

From: NEWT G.

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

rom: (b)(6) CIV, OSD  
Sent: Monday, November 07, 2005 3:11 PM  
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD  
Subject: FW: A Hospital Plan for Pandemics

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Thirdwave2 <thirdwave2@speakingingrich.com>  
To: ahubbard@who.eop.gov <ahubbard@who.eop.gov>; mol@hhs.gov <mol@hhs.gov>;  
jbolten@omb.eop.gov <jbolten@omb.eop.gov>  
CC: mmcclellanoa@cms.hhs.gov <mmcclellanoa@cms.hhs.gov>; jyg2@cdc.gov <jyg2@cdc.gov>;  
cclancy@ahrq.gov <cclancy@ahrq.gov>; cmgrath@ovp.eop.gov <cmgrath@ovp.eop.gov>  
Sent: Sun Nov 06 07:06:53 2005  
Subject: FW: A Hospital Plan for Pandemics

It may be worth asking an outside panel if walter reed should be transferred to the public health service and maintained as a reserve hospital that could be expanded during a pandemic or a terrorist attack

I am not advocating this but the contrast between saying we are worried about a pandemic with too few hospital beds while closing a major hospital is striking

newt

From: Terry Balderson [mailto:tbalders@tampabay.rr.com]  
Sent: Sunday, November 06, 2005 5:57 AM  
To: Thirdwave2  
Cc: Robert Egge  
Subject: A Hospital Plan for Pandemics

A Hospital Plan for Pandemics  
Don't Close Walter Reed and Other 'Obsolete' Facilities

By Phillip Longman The Washington Post Sunday, November 6, 2005; B07

Got your Tamiflu yet? How about a home respirator and a live-in nurse? If expert predictions of a coming flu pandemic prove right, there's little chance you'll be able to find a hospital bed in which to

11-L-0559/OSD/54910

recover.

Here in Washington, for example, after a long series of hospital closures, there are only 4,346 hospital beds left -- a number that will soon go lower with the closing of Walter Reed Army Medical Center's main facilities. Yet projections show that even a moderately severe strain of a pandemic flu virus would require some 5,000 people to be hospitalized in the District alone. Even if we discharged every patient in Washington's hospitals -- including all the mental patients in St. Elizabeths, all the frail elderly in Hadley Memorial's long-term acute care facility and all the veterans in Veterans Affairs Medical Center -- there still would not be enough hospital beds available to care for, or even to quarantine, highly infectious flu patients.

The same is true nationally. Since 1980 the number of hospital beds available per U.S. resident has declined by roughly 40 percent. Today the United States has only about 965,000 staffed hospital beds. Yet Trust for America's Health, a nonprofit group committed to promoting public health, estimates that the emergence of a pandemic flu virus like the one of 1918 would require hospitalization of 2.3 million people in this country.

There are many sound reasons why the number of hospital beds has been declining. New technology allows for much greater use of outpatient facilities. Galloping medical inflation demands more cost-effective care. But the result is a health care system that is perpetually running at or above 100 percent capacity, and that will be overwhelmed by a pandemic, major terrorism attack or natural disaster.

Fortunately, there is a way to help solve this problem and many others that plague our health care system.

Let's start with the example of Walter Reed. Located just 5 1/2 miles from the White House, 6 1/2 miles from the Capitol and six miles from the Washington Convention Center, its facilities, including a hospital built in 1972, are an integral component of the District's emergency preparedness plan. In the event of a mass casualty terrorist attack or other public health emergency, the plan calls for Walter Reed to discharge its noncritical patients and begin treating civilian victims within as little as three hours. Walter Reed is particularly well equipped and well situated to treat not only victims of a flu pandemic but also those wounded by a nuclear or biological attack in downtown Washington. But maintaining this capacity is expensive, and right now Congress is poised to accept the recommendation of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission that the main hospital and most other buildings on the 113-acre campus be razed.

It may well be appropriate for the military to reorganize and rationalize the way it delivers care in the Washington area and many other parts of the country, just as it is for the private sector. Across the Northeast and Midwest, for example, many VA hospitals have lost their patient base because so many aging veterans have retired elsewhere. The Department of Veterans Affairs has announced that it is closing hospitals in Pittsburgh and in Brecksville, Ohio, and it is threatening to close facilities in Brooklyn and Manhattan. But rather than abandon these and other "obsolete" hospitals -- including many shuttered public hospitals such as D.C. General -- we should turn at least some of them into facilities that will stand ready to serve the public in the event of disasters and that between disasters will serve the uninsured and those on Medicaid.

Private health care providers are under such enormous pressures to contain costs that they cannot begin to afford to keep wards open that aren't filled nearly every day. This makes it the proper role of government to ensure we have surge capacity that the private sector cannot deliver. Literally every American, including those with gold-plated health insurance plans, stands to benefit from a health care system built to handle such increasing risks as a flu pandemic, another Katrina, a major

earthquake or a terrorist attack.

Such a plan would also go a long way toward both rationalizing the U.S. health care system and making it more equitable. Study after study has shown that Veterans Affairs, by making extensive use of electronic medical records, information technology and provider incentives, is providing health care of far higher quality, and at less cost, than that received by most insured Americans, let alone the uninsured. At the same time, hospitals in the District of Columbia spend nearly 7 percent of their revenue on the uninsured, and the total cost to the local health care system is much higher. Meanwhile, nearly a quarter of all patients in Washington hospitals are on Medicaid, and to hear the hospitals tell it, they lose money on every one.

Message to Congress and local decision makers: Why not turn Walter Reed and facilities like it across the country into pilot projects that can point the way toward true reform and improvement of our beleaguered health care system?

The writer is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation.



**THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

1200 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

19:18

**INFO MEMO**

HEALTH AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEC 2 2005

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs) *llj*

SUBJECT: Suggestion from Newt Gingrich Concerning Retaining Walter Reed Army Medical Center

- You asked for my thoughts regarding using Walter Reed Army Medical Center as a reserve hospital that could be expanded during a pandemic or terrorist attack as suggested by Mr. Gingrich (TAB A).
- Although at initial glance, this would appear to be a good idea, it is probably not for the following reasons:
  - Extraordinary resources would be needed to maintain Walter Reed Army Medical Center in acceptable condition, as well as staff to operate the facility.
  - There are more effective and affordable alternatives. The Departments of Health & Human Services and Homeland Security are leading initiatives to create temporary deployable facilities, and they are working with private sector hospitals to maintain required beds and trained staff.
  - DoD could, if needed, support these efforts with deployment of our own field hospitals.
- The most important effort now to prepare for and manage a pandemic should be to develop and procure needed medical countermeasures (antivirals, vaccines, etc), and to have the capability to rapidly distribute these materials. These efforts, now ongoing, are far more critical than having a standing hospital to care for the sick.
- Finally, according to BRAC rules, if DoD has no specific use for the Walter Reed site, it could be then turned over to another government agency, the District of Columbia, or the private sector. I expect others will be working hard to pursue their vision for how to use this potentially very valuable piece of real estate.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *David C. ...*

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Clayton Beonecke, OCFO, (b)(6) DOCS Open 95561,96587

11-L-0559/OSD/54913

OSD 23468-05

From: NEWT G.

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

---

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jbolten@omb.eop.gov <jbolten@omb.eop.gov>  
CC: mmcclellanoa@cms.hhs.gov <mmcclellanoa@cms.hhs.gov>; jyg2@cdc.gov <jyg2@cdc.gov>;  
cclancy@ahrq.gov <cclancy@ahrq.gov>; cmgrath@ovp.eop.gov <cmgrath@ovp.eop.gov>  
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Got your Tamiflu yet? How about a home respirator and a live-in nurse? If expert predictions of a coming flu pandemic prove right, there's little chance you'll be able to find a hospital bed in which to

11-L-0559/OSD/54914

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The writer is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation.

12/6  
515 ✓

12/7  
DEFENSE



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

ACTION MEMO

DEC 5 2005 5:52

December 5, 2005, 1:00 p.m.

LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

Robert Rangel

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake#111405-07 - Status of Congressional Gold Medal Legislation for Tuskegee Airmen

- The Senate passed S. 392, a bill authorizing the President to award a Congressional Gold Medal to the Tuskegee Airmen in October by unanimous consent. The bill was referred to the House Financial Services Committee.
- Rep. Rangel (D-NY) sponsored H.R. 1259, a companion bill to S. 392, in the House. His bill was also referred to the House Committee on Financial Services. It has about 115 co-sponsors of the 280 needed for the Financial Services committee to take action and send it to the Floor for a vote.
- Attached is a proposed letter to Rep. Rangel expressing support for the bill.
- Rep. Rangel intends to include your letter in a "Dear Colleague" letter designed to enlist the support of additional Members as co-sponsors of H.R. 1259. He also intends to issue a press release highlighting your support. He was "thrilled" to hear of your desire to promote the effort.
- Recommendation: Express support for Congressional efforts to pass this legislation in press appearances and a press release following delivery of the letter to Rep. Rangel. It may be advantageous to appear with Rep. Rangel in a short press event.

2006

5 Dec 05

SECDEF DECISION:

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_  
Other: \_\_\_\_\_

*See above*

Attachments:

1. Snowflake#111405-07
2. SECDEF letter to Representative Rangel
3. Senate VA Committee Press Release on Passage of S. 392
4. H.R. 1259 language and list of Co-Sponsors

14 Nov 05

MA SD	12/7	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	M-216	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	M 12/6	1435	12/7
ESR MA	8/13/5	1226	

Special Assistant for Personnel Policy, OSD(LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/54917

OSD 23525-05

**SENATE VOTES TO AWARD CONGRESSIONAL GOLD MEDAL TO THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN**



October 5, 2005  
**Contact:** Jeff Schrade (202)224-9093

(Washington, DC) In 1941, several months before the Japanese attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Army Air Force began a program to train black Americans as military pilots near Tuskegee, Alabama. On Tuesday the United States Senate unanimously passed legislation (S. 392) authorizing President Bush to award the Congressional Gold Medal to the Tuskegee Airmen in honor of their unique military record.

As an escort fighter wing during World War II, they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters.

The Tuskegee Airmen painted the tails of their planes red, and were initially equipped with P-39

Airacobras, later with P-47 Thunderbolts, and finally with the airplane that would become their signature, the P-51 Mustang.

**"This is a much deserved award and I am happy for those who will receive this important recognition on behalf of a grateful nation. The successes of the Tuskegee Airmen helped win the war and helped breakdown racial stereotypes,"** said **Sen. Larry Craig, Chairman of the U.S.**

**Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs. "I commend Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) for introducing this legislation."**

German pilots, who both feared and respected them, called the Tuskegee Airmen the "Schwartz Vogelmenchen" (Black Birdmen). White American bomber crews referred to them as "Redtailed Angels" because of the bright red painted on the tail assemblies and because of their reputation for not losing bombers to enemy fighters.

During World War II, Tuskegee Airmen were credited with destroying 261 aircraft, damaging 148 aircraft, flying 15,553 combat sorties and 1,578 missions over Italy and North Africa. They destroyed or damaged over 950 units of ground transportation and escorted more than 200 bombing missions.

The award the Airmen may receive will be unique since each Congressional Gold Medal of Honor is created by the United States Mint for each specific recipient, or group of recipients, so there is no standard design. The award is a completely separate decoration from the Medal of Honor, which is the rarest recognition the nation bestows for extreme bravery in combat.

The Continental Congress first authorized the commissioning of Congressional Gold Medals during the Revolutionary War, and the first recipient was General George Washington. Over the past two centuries, Congress has presented the award to those who participated in other wars and who otherwise contributed to society. Recipients include Ulysses S. Grant, John Wayne, Bob Hope, Pop John Paul II, Winston Churchill, and the Navajo Code Talkers of World War II.

If the Senate's vote is ratified by the House of Representatives, the Tuskegee Airmen, with nearly 1,000 members, will be the largest group to ever receive the award.

HR 1259 IH

109th CONGRESS

1st Session

**H. R. 1259**

To authorize the President to award a gold medal on behalf of the Congress, collectively, to the Tuskegee Airmen in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces.

**IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES****March 10, 2005**

Mr. RANGEL (for himself, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Mr. FILNER, Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, Mr. OWENS, Ms. CARSON, Mr. TOWNS, Ms. CORRINE BROWN of Florida, Mr. CUMMINGS, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. MEEKS of New York, and Mrs. CHRISTENSEN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

**A BILL**

To authorize the President to award a gold medal on behalf of the Congress, collectively, to the Tuskegee Airmen in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

**SECTION 1. FINDINGS.**

The Congress finds the following:

(1) In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt overruled his top generals and ordered the creation of an all Black flight training program. President Roosevelt took this action one day after the NAACP filed suit on behalf of Howard University student Yancy Williams and others in Federal court to force the Department of War to accept Black pilot trainees. Yancy Williams had a civilian pilot's license and had earned an engineering degree. Years later, Major Yancy Williams participated in an air surveillance project created by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

(2) Due to the rigid system of racial segregation that prevailed in the

United States during World War II, Black military pilots were trained at a separate airfield built near Tuskegee, Alabama. They became known as the 'Tuskegee Airmen'.

(3) The Tuskegee Airmen inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces, paving the way for full racial integration in the Armed Forces. They overcame the enormous challenges of prejudice and discrimination, succeeding, despite obstacles that threatened failure.

(4) From all accounts, the training of the Tuskegee Airmen was an experiment established to prove that so-called 'coloreds' were incapable of operating expensive and complex combat aircraft. Studies commissioned by the Army War College between 1924 and 1939 concluded that Blacks were unfit for leadership roles and incapable of aviation. Instead, the Tuskegee Airmen excelled.

(5) Overall, some 992 Black pilots graduated from the pilot training program of the Tuskegee Army Air Field, with the last class finishing in June 1946, 450 of whom served in combat. The first class of cadets began in July 1941 with 13 airmen, all of whom had college degrees, some with Ph.D.'s, and all of whom had pilot's licenses. One of the graduates was Captain Benjamin O. Davis Jr., a United States Military Academy graduate. Four aviation cadets were commissioned as second lieutenants, and 5 received Army Air Corps silver pilot wings.

(6) That the experiment achieved success rather than the expected failure is further evidenced by the eventual promotion of 3 of these pioneers through the commissioned officer ranks to flag rank, including the late General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., United States Air Force, the late General Daniel 'Chappie' James, United States Air Force, our Nation's first Black 4-star general, and Major General Lucius Theus, United States Air Force (retired).

(7) Four hundred fifty Black fighter pilots under the command of then Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., fought in World War II aerial battles over North Africa, Sicily, and Europe, flying, in succession, P-40, P-39, P-47, and P-51 aircraft. These gallant men flew 15,553 sorties and 1,578 missions with the 12th Tactical Air Force and the 15th Strategic Air Force.

(8) Colonel Davis later became the first Black flag officer of the United States Air Force, retired as a 3-star general, and was honored with a 4th star in retirement by President William J. Clinton.

(9) German pilots, who both feared and respected the Tuskegee Airmen, called them the 'Schwartzte Vogelmenshen' (or 'Black Birdmen'). White American bomber crews reverently referred to them as the 'Black

Redtail Angels', because of the bright red painted on the tail assemblies of their fighter aircraft and because of their reputation for not losing bombers to enemy fighters as they provided close escort for bombing missions over strategic targets in Europe.

(10) The 99th Fighter Squadron, after having distinguished itself over North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, joined 3 other Black squadrons, the 100th, the 301st, and the 302nd, designated as the 332nd Fighter Group. They then comprised the largest fighter unit in the 15th Air Force. From Italian bases, they destroyed many enemy targets on the ground and at sea, including a German destroyer in strafing attacks, and they destroyed numerous enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.

(11) Sixty-six of these pilots were killed in combat, while another 32 were either forced down or shot down and captured to become prisoners of war. These Black airmen came home with 150 Distinguished Flying Crosses, Bronze Stars, Silver Stars, and Legions of Merit, one Presidential Unit Citation, and the Red Star of Yugoslavia.

(12) Other Black pilots, navigators, bombardiers and crewman who were trained for medium bombardment duty as the 477th Bomber Group (Medium) were joined by veterans of the 332nd Fighter Group to form the 477th Composite Group, flying the 8-25 and P-47 aircraft. The demands of the members of the 477th Composite Group for parity in treatment and for recognition as competent military professionals, combined with the magnificent wartime records of the 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group, led to a review of the racial policies of the Department of War.

(13) In September 1947, the United States Air Force, as a separate service, reactivated the 332d Fighter Group under the Tactical Air command. Members of the 332d Fighter Group were 'Top Guns' in the 1st annual Air Force Gunnery Meet in 1949.

(14) For every Black pilot there were 12 other civilian or military Black men and women performing ground support duties. Many of these men and women remained in the military service during the post-World War II era and spearheaded the integration of the Armed Forces of the United States.

(15) Major achievements are attributed to many of those who returned to civilian life and earned leadership positions and respect as businessmen, corporate executives, religious leaders, lawyers, doctors, educators, bankers, and political leaders.

(16) A period of nearly 30 years of anonymity for the Tuskegee Airmen was ended in 1972 with the founding of Tuskegee Airmen, Inc., in

Detroit, Michigan. Organized as a non-military and nonprofit entity, Tuskegee Airmen, Inc., exists primarily to motivate and inspire young Americans to become participants in our Nation's society and its democratic process, and to preserve the history of their legacy.

(17) The Tuskegee Airmen have several memorials in place to perpetuate the memory of who they were and what they accomplished, including--

(A) the Tuskegee Airmen, Inc., National Scholarship Fund for high school seniors who excel in mathematics, but need financial assistance to begin a college program;

(B) a museum in historic Fort Wayne in Detroit, Michigan;

(C) Memorial Park at the Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio;

(D) a statue of a Tuskegee Airman in the Honor Park at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado; and

(E) a National Historic Site at Moton Field, where primary flight training was performed under contract with the Tuskegee Institute.

## **SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL GOLD MEDAL.**

(a) Presentation Authorized- The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate shall make appropriate arrangements for the presentation, on behalf of the Congress, of a gold medal of appropriate design to the Tuskegee Airmen, collectively, in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces.

(b) Design and Striking- For the purposes of the award referred to in subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury (hereafter in this Act referred to as the `Secretary') shall strike a gold medal with suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions, to be determined by the Secretary.

## **SEC. 3. DUPLICATE MEDALS.**

Under such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary may strike and sell duplicates in bronze of the gold medal struck under section 2, at a price sufficient to cover the costs of the medals, including labor, materials, dies, use of machinery, and overhead expenses.

## **SEC. 4. NATIONAL MEDALS.**



H.R. 1259

**Title:** To authorize the President to award a gold medal on behalf of the Congress, collectively, to the Tuskegee Airmen in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces.

**Sponsor:** Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 3/10/2005)

Cosponsors (116)

**Related Bills:** S. 392 (passed by unanimous consent)

**Latest Major Action:** 8/24/2005 Referred to House subcommittee. **Status:** Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology.

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**COSPONSORS(113), ALPHABETICAL** prior to Thanksgiving break

<u>Rep Ackerman, Gary L.</u> [NY-5] -D 7/25/2005	<u>Rep Baca, Joe</u> [CA-43] - D 6/23/2005
<u>Rep Balrd, Brian</u> [WA-3] -D 11/2/2005	<u>Rep Barrow, John</u> [GA-12] -D 7/25/2005
<u>Rep Berman, Howard L.</u> [NY-28] -R 5/24/2005	<u>Rep Bishoo, Sanford D., Jr.</u> [VA-1] - R 5/24/2005
<u>Rep Bordallo, Madeleine Z.</u> [GU] -D 3/17/2005	<u>Rep Brady, Robert A.</u> [PA-11] -D 3/10/2005
<u>Rep Brown, Corrine</u> [FL-3] -D 3/10/2005	<u>Rep Butterfield, G. K.</u> [NC-1] D 3/17/2005
<u>Rep Carson, Julia</u> [IN-7] -D 3/10/2005	<u>Rep Christensen, Donna M.</u> [VI] - 3/10/2005
<u>Rep Clay, Wm. Lacy</u> [MO-1] -D 7/12/2005	<u>Rep Cleaver, Emanuel</u> D [MO-5]6/8/2005
<u>Rep Clyburn, E.</u> [SC-6] -D 5/24/2005	<u>Rep Convers, John, Jr.</u> [MI-14]D 5/24/2005
<u>Rep Cooper, Jim</u> [TN-5] -D 10/26/2005	<u>Rep Cramer, Robert E. (Bud), Jr.</u> D [AL-5] - 10/26/2005
<u>Rep Crowley, Joseph</u> [NY-7] -D 7/25/2005	<u>Rep Cummins, Elijah E.</u> [MD-7] D - 3/10/2005
<u>Rep Davis, Artur</u> [AL-7] -D 6/23/2005	<u>Rep Davis, Danny K.</u> [IL-7] -D 7/12/2005
<u>Rep Davis, Geoff</u> [KY-4] -R 11/2/2005	<u>Rep, Davis, Jo Ann</u> [VA-1] -R 11/2/2005
<u>Rep DeGette, Diana</u> [CO-1] -D 11/1/2005	<u>Rep DeLoach, L.</u> [CT-3] -D 7/27/2005
<u>Rep Emanuel, Rahm</u> [IL-5] -D 7/25/2005	<u>Rep Engel, Elliot L.</u> [NY-17] -D 11/18/2005
<u>Rep Evans, Lane</u> [IL-17] -D 6/23/2005	<u>Rep Faleomavaea, Eni F. H.</u> D [AS]- 7/14/2005

Rep Fattah, Chaka [PA-2] -D  
 7/20/2005

Rep Ford, Harold E., Jr. [TN-9] -D  
 7/14/2005

Rep Frank, Barney [MA-41] -D  
 5/24/2005

Rep Green, Al [TX-9] -D  
 7/12/2005

Rep Grijalva, Raul M. [AZ-7] -D  
 7/25/2005

Rep Harman, Jane [CA-36] -D  
 5/24/2005

Rep Hastings, Alcee L. [FL-23] -D  
 3/10/2005

Rep Hunter, Duncan [CA-52] -R  
 11/18/2005

Rep Issa, Darrell E. [CA-49] -R  
 11/2/2005

Rep Jackson-Lee, Sheila [TX-18] -D  
 7/12/2005

Rep Johnson, Eddie Bernice D  
 [TX-30] - 5/24/2005

Rep Kaptur, Marcy [OH-91] -D  
 5/24/2005

Rep Kilpatrick, Carolyn C. [MI-13] D  
 7/12/2005

Rep Larson, John B. [CT-1] -D  
 6/8/2005

Rep Levin, Sander M. [MI-121] -D  
 5/24/2005

\_\_\_\_\_ [IL-3] -D  
 6/23/2005

Rep McCarthy, Carolyn [NY-4] -D  
 3/17/2005

Rep McDermott, Jim [WA-7] -D  
 3/17/2005

Rep McKinney, Cynthia A. [GA-4] -D  
 7/12/2005

Rep Meeks, Gregory W. [NY-6] -D  
 3/10/2005

Rep Filner, Bob [CA-51] -D  
 3/10/2005

Rep Fortuno, Luis G. [PR] -R  
 10/26/2005

\_\_\_\_\_ Chad \_\_\_\_\_ D  
 [TX-20] - 6/8/2005

Rep Green, Gene [TX-29] -D  
 11/18/2005

Rep Gutierrez, Luis V. [IL-4] -D  
 11/15/2005

Rep Hart, Melissa A. [PA-4] -R  
 11/15/2005

Rep Higgins, Brian [NY-27] -D  
 11/15/2005

Rep Israel, Steve [NY-2] -D  
 6/8/2005

Rep Jackson, Jesse L., Jr. [IL-2] D  
 - 7/12/2005

Rep Jefferson, William J. [LA-2] D  
 - 7/12/2005

Rep Jones, Stephanie Tubbs D  
 [OH-11] - 6/8/2005

\_\_\_\_\_ [MI-5] -D  
 4/13/2005

Rep Lantos, Tom [CA-12] -D  
 11/15/2005

Rep Lee, Barbara [CA-9] -D  
 6/30/2005

Rep Lewis, John [GA-5] - D  
 5/5/2005

Rep Maloney, Carolyn B. [NY-14] D  
 6/8/2005

Rep McCotter, Thaddeus G. R  
 [MI-11] - 10/26/2005

Rep McGovern, James P. [MA-3] D  
 7/25/2005

Rep Meek, Kendrick B. [FL-17] D  
 6/30/2005

Rep Millender-McDonald, Juanita D  
 [CA-37] - 6/30/2005

Rep Miller, Candice S. [MI-10] -R  
 7/25/2005  
Rep Moore, Gwen [WI-4] -R  
 7/12/2005  
Rep Nadler, Jerrold [NY-8] -D  
 11/15/2005  
Rep Neal, Richard E. [MA-2] -D  
 7/25/2005  
Rep Nunes, Devin [CA-21] -R  
 7/28/2005  
Rep Pascrell, Bill, Jr. [NJ-8] -D  
 11/1/2005  
Rep Rogers, Mike D. [AL-3] -R  
 7/25/2005  
Rep Ruppertsberger, C. A. Dutch D  
 [MD-2] - 7/25/2005  
Rep Ryan, Tim [OH-17] -D  
 7/25/2005  
Rep Schakowsky, Janice D. D  
 [IL-9]- 11/1/2005  
Rep Schwarz, John J.H. "Joe" [MI  
 7] - 9/21/2005  
Rep Scott, Robert C. [VA-3] D  
 3/17/2005  
Rep Sherman, Brad [CA-27] -D  
 9/21/2005  
Rep Skelton, Ike [MO-4] -D  
 7/26/2005  
Rep Soratt, John M., Jr. [SC-5] D  
 11/16/2005  
Rep Terry, Lee [NE-2] -D  
 6/23/2005  
Rep Towns, Edolphus [NY-10] -D  
 3/10/2005  
Rep Wasserman Schultz, Debbie D  
 [FL-20] - 7/25/2005  
Rep Watson, Diane E. [CA-33] D  
 7/12/2005  
Rep Waxman, Henry A. [CA-30] D  
 11/15/2005  
Rep Miller, Jeff [FL-1] -R  
 6/8/2005  
Rep Moran, James P. [VA-8] R  
 7/25/2005  
Rep Naoolitano, Grace E. [CA-38] D  
 11/16/2005  
Rep Norton, Eleanor Holmes [DC] D  
 - 7/12/2005  
Rep Owens, Maior R. [NY-11] -D  
 3/10/2005  
Rep Payne, Donald M. [NJ-10] -D  
 3/10/2005  
Rep Ross, Mike [AR-4] -D  
 7/25/2005  
Rep Rush, Bobby L. [IL-1] -D  
 7/12/2005  
Rep Sanchez, Linda T. [CA-39] -D  
 11/1/2005  
Rep Schiff, Adam G. [CA-29] -D  
 3/10/2005  
Rep Scott, David [GA-13] -D  
 5/24/2005  
Rep Serrano, Jose E. [NY-16] -D  
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 \_\_\_\_\_ [CT-2] -R  
 11/1/2005  
Rep Snyder, Vic [AR-2] -D  
 11/15/2005  
Rep Tanner, John S. [TN-9] -D  
 11/15/2005  
Rep Thompson, Bennie G. [MS-2] D  
 7/12/2005  
Rep Udall, Mark [CO-2] -D  
 11/1/2005  
Rep Waters, Maxine [CA-35] -D  
 7/12/2005  
Rep Watt, Melvin L. [NC-12] -D  
 6/30/2005  
Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] -R  
 10/26/2005

Rep. Wexler, Robert [FL-19] -D  
7/27/2005

Rep. Wilson, Joe [SC-2] -R  
7/14/2005

Rep. Cuellar, Henry [TX-28] D  
12/6/2005

Rep. Weiner, Anthony D. [NY-9] D  
12/6/2005

Rep. Menendez, Robert [NJ-13] D  
12/6/2005



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

ACTION MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF THE  
DEFENSE

2005 FEB -5 PM 5:52

December 5, 2005, 1:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake #111405-07 – Status of Congressional Gold Medal Legislation for Tuskegee Airmen

- The Senate passed S. 392, a bill authorizing the President to award a Congressional Gold Medal to the Tuskegee Airmen in October by unanimous consent. The bill was referred to the House Financial Services Committee.
- Rep. Rangel (D-NY) sponsored H.R. 1259, a companion bill to S. 392, in the House. His bill was also referred to the House Committee on Financial Services. It has about 115 co-sponsors of the 280 needed for the Financial Services committee to take action and send it to the Floor for a vote.
- Attached is a proposed letter to Rep. Rangel expressing support for the bill.
- Rep. Rangel intends to include your letter in a "Dear Colleague" letter designed to enlist the support of additional Members as co-sponsors of H.R. 1259. He also intends to issue a press release highlighting your support. He was "thrilled" to hear of your desire to promote the effort.
- Recommendation: Express support for Congressional efforts to pass this legislation in press appearances and a press release following delivery of the letter to Rep. Rangel. It may be advantageous to appear with Rep. Rangel in a short press event.

SECDEF DECISION:

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_  
Other: \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

1. Snowflake #111405-07
2. SECDEF letter to Representative Rangel
3. Senate VA Committee Press Release on Passage of S. 392
4. H.R. 1259 language and list of Co-Sponsors

Prepared by Tom Jones: Special Assistant for Personnel Policy, OSD(LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/54928

OSD 23525-05

1430

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~~FOUO~~

November 14, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Status of Gold Medal for Tuskegee Airmen

Please find out the status of the gold medal process for the Tuskegee Airmen that is moving through Congress. Is there anything we can do to promote it? Should we send a letter to the Members of the House and Senate?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
111405-07

.....  
*Please Respond By December 15, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/54929



RETAR OF DE  
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The Honorable Charles B. Rangel  
U. S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Rangel:

Thank you for sponsoring H.R. 1259, a Bill that would "authorize the President to award a gold medal on behalf of the Congress, collectively, to the Tuskegee Airmen in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces." I am pleased that the Senate unanimously passed a companion measure, S. 392.

I understand that both H.R. 1259 and S. 392 have been referred to the House Financial Services Committee and await action. I also understand that you and your co-sponsors have gathered about 115 signatures of Members towards the 280 needed for the Committee to consider the legislation.

In my view, this recognition is well deserved. This group of American heroes significantly contributed to victory in Europe during World War II and helped breakdown racial barriers in our armed forces. I offer my support for passage of H.R. 1259 and/or ratification of S. 392 and encourage all Members to sign on as additional co-sponsors to H.R. 1259. This is of utmost importance to me.

Your continued concern for and support of our Nation's brave men and women in uniform and their families are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

cc:  
Speaker of the House  
House Majority and Minority Leaders  
Chairman and Ranking Member, House Financial Services Committee  
Chairmen and Ranking Members, Senate and House Committees on Armed  
Services



11-L-0559/OSD/54930

## SENATE VOTES TO AWARD CONGRESSIONAL GOLD MEDAL TO THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN



October 5, 2005

Contact: Jeff Schrade (202)224-9093

(Washington, DC) In 1941, several months before the Japanese attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Army Air Force began a program to train black Americans as military pilots near Tuskegee, Alabama. On Tuesday the United States Senate unanimously passed legislation (S. 392) authorizing President Bush to award the Congressional Gold Medal to the Tuskegee Airmen in honor of their unique military record.

The Tuskegee Airmen painted the tails of their planes red, and were initially equipped with P-39 Airacobras, later with P-47 Thunderbolts, and finally with the airplane that would become their signature, the P-51 Mustang.

As an escort fighter wing during World War II, they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters.

"This is a much deserved award and I am happy for those who will receive this important recognition on behalf of a grateful nation. The successes of the Tuskegee Airmen helped win the war and helped breakdown racial stereotypes," said Sen. Larry Craig, Chairman of the U.S.

Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs. "I commend Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) for introducing this legislation."

German pilots, who both feared and respected them, called the Tuskegee Airmen the "Schwartz Vogelmen" (Black Birdmen). White American bomber crews referred to them as "Redtailed Angels" because of the bright red painted on the tail assemblies and because of their reputation for not losing bombers to enemy fighters.

During World War II, Tuskegee Airmen were credited with destroying 261 aircraft, damaging 148 aircraft, flying 15,553 combat sorties and 1,578 missions over Italy and North Africa. They destroyed or damaged over 950 units of ground transportation and escorted more than 200 bombing missions.

The award the Airmen may receive will be unique since each Congressional Gold Medal of Honor is created by the United States Mint for each specific recipient, or group of recipients, so there is no standard design. The award is a completely separate decoration from the Medal of Honor, which is the rarest recognition the nation bestows for extreme bravery in combat.

The Continental Congress first authorized the commissioning of Congressional Gold Medals during the Revolutionary War, and the first recipient was General George Washington. Over the past two centuries, Congress has presented the award to those who participated in other wars and who otherwise contributed to society. Recipients include Ulysses S. Grant, John Wayne, Bob Hope, Pop John Paul II, Winston Churchill, and the Navajo Code Talkers of World War II.

If the Senate's vote is ratified by the House of Representatives, the Tuskegee Airmen, with nearly 1,000 members, will be the largest group to ever receive the award.

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HR 1259 IH

## 109th CONGRESS

1st Session

**H. R. 1259**

To authorize the President to award a gold medal on behalf of the Congress, collectively, to the Tuskegee Airmen in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces.

**IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES****March 10, 2005**

Mr. RANGEL (for himself, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Mr. FILNER, Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, Mr. OWENS, Ms. CARSON, Mr. TOWNS, Ms. CORRINE BROWN of Florida, Mr. CUMMINGS, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. MEEKS of New York, and Mrs. CHRISTENSEN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

**A BILL**

To authorize the President to award a gold medal on behalf of the Congress, collectively, to the Tuskegee Airmen in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

**SECTION 1. FINDINGS.**

The Congress finds the following:

(1) In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt overruled his top generals and ordered the creation of an all Black flight training program. President Roosevelt took this action one day after the NAACP filed suit on behalf of Howard University student Yancy Williams and others in Federal court to force the Department of War to accept Black pilot trainees. Yancy Williams had a civilian pilot's license and had earned an engineering degree. Years later, Major Yancy Williams participated in an air surveillance project created by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

(2) Due to the rigid system of racial segregation that prevailed in the

United States during World War II, Black military pilots were trained at a separate airfield built near Tuskegee, Alabama. They became known as the 'Tuskegee Airmen'.

(3) The Tuskegee Airmen inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces, paving the way for full racial integration in the Armed Forces. They overcame the enormous challenges of prejudice and discrimination, succeeding, despite obstacles that threatened failure.

(4) From all accounts, the training of the Tuskegee Airmen was an experiment established to prove that so-called 'coloreds' were incapable of operating expensive and complex combat aircraft. Studies commissioned by the Army War College between 1924 and 1939 concluded that Blacks were unfit for leadership roles and incapable of aviation. Instead, the Tuskegee Airmen excelled.

(5) Overall, some 992 Black pilots graduated from the pilot training program of the Tuskegee Army Air Field, with the last class finishing in June 1946, 450 of whom served in combat. The first class of cadets began in July 1941 with 13 airmen, all of whom had college degrees, some with Ph.D.'s, and all of whom had pilot's licenses. One of the graduates was Captain Benjamin O. Davis Jr., a United States Military Academy graduate. Four aviation cadets were commissioned as second lieutenants, and 5 received Army Air Corps silver pilot wings.

(6) That the experiment achieved success rather than the expected failure is further evidenced by the eventual promotion of 3 of these pioneers through the commissioned officer ranks to flag rank, including the late General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., United States Air Force, the late General Daniel 'Chappie' James, United States Air Force, our Nation's first Black 4-star general, and Major General Lucius Theus, United States Air Force (retired).

(7) Four hundred fifty Black fighter pilots under the command of then Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., fought in World War II aerial battles over North Africa, Sicily, and Europe, flying, in succession, P-40, P-39, P-47, and P-51 aircraft. These gallant men flew 15,553 sorties and 1,578 missions with the 12th Tactical Air Force and the 15th Strategic Air Force.

(8) Colonel Davis later became the first Black flag officer of the United States Air Force, retired as a 3-star general, and was honored with a 4th star in retirement by President William J. Clinton.

(9) German pilots, who both feared and respected the Tuskegee Airmen, called them the 'Schwartzte Vogelmenchen' (or 'Black Birdmen'). White American bomber crews reverently referred to them as the 'Black

Redtail Angels', because of the bright red painted on the tail assemblies of their fighter aircraft and because of their reputation for not losing bombers to enemy fighters as they provided close escort for bombing missions over strategic targets in Europe.

(10) The 99th Fighter Squadron, after having distinguished itself over North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, joined 3 other Black squadrons, the 100th, the 301st, and the 302nd, designated as the 332nd Fighter Group. They then comprised the largest fighter unit in the 15th Air Force. From Italian bases, they destroyed many enemy targets on the ground and at sea, including a German destroyer in strafing attacks, and they destroyed numerous enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.

(11) Sixty-six of these pilots were killed in combat, while another 32 were either forced down or shot down and captured to become prisoners of war. These Black airmen came home with 150 Distinguished Flying Crosses, Bronze Stars, Silver Stars, and Legions of Merit, one Presidential Unit Citation, and the Red Star of Yugoslavia.

(12) Other Black pilots, navigators, bombardiers and crewman who were trained for medium bombardment duty as the 477th Bomber Group (Medium) were joined by veterans of the 332nd Fighter Group to form the 477th Composite Group, flying the B-25 and P-47 aircraft. The demands of the members of the 477th Composite Group for parity in treatment and for recognition as competent military professionals, combined with the magnificent wartime records of the 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group, led to a review of the racial policies of the Department of War.

(13) In September 1947, the United States Air Force, as a separate service, reactivated the 332d Fighter Group under the Tactical Air command. Members of the 332d Fighter Group were 'Top Guns' in the 1st annual Air Force Gunnery Meet in 1949.

(14) For every Black pilot there were 12 other civilian or military Black men and women performing ground support duties. Many of these men and women remained in the military service during the post-World War II era and spearheaded the integration of the Armed Forces of the United States.

(15) Major achievements are attributed to many of those who returned to civilian life and earned leadership positions and respect as businessmen, corporate executives, religious leaders, lawyers, doctors, educators, bankers, and political leaders.

(16) A period of nearly 30 years of anonymity for the Tuskegee Airmen was ended in 1972 with the founding of Tuskegee Airmen, Inc., in



- Medals struck pursuant to this Act are national medals for purposes of chapter 51 of title 31, United States Code.

## **SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS; PROCEEDS OF SALE.**

(a) Authorization of Appropriations- There is authorized to be charged against the United States Mint Public Enterprise Fund, an amount not to exceed \$30,000 to pay for the cost of the medals authorized under section 2.

(b) Proceeds of Sale- Amounts received from the sale of duplicate bronze medals under section 3 shall be deposited in the United States Mint Public Enterprise Fund.

'END

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**H.R.1259**

**Title:** To authorize the President to award a gold medal on behalf of the Congress, collectively, to the Tuskegee Airmen in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces.

**Sponsor:** Rep Rangel, Charles B. [MY-15] (introduced 3/10/2005)

Cosponsors (116)

**Related Bills:** S.392 (passed by unanimous consent)

**Latest Major Action:** 8/24/2005 Referred to House subcommittee. Status: Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology.

**COSPONSORS(113), ALPHABETICAL** prior to Thanksgiving break

<u>Rep Ackerman, Gary L.</u> [NY-5] -D 7/25/2005	<u>Rep Baca, Joe</u> [CA-43] - D 6/23/2005
<u>Rep Baird, Brian</u> [WA-3] -D 11/2/2005	<u>Rep Barrow, John</u> [GA-12] -D 7/25/2005
<u>Rep Berman, Howard L.</u> [CA-28] -R 5/24/2005	<u>Rep Bishop, Sanford D., Jr.</u> R [GA-2] - 5/24/2005
<u>Rep Bordallo, Madeleine Z.</u> [GU] -D 3/17/2005	<u>Rep Brady, Robert A.</u> [PA-1] -D 3/10/2005
<u>Rep Brown, Corrine</u> [FL-3] -D 3/10/2005	<u>Rep Butterfield, G. K.</u> [NC-1] D 3/17/2005
<u>Rep Carson, Julia</u> [IN-7] -D 3/10/2005	<u>Rep Christensen, Donna M.</u> D [VI] - 3/10/2005
<u>Rep Clay, Wm. Lacy</u> [MO-1] -D 7/12/2005	<u>Rep Cleaver, Emanuel</u> D [MO-5]6/8/2005
<u>Rep Clyburn, James E.</u> [SC-6] -D 5/24/2005	<u>Rep Cowers, John, Jr.</u> [MI-14]D 5/24/2005
<u>Rep Cooper, Jim</u> [TN-5] -D 10/26/2005	<u>Rep Cramer, Robert E. (Bud), Jr.</u> [AL-5] - 10/26/2005
<u>Rep Crowley, Joseph</u> [NY-7] -D 7/25/2005	<u>Rep Cummings, Elijah E.</u> [MD-7] D - 3/10/2005
<u>Rep Davis, Artur</u> [AL-7] -D 6/23/2005	<u>Rep Davis, Danny K.</u> [IL-7] -D 7/12/2005
<u>Rep Davis, Geoff</u> [KY-4] -R 11/2/2005	<u>Rep Davis, Jo Ann</u> [VA-1] -R 11/2/2005
<u>Rep DeGette, Diana</u> [CO-1] -D 11/1/2005	<u>Rep DeLauro, Rosa L.</u> [CT-3] -D 7/27/2005
<u>Rep Emanuel, Rahm</u> [IL-5] -D 7/25/2005	<u>Rep Engel, Eliot L.</u> [NY-17] -D 11/18/2005
<u>Rep Evans, Lane</u> [IL-17] -D 6/23/2005	<u>Rep Faleomavaea, Eni F. H.</u> D [AS] - 7/14/2005

Rep Fattah, Chaka [PA-2] -D  
 7/20/2005  
Rep Ford, Harold E., Jr. [TN-9] -D  
 7/14/2005  
Rep Frank, Barney [MA-4] -D  
 5/24/2005  
Rep Green, Al [TX-9] -D  
 7/12/2005  
Rep Grijalva, Raul M. [AZ-7] -D  
 7/25/2005  
Rep Harman, Jane [CA-36] -D  
 5/24/2005  
Rep Hastings, Alcee L. [FL-23] -D  
 3/10/2005  
Rep Hunter, Duncan [CA-52] -R  
 11/18/2005  
Rep Issa, Darrell E. [CA-49] -R  
 11/2/2005  
Rep Jackson-Lee, Sheila [TX-18] -D  
 7/12/2005  
Rep Johnson, Eddie Bernice D  
 [TX-30] - 5/24/2005  
Rep Kaptur, Marcy [OH-9] -D  
 5/24/2005  
Rep Kilpatrick, Carolyn C. [MI-13] D  
 7/12/2005  
Rep Larson, John B. [CT-1] -D  
 6/8/2005  
Rep Levin, Sander M. [MI-12] -D  
 5/24/2005  
Rep Lipinski, Daniel [IL-3] -D  
 6/23/2005  
Rep Mdarthy, Carolyn [NY-4] -D  
 3/17/2005  
Rep McDermott, Jim [WA-7] -D  
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Rep McKinney, Cynthia A. [GA-4] -D  
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Rep Meeks, Gregory W. [NY-6] -D  
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Rep Israel, Steve [NY-2] -D  
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Rep Jackson, Jesse L., Jr. [IL-2] D  
 - 7/12/2005  
Rep Jefferson, William J. [LA-2] D  
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Rep Jones, Stephanie Tubbs D  
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Rep Kildee, Dale E. [MI-5] -D  
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[MD-2] - 7/25/2005  
Rep Ryan, Tim [OH-17] -D  
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Reo Watson, Diane E. [CA-33]D  
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Rep Thompson, Bennie G. [MS-2]D  
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Reo Udall, Mark [CO-2] -D  
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Rep Waters, Maxine [CA-35] -D  
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Reo Watt, Melvin L. [NC-12] -D  
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Rep Weldon, Curt [PA-7] -R  
10/26/2005

Rep. Wexler, Robert [FL-19] -D  
7/27/2005

Rep. Wilson, Joe [SC-2] -R  
7/14/2005

Rep. Cuellar, Henry [TX-28] D  
12/6/2005

Rep. Weiner, Anthony D. [NY-9] D  
12/6/2005

Rep. Menendez, Robert [NJ-13] D  
12/6/2005



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Charles B. Rangel  
U. S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Rangel:

Thank you for sponsoring H.R. 1259, a Bill that would "authorize the President to award a gold medal on behalf of the Congress, collectively, to the Tuskegee Airmen in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces." I am pleased that the Senate unanimously passed a companion measure, S. 392.

I understand that both H.R. 1259 and S. 392 have been referred to the House Financial Services Committee and await action. I also understand that you and your co-sponsors have gathered about 115 signatures of Members towards the 280 needed for the Committee to consider the legislation.

In my view, this recognition is well deserved. This group of American heroes significantly contributed to victory in Europe during World War II and helped breakdown racial barriers in our armed forces. I offer my support for passage of H.R. 1259 and/or ratification of S. 392 and encourage all Members to sign on as additional co-sponsors to H.R. 1259. This is of utmost importance to me.

Your continued concern for and support of our Nation's brave men and women in uniform and their families are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,


cc:  
Speaker of the House  
House Majority and Minority Leaders  
Chairman and Ranking Member, House Financial Services Committee  
Chairmen and Ranking Members, Senate and House Committees on Armed Services



11-L-0559/OSD/54941

Exec Sec - 8 Dec 05/1151

Corrected as request.

R,  


143

~~FOUO~~

November 14, 2005

To: Dan Stanley  
 FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT Status of Gold Medal for Tuskegee Airmen

Please find out the status of the gold medal process for the Tuskegee Airmen that is moving through Congress. Is there anything we can do to promote it? Should we send a letter to the Members of the House and Senate?

Thanks.

DHR:ls  
 111405-07

.....  
 Please Respond By December 15, 2005

*DR*  
*DR*  
 Sir,  
 Response attached.  
 v/R  
 Lt Col Langgel

OEC 07 2005

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/54943

*2006*

*14 Dec 05*

*5 Dec 05*



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DEC 8 2005

The Honorable Charles B. Rangel  
U. S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Rangel:

**Thank** you for sponsoring H.R. **1259**, a Bill that would “authorize the President to award a gold medal on behalf of the Congress, collectively, to the Tuskegee Airmen in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the **Armed** Forces.” I **am** pleased that the Senate unanimously passed a companion measure, S. **392**.

I understand that both H.R. **1259** and S. **392** have been referred to the House Financial Services Committee and await action. I also understand that you and **your** co-sponsors have gathered about **115** signatures of Members towards the **280** needed for the Committee to consider the legislation.

In my view, this recognition is well deserved. This group of American heroes significantly contributed to victory in Europe during World **War** II and helped breakdown racial barriers in our armed forces. I offer my support for passage of H.R. **1259** and/or ratification of S. **392** and encourage all Members to sign on **as** additional co-sponsors to H.R. **1259**. **This** is of utmost importance to me.

Sincerely,

cc:  
Speaker of the House  
House Majority and Minority Leaders  
Chairman and **Ranking** Member, House Financial Services Committee  
Chairmen and Ranking Members, Senate and House Committees on Armed Services

2006

8 Dec 05

14 Nov

OSD 23525-05



1/20  
1355



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

act  
1/24

2006-01-19 AM 2036

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Hellenic Ministry of National Defense Proposal to Recapitalize U.S. Tactical Vehicles

- The Army conducted a survey of capabilities in the Mediterranean Region to determine the feasibility of a wheeled vehicle recap facility for planning purposes only.
- Hellenic Minister of Defense proposes the use of Greek facilities to recapitalize tactical U.S. military vehicles (Tab B).
- His letter highlights the following benefits:
  - o Competitive cost: An estimated recapitalization cost of 55% of the procurement value of a new vehicle. (Requires validation by the Army)
  - o Schedule Savings: Proximity to current U.S. Army theaters of operation insures return of assets within 65 days. (Requires validation by the Army)
  - o Significant U.S. added value: Over 50% of spare parts purchases sourced from U.S. companies, thus increasing or preserving U.S. employment levels. (Also requires further validation and depot impact assessment)
- Currently the Army has no requirement for a recap facility in Greece.

APPEALS

14 Jan 06

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary of Defense sign letter at Tab A.

COORDINATION Tab C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Michael Zapf

(b)(6)

MA SD	1/24	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	1/23	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	1/20	1331	0559
ESR MA	8/17	1246	

OSD/54945

OSD 23556-05

14 Jan 06



**EMBASSY OF GREECE**  
**Defense and Military Attaché**  
**2228 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.**  
**Washington D.C. 20008**  
**Tel: (202) 234-5695**  
**Fax: (202) 232-2605**

**The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld**  
**Secretary of Defense**  
**of the United States of America**

**November 29, 2005**

I have the honor to forward to you, a letter from the Minister of National Defense of Greece, the Honorable Mr Spiros Spiiotopoulos, which was received here at the Embassy of Greece by the Diplomatic Mail.

Respectfully,

**LTC Sotirios Kasselomias**  
**Assistant Defense and Military Attaché**

11-L-0559/OSD/54946



HELLENIC REPUBLIC  
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE  
MINISTER

ME  
The Secretary of Defense  
Of the United States  
Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld

Athens, 14<sup>th</sup> November 2005

Dear Mr Secretary,


I have recently become aware of a potential US Army requirement to recapitalize tactical vehicles. The government of Greece would like to declare its interest by proposing a solution to this requirement.

According to our information, there is a significant quantity of US Army tactical vehicles currently supporting military campaigns in Iraq, while these vehicles are operating in severe conditions and considerable maintenance is required to sustain operational readiness and extend their service life. Vehicle recapitalization - stripping the vehicles down to the frames and rebuilding them to the latest configuration - is one approach to solving this need.

Our understanding is that recapitalization efforts currently underway in the US cost about 75% of the procurement value of a new vehicle. Moreover, it takes over 200 days to move vehicles from the theater to the US and back. Greece can offer considerable cost and schedule savings to the US Army, indicatively at 55% and 65 days respectively, for recapitalization of light and heavy tactical vehicles operating in this region.

Based on both this requirement and our government's desire to participate more fully in the efforts to stabilize the wider Gulf region, the Hellenic Ministry of Defense was tasked to review resources and develop plans to assist in meeting the US Army's and regional forces' needs. This review shows a Greek strength in heavy and light tactical vehicle depot maintenance. Greece has capital resources, a highly educated and agile workforce, and a long standing experience with US equipment and manufacturers. Additionally, Greece has a very competitive labor rate. All these capabilities can be brought to bear to assist the US Army. Furthermore, Greece's proximity to the Iraqi theater of operations and our secure and stable environment ensure a constant throughput of assets.

I am convinced that a US Army decision to take advantage of a tactical vehicle recapitalization program in Greece would have both material and political value in our bilateral relationship, further promoting our strategic partnership. I hope this will spur your interest in our offer. I believe such an arrangement would benefit the US Army, United States, Greece and the region.

Sincerely yours,  
  
Spiros P. Spiliotopoulos

## **Proposal for Recapitalization of US Heavy Tactical Vehicles by the Greek Armed Forces**

The Greek Army was tasked to review resources, leading to an in-depth design of the facilities required to carry out a Heavy Tactical Vehicle recapitalization program for the benefit of the US Army, and remains ready to initiate the steps necessary for its implementation.

Main elements of the design include the selection of a military depot situated in a comparatively remote area, among a principally agrarian community in the northwest portion of the Peloponnesian peninsula, demonstrating the capacity to recapitalize up to 4 HTVs per day.

Some of the benefits of the Greek offer to the US Army are highlighted below:

1. Competitive cost: Greece's lower labor rates, relative to those in the US and most of the other European states, allow for a highly financially attractive offer, at an estimated recapitalization cost of 55% of the procurement value of a new vehicle.
2. Schedule savings: Proximity to the current US Army theaters of operation guarantees the return of the assets within 65 days.
3. Increasing support to allied forces: Greece sees this offer as an opportunity to further increase the already high levels of logistical support it offers to allied forces in the region.
4. Significant levels of US added value: Over 50% of the total program cost relates to spare part purchases, which could potentially be sourced from US companies, thus increasing or preserving US employment levels.
5. Secure Environment: As recently demonstrated through the successful execution of the 28th Olympic Games in Athens, Greece has the capacity to guarantee a secure and stable environment for foreign citizens and assets. More specifically, the remoteness of the region designated for the RECAP program, coupled with the chosen facility's excellent protective site-lines further guarantee the security of the assets, as it was also highlighted in a recent site survey conducted by the US Embassy/Greece.
6. Hands-off management: The Greek Army can facilitate all logistical aspects from vehicle receipt to delivery, freeing up valuable US support resources in the region.
7. Quality assurance: Greece's highly educated and agile workforce, coupled with a long standing experience with US equipment and manufacturers, guarantees execution of the RECAP program at the specifications provided by the US Army.

A potential award of the RECAP program to the Greek Armed Forces will promote further exposure of the Greek Army's technical personnel to US asset maintenance and technology, building a strong foundation for further collaboration in the future.

**COORDINATION PAGE**

**SUBJECT: Hellenic Ministry of National Defense Proposal to Recapitalize U.S. Tactical Vehicles**

<b>Under Secretary of Defense (AT&amp;L)</b>	<b>Mr. Kenneth J. Krieg</b>	<b>01/05/2006</b>
<b>Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)</b>	<b>Mr. Peter Flory</b>	<b>01/05/2006</b>
<b>General Counsel</b>	<b>Mr. Daniel Dell'Orto</b>	<b>01/09-2006</b>
<b>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</b>	<b>GEN Peter Pace</b>	<del><b>(Pending)</b></del> <b>1/23/06</b>
<b>Office of Defense Cooperation, Athens</b>	<b>COL Robert Hendricks</b>	<b>12/16/2005</b>



HELLENIC REPUBLIC  
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE  
MINISTER

H.E.  
The Secretary of Defense  
Of the United States  
Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld

Athens, 14<sup>th</sup> November 2005

*Dear Mr Secretary,*


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Based on both this requirement and our government's desire to participate more fully in the efforts to stabilize the wider Gulf region, the Hellenic Ministry of Defense was tasked to review resources and develop plans to assist in meeting the US Army's and regional forces' needs. This review shows a Greek strength in heavy and light tactical vehicle depot maintenance. Greece has capital resources, a highly educated and agile workforce, and a long standing experience with US equipment and manufacturers. Additionally, Greece has a very competitive labor rate. All these capabilities can be brought to bear to assist the US Army. Furthermore, Greece's proximity to the Iraqi theater of operations and our secure and stable environment ensure a constant throughput of assets.

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*Sincerely yours,*  
  
Spiros P. Spiliotopoulos

SECRET  
2005 DEC -6 11 11

6



**EMBASSY OF GREECE**  
**Defense and Military Attache**  
**2228 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.**  
**Washington D.C. 20008**  
**Tel: (202) 234-5695**  
**Fax: (202) 232-2605**

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
of the United States of America

November 29, 2005

I have the honor to forward to you, a letter from the Minister of National Defense of Greece, the Honorable Mr Spilios Spiliotopoulos, which was received here at the Embassy of Greece by the Diplomatic Mail.

Respectfully,

LTC Sotirios Kasselouris  
Assistant Defense and Military Attaché

11-L-0559/OSD/54951



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000

JAN 24 2006

His Excellency  
Spilios P. Spiliotopoulos  
Minister of National Defense  
The Hellenic Republic  
Athens, Greece

Dear Minister Spiliotopoulos:

Thank you for your letter of November 14, 2005, regarding a proposal to recapitalize United States Army tactical vehicles in *Greece*.

The United States Army has completed its exploratory assessment of establishing an offshore refurbishment capability for its tactical vehicles. At this time, the United States Army has concluded that it does not need to establish such a capability. If at some point in the future the need for offshore refurbishment does arise, your proposal will be reconsidered.

I would like to personally thank you for your proposal. It was a constructive contribution to our continuing bilateral relationship.

Sincerely,

Greece

Spiliotopoulos

14 Nov 05

OSD 23556-05


11-L-0559/OSD/54952

~~FOUO~~

DEC 06 2005

**TO:** GEN John Abizaid

**CC:** Gen Pete Pace

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld 

**SUBJECT:** Memo

Afghanistan

Your memo on Afghanistan-State-DoD was helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120205-18

OSD 23557-05

6 DEC 05

~~FOUO~~


11-L-0559/OSD/54953

~~FOUO~~

IOS/014228  
ES-4532

2005 OCT 05 11:39

OCT 25 2005

TO: Peter Flory  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Rocket Fuel

Please make sure you get back to me with an answer to the question the Ukraine MoD raised with me on why rocket fuel is not considered to be military. I certainly think we ought to find a way to redefine it, if that is true.

Thanks.

DJR:jk  
102475-211781.doc

.....  
*Please respond by November 10, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 23563-05

11-L-0559/OSD/54954

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

2005: 11:39

05/014228-ES  
USD(P) ~~DEC 06 2005~~  
~~PM 8:30~~ DEC 04 2005  
ES-4532

INFO MEM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

NOV 29 2005

SUBJECT: Rocket Fuel in Ukraine (Ref: ES-4532)

- On October 25, 2005 you said: "Please make sure you get back to me with an answer to the question the Ukraine MoD raised with me on why rocket fuel is not considered to be military. I certainly think we ought to find a way to redefine it if that is true."
- We believe the "rocket fuel" Minister Hrytsenko raised with you was a chemical used in Soviet-era cruise missiles called "Mélange."
- Melange is a commonly available chemical – a form of nitric acid – and is not judged to be a proliferation risk. Therefore, DoD programs such as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) do not have authority to dispose of it.
- We believe the melange is an environmental problem for Ukraine, not a proliferation problem.
- CTR has provided Ukraine with \$501 million for disposal of Soviet-era strategic weapons such as bombers, long-rang missiles, and related infrastructure.
- Over \$100M in CTR assistance to Ukraine is planned over the next five years for WMD border security and bio-weapons proliferation prevention.
- If we were to reclassify melange, it would compete for funding with the other WMD-focused problems.
- We have proposed that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) find means to help eliminate the melange fuel.
  - OSCE already is providing assistance to Armenia for conversion of melange into liquid fertilizer.
- We also are working with State to encourage G-8 support for melange elimination.

COORDINATION: ISP-Eurasia

Approved: DASD-NP Jack David

*Jack David*  
11/28/05  
1645

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/54955

OSD 23563-05

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

October 31, 2005

55

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Communication Issues in Louisiana

They say that the National Guard and the 82nd Airborne in Louisiana couldn't talk to each other on the radios. I thought JROC was supposed to get interoperability within the Department. That is what Governor Kempthorne told me.

Thanks.

DHR:m  
103105-12

.....  
*Please Respond By November 17, 2005*

OSD 23590-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/54956

**TAB B**

**COORDINATION**

**USNORTHCOM**

**Colonel Champagne**

**14 November 2005**

**Tab B**

**11-L-0559/OSD/54957**



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-0076-05  
6 December 2005

2005 12 06 14:54

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *VP 23 Dec 05*

SUBJECT: Communications Issues in Louisiana (SF 103105-12)

- Answer. In response to your issue (TAB A), the problem was not a radio interoperability issue. The issue was a lack of appropriate radios for some units conducting recovery operations. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council continues to provide the framework to ensure interoperability for all joint capability solutions.
- Analysis
  - Active Duty units like the 82nd Airborne Division operate and maintain single-channel ground and airborne radio systems (SINCGARS) designed and built in the 1990s to provide portable, secure, and interoperable military communications.
  - National Guard units also have SINCGARS, but many of their radios were already deployed with troops in support of the War on Terrorism. Units deploying for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts took what equipment and personnel were immediately available, including legacy radios that were not SINCGARS compatible.
  - USNORTHCOM is working with state joint task force headquarters, the US Army, and the National Guard Bureau to better integrate communications contingency planning procedures and modernize inventories of deployable radios to support DOD and Interagency first responders.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Robert M. Shea, USMC; Director, J-6 (b)(6)

OSD 23590-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FOUO

DEC 12 2005

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Memo on Incentive Pay to Extend

*240*

I read your memo on incentive pay to extend. You analyzed it correctly, but you did not tell me what you think I ought to do. Don't you think some of the other services ought to get on the bandwagon and get going?

Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach 10/20/05 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R), 11/15/05 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss  
120905-04

*12/20/05*

.....  
***Please Respond By January 04, 2006***

*2006105*

OSD 23617-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/54959

*BeD*

12/7  
14/15 ✓

12/1  
17/30



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



2005 FEB 17 11 9

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

November 15, 2005, 10:45 AM

240

Robert Rangel

RR  
12/8

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: *David S. C. Chu - 4 Dec 05*  
Incentive Pay to Extend—SNOWFLAKE

- You asked why we don't get Air Force and Navy to pay Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) to get folks to extend their tour lengths, as the Army does in Korea (Tab A).
- We do support use of AIP by others, and they are using it. While Army is a larger Korea presence, Air Force also uses AIP. As of October 2005, 12,417 Army, and 667 Air Force personnel had extended in Korea via AIP. Minimum extensions are 12 months.
- Navy does not offer AIP for tour extensions in Korea (modest permanent presence). However, Navy does offer AIP to enlisted members who agree to serve 18 months (versus the current 12-month tour length) in some key billets in Bahrain, and plans soon to extend the option to officers.
- Marine Corps to date has not begun using AIP.
- To achieve stability and savings, all Services offer tour extension pay (Overseas Tour Extension Incentive Pay, up to \$2,000 per year) and other options (rest and recuperation absence or round-trip travel home) as incentives for people to serve longer, or consecutive, tours in select overseas areas.
  - o The Services paid out roughly \$10 million in Overseas ~~Tour~~ Extension Incentive Pay for overseas permanent duty tour extensions in fiscal year 2004.

(15 NOV 05)

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Ms. Nina Fountain, ODUSD(MPP)/Compensation (b)(6)

20 Oct 05

SPS 12/07

MA SD	12/8	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	12/7	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	12/7	1350	
ESR MA	12/7	1200	

11-L-0559/OSD/54960

OSD 23617-05

OCT 19 2005

October 20, 2005

240

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Incentive Pay to Extend

I saw a note from Leon LaPorte to the effect that the Army has given assignment incentive pay to get folks in Korea to extend for 12 to 24 additional months, and they have saved \$55 million in two years by reducing permanent changes of station.

Why don't we get the Navy and the Air Force to do that?

Thanks.

DFPR:db  
162005-08 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by November 17, 2005*

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/r  
Lt Col Lengyel*

DEC 08 2005

*(20 Oct 05)*

OSD 23617-05

11-L-0559/OSD/54961

OCT 19 2005

October 20, 2005

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Incentive Pay to Extend

I saw a note from Leon LaPorte to the effect that the Army has given assignment incentive pay to get folks in Korea to extend for 12 to 24 additional months, and they have saved \$55 million in two years by reducing permanent changes of station.

Why don't we get the Navy and the Air Force to do that?

Thanks.

DHR:rh  
102005-08 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by November 17, 2005*



FOUO

Ms Mc Ginn ofh  
→ Bus Gen Melain  
(action)

OCT 04 2005

10:00

OCT 04 2005

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Center for Military Readiness Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence

Here is an analysis by the Center for Military Readiness. I have not read it.

Please review it and let me know your reaction. It seems sensible for someone to be in touch with the author to see if she might benefit from some additional information or discussion about the policy.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/20/05 Donnelly ltr to SecDef w/Center for Military Readiness Policy Analysis re: Sexual Harassment and Violence

DHR:dh  
100305-37

.....  
*Please Respond By November 03, 2005*

FOUO

OSD 23628-05



# Center for Military Readiness

P.O. Box 51600 ★ Livonia, Michigan 48151  
734/464-9430 ★ Fax 734/464-6678  
www.cmrlink.org

**Elaine Donnelly**  
Resident

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington D.C. 20301-1000

AL  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
September 20, 2005  
2005 SEP 23 PM 3:54

## Board of Advisors

- REAR ADM. JOHN M. BURETT, USN Ret.
- GEN. ROBERT H. BARNOW, USMC Ret.
- ALAN C. CARLSON, PhD
- VICE ADM. DAVID CALSON, USN Ret.
- LINDA CHAFFETZ
- BRIG. GEN. SAMUEL G. COCKREHAN, USA Ret.
- LT. COL. CHARLES G. COOPER, USMC Ret.
- REAR ADM. JEREMY J. DEBONO, USN Ret.
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- FRANK J. GIFFNEY, JR.
- MAJ. BRUCE M. HEDDER, USMC Ret.
- DAVID MOROZITZ
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- CAPT. DUSTAN B. "RED" McDONNELL, USN Ret.
- PATR O'BRIEN
- VICE ADM. DAVID C. REYNOLDS, USN Ret.
- COL. JOHN W. RILEY, USMC Ret.
- CAPT. WALTER H. SCHMIDT, JR., USN Ret.
- PHYLLIS SCHLAFER
- COL. MARION C. SHERMAN, USAF Ret.
- CAPT. ROBERT E. STURDY, USN Ret.
- LT. GEN. RICHARD Q. TERRY, USA Ret.
- ADM. C. A. H. TROEN, USN Ret.
- LT. GEN. CLAUDIO E. WATTS III, USAF Ret.
- THE HON. PATTY WITTEZGER
- WALTER E. WILLIAMS, PhD
- PROF. WILLIAM A. WOODHUFF

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I am sending a copy of a CMR Analysis of the Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual ~~Harassment~~ & Violence at the Military Service Academies.

