

~~FOUO~~

FILE COPY

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ME  
025

June 14, 2005

000-3

TO: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Religion at the Air Force Academy

Please get your head into this issue on the handling of religion at the Air Force Academy, and get back to me on it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
061305-4

.....  
Please respond by 7/14/05

14 JUN 05

*DR* 7/19

Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/n  
LT Col Lenzel

JUL 19 2005

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20319-05

19 JUL 05

11-L-0559/OSD/52910


July 19, 2005

*OSD*  
*7/19*

000.3

To: SECDEF

Fr: Gordon England



Subj: Religion at the Air Force Academy

Don,

- In my judgment, we have taken the right first steps to handle this issue.
- The new Superintendent, new Deputy and the new Commandant to take over this fall are part of the long-term solution.
- Senior Air Force has taken appropriate corrective actions, and these actions appear to have contained outside criticism. This subject is no longer in the press or on the airwaves.
- At this time, I recommend that we let the corrective actions take hold along with the new leadership at the Academy.

Gordon

OSD 20319-05

19 JUL 0

11-L-0559/OSD/52911

F000

June 13, 2005



000, 5

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: al Qaeda Members captured in California

I need someone to fill me in on the al-Qaeda members that were captured in California, and how important they may or may not be.

Thanks.

DIR:ss  
061305-1

.....  
Please respond by 6/23/05

13 JUN 05

F000

11-L-0559/OSD/52912

OSD 20320-05

JUN 13 2005



383.6

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Detainee Briefing

We need to find a way to get the Detainee briefing out to a lot of people, so they have that information. I think it needs to be sent out as a cable by the State Department.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
060905-31 (TS)

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_ 105

6/16 *DR*  
6/17  
Sec def -  
It ~~will~~ <sup>will be</sup> broadly

distro'd on all our  
lists (~~thousands~~ thousands).

I'll work with State on  
a cable. I sent it to

~~FOUO~~ State already. ~~State~~

We will do a broad distribution  
on the Hill, too.

13 JUN 05

*Di Rita*



JUN 13 2005

TO: *Dr/Col Bucci*  
~~ADM J.D. Stavridis~~  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*  
 SUBJECT: Request by Kristin Devold

Kristin Devold wants us to take a Norwegian soldier who was shot in Afghanistan and had been injured for two years, and see if our top diagnostic people can do anything for him.

Please see me about it.

Thanks.

DIR:ss  
 060905-25 (TS)

.....  
 Please respond by 6/16/05

*TD sec Def*

*Sir*

*The latest*

*KR: Dr. B*

*DL  
6/27*

*701*

*13 Jun 05*

27 June 2005

OK  
4/27

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Helping the wounded Norwegian Soldier

Sir,

We have received information from the Norwegian MOD folks stating that the MOD wishes to delay her formal request for US help. Bottom line is that she apparently asked you a little too soon. The details are attached.

I will continue to monitor until it is resolved.

V/R, Dr. B

11-L-0559/OSD/52915

Follow-on med rehab for (b)(6)

Update:

The Norwegian MOD Personnel Department caseworker for the (b)(6) rehab case called. According to her, the MOD desires to slow down the formal request process for action until later this year.

The stated reason that the request for the delay is the following:

- a. No one has yet even contacted (b)(6) to see if he desires to be treated in the USA.
- b. Norwegian Surgeon General's office is coordinating English translation of (b)(6) medical records with 3 different Norwegian hospitals which will take an estimated 2-3 months for completion.
- c. No determination has yet been made by Norwegian military/civilian medical authorities if follow-on treatment outside Norway is even warranted.
- d. Norwegian medical authorities cannot estimate the eventual specific US-provided rehab requirement (spine/renal/gastro) until his case is evaluated in its entirety by the appropriate Norwegian medical authorities.

Norwegian Surgeon General has stated that he would prefer to have the time to review the case, consider Nordic rehab options for follow-on treatment amongst Nordic medical institutions and, failing there, conduct a medical teleconference with US medical authorities to review the case (to determine availability/capability for treatment) prior to any eventual US rehab for (b)(6)

The overall feeling is to delay the formal request until such time that it is actually deemed necessary.

We go into the wait mode until such time that an MOD rep formally requests the assistance.

JUN 13 2005

UZBEKISTAN

TO: Dan Stanley  
CC: MG Mike Maples  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article on Uzbekistan

**This letter from the Senators is filled with inaccuracies. Please get with the Joint Staff and figure out how we handle it.**

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/9/05 London FT article

DHR:ss  
060903-18 (TS)

.....  
Please respond by 6/23/05

OSD 20323-05

JUN 13 ENTU

*CM*

11-L-0559/OSD/52917

13 JUN 05

In his brief remarks, Bush provided little more than an economic nod. "And, finally, we discussed the domestic issues. We discussed our economies. And the prime minister reminded me that the -- in his judgment, Turkey is a good place for U.S. investment."

#### US senators ask for UN action in Uzbekistan

Financial Times

Demetri Sevastopulo

9 June 2005

A bipartisan group of senators on Wednesday asked the Bush administration to consider whether the US could take action via the United Nations if Uzbekistan does not allow an independent investigation into last month's massacre at Andijan.

In a letter to the Bush administration, four Republican senators - John McCain, Lindsey Graham, John Sununu and Mike DeWine - and two Democrats - Patrick Leahy and Joseph Biden - said the US should reconsider its relationship with Uzbekistan in light of the May 13 massacre, in which hundreds of civilians were reportedly killed by Uzbek forces.

"Particularly after freedom's advances in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, we believe that the United States must be careful about being too closely associated with a government that has killed hundreds of demonstrators and refused international calls for a transparent investigation," the senators wrote.

The US, which has boosted military cooperation with Uzbekistan since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, is currently considering transforming a temporary military base into a permanent installment. Some State Department officials, however, believe the US should distance itself from the regime of President Islam Karimov to avoid the appearance that the US is supporting some undemocratic countries while urging for the spread of democracy in others.

In the letter to Donald Rumsfeld, defence secretary, and Condoleezza Rice, secretary of state, the senators ask whether the administration knows which Uzbek forces participated in the crackdown and whether any received US military training. US-based human rights investigators are looking into allegations that US-trained Uzbek forces may have participated in the massacre. The Pentagon last week said they had no evidence to substantiate those claims.

The senators also urged the Bush administration to consider the repercussions of building a permanent base in Uzbekistan, and asked whether the US is exploring alternative military facilities in neighbouring countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in order to provide the US with more flexibility to alter its relationship with Uzbekistan.

"We appreciate that these are difficult questions that cut to the heart of our relationship with the government in this strategically important region," the senators wrote. "But we also believe that, in the aftermath of the Andijan massacre, America's relationship with Uzbekistan cannot remain unchanged."

Human Rights Watch this week called on the Bush administration to halt negotiations with Uzbekistan about a permanent military base. In a report on the crackdown, the group argues that most of the people killed were not Islamic terrorist as the Uzbek government alleges but in fact civilian protesters.

"The Uzbek authorities are trying to whitewash this massacre," said Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch.

## EUROPE/CENTRAL ASIA

Bush Praises Turkey, Offers Ally **Little More**

Jim VandeHei

Washington Post

9 June 2005

President Bush praised Turkey yesterday as a close, democratic ally in the Middle East but stopped short of meeting Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's plea for greater U.S. assistance to defeat a Turkish terrorist group operating out of northern Iraq.

Erdogan, whose country is considered the United States' closest Muslim ally, came to Washington seeking more help from the Bush administration in cracking down on a rebel group -- called the Kurdistan Workers' Party -- that has killed hundreds of Turkish troops in recent attacks. After meeting with Bush, Erdogan told reporters the president expressed concern about the terrorist groups but promised little in terms of new assistance to cut off the group's logistics and financing.

"We are exchanging information," Erdogan said. "However, we don't think it is sufficient. We want [the cooperation] to be taken further." He said Bush's priority is getting the new Iraqi government in place before shifting attention to other problems.

White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Bush is committed to defeating the Turkish rebel group and other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq. "There are a number of challenges we continue to face in Iraq, and the president talked about that," he told reporters. "This is one area where we will continue working with Turkey and the transitional government in Iraq to address."

At a short, joint appearance after their meeting, Bush did not mention the Turkish terrorist threat, instead paying tribute to Turkey's democracy and role in finding peace in the broader Middle East. "We've had an extensive visit about a lot of issues," Bush said. "And the reason why is because Turkey and the United States has an important strategic relationship." Bush did not allow for any questions from the media.

More Turkish troops have been killed by the rebel group in recent months than U.S. troops have been killed in Iraq. The Kurdish Workers' Party uses many of the same techniques the insurgents battling U.S. troops and Iraqis employ, including explosive devices detonated by remote control.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship was strained over the Iraq war, especially the 2003 decision by the Turkish Parliament to deny U.S. troops the ability to attack Iraq from its border. Pentagon officials still complain that Turkey's decision hampered the U.S. plan to quickly topple Saddam Hussein and capture or kill members of his Baathist Party.

"We will continue to have the same kind of solidarity we've had in Turkish-U.S. relations in the past and the future, as well," Erdogan said after he left the White House. "Our strategic relationship will move and take place in the future as it has been done in the past."

Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), speaking on the floor, said Erdogan should "move beyond recent tensions" with the United States and stamp out anti-American passions in his country. "The first step is for Prime Minister Erdogan to speak clearly in defense of our partnership and to dispel a wave of anti-Americanism that runs counter to the last five decades of cooperation," Frist said.

JUN 13 2005

337 DNI

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo from DNI

Please take a look at this memo from DNI and tell me what you think it says, and what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/2/05 Memo 60m DNI

DHR:ss  
060905-6 (TS)

.....  
Please respond by 6/23/05

OSD 20324-05

JUN 13 2005

*ERD*

13 JUN 05

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511all  
6/10

June 2, 2005

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Secretary of Energy  
The Secretary of Homeland Security  
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency  
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs Staff

**SUBJECT:** Intelligence Community Meeting Schedule

A key mechanism for my leadership of the Intelligence Community will be regular gatherings of senior Community officials. These meetings will provide opportunities for General Hayden and me to discuss with departmental and agency leaders the key issues we face as consumers and producers of intelligence. Of equal import, convening intelligence leaders on a regular basis will allow us to work closely in building up the Intelligence Community by addressing difficult collection and analytical issues; simultaneously, the meetings will ensure that you and your representatives are kept well informed of the developments across the Community, thereby strengthening the sinews of the Intelligence Community as a unified whole.

The proposed schedule includes four levels of meetings:

- **Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC):** I will chair this statutory Council comprising the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and the Attorney General. Depending on the agenda topics, additional Cabinet-level members may be asked to attend. The Council will provide a venue to discuss high-level issues of concern to Cabinet-level participants, including budgetary matters, and will meet at least twice yearly.
- **JICC Deputies:** General Hayden will chair this quarterly gathering of deputies to JICC members. I view the meeting of JICC Deputies to be critical to ensuring the Intelligence Community functions as a well-integrated and efficient enterprise. A JICC Deputies session will precede all JICC meetings. As necessary, a Deputies session will follow JICC meetings to gauge progress towards goals set.
- **Program Managers:** General Hayden will chair this bi-monthly meeting of the heads of NSA, NGA, NRO, DIA, CIA, and FBI. This will be a continuation of the former DCI-led Program Managers meeting, with the critical addition of the FBI as a regular

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A-192

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

participant. In addition to these "in person" meetings, General Hayden plans on holding video teleconferences with the same group on intervening weeks.

- *Intelligence Community Leadership Committee:* General Hayden will chair this expanded version of the Program Managers meeting; the Committee will include representatives of all 15 agencies or elements in the Intelligence Community, and meetings will take the place of every fourth Program Managers meeting.

Please find attached the proposed schedule of Intelligence Community meetings for the coming year. I would be happy to discuss the scheduling or format of these meetings. I will also ensure that we incorporate your input to the meeting agendas in order to be more effective in addressing Intelligence Community issues of concern to you. Please do not hesitate to contact General Hayden or me.

  
John D. Negroponte

Attachment: Meeting Schedule

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

**SUBJECT: Intelligence Community Meeting Schedule**

**External Distribution:**

- 1 - The Secretary of State
- 1 - The Secretary of the Treasury
- 1 - The Secretary of Defense
- 1 - The Attorney General
- 1 - The Secretary of Energy
- 1 - The Secretary of Homeland Security
- 1 - Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
- 1 - Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- 1 - Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

**Internal Distribution: DNI 2005**

- 1 - PDDNI (Gen. Hayden)
- 1 - Chief of Staff (Mr. Shedd)
- 1 - DNI Executive Secretariat

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

**PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MEETING SCHEDULE**

*All meetings are on Mondays from 2 pm – 3 pm unless otherwise noted*

*Meeting agenda will be distributed by approximately noon the Thursday prior*

**Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC)**

Monday, July 25  
Monday, September 26  
Monday, March 20

**JICC Deputies**

Monday, August 29  
Monday, November 21  
Monday, February 6

**Program Managers**

Monday, June 13  
Monday, July 11  
Monday, July 25  
Monday, August 8  
Tuesday, September 6 (Monday is a holiday)  
Monday, September 19  
Monday, October 3  
Monday, October 31  
Monday, November 14  
Monday, November 28  
Monday, December 19  
Tuesday, January 3 (Monday is a holiday; prior week is Christmas)  
Tuesday, January 17 (Monday is a holiday)  
Monday, February 13  
Monday, February 27  
Monday, March 13  
Monday, April 10  
Monday, April 24  
Monday, May 8

*— Program Managers' VTC will be held on weeks in which there is no scheduled meeting —*

**Intelligence Community Leadership Committee**

Tuesday, June 28  
Monday, August 22  
Monday, October 17  
Monday, December 12  
Monday, January 30  
Monday, March 27  
Monday, May 22

FOUO

June 7, 2005

580

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Use of DoD Aircraft



I am not comfortable with this note from Paul Butler on MilAir. I would like to see what actually has been done on it in a given year - who has used it, for what, with whom, and costs.

Thanks.

Attach.  
4/25/05 Memo from ExecSec to SecDef  
4/21/05 Memo from Paul Butler to SecDef

DHR:as  
060705-30 (13)

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

FOUO

OSD 20326-05

JUN 07 ENT'D

501105

11-L-0559/OSD/52925

B

MTG

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

4/27  
C. V.

To SecDef  
From Paul Butler

Sr -

Procedures on use of MilAir.

I have discussed this with ExecSec and I do not think there is any problem here. ExecSec vets these requests carefully and compares costs of MilAir against flying Commercial and that all of these regs are followed carefully.

Also, the IG has withdrawn his MilAir request for the trip to Germany.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 APR 25 PM 3:38 APR 25 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: CAPTAIN WILLIAM P. MARRIOTT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*WPM* 4/25

SUBJECT Eligible Passengers for Use of DoD Aircraft

- DoD Civilians and Uniformed Service members are eligible to use DoD aircraft in accordance with DoD Directive 4515.13R
- Additionally, DoD Directive 4500.56 defines policy for the use of military aircraft for transportation by DoD senior officials (general or flag officers and members of the Senior Executive Service)
  - o In general, use of military aircraft for transportation is limited to those circumstances where is it either cost effective, required for operational considerations (i.e. classified meetings, secure communication), or commercial service is not available (i.e. travel within war zones). Specifically, military aircraft are not to be used if commercial aircraft are available to meet travel requirements within a 24-hour period of the departure/arrival requirements
  - o The process to secure military aircraft for transportation includes a formal, written request (signed by the senior traveler), approval by the Executive Secretary (Secretary of Defense's designee per 4500.56), and tasking to the appropriate agency to provide the support (AF DV aircraft, Director of Joint Staff, etc.)
- Non-DoD members are also eligible to use DoD aircraft for transportation
  - o Under the provisions of the Economy Act, other federal agencies may request the use of military aircraft on a reimbursable basis (i.e. another Cabinet member may use DoD DV aircraft)
  - o The White House may direct the use of military aircraft for specific missions (i.e. Secretary of State movements)
  - o Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense may authorize an exception to policy (i.e. President Karzai's support within Afghanistan)



Prepared by Col Bill Erikson, OSD/EXECSEC (b)(6)

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD	4/27	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	4/25	1750	
ESR MA			

OSD 07739-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52927

FILE COPY

June 7, 2005

0993

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
 CC: Doug Feith  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Meeting with MODs of Central America

My impression is this April 7 memo I sent to Doug Feith has dropped of the radar. I don't see that anything has been done on it.

I think MOD Breve's suggestion was a good *ope*, and I think we need to go forward on it. What do I have to do to get something to happen?

Thanks.

Attach  
 4/7/05 SecDef Memo to Doug Feith

6/10

DIR:sa  
 060705-29 (TS)

.....  
 Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Update next under.*

*I'll have a complete decision concept for your approval Monday, 13 June.*

FOUO

V/R

OSD 20328-05

7 JUN 05

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

USD(P) \_\_\_\_\_

I-05/004910-ES

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Meeting with Central America Ministers of Defense

- You asked about progress of the meeting for the Central American MODs (Tab A).
- Based on your guidance in our recent conversation, we are setting up an October or November event that gathers the 5 CAFTA states plus Belize and Panama.
  - o The event includes a working group in Williamsburg, VA, plus visits to Joint Forces Command and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.
  - o The agenda includes: interoperability, peacekeeping, the regional security strategy, coordinating law enforcement and military, gangs, air interdiction, cooperation with Colombia, and regional threats (e.g. Venezuela).
- We are still sorting out logistical details with the Central Americans.
  - o Next week you will have a decision memo to approve the overall concept—you will have the option of hosting the Ministers at the Pentagon or in Florida, supported by SOUTHCOM.
- DASD Pardo-Maurer has been invited to meet with all the MODs in Guatemala, on June 30, to celebrate Guatemala's Armed Forces day.
  - o We hope to use this opportunity to ~~fill~~ firm up the substantive agenda and present invitations to the Ministers.

COORDINATION: N/A

Attachment: As stated

April 7, 2005.

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Defense Ministers of Central America


I agree with MoD Breve's attached suggestion that we have another meeting of the Defense Ministers of Central America, possibly here in Washington if we could get them all to come up.

Please have Peter Rodman and Roger Pardo-Maurer pull something together for a proposal: find a convenient date and do something nice for them, maybe even have a reception of some kind.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/29/05 Honduran MoD ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
040705-23



.....  
Please respond by 4/28/05



*off  
4/1*

INFORMACION DE DISTRIBUCION				
SECRETARIA	DEFENSA	ESTADO	COMANDO EN JEFE	UNIDAD
USA	USA	USA	USA	USA



*Secretaría de Estado en el Despacho de Defensa Nacional*  
**REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS**

**S.D.N. Oficio No. 0275-005**

March 29, 2005

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Considering our mutual interest in pursuing change in the traditional global concept of security, I felt it was appropriate to share the latest experience I had at the recent hemispheric security strategy symposium co-hosted by SOUTHCOM, the U.S. Army War College, and Florida International University. General Craddock, Dr. Max Mainwaring and Professor Eduardo Gamarra provided an excellent forum for discussing new approaches to security and defense in the hemisphere. I would even go so far as to see we are setting the example for other regional coalitions that may prove useful in other areas of the world, such as Eastern Europe and Africa.

As you know, Honduras has been leading regional efforts to modernize and sustain forces to better address emerging threats such as narco-terrorism and illicit trafficking in Central America. I have enclosed a copy of my keynote address, where I mentioned some of the practical steps we are taking on all operational fronts, such as maritime operations, airspace control, and most recently, the regional Rapid Reaction Force agreed to by the Presidents at their last SICA (System for Central America Integration) summit meeting held on February 1st in Honduras.

*of*

I would dare say that another meeting of the Defense Ministers of the Central American countries with you could prove very valuable to capitalize on these efforts of regional collaboration and integration, paving the way to move beyond the theoretical realm into a practical operational one. We need to continue the group momentum we achieved at last year's Defense Ministerial in Quito, Ecuador. I look forward to hearing your thoughts for the road ahead.

Sincerely,



**FEDERICO BREVE TRAVIESO**  
 Minister of Defense

Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld  
 Secretary of Defense de  
 Estados Unidos de América

June 7, 2005

Frax

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Dan Stanley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT ~~Washington~~ Post Article quoting Curt Weldon

Let's find out if Curt Weldon actually made the remark attributed to him in the attached *Washington Post* article (about Rumsfeld and others misleading Americans about Iraq). That is typical of Biden, but not Weldon. Someone ought to talk to him.

Thanks.

Attach  
 6/5/05 *Washington Post* article "Bush's Optimism on Iraq Debated"

DHR:as **A**  
 060705-5 (TS)

.....  
 Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 20331-05

JUN 07 ENTD

7 JUN 05

Washington Post  
June 5, 2005  
Pg. 1

## Bush's Optimism On Iraq Debated

### *Rosy View in Time Of Rising Violence Revives Criticism*

By Jim VandeHei and Peter Baker, Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush's portrayal of a wilting insurgency in Iraq at a time of escalating violence and insecurity throughout the country is reviving the debate over the administration's Iraq strategy and the accuracy of its upbeat claims.

While Bush and Vice President Cheney offer optimistic assessments of the situation, a fresh wave of car bombings and other attacks killed 80 U.S. soldiers and more than 700 Iraqis last month alone and prompted Iraqi leaders to appeal to the administration for greater help. Privately, some administration officials have concluded the violence will not subside through this year.

The disconnect between Rose Garden optimism and Baghdad pessimism, according to government officials and independent analysts, stems not only from Bush's focus on tentative signs of long-term progress but also from the shrinking range of policy options available to him if he is wrong. Having set out on a course of trying to stand up a new constitutional, elected government with the security firepower to defend itself, Bush finds himself locked into a strategy that, even if it proves successful, foreshadows many more deadly months to come first, analysts said.

Military commanders in Iraq privately told a visiting congressional delegation last week that the United States is at least two years away from adequately training a viable Iraqi military but that it is no longer reasonable to consider augmenting U.S. troops already strained by the two-year operation, said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.). "The idea that the insurgents are on the run and we are about to turn the corner, I did not hear that from anybody," Biden said in an interview.

Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), who joined Biden for part of the trip, said Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and others are misleading Americans about the number of functional Iraqi troops and warned the president to pay more attention to shutting off Syrian and Iranian assistance to the insurgency. "We don't want to raise the expectations of the American people prematurely," he said.

After dialing down criticism of Bush's policy following the successful January elections in Iraq, congressional Democrats are increasingly challenging the president's decisions and public assessments, and developing alternative policy ideas. "The administration has failed to level with the American people," said Senate Minority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.). "It's terrible because they refuse to provide a full picture of what is really happening there."

Reid traveled to Iraq in April and was confined to heavily fortified zones in and around Baghdad and prohibited from visiting some of the most troubled areas where the insurgency is particularly strong. "The place is in turmoil," he said. Since then, Reid said, he has been meeting with former Clinton administration officials in an effort to devise a new Iraq plan, including the possibility of calling for more U.S. troops and questing additional international assistance.

The White House says the focus on recent killings overshadows substantial 10%-term progress in Iraq,

where the January elections allowed the United States to turn over more control for security to the Iraqis and set the stage for a new constitution to be written and approved this fall. Once that happens, White House officials say, a democratically elected Iraqi government protected by a better trained and equipped Iraqi military will hold off what remains of the insurgency and gradually allow U.S. forces to withdraw. Iraq's recent decision to put 40,000 troops around Baghdad, the most ambitious military move yet by the two-month-old government, proves that the U.S. plan to eventually turn over peacekeeping duties is not only viable, but working, White House officials maintain, Bush and Cheney, however, continue to decline to set deadlines for how long U.S. troops will remain.

"I am pleased that in less than a year's time, there's a democratically elected government in Iraq, there are thousands of Iraq soldiers trained and better equipped to fight for their own country [and] that our strategy is very clear," Bush said during a Rose Garden news conference Tuesday. Overall, he said, "I'm pleased with the progress." Cheney offered an even more hopeful assessment during a CNN interview aired the night before, saying the insurgency was in its "last throes."

Several Republicans questioned that evaluation. "I cannot say with any confidence that that is accurate," said Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio), a member of the House International Relations Committee. "I think it's impossible to know how close we are to the insurgency being overcome."

It is not unusual for a president to put the most positive spin possible on U.S. policy, especially during a time of armed conflict when public support is crucial. But the administration's assertions about Iraq have been a source of controversy since the earliest days of the operation, from the insistence that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction to Cheney's claim of links between Iraq and al Qaeda to the rosy forecasts about how welcome U.S. troops would be.

A poll conducted last month by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that only 37 percent of those surveyed approved of Bush's Iraq policy, while the number of people telling pollsters the war was not worth the cost has been rising in recent months.

"We are just paying a heavy price for mistakes made before," said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.).

"It's dangerous when U.S. officials start to believe their own propaganda," said David L. Phillips, a former State Department consultant who worked on Iraq planning but quit in frustration in 2003 and has written a book called "Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco." "I have no doubt that they genuinely think that Iraq is a smashing success and a milestone in their forward freedom strategy. But if you ask Iraqis, they have a different opinion."

Phillips added that U.S. officials keep pointing to landmarks such as the January elections as turning points but "at no point have any of these milestones proven to be breakthroughs."

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari last week lobbied Cheney and others for a more assertive U.S. military approach in Iraq, as well as for more help meeting the fall deadline for writing and approving a constitution. But even that carries risks. "Heavy-handed meddling by the Bush administration only undermines Iraq's new political leaders," Phillips said.

Peter Khalil, a former national security policy adviser for the Coalition Provisional Authority that ruled Iraq after Hussein's fall, said the rosy views expressed by Bush and Cheney reflect tentative hopes for progress down the road rather than a focus on day-to-day events at the moment. "They're thinking more long term when they make such optimistic remarks," said Khalil, now a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. "There's some cause for optimism; however, things could turn badly very quickly."

Major Sunni leaders recently agreed to abandon their boycott of the political process; if they can be brought into the drafting of a new constitution and subsequent elections, Khalil and others say, it would undercut the elements of the insurgency that are powered by disaffection among the once-ruling Sunni minority. To do that, Khalil said, the new Shiite-led Iraqi government has to find the right balance in terms of including former members of Hussein's Sunni-dominated Baath Party.

"If you address these issues, it's very, very difficult to see them continue on in the use of violence because they become part of that [governing] structure," Khalil said.

A Western diplomat in Baghdad said victory would have to be won in a drawn-out struggle that will have peaks and valleys. "We should not expect some big-bang breakthrough so that one day the insurgency ends," he said on the condition of anonymity. "We should expect a long grind-it-out." After all, he said, "this is the hardest thing we've done to try to rebuild a state almost from zero."

"If you pull back far enough," he added, "you see a positive trend. . . . The negative is we've had some really spectacular car bombs, really gruesome car bombs and we've had a terrible civilian death toll. . . . The overall trend lines for the last six to seven months are better, but not so much better that we can say it's over or we won."

McCain said Bush needs to carefully balance his reassuring statements to a troubled nation with frank talk about the arduous and unpredictable future. "It's a long, hard struggle and very gradually maybe we are making progress," McCain said. "There are tough times ahead."

FOUO

June 7, 2005

To: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: *NY Times* Article

What is this *NY Times* article regarding the restrictions on the Intelligence Chief about?

Thanks.

Attach:  
5/26/05 *NY Times* Article "Panel Backs Restriction on Intelligence Chief"

DR:cm  
060708-4 (7/9)

\*\*\*\*\*  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*040  
NF*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20333-05

JUN 09 ENTD

*7 JUN 05*

11-L-0559/OSD/52936

*AT*

New York Times  
May 26, 2005

## Panel Backs Restriction On Intelligence Chief

By Douglas Jehl

WASHINGTON, May 25 - Against opposition from Democrats and the White House, Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee have approved legislation **limiting** the authority of the new director of national intelligence to transfer personnel from one agency to another.

The measure **was** described by Republican proponents as an effort to insulate the Defense Department from changes dictated by the new director. It **was** strongly opposed by Democrats, who said it would essentially provide the Pentagon with veto power over personnel moves essential to the success of the country's new intelligence architecture.

Representative Jane Harman of California, the ranking Democrat on the panel, said in an interview that she would press for a reversal of the change. Ms. Harman said the measure represented "the first **big** test" of the authority wielded by John D. Negroponte, who took office last month as the new intelligence chief.

The measure was identical to one set aside last week by the House Armed Services Committee after opposition from the White House and from Mr. Negroponte and his deputy, Gen. Michael V. Hayden of the Air Force. It was revived Tuesday by Representative Peter Hoekstra, the Michigan Republican who heads the Intelligence Committee, and approved on a party-line vote.

In a telephone interview Wednesday, Mr. Hoekstra said White House officials had stated their concerns, but he said he and other Republicans felt obliged to address "legitimate concerns" by Representative Duncan Hunter, a California Republican and head of the Armed Services Committee, that "the **scope** of the Defense Department **is** protected."

An official authorized to **speak** for **Mr. Negroponte's** office said: "We have not seen the amendment, but **are** aware of the proposal. We would be concerned with any legislation that undercuts the letter and spirit of the intelligence reform **bill** passed only **a few months ago.**"

The official said that current law allowed the intelligence **chief, after** consulting with Congress and with **approval** of the Office of Management and Budget, to transfer up to 100 personnel **from** agencies in the intelligence community to any newly established national intelligence center. "We support the current law," the **official said.**

Under the changes approved **by** the Intelligence Committee, the intelligence chief would be prohibited from making such **transfers** unless he first provided the appropriate Congressional committees with a detailed accounting **of his** reasons and received **a** response from them.

FOUO

June 6, 2005

4220

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Response to Washington Post on Marine Vest Issue

Did you ever write a correction to the Washington Post on this marine vest issue?

Thanks.

**Attach.**

5/10/05 SecDef Memo to SecNav  
 6/03/05 DSD Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss  
 060305-6(TS)

.....  
 Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

FOUO

OSD 20335-05

6 JUN 05

11-L-0559/OSD/52939

~~FOUO~~

May 10, 2005

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld %  
SUBJECT: Marine Vest Issue

Please get back to me on the Marine vest issue. I don't accept what I am hearing.  
I think there may be more to it. You ought to push and probe hard and FAST.

Thanks.

Attach  
5/10/05 Washington Post Article

DHE:m  
051005-24

.....  
Please respond by 6/26/05

Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/m  
Lt Col Lengyel  
3 Jun 05

FOUO

A76-3  
OSD 11227-05

INFO MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*[Handwritten signature]*  
6-3

- Of the 181,000 OTVs fielded to Fleet Marine Forces, eleven lots (totaling 5,277 vests) received ballistic waivers for the 9mm contract requirement. These waivers, developed in concert with Army Natick engineers, ensured that the subject lots were still clearly capable of defeating standard 9mm pistol bullets and provided the required protection from shrapnel and fragmentation.
- The decision to waive these lots was made so that deploying Marines fielded the best available individual protective equipment. OTVs, to include those lots subject to the ballistic waiver, were a significant improvement in protection from the outdated Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) flak jacket they replaced. The OTV system, which consists of the vest and Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) plates, provided protection from assault rifle rounds.
- The decision to recall the waived lots occurred one year after Marines redeployed with the OTVs to Iraq in Spring 2004. The OTVs proved highly effective in protecting Marines, but the Marine Corps knew an unfavorable article was forthcoming and recalled the subject lots to remove any doubts that the article might create in the minds of Marines in combat.
- I believe the right actions were taken to provide the best equipment to our Marines and Sailors going in harm's way. I am available to discuss this issue further at your convenience.

A-76

TO: Lt Col Lengyel

From: Lt Col Nagel



HOMELAND DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

ACTION MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECY OF DEFENSE  
2005 OCT 11 11 43 AM '05  
DepSecDef  
USD(P) OCT 13 2005  
I-05/012708-ES  
ES-4266  
Peter F. Verga  
Principal Deputy

11 OCT 2005

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

SUBJECT: Meeting Idea

- In the memo at TAB A, you asked me to review a proposal from former Speaker Newt Gingrich for a meeting between the President, DoD, and members of the Louisiana Congressional delegation regarding how, within the context of the BRAC, "the DoD investment [in the state of Louisiana] could be increased."
- In its procurements, generally DoD is obligated to use competitive procedures. Absent new legislative authority, DoD cannot limit competition or provide preferences to companies within the disaster areas.
- The President approved the BRAC's recommendations and forwarded them to Congress on September 15, 2005. Under the legislation establishing the Commission, the Department cannot change the recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION: The proposed meeting should not occur because the Department does not have the authority to increase its investment.

SecDef Decision:

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Bryan, OASD(HD)/FP&E, (b)(6)

323.3

11 OCT 05

21 SEP 05

12-13-05 12:03:11  
OSD 20348-05

11-L-05506 SD/52943

10-11-05 P12:03 IN

~~FOUO~~

323.3

SEP 21 2005  
I-05/012708  
ES-4266

**TO:** Paul McHale  
**CC:** Eric Edelman  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Meeting Idea

Please take a look at the attached e-mail from Newt Gingrich and tell me if you think a meeting like the one he proposes in item #3 is something we ought to think about.

Thanks.

Attach: 9/9/05 E-Mail from Newt Gingrich

DHR:ss  
091905-40

.....  
*Please Respond By September 28, 2005*

21 SEP 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20348-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52944

(b)(6)

CIV. OSD

From: Thirdwave2 [thirdwave2@speakingingrich.com]  
Sent: Friday, September 09, 2005 7:27 AM  
To: (b)(6) @OSD.Mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil  
Cc: (b)(6) Giambastiani, SP, ADML VCJCS; peter.pace@jc.pentagon.mil;  
james.stavridis@osd.mil; frank.helmick@us.army.mil  
Subject: two good ideas, new!

Note the second idea about dod and new Orleans  
If only as a morale builder it might be a good meeting to have new!

Please use my new email address Thirdwave2@speakingingrich.com

New!

Original Message-----  
From: James Farwell [mailto:(b)(6)]  
Sent: Friday, September 09, 2005 5:21 AM  
To: James Farwell; Thirdwave2; Livingston, Robert; Vince Haley  
Cc: ndesmond@mindspring.com; revans@mckennalong.com; Robert Egge; Jim Frogue; Albert Hanser; Rick Tyler; balders@tampabay.az.com; edamuth@aai.org; Sforstchen@montreal.edu; ed.feulner@heritage.org; John Barry; C.H. Forgotston; jpeiss@reisscompanies.com; Ron Faucheux; Madhu.Beriwal@ieminc.com; dbe@ensenat.com; (b)(6) John Breaux; ivor@hurricane.lsu.edu; andres@dpz.com; lizz@dpz.com; fmoelure@sonnenschein.com; gunder@ncc@graystonegg.com; Partners; Candienne, Martin; Johnson, Chris; Ernest, Harvey; BDupuy@nrahq.org; (b)(6) Kyle\_Ruckert@vitter.senate.gov; Mike Huckabee  
Subject: Re: s moving to recovery

Additional notes to think about:

1. As to the potential toxicology problem, the EPA should do a baseline study of stagnant flood waters to ascertain their composition and to provide data for health recommendations. We need to know what is in the water and what should be done to protect public safety.

2. Concrete steps to replace housing stock suggest two broad aspects to consider:

First let's reach out nationally and internationally for innovative urban design to make rebuilt neighborhoods a showcase and avoid shantytown construction that one may be tempted to throw up for workers coming back to do physical rebuilding. Let's do this right, with a view to the future. The St. Thomas redevelopment offers one model but there should be others. While we want to reach out, we are also loaded with talent at home. Grwar Mouton in New Orle — has become an influential advisor to China for design and historic preservation and he is just one example. We have many others.

Those of us from here like of NOLA as the Paris of the Americas. Let's make this a garden city. Whatever differences may have emerged between the US and France or Spain over foreign policy, New Orleans is proud of its French and Spanish heritage and that offers unique opportunities to allow it to shine as a cosmopolitan city by strengthening those historic cultural ties. That our economy relies heavily on tourism and hospitality underscores this imperative.

Second, low interest loans for rebuilding housing stock will draw citizens back.

3. Our largest employer is the Department of Defense. Our Congressional delegation which makes up in high talent for what as a newer group it lacks in seniority, should jointly meet with the President to determine how DoD investment can be increased. We are intensely proud to host our military and they represent a core strength to build on and as the President considers the BRAC recommendations and NOW is the time to move swiftly on this.

4. On Mardi Gras, just to be clear, the reason to minimize the role of public officials is not a criticism of them, but merely a recognition that Mardi Gras is historically a private party thrown for the public, in which participation comes from every part of our society. Let's broaden participation but keep it in the private sector as much as

possible.

with hope.

JPF

--- Original Message ---

From: "James Farwell" <(b)(6)>  
 Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2005 03:30:33  
 To: "Newt Gingrich" <Robert">  
 <v: on l /ingsto gro pdc.com ; Vince La y' <vhaley@aol.org>  
 cc: ndesmond@mindspring.com; zevans@mckenzalong.com; I JG  
 gg: i g i d com>; "Jim F. " JF: @ i c i g Hanser"  
 (hnt: c :. (c) Tyler"  
 k'y @ n org>; ld rr.com; cdemuth@aol.org; BForstchen@montreat.edu; ed.f  
 eulner@heri org; "James Farwell" dldl ll l t ; "John B y"  
 -JVbac } "( on  
 kfi: r s >rel c y i ie  
 rf } Beriwal@ieminc ; i B  
 re  
 <jbreaux@pattonboggs.com>; ivor@hurricane.lsu.edu; andrea@dpz.com; lizzedpz.com; fuclure  
 r h i c u/g ler @g y t gp c ; "P t s"  
 <Partners@livingstongroupdc.com>; "Candienne, Martin"  
 <mcandienne@livingstongroupdc.com 'Johnsen i j  
 Harvey"  
 <harvey@ERIVERGROUP.com>; SDupuy@rahq.org; (b)(6) Kyle\_Rucker@vitter.senate.go

Subject: : moving to recovery

Much of the conversation over how we stand New Orleans on its feet again is too focused in bureaucracy. I spent the day in the city as a volunteer helping to feed the police. Their performance and bravery under extreme adverse conditions commands respect.

But the legislation considered by Congress to aid recovery is too focused on funding FEMA rather than the broader effort to rebuild.

Ron Faucheux and I believe there should be additional efforts and dollars focused on providing meaningful incentives that inspire citizens to return, rebuild and reinvest.. Do not presume that will happen automatically.

We propose a series of initiatives that would lift spirits and promote cohesion.. The energy companies have now left. Banks are moving white-collar jobs in backroom operations to other cities. The tourist industry will take time to revive. All this in a place that I grew up in and love -- and which today, spiritually and physically seemed to be a different country. I felt like a stranger.

we propose:

1. A property tax holiday of two years, with the federal government to fully reimburse all tax recipient government bodies at pre-Katrina assessment levels. we must reassure property owners that their homes have value. What is that value today? Who knows. It will require time to establish a fair value that reflects remotely objective standards. This approach puts federal dollars towards concrete incentives to return while buying time to allow values to find a balance in the market-place.
- Any attempt to reassess in the currnt uncertain atmosphere would trigger litigation that ties up local government revenue for many years.
2. A state and federal tax holiday of two years on employment taxes. Such taxes make no sense anyway because they tax people on the good things they do -- creating jobs. our film industry has thrived by offering tax incentives and we prosper as a community as it flourishes. Give people solid financial reasons to come back.
3. A two year holiday on sales taxes with the federal government to reimburse state and local government for the full revenue loss pegged to pre-Katrina levels. This would stabilize revnues, help people and build confidence for einvestment.

4. We have discussed on these exchanges the need to concretely and realistically address coastal erosion and the desire of the Mississippi to follow a different course. Failure to do that leaves the whole region irresponsibly vulnerable to the next big storm.

Newt has suggested looking at the Dutch experience and we should. The 2050 plan merits close consideration.

5. Newt has responded to concerns that I have raised about the environmental impact of mold, mildew, bacteria and the toxic cocktail otherwise known as our lake by wisely asking CDC for input. Let's see what they and other experts say. I note in passing to those who airily wave off such concerns that the first thing that greeted us upon arriving to feed the 2d District were shots for tetanus and hepatitis. All the police and medical people warned against stepping into flood waters as toxic. Rebuilding has to be environmentally sensitive. It is more than just a question.

6. Ron has a good idea in suggesting that both political parties hold their 2008 convention here. That would offer a powerful national statement that no calamity will stand in the way of our progress.

7. I have suggested key precepts that should underlie Newt's suggestion that we use Mardi Gras to spotlight renewal. We would commence the celebration with the participation of other cities and relief organizations who have extended to expatriots -- the correct way to describe us -- their gracious hospitality. We must take care to ensure inclusion of traditional but less affluent participants like the Mardi Gras Indians, brass bands, and Zulu. Participation by state and local officials should be minimized, but tribute must be paid to our valiant police force and state troopers.

8. We must capitalize on this unique opportunity to address housing. The flood requires massive rebuilding. We must invite the best and most innovative and creative people to put forth ideas and select the best and act on them.

9. We must take advantage of this opportunity to fix a broken school system with innovative 21st century charter schools that focus on math and science and that prepare our kids for the global economy. Past failure to achieve that has seriously impaired our ability to attract jobs because people do not want to send their kids to public school and cannot afford private schools.

10. These challenges present historic opportunities that can best be capitalized on with national, bi-partisan leadership. No choice is perfect but we think Colin Powell offers the right combination

--- Original Message-----

From: "Thirdwave2" <thirdwave2@speaker Gingrich.com>  
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 16:43:15  
To: "Livingston, Robert" <rlivingston@livingstongroupdc.com>, "Vince Haley"  
<vhaley@aol.org>  
Cc: <ndesmond@mindspring.com>, <revans@ckennalong.com>, "Robert Egge"  
<REgge@gingrichgroup.com>, "Jim Frogue" <JFrogue@gingrichgroup.com>, "Albert  
Hanser" <(b)(6)>, "Rick Tyler" <RickTyler@newt.org>,  
<tbalders@tampabay.rr.com>, <cdemath@aol.org>, <BForstchen@montreat.edu>,  
ced.feulnemheritage.org, <(b)(6)>, <(b)(6)>,  
<(b)(6)>, <jreiss@reisscompanies.com>, <(b)(6)>  
<Madhu.Beriwal@eminc.com>, <dbecensen@at.com>, <(b)(6)>  
<jbreaux@pattonboggs.com>, <ivor@hurricane.lsu.edu>, <andres@dps.com>,  
<lizz@dps.com>, <fmaclure@sonnenschein.com>, <gundersonsc@greystonecp.com>.  
"Jim Frogue" <JFrogue@gingrichgroup.com>, "Partners"  
<Partners@livingstongroupdc.com>, "Candienne, Martin"  
<mcandienne@livingstongroupdc.com>, "Johnsen, Chris" <ccjohnsen@joneswalker.com>,  
"Ernest, Harvey" <harvey@RIVERGROUP.com>, <BDupuy@nrahq.org>, <(b)(6)>  
<Kyle\_Ruckert@vitter.senate.gov>, <(b)(6)>.  
<climer@CongInst.org>  
Subject: RE: Unnatural Disaster: A Hurricane EXPOSES the Man-Made Disaster of the welfare State

Bob raises the good point that some selective recruitment for leaders from the communities

to have a participatory planning aimed at ending disparities in health outcomes, improving housing and education and having neighborhoods that are not economically segregated is a key part of rethinking the future of New Orleans and other damaged areas

\newt

From: Livingston, Robert [mailto:rlivingston@livingstongroupdc.com]  
Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 4:26 PM  
To: Thirdwave2; Vince Haley  
cc: ndesmond@mindspring.com; revans@mckennalong.com; Robert Egge; Jim Frogue; Albert Hanser; Rick Tyler; tbalders@tampabay.rr.com; cdemuth@aai.org; BForstchen@montreat.edu; ed.feulner@heritage.org; (b)(6); jreiss@reisscompanies.com; (b)(6) Madhu.Beriwal@ieminc.com; dbe@ensnat.com; (b)(6) jbreaux@pattonboggs.com; ivor@hurricane.lsu.edu; andres@dps.com; lizz@dps.com; fmcclure@sonnenschein.com; gundersonsc@greystonegp.com; Jim Frogue; Partners; Cancienne, Martin; Johnsen, Chris; Ernest, Harvey; BDupuy@rahq.org; (b)(6) Kyle\_Ruckert@vitter.senate.gov; (b)(6) climer@CongInst.org  
Subject: RE: Unnatural Disaster: A Hurricane Exposes the Man-Made Disaster of the Welfare State

I think every other problem will take care of itself with proper incentives, but this is the toughest. After Hurricane Betsy, we just piled poor people into newly constructed multi-story buildings, and they turned into hell-hole projects. We cannot repeat that tragic mistake. We need to carefully plan the maintenance of these people in the short term, and when we can, bring them back to suitable, stable, and well constructed scattered site housing that will be conducive to stable neighborhoods for generations to come. For those that can or are able, we should include them in the reconstruction so that they have a vested interest in building and protecting what they have helped to build. We have the opportunity to change the poverty cycle in New Orleans forever, but its going to take careful planning.

Bob L.

From: Thirdwave2 [mailto:thirdwave2@speaker Gingrich.com]  
Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 4:05 PM  
To: Vince Haley  
Cc: ndesmond@mindspring.com; (b)(6) REgge@gingrichgroup.com; jfrogue@gingrichgroup.com; Albert Hanser; RickTyler@newt.org; tbalders@tampabay.rr.com; cdemuth@aai.org; BForstchen@montreat.edu; Livingston, Robert; ed.feulner@heritage.org; (b)(6)  
Subject: FW: Unnatural Disaster: A Hurricane Exposes the Man-Made Disaster of the Welfare State

Part of our brainstorming for a really better future should be replacing the failed public housing areas with a lot better quality of life and greater opportunity for the poor

It would be good as a goal to have a more prosperous and more integrated poor for the future

newt

---

Sent via BlackBerry from Cingular Wireless  
sent via BlackBerry from Cingular Wireless

**COORDINATION  
Meeting Idea**

<b>Office</b>	<b>Representative</b>	<b>Date</b>
USD(AT&L)	Mr Krieg	Sept 28,2005
OGC	Mr Dell'Orto	Sept 27,2005

10/14  
1500



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

2005 OCT 13 5:41

ACTION MEMO

October 7, 2005, 5:00 P.M.

**Robert Rangel**  
FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

RR, 10/14

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

*Robert L. Wilkie*  
Oct. 13, 2005

SUBJECT: Rep. Vic Snyder (D-AR) Question on Mr. Safavian, Snowflake #093005-21

- You asked us to relay to you the answer to Rep. Vic Snyder's (D-AR) question during the September 29<sup>th</sup> HASC hearing on Iraq reference Mr. David Safavian's role in Defense procurement and outsourcing.
- Mr. Safavian was the Administrator for the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. He was involved in formulating and issuing government-wide procurement and competitive sourcing policy. He was arrested September 19<sup>th</sup> for three criminal charges relating to obstruction of a federal investigation.
- Mr. Safavian did not have any involvement on any specific DoD procurement nor was he generally involved in specific competitive sourcing actions.
- He did serve as approval authority for deviations under OMB Circular A-76, and, as such, approved a Marine Corps deviation that allowed a temporary, in-house workforce to perform at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point until the Defense Logistics Agency completed a new contract competition.
- We will provide this information to Rep. Snyder as a response to a Question for the Record from the September 29<sup>th</sup> hearing (Tab 1).

OYO ONE

7 October

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the attached QFR response.

SECDEF DECISION:

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Comment: \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Draft QFR
- Snowflake #093005-21

SPB 10/14

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD	10/14	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	11/10/14	1105	
ESR MA	8/11/14	0915	

3 October

Prepared By: COL Mike Hadley, Director, House Affairs, OSD (LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/52951

A-28-2  
OSD 20352-05



LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

2005 OCT 13 PM 5:41

ACTION MEMO

October 7, 2005, 5:00 P.M.

Robert Rangel FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

R 10/12

FROM Daniel R Stanley, Assistant secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

Robert L. Wilkie

Oct. 13, 2005

SUBJECT: Rep. Vic Snyder (D-AR) Question on Mr. Safavian, Snowflake #093005-21

- You asked us to relay to you the answer to Rep. Vic Snyder's (D-AR) question during the September 29th HASC hearing on Iraq reference Mr. David Safavian's role in Defense procurement and outsourcing.
- Mr. Safavian was the Administrator for the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. He was involved in formulating and issuing government-wide procurement and competitive sourcing policy. He was arrested September 19th for three criminal charges relating to obstruction of a federal investigation.
- Mr. Safavian did not have any involvement on any specific DoD procurement nor was he generally involved in specific competitive sourcing actions.
- He did serve as approval authority for deviations under OMB Circular A-76, and, as such, approved a Marine Corps deviation that allowed a temporary, in-house workforce to perform at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point until the Defense Logistics Agency completed a new contract competition.
- We will provide this information to Rep. Snyder as a response to a Question for the Record from the September 29th hearing (Tab 1)

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the attached QFR response.

SECDEF DECISION:

Approve: OK - Dan S. handle - DRB 10/14

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

comment: \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Draft QFR
- Snowflake #093005-21

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD	DRB	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	WAF	ROS	
ESR MA	DRB	OS	

Prepared By: COL Mike Hadley, Director, House Affairs, OSD (LA) (b)(6)

A-28-2  
OSD 20352-05

House Armed **Services** Committee Full **Committee**  
Question for the Record  
Hearing on Iraq Update  
Witness: Secretary Rumsfeld  
September **29, 2005**

Representative Snyder

**QUESTION** I am sure that you are aware that a senior OMB official in charge of procurement, Mr. Safavian, resigned and was arrested the other day. Did Mr. Safavian have any involvement in Defense procurement or outsourcing? Is any ~~sort~~ of internal look going on inside DoD about contracts or policies in which he may have played a part?

**ANSWER** Mr. Safavian did not have any involvement on any specific Department of Defense (DoD) procurements. Generally, Mr. Safavian was not involved in specific competitive sourcing actions. **As** the approval authority for deviations under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, he did meet with DoD officials regarding an expired contract at the Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, and decided to allow a temporary, in-house workforce perform until a competition among sources in the private sector was complete. Mr. Safavian approved the deviation, and Defense Logistics Agency recently selected a new contractor.

As the Administrator for the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), Mr. Safavian was involved in formulating and issuing government-wide procurement and competitive sourcing policy, which was implemented by DoD, **as** well as all other Federal Agencies. In **this** capacity, Mr. Safavian chaired the Federal Acquisition Council, which regularly reviews and approves any new or amended provisions in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (**FAR**). Additionally, DoD implemented other procurement policies issued by Mr. Safavian, such as those addressing procurement efforts related to Hurricane Katrina. Generally, Mr. Safavian was not directly involved in the formation of unique DoD procurement policies. Mr. **Safavian** may have **had** some indirect involvement because DoD's proposed changes to the DoD **FAR** Supplement (**DFARS**) are sent to **OMB's** Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for approval prior to publication, **and** **OIRA** obtains **OFPP** approval. In one instance, Mr. Safavian attended a meeting at OMB prior to approval of a DFARS rule that would allow DoD to implement a requirement for Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) on DoD contracts. **This** meeting was requested by DoD to explain the RFID rule to **OMB** officials. We are not aware of any other significant involvement by Mr. Safavian with respect to DoD procurement policies.

At **this** time, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for the Department of Defense **has** not initiated any review of DoD contracts or policies in response to the arrest of

Mr. Safavian. The OIG has not received any allegations that Mr. Safavian was improperly involved in DoD contracting. Should such information come to the attention of the OIG, it would be referred to the appropriate office for investigation or review.

USD(AT&L) Approved 

OCT 07 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/52954

A-28-4

FOUO

2

2005

15:41

OCT 03 2005

TO: Dan Stanley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DR*

SUBJECT: Congressman Snyder's Question about Sefairan

When you get back to Congressman Snyder about SEFAIRAN who resigned from OMB, give me the answer as well.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
093005-21

.....  
*Please Respond By October 11, 2005*

*A-28-5*  
OSD 20352-05

11-L-0559/OSD/52955

~~FOUO~~

2

10/3/05 11:54 AM

OCT 03 2005

0410 OMBE

TO: Dan Stanley

Donald Rumsted *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressman Snyder's Question about SeFairan

When you get back to Congressman Snyder about SEFAIRAN who resigned from OMB, give me the answer as well.

Thanks

DHR:js  
10/3/05 11:54 AM

.....  
***Please Respond By October 11, 2005***

30 Oct 05

**OSD 20352-05**

11-L-0559/OSD/52956

~~FOUO~~

October 17, 2005

000.92

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Not Yet Accounted For

How do you explain the fact that we cannot verify the whereabouts of over 300 people this many weeks after Katrina and Rita? What is wrong with <sup>our</sup> systems?

Thanks.

Attach.

10/11/05 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Personnel Not Accounted For [OSD 20355-05]

DRH:dh  
101705-19(TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by October 27, 2005*

17 Oct 05

FOUO

11 Oct 05

11-L-0559/OSD/52957

*AP*  
OSD 20355-05

10/14  
1300



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



10/17

2005 OCT 13 PM 6 23

INFO MEMO

October 11, 2005, 5:00PM

Robert B. ~~Banerjee~~ SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

10/14

FROM: David S. G. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

*David S. G. Chu*

SUBJECT: Daily Report on Personnel Not Yet Accounted For in Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita effected areas for October 11, 2005

Daily Report on Defense Personnel unaccounted for in areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina. As of October 11, 2005 there were 322 Service members and defense civilians unaccounted for in areas impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This figure represents a decrease of 14.5% (50 persons) in Katrina impacted areas and a decrease of 75.2% (82 persons) in Rita impacted areas since the previous report dated 7 October 2005. The tables below depict the tally by service:

DOD Totals

	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
	0	0	1	0
	142	0	26	0
	3	1	0	0
	0	0	0	0
	150	2	0	0
	295	3	27	0

SOR 10/14

MA SD	10/14	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	10/14	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	11/14	III	NSD
ESRMA	7/14	NS	



OSD 20355-05

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
11-L-0559/OSD/52958

Service Totals

	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
	0	0	1	0
	88	0	25	0
	0	0	0	0
	147	2	0	0
	235	2	26	0

	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0
	0	1	0	0
	0	1	0	0

	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
	0	0	0	0
	54	0	0	0
	3	0	0	0
	3	0	0	0
	60	0	0	0

	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
	0	0	0	0
	0	0	1	0
	0	0	0	0
	0	0	1	0

	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0

Prepared By: Valerie Ratliff, Colonel, USA, Military Assistant (MC&FP) (b)(6) *J. Burke*



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



2005 OCT 13 PM 6:23

PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

INFO MEMO

October 11, 2005, 5:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S-G. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

*David S-G. Chu 10/11/05*

SUBJECT: Daily Report on Personnel Not Yet Accounted For in Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita effected areas for October 11, 2005

**Daily Report on Defense Personnel unaccounted for in areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina.** As of October 11, 2005 there were 322 Service members and defense civilians unaccounted for in areas impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This figure represents a decrease of 14.5% (50 persons) in Katrina impacted areas and a decrease of 75.2% (82 persons) in Rita impacted areas since the previous report dated 7 October 2005. The tables below depict the tally by service:

**DOD Totals**

	Hurricane Katrina		Hurricane Rita	
	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
Service: DOD				
1. Active Duty	0	0	1	0
2. Reserve	142	0	26	0
3. Service Civilians	3	1	0	0
4. Defense Agency Civilians	0	0	0	0
5. National Guard	150	2	0	0
Total	295	3	27	0



### Service Totals

	Hurricane Katrina		Hurricane Rita	
	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
<b>Service: Army</b>				
1. Active Duty	0	0	1	0
2. Reserve	88	0	25	0
3. Service Civilians	0	0	0	0
5. National Guard	147	2	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>0</b>

	Hurricane Katrina		Hurricane Rita	
	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
<b>Service: Navy</b>				
1. Active Duty	0	0	0	0
2. Reserve	0	0	0	0
3. Service Civilians	0	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

	Hurricane Katrina		Hurricane Rita	
	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
<b>Service: Air Force</b>				
1. Active Duty	0	0	0	0
2. Reserve	54	0	0	0
3. Service Civilians	3	0	0	0
5. National Guard	3	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

	Hurricane Katrina		Hurricane Rita	
	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
<b>Service: Marine Corps</b>				
1. Active Duty	0	0	0	0
2. Reserve	0	0	1	0
3. Service Civilians	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>

Service: Defense Civilian Agencies	Hurricane Katrina		Hurricane Rita	
	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased	Not Yet Accounted For	Deceased
1. DCMA	0	0	0	0
2. PLA	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	0	0	0	0

Prepared By: Valerie Ratliff, Colonel, USA, Military Assistant (MC&FP) (b)(6)

*J. Burke*

FOUO

EX-100  
EX-100  
EX-100  
OCT 04 2005  
2005 OCT 14 AM 1:10

TO: Dan Stanley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: McCain's Comments

McCain said either that no military expert he knows thinks we have had and do have enough troops, or that we don't have a need for more troops, I forget his phraseology. Let's get the transcript.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100305-25

.....  
*Please Respond By October 13, 2005*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/52964

OSD 20382-05



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

October 13, 2005, 6:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
For Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

*Robert L. Walker*

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response – McCain's Comments

- You asked for the transcript of Senator McCain's remarks regarding the need for more troops in Iraq.
- Senator McCain spoke on September 29<sup>th</sup> before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq. His comment is reflected on Page 34 of the attached Congressional Transcript (Tab 2).

Attachments:

Snowflake #100305-25 (TAB 1)  
Congressional Transcript (TAB 2)

Prepared by: MGySgt Sue Hines-Laboy, Executive Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/52965

OSD 20382-05

# TAB

# 1

~~FOUO~~

2005 OCT 14 PM 1:10  
OCT 04 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld \$  
SUBJECT: McCain's Comments

McCain said either that no military expert he knows thinks we have had and do have enough troops, or that we don't have a need for more troops, I forget his phraseology. Let's get the transcript.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
100305-25

.....  
*Please Respond By October 13, 2005*

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/52967

OSD 20382-05

# TAB

# 2

CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS  
Congressional Hearings  
Sept. 29, 2005

## Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq

### LIST OF SPEAKERS

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WARNER.

The committee meets this morning to receive testimony on U.S. military strategy and operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and in other areas of the CENTCOM.

And we welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs; General John Abizaid, commander, U.S. Central Command; and General George Casey, commander of Multinational Forces.

We look forward to your testimony.

I and other members of this committee wish to thank each of our witnesses and the countless men and women they represent for their service and their tireless efforts to secure peace and self-determination for the Iraqi people, Afghan people and others.

I want to especially thank General Myers for his service, not only for the past four years as chairman of the Joint Chiefs but over 40 years of distinguished service uniform.

Tomorrow, you will turn over your responsibility as chairman to General Pete Pace, United States Marine Corps. This will be an important day for you, your lovely wife and family, and General Pace and his family.

You've served the nation faithfully with distinction and with great credit to the uniform that you proudly wear, General.

Well done, sir

MYERS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER:

We're ever-mindful of the sacrifices of the men and women of the armed forces and that of their families at home as we open this hearing.

We have an unusual day in terms of the schedule of the Senate before us. And in consultation with the ranking member, I've made the decision that we will proceed this morning until the hour of approximately 11:15, at which time we'll stand in recess, such that the colleagues on this committee can join all others in the vote on the next Supreme Court chief justice.

So after that, we'll resume at 12:15. And at about 1:15 we will go into a closed session for a short period in 219, following which our distinguished panel of witnesses go over to the House of Representatives.

Given that set of circumstances, I'll ask unanimous consent that my statement in its entirety be put into the record, such that we can move promptly to our witnesses.

And after the secretary's comment, we'll receive briefings from General Abizaid and General Casey.

The Senate, in closed session yesterday, had those briefings -- again this morning at a breakfast briefing in the House of Representative side -- four senators and House members.

And I wish to make a point that I think you're setting forth with great clarity the strategy of this country and the importance of everything that is being done by the armed forces of the United States to secure the freedom of this country here at home and abroad. And I commend you for what I have heard in the past 24 hours from each of you.

WARNER:

Senator Levin?

LEVIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to join Senator Warner in welcoming our witnesses this morning.

I especially want to express our gratitude and our congratulations to General Myers for his more than 40 years of distinguished service to this nation. I have a fuller statement about that but, like most of the rest of my statement, I will be putting that in the record.

General Abizaid and General Casey, thank you both for your service. And please convey to the personnel under your command our gratitude for all that they have done and are doing; and assure them that while there are differences among us about a number of issues relative to Iraq, all Americans hold our troops in the highest esteem and are united in our determination to give them and their families our full support.

This is an important hearing, coming **as** it does a little more than two weeks prior to the national referendum in Iraq on its draft constitution. Our military leaders have repeatedly told us that there is no purely military solution in Iraq and that a genuine, broad-based political settlement among Iraqis is essential for success and for the defeat of the insurgency.

That means that we must do all that we can to encourage that political settlement, which many believe is not embodied in the Iraqi constitution in its present form. While the Kurds and Shiites are generally happy with the draft constitution, the Sunni leadership strongly opposes that draft constitution.

LEVIN:

While our hope is that a new constitution would serve to unite the Iraqis, the more likely scenario is that the Sunni Arabs will vote overwhelmingly against it, but will be unable to defeat it.

If that scenario comes to pass, the danger is that the draft constitution will cement the differences between the **Sunni Arabs** on the one hand and the Shiites and Kurds on the other.

The distinguished International Crisis Group, in a policy briefing released just on Monday, concludes that, quote, "without a strong U.S.-led initiative to assuage Sunni Arab concerns, the constitution is likely to fuel, rather than dampen, the insurgency, encourage ethnic and sectarian violence and hasten the country's violent breakup," close quote.

I believe that if the Iraqis do not come together to reach a political solution by the end of the year -- and adopting the draft constitution in the face of overwhelming opposition of one of the three main Iraqi groups doesn't meet that description -- that we must then consider a timetable for the withdrawal of our forces. I emphasize the word "consider."

That is not setting a date for departure at this time. That's simply conveying clearly and forcefully to the Iraqis that the presence of our forces in Iraq is not unlimited.

The administration's repeated statements that we will stay in Iraq as long as needed sends the wrong message. We should not mislead the Iraqis into thinking that they have

unlimited time to reach a broad-based political settlement. Because if they think that they are less likely to make the compromises necessary to reach a political settlement.

I would hope that our witnesses would address the importance of a political coming together on the part of the Iraqis in terms of a military success.

LEVIN:

I would hope *our* witnesses would talk about whether the insurgency has declined or whether it has increased or whether it's about the same as it was a few months ago when they were here last.

I would hope that our witnesses would discuss the status of Iraqi forces in terms of their capability and their ability to take on the insurgency.

I would ask that the balance of my statement, Mr. Chairman, be inserted in the record.

WARNER:

Without objection.

LEVIN:

Thank you.

WARNER:

Colleagues, before we begin to hear from our witnesses, I recognize that a quorum is present. I now ask the committee to consider a list of 3,979 pending military nominations. These nominations have been before the committee the required length of time. There are no objections that have been raised regarding them.

Is there a motion to favorably report 3,979 military noms to the Senate?

LEVIN:

So moved.

WARNER:

Second?

(UNKNOWN)

(OFF-MIKE)

WARNER

All in favor say "aye."

Opposed?

Ayes have it; passed.

Secretary Rumsfeld?

RUMSFELD:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

Chairman Myers and I are joined today, as you pointed out, by the combatant commander of the Central Command, General John Abizaid and the Iraq commander, General George Casey.

They are back in Washington for meetings of the combatant commanders and to brief the National Security Council. And we're all pleased to be able to have this opportunity to meet with this committee.

These general officers have been entrusted with protecting the interests and security of the American people in those vital parts of the world. The president has great confidence in them. And the country, I believe, can be encouraged and grateful to them for their leadership.

General Abizaid's briefing is based on his perspective as the combatant commander responsible for the region of the world most troubled by violent extremism.

General Casey will discuss the situation in Iraq, certainly an important front, but not the only front in the global war on terror.

RUMSFELD:

As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, this will be General Myers' last appearance before this committee as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the past four years, Dick Myers has been a wise and valued counselor to the president, to the National Security Council and to me during all of the most important discussions and decisions affecting the security of the American people.

Members of the National Security Council have asked his advice on literally thousands of matters. And it has always given me great confidence that I always knew that every piece of advice he has given has been *rooted* in his devotion to the United States of America, to the American people and to the men and women in uniform.

And I certainly want to join in thanking General Myers for his four decades of superb service to our country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER:

Thank you.

General Myers?

MYERS:

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, as the secretary said, I have just over **24** hours left as the chairman.

I also understand that this is my 64th congressional hearing, and perhaps it's fitting that this is one of my last official activities since the job began with confirmation hearings just over four years ago.

Through all the national security discussions we've had over the years, it's clear that all of us share a deep love for our country. And we share a strong belief in the ideals **upon** which this nation was founded: freedom, justice, equality. And we share our commitment to defending those ideals.

MYERS:

Our united efforts to meet this commitment have never been more important than today, when violent extremists and terrorists threaten all that we hold dear. So I thank

you, this committee, for your leadership in sustaining our nation's unity and resolve for the long war.

I think we also share a tremendous pride in our troops and all their accomplishments, their professionalism, their courage, their selflessness, their compassion. They are 100 percent committed to accepting nothing short of winning this important struggle and they understand perfectly what they've been asked to do.

They can take great pride in their many successes: the recent elections in Afghanistan, the constitution being debated in Iraq and the growing capabilities of Iraqi and Afghan security forces.

All they need from us is the resources to finish the job, the continued resolve of the nation and the support of the American people.

I thank you for ensuring they have those three things.

It's been an honor to serve alongside all our men and women in uniform and to represent them in front of this committee.

*Thank you, Mr. Chairman.*

**WARNER:**

Thank you very much, General Myers.

General Abizaid?

**ABIZAID:**

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to join you today.

Over the past several months, I have spent considerable time in the CENTCOM theater meeting with regional leaders, our commanders and troops and our partners' commanders in the field.

The region churns with undercurrents of change representing both opportunities and challenges for us.

**ABIZAID:**

Our troops continue to perform at levels of operational excellence that are unmatched.

It's a privilege to lead such courageous young men and women. They are courageous, they're committed, they're competent. If I could bottle up what they represent and sell it, I'd be a rich man.

I want to talk briefly today about the Al Qaida threat as the main threat that we face in a region beset with many difficulties.

And while Al Qaida does not represent the main part of the insurgency in Iraq, it is certainly present in Iraq. And while it doesn't represent the main source of difficulties in Pakistan's northwestern territory and Waziristan areas, it certainly plays a role there.

Al Qaida has struck in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt, in Spain, in London, in Washington and New York. Its global reach and its ability to inflict damage should not be underestimated. In this year alone, over 400 suicide bombers have been deployed worldwide and thousands and thousands of innocent civilians, most of whom are Muslims, have been killed by Al Qaida as Al Qaida attempts to become mainstream ideologically in the region.

In June, I briefly spoke to you about the broader struggle in the region, and I wish to deepen this discussion by focussing on the Al Qaida threat.

I think such a focus should also provide a fuller understanding of what's at stake in the region, where Iraq and Afghanistan fit, causing the dialogue to extend beyond just what's happening in Iraq and just what's happening in Afghanistan, as if what's happening there is unconnected to the broader pressures in the region caused by extremism, such as represented by Al Qaida, and other issues, such as Sunni-Shia violence that we see starting to develop in various places.

#### **ABIZAD:**

Al Qaida and associated extremists are the main enemy to peace and stability in the region. The enemy that brought us 9/11 continues to represent one of the greatest dangers to this nation.

First, this enemy is driven by a militant ideology that celebrates murder and suicide. In the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan, we saw how this ideology oppressed the masses and covered a nation in darkness: no music, executions in soccer stadiums, women sequestered, works of art destroyed.

The good news, however, is that the vast majority of people in the Middle East and Central Asia and the Horn of Africa don't buy this perverted view of Islam.

They want to lead a better life. They want to lead a more prosperous life. They do not want the extremists to win.

But the grip of this ideology should not be underestimated. Communism and fascism started with relatively few, but deeply committed, adherents. And the hate preached by Al Qaida resonates with some misguided people who believe that Al Qaida represents a true Islamic alternative.

It does not.

Second, the enemy is empowered by modern communications, expertly using the virtual world for planning, recruiting, fund-raising, indoctrination and exploiting the mass media.

Their main effort is not to defeat us militarily, but to break our will by capturing the headlines, by making us think that we cannot help the people in the region help themselves against the extremist ideology. They know that propaganda and grabbing headlines are more important than military operations.

Importantly, this enemy seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction and will certainly use such weapons if they obtain them.

They experimented with anthrax in Afghanistan. They tried to develop crude chemical weapons in Afghanistan. They are always talking about how they might develop a radiological dispersal device. If they could buy or acquire a nuclear weapon, they would.

This is not my guess; this is what they say. It's well known they want to do this and they'll stop at nothing to try to do that.

These extremists are ruthless. Their depraved attacks and robust suicide bomber network intimidates entire communities and, indeed, intimidates entire countries.

They are masters of intimidation, but they are not masters of the battlefield.

ABIZAD:

They can kill innocents, but they can't win a single engagement against military forces properly deployed.

This ability to intimidate gives them power beyond their relatively small numbers. It also gives them a chance, if we fail in our mission to prevent them from spreading their ideology, to gain more and more adherents and eventually gain an opportunity to achieve a safe haven not unlike the one that they achieved in Afghanistan.

I'd ask the committee to bear with me for a few moments and look at a few charts that describe the enemy's strategy in their own words.

Their objectives are very clear. They believe in a jihad: a jihad, first and foremost, to overthrow the legitimate regimes in the region. But in order to do that, they have to first drive us from the region.

This is what they believe: They believe, ultimately, that the greatest prize of all is Saudi Arabia and the holy shrines there. And no one knows this better today than the Saudis do.

The enemy will then try to create and expand a geographic safe haven in the region which they will call the Caliphate. That's what they called it in Afghanistan. That's what they called it in Fallujah. That's what they call it in Waziristan.

They will try to reestablish a caliphate throughout the entire Muslim world and apply a very, very narrow form of Sharia law, a form of Sharia law not believed in or practiced anywhere in the Muslim world today.

And it certainly would allow Al Qaida and their proxies to control a vast degree of oil wealth that exists in the region. And it certainly is clear that they intend to destroy Israel in the process as well.

As they expand to look for safe havens, they are moving into areas of the world such as the middle of Africa, the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia. And they operate from bases of relative safety, especially within the virtual world, where they purvey their hatred through the Internet from places such as Germany, Holland, and even use servers here within the United States.

#### **ABIZAD:**

They aim to take advantage of open societies and strike those open societies when they're ready at their time and place of choosing.

There are many active jihads, of course, that they're participating in. And while they're not the main enemy in all of the jihads, they participate in every one of them because they are trying to cause instability. They feed on instability.

You see here the future fight. They'll eventually exhaust the far enemy -- which is us and our allies -- overthrow the regimes of the region.

And to see, in their own view, off of one of their Web sites -- next slide -- to give a view of how they see it, you can see here in green the first step to achieve an Al Qaida-

dominated caliphate throughout the known Muslim world. And then you see down in the corner where they think it will go on 100 years.

Let there be no doubt about what they think. Just as we had the opportunity to learn what the Nazis were going to do from Hitler's world in "Mein Kampf" we need to learn what these people intend to do from their own words.

There are a lot of different ways to look at this enemy. Perhaps the most classic way to look at this enemy is by taking a look at a map and see support nodes and leadership nodes, lines of communication, places where the enemy can operate, where we know them to operate, where we understand that their cells exist, where they are not openly active yet somehow manage to organize suicide bombing and activity against reasonable governments and properly appointed governments in the region.

#### **ABIZAIID:**

They also operate in areas where there is no governance. And they take advantage of these ungoverned spaces to operate decisively and organize and plan and train.

And if you look at the geographic representation of Al Qaida and their associated movements and you see how distributed it is, you get the mistaken belief that it is not a global or borderless organization.

It's not like IBM, a monolith that's centrally led from a central headquarters. It's much more like McDonald's, a franchise that is decentralized and dangerous and linked in many ways that I think the next chart represents in a much better way.

It shows at the bottom the traditional areas of where we find the enemy: in training camps, places where military forces can have an effect against them, where leaders and fighters can be captured and killed, where technical expertise can be interdicted.

But in reality, this enemy has adapted to the environment of our strength and our power and the strength of regional governments, and they've developed a media and a propaganda campaign that you see up here in the blue, an Internet and proselytizing campaign -- recruitment and education. They develop safe havens that are both geographic and ungoverned spaces and virtual, within the Internet and within the mass media world.

They have front companies. They buy off politicians. They develop facilitators and smugglers. They deal with financiers that move drug money around as well as other illicit money.

ABIZAD:

And they have sympathetic nongovernmental organizations that they sponsor to transfer some of their hateful ideology in very, very insidious ways around the region.

This type of enemy is the type of enemy that requires not only military pressure to get at those things that you see in yellow, but it requires all elements of international and national power to put pressure throughout the network over time in order to squeeze the ideology, defeat its sources of strength and ultimately allow the good people of the region to have the courage and the ability to stand against this type of an organization.

We know the enemy's strategy and we have a rare opportunity to get in front of these extremists and focus on them now before Al Qaida and its underlying ideology become mainstream.

We will do this through an indirect approach. We must help others in the region help themselves by promoting self-reliant partners who are willing to face the enemy from within their own countries and within their own borders.

As we do this, we should, in fact, in the long war, over time, reduce our military footprint in the region, being mindful of the fact that first we must stabilize Afghanistan, stabilize Iraq, continue to deter Syria and Iran, and protect the flow of oil vital to all the economies of the world and the peoples of the region.

We must make clear to the people of the region that we have no designs on their territory and resources. We must make clear that we fight with them out of mutual respect and mutual self-benefit.

We must also enhance our own networks among our agencies, our allies, our coalition and the partner governments to ensure that we're coordinating all of our instruments of national power in the fight against Al Qaida.

ABIZAD:

Our military forces in the region are playing a key role in implementing this strategy to defeat Al Qaida and we have had much success. We recently were able to kill the number two leader of Al Qaida in Iraq.

Our allies in Pakistan and our friends in Saudi Arabia have relentlessly produced results against Al Qaida in certain part of their territories.

**Our** own forces have fought Al Qaida wherever we've found them and have had good effect. But we have not finished the job. Their leadership remains at large. Their financial flows remain. And we must continue to keep pressure on them over time to ensure that the ideology that they represent does not grow mainstream within the societies.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, our forces provide the shield behind which legitimate and representative governments and economic development are taking root. It is so important for us to understand that it is a combination of military power, economic power, diplomatic power and political power that will ultimately spell the end of Al Qaida's hateful ideology.

Elsewhere, such as in the Horn of Africa, our training assistance enables nations to strengthen their military capabilities and to strengthen their counterterrorist capabilities over time. We are part of a much broader force.

Back in March of 2003, there were about 375,000 American troops in the region. Today, it's about 200,000.

As Afghanistan and Iraq stabilize over time, you could see it possible, and indeed beneficial, for that strength to come down as and only if indigenous capabilities improved to the point that local nations can fight the fight themselves.

#### **ABIZAD:**

Certainly, there has been progress, and General Casey will talk about progress in Iraq. But in Afghanistan, the recent successful elections there constituted another significant setback for the Taliban and Al Qaida.

In Pakistan, President Musharraf is leading his country not **only** in hunting down extremists but in discrediting their ideas.

In Saudi Arabia, security forces are aggressively combating that country's terrorists that have been so aggressively pursuing all of the instruments of national power that exist within the kingdom.

It is important, I think, in closing, Mr. Chairman, that we recognize the global threat that Al Qaida presents to the United States and to the civilized nations of the world. We are not yet organized to the extent that we need to be to fight this enemy with coordinated and synchronized international and interagency action.

We have time to do that. But we need to seize the moment and do it now.

**Thank** you, sir.

WARNER:

Thank you very much, General.

And I appreciate that you and General Casey have returned from your duties abroad to meet the important challenge to brief not only the president but, as you have been briefing here for two days, the Congress and the American people about this global threat and how we, working with other nations, are combating it.

General Casey?

CASEY:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As we approach the referendum on the Iraqi constitution, and for the elections for a government based on that constitution, the Iraqi people are locked in a struggle between tyranny and democracy.

They're fighting for their future against the remnants of the regimes that tyrannized them for over three decades, and against the elements of the global terrorist network that General Abizaid just talked about, who seek to establish Iraq as a base from which they can export terror throughout the Middle East and around the world.

CASEY:

With our support, I am convinced that the Iraqis will prevail.

Our efforts in Iraq have been guided by a campaign plan and a strategy based on proven counterinsurgency principles, in close coordination with successive Iraqi governments, to guide us to our end state. And that end state is an Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the war on terror, with a representative government that respects human rights, and security forces that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terror.

I'll say more about the strategy, the operational concept and our assessment of the enemy and the insurgency in closed session, but I think it's important to note some of the broad concepts that underpin our efforts in Iraq.

First of all, the capacity of Iraqi security forces has increased quantitatively and qualitatively over the past year. At transfer of sovereignty last June, there was one

battalion in the Iraqi army, some number of partially trained and equipped national guard forces, Iraqi national guard forces, and some 3,000 police.

Today, the number of police has more than doubled. We have more than 100 Iraqi army and special police battalions participating with us in conducting counterinsurgency operations.

We have also developed with the Iraqis a readiness reporting system not unlike the one we have in place for our own forces that allows us to measure their capabilities and their growth monthly.

So over the past 18 months, we have build enough Iraqi capacity where we can begin talking seriously about transitioning this counterinsurgency mission to them.

