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
Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report
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OPERATIONS

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

Operations - Total



• Key Data Observations Under Development


	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	%Change
Operations Categories (FOA, Dollars in Billions)								
Readiness	44.2	47.3	55.1	80.5	86.5	70.4	57.4	30%
Infrastructure Support	28.7	31.7	29.9	40.2	36.2	36.0	38.3	33%
Admin and Headquarters	11.8	12.7	13.4	16.7	17.5	14.9	16.0	36%
Depot Maintenance	8.3	8.6	10.4	13.4	12.4	12.0	11.6	40%
Intel Agencies/Other	5.4	5.7	19.0	9.8	10.0	9.1	8.8	63%
Training and Recruiting	5.4	5.9	0.5	7.3	7.0	0.0	0.0	59%
TOTAL Operations	103.8	111.9	134.3	167.9	170.4	150.4	140.7	36%

Categories as a % of Operations Funding								% Change
Readiness	43%	42%	41%	48%	51%	47%	41%	-2%
Infrastructure Support	28%	28%	22%	24%	21%	24%	27%	-1%
Admin and Headquarters	11%	12%	10%	10%	10%	10%	12%	+1%
Depot Maintenance	8%	8%	8%	8%	7%	8%	8%	0%
Intel Agencies/Other	5%	5%	14%	6%	6%	6%	6%	+1%
Training and Recruiting	5%	5%	5%	4%	5%	5%	6%	+1%
TOTAL Operations	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

Operations - Readiness




• Key Data Observations Under Development

	MOO	FY 01	M 0 2	FY03	M 0 4	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 %Change
Readiness Categories (TGA, Dollars in Billions)								
Air Operations	11.8	13.4	16.3	16.6	16.3	15.7	17.7	53%
Land Force	8.2	9.1	10.2	14.0	13.4	17.1	12.5	52%
Space, Combat, and Weapons Support	10.1	9.7	11.6	28.0	38.3	23.6	11.0	9%
Logistical Support	7.3	7.4	8.4	11.1	9.8	7.4	7.8	7%
Ship Operations	3.3	3.7	3.9	4.9	4.0	3.9	4.4	33%
Lift and Repositioning	3.7	4.0	4.7	5.9	4.7	2.7	4.0	8%
TOTAL operations - Readiness	44.2	47.3	55.1	80.5	86.5	70.4	57.4	30%
Categories as a % of Readiness Funding								
Air Operations	26%	28%	30%	21%	19%	22%	31%	+5%
Land Force	19%	19%	19%	17%	16%	24%	22%	+3%
Space, Combat, and Weapons Support	23%	21%	21%	35%	44%	33%	19%	-4%
Logistical Support	17%	16%	15%	14%	11%	11%	13%	-4%
Ship Operations	7%	8%	7%	6%	5%	6%	8%	+1%
Lift and Repositioning	8%	8%	8%	7%	5%	4%	7%	-1%
TOTAL Operations - Readiness	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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Operations - Infrastructure Support




• Key Data Observations Under Development

	W O O	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	M10-3	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 %Change
Infrastructure Support Categories								
Base Support	14.7	15.2	14.8	21.1	19.2	18.4	19.0	29%
Facilities Maintenance & Repair	5.0	5.6	6.1	8.5	6.2	7.1	6.7	34%
Readiness Facilities	2.4	2.7	1.7	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	13%
Quality of Life and Supporting Facilities	2.3	2.7	2.9	3.3	3.2	3.2	2.7	17%
BRAC	0.6	1.0	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.2	2.3	283%
NATO Security Investment Program	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100%
Family Housing	3.6	4.3	3.7	3.9	4.3	4.2	4.7	31%
TOTAL Operations - Infrastructure Support	28.7	31.7	29.9	40.2	36.2	36.0	38.3	33%
Categories as a % of Infrastructure Support Funding								
Base Support	51%	48%	49%	53%	53%	51%	50%	-1%
Facilities Maintenance & Repair	18%	18%	20%	21%	17%	19%	17%	-1%
Readiness Facilities	8%	8%	6%	6%	7%	7%	7%	-1%
Quality of Life and Supporting Facilities	8%	8%	10%	8%	9%	9%	7%	-1%
BRAC	2%	3%	2%	2%	1%	1%	6%	+4%
NATO Security Investment Program	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	+1%
Family Housing	13%	14%	12%	10%	12%	12%	12%	-1%
TOTAL Operations - Infrastructure Support	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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Operations - Admin and Headquarters



• Key Data Observations Under Development


	FY 00	FY01	FY02	FY 03	FY04	FY 05	FY06	FY00-FY06 % Change
Admin and Headquarters Categories (FY00-FY06)								
Service-Wide Support	6.7	7.2	7.5	9.3	9.7	7.3	7.8	16%
Security Support	1.7	1.9	2.2	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.2	88%
Personnel Support	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.6	2.5	2.7	42%
Management and Control	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	86%
Financial/Audit Oversight	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	20%
Support to Other Nations	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	33%
TOTAL Operations - Admin and Headquarters	11.8	12.7	13.4	16.7	17.5	14.9	16.0	36%

Categories as a % of Admin and Headquarters Funding								% Change
Service-Wide Support	57%	57%	57%	55%	56%	49%	49%	-8%
Security Support	14%	15%	16%	18%	17%	19%	20%	+6%
Personnel Support	16%	16%	15%	14%	15%	17%	17%	+1%
Management and Control	6%	6%	6%	8%	7%	9%	8%	+2%
Financial/Audit Oversight	4%	4%	4%	3%	3%	4%	4%	0%
Support to Other Nations	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	-1%
TOTAL Operations - Admin and Headquarters	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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Operations - Depot Maintenance




• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	M 0 2	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 % Change
Depot Maintenance Categories (TOA, Dollars in Billions)								
Ship Operations	3.9	3.9	4.5	6.4	5.1	5.1	4.9	26%
Air Operations	3.2	3.5	4.6	5.1	4.6	5.0	4.7	47%
Land Forces Operations	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.9	2.7	1.9	2.0	67%
TOTAL Operations - Depot Maintenance	8.3	8.6	10.4	13.4	12.4	12.0	11.6	40%
Categories as a % of Depot Maintenance Funding								
Ship Operations	47%	45%	44%	48%	42%	43%	42%	-5%
Air Operations	39%	41%	44%	38%	37%	41%	41%	+2%
Land Forces Operations	14%	14%	12%	14%	21%	16%	17%	+3%
TOTAL Operations - Depot Maintenance	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

Operations - Intel Agencies|Other



• Key Data Observations Under Development


	W.O.O	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 % Change
Intel Agencies Categories (FY04, Dollar in Billions)								
Intel Agencies Other	5.4	5.7	19.0	9.8	10.0	9.1	8.8	63%
TOTAL Operations - Intel Agencies Other	5.4	5.7	19.0	9.8	10.0	9.1	8.8	63%
Categories as a % of Intel Agencies Other Funding								
Intel Agencies Other	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%
TOTAL Operations - Intel Agencies Other	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%

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Operations – Training and Recruiting

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	M03	FY04	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 % Change
Training and Recruiting Categories								
Basic Skill and Advanced Training	3.1	3.4	3.8	4.3	4.5	4.7	5.0	61%
Recruiting	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.7	59%
Accession Training	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	50%
TOTAL Operations - Training and Recruiting	5.4	5.9	6.5	7.3	7.8	8.0	8.6	59%
Categories as a % of Training and Recruiting Budget Funding								
Basic Skill and Advanced Training	58%	57%	59%	58%	58%	58%	58%	0%
Recruiting	31%	32%	31%	32%	32%	32%	31%	0%
Accession Training	11%	11%	10%	10%	10%	10%	11%	0%
TOTAL Operations - Training and Recruiting	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	



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
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INVESTMENT

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

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Investment - Total



• Key Data observations
Under Development


Investment Categories	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	%Change
FY 04, Dollars in Billions								
Aircraft	25.6	25.3	27.2	33.2	34.9	37.3	38.6	51%
Missiles, Munitions, & Missile Defense	10.7	11.7	15.0	17.9	17.8	19.1	17.9	67%
Ships & Ship Related	11.9	16.4	14.2	15.2	17.8	17.5	16.2	36%
Ground Support Equipment	7.2	8.5	9.1	11.0	12.5	12.0	10.6	47%
Science & Technology	7.9	8.5	9.7	10.6	11.7	12.8	10.4	32%
Space	3.6	4.4	4.4	5.3	5.7	5.9	7.6	111%
Other/Classified	27.2	29.9	32.2	44.5	47.2	44.1	46.1	69%
TOTAL Investment	94.1	104.7	111.8	137.7	147.6	148.7	147.4	57%

Categories as a % of Investment Funding	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	% Change
Aircraft	27%	24%	24%	24%	24%	25%	26%	-1%
Missiles, Munitions, & Missile Defense	11%	11%	13%	13%	12%	13%	12%	+1%
Ships & Ship Related	13%	16%	13%	11%	12%	12%	11%	-2%
Ground Support Equipment	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	7%	-1%
Science & Technology	8%	8%	9%	8%	8%	8%	7%	-1%
Space	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	5%	+1%
Other/Classified	29%	29%	29%	32%	32%	30%	32%	+3%
TOTAL Investment	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

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Investment - Aircraft



Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	% Change
Aircraft Categories								
<i>(FOIA: Dollars in Billions)</i>								
Helicopters	4.2	4.2	5.0	6.3	7.0	6.9	7.7	83%
Airlift	4.9	4.5	4.9	6.1	5.6	7.2	6.1	24%
Joint Strike Fighter	0.5	0.7	1.4	3.3	4.1	4.3	5.0	900%
F-22	2.8	4.0	3.9	5.4	5.1	4.7	4.3	54%
Electronic Attack	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.8	3.0	3.8	138%
F/A-18	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.8	3.6	3.5	3.3	-6%
F-15/F-16	1.4	1.3	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9	-36%
Spare Parts	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.3	-7%
Other Aircraft, Modifications and Support	5.3	4.7	4.7	4.8	5.6	5.6	6.2	17%
TOTAL Aircraft	25.6	25.3	27.2	33.2	34.9	37.3	38.6	51%


Categories as % of Aircraft Funding								
Helicopters	17%	17%	18%	19%	20%	19%	20%	+3%
Airlift	19%	18%	18%	18%	16%	19%	16%	-3%
Joint Strike Fighter	2%	3%	5%	10%	12%	12%	13%	+11%
F-22	11%	15%	15%	16%	15%	13%	11%	0%
Electronic Attack	6%	5%	5%	4%	5%	8%	10%	+4%
F/A-18	14%	13%	13%	12%	10%	9%	9%	-5%
F-15/F-16	5%	5%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	-3%
Spare Parts	5%	5%	6%	4%	4%	3%	3%	-2%
Other Aircraft, Modifications, & support	21%	19%	17%	15%	16%	15%	16%	-5%
TOTAL Aircraft	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

Investment - Missiles, Munitions, and Missile Defense

Dollars (Billions)




Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 %Change
Missiles, Munitions, & Missile Defense								
Categories	FY00 Dollars in Billions							
Missile Defense	4.0	4.8	7.8	7.6	9.0	9.9	8.8	+120%
Missiles	3.8	3.6	3.6	4.3	3.9	4.1	4.3	+13%
Munitions	2.9	3.3	3.6	6.0	4.9	5.1	4.8	+66%
TOTAL Missiles, Munitions, & Missile Defense	10.7	11.7	15.0	17.9	17.8	19.1	17.9	+67%
Categories as a % of Missiles, Munitions, & Missile Defense Funding								
Missile Defense	37%	41%	52%	42%	50%	52%	49%	+12%
Missiles	36%	31%	24%	24%	22%	21%	24%	-12%
Munitions	27%	28%	24%	34%	28%	27%	27%	0%
TOTAL Missiles, Munitions, & Missile Defense	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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Investment - Ships & Ship Related



• Key Data Observations Under Development


	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 % Change
Ships & Ship Related								
Submarines	2.6	3.5	4.6	5.2	5.4	5.4	5.4	108%
Destroyers	4.6	5.2	5.5	5.4	6.3	7.3	4.6	0%
Aircraft Carriers	1.3	5.0	1.8	0.8	1.6	1.2	2.3	77%
Amphibious Ships	2.1	1.1	1.0	1.7	2.2	2.0	2.0	-5%
Research and Other Ships	1.3	1.6	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.6	23%
SSGN Conversion			0.4	1.1	1.2	0.5	0.3	-25%
TOTAL Ships & Ship Related	11.9	16.4	14.2	15.2	17.0	17.5	16.2	36%

Categories as a % of Ships & Ship Related Funding								% Change
Submarines	22%	21%	32%	34%	30%	31%	33%	+11%
Destroyers	38%	32%	39%	36%	35%	42%	29%	-9%
Aircraft Carriers	11%	30%	13%	5%	9%	7%	14%	+3%
Amphibious Ships	18%	7%	7%	11%	13%	11%	12%	-6%
Research and Other Ships	11%	10%	6%	6%	6%	6%	10%	-1%
SSGN Conversion	0%	0%	3%	7%	7%	3%	2%	2%
TOTAL Ships & Ship Related	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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Investment – Ground Support Equipment



• Key Data Observations Under Development


	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 %Change
Ground Support Equipment Categories (TOA, Dollars in Billions)								
Vehicles	3.3	4.5	4.4	5.5	7.4	7.0	6.3	91%
Weapons	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.4	133%
Training	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.4	33%
Amphibious	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0%
Other Ground	2.7	2.6	3.3	3.8	3.3	2.9	2.2	-19%
TOTAL Ground Support Equipment	7.2	8.5	9.1	11.0	12.5	12.0	10.6	47%

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	% Change
Categories as a % of Ground Support Equipment Funding								
Vehicles	46%	53%	49%	50%	59%	58%	59%	+13%
Weapons	8%	9%	10%	9%	8%	10%	13%	+5%
Training	4%	4%	3%	3%	4%	5%	4%	0%
Amphibious	4%	4%	2%	4%	2%	3%	3%	-1%
Other Ground	38%	30%	36%	34%	27%	24%	21%	-17%
TOTAL Ground Support Equipment	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

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Investment - Science & Technology



Key Data Observations Under Development


	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	M 06	FY00-FY06 % Change
Science & Technology Categories (FY00 Dollars in \$Billion)								
Basic Research	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.3	18%
Advanced Research	3.3	3.5	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.8	4.2	27%
Advanced Technology Development	3.5	3.7	4.3	4.9	6.0	6.5	4.9	40%
TOTAL Science & Technology	7.9	8.5	9.7	10.6	11.7	12.8	10.4	32%

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	M 06	% Change
Categories as a % of Science & Technology Funding								
Basic Research	14%	15%	14%	13%	12%	11%	13%	-1%
Advanced Research	42%	41%	42%	41%	37%	38%	40%	-2%
Advanced Technology Development	44%	44%	44%	46%	51%	51%	47%	+3%
TOTAL Science & Technology	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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Investment - Space



• Key Data Observations Under Development


	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 %Change
Space Categories								
FY00 Dollars in Billions								
Satellite Communications	1.0	1.2	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.5	3.4	240%
Space Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.6	60%
Launch	0.9	1.2	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.8	1.2	33%
Navigation	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	167%
Other Space	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	50%
TOTAL Space	3.6	4.4	4.4	5.3	5.7	5.9	7.6	111%

Categories as % of Space Funding								
	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	% Change
Satellite Communications	28%	27%	43%	38%	39%	42%	45%	+17%
Space Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	28%	25%	20%	28%	25%	22%	21%	-7%
Launch	25%	27%	16%	11%	16%	14%	16%	-9%
Navigation	8%	12%	12%	13%	10%	12%	10%	+2%
Other Space	11%	9%	9%	10%	10%	10%	8%	-3%
TOTAL Space	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

Investment - Other/Classified



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 % Change
Other/Classified Categories (COA, Dollars in Billions)								
classified	17.9	19.8	21.6	30.2	31.6	30.8	31.5	76%
Communications & Electronics	5.1	5.4	5.3	7.8	8.6	7.2	7.9	55%
R&D Management Support	2.8	3.3	3.6	4.0	4.3	3.5	3.8	36%
Intelligence, Surveillance Reconnaissance	1.4	1.4	1.7	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.9	107%
TOTAL Other/Classified	27.2	29.9	32.2	44.5	47.2	44.1	46.1	69%