Of all the reports done on this subject in recent years, this one is the most radical. We are particularly concerned about statements on page 5, indicating that the "remaining task" of the Joint Task Force on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, in addition to issuing a Defense Department Directive on this subject, is to "establish a permanent office wifinthe office of the Secretary of Defense."

I hope that you will pay close attention to what is being drafted for your approval, and decline, without apology, to set up an Office of the Victim Advocate (OVA) in your office or anywhere in the Pentagon.

For reasons set forth in the Executive Summary and CMR Policy Analysis of this Task Force Report, an OVA in the Pentagon would be a constant source of negative publicity and potential interference in military affairs. The Department of Defense does not need a new bureaucracy to deal with emotionally charged problems that are essentially local in nature, or already included in areas of responsibility assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

I would be honored to meet with you or the official(s) assigned responsibility for these matters in the next few weeks. I can be reached at 734/464-9430, and hope to hear from your staff soon.

Sincerely,

Elaine Donnelly

Enclosure  
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Chairman ~~and~~ Members, House Armed Services Committee

# **CMR Policy Analysis**

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## **The Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies**

**Prepared by the Center for Military Readiness**

**September 2005**

11-L-0559/OSD/54967

## **Executive Summary**

### **CMR Policy Analysis: The Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies**

**As directed by Congress** in 2004, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies studied the issue of **sexual** misconduct at the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis. (A similar report regarding the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs was published in 2003.)

Some recommendations in this Task Force Report are worthwhile, but the most far-reaching proposals should be viewed with caution or rejected. The presumptions, findings, recommendations and tone of the Report are somewhat skewed by an over-representation of civilian "victim advocate" groups. Among other things, these activists have been demanding the establishment of a permanent "Office of the Victim Advocate" (OVA) within the Pentagon.

The Secretary of Defense should decline, without apology, to establish such an office, which would duplicate responsibilities of existing offices at the Pentagon and at local levels. An OVA in the Pentagon could become a power base for activists who would constantly generate negative publicity, and promote a controversial, emotionally charged agenda that is not in the best interests of the Defense Department or women in the military.

Such an office in the Pentagon could also disrupt military operations by causing political interference and second-guessing of decisions made by officers in the chain of command.

The Task Force Report should have included the views of academy personnel and experts who do not agree that the complainant is always right and the accused always wrong. The services do not need officers who have engaged in sexual abuse or rape. Nor do they need officers who have made unsubstantiated accusations that unjustly destroy the careers of others.

The Report asserts that women are harassed at the academies because of regulations that exempt women from close combat, and recommends gender-based recruiting quotas to reduce harassment. These assumptions and proposals are unsupported and questionable.

Recommendations in the Report for new legislation to mandate confidentiality between complainants and civilian "victim advocates" focus on only the first of three parties at interest: complainants, commanders, and alleged offenders. Recommended amendments to the UCMJ, to permit closed disciplinary proceedings, are in conflict with legal precedent upholding the right of accused parties to have open hearings. Neither proposal should be supported or implemented.

The Task Force Report correctly avoids endorsement of the concept of "blanket amnesty" for complainants. It also criticizes stereotypes regarding the guilt of alleged offenders. The Report, however, reinforces such stereotype throughout.

The document barely recognizes the imbalance between extensive resources available to complainants, compared to minimal support systems available for those accused. The Report

mentions but does not adequately **address** the widespread notion that disciplinary action **against** a complainant constitutes "retaliation." It **also** downplays the problem of **false** or exaggerated complaints of misconduct, which **are demoralizing** and divisive in all military **organizations**.

The **Task Force Report** includes sweeping **recommendation** for changes **in** law to reflect the "full range of **sexual** misconduct," even though there **are many** military laws and regulations that do not **exist** in the civilian world. In addition to rules unique to **the** military, cadets and midshipmen are subject to the academies' Codes of **Honor**, which forbid such offenses.

The **Report** recommends that **training** and education courses teach acceptance of gender-normed physical **standards**, but **allowances** and special "assistants" for female **trainees** are **too** obvious and pervasive **to** support the indoctrination. All cadets **and** midshipmen **know that** there is no gender-norming on the battlefield, but men and women **are** not treated **equally in training programs requiring** strength and endurance.

The Task Force **Report** **further** recommends that **several** sexual harassment and assault classes at the academies be mandatory, conducted **in** prime time, **graded**, and included in calculations for class rank. Implementation of this plan **could** aggravate men and women for different reasons, and become counterproductive.

**Instead** of civilian-oriented presentations, instructors should **stress** the academies' Codes of Honor. People who do not lie, cheat, or **steal** will **not** engage in **sexual** misconduct.

The **Report** correctly **asserts** that the majority **of** sexual assaults at the academies involve the illegal **use** of alcohol to some **degree**, but proposals to **address** this factor are **less than** adequate.

Coordination with civilian authorities can be helpful, **but** the over-emphasis on the **needs** of complainants, who are **presumptively** called "victims," could result in **officials taking sides** in emotionally charged, **unresolved** proceedings. Granting **semi-official** status to civilians who do not **understand** or support **tenets** of military law could undermine **the** due process **rights** of **persons** accused of misconduct, and make it **harder** for justice to be done.

All investigations should be conducted with **sensitivity** for the personal **feelings** of the complainant, combined with full protection of the rights of the accused.

The extraordinary mission of the service academies should not be undermined by presumptions that women **are** always **right** and **men** are always **wrong**. The truth is that neither gender is perfect. Personnel policies must recognize the existence of human failings, and take realistic **steps** to encourage discipline, **rather** than indiscipline.

*The Center for Military Readiness is an independent public policy organization that specializes in military personnel policies. More information on this and related issues is available at [www.emriink.org](http://www.emriink.org).*

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## CMR Policy Analysis: The Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies

### Introduction:

The mission of the service academies is to educate and train military officers, most of whom will have the responsibility to lead others in the nation's wars, and to teach others over a lifetime. To produce officers worthy of that trust, the service academies must establish and enforce standards of personal conduct that are higher than most civilian colleges and universities.

The Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies (and an earlier report on the Air Force Academy) address problems of serious concern. This Report is flawed, however, because its presumptions, findings, recommendations and tone are somewhat skewed by an over-representation of civilian "victim advocate" puppets.<sup>1</sup>

The opinions of such groups should be heard, but some leaders who have been quoted frequently since the beginning of the Air Force Academy scandal in 2003 have shown inadequate knowledge of the military justice system and the various forms of punishment for misconduct available under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Others have routinely accepted one-sided victims' complaints as absolute truth, confused allegations with substantiated crimes, essentially excused women of the consequences of their own high-risk behavior, and demanded punishment even when alleged victims do not report offenses to responsible authorities?

The Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis have been more successful than the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs in deterring sexual harassment and abuse.<sup>2</sup> Recommendations in this Task Force Report nevertheless are more radical than those made by the 2003 Panel to Review Misconduct Allegations at the Air Force Academy. Some recommendations are worthwhile, but many should be viewed with caution or rejected.

### Office of the Victim Advocate

The Report states that the "remaining task" of the Joint Task Force on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (JTF-SAPR), in addition to issuing a Defense Department Directive on this subject, is to "establish a permanent office within the office of the Secretary of Defense." (p. 5) The Secretary of Defense should decline, without apology, to set up a new bureaucracy to deal with problems that are essentially local in nature.

A long list of officials, Boards, and Commissions have studied and reported on sexual misconduct problems in recent years. The responsibility to implement useful recommendations is already assigned to the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David Chu.

Congress passed legislation several years ago that authorizes local level victims advocates and counseling services at all military institutions. At the service academies these resources, as listed in this Report, are extensive and widely publicized. The Defense Department

does not need an "Office of the Victim Advocate" (OVA) in the Pentagon, which is likely to become an unaccountable bureaucratic boondoggle that constantly generates negative publicity, and causes interference in unresolved, emotionally charged cases that are demoralizing to all.

- Among other things, this office is supposed to provide regular reports on incidents of sexual misconduct. If numbers of complaints go down, the OVA will insist that women are still afraid to come forward. But if the number of complaints increases, the office will insist on even more staff and money to continue its work.
- For the Department of Defense, this is a lose-lose situation. As was the case with news stories about this and previous official reports on this subject, news is always portrayed as a black eye for the military.<sup>4</sup>
- Regardless of original intent, such an office quickly would become a tax-funded power base for advocates to lobby for controversial goals, including ill-advised legislative changes that are promoted in the Task Force Report.
- Since the Report pointed to women's exemption from land combat as a cause of resentment against women, it is reasonable to expect that OVA officials would push for elimination of women's remaining exemptions from land combat as one way to "solve" the problem, regardless of the legal and military consequences.
- Amnesty International and the civilian advocacy group Miles Foundation demanded a \$10 million appropriation to set up an "Office of the Victim Advocate" (OVA) in the Pentagon, ostensibly to fight sexual harassment/assault in the military, but also to advance several controversial, internationalist social goals.<sup>5</sup>

An OVA in the Pentagon could also disrupt military operations by causing political interference and second-guessing of decisions made by officers in the chain of command.

- The presumption that any accusation of harassment or assault is true and unchallengeable could lead Pentagon officials to intervene in far-away "he said, she said" disputes. Field commanders' fear of being second-guessed by Washington officials could skew their decisions on individual cases. Some might feel compelled to remove key personnel prematurely, regardless of the military consequences.
- Civilian involvement in the military justice system would undermine morale by increasing political pressure for punishment of prominent people, regardless of guilt.<sup>6</sup> It could also lead to command interference that causes some cases to be thrown out, due to violations of due process rights. This happened with several cases related to the Tailhook scandal, leading to criticism that "no one" had been punished.<sup>7</sup>

### **Methodology**

The Task Force used standard methods of research, but failed to seek the views of women and men who are skeptical of the type of victimology advocated by some "experts" in the field.

- The **Task Force** should have specifically invited the views of **male** midshipmen and cadets who have been **wrongly** accused of misconduct without substantiation, or their legal counsel. The panel also should have sought the views of **experienced** investigators who are skilled in distinguishing **genuine** charges **from** ones that are unfounded or self-serving.<sup>8</sup>
- Unsubstantiated or exaggerated allegations have been **known** to destroy careers.<sup>9</sup> A five-year survey of sexual assault in the **U.S.** Army found that reports of sexual **abuse** that proved to be “unfounded” after investigation tripled from **48** to **157** between **1999** and **2003**. No explanation for the increase was given.<sup>10</sup>
- Every alleged offender is innocent until proven guilty, but some believe that **guilt** is directly proportional to the **seriousness** of the charge. **This** attitude is demoralizing to all, and **sometimes** extremely so.<sup>11</sup>
- Unsubstantiated or recanted accusations sometimes **occur** for a variety of reasons. These include **remorse** after an impulsive sexual encounter, an attempt to escape **accountability** for behavior that violates Academy rules, jealousy, the desire for attention, or revenge when a romantic relationship **goes sour**.<sup>12</sup> **The services** do not need officers who have engaged in sexual abuse or rape. Nor do **they** need officers known to have made false accusations that unjustly destroyed the careers of others.

### ***Service Academy Culture***

The panel correctly places responsibility for preventing bad behavior on cadets and midshipmen themselves, but follows that **laudable** statement with **an unsupported** assertion: Due to the minority **status** of women at the Academies, some communities “**do not value women as highly as men,**” and this is a major cause of **sexual** harassment and assault. (p. **ES-I**)

**The Task Force** blames incidents of harassment **on women’s** “exclusion” (a.k.a., exemption) from combat specialties, **and** the existence of different **standards** to allow for physical differences. These assumptions should **be** questioned for **several** reasons:

- With the exception of a brief footnote citing undocumented focus **group** conversations with persons talking about the attitudes of their peers, the Report cites no support for **the** statement that women are undervalued at the Academies because they are exempt from direct ground combat. (pp. **ES-1, 8, & fn 21**)
- The Report’s recommended remedy for **these** perceived problems is an anachronistic call for gender-based admission and promotion quotas, in **order** to provide more female “**role-models**” in key admissions, faculty hiring and promotion boards. (p. **23**)
- The **Report** mentions “current service operational constraints” as a factor that **might** limit the percentage of gender integration **beyond** 15-17%, but presents no evidence

to support the panel's assumption that greater numbers of women would improve their acceptance. (If that is the case, why not call for 50-50 representation?)

- Since the **Task Force** identifies as a factor increasing the likelihood of harassing behavior, it is reasonable to expect a the Pentagon OVA would **use** its position to advocate repeal of all women's exemptions from land combat units, Special Operations Forces, and submarines—**particularly** when gender-based recruiting quotas **create** an over-supply of female officers.
- The Navy is reducing its number of ships and personnel, and the **greatest need** in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps is for male officers to lead **reorganized** land combat infantry/armored battalions, Special Operations Forces and Navy SEALs. **Since** gender quotas **almost** always involve "adjustments" in standards to **meet** the politically mandated **goal**, implementation of the **Task Force's** recommendations **might increase** tensions **between** male and female midshipmen and cadets, **instead** of reducing them.
- It would not be helpful to **create new** perceptions of favoritism for **women** at the academies. **Studies** done by the General Accounting Office in 1991 and 1994 found that complaints about double standards favoring women **were** the **second-most** common form of "sexual harassment" at all of the **service academies**. (p. 3)

### ***Confidentiality - Counseling***

The **Task Force Report** correctly asserts that confidentiality, referring to privileged communications between complainants and specified care providers and counselors, is a complicated **matter**. It **also** notes that limited confidentiality is already available prior to a decision to prosecute an alleged offender. The **Report** nevertheless recommends passage of a new law **creating** special privileges not **just** for health care providers, but **also** for "victim advocates." (pp. ES-2, 14, 26)

**This** recommendation is overly simplistic and focused on only the first two of three "stakeholders" in a triangle of interests. The three are:

1. Complainants alleging harassment or assault;
2. Commanders who **need to** know about incidents of misconduct
3. Alleged offenders, whose **rights of** due process must be protected to achieve justice

Congress should reject proposed legislation guaranteeing confidentiality to **victim** advocates. **There** is no **need** to codify policies that are already available under certain circumstances.<sup>13</sup> Matters can be confidential during early stages, but once **charges** are filed and someone's career and/or liberty **are at stake**, confidentiality should **end**. If the **accusation is** true, it should be provable without providing **special** rules that **do not** apply in other cases.

Commanders **have** the responsibility to evaluate the **readiness/competence** of all personnel **at all times**. Withholding information due to potential **embarrassment** of complainants

could interfere with this command responsibility, as well as discovery proceedings and rights of due process when disciplinary proceedings begin.

### **Confidentiality - Disciplinary Hearings**

The **Task Force Report** recommends that Article 32 of the UCMJ be amended to permit commanders to close the proceedings **"to protect the privacy of victims and alleged offenders."** (pp. ES-2, 33) Although the recommendation appears to be evenhanded, in actual practice it would violate the rights of anyone accused of misconduct. The recommendation also conflicts with a clear legal precedent upholding the right of persons accused to have an open **hearing**:

- In **1998** the Court of Appeals for the **Armed Forces**, in **AEC Inc v. Powell**, ruled that proceedings must be open unless there is a compelling **need** to close them. The **petition** to that **Court** was part of the highly publicized **prosecution** of Army Sgt. Maj. Gene McKinney for **sexual** misconduct
- Advocates for five complainant witnesses argued that a closed **hearing** would make it easier for the **women** to testify against **Sgt. Maj. McKinney**. The Court concluded **that** fear of embarrassment by adult females was not a good enough **reason** to close **Article 32** hearings. Despite intense media interest **that** largely prejudged the defendant's **guilt**, McKinney **was** acquitted on **18** of **19** charges.<sup>14</sup>

### **"Victims" Rights**

The **Task Force** correctly recommends that persons who want to report misconduct or assault should be **informed** of their **rights** and the various resources available **to** them. The Report also should have noted that every person **accused** of misconduct is entitled to the presumption of innocence. The presumptive designation "victim," without the modifier "alleged," is a **loaded** word. Its constant **use** colors the Report's findings and recommendations.

The Report is replete with references to a long list of officials and **institutions that are** available for the support of the (alleged) victims. (pp. 11-13)

- At the Naval Academy, these include: Chaplains, Psychotherapists, Medical **Staff** and Family Support **Counselors**, military and civilian "Victims Advocates," the **Sexual Harassment, Misconduct and Assault Prevention and Response Program** Office, the Sexual Assault & Victim Intervention (SAVI) **Program**, the **Command Managed Qual Opportunity (CMEO) Program** for training midshipmen **on sexual** harassment **issues**, Company Officers and Senior **Enlisted Leaders**, plus the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, which provides counsel and **prosecutors** on campus.
- The U.S. Military Academy provides all of the above **resources** with slightly **different names**, such as the **Simon** Center for the Professional Military Ethic (SCPME), the Cadet Health **Promotion** and Wellness Council (CHF WC), and the **Respect Program** Advisory council (RPAC), established in 1992.

- The Air Force Academy has a similar array of services, and institutions such as the Center for Character Development (CCD) and **Cadets Advocating Sexual Integrity and Education (CASE)**. **These** organizations have **established** relationships with several civilian hospitals, crisis centers and law enforcement agencies. supervising these institutions at each Academy **are** the Boards of Visitors, the Superintendents, and other officials who **are** accountable **for** disciplinary actions.
- At the federal level, DoD Directives 1030.1 and 1030.2 guarantee **seven** major **rights** to persons who decide to pursue legal **remedies**, including full **consultation and** information **as** legal proceedings progress.
- In addition to all of the above, the **Task Force** **recommends** the designation of a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC), plus a Victim Witness Coordinator (**different** from the Victim Advocate) at each Academy. (p. 27)

Some advocates claim that any action that holds **an** (alleged) victim accountable for **her** own violation of personal conduct **rules amounts to "retaliation."** This implies that the complainant should not **be** held accountable for **her own high-risk** behavior.

- The **Task Force** is to be commended for not **endorsing** the concept of "blanket amnesty" for complainants. (pp. 28-29) Such a policy would **create** a perverse incentive for women involved in personal misconduct **to make false** allegations of abuse or rape in **order to** escape accountability for their own **actions**.
- The **Task Force** **does** endorse postponement of discipline while **investigation** of the accused offender is pending, which **makes sense in** some cases. Investigations should be conducted with sensitivity for the personal feelings of the complainant, combined with **full** protection of the **rights** of the accused.

#### ***Alleged Offender Rights***

The **Report** recommends that education programs should "*avoid categorically stereotyping men as perpetrators and women as victims*"—a comment **reported to have come up in focus group discussions at the Naval Academy.** (pp. 38-39) That stereotype, unfortunately, is reinforced by the obvious imbalance between extensive **resources** available for persons alleging misconduct (listed above) and minimal **support** systems available for those accused.

- **Legal** representation is essential **to assure** due process, but the **Report** indicates that there is only one advisor available for this purpose **on the Naval Academy** campus. At West Point, legal help **is six** hours away. at **Fort Drum, NY**. The Task Force only recommends that the **West Point** advisor be available on campus. (pp. 15, 34)
- **Sexual** abuse and personal misconduct **are** evidence of poor character. False or exaggerated accusations against others, which **are** not an uncommon, demonstrate a lack of integrity.<sup>15</sup> Both **infractions** violate the Uniform Code of Military **Justice** and the **service academies'** Codes of Honor.

- On page 34 the **Task Force Report** mentions two incidents of **fraudulent reporting** out of 85 cases, but downplays the problem by **claiming** that an unspecified number of allegations were **recanted** because the (**alleged**) victims did not want to **endure** the investigative and judicial process.
- Footnote 137 reports that a DoD Inspector General **survey** in 2004 found that 43.2% of males and 36.8% of female midshipmen considered **fraudulent reporting** to be a large or very large problem. Comparable **figures** at West Point **were** 17.3% for men and 17% for women. The **Task Force Report** downplayed these **figures** and apparently did not investigate why these perceptions **persist**. **Not** did the **Report** recommend accountability for persons who make unfounded allegations.
- To the contrary, the **Task Force Report** **recommends** mandatory **training** to teach investigators and prosecutors to **"take their focus off of the victim's behavior and place it on the defendant's behavior."** (p. 32) It recommends **courses** on how to identify predatory behavior, but not **on** techniques **useful** in recognizing when an accusation is not credible.
- Some male cadets and midshipmen avoid female classmates in order to avoid the experiences of others whose careers **were** **ruined** due to relationships with women that **led** to charges of sexual misconduct. The result is that some women feel **"shunned."**
- Some service academy investigations have been hampered because allegations of abuse were filed weeks or even years after the fact. The **Task Force Report** should have recommended that complaints must be filed within a reasonable **length** of time.

#### ***Recommended Changes in the UCMJ***

The Report makes the unsupported and overstated **assertion** that the Academies did not hold **alleged offenders** "accountable" over the past **ten** years. **This** reflects **apparent** civilian misunderstandings of the nature of the UCMJ and non-judicial punishment. 16

- Some people believe any sort of punishment short of **court martial** and conviction **amounts** to no punishment at all. To **the** contrary, **military people** are **routinely** punished for improper behavior **that** would not be considered a crime **in** civilian life.
- **These** include regulations forbidding senior/subordinate fraternization, on-campus **drinking** and sexual activity, failure to **obey** orders, and "conduct **unbecoming** an officer"—a punishable **offense** that has **no** counterpart in civilian codes of **law**.

The panel nevertheless makes a **sweeping** recommendation for **statutory** changes to reflect the "**full** range of sexual misconduct." (p. 31) New legislation will not add to mandates **already** present in the academies' Codes of Honor, or law and regulations **already** in effect, except to create **new** criminals whose guilt would be no less difficult to prove.

- In many cases of alleged assault at the Air Force Academy, as examined in excruciating detail by a 2003 Air Force Working Group, many prosecutions for rape were not conducted because there was insufficient evidence. It does not benefit anyone to pursue a weak or questionable case that is sure to be dismissed by jury members who take their job, and instructions from a judge, seriously.
- The threshold of proof of forcible rape is justifiably high, since persons convicted are subject to severe penalties and the official designation of "sex offender" for life. Reasonable doubts are inherent in "he said, she said" situations, especially when illegal drinking by underage midshipmen and cadets elevates the risk of misconduct.
- The demand for new Legislation sometimes reflects misimpressions about alleged offenses. Inaccurate news reports frequently describe all forms of sexual misconduct, ranging from inappropriate jokes to rape, as always credible and equally egregious. Comparatively minor incidents do not justify new legislation.<sup>17</sup>

### ***Training and Education - Physical Differences***

The Task Force suggests that male cadets and midshipmen might be more supportive of female classmates if they were educated on the rationale for gender-normed standards. (p. 39) Classes would have to indoctrinate acceptance of different physical standards and other gender specific allowances that are obvious at the academies and other officer training centers.

- A research project done at the Naval Academy in 1998 (one of many) reported that in military related training, women are nine times more prone to knee ligament injury than men, and the higher level of risk exists throughout a military career.<sup>18</sup>
- At the Marine Corps Officer Candidate School at Quantico, the tallest obstacle course bars are two feet higher for men than bars on the nearby course for women. Small wooden "assist" sticks nailed to the support posts help women to tackle the elevated bars. Female trainees also benefit from flat "assist" boards nailed about 12" from the bottom of obstacle course climbing walls that test upper body strength.<sup>19</sup>
- In the OCS Combat Readiness Test, men and women do the same CRT events, but with different time requirements. Even with these and other allowances, in the second OCS class of 2005, the attrition rate for women was 30%, compared to 8.3% for the men. Of the candidates who graduated, 48% of the females failed the CRT event, compared to 5% of the males. Results like this, which are not unusual, undermine theories of gender "equality" in physical training.

"Success" in this education effort also would require mandatory doublethink: i.e., belief in the idea that special treatment for women is the same as equal treatment. But the enormous physical demands associated with deliberate offensive action in Army and Marine direct ground combat units, or even in surface warfare emergencies such as the attacks on the Navy ships *Stark* and *Cole*, cannot be modified. There is no gender-norming on the battlefield.

### ***Training and Education – Sexual Harassment and Assault***

The Task Force **Report** recommends that several sexual harassment and assault (SH&A) classes at the academies be a) Mandatory; b) Scheduled in “prime time” usually devoted to academic subjects; and c) Graded for inclusion in calculations for class ranking. Implementation of these recommendations, which seem unnecessary given the availability of a wide array of academy Values, Ethics, and other SH&A education programs, reflect skewed priorities that could reach the point of diminishing returns.

- Male midshipmen and cadets who are more interested in learning core military subjects may not appreciate the elevation of such classes to the same importance as electrical engineering, especially if grades affect class standing.
- Accomplished female cadets and midshipmen may not appreciate relentless “special” programs that imply that women are helpless creatures who don’t know how to deal with men. They are also likely to be annoyed by mandatory programs that involve self-conscious displays, lecture series, readings and theater performances to address the “equal importance of men and women to mission accomplishment.” (p. 38)
- An example of such a program occurred on August 26, 2005, when members of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division at Fort Hood TX were required to attend a “Women’s Equality Day” observance that included overdone, eye-rolling material.<sup>20</sup>
- The Task Force further recommends a “variety of instructional methods” to include even more sensitivity/diversity training conducted by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), and by outside speakers or consultants on “gender Violence-related topics.” At a time when other military communities are being downsized, this amounts to a jobs program for DEOMI, which has been known to conduct controversial presentations<sup>21</sup>
- It is not clear what the Task Force means in saying that such programs are “remiss in not acknowledging current youth culture, trends, and social norms.” (p. 39) Instead of spending time studying popular culture, instructors should stress the academies’ Codes of Honor. People who do not lie, cheat, or steal will not engage in sexual misconduct, which involves infractions of all three prohibitions.
- There is a cultural contradiction in opposing violence against women, but condoning violence against military women, as long as it happens in aggressive “warrior” training or at the hands of the enemy.

### ***Prevention***

The **Report** rightly mentions casual attitudes toward sex and alcohol as factors that contribute to “poor judgment, lowered inhibitions, and increased aggression and/or vulnerability to sexual assault.” More involvement by Tactical Noncommissioned Officers and Senior Enlisted Leaders, particularly during evening and weekend hours, could be helpful in

reducing the illegal use of alcohol and other high-risk behaviors. To be effective, however, such plans must involve firm enforcement of rules against alcohol and sexual encounters on campus.

The Report asserts that *"the majority of sexual assaults at both Academies involve alcohol to some degree,"* but proposals to address this factor are less than adequate. (pp. 8, 24)

- Footnote 25 reports that of the sexual cases reviewed by the Task Force, alcohol was involved in 58% of Military Academy cases and 57% of Naval Academy cases.
- Despite years of negative publicity about the Air Force Academy, alcohol offenses there have jumped 57 percent since the fall of 2003.<sup>22</sup>

### ***Coordination Between Military and Civilian Communities***

Coordination with civilian authorities is a useful idea, but the sole emphasis on victim support could result in officials taking sides in complex, unresolved proceedings.

The Task Force recommends the training of civilians to counsel (alleged) victims, but this is not the role of the military. It would be problematic to give civilians semi-official status, and to extend to them special privileges that could undermine the due process rights of midshipmen and cadets accused of misconduct. Most civilians are not familiar with the need to avoid command interference in disciplinary proceedings.

### ***Conclusion***

The Task Force Report correctly observes that sexual harassment and assault is not a "fix and forget" problem. Human relationships are far more complicated than that. It does not follow, however, that all of the panel's recommendations, including new legislation, are necessary or justified.

It is possible that the Academies' unbalanced emphasis on the rights of (alleged) victims only, with little apparent concern for persons faced with serious charges, is in itself creating an atmosphere of tension that more of the same would make worse. Given the findings of the GAO in 1994 and 1995, which found that complaints about double standards are the second-most common form of reported harassment, this possibility is more plausible than the theory that gender quotas and even more special treatment and will somehow correct the problem.

The extraordinary mission of the service academies should not be undermined by the theories of professional victimologists, whose philosophy suggests that women are always right and men are always wrong. The truth is that neither gender is perfect. Personnel policies must recognize the existence of human failings, and take realistic steps to encourage discipline, rather than indiscipline.

\* \* \* \* \*

*The Center for Military Readiness is an independent public policy organization that specializes in military personnel policies. Information about this and related issues of concern to CMR is available at [www.cmrlink.org](http://www.cmrlink.org).*

Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup> The panel's present or former military members include Co-Chair Vice Adm. Gerald Howing, chief of Naval Personnel, Col. Sharon K. G. Duobar, USAF, Brig. Gen. Gina S. Farrisce, USA, Navy Chief of chaplains Rear Adm. Louis V. Jasielo, Sgt. Maj. Alford L. McMichael, USMC, Maj. Gen. Michael J. Nardotti, USA (Ret.), and Brig. Gen. Jarisse Sanborn, USAFA. Civilians include Co-Chair Delilah Rumburg, Executive Director PA Coalition Against Rape, Anita Carpenter, CEO, Indiana Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Vera Mikula, St. Mary's High School Counselor, Dr. Laura L. Miller, RAND Social Scientist, and Diane M. Stuart, Director, Department of Justice Office on Violence Against Women.

<sup>2</sup> See statement of Christine Hansen, Executive Director, Miles Foundation, speaking at a joint news conference at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. on March 5, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Weller, AP, "Army, Navy Academies Have Avoided Sex Scandals," *Monterey Herald*, Mar. 30, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Bradley Olson, *Baltimore Sun*, "Task Force Faults Academies for Harassment," Aug. 26, Steve Komorrow and Todd Platt, *USA Today*, "Abuse Found in Military Schools," Aug. 26, Editorial, *Toledo Blade*, "Culture of Harassment," Jim Miklaszewski, "Warrior Ethos to Blame?" NBC News, Aug. 26.

<sup>5</sup> According to the Amnesty International news release, an OVA should be "established within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which would provide oversight, training and accountability to all branches of the armed forces and establish a privacy privilege for survivors [of violence against women.]"

Together with Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International is a prime advocate of controversial globalist goals such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Amnesty International President William F. Schulz also called upon the Pentagon to "must take seriously evidence suggesting that combat makes soldiers more aggressive"

<sup>6</sup> In the aftermath of the Navy's 1991 Tailhook scandal, the commander of the Blue Angels, Commander Robert Swampf, was accused but cleared of wrongdoing at the Tailhook convention by a Navy Board of Review. His deserved promotion to Captain nevertheless was held up for more than a decade.

<sup>7</sup> Elaine Donnelly, "The Tailhook Scandals," *National Review*, Mar. 7, 1994, (posted on [www.cmrlink.org](http://www.cmrlink.org), under Issues/Social Policies), and Col. W. Hays Parks, USMCR (Ret.), "Tailhook, What Happened, Why & What's to be Learned," *Naval Institute Proceedings*, Sept. 1994.

<sup>8</sup> For example, Dr. Charles P. McDowell, PAD, Author of "False Allegations," *Forensic Science Digest*, 1981, and Eugene J. Kamin, Ph.D., Purdue University, author of "False Rape Allegations," *Archive of Sexual Behavior*, 1994.

<sup>9</sup> AP, "Male Academy Cadets Fear 'Witch Hunt,'" *New York Times*, Apr. 2, 2003, and Robert F. Door, "Some Reported Academy Sex Assaults are Lies," *Air Force Times*, April 4.

<sup>10</sup> R. Jeffrey Smith, "Sexual Assaults in Army on Rise," *Washington Post*, June 3, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Robert Weller, AP, *Rocky Mountain News*, Sept. 1, and KSDO-TV, Aug. 28. A senior Air Force Academy cadet reportedly tried to kill freshman cadet Nicholas Kahn, who had accused the senior of coercing a female freshman into having sex. The senior cadet reportedly threw Kahn, who was in the process of reporting the alleged misconduct, out of a window. Kahn fell 30 feet and broke his back. The case is currently under review.

<sup>12</sup> Experts in the field include Dr. Charles P. McDowell, Ph.D., Author of "False Allegations," *Forensic Science Digest*, 1981, and Eugene J. Kanin, Ph.D. of Purdue University, author of "False Rape Allegations," *Archive of Sexual Behavior*, 1994.

<sup>13</sup> This recommendation may be inspired by a situation involving Colorado rape counselor Jennifer Bier, who is fighting an arrest warrant issued in May 2005 after she refused to turn over her records in the pending court-martial of 1<sup>st</sup> Lt. Joseph Harding, who is alleged to have sexually assaulted two female cadets in 1999 and 2000. (*Air Force Times*, June 13)

<sup>14</sup> ABC, Inc.; Cable News Network, Inc. ("CNN"); CBS Inc., Fox News Network, National Broadcasting Company, Inc. and The Washington Post, Petitioners, and Gene C. McKinney, Sergeant Major of the Army, Petitioner, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, *Misc. Nos. 97-8023, 97-8024*, decided Nov. 5, 1997. **Excerpt of opinion:**

"SMA McKinney's Article 32 hearing was ordered closed by Colonel Owen C. Powell, the special court-martial convening authority (SPCMA), who appointed the Article 32 investigating officer... Colonel Powell gave the following reasons in support of ordering a closed hearing: (1) to maintain the integrity of the military justice system and ensure due process to SMA McKinney; (2) to prevent dissemination of evidence or testimony that would be admissible at an Article 32 investigation, but might not be admissible in trial, in order to prevent contamination of the "potential pool of panel members," and (3) to protect the alleged victims who would be testifying as witnesses against SMA McKinney, specifically to shield the alleged victims from possible news reports about anticipated attempts to delve into each woman's sexual history.

"...In *Hershey*, we recognized that "[u]ndeniably there is a certain amount of mortification imposed on victim-witnesses in sex cases, but that is a condition which cannot be eliminated from our judicial system." (emphasis added)... Every case that involves limiting access to the public must be decided on its own merits."

<sup>15</sup> At the infamous 1991 Tailhook convention, then-Navy Ensign Beth Warnick accused three naval aviators of gang-raping her, but later admitted she had lied. Warnick was never punished appropriately for this serious ethical violation, but the men she accused suffered severe career penalties. See *National Review* article footnoted above.

<sup>16</sup> Some sensational news reports about the 2003 Air Force Academy scandal created the impression that rapes and assaults were occurring constantly, and that anything short of successful prosecution by courts-martial constituted no punishment at all. A 2003 investigation by an Air Force Working Group, headed by Mary L. Walker, found that there had been 43 allegations of sexual assaults and rape that occurred over 10 years, and nearly all of the cases were handled properly. Punishments ranged from letters of censure to expulsion or imprisonment.

<sup>17</sup> See page 3, referring to studies done by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in January 1994 and 1995. Both of these surveys found that complaints about more serious incidents, such as unwanted sexual advances or pressures for dates by superiors, were quite rare, while derogatory comments, nicknames, and jokes were mentioned far more often at all the service academies.

<sup>18</sup> Memo from Staff Orthopaedic Surgeon, Naval Medical Clinic, Annapolis, to Superintendent, USNA, covering "Relative Gender Incidence of ACL Injury at the US Naval Academy," accepted for presentation at the Society of Military Orthopaedic Surgeons Annual Meeting, 7 December 1998.

<sup>19</sup> The 2005 OCS class started with 57 females and 114 males for a total of 171 candidates. Of that number 40 women graduated, 19 of whom had failed the Combat Readiness Test, compared to 5 of the men.

<sup>20</sup> Among other things, attendees witnessed a high-school type re-enactment of statements from several historic suffragists, plus a slideshow, a poem, and the introduction of former Spec. Shoshana Johnson, one of three women captured in Iraq in March 2003. Ms. Johnson was presented with a gift and a sash, which she used to cut a cake.

<sup>21</sup> Matt Labash, "How the Military Indoctrinates Diversity," *Weekly Standard*, August 18, 1997

<sup>22</sup> "Alcohol Abuse Up at Air Force Academy," *Air Force Times*, Feb. 21.



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

11-03

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

December 6, 2005, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Center for Military Readiness (CMR) on Sexual Harassment  
and Violence--SNOWFLAKE

- You asked that we provide Elaine Donnelly more information (Tab **A**), and we have done so.
- You also asked for my reaction to her report:
  - Her analysis is largely negative and argues inaccurately that DoD is not protecting the rights of those accused of sexual misconduct.
  - In addition, she focuses on a congressionally proposed Office of the Victim Advocate, an issue not discussed in the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies.
  - She supports DoD's conclusion that Congress does not need to enact legislation on sexual assault.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment  
As stated

Prepared by: Roger Kaplan, JTF-SAPR, (b)(6)

OSD 23628-05

11-L-0559 OSD/54983

# TAB

# A





# Center for Military Readiness

P.O. BOX 51600 ★ Livonia, Michigan 48151  
734/464-9430 ★ Fax 734/464-6678  
www.cmrlink.org

**ELAINE DONNELLY**  
President

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington D.C. 20301-1000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
September 20, 2005  
2005 SEP 23 PM 3:54

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- WALTER E. WILLIAMS, PhD
- PAUL WILLIAM A. WOODRUFF

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I am sending a copy of a CMR Analysis of the Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies.

Of all the reports done on this subject in recent years, this one is the most radical. We are particularly concerned about statements on page 5, indicating that the "remaining task" of the Joint Task Force on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, in addition to issuing a Defense Department Directive on this subject, is to "establish a permanent office within the office of the Secretary of Defense."

I hope that you will pay close attention to what is being drafted for your approval, and decline, without apology, to set up an Office of the Victim Advocate (OVA) in your office or anywhere in the Pentagon.

For reasons set forth in the Executive Summary and CMR Policy Analysis of this Task Force Report, an OVA in the Pentagon would be a constant source of negative publicity and potential interference in military affairs. The Department of Defense does not need a new bureaucracy to deal with emotionally charged problems that are essentially local in nature, or already included in areas of responsibility assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

I would be honored to meet with you or the official(s) assigned responsibility for these matters in the next few weeks. I can be reached at 734/464-9430, and hope to hear from your staff soon.

Sincerely,

Enclosure  
C C See Distribution List

Elaine Donnelly

OSD 19119-05

**Distribution List:**

**Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense**  
**Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness**  
**Principal Deputy, Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness**  
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**Secretary of the Air Force**  
**Chief of Staff of the Air Force**  
**Superintendent, U.S. Naval Academy**  
**Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy**  
**Superintendent, U.S. Air Force Academy**  
**Chairman and Members, Senate Armed Services Committee**  
**Chairman and Members, House Armed Services Committee**

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# **CMR Policy Analysis**

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## **The Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies**

**Prepared by the Center for Military Readiness**

**September 2005**

11-L-0559/OSD/54988

## **Executive Summary**

### **CMR Policy Analysis: The Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies**

As directed by Congress in 2004, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies studied the issue of sexual misconduct at the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis (A similar report regarding the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs was published in 2003.)

Some recommendations in this Task Force Report are worthwhile, but the most far-reaching proposals should be viewed with caution or rejected. The presumptions, findings, recommendations and tone of the Report are somewhat skewed by an over-representation of civilian "Victim advocate" groups. Among other things, these activists have been demanding the establishment of a permanent "Office of the Victim Advocate" (OVA) within the Pentagon.

The Secretary of Defense should decline, Without apology, to establish such an office, which would duplicate responsibilities of existing offices at the Pentagon and at local levels. An OVA in the Pentagon could become a power base for activists who would constantly generate negative publicity, and promote a controversial, emotionally charged agenda that is not in the best interests of the Defense Department or women in the military.

Such an office in the Pentagon could also disrupt military operations by causing political interference and second-guessing of decisions made by officers in the chain of command.

The Task Force Report should have included the views of academy personnel and experts who do not agree that the complainant is always right and the accused always wrong. The services do not need officers who have engaged in sexual abuse or rape. Nor do they need officers who have made unsubstantiated accusations that unjustly destroy the careers of others.

The Report asserts that women are harassed at the academies because of regulations that exempt women from close combat, and recommends gender-based recruiting quotas to reduce harassment. These assumptions and proposals are unsupported and questionable.

Recommendations in the Report for new legislation to mandate confidentiality between complainants and civilian "victim advocates" focus on only the first of three parties at interest: complainants, commanders, and alleged offenders. Recommended amendments to the UCMJ, to permit closed disciplinary proceedings, are in conflict with legal precedent upholding the right of accused parties to have open hearings. Neither proposal should be supported or implemented.

The Task Force Report correctly avoids endorsement of the concept of "blanket amnesty" for complainants. It also criticizes stereotypes regarding the guilt of alleged offenders. The Report, however, reinforces such stereotype throughout.

The document barely recognizes the imbalance between extensive resources available to complainants, compared to minimal support systems available for those accused. The Report

mentions but **does** not adequately **address** the widespread notion that disciplinary action against a complainant constitutes "retaliation." It **also** downplays the problem of false, or exaggerated complaints of **misconduct**, which **are demoralizing and** divisive in all military organizations.

The **Task Force Report** includes sweeping recommendation for changes in law to **reflect** the "full range of **sexual misconduct**," even though there **are many** military laws **and** regulations that do not exist in the civilian world. In addition to rules unique to the military, cadets and midshipmen are subject to the academies' Codes of Honor, which forbid such **offenses**.

The **Report** recommends that **training** and education courses **teach** acceptance of gender-normed physical **standards**, but allowances **and** special "assists" for female trainees are too obvious and pervasive to support the indoctrination. All cadets **and** midshipmen know that there is no gender-norming on the battlefield, but **men** and women **are not** treated equally in training programs requiring strength **and** endurance.

The **Task Force Report** further recommends that *several* sexual harassment and assault classes at the academies be mandatory, conducted in prime time, **graded**, and included **m** calculations **for** class rank. Implementation of **this plan could** aggravate men and **women** for different reasons, **and become** counterproductive.

**Instead** of civilian-oriented presentations, instructors should **stress** the academies' **Codes** of Honor. People **who** do not lie, cheat, or **steal** will not engage in **sexual misconduct**.

The **Report** correctly asserts that the *majority* of sexual assaults at **the** academies involve the illegal **use of** alcohol to some degree, but proposals **to address this factor are** less **than** adequate.

Coordination with civilian authorities *can* be helpful, but **the over-emphasis** on the needs of complainants, **who** are presumptively called "victims," could **result m** officials **taking sides** in emotionally charged, unresolved proceedings. Granting **semi-official** status to civilians who do not understand or **support** tenets of military law could undermine **the** due process **rights** of persons accused of misconduct, and make it harder for justice **to** be done.

All investigations **should** be conducted with sensitivity for the personal **feelings** of the complainant, combined with full protection of the **rights** of the accused.

The extraordinary mission of the service academies should not be undermined by presumptions that women **are** always right and men **are** always wrong. The truth is that **neither** gender is perfect. Personnel policies must recognize the existence of **human fallings**, and take realistic **steps to** encourage discipline, **rather** than indiscipline.

*The Center for Military Readiness is an independent public policy organization that specializes in military personnel policies. More information on this and related issues is available at [www.cmrlink.org](http://www.cmrlink.org).*

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### **CMR Policy Analysis: The Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies**

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## CMR Policy Analysis: The Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies

### Introduction:

The mission of the service academies is to educate and train military officers, most of whom will have the responsibility to lead others in the nation's wars, and to teach others over a lifetime. To produce officers worthy of that trust, the service academies must establish and enforce standards of personal conduct that are higher than most civilian colleges and universities.

The Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at the Military Service Academies (and an earlier report on the Air Force Academy) address problems of serious concern. This Report is flawed, however, because its presumptions, findings, recommendations and tone are somewhat skewed by an over-representation of civilian "victim advocate" pup s.<sup>1</sup>

The opinions of such pup s should be heard, but some leaders who have been quoted frequently since the beginning of the Air Force Academy scandal in 2003 have shown inadequate knowledge of the military justice system and the various forms of punishment for misconduct available under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Others have routinely accepted one-sided victims' complaints as absolute truth, confused allegations with substantiated crimes, essentially excused women of the consequences of their own high-risk behavior, and demanded punishment even when alleged victims do not report offenses to responsible authorities.<sup>2</sup>

The Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis have been more successful than the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs in deferring sexual harassment and abuse.<sup>3</sup> Recommendations in this Task Force Report nevertheless are more radical than those made by the 2003 Panel to Review Misconduct Allegations at the Air Force Academy. Some recommendations are worthwhile, but many should be viewed with caution or rejected.

### Office of the Victim Advocate

The Report states that the "remaining task" of the Joint Task Force on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (JTF-SAPR), in addition to issuing a Defense Department Directive on this subject, is to "establish a permanent office within the office of the Secretary of Defense." (p. 5) The Secretary of Defense should decline, without apology, to set up a new bureaucracy to deal with problems that are essentially local in nature.

A long list of officials, Boards, and Commissions have studied and reported on sexual misconduct problems in recent years. The responsibility to implement useful recommendations is already assigned to the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David Chu.

Congress passed legislation several years ago that authorizes local level victims advocates and counseling services at all military institutions. At the service academies these resources, as listed in this Report, are extensive and widely publicized. The Defense Department

does not need an "Office of the Victim Advocate" (OVA) in the Pentagon, which is likely to become an unaccountable bureaucratic boondoggle that constantly generates negative publicity, and causes interference in unresolved, emotionally charged cases that are demoralizing to all.

- Among other things, this office is supposed to provide regular reports on incidents of sexual misconduct. If numbers of complaints go down, the OVA will insist that women are still afraid to come forward. But if the number of complaints increases, the office will insist on even more staff and money to continue its work.
- For the Department of Defense, this is a lose-lose situation. As was the case with news stories about this and previous official reports on this subject, news is always portrayed as a black eye for the military.<sup>4</sup>
- Regardless of original intent, such an office quickly would become a tax-funded power base for advocates to lobby for controversial goals, including ill-advised legislative changes that are promoted in the Task Force Report.
- Since the Report pointed to women's exemption from land combat as a cause of resentment against women, it is reasonable to expect that OVA officials would push for elimination of women's remaining exemptions from land combat as one way to "solve" the problem, regardless of the legal and military consequences.
- Amnesty International and the civilian advocacy group Miles Foundation demanded a \$10 million appropriation to set up an "Office of the Victim Advocate" (OVA) in the Pentagon, ostensibly to fight sexual harassment/assault in the military, but also to advance several controversial, internationalist social goals.<sup>5</sup>

An OVA in the Pentagon could also disrupt military operations by causing political interference and second-guessing of decisions made by officers in the chain of command.

- The presumption that any accusation of harassment or assault is true and unchallengeable could lead Pentagon officials to intervene in far-away "he said, she said" disputes. Field commanders' fear of being second-guessed by Washington officials could skew their decisions on individual cases. Some might feel compelled to move key personnel prematurely, regardless of the military consequences.
- Civilian involvement in the military justice system would undermine morale by increasing political pressure for punishment of prominent people, regardless of guilt.<sup>6</sup> It could also lead to command interference that causes some cases to be thrown out, due to violations of due process rights. This happened with several cases related to the Tailhook scandal, leading to criticism that "no one" had been punished.<sup>7</sup>

### **Methodology**

The Task Force used standard methods of research, but failed to seek the views of women and men who are skeptical of the type of victimology advocated by some "experts" in the field.

- The **Task Force** should have specifically invited the **views** of male midshipmen and cadets who have been wrongly accused of misconduct without substantiation, **or** their legal **counsel**. The panel also should have **sought** the views of **experienced** investigators who **are** skilled in distinguishing genuine charges **from ones that** are unfounded or self-serving.<sup>8</sup>
- Unsubstantiated or exaggerated allegations have been **known** to destroy careers.<sup>9</sup> A five-year **survey** of sexual assault in the U.S. **Army** found that **reports** of sexual abuse that proved to **be** “unfounded” after investigation tripled from **48** to **157** between 1999 and 2003. No explanation for the increase **was given**.<sup>10</sup>
- Every alleged offender is innocent **until** proven guilty, but some believe that guilt is directly proportional to the **seriousness** of the charge. **This** attitude is demoralizing to all, and sometimes **extremely so**.<sup>11</sup>
- Unsubstantiated or recanted accusations sometimes **occur** for a **variety** of reasons. These include remorse, **after** an impulsive **sexual** encounter, an **attempt** to escape accountability for behavior that violates Academy rules, **jealousy**, the **desire** for attention, or revenge when a romantic relationship **goes sour**.<sup>12</sup> The services do not need **officers** who have engaged in **sexual** abuse or **rape**. Nor do they need **officers known** to have made false accusations that unjustly destroyed the careers of **others**.

### *Service Academy Culture*

The panel correctly places responsibility for preventing bad behavior on cadets and midshipmen themselves, but follows that laudable statement with **an** unsupported **assertion**: Due to the minority **status** of women **at** the Academies, some **communities** “**do not value women as highly as men**,” and **this** is a major cause of sexual **harassment and** assault. (p. ES-1)

The Task **Force** **blames** incidents of harassment on women’s “exclusion” (a.k.a., exemption) from combat specialties, **and** the existence of different **standards** to allow **for** physical differences. These assumptions should be questioned for several **reasons**:

- With the exception of a brief footnote citing undocumented **focus** group conversations with persons talking about the attitudes of their peers, the **Report** cites no support for the statement that women are undervalued **at** the Academies because they are exempt from direct ground combat. (pp. ES-1, 8, & **fn 21**)
- The **Report’s** recommended remedy for these perceived problems is an anachronistic call for gender-based admission and promotion quotas, in order to provide more female “role-models” in key **admissions, faculty** hiring and promotion **boards**. (p. 23)
- The **Report** mentions “current service operational constraints” as a **factor that might** limit the percentage of gender integration beyond 15-17%, but presents **no** evidence

to support the panel's assumption that greater **numbers** of women would improve their acceptance. (If that is the case, why **not** call for 50-50 **representation**?)

- Since the **Task Force** identifies as a factor **increasing** the **likelihood** of harassing behavior, it **is** reasonable to expect a the Pentagon OVA would use its **position** to advocate repeal of all women's exemptions from land combat **units**, **Special Operations Forces**, and submarines—particularly when gender-based recruiting quotas create **an** over-supply of female officers.
- The Navy is reducing its **number** of ships and personnel, and the **greatest** need in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps is for male officers to lead **reorganized** land combat infantry/armored battalions, **Special Operations Forces** and Navy **SEALS**. Since gender **quotas** almost always involve "adjustments" **m** standards to meet the politically mandated goal, implementation of the **Task Force**'s recommendations might **increase** tensions **between** male and female midshipmen and cadets, **instead** of reducing them.
- It would not be helpful to **create** new perceptions of favoritism for women at the academies. **Studies** done by the General Accounting Office in 1991 and 1994 found that complaints about double **standards** favoring women were the second-most common form of "sexual harassment" at all of the service academies. (p. 3)

### **Confidentiality - Counseling**

The **Task Force Report** correctly **asserts** that confidentiality, referring to privileged communications between complainants and specified **care** providers and counselors, **is** a complicated matter. It also notes that limited confidentiality is already available prior to a decision to prosecute **an** alleged offender. The Report **nevertheless** recommends passage of a **new** law creating special privileges not just for health care providers, but also for "victim advocates." (pp. ES-2, 14, 26)

**This** recommendation is overly simplistic and focused on only the **first two** of three "stakeholders" in a triangle of interests. The **three** are:

1. Complainants alleging harassment or assault
2. Commanders who **need** to know about incidents of misconduct
3. Alleged offenders, whose rights of due process must be **protected** to achieve justice

Congress should reject proposed legislation guaranteeing confidentiality to victim advocates. There is no need to codify policies that **are** already available under certain circumstances.<sup>13</sup> Matters **can** be confidential **during** early **stages**, but once **charges** are filed and someone's career and/or liberty **are** at stake, confidentiality should **end**. If the accusation is true, it **should** be provable without providing special rules that do not apply in other cases.

Commanders have **the** responsibility to evaluate the **readiness/competence** of all personnel at all times. Withholding information due to potential embarrassment of complainants

could interfere **with** this command responsibility, **as well as** discovery proceedings and rights of due process when disciplinary proceedings **begin**.

### **Confidentiality – Disciplinary Hearings**

The **Task Force** Report recommends that Article 32 of the UCMJ be amended to permit commanders to close the proceedings **“to protect the privacy of victims and alleged offenders.”** (pp. ES-2, 33) **Although** the recommendation appears to be **even handed**, in **actual** practice it would violate the rights of anyone accused of misconduct. **The** recommendation also **conflicts** with a clear legal precedent upholding the right of persons **accused** to have **an open hearing**:

- In 1998 the Court of Appeals for the **Armed Forces**, in **ABC, Inc v. Powell**, ruled that proceedings must be **open** unless there is a compelling **need** to close them. The petition to **that** Court was part of the **highly** publicized prosecution of Army Sgt. Maj. Gene McKinney for sexual misconduct.
- Advocates for five complainant witnesses argued that a closed **hearing** would make it easier for the women to testify against **Sgt. Maj. McKinney**. The **Court** concluded **that** fear of embarrassment by adult females was **not a good enough reason** to close Article 32 hearings. Despite intense media interest that largely prejudged the defendant's guilt, McKinney was acquitted on 18 of 19 charges.<sup>14</sup>

### **“Victims” Rights**

The **Task Force** correctly recommends that **persons** who want to **report** misconduct or assault should be informed of their rights and **the** various resources available to **them**. The Report also should have noted **that** every person accused of misconduct is entitled to **the** presumption of innocence. The presumptive designation “victim,” without the modifier “alleged,” is a loaded **word**. Its constant use colors the Report's findings and recommendations.

The Report is replete with references to a **long** list of officials **and institutions** that are available for the support of **the** (alleged) victims. (pp. 11-13)

- **At the Naval Academy**, these include: Chaplains, **Psychotherapists**, **Medical Staff** and Family Support Counselors, military and civilian “Victims Advocates,” the Sexual Harassment, Misconduct **and Assault** Prevention **and Response Program** Office, the **Sexual Assault & Victim Intervention (SAVI)** Program, **the Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) Program** for training midshipmen on **sexual** harassment issues, Company Officers and **Senior Enlisted Leaders**, plus the Office of the **Staff Judge Advocate**, which provides counsel and **prosecutors** on campus.
- The U.S. Military Academy provides all of the above **resources** with slightly different names, such **as** the Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic (SCPME), the Cadet Health Promotion and Wellness Council (CHPWC), and **the Respect Program** Advisory council (RPAC), established in 1992.

- The Air Force Academy has a similar array of services, and institutions **such as** the Center for Character Development (CCD) and *Cadets* Advocating Sexual Integrity and Education (CASE). **These organizations** have established relationships with several civilian hospitals, crisis centers and law enforcement agencies. Supervising these institutions at each Academy are the **Boards** of Visitors, the Superintendents, and other officials who **are** accountable for disciplinary **actions**.
- At the federal level, DoD Directives 1030.1 and 1030.2 guarantee **seven** major rights to persons who decide to pursue legal remedies, including **full consultation** and information **as** legal proceedings **progress**.
- **In** addition to all of the above, the **Task** Force recommends the designation of a Sexual **Assault** Response Coordinator (SARC), plus a Victim Witness Coordinator (different from the Victim Advocate) at each Academy. (p. 27)

Some advocates claim that any action that holds an (alleged) victim accountable for her own violation of personal conduct rules **amounts to "retaliation."** **This implies that** the complainant should **not** be held accountable for her own **high-risk** behavior.

- The **Task** Force is to be commended for not endorsing the concept of "blanket amnesty" for complainants. (pp. 28-29) Such a policy would create a **perverse** incentive for women involved in personal misconduct to **make false** allegations of abuse or rape in **order** to escape accountability for **their own** actions.
- The **Task** Force does **endorse** postponement of **discipline** while investigation of the accused offender is pending, which makes sense **in** some cases. **Investigations** should be conducted with sensitivity for the personal feelings of the complainant, combined with full protection of the **rights** of the accused.

#### ***Alleged Offender Rights***

The Report **recommends that** education programs should "**avoid categorically stereotyping men as perpetrators and women as victims**"—a comment reported to have come up in focus group discussions at the Naval Academy. (pp. 38-39) That stereotype, unfortunately, **is reinforced** by the obvious imbalance between extensive **resources** available for persons alleging misconduct (listed above) and minimal **support systems** available for those **accused**.

- Legal representation is **essential to assure** due process, but the **Report indicates** that **there** is only one advisor available for this purpose **on** the Naval Academy campus. At West Point, legal help is **six** hours away, at Fort **Drum, NY**. The **Task Force** only recommends that the West Point advisor be available on campus. (pp. 15, 34)
- Sexual abuse and personal misconduct are evidence of poor character. **False or exaggerated** accusations against others, which **are not an** uncommon, demonstrate a lack of integrity.<sup>15</sup> Both infractions violate the Uniform Code of Military **Justice** and the **service academies'** Codes of Honor.

- On page 34 the **Task Force Report** mentions two incidents of fraudulent reporting out of 85 cases, but downplays the problem by claiming that an unspecified number of allegations were recanted because the (alleged) victims did not want to endure the investigative and judicial process.
- Footnote 137 reports that a DoD Inspector General survey in 2004 found that 43.2% of males and 36.8% of female midshipmen considered fraudulent reporting to be a large or very large problem. Comparable figures at West Point were 17.3% for men and 17% for women. The **Task Force Report** downplayed these figures and apparently did not investigate why these perceptions persist. Nor did the **Report** recommend accountability for persons who make unfounded allegations.
- To the contrary, the **Task Force Report** recommends mandatory training to teach investigators and prosecutors to “take their focus off of the victim’s behavior and place it on the defendant’s behavior.” (p. 32) It recommends courses on how to identify predatory behavior, but not on techniques useful in recognizing when an accusation is not credible.
- Some male cadets and midshipmen avoid female classmates in order to avoid the experiences of others whose careers were ruined due to relationships with women that led to charges of sexual misconduct. The result is that some women feel “shunned.”
- Some service academy investigations have been hampered because allegations of abuse were filed weeks or even years after the fact. The **Task Force Report** should have recommended that complaints must be filed within a reasonable length of time.

#### ***Recommended Changes in the UCMJ***

The **Report** makes the unsupported and overstated assertion that the Academies did not hold alleged offenders “accountable” over the past ten years. This reflects apparent civilian misunderstandings of the nature of the UCMJ and non-judicial punishment.<sup>16</sup>

- Some people believe any sort of punishment short of court martial and conviction amounts to no punishment at all. To the contrary, military people are routinely punished for improper behavior that would not be considered a crime in civilian life.
- These include regulations forbidding senior/subordinate fraternization, on-campus drinking and sexual activity, failure to obey orders, and “conduct unbecoming an officer”—a punishable offense that has no counterpart in civilian codes of law.

The panel nevertheless makes a sweeping recommendation for statutory changes to reflect the “full range of sexual misconduct.” (p. 31) New legislation will not add to mandates already present in the academies’ Codes of Honor, or law and regulations already in effect, except to create new criminals whose guilt would be no less difficult to prove.

- In many cases of alleged assault at the Air Force Academy, as examined in excruciating detail by a 2003 Air Force Working Group, many prosecutions for rape ~~were~~ not conducted because *there* was insufficient evidence. It **does** not benefit anyone to pursue a weak or questionable *case* that is **sure** to be dismissed by jury members **who** take their job, and instructions from a judge, seriously.
- The threshold of proof of forcible **rape** is justifiably high, since **persons** convicted **are** subject to severe penalties and the official designation of "**sex offender**" for life. Reasonable doubts are inherent in "~~%~~said, she said" **situations**, especially when illegal drinking by underage midshipmen and cadets elevates the **risk** of misconduct.
- The demand for new legislation sometimes **reflects** **misimpressions** about alleged **offenses**. Inaccurate news reports frequently describe all forms of **sexual** misconduct, ranging from inappropriate **jokes** to rape, **as** always credible and equally egregious. Comparatively minor incidents do not **justify** new legislation.<sup>17</sup>

#### ***Training and Education - Physical Differences***

The Task Force **suggests** that male cadets and **midshipmen** might be more supportive of female classmates if they were educated on the rationale for gender-normed **standards**. (p. 39) Classes would have to indoctrinate acceptance of different physical **standards** and other gender specific allowances that are obvious at the academia **and** other officer training centers.

- A **research** project done at the Naval Academy in 1998 (one of many) **reported** that in military related **training**, women **are** nine times more prone to knee ligament injury than men, and the **higher** level of **risk** exists throughout **a** military career.<sup>18</sup>
- At the Marine Corps Officer Candidate School at Quantico, the tallest obstacle course bars are two feet higher for men than bars on the **nearby** course for women. **Small** wooden "assist" sticks nailed to the **support posts** help women to tackle the elevated bars. Female trainees also benefit from flat "assist" boards nailed about 12" from the bottom of obstacle course climbing walls that test upper body **strength**.<sup>19</sup>
- In the OCS Combat Readiness **Test**, men and women do the same CRT events, but with different time **requirements**. Even with these and **other** allowances, in the second OCS **class** of 2005, the attrition rate for women **was** 30%, compared to 8.3% for the men. **Of** the candidates who **graduated**, 48% of the females failed the CRT event, compared to 5% of the males. **Results** like this, which are not unusual, undermine theories of gender "equality" in physical training.

"Success" in this education effort **also** would require mandatory doublethink: i.e., belief in the idea that special treatment for women **is** the same **as equal** treatment. But the **enormous** physical demands associated with deliberate offensive **action** in Army and Marine direct ground combat units, or even in surface warfare emergencies such **as** the attacks on the Navy ships Stark and Cole, **cannot** be modified. There is no gender-norming on the battlefield.

### ***Training and Education – Sexual Harassment and Assault***

The Task Force **Report** recommends **that** several sexual harassment and assault (SH&A) classes at the academies be a) **Mandatory**; b) Scheduled in “prime time” usually devoted to academic subjects; and c) **Graded** for inclusion in calculations for class ranking. Implementation of these recommendations, which seem unnecessary given the availability of a wide array of academy **Values**, Ethics, and other SH&A education programs, **reflect** skewed priorities that could reach the point of diminishing returns.

- Male midshipmen and cadets who **are more** interested in learning core **military subjects** may not appreciate the elevation of such classes to the **same importance** as electrical engineering, especially if grades affect class standing.
- Accomplished female cadets and midshipmen may not appreciate relentless “special” programs **that** imply that women **are** helpless **creatures** who don’t **know how** to deal with **men**. They are also likely **to be** annoyed by mandatory programs **that** involve self-conscious displays, lecture series, readings and **theater** performances to **address** the **“equal importance of men and women to mission accomplishment.”** (p. 38)
- **An** example of such a program occurred on **August 26, 2005**, when members of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division at Fort Hood TX were required to **attend** a **“Women’s Equality Day”** observance that included overdone, **eye-rolling** material.<sup>20</sup>
- **The Task Force** further recommends a “variety of instructional **methods**,” to include even more sensitivity/diversity training conducted by **the** Defense **Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)**, and by outside speakers or consultants on “gender **violence-related** topics.” **At** a time when **other** military Communities are being downsized, this amounts to a **jobs** program for DEOMI, which **has been known** to conduct controversial presentations.<sup>21</sup>
- It is not clear what the **Task Force** **means** in **saying** that **such programs** are **“remiss in not acknowledging current youth culture, trends, and social norms.”** (p. 39) Instead of **spending** time studying popular culture, instructors should **stress** the academies’ **Codes of Honor**. People **who** do not lie, cheat, or **steal** will not engage in **sexual** misconduct, which involves infractions of all **three** prohibitions.
- There is a cultural contradiction in **opposing** violence against women, but condoning violence against **military women**, as long as it **happens** in aggressive “warrior” training or **at** the **hands** of the enemy.

### ***Prevention***

**The Report** rightly mentions casual attitudes toward **sex and alcohol** as factors that contribute to **“poor judgment, lowered inhibitions, and increased aggression and/or vulnerability to sexual assault.”** More involvement by Tactical Noncommissioned Officers and Senior Enlisted Leaders, particularly during evening and weekend **hours**, could be **helpful** in

reducing the illegal **use** of alcohol and other **high-risk** behaviors. To be effective, however, **such** plans must involve firm enforcement of **rules** against alcohol and **sexual encounters on campus**.

The **Report** asserts that “the **majority of sexual assaults at both Academies involve alcohol to some degree**,” but proposals to address **this** factor are less than adequate. (pp. 8, 24)

- Footnote **25** reports that of the sexual cases reviewed by the **Task Force**, alcohol **was** involved in **58%** of Military Academy cases and **57%** of Naval Academy cases.
- Despite years of negative publicity about the Air Force Academy, alcohol offenses there have jumped **57 percent** since the fall of 2003.<sup>22</sup>

### **Coordination Between *Military and Civilian Communities***

Coordination with civilian authorities is a **useful** idea, but the sole emphasis on **victim** support could result in officials taking sides in **complex, unresolved proceedings**.

The **Task Force recommends** the training of civilians to counsel (alleged) victims, but **this is not** the role of the military. It would **be problematic** to give civilians semi-official **status**, and to extend to them special privileges that could undermine the due process **rights** of midshipmen and cadets **accused** of misconduct. **Most** civilians **are** not familiar with the **need** to avoid command interference in disciplinary proceedings.

### **Conclusion**

The **Task Force Report** correctly observes that **sexual harassment and assault is not a “fix and forget” problem**. **Human relationships are far** more complicated **than** that. It does not follow, however, that all of the panel’s recommendations, including **new legislation**, **are necessary or justified**.