Second, our strategy was underpinned by a close study of the histories of counterinsurgency operations, and that told us a few things that we have weaved into the strategy.

First of all, history tells us that external powers, without a strong indigenous partner in the security side, have not fared well in dealing with insurgencies.

Second, the average counterinsurgency in the 20th century has lasted nine years. Fighting insurgencies is a long-term proposition, and there's no reason that we should believe that the insurgency in Iraq will take any less time to deal with.

#### **CASEY:**

And, third, based on history and my personal experience in the Balkans, we determined that the longer that the coalition bears the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight, the longer we'll bear the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight. And this is about dependency.

And so as we looked at all those things, we adopted a strategy to take early action to empower Iraqis. And I think this is a key element of our strategy that everyone needs to understand.

The Iraqi people have confidence in their security forces and they want to be protected by them. Iraqi leaders want to take the lead in defending the Iraqi people and the strategy that we've crafted helps them do this.

**Third** point: We and the Iraqis adopted programs to enhance the development and performance of the Iraqi security forces by placing coalition transition teams with Iraqi security forces and by partnering army units with coalition units to enhance the amount of training and capabilities that were available to help the Iraqis grow. This process began in

the spring and is currently implemented across Iraq in army, special police and border units.

These programs allows us to directly improve the operational capability and effectiveness of Iraqi units, to build strong Iraqi chains of command and counterinsurgency capabilities, and to enhance the development of Iraqi military and police institutions.

## CASEY

We have just completed an assessment of the transition team concept and we're very pleased with the positive impact that these programs have had across the Iraqi forces.

Fourth point: Our aim is to defeat the terrorists and foreign fighters and to neutralize the insurgency while we progressively transition the counterinsurgency campaign to increasingly capable Iraqi security forces and ministries.

This is no easy task and it will not be done overnight. But we strongly feel that getting the Iraqis into leading the counterinsurgency effort as they are capable will allow us to gradually reduce the visibility of coalition forces across Iraq and ultimately, as conditions warrant, to begin to reduce our presence in Iraq, taking away one of the elements that fuels the insurgency: that of the coalition forces as an occupying force.

We are quite clear that whatever we do with the Iraqi security forces must be sustainable over the long term.

Now, if I could, I'd just like to take a moment to address a couple of questions that relate to this that I'm continually asked.

Question one: Do you have enough troops? Question two: Do you still see it's possible to take fairly substantial reductions next spring?

Now, these are difficult questions that cause some people to scratch their heads, especially when you ask them both at the same time. But let me try to take a couple of swings at those.

First of all, I have and I will continue to ask for what I need to have to accomplish this mission.

You asked me that, Mr. Chairman, and I think the ranking member asked me the same thing in my confirmation and I've continued to do that.

CASEY:

Today in **Iraq**, we have over 350,000 coalition and Iraqi security forces available for security operations.

Second: I think it was Yogi **Berra** that said, "Predictions are hard, especially when you're talking about the future." And it is. And you can only make predictions if you make assumptions, and then by going back and continually evaluating those assumptions.

With my subordinates, we continually reassess the situation on the ground in Iraq, we challenge the assumptions that we've made and we make projections on our requirements for forces. And we adapt our projections to the situation on the ground.

Third: As I suggested earlier, in Iraq, more coalition is not necessarily better. More and more capable Iraqi security forces are better.

Increased coalition presence feeds the notion of occupation. It contributes to the dependency of Iraqi security forces on the coalition. It extends the amount of time that it will take for Iraqi security forces to become self-reliant. And it exposes more of coalition forces to attacks at a time when Iraqi security forces are increasingly available and increasingly capable.

Fourth point: Reducing the visibility and, ultimately, the presence of coalition forces as we transition to Iraqi security self-reliance remains a key element of our overall counterinsurgency strategy. Any changes to our posture will be conditions-based and made in conjunction with our coalition and Iraqi partners. But it remains a key element of our overall strategy.

CASEY:

So there are a lot of factors that we consider and some tough calls that we're going to have to make here over the coming months. But I want to reiterate to you, again, Chairman, what I said to you in my confirmation hearing: I'll continue to ask for what I need to successfully accomplish this mission.

Back to the strategy then, we've crafted a strategy for success in **Iraq** based on historical lessons, counterinsurgency principles and the realities on the ground in Iraq. And this is a strategy that will enable the Iraqis to take charge of their future.

To be sure, the next couple of months are going to be tough and difficult, as our enemies also recognize what's at stake here as we complete this political process.

They're already challenging the referendum process with increased terror attacks to create the impression that attempts at progress are futile and that Iraq will never become a modern democratic society. They're attacking the will of the Iraqi people and the will of coalition publics.

They are failing in Iraq.

Across Iraq, 98 percent of eligible Iraqis have registered to participate in the referendum and the elections. Better than 90 percent of Iraqis have stated their intent to vote.

And probably most importantly, Sunni Arabs who boycotted January's election remain committed to participating in both the referendum and the election. This is a significant step forward from earlier this year.

Further, as I mentioned, we continue to make substantial progress with Iraqi security forces. Today, we expect to have 60,000 to 70,000 more Iraqi security forces available for referendum security than we had in the January elections. By the elections in December, we expect that to rise to about 100,000 for Iraqi security forces available for election security.

As a result, I only ask for 2,000 additional forces to help us with this year's election process, as compared to 12,000 that I asked for for the January elections.

Militarily, coalition forces and Iraqi security forces continue to pressure terrorists and insurgents across Iraq. And Iraqi security forces are progressing and continuing to take a more prominent role in defending their country.

In the recent success in Tal Afar, Iraqi security forces outnumbered coalition forces for the first time in a major operation. A year ago, that division didn't exist.

CASEY:

We've also had good successes against the Al Qaida network, killing or capturing more than 20 of their key leaders since July, including the recent death of one of Zarqawi's key lieutenants, Abu Azzam.

We and our Iraqi colleagues remain postured to provide security for the referendum and the election. And while I expect *the* insurgents and the terrorists to pull out all the stops, they will not be able to stop the political process from going forward.

We're in a tough fight, but we've been in tough fights before to advance the cause of democracy and to protect our way of life. We should not be afraid of this fight. We and the Iraqi people will prevail in this battle of wills if we don't lose ours.

Now, I know some of you worry about the impact of the calls for early withdrawal from Iraq has on our troops in Iraq. In some recent discussions with a group of soldiers I asked them was what the impact, what did they think about what was going on in the United States with the antiwar movement.

A sergeant major responded to me that he just had a conversation about that with some of his soldiers. Here's what they said: "Tell those folks not to speak for us. September 11th won't happen again. We'll beat them here."

The soldiers get it. This is the mettle of our troops. And as I've said many times, and as General Abizaid said at the beginning of his statement, I continue to be amazed at their courage, their commitment and their ability to make a difference in a challenging environment every day.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we and our Iraqi colleagues continue to make progress in Iraq every day. Some days the steps are smaller than others, but we are more relentless in our progress than those who seek to disrupt it.

We have a strategy and a plan for success in Iraq, and we're broadly on track in achieving our goals. It's hard work in a challenging environment, but we have the best of America and coalition countries, military and civilian, committed to defeating terrorism and tyranny in Iraq so that we can all live safer.

Success in Iraq will require patience and will, but both the United States and the region will be safer when we've prevailed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER

Thank you very much, General

And, again, General Abizaid, General Casey, those are strong statements, preparing the Congress with new knowledge with regard to your detailed plans to confront the uncertainties of the future. And through each of you we convey, again, to the men and women of the armed forces under your command and their families our deepest appreciation for their service and their sacrifice.

Secretary Rumsfeld, we often hear the phrase, "Stay the course." And we are now receiving, I think, a good briefing as regard to the military progress. And I personally agree that there is progress.

I was privileged to be in Iraq several weeks ago and I saw it with my own eyes.

WARNER

And, General Casey, the thoughts of your troops -- I confirm their belief in what they're doing and their willingness to stay the course.

But, Secretary Rumsfeld, the infrastructure in Iraq is an integral part of any measure of progress. And, in the course of our visit, myself with Senator Stevens -- I'll speak only for my own views -- I felt that the secretary of defense and that organization was not, in my judgment, showing the strength and decisiveness that is needed at this time.

And, to some lesser extent, I was concerned about the interior ministry and that individual's ability to step up and deal with this situation.

I want to ask you: I saw there were reports the other day about a change which I heartily endorse. When we started, the basic responsibility of the refurbishment of the infrastructure -- now, that's electricity and water and security and other matters -- was largely under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, and then it shifted, when Ambassador Negroponte took his office, to the Department of State.

Now, could you clarify with regard to the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry some, as I understand it, reshifting of that responsibility back to your department. I, frankly, endorse it but I think the details should be made known.

RUMSFELD:

Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that if by infrastructure you mean electricity and water and sewage and all those types of things, I know of no plans to move responsibility for those to the Department of Defense.

I am told that General Casey and the ambassador, U.S. ambassador, Zal Khalilzad, have recommended to Washington that the Department of Defense take over responsibility for the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense, which have also been under the Department of State.

RUMSFELD:

When I say "take over responsibility," these are very fragile institutions. They don't have a history there of strong ministries that are democratic and representative of all the elements in the society.

The problem we've got in the country is that you have can have security forces, but unless the security forces on the military side work well with the police side, unless they have a chain of command that's clear, unless the ministries are able to support them and see that they can provide the kinds of combat support and combat service support and logistics that are needed, unless they're properly connected to the intelligence community, they don't do as well as they otherwise would do.

And so, General Casey, who could respond to this, has recommended, I believe, and it's now being considered in Washington, that the Department of Defense, which has a major interest in seeing that those two ministries alone -- not the reconstruction ministries or the infrastructure ministries, but just those two ministries -- work very closely with the train-and-equip activity, both ours and NATO's activity, and that we assume responsibility for strengthening the competence in those ministries.

One of the problems we face is a real one. If you think about it, we've gone, in Iraq, from the governing council to the interim government, now a transitional government, and we've got an election in December for a permanent government. And every time you change governments, there's a lot of turbulence.

And so those ministries have not had the stability that would be desirable. We look forward with a great deal of hope to the time when the Iraqis will have a four-year government and those ministries will have some stability and less turbulence and that we will be able to assist them in developing the kinds of systems and procedures and approaches that will make them more effective.

WARNER:

Well, Mr. Secretary, when we were there, we learned -- and I'll address this to General Casey -- that the minister of defense didn't have the money to pay his troops in some instances.

WARNER

Is that correct, General Casey?

I mean, to me, that is an egregious breakdown of responsibility.

CASEY:

That's exactly the type of ministerial capacity that we intend to try to help them build.

He had the money, Senator. He didn't have a system in place that got the money to the right place at the **right time**. And **that's** something that is symptomatic of both the Ministry of Interior and Minister of Defense.

And what we've tried to do with this proposed **shift** is to have one person responsible for the ministries **from the foot soldier all the way up to the ministry**, so that we can generate the institutional systems -- that you all look at here with all of our armed forces - that will sustain the Iraqi security forces so they can accomplish their mission.

WARNER:

Can you give us your own views with regard to the forthcoming referendum on the constitution and the likelihood of it being adopted?

CASEY:

I can, Senator.

My personal views are -- and **this is** backed up by my intelligence analysts -- is that it will likely pass. That there will be a sizable no-vote by the Sunni minority, but we don't think right now that they have the capability of getting a two-thirds majority in the provinces they need for this to pass.

That said, there's a lot that can happen here in two weeks. And we'll really must have to wait to see what the outcome is.

WARNER:

Colleagues, I've just been handed my card. I'm going to stop my questions promptly because I'm hopeful we can get as many senators in before the 11:15 termination.

Senator Levin?

LEVIN:

Thank you.

General Casey, you indicated that you were going to comment about previous statements of yours about prospects for reductions in American forces next spring. You laid out all of the factors that go into that kind of a decision.

Are you projecting now, based on any assumptions you want to make, that there will be a drawdown of American forces starting next spring? Are you making that projection at this time?

**CASEY:**

As I said, Senator, conditions-based reduction of coalition forces is a critical element of our strategy. And we certainly do look to do that over the course of next year.

**LEVIN:**

And are you projecting that those conditions would exist next spring as of this time?

**CASEY:**

Senator, the next 75 days are going to be critical in what happens after that.

**CASEY:**

And so I'd like to wait until we get through this political process here to give you a better assessment of that.

**LEVIN:**

Do you have milestones, a timeline, which would reflect how we would reduce our forces when Iraqi forces gain certain strength? How many Iraqi battalions would have to be assessed at a particular level in order for a U.S. battalion to withdraw?

Do you have that kind of a timeline and that kind of a milestone?

**CASEY:**

We do not have a timeline or milestones that directly tie the drawdown of coalition units to numbers of Iraqi battalions.

As this happens, it will happen in a phased way around the country. So it's not something that lends itself that -- for example, when you have 20 Iraqi brigades you'll be able to downsize four U.S. brigades. It's not quite that simple.

LEVIN:

All right.

General, I want to just reinforce something the chairman said about the Iraqis not having funds to pay their troops. When we met with President Talabani here a few weeks ago, he confirmed reports that they did not have the funds to pay their troops. It wasn't a matter of not getting the money to the right place at the right time; he said they did not have the funds to pay their troops.

And you're saying that's not accurate.

CASEY:

I know that was true for the Ministry of Interior. I do not recall that being true for the Ministry of Defense.

LEVIN:

All right, but the minister of interior handles the police,

CASEY:

That's correct.

LEVIN:

And how many of the 190,000 are police?

CASEY:

About 84,000

LEVIN:

So half, roughly, of the so-called security forces were not being paid, because the money wasn't there. Now, that represents more than incompetence. I'm afraid that may represent corruption and worse. But how can we tolerate that situation?

Was there corruption involved in that in your judgment?

**CASEY:**

I have no knowledge or evidence that corruption was directly involved in that.

The other thing, Senator, my knowledge of this situation is, it wasn't that half of the people couldn't get paid. There were spots, like Fallujah **and** like different places, that could not be paid.

**LEVW:**

Some of the 84,000. I overstated **that**, then, but some of the **84,000 in** the police. **Do** we have any idea what percentage were not paid?

**CASEY:**

I don't, sir.

**LEVIN:**

Well, it's totally intolerable. I would hope that you give the committee a report on that.

General Abizaid, let me ask you...

**CASEY:**

Senator, **if** I could, the secretary just showed me -- it's about 67,000 on the local police.

**LEVIN:**

Who were not paid or a part of that?

**CASEY:**

That's the total number, not 84,000.

**LEVW:**

OK. Thank you.

General Abizaid, in your judgment, what **is** the importance of a genuine, broad-based political coming together among **the Iraqis** as being vital to defeat the insurgency? How important is that, that there be a political coming together among the Iraqi factions?

**ABIZAID:**

Senator Levin, I *think* it's absolutely vital

**LEVIN:**

And do we know whether or not, if the constitution passes, but with a strong majority of Sunnis opposing that passage -- whether or not the passage under that circumstance would represent a plus or a minus **in** terms of their coming together politically? Do we have a prediction on **that**, a feeling about that?

**ABIZAID:**

I would defer to General Casey on that, Senator Levin.

**LEVIN:**

General Casey, do you have a feeling about that? If there's a strong majority of Sunnis -- which is very possible -- **that** vote against **that** constitution, could **that** not possibly lead to a worsening political situation rather than a better one?

**CASEY:**

I think that's entirely possible, Senator. I mean, as we've looked at this, we've looked for the constitution to be a national compact, and the perception now is **that** it's not, particularly among the Sunni.

**RUMSFELD:**

Current indication, Senator, is that a majority *of the Sunnis* will vote against *it*. That's the impression you get **from** the polls and the conversation.

On the other hand, the positive side of it is they do plan to participate fully in the election.

LEVIN:

Right.

But I *think* General Casey's answer, that if a vast majority vote against the constitution, that that could indeed worsen the political situation, I would hope the administration would not just simply continue to say, "We're there as long as you need us. We're there as long as you need us." I mean, we're doing our part.

And the Iraqis, it seems to me, must be told that they've got to settle their political differences and come together politically. And if that constitution is adopted and that adoption does not represent the coming together -- as I think is very possible; indeed, likely -- I would hope the administration, Secretary Rumsfeld, would let the Iraqis know they got work to do politically to pull together their political home, even if the constitution's adopted; that that isn't enough, if there's going to be a faction which is seriously opposed to that constitution, even if they do participate in the elections.

Can that message be delivered to the Iraqis so they don't think they have us there for some unlimited period and it doesn't make any difference if they work out their political differences?

RUMSFELD:

Well, General Casey, you're in the meeting with the ambassador and the Iraqis on a continuing basis. I would say that that message does get communicated, wouldn't you?

CASEY

I would not say it as necessarily as forceful as Senator Levin just put it.

LEVIN:

Thank you. My time is up.

WARNER

*Thank* you very much.

LEVIN:

But I would hope it would be forcefully delivered.

CASEY:

If I could just respond,

WARNER:

Yes, go ahead.

CASEY:

Senator, you asked me, "Could it have an adverse effect?" and I said, "Yes."

But it could also have a positive effect. And if you look at what has been kicked into the next assembly in the constitution, which are really the major building blocks of federalism and other things, it could drive the Sunnis to participate even greater in the elections in December to get into the assembly.

They, then, could get into an alliance with other secular parties and this process could move forward.

So it can work both ways. It's not necessarily bad.

LEVW:

Either way. It could work either way?

CASEY:

Yes.

LEVIN:

Thank you.

WARNER

When we commenced the hearing today, I advised the committee that we would have a closed session. We are continuing to do that. But we've shifted it from 219 to the Armed Services hearing room, 222.

Senator McCain?

MCCAIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General Myers, thank you again for all your great service to this nation. We'll miss you. And we appreciate everything that you have done in service to our nation.

General Abizaid, there was a report sent over, I think last June, that three of the 100 Iraqi battalions were fully trained and equipped, capable of operating independently.

What is that number now?

ABIZAID:

The number now is, if you're taking about level 1- trained, it's one.

MCCAIN:

You have one battalion?

CASEY

Senator, if I might, could I take that, because I think I'm more familiar with it than General Abizaid?

MCCAIN:

Sure.

CASEY:

I mentioned in my opening testimony that what we were focused on is putting Iraqis in the lead as soon as they are capable. We fully recognize that Iraqi armed forces will not have an independent capability for some time, because they don't have the institutional base to support them.

And so level 1, as you'll recall from the slide, that's what's got one battalion. And it's going to be a long...

MCCAIN:

It used to be three. Now we've gone from three to one?

CASEY:

Pardon me?

MCCAIN:

It was three before.

CASEY:

Right.

MCCAIN:

The previous report you had three battalions. Now we're down to one battalion.

CASEY:

Right. And things changed in the battalions. I mean, we're making assessments on personnel, on leadership, on training. There are a lot of variables that are involved here, Senator.

MCCAIN:

And your response to Senator Levin was that you are not planning on troop withdrawals because you want to see what happens in the next 75 days. Was that a correct..

CASEY:

Senator, that's not how I'd characterize my response.

I said that condition-based reductions of coalition forces remains **an** integral part of our overall strategy. And I believe I did say to the senator that that still remains possible in 2006.

MCCAIN:

**Are** you planning on troop withdrawals for next year?

CASEY:

I just said that, Senator, yes.

MCCAIN:

Yes or no?

CASEY:

Yes, Senator, I do believe that the possibility for condition-based reductions of coalition forces still exists in 2006.

MCCAIN:

And, General Abizaid, or General Casey, in Camp Al Kime (ph), senior U.S. Marine commander said insurgents loyal to Zarqawi have taken over at least five key western Iraqi towns on the border with Syria.

How many times, General Casey, are we going to read about another offensive in Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi, Al Kime (ph), where we go in, we take control and we leave, and the bad guys come back again? How often are we going to read that, General Casey?

CASEY.

Hopefully, not too frequently, Senator.

In the last 90 days we've pushed five Iraqi brigades **and** about four coalition battalions into Anbar province. The issue has always been the availability of Iraqi security forces to remain and retain control.

MCCAIN.

Some would argue that maybe it was the availability of American forces. There's 1,000 Marines stationed in the desert populated by 100,000 Sunni Arabs. The border between Syria **and** Iraq obviously is not under our control. And I hear that from -- do you agree with that? Is the border between Syria and Iraq under our control?

CASEY:

No, Senator, it's not. And we have had since April an objective of restoring Iraqi control to that Syrian border before the election. The operation you saw in Tal Afar is a part of that strategy, and you will see operations along the Euphrates Valley *here* in near term.

MCCAIN:

I was interested in your comment: The longer we carry the brunt of the insurgency fight, the longer we will carry the brunt.

Does that mean that the Iraqis are able to carry the brunt?

CASEY

That means the longer that we lead, Senator, the longer we'll continue to lead. And that's why we have a conscious strategy of passing that off -- the lead off *to* the...

MCCAIN:

That assumes that the Iraqis are capable of assuming that leadership, General Casey.

MCCAIN:

And most people that I talk to say, by most measures, they are not ready to do that.

And so, what we're doing here -- I refer to David Ignatius's column: "From what they, the military, described, a military approach that's different at least in tone from what the public perceives for the commanders. Iraq is in an endless tunnel. They're planning to reduce U.S. troop levels over the next year to a force that will focus on training and advising the Iraqi military."

You know, nobody could argue with that. But there's one fundamental problem with it, and that is whether the Iraqis are capable of carrying out their own military responsibilities.

The president, yesterday -- you might understand that the American people are a little confused -- says, "Bush warns of upsurge of violence in Iraq before next month's voting."

So Americans are seeing on the crawl, on their television set, American Marines killed, soldiers killed, more people killed -- a couple hundred in one day. And yet we are now planning on troop withdrawals.

General Casey, I am not worried too much about the impact on American military morale because I have great faith in them. I'm worried about the impact on the insurgents.

You're planning on troop withdrawals -- you and General Abizaid -- without any criteria being met that I can see, or certainly, broadcasting that in very loud and clear tones as you did several months ago when the president said, "We are going to do whatever is necessary." And it stopped for awhile and now, it's there again.

You're taking a very big gamble here. I hope you're correct. I don't see the indicators yet that we are ready to plan or begin troop withdrawals given the overall security situation. And that just isn't my opinion alone.

General Abizaid would like to respond, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired

ABIZAID:

Well, thanks, Senator McCain.

If I may, I'd like to point out a couple of things.

First of all, the war has moved to the west, which is a good scene, a good indicator that Iraqi and U.S. forces are having an effect elsewhere.

The amount of infiltration across the Syrian border remains a concern, but it's down, not so much because of Syrian activity, but because of U.S. and Iraqi activity.

Iraqi casualties are probably taking place are around four times the level of our own, which indicates a willingness to fight for their own country. And their organizational capability is pretty good as well.

But I can assure you, Senator McCain, General Casey and I want to win this war. And if we need to ask for more U.S. troops in the short term or in the long term, we will.

MCCAIN:

General, there's no expert that I know that doesn't attest that we needed more troops at the time a lot of us said we needed them.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER

General Casey, do you wish to add anything to this very important question by Senator McCain?

CASEY

Yes, if I could, to the senator's point that we don't have any way of measuring the progress of these forces, that's exactly what the purpose of putting the transition teams with these forces and producing these monthly readiness reports is.

CASEY:

And we are fighting with them, side by side, on a daily basis, improving their capabilities day by day.

Our sense is that when we get them in the lead, they'll learn faster and they'll improve faster, rather than following us around and watching us do what we do.

And we're measuring this very carefully. And we're not going forward with this capriciously.

And as I said, this is an integrated strategy. And the reductions will come when the conditions are met as an overall part of the strategy.

WARNER:

General Myers?

MYERS:

Thank you, Chairman.

Just to comment on Senator McCain's comment that experts have said we've always needed more troops. I mean, we've all heard those calls, and I respect some of the people who have made those calls.

But the facts as I know them, that there's not been anybody in a position of responsibility for carrying out the mission in Iraq that has said that or believed that.

It's a complex situation that is not well-understood by folks who fought in Vietnam, for instance, or fought in the world wars. This is a much more complex situation. The task is very hard.

And I think General Casey established it in his opening remarks when he said if we were viewed as occupiers, we draw fire just by being occupiers.

And I think the thing we have to do, Senator McCain, is convince people this is not a cut-and-run strategy. This is a win strategy. And it's trying to walk that very fine line between being seen as an occupier and being effective and winning this war and helping the Iraqis stand up on their feet and take the fight to the enemy.

And I keep hearing "more troops," but I can tell you that the people we talk to, the academics that we bring in, the military experts -- and we'll talk to anybody that will write about this or talk about it, we're happy to talk about it. And this strategy has been reviewed -- George, I don't know how many times we've picked at your strategy -- by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And we certainly don't think that more American forces is the answer.

MCCAIN:

Mr. Chairman, I felt compelled to just make one comment.

General Myers seems to assume that things have gone well in Iraq. General Myers seems to assume that the American people or the support for our conflict there is not eroding. General Myers seems to assume that everything has gone fine, and our declarations of victory, of which there have been many, have not had an impact on American public opinion.

Things have not gone as we had planned or expected, nor as we were told by you, General Myers. And that's why I'm very worried, because I think we have to win this conflict.

So you've been bringing in the wrong experts, in my view, because the conflict has not gone as it was testified to before this committee by this group of witnesses.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MYERS:

It depends on...

WARNER

The record will remain open for purposes -- I will allow you to rebut that.

The record is open on this very important question. Any of the witnesses may supplement it.

One last comment, Mr. Chairman.

MYERS:

I don't think this committee or the American public has ever heard me say that things are going very well in Iraq.

This is a hard struggle. We are trying to do in Iraq what has never been done before. This is historic.

MYERS:

It's historic in terms of our security because it's part of the global war that General Abizaid talked about.

This is, for the Al Qaida, a center of gravity. Whether we like it or not, those are the facts.

We've got the Al Qaida in Iraq that's been charged to continue the fight not only in Iraq but in Europe and the United States. That's a fact. That's what he's been charged to do by the leader of Al Qaida.

And I don't know how you characterize what goes on in Iraq but we've set up milestones way back at the end of major combat.

The first remarkable thing that happened in Iraq was our troops took Baghdad just weeks after many critics said, "You're in a quagmire." Maybe some of the same experts that think we need more troops. But, "You're in a quagmire," and then a few weeks later, Baghdad falls.

It is not easy to do what we're trying to do in Iraq. It's not easy for the U.S. government or coalition friends to do it. And we've made lots of mistakes along the way, Senator McCain, no doubt about it. Because it's never been done before. It's never been attempted before.

But the outcome is so potentially stabilizing for the region and for our country and so here we are. We've had several transitional governments. We said the Iraqis would develop a constitution and have a vote in October. That's going to happen. We're going to have elections in December. I think that, in a sense, things are going well.

It's not easy. The people that understand that are the people that volunteered to go over there. If you talk to the men and women, they understand what's at stake and they're willing to go out on patrol, on raids, to protect infrastructure, to protect individuals and put their lives in harm's way because they understand what's at stake.

So I'm not -- not to be Pollyannish about this, this is tough. And I don't think I ever have been. But I think I've been a realist and I think I trust the judgment of people on the ground and people on the Joint Staff that have just come back from Iraq, the battalion commanders, the brigade commanders, the general officers.

I respect their opinion. They've been over there in the crucible with the blood and the dust and the gore. And those are the people that I trust their opinion.

And I particularly the opinion of General George Casey and General Abizaid. They've been at this a long time and they know what they're doing and we should trust them

WARNER:

Thank you very much.

Senator Kennedy?

KENNEDY:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,

And thank all of you for the continued service to the country.

I'm concerned, Mr. Secretary, by the continuing reports that the Iraqi police and security forces we're training are substantially infiltrated by the insurgents.

KENNEDY:

Earlier this month, I received a shocking letter from a retired military officer whose nephew is a Marine recently sent to Iraq.

And his letter says that, "My nephew was briefed by just-returned Marines that 100 percent of the Iraqi police and army have now been compromised by insurgents. He and his fellow Marines were warned that all operations that involve the Iraqi police or army units would result in ambush. Not all Iraqi police or army are members of the insurgency but he was briefed that all units were infested with hostile collaborators to the point of being dysfunctional as partner security forces."

We've had warning signs before about infiltration. A year ago, the New York Times reported that an adviser to the Prime Minister Allawi said that as many as 5 percent of the Iraqi government troops are insurgents who have infiltrated the ranks or they're sympathizers.

And at the time, we had Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Sinclair, the 1st Division -- said, "The police and military forces all have insurgents in them. You don't have a pure force."

Then in February, Major Don McCardell (ph), who's a deputy commandant of the 4th Iraqi Division training academy, said, "After a recent battle in Mosul, some insurgents' bodies were found wearing identification tags from the academy."

And in February, Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said penetration of the Iraqi security and military forces may be the rule *not* the exception.

And then on July 25th, the inspector general of the Defense Department released a joint report saying this: "Even more troubling is infiltration by intending terrorists or insurgents. There's sufficient evidence to conclude that such persons are, indeed, among the ranks of the IPS."

The report also says, "The meddlesome issue has been the fact that some graduates do not enter the Iraqi police service after completing training. Keeping tracking of the numbers trained but not assigned is an elusive problem. Some U.S. sources assert that the number might be as high as a third or more of those who have gone through basic training" -- a third or more.

The report went on to say that the questions of accountability for controlled equipment is particularly critical, the specter of weapons issued to members of the Iraqi police service from falling into the wrong hands is a concern.

As we all know, President Bush has said that our forces will stand down as the Iraqis stand up. The question is, who are we helping to stand up, and are the insurgents benefiting from the military training and the equipment and using inside knowledge to ambush and kill our soldiers?

Can you assure us, Mr. Secretary, and the American people that we're not training the insurgents in the Iraqi security forces?

RUMSFELD:

Senator, there's no question but that the vetting issue is a difficult one and an imperfect one. The people who are volunteering undoubtedly have among them individuals who are attempting to infiltrate.

The percentages you've cited, I've not heard from anyone in any kind of authority: the 100 percent or 30 percent, or those kinds of things.

It's a problem that's faced by police forces in every major city in our country, that criminals infiltrate and sign up to join the police force. We know that this is a difficulty.

They do have a vetting process. They also today have a better insight into it, as General Casey said, because they have embedded Americans in the Iraqi forces so they're better able to see how the leadership is, where the weaknesses are and where the possible infiltrations might have occurred.

General Casey, you may want to comment on it.

KENNEDY:

Yes, perhaps, General Casey -- you tell us the extent -- how much of a problem? We have the I.G.'s report as of July. It's quite extensive on this -- the other kinds of comments and statements that have been made that it is a problem and that it's not getting any better. I want your response.

CASEY:

Senator, my assessment is that it is more problematic with the police than it is with the army because the police are primarily recruited locally and the army is broadly recruited nationally.

CASEY:

As the secretary suggested, there is a vetting process, but it's a very difficult process and it's not a failsafe process for sure.

Numbers like 100 percent are not numbers that I know. We certainly do expect that there is some infiltration of the police and, to some extent, the military forces. But we don't see it in the way that would render these forces incapable.

Now, if I could just add one last thing...

KENNEDY:

Yes, I've just got a few...

CASEY:

We saw something down in Basra that is also troubling, and that is the presence of people in the police departments whose loyalty are more to their militia leaders than they are to the chief of police. And that was part of the situation down there that we...

KENNEDY:

Well, in your report that you're coming in October, can you expand on this, give us a fuller kind of report?

Just in the last moments that I have, I'm deeply concerned by the grisly photos American soldiers near the dead and mutilated bodies that have been posted on the Internet. There's a story in here today, in The Washington Post, and it's reminding us of the pictures that were there after Abu Ghraib.

And it's against the background of that excellent letter but that extraordinary young captain -- it was in the Post yesterday. Ian Fishback. It said, "Despite my efforts, I've not been able to get clear, consistent answers from my leadership about what constitutes law and humane treatment of detainees."

What in the world is going on when we see in the Internet the American service men posed against mutilated -- what does it say about our respect for those that we are fighting, certainly, but our respect for the dead and particularly the dead of other countries and other traditions? And what are we doing about it, Mr. Secretary?

CASEY:

Senator, those photos are not something that we condone. And we're taking appropriate action to ensure that that practice, such as it exists, is halted.

KENNEDY

My time is up.

WARNER:

Senator Inhofe?

INHOFE:

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

First of all, for clarification purposes, there was an article in yesterday's one of the papers talking about how the suicide bomber had penetrated the green zone and then it was retracted today. Did it not happen?

CASEY:

Senator, I don't have specific knowledge on that particular article that you're talking about,

INHOFE:

OK.

CASEY:

But I have no knowledge of someone, a suicide bomber, penetrating the green zone.

INHOFE:

That's very good, very good.

INHOFE:

The chairman talked a little bit about some of the things in terms of infrastructure.

On quite a number of trips that I've been over there, and one in particular I remember General Petraeus taking about the effectiveness, Mr. Chairman, of the CERP program, the commander's emergency response program, and how significant that is for a very small amount of money, they are in a position to see what needs to be done immediately in certain areas.

I'd like to have you comment -- perhaps, General Casey, you'd be the best one -- on that program.

CASEY:

It's probably our most effective program, Senator. And last year we spent over \$700 million, dispensed out through the commanders, small, high-impact projects that affected the local communities. And this is one of the best programs we have, in that our commanders have to influence things economically within their area.

INHOFE:

In other words, the money spent there is far greater than going through a process where something might be done six months from now.

CASEY

Certainly it has greater local impact.

INHOFE:

*Yes.*

CASEY

But the country still needs big projects and long-term...

INHOFE:

I understand that. Thank you very much.

Yesterday, in the closed briefing -- and I can say it now since you repeated it in this open briefing -- you talked about the average insurgency takes about nine years to put down. Consequently, one of the participants, or one of the senators in the audience, said in a rather loud voice right after that, where several people were listening, "Well, we've signed up for nine years."

My interpretation of that statement that you repeated today is, "Yes, that's true, and *this* could take nine years, but it doesn't mean that we are going to be doing it for nine years."

Would you clarify that?

**CASEY:**

That's exactly right, Senator. And that's the thrust of the strategy. The strategy is to put the Iraqis in a position to deal with the insurgency while we bring it down to a level...

**INHOFE:**

Very good. That clarification I think is very important.

I think we all remember the prophets of doom before the **January** election. We found them to be wrong. Those same prophets are out there right now. And I have every reason to believe -- quite frankly, I take the oversight responsibilities of this committee very seriously. I've been over there many times, and I will be over again next week.

**INHOFE:**

But you did **an** excellent job, General Casey, of outlining those good things that have taken place. And you put it in a very good light.

I would suggest any of those who are here -- the senator from Massachusetts, who I **am** understanding has not been there **personally** -- if you rely on reports and you rely on the media and the distorted way in which the media is reporting what's going on there, you're not going to get a very good idea of what's really going on.

I can remember so well spending one whole trip in the Sunni triangle, in Fallujah, just **talked** to the troops there. You used that quote, "9/11 won't happen again, because we'll defeat them here." I heard that same thing said by a Marine sergeant over there, in Fallujah.

And the former brigade commander that hated Americans, he's a brigade commander for Saddam Hussein, now after having experienced embedded training with our Marines over there has totally changed his mind. He loves them. He actually cried when the rotation came.

I mean, these things are actually happening over there.

He renamed the Fallujah security forces the Fallujah marines.

I was there right after in Tikrit when the explosion took place, 40 people -- Iraqis in training for security forces -- were either killed or were injured. And in that case, the families of those who were killed or injured actually replaced with another member of the family each one who went down.

Now, that's very significant that we talk about that, because these things are happening. And, as anyone who's been over there will tell you, the first thing you get from the young troops that are there is, "Why is it the media doesn't understand what we're doing, what our commitment is, the threat that our nation is facing?"

Last June we had a hearing on the IEDs, the improvised explosive devices, by General Votel. I'd like to know, since that time, is there any update on that particular -- any progress that's being made in terms of the threat of the IEDs?

MYERS (?):

Senator, with your permission, I'd like to hold the IED discussion for the closed hearing.

INHOFE:

That's perfectly reasonable.

Since my time is rapidly going by, let me get one last question in here.

General Abizaid, I'm reading a quote from you: "The Afghans and Iraqis on this trip kept saying to me over and over again, 'Are you going to stick with us?' And I kept telling them over and over again, 'Yes, we will.' I ask the American people not to make a liar out of me."

That's a great statement. And I've thought, you know, the cut- and-run caucus is alive and well here in Washington. I'd just like to have you make any comment you can make - - if we should surrender, if we should cut and run at this time, what would be the result?

**ABIZAIID:**

It would be a disaster for the region. It would be a disaster for the United States. It would be a disaster for the people in the region.

You know, Senator Inhofe, I look at this region -- I've been around this region most of my professional life. There are good things happening in the region that aren't measured by what soldiers do.

People are debating the future of governments. People are participating in electoral sorts of organizations and activities that were unheard of years ago. People are standing up for their rights, people are coming forward and debating their future in a way that I've just never seen before.

And I don't believe any of that would have happened were it not for the American soldier, sailor, airman and Marine.

And in the long run, there's nothing to be afraid of. We can win the fight. It's difficult. It's costly. But the implications of allowing the region to become dominated by the ideology of Al Qaida are the same as the implication in the years previous to World War II of allowing fascism to become the ideology of Germany. It will lead to a big war that none of us can stand.

We have to fight. We have to win. We can't walk away from this enemy.

Nor can we walk away from the good people of the region. We're fighting their enemy side by side. And over time more and more people will realize that.

It's easy to wring our hands and say, "Oh, woe is us." But those of us that are in the field don't say that. We say, "We're winning. But it's not going to be easy."

**MYERS:**

Senator, also, just let me add a comment to that.

If we were to lose in Iraq -- whatever that means: pulling out or whatever -- that is a hassle in this longer war that we've talked about, the war on terrorism.

And my view is that as soon as we pull out, that would embolden this Al Qaida organization, their violent extremist techniques and that surely the next 9/11 would be right around the corner. It would embolden them beyond belief if we were to cut and run, as some have said.

And we can't afford to do that.

INHOFE:

Thank you, General.

And by the way, let me associate myself with the remarks and the compliments about you, General Myers. Thank you so much for your service.

WARNER:

Thank you, General Abizaid **and** General Myers, for those very powerful statements.

WARNER:

Senator Reed?

REED:

Well, first, General Myers, let me, too, compliment you on **40** years of honorable service to the nation in the uniform of our country. That's something we all can agree upon and something to be very proud of. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, last September General **Curran** (ph) came before the committee and a response to a question from **Chairman** Warner indicated that the inspector general of the Department of Defense and the inspector general of the **CIA** had taken upon the task, in his words, of investigating the ghost detainee policy.

**Can** you give **us** an update on those investigations, when they are to conclude and when we might get results?

RUMSFELD:

I have **no** information about the CIA investigation. I certainly can get you an answer as to when the I.G. and the department estimates that they'll complete it.

REED:

Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, one other thing: In a response to Senator Kennedy's question, and I might have misheard you, but you seemed to imply that every police department is infiltrated by criminals.

RUMSFELD:

No. I think what I said was, if you look around our country and other nations and look at big city police departments, they do have a problem of vetting to see that they are not infiltrated by criminals.

We do know from time to time that there are scandals in police departments in major cities in the United States -- certainly in my lifetime I've seen it -- where individuals did end up inside the police department. But I didn't make any blanket statements...

(CROSSTALK)

REED:

Well, I just wanted to clarify that, Mr. Secretary.

General Abizaid, I agree with your analysis of the threat we face. It's a distributed network threat, entrepreneurial, ideologically driven, and committed -- regardless of what we do in Iraq -- to attack us here in the United States again.

And the question you raised, I think, is the primary question for us: How does Iraq fit into that overall threat?

Many Americans today are suggesting it doesn't fit very well; that, because of our presence there, because of the activities there, because of the events there, we are not winning the allegiance, support and cooperation of allies.

You have the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia who has said recently that he sees the country disintegrating, and that disintegration could lead to a regional conflict between Sunni and Shia.

Just yesterday, Secretary Hughes was assailed by Turkish women's rights activists about our policy in Iraq: the very good people that we would expect would be with us and would be supportive.

And on the tactical level, evidence suggests that there are numerous recruits going to Iraq from other countries in order to fight us, to keep this insurgency going.

And an issue that I find very troubling is that, in some respects, all of our activities there might be of marginal relevance to those other cells in other places -- particularly

Europe -- who might be much more capable of mounting an attack against their homeland because of language skills, the ability to move quickly through airports.

I mean, I think the idea of an American terrorist is someone dressed and speaking dressed like an insurgent in Iraq, but not someone with a British accent or a European accent.

REED:

So the question, I think, is how much does Iraq complement and help our strategic role, which -- I'd agree with you -- it's a long-term battle.

ABIZAID:

I think, in the long-term strategy, Senator, we certainly have to stabilize Iraq. I believe we have to stabilize Iraq. We haven't made the terrorists that have come our way; Al Qaida has made the terrorists that have come our way. We didn't ask for this war; it was thrust upon us.

The entire region plays, in different ways, in the overall battle. The most important thing is that Iraq stabilizes, Afghanistan stabilizes. And I believe, when that happens, it starts to be the beginning of the end for the extremist movement.

REED:

*But, General, just in response*, we did not ask to be attacked on September 11th. But we certainly made a conscious decision to attack Iraq on evidence that some people debate.

And now, I think, many people, not just myself but many others, are questioning whether that commitment of resources (inaudible) is really going to defeat this overall and much more lethal threat which you described to us very well, which is located in London and Hamburg and in Manila, in Jakarta.

And we're engaged there -- I agree with you: We can't leave it unstable. But that might be just because of the fact we at least prompted the instability by our actions.

ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, I don't know that I would say it's our actions at all.

I'd say that the main theater of military activity is Iraq. The main effort is George Casey. And we've got to stabilize Iraq in order to fight the broader Al Qaida threat.

The foreign fighter network is not just focused on Iraq. It moves worldwide. It's global. The fact that it happens to manifest itself by a large number of suicide bombers in Iraq gives us an opportunity to attack it, gives us an opportunity to understand the network -- this suicide bombing network that exists in Iraq exists in other places all around the world.

And so Al Qaida, as I've said in my presentation, Senator, is not the main enemy in Iraq. It is the most dangerous enemy in Iraq and it feeds on the instability of Iraq. We've got to stabilize Iraq in order to fight the broader enemy and the broader enemy's going to be with us for a long time.

But we can't walk away from Al Qaida. They won't let us.

REED:

My ~~time~~ is up.

WARNER

Senator Collins?

COLLINS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Myers, let me begin my comments today by echoing the thanks of my colleagues for your extraordinary service. We very much appreciate your strong commitment to your country and we wish you well.

General Casey, for the past year, this committee has received regular briefings on the status of the training of the Iraqi security forces. The training and equipping of those forces are a **key part** of our strategy, as you've outlined again today.

COLLINS:

It is, therefore, discouraging to hear today that there is only one Iraqi battalion that is fully capable. And as Senator McCain has pointed out, that number is fewer than just a few months when we were briefed on the status of *the* training effort.

That contributes to a loss of public confidence in how the war is going and whether this strategy is the appropriate one and it's being executed properly, whether or not we're making progress.

It doesn't feel like progress when we hear today that we have only one Iraqi battalion that is fully capable.

I have two questions for you. One, have we lost ground in the training of the Iraqi security forces? And second, how many fully trained Iraqi forces do we need in order for American troops to withdraw from the country without plunging it into chaos, an outcome that none of us wishes to see?

CASEY:

Thank you, Senator.

I'm struggling here a little bit with this "fully capable" because when -- and it may be something that we put on ourselves because of our military ethic. But when we say a unit is fully capable, that means something to us. It means that they are capable of going out and conducting operations without any other support.

That's a high standard, and we recognize that.

We also recognize that it was going to take the Iraqis -- one, because of recruiting and training issues, but also because of ministerial support along the lines of what the senators were talking about earlier in terms of pay systems, that it was going to be a while before the institutions of Iraq could support a military.

So we didn't want to wait until everybody was 100 percent fully capable. We adopted a strategy that says, "Give them the transition teams, get them to a level 2, where they can lead. And get them into the lead with our transition teams and enablers."

CASEY:

That's the one we're focused on. And there's over 30 battalions in that category.

So I understand what you're saying, how it could be perceived as disappointing, but really at level 2 and level 3 all of those units are operating with us. And in level 2, they have the capability to lead.

So have we lost ground? Absolutely not. In fact, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the transition teams that we've placed with the Iraqi security forces have enhanced what these organizations and these units have been able to do.

I will tell you, there's a lot of intangibles with unit readiness. For example, if a battalion commander gets dismissed and he goes off, that unit takes a couple of steps backwards. Then you have to rebuild that.

So this is a constant battle and challenge.

But the transition teams have given us the insight and the visibility into the real capabilities of these units. So we see it warts and all. And that's the only way we're going to get it fixed.

How many fully trained Iraqis does it take before we can start drawing down coalition forces? As I mentioned to somebody else earlier, we are not tied to a specific number. This will take place regionally, as the forces within those regions reach appropriate level. And then we will gradually start pulling coalition forces out.

So it's not, "We have to get to some number and then we can start." We'll be able to start gradually as these Iraqi security forces become capable of taking the lead with our support.

RUMSFELD:

If I might add, Senator Collins, if one thinks about it, out of the 194,000 Iraqi security forces, the army is 75,000. There are any number of other elements included in that number that are able to do what they are designed to do. A police unit's able to do what it's designed to do. The border enforcement, the highway patrol, the special police commandos, dignitary protection: These people are out doing what it is they are trained and equipped to do.

What we've done is to look at a grading system that we use here in the United States and tried to determine for the Iraqi army how they would fit. And that's where you get that one unit.

On the other hand, if you think about it, we don't judge our other alliances that way. We have NATO activities that don't have the enablers that they need to operate independently, and we have to participate with them with intelligence or with commander and control, with airlift or special reconnaissance activities.

If you think about it, our alliance with Korean is one where we're together. And a good deal of what they do, we do with them in assisting them.

So it's not clear to me that this ability to operate independently is necessarily the determinative metric. It needs to vary for each of the various elements as to what we ought to set as the standard.

And I think reality is, these folks are not going to end up at a level of U.S. forces, period. There isn't a military in the Middle East that's at anywhere near U.S. level.

MYERS:

Senator, as a way to measure progress -- and, George, help me on this -- but I think we have **86** Iraqi army battalions today that are operating with us.

MYERS:

How many did we have a year ago of those **86**?

CASEY:

Probably no more than a handful, Chairman.

MYERS:

And I *think* that bespeaks the progress as we move forward. Those are **86** battalions that are out there operating with our folks.

The people I've talked to in my recent trip over there -- talked to this great Army major -- sorry, captain...

WARNER:

General, I regret to say that we have been informed by our respective leadership that we're asked to take our seats for a very important vote in the Senate. So we will now stand in recess.

Before I do so, Mr. Secretary...

(UNKNOWN)

Until what time?

WARNER:

Till the hour of 12:15.

Secretary Rumsfeld, I had a very interesting telephone call last night from a Mr. Paul Steiger, managing editor of the Wall Street Journal. He represents, in his capacity, a large group of people.

And they're experiencing -- and he was speaking on behalf of the entire media, which is his responsibility in his group -- that they're encountering some difficulties. And I'm going to leave with you as I depart now the copies of the correspondence that I've received from him which, I understand, has also been forwarded to your office.

And perhaps when we resume, you might have some comment on that. I think it will require a period of time for you to fully assess the problem that he describes **and**, in all probability, to put in place such corrective measures **as** you desire.

So I'll leave that with you in hopes that maybe you can make some brief comment when we return.

We stand in recess until 12:15.

(RECESS)

WARNER:

The hearing will resume.

And, Mr. Secretary, as we concluded, I gave you correspondence which has been forward to your office, but through other channels, from various individuals who have responsibility regarding the press that are, I think, serving the interests of our country as well as they can under difficult circumstances.

My understanding is that you will take this under consideration.

And perhaps General Casey, who has the action responsibility, has a comment or two. Am I correct in that?

CASEY

Yes, indeed. Thank you.

Senator, I haven't had a chance to go through the whole letter, but I understand the issue. It's an issue that we take very seriously. And what I will do when I get back to

Baghdad is I'll get a few of the local journalists together and work through some of their concerns with them.

I'll also take a look at this letter here and get some responses back...

WARNER

If I might suggest, I would, on behalf of CENTCOM, because it relates, I'm sure, to the journalists in Afghanistan as well, I'd suggest you make a direct communication with the two principals that have forwarded the letters to myself, other members of Congress, and to the secretary of defense, as well as convening in-country a representative group to try and get their views.

And then once we gather the facts, I'm sure we can, hopefully, address this matter.

Now, I also suggested that during the interim that it was my concern that, listening very carefully to the testimony this morning, we need to have a clarifying and convinced set of fact to give the American public and indeed the Congress a more exact status of our efforts, together with coalition partners and NATO and others, to train the Iraqi security forces. And I think you're prepared to give that, General Casey.

CASEY:

Thank you for the opportunity, Senator. I don't think I did Senator Collins's question justice, in trying to explain the way we rate these forces. And I would not want people to think, because in the first category we've gone from three to one, that we're actually taking a step backwards with the Iraqi security forces, because that's just not the case.

A couple of points.

First of all, this fully capable: I mentioned in my testimony that one of the driving forces behind all of this strategy is that we need the Iraqis to be able to sustain the capability that they have as we progressively draw down and after we're gone. And so we wanted to set a very high standard and that became category one.

Now we recognize that it was a standard that they were not going to achieve for some time. And that's why we focused on the second level.

CASEY:

And that's the level where they take the lead and we put them in charge.

And I'll give you an example of the capabilities of those units that are in that second category. Just recently, the 3rd Iraqi Infantry Division conducted a three-brigade operation into the town of Tal Afar with coalition forces.

I mentioned in my testimony that that was the first major operation in which the Iraqi security forces outnumbered the coalition forces. All those brigades and all the battalions in those brigades were level 2, level 3, yet they fought with us into a major urban area, into an urban defense, and conducted the toughest type of ground combat very successfully.

And, you'll recall, about 500 insurgents or terrorists killed or captured as a result of that whole operation.

So that's the kind of capabilities these units that are categorized as level 2 and level 3 have, because they're able to do it with our enabling support.

If they'd been able to do it all by themselves without any of our support, they would have been in level 1. And that's some time in coming.

So I don't know if that gives it a little bit more granularity but, as I mentioned, we are making great progress.

WARNER:

Bottom line, you are making progress and the progress can be documented and you see it every day with the performance, which is every day increasing, and the professional capabilities of these forces.

CASEY:

Thank you, Senator. I couldn't have said it better.

WARNER:

Well, I thank you very much.

Senator Ben Nelson, you...

LEVIN:

If Senator Nelson would just yield...

WARNER:

He has a time...

LEVIN:

One minute. Just for 30 seconds.

BEN NELSON:

Sure. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

LEVIN:

It would be helpful to your point if you gave us how many level 2 there were four months ago or a year ago and how many there are now; how many level 3 a year ago, how many there are now.

I think that would -- you talk about granularity. It would help the point you're making. And I think you should just do it very clearly.

But I just suggest that to you. I don't want to take any more of Senator Nelson's time.

CASEY:

And I'm sorry, if I could just respond to that. We didn't start this till May.

LEVIN:

Fine. Give us May and now.

CASEY:

OK. And May was just the trial, too. So I got it.

WARNER

Excuse me. The chairman has indicated that you wish to address...

MYERS:

If I could tag onto General Casey's point for just a minute, some of the things that we made here, I think, are interesting.

The task forces that conduct raids in Baghdad, 26 percent of those are either Iraqi-led or Iraqi-only. So over a quarter of the major activities taking place in Baghdad are Iraqi-only or Iraqi-led. Just three or four months ago, George, that was probably zero.

Task Force Baghdad combat patrols -- this is the last week of July basically -- 43 percent of the combat patrols in Baghdad are Iraqi-only or Iraqi-led 43 percent.

Task Force Baghdad checkpoints, in the last week of July -- it's 22 to 28 July, actually -- Iraqi-only, Iraqi-led, 72 percent: 72 percent of the Task Force-Baghdad checkpoints -- 72 percent -- are Iraqi-only, Iraqi-led.

MYERS:

And if you go to multinational operations in north-central, we can compare the period 3 June to 9 June to 2 September to 8 September. In June, Iraqi-only, Iraqi-led checkpoint operation in north-central Iraq, 77 percent to 92 percent in September.

So everything you measure, the Iraqis are more and more involved. And those just aren't, obviously, the level 1 battalion, those are all Iraqis in the fight.

WARNER

Thank you very much.

Senator Ben Nelson?

BEN NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me extend my appreciation to General Myers for your outstanding service. And best wishes for a long and happy future.

As we look back, our mission in going to Iraq was to remove Saddam and ultimately democratize, through the workings with the Iraqi forces and people, the country of Iraq.

Now, we removed Saddam from power and historic elections have been held to elect the national assembly and prime minister. And, of course, a constitution has been approved by the assembly. And hopefully, the Iraqi people will vote it up, but we'll soon now whether they're going to vote it up or down.

So really what we're working at, it seems to me, is helping the Iraqi people do two things: one is govern themselves; and **two**, defend themselves, because if they can't defend themselves it's going to be very difficult, most likely impossible to govern themselves.

We have measurable benchmarks and events that work toward self-governance. One of the frustrations that I keep picking up from people when I'm talking to them back home is we don't have similar measurable guideposts or measurable results to be able to determine what is happening. **So** you've got some people saying, "We're winning the war," and others saying, "We're losing the war," when the truth of the matter is we need to find out what kind of progress we're making. Many of the questions today were based on trying to determine progress.

I don't **think** there's anybody that's going to raise a question about whether or not we're making progress but there probably will be some questions about how much progress do we need to make and maybe have we made.

**BEN NELSON:**

And more importantly, maybe, how much progress do we need to make to be able to satisfy both self-governance and self defense.

Now, I understand the importance of capability and readiness of the Iraqi forces to be able to do what is necessary to defend themselves. And I understand conditions-based reductions.

My first question is, what are our goals to achieve to train, equip and I suspect get experience for sufficient troops to be able to defend themselves in Iraq?

**CASEY:**

**As I** mentioned earlier in this, Senator, we have said that we were going to train and equip a total number of around 350,000 Iraqi security forces. That process will go on for some time, and particularly because the police training is a 10-week program...

**BEN NELSON:**

It's obviously important to have the entire security forces in place because of other things. But what kind of numbers do we look at or what percentage have we achieved with Iraqi forces, equivalent to special operations forces, capable and ready, to fight the insurgency to a standstill and defeat it?

CASEY:

There are 10 Iraqi divisions. And they have been placed around Iraq and partnered with coalition divisions. And the Iraqis have placed two divisions each in the most difficult areas.

BEN NELSON:

Are these part of the level 1 force?

CASEY:

They are part of the force that is progressing from level 3 to 2 to 1, and will progress there over time.

But we don't need to have that whole force at level 1, or even that whole force at level 2, before we can begin considering coalition reductions, because regionally there will be units that achieve capability faster than other units.

And so we're not waiting to get all 10 of these divisions all across Iraq level 2 before we start drawing down forces. We will actually start drawing them down by smaller-sized units as Iraqi brigades take over places around Iraq.

BEN NELSON:

Do we know, in our own minds -- and this is probably something that needs to be handled in a secure setting -- do we know what the number is that is really going to be required, of those 10 units, to be able to defeat the insurgency?

And we talk about it in 10 years, so is the variable 10 years? Can we defeat them faster if we have more? Are we faced with 10 if we have less? Or how does this equation work?

CASEY

Last year, actually around this time, we went through a very thorough analysis of what security forces the Iraqis needed, both on the military side and on the police side.

And that is the force we are building to now.

I just instructed General Dempsey, who just replaced General Petraeus now, that I thought it was time to conduct a similar review, to go back and look at what we have programmed, where we are, and decide if those forces are, in fact, still the forces that we need to do what you say: to be able to defeat this insurgency over the long haul.

**CASEY**

And we will continue to assess and evaluate this as we go forward.

**BEN NELSON:**

Well, the American people understand the checkpoints for self-governance. Is it possible to put together -- whether we're 20 percent capable at the present time, 30 percent -- in six months we would be at 50 percent capability and readiness to defeat (inaudible) with our embedded help? When I say "we", I'm talking about Iraq and our embedded help. Will we be at a point in six months at 50 percent capability to defeat the insurgency?

**CASEY:**

As has been suggested here, from a military and a police capability, we're not going to defeat the insurgency. And as you mentioned, the political side also has benchmarks and milestones.

So it's really the interaction of all of the different elements, political, economic and military that has to come together over the next period of months and years before we can ultimately defeat this insurgency.

**BEN NELSON**

But most of the people want to know whether it's months or years. And I'm not trying to pin you down in an unfair way. But I hear this constantly about those who have tried to push for a timetable. And I'm less interested in pushing for a timetable than I am in knowing what percentages, where we are at the level of reaching our ultimate goal.

That is also a factor that's variable for time as well as you say for the political capabilities as well as military capabilities and perhaps as well as governing capabilities.

As I understand, it's all tied together.

CASEY:

fight. And your question is a fair one. And we have now good visibility on the military units. And we also are starting to get better visibility on the ministries. Because those are the institutions that provide the logistical and the pay and all the other support that these military units and police units need to exist.

And it's all -- again, the military and police side, this is all interrelated as well. And so I do not have an overall metric that ties all that together and say: OK, we're 60 percent there in terms of security capability toward our broad objective.

BEN NELSON:

But don't you think...

RUMSFELD:

May I make a comment?

Sir, first of all, I think he mentioned 10 years...

BEN NELSON:

I said nine years..

RUMSFELD:

... For an insurgency. And I would like to make sure that everyone understands that that is not General Casey's prediction.

BEN NELSON:

I understand.

RUMSFELD:

That's the average length of insurgencies.

RUMSFELD:

And insurgencies ultimately are defeated by the indigenous people in that country, not by outside forces, because outside forces can, in fact, contribute to the growth of an insurgency if they are seen as an occupation force.

With respect to your question, the answer is, it seems to me, in two parts.

First, the political and the economic and the security all have to go forward together. And to the extent there's a failure on the economic or the political side, it makes the security situation in an insurgency environment more difficult.

Now, that means that there isn't an answer to your question where you could say 10 percent, 20 percent or 30 percent, I don't believe.

Second, we looked at the things that are easy to count -- numbers of divisions, readiness levels and the like. The reality is that the soft stuff that you can't count is every bit as and possibly even more important than the hard stuff.

What do I mean by the soft stuff! The relationship between the police and the military. The relationship between those entities and the intelligence community. The noncommissioned officers and the rib cage of a military or a police organization. The strength of the ministry and the effectiveness of the chain of command. The turbulence in the ministry.

All of those things are going to either favorably or unfavorably affect the progress on the security side.

Let me give you one example. Let's say that we have an election -- the constitution passes, which I believe it will, and there's election December 15th, and a new government comes in.

And let's say it takes 30 days to form the new government, there's a new minister of defense and he's effective, and he decides not to change everything for the sake of change, and he immediately takes advantage of the outside assistance and forms an effective ministry. That's one scenario.

The other is, the election takes place, there isn't a new government in one month, it takes four months or five months to form the new government, and the minister comes in and he decides he's going to swing the wheel this way or that way and change everybody, and there's turbulence.

Now, all of that's going to affect the effectiveness of the security forces every bit as much as the numbers.

DAYTON:

Would that be part of the equation that you're working on for condition-based reduction?

RUMSFELD:

Exactly.

DAYTON:

So it's still pretty hard to decide whether you're going to do anything in the next six months, isn't it, if you don't know all these variables?

RUMSFELD:

Well, you can't know the variables. **You** can't know how Syria's behavior's going to be. *Are they* going to be helpful or harmful? You can't know what **Iran's** going to be doing. *Are they* going to be helpful or harmful?

RUMSFELD:

And that's why you have to use the phrase "condition-based." It is not possible to look out there.

But the progress that's being made politically is real. They did **draft** a constitution. They are going to vote on it. There is going to be **an** election.

And that's good stuff. That's historic.

By the same token, the progress on the security forces: Every single week that goes by, the numbers **of** security forces go up, total. Even if we were to come down, even if the coalition were to go down, because of the **growth** in the Iraqi security forces, the total security forces are going up.

And that's a good thing.

And we believe that, over this period of time, there will be opportunities to transfer, as the General says, pieces of responsibility, pieces of real estate, over to Iraqi security forces. And that's a good thing.

BEN NELSON:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER:

Thank you.

Senator Sessions?

SESSIONS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rumsfeld, I think that was an honest and direct answer to our questions, and it's just a difficult thing to build from scratch a military and police force capable of operating on its own.

General Myers, it's an honor to have served with you, in a way. To think you've testified before 64 committee hearings is a stunning and ominous thought really. You have done so and won the constant respect and admiration of members of Congress.

None of them have ever doubted your integrity, your commitment to our men and women in uniform, your commitment to victory and your willingness to take any effort possible. And you've been honest with us time and time again.

If that had not been so, you would have felt the sting and complaint. You've not felt it.

It's a remarkable achievement. Your 40 years of service is something you can take pride in and all Americans do.

General Abizaid, I think you gave us a great briefing yesterday that was a closed briefing and a part of that and some of the same things you've said today. I thought it was comprehensive. I thought it was wise.

I thought it was good advice for America, no less than Ted Stevens, who's the president pro tem of the Senate who chairs the Defense Arms Subcommittee on Appropriations and who's been a champion of defense, said it was an extraordinary briefing, one of the best he'd heard in years. And I felt the same way.

So I was a bit taken aback when the assistant Democratic leader came out of the meeting -- I'm not sure he stayed till the end -- and said no plan had been presented. And I think you felt you gave a plan.

## SESSIONS:

I did. I want to ask you to comment on that, but that's the way I felt about it.

As with regard to the American people and our concern over the progress, the American people want to see progress. There have been ups and downs; there always have. But I have no doubt that they are committed to seeing this through and there's no movement out there to abandon our soldiers.

And what I hear from families who've lost loved ones is that they want us to succeed and to affirm the sacrifice their families members made.

General Myers, let me start off with you -- and if you others would like to comment on this -- I'd like to pursue it with some interest, and that is the military's role. Many of the questions that have been given to you today have dealt with infrastructure, they've dealt with political issues, they've dealt with relations with foreign countries, they've dealt with electricity and water and sewage and the mood of the people in Iraq and communications to the people in Iraq. And we have a lot of questions about that.

And in the Armed Services Committee, it's you in uniform that are here answering all of those questions. But isn't it a fact that the political process, the economic program, the education, the health program, the infrastructure -- electricity and water -- dealing with matters like corruption and the political efficiency, the Defense Department is not the lead agency for that but it is now the State Department?

## MYERS:

Senator Sessions, you make a very good point. Insurgencies, we've talked about, aren't defeated just militarily. There's always a political component, an economic component, educational opportunities and an informational component, both internally and externally.

And what we've tried to do is harness all instruments of our national power and all the instruments of national power of our international friends and partners in this is to bring those instruments of national power, of which the military is just one, to bear on the problem.

I think that our military has done a terrific job being the first on the ground to fill a lot of those roles. I mean, we had 21-year-old soldiers advising town councils on how to organize, relying on their high school civics lessons of course and their own good common sense and judgment.

But that has to transition at some point to where we have seasoned individuals that are steeped in these kinds of matters to be mentoring the Iraqi folks, and that is certainly not the sole role of the Department of Defense.

Most of those areas you mentioned are the responsibilities of other departments and agencies in this government, to include the State Department, as you said.

SESSIONS:

You might advise in that and you may even support them, but as the decision-making authority and responsibility, it would be those agencies and not the Department of Defense that's responsible?

MYERS:

That's correct.

And as we do with our troops that are in Iraq and as we've done with our commander in Iraq, General Casey -- General Casey is going to serve, as far as we know now, about two years in Iraq. ~~Our~~ troops serve about a year. And we need other departments and agencies to put there people over there with that same dedication and that same commitment of time to do the sort of work they need to do to finish the job.

SESSIONS:

Well, I just think we've got to *make* sure that State -- we've been asking: Is the military adequately prepared, staff committed, got an adequate program? We also need to be asking whether the other agencies of government -- who in recent months assumed primary responsibility for these ideas -- whether they're making adequate progress.

SESSIONS:

Thank you.

WARNER:

Senator, I agree with you.

It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that's been brought up by first General Abizaid in his opening comments, now General Myers, the fact that the military is doing its job, but we need greater support from other departments and agencies of the federal government.

Do you have a comment on how we can bring to bear --what could the Congress do to help you?

RUMSFELD:

Well, it is a fact. Another fact is that the United States government, in the domestic areas, is not organized, trained and equipped to do those things. We're not structured in a way that they can readily deploy people of certain competence levels the way the Department of Defense can.

And it is a reality that *to* the extent our country is going to be called upon to be engaged *in* these types of things that we do need to look at roles and missions in the executive branch of the federal government and the mirrored relationship in the Congress.

I mentioned one of the things earlier today, and that is the authority to help train and equip other countries. To the extent we can build partnership capacity in other countries, we relieve ourselves of that burden. To the extent we can do things like getting coalition countries to help us, we relieve ourselves of that burden.

The NATO train and equip in Iraq is a perfect example, where we are getting -- all of the NATO countries are in one way or another now assisting in Iraq.

*So* too in Afghanistan, where the NATO has taken over the north; it's now taken over the west; it's going to be taking over the southern sector of Afghanistan as well *as* the original Kabul ISAF activity. And that's good progress.

And it's important that, as General Myers says, that we recognize -- I'll just make a comment about Afghanistan. The Bonn process produced an arrangement whereby lead countries would take responsibilities for certain things.

The British took responsibility for the drug problem in Afghanistan. The Italians, as I recall, took the civil justice system or the criminal justice system. The Germans took the border patrol and various things. The reality is, that the progress in those areas in Afghanistan has been slow, because it's hard stuff. It isn't easy to do. Those countries don't have a background in developing that kind of competence. They're used to functioning in dictatorships.

And so partly it's just because it's hard stuff. Partly because the other countries and other elements of our government haven't fully arranged themselves to do as good a job as might be necessary...

WARNER:

Let's just take a minute. On our government, we have got to put that as the highest priority, because we are, daily, taking casualties. And, to the extent that infrastructure is not being brought together, it contributed to that casualty rate.

RUMSFELD:

Well, the executive branch has created a new entity inside the Department of State on - what's it called? -- stabilization and reconstruction. They've selected a new individual to assist in that -- Mr. Pascuale, as I recall, who is a very capable person. And the department is focusing on that.

The Department of State also has assigned Karen Hughes to be involved.

WARNER

All right.

RUMSFELD:

So there are steps being taken.

WARNER

All right. Thank you.

ABIZAID:

Mr. Chairman, if I could just add something to this. I want to make sure we make it clear here that we don't regard the other agencies of the U.S. government as not doing their jobs. We want to make clear to everybody that we need them with us out in the field because they add so much, especially in the counterinsurgency environment.

A young State Department officer that can work the politics in an Afghan province is worth a battalion. A USAID person that can help move a road project forward is worth a company.

It's just so important for us to understand that it's these young people that can come forward, stay with us long enough to learn the area. I believe there's absolutely no shortage of volunteers, but we need to make sure that priorities are right -- in the field, not in Washington.

**WARNER:**

I'll address this further, because I witnessed a superb job being done, on my last trip, by the State Department people that are implanted with our forces.

Senator Dayton, you're next.

**DAYTON:**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

General Myers, I want to join with my colleagues in thanking you for your extraordinary service to our country.

General Abizaid, you've defined the war in Iraq as a war against Al Qaida. If so, I think you're describing the failure of U.S. policy there, which is not a military failure at all, but it's a failure caused by strategic miscalculations by policymakers and the operational disasters that have plagued the last 2.5 years -- whether they were avoidable or not, I guess hindsight will say.

But Iraq was not a haven for Al Qaida before the U.S. invasion. Iraq was not -- as it's been called -- the front line of the international war against terrorism before war began.

I agree with what you've all said that we are there and that we must be successful. And I think, as you've defined it, I would read success as when the Iraqis can prevail there so that we don't have to.

I don't question to absence of a plan, but I think what people are asking here today is the progress, or lack thereof, toward that goal and what the anticipated timetable is.

**DAYTON**

It's been now almost, I believe, two years since the training of the Iraqi forces has begun, began in earnest, General Petraeus and others undertaking that, extremely well-qualified U.S. leaders in that regard.

As I talk to Minnesotans, particularly those whose husbands and wives and fathers and mothers are serving over there, they keep asking, "Why is it that we have to" -- their husbands, their loved ones -- "Why do we have to keep doing what the Iraqis seemingly can't or won't do for themselves?"

I'd like to read just a brief excerpt from -- a recent Time magazine describes the situation recently, September 6th, in Tal Afar -- and just ask for your response.

It said: "The two-day grace for civilians to evacuate stretches to a four-day standstill as the Iraqi prime minister orders a tactical pause. He insists on assurances from his military commanders that they battle will be a decisive success. The wait leaves U.S. troops embittered, their momentum lost to what they see as political calculations. Quote, 'This is turning into a goat blank,' close quote, bemoans an angry Green Beret. By the time the prime minister approves the assault into Al Qaida's heartland, it sizzles. Not a hostile shot is fired, not a single enemy fighter is found, safehouses and weapons caches are empty, cleansed like an operating room."

It sounds to me, if that's an accurate portrayal and description by somebody who was on site, that this is, as Senator Levin said, indication of a government or a Iraqi military command that believes they have all the time in the world and we're going to be there with them or for them for as long as the nine years or whatever it's going to be.

And I guess, you know, I echo what others have said, but the absence of their demonstrated willingness or ability or combination of the two to stand up and take responsibility for their own country against insurgents from within their own country, or outside the country -- but I gather the insurgent force, the military insurgence is primarily from within the country -- I mean, at what point are they going to be responsible? If they won't take responsibility after two years of training, how do we believe that they will in the next six months, 12 months or whenever?

CASEY

Well, let me take that, Senator.

DAYTON

Yes, sir.

CASEY:

First of all, I haven't read that article, but what you read is not an accurate portrayal of the prime minister's role in the sequence of operations in Tal Afar.

And I was personally involved with that ...

DAYTON:

I've known the media to be wrong myself.

CASEY:

Right. But that was not the case.

In fact, the goatender was working quite closely with us to set the conditions that made the military success there possible. They sent a team up to Cal Afar and negotiated with the sheiks, got all the sheiks from the different tribes Tobbin, and got them to invite the military force in.

That was a huge plus for our soldiers. They put in place emergency measures -- curfews, vehicle bans, close the border, putting exclusions on on the border -- again, to make the job easier for our troops. They pulled together a \$50 million reconstruction package and compensation package for Tal Afar.

And those were some of the conditions that were being set as we went between the 6th and the 10th of September. So the prime minister wasn't pulling the string on that, but they were actively helping us.

CASEY

On your question of why we have to keep doing things for the Iraqis, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we recognize that we need to empower the Iraqis and to get them in the lead as soon as they are capable.

They want that. The leaders want it. The Iraqi people want it. And it's a matter of us assisting them with their training and equipping and making them better faster.

They're embracing that. We are making progress on that. And we're really at a different level now than we were two years ago.

DAYTON

General, how long is basic training for a American basic soldier take?

CASEY:

I think it's about nine weeks and then advanced training after that is added on.

DAYTON:

So, again, I cannot just cannot understand how almost two years now after we'd begun the training -- and I don't question the ability of General Petraeus and others who have led the training -- but almost two years later, we don't have Iraqis who are trained to do what, I guess, our soldier are trained to do after nine weeks or whatever advanced training thereafter.

CASEY

Basic training, they've done. And most of the Iraqi soldiers that have been through the basic training are not as capable as ours, certainly, but they can do basic tasks. But it's taking those soldiers, putting them in units, training them as units at progressively higher levels.

And until Iraqi commanders, at the colonel and general officer level can direct and plan Iraqi forces in conducting Iraqi operations, they're not going to be able to take over. And that's the whole strategy.

DAYTON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman now.

RUMSFELD:

May I make a brief comment?

ABIZAID:

Senator, I'd like to make a comment, if I may. It has to do with the Iraqis. You ought to read David McCullough's book, "1776," about the birth of our own army. It's amazing. And you ought to consider, in most of the 33 years I've been serving in the United States Army, we've struggled to make ourselves better. And we just do that all the time.

And so I have great respect for the Iraqis and what they're trying to do. Sometimes we give the impression that they're not organized, they're not trained, they're infiltrated.

More Iraqis have died fighting for Iraq against this insurgency than have Americans. And that deserves our respect and thanks.

We're fighting with them, not against them. And it just time and time again that we've got to understand that this war in the Middle East is as much about respect for the people that are fighting with us as it is anything else.

WARNER:

Thank you very much.

Senator Graham?

RUMSFELD:

Mr. Chairman, may I make a quick comment on this? This is an important subject.

First of all, just historically, we ought to refresh ourselves that Zarqawi was already in Iraq before the war ever started. Zarqawi was running terrorists out of Iraq in several countries before the war ever started.

Saddam Hussein was listed as a terrorist state before the war ever started. Saddam Hussein was giving \$25,000 to the families of suicide bombers before the war ever started.

With respect to the Iraqis taking hold, General Abizaid's right. The Iraqi security forces have lost more people than the coalition has since a year ago September. They've lost twice as many.

The people who are running for office are threatened. Their lives are threatened. The people who are voting, their lives are threatened by the people who are trying to prevent democracy from occurring in that country. There is a lot of Iraqi courage that's being demonstrated in that country every day.

WARNER:

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I think it's helpful that we get the full picture on this very important issue.

Senator Graham?

GRAHAM:

Well, thank you.

He just stole my first question. My first question was going to be to say that I think the causality figures for us is 1,922. That may be wrong, but it's over 1,900. Is that correct?

RUMSFELD:

I was using the killed in action.

RUMSFELD:

Ours is currently 1,475, I believe.

And the Iraqis have had roughly double since I think it's a year ago.

GRAHAM:

That was the point I was going to make: If there's a reason to be optimistic in all of this, I think the reason to be optimistic is, this is the only place in the Mideast or anywhere in the world I know, where people are taking up arms against the Zarqawis of the world.

And, Mr. Secretary, I would suggest to you you give us a complete number, if you can, later on, how many Iraqis have died fighting the insurgency, how many Iraqis have been killed trying to run for office, how many Iraqis have been killed joining the army.

I think the numbers are large. And it gives me a sense of optimism, because at the end of the day, all you can ask of anyone is to be willing to fight and die for your freedom.

So I think that's the most optimistic thing that's available to us: something for us all to hang on to is that the Iraqis, whatever problems they have, they're still fighting and dying for their own freedom. And it makes me proud to be their partner.

And we need to know a number, because I think the American people need to know a number, too.

But the one thing I found about this hearing, the tone has changed. There's certainly a political component of whether we should have went into Iraq to begin with. And it's been replaced with some pretty good questions, on both sides of the aisle.

You mentioned trust, General Myers, about the officers serving with you on the panel and the people in the field. It's not a question of trust, but I think we're in a position now of trust, but verify.

Because I've heard things from panels before. I'm no military expert. I'm a military lawyer. So I certainly know my limitations.

But I do have common sense, General Casey. And you said the last time we were here the insurgency was 0.1 percent. And I was amazed at how you could pick a number so accurately. And I was skeptical if anybody really knows the number of insurgents over there to the point that it's 0.1 percent.

And when you say that, it bothered me. Do you still believe that?

**CASEY:**

Senator, what I said was, even by our most pessimistic estimates of the insurgency, we estimated it to be less than 0.1 percent of the overall population of Iraq. And I think that's still about right.

**GRAHAM:**

And my comment -- you **have** no way of knowing and no one does. And I don't have **any** confidence in that number. I know you're on the ground; I know you're risking your life.

But the point we've learned about Iraq, that it's fluid and it changes. And getting your **hands** on this is very difficult. The insurgency changes. **Its** make-up has changed to where the foreign fighter is now the biggest threat. The Sunnis are beginning to join.

So I just caution you: It's OK to say, "We don't know how many, but we're going to go after all the ones we can find and there are a lot of Iraqis who are fighting them in addition to us."

And Zarqawi has lasted a long time in Iraq.

Who said he was there before? **Was** that you, Mr. Secretary?

**GRAHAM:**

He was there before but he survived a long time. And common sense tells me there must be a support network over there, fairly sophisticated, for this guy to have survived this long. And that's just common sense.

My question, fairly simply put: In hindsight, looking back, has there ever been a point in time -- to anyone in this panel -- where it was clear, looking backward, that we did not have enough troops to secure the country?

CASEY:

I guess I'll start.

It's been clear to me from the beginning -- from the beginning -- that we've had the right number of troops, given the balance we're trying to balance, given the balance between being seen as occupiers, or seen as liberators.

It's a tough balance.

Now, things have changed. So in hindsight -- I don't know in hindsight that I would change my opinion. There are some things we'd do different in hindsight. There is no question about...

(CROSSTALK)

CASEY:

...has to do with the number of troops.

GRAHAM:

I don't mean to cut you off but I've only got five minutes.

So I would suggest that one of the lessons of Abu Ghraib is that we had an ill-prepared force for the mission assigned to them; that the people in that prison weren't really well-trained to run a prison. They were overwhelmed because, in August, you had 600 prisoner. By October, you had 6,000 prisoners. And it's clear to me that the people in Abu Ghraib weren't equipped and trained to handle the mission and they got overwhelmed.

That would be an example. It was clear to me that the looting was rampant right after the fall of Baghdad.

I'm not blaming you. I'll take blame. I thought it would be a lot easier than it has been. I thought the Iraqi people would step up to the plate. I missed it a mile. If you want

somebody to blame, I went home and said, once the statue fell, "Good times are ahead." I misunderstood.