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	% Change
Categories as a % of Other/Classified Funding								
classified	66%	66%	67%	68%	67%	70%	69%	+3%
Communications & Electronics	19%	18%	17%	17%	18%	16%	17%	-2%
R&D Management Support	10%	11%	11%	9%	9%	8%	8%	-2%
Intelligence, Surveillance Reconnaissance	5%	5%	5%	6%	6%	6%	6%	+1%
TOTAL Other/Classified	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	



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
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**MILITARY
PERSONNEL
&
HEALTH CARE**

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

Military Personnel and Health Care - Total



• Key Data Observations Under Development


	FY00	FY 01	FY02	FY 03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY00-FY06 %Change
Military Personnel and Health Care Categories								
<i>(FY00 = \$86.0 billion; FY06 = \$126.7 billion; (FY04, Dollars in Billions)</i>								
Current Pay and Benefits	59.3	62.8	70.6	85.9	89.0	78.4	81.6	38%
Retirement Benefits	14.3	14.4	16.5	23.3	26.5	26.9	27.3	91%
Current Health Care	12.2	13.6	17.7	15.3	17.8	18.2	19.8	62%
TOTAL Military Personnel and Health Care	85.8	90.8	104.8	124.5	133.3	123.5	126.7	50%

	FY00	FY 01	FY02	FY 03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY00-FY06 %Change
Categories as a % of Military Personnel and Health Care Funding								
Current Pay and Benefits	69%	69%	67%	69%	67%	63%	64%	-5%
Retirement Benefits	17%	16%	16%	19%	20%	22%	21%	+4%
Current Health Care	14%	15%	17%	12%	13%	15%	15%	+1%
TOTAL Military Personnel and Health Care	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

Military Personnel and Health Care - Current Pay and Benefits



• Key Data Observations Under Development


	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 %Change
Current Pay and Benefits Categories (DOD Dollars in Billions)								
Basic Pay	38.4	40.6	45.3	50.9	53.8	48.6	50.2	31%
Housing Allowance	6.2	7.6	9.5	11.9	13.0	12.6	13.1	111%
Special Pays & Benefits	7.9	7.6	8.3	13.5	11.9	9.5	10.4	32%
Food Allowance	3.8	4.0	4.4	6.0	7.0	4.6	4.6	21%
Moves	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.6	3.3	3.1	3.3	10%
TOTAL Current Pay and Benefits	59.3	62.8	70.6	85.9	89.0	78.4	81.6	36%

Categories as a % of Current Pay and Benefits Funding								% Change
Basic Pay	65%	65%	64%	59%	60%	62%	61%	-4%
Housing Allowance	11%	12%	14%	14%	15%	16%	16%	+5%
Special Pays & Benefits	13%	12%	12%	16%	13%	12%	13%	0%
Food Allowance	6%	6%	6%	7%	8%	6%	6%	0%
Moves	5%	5%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	-1%
TOTAL Current Pay and Benefits	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

Military Personnel and Health Care - Retirement Benefits



• Key Data Observations Under Development


	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 %Change
Retirement Benefits Categories (FOA, Dollars in Billions)								
Retired Pay Accruals	11.4	11.3	13.1	13.4	14.1	12.9	12.8	12%
Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Accruals				6.0	8.3	10.3	10.7	78%
Social Security Contributions	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.9	4.1	3.7	3.8	31%
TOTAL Retirement Benefits	14.3	14.4	16.5	23.3	26.5	26.9	27.3	91%

Categories as a % of Retirement Benefits Funding								
Retired Pay Accruals	80%	78%	79%	57%	53%	48%	47%	-33%
Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Accruals				26%	32%	38%	39%	+13%
Social Security Contributions	20%	22%	21%	17%	15%	14%	14%	-6%
TOTAL Retirement Benefits	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

Military Personnel and Health Care - Current Health Care



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	M05	FY 06	FY00-FY06 %Change
Current Health Care Categories (Total Dollars in Billions)								
Riate Sector Care	5.4	6.2	8.5	7.2	8.5	8.9	10.2	89%
In-House Care	6.2	6.7	8.3	7.4	8.5	8.4	9.0	45%
Health Care Investment	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.6	0%
TOTAL Current Health Care	12.2	13.6	17.7	15.3	17.8	18.2	19.8	62%
Categories as a % of Current Health Care Funding								
Riate Sector Care	44%	46%	48%	47%	48%	49%	52%	+8%
In-House Care	51%	49%	47%	48%	48%	46%	45%	-5%
Health Care Investment	5%	5%	5%	5%	4%	5%	3%	-2%
TOTAL Current Health Care	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	



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
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Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

**REVOLVING
FUNDS**

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

Revolving Funds - Total



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	M 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	MOO-M06 %Change
Revolving Funds Categories (TOA, Dollars in Billions)								
National Defense Sealift Fund	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.6	300%
Commissary Ops	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	20%
War Reserve/Spare Parts	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.2	100%
Underutilized Plant Capacity/ DLA Costs				0.1	0.5	0.0	0.1	0%
Contract Authority	0.3	0.2	0.0	-0.9	0.0	0.8	0.0	-100%
Fuel Supplementals	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.6	0.0	0.0	-100%
Closed Account Adj/Undistributed			0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.3	0.0	-100%
TOTAL Revolving Funds/Other	3.4	1.6	2.7	2.5	4.7	2.6	3.1	-9%

Categories as % of Revolving Funds/Other								% Change
National Defense Sealift Fund	12%	25%	37%	36%	21%	35%	52%	+40%
Commissary Ops	29%	56%	41%	40%	23%	46%	39%	+10%
War Reserve/Spare Parts	3%	6%	18%	12%	11%	0%	6%	+3%
Underutilized Plant Capacity/ DLA Costs	0%	0%	0%	4%	11%	0%	3%	+3%
Contract Authority	9%	13%	0%	-36%	0%	31%	0%	-9%
Fuel Supplementals	47%	0%	0%	44%	34%	0%	0%	-47%
Closed Account Adj/Undistributed	0%	0%	4%	0%	0%	-12%	0%	0%
TOTAL Revolving Funds/Other	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	



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
Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report
Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

WAR

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

War Related Obligations (FY 2001 - Present)



• Key Data Observations
Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	PI02	FY03	FY 04	FY 05	Total
War Related Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Operations		14.1	8.0	40.5	42.3	15.9	120.8
Military Personnel		0.0	7.1	15.7	17.0	5.1	44.9
Personnel Support		0.0	1.5	3.3	4.6	2.3	11.7
Investment		0.0	0.0	1.7	7.4	1.4	10.5
TOTAL War-Related Obligations		14.1	16.6	61.2	71.3	24.7	187.9

*Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less

Categories as a % of War Related Obligations							
Operations		100%	47%	66%	59%	64%	64%
Military Personnel		0%	43%	26%	24%	21%	24%
Personnel Support		0%	10%	5%	7%	9%	6%
Investment		0%	0%	3%	10%	6%	6%
TOTAL War-Related Obligations		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

War Related- Operations

(FY2001 - Present)

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	Total
Operations Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
OPTEMPO		13.9	2.6	7.3	7.8	2.2	33.8
Transportation		0.0	1.1	8.1	6.1	2.5	17.8
Facilities/Base Support		0.0	0.5	3.9	9.4	3.6	17.4
Supplies & Equipment		0.1	1.4	6.9	5.4	1.8	15.6
Equipment Maintenance		0.0	0.2	3.8	4.8	2.7	11.5
C4I		0.0	0.6	1.8	1.3	0.6	4.3
Training		0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.5
Other/Miscellaneous		0.0	1.5	8.6	7.3	2.4	19.8
TOTAL War-Related Operations Obligations		14.1	8.0	40.5	42.3	15.9	120.8

*Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less

Categories as a % of Operations Obligations						
OPTEMPO	99%	32%	18%	19%	14%	28%
Transportation	0%	14%	20%	15%	16%	15%
Facilities/Base Support	0%	6%	10%	22%	23%	14%
Supplies & Equipment	1%	18%	17%	13%	11%	13%
Equipment Maintenance	0%	3%	9%	11%	17%	9%
C4I	0%	8%	4%	3%	3%	4%
Training	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Other/Miscellaneous	0%	19%	22%	17%	15%	17%
TOTAL War-Related Operations Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

War Related- Military Personnel

(FY 2001 - Present)

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	Total
Military Personnel Obligation Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Reserve Called to Active Duty		0.0	5.3	9.3	8.8	3.2	26.6
Overstrength		0.0	0.0	3.8	4.7	0.6	9.1
Subsistence		0.0	0.5	1.6	2.5	0.6	5.2
Special Pay		0.0	0.3	1.0	1.0	0.3	2.6
Other Costs		0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.4
TOTAL War Related Military Personnel Obligations		0.0	7.1	15.7	17.0	5.1	44.9

*Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less

Categories as a % of Military Personnel Obligations							
Reserve Called to Active Duty		5%	75%	59%	51%	63%	59%
Overstrength		1%	4%	6%	6%	6%	6%
Subsistence		43%	7%	10%	15%	12%	11%
Special Pay		0%	0%	24%	28%	12%	20%
Other Costs		51%	14%	0%	0%	8%	3%
TOTAL War Related Military Personnel Obligations		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

War Related- Personnel Support

(FY 2001 - Present)

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	Total
Personnel Support Obligation Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Temporary Duty		0.0	1.2	1.5	1.8	0.6	5.1
Clothing & Personnel Supplies		0.0	0.1	0.9	1.7	0.9	3.6
Medical/Health Services		0.0	0.1	0.7	0.8	0.5	2.1
Other Costs		0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.9
TOTAL War Related Personnel Support Obligations		0.0	1.5	3.3	4.6	2.3	11.7

* Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less

Categories as a % of Personnel Support Obligations						
Temporary Duty	66%	80%	45%	39%	26%	44%
Clothing & Personnel Supplies	18%	7%	27%	37%	39%	31%
Medical/Health Services	14%	7%	21%	17%	22%	18%
Other Costs	1%	7%	6%	7%	13%	8%
TOTAL War Related Personnel Support Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

War Related - Investment

(FY 2001 - Present)

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	Total
Investment Obligation Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Other Procurement				0.4	2.9	0.8	4.1
Munition Procurement				0.6	1.4	0.2	2.2
C3 Equipment Procurement				0.4	1.2	0.0	1.6
Vehicle Procurement				0.0	1.0	0.3	1.3
Aircraft Procurement				0.0	0.6	0.1	0.7
RDT&E				0.3	0.2	0.0	0.5
Major Construction				0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
TOTAL War Related Investment Obligations				1.7	7.4	1.4	10.5

* Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less

Categories as a % of Investment Obligations				
Other Procurement	24%	39%	57%	39%
Munition Procurement	35%	19%	14%	21%
C3 Equipment Procurement	24%	16%	0%	15%
Vehicle Procurement	0%	14%	21%	12%
Aircraft Procurement	0%	8%	7%	7%
RDT&E	18%	3%	0%	5%
Major Construction	0%	1%	0%	1%
TOTAL War Related Investment Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%



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Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005


WAR
OIF

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (FY 2001 - Present)

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations
Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	Total
OIF Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Operations		0.2	2.4	28.1	37.1	13.8	81.6
Military Personnel		0.0	0.0	8.0	12.2	3.6	23.8
Investment		0.0	0.0	2.0	6.7	1.4	10.1
Personnel Support		0.0	0.0	1.8	3.7	1.9	7.4
TOTAL OIF Obligation		0.2	2.4	39.9	59.7	20.7	122.9

*Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less.

Categories as a % of OIF Obligations						
Operations	100%	100%	71%	62%	67%	67%
Military Personnel	0%	0%	20%	21%	17%	19%
Investment	0%	0%	5%	11%	7%	8%
Personnel Support	0%	0%	5%	6%	9%	6%
TOTAL OIF Obligation	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

Operations Iraqi Freedom - Operations

(FY 2001 - Present)

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	Total
Operations Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
OPTEMPO		0.0	0.0	5.1	9.3	1.9	16.3
Facilities/Base Support		0.2	2.4	2.3	8.0	3.1	16.0
Transportation		0.0	0.0	5.6	5.1	2.3	13.0
Supplies & Equipment		0.0	0.0	5.1	4.4	1.7	11.2
Equipment Maintenance		0.0	0.0	3.3	4.6	2.6	10.5
C4I		0.0	0.0	1.0	0.8	0.4	2.2
Training		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2
Other/Miscellaneous		0.0	0.0	5.7	4.8	1.7	12.2
TOTAL OIF Operations Obligations		0.2	2.4	28.1	37.1	13.8	81.6

*Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less.

Categories as a % of Operations Obligations						
OPTEMPO	98%	0%	18%	25%	14%	20%
Facilities/Base Support	1%	100%	8%	22%	23%	20%
Transportation	0%	0%	20%	14%	16%	16%
Supplies & Equipment	0%	0%	18%	12%	12%	13%
Equipment Maintenance	0%	0%	12%	12%	19%	13%
C4I	1%	0%	4%	2%	3%	3%
Training	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Other/Miscellaneous	0%	0%	20%	13%	12%	15%
TOTAL OIF Operations Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

Operations Iraqi Freedom- Military Personnel

(FY 2001 - Present)

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	M 02	FY 03	FY 04	M 05	Total
Military Personnel Obligation Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Reserve Called to Active Duty				5.4	6.9	2.3	14.6
Subsistence				0.7	2.0	0.4	3.1
Overstrength				0.0	2.5	0.5	3.0
Special Pay				0.6	0.8	0.2	1.6
Other Costs				1.3	0.0	0.2	1.5
TOTAL OIF Military Personnel Obligations				8.0	12.2	3.6	23.8

* Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less.


Categories as a % of Military Personnel Obligations				
Reserve Called to Active Duty	67%	57%	63%	61%
Subsistence	9%	16%	11%	13%
Overstrength	0%	20%	14%	13%
Special Pay	8%	7%	6%	7%
Other Costs	16%	0%	6%	6%
TOTAL OIF Military Personnel Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

Operation Iraqi Freedom- Personnel Support

(FY 2001 - Present)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	M02	M03	FY 04	FY 05	Total
Personnel Support Obligation Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Clothing & Personnel Supplies				0.7	1.6	0.8	3.1
Temporary Duty				0.6	1.1	0.3	2.0
Medical/Health Services				0.5	0.6	0.5	1.6
Other Costs				0.1	0.3	0.3	0.7
TOTAL OIF Personnel Support Obligations				1.8	3.7	1.9	7.4

*Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less.


Categories as a % of Personnel Support Obligations				
Clothing & Personnel Supplies	37%	44%	44%	42%
Temporary Duty	32%	30%	17%	27%
Medical/Health Services	27%	17%	25%	22%
Other Costs	4%	9%	14%	9%
TOTAL OIF Personnel Support Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

Operation Iraqi Freedom - Investment (FY 2001 - Present)

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	Total
Investment Obligation Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Other Procurement				0.3	2.8	0.8	3.9
C3 Equipment Procurement				0.3	1.0	0.0	1.3
Munition Procurement				0.2	1.0	0.2	1.4
Vehicle Procurement				0.0	1.0	0.3	1.3
Major Construction				1.0	0.1	0.0	1.1
Aircraft Procurement				0.0	0.6	0.1	0.7
RDT&E				0.3	0.1	0.0	0.4
TOTAL OIF Investment Obligations				2.1	6.6	1.4	10.1

*Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less.

Categories as a % of Investment Obligations				
Other Procurement	14%	42%	56%	39%
C3 Equipment Procurement	14%	15%	1%	13%
Munition Procurement	9%	15%	14%	14%
Vehicle Procurement	1%	15%	21%	13%
Major Construction	47%	2%	0%	10%
Aircraft Procurement	1%	9%	7%	7%
RDT&E	14%	2%	1%	4%
TOTAL OIF Investment Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%



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11-L-0559/OSD/48910

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report


Year-to-Year Information as of February 2005

WAR
OEF

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (FY 2001 - Present)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	Total
OEF Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Operations		5.1	4.4	10.3	6.7	1.5	28.0
Military Personnel		0.0	3.4	4.3	2.8	1.1	11.6
Personnel Support		0.0	0.8	0.9	0.5	0.2	2.4
Investment		0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
TOTAL War Related Obligations		5.1	0.6	16.0	10.5	2.0	43.0

* Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less.