It is possible that the Academies’ unbalanced emphasis on **the rights** of (alleged) victims **only**, with **little** apparent concern for persons **faced** with **serious charges**, is in itself creating an atmosphere of tension that more of the **same** would make worse. **Given the findings** of the GAO in 1994 and 1995, which found that complaints about double **standards** are the **second-most** common form of reported harassment, this possibility is more plausible than the theory that gender quotas and **went** more special **treatment** and will **somehow correct** the problem.

The extraordinary mission of the **service academies** should **not** be undermined by the theories of professional victimologists, whose philosophy suggests that women **are** always right and men are always wrong. The truth is that neither gender is perfect. **Personnel** policies must recognize the existence of human failings, and take realistic **steps** to encourage discipline, rather **than** indiscipline.

\* \* \* \* \*



<sup>12</sup> Experts in the field include Dr. Charles P. McDowell, Ph.D., author of "False Allegations," *Forensic Science Digest*, 1981, and Eugene J. Kanin, Ph.D. of Purdue University, author of "False Rape Allegations," *Archive of Sexual Behavior*, 1994.

<sup>13</sup> This recommendation may be inspired by a situation involving Colorado rape counselor Jennifer Bier, who is fighting an arrest warrant issued in May 2005 after she refused to turn over her records in the pending court-martial of Lt. Joseph Harding, who is alleged to have sexually assaulted two female cadets in 1999 and 2000. (*Air Force Times*, June 13)

<sup>14</sup> ABC, Inc.; Cable News Network, Inc. ("CNN"); CBS Inc., Fox News Network, National Broadcasting Company, Inc. and The Washington Post, Petitioners, and Gene C. McKinney, Sergeant Major of the Army, Petitioner. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Misc. Nos. 97-8023, 97-8024, decided Nov. 5, 1997. Excerpts of opinion:

"SMA McKinney's Article 32 hearing was ordered closed by Colonel Owen C. Powell, the special court-martial convening authority (SPCMCA), who appointed the Article 32 investigating officer... Colonel Powell gave the following reasons in support of ordering a closed hearing: (1) to maintain the integrity of the military justice system and ensure due process to SMA McKinney; (2) to prevent dissemination of evidence or testimony that would be admissible at an Article 32 investigation, but might not be admissible at trial, in order to prevent contamination of the "potential pool of panel members," and (3) to protect the alleged victims who would be testifying as witnesses against SMA McKinney, specifically to shield the alleged victims from possible news reports about anticipated attempts to delve into each woman's sexual history.

"...In *Hershey*, we recognized that "[u]ndeniably there is a certain amount of mortification imposed on victim-witnesses in sex cases, but that is a condition which cannot be eliminated from our judicial system." (emphasis added)... Every case that involves limiting access to the public must be decided on its own merits."

<sup>15</sup> At the infamous 1991 Tailhook convention, then-Navy Ensign Beth Warlick accused three naval aviators of gang raping her, but later admitted she had lied. Warlick was never punished appropriately for this serious ethical violation, but the men she accused suffered severe career penalties. See *National Review* article footnoted above.

<sup>16</sup> Some sensational news reports about the 2003 Air Force Academy scandal created the impression that rapes and assaults were occurring constantly, and that anything short of successful prosecution by courts-martial constituted no punishment at all. A 2003 investigation by an Air Force Working Group, headed by Mary L. Walker, found that there had been 43 allegations of sexual assaults and rape that occurred over 10 years, and nearly all of the cases were handled properly. Punishments ranged from letters of censure to expulsion or imprisonment.

<sup>17</sup> See page 3, referring to studies done by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in January 1994 and 1995. Both of these surveys found that complaints about more serious incidents, such as unwanted sexual advances or pressures for dates by superiors, were quite rare, while derogatory comments, nicknames, and jokes were mentioned far more often at all the service academies.

<sup>18</sup> Memo from Staff Orthopaedic Surgeon, Naval Medical Clinic, Annapolis, to Superintendent, USNA, covering "Relative Gender Incidence of ACL Injury at the U.S. Naval Academy," accepted for presentation at the Society of Military Orthopaedic Surgeons Annual Meeting, 7 December 1998.

<sup>19</sup> The 2005 OCS class started with 57 females and 114 males for a total of 171 candidates. Of that number 49 women graduated, 19 of whom had failed the Combat Readiness Test, compared to 5 of the men.

<sup>20</sup> Among other things, attendees witnessed a high-school type re-enactment of statements from several historic suffragists, plus a slide show, a poem, and the introduction of former Spec. Shoshana Johnson, one of three women captured in Iraq in March 2003. Ms. Johnson was presented with a gift and a saber, which she used to cut a cake.

<sup>21</sup> Matt Labash, "How the Military Indoctrinates Diversity," *Weekly Standard*, August 18, 1997.

<sup>22</sup> "Alcohol Abuse Up at Air Force Academy," *Air Force Times*, Feb. 21.

**TAB**

**B**



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C 20301-4000



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

05 OCT 2005

Elaine Donnelly  
President  
Center for Military Readiness  
PO Box 51600  
Livonia, MI 48151

Dear Ms. Donnelly,

I am writing in response to your letter to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding the *Report of the Defense Task force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies*. We very much appreciated receiving the policy analysis that the Center for Military Readiness prepared.

The Department conducted a careful review of the Defense Task Force report and forwarded its comments to Congress on September 30, 2005 (see enclosure).

The Joint Task Force for Sexual Assault Prevention and Response transitioned into a permanent office within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in October 2005. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response office (SAPRO) will remain the single point of accountability for sexual assault policy for DoD, and it will work closely with the Military Services to ensure that all our service members, to include cadets and midshipmen, enjoy an environment free of sexual assault, harassment and other related criminal acts. SAPRO will not perform the missions of the office of the Victim Advocate proposed in HR 1403.

The Department previously awarded a contract to determine the most effective placement of an office of Victim Advocate and to ensure the optimal use of resources for victim support. The study report is expected this autumn.

I appreciate your regard for the men and women who serve our Nation and hope you find this response both encouraging and reassuring.

Sincerely,

K.C. McClain  
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force  
Commander  
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office

Enclosure:  
As stated



ATTACHMENT

11-L-0559/OSD/55005



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



SEP 29 2005

The Honorable Duncan Hunter  
**Chairman**  
Committee on Armed Services  
U. S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-0552

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am forwarding the Department of Defense's comments on the Defense Task Force Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies as required in Section 526(d)(3), of Public Law 108-136, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (NDAA FY04). In addition, I am forwarding to you the acting Secretary of the Air Force's assessment of corrective actions being taken at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) to address sexual assault and harassment. This simultaneous submission complies with Section 526(e) of the NDAA FY04.

I commend the Defense Task Force for conducting a comprehensive review of the issues related to sexual harassment and violence at the United States Military and Naval Academies. The report validates the direction and focus of our most recent efforts. The Department of Defense (DoD) established comprehensive sexual assault policies prior to the report's completion. For example, the Department instituted a collateral misconduct provision, a common survey that measures the effectiveness of sexual assault and harassment prevention programs at the service academies is in effect, and DoD proposed to Congress an offense for stalking earlier this year (see enclosure(1)(d) for specific comments).

Of note, the Department has implemented a comprehensive confidential reporting policy throughout DoD to include the Service academies. Effective since June, this provision permits victims to report sexual assaults to victim advocates, healthcare providers, and other specified individuals and receive medical care and counseling without prompting a criminal investigation. These new policies will undoubtedly enable more victims to receive medical treatment as well as provide the initial support needed to foster a climate of confidence. Increased confidence could lead to victims openly reporting their assaults to law enforcement and seeking criminal investigations.

In regard to the acting Secretary of the Air Force's assessment of corrective actions being taken at USAFA to address sexual assault and harassment, the leaders at Headquarters Air Force and USAFA remain fully committed to ensuring that all cadets enjoy an environment free of sexual assault and harassment. They have vigorously implemented policies and programs to address the findings and recommendations of several internal and external studies.

Of note, the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force now includes a permanent position to assist with USAFA oversight and a new office within the Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel



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
for operational support and policy development. Additional oversight consists of the Executive Steering Group, a 4-Star committee under the chairmanship of the Vice Chief of Staff, a General Officer Steering Committee, consisting of major generals; and a reinvigorated Board of Visitors under the leadership of the Honorable Jim Gilmore, former Governor of Virginia.

The DoD has worked closely with the Air Force to ensure the seamless implementation of our new comprehensive sexual assault prevention and response policy. In addition, DoD policy development has benefited greatly from the lessons learned at USAFA.

The Department's commitment to this issue is unwavering. We will continue our efforts to ensure that all our Servicemembers, to include cadets and midshipmen, enjoy an environment free of sexual assault, harassment and other related criminal acts. I have established a permanent DoD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to provide policy guidance, oversight and to work closely with the Military Departments as they vigorously implement their prevention and response programs.

I am sending a similar letter and the Department's reports to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David S. C. Chu". The signature is written in a cursive style with a horizontal line underneath the name.

David S. C. Chu

Enclosures:

- (1) Department of Defense Comments on the Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies
- (2) Acting Secretary of the Air Force's Assessment of Corrective Actions Taken at USAFA Regarding Sexual Assault and Harassment (NDAAFY04, Section 526(e)), dated August 29, 2005

cc:

The Honorable Ike Skelton  
Ranking Member

## Department of Defense Comments

### Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies

1. **Background:** The Secretary of Defense established the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies (DTF) pursuant to Section 526 of Public Law 108-136, the National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2004. Congress directed the DTF to assess and make recommendation “by which the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy may more effectively address matters relating to sexual harassment and violence at the United States Military Academy and the United States Naval Academy.”

2. **Findings and Recommendations:** The DTF conducted a comprehensive review that focused on service academy culture; victims’ rights and support; offender accountability; data collection and case management tracking; training and education; prevention; and coordination between military and civilian communities. Based on site visits, interviews, consultations with subject matter experts, and an extensive review of academy and military department policies, records, and reports, the DTF made 44 findings and 43 recommendations.

3. **Comments:** The DTF conducted its review while the Department of Defense (DoD) was establishing a sexual assault policy framework. We are pleased that the DTF report largely validates core DoD concepts. The report’s key findings and recommendations identify issues addressed in the Department’s new sexual assault policy or currently targeted in Service-level sexual assault and harassment programs. For example, the DTF emphasized the need for confidentiality, prevention, increased reporting avenues, deferring collateral misconduct determinations, specialized training for investigators and prosecutors, and increased coordination with civilian communities. In each case DoD has an existing policy in place and, just as important, the Military Departments have already taken action to ensure their implementation in the active force, Reserve Components and the Service academies.

a. **General** In the aggregate, the findings and recommendations identify shortcomings or deficiencies in the sexual assault and harassment programs at the United States Military and Naval Academies. Some refer to issues that do not fall within the purview of sexual assault and harassment prevention but can affect the success of these two programs. The Department conceptually concurs with most of the findings and recommendations, differing in some cases only in terms of degree or the particulars of recommended responsive actions.

b. **Confidentiality:** The DTF correctly emphasized in its report the need for a confidentiality policy and devoted an entire chapter to the concept. DoD similarly recognized the importance of permitting victims of sexual assault to obtain healthcare

services without triggering a criminal investigation. DoD announced a limited confidentiality policy in March 2005 with a June 14, 2005, effective date to ensure that commanders, service members, and sexual assault responders had sufficient opportunity to fully understand the new policy.

Confidentiality represents a marked departure from DoD's previous policy of mandatory reporting and investigation of sexual assaults. The Department's goal is to ensure all victims receive care and support, to obtain a clearer understanding of the actual prevalence of sexual assault within the military, and to create an environment of confidence that will lead to greater numbers of victims seeking criminal investigations.

Accordingly, this policy allows an active duty sexual assault victim, on a confidential basis, to disclose the details of his/her assault to specifically identified individuals—Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs), Victim Advocates (VAs), healthcare providers (HCPs), and chaplains—and receive medical treatment and counseling, without prompting the official investigative process. Installation commanders will be notified of the assault but receive only non-personal identifying information about the victim.

Confidentiality essentially empowers the victim. The policy provides a victim additional time and increased control over the release and management of his/her personal information, and empowers him/her to seek relevant information and support to make more informed decisions about participating in a criminal investigation. A victim who receives appropriate care and treatment, and is provided an opportunity to make an informed decision about reporting the assault, is more likely to develop increased trust that his/her needs are of primary concern to the command and may eventually decide to report the sexual assault to law enforcement. Even if the victim chooses not to report the sexual assault to law enforcement, this additional reporting avenue gives commanders a clearer picture of the sexual violence within their command, and enhances a commander's ability to provide an environment which is safe and contributes to the well-being and mission-readiness of all of its members.

Initial data from the Services indicate that the policy is on track. Additional victims have come forward under confidentiality to make restricted reports and receive medical care, treatment, and counseling. Moreover, some victims subsequently changed their reporting option from restricted to unrestricted in a matter of weeks, thereby permitting the initiation of criminal investigations. DoD believes that this trend will continue.

Confidentiality, carefully formulated after extensive consultation with the Military Departments, therapists and surveys of individual military members, did not require congressional legislation or the expansion of privileged communications to SARCs, VAs, and HCPs as recommended in the DTF report. DoD policy protects communications between the victim and the above specified responders through confidentiality, with narrowly limited exceptions we believe are necessary to meet the unique requirements of an effective military force. We recognize that it is difficult to

have absolute answers to this very complex issue of privileged communications, particularly as it relates to federal and state law and the unique needs of a military environment, but we will continue to closely examine these issues and make appropriate modifications that are in the best interests of the individual military service member and the armed forces.

Extending privilege beyond chaplains and therapists will not enhance DoD's confidentiality policy and could negatively affect the Department. The Military has unique needs that have prompted the U. S. Supreme Court to recognize it as a specialized society. The Department believes that the existing policy balances the need to protect the privacy of victims and provide treatment with the need for commanders to maintain good order and discipline within the "specialized society of the military" while also addressing military readiness and national security.

This does not mean that the Department believes no further refinements in sexual assault policy will be called for in the future. We have introduced sweeping policy that made numerous, significant changes in how we meet the needs of sexual assault victims and address sexual assault and misconduct. Changes in this policy prior to the Department capturing meaningful statistical data that would provide an objective basis for further actions might cause more harm than good. Rest assured that if the data in the coming year indicates that the policy is failing to meet its objectives, we stand ready to promptly address such deficiencies. To overlay a new legislative framework for confidentiality on top of the global administrative program and policy that was **only** recently implemented, would cause confusion across the military.

DoD will closely monitor implementation of the new confidentiality policy to ensure that it is, in fact, providing multiple reporting channels, protecting victim identities, and improving access to services.

c. **Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC):** DoD is concerned that the DTF did not fully understand the critical role SARCs ~~perform~~ in ensuring an effective installation sexual assault prevention and response program. Strikingly, the report mentions the SARC only in one recommendation (9B) and advocates restrictions that would reduce that position's effectiveness.

DoD considers the SARC to be the center of gravity for each installation's sexual assault prevention and response program. SARCs serve as the single point of contact to coordinate sexual assault victim care and to track the services provided to the victim from initial report of a sexual assault through disposition and resolution of the victim's health and well-being. **These** duties may include coordination with other facilities should the victim deploy overseas or be reassigned to another installation.

Recommendation 9B proposes that SARCs not have access to identifying information from a restricted report. This proposal not only prevents a SARC from coordinating victim care and supervising or providing guidance to his/her VAs; it conflicts with DoD and Military Service policies that responders immediately contact the

SARC whenever a restricted or unrestricted report is made. **The** suggestion would also prevent SARCs from later informing VAs of the actions taken or maintaining confidential files and other documentation.

Experience to date **has** provided no data that SARC access to identifying information from a restricted report has been detrimental to any victim. Rather, anecdotal reports indicate that the current policy is effective and contributing to the rapid implementation of DoD's sexual assault prevention and response policy.

d. **Offender Accountability:** DoD agrees with the DTF report (page 15) "that virtually all sexual misconduct can be charged under the current code [of military justice]." The one exception is stalking. To correct this, the Department submitted a legislative proposal to Congress to add that crime to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); the Department will **prepare** corresponding amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).

**The** Department also concurs with the DTF that "not all sexual offenses **are** easily prosecutable." However, the difficulty in prosecuting many cases is not due to the UCMJ or the MCM. Civilian jurisdictions encounter the same problem, which stems from the very nature of most sexual assaults: no third party witnesses and evidence that verifies **only** that a sexual act occurred but not the circumstances.

The Department's previously proposed amendments to the UCMJ and MCM provide a better representation of categories or types of sexual assaults; enable a more meaningful comparison of military offenses with the provisions of other jurisdictions; and reflect the range of commonly-encountered contemporary sex crimes.

The Department's combined UCMJ and MCM proposals provide a compilation of varying degrees of behavior constituting sexual assaults with graduated punishments reflective of their varying degrees of gravity. For example, DoD's proposal specifically enumerates eight categories of "force," including having sexual intercourse with someone who is substantially incapacitated, substantially incapable, or legally incapable of appraising the nature of **the** act, declining participation in the act, **or** communicating unwillingness to engage in the act. "Force" also includes administering any drug, intoxicant, or other substance to an unknowing victim to overcome or prevent the victim's resistance or substantially impair the victim's ability to appraise or control the victim's conduct. Actual violence and threats of violence remain covered as forms of "force." No accompanying physical injury or harm is required. These changes obviate the need to create an offense of "date or acquaintance rape" or labeling rape only for "the most forceful acts of penetration," (Recommendation 16).

DoD disagrees with Recommendation 16 to delete "force" from the elements of sexual assault crimes and rely on the element of the victim's "lack of consent." This change would place the focus of the trial and litigation on the victim's conduct rather than on the perpetrator's misconduct. This recommendation contradicts the objective of DoD recently-proposed legislation **which** has been to eliminate **the** "without consent"

requirement from the current offense of rape (Article 120, UCMJ). By returning the focus to the consent issue, the recommendation would provide defense counsel no recourse but to challenge the accusation by challenging the victim's account and veracity, thereby "put[ting] the victim on trial." Instead, the current DoD legislative proposal focuses the trial on the perpetrator's misconduct, not the victim's consent or conduct.

**e. Amend Article 32 to explicitly permit commanders to close the hearing:**

The Department understands the intent of Recommendation 18 that Congress amend Article 32 to permit commanders to close the proceedings to protect the privacy of victims and alleged offenders. Rule for Court-Martial 405(h)(3), MCM, currently provides that "access by spectators to all or part of the proceeding may be restricted or foreclosed in the discretion of the commander who directed the investigation or the investigating officer." However, the ability to close the proceedings is not absolute, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF) decision in *ABC, Inc. v. Powell*, 47 M.J. 363 (1997) may limit the ability to enact legislation on this issue.

In *ABC, Inc. v. Powell*, USCAAF granted the request of reporters that a writ of mandamus be issued to a convening authority commander to withdraw his previous order to close an Article 32 investigative hearing. The commander's order was designed, in part, to protect the alleged victims of sexual assault and harassment. The Court held that the commander's stated justification was insufficient and ruled that "the determination [to close the hearing] must be made on a case-by-case, witness-by-witness, and circumstance-by-circumstance basis whether closure in a case is necessary to protect the welfare of a victim or alleged victim of sexual assault." In reaching its decision, USCAAF also referenced civilian cases and observed that overly broad, blanket rules of closure, for privacy concerns, for the testimony of child sexual-assault victims had been held unconstitutional.

**f. Collateral Misconduct:** DoD agrees that commanders must have the discretion to handle victim misconduct and addressed this issue in Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) (JTF-SAPR-001), *Collateral Misconduct in Sexual Assault Cases*. Consistent with the DTM, this policy also rejects blanket amnesty, and it balances the victim's interests with the commander's responsibilities and authority under the RCM 306 policy that "Allegations of offenses should be disposed of in a timely manner at the lowest appropriate level of disposition."

However, the Department disagrees that victims should have the option of deciding when to have their offenses adjudicated. A blanket provision that postpones or defers appropriate discipline based solely upon a victim's choice is inconsistent with RCM 306 and would adversely affect a commander's discretion and responsibility for enforcing good order and discipline. A commander's discretion in this area should be preserved and not abdicated to the victim's choice. A victim's preference should be considered, but should not be absolute or totally controlling.

**g. Statutory limitation on the use of indexing information:** Recommendation 23 requests that indexed information not be used later for official purposes other than law

enforcement, citing a 1999 report of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA). However, no examples of misuse were provided.

DoD respectfully disagrees with both Finding **23** and Recommendation **23**. The NAPA report, "*Adapting Military Sex Crime Investigations to Changing Times*," recommended changing the standard for indexing to probable cause. Further, the DTF report does not reference the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments regarding the 1999 NAPA report recommendations, or the Secretary of Defense comments to the Congress on August **24**, 1999, addressing the NAPA recommendations. The Secretary advised that DoD "non-concurred" with the NAPA recommendations regarding "titling" and referenced an ongoing review of the process by the DoD Inspector General. Significantly, the NAPA report did not cite any examples of misuse.

DoD Instruction 5505.7, *Titling and Indexing Subjects of Criminal Investigations in the Department of Defense*, provides a uniform standard for titling and indexing subjects of criminal investigations. Mechanisms **are** already in place to limit the use of the files for law enforcement and security purposes. The Instruction provides for "investigative organizations to title and index individuals who are subjects of criminal investigations when credible information exists that **the** subject committed a criminal offense." Further, the Instruction establishes a review **process** for the appropriateness of **a** titling/indexing decision as well **as** an appeal process **for** any individual who believes they were **wrongly** titled or indexed. Therefore, further evaluation of this issue is necessary before seeking statutory, as **opposed** to regulatory, remedies or stricter controls.

**TAB**

**C**

COORDINATIONS

*ADM*

6  
FOUO

AUG -1-7-2005

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
CC: Terry Robbins  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Library of Congress Papers

314.7

Thanks so much for your memo of August 12 on the Library of Congress papers. I have these thoughts:

- Page 1, line 9. "Donor warrants." I don't see any reason I have to "warrant." Wouldn't I rather say that the Donor "believes" that he owns the material and believes that it is clear of any known liens? That is accurate. I have not gone through every piece of paper in there, and I am not a lawyer, so I cannot say that I do own it all. I think I do, and I don't know of any liens, so why don't we say it that way, unless there is some reason not to.
- Page 3, line 1. This sentence seems to have me attesting to the fact that everything has been properly classified. I don't know why I should have to attest to that. I didn't put the classification markings on papers or fail to put a classification markings on something. If it is necessary to do that, I would think we would have to have someone go through all the papers to determine classifications, but certainly I am not able to do it.
- Page 4, first full paragraph. "The following classes of materials should be restricted from public access." Who restricts them - the Library of Congress?

17 AUG 05

23 Feb 05

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Kis

AUG 17 2005

OSD 23637-05

FOUO

- Page 6, second full paragraph, next to last line. It specified that it may not be any of the surviving children. Is there any reason why it should say that?
- Page 8, paragraph 5. Let me know what amount is appropriate to donate at the outset.
- Page 8, fourth line from the bottom. It says the donor agrees that any such amount should be used by the Library for outreach. Why don't we say any such amount, plus any accrued interest?

Those are the thoughts I had. The rest of it looks pretty good. Let me know what the next step is.

I look forward to reviewing the materials in my office next week. Will the material from Mr. Haynes's letter on the Nixon and Ford periods be there for me to review?

Do let me know what Terry Robbins says about the residence issue, any other comments he has on the draft instrument, and whether or not he thinks I need an IRS ruling.

Additionally, I just came across the attached 8/15/04 memo from Terry Robbins. Please go through the Instrument of Gift to make sure the points he raised have been dealt with and let me know.

Please assure me that once the Instrument of Gift is signed and the papers digitized, and I have had a chance to look at the digitized material, that I will have the right to remove anything I want - completely - or take an original out and only leave a copy. I need to know that, since I won't know what I am gifting until the digitization is done and I have had a chance to review it.

FOUO

2

11-L-0559/OSD/55017

Also, I don't have clarity as to how *they* handle photographs, videotapes and audiotapes.

Thanks so much.

Attach.

8/12/05 Dell'Orto memo to SD

8/15/04 Robbins memo to SD

2/23/05 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LTR  
TO SD

DHR:db  
081605-3078

.....  
*Please respond by September 15, 2005*

Tab E

314.7



THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS  
101 INDEPENDENCE AVENUE, S.E.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540-4000

MANUSCRIPT DIVISION

February 23, 2003

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter from Dr. Marc Suster, the historian of the U.S. Department of State. It requests access for DOS historians preparing volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series to the Nixon and Ford administration era sections of the Donald Rumsfeld papers held here in the Manuscript Division.

Under the terms of the deposit agreement for your papers any research access to your papers requires your permission. Could you let us know your preference on this matter?

Due to the terrorist incident in which mail containing anthrax was sent to a congressional office, mail coming via the congressional post office, including mail to the Library of Congress, is x-rayed, subjected to irradiation to destroy biological agents and physically inspected. Delivery is considerably delayed. Consequently, response by fax (202 707-6336) or e-mail (jhay@loc.gov) is preferable to regular mail.

Sincerely,

John Earl Haynes  
20th Century Political Historian

Enclosure

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

OSD 23637-05

4-38

23 FEB 05



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 10, 2005

Dear Dr. Hutson:

I am writing in my capacity as The Historian of the Department of State to request access to the Donald H. Rumsfeld Papers at the Library of Congress. As you may know, the Department of State's Office of the Historian is charged by law with the preparation of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, which is the official documentary record of U.S. foreign policy. The statute requires that the series, published since 1861, "be a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity."

The Department of State's staff of official historians is now preparing 56 *Foreign Relations* volumes documenting the foreign policies of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford during the years 1969-1976. No published official documentary record of the foreign policies of the Nixon and Ford administrations can purport to be "thorough, accurate, and reliable" without access to the papers of Rumsfeld, who served as Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1973-1974, as an assistant to President Ford from 1974-1975, and as Secretary of Defense from 1975-1977. The inclusion of documents from his papers by the Department's official historians will help place those records, as well as the diplomacy of the Nixon and Ford administrations, in their proper historical context.

The Department's official historians, all of whom hold appropriate security clearances, requiring access to the Rumsfeld Papers for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series are as follows: Dr. Kristin L. Ahlberg, Dr. Monica Belmonte, Dr. Michael Todd Bennett, Myra F. Burton, Dr. John M. Carland, Dr. Bradley L. Coleman, Dr. Steven G. Galpern, David C. Geyer, David L. Goldman, Dr. Paul J. Hibbets, Dr. Adam M. Howard, Dr. Peter A. Kraemer, Douglas W. Kraft, Dr. Erin R. Mahan, Dr. William B. McAllister, Dr. David P. Nickles, Dr. Linda W. Qammanqamu, Dr. Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Dr. Douglas E. Salvage, Dr. James Sickmeier, Dr. Louis J. Smith, Dr. Christopher J. Tudda, Dr. James C. Van Hook, and Dr. Laurie W. Van Hook.

All documents drawn from the Rumsfeld Papers and incorporated into *Foreign Relations* manuscripts will continue to bear appropriate classification markings until final declassification of the volumes. Any such documents selected for use in *Foreign Relations* volumes will be submitted for declassification review in accordance with established procedures.

Dr. James H. Hutson  
Chief, Manuscript Division  
Library of Congress  
101 Independence Avenue, SE  
Washington, DC 20540-4880

Please feel free to contact the FBI if you require additional information or wish to discuss this matter further. Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Mark J. ...  
The Director



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



2005  
8/16

INFOMEMO

August 12, 2005

FOR: — SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

*Dan J Dell'Orto*

SUBJECT: Donation of Papers to Library of Congress - Update

314.7

- Attached is ~~the~~ latest version of the draft instrument of gift.
  - o ~~This version should capture the changes you directed at our video~~ teleconference meeting on August 1, 2005.
  - o Those changes are ~~highlighted~~ in yellow.
  - o While I believe I have ~~made~~ the changes you directed, I may have ~~missed~~ some of your guidance in my attempt to take accurate ~~notes~~ during our discussion.
  - o ~~Although this version provides for alternative residences, on further reflection I don't believe that we need make any reference to a residence. I will check with Terry Robbins to ensure that there is no tax consequence to not stating a residence.~~
- I have sent a copy of this version of ~~the draft~~ instrument of gift to ~~Terry~~ and to the ~~Library of Congress~~ for review.
- I have ~~asked~~ Terry to consider the possibility of an IRS ruling to confirm ~~the tax~~ deductibility issue.
- Those portions of the ~~materials~~ currently on deposit at the Library which you have expressed a desire to review should be delivered to your office next ~~week~~.
- I have ~~informed~~ the 20<sup>th</sup> Century Political Historian at the Library of Congress that you have deferred ~~any~~ decision on the State Department Historian's request to review documents from the Nixon and Ford presidential ~~eras~~ currently on deposit with the Library until after you have reviewed ~~the~~ materials.

12 AUG 05

23 Feb 05



ATTACH. 1

OSD 23637-05

DRAFT  
Aug 11, 2005 (1230)

**INSTRUMENT OF GIFT**

I, **Donald H. Rumsfeld**, residing in Illinois, Washington, D.C., or Maryland (hereinafter referred to as Donor), hereby give, grant, and set over to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library of Congress (hereinafter Library) and for administration ~~therein~~ by the authorities thereof a collection of my personal and professional papers and associated material documenting my life and career in public service and government (hereinafter referred to as Collection), more particularly described by the attached schedule.

Donor <sup>believes</sup> ~~warrants~~ that he owns the physical property in the Collection free and clear of any <sup>liens</sup> ~~liens~~. Donor does not represent that the papers and materials donated constitute the entirety of the personal and professional papers and associated material in his possession.

This is a gift of only the physical ~~property~~ contained in the materials constituting the Collection, and Donor reserves to himself all

rights, title, and interest he may have in and to all of the intellectual property associated with the Collection including, but not **Limited** to copyright. ~~Further,~~ Donor, in his complete discretion, **may retain** the original of **any of his** personal papers after digitization and furnish a **copy** of that original to the Library.

---

**By** accepting **this gift**, however, the Library does **so** to improve the national collections, and such acceptance of the physical property shall not be construed **as** a conclusive determination by the Library that Donor does, in fact, have or possess with regard to these materials such intellectual property **as** above identified ~~or~~ described.

The Collection shall be subject to the following conditions:

1. **Classified Materials**. All materials in the Collection that **are** specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign

DRAFT

*Am I attaching that document if correct?  
Why who will track for me-*

policy, and are, in fact, properly classified pursuant to such statute or executive order, shall be safeguarded and administered by the Library in ~~accordance with such statutes or executive orders.~~ Access to these materials shall be allowed only in accordance with procedures established by the **United States Government** to govern the availability of such information. All classified materials shall be reviewed from time to time by the Library (and, at the **Library's** request, by appropriate ~~security classification authorities~~), and materials which, because of the passage of **time** or other circumstances, no longer require classification restrictions shall, upon declassification, be **opened** to public access, unless the restriction period in **Section #2** below remains in effect. **This gift** does not transfer title to classified information, in whatever form in the collection; **and**, in accepting the **gift**, the Library agrees to receive classified information **only** as a deposit for administration under the terms of **this** document.

**2. Access.** With the exception that the entire Collection shall at **all**

times be available to the staff of the Library for administration purposes, access to the Collection is reserved to Donor and to others only with ~~Donor's written permission, or, in the event of the death of Donor, with~~ the permission of Donor's literary executor for a period of twenty-five ~~(25) years from the date of death of Donor or the death of Joyce P.~~ Rumsfeld, whichever is later; thereafter the Collection shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature.

Donor recognizes that the Collection may contain some or all of the following classes of material that should be restricted from public access:

*§ 1-603?*

(a) Papers and other historical materials ~~the~~ disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a living ~~person~~ or persons.

(b) Papers and other historical materials that ~~are~~ specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be restricted from public disclosure in the interest of national defense or

DRAFT

foreign policy.

(c) Materials relating to the personal, family, and ~~confidential business affairs of Donor or other persons referenced in the~~ Collection.

~~(d) Materials containing statements made by or to Donor in~~ confidence.

(e) Materials containing statements or information the ~~divulgence of which might prejudice the conduct of foreign relations~~ of the United States or which could affect adversely the security, reputation, or image of the ~~United~~ States.

(f) Materials relating to law enforcement investigations of individuals ~~or~~ organizations, to proposed appointments to ~~office~~, or to ~~other~~ personnel matters directly affecting individual privacy.

Except for papers that contain national security information as described in 2(b), ~~all~~ the papers in the Collection shall be made available to researchers twenty-five (25) years from the ~~date~~ of death of Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld, whichever is later.

Those requesting access to the Collection shall provide Donor with their subject of interest and purpose of their research. Those **granted access also must agree in writing to obtain written permission of Donor** or his designee prior to quoting for publication any unpublished material **in the Collection.**

Donor will appoint **his** literary executor. Upon Donor's death, Joyce **P.** Rumsfeld may appoint a new literary executor, including **herself.** ~~Upon the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld, their surviving children~~ may jointly appoint a new literary executor, who may not be any of the ] why surviving children.

The ~~Library will~~ notify Donor or, upon his death, his literary executor, promptly of any requests, claims, or legal actions relating to the papers or materials of the Collection.

[ Reference to documents from the Ford presidency era has been deleted in this draft, because the extension of the time period before public access would be granted to 25 years eliminated the need for it. ]

3. Reproduction. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned reservation of rights and interest in and to the intellectual **property** as above identified, persons granted access to the Collection may obtain

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**DRAFT**

single-copy reproductions of the materials contained therein for research purposes, and, consistent with Library practices and procedures, such additional copies **as may be allowed by copyright law** (e.g., by the fair use doctrine or expiration of the copyright term). The Library may **make** preservation copies **of the materials in the Collection** in any format as determined by the Library and such copies shall become the property of the Library.

---

4. **Use.** Use of the materials constituting the Collection shall be governed by the Library's policies for the administration and service of materials of **this** nature. The Library is also permitted to exhibit any **or** **all** of the material in the Collection on- and off-site and may display any **or** **all** of the materials in the Collection on its website or in any **other** electronic form or successor technology, provided, however, that the Library first obtains the permission of Donor or Donor's literary executor except for classified materials for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the date of death of Donor or the death of Joyce P.

Rumsfeld, whichever is later. Donor reserves the right to make selected unclassified materials available to the public at **any** time upon written ~~notification to the Library.~~ — — — — —

5. Digitization of Material Currently on Deposit. Donor **agrees** to establish the Donald **H.** Rumsfeld ~~Gift~~ Fund by giving the Library the money required to **digitize** the Collection. The monies in **this** Fund **are for immediate expenditure.** Donor ~~shall establish the Fund by initially~~ donating \$\_\_\_\_\_ to the Library within ninety **(90)** days of the signing of **this** Instrument. Thereafter, Donor shall deliver such amounts to the Library to be deposited in the Fund no later than **thirty (30) days after** receiving notice ~~from~~ the Library of the cost of digitizing each portion of the Collection. Should there be any amount **remaining** in the Fund after the Collection has been digitized, Donor **agrees** that such amount <sup>and any accrued interest</sup> may be used **by** the Library for educational outreach regarding the Collection. Because ~~of~~ the requirements and conditions described in **this** Instrument and inherent in the purpose of the **gift**, the Librarian of Congress, in

Library under a separately negotiated Instrument of **Gift**.

~~7. Original Items. Donor may borrow original items from the Library for such periods of time as will be mutually agreed to by Donor and the Library at the time of the loan of the original items.~~

8. Disposal. Should any part of the Collection be found by the Library to include materials which the Library **deems** inappropriate for retention with the Collection or for transfer to other collections in the Library, the Library shall offer to return the materials to Donor and allow the Donor six (6) months from the date of such offer to reply. If Donor does not wish to receive said materials or designate another repository to receive them, or **has** not responded to the Library's offer by the end of the aforesaid six (6) months, the Library **may** dispose of such materials in accordance with its procedures for disposition of **materials** not needed for the Library's collections. Should the Library determine, subsequent to acceptance and transfer of the Collection that any part of

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the Collection includes classified information which the **Library** deems inappropriate for permanent retention with the Collection, it shall **notify** ~~the Department of~~ Defense. The Department of Defense shall then notify the Library in writing of **the** appropriate disposition of these classified **materials.**

**9. Communications.** Donor will provide the Library with a **current address and other contact information in order that the Library** can meet its responsibilities **as** herein **described**. The Library will send notices **and** requests to addresses of **record as** provided and updated by Donor.

In witness whereof, I have set my hand **and** seal **this**

\_\_\_\_\_ **day of**

\_\_\_\_\_, 2005 in the City

Of \_\_\_\_\_

Donald H. Rumsfeld

Accepted for the United States of America

---

The Librarian of Congress (seal)

## ROBBINS &amp; ASSOCIATES LLC

TO: DONALD RUMSFELD  
FM: TERRY ROBBINS *Terry*  
DT: AUGUST 15, 2004  
RE: PERSONAL PAPERS COLLECTION

---

I have been working with Dan Dell'Orto and (b)(6) on your personal papers. I have reviewed the draft Instrument of Gift and McNeil Technologies letter on digitization of the Collection. I have a couple of thoughts.

Instrument of Gift

I would highly recommend you retain the intellectual property and copyright. This is important for a number of reasons, including any future book deals and the potential commercialization of the Rumsfeld name.

Section 2 - Once you decide on access and who will determine access after your demise, it is advisable to coordinate this provision with your Revocable Trust to avoid any inconsistencies.

Section 5 - We advise against having the Foundation pay for the cost of digitization. This would almost certainly be considered an act of self-dealing between the Foundation and you. *You should pay the cost of digitization personally.* Our initial review indicates that you might be able to get a charitable deduction for the cost of the digitization, but we have not reached a definitive conclusion.

Due to the importance of this matter, and the dollars involved, I would suggest you consider having outside legal counsel review the Instrument of Gift and McNeil letter before they are finalized.

Special Correspondence

Over your career, you have received special correspondence from world leaders and other distinguished people. The original of these documents may have significant intrinsic value now, and even greater value in the future, because of the parties involved. (b)(6) records indicate that the special correspondence is contained in several boxes. I would suggest you give strong consideration to retaining these original documents and not making them part of the Collection given to the Library of Congress.

Regards.

\\rumsfeld\cbl\lrb\p0810420-15-04\Myers\cc\collections.doc

ATTACH . 2

11-L-0559/OSD/55034



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

2005-12-08 10:58  
295 11:44

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Reducing Days Not Available

- This responds to the Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated October 5, 2005, subject as above (Tab A).
- By FY07, the Army will reduce the time period from mobilization to deployment for a mobilized reserve component unit by 6-20 days, depending on the size of the unit. This time is measured from their mobilization date to their Ready to Load date.
- Our longer term goal is to further reduce this time to the FY08 goals listed below. These goals are for units that are deploying with the requirement to accomplish their full war-time missions. Units that deploy with reduced mission requirements (i.e. security protection or training support) could deploy even faster.

	<u>Current</u>	<u>FY 07 Target</u>	<u>FY 08 Goal</u>
Brigade	120 days	100 days	60-90 days
Battalion	75 days	60 days	40 days
Company	36 days	30 days	20 days

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC John Kem, (b)(6)


OSD 23744-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55035

## MOBILIZATION to DEPLOYMENT PLANNING TIMES

(Planning Times Represent **Mob** Date through the Ready to Load Date)

	<b>Current Planning Time</b>	<b>Target Planning Time</b>	<b>Target Timelines</b>	<b>Goal Planning Time</b>	<b>Goal Timelines</b>
<b>Brigade</b>		100 days	FY07		
<b>Battalion</b>		60 days	FY07		
<b>Company</b>		30 days	FY07		



# Tab A

~~FOUO~~

2005 10 05 - 11:44 **October 05, 2005**

**TO:** Fran Harvey  
**CC:** Gen Pete Pace  
David Chu  
GEN Pete Schoomaker  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld  
**SUBJECT:** Timeline for Reducing Days Not Available

I have received your memo on reducing days, and I don't see any targets for the future. What are your targets; goals; and what is the timeline?

Thanks.

Attach: 9/2/05 SecDef memo to SecArmy; 9/28/04 SecArmy memo to SecDef

DHR\_ss  
100505-14

.....  
*Please Respond By November 02, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

**OSD 23744-05**

11-L-0559/OSD/55038



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

**FILE**

2005-09-28 11:42

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Reducing Days Not Available

- This responds to Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated September 2, 2005, subject as above (Tab A).
- 'Where we were.' Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom II the Army mobilized reservists via an immature training base, manual personnel processing tools, and limited **experience with** the rapid deployment of numerous reserve units. Between Oct 2003 and Jan 2004, company-size and larger reserve units that were mobilized to support Central Command spent an average **94** days preparing for deployment. This time **is** measured from their mobilization date to their latest arrival date (LAD) in theater. The average time spent directly supporting the combatant commander represented 79 percent of an individual's tour on active duty measured between mobilization and **CONUS** return (Tab B).
- 'Where we are now.' The Army has focused on reducing time spent preparing reserve units for deployment. We expanded the training base to improve throughput, automated our personnel processing tools, and became more efficient with cross leveling personnel and equipment. Since January 2004, the average time reserve units prepared for deployment in support of Central Command decreased to **68** days (as compared to **94** days in September 2003). **As** a result, the average time spent directly supporting the combatant commander is 84 percent (as compared to 79 percent in September 2003) of an individual's tour on active duty measured between mobilization and **CONUS** return. The Army has effectively implemented the necessary training infrastructures and management improvements to reduce the time reservists are not available to the combatant commander (Tab C).
- 'How we might improve.' Army staffs at all levels are examining ways to reduce the mobilization pre-deployment planning process. We generally reduced unit pre-deployment times by implementing phased mobilization, improving the cross leveling process of personnel and equipment during the Alert Phase, and making better use of automation tools to assist with inprocessing (Tab D).
- The recently implemented Mobilization for Training policy **has** not yet made a

11-L-0559/OSD/55039

▪ SUBJECT: Reducing Days Not Available

significant impact to allow us to further reduce the 68 days on average that units are preparing to deploy. The Mobilization for Training policy allows us to mobilize Soldiers prior to the unit alert in order to complete Military Occupational Specific Training and Non-Commissioned Officer Educational System courses. Eventually, this will contribute to decreasing the time some reservists spend preparing for unit deployments. More importantly, it will ensure that Soldiers are properly trained and educated on their individual skills. This will make them more effective after mobilization when collective training time is so critical.

- There are also initiatives for Home Station mobilization which we are examining to further reduce preparation times. We will continue to improve our automation capability to track and manage each mobilized soldier to ensure compliance with established policies.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC John Kem, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

~~SEP-02, 2005~~

TO: Fran Harvey

CC: .. Gen Dick Myers  
David Chu  
GEN Pete Schoomaker

FROM: . Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reducing Days Not Available

You folks ought to take another **hard** look at how we can cut the number of **days** an activated reservist is "not" available to a combatant commander. There have to be ways to continue to reduce down the period when they are doing something other than that which they are being called **up** to do.

*326*

I would like some data showing me where you **think** you were, where you think you are now, and what you **think** you **might** do to improve it.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
090105-06

.....  
*Please Respond By 09/29/05*

CF: USA  
CSA  
VCSA  
DAS  
ECC  
SMA

*25005*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19468-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55041

FOUO

December 01, 2005

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Robert Rangel

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

**SUBJECT** Gilead and AIDs Drug

As you know, I have recused myself ~~from~~ activities involving products of Gilead Sciences. This note is just to alert you that I believe Gilead may also have a drug for the treatment of AIDs.

I have no idea what the Department of Defense does with respect to AIDs, but someone ought to be attentive to that and let me know if there is an issue.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120105-10

.....

OSD 23788-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55042

*Soco for action  
Coordinate w/  
R-HP*




GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

2005-12-06 14:14

December 6, 2005 (2:30pm)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: Gilead and **AIDS** Drugs

- You asked about your recusal requirements for Gilead medicines used to treat AIDS. Gilead currently is marketing four medicines, Truvada, Viread, Emtriva, and Vistide, that may be used in the treatment of AIDS or AIDS-related conditions.
- The small amount of Gilead products purchased by DoD last year was purchased through vendor contracts, by the mail order pharmacy contractor, or through payments to retail pharmacies. The products were not purchased directly from Gilead.
- You are recused from participating in particular matters involving the use of these medicines. DoD purchases little of these medicines and they are used exclusively for the treatment of DoD personnel and their family members. As a result, it is unlikely that you will have an opportunity to participate in a particular matter affecting the use of these specific medicines.

COORDINATION None

Initial draft by S. Epstein (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/55043

OSD 23788-05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999

INFQMEMO

CM-0024-05

2 December 2005

Page 57

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *PAK/pace*

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Effort (SF 100505-20)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), my staff's general/flag officers have the attached talking points (TAB B) to use **as** the foundation for all relevant speaking events. The Joint Staff Public Affairs Office produced these talking points from recent remarks by President Bush and congressional testimony by General Abizaid.
- **Analysis.** The Joint Staff Strategic Communications Steering Group is creating standardized briefings and talking points that will be continually updated and made available to all Joint **Staff members** involved in this concerted outreach effort. The group **will** monitor success of our communications efforts. The steering group's engagement plan is attached (TAB C).

COORDINATION: **NONE**

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Colonel E. K. Haddock, USMC; Special Assistant to the Chairman for Public Affairs; (b)(6)

OSD 23793-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

October 05, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
ADM Ed Giambastiani  
Fran Harvey  
Pete Geren  
Gordon England  
GEN John Abizaid  
GEN Doug Brown  
Gen James Cartwright  
GEN John Craddock  
ADM Bill Fallon  
GEN Mike Hagee  
Gen Mike Moseley  
ADM Tim Keating  
ADM Mike Mullen  
GEN Pete Schoemaker  
Gen Norty Schwartz  
LTG Robert Wagner  
Gen Jim Jones

FROM Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT Public Affairs Effort



Over the past few days, we have had good meetings with interesting presentations and some good discussion. I am hopeful that many of you will use the material in the Global War on Terror briefs, such as John Abizaid's "The Long War," in your upcoming speeches and testimony.

Please send along examples of what you are doing in this regard. I know Larry Di Rita and his team would be willing to help your staffs in preparing such materials.

Thanks again for a good set of meetings and for all you do. We have a good deal of important work to do, but we have a good team to deal with the many challenges we face.

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/55045

OSD 21992-05

~~FOUO~~

DHR:as  
10503-20

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/02/05*

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/55046

## Fighting and Winning The Long War Winning the War Against a Worldwide Terrorist Network

### Who Are They?

- Let's be perfectly clear: our enemies in this War on Terrorism seek to abolish our way of life and to replace it with the rule of an extremist Islamic empire.
- We are at war with an enemy who flies no flag, defends no borders, has no standing armies, and occupies no territory but who rather derives its strength and support by:
  - Developing safe havens in the geographic, Virtual, and mass media worlds, primarily the internet
  - Setting up front companies
  - Buying off politicians and financiers who launder illicit money
  - Co-opting or enlisting sympathetic civic and charitable organizations that propagate their ideology of hate

### What Is Their Goal?

- It is important that we fully understand our enemy's intent.
  - Look no further than their own written and spoken word
  - As Hitler did in *Mein Kampf*, al **Qaida** has very publicly outlined its goals
  - These goals are ambitious, but simple and clear:

Sources: President Bush remarks, congressional testimony by General John Abizaid

Tab B

- ❖ Purge the Middle East of all foreign influences
- ❖ Overthrow Islamic governments they view as illegitimate – which is basically all of them
- ❖ Establish an extremist Islamic empire in their place
- Similarly, their campaign against the United States and its allies is equally ambitious, simple, and clear:
  - ❖ Bankrupt and exhaust us (like the Soviet Union in **Afghanistan** – their one success to date)
  - ❖ Work to establish and expand safe havens from which to operate
  - ❖ Use their growing Islamic empire to gain WMD capabilities and control oil resources

### **How Do They Operate?**

- The followers of Islamic radicalism are bound together by this extreme ideology, not by any centralized command structure. This makes it easy for a loose **network** to achieve “unity of effort” and difficult for any single military campaign to eradicate the threat, since ideas can’t be eliminated by guns alone.
- They are masters of intimidation, but not of the battlefield. They can intimidate and kill **innocents**, but cannot win an engagement against military forces properly employed.
- They exploit local conflicts to build a culture of victimization; mobilize resentful, disillusioned, and underemployed young

Tab B

men and women; and use modern technology to amplify the effects of **their** destructive acts.

- 9 They purposely target innocent individuals for a clear political purpose.
  - o They don't target our **military** outright because they get thrashed whenever they try to.
  - o Instead, they use improvised explosive devices to kill innocent citizens – victims with no tactical military value but immense strategic import to the terrorist. It sends the message, “if only the Americans would leave Iraq, we would stop killing you.”
  - o The enemy's goal is to break our will with a constant drumbeat of death and destruction, amplified by an around-the-clock news cycle and clever use of the internet.
- 9 They know that propaganda and making the news are more important than military operations, and they expertly use the virtual world for planning, recruiting, fundraising, indoctrination, and exploitation of the mass media.
- These militants have shown themselves to be enemies of not only America and Iraq, but of Islam and humanity.
- 9 Thankfully, the vast majority of the people of Islam – a religion whose very name means “peace” - don't buy this extreme ideology. However, its attraction to the minority energized to act on its demands should not be underestimated.

## The Terrorists' Vision For The World Starts With Iraq

- 9 First, these extremists are determined to end American and western influence in the Middle East. The enemy believes in a jihad to overthrow legitimate regimes in the region. To do that, they first must drive all foreign influences from the region.
  - o Al Qaida's leader, Osama Bin Laden, has called on Muslims to dedicate their "resources, sons and money to driving the infidels out of their lands."
  - o One of the main foreign influences is the spread of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  - o Zarqawi, the face of al Qaida in Iraq, has explicitly warned that the establishment of a democratic Iraq is the death of al ~~Qaida~~ there.
  - o **This** explains the dramatic increase in violence before each democratic milestone.
- 9 Second, the militant network plans to use the vacuum created when they drive us from the region to expand its power.
  - o As they once did in Afghanistan and are trying to do **now** in Iraq, they will seek to gain control of an entire country • a base **from** which to train more terrorists and conduct their war against non-radical Muslim governments.
  - o Their greatest prize would be Saudi Arabia and its holy shrines. This would allow al Qaida to control vast oil wealth, threaten Western economic security, and claim religious legitimacy for its cause.

- Third, from their new base, these militants will seek to establish a radical Islamic empire that spreads from Spain to Indonesia.

## **The Strategy To Win**

- Defeating a broad, decentralized, and adaptive terrorist network requires willpower and patience; constant military, diplomatic, and economic pressure; and strong, capable partners.
- Recognizing this, the President has laid out five national strategic objectives:
  - Prevent terrorist attacks before they occur
  - Deny weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes and their terrorist allies
  - Deny radical groups the support and sanctuary of outlaw regimes
  - Deny the militants control of any nation
  - Deny the militants future recruits by advancing democracy and hope across the broader Middle East
- In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Coalition provides the security shield behind which legitimate and representative governments, economic development, and reconstructed security forces are taking root.
- We must help those in the region help themselves by promoting self-reliant partners willing and able to defeat the enemy within their own borders – which is why the job of training and

Tab B

equipping the Iraqi and Afghan security forces is central to our campaign strategy.

- As the President has said, in time we will reduce our military footprint in the region, but we must:
  - Provide for a stable Afghanistan and Iraq
  - Continue to deter **Syria** and **Iran**
  - Protect the flow of oil vital to the people of the region and the economies of the world
  
- While securing peace and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan will lay the foundation for winning the War on Terrorism, we must prepare ourselves for the long war of ending the threat of terror around the globe.
  - Afford the enemy no sanctuaries
  - Develop partners with capabilities
  - Foster democracy and economic development
  - Develop our own broad set of capabilities – not just military
  - Keep **a** long perspective – **this** is a test of wills and the enemy **has** staying power

TAB C

22 November 2005

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Public Affairs Effort (SF 100505-20)

1. Purpose. To detail the Joint Staff Strategic Communications Steering Group engagement plan.
2. Key Points. The group's strategy will:
  - Incorporate the "long war" as one of several themes, including progress in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  - Be presented to several key US audiences, such as:
    - Think tanks
    - Academia
    - Congressional members and senior staffers
    - American public venues that do not have the benefit of nearby uniformed leaders
    - Media
  - Include speaking opportunities for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Joint Staff general/flag officers through calendar year 2006.
  - Map out a military-to-military outreach plan in support of public and military diplomacy.

Tab C

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55053

~~FOUO~~

DEC 09 2005

**TO** Vice President Richard B. Cheney

**FROM** Donald Rumsfeld 

**SUBJECT** A. Lawrence Chickering

080

Mr. Vice President,

Attached is a letter that was sent to Joyce by a person that was involved with the Institute of Contemporary Studies in California, and is now a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. I never knew him well, but he is a very appealing person, and his letter is straightforward. His hope is to brief your staff on his idea.

I'll leave it in your hands.

Regards,

Attach 12/6/05 A. Lawrence Chickering letter to SecDef


DHR:ss  
120805-05

900205

~~FOUO~~

OSD 23801-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55054

**A. LAWRENCE CHICKERING**(b)(6)  


December 6, 2005

Joyce Rumsfeld  
c/o Department of Defense  
Attention: (b)(6)  
FAX: (b)(6)

Dear Joyce:

I need your advice. I have been a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution for the past two years and am co-author of a book that Hoover Press will publish next month on how civil society organizations (CSOs) can be used to support US foreign policy objectives. Our proposals are all based on what has been shown to work: on real experiences of initiatives that have promoted significant and lasting economic, political and social change in all regions of the world.

Last week one of my co-authors and I had an opportunity to present our conclusions to a small group of senior officials at the State Department. We need an entree to present these ideas to the Vice President's Office, which I understand vets new ideas in the arena of foreign policy and national security. The need is acute because the successes of CSOs suggest important new strategies for addressing major challenges in Iraq and other troublesome places.

These include strategies for recruiting Sunnis into the political process, recruiting Sunnis into the new Iraqi military, (borrowing from the experience in Northern Ireland) promoting non-violence among groups that have not yet renounced violence, and engaging Iraqis in a process of national reconciliation, as was done in South Africa so successfully by Bishop Tutu. I also believe we could provide immediate help through a multi-country, citizen-based initiative throughout the Arab world to raise Arab consciousness about the Arab stake in what happens in Iraq—and the need for Arabs to become involved there in a more constructive way than they have to date.

Finally, we believe our ideas could enormously strengthen the work contemplated in a new \$1 billion USAID contract for pacification in ten strategically important cities in Iraq.

You know about some of the real experiences on which we have drawn for our book. One is the International Center for Economic Growth (ICEG), a program of the Institute for Contemporary Studies (ICS) when Don was Chairman. ICEG played an important role in promoting major economic policy changes in more than 50 countries in a ten-year period. Another is Hernando de Soto and his Instituto Libertad y Democracia (ILD) in

Lima, Peru. He is advising forty heads of state on how to get property rights to the great majority of people in their countries.

Our book's title is *After 9/11: The Roles of Civil Society in International Security*. (The co-authors are Isobel Coleman, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Edward Haley, Professor of International Relations at Claremont-McKenna College; and Emily Vargas-Baron, former senior official at USAID.) Our general argument is that significant new civil society instruments are available to support US policy strategically, yet in reality none of them are beginning to play the roles they could play. In the cases of ICEG and the ILD, the problem was bureaucratic. Everybody knows Hernando should be heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan; yet he is not because the government institution charged with getting him there (USAID) has not been able to accomplish that.

Please forgive the length of this letter. I feel what we have done, building on work I have done over the past twenty years, has very great significance for promoting a positive outcome in Iraq and other places. We have strong connections at State and the NSC to communicate our message. I hope you can offer advice about how we might develop similar access in Defense.

My hope is that we can speak on the phone about this. You can reach me at (b)(6)

(b)(6)

All best,

  
A. Lawrence Chickering

~~FOUO~~

A

2005 Dec 13 3:59

DEC 01 2005

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Dan Stanley  
Larry DiRita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Legislative Language for Equipment

I saw Chairman Warner today. He said he had talked to you about getting some legislative language in the authorization bill that would enable us to deal with equipment for the Iraqis and the *Afghans*.

He said he thought it would be wise to get it in both the authorization and appropriations bills, since the appropriations is the only thing that is sure to pass. I agree with him. What is the issue?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
113005-06

.....  
*Please Respond By December 15, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 23823-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55057



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

December 9, 2005, 7:30 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response, Legislative Language for Equipment, #113005-06 & 112305-19

- Senator Warner asked about the need for legislative language in the authorization or appropriations bills that would better enable DoD to transfer equipment to the Iraqis and Afghans. He also expressed concern in a phone call with equipping Iraqi Security Forces.
- DoD has existing authorities to transfer equipment, but there are limitations:
  - The authority to transfer "excess" defense articles might be difficult to use for equipment such as Up-Armored HMMWVs, that are not "excess."
- It would be useful to augment existing authorities in the 2006 Authorization Bill:
  - Provide DoD authority to transfer Significant Military Equipment (SME), such as Up-Armored HMMWVs, to Coalition partners (including ultimately Iraq and Afghanistan) by means of an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), on a reimbursable basis. (Draft at TAB B)
  - Include "section 1201" authority (eliminated during FY2006 Authorization Bill markup) to create a contingency drawdown authority to provide equipment and supplies, among other things, to support building the capacity of our Coalition partners' forces. (Draft at TAB C)
  - Enact authorization language to authorize the DoD to leave non-excess equipment behind for the Iraqis and Afghans to assist their forces in maintaining peace and security in their countries. (Draft at TAB D)
- In addition, we could request language from Congress in an appropriate report that supports DoD's use of existing and new authorizations to transfer equipment to the Iraqis and other Coalition partners supporting our mission. It should be emphasized that such language is not a substitute for the authorities requested above.
- DepSecDef advised Senator Warner of these authorities and our efforts to equip ISF via letter dated 8 Dec 2005.

Coordination: OGC, VCJCS, Joint Staff GC, DSCA General Counsel

Attachments:

Snowflakes #113005-06 & 112305-19 (TAB A)  
DoD Authority to Transfer SME (TAB B)  
Section 1201 Authority (TAB C)  
Non-excess Equipment Language (TAB D)  
DepSecDef 8 December 2005 Letter (TAB E)

Prepared by Christian P. Marrone, Special Assistant to ASD (LA), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/55058

OSD 23823-05

**FOUO**

**November 23, 2005**

**TO: Dan Stanley**  
**CC: Gen Pete Pace**  
**Eric Edelman**  
**FROM: Donald Rumsfeld** *DR*  
**SUBJECT: Phone Call with John Warner**

When I spoke with John ~~Warner~~ today he said he needed to know what we are doing to equip the Iraqi Security Forces - that they seem to be driving around in pick-up trucks instead of armored vehicles, and that the chain is no stronger than the weakest link.

We need to get him a report on what we are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:js  
112305-19

.....  
*Please Respond By December 01, 2005*

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/55059

*OSD 234 12-05* *KTS*

## DRAFT

## SEC. \_\_\_ . CHANGE TO ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS

DEFINITION TO ALLOW LOAN OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY  
EQUIPMENT.

Section 2350(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after "Act" the following: ", except that such items of significant military equipment may be provided for temporary use to the armed forces of nations participating in combined operations with United States Forces, if the Secretary of Defense determines in writing that it is in the security interests of the United States to provide such support."

**Supporting Rationale**

This amendment fulfills a need deemed critical by the Commander, U.S. Central Command to provide interoperability and adequate support to coalition partners. In the subchapter authorizing Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements, section 2350 of title 10, United States Code, defines the logistic support, supplies, and services that may be acquired or provided under logistic support agreements with the governments of NATO countries and other eligible countries and organizations. As written, section 2350 prohibits the transfer of significant military equipment (SME) by an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The proposed change would authorize the Department of Defense to transfer under the authority of an ACSA, on a lease or loan basis, items identified as SME to nations participating with U.S. Forces in military operations if the Secretary of Defense determines in writing that it is in the security interests of the United States to provide such support.

Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) have demonstrated the requirement for such authority and are predictive of future value. Among other reasons, the unorthodox manner in which terrorists and insurgents indiscriminately target forces in areas previously called "rear areas" warrant the flexibility that this authority would provide. The value of such authority has been demonstrated as commanders desire to provide available hardened vehicles, primarily armored HMMWVs or HMMWVs with add-on-armor kits, to coalition partners. U.S. Forces count on our Coalition partners to be able to patrol and engage opposition forces as needed. Due to improvised explosive devices and the weapons and/or weapon systems available to opposition forces, providing use of all reasonably available security measures not only for U.S. but also coalition forces of other countries is critical. However, since assets such as counter-IED equipment, defusing equipment, and certain vehicles, (e.g., hardened or those with turrets) are currently designated as SME on the U.S. Munitions List, section 121.1, current ACSA authorities do not permit the Combatant Commander to provide them even temporarily to coalition forces.

The nations that have provided forces in support OIF and OEF often do not have the same capability to protect their personnel as U.S. Forces possess. There have been a number of occasions where Coalition members have requested temporary U.S. logistical support in the form of items designated as SME in order to be able to accomplish OEF and OIF missions in concert with U.S. Forces and in a safe manner. The proposed change would authorize the temporary transfer of these vehicles and other military equipment that would contribute to the survivability of the armed forces of coalition nations supporting U.S. efforts. Use of this temporary transfer authority would require the Secretary of Defense to determine in writing that it is in the security interests of the United States to provide such support, and allow only temporary use of the items for receipt of reciprocal value under existing ACSAs with coalition partner countries.

**Proposal Title: CHANGE TO ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS DEFINITION TO ALLOW LOAN OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EQUIPMENT**

C

**SEC. 1201. BUILDING THE PARTNERSHIP SECURITY CAPACITY OF FOREIGN  
MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES.**

(a) **AUTHORITY.**—The President may authorize building the capacity of partner nations' military or security forces to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, or participate in or support United States, coalition, or international military or stability operations.

(b) **TYPES OF PARTNERSHIP SECURITY CAPACITY BUILDING.**—The partnership security capacity building authorized under subsection (a) may include the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding.

(c) **LIMITATIONS.**—The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, may implement partnership security capacity building as authorized under section (a). The amount of such partnership security capacity building provided by the Department of Defense under this section may not exceed \$750,000,000 in any fiscal year.

(d) **CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.**—Before building partnership security capacity under this section, the Secretaries of State and Defense shall submit to their congressional oversight committees a notification of the nations with which partnership security capacity will be built under this section and the nature and amounts of security capacity building to occur. Any such notification shall be submitted not less than 7 days before the provision of such partnership security capacity building.

(e) **MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES DEFINED.**—For purposes of this section, the term "military and security forces" includes armies, guard, border security, civil defense, infrastructure protection, and police forces.

(f) **COMPLEMENTARY AUTHORITY.**—The authority to build partnership security capacity under this section is in addition to any other authority of the Department of Defense to provide assistance to a foreign country.

D

**TAB D**

**SEC. \_\_\_\_ . ASSISTANCE TO IRAQI AND AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES.**

(a) **ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.**—If the President determines that such assistance is necessary to train, equip and sustain Iraqi and Afghan security forces to permit such forces to restore and maintain peace and security in that country, he may authorize the transfer of equipment and supplies from the inventory of the Department of Defense to such forces for such purposes, including the provision of any necessary services in connection with the transfer of equipment and supplies.

(b) **LIMITATION ON TRANSFERS.**—An aggregate value of not to exceed \$XXX,000,000 of equipment, supplies, and services may be provided under subsection (a) in any fiscal year.

(c) **ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.**—The authority provided by this section is in addition to any other authority available to the President to provide assistance to Iraqi security forces.

(d) **EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.**—The authority provided by this section shall expire on September 30, 2007.



**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON**  
**WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010**

*E*

December 8, 2005

The Honorable John W. Warner  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510-6050

*Mr. Chairman*  
Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department wholeheartedly agrees with your views on the importance of equipping the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) with the right tools to fight the insurgency. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), in coordination with the Iraqi government, developed the requirements to equip Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces. Conventional MOD and MOI forces receive new and adequate uniforms, body armor, weapons and ammunition that enable their survivability and enhance their capability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Iraqi Special Operations Forces are fielded with modern, high-tech equipment comparable to that of US forces.

MNSTC-I and the Iraqi government are taking further steps to improve the survivability of the ISF through the acquisition of up-armored wheeled vehicles. For example, MNSTC-I purchased 1500 Level I up-armored HMMWVs for the Iraqi Army to be delivered over the next year (See Attachment A). Likewise, the Iraqi MOD purchased 600 Polish-made armored wheeled vehicles and 500 additional Level II up-armored HMMWVs with MNSTC-I funding the up-armored kits. Iraqi MOI forces have received US-made armored security vehicles. Our NATO allies are also improving ISF armor capability. Hungary recently donated 77 refurbished T-72 tanks and 36 armored tracked vehicles for the Iraq mechanized forces.

The Department appreciates your recommendation to make older American equipment available to the Iraqi government or to leave equipment behind upon redeployment. The Department has existing authorities to transfer equipment, but there are limitations; e.g., the authority to transfer "excess" defense equipment may not be possible for equipment such as Up-Armored HMMWVs that are not "excess". It would therefore be most helpful to expand existing authorities in the 2006 Authorization Bill in the following ways:


1. Provide DoD authority to transfer Significant Military Equipment (SME) such as Up-Armored HMMWVs to coalition partners including Iraq and Afghanistan by means of an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) on a reimbursable basis (Draft at Attachment B).