The point I'm trying to make: It's clear to me there have been times in the past where we didn't have enough troops. And if you don't see that, that bothers me.

And please, anyone else join in in answering.

CASEY:

I just note, Senator Graham, that on two occasions, last year's election and this year's election, I didn't have enough troops to do what I needed to do and I asked for more and I got them.

And if I could go back to your original comment, Senator, my comment on the 0.1 percent was more a comment about the 99.9 percent of the Iraqi population that wants something better, rather than a comment on the size of the insurgency, which we all know is very, very difficult to calibrate.

MYERS:

It is very difficult to calculate, even though we've been pressed, right here in this hearing room, by the way -- I've been pressed personally; been talked to very strongly. "Give us the number." "Give the American people the number."

And, as you've just stated, Senator Graham, when you're dealing with an insurgency, you can't come up with a number.

And so I think we've done exactly the right thing there.

And I think the way General Casey puts it is about right. I mean, we do have ideas of numbers. But in insurgencies, you always have people that on one day are insurgents and on the next day are business people and -- depending on how the political process is going and their economic fortunes are going -- will have different views.

MYERS:

Whether or not we had the right training, the right number of folks in Abu Ghraib is one issue. Whether or not, in the broader sense -- which I thought you were talking about -- that we had the right number of troops generally in Iraq is another issue.

I'll stand by the commanders' request for those troops. Of course, you know, right after major combat, there were proposals to go lay down in troop strength. And it was others that prevailed, that said, "No, we should not do that."

And so we've made adjustments from the day major combat was over. And we had the flexibility to do that because, as you know, we brought the 4th I.D. after major combat for the very purpose of trying to work through the stability and reconstruction that would follow.

So I think we've called the audibles.

I agree that the folks at Abu Ghraib, obviously, could have been better trained. And perhaps they needed more. Now, it turns out there are resources in-country that could have been redistributed but, unfortunately, commanders on the ground that were involved in Abu Ghraib and responsible for it didn't make those requests.

WARNER

*Thank you very much, Senator.*

ABIZAID:

Well, Senator, if I could say a word or two. Obviously, you know, there's a certain amount of frustration where we're obviously not getting through.

At one point -- I think it was during the presidential election period -- we were very close to 200,000 troops in Iraq, which was more than we had at any time during the ground campaign by substantial amounts.

So our numbers have gone up and they've gone down. And they have responded to what we think we need. But at the same time, we've always been mindful of saying, "Look, you Iraqis need to understand that you have to step up to the plate."

And so there's a tension and there's an art in all this that's difficult.

But I would like to say something: I don't believe that we're fools. We have made mistakes. Abu Ghraib was a huge mistake that we've tried to recover from in a lot of different ways.

We've made probably a clear mistake in the way that we originally resourced our headquarters right after the movement phase of the ground war and we corrected that.

And as I look out now, I'll take responsibility for that, you know.

So there are a lot of mistakes in war. The key is whether or not you can learn from your mistakes. And I think, in balance, we've done pretty damn good.

GRAHAM:

See, that's the ultimate question -- and, Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to belabor this -- because there are some of us who believe that a larger military footprint, particularly in the support area, would have advanced the cause quicker.

And when you see a city cleaned up with a major military action to be reoccupied, whether it's the lack of Iraqi troops or American troops, that dynamic needs to stop.

GRAHAM:

So we've seen several instances where the insurgencies have been defeated by Iraqi and American troops fighting very bravely only to reappear in the same areas, and that confuses us.

ABIZAID:

But, Senator, if I may, there is no straight line in counterinsurgency business. And there's an awful lot of learning that has to go on.

And, for example, you take the first battle of Fallujah. Obviously, if you had just taken away the military component and isolated it and said, "Do this," and then not added into it the governance component, you might have had a different conclusion but you might have overall destroyed our ability to accomplish the mission in the long term.

Getting back to Senator Nelson's point, this issue of governance and military, indigenous forces being built together in a synchronized fashion, it's the key to success. But there are so many outside influences that move around it and flurry around it that make it difficult for commanders on the ground to sense. The most important sensing is whether or not the Iraqis are willing to fight for their own country. And so far, General Casey and I can say to you and to our secretary, "Yes, they are."

And the day they're not, by the way, we'll come forward and we'll tell you. But give them a chance.

WARNER:

Thank you very much.

Before we proceed, Mr. Secretary, you quite accurately reported that the total number of deaths associated with combat-related activities is around 1,450. But when you add those that have lost their lives in a non-combat, non-related status, it's about 1,922.

That's the figure that so often is reported. And I want those following this hearing to be able to reconcile the two different figures.

And I think it's always imperative when we talk about our casualties of the wounded, and that is over 1,200 who have suffered in one degree or another the combat wounds.

RUMSFELD:

Just for the record, you're quite right. I said "killed in action," and there have been an additional 450 to 500 that have been killed in non-combat environment.

The actual killed in action thus far is 1,480. And I don't know what the date of this is, but the U.S. wounded are roughly in the 14,700.

WARNER:

I think it's very important that we...

MYERS:

Another important number there, Chairman, is that of the wounded of which we see many of them back here in the two major hospitals here in town -- of the 14,752 is the number I have, as of yesterday -- about 50 percent were returned to duty in just several days, which I think is a tribute to the commanders and NCOs, their tactics, techniques and procedures and the gear that's been provided and equipment that's been provided.

WARNER:

Protection gear.

MYERS:

Protection gear and so forth. Which is a remarkable number unlike any other time in our history in terms of combat. I mean, it's just absolutely remarkable.

WARNER:

"hank you very much, gentlemen.

Senator Lieberman?

LIEBERMAN:

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

General Myers, let me join the chorus of thanks to you for your extraordinary service. I was thinking as the hearing was going on that it's a measure of the respect that this committee has for you that on the day before you end your remarkable career in the military we're still asking you tough questions. And you're answering them.

MYERS:

I appreciate the opportunity. And thank you for the comments, Senator.

LIEBERMAN:

Thank you.

I thank all of you for being here. I particularly thank General Abizaid and General Casey for coming back.

I think you know -- and you've testified to it -- that in a conflict of this kind, there's a battlefield at home as well as a battlefield over there. And support for the war is eroding here. We can feel it at home. And when we go home we can see it the public opinion polls.

And it's very critical that you and the uniformed military be part of two things -- two questions we've got to answer: one, is it worth it for us to be in Iraq; and two, is what we're doing working?

And I think you've fanned out across Capitol Hill this week in a very effective way. Tough questions, but those are the kinds of exchanges from which progress occurs.

I think we've got to figure out a way that you do the same with more of the American people. If they get to see you here, they'll maybe even have opportunities to question you.

I appreciate General Abizaid's introduction. The global war against Islamist terrorism is critical to our future security. I don't think you'd get anybody on *this* panel or most anybody in this country who would disagree with that.

Senator Reed raised an important question, which is: There are a **lot** of people out there who don't get exactly how Iraq fits into that. And I think we've got to begin to describe what would happen if we failed in Iraq, which is that **there** -- and one of you said it and we've got to say it over and over again -- **there** will undoubtedly be a civil war; there will undoubtedly be destabilization in the entire region.

And if you or any **of us** were the terrorists, you'd say, "Well, how about that? We've got a method that works here. So we did it in Iraq now let's take it to Saudi Arabia or Egypt or the Gulf states." You just think about the implications for them and for us.

So I think maybe people need to be reminded in a very personal way why this is important.

But the second part **of** it is: Is it working? And here we've got a real challenge because, as you know, what the people see every night on the television is suicide bombing.

In one **of** the briefings -- a classified briefing you gave yesterday -- you gave a measure of how successful we've been at not losing battles, if you will, or platoons, or any platoon.

But **as** the people see those suicide bombings going up, they interpret them as defeat. And I think we've got to convince **them**, one, that -- I think you've convinced us that you've got a plan. And I think the question is: Is the plan working?

And the second part of that, I would appeal to you -- I think you said it to Senator McCain, when he talked about people arguing for more troops there. I'm sympathetic to that point of view myself.

I just said to John afterward: "We ought to give you a list of names of people who'll tell us when we need more troops there we'd be better off and urge you to hear them out and respond to them."

But here's my question, and **this** is the difficulty: How do we defeat **an** enemy of this kind, where it is a **fraction** of the overall Iraqi population, but they're prepared in unbelievable numbers to blow themselves up?

Somebody -- Tom Friedman -- said they hate us or they believe in their cause more than they love their own lives.

And they keep coming back. I think by one standard, it'll be hard to say that there were fewer of the enemy today than there were six months or a year ago.

So as I look at Iraq -- and I think a lot of people following it with less support of what we're doing there than I do say, "Wow, the economic reconstruction isn't going very well. Maybe that's because of the security problems."

Remarkably, the political situation has gone a lot better **than** most people had a right to expect. People come out **and** voted in January. The constitution forum. It's not perfect but, overall, real progress. Hopefully it'll be adopted in the referendum and then the election.

**LIEBERMAN:**

But I think so long as the suicide bombers go on, and we don't show the progress **better** than you've reported today in the training of the Iraqi security forces, we've got a problem with American public opinion.

I'll see if I can focus **that** into a question. How do we defeat an enemy like this where **they're** not fighting fair? They're just going to vulnerable targets and blowing themselves **up**. And that creates a certain amount of **havoc both** on the battlefield and particularly here at home.

**CASEY**

Why don't I take a swing at that first because that's precisely the challenge that we're working to deal with. And I may go into a little more detail if you're there for the closed session. But in general terms, first, you have to stop **them** from coming into the country. And that was the discussion we were having earlier about restoring Iraqi control to their borders.

We've **had** success up in the north and we'll **continue** to work that. We're working on the Euphrates River valley **which** is where most **of** these guys are coming in now.

So we'll restore Iraqi control of **that** border.

Then you have to disrupt the **facilitation networks** all throughout the country. **And** then you have to go after the leaders and the facilitators who are actually instructing **these folks** where to go and to linking them up with the car bomb.

**And** then the last **part** is the guy who makes the car bomb. **And** so there are all these pieces of this network that have to **be** attacked and are being attacked simultaneously.

But as you know, trying to kill and capture someone who's willing to **kill** themselves is not an easy task.

**ABIZAD:**

Senator, I would just add a point that I've tried to make on other occasions. We have to expose the enemy. No culture will respect itself when it understands that its young people are killing themselves by killing innocent women and children that are minding their own business. I don't believe any culture anywhere can stand for that.

And, ultimately, there are antibodies within the true Islamic community that will prevent this from happening. And we've got to help those people help themselves against this phenomenon.

We see the Saudis in particular working very hard now to fight against this phenomenon. They've dropped down the number of people that are infiltrating into Iraq because they're pushing it.

They're attacking the sickness within the extremist groups. But it's incumbent upon everybody in this part of the world to not use extremists to further their ends but to stamp it out before it becomes their worst enemy as well.

LIEBERMAN:

Well, I appreciate the answers, particularly the part which we had begun earlier to try to block the borders across which those foreign fighters are coming.

My time's up. I just want to say -- and I'm not going to ask another question -- I urge you to try to work up a better explanation of the progress we're making in the training of the Iraqi security forces. Senator McCain said there were three at the top level. I heard in an earlier briefing that there was one. So it's one to one.

Now, we still might ask, why hasn't it improved? But at least it hasn't gone down

And the second is, in that second category, where they can stand up and fight but they need our logistic support, there's been an increase there, and I think we have to give people a sense of, as I said, it's worth it and it's working. And part of the working is that we're making progress.

Thank you for your testimony. Look forward to working with you toward that progress.

MYERS:

Senator Lieberman, could I just -- let me just tag on to what General Abizaid said on how you confront the long war.

And he had a chart **up**. I think it was his last chart and it had a big circle, and it talked about the virtual and the real elements that an insurgency that attracts people to commit suicide for their extremist beliefs needs to function. And on that chart perhaps the most important element is getting the voice of moderation, of moderates, heard.

I think on the good news front, if you check, and you check in the Middle East and around the world, for that matter, that the moderates are more and more speaking out.

The Al Qaida and these violent extremists I think have way overplayed their card and the moderates are now understanding that what they represent is outside any religion that anybody believes in, and it's certainly outside civilization. This is uncivilized behavior, and that is something nobody wants to tolerate.

So there's parts of this that are working, but it needs a broader strategy. If you look at that chart, the financing, the rest of that, there are lots of parts to that that have to be addressed, that has to be addressed with all instruments of national power, both here and internationally. And that's how you eventually get to the point where people aren't will to come forward and do that, where it's just so abhorrent.

LIEBERMAN:

'Thanks.

My time is up. Thank you.

WARNER

Senator Clinton?

CLINTON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I join in thanking General Myers for your many years of service. Wish you well as you head into retirement.

You know, one of the challenges for those of us sitting on this side of the table is that the strategy which you have described, and I think earlier was characterized as a strategy with great clarity, has neither benchmarks nor results that we can see which lead us to believe it's a strategy that is working. So even if it's a strategy with clarity, it may not be a strategy with success.

And I think that's the challenge for us, to try to understand where we are in this situation.

Secretary Rumsfeld, when you were actually a member of Congress years ago you said about a previous war -- namely, Vietnam -- "The people of the United States must know not only how their country became involved, but where we are heading."

So to that end, I'd like to ask first General Casey, a recent article in Foreign Affairs by Andrew Krepinevich asserts that the United States lacks a coherent strategy for defeating the insurgency and winning in Iraq. He argues that the president's statement that, quote, "As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down," describes a withdrawal plan rather than a strategy.

Mr. Krepinevich lays out a strategy for countering the insurgency by shifting U.S. military efforts from focusing on chasing and killing insurgents, to seeking to provide security and opportunity to the Iraqi people by ensuring the safety of key areas and gradually expanding those secure areas over time -- sometimes referred to as the oil spots theory -- thereby denying the insurgency the popular support it needs.

CLINTON:

Now, the article concludes that in order for this strategy to succeed, it will require at least a decade of commitment and hundreds of billions of dollars, and will result in longer U.S. casualty rolls.

General Casey, do you have an opinion of Mr. Krepinevich's assessment, that we need to focus in Iraq away from hunting down insurgents and toward an emphasis on providing secure areas that deny popular support to the insurgency?

CASEY:

I read the article. And just a couple of general impressions.

I think he has a very good view of history and he has a very good feel for counterinsurgency doctrine. But my sense is, he has misapplied this strategy in Iraq.

And what I read it as is a sequential strategy for a rural insurgency, rather than an urban insurgency that we're dealing with in Iraq. These cities, like Tal Afar, for example, of a quarter million people, so they're not hamlets, they're fairly substantial cities.

The other piece is the sequential piece. And while it is a well-accepted piece of counterinsurgency doctrine that you need to protect the population and you need to isolate them from the insurgents -- and we are doing that across Iraq -- I think there is a

misperception that all we're doing is running around chasing people and trying to kill them; that our soldiers and leaders are not out there every day gathering intelligence, protecting the population, assisting the population in things, as was mentioned earlier, the CERP program, where they invest in the community.

So our soldiers have a very good feel for counterinsurgency doctrine. And I've recently sent a team out there to see how they were applying it. And the team came back and said that they generally have it about right.

Sure, there are things we can do better. But we're applying counterinsurgency doctrine to the situation in Iraq, and doing it fairly well.

So broadly, good thoughts on how to deal with things. But I think his sequential strategy, like he suggests in Iraq -- I think we're past that. We had to do it in Fallujah and those places last year. We didn't have enough Iraqi security forces. Now we're getting to the point where we do.

CLINTON

General, the problem, of course, again, from this side of the table, is that we can't even secure a six-mile road from the airport into Baghdad. It's very hard to get whatever the metrics are that we are asked to judge success by.

CLINTON:

And I think there is at least, again, based on people with whom we speak and who reach out to us, an acceptance of the fact that the insurgency has gotten more organized, more deadly and larger.

You know, the London Times quoted an American intelligence officer in Baghdad, who said we had reason to believe that Zarqawi is now giving tactical command in the city over to groups that have had to merge under him for the sake of their survival.

This week, The Washington Post quoted the top U.S. military intelligence officer in Iraq, Major General Zahner as saying, "I think what you really have here is an insurgency that's been hijacked by a terrorist campaign."

And what is troubling to many of us is that the numbers that are reported to us of the insurgents continue, if not to grow, at least not to decrease.

And a recent CSIS study concluded that there was an unsettling realization that the vast majority of Saudi militants who have entered Iraq were not terrorist sympathizers before the war and were radicalized almost exclusively by our invasion and what happened next.

So, it is difficult for us -- and on this committee, you have people who have spent a lot of time trying to understand this -- if we can't understand what the metrics of success are, if we don't see the results of this strategy with clarity, I think it is hard to expect the American people, who tune in and out of this as the information comes to them, to understand exactly where we are headed.

So, I guess I join my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in expressing concern and frustration that we just don't see the success of the strategy that you have described and that you have very eloquently defended in the course of this hearing and on other occasions.

CASEY:

Senator, I take your point on the metrics. I would say the Route Irish myth is a little dated. There has not been a casualty there since June. Iraqi security forces have gone out there with our coalition forces and we are able to use that root without a great danger of casualty.

Your comments on the insurgency and the levels of violence: I recognize that that is what it appears. But that is what the terrorists and insurgents are trying to convey. They're trying to convey that they are winning. And they're doing it by murdering innocent Iraqis and by putting car bombs and improvised explosive devices against us and our Iraqi colleagues and against civilians.

And it's a tough situation. But that's what a terror campaign is all about.

And this is about political will. And as I said in my opening statement, they are attacking ours and the will of the Iraqi people. They're not winning in Iraq and they will only win here if we lose our will.

CLINTON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MYERS:

A couple of extra points, Mr. Chairman.

We've got Andy Krepinevich. He's either been in or he will be, and we've asked him to come in and talk to us on the joint staff and talk about his theory because, as this has been from the beginning, we're happy to have folks that think there's a better way of doing this come talk about their particular strategies.

And then back to Senator Lieberman, just for a minute, but it ties into this, as well, about winning, you know, every time a terrorist blows himself up or injures civilians, the violent extremists' cause loses. Now, that might not have been true early on but it's certainly true today.

If you remember, after the London bombings, there were fatwas issued by moderate Muslim clerics in Europe, in Asia and in the United States. Those bombings have dropped OBL's rating -- which at some point he was favored in Iraq by over 70 percent; 70 percent said, "Pretty good guy." Now it's around 20 percent.

So their strategy is not working. They have no offer of hope. And I would say our strategy is.

But it's as George says: It's a test of wills. In Iraq, they get it, and we've got to make sure we stay stalwart, too. At the same time being flexible enough to adjust strategies as required. And I think that you've got a team here that's wanted to do that.

WARNER:

For the benefit of all present, recognizing we have two members that have yet had their question opportunity, both members will be accommodated. At the conclusion of their questioning period this hearing will be completed.

And, Mr. Secretary, we will ask that the record remain open such that we can place into the record certain classified material, which General Casey was anxious to provide, and questions for the record.

We have to close the hearing in recognition that you have to appear before the other body at 2 o'clock, and we want to in every way accommodate that schedule. Am I not correct in that?

RUMSFELD:

That's correct, yes, sir.

WARNER:

Thank you.

Well, I appreciate that we've had a very good hearing and we've been able to accommodate all senators here.

Next, Senator Chambliss for a period of six minutes, followed by Senator Nelson.

CHAMBLISS:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I will be brief.

Gentlemen, first of all, let me once again thank you for the service that each of you provide to our country. We can't tell you enough how much we appreciate you and particularly those brave men and women that serve under you.

And, General Myers. I don't know how many more times we will see you but just know...

(LAUGHTER)

...how much we appreciate your great service to America as well as to the United States Air Force.

MYERS:

Sir, it's been a privilege.

CHAMBLISS:

You have been a great trooper in every single way.

I just want to make a comment, because I take a little bit different take than some of my other colleagues do about what's happening over there now.

General Casey, General Abizaid, I had the privilege of meeting with you on -- I didn't see you the last trip, General Abizaid, but I did see General Casey once again.

I was there in Thanksgiving last year; was back last month. And, gentlemen, I don't have to tell you that the difference in what I saw between November last year and August this year was amazing.

When General Petraeus laid out for us the chart which showed the dynamics of what we have done under his leadership in transforming the Iraqi army, it's truly amazing what's been done in a short period of time.

We've argued within this committee about how many troops were trained. There have been a lot of numbers that are thrown out there. And we all have ultimately agreed that it doesn't make any difference what the numbers are; it's how many are ready to go to battle.

And what General Petraeus has done, with you all's help, is to take whatever number, and it's probably 170,000, that have been trained -- they may not be ready to go to battle, but there is 170,000 -- and he's taken individuals who had never held a gun before in hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of instances, and trained those individuals to be not just infantryman, but to drive tanks, to be medical corpsmen, to be engineers, to do all the things that people have to do at every level of a trusted and competent military.

And that has not been an easy task.

The one thing that General Petraeus nor any other person who is responsible for training the military can do is to train somebody how to be a leader. Leadership has to come from within. And anybody who is a member of the Iraqi army now, who exhibited leadership before, would probably have been in opposition to Saddam and he'd have been killed or his family would have been raped and tortured.

So these are individuals who have never exhibited leadership before because they've been afraid to. And as you have gone through this process of training those individuals, the leadership within the Iraqi army is starting to surface.

General Casey, I know you talked to us about the fact that we've got three Iraqi patrols now, and I don't remember what really the size of them were. But they have taken over segments of Baghdad.

CHAMBLISS:

And they are patrolling Baghdad on their own. Sure, we continue to advise them but they're doing it.

And the leadership has surfaced within those groups of soldiers and it's spreading. And it's going to take some more time for that to happen. But it is happening.

And the other thing I would say in closing is, and we have expressed this to the White House -- and I'm pleased to see that you're here talking about the good things that are happening over there and that you're going to be doing more of this, because the American people have got to hear it. They've got to hear about the good things that are happening over there in addition to what they're going to read in the paper tomorrow about the IED that exploded today and took some more American lives. And the people who need to be talking about that to the American people are you.

I told General Petraeus if he could go on the Sunday talk shows or in whatever forum to talk about what he's doing, it would have a much greater impact than any of us talking about it and certainly the individuals who are critics of what's going on over there -- not talking about the good things that are happening.

So I'm pleased to see you here.

And will have to say, General Casey, I was -- the morale of your troops was unbelievable.

My National Guard unit, which has got 3,500 people over there today, had lost 16 soldiers when I was there. And I'd talked to General Rohero (ph) -- when I got out of the vehicle, he came to me and I said, "How's the morale of your troops? What's going on?"

And he said, "You won't believe it." He said, "We're still grieving for our lost comrades but morale is extremely high, these are very professional men and women." And what he told me is exactly what I saw when I had a chance to look those National Guardsmen and -women in the eye.

So in spite of all the negative press and the negative comments that are ongoing, I walked away from there with a feeling that it's tough. And, General Myers, you're right, it's not a pretty picture to paint. But those men and women are doing a hell of a job of winning this war. We may not be winning the political war right now but if we don't win the military side of it -- and we're doing that -- we'll never win the other side of it.

So I appreciate the great job you're doing, and I know we've got to stay the course and we've got to continue to do the things that each of you and the folks under you are doing every single day over there.

So thank you.

WARNER

Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Nelson?

BILL NELSON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm going to shift to another subject about Iraq -- Captain Scott Speicher.

But before I do, General Myers, thank you for your public service. You've been at this for 40 years. I, too, was commissioned 40 years ago but my public service took a different path. And on the occasion of your retirement, Grace and I look forward to seeing you and Mrs. Myers socially.

MYERS:

I hope so, too, Senator, thank you.

BILL NELSON:

Yes, sir.

Also, before we get to Captain Speicher, Mr. Secretary, it needs to come to your attention -- as I spoke with one of your assistant secretaries, Grone, you are about to have the threat of taking away the entire Gulf of Mexico off of Florida as one of the most significant training areas that you have, where you're not only training the F-22 and the F-35 pilots, but also you're shooting a lot of your more exotic warfare that you need plenty of airspace.

BILL NELSON:

And what Mr. Grone did not understand was, he thought he had the luxury of several years to work this out with the Minerals Management Service in the Department of Interior on the expansion of oil and gas leasing on the surface of the Gulf below; when, in fact, you've got a matter of days or at least weeks to register how this would impair the training capability for the United States military if you are denied that area. Because yesterday a bill **was** marked up in a House committee that, in fact, takes all of the area, except for **25** miles from shore, and opens it to oil and gas leasing.

And I've been the one that has been raising this, trying to protect the interests of the United States military. And I think the department has had the idea, "Well, we can work this out with the Department of Interior."

Well, there is a freight train that is starting to move in the aftermath of Katrina and the fear of the shortage. And in this atmosphere, I don't want your United States military preparedness to get hurt by you being denied all of that area because you can't be shooting things down there on the surface of the water if they've got oil and gas rigs all over there.

So I bring that to your attention.

Now I want to get to Captain Speicher. There was the review board. They concluded there was no evidence that he was dead and that there was sufficient evidence that he probably survived being shot down and that there may be Iraqis who know his fate. And both the review board and Secretary England agree that the search must continue.

So, General Casey, can you describe the effort to continue to try to determine the fate of Captain Scott Speicher?

CASEY:

Senator, I have not had an update on Captain Speicher since the review board has met, so I cannot give you that. But as soon as I get back to Iraq, I will get right back with you and let you know what that is.

BILL NELSON:

Does anybody else on the panel want to comment on that?

RUMSFELD:

Well, we do know that Captain Speicher remains on the priority list for gathering of intelligence and information. There's data searching taking place in Iraq. There's data searching taking place outside of Iraq, in another Gulf location. And the interest that we have is the same as your interest.

MYERS:

And we're doing the same thing for Sergeant Maupin as well.

WARNER:

Thank you very much.

I asked the witnesses if they could indulge, just a few minutes. We've been joined by the senator from Missouri.

TALENT:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER

This panel must get to the House of Representatives.

TALENT:

But other than to say thank you, General Myers, for your service, in particular.

And all of you, two very brief questions.

TALENT:

Number one, are we, in your judgment, doing enough to empower local commanders to do smaller projects that are appealing to the population in their particular area?

I saw a lot of this in Sadr City when I was there. Almost, if I can say it, a, kind of, a petty cash fund to go out and do some local work. Evidently, that's been very successful in helping to recruit the population on our behalf.

And what, if anything, can we do when we go into places like Tal *Afar* to help ensure a longer-term, more secure type situation? Because I know we've been going in search and destroying and then having to go. What, in your judgment, can we do there? Maybe to General Abizaid or General Casey.

CASEY:

I'll take first on the CERP.

We have something we call bulk CERP, which does exactly what you said, almost a petty cash thing that the local commanders use to get that out there. I don't think you were here. And I said, we spent over \$700 million in CERP this year and it has been the best assistance for the local commanders.

TALENT:

I'm really glad you recognize that, and I hope we make available as they think they can need.

CASEY:

Thank you.

Now, on Tal Afar -- and this is a great question because it speaks to a strategy that we have used in Najaf, Fallujah, Samarra, and we apply with this new government in Tal Afar.

And before we go in -- and this gets to the question over here -- before we go in with sit down with a government and say, "OK, what are you going to do politically here to make it easier for our troops? What are you going to do economically to ensure there's humanitarian assistance available, that there's reconstruction money available, that there's compensation available? And then what are you going to do to ensure that there are police program and the political training program is put in place there so that you generate the Iraqi local security forces that will make this a long-term success?"

As I said, we started it in Najaf, did it in Samarra. We haven't been as successful in Samarra because largely the Iraqis could never put together a local political leadership that wanted to make this succeed. And I told the deputy government up there the other day, I said, "Look, we can't want this more than you do."

Fallujah is coming up on the first anniversary of the battle, and I think what we are going to see is the great success that's gone on there inside Fallujah. Almost 70 percent of the people in Fallujah have electricity and running water. And this is something that those of you who were there shortly after the battle -- I was there last week, it's amazing.

So we applied the same things in Tal Afar. And, again, it's a holistic package, done in advance, and then followed up with steady pressure to ensure that people don't take their eye off the ball after the battle's over, which is hard.

WARNER:

Thank you very much.

TALENT:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence.

WARNER:

The subject of IEDs -- that's the explosive devices -- which has taken such a heavy toll, we were going to largely cover in the classified, and will cover it in our classified annex, which will be prepared and put in today's hearing.

But I think you can give us an assurance publicly that everything that can be brought to bear in the way of technology, equipment, people and otherwise are being devoted to try and contain that type of threat to our forces.

**Am I** not correct, General Casey?

CASEY:

Senator, you are.

I met with General Votel, the head of the IED task force, yesterday, and I will tell you that we continually try to find new things as the enemy adapts his tactics, and we continue to work on improving our capabilities to deal with these.

WARNER:

Our committee regularly meets with the general.

Gentlemen, thank you very much. We've had a very good hearing. The hearing stands in recess.

CQ Transcriptions, Sept. 29, 2005

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### List of Speakers

U.S. SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER (R-VA) CHAIRMAN

U.S. SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ)

U.S. SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE (R-OK)

U.S. SENATOR PAT ROBERTS (R-KS)

U.S. SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL)

U.S. SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS (R-ME)

U.S. SENATOR JOHN ENSIGN (R-NV)

U.S. SENATOR JIM TALENT (R-MO)

U.S. SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA)

U.S. SENATOR LINDSEY O. GRAHAM (R-SC)

U.S. SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE (R-NC)

U.S. SENATOR JOHN CORNYN (R-TX)

U.S. SENATOR JOHN THUNE (R-SD)  
U.S. SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI) RANKING MEMBER  
U.S. SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY (D-MA)  
U.S. SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD (D-WV)  
U.S. SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN (D-CT)  
U.S. SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI)  
U.S. SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA (D-HI)  
U.S. SENATOR BILL NELSON (D-FL)  
U.S. SENATOR BEN NELSON (D-NE)  
U.S. SENATOR MARK DAYTON (D-MN)  
U.S. SENATOR EVAN BAYH (D-IN)  
U.S. SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (D-NY) WITNESSES:  
DONALD RUMSFELD,  
U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL RICHARD MYERS (USAF),  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
GENERAL JOHN ABIZAID,  
COMMANDER,  
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY,  
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

October 13, 2005, 6:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
For Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

*Daniel R. Stanley*

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response – McCain's Comments

- You asked for the transcript of Senator McCain's remarks regarding the need for more troops in Iraq.
- Senator McCain spoke on September 29<sup>th</sup> before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq. His comment regarding "more troops" is reflected on Page 34 of the attached Congressional Transcript excerpt, attached at (Tab 2).

Attachments:

Snowflake #100305-25 (TAB 1)

Congressional Transcript Excerpt (TAB 2)

Prepared by: MGySgt Sue Hines-Laboy, Executive Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/53068

OSD 20382-05

~~FOUO~~

A

OCT 04 2005  
2:35 PM '05

TO: Dan Stanley  
FROM: Donald Ramsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: McCain's Comments

McCain said either that no military expert he knows thinks we have had and do have enough troops, or that we don't have a need for more troops. I forget his phraseology. Let's get the transcript.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100305-15

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*Please Respond By October 3, 2005*

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/53069

OSD 20382-05

B

CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS  
Congressional Hearings  
Sept 29, 2005

## Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq

### LIST OF SPEAKERS

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WARNER:

The committee meets this morning to receive testimony on U.S. military strategy and operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and in other areas of the CENTCOM.

And we welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs; General John Abizaid, commander, U.S. Central Command; and General George Casey, commander of Multinational Forces.

We look forward to your testimony.

I and other members of this committee wish to thank each of our witnesses and the countless men and women they represent for their service and their tireless efforts to secure peace and self-determination for the Iraqi people, Afghan people and others.

I want to especially thank General Myers for his service, not only for the past four years as chairman of the Joint Chiefs but over 40 years of distinguished service uniform.

Tomorrow, you will turn over your responsibility as chairman to General Pete Pace, United States Marine Corps. This will be an important day for you, your lovely wife and family, and General Pace and his family.

You've served the nation faithfully with distinction and with great credit to the uniform that you proudly wear, General.

Well done, sir.

MYERS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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WARNER:

We're ever-mindful of the sacrifices of the men and women of the armed forces and that of their families at home as we open this hearing.

We have an unusual day in terms of the schedule of the Senate before us. And in consultation with the ranking member, I've made the decision that we will proceed this morning until the hour of approximately 11:15, at which time we'll stand in recess, such that the colleagues on this committee can join all others in the vote on the next Supreme Court chief justice.

So after that, we'll resume at 12:15. And at about 1:15 we will go into a closed session for a short period in 219, following which our distinguished panel of witnesses go over to the House of Representatives.

Given that set of circumstances, I'll ask unanimous consent that my statement in its entirety be put into the record, such that we can move promptly to our witnesses.

And after the secretary's comment, we'll receive briefings from General Abizaid and General Casey.

The Senate, in closed session yesterday, had those briefings -- again this morning at a breakfast briefing in the House of Representative side -- four senators and House members.

And I wish to make a point that I think you're setting forth with great clarity the strategy of this country and the importance of everything that is being done by the armed forces of the United States to secure the freedom of this country here at home and abroad. And I commend you for what I have heard in the past 24 hours from each of you.

WARNER

Senator Levin?

LEVIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to join Senator Warner in welcoming our witnesses this morning.

I especially want to express our gratitude and our congratulations to General Myers for his more than 40 years of distinguished service to this nation. I have a fuller statement about that but, like most of the rest of my statement, I will be putting that in the record.

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11-L-0559/OSD/53071

WARNER:

When we commenced the hearing today, I advised the committee that we would have a closed session. We are continuing to do that. But we've shifted it from 219 to the Armed Services hearing room, 222.

Senator McCain?

MCCAIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

And, General Myers, thank you again for all your great service to this nation. We'll miss you. And we appreciate everything that you have done in service to our nation.

General Abizaid, there was a report sent over, I think last June, that three of the 100 Iraqi battalions were fully trained and equipped. capable of operating independently.

What **is** that number now?

ABIZAID:

The number now is, if you're talking about level 1- trained, it's one.

MCCAIN:

*You* have one battalion?

CASEY:

Senator, if I might, could I take that, because I think I'm more familiar with it than General Abizaid?

MCCAIN:

Sure.

CASEY

I mentioned in my opening testimony that what we were focused on is putting Iraqis in the lead as soon as they are capable. We fully recognize that Iraqi armed forces will not have an independent capability for some time, because they don't have the institutional base to support them.

And so level 1, as you'll recall from the slide, that's what's got one battalion. And it's going to be a long...

MCCXIN:

It used to be three. Now we've gone from three to one?

CASEY:

Pardon me?

MCCAIN:

It was three before.

CASEY:

Right.

MCCAIN:

The previous report you had three battalions. **Now** we're down to one battalion.

CASEY:

Right. And things changed in the battalions. I mean, we're making assessments on personnel, on leadership, on training. There are a lot of variables that are involved here, Senator.

MCCAIN:

And your response to Senator Levin was that you are not planning on troop withdrawals because you want to see what happens in the next 75 days. Was that a correct...

CASEY

Senator, that's not how I'd characterize my response

I said that condition-based reductions of coalition forces remains an integral part of our overall strategy. And I believe I did say to the senator that that still remains possible in 2006.

MCCAIN:

Are you planning on troop withdrawals for next year?

CASEY:

I just said that, Senator, yes.

MCCAIN:

Yes or no?

CASEY:

Yes, Senator, I do believe that the possibility for condition-based reductions of coalition forces still exists in 2006.

MCCAIN:

And, General Abizaid, or General Casey, in Camp Al Kime (ph), senior U.S. Marine commander said insurgents loyal to Zarqawi have taken over at least five key western Iraqi towns on the border with Syria.

How many times, General Casey, are we going to read about another offensive in Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi, Al Kime (ph), where we go in, we take control and we leave, and the bad guys come back again? How often are we going to read that, General Casey?

CASEY:

Hopefully, not too frequently, Senator.

In the last 90 days we've pushed five Iraqi brigades and about four coalition battalions into Anbar province. The issue has always been the availability of Iraqi security forces to remain and retain control.

MCCAIN:

Some would argue that maybe it was the availability of American forces. There's 1,000 Marines stationed in the desert populated by 100,000 Sunni Arabs. The border between Syria and Iraq obviously is not under our control. And I hear that from -- do you agree with that? Is the border between Syria and Iraq under our control?

CASEY:

No, Senator, it's not. And we have had since April an objective of restoring Iraqi control to that Syrian border before the election. The operation you saw in Tal Afar is a **part** of that strategy, and you will see operations along the Euphrates Valley here in near term.

MCCAIN:

I was interested in your comment: The longer we carry the brunt of the insurgency fight, the longer we **will** carry the brunt.

Does that mean that the Iraqis are able to carry the brunt?

CASEY:

That means the longer that we lead, Senator, the longer we'll continue to lead. And that's why we have a conscious strategy of passing that off -- the lead off to the....

MCCAIN:

That assumes that the Iraqis are capable of assuming that leadership, General Casey.

MCCAIN:

And most people that I talk to say, by most measures, they are not ready to do that.

And so, what we're doing here -- I refer to David Ignatius's column: "From what they, the military, described, a military approach that's different at least in tone from what the public perceives for the commanders. Iraq is in an endless tunnel. They're planning to reduce U.S. troop levels over the next year to a force that will focus on training and advising the Iraqi military."

You know, nobody could argue with that. But there's one fundamental problem with it, and that is whether the Iraqis are capable of carrying out their own military responsibilities.

The president, yesterday -- you might understand that the American people are a little confused -- says, "Bush warns of upsurge of violence in Iraq before next month's voting."

So Americans are seeing on the crawl, on their television set, American Marines killed, soldiers killed, more people lured -- a couple hundred in one day. And yet we are now planning on troop withdrawals.

General Casey, I *am* not worried too much about the impact on American military morale because I have great faith in them. I'm worried about the impact on the insurgents.

You're planning on troop withdrawals -- you and General Abizaid -- without any criteria being met that I can see, or certainly, broadcasting that in very loud and clear tones as you did several months ago when the president said, "We are going to do whatever is necessary." And it stopped for awhile and now, it's there again.

You're taking a very big gamble here. I hope you're correct. I don't see the indicators yet that we are ready to plan or begin troop withdrawals given the overall security situation. And that just isn't my opinion alone.

General Abizaid would **like** to respond, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired.

**ABIZAIID:**

Well, thanks, Senator McCain.

**If I** may, I'd like to point out a couple of things.

First of all, the war has moved to the west, which is a good scene, a good indicator that Iraqi and U.S. forces are having an effect elsewhere.

The amount of infiltration across the Syrian border remains a concern, but it's down, not so much because of Syrian activity, but because of U.S. and Iraqi activity.

Iraqi casualties are probably taking place are around four times the level of our own, which indicates a willingness to fight for their own country. And their organizational capability is pretty good as well.

But I can assure you, Senator McCain, General Casey and I want to win this war. And if we need to ask for more U.S. troops in the short term or in the long term, we will.

MCCAIN:

General, there's no expert that I know that doesn't attest that we needed more troops at the time a lot of us said we needed them.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER:

General Casey, do you wish to add anything to this very important question by Senator McCain?

CASEY:

Yes, if I could, to the senator's point that we don't have any way of measuring the progress of these forces, that's exactly what the purpose of putting the transition teams with these forces and producing these monthly readiness reports is.

CASEY:

And we are fighting with them, side by side, on a daily basis, improving their capabilities day by day.

Our sense is that when we get them in the lead, they'll learn faster and they'll improve faster, rather than following us around and watching us do what we do.

And we're measuring this very carefully. And we're not going forward with this capriciously.

And as I said, this is an integrated strategy. And the reductions will come when the conditions are met as an overall part of the strategy.

WARNER:

General Myers?

MYERS:

Thank you, Chairman.

Just to comment on Senator McCain's comment that experts have said we've always needed more troops. I mean, we've all heard those calls, and I respect some of the people who have made those calls.

But the facts as I know them, that there's not been anybody in a position of responsibility for carrying out the mission in Iraq that has said that or believed that.

It's a complex situation that is not well-understood by folks who fought in Vietnam, for instance, or fought in the world wars. This is a much more complex situation. The task is very hard.

Ana I think General Casey established it in his opening remarks when he said if we were viewed as occupiers, we draw fire just by being occupiers.

And I think the thing we have to do, Senator McCain, is convince people this is not a cut-and-run strategy. This is a win strategy. And it's trying to walk that very fine line between being seen as an occupier and being effective and winning this war and helping the Iraqis stand up on their feet and take the fight to the enemy.

And I keep hearing "more troops," but I can tell you that the people we talk to, the academics that we bring in, the military experts -- and we'll talk to anybody that will write about this or talk about it, we're happy to talk about it. And this strategy has been reviewed -- George, I don't know how many times we've picked at your strategy -- by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And we certainly don't think that more American forces is the answer.

MCCAIN:

Mr. Chairman, I felt compelled to just make one comment.

General Myers seems to assume that things have gone well in Iraq. General Myers seems to assume that the American people or the support for our conflict there is not eroding. General Myers seems to assume that everything has gone fine, and our declarations of victory, of which there have been many, have not had an impact on American public opinion.

Things have not gone as we had planned or expected, nor as we were told by you, General Myers. And that's why I'm very worried, because I think we have to win this conflict.

So you've been bringing in the wrong experts, in my view, because the conflict has not gone as it was testified to before this committee by this group of witnesses.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MYERS:

It depends on...

WARNER:

The record will remain open for purposes -- I will allow you to rebut that.

The record is open on this very important question. Any of the witnesses may supplement it.

One last comment, Mr. Chairman.

MYERS:

I don't think this committee or the American public has ever heard me say that things are going very well in Iraq.

This is a hard struggle. We are trying to do in Iraq what has never been done before. This is historic.

MYERS:

It's historic in terms of our security because it's part of the global war that General Abizaid talked about.

This is, for the Al Qaida, a center of gravity. Whether we like it or not, those are the facts.

We've got the Al Qaida in Iraq that's been charged to continue the fight not only in Iraq but in Europe and the United States. That's a fact. That's what he's been charged to do by the leader of Al Qaida.

And I don't know how you characterize what goes on in Iraq but we've set up milestones way back at the end of major combat.

The first remarkable thing that happened in Iraq was our troops took Baghdad just weeks after many critics said, "You're in a quagmire." Maybe some of the same experts that think we need more troops. But, "You're in a quagmire," and then a few weeks later, Baghdad falls.

It is not easy to do what we're trying to do in Iraq. It's not easy for the U.S. government or coalition friends to do it. And we've made lots of mistakes along the way, Senator McCain, no doubt about it. Because it's never been done before. It's never been attempted before.

But the outcome is so potentially stabilizing for the region and for our country and so here we are. We've had several transitional governments. We said the Iraqis would develop a constitution and have a vote in October. That's going to happen. We're going to have elections in December. I think that, in a sense, things are going well.

It's not easy. The people that understand that are the people that volunteered to go over there. If you talk to the men and women, they understand what's at stake and they're willing to go out on patrol, on raids, to protect infrastructure, to protect individuals and put their lives in harm's way because they understand what's at stake.

So I'm not -- not to be Pollyannish about this, this is tough. And I don't think I ever have been. But I think I've been a realist and I think I trust the judgment of people on the ground and people on the Joint Staff that have just come back from Iraq, the battalion commanders, the brigade commanders, the general officers.

I respect their opinion. They've been over there in the crucible with the blood and the dust and the gore. And those are the people that I trust their opinion.

And I particularly the opinion of General George Casey and General Abizaid. They've been at this a long time and they know what they're doing and we should trust them.

WARNER:

*Thank you very much.*

Senator Kennedy?

KENNEDY:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you for the continued service to the country.

I'm concerned, Mr. Secretary, by the continuing reports that the Iraqi police and security forces we're training are substantially infiltrated by the insurgents.

KENNEDY:

Earlier this month, I received a shocking letter from a retired military officer whose nephew is a Marine recently sent to Iraq.

And his letter says that, "My nephew was briefed by just-returned Marines that 100 percent of the Iraqi police and army have now been compromised by insurgents. He and his fellow Marines were warned that all operations that involve the Iraqi police or army units would result in ambush. Not all Iraqi police or army are members of the insurgency but he was briefed that all units were infested with hostile collaborators to the point of being dysfunctional as partner security forces."

We've had warning signs before about infiltration. A year ago, the New York Times reported that an adviser to the Prime Minister Allawi said that as many as 5 percent of the Iraqi government troops are insurgents who have infiltrated the ranks or they're sympathizers.

And at the time, we had Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Sinclair, the 1st Division -- said, "The police and military forces all have insurgents in them. You don't have a pure force."

Then in February, Major Don McCardell (ph), who's a deputy commandant of the 4th Iraqi Division training academy, said, "After a recent battle in Mosul, some insurgents' bodies were found wearing identification tags from the academy."

And in February, Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said penetration of the Iraqi security and military forces may be the rule not the exception.

And then on July 25th, the inspector general of the Defense Department released a joint report saying this: "Even more troubling is infiltration by intending terrorists or insurgents. There's sufficient evidence to conclude that such persons are, indeed, among the ranks of the IPS."

The report also says, "The meddlesome issue has been the fact that some graduates do not enter the Iraqi police service after completing training. Keeping tracking of the numbers trained but not assigned is an elusive problem. Some U.S. sources assert that the number might be as high as a third or more of those who have gone through basic training" -- a third or more.

FOUO

December 28, 2005

TO Gen Pete Pace  
 CC Gordon England  
 Tina Jonas  
 Brad Berkson  
 VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT Reconstituting the Force

530.4

I just read your December 21 memo on reconstituting the force. I find it confusing. Your first sentence says, "Joint Staff asked the Services to provide their estimates of costs to reset the force to a pre-conflict condition after operations end." That is precisely what I did not ask anyone to do. I wanted to get them reset for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

11

Jim Stavridis, please set a meeting for me to get briefed on this. I am concerned. We should do it soon, before people get so far down the road that they gum it up.

20 DEC 2005

Thanks.

Attach.

12/21/05 CJCS memo to SD re: Reconstituting the Force (OSD20425-05)

DHR:dh  
122805-04 (TS).doc

.....  
 Please respond by January 19, 2006

FOUO

OSD 20425-05

B-15-2

530.4

FOUO

FILE COPY

FILE COPY

December 28, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace

Gordon England  
 Tim Jones  
 Brad Berkson  
 VADM Jim Stovick

Donald Rumsfeld

Reconstituting the Force

*DJS -*  
*Please prepare the briefing.*  
*Thanks*

12/30

I just read your December 21 memo on reconstituting the force. I find it confusing. Your first sentence says, "Joint Staff asked the Services to provide their estimates of costs to reset the force to a pre-conflict condition after operations end." That is precisely what I did not ask anyone to do. I wanted to get them reset for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Jim Stovick, please set a meeting for me to get briefed on this. I am concerned. We should do it soon before...

FORM 8-61 (Rev. 10-6-61)

Please respond by January 19, 2006

FOR SECRET:

SIR,

WE WILL SET UP THE BRIEFING. THIS WAS MEANT TO SAY:

- EQUIPMENT THAT WILL BE PART OF THE FUTURE FORCE WILL BE RESET TO PRE-CONFLICT CONDITION.
- WE WILL RESTRUCTURE THE FORCE FOR THE FUTURE.

VAD/ST 12/30

B-15-Z

C-18 48

A-106-2

12/22  
1530



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9998

INFO MEMO

CM-0115-05

21 December 2005

12/22  
1530  
12/22

Robert Rafter  
12/22

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *PRF 20 Dec 05*

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force (SF 100605-09)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB), we are properly setting the force to a combat-ready condition.
- **Analysis**
  - **Joint Staff asked the Services** to provide their estimates of costs to reset the force to a **pre-conflict condition** after operations end. Guidance to the Services characterized resetting the force as repairing and/or replacing equipment and stocks degraded or consumed as a direct result of Operations **IRAQI FREEDOM** and **ENDURING FREEDOM**.
  - The Services provided estimates totaling \$53 billion (if operations ended in FY 06, and assuming Services get full supplemental funding in FY 06). The Services' estimates include costs to not only return the force to a pre-conflict condition, but also to restructure the force for the future and in some cases fix existing maintenance problems. Some of these costs clearly are incremental and tied to the war, and consequently are viable supplemental funding candidates. Other costs, to restructure the force or fix maintenance problems, may be more appropriate to fund in the core budget.
  - Joint Staff, OSD-PA&E, and USD(C) are working together with the Services to refine these estimates so the Department as a whole can continue to validate requirements and explore appropriate funding options.
  - In the near term, Joint Staff will continue to work with Services, PA&E, and the USD(C) to refine estimates and front load validated efforts in the FY 06 supplemental funding request.

?

COORDINATION NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral E. M. Chanik, USN; Director, J-8 (b)(6)

MA SD	12/23	MA DSD
TSA SD	12/22	SA DSD
EXEC SEC	12/23	
ESR MA	12/22	1359

OSD 20425-05

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

C-18 2/3

B-15-3

A-106-4



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-5000

INFO MEMO

205 205 02 10:02

CB-8115-03  
21 December 2003

NSL  
12/21/03

Roberts  
12/22

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *12/21/03*

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force (RF 100005-09)

- Answer. In response to your question (TAB), we are properly setting the force to a combat-ready condition.
- Analysis
  - Joint Staff asked the Services to provide their estimates of costs to reset the force to a ~~pre-conflict condition~~ after operations end. Guidance to the Services characterized resetting the force as replacing and/or replacing equipment and stocks degraded or consumed as a direct result of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM.
  - The Services provided estimates totaling \$53 billion (if operations ended in FY 06, and assuming Services get full supplemental funding in FY 06). The Services' estimates include costs to not only reset the force to a pre-conflict condition, but also to ~~restructure the force for the future and in some cases fix existing maintenance problems~~. Some of these costs clearly are incremental and tied to the war, and consequently are viable supplemental funding candidates. Other costs, to restructure the force or fix maintenance problems, may be more appropriate to fund in the core budget.
  - Joint Staff, OSD-FA&E, and UED(C) are working together with the Services to refine these estimates to the Department as a whole and continue to validate requirements and explore appropriate funding options.
  - In the near term, Joint Staff will continue to work with Services, FA&E, and the UED(C) to refine estimates and front load validated efforts in the FY 06 supplemental funding request.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral E. M. Cissik, USN; Director, J-5 (b)(6)

NA SO	12/25	2003
NSA SO	12/25	2003
SECDEF	12/25	2003
SECSTATE	12/25	2003

OSD 20425-05

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

8-15-3

C-18 2/3

A-06-4 TOTAL P.03

TAB

~~FOUO~~

October 06, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
Tina Jones

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force

I was concerned yesterday about Abizeid's questions as to whether or not we are properly reconstituting the force. What do you think?

Thanks.

DEB:sk  
100905-09

.....

*Please Respond By 10/27/05*

*Sir, <sup>add 12/28</sup>  
Response attached.  
v/r,  
Lt Col Langyel*

DEC 23 2005

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 20425-05

B-15-4

TAB

~~FOUO~~

October 04, 2005

TO: Gus Peto Doss  
Tim Jones

FROM: Donald Rumbold *DR*

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force

I was concerned yesterday about Albin's question as to whether or not we are properly reconstituting the force. What do you think?

Thanks

DR  
10/4/05

Please Respond by 10/27/05

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
1/12,  
L+L Langel*

DEC 2 8 2005

~~FOUO~~

TAB

OSD 20425-05

B-15-4

*C-18 3/3*

*A-106-3*

~~FOUO~~

October 06, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force

I was concemed yesterday about Abizaid's questions as to whether or not we are properly reconstituting the force. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100605-09

.....  
*Please Respond By October 27,2005*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/53088

OSD 20425-05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-0115-05 - 02  
21 December 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *VR/P 20 Dec 05*

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force (SF 100605-09)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB), we are properly setting the force to a combat-ready condition.
- **Analysis**
  - Joint Staff asked the Services to provide their estimates of costs to reset the force to a pre-conflict condition after operations end. Guidance to the Services characterized resetting the force as repairing and/or replacing equipment and stocks degraded or consumed as a direct result of Operations **IRAQI FREEDOM** and **ENDURING FREEDOM**.
  - The Services provided estimates totaling \$53 billion (if operations ended in FY 06, and assuming Services get full supplemental funding in FY 06). *The Services' estimates include costs to not only return the force to a pre-conflict condition, but also to restructure the force for the future and in some cases fix existing maintenance problems. Some of these costs clearly are incremental and tied to the war, and consequently are viable supplemental funding candidates. Other costs, to restructure the force or fix maintenance problems, may be more appropriate to fund in the core budget.*
  - Joint Staff, OSD-PA&E, and USD(C) are working together with the Services to refine these estimates so the Department as a whole can continue to validate requirements and explore appropriate funding options.
  - In the near term, Joint **Staff** will continue to work with Services, PA&E, and the USD(C) to refine estimates and front load validated efforts in the FY 06 supplemental funding request.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral E. M. Chanik, USN, Director, J-8: (b)(6)

OSD 20425-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FILE 0559/OSD/39089

TAB

~~FOUO~~

October 06, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force

I was concerned yesterday about Abizaid's questions as to whether or not we are properly reconstituting the force. What do you think?

Thanks.

DR:ch  
10/06/05

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 10/27/05*

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/53090



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

1100  
DEFENSE  
OCT 14 2005 6:07 PM

INFO MEMO

October 14, 2005, 3:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ACTING DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force

- You asked for my thoughts on General Abizaid's question on whether we are properly reconstituting the force (TAB A).
- The Department has worked the reconstitution issue aggressively and will continue to do so as we build the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 Supplemental Request.
- The Congress provided nearly \$18 billion this spring in the FY 2005 Supplemental in the investment appropriations for new equipment requirements to support deploying forces, modularity, and reconstitution. We expect that about \$6-8 billion will be provided shortly in Title IX of the FY 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act for these purposes.
- Brad Berkson has been studying the requirement to reconstitute the force. If operations were to cease in FY 2005, based upon the previous contingency costs, he estimates an additional \$16-20 billion will be required to restore the services to their pre-combat state and reconstitute prepositioned stocks. This is a reasonable estimate given past experience, but we will continue to work with the Services, PA&E, and the Joint Staff to refine these projections.
- We plan to include reconstitution costs in the FY 2006 Supplemental and will work to ensure that they are supported by Congress.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: John Roth, (b)(6)

OSD 20425-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53091

**TAB**

**A**

**FOUO**

October 06, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
Tina Jonas

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force

I was concerned yesterday about Abizaid's questions as to whether or not we are properly reconstituting the force. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100605-09

.....

*Please Respond By October 27, 2005*

**FOUO**  
11-L-0559/OSD/53093

OSD 20425-05

**TAB**

**B**

## COORDINATION SHEET

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force

**PA&E**

Bradley Berkson  
Director

October 13,2005

**J-8**

E. M. Chanik  
Director

October, 13,2005

**COORDINATION SHEET**

SUBJECT: Reconstituting the Force

D, PA&E: *Bradley Berkson* Date: 13 Oct 2005

Printed Name: Bradley Berkson Title: Director, PA&E

D, J-8: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Printed Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Title: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: Questions can be addressed to: Caral Spangler at (b)(6)  
Coordination is due back by: 10/13/05

**This office requests that your office only fax back the signed Coordination sheet and any changes to (b)(6)**

For pickup: Call Cindy Alexander, (b)(6) or Lisa Savoy (b)(6)

*Thank you*



*substate*

*1143  
9/27*

~~FOUO~~

September 26, 2005

TO: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Haley Barbour

I met with Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi on Friday. He said he didn't want to ask us for something that isn't right for the Department, or the country. However, he has some thoughts that relate to accelerating things that DoD may already be planning to do to help get the economy of Mississippi going.

1. He suggested speeding up DDX and LHDR. The contractor is apparently a big employer.
2. He mentioned a company called Ballinger (?), which has a shipyard with a License to build the Australian fast boat in the U.S. -- the one that we are currently leasing. They have a shipyard at Natchez. He said if we are going to order them then sooner is better than later.
3. He mentioned the Naval Air Station at Pascagoula -- he said it could be a terrific Coast Guard base and we ought to restore it to what it was, because the Coast Guard will use it.
4. Last, he mentioned a company named Ionatron that manufactures the Jinx -- an E D detector and destroyer. He says we have ordered 12. It is the size of a golf cart. They make them at Stennis.

*093*

Why don't you look into these and get back to me with your thoughts.

Thanks.

DHR:gr  
092605-25

.....  
Please Respond By 10/11/05

~~FOUO~~

*26 Sep 05*

OSD 20429-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53098

FOUO

October 20, 2005

I-OS/014008  
ES-4493

TO: Gordon England  
Ryan Henry

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Integrating Information

Attached is e memo from Lin Wells. I think he has a point about having a key decision criterion when we're looking at trade-offs as to whether or not a "system has planned for its information to be integrated to enable better joint decisions and more effective action."

Please *take a look at his memo and let's discuss it.*

Thanks.

Attach.

CFO/ASD(NII) memo to SecDef re: Follow-up to Strategic Planning Council [OSD 20431-05]

DHR:zh  
102005-07 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by November 10, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

330.2 Strategic  
20 Oct 05  
15 Oct 05

20-10-05 11:20:11 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/53099 02020431-05

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
8000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO ACTION MEMO

2005 OCT 17 AM 8:23

15 October 2005

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION  
INTERSECTION

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells, Acting DoD CIO/ASST

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Strategic Planning Council (SPC) (U)

Robert Farooq  
147

At the SPC you asked for inputs on issues related to the meeting. I offer three. Actions in each area below are underway, but some aspects need more senior-level emphasis.

- Integrating information and turning decisions into timely action has been a consistent theme of transformation. Network-centric initiatives and Chief Information Officer (CIO) policies advocate enterprise approaches now, but too many systems still produce information that goes into stovepipes. Platforms and sensors must tie to the net and link to decision-makers, not stand alone. Also, as GEN Abizaid repeatedly says, we must fuse operational and intelligence information, which drives sharing across mission areas, and actionable information must get quickly to those who need it. As you approach the risk reduction trade-offs discussed in the Oct 14 SLRG, recommend that a key decision criterion be whether a system has planned for its information to be integrated to enable better joint decisions and more effective action. Many haven't.
- Protection of the network infrastructure and the information (content) on the net is essential. Leadership should consider the net as a weapon system to be fought, not just an administrative support tool. We must plan, train and equip accordingly. The QDR is supporting information assurance, but we also need immediate, aggressive steps to counter ongoing intrusions. NII is coordinating recommendations with USDP, USDI, CJCS, STRATCOM, and NSA and will submit them separately.
- In disaster relief, as well as in stabilization operations, communications and command & control (C2) are not just technical adjuncts to the provision of food, medicine and shelter. They are the critical enablers of everything else that happens. We've seen this in Katrina, Rita, tsunami relief, and elsewhere. Such capabilities should be deployed in the first hours of future contingencies. Moreover, traditional military communications and C2 systems fill only part of the needs in these situations. DoD needs to plan for tools to reach beyond the limits of military networks to communicate, collaborate and engage with non-traditional partners, such as state and local authorities, non-governmental organizations, and indigenous security forces.

John Grimes should be onboard soon as your CIO. He brings in-depth experience to address these issues from an enterprise-wide focus. I hope you'll use them to full advantage. Will be glad to amplify any of these points as you wish.

NSA ID	10/12	NSA USE	
TBA ID	10/12	SA DPO	
EXEC SEC	10/17/05		
IPRMA	10/17/05	0840	

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OSD 20431-05

A-2-a



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

ACTION MEMO

15 October 2005

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION  
INTEGRATION

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lin Wells, Acting DoD CIO/ASD(NII) *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Strategic Planning Council (SPC) (U)

At the SPC you asked for inputs on issues related to the meeting. I offer three. Actions in each area below are underway, but some aspects need more senior-level emphasis.

- Integrating information and turning decisions into timely action has been a consistent theme of transformation. Network-centric initiatives and Chief Information Officer (CIO) policies advocate enterprise approaches now, but too many systems still produce information that goes into stovepipes. Platforms and sensors must tie to the net and link to decision-makers, not stand alone. Also, as GEN Abizaid repeatedly says, we must fuse operational and intelligence information, which drives sharing across mission areas, and actionable information must get quickly to those who need it. As you approach the risk reduction trade-offs discussed in the Oct 14 SLRG, recommend that a key decision criterion be whether a system has planned for its information to be integrated to enable better joint decisions and more effective action. Many haven't.
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*3202 Strategic*

*15 Oct 05*

John Grimes should be onboard soon as your CIO. He brings in-depth experiences to address these issues from an enterprise-wide focus. I hope you'll use them to full advantage. Will be glad to amplify any of these points as you wish.

~~FOUO~~

USDP HAS SEEN

October 07, 2005

I-0501 3504

ES-43qs

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Larry DiRita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: President's Speech to MODs

We ought to get the President's NED speech to all the NATO Ministers of Defense and to the Ministers of Defense for the Partnerships for Peace countries, and any other MODs we deal with around the world: Japan, Korea, Singapore, etc.

Thanks.

DHR.es  
100705-06

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/28/05*

350.001 WH

7 OCT 05

14 OCT 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/53102

FOUO

2005 OCT 17 10 03 AM

INFO MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Eric S. Edelman

*ES*

OCT 14 2005

SUBJECT: MOD Letters with President's GWOT Speech

- Per your 7 October 2005 note (TAB A), we have drafted a letter for you to send to your MOD counterparts in key countries highlighting important concepts from the President's 6 October GWOT speech. You approved the draft letter.
- We have developed a list of countries that should receive letters (TAB B) and will work with your staff to ensure they are sent promptly.
- I will also send out similar letters to my counterparts in a select group of countries.

350.0016H

OSD 20432-05

14 Oct 05

FOUO

**List of Countries Receiving MOD Letters from SecDef**

**EU/NATO Countries**

Austria  
Belgium  
Bulgaria  
Canada  
Cyprus  
Czech Republic  
Denmark  
Estonia  
Finland  
France  
Greece  
Hungary  
Iceland  
Republic of Ireland  
Italy  
Latvia  
Lithuania  
Luxembourg  
Malta  
The Netherlands  
Portugal  
Romania  
Slovak Republic  
Slovenia  
Spain  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
Turkey  
United Kingdom

Note: Germany, Norway, and Poland omitted based on government turnovers in progress. We will plan on including similar text in letters send to welcome aboard the new MODs

**Eastern Europe/Eurasia**

Albania  
Armenia  
Azerbaijan  
Croatia

Georgia  
Kazakhstan  
Kyrgyzstan  
Macedonia  
Moldova  
Russia  
Tajikistan  
Turkmenistan  
Ukraine  
Uzbekistan

**Middle East/North Africa**

Afghanistan  
Algeria  
Bahrain  
Bangladesh  
Egypt  
Kuwait  
India  
Israel  
Pakistan  
Saudi Arabia  
Sri Lanka  
Tunisia  
UAE

**Asia Pacific**

Australia  
Brunei  
Burma  
Cambodia  
Fiji  
Indonesia  
Japan  
Korea  
Laos  
Philippines  
Malaysia  
Mongolia  
New Guinea  
New Zealand

Singapore  
Taiwan  
Thailand  
Tonga  
Vietnam

**South America**

Bolivia  
Ecuador  
Paraguay  
Peru  
Uruguay

**Africa**

Botswana  
Ghana  
Kenya  
Liberia  
Mali  
Niger  
Senegal  
Sierra Leone  
South Africa

FOUO

September 26, 2005

TO: Eric Edelman  
Richard Lawless

CC: Larry DiRita  
Matt Latimer PA

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Evolving Relationship with Korea

Korea

One of the items that came up in the Defense Policy Board meeting on September 23 was the need to begin laying the groundwork with the *American* people about an evolving relationship with Korea. We may need a speech.

Thanks.

DHR<sub>16</sub>  
092605-08

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/06/05*

26 Sep 05

OSD 20470-05

~~FOUO~~

26-09-05 13:52 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/53106

FOUO

October 11, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
 Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hill 'Testimony to include Building Partnership Capacity

0913

I think we ought to get everybody who is going to be testifying on the Hill to testify in favor of having building partnership capacity both within the U.S. Government and without the U.S. Government

Thanks.

DHR:s  
 10/11/05-JMTS

.....  
*Please respond by October 28, 2005*

FOUO

11 OCT 05

OSD 20497-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53107



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

2005 OCT 17 PM 5:16

INFO MEMO

October 14, 2005, 5:00 P.M.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response – Building Partnership Capacity #101105-39

- You stated that Department officials testifying on the Hill ought to testify in favor of building partnership capacity, both within the U.S. Government and outside the Government.
- We have taken the following measures:
  - o Directed our OSD Legislative Affairs staff to promote this course of action in their hearing preparations for OSD witnesses and in their review of draft written testimony and opening statements.
  - o Advised the Services of your guidance to promote Partnership Capacity. In this regard, we suggested that an effective vehicle for the services would be to link the train and equip authorities to the “Stress on the Force” challenges we face across the services.
  - o Advised the Combatant Commanders to endorse these authorities during their testimony and engagements with members of Congress.

Attachments:

Snowflake#101105-39 (TAB 1)

Prepared by: Col Alan R. Metzler, Military Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/53108

OSD 20497-05

0913

14 OCT 05

11 OCT 05

~~FOUO~~

October 11, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hill Testimony to include Building Partnership Capacity

I think we ought to get everybody who is going to be testifying on the Hill to testify in favor of having building partnership capacity, both within the U.S. Government and without the U.S. Government

Thanks.

DRR ss  
10/11/05, 3:21 PM

.....  
*Please respond by October 28, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/53109

FOUO

October 17 2005

TO: GEN George Casey  
LTG J. R. Vines

CC: Gen Peter Pace and  
GEN John Abiz

FROM Donald Rumsfeld



Iraq

SUBJECT: Good Job on the Constitutional Referendum

It certainly looks like the referendum will go down in the history books as a big success from a security and execution standpoint. Over 60% voter turnout, far fewer security incidents than in January, and Iraqi Security Forces' involvement at every level - excellent work!

Please pass along my thanks to all concerned.

Thanks.

DHR:ee  
101705-01(76)

.....

FOUO

17 Oct 05


OSD 20508-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53110

~~FOUO~~

October 17 2005

TO GEN George Casey  
LTG J. R Vines

CC: Gen Pete Pace *id*  
GEN John Abizi 

FROM Donald Rumsfel

SUBJECT: *Good Job on the Constitutional Referendum*

*It certainly looks like the referendum will go down in the history books as a big success from a security and execution standpoint. Over 60% voter turnout, far fewer security incidents than in January, and Iraqi Security Forces' involvement at every level - excellent work!*

*Please pass along my thanks to all concerned.*

Thanks.

DHR:m  
101705-01(TB)

.....

~~FOUO~~


OSD 20508-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53111

~~FOUO~~

October 17 2005

TO: GEN George Casey  
LTG J. R. Vires

CC: Gen Pete Pace and  
GEN John Abizi 

FROM: Donald Rumsfel

SUBJECT: Good Job on the Constitutional Referendum

It certainly looks like *the* referendum will go down in *the* history books as a big success from a security and execution standpoint. Over 60% voter turnout, far fewer security incidents than in January, and Iraqi Security Forces' involvement at every level - excellent work!

Please pass *along* my thanks to all concerned.

Thanks.

DHR:ms  
101705-01(RS)

.....

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20508-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53112

FOUO

June 27, 2005

TO: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Letter from Marisa Harris

Someone ought to draft a nice letter to Marisa Harris and thank her for the attached letter.

Thanks.

DIR ss  
062705-51

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/07/05*

3355D

2 4405

CSC  
PLS S66 MG  
M

\_\_\_\_\_

23 4405

OSD 20511-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/53113

Jun 23 05 02:43p

(b)(6)

To: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld  
@ fax # (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Marisa Harris

(b)(6)

2 pages

Dear Sec. Rumsfeld,

I am writing to reaffirm my confidence and support for you, and for our heroic military.

This week, our local community has lost three of its sons - Cpl. Stanley Lupinski, Cpl. Jesse Jaime and Spc. Anthony Conuta. They loved our country and revered its principles. They made the ultimate sacrifice to keep our nation secure and advance the cause of Freedom. Their lives and their selfless service were precious gifts and we must honor them in the only appropriate way, which is to win this war, all the way, no matter what. Next time you're asked what our "exit strategy" is please tell them "victory." Nothing less. If we were to cave in to pressure and forget this ultimate goal, our nation would be disgraced. It would be a betrayal of our troops and of the families of those who have died fighting to achieve this victory. We would never know peace again. We'd never be trusted by our allies or feared by our enemies. And the bright and enduring light of hope and liberty that America has represented to the world would be forever dimmed.

2957

I know that you and President Bush are under intense pressure. I have heard some of the ludicrous, self-defeating, self-destructive "hearings" going on in Congress, as well as the malicious, despicable words spoken by Sen. Durbin, Sen. Kennedy, Rep. Pelosi, Rep. Waxman, and the other pompous hypocrites whose language has become almost indistinguishable from that of our enemy. I am angry and disgusted to my core over this.

J. Harris

(continued...)

OSD 20511-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53114

To Sec. Rumsfeld  
From: Marisa Harris

But such irresponsible behavior will not be tolerated anymore. It never should have been. I don't accept their apology. If they had a drop of patriotism and decency in them, those words could never have come out of their mouths. They are trying to undermine our country and all that our troops have achieved. They must not succeed. Please, Mr. Secretary, as much as you are able - tell them to go to Hell, and do what you know in your heart is right for our soldiers on the battlefield and for our country.

As far as these "deteriores" (enemy combatants) are concerned, they need to be thankful for another day of life, and for the humane treatment they receive from our soldiers. They don't deserve any protection or consideration. They're the scum of the earth, and if they could kill any of our troops or any of us, they'd do it without a moment's hesitation. Our troops should not be burdened with having to fight a "politically-correct, humane" war. There's no such thing. It's all about killing your enemy before he can kill you. And when you do kill these heartless murderers, you save so many innocent lives.

May God bless you, our military and our great nation.

Respectfully, Marisa Harris



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

SEP 13 2004

335 SA

Ms. Marisa Harris

(b)(6)



Dear Ms. Harris,

Thank you so much for your letter. I appreciate  
your kind words of support. They mean a great deal.

Sincerely,

13 SEP 04

OSD 13495-04

8 SEP 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 18 2005

Ms. Marisa Harris

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Harris,

I received your letter, and I appreciate your taking the time to send it. It is evident how much you care about our country and those serving in our military. Thank you for your steadfast support.

Sincerely,

3355A

150081

OSD 20511-05

239und

11-L-0559/OSD/53117

Ms. Marisa Harris

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Harris.

I received your letter, and I appreciate your taking the time to send it. It is evident how much you care about our country and those serving in our military. Thank you for your steadfast support.

Sincerely,

10/17  
14:30  
Read son  
SFB 10/19

FOR REVIEW  
M. 10/17

Robert Rangel 10/17

SSA Rangel

- Please see attached letter we sent her in 2004
- Some of her sentiments are very intense so I want to be sure we're OK responding to her.

Tru  
CSC 10/17

FOUO

2005 SEP 20 10:56

SEP 20 2005

I-05/012657  
ES-4259

000,92

TO: Paul McHale  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Report

When do you think you can give me the interim report on lessons learned, and when would the final report be ready?

Thanks.

DHR,dh  
091905-51

.....  
*Please Respond By September 29, 2005*

20 Sep 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/53119

OSD 20513-05



HOMELAND  
DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

INFO MEMO

13 OCT 2005  
A/DepSecDef  
USD(P)  
I# 057012657  
ES-4259  
OCT 17 2005

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Report

*PM*

000,92

On October 3, 2005, Fran Townsend requested a general assessment of the Department's lessons learned in responding to Hurricane Katrina, including an interim chronology of all significant DoD actions from August 23, 2005, through September 28, 2005 (TAB D). Fran Townsend's request is at TAB A and the reply is at TAB B.

Per your comments, the Lessons Learned document at TAB C has been revised. It also incorporates comments from Larry Di Rita.

COORDINATION: TAB E

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Thomas Lacrosse, Ctr. OASD(HD)/FP & E (b)(6)

13 Oct 05

20 Sep 05

OSD 20513-05

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 3, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF STATE  
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE  
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
SECRETARY OF LABOR  
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT  
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION  
SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS  
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND  
BUDGET  
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL  
PROTECTION AGENCY  
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG  
CONTROL POLICY

FROM:   
FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND  
SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM

SUBJECT: COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT  
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

As discussed at our meeting on Friday, September 23, each Department and Agency should be conducting its own internal review of its involvement and performance in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Such internal reviews will assist the Homeland Security Council (HSC) in completing the comprehensive review that the President had ordered.

Following the meeting, it was suggested that it **would** be helpful for you to receive general guidance on the subjects that should be covered in your internal review, and the deliverables that should be produced. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide that guidance and an associated timeline, in order to bring uniformity to the process across Departments and Agencies and thereby facilitate the most prompt and meaningful response to the President.

11-L-0559/OSD/53122

OSD 19721-05

In the course of conducting your internal review, you are requested to prepare and submit to Joel Bagnol, Special Assistant to the President, at the HSC Executive Secretariat (EEOB 496, 202-456-1990 or jrbagnol@who.eop.gov), deliverables on or before the specified dates (drafts may be submitted and so marked, provided that succeeding drafts and final versions are also made available promptly).

- Provide a general assessment of your Department or Agency's lessons learned in responding to Hurricane Katrina, including an annotated chronology of all significant actions taken by your Department or Agency relating to the hurricane from August 23, 2005, through September 28, 2005 (all Departments and Agencies). Deadline: October 7, 2005.
- Provide a paper on each of the topics below relating to the response to catastrophic events, prepared by the specified Departments. Unassigned Departments and Agencies are welcome to respond. These topics represent some of the high order issues that require immediate attention. The questions provided after each topic are illustrative and do not represent the full depth of analysis expected in the papers.
  - Information and Decision Flow (DHS, DoD, and DOJ). Was the National Response Plan (NRP) effectively executed? Does the NRP work for catastrophic events? How do we ensure situational awareness for all levels of leadership? How do we ensure a common operational picture so that all levels of decision makers have the same information from which to make coordinated and accurate judgments? What is the best method of communicating information and coordinating actions between Federal Agencies? What is the best method of communicating information and coordinating preparedness and response actions between the Federal Government and State and local governments? What is the best method of resolving conflicts between decision authorities during an incident? What is the best method for crisis action planning and decision making amongst Federal Agencies during an incident?
  - 9 Appropriate use of the military in catastrophic events (DoD, DOJ, and DHS). Is there an appropriate expanded role for the military in a catastrophic event? Under what circumstances should an expanded military role be considered? How does this affect the delineation of roles and responsibilities with DHS and other Agencies under the National Response Plan? What is the role of the National Guard in a catastrophic event? Under what circumstances is it appropriate to federalize the National Guard for a catastrophic event? (DOJ, DHS, and DoD).
  - 9 Authorities (DOJ, DHS, and DoD). Is there a need for additional authority to deploy federal troops for security purposes in response to a catastrophic event? Should additional disaster assistance authorities be added to the Stafford Act? What legislative or policy alternatives exist to provide for a more timely and seamless government response?
  - 9 Communications (DHS, DOC, DoD, and DOJ). Do we have a plan for implementing a reliable communications system for the full range of responders during an incident that takes into account spectrum, technology, interoperability, mobile emergency systems, governance, and redundancy issues?
  - 3 Transportation (DOT, DHS and DoD). Do emergency transportation plans at the State and local level account for mass evacuation and influx of emergency services at the same time during a catastrophic event? Do emergency transportation plans account for special needs

population? Do emergency transportation plans apply emergency management agreement compacts or Federal resources where shortfalls in capability exist? Do adequate transportation plans exist for post catastrophic event sequenced movement of required emergency personnel (i.e. law enforcement, fire, medical, infrastructure specialists, and others)

- Private Aid and Assistance (Commerce, State, and DHS). Do we have plans for the effective mobilization and integration of private sector aid and assistance during an incident? Do we have plans for the effective integration of foreign aid and assistance into the response to an incident?

Deadline: October 14,2005.

All deliverables should be cleared up through the Department or Agency head before being submitted to HSC. Each deliverable should reference all Records used in its preparation, either through the use of footnotes or by attaching a list of references grouped by subject matter.

The comprehensive review will follow the HSC policy development process:

- Lessons learned recommendations from Departments and Agencies will flow into the Comprehensive Review Working Group (CRWG), which will be comprised of Detailees from Departments and Agencies and officials from the Homeland Security Council staff. A senior experienced official will lead the CRWG and report to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHS/CT). The CRWG may develop independent analysis at the request of the APHS/CT. Departments and Agencies are requested to provide Detailees as indicated below to work full time on the CRWG at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building beginning October 11,2005. Nominations for Detailees should be provided to the HSC Executive Secretariat by October 5, 2005.
  - DoD – four GS-15 or O-6 level strategic planning and policy experts
  - DHS – three GS-15 level planning and policy experts
  - DOJ – two GS-15 level legal policy experts
  - FBI – one GS-15 level law enforcement planning expert
  - HHS – one GS-15 level medical planning expert
  - DOT – one GS-15 level transportation planning expert
  - DOS – one GS-15 level refugee planning expert and one GS-15 level international assistance planning expert
- Work products from the CRWG will be reviewed by a Senior Review Group (SRG), comprised of Assistant Secretary level representatives from Departments and Agencies. The SRG will serve as a Policy Coordinating Committee and forward recommendations to the HSC Deputies Committee and Principals Committee for review and decision as appropriate.

If you or your staff has any questions, please direct them to Joel Bagnal. Thank you in advance for your assistance.