Categories as a % of OEF Obligations						
Operations	100%	51%	64%	64%	54%	65%
Military Personnel	0%	40%	27%	26%	39%	27%
Personnel Support	0%	9%	6%	5%	7%	6%
Investment	0%	0%	3%	5%	0%	2%
TOTAL War Related Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

Operations Enduring Freedom • Operations (FY 2001 - Present)

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations
Under Development

	FY00	FY 01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	Total
Operations Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
OPTEMPO		4.9	1.2	2.0	1.0	0.3	9.4
Transportation		0.0	0.6	2.6	1.0	0.3	4.5
Supplies & Equipment		0.1	1.2	1.5	0.8	0.2	3.8
Facilities/Base Support		0.0	0.4	0.9	0.9	0.3	2.5
C4I		0.0	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.1	1.7
Equipment Maintenance		0.1	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.1	1.1
Training		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other/Miscellaneous		0.0	0.2	2.2	2.4	0.2	5.0
TOTAL OEF Operations Obligations		5.1	4.4	10.3	6.7	1.5	28.0


*Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less.

Categories as a % of Operations Obligations						
OPTEMPO	97%	28%	20%	15%	19%	34%
Transportation	0%	12%	25%	15%	18%	16%
Supplies & Equipment	2%	26%	15%	12%	11%	13%
Facilities/Base Support	0%	9%	9%	13%	21%	9%
C4I	0%	13%	5%	6%	6%	6%
Equipment Maintenance	1%	6%	5%	3%	6%	4%
Training	0%	1%	0%	1%	2%	0%
Other/Miscellaneous	0%	5%	21%	35%	16%	18%
TOTAL OEF Operations Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

Operation Enduring Freedom - Military Personnel (FY 2001 - Present)



• Key Data Observations Under Development


	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	Total
Military Personnel Obligation Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Reserve Called to Active Duty		0.0	2.2	1.9	0.7	0.7	5.5
Overstrength		0.0	0.0	1.6	1.8	0.1	3.5
Subsistence		0.0	0.3	0.6	0.2	0.1	1.2
Special Pay		0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.6
Other Costs		0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.8
TOTAL Off Military Personnel Obligations		0.0	3.4	4.3	2.8	1.1	11.6

* Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less.

Categories as a % of Military Personnel Obligations							
Reserve Called to Active Duty		0%	66%	44%	26%	68%	48%
Overstrength		0%	0%	37%	63%	6%	30%
Subsistence		97%	8%	14%	8%	12%	10%
Special Pay		3%	7%	5%	4%	7%	5%
Other Costs		0%	19%	0%	0%	7%	7%
TOTAL Off Military Personnel Obligations		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	PI03	PI04	PI05	Total
Personnel Support Obligation Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Temporary Duty		0.0	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.2	1.6
Clothing & Personnel Supplies		0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.3
Medical/Health Services		0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.4
Other Costs		0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1
TOTAL OEF Personnel Support Obligations		0.0	0.8	0.9	0.5	0.2	2.4

*Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less.


Categories as a % of Personnel Support Obligations						
Temporary Duty	74%	75%	49%	73%	72%	65%
Clothing & Personnel Supplies	14%	9%	25%	7%	4%	14%
Medical/Health Services	11%	10%	18%	18%	17%	15%
Other Costs	1%	6%	8%	2%	7%	6%
TOTAL O B Personnel Support Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Department of Defense Financial Indicators Report

Year-to-Year Information as of January 2005

War Related Obligations - OEF Investment (FY 2001 - Present)

Dollars (Billions)



• Key Data Observations Under Development

	MOO	FY 01	FY02	FY03	MO 4	FY05	Total
Investment Obligation Categories (Dollars in Billions)							
Munition Procurement				0.3	0.2	0.0	0.5
C3 Equipment Procurement				0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2
RDT&E				0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
Vehicle Procurement				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Aircraft Procurement				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Major Construction				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Procurement				0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2
TOTAL OEF Investment Obligations				0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0

*Values of 0.0 in the table may represent spending of \$50 million or less.

Categories as a % of Investment Obligations				
Munition Procurement	49%	50%	15%	48%
C3 Equipment Procurement	19%	13%	19%	16%
RDT&E	8%	14%	0%	9%
Vehicle Procurement	0%	0%	66%	4%
Aircraft Procurement	6%	0%	0%	3%
Major Construction	0%	0%	0%	0%
Other Procurement	18%	23%	0%	20%
TOTAL OEF Investment Obligations	100%	100%	100%	100%

TAB D

DoD Financial Data —Key Observations 2000-2006

Military Personnel and Health Care (31 % of 2006 Budget Request):

- ***Current Pay and Benefits*** increases by 38%, but does not keep pace with the 46% overall growth of the budget topline.
- ***Current Health Care*** grows by 62% driven primarily by the 89% growth in outsourced private sector care. The cost of care in military facilities grows by 45%.
- ***Retirement Benefits*** increases by 91% as a result of the new (2003) accounting requirement for the Department to fund accrual payments for Medicare-eligible retiree health care.

Operations (33% of 2006 Budget Request):

- ***Readiness, Infrastructure Support, Administration, and Depot Maintenance*** increases in the 30-40% range.
- ***Training*** increases by 59%.

Investment (35% of 2006 Budget Request):

- ***Ships, Aircraft, Missiles/Munitions/Missile Defense.*** The relative percentage distribution for the major investment categories has not changed significantly since 2000.

In aircraft, there is a shift away from older aircraft (F/A- 18, F-15/16) to newer ones (JSF, F-22).

In ships, there is a shift in investment away from traditional surface ships (destroyers, amphibious ships) to new aircraft carriers and submarines.

~~FOUO~~

December 10, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Briefing on SOF

Please take a look at this report on SOCOM. Should we do some sort of a statement or briefing sometime on this? This is an amazing amount we've done.

322

Thanks.

Attach.

11/2/04 ASD(SO/LIC) memo to SD re: Special Operations Forces

DHR:dh
120904-50

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

10 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08055-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48919

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DU 12/9

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____
USD(P) copy provided
I-04/014546 2 Nov 04

NOV - 2 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

~~SECRET~~
ZANOV4

SUBJECT: Special Operations Forces

You asked for a summary reflecting SOF advances over the past four years addressing capabilities, command relationships, service roles, reduction of nonessential missions, and improved posture for GWOT. The attached paper is the second attempt.

Lamy

FOR DISSEMINATION/48920

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**INFORMATION PAPER
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

OASD(SO/LIC)

2 Nov 04

- The Secretary requested and received Congressional authority to provide SOF support to foreign forces (including groups and individuals) that can assist with GWOT missions. (Greatly increases SOF options and flexibility). (Twenty years overdue).
- SOCOM was designated as the lead (supported) command for GWOT missions with a sweeping change to the UCP. Triggered development of a series of OPLANs orchestrating interagency, combatant command, and allied participation.
 - SOCOM established a Center for Special Operations with joint/interagency collaboration capability. Can respond quickly to the SECDEF's guidance on OPLAN development and adjustment. Monthly reviews with SECDEF. (MG Dell Dailey)
- SOCOM strengthened Theater Special Operations Commands to better support Geographic Combatant Commanders. More robust and responsive planning and execution capability for SOF missions.
- The Secretary directed increased USMC participation with SOCOM.
 - SOCOM/USMC signed a Memorandum to improve communications and logistics, established an annual SOCOM/USMC wargame focused on interoperability, and established a 100 man USMC SOCOM Detachment for a six month combat deployment to Iraq with SEAL Team One. This team recently returned and is reviewing lessons learned.
 - Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) now provide Liaison Officers to the Theater Special Operations Commands, upon arrival in theater, establishing a much tighter link for all the Geographic Combatant Commander's interoperability issues. USMC participation on the SOCOM staff has increased, with Marines in key leadership positions.
- At the Secretary's direction, worldwide SOF units have been redeployed and reconfigured to support OIF and OEF. Task organization changes provide CENTCOM with a more flexible, responsive and successful force for missions such as HVT operations.

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11-L-0559/OSD/48921

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- Worldwide SOF missions have been carefully monitored and adjusted by the SECDEF:
 - All SOF deployments for counternarcoterrorist missions, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCETs), and allied exercises have been reviewed and realigned to put more SOF into GWOT missions. An example is Georgia train and equip. Another is the 7th and 10th Special Forces Group missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. (The 7th Group traditionally focuses on Latin America, the 10th on Eastern Europe and portions of Africa.).
 - SECDEF guidance has refocused SOF deployments from a 30% rate in GWOT priority countries three years ago to a 90% rate for 2005.
- The Secretary expanded both SOF personnel (12%) and budget lines (77%) providing significant increases in SOF aviation (transport, tanker, and gunship capabilities). This upward ramp for personnel continues through 2009.
 - One benefit to the conventional forces has been increased AC-130 gunship support, (four aircraft) providing precision fires for combat in urban areas and sustained surveillance capability during OIF and OEF.
 - Development of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System merges naval submarine stealth and range with SEAL stealth and lethality for special reconnaissance and direct action missions.
- Because of the rapid development and acquisition process employed by SOCOM, important developments in sensors, communications, night vision systems, and soldier systems have been quickly transferred to conventional forces.
- USSOCOM PSYOP capabilities are now integrated with STRATCOM's IO mission. Theater PSYOP operations executed under the SECDEF's DEPOD process now contribute to the GWOT strategy.
 - PSYOP broadcast capability has been improved with the modification of airborne broadcast platforms. (EC-130s).
- SOF Special Mission Units have been strengthened under the Secretary's direction including transfer of command to SOCOM. They have repeatedly provided actionable intelligence for both SOF and conventional forces, and have been at the center of the most important successes in the GWOT, OEF, and OIF.
- SECDEF's Global Force Posture initiative offers SOF new basing initiatives, allowing more effective task organization and rotation options. This initiative will reduce strain on SOF – from families to mobility platforms.

December 10, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Militia Theory

Attached is an e-mail I received on militias. What do you think of it?

Thanks.

Attach.

11/16/04 Pickard e-mail to SD re: Militia Theory

DHR:dh
120904-49

.....
Please respond by

1/6/05

Iraq

10 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08074-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48923

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 4:02 PM
 To: (b)(6)
 Subject: FW: Militia theory

From DR's email

-----Original Message-----

From: Ronn S. Pickard [mailto:fsm@gte.net]
 Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 11:51 PM
 To: Donald Rumsfeld
 Subject: MILITIA THEORY

Don,

The Department of Defense has no militia theory.

Fundamentally, the term "militia" refers to a citizenry voluntarily mobilized for the common defense.

The strategy of terrorism is ultimately simple. A community is criminally attacked. The folks in the community naturally organize to defend themselves. Terrorist allies within the government block the government from passing proper laws to enable the community to defend itself lawfully and openly. Terrorist allies within the community attacked promote the formation of illegal militias and, thus, control the linkage between illegal militia units. The illegal militia units are then run up against each other and the government. Totalitarianism results. A well regulated militia would make such shenanigans impossible.

Things immediately became unglued in Iraq after Allawi stated that there would be "no militia laws". How could the people of Iraq possibly support a government that seeks to disarm and disorganize them in the face of such violence? Without a lawful self-defense how much easier could it be for terrorists to dominated communities?

The Kurdish militia had repelled Saddam Hussein and his agents when they were in power with a minimum of support from the United States. The Allawi government with U.S. support has sought to stand down the Kurdish militia and replace them with government paid police. The result as with the situation in Mosul was predictable. The militia has to be properly regulated not eliminated.

There is a world of difference between a well regulated militia, a poorly regulated militia, an unregulated militia, and an illegal militia. The Department of Defense has no analysis of the difference.

The principles of a well regulated militia are universal, although unknown to the D.O.D.

1. The basic militia unit must be neighborhood based so that the members are first defending their own families and neighbors. This makes the militia unit naturally conservative and responsible. It would be extremely difficult for a neighborhood based militia unit under proper regulations to sustain illegal activities because everyone in the neighborhood would know what they were doing. It would be too easy for authorities to investigate reports of misbehavior and provide remedial discipline.
2. The members of the basic militia unit elect their own sergeant. This makes the militia unit a bulwork of democracy and assures community support for the unit.
3. The militia sergeants must swear into "the regular uniformed officer corps" -- in municipalities this means the local police station. Sergeants serve, in effect as reserve police officers. They are always subject to the martial laws. No law commands individual militia members to mobilize unless the order comes from a governor or the president. However, the social conditions of the basic militia unit effectively require members to mobilize at the call of their sergeants unless there are exceptional political conditions afoot.

11/17/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/48924

Once mobilized, militia members are under the martial laws.

Our Constitution gives it to the Congress to write the militia code for the nation and leaves it to the states to implement that code. The President becomes commander-in-chief of the militia if he declares a state of emergency.

The Congress never wrote the appropriate militia code. The lack of a national militia code resulted in the militias of the individual states becoming independent only state organs -- which was the necessary precondition if not the ultimate cause of the Civil War.

It would be easy to implement a good Standard Militia Code in Iraq. Provide the form for neighborhoods to form units and elect sergeants. Assign local police officers to the units and ex-military personnel to drill them. This would put an immediate end to the insurgency because it would give the citizenry the mechanism to lawfully root it out and also prevent the only course to power the insurgency depends upon.

If even the weak PLA issued a Standard Militia Code, the Palestinian people would immediately and openly establish neighborhood militia units. These units would put a prompt end to the petty crime in the neighborhoods that is the necessary precursor to the gangs and larger illegal militia organizations. Once the Palestinian neighborhood militias were up and properly regulated, they would quickly put an end to any intimidation by the existing illegal militias such as that of Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. What seems so difficult from a centralized political perspective is essentially simple on the neighborhood level.

The political opposition to well regulated militias is simply motivated. If folks in a neighborhood had a well regulated militia unit, they would use different but similar neighborhood based organization to address other political concerns. The well regulated militia entrenches the principles of freedom, democracy, and good government.

This is evident in urban American. Good neighborhood watches use the natural principles of a well regulated militia. Where the good neighborhood watch exists, the community is safe. Governing urban Democratic Parties actively and systematically oppose those who independently select their neighborhood leadership for any purpose. We have the common phenomenon of Democratic politicians pulling back their opposition to a neighborhood's self-organizing when crime surges and then pouncing back in after the crime is reduced. The meetings are flooded out with public employees, etc., when the crisis is solved. In minority areas where the Democrats' hold is especially strong, gangs can simply take over. Although the American neighborhood watch rarely displays arms, they are present in the background.

The well regulated militia simply formalizes the rights and procedures that are natural and appropriate. The well regulated militia, of course, also instructs and disciplines the use of arms.

The problems with militias around the world are predictable when we look at how the individual principles of the well regulated militia are manifest or absent. In Iraq, even urban militias are tied to family and tribes rather than being neighborhood based. Local unit leaders are appointed not elected. The regular uniformed officer corps plays no role. It would be easy to replace these structures with a well regulated militia structure.

The well regulated militia requires that the regular uniformed officer corps is under local civil authority except for states of emergency.

It should be expected that members of a well regulated militia in their individual capacity as citizens would form civic associations and have political impacts. It would be best for such associations to follow the principles of American non-profit organizations.

It is also proper that militias have communications and joint operational infrastructures by which they can operate if their regular uniformed officers are absent. Those communications and joint operational infrastructures should develop under the law and the supervision of the regular uniformed officer corps. For instance, in case of strife, a police department headquarters could be compromised or officers might need to be sent to particular hotspots. The neighborhood militia should still be able to mobilize and communicate. When regular officers return, their authority should be immediately recognized.

It is common in America for citizens to take action to apprehend a suspect, and for those citizens to immediately follow the orders of police officers when they arrive on the scene. The principles involved are natural.