2. Include "Section 1201" authority (removed during FY2006 Authorization Bill markup) to create a contingency drawdown authority to fund equipment and supplies to support building the capacity of our Coalition partners' forces (Draft at Attachment C).

3. Enact authorization language to authorize the DoD to leave non-excess equipment behind for the Iraqis and Afghans to assist their forces in maintaining peace and security in their countries (Draft at Attachment D).

The Department is available to brief your committee on these approaches to equip the ISF. As always, your support of our military and their critical efforts to preserve freedom and liberty for our Nation and our allies is deeply appreciated.



Andrew England  
ACTING

UNCLASSIFIED

11 L 0550/OSD/55065

# Levels of Protection



- **Level I – HQDA-approved Integrated Armor**
  - Fully integrated armor, ballistic windows and air conditioning installed during production/retrofit.
  - Provides protection from small arms, mines and IEDs.
- **Level II – HQDA-approved Add-On Armor Kits**
  - Includes armor panels, ballistic glass and air conditioners
  - Provides protection from small arms, mines, and IEDs.
- **Level III – Locally fabricated armor**
  - Tnterim solution
  - Utilizing HQDA-approved steel, protection comparable to Level II without ballistic glass
  - Cut and installed at theater or unit level

\* Degree of protection is sensitive issue

## DRAFT

## SEC. \_\_\_\_ . CHANGE TO ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS

DEFINITION TO ALLOW LOAN OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY  
EQUIPMENT.

1           Section 2350(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after "Act" the  
2 following: ", except that such items of significant military equipment may be provided for  
3 temporary use to the armed forces of nations participating in combined operations with United  
4 States Forces, if the Secretary of Defense determines in writing that it is in the security interests  
5 of the United States to provide such support."

**Supporting Rationale**

This amendment ~~fulfills~~ a need deemed critical by the Commander, U.S. Central Command to provide interoperability and adequate support to coalition partners. In the subchapter authorizing Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements, section 2350 of title 10, United States Code, defines the logistic support, supplies, and services that may be acquired or provided under logistic support agreements with the **governments** of NATO countries and other eligible countries and organizations. As written, section 2350 prohibits the transfer of significant military equipment (SME) by an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The proposed change would authorize the Department of Defense to transfer under the authority of an ACSA, on a lease or loan basis, items identified as SME to nations participating with U.S. Forces in military operations if the Secretary of Defense determines in writing that it is in the security interests of the United States to provide such support.

Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) have demonstrated the requirement for such authority and are predictive of future value. Among other reasons, the unorthodox manner in which terrorists and insurgents indiscriminately target forces in areas previously called "rear areas" warrant the flexibility that this authority would provide. The value of such authority has been demonstrated as commanders desire to provide available hardened vehicles, primarily armored HMMWVs or HMMWVs with add-on-armor kits, to coalition partners. U.S. Forces count on our Coalition partners to be able to patrol and engage opposition forces as needed. Due to improvised explosive devices and the weapons and/or weapon systems available to opposition forces, providing use of all reasonably available security measures not only for U.S. but also coalition forces of other countries is critical. However, since assets such as counter-IED equipment, defusing equipment, and certain vehicles, (e.g., hardened or those with turrets) are currently designated as SME on the U.S. Munitions List, section 2111, current ACSA authorities do not permit the Combatant Commander to provide them even temporarily to coalition forces.

The nations that have provided forces in support OIF and OEF often do not have the same capability to protect their personnel as U.S Forces possess. There have been a number of occasions where Coalition members have requested temporary U.S. logistical support in the form of items designated as SME in order to be able to accomplish OEF and OIF missions in concert with U.S. Forces and in a safe manner. The proposed change would authorize the temporary transfer of these vehicles and other military equipment that would contribute to the survivability of the armed forces of coalition nations supporting U.S. efforts. Use of this temporary transfer authority would require the Secretary of Defense to determine in writing that it is in the security interests of the United States to provide such support, and allow only temporary use of the items for receipt of reciprocal value under existing ACSAs with coalition partner countries.

**Proposal Title: CHANGE TO ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS DEFINITION TO ALLOW LOAN OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EQUIPMENT**

## DRAFT

**SEC. 1201. BUILDING THE PARTNERSHIP SECURITY CAPACITY OF FOREIGN  
MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES.**

1 (a) **AUTHORITY.**—The President may authorize building the capacity of partner nations'  
2 military or security forces to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, or  
3 participate in or support United States, coalition, or international military or stability operations.

4 (b) **TYPES OF PARTNERSHIP SECURITY CAPACITY BUILDING.**—The partnership security  
5 capacity building authorized under subsection (a) may include the provision of equipment,  
6 supplies, services, training, and funding.

7 (c) **LIMITATIONS.**—The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of  
8 State, may implement partnership security capacity building as authorized under section (a). The  
9 amount of such partnership security capacity building provided by the Department of Defense  
10 under this section may not exceed \$750,000,000 in any fiscal year.

11 (d) **CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.**—Before building partnership security capacity under  
12 this section, the Secretaries of State and Defense shall submit to their congressional oversight  
13 committees a notification of the nations with which partnership security capacity will be built  
14 under this section and the nature and amounts of security capacity building to occur. Any such  
15 notification shall be submitted not less than 7 days before the provision of such partnership  
16 security capacity building.

17 (e) **MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES DEFINED.**—For purposes of this section, the term  
18 "military and security forces" includes armies, guard, border security, civil defense,  
19 infrastructure protection, and police forces.

**Attachment C**

1           (f) COMPLEMENTARY AUTHORITY.—The authority to build partnership security capacity  
2 under this section is in addition to any other authority of the Department of Defense to provide  
3 assistance to a foreign country.

DRAFT

SEC. \_\_\_\_ . ASSISTANCE TO IRAQI AND AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES.

1 (a) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—If the President determines that such assistance is  
2 necessary to train, equip and sustain Iraqi and Afghan security forces to permit such forces to  
3 restore and maintain peace and security in that country, he may authorize the transfer of  
4 equipment and supplies from the inventory of the Department of Defense to such forces for such  
5 purposes, including the provision of any necessary services in connection with the transfer of  
6 equipment and supplies.

7 (b) LIMITATION ON TRANSFERS.— An aggregate value of not to exceed \$XXX,000,000 of  
8 equipment, supplies, and services may be provided under subsection (a) in any fiscal year.

9 (c) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.—The authority provided by this section is in addition to  
10 any other authority available to the President to provide assistance to Iraqi security forces.

11 (d) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.—The authority provided by this section shall expire on  
12 September 30, 2007.

IO5/016093  
ES-4842

~~FOUO~~

December 07, 2005

ILAD

TO Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Commission

Please be sure you get back to me with your two-pager on the Joint Commission issues in Iraq before you go back to anyone else.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120705-15

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/15/05*

08-12-05 05:14 PM

7 DECOS

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55072

OSD 23826-05

~~FOUO~~

DEC 12 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joe Lieberman's Idea

0011

I had breakfast with Joe Lieberman yesterday. He strongly recommends that we think about **trying** to invite the Chairmen **and Ranking** Member of the Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Intel Committees of the House and Senate to a weekly **meeting**, which you would host, and Condi, the Vice President, and I would attend.

Lieberman says the Ops-Intel briefings **are** helpful, but it is more of a short briefing with Q&A followed by dueling press conferences down at the stakeout.

It may just be that it could help.

DHR.ss  
120905-19

12 Dec 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 23859-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55073

~~FOUO~~

August 09, 2005

TO: Larry DiRita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Winkenwerder Memo on Positive Feedback

383.6

You may want to do something with the attached memo from Bill Winkenwerder.

Thanks.

Attach 7/29/05 ASD (Health Affairs) Memo to SecDef

DHR:m  
080905-07

.....  
***Please Respond By August 31, 2005***

OSD 23860-05

*DR*

AUG 09 2005

9 AUG 05

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/55074

FOUO

November 28, 2005

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Pending Lawsuits

You were in the meeting I had with Robert McCollum, Jr. when he and Brian Boyle briefed me on the four lawsuits against me.

Please find out what the current status of those lawsuits are.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
112805-45

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/14/05*

*383,6*

*25 Nov 05*

FOUO

OSD 23874-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55075



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEC 12 2005  
INFO MEMO

2005 DEC 12 PM 2:30

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense  
SUBJECT Update on Pending Lawsuits

*William J. Haynes II 12/10/05*

- You recently asked for the current status of these cases.
- I supplied a previous summary and update on August 26, 2005. (TAB A)
- Ali, et al. v. Rumsfeld. No. 1:05-cv-01378-TFH (D.D.C.) (consolidated with three related cases)
  - There has been no substantive activity since my last report.
  - The attorneys for plaintiffs have informed the Department of Justice (DOJ) that they plan to file an amended complaint around the end of the year. The parties will work out a briefing schedule to be presented to the court, which would call for a response to be filed within sixty days.
  - Based on the allegations in plaintiffs' earlier complaint, DOJ prepared a motion to dismiss, a draft of which I submitted to your office last summer. Once the judge sets a schedule in the consolidated action, this motion will be revised as necessary, finalized, and filed.
  - The court has set a scheduling conference for January 25.
- Rasul, et al. v. Rumsfeld. et al., No. 1:04-cv-1864-RMU (D.D.C.)
  - There has been no activity since my last report.
  - DOJ anticipates a decision on the pending motion to dismiss in the next month or two.

385 C  
12 Dec 05

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment: As stated.

Prepared By: Robert Easton, Associate Deputy General Counsel (LC), (b)(6)

28 Nov 04



5/29  
1550

9/29  
01/2



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
8/31

INFO MEMO

Z05 AUG 26 AM 11: 59

Robert Fengel  
FOR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

RE  
8/8

FROM

William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Update on Pending Suits

- You recently asked for an update on these cases.
- ii. et al. v. Rumsfeld, No. 1:05-cv-01378-TFH (D.D.C.)
  - In this case and three similar suits brought against senior Army officers, former detainees held in Iraq and Afghanistan allege that actions taken by you and the officers caused the detainees to be subjected to harsh conditions in violation of the Constitution and domestic and international law.
  - As previously reported, the four cases were transferred to the D.C. federal court and assigned to Judge Hogan for consolidated pre-trial proceedings. The cases have been docketed but a schedule has not yet been set.
  - The Department of Justice has prepared a motion to dismiss that addresses all claims against you. A draft was submitted to your office on July 13. Once the judge sets a schedule, the motion will be finalized and filed at the appropriate time.
  - In my July 13 memo, I proposed a delegation of authority to streamline the handling of this case. We are prepared to address any questions that you or your staff might have regarding this.
- Rasul, et al. v. Rumsfeld, et al., No. 1:04-cv-01864-RMU (D.D.C.)
  - This case involves tort claims brought against you and ten senior military officials by four former GTMO detainees who are citizens of the United Kingdom. They allege that they were tortured and otherwise mistreated in violation of the Constitution and domestic and international law.
  - A fully briefed motion to dismiss is pending before Judge Urbina.
  - The only recent activity has been the filing of a notice with the court regarding two cases decided after briefing had concluded.
  - No further activity is anticipated until the judge rules on the motion.

401

COORDINATION None.

Attachments: None

60 8725

MA SD	BK 7/3	SMA OSD	
TR SD	M 4/9	SA OSD	
EXEC SEC	MS 6	1500	
ESR MA	KSV	8-2605	1335

aston, Associate Deputy General Counsel (LC) (b)(6)

1552

OSD 17318-05

~~FOUO~~

November 28, 2005

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DR*

SUBJECT Pending Lawsuits

You were in the meeting I had with ~~Robert~~ McCollum, Jr. when he and Brian Boyle briefed me on the four lawsuits against me.

Please find out what the current status of those lawsuits are.

---

Thanks.

DHR.es  
112805-45

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/14/05*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55078

~~FOUO~~

THE  
SECRET

2005

10:47

OCT 25 2005  
I-05/014233

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Mongolia

I think we ought to try to be helpful to Mongolia becoming a NATO Partnership  
for Peace nation.

Thanks.

DMR dh  
112494491TS1.doc

.....  
*Please respond by November 24, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

**OSD 23895-05**  
25-10-05 12:32 11

11-L-0559/OSD/55079

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

2005 DEC 13 11 09 AM '05 DEC 12 2005  
USDP  
I-05/016005  
ES-4831

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (Peter Flory) / *from 12/12*  
SUBJECT: Ghulamov (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ Since you asked us to get the phone number for former Uzbek MOD Ghulamov, we have made many efforts through the Ministry of Defense and private contacts.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ So far we have been unable to reach him. At the same time, our efforts seem to have attracted the attention of the Uzbek government, which is wondering why we are **trying** to reach Ghulamov.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ We are prepared to continue our efforts, but **also** have heard that you may have **directed** that we drop this matter for the time being.
- (U) Should we:

\_\_\_\_\_ Continue to try to contact Ghulamov

Desist per Basu

MA SD		SMA DSD	
<del>TSA SD</del>		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>11/12/13</i>	<i>1445</i>	
ESR MA	<i>RSV B-15 1302</i>		

12-12-05 14:25 IN

OSD 23906-05  
12/12/2005

I 05/016005  
ES-4831

~~FOUO~~

December 05, 2005

TO Eric Edelman

CC Steve Bucci

(b)(6)

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*DR.*

SUBJECT: Ghulamov

Please ask the intelligence folks to find out ~~where~~ Ghulamov is, and have him call me collect at a place and time of his convenience. We'll accept the call, or we can arrange a time for me to call him at his convenience.

Thanks.

DHR m  
120505-19

.....

*Uzbekistan*

*5 Dec 05*

*12 DEC 05*

04-12-05 14:39 17

~~FOUO~~

OSD 23906-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55081



CHIEF OF STAFF  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-5900

2005 DEC 13 10:19:03

INFO MEMO

CK-0089-05  
12 December 2005

710

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *VRP 9 Dec 05*

SUBJECT: General McCaffrey's Press Statement (SF 101705-18(TS))

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), General McCaffrey explained in a 14 October meeting with ASD(SOLIC) that he was misquoted.
- **Analysis.** General McCaffrey supports the DOD programs but warns of the threat of Soldiers being exposed to huge amounts of opiates in Iraq and Afghanistan. His data was derived from outdated articles and **data** that do not match current information **from** the Defense Manpower Data Center and Services. Services concur that current drug testing reports **do** not support **his** original claims.
- General McCaffrey's office provided him information from **data** obtained **from** the Internet dated 1999 to **2002**. His main reference was an article in the *Sun Diego Tribune* quoting numbers from the 1999 to 2001 timeframe. He also used the TRICARE Management Activity reports for the same period.
- Current Department drug testing results indicate: 1) falling positive test rates for the third year in a row; 2) FY 04 positive test rates lower than the civilian population; 3) deployed forces positive test rates lower than the general DOD population; and 4) no new heroin positive tests were reported from USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.
- General McCaffrey is not a government employee. He is currently the Bradley Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy. This is a non-paid volunteer position.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Rear Admiral Donna L. Crisp, USN, Director, J-1: (b)(6)

12 DEC 05

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Eric Edelman  
David Chu  
Larry Di Rita  
Tom O'Connell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: General McCaffrey's Press Statements

If the facts are different from what McCaffrey is asserting, the best course of action might be for the Services and Chu to prepare a paper setting out what McCaffrey is saying and stating what the facts are.

We need to see what his position is and where he got his information. I would express concern that a person working at West Point would put out information that seems to be so inconsistent with the facts as we see them. If he knows something we don't know, we would appreciate it if he would tell us. If his facts are wrong while he is part of the Defense establishment, I find it of concern.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/7/05 ASD(SOLIC) memo to SecDef re: General McCaffrey's statements on Drug Testing and Terrorist Drug Financing [OSD 77756-05]

DFIL:ch  
101705-18781.doc

.....  
*Please respond by November 3, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/55083

Washington Times  
October 1, 2005

## Retired General Says Drug Money Fueling Taliban, Al Qaeda

By Sharon Belm, The Washington Times

The easy availability of heroin and opium produced in Afghanistan has led to an increase in drug abuse among the U.S. military, said retired four-star Gen. Barry McCaffrey, but total numbers are still far below that of the overall American population.

The larger problem, emphasized the general, are the unmistakable signs that opium and heroin money is emerging both al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and widening the drug trade into the Persian Gulf and Iraq.

Gen. McCaffrey, a professor at West Point, recently visited Afghanistan and Pakistan, a trip conducted with the full support of the Department of Defense and in coordination with Central Command.

The military is "the biggest drug-free institution in American society, period," Gen. McCaffrey told The Washington Times. But, he added: "We've seen the numbers go up in the last two years."

The intelligence community was reluctant to link increased drug production money in Afghanistan to either the terrorist organization or the militant fundamental Muslim organization that supports it, he said. The Washington Times reported last month that defense officials were reluctant to make the link for fear of being forced to take a direct, but unwanted, role in interdiction.

But Gen. McCaffrey insisted there was an obvious link between the money gained from the 482 metric tons of opium that Afghanistan currently produces a year, and the equipment terrorist fighters were acquiring.

"Is there a relationship between \$2 billion in this impoverished 14th-century desperate land, and the appearance of brand-new guns and shiny camping gear? Of course there is," he said.

"And we are seeing bunches of opium and heroin appear in the Persian Gulf, headed into Iraq," he added.

Afghanistan is the largest opium producer in the world. It also produces highly addictive opium derivatives -- heroin and morphine -- inside the country, Gen. McCaffrey said on Thursday.

Under NATO, Britain is the lead nation for Afghanistan's drug-eradication program, and is working with the German NATO force to create a national drug court. The DEA has 17 agents helping train counterterrorism forces.

But the general, who spent a week in the region in August, during which time he was briefed by State Department, Defense, Special Forces, FBI and other government officials, said their efforts were not enough.

"It is the biggest narcotics in history, it dominates every other reality in Afghanistan," he said. "We cannot achieve our purposes, unless we not only build roads, ethics and democracy, but also counter

7/25/4

this massive criminal threat."

Gen. McCaffrey warned that the availability of heroin would drive up criminal activity, addictions among the Afghan population and the Afghan military, and the U.S. military would become increasingly exposed to the drug.

Asked if there was a problem of drug abuse among U.S. forces, he answered: "We are starting to see some indications, pretty damn modest.

"Given a tiny denominator, there has definitely been a rise" because of the ready availability of the drugs, Gen. McCaffrey said. But, he insisted, the abuse was "minor," and there was no comparison to the situation in Vietnam in 1971, where he said roughly 5 percent of the U.S. forces there were using heroin.

TASA

# UNCLASSIFIED

## TAB B

### COORDINATION

ASD(SOLIC)	Mr. Robert Newberry	18 November 2005
OSD(P&R)	Mr. Richard Krimmer	10 November 2005
USA	COL Strong/Dr. McFarling	10 November 2005
USN	CAPT D. N. Maynard	10 November 2005
USAF	Col Edwin T. Parks	10 November 2005
USMC	Col O.R. Richey	10 November 2005

Tab B

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
11-L-0559/OSD/55086



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT

THE  
DEFENSE

MEMORANDUM FOR: 2005 DEC 13 PM 12:09

12/12

TO - Jim O'BEANE

- FYI on attached memo  
RE: DACOWITS
- Pls. get with DAVID CHU  
AND provide SecDef with  
latest state of play on  
DACOWITS membership.

THANKS,

R.

Robert Rangel

12/13



OSD 23915-05

29  
1930

~~FOUO~~

~~DEC 09 2005~~

TO: David Chu

CC: Robert Rangel  
Larry DiRita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Margaret Robson and DACOWITS

Margaret Robson might agree to serve one more year, but not a full three year term. I think we ought to reappoint her, so add her to the list. Also, everyone I talk to thinks that Mutter has done a very good job, I wonder if we want to think about reappointing her for another period.

Do we have a deadline on finishing this?

Thanks .

DHR:ss  
120805M

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/19/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55088

*OSD 23915-05*

29  
1930

FOUO

DEC 09 2005

TO: David Chu  
CC: Robert Rangel  
Larry DiRita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Margaret Robson and DACOWITS

Margaret Robson might agree to serve one more year, but not a full three year term. I think we ought to reappoint her, so add her to the list. Also, everyone I talk to thinks that Mutter has done a very good job, I wonder if we want to think about reappointing her for another period.

Do we have a deadline on fishing this?

Thanks.

DHR:es  
120805-04

.....  
Please Respond By 12/19/06

334 DACOWITS

9 Dec 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55089

OSD 23915-05



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. S. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

*David S. S. Chu & Maj. Gen.*  
SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE – Margaret Robson and DACOWITS

- You asked for information on completing the DACOWITS membership. (TAB A).
- You appointed seven members to the DACOWITS including Dr. Mary Nelson as Chairperson and reappointed Margaret Robson for an additional year. (TAB B).
- I met with Jim O'Beirne and agreed on a package of five nominees that if approved, would complete the Committee at twelve members. The nominees being vetted for your consideration are:
  - Kerry Lassus, Military Spouse and independent business women.
  - Roberta Santiago, Retired Army Reserve Command Sergeant Major.
  - Judith O'Flaherty, Former Naval officer with deployment experience.
  - Vera Mikula, Military Spouse and former member of the DoD Sexual Assault and Prevention Task Force.
  - Felipe Torres, Retired active duty Marine with combat, Inspector General, and Equal Opportunity experience.
- I agree that LtGen (Ret) Mutter did a good job as the DACOWITS Chairperson. Since Dr Nelson has been appointed as the current Chairperson, LtGen (Ret) Mutter is available for your consideration for another assignment.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: COL Rick Mustion, OUSD(P&R) (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/55090



OSD 23915-05

5/3/2006 7:02:59 AM

**TAB**

**A**

**FOUO**

**December 08, 2005**

TO: David Chu  
CC: Robert Rangel  
Larry DiRita  
Jim O'Beirne  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
SUBJECT: Margaret Robson and DACOWITS

Margaret Robson might agree to serve one more year, but not a full three year term. I think we ought to reappoint her, so add her to the list. **Also**, everyone I talk to thinks that Mutter has done a very good job, I wonder **if** we want to think about reappointing her for another period.

Do we have a deadline on finishing this?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
120805-04

.....  
***Please Respond By 12/19/06***

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/55092

*OSD 23915-05*

**TAB**

**B**



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

PERSONNEL SENSITIVE - RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

SPECIAL ASSISTANT

INFO MEMO

March 2, 2006; 1:00PM

FOR UNDER SECRETARY FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

FROM: Jim O'Beirne, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for White  
House Liaison (WHL) *902  
12/21/06*

SUBJECT: DACOWITS Membership

The following seven individuals, all previously approved by the Secretary, are cleared for immediate appointment to the DACOWITS:

- 1. Mary Nelson New Chairman [Holdover]
- 2. Lynda Davis Vice Chair [Holdover]]
- 3. Margaret Hoffman Member [Holdover]
- 4. Margaret Robson Member [Holdover]
- 5. Denise Balzano Member [New member/resume attached]
- 6. Margaret White Member [New member/resume attached]
- 7. Diana Denman Member [New member/resume attached]

Appointees for the remaining vacant positions on the panel will be approved by the Secretary at the next scheduled civilian non-career personnel meeting.

PERSONNEL SENSITIVE - RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

~~FOUO~~

NOV 16 2005

NOV 16 2005

NOV 22 2005

TO: Bill Winkenwerder  
CC: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. Henry Betts

Please see the attached letter and call Dr. **Henry Betts**, who is an expert on the subject, and **get** back to me and tell me what you think I ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach: 11/8/05 Dr. Henry Betts letter to SecDef

DHR:ss  
112105-05

.....  
*Please Respond By December 15, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55095

OSD 23917-05

205 NOV 19 11 08:25



Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago

345 East Superior Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60611-4496  
312-238-1000 telephone  
www.ric.org

8<sup>th</sup> November 2005

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don:

I do not believe that the system for the military returning from Iraq is sufficient. It is clear-cut what must be done.

From the beginning of treatment of someone who has a disability there must be **staff** that understand and recognize that the technical skills **that** occur in the **early** part of rehabilitation are not enough. There must be continual consideration of the fact that there is a life to be led after leaving the acute care hospital – involving preparation and careful interactions. Long-term follow **up** and counseling of how to get along in the world where most people are not kindly disposed to “cripples” are going to be necessary.

There must be no lag time between acute care and moving into an end phase of counseling, evaluation, job placement, meeting with potential employers, dealing with psychiatric problems, etc. This **part** of the treatment *can* become very bureaucratized, slow, and ponderous. It takes acute management to establish a real continuum.

I understand now that the patients are moved from the military into the VA system where the budget is low for the kind of things I **am** talking about. I was on the rehabilitation committee of the Veterans' Administration and the “Mission Commission” and can easily imagine that the long-term care can be lacking.

**As far as** I am concerned, there should be no delay. We certainly have seen the turmoil caused by the delays in helping the victims of natural disasters in our country. It is nothing compared to what there will be if the treatment of these “heroes and heroines” of this war **falls** between the cracks, too.

OSD 22579-05


11-L-0559/QSD/55096

RUMSFELD/Page 2: 8" November 2005

This is not an attack about you. The issue is complicated and may require overriding ordinary bureaucratic situations, but it **must** be done and set in motion immediately or the American people are **going** to be extremely irritated – **and** our extraordinary military figures unduly disadvantaged.

Remember, this later part of the medical treatment is **less** glamorous so can be "swept under the rug." There will not be **many** CNN sound bytes in the search for jobs, for instance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Henry Betts", written over a vertical line that extends from the word "Sincerely," down to the typed name below.

Henry Betts, M.D.  
Past Medical Director/President/CEC  
Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago

HBB/mg

PS: Mr. Paul Meyer at your request called me. He no longer **works** for the government.

11-L-0559/OSD/55097

UPR



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOV 22 2005

Dr. Henry Betts  
Past Medical Director/President/CEO  
Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago  
345 East Superior Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60611-4496

Dear Henry,

Thanks so much for your note. I appreciate your taking the time to so forcefully make the important case you did.

Dr. Bill Winkenwerder will be giving you a call, and we will try to overcome any ordinary bureaucratic arrangements, if that must be done.

Thanks so much.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'DZ'.

OSD 22579-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55098



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1200 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

DEC 09 10:16

INFO MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

DEC 09 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Inquiry from Dr. Henry Betts

- Dr. Henry Betts of the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago wrote you regarding current post combat rehabilitation efforts by DoD and the VA. (TAB A).
- I agree with Dr. Betts' view that focused, individualized management of each patient "case management" is necessary to achieve the best results and a good transition to civilian life after battle injuries.
- DoD and the VA are improving their coordination of health care for Service members and veterans to ensure smooth transition from care for injuries and illnesses to rehabilitation and civilian life. We have learned from previous conflicts and from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom that close cooperation is necessary to create a system for seamless transition.
- Since 2003, a joint DoD-VA program has been established at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and seven other military hospitals to provide case management for more than 3,900 combat veterans. On-site VA social workers coordinate transfer of care, establish appointments at a VA Medical Center near the patient's home, and follow patients to ensure success after discharge.
- The Military Severely Injured Support Center assists the worst injured Service members and their families. The Center works with other programs to assist during transition from military service, through their rehabilitation, and on to civilian life. Feedback on this new program has been good.
- My assessment, albeit biased, is that our programs are working well. However, they can always be improved. I will call Dr. Betts to get any specific ideas he might have that could be useful for us.

Attachment: As stated

cc: USD (P&R)

Prepared by: Dr. Kilpatrick, DHSD, (b)(6) DOCS Open 96232,96874,96907

11-L-0559/OSD/55099

OSD 23917-05

**TAB**

**A**

11-L-0559/OSD/55100

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NOV 10 11 08:25



Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago

345 East Superior Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60611-4496  
312-238-1000 telephone  
www.ric.org

8<sup>th</sup> November 2005

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don:

I do not believe that the system for the military returning from Iraq is sufficient. It is clear-cut what must be done.

From the beginning of treatment of someone who has a disability there must be **staff** that understand and recognize that the technical skills that occur in the **early** part of rehabilitation are not enough. There must be continual consideration of the fact that there is a life to be led after leaving the acute care hospital - involving preparation and careful interactions. Long-term follow **up** and counseling of how to get along in the world where most people are not kindly disposed to "cripples" are going to be necessary.

There must be no lag time between acute care and moving into an end phase of counseling, evaluation, job placement, meeting with potential employers, dealing with psychiatric problems, etc. This part of the treatment can become very bureaucratized, slow, and ponderous. It takes acute management to establish a real continuum.

I understand now that the patients are moved from the military into the VA system where the budget is low for the kind of things I am talking about. I was on the rehabilitation committee of the Veterans' Administration and the "Mission Commission" and can easily imagine that the long-term care can be lacking.

As far as I am concerned, there should be no delay. We certainly have seen the turmoil caused by the delays in helping the victims of natural disasters in our country. It is nothing compared to what there will be if the treatment of these "heroes and heroines" of this war falls between the cracks, too.

OSD 22579-05


11-L-0559/OSD/55101

RUMSFELD/Page 2: 8" November 2005

This is not an attack about you. The issue is complicated and may require overriding ordinary bureaucratic situations, but it must be done and **set** in motion immediately or the American people are going to be extremely irritated – and our extraordinary military figures unduly disadvantaged.

Remember, this later **part of** the medical treatment **is** less glamorous so can be “swept under the rug.” There will not be many CNN sound bytes in the search for jobs, for instance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Henry Betts", written over a vertical line that extends from the word "jobs" in the paragraph above.

Henry Betts, M.D.  
Past Medical Director/President/CEO  
Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago

HBB/mg

PS: Mr. Paul Meyer at your request called me. He no longer works for the government.



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1200 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

32

INFO MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

DEC 22 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Wickenwerder, Jr.* MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. Henry Betts

- You asked me to contact Dr. Betts to discuss rehabilitation for injured Service members returning from Iraq. (TAB A)
- I had a good conversation with Dr. Betts. His comments were not based on his knowledge of any specific case or situation, but were just his general impressions of how the VA approaches long-term rehabilitation of the severely injured.
- We discussed DoD initiatives focused on care for the wounded and their families, including services offered by the Severely Injured Soldier Support Center and Amputee Center --- providing Dr. Betts with the total view of the rehabilitation process, and the culture that has developed among soldiers and Marines who want to get back to their jobs, work, and life in general. Dr. Betts was favorably impressed with our efforts.
- I invited him to visit Walter Reed Army Medical Center to see our entire operation. A visit is being set up now. The Commander at Walter Reed, MG Ken Farmer, and his staff, will work with Dr. Betts directly and host his visit.

Attachment:  
As stated

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *Donald L. Chow* 12/22/05

Prepared by: LCDR Lisa Lewis, OASD (HA) (b)(6) DOCS Open 97669

11-L-0559/OSD/55103

OSD 23917-05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999

12 11:00

INFO MEMO

CM-0080-05

6 December 2005

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *P. Pace*

SUBJECT: Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) (SF 101405-05)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), I appoint the Chairman of the IADB in my role as Chairman. The board is the military advisory body to the Organization of American States. It is in the US military's interest to continue to support this board.
- **Analysis**
  - The IADB is a multinational organization chaired by a US two-star (currently Major General Keith Huber) who serves as an "international" officer. He is dual-hatted as Director, Inter-American Defense College (IADC), a DOD-recognized senior Service college. The Joint Staff/J-5 Vice Director is the US delegate to the board.
  - The IADB offers the Department of Defense a unique and valuable mechanism to constructively influence the region on security issues. Although the board has a limited mandate, it has been a useful tool in US efforts to encourage regional confidence and security building measures such as de-mining, peacekeeping operations, and disaster response. The Joint Staff works closely with your staff to help the IADB further US initiatives.
  - Information paper (TAB B) provides further information.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Victor Renuart, USAF; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 23922-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB A

CJS

FOUO

October 14, 2005

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: GenPete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Inter-American Defense Board

Please take a look at the Inter-American Defense Board -- who we appoint there, what it does and whether or not we want to continue doing it.

Thanks.

DRL:di  
101421-05

.....  
Please Respond By November 10, 2005

FOUO

Tab A

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

11-L-0559/OSD/55105

OSD 23305-05

16 November 2005

## INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)

1. Purpose. To describe the IADB.2. Key Points

- Established in 1942, the IADB later became the military advisory body to and is funded by the Organization of American States (OAS). Its mission is to provide technical advice and educational expertise on defense and security issues. Although slow to adapt to the post Cold-War environment, the IADB is increasingly relevant in terms of providing a security structure to counter transnational threats. It is the only entity that supports the OAS in these matters.
- Consistent with US national military strategy, US participation in the IADB and Inter-American Defense College demonstrates a commitment to the region and enhances military-to-military contacts with member nations. The board is comprised of 25 delegations from the 34 OAS member states; the college has graduated 2,128 officials, including 2 presidents, 30 ministers, and 497 general/flag officers.
- The IADB provides a venue to positively influence the region's military leaders via: promotion of common interests like counterterrorism, humanitarian relief, demining, counternarcotics, interoperability, and peacekeeping; a forum to advance US interests by providing direct access to people of influence; and maintenance of a democratic hemisphere that promotes civilian oversight of the military and respect for democratic principles.
- The IADB offers the Department of Defense a unique and valuable mechanism for interaction with the OAS on hemispheric security issues. The board's limitations lie in the political landscape of the region, not in its role. Were the United States to withdraw support, others would seek to replace it with a less friendly framework. Therefore, the US delegation is advancing an agenda to revitalize the board by seeking a juridical link to the OAS along with other measures to involve it with DOD initiatives in the region.

Tab B

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-16397-106

# UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

## COORDINATION

<b>IADB</b>	MG Huber	1 November 2005
USSOUTHCOM	Copy Provided	7 November 2005
DASD/WHA	Copy Provided	8 November 2005

Tab C

# UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/55107

FOUO

273 11:36

September 15, 2005

EG4225  
05/0124

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending by NATO

At the NATO meeting it was pointed out that NATO is spending 100million Euros a year on a pipeline from Rotterdam to France, and that it takes consensus to stop it. It certainly doesn't belong in the NATO budget.

We should have GAO conduct an investigation of NATO as an organization, and get some ground truth as to what is going on. If the Secretary General doesn't have the authority to cut something that is wasteful, maybe the only way to deal with it is through shame.

The other approach might be to recommend that we end the consensus rule for halting wasteful things that are legacy items, and allowing, for example, 2/3 to decide whether to discontinue a project, rather than 100%.

Please get back to me with your thoughts.

Thanks.

DHR:ls  
091505-04

.....  
*Please Respond By October 04, 2005*

OSD 23929-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55108

~~FOUO~~

25 OCT 2005 11:33

OCT 25 2005

I-05/014242  
ES-4540

TO: Peter Rodman  
CC: Eric Edelman  
Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Training More Mongolian Military

What should we be doing with respect to getting more non-commissioned officers from Mongolia trained in the US?

What should we do about solving the cost problem for training other countries' militaries for those countries that cannot afford it?

It seems to me it benefits us as much as it does them. We ought to be able to find a way to pay for it. It is one of the least expensive things we can do to help our country.

Thanks.

DHR ah  
102405-01 (18) (46)

.....  
*Please respond by November 24, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

**OSD 23931-05**

25-10-05 09:35:18

11-L-0559/OSD/55109

Tab A

DJS

SECRET

~~FOUO~~

DJS 44  
DJ-5 LEAD

September 20, 2005 DJ-3

TO Gen Dick Myers

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Musharraf's Thoughts on Stopping Infiltration

The report on Musharraf saying the way to stop infiltration is to build fences is worth your thinking about

Thanks.

DHR:as  
092005.13

\*\*\*\*\*

*Please Respond By 10/13/05*

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 23932-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55110

~~FOUO~~

NOV 30 2005

11 2:10

TO: Fran Harvey  
Michael Wynne  
GEN Pete Schoomaker  
Gen Mike Moseley  
GEN Mike Hagee

CC: Gordon England  
Dino Aviles  
ADM Mike Mullen  
David Chu

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan

Attached is some material on the Thrift Savings Plan figures. It is clear the Navy has worked the program and been successful. It seems the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps may have not done so.

The Thrift Savings Plan is an enormous Benefit. It ought to be of significant interest and attraction to the people you are trying to recruit and retain.

 Please tell me what you are doing to get your Service to do a better job in communicating the Thrift savings Plan program

In addition I would like a report every six months, beginning June 1, 2006, on progress or the lack thereof.

Thanks.

Attach 8/10/05 SecDef memo to USD P&R, 10/13/05 USD P&R memo to SecDef

DHR:aa  
112805-42

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 23959-05

8/10/05

SECRET  
NOFORN  
NO DISSEM

August 10, 2005

2005 08 10 PM 4: 38

TO: David Chu  
CC: Larry DiRita  
Service Secretaries  
Service Chiefs

240

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: ~~Thrift~~ Savings Plan Figures

Attached is a memo David Chu sent me by request. What it says basically is a person who joins the Service ends up with a nest egg of a substantial sum.

To my knowledge, this has never been communicated. It is not a part of the recruiting activity, it is not a part of the retention activity, and it is not even on the radar screen of most of the men and women who serve in the military.

10 Aug 05

My personal view is it would be an attractive addition to be injected into their considerations for recruited and being retained.

Please think about this and get back to me through David Chu.

David, I would like you to consider this and get back to me and get back to me with a memorandum no later than August 22.

Thank you.

Attach: 7/18/05 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef

DHR.as  
080905-40

.....

Please Respond By 08/22/05

17 Jul 05

14286-05



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO 075 0012 0013:03

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

July 18, 2005, 1:04 PM

*Robert Rangel*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC \_\_\_\_\_

*RR  
7/24*

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan -- SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- TSP for military was established in January 2002, TAB B.
- The Federal Thrift Savings Board provided figures for each scenario you posed, assuming a 7.5 percent return, 5 percent annual contribution, 3 percent annual pay raise, and no contributions for bonuses or special pays:
  - o Enlists at age 18, serves 20 years, retires as an E8, TSP account is \$83,000. If left in TSP until he reaches age 60, TSP account is \$440,000.
  - o Enlists at age 18, serves 30 years, retires as an E9, TSP account is \$257,000. At age 60, TSP account is \$658,000.
  - o Officer commissioned at age 22, serves 20 years, retires as an O5, TSP account is \$163,000. If left in TSP until he reaches age 60, TSP account is \$643,000.
  - o Officer commissioned at age 22, serves 30 years, retires as an O6, TSP account is \$483,000. At age 60, TSP account is \$927,000.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTC Janet Fenton, USA (JAG Corps), OUSD(P&R), (b)(6)

*J-  
Give JAG mil  
P&R - review*

MA SD	7/29	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	07/25	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	07/26	1540	
ESR MA	07/26	1502	



OSD 142 86-05

## **Features of Thrift Savings Plan for Uniformed Services**

- o TSP is a voluntary deferred compensation plan for retirement savings.
- TSP accounts are treated like 401(k) plans for tax purposes.
  - o Participant contributions are pre-tax dollars, reducing the taxable gross income of the participant for the tax year of contribution.
  - o Contributions and earnings grow tax free while in the TSP.
  - o Contributions made while serving in a combat zone are tax-exempt and remain tax-exempt when eventually withdrawn. Earnings on combat zone contributions are tax deferred and are taxed upon withdrawal.
  - o Contributions made while serving in a combat zone do not count against the IRC deferred compensation limit, \$14,000 in 2005. This allows Servicemembers serving in combat zones to contribute more to the TSP.
  - o Distributions from TSP before age 59 1/2 are taxable income and subject to penalty for early withdrawal.
- TSP is a portable investment fund.
  - o Servicemembers who leave the military before retirement can keep their TSP account, which will continue to accumulate earnings, roll it over into another retirement fund, or roll it over into an Individual Retirement Account.
  - o Servicemembers who remain in the military until retirement have the same options.
- TSP investment funds.
  - o G Fund: Government Securities Investment Fund. All contributions go into this fund until the participant elects future allocations.
  - o F Fund: Fixed Income Index Investment Fund.
  - o C Fund: Common Stock Index Investment.
  - o S Fund: Small Capital Stock Index Investment Fund.
  - o I Fund: International Stock Index Investment Fund.
  - o L Funds: New in 2005; the L Funds are Lifecycle Funds that diversify participant accounts among the G, F, C, S, and I Funds, using professionally determined investment mixes that are tailored to different time horizons.

1719  
11/22  
2930



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
CHIEF OF STAFF



11/21

INFO MEMO 2005 NOV 21 AM 11: 54

October 13, 2005

*Army*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC \_\_\_\_\_

*RL*  
*ROBERT ROOPER*

FROM: David S. C. Chu, U-1 (P&R)

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) Figures - SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- All of the Services agree that additional and continuous education regarding the benefits of the Thrift Savings Plan is necessary.
- The Navy and Marine Corps are the only Services that specifically target recruits and new inductees with information on the TSP.
- Newly accessed Navy recruits receive 1.5 hours of instruction and information on the TSP and its benefits. Their participation rates illustrate the success of this method.
  - o Over 40 percent of the active Navy force participates in TSP. Participation rate for active duty in the other services is: Army 18 percent; Air Force 27 percent, Marine Corps 28 percent.
  - o Forty-eight percent of Navy and 30 percent of Marine Corps junior enlisted participate in TSP compared to 6 percent in the Army and 13 percent in the Air Force.
  - o Sixty percent of Navy company grade officers participate in TSP compared to 34 percent of Army, 47 percent Marine Corps, and 54 percent of Air Force.
- The Navy incorporates TSP information in its traveling Career symposia, which goes to ships and installation town hall meetings worldwide.
- The Marine Corps includes TSP information to all applicants in its recruiting material on financial security. Army is developing a marketing plan for inclusion in their recruiting campaign.
- All Services are committed to increasing awareness and information regarding TSP to the force and recruits. We will ensure this occurs by working with the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Attachment:  
As stated

*SP3 11/21*

MA SD	11/23	SMA DSD	
ISA SD	11/22	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	11/21	16SS	11/23/05
ESR MA	11/21	1/20	

Fenton, USA (JAG Corps), OUSD(P&R) (b)(6)



OSD 22744-05

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

2005 11 14 10:23

IRAC

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Truck Convoys in Iraq

What about getting Kurds to drive convoy trucks in Iraq?

Thanks.

DHML:sp  
102805-17

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/17/05*

OSD 24007-05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/55116

20051105

~~FOUO~~

NOV 3 0 2005

NOV 3 0 2005

NOV 3 0 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
CC: Larry DiRita  
Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Linking Governors

Attached is a copy of a note from Governor Kempthorne. What do you propose to do by way of *linking us* with the governors?

Thanks.

Attach 11/10/05 Note From Gov Kempthorne to SecDef

DHR:js  
112905-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/15/05*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24024-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55117

DIRK KEMPTHORNE  
GOVERNOR



Mr. Secretary,

November 10, 2005

Thank you for meeting with me to discuss National Guard issues. I greatly appreciated our conversation and I believe a strong partnership can be developed between DOD and the Nation's governors. Thank you, too, for your service to our country. God bless.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dirk Kempthorne".



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300  
UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

December 13, 2005 5:00 PM

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: SECDEF Snowflake Response regarding linking DoD with Governors

- You forwarded me a copy of a note from Governor Kempthorne and asked what we can do to link the department to governors.
- Since you met with Governor Kempthorne, DoD sent a delegation of four governors to the CENTCOM AOR for Thanksgiving.
- I have a Director of Intergovernmental Affairs on my staff, and we are working on several projects to link the Department more closely with governors:
  - Governor's Delegations: I am planning a delegation of governors to the CENTCOM AOR in late January.
  - National Governors Association Winter Meeting: The NGA has asked you to address governors at their February meeting here in town. I think you should accept.
  - NDU War Games: As part of the NGA Winter Meeting, I would like to invite the governors to participate in a NDW war game exercise on pandemic flu.
  - Consistent Interaction: The Department does a good job of notifying Members of Congress when service members in their districts are deployed. The services do a good job of notifying Members about casualties. No one extends these courtesies to governors. We are working to include governors in these announcements.

Attachments:  
Snowflake # 112905-01


Prepared by: Claude Chafin, Director of Communications and Intergovernmental Affairs (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/55119

OSD 24024-05

~~FOUO~~

DEC 14 2005

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Report from Jim Steele

IRAR

Attached is an interesting report from Jim Steele, who has been working with the Iraqi police. I think you will find the insights useful.

Respectfully,

Attach. 12/11/05 Report from Jim Steele

DHR:db  
121305-21

14 Dec 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24028-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55120

WEEKLY REPORT - 11 December 2005

**This report** summarizes my activities in Iraq during the period 1-8 December 2005. During **this** time, I operated from the Jadrihya area of Baghdad. My focus was *principally* on MOI forces, although I came in contact with Iraqi Army as well as militia elements from the Pesh, Badr and Mahdi Army. My initial effort was focused on high end forces **within** the MOI, including the Police commandos, public **order** units and the 1<sup>st</sup> Mech. At LTG Demsey's request, I concentrated the later part of the visit on the **IPS**, including the Nejda (patrol police) and the Baghdad police. Key observations and recommendations follow:

- The MOI has a significant combat capability in its Special Forces command under MG Adnan. This command includes approximately 20,000 men, equipped with armored vehicles and heavy weapons. Although it has **US** advisory teams assigned, it is considerably **more** independent from the Coalition than **LA** units.
- Militias represent a serious threat to our success. Recognizing the capabilities of the MOI Special Forces, SCIRI and its Badr militia have systematically targeted those forces in an effort to control them and use them for their **own** political purposes. **This** targeting effort **has** been in the **form** of replacing experienced leaders **with** Badr personnel and bringing in Shia recruits, many who **are** associated with Badr. Minister Jabr, a member of SCIRI, has repeatedly been instrumental in protecting Badr officers and generally facilitating **this** infiltration effort. There is evidence that **Badr's** assassination unit, known as Hussein's Revolutionaries, have the mission to kill **ISF** leaders that they consider to have been too much in authority during the Saddam period, especially those that held positions of authority in the Iran-Iraq war.
- Militia influence in the IPS has also increased, although it appears to be less organized and is focused at lower levels. Badr has reportedly made use of police vehicles to conduct both assassinations and kidnappings. Madhi Army, **on the** other **hand**, intimidates the IPS in areas where Sadr is strong. For example, Madhi has essentially taken control of Sadr City. I traveled throughout Sadr City and saw strong evidence that Madhi was in charge.
- The rise of militias under the present circumstances is predictable. Iraqis tend to band together in gangs for self protection. When viewed at the national level, these gangs or militias are dominated by **three** major players, the Pesh, the Badr and Mahdi Army. They are well armed, and in the current atmosphere of uncertainty have **an** abundance of members. I believe that in the near term, they will remain strong and efforts to destroy them **are** doomed to failure. In fact, such efforts could cause sectarian violence to escalate to civil war.
- What makes Badr, in particular, so dangerous and threatening to the success of our strategy is not its mere existence, but the fact that it **is** actively undermining the effectiveness of the national government forces. It is essential that we do not

allow the militias to **retard** or degrade the **ISF**, especially the MOI forces, which are particularly vulnerable..

- Dealing with **this** problem is on par or perhaps even more important than **fighting** the insurgency. **Our** worst scenario is a civil war. In my view, the choice of ministers for MOI and **MOD** is critical. We cannot influence the outcome of the election **this** week beyond attempting to avoid fraud. The people will decide the allocation of seats and ultimately who is the PM. However, we can and must weigh in regarding the selection of ministers in MOI and MOD. We cannot afford to have a **repeat** of the current situation, characterized by two weak ministers in key security posts, which allows **SCIRI** and **Badr** to either control (**as** in the case of MOI) or circumvent (**as** in the case of MOD) the employment of these forces. If the new ministers are strong and focused on what is best for **Iraq**, **this** militia problem can be managed. As strong national government forces emerge and the various sectors feel increasingly less threatened, I predict that the militias will begin to fade. However, if militias are able to make use of the power of the state for their **own** purposes, the national effort and our success is at risk.
- Illegal detentions, murders and torture should be expected when militias operate with tacit government support. The recent bunker discovery is a classic example. In a separate case, I witnessed the horrific results of torture by the 1<sup>st</sup> Mech **this** week when I visited with detainees that had been in that unit's custody for several months. We can't afford to compromise our principles and be made accomplices to such actions. We must be prepared to cut off support to any ISF unit that engages in illegal detentions, murders and torture. Recommend we begin with 1<sup>st</sup> Mech unless **BG** Bassem and his intel officer, LTC Hakim are removed immediately.
- Leadership overshadows training and equipment. With the possible exception of Anbar, I believe the ISF is adequately trained and equipped right now to contain the insurgency if the right leadership is in place. **This** is much more difficult for us to address than the ISF's level of training or its equipment status. It requires us to know what is going on in the units and being prepared to withhold **resources** if necessary to ensure that strong leadership exists in key positions. **Our** advisory teams with the ISF become increasingly important **as** we turn over security responsibilities. I recommend that we focus **on** getting the very best officers and NCOs to fill these critical positions. I recommend US Special Forces be **assigned** to work directly with ISF units, especially the high end units within the MOI. Unfortunately, **SF** has moved away from **this** type of mission. I recommend this be reversed. Advisors, in order to be effective, must live with the **ISF** day and night. **This** means eating and sleeping with them, despite the danger and discomfort. Again, unfortunately **this** is not always the case at present. Recommend it be reversed.

I appreciate the excellent support I received MNSTC-I and 31D during my visit. I'm also thankful to the Al-Janabi tribe for providing my bodyguards, as well as MOI's Special Forces and the Nejda for their assistance and cooperation.

*Jim Steele*

~~FOUO~~

DEC 14 2005

TO: GEN George Casey  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
GEN John Abizaid  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld %  
SUBJECT Steele Report

IRAO

Attached is an interesting report from Jim Steele with some ideas I think merit our close attention.

Regards,

Attach. Steele Report

DHR:dh  
121305-20

14PAE05

OSD 24029-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55124

## WEEKLY REPORT - 11 December 2005

This report summarizes my activities in Iraq during the period 1-8 December 2005. During this time, I operated from the Jadrihya area of Baghdad. My focus was principally on MOI forces, although I came in contact with Iraqi Army as well as militia elements from the Pesh, Badr and Mahdi Army. My initial effort was focused on high end forces within the MOI, including the Police commandos, public order units and the 1<sup>st</sup> Mech. At LTG Demsey's request, I concentrated the later part of the visit on the IPS, including the Nejda (patrol police) and the Baghdad police. Key observations and recommendations follow:

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- What makes Badr, in particular, so dangerous and threatening to the success of our strategy is not its mere existence, but the fact that it is actively undermining the effectiveness of the national government forces. It is essential that we do not

allow the militias to retard or degrade the ISF, especially the MOI forces, which are particularly vulnerable..

- Dealing with this problem is on par or perhaps even more important than fighting the insurgency. Our worst scenario is a civil war. In my view, the choice of ministers for MOI and MOD is critical. We cannot influence the outcome of the election this week beyond attempting to avoid fraud. The people will decide the allocation of seats and ultimately who is the PM. However, we can and must weigh in regarding the selection of ministers in MOI and MOD. We cannot afford to have a repeat of the current situation, characterized by two weak ministers in key security posts, which allows SCIRI and ~~Badr~~ to either control (as in the case of MOI) or circumvent (as in the case of MOD) the employment of these forces. If the new ministers are strong and focused on what is best for Iraq, this militia problem can be managed. As strong national government forces emerge and the various sectors feel increasingly less threatened, I predict that the militias will begin to fade. However, if militias are able to make use of the power of the state for their own purposes, the national effort and our success is at risk.
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I appreciate the excellent support I received MNSTC-I and 31D during my visit. I'm also thankful to the Al-Janabi tribe for providing my bodyguards, as well as MOI's Special Forces and the Nejda for their assistance and cooperation.

Jim Steele

E

~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2005

TO: . The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
The Honorable Carlos Gutierrez

CC: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT Letter from James Denny

004

Attached is a letter from a close friend of mine, Jim Denny. He is the former Chief Financial Officer at J.D. Searle, Chief Financial Officer at Sears Roebuck, General Counsel at Firestone, and most recently, Chairman of the Board at Gilead Sciences.

Jim Denny's letter is self-explanatory. I think it is worth looking into. The people from Chicago who are involved are an impressive group.

Please give me any thoughts you may have.

Thanks.

Attach 11/29/05 Letter from James M. Denny to SecDef

DHR:ss  
121405-06

14 DEC 05

OSD 24081-6\*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55128

JAMES M. DENNY  
ONE NORTH WACKER DRIVE  
SUITE 4085  
CHICAGO, IL 60600

(b)(6)

November 29, 2005

Dear Don,

I need some advice and possibly some help.

Several years ago Cate and I underwrote a chair at the Catholic Theological Union (CTU) for a Catholic/Muslim study program. CTU, located on the University of Chicago campus, is the largest Catholic seminary in the United States. The program was intended to compliment the Catholic/Jewish chair underwritten by the Crowns and the Ryans. As a result, CTU has become a forum for Jews and Muslims to exchange ideas and it was there that Marshall Bennett and Talat Othman met and became friends. They were surprised by their essential agreement on the steps necessary to achieve peace in Palestine and decided to form a small group of Jews, Muslims, and Christians whose unanimity of views would symbolize the potential for the two sides to reach agreement. The group, now known as the Chicago Ten, initially consisted of Lester Crown, Newt Minow, Marshall Bennett, Penny Pritzker, Talat Othman, Imad Almunaseer, Bob Abboud, Cherif Bassiouni, Don Senior and me, but has since been expanded to include J.D. Bindenagel (see attached biographical sketches).

During the last two years we explored various ways to be helpful to the peace process but without meaningful success. Following Israel's announcement to leave Gaza, we decided to form a trading company which would act as a clearinghouse to connect Palestinian manufacturers with Israeli, European, and U.S. markets. The theory was that the best foundation for a lasting peace was the creation of jobs within Gaza to which a revitalized export trade could make a substantial contribution.

11-L-0559/OSD/55129

Our efforts were warmly received by the **Israelis**, the Palestinians, and the regional representatives of the World Bank, U.S. AID and others (e.g., The **East-West Institute**, The Gates Foundation, The Aspen Institute). No progress was possible, however, as long as **ingress** and egress to and from Gaza was subject to prolonged interruptions due to **Israel's** legitimate security concerns.

With the recent Rafah breakthrough, parties on both sides **have focused** on our initiative as one **among** several possibly important next steps. **Marshall** Bennett has just returned from a five day trip to the region and found considerable support and enthusiasm for our concept. Bob Abboud is scheduled to attend a World Bank-sponsored meeting in London on December 11-13 to explain our concept and to generate interest by western purchasers for Palestinian sourced goods as well as to encourage others to **accelerate** their investigations of how they could become involved, e.g., providing or subsidizing **export** finance, investment guarantees, etc.

We have funded our company, the Chicago **Ten** Trading Company (CTTC), with initial capital of approximately \$100,000 and are now seeking potential buyers in the U.S. and **Europe** for Palestinian goods. Our initial intention was to operate as a not-for-profit in order to facilitate governmental support, but it proved to be too cumbersome. We think a for-profit **entity** could serve the purpose almost as well. If our concept proves to be viable, our commitment is to turn control and ownership of the company over to the Palestinians without any economic **return** to our group. In the interim, we would cover the company's operating costs by charging a commission on transactions that originate under its auspices.

I think we will be successful in developing interest by U.S. retailers but **what** would provide real impetus to our initiative is an endorsement by the U.S. Government. The endorsement could take many forms, ranging from words of encouragement for endeavors such as ours to a statement of intent to explore the feasibility of purchasing Palestinian sourced goods **using** the services of intermediaries such as the trading company.


**There are** still many **unknowns** including the ability to implement the recent agreement, the forthcoming elections in both Israel and Palestine, and the potentially

diverse effects of geopolitical skirmishes. We believe, however, that if we are going to take the promise of a better ~~future~~ credible and worth Striving for, we must push ahead on the assumption that the odds for success have improved and we should take the gamble.

Any advice you could give us would be greatly appreciated as well as any suggestions you might have as to how we could obtain some form of endorsement by an agency or department of the U.S. Government.

We realize that circumstances or the timing of this request may be inopportune and we understand fully that you may be unable to respond. Should that not be the case, however, pointing us in the right direction would be a big help.

Many thanks and best regards.

  
Jim

attach.

## Chicago 10 Trading Company Biographical sketches

- Robert **Abboud**, former Chairman of the First National Bank of Chicago
- Jr. **Imad Almanaseer**, a Pathologist
- Cherif Bassiouni, President of the International **Human Rights** Law Institute at DePaul University
- Marshall Bennett, retired Real **Estate** Developer
- J.D. Bindenagel, V.P. Community, Government and International Affairs, DePaul; former U.S. **Ambassador** and special envoy for **Holocaust** issues
- Lester Crown. **Chairman**, Material Service Corporation
- Jim **Denny**
- Newton Minow, Partner, Sidley Austin Brown & **Wood**
- Talat Othman. CEO. Grove Financial Corporation
- Penny Pritzker, President, Pritzker Realty
- Fr. Donald Senior, President, CTU

FOUO

December 14, 2005

TO Stephen J. Hadley

CC: ~~Marc~~ Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Piece by Daniel Gallington-

Attached is an interesting piece by Daniel Gallington, who used to work at the Pentagon. He is a supporter, and he has some interesting insights on the use of the word victory, and the importance of emphasizing the fact that we are confronting violent Islamic radicals over there, and not here. That is the strategy.

Regards,

Attach 12/2/05 *Washington Times* piece by Daniel Gallington "Defining the Mission"

DHR:tt  
121405-14

OSD 24082-05

14 DEC 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55133

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# The Washington Times

[www.washingtontimes.com](http://www.washingtontimes.com)

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## Defining the mission

By Daniel Gallington

Published December 2, 2005

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The president gave us an inspiring and timely speech at the U.S. Naval Academy Wednesday, emphasizing the **need** to "complete the mission" and achieve "victory in Iraq."

The speech was also very important because defining the mission in Iraq also defines the force levels necessary to achieve victory. And Tuesday the president also issued a 35-page document, "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," a strong beginning step in achieving that goal.

The new document **says**, "Victory in Iraq is a vital U.S. interest" because "Iraq is the central front on the global war on terror," and perhaps even more important: "The fate of the greater Middle East -- which will have a profound and lasting impact on American security -- hangs in the balance."

We didn't begin our role in Iraq with such clear strategic vision: The "mission" or strategic reason we went into Iraq was the belief Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (**WMD**). It turned out, he didn't. While there is unending political debate from the left on this retrospection, most Americans understand that the real possibility of WMD in the hands of Saddam was such an unacceptable risk it didn't make much difference.

In other words: Because we simply couldn't **afford** to make a mistake about WMD in Iraq, it was probably all right we did **so**.

And, we clearly had enough troops in Iraq to address that **threat**: In fact, I wrote in Commentary at the time that we should just knock down Saddam, knock down the **WMD** infrastructure, and leave -- allowing the warring factions to tear themselves to pieces. I also argued, however, that our threshold for taking down a dangerous successor regime in Iraq should be pretty low.

We didn't do this -- we stayed, a huge insurgency developed -- and we **are** now "democratizing" Iraq. However, the insurgency opposing this is very robust, growing in ferocity and shows no sign of letting up, despite democratization's political successes.

So, what we have accomplished? The original purpose met with success, even if there was no WMD; democratization has seen some notable success but the insurgency seems to have fought it to a draw. And it's clear if we leave Iraq soon the insurgents would take over quickly -- not only that, but it is very likely some kind of terrorist state or refuge would emerge.

But what if there was -- and is -- a far more compelling strategic reason we went into Iraq and have stayed there, one that wasn't very well articulated until the president's new strategy was released this week? The idea is that "the fate of the Middle East -- which [has] a profound and lasting impact on American security -- hangs in the balance."

There's another, perhaps even better, way to say this: "Forcefully countering the

influc \_\_\_\_\_ violently anti-American Islamic fundamentalists in the Arab Middle East," was suggested recently by Nicholas Lehmann.

In fact, the president's recent speeches have spoken of this strategic concept, in the context of the need to oppose persistent and increasingly dangerous **threats** from "Islamofascism" and the like.

If **this** is the strategic **case** for staying in Iraq, the administration must make it **far more** effectively than they have so far. Why? It's an extremely persuasive and compelling **case** most Americans would probably agree with and support -- assuming it was better articulated and understood.

**But** this "new" strategy simply cannot be **carried out** with the **forces** we now have on the ground in Iraq. And those who have all along argued for **more troops** will be right, albeit for different reasons than they may have **had** originally.

The **bottom** line: If the "**real**" reason for the Iraq war was **to** depose Saddam and neutralize the WMD threat, we've done it; if the "real" reason **was** to democratize Iraq, we may not be able to do it -- even with present **troop** levels -- because of the growing insurgency.

However, if the "real" strategic reason for being in Iraq is "forcefully countering the influence **of** violently **anti-American** Islamic fundamentalists in the Arab Middle **East**," the administration **must** make this case more persuasively to the Congress and the people **and** increase substantially our ground forces in Iraq.

*Daniel Gallington is a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, Va.*

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11-L-0559/OSD/55135

FOUO

DEC 12 2005

TO: Bill Marriott  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Draft a Response to Christmas Cards

Please draft a nice note to thank each of the folks who sent me the attached Christmas cards, and I will sign them.

Thanks.

Attach 5 Christmas Cards to SecDef

DHR:ss  
120905-12

.....  
*Please Respond By December 15, 2005*

*J35TD*

*re: a snowflake*

*The  
Call 12/14*

*12/14  
DHR* - SD INDICATE WANTING  
TO SIGN. SEND IN  
FOR REVIEW R.  
12/14

COMBO - THANK YOU NOTES  
§ SNOWFLAKE RECAP  
M read some of  
12/14 call. SAB 12/14

OSD 24096-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55136

*12 Dec 05*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 15 2005

Mrs. Joanne Phillips

(b)(6)

Dear Mrs. Phillips.

I want to thank you for the Christmas card you sent me. I appreciate your support a great deal.

Please pass along my gratitude to your children for their service to our nation. You have every right to be proud.

With my best wishes for the holiday season,

Sincerely,

OSD 24096-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55137



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 15 2005

Ms. Kelli Henson

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Henson,

Thank you so much for the Christmas card. It was kind of you to remember me, and I want you to know I appreciate your words of support.

You have my best wishes for the holiday season.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Z. R. ...".

OSD 24096-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55138



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 15 2005

**Mr. and Mrs. James Eddy**

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Eddy,

I received the holiday card you sent me, and hasten to thank you. Your words of support mean a great deal. Please know how much I appreciate your thoughtfulness.

You have my best wishes for the holiday season.

Sincerely,



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 15 2005

**Ms. Nancy L. Gowing**

(b)(6)

**Dear Ms. Gowing,**

**Thanks so much for the holiday card you sent me. I  
deeply appreciate your kindness and your support.**

**You have my best wishes for the holiday season.**

**Sincerely,**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. M. Gates".



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 15 2005

Mr. and Mrs. Donald Fisher



Dear Mr. & Mrs. Fisher,

It was so thoughtful of you to send me such a kind note. Your support means a great deal to me, and takes on a new significance in the face of your family's loss.

As I said in my earlier letter, your son was an honorable man who was dedicated to the cause of freedom. Corporal Donald Fisher played an important part in helping Iraq build its growing democracy. His sacrifice was not made in vain. The service he gave has historic meaning, for with the spread of democracy comes the promise of a safer world.

I will continue to keep you and your family in my prayers during this holiday season.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 24096-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55141

Mrs. Joanne Phillips

(b)(6)

Dear Mrs. Phillips,

I want to thank you for the Christmas card you sent me. I appreciate your support a great deal.

Please pass along my gratitude to your children for their service to our nation. You have every right to be proud.

With my best wishes for the holiday season,

Sincerely,

6/2





Mr. Donald Rumsfeld  
&  
Family

May the love that  
was born to Christ  
be your guiding light  
all the days of your

Thank you for all you do  
U.S. Armed forces. I have  
children currently in the  
and I am very proud of

Merry Christmas  
and  
God Bless

*"...Christ shall give thee light."*

ANS 5514

11-L-0559/OSD/55144

Ms. Kelli Henson

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Henson,

Thank you so much for the Christmas card. It was kind of you to remember me, and I want you to know I appreciate your words of support.


You have my best wishes for the holiday season.

Sincerely,

61

Kelli Henson

(b)(6)



Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000



Mr. Secretary,  
I appreciate so much your  
wavering resolve and leadership  
during these trying times in  
America's history! May God bless  
you and your family at Christmas  
and always!

Kelli Henson

  
There's no nicer time  
than Christmas  
to remember  
special people  
like you!

Merry Christmas

Sincerely,  
Kelli Henson

(b)(6)

2005

11-L-0559/OSD/55146

Mr. and Mrs. James Eddy

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Eddy,

I received the holiday card you sent me, and hasten to thank you. Your words of support mean a great deal. Please know how much I appreciate your thoughtfulness.

You have my best wishes for the holiday season.

Sincerely,

b/c

Yes, the eagle is flying  
high with success in the war  
against terrorism. Best wishes  
in leading our very special  
Americans in opening the gates  
of liberty & democracy to people  
chained to terrorism.

Secretary Rumsfeld B. L.

May 2006 bring  
in achieving your personal  
goals. Charge!