TAB B

13 OCT 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND  
SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Review of the Federal Government Response to Hurricane  
Katrina

This is in reply to your October 3, 2005, memorandum requesting a general assessment of the lessons learned in responding to Hurricane Katrina, including an interim chronology of all significant actions taken by the Department of Defense relating to the hurricane from August 23, 2005, through September 28, 2005, for your use in preparing a response to the President.



Paul McHale  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Homeland Defense)



RICHARD J. MAULDIN  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Director for Operational Plans  
and Joint Force Development

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/53126

TAB C

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
**HURRICANE KATRINA**  
**INITIAL OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED**

Initial observations from the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the Hurricane Katrina response reveal challenges DoD and the U.S. Government must address to improve future Federal catastrophic event response. These issues can be sorted into mission execution challenges and strategic ramifications.

**Mission Execution**

- **Situational Awareness and Damage Assessment.** Imperfect shared situational awareness and damage assessments delayed timely Federal response.

**Observations:**

- o Federal Government leadership, including those in DoD, had limited situational awareness or appreciation of the extent of preliminary damage. Initial local and national media reported that “New Orleans had dodged a bullet” but within hours, levees were breached, resulting in rapid deterioration of the situation.
- o DoD’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities could have been employed early, as they were later in the Hurricane Rita response, to provide near real time situational awareness and preliminary damage assessment.

**Implications:** DoD’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, if deployed, could have significantly improved situational awareness and preliminary damage assessments.

- **Search and Rescue Command and Control.** Multi-Agency Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts saved lives. However, a comprehensive plan to establish priorities, execute SAR operations, and identify where to deliver evacuees who did not require immediate medical attention would have been desirable.

**Observations:**

- o Initially, limited coordination authority existed to de-conflict assets from different agencies operating in the affected areas.
- o Minimal planning occurred to prioritize SAR operations.
- o Initially, limited airspace control existed within the incident area to de-conflict SAR operations.
- o Confusion existed regarding where to deliver evacuated personnel who did not require immediate medical attention. Some evacuation locations lacked food, water, and shelter and included highway overpasses with no follow-on pick-ups.

**Implications:** A comprehensive interagency Search and Rescue plan needs to be developed to clearly identify roles, missions, and functions as well as to establish common protocols and de-conflict air missions for multi-agency operations.

- **Interoperable Communications.** Insufficient interoperable communications among civilian first responders, state authorities, National Guard, and Federal military resources made it difficult to establish and maintain command and control.

**Observations:**

- Local authorities' first responder communications capability did not survive.
- State and local emergency managers were quickly overwhelmed by the severity and magnitude of Hurricane Katrina.
- Degraded communications capability in the area made both civilian and military command and control difficult during the response effort.

**Implications:** Civilian first responders, state authorities, National Guard, and Federal military require interoperable, survivable, and/or readily replaceable communications to effect and maintain command and control.

- **Integration of Title 10 and National Guard.** Better awareness of overall deployment of total forces would have ensured more effective integration of National Guard and Active Duty resources.

**Observations:**

- DoD, DHS, and FEMA had limited awareness of National Guard forces deploying under state status into the affected area.
- Senior Leaders from National Guard Bureau as well as Army and Air National Guard headquarters were in close contact with Adjutants General in the affected states as well as with those states sending responders under state authority.
- However, limited situational awareness led to senior Federal officials filling FEMA Requests for Assistance with Federal resources without realizing state status National Guard personnel and equipment had been deployed to fill the same needs.

**Implications:** Planning for homeland defense and civil support requires close coordination among the Federal military forces, National Guard Bureau, and affected States' Adjutants General. National Guard and Title 10 planning was superbly executed, but not fully integrated due to parallel planning processes.

- **Non-lethal Technology.** When called upon to provide security and law enforcement support, National Guard personnel were not equipped or trained to use non-lethal technology and equipment.

**Observation:** Most National Guard personnel are not currently equipped or trained to use non-lethal technology and equipment while performing law enforcement missions.

**Implications:** DoD needs to provide carefully defined policy guidance, CONOPS, tactics, techniques and procedures for National Guard use of non-lethal technology in the United States.

- **Medical care.** Lack of a well-organized and robust civilian medical surge capability resulted in early employment and excessive reliance on DoD capabilities.

### **Observations:**

- o The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) provides surge medical capability to the nation when local medical capabilities are overwhelmed.
- o The NDMS agreement among DoD, DHS, DHHS, and VA was signed on September 6, 2005.
- o Each of the three pillars of the NDMS: deployable medical capability to a disaster site; patient movement and tracking from a disaster site; and definitive care at participating hospitals outside of the effected area, require further refinement.
- o DHS is responsible for activating NDMS, and must have trained staff to do so.

**Implications:** DoD and the Federal partners need to build on the NDMS agreement and create plans, procedures, and CONOPS adequately resourced and exercised to meet the medical needs during a catastrophic event.

### **Strategic Ramifications**

- **Unity of Effort.** Throughout the response, coordination among local, state, and Federal authorities was difficult. Operational decisions must be well coordinated and effectively transmitted.

#### **Observations:**

- o All levels of Government need clear information for coordination and command and control of assets conducting relief operations.
- o Interagency Headquarters were not always co-located, hampering coordination.

**Implications:** Clarification of roles in the National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Annex is needed to streamline future responses. The U.S. Government requires a DoD-like deliberate planning process and routine exercises of authorities to integrate the Federal response effectively.

- **DoD's role in catastrophic response.** An enhanced role for the Department during catastrophic events requires further evaluation.

#### **Observations:**

- o The majority of disasters and emergencies that occur each year entail limited Federal involvement or support.
- o The local, state, and Federal disaster management processes and resources were stressed by the scope and magnitude of Hurricane Katrina.
- o In catastrophic situations, DoD can provide situational awareness, search and rescue, communications, massive casualty extraction, evacuation assistance, mass decontamination, surge medical care, and if authorized and approved, security and law enforcement operations.
- o Triggering mechanisms should be identified to authorize DoD to assume a larger role during catastrophic events.

**Implications:** DoD authorities, roles, and missions during catastrophic events should be examined. This will require a review of current agency responsibilities in the National Response Plan.

TAB D

<b>HURRICANE KATRINA INTERIM TIMELINE (August - September 2005)</b>			
<b>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)</b>			
<b>Date</b>	<b>Hurricane KATRINA Events</b>		
	<b>Significant Event</b>	<b>Requests for Assistance (Received Date)</b>	<b>Order (Approved)</b>
<b>Friday, 8/19/2005</b>	In anticipation of the upcoming hurricane season, SecDef approves standing EXORD for severe weather disaster operations. SecDef delegates authority to the Commander USNORTHCOM to use military installations and to deploy Defense Coordinating Officers/Elements (to coordinate directly with FEMA) as severe weather approaches.		SecDef approved Base EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for hurricane response (19 Aug 2005)
<b>Tuesday, 8/23/2005</b>	<p><i>Tropical Depression 12 is located about 140 miles southeast of Nassau and about 370 miles east-southeast of the southeast coast of Florida</i></p> <p>ASD(HD) directed a review of DoD assets that were required for the hurricane response in Florida in 2004 and Hurricane DENNIS in 2005 to determine availability. Specifically, Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), installations used as FEMA Mobilization Centers, communication packages, and health care resources and mobile hospitals. The Defense Logistics Agency reported that 18 million of the total 36 million MREs in the US were available for distribution to FEMA. In anticipation of this tropical depression, installations in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana were reported available. Health care providers &amp; mobile hospitals also available for deployment. Permanent OASD (HD) staff at DHS alerted to prepare for Hurricane landfall and DoD-DHS relief effort coordination.</p>		
<b>Wednesday, 8/24/2005</b>	<p><i>Tropical Depression strengthens and becomes Tropical Storm Katrina over central Bahamas. Hurricane Warning is issued for the southeastern Florida Coast.</i></p> <p>USNORTHCOM, Joint Staff, National Guard Bureau and FEMA conduct first teleconference. Issues included DOD support to Federal Authorities (staging at military installations and military assistance availability).</p>		

	USNORTHCOM issues a Warning Order to prepare to support requests for DoD assistance.		
<b>Thursday, 8/25/2005</b>	National Guard Total: Florida Governor alerts all National Guard personnel and activates 800.		
	<i>Hurricane Katrina strikes south tip of Florida in the evening as a Category 1 Hurricane.</i>		
	DoD augments NG Liaison Officer at FEMA with 3 Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers		
	Planning Order issued to deploy Regional Emergency Preparedness Officer, Defense Coordinating Officer and a State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer to FL.		USNORTHCOM Planning Order
	LA and MS Governors alert their National Guard.		
<b>Friday 8/26/2005</b>	National Guard Total: 930 activated in the operational area.		
	Hurricane Katrina continues west and intensifies to a Category 2 hurricane.		
	LA and MS Governors declare states of emergency.		
	Defense Coordinating Officers and coordinating elements deploy to FL and AL to join Federal liaison officers.		USNORTHCOM Order
	Army Corps of Engineers activates Memphis District Emergency Operations Center.		
	DoD Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer reports to FEMA Regional Response Coordination Cell in Atlanta. Military liaison officers are in place to coordinate the efforts.		
	FEMA notifies OASD(HD) of Katrina preparation conference calls beginning 27 August.		
<b>Saturday 8/27/2005</b>	National Guard Total: 2,633 (FL - 777, MS - 180, LA - 1,675, AL - 1)		
	<i>Hurricane Katrina enters Gulf of Mexico, intensifies to Category 3 and is predicted to make landfall between the FL panhandle and Southern LA.</i>		
	Mayor of New Orleans declares a state of emergency and urges evacuation.		
	National Guard Bureau, as a preemptive measure, coordinates Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) for TX, OK, and FL. LA National Guard coordinates initial helicopters.		
	(1200) PDASD(HD) and Joint Staff participate in FEMA conference call		

	DoD receives first request for assistance from FEMA to designate Naval Air Station Meridian, MS as FEMA operational staging area.	FEMA RFA (27 Aug)	USNORTHCOM EXORD (27 Aug)
<b>Sunday</b> 8/28/2005	National Guard Total: 5,376 personnel are in the operating area.		
	Hurricane <i>Katrina</i> intensifies to <i>Category 5</i> .		
	The President issues a major disaster declaration for Florida		White House News Release (28 Aug)
	New Orleans Mayor orders mandatory evacuation.		
	Defense Coordination Officers deploy to MS and LA.		USNORTHCOM EXORD (28 Aug)
	DoD activates Hurricane Operations Cell for 24/7 operations in advance of and during the storm's landfall and aftermath.		
	(1200) PDASD(HD) and Joint Staff participate in FEMA conference call		
Draft SecDef Base EXORD for Hurricane Katrina designates USNORTHCOM as the Supported Combatant Commander to plan and conduct disaster relief operations in support of FEMA. Tasks USJFCOM to provide two (2) helicopters to assist in transporting Rapid Needs Assessment Teams in response to FEMA RFA (28 Aug). Tasks USTRANSCOM, the Military Department Secretaries, and Directors of Defense Agencies to Be Prepared To (BPT) support ongoing hurricane relief operations.	FEMA RFA (28 Aug)	SecDef Base EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (29 Aug)	
USNORTHCOM deploys an advance headquarters, Joint Task Force Katrina Forward, to Camp Shelby, MS, and designates Barksdale AFB a FEMA operational staging area.	USNORTHCOM RFF, FEMA RFA	USNORTHCOM EXORD (28 Aug)	
USTRANSCOM puts aircraft, crews and Contingency Response Wings on alert.			
<b>Monday</b> 8/29/2005 <i>Landfall</i>	National Guard Total: 7,522 in operating area		
	Hurricane Katrina changes to Category 4 and makes landfall near Buras, LA at 0600 ED		
	Overtopping of levees in New begins.		
	President issues major disaster declarations for AL, LA, and MS.		White House News Release (29 Aug)
	ASD(HD) briefs SecDef on DoD's response to Hurricane Katrina.		
USNORTHCOM designates Maxwell Air Force Base as a Federal operational staging area and directs Military Department Secretaries to provide aircraft to move FEMA teams.	FEMA RFA	USNORTHCOM EXORD (29 Aug)	

	Alert Orders given to stage airlift and cargo handling to move supplies on order. Search and rescue aircraft coordinated. US Navy vessels afloat are directed to disaster area.		
	Within 4 hours of Hurricane Katrina's passage, Army National Guard helicopters are performing rescue. 65 helicopters are positioned in FL, TX, AL, LA, and MS. National Guard personnel assessing situation with local law enforcement personnel.		
<b>Tuesday 8/30/2005</b>	Total Active Duty: 1,000 Total National Guard: 10,974		
<b>Landfall + 24 hours</b>	Secretary of Homeland Security declares an Incident of National Significance		Per National Response Plan
	SecDef in San Diego, CA, returning to Washington.		
	DepSecDef with CJCS gives VOCO approval to USNORTHCOM to assume control of all DoD resources necessary to support recovery operations for Hurricane Katrina.		
	DepSecDef hosts Hurricane Katrina Round Table.		
	ASD(HD) instructs PDASD(HD) to contact DHS (Stephan) about appointment of PFO; PFO (Brown) appointed later in afternoon.		
	Additional OASD(HD) personnel augment permanent OASD(HD) staff at DHS HSOC.		
	National Guard helicopters continue S&R operations.		
	Draft MOD 1 to SecDef EXORD tasks USJFCOM to provide five (5) helicopters to assist in assessments and Search and Rescue. Tasks USTRANSCOM to provide and Strategic Airlift for Swift Water Rescue Boats.	FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DoD-01 FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DoD-01 FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DoD-02	MOD 1 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (30 Aug).
	Maxwell AFB, AL; Barksdale AFB, LA; Meridian NAS, MS; and Old England AFB, LA, being used as FEMA Mobilization Centers		
	Depended directs CJCS and USNORTHCOM to push all available DoD assets forward that could be useful to FEMA. Depended sends relief support memorandum to the White House.		
	DEPENED hosts Hurricane Katrina Round Table with CJCS, VCJCS, DJS, DJ2, DJ3, DJ4.		
	USNORTHCOM activates Joint Task Force Katrina and forward Headquarters begins transition to full operations.		
	Defense coordinating element teams arrive to augment existing DCOs located on site with FEMA in FL, AL, MS, and LA.		

	Key liaison officers sent to Department of Homeland Security and Red Cross.		
	Active duty aviation units conduct evacuation and search and rescue operations: USSOCOM deployed 6 x HH-60s to MS ANG Facility at Jackson International Airport; flies Search and Rescue mission - 12 sorties for 55.9 hours/221 saves; USSOCOM also directs 3 x IFR capable MH-53M to support operations. USAFR 433 Air Evacuation Squadron out of Lackland AFB, San Antonio, flies 11 sorties in C-5B aircraft moving 412 patients out of New Orleans.		
	MOD 2 to SecDef EXORD tasks Military Department Secretaries to provide NMDS Hospital Bed Count to FEMA.	FEMA RFA 1605DR-AL-DoD-01 FEMA RFA 1602DR-FL-DoD-04 FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DoD-02 FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DoD-04 FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DoD-06	MOD 2 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (31 Aug).
	Draft MOD 3 SecDef EXORD tasks USJFCOM to provide 36 helicopters to support personnel, cargo, and casualty transportation requirements	FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DoD-07	MOD 3 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (31 Aug)
	Aeromedical evacuation begins: Humanitarian assistance vessels, salvage and construction, medical trauma, and strategic airlift capabilities directed to the area of operation.		
<b>Wednesday 8/31/2005</b> <b>Landfall + 48 hours</b>	Total Active Duty: 2,000 Total National Guard: 11,251		
	SecDef, ASD(HD), and CJCS attend Hurricane Katrina Task Force meeting with the President to discuss military response in Cabinet Room at White House.		
	DepSecDef Hurricane Update with CNGB, VCJS, DJS, DJ2, DJ3, DJ5		
	DepSecDef confers with CJCS on augmentation of PFO staff		
	ASD(HD) reviews possible augmentation of PFC staff with SecDef; SecDef confers with CJCS: 20-6 selected from USNORTHCOM for augmentation: ASD(HD) calls PFO Brown who accepts staff augmentation,		
	Levees fail in New Orleans; extensive flooding throughout city; USACE conducts operations to close breach on 17th Street canal.		
	JTF Katrina fully operational.		

JTF Katrina conducts Superdome evacuation operations: LTG Honore arrived at Superdome at 0930 Local; after meeting with city leaders, flew to Baton Rouge late in day to discuss courses of action with LA Governor and staff for evacuation of Superdome; determine most efficient course of action was evacuation by bus; buses directed to vicinity of Superdome the following day.		
National Guard helicopters continue S&R operations.		
Active component helicopters continue S&R operations.		
USS BATAAN arrives and assumes tactical control of all JTF Katrina aviation assets; arrives with 2 x MH-60 and 4 x MH-53 helicopters aboard.		
USMC 2 x UH-1N, 1 x AH-1W helicopters of HLMA-733 arrived in New Orleans area and conducted relief and evacuation of NAS Bell Chase.		
4 x USAF HH-60 helicopters from Patrick AFB, FL, and Moody AFB, GA, deploy to Jackson, MS.		
Swift Water Rescue Teams in place in LA		
Tasks USJFCOM to provide field hospital with up to 500-bed capacity to be located in the vicinity of New Orleans.	FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-5	MOD 2 to SecDef EXORD for DoD support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (31 Aug).
Multiple rescue operations accomplished, more medical assets arrive, and additional capabilities coordinated and ordered.		
VOCO by SecDef and Draft MOD 4 to SecDef EXORD tasks SECARMY to provide Fort Polk, LA, as a deployment site for four (4) Federal Medical Shelters. Tasks SECNAV to provide Naval Air Station, Meridian, MS, as a deployment site for two (2) Federal Medical Shelters. Tasks SECAF to provide Eglin AFB, FL, as a deployment site for two (2) Federal Medical Shelters. Tasks Chief, NGB to coordinate for the use of MS ARNG Base, Jackson, MS, as a deployment site for two (2) Federal Medical Shelters.	Initial DHHS RFA (A/S Simonson) (31 Aug); follow-on FEMA RFA	VOCO Approval (31 Aug): MOD 4 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (1 Sep)
Air mobility command generates 28 heavy airlift aircraft dedicated to support aeromedical evacuation as water search and rescue continues.		
National Guard from 14 states supporting operations.		

<p><b>Thursday</b>  <b>9/1/2005</b>  <b>Landfall + 72</b>  <b>hours</b></p>	<p>Total Active Duty: 3,000                  Total National Guard: 16,232</p>		
	<p>The President meets with SecDef and Chief National Guard Bureau to discuss active duty and National Guard response.</p>		
	<p>ASD(HD) had a conference call with DHHS A/S Simonson regarding medical support for Hurricane Katrina</p>		
	<p>Press conference with DHS Secretary Chertoff</p>		
	<p>Hurricane Katrina SVTC</p>		
	<p>FEMA ordered 19 million MREs, to be picked up from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) warehouses and directly from the manufacturer.</p>		
	<p>ASD(HD) met with the Joint Staff Director of Logistics (DJ4) to determine if DoD could take over the distribution of ice, water, food, and medical supplies from FEMA. The DJ4 told the ASD(HD) that DoD could perform the mission.</p>		
	<p>FEMA relief operations focused on evacuation of Superdome.</p>		
	<p>helicopters continue <b>S&amp;R</b> operations.</p>		
	<p>JTF Katrina Commander, LTG Honore, conducts recon of heart of New Orleans to identify other locations with large numbers of displaced persons; locates 15,000 citizens in City Convention Center needing evacuation; immediately coordinated for large delivery of food and water at site.</p>		
	<p>(0700) USNORTHCOM RFF 7 requested 70 soldiers with rubber boats to assist in evacuation of Superdome.</p>		
	<p>(1700) Evacuation of Superdome and New Orleans using military trucks, aircraft, and FEMA contracted buses is proceeding.</p>		
	<p>USNORTHCOM establishes a Deployment and Distribution Operations Center to coordinate DoD support missibns.</p>		
	<p>USNORTHCOM gives XVIII Airborne Corps "be prepared to" mission for hurricane relief operations.</p>		
<p>National Guard from 23 states supporting operations.</p>			

<p>VOCO by SecDef and follow-on Draft MOD 5 to SecDef EXORD tasks USJFCOM to provide two (2) rotary wing aircraft to fly damage assessment teams.                  Tasks SECAF to provide JP-8 aviation fuel with refueling tankers to support rotary wing aircraft for search and rescue and levee repair operations.                  Tasks SECNAV to provide Naval Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport, MS, for use as a Federal Operational Staging Area.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-10-01                  FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-09</p>	<p>Approved VOCO (2 Sep); MOD 5 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (2 Sep)</p>
<p>VOCO by SecDef and follow-on Draft MOD 6 SecDef EXORD tasks CDR USTRANSCOM to provide strategic airlift to transport an estimated 10,000 evacuees from New Orleans, LA, to San Antonio, TX.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-14</p>	<p>Approved VOCO (1 Sep); EXORD MOD 6 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (1 Sep)</p>
<p>Draft MOD 7 SecDef EXORD tasks</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-13                  FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DOD-11                  FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DOD-11-01                  FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DOD-16                  FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DOD-17</p>	<p>EXORD MOD 7 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (SEP)</p>
	<p>FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-12</p>	<p>EXORD MOD 8 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (SEP)</p>
<p>Air space management capability established. Aeromedical evacuation and water search and rescue continue. Additional support vessels and survey and construction units diverted to the area of operations.</p>		
<p>Airlift for 10,000 personnel begins from New Orleans to Houston.</p>		
<p><b>Friday 9/2/2005</b></p>		
<p><b>Landfall + 4 days</b></p>		
<p>Total Active Duty: 4,011                  Total National Guard: 20,628</p>		
<p>SecDef, ASD(HD), and CJCS SVTC on Hurricane Katrina with the President</p>		
<p>SecDef, ASD(HD), CJCS attend White House SVTC attended by the President with ADM Keating from USNORTHCOM; President discusses MACDIS - directs DOD to explore options. Unity of Command also discussed.</p>		

Following White House SVTC, ASD(HD) confers with CJGS regarding MACDIS, Unity of Command, and National Guard dual-hat status.		
ASD(HD) met with Joint Staff Director of Operations (DJ3) twice to discuss courses of action for response to Hurricane Katrina (Unity of Command, MACDIS, and dual hat status).		
ASD(HD) met at length with SecDef (in SecDef office), CJCS, and other senior staff regarding MACDIS, Title 32/dual hat status, and Unity of Command.		
ASD(HD) holds second meeting on Friday with Joint Staff Director of Operations (DJ3) to discuss a courses of action for response to Hurricane Katrina:discussed Title 32/dual hat courses of action.		
National Guard and Active Component helicopters continue <b>S&amp;R</b> operations.		
The President visits Gulf Coast. Governor of AL makes Title 32 request to SecDef.		
NG forces secured City Convention Center and distributed food and water.		
with MREs and water on-site at City Convention Center and distributed.		
Late in day, LTG Honore and city officials met and developed plan to evacuate City Convention Center.		
FEMA ordered an additional 2.5 million MREs, to be picked up from the Defense Logistics Agency warehouses and directly from the manufacturer.		
DLA directed the manufacturer surge to increase MRE production capability.		
DJ4 met with his staff and developed a logistical support plan for the distribution of ice, water, food and medical supplies to Louisiana and Mississippi.		
Aeromedical evacuation and medical operations continue.		
Issued Meals ready to Eat (MRE) numbers take the Department of Defense below war stock reserve levels. Remaining CONUS MREs are under Service's control.		
Levee repairs by Army Corps of Engineers continue with US Navy support.		
Tasks USNORTHCOM to provide one (1) Public Information Officer to the Joint Information Center, MS Joint Field Office.	FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DOD-1B	MOD 8 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (3 SEP)
National Guard from 32 states supporting the operations.		

	The majority of personnel evacuations from Superdome complete.		
	Draft MOD 9 to SecDef EXORD tasks Director DLA to provide and deliver 500k to 1.5m MREs to Camp Beauregard, LA. Tasks the Commander Armed Forces Institute of Pathology to provide a two person DNA team to assist Disaster Mortuary Affairs Teams at Baton Rouge, LA with victim identification.	FEMA REA 1603DR-LA-DOD-15 FEMA REA 1603DR-LA-DOD-18	MOD 9 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (3 SEP)
	Draft MOD 11 to SecDef EXORD tasks USJFCOM to provide ten (10) high-water vehicles with operators, logistics, and maintenance, for transporting law enforcement personnel/soldiers.	FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-17	MOD 11 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (6 SEP)
<b>Saturday 9/3/2005 Landfall + 5 days</b>	Total Active Duty: 4,631		
	Total National Guard: 29,491		
	ASD(HD) attends pre-brief with SecDef (Pentagon)		
	ASD(HD) accompanies SecDef to White House for Hurricane Katrina Update to President		
	SecDef attends press conference with President - President announces deployment of 7,200 active duty forces to the area of operation.		
	ASD(HD) confers offline (following update with President at White House) with DHS DepSecDef Jackson to draft comprehensive Request for Assistance for FEMA.		
	National Guard and Active Component helicopters continue S&R operations.		
	ASD(HD) and CJCS attends HSC Hurricane Katrina SVTC at White House as DoD representative.		
	(1200) USNORTHCOM JOC received VOCC by SecDef orders from CJCS (Gentry) approving movement of 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, and 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; elements have boots on ground within 6 hours; confirmed C-17 aircraft departed Fort Bragg, North Carolina for New Orleans at 1500 EDT with arrival of 1700 EDT in LA with 75 soldiers and 4 vehicles.		
	Over 23,000 displaced citizens evacuated and Superdome and City Convention Center cleared of initial evacuees.		
	Governor of MS Title 32 request forwarded to SecDef.		
	Aeromedical evacuation and video reconnaissance operations continue.		

	USNORTHCOM deploys 2 C-130 aircraft equipped with Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems to Pensacola, FL To date, ANG units conducted 726 sorties in support of LA and MS; included movement of 11,421 personnel and 3,647 cargo tons of supplies.		SecDef Wild land Firefighting EXORD
	ARNG coordinated delivery of 230 HMMVs from Red River Army Depot for LA and MS		
	National Guard from 36 states supporting operations.		
	Draft MOD 8 to SecDef EXORD tasks USNORTHCOM to plan and develop a Concept of Operations to execute logistical support operations, and upon CJCS approval of CONOPS, execute logistical support operations in LA and MS.	FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DOD-19	MOD 8 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (3 SEP)
	Draft MOD 10 tasks SECARMY to provide the Army Reserve Center located at Greenwood, MS to be used as a shelter location to assist displaced persons. Increases funding for previously approved pharmaceuticals (MOD 7) and closes out JFCOM requirement for two rotary wing aircraft (MOD 5).	FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DOD-20 FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DOD-16-01	AOD 10 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (4 SEP)
<b>Sunday 9/4/2005</b> <i>Landfall + 6 days</i>	Total Active Duty: 10,952 Total National Guard: 35,4121		
	ASD(HD) travels with SecDef and CJCS to LA and MS		
	DHS (FEMA) "broad" RFA reviewed and clarified with DepSecDef, VCJCS, DJ3, and PDASD(HD) along with DHS leadership: draft faxed to SecDef aboard plane		
	Later in day, SecDef returns to Washington with RFA edits/approval.		
	USNORTHCOM Deployed Distribution Operations Center established at Fort Gillem, GA, to assist with distribution of food, water and reconstruction supplies and equipment.		
	Draft MOD 12 to SecDef EXORD directs SECARMY to provide the Army Reserve Center, Laurel, MS as a shelter to support 200 relief workers and Army personnel.	FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-24	AOD 12 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (6 SEP)
	Draft MOD 12 SecDef EXORD also tasks SECNAV to provide two (2) water purification units with operators and transportation to two hospitals in MS. Tasks SECARMY to provide the Army Reserve Center at Laurel, MS to shelter 200 relief workers and military personnel.	FEMA RFA 1604DR-MS-DOD-23	AOD 12 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (6 SEP)
	Draft MOD 17 to SecDef EXORD tasks SECAF to provide a communications support unit to augment air traffic control.	NC RFF 12	AOD 17 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (10 SEP)

	Active duty elements arrive in affected area: 1st Battalion, 8th Marines via 6 x C-130 from Camp Lejeune on ground at NAS New Orleans; Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force main element on ground in Biloxi and Gulfport, MS; 82nd ABN via airlift - 344 soldiers, 14 vehicles, 2 UH-60 helicopters on ground in New Orleans; 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry from Ft. Hood - 1st of 4 groups - 420 soldiers on ground in Hammond, LA.		
	1830 EDT 1,469 82nd soldiers on ground in New Orleans with 60 vehicles, 12 UH-60 helicopters.		
	A total of 9.2 million MRE's are present or enroute to disaster area.		
	Additional vessels afloat arrive. Levee repair, medical operations, security operations, debris removal, search and rescue, and food/water distribution continue.		
	USS TORTUGA arrives in New Orleans		
<b>Monday 9/5/2005 Landfall + 7 days</b>	Total Active Duty: 14,232		
	Total National Guard: 39,096		
	The President visits Gulf Coast.		
	SecDef hosted daily Katrina SVTC with DJS		
	HSC Deputies SVTC on Hurricane Katrina		
	ASD(HD) met with DepSecDef to update him on DoD response to Hurricane Katrina to further refine RFAs into more specific requirements.		
	Governor of LA Title 32 request is sent to SecDef.		
	Chief of National Bureau Title 32 request (covering all Katrina recovery forces) is sent to SecDef.		
	USS IWO JIMA arrives in New Orleans.		
	0700 EDT 1,469 82nd soldiers, 141 1st Cav Div, and 242 4th Infantry Division on ground in New Orleans.		
	Humanitarian assistance vessels, salvage and construction, medical trauma, and strategic airlift capabilities arrive in area of operation.		
	Draft MOD 17 to SecDef EXORD tasks SECDEF to provide a ground based capability to receive video feeds from multiple platforms including RC-130, P3, and UAVs.	NC RFF 14	MOD 17 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (10 SEP)
	Draft MOD 21 to SecDef EXORD tasks SECDEF to provide two Aerostats (one with radio/cellular repeaters and one with SINGARS/HQ repeaters.	NC RFF 14	MOD 21 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (14 SEP)

	Draft MOD 18 to SecDef EXORD tasks SECNAL to provide a transportable trunked radio system that includes two hundred (200) hand-held radios.	NC RFF 14	MOD 18 to SecDef EXORD to DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (13 SEP)
	Directs Director, DISA to provide communications technicians and to operate communications equipment provided by JDOMS in support of the New Orleans Police Department.	FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-27	MOD 12 to SecDef EXORD to DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (6 SEP)
	23 water distribution sites are functioning; ice being provided; approximately 13.4 million MRE shipped or arrived to date.		
<b>Tuesday 9/6/2005 Landfall + 8</b>	Total Active Duty: 14,853		
	Total National Guard: 44,087		
	SecDef attends Cabinet meeting on Hurricane Katrina		
	JTF Katrina relocates to USS IWO JIMA in New Orleans		
	SecDef concurs with Secretary of Transportation for use of Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force to carry non-defense related humanitarian cargo.		
	SecDef hosts Hurricane Katrina SVTC		
	SecDef Briefing for Senators with ASD(HD)		
	SecDef briefing for House members with ASD(HD)		
	745 DoD hospital bed capability in place.		
	1500 Land Mobile Radios delivered to 82nd Airborne Communications Officer for use with LA/MS Emergency Responders (Police and Fire)		
	Draft MOD 13 to SecDef EXORD directs USNORTHCOM to: Conduct search and rescue operations, collect and evacuate live persons Provide assistance to locate, maintain contact with and provide storage for bodies of deceased persons Provide assistance for debris removal and assist in restoration of basic utilities and key transportation routes (land and water)	FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-29-01 FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-30 FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-31 FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-32 FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-33	MOD 13 to SecDef EXORD to DoD support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (6 SEP)
	Draft MOD 14 to SecDef EXORD directs USTRANSCOM to provide aviation support on 5 hour alert to carry supplies and/or passengers not to exceed 8 463L pallet equivalents Directs USJFCOM to provide 16 amphibious vehicles for transport of rescuers, victims, and portable pumps; and provide 5 general purpose trucks and operators capable of operating in high water.	FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-36 FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-37 FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-38 FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-39	MOD 14 to SecDef EXORD to DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (7 SEP)

Draft MOD 12 to SecDef EXORD further directs SECNAV to provide additional 750 bed capability to house first responders on the USNS COMFORT.	FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-07-02	MOD 12 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (6 SEP)
Draft MOD 27 to SecDef EXORD directs CDR USJFCOM to provide Military Medical support to consist of one (1) NCO, three (3) personnel and two (2) squads of twenty (20) personnel with organic support and transportation to provide veterinary support to LA.	FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-31	MOD 27 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (24 SEP)
Draft MOD 16 to SecDef EXORD tasks SECAF to provide Maxwell AFB as an Operational Staging Area.	FEMA RFA 1605-DR-LA-DOD-05	MOD 16 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (9 SEP)
Draft MOD 23 to SecDef EXORD tasks SECARMY to provide one (1) SMART-PM (preventative Medicine) team to LA	FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-31	MOD 23 to SecDef EXORD for DoD support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (17 SEP)
Draft MOD 25 to SecDef EXORD tasks National Geospatial Intelligence Agency to provide one U-2 aircraft to provide high resolution synoptic coverage of Plaquemines Parish, LA	FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-32	MOD 25 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (21 SEP)
Tasks USSOCOM to provide riverine/bayou search and rescue capability with command and control capability.	NC RFF 17	MOD 17 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (10 SEP)
ASD(HD) briefed SASC and HASC Professional Staff Members and Military Legislative Assistants on DoD activities in support of the Hurricane Katrina rescue and recovery effort		
<b>Wednesday 9/7/2005 Landfall + 9 days</b>		
Total Active Duty: 19,224		
Total National Guard: 50,150		
SecDef and ASD(HD) attend NSC/HSC meeting with President.		
SecDef hosts Hurricane Katrina SVTC		
DepSecDef approves Chief of National Bureau Title 32 request (retroactive to 29 August).		
ASD(HD) interview with New York Times		
JTF Katrina Commander, LTG Honore, directs active and reserve forces will not participate or assist any forced evacuation.		
USS SHREVEPORT is pier side in New Orleans serving as staging area for New Orleans Police Department and National Guard forces.		
4,500 FORSCOM purchased AM/FM radios were delivered to MS for distribution to the civilian populace.		
DoD continues to provide vehicles, airlift, medical, pastoral and religious support teams to the area of operations. 16.7 million MREs shipped or enroute to the area.		

<p>Additional equipment and personnel are sent to the Gulf Coast for construction, fire fighting, communication, and logistical operations, including fuel pumping units for fuel transport and fueling of emergency vehicles and mosquito aerial spraying.</p>		
<p>Draft MOD 15 to SecDef EXORD directs USJFCOM to provide four tank pump units operators and fuel handlers for fuel transport and fueling of emergency response vehicles at Fort Whiting, Mobile, AL. Directs USNORTHCOM deobligate \$500k until additional FEMA funds become available (original request was for \$1 billion) to plan and execute transportation and distribution of supplies.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 1604-DR-AL-DOD-06 FEMA RFA 1604-DR-MS-DOD-19-03</p>	<p>MOD 15 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (8 SEP)</p>
<p>Draft MOD 16 to SecDef EXORD further directs SECNAV to provide NAS Meridian, MS, and Maxwell AFB, AL, as FEMA operational staging bases for up to 180 days. Further directs SECNAV to provide Naval Air Station Belle Chase, LA, as a lodging facility for 30 MCI employees and use of Naval Air Station Corpus Christie, TX, as an Operational Staging Area. Directs USJFCOM to provide DCO/DCE augmentation support and communications support cell.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 1604-DR-MS-DOD-25 NC RFF 19</p>	<p>MOD 16 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (9 SEP)</p>
<p>USEUCOM establishes a web portal site for collaborative planning with USNORTHCOM and USAID to coordinate USEUCOM responses to Katrina missions.</p>		
<p>PDASD(HD) briefed HAC-D and SAC-D Professional Staff members and Personal Staffs on DoD activities in support of the Hurricane Katrina rescue and recovery effort.</p>		
<p>USNORTHCOM RFF that directs ASD HA to provide software and trainers to administer the battlefield medical information system</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 1604-DR-MS-DOD-26</p>	<p>MOD 18 to SecDef EXORD to DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (13 SEP)</p>
<p><b>Thursday 9/8/2005 Landfall + 10 days</b></p>		
<p>Total Active Duty: 19,749 Total National Guard: 48,560 (-)</p>		
<p>ASD(HD) travels with Vice President to affected areas.</p>		
<p>HSC DC SVTC on Hurricane Katrina.</p>		
<p>Oil refineries are operating at 70% of capacity, with capability of 100%.</p>		
<p>ASD(HD), NGB, and Joint Staff J3- DDAT/HD brief House Armed Services Committee and HAC-QOLNA staffers on Hurricane Katrina relief.</p>		
<p>PDASD(HD) briefs Appropriations Subcommittee on Hurricane Katrina operations.</p>		

	Governor of LA states that no citizens will be forcibly removed.		
	Seven Ready Reserve Force ships receive activation orders for berthing of relief workers.		
	Medical, salvage, search and rescue, debris removal, evacuation, sewage restoration, relief worker billeting, airlift, air traffic control, reconnaissance, fuel distribution, feeding, water distribution, and construction efforts continue.		
	Draft MOD 22 to SecDef EXORD directs CDR USJFCOM to provide continued engineer support to effect facility repairs for displaced citizens, public shelters, local infrastructure, utilities and basic public services in MS.	FEMA RFA 1604-MS-DOD-27	MOD 22 to SecDef EXORD for DoD support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (16 SEP)
	USNORTHCOM submits RFF that directs SECARMY to provide a task organized Joint Network Node capability for the deployed Headquarters.	NC RFF # 20	MOD 17 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (10 SEP)
	USNORTHCOM submits RFF that directs SECNAV to provide one blue force tracking Common Operational Picture manager and one C2PC Common Operational Picture manager	NC RFF # 20	MOD 18 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (13 SEP)
<b>Friday 9/9/2005</b> □ + 11 days	Total Active Duty: 19 973		
	Total National Guard: 30,116 (+)		
	President approves additional \$5 billion for Hurricane Katrina relief.		
	SecDef hosted daily SVTC		
	ASD(HD) conference call with Dan Bartlett (White House)		
	Radio Day Participation (Pentagon)		
	Movement of all 7,200 active and reserve forces into the operations area is complete.		
	supplies have been moved by airlift.		
	Armed Forces Institute of Pathology is providing a specialized DNA team to assist with identification of fatalities.		
	17.1 million MREs shipped to date.		
	Draft MOD 18 to SecDef EXORD tasks SECARMY to provide one Command and Control element for theater management of Medical supplies and pharmaceuticals.	NC RFF # 21	MOD 18 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (13 SEP)
	Draft MOD 22 to SecDef EXORD tasks CDR USJFCOM to provide one Command and Control element for theater management of Medical supplies and pharmaceuticals, MOD 18 incorrectly assigned request to the Army.	NC RFF # 21	MOD 22 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (16 SEP)

	Draft MOD 21 to SecDef EXORD directs SECARMY to provide the US Army Reserve Center in Vicksburg, MS, as a temporary public school over-flow classroom space	FEMA RFA 1604-MS-DOD-29	MOD 21 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (14 SEP)
	Draft MOD 18 to SecDef EXORD also increases funding from \$500M to \$1B for planning and executing logistical support.	FEMA RFA 1604-MS-DOD-19-04	MOD 18 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (13 SEP)
<b>Saturday 9/10/2005 Landfall+ 12 days</b>	Total Active Duty: 20,991 Total National Guard: 50,116 SecDef hosted daily SVTC USNORTHCOM Conference Call for Hurricane Katrina with SecDef, Depended, CJCS, COCOM CDR (Pentagon) DHS assigns VADM Thad Allen (USCG) as Principal Federal Official for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. USNORTHCOM begins planning for retrograde of NG assets from MS with emphasis on units from states in possible Hurricane Ophelia path. SACEUR, through NATO, offers 2 x 707 aircraft and 3 x Roll-on Roll-off ships to transport donations. Draft MOD 18 to SecDef EXORD further directs SECNAV to provide one deployable command and communications center to support a 60-personnel operations cell.	NC RFF # 22	MOD 18 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (13 SEP)
<b>Sunday 9/11/2005 Landfall+ 73 days</b>	Total Active Duty: 20,991 Total National Guard: 50,116 President visits Gulf Coast and stays overnight on USS IWOJIMA. PFO Katrina Operations Center now onboard USS IWOJIMA. Mortuary Affairs support from the Department of Defense is being reconsidered by FEMA in lieu of contracting. Contractor withdraws. JTF Katrina issues first request for USNORTHCOM to re-deploy forces no longer needed to support relief operations. Request includes Navy ships, helicopters, UAV support and USMC forces totaling about 2,000 personnel. Draft MOD 21 to SecDef EXORD directs SECDEF to provide a mental health capability to support 10K deployed T10 Forces.	NC RFF # 24	MOD 21 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (14 SEP)

	Draft MOD 19 to SecDef EXORD directs USTRANSCOM to provide airlift for two firefighting trucks from Holloman AFG, NM and Mountain Home AFB. ID to the New Orleans International Airport. Directs SECAF to fill the USTRANSCOM firefighting trucks requirement.	NC RFF # 23	MOD 19 to SecDef EXORD fo DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (11 SEP)
<b>Monday 9/12/2005</b>	Total Active Duty: 22,028 Total National Guard: 48,045		
<b>days</b>	Army Mortuary Affairs Teams. SecDef gives VOCO authorization to redeploy the USS HARR S. TRUMAN and USS WHIDBEY ISI AND to home station Katrina conference call with SecDef, CJCS, USNORTHCOM, and ASD(HD). SecDef directs daily conference calls and that the daily Katrina briefs from both DoD and USNORTHCOM be sent to the President. White House received them today. ASD (HD), NGB Chief, and Joint Staff, J-3-DD ATHD briefed Senate Armed Services Staffers on DoD Katrina relief operations. Questions from staffers focused on DoD responsiveness. Draft MOD 21 to SecDef EXORD directs SECARMY to provide space at Ft. Gillem, GA, for use as a FEMA Mobilization Center for 60 days. FEMA amendment to restore \$10M dollars for DOD personnel to assist in the physical collection and removal of human remains.	FEMA RFA 1603-DR-MS-DOD-30    FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-40-2	MOD 21 to SecDef EXORD fo DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (14 SEP)    MOD 20 to SecDef EXORD fo DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (13 SEP)
<b>Tuesday 9/13/2005 Landfall + 15 days</b>	Total Active Duty: 19,337 Total National Guard: 48,280 SECDEF Katrina conference call SecDef approved Force Adjustment EXORD. USNORTHCOM establishes a conditions-based transition/force adjustment that entails coordination with JTF-Katrina, Principal Federal Officer, and SecDef final approval. Operations in LA focus on deliberate searches - 50% complete - and unwatering. Operations in MS focus on Gulfport and Biloxi- US Navy and international (Dutch/Mexican) vessels support clearing operations. 12,000 Guard, Active, and Reserve air missions flown in support of Katrina to date. FEMA requested DoD perform all aspects of the mortuary affairs mission until another contractor can be found		

	USNS Comfort redeployment pending coordination and agreement between the Secretary DHS, Principal Federal Official, and State Officials that ship and unit are no longer required.		
	ASD(HD) phone call with Gen Jones, SACEUR, discussing NATO roll-on, roll-off ship support		
	PDASD(HD) updated SASC Professional Staff Members and Military Legislative Assistants on DoD activities in support of the Hurricane Katrina rescue and recovery effort.		
	Anticipating Hurricane Ophelia response, USNORTHCOM directs 3 DCO/DCE to deploy to FL, GA, SC, and NC to support FEMA for Hurricane Ophelia and establishes Fort Bragg, NC, and McIntire ANG Base, SC, established as Operational Staging Areas under the authority of the CJCS Severe Weather EXORD.		CJCS Severe Weather EXORD (19 Aug 2005)
<b>Wednesday 9/14/2005 Landfall + 16 days</b>	Total Active Duty: 18,276		
	Total National Guard: 48,280		
	SECDEF Katrina conference call		
	SecDef VOCO authorizes deployment of 9 additional Mortuary Affairs teams. Number later revised to 4. Capability present in the area of operations is assessed as sufficient for current operations and a surge.		
	SecDef authorizes a Force Adjustment, releasing capabilities considered mission complete or no longer required. Capabilities released include aerial search/lift, aerial imaging, ground and transportation units. Total number of personnel is 758.		
	USNORTHCOM reduces FPCON from Bravo to Alpha for all DoD JTF-Katrina forces operating in the Joint Operations Area.		
	For Hurricane Ophelia preparations, FEMA requests 7 Rotary Wing aircraft for potential evacuation, deliver essential supplies in NC and transport Federal Rapid Needs Assessment teams	FEMA RFA 7220SU-MC-DOD-06	JS EXORD Ophelia
	FEMA requests 3 helicopters for potential evacuation of citizens to save lives, deliver other essential supplies and equipment in VA. 20 watercraft to assist in potential water rescue operations in support of Hurricane Ophelia response operations in North Carolina.	FEMA RFA 7220SU-VA-DOD-05 FEMA RFA 7220SU-NC-DOD-07	MOD 1 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Ophelia ( SEP)
USNORTHCOM submits RFF that directs SECARMY to provide one SMART-PM (Preventive Medicine team) for Katrina.	NC RFF #28	AOD 23 to SecDef EXORD to DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (17 SEP)	

<p><b>Thursday 9/15/2005 Landfall + 17 days</b></p>	<p>Total Active Duty: 17,176 Total National Guard: 47,398 SECDEF Katrina conference call The President visits Gulf Coast.  SecDef and ASD(HD) attend White House HSC Principal's meeting hosted by Fran Townsend. Discussion topics included stand-up of the White House Hurricane Katrina Task Force as well as the way ahead concerning benefits and recovery.  Continuing to refine force adjustment procedures with Principal Federal Official and CDR USNORTHCOM.</p>		
<p><b>Friday 9/16/2005 Landfall + 18 days</b></p>	<p>Total Active Duty: 14,336 Total National Guard: 45,213 SECDEF Katrina conference call PDASD(HD) attended a Deputies-level HSC meeting regarding the environmental clean-up of Katrina devastation  USNORTHCOM continues analyzing conditions-based transition/force adjustments with JTF-Katrina and Principal Federal Official. Force adjustment capabilities under consideration include aerial search/lift, waterborne search and rescue, food service support and waterborne survey and clearance operations.  Draft MOD 24 to SecDef EXORD directs SECARMY to provide two Armed Forces Institute of Pathology DNA teams to assist DMORT in Gulfport, MS</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 1604-DR-MS-DOD-32</p>	<p>MOD 24 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (19 Sept)</p>
<p><b>Saturday 9/17/2005 Landfall + 19 days</b></p>	<p>Total Active Duty: 14,221 Total National Guard: 45,015 <i>Tropical Depression #18 strengthens to Tropical Storm Rita and continues to move west toward the Florida Straights.</i> FEMA transitions from Response to Recovery Operations. New Orleans Mayor announces reentry plan. Coordination continues with Principal Federal Official. SECDEF Katrina conference call Army Corps of Engineers have 6 of 9 levees repaired. USNORTHCOM submits RFF that directs the SECNAV to provide one historical detachment and the SECARMY one military history detachment.</p>	<p>USNORTHCOM RFF # 29</p>	<p>MOD 25 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (21 Sept)</p>

	Draft MOD 25 to SecDef EXORD directs the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency to provide one U-2 aircraft for high resolution synoptic coverage of Plaquemines Parish, LA	FEMA RFA 1603-DR-LA-DOD-32	MOD 25 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (21 Sept)
<b>Sunday 9/18/2005</b>	Total Active Duty: 14,219 Total National Guard: 41,621		
<b>days</b>	requirements for Federal forces.		
	Admiral Allen states that the necessary infrastructure and services are not in place to safely sustain re-population of New Orleans at the time		
	USNORTHCOM issues a Warning Order for Rita.		
	US Army Corps of Engineers assesses the levee system for the greater New Orleans area as not sufficiently restored to protect New Orleans and previously flooded areas from floodwaters and storm surge from future storms or hurricanes.		
	US Army Corps of Engineers provides robust support to the Joint Operations Area. In addition to un-watering, the ice, water, temporary power provision missions as well as debris removal in LA, MS, and AL constitute significant commitment of resources. The Corps integrates 2,400 personnel in operations with the Federal Bureau of Reclamation, the Environmental Protection Agency, the United States Coast Guard, Army Material Command, Germany, and the Netherlands. Debris removal, calculated at 55 million cubic meters for LA, 20 million cubic meters for MS, and 2.5 million for AL, is assessed to be lengthy and costly.		
	National Guard missions focused on presence patrols, site security, and providing quick reaction forces.		

	<p>Draft CJCS EXORD for Hurricane Rita designates USNORTHCOM as the Supported Combatant Commander to plan and conduct disaster relief operations in support of FEMA. Tasks USJFCOM to provide eight (8) helicopters for potential evacuation, to transport Search and Rescue Teams and Rapid Needs Assessment Teams, and deliver other essential supplies and equipment in and around Miami and Key West, FL. Tasks USTRANSCOM, the Military Department Secretaries, and Directors of Defense Agencies to Be Prepared To (BPT) support ongoing hurricane relief operations.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 7220SU-FL-DOD-28</p>	<p>EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Tropical Storm Rita (19 Sep)</p>
<p><b>Monday 9/19/2005 Landfall +21 days</b></p>	<p>Total Active Duty: 13,320 Total National Guard: 41,888</p> <p>FL Governor declares a state of emergency. Tropical Storm Rita is anticipated to maintain this track for the next 24-48 hours. Defense Coordinating Officers are in place in TX and FL.</p> <p>Mayor of New Orleans announces a halt to further reentry due to approach of Tropical Storm Rita.</p> <p>Per Principal Federal Officer's request, force adjustments put in "operational pause."</p> <p>SECDEF Katrina conference call</p> <p>SecDef and ASD(HD) attend Cabinet-level meeting. Receive a Hurricane Katrina overall update</p> <p>USNORTHCOM places forces in JTF-Katrina Joint Area of Operations that are in a Force Adjustment posture for redeploying in an operational pause while Hurricane Rita develops</p> <p>Commander JTF-Katrina, in coordination with the New Orleans Mayor, the LA Governor, and the Principal Federal Officer develop six decision points with a set of actions for each, in order to act as Rita develops. These include halting the re-populating of New Orleans, evacuating non-essential personnel, moving air and maritime assets to safe havens, positioning first responders, and surging assessment and search and rescue capabilities behind Rita making landfall.</p> <p>1,100 Texas National Guard troops have returned to Texas to prepare for Tropical Storm Rita.</p> <p>US Navy ships begin departure from New Orleans due to approach of Tropical Storm Rita.</p>		

	ASD(HD) updated on initial observations from DoD's on-going lessons learned effort		
<b>Tuesday 9/20/2005 Landfall + 22 days</b>	Total Active Duty/Reserve: 13,305 Total National Guard: 41,888		
	At 1100, Tropical Storm Rita strengthens to Category 1 Hurricane Rita.		
	At 1400, Hurricane Rita increased in strength to a Category 2 Hurricane.		
	President visits Gulfport, Biloxi, New Orleans, and USS IWO JIMA.		
	USNORTHCOM plan to stand up Joint Task Force Rita complete.		
	Joint Task Force Katrina East moves from USS IWO JIMA to Camp Shelby, MS.		
	ASD(HD) and DUSD(I&E) attend a White House Principal's Committee meeting discussing housing issues arising from Katrina		
	DoD and Joint Staff discuss and coordinate the requirements to use Katrina forces under operational control of CDR USNORTHCOM for rotable use with Rita.		
	PDASD(HD) briefed SASC and Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee Professional Staff Members and Committee Staffs on update of DoD activities in support of the Hurricane Katrina rescue and recovery effort.		
	Draft MOD 26 to SecDef Katrina EXORD directs the SECARMY to provide a tailored Information Technology package to support Joint Communication Control Center in Camp Shelby; 3 Defense Information Systems Network SMEs to support the JTF and subordinate unit command and control operations; and one DISN video global engineer	NC RFF #31	MOD 26 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina ( 21Sep)
	Draft MOD 1 to CJCS Hurricane Rita EXORD tasks USJFCOM to provide twenty-six (26) helicopters with air crews, support personnel, and necessary equipment. Initial staging at Martindale Army Air Field, San Antonio, TX, and to provide five (5) communication teams to provide long range satellite communications capability to sites specified by FEMA.	FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-06 FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-07	MOD 1 to EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 21Sep)
<b>Wednesday 9/21/2005 Landfall + 23 days</b>	Total Active Duty/Reserve: 11,273 Total National Guard: 38,661		
	Hurricane Rita rapidly strengthens from a Category 1 to a Category 5 hurricane.		

	President makes emergency declaration for Texas and Louisiana.		
	SecDef expands Katrina conference call to deal with Rita as well		
	Texas Governor authorizes up to 5,000 National Guardsmen (2,000 recalled and 1,300 returning from Katrina=3,300) for state active duty.		
	Commander of 5th US Army prepared to stand up Joint Task Force Rita.		
	USNORTHCOM prepares to re-designate USS IWOJIMA to lead an Amphibious Readiness Group and, when activated, support Joint Task Force Rita.		
	Fort Sam Houston activated as FEMA staging area.		
	Secretary of Defense and ASD(HD) participated in a briefing to Congressional members on the Federal response and recovery efforts for Hurricane Katrina as part of the SecDef's Ops Intel brief		
	Draft MOD 2 to CJCS Hurricane Rita EXORD tasks USJFCOM to provide one (1) search aircraft in a <b>twelve</b> (12) BPTD. and provide HO Element of Fifth Army as a command and control element for DoD forces providing support in the JOA. Tasks USTRANSCOM to provide Aero-Medical Evacuation to include one Joint Medical Patient Team and Expeditionary Medical Support for evacuation of 600 patient movement using fixed wing aircraft. Tasks SECAF to provide one Aero-Medical Liaison Team and be prepared to provide one Contingency Aero-Medical Staging Facility.	FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-10	MOD 2 to EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 22 Sep)
	Draft MOD 6 to CJCS Hurricane Rita EXORD same tasks USJFCOM to provide two (2) Communication Packages and six (6) Mobile Communication Packages for command and control, three (3) Theater Deployable Communications Packages, and two (2) Mobile Deployable Communications Packages.	FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-08	MOD 6 to EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 23 Sep)
<b>Thursday 9/22/2005 Landfall + 24 days</b>	Total Active Duty/Reserve: 13,273 Total National Guard: 38,108 Hurricane Rita weakens to <b>Category 4</b> . Almost all Mission Assignments for FL cancelled by FEMA.		

USNORTHCOM convenes a video teleconference to review the preparations for Hurricane Rita. Adequacy of the supply of Meals, Ready to Eat (MRE), Mortuary Affairs capacity, and impact on OIF/OEF are discussed.		
Joint Task Force Rita is operational, established at Fort Sam Houston.		
ASD(HD) and Mr. Rangel discuss Levee repair efforts		
ASD(HD) meets with SecDef to prepare for 23 Sept HSC Principal's Committee meeting on a Federal Comprehensive Review of Katrina response and recovery efforts		
ASD(HD) phone call with G Sharn, Director of the JCS, regarding JCS participation in White House Comprehensive Review		
ASD(HD) interviewed by Washington Post (Ann Tyson)		
LA Governor requests 15,000 Federal forces be prepared to immediately assist the state with emergency evacuations, search and rescue, security, logistics, medical, communications, and transportation operations.		
The preparations for Hurricane Rita relief are focused on establishing command and control, evacuation, and positioning maritime, ground and air capabilities to immediately assist with search and rescue, medical care and assessment.		
PDASD(HD) and (HD) DoD OGC lawyer who supports OASD(HD) discussed the Posse Comitatus Act with Congressman Skelton		
Draft MOD 29 to SecDef Hurricane Katrina EXORD directs USJFCOM to provide 500 bed Mobile treatment facility.	FEMA RFA 1603-LA-DOD-05	MOD 29 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina ( 27 Sept)
Draft MOD 30 to SecDef EXORD same directs USJFCOM to provide 500 bed Mobile treatment facility and increased funding from \$3.5M to \$10M	FEMA RFA 1603-LA-DOD-05-01	MOD 30 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (29 Sept)
Draft MOD 10 to CJCS Hurricane Rita EXORD tasks SECNAV to provide two (2) NRL mobile satellite vehicles.	FEMA RFA 3261EM-TX-DOD-15	MOD 10 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 26 Sep)
Draft MOD 3 to same tasks USTRANSCOM to provide Aero Evacuation of people from coastal locations in Texas to inner city locations within Texas using fixed wing aircraft.	FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-25	MOD 3 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 22 Sep)

<p>Draft MOD 4 to same tasks USJFCOM to provide a command and control ship as an operations center for the JTF: bridging capability from Houston to Galveston; debris clearing equipment and personnel; aircraft, boats, or high water vehicles for distribution of supplies; vessel salvage and wreck removal; Mortuary Affairs capability; ground and aerial Search and Rescue capability; air space and traffic command and control; eight utility aviation helicopters; Aviation Task Force, Signal Company, and two public affairs detachments in San Antonio; and 800 marines to assist in humanitarian assistance. Tasks USTRANSCOM to provide berthing ship for housing emergency workers. Tasks SECNAV to provide use of Ellington Airfield TX for major aircraft operations; and 125 DoD buses 15 DoD ambulances to support evacuation. Tasks SECARMY to provide 125 DoD buses to support evacuation. Tasks DLA to provide 500,000 meals at up to 15 geographically dispersed locations and personnel to manage and operate 25 Level II distribution site.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-10                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-11                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-12                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-13                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-14                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-15                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-16                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-17                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-18                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-19                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-20                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-21                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-22                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-23                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-24</p>	<p>MOD 4 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita (23 Sep)</p>
<p>Draft MOD 5 to CJCS Rita EXORD tasks USJFCOM to provide five (5) communications teams and aerial platforms capable of conducting aerial situational awareness of critical locations in the JTF-Rita JOA.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-11</p>	<p>MOD 5 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita (23 Sep)</p>
<p>Tasks USJFCOM to provide one (1) Army Movement Control Team; one (1) Cargo Transfer Company; and labor capability to operate 25 FEMA Category III distribution sites. Tasks SECNAV to provide one (1) Air Force Contingency Response Group.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-15                  FEMA RFA 7220SU-TX-DOD-22</p>	<p>MOD 8 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita (24 Sep)</p>
<p>Draft MOD 13 to CJCS Rita EXORD tasks SECNAV to provide Lackland AFB facilities to house 200 response personnel, dining facilities, office space, floor space, and shower facilities.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 3261EM-TX-DOD-04</p>	<p>MOD 13 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita (28 Sep)</p>
<p><b>Friday</b>  <b>9/23/2005</b>  <b>Landfall + 25</b></p> <p>Katrina                  Total Active Duty/Reserve: 11,518                  Total National Guard: 32,159</p>		

days	Rita Total Active Duty/Reserve: 389 Total National Guard: 6,253		
	USNORTHCOM evacuates approximately 3400 special needs and medical passengers from the three airheads at Beaumont, Ellington, and Lake Charles.		
	Standing Joint Force Headquarters North repositioning to Austin, TX.		
	SecDef Katrina - Rita conference call		
	Multiple Mission Assignments are received from FEMA focused on medical/medical evacuation, search and rescue, and communications packages.		
	Medical evacuations of patients from TX and LA are complete.		
	ASD(HD) and VJCS attend HSC Principals Committee meeting laying out the HSC concept for a federal-wide comprehensive review of Katrina response		
	SecDef and ASD(HD) have lunch with Mississippi Governor Barbour		
	Amphibious Ready Group is positioned and prepared to assume mission under tactical control of Joint Task Force Rita.		
	Draft MOD 29 to the SecDef Hurricane Katrina EXORD directs USNORTHCOM to provide 3 Tactical Satellite terminals to establish voice/data communications to city and county governments in the most devastated areas of MS.	FEMA RFA 1604-MS-DOD-35	MOD 29 to SecDef EXORD for DoD support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina ( 27 Sept)
	Draft MOD 28 to SecDef EXORD the same directs CDR USTRANSCOM to provide 2 Barracks Barges to Pascagoula and Gulfport, MS, to shelter individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina	FEMA RFA 1604-MS-DOD-34	MOD 28 to SecDef EXORD for DoD support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (27 Sept)
	Draft MOD 7 to the CJCS Hurricane Rita EXORD tasks SECARMY, SECNAV, and SECAF to identify installations and plan for support to host Federal Medical Shelter units.	FEMA RFA 3261EM-TX-DOD-11	MOD 7 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 26 Sep)
	Draft MOD 9 to CJCS EXORD the same tasks USJFCOM to provide one (1) Brigade up to 4,000 personnel to assist 12 affected counties in humanitarian assistance.	FEMA RFA 3261EM-TX-DOD-10	MOD 9 to CJCS EXORD for DoD support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 24 Sep)
Draft MOD 12 to CJCS EXORD the same tasks SECARMY to provide four (4) Operational Planners to FEMA Headquarters. Tasks SECAF to provide two (2) Logistics Planners to FEMA Headquarters.	FEMA RFA 3261EM-TX-DOD-12	MOD 12 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 26 Sep)	
<b>Saturday 9/24/2005 Landfall + 26</b>	Katrina Total Active Duty/Reserve: 15,023 Total National Guard: 34,653		

<b>days</b>	Rita Total Active Duty/Reserve: 623 Total National Guard: 6,253		
	Hurricane Rita makes <i>landfall</i> as a <i>Category 3</i> Hurricane, weakens to a <i>Category 2</i> as it moves inland and <i>by</i> midday downgrades to tropical storm status. <i>As</i> it moves inland it <i>produces</i> heavy rains and winds		
	The President stays at USNORTHCOM to monitor landfall.		
	SecDef and ASD(HD) participate in a SVTC with the POTUS regarding a Katrina-Rita update		
	ASD(HD) participates in a Rita Deputies Level VTC - Rita status discussed		
	Defense Coordinating Officer, Defense Coordinating Element and SEPLO are positioned at the Joint Field Office in Austin, TX.		
	USNORTHCOM capabilities are in place to provide immediate operational staging areas, aviation assets, medical care and evacuation, logistics and planning to support JTF Rita with LA TF Rita as required.		
	MS National Guard focus is force adjustment planning, security operations and planning to support JTF Rita with TF Hoosiers as required.		
	TX National Guard is focused on providing immediate search and rescue, support operations and basic commodity needs.		
	Draft MOD 30 to SecDef Hurricane Katrina EXORD directs SECARMY to provide billeting at Fort Polk, LA (Intermediate Staging Base Alexandria), for up to 4K LA NG personnel evacuated as a contingency for Hurricane Rita.	FEMA RFA 160DR-LA-DOD-42	MOD 30 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (29Sept)
Draft MOD 7 to CJCS Rita EXORD tasks Director, DLA to provide blankets, cots, and health care packs.	FEMA RFA 3261EM-TX-DOD-14	MOD 7 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 26 Sep)	
<b>Sunday</b> <b>9/25/2005</b> <b>Landfall + 27</b> <b>days</b>	Katrina Total Active Duty/Reserve: 15,023 Total National Guard: 34,653		
Rita Total Active Duty/Reserve: 623 Total National Guard: 6,253			

	<p><b>As of 2300 EDJ</b>, Tropical Depression Rita is located near latitude 38.5 north, longitude 89.5 west (~ 55 miles southeast of <i>St. Louis</i>, Missouri) moving north northeast at approximately 25 mph. This general motion is expected to continue through the next 24 hours as the storm continues to slowly weaken.</p>		
	<p>Damage assessments ongoing in TX and LA. Hardest hit areas appear to be in Beaumont, TX, Lake Charles, LA, and Vermillion parish, LA. Water level in New Orleans stabilized at post-Katrina flood levels.</p>		
	<p>National Guard units are projected to provide the majority of support in the next 24-48 hours relieving the need for <b>Title 10</b> units.</p>		
	<p>2.7 million evacuees need to be returned to an area from Corpus Christi to Beaumont, TX. Texas plans a 7-day re-entry operation, but power will need to be restored first. 1.1 million without power in Texas. State expects 80% of power will be restored by Tuesday or Wednesday.</p>		
	<p>Draft MOD 11 to CJCS Rita EXORD tasks USJFCOM to provide three (3) Mine Counter Measure ships, two (2) MH-53 helicopters, and ten (10) high water all terrain vehicles.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 3261EM-TX-DOD-05 FEMA RFA 3261EM-TX-DOD-23</p>	<p>MOD 11 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 26 Sep)</p>
<p><b>Monday 9/26/2005 Landfall + 28 days</b></p>	<p>Katrina Total Active Duty/Reserve: 14,334 Total National Guard: 33,012</p>		
	<p>Rita Total Active Duty/Reserve: 1,048 Total National Guard: 3,549</p>		
	<p><i>As of 0300</i>, National Hurricane Center issues the final advisory for Tropical Depression Rita, located 80 miles north northwest of Indianapolis, moving northeast at 30 mph with max sustained winds of 15 mph.</p>		
	<p>USNORTHCOM committed elements of 1/8 Marines on board USS IWO JIMA and USS TORTUGA to go ashore and link up with TF All American (82nd Airborne).</p>		
	<p>All American Task Force (82nd AEN) and elements of MARFOR Katrina (4th AT BN), along with elements of TF Santa Fe (35th ID, Kansas), are conducting search and rescue (SAR) operations in southwest Louisiana parishes. Over 1,000 persons have been evacuated over the past 24 hours.</p>		
	<p>ASD(HD) interviewed by the New Republic (Spencer Ackerman)</p>		

	New Orleans Mayor has announced that residents of Algiers and business owners in the French Quarter, Uptown, the Central Business District and Algiers will be allowed to return. Medical infrastructure availability concerns remain.		
	Draft MOD 30 to the SecDef Hurricane Katrina EXORD directs SECARMY to provide staging areas with associated logistical support for up to 10K trailers at Lone Star and Red River Army Depots	FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-43	WOD 30 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (29 Sept)
	Draft MOD 13 to the CJCS Hurricane Rita EXORD tasks SECAF to provide three (3) shower units and support equipment, personnel, transportation and setup; one 10 member Aero-Medical Evaluation Liaison Team; and one 10-bed Mobile Aero-Medical Staging Facility.	FEMA RFA 1606DR-TX-DOD-05 FFMA RFA 1606DR-TX-DOD-23	MOD 13 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Hita (28 Sep)
<b>Tuesday 9/27/2005 Landfall + 29 days</b>	Katrina Total Active Duty/Reserve: 14,334 Total National Guard: 31,796		
	Rita Total Active Duty/Reserve: 861 Total National Guard: 3,323		
	POTUS accompanied by Governor of Louisiana visits the Federal Emergency Management Agency Joint Field Office in Baton Rouge.		
	DoD reports 2.2 million Meals Ready to Eat were delivered in support of Hurricane Rita to Texas and 8.8 million were delivered in support of Hurricane Katrina to Louisiana on September 27 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requesting 1.5 million meals to be distributed in the vicinity of Beaumont, TX. Current DLA is at zero balance. Director DLA reviewing feasibility of tapping into War stock supplies.		
	SecDef Katrina- Rita conference call		
	ASD(HD) conducts phone calls with Andrew Card, Secretary Chertoff, ADM Keating regarding Katrina/Rita updates		
	MODs 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13 to CJCS EXORD for Hurricane Rita and MODs 28, 29 to SecDef EXORD for Hurricane Katrina released.		
	PDASD(HD) briefed SASC and HASC Professional Staff Members and Military Legislative Assistants on updates to DoD activities in support of the Hurricane Katrina/Rita rescue and recovery effort.		

	<p>Draft MOD 30 to the SecDef Hurricane Katrina EXORD directs USJFCOM to provide 500 bed Mobile treatment facility to on or about 30 OCT 05.</p> <p>Directed SECARMY to provide DHHS with one field hospital equipment package (EMEDS +10) to support emergency room, acute, and primary care facilities w/medical supplies, laboratory, x-ray, and pharmacy capabilities. Included 14 to 16 personnel to train civilian staff members on facility construction and operation.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 1603DR-LA-DOD-05-02 FEMA RFA MA-Task DOD-31-006</p>	<p>MOD 30 to SecDef EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina (29 Sept)</p>
	<p>Draft MOD 14 to CJCS Hurricane Rita EXORD tasks Director, DLA to provide 1.5 million meals shipped to Fort Worth ,TX.</p>	<p>FEMA RFA 1606DR-TX-DOD-08 FEMA RFA 1606DR-TX-DOD-08-01</p>	<p>MOD 14 to CJCS EXORD for DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 29 Sep)</p>
<p><b>Wednesday 9/28/2005 Landfall + 30 days</b></p>	<p>Katrina Total Active Duty/Reserve: 14,145 Total National Guard: 28,944</p>		
	<p>Rita Total Active Duty/Reserve: 839 Total National Guard: 3,449</p>		
	<p>USNS COMFORT transits the Lower Mississippi River and arrives in downtown New Orleans. MOU for signature by DoD (Health Affairs), DON (CFFC) and LA Dept of Health and Hospitals to allow civilian medical providers to live and work on board USNS COMFORT.</p>		
	<p>Seabees building 2 x 1000 person tent city, one each at Pass Christian, MS and D'Iberville, MS. Tent raising in progress with estimated completion-on 2 Oct.</p>		
	<p>Air Force reports approximately \$995M in damage to base facilities.</p>		
	<p>ASD(HD) phones with Joint Staff and COM regarding Force Mods 6 &amp; 7</p>		
	<p>ASD(HD) testified before the HAC-D in a hearing on Hurricane Katrina</p>		
<p><b>Thursday 9/29/2005 Landfall + 31 days</b></p>	<p>Katrina Total Active Duty/Reserve: 12,988 Total National Guard: 29,182</p>		
	<p>Rita Total Active Duty/Reserve: 734 Total National Guard: 3,566</p>		
	<p>SecDef approved Force Adjustment package Golf and Hotel (0730EST).</p>		
	<p>USS IWOJIMA, USS SHREVEPORT, USS TORTUGA, USNS SUPPLY AND USS GRAPPLE released, by USNORTHCOM MSG MOD's 7 thru 10.</p>		

	Mayor of New Orleans signed executive order authorizing the US Army Corps of Engineers to enter dwellings when the owner is not clearly present, install plastic sheeting on damaged roofs and remove debris to include automobiles.		
<b>Friday 9/30/2005 Landfall + 32 days</b>	Katrina Total Active Duty/Reserve: 3,879 Total National Guard: 27,713		
	Rita Total Active Duty/Reserve: 687 Total National Guard: 3,603		
	The National Guard has assumed all search missions in New Orleans. This will allow release of the 82 <sup>nd</sup> Airborne who will redeploy in the USNS PILLAU on 30 Sep		
	Combat Support Hospital and USS COMFORT in place to support New Orleans re-population		
	USS GRAPPLE and 3 MCM ships are to conduct open-ocean hydrographic surveys of channel approaches to Galveston-Houston, TX; Port Arthur-Beaumont, TX and Lake Charles, LA		
	DLA will deliver 1.5 million meals to Fort Worth, TX, to FEMA controlled transportation and distribution sites.		
	ASD(HD), VJCS, and DASD(HD) Rowell attend HSC Principal's Committee meeting kicking off the White House Comprehensive Review of Federal Government Response to Hurricane Katrina		
	ASD(HD) participates in HSC-led VTC on short- and long-term Housing recovery policy and plans		
	DoD OGC lawyer who supports OASD(HD) briefed the House Judiciary Committee Staff on the Posse Comitatus Act		
	Draft MOD 15 to the CJCS Hurricane Rita EXORD deletes requirement for SECARMY and SECAF to provide planners to FEMA. Tasks USNORTHCOM to provide planners to FEMA. Deletes requirement for SECAF to provide one Aero Medical Evaluation Liaison Team, one ten bed Mobile Aero-Medical Staging Facility.	FEMA RFA 1606DR-TX-DOD-06-01 FEMA RFA 1608DR-TX-DOD-05-01	MOD 15 to CJCS EXORD to DoD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Rita ( 30 Sep)

# TAB E

**COORDINATION  
DoD Hurricane Katrina  
Lessons Learned Report**

<b>Office</b>	<b>Representative</b>	<b>Date</b>
Joint Staff, J3	Marylee Baker	10/11/05
Joint Staff, J7	CAPT Jeffery Miller	10/11/05
OSD(PA)	Lawrence Di Rita	10/12/05
OGC	Chuck Allen	10/14/05

FOUO

August 12, 2005

2005 OCT 19 AM 12:11

**TO:** Mike Donley

**CC:** Gordon England  
Eric Edelman  
Robert Rangel  
VADM Jim Stavridis

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

**SUBJECT:** Department of Defense Drug Testing

I was unaware of the fact that OSD Policy is in charge of the Department's drug testing program. It seems logical to me that DA&M would be in charge of that. Please get back to me with a proposal and timeline for moving this program into DA&M.

Thanks.

DHR  
081005-23

.....

FOUO

OSD 200508-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53166



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

17 OCT 2005 12:11

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD**

SUBJECT Department of Defense Drug Testing

- This is an interim response to your memo (attached) asking for a proposal for moving the drug testing program to my office.
- My staff has begun to examine the program and the complexities in separating drug testing policy and funding from the overall counternarcotics program, but our work is not complete. I expect to have a response to your memo by mid November.
- Tom O'Connell oversees drug testing policy as an integral part of the counternarcotics program and there is synergy there. All military and civilian drug testing is accomplished by the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and my field activity, Washington Headquarters Services (WHS). DA&M, through WHS, is already conducting drug testing for the OSD and JCS civilian workforces.
- My staff is impressed with the efficiency of the drug testing program. Under Tom O'Connell's DASD for Counternarcotics there is only one action officer who provides oversight of the Department's drug testing program and resources.
- We want to be very careful in considering alternatives to separate drug testing policy from the counternarcotics program that we do not lose the effectiveness of the combined program or incur other risk.

COORDINATION: ASD(SO/LIC)

Attachment  
As stated

Prepared By: Bob Menig, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/53167

OSD 20520-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OCT 4 2005

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2005 OCT 12 12:32

**INFO MEMO**

ADSD  
PD/USD(R)  
OCT 17 2005  
I-05/010628  
ES-3913

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *WR* OCT 14 2005

SUBJECT: Meeting with George Shultz, Hoover Institution, 27 September 2005

- At your request (Tab A), I met with George Shultz at Hoover to discuss the study, "Communicating with the World of Islam" (Tab B). I brought a member of ~~my~~ staff, Eric Ruff, and BG Bob Caslen from the Joint Staff.
- Secretary Shultz outlined Hoover's assessment of the Cold War era's broadcasting experience, and drew some "lessons learned" that could be applicable to our current outreach to the Muslim and Arab worlds. Pages 1-5 of Tab B sum them up.
  - Professor Fouad Ajami (SAIS) offered a paper on Muslim anti-Americanism, which he sees as a revolt against modernism (Tab C). He urges that the USG hold Arab / Muslim governments accountable for the vehement anti-Americanism in their controlled media.
  - He displayed a copy of an Egyptian magazine published by government-controlled Ai-Ahram. The headline on the cover was that the U.S. is committing genocide against the Sunnis in Iraq.
- Dr. Abbas Milani (Hoover's Iran expert) offered a paper (pages 17-19 of Tab B) pointing out that the Iranian population remains pro-American. He argued that the USG could undermine Iranian popular support for nuclear weapons by stressing that such weapons are meant to perpetuate the hated clerical regime in power.
- In our discussion, it was agreed that the US needs more people trained in the Arabic language and area studies. Unfortunately, the Middle East studies field in American academia is horribly biased. Shultz said Hoover is beginning a program to try to reform US Middle East area studies. (They are trying to hire Dr. Ajami.)
- We continued the discussions at dinner, updating Shultz on Iraq in the process.

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11-L-0559/OSD/53168

17-10-05 00:00 OSD 20533-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

- He is anxious to talk to Karen Hughes **but** asks that we not share his report with her at this time.
- He sends his warm regards and looks forward to continuing this dialogue.

RECOMMENDATION: That you read the papers. They are concise and to the point.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: John Matheny and Susanne Stetzer, ISA (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/53169

**TAB**

**A**

To: Doug FEITH  
From: Larry Di Rita

FOUO

August 1, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Recommendation

Please give me a recommendation as to who you think ought to go out in response to the attached note from George Shultz.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/25/05 George Shultz letter to SecDef

DHR:sp  
072904-05

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

- 8/2
- SecDef - I recommend
  - Peter Rodman, plus one or two people in his ~~staff~~ shop who focus on this issue
  - Me and Dorrance Smith if Available, plus Frank Thorp
  - General Sharp, J-5

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/53171

OSD 16213-05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
776 Dolores Street  
Stanford, CA 94305

Dear George,

Thanks so much for your note. I will certainly send someone out to hear what you folks have to say on that critically important subject thought

Warm regards,

Warm regards



VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
THOMAS W. AND SUSAN B. PAPP  
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW

July 25, 2005

Dear Don,

Thanks for your "War of the Words" in the July 18 *Wall Street Journal*. Thoughtful statements like this are really helpful. I was particularly struck by your last point: "Government officials must find new and better ways to communicate America's mission abroad."

You may be aware that Hoover now has all of the archival material from Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. Last fall we had a fascinating conference on lessons learned by mining this material and by comparing the objectives of the Radios with material now collectible from behind the old iron curtain. Subsequently Hoover held a conference on the possible applicability of these lessons for communicating America's mission abroad, particularly to the world of Islam.