Under our Constitution, our Congress should enact legislation that gives our citizens the specific right and regulations to form neighborhood militia units, elect sergeants, and be assigned officers. If we had a Standard Militia Code, the neighborhoods across the America would form militia units virtually overnight. Street crime and neighborhood gangs would vanish in a few short weeks. This is not a pipe dream. It is based on practical experience. I served as chair of an ad hoc community neighborhood watch in a high crime minority area in Los Angeles. At one point we dissolved what had become the heaviest drug trafficking intersection in Los Angeles in two weeks without arrests -- then the politicians swept in.

My concern is with applying the natural principles of a well regulated militia without written regulations and formal structures. Although this immediately pacifies neighborhoods, the corruption of these structures looms.

We should take advantage of the crises in this country and abroad to enact the full regulatory structures that would govern appropriately long after the crises are past. Parties will always seek to dominate and exploit any neighborhood structures (let alone militia) for other political purposes. Only by good regulations can militia be properly governed and sustained.

Presently, the D.O.D. position is against any militia because it has no theory of regulation let alone the regulations themselves.

Citizens have the natural right to mobilize for the common defense. It is essential that this be properly regulated. The alternative is untenable.

At the time our Constitution was written the wisdom of the following words of the Second Article of the Bill of Rights was self-evident:

"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Your D.O.D. has analysts who would be willing to work on the development of militia theory and a Standard Militia Code. Would you care for names?

It would be easy to have the assistance in doing this from police departments across America. The people would support, the Congress would pass, and the President would sign such a code.

Sincerely yours,
Ronn S. Pickard

(b)(6)

December 10, 2004

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: E-mail Response to Ronn Pickard

Iraq

Please send the following e-mail response to Ronn Pickard:

Dear Mr. Pickard—

I received your e-mail. I thank you and I will see that it is put in the hands of a number of people.

Thank you so much.

Attach.

11/16/04 Pickard e-mail to SD re: Militia Theory

DHR:dh
120904-48

.....
Please respond by _____

OK

10 Dec 04

FOUO

OSD 08075-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48927

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 4:02 PM
 To: (b)(6)
 Subject: FW: Militia theory

From DR's email

-----Original Message-----

From: Ronn S. Pickard [mailto:fsm@gte.net]
 Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 11:51 PM
 To: Donald Rumsfeld
 Subject: MILITIA THEORY

Don,

The Department of Defense has no militia theory.

Fundamentally, the term "militia" refers to a citizenry voluntarily mobilized for the common defense.

The strategy of terrorism is ultimately simple. A community is criminally attacked. The folks in the community naturally organize to defend themselves. Terrorist allies within the government block the government from passing proper laws to enable the community to defend itself lawfully and openly. Terrorist allies within the community attacked promote the formation of illegal militias and, thus, control the linkage between illegal militia units. The illegal militia units are then run up against each other and the government. Totalitarianism results. A well regulated militia would make such shenanigans impossible.

Things immediately became unglued in Iraq after Allawi stated that there would be "no militia laws". How could the people of Iraq possibly support a government that seeks to disarm and disorganize them in the face of such violence? Without a lawful self-defense how much easier could it be for terrorists to dominated communities?

The Kurdish militia had repelled Saddam Hussein and his agents when they were in power with a minimum of support from the United States. The Allawi government with U.S. support has sought to stand down the Kurdish militia and replace them with government paid police. The result as with the situation in Mosul was predictable. The militia has to be properly regulated not eliminated.

There is a world of difference between a well regulated militia, a poorly regulated militia, an unregulated militia, and an illegal militia. The Department of Defense has no analysis of the difference.

The principles of a well regulated militia are universal, although unknown to the D.O.D.

1. The basic militia unit must be neighborhood based so that the members are first defending their own families and neighbors. This makes the militia unit naturally conservative and responsible. It would be extremely difficult for a neighborhood based militia unit under proper regulations to sustain illegal activities because everyone in the neighborhood would know what they were doing. It would be too easy for authorities to investigate reports of misbehavior and provide remedial discipline.
2. The members of the basic militia unit elect their own sergeant. This makes the militia unit a bulwork of democracy and assures community support for the unit.
3. The militia sergeants must swear into "the regular uniformed officer corps" -- in municipalities this means the local police station. Sergeants serve, in effect as reserve police officers. They are always subject to the martial laws. No law commands individual militia members to mobilize unless the order comes from a governor or the president. However, the social conditions of the basic militia unit effectively require members to mobilize at the call of their sergeants unless there are exceptional political conditions afoot.

11/17/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/48928

Once mobilized, militia members are under the martial laws.

Our Constitution gives it to the Congress to write the militia code for the nation and leaves it to the states to implement that code. The President becomes commander-in-chief of the militia if he declares a state of emergency.

The Congress never wrote the appropriate militia code. The lack of a national militia code resulted in the militias of the individual states becoming independent only state organs -- which was the necessary precondition if not the ultimate cause of the Civil War.

It would be easy to implement a good Standard Militia Code in Iraq. Provide the form for neighborhoods to form units and elect sergeants. Assign local police officers to the units and ex-military personnel to drill them. This would put an immediate end to the insurgency because it would give the citizenry the mechanism to lawfully root it out and also prevent the only course to power the insurgency depends upon.

If even the weak PLA issued a Standard Militia Code, the Palestinian people would immediately and openly establish neighborhood militia units. These units would put a prompt end to the petty crime in the neighborhoods that is the necessary precursor to the gangs and larger illegal militia organizations. Once the Palestinian neighborhood militias were up and properly regulated, they would quickly put an end to any intimidation by the existing illegal militias such as that of Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. What seems so difficult from a centralized political perspective is essentially simple on the neighborhood level.

The political opposition to well regulated militias is simply motivated. If folks in a neighborhood had a well regulated militia unit, they would use different but similar neighborhood based organization to address other political concerns. The well regulated militia entrenches the principles of freedom, democracy, and good government.

This is evident in urban American. Good neighborhood watches use the natural principles of a well regulated militia. Where the good neighborhood watch exists, the community is safe. Governing urban Democratic Parties actively and systematically oppose those who independently select their neighborhood leadership for any purpose. We have the common phenomenon of Democratic politicians pulling back their opposition to a neighborhood's self-organizing when crime surges and then pouncing back in after the crime is reduced. The meetings are flooded out with public employees, etc., when the crisis is solved. In minority areas where the Democrats' hold is especially strong, gangs can simply take over. Although the American neighborhood watch rarely displays arms, they are present in the background.

The well regulated militia simply formalizes the rights and procedures that are natural and appropriate. The well regulated militia, of course, also instructs and disciplines the use of arms.

The problems with militias around the world are predictable when we look at how the individual principles of the well regulated militia are manifest or absent. In Iraq, even urban militias are tied to family and tribes rather than being neighborhood based. Local unit leaders are appointed not elected. The regular uniformed officer corps plays no role. It would be easy to replace these structures with a well regulated militia structure.

The well regulated militia requires that the regular uniformed officer corps is under local civil authority except for states of emergency.

It should be expected that members of a well regulated militia in their individual capacity as citizens would form civic associations and have political impacts. It would be best for such associations to follow the principles of American non-profit organizations.

It is also proper that militias have communications and joint operational infrastructures by which they can operate if their regular uniformed officers are absent. Those communications and joint operational infrastructures should develop under the law and the supervision of the regular uniformed officer corps. For instance, in case of strife, a police department headquarters could be compromised or officers might need to be sent to particular hotspots. The neighborhood militia should still be able to mobilize and communicate. When regular officers return, their authority should be immediately recognized.

It is common in America for citizens to take action to apprehend a suspect, and for those citizens to immediately follow the orders of police officers when they arrive on the scene. The principles involved are natural.

Under our Constitution, our Congress should enact legislation that gives our citizens the specific right and regulations to form neighborhood militia units, elect sergeants, and be assigned officers. If we had a Standard Militia Code, the neighborhoods across the America would form militia units virtually overnight. Street crime and neighborhood gangs would vanish in a few short weeks. This is not a pipe dream. It is based on practical experience. I served as chair of an ad hoc community neighborhood watch in a high crime minority area in Los Angeles. At one point we dissolved what had become the heaviest drug trafficking intersection in Los Angeles in two weeks without arrests -- then the politicians swept in.

My concern is with applying the natural principles of a well regulated militia without written regulations and formal structures. Although this immediately pacifies neighborhoods, the corruption of these structures looms.

We should take advantage of the crises in this country and abroad to enact the full regulatory structures that would govern appropriately long after the crises are past. Parties will always seek to dominate and exploit any neighborhood structures (let alone militia) for other political purposes. Only by good regulations can militia be properly governed and sustained.

Presently, the D.O.D. position is against any militia because it has no theory of regulation let alone the regulations themselves.

Citizens have the natural right to mobilize for the common defense. It is essential that this be properly regulated. The alternative is untenable.

At the time our Constitution was written the wisdom of the following words of the Second Article of the Bill of Rights was self-evident:

"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Your D.O.D. has analysts who would be willing to work on the development of militia theory and a Standard Militia Code. Would you care for names?

It would be easy to have the assistance in doing this from police departments across America. The people would support, the Congress would pass, and the President would sign such a code.

Sincerely yours,
Ronn S. Pickard

(b)(6)

December 9, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita

CC: COL Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Future Travel

In terms of travel, I think when I go over to Asia, I ought to go to Thailand, Malaysia, probably Indonesia, Cambodia and Mongolia.

Let's talk about that trip.

Thanks.

DHR:dlh
120904-43

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08076-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48931

333 SD

9 Dec 04

December 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita
VADM Jim Stavridis

CC: COL Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Plans for DoD

Attached is a memo we ought to start thinking about fast.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/9/04 SecDef memo re: Plans for DoD - 2005

DHR:dh
120904-39

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

020 100

9 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

December 9, 2004

SUBJECT: Plans for DoD – 2005

We need to set our plans for DoD for the coming year:

- Outreach – Get a schedule that is more creative. For DR plus other DoD folks.
- Members of Congress – Get a schedule and master plan for DR, plus others.
- Ministers of Defense – schedule regular calls to key MoDs and key coalition partners.
- Travel – Lay out 2005 now. Must be creative – domestic and international.
- Press plan – do's and don'ts, off the record sessions, social, ways to help key press people who cover us thoughtfully and carefully (Mikelczewski, Raddatz, key folks from *Defense News*), contact with some of the key press people from DoS and WH, etc.
- Consider a new rhythm for staff meetings.
- Set plans to keep Service Secretaries in tight.
- Plan creative events by DoD for those who help – USO, entertainers, heroes, etc.


DHR:dh
120904-31

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48933

December 3, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letter to POTUS

Please draft a letter from me to the President, telling him how much Diane
Bodman is doing for the troops.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120304-22

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

201.22

3 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08078-05

724
~~FOUO~~

December 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: National Security Personnel System

Whenever we talk about transformation, we ought to mention the National Security Personnel System.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120304-12

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08079-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48935

230

3 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

December 3, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thank You Note for Bill Timmons

If we have not prepared a thank you to Bill Timmons for his heads up on the calling cards for the military, please draft one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120304-10

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

311.3

3 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08080-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48936

~~FOUO~~

file

December 3, 2004

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

9

SUBJECT: Note to Chefs

Someone ought to draft a nice note from me to the chefs of each of the restaurants listed on the attached invitation, thanking them for helping out the troops.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/13/04 Invitation to USO Holiday for the Troops Dinner

DHR:ss
120304-7

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

12/15 OK 12/16

TO SecDef
From Paul Butler

These have been Dave

335 SD

3 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08082-05

We would like to cordially invite you and a guest to join the service members from Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda for the

"HOLIDAY FOR THE TROOPS" DINNER

Chefs from:

Ceiba
Citronelle
Equinox
Fat Punk's
Kinkead's

Marcel's
Melrose
Poste Brasserie
Rocklands BBQ
Tosca

Will be cooking a very special dinner on
MONDAY DECEMBER 13TH
6:00-9:00 PM

Mologne House Dining Room
Walter Reed Army Medical Center

Please RSVP to Lisa Marie at 703-696-0717



of Metropolitan Washington



Fax

To: Honorable Donald Rumsfeld and guest

Fax Number: (b)(6)

From: Elaine Rogers President, USO & Metropolitan Washington


Number of Pages including Cover Page: 2

Message: We are pleased to invite you to celebrate the holiday season with our wounded service members. Please RSVP no later than December 8, 2004. Thank you!

HAPPY HOLIDAYS

11-L-0559/OSD/48939

December 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards for Military

Attached is a note from my friend, Bill Timmons, raising a matter of importance and concern on telephone credit cards for the military. It is self-explanatory.

The solution lies totally outside the Department of Defense, as I read it. I would very much appreciate your interest in this.

Thank you, sir.

Attach.
12/1/04 Memo to SecDef from Bill Timmons

DHR:ss
120304-3

311.3

3 Dec 04

1 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08084-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48940

VIA FAX

Memorandum for the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: Bill Timmons *Bill*

Date: 1 December 2004

Subject: Prepaid Telephone Calling Cards for Military

Request your personal assistance on an issue of importance to our servicemen and women and their families. In the next few weeks the FCC intends to issue an order concerning prepaid calling cards that threatens to increase rates on the military and other users of this low-cost telephone service by as much as 20%.

Ten years ago calling card service that contained promotional advertisements (called enhanced cards) was placed in service. Telephone calls using these enhanced cards are informational and outside regulated service and therefore not subject to intrastate access or universal service fees. After all these years the FCC intends to make these cards fall in a revenue category that will cause troops and other card users to contribute more so others may contribute less.

Consistent with the goals of universal service, the cards today provide low-cost calling for those who need it most - military, senior, rural, minority, and low-income users. The USO provides free pre-paid cards to service personnel as part of "Operation Phone Home program." Wal-Mart, Sam's Club, drug stores, military exchanges, and other retail outlets sell the inexpensive calling cards. Members of Congress have communicated with FCC Chairman Powell not to take money out of soldiers' pockets while they defend our country. In fact, in the closing days of this Congress through report language for the final budget legislation Congress directed the FCC "not to take any action that would directly or indirectly have the effect of raising the rates charged to military personnel or their families for telephone calls placed using prepaid phone cards." On 23 July of this year the Pentagon weighed in when Charles Abell wrote the FCC pointing out the increased costs to service personnel and families if this order were implemented. The FCC chairman put off official action until after the election but now intends to go forward.

Don, about the only avenue open seems to be White House involvement to protect the low-cost prepaid calling cards for the military. May I suggest you call Andy Card and ask him to help?

Thanks a bunch.

OSD 08084-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48941

311.3

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fundraising

005

Please call Lynda Webster and tell her I cannot write a letter like this, according to the General Counsel.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/15/04 Webster fax re: Request from Ambassador Michael Thawley

DHR:dh
120104-4

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

1 Dec 04

Pentagon Memorial Fund

Fax

To: Sec. and Joyce Rumsfeld From: Lynda Webster

Fax: (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)

Phone: (b)(6)

Phone: (b)(6)

Date: 11/15/2004

Pages: 2

Subject: Request from Ambassador Michael Thawley

Hello~!

I received a call from Ambassador Michael Thawley of Australia. As you may recall, he was seated at your table, Secretary Rumsfeld, the day we held the Pentagon Memorial 'friendraiser' a few weeks ago. He was seated there because we have been talking with him at length about an Australian gift to the Memorial. Australia lost a citizen in the attack.

In order to secure the largest commitment possible, the ambassador is confident a letter from you to their Minister of Defense would be helpful. He took the liberty of drafting one he thought would be effective; it's attached for your review and consideration. Naturally it can certainly be re-worded to satisfy your legal team.

I told Ambassador Thawley that while you have both been extremely supportive of our Memorial effort, you are being very careful not to engage in anything that might be perceived as "fundraising." Whether or not this proposed letter falls into that category will be something I'll leave for you to determine.

Should you or an aide wish to contact Ambassador Thawley directly, his number is (b)(6) his fax is (b)(6). Or, you may simply give me direction on how to respond to his request.