Samuel Fielder

May 2, 2006

11-L-0559/OSD/55148

## SAVE TREES

an alternative to trees - saving our forests. We use kenaf in the southern United States. By using kenaf, we are preserving valuable animal habitat. In addition, kenaf is chemical-free in processing and is fully recyclable. We imagine a world where trees are cut to make paper. This card is one small step in that direction, hoping forests to stay tree-full.

forêts, il y a une autre alternative que les arbres dans la forêt. Nous utilisons du Kenaf (chanvre), plante qui pousse au sud des États-Unis. En utilisant cette matière, nous supportons les cultivateurs et préservons l'habitat des animaux sauvages. De plus, Kenaf ne nécessite aucun produit chimique et il est entièrement recyclable. Nous imaginons qu'un jour les arbres seront coupés pour faire du papier. La fabrication de cette carte est une petite étape dans cette direction, espérant ainsi sauvegarder nos forêts.



Tree-Free Greetings™

Marblehead, New Hampshire

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Tree-Free Paper supplied by Vision Paper

410165

55149

Printed in Canada





Mr. James Eddy

(b)(6)



RECEIVED  
DEC - 7 2005  
Correspondence Control Division

Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.  
501-1000

Ms. Nancy L. Gowing

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Gowing,

Thanks so much for the holiday card you sent me. I deeply appreciate your kindness and your support.

You have my best wishes for the holiday season.

Sincerely,

DLK

Nancy L. Gowing

(b)(6)

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,



May your holidays  
arrive on wings of hope!

Thank you for all you've done and are  
doing for our country and for the world.  
I support the Bush administration 1000%,  
and you are such an important part of it.  
The USA couldn't be in finer hands.

With much gratitude, Nancy Gowing

11-L-0559/OSD/55152

Nancy Gowing

(b)(6)



DALLAS TX 752

28 NOV 2005 PM 2 L



Secretary Donald Rumsfeld  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

20301+1000

1106591080/531531

Mr. and Mrs. Donald Fisher

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Fisher,

It was so thoughtful of you to send me such a kind note. Your support means a great deal to me, particularly in the face of your family's loss.

As I said in my earlier letter, your son was an honorable man who was dedicated to the cause of freedom. Corporal Donald Fisher played an important part in helping Iraq build its growing democracy, and his sacrifice was not made in vain. His service has historic meaning, for with the spread of democracy comes the promise of a safer world.

I will continue to keep y  
prayers during this holiday sea:

With my very best wish

Since

OK

All -

This couple lost a son in OIF and  
were kind enough to send the attached  
note in response to SD's condolence  
letters. He included the with this  
snowflake (120905-12) w: Christmas  
cards. I have used similar language  
in similar letters pg 1. Original  
condolence attached. This  
QJL 12/13



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOV 16 2005

Mr. and Mrs. Donald E. Fisher

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Fisher,

I want to offer my deepest sympathy on the loss of your son. I realize no words can ease your pain, but please know that you are in my thoughts and prayers during this difficult time.

Those who serve in our military face danger and risk in defense of our nation. Your son was a courageous American who served with honor, and he will be remembered for his sacrifice for the country.

In voluntarily placing himself in danger, your son joined a long line of distinguished American heroes who chose a path of service to others. Our nation and the world are enriched because he took a stand for liberty. He will be missed.

Corporal Donald Fisher was a devoted Soldier and gave his all for the cause of freedom. His efforts helped to put the people of Iraq on a path toward the opportunities offered in a free society. We are proud of him and grateful for his accomplishments in helping liberate the 26 million people of Iraq.

Please accept my heartfelt condolences.

Sincerely,

OSD 22435-05

It was so  
and  
ll

Thank yo

Sheryl

-Mr. Rumsfeld-

Thank you for the wonderful  
letter. Your support of our troops  
is greatly appreciated by all of  
us. May God bless you and your  
family.

11-L-0559/OSD/55156



~~FOUO~~

December 15, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Advanced Preparation

334NR8

If we could get the read-aheads for **PC** and **NSC** meetings three days ahead, it would be terrific. Then my **staff** could work them for a day, and I could have a pre-brief on them the day ahead of the meetings. so I will have time to fit in my preparation time with the rest of my schedule. There isn't much point in meeting unless we have prepared properly.

At present, the read-aheads are often coming the **day** ahead, with the **NSC** or **PC** meeting the next day. When that happens, my staff doesn't have time to gather the information I need to be prepared, and I don't have time to read the materials, so that I can participate thoughtfully.

It would sure be a help in my life if that could be arranged.

Thanks.

DHR.db  
121405-28

OSD 24142-05

15 DEC 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55158

1/20  
1/21  
1/20  
1315



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

1/20  
1/23  
7:16

ACTION MEMO

January 18, 2006, 5:00 PM

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

COMPTROLLER  
**Robert Rangel**  
01/23  
RR →

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Support for Regime Crimes Liaison Office - Request from the Attorney General

- You asked me to provide you a status of the funding request from Attorney General Gonzales for continued DoD financial support for the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), and what if anything DoD should be doing about it (Tab A).
- To date, DoD has provided financial support to the RCLO using resources (\$82 million) from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), which is managed by the Department of State.
- I have discussed this issue with Joe Bowab, my counterpart at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
  - He agreed that RCLO support is not a DoD funding responsibility.
  - He intends to work with the Department of State concerning the additional funding being sought by the Department of Justice for RCLO support.
- I have attached a proposed response to the Attorney General that advises him that OMB intends to address the RCLO funding issue with the appropriate parties to achieve a successful outcome (Tab B).

*TWJ*  
*18 Jan 6*

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary of Defense sign letter at Tab B.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Mary E. Tompkey, (b)(6)

SP3 1/20

MA SD	1/23	SMA DSD	
SA SD	<i>ML</i>	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>M</i>	<i>MS</i>	1/23 135
ESR MA	<i>SV-20</i> <i>1016</i>		

*16 Dec 05*

OSD 24195-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55159

FOUO

JAN 03 2006 7:16

JAN 03 2006

TO: Tina Jones  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Funding for Regime Crimes Liaison Office

Please take a look at this letter from the Attorney General of the United States and tell me what the status is and what we ought to be doing, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/14/05 AG ltr to SD re: Iraq Special Tribunal

DHR-sh  
122905-04 (TB).doc

.....  
*Please respond by January 26, 2006*

*DR*  
*1/23*  
Sir.  
Response attached.  
*v/m,*  
*Lt Col General*

JAN 23 2006

FOUO

OSD 24195-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55160



Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

December 16, 2005

DR  
12/16

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States Department of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

On May 13, 2004, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSIPD) 37, which called for the United States to provide the necessary assistance to the Iraqi people to establish a fully functioning, independent Iraqi Special Tribunal, consistent with applicable law.

In accordance with NSIPD 37, I appointed a Region Crime Liaison (RCL) to the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Through our operations of the Region Crime Liaison Office (RCLLO), the Department of Justice assists the Iraqi Government in its commitment to try Saddam Hussein and others accused of crimes against humanity. Our efforts range from evidence gathering to critical prosecutorial support. Also, as part of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the United States Marshall Service has ordered the Iraqi Judiciary with witness and courthouse security, which is necessary for bringing members of the former regime to trial.

I would like to thank you for your support the RCLLO and to call your continued support. Over the past two years, the Department of State has provided \$24.4 million to the RCLLO and \$13.9 million to the Marshall Service, and the Department of Defense has provided \$81.5 million to the RCLLO. These funds, provided by Congress in the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund, have greatly contributed to our support of the Iraqi Special Tribunal and its efforts in ensuring that the members of the former Iraqi regime are held for their crimes against the Iraqi people.

Unfortunately, I understand that current funding for the RCLLO will expire between June and September 2006, and I am unaware of plans for continued funding. As the vital of Saddam Hussein program, critical RCLLO and other Department of Justice support must not be disrupted. The Department urgently needs your continued financial support. I have asked OMB Director Joshua Bolten aware of the funding situation, and given the seriousness of the issue and our support to the



A-11-2

OSD 24/195-05

11-L-05559/OSD/55161


12/16/2006 10:41 FAX

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Page 2

Iraq justice system, I wanted to be sure I have your support as your financial staff requests additional Iraq reconstruction funding.

Thank you for your help with this very important mission.

Sincerely,



Alberto R. Gonzales

cc: Joshua Bolton  
Director  
Office of Management and Budget

Condoleezza Rice  
Secretary of State  
United States Department of State

A-#3

**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)**

**COORDINATION SHEET**

SUBJECT: Support for Regime Crimes Liaison Office – Response to the Attorney General

USD(Policy)	Eric Edelman	January 9, 2006
General Counsel <b>GC Comment:</b>	W. J. Haynes No legal objection to proposed response, but I believe <del>that</del> DoD <u>could</u> justify such support also.	January 16, 2006
Office of Management and Budget	Joe Bowab Associate Director National Security and International Affairs Division	January 9, 2006

~~FOUO~~

7:16

JAN 03 2006

*Iraq*

TO: Tina Jonas  
 CC: Eric Edelman  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Funding for Regime Crimes Liaison Office

Please take a look at this letter from the Attorney General of the United States and tell me what the status is and what we ought to be doing, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 12/16/05 AG ltr to SD re: Iraqi Special Tribunal

DRE:dh  
 122905-24 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by January 26, 2006*

*3 Jan 06*

~~FOUO~~

*16 Dec 05*

OSD 24195-05



Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D. C. 20530  
December 16, 2005

2005 DEC 16 11 03 AM '05

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States Department of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld

On May 13, 2004, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 37, which called for the United States to provide the necessary assistance to the Iraqi people to establish a fully functioning, independent Iraqi Special Tribunal, consistent with applicable law.

In accordance with NSPD 37, I appointed a Regime Crimes Liaison (RCL) to the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Through our operation of the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), the Department of Justice assists the Iraqi Government in its commitment to try Saddam Hussein and others accused of crimes against humanity. Our efforts range from evidence gathering to critical prosecutorial support. Also, as part of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the United States Marshals Service has assisted the Iraqi judiciary with witness and courthouse security, which is necessary for bringing members of the former regime to trial.

I would like to thank you for your support the RCLO and to enlist your continued support. Over the past two years, the Department of State has provided \$24.4 million to the RCLO and \$35.0 million to the Marshals Service, and the Department of Defense has provided \$81.6 million to the RCLO. These funds, provided by Congress in the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund, have greatly contributed to our support of the Iraqi Special Tribunal and its efforts in ensuring that the members of the former Iraqi regime are tried for their crimes against the Iraqi people.

Unfortunately, I understand that current funding for the RCLO will expire between June and September 2006, and I am unaware of plans for continued funding. As the trial of Saddam Hussein progresses, critical RCLO and other Department of Justice support must not be disrupted. The Department urgently needs your continued financial support. I have made OMB Director Joshua Bolten aware of the funding situation, and given the seriousness of the issue and our support to the

OSD 24195-05

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
11-L-0559/OSD/55165

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Page 2

Iraqi justice system, I wanted to be sure I have your support as your financial staff requests additional Iraq reconstruction funding.

Thank you for your help with this very important mission.

Sincerely,

  
Alberto R. Gonzales  
Alberto R. Gonzales

cc: Joshua Bolten  
Director  
Office of Management and Budget

Condoleezza Rice  
Secretary of State  
United States Department of State



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JAN 24 2006

The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales  
Attorney General  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I am responding to your request for continued DoD financial support to the Regime Crimes Liaison Office.

We have discussed the issue of providing continued support for the Regime Crimes Liaison Office with the Office of Management and Budget. They do not believe that this is a Department of Defense funding issue. We understand that they intend to address the funding shortfall with the appropriate parties to achieve a successful outcome.

Sincerely,

*TRP*

*24 Jan 06*

*16 Dec 05*



OSD 24195-05

~~FOUO~~

NOV 28 11:52

November 28, 2005

I-05/015669  
ES-4765

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld: *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Template on World-Wide Planning

You may want to take a look at this memo I dictated in October. There are some thoughts there you might want to begin thinking about fashioning a template on.

Please think about it, and talk to me.

Thanks.

Attach: 10/4/05 SecDef MFR on World-Wide Planning

DHR:es  
(12805-3)

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/16/05*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24232-05

25-11-05 14:53 16

11-L-0559/OSD/55168

**FOUO**

**October 04, 2005**

**SUBJECT:** World-wide Planning

I have to think **through** who is doing what world-wide:

- **Who is** planning exercises with India, the countries we want to **cultivate and the like**.
- Get a laydown of who is **going** where when.
- Coordinate trips **so** we get the right emphasis, the right rhythm, **the right messages, and the right people in the right countries**.
- We have **to** link public affairs with senior military **and** civilian people (people who are **4-stars** and above), **see** that they **are moving** around the **USA** and **that** we **know** where they **are going**.
- We ought **to look** at what the market is, how we're impacting it, what is **right and what is wrong and fix** it with a new set of **arrangements**.

DHR:db  
100405-26

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/55169

INFO MEMO

11:52

A/DSD \_\_\_\_\_  
I-05/015669-ES  
ES-4765

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *UE* DEC 16 2005

SUBJECT: Your "Template on World-Wide Planning" Memo

- In response to your memo (next under) we are taking steps to better coordinate the travel of, and messages delivered by, the Department's senior military and civilian officials.
  - We are creating a database in which all senior officials' planned travel will be input and updated monthly or as required.
    - o These travel plans should be driven by your *Security Cooperation Guidance*
  - We will work with Public Affairs to mine this database to ensure the right countries are getting the right attention from the right people.
    - o Where needed, we will suggest changes to get it right.
  - I will recommend to Larry DiRita that PA establish a similar database for domestic travel, and reception of foreign senior-level persons.
- The mechanism we develop will ask DoD Components to:
  - Consult the *SCG* to prioritize their travel;
  - Develop strategic communication annexes to their country/regional plans; and
  - Consult with Peter Rodman or Peter Flory and ASD(PA) prior to travel to assure continuity of message.

COORDINATION:

ASD(PA) CORY provided

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: CDR Chip Denman, OSD(P)-STRAT, (b)(6)

OSD 24232-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55170

~~FOUO~~

- NOV 22 2005

TO: Mike Donley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: New Comdor

I would really like to have a corridor dedicated to all the humanitarian things the Department of Defense has done -- like the Tsunami, Pakistan, Rita, Katrina, firefighting, etc. -- all the things we've done around the world over the years, and I would like to be able to dedicate it some time next year.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
112103-09

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55171

OSD 24261-05



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

DEC 19 2005  
11 12 34

INFOMEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration & Management <sup>MBD</sup> DEC 19 2005

SUBJECT: New Corridor

- In a November 22, 2005 "snowflake" you asked for creation of a "humanitarian operations" comdor here in the Pentagon.
- We are working with representatives of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to formulate alternate concepts (design and location) to submit for your review and approval not later than end of January.
- We are also in the process of developing a coordinated Pentagon Master Corridor and Exhibit Plan publication which we will be providing to you for your review and approval sometime this spring.
- We will keep you apprised of the progress being made on both projects.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Craig H. Glassner, (b)(6)

OSD 24261-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55172

**WHS SUMMARY SHEET**

	TO	ACTION	Signature, Name and Date	TO	ACTION	Signature, Name and Date
1	CCS Manager	LOG IN	<i>EE Cook-Harmonizing</i> DEC 13 2005			
2	Dir, WHS	COORD	<i>12/15</i>			
3	A & M	SIGN	<i>ADD 12/19</i>			
4	CCS Manager	LOG OUT	<i>EE Cook-Harmonizing</i> DEC 13			
5						

Name of Action Officer: Craig H. Glassner	Symbol: ESD	Phone: <input type="text" value="(b)(6)"/>	Suspense Date:
--	----------------	---	----------------

Subject: "Humanitarian Operations" Corridor	Date: 13 Dec 05
--	--------------------

RECOMMENDATION: Director, Administration and Management approve and sign memo ~~at TAB A~~

*Craig H. Glassner*  
 Craig H. Glassner  
 Director, Executive Services Directorate

*[Signature]*  
 2 Tabs AS  
 1. Proposed Memo for signature  
 2. SECDEF Snowflake

*AM 200611-05*



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFOMEMO

11-44

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD** 21 DEC 2005

SUBJECT: New Corridor

- In a November 22, 2005 "snowflake" you asked for creation of a "humanitarian operations" corridor here in the Pentagon,
- We are working with representatives of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to formulate alternate concepts (design and location) to submit for **your** review and approval by January 31, 2006.
- We are also in the process of developing a coordinated Pentagon Master Corridor and Exhibit Plan publication which we will be providing to you for your review and approval by April 28, 2006.
- We will keep you apprised of the progress being made on both projects.

COORDINATION None

Prepared by: Craig H. Glassner, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

NOV 22 2005

TO: Mike Donley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: New Corridor

I would really like to have a corridor dedicated to all the humanitarian things the Department of Defense has done -- like the Tsunami, Pakistan, Rita, Katrina, firefighting, etc. -- all the things we've done around the world over the years, and I would like to be able to dedicate it some time next year.

**Thanks.**

DHR:es  
112105-09

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55175

OSD 24261-05

NOV 22 2005

TO: Mike Donley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: New Corridor

I would really like to have a comdor dedicated to all the ~~humanitarian~~ things the Department of Defense ~~has~~ done -- like the Tsunami, Pakistan, Rita, Katrina, firefighting, etc. -- all the things we've done around the world over the years, and I would like to be able to dedicate it some time next year.

Thanks.

DHR:es  
112105-09



*Re-do w/ date certain for the projects referred to*

*Sir  
Response attached.  
via  
LHed lensyel*  
DEC 21 2005

2/20  
1430



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET  
NO FORN DISSEM

INFOMEMO

Robert Rangel

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration & Management

DEC 19 2005

SUBJECT: New Corridor

- In a November 22, 2005 "snowflake" you asked for creation of a "humanitarian operations" corridor here in the Pentagon.
- We are working with representatives of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to formulate alternate concepts (design and location) to submit for your review and approval not later than end of January.
- We are also in the process of developing a coordinated Pentagon Master Comdor and Exhibit Plan publication which we will be providing to you for your review and approval sometime this spring.
- We will keep you apprised of the progress being made on both projects.

COORDINATION NONE

Prepared By: Craig H. Glassner (b)(6)

SPO 12/20

MA ST	12/21	OWA DRU
TSA SU	12/20	SA DSP
EXEC SEC	12/20 1330	12/21
LSR/AR	12/21	12/21

11-L-0559/OSD/55177

OSD 24261-05

~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2005

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Secretary of State's Authority to Send People Oversea

I would like to know precisely what the Secretary of State's authority is to order people to go overseas -- to places like Iraq and *Afghanistan*.

Thanks.

---

DTIC  
121405-22

.....  
*Please Respond By January 04, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24262-05  
Patt P. Proctor  
cc IA

11-L-0559/OSD/55178



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

705

1 B 5

INFO MEMO

DEC 19 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Department of State Authority to Order Civilian Employees to go Overseas

- You asked what precise authority the Secretary of State has to order people to go overseas – to places like Iraq and Afghanistan.
- The specific authority is found in section 504 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended" (22 U.S.C. § 3984(a)) (attached), which states in part that:  
"Career members of the [Foreign] Service shall be obligated to serve abroad and shall be expected to serve abroad for substantial portions of their careers."
- This authority applies only to members of the Foreign Service. There is no such authority for title 5 employees, e.g., General Schedule employees, in the State Department.
- State Department makes "world-wide availability" a condition of employment in the Foreign Service.
- This is consistent with the statement of Congressional intent that members of the Foreign Service should be "available to serve on assignments throughout the world" (22 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(4)).

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by Helen Sullivan, ODGC(P&HP), (b)(6)

11-L-0550/SD/55179

OSD 24262-05

## LIBRARY REFERENCES

**American Digest System**

Ambassadors and Consuls ¶1, 2.  
Key Number System Topic No. 26.

## WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH

See WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume.

**§ 3984. Service in United States and abroad****(a) Obligation to serve abroad; length of stay in United States**

Career members of the Service shall be obligated to serve abroad and shall be expected to serve abroad for substantial portions of their careers. The Secretary shall establish by regulation limitations upon assignments of members of the Service within the United States. A member of the Service may not be assigned to duty within the United States for any period of continuous service exceeding eight years unless the Secretary approves an extension of such period for the member because of special circumstances.

**(b) Intermittent duty within United States**

Consistent with the needs of the Service, the Secretary shall seek to assign each career member of the Service who is a citizen of the United States (other than those employed in accordance with section 3951 of this title) to duty within the United States at least once during each period of fifteen years that the member is in the Service.

**(c) sabbaticals**

The Secretary may grant a sabbatical to a career member of the Senior Foreign Service for not to exceed eleven months in order to permit the member to engage in study or uncompensated work experience which will contribute to the development and effectiveness of the member. A sabbatical may be granted under this subsection under conditions specified by the Secretary in light of the provisions of section 3396(c) of Title 5, which apply to sabbaticals granted to members of the Senior Executive Service.

(Pub.L. 96-465, Title I, § 504, Oct. 17, 1980, 94 Stat. 2094; Pub.L. 103-236, Title I, § 180(a)(5), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 416.)

## HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

**Revision Notes and Legislative Report.** 103-482, see 1994 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 302.  
1980 Acts. Senate Report No. 96-913 and House Conference Report No. 961432, see 1980 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4419.  
**Amendments.** 1994 Amendment. Subsec. (b) 1994 Act. Senate Report No. 103-107 and House Conference Report No. 103-482, see 1994 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 302.

section with section 3951 of this title) after "United States".

**Effective and Applicability Provisions.** 1980 Acts. Section effective Feb. 1, 1981, except as otherwise provided, s

## LIBRARY

**American Digest System**

Ambassadors and Consuls ¶1.  
Key Number System Topic No. 26.

## WESTLAW ELE

See WESTLAW guide following the

**§ 3985. Temporary details**

A period of duty of not more than one year of a member of the Service shall not be considered an assignment for purposes of this subchapter.

(Pub.L. 96-465, Title I, § 505, Oct.

## HISTORICAL AND

**Revision Notes and Legislative Reports.** 1980 Acts. Senate Report No. 96-9 and House Conference Report No. 96-1432, see 1980 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4419.

## LIBRARY

**American Digest System**

Ambassadors and Consuls ¶1.  
Key Number System Topic No. 26.

## WESTLAW ELE

See WESTLAW guide following the

## SUBCHAPTER VI—PR

**§ 4001. Promotions****(a) Method of promotion**

Career members of the Senior Foreign Service serving under career appointments are promoted by this title to a higher salary class in the Senior Foreign Service officers, and

~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2005

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Secretary of State's Authority to Send People Overseas

I would like to know precisely what the Secretary of State's authority is to order people to go overseas -- to places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHK ss  
121405-22

.....  
***Please Respond By January 04, 2006***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55181

PtHP Section  
cc IA

**FOUO**

**December 08, 2005**

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT Defined Benefit Pension Plan Policy

I just read your memo on the new Armed Services Committee Defined Benefit Pension Plan policy. You say I'm not subject to it because it applies only to current and future nominees, as opposed to officials. I wonder if I ought to go ahead and adhere to it, regardless. If so, what would I have to do?

Thanks.

DHR ss  
120805-07

.....

*Please Respond By 12/19/05*

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/55182

**OSD 24269-05**



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600


SECRET

INFO MEMO

2005 DEC 20 PM 3:04

December 20, 2005 (10:34pm)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: Defined Benefit Pension Plan Policy

- You asked whether you should voluntarily apply the SASC defined pension benefit plan policy, and if you do, what would be the consequence.
- A voluntary application of the SASC policy would demonstrate once more your willingness to go above and beyond what is required and the affect of this action would be limited.

The SASC policy is triggered only by contractors that have contracts with DoD exceeding \$1M. Of your holdings, this affects only the Kellogg Company.

- You would only be required recuse yourself from acting on particular matters that have a direct, predictable, and substantial effect on the financial interests of the Kellogg Company.
- It is extremely remote that this Department can substantially affect the Kellogg Company, since our business with them in FY 04 was \$19.5M out of their net sales of \$9.614B.
- Even then the Designated Agency Ethics Official may authorize your participation after making a written finding that the interest of the Government in your participation outweighs the appearance of impropriety.
- If you were to adopt this limitation, I will draft a memo to your immediate office advising them to divert such matters to the Acting Deputy Secretary.

COORDINATION: None



11-L-0559/OSD/55183

OSD 24269-05

~~FOUO~~

December 08, 2005

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT Defined Benefit Pension Plan Policy

I just read your memo on the new Armed Services Committee Defined Benefit Pension Plan policy. You say I'm not subject to it because it applies only to current and future nominees, **as** opposed to officials. I wonder if I ought to go ahead and adhere to it, regardless. If so, what would I have to do?

Thanks.

DHR.ss  
120805-07

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/19/05*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55184

Back

FOUO

*[Handwritten scribbles]*

November 28, 2005

I-05/015742  
ES-4786

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Establishing Priorities

*AFGHANISTAN? OR GLOBAL?*

You might want to think about whether it is possible to begin establishing some priorities for the U.S. Government. As an example, where does strengthening the rule of law in Afghanistan rank?

Please see me to discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:sa  
112805-48

.....  
Please Respond By 12/15/05

*12/15/05*

OSD 24270-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55185

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

DSD  
A/USDP *12* DEC 20 2005  
I-05/015742  
ES-4786

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

*Ruby*

DEC 16 2005

SUBJECT: Establishing U.S. Government Priorities

- You asked us to look at establishing priorities for the U.S. Government (note attached).
- In our QDR work we are not only determining priorities for the Department of Defense, but also highlighting those capabilities and responsibilities that we feel should be addressed by the broader U.S. Government.
- We have also raised such issues with Peter Feaver for consideration in the next National Security Strategy or a subsidiary interagency planning document. These issues warrant attention by many departments across the U.S. Government.
  - For example, a classified National Security Planning Guidance – a concept you approved at the 5 December SLRG – could establish such priorities.
- I will continue to keep you informed on the progress of these discussions.

COORDINATION:

Attachment: As stated.

Prepared by: LTC Tom Cosentino, Strategy (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 24270-05

Policy Info Memo Template

11-L-0559/OSD/55186

FOUO

DEC 20 2005

TO: **Vice** President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Poster: We're At War

Attached is a poster you may want to place in **your** office as a reminder to everybody that we are at war.

Regards, and Merry Christmas.

Attach **Posters**

DHR:dh  
121905-38

OSD 24277-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55187

060

20 DEC 05

**WE'RE AT WAR**



WAVE, UNITED STATES FLAG

**ARE YOU DOING  
ALL YOU CAN?**

OSD 24277-05

~~FOUO~~

DEC 20 2005

TO: The Honorable Robert Kimmitt  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Poster

060

Attached is a poster you deserve. My impression is that you've stepped right up and are helping to see that your Department is doing all it can with respect to the Global War on Terror. I want you to know that it is noticed, and we appreciate it.

Warm regards,

Attach. Poster

DHR.dh  
121905-39

OSD 24279-05

270 DEC 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55189

**WE'RE AT WAR**



WAVE, UNTECHERY FLAGG

**ARE YOU DOING  
ALL YOU CAN?**

OSD 24279-05

~~FOUO~~

DEC 20 2005

KAZAKHSTAN

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
CC: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Kazakhstan's Presidential Inauguration on 11 January 2006

I think it's important that we send a top-level delegation to Astana for the Kazakh presidential inauguration on 11 January. We need to have a high profile presence there, given the critical importance of that country.

I would recommend at a minimum we consider Carlos Gutierrez, John Snow and/or Sam Bodman, as well as some important business people and a strong Congressional presence.

I'm told Condi can't go. I have all the Combatant Commanders in town for a three-day conference that falls right over the date, or I'd go. I hope you'll push on this.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
121905-42

20 DEC 05

OSD 24280-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55191

**FOUO**

AUG 16 2005

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Accelerating the **Date** on the Joint Foreign Area Officer Program

Please accelerate the **date on the Joint Foreign Area Officer Program to September 15**. Let's get it done.

Thanks.

Attach: 6/7/05 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R); 8/9/05 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss  
081505-22

.....  
*Please Respond By September 15, 2005*

USD	PDUSD
RA	HA
PI	Roadiness
MPP	CPP
PLANS	MC&FP
CCO	

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/55192

OSD 24282-05

FOUO

2005 AUG 11 AM 11: 57

June 7, 2005

TO: David Chu  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Joint Foreign Area Officers Program

Attached is an interesting article from Proceedings comparing the Service's FAO programs. Should we have a single, Joint approach for FAO programs?

It doesn't make sense to have each of the Services developing separate tracks. Maybe we should pick the best model and have everyone implement it.

Let me know what you propose.

Thanks.

Amak  
 06/05 Proceedings article "Behind the Curve in Culture-Centric 21st C"

DEK:us  
 08/76-27 (12)

.....  
 Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Siri*  
*Response attached.*

*V/A*  
*Lt Col Longyel*

AUG 12 2005

FOUO

USD	POUSD
NA	NA
PI	Readiness
MPP	CFP
PLANS	MC&FP
CCO	

OSD 15677-05

~~FOUO~~

X TET

June 7, 2005

TO: Gordon England  
 Fran Harvey  
 Mike Dominguez  
 Gen Mike Hageo

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
 David Chu  
 ADM Vern Clark  
 GEN Pete Schoomaker  
 Gen John Jumper

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Foreign Area Officers Program

Attached is an interesting article from Proceedings comparing the Service's FAO programs. I know you have been thinking about this as well. Please give me a sense of what your Service is doing to energize its approach - this is a critical area of concern throughout the Department.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 06/05 Proceedings article "Behind the Curve in Culture-Centric Skills"

DR/Rum  
 060705-26 (13)

.....  
 Please respond by 6/24

*6/24*

~~FOUO~~

*- Copy sent to  
 Mr. Arthur [unclear]*

*RA*

81.



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



2005 AUG 11 AM 11:57

INFO MEMO

August 9, 2005, 1:30 PM

8/12  
Steve Bulls  
Staff Director

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

SUBJECT: Joint Foreign Area Officer Program — SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

8/12

- You asked, "Should we have a single, joint approach for FAO programs?"
- That is the direction in which we are headed, through Department-wide standards each program must meet. These were promulgated in DoD Directive 1315.17 "Military Department Foreign Area Officer Programs" signed on April 28, 2005, by the Deputy Secretary.
- ~~After~~ signing the Directive, the ~~Deputy~~ Secretary asked the Services to develop action plans. We have received the Army, Navy and USAF Action Plans. The USMC plan will be forthcoming shortly.
- We will review ~~the~~ Service Action Plans with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and submit a "Joint Plan" to the Deputy Secretary by September 30, 2005.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: LTC Iris Bulls, ODUSS/PLANS/DLO, [iris.bulls@osd.pentagon.mil](mailto:iris.bulls@osd.pentagon.mil), (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

MA GD	8/12	SMA DSD	
SEA GD	8/12	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	8/11	VSO	
ENR MA	8/11	LSIS	



OSD 15677-05



PERFORMANCES

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D C. 20301-4000



INFORMATION MEMO

November 21, 2005, 2:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu*  
2005.12.1

SUBJECT: Joint Plan for the Foreign Area Officer Program

- You asked us to develop and accelerate a Joint Foreign Area Officer Program (TAB A). The Deputy Secretary had also requested Service plans and a Joint program (TAB B.)
- The Services have submitted action plans to us. We have reviewed these plans, in coordination with the Joint Staff. These plans will produce over 400 new FAOs by FY2010 (TAB C).
- The purpose of a Joint FAO Program will be to build a corps of FAOs capable of operating in a joint environment because they have similar training, developmental experiences, and expertise.
- To get there, over the next 12 months we will build on the Service plans and engage the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Services, and interested parties in OSD to standardize the Service FAO programs, determine needs, and develop roles and responsibilities. Our immediate efforts will focus on:
  1. Standardizing the minimum FAO training and educational requirements, identifying the best parts of each Service program.
  2. Examining the concept of establishing one or more Joint FAO Training Centers of Excellence.
  3. Addressing requirements for FAO retention and incentives.
  4. Establishing metrics to track FAO program implementation.
  5. Ensuring follow through on program implementation.
- We will also need to work with the Services to ensure that there is an opportunity for promotion of FAOs to general/flag officer rank. This aspect was weak in the reports we received.
- I have signed a memorandum kicking off this initiative (TAB D).

COORDINATION: Director, Joint Staff (TAB E)

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC (P) Benya. christopher.bervaiosd.uentagon.mil (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/55197

**FOUO**

AUG 16 2005

3:43

**T O** David Chu

**CC:** Gen Dick ~~Myas~~

**FROM** Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

**SUBJECT:** Accelerating the Date on the Joint Foreign Area Officer Program

Please accelerate the date on the Joint Foreign Area Officer Program to September 15. Let's get it done.

Thanks.

Attach: 6/7/05 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R); 8/9/05 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDx

**DRR:sa**  
081505-22

.....

*Please Respond By September 15, 2005*

r

<b>USD</b>	<b>PDUSD</b>
<b>RA</b>	<b>HA</b>
<b>PI</b>	<b>Readiness</b>
<b>MPP</b>	<b>CPP</b>
<b>PLANS</b>	<b>MC&amp;FP</b>
<b>CCO</b>	

**FOUO**

OSD 24282-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55198

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 AUG 11 AM 11: 57

June 7, 2005

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Foreign Area Officers Program

Attached is an interesting article from Proceedings comparing the Service's PAO programs. Should we have a single, Joint approach for PAO programs?

It doesn't make sense to have each of the Services developing separate tracks. Maybe we should pick the best model and have everyone implement it.

Let me know what you propose.

Thanks.

Attach:  
06/05 Proceedings article "Behind the Curve in Culture-Centric Skills"

CRS  
08/05-07 (10)

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Siri*  
*Response attached.*  
*v/a*  
*Lt Col Bengyel*

AUG 12 2005

FOUO

USD	PDUSD
RA	HA
PI	Readiness
MPP	GPP
PLANS	MCRFP
CGO	

OSD 15677-05

~~FOUO~~

X TRT

June 7, 2005

TO: Gordon England  
Fran Harvey  
Mike Dominguez  
Gen Mike Hagee

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
David Chin  
ADM Vern Clark  
GEN Pete Schoonmaker  
Gen John Jumper

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Foreign Area Officers Program

Attached is an interesting article from Proceedings comparing the Service's FAO programs. I know you have been thinking about this as well. Please give me a sense of what your Service is doing to energize its approach - this is a critical area of concern throughout the Department.

Thanks.

Attach.  
06/05 Proceedings article "Behind the Curve in Culture-Centric Skills"

DESIG  
960703-26 (18)

.....  
Please respond by 6/24

FOUO

*6/6*  
- Copy sent to  
All Parties USR 100

*FA*

11-L-0559/OSD/55200



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



2005 AUG 11 AM 11: 57

INFO MEMO

August 9, 2005, 1:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

SUBJECT: Joint Foreign Area Officer Program — SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

SP-15/12  
Steve Bullis  
Staff Director

8/12

- You asked, "Should we have a single, joint approach for FAO programs?"
- o That is the direction in which we are headed, through Department-wide standards each program must meet. These were promulgated in DoD Directive 1315.17 "Military Department Foreign Area Officer Programs" signed on April 28, 2005, by the Deputy Secretary.
- o After signing the Directive, the Deputy Secretary asked the Services to develop action plans. We have received the Army, Navy and USAF Action Plans. The USMC plan will be forthcoming shortly.
- o We will review the Service Action Plans with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and submit a "Joint Plan" to the Deputy Secretary by September 30, 2005.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC Iris Bullis, ODUSD/PLANS/DLO, [iris.bullis@osd.pentagon.mil](mailto:iris.bullis@osd.pentagon.mil), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

MA SD	9/12	SMA DSD	
PA SD	8/12	SA DSD	
DEP SEC	8/11	VSO	
EDR MA	8/11	ISIS	



OSD 15677-05



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

APR 28 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTMTIES

SUBJECT: Foreign Area Officer Programs

I have just signed the revision to the DoD Directive 1315.17 "Military Department Foreign Area ~~Officer~~ Programs" that sets the stage for the development and sustainment of a robust Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program within the Department of Defense.

As a first step toward this objective, I ask the Secretaries of the Military Departments to develop a detailed FAO Action Plan for Deputy Secretary approval. Such Action Plan will include the number of military officers to be trained as FAOs and a description of a viable career path that provides the opportunity for promotion of these officers into the General/Flag ranks. Additionally, the plans must display those elements necessary to maintain a sufficient cadre of FAOs, in both the Active and Reserve Components, capable of serving in combined headquarters or standing Joint Task Forces and meeting other requirements determined by the Department. I encourage you to factor the Regional Centers into your Action Plans.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) will work with each Military Department in the development of these plans and will review the plans upon completion. The USD (P&R) will provide guidelines and milestones to ensure the timely and comprehensive completion of these plans. Based on each of the individual Military Department's Action Plans, USD (P&R), in coordination with CJCS, should present a Joint Plan for the Department no later than July 29, 2005. To meet this schedule, individual Military Departments should submit their plans by June 30, 2005.

Thank you for your attention to this important initiative.

cc:  
COMMANDER, USBU COM/SACEUR  
COMMANDER, USNORTHCOM



11-L-0559/OSD/55202

OSD 02031-05

**COMMANDER, USSOCOM  
COMMANDER, STRATCOM  
COMMANDER, USTRANSCOM  
COMMANDER, USPACOM  
COMMANDER, USSOUTHCOM  
COMMANDER, USJFCOM  
COMMANDER, CENTCOM**

**PROJECTED  
FOREIGN AREA OFFICER (FAO) GROWTH'  
ALL SERVICES**

	Base FY05 Population	Additional				
		FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10
Albanian	0	0	0	0	1	0
Arabic	105	7	16	21	15	15
Chinese	51	3	6	8	4	4
Czech	13	0	0	1	1	1
Danish	0	0	0	0	1	1
Dutch	10	0	0	0	1	1
French	194	4	4	4	7	8
German	133	1	1	1	3	3
Greek	11	1	1	1	1	2
Hindi	14	2	1	2	1	2
Indonesian	19	2	3	4	6	5
Italian	46	1	1	1	2	2
Japanese	40	3	3	4	3	3
Khmer	0	0	0	1	0	0
Korean	49	3	5	7	4	4
Malay	6	0	1	0	1	1
Norwegian	6	0	0	0	2	2
Pashto	0	0	2	3	1	1
Persian-Dari	0	0	1	2	1	1
Persian-Farsi	4	1	2	2	1	1
Polish	13	1	1	1	2	2
Portuguese	132	2	3	2	4	4
Romanian	10	1	1	0	2	2
Russian	173	7	8	8	9	9
Serb-Croat	20	0	2	1	2	1
Spanish	303	11	11	11	16	15
Tagalog	13	1	2	2	2	3
Thai	27	1	2	2	4	3
Turkish	14	1	2	2	4	3
Ukrainian	31	1	0	1	0	0
Uzbek	0	0	0	1	1	1
Urdu	10	1	1	1	1	1
Vietnamese	19	1	1	2	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1466</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>103</b>

Numbers are not cumulative, but reflect the projected growth per year above attrition.

Note: Projected FAO growth in common languages such as French, Spanish, and Portuguese are based on intelligence and regional expertise requirements needed to assist in tracking the actions of terrorist organizations. These languages serve as a "Lingua Franca" allowing communication between peoples with no other shared language.



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



DEC 20 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Joint Plan for the Foreign Area Officer Program

The goal of the joint Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program is to build a corps of FAOs capable of operating in a joint environment based on similar training, developmental experiences, and expertise. We have, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed and identified the merits of each Service Plan. Now we are consolidating the best parts of each plan and accelerating our efforts to institute a robust joint FAO program.

Over the next **12** months, I have asked the Defense Language Office to follow through on program implementation by:

1. Standardizing the minimum FAO training and educational requirements, identifying the best parts of each Service program.
2. Examining the concept of establishing one or more joint FAO Training Centers of Excellence.
3. Examining FAO assignment and utilization.
4. Addressing requirements for FAO retention and incentives.
5. Establishing metrics to track FAO program implementation.

Please lend your support to the accomplishment of this critical initiative.



David S. C. Chu



11-L-0559/OSD/55205

cc:

COMMANDER, USEUCOM/SACEUR

COMMANDER, USNORTHCOM

COMMANDER, USSOCOM

COMMANDER, USSTRATCOM

COMMANDER, USTRANSCOM

COMMANDER, USPACOM

COMMANDER, USSOUTHCOM

COMMANDER, USJFCOM

COMMANDER, USCENTCOM



THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

DJSM 1038-05  
05 October 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Subject: Joint Foreign Area Officer (FAO) **Program**

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the information paper on the Joint FAO Program.<sup>1</sup> We concur in your findings with the following comments:

a. The phased approach of the OSD Joint FAO **Plan** makes sense and is achievable through the milestones presented. Each Service program has strong merits; therefore, recommend we adopt the best parts of each as we move toward a joint approach. The key **will** be the development of standard requirements for use by **all** the Services as they access, train, and manage their officers while keeping their Service ethos in tact.

b. None of the Services has identified specific general and flag officer billets. This issue **will** have to be worked with the Services, particularly the **Air** Force and USMC who desire to maintain dual-track specialties for their warfare officers.

2. The Joint Staff point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Rado, USA; J-1/DAG; (b)(6)

WALTER L. SHARP  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director, Joint **Staff**

Reference:

- 1 PDUSD(P&R) memorandum, 16 September 2005, "Foreign Area Officer **Program**"

~~FOUO~~

DJS

DJS MS

DJ-3 LEAD

November 22, 2005 DJ-5

DJ-1

TO: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Casualty Figures

If 50% of the casualties occur during the first 90 days of peoples' tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, that is half the time the Marines are even in there. If that is true, what does that mean in terms of Marine tour lengths in theater? Should they be there longer like the Army?

I also think it is long past time we get solid data as to exactly what mission (e.g. convoy escort, dismounted patrol, etc.) each person was conducting when they became a casualty, so we can begin to look at that.

I would like to see a proposal as to how we can resolve these issues quickly.

Thanks.

DHR:sm  
112205.22

.....  
***Please Respond By 12/14/05***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55208

OSD 24283-05



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300  
UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

December 20, 2005, 5:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response -- Inspector General Reports on "Ghost Detainees,"  
#093005-11 and # 100305-24 (Tabs A and B)

- Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) inquired about the status of reported CIA and DoD Inspector General investigations of "ghost detainee policy."
- Senator Reed's inquiry stems from the attached testimony of General Paul Kern, *et. al.*, on September 9, 2004 to the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on investigation into abuses at the Abu Ghraib theater internment facility. He states, "the Department of Defense Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General... have agreed that they will take on that task of investigating this *ghost detainee policy*." (Tab C)
- To date, the DoD Inspector General has not undertaken an investigation on this matter, and none is planned. DoD IG is conducting a review of the major detainee investigations, and the "ghostdetainee" issue is part of that review.
  - Regarding any CIA OIG investigations, the DoD OIG cannot attest to the work being done by the CIA OIG. Therefore, the Senator or his staff would need to pose any questions concerning CIA OIG completed, ongoing, and planned work to CIA.
- As stated in your memorandum of September 20, 2005, it is the policy of the Department of Defense to assign all detainees in its control an internment serial number as soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture. The Department maintains full accountability for all DoD detainees.
- My staff contacted Senator Reed's office on November 9, 2005 and provided this information to the Senator's Military Legislative Assistant.

COORDINATION: OGC, Detainee Affairs, DoD IG

Attachments:

Snowflake #093005-11 (TAB A)

Snowflake #100305-24 (TAB B)

SASC September 9, 2004, Question from Senator Reed (TAB C)

Prepared by: Christian P. Marrone, Special Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

OSD 24301-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55209

~~FOUO~~

A

OCT 04 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Answer to Senator Reed

I need to get an answer back to Senator Reed on the IG report that he asked about, which I don't remember.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100305-24

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By October 13, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 22270-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55210

~~FOUO~~

B

OCT 03 2005 11:05

TO: Dan Stanley  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Question from Senator Reed

Senator Reed asked about the CIA IG and the DoD IG with respect to ghost detainees. We need to get back to him (and me) as to when the inspection will be done.

Thanks

DHR..s  
0911105-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/18/05*

**OSD 22269-05**

11-L-0559/OSD/55211

CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS  
Congressional Hearings  
Sept 29, 2005

C

## Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq

REED:

Well, first, General Myers, let me, too, compliment you on 40 years of honorable service to the nation in the uniform of our country. That's something we all can agree upon and something to be very proud of. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, last September General Curran (ph) came before the committee and a response to a question from Chairman Warner indicated that the inspector general of the Department of Defense and the inspector general of the CIA had taken upon the task, in his words, of investigating the ghost detainee policy.

Can you give us an update on those investigations, when they are to conclude and when we might get results?

RUMSFELD:

I have no information about the CIA investigation. I certainly can get you an answer as to when the I.G. and the department estimates that they'll complete it.

Federal News Service September 9, 2004 Thursday

you do not have to register them immediately. That is part of the Geneva Convention, is allowed. We also found many reports for which we cannot document for you because the documentation does not exist for people who were brought into the facilities and who were moved so that they could not be identified by the International Red Cross. This is in violation of our policy which requires us to register people so that it can be reported that they are being held in detention

we have taken those actions and, as required by the instructions that we have given, and asked two organizations to do further investigations, the Department of Defense Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General, and both have agreed that they will take on that task of investigating this ghost detainee policy. The CIA has provided us a document that says their current policy is to abide by our regulations and policies if they bring a detainee to our facilities, but that policy was apparently, from what we can find, either not in effect or not known at the time that the violations that we believe happened are being reported, and that's what we're asking for further investigation to go into

SEN. WARNER: What's the volume of cases?

GEN. KERN: I can't give you a precise volume, Chairman, because there is no documentation of the numbers. We believe, and I would ask General Fay to perhaps add to this, that the number is in the dozens to perhaps up to 100. I cannot give you a precise number.

GEN. FAY: This is accurate, sir. We were not able to get documentation from the Central Intelligence Agency to answer those types of questions, so we really don't know the volume, but I believe it's probably in the dozens.

SEN. WARNER: up to 100?

GEN. FAY: I doubt that it's that high, sir, but I think it's somewhere in the area of maybe two dozen or so, maybe more.

GEN. KERN: It's a very difficult question for us to answer, Mr. Chairman, because we don't have the documentation. What you see in our report is during the interviews of people reporting to us what happened without documentation.

That is a summary of what we found, and the causes of it, failures of leadership, failures of our own discipline when we expect people without leadership to do the right thing, failures to follow our own policy, doctrine and regulations which allowed these to take place, confusion because other policies which were designed for other theaters, Guantanamo, Afghanistan, found their way into documentation that we found in Abu Ghraib, which led to numerous iterations of how interrogations and the limits of authority were to be conducted. Those interrogations -- those policies were being debated while we were asking soldiers to conduct interrogations, and so they were seeking to find their limits of their authority at the same time, as reported, they were receiving pressure to produce intelligence. The purpose of interrogations clearly is to produce intelligence, and so that is a natural state of affairs. What was not occurring, though, was the leadership to stand in-between the interrogators and the sources of those who were trying to determine the intelligence to relieve the pressure on the interrogators. Again, a failure in the leadership and the chain of command to do the right thing.

We have found, and is reported in here, that it is not just enlisted soldiers, there are commissioned officers through the grade of colonel whom we believe are culpable, and through the grade of general officer whom we believe are responsible for these allegations, and for the actions that took place.

1 of 1 DOCUMENT

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Federal News Service

September 9, 2004 Thursday

SECTION: PRESS CONFERENCE OR SPEECH

LENGTH: 32797 words

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION OF THE 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON, IRAQ

CHAIRMAN: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIAL COMMAND; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTHONY R. JONES, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL R. STEVEN WHITCOMB, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY, DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO W. TAGUBA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, READINESS, TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION

LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

## BODY:

SEN. WARNER: (Sounds gavel.) Good morning, everyone. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the investigation of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, commonly referred to as the Fay-Jones Report. We welcome our witnesses, General Paul Kern, United States Army, appointing officer for the investigation; Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones, investigating officer; Major General George Fay, investigating officer; and Major General Anthony Taguba, investigating officer concerning the detainee abuse by members of the 800th Military Police Brigade at the prison; and Major General R. Steven Whitcomb, United States Army, special assistant to the commander of Central Command, representing the command responsible for acting on the majority of the recommendations that are flowing from their investigation and how they are being implemented.

General Fay was originally appointed as the investigating officer by General Sanchez, and was tasked with investigating allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib detention facility, and were the MI personnel, that's military intelligence personnel, comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable law and regulations. General Fay's investigation was subsequently augmented by the addition of Lieutenant General Jones as an investigating officer. General Jones was charged with focusing on whether organization or personnel higher than the 205th brigade chain of command or events and circumstances outside of

11-L-0559/OSD/55214

Federal News Service September 9, 2004 Thursday

GEN. KERN: We have that in our report, Senator. I don't have it at the tip of my fingers. We can provide that for the record.

SEN. WARNER: It's a mix?

GEN. KERN: It's a mix.

In addition, for non-military intelligence personnel, military police, an reported previously by Major General Taguba, there are seven who are previously charged. Those are the court cases which we see that are being followed today. In addition, we found three more. And we also found one more military police failure to report. We also found that there were medical personnel who failed to report abuses even though they clearly see what had happened. Next.

I'd like to summarize our findings in these points. First, there is no single cause. There are multiple causes of the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib. Second, as you pointed out, Senator, the primary cause of detainee abuse was individual misconduct. But also very disappointing to us is there was a failure of leadership, and a failure of discipline -- both hallmarks of our soldiers that we expect to be followed. In these cases, we found that there were failures in the entire chain-of-command, and in many cases a lack of a chain-of-command to oversee the operations that took place. What should have been reported by non-commissioned officers and officers was not,

Finally, and I really would like to emphasize this point, the vast majority of our soldiers are doing the right thing and are following the right standards. We're reporting to you on those that did not. We are taking action to ensure that those corrections are in place, and I will tell today that if you visited Abu Ghraib, if you visited with our soldiers, you would see a very, very different picture.

The 7,000 is now fewer than 2,400. The number of boards takes place on a regular basis to review the detainees and to ensure their release is appropriate. IA and IB now belong entirely to the Iraqi government. And so when a determination is made that a detainee is no longer to be held in U.S. custody, if they violated an Iraqi law, they are turned over to the Iraqi government for detention and further disposition in their court system.

And others are returned to their hometowns, but not just let out the front gate and said, "Go home." They make a strong effort today to go to the town, bring in the community, to talk to the religious leaders, the imams, to talk to the community leaders to ensure that they welcome these people back and know that they have been cleared, even if they had been brought into a U.S. detention facility. And so we are working both the quality of life for these people and the cultural issues as they are returned to their towns from which they were originally captured.

Finally, the soldiers there are being screened through a certification process to know that they clearly understand the rules of interrogation and detention. The medical personnel are providing medical care today in those facilities far better than most of those people have seen in their entire lives. So all of those previous problems, which were reported are greatly improved today. And I would report that it is also underway that we will close out this facility for U.S. operations in the future.

Finally, ghost detainees. This is perhaps one of the more troubling pieces of our investigation. We did find, in fact, that there were detainees brought into Abu Ghraib who were not registered in accordance with our regulations and policy. These personnel in some cases of eight that we could identify were done under an Article 143 exception, which says that for military security purposes

11-L-0559/OSD/55215



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

January 3, 2006, 3:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response -- Inspector General Reports on "Ghost Detainees"  
#093005-11 and # 100305-24 (Tabs A and B)

- Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) inquired about the status of reported CIA and DoD Inspector General investigations of "ghost detainee policy."
- Senator Reed's inquiry stems from the attached testimony of General Paul Kern, *et. al.*, on September 9, 2004 to the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on investigation into abuses at the Abu Ghraib theater internment facility. He states, "the Department of Defense Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General...have agreed that they will take on that task of investigating this *ghost detainee policy*." (Tab C)
- To date, the DoD Inspector General has not undertaken an investigation on this matter, and none is planned. DoD IG is conducting a review of military department investigations of detainee abuse.
- Regarding any CIA OIG investigations," the DoD OIG cannot attest to the work being done by the CIA OIG. Therefore, the Senator or his staff would need to pose any questions concerning CIA OIG completed, ongoing, and planned work to CIA.
- As stated in your memorandum of September 20, 2005, it is the policy of the Department of Defense to assign all detainees in its control an internment serial number as soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture. The Department maintains full accountability for all DoD detainees.
- My staff contacted Senator Reed's office on November 9, 2005 and provided this information to the Senator's Military Legislative Assistant.

COORDINATION: OGC, Detainee Affairs, DoD IG (TAB D)

Attachments:

Snowflake #093005-11 (TAB A)

Snowflake #100305-24 (TAB B)

SASC September 9, 2004, Question from Senator Reed (TAB C)

Prepared by: Christian P. Marrone, Special Assistant, OASD (LA), (b)(6)

OSD 24301-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55216

A

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Answer to Senator Reed

I need to get an answer back to Senator Reed on the IG report that he asked about, which I don't remember.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100305-24

.....  
*Please Respond By October 13, 2005*

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/55217

OSD 22270-05

B

~~FOUO~~

OCT 03 2005 11:05

TO: Dan Stanley  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Question from Senator Reed

Senator Reed asked about the CIA IG and the DoD IG with respect to ghost detainees. We need to get back to him (and me) as to when the inspection will be done.

Thanks.

DHR:js  
093005-11

.....

*Please Respond By 10/18/05*

C

CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS  
Congressional Hearings  
Sept 29, 2005

## Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq

REED:

Well, first, General Myers, let me, too, compliment you on 40 years of honorable service to the nation in the uniform of our country. That's something we all can agree upon and something to be very proud of. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, last September General Curran (ph) came before the committee and a response to a question from Chairman Warner indicated that the inspector general of the Department of Defense and the inspector general of the CIA had taken upon the task, in his words, of investigating the ghost detainee policy.

Can you give us an update on those investigations, when they are to conclude and when we might get results?

RUMSFELD:

I have no information about the CIA investigation. I certainly can get you an answer as to when the I.G. and the department estimates that they'll complete it.

Federal News Service September 9, 2004 Thursday

you do not have to register them immediately. That is part of the Geneva Convention, is allowed. We also found many reports for which we cannot document for you because the documentation does not exist for people who were brought into the facilities and who were moved so that they could not be identified by the International Red Cross. This is in violation of our policy which requires us to register people so that it can be reported that they are being held in detention.

we have taken those actions and, as required by the instructions that we have given, and asked two organizations to do further investigations, the Department of Defense Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General, and both have agreed that they will take on that task of investigating this ghost detainee policy. The CIA has provided us a document that says their current policy is to abide by our regulations and policies if they bring a detainee to our facilities, but that policy was apparently, from what we can find, either not in effect or not known at the time that the violations that we believe happened are being reported, and that's what we're asking for further investigation to go into.

SEN. WARNER: What's the volume of cases?

GEN. KERN: I can't give you a precise volume, Chairman, because there is no documentation of the numbers. We believe, and I would ask General Fay to perhaps add to this, that the number is in the dozens to perhaps up to 100. I cannot give you a precise number.

GEN. PAY: This is accurate, sir. We were not able to get documentation from the Central Intelligence Agency to answer those types of questions, so we really don't know the volume, but I believe it's probably in the dozens.

SEN. WARNER: Up to 100?

GEN. PAY: I doubt that it's that high, sir, but I think it's somewhere in the area of maybe two dozen or so, maybe more.

GEN. KERN: It's a very difficult question for us to answer, Mr. Chairman, because we don't have the documentation. What you see in our report is during the interviews of people reporting to us what happened without documentation.

That is a summary of what we found, and the causes of it, failures of leadership, failures of our own discipline when we expect people without leadership to do the right thing, failures to follow our own policy, doctrine and regulations which allowed these to take place, confusion because other policies which were designed for other theaters, Guantanamo, Afghanistan, found their way into documentation that we found in Abu Ghraib, which led to numerous iterations of how interrogations and the limits of authority were to be conducted. Those interrogations -- those policies were being debated while we were asking soldiers to conduct interrogations, and so they were seeking to find their limits of their authority at the same time, as reported, they were receiving pressure to produce intelligence. The purpose of interrogations clearly is to produce intelligence, and so that is a natural state of affairs. What was not occurring, though, was the leadership to stand in-between the interrogators and the sources of those who were trying to determine the intelligence to relieve the pressure on the interrogators. Again, a failure in the leadership and the chain of command to do the right thing.

We have found, and is reported in here, that it is not just enlisted soldiers, there are commissioned officers through the grade of colonel whom we believe are culpable, and through the grade of general officer whom we believe are responsible for these allegations, and for the actions that took place.

11-L-0559/OSD/55220

1 of 1 DOCUMENT

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Federal News Service

September 9, 2004 Thursday

SECTION: PRESS CONFERENCE OR SPEECH

LENGTH: 32191 words

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION OF THE 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE AT ABU GERAIB PRISON, IRAQ

CHAIRMAN BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTHONY R. JONES, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL R. STEVEN WHITCOMB, SPEC W ASSISTANT TO THE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY, DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, READINESS, TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION

LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:

SEN. WARNER: (Sounds gavel.) Good morning, everyone. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the investigation of the 209th Military Intelligence Brigade at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, commonly referred to as the Fay-Jones Report. We welcome our witnesses, General Paul Kern, United States Army, appointing officer for the investigation; Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones, investigating officer; Major General George Fay, investigating officer; and Major General Anthony Taguba, investigating officer concerning the detainee abuse by members of the 800th Military Police Brigade at the prison; and Major General R. Steven Whitcomb, United States Army, special assistant to the commander of Central Command, representing the command responsible for acting on the majority of the recommendations that are flowing from this investigation and how they are being implemented.

General Fay was originally appointed as the investigating officer by General Sanchez, and was tasked with investigating allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib detention facility, and were the MI personnel, that's military intelligence personnel, comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable law and regulations. General Fay's investigation was subsequently augmented by the addition of Lieutenant General Jones as an investigating officer. General Jones was charged with focusing on whether organizations or personnel higher than the 205th brigade chain of command or events and circumstances outside of

11-L-0559/OSD/55221

Federal News Service September 9, 2004 Thursday

GEN. KERN: We have that in our report, Senator. I don't have it at the tip of my fingers. We can provide that for the record.

SEN. WARNER: It's a mix?

GEN. KERN: It's a mix.

In addition, for non-military intelligence personnel, military police, as reported previously by Major General Taguba, there are seven who are previously charged. Those are the court cases which we see that are being followed today. In addition, we found three more. And we also found one more military police failure to report. We also found that there were medical personnel who failed to report abuses even though they clearly see what had happened. Next.

I'd like to summarize our findings in these points. First, there is no single cause. There are multiple causes of the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib. Second, as you pointed out, Senator, the primary cause of detainee abuse was individual misconduct. But also very disappointing to us is there was a failure of leadership, and a failure of discipline -- both hallmarks of our soldiers that we expect to be followed. In these cases, we found that there were failures in the entire chain-of-command, and in many cases a lack of a chain-of-command to oversee the operations that took place. What should have been reported by non-commissioned officers and officers was not.

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The 7,000 is now fewer than 2,400. The number of boards takes place on a regular basis to review the detainees and to ensure their release is appropriate. 1A and 1B now belong entirely to the Iraqi government. And so when a determination is made that a detainee is no longer to be held in U.S. custody, if they violated an Iraqi law, they are turned over to the Iraqi government for detention and further disposition in their court system.

And others are returned to their hometowns, but not just let out the front gate and said, "Go home." They make a strong effort today to go to the town, bring in the community, to talk to the religious leaders, the imams, to talk to the community leaders to ensure that they welcome these people back and know that they have been cleared, even if they had been brought into a U.S. detention facility. And so we are working both the quality of life for these people and the cultural issues as they are returned to their towns from which they were originally captured.

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D

COORDINATION:

OGC: Dan Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy  
Detainee Affairs: Alan Liotta, Principal Deputy  
DoD IG: John Crane, Assistant IG

DATE

December 30, 2005  
January 3, 2006  
December 22, 2005

~~FOUO~~

November 28, 2005

I-05/015669  
ES-4765

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld: *DR*

SUBJECT: Template on World-Wide Planning

You may want to take a look at this memo I dictated in October. There are some thoughts there you might want to begin thinking about fashioning a template on.

Please think about it, and talk to me.

Thanks,

Attach: 10/4/05 SecDef MFR on World-Wide Planning

DHR:as  
112803-51

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/16/05*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55224 11-05 14:53 10

FOUO

October 04, 2005

SUBJECT World-wide Planning

I have to think through who is *doing* what world-wide:

- Who is planning exercises with India, the countries we want to cultivate and the like.
- Get a laydown of who is going where when.
- Coordinate trips so we get the right emphasis, the right rhythm, the right messages, and the right people in the right countries.
- We have to link public affairs with senior military and civilian people (people who are 4-stars and above), see that they are moving around the USA and that we know where they are going.
- We ought to look at what the market is, how we're impacting it, what is right and what is wrong and fix it with a new set of arrangements.

DFRC.db  
100405-26

11-L-0559/OSD/55225

FOUO

INFO MEMO

A/DSD  
1-05/015669-ES  
ES-4765

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

DEC 21 2005

SUBJECT: Your "Template on World-Wide Planning" Memo

- In response to your memo (next under) we are taking steps to better coordinate the travel of, and messages delivered by, the Department's senior military and civilian officials.
  - We are creating a database in which all senior officials' planned travel will be input and updated monthly or as required.
    - These travel plans should be driven by your *Security Cooperation Guidance*.
  - We will work with Public Affairs to mine this database to ensure the right countries are getting the right attention from the right people.
    - Where needed, we will suggest changes to get it right.
  - I will recommend to Larry DiRita that PA establish a similar database for domestic travel, and reception of foreign senior-level persons.
- The mechanism we develop will ask DoD Components to:
  - Consult the SCG to prioritize their travel;
  - Develop strategic communication annexes to their country/regional plans; and
  - Consult with Peter Rodman or Peter Flory and ASD(PA) prior to travel to assure continuity of message.

COORDINATION:

ASD(PA) Copy provided

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: CDR chip Denman, OSD(PI-STRAT) (b)(6)

OSD 24302-01

11-L-0559/OSD/55226

J  
**FOUO**

November 28, 2005

I-05/015669  
ES-4765

TO Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld: *DR.*

SUBJECT: Template on World-Wide Planning

You may want to take a look at this memo I dictated in October. There are some thoughts there you might want to begin thinking about fashioning a template on.

Please think about it, and talk to me.

Thanks.

Attach: 10/4/05 SecDef MFR on World-Wide Planning

DHR:sa  
112805-31

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/16/05*

**FOUO**  
11-L-0559/OSD/55227

20-11-05 14:23 16

~~FOUO~~

October 04, 2005

SUBJECT: *World-wide Planning*

I have to think through who is doing what world-wide:

- Who is planning exercises with India, the countries we want to cultivate and the like.
- Get a laydown of who is going where when.
- Coordinate trips so we get the right emphasis, the right rhythm, the right messages, and the right people in the right countries.
- We have to link public affairs with senior military and civilian people (people who are 4-stars and above), see that they are moving around the USA and that we know where they are going.
- We ought to look at what the market is, how we're impacting it, what is right and what is wrong and fix it with a new set of arrangements.

DHR,db  
100405-26

11-L-0559/OSD/55228

**FOUO**

2005 DEC 01 PM 4:25  
December 02, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Detainee Material for Senator Nelson

Please get back to me after you have Pete Geren and Matt Waxman show the material on detainees to Senator Ben Nelson. I would like to know what his reaction to it all was and what you decided to leave with him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120205-15

.....  
**Please Respond By 12/16/05**

*383, 6*

**FOUO**

*2 Dear*



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300  
UNCLASSIFIED

2005 DEC 21 7:42:25

INFO MEMO

December 21, 2005, 7:30 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Interim Snowflake Response - Detainee Material for Sen. Ben Nelson,  
#120205-15

- Sen. Ben Nelson has requested that he be shown the material on detainees after the Christmas recess.
- My staff will schedule the meeting with the Senator and Matt Waxman and advise you on the reaction of the Senator.

Attachments:  
Snowflake# 120205 -15 (TAB A)

383.6

21 Dec 2005

2 Dec 2005

Prepared by: Christian P. Marrone, Special Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

10:54

OCT 21 2005

TO: Robert Rangel  
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. L. R.*

SUBJECT: Rapid Response

We need to get arranged in DoD so we do things more proactively. I noticed that the State Department had congratulations out when the Chinese did a successful manned space launch, and they have sympathy messages out when there is an earthquake someplace. DoD isn't organized to do that. We seem not to do it unless I ask for it, and it's always after I have seen it late, and after everyone else in the world - the President, the State Department and everyone else has said something.

It means a great deal to these folks around the world. The first thing the Chinese mentioned to me was their appreciation for the State Department's congratulations on their successful space flight.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how we can get DoD so it has a degree of sensitivity.

Thanks.

DRR:sk  
102005-02 (75)skc

.....  
*Please respond by November 10, 2005*

FOUO

OSD 24375-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55231

FOUO

I-05/016656  
ES-4957  
December 07, 2005

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Robert Rangel  
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Memo on Rapid Response

Please take a look at this memo I sent Rangel and Stavridis. I think this is partly your shop. Please get organized to do that, and our office will worry about the things that are not directly policy related.

Thanks.