Karen Hughes is aware of what we are doing and plans to come out here for a discussion. But before that is arranged, it occurred to me that you might want to send somebody out to hear what we have to say. You might learn something and we might learn something. Also, the weather is not as muggy out here, so give someone a break.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "George".

George P. Shultz

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
U.S. Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880  
Washington, D.C. 20330

**TAB**

**B**

# COMMUNICATING WITH THE WORLD OF ISLAM



September 27, 2005

## Communicating with the World of Islam

We seek to answer three questions:

1. What can we learn from the broadcasting experience of the Cold War, particularly by examining the experiences of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, the BBC, and the Voice of America?
2. What is the current state of broadcasting efforts into the world of Islam and, in particular, into countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Egypt, and the Muslim communities of Europe?
3. What are the best ways of going about our own efforts to communicate with the world of Islam?

---

This paper was prepared by George P. Shultz with lots of help from Fouad Ajami, Matthew Gunn, A. Ross **Johnson**, Abbas Milani, and Eugene Parta.

## Lessons Learned

Drawing on the excellent summary of lessons learned from the Cold War experience by Gene Parta and Ross Johnson, we will set out a series of bullet points with a little amplification about those lessons.

The lessons identified here emerged from papers and discussions at two recent conferences' with participants who had studied the records of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, now located at the Hoover Institution, had been part of the effort of the Radios and of Voice of America and the BBC, or were in one capacity or another at the receiving end of the broadcasts. Here is a distillation of the lessons.

1. International broadcasting can work. Our conference participants agreed that these broadcasts had an indisputable impact, as documented by external and internal audience surveys, elite testimony, and the magnitude of Communist regime countermeasures against the broadcasts.\*<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "The Cold War Broadcasting Impact Conference" held at Hoover in October 2004 and sponsored by the Hoover Institution and the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars reviewed evidence from Western and Communist-era archives and oral history interviews to assess the impact of Western broadcasts to the USSR and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. A second conference on "Communicating with the Islamic World," sponsored by the Annenberg Foundation Trust, took place in Rancho Mirage, California, on February 4-6, 2005. Lessons learned at the Hoover Institution conference were reviewed again at this conference. In attendance were: Fouad Ajami, Mrs. Walter Annenberg, Elena Danielson, Thomas Dine, Richard Fairbanks, Joyce Garczynski, Kathleen Jamieson, A. Ross Johnson, Abbas Milani, Newton Minow, Gregory Mitrovich, David Newton, Christian Ostermann, Eugene Parta, John Raisian, George Shultz, Kenneth Tomlinson, and Charles Wick.

<sup>2</sup> Communist regimes organized expensive radio jamming on a massive scale, spending more on jamming than the West did on broadcasting. They placed spies in the Western radios and attempted to interrupt the flow of information to them about domestic developments. They took reprisals against listeners and Radio employees. They organized counterpropaganda, while at the same time secretly circulating monitoring of Western broadcasts among top officials to provide information not available from their own controlled media or intelligence services. Even counterpropaganda had to acknowledge and thus amplify in local media some information provided by Western radios. These countermeasures were a significant drain on domestic resources, yet they failed to neutralize Western broadcasts.

2. A clear sense of purpose guided the efforts with emphasis on strategic objectives. The objectives were to constrain Soviet power (without provoking suicidal revolt), to keep alive hope of a better future, to limit tyranny, to broaden the boundaries of internal debate, all in order to make the Soviet empire a less formidable adversary. These strategic objectives emerged after some fumbling in the early 1950s with notions of early “liberation,” “roll back” and “keep[ing] the pot boiling.”
3. A variety of methods for appraising effectiveness were developed to guide fiscal allocations but even more important to suggest new ways of going about the effort.
4. A strong capability was developed for sophisticated appraisal of the adversary. A cadre of specialized researchers was developed with deep area expertise. This information and analysis function was not envisaged at the outset – it was developed at the Radios over time in response to operational need. It became in turn a major input to U.S. Government and scholarly analyses.
5. Differentiated and tailored programs were developed for multiple audiences among and within target countries. Balanced world and regional news was a staple for all audiences. Programs for Communist elites included coverage of conflicts within and among Communist parties and reports on social democracy in Europe. Programs for non-Communist elites covered Western culture and intellectual life and, as internal dissent developed, amplification of that dissent. Programs for general audiences covered everything from agriculture to religion to labor to sports. Banned Western and internal music was featured. Willis Conover of VOA introduced a generation of Russians and Poles to jazz, the RFE Hungarian Service “teenager party” program attracted a generation of Hungarian youth to RFE, and Western music attracted listeners in

---

Audience surveys among over 150,000 travelers to the West, once-secret internal regime surveys, and retrospective internal surveys commissioned after 1989 all indicated remarkably large regular audiences to Western broadcasts – about one-third of the urban adult Soviet population and closer to half of East European adult populations after the 1950s. These large audiences were further increased by extensive word of mouth amplification.

the other RFE target countries as well. In the USSR, the magnetizdat phenomenon introduced banned Soviet underground music to a wide public.

6. The programs were purposeful, credible, responsible, and relevant to their audiences. A great effort was made to develop credibility. Events of the day were covered, but thematic programming was important as well (e.g. a series on parliamentary institutions in a democracy). Commentary was included along with straight news and news analysis, and audiences were attracted to star-quality commentators. It was essential that programs built and maintained credibility by reporting the bad news along with the good, for example in coverage of Watergate and Vietnam. Responsible programming was (at its best) calm in tone and (after the early 1950s) avoided tactical advice and especially any encouragement of violent resistance. Programming emphasized local developments and was attuned to the listeners through constant audience feedback obtained from traveler surveys and listener mail and through continuous management quality control.
7. The broadcast organizations believed in decentralization and a large measure of autonomy for country broadcast units. This led to wider audiences and the improvement and quality that always stem from competition.
8. The broadcasts were accompanied by multiple-media operations going back to balloon leaflets in the 1950s, but including periodicals, Western books, and locally unpublished books.
9. Funding was provided by the Congress at levels that were adequate without being lavish and was subject to careful fiscal oversight.
10. Distance and insulation from official government policies were sustained and a tradition of journalistic independence nourished. The authorizing legislation, Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, Section 2, provided for "an independent broadcast media, operating in a manner not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States and in accordance with high professional standards," giving RFE and RL considerable journalistic flexibility. Advocacy of specific U.S.

policies was not required and was in fact avoided. The BBC enjoyed similar autonomy in the British context. VOA's journalistic independence, affirmed in 1976 by law in the VOA Charter, was sometimes challenged by Administration policy interference and complicated by the requirement to broadcast Administration policy editorials.

11. The target audiences lived in an "information poor" environment subject to continual propaganda and censorship. This created receptive audiences, a key ingredient for success. East Europeans in particular felt particularly cut off from the rest of Europe and were mostly pro-American.
12. Careful use of émigré populations was accomplished. This was no simple task because émigrés tend to exaggerate both positive and negative news. Nevertheless, it is possible and important to broadcast using known figures who speak the languages easily.
13. As is always the case, there is a flow of events. These events offer opportunities because people, denied information by propaganda sources, are eager to know what is going on. Chernobyl is an interesting example because the endangered population got all its initial news about the event from the West and nothing, or a distorted view, from the Soviets. The development of credibility makes it possible for broadcasters to take full advantage of these events.

Ross Johnson and Gene Parta summarize with this conclusion:

Western broadcasts had a remarkable impact in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the circumstances of the Cold War. They reached mass audiences, as documented by traveler surveys at the time and confirmed now by evidence from the formerly closed Communist archives. They reached key elites, both within the Communist regimes and among regime opponents. The keys to the mass and elite audiences were the credibility and relevance of the broadcasts. Government mechanisms were geared to providing public funding and oversight while ensuring management autonomy and journalistic independence.

## What's Going on Now?

A variety of efforts stemming from the United States and other Western countries are currently active in the Middle East. As distinct from the Cold War period, however, there is a plethora, more in some countries than others, of indigenous TV and radio broadcasting. New radio and TV indigenous initiatives keep appearing. This represents the competition or, in some cases, an opportunity to make common cause in some manner, but it represents a much more complex problem than the Cold War problem.

Since the passage of the International Broadcasting Act in 1994, all U.S. international broadcasting is under the direction of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (an Executive Branch agency headed by eight Governors of both parties nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate plus the Secretary of State). The BBG is intended to insulate the broadcasting entities from U.S. government pressure and provides some degree of independence.

The following list, though certainly not exhaustive, captures a great deal of what the United States and other Western countries are broadcasting in the Middle East. In the Arabic language, the United States currently supports *Hi Magazine*, Radio Sawa, Radio Free Iraq, and Al Hurra Television.

- The United States started *Hi Magazine* in 2003. *Hi Magazine* is a completely non-political, Arabic language, lifestyle magazine targeted toward individuals between the ages of 18 and 35. At launch, its circulation was supposed to be around 50,000 with an eventual goal of 250,000.
- Radio Sawa, started by the United States in 2002, is reachable through most of the Arab world and its format is predominantly Arabic-Western popular music with newscasts twice an hour, 24 hours a day. Radio Sawa has six separate radio streams for Iraq, Morocco, the Gulf, Egypt, Jordan and the West Bank, Sudan, and Yemen. In August 2004, a BBG-commissioned survey found Radio Sawa reached 44.6 percent of those surveyed weekly in Iraq. A separate

2004 BBG-commissioned survey found the weekly reach was 30.4 percent in Jordan, and a 2003 BBG-commissioned survey showed a 10.9 percent weekly reach in Egypt. A key necessity for music-based radio stations is the ability to broadcast locally on the FM band. As of **January** 2005, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have not made FM licenses available to the BBG despite repeated requests. Though Radio Sawa is much listened to throughout the Arab world, some of its lowest listenership numbers are in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

- Voice of America used to broadcast an Arabic radio service, but this was cut following the introduction of Radio Sawa. The VOA Arabic used to broadcast for seven hours daily and was more news focused and targeted towards elites. The weekly listenership rate was 1.5 percent in a 1999 Kuwait survey, but for other Arab countries surveyed at various times, it was below 1 percent. Radio Free Iraq broadcasts news for five hours daily. According to a 2004 BBG-commissioned survey, RFI reached 5.5 percent of those surveyed daily and 17.7 percent weekly; 76 percent found it either very or somewhat reliable. Radio Free Iraq is scheduled to go dark in September of 2005. Many who follow these developments question the wisdom of this decision.
- Al Hurra Television, launched in 2004, is a U.S.-funded, 24/7, Arabic language satellite television station that broadcasts news shows, talk shows, documentaries, and some other programs. Al Hurra is available via satellite throughout the Middle East and will soon be available in Europe. The station has also launched a special Al Hurra Iraq channel. In a 2004 BBG-commissioned survey, 11.1 percent of the population reported watching Al Hurra in the past day and 29.5 percent in the past week, and 62 percent of those who watched found it very or somewhat reliable.
- Other countries also have operations in the Middle East. Radio Monte Carlo, a French-sponsored radio station, has been broadcasting since 1972 and like Radio Sawa, its programming is predominantly music with regular newscasts.
- The BBC has been broadcasting in Arabic throughout the Middle East as part of its BBC World Service radio.

- Kol Israel, the voice of Israel, also has operations in Arabic, Persian, and English.
- In February 2005, Deutsche Welle officially launched a new three-hour satellite TV news program in the Arabic language hosted by a female anchor formerly employed by Al Jazeera. Deutsche Welle previously had an Arabic-subtitled TV news program and has also been expanding its Arabic language radio service in recent years.

Broadcasting in Persian, the U.S. government supports Radio Farda, Voice of America radio, and three Voice of America television programs.

- Radio Farda, modeled on Radio Sawa but with more informational content and managed by RFE/RL and VOA, is a Persian language radio station that plays predominantly popular music with regular newscasts. A BBG-commissioned telephone survey conducted in February 2004 found that Radio Farda had a 15 percent weekly reach and that 9 percent of those surveyed listed Radio Farda as one of their three most important sources of news.
- The Voice of America has a Persian radio service that broadcasts into Iran. The February 2004 survey found VOA radio in Farsi had a 6 percent weekly reach.
- The Voice of America broadcasts a daily 30-minute television program via satellite TV titled *News and Views* in the Persian language. VOA also broadcasts a weekly 90-minute discussion show, *Roundtable With You*, and a weekly youth news magazine show titled *Next Chapter*. The BBG in February requested additional money to expand *News and Views* to a full one-hour program. The February 2004 survey found that VOA-TV had a 5 percent weekly reach.
- The BBC broadcasts a Persian radio service as part of its BBC World Service radio. Its weekly reach in Farsi in February 2004 was 8 percent.
- Various other countries also sponsor broadcasts. China Radio International, Deutsche Welle, Kol Yisrael (Voice of Israel), NHK

Radio Japan, Radio France International, and Voice of Russia all have Persian radio broadcasts to Iran.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America broadcast a number of programs in the languages of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

- The Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty broadcast in other languages such as Uzbek, Kurdish, Dari, Pashto, and Urdu. In the past year, Voice of America has launched a new radio program, *Aap ki Dunya*, focused on the under-40 audience in Pakistan.
- The BBC broadcasts in Pashto, Uzbek, and Urdu as part of their BBC World Service radio.
- In March 2005, Deutsche Welle announced it would begin broadcasting radio programs in Dari, Pashto, Urdu, English, and German languages in the vicinity of Kabul.

Various privately run endeavors exist as well.

- Los Angeles has a large Iranian community, and there are numerous stations run by expatriates that broadcast satellite TV out of Los Angeles to Iran.
- Layalina Productions, started in March 2002, is a private, non-profit corporation dedicated to creating informational and entertaining television programming to bridge the divide between the Arab Middle East and the United States. For example, Layalina has a semi-reality TV show, *On the Road in America*, that films three young Arab men traveling across the United States for the first time. In addition, Layalina is producing talk shows, children's animation programs, documentaries, dramas, and sitcoms. The idea is to create culturally appropriate Hollywood-quality program content in Arabic for sale to popular indigenous satellite stations.

Since September 11, there has been a dramatic change in United States broadcasting to the Middle East. Prior to September 11, the only US.-sponsored Arabic operations were Voice of America Arabic Service and Radio Free Iraq. Since then, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) has cancelled VOA Arabic Service, scheduled Radio Free Iraq for termination, and created Radio Sawa and Al Hurra Television. In the Persian language, RFE/RL Persian Service has been replaced by the new Radio Farda, and Voice of America TV has been introduced. In the aftermath of September 11, Radio Free Europe and VOA significantly expanded their efforts in Uzbek, Pashto, and Urdu, and in the past year, Voice of America has broadened its Pakistan coverage with the new Aap ki Dunya program.

The changes made by the BBG since September 11 were not without controversy. In 2004, approximately 450 members of VOA circulated a petition bringing attention to, among other things, the “systematic dismantling” of VOA. Operations were cut in Europe and elsewhere and funds were reprogrammed for the Middle East. Quoting Alan Heil, a supporter of the petition and former VOA deputy director, the BBG has “closed VOA Arabic and replaced it with Radio Sawa, a 24/7 pop music service aimed at youth rather than intellectuals, government leaders, educators, and movers and shakers in Arab society.” On the other hand, Kenneth Tomlinson, the current chairman of the BBG and director of VOA from 1982 to 1984, strongly defends the news content of Radio Sawa and argues that the music format has been successful in reaching large audiences. The BBG called Sawa “one of the most innovative public diplomacy initiatives in a generation.”

In the case of Radio Sawa, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has decided to target aggressively large young audiences. In a recently published book, *Engaging the Arab and Islamic Worlds Through Public Diplomacy*, Norman J. Pattiz, a BBG board member, said, “In the Middle East, the elite versus mass audience discussion becomes almost moot, as 60 to 70 percent of the population is under 30. Few of the region’s young adults qualify as elites by any definition usually applied.” Before coming to the BBG, Pattiz ran Westwood One, building it from a small syndication business to a radio giant. While at the BBG, Pattiz has played a large role in trying to establish Al Hurra and Radio Sawa as slick, modern media operations. According to Pattiz, “Al Hurra is visually stunning television from its trademark Arabian horses to its expertly crafted station IDs to its

state-of-the-art studio sets. The stations are a pleasure to listen to and watch.”

At least one aspect of the disagreement between the BBG and its critics appears to be a rehash of the age-old popularity versus content debate. Another aspect is frustration that VOA Arabic cost \$4 million in its final year, Radio Sawa cost \$34 million in its first year, and VOA Arabic was cut, even though the two stations were not at all similar. Without taking a position on the merits of the VOA Arabic program, it is worth saying that it is not necessarily redundant to have two different media outlets in the same medium and in the same market if they have different content, format, and purpose. The issue is pertinent given the impending closing of Radio Free Iraq.

## What Can be Applied to our Current Efforts to Influence the World of Islam?

### The Arab Lands\*

Our country is involved in a critical struggle against a complex movement of radical Islam using the tactics of terror in an effort to change the way the world works. Our military and economic efforts to deal with this problem are a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. As President Bush said in his most recent inaugural address, “In the long-term, the peace we seek will only be achieved by eliminating the conditions that feed radicalism and ideologies of murder. If whole regions of the world remain in despair and grow in hatred, they will be the recruiting for terror, and that terror will stalk America and other free nations for decades. The only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom.”

There is a canon nowadays that dwells on the rampant anti-Americanism in Arab and Muslim lands. The pollsters – the Pew survey, the Zogby survey, and others – return from those lands with what have become predictable results: huge majorities in Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia proclaim an uncompromising anti-Americanism. Those results are then inserted into our national debate, and the received wisdom is that the anti-Americanism has been triggered by America’s war against terror, by our toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and by the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. This political judgment can be questioned, and there is a whole different way of reading this anti-Americanism. “They hate us, what’s wrong with us?” ought to yield to another way of framing this large question: “They hate us, what’s eating at their societies?” In critically important societies in the “broader Middle East,” the anti-Americanism is the diet that rulers provide for populations denied a role in the making of a decent public order. “Nations follow the religion of their kings,” goes an Arabic maxim. The anti-Americanism in some Muslim lands is part of the rulers’ strategy, an expression of the revolt against modernism plaguing Islamic societies today.

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\* Principal author: Professor Fouad Ajami

In freedom's confrontation with the Communist world, our broadcasting aimed at, and found, populations eager for an alternative source of information to compete with the official "truth." The Arab-Muslim world today presents a different challenge. This world is "wired" in the extreme, its public life a tumult of arguments and messages, its underemployed young people prey to the satellite channels, and the radical preachers, and the steady drumbeats of anti-Americanism. A strategy to reach these populations would have to acknowledge the difficulty of this terrain.

The American dilemma is particularly acute in Arab and Muslim societies supposedly in our strategic orbit – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Jordan come to mind. In the words of the distinguished historian Bernard Lewis, these lands could be described as pro-American regimes with anti-American populations. They contrast with Iran, where the rulers are anti-American but the population is on the other side. In the two most important Arab countries – Saudi Arabia and Egypt – the ground is treacherous. These two countries, it is fair to say, gave us Al Qaeda and the death pilots of 9/11. It is from the "deep structure" of these two societies that the modern phenomenon of Islamist terrorism emerged. Starkly put, the disaffected children of these two countries came together to strike at America as part of their campaign to bring down their entrenched regimes. A ruthlessly brilliant man of the upper reaches of Egyptian society, the physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, distinguished between what he called "the near enemy" (the Arab regimes), and the "distant enemy" (the United States). The terror against America was the choice made because our country was open and unaware of the dangers stalking it, because the Islamists could slip through our open borders, exploiting liberty and constitutional limits.

The Saudi and Egyptian custodians of power know that America was caught in the crossfire between themselves and their Islamists, but never own up to it. They play with us a double-game: they provide us with some intelligence and access to their workings, and to the ways of their networks of terror, while scapegoating their domestic troubles by nurturing a culture and a public information system poisoned by a malignant anti-Americanism. You need only read *Al-Ahram*, President Hosni Mubarak's principal newspaper, to be treated to the ceaseless anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories. Likewise with the press, and the religious pulpits of Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi hatred of modernism is fierce, and the anti-Americanism now suffuses that country's life. There are thousands of liberal/secularist Saudis,

many of them educated by our elite universities, but they are hunkered down, and terrified, and, frankly, they don't see us as their friends. In their world American power is tethered to the ruling dynasty, and this embattled minority is in a no-man's-land.

Our leaders know the depth, and the danger, of these two Arab settings. In both his seminal speech to the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003 and in his State of the Union Address of 2005, President Bush spoke to, and of, these problematic allies in Riyadh and Cairo: "The government of Saudi Arabia can demonstrate its leadership in the region by expanding the role of its people in determining their future. And the proud nation of Egypt, which showed the way towards peace in the Middle East, can now show the way toward democracy in the Middle East." We have been trying to wean these two nations away from their authoritarian ways. But these two regimes, it must be conceded, have been good at feeding the forces of anti-Americanism while cooperating with America in the shadows. A terrible price has been paid in the process: the modernist possibilities have been damaged in these two lands, and we, for our part, have paid dearly for dangers that came our way from purported allies.

Egypt is a proud nation to be sure. But its pride stands in sharp relief against the background of dismal political and economic and cultural results. Egypt's standing has eroded on all the indices that matter – political freedom, economic advance, transparency in economic and public life. Fairly or not, we are implicated in the deeds of the Mubarak regime. This is our second largest recipient of foreign aid, but the aid has been squandered, and Egypt is in the throes of a deep political crisis. From Egypt, we hear a steady mix of anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, and anti-modernism. Our embassy there has been caught up in an on-going clash with the media and the organs of the regime. What is said about America in that crowded and important country is a betrayal of the American aid given to Egypt. We have not been good at reaching Egyptians, challenging the conspiracy theories that have become a staple of their public life. We need to break out of this unhealthy embrace of the Egyptian regime. This is a pan-Arab matter, for Egyptians – in the main embittered and angry, disappointed in their country – have turned on us in all arenas. They expressed no remorse for the terrors of 9/11, they opposed the Iraq war, and both the regime and the "civil society" were remarkably hostile to the Iraqi people's attempt to rid themselves of the legacy of the Saddam Hussein tyranny.

In Saudi Arabia, the challenge is equally daunting. Powered with a new windfall – in 2004, Saudi Arabia took in \$110 billion in oil income – public life in that country is filled with a belligerent kind of piety. The religion is made to carry and express the revolt against reason, a determination to frighten the liberal minority within the land, and to spread Wahhabism's influence abroad. The regime has manipulated this religious bigotry, allowed it ample running room, gave it access to the mosques and to the religious institutions and philanthropies. But of late, there has been something of a retreat from this policy on the part of the House of Saud. The extremists had brought the fight onto Saudi soil. The tranquility of the realm has been shattered, and with it the smug belief that Arabia was immune to sedition and troubles. It must be this re-assessment that accounts for the new moderation of the Saudi-owned satellite television news channel Al-Arabiya (based in Dubai) and of the influential newspaper *Asharq Al-Awsat*. (The former is owned by in-laws of the late King Fahd, while the latter is the property of King Fahd's full brother, Prince Salman, and presided over by Salman's son, prince Faisal.) The Saudis may just be awakening to the monster of radicalism that they had fed and let loose on others.

These Arab and Muslim countries need to be monitored, and known as they are. We need able linguists and interpreters. We need to persist with the message, so forcefully stated by our president, that we stand for liberty, that we believe that liberty can flourish on Arab and Muslim soil. Our enemies (Iran, Syria, the rogues) need to be told this as often, and as forcefully, as our friends in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. For decades, we have accepted a terrible bargain with Arab and Muslim authoritarianism. On 9/11 we discovered that the bargain did not work. A public diplomacy worth the effort and the price tag must start from that recognition. Its message must be free of any debilitating guilt. We have to state in unequivocal terms our belief in the necessity of modernity in Muslim lands. We must let the rulers and their circles of power know that we are listening in on them, that we are in the know as to the sort of things they say on their television channels and in their papers and on their pulpits. We might be surprised to find out that the tone will be changed in those lands once people are put on notice that we have shed our innocence, and that we are no longer taken in by their dissimulation.

Much has been said of the impact of the Iraq war on America's standing in Arab lands, and truth be known much of it is off the mark. A look at Iraq beyond the headlines of roadside bombs and daily carnage, there is a vibrant media culture in Iraq today. By one estimate, there are more than 250 daily and weekly papers in Iraq, there is a multiplicity of private radio and television stations in Baghdad, and in the other provinces. There is no censorship of the media. This is a healthy contrast to the servile press in neighboring Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. We are slowly – and painfully at times – winning this bet on freedom in Iraq. It is their world, and they will have to do most of the repair. But our power and support matter greatly, so is the optimistic and uplifting message articulated by President Bush that we will not consign the Arabs to the “soft bigotry of low expectations.”

Look to Lebanon next where the “Cedar Revolution” and the release from the big Syrian prison are sure to give rise to a new arena of cultural freedom, to another Arab example where men and women may yet go beyond anti-Americanism and scapegoating to accept responsibility for their own public life. Beirut had traditionally been a city of the Arab enlightenment, a haven for freedom, and for Arab dissidents. Its newspapers and electronic media are remarkably sophisticated. This return to freedom was in good measure due to American diplomacy and power. Gratitude is not always guaranteed in the affairs of nations, but it should be reasonable to expect that a Lebanon released from Syrian captivity should play its part in the spread of a culture of liberty.

We need to develop by example, and with our support, the middle ground between the media of incitement (Al Jazeera) and the servile media of the Arab regimes. Al Jazeera is now nearly a decade old\*: it caters to “the street” and to popular passions. It has its audience, and always will. But doubts have arisen about its brand of journalism. There is distrust of it among Iraqis, and among Lebanese, because the satellite channel did not support their quest for freedom. The taste for the spectacular may have peaked, and credible journalism could make a dent on the Arab psyche.

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Al Jazeera provided continuous coverage of the demonstrations in Beirut's Martyr Square for over 12 hours. This was very popular in Lebanon as it provided wide coverage to their efforts.

## On Talking with Iran\*

The case of Iran offers challenges and promises different from those in the Arab world. Iranians have historically seen themselves as distinct from Arabs and dislike being lumped together with them. Furthermore, the reality on the ground in Iran today makes the country different from the rest of the Muslim Middle East. The biggest difference is that the people of Iran seem to be overwhelmingly pro-American and pro-democracy while the unelected mullahs who rule them see virulent anti-Americanism as part of their *raison d'être*.

The delicacy of the U.S. position lies precisely in the fact that while it must work to curtail Iran's ambitions for nuclear weapons, it must not, in the short run, seem to be making a "deal" that legitimizes the regime.

This powerful democratic movement, now in temporary tactical retreat as the result of the failures of the Khatami experience and the recent "election," is sure to stir back into full action at some unpredictable moment in future. The United States can help bring about that "moment" and, at the same time, must begin planning for how to help the transition to democracy when the moment comes.

In navigating our way to a solid public diplomacy strategy on Iran, we must have a clear and sober analysis of our friends and foes in Iran, including their relative strengths and weaknesses. The Iranian democratic movement, the middle class that is its backbone, and the urban women who have spearheaded it for the past quarter of a century are the strategic allies of the United States. The Iranian youth who constitute close to 60 percent of the population are predominantly pro-democratic and pro-Western, and thus form part of the embryonic pro-American grand alliance for democracy. Many members of the Iranian industrial entrepreneurial group have been trained in the West; they are by and large pro-American and are wary of the regime's corruption, incompetence, and adventurism. They want a thriving private sector, a thinning role for the state, an end to corruption and crony capitalism, an end to the embargo, extended economic ties with the United States, and, more than anything else, the rule of law. They, too, are our allies. More and more of the urban poor and elements of the Iranian countryside are beginning to lose what little faith they had in the system.

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\* Principal author: Dr. Abbas Milani

The economically powerful Iranian Diaspora in the United States wants democracy in Iran and can help underwrite the cost of the transition to democracy. More importantly, they can be a helpful resource in fine-tuning the way we talk to the Iranian population. We must find ways to strengthen the democratic movement by bringing together these disparate forces while at the same time not giving the mullahs an excuse to attack or muzzle them.

In talking with the Iranian people, we must keep in mind both strategic as well as tactical goals and tools. As in the days of the Cold War, we need to use every tool and weapon in our arsenal. These include publishing magazines that promote democracy, supporting publishing houses that contribute to the strengthening of a democratic dialogue, organizing conferences that deal with issues relating to democracy in Iran, and finally helping establish a twenty-first century media to speak with the Iranian people that includes short-wave and medium-wave radio and television, pod-radio, and the Internet, all dedicated to the promotion of democracy in Iran. We need to use language free from the taint of hectoring or condescension and commensurate with the sophisticated democratic discourse that has recently evolved in Iran. What works in Egypt or Saudi Arabia does not necessarily work in Iran. In each case, the message and the medium must fit the intended recipients. The thousands of exiled Iranian intellectuals can help fashion a language that best suits Iran.

Iran today is unusually well "wired"; it is the country with the most bloggers – some 75,000 – after Brazil and the United States. There is also a nascent movement in the use of pod-radios – personal computers used for private, Internet-accessible radios. In addition, of the country's 75 million people, some 20 million have access to satellite dishes that connect them to the outside world and to the Iranian Diaspora media. That leaves another 55 million who are without access, and they hold the key to the future success of the pro-American democratic coalition.

However, the Diaspora media has failed to mobilize the masses and has gradually lost its credibility as a reliable source of news. The United States can help ignite the democratic movement by providing technological assistance through medium- and short-wave access that allows the great majority of Iranians to participate in what can become, even in its initial phase, the virtual community of the democratic coalition. Pope John Paul's journey to Poland in 1979 ignited the country's democratic movement by conveying to the millions of Poles who had come to greet the Pontiff that

they were not alone. In Iran today, an expanded and expert media presence with a honed message that reaches every corner of the country can play the same unifying role. It can convey news about the democratic movement, expose the corruption and despotism of the regime, and inform the masses of the real news of the country and the world.

Aside from these strategic considerations, the United States can also make a number of short-term tactical gestures that will disarm the regime's anti-American rhetoric and strengthen the hands of the democratic movement. Here are two examples:

1. Put an immediate end to the embargo on the import of earthquake warning equipment. Iran sits on some of the world's most dangerous faults and the Islamic regime has been reckless in doing absolutely nothing about this danger. It is estimated that the Iranian capital, Tehran, would lose close to two million people in a future quake. Donating some of this equipment would not only expose the regime's dangerous dereliction of duty but also improve the image of the United States in Iran and the rest of the Muslim world.
2. Provide detailed programs that show the real costs and dangers of Iran's nuclear program and underscore the fact that acquiring nuclear bombs may prolong the life of the regime.

The malady in the Arab-Muslim world thus understood, here are some thoughts about how to undertake the task of influencing the world of Islam in a positive direction:

1. Lessons of the Cold War experience show that international broadcasting and associated information methods can have an important impact and play a significant role in dealing with this problem. The task is much more complicated in this case because the target audience is so diverse and the competition for attention is so large. Nevertheless, the mission is essential and the job can be done.
2. Construct a realistic sense of mission. While radical Islam is in a sense the problem, the mission needs focus on helping what may be called mainstream Muslims address the issues and take on the radicals. In the end, it is the Islamic community itself that needs to engage in this battle and we need to encourage that effort. In doing so, we advance the spread of freedom and democracy, and we encourage the regimes to provide good and responsive governance for their people. We also know that radical Islamists cannot function without a surrounding population that acquiesces in, or can be frightened into, supporting or not opposing them. So our effort has to be to dry up the sea of support in which terrorists swim. That is the mission.
3. Build a credible case for the necessity of the effort. Outline in broad terms what needs to be done and thereby attract the funds that will draw high talent to the effort, assure sustainability, and allow for considerable variety in what is undertaken.
4. Study the target audiences carefully. We will need to differentiate among them. Words like “Arabs” or “Muslims” are deceptive because they conceal immense variety. Above all, pay attention to women. Because in

some countries\*they are kept out of everyday life, they have huge amounts of time to watch TV at home where the morals police can't get at them. Women's content programming is essential. Something similar, but with very different content, should be designed for another vast audience, unemployed males who sit around at the corner coffee houses all day.

5. Beyond the broad sweep of programs such as those now sponsored by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, special efforts should be made to target audiences in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, the Muslim communities in Western Europe, and possibly Pakistan. The history of radical movements shows that a high proportion of them originate in one form or another in these areas.
6. While you will need to undertake studies yourself, you will need a lot of help. Unfortunately, proficiency in languages and efforts at area studies have declined in the United States. What now passes for "Mideast Studies" are not at all satisfactory. This means a major effort is necessary to encourage universities to undertake scholarship in this field and to preserve and enhance all the ways in which the relevant languages are acquired by at least a reasonable number of Americans.
7. Monitor what people say and be ready to interact. Much of what passes for commentary is altogether delusional. The Middle East, always remember, is the world center for conspiracy theories. So some sort of counter-conspiracy desk is needed. If we are candid, open, and factually correct, we have a platform for countering some of this delusional talk. Much of the world of Islam has lost contact with reality, with the relationship of cause to effect. Reality needs to be a centerpiece in what we talk about.

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\* Note: The daily lives of women vary greatly in Arab countries, e.g., Lebanon and Egypt versus Saudi Arabia.

8. As part of the effort to connect people with reality, emphasis can be placed on the importance and the virtues of work. Among the problems in the European Muslim community is the fact that, as estimated for some urban areas, well over half the men of Moroccan origin over the age of 40 were living on welfare of one kind or another and had little expectation of working. Work connects people with reality.
9. We need to think through the problem of addressing the Muslim populations in Western Europe, especially though not exclusively those in Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. We will need close collaboration with the governments involved but we need to approach them with ideas of our own. We might ask ourselves, "How do we deal with intolerant and violent forces in a tolerant society" and "How do we encourage sensible Muslim voices to rise above the intolerant barrage?"
10. We also need to develop ideas and approaches to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. Each is different, as is brought out in the introductory material and in the addendum on Iran.
11. Develop means of evaluating the effects of our efforts. This is essential in maintaining funding but also in the constant process of honing our messages so that they are as effective as possible.
12. Encourage differentiated programs that are broadly consistent with the worldview of the United States and allow for decentralized creativity in efforts to reach various populations and in developing ways of putting messages. In this connection, émigrés can be very helpful, but they need to be evaluated with great care. As is always the case, émigrés tend to exaggerate the positive and the negative, but really credible individuals can be identified and they can carry great weight when they

speaking, among other reasons because they manage the language in a natural way.

13. Governmental efforts are the centerpiece in all of this, but private efforts can be helpful. Here are two examples:

Layalina Productions, mentioned earlier, is developing program content under the leadership of former Ambassador Richard Fairbanks. The idea is to air these programs on existing and watched stations. This effort deserves support. An entirely different example of private enterprise is that generated by a group of advertising people on behalf of a number of companies operating overseas. Their work stems from a salesman's incentive to have people abroad like Americans and therefore their products. That is a goal certainly compatible with your objectives. Find out what they do. They are likely to have some good ideas.

14. Put emphasis on the importance of education in the basic sense of the word. Too much of what passes for education in the world of Islam is simply propaganda and doesn't prepare people adequately for tasks of work and tasks of critical evaluation of what they are hearing. Special incentives might be developed to encourage people to learn the English language.
15. There are many voices in the Arab world that carry encouraging and reasonable messages, often with an effort to legitimize themselves by including some critical comments about America. Don't worry excessively about the attacks on us. Work with the positive words of these voices and amplify them.
16. No matter how impressive our effort, it will never succeed so long as Arab regimes continue to pump out tons of daily propaganda that over recent decades has

driven ordinary Arabs into a perpetual condition of hyper-inflamed rage at outsiders, thus diverting the Arab populations away from the regimes themselves. A concerted effort is needed on this problem. We need to maintain the pressure on the rulers of Qatar over the content and programming of Al Jazeera. They own it and finance it, and by recent credible reports the Emir of Qatar and his principal aides have been made to understand by the Administration that they can't befriend us while sponsoring this brand of journalism.

17. Consider including in our media strategy material that deftly shows that the Arab-Islamic world needs to communicate with us in a far better way than they have done. Such material could show how awful they look to the world when they appear to be saturated in hate, self-pity, and slaughter.
18. Our news content must be candid, tuned to local audiences, and remorselessly accurate. Credibility will emerge and credibility is the name of the game. Always, major events come along (the elections in Iraq, the Cedar Revolution), and credibility leads people to take our reports on such events as accurate. In the process, we discipline all the other outlets.

**TAB**

**C**

What Can be Applied to our Current Efforts to  
Influence the World of Islam?

The Arab Lands\*

Our country is involved in a critical struggle against a complex movement of radical Islam using the tactics of terror in an effort to change the way the world works. Our military and economic efforts to deal with this problem are a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. As President Bush said in his most recent inaugural address, "In the long-term, the peace we seek will only be achieved by eliminating the conditions that feed radicalism and ideologies of murder. If whole regions of the world remain in despair and grow in hatred, they will be the recruiting for terror, and that terror will stalk America and other free nations for decades. The only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom."

There is a canon nowadays that dwells on the rampant anti-Americanism in Arab and Muslim lands. The pollsters – the Pew survey, the Zogby survey, and others – return from those lands with what have become predictable results: huge majorities in Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia proclaim an uncompromising anti-Americanism. Those results are then inserted into our national debate, and the received wisdom is that the anti-Americanism has been triggered by America's war against terror, by our toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and by the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. This political judgment can be questioned, and there is a whole different way of reading this anti-Americanism. "They hate us, what's wrong with us?" ought to yield to another way of framing this large question: "They hate us, what's eating at their societies?" In critically important societies in the "broader Middle East," the anti-Americanism is the diet that rulers provide for populations denied a role in the making of a decent public order. "Nations follow the religion of their kings," goes an Arabic maxim. The anti-Americanism in some Muslim lands is part of the rulers' strategy, an expression of the revolt against modernism plaguing Islamic societies today.

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1077

~~FOUO~~  
TAB A

July 27, 2005

POLAND

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Polish Turnover

The Polish MoD indicated that, if they are going to be able to turn over their area to the Iraqis, it is critically important that the Iraqis in their area be put at the top of the priority list for training and equipment.

Can you please see that that gets done, unless there is some reason it shouldn't be?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072705-2478

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*Please respond by August 18, 2005*

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

27 JUL 05

11-L-0559/OSD/53206

OSD 20547-05

~~FOUO~~

October 21, 2005

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 2006 Air Force Shaping Program

Please take a look at this memo from Pete Geren. Tell me if you have put your head into this issue and what you think about it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/18/05 Acting SecAF memo to SecDef [OSD 20558-05]

DHR:dh  
1021 03-02 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by November 17, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

32012  
21 OCT 05  
18 OCT 05

11-L-0559/OSD/53207

*DR*  
OSD 20558-05

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 OCT 18 8:00 OCT 20 2005

*2005  
10/21*

*Robert Rangel*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Pete Geren, Acting Secretary of the Air Force



SUBJECT: 2006 Air Force Shaping Program

- The Air Force currently is within authorized end strength limits.
- Today the Air Force will announce a Force Shaping Initiative to reduce the number of junior officers in the active duty Air Force and increase the number of enlisted personnel for a zero net change in end strength.
- In January 2004, the AF initiated force reduction efforts to bring active duty end strength down by 22,000 personnel.
- By May 2005 the AF had achieved the target of 22,000 reduction in personnel through restricted enlisted accessions and officer and enlisted voluntary separation programs.
- The end-strength reductions resulted in an "out of balance" ratio of enlisted and officers, with enlisted under-strength of 6,000 and officers over-strength by 3,000, primarily in the ranks of junior officers.
- The AF will correct this imbalance through force management initiatives that includes:
  - Enlisted and officer accessions to sustainable levels in all career fields, and
  - A force shaping construct tailored to address the bulge in the junior officer ranks.
- The force shaping initiative divides the junior officers into three categories:
  - Category 1 (Less than 3 years commission service)
  - Category 2 (Over 3 years but less than 5 years commission service)
  - Category 3 (Over 5 years commission service)

*Sgt 10/19*

MASS	<i>10/20</i>	EMA DSD	
TRASD	<i>10/20</i>	SA DSD	
DECSG	<i>10/20</i>	<i>10/20</i>	<i>10/20</i>
PERNA	<i>10/20</i>	<i>10/20</i>	<i>10/20</i>

08D 20558-05

*A-1512*

- For Category 1 (officers commissioned in 2004 and later), current voluntary separation options will be used.
- Category 2 (officers commissioned in 2002 and 2003) will experience the most aggressive practices with the goal of reducing the officer strength of these two year groups from 9,500 to 7,800 by September 29, 2006. Pursuit of voluntary separation options, including the Air Force to Army initiative (Blue to Green) and transfers to reserve and civilian components, will be encouraged. However, if the target of 7,800 is not met through voluntary separations, the AF will convene a board in April 2006 to achieve the necessary reductions.
- For Category 3 (officers commissioned in 2001 and earlier), current voluntary separation options will be used.
- Further force shaping will be achieved as each respective year group meets its scheduled field grade promotion board.
- Media coverage (Air Force Times) is expected upon public release.

COORDINATION: OSD-P&R

11-54-3

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 OCT 1 8 18 AM '05  
OCT 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Pete Geren, Acting Secretary of the Air Force 

SUBJECT: 2006 Air Force Shaping Program

- The Air Force currently is within authorized end strength limits.
- Today the Air Force will announce a Force Shaping initiative to reduce the number of junior officers in the active duty Air Force and increase the number of enlisted personnel for a zero net change in end strength.
- In January 2004 the AF initiated force reduction efforts to bring active duty end strength down by 22,000 personnel.
- By May 2005 the AF had achieved the target of 22,000 reduction in personnel through restricted enlisted accessions and officer and enlisted voluntary separation programs.
- The end-strength reductions resulted in an "out of balance" ratio of enlisted and officers, with enlisted under-strength of 6,000 and officers over-strength by 3,000, primarily in the ranks of junior officers.
- The AF will correct this imbalance through force management initiatives that includes:
  - o Enlisted and officer accessions to sustainable levels in all career fields, and
  - o A force shaping construct tailored to address the bulge in the junior officer ranks.
- The force shaping initiative divides the junior officers into three categories:
  - o Category 1 (Less than 3 years commission service)
  - o Category 2 (Over 3 years but less than 5 years commission service)
  - o Category 3 (Over 5 years commission service)

320,2

19 Oct 05

OSD 20558-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53210

- For Category 1 (officers commissioned in 2004 and later), current voluntary separation options will be used.
- Category 2 (officers commissioned in 2002 and 2003) will experience the most aggressive practices with the goal of reducing the officer strength of these two year groups from 9,500 to 7,800 by September 29, 2006. Pursuit of voluntary separation options, including the Air Force to Army initiative (Blue to Green) and transfers to reserve and civilian components, will be encouraged. However, if the target of 7,800 is not met through voluntary separations, the AF will convene a board in April 2006 to achieve the necessary reductions.
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- Further force shaping will be achieved as each respective year group meets its scheduled field grade promotion board.
- Media coverage (Air Force Times) is expected upon public release.

COORDINATION: OSD-P&R

FOUO

2005 JUN 02 09 06 11

June 2, 2005

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Plan to Brief PC on Detainees

I need to pull together a plan to brief the PC on detainees. It is conceivable that what we could do it in one session, but I think it may take more than one. The elements should include:

*SP3.C*

- 1) The number of investigations, and what was found
- 2) The prosecutions, the acquittals, number guilty, and punishments
- 3) The frequent charges and allegations, and the proper responses - a hard pushback
- 4) All the reforms that have been instituted
- 5) Open questions (i.e. Should we get Congress involved, should we ask for legislation, what is the legal situation, etc.)
- 6) Other

I should get together with Dick Myers, Maples, Geren, et al. and talk through what we should propose to the NSC, when State and Justice can be there, so everyone gets the full story. The USG has got to get aboard.

DHR:ms  
 060205-14 (TS)

.....  
 Please respond by 6/24/05

FOUO

*2 Jun 05*

OSD 20561-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53212

JUN 06 2005

To: MG Maples  
Mr Pete Geren

cc: Mr Paul Butler  
Mr Matt Waxman  
COL Grimsley  
Mr Larry DiRita  
Dr Bucci  
Rachel Billingslea

Fm: Lt Col Lengyel

Subj: Plan to brief PC on Detainees

Gentlemen,

VADM Stavridis asked that I forward the attached snowflake to you for action. He specifically requests that you draft a briefing to meet Secdef's intent. He'd like meet and discuss Monday, 13 Jun.

V/r,



060205-146

11-L-0559/OSD/53213

FOUO

JUL 01 2005  
2005 JUN 30 11 41 11

TO: Larry Dí Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article

Please see if you can find out where I have "long argued this" as this article says? I don't remember it.

Thanks.

Attach: 7/4/05 Newsweek Article by Fareed Zakaria

DHR.ss  
063005-01

*JHR*

.....  
*Please Respond By July 07, 2005*

*1 June 05*

JUL 05 2005

FOUO

OSD 20562-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53214

*DHR*

# The Good News And Bad News

**DON'T SEE HOW IRAQ'S INSURGENCY CAN WIN. IT LACKS THE support of at least 80 percent of the country (Shiites and Kurds), and by all accounts lacks the support of the majority of the Sunni population as well. It has no positive agenda, no charismatic leader, virtually no territory of its own, and no great power suppliers. That's why parallels to Vietnam and Algeria don't make sense. But despite all these obstacles,**

the insurgents launched 700 attacks against U.S. forces last month, the highest number since the invasion.

They are getting more sophisticated, now using shaped charges, which concentrate the blast of a bomb, and infrared lasers, which cannot be easily jammed. They kill enough civilians every week that Iraq remains insecure, and electricity, water and oil are still supplied in starts and stops. That's where things stand in Iraq—it's a conflict the United States cannot easily lose but also cannot easily win.

The positive picture is worth painting. Iraq has had successful elections, a new (and more legitimate) government, Sunnis included into the political process, and is working on a new constitution. The insurgents' attacks on ordinary Iraqis are having the predictable effect of making them lose popular support. When I was in Iraq recently, several Iraqis (all Sunnis) told me that they were losing respect for and patience with the insurgents. "These guys are thugs who are killing Iraqis, not resistance fighters battling the occupation," one of them said. And finally, Iraqi politicians have been more mature and steadfast than one could have ever hoped for—making compromises, arriving at consensus and moving forward under tremendous personal danger.

What I worry about is not a defeat along the lines of Vietnam. It is something different. If the insurgents keep up their attacks, prevent reconstruction and renewed economic activity and, most important, continue to attract jihadists to Iraq from all over the region and the world. Last month's leaked CIA report, which described Iraq as the new on-the-ground training center for Islamic extremists, points to the real danger. If thousands of jihadists hone their skills in the streets and back alleys of Iraq and then return to their countries, it could



a half years of errors, since late 2004, Washington has been urging political inclusion, speeding up economic reconstruction and building up local forces. But U.S. policy still lacks a central direction—and the energy, vision, increased resources and push that such direction would bring. Who is running Iraq policy in Washington?

The intense and bitter interagency squabbles of the past three years—and the disastrous mistakes made by the Defense Department and the coalition Provisional Authority—have left Iraq something of an orphan. Day to day, Iraq policy is now run by the State Department and the U.S. Army, but those two chains of command never meet.

On the civilian side, for example, the American effort is massively understaffed. Several Army officers in Iraq told me that their jobs would be greatly improved if they had more people from the State Department, USAID and other civilian agencies helping. One said to me last year, "I've had 25-year-old sergeants adjudicating claims between Turkomans and Kurds, when they don't really know how they are different. We could use political officers who could brief them."

The vacuum is being filled

**This is the picture in Iraq: A conflict that the United States cannot easily lose, but also cannot easily win.**

mark the beginning of a new wave of sophisticated terror. Just as Al Qaeda was born in the killing fields of Afghanistan, new groups could grow in the back alleys of Iraq. And many of these foreigners are kids with no previous track record of terror. Some even have European passports, which means that they will be very difficult to screen out of the United States or any other country.

Additionally, by the fall of 2006, it will be virtually impossible to maintain current troop levels in Iraq because the use of reserve forces will have been stretched to the limit. That's when pressure to bring the boys home will become irresistible. And that would be bad news for the Iraqi government, which is still extremely weak and in many areas dysfunctional.

The good news is that America has stopped blundering in Iraq. After two and

by the U.S. Army, which has been building bridges and schools, securing neighborhoods and power plants and, yes, adjudicating claims between Turkomans and Kurds. It is doing these things because someone has to. Secretary Rumsfeld has long argued that American troops should never engage in nation building, leaving that to locals. But while we waited for Iraqis to do it, chaos broke out and terror reigned. So the Army on the ground has ignored Rumsfeld's ideology and has simply made things work. (It's a good rule of thumb for the future.)

But if we want to move beyond coping, we need a full-scale revitalization of Iraq policy, with resources to match it. Muddling along will ensure we don't lose in Iraq, but we won't win either.

Write the author at [comments@fareedzakaria.com](mailto:comments@fareedzakaria.com).

FOUO

2005 JUN 10 PM 6:11

JUN 29 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Blechman Piece on BRAC



Here's a good op-ed by Barry Blechman on BRAC that should be circulated more widely.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Blechman, Barry. "Base Closings Essential," *Defense News*, June 27, 2005, p. 29.

DHR:dt  
062905-04

*323.3*

.....  
*Please Respond By July 14, 2005*

*7/6*      *1/8*  
SecDef - We'll  
put it in Early Bird  
and distro to our  
analysts/etc. lists.

*D, R, F.*

*29 June*

OSD 20563-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/53216

## INSIDE VIEW

# Base Closings Essential

## Despite Local Pain, Moves Aid Wider Strategy

**M**edia coverage of the U.S. Defense Department's base closing recommendations has featured the anguished cries of politicians whose states and districts would lose jobs under the proposed realignments. While understand-



By Barry Blechman, chairman of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, and chief executive of DFI International, industry and government consultants.

able, such local protests obscure the fact that the national interest and welfare of the armed forces would be well served by the changes.

The department's proposals would accomplish three goals essential to the effectiveness of the armed forces: saving money, integrating active and reserve forces, and helping services work better together. The first goal, and the most consequential for U.S. taxpayers, is curbing the growth in military operating costs. Over the past few years, the costs of operations and maintenance and personnel have grown at unprecedented rates. In the wake of 9/11, the country was prepared to let deficits soar, allowing the Defense Department to pay these bills while modernizing weapons and developing transformational tech-

nologies. Now that pressure is rising to reduce deficits, the defense budget top line will level off. Continuing growth in operational costs will crowd out funds needed for capital investments. The Government Accountability Office estimates that past base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds have saved \$29 billion so far, an amount increasing by about \$7 billion every year. But the department desperately needs more.

The armed forces are roughly two-thirds of their Cold War size. Bases should be adjusted accordingly — closing ancient Army depots, consolidating Army training facilities, and centralizing certain Navy research and development centers are cases in point. Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, once an important Cold War station, should be shuttered and its small force of B-1 bombers sent to join the ones at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas.

The second, and most politically charged, goal is the proposed transfer of Reserve and National Guard facilities to active service bases. Cuts in Reserve component facilities account for some two-thirds of the proposed closures. Opponents say the reductions in local reserve centers will make it more difficult to recruit and retain troops. This is a serious issue, given current personnel con-

cerns, and the BRAC commission is certain to take a hard look at some of these suggested consolidations.

But the proposed changes recognize a vitally important strategic change in the way the United States fights wars in the 21st century. Already evident during the Balkan interventions in the 1990s, the recent engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate clearly the nation's dependence on Reserve units operating in a fully integrated manner with active duty forces.

Bringing scattered units into larger installations that combine active and reserve troops will improve their ability to work together. For example; the consolidation of the Air Force's C-130 reserve assets in Reno, Nev.; Schenectady, N.Y.; Channel Islands, Calif.; and Dyess into an integrated airlift wing at Little Rock Air Force Base, Ark.; will make these units more ready to deploy quickly for emergencies.

Third, the goal of integrating service operations, or jointness, the most consistent theme of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's tenure, played a central role in the Pentagon's recommendations. Modern wars rely on effective joint military actions, and this needs to be reflected not only on the battlefield but in how the services prepare for war.

The proposals to create joint training facilities and medical centers are modest steps. They include the conversion of Eglin Air Force Base in Florida into a joint training site for Joint Strike Fighter pilots and the merger of some of the Army's medical facilities at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington with the Navy's medical center in nearby Bethesda, Md.

But these could mark the beginning of a longer-term process aimed at reducing duplication in shared support functions. While many think the department should have gone farther, the Pentagon's recommendations are a significant break with the past, setting precedents for future joint initiatives.

To some, the Pentagon's recommendations may appear partisan. States that voted for Democratic presidential candidate Sen. John Kerry will lose 22,000 jobs, while those that supported President George W. Bush will gain 11,000. But the moves are not politically inspired.

Sen. Thune, R-S.D., who defeated the Senate Democrats' leader, Tom Daschle, is threatened with the closure of Ellsworth, and Sen. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, chairman of the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee and arguably the most powerful senator on defense issues, could lose nearly 200 jobs in his state.

Rather, the geographic distribution of proposed closures continues what has been a long-term trend toward concentration of the nation's armed forces in the southern and mountain portions of the country. Given that military families, retirees and contractors tend to cluster near military bases, this geographic concentration leads to wide differences in public opinion on military issues, perhaps helping to explain the electoral outcome, rather than reflecting it.

If there's anything regrettable about the Pentagon's proposed closures, it's that they don't go far enough. This has much to do with the demands of ongoing operations and with the anticipated return of tens of thousands of U.S. forces now deployed in Europe and Asia. Still, one can't shake the feeling that Rumsfeld or the White House decided they had enough problems with the Congress without launching the "Mother of all BRACs," as had been promised.


But overall, the Pentagon's recommendations clearly support the country's defense and fiscal priorities. They are based on sound military judgments, informed by the experience of recent wars and long-term needs to transform military capabilities.

Like all decisions that affect local economic interests, there is bound to be opposition and discontent. Ultimately, however, if the Pentagon's recommendations, or something close to them, are allowed to stand, the winners will be not only the men and women in uniform, but all American taxpayers. ■

~~FOUO~~

205 05 18 11 09 11

JUN 29 2005



TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lynne Cheney's Remarks

Here are Lynne Cheney's remarks at the Pentagon Memorial Fund breakfast hosted by Don Graham. I think you ought to find a way to get them distributed. They are excellent.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/16/05 Lynne Cheney remarks at Pentagon Memorial Fund Breakfast

350.001

DHR:dh  
062905-03

.....  
Please Respond By July 14, 2005


*7/6*  
*Sec Def -*  
*We will get these around.*  
*Di Rita*

*29 June 05*

OSD 20565-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/53218



For Immediate Release  
June 16, 2005

## Mrs. Cheney Delivers Remarks at Pentagon Memorial Fund Breakfast

The Madison Hotel  
Washington, D.C.

(as prepared)

Thank you very much. I appreciate the very kind introduction, Don, and the opportunity to join you this morning. Don Graham and Peter Nostrand, thank you so much for hosting this breakfast, and for the outstanding support the Washington Post Company and Sun Trust Bank have given to the Pentagon Memorial Fund. And let me thank all of you for being here today. It's wonderful to be part of this event, because it brings the Memorial Fund one step closer to the success of a beautiful and worthy project.

As Don Graham noted, Dick served four years as secretary of defense, going to work each morning at the Pentagon. And he had such tremendous respect for the career officers, enlisted and civilian personnel who work in that building. One of the reasons that was such a memorable experience is the opportunity it gave him to know what an amazing group they are and what great camaraderie they have. The Pentagon, of course, is enormous, with many thousands of people on duty. And yet because of the shared mission of national security, the patriotic culture of the defense department, and the traditions of the armed services, there is a very strong bond among all who work there. So in the aftermath of September 11th, 2001, when workers brought out that gigantic American flag and draped it near the hole in the building, the gesture captured perfectly the feelings of solidarity and resolve felt throughout the Pentagon, and throughout our country.

That image lingers, for all of us, as a symbol of strength and determination. And now that the Pentagon has been rebuilt, stone by stone, it is time to add a permanent place of honor to remember those who died there on 9/11.

One of our great strengths as a nation is that we look ahead. Americans have always been oriented to the future. But we are even stronger when we also look back and remember and honor those who have gone before us.

We have learned so much about the innocent victims of that day - and because we live in Washington, many of us know people directly affected by the attack. With the crew of Flight 77 were business travelers, and vacationers, and boys and girls on a school trip - children with their whole lives ahead of them. In the west side of the Pentagon, workers included people in the early stages of the careers, and a budget analyst who had worked at the Pentagon for 30 years. The youngest of the 184 who died at the Pentagon was three years old; the oldest was 71.

It was all so awful - and it occurred in the very midst of ordinary life in our community. We have all taken flights out of Dulles; the Pentagon is such a familiar sight ... and to have seen all of it in a picture of violence is almost impossible to absorb. None of the people who boarded that plane, or who stepped off the Metro or parked their cars and walked into the Pentagon, could have had the slightest inkling that they would be among the first casualties of a war. The events of 9/11

were an attack on our country and on our ideals. **As** Americans we also regard them as individual acts of murder - against men, women, and children **who** had every right to live out that day, **safe** from harm, **as** citizens of a **free** country.

The Pentagon Memorial is intended to mark **a** moment in time; to remember what happened and to whom it happened. I hope all of you have had a chance to see the design plan for the Memorial. It is **stunning**. Out of well over a thousand entries submitted, Julie Beckman and Keith Kaseman have given us **a** design that is dignified, deeply symbolic, and beautiful to behold. **Each** one of the **lost** is honored **as an** individual. **At the same** time, all are honored together in a **park** that is expansive, welcoming to visitors, and incredibly graceful. **As** Julie Beckman said, "It's a place **where** two people can be, or thousands can be." The design reflects tremendous credit on the talent and sensitivity of these two fine designers. And when the project **is** completed, it will be a dramatic and poignant addition to the grounds of the Pentagon.

We've heard it said that a nation reveals itself in its choice of heroes - and that is so true. **Yet** we reveal our national character in so many other **ways**: in **the** ideals **we** uphold, in the promises we make, in the causes we serve, and in the memorials **we** build. **This** city and **this** country were so profoundly touched by the events of 9/11. We are still so greatly moved by the stories of **loss** and heroism, by the bravery of the families, and by the hope that survives. **And very** soon, **thanks** in part to the generosity of all of you in **this** room, a lovely memorial will soon be raised up that **truly** expresses the compassion, the faith, and the good heart of the American people.

*Thank you very much.*

FOUO

March 2, 2005

205 6.6-12

326

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: U.S. Army Reserve Availability

Here is a memo from Fran Harvey about the Reserves. I have not read it, but it is an important subject.

Please review it, get with Fran and the Joint Staff if necessary, and give me your views.

Thanks.

Attach  
2/25/05 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: U.S. Army Reserve Availability

DHR:dh  
022805-1

.....

Please respond by 3/31/05

FOUO

OSD 2056.6-05

2 MAR 05

INFO MEMO

February 25, 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: U.S. Army Reserve Availability

- In light of recent Congressional testimony and media coverage regarding stress on the United States Army Reserve (USAR), I want to provide you with information on the status of USAR manpower issues and a game plan for addressing the challenges.
- While sourcing for OEF 5/OEF 7 at the current level of effort will be challenging, the Army will meet combatant commander requirements.
- The USAR missed its retention and end strength objectives for FY 2004. Currently, the USAR has an authorized end strength of 205,000 and is operating with an end strength of approximately 198,000 Soldiers. The primary cause was a lack of available prior service Soldiers for transition into the USAR. The recruiting pool *shrunk* because "Stop Loss" policies and a strong Active Component retention program were successful in helping the Army keep soldiers in the AOR. As you are aware the USAR historically garnered numerous soldiers each year from the prior service community.
- To reverse this negative trend in personnel strength levels, the Army has increased the number of recruiters in the field, adding over 735 authorizations in the USAR. Additionally, we have implemented a number of bonus and incentive programs and increased the value of existing recruiting options. In the near term, projections are that the USAR will remain below its end strength objectives in 2005. I believe, however, the initiatives the USAR has in place should reverse the negative trends this year and allow us to meet our end strength objectives in 2006.
- The Army is also taking an aggressive approach to resolving USAR company grade officer shortages that developed over a 10-year period. In addition to increased accessions, solutions include: changes in the promotion system; additional officer Basic Course seats and tighter management greater continuum of service for those leaving the active component to serve in the USAR; and efforts to lower officer attrition.
- Because of the importance of the USAR in sustaining our global commitments, I plan to establish a Task Force composed of working groups and an outside review panel to assess the future availability of Reserve Forces and a corresponding plan to meet a range of projected force levels. This plan may recommend changes to current policies and authorities needed to accommodate the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Strategic Environment of sustained operations with an all-volunteer force. The Chief of Staff and I believe the Army Modular Force will eventually alleviate the significant stress that is being experienced today by our forces.
- I will keep you apprised of our efforts and emerging insights. As needed, I will come to you for relief where proposed solutions to fulfill Army requirements exceed my authority.

11-L-0559/OSD/53222

2005 NOV 10 11 08 11  
November 5, 2004

**TO:** David Chu  
**C C** Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Jim Haynes  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *SR*  
**SUBJECT:** Selective Service for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

Please take a good look at what they are doing with Selective **Service**, including general registration, maintenance of specific skill lists, and anything else they **are** doing. As we move forward, we may want to significantly change the approach.

327

Please show me some options, including ending it entirely.

**Thanks.**

DHR:ms  
101904-19

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

5 Nov 04

FOUO

2005 JAN 03 08:06 | January 3, 2005

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Precepts for Selection Boards

Please get together with the three Service Secretaries and make sure their precepts for selection boards are appropriate and relevant to the new century. Try to determine what the precepts suggest with respect to diversity and innovation, and that they conform with the law on the former.

Thanks.



DHR:dh  
010305-14

3A0.2

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

FOUO

3 pages

OSD 20568-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53224



FOUO

JUN 03 2005

2005 JUN 15 PM 6:12

**T.O.** David Chu  
**cc:** Gordon England  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT** Responses to Memos

I'm still waiting for some feedback from you on the following memos:

- Olmstead Scholarship Program (Due 5/12)
- Amputees (Due 5/31)
- Army Reserves (Due 3/31)
- Precepts for Selection Boards (Due 3/31)
- Home Schooling (Due 3/24)
- Innovative Health Care Options for the Force (Due 12/1/04)
- Selective Service (Due 12/5/04)

312

Thanks.

Attach:  
SecDef Memos to USD (P&R)

DHR:sa  
060205-24 (TS)

.....  
Please respond by 6/17/05

3 queries

FOUO

JUN 03 ENT'D

11-L-0559/OSD/53226

OSD 20569-05

~~FOUO~~

JUN 16 2005

FILE COPY

205 9:31

TO: Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *P.*  
SUBJECT: Train Chaplains re: Military Marriages

Please call Jack Herschend (see the attached letter from him and my response) and find out precisely what he thinks he needs.

See if you can give him a hand. He's a fine person, and it sounds like a fine program.

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/20/05 Herschend letter to SD  
SD response

061505-22

OSD 20574-05

.....  
Please respond by 7/14/05

Sir,

*DB 6/21*

I spoke with Mr. Herschend, and I agree he is a fine person. I am also familiar with the organization he spoke of. It is a great program, and I have used their materials when (b)(6) and I have done marriage seminars in the past. A representative from PRR will contact Mr. Herschend to see how we can facilitate getting the training courses for our chaplains. I will follow up to see how far it goes ~~FOUO~~ in the next few days.

*16 June 05*

OSD 20574-05

*VJK*  
11-L-0559/OSD/53227, B

JUN 20 ENTD



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Mr. Jack Herschend  
Herschend Family Entertainment  
100 Corporate Place  
Branson, MO 65616

Dear Jack,

I remember my friend Jack Waggoner well, and I am delighted to hear from you!

I have asked Steve Bucci, who works with me here, to get in touch with you and figure out a way to connect you with the people who would be appropriate. It sounds like an excellent idea to me.

I'll certainly tell Joyce I've been in touch with you.

With my thanks to you for your kind words of support,

Sincerely,

OS

20 June 05

16 June

HERSCHEID  
FAMILY  
ENTERTAINMENT

100 Corporate Place • Branson, MO 65616  
ph 417-334-0140 • fax 417-337-8112

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2005 JUN 15 AM 8 12

*all  
4/21*

May 20, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Donald

If you go back in time to 1950 you will remember a fellow wrestler named Jack Waggoner who wrestled with you at New Trier and was present to watch **you** take the state championship when you beat Fred Pearson. It has been a joy to follow your career and admire you and the tremendous contribution you have made to our country over the years.

The purpose of writing you is to see **if** you can put me in contact with the **right** people to fund a program to train chaplains as to how to salvage military marriages that are in trouble...or to make good marriages, great marriages for the **men** and women in the military.

I serve on the board of a ministry called Smalley Marriage Institute who has been working with pastors across the country to turn around the devastating divorce rate in our country.

I don't expect **you** to answer personally because you have weighty responsibilities. But if you could ask **the** right person to contact me, I would be most appreciative.

Your friend from the past,

*Jack Herschend*

Jack Herschend (formerly Jack Waggoner)

Enclosure

*P.S. my best regards to Joyce. I went thru grade school with her.*

...creating memories worth repeating...

Silver Dollar City Properties • Stone Mountain Park • Dollywood Properties • Dixie Stampede • Ride the Ducks  
Herschend Family Entertainment Corporation

US 11443-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53229

~~FOUO~~

JUN 16 2005



2005 JUN 17 01 9:31

TO: Steve Bucci  
FROM: .Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
SUBJECT Train Chaplains re: Military Marriages

Please call Jack Herschend (see the attached letter from him and my response) and find out precisely what he thinks he needs.

See if you can give him a hand. He's a fine person, and it sounds like a fine program.

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/20/05 Herschend letter to SD  
SD response

061505-22

OSD 20574-05

.....  
Please respond by 7/14/05

Sir,

I spoke with Mr. Herschend, and I agree he is a fine person. I am also familiar with the organization he spoke of. It is a great program, and I have used their materials when (b)(6) and I have done marriage seminars in the past. A representative from PTR will contact Mr. Herschend to see how we can facilitate getting the training courses for our chaplains. I will follow up to see how far it goes ~~FOUO~~ in the next few days.

*DR 6/21*

0003 2050105 16 JUN 05

OSD 20574-05

*V/R*  
11-L-0559/OSD/53230B

JUN 20 ENT'D

~~FOUO~~

JUN 29 9:45 AM '05

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Copy of Memo from Mike Dunn

413.51

Here is the ~~third~~ copy of this I have given you.

Thanks.

Attach 5/9/05 SecDef Memo to Larry Di Rita; 4/25/05 SecDef Memo to Lt Gen Dunn; 5/5/05 Lt Gen  
Dunn Memo to SecDef

DHR:as  
062805-06

.....  
*Please Respond By July 14, 2005*

29 Jun 05

~~FOUO~~ 11-L-0559/OSD/53231 OSD 20575-05

*DRP*

May 9, 2005

TO: Lany Di Rita

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo from Mike Dunn

Attached is an excellent paper from Mike Dunn. Please take a look at it, and tell me how you think we can move forward.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 4/25/05 SecDef Memo to Lt. Gen. Mike Dunn  
 5/05/05 Lt. Gen. Mike Dunn Memo to SecDef

DHR:gs  
050905-31

.....

Please respond by 6/16/05

*Sir,  
 Response attached.  
 (First under)  
 v/r  
 Lt Col Lengyel*

MAY 18 2005

May 18,2005 MEMO TO SECDEF from Di Rita

Mike Dunn's concepts for outreach are excellent. National Defense University is a wonderful draw for groups that want to interact with **us**.

I'll ask Allison Barber, who manages our broader outreach, to get herself into this with General Dunn and see what makes sense.

April 25, 2005

TO: Lt Gen Mike Dunn

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DR*

SUBJECT Military Educational Institution Network

Mike; it sounds like you are achieving some good results with your unofficial e-mail network among military educational institutions - good thinking.

Are there other, similar networks of which we could take advantage?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042205-34

.....  
Please respond by 5/12/05

*Sir, <sup>sent</sup> 5/9  
Response attached.  
v/R  
Lt Col Lengyel*

MAY 09 2005

~~FOUO~~

W

9: 58 June 27, 2005

TO: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich Paper on Coaching Large-Scale Change

This is an interesting memo from Newt, with a focus on how to implement transformation while still keeping focused on winning the war.

Please look it over and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/16/02 Gingrich e-mail: Coaching Large Scale Change  
6/27/03 Gingrich paper: Seven Strategic Necessities

DHR,dh  
062705-33



*Please Respond By 07/28/05*

27JUN05

11-L-0559/CSD/53235 ~~FOUO~~ DSD 20576-05

*BMP*

*From Newt Gingrich*

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

*copies provided to Adm G*

*D. R. T.*

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com  
Sent: Friday, August 16, 2002 9:33 AM  
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;  
Subject: coaching large scale change

for secdef  
from newt 8/15/02

Coaching large scale change: the key to implementing transformational change in defense while winning the war

**WARNING:**

none of the following is possible without a new scheduling system, a new set of priorities and the implementation of an internal communications-command system which makes information flow dramatically more efficient and more responsive.

Real change will require real change.

The earlier memo on transformational change in defense while winning the war outlined a system which would define the secdef job as:

1. maker of all key decisions and definer of metrics of success:
2. chief coach for a team which includes three powerful collaborators in a Senior Defense Group (depsecdef, chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs) and seven team leaders responsible for seven major areas of achievement:
3. cheerleader, enforcer, and chief innovative problem solver when the achievement teams get stuck or bogged down;
4. chief public articulator of national security to the White House, the rest of the Executive Branch, the Congress, the News Media, the American people and in coordination with the President to our allies.

This is a disciplined, scheduled, staffed system with defined responsibilities and defined allocations of resources.

You shift from doing to ensuring that others are doing in an organized systematic manner.

The following memo assumes these conditions have been met.

*attached*

The previous memo on seven large areas of change, in national security implied but did not outline a pattern of implementation in which you and the other three members of your Senior Defense Group (depsecdef, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

and Vice Chairman) coach the seven leaders and their implementation teams into success.

This proposal assumes that you will have neither the perfect leader nor the perfect hierarchy for large scale change. It also assumes that it will take too long to find and get into position the right people and it will take too long to think up the right organization chart and get it approved by the Congress,

When I became Speaker and delegated the management of the House to Majority Leader Armev to pass the Contract provisions in the first 100 days I freed myself up to focus (with John Kasich, Bill Archer and Bob Livingston, the chairmen of Budget, Ways and Means and Appropriations) on getting to the first decisively balanced budgets in 70 years.

With the help of the Business Roundtable we brought in many major CEOs and asked them how they had changed their companies. Almost without exception they outlined the same set of principles:

1. set big goals
2. establish short deadlines
3. delegate and insist on results but tolerate wide diversity of methods
4. ask no experts for their opinions because they will all be too timid and they will all be wrong about what is possible.

The biggest challenge we faced was to reform Medicare in the face of a liberal Democratic President while having to win reelection. It was impossible to balance the budget without reforming Medicare. We worked very closely with AARP and I created a task force which combined the members and staffs of two committees (Ways and Means and Commerce) which I chaired? We broke all the precedents, secured AARP's support in the face of Clinton Administration opposition, weathered 125,000 negative ads and House Republicans ran 16 percent ahead of Dole among seniors in 1996 while winning reelection as a majority for the first time since 1928.

None of this was possible within a traditional framework and following the de jure rules of Congressional committee structure. Real change requires real change and that includes changes in the current power structure to facilitate the implementation of your will despite the resistance of the established order.

You must designate big areas of accomplishment. I have proposed seven in the previous memo.

Then you want to pick the least inadequate person available to lead the team in each area. Anyone who is willing to try and is willing to be coached is better than waiting for the best person. You need the momentum and the movement while your prestige is at its peak and the administration is still relatively young (assuming two

terms). Every day lost is beyond recovery.

An appointee who proves to be too weak can be replaced and we will at least have learned some things not to do with the second appointee.

Each team leader has power because you and your three colleagues in the Senior Defense Group have imbued them with that power. You can cross attach to that team leader any personnel in any area as temporary workers for secdef. Have your lawyers figure out how to do it and fire them if they insist on negatives. There is always a technique for temporary assignments, internships, etc.

You are consciously and deliberately shifting the energy into an informal but explicit structure whose power comes from the fact that the people with real power will pay attention to it. You are lending your authority by allocating your schedule and you are empowering and training a group of team leaders and their teams to build informal networks throughout DOD to gather information and prepare decision options which optimize your ability to achieve your seven accomplishments.

At the end of this process you can propose a new codification of DOD structures and organizations to replace the current mess with a leaner, more powerful, and more fast paced and energetic system of management. Today you do not know enough to make that proposal and you do not want to wait for Congress to act. Your goal should be to know enough to submit the bold new 21st century national security structure (which may extend beyond DOD in its reforms) in the 2004 or 2005 State of the Union. In the interim you want to keep forcing changes and having your seven teams learn and develop new better methods and new better structures, systems, and habits.

First with the help of your Senior Defense Group you identify the proposed team leader for each of the seven agreed accomplishments.

Second, you and the Senior Defense Group work out with the proposed team leader an agreed definition of the accomplishment in their area. In effect you are creating a mission type order with a clear commander's intent from secdef.

Third, the team leader and the Senior Defense Group work out a written grant of authority and jointly agree on the key team members of this achievement group. They also agree on specific metrics of achievement and on systems of deciding and reporting for the team-group relationship.

The achievement team should be the smallest number of members who could achieve the goal, As small as possible, as large as necessary is the right principle. The achievement team can reach out and create many project teams for thinking through and implementing specific aspects of their assignment. However the core team should be permanent and share mutual commitment and mutual responsibility

for the metrics and the goals.

Fourth, the achievement team members are brought together with their team leader and the Senior Defense Group and develop a clear understanding of what they are going to achieve and what their authority is to achieve it.

A clear system of reporting is established including ad hoc meetings (conference calls and videoconferences as well as in person), a weekly report by the team leader to the Senior Defense Group and monthly meetings between the achievement team as a whole and the Senior Defense Group with clear metrics for monthly progress and a designated secretary to keep track of each achievement team.

Fifth, the achievement team establishes a pattern of moving rapidly to implement ideas and gather information. The principle is established that action-error-learn-improve--new action is preferable to long periods of planning and thinking,

The goal is to establish an iterative process of constant effort in which each step can be evaluated and improved upon quickly. The reporting and collaborating between the achievement team and the Senior Defense Group has to be so rapid and so continuous that errors can be corrected and momentum maintained.

This is precisely the problem of a theater commander or battle group commander in a modern war and the information systems appropriate to a high tempo, information rich modern battlefield should be brought directly into the Senior Defense Group-achievement team process. The combination of the command system used in Millenium Challenge 02, the Spawar Knowledge Wall system for Carriers (or the similar Air Force Combat Command system) and the JMPRS-NT mobile command module can be brought together into an information support system that would enable the top four people at DOD (the Senior Defense Group) to stay in close touch with the seven achievement teams with less effort and less time than the current system requires.

Deciding to create this transformational senior command and control system is an unavoidable part of large scale change. It is impossible for secdef to run a high tempo dispersed system without this new more powerful integrating, information and command system. This system should be assigned to JFCOM and Giambastiani to build NOW while the work on thinking through and recruiting the achievement teams goes on in parallel. The goal should be to have the system up and running in 60 days (November 1) in parallel with the new seven achievement teams and the routine operation of the Senior Defense Group.

Sixth, the achievement team develops a plan for completing their mission and within two to four weeks reports back with the full achievement team briefing the Senior Defense Group. After a lively and thorough discussion and vetting of alternatives

(which may take several meetings) the Senior Defense Group approves the modified proposal and the achievement team focuses on implementation.,

These seven areas are each comparable to a campaign the size of Just Cause or Desert Storm. They deserve the intensity of thought and the careful scrutiny in planning which would be given to a military campaign. The goal is for the powerful, prestigious senior leaders to coach their hand picked team leaders to strength and to help them think through the problems-that seem insoluble and to do it rapidly efficiently and with minimum loss of time and energy.

## SCHEDULE

September 15-- system of Senior Defense Group and achievement teams agreed to by the four top leaders and briefed to the President.

October 1--seven top achievements agreed to and defined by the Senior Defense Group, team leaders selected and the President briefed.

October 15 --initial contracts between the team leaders and the Senior Defense Group agreed to and the makeup of the teams decided on.

November 1-- new communications and command system implemented at secdef-Senior Defense Group and achievement team level

January 1 --all seven achievement team plans and metrics approved and teams beginning to implement.

Seven, using the new communications and command system s the Senior Defense Group monitors the progress of the achievement teams and routinely coaches them when they get stuck or lose momentum, People who prove incapable of coaching will have to be replaced but in this setting and with this quality of reinforcement most of the team leaders and most of the teams will grow far beyond their original capabilities.

## FINAL NOTE

This is a complicated system and specific culture of delegated team achievement. If you want to pursue it I would be glad to meet with you and the proposed Senior Defense Group and discuss this in more detail and then lay out an implementation plan.

Seven Strategic Necessities  
June 27, 2003  
Newt Gingrich

cc to DRT  
Craddock

There are seven large areas of strategic necessity that require strategic planning and some significant-modifications of current assumptions and efforts. --

I. Strategic need 1. Winning the larger argument about terrorism, weapons of mass murder, and American security

It is very important for the Bush administration not to get drawn into a day to day, incident managing, news media and legislator appeasing mindset.

We are going to take casualties.

We are going to be engaged in Iraq, Iran, Palestine and elsewhere for a long time.