We have just passed the \$4.5 million mark today...! We continue to be grateful to you both for your continued interest and support.

Warmly, Lynda

11-L-0559/OSD/48943

FROM :

FAX NO. (b)(6)

Nov. 29 2003 07:08PM P2

11/15/2004 17:59

(b)(6)

AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE

PAGE 01/01

(b)(6)

DRAFT

→ Lynda Webster

Senator ~~the~~ Hon. Robert Hill
Minister ~~for~~ Defence
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Minister

The profound loss of September 11, 2001 has moved a great many people to support the building of a permanent memorial at the site of the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. All those affected by the attack hope for a fitting place to remember the events of that day.

We remember that Australia grieved with us then. An Australian, Yvonne E. Kennedy, was aboard the flight that hit the Pentagon. And we will always be grateful for the fellowship expressed by your Prime Minister, John Howard, during his visit to Washington at the time of the attacks— and for Australia's support in the war on terror.

A Pentagon Memorial Fund has been established by a group of leading private citizens and corporations which aim to raise \$17.5 million to build and maintain the memorial.

The Fund would like to include Australia in its endeavour and has invited Australia to participate in the building of the memorial. I would like to endorse their approach to you and encourage you to contribute. I understand that the Fund has had some discussion with your Ambassador about an appropriate contribution.

I enclose some additional information about the memorial and the fund. We would be privileged to have one of our principal allies involved in an enduring memorial to an event so close to our hearts.

Lynda Webster
→ Could send
information under separate cover.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/48944

December 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Admiral Ellis

Let's put Admiral Ellis on the Defense Science Board.

Thanks,

DHR:dh
120104-6

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

334 DSB

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet with Commandant, Marine Corps

I would like a meeting with General Hagee sometime to talk to him about transformation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-7

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

000.71 ST

1 Dec 04

720
~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet with Service Secretaries

I need to see the three Service Secretaries and David Chu to talk to them about precepts for selection boards and the importance of diversity and innovation.

Thanks,

DHR:dh
120104-8

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

006-71 SD

1 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48947

OSD 08105-05

720
~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Projects

I would like to see a list of the projects you're working on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-12

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

020 DSD

1 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~


11-L-0559/OSD/48948

OSD 08107-05

~~FOUO~~

Adm. comment

December 1, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Meeting w/VP

The President suggested that I have a meeting with Vice President Cheney.

Please see if you can work with Cheney's office and get it set up for shortly after I get back from India - the first day or the next day.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-14

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

0001151

~~FOUO~~

1 Dec 04

11-L-0559/OSD/48949

OSD 08108-05

December 1, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
cc: Larry Di Rita
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Early Report of Abuse

What is this *Early Bird* article about from the *Washington Post*? I have never heard of it.

Thanks.

Attach.

White, Josh. "U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds," *Washington Post*, December 1, 2004, p. 1.

DHR:dh
120104-16

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

38346

1 Dec 04

Washington Post
December 1, 2004
Pg. 1

U.S. Generals In Iraq Were Told Of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds

By Josh White, Washington Post Staff Writer

A confidential report to Army generals in Iraq in December 2003 warned that members of an elite military and CIA task force were abusing detainees, a finding delivered more than a month before Army investigators received the photographs from Abu Ghraib prison that touched off investigations into prisoner mistreatment.

The report, which was not released publicly and was recently obtained by The Washington Post, concluded that some U.S. arrest and detention practices at the time could "technically" be illegal. It also said coalition fighters could be feeding the Iraqi insurgency by "making gratuitous enemies" as they conducted sweeps netting hundreds of detainees who probably did not belong in prison and holding them for months at a time.

The investigation, by retired Col. Stuart A. Herrington, also found that members of Task Force 121 -- a joint Special Operations and CIA mission searching for weapons of mass destruction and high-value targets including Saddam Hussein -- had been abusing detainees throughout Iraq and had been using a secret interrogation facility to hide their activities.

Herrington's findings are the latest in a series of confidential reports to come to light about detainee abuse in Iraq. Until now, U.S. military officials have characterized the problem as one largely confined to the military prison at Abu Ghraib -- a situation they first learned about in January 2004. But Herrington's report shows that U.S. military leaders in Iraq were told of such allegations even before then, and that problems were not restricted to Abu Ghraib. Herrington, a veteran of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam, warned that such harsh tactics could imperil U.S. efforts to quell the Iraqi insurgency -- a prediction echoed months later by a military report and other reviews of the war effort.

U.S. treatment of detainees remains under challenge. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross recently told U.S. military officials that the treatment of inmates held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was "cruel, inhumane and degrading" (story, Page A10). Herrington's report, which was commissioned by Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, the top intelligence officer in Iraq, said some detainees dropped off at central U.S. detention facilities other than Abu Ghraib had clearly been beaten by their captors.

"Detainees captured by TF 121 have shown injuries that caused examining medical personnel to note that 'detainee shows signs of having been beaten,'" according to the report, which later concluded: "It seems clear that TF 121 needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of detainees."

A group of Navy SEALs who worked as part of the task force has been charged with abuse in connection with the deaths of two detainees they arrested in the field. One died in a shower room at Abu Ghraib on Nov. 4, 2003, a month before Herrington arrived for his review.

A military source who participated in Task Force 20, the predecessor to TF 121, said the task forces comprised several 12-man units that had targeted missions, such as searching for Hussein loyalists and

terrorists. TF 20, which had about 1,000 soldiers, incorporated Army Rangers, members of Delta Force and Special Forces units working with CIA agents. They planned their missions nearly autonomously and answered either directly to the theater commander or to officials in Washington, the source said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the missions were classified.

Task Force 121 added Navy SEAL units but was slightly smaller overall. Herrington wrote that an officer in charge of interrogations at a high-value target detention facility in Baghdad told him that prisoners taken by TF 121 showed signs of having been beaten.

Herrington asked the officer whether he had alerted his superiors to the problem, and the officer replied: "Everyone knows about it."

While several investigations have been completed into the Abu Ghraib scandal and U.S. interrogation practices in Iraq, an official military inquiry into the detention activities of Special Operations forces has not been released. That probe, headed by Brig. Gen. Richard P. Formica, was expected to be presented to Congress earlier this year, but a Pentagon spokesman said it is ongoing.

Of the Herrington report, a Pentagon official said top generals in Iraq, including Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, who at the time directed U.S. forces there, reported the alleged abuses to officials at U.S. Central Command, which oversees military activities in the Middle East. The official said TF 121 was investigated, but he could not provide results.

"The Herrington report was taken very seriously," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the report has not been released.

The report also provided an early account of the practice of holding some detainees -- sometimes called "ghost detainees" -- in secret and keeping them from international humanitarian organizations. Herrington also wrote that agents from other government agencies, which commonly refers to the CIA, regularly kept ghost detainees by not logging their arrests.

Nearly six months later, Defense Department officials were forced to acknowledge the practice because of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Soldiers who worked at the prison said several detainees were hidden, and a prison logbook showed a consistent stream of them from October 2003 to January 2004.

Herrington, who is considered an expert in human intelligence operations, ran programs during Operation Desert Storm and in Panama and was part of the controversial Phoenix Program, which targeted the roots of the Viet Cong insurgency in Vietnam. He compiled his report after a week-long trip to Iraq beginning Dec. 2, 2003, joined by a military intelligence officer and an Army intelligence official from the Pentagon.

His ultimate conclusion was that much needed to be done to increase intelligence capabilities, which he called below average, though he praised Fast's determination.

"Given the fact that the United States and its coalition partners paid and continue to pay a steep price in losses and national treasure to lay our hands on these detainees, it is disappointing that the opportunity to thoroughly and professionally exploit this source pool has not been maximized, in spite of your best efforts and those of several hundred MI [military intelligence] soldiers," Herrington wrote to Fast in the Dec. 12 report. "Even one year ago, we would have salivated at the prospect of being able to talk to people like the hundreds who are now in our custody. Now that we have them, we have failed to devote the planning and resources to optimize this mission."

Herrington, contacted by telephone, declined to discuss the report. A Pentagon official said Fast personally requested Herrington's visit, and the report indicates Fast was interested in improving U.S. intelligence and detention operations, saying that "in spite of efforts to upgrade this effort, [she] remained concerned about its state of health."

In the 13-page report, Herrington wrote that overcrowding and a lack of resources caused the Army to use "primitive prison accommodations" for even the most important targets. He said that led to the loss of considerable significant intelligence and might have fueled the Iraqi insurgency.

He added that some detainees were arrested because targets were not at home when homes were raided. A family member was instead captured and then released when the target turned himself in -- a practice that, Herrington wrote, "has a 'hostage' feel to it."

A separate report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, issued this past May and intended for internal use, gave the sense that some Army tactics served to "alienate common Iraqis who initially supported the coalition."

The 134-page CALL report singled out the practice of detaining female family members to force wanted Iraqi males to turn themselves in, similar to Herrington's findings.

"It is a practice in some U.S. units to detain family members of anti-coalition suspects in an effort to induce the suspects to turn themselves in, in exchange for the release of their family members," the report stated. The CALL report also was critical of the delays in notifying family members about the status of detainees held in U.S. custody, reminding family members of Hussein's tactics.

Herrington's report also noted that sweeps pulled in hundreds and even thousands of detainees who had no connection to the war. Abu Ghraib, for example, swelled to several thousand more detainees than it could handle. Herrington wrote that aggressive and indiscriminate tactics by the 4th Infantry Division, rounding up random scores of detainees and "dumping them at the door," was a glaring example.

As the United States recently has picked up its counterinsurgency efforts, the number of new detainees has again surged.

"Between the losers and dead end elements from the former regime and foreign fighters, there are enough people in Iraq who already don't like us," Herrington wrote. "Adding to these numbers by conducting sweep operations . . . is counterproductive to the Coalition's efforts to win the cooperation of the Iraqi citizenry. Similarly, mistreatment of captives as has been reported to me and our team is unacceptable, and bound to be known by the population."

Staff writer Thomas E. Ricks contributed to this report.

December 1, 2004

TO: Tina Jonas
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GAO Report

What is this item about in today's *Early Bird* referencing a GAO report that says DoD is not providing proper oversight to ensure that military personnel appropriations are directed to cover pay, benefits and expenses?

Thanks.

Attach.

McGlinchey, David. "Defense Department Not Tracking Personnel Spending, Report Says," *GovExec.com*, November 30, 2004.

DHR:dh
120104-17

.....
Please respond by 12/4/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48954

OSD 08110-05

120-1

1 Dec 04

GovExec.com
November 30, 2004

Defense Department Not Tracking Personnel Spending, Report Says

By David McGlinchey

The Defense Department is not providing sufficient oversight to ensure that military personnel appropriations actually are directed to cover pay, benefits and expenses, according to a new Government Accountability Office report.

As a result of the report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has ordered a study on the cost and time needed to modify the relevant financial systems to comply with regulations.

GAO released similar findings to lawmakers in 2003, and the fiscal 2004 conference report on defense appropriations called on the Pentagon to "strengthen the annual review process" and "provide transparency of disbursements at the same level as the budget submission."

In the report released this week, however, GAO announced that the Pentagon is not following congressional direction on oversight.

"The military services are not matching obligations to disbursements at the individual disbursement transaction level in all the years that disbursements can occur as required by the Financial Management Regulation," the report (GAO-05-87R) said. "Additionally, the services are not reporting the obligation balances at the budget submission level as directed by congressional conferees."

In their report, GAO noted that military personnel appropriations, also known as MILPERS, make up a significant amount of the Defense Department's budget. In fiscal 2003, MILPERS accounted for more than \$109 billion. That figure also includes allowances, housing, travel and reserve training. GAO investigators said the insufficient budget review is stopping lawmakers from making informed decisions on funding.

"This has made it difficult, if not impossible, for decision-makers to oversee how the services actually use MILPERS funds," the GAO report said.

The investigator took the Office of the Secretary of Defense to task for failing to implement the reforms from the top.

"OSD has not provided the services with explicit instructions in the Financial Management Regulation requiring them to review MILPERS obligations," the report said. "Moreover, OSD has not effectively monitored the services' compliance with the Financial Management Regulation's requirement to review obligation balances. Unless the services strengthen their year-end reviews and certification processes, the actual use of MILPERS funds will continue to be masked, and the baseline for future budget requests may be inaccurate."

GAO did note that the Army has made some progress in developing prior year financial reports with great detail. In a Nov. 23 directive, top Defense officials ordered the Air Force, Navy and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to complete a feasibility study on recording and reporting detailed

disbursements for prior years' spending. That study is scheduled to be completed by Jan. 31, 2005.

72
~~FOUO~~

file

December 14, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
cc: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Breakfast with POTUS

I think the President wants to have breakfast in the residence on Thursday morning at 7:00 am with Casey, Abizaid and probably Myers or Pace (but not both) and me. Let's confirm that with the White House.

Thanks.

DIR:ss
121404-22

.....
Please respond by _____

Sir,

OK 12/14

It is confirmed and on the schedule:

Thursday 16 December 7:00am-8:00 w/POTUS, SecDef, Abizaid, Casey, VCJCS, VP, Card, Rice @ Small Dining Room next to Oval Office.

Cathy.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48957

OSD 08112-05

337 WH

14 Dec 04

720
FOUO

December 14, 2004

TO:

(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Cabinet Acknowledgements

I need to know who I have called and who I have written to in connection with
Cabinet people coming and going.

Please give me a list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-20

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

230,02

14 Dec 04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/48958

OSD 08113-05

7200
~~1000~~

file

December 14, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Tony Dolan

*He is on tomorrow's
schedule for 8:40am.*

I would like to see Tony Dolan for about 10 or 15 minutes sometime this week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-16

.....
Please respond by _____

000.71 SD


~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48959

OSD 08114-05

14 Dec 04

December 14, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Travel Schedules

I would like to see the travel schedules between now and March 1 for General Myers, General Pace, Paul Wolfowitz, Jim Haynes, Steve Cambone, and Larry Di Rita.

Thanks.


DHR:dh
121404-15

.....
Please *respond* by 12/16/04

333

14 Dec 04

December 14, 2004

TO: Calendar
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Location of Events

In the future, it would be helpful if it is listed on the calendar where in the White House a meeting is going to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-14

Please respond by

357 WH

14 Dec 04

December 14, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Debrief Doug Feith

Please debrief Doug Feith on the NSC meeting and make sure he comes up with a list we can use with the NSC of possible things we can do with respect to Syria.

Thanks.

DHR:as
121404-13

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

334 NSC

14 Dec 04

December 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Wehrkunde Conference

I've forgotten the name of the guy who runs the Wehrkunde Security Conference in Munich. But given the lawsuit that has been filed against so many people in Germany, I think he ought to be aware that there may be a reluctance to attend Wehrkunde on the part of people who are subject to those frivolous lawsuits.

Thanks,

Attach.

12/14/04 Washington Times Article

DHR:SS
121404-S

Please respond by

12/22/04

MR. SECRETARY:

- I CALLED MR. HORST TELTSCHIK TODAY
AND PASSED ON THAT THE LAWSUIT IS
PROBLEMATIC AND THERE MAY BE A RELUCTANCE
TO ATTEND ON THE PART OF THOSE NAMED, BUT
NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE.

NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE.
- TELTCHIK SAID HE APPRECIATED THE CALL,
UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS, AND WOULD LET US
KNOW IF HE LEARNED ANYTHING RELATED TO
THE LAWSUIT. HE ~~ADDED~~ ^{TOOK} IT WOULD BE A PITY
IF YOU DID NOT ATTEND.

15-12-04 A10:56 IN

OSD 08118-05

✓R Mira

[illegible]

0763

14 Dec 04

Washington Post
December 14, 2004
Pg. 2

1. Corrections

Two Dec. 13 articles incorrectly identified Gen. Paul J. Kern as the commander of the Army Materiel Command. Kern relinquished that post in November.

Editor's Note: The articles referred to appeared in the Current *News Early Bird*, December 13, 2004.