Attach: 10/21/05 Memo from SecDef (102005-02TS)

DHR:ss  
120705-12

.....  
***Please Respond By 12/22/05***

05-12-05 11:29 AM

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55232

OSD 24377-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DEC 19 2005 10:54

INFO MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *ME* DEC 21 2005

DSD  
APDUSDP  
DEC 19 2005  
I-05/016656-PDUSDP  
ES-4957

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Policy's Plan for Rapid Correspondence Response

- In response to your 7 December 2005 Snowflake on *Rapid Response*, Policy has undertaken several steps to improve our written correspondence.
- I have assigned a POC in my office to research, initiate and oversee timely correspondence in response to significant world events
- This POC will work closely with your office, and CCD, to coordinate our efforts.
- In addition, Policy will publish an internal Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to emphasize proactive correspondence as a high priority for the Department's leadership, and to encourage our Action Officers to take the initiative.
- Policy's SOPs establish procedures for our internal processes. This SOP is intended to ease the standard guidelines for correspondence in an effort to allow for proactive correspondence to reach your office within 24 hours of the initial draft.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55233

OSD 24377-05

~~FOUO~~

December 16, 2005

TO: Stephen J Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: ~~Kazakhstan~~ President Nazarbayev's Inauguration

*KAZAKHSTAN*

The Kazaks **have** invited me to attend their presidential inauguration on **January 11**. I would like to go, but I don't know if I can. I think we **ought** to put a first-rate delegation together, to possibly include Carlos Gutierrez. What are the plans?

Thanks.

DHR:es  
121605-03

.....

OSD 24415-05

*16 DEC 05*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55234

FOUO

December 28, 2005

TO David Chu  
 CC: Dan Stanley  
 FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT Response on Former Spouse Protection Act

Your memo of December 22 doesn't do it for me. I need to know the issues involved to decide what I want to do about it. Please be more explicit.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 12/22/05 USD(P&R) memo to SD re: Former Spouse Protection Act (OSD 24417-05)

DHR:dh  
 122805-01 (TS).doc

.....  
 Please respond by January 26, 2006

FOUO

OSD 24417-05

B-21-2

272

28 DEC 05

25 04 05

12/23 ✓  
1005

OK  
12/28



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2005 DEC 23 AM 8:09



INFO MEMO

December 22, 2005, 12:30 P.M.

Robert ~~Robert~~ SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT The Former Spouses Protection Act - SNOWFLAKE

- In your October 25 memo (attached), you asked that we seek legislative action to address troop concerns about the Former Spouses Protection Act. The Former Spouses protection Act has been controversial for 23 years, and the Hill has been reticent to reopen a debate that has strong constituencies on both sides. We have three times in this Administration proposed change without Hill action, but action in the FY07 Authorization Act is more likely.
- The issue is larger than simply that of requiring a member to pay support to a former spouse prior to reaching retirement. Indeed, this anomaly occurs only in a handful of states, and does not affect the vast number of divorced or divorcing troops. The Department's 2001 report to Congress on Former Spouses Protection Act identified several needed improvements, including basing payment to the former spouse on the member's rank and time served at the time of divorce rather than time of retirement.
- We shall again submit each of the legislative proposals identified in our earlier report to Congress - all still worthy. Your endorsement in testimony would be helpful

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Janet Fenton, USA (JAG Corps), OUSD(P&R), (b)(6)

Coordination Sheet for FSPA Snowflake (October 2005)

MA SD	12/23	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	12/23	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	12/23		
ESRMA	12/23	BY3	



821-3  
OSD 24417-05

156-9

292

132 DEC 05

250605

FOUO

DEFENSE

2005 OCT 23 AM 8:09

OCT 25 2005

10/29/05

TO: David Chu  
 Dan Stanley

CC: Robert Rangcl

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Former Spouse Protection Act

We're going to have to readdress this former spouse protection issue that is causing angst among the troops, whereby under some state laws they have to start paying their former spouses even before they retire, after 20 years of active duty. I think we may need some legislative adjustment. Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:mh  
102405-04.rts.doc

Please respond by November 24, 2005

*colt  
12/28*

*Sin,  
Response attached  
V/A,  
col Grinsky*

FOUO

B-21-4  
OSD 24417-05

ASG-2

(OSD OCT 05)

~~FOUO~~

OCT 25 2005

TO: David Chu  
Dan Stanley

CC: Robert Rangel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Former Spouse Protection Act

We're going to have to readdress this former spouse protection issue that is causing angst among the troops, whereby under some state laws they have to start paying their former spouses even before they retire, after 20 years of active duty

I think we may need some legislative adjustment. Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DRR:dh  
102405-041TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by November 24, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55238

OSD 24417-05



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

0:09



INFO MEMO

December 22, 2005, 12:30 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.-C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: *Former Spouses Protection Act*  
The Former Spouses Protection Act – SNOWFLAKE

- In your October 25 memo (attached), you asked that we seek legislative action to address troop concerns about the Former Spouses Protection Act. The Former Spouses Protection Act has been controversial for 23 years, and the Hill has been reticent to reopen a debate that has strong constituencies on both sides. We have three times in this Administration proposed change without Hill action, but action in the FY07 Authorization Act is more likely.
- The issue is larger than simply that of requiring a member to pay support to a former spouse prior to reaching retirement. Indeed, this anomaly occurs only in a handful of states, and does not affect the vast number of divorced or divorcing troops. The Department's 2001 report to Congress on Former Spouses Protection Act identified several needed improvements, including basing payment to the former spouse on the member's rank and time served at the time of divorce rather than time of retirement.
- We shall again submit each of the legislative proposals identified in our earlier report to Congress – all still worthy. Your endorsement in testimony would be helpful

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTC Janet Fenton, USA (JAG Corps), OUSD(P&R), (b)(6)

Coordination Sheet for FSPA Snowflake (October 2005)



11-L-0559/OSD/55239

OSD 24417-05

FOUO

December 15, 2005

TO: Mike Donley

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT Instructions for Submitting Papers to me

We need a directive to go out instructing ~~that~~, in the ~~future~~, the coordination page indicating the people who have chopped on a package ~~contains~~:

- a typed name
- a typed title
- the date that they've chopped off, and
- printed, legible notes (if any), so I can read them.

I have no idea who has coordinated on these papers that they are recommending I act on.

Please get something out -- FAST.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
121505-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/22/05*

FOUO

OSD 24444-05



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD**

JAN 13 2006

SUBJECT: Correspondence Coordination

- o In your December 15, 2005 snowflake (TAB A), you directed that instructions be sent to the staff outlining correspondence coordination requirements for papers coming to you. You specifically cited the requirement for:
  - o a typed name
  - o a typed title
  - o the date that they've chopped off and
  - o printed, legible notes (if any), so you can read them
- On December 21, 2005, the Executive Secretary signed out a coordinated memo outlining the requirements detailed in the snowflake to the staff (TAB B).
- On January 11, 2006, I signed out a memorandum to the staff reinforcing your concerns and stressing the timeliness, accuracy and proper coordination of executive correspondence (TAB C).
- The Executive Services Directorate has suggested a number of initiatives to improve the correspondence coordination and control process that we intend to implement in the near future. We will continue to closely monitor the situation and work in concert with the Executive Secretary to improve the timeliness, accuracy and coordination issues expressed.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: James F. Deming, (b)(6)

**FOUO**

December 15, 2005

TO: Mike Donley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Instructions for Submitting Papers to me

We need a directive to go out instructing that, in the future, the coordination page indicating the people who have chopped on a package contains:

- atypedname
- a typed title
- the date that they've chopped off, and
- printed, legible notes (if any), so I can read them.

I have no idea who has coordinated on these papers that they are recommending I act on.

Please get something out -- FAST.

*Thanks.*

DHR.es  
121505-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/22/05*

**FOUO**

*OSD 24444-05*

11-L-0559/OSD/55242



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEC 21 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Coordinating Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and Deputy Secretary of  
Defense (DepSec) Action and Information Memoranda

Reference: DoD 5110.4-M, Manual for Written Material, March 2, 2004

There has been an inordinate number of Action and Information Memoranda forwarded for SecDef and DepSec decision or review that lack the appropriate level of coordination, fail to document coordination or to identify the coordinating official in accordance with current DoD policy (DoD 5110.4-M). In the future, please ensure your written products comply with the following key provisions for SecDef and DepSec packages:

- Concurrence or comments are required from the Heads of DoD Components or, in their absence, Principal Deputies.
- Coordination sheets must be typed, and include the name and position of each coordinating official, organization name and coordination date – “copy provided” is not considered a valid coordination.

Staff actions that do not comply with this guidance will be returned to the originating agency for compliance. Handwritten notes must be kept to a minimum per SecDef guidance. If required they should be printed and legible.

OSD 24397-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55243

You may direct any questions to the Washington Headquarters Services,  
Executive Services Directorate at (b)(6).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'W. P. Marriott', with a stylized flourish at the end.

William P. Marriott  
Executive Secretary



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950**

**JAN 11 2006**

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES**

**SUBJECT: Action and Information Memoranda for the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and  
Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF)**

**Reference: Executive Secretary memo on Coordinating SECDEF and DEPSECDEF  
Memoranda, December 21, 2005**

The SECDEF and DEPSECDEF rely upon each of us to provide them with documents for their decision or information that are timely **as well as** properly prepared and coordinated. Recently, per the reference, the Executive Secretary reiterated the format and proper coordination level for documents addressed to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF.

Delays in timely processing and delivery to these senior officials are caused whenever substantive deficiencies are detected and they must be returned to the submitting organization for correction.


The primary responsibility for ensuring that documents are prepared in compliance with SECDEF prescribed requirements of course is at the originating organization. The next and first level of external screening and quality control is at the Executive Services Directorate (ESD), which is the organization responsible for receiving, controlling and processing all documents addressed to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF before they are forwarded **through** the Executive Secretary.

The Director ESD currently is working a number of initiatives, both short and long term, that are designed to enhance and improve the processes and procedures for the improvement of quality control in SECDEF/DEPSECDEF correspondence. Information on these initiatives is forthcoming and will be provided to key members on your staff who are responsible for administrative matters.

**OSD 00487-06**

11-L0059/OSD/55245

I appreciate your continued cooperation and support in this effort to provide the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF timely, accurate and properly coordinated staff products to improve the decision making process within the Department.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michael B. Donley". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "M".

Michael B. Donley  
Director



~~FOUO~~

December 15, 2005

TO: Mike Donley

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT Instructions for Submitting Papers to me

We need a directive to go out instructing ~~that~~, in the future, the coordination page indicating the people who have chopped on a package ~~contains~~:

- a typed name
- a typed title
- the date that they've chopped ~~off~~, and
- printed, legible notes (if any). **so I can read them.**

I have **no** idea who **has** coordinated on these papers that they **are** recommending I **act on**.

Please get something out -- **FAST**.

Thanks.

DHR:js  
121305-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/22/05*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24444-05

11 L 0559/OSD/55248

C2.5.3.2. The responsible office shall furnish the ASD(PA) with information on which to base replies and updated information if circumstances change. When initiating a transfer, return original correspondence (if original was received) and proposed reply to the CCD along with SD Form 391 annotated with the name and telephone number of the ASD(PA) accepting official.

C2.5.4. **On** occasion, the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, their Military or Special Assistants, or the Executive Secretary may change an action assignment. In those instances, CCD shall forward a revised SD Correspondence Routing Slip formally notifying the responsible office that its requirement has changed.

## C2.6. COORDINATING ASSIGNED ACTIONS

C2.6.1. Coordinate with offices designated on the Secretary of Defense Correspondence Routing Slip and **any** office that **may** have an interest in or be affected by the outcome of the action.

C2.6.2. Obtain concurrence or comments from the Heads of the DoD Components or, in their absence, principal deputies.

C2.6.3. Coordinate with the DoD Components simultaneously to ensure responses are received **as quickly as possible**.

C2.6.4. Never allow disagreements about **your** recommendations or lack of response from a coordinating office to hold up a document. List "nonconcur" and place their comments at the coordination tab. Be sure to address their issues in a memorandum or attached supplement. Note on the coordination sheet when coordination was attempted, but not accomplished; include the amount of time allotted.

C2.6.5. If no coordination is required on **an** Action or Info Memo, state "none" on the coordination line. See Chapter 5 for details.

C2.6.6. Coordinate with the ASD(PA) on all correspondence:

C2.6.6.1. Containing information with public affairs implications.

C2.6.6.2. Involving requests for the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense to participate in public forums, such as speaking and media events, or events in DoD or military settings that may draw media coverage.

C2.6.7. Coordinate with the General Counsel, Department of Defense, on all correspondence having any legal implications or possible adverse reflection on the Department and all correspondence based on law.

C2.6.8. Coordinate with the ASD(LA) on all correspondence to Members of Congress.

C2.6.9. Coordinate with the Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for Protocol on all schedule proposals.

## C2.7. SUBMITTING MATERIALS TO THE SECRETARY OR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

C2.7.1. Use either an Action or Info Memo to forward materials to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. See Chapter 5 for details.

C2.7.2. Submit packages to CCD, Room 3A948, for control and forwarding through the Executive Secretary to either the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

C2.7.3. Correspondence requiring expeditious processing should be flagged with a red tag. ESCD staff shall ensure these materials receive priority processing and prompt delivery to the Executive Secretary.

C2.7.4. Extremely urgent communications requiring the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense attention within 2 hours should be flagged with a green tag and hand-carried to the Executive Secretary. See Table C2.T1., "Materials ESCD Does Not Process."

## C2.8. SUSPENSE REPORTING

ESCD publishes the "Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense Correspondence Report." This weekly report, distributed by e-mail on Fridays, consists of four sections. The first section provides a summary of overdue PRS/PRD and RDC/RD takings. Two additional sections provide detailed information about the PRS/PRD and RDC/RD overdue taskings. The final section provides a listing of all taskings that are

C5.4.1.2.6. Body. Adouble space belowthe subject line, type succinct bullet statements that tell the recipient what he or she needs to know about the subject and why it is okay to do what you are recommending. Double-space between bullets. Do not use the paragraph format for the standard memo. (See paragraph C4.1.5. for guidance on structuring bullet statements.)

C5.4.1.2.7. Recommendation. Adouble space below the bullet statements, type "RECOMMENDATION:" followed by a statement describing what you intend the recipient to do.

C5.4.1.2.7.1. If you are providing a letter for signature, the statement may read: "That Secretary of Defense sign letter at TAB A."

C5.4.1.2.7.2. If you do not provide adocument for signature, indicate what action the recipient should take, e.g., "RECOMMENDATION: That Secretary of Defense approve release of funds by initialing: Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_."

C5.4.1.2.8. Coordination. Adouble space below the recommendation, type "COORDINATION:" and specify the tab with the list of coordinating officials (always placed at the last tab in the package), or if appropriate, type "**NONE**."

C5.4.1.2.9. Signature Block. Do not include asignature block in an Action Memo.

C5.4.1.2.10. Attachments. List as in a standard memo.

C5.4.1.2.11. Classification Markings. Mark as in a standard memo.

C5.4.1.2.12. Prepared By Line. One inch from the bottom of the page and aligned with the left margin, type "Prepared by:" followed by the name and telephone number of the action officer who prepared the memo.

#### C5.4.2. Assembling an Action Memo Package

C5.4.2.1. Assemble packages with the Action Memo as the cover and/or forwarding document as follows:

C5.4.2.1.1. **TAB A** for the action item (e.g., for signature or approval).

C5.4.2.1.1.1. If sending a similar letter or memo to multiple addressees, place all at TAB A

C5.4.2.1.1.2. If including different items for the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense to sign or approve, separate them at TAB A-1, A-2, etc.

C5.4.2.1.1.3. For Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense communications with foreign government officials that require both a letter and a Defense Messaging System (DMS) message for electronic transmission, include both at TAB A

C5.4.2.1.2. TAB B for incoming correspondence, if applicable.

C5.4.2.1.3. TAB C for background material. If you need to use more than one tab, tab sequentially. If forwarding substantive or lengthy background information, provide a one-page executive *summary* of the information.

C5.4.2.1.4. TAB D (or last tab in package) to list the coordinating offices and/or activities on one page. See Figure C5.F15. for an example. Make sure you:

C5.4.2.1.4.1. Include the name and position of each coordinating official, as well as his or her organization and coordination date.

C5.4.2.1.4.2. Include concurrences from the Heads of the DoD Components, or, in their absence, the principal deputies.

C5.4.2.1.4.3. List "nonconcurs" and place their comments at the coordination tab. Be sure to address their issues in a memorandum or an attached supplement. Be sure to include:

C5.4.2.1.4.3.1. All interested parties' views and reasonable options.

C5.4.2.1.4.3.2. The coordinators' comments, modifications, or rewrites.

C5.4.2.1.4.4. State coordinations you attempted to obtain, but did not receive, **as well as** the time you allotted that coordinating office.

C5.4.2.2. Attach package elements with two-inch paper clips; do not staple or use clam clips.

C5.4.3. Submitting an Action Memo. Submit Action Memos to the Correspondence Control Division, Room 3A948. Provide the following:

C5.4.3.1. The original plus one complete copy of the memo with tabs and attachments. The copy should be of the same quality **as** the original, e.g., if attachments are printed in color for the original, the copy should have color attachments as well.”

C5.4.3.2. Mailing envelopes if unclassified, or two address labels per signature item if classified, when the correspondence shall be mailed after the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense approves it. You may use a rubber stamp for the return address, but do not use a rubber stamp or hand print the to address on envelopes for outgoing official mail.

C5.4.3.3. An electronic message version of any letter the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense shall sign to a foreign dignitary.

---

<sup>10</sup> For multiple addressee letters or those with cc listings, enclosures consisting of published reports in excess of 25 pages ~~must~~ be provided to CCB when the signature package is submitted.

Figure C5.F15. Sample Coordination Page

<b>Coordination:</b>		
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)	Mr. Johnson	March 20, 2002
Assistant Secretary of Defense (LA)	Mr. Smith	March 18, 2002
General Counsel	Mr. Jones	March 15, 2002
Director for Strategic Review	None obtained	Delivered March 10 - No response as of March 20

## C5.5. INFO MEMO

### C5.5.1. Preparing an Info Memo

C5.5.1.1. See Figure C5.F16. for an example.

C5.5.1.2. Organize and format an Info Memo as follows:

C5.5.1.2.1. Header. A double space below the last line of the letterhead or organizational seal, type "**INFOMEMO**" all caps, centered, in boldface type.

C5.5.1.2.2. Date. A double space below the header, type the date, using month, day, year format with day and year in numerals and ending at the right margin. At the end of the date line, include the time the memo was prepared.

C5.5.1.2.3. Address Line. A double space below the date line, type "FOR:" followed by the title of the addressee.

C5.5.1.2.4. From Line. A double space below the address line, type "FROM:" followed by the name and title of the sender. Note that the sending official signs and dates on the "FROM" line; there is no signature block on an Info Memo.<sup>11</sup> If someone signs "for" the originating official, print the signer's name and title below the signature.

<sup>11</sup> If someone other than a Component Head or Principal Deputy signs an Info Memo, at least one of them shall be listed on the coordination page.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEC 21 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Coordinating Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and Deputy Secretary of  
Defense (DepSec) Action and Information Memoranda

Reference: DoD 5110.4-M, Manual for Written Material, March 2, 2004

There has been an inordinate number of Action and Information Memoranda forwarded for SecDef and DepSec decision or review that lack the appropriate level of coordination, fail to document coordination or to identify the coordinating official in accordance with current DoD policy (DoD 5110.4-M). In the future, please ensure your written products comply with the following key provisions for SecDef and DepSec packages:

- Concurrence or comments are required from the Heads of DoD Components or, in their absence, Principal Deputies.
- Coordination sheets must be typed, and include the name and position of each coordinating official, organization name and coordination date – “copy provided” is not considered a valid coordination.

**Staff** actions that do not comply with this guidance will be returned to the originating agency for compliance. Handwritten notes must be kept to a minimum per SecDef guidance. If required they should be printed and legible.

OSD 24397-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55255

You may direct any questions to the Washington Headquarters Services,  
Executive Services Directorate at (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'W.P. Maniott', with a stylized flourish at the end.

**William P. Maniott**  
**Executive Secretary**

A !

~~FOUO~~

NOV 29 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Aggregate OSD-LA Data

I heard the other day that someone said (I believe it may have been Olympia Snowe) that DoD doesn't listen to anyone from Capitol Hill.

I wonder if we ought to aggregate all the data as to the number of:

- Hearings
- Briefings
- calls
- People we have working full-time with Capitol Hill

Then circulate that information to her and the rest of the Members, so that they know the effort that is put into it.

What are your thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:es  
112805-60

.....  
*Please Respond By December 15, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55257

*KJS*



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300  
UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

December 21, 2005, 10:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response – Aggregate OSD-LA Data. #112805-60

- You asked for my thoughts on circulating aggregated data on the numbers of hearings, briefings, calls, and people we have working full-time with Capitol Hill. This inquiry was made in response to a statement by a member of Congress that the Department does not listen to people on Capitol Hill.
- Please find attached a spreadsheet of your and the Deputy's Congressional contacts since 2002. The numbers reflect positively on the effort made by you and the DEPSECDEF to meet with and engage the Hill.
- Circulating the information to Senator Snowe and other Members of Congress, absent a specific inquiry, may not achieve the effect you desire. These data points would be more effective during your engagements with the members (e.g., meetings or briefings) or in your strategic communications opportunities (e.g., speeches, press events, testimony, etc.) when they can be offered as supporting evidence of your active engagement with the Congress on matters of national security and defense.
- To that end, we will make this information available to your speechwriting team and Public Affairs staff in support of your strategic communications events.

Attachments:

Snowflake #112805-60 (TAB A)  
Capitol Hill Contacts (TAB B)

Prepared by: Ms. Tara Napier, OASD (LA), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/55258

OSD 24463-05



TAB B

~~FOUO~~

JUL 16 2005

1064

JUL 11 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
CC: Ryan Henry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*  
SUBJECT Charter of Combined Arms Center

Where do we stand on refashioning the charter of the Combined Arms Center to take care of the train and equip task on a joint basis for non-US forces?

We also ought to give some thought as to how we link that to stability operations.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070805-02

.....  
*Please Respond By August 04, 2005*

OSD 24510-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55260

Tab B

# UNCLASSIFIED

## TAB C

### COORDINATION

USA	COL Spinelli	17 November 2005
USN	CAPT Wode	29 July 2005
USAF	Col Parks	2 August 2005
USMC	Col Pearson	28 July 2005
USA Combined Arms Center/ Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance	LTG Petraeus	17 November 2005

Tab C

UNCLASSIFIED

14-L-0559/OSD/55261

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

11

2005 JUL 16 10:16

1068

July 18, 2005

TO Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Duty **Description** for Director of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

Attached is the duty description for the Director of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance.

Doug: I would like you to ~~take~~ a **look at it, and** make any edits you deem appropriate, for me to look at.

Dick: The only thing that came to my mind when I read it was that one of the things this outfit ought to **do is to** train other countries to train the security forces of nations we are assisting, or to help organize them to do it -- in country and out of country.

Thanks

Attach: 7/14/05 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

DHR:ss  
071805-04

.....  
*Please Respond By August 09, 2005*

OSD 24521-05

Tab A

11-L-0559/~~FOUO~~OSD/55262



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

016

INFO MEMO

CM-0118-05

22 December 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *VP/P 22 Dec 05*

SUBJECT: Duty Description for Director of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (SF 1068) and Charter of Combined Arms Center (SF 1064)

- **Answer.** In response to your questions in TABs A and B, the Joint Staff, in consultation with the Army and Lieutenant General Dave Petraeus, developed a detailed charter for the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance that expands on the job description but does not include the requirement to physically train and equip foreign forces. It does, however, include the task to send teams to assist and advise Joint Forces Command, regional combatant commanders, and partner nations who are conducting the training missions. As this concept matures, General Petraeus will reassess his mission and recommend any modifications to the charter.
- The Services are currently reviewing the final draft of the charter, which we expect to provide to you 15 January 2006 so we can meet initial operational capability by May 2006.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Rear Admiral Richard J. Mauldin, USN; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

OSD 24521-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOUO~~

December 27, 2005

TO: Josh Bolten  
CC: Vice President Richard B Cheney  
Gordon England

FROM Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: DoD Budget

I have heard from Gordon England that the guidance Joel Kaplan provided is that DoD should take the full one percent cut (\$4.4 billion) on the FY '07 budget.

Anticipating that Congress might require some sort of cut and before being asked, I requested our folks to go back and see what we could do. We determined that we could take \$3 billion in FY '07, but that we should not go beyond that.

Subsequently, I am told that another \$0.4 billion can be offered up for FY'07 for a total of \$3.4 billion, but not the full \$4.4 billion.

Though Joel gave no guidance regarding adjustments in FY '08 through FY '10, I need to reiterate that it would be unwise at this late date to slip in negative wedges for the remaining years of the Future Years Defense Program.

I think it is unwise -- in the middle of a war -- to further reduce DoD's budget. I strongly recommend that it not be done.

I would be happy to visit with the President about it, if you consider your guidance to Gordon England to be your final recommendation.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
122605-16

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24524-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55264

110.01

27 DEC 05

**FOUO**

2005 OCT 07 PM 4:11

**October 07, 2005**

TO: Eric Edelman

ES-4397

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

05/013518

**SUBJECT** Information on **U.S. Financial Aid**

I would like someone to pull together the following information:

1. All the assistance that we provide every county in the world from every Department of the **U.S.** Government

a) What we give in dollars

b) What percentage it is of what we give overall

c) Out of all the aid they receive, what percentage of that is

**U.S. dollars**

d) The percentage each country votes with *the* **U.S.** in the **U.N.**

**Thanks.**

DHL:st  
100705-09

.....  
**Please Respond By 11/01/05**

**FOUO**

11-10-05 07:32 IN

**OSD 24576-05**

11-L-0559/OSD/55265

*[Handwritten mark]*

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_  
USD(P) LRM/pw.  
PDUSD(P) DEC 26 2005  
ES-4397 I-05/013518

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *[Signature]* DEC 14 2005

SUBJECT: Information on U.S. Financial Aid

- On 7 Oct, you asked for information on the assistance provided by the USG to every country in the world, broken out by (next under):
  - o What the USG gives in dollars;
  - o Of the total assistance (i.e., dollars plus material and services) provided by the USG, what percentage of the total is given in dollars;
  - o Of the total aid countries receive, what percentage is provided by the USG;
  - o The percentage of times each country's vote in the U.N. conforms with that of the U.S.
- There is no organization or single source that comprehensively reports either dollars or items of U.S. aid for every USG Department (e.g., OMB, State, or USAID) for every country in the world.
- Many Federal departments and agencies do not track the information in detail, much less by country.
- The estimates provided at Tab A summarize data collected from multiple open resources within the Interagency where detailed information was available. These open resources are outlined in Tab A. The table provides some noteworthy insight into where U.S. financial aid has been directed (especially in relation to support for our U.N. initiatives). For example:
  - o Afghanistan and Pakistan each received over \$2B of U.S financial aid in 2004, but voted with the U.S in the U.N. only 9% and 10% of the time, respectively.
  - o Israel received over \$2B in U.S. financial aid in 2004 and voted with the U S in the U.N. 93% of the time.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Bradley L. Bittinger, DSCA/PGM-FTE, (b)(6)

DIR, DSCA *[Signature]*  
PDASD/ISA *[Signature]*

OSD 24576-05

~~FOUO~~

October 07, 2005

TO: Eric Edelman

ES-4397

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DR*

05/013518

SUBJECT: Information on U.S. Financial Aid

I would like someone to pull together the following information:

1. All the assistance that we provide every county in the world from every Department of the U.S. Government

a) What we give in dollars

b) What percentage it is of what we give overall

c) Out of all the aid they receive, what percentage of that is

U.S. dollars

d) The percentage each country votes with the U.S. in the U.N.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100705-09

.....  
***Please Respond By 11/01/05***

~~FOUO~~

11-10-05 07:32 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/55267

OSD 24576-05

**FINANCIAL DATA  
EXAMPLE: NOTES**

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--	--	--	--	--	--

--	--	--	--	--	--

**2004**

- What the number means: The U.S. provided \$2,205,778,000 in aid.
- FY04 funding from State, USAID, DoD, Agriculture, Energy, and Treasury.
- Debt relief information from Treasury based on FY03 data – FY04 data not available for several months.
- FY05 accounting data not completed.

**% of Voting w/US @ UN**

- What the number means: 9% of the time, Afghanistan voted in the U.N. with the US.
- UN General Assembly voting data for FY04
- Data rounded for simplicity

## **FINANCIAL DATA SOURCES**

- Office of Management and Budget, National Security Programs Division, International Affairs Office
- State Bureau of International Organizations
- State Bureau of Resource Management, Office of Foreign Assistance Programs and Budget
- Treasury Department, International Affairs Office
- Various OSD and Joint Staff Offices
- World Bank web site
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) web site
- State Department web site
- USAID web site
- Energy Department web site
- Treasury Department web site
- Commerce Department web site
- Millennium Challenge Corporation web site
- Various DoD and DoS publications and documents to include the FY06 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations

## U.S. FINANCIAL AID by Country

Country	% of Aid from US	Rank of US among Donors	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Afghanistan	58.91	1 out of 20	2,205,778	9
Albania	23.76	1 out of 17	38,636	50
Algeria	1.88	8 out of 18	1,768	10
Angola	42.85	1 out of 19	92,060	17
Antigua & Barbuda	<1	6 out of 6	2,987	11
Argentina	15.24	4 out of 16	1,833	25
Armenia	49.58	1 out of 17	80,830	27
Azerbaijan	61.73	1 out of 16	53,062	43
Bahrain	8.64	3 out of 4	25,450	9
Bangladesh	13.71	2 out of 22	95,124	9
Barbados	45.52	1 out of 8	415	10
Belarus	27.23	2 out of 13	8,369	8
Belize	28.91	2 out of 9	2,735	12
Benin	14.78	2 out of 17	23,322	15
Bolivia	41.23	1 out of 17	157,977	23
Bosnia-Herzegovina	21.23	2 out of 18	77,544	43
Botswana	51.57	1 out of 14	13,132	13
Brazil	17.67	2 out of 19	28,442	15
Bulgaria	19.35	2 out of 14	45,596	44
Burkina Faso	6.11	5 out of 17	11,821	14
Burma	5.02	6 out of 18	12,951	12
Burundi	36.75	1 out of 16	26,587	10
Cambodia	21.49	1 out of 19	54,821	12
Cameroon	46.38	5 out of 17	5,073	21
Cape Verde	7.35	3 out of 13	116,666	8
Central African Rep.	2.31	3 out of 9	1,136	16
Chad	8.62	3 out of 17	21,549	23
Chile	3.78	7 out of 18	2,695	27
China	2.18	8 out of 20	863	9
Colombia	86.3	1 out of 19	736,046	11
Comoros	<1	4 out of 6	251	8
Costa Rica	14.46	3 out of 13	2,640	21
Cote d'Ivoire	18.57	2 out of 17	15,425	18
Croatia	38.59	1 out of 17	29,799	43
Cuba	19.7	2 out of 15	21,369	7
Cyprus	40.2	1 out of 9	38,820	40
Czech Republic	4.2	6 out of 13	10,297	45
Dem. Rep. of Congo	27.37	1 out of 20	71,694	27
Djibouti	45.49	1 out of 8	11,020	13
Dominica	0	0 out of 5	1,283	10
Dominican Republic	42.62	1 out of 11	36,011	24
East Timor	13.84	3 out of 15	28,025	25
Ecuador	41.28	1 out of 16	74,250	16
Egypt	58.57	1 out of 19	1,868,753	9
El Salvador	43.69	1 out of 20	49,772	24
Eritrea	50.5	1 out of 18	73,830	11
Estonia	8.11	4 out of 12	9,509	42
Ethiopia	60.48	1 out of 21	347,640	14
Fiji	1.73	4 out of 10	1,668	19
Gabon	2.56	3 out of 8	2,828	12
Gambia	30.9	2 out of 15	2,777	12
Georgia	45.87	1 out of 18	416,554	37
Ghana	10.63	3 out of 18	60,487	15
Greece	-	-	667	44
Grenada	1.78	5 out of 5	1,196	29
Guatemala	43.72	1 out of 17	52,285	24
Guinea	35.94	1 out of 16	32,709	17
Guinea-Bissau	2.16	5 out of 14	33	21



## U.S. FINANCIAL AID by Country

Country	% of Aid from US	Rank of US among Donors	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Guyana	17.16	2 out of 8	12,567	13
Haiti	61.77	1 out of 15	133,915	18
Honduras	41.2	1 out of 17	268,491	24
Hungary	1.88	7 out of 16	9,733	43
India	21.42	2 out of 20	128,873	20
Indonesia	25.11	1 out of 18	128,719	8
Iran	1.54	9 out of 18	0	9
Iraq	85.19	1 out of 21	18,918,712	6
Ireland	-	-	21,870	41
Israel	93.97	1 out of 13	2,627,369	93
Jamaica	56.97	1 out of 11	25,661	12.5
Jordan	83.81	1 out of 17	657,775	16
Kazakhstan	60.4	1 out of 16	48,652	11
Kenya	36.06	1 out of 20	147,716	13
Kiribati	13.5	4 out of 8	1,472	50
South Korea	<1	5 out of 11	0	39
North Korea.	52.78	1 out of 16	45,704	3
Kuwait	0	0 out of 4	46,173	10
Kyrgyz Rep.	56.5	1 out of 13	3,592	13
Laos	5.92	6 out of 17	0	5
Latvia	18.03	2 out of 12	11,155	47
Lebanon	40.69	1 out of 15	36,906	9
Lesotho	6.56	4 out of 13	3,541	9
Liberia	43.98	1 out of 18	225,416	14
Libya	0	0 out of 8	0	10
Lithuania	9.51	4 out of 12	10,882	44
Macedonia	32.29	1 out of 19	51,699	N/A
Madagascar	12.89	3 out of 15	145,901	13
Malawi	17.63	2 out of 19	41,985	23
Malaysia	3.63	4 out of 14	2,185	9
Maldives	0	0 out of 10	271	10
Mali	17.42	2 out of 17	44,156	14
Malta	68.57	1 out of 5	377	40
Marshall Islands	83.75	1 out of 4	0	61
Mauritania	23.64	2 out of 17	11,140	9
Mauritius	2.13	4 out of 7	144	12
Mexico	45.89	1 out of 17	72,260	23
Micronesia	90.95	1 out of 6	2,048	78
Moldova	62.26	1 out of 17	26,690	37
Mongolia	14.39	3 out of 18	14,854	15
Morocco	6.23	5 out of 16	21,256	11
Mozambique	15.66	1 out of 21	79,984	10
Namibia	30.2	1 out of 18	27,255	15
Nepal	19.13	3 out of 19	46,294	13
Nicaragua	15.47	2 out of 18	263,565	26
Niger	6.37	3 out of 15	11,195	15
Nigeria	34.68	1 out of 17	81,189	15
Oman	4.07	3 out of 5	26,080	10
Pakistan	74.59	1 out of 19	2,106,433	10
Palau	73.94	1 out of 5	2,044	99
Panama	62.31	1 out of 9	26,689	24
Papua New Guinea	0	0 out of 10	592	22
Paraguay	31.36	2 out of 12	13,408	25
Peru	59.2	1 out of 20	186,847	25
Philippines	29.4	2 out of 19	113,412	13
Poland	<1	7 out of 13	152,062	46
Portugal	-	-	752	44
Qatar	28.13	1 out of 4	0	10

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID  
by Country**

FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid    % of Voting

Rep. of Congo	13.51	2 out of 16	162	7
Romania	26.07	2 out of 14	45,973	44
Russia	81.89	1 out of 16	600,574	17
Rwanda	13.33	7 out of 14	50,899	11
St. Kitts-Nevis	0	0 out of 3	1,121	17
St. Lucia	0	0 out of 6	1,884	13
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	0	0 out of 4	556	13
Samoa	7.33	4 out of 7	1,293	30
Sao Tome & Principe	<1	10 out of 10	548	9.3
Saudi Arabia	1.84	4 out of 7	35	7.2
Senegal	15.68	2 out of 17	34,835	13
Serbia & Montenegro	24.71	1 out of 19	135,800	43
Seychelles	<1	4 out of 8	98	15
Sierra Leone	34.13	1 out of 19	22,948	12
Singapore	0	0 out of 7	430	14
Slovak Republic	6.15	6 out of 14	9,061	44
Slovenia	13.61	2 out of 11	3,731	44
Solomon Islands	<1	4 out of 9	72	23
Somalia	28.15	2 out of 16	24,204	9
South Africa	17.61	2 out of 21	99,179	11
Sri Lanka	9.8	4 out of 18	26,678	13
Sudan	59.36	1 out of 19	436,030	13
Suriname	3.14	4 out of 8	2,257	9
Swaziland	11.4	3 out of 12	1,895	14
Syria	0	0 out of 13	0	10
Taiwan	2.41	3 out of 8	550	N/A
Tajikistan	50.48	1 out of 13	35,718	11
Tanzania	10.7	4 out of 20	81,951	12
Thailand	15.25	2 out of 19	32,672	15
Tibet	-	-	3,976	N/A
Togo	8.95	3 out of 13	2,832	11
Tonga	6.86	4 out of 7	1,844	8
Trinidad & Tobago	5.11	5 out of 7	1,254	16
Tunisia	<1	15 out of 16	13,067	10
Turkey	86.94	1 out of 15	50,923	35
Turkmenistan	80.85	1 out of 10	9,101	6
Tuvalu	0	0 out of 6	65	15
Uganda	29.63	1 out of 20	188,819	8
Ukraine	50.07	1 out of 14	118,982	29
United Arab Emirates	11.31	3 out of 5	250	8
United Kingdom	-	-	5,594	57
Uruguay	1.74	7 out of 12	1,132	21
Uzbekistan	58.97	1 out of 13	60,712	13
Vanuatu	4.17	5 out of 6	2,084	12
Venezuela	48.02	1 out of 13	6,998	11
Vietnam	6.63	6 out of 19	23,424	6
Yemen	25.12	3 out of 12	34,090	9
Zambia	11.25	4 out of 19	85,762	13
Zimbabwe	23.21	2 out of 19	15,937	7.2

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID  
% Provided by US**

Country	% of Aid from US	Rank of US among Donors	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Israel	93.97	1 out of 13	2,627,369	93
Micronesia	90.95	1 out of 6	2,048	78
Turkey	86.94	1 out of 15	50,923	35
Colombia	86.3	1 out of 19	736,046	11
Iraq	85.19	1 out of 21	18,918,712	6
Jordan	83.81	1 out of 17	657,775	16
Marshall Islands	83.75	1 out of 4	0	61
Russia	81.89	1 out of 16	600,574	17
Turkmenistan	80.85	1 out of 10	9,101	6
Pakistan	74.59	1 out of 19	2,106,433	10
Palau	73.94	1 out of 5	2,044	99
Malta	68.57	1 out of 5	377	40
Panama	62.31	1 out of 9	26,689	24
Moldova	62.26	1 out of 17	26,586	37
Haiti	61.77	1 out of 15	133,915	18
Azerbaijan	61.73	1 out of 16	53,062	43
Ethiopia	60.48	1 out of 21	347,640	14
Kazakhstan	60.4	1 out of 16	48,652	11
Sudan	59.36	1 out of 19	436,030	13
Peru	59.2	1 out of 20	186,847	25
Uzbekistan	58.97	1 out of 13	60,712	13
Afghanistan	58.91	1 out of 20	2,205,778	9
Egypt	58.57	1 out of 19	1,868,753	9
Jamaica	56.97	1 out of 11	25,681	12.5
Kyrgyz Rep.	56.5	1 out of 13	3,592	13
North Korea	52.78	1 out of 16	45,704	3
Botswana	51.57	1 out of 14	13,132	13
Eritrea	50.5	1 out of 18	73,830	11
Tajikistan	50.48	1 out of 13	35,718	11
Ukraine	50.07	1 out of 14	118,982	29
Armenia	49.58	1 out of 17	80,830	27
Venezuela	48.02	1 out of 13	6,996	11
Cameroon	46.38	5 out of 17	5,073	21
Mexico	45.89	1 out of 17	72,260	23
Georgia	45.87	1 out of 18	416,554	37
Barbados	45.52	1 out of 8	415	10
Djibouti	45.49	1 out of 8	11,020	13
Liberia	43.98	1 out of 18	225,416	14
Guatemala	43.72	1 out of 17	52,285	24
El Salvador	43.69	1 out of 20	49,772	24
Angola	42.86	1 out of 19	62,069	17
Dominican Republic	42.62	1 out of 11	36,011	24
Ecuador	41.26	1 out of 16	74,250	16
Bolivia	41.23	1 out of 17	157,977	23
Honduras	41.2	1 out of 17	268,491	24
Lebanon	40.69	1 out of 15	36,906	9
Cyprus	40.2	1 out of 9	38,820	40
Croatia	38.59	1 out of 17	29,799	43
Kenya	36.88	1 out of 20	147,715	13
Burundi	36.75	1 out of 16	26,587	10
Guinea	35.94	1 out of 16	32,709	17
Nigeria	34.68	1 out of 17	81,189	15
Sierra Leone	34.13	1 out of 19	22,948	12
Macedonia	32.29	1 out of 19	51,689	N/A
Paraguay	31.36	2 out of 12	13,408	25
Gambia	30.9	2 out of 15	2,777	12
Namibia	30.2	1 out of 18	27,255	15
Uganda	29.63	1 out of 20	188,819	8
Philippines	29.4	2 out of 19	113,412	13
Belize	28.91	2 out of 9	2,735	12
Somalia	28.15	2 out of 16	24,204	9

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID**  
**% Provided by US**

Country	% of Aid from US	Rank of US among Donors	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Qatar	28.13	1 out of 4	0	10
Dem. Rep. of Congo	27.37	1 out of 20	71,694	27
Belarus	27.23	2 out of 13	8,369	8
Romania	26.07	2 out of 14	45,973	44
Yemen	25.12	3 out of 12	34,090	9
Indonesia	25.11	1 out of 18	128,719	8
Serbia & Montenegro	24.71	1 out of 19	135,800	43
Albania	23.76	1 out of 17	38,636	50
Mauritania	23.64	2 out of 17	11,140	9
Zimbabwe	23.21	2 out of 19	15,937	7.2
Cambodia	21.49	1 out of 19	54,821	12
India	21.42	2 out of 20	128,873	20
Bosnia-Herzegovina	21.23	2 out of 18	77,544	43
Cuba	19.7	2 out of 15	21,369	7
Bulgaria	19.35	2 out of 14	45,595	44
Nepal	19.13	3 out of 19	46,294	13
Cote d'Ivoire	18.57	2 out of 17	15,425	18
Latvia	18.03	2 out of 12	11,155	47
Brazil	17.67	2 out of 19	28,442	15
Malawi	17.63	2 out of 19	41,985	23
South Africa	17.61	2 out of 21	99,179	11
Mali	17.42	2 out of 17	44,156	14
Guyana	17.16	2 out of 8	12,567	13
Senegal	15.68	2 out of 17	34,835	13
Mozambique	15.66	1 out of 21	79,984	10
Nicaragua	15.47	2 out of 18	263,565	28
Thailand	15.25	2 out of 19	32,672	15
Argentina	15.24	4 out of 16	1,833	25
Benin	14.78	2 out of 17	23,322	15
Costa Rica	14.46	3 out of 13	2,640	21
Mongolia	14.39	3 out of 18	14,854	16
East Timor	13.84	3 out of 15	28,025	26
Bangladesh	13.71	2 out of 22	95,124	9
Slovenia	13.61	2 out of 11	3,731	44
Rep. of Congo	13.51	2 out of 16	162	7
Kiribati	13.5	4 out of 8	1,472	50
Rwanda	13.33	2 out of 19	50,899	11
Madagascar	12.89	3 out of 15	145,901	13
Swaziland	11.4	3 out of 12	1,895	14
United Arab Emirates	11.31	3 out of 5	260	8
Zambia	11.25	4 out of 19	85,762	13
Tanzania	10.7	4 out of 20	81,951	12
Ghana	10.63	3 out of 18	60,487	15
Sri Lanka	9.8	4 out of 18	26,678	13
Lithuania	9.51	4 out of 12	10,882	44
Togo	8.95	3 out of 13	2,832	11
Bahrain	8.64	3 out of 4	25,450	9
Chad	8.62	3 out of 17	21,549	23
Estonia	8.11	4 out of 12	9,509	42
Cape Verde	7.35	3 out of 13	116,666	8
Samoa	7.33	4 out of 7	1,293	30
Tonga	6.86	4 out of 7	1,844	8
Vietnam	6.63	6 out of 19	23,424	6
Lesotho	6.56	4 out of 13	3,641	9
Niger	6.37	3 out of 15	11,195	15
Morocco	6.23	5 out of 16	21,256	11
Slovak Republic	6.15	6 out of 14	9,061	44
Burkina Faso	6.11	5 out of 17	11,821	14
Laos	5.92	6 out of 17	0	5
Trinidad & Tobago	5.11	5 out of 7	1,254	16
Burma	5.02	6 out of 18	12,951	12

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID  
% Provided by US**

Country	% of Aid from US	Rank of US among Donors	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Czech Republic	4.2	6 out of 13	10,297	45
Vanuatu	4.17	5 out of 6	2,084	12
Oman	4.07	3 out of 5	26,080	10
Chile	3.76	7 out of 18	2,695	27
Malaysia	3.63	4 out of 14	2,185	9
Suriname	3.14	4 out of 8	2,257	9
Gabon	2.56	3 out of 8	2,828	12
Taiwan	2.41	3 out of 8	550	N/A
Central African Rep.	2.31	3 out of 9	1,136	16
China	2.18	8 out of 20	863	9
Guinea-Bissau	2.16	5 out of 14	33	21
Mauritius	2.13	4 out of 7	144	12
Algeria	1.88	8 out of 18	1,768	10
Hungary	1.88	7 out of 16	9,733	43
Saudi Arabia	1.84	4 out of 7	35	72
Grenada	1.79	5 out of 5	1,196	29
Uruguay	1.74	7 out of 12	1,132	21
Fiji	1.73	4 out of 10	1,668	19
Iran	1.54	9 out of 18	0	9
Antigua & Barbuda	<1	6 out of 6	2,987	11
Comoros	<1	4 out of 6	251	8
South Korea	<1	5 out of 11	0	39
Poland	<1	7 out of 13	152,062	46
Sao Tome & Principe	<1	10 out of 10	548	9.3
Seychelles	<1	4 out of 8	98	15
Solomon Islands	<1	4 out of 9	72	23
Tunisia	<1	15 out of 16	13,067	10
Dominica	0	0 out of 5	1,283	10
Kuwait	0	0 out of 4	46,173	10
Libya	0	0 out of 8	0	10
Maldives	0	0 out of 10	271	10
Papua New Guinea	0	0 out of 10	562	22
St. Kitts-Nevis	0	0 out of 3	1,121	17
St. Lucia	0	0 out of 6	1,884	13
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	0	0 out of 4	556	13
Singapore	0	0 out of 7	430	14
Syria	0	0 out of 13	0	10
Tuvalu	0	0 out of 6	65	15
Greece	-	-	667	44
Ireland	-	-	21,870	41
Portugal	-	-	752	44
Tibet	-	-	3,976	N/A
United Kingdom	-	-	5,594	57

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID**  
by Rank of US among Donors

Country	Rank of US among Donors	% of Aid from US	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Marshall Islands	1 out of 4	83.75	0	81
Qatar	1 out of 4	28.13	0	10
Malta	1 out of 5	68.57	377	40
Palau	1 out of 5	73.94	2,044	99
Micronesia	1 out of 6	90.95	2,048	78
Barbados	1 out of 8	45.52	415	10
Djibouti	1 out of 8	45.49	11,020	13
Cyprus	1 out of 9	40.2	38,820	40
Panama	1 out of 9	62.31	26,689	24
Turkmenistan	1 out of 10	80.85	9,101	6
Dominican Republic	1 out of 11	42.62	36,011	24
Jamaica	1 out of 11	56.97	25,661	12.5
Israel	1 out of 13	93.97	2,627,369	93
Kyrgyz Rep.	1 out of 13	56.5	3,592	13
Tajikistan	1 out of 13	50.48	35,718	11
Uzbekistan	1 out of 13	58.97	60,712	13
Venezuela	1 out of 13	48.02	6,998	11
Botswana	1 out of 14	51.57	13,132	13
Ukraine	1 out of 14	50.07	118,982	29
Haiti	1 out of 15	61.77	133,915	18
Lebanon	1 out of 15	40.69	36,906	9
Turkey	1 out of 15	86.94	50,923	35
Azerbaijan	1 out of 16	61.73	53,062	43
Burundi	1 out of 16	36.75	26,587	10
Ecuador	1 out of 16	41.26	74,250	16
Guinea	1 out of 16	35.94	32,709	17
Kazakhstan	1 out of 16	60.4	48,652	11
North Korea.	1 out of 16	52.78	45,704	3
Russia	1 out of 16	81.89	600,574	17
Albania	1 out of 17	23.76	38,636	50
Armenia	1 out of 17	49.58	80,830	27
Bolivia	1 out of 17	41.23	157,977	23
Croatia	1 out of 17	38.59	29,799	43
Guatemala	1 out of 17	43.72	52,285	24
Honduras	1 out of 17	41.2	268,491	24
Jordan	1 out of 17	83.81	657,775	16
Mexico	1 out of 17	45.89	72,260	23
Moldova	1 out of 17	62.26	28,596	37
Nigeria	1 out of 17	34.68	81,189	15
Eritrea	1 out of 18	50.5	73,830	11
Georgia	1 out of 18	45.87	416,554	37
Indonesia	1 out of 18	25.11	128,719	8
Liberia	1 out of 18	43.98	225,416	14
Namibia	1 out of 18	30.2	27,255	15
Angola	1 out of 19	42.85	92,060	17
Cambodia	1 out of 19	21.49	54,821	12
Colombia	1 out of 19	86.3	736,046	11
Egypt	1 out of 19	58.57	1,868,763	9
Macedonia	1 out of 19	32.29	51,699	N/A
Pakistan	1 out of 19	74.59	2,106,433	10
Serbia & Montenegro	1 out of 19	24.71	135,800	43
Sierra Leone	1 out of 19	34.13	22,948	12
Sudan	1 out of 19	59.36	436,030	13
Afghanistan	1 out of 20	58.91	2,205,778	9
Dem. Rep. of Congo	1 out of 20	27.37	71,694	27
El Salvador	1 out of 20	43.69	49,772	24
Kenya	1 out of 20	36.88	147,715	13
Peru	1 out of 20	59.2	186,847	25
Uganda	1 out of 20	29.63	188,819	8
Ethiopia	1 out of 21	60.48	347,640	14
Iraq	1 out of 21	85.19	18,918,712	6

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID**  
by Rank of US among Donors

country	Rank of US among Donors	% of Aid from US	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Mozambique	1 out of 21	15.66	79,984	10
Guyana	2 out of 8	17.16	12,567	13
Belize	2 out of 9	28.91	2,735	12
Slovenia	2 out of 11	13.61	3,731	44
Latvia	2 out of 12	18.03	11,155	47
Paraguay	2 out of 12	31.36	13,408	25
Belarus	2 out of 13	27.23	8,369	8
Bulgaria	2 out of 14	19.35	45,596	44
Romania	2 out of 14	26.07	45,973	44
Cuba	2 out of 15	19.7	21,369	7
Gambia	2 out of 15	30.9	2,777	12
Rep. of Congo	2 out of 16	13.51	162	7
Somalia	2 out of 16	28.15	24,204	9
Benin	2 out of 17	14.78	23,322	15
Cote d'Ivoire	2 out of 17	18.57	15,425	18
Mali	2 out of 17	17.42	44,156	14
Mauritania	2 out of 17	23.64	11,140	9
Senegal	2 out of 17	15.68	34,835	13
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2 out of 18	21.23	77,544	43
Nicaragua	2 out of 18	15.47	263,565	26
Brazil	2 out of 19	17.67	28,442	15
Malawi	2 out of 19	17.63	41,985	23
Philippines	2 out of 19	29.4	113,412	13
Rwanda	2 out of 19	13.22	50,899	11
Thailand	2 out of 19	15.25	32,672	15
Zimbabwe	2 out of 19	23.21	15,937	7.2
India	2 out of 20	21.42	128,873	20
South Africa	2 out of 21	17.61	99,179	11
Bangladesh	2 out of 22	13.71	95,124	9
Bahrain	3 out of 4	8.64	25,450	9
Oman	3 out of 5	4.07	26,080	10
United Arab Emirates	3 out of 5	11.31	250	8
Gabon	3 out of 8	2.56	2,828	12
Taiwan	3 out of 8	2.41	550	N/A
Central African Rep.	3 out of 9	2.31	1,136	16
Swaziland	3 out of 12	11.4	1,895	14
Yemen	3 out of 12	25.12	34,090	9
Cape Verde	3 out of 13	7.35	116,666	8
Costa Rica	3 out of 13	14.46	2,640	21
Togo	3 out of 13	8.95	2,832	11
East Timor	3 out of 15	13.84	28,025	25
Madagascar	3 out of 15	12.89	145,901	13
Niger	3 out of 15	6.37	11,195	15
Chad	3 out of 17	8.62	21,549	23
Ghana	3 out of 18	10.63	60,487	15
Mongolia	3 out of 18	14.39	14,854	15
Nepal	3 out of 19	19.13	46,294	13
Comoros	4 out of 6	<1	251	8
Mauritius	4 out of 7	2.13	144	12
Samoa	4 out of 7	7.33	1,293	30
Saudi Arabia	4 out of 7	1.84	35	7.2
Tonga	4 out of 7	6.86	1,844	8
Kiribati	4 out of 8	13.5	1,472	50
Seychelles	4 out of 8	<1	98	15
Suriname	4 out of 8	3.14	2,257	9
Solomon Islands	4 out of 9	<1	72	23
Fiji	4 out of 10	1.77	1,668	10
Estonia	4 out of 12	8.11	9,509	42
Lithuania	4 out of 12	9.51	10,882	44
Lesotho	4 out of 13	6.56	3,641	9
Maldives	4 out of 14	2.63	2,185	6

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID  
by Rank of US among Donors**

Country	Rank of US among Donors	% of Aid from US	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Argentina	4 out of 16	15.24	1,833	25
Sri Lanka	4 out of 18	9.8	26,678	13
Zambia	4 out of 19	11.25	85,762	13
Tanzania	4 out of 20	10.7	81,951	12
Grenada	5 out of 5	1.79	1,196	29
Vanuatu	5 out of 6	4.17	2,084	12
Trinidad & Tobago	5 out of 7	5.11	1,254	16
South Korea	5 out of 11	<1	0	39
Guinea-Bissau	5 out of 14	2.16	33	21
Morocco	5 out of 16	6.23	21,255	11
Burkina Faso	5 out of 17	6.11	11,821	14
Cameroon	5 out of 17	46.38	5,073	21
Antigua & Barbuda	6 out of 6	<1	2,987	11
Czech Republic	6 out of 13	4.2	10,297	45
Slovak Republic	6 out of 14	6.15	9,061	44
Laos	6 out of 17	5.92	0	5
Burma	6 out of 18	5.02	12,951	12
Vietnam	6 out of 19	6.63	23,424	6
Uruguay	7 out of 12	1.74	1,132	21
Poland	7 out of 13	<1	152,062	46
Hungary	7 out of 16	1.88	9,733	43
Chile	7 out of 18	3.76	2,595	27
Algeria	8 out of 18	1.88	1,768	10
China	8 out of 20	2.18	863	9
Iran	9 out of 18	1.54	0	9
Sao Tome & Principe	10 out of 10	<1	548	9.3
Tunisia	15 out of 16	<1	13,067	10
St. Kitts-Nevis	0 out of 3	0	1,121	17
Kuwait	0 out of 4	0	46,173	10
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	0 out of 4	0	556	13
Dominica	0 out of 5	0	1,283	10
St. Lucia	0 out of 6	0	1,884	13
Tuvalu	0 out of 6	0	65	15
Singapore	0 out of 7	0	430	14
Libya	0 out of 8	0	0	10
Maldives	0 out of 10	0	271	10
Papua New Guinea	0 out of 10	0	592	22
Syria	0 out of 13	0	0	10
Greece	-	-	667	44
Ireland	-	-	21,870	41
Portugal	-	-	752	44
Tibet	-	-	3,976	N/A
United Kingdom	-	-	5,594	57

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID  
by FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid**

Country	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Aid from US	Rank of US among Donors	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Iraq	18,918,712	85.19	1 out of 21	6
Israel	2,627,369	93.97	1 out of 13	93
Afghanistan	2,205,778	58.91	1 out of 20	9
Pakistan	2,106,433	74.69	1 out of 19	10
Egypt	1,868,753	58.57	1 out of 19	9
Colombia	736,046	86.3	1 out of 19	11
Jordan	657,775	83.81	1 out of 17	16
Russia	600,574	81.89	1 out of 16	17
Sudan	436,030	59.36	1 out of 19	13
Georgia	416,554	45.87	1 out of 18	37
Ethiopia	347,640	60.48	1 out of 21	14
Honduras	268,491	41.2	1 out of 17	24
Nicaragua	263,565	15.47	2 out of 18	26
Liberia	225,416	43.98	1 out of 18	14
Uganda	188,819	29.63	1 out of 20	8
Peru	186,917	50.2	1 out of 20	26
Bolivia	157,977	41.23	1 out of 17	23
Poland	152,062	<1	7 out of 13	46
Kenya	147,715	36.88	1 out of 20	13
Madagascar	145,901	12.89	3 out of 15	13
Serbia & Montenegro	135,800	24.71	1 out of 19	43
Haiti	133,915	61.77	1 out of 15	18
India	128,873	21.42	2 out of 20	20
Indonesia	128,719	25.11	1 out of 18	8
Ukraine	118,982	50.07	1 out of 14	29
Cape Verde	116,666	7.35	3 out of 13	8
Philippines	113,412	29.4	2 out of 19	13
South Africa	99,179	17.61	2 out of 21	11
Bangladesh	95,124	13.71	2 out of 22	9
Angola	92,060	42.85	1 out of 19	17
Zambia	85,762	11.25	4 out of 19	13
Tanzania	81,951	10.7	4 out of 20	12
Nigeria	81,189	34.68	1 out of 17	15
Armenia	80,830	49.56	1 out of 17	27
Mozambique	79,984	15.66	1 out of 21	10
Bosnia-Herzegovina	77,544	21.23	2 out of 18	43
Ecuador	74,250	41.26	1 out of 16	16
Eritrea	73,830	50.5	1 out of 18	11
Mexico	72,260	45.89	1 out of 17	23
Dem. Rep. of Congo	71,694	27.37	1 out of 20	27
Uzbekistan	60,712	58.97	1 out of 13	13
Ghana	60,487	10.63	3 out of 18	15
Cambodia	54,821	21.49	1 out of 19	12
Azerbaijan	53,062	61.73	1 out of 16	43
Guatemala	52,285	43.72	1 out of 17	24
Macedonia	51,699	32.29	1 out of 19	N/A
Turkey	50,923	86.94	1 out of 15	35
Rwanda	50,899	13.33	2 out of 19	11
El Salvador	49,772	43.69	1 out of 20	24
Kazakhstan	48,652	60.4	1 out of 16	11
Nepal	46,294	19.13	3 out of 19	13
Kuwait	46,173	0	0 out of 4	10
Romania	45,973	26.07	2 out of 14	44
North Korea	45,704	52.78	1 out of 16	3
Bulgaria	45,596	19.35	2 out of 14	44
Mali	44,156	17.42	2 out of 17	14
Malawi	41,985	17.53	2 out of 19	23
Cyprus	38,820	40.2	1 out of 9	40
Albania	38,636	23.76	1 out of 17	50
Lebanon	36,906	40.69	1 out of 15	9
Dominican Republic	36,011	42.62	1 out of 11	24
Tajikistan	35,718	50.48	1 out of 13	11
Senegal	34,835	15.68	2 out of 17	13
Yemen	34,090	25.12	3 out of 12	9

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID  
by FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid**

Country	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Aid from US	Rank of US among Donors	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Guinea	32,709	35.94	1 out of 16	17
Thailand	32,672	15.25	2 out of 19	15
Croatia	29,799	38.59	1 out of 17	43
Moldova	28,596	62.26	1 out of 17	37
Brazil	28,442	17.67	2 out of 19	15
East Timor	28,025	13.84	3 out of 15	25
Namibia	27,255	30.2	1 out of 18	15
Panama	26,689	62.31	1 out of 9	24
Sri Lanka	26,678	9.8	4 out of 18	13
Burundi	26,587	36.76	1 out of 16	10
Oman	26,080	4.07	3 out of 5	10
Jamaica	25,661	56.97	1 out of 11	12.5
Bahrain	25,450	8.64	3 out of 4	9
Somalia	24,204	28.15	2 out of 16	9
Vietnam	23,424	6.63	6 out of 19	6
Benin	23,322	14.78	2 out of 17	16
Sierra Leone	22,948	34.13	1 out of 19	12
Ireland	21,870	-	-	41
Chad	21,549	8.62	3 out of 17	23
Cuba	21,369	19.7	2 out of 15	7
Morocco	21,256	6.23	5 out of 16	11
Zimbabwe	15,937	23.21	2 out of 19	7.2
Cote d'Ivoire	15,426	18.57	2 out of 17	18
Mongolia	14,854	14.39	3 out of 18	15
Paraguay	13,408	31.36	2 out of 12	25
Botswana	13,132	51.57	1 out of 14	13
Tunisia	13,067	<1	15 out of 16	10
Burma	12,951	5.02	6 out of 18	12
Guyana	12,567	17.16	2 out of 8	13
Burkina Faso	11,821	6.11	5 out of 17	14
Niger	11,195	6.37	3 out of 15	15
Latvia	11,155	18.03	2 out of 12	47
Mauritania	11,140	23.64	2 out of 17	9
Djibouti	11,020	45.49	1 out of 8	13
Lithuania	10,882	9.51	4 out of 12	44
Czech Republic	10,297	4.2	6 out of 13	45
Hungary	9,733	1.88	7 out of 16	43
Estonia	9,509	8.11	4 out of 12	42
Turkmenistan	9,101	80.85	1 out of 10	6
Slovak Republic	9,061	6.15	6 out of 14	44
Belarus	8,369	27.23	2 out of 13	8
Venezuela	8,998	48.02	1 out of 13	11
United Kingdom	5,594	-	-	57
Cameroon	5,073	46.38	5 out of 17	21
Tibet	3,976	-	-	N/A
Slovenia	3,731	13.61	2 out of 11	44
Lesotho	3,641	6.56	4 out of 13	9
Kyrgyz Rep.	3,592	56.5	1 out of 13	13
Antigua & Barbuda	2,987	<1	6 out of 6	11
Togo	2,832	8.95	3 out of 13	11
Gabon	2,828	2.56	3 out of 8	12
Gambia	2,777	30.9	2 out of 15	12
Belize	2,735	28.91	2 out of 9	12
Chile	2,695	3.76	7 out of 18	27
Costa Rica	2,640	14.46	3 out of 13	21
Suriname	2,257	3.14	4 out of 8	9
Malaysia	2,185	3.63	4 out of 14	9
Vanuatu	2,084	4.17	5 out of 6	12
Micronesia	2,048	90.95	1 out of 6	78
Palau	2,044	73.94	1 out of 5	99
Swaziland	1,895	11.4	3 out of 12	14
St. Lucia	1,884	0	0 out of 6	13
Tonga	1,844	6.86	4 out of 7	8
Argentina	1,833	15.24	4 out of 16	25

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID  
by FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid**

Country	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)	% of Aid from US	Rank of US among Donors	% of Voting w/US @ UN
Algeria	1,768	1.88	8 out of 18	10
Fiji	1,668	1.73	4 out of 10	19
Kiribati	1,472	13.5	4 out of 8	30
Samoa	1,293	7.33	4 out of 7	30
Dominica	1,283	0	0 out of 5	10
Trinidad & Tobago	1,254	5.11	5 out of 7	16
Grenada	1,196	1.79	5 out of 5	29
Central African Rep.	1,136	2.31	3 out of 9	16
Uruguay	1,132	1.74	7 out of 12	21
St. Kitts-Nevis	1,121	0	0 out of 3	17
China	863	2.18	8 out of 20	9
Portugal	752	-	-	44
Greece	667	-	-	44
Papua New Guinea	592	0	0 out of 10	22
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	556	0	0 out of 4	13
Taiwan	550	2.41	3 out of 8	N/A
Sao Tome & Principe	548	<1	10 out of 10	9.3
Singapore	430	0	0 out of 7	14
Barbados	415	45.52	1 out of 8	10
Malta	377	68.57	1 out of 5	40
Maldives	271	0	0 out of 10	10
Comoros	251	<1	4 out of 6	8
United Arab Emirates	250	11.31	3 out of 5	8
Rep. of Congo	162	13.51	2 out of 16	7
Mauritius	144	2.13	4 out of 7	12
Seychelles	98	<1	4 out of 8	15
Solomon Islands	72	<1	4 out of 9	23
Tuvalu	65	0	0 out of 6	15
Saudi Arabia	35	1.84	4 out of 7	7.2
Guinea-Bissau	33	2.16	5 out of 14	21
Iran	0	1.54	9 out of 18	9
Laos	0	5.92	6 out of 17	5
Libya	0	0	0 out of 8	10
Marshall Islands	0	83.75	1 out of 4	61
Qatar	0	28.13	1 out of 4	10
South Korea	0	<1	5 out of 11	39
Syria	0	0	0 out of 13	10

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID**  
by % of Voting w/US @ UN

% of Voting

FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid

	% of Voting			
Palau	99	73.94	1 out of 5	2,044
Israel	93	93.97	1 out of 13	2,627,369
Micronesia	78	90.95	1 out of 6	2,048
Marshall Islands	61	83.75	1 out of 4	0
United Kingdom				
Albania	50	23.76	1 out of 17	38,636
Kiribati	50	13.5	4 out of 8	1,472
Latvia	47	18.03	2 out of 12	11,155
Poland	46	<1	7 out of 13	152,062
Czech Republic	45	4.2	6 out of 13	10,297
Bulgaria	44	19.35	2 out of 14	45,596
Greece	44			667
Lithuania	44	9.51	4 out of 12	10,882
Portugal	44	-	-	752
Romania	44	26.07	2 out of 14	45,973
Slovak Republic	44	6.15	6 out of 14	9,061
Slovenia	44	13.61	2 out of 11	3,731
Azerbaijan	43	61.73	1 out of 16	53,062
Bosnia-Herzegovina	43	21.23	2 out of 18	77,544
Croatia	43	38.59	1 out of 17	29,799
Hungary	43	1.88	7 out of 16	9,733
Serbia & Montenegro	43	24.71	1 out of 19	135,600
Estonia	42	8.11	4 out of 12	9,509
Ireland	41	-	-	21,870
Cyprus	40	40.2	1 out of 9	38,820
Malta	40	29.67	1 out of 9	277
South Korea	39	<1	5 out of 11	0
Georgia	37	45.87	1 out of 18	416,554
Moldova	37	62.26	1 out of 17	28,596
Turkey	35	86.94	1 out of 15	50,923
Samoa	30	7.33	4 out of 7	1,293
Grenada	29	1.79	5 out of 5	1,196
Ukraine	29	50.07	1 out of 14	118,982
Armenia	27	49.58	1 out of 17	80,830
Chile	27	3.76	7 out of 18	2,695
Dem. Rep. of Congo	27	27.37	1 out of 20	71,694
Nicaragua	26	15.47	2 out of 18	263,565
Argentina	25	15.24	4 out of 16	1,833
East Timor	25	13.84	3 out of 15	28,025
Paraguay	25	31.36	2 out of 12	13,408
Peru	25	59.2	1 out of 20	186,847
Dominican Republic	24	42.62	1 out of 11	36,011
El Salvador	24	43.69	1 out of 20	49,772
Guatemala	24	43.72	1 out of 17	52,285
Honduras	24	41.2	1 out of 17	266,491
Panama	24	62.31	1 out of 9	26,689
Bolivia	23	41.23	1 out of 17	157,977
Chad	23	8.62	3 out of 17	21,549
Malawi	23	17.63	2 out of 19	41,985
Mexico	23	45.89	1 out of 17	72,260
Solomon Islands	23	<1	4 out of 9	72
Papua New Guinea	22	0	0 out of 10	592
Cameroon	21	46.38	5 out of 17	5,073
Costa Rica	21	14.46	3 out of 13	2,640
Guinea-Bissau	21	2.16	5 out of 14	33
Uruguay	21	1.74	7 out of 12	1,132
India	20	21.42	2 out of 20	128,873
Fiji	19	1.73	4 out of 10	1,668
Cote d'Ivoire	18	18.57	2 out of 17	15,425

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID**  
by % of Voting w/US @ UN

Country	% of Voting w/US @ UN	% of Aid from US	Rank of US among Donors	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)
Haiti	18	61.77	1 out of 15	133,915
Angola	17	42.85	1 out of 19	92,060
Guinea	17	35.94	1 out of 16	32,709
Russia	17	81.89	1 out of 16	600,574
St. Kitts-Nevis	17	0	0 out of 3	1,121
Central African Rep.	16	2.31	3 out of 9	1,136
Ecuador	16	41.26	1 out of 16	74,250
Jordan	16	83.81	1 out of 17	657,775
Trinidad & Tobago	16	5.11	5 out of 7	1,254
Benin	15	14.78	2 out of 17	23,322
Brazil	15	17.67	2 out of 19	28,442
Ghana	15	10.63	3 out of 18	60,487
Mongolia	15	14.39	3 out of 18	14,854
Namibia	16	30.2	1 out of 18	27,266
Niger	15	6.37	3 out of 15	11,195
Nigeria	15	34.68	1 out of 17	81,189
Seychelles	15	<1	4 out of 8	98
Thailand	15	15.25	2 out of 19	32,672
Tuvalu	15	0	0 out of 6	65
Burkina Faso	14	6.11	5 out of 17	11,821
Ethiopia	14	60.48	1 out of 21	347,640
Liberia	14	43.98	1 out of 18	225,416
Mali	14	17.42	2 out of 17	44,156
Singapore	14	0	0 out of 7	430
Swaziland	14	11.4	3 out of 12	1,895
Botswana	13	51.57	1 out of 14	13,132
Djibouti	13	45.49	1 out of 8	11,020
Guyana	13	17.16	2 out of 8	12,567
Kenya	13	36.88	1 out of 20	147,715
Kyrgyz Rep.	13	58.5	1 out of 13	3,592
Madagascar	13	12.89	3 out of 15	145,901
Nepal	13	19.13	3 out of 19	46,294
Philippines	13	29.4	2 out of 19	113,412
Senegal	13	15.68	2 out of 17	34,835
Sri Lanka	13	9.8	4 out of 18	26,678
St. Lucia	13	0	0 out of 6	1,884
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	13	0	0 out of 4	550
Sudan	13	59.36	1 out of 19	436,030
Uzbekistan	13	58.97	1 out of 13	60,712
Zambia	13	11.25	4 out of 19	85,762
Jamaica	12.9	50.97	1 out of 11	25,001
Belize	12	28.91	2 out of 9	2,735
Burma	12	5.02	6 out of 18	12,951
Cambodia	12	21.49	1 out of 19	54,821
Gabon	12	2.56	3 out of 8	2,828
Gambia	12	30.9	2 out of 15	2,777
Mauritius	12	2.13	4 out of 7	144
Sierra Leone	12	34.13	1 out of 19	22,948
Tanzania	12	10.7	4 out of 20	81,951
Vanuatu	12	4.17	5 out of 6	2,084
Antigua & Barbuda	11	<1	6 out of 6	2,987
Colombia	11	86.3	1 out of 19	736,046
Eritrea	11	50.5	1 out of 18	73,830
Kazakhstan	11	60.4	1 out of 16	48,652
Morocco	11	6.23	5 out of 16	21,256
Rwanda	11	13.33	2 out of 19	50,899
South Africa	11	17.61	2 out of 21	99,179
Tajikistan	11	50.48	1 out of 13	35,718
Togo	11	8.95	3 out of 13	2,832

**U.S. FINANCIAL AID**  
by % of Voting w/US @ UN

Country	% of Voting w/US @ UN	% of Aid from US	Rank of US among Donors	FY04 Dollar Amount of Aid (in thousands)
Venezuela	11	48.02	1 out of 13	6,998
Algeria	10	1.88	8 out of 18	1,768
Barbados	10	45.52	1 out of 8	415
Burundi	10	36.75	1 out of 16	26,587
Dominica	10	0	0 out of 5	1,283
Kuwait	10	0	0 out of 4	46,173
Libya	10	0	0 out of 8	0
Maldives	10	0	0 out of 10	271
Mozambique	10	15.66	1 out of 21	79,984
Oman	10	4.07	3 out of 5	26,080
Pakistan	10	74.59	1 out of 19	2,106,433
Qatar	10	28.13	1 out of 4	0
Syria	10	0	0 out of 13	0
Tunisia	10	<1	16 out of 16	13,067
Sao Tome & Principe	9.3	<1	10 out of 10	548
Afghanistan	9	58.91	1 out of 20	2,205,778
Bahrain	9	8.64	3 out of 4	25,450
Bangladesh	9	13.71	2 out of 22	85,124
China	9	2.18	8 out of 20	863
Egypt	9	58.57	1 out of 19	1,868,753
Iran	9	1.54	9 out of 18	0
Lebanon	9	40.69	1 out of 15	36,908
Lesotho	9	6.58	4 out of 13	3,641
Malaysia	9	3.63	4 out of 14	2,185
Mauritania	9	23.64	2 out of 17	11,140
Somalia	9	28.15	2 out of 16	24,204
Suriname	9	3.14	4 out of 8	2,257
Yemen	9	25.12	3 out of 12	34,090
Belarus	8	27.23	2 out of 13	8,369
Cape Verde	8	7.35	3 out of 13	116,666
Comoros	8	<1	4 out of 6	251
Indonesia	8	25.11	1 out of 18	128,719
Tonga	8	6.86	4 out of 7	1,844
Uganda	8	29.63	1 out of 20	188,819
United Arab Emirates	8	11.31	3 out of 5	250
Saudi Arabia	7.2	1.84	4 out of 7	35
Zimbabwe	7.2	23.21	2 out of 19	15,937
Cuba	7	19.7	2 out of 15	21,369
Rep. of Congo	7	13.51	2 out of 16	162
Iraq	6	85.19	1 out of 21	18,918,712
Turkmenistan	6	80.85	1 out of 10	9,101
Vietnam	6	6.63	6 out of 19	23,424
Laos	5	5.92	6 out of 17	0
North Korea	3	52.78	1 out of 16	45,704
Macedonia	N/A	32.29	1 out of 19	51,699
Taiwan	N/A	2.41	3 out of 8	550
Tibet	N/A	-	-	3,976

FOUO

December 26, 2005

TO: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Letter from Melaney Murray-McLellan

Attached is a letter that was left in my mailbox in (b)(6) Apparently I met this person, but I don't know them.