We need an elevated debate about the larger zone of American security and the threats to that security. We want to divide the country into three factions.

1. Those who would hide and ignore reality (essentially the McGovern-Dean Democrats).
2. Those who pretend to be responsible but really want to carp and complain without an effective alternative.
3. Those who understand that this will be a hard campaign and may take years and will involve mistakes.

You want to force the carping, criticizing group to join you for the long haul or join the isolationists and reality avoiders.

If there is a clear strategic choice the Bush Administration will win.

If people get three choices the knit picking, daily critics will steadily gain ground.

Do not let yourself be caught up in a daily argument or in trying to predict when you will leave a country or when you will solve everything.

The country needs a little Churchillian promise of 'blood, sweat, toil and tears'.

In 1945-47 the country reluctantly had a great debate about the nature of the Soviet threat. People who had survived a depression and a world war wanted to return to normalcy. Gradually they concluded that that was impossible and with the help of young Republicans like Nixon and Ford, Harry Truman and George Marshall forged a consensus that lasted for over 40 years.

A large debate requires large strategies and speeches about the larger realities.

II. Strategic Need 2. Creating a world with minimum terror and minimum **risk** of weapons of mass murder requires both the negative goal of defeating bad people and bad regimes and the positive goal of creating systems of safety, health, prosperity, and freedom (the four words ~~which best express the world~~ we want our neighbors to live in).

We are very good at creating a first campaign to defeat the bad guys or the bad regime. We are stunningly less effective at creating a campaign to build systems of safety, health, prosperity and freedom.

-----  
We need a doctrine for second campaigns. This will inherently be a doctrine for integrated operations. Joint operations involve all the services. Combined operations include foreign countries. Integrated operations involves all the elements of governmental and non-governmental power being orchestrated and brought to bear to help build a country or society after we have defeated the bad forces which have been oppressing them and threatening us.

The current challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan are symptoms of this lack of an integrated doctrine and the lack of an effective interagency system for implementing such a doctrine. We can continue muddling through at increased cost and risk to ourselves or we can take winning the peace as seriously as we take winning the war.

Compare the quality of people and level of resources spent thinking through and creating the units and people which won in Iraq in three weeks with the stunningly smaller effort to think through how we rebuild a country and the disparity becomes unchallengeable.

There is still some wishful thinking in Washington that somehow these things will go away or can be fixed on the cheap.

The countries we liberate will not go away. In the absence of a successful and powerful American doctrine and system for a second campaign using integrated and combined assets we run a real risk of losing in the peace what we have gained in the war.

Those trying to deal with Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine should simply build lists and brief reports on every impediment to effectiveness and every tool and system they wished they had. We will only get better by being consciously self aware.

III, Strategic Need 3.. Palestine may present us the challenge of trying to win a total war against an enemy hiding among civilians. Hamas' leaders state publicly that 'not a single Jew' will be left in Israel and that 'not a single meter of territory' will be left in Jewish hands. There is sound reason to believe they mean it. This is a declaration of total war.

America has a sound doctrine for total war against an entire nation. Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo and Nagasaki are among the memories of how decisive Americans can be when faced with a threat of total war.

However America does not have a doctrine for total war against an enemy who is hiding behind a civilian population. Furthermore that civilian population is likely to be terrorized by the forces of total war and so simply appealing to their better interests is useless. — — — — —

We learned in Iraq that the Baathist forces would kill villagers and threaten wives and children in order to get people to attack the Americans.

It is clear that Palestinians who favor real democracy or would be willing to live peacefully with Israel risk their lives if they speak out.

When faced with a terrorist opponent willing to use violence against their own people the only solution is to develop overmatching systems of intelligence and force which can help people defeat them.

British General Thompson in Malaya developed a system like this and decisively defeated the communists. In one of the most successful aspects of the Viet Nam war (described in Bing West's *The Village*) very small units of Marines worked with villagers to develop self defense forces in communities of 6,000 Vietnamese with about 20 Marines.

If the President is to be able to confront and defeat Hamas the United States will have to develop a doctrine and system of helping those Palestinians who want their families to have safety, health prosperity, and freedom and are prepared to fight the terrorists if necessary to achieve that future.

The only hope for peace between Israel and the Palestinian people is for the United States to overtly ally with those Palestinians who will accept Israel if they have safety, health, prosperity and freedom and in this alliance defeat and ultimately eliminate the threat of the terrorists.

Victory in the Israel-Palestinian conflict thus inherently means victory both in a campaign against terrorists and in a campaign to build a safe, healthy, prosperous, free Palestinian society.

In this case victory in a total war surrounded by civilians requires waging the first and second campaigns concurrently.

The specialists at Quantico, Fort Benning and Fort Bragg should be assigned the job of developing in detail a doctrine, strategy and structure for winning this total war on behalf of the Palestinian people against the terrorists. The intelligence community should be

involved for its knowledge but the doctrine for war winning should come from specialists in policing, urban warfare, and guerrilla operations in the military.

The goal is to give the President the instruments he needs to be able to win if the forces of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Fatah, etc insist on total war.

**IV. Strategic Need 4.** Future threats and complex realities rather than lessons learned from Iraq should define the core of American intelligence, military and integrated needs for the next generation.

Iraq and Iran are useful campaigns to study but they have limited application to force size and structure for the future. The real challenges are in heavier opponents (North Korea, a rogue Pakistan, Iran) and more dispersed problems (Palestine, the ungoverned areas, the dictatorships of Syria, Libya etc.)

Planning should begin with the decisiveness of President Bush's description of the global war on terror on the USS Lincoln and the wide ranging assertions of the National Strategy released September 20, 2002.

The forces today are stretched much further than people in Washington believe.

The number of places we could be involved is far larger than anyone in Washington wants to contemplate.

The number of people who live in ungoverned areas is far greater and more dangerous than anyone currently wants to report.

The amount of money and scale of activity underway in the gray areas (people smuggling, illegal arms deals, illegal international transportation, traditional international crime, and international narcotics) creates a system within which terrorism can operate which is far larger, more robust and more agile than anyone contemplates. This dark underside of globalization is better funded than the police, more agile than public bureaucracies and often better equipped technologically.

In 1975 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld used the facts to convince the post-Viet Nam, post-Watergate Democratic Congress that the world was dangerous and defense spending had to be increased.

Today a similarly comprehensive, realistic and starkly candid assessment needs to be developed by the Administration and shared with the Congress and with the American people so they will understand the scale of the threat, the complexity and speed of the modern world, and the amount we will have to invest to develop truly effective systems of national security.

Handwritten notes: "to New York" and "Private" with an asterisk.

This may be the most difficult challenge we face and it may take more political and bureaucratic courage to confront than any other strategic necessity.

V. The fifth strategic necessity is to transform the Army into an institution which is at the center of jointness. This is a much bigger challenge than simply bringing the Army into jointness. The Army's instinct that complex warfare requires land forces is exactly right. The Army's instinct that in the end all the other services may end up supporting ground forces is almost certainly right.

However this is an argument for jointness at the heart of the Army and not at its periphery.

This requires the development of joint tactics and effective fires so the entire process from day one is seamlessly joint.

~~This also requires profoundly reshaping the Army's personnel system to get rid of the 1917 individual replacement system and move to a unit preparedness system more like the Navy and the Marine Corps.~~

If the new Army team is instructed to begin with jointness and then think through the redesign of the Army a drastically different outcome will result than if the team is told to rethink the Army with jointness as one of the goals.

First comes immersion in jointness and then comes design of the new 21st century Army.

This is the only way to get to an effective joint force in the next decade.

VI. The sixth strategic necessity is a briefing on the first two years of the war and where the United States must go from here.

The first step is to combine the lessons learned from 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq with the emerging threats and realities around the world into a single briefing for the congress, the news media and the country.

Beginning in mid-September the Congress should be thoroughly briefed on the first two years of the war with terrorism and weapons of mass murder. The briefing should go on to outline the current threats to security and to outline the President's strategies for defeating these threats. Finally, the briefing should outline a positive vision of a future of safety, health, prosperity and freedom for all people in a world in which terrorism and weapons of mass murder are opposed and defeated by virtually everyone in a strategic coalition of the willing.

The entire information campaign of the future (which has to be an integral part of developing the Integrated doctrine and system mentioned in strategic necessity two above (second campaigns) depends on the development of this presentation.

Start at heart of it

Members of Congress, reporters, and citizens all need a coherent single explanation of what has happened, what we have learned from it, what threatens us and what we are going to do about it and the metrics appropriate to measure success in the future.

In September there will still be great interest in the lessons learned and they are the logical hook as a two years after review of phase one of the global war. By January the lessons will be in the past and the Congress will be focused on politics and elections.

There is a window of about three months in which this can be achieved.

This is potentially an enormous mobilizer of understanding, support and resources. Without it people will develop their own models and their own metrics for success and the situation will be dramatically **more** muddled.

VII. The seventh strategic necessity is to establish a system of DoD detailees throughout the federal government and where possible as overseas detached personnel for foreign governments to both maximize DoD's influence on debates and to maximize the flow of information to DoD.

It has been a significant mistake to yield the territory at NSC and elsewhere to the State Department and other interests. The result has been a much more limited reach by the Defense system into the policy making apparatus.

What is really needed is the opposite approach.

There should be a conscious systematic strategy for sending good people to every point in the federal government and to as many contacts with foreign governments as possible.

This requires carrying extra officers and senior neos on the rolls but in the long run it will pay a tremendous dividend in communicating the defense system's views, values, and practices.

FOUO

FILE BY

2005 JUN 19 09:10:13

June 27, 2005

TO: GEN Pete Schoomaker  
cc: Gen Dick Myers  
Fran Harvey  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Quote by General Cody

320.2

Please take a look at the attached quote from Dick Cody. If that's his feeling, why don't you, or he, or Fran Harvey tell me about it? If he tells the Senate and the press, you would think somewhere, someone would tell me, and I have not heard a word from anyone of the three of you on it.

Thanks.

Attach: 3/19/05 *Washington Post* Article by Ann Scott Tyson

DIIR.ss  
062705-35

.....

*Please Respond By 07/07/05*

Sir,  
Response attached.

WHT  
6/30

v/r  
Lt Col Kengyel  
JUN 30 2005

27 JUN 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/53247

OSD 20577-05



UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*DDA  
6/30*

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

*S  
29 June 2005*

SUBJECT: Quote by General Cody

- This responds to Secretary of Defense's Snowflake, June 28, 2005, Subject: Quote by General Dick Cody.
- I have reviewed the attached excerpt of the testimony (Tab A) given by General Cody before the SASC Airland Subcommittee Hearing on FY 06 Budget conducted March 16, 2005, and have discussed it with him.
- Within the context of General Cody's full response, and the force generation chart that he had shown to Senator Lieberman, I find his quote totally consistent with what you and I have discussed on numerous occasions, during which I believe we have consistently been in agreement.
- The bottom line of his response, placed in proper context, is that the Army structure (all-volunteer force) in '06, "will be about right" (if we stay on our current transformation plan).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

INFO: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army  
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Prepared By: General Peter J. Schoomaker, (b)(6)

320.2

29 JUN 05

29 JUN 05

WHO: Panel - VCSA, MR. Bolton  
WHAT: SASC Subcommittee on AirLand Hearing on FY06 Budget (FCS  
and Army Aviation Transformation/Modularity)  
Chairman: Senator McCain  
WHEN: 16 March 2005

Pg 12 of testimony reads:

LIEBERMAN:

Thanks, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, let me just ask one more question and it builds on General Cody's direct answer about your question about personnel, which I appreciate. Obviously, it is critical as part of this to have a rotation base that allows sustained commitments without overstressing the force or understaffing the critical training base, which is exactly what you talked about. You know and I know -- I have been reading -- that there are independent analysts now who are questioning whether a 3-to-1 rotation base in the active force is adequate, with some saying 4-to-1 or even 5-to-1 is necessary. If the 20 brigade assumption should prove incorrect - for instance, you were asked to carry out a mission, which we hope will not happen but realistically is a possible contingency, in a place like Pakistan or even Iran, or if the Army needs to surge as a result of those kinds of missions to a larger number, then the current force generation may prove inadequate. It will prove inadequate if that happens. So I want to ask you whether you believe that the temporary addition of 30,000, which we have now done in end strength, and an additional 10 brigades will allow the Army to maintain that 3-to-1 rotation base for a contingency requiring 20-plus brigades for 4 or 5 years.

CODY:

Mr. Senator, thank you for that question because it is one we grapple with every day. Let me start by saying what keeps me awake at night is what will this all-volunteer force look like in 2007.

LIEBERMAN:

Right.

CODY:

We mentioned the 3rd ID going back. You may not know. I have two sons that are captains in the Army. My oldest son is getting ready to deploy on his third combat tour since he graduated from flight school, Afghanistan, Iraq, now Afghanistan in 4 years. My youngest son is getting ready to go back with him for his second tour. Just like young Rob McChrystal and Sergeant

Harmer, we have thousands of those types of stories. We are going out and we are trying to understand, because this is the first time we have taken this all-volunteer force into this type of fight rotational. And 12 months is along time. As you know, the Army during the '90's was doing 6-month tours in IFOR, then SFOR, then KFOR, and we had some concerns about that. And our really only short tour was over in Korea. When this fight started, we had 29,000 to 30,000 soldiers on a short tour in Korea and 166,000 in short tours in combat. That is what we had to manage. So when we looked at this in particular, we said, okay, if we have to do this, 30,000 is what we need right now, and then we want to make a decision in '06. After we get the 10th new brigade built, that will bring the Army up to 43 brigades, which also allows us to restructure the combat service support. As you know, we have gone from nine types of brigades in the Army to three. That allows us to restructure our combat service support. We think there are probably 6,000 or 7,000 spaces by restructuring there that we can gain to reinforce our tooth versus tail. In '06, we will take a look at what the end strength should be after we settle this out. But what really will drive the number you talked about, more than 20 if we have to do a simultaneous two swiftly defeats, is the accessibility to the National Guard and Reserve. Is it 1 in 5? Is it 1 in 6? If it is 1 in 5 and 1 in 6, we think that the structure that we are going to come in '06 will be about right.

~~FOUO~~  
CLOSE HOLD Attachment

2005 JUN 28 10:29

TO: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich Paper on "Topics for SecDef"

381

Please take a look at whether or not this paper from Newt Gingrich contains the right topics for us to consider, but keep it close hold. Over the past year and a half, we've gone after some of them and been less focused on others.

I'd like your thoughts.

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/21/04 Gingrich paper: Topics for SecDef

DHR:dh  
062705-43

28 Jun 05

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/04/05*

21 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~  
CLOSE HOLD Attachment  
11-L-0559/OSD/53251

USD 20580-05

*DRP*

Topics for Secdef  
February 21, 2004  
Newt

2005 1 17 10:10:29

1. Why American national security and prosperity will be harder to achieve in the next **quarter** century:
  - a. the three zones of challenge problem (paper attached):
    1. the scale of scientific and technical change multiplied by the **rise** of China and India
    2. the complexity of having to lead a real time global information age system in a time of growing democratization when the lack of a threat requires the higher standard of acceptable-desirable leadership to replace the anti-Soviet standard of grudging **minimal** acceptance;
    3. the **Islamic Civil War** and the rise of the irreconcilables in an age of weapons of mass murder and mass destruction and the requirements for an offensive strategy of transforming societies, **cultures** and governments compared with the simpler, defensive strategy of containing the Soviet Empire until it decayed (why 'stability operations' is the wrong term).

These three conditions interlock and require:

1. a series of domestic transformational strategies;
2. a new system of national security capabilities and strategies;
3. a long term multigenerational strategy for helping our allies in Islam win their civil war while minimizing threats to America and her allies.

## 2. Tricare as an opportunity.

The Center for Health Transformation has developed a strategy of transforming the health system which Elias Zerhouni at NIH estimates could take as much as 40% out of the projected cost of healthcare (taking into account the rising number of older people).

The Bush Administration cannot meet the budget challenge without a major change in projected health costs. I have proposed a goal of saving ten per cent (10%) over the next decade in total projected federal health spending. That would be about \$500 billion plus.

Tricare should be directed to save at least \$12 billion in this fydep and 10% of current projections over the next ten years.

Gingrich, Chu, Winkenwerder, and Jumper should be directed to develop a plan for a Tricare transformation that would be acceptable to both active and retiree populations and meet the military and Homeland security needs.

## 3. Sustaining the alliances:

381

21 Feb 05

**NATO transformation as an opportunity for long term team building**

Brussels(the European Union) as a fact rather than a problem and the required change in American strategies and structures.

The UN as a fact and the need to learn to strengthen the UN on our terms.

The need for much larger foreign area programs.

4. China-Taiwan as stunningly dangerous:
  - a. Direct the Congressional war gaming center at **NDU** to have as many members as possible play a China-Taiwan diplomatic crisis so they grow to understand how dangerous it would be, how fast it could develop, and how limited our options might be.
  - b. Direct Pacom to work with Stratcom and the Chiefs to develop a much more imaginative solution to the Taiwan straits problem.
  - c. Create an all source Chinese focused intelligence effort with a generation long plan and structure and to maximize our understanding of the most likely large power in the mid 21<sup>st</sup> century. Plan on human and financial resource commensurate with the scale and difficulty of the challenge.
5. Assign Pete Geren or someone comparable the job of working with the White House and congressional leaders to develop a post-election personnel and security reform plan.
6. Homeland Security Departmental Planning
7. Schoomacher starting down the right roads
8. Quantum Computing may be the greatest threat of breakout against us in the next 30 years. We need a long term coordinated program at ARDA (Advanced Research and Development Activity in Information Technology) in the \$60 million plus level not counting DARPA and NSF projects.
9. Iraq and the Middle East:
  - a. What lessons should I learn about the difference between pre-war planning and the post occupation phase?
  - b. We need a strategic lessons learned as people come back from the region (Hadley with your approval or you and Tenet approve?)
  - c. There should be a reassessment of joint and integrated intelligence, planning and coordination at the operational level of war in Iraq. This has been much too tactical a campaign and much too uncoordinated.
  - d. Your immediate need is to identify Bremer's replacement and start shifting power from Bremer to that person. This is a continuation of the Garner-Bremer system and the person has to be much more effective in

leadership and much more sensitive to political nuance than normal appointees (Jim Jones would be capable as an example). Whoever is chosen should be acceptable to and compatible with Abizaid;

- e The Islamic Civil War in the age of weapons of mass murder and mass destruction gives America a vastly greater interest in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The United States should develop a strategy capable of developing and strengthening a pro-Peace Palestinian community and discrediting its opponents within the Palestinian people while helping the new Palestinian system defeat those who would insist on destroying Israel. This is a campaign of victory over the destroyers not of negotiating with them.

843

FOUO



20581-05 52 June 7, 2005

292

TO: Dr. Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Response to Henry Betts

I cannot tell from the attached papers whether we ever answered Dr. Henry Betts - he is a friend of mine. Did he ever get a response from us? If not, please draft one.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/3/05 Memo to SecDef re: Dr. Henry Betts

DIR:ss  
060705-5 (TS)

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Sir,

Response is attached.

V/R, Dr. B

FOUO

73

05

OSD 20581-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53255

A-208-2

Draft

Dr. Henry Betts  
Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago  
345 East Superior St  
Chicago, IL 60611

Dear Henry,

I am *sorry* for the delay in answering, but my staff has been working the issue of how to best utilize the wounded young men and women, and I wanted to provide you a proper response.

I understand Mr. Paul Meyer has contacted you. I think we have gone a long way toward closing the gap that exists between direct medical treatment and the programs of the VA, or return to full duty. We have been trying to find the best way to properly and rehabilitate these folks by finding them useful work to do while they get physical therapy rather than the old method of simply putting them in holding units with little to do.

Any suggestions or guidance you can provide based on your experiences would be greatly appreciated. You can send it through Mr. Meyer or directly to me through Dr. Bucci on my staff. I can assure you we will put your ideas into action. We have a great asset in these young people and we must use them effectively, and assist in their rehabilitation in every way.

Donald H. Rumsfeld

D. H. Rumsfeld  
A-L-0559/OSD/53256

208-3

3 June 2005

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Response to Snow Flakes Ref Wounded Internship Program

Sir,

The "internship" project is in full swing. It is called Operation War Fighter, the name originally used by Mr. DuBois's people for their first smaller version, which only placed wounded within DoD.

The smaller project was successful, but has now been subsumed by a much more robust project under USD(P&R). This one places soldiers all across the Government. They have a full time administrator, who worked in Rehab programs for 25 years in the Dept of Labor. He currently has 36 soldiers and marines in various stages of the process.

Mr. Meyer, as the Coordinator for project interviews the service members, solicits slots from each of the Cabinet Agencies (presently has more requests for troops than he has bodies to fill them), places the service members, transports them (he has funds for vans to move them), and monitors their progress. He also, as part of the placement decision, puts the troops into organizations that also have offices near the projected home location of the troops so they have an increased possibility of getting a job should they eventually get out of the military.

Mr. Meyer knows Dr. Betts from when Meyer worked rehab issues at Dept of Labor. He immediately recognized his name, identified him as the "Guru of Rehab in America". Mr. Meyer has contacted Dr. Betts. They will speak again in order to provide him with a description of the program and see what suggestions or advice Dr. Betts can offer in improving it.

Mr. Meyer is also coordinating with the VA, so the transition between the program here and the VA programs is as seamless as possible. I will call Mrs. Bodman this coming week and inform her as to the most updated status of the program, and give her Mr. Meyer's contact information in case she gets any ideas that we can add into the process.

V/R, Dr. B

SFB

A4-2

16<sup>th</sup> March 2005

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ZDS APR 15 PM 3:49

Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago

345 East Superior Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60611-4496  
312.239-1000 telephone  
www.ric.ate

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Don:

(b)(6) who is a great friend of mine -- a patient of mine when I was a resident -- told me that you asked him something about what should be done for the wounded veterans of the Iraqi War.

You can do something major.

The biggest problem for people with disabilities these days is that a very ~~of them~~ are working. I am not in favor of quotas; I am not in favor of giving them any old job out of sentiment, which inevitably would lead to disappointment on everybody's part.

I feel the missing ingredient has been the private sector, i.e., "CEOs".

The whole employment issue has been very bureaucratized and has been in the hands of vocational counselors (who are not likely to know a great deal about "real" business) and human resource people. Nobody is hearing from the people who really employ the person.

In Chicago, the CEOs I talk to about this (and as you may know, I have had a huge success in raising money from them for the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago) have been glassy-eyed about the whole thing. Frankly, I gave up and went straight to Mayor Daley, who I must say is passionately interested in getting something done about it. I then got Bill Osborn of the Northern Trust and the two of them are co-chairing an initiative to get people with disabilities employed.

My assumption is that the wounded coming back from Iraq are getting good medical and rehabilitation care. What you must know is that you should not be deluded that the employment part is really being taken care of. As a

164-4  
DSD 07172-05

An Academic Affiliate of Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine

11-L-0559/OSD/53258

205-5

Physiatrist with a large team of people surrounding me, I can tell you that in some peculiar way the vocational counseling departments of our rehab centers (private, military and the VA) seem somewhat "aside" from the rest. They are *not as cohesive with us as team leaders as are occupational and physical therapists, nurses, etc.*

I suggest a vigorous effort to consider employment from *the* time a person is wounded and appears in a rehabilitation setting. Plan to instill the idea from the beginning that a job is going to be a possibility - then see that it is.

*This is the greatest favor you could give the wounded veterans.*


I was on the "Mission Commission" to improve the VA and saw in detail the results of the fact that employment was not developed early and strongly as it should have been. I found out exactly what it is like now.

Of course, most veterans nowadays are older and not exactly job-oriented. They may now have other problems *that* take preference.

Do not be misled in thinking that a person who is wounded can go through the rehabilitation process, get the necessary prosthesis and technical help, get all the fancy doctors they want and so on but then be sent home with no consideration of what *the future is in the community* - which has as a very important component, working.

Except for Mayor Daley and Bill Osborn, I haven't seen any "passion" about this fact on the part of anybody. It is not a simple issue.

Sincerely,

  
Henry Betts, M.D.  
Past Medical Director/President/CEO  
Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago

HBB/mg

AGA-5

U

FOUO

IO5/013311  
ES-4357

OCT 04 2005

A-470-02

TO: Peter Flory  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Trajectory in Reducing Deployed Strategic Nuclear Weapons

I would like to see the trajectory with respect to the progress in reducing deployed strategic nuclear weapons and where we are going to end up by 2012. Please tell me what it is going to be between now and then, if we know.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/26/05 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef re Report on Progress in Reducing Deployed Strategic Nuclear Weapons [OSD 19325-05]

DHR:m  
100305-17

.....  
*Please Respond By October 27, 2005*

*1*

OSD 20591-05

4 Oct 05

11-L-0559/OSD/53260



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

INFO MEMO

1-05/011801-SP&I  
ES 4098

DepSecDef

USD(P)

*WJ* SEP 26 2005

A-F70.02

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: PETER *OS* FLORY ASD/ISP SEP 26 2005

SUBJECT Report on Progress in Reducing Deployed Strategic Nuclear Weapons

- On 31 August you asked if we report on progress in reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons (ODSNW) to 1700 to 2200 (Tab A).
- The Department provides several periodic updates.
  - Under NSPD 14, the Department provides an annual report to the President on nuclear forces available for employment and the status of reducing the number of ODSNW.
  - Additionally, we report the number of ODSNW to Congress annually.
  - We also inform Russia of the unclassified, aggregate U.S. number of ODSNW during biannual sessions of the US-Russia Bilateral Implementation Commission of the Moscow Treaty.
- We are on track to achieve the directed reductions of ODSNW to 3,800 by 2007 and 1,700-2,200 by 2012.

26 Sep 05

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: Erik Finn, OSD/PI/SP/FP. (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 19325-05

26-09-05 P:1132 17

31 Aug 05

11-L-0559/OSD/53261

**COORDINATION**

Principal Director, Forces Policy <sup>for</sup> BGEN Roberts

RLS 13 Sep 05

Senior Director, SP&I Mr. Scheber

RLS 13 Sep 05

Director, Strategic Strike Dr. Dellermann

RLS 9/9/05

**COORDINATION**

**USDA**

**Ms. Nagelmann**

**9 SEP 2005**

**DASD Negotiations Policy**

**Mr. Walter Earle**

**12 SEP 2005**

~~FOUO~~

August 31, 2005  
I-05/011801  
ES-4098

A-479.02

TO: Eric Edelman  
Steve Cambone

FROM Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Report on Progress

Do we ever report on the progress in reducing down towards 1700 to 2200  
deployed offensive strategic nuclear warheads?

Thanks.

DHR:jk  
08/31/05-22

.....  
*Please Respond By 09/15/05*

3/19/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19325-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53264

~~FOUO~~

2005 JUN 10 11:52 AM  
June 7, 2005

000.3

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Pete Geren  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Draft a Response to Zakaria Piece

I would like you and Pete Geren to draft a letter in response to the Zakaria piece. I think it is terrible.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/6/05 Newsweek Piece by Fareed Zakaria

DIR:ss  
060705-3 (TS)



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

7 JUN 05

OSD 20596-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53265

# Uncle Sam: Jekyll or Hyde?



I HAVE RESISTED THE TEMPTATION TO WRITE SOMETHING ON THE Qur'an-abuse story. But since the controversy continues, here goes. I think that the Bush administration has a Jekyll-and-Hyde problem—a contradictory attitude toward the war on terror. On the one hand it has wholeheartedly embraced the view that America must change its image in the Muslim world. It wants to stop being seen as the supporter of

Muslim tyrants and instead become the champion of Muslim freedoms. President Bush and his secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, are transforming American policy in this realm, and while some of the implementation has been spotty, the general thrust is clear and laudable. For this they deserve more credit than they have generally been given, perhaps because of the polarization of politics these days, perhaps because the topic inevitably gets mixed up with the botched occupation of Iraq.

But while Dr. Jekyll makes speeches by day on Arab liberty, some nights he turns into Mr. Hyde. There is within the Bush administration another impulse, a warrior ethos that believes in beating up bad guys without much regard for such niceties as international law. Excessive concern for such matters would be a sign of weakness, the kind of thing liberals do. Men like Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld see themselves above all else as tough guys.

The historian Walter Russell Mead has argued that the Bush administration fits into the "Jacksonian tradition" in American politics. One of this tradition's core beliefs is that normal rules of warfare are suspended when dealing with "dishonorable enemies." Mead gives the example of the Indian wars in which American soldiers, enraged by Indian fighting tactics, waged battle ruthlessly and with no holds barred.

It is surely this sense of toughness that made Alberto Gonzales (then White House counsel) and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld assert in 2002 that the Geneva Conventions did not really apply, in Rumsfeld's phrase, to today's "set of facts." It is this sense of toughness that led Rumsfeld to authorize various forms of coercive interrogation that were designed to humiliate prisoners by offending their faith. These included shaving prisoners' beards, stripping and setting dogs on them—all religions and cultural taboos. The action memo on inter-



NICHOLAS KAHN—AP/REUTERS

RUMSFELD: Tough guy in a globalized world

their impact. He simply couldn't get over the fact that the guards had been taking pictures with their miniature digital cameras. With a mixture of amazement and frustration, he wondered how to fight a war in "the information age where people are running around with digital cameras and taking these unbelievable photographs and then passing them off, against the law, to the media, to our surprise, when they had not even arrived in the Pentagon."

That's the problem. Tough tactics in a darkened room in Abu Ghraib are not going to stay dark in a world of tiny cameras and recorders. And it's not just technology that's lifting the curtain. Today, when you release prisoners from Guantánamo, they don't return quietly to their villages in Waziristan. They hire lawyers, talk to human-rights organizations and organize public protests. And in a war for hearts and minds, the benefits of the intelligence gained might well be outweighed by the cost to America's image. I Jekyll needs to explain this to Mr. Cheney, I mean Mr. Hyde. American soldiers operate with high moral standards, but they're often forgotten

## War is a hellish business, but when you release prisoners today, they don't just return quietly to their villages. They hire lawyers.

rogation in Guantánamo authorized the removal of "comfort items (including religious items)"? That procedure, as well as several others, was rescinded in a memo in January 2003. But in reading even subsequent memos on the treatment of prisoners, now declassified, it's often slightly unclear—at least to me—whether the Geneva Conventions were to be followed precisely.

I have some sympathy for the Jacksonian view. War is hell and Al Qaeda is as dishonorable an enemy as there has ever been. The trouble is, in today's world, militarily effective methods can generate huge political costs.

There was a moment in Rumsfeld's appearance at the Senate Armed Services Committee after Abu Ghraib that was utterly revealing. Rumsfeld explained that while he knew about the investigation, he was blindsided by the photographs and

hypocrisy of the world because of the intense scrutiny they are subjected to by both domestic and foreign media. (How many front-page stories have there been on the Russian Army's behavior in Chechnya or the French Army's assistance to the Hutus in Rwanda?) Remember that it was the uniformed services and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell who argued against Gonzales's cavalier attitude toward the Geneva Conventions. But when there are lapses, the Pentagon needs to get much better at admitting them, investigating them and taking responsibility for them.

Some of these new pressures are unfair, all are costly, but in the open, globalized world we live in, they're inevitable and that's not going to change. Tough guys should understand that.

Write the author at [comments@fareedzakaria.com](mailto:comments@fareedzakaria.com).

~~FOUO~~

FILE COPY

June 6, 2005

2005 JUN 06 10:05

3335D

TO (b)(6)

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Information for Foreign Trips/Dignitaries Report

Attached is a list of the principals that attended the Singapore Conference for the Foreign Trips/Dignitaries Report.

I met with:

- YB Pehin Datu Singamanteri, Brunei
- General Nhek Bun Chhay Deputy Prime Minister, Cambodia
- General Cao Gangchuan, China
- Shri Pranab Mukherjee, India
- Dr. Tony Tan, Singapore
- Zahid Hamid, Pakistan

I don't remember seeing the representatives of Laos or Vietnam.

Please be sure to make a record of it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
VIP Attendee List for the 4<sup>th</sup> IISS Asia Security Conference

DHR:aa  
060505-1 (TS)

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

*SIR -  
Will Do. I GET  
ALL INFO FROM THE COORD  
AFTER YOUR REVIEW AND DO A  
THOROUGH ACCOUNTING FOR  
EACH COUNTRY AND  
ALL MEETINGS*

RETURN 05

030-20597/030/53267

(b)(6)

**4th IISS ASIA SECURITY CONFERENCE - THE SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE**  
**3 - 5 JUNE 2005**

**VIPs**

**(ministers, military commanders, defence permanent secretaries)**

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>MINISTER</u>	<u>MILITARY COMMANDER</u>	<u>PS</u>
Australia	Senator the Hon. Robert Hill ✓ Leader of the Government in the Senate & Minister for Defence 'yes	Air Marshal Angus Houston AO AFC Chief of Air Force & Chief the Defence Force-designate 'yes	Mr Richard Smith Secretary of Defence 'yes
Brunei	YB Pehin Datu Singamaneri Colonel (L) Dato Paduka Haji Mohammad Yasmin bin Haji Umar Deputy Minister of Defence	CDF = No	
7 Cambodia	H.E. General Khak Bun Chhay Deputy Prime Minister and Co-Minister of National Defense 'yes	CDF = No	
no Canada	The Honourable William Graham ✓ Minister of National Defence * yes	CDF = No	
7 China	General Cao Gangchuan Minister of National Defence; Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission	General Liang Guanglie Chief of the General Staff	
FRANCE	Minister = No	CAPT (Navy) Olivier de Rostolan (representative of CDF) Chief of International Relations, Navy Staff *yes	Mr Marc Ferrin de Bricambaut Director for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence 'yes

Yes	<b>ROK</b>	<b>H.E. Yoon Kwang Ung</b> Minister for National Defense *yes		
Yes	<b>Singapore</b>	<b>Dr Tony Tan</b> Deputy Prime Minister and Co-ordinating Minister for Security and Defence *yes	<b>LG Ng Yat Chung</b> Chief of Singapore Defence Force *yes	<b>Mr Chiang Chia Foo</b> Permanent Secretary (Defence) *Yes
		<b>Mr Teo Ches Hean</b> Minister for Defence Yes		
Yes	<b>Thailand</b>	<b>General Yuthasak Sasiprapha</b> Vice Minister for Defence *yes	CDF = No	
	<b>Timor-Leste</b>	<b>Dr Roque Rodrigues</b> Secretary of State for Defence *yes	<b>BG Taur Matan Ruak</b> General Chief of Staff, Timor-Leste Defence Force *yes	
No	<b>UK</b>	<b>The Rt Hon Dr John Reid MP</b> Secretary of State for Defence *yes	<b>LG Robert Fry</b> (representative of CDF) Deputy Chief of Defence Staff [Commitments] *yes	<b>Sir Kevin Tebbit</b> Permanent Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence *yes
	<b>US</b>	<b>The Hon Donald Rumsfeld</b> Secretary of Defense *yes	<b>General Richard B. Meade</b> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff *yes	
			<b>Admiral William J Fallon</b> Commander, US Pacific Command *yes	
	<b>Vietnam</b>	Minister - No	CDF = No	<i>Remarks: Delegation led by Senior Colonel Vu Quoc Hung (Deputy Director of the Institute of Military Strategy, Ministry of Defence)</i>

last update 25 May 05

15 June 2005

15

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Min of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgystan

Sir,

I dropped the ball on this one.

I get reports every week from the DSD, the USD(P), USD(I), USD(AT&L), and the Joint Staff. I review them, and when I identify a potential event that might warrant a drop by from you, I send them to you for decision. We have done this several times in the past, the most recent being the Russian CHOD, GEN Baluyevskiy. The reports have meetings down to the Assistant Secretary level, and for the CJCS and the VCJCS.

I missed the MOFA. It was on the DSD report

We have a system, but it failed. I will have another person double check the lists to ensure there is no a single point of failure in the future.

V/R, Dr. B

KYRGYZSTAN

15 JUN 05

OSD 20599-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53270

FOUO

June 16, 2005

205 20599-05

Kyrgyzstan



TO: Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Link Between Me and Gordon England

We need to fix this link between me and Gordon England seeing people like the Kyrgyzstan Foreign Minister.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
061505-23

.....  
Please respond by 6/23/05

*To Sec Def.*

*Sis,*

*DR  
6/16*

*Attached, sent in  
on 15 June.*

*YR, SCS*

16 JUNE

FOUO

OSD 20599-05

15 JUNE 05

11-L-0559/OSD/53271

JUN 16 ENT'D

JUN 16 2005

11:33

314.7

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Archivist

I had a photo-op yesterday with a fellow named (b)(6) who has been working with the archivists and historians. He said he would come back and help me anytime I wanted to get my personal papers sorted out.

We may want to keep his name on hand for future reference.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
061506-13

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

16 JUN 05

JUN 16 ENTU

*EMJ*

11-L-0559/061506-13-05



FILE COPY

JUN 16 2005

LEAD

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Reporter's Question on Iraqi Minister of National Security

During yesterday's press conference, someone asked me a question about a Minister of National Security in Iraq. I have never heard of that title. Would you check to see if there is such a position, and let me know? Then we ought to get back to the reporter who asked the question.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
061505-2

.....  
Please respond by 6/23/05

Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/r  
Lt Col Bengel  
JUN 29 2005

16 JUN 05

FOUO  
11-L-0559/OSD/53273

OSD 20603-05

June 17, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

THROUGH: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

THROUGH: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PRESS OPERATIONS

FROM: PRESS OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response--"Iraqi Minister of National Security"

PURPOSE: Provide information in response to SecDef snowflake (Tab A).

DISCUSSION:

The correspondent engaged in the exchange during the June 15 press briefing with SecDef re: amnesty was Jonathan Karl, the diplomatic correspondent for ABC News (Tab B). Mr. Karl was filling in Wednesday for ABC's Pentagon correspondent, Martha Raddatz, who is currently in Iraq.

The reporter's incorrect reference to the "Iraqi Minister of National Security" made during the news briefing originated in a June 14 AP story from Baghdad (Tab C).

The correct reference in all cases should have been to the Iraqi Transitional Government's Minister of State (National Security Affairs) 'Abd al-Karim al-'Anzi (Tab D). There is not a "Minister of National Security" position in the JTG.

The Press Office has contacted Mr. Karl via email with the correct information.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

~~PDASD (PA) ACTION:~~

~~Approve Disapprove Other~~

Prepared by: LTC Venable, DPO, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/53274

FOUO

JUN 16 2005

061505-0

383.6

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Karen Hughes

I have reason to believe that Karen Hughes and Condi are concerned about the detainee matter. I have briefed Condi.

I think we better get Karen Hughes back over here and give her a full briefing on what the situation is. We should give her a copy the briefing charts, without the last two pages.

I would be happy to participate in it. I think it is important because she has that responsibility and is working the problem with the interagency and the boss.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061505-0

.....  
Please respond by 7/7/05

FOUO

OSD 20605-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53275

*H* JUN 16 ENTD

1 JUN 05

~~FOUO~~

JUN 16 2005

2005 JUN 16 11:11



TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Pete Geren  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Edit Detainee Briefing

Whoever did the Detainee briefing should remove "due process" off the bullet on page 11, and simply say "procedures provided at Guantanamo."

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
061505-7

*553.6*

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Complete*

*Sir,  
Action Complete.  
v/r  
Lt Col Lengyel*

JUN 16 2005

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/53276 OSD 20608-05

*Quar...*

FOUO

June 16, 2005

205 11-0559/OSD/53277

**MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: Pete Geren**

**SUBJECT: Edit Detainee Briefing**

The edit to the detainee briefing has been made on page 11. I removed "due process" and replaced it with "procedures provided at Guantanamo."

383.6

16 June 05

16 June 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/53277

OSD 20608-05

December 21, 2004

TO: ADM Tom Fargo

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Philippine Relief Operations

Your folks have done some good work moving hundreds of thousands of pounds of relief supplies to the Philippines after the tropical storm and associated flooding.

Please pass along my thanks to your team for a job well done.

DHR:dh  
122104-20

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Philippines*

*21 Dec 04*

OSD 20617-04



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 DEC 23 AM 10:41



ACTION MEMO

December 20, 2004, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: *fa* David S. C. Chu Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

*Charles Mill 12-22-04*  
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Managing Air Force Strength, and Supplemental Funding

- Wanted to offer perspective regarding your October 7 snowflake (Tab A). I believe that a requirement for AF to effect accelerated drawdown would provoke intolerable risk in enlisted accessions (falling from 22K to 12K against a normal 34K intake).
- We are continuing to work with AF to define a range of imaginative programs to balance its force, including needed legislative authority (NDAA'06) to permit shaping of more senior cohorts (years of service 14 plus) approaching retirement.
- Those aberrantly large senior cohorts are a legacy of the way AF executed its early-nineties defense reductions - a strategy that also depressed accessions in favor of careerists -- something we want to avoid in the management of this drawdown.
- I believe that the Department should look for ways to assist the Air Force with financing its end strength in FY 05, to permit a soft yet sure landing at end-FY 05, without further truncating recruiting and generating another legacy of imbalances for the AF of the future.

320.2

20 DEC 04

RECOMMENDATION: Allow me, Tina Jonas, and the Air Force to work on funding to avoid the intolerable risk of shrinking enlisted accessions from 34K to 12K.

Attachment  
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Bill Carr Acting DUSD (Military Personnel Policy) (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED *JK* DEC. 30 2004

DISAPPROVED \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

MA SD	SMA DSD	12/29	
TSA SD	SA DSD	12/28	
EXEC SEC	<i>E</i> 12/27	<i>E</i> 12/30	
ESR MA	<i>E</i> 12/27		

7 Dec 04



OSD 20653-04

October 7, 2004

File  
10/20  
10/10/04

TO: Jim Roche  
Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-12

.....  
Please respond by MONTHLY

Butler TO Sec Def  
12/28  
GWB

FOUO

10/8/04

October 7, 2004

TO: Jim Roche  
 Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
 David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

320.2

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-12

.....

Please respond by MONTHLY

7 Dec 04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/53281

December 20, 2004

TO: ~~VADM Jim Stavridis~~ LARRY DIRITA  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: List of SOM'd Items

The list you gave me as to what we SOM did not include everything. Please get back to be with a complete list of everything we are SOMing, so I can decide whether or not I want to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
 122004-26

4/13

.....  
 Please respond by 12/22/04

Exec Sec <sup>12/22</sup>  
 Capt. Marrioff ~~←~~  
 Can you assist? This ~~←~~ DONS  
 Capt. Romley <sub>u</sub>

20 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

September 26, 2005

I-05/012930  
ES-4292

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Jack Keane's Comments at the Policy Board Meeting

At the Policy Board meeting on September 23, Jack Keane pointed out that during the Cold War we had a mass of capabilities focused on the issue of Communism.

We don't have that for **Islam**. How do we get that organized?

Please task the Red Team to come back with some suggestions that **look** at process and tell **us** what we might do.

Thanks.

DHR ss  
092605-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/20/05*

000.3

OSD 20662-05

*26 Sep 05*

~~FOUO~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

MSD \_\_\_\_\_

INFO MEMO

I-05/01 2930 ES-4292

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OCT 19 2005

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *ES Edelman*

SUBJECT: Jack Keane's Comments at the 23 September Defense Policy Board Meeting  
~~(FOUO)~~

- ~~(FOUO)~~ In response to your snowflake of 26 September (Tab 1) on Jack Keane's comments at the 23 September Defense Policy Board meeting, I provide the following thoughts.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Jack Keane pointed out that we lack a mass of capabilities focused on the issue of Islamist extremism in the way that we had efforts organized during the Cold War against Communism.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The War on Terrorism (WoT) review currently underway, for which Tom O'Connell is our lead, is the government's main organizing effort.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ A key element in the WoT review's draft strategy/plan is to institutionalize--domestically and internationally--the war against terrorism and violent extremism.
  - To do so effectively, this must include a broad survey of useful efforts currently underway that specifically or generally support our actions to win the war:
    - o Across the Department of Defense;
    - o Across the government broadly; and
    - o Across the private and NGO sectors.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ We will recommend ways to integrate the good work that is currently underway across the Department both to better understand the adversaries and to develop effective strategic and operational approaches for defeating them, including:
  - Accelerating our work on reducing ungoverned areas and on deterrence and dissuasion of terrorist networks to provide more informed policy guidance for such efforts;
  - Harnessing the work of STRATCOM and SOCOM that advances our knowledge of the enemy and the cultural environment;

000.3

19 Oct 05 4

26 Sept 05

- Incorporating the results of key research centers, such as The United States Military Academy (USMA) Combating Terrorism Center and The Center for International Issues Research (on Braddock Road), that provide cutting-edge analysis of open-source material to better understand our opponents;
  - Focusing efforts of competitive analytical capabilities, such as the Army Red Team and Andy Marshall's office, to rigorously challenge and validate our assumptions;
  - Strengthening our common security assessments of the threat and our strategies to foster understanding at the government and ministry level with our allies and partners; and
  - Ensuring your Regional Centers incorporate an international perspective into our approaches and disseminate our thoughts to emerging leaders of allied and partner countries.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Many organizations have begun to re-focus their efforts in support of this work. Attached at Tab 2 are the Army Red Team's thoughts on institutional approaches for countering Islamist extremism.
    - One of their key suggestions is to establish an integrating center to synthesize input from diverse perspectives. An already existing center may be able to do this.
    - There are various other efforts, such as the National Language Education Initiative (an interagency partnership between DoD, DoS, and DoE to increase U.S. language capabilities in Arabic), that seek to expand our capabilities to understand and counter Islamist extremists which could be brought to bear in support of the WoT review process.
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ I will provide you with routine updates as this work proceeds.

Prepared by: LTC Tom Cosentino, OUSDP Strategy (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/53285

~~FOUO~~

September 26, 2005

I-05/012930  
ES-4292

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Jack Keane's Comments at the Policy Board Meeting

At the Policy Board meeting on September 23, Jack Keane pointed **out** that during the Cold War we had a mass of capabilities focused **on** the issue of Communism. We don't have that for Islam. How do we get **that** organized?

Please **task** the Red Team to come back with some suggestions **that** look at process and tell us what we might do.

**Thanks.**

DHR ss  
092605-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/20/05*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/53286 25-09-05 10:14

**1. General Problem:** There is no body of generally agreed upon material that describes our new adversary as there was for the Soviet Union (i.e. FM 100-2-1 Soviet Army Operations and Tactics, FM 100-2-2 Soviet Army Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support, FM 100-2-3 Soviet Army Troops, Organization and Equipment). To understand the new adversary, we have to understand **two** things: (1) The Adversary's basic make-up and nature, including their goals and objectives, (2) The adaptive and emergent forms of warfare the new adversary will employ

## **2. Problem 1, Nature of the Threat:**

a. Background. By the 1980s, the US military had accumulated an extremely large body of research on the Soviet threat. This knowledge permeated all aspects of military education and training. Consequently, there was an excellent level of understanding at all ranks and in all services on the threat. This high level of corporate knowledge permitted commensurately high levels of professional discussion, which resulted in **very** finessed plans and procedures based on a strong understanding of the enemy. A similar understanding of the current enemy is lacking in today's military.

b. Discussion. There are several components that make up the new adversary and these must be studied and understood individually. However, an understanding of this new threat is incomplete without understanding the interlocking nature of these components and how they make up this new adversary. These components are:

- Islam in general and the militant radical Islamic ideology that our adversary advocates. We must understand basic principles within Islam, and how radical Islamists apply Islam. This informs us on their basic strategic motives and objectives.

- Insurgency strategies. Understanding the various models of insurgency explains the broader means to an end for radical Islamists. A subordinate subject is the nature of terrorism. We must understand the basics of insurgent strategic models in order to have any understanding of the adversary's operational and tactical motives and objectives.

- Influence Operations. The new adversary begins with a cultural frame of reference that gives him a distinct advantage in influencing the population. We must understand basic cultural perceptions (Islamic, ethnic, and local/tribal) in order to compete.

- Various cultures that make up the Islamic World. Muslim is does not necessarily mean Arabic, and there are important differences. We must know these differences in order to be effective allies and to take advantage of divisions.

## **3. Problem 2, Adaptive/Emergent Methods of Warfare:**

a. Background: Terrorism, guerilla warfare, and insurgency are not new. Many of the tactics are centuries old. However, the Information Age opens new venues for radical Islamists to operate. This aspect was not a major factor in studying the Soviet Union during the cold war and their organization and associated TT&P evolved incrementally in

observable ways. The explosion of Information Age technologies and its rapid introduction to civilian and military daily life means an adversary has new opportunities to strike and these opportunities continue to evolve quickly.

b. Discussion: The radical Salafists are information technology savvy. For skills they do not possess, there are numerous mercenary entities like hacker groups or individual specialists in certain technologies, that can be hired on---wittingly or unwittingly. Therefore, we must study the practical application of Information Technologies as adapted for use as a weapon. These include:

- Simple data systems that can be used to activate tactical physical attacks (IEDs, etc) but similarly to initiate a WMD...perhaps from a continent away
- We must study the full depth and breadth of how hackers attack networks and critical infrastructure. This is currently the domain of technicians, counterintelligence, and law enforcement in the US and not mainstream warfighting. The new adversary will treat this as a method of warfighting.
- We must monitor and adapt as the new adversary adapts his TT&P.

#### **Recommendations:**

a. Integrating Center. Create small dedicated center of excellence whose mission is to synthesize input from many perspectives. Its singular task is to gather academic, intelligence community, cultural, theological, anthropological, business and other studies relating to the new adversary and integrate them into Threat studies at strategic, operational, and tactical level --both classified and unclassified. It must cast a wide net in order to gather the "mass of capabilities" GEN Keane described. It would produce broad descriptive studies on the Threat (like the FM 100 series document) as well as narrow pieces (like Leavenworth Papers). The Center should be joint in nature, and include a significant number of world class civilian experts and researchers. Some of these could be adjunct members. It would serve as a seminar training center for senior and mid range leaders within the Armed Forces and include a healthy interagency representation as both SME/faculty, as well as training audiences. It must be free from service and political pressures regarding the nature of its products and respect academic freedom as a principle.

b. Professional Military Education. DoD should review the JPME requirements placed on service schools to add in curriculum in both the Nature of the Threat and the Adaptive/Emergent Methods of Warfare.

c. Red Teaming. In concert with the Integrating Center, DoD should establish several Red Teams to focus on various aspects of the new adversary and the adaptive/emergent methods of warfare. Similarly, service should Red Team service specific capabilities against a comprehensive portrayal of this new adversary.

~~FOUO~~

October 20, 2005

To: Steve Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article

Please read *this* article by Robert Maginnis, "Challenges Ahead." I don't know anything about him, but it's worth your being aware of it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Maginnis, Robert. L. "Challenges Ahead," *Washington Times*, October 19, 2005

DHR:dh  
102005-04 (TS).doc

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20679-05

11-L-0559/OSD/53289

*DR*

*20 Oct 05*

and prosecutors, some of whom say privately that they are still afraid of Hussein, even sitting across from him in a courtroom.

Partly because of all that, and partly because they didn't much like the invasion of Iraq in the first place, the international human rights groups that are normally enthusiastic about trials of dictators are squeamish about this one. Human Rights Watch has said that the tribunal has an "inappropriate standard of proof," and it worries that the accused will not have adequate defense. The International Center for Transitional Justice complains of the "legal, administrative and procedural" issues that have not been resolved, quite apart from the political issues. There is a lot of high-minded grumbling about the death penalty that will, presumably, be the end result.

And yet - if the court is able to compile a true record of events, if the judges are able to present authentic witnesses, and if tribunal spokesmen are able to communicate their findings to the Iraqi and international press, none of that matters. The fact that the court is starting with a smaller incident, the 1982 massacre of more than 140 Shiite men in the village of Dujail, is a good sign: The investigators do have witnesses, there is documentary evidence, and the story of Dujail is easier to tell than that of more complicated crimes, such as Hussein's genocide campaign against the Kurds or the Shiites of the south. Far from rushing or politicizing the trial, today's hearings will probably be followed by a delay, so more evidence can be gathered.

In the end, it is by the quality of that evidence, and the clarity with which it is conveyed, that this trial should be judged. The result is irrelevant: Quite frankly, it doesn't matter whether Saddam Hussein is drawn and quartered, exiled to

Pyeongyang, or left to rot in a Baghdad prison. No punishment could make up for the thousands he killed, or for the terror he inflicted on his country.

But if his Sunni countrymen learn what he did to Shiites and Kurds, if the Shiites and Kurds learn what he did to Sumaiya, if Iraqis come to realize that his system of totalitarian terror damaged them all, and if others in the Middle East learn that dictatorships can be overthrown, then the trial will have served its purpose. That, and not an arbitrary standard of international law, is how the success of this unusual tribunal should be measured.

Washington Times  
October 19, 2005  
Pg. 18

#### 47. Challenges Ahead By Robert L. Maginnis

President Bush's Iraq strategy is on track for developing the security forces. If, however, Iraq is the "central front in our war on terror," a broader segment of the U.S. government must become involved before we can downsize our forces and expect Iraq to survive as a republic.

Last week, I was in Iraq to speak with U.S. and Iraqi officials to assess our progress and ascertain what's required to realize the president's goals. American officials told me leaving Iraq prematurely could result in an Islamic caliphate in western Iraq, more sectarian fighting, a totally autonomous Kurdistan and the likelihood neighboring countries would use Hezbollah-like puppets to Lebanonize Iraq. Our presence steadies the throttle of this newly born republic.

One potential danger of our making could be creation of a strong Iraqi military. An Iraq with a strong military but weak central government would be ripe for coups vis-a-vis Pakistan's Gen. Pervez Musharraf. A number of senior military officers

expressed the wish that a broader U.S. government representation join the bolstering of Iraq's federal bureaucracy.

I saw mostly U.S. soldiers at Iraqi ministries and Iraqi primarily from military officers overseeing traditional civilian bureaucracies. U.S. government civilians were at the embassy but only one each at the Iraqi interior and defense ministries.

Our military has led because Iraq is dangerous and soldiers can be ordered to the front lines but civilians shy from combat.

We must, however, build government bureaucracies prepared to guide Iraq's future. Effective government will keep Iraqis reasonably satisfied even if their politics continue to be "like a child's playground" according to one official.

The imbalance between our military and civilian efforts is troubling. The Pentagon is working double-time with security forces fighting the insurgency while simultaneously creating a viable military from remnants of Saddam Hussein's former army. According to the defense minister, more than 100 Iraqi battalions are credibly engaged in current operations.

Our objective is to make Iraqi forces better than the terrorists they fight. Iraqis have already assumed control of considerable battle space and are taking casualties as they stand their ground. While our advisers and units are ready to lead or support each fight, we must at the same time guarantee Iraq's security against threats from Syria and Iran.

Both the Iraqi military and government suffer from cultural challenges. Corruption is widespread. An American commander told me Iraqi leaders are often selected by nepotism and some Iraqi commanders expect a cut from any contract because "that's how things have been done in the past." A senior Iraqi

commander was caught scalping \$50,000 off a contract.

American military mentors are trying to guide their counterparts toward a different set of professional ethics. We also are helping them select leaders based on competence and loyalty and creating appropriate administrative systems such as those for pay and logistics.

The civilian bureaucracies have the same ethical and technical challenges but less American supervision. One commander used the Ministry of Oil, Iraq's chief money-making commodity, as an example that applies to the other ministries and services. Oil production is at the mercy of contracts. One contract was written so payment was based on how many repairs were made rather than the amount of oil delivered. Unsurprisingly, the system suffers frequent sabotage and slow delivery. Despite a corrupt system, Iraq earned \$20 billion from oil this year.

The Ministry of Education (MOE) also suffers from corruption. Our military has renovated 3,315 primary schools. But permission to work school projects is linked to MOE approval. This, unofficially, requires a bribe. Fortunately for the children, Americans often circumvent MOE officials and deal directly with locals who enthusiastically endorse the work.

Officials acknowledge police training lags military preparations by more than a year. But police training is not the military's strong suit. If police are to be effective, more law enforcement experts are needed in Iraq to help. Others must be imbedded in local stations as the military is with the Iraqi army.

The American military has uniformed experts helping every Iraq government sector, but the 38 Iraqi ministries need "real experts," a senior official said. Experts should be

assigned for at least one-year tours instead of being switched every couple months as some civilian agencies are accustomed to doing. Otherwise their credibility is suspect and their effect minimized.

We have become our worst enemy on nurturing the Iraqi bureaucracy which, to its credit, has managed to function despite constant change in governments -- four by January.

Despite the war and politics, the Iraqi people strongly support their political process and their military. Their patience isn't eternal, however. They want security, electricity, clean water, good schools, health care and jobs.

The Iraqi military is on a fast track but it is debatable if the rest of the government can satisfy their other legitimate needs.

Attaining an effective Iraqi government that controls its military and provides its people reliable services will require the involvement of representatives of the entire U.S. government. Only then will we be able to bring our troops home without suffering potentially unacceptable outcomes on the horizon.

Robert L. Maginnis is a retired U.S. Army officer, a national security and foreign affairs analyst for broadcast networks and a senior systems analyst with RCP International Ltd. in Alexandria, Va. He visited Iraq in 2003 and early this month.

New York Times  
October 19, 2005  
48. Leading By (Bad)  
Example  
By Thomas L. Friedman

WASHINGTON, Oct. 18 (Iraq News Agency) - A delegation of Iraqi judges and journalists abruptly left the U.S. today, cutting short its visit to study the workings of American democracy. A delegation spokesman said the Iraqis were "bewildered" by

some of the behavior of the Bush administration and felt it was best to limit their exposure to the U.S. system at this time, when Iraq is taking its first baby steps toward democracy.

The lead Iraqi delegate, Muhammad Mithaqi, a noted secular Sunni judge who had recently survived an assassination attempt by Islamist radicals, said that he was stunned when he heard President Bush telling Republicans that one reason they should support Harriet Miers for the U.S. Supreme Court was because of "her religion." She is described as a devout evangelical Christian.

Mithaqi said that after two years of being lectured to by U.S. diplomats in Baghdad about the need to separate "mosque from state" in the new Iraq, he was also floored to read that the former Whitewater prosecutor Kenneth Starr, now a law school dean, said on the radio show of the conservative James Dobson that Miers deserved support because she was "a very, very strong Christian [who] should be a source of great comfort and assistance to people in the households of faith around the country."

"Now let me get this straight," Judge Mithaqi said. "You are lecturing us about keeping religion out of politics, and then your own president and conservative legal scholars go and tell your public to endorse Miers as a Supreme Court justice because she is an evangelical Christian."

"How would you feel if you picked up your newspapers next week and read that the president of Iraq justified the appointment of an Iraqi Supreme Court justice by telling Iraqis: 'Don't pay attention to his lack of legal expertise. Pay attention to the fact that he is a Muslim fundamentalist and pays at a Saudi-funded Wahhabi mosque.' Is that the Iraq you sent your sons to build and to die for? I don't think so. We can't have our people exposed

to such talk."

A fellow delegation member, Abdal Wahab al-Unfi, a Shiite lawyer who walks with a limp today as a result of torture in a Saddam prison, said he did not want to spend another day in Washington after listening to the Bush team defend its right to use torture in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfi said he was heartened by the fact that the Senate voted 90 to 9 to ban U.S. torture of military prisoners. But he said he was depressed by reports that the White House might veto the bill because of that amendment, which would ban "cruel, inhuman or degrading" treatment of P.O.W.s.

"I survived eight years of torture under Saddam," Unfi said. "Virtually every extended family in Iraq has someone who was tortured or killed in a Baathist prison. Yet, already, more than 100 prisoners of war have died in U.S. custody. How is that possible from the greatest democracy in the world? There must be no place for torture in the future Iraq. We are going home now because I don't want our delegation corrupted by all this American right-to-torture talk."

Finally, the delegation member Sabaf al-Sahafi, editor of one of Iraq's new newspapers, said he wanted to go home after watching a televised videoconference last Thursday between soldiers in Iraq and President Bush. The soldiers, 10 Americans and an Iraqi, were coached by a Pentagon aide on how to respond to Mr. Bush.

"I had nightmares watching this," Sahafi said. "It was right from the Saddam playbook. I was particularly upset to hear the Iraqi sergeant major, Akel Shalir Nasser, tell Mr. Bush: 'Thank you very much for everything. I like you.' It was exactly the kind of staged encounter that Saddam used to have with his troops."

Sahafi said he was also floored to see the U.S. Government Accountability

Office, a nonpartisan agency that works for Congress declare that a Bush administration contract the paid Armstrong Williams, a supposedly independent commentator, to promote MI Bush's No Child Left Behind policy constituted illegal propaganda - an attempt by the government to buy good press.

"Saddam bought and paid journalists all over the Arab world," Sahafi said. "It makes me sick to see even a drop of that in America."

By coincidence, the Iraq delegates departed Washington just as the Bush aide Karen Hughes returned from the Middle East. Her trip was aimed at improving America's image among Muslims by giving them a more accurate view of America and President Bush. She said, "The more they know about us, the more they will like us."

(Yes, all of this is a fake news story. I just wish that it weren't so true.)

New York Times  
October 19, 2005  
49. A Military Role In  
Disaster Relief

To the Editor.  
Re "Next: A War Against  
Nature" by Robert D. Kaplan  
(Op-Ed, Oct 12):

With the aim to win hearts and minds, militaries provide aid in accordance with political or public relations priorities not necessarily to those most in need. Witness the huge military support in aid efforts after the South Asia tsunami versus the meager assistance offered to the millions of people displaced by conflict in Congo.

Instead of a gesture of human solidarity with no aim other than to alleviate the suffering of populations in need, militarized aid becomes a political tool in the conflict when it is seen as part of a political agenda in natural disasters or wars. People in Brooklyn would not want to see politics in their doctor's

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

December 13, 2004 7:00:12

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
CC: Fran Harvey  
Gordon England  
GEN Pete Schoomaker  
Gen Mike Hagee  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Komatsu

Attached is an article on Komatsu. It apparently has small armored vehicles.  
Please look into it and **get** me an answer fast.

I have obviously been laboring under the delusion that the Services were  
responsible for organizing, training and equipping the forces.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Brown, Peter. "Need Armor Fast?" *Washington Times*

DHR:dh  
121304-13

.....  
Please respond by

12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/53292

OSD 20709-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

751 500 87 11 0 10  
CH-2248-04  
23 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 12/23*

SUBJECT: Komatsu (SF 914)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), the Army (TAB B) and Marine Corps (TAB C) have examined several foreign armored vehicles, to include the Komatsu light armored combat vehicle, for use in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM.
- **Analysis.** During the review, the Komatsu vehicle was evaluated as a source for rapid procurement. The Army and Marine Corps concluded that the vehicle was in its initial stages of production and there was insufficient data to make an informed procurement decision. Foreign products will continue to be assessed--including the Komatsu--for rapid procurement in support of USCENTCOM requirements.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated

*This is a good issue to  
put in our U-4's in-basket.  
VZ Dick*

Prepared By: Lt Gen Duncan J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

62-117  
December 13, 2004 7:09:10

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
CC: Fran Harvey  
Gordon England  
GEN Pete Schoomaker  
Gen Mike Hagee  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Komatsu

Attached is an article on Komatsu. It apparently has small armored vehicles.  
Please look into it and get me an answer fast.

I have obviously been laboring under the delusion that the Services were  
responsible for organizing, training and equipping the forces.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Brown, Peter. "Need Armor Fast?" *Washington Times*

DHR:dh  
121304-13

.....  
Please respond by

12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/53294

OSD 20709-04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310

INFO MEMO

December 22, 2004, 1:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter J. Schoomaker, General, Chief of Staff

*Gen Richard Alody 22/12/04*

Army

THRU: Richard B. Myers, General, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Peter Brown Article, "Need Armor Fast?"

- The Army considers all known foreign and domestic sources in satisfying materiel solutions for needed capabilities. To date, we have not found a better alternative than the M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) and Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) for the Convoy Protection Platform (CPP) and other selected roles.
- The following vehicles have been/are being considered by the Army for their related mission essential roles:
  - Casspir, RG-31, and Meerkat; South Africa. Procured for current operations.
  - Cougar and Buffalo; Canada. Procured for current operations.
  - Cohra; Turkey. Evaluated, but not used.
  - VBL; France. Evaluated, but not used.
  - Dingo, Mungo and Husky; Germany. Husky procured for current operations. Information requested on Dingo and Mungo manufacturers.
- Limited information is available on the JGSDF (Japanese Ground Self Defense Force) Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) produced by Komatsu Ltd. The JGSDF LAV is in the early stages of production and its characteristics are unknown. The Army will continue to pursue contacting Komatsu to properly assess the vehicle's capabilities.
- PM Tactical Vehicles published an armor sources sought in the FedBizOps on October 1, 2003.
- Since October 2003, the Army has tested 207 different armor solutions from 40 vendors. The Army evaluated and is producing 12 add-on-armor (AoA) kits for our Light, Medium, and Heavy truck fleet. The 12 kits are in production at six depots and

11-L-0559/OSD/53295

SUBJECT: Peter Brown Article, "Need Armor Fast?"

five corporate locations. As of December 15, 2004 we have produced 13,845 kits. In addition, the Army projected production of 8,105 UAH vehicles by April 2005 with the current production rate of 450 per month. The recent modification to accelerate production to 550 per month provides additional UAH vehicles beginning in March.

- In addition to armoring solutions, the Army continues to modify tactics, techniques, and procedures to preclude Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks.
- Additional information regarding the other vehicles procured and those evaluated but not procured is provided as follows:
  - Casspir, RG-31, and Meerkat; South Africa. One Casspir and one RG-31 have been purchased and are being evaluated by the Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF). PM Close Combat Systems (PM CCS) is purchasing 148 RG-31s as a medium mine protected vehicle. There are 2 in Iraq, 5 in Afghanistan and 141 systems yet to be produced. PM CCS is purchasing 39 Meerkat vehicles as the Interim Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (IVMMD). There are 6 in Iraq, 3 in Afghanistan and 30 systems yet to be produced.
  - Cougar and Buffalo; Canada. The USMC purchased 16 Cougars. The PM CCS is purchasing 46 of the Buffalo as the Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS Block 0). There are 11 in Iraq, 3 in Afghanistan and 32 systems yet to be produced.
  - Cobra; Turkey. The Cobra was formally evaluated for Special Operations. The vehicle did not meet payload and survivability requirements and was not purchased.
  - VBL; France. The Army evaluated the VBL. The VBL was similar to the HMMWV. The VBL was evaluated but due to human factor issues was not considered for additional analysis.
- Dingo, and Mungo; Germany. The Army has contacted the Dingo and Mungo producers and requested information on these products. Textron, under license from KWL, is going to produce a Dingo2 that they would like the U.S. Army to consider. However, Textron does not yet have the production line up and running. The Mungo is a light armored airborne vehicle that would require additional armor protection for US Army application.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: LTC Jeffrey Voigt, (b)(6)

CF: Secretary of the Army



TAB C

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

INFORMATION PAPER

16 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps *WHA for*

SUBJECT: Response to Komatsu Snowflake

- Komatsu Armored vehicle
  - The Marine Corps **has** procured no armored vehicles from Komatsu Defense LTD.
  - However, the Komatsu armored vehicle (at Tab A) was considered twice as a candidate for procurement, once for a Convoy Escort Vehicle and the second time for a Hardened Engineer Vehicle. In both instances the vehicle was identified as a "developmental item" and therefore not considered a viable candidate for urgent requirements that targeted fielding time lines of six months or less.
  - Of note, a third opportunity to evaluate the Komatsu is on going; a Request for Information was released for a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle requirement last Friday, 10 Dec. All vendor responses, domestic and foreign, are due NLT 15 Jan 05. Komatsu, along with other foreign vendors, will be made aware of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle RFI.
  - We will continue to investigate foreign products, like the Komatsu vehicle, that can be rapidly procured to support OIF requirements.
- Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Forces
  - 1 MEF deployed to Iraq in March 2004 for OIF II. This force was well prepared for operations - 100% of its vehicles had armor protection and each Marine had the best personnel protective equipment available.
  - Attached is an earlier memo from Assistant Secretary Young (Tab B) that highlights the successful efforts to equip Marine forces.


Tabs: as stated

Prepared by: Mr. Steven J. Manchester, Director, International Programs, (b)(6)

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/53297

**TAB (A) – Komatsu Armored Vehicle Photos**



Tab C

December 14, 2004

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld / General Myers

FROM: - John Young 

SUBJECT: MARINE CORPS VEHICLE ARMOR

BEFORE the Marine Corps I MEF force crossed the line of departure into Iraq in March, 2004, the Marine Corps had armor for 100% of its 3000+ vehicles. The armor, a quick application of 3/16" steel, was installed on 90% of the HMMWV's and MTVR's. The Marine Corps also had 37 up-armored HMMWV's. The Marine Corps acquisition and logistics system assembled over 1,800 sets of the interim 3/16" armor kits within six weeks of receiving the execute order to provide armor for the MEF prior to it rolling across the line of departure. Similarly, all Marine Corps helicopters were equipped with Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) countermeasures for deployment. Finally, every Marine in Iraq has, and has always had, personal protection gear (Outer Tactical Vests, Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates, ear plugs, and safety glasses).

The Department next identified additional reprogramming funds and upgraded all vehicle armor kits to Marine depot built 3/8" rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) by September, 2004. We used an effort called Operation Respond, supplemented by the Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, to identify the urgent needs of the Marines as well as to force the naval enterprise to identify funds. In excess of \$520 million was reprogrammed to meet over 120 requirements for deployed Marines. These initiatives included additional armor kits, IED jamming devices, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) robots, dogs for IED detection, gunner's shields, unmanned air and ground vehicles, ballistic goggles, body armor extensions for extremity protection, communications gear, and language translation equipment. Through dedicated leadership and Operation Respond, the naval acquisition team equipped the Marines with every needed, available solution.

cc: Secretary England

Tab C

TAB (8)

11-L-0559/OSD/53299

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

Name	Agency	Date
The Honorable Francis J. Harvey	SECARMY	16 December 2004
General Schoomaker	CSA	16 December 2004
General Hagee	CMC	16 December 2004

FOUO

SEP 21 2005 4:56

SEP-21 2005

TO: Ryan Henry  
Brad Berkson  
Andy ~~Marshall~~

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Piece by Barry Blechman

Attached is an interesting article by Barry Blechman, a friend of mine who serves on the Defense Policy Board. Please take a look at it, and tell me if you think we are doing the things he thinks we ought to be doing, and if we are not, let me know.

Thanks.

Attach *U.S. Defense Planning* by Barry Blechman

DHR:ss  
091905-32

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/18/05*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/53301

OSD 20772-05

INSIDE VIEW

# U.S. Defense Planning

## It's Not That Complicated

The Pentagon has been working hard all spring and summer on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Particular attention has been paid to the formula that should be used as the basis for force planning, with the old standard "1-4-2-1" — focusing on home defense, and deterring and defeating aggression in certain world regions — deemed by some to be overtaken by events.

The stakes are high as both the relative size of the military



By Barry Blechman is the chief executive of DFI International and the co-founder and chairman of the Henry L. Stimson Center.

services and their components, and the relative priority accorded to weapon programs, could rise or fall depending on the outcome. The formulas proposed for force planning, in fact, are euphemisms for bread-and-butter

issues, such as larger or smaller fighter aircraft forces, a bigger

continued, as technology allows, but defense against cruise missiles should be added to the Missile Defense Agency's agenda, as these latter weapons are more ubiquitous and far easier for enemies to operate and launch.

Defense against unconventional means of delivering a nuclear or biological device has received far fewer resources. Partly, this is a jurisdictional issue. The Department of Homeland Security is primarily responsible for securing the nation's ports and borders, but the defensive boundary needs to be drawn much farther out and the Defense Department has a major role to play.

### Defending Unconventional Nukes

If we took the unconventional nuclear threat to the United States seriously, we would allocate defense resources sufficient to build the sensor networks and information systems

Protecting the United States requires preventive actions overseas to disrupt terrorist networks before they can acquire and deploy nuclear or biological devices.

on tenor. What should not be in question is that this should be the highest priority.

■ The capability to fight major theater wars (MTWs).

Debate rages over whether we should have capabilities to fight one or two such conflicts simultaneously. This is an artificial debate, however, as the term itself is misleading. There is not one type of MTW, but two distinct types of operations.

There are plenty of people who know what to do. American military officers and civilian government officials learned lessons throughout the 1980s and 1990s in the Balkans, Central America and elsewhere.

But the Army and the Defense Department resisted looking seriously at these requirements for years. The current QDR is an opportunity to set a new course.

Obviously like preventing nuclear attacks, effectively stabilizing foreign governments requires contributions from many U.S. departments — State, Treasury and many other civilian agencies. Only DoD, however, has the resources to make any interagency approach work, and the Army has to take the lead.

### Variety of Sources

To better prepare for the role, the department must develop the means to generate additional

other regional organizations, evacuating U.S. citizens from troubled nations, sea and air — cue missions, disaster relief, and the insertion of small groups of forces to deal with criminal bands or rebel movements that sometimes threaten weak but friendly governments.

How many and which specific types of forces are necessary can be gleaned by looking at the now 15 years of post Cold War history.

### Special Capabilities, Enough Troops

Two things are evident: The forces required for lesser contingencies are not completely provided by planning for MTWs; they are not just lesser operations, but require some specialized capabilities. Second, not having sufficient numbers of such forces raises U.S. military operating tempos to levels with deleterious effects on personnel and equipment.

Preparing for the threats we cannot now foresee and taking advantage of the technologies that are now only dimly understood.

This requires spending on basic and advanced research, but not the advanced systems development that accounts for the

inent.

Debates like this are as old as the Defense Department itself; only the terminology changes every four years. What's surprising, this time, is that debate rages despite the department having entered the QDR with an established and clear military Strategy, and a good understanding of the contingencies the United States faces now and will likely face in the future.

#### Four Priorities

So long as one looks squarely at those threats, keeping in mind the strategy already established to defeat them, the basis for U.S. force planning should be evident. It all comes down to four priorities:

■ Prevention of nuclear or biological attack in this country.

Such an event would be an unprecedented catastrophe for the United States. A nuclear bomb exploded in a U.S. city during a business day could kill hundreds of thousands of people, injure millions and affect the health of still millions more — born and unborn.

The U.S. armed forces are now making plans to contain the consequences of such an attack, but preventing it must be the highest priority. Yet the allocation of government resources suggests that we haven't truly internalized that. Three elements are involved.

Defending ourselves against possible ballistic missile attacks is the one aspect of the problem that has received high priority. These efforts clearly should be

forces needed to intercept and inspect or destroy questionable platforms.

This is not a technology problem; it is a matter of engineering and resources, and insisting the commercial carriers that control the bulk of traffic to and from the United States establish procedures to make the task easier.

Finally, protecting the United States requires preventive actions overseas to disrupt terrorist networks before they can acquire and deploy nuclear or biological devices.

It means cooperating with as many countries as possible to help them reduce and secure dangerous materials, and to exert better controls on their borders — and, in the case of poorer countries, facilitating such cooperation by providing expertise, technology and money.

It means international cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence organizations, which sometimes requires a more forthcoming U.S. position than, one gathers, is typically the case.

And, of particular interest to the QDR debate, it means raising & training, equipping and deploying U.S. special forces that can work with foreign militaries to find and destroy terrorists, and, when necessary, independently take out such groups in un-governed territories or in countries that won't cooperate with us.

One question for the QDR to decide is how many and what types of special forces the United States needs to fight the war

combat forces capable of intimidating a nation, destroying its armed forces, and stabilizing the situation on the ground sufficiently to transition to a stable and friendly government.

How big do these forces have to be? Answering that question requires diverting from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's favored capabilities-based approach to planning and taking a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies.

While national and international politics can certainly surprise us, a look around the world will make clear which specific contingencies are possible in the midterm.

The requirement for these kinds of forces is not open-ended. Presumably, the United States is not going to repeat Napoleon's and Hitler's mistake, of attempting regime change in Moscow, no matter what course future Russian governments take. Nor can one imagine a U.S. president violating the long-standing maxim of avoiding large-scale land war in East Asia.

#### Stabilization Phase

The more pressing question for QDR defense planners is how to structure, equip and train forces for the stabilization phase of the fighting. The Defense Department demonstrated convincingly in March 2003 that it had mastered the regime change part of the challenge. But it is clear that we had not paid enough attention preparing to help countries make political transitions effectively

and civil affairs chores.

Some of these capabilities can be located in the active forces, others in the reserves, and still others can be provided by civilian contractors. In addition, the U.S. armed forces, and especially the Army and Marine Corps, must pay greater attention to these missions in training their personnel.

The second type of MTW places greater emphasis on air and naval forces. This type of contingency is harder to define, but typically involves utilizing air and naval power to isolate a hostile nation or to defend a friendly one from attack. A Taiwan crisis would fit in this category, as would a need to keep open the Strait of Hormuz or the Malacca Strait to ensure oil flows.

Militarily, it requires an ability to rapidly establish total air and sea dominance in a particular region, to conduct precision air strikes anywhere in the world in a timely manner, and to support such forces far from the United States.

America has invested heavily in these capabilities in the past, has unsurpassed forces to conduct these missions now, and need only ensure that U.S. air, space and naval forces are modernized at a sufficient rate to maintain this qualitative edge indefinitely.

Maintaining the forces necessary for conducting a variety of lesser contingencies.

These could include supporting peace operations by the United Nations, NATO and

devoted to basic research is a matter of subjective judgment, but 3 percent of the total budget seems to garner widespread support.

There are a host of capabilities that underlie all four priorities, of course, from the training, sustaining and medical systems that support the troops, to the intelligence, communications and information (and disinformation) systems that are the true enablers of modern U.S. military capabilities.