Washington Times
December 14, 2004
Pg. 1

2. 'Frivolous Lawsuit' Irks Pentagon

Leftists target Rumsfeld
By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

The Pentagon expressed concern yesterday about a "frivolous" complaint filed against Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld by a leftist group that is using a new German law that claims the right to investigate war crimes anywhere in the world.

The reaction was in response to a Nov. 30 lawsuit filed in Berlin by the Center for Constitutional Rights, whose founders include liberal activist William Kunstler.

The New York-based center filed the German complaint against Mr. Rumsfeld and other U.S. officials on behalf of four Iraqis who, the complaint says, were abused by U.S. guards at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

"Generally speaking, these cases are of concern, these frivolous lawsuits filed by activist groups on behalf of people making very unsubstantiated charges and probably not able to be substantiated charge," Larry Di Rita, chief Pentagon spokesman, said in an interview yesterday. "These kind of frivolous lawsuits are troubling."

Mr. Di Rita said the Pentagon has raised the issue with the State Department.

Tell Weekly
"State is engaged in this," he said. "Obviously, it's something that we're focused on and very concerned with and are going to pursue with purpose to make sure this does not become part of a pattern."

German-U.S. relations have been strained over the Iraq war, which the Berlin government adamantly opposed.

The Pentagon's concerns resemble a dispute last year between Mr. Rumsfeld and another NATO country, Belgium. Mr. Rumsfeld traveled to Brussels for a NATO meeting and used the visit to bluntly chastise Belgium for a law that has made the nation a favored venue for accusations of war crimes against American leaders.

Lawyers cited Belgium's law to file a number of lawsuits, including one against retired Gen. Tommy Franks, who commanded the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 to oust Saddam Hussein. Previously, a complaint was filed against former President George Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf.

Activists also filed cases against former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro.

Mr. Rumsfeld said the law could force U.S. officials to shut NATO headquarters in Brussels. He also threatened to block funding for a new NATO building.

"We will have to seriously consider whether we can allow our civilian and military officials to come to Belgium," Mr. Rumsfeld said at a news conference last year.

As the lawsuits and complaints piled up, Belgium gutted the law.

Republicans in Washington take a dim view of U.S. service members being subjected to international courts, fearing that anti-U.S. groups will use such courts as a

vehicle to carry out a vendetta against American forces throughout the world.

On a global scale, President Bush has refused to submit a treaty to the Senate that would make Washington a party to a new International Criminal Court.

There are parallels to the situation in Germany, where the United States stations about 70,000 troops. In 2002, Germany enacted the Code of Crimes Against International Law. It grants German courts "universal jurisdiction" or the power to hear war-crimes complaints regardless of where the war crimes are supposed to have taken place.

This law is the basis for the Center for Constitutional Rights' picking Germany to file its complaint against Mr. Rumsfeld. Also named in the complaint are former CIA Director George J. Tenet; Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence; Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the former top commander in Iraq when abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred; and Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, who ran the prison.

Under the German code, the country's general prosecutor, who is akin to the U.S. attorney general, now must decide whether the case has merit and should be forwarded to the courts for a criminal investigation.

Asked to respond to Pentagon complaints, a spokeswoman at the German Embassy said, "German courts are independent of the government and this is an important part of a democratic system."

"Secondly, the international code of crimes deals with crimes against humanity and crimes punishable following international conventions," she said on the condition of anonymity.

The spokeswoman also said that after the law took effect in 2002, a "handful" of complaints were filed and the

general prosecutor rejected them all.

Center for Constitutional Rights President Michael Ramer personally filed the Rumsfeld complaint in Berlin.

"From Donald Rumsfeld on down, the political and military leaders in charge of Iraq policy must be investigated and held accountable," Mr. Ramer said. "It is shameful that the United States of America, a nation that purports to set moral and legal standards for the world, refuses to seriously investigate the role of those at the top of the chain of command in these horrible crimes."

The Pentagon has started a number of administrative and criminal investigations that have resulted in criminal charges against personnel who abused Iraqi detainees.

The center's mission statement reads, "CCR uses litigation proactively to advance the law in a positive direction, to empower poor communities and communities of color, to guarantee the rights of those with the fewest protections and least access to legal resources, to train the next generation of constitutional and human rights attorneys, and to strengthen the broader movement for constitutional and human rights."

Wall Street Journal
December 14, 2004

Pg. 4

3 Pentagon To Seek \$80 Billion More

Request to Help Finance Iraq, Afghanistan Presence Is Bigger Than Expected

By Greg Jaffe and Jackie Calmes, Staff Reporters Of The Wall Street Journal
WASHINGTON

Pentagon officials said they will ask the Bush administration for an additional \$80 billion in emergency funding to help pay costs of the military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, slightly higher than the \$70 billion to \$75

FOUO

DEC 14 2004

TO: Pete Geren
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brits and Detainees

385.6

Colin Powell tells me the Brits are going to come back and try to get four more detainees. We better be ready.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121304-38

.....
Please respond by _____

14 Dec 04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/48965

OSD 08119-05

DEC 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Article by Douglas MacKinnon

Here's an interesting article by Douglas MacKinnon. You might want to thank him.

Thanks.

Atach.
12/11/04 New York Post article by Douglas MacKinnon

DHR:ss
121304-34

.....
Please respond by _____

000.7

14 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48966

OSD 08120-05

insurgency.

On the other hand, the United Iraqi Alliance, a coalition of mostly Shiite parties organized under the auspices of Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, is expected to win a large majority in the 275-seat assembly, enabling it to write up Iraq's constitution. A Shiite domination of Iraqi politics will further polarize the ethnic divide already aggravated by the war and push the door wide open toward a civil war.

Although Shiite and Sunni affiliations have been an integral part of Iraq's history, two U.S.-led wars and occupation have galvanized these far-from-homogenous communities into tribe-like ethnicities with hardening sectarian loyalties. During the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, Iraqi Shiites were seen as great patriots who fought bravely against the (Shiite) Iranian Army. With the exception of the 1990 uprising incited by the Americans and the Iranians, contrary to conventional wisdom, Iraqi Shiites were no more oppressed than the Sunnis whom Saddam considered more threatening to his regime.

Today, the Bush administration is peddling the ethnic factor as a precondition for Iraq's (numeric) democracy. It argues that since the Shiites make up a majority 60 percent of the population, their vote will guarantee the legitimacy of the elections and pave the way toward democracy, with Sistani's indispensable encouragement. Wrong.

Referred to as a "moderate" for not advocating resistance against the American occupation, the fundamentalist cleric is also seen as a "democrat" for being adamant on holding elections when parts of the country burn. Beyond that, little is known about how he thinks or what he is planning.

What is certain, however, is that the ayatollah is a spiritual leader with no

political experience or interest, whose only connection to the rest of Iraq, indeed the world, is a network of politically minded functionaries and clerics with sectarian agendas and ambiguous liaisons within and outside Iraq. They feed him information and implement his general directives as they see fit. Today, they are dividing the assembly seats among their close allies in the Shiite parties. That is hardly a cause for optimism.

In fact, members of Sistani's entourage are thought to be concealing their true intentions in accordance with the Shiite religious code of Taqiyyah, or concealment in the face of danger, which was adopted through centuries of discrimination against them as a small minority within the Muslim world. Sistani's men are exploiting America's need for elections (when all other justifications for the war have been discredited), to prepare for Iranian-style clerical control over a predominantly secular Iraq. In recent days, Arab leaders, including Yasser, have warned against blatant Iranian interference in Iraq and a "dramatic geopolitical shift" in the region resulting from the elections.

Why then does Washington insist on a policy that strengthens the fundamentalists and inflames ethnic strife, instead of empowering secular or Arab majorities in a federal democratic Iraq? Simply put, the Bush administration is trapped between two alternatives and no real choice.

If it alienates Shiite leaders, they would organize their own insurgency parallel to the one in the Sunni Triangle, leading to an immediate Vietnamization of Iraq's war. Otherwise, it must appease them and risk the consequences of their takeover. The latter scenario will probably not last long as the conflict escalates into an open ethnic war inflamed by

extremists on both sides.

In light of an aggravating strategic impasse, the Bush administration is opting for appeasement in the imperial tradition: Divide and rule. Better split the Iraqis through elections than having them unite through resistance to the occupation.

Such a shortsighted and morally bankrupt policy will backfire with cataclysmic domestic and regional consequences. Only in the context of a healing process of national reconciliation, reconstruction and the promise of full American withdrawal do elections play a pluralistic rather than a divisive role. Otherwise, Iraq would have suffered a costly war only to replace an oppressive regime with fundamentalist sectarian rule.

Marwan Bishara is a visiting lecturer at the American University of Paris and the author of "Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid."

New York Post
December 11, 2004

42. Press Pile-On

By Douglas MacKinnon

WITH each passing day, the role of the media in Iraq becomes more confusing and much more controversial.

The latest example: the "question" asked of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during his "town hall" meeting this week with U.S. soldiers in Kuwait.

One soldier asked, "Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal ... to up-armor our vehicles, and why don't we have those resources readily available to us?"

That question and the video of that question led almost every newscast or front page in this country. What does the question have to do with the media and its ever growing controversial role in Iraq? A reporter for the Chattanooga Times Free Press fed the

question to the soldier so he could set up Donald Rumsfeld.

While there is no doubt our soldiers need more armor and protection, the question remains: Is it right or ethical for a member of the media to spoon-feed a question to a soldier and manufacture a news story that he and others would then cover?


Which begs a larger question: At what point does irresponsible and sensationalist reporting become dangerous, or even acts of betrayal? All involved in prosecuting and covering this war need to ask themselves that.

Political correctness dictates that we do not speak about this, but I have yet to talk with a member of our military who does not strongly believe that the Abu Ghraib prison scandal wasn't blown out of all proportion. Worse, they feel that the ensuing media feeding frenzy had a direct result in fueling the insurgents attacking our troops and innocent civilians in Iraq.

Do they feel the mistreatment of the Iraqi and insurgent prisoners was wrong and disgusting? To a person. Do they think some in the media have used the inappropriate behavior of seven ignorant soldiers to tar and feather the other 140,000 on the ground? To a person. Just as they feel that many in the press are purposely twisting the definition of "torture" to play "gotcha" journalism with a military they not so secretly look down upon.

As recently as this week, in a lead editorial, The Washington Post referred to the Abu Ghraib situation as "torture" and "extreme." If the Post thinks that the reprehensible, but juvenile humiliation we saw in the Abu Ghraib photos rises to the level of "torture," then I would ask them to define what innocent Iraqi police endured before being shot in the head, or the brutal beatings endured by U.S. military POWs during the first Gulf War.

December 14, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Ballot for Marty Hoffmann

Please **put** this ballot with the materials for Marty Hoffmann that we are going to give him.

Thanks.

Attach.
Ballot


DHR:dh
121404-25

.....
Please respond by _____

014.35

14 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Jim O'Beirne
COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Tony Principi

I ought to try to have lunch with Tony Principi sometime to talk about the VA-DoD relationship.

Jim O'Beirne, please get me a copy of his background sheet.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-12

.....
Please respond by

1/13/05

000,115D

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: MoD Letter

I should get a letter off to the new Minister of Defense of Afghanistan, if in fact it has been decided.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-10.....
Please respond by12/22/04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/48970

OSD 08123-05

Afghanistan

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Kurt Schilling

I saw Kurt Schilling last night, and he volunteered to help and do anything. I talked to him a bit about the possibility of going to Walter Reed or Bethesda. He said he has just had an operation on a leg, so he is not able to do much right now, but at some point in the future.

He also said he would be willing to go overseas, if that would be helpful.

Why don't we check in two months and see how his health is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-8

.....
Please respond by

2/10/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48971

OSD 08124-05

335

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

311.3

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards

Please look into this memo I sent Andy Card.

Thanks.

Attach
12/3/04 SD memo to Card

DHR:dh
121504-6

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

15 Dec 04


~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48972

OSD 08125-05

FOUO

December 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards for Military

Attached is a note from my friend, Bill Timmons, raising a matter of importance and concern on telephone credit cards for the military. It is self-explanatory.

The solution lies totally outside the Department of Defense, as I read it. I would very much appreciate your interest in this.

Thank you, sir.

Attach.
12/1/04 Memo to SecDef from Bill Timmons

DHR:ss
120304-3



FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/48973

OK 12/3

VIA FAX

Memorandum for the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: Bill Timmons *Bill*

Date: 1 December 2004

Subject: Prepaid Telephone Calling Cards for Military

Request your personal assistance on an issue of importance to our servicemen and women and their families. In the next few weeks the FCC intends to issue an order concerning prepaid calling cards that threatens to increase rates on the military and other users of this low-cost telephone service by as much as 20%.

Ten years ago calling card service that contained promotional advertisements (called enhanced cards) was placed in service. Telephone calls using these enhanced cards are informational and outside regulated service and therefore not subject to intrastate access or universal service fees. After all these years the FCC intends to make these cards fall in a revenue category that will cause troops and other card users to contribute more so others may contribute less.

Consistent with the goals of universal service, the cards today provide low-cost calling for those who need it most - military, senior, rural, minority, and low-income users. The USO provides free pre-paid cards to service personnel as part of "Operation Phone Home program." Wal-Mart, Sam's Club, drug stores, military exchanges, and other retail outlets sell the inexpensive calling cards. Members of Congress have communicated with FCC Chairman Powell not to take money out of soldiers' pockets while they defend our country. In fact, in the closing days of this Congress through report language for the final budget legislation Congress directed the FCC 'not to take any action that would directly or indirectly have the effect of raising the rates charged to military personnel or their families for telephone calls placed using prepaid phone cards.' On 23 July of this year the Pentagon weighed in when Charles Abell wrote the FCC pointing out the increased costs to service personnel and families if this order were implemented. The FCC chairman put off official action until after the election but now intends to go forward.

Dan, about the only avenue open seems to be White House involvement to protect the low-cost prepaid calling cards for the military. May I suggest you call Andy Card and ask him to help?

Thanks a bunch.

December 15, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Progress

The progress in South Korea is impressive. Congratulations!

DHR:dh
121504-2

.....
Please respond by _____

Korea

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004



TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Operation Hometown

Someone with the Vice President's party last night talked to me about "Operation Hometown." Do you know anything about it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-1

Please respond by

1/6/05

1/21/05

1/11

SecDef -

See Re attached

Note. It may be what

The individual was referring to. It is a good and very interesting program at the National Endowment for the Arts. Could not

FOUO

find "Operation Hometown" per se.

11-L-0559/OSD/48976

D. Rita

OSD 08127-05

1
292

15 Dec 04

MEMORANDUM

To: Allison Barber
Dallas Lawrence

From: Babs Chase

Date: December 17, 2004

Re: Operation Hometown/ Operation Homecoming


I have reviewed our *America Supports You* database and researched online, but I was unable to locate a program entitled *Operation Hometown*. There is a program entitled *Operation Homecoming* that may be the one to which he is referring.

- *Operation Homecoming: Writing the Wartime Experience*, is a program for U.S. military personnel and their families aimed at preserving the stories and reflections of American troops who have served our nation in Afghanistan and Iraq—and stateside defending the homeland.
- In coordination with all four branches of the Armed Forces and the Department of Defense, the National Endowment for the Arts is sponsoring writing workshops for returning troops and their families at military installations across the country and overseas.
- The workshops will be taught by some of America's most distinguished novelists, poets, historians, and journalists, these workshops will provide service men and women with the opportunity to write about their wartime experiences in a variety of forms—from fiction, verse, and letters to essay, memoir, and personal journal. The visiting writers, many of whom are war veterans themselves, will help the troops share their stories with current and future generations.
- The Arts Endowment has produced an accompanying audio CD for this program. Moving from a heart-rending letter from the Civil War to poems and memoirs about World War II to Vietnam War fiction, the CD explores the variety of literary responses by those who have come through similar experiences.
- In addition to these multi-day workshops and CD, the Arts Endowment will provide an online writing tutorial at www.operationhomecoming.org to help the troops develop their writing skills and access writing resources. The Web site also will be used to collect submissions of writing by active personnel and their families.
- The best writing that emerges from this program will be published in a nationally promoted anthology of wartime writing that will be sold in bookstores and will be distributed free by the Arts Endowment to military installations, schools, and libraries.