Please figure out how this should be handled, and get in touch with them either by phone or in writing, and report back to me and tell me what was done.

Thanks.

Attach: 12/14/05 Letter from Melaney Murray-McLellan

DNR.m  
122605-10

.....  
*Please Respond By January 30, 2006*

Robert -  
SD ok'd a reply letter to this. It is attached last, but it needs to be re-typed, signed, and sent.

*Justin*  
(b)(6)

FOUO

OSD 24585-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55286

*383,7*

*26 Dec 05*

*14 Dec 05*

December 14, 2005

To: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

From: Melaney Murray-McLellan

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld,

I apologize for writing you in such a forward manner. My (b)(6) (b)(6) and I met you at (b)(6) St. Patrick's day Party last March. I spoke to you and your wife about living in (b)(6) - I was the one who made the spinach stuffed shells (which did not turn out that great I may add)- Anyhow, I have rather an unfortunate situation in my family And was hoping that you could forward this matter to the right person on your staff.

353.7

My (b)(6) are in the midst of adopting A baby boy. It is through an agency in North Carolina and Is a foreign/Russian adoption. About 5 years ago my (b)(6)

(b)(6) The agency here in the United states approved their credentials and sent them over to Moscow about 7 weeks ago to meet their new baby boy. Protocol is to make two trips with second trip bringing the baby home.

They have run into a huge hurdle because the Russian judge will not approve the adoption due to (b)(6)

(b)(6) They made a stipulation stating if (b)(6) (b)(6) could be sole petitioner, that they would be able to follow through with adopting this particular child.

All they need is the U.S. to approve thk- a signature from a government official **At the Department of CIS- Citizen Immigration Services- Or someone from that department to contact them-**

14 Dec 05

OSD 24585-05

And direct them to be able to adopt this child/  
The (b)(6) would be the sole petitioner.

To Contact (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Adoption Agency: (b)(6)

My name is Melaney Murray-McLellan  
(b)(6)

I just want to thank you for any help or attention you can give this  
Matter- (b)(6) has suffered a lot and I'm just trying to find any  
assistance available.

Thank you very much for your time and consideration.  
Again, I apologize for the manner in which this letter comes but  
There is a time constraint as well.

Thank you and Happy Holidays,

*Melaney Murray-McLellan*

Melaney Murray-McLellan  
(b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)  
Subject: Adoption Letter  
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2005 19:17:48 -0500  
To: "Melaney and (b)(6)"



4

Ministry of Education  
Moscow Region  
Moscow, Russia

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to inform you that (b)(6) were issued a Notice of Favorable Determination  
Consent Application for Admission Processing of Orphan, Position (171-H) on Sept. 8, 2005. The Position on this 171-H is listed  
as (b)(6). This approval that (b)(6) in accordance to CIS regulations if a couple is  
married they must petition for adoption of a child number. The couple's nationality was carefully reviewed by CIS office and they were  
approved. They disclosed the fact (b)(6)  
(b)(6) CIS would not consider (b)(6)  
(b)(6) is a prohibitive factor in situation 171-H scenario. We have been informed that in accordance to Russian international  
adoption statute, that a parent (b)(6) before they can have their name  
placed on the petition to adopt a child; however, if parent who (b)(6) will file as sole petitioner with the  
Russian authorities that this would be acceptable, as long as other parent consented to spouse filing as sole petitioner and CIS was aware  
of this procedure granted their consent. Please be advised that CIS has been informed of the situation by family and homestay agency  
and do not object to having (b)(6) as a sole petitioner for international adoption of their son in accordance with  
requirements of the Federation of Russia.

Signature:

Title:

Special Agent  
to Robert  
Rangel.

DRAFT

Ms. Melaney Murray-McLellan

(b)(6)

Dear Mrs. Murray-McLellan,


I just received your letter, and have asked my Special Assistant, Mr. Robert Rangel, to look into the matter for you, and get back to you.

Needless to say, this is ~~way~~ out of my area of responsibility, but we will certainly see if we can provide some guidance for you.

With my best wishes for the Holiday Season,

Sincerely,

DRK



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 29 2005

Ms. Melaney Murray-McLellan

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Murray-McLellan,

I just received your letter. I have asked my Special Assistant, Mr. Robert Rangel, to look into the matter and get back to you.

Needless to say, this is out of my area of responsibility, but we will certainly see if we can provide some guidance for you.

With my best wishes for the Holiday Season,

Sincerely,

cc:  
Robert Rangel

OSD 24585-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55291

385.7

29 Dec 05

14 Dec 05

Ms. Melaney Murray-McLellan

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Murray-McLellan,

I just received your letter. I have asked my Special Assistant, Mr. Robert Rangel, to look into the matter ~~for you~~ and get back to you.

Needless to say, this is out of my area of responsibility, but we will certainly see if we can provide some guidance for you.

With **my** best wishes for the Holiday Season,

Sincerely,

TRK  
OSL 12/24

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

2005 12 05 08:05

December 05, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Cooper Slings

Please tell me about the "Cooper slings" that, according to what they're saying on TV, are being bought privately and sent to Iraq. It is a sling for the gunner in a HMMWV. Is it as good as they say?

Thanks.

DHR:aa  
120505-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/22/05*

**OSD 24622-05**

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55293



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-0125-05

28 December 2005

2:05

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Admiral E. P. Giambastiani, Acting CJCS *E. P. Giambastiani 12/27*

SUBJECT: Information on Cooper Slings (SF 120505-01)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ **Answer:** In response to your question (TAB A), the following is provided. The cooper sling is a gunner restraint harness manufactured by Black Mountain Industries in response to soldiers' complaints regarding the comfort of existing HMMWV restraint systems. These slings have been privately purchased for use in Iraq and are more comfortable than existing gunner restraints. The Army evaluated the cooper sling for Service-wide use and determined it did not meet safety requirements.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ **Analysis:** The cooper sling incorporates a wide leather seating area and a fixed restraint system. In rollover testing, it allowed partial ejection of the gunner. In November, the Army began replacing existing HMMWV slings with an enhanced gunner restraint system that provides both better comfort and a more secure restraint system. The restraint system incorporates a tension retractor (like a car seatbelt) that permits normal movement but limits **high** impact movement during a crash or rollover. Procurement of the enhanced gunner restraint system by the other Services and USSOCOM is currently under review. There are no planned Service-wide procurements of the cooper sling in the Department of Defense.

(U) COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Claude Christianson, USA; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

OSD 24622-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

11

12:05

December 05, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Cooper Slings

Please tell me about the "Cooper slings" that, according to what they're saying on TV, are being bought privately and sent to Iraq. It is a sling for the gunner in a HMMWV. Is it as good as they say?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
120505-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/22/05*

**OSD 24622-05**

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55295

# UNCLASSIFIED

## TAB B

### COORDINATION

USA	Colonel Strong	12 December 2005
USN	Captain Wode	22 December 2005
USAF	Colonel Davis	22 December 2005
USMC	Colonel Haines	22 December 2005
USSOCOM	Colonel Price	22 December 2005

**UNCLASSIFIED**

11-L-0559/OSD/55296

Tab B

This Cover Sheet is ~~FOUO~~ when separated  
from Attachment

August 15,2005

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: TS Paper and Action

Please see the attached TS paper and your note. I read your note twice, and I have no idea what you expect or suggest I **do**. Please advise.

Also, in the future, when you are sending me a note, please have some direction to it, so I have a sense of what you have in mind.

Thanks.

Attach: ~~TS~~ NSC Restricted Information

DHR:ss  
081505-25

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/23/05*

This Cover Sheet is ~~FOUO~~ when separated  
from Attachment

11-L-0559/OSD/55297

**OSD 24638-05**

FOUO

December 27, 2005

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Teleconference

You asked if the video teleconference to the Town Hall in Washington worked, and I told you it did. Here is a photo from the event.

Thanks again for all you're doing.

Warm regards,

Attach.  
Photo

DHR:dh  
122705-01 (TS)

06050

27 Dec 05

FOUO

OSD 24640-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55298

051215-D-2987S-037

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (right) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace, U.S. Marine Corps, listen to the Commander of Multinational Force and Observers Gen. George W. Casey Jr., U.S. Army, describe the success of the Iraqi election satellite feed during a Pentagon Town Hall meeting on Dec. 15, 2005. DoD photo by C. Stikkel. (Released) R-430-2005

OSD 24640-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55299

December 28, 2005

TO Newt Gingrich  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: AEI

My impression is that AEI is consistently off on foreign policy and defense issues, and the person heading it up tends to lead the charge. Is that your assessment?

DHR:dh  
122805-08 (TS).doc

080

28 DEC 25

OSD 24641-05

B-17-3

~~FOUO~~

FILE COPY

020 WRE

SEP 16 2005 7:18  
September 16, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Pete Geren  
Mike Donley  
Steve Cambone  
Ron Sega

CC Steve Bucci  
Cathy Mainardi  
Robert Rangel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Meeting on NRO Discussions

The discussions on how DoD with NRO are going too slowly. I would like to have a meeting on September 29 with the people listed above. Please be ready to discuss. We need to get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
091503-06

.....  
*Please Respond By 09/29/05*

*Close*

16 SEP 05

OSD 24646-05

11-L-0559/~~FOUO~~/55301

30  
130



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SEP -8 PM 1:28

INFO MEMO

September 8, 2005

Robert Rangel

RR → FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
9/12

FROM Michael B. Donley, Director of Administration and Management **MD**

SUBJECT **Props Report** on DA&M NRO Efforts

- You tasked me to implement your decision with Ambassador Negroponte to split the Director, **NRO** from the Under Secretary of the Air Force and, in so doing, bring the organizational-management arrangements associated with the NRO up-to-date using a revision to the NRO charter directive as the principal implementing tool.
- Discussions with your senior advisors with responsibilities in this area have been productive. USD(I), SecAF, DNRO, CJCS, STRATCOM, and DoD GC are participating. Steve Cambone and his staff are coordinating with the ODNI and CIA, as appropriate.
- We are now on three tracks to get *this* done (co-leads in parentheses):
  - ✓ Draft new NRO charter to replace 1964 version (DA&M and USD(I)).
  - ✓ Review NRO organization and future (DNRO and USD(I)).
  - ✓ Review NRO relationships with the DoD Executive Agent for Space and STRATCOM (USD(I), SecAF, and CJCS).
- Three broad issues are in play with the DNRO-UsecAF split.
  - ✓ Codifying USD(I)'s exercise of your authority, direction, and control over the NRO (and the other Defense Agencies that are members of the Intel Community).
  - ✓ Balancing NRO's dual roles as a member of both DoD and the Intel Community and its role in space with ties to the DoD Executive Agent for Space.
  - ✓ Defining the desired **NRO** relationships with the **COCOMs**, specifically in view of the ISR coordinating roles assigned to **STRATCOM**.
- Air Force leadership is pushing to redefine NRO's mission, re-establish a reporting relationship between it and the **NRO**, and resolve detailed operational and programmatic issues in advance of finalizing the new NRO charter directive.
  - ✓ Secretary Geren hosted a meeting on 30 August to discuss **Air** Force issues associated with the **NRO**. UsecAF Sega, Gen Myers, Gen Jumper, Gen Mosely,

MA SD	9/12	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	12/19	SA DSD	
	11/18	1450	

30 9/8  
11-1-0559/QSD/55302  
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OSD 18113-05

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and Gen Lord **as well as** Steve Cambone, **Gen** Cartwright, Gen Hayden (Principal Deputy DNI), and I attended; NRO was represented by Brig Gen Carpenter (**Deputy** Director for Military Support/NRO).

- ✓ Resolution of the detailed issues advocated by the Air Force could unnecessarily delay the **NRO** charter directive for several months.
  
- e **At** the same time, Steve Cambone **has** asked Don ~~Kerr~~ **as** the new DNRO to complete **an** assessment of the NRO and its future. He has also asked us to incorporate its results, **as** appropriate, in the NRO charter directive.
  
- All factors considered, I believe the NRO charter should be updated **to** reflect its mission and relationships with the COCOMs and the DoD EA for Space. For **this** purpose, waiting for Don Kerr's assessment, which we understand is due to Steve soon, is important. However, resolution of the detailed operational and programmatic issues raised by the Air Force should proceed separately from the NRO charter directive process, under Steve's lead.
  
- e **On** the way forward:
  - ✓ I will have **an** NRO charter directive drafted **no** later than **15** October that reflects the progress of our efforts and Dr. ~~Kerr's~~ initial assessment. It would be my intention to formally coordinate the draft and forward it for **your** consideration.
  - ✓ I **also** anticipate bringing the USD(I) charter directive forward for signature **soon**; this is **an** important, overall step that **also** affects the update to **NRO** organizational-management arrangements.
  - ✓ Secretary Geren will host a follow-on meeting in late September to continue discussions on Air Force issues **as well as** operational **and** programmatic details.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Provided **for your** information.

**COORDINATION:** Informally coordinated with Steve Cambone and Mike Maples.

Prepared by: Mark A. Munson, Sr., O&MP/ODA&M Staff, (b)(6)

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ES 4205

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SEP 14 2005



TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: National Security Strategy Outline

Please take a look at this National Security Strategy outline and see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach:  
National Security Strategy Outline

DHR:m  
091305-09

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/05

*OBE*

Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/r  
Lt Col Langyel

OCT 26 2005

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OSD 24647-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55304

**Scoping the National Security Strategy Report**  
(to be released January 2006)

Outline of NSS 2002

1. **Overview of America's International Strategy**
  - Provides an introduction and outlines the next eight chapters.
2. **Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity**
  - Describes philosophical underpinning for democracy Strategy; describes "core beliefs" that animate the National Security Strategy.
3. **Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends**
  - Discusses "struggle against global terrorism... on many fronts" and "coordinated effort" with "regional partners."
4. **Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts**
  - "In an increasingly interconnected world," "concerned nations must remain actively engaged in critical regional disputes." Focuses on Israeli-Palestinian conflict; India & Pakistan; Latin America; Columbia; and Africa.
5. **Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction**
  - Makes the case for preemptive action, complete with philosophical justification. "Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture.."
6. **Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade**
  - "Strong economic growth [among allies and trading partners] is vital to U.S. national security interests.."
7. **Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy**
  - Outlines ways the developed world can promote the flourishing of democracy through aid to impoverished countries.
8. **Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power**
  - Outlines initiatives for increasing cooperation with key allies and NATO on national security matters.

9. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the 21st Century
  - "The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed."

Proposed Approach for NSS 2006

1. Maintain basic structure of 2002 NSS
2. Within each chapter
  - Describe strategy *per* NSS 2002
  - Describe current context
    - Successes
    - New challenges
  - Describe approach going forward
3. Discussion will include/amplify
  - Defend basic approach
    - Historical roots
    - Validation by success/events
    - Risks/mitigation
  - Agenda for 2<sup>nd</sup> term
    - what we want to achieve
      - Priorities without exclusion
    - How we plan to achieve it
      - Means/ends
      - Realism, not overreach
      - Need to integrate all elements of influence, our own and others (national/transnational)

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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 OCT 24 PM 6:14

ACTION MEMO

1-05/013608-STRAT  
ES-4205

Robert Rangel

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *EE* **OCT 24 2005**

SUBJECT: National Security Strategy (NSS) Outline

- On October 7" I met with Dr. Peter Feaver and a few other key participants in the 2006 National Security Strategy development process.
- Dr. Feaver provided a timeline (Tab A) and draft outline for the new NSS (Tab B) and requested comments on the structure and key themes.
- I provided initial thoughts on the outline to Dr. Feaver today (Tab C), and seek any additional comments you may have.
- Ryan Henry and I will ensure that important concepts from the QDR are incorporated into the NSS as the two processes proceed. There will be no daylight between them.
- I will provide you with routine updates as the NSS develops, per your snowflake (Tab D).

RECOMMENDATION: Review comments at Tab C and provide any additional views.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Approve with changes \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_



Prepared by: ~~Eric~~ Pavel, Principal Director for Strategy, (b)(6)

*SP3 10/25*

MA SD		SMA OSD	
TSA SD	<i>10/25</i>	SA OSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>10/25</i>	<i>0820</i>	<i>10/26</i>
ESR MA	<i>10/25</i>		

OSD 20970-05

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11-L-0559/OSD/55307

*Proposed Timeline for National Security Strategy*

October 7: "Deputized *Committee*" (DC) meets to discuss outline

November 4 SPIR produces draft NSS, circulates to DC

November 11 :DC provides feedback on draft NSS

November 16: SPIR circulates revised draft to DC

November 18: DC meets to conclude draft

December 2: SPIR circulates draft to Principals

December 14: Principals approve NSS draft, send to POTUS

December 23: POTUS approves NSS

January 9: Public release of NSS

## National Security Strategy 2006: Outline

### 1. Overview of America's International Strategy

- Written fresh
- This is a "wartime" national security strategy, written in the early years of a new long war.
- NSS **2002** written very early in that process, before we had as firm a grip on the ideological nature of the struggle as we have today. Saw the outline then, can see **more** of the details now.
  - In a period not unlike the early days of the Cold War where new doctrines and new institutions gradually took shape, even against the backdrop of intensive debate and uncertainty. What emerged came to lay the broad tracks along which American foreign policy ran for subsequent decades.
- Strategy can't ignore U.S. unique power and role, but also must recognize limits to our power. Reinforce, without giving undue emphasis or sounding chastened, the discussion of the caveats that have already been acknowledged.
  - Idealistic about goals, realistic about means
- Grounded in bedrock traditions that have served the country well, but applied to the novel conditions we **face** today
- The freedom agenda provides the overall strategic framework that connects and advances the component goals that make up our national security strategy.
  - Our approach: developing effective democracies, characterized by ordered liberty -- freedom/justice/rule of law - and economic growth. Such states create conditions for political competition in stead of armed conflict.

### 2. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity

#### A. Summary of NSS 2002

- the long-range goal is transformative, reflecting America's transformative tradition: ending tyranny
- success of our mutual relations depends on what the other countries do domestically: a rebuke of narrow realism
- human rights cannot be guaranteed without human liberty - can't have rights without political participation

#### B. Current Context: Successes/Challenges

- Colored revolutions, a continuation of broad historical trend
- ice cracking in middle east
- Some reversals

**C. Approach Going Forward**

- draw on 2<sup>nd</sup> inaugural
- work in language that pairs freedom with "justice" **and** "ordered liberty"
- survival of freedom and justice depends on success of freedom and justice
- Reiterate idealistic about goals, realistic about means
  - Emphasize how goals are worthy in themselves, but also means to other ends in the strategy
- Not one man, one vote, one time
- Democratization as a process can be destabilizing and does depend on local conditions; but is the best hope for transition from pursuit of goals by arms to pursuit of goals by politics and outside actors have a role to play (setting example, encouraging reformers)

**3. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Terrorists and Their Ideology and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends [N.B. slight change in title, adding "and their ideology"]**

**A. Summary of NSS 2002**

- the problem was not simply terrorists but also regimes and transnational networks that enabled terrorists
- long war requiring all instruments of national power, and close international cooperation
- could not simply play defense, must take the fight to the terrorists
- War of ideas crucial

**B. Current Context: Successes/Challenges**

- Terrorists on the run: Afghanistan, Iraq, AQ network disrupted
- International community rallied: extensive cooperation
- Terrorists adapting: expanding fight (Bali, London, Madrid)
- Frank discussion of the war in Iraq

**C. Approach Going Forward**

- Draw on WoT review
  - Emphasize international cooperation and partnership capacity
  - Role of strategic communication
- Draw on 6 October speech
- Terrorists exploit regional and transnational conflicts, so we must address them as part of the WoT (foreshadowing chapter 4)

**4. Work with Others to Defuse Regional and Transnational Conflicts**

A. Summary of NSS 2002

- In globalized world, regional conflicts cannot be isolated for long - affect our interests
- Require cooperation
- Depends on the readiness of the actors themselves to move to peace

B. Current Context: Successes/Challenges

- Southern Sudan, but Darfur
- Progress in Israeli-Palestinian
- Progress on Kashmir
- Progress in Aceh
- Progress on Northern Ireland
- Challenges in all these places, plus Colombia, Thailand, etc.

C. Approach Going Forward

- U.S. leadership can be catalyst, sometimes a necessary catalyst when the right ingredients present
- But no substitute for local leadership
- Need to take genocide and "mass killing conditions that lead to genocide" more seriously

**5. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction**

A. Summary of NSS 2002

- Drew on time-honored, bedrock American principles
- Cannot wait until threats gather before addressing them
  - Use word "preemption" once, and only once
- Deterrence-only a risky proposition against terrorists. Augment with action when circumstances warrant.
- Reorient nonproliferation regime towards action rather than rhetoric
- Lead coalition of actors who understand the problem and are willing to take action
- Not a cookie-cutter doctrine, but tailored to local circumstances

B. Current Context: Successes/Challenges

- Iraq WMD (from myths/realities)
- Libya
- Khan network

- PSI
- **NK**
- Iran
- Continued interest of terrorists in getting WMD

**C. Approach Going Forward**

- Candor that Iraq has complicated political picture
  - Iraq WMD a symbol not of inherent limits of intelligence but rather a **symbol** of a massive intelligence failure. We must do better.
  - Demands of modern world demand that intel meet a certain standard - we are determined to fix it.
- Develop common stake, common threat assessment with essential partners (as was done in Iraq with regional support and necessary members of coalition of willing). Being done with Iran and NK.
- But cannot abdicate US role which is irreplaceable

**6. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade**

**A. Summary of NSS 2002**

- Longstanding bedrock American principle: greater economic freedom translates into greater economic opportunity and prosperity.
- Globalization, properly harnessed and managed, is a great engine for prosperity and progress

**B. Current Context: Successes/Challenges**

- CAFTA
- Demographics
- Energy demands

**C. Approach Going Forward**

- DOHA
- **Good** governance, anti-corruption
- Energy??

**7. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy**

**A. Summary of NSS 2002**

- Had to move from input-based to output-based development

**B. Current Context: Successes/Challenges**

- **MCA:** mixed
  - Strong leadership at WB
  - Africa commitments
- C. Approach Going Forward
- Reform Foreign Aid
  - Recognize that aid depends on global stability: **thus** contributions to global stability are every bit as important as counting aid \$\$

**8. NEW CHAPTER: Confronting the Grave Public Health Threats to International Stability**

- avian flu
- aids
- demographic change
- technology change
- drug war?
- these have in common numerous features:
  - not traditional threat in the sense of arising from the malevolence of a political actor determined to harm our interests
  - yet consequences of sufficient gravity that they pose a comparable, or in some cases more serious, threat to our national interest than some traditional security concerns
  - politics, especially transnational and international politics, and especially traditional politics of competing national security interests, are thoroughly implicated in any solutions
  - there is a role, though not necessarily a lead role, for traditional security instruments

**9. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power**

A. Summary of NSS 2002

- "There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world with the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe"
- Develop cooperative relationships with key power centers and prevent rise of old power rivalries
- Old alliance structures must innovate to meet new challenges

B. Current Context: ~~Successes~~/Challenges

- Disagreements over Iraq did not impede cooperation on Wot
- Close coordination on 6 party talks, and EU-3 vs. Iran

- NATO role in Afghanistan evolving

C. Approach Going Forward

- PSI-model: international institutions oriented around action, not talking
- Enhance NATO reform
- Strengthen cooperation of democracies, who share the most in common
- Regional goals from Record **2008**

10. Transform ~~America's~~ National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges ~~and~~ Opportunities of the ~~21st~~ Century

A. Summary of NSS 2002

- Cold War institutions had to be reformed to meet the new challenges

B. Current Context: Successes/Challenges

- Homeland Security
- Defense transformation
- State Dept: transformational diplomacy
- Intelligence reform

C. Approach Going Forward

- Extend transformation to the interagency process, breaking down stovepipes

10. **How does this work**

- new chapter that outlines interlocking, cross-cutting logic

Themes that should be woven throughout text:

- relative importance of states and transnational forces
- relationship between force and other instruments
- Short-run/medium-run/long-run aspects of goals
- Discuss alternatives and why we have rejected them
- Risks and steps to manage/mitigate risk
- Comparison with alternative approaches
- Priorities
- relationship between ends and means
- limits we acknowledge, steps we have taken to avoid overreach
- expectations of how others might respond to our policies and how we can anticipate and adjust accordingly
- how the different pieces fit together or reinforce each other

## **Recommended Changes to the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2006 Outline**

- I recommend that the preamble briefly address the changed security environment, using language articulating the four key types of security challenges outlined in the National Defense Strategy: traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive (see Tab 1).
- It is important to highlight the Administration's significant accomplishments (e.g., bringing 50 million people to freedom, weakening the Al Qaeda network, destroying the A.Q. Khan network, convincing the Libyan regime to dismantle its WMD programs, etc.) – either in the front of the strategy or throughout the document.
- There are key points from the 2002 NSS that should be retained that are not captured in the current outline (e.g., influencing states at strategic crossroads).
- Regarding the specific chapters in the outline, I provide the following comments:

### **1. Overview of America's International Strategy**

- The overview is well constructed. A few thoughts:
  - We should proceed carefully with the use of the term “ordered liberty.” It could be misconstrued, or adopted by regimes with authoritarian tendencies.
  - We might consider focusing the overview on promoting a well-ordered world of responsible, sovereign states.
  - This approach would highlight the linkages between promoting human dignity and strengthening security. For example, working with our international partners to encourage and enable states to exercise effective sovereignty would:
    - Help prepare all of us to better handle strategic uncertainty,
    - Help prevent or mitigate the emergence of threats, and
    - Improve our ability to work together to address common security problems.
  - The last sub-bullet should be expanded to point out the importance of effective sovereignty for addressing ungoverned areas. Such areas can be exploited by terrorists and other actors, with deleterious consequences for neighbors and the broader international community.

## 2. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity

- This is a very good chapter that emphasizes the importance of the role of the United States as a champion for human dignity and individual freedom.
- Considering that the war on terrorism is often mistakenly cast by our adversaries as a war against Islam, we might use this chapter to highlight our belief in the importance of freedom of religion and conscience.

## 3. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Terrorists and their Ideology and Work to Prevent Attacks against Us and our Friends

- A few comments on this important chapter:
  - The title for Chapter 3 needs further consideration.
    - The use of “ideology” implies that all terrorists subscribe to a single worldview. Better to narrow the range of terrorists (to Islamist extremists only) or expand the notion of their motives and aspirations.
    - Some alternatives for replacing “Terrorists and their Ideology” are:
      - Terrorists and their ideologies
      - Radical militant Islamism (religious)
      - Violent extremism (broad).
  - This chapter should introduce the importance of deterring and dissuading terrorist networks.
    - Some say terrorists are not deterrable. Yet, various actors in terrorist networks may be motivated by goals that can be denied or have things they value that can be held at risk, e.g.:
      - Financiers, who may not be as committed to their murderous causes as suicide bombers, may value material assets and their own lives.
      - Terrorist foot soldiers have goals (e.g., successful attacks) that can be denied and, therefore, possibly can be deterred.
    - Successful deterrence and dissuasion can save lives, prevent crises, and conserve resources.
  - ~~Part~~ C should reflect the main elements of the U.S. strategy for the global war on terrorism:
    - Protect and defend the homeland;
    - Attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad;

- Support mainstream Muslim efforts to reject violent extremism.
- o In addition to exploiting conflict (as the outline states), terrorists also exploit ungoverned areas – areas where governments have difficulty providing basic services to their populations, providing justice and security, or setting the conditions for economic opportunity. In such areas, the circumstances are ripe for violent extremist ideologies or the lure of criminal activity to take root or spread – thereby further eroding effective sovereignty, creating a vicious cycle. (foreshadowing chapters 6 and 7).

#### 4. Work with Others to Defuse Regional and Transnational Conflicts

- We should use this section to extol key successes and strengthened capabilities for international cooperation (e.g., Global Peace Operations Initiative).

#### 5. Prevent our Enemies from Threatening Us, our Allies, and our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

- The discussion of pre-emption in the new strategy should be in a broader context.
  - o Pre-emption is one option among an array of preventive measures that we further elucidated in the National Defense Strategy.
  - o Preventive activities:
    - Aim to preclude gathering threats -- they are early measures that prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming conflicts;
    - Also aim to create conditions for a more favorable international system; and
    - Include security cooperation initiatives, forward deterrence, humanitarian assistance, and non-proliferation initiatives.
- I do not recommend a significant reduction in the number of times the word “pre-emption” is used, as many audiences who read and analyze the NSS would interpret that as a signal that the Administration is backing away from this important element of the Strategy.
  - o However, I recommend that those uses be placed in the broader context of preventive measures.
- This discussion also should highlight the continuing **U.S** commitment to the active deterrence of aggression, coercion, and other dangerous activities by state adversaries.

- It should be made clear that states that provoke our concerns regarding WMD activities are responsible for making their intentions and activities transparent to the international community. If their behavior invited suspicions, they are responsible for proving those suspicions wrong.

## **6. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade**

- Since peaceful and secure states can become prosperous through trade and investment, this chapter provides an opportunity to discuss economic aspects of effective sovereignty, including:
  - The importance of sound institutions;
  - The benefits of sustaining an environment in which a vibrant private sector can generate wealth creation opportunities; and
  - The benefits of integrating into the global community.
- This chapter also might highlight that we will be vigilant to revisionist alternatives to free-market economies.

## **7. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy**

- This chapter could be combined with chapter 6 to emphasize that economic growth and building the infrastructure of democracy are mutually reinforcing
  - Better than stating that aid is dependent on global stability, **this** chapter should highlight the importance of U.S.-led security alliances and partnerships for underpinning a stable international economic system.
  - It is important to highlight the linkages of issues in **this** (and the previous) chapter to the GWOT, including the importance of efforts to strengthen governance in countries with ungoverned areas that terrorist networks can exploit.
    - Building sustainable capacity requires understanding how the various components of governance (e.g., justice and law, administrative and economic capabilities, political institutions and civil society, **and** national security capabilities) interact to be mutually reinforcing. (foreshadows the need for greater interagency coordination in chapter 10)

- It also requires capacity-building activities that ensure the sustained ability to exercise effective sovereignty once external assistance is removed.
- o The Administration is coordinating such governance capacity-building efforts with those of other countries to ensure all contributors' actions reinforce each other.

## **8. NEW CHAPTER Confronting the Grave Public Health Threats to International Stability**

- I recommend changing the title to “confronting Global Public Health and Safety Threats to International Security and Prosperity.” Security, not stability, should be the primary goal. The value of early measures to prevent these problems from becoming crises also should be highlighted. Many such challenges represent the underside of globalization, in contrast to the many benefits that globalization brings us. I also recommend:
  - o Discussing the broader challenge of addressing pandemic disease (including avian influenza and AIDs) rather than focusing on the unique challenges of two specific diseases.
  - o Adding a section on international cooperative responses to catastrophic natural disasters (e.g., tsunamis, earthquakes, etc.).
  - o Limiting the demographics discussion to diagnosis of key challenges.
  - o Adding discussion of trafficking in persons (hence “safety” in the title).
    - Such trafficking often uses the same transit routes and networks as the drug trade.
  - o Mentioning, but not overstating, the linkages among the illicit drug trade, other transnational criminal activities, and terrorist networks.
- This chapter also might highlight that, in cooperation with international partners, we will protect the global commons (international waters, airspace, cyberspace, and outer space) to ensure that disruptive threats do not emanate from these natural “seams” in the international system of sovereign states.

## **9. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power**

- Limiting **this** discussion to centers of *global* power may cast this chapter too narrowly. We could drop the word “global” to include discussions on developing

or strengthening our relationships with regional powers that we seek to influence in light of the GWOT and other challenges.

- Correct the typo (change "with" to "without").
- Highlighting PSI as a model for international action is a good idea. We should try to be specific in the NSS in suggesting applications of the PSI model to ~~other~~ endeavors, such as partnering with other nations to increase governance in priority regions.
- Ensure that regional goals include a discussion of the importance of influencing China and other key states at strategic crossroads.

#### **10. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

- In this section it would be useful to address in some detail the transformation efforts across the United States Government.
  - o We should include the key initiatives that emerge from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
  - o We also might highlight that, to promote integrated operations among elements of the USG, it is important to increase the planning, execution, and assessment capabilities of USG departments and agencies. (The QDR will address this issue as well.)

#### **11. How does this work**

- It is not clear that this chapter is necessary if we effectively highlight linkages among the chapter topics throughout the text.

## MATURE AND EMERGING CHALLENGES

"America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few." –*National Security Strategy, September 2002*

The U.S. military predominates in the world in *traditional* forms of warfare. Potential adversaries accordingly **shift** away from challenging the United States **through** *traditional* military action and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods. An array of *traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive* capabilities and methods threaten U.S. interests:

- **Traditional** challenges are posed by **states** employing recognized **military** capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict.
- **Irregular** challenges come **from** those employing "unconventional" methods to **counter** the *traditional* advantages **of** stronger opponents.
- **Catastrophic** challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use **of** WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects.
- **Disruptive** challenges may come **from** adversaries who develop and use **break-through** technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.

These categories overlap. Actors proficient in one can be expected to **try** to reinforce their position with methods and capabilities drawn from others.

Indeed, recent experience indicates that the most dangerous circumstances **arise** when we face a complex of challenges. For example, our adversaries in **Iraq** and *Afghanistan* presented both *traditional* and *irregular* challenges. Terrorist groups like al Qaeda are *irregular* threats but also actively **seek** *catastrophic* capabilities. *North Korea* at once poses *traditional, irregular, and catastrophic* challenges. Finally, in the future, the most capable opponents may seek to combine truly *disruptive* capacity with *traditional, irregular, or catastrophic forms of warfare*.

**Traditional challenges.** These challenges are most often associated with states employing armies, navies, and air forces in long-established forms of military competition. *Traditional* military challenges remain **important, as** many states **maintain** capabilities to influence security conditions in their region. However, allied superiority in traditional domains, coupled with the costs of traditional military competition, drastically reduce adversaries' incentives to compete with us in this arena.

As formidable as U.S. capabilities are against *traditional* opponents, we cannot ignore the challenges that such adversaries might present. Traditional challenges require us to maintain sufficient combat capability in key areas of military competition.

**Irregular challenges.** Increasingly sophisticated *irregular* methods—e.g., terrorism and insurgency—challenge U.S. security interests. Adversaries employing irregular methods

aim to erode U.S. influence, patience, and political will. Irregular opponents often take a long-term approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the United States to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action.

Two factors have intensified the danger of *irregular* challenges: the rise of *extremist* ideologies and the absence of effective governance.

Political, religious, and ethnic extremism continues to fuel conflicts worldwide.

The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Many states are unable, and in some cases unwilling, to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas open to hostile exploitation.

Our experience in the war on terrorism points to the need to reorient our military capabilities to contend with such irregular challenges more effectively.

***Catastrophic challenges.*** In the face of American dominance in *traditional* forms of warfare, some hostile forces are seeking to acquire *catastrophic* capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Porous international borders, weak international controls, and easy access to information-related technologies facilitate these efforts. Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transnational terrorists, proliferation, and problem states that possess or seek WMD, increasing the risk of WMD attack against the United States.

Proliferation of WMD technology and expertise makes contending with *catastrophic* challenges an urgent priority. Even a single *catastrophic* attack against the United States or an ally would be unacceptable. We will place greater emphasis on those capabilities that enable us to dissuade others from acquiring catastrophic capabilities, to deter their use and, when necessary, to defeat them before they can be employed.

***Disruptive challenges.*** In rare instances, revolutionary technology and associated military innovation can fundamentally alter long-established concepts of warfare. Some potential adversaries are seeking *disruptive* capabilities to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and offset the current advantages of the United States and its partners.

Some *disruptive* breakthroughs, including advances in biotechnology, cyber operations, space, or directed-energy weapons, could seriously endanger our security.

As such breakthroughs can be unpredictable, we should recognize their potential consequences and hedge against them.

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECY OF DEFENSE  
2005 SEP 03 07:18  
SEP 13 2005

*Israel*

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Calls in Washington by General Yaron

Please give me a recommendation on the attached letter from the outgoing U.S. Ambassador. ~~You will need to check with Doug Feith and Lisa Bronson to get the full picture.~~

*Thanks.*

Attach: 9/8/05 AMB Kurtzer letter to SecDef

DHR:as  
090905-09

.....  
***Please Respond By September 22, 2005***

*13 SEP 05*

*Kjs*  
SEP 13 2005

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/55323

OSD 24648-05

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE2005 SEP 09 AM 9:17  
Embassy of the United States of AmericaTel Aviv, Israel  
September 8, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
~~Secretary of Defense~~  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

~~As I conclude my four-year tour of duty as United States Ambassador to Israel~~ want to raise one issue that I ~~hope~~ you will consider. ~~After~~ more than a year of hard work involving senior Defense Department officials and two special envoys from Defense Minister Mofaz, we have reached a successful ~~outcome~~ on the question of Israel's military exports, especially to China. This effort ~~was well worth our~~ time in it has now led to the beginning of fundamental changes in Israel's military export control regime.

The one ~~outstanding question~~ involves the personal status of Defense Ministry Director General Amos Yaron. As the Israeli official in charge of Israel's export controls, Yaron clearly had the responsibility to keep us informed in a timely manner sensitive exports to China. However, now that we have reached agreement with the Government of Israel, I believe it is important that we allow Yaron to retire with dignity. He is a man who has served his country honorably and ably, and he also served with distinction as Israel's Defense Attaché to the United States during the Reagan Administration. Before retiring, he seeks to meet with some of your officials in the Pentagon and elsewhere in Washington in order to say goodbye and to close the file. I hope you will authorize his coming to Washington to make these farewell calls in an official capacity.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Daniel C. Kurtzer  
Ambassador

OSD 18145-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55324

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2005

0005

TO: The Honorable Karen Hughes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: November 2004 Report

Attached is a report that was submitted to me privately by three folks who had been involved with USIA over the years. It is dated -- almost a year old now, but they did it at my request. I found it interesting and thought you **might** as well.

If I can be helpful, do let me know. I know that these individuals are all interested in being of assistance, if that is your desire.

Thanks.

Attach November, 2004 Private Report to SecDef

DHR:ss  
092705-07

27SEP05

*27 Sep 05*  
*[Signature]*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55326 ~~OSD~~ 24654-05

*Private Report to the  
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:  
Joseph Duffey  
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.  
Lewis Manilow

*November 2004*

11-L-0559/OSD/55326

## Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of **shaping** the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital, and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should

### 1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

**OBJECTIVE Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.**

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and

appropriate degree—our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To this end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the USG to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages. Crucially, CPOA would only provide the research product — coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

## 2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

**OBJECTIVE:** Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the USG has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. CPOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the U.S. government's message into the future. The USG must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on CFOA data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis,

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC deliberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

## Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams **was** asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion – and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can win over to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, “The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin’s version of Islam are impervious to persuasion.”<sup>1</sup> To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are “impervious to persuasion,” and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines due to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government’s public diplomacy infrastructure.<sup>2</sup> Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy – old and new – and how they can be properly targeted at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

<sup>1</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” pg. 375.

<sup>2</sup> Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the American media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

## **I. How America Is Viewed Abroad**

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S., while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.<sup>3</sup> This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat – and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States – than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 1.4% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States: is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

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<sup>3</sup> "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.<sup>4</sup> The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question – some of which might even prove accurate – the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

## II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is **startling** how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends **\$5 million** annually on this type of analysis.<sup>5</sup> Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said."

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.<sup>7</sup> Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

<sup>4</sup> Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

<sup>5</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

<sup>7</sup> U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the “takeoff” as well as the “crash landing” of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not always agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America’s vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will “play” in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makes, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

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radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and “issue of the day” polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

### **III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror**

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said “I never know what I say until I hear the response.” This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department’s public diplomacy efforts, “State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs.”<sup>8</sup> America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America’s standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

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<sup>8</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy,” September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are trying to persuade and what tools we have at our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences as well as how and when these tools should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of law (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), we must begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world that we are trying to persuade. That is, a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort is less likely to be successful than one that recognizes that the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments we should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country than we would another group. The same could be true for different age groups – older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this does not mean America should be delivering contradictory messages to different groups. Not only does delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but also it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to different groups.

To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, business people, and so forth. These "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The U.S. government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States. As an Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."<sup>9</sup> Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will ~~remain~~ vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American private sector

#### IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

- A viral part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at all times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will allow the U.S. government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

#### *The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution*

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Shmson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."<sup>10</sup>

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of America."

<sup>9</sup> Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

<sup>10</sup> The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented **use** of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to **RAND** charged with gathering the information required by the U. S government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (**CFOA**) would be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It would be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is simply not done today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be tasked with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls the focus of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide-array of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.

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<sup>11</sup> See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror

### **Create a mechanism for using CFOA**

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.<sup>12</sup> CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

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<sup>12</sup> The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PWD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.”<sup>13</sup>

In order to keep all parts of the government bureaucracy moving towards the same goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government’s foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CFOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government’s long term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily “Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs” or “The Global Messenger” produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.<sup>14</sup> Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessman, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America’s message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

### *A Serious Commitment From the President*

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

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<sup>13</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 8.

<sup>14</sup> The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security **priority** by the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This **commitment** must be **made** not only through public statements and **private** consultation and **analysis** within the White House, but also in the President's **continuing** contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of **Mission**. It must be a **priority commitment** that is followed **through** on a day-to-day basis and **in** each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to **American** national security than American public opinion is to an election.

### **Conclusion**

While one might be understandably skeptical of a **proposal** for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a **short pause** to hammer out a comprehensive **strategy** is called for. The **temptation** of many in Washington - including many who have written **reports** on how to revitalize public diplomacy - is to try and rekindle the **glory years** of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USM-type programs are important - and should be **seen** as vital components of the **War on Terrorism** - it is far **more** important for the U.S. government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with **the rest** of the world. **America** needs to do **more than broadcast** our message to foreign audiences; **we need** to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in this paper **does** just that. It **starts** with an intense stage of information gathering where **American government** officials - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate all of the information currently available and **procures** whatever other information **is needed** to accurately and fully **understand** foreign public opinion at a **specific point in time**. This baseline is then **given** to policy makers, so prior policy can be **reevaluated** and future policy **evaluated** in light of the benefits **America** gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given **to** **American** public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a SIG - who **use** this information to craft an effective, informed, and flexible communications effort for America.

Finally, **this dialogue** between America and the rest of the world –and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen as a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America’s message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the U.S. government the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.

As John Adams famously observed, “The Revolution was in the **minds** and hearts of the people.” For a **small, extremist** segment of the world population values like freedom and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the vast majority of people around the globe is more interested in security for themselves and **their** families than war and destruction. America **has** a peaceful message and strives to be a force for freedom and prosperity around the world. Yet **we are** doing incredible harm to ourselves by not advocating for ourselves effectively. As the 9/11 commission stated “If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.”<sup>16</sup> Richard Holbrooke put it best, “How can a man in a cave out communicate the world’s leading communications society?”<sup>16</sup>

American national security requires that we harness the **wealth of resources** we have available to communicate with the rest of the world. We must **soak** and listen to the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do so, we will prevail.

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<sup>16</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” pg. 377.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out,” *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

~~FOUO~~

September 09, 2005

000-92

**TO:** President George W. Bush  
**CC:** Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Stephen J. Hadley

**FROM:** Donald Rumstfeld



**SUBJECT:** Daily Update on Department of Defense KATRINA Activity

Attached is the latest update with new information **is** in bold **type**. Worth noting:

- Stabilizing around **65,000** National Guard **and** Active Duty
- Watching Tropical Storm Ophelia off Florida closely
- Approaching **15** million **MREs and 25** million liters H2O
- International **aid** starting to flow into the area
- Supporting FEMA on **Mortuary** Affairs

Respectfully,

Attach: 9/9/05 Daily Update on Department of Defense KATRINA Activity

DHR:ss  
090805-08

9 SEP 05



~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/55342

SEP 09 2005  
OSD 24655-05

DoD Support to Hurricane KATRINA  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)  
Executive Summary  
Friday, September 9, 2005 (as of 0600)

Command and Control

- U.S. Northern Command Commander is Admiral Keating in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
- Joint Task Force Katrina Commander is Lieutenant General Honore at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.
- Joint Task Force Louisiana National Guard Commander is Major General Landreneau, New Orleans, Louisiana.
- Joint Task Force Mississippi National Guard Commander is Major General Cross at Keesler AFB, Mississippi.

Operational Highlights

- **70,616** Active Duty and National Guard personnel are on the ground or aboard ships supporting relief operations.
  - **19,793** Active Duty.
  - **46,186** National Guard. (+ **4,637** outside the response area).
- 20 US Navy ships are in the area.
- Total aviation support includes Active Duty and National Guard aircraft
  - **346** (-) helicopters (**166** Active Duty and **180** National Guard).
  - **68** (-) airplanes (**35** Active Duty and 33 National Guard).
- DoD has provided extensive search and rescue, evacuation, and medical support:
  - **4,637** active sorties flown – **496** in the past 24-hours.
  - **8,697** National Guard sorties flown – **309** in the past 24 hours.
  - Approximately **80,000** people evacuated.
  - Approximately **15,000** people rescued.
  - 7,500 patients evacuated by ground and an additional 2,607 evacuated by air.
  - 5,707 patients treated.
- Total DoD medical personnel in the area is 2,037 (1072 Active and 965 National Guard).

- Deputy Secretary of Defense approved Federal funding for use of National Guard in Title 32 status to support relief operations – status is retroactive to August 29.
- Projected **flow** of personnel for the next **24** to **48** hours: **3,140** Active Duty and **1154** National Guard.
- Joint Task Force Katrina (West) aboard the USS IWO JIMA.
- JTF Katrina (Forward) continues to improve JTF communications and computer networks and complete establishment of backup systems.
- Lieutenant General Honore directed that no Federal military service member will perform or assist with any type of forced evacuation.
- The **USNS COMFORT** is positioned **142** miles southeast of New Orleans awaiting **US** Northern Command decision on final port.
- o-- 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Cavalry Division, I and II Marine Expeditionary Force conducting humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, evacuation and security assessments.
  - Developing boundaries and search grid systems in conjunction with JTF Katrina and FEMA to facilitate clearing designated areas.
  - Deliberate planning to execute the high risk waterborne search and recovery in flooded areas in coordination with FEMA and **US** Coast Guard.
  - Division soldiers will not recover remains; will only mark and record locations for mortuary teams.
- 54<sup>th</sup> Quartermaster Corps, Fort Lee, Virginia, is standing-by at Fort Benning prepared to assist FEMA with mortuary affairs if required.
- Six installations are providing support as transportation staging areas for ice, water, medical supplies.
- **1,507** beds are available in field hospitals: New Orleans International Airport (**25** beds), USS BATAAN (**360** beds), USS IWO JIMA (**360** beds), **USS** Tortuga (**308** beds), **14<sup>th</sup>** Combat Support Hospital (**204** beds) and the **USNS COMFORT** (**250** beds).
- **21** million Meals Ready to Eat have been ordered by **FEMA** – **15.7** million have been delivered.
  - As a result of more organizations providing meals and movement of people to temporary shelters, **FEMA** placed the delivery of **25** million meals on-hold as current inventory is sufficient.
- Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas is the central collection point for supplies donated by foreign countries - **100** nations and **11** international organizations have offered assistance.

FOUO

September 06, 2005

Transcom

TO: Gen Norton Schwartz

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
ADM Ed Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT** Taking Command at TRANSCOM

Attached is a pretty good list of things John Handy sent along to me of both accomplishments and things remaining to be done. **You** will have your own ideas, of course, but these seem like a pretty good place to start. Go get 'em!

Attach: List of Accomplishments and Tasks Remaining

DHR:as  
090805-07



8 SEP 05

*KJS*  
SEP 08 2005

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55345

OSD 24656-05

Accomplishments:

- **Since Sep01**, USTRANSCOM has overseen the largest transportation operation during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM/IRAQI FREEDOM (OEF/OIF) since World War II while continuing to support other global commitments—all while transforming ourselves and DOD logistics. It has supported the nation's military in assuring **our** allies; fighting the Global ~~War~~ on Terror while transforming the entire command—it's headquarters and the service components
  - Moved 2.9M passengers, 6.7M short tons of cargo, and 64.5M barrels of fuel into the **CENTCOM** area of operations
  - Evacuated **25K** OEF/OIF patients, including 4.1K battle casualties, without loss of life
- **As** the Distribution Process Owner, transformed Department of Defense (DOD) distribution, integrating supply and transportation
  - Established deployment and distribution operations centers in each theater of operations to synchronize strategic and theater distribution activities — speeding deployment **and** reducing costs
  - ~~Reduced troop movement in-transit times to~~ theater of operations from 72 ~~to~~ 27 hours
  - Generated \$506.3M cost savings/avoidance by metering theater distribution flow, optimizing intermodal lift, and employing **more** efficient contracting capabilities
  - Improved delivery time by consolidating cargo loads for specific destinations
  - Streamlined troop movements via commercial aircraft by 63% - eliminated delays at intermediate stops
- Advanced the recapitalization of the Defense Transportation System
  - Expanded use of scheduled commercial transportation by 9% for unit deployment cargo and sustainment
  - Improved the readiness and reliability of **the** maritime fleet by working with the Department of Transportation to expand the Maritime Security Program from 47 to 60 ships
- Established a joint research and development program to explore and field transformational distribution capabilities

Things left to do:

- Formalize and codify Joint Theater Logistics (JTL), creation of a JTL Commander
  - Standardize port operations worldwide to ensure all ports are using the **same** systems, processes, and equipment

- Joint Task Force – Port Opening to present COCOMs a new capability; USTRANSCOM- assigned forces organized and presented to Regional Combatant Commanders to quickly open and operate ports in specific theater locations until replaced by other capability
- P Director of Mobility Forces (DM4) – Surface and the DM4-Air; responsible for executing mobility mission in the Theater Functional Components
- Implement a DOD-wide single distribution financial system (Defense Enterprise Accounting and Man-agement System)
- Expand use of commercial partners; employing use of third party logistics entities to manage movement of DOD freight within the United States (Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative)
  - Lead DOD to an enterprise solution yielding total asset visibility – end-to-end:
    - personnel/assets/ cargo \_\_\_\_\_
- Develop an “assured business plan” for commercial airlift similar to Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
- Drive information systems simplification – eliminate duplication; modernize
- Finalize operational and IT system architectures to determine capability gaps and develop change recommendations that transform end to end distribution
- Joint professional workforce — military and civilian
  - Develop professional career path for all services
  - Develop civilian personnel and training processes to ensure joint logistics skills


**FOUO**

SEP 08 2005

000.92

**TO:** President George W. Bush  
**CC:** Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr  
The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Stephen J. Hadley

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld



**SUBJECT:** Daily Update on Department of Defense KATRINA Activity

**Attached is the latest update. New information is in bold type. We are continuing to flow forces into the affected areas.**

Attach 9/7/05 DoD Support to Hurricane KATRINA

DHR:ss  
090705-02

SEP 08 2005



8 SEP 05

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/55348

**OSD 24657-05**

**DoD Support to Hurricane KATRINA**  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)  
Executive Summary  
Wednesday, September **07,2005** (as of **0600**)

Command and Control

- U.S. Northern Command Commander is Admiral Keating in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
- Joint Task Force Katrina Commander is Lieutenant General Honore at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.
- Joint Task Force Louisiana National Guard Commander is Major General Landreneau, New Orleans, Louisiana.
- Joint Task Force Mississippi National Guard Commander is Major General Cross at Jackson, Mississippi.

Operational Highlights

- 60,407 Active Duty and National Guard personnel are on the ground or aboard ships supporting relief operations.
  - 17,417 Active **Duty**.
  - 42,990 National Guard.
- **20** U.S. Navy ships are in the Joint Operational Area.
- Total aviation support includes Active Duty and National Guard aircraft
  - **360** helicopters (**180** Active Duty & 180 National Guard).
  - 93 airplanes (70 Active Duty & 23 National Guard).
- DoD has provided extensive search and rescue, evacuation, and medical support:
  - **5,211** sorties flown - **802** in the past 24-hours.
  - 75,000 people evacuated.
  - **14,224** people rescued.
  - 7,500 patients evacuated by ground and **an** additional 2,552 evacuated by air.
  - 5,512 patients treated.
- **4,160** unaccounted-for DoD personnel - Our assessment is this will be reduced sharply as time goes by.
  - **3,188** Navy
  - **971** Air Force
  - **1** Marine

- Projected flow of personnel for the next **24 – 48** hours:
  - **1,419** National Guard
  - **5,441** Active Duty
- Joint Task Force Katrina (Forward) will relocate to the USS IWO JIMA within **24** hours.
- Corps of Engineers closed 17th Street Canal levee breach and began pumping operations on September **6**. Working to open pump station **#7**.
- 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Cavalry Division, I and II Marine Expeditionary Force will conduct humanitarian, search and rescue, evacuation and security missions.
- Mortuary Affairs is expected to arrive at Camp Shelby, **7** Sep to assist FEMA with processing of deceased.
- Armed Forces Institute of Pathology is providing a specialized DNA team to assist with identification of fatalities.
- USS WHIDBEY ISLAND and USS GRAPPLE arrived in the Gulf:
  - **USS WHIDBEY ISLAND** delivered six floating bridges to replace destroyed bridges in New Orleans. USS GRAPPLE is on station to support salvage and clearing operations with the **U.S.** Coast Guard.
- USNS COMFORT, staffed to treat **250** patients, will arrive **9** September.
- U.S. Army element arrived at Camp Shelby, Mississippi equipped with airborne and ground loud speakers to assist with evacuation operations.
- **DoD** provided **1,500** mobile radios and technical support to be used by officials in Mississippi and Louisiana; radios arrived September **6** and given to the **82<sup>nd</sup>** Airborne at the New Orleans Airport.
- Six installations are providing support as transportation staging areas for ice, **water**, medical supplies.
  - Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas is the central collection point within DoD for supplies donated by foreign countries.
- Military Sealift Command contracted for one passenger ship to provide lodging for disaster victims and response personnel.
- **21** million MREs have ordered by FEMA.
- 745 beds are available in field hospitals: New Orleans International Airport (25 beds), USS BATAAN (**360** beds) and USS IWO JIMA (**360** beds).
- Ten Department of Health and Human Services Federal Medical Shelters (250 beds each) are located at DoD installations: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida (2 shelters); Fort Polk, Louisiana (4 shelters); Meridian Naval Air Station, Mississippi (4 shelters).
- Air Force established 1 of 3 tent cities at New Orleans International Airport.

**DoD Support to Hurricane KATRINA**  
**Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)**  
**Executive Summary**  
**Thursday, September 8, 2005 (as of 0400)**

**Command and Control**

- U.S. Northern Command Commander is Admiral Keating in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
- Joint Task Force Katrina Commander is Lieutenant General Honore at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.
- Joint Task Force Louisiana National Guard Commander is Major General Landreneau, New Orleans, Louisiana.
- Joint Task Force Mississippi National Guard Commander is Major General Cross at Keesler AFB, Mississippi.