Some of these enablers are based in space, some on aircraft or ship platforms, others on the ground. Choosing how to provide these capabilities efficiently poses difficult problems, but these are problems best handled in the normal acquisition and budgeting processes. They should not enter debate on the fundamental issues in U.S. defense priorities.

The four priorities should be clear

Prevent a nuclear or deadly biological attack in this nation; be prepared for two types of major theater wars, one which requires the invasion and replacement of hostile regimes that threaten the nation's basic interests, and a second which requires gaining air and sea dominance over any region of the globe as necessary to achieve the nation's objectives there; be prepared for a variety of lesser contingencies; and invest in future technologies so that the United States will remain, indefinitely, the most powerful military actor on Earth. ■

~~FOUO~~

NOV 22 2005 9:47  
05/015467  
ES-4748

**TO** Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace  
ADM Ed Giambastiani  
Ryan Henry  
**FROM** Donald Rumsfeld   
**SUBJECT** RAND Report on Defense Strategy

You might want to take a look at this Andy Hoehn paper and see the extent to which you think we've considered anything useful there in our QDR effort

Thanks.

**Attach.**

Undated Hoehn ltr to SecDef rec'd 10/21/05 and Summary of *A New Division of Labor: Reconsidering American Strategy and Forces to Meet New Challenges* (DDR-3713-AF)

DHR:dh  
111805-11 (TS)

.....

*Please respond by December 8, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20825-05



1200 SOUTH HAYES STREET  
 ARLINGTON, VA 22204-2900  
 TEL 703.613.1100  
 FAX 703.613.8111  
 DEPT OF THE  
 SEC OF DEFENSE  
 2005 OCT 21 PM 3:33

*del*  
*11/18*

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
 Secretary of Defense  
 1000 Defense Pentagon  
 Room 3E880  
 Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear *Secretary* Rumsfeld

On the wall of your office, there is a picture inscribed to you by the President that says, "Let freedom reign." The picture and its message are an important symbol of a central challenge of our time.

In the attached report, *A New Division of Labor: Reconsidering American Strategy and Forces to Meet New Challenges (DRR-3713-AF)*, several RAND colleagues and I collaborated to explore what it will mean for the U.S. armed forces to support a national strategy aimed at exporting freedom.

In the report, we make several points that I think merit your attention as you contemplate key choices to be made in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Chief among these are:

- It is imperative that DoD, in conjunction with other agencies, undertake sustained efforts to train, equip, advise, and assist the forces of friendly nations seeking to combat terrorist and insurgent groups operating on their territories or in the under-governed areas of the world. Properly trained forces and an adequate rotation base will be needed for this effort.
- At the same time, the nation must retain the capability to defeat aggression in more than one region. As adversaries acquire more capable weapons—especially nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them—extensive modernization will be required.

The question, of course, is how to meet these new requirements in the face of constrained resources. Our recommendation is that DoD adopt a force sizing approach that calls on U.S. ground forces—Army, Marines, and SOF—to provide forces for ongoing stability and advisory operations and a single theater war, while the Navy and Air Force remain sized and equipped primarily to deter and, if necessary, fight two theater wars, while providing support to ground forces.

The paper makes a number of other important observations, seeking to identify the types of operational capabilities that will be most important for U.S. forces in the

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OSD 20825-05




RAND

years ahead and the kinds of cooperation among the services that will be needed to achieve the nation's broader goals.

I hope that you find the paper to be useful. I can be reached at [Hoehn@rand.org](mailto:Hoehn@rand.org) if you have comments or observations.

Sincerely,



Andrew Hoehn  
program \_\_\_\_\_  
Strategy and Doctrine  
Project A/F FORCE

ps. Hope all is well.

**SUMMARY**

In January 2005, George W. Bush took the oath of office for his second term as President. In his inaugural address, Bush pledged his administration to 'seek and support the growth of democratic movements in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in the world.' The spread of freedom and democracy is Bush's answer to the threat of terrorism and extremism.

In a sense, this is a natural American response to a threat to core U.S. interests. The spread of freedom and democracy has been a prominent feature of American policy and culture since the founding of the republic. It had been a key theme of nearly every 20th century presidential administration, and, in fact, animated Wilson and Roosevelt as they sought to shape the outcomes of the two great wars of that century. Moreover, it was a theme that motivated Bush's immediate predecessors, particularly Bill Clinton, and led to American support for emerging democracies in Latin America, East Asia and South Africa, as well as American military involvement in places like the Balkans.

But, in another sense, it represents a radical departure for American foreign and security policy in that this president has demonstrated a willingness not only to stand up to America's foes but also to discomfit its friends. In pursuit of this strategy, the President is prepared to foster near-term instability, sometimes by force of arms, to secure longer-term goals.

And it is here that Bush parts company with his predecessors, for in defining America's response to terrorism and extremism Bush has made clear that the United States, in at least some circumstances, will no longer simply allow despotic governments to collapse under their own weight, but instead will take action to hasten or cause their demise. He will no longer excuse the policies of repression on the part of America's friends, but will call for thoroughgoing reforms.

This expansive strategy has important implications for the entire national security establishment, and diplomats and warriors alike are adapting to new demands and seeking to define new roles. Should the

nation continue to pursue this strategy - and we believe that there is every evidence that it will<sup>2</sup> - the institutions of government will, of necessity, change and adapt, much as they did when America accepted new global responsibilities at the end of World War II.

#### **A NEW GRAND STRATEGY**

Just as in the late 1940s, when it took the emergence of a clear and compelling threat - Soviet expansionism backed by powerful military forces - to induce the United States to shake off its tradition of isolationism and adopt the strategy of containment, so too did the shock of 9/11 prompt this administration to put forth a far-reaching strategy. That strategy, the centerpiece of which is to promote democracy and freedom abroad, is the necessary response to conditions that can breed serious threats to the security of Americans worldwide and to their way of life. Although this strategy has roots in all post-Cold War administrations, it has been given clearest expression and the most expansive objectives by the current administration. As a consensus forms around the idea that the United States and its allies must work to extend the reach of freedom and democracy, this strategy will be recognized as the long-awaited replacement for containment.

The strategy is nothing if not ambitious. Pursuing this strategy in earnest will require the United States and its partners to marshal substantial levels of resources and to apply them with patience and commitment. It will also call for the involvement of, and significant changes to, America's armed forces.

#### **CONFLICT IN THE POST POST-COLD WAR WORLD**

U.S. grand strategy, along with the Challenges posed by adversaries of the United States and its allies, will place daunting demands on America's military forces. Three developments in particular present novel and stern challenges to the armed forces of the United States:

---

<sup>2</sup> In judging that the nation will continue on this path for the foreseeable future, we also recognize that different leaders will interpret this strategy in different ways. Just as "containment" was modified and adapted over the long years of the Cold War, so too will the strategy to export freedom and democracy take many forms.

- **Terrorist and insurgent groups.** The spread of technological know-how related to means of killing--ranging from powerful explosive devices to biological and, ultimately, nuclear weapons--is giving small groups the means to kill thousands. By harnessing militant interpretations of Islam to new means of violence, Al Qaeda and other such groups have created a virulent threat that all responsible states must act to defeat.
- **Regional powers with nuclear weapons.** States such as North Korea and Iran appear determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is possible that North Korea already possesses a limited nuclear arsenal. They and others, including terrorist organizations, have access to a world-wide supply chain that is not entirely under the control of states. If adversaries such as these succeed in fielding deliverable nuclear weapons the implications for regional stability and the security of our allies will be highly troubling. The leadership in Pyongyang, for example, seems to understand that if it precipitates a war on the Korean peninsula the ultimate outcome of that war will be the end of its regime. This reality has had a salutary deterrent effect on the regime's actions, if not its rhetoric. But unless a way is found to neutralize North Korea's nuclear weapons or its ability to deliver them, its leaders may come to believe that they could impose unacceptable costs on the United States and its allies and that regime change as a U.S. objective may be achievable only at prohibitive cost and risks. Such a shift in Pyongyang's calculus would be very dangerous.
- **Military competition in Asia.** Arguably, U.S. forces can prevail over the conventional forces of any nation, provided the full panoply of U.S. capabilities can be brought to bear. Recognizing this, regional adversaries are focusing their military investments on capabilities that can be used to impede U.S. forces from getting to the fight. China, with its burgeoning economy and growing technical sophistication, is

fielding the most impressive set of such capabilities. They include advanced air defenses, numerous systems for attacking surface ships, anti-satellite weapons, and, most troublingly, large numbers of accurate, long-range strike systems, principally conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. These weapons can not only keep O.5. expeditionary forces at bay for significant periods; they can also be used to coerce and intimidate the leadership of Taiwan and other states in the region.

#### **MEETING THESE CHALLENGES**

These developments carry several implications for U.S. defense planners:

- First, a substantial and sustained level of effort to suppress terrorist and insurgent groups abroad is essential if the nation is to make headway against the threats they pose. For DoD, this will sometimes take the form of direct action to locate and capture or kill terrorists and insurgents. Far more often, it will involve undertaking indirect actions, principally long-term, "hands on" efforts to train, equip, advise, and assist the forces of nations that seek to suppress these groups on their own territory.
- Related to this, U.S. forces will be called upon to help bring stability and security to nations struggling to implement democratic reforms. This will involve providing support to defeat internal threats and shoring up regional security to cope with external enemies.
- U.S. forces must develop and field far more effective means for locating and destroying or otherwise neutralizing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.
- U.S. forces must also ensure that they can overcome modern anti-access weapons and methods. Of particular urgency is the need for highly effective, wide-area defenses against theater ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles also are a concern.

America's new grand strategy, combined with daunting challenges emanating from states and from non-state adversaries, will impose extraordinary demand on U.S. armed forces. These demands will stress our forces both qualitatively (by creating needs for new types of capabilities) and quantitatively (calling for unprecedented levels of commitment abroad). At the same time, fiscal realities are placing strict limits on the resources available not only for defense but also for important related activities, such as counter-proliferation initiatives, international development assistance, and public diplomacy. This combination of an ambitious strategy, a dynamic and challenging threat environment, and tightly constrained resources creates a profound dilemma for military strategists and force planners. How might these factors be reconciled?

#### **RECASTING U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY**

The Defense Department first needs to define a new defense strategy that embraces the goal of extending the reach of democracy and freedom. Above all, *this* means placing far more emphasis than heretofore on the missions of security cooperation (i.e., training, equipping, advising, and assisting the security forces of friendly states) and stability operations. Practically speaking, this means that the force sizing criterion posited by the defense strategy of 2001--"1-4-2-1"--should be recast.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, the nation no longer will be able to limit its day-to-day activities and posture to only four regions where it is deemed to have important geopolitical interests, as classically defined: Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia. It is now clear that seemingly remote areas such as Afghanistan and Sudan, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, Central Asia, the Philippines and Indonesia can gestate serious threats not only

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<sup>3</sup> The criterion that became known as "1-4-2-1" directed the armed forces to be prepared simultaneously to defend the United States (1), deter aggression and coercion in four critical regions (4), swiftly defeat aggression in two overlapping conflicts (2) while preserving the option to impose a change of regime in one of the conflicts (1). It also stated that the forces were to be able to conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations. For further elaboration, see the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2001.

to regional peace and stability but also to America and Americans. In fact, the number of places in which U.S. and allied forces might be called upon to engage in promoting stability, democracy, and military competence is indeterminate. Thus, in our assessment, '4' has, of necessity, become 'n.'

At the same time, familiar missions of deterring aggression, redressing imbalances in military power, and defeating aggression through large-scale power projection operations have not diminished in importance. In fact, these missions are, in some ways, becoming more challenging. Protecting U.S. national interests in southwest Asia, East Asia, and elsewhere will demand that U.S. forces, in conjunction with those of our allies, remain able to defeat the forces of adversary states in more than one region. This is critically important not only to credibly deter our adversaries but also to assure our allies and partners. Needless to say, U.S. forces must also do whatever is necessary to protect the United States itself.

The question then becomes whether and how DoD can support a demanding '1-n-2-1' criterion for sizing and shaping the armed forces of the United States.

#### **A NEW DIVISION OF LABOR**

The first thing to recognize is that the demands of '1-n-2-1' need not apply equally to every branch of the armed forces. The imperative to promote stability, democracy, and military competence abroad will place the greatest demands on America's land forces--the Army and the Marine Corps--and special operations forces. Air and naval forces can make important contributions to these missions, principally in the areas of intelligence, lift, base operating support or offshore bases, and humanitarian support. But by and large, these missions call for substantial commitments of ground forces to work directly with their host country counterparts. By the same token, the most plausible major combat operations that U.S. forces might be called upon to fight in the years to come--involving Iran, China (over Taiwan) and North Korea--call for heavy commitments of air and naval forces and, in most cases, smaller numbers of U.S. land forces.

Given limited resources, including limited numbers of people, the nation's leaders face a choice of where to apportion risk: either they can continue to ask U.S. ground forces to prepare for major wars and risk a diminished ability to operate effectively in stability, support, and advisory missions, or they can focus a much larger proportion of U.S. ground forces on such missions and accept the risk of shifting some of the burden for large force-on-force contingencies to air and naval forces. Given the demands of America's new grand strategy, the certainty of the need for stability, support, and advisory missions, and recent advances in the ability to use precision firepower to shape the battlefield to the ground commander's advantage, we suggest that DoD's leaders consider the latter course. Such a decision would place a greater sustained level of ground force effort in stability, support, and advisory missions by relieving the Army and the Marine Corps of the requirement to provide forces for more than one major war. Taking this step would help to keep overall demands on the forces of these two services manageable. Equally important, it would also permit substantial portions of both services to optimize training, doctrine, and equipment on the development of forces for manpower intensive operations now demanded by America's new grand strategy. Under this construct, the Navy and Air Force would retain their focus on large-scale power projection operations, though both services will be called upon to provide essential enabling capabilities to stability, support, and advisory missions. Both will also need to place much greater emphasis on defeating enemies armed with nuclear weapons and with more sophisticated anti-access capabilities than have heretofore been encountered.

#### **POTENTIAL ACTIONS**

The foregoing considerations suggest that DoD's leaders should consider the following actions to bring America's defense capabilities in better alignment with the nation's new grand strategy:

- Recast U.S. defense strategy to incorporate "1-n-2-1" as the aggregate statement of demand for U.S. forces. Consider relieving the Army and Marine Corps of the requirement to

provide forces for more than one major combat operation at a time. Because of the need for ground forces to conduct a broad range of stability, support, and advisory operations, this should not prompt a decrease in the force structure or end strength of either the Army or Marine Corps, but it will affect the recruiting, training, and equipping and operating tempo of sizable portions of both services.

- **Complete the transition of the joint command structure.** Given that U.S. forces will likely be committed for extended periods of time to operations in many areas of the world, regional commanders need to remain focused on strategic matters, including achieving strategic victory in areas where U.S. forces are engaged. Regional commanders should not be involved in overseeing day-to-day activities in any single location. To relieve them of this requirement, more effective joint task force headquarters are needed. Ongoing efforts at U.S. Joint Forces Command should be buttressed as a step toward this goal. Moreover, the joint division of labor among regional commands, global commands, and military services and supporting agencies should be further clarified.
- **Complete the effort to realign U.S. global military posture.** Forces and supporting infrastructure need to be realigned to support operations aimed at new democracies, countering terrorist and insurgent groups, deterring and defeating regional adversaries, and dissuading military competition in Asia. Current plans should be implemented and reevaluated regularly to ensure that strategy and posture remain in proper alignment.
- **Increase investments in promising systems for surveillance and reconnaissance.** It should be the goal of defense planners to put an end to the situation in which sensor systems and the means to interpret the information they acquire are chronically treated as low-density/high demand assets. And efforts should be made to accelerate the development of new systems

better suited to finding such targets as mobile missiles, nuclear weapons, and small groups of armed combatants.

- **Help to rebuild the nation's intelligence system--and by implication DoD's intelligence capabilities--by focusing first and foremost on the human dimension.** More and better-trained people are needed throughout the collection, assessment, and dissemination chain. Greater numbers of people with skills to understand the political and social dynamics of troubled regions are especially needed. Automation can be an aid, but is not a solution in and of itself.
- **Pursue an aggressive effort to develop and produce more effective defenses against theater ballistic and cruise missiles.** Truly effective defenses will require the fielding of larger numbers of existing systems for theater missile defense, both land- and sea-based, and deploying one or more additional 'layers' of active defense.
- **Broker three "marriages" to achieve greater strategic and operational depth and joint tactical proficiency.** Even as greater differentiation among the capabilities of the military services is called for, new interdependencies need to be forged. We view this as something akin to brokering a new set of marriages among the military services.
  - **Marriage 1: Develop and implement plans for air and land forces to train more frequently to conduct highly integrated operations.** This will entail, inter alia, more frequent *regular* joint training and new fire control procedures.
  - **Marriage 2: Foster tighter links among air, naval, and space forces to create a more robust, more effective power projection force.** These links will require much more routine training and the development of more effective common command and control procedures and mechanisms.

- **Marriage 31 Promote a more seamless integration between the Marine Corps and U.S. special operations forces. The Marine Corps' regular presence in troubled parts of the world should become the planning basis for sensitive special operations missions.**

To achieve these goals, just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act created incentives for the best officers to seek joint assignments, the services should change incentive structures to make involvement in joint training in these areas a major criterion for promotion to more senior positions.

- **Greatly expand the capacity and competence of forces devoted to combat advisory and training missions. The most effective means for DoD to counter terrorist groups abroad is to train, equip, advise, and assist the forces of friendly governments. Substantial portions of the 'regular' forces must contribute to this vital mission. Although the largest number of advisors will likely come from the Army and Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force advisory capabilities need to expand as well. Foreign Area Officer (FAO) programs in the services are essential to develop the language skills and cultural understanding necessary to be effective analysts and advisors. Although each of the services is expanding their respective programs to address these needs, substantially more will need to be done.**
- **Direct the Army to explore creating two distinct elements within its structure capable of carrying out traditional and non-traditional missions. One element would specialize in conventional warfighting operations and the other element would specialize in stability, support, and advisory operations. Training constraints will prevent the Army from fully preparing its entire tactical structure for both conventional warfighting and stability operations. By realigning its structure, the Army would free the units assigned to conventional missions to prepare more fully for warfighting operations and free units assigned to stability, support, and advisory operations to**

prepare more fully for those difficult missions. The result will be that the Army should become more proficient at both.

- **Direct the Army to create doctrine and professional military education curricula devoted to the conduct of stability, support, and advisory operations.**
- **Direct the Air Force to undertake a fundamental re-evaluation of its concepts for large-scale power projection operations, assessing in particular the implications for its mix of long- and short-range platforms. The USAF's planned investments in new combat aircraft implicitly reflect the belief that force will be able to deploy forward and conduct high-tempo operations from air bases within or close to the theater of conflict. Such assumptions seem increasingly ill-advised. A platform mix that placed greater emphasis on long-range reconnaissance and strike would provide commanders with more options for basing aircraft in areas less threatened by attack from enemy missiles and would provide a more robust means for striking adversaries and providing support to forces on the battlefield.**
- **Direct U.S. air forces to train more frequently with U.S. SOF and the ground forces of friendly nations to provide operational support during counter-insurgency operations. U.S. air forces can provide friendly forces with critical surveillance, strike, and lift support without imposing a large footprint in the host country. When combined with competent local ground forces, they can be extremely effective against insurgents.**

Finally, while striving to fix what is broken, the Department of Defense should be careful not to break what is fixed. The U.S. armed forces are the most powerful and successful in the world, perhaps in history. Their dominance of the conventional 'force on force' battlefield is so overwhelming that it has, among other things, rendered a whole class of historically troubling scenarios--massed cross-border aggression by large, armored forces--largely obsolete. Maintaining the

capabilities that have created this situation is critically important. continued, selective investment in the areas in which the United States currently enjoys 'overmatch' will be needed alongside the new initiatives required to solve the nation's emerging security problems.



22002-5030  
SECRETARY OF THE  
DEFENSE

2005 OCT 31 PM 3:33

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

On the wall of your office, there is a picture inscribed to you by the President that says, "Let freedom reign." The picture and its message are an important symbol of a central challenge of our time.

In the attached report, *A New Division of Labor: Reconsidering American Strategy and Forces to Meet New Challenges* (DRR-3713-AF), several RAND colleagues and I collaborated to explore what it will mean for the U.S. armed forces to support a national strategy aimed at exporting freedom.

In the report, we make several points that I think merit your attention as you contemplate key choices to be made in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Chief among these are:

- It is imperative that DoD, in conjunction with other agencies, undertake sustained efforts to train, equip, advise, and assist the forces of friendly nations seeking to combat terrorist and insurgent groups operating on their territories or in the under-governed areas of the world. Properly trained forces and an adequate rotation base will be needed for this effort.
- At the same time, the nation must retain the capability to defeat aggression in more than one region. As adversaries acquire more capable weapons—especially nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them—extensive modernization will be required.

The question, of course, is how to meet these new requirements in the face of constrained resources. Our recommendation is that DoD adopt a force sizing approach that calls on U.S. ground forces—Army, Marines, and SOF—to provide forces for ongoing stability and advisory operations and a single theater war, while the Navy and Air Force remain sized and equipped primarily to deter and, if necessary, fight two theater wars, while providing support to ground forces.

The paper makes a number of other important observations, seeking to identify the types of operational capabilities that will be most important for U.S. forces in the

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years ahead and the kinds of cooperation among the services that will be **needed** to achieve the nation's broader goals.

I hope that you find the paper to be useful. I can be reached at [Hoehn@rand.org](mailto:Hoehn@rand.org) if you have comments or observations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Andrew Hoehn".

Andrew Hoehn  
Program Director  
Strategy and Doctrine  
Project AIR FORCE

*ps. Hope all is well.*

# RESTRICTED D R A F T

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## A New Division of Labor

### Reconsidering American Strategy and Forces to Meet New Challenges

ANDREW HOEHN, ADAM GRISSOM,  
DAVID OCHMANEK, DAVID SHLAPAK,  
ALAN VICK

DRR-3713-1-AF

September 2005

Prepared for the United States Air Force

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PROJECT AIR FORCE

11-L-0559/OSD/53321

## PREFACE

In January 2005, upon accepting the oath of office, President George W. Bush committed the nation to the extraordinary goal of "ending tyranny in our world," a goal consistent with Bush's earlier national security statements, but that had not been expressed before in such an expansive fashion. Although some have been tempted to dismiss this goal as mere rhetoric, the evidence suggests that the President and his administration are serious about the goal and are prepared to use all available means, including the force of arms, to support it as the central element of the nation's new grand strategy. Should the strategy be sustained, as we expect it will, this would represent a major shift in U.S. foreign and security policy that will have far-reaching implications for all institutions of government.

This report explores the implications of this change in strategy and of key factors shaping the international security environment for the Department of Defense. We focus on the Department of Defense for two key reasons:

- First, the armed forces of the United States have been used to spearhead this new strategy, and they have achieved important successes. But it is also clear that, in several instances, U.S. armed forces are being called upon to perform missions that are outside their normal repertoire. If these missions are only temporary, then ad hoc arrangements may suffice. But if these new missions represent a more permanent set of demands on the armed forces, pursuant to an enduring change in strategy, then more lasting changes may need to be considered.
- Second, and on a more urgent basis, the Department of Defense is involved in a major review of strategy and policy - the Quadrennial Defense Review, often referred to as the QDR. This review offers the administration the opportunity to examine anew the demands of the international security environment, the missions assigned to the armed forces, the proper emphasis

among those missions, and the allocation of resources allotted to them.

The purpose of this effort is to offer ideas and insights to the leadership of the Department of Defense on key issues as it strives to align defense resources and capabilities with the demands of a new grand strategy and stressing security environment.

The approach taken in this study aims first and foremost to explore the implications of a new and demanding strategy - a change that has potential to be tectonic in its implications. That is, this study takes as its conceptual starting point the national security strategy defined by the Bush administration and explores the implications of this strategy for the U.S. armed forces. Examining threats to the objectives embodied in that strategy, the authors then define what would logically be the central elements of a defense strategy appropriate to the conditions likely to emerge in the coming years. Planned forces and posture are then examined in terms of the degree to which they can provide the capabilities most appropriate to implementing that strategy.

The work presented here does not seek to address important issues relating to the management of DoD, including acquisition reform, the industrial base, business and accounting practices, or personnel management. Nor does this report attempt to address the question of whether the aggregate level of resources the United States is devoting to its armed forces is appropriate.

The authors have drawn on work undertaken at RAND and elsewhere over the past several years. Chief among their sources are: assessments of international terrorism and strategies for defeating terrorist groups, war games featuring hostile regional powers armed with nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, operational analyses of possible scenarios involving conflict over Taiwan, detailed evaluations of concepts and systems for airborne and space-based surveillance, assessments of evolving threats to airfields and other key components of military infrastructure in potential theaters of conflict, and, importantly, lessons from recent wars.

This report is, by RAND's standards at least, brief. It is meant to be read by busy people. This makes it impossible to provide the full

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rationale behind the many judgments contained in the report. But substantial amounts of research and analysis underlie our findings and much of the documentation of this work is available to the public.<sup>1</sup>

#### **RAND PROJECT AIR FORCE**

RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air Force's federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Aerospace Force Development; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. Integrative research projects and work on modeling and simulation are conducted on a PAF-wide basis. The research reported here was prepared within the PAF-Wide Program under contract F49642-01-C-0003.

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<sup>1</sup> Publicly available sources relevant to the material presented in this report are cited in the bibliography. These sources and others are available through RAND's web site: [www.rand.org](http://www.rand.org).

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**SUMMARY**

In January 2005, George W. Bush took the oath of office for his second term as President. In his inaugural address, Bush pledged his administration to "seek and support the growth of democratic movements in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in the world." The spread of freedom and democracy is Bush's answer to the threat of terrorism and extremism.

In a sense, this is a natural American response to a threat to core U.S. interests. The spread of freedom and democracy has been a prominent feature of American policy and culture since the founding of the republic. It had been a key theme of nearly every 20th century presidential administration, and, in fact, animated Wilson and Roosevelt as they sought to shape the outcomes of the two great wars of that century. Moreover, it was a theme that motivated Bush's immediate predecessors, particularly Bill Clinton, and led to American support for emerging democracies in Latin America, East Asia and South Africa, as well as American military involvement in places like the Balkans.

But, in another sense, it represents a radical departure for American foreign and security policy in that this president has demonstrated a willingness not only to stand up to America's foes but also discomfit its friends. In pursuit of this strategy, the President is prepared to foster near-term instability, sometimes by force of arms, to secure longer-term goals.

And it is here that Bush parts company with his predecessors, for in defining America's response to terrorism and extremism Bush has made clear that the United States, in at least some circumstances, will no longer simply allow despotic governments to collapse under their own weight, but instead will take action to hasten or cause their demise. He will no longer excuse the policies of repression on the part of America's friends, but will call for thoroughgoing reforms.

This expansive strategy has important implications for the entire national security establishment, and diplomats and warriors alike are adapting to new demands and seeking to define new roles. Should the

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nation continue to pursue this strategy - and we believe that there is every evidence that it will<sup>2</sup> - the institutions of government will, of necessity, change and adapt, much as they did when America accepted new global responsibilities at the end of World War II.

#### **A NEW GRAND STRATEGY**

Just as in the late 1940s, when it took the emergence of a clear and compelling threat - Soviet expansionism backed by powerful military forces - to induce the United States to shake off its tradition of isolationism and adopt the strategy of containment, so too did the shock of 9/11 prompt this administration to put forth a far-reaching strategy. That strategy, the centerpiece of which is to promote democracy and freedom abroad, is the necessary response to conditions that can breed serious threats to the security of Americans worldwide and to their way of life. Although this strategy has roots in all post-Cold War administrations, it has been given clearest expression and the most expansive objectives by the current administration. As a consensus forms around the idea that the United States and its allies must work to extend the reach of freedom and democracy, this strategy will be recognized as the long-awaited replacement for containment.

The strategy is nothing if not ambitious. Pursuing this strategy in earnest will require the United States and its partners to marshal substantial levels of resources and to apply them with patience and commitment. It will also call for the involvement of, and significant changes to, America's armed forces.

#### **CONFLICT IN THE POST POST-COLD WAR WORLD**

U.S. grand strategy, along with the challenges posed by adversaries of the United States and its allies, will place daunting demands on America's military forces. Three developments in particular present novel and stern challenges to the armed forces of the United States:

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<sup>2</sup> In judging that the nation will continue on this path for the foreseeable future, we also recognize that different leaders will interpret this strategy in different ways. Just as "containment" was modified and adapted over the long years of the Cold War, so too will the strategy to export freedom and democracy take many forms.

- **Terrorist and insurgent groups.** The spread of technological know-how related to means of killing--ranging from powerful explosive devices to biological and, ultimately, nuclear weapons--is giving small groups the means to kill thousands. By harnessing militant interpretations of Islam to new means of violence, Al Qaeda and other such groups have created a virulent threat that all responsible states must act to defeat.
- **Regional powers with nuclear weapons.** States such as North Korea and Iran appear determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is possible that North Korea already possesses a limited nuclear arsenal. They and others, including terrorist organizations, have access to a world-wide supply chain that is not entirely under the control of states. If adversaries such as these succeed in fielding deliverable nuclear weapons the implications for regional stability and the security of our allies will be highly troubling. The leadership in Pyongyang, for example, seems to understand that if it precipitates a war on the Korean peninsula the ultimate outcome of that war will be the end of its regime. This reality has had a salutary deterrent effect on the regime's actions, if not its rhetoric. But unless a way is found to neutralize North Korea's nuclear weapons or its ability to deliver them, its leaders may come to believe that they could impose unacceptable costs on the United States and its allies and that regime change as a U.S. objective may be achievable only at prohibitive cost and risks. Such a shift in Pyongyang's calculus would be very dangerous.
- **Military competition in Asia.** Arguably, U.S. forces can prevail over the conventional forces of any nation, provided the full panoply of U.S. capabilities can be brought to bear. Recognizing this, regional adversaries are focusing their military investments on capabilities that can be used to impede U.S. forces from getting to the fight. China, with its burgeoning economy and growing technical sophistication, is

fielding the most impressive set of such capabilities. They include advanced air defenses, numerous systems for attacking surface ships, anti-satellite weapons, and, most troublingly, large numbers of accurate, long-range strike systems, principally conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. These weapons can not only keep U.S. expeditionary forces at bay for significant periods; they can also be used to coerce and intimidate the leadership of Taiwan and other states in the region.

#### **MEETING THESE CHALLENGES**

These developments carry several implications for U.S. defense planners:

- First, a substantial and sustained level of effort to suppress terrorist and insurgent groups abroad is essential if the nation is to make headway against the threats they pose. For DoD, this will sometimes take the form of direct action to locate and capture or kill terrorists and insurgents. Far more often, it will involve undertaking indirect actions, principally long-term, "hands on" efforts to train, equip, advise, and assist the forces of nations that seek to suppress these groups on their own territory.
- Related to this, U.S. forces will be called upon to help bring stability and security to nations struggling to implement democratic reforms. This will involve providing support to defeat internal threats and shoring up regional security to cope with external enemies.
- U.S. forces must develop and field far more effective means for locating and destroying or otherwise neutralizing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.
- U.S. forces must also ensure that they can overcome modern anti-access weapons and methods. Of particular urgency is the need for highly effective, wide-area defenses against theater ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles also are a concern.

America's new grand strategy, combined with daunting challenges emanating from states and from non-state adversaries, will impose extraordinary demands on U.S. armed forces. These demands will stress our forces both qualitatively (by creating needs for new types of capabilities) and quantitatively (calling for unprecedented levels of commitment abroad). At the same time, fiscal realities are placing strict limits on the resources available not only for defense but also for important related activities, such as counter-proliferation initiatives, international development assistance, and public diplomacy. This combination of an ambitious strategy, a dynamic and challenging threat environment, and tightly constrained resources creates a profound dilemma for military strategists and force planners. How might these factors be reconciled?

#### **RECASTING U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY**

The Defense Department first needs to define a new defense strategy that embraces the goal of extending the reach of democracy and freedom. Above all, this means placing far more emphasis than heretofore on the missions of security cooperation (i.e., training, equipping, advising, and assisting the security forces of friendly states) and stability operations. Practically speaking, this means that the force sizing criterion posited by the defense strategy of 2001--"1-4-2-1"--should be **recast**.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, the nation no longer will be able to limit its day-to-day activities and posture to only four regions where it is deemed to have important geopolitical interests, as classically defined: Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia. It is now clear that seemingly remote areas such as Afghanistan and Sudan, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, Central Asia, the Philippines and Indonesia can gestate serious threats not only

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to regional peace and stability but also to America and Americans. In fact, the number of places in which U.S. and allied forces might be called upon to engage in promoting stability, democracy, and military competence is indeterminate. Thus, in our assessment, "4" has, of necessity, become "n."

At the same time, familiar missions of deterring aggression, redressing imbalances in military power, and defeating aggression through large-scale power projection operations have not diminished in importance. In fact, these missions are, in some ways, becoming more challenging. Protecting U.S. national interests in Southwest Asia, East Asia, and elsewhere will demand that U.S. forces, in conjunction with those of our allies, remain able to defeat the forces of adversary states in more than one region. This is critically important not only to credibly deter our adversaries but also to assure our allies and partners. Needless to say, U.S. forces must also do whatever is necessary to protect the United States itself.

The question then becomes whether and how DoD can support a demanding "1-n-2-1" criterion for sizing and shaping the armed forces of the United States.

#### **A NEW DIVISION OF LABOR**

The first thing to recognize is that the demands of "1-n-2-1" need not apply equally to every branch of the armed forces. The imperative to promote stability, democracy, and military competence abroad will place the greatest demands on America's land forces--the Army and the Marine Corps--and special operations forces. Air and naval forces can make important contributions to these missions, principally in the areas of intelligence, lift, base operating support or offshore bases, and humanitarian support. But by and large, these missions call for substantial commitments of ground forces to work directly with their host country counterparts. By the same token, the most plausible major combat operations that U.S. forces might be called upon to fight in the years to come--involving Iran, China (over Taiwan) and North Korea--call for heavy commitments of air and naval forces and, in most cases, smaller numbers of U.S. land forces.

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Given limited resources, including limited numbers of people, the nation's leaders face a choice of where to apportion risk: either they can continue to ask U.S. ground forces to prepare for major wars and risk a diminished ability to operate effectively in stability, support, and advisory missions, or they can focus a much larger proportion of U.S. ground forces on such missions and accept the risk of shifting some of the burden for large force-on-force contingencies to air and naval forces. Given the demands of America's new grand strategy, the certainty of the need for stability, support, and advisory missions, and recent advances in the ability to use precision firepower to shape the battlefield to the ground commander's advantage, we suggest that DoD's leaders consider the latter course. Such a decision would place a greater sustained level of ground force effort in stability, support, and advisory missions by relieving the Army and the Marine Corps of the requirement to provide forces for more than one major war. Taking this step would help to keep overall demands on the forces of these two services manageable. Equally important, it would also permit substantial portions of both services to optimize training, doctrine, and equipment on the development of forces for manpower intensive operations now demanded by America's new grand strategy. Under this construct, the Navy and Air Force would retain their focus on large-scale power projection operations, though both services will be called upon to provide essential enabling capabilities to stability, support, and advisory missions. Both will also need to place much greater emphasis on defeating enemies armed with nuclear weapons and with more sophisticated anti-access capabilities than have heretofore been encountered.

#### **POTENTIAL ACTIONS**

The foregoing considerations suggest that DoD's leaders should consider the following actions to bring America's defense capabilities in better alignment with the nation's new grand strategy:

- **Recast U.S. defense strategy to incorporate "1-n-2-1" as the aggregate statement of demand for U.S. forces.** Consider relieving the Army and Marine Corps of the requirement to

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provide forces for more than one major combat operation at a time. Because of the need for ground forces to conduct a broad range of stability, support, and advisory operations, this should not prompt a decrease in the force structure or end strength of either the Army or Marine Corps, but it will affect the recruiting, training, and equipping and operating tempo of sizable portions of both services.

- **Complete the transition of the joint command structure.** Given that U.S. forces will likely be committed for extended periods of time to operations in many areas of the world, regional commanders need to remain focused on strategic matters, including achieving strategic victory in areas where U.S. forces are engaged. Regional commanders should not be involved in overseeing day-to-day activities in any single location. To relieve them of this requirement, more effective joint task force headquarters are needed. Ongoing efforts at U.S. Joint Forces Command should be buttressed as a step toward this goal. Moreover, the joint division of labor among regional commands, global commands, and military services and supporting agencies should be further clarified.
- **Complete the effort to realign U.S. global military posture.** Forces and supporting infrastructure need to be realigned to support operations aimed at new democracies, countering terrorist and insurgent groups, deterring and defeating regional adversaries, and dissuading military competition in Asia. Current plans should be implemented and reevaluated regularly to ensure that strategy and posture remain in proper alignment.
- **Increase investments in promising systems for surveillance and reconnaissance.** It should be the goal of defense planners to put an end to the situation in which sensor systems and the means to interpret the information they acquire are chronically treated as "low-density/high demand" assets. And efforts should be made to accelerate the development of new systems

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better suited to finding such targets as mobile missiles, nuclear weapons, and small groups of armed combatants.

- **Help to rebuild the nation's intelligence system--and by implication DoD's intelligence capabilities--by focusing first and foremost on the human dimension.** More and better-trained people are needed throughout the collection, assessment, and dissemination chain. Greater numbers of people with skills to understand the political and social dynamics of troubled regions are especially needed. Automation can be an aid, but is not a solution in and of itself.
- **Pursue an aggressive effort to develop and produce more effective defenses against theater ballistic and cruise missiles.** Truly effective defenses will require the fielding of larger numbers of existing systems for theater missile defense, both land- and sea-based, and deploying one or more additional "layers" of active defense.
- **Broker three "marriages" to achieve greater strategic and operational depth and joint tactical proficiency.** Even as greater differentiation among the capabilities of the military services is called for, new interdependencies need to be forged. We view this as something akin to brokering a new set of marriages among the military services.
  - **Marriage 1: Develop and implement plans for air and land forces to train more frequently to conduct highly integrated operations.** This will entail, inter alia, more frequent regular joint training and new fire control procedures.
  - **Marriage 2: Foster tighter links among air, naval, and space forces to create a more robust, more effective power projection force.** These links will require much more routine training and the development of more effective common command and control procedures and mechanisms.

- **Marriage 3: Promote a more seamless integration between the Marine Corps and U.S. special operations forces.** The Marine Corps' regular presence in troubled parts of the world should become the planning basis for sensitive special operations missions.

To achieve these goals, just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act created incentives for the best officers to seek joint assignments, the services should change incentive structures to make involvement in joint training in these areas a major criterion for promotion to more senior positions.

- **Greatly expand the capacity and competence of forces devoted to combat advisory and training missions.** The most effective means for DoD to counter terrorist groups abroad is to train, equip, advise, and assist the forces of friendly governments. Substantial portions of the "regular" forces must contribute to this vital mission. Although the largest number of advisors will likely come from the Army and Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force advisory capabilities need to expand as well. Foreign Area Officer (FAO) programs in the services are essential to develop the language skills and cultural understanding necessary to be effective analysts and advisors. Although each of the services is expanding their respective programs to address these needs, substantially more will need to be done.
- **Direct the Army to explore creating two distinct elements within its structure capable of carrying out traditional and non-traditional missions. One element would specialize in conventional warfighting operations and the other element would specialize in stability, support, and advisory operations.** Training constraints will prevent the Army from fully preparing its entire tactical structure for both conventional warfighting and stability operations. By realigning its structure, the Army would free the units assigned to conventional missions to prepare more fully for warfighting operations and free units assigned to stability, support, and advisory operations to

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prepare more fully for those difficult missions. The result will be that the Army should become more proficient at both.

- **Direct the Army to create doctrine and professional military education curricula devoted to the conduct of stability, support, and advisory operations.**
- **Direct the Air Force to undertake a fundamental re-evaluation of its concepts for large-scale power projection operations, assessing in particular the implications for its mix of long- and short-range platforms.** The USAF's planned investments in new combat aircraft implicitly reflect the belief that forces will be able to deploy forward and conduct high-tempo operations from air bases within or close to the theater of conflict. Such assumptions seem increasingly ill-advised. A platform mix that placed greater emphasis on long-range reconnaissance and strike would provide commanders with more options for basing aircraft in areas less threatened by attack from enemy missiles and would provide a more robust means for striking adversaries and providing support to forces on the battlefield.
- **Direct U.S. air forces to train more frequently with U.S. SOF and the ground forces of friendly nations to provide operational support during counter-insurgency operations.** U.S. air forces can provide friendly forces with critical surveillance, strike, and lift support without imposing a large footprint in the host country. When combined with competent local ground forces, they can be extremely effective against insurgents.

Finally, while striving to fix what is broken, the Department of Defense should be careful not to break what is fixed. The U.S. armed forces are the most powerful and successful in the world, perhaps in history. Their dominance of the conventional "force on force" battlefield is so overwhelming that it has, among other things, rendered a whole class of historically troubling scenarios--massed cross-border aggression by large, armored forces--largely obsolete. Maintaining the

capabilities that have created this situation is critically important. Continued, selective investment in the areas in which the United States currently enjoys "overmatch" will be needed alongside the new initiatives required to solve the nation's emerging security problems.

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

This report began as a series of discussions in the hallways of RAND in the late winter and early spring of 2005. What arose from these discussions was a growing conviction among the authors that responsibilities being levied upon our armed forces had become so numerous and tasks assigned to them so complex that multiple components of the defense establishment, including command arrangements, overseas posture, key programs, training regimes, and the defense strategy itself, had to change. The authors are especially grateful to Natalie Crawford, Vice President of RAND Project AIR FORCE, who reviewed the manuscript closely, offered numerous suggestions for improvement, and helped expedite the draft through the publications process. Bruce Bennett, James Dobbins, and Joseph Wood also provided valuable comments and recommendations. The contributions of Colleen O'Connor were especially noteworthy: she managed the schedules and inputs of the contributors and ensured that the materials we developed were coherent and complete.

**GLOSSARY**

ABL	Airborne Laser
ANGLICO	Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies
CATS	Combined Arms Training Strategy
DoD	Department of Defense
FAO	Foreign Area Officer
FCS	Future Combat System
FM	Field Manual
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
IMET	International Military Education and Training
MCO	Major Combat Operation
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
PAF	Project AIR FORCE
PLA	Peoples' Liberation Army
PLAAF	PLA Air Force
PLAN	PLA Navy
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SBIRS	Space-Based Infra-Red System
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TDM	Theater Ballistic Missile
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UAV	Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
VTOL	Vertical Takeoff and Landing

## 1. EXPORTING FREEDOM

The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union set off a debate in this country--and indeed throughout much of the world--on what would be the successor strategy to the long years of containment. With Communist expansion no longer the focus for American foreign and defense policy, analysts and practitioners alike considered fundamental questions regarding the future role of America in the world. Their conclusions ranged from calls for a "new isolationism" to declarations of a "unipolar moment," with many variations in between.\* Some commentators focused on America's economic leadership in the world, others talked of America's responsibility in supporting and defending democracy abroad. Almost all who were involved in the debate wondered how America would redefine its leadership role in the world and how the world would respond to America's new pursuits.

Looking back over these last fifteen years, it is now clear that America has indeed adopted a new approach to the world, that this approach is ambitious, and that the focus of American leadership will be on supporting and defending the emergence of freedom and democracy abroad. If America's role in the Cold War was to lead in the "defense of freedom,"<sup>5</sup> then America's goal in this new era is to expand the reach of freedom. This is the position not only of the current administration, but also that of its predecessors and almost certainly its successors. In short, the successor strategy to containment is, ultimately, to export freedom to all corners of the globe--occasionally by force of arms.

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<sup>4</sup> For a sampling of this debate, see William G. Hyland, "America's New Course," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1990; Theodore Sorensen, "Rethinking National Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1990; Paul H. Nitze, "America: Honest Broker," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1990; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991; Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World*, 1991/1992.

<sup>5</sup> In his 1953 inaugural address, Dwight D. Eisenhower exclaimed, "Freedom is pitted against slavery; lightness against dark..Conceiving the defense of freedom, like freedom itself, to be one and indivisible, we hold all continents and peoples in equal regard and honor."

On the 20th of January 2005, President George W. Bush took the oath of office for his second term as President of the United States. Upon taking the oath, Bush made clear that "America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one." Our commitment to our own freedom now would define our relations with others.

Bush went on: "The survival of liberty in our own land increasingly depends upon the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope of peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world ... [I]t is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."<sup>6</sup>

These sentiments were not new for this president. Introducing his 2002 national security strategy, Bush wrote, "The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom--and a single, sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise... We seek to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic **liberty**."<sup>7</sup>

To be sure, the roots of this strategy are drawn from America's long experiences in the world<sup>8</sup> and from its great 20th century struggles

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<sup>6</sup> Bush, George W., "Second Inaugural Address," Washington, D.C., January 20, 2005.

<sup>7</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002.

<sup>8</sup> The debate over the importance of supporting democracy abroad is nearly as old as the Republic itself. U.S. foreign policy during George Washington's second term as president was dominated by a debate over whether the United States should lend support to revolutionary France or remain neutral. Thomas Jefferson favored U.S. intervention to support the fledgling democracy, while Alexander Hamilton argued, successfully, for neutrality. See [www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/gw1.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/gw1.html).

against fascism and **communism**.<sup>9</sup> But the roots also are found in the policies of Bush's immediate predecessors: Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush. Both men saw it as America's mission to bring freedom to others in the world, and both men acted to reinforce the gains of freedom where they could. For George H. W. Bush, one of his key goals was to "strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual **rights**."<sup>10</sup> In practical terms, this meant providing tangible support to the new democracies of Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the Soviet Union, as well as providing support to democratic forces within Russia itself. For Clinton, who established as one of three national security goals "to promote democracy **abroad**,"<sup>11</sup> it meant securing the gains of freedom by enlarging NATO, fostering new relationships in the Americas, supporting the democratic movement in South Africa, developing relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and supporting democratic elections throughout East **Asia**.<sup>12</sup>

#### **AMERICA'S NEW GRAND STRATEGY**

Extending the reach of freedom formed the West's response to the immediate end of the Cold War--supporting "a Europe whole and free" encompassing the former members of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, including the unification of Germany. It was the basis for U.S. policy

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<sup>9</sup> Recall, for example, Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms. Roosevelt, Franklin D., "The 'Four Freedoms,'" speech delivered to The Congress of the United States, Washington, D.C., January 6, 1941. Consider also John F. Kennedy's Inaugural Address, where he stated "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." Kennedy, John F., Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1961.

<sup>10</sup> See, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, August 1991, p. 3. For a discussion of the elder Bush's views at the time, see Bush, George and Brent Snowcroft, *A World Transformed*, New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1998.

<sup>11</sup> Clinton's other goals were "to credibly sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight" and "to bolster America's economic revitalization." See, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, July 1994.

<sup>12</sup> For a separate discussion, see Albright, Madeline, *Madame Secretary*, New York, N.Y.: Miramax Books, 2003.

in Central and Eastern Europe and in Central and South America throughout the 1990s. It motivated the U.S. response to support the end of apartheid in South Africa. It has guided U.S. interactions throughout large portions of Asia, China being an important exception. It has been a source of friction for U.S. policy in the greater Middle East and ultimately became the basis for U.S. interactions with the Palestinian Authority. And it has remained an important aspiration for U.S. policy in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and large portions of Africa.

Now, most importantly, the assumption that democracy is the foundation of lasting peace motivates a central component of the nation's response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. For not only did the United States respond to those tragic events by bringing its might against those who perpetrated the attacks, it also displaced the Taliban regime that hosted Al Qaeda and sought--and still seeks today--to leave in its place a free Afghan people governed by democratic principles. Within little more than a year, America set for itself similar goals in Iraq: to free the Iraqi people from a despotic regime that had repeatedly threatened its neighbors, attacked its own citizens, and was purported to possess weapons of mass destruction.

And it is here that the strategy of this administration has taken an important and arguably fundamentally different turn. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, America was no longer content simply to await opportunities to extend freedom as such opportunities arose; it would now commit itself to creating opportunities for exporting freedom, even if, at times, that should require the force of arms. If American freedoms were to be protected at home, freedom needed to take broader and deeper roots abroad. The defeat of Saddam Hussein, arguably the worst tyrant in his region, was seen as the first step towards reshaping the broader Middle East to introduce more liberal institutions and thereby ameliorate the

conditions that spawned **terrorism**.<sup>13</sup> At least for this administration, the link between freedom abroad, especially in troubled regions, and American security crystallized into the basis for long-term strategic action.<sup>14</sup>

Although American leaders will differ over the intensity with which to pursue this overriding goal and the methods used to export freedom abroad, it seems likely that just as this and past American presidents have committed themselves to this goal, so too will future American presidents.<sup>15</sup>

The strategy for exporting freedom will take many forms:

- Providing support to non-violent democratic movements throughout the globe, such as the velvet, rose, and orange revolutions<sup>16</sup>
- Providing aid and encouragement to democratic regimes in newly independent countries
- Where appropriate, extending security commitments to emerging democracies

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<sup>13</sup> As this text is being written, American leaders are calling for free elections in Egypt and have argued aggressively for democratic reforms throughout the greater Middle East. For a discussion on the near-term prospects for liberalization in Egypt, see Jackson Diehl, "Battle for Egypt's Future," *Washington Post*, April 25, 2005, p. A19. For a brief discussion of pressures within Saudi Arabia, see "Should the West Always Be Worried if Islamists Win Elections," *The Economist*, April 28, 2005.

<sup>14</sup> For a separate, impassioned discussion on the case for spreading freedom and democracy abroad, see Sharansky, Natan, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004.

<sup>15</sup> As an illustration, in the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign John Kerry argued, "...we will promote the development of free and democratic societies throughout the Arab and Muslim World. Millions of people there share our values of human rights, and our hopes for a better life for the next generation. We must reach out to them and yes we must promote democracy. I will be clear with repressive governments in the region that we expect to see them change--not just for our sake but for their own survival." Kerry, John, Remarks at Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, September 24, 2004.

<sup>16</sup> This, of course, refers to the democratic movements in the Czech Republic, Georgia, and, most recently, Ukraine.

- Pressuring friendly regimes that restrict freedom by limiting aid and support
- Aiming to defeat those groups, movements, and individuals that threaten the freedom and security of others, particularly global terrorist organizations
- Enforcing "responsible sovereignty" by challenging regimes to protect freedoms within their **own** boundaries and to prohibit outlaw activity, especially terrorism
- When feasible, ending the rule of the most repressive regimes.

There is no question that America's new grand strategy comes with controversy and risk; the Iraqi insurgency, for example, is an unintended consequence of U.S. efforts to depose Saddam Hussein. Americans themselves, although unquestionably supportive of their freedoms at home, are divided over the extent to which America should be not only a beacon for freedom abroad, but also play the role of liberator and enforcer.<sup>17</sup> Likewise, some of America's long-time friends and allies are concerned about the spillover effects of pushing too hard, too fast to open societies that have long been under repressive rule. Indeed, leaders of some pro-American states are concerned not only about the effects abroad, but also about the impact that instability and upheaval abroad could have within their **own societies**.<sup>18</sup> Some of America's new partners are grateful for American support to their **own** causes, but are reluctant to assume the risks of supporting American goals for freedom in other **lands**.<sup>19</sup> And, of course, several of America's long-time partners--Egypt and Saudi Arabia come to mind--and

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<sup>17</sup> For example, in The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations' "Global Views 2004," where only 14 percent of those surveyed thought that "helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations" was a very important foreign policy goal; 27 percent of the people thought this goal was not important. This compares with 73 percent of those surveyed who thought "preventing the spread of nuclear weapons" was a very important foreign policy goal.

<sup>18</sup> See for example, Rabasa (2004). See also Zakaria (2003).

<sup>19</sup> For example, consider declines in support for providing troops in Iraq. See for example, Robin Wright and Josh White, "U.S. Moves to Preserve Iraq Coalition," *Washington Post*, February 25, 2005, p. A1.

new partners in the war on terrorism--Pakistan and Uzbekistan to name two--are at best ambivalent towards America's goals for freedom and at worst strongly against them.<sup>20</sup>

**NEW FRIENDS, NEW COMMITMENTS, NEW TENSIONS**

America's new strategy has won many important supporters and friends. Key allies, such as Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and Australia, firmly back America's goals, even as debate about such support continues within their own societies. New allies and partners, such as Poland, Romania, and Georgia, have pledged support to America's goals and have provided visible assistance, in the form of troops, to aid in advancing these goals.

But just as new partners are prepared to provide support, they will also rely for their own security on America's commitment and support. Political and economic liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe was followed by security commitments in the form of NATO enlargement. For now, these commitments come at a relatively low cost to the United States, given the relatively benign circumstances in Europe. But the future remains uncertain, and new challenges could place additional demands on America and its NATO partners thus raising the stakes on what it actually means to enlarge the alliance.

The same is true in Asia. Although America's democratic partners in Asia generally are more prosperous and thus able to provide more effectively for their own security, security challenges in Asia also are more difficult, as will be discussed subsequently. Just as many of America's Asian allies are prepared to support America's goals for freedom beyond Asia, we should also expect that America's allies in Asia will look for stronger American commitments to deal with mounting security challenges within the region where they live.

America today is deeply involved in Afghanistan and Iraq. Long-term security relationships have not yet been the subject of open discussion, but we should expect that, as political institutions mature in these

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<sup>20</sup> "Egypt Criticizes U.S. 'Democracy' Initiative, Jordan, Qatar, Israel Welcome," *IslamOnline*, December 13, 2004. See also, "Should the West Always be Worried if Islamists Win Elections," *The Economist*, April 28, 2005.

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countries, political leaders in both countries will desire to engage the United States in a debate about how to protect new-found freedoms and provide for long-term security.

Even when America's allies and partners are prepared to provide support for America's broader goals of freedom, such support will inevitably be conditional. In some cases, the risks that America is asking others to share are not always ones that America's partners are prepared to accept. And when they do accept a role in sharing these risks, America's partners, particularly its newest partners, generally seek something tangible in return, like money, which is relatively easy to provide, or special status, which can be more difficult and may not always be that meaningful (note the proliferation of non-NATO ally status), or a commitment to deal with their own security problems, which can be the most difficult, particularly when it may involve the United States taking sides among potential partners.

Sharing risks also means sharing in the rewards. Allies and partners that share in America's risks want a much greater voice in the decisions being taken. They will have a stake in the outcomes that America seeks--indeed they may want very different outcomes than those that America seeks--and therefore will want to shape events in conference rooms as well as on battlefields. American leaders, in turn, will need to respect these desires and create modalities so that those who share in the risks have a voice in shaping the outcomes.

Others, of course, are deeply conflicted about America's new strategy. Some of America's partners, particularly its partners in the war on terrorism, worry that America's pursuit of freedom will bring about the fall of its purported friends. Following his ousting in the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze is said to have warned his fellow leaders in the Caucasus and Central Asia that America's support for internal reforms ultimately would lead to their own demise. Though these leaders are prepared to partner with the United States to achieve very specific aims, they may be wary of America's ultimate goals. Observers throughout the Middle East certainly harbor similar apprehensions.

These apprehensions are not limited to small, regional states. China has expressed strong resentment of America's calls for freedom. While generally supportive of America's narrower goals of defeating global terrorism, China's leadership remains suspicious of America's broader ambitions for freedom and its demands that human rights be **respected**,<sup>21</sup> especially if that were to mean the end of communist party rule. And China has expressed grave concerns over calls for freedom in Taiwan, especially when those calls are linked to support for Taiwan's independence.

Russia, too, is suspicious of Washington's motives, both for Russia itself and for the area that Russia considers its "near **abroad**."<sup>22</sup> Russian leaders remain concerned that as Washington establishes closer relationships with states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, it will encroach on areas of traditional Russian influence and foment instability that could directly affect Russia itself. Although Vladimir Putin recently stated that there is no turning back on Russian **democracy**,<sup>23</sup> Russia objects to Washington asserting its views about how freedoms should be manifested within Russian society.

And more recently, China and Russia have sought to cooperate in setting limits to the reach of American efforts to export democracy abroad.<sup>24</sup>

#### **WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR AMERICA'S ARMED FORCES?**

America's armed forces have been and will continue to be affected deeply by America's new grand strategy. As the United States assumes new commitments, America's military forces will be called upon to support

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<sup>21</sup> The Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, *The Human Rights Record of the United States in 2004*, March 3, 2005.

<sup>22</sup> Russia considers the "near abroad" the other fourteen former Soviet Republics that declared their independence by the time the Soviet Union broke up at the end of 1991.

<sup>23</sup> Bush, George W. and Vladimir Putin, statements at joint press conference, Bratislava, Slovak Republic, February 24, 2005.

<sup>24</sup> For more on Russian and Chinese cooperation, see David Holley, "Russia, China Team Up to Assail U.S. Foreign Policy," *Los Angeles Times*, July 2, 2005.

and defend those **commitments**.<sup>25</sup> As the United States supports freedom and independence for others, America's forces will be called upon to advise, support, train, and assist the forces of likeminded states. As the United States continues to fight the war on terrorism, America's forces will be heavily involved as advisors and supporters as well as combatants. As America and its partners seek to halt the proliferation of dangerous weapons and technologies to hostile regimes--which, in many instances, are the regimes most hostile to America's goals for freedom--America's forces will be called upon to provide intelligence, track the movement of people and goods, intercept banned weapons and cargo, and occasionally strike with force against weapons, facilities, and command and control complexes. And finally, in fewer but not unimaginable circumstances, American forces could again be called upon to be liberators and enforcers of freedom abroad.

Add these tasks to more traditional roles of protecting America at home, defending Americans abroad, protecting maritime, air, space, and cyberspace commons, securing America's allies (now against a much wider array of challenges), and projecting American power to defend against aggression and coercion, and it becomes clear that America's armed forces will be called upon to conduct an ever more diverse set of missions and activities. How better to provide the forces and capabilities most needed to meet the demands of these requirements is the focus of the chapters that follow.

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<sup>25</sup> As one simple example, when NATO grew first from **16** to **19** nations, then **19** to **26** nations, there came with that growth a new American military commitment to work with NATO's new partners. And while this will not likely require significant new presence of American military forces, it will place significant demands on American forces to interact, train, and exercise with all **26** NATO member nations.

## **2. THE SHOCK OF THE NEW: CONFLICT IN THE POST POST-COLD WAR WORLD**

While U.S. grand strategy is one important source of change in the geopolitical environment, it is not the sole, or even primary, force at work; the world has dynamics and logics of its **own** that strategy must accommodate or change. While the security environment may exhibit a rough equilibrium for protracted periods, it is subject to occasional and often unpredictable eruptions of change. The world experienced one such seismic shock in the early **1990s** when the Soviet Union imploded and the Cold War, which had dominated American security thinking and military planning for four decades, came unexpectedly to an end. Even fifteen years later, the U.S. security establishment has yet to adapt fully to the aftershocks of this sudden, seismic shift in the geopolitical landscape. Nevertheless, however complete or incomplete the Pentagon's transition from its Cold War mind set, it today confronts another set of new circumstances that will require major adjustments in institutions, forces, and posture. The ambitious strategy outlined in the preceding chapter is motivated in large measure by these challenges.

The symbolic mileposts for this latest transition are, of course, the September **11**, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., but the changes were in train long before that day, the threat of which the strikes on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are emblematic is just one of three contemporary challenges that the nation must confront: terrorism and insurgency, nuclear proliferation, and the emergence of China. All stem to some extent from the diffusion of technological know-how and power, including the power of lethal and large-scale violence, associated with the processes of globalization now underway. And, while U.S. grand strategy can aspire in the mid- to long-term to ameliorate each of the three, they represent a reality that in the near term--meaning, essentially, for the policy-relevant future--must be managed.

**CHAOS BLEEDS: TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY**

In the forefront of the nation's security concerns today are, of course, the related problems of terrorism and insurgency. Al Qaeda's attacks on the United States and its allies—not just on September 11th, but also in Spain, East Africa, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and elsewhere—demonstrate that small but motivated groups of individuals can inflict severe damage at places and times that generally cannot be anticipated. The experience in Iraq, meanwhile, has reminded Americans of the costs and difficulties of fighting against an insurgent opponent that is well integrated into the local environment and capable of disrupting and distorting normal social, economic, and political life. Today, the United States is engaged in what may prove to be a prolonged and wide-ranging struggle against what some observers have called a "global insurgency"—a nexus of terrorists, guerrillas, criminals, and others who reject the global order promoted by the West and seek to undermine American power and influence. These enemies pose serious challenges: they lack well defined and easily identifiable centers of gravity, they are resilient and adaptive, they are deeply unpredictable, and they are ambitious in their strategic goals.

The challenges inherent in this confrontation are manifold. To begin with, the threat is global in two respects. First, it is apparent that sophisticated terrorist groups like Al Qaeda have developed "networking" capabilities that allow widely dispersed individuals and cells to work together in mounting complex attacks. Planning and preparations for the September 11th hijackings, for example, appear to have involved operatives in North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. Second, it is almost impossible to rule out a priori any potential target from being at risk. We know little about the targeting processes or preferences of our adversaries save what we have learned from the proverbial "flaming data," which suggest that terrorists and insurgents will strike at such diverse things as power lines, discothèques, and the military headquarters of

the most powerful nation on **earth**,<sup>26</sup> Any strategy for countering terrorism that pays insufficient heed to these qualities of the opposition runs the risk of pursuing little more than a lethal and expensive game of responding after the fact rather than anticipating and disrupting potential operations.

Second, because the threat is adaptable and can manifest itself almost anywhere, point defense becomes a mug's game. There are some highly exposed targets—U.S. embassies in troubled areas, for example—and others of sufficient importance (facilities associated with critical consequence management functions come to mind) as to merit some degree of protection. But in general, attempts to protect everything will likely result in protecting nothing, and the best that can be done is to try to close the most obvious avenues of attack (pre-September 11th airline security being the most notorious example) while taking the fight to the enemy.

Finally, the struggle will be a long one and will assume many forms and shapes. Already we have seen—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Central Asia, the Philippines, and elsewhere—how individual missions can last years, and involve anywhere from dozens to tens of thousands of personnel in roles ranging from support and training through sustained direct combat. U.S. military forces will be called upon to mount and sustain multiple prolonged operations of very different sizes and purposes in widely separated parts of the world. In a sense, we may be seeing a redefinition of what "forward presence" means: rather than mechanized brigades and fighter wings sitting in a few garrisons waiting for a crisis to erupt, U.S. forces will instead be scattered around the world, usually in smaller deployments, with the goal of heading off threats before they materialize. This is a very different kind of tasking, and

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<sup>26</sup> There has, of course, been no lack of studies on the future of terrorism since September 2001. A brief but quite trenchant one is Bruce Hoffman, *Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities*, Santa Monica; RAND, P-8078, 2003. Please see also Kim Cragin, S. A. Daly, *The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1782-AF, 2004.

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carrying it out successfully will call for new kinds of capabilities from each of the services.

#### THE NEW NUCLEAR EQUATION

New challenges are arising, too, on the opposite end of spectrum of conflict: in the realm of inter-state warfare-what the Pentagon has sometimes referred to as "major combat operations," or MCOs. For the past century, these "big wars" have generally been the focal point of U.S. defense planning, whether the opponent was projected to be Japan or Germany in the 1930s, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites throughout the Cold War, or Iraq and North Korea since 1990. When called upon to fight these enemies, U.S. forces have proven to be very successful, especially over the past 15 years. Future MCOs will be quite different, however, than the 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq. One major component of that difference is the role nuclear weapons are likely to play in future crises.

For decades, the global non-proliferation regime, exemplified by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), had served as the backbone of efforts to halt or slow the spread of nuclear weapons. A key aspect of this regime's success was that, for most of the nuclear age, both the weapons and know-how for manufacturing them remained in the hands of nations that by and large had little if any incentive to spread either around.<sup>27</sup> The adoption of the NPT formalized this situation, committing the then-nuclear powers to cooperate in limiting the diffusion of nuclear weapons. As was perhaps inevitable, however, recent years have seen the acquisition of nuclear arms by countries that have proven less responsible in the management of their new capabilities. While there is as yet no available evidence to suggest that complete and functioning nuclear weapons have changed hands, or even that substantial quantities of weapons-grade fissile materials have been transferred, weapons

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<sup>27</sup> The Soviets, for example, were so concerned about the possible spread of nuclear technology that they reneged on a deal to provide a prototype weapon to China, a decision that cemented the split between Moscow and Beijing that wound up outlasting the U.S.S.R. itself. See Andrew J. Nathan and R. S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress*, New York; Norton, 1998.

technology has certainly leaked, whether as a deliberate act of state policy, as is likely the case with North Korea, or as a result of individual actions, as demonstrated by the behavior of the A.Q. Khan "network" in Pakistan. Either way, the nuclear genie is today well out of the bottle, and prudent U.S. planners at both the strategic and operational levels must seriously contemplate the implications of a proliferated world for American concepts of national defense and power projection.

Cold War-era deterrence rested on a number of convictions that were held in one form or another by all three parties, most importantly by the United States and the Soviet **Union**.<sup>28</sup> One was that the sides' mutual interest in avoiding a potentially cataclysmic confrontation far outweighed their stakes in any of the disagreements that would inevitably arise between them; another was that neither side would deliberately provoke a deep crisis between them. Within these broad constraints, both Moscow and Washington tried to define the boundaries of acceptable behavior often by pushing them, most dramatically in 1962 when Khrushchev almost catastrophically underestimated the United States' reaction to the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. But, for the most part, the Cold War adversaries respected the rules of the deterrence game. Indeed, the United States imposed fairly substantial constraints on its military operations in both Korea and Vietnam out of a perceived need to avoid provoking escalatory responses from Moscow and Beijing.

Neither of these two foundations of a relatively robust deterrent relationship may hold between the United States and a nuclear-armed North Korea or other nuclear-armed **foes**.<sup>29</sup> In the case of Korea, for example, the risk of conflict may not be determined solely, or even primarily, by Pyongyang's external circumstances. Internationally

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<sup>28</sup> Although Mao's China sometimes asserted that it did not accept the logic of deterrence, or at least did not believe that it applied to Beijing's relationships with the United States and the U.S.S.R., its international behavior generally accorded with the tenets of the model.

<sup>29</sup> This discussion will focus on the problems posed by a North Korean bomb. We believe, and argue elsewhere, that a similar logic would inform the U.S. position vis à vis a hostile and nuclear-armed Iran, or other regional adversary with nuclear arms.

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isolated, desperately poor, and politically underdeveloped to the point of self-caricature, it is not implausible that North Korea may prove to be so unstable that, confronting some domestic crisis, it could strike out against outside enemies, real or perceived. Even the most conciliatory U.S. policy might prove inadequate to prevent such an outcome with its accompanying risk of nuclear use.

Yet, U.S. policy towards North Korea seems unlikely to be conciliatory. Unlike the situation in the Cold War, the United States may have interests outside the immediate confines of the cross-DMZ confrontation that outweigh the risks of a confrontation with Pyongyang. For example, concerns over proliferation of nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, could prompt Washington to seek a showdown with the North, especially if there is a risk of a terrorist group such as Al Qaeda being on the receiving end. Under such circumstances, Kim Jong Il would almost certainly, and probably correctly, believe that his rule was at risk and thus could be motivated to use every tool at his disposal, including nuclear weapons, in his attempts to ward off American pressure. In other words, the constraints on escalation that the nuclear powers have long relied on in dealing with one another may not apply in North Korea, where the stakes of any confrontation with the United States are apt to be perceived by the leadership in Pyongyang as mortal. Whether the crisis erupts due to internal convulsions within North Korea or out of external pressures applied to it, U.S. planners must contend with the very real possibility that any future war on the Korean peninsula could include the use of nuclear weapons. This raises serious political and operational problems.

The most interesting political challenges posed by a nuclear North Korea stem from the reversal of the classic extended deterrence logic that long prevailed between the United States and its allies. Throughout the Cold War, the United States linked its nuclear weapons to the security of its core allies by threatening retaliation against the Soviet Union for any attack on, for example, West Germany or Japan. In doing so, the United States was attempting to protect important and shared interests—the security of its partners—by exposing itself to a risk of Soviet counter-attack. Today in Northeast Asia, the situation

may be reversed. In pursuit of common goals, such as non-proliferation, the United States may be asking Japan and South Korea—who would be directly endangered by any North Korean nuclear arsenal—to assume risks against which Washington can offer no viable defense or credible **response.**<sup>30</sup> The complexities this turnaround of risk dynamics could introduce into alliance relations, and the attendant difficulties in basing and access that it could cause, should be of concern to U.S. strategists and planners. The coercive effects of nuclear weapons in the hands of adversaries could be substantial; whether or not North Korea, for example, explicitly brandished its arsenal as an Northeast Asian crisis unfolded, both Seoul and Tokyo would have to factor the extraordinary existential risks associated with confronting a nuclear power into their behavior, with perhaps dangerous consequences for U.S. political and military freedom of action.

Operationally, of course, nuclear weapons will give North Korea offensive options against both military and civilian targets within range of its delivery systems, which likely will include most of Japan in addition to all of South Korea. Key U.S. bases at Osan, Kunsan, Misawa, and on Okinawa will be at risk, as will population centers like Seoul, Pusan, and **Tokyo.**<sup>31</sup> While active defenses and hardening could enhance the survivability of military installations and, to a lesser extent, cities, for the foreseeable future there is no means of assuring that either type of target could be protected against nuclear attack.

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<sup>30</sup> The United States has obvious quantitative and qualitative nuclear superiority over North Korea and could threaten massive retaliation against it in response to attacks on U.S. allies in Asia. However, given that the North Korean leadership would probably believe that their survival was at stake no matter what course they were to choose, it is not clear that **merely** changing the means of their threatened destruction would have a profound deterrent effect. Further, in a fight that is not for the survival of the United States, nuclear attacks that carry with them the prospect of immense casualties among the adversary's civilian population could seem morally reprehensible to U.S. leaders and citizens alike. Finally, creating further devastation than would already exist absent nuclear strikes (indeed, even absent any war at all) would have profound and negative consequences in the postwar period.

<sup>31</sup> For a recent revelation on North Korea's Nuclear capabilities, see Bradley Graham and Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea Nuclear Advance is Cited," *Washington Post*, April 29, 2005, p. 1.

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## THE RISE OF CHINA

The re-emergence of China as a true "great power" is a third major force that will shape the security environment in coming years and beyond. The world's most populous country, China has over the past three decades built the planet's second-largest national **economy**.<sup>32</sup> Beijing's reputation has also grown as the country transitioned from the Maoist period to its more modern, outwardly-oriented profile.

From a security perspective, the growing power of China's military is a challenge to the existing order in East Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has stood unrivalled as the pre-eminent military power in East Asia and has likewise been the ultimate guarantor of stability in the region. Even if Beijing's integration into the global community continues to be by and large a peaceful process, the emergence of a large and modern Chinese military is altering the balance of power in Asia in unsettling ways. Helping shape modern China's debut on the world stage into a positive development while simultaneously hedging against the possibility that it could turn more hostile is a major and enduring challenge for U.S. security policy.

The status of Taiwan is the principal issue of contention in the Sino-U.S. relationship. While the United States withdrew from its defense treaty with Taipei in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act has required every Administration since to pay close attention to the cross-Strait military balance. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan—which the Chinese regime considers a renegade province—have engendered periodic and almost predictable eruptions of outrage from Beijing, but to little avail; through it all, U.S. policy on the China-Taiwan issue has remained remarkably consistent, calling on both sides to keep the peace and to resolve the question of sovereignty over the island in a manner consistent with the will of the people of Taiwan. Today, the status of Taiwan is the most contentious point in the Sino-U.S. relationship and one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the **world**.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> According to the 2004 edition of the CIA *World Factbook*, China's 2003 GDP of about \$6.5 trillion trailed only that of the United States and was nearly double that of third-place Japan.

<sup>33</sup> As China's strength and self-confidence grow, it is possible that other points of contention will arise between Beijing and

The cross-Strait dilemma has been heightened in recent years by China's growing political, economic, and military power. Beginning in the 1970s deep economic reform unleashed a Chinese economy that had, by 2003, grown to be one of the largest in the world. Increased prosperity has turned out to be a double-edged sword for China's Communist leaders, however. On the one hand, China's new wealth means greater regional and global influence and it creates resources to build all elements of the "comprehensive national power" sought by Beijing. On the other, the overtly capitalist aspects of the new economy have once and for all vanquished the gods of Chinese Marxism-Leninism without offering satisfactory replacements. Beijing's solution has been to seek regime legitimacy by delivering continued economic growth and through appeals to nationalism.

So far, their strategy has succeeded. China's economy continues to turn in impressive growth year after year. And, although it faces some real challenges managing, for example, the sharply skewed distribution of wealth between the modernized coastal provinces and the less-developed interior regions, a return to pre-reform ways of doing business seems unthinkable. Similarly, the leadership has scored two historic successes by achieving the return of Hong Kong and Macao, both lost to European powers in the pre-Communist era. The last colonial "humiliation" to be rectified by China is the loss of Taiwan, which was ceded to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki that in 1895 ended the Sino-Japanese War.

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Washington. To take a current example, China has conflicting objectives in dealing with North Korea. On one hand, China desires a non-nuclear Korean peninsula; on the other, however, concerns over the likely consequences of any unrest in North Korea lead it to strongly prefer a stable regime in Pyongyang. For the United States, the goal of denying North Korea a nuclear capability trumps any concerns over internal stability there. While it is unlikely that such differences would cause the U.S. and China to come to blows, the example does point to the possibility that multiple sources of friction could, and likely will, emerge as China becomes more vocal about and active in the defense of its perceived interests in Asia and elsewhere. As is the case with North Korean nuclear weapons, these issues will complicate not just Sino-U.S. relations but also America's ties with its allies and friends, such as Japan and South Korea.

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Since at least the **mid-1990s**, Beijing has had concerns that Taiwan may be slipping out of its grasp. While only a minority on the island advocate outright independence—a step that China has repeatedly warned could result in an all-out attack on Taiwan—the Chinese leadership fears that Taiwan's increasing democratization and the growing "Taiwanization" of its culture and politics are pulling it further and further from the mainland. While China is unlikely to risk war to compel unification per se, most analysts agree that Beijing is serious when it says that it will consider using force to prevent a final break between Beijing and Taipei. To this end, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has been tasked with developing a range of military options for pressuring and, if necessary, conquering Taiwan.<sup>34</sup>

While no longer bound by treaty to Taiwan's defense, the United States remains the third main player in the cross-Straits security dynamic. Isolated from other major providers of military hardware, Taiwan depends heavily on the United States to help it maintain a defensive posture against the mainland. Moreover, the Chinese leadership probably regards direct U.S. intervention in a China-Taiwan conflict as highly likely. Accordingly, China's military modernization, which has been underway for many years but has accelerated in the past half-decade, has two primary goals: deterring or preventing an effective U.S. military intervention in a cross-Straits military offensive and compelling an isolated Taiwanese leadership to surrender. To achieve this, the PLA has undertaken to update both its strategy and its order of battle.

On the first count, the Chinese have dramatically altered their understanding of their core security problem and the doctrine and planning by which they intend to address it. For most of the PRC's

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<sup>34</sup> There is a broad and diverse literature on the subject of China's military modernization. See, for example, David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, Berkeley, California: University of California, 2004; and Keith Crane et al., *Modernizing China's Military: Opportunities and Constraints*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-260-AF, 2005. A less rigorous but perhaps more entertaining perspective can be found in Richard Bernstein and R. H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China*, New York; Vintage, 1998.

history, the primary threats that it perceived were a nuclear attack by either superpower and a massive land invasion by its Soviet neighbor. Against the former it offered as "defense" its expansive geography and a determined effort to disperse its industrial facilities to enhance their survivability, augmented after 1964 by a limited nuclear deterrent force. Against Soviet armies, the PLA proposed to fight a "people's war," once again exploiting China's land mass to draw the invader in, extend its lines of communications, then engage it in a battle of attrition until it was exhausted.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing recognized that its security situation has been transformed and that new doctrine was called for. By the **mid-1990s**, a new approach had largely crystallized that emphasized limited offensive power projection in areas on China's periphery, such as the Taiwan Strait. This doctrine, sometimes referred to as "limited war under high-tech conditions," emphasized both the subordination of military to political goals and the need to achieve a military decision quickly, before international pressure could force an end to hostilities. Such a doctrine also has obvious appeal in terms of helping the PLA deal with the threat of U.S. intervention; the Chinese would hope to exploit the time it would take the United States to decide on a course of action and then mobilize and deploy its forces. Ideally, from Beijing's point of view, Taiwan would be subdued before anything more than token U.S. military power could be brought to bear, leaving Washington to decide whether the costs of reversing a new status quo would be justified by the U.S. interests engaged.

To deal with any U.S. forces that do attempt to come to Taiwan's defense, China has focused considerable attention on developing and fielding what are often referred to in American defense circles as "anti-access" capabilities. These capabilities run a wide gamut, from offensive information operations and counter-space, to advanced fighters and air defenses, to long-range strike systems able to target air bases, ports, and naval forces. The PLA's goal would not be to defeat the U.S. military in a traditional, stand-up fight to the death, but rather to

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keep it at arm's length just long enough—perhaps a few days, certainly not more than a week or two—to bring Taiwan to **heel**.<sup>35</sup>

For U.S. planners, a China-Taiwan scenario presents multiple difficulties. The Western Pacific is vast, and there is little territory to which land-based forces, including air forces, can stake a claim. And the installations that do exist will be increasingly threatened by Chinese offensive capabilities. Today, the PLA deploys over 500 ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan, a number of which could be fired at the key USAF base in the region, Kadena Air Base on **Okinawa**.<sup>36</sup> As for maritime forces, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is operating increasingly sophisticated and well-armed surface and submarine forces. While they are no match for the U.S. Navy in a full-scale fleet action, early arriving USN forces—perhaps a single carrier strike group—would confront a multi-faceted threat that could either keep them away from the immediate area of operations or compel them to dedicate a substantial portion of their combat power to self-defense instead of the defense of Taiwan. Either way, the Chinese would have accomplished what they set out to do.