~~FOUO~~

December 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Ike Skelton Story

Please get back to me with **the answer on the Ike Skelton story** on the armored personnel carriers, and why we are not using them until we get enough up-armored humvees. It sounds reasonable to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-21

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

451.6

15 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08128-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48978

December 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Ike Skelton Story

MR

Please get back to me with the answer on the Ike Skelton story on the armored personnel carriers, and why we are not using them until we get enough up-armored humvees. It sounds reasonable to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-21

.....
Please respond by

1/6/05

1/12/05 -

SecDef -

General Myers will be responding to Ike Skelton, but there seems to be a divergence of views in the matter between the Army and CentCom in the matter. There is an indecipherable Joint Staff info memo attached, but Myers will apparently respond.

OSD 08128-051-L-0559/OSD/48979

4515

12 Jan 05

15 Dec 04

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION NUMBER SJS 04-08131

TO CJCS

THRU DJS

ORIG SUSPENSE 6 Jan 2005

SUBJECT /5C/ LETTER TO CJCS FROM REPRESENTATIVE IKE SKELTON REGARDING RECENT MEDIA REPORTS ABOUT THE LACK OF ARMOR IN ~~IRAQ~~

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Purpose. To clarify Army and CENTCOM positions regarding the feasibility of using M113s to augment HMMWV armored vehicles prior to the CJCS's response to Congressman Skelton.¹

2. Discussion.

a. Recently Army² and CENTCOM³ provided responses to JSAP 04-08131 for the Joint Staff to prepare a coordinated response to Congressman Skelton's request for information on the feasibility of using the M113 in Iraq to augment armored HMMWVs. CENTCOM and Army indicated in their responses that the M113 was neither practical, nor readily available to augment armored HMMWVs for operations in Iraq.

b. In a 4 Jan 2005 Miami Herald article, written by Joe Galloway, the paper cites an anonymous Army source who states that the Army is preparing M113s with add on armor for deployment to Iraq at the request of LTG Metz and approved by GEN Casey.⁴

3. Recommendation. HQDA and USCENTCOM provide feedback reference the validity of the Galloway article prior to the CJCS response to Congressman Skelton.

COORDINATION

NAME	AGENCY	DATE	NAME	AGENCY	DATE
	Army				
	CENTCOM				

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION/DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

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 HENRIK P. BUCCI, MISSISSIPPI, CALIFORNIA
 MAC INGRAMMEY, TEXAS
 JIMMY W. HESTER, INDIANA
 JIMMY W. HESTER, NORTH CAROLINA
 JIM RYUN, KANSAS
 JIM DUNNEN, NEVADA
 ROBERT HATES, MONTANA
 HELEN WILSON, NEW CAROLINA
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 WALE ROBERTS, ALABAMA
 TRACY BRANES, ARIZONA

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

December 13, 2004

[illegible]

ROBERT V. MULLIGAN, STAFF DIRECTOR

General Richard B. Myers
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon
Washington DC 20310

Dear General Myers:

I am concerned that the recent discussions in the press regarding the lack of armor in Iraq are a symptom of a larger problem with U.S. forces in Iraq. This problem has links to the Vietnam War. As I am sure you are aware, in the early days of that war the Army sent only infantry forces based on a mistaken belief that armor forces were inappropriate. It was only after several years that the Army leadership recognized that armor forces could make a significant contribution. One of the most successful units in Vietnam was the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which was equipped with M-113 Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAVs) and M-48 tanks. Armed with multiple machine guns behind gun shields, the M-113 proved itself an especially effective vehicle for close combat in jungles against enemy forces armed with RPGs and AK-47 rifles.

- I understand that the M-113 may not provide the same level of protection as some other armored vehicles currently in use, but they certainly provide better protection than soft-skinned vehicles. Moreover, I believe that the M-113 chassis is robust enough to easily accommodate the additional weight of supplemental armor kits, whereas the HMMWV struggles under the burden, and it is causing significant maintenance issues. As you know, broken-down up-armored HMMWVs provide no protection at all.

I have read reports where earlier this year, the deputy director of Army Material Command said he had seven hundred M-113 series vehicles prepositioned in Kuwait. Are they still there? I know you share my concern that we provide our fighting men and women with the very best equipment available. While we await delivery of additional up-armored HMMWVs, I would like you to revisit the possibility of using the M-113s the Army already has on hand as a means to provide them additional mobile protection. Could they point toward a solution to the Army's challenge in supplying armored transportation to protect our soldiers?

Sincerely,

[Handwritten signature]

Ike Skelton
Ranking Member

11-L-0559/OSD/48981

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT DEPUTY TO THE ARMY OPERATIONS DEPUTY
(JOINT AFFAIRS)
OFFICE OF JOINT AND DEFENSE AFFAIRS

20 DEC 2004

ARMY PLANNER DACS-ZD-JDA
Memorandum Number: 788-04

MEMORANDUM FOR J4/SAIL, ATTN: LTC Ware (b)(6)

SUBJECT: (U) Response to Representative Ike Skelton's letter regarding recent media reports about the lack of armor in Iraq.

1. (U) Purpose. To provide feedback to Representative Skelton regarding the feasibility of using M113s to augment HMMWV armored vehicles.

2. (U) Discussion.

a. The Multinational Force-Iraq Commander identifies requirements in theater and has determined that the Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (UAH) and Add-on Armor kit program best fit the need for daily operations in theater instead of the M113A3. Nonetheless, there are still over 800 M113A3s in use in the theater of operations.

b. Tracked vehicles, such as the armored personnel carrier, are not well suited for operations in an urban environment. The heavy tracked vehicle tends to be more difficult to maneuver on the paved streets than wheeled vehicles. The tracks of the heavy vehicles are also known to inflict heavy damage to the infrastructure. Operational commanders prefer the Up-Armored HMMWV to the armored personnel carrier.

c. The chart below depicts the availability of M113s in or near the area of operation. Of the 62 M113A3s on hand, 48 require some level of maintenance before they could be issued to units. Of the 332 M113A2s on hand, 242 require some level of maintenance.

MODEL	Kuwait	Qatar	DRMO SWA	APS 2	TOTAL
M113A3	2 (1)	45 (45)	0 (0)	15 (2)	62 (48)
M113A2	3 (3)	0 (0)	149 (149)	180 (90)	332 (242)

* Total Vehicles on hand (vehicles requiring maintenance) - AMC G3 data

d. Additionally, the M113A2 is not well suited for add on armor kits. The added weight puts a severe strain on the engine and transmission and causes the vehicle to move much slower. This is important to note since speed has become a critical survivability measure in the Iraqi area of operations.

3. (U) POC for this action is MAJ Steven J. Adams, DAMO-SSW, (b)(6)

Robert
ROY L. HOWARD
Colonel GS
Army Planner

11-L-0559/OSD/48982

UNCLASSIFIED

CCJ3 Information Paper

Subject: Letter to CJCS from Representative IKE Skelton
Regarding Recent Media Reports About the Lack of Armor in Iraq

1. Purpose. To provide feedback to Representative Skelton regarding the feasibility of using M113s to augment HMMWV armored vehicles.

2. Background. Senator Skelton would like to revisit the possibility of using M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) that the US Army already has on hand as a means to provide soldiers in Iraq with more armor protection. The following information in response to Representative Skelton's query was provided by LTC Clark LeMasters, CCJ4-G-LRC DSN (b)(6)

- (U) Question: *Senator Skelton specifically asked about the status of several hundred M-113s that Army Material Command previously reported were in Kuwait.*

- (U) Based on a phone call from BG Leonard, CFLCC C-4/AMC SWA Commander, there are 45 M113s in Kuwait. All are Non-Mission Capable.

- (U) Based on a review of reports from MNC-I, there are 609 M113, APCs with MNC-I in Iraq. The table below shows the break out by unit. I MEF does not have M113s.

Table Extracted from 4th CMMC Maintenance Report.

M113	Required	O/H	FMC	NMC	FMC
1 CD	238	238	223	15	
2/2 ID	87	85	71	14	81%
1 ID	200	200	107	12	
MNB-N			0		N/A
III CARTY	8	8	5	3	63%
1ST COSCOM			0		N/A
44 MED			0		N/A
185 AVN			0		N/A
420 EN BDE	28	32	28	4	88%
16 MP BDE			0		N/A
42 MP BDE	0	0	0	0	N/A
504 MI BDE			0		N/A
81 ESB	37	37	35	2	
HQ, III CORPS			0		N/A
3 SIG BDE			0		N/A
III CORPS	607	609	559	50	

O/H - On Hand; FMC - Fully Mission Capable; NMC - Not Mission Capable

UNCLASSIFIED

CCJ3

Subject: Letter to CJCS from Representative IKE Skelton
Regarding Recent Media Reports About the Lack of Armor in Iraq

- (U) From the Army G-4, LOC Brief from 15 DEC 04, the Depot Maintenance Workload slide shows there are 750 M113s scheduled for repair at Anniston, AL, Army Depot (ANAD). 303 are currently on hand at ANAD.

SYSTEM	SOURCE OF REPAIR	FY05 REQUIREMENT	FY05 FUNDED WORKLOAD	ON-HAND		FY05 PROG (EOM)	FY05 COMP (TO DATE)
				UNSERV WAITING INDUCTION	WORK IN PROGRESS		
M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER FOV	ANAD	763	750	243	60	41	28

- (U) From the same Army G-4 LOC brief, Retrograde Processing Status slide for APS Rolling Stock shows that there are 626 M113 APCs that have been shipped from APS stocks in Kuwait to source of repair. 445 are in transit and 181 are at the source of repair.

SYSTEM	BALANCE (AS OF 24NOV04)	SHIPPED TO DATE		REMAINING TO BE SHIPPED	IN TRANSIT	REC'D AT SOURCE OF REPAIR	REMARKS
		NUMBER SHIPPED	PERCENT SHIPPED				
M113 ARMORED—PERSONNEL CARRIER FOV	626	626	100%	0	445	181	363 ON CHARLTON

3. Recommendation: None. Provided for information only.

APPROVED BY: //PJK//21 Dec 04// PREPARED BY: //EAA//20 Dec 04
 PATRICK J. KANEWSKE EDUARDO A. ADISELLAN
 Colonel, USMC Major, USMC
 Chief, Current Ops Division Ground Operations

Miami Herald
January 4, 2005

U.S. Army Adding Armor To 'War Horse' Troop Carriers

To answer complaints about inadequately armored vehicles, the Army confirmed that it will armor two types of veteran war horse carriers and send them to Iraq.

By Joseph L. Galloway

WASHINGTON - The Army, beset with complaints that its troops are going into combat in inadequately armored Humvees, will send an older and less used class of armored personnel carriers to Iraq after spending \$84 million to add armor to them.

These vehicles, both veteran war horses, are the M-113/A3 armored personnel carrier and the M-577 command post carrier. Both will be tougher and safer than newly armored Humvees.

Army officials who pushed hard over the past two years for getting the M-113 into duty in Iraq said it was more useful, cheaper and easier to transport than the Army's new wheeled Stryker armored vehicle, also in use in Iraq.

The Army and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld found themselves at the center of a firestorm last month over the pace of adding armor to the Humvee, a small transport vehicle that's been pressed into service in Iraq as a combat vehicle. Critics have charged that even with armor the Humvee is too easily destroyed by rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices.

An Army representative, who requested anonymity, said Monday that \$84 million was being spent to add armor to 734 M-113/A3s and M-577s.

For the M-113s, that includes hardened steel side armor, a "slat armor" cage that bolts to the side armor and protects against rocket-propelled grenades, anti-mine armor on the bottom and a new transparent, bulletproof gun shield on the top that improves gunners' vision.

SLAT ARMOR

The M-577, nicknamed the "high-top shoe" for its tall, ungainly silhouette, will get only slat armor and anti-mine armor. Its high sides can't take the steel armor without making the vehicle unstable and even more liable to roll over.

The slat-type armor essentially is a metal cage designed to detonate RPGs before they breach the steel armor and the light aluminum wall. Similar slat armor has been added to the Stryker vehicle.

The armor kits will be produced in the United States, the Army representative said, and installed in Kuwait.

The representative said the M-113 upgrade was requested by Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz, the ground commander in Iraq, and approved by Gen. George Casey, the commander of multinational forces in Iraq.

The **M-113** typically carries a driver, a commander and 11 infantry soldiers. It can be fitted with a .50-caliber machine gun or a **MK-19 40mm** grenade launcher.

NEWER, IMPROVED

The **M-113/A3** version, introduced in **1987**, has a bigger turbo-charged diesel engine, an improved transmission, steering and braking package, and inside liners to suppress spall, the superheated molten metal produced by **RPG** and tank-round hits. It has a range of 300 miles and a road speed of more than 40 mph. It also is amphibious.

More than **80,000 M-113s** in **28** configurations have been manufactured since **1960**.

At 13 tons, the M-113 is much easier to transport than the behemoth **M1A2 Abrams** tank or **Bradley Fighting Vehicle**.

72
~~FOUO~~

December 15, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Taiwan

Do take over the Taiwan weapon issue, and keep me posted on what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-20

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

China(Chas)

15 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48987

OSD 08129-05

72
~~FOUO~~

December 15, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Turkey

Turkey

Do get back to me after you have talked to the Intel community about the situation with Turkey, and why the drift.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-19

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

IS Deacy

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48988

OSD 08130-05

DEC 16 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: "Rumsfeld Plan"

0205D

What in the world is this group talking about – the "Rumsfeld Plan"?

It seems to me that this is this fellow out in Hawaii who we had questions about. I don't know what is going on, but I have never heard of the "Rumsfeld Plan."

Thanks.

Artach.

Halloran, Richard. "Rumsfeld Plan Called Ambitious, Flawed," *Honolulu Advertiser*, December 12, 2004.

DHR:dh
121504-14

.....
Please respond by

1/6/05

~~FOUO~~

16Dec04

11-L-0559/OSD/48989

OSD 08131-05

Honolulu Advertiser
December 12, 2004

The Rising East

Rumsfeld Plan Called Ambitious, Flawed

By Richard Halloran

The plans of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to transform the nation's armed forces ran into a spirited dose of skepticism at a recent gathering in Hawai'i of strategic thinkers from America, Asia and the Pacific.

An Australian strategist on land warfare, Michael Evans, set the tone by pointing to both the strengths and weaknesses of the Rumsfeld plan, which seeks to propel American military power so far ahead of that of any other nation that none would dare challenge it.

"American strengths in transformation are seen as being in the realm of ideas, innovation and technology," Evans told his colleagues. Weaknesses included "a tendency toward faddism," a love of technology for the sake of technology, and "a perceived inability to transform the vast organization of the Pentagon, whose mindset was formed in the crucible of the Cold War."

The conference on transforming U.S. armed forces was organized by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, where military officers, defense officials, diplomats and law-enforcement officers from America, Asia and the Pacific meet to examine security issues.

To encourage candor, speakers usually cannot be identified. Evans, however, agreed to be quoted.

The main cause of the Asian doubts, which were as much cultural as military, was their difficulty in discerning what "transform" means. American defenders of the plan acknowledged that it was an "elusive concept," but asserted that the objective was to assemble a force that could dominate the spectrum of conflict from nuclear war to terrorism.

This transformed force, which would include political, economic, diplomatic and cultural elements, would provide depth in homeland defense and would rely on a revitalized intelligence corps, innovative uses of space, streamlined logistics, and new weapons.

The deadline was set as 2012.

In Asia and the Pacific, the United States has already begun to redraw the map of its bases and to realign forces so that expeditions could be launched to points elsewhere in the region. War plans are being updated and speed of command will be emphasized.

Alliances with Japan, and to a lesser extent with South Korea, will become even more vital than they are today.

Even so, Japanese misgivings included concern that the plan relied too much on advanced technology that Japan's Self-Defense Forces could not match. There was concern that efforts to win hearts and minds through public affairs, psychological operations, and the Internet would be neglected.