**operational Highlights**

- **65,410** Active Duty and National Guard personnel are on the ground or aboard ships supporting relief operations.
  - **19,224** Active Duty.
  - **46,186** National Guard.
- 20 U.S. Navy ships are in the Joint Operational Area .
- Total aviation support includes Active Duty and National Guard aircraft:
  - **373** helicopters (**175** Active Duty & **198** National Guard).
  - 93 airplanes (70 Active Duty & 23 National Guard).
- DoD has provided extensive search and rescue, evacuation, and medical support:
  - **4,019** active sorties flown – **598** in the past 24-hours.
  - **8,388** ANG /ARNG sorties flown – **409** in the past 24 hours
  - **77,769** people evacuated.
  - **14,275** people rescued.
  - 7,500 patients evacuated by ground and an additional **2,607** evacuated by air.
  - **5,707** patients treated.
- Projected flow of personnel for the next 24 – 48 hours: **3,267** Active Duty
- Joint Task Force Katrina (West) **aboard** the USS IWO JIMA
- **Lieutenant General Honore directed that no Federal military service member will perform or assist with any type of forced evacuation.**

9/8/2005 6:41 AM

- 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Cavalry Division, I and II Marine Expeditionary Force **conducting** humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, evacuation and **security** assessments.
  - Primary operating **area** is Orleans Parish and St. Tammany Parish.
  - Evacuated **2,769** and rescued **51** displaced Americans
- Federal military forces in Mississippi will move to Louisiana; National Guard forces in Mississippi are **sufficient**.
- **54<sup>th</sup>** Quartermaster Corps, Fort Lee, Virginia, is standing-by at Fort Benning prepared to assist FEMA if required - unit consists of 13 teams with a capacity to process 260 bodies per day.
- USS WHIDBEY ISLAND and USS GRAPPLE in the area:
  - USS WHIDBEY ISLAND completed off-load of the Marine Air Ground Task Force.
  - USS GRAPPLE is on station to support salvage and clearing operations with the U.S. Coast Guard.
- USNS COMFORT, staffed to treat 250 patients and **750** beds to house support personnel, will arrive September 9.
- Biloxi Airport generator is receiving the highest priority to bring it back on line.
- Six installations are providing support as transportation staging areas for ice, water, medical supplies.
- **1,257** beds are available in field hospitals: New Orleans International Airport (25 beds), USS BATAAN (360 beds), USS IWO JIMA (360 beds), USS Tortuga (308 beds), and **14<sup>th</sup>** Combat Support Hospital (**204** beds)
- Deputy Secretary of Defense approved Federal funding for use of National Guard in Title **32** status to support relief operations - status is retroactive to August **29**.
- The Vice President will visit the disaster area on September 8 - the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will accompany; itinerary details have not been released.
- Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas is the central collection point for supplies donated by foreign countries; eighty-nine nations and international organizations have offered assistance.
  - U.S. Government has accepted or plans to accept **49** offers of assistance.
  - To date the United Kingdom, France, and Italy have provided material assistance; decision to accept assistance from China, Spain, Israel, Egypt and Russia is pending.
  - Tinker Air Force Base, is available as back-up staging area, if required.

9/8/2005 6:41 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/55352

2

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

September 14, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Visibility with the Reserves and National Guard

I am concerned about the lack of visibility with respect to the National Guard. It is clear that NORTHCOM, Joint Forces Command, and Joint Staff have a reasonable grip on Active Duty forces. The impression is, however, that we have a less good visibility in the Reserve Forces and the National Guard.

Please come to me with a proposal as to how we might correct this.

Thanks,

*re. re-visit  
by 10/10/05*

DHR:af  
091405-09

.....  
*Please Respond By 09/14/05*

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24684-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55353



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CK-0130-05

29 December 2005

03

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS

*E. Giambastiani 12/28*

SUBJECT: Visibility of Reserves and National Guard (SF 091405-09)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), we did not have good visibility on title 32 National Guard (NG) forces during Hurricane Katrina relief operations due to current policy. Modifications are proposed below.
- **Analysis.** USJFCOM does not have a system that can provide direct visibility on NG forces operating in title 32 under the command of a governor. To fix this we will:
  - Modify the Defense Readiness Reporting System to track NG forces in title 32. We will include this capability in the future global visibility tool as well.
  - Recognize the **54** NG joint force headquarters (JFHQ) – State and ad hoc NG statejoint task forces that are already operating provisionally as joint DOD activities. The National Guard Bureau has requested formal DOD recognition of NG JFHQ-State and the action is currently in staffing. JFHQ-State's approved mission statement includes providing expertise and situational awareness to DOD authorities to facilitate integration of federal and state activities. Dual-hatting active duty and/or NG commanders of these elements in titles 10 and 32, as outlined in 32 USC 315 and 325, may also be helpful in gaining improved situational awareness by establishing unity of command. Having 54 NG JFHQ-State elements, trained and validated by USJFCOM and reporting to USNORTHCOM, will greatly enhance visibility of title 32 NG forces in a domestic crisis.
  - Add an NG liaison officer to the Joint **Staff** Reaction Cell during domestic crisis events to increase NG visibility.

COORDINATION TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: RADM Richard J. Mauldin, USN; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/35354

OSD 24684-05

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

September 14, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Visibility ~~with~~ the Reserves and National Guard

I am concerned about the lack of visibility with respect to the National Guard. It is clear that NORTHCOM, Joint Forces Command, and Joint Staff have a reasonable grip on Active **Duty** forces. **The** impression is, however, that we have a less good visibility in the Reserve Forces and the National Guard.

Please come to me with a proposal as to **how** we might correct this.

Thanks.

*1. Please respond  
10/10/05*

DHR:af  
091405-09

.....  
*Please Respond By 09/14/05*

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24684-05

11-L-0559/OSD/55355

# UNCLASSIFIED

## TAB B

### COORDINATION

National Guard Bureau	MG Young	11 October 2005
USJFCOM	COL Rockhold	4 October 2005
USNORTHCOM	CAPT Johanson	3 October 2005

Tab B

# UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/55356

USP


326


- a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO  (Justify Below)
- c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) Extend suspense to  (Justify Below)

2. JUSTIFICATION

The snowflake that the INFO MEMO responded to has been closed. The information is now ~~month~~ months old. Since the snowflake was closed by an MA in the SecDef's office I am closing the tasking to USP.

3. REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY USP	e. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level)
b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER	Signature 
	Date Signed

c. TELEPHONE NO. <input type="text"/>	<b>5. ACTION TAKEN</b> (For EXSEC/ Correspondence Control Division Use Only)		
	a. EXT	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
d. DATE <input type="text"/>	b. CANX	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	c. DWNGRD	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
4. CCD CONTROL # OSD 24684-05	d. TRANSFER	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	e. OTHER (Specify) <input type="text"/>		
	Signature 		Date Signed 6/27/06

(29 Dec 05)

R 24684-05

FOUO

October 04, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT NCTC

We have to have a plan to shape the NCTC for success.

DHR:dh  
100405-23



*Respond by 11/10/05*  
*ML*  
*10/*

*040519*

FOUO

OSD 24686-05

*40519*

11-L-0559/OSD/55358

**TAB A**

**FOUO**

November 28, 2005

TO: **Cien Pete Pace**  
Eric Edelman  
Larry DiRita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Visual Display

It **would** be good to have a visual display of the progressive handover of responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces.

For example, a map of Iraq that showed **the** operating bases, cities, and provinces **is** applicable that are **now** in Iraqi control, **or** effectively in Iraqi control. I understand 20 or more operating bases have been **turned** over. That is **probably** up from zero **over some** period.

Being able to show that graphically **or with** a map or chart, or **some** visual aid **could** be a useful way to demonstrate that Iraqis are **doing more** and Coalition Forces **are** doing less.

Maybe I could see something this week, **to** see **how** I feel about it.

Let me see it before it **is** used.

Thanks.

DRR:  
112805-02

\*\*\*\*\*

Please Respo By 12/01/05



**Tab A**

**FOUO**



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 2 2004

His Excellency General Thammarak  
Isarangun na Ayutthaya  
Minister of Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Bangkok, Thailand

293

Dear Minister Thammarak:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the **Trai** soldiers killed in Karbala. We were saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of the victims.

We are grateful for the continued commitment Thailand is making in the global war on terror and to the reconstruction efforts in **Iraq**.

**With** deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

25 Jan 04

U21497 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 2 2004

The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov  
Minister of Defense  
Ministry of Defense  
Bulgaria 1000 Sofia  
3 Diakon Ignatii St

Dear Minister Svinarov:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the **Bulgarian** soldiers killed in Karbala. We are saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of those lost. They **are** in our thoughts during **this** difficult **time** and we wish those who were injured a speedy recovery.

We are grateful for the continued commitment Bulgaria is making in the global war on terror and to the reconstruction efforts in **Iraq**.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

U21497 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/55361

His Excellency General Thammarak  
Isarakun na Ayutthaya  
Minister of Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Bangkok, Thailand

Dear Minister Thammarak:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the Thai soldiers killed in Karbala. We were saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of the victims.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

*We are grateful for the continued commitment Thailand is making in the global war on terror, and to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.*

arrv DI RIN

TSA,  
Thai letter  
for final review.  
J/R Stone

LEAD: DEIR

12

3  
50m

11-L-0559/OSD/55362



EF-7934  
I-03/017528

December 27, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Letter to Bulgarian Mo

*ISA,  
Proposed Bulgaria  
letter  
v/r Skinn*

*JEM  
12/27/03*

If we lost some Bulgarians in Iraq, I ought to get a letter off to the Minister of Defense of Bulgaria.

Thanks.

DRR:ah  
122703-10 (no computer)

*SD  
Snowflake*

.....  
Please respond by 12/30/03

**Policy ExecSec's Note**

December 31, 2003

CDR Nosenzo,

- The attached letter was forwarded electronically to Bill Marriott and Monica Generous on 30 Dec 03 in response to this SecDef note.

*C. L. O'Connor*

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

29-12-03 13:49 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/55363

**Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD**

---

**From:** Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 30, 2003 5:57 PM  
**To:** Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Lohse, John A, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: Bulgarian condolence

John or Monica or Carrie Sue, please turn this into a good condolence letter-per USD(P) for Mr D's approval...thx, m

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Haber, Lauren, CIV, OSD-POLICY  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 30, 2003 5:52 PM  
**To:** Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD  
**Subject:** Bulgarian condolence



The Honorable  
Nikolay Svtarov...

The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov  
Minister of Defense  
Ministry of Defense  
Bulgaria 1000 Sofia  
3 Diakon Ignatii St

**Dear** Minister Svinarov:

I ~~offer~~ my condolences on the deaths of the Bulgarian soldiers killed in Karbala. We are saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of those lost. They are in our thoughts during ~~this~~ difficult time and we wish ~~those~~ who were injured a speedy recovery.

We ~~are~~ grateful for the continued commitment Bulgaria is making in the global war on ~~terror~~ and to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,



**CNN.com**

 **PRINT THIS**

Powered by 

## Karbala attacks kill 12, wound dozens

### Bulgarians, Thais suffer first deaths

**BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN)** -- Insurgents struck three targets in the holy city of Karbala in Iraq on Saturday, killing four Bulgarian soldiers, two Thai army engineers and six civilians, and wounding dozens of troop and civilians, coalition authorities said.

At least 37 troops, including five U.S. soldiers, were hurt in attacks that targeted a police station, the town's city hall and Karbala University, where the six killed soldiers were living in barracks. More than 100 civilians were injured in the closely coordinated strikes, coalition authorities said.

The Bulgarian and Thai troops, the first from those countries to be killed in the Iraqi war, were part of a Polish-led multinational coalition force patrolling south-central Iraq.

In Sofia, the Bulgarian Defense Ministry reported the four Bulgarian deaths and said several other soldiers were wounded. In Bangkok, a Thai military spokesman told CNN that two army engineers were killed. Thailand has a noncombatant force in Iraq.

In Iraq, a Polish military spokesman said the attackers used four suicide car bombs, machine guns and mortars. The strikes hit two coalition compounds and the provincial governor's office.

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy chief of operations for U.S. forces, said the insurgency responsible for such attacks appears to be small, loosely coordinated cells throughout the country.

"It takes a very few number of people in the country to create the kind of damage we are seeing," said Kimmitt.

Local police and witnesses said they saw a booby-trapped truck carrying gasoline slamming into a Karbala University building at 12:30 p.m. local time. There were many casualties, the Polish military headquarters in Karbala said.

Police and witnesses said that 15 minutes later, rockets were fired at the provincial governor's office, also referred to as city hall. It was packed with people on what is a regular business day in Iraq. Casualties were numerous, a witness told CNN.

The city south of Baghdad had suffered under Saddam Hussein, who oppressed the Shiite community



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 6 2004

248.7

The Honorable Jim Ramstad  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A large, bold, handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense at the time.

6 Jan 04

U21538 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 6 2004

The Honorable Dennis Moore  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. Moore", written in a cursive style.

U21538 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/55368

December 11, 2003

TO: ~~Jaymie Durbin~~ Larry D. Ritz

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Expenses for Soldiers to Get Home

At the President's Congressional Ball, one of these two Congressmen handed me the attached "Dear Colleague" letter on soldiers still paying their own way home.

Would you please read it, develop an appropriate answer, tell me if you think we ought to fix the law and then let's get back to them in an appropriate way.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/8/03 Congressional "Dear Colleague" letter signed by Ramsiad and Moore  
12/12/03 letter to SecDef

DHR:dh  
121 103-16

.....  
Please respond by 1/9, 04 12/15

*12/12*  
*Carrie Lane -*  
*Please draft*  
*response to*  
*Post report, but*  
*Dr. Chu is not*  
*responsible for*  
*med. evac. camp.*

*ixox Sec*  
*Please get the*  
*info on this.*

*D. Ritz*

*LARRY D. RITZ*  
*12/22*

Larry D. Ritz

11-L-0559/OSD/55369

U21545 <sup>12/16</sup> /03

**Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD**

---

**From:** Harrison, Richard A. CPT, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 18, 2003 1:26 PM  
**To:** Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: snowflake: expenses for soldiers to get home

Sir,  
Below is an update on the R&R travel snowflake from SD to Mr. DiRita. I'm still awaiting for a response on the policy memo that Mr. Abell will sign. More information to follow.

v/r  
Rich

Richard A. Harrison  
CPT, USA  
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Secretariat  
Comm: (b)(6)  
Room 3D853

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Loo, Bradford G, CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 17, 2003 5:09 PM  
**To:** Harrison, Richard A, CPT, OSD  
**cc:** Ellison, Lisa, CIV, OSD-P&R; Mack, Paris COL Army G1; Pendleton, Chris L, CDR, OSD-P&R; Darden-Ogbunnah, Chenetta Dr., CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** snowflake: expenses for soldiers to get home

cpt harrison, because my office has policy for leave and liberty, lisa ellison passed me the snowflake for action for payment r&r travel.

the short answer is the department of defense, iaw p.l. 108-106, will start paying service members air fare from the aerial port of debarkation (apod) to the airport nearest the service member's leave destination. the policy memorandum will be sent today or tomorrow to mr abell, pducd (p&r) for approval.

the army is executive agent for the centcom r&r leave program and to date, has not set the date for implementation -- but it will be sooner than later.

if you need something more let me know.

brad  
Acting Director, OEPM  
Room 28265, the Pentagon  
(V) (b)(6)  
(F)  
(E) Bradford.Loo@osd.mil

12-8-03

Mr. President -  
If you could make  
this happen, it would  
be a wonderful gift  
to our military  
personnel!!  
Thank you!  
Dennis Moore

**Soldiers Are Still Paying their Own Way Home!**

December 8, 2003

Dear Colleague:

We are sure you are as concerned as we are to find out that our soldiers are still paying their own way home from Iraq and Afghanistan. This is especially concerning after Congress amended the FY 2004 Iraqi supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 108-106) to include \$55 million in funding to reimburse soldiers who qualify for rest and recuperation (R&R) leave for their U.S. domestic travel.

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) our "language is not law, and is permissive and not mandatory in nature." But it does allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide assistance for travel-related expenses (such as emergency hotel accommodation for service members or travel to their homes) not otherwise specifically authorized in law.

In a letter regarding R&R domestic travel Rep. Moore received November 4, 2003, from Bradford Loo, Acting Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management at DOD, "the unprogrammed additional cost to the Army would be \$16 million." CRS, however, quoted an unnamed defense official as saying the R&R program total cost would be \$1 billion.


We need to make our intentions very clear to the Defense Department that we want our soldiers to be reimbursed for their domestic travel while on R&R. Please join us in sending the attached letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, respectfully requesting that our soldiers be reimbursed.

This is not a Democratic idea or a Republican idea: it is just the right thing to do for the men and women of the Armed Forces who put their lives on the line for our country and our freedom.

Very truly yours,



JIM RAMSTAD  
Member of Congress



DENNIS MOORE  
Member of Congress

Please join us -  
for our troops!  
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/55371

# *U.S. House of Representatives*

December 12, 2003

THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD  
SECRETARY  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
THE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20350-0001

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing today to clarify Congress' intent with regard to funding domestic travel for soldiers returning to the U.S. on rest and recuperation (R&R) leave from Iraq or Afghanistan.

The intent of our recommendations in the FY 2004 Iraqi appropriations supplemental (P.L. 108-106) is to reimburse soldiers who qualify for R&R leave for their domestic travel. This R&R reimbursement should also include those soldiers who have already taken qualified R&R leave. The reimbursement includes air travel, bus, train, ferry, and vehicle rental expenses incurred in getting to and from the port-of-entry (Baltimore, Atlanta, Dallas, Frankfurt, or Los Angeles) to the soldier's choice of home-of-record or current military base of residence (*i.e.*, wherever his or her spouse resides at this time). In addition, personal vehicle mileage may be paid for the distance between an airport, or a train or bus depot, and that home. If travel distance is longer than 50 miles and extends over meal times, reasonable per diem expenses should be reimbursed. If travel is overnight and requires a hotel stay, that should be reimbursed.

Given that all the forms, procedures, and staff are already in place to reimburse soldiers, we see no reason that this policy cannot be made effective immediately, and retroactive to October 1<sup>st</sup>. If the Department of Defense (DOD) wishes to create a procedure for directly buying plane tickets in the future, that is understandable.

We appreciate that the DOD may have concerns about this program due to its significant change in leave policy, but we feel that our troops should not have to bear any more burdens – financial or otherwise – than their extended service to our country already demands. It is our intention that the federal government covers all travel and transportation costs necessary to return military personnel to their homes and families. In a letter received on November 4, 2003, Bradford Loo, Acting Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management wrote, “the unprogrammed additional cost to the Army would be \$16 million.” Congress has provided \$55 million to assist soldiers in covering domestic travel expenses. We respectfully request that you to use those funds as we intended.

Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,

cc: General Richard Meyer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff  
cc: Army Chief of Staff  
cc: Admiral Vernon E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations  
cc: John P. Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff  
cc: General Michael W. Hagee, Marine Corps Commandant

11-L-0559/OSD/55372



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



DEC 19 2003

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJECT: Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program

References: (a) Congressional Conference Report 108-337, 30 October 2003, "Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes."

(b) USD (P&R) Memorandum, 29 September 2003, subject: Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program for USCENTCOM

As recommended in reference (a), the R&R destination for a military member on active duty (Active and Reserve Components) serving in a contingency location providing support to Operations ENDURING or IRAQI FREEDOM is changed to the Aerial Port of Debarkation and then onward to the airport nearest the member's R&R leave destination. This change will also apply to a civilian authorized R&R leave in accordance with reference (b).

In accordance with reference (b), as Executive Agent, the Army is responsible for managing implementation in coordination with the DoD Comptroller, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and the Joint Staff.

Charles S. Abell  
Principal Deputy



TOTAL P. 82

11-L-0559/OSD/55373



1/2  
1990

C&D  
SMOOTH & SOM

MRD: SOM  
FOR REVIEW  
M. 1/2  
purman  
1/5

The Honorable Jim Ramstad  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail of you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dennis Moore  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December.

Mr. Abell is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/55376

2 ITRs  
- Ramstad  
- Moore

The Honorable Jim Ramstad  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad,

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter ~~on P.L. 108-106.~~

*concerning No rest and recuperation  
program for  
U.S. forces serving  
&*

~~I am happy to report that~~ Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for  
Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding  
Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of  
December.

~~If you would like additional information on the matter,~~ Mr. Abell ~~is available~~  
~~I appreciate your strong support of our troops.~~ *to brief you on your staff's  
- general details if you desire.*

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



Larry Di Rita  
12/30

Note: ITR from JCS asks this to be  
retroactive to 1 Oct. - it appears  
this did not happen.

The Honorable Dennis Moore  
United States House of Representatives  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore,

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter on P.L. 108-106.

I am happy to report that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December.

I appreciate your strong support of our troops.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



7209  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1525-04

17 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 2/14*

SUBJECT: Getting Joint

- **Question.** "Do you feel we are pursuing these 'getting joint' items I mention in the attached memo? We have to figure a way to get joint earlier, to get responsibilities from the Joint Staff down to Joint Forces Command, to develop initiatives and suggestions, and to instruct the Service Secretaries." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** We have made significant progress in each of these areas, and are pursuing meaningful, relevant answers. "Getting joint" is the focus of on-going actions and initiatives in the Service headquarters, selected combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. Specific details concerning on-going actions are contained in the information paper at TAB B.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director J-3 (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/55379

U22138 /03

322

17 Feb 04

July 30, 2002 7:05 AM

Handwritten signature and initials, possibly "A. B. King" and "M. Kernan", with an arrow pointing to the right.

**SUBJECT: Getting Joint**

We have to figure out a way to get joint earlier.

**Some thoughts:**

1. Get the joint responsibilities from the Joint Staff down to Joint Forces Command.
2. Instruct the Service Secretaries.
3. The best joint service is with the CINC, rather than the Joint Staff.
4. Ask Cebrowski for initiatives.
5. Ask Buck Kernan to give us a series of suggestions.

DHR:dh  
073002-1

Tab A

28 January 2004

TAB B  
INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Getting Joint

1. Purpose. To provide additional information the SecDef's questions concerning "gettingjoint."

2. Key Points

- SecDef memo dated 30 July 2002 articulated a need to "figure out a way to get joint earlier," and articulated several thoughts along those lines.
- Pursuing meaningful, relevant answers to the "gettingjoint" items listed by the SecDef is the focus of related, on-going projects/actions in the Secretariat, Service headquarters, selected combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. They include:
  - US Strategic Command: Unified Command Plan (UCP) assumption of responsibility for Global Strike, C4ISR, integrated missile defense, and DOD Information Operations.
  - US Special Operations Command: When approved, UCP assumption of responsibility as the supported combatant commander for planning selected global war on terrorism missions and for exercising command and control of missions in support of selected campaigns if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
  - US Transportation Command: When approved, UCP assumption of responsibility for global patient movement, redeployment, terminal management and joint distribution process ownership.
  - US Joint Forces Command:
    - Developing a capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of Operational Availability capability packages in support of providing immediate response, focused and conclusive campaign forces to the combatant commanders. This initiative directly supports the CJCS efforts on Global Force Management/Joint Force Manager.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/55381

- Standing Joint Force Headquarters. To improve combatant command joint warfighting capabilities, USJFCOM is fielding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters prototype to the five regional combatant commands by FY05, to include enabling prototypes for joint command and control that push jointness to operational level and below.
- Developing the Joint Manpower Exchange Program, a Permanent Change of Station exchange of officers and senior enlisted personnel among USJFCOM Service component operational headquarters (e.g., Marine Expeditionary Forces, Army Corps, Navy Fleets and numbered Air Forces), designed to improve joint expertise in training, planning, and operations, as well as provide a “jump start” in response to potential tasking to establish a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters.
- To further improve joint warfighting at the combatant command and lower levels, USJFCOM is undertaking a concerted effort to collect, assess and disseminate joint lessons learned from on-going operations. Once validated, joint lessons learned are utilized to improve concept development, training, integration, and deployment.
- USJFCOM UCP designation as:
  - Lead joint force integrator, including responsibility for:
    - Supporting the development and integration of fully interoperable C4ISR systems and capabilities for joint warfighting.
    - Serving as the DOD executive agent for Joint Concept Development & Experimentation, including development and integration of Joint Operating Concepts and associated Joint Integrating Concepts that improve future joint warfighting and coordinate the joint experimentation efforts of the combatant commands and Services.
    - Serving as the Joint Deployment Process Owner, responsible for maintaining the global capability for rapid and decisive military force power projection, including collaborative efforts to improve joint, multinational and interagency deployment operations. This initiative effectively moves responsibility for joint deployment from the Joint Staff to USJFCOM.
    - The lead agent for joint force training, including combatant command battlestaffs, JTF headquarters, JTF functional component

commands and their staffs, as well as interoperability training of forces that are to operate as part of joint/combined task forces (including interagency and multinational participation in current and future training). In 2004, USJFCOM will establish the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) by linking previously independent Service ranges together in a network that can be used for joint training and experimentation.

- Joint force provider of assigned CONUS-based forces, responsible for deploying trained and ready joint forces in response to supported combatant command requirements.
- CJCS with Joint Chiefs
  - Developing the Global Force Management (GFM) process that integrates apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies to better align planning and defense strategy requirements.
    - Working the GFM-related effort to designate an organization as the single Joint Force Manager responsible for executing the GFM process.
  - Developing force allocation processes based on articulating capabilities desired to achieve effects and outcomes rather than requests for troops or platforms. As these processes are developed, they will be codified through development of the *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* and CJCS Instruction 3170.01C.
  - Developing and implementing changes in how we educate and train the joint force. This includes enhancements to Joint Professional Military Education, to include programs designed to foster an understanding of joint warfighting earlier in a Service member's career as well as programs to increase the number of senior officers skilled in joint operational art and campaign planning through the establishment of a Joint Advanced Warfighting School. Senior general/flag officer courses are also in development. Changes in joint force training include, in conjunction with USJFCOM, establishing the JNTC in FY04.
  - Maintaining a robust Chairman's Exercise Program that directly supports combatant command joint exercises, and promotes joint, interagency, and--where possible--multilateral participation.

- Secretariat
  - OSD(P&R): Developing the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to establish a capabilities-based, adaptive, near real-time readiness reporting system. DRRS will have an initial operating capability in FY04, and full operating capability in FY07.
- Services
  - Developing modular force design concepts that describe the Service capabilities required to drive modular design at appropriate levels within each Service and develop options for implementation and integration.
- Pursuing answers and developing implementation plans for these multiple, crosscutting initiatives will inevitably create seams and friction points among the multiple stakeholders that are responsible for these actions. The Joint Chiefs are committed to minimizing these points of friction.
- Full implementation of selected long-term solutions to these “getting joint” items may require statutory changes, regulatory changes, or delegation of Secretarial authority.

TAB A



December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *WR*  
SUBJECT: Getting Joint

Do you feel we are pursuing these "gettingjoint" items I mention in the attached memo?

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/30/02 SecDefMFR {073002-1}

DHR:db  
122703-35 (to computer)

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*1/31/04*

11-L-0559/OSD/55385

Tab A

PERSONAL

OFFICE OF THE  
SECURITY ASSISTANT  
January 2, 2006  
707 JAN -3 11 8:35



TO: President George W. Bush

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: General Casey and General A b d d

Mr. President—

I have talked to George Casey. He was scheduled to rotate June 2006, but I have asked him to stay on through the entire year of 2006. He has agreed, but he said he wants to talk to his wife, Sheila, before it is announced or discussed.

I have also talked to John A b d d, who is due to rotate in June 2006. I told him we wanted to extend him for another year in his current position, and he said he would do so.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh  
010106-01 (TS).doc

CENTCOM

25 Jan 06

PERSONAL

OSD 00012-06

Bto-2

11-L-0559/OSD/55386

FOUO

5

January 05, 2006

110 01

**TO:** Steve Bucci

**CC:** Cathy Mainardi

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT:** Meeting on Defense Authorization Act for FY06

Please set up a meeting with all the **folks** I will need to have them **explain** the attached memo from Dan Stanley regarding what **took** place with the legislation.

And be sure **I** have the attached memo (with my handwritten notes) **for** that meeting.

Thanks.

Attach 1/3/06 ASD (LA)

DHR:ss  
010406-35

.....

*Please Respond By January 31, 2006*

5 JAN 06

3 JAN 06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55387



5/3/2006 2:21:36 PM



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

January 3, 2006, 7:00 A.M

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Summary from the Conference Report for H.R. 1815, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.

The House and Senate completed Conference of H.R. 1815 on Thursday, December 22, as summarized below.

- The House passed the report 374-41 on Monday, December 19.
- The Senate cleared the Fiscal Year 2006 defense authorization bill for the President's signature by voice vote on Wednesday, December 21.
- The President will most likely sign the legislation early this week.
- Conferees authorized \$441.5 billion for the Department of Defense and national security programs of the Department of Energy.
- A \$50 billion supplemental was provided to support the war on terror.
- The Defense Authorization Bill was not affected by the one percent across the board reduction; however, the Appropriations Bill does reflect the reduction.

Specific areas of interest for the Department include:

**Detainee Amendments.** Contains two major provisions:

- The McCain provision regarding detainee treatment; prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading (CID) treatment or punishment and provides protection of U.S. personnel engaged in gathering intelligence. This does not provide immunity to anyone who breaks the law, but it extends a basic level of protection to U.S. Forces under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- The second provision directs SECDEF to submit procedures for Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and Annual Review Board (ARBs), channels into one federal court all petitions for writs of habeas corpus brought by alien wartime detainees held at GTMO; and provides alien detainees convicted by military commission (sentence of 10 or more years) to appeal to the D.C. Court of Appeals.

**Building Partnership Capacity.** Grants new authorities to build the capacity of foreign military forces, provide security and stabilization assistance, and the authority to transfer defense articles and provide defense services to the military and security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan:

- **Section 1206: Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces (Train and Equip).** Under this section, the President may direct SECDEF to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces in order for that country to conduct counterterrorist operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in which the U.S. Armed Forces are a participant. The program may include the provision of equipment, supplies, and training, and authorizes up to \$200 million annually for defense-wide operation and maintenance to conduct or support activities under this authority. There are no geographic restrictions included, but countries that are already prohibited from receiving assistance may not receive assistance under this section. This authority expires in two years. The Administration requested \$750 million annually for security forces. The provision reduced the amount authorized and limits the program to military forces.
- **Section 1207: Security and Stabilization Assistance.** Under this section, the SECDEF may provide services to and transfer defense articles and funds to the Secretary of State for the purposes of facilitating reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country. The aggregate value of all services, defense articles, and funds provided or transferred to the Secretary of State under this section in any fiscal year may not exceed \$100 million. Any funds transferred to the Secretary of State under this section may remain available until expended. This authority expires September 30, 2007. The Administration requested \$200 million for FY06. The provision limits the transfer to the State Department vice any agency, as requested by the Administration.
- **Section 1209: Authority to Transfer Defense Articles and Provide Defense Services to the Military and Security Forces of Iraq and Afghanistan:** Under this section, the President is authorized to transfer defense articles from DoD and to provide defense services in connection with the transfer of defense articles to the military and security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan in order to support the efforts of those forces to restore and maintain peace and security in those countries. The aggregate value of all defense articles transferred and defense services provided to Iraq and Afghanistan may not exceed \$500 million, and the authority granted under this section must be exercised before September 30, 2006. This language is similar to language passed last year.

**Missile Defense.** Approves \$7.8 billion for research, development, test and evaluation. Emphasizes the importance of fielding near-term capabilities and directs operational test and evaluation components of DoD and the Missile Defense Agency to prepare a plan to test and evaluate the operational capability for each block of the missile defense system.

**Buy American Act Amendments.** The Senate agreed to the House language that requires DoD to publicly announce when it utilizes a waiver to the Berry Amendment and expands and clarifies the definition of “clothing” to protect domestic textile manufacturers. Other House positions relating to Berry Amendment/Buy America Act were dropped in Conference.

**Acquisition Restrictions.** Identified three major areas of closer Congressional oversight of DoD acquisition: Major Defense Acquisition Programs, Internal Controls for Interagency Procurement Contracts, and the Management Structure of Service Contracts. Largely, this will require increased reporting to Congress on these issues.

**Aircraft Carrier Force Structure.** Requires the Navy to maintain 12 aircraft carriers in active service and provides \$288 million to extend the life of USS John F. Kennedy.

**Navy Shipbuilding.** Requires the Secretary of the Navy to assess the US shipbuilding industry to determine best practices for innovation, processes, and infrastructure to improve efficiency.

**Next Generation Destroyer (DDX).** Authorizes procurement funding for DD(X), but establishes a \$2.3 billion cap on the fifth ship of the class. Also prohibits a “winner takes all” acquisition strategy for DD(X).

**Force Protection.** Includes \$1.29 billion for force protection including Up-Armor HMMWVs, Add-On Armor Kits, Enhanced Body Armor, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Jammers, Night Vision Equipment, and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Recapitalization and Modernization.

**Future Combat Systems (FCS).** Supports spiraling FCS technology into current force. The report directs an annual review by the Comptroller General and limits funds for Manned Ground Vehicles within FCS until the program is certified by the Secretary of Defense.

**C-17 Procurement.** Authorizes a multi-year procurement of 42 additional C-17s. Procurement is contingent on certification by the Secretary of Defense that additional procurement is consistent with findings of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

**Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).** Authorizes full funding of JSF budget request including advanced procurement and research, development, test and evaluation.

**KC-135E/F-117/C-130E/H Retirement.** Prohibits the Air Force from retiring any KC-135E aerial refueling aircraft, F-117 Nighthawk attack aircraft, or C-130E/H tactical airlift aircraft during fiscal year 2006.

Riot Control Agents. Restates that it is the policy of the United States that riot control agents are not chemical weapons and that the President may authorize their use as legitimate, legal, and non-lethal alternatives to the use of force by members of the Armed Forces in war in defensive military modes to save lives.

Iraq Reporting Requirements. The Conference Report includes four reporting requirements pertaining to Iraq.

- Procurement and Equipment Maintenance Costs for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle. Includes facility infrastructure costs associated with OIF and OEF. To be submitted by DoD.
- Quarterly Reports on War Strategy in Iraq. Requires a briefing to the Defense, Appropriations, and Intelligence Committees. To be submitted by CIA and DoD.
- Report on Records of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. To be submitted by DoD.
- Report to Congress on Policy and Military Operations in Iraq. Issues include military mission and diplomatic, political economic and military measures being taken to successfully complete that mission and whether the Iraqis have made compromises to achieve broad-based and sustainable political settlement to defeat insurgency. To be submitted by the President.

Personnel and Benefits Issues.

- End-Strength.
  - o Authorizes increases in permanent active duty end-strength minimum levels of 10,000 Army and 1,000 Marines, while reducing the levels for Navy and Air Force.

Service	FY05 Authorized	Conference Recommendation	Change from FY05 Authorized
Army	502,400	512,400	10,000
Navy	365,900	352,700	-13,200
Marine Corps	178,000	179,000	1,000
Air Force	359,700	357,400	-2,300
<b>DoD TOTAL</b>	<b>1,406,000</b>	<b>1,401,500</b>	<b>-4,500</b>

- o Additional “permissive” authority was also provided to increase active duty end-strength for the Army by up to 20,000 and by up to 5,000 for the Marine Corps, to support operational missions and to achieve transformational reorganization objectives, between Fiscal Years 2007-2009. Funding of active duty end-strength in excess of that permanently authorized shall be included in DoD’s annual budget submission to Congress.

- **Expansion of Health Care Benefits for Non-Activated Reserves and their Families.**
  - Permits a reservist, up to 90 days after release from active duty, to decide whether to continue reserve service and enroll in TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS). There are no cost estimates; however, cost is expected to be minimal for DoD.
  - Extends benefits for qualified members and extends benefits to family members six months beyond the death of a member enrolled in TRS. Cost for DoD is expected to be minimal.
  - Authorizes TRICARE Standard coverage and defines eligibility for all members of the Selected Reserve, and their families, who commit to continued Selected Reserve service. DoD strongly opposed this legislation based on an estimated cost of \$6.2B over the next five years and lack of evidence that increased access to health care insurance would improve recruitment, retention, or medical readiness of Reserve Component Members. The Conference Report provides a 3 tiered benefit that is expected to cost significantly less than the previous estimate of \$6.2B.
  
- **Reserve Retirement Prior to Age 60.** The report did not lower the age for Reserve Retirement. Reserve retirement remains at 60 years of age. This is consistent with our recommendation.
  
- **Survivor Benefit Plan/Dependency and Indemnity Compensation Offset.** The report did not eliminate the SBP/DIC Offset. This is consistent with our recommendation.
  
- **Civilian Salary Differential for Mobilized Reservists.**
  - Requires DoD to pay involuntarily mobilized reservists on a monthly basis the income differential between their total military compensation and average civilian income.
  - Pay begins after 18 continuous months of involuntary mobilization or when a member is involuntarily mobilized for service on active duty for a period of at least 180 days within 6 months following the member's previous period of involuntary active duty for a period of at least 180 days.
  - Monthly payment to a member may not exceed \$3,000 and the authority expires on December 31, 2008.
  - The Department opposed this provision due to cost and morale and unit cohesion factors.

- **Expanded Death Gratuity.**
  - Increases death gratuity payment from \$12,000 to \$100,000 to survivors if a service member dies on active duty (survivor payment is retroactive to October 7, 2001).
  - An additional \$150,000 death gratuity payment is made to survivors if a service member died on active duty between October 7, 2001 and May 11, 2005. This payment is to compensate for the increase in Service members' Group Life Insurance.
  - Funding is derived from supplemental appropriations, contingent upon such appropriations being enacted.
  - The Department opposed this provision due to cost.
  
- **Retirement Credit for Certain National Guard Members.** Authorizes retirement credit to members of the National Guard who performed full-time State active duty between September 11, 2001, and October 1, 2002. The Department opposed this recommendation because it establishes an untenable precedent that might become the basis for providing Federal retirement credit for State active duty.
  
- **Military to Civilian Conversions.** Reduces the Department's request by \$267 million.
  
- **Women in Combat.**
  - Requires DoD to submit a report to the SASC and HASC not later than March 31, 2006, assessing the current and future implementation of the policy regarding the assignment of women.
  - The review must closely examine Army unit modularization efforts and associated personnel assignment policies to ensure compliance.

:JAN 03 2006

TO: ~~Newt Gingrich~~  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Comments from Thomas Donnelly

I just saw this article out of the *Washington Times*, where Donnelly once again continues his pattern of monthly cracks at the Pentagon.

I don't think I have ever met him but I cannot imagine how an outfit as good as AEI can have a person that had representing them in the foreign policy and national security areas. He is consistently wrong.

Thanks.

Attach.

Associated Press. "Rumsfeld Allies Moved Up Succession Chain," *Washington Times*, December 29, 2005, p. 4.

DHR:db  
122905-12 (TS).doc

38

3 Jan 06

05D 00059-06

11 E 0550/055/05501

Washington Times  
December 29, 2005  
Pg. 4

## Rumsfeld Allies Moved Up Succession Chain

By Associated Press

**The** three military service chiefs have been dropped in the **Bush** administration's doomsday line of Pentagon succession, **pushed** beneath three civilian undersecretaries in **Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's inner circle.**

A little-noticed holiday week executive **order from** President **Bush** moved the Pentagon's intelligence chief to the No. 3 spot in the succession hierarchy **behind** Mr. Rumsfeld. The second spot would be the deputy secretary of defense, but **that** position currently is vacant. The Army chief, which long held the No. 3 **spot, was dropped** to sixth.

The changes, **announced** last week, **are the second** in six months and mirror **the** administration's **new emphasis** on intelligence gathering versus combat in **21st-century warfighting.**

**Technically, the** line of succession is assigned to specific positions, rather **than** the current individuals holding **those jobs.**

**But** in its current **incarnation,** the doomsday plan moves **to** near the top three undersecretaries **who are** Rumsfeld loyalists **and** who previously worked for Vice President Dick Cheney **when he was** defense secretary.

The changes were recommended, said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman, because the three undersecretaries have "a **broad** knowledge and perspective of overall Defense Department operations." The service leaders **are** more focused on training, equipping and leading a particular military **service,** said **Mr. Whitman.**

Thomas Donnelly, a **defense** analyst with the American Enterprise Institute, said the changes **make** it easier for the administration to assert political control.

"It continues to devalue **the** services as **institutions,**" said Mr. Donnelly, saying it will **centralize** power, and **shift** it away from the **services,** where there is generally more military expertise and interest.

Under the new plan, Rumsfeld ally Stephen Cambone, the undersecretary for intelligence, **moved up to** the third **spot,** while former Ambassador Eric Edelman, the policy undersecretary, and Kenneth Krieg, the undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, hold the fourth and fifth positions.

The first **to succeed** Mr. Rumsfeld **remains the job of the** deputy secretary, a position currently vacant because the Senate **has** not confirmed Mr. **Bush's** nominee -- Navy Secretary Gordon England.

Senators have **already** approved Donald Winter to be Mr. England's replacement **as** Navy secretary, and it is expected **that Mr.** Bush will eventually move Mr. England into the No. 2 Pentagon **job without** congressional approval **through** what is known **as** a recess appointment

The new succession order bumps the Navy secretary to near the bottom of the line of succession -- eighth behind the deputy, the three Pentagon undersecretaries and the Army and Air Force secretaries.

The Army secretary historically has been third in line, right behind the deputy secretary.

~~FOUO~~

JAN 03 2006

TO: David Addington  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Lawsuits

Thanks so much for sending me a copy of your note to the Acting Deputy Attorney General on the subject of lawsuits against public officials, I appreciate your taking such prompt action!

Regards,

DHR:dh  
122905-23 (TS) doc

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00063-06


D13

3 Jan 06

FOUO

JAN 03 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
GEN Leon LaPorte  
GEN B.B. Bell

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT North Korea

Attached is an interesting perspective on North Korea that we should keep in mind.

Happy New Year!

Attach.

'Flashlights in the Bathroom: A Thoughtful Tourist in North Korea' Unclass Shenyang 001229

DHR:dh  
122905-30 (TS).doc

FOUO

OSD 00064-06

11-L-0559/OSD/55398

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OK  
12/29

**Subject: FLASHLIGHTS IN THE BATHROOM: A THOUGHTFUL TOURIST IN NORTH KOREA**

BT  
UNCLAS SHENYANG 001229

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, 300M, SOCI, EN, CH  
COMBINE: COMPLETE

*Not really an intelligence piece but an interesting anecdote nonetheless.*

SUBJECT: FLASHLIGHTS IN THE BATHROOM: A THOUGHTFUL TOURIST IN ANECDOTE NONETHELESS.  
NORTH KOREA

REF: 05 SHENYANG 017

THIS DOCUMENT IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. NOT FOR INTERNET PUBLICATION.

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SUMMARY  
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1. (SBU) THE DPRK APPEARS TO FOREIGN VISITORS A SAD LAND OF DEPRIVATION AND ISOLATION, WHERE, IN SPITE OF FATUOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS OF GLOBAL ADMIRATION FOR ITS SOCIETY THE REALITY IS POVERTY, IGNORANCE AND DEEP-SEATED SUSPICION. THE FOLLOWING IS THE OBSERVATIONS OF A CANADIAN ACADEMIC RESIDENT IN CHINA RECENTLY WENT TO NORTH KOREA AS PART OF A GROUP TOUR. POST FOUND HIS ACCOUNT ONE OF THE MOST VIVID POST HAS HEARD FROM FOREIGN VISITORS AND TOURISTS. END SUMMARY.

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THE TOUR GROUP: BEING CAREFUL  
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2. (SBU) A CANADIAN PROFESSOR WHO LIVES IN NORTH CHINA RECENTLY SPENT FOUR DAYS IN THE DPRK, WITH A GROUP OF MOSTLY BRITISH AND GERMAN TOURISTS. PART OF HIS AGREEMENT WITH THE TOUR COMPANY WAS THAT HE COULD WRITE NOTHING ABOUT THE EXPERIENCE. BUT HE WAS KEEN TO SHARE IT WITH POST. HIS TOUR GROUP OF TWENTY-ONE, DEPARTED BEIJING ON AIR KOSVO (THE DPRK AIRLINE) AFTER A CAREFUL DOCUMENT CHECK, INCLUDING BY A SHORT WOMAN IN A DARK BLUE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY UNIFORM. PASSENGERS INCLUDED A GROUP OF CHINESE TOURISTS WHO SAID THEY WERE GOING FOR THE GAMBLING (SEE REPTTEL), SOME SOUTHERN KOREANS WITH HUGE PARCELS, AND A PAIR OF MIDDLE EASTERN MEN SPORTING EXPENSIVE WATCHES.

3. (SBU) THE AGING RUSSIAN AIRLINER FLIES INTO PYONGYANG FROM BEIJING TWICE A WEEK. LANDING AT THE PYONGYANG AIRPORT, THE ENORMOUS RUNWAY ENDED AT A TINY, SHABBY TERMINAL BUILDING, WITH A HUGE MURAL OF THE LATE GREAT LEADER, KIM IL SUNG. AS THE PROFESSOR OBSERVED, THIS MURAL WAS REPEATED ON VIRTUALLY EVERY PUBLIC BUILDING OF ANY NOTE. THE TERMINAL BUILDING WAS FREEZING COLD AND FULL OF UNIFORMED AND UNSMILING PEOPLE. A LARGE COHORTING OF WELL-GROOMED MEN IN THE DPRK VERSION OF "MAO SUITS" STOOD AROUND EYEING THE INCOMING PASSENGERS.

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4. (SBU) LEAVING THEIR CELL PHONES, MOVIE CAMERAS, AND TELEPHOTO LENSES WITH THE BORDER GUARDS, THE TOUR GROUP MET THEIR THREE GUIDES. THE GUIDES ACCOMPANIED THEM EVERYWHERE EXCEPT MEALS AT THE HOTEL. THE TOURISTS, EXPERIENCED TRAVELERS ALL, EVENTUALLY SPOTTED THE PERSON ASSIGNED TO WATCH THE GUIDES.

-----  
NEW CARS, OLD BUSES, AND WALKING  
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5. (SBU) THE VISITORS, SAID THE PROFESSOR, NOTED THAT THE FEW CARS, ALL APPARENTLY CHATTERING BIG SHOTS, WERE NEW CHINESE AND JAPANESE MODELS. THE CRAMPED BUSES AND TRAMS APPEARED TO DATE FROM THE 1950S. THEY WERE SHABBY AND DENTED AND BELCHED SMOKE. THE TRUCKS, WHICH RESEMBLED 1940S STYLE ARMY TRUCKS, WERE EQUALLY BEATEN-UP. THE COUNTRY ROADS SNAKING UNDER AND AWAY FROM THE EMPTY FREEWAY WERE DIRTY PAINS. SEVERAL TIMES THE TOURISTS SAW A TRACTOR OR A TRUCK FORDING A CREEK BECAUSE NO BRIDGE HAD BEEN BUILT. BICYCLES WERE COMMON, BUT MOST PEOPLE WERE ON FOOT. THEY CARRIED BUNDLES OR TRUNDLED HANDCARTS, OFTEN WITH SMALL BUNDLES OF RICE STRAW, BROKEN BOXES, OR ARMPFULS OF STICKS FOR FIREWOOD. THERE WAS SOME PLOWING BEING DONE BY AN AGING TRACTOR OR A SINGLE SKINNY ANIMAL. OX CARTS WERE COMMON. THE PROFESSOR NOTED THAT THE VIEW WAS MEDIEVAL, THE SETTING SOMBER, AND THE LANDSCAPE SPOKE OF DESPERATE AND RELENTLESS CULTIVATION OF EVERY SQUARE FOOT OF LAND.

-----  
DRAB AND DERELICT  
-----

6. (SBU) PEOPLE WERE DRESSED IN BLACK OR DARK BLUE CLOTHES. AMONG THEM, CHILDREN IN BRIGHTLY COLORED JACKETS \*STOOD OUT LIKE DAFFODILS ON A COAL PILE,\* THE PROFESSOR SAID. IN THE COUNTRYSIDE CLOTHES WERE SHABBY AND HAD THE LOOK OF LONG WEAR AND LITTLE WASHING. WOMEN COULD ONLY WEAR THEIR HAIR IN PRESCRIBED STYLES. THE TOUR GUIDE TOLD THE VISITORS. ONLY CHILDREN RETURNED THE VISITORS' WAIVES. NO ADULTS MADE EYE CONTACT, OR EVEN ACKNOWLEDGED THE VISITORS' PRESENCE. THIS WAS IN STRIKING CONTRAST TO CHINA, THE PROFESSOR NOTED, WHERE GAWKING AT FOREIGNERS IS COMMONPLACE. THE FEW FACTORIES THE VISITORS SAW APPEARED DERELICT. THERE WAS NO SMOKE. THERE WERE NO WORKERS. THE HIGHWAYS WERE EMPTY OF TRAFFIC. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY SHOPS, ALL WERE POORLY STOCKED. THE ONE GROCERY STORE THE VISITORS COULD LOOK INTO HAD ONLY A GREEN LIKE WATERCRESS AND SOME WILTED CHINESE CABBAGE.

9. (SBU) LARGE BLOCKS OF SHABBY APARTMENTS DOMINATED THE TOWNS. THEY WERE DIMLY LIT. THERE WERE NO PARKING LOTS OR NEON LIGHTS AND ONLY A HANDFUL OF ILLUMINATED SIGNS. EVERY PUBLIC BUILDING IN RURAL AREAS HAD A LARGE CONCRETE PILLAR WITH A RED ENGRAVING EULOGIZING THE GREAT LEADER. ALL BILLBOARDS SHOWED THE GREAT LEADER, OR SCENES OF HEROIC WORKERS OR SOLDIERS. THE VISITORS' HOTELS WERE DEVOID OF GUESTS. THE 46-STORY PYONGYANG HOTEL HOUSED ONLY THE VISITORS AND A SMALL GROUP OF CHINESE THERE TO GAMBLE IN THE BASEMENT CASINO. AT THE TOURISTS' COUNTRY HOTEL THE VISITORS' ONLY COMPANIONS WERE RATS SCUTTLEING IN THE DARK CORNERS OF A HUGE MARBLE LOBBY. THE HOTEL OFFERED (ALLEGED) "DELUXE ROOMS" AT 200 EUROS (USD 240) A NIGHT. FIVE RESTAURANTS

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(ALL CLOSED), AND "MATE SHIFT OPEN AIR MESS HALL," OFFERED "DELUXE ROOMS" AT 200 EUROS (USD 240) A NIGHT. AT THE UNHEATED KARAOKE BAR THE ONLY PATRONS WERE THE VISITORS, THEIR GUIDES, AND THE SCAVE BUT SILENT MAO-SUITED MEN. THE TV SHOWED ENDLESS SCENES OF THE GREAT LEADER REVIEWING TROOPS AND BEING WILDLY APPLAUDED.

.....  
YES, WE HAVE APPLES, AND FREE SCHOOLING, BUT NO HEAT OR LIGHT  
-----?

10. (SSU) AT THE FOREIGN CURRENCY STORE, THE VISITORS BOUGHT THEIR GUIDE A BAG OF ORANGES MSTING 1.50 EUROS (USD 1.77) EACH. APPLES, THE GUIDE TOLD TREN, WERE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC; ORANGES WERE NOT. IN SPITE OF OBVIOUS DEPRIVATION, NO ONE THE VISITORS SAW LOOKED HUNGRY. FORTY TO FIFTY EUROS (USD 47 TO 59) A MONTH IS THE AVERAGE WAGE, THE VISITORS WERE TOLD. AND HOUSING, MEDICAL CARE, AND EDUCATION THROUGH UNIVERSITY ARE FREE AS THE PROFESSOR NOTED, HOWEVER, THE THREE YEARS OF ARMY SERVICE EVERYONE DOES AFTER HIGH SCHOOL ARE FREE, TOO. YOUNG SOLDIERS WERE EVERYWHERE. EVERY BRIDGE AND TUNNEL HAD A YOUTHFUL GUARD IN A "DECREDIT" HUT;

11. (SSU) EVERYWHERE THE VISITORS WENT, OTHER THAN THEIR HOTEL ROOMS AND THE GREAT LEADER'S MAUSOLEUM, WAS UNHEATED. AT THE CHILDREN'S CULTURAL PALACE, A LARGE PUBLIC BUILDING, WELL-REHEARSED AND SKILLED YOUNGSTERS PERFORMED IN FREEZING COLD. AFTER THE EVENING PERFORMANCE ENDED THE PROFESSOR HAD TO USE THE TOILET, AND THE GUIDE AND HE LEFT THE DIMLY LIT FOYER FOR A BASEMENT WASHROOM THAT WAS PITCH BLACK. THE ONLY LIGHT CAME FROM A WEAK FLASHLIGHT A SMALL BOY HELD. HE WAS USING IT TO PINPOINT HIS URINAL. THE GUIDE MADE THE BOY WAIT AND USED THE FLASHLIGHT TO ILLUMINATE THE GUEST'S TARGET. ON THE WAY BACK, THE PROFESSOR PASSED A COMPLETELY DARK AND UNHEATED ROOM FULL OF CHILDREN PRACTICING THE ACCORDION. EVEN THE ENDLESS MONUMENTS TO THE GREAT LEADER WERE SUNK IN DARKNESS AT NIGHT. THE TOUR BUS'S HEADLIGHTS WOULD SWEEP THE BLACK CITY STREETS AND SUDDENLY DOZENS OF PEOPLE ON FOOT OR BICYCLE WOULD APPEAR, THE PROFESSOR SAID, LIKE BATS IN A CAVE.

.....  
AND NOW FOR SOMETHING REALLY STRANGE  
.....

12. (SSU) THE MOST BIZARRE PART OF THE TRIP WAS VISIT TO THE MAUSOLEUM OF THE GREAT LEADER. AS THE PROFESSOR DESCRIBED IT, THE GREAT LEADER'S BODY LAY AT THE CENTER OF AN ENORMOUS MARBLE BUILDING RESEMBLING A WEDDING CAKE. THE BUILDING WAS SET IN A LARGE SQUARE REACHED BY A FOUR-LANE PAVED ROAD EMPTY OF TRAFFIC AND PEOPLE. THE VISITORS HAD TO EMPTY THEIR POCKETS ON THE BUS AND MARCH, FOUR ABREAST, INTO THE BUILDING. APPROPRIATE DRESS WAS REQUIRED - DRESS SHIRTS AND TIES FOR THE MEN. THE GROUP PROCEEDED DEEP UNDERGROUND TO AN UNHEATED CLOAK ROOM. THERE THEY CHECKED THEIR COATS WITH A "COMPLETELY SILENT" WOMAN IN FORMAL CLOTHES. THEY THEN MARCHED OR RODE ON MOVING WALKWAYS, THROUGH ENDLESS MARBLE HALLWAYS. THE SOLES OF THEIR SHOES WERE CLEANED TWICE. THEY WERE CARRIED PAST A FULL-BODY SCREENING DEVICE AND A ONE-WAY MIRROR EXAMINATION BOOTH TO WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN AIRPORT METAL DETECTOR DOORWAY. FINALLY, THERE WAS A FULL BODY SEARCH WITH A METAL DETECTOR INCLUDING ARMPITS, CROTCH, AND THE

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BACK OF THE NECK.

13. (SBU) AS THEY PROCEEDED DEEPER INTO THE MAUSOLEUM, THE TOURISTS PASSED SILENT, SOMBER GROUPS OF KOREANS GOING THE OTHER WAY. THE MEN WERE DRESSED IN SUITS OR UNIFORMS AND THE WOMEN IN UNIFORMS OR FULL TRADITIONAL KOREAN GOWNS, WITH THEIR HAIR AND FACES CAREFULLY DONE UP FOR THE EVENT. THERE WERE NO SMILES AND NO NOISES. NO ONE LOOKED AT THE FOREIGN TOUR GROUP. IN EVERY CORNER, ALONG EVERY HALL, AT THE FOOT OF EVERY RAMP WERE SECURITY MEN IN DARK BLUE STANDING SILENTLY, SCANNING THE CROWD.

-----  
WE WILL JUST BLOW THAT LAST SPECK OF DUST OFF YOU!  
-----

14. (SBU) THE SANCTUM SANCTORUM ITS — WAS APPROACHED THROUGH AN ANTECHAMBER CONTAINING A HUGE WHITE STATUE OF THE GREAT LEADER, NICELY BACKLIT TO SIMULATE THE SETTING SUN. THERE THE VISITORS, STILL MARCHING TIGHT AHEAD, MADE OBLIGATORY BOWS. A TOUCH-OF PRECEDED THE VIEWING. AS THEY VISITORS PASSED THROUGH A NARROW DOORWAY TO THE CRYPT, A VERY STRONG BLAST OF AIR BLEW ON THEM, GETTING RID OF THE LAST BIT OF CONTAMINATING DUST. THE DEAR LEADER REPOSED IN A GLASS CASE. IN A MOOD OF UTTER SOLEMNITY, THE VISITORS, IN UNISON WITH THEIR GUIDES, BOWED TO THE CORPSE FROM ALL FOUR SIDES OF THE CASE. NEXT CAME, APPROPRIATELY, THE "HALL OF LAMENTATION," A VAST, COLUMNED HALL WITH ORNATE BRONZE BAS-RELIEFS SHOWING SCENES OF THE INTENSE SORROW FELT AROUND THE WORLD ON THE DAY THE GREAT LEADER DIED. THE VISITORS WERE GIVEN INDIVIDUAL MP3 PLAYERS WITH AN ENGLISH SOUNDTRACK THAT BEWAILED, IN A SHRIEKING MONOLOGUE, THE PEOPLE'S SORROW: "THE TEARS OF LAMENTATION OF THE PEOPLE BURN THE VERY GROUND ON WHICH THE PEOPLE STOOD AND REMAIN THERE TO THIS VERY DAY SPARKLING LIKE STARS IN THE SKY!"

15. (SBU) DPRK GROUPS GOT THE SAME LECTURE FROM LOUDLY SOBBING WOMEN GUIDES WHO WAILED AND DABBED THEIR EYES AS THEY SHOUTED OUT THE EARTH-SHAKING EFFECT KIM'S DEATH. MANY OF THE DPRK VISITORS WERE ALSO CRYING AS THEY LEFT THE CRYPT. THE VISITORS GOT TO PASS BY THE GREAT LEADER'S LAST V12 MERCEDES SEDAN, HIS LAST PRIVATE TRAIN CAR - ACCOMPANIED BY A 3 STOREY HIGH MAP WITH RED LIGHTS SHOWING WHERE HE WENT IN IT - AND SEVERAL ROOMS OF MEDALS AND HONORS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES (E.G. "GRAND CROSS OF SYRIA"). THERE ALSO WERE LARGE PHOTOS OF THE GREAT LEADER MEETING OTHER LEADERS SUCH AS CASTRO AND MAO. THE LAST STEP WAS SIGNING THE VISITORS' BOOK IN WHICH THE GUESTS WERE EXPECTED TO SAY SOMETHING REVERENTIAL. AFTER EACH SIGNED, THE "SUITS" WOULD COME OVER AND READ IT. THE PROFESSOR'S HANDWRITING ATTRACTED TWO OF THEM, A WHISPERED CONVERSATION, AND SOME NOTE TAKING.

-----  
PRESSING THE FLESH, WEAKLY  
-----

16. (SBU) THE TRIP TO THE MAUSOLEUM PROVIDED ONE OF THE TWO OCCASIONS ON WHICH THE VISITORS GOT TO INTERACT WITH ORDINARY NORTH KOREANS. DPRK VISITORS TOOK TURNS BEING PHOTOGRAPHED IN THEIR GROUPS ON A SET OF BLEACHERS TO COMMEMORATE THEIR DAY IN THE PLAZA. THE FOREIGN GROUP'S GUIDES THEN LET THEM TAKE PICTURES OF THE DPRK GROUPS BEING PHOTOGRAPHED. THE PROFESSOR WALKED INTO A GROUP OF WOMEN IN RED GOWNS TO SHOW THEM THEIR

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IMAGES ON HIS DIGITAL CAMERAS. THEIR SMILES WERE THE FIRST ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY ANY ORDINARY PERSON OF THE PROFESSOR'S PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY. IT WAS SHORT LIVED, HOWEVER. THE TOUR GROUP GOT CHASED AWAY BY A VERY ANGRY ARMY OFFICER.

17. (SBU) THE NEXT MORNING THE VISITORS HAD THEIR SECOND SOCIAL CONTACT OF THE TRIP WHEN THEY PLAYED A GAME OF SOCCER IN THE HOTEL DRIVEWAY WITH SOME WORKERS. THE PROFESSOR PLAYED ON THE DPRK SIDE AND THEY WON. THE WESTERNERS QUIBBLED OVER THE DPRK REFEREE'S JUDGMENT BUT, IN THE END, ALL SHOOK HANDS AND POSED FOR A GROUP PHOTO. THIS WAS A VERY RARE EVENT, ACCORDING TO THE TOUR COMPANY OWNER WHO WAS WITH THEM. SEVERAL 'SUITS' MEN WATCHED THIS EXAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACCORD FROM THE SIDELINES BUT 'DID NOT CHEER,' IN THE PROFESSOR'S WORDS.

-----  
**NIGHT AND FOG**  
-----

1e. (SBU) THE GROUP LEFT THE DPRK BY TRAIN FROM PYONGYANG FOR SINYUJU, THE NORTH KOREAN TOWN DIRECTLY ACROSS THE YALU RIVER FROM THE CHINESE CITY OR DANDONG. THEY ARRIVED AT NIGHT. FOG WAS SWIRLING AROUND THE BASE OF A GIANT GOLD FLOODLIT STATUE OF THE GREAT LEADER. NO ONE WAS VISIBLE ON THE DARK STREETS EXCEPT SOLDIERS. AT THE STATION THE TOUR GROUP'S TWO CARS AND ENGINE WERE UNCOUPLED FROM THE REST OF THE TRAIN. THE CARS WERE SEARCHED, THE VISITORS' LUGGAGE AND PAPERS CHECKED FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR BEFORE THEY WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE. THE TRUNCATED TRAIN THEN CREEPT OVER THE BRIDGE TO CHINA. DANDONG WAS BRIGHTLY LIT, EVEN GARISH, WITH ACES OF NEON, BRIGHT SHOPS, PURPLE AND GREEN SEARCHLIGHTS OUTSIDE RESTAURANTS, AND STREAMS OF CARS. AS THE TRAIN EDGED ONTO CHINESE TERRITORY, A NORTH KOREAN WOMAN WHO HAD IGNORED THE VISITORS ALL DAY ON THE RIDE FROM PYONGYANG, TURNED FROM THE WINDOW, LOOKED UP AT THE PROFESSOR AND SMILED. HE SMILED BACK.

KORNELCUTB  
END OF MESSAGE

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181-33

6

~~FOUO~~

January 05, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Kazakhstan Delegation

KAZAKHSTAN

Once you figure out the delegation to Kazakhstan, I would like to know who is going.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
010406-30

*What about Laura Rich -*

5 Jan 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/55404

OSD 00177-06

FOUO

JAN 05 2006

TO: GEN John Abizaid  
GEN George Casey  
LTG Marty Dempsey

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT Briefings to the President

33M WH

The briefings you provided the President were first-rate. Additionally, it is a pleasure to watch the three of you interact -- I know the President left the Pentagon feeling he has the A-team on the job in Iraq.

I'm delighted you are leading the fight for our country in the most important set of challenges we face.

DHR:dh  
010406-19

STAN06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55405

OSD 00178-06

FOUO

JAN 05 2006

TO: Vice President Richard B Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: AEI

VP--

How can this be? The AEI guy is almost always wrong.

Attach.

Memo to N. Gingrich

DHR:dh  
010406-15

381

STAN 06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/55406

OSD 00180-06

January 03, 2006

TO: Newt Gingrich

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Comments from Thomas Donnelly

I just saw this article out of the *Washington Times*, where Donnelly once again continues his pattern of monthly cracks at the Pentagon.

I don't think I have ever met him, but I cannot imagine how an outfit as good as **AEI** can have a person that bad representing them in the foreign policy and national security areas. He is consistently wrong.

Thanks.

DHR:ks  
122905-12

11-L-0559/OSD/55407

Washington Times  
December 29, 2005  
Pg. 4

## Rumsfeld Allies Moved Up Succession Chain

By Associated Press

The three military service chiefs have been dropped in the Bush administration's doomsday line of Pentagon succession, pushed beneath three civilian undersecretaries in Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's inner circle.

A little-noticed holiday week executive order from President **Bush** moved the Pentagon's intelligence chief to the No. 3 spot in the succession hierarchy behind Mr. Rumsfeld. The second spot would be the deputy secretary of defense, but that position currently is vacant. The Army chief, which long held the No. 3 spot, was dropped to sixth.

The changes, announced last week, are the second in six months and mirror the administration's new emphasis on intelligence gathering versus combat in 21st-century warfighting.

Technically, the line of succession is assigned to specific positions, rather than the current individuals holding those jobs.

But in its current incarnation, the doomsday plan moves to near the top three undersecretaries who are Rumsfeld loyalists and who previously worked for Vice President Dick Cheney when he was defense secretary.

The changes were recommended, said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman, because the three undersecretaries have "a broad knowledge and perspective of overall Defense Department operations." The service leaders are more focused on training, equipping and leading a particular military service, said Mr. Whitman.

**Thomas** Donnelly, a defense analyst with the American Enterprise Institute, said the changes make it easier for the administration to assert political control.

"It continues to devalue the services as institutions," said Mr. Donnelly, saying it will centralize power, and shift it away from the services, where there is generally more military expertise and interest.

Under the new plan, Rumsfeld ally Stephen Cambone, the undersecretary for intelligence, moved up to the third spot, while former Ambassador Eric Edelman, the policy undersecretary, and Kenneth Krieg, the undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, hold the fourth and fifth positions.

The first to succeed Mr. Rumsfeld remains the job of the deputy secretary, a position currently vacant because the Senate has not confirmed Mr. Bush's nominee -- Navy Secretary Gordon England.

Senators have already approved Donald Winter to be Mr. England's replacement as Navy secretary, and it is expected that Mr. Bush will eventually move Mr. England into the No. 2 Pentagon job without congressional approval through what is known as a recess appointment.

**The new succession order bumps the Navy secretary to near the bottom of the line of succession -- eighth behind the deputy, the three Pentagon undersecretaries and the Army and Air Force secretaries.**

**The Army secretary historically has been third in line, right behind the deputy secretary.**