Coping with growing Chinese power, like dealing with nuclear weapons, will be far from easy. Helping defend civilian and military targets on Taiwan (and in Japan) from barrages of modern, accurate Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles will require offensive and

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<sup>35</sup> Even with recent, substantial increases in military spending, China's defense buildup appears to be unfolding at a deliberate pace; the best available estimate for China's total military spending—both official and unofficial—in 2003 is \$31-38 billion. Given reasonable assumptions about both the pace of China's continued economic growth (which could slow) and its ability to mobilize resources for defense, that number can be expected to grow to over \$180 billion (FY 01 dollars) by 2025 and could exceed \$400 billion. China's cumulative investment in research and development and procurement between 2003-2025 will likely fall in the range of roughly \$600 billion to \$1.2 trillion, or between one-fourth and one-half the total the U.S. invested in similar accounts between 1981 and 2003. These levels of expenditure mean that the PLA can expect to enjoy substantial capability improvements in coming years. For a seminal analysis of China's current and future defense spending, see Crane et al., op. cit.

<sup>36</sup> The number of short- and medium-range missiles in Beijing's arsenal is also growing every year, as is their accuracy and the sophistication and variety of conventional warheads deployed on them.

defensive capabilities that do not presently exist. The PLA presents threats to U.S. air, space, and naval operations the likes of which have not been encountered since the fall of the Soviet Union. And, in a conflict with Taiwan, if the Chinese are able to enforce the kind of compressed timeline toward which their doctrine suggests that they will strive, the United States may have only hours or days to mount an effective response. Any Chinese attack on Taiwan remains a high-risk gamble on Beijing's part; however, as the PLA's capabilities grow, the risks to the United States and Taiwan increase in **parallel**.<sup>37</sup>

#### **WELCOME TO THE POST POST COLD WAR WORLD**

In this chapter we have explored the diverse kinds of challenges that the United States will likely encounter in the new era that we have dubbed the post post-Cold War world. They can be summarized as:

- Subnational or transnational groups—insurgencies and terrorist organizations—able to launch highly destructive attacks against U.S. interests and citizens and those of its allies
- State adversaries armed with nuclear weapons and an inclination to employ them or so threaten believably
- State adversaries—China being the prime example—equipped with "anti-access" capabilities and strategies intended to hold U.S. power at bay.

Coping with any one of these problems is demanding; dealing with all three simultaneously will likely require a substantial re-thinking of how U.S. military forces are organized, trained and equipped, to say

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<sup>37</sup> As China's projected timelines for subduing Taiwan grow shorter, the time-distance problems faced by the United States—whose closest base to Taiwan is Kadena, 450nm away and threatened by Chinese SSMs—will grow. Honolulu is over 4200nm from Taiwan; steaming at 25 knots, an aircraft carrier deploying from Pearl Harbor would take about a week to reach the island. Land-based aircraft can deploy more rapidly, of course, but, as noted, there are few bases for them in the region. With adequate air-to-air refueling support, fighters can operate out of Guam, but from that distance—about 1300nm—the round-trip transit time for a sortie is on the order of six hours. Missions of such long duration reduce the sortie rates that can be achieved by a fleet of a given size and could impede USAF operations in defense of Taiwan.

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nothing of the roles that we and our allies need to adopt to provide for our security. In the next chapter, we present some ideas about what forces built to succeed in this complete and dangerous world might look like.

### 3. TOWARD A NEW DIVISION OF LABOR

The grand strategy that the nation has adopted and the difficult challenges America will confront in the years to come beget a wide range of missions for America's armed forces. They also call for different types of arrangements within America's alliances and partnerships, with more focus needed on new and emerging missions and different focus on more traditional missions in light of the changing security environment that is emerging.<sup>38</sup>

For the purposes of sizing and shaping the nation's general purpose and special operations forces, the following five missions are most relevant:

- Countering terrorist and insurgent groups abroad
- Helping to bring stability to emerging democracies
- Deterring and defeating regional adversaries
- Dissuading military competition in Asia, specifically by countering Chinese military power
- Helping to protect the U.S. homeland.

This chapter examines each of these missions in turn, identifying the types of capabilities that will likely be called for to accomplish each one. It then offers some insights about the overall levels of

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<sup>38</sup> Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, alliance capabilities have not kept pace with changing security dynamics. Developments, such as the NATO response force, are promising, but will need continuous attention and refinement if they are to be useful and usable. Cooperation in the areas of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency has highlighted deficiencies in identifying, tracking, and targeting terrorist and insurgent operations. Alliance cooperation in missile defense is well underway but continues to lag the development and deployment of increasingly accurate missile capabilities.

military capability that are appropriate to meeting the demands of U.S. grand strategy.<sup>39</sup>

#### **COUNTERING TERRORISTS AND INSURGENT GROUPS ABROAD**

Although the armed forces of the United States do not bear sole responsibility for protecting the nation against terrorist attacks, they do play important roles in this regard and these roles have placed new demands on the armed forces. Nowhere is this more evident than in cases where a foreign government shares our interest in eradicating terrorism but lacks the capabilities to do so effectively on its *own*.<sup>40</sup> Such states span a wide gamut, from traditional security partners, such as the Philippines, to states with which the United States lacks a long history of security cooperation, such as Yemen. Some, like the governments of Uzbekistan and Philippines, seek to prosecute aggressive operations against terrorist groups on their territory. Others, such as Sudan and Somalia, may have a more ambivalent attitude or simply be incapable of mounting effective operations. Given this wide range of potential operating environments, one would expect a wide variance in the types of operations that U.S. forces might be called upon to conduct in these countries. Nevertheless, it is possible to define a general strategy for military operations against terrorist and insurgent groups.

The mission of U.S. forces in these countries is clear: To eliminate or neutralize terrorist groups threatening U.S. interests.

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<sup>39</sup> This paper focuses on military capabilities with the intent of contributing to the deliberations surrounding DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review. However, dealing with the challenges of the "post post-Cold War world" described in the last chapter is far from exclusively a DoD problem. Serious attention must be paid to the organization and roles of all U.S. government agencies whose resources will be essential to implement a new, ambitious grand strategy. Such attention must focus not just on the Washington interagency process but also on field implementation and the "country team" approach. U.S. grand strategy will not succeed if it views the strategic landscape solely through military lenses and acts accordingly.

<sup>40</sup> For states that are capable of effectively policing their populations and that seek to eradicate terrorist groups, intelligence sharing, coordination of legal practices, and other policy instruments play leading roles. For states that resist pressures to act against terrorist groups within their jurisdictions, classical instruments of coercion and persuasion remain appropriate.

Operations in support of this mission will generally be undertaken in cooperation with (and, indeed, in support of) forces of the host country. The armed forces of the United States lack the manpower and resources to conduct direct counter-terrorist and counterinsurgency operations in all of the countries in the world where threatening groups exist. But even if they could undertake unilateral operations on such a scale, lasting success is more likely to result when the forces prosecuting operations in the field are from the host country. If they are disciplined and well trained, local forces are far less likely to engender feelings of resentment within the populace than are forces of an outside power. Local forces are also often better positioned than foreigners to develop accurate intelligence about groups operating within their borders. Ultimately, defeating terrorist and insurgent groups is about bringing security and good governance to the populations in which subversive groups would seek to operate. When that happens, the popular support on which such groups depend for survival dries up. Training, equipping, advising and, as appropriate, assisting host country forces, then, are the sine qua non of effective campaigns against terrorist and insurgent groups.

Specific campaigns will generally be comprised of different combinations of the following operational objectives:

- Strengthen the capabilities and will of host government forces.
- Disrupt the activities of terrorists.
- Help to alienate terrorists from the populace.
- Find and capture or kill terrorists.
- Gather intelligence about terrorist networks and activities around the world.
- Protect friendly forces and **bases**.<sup>41</sup>

If this vision of future U.S. military operations against terrorist groups is an accurate guide to strategy, it suggests that the widely

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<sup>41</sup> For more on strategies for countering terrorist and insurgent groups and their implications for DoD, see David Ochmanek, *Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups Abroad*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1738-AF, 2003, on which this section is based.

used term "war on terrorism" is unfortunate. The sorts of operations envisaged here are likely to be long-term efforts in which the actual use of force, at least by U.S. military personnel, is only sporadic. Indeed, military operations against terrorist groups will have much in common with effective counter-insurgency operations if they are to be successful. Accordingly, the hallmarks of effective counter-terrorist efforts generally will be:

- The host government and not the United States plays the leading role in hunting down the terrorists
- The terrorists are subjected to relentless pressure and are not able to determine the tempo and timing of operations but rather are forced to react to government-initiated operations
- Operations are "information intensive," depending crucially on accurate information on the activities, location, and identities of the terrorists.
- Most importantly, the host government must win the loyalty of its populace, alienating the terrorists from potential sources of support.

These considerations point to a demanding set of operating environments for U.S. forces charged with countering terrorist groups abroad. Those forces will be called upon to forge strong relationships with host-country personnel, to show great discretion in their conduct of operations, to maintain a low profile in the host country, yet to be able to react swiftly and effectively when promising targets arise.

Forces and assets relevant to these missions tend to be in chronically short supply within DoD. They include:

- Conventional and special operations forces trained to operate effectively in foreign settings
- Surveillance platforms and operators, human intelligence specialists, and imagery and intelligence analysts
- Military police and other force protection assets

- Base operating support personnel and equipment to provide vital functions, such as communications, housing, and transportation at a wide range of operating locations
- Combat search and rescue (for U.S. and host-country personnel) as well as SOF insertion and extraction capabilities
- People and equipment to deliver humanitarian services, including engineers, doctors and dentists, public health specialists, tactical airlift aircraft, and crews.

#### **SUPPORTING NEW DEMOCRACIES**

There appears to be a growing consensus that, in countries where important U.S. interests are engaged, the nation has a stake in preventing elements hostile to those interests from sowing unrest and using violence to prevent the establishment of stable institutions of democratic governance. And in a world where terrorist groups can reach across continents to threaten our way of life, America can have important interests potentially anywhere.

While DoD does not by any means have a monopoly on instruments for these sorts of missions, U.S. military forces play vital roles in them. Given the nation's focus on expanding democracy, DoD will need to take steps to ensure that it fields forces capable of undertaking effective nation-building missions on a very significant scale and for many years to come. What will those missions likely entail? Our operations in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and, especially, in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban provide insights. In general, the primary objectives of U.S. forces are to provide a secure external and internal environment so that political, economic, and social development may proceed. The immediate end state toward which U.S. forces work is to get the country to the point where the U.S. role reverts to that of advisory assistance and training, as outlined in the section above. Once this threshold is reached, U.S. forces can take a much lower internal profile, reducing the potential to become a lightning rod for criticism and a rallying point for forces opposed to the central government. Reaching that point may be difficult, however. Moreover, even when such a point is reached, the presence of U.S. forces

may be necessary to establish a regional security environment that permits friendly governments to focus their resources on internal development.

Depending on the state of the host government and society, U.S. and other outside forces may need to conduct the following types of operations:

- Provide security for key facilities and population centers
- In the immediate aftermath of conflict, provide for governance of the state
- Develop intelligence on the identity and the modus operandi of anti-government elements
- Monitor borders and interdict the flow of fighters, weapons, and material support into and out of the country
- Arrest or, if necessary, kill those who employ or advocate violence against the government and security forces
- Organize, recruit, train, equip, and assist security forces for the country
- Help the new government to win the loyalty of its people by providing information about government policies and by offering humanitarian resources, infrastructure development, and other incentives to communities that support the **government**.<sup>42</sup>

Importantly, in their training and assistance efforts, U.S. and other Western forces do more than simply impart military skills. They also seek, directly and indirectly, to inculcate in their counterparts an understanding of and appreciation for democratic values, including the rule of law and civilian control over military institutions.

The forces and capabilities required for these sorts of operations are essentially the same as those required for countering terrorist and insurgent groups. Depending on the balance of power between the

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<sup>42</sup> For a more thorough review of strategies for post-conflict stability operations, see James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1753-RC, 2003.

government and the forces of disorder, fairly large increments of outside combat forces might also be required. Clearly, if the United States is to sustain a level of effort in these mission areas commensurate with the nation's interest in defeating terrorism and establishing democracy, changes will be required in how U.S. ground forces are organized, trained, and prepared for rotations **abroad.**<sup>43</sup>

#### **DETECTING AND DEFEATING REGIONAL ADVERSARIES**

Key dynamics in the international arena coupled with the U.S. response to them have pushed to the fore "new" missions of countering terrorist and insurgent groups and helping to stabilize conditions in newly democratic states. But more familiar missions remain and are, in many ways, as important as ever. And, as the brief review of emerging threats in Chapter Two strongly suggests, these missions are growing significantly more demanding.

For example, in the cases of North Korea and Iran, both nations pose significantly greater military challenges than Iraq or certainly Serbia. In Iran's case, there is the problem of scale: Iran is approximately three times larger than Iraq and has roughly three times the population. If even a sizable minority of its people opposed the notion of being invaded and occupied by the United States, our forces would simply lack the manpower to occupy and pacify the nation. In addition, both Iran and North Korea have at their disposal military capabilities that were not present to a significant degree in Iraq's armed forces. For instance, they have a panoply of means for attacking naval forces and merchant shipping, including submarines, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and special operations forces. Iran is also projected to field much more capable surface-to-air missile systems than either Iraq or Serbia possessed. **And** both nations are believed to possess chemical and biological weapons. Of course, North Korea claims to have deployed nuclear weapons, and the Iranians are believed to be working covertly toward the same goal. If mated to survivable long-

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<sup>43</sup> Whittle, Richard, "Division Reorganized for Return Trip: Emphasis shifted to brigades as agile, main fighting formations," Dallas Morning *News*, April 30, 2005.

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range delivery systems, such as the mobile missile systems that both countries have deployed, even a modest number of these weapons (say, ten to twelve) would radically alter the military situation in the region. Unless enemy leaders can somehow be deterred from using nuclear weapons, forward bases and concentrations of troops or materiel on land may become untenable. Further, regional allies may be unwilling to participate in coalition operations against a nuclear armed power or to permit U.S. forces to base there for fear of being attacked. Obviously, deterrence of nuclear use becomes problematic if the goal of a U.S.-led military operation is to end the regime of the adversary state. What appears at first to be a familiar mission of regional power projection is taking on new and troubling dimensions.

Chapter Five addresses the implications of these trends for modernization priorities, but we list here the primary types of forces and capabilities called for in prosecuting operations against regional adversaries:

- Large numbers of ships and cargo aircraft to transport forces to theater and to support sustained operations.
- Aerial refueling assets to support the airlift effort and to allow surveillance and combat aircraft to fight effectively, especially if bases outside of the theater are used.
- Air and missile defenses to protect forward forces and bases and to extend some measure of protection to allies' civil infrastructure and populations.
- Airborne and space-based platforms to provide comprehensive surveillance over enemy territory.
- Capabilities to gain and maintain air and maritime superiority over and around the enemy's territory so that joint forces can observe and strike enemy forces at will and enjoy freedom of maneuver.
- Aircraft and cruise missiles for responsive, precise, and, at times, high volume attacks on enemy forces and supporting infrastructure.

The types of forces and capabilities listed above would be required in almost any large-scale military operation against a capable regional adversary such as Iran or North Korea, whether the chief purpose of that operation was to coerce the opposing regime into changing its policies, to deny it certain military capabilities, or to protect regional allies and forces from attacks by enemy forces. Ground forces and amphibious forces, perhaps in sizable numbers, would also be required for some campaigns, particularly if their objective was to take down the enemy regime and occupy the country. Campaigns with more limited objectives—for instance, preventing North Korean forces from shelling Seoul and environs with long-range artillery, or coercing Iran's leaders by imposing an embargo on oil exports—might also call for ground and/or amphibious operations to seize and hold portions of the country. But it is also possible to imagine operations, particularly against Iran, that feature little or no commitment of U.S. ground forces.

#### **DISSUADING MILITARY COMPETITION IN ASIA**

China was not mentioned in the section above because, although it may become a military adversary, China stands apart from other states both qualitatively and quantitatively and poses distinct military and strategic challenges. This is not just because China is one or more orders of magnitude larger and richer than states like North Korea and Iran. It is also because the political dynamics between China and the rest of the world are different from those characterized by what used to be termed "rogue states." By all indications, China is ruled by a fairly risk-averse set of leaders who seem, at least for the present, to be largely satisfied with the international system and its norms. To be sure, China aspires to carry more geo-strategic weight, commensurate with its growing political and economic reach, but these ambitions are, at least in theory, compatible with a peaceful order in Asia. In fact, other than the issue of Taiwan's future status, and absent some uncharacteristically reckless behavior by China's rulers, it is difficult to imagine plausible circumstances that could bring the United States and its allies into large-scale military conflict with China. For these reasons, and because the issue of Taiwan per se does not

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impinge upon the survival interests of either side, should conflict occur, deterrence of nuclear attacks on the American and Chinese homelands should be fairly **robust**.<sup>44</sup>

Comparing this situation with the real possibility of nuclear use in conflicts involving lesser regional powers, one may be tempted to conclude that the military requirements associated with deterring conflict and dissuading military competition with China might be relatively easy. This would be a mistake. China, which is already among the world's top spenders on military forces, is expanding its military budgets at double digit rates every year. And the Chinese are focusing their modernization efforts on precisely the sorts of capabilities designed to thwart U.S. power projection operations. For example:

- China has fielded large numbers of theater ballistic missiles and has been improving their accuracy. Soon they will be in a position to destroy specific elements of targeted military facilities, such as runways, taxiways, fuel storage tanks, and living quarters on **airbases**, or supply ships at quayside, loading facilities, and marshalling yards at ports. Compounding this threat, the Chinese are also developing modern cruise missiles.
- The Chinese are fielding a modern, integrated air defense system with large numbers of highly capable long-range surface-to-air missiles (**SAMs**). Within this decade, the Peoples' Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) will have the second or third largest fleet of advanced, fourth-generation fighter aircraft in the world.

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<sup>44</sup> An important exception, which cannot easily be dismissed, would be the perception on the part of China's leaders that a failure to achieve its goals should war commence in the Taiwan Straits would be likely to lead to the fall of the Chinese Communist Party. In this context, it is possible to imagine China's leaders resorting to limited uses of nuclear weapons to interfere with key aspects of U.S. military options and/or to intimidate Taiwan's leaders into accepting **Beijing's** terms for reunification.

- China is investing in a panoply of advanced systems for attacking surface ships, including quiet submarines, air- and sea-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, long-range aircraft and sensors, and modern surface combatants.
- And the Chinese are increasing the number and sophistication of their military satellites even as they also test means for interfering with the satellites of other **nations**.<sup>45</sup>

Projecting power into East Asia to defeat possible Chinese aggression will be by far the most difficult challenge facing U.S. forces in a conventional conflict. Accordingly, the mission of deterring China and dissuading military competition in East Asia will serve as the prime force motivating the modernization of the United States Air Force and Navy. As with defeating regional aggressors, it is of paramount importance that DoD improve its ability to defeat attacks by ballistic missiles. In order to thwart Chinese military options it will be necessary to protect not only forces and bases but also Taiwan's people and infrastructure from missile attack. Other capabilities required to effectively counter a Chinese offensive would be broadly similar to those highlighted above for defeating regional adversaries. But the timelines associated with engaging Chinese forces may be very short: U.S. forces might only have a few days in which to mobilize and deploy to the region before the shooting begins. This places a premium on forces that can deploy quickly and that have large margins of qualitative superiority over the **enemy**.<sup>46</sup> In addition to blunting missile attacks, it will be particularly important that U.S. forces be

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<sup>45</sup> For an overview of key aspects of a hypothetical conflict over Taiwan, see David A. Shlapak et al., *Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, **MR-1217-AF**, 2000. See especially pp. 54-57, which focus on implications of China's acquisition of more modern conventional weapons.

<sup>46</sup> Lanchester's square law teaches us that quantity has a quality all its own. If a force half the size of its opponent is to fight to a draw, it must be four times as capable on a unit-for-unit basis. If U.S. forces are to fight the opening engagements of a conflict outnumbered, they must be far superior qualitatively in order to prevail.

able rapidly to defeat Chinese air attacks, break down China's integrated air defenses (fighters, long-range SAMs, and command and control systems) deployed near the coast, and interdict enemy naval vessels operating in and near the Taiwan Strait. These requirements argue for significant forward basing of key U.S. capabilities, configured in such a way as to minimize their vulnerability to preemptive attack.

#### **DEFENDING THE HOMELAND**

Protecting the nation from attack is a fundamental responsibility of any government. **DoD's** primary contribution to this core objective is to identify and defeat threats abroad, be they in the form of threats from conventional military forces or from terrorist groups, before they reach our shores. In this regard, new emphasis has been placed on protecting the nation from attacks by small numbers of long-range ballistic missiles—a threat that could emerge over the next decade. Thought is also being given to options for defending against cruise missile attacks that could be launched from naval combatants or from converted merchant ships off the coasts. Since September 11th, the Air Force has also been tasked with providing some capability to intercept and shoot down civil aircraft that have been commandeered by terrorists before those aircraft can be used as weapons. Given the attackers' ability to choose the time and place for such attacks, it is not feasible to provide comprehensive protection against such threats by posturing fighter, tanker, and AWACS aircraft. Rather, measures to make it far more difficult to commandeer aircraft, such as passenger screening, strengthening cockpit doors, and putting air marshals on board most flights, offer much higher **payoff**.<sup>47</sup>

In pursuit of their primary missions, the armed forces field certain capabilities that can supplement those of other agencies charged with monitoring, screening, and intercepting threats at the borders—

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<sup>47</sup> For an assessment of USAF roles in countering terrorist attacks in the United States see Eric Larson et al., *Persistent Awareness, Immediate Response: Framing the Air Force's Role in Homeland Security*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-132-AF, forthcoming, ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~.

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agencies such as the Coast Guard, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Customs Service. Perhaps the most often used of these capabilities is aerial surveillance of maritime and land approaches to the United States. Other DoD assets, including airlift and surveillance aircraft, and decontamination assets, may be useful in responding to potential attacks. In extreme circumstances, one could imagine substantial numbers of U.S. ground forces being called upon to help restore civil order after a massive attack.

However, aside from forces that defend the country against air and missile attacks and command and control functions associated with homeland defense, this mission is not a primary factor in sizing and shaping the armed forces for the roles discussed in this paper.

#### **COUNTERING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

The imperative of countering the spread of nuclear weapons cuts across several of the missions discussed here. Because of their vast destructive potential, DoD and other agencies of the U.S. government must do everything possible to monitor existing arsenals as well as potential sources of nuclear technologies and fissile materials. Preventing enemies from getting access to or from using nuclear weapons will also be a part of military operations before, during, and after combat.

One of the "nightmare scenarios" associated with nuclear weapons merits special mention: The problem of "loose nukes" in a failing state. A number of permutations of this scenario are imaginable, but at its core it involves the possible loss of control of all or part of an arsenal of fission weapons by a government that loses the capacity to govern some or all of its territory. If it were thought that a faction contending for control of the country might use or disperse the weapons, U.S. leaders would have to consider employing military forces in an attempt to secure or neutralize them. It goes without saying that the difficulties and risks associated with such an operation would be legion. They would include determining: where the weapons are, the level of security at the facilities and in the surrounding areas, which forces within the country, if any, might be sympathetic to efforts to

secure the weapons, which would be hostile, and so forth. One cannot expect this sort of operation to be executed successfully without sufficient planning and training. If U.S. leaders wish to guard against failure under such circumstances, extensive preparations must be made well in advance. These considerations have implications for DoD's deliberate planning process, its intelligence collection and analysis efforts, and for training, equipping, and posturing elements of the forces. Capabilities that would be especially useful include:

- The ability to detect and track fissile material and activities related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons using remote sensors
- The ability to insert special operations or infantry forces deep into contested territory and to support them with information, firepower, and supplies once they are deployed
- The ability to deny personnel access to a defined area for periods of hours to days.

#### **SETTING AGGREGATE LEVELS OF CAPABILITY**

Until this point, we have focused on the qualitative dimension of force planning: What types of capabilities should our armed forces possess in order to accomplish the most important missions assigned to them? Defense planning and resource allocation must also be informed by an appreciation of the quantitative dimension: How much aggregate capability is appropriate? During the first decade after the Cold War, U.S. general purpose forces were sized primarily by the requirement to be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts "in overlapping time frames." While it was recognized that missions other than defeating regional aggressor states would require some specialized capabilities, for purposes of gross force sizing these missions were treated essentially as lesser included cases. The defense strategy promulgated in 2001 posited a more elaborate criterion for sizing the force. It stated that U.S. forces should be able to:

- Defend the United States;

- Deter aggression and coercion forward in four critical regions;<sup>48</sup>
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts, including the possibility of regime change and occupation; and
- Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.<sup>49</sup>

The force sizing construct outlined in QDR 01 came to be known as "1-4-2-1." Although it emphasized a wider range of challenges than captured previously by force planners, it did not account for the challenges faced today in defeating terrorists and insurgents abroad. Moreover, as outlined previously, this approach does not begin to capture the likely long-term requirements associated with promoting freedom and democracy abroad, a likely mainstay of U.S. grand strategy.

*For these reasons, we conclude that the "1-4-2-1" criterion no longer comports well with the actual requirements of U.S. grand strategy. Nor need it apply equally to all of the military services; hence the need for a new division of labor among them. What follows is a suggested new approach, which both reflects the demands of U.S. grand strategy and the difficult military challenges U.S. forces will confront in the years to come.*

#### **One Homeland**

It is only appropriate to begin the force sizing requirement with "1," if only as a reminder of the centrality of protecting the territory and people of the United States from attack. But in practical terms, within DoD only capabilities for the defense of the nation from air and missile attack are actually sized by this requirement. Other capabilities that the armed forces might contribute to defending the homeland or to mitigating the consequences of an attack exist because

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<sup>48</sup> The four regions are: Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia.

<sup>49</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001, p. 17.

they were fielded to enable other missions. With this, however, comes one critically important caution: should the United States experience an attack that is of a scale much larger than the attacks of September 11, 2001, significant portions of the U.S. armed forces, particularly the Army (active duty units as well as national guard), could be involved in operations here at home aimed at helping to manage and remediate the consequences of such an attack.

### **Beyond Four Regions**

The era is gone when strategists could divide the planet into regions where the nation has important interests at stake (e.g., trade relationships, access to critical resources, alliance commitments, etc.) and where it does not. In terms of classic geopolitics, Afghanistan and Sudan were beyond our strategic purview, yet they were the breeding grounds of Al Qaeda. In a world where small groups of individuals can acquire the means to kill thousands, the United States and its security partners cannot be indifferent to conditions in any other state if a terrorist group with the intent and capability to attack them might be gestating there. This is why the United States today deploys roughly 15,000 troops in Afghanistan. It is also why, since 2001, U.S. forces have been actively engaged in training and advisory assistance missions in such places as Georgia, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and other areas that lie outside of the four regions highlighted in the defense strategy of 2001. The actual number of regions in which U.S. forces should expect to be conducting counter-terrorist, counterinsurgency, or nation assistance missions, then, is indeterminate but is certainly larger than four. In fact, it is not useful to characterize the demand for forces to conduct these operations in terms of "regions." Today, large portions of the force structure are engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. In a few years, deployment levels and the distribution of forces may be quite different.

Rather than fixating on some number of regions, which will, unavoidably, be wrong, the Defense Department should consider committing a sizable increment of force structure to these missions and plan to employ it (at a sustainable pace) doing them. If a placeholder is

needed for the number of ongoing missions of this type and for classical deterrence and assurance missions, the number is "n." As discussed above, missions to train and advise local forces and to help new regimes bring stability to their countries along with democratic governance are typically labor intensive. They call for U.S. forces to be present on the ground, sometimes in large numbers, working closely with host country forces and, in some cases, conducting operations against terrorists and insurgents. If the United States and its allies are to defeat or maintain pressure on the terrorist and insurgent groups that pose the greatest threats to their interests, a substantial level of effort will be required and it will have to be sustained over many years, irrespective of the future course of events in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, these missions should become a primary factor in sizing the Army and Marine *Corps* as well as special operations forces.

#### **Two Major Combat Operations**

The rationale behind fielding forces sufficient to prevail in two wars is sound and has been a basis for U.S. planning for more than 50 years.<sup>50</sup> Because the United States has important interests and alliance relationships in multiple regions of the world, and because plausible military threats to those interests exist in more than one region, we must avoid placing ourselves in a situation in which we could not deter and defend against aggression, even when substantial forces are engaged elsewhere. Adopting something less than a "two war" criterion for sizing U.S. forces might also cause important allies to question the value of their security partnership with the United States, leading to the unraveling of alliances and a loss of American influence. But the persistence of the number "2" in the force sizing criterion does not imply stasis in the composition of the forces called for to fight and win wars. As we have seen, the challenges posed by regional adversaries and by China are changing dramatically. U.S. forces engaging in hostilities against such foes must find ways to deal with a host of

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<sup>50</sup> Since the time of the Korean war, U.S. planners assumed American forces must be capable of executing overlapping, if not simultaneous, wars in Europe and Asia.

threats to naval forces, modern air defenses, chemical and biological weapons, and, most worrisome, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Defeating or blunting these threats will require extensive and costly modernization efforts. We suggest below that the requirement to project power against two regional adversaries should remain relevant to determining the overall size and shape of the Navy and the Air Force.

#### **One "Decisive Win" and Occupation**

U.S. leaders will want to maintain the capability to defeat comprehensively the forces of a regional adversary, to occupy the country, and to forcibly remove its regime from power. If and as regional adversaries acquire "strategic deterrent" forces, pursuing such objectives via overt military means may become less and less feasible. But having the potential to invade and occupy an enemy's country and take down its leadership is a powerful trump card that should be maintained.<sup>51</sup>

#### **IMPLICATIONS FOR FORCES AND POSTURE**

What this all means for the overall size and shape of the armed forces is, to a first order, fairly clear: The Army and Marine Corps, along with much of the special operations community, must play the leading roles in countering terrorist and insurgent groups abroad and in helping to stabilize nations trying to emerge from authoritarian forms of governance. The key to long-term success in these operations is to foster the emergence of competent security forces within host countries so that governments that share our interest in suppressing terrorism and insurgency can do so increasingly on their own. The host country forces that accomplish these missions will be primarily ground forces and they will, perforce, be trained and assisted by other ground forces. U.S. naval and air forces can contribute important capabilities, but they will generally play supporting roles.

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<sup>51</sup> For an assessment of the efficacy of military operations to remove enemy leaders and of the operational challenges associated with such missions, see Stephen T. Hosmer, *Operations Against Enemy Leaders*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1385-AF, 2001.

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Both the Navy and the Air Force, by contrast, must remain focused on securing the commons and on conducting large-scale power projection operations against the forces of other nations as their primary *raison d'être*. These two services already possess the nation's primary means for projecting military power swiftly across long distances and for striking at the enemy's centers of gravity. U.S. concepts of operation in all three of the major combat scenarios we regard as plausible-- Korea, China-Taiwan, and Iran--call for large-scale air and naval forces to defeat enemy thrusts, gain freedom to operate on and near the enemy's territory, and destroy the enemy's capacity to make war. And U.S. forces conducting stability operations as well as large-scale combat will want more comprehensive and accurate information about the enemy--a requirement that will place greater demands on air, naval, and space forces.

Because of the crucial importance of the counter-terror and stabilization missions, and because of the changing nature of the threat posed by regional adversaries, *the Army and Marine Corps reasonably could be relieved of the requirement of preparing forces to fight in two nearly simultaneous wars*. Our concept for defending Taiwan does not call for substantial numbers of U.S. ground forces. And in RAND war games featuring conflict with Iran, we do not identify substantial roles for ground and amphibious forces.<sup>52</sup> Even North Korea, which has long posed a serious threat of armored invasion across the demilitarized zone, is evolving into a more complex problem where the focused application of naval and air forces in support of improving South Korean capabilities could reduce the demand for U.S. ground forces early in a conflict.<sup>53</sup> *Transitioning the Army and Marine Corps to "one war" forces*

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<sup>52</sup> Iran's capabilities for invading its neighbors with mechanized ground forces are not impressive. The primary uses for U.S. ground and amphibious forces in scenarios involving conflict with Iran center on seizing and holding, for limited periods, relatively small portions of territory for coercive purposes or to preclude certain Iranian military options.

<sup>53</sup> A rational North Korean leadership must realize that an invasion of South Korea would be suicide if conducted only with conventional forces. Accordingly, more interesting conflict scenarios for American and ROK planners involve efforts to develop coercive or denial strategies that might compel Pyongyang to forego its nascent nuclear

*does not necessarily imply that troop numbers or the force structure of either service should decline.* Such a transition would make it possible for large portions of America's two ground-oriented services to focus increasingly on preparing for and carrying out the vital missions of countering terrorist groups and helping to stabilize emerging democracies. Chapter Five offers ideas for how each service's efforts might be modified to better support the demands described here.

Finally, to contend with the sorts of challenges we envisage, the United States will wish to change substantially the posture of its forces and bases overseas. Although stationing and deploying U.S. forces in certain areas overseas can carry political and psychological value in and of itself, important elements of current overseas presence lack a strong operational or strategic **rationale**,<sup>54</sup> and this will ultimately undermine their political utility. Moreover, some U.S. overseas forces are militarily vulnerable today and are likely to become more vulnerable in the future. If these vulnerabilities are not corrected, the strategic and operational utility of these forces will be dubious and potentially dangerous if the deployments invite preemptive attack. And just as the defense strategy will require more differentiated roles for U.S. military forces, so too will the United States need to maintain more diverse and differentiated forms of presence and basing overseas.

In Europe, the United States should move beyond the "heavy" footprint of permanently-based forces it maintains in Germany and develop instead an expeditionary posture that is better suited to training with **allies**<sup>55</sup> away from garrison and bringing military

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weapons capabilities. Given the isolated and potentially irrational (from our perspective) nature of the Pyongyang regime, U.S. force planning should look mainly at actual North Korean capabilities rather than unpredictable motives.

<sup>54</sup> For example, the presence of heavy ground forces in Europe provides little value to the defense of Europe, which is no longer threatened by a Soviet invasion. The argument that heavy ground forces in Europe are closer to potential trouble spots rests on the dubious assumption that those forces can be moved to the south through Mediterranean ports.

<sup>55</sup> The importance of such training should not be forgotten. NATO operates as an Allied force in Afghanistan today while the EU has relieved NATO and U.S. Forces in the Balkans. These developments are

assistance to new allies and partners in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the **Caucasus**.<sup>56</sup> Current plans to return heavy Army forces to the United States should proceed apace, as should the deployment of one of the Army's Stryker brigades to Europe. For its part, the Air Force should be more aggressive in exploring the feasibility of establishing a more expeditionary presence - and perhaps even permanent basing - closer to potential operating areas in the Middle East and the Caucasus. The Navy can maintain an in-transit carrier presence, but may need to consider more missile defense cooperation with NATO countries, which, in turn, may require more surface combatant presence in the Mediterranean. Special Operations Forces (SOF) can stage effectively from Southern Europe if a suitable home can be found there for them. If not, U.S. SOF in Europe could be returned to the United States and deployed rotationally to Africa, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will profoundly affect the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and in South and Central Asia. Existing infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region is largely a reflection of U.S. efforts through the 1990s to contain and ultimately defeat Iraqi aggression. While the United States ultimately will want to maintain a long-term military presence in the Middle East and South and Central Asia to reshape the region, it is not clear that all existing military infrastructure is appropriate or will be required for these missions. In general, therefore, additional investments in Persian Gulf infrastructure should await further resolution of the situations in Afghanistan and particularly Iraq as well as clarification of broader U.S. strategic objectives. One matter, however, is clear: Airbases in the Gulf region that might be used by deploying U.S. forces will need to be hardened against attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles if the United States is to retain a credible power projection capability vis a vis Iran. Even fairly inaccurate missiles, if armed with unguided

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possible because of decades of U.S.-led combined training and operations.

<sup>56</sup> One approach to supporting expeditionary forces worldwide can be found in Paul S. Killingsworth et al., **Flexbasing: Achieving Global Presence for Expeditionary Aerospace Forces**, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1113-AF, 2000.

submunitions, can achieve a high probability of kill against "soft" targets, such as aircraft in the open, above-ground fuel storage tanks, and personnel bivouacked in **tents**.<sup>57</sup>

Temporary infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan may or may not form the basis for a longer-term presence in those countries. But U.S. military planners should not rule out the possibility that both countries might seek some form of long-term security relationship with the United States and would perhaps welcome a modest presence of U.S. military forces.

The prospects of Korean nuclear weapons and China's military emergence in Asia will greatly affect our military relationships in Asia and our military posture in the region. So, too, will the presence of Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia. Indeed, Asia is the one area where the full set of challenges identified in Chapter Two--terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and growing Chinese military power--overlap. Existing military facilities in Asia are becoming increasingly vulnerable, and our ability to reinforce quickly with air and naval forces from beyond the region is not adequate to the growing threat. Area missile defense appears to be a major gap in existing capabilities. The United States lacks sufficient infrastructure and **training/advisory** relationships in Southeast Asia to assist local nations in countering Islamic extremism. The United States needs to work with its Asian partners to develop additional basing infrastructure in places like the Ryukyu Islands, the Philippine Islands, Singapore, and Thailand. The Navy and Air Force should consider conducting additional routine air and naval training and operations the Western Pacific. The Army and Marine Corps, in conjunction with U.S. special operations forces, should increase advisory and assistance missions throughout Southeast Asia. The United States should at the same time take steps to improve its ability to deploy combat ready forces quickly to the region. In order to conduct rapid and robust power projection operations into East Asia, U.S. naval

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<sup>57</sup> For an overview of the threats posed by ballistic and cruise missiles to forward deployed air forces, see John Stillion and David T. Orletsky, **Airbase vulnerability to Conventional Cruise Missile and Ballistic Missile Attacks**, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1029-AF, 1999, pp. 78-80.

forces in the Pacific will have to continue to shift their "center of mass" westward. The focus of our ability to respond to threats or provocations must be on days--not weeks.

In general, this will mean increasing the number and capabilities of assets typically deployed in Hawaii, Guam, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Among other initiatives, the Air Force and Navy should continue to upgrade facilities on Guam and routinely deploy more power projection assets **there**.<sup>58</sup> More attention also should be given to command and control arrangements, particularly given the potential for multiple military operations within the Pacific theater. And the United States needs to be forthcoming in working with its partners in Korea and Japan to remove unnecessary irritants so that the U.S. military presence in these areas remains viable over the longer term.

Finally, because the threats to the United States have become global and we are not able to predict precisely where U.S. interests will be challenged, more attention needs to be given to understanding how U.S. forces will reach those areas that have not been traditional loci for U.S. military operations. This places a premium on both strategic agility--the ability to move forces and assets quickly from place to place--and on global sustainment--the ability to support large numbers of geographically dispersed operations over prolonged periods. Broadly speaking, DoD's existing transportation infrastructure is well suited to moving people, equipment, and supplies east and west from the United States to various parts of the world. It is less well suited for supporting even modestly sized operations north and south from North America to South America, from Europe to Africa, from the Caucasus and Central Asia to South Asia, or from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia. More attention should be paid to creating the proper legal and support arrangements **so** that U.S. forces and supplies, including humanitarian assistance supplies, can be moved throughout the globe on short notice.

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<sup>58</sup> See Zalmay Khalilzad et al., *The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1315-AF, RAND, 2001.

#### 4. WHAT WILL IT MEAN TO BE JOINT?

Coming out of the American experiences in World War II, defense reforms for more than half a century have sought to unify American military planning, centralize the resource allocation process, create efficiencies in acquisition and support activities, and strengthen civilian control over military decisions. But most importantly, defense reforms have sought to create the conditions for greater military effectiveness.

The defense reforms immediately following World War II established the unified combatant commands. The reforms of 1958 took the military services out of the operational chain of command, in effect distinguishing between providers and users of forces--the military services as the providers and the unified commands as the users. And the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986 clarified the operational chain of command and strengthened individual and institutional incentives to develop joint warfighting expertise. America's military proficiency since the 1986 reforms, particularly the ability of American forces to achieve operational success on the battlefield, can be attributed in large measure to the decades-long efforts of those who understood that military power is most effective when all requisite elements of force can be brought to bear to achieve decisive results. In this regard, the long-elusive goal of joint operational prowess has been achieved.

But this same operational prowess could remain elusive in the face of the challenges outlined in this study. Moreover, operational prowess alone does not necessarily lead to joint tactical proficiency, and, more importantly, it may not yield strategic success.<sup>59</sup>

#### DIFFERENT DEMANDS FOR JOINT WARFIGHTING PROWESS

As the preceding chapters have highlighted, American military forces will be called upon to undertake an increasingly diverse set of

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<sup>59</sup> The views in this chapter are those of the authors. Several of the insights result from interviews with senior military leaders in 2003 and 2004.

missions. In some cases this will lead to more sharply differentiated roles among the military services and supporting agencies. Not all forces can be optimized for the wide diversity of missions described here. The military services and supporting agencies must recognize that in some instances ground forces, for example, will absorb the preponderant share of responsibility for particular actions, while in other cases air and naval forces will provide the preponderance of capability. As Chapter Three highlights, the old notion of force building **blocks**,<sup>60</sup> in which each Service had an expectation that it would be given a significant share of every major military task, must give way to a new concept of differentiated responsibilities, where Services and agencies refine old skills and develop new competencies to cover an expanding mission space without unnecessarily duplicating the contributions of others.

At the same time, some elements of this new set of missions will call for greater interdependence among the Services and supporting agencies--not just operationally, but tactically. The relationship among air and ground forces, for example, will of necessity move beyond a set of supported and supporting relationships to tactical **interdependence**.<sup>61</sup> In many instances, it will no longer suffice for forces simply to "deconflict" their operations on the battlefield--that is, for forces to ensure that they are not working at cross purposes or, worse, attacking each other. Rather, there will be many cases where planning, training, and actual employment of forces will need to be fully integrated to achieve the desired battlefield effects. Ultimately, commanders will aspire to extend this level of tactical integration to operations with allied and coalition partners.

In short, we believe that additional time and attention will be required to achieve levels of joint warfighting prowess at the strategic and tactical levels of war similar to that which exists today at the operational level.

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<sup>60</sup> See, for example, the discussion in Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom Up Review*, 1993, pp. 13-26.

<sup>61</sup> For more on this point, see Section 5. See also Pirnie, Bruce, et al., *Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Ground Partnership*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-301, 2005.

### **Maintaining Strategic Focus**

The missions described here - including countering terrorist and insurgent groups abroad, supporting emerging democracies, deterring and defeating regional adversaries, dissuading military competition in Asia, and helping to protect the American homeland - require the long-term commitment of U.S. forces. They also will require a different level of attention from U.S. regional commanders. Given the complexity of the strategic environment and the high probability that multiple long-term **and** short-term operations could be underway in a single theater of operations at any given time, regional commanders may well need to separate strategic and operational planning within their respective commands and devote a disproportionate amount of their personal time to maintaining strategic focus and securing strategic success.

Recent operational success has involved the deep commitment - indeed day-to-day, hour-to-hour involvement - of U.S. regional commanders. For example, it is interesting to observe that in operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Tommy Franks essentially transitioned from being strategic commanders of all forces, activities, and relationships within their assigned regions to that of field commanders, providing operational oversight - and at times tactical **direction**<sup>62</sup> - for the fighting taking place in one area of their assigned region. There is little doubt that the commitment of these field commanders led to the success of these operations. But it is also clear that while these commanders were providing day-to-day direction and oversight in the field, they were less focused on dealing with other pressing problems within their regions. Moreover, had events taken a different turn, and had these commanders been challenged with multiple crises within their **regions**,<sup>63</sup> it is not clear that either of

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<sup>62</sup> See, for example, General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, pp. 491-492.

<sup>63</sup> For example, had the first Gulf War escalated such that Israeli forces were committed directly in the fight, or had weapons of mass destruction been used on the territory of other coalition partners, or had another crisis broken out in the Central Command area, it is not clear the General Schwarzkopf would have been well positioned to provide strategic direction within his area of responsibility. Similarly, had events in the greater Middle East during the opening weeks of Operation

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these commanders would have been well positioned to provide command oversight for all activities within his area of responsibility.

By contrast, during the run-up and throughout Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, General Franks focused on developing coalition support, ensuring basing and throughput for coalition forces, working closely with Washington on post-conflict governance and support alternatives, and, importantly, maintaining an effective deterrent posture elsewhere in the Central Command region. In a sense, the command model exercised in Operation Enduring Freedom may be a more appropriate example for future regional commanders than the models exercised in the two Gulf wars.

In short, the diverse challenges of this era may mean that theater commanders may no longer have the luxury of setting aside their duties of providing strategic direction for all forces, activities, and relationships within their regions to become field commanders for any single operation, large or small, within their region. The enormous demands of establishing, maintaining, and sustaining alliance and coalition relationships, the likelihood that multiple military operations could be underway in any single theater or area, and that ultimate strategic success will depend upon winning the peace as well as the war, means that regional commanders must maintain a strategic perspective even as field commanders are directing combat operations. For these reasons - and somewhat ironically - we may need to see a return to World War II practices, where theater commanders focused intensively on relationships with allies and partners, provided broad direction for ongoing operations, and planned intensively for future phases of the campaign. Day-to-day control of the actual fighting that took place in World War II was left to the field commanders - in today's parlance, the joint task force commander.

If a new set of relationships within the regional command structure is to succeed, more time and attention need to be devoted to the

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Iraqi Freedom transpired such that there were urgent military needs in Afghanistan or, say, Pakistan - and recognizing that the Central Command staff was split between Tampa, Florida and Qatar - it is not clear that General Franks would have been well positioned to provide command of his entire geographic theater.

development, training, and support of the joint task force commander. Just as it would be a mistake to assume that organizing, training, and equipping forces can be done on the fly, so, too, would it be a mistake to assume that the planning responsibilities and command and control functions of joint task force commanders can be done without careful and continuous preparation.

Efforts that are underway within Joint Forces Command offer a promising start but, as currently constructed, may not lead to a satisfactory result. Without much closer collaboration among Joint Forces Command and the other regional and global commands on meeting the needs for future joint task force commanders, it is likely that joint operational command and control will suffer the same inattention it has in the past. Existing "three star" headquarters within the Service component headquarters should form the basis for this effort. Finally, without robust mechanisms, procedures, and training to prepare future JTF commanders in joint operational command and control, regional commanders will continue to be tempted to assume field command when U.S. forces are committed to combat.

#### **ACHIWINQ JOINT TACTICAL PROFICIENCY**

Although the lessons of recent conflicts highlight operational proficiency, the lessons also note that this proficiency does not necessarily extend to tactical matters. Recent operations remain replete with incidents where tactical commanders remained unaware of operational schemes of maneuver, where existing joint and service doctrine inhibits tactical success on the battlefield, and, worse, where the lack of tactical integration resulted in combat failures and unnecessary casualties.<sup>64</sup>

Part of the challenge can be explained by how joint forces currently are organized, fielded, and committed to combat. Regional

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<sup>64</sup> See for example Johnson (forthcoming). Poor situational awareness during a chaotic fight combined with an absence of planning and inadequate IFF capabilities resulted in the "friendly fire" deaths of several Marines in Nasiriyah on March 23, 2003 during OIF. See *Second Marine Expeditionary Force After Action Report*, "Nasiriyah," 2003 pp. 11-14.

commanders organize joint forces through Service components commands; that is, every regional command has an Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Special Operations component. In planning operations, regional commands develop plans through their service components. Units are integrated at the component level, and the forces are supported through their parent Services. Unless units have been assigned and collocated together for training, at the time of any given operation there is no particular reason to assume that different Service units have ever trained or operated together.

This joint tactical division of labor might be viable if Service components had clearly defined battlefield roles. But as was highlighted previously and will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, for a variety of missions we should assume greater not lesser interdependence among most elements of the force. As American forces learned in Afghanistan, special operations forces, fighting alongside indigenous ground forces, became much more effective when they received supporting fires from naval- and land-based aircraft. Future Army ground force operations will depend more and more on precision fire support from the air. Air and naval power projection will need to be increasingly integrated in order to effectively counter enemy anti-access operations. And we believe there is greater effectiveness to be achieved by strengthening the relationship between the Marine Corps and special operations forces. In short, joint commanders and supporting Services will need to facilitate more routine integration of tactical formations across a variety of military tasks.

To achieve new levels of joint tactical proficiency, joint task force commanders will need to train units more routinely in joint operations. While Service "centers of excellence," like the Army's National Training Center or the Air Force's Fighter Weapons School, will remain an integral part of the training curriculum, additional effort must be given to attaining joint tactical proficiency. Just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act introduced incentives for capable officers to seek joint assignments, incentive structures for officer promotion at the O-5/6/7 levels should include emphasis on joint training. For example, the services should create incentive structures at the O-5/6/7 level to

make seeking and exploiting joint training opportunities criteria for success in command positions. Forging these types of joint tactical arrangements - indeed creating joint tactical interdependencies - and training and testing these arrangements routinely will be essential to support America's new grand strategy and confront the daunting challenges outlined in this report.

Moreover, if we are to assume that coalition operations will be the norm, additional time and attention will need to be given to integrating coalition members into various concepts of operation. This will, of necessity, need to become a focus on American security cooperation activities.

#### **A NEW JOINT DIVISION OF LABOR**

Since the mid-1980s, the command and control of American forces has been undergoing profound but under-appreciated change. With the establishment of U.S. Space Command,<sup>65</sup> U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command - often referred to as functional commands - the U.S. command structure began a trend of consolidating and centralizing functions that has continued to this day.<sup>66</sup> This has created a new set of command and control arrangements for U.S. forces. Whereas in the past there was a rough division of labor between force providers (military Services) and users (unified commands), this new development has created a new division of labor among providers, users, and managers (functional or global combatant commands). These functional or global managers are responsible for integrating common assets supplied by the providers and managing the allocation of these assets to the users of military forces. Although the role of manager has existed for nearly 20 years, it is a role that has thus far been overshadowed by the relationship between providers and users.

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<sup>65</sup> As of October 2002, U.S. Space Command was merged with U.S. Strategic Command.

<sup>66</sup> Similar consolidation has taken place outside the command structure with the establishment of defense agencies and field activities.

In the last several years, revisions to the Unified Command Plan have strengthened the role of global integrators and **managers**.<sup>67</sup> U.S. Strategic Command has been assigned responsibility for planning and integrating forces for five key mission areas: global strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; information operations; missile defense; and, most recently, counterproliferation. Similarly, U.S. Special Operations Command has been given responsibility to plan and integrate operations against terrorist **organizations**.<sup>68</sup> And, more recently, Joint Forces Command was assigned responsibility to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on the peacetime allocation of forces to the regional combatant commands. In each case, the global commands' role as integrator and manager was strengthened with respect to the regional commands, services, and supporting agencies. Providers, managers, and users clearly have been put on a more equal footing. Managers will have a larger say in the allocation of military capabilities, balancing the natural desires of regional commands to want more assets for any given mission and the reluctance of the Services to break with normal routines to satisfy combatant commander requests.

Whether all inherently joint capabilities should be put under the purview of a global force manager remains an open question. If this were to be the case, we should expect the full array of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and battle command assets to come under joint control. We might also see more effort to place joint combat support assets under the responsibility of U.S. Transportation Command, perhaps expanding the command's mission to include transportation and

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<sup>67</sup> The Unified Command Plan establishes the missions and geographic responsibilities among the combatant commanders. Among revisions to the plan that took place on Oct. 1, 2002: 1) U.S. Northern Command: New combatant command assigned to defend the United States and support military assistance to civil authorities. Northern Command's headquarters is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; 2) U.S. Joint Forces Command: Focus became transforming U.S. military forces; geographic responsibilities shift to Northern and European commands. Joint Forces Command's headquarters is in Norfolk, Virginia; 3) U.S. Space Command and Strategic Command merged into an expanded STRATCOM, located at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

<sup>68</sup> Both of these commands can also be called upon to carry out missions as assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense.

materiel support. Moreover, whether or not the role of force managers expands to give global commands a greater voice in setting requirements to guide the acquisition process also remains an open question.

This new dynamic will have an additional layer of complexity if we are to assume that regional commanders will play less of a role as field commanders and more of a role as strategic advisors and implementers for the President and Secretary of Defense. To the extent this trend continues, the actual users of forces will be the joint task force commanders. Regional commanders will, to a growing degree, render advice on the allocation of forces within their areas of responsibility, and Joint Forces Command will provide advice on the allocation of forces among regional commanders. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will retain their traditional voice as advisors on the use of Service assets in joint contexts. There could be great benefit in these multiple sources of advice. There could also be considerable confusion if the various parties are not privy to the same sources of **information.**<sup>69</sup>

These changes in the joint division of labor, paired with the observations and recommendations outlined elsewhere in this report, will help create the proper focus and yield the requisite capabilities, including joint tactical interdependencies, that will be necessary to support American strategy and confront the difficult challenges of this era. In the following section, we explore the implications of these changes for the military services.

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<sup>69</sup> On operational matters, for example, it will be essential that the various parties responsible for providing advice are conversant on the joint task force commander's plans and recommendations.

## 5. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Realigning the macro division of labor among the armed forces would be but part of the solution needed to align forces and capabilities to support U.S. grand strategy. The Defense Department would also need to field different kinds of forces and capabilities. Here we explore the implications of our assessment for the overall military establishment.

### **BUILDING THE "INFORM AND ACT" SYSTEM**

Undergirding all of the diverse capabilities of the U.S. armed forces are requirements for a new and daunting degree of information—about the enemy, about the environment, and about themselves. These requirements seem likely to grow and diversify. To put the problem in perspective, consider that the U.S. intelligence community had two opportunities to assess Iraq's WMD programs. In 1990, prior to Operation Desert Shield, it substantially underestimated their extent and sophistication. A dozen years later, even after nearly a decade of highly intrusive inspections on the ground in Iraq, it spectacularly overstated the threat. The challenges of identifying the WMD threat in Iraq, along with the so-far unsuccessful manhunt for Osama bin Laden and the Taliban's Mullah Omar are much more characteristic of the intelligence challenges the nation will face in the future than are the silo-and-tank-counting exercises of the Cold War period. Even the most capable Joint combat force will have tremendous difficulties succeeding in future complex operations unless it is embedded in an "inform and act" complex that is pervasive and persistent. What this means for the Department of Defense is both far-reaching and potentially troubling.

We deliberately eschew the terminology of "RSTA," "C'ISR" or any other such term for three reasons. First, we want to emphasize the novelty of what will be demanded by a world that is vastly different than any that could have been imagined by the architects of the existing intelligence system. As the notion of the "battlefield" morphs from clearly-delineated geographic areas to specific rooms in particular buildings on the one hand, and the minds of one-and-a-half billion

Muslims on the other; as U.S. forces are called upon to grapple with adversaries whose intentions, strengths, and vulnerabilities are radically different than those of our past opponents; and as we strive to increase the effectiveness of and reduce dangers to the troops "at the point," the magnitude of the task becomes clear. Second, resort to the commonplace terminology of the intelligence or command-and-control worlds to describe the challenge would tend to channel thinking about possible solutions into narrow "stovepipes," whereas the evidence suggests that an extremely integrated set of capabilities is needed. Finally, the standard terminology tends to drive the discussion to the technical level of platforms, sensors, bandwidth and the like, whereas we believe that meeting the challenges of the future is at least as much about people as it is about hardware.

What is called for is an overarching architecture that connects strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level collection, assessment, and dissemination assets and processes with sufficient fidelity and seamlessness to inform decision makers at all levels with adequate timeliness and reliability. It is an "effects-based" approach to intelligence, where the desired effect is the right choice at the right time. A "global information grid" could be a description of one important enabling component, but it is not the architecture itself.

The needed "inform and act" complex will be persistent, profoundly so. How many sensors, including human eyes and ears, will need to stare for how many months at how many patches of mountain or jungle under the attentive control of how many highly trained and experienced analysts to track down the next Osama bin Laden (or even the current one)? What will be needed to locate and target with high confidence every, or at least nearly every, nuclear weapon deployed by a threatening country—and keep them targeted, despite the enemy's sophisticated attempts to conceal and confuse? Just describing the problems briefly suffices to convey their magnitude and difficulty.

Confronting them will not be a task just for DoD; if ever there was a security problem that was truly "inter-agency" it is this one. Indeed, breaking down institutional and bureaucratic barriers, not just within the traditional intelligence community but broadly across government, is

one of the more formidable aspects of building the complex. Another will be to find the substantial resources that will be needed to devise, develop, and field the systems comprising the complex. Many, such as UAVs, exist already, but are being procured in inadequate quantities; these problems are easy to fix in theory, however painful the solutions may be programmatically. Other capabilities, like foliage-penetrating radars or hyperspectral imaging sensors, need infusions of money and ingenuity to reach their military potential, while still other critical pieces are yet to be imagined or, if imagined, remain in an infancy of development. This is clearly an area where all manner of science and technology investment is needed.

More important than investments in technology, however, will be investments in people. Although computerized algorithms for automated target recognition and similar tasks are potentially very useful adjuncts, the human mind remains our world's most subtle and sophisticated analytic tool. It has evolved to see and interpret patterns, to "connect" apparently unrelated "dots," and to create knowledge from what previously was only data. Developing cadres of highly trained personnel to power the "inform and act" architecture, and creating professional trajectories that allow them to profitably employ their skills throughout their careers, is a major challenge for the United States government--and for the armed forces in particular.

In conjunction with all of this, DoC must continue its efforts to protect its information resources from adversary attack and exploitation. As the joint force becomes ever more reliant on timely and massive information flows, likely opponents will almost certainly arrive at the same conclusions that the Chinese apparently already have; namely, that disrupting or distorting U.S. information systems offers a great degree of leverage against the American **superpower**.<sup>70</sup> It is not only leaders of the U.S. armed forces that dream of convincing the enemy's key weapons that they are "Maytag(s) in a rinse cycle"; similar

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<sup>70</sup> For a thorough discussion of China's thinking on information warfare, see James C. Mulvenon and R. H. Yang, *The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CF-145-CA22/AF, 1999.

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techniques will be aimed at American forces by adversaries exploiting the diffuse technical sophistication inherent in a globalized world.<sup>71</sup> Cyber-security will become simultaneously more critical and more complicated as increasing numbers of "non-IC" and non-DoD actors are inevitably engaged in planning, informing, and assessing the nation's security policies and their execution.

The ongoing QDR may present an opportunity to explore whether an ambitious program for revamping and enhancing the nation's intelligence and information architecture is called for, and to begin shaping the desired "inform and act" complex if, as we believe, it is deemed necessary. Steps that should be considered include:

- Recruiting and developing a new generation of analysts and intelligence managers with the skills, including language and area training and technical know-how, to deal with the threats emanating from both state and non-state actors
- Realigning development and acquisition priorities to reduce dependence on small numbers of very sophisticated and very expensive platforms and emphasize, instead, more diverse, numerous, and responsive systems (including UAVs with these latter characteristics)
- Accelerating the operational deployment of advanced sensors that have lingered in the developmental pipeline as well as developing new classes of networked, inexpensive, "disposable" collection devices such as air-droppable ground sensors and EO/IR cameras.

Finally, it will be critical to connect people, platforms, and sensors to one another and to commanders and decision makers with hardware, procedures' and processes that are fast, flexible, and robust.

#### **A STRATEGICALLY DECISIVE ARMY: WINNING AT PEACE AS WELL AS WAR**

The new American strategy, predicated on supporting freedom around the world, will create extraordinary challenges for the U.S. Army. For

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<sup>71</sup> General John Jumper quote from J. A. Tirpak, "The New Way of Electron War," in *Air Force*, Vol. 87, No. 12, December 2004, browsed at <http://www.afa.org/magazine/dec2004/1204electron.html>.

the past fifty years, the Army's primary mission has been to win decisively on the conventional **battlefield**.<sup>72</sup> As discussed in Chapter One, national priorities are now evolving. Motivated by grave threats emanating from illiberal regimes and ill-governed territories, the new grand strategy requires the Army to shoulder a second, co-equal, mission: stabilizing key regions in order to facilitate the expansion of freedom.

This strategic evolution poses a dilemma for the Army leadership. On the one hand, it is essential that the Army maintain its hard-earned mastery of conventional warfighting. Decades of extraordinary effort and investment forged the Army into the world's preeminent instrument of conventional landpower, but this preeminence is ephemeral and subject to gradual erosion by innovative **adversaries**.<sup>73</sup> Sustaining the Army's conventional dominance therefore requires relentless effort and re-investment in the Army's conventional capabilities.

On the other hand, the new grand strategy charges the Army with a second mission, stabilization, that is equally demanding and increasingly vital to the nation's **security**.<sup>74</sup> The new strategy will result in more stability operations that are also larger, more complex, more ambitious, and much more important than in past **eras**.<sup>75</sup> Some of these campaigns will feature direct stability operations, i.e.,

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<sup>72</sup> See for example, John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998.

<sup>73</sup> See for example *Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command 1913-1998*, Hampton, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1999. On innovative adversaries, see Adam Grissom and Jasen Castillo, *Innovation and Response: Precision Tactical Airpower and the Future Operational Environment*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005, forthcoming.

<sup>74</sup> The Army defines stability operations as, "peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counter-drug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control and show of force." FM 3-07 "Stability Operations and Support Operations," Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 1-2.

<sup>75</sup> Bruce Nardulli, "The U.S. Army and the Offensive War on Terrorism," in Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro (eds.), *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1657-A, 2003, pp. 27-60.

pacification, by Army **forces**.<sup>76</sup> Others will be less direct, consisting mainly of military assistance, advisory, training, and security cooperation missions that indirectly cultivate favorable political conditions in key regions and strengthen the capacity of friendly states to maintain internal **security**.<sup>77</sup> Still others may involve a mixture of direct and indirect stability operations, as seen today in Iraq and **Afghanistan**.<sup>78</sup> Whatever the specific context, all are likely to feature a prolonged Army presence, stressful operational and tactical conditions, labyrinthine political-military dynamics, and adaptive adversaries seeking asymmetric advantages. If the Army is to succeed at these complicated and difficult assignments, it will be obliged to devote substantially more effort and resources than heretofore toward organizing, training, and equipping Army forces to conduct stability operations.

Therein lies a dilemma. Sustaining conventional dominance while developing greater proficiency for stability operations may overtax the Army's current institutional capacity. The torque of these twin requirements is straining the Army to the breaking **point**.<sup>79</sup> Each of these missions is a full-time job. Individual Army units have neither the time nor the institutional support needed to become truly proficient at both missions **simultaneously**.<sup>80</sup>

Fortunately, the Army Chief of Staff recognizes this dilemma and is moving to better position the Army to fulfill its role in the new grand strategy. Many Army capabilities that are overabundant in the current

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<sup>76</sup> By "direct stability operations" we are referring to situations in which U.S. forces conduct tactical missions themselves. By "indirect stability operations" we mean situations in which U.S. forces are acting to expand the capacity of indigenous forces.

<sup>77</sup> An example is the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) conducted by U.S. forces in the Republic of Georgia from 2002 to the present. See "Georgia Train and Equip Program Fact Sheet," Vaihingen, GE: U.S. European Command, n.d. (2003).

<sup>78</sup> Both Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom feature direct counter-insurgent operations by U.S. forces complemented by training programs for indigenous forces run by U.S. special forces, allied forces, and conventional U.S. Army units.

<sup>79</sup> See for example *Department of Defense Reserve Component Employment Study 2005*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005.

<sup>80</sup> Interviews with Army maneuver unit commanders, March 2005.

structure, such as air defense and field artillery, are being downsized to make room for capabilities that are more appropriate to stability operations, such as civil affairs, military police, and special forces.<sup>81</sup> The Army is also reorganizing from a division-based force (33 maneuver brigades in ten divisions) to a modular force of 43 to 48 new-model brigade combat teams that will support a greater presence overseas and be individually more balanced and versatile.<sup>82</sup> Personnel and rotational policies are also being revamped to provide more stability for the officer corps and, potentially, more time in assignments to facilitate professional development.<sup>83</sup> These reforms, and many others instituted by the Army Chief of Staff, are broadly commendable and represent an excellent start toward adjusting the service to the new American grand strategy.

However, to fully support the strategy more will need to be done. As impressive as the Army's transformation efforts are, they have yet to address the central dilemma facing the service - how to prepare the Army to excel at conventional warfighting and stability operations simultaneously. For example, while Army doctrine and institutional training continue to focus on conventional warfighting, collective training within many units now focuses exclusively on stability operations.<sup>84</sup> This mismatch degrades proficiency for both missions. Units also continue to be organized and echeloned primarily for the conventional battlefield, then disassembled and reassembled along different lines for deployment to stability operations.<sup>85</sup> Army modernization plans also focus nearly exclusively on conventional mission areas even while the day-to-day focus of the Army acquisition

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<sup>81</sup> See draft Army briefing for POTUS on "Building Army Capabilities," at: [www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0401armstructbrief.ppt+%22Building+Army+Capabilities%22&hl=en](http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0401armstructbrief.ppt+%22Building+Army+Capabilities%22&hl=en).

<sup>82</sup> GEN Peter J. Schoomaker and Francis K. Harvey, "The Army 2005 Posture Statement," Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 6 February 2005.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Interview with Army and Marine Corps maneuver unit commanders, March 2005.

<sup>85</sup> See "The 2005 Army Modernization Plan," Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, February 2005.

corps is jury-rigging equipment for stability operations.<sup>86</sup> Each of these situations is indicative of the larger challenge faced by the Army.

#### **Organizing, Training, and Equipping to Support the New Grand Strategy**

To better manage the dilemma posed by the new grand strategy, the Army should consider further reforms in its three core Title 10 functions - organizing, training, and equipping. The Army might begin by considering adjustments to its longstanding "force package" model of organizing its tactical structure. Under this model, the Army divides its tactical forces into four packages, each of which is assigned a different role in support of existing operations plans and, in some cases, oriented toward a particular theater.<sup>87</sup> The force package model allows the Army to tailor training and equipment for each unit according to wartime role while prioritizing modernization and experimentation across the overall force. In the course of the QDR, the existing force packages will doubtlessly be reexamined by DoD and the Army to account for the Army's modularity initiative, global posture realignment, and the aftermath of operations in Iraq. This will present an excellent opportunity to better position the Army to support the new strategy.

In the context of the 1-n-2-1 framework and the stability/conventional dilemma, the Army should consider realigning its force packages by stability/conventional mission area. Specifically, in place of the four existing force packages, the Army should consider dedicating

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Force Package I is the Major Contingency Response Force comprising two corps headquarters (III and XVIII Airborne) and four divisions (82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne, 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry, and 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry) focused on major combat operations, especially in southwest Asia. Force Package II is the Rapid Regional Response Force comprising one active component corps headquarters (I Corps) and three divisions (2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry, and 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry) focused on the 5027 series of plans. Force Package III is the Reinforcing Force comprising one active component corps headquarters (V Corps) and three divisions (1<sup>st</sup> Infantry, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain). Force Package IV is the Strategic Reserve, comprising the remaining active tactical formations stationed in the U.S. Each force package also has reserve component units associated with it.

one force package to conventional warfighting operations and three force packages to stability operations.

Not unlike the existing arrangement, the new Force Package I might comprise a small number of dedicated Unit of Action (*i.e.*, corps and division-level) headquarters, the fifteen brigades slated to receive the Future Combat System, and the full panoply of active component combat support and combat service support units associated with today's heavy **forces**.<sup>88</sup> The new Force Package I would be aggressively modernized and trained to maintain conventional warfighting superiority over potential regional or peer **adversaries**.<sup>89</sup> As a result, it would not be rotated overseas for stability operations, nor would it participate in the Army's new three-year force generation cycle. Instead, it would focus solely on maintaining peak readiness to halt conventional aggression by an emerging peer competitor or to defeat and depose a regional adversary.

The remaining Army tactical structure might be grouped in three force packages, together comprising the Army's contingency forces. They would include light, medium, and heavy maneuver brigades, combat service support echelons, and combat support units relevant to stability operations. The contingency forces would be rotationally available according to the Army's new three-year force generation cycle (*i.e.*, one force package available at any given time). Their primary mission would be to conduct direct and indirect stability operations, including counter-insurgency, peace operations, military advisory and training missions, and security cooperation activities. As such, they should habitually incorporate additional capabilities such as civil affairs, military police, psychological operations, robust multinational liaison teams, and linguists, not normally found in conventional maneuver brigades. They would also routinely train and operate with Army special forces elements during foreign internal defense operations and security cooperation **missions**.<sup>90</sup> It might even be possible to orient brigades on

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<sup>88</sup> Tim Weiner, "An Army Program To Build a High-Tech Force Hits Cost Snags," *New York Times*, 28 March 2005, p. 1.

<sup>89</sup> *Supra* note 13.

<sup>90</sup> These units would obviously not be special forces, but they might usefully augment special forces for missions requiring

a particular region of the world to facilitate development of language skills and habitual linkages with special forces groups, service component command headquarters, and combatant command headquarters oriented on the same **regions**.<sup>91</sup> Organized in this manner, the contingency forces would provide a robust steady-state capacity to conduct both direct and indirect stability operations around the globe.

Despite the prospective benefits of force package realignment, there will undoubtedly be concerns raised about its long-term ramifications. Some critics may argue that the units in Force Packages II-IV will be nothing more than constabularies, unable to hold their own in serious combat. In fact, however, as proposed here they would be warfighting units possessing the entire suite of combined arms capabilities, merely focused on defeating unconventional and irregular adversaries. Critics might also argue that dividing the Army in this manner will compromise the unity of its professional culture, though the Service has used the force package model for many years and it has long been divided along branch and specialty lines. Finally, it might be argued that dedicating a portion of the Army's tactical structure to conventional warfighting will exacerbate the existing operations tempo burden on the rest of the force structure. While this may be true, the current "general purpose" approach will, in the context of the new strategy, produce units that are insufficiently proficient in either of the two key mission areas. The Army's first priority must be quality and readiness for the missions required by the new strategy. Whether the Army is large enough to support all the possible operations that might be generated by the new strategy is a separate question, and one

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capabilities they already possess, such as training foreign forces. The British Army has used conventional units to train local forces for many years with impressive results.

<sup>91</sup> Some would argue that regional orientation would reduce the flexibility and global deployability of units. However, regional orientation would not preclude deploying units to contingencies in other regions. Moreover, based on experience "cross-leveling" special forces teams outside their assigned regions, there is reason to believe that even units that are oriented on the "wrong" region will likely adjust more quickly than units with no international exposure in the first place. Regional orientation may therefore be a useful step even if the locale of future contingencies can't be predicted with certainty.

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requiring consideration by policy makers and research beyond that available for this study.

### **Training**

In addition to structuring itself to better support the new grand strategy, the Army should consider altering aspects of its recruiting, training, and education system. Most importantly, the basic intellectual framework for the Army - its field manuals (FMs), tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) handbooks, and Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) training plans - should be reoriented to mirror the co-equal status of conventional warfighting and stability operations under the new grand strategy. At the lower tactical levels, the Army might find it advantageous to maintain two parallel sets of doctrine and training products, one for units in Force Package I and another for contingency units in the other three force packages.<sup>92</sup> The Army has more than a decade of experience maintaining parallel doctrine and training materials for "digitized" and "non-digitized" forces that can serve as a model in this regard.<sup>93</sup>

Similarly, the Army should consider reorienting the curricula at the service's professional military education institutions to establish a new balance between warfighting and stability operations. The content of most curricula need not be changed because they possess equal relevance for both mission areas (e.g., the military decision-making process and combined arms tactics). Course content applicable solely to conventional warfighting (e.g., deep attack) would in general be replaced by stability operations content, as this will be most relevant

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<sup>92</sup> For example, the Army might consider rebalancing capstone Army doctrine (i.e., FM 3-0 Operations) and operational-level doctrine to give equal weight to warfighting and stability operations. Tactical doctrine, TTPs, and training literature might best be issued in two forms, one focused on conventional warfighting and another focused on stability operations. Units in III Corps would train to the warfighting doctrine, contingency force units would train to the stability doctrine.

<sup>93</sup> III Corps headquarters, the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division are the Army's first digitized units. A parallel set of field manuals, TTPs, and training products have been developed to enable these units to exploit their new digital battle command systems to the utmost.

to the sizable majority of officers who will be going to contingency force units in their next assignment. To ensure that officers in conventional warfighting units maintain peak proficiency, a dedicated schoolhouse might be collocated with a Force Package I corps headquarters to provide extra exposure to these issues. Again, the digitization experience provides a **model**.<sup>94</sup>

Over time, these changes to the Army's education and training structure, coupled with new patterns of deployment and operations, will significantly alter the skill mix of the officer corps. The Army would become broadly more proficient in stability operations, and broadly less practiced at conventional warfighting. However, units specializing in conventional warfighting could actually be expected to be more proficient than today's units attempting to train for both warfighting and stability operations. Units specializing in stability operations would likely be much more proficient than today's forces. The result would be an Army better postured and prepared to support the new grand strategy.

#### **Equipping the Force**

Finally, the Army should also consider certain adjustments to its materiel investment plans. The Future Combat System (FCS) is currently the centerpiece of these **plans**.<sup>95</sup> The FCS program is intended to produce a new family of armored vehicles that will be linked together at every echelon by an advanced digital information system. Generally speaking, the primary objective of the FCS program is to enable to Army to sustain indefinitely its tactical superiority over conventional opponents. This objective, in and of itself, is laudable.

However, within its modernization program, the Army should consider reallocating research, development, and procurement resources toward enhancing the capabilities of individual soldiers. Current Army modernization plans focus heavily on new platforms and their associated systems. Relatively little is devoted to what are termed "soldier

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<sup>94</sup> The Fort Hood Battle Command Training Center, which trains officers transitioning to III Corps units on digitized doctrine and TTP, provides a model in this regard.

<sup>95</sup> Supra note 13.

systems."<sup>96</sup> For more than a decade, the Army has had a program on the books called "Land Warrior" that aims to provide an integrated suite of miniaturized digital communications, improved ballistic protection, advanced night vision, more lethal individual weapons, and other improved individual kit to individual soldiers. Over the years, the Army has consistently placed a lower priority on Land Warrior than platform-based systems, resulting in many delays and setbacks. Given the new operational environment and the demands of the new grand strategy, the Army should consider significantly expanding the resources it devotes to soldier modernization in general and Land Warrior more specifically.

#### **A NEW AIR-GROUND PARTNERSHIP**

America's new strategy will likely call on air and land forces to partner in new ways. In some cases, U.S. air forces will partner with local ground forces to help an emerging democracy defeat internal threats such as insurgency and terrorism. In other cases, coalition air forces will partner with special forces and indigenous ground forces to conduct counter-terrorist missions. Finally, in major combat operations, air and land forces will increasingly combine in modular, responsive, and agile packages to protect friendly nations from external aggression or to take down regimes.

Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate how effective these innovative partnerships can be. In Afghanistan, coalition special forces directed precision air strikes against enemy forces. Special forces, sometimes working alone but usually integrated with friendly indigenous ground forces, were able to detect and identify targets impossible to identify from the air alone. USAF Terminal Attack Controllers (TACs) working on the ground with U.S. Army and coalition special forces directed air strikes that were precise and at times massive. Air and ground forces working together presented the Taliban with a dilemma: if they dispersed to avoid air attack, they would be overrun by anti-Taliban forces; if they concentrated to defend against ground attack, they became vulnerable to devastating air attack. They

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<sup>96</sup> Supra note 13.

generally chose the latter and suffered greatly as a result. In short, air strikes tipped the balance of power in favor of the Northern Alliance and other friendly Afghan forces, allowing them to break a stalemate that had lasted for years, defeat Taliban Forces, and overthrow the **government**.<sup>97</sup>

U.S. ground maneuver forces subsequently deployed into the country to conduct counter-terrorism and stability operations. These ground forces deployed to Afghanistan without their artillery, counting on rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft to provide needed fire support. In operations since the fall of the Taliban, air forces have played a vital supporting role in Afghanistan, providing essential lift, intelligence, and strike support. Coalition air forces have prevented insurgents from massing and provided on-call fire support for Afghan and U.S. forces. This has allowed effective patrolling by small units of coalition forces without the risk of being overwhelmed by superior numbers.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, air-ground synergies were again exploited in what were largely simultaneous air-ground offensives. To speed the movement of ground forces into the Gulf and make them more agile on the battlefield, the Army deployed about half the fire support capacity that it took with it to Operation Desert Storm in **1991**.<sup>98</sup> Relying heavily on air forces for close support, and less encumbered by the need to move large artillery formations and tons of ammunition, the Army drove rapidly up the west side of the Euphrates River valley. The Marines, who had decided to supplement relatively limited artillery support with air power decades earlier, made similar progress to the east in the drive on Baghdad.

Coalition air attacks sapped the morale of soldiers in the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard, interdicted Iraqi forces that sought to move, destroyed many in defensive positions or hides, and protected flanks. Although far from perfect, the combination of airborne ISR and strike

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<sup>97</sup> For a more detailed discussion of how air and ground forces worked together in *Operation Enduring Freedom*, see Bruce Pirnie, et al., *Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-301-AF, 2005.

<sup>98</sup> As measured by the fire support potential (in tons) per maneuver brigade. See Pirnie, et al., 2005, p. 134.