For South Korea, the Rumsfeld plan is seen as ambitious but ambiguous and has been greeted with ambivalence. President Roh Moo-hyun has asserted that his nation should be "self-reliant" in defense against North Korea, but some South Koreans have deplored U.S. plans to reduce troop levels in South Korea and to assign those forces missions elsewhere.

A participant from Southeast Asia drew affirmative nods when he asserted that too often, U.S. leaders insist that "you must do it my way" rather than to seek Asian points of view.

Another participant said Singapore found the plan had little relevance for small powers.

A South Asian contended that most strategists in his part of the world saw the Rumsfeld plan as "too expensive and too expansive." It was "technologically exotic" and not suited to low-level threats, such as terrorism, that plague that region.

The Australian strategist, Michael Evans, did not go into detail about the Pentagon's flaws. Others have pointed to bloated bureaucracies, contorted chains of command, and unending disputes over roles and missions. They have cited warring rivals in the feudal domains within the Pentagon and the anomaly of commanding U.S. forces by a committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Further, Congress adds billions of dollars to defense spending every year with projects that bring money to members' districts but hamper military readiness. Allied with Congress is a defense industry that permits incompetent management, produces shoddy workmanship and is too often guilty of waste or fraud.

Moreover, Rumsfeld and his colleagues have made little effort to explain their plan to Congress or the American voters and taxpayers, whose sons and daughters serve in the armed forces. Nor apparently, have Pentagon officials or American diplomats been successful in persuading friends and allies in Asia of the need to transform and realign the U.S. armed forces in their neighborhood.

In his summary, Evans did not spare his own country from criticism but concluded: "The process of defense transformation in both Australia and the United States is an unfinished symphony whose final form remains unclear since neither country has yet seriously tackled the key issue of organizational culture."

Richard Halloran is a Honolulu-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent in Asia. He wrote this article for The Advertiser.

DEC 16 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Armstrong Williams

Armstrong Williams wants me on his television program, and I have promised to do it. He is a friend of a friend of mine.

It is an hour program. I think I might like to do it for half an hour, and then maybe have someone else do another half hour, like Dick Myers.

Thanks.

Attach.
Business card

DHR:dh
121504-15

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

Television and Radio Syndication

Armstrong Williams
President & Executive Producer

The Right Side Production
201 Massachusetts Ave., NE, #C-3
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-5400 Tel
(202) 546-1218 Fax
www.armstrongwilliams.com
email: (b)(6)

the RIGHT Side

FOUO

OSD 08132-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48992

000.7758

16 Dec 04

December 16, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Intel Item

Please talk to the Intel community to try and figure out why the threats never materialize, after the USG has spun up. Is it because of the deterrent effect? Are the terrorists jerking us around? Is the intelligence weak? We ought to be able to begin to get some visibility into this issue, in that it has happened so many times.

What it is costing us? It has to be billions of dollars. Please talk to Tina and see what she can estimate.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-18

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/48993

OSD 08134-05

350.09

1/16/04

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

12/02

December 2, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

CC: ADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief

322

I was impressed with Ed Giambastiani's concept for the JTF HQ. Clearly a lot of good work by his staff and the Joint Staff as well went into it.

I do want to see you carefully think through whether it ought to be an active cadre of folks instead of reserves. I cannot see any reason whatsoever to use reserves. Once you think that through, I'd like to see an implementing document that I can sign in the next two weeks. We need to move out on this.

Thanks.

DAK:ss
120204-10

.....
Please respond by 17 Dec 04

Thanks.

*Sir,
Response attached.
v/r
Lt Col Longel
FEB 04 2005*

e
Dec 04~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 08135-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48994

December 2, 2004

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ~~FOUO~~

SUBJECT: Tilghman Island

An acquaintance of mine gave me this material about Tilghman Island. It sounds reasonable to me. Why don't you have someone look into it. I don't know what the arguments, and I don't have a view.

Thanks.

Attach.
Information on Tilghman Island, MD

DHR:ss
120204-8

.....
Please respond by 11/13/05

Thanks.

800

2 Dec 04

Objective: To restore Devils Island in Tilghman, Maryland to its former size which could then be used as a wildlife habitat. **Action Required:** The Corps of Engineers periodically dredges the Knapps Narrows channel in Tilghman for navigation purposes. The dredge materials are presently barged to far away Poplar Island. Instead of depositing the dredge at Poplar Island, the Corps may want to consider depositing it at Devils Island, a far closer location with the resultant beneficial results of less costs for transportation and the creation of a wildlife habitat. (The present owner of Devils Island is offering the location for dumping of the dredge at no cost to the government.)

Point which it holds to this day. It is at the end of Poplar Grove Street, and is the location of many modern homes. Sailing past Chicken Point comes in our view a small man made island which is the birthplace of many of the East coast's work and racing canoes, built on Tilghman's Island. Here Capt. John B. Harrison had a boat yard and also a fish packing and oyster house. Mr. Harrison packed his fish in a different method than is done today. They were put in barrels with much salt and packed very hard. The island is reached either by boat or the long board walk that connects it to the main land. This at present has been nearly torn down by storms and high tides. Just who named Devil's Island is not known. However, it no doubt was named by the ones who built it. This landmark is not in use at the present writing.


Just a short distance from here is another man made island, much larger in size. It is that of Avalon. This is where the only post office in the United States, to be on such an island, is located. Just how it received its name is plain to see. The word avalanche meaning a mass of rock, stone, or shells, no doubt is how it came about. There was also a steamboat running there by the name of Avalon, and some to this day feel that it was named after the boat.

As we sail around the shores of Tilghman's Island, some distance from Avalon is another well known name, Pig Pen, where during the War of 1812 stood a very large dwelling. This story may be well considered, as the party telling it made it clear, that it was only handed down to her and may not be at all correct.


The story goes, that an old slave who was freed by his owner, did not want to leave so built himself a little place here. It being so small and all that he could afford, he called it his Pig Pen. Since that time it still holds that name. Just a few more minutes of sailing and we arrive at the village of Barneck, so named because of a long sandy bar that extended from one of its points. Homes at Barneck are somewhat scattered, but it is an ideal place for the man making a livelihood from the water.

Around the shore from this village is another which is some-

(circa 1950)



DEVIL'S ISLAND



AVALON

BAY

KNAPP WAREHOUSES

Davis Island

HARRIS

21671


CHESAPEAKE

Payson Island

KE BAY

PTANK

11-L-0559/OSD/48998




720
~~FOUO~~

December 2, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci

CC: Cathy Mainardi
(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Visits to Bethesda and Walter Reed

I want to go to both Bethesda and Walter Reed sometime before Christmas to see the wounded troops. If I'm not here on a weekend, or traveling too much, I'll have to do it during the week.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120204-6

.....
Please respond by _____

333 SD

2 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08138-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49000

December 2, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci

c c : Cathy Mainardi
(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Boy Scout Jamboree

I ought to think about going to the Boy Scout Jamboree on July 24, 2005 at Fort
AP Hill, near Richmond.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120204-4


.....
Please respond by _____

080

2 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

December 2, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Powell Moore

Here's the material from Powell Moore. I asked him to please try to stay on longer, to be sure we get someone confirmed in time.

You should get hot on this - let's get that list and put it on the top of the priorities.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/1/04 Powell Moore Memo to SecDef
12/1/04 Powell Moore letter to POTUS

DHR:ss
120204-2

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

020 LA

2 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08141-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49002



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

Personal and Confidential

December 1, 2004

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Retirement Plans

- I would like to advise you that I have accepted an offer from the law firm of McKenna, Long and Aldridge to join them on February 1, 2005 to assist them in advising and representing their clients on public policy issues. Before entering discussions with them on October 13, 2004, I consulted with the Office of General Counsel and I disqualified myself from taking any action that might have an impact on the firm, their subsidiaries, affiliates or joint ventures. I share your commitment to strict observance of all ethical standards including post Federal employment restrictions on representational activities.
- In addition, I have asked the Department's benefits personnel to begin processing my retirement from Federal service to be effective on February 1, 2005.
- I have also attached a formal letter of resignation and request that you forward it to the President's staff. In this letter, I restate my interest in an assignment abroad, preferably in Europe.
- Needless to say, I am eager to support in any way possible the urgent task of identifying and recruiting a highly qualified successor. I have a couple of names to add to the list I gave you on July 31 and have given them to Jim O'Beime.

Attachment:
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/49003



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

December 1, 2004

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

With deep appreciation for the opportunity to serve in your Administration, I hereby offer my resignation from the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs to be effective on January 31st, 2005.

No honor has ever come to me that exceeds the privilege of serving under the leadership of you and Secretary Rumsfeld for the past four years. Generations of Americans will benefit from the visionary, heroic approach that both of you have brought to the national security challenges of the first four years of the 21st Century. The two of you have proven to be the right leaders for this important crossroads in the history of our Nation. My gratitude for the experience of being a member of your team and Secretary Rumsfeld's team is beyond my ability to express.

I would like to restate my interest in another opportunity to serve our Nation abroad. The private sector currently has many attractions for me, but I would willingly forego them for an appointment from you for an overseas assignment.

Congratulations on your historic re-election and best wishes for a successful second term.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Powell A. Moore", is written over a large, stylized "P" that begins the signature.

Powell A. Moore

11-L-0559/OSD/49004

724
~~FOUO~~

December 2, 2004

TO: Dina Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Powell Moore

Here's a background sheet on Powell Moore, and also some points that I have developed with respect to the job he could do as a U.S. Ambassador for this Administration. He is first rate. He is leaving. He would very much like to serve the country. I hope you will see that his name is carefully considered. You never know what might happen, but this is a person who has been carrying the mail, as has his wife, Pam, for many, many decades.

Thanks.

Attach.
Powell Moore Bio
Talking Points on Powell Moore

DHR:ss
120204-1

020 LA

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08143-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49005

2 Dec 04

POWELL A. MOORE

Powell A. Moore is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. He was nominated by President Bush for this position on April 23, 2001 and confirmed by the Senate on May 1, 2001.

Mr. Moore formerly served as the Chief of Staff for Senator Fred D. Thompson, Republican of Tennessee, and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Mr. Moore held this position from September 1998 until assuming his current duties.

Active in public policy affairs in Washington for more than 37 years, Mr. Moore is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs under President Reagan and served on the White House staff under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan.

Mr. Moore began his Washington career in 1966 as Press Secretary to Senator Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, and served in this capacity until Senator Russell's death in January of 1971. He then joined the Nixon Administration, first serving as Deputy Director of Public Information for the Department of Justice and later as a member of the White House Legislative Affairs staff.

He left the White House in 1975, and for the subsequent six years, engaged in government relations and legislative affairs consulting, representing a variety of corporations and associations.

Mr. Moore returned to the White House in January 1981 on the day following Ronald Reagan's inauguration as the 40th President of the United States. As Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs during 1981, he managed the Senate component of the legislative affairs office at the White House.

In January of 1982, President Reagan nominated him to be Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, and he was confirmed by the Senate on February 4, 1982.

After leaving government in late 1983 and before returning in 1998, Mr. Moore advised and represented business interests as a consultant and as Vice President for Legislative Affairs of the Lockheed Corporation.

Mr. Moore was born in Milledgeville, Georgia, on January 5, 1938. He graduated from the University of Georgia in Athens in 1959 after attending preparatory school at Georgia Military College in Milledgeville. After graduation, he was commissioned as an Infantry officer in the United States Army where he served for three and one-half years with tours in Baumholder, Germany, and Fort Benning, Georgia.

Mr. Moore lives in Washington, D.C. with his wife Pamela. He has a (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Mr.

and Mrs. Moore together have (b)(6)

Talking Points to Support a Recommendation Of Powell Moore to be an Ambassador


- Powell Moore's career has prepared him to serve as an Ambassador and lead an embassy team to advance the interests of the United States overseas.
- He has a longstanding history of achieving measurable results in developing and implementing strategies to deliver public policy messages.
- As a member of the President's legislative affairs and national security team for the past four years, he has a deep understanding of the President's national security and foreign policy goals
- His career in legislative affairs has provided him with solid preparation for a diplomatic post where accurate reporting and insightful analysis are essential.
- Powell Moore has an in-depth knowledge of the United States government. He has worked for Senators Richard Russell of Georgia and Fred Thompson of Tennessee, on the White House staff under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Reagan and in the Departments of Justice, State and Defense. He also understands the interests and issues of the Nation having worked closely with scores of Senators and Representatives from every region on a variety of issues including trade, manufacturing, agriculture and finance.
- As Assistant Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of Defense, he has accompanied Members of Congress to more than forty nations where he has participated in meetings with numerous international leaders.
- His introduction to U.S. ties to Europe came early in his career when he served for two years as an Infantry officer in Germany at the time of the Berlin crisis.
- His wife, Pamla Moore, would be an exceptional representative of our nation.
 - Pamla came to Washington from Atlanta in 1989 as a key member of the staff of President G.H.W. Bush's Peace Corp Director, Paul Coverdell. Her association with the late Senator Coverdell spanned more than 20 years in Republican fundraising and political activities in Georgia and in Washington.
 - As Director of the Office of Private Sector Relations for the U.S. Peace Corps, she raised more than \$12 million in private sector donations to support the Peace Corps' initiative into former Warsaw Pact countries.
 - She currently directs the National Blood Foundation, which provides support for transfusion medicine research with an endowment of more than \$4 million.
 - Pamla was an alternate delegate from the District of Columbia to the Republican National conventions in Philadelphia in 2000 and in New York in 2004.
 - On November 2, 2004, she won a non-partisan election with more than 70 percent of the vote to represent the eastern section of Georgetown on a District of Columbia Advisory Neighborhood Commission.
- Powell Moore has loyally served in the Administration of President Bush during his first term and is eager to serve the President and the Nation in a challenging assignment abroad in the second term.

~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Stabilization

Do we need to organize the civilian side of the Department of Defense to include post-war, post-major combat operations stabilization efforts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-26

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08144-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49008

381

1 Dec 04

720
~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld [↑]
SUBJECT: For Next Ivanov Meeting

Please tickle a note for the next time I see Ivanov that I want to talk to him about the statements we have made out of the Department concerning Russia moving WMD out of Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-25

.....
Please respond by /

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08145-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49009

Russia

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne

CC: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 7A

SUBJECT: Candidates

Please take a look at the following as possibilities for civilian appointments:

1. Seth Cropsey.
2. Pat Harrison. I believe she is currently acting in the public diplomacy spot over at State.
3. Steve Friedman. He just left as the White House economic person.
4. Terry O'Donnell.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-24

.....
Please *respond* by _____

FOUO

OSD 08147-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49010

230.02

1 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: VADM Staser Holcomb (ret)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paul David Miller

Attached is a background sheet on Paul David Miller. You may know him.

If you think well of him, why don't you check him out with Vern Clark, and then think of where in the structure we could use someone with his background. He looks awfully good. I suppose AT&L is a possibility, possibly NI² or some other spots.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.
Paul David Miller resume

DHR:dh
120104-23

Please respond by 12/9/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08149-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49011

230.02

1 Dec 04

Paul David Miller
Chairman of the Board, Alliant Techsystems
Admiral, U.S. Navy, retired

1999 – 2003: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Alliant Techsystems (ATK)

1994 – 1998: President, Sperry Marine / Vice President, Litton Industries

1992 – 1994: Commander Atlantic Command; Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

2 4*

Thirty years of naval service followed by ten years of Aerospace and Defense industry leadership

Leading advocate for operational change while Commander Atlantic Command (for-runner of Joint Forces Command)

- Joint force packaging
- Flexible naval deployments
- Focus on operations other than war
- Inter-agency cooperation

Accomplished business leader

- Took ATK from 1.1 billion to 2.5 billion in sales
- Recognized innovator in addressing emerging DOD requirements

Uniquely suited to lead systemic acquisition transformation in support of operational transformation

- Well established record of tough-minded leadership
- Extensive DOD acquisition experience both within and outside the department

- Sees need for significant process change to overcome acquisition community and structural lethargy
- Willing to make the hard calls to implement lasting improvements

Available: Completing final year as ATK Chairman

Paul David Miller

Paul David Miller, Admiral, United States Navy (Retired), is Chairman of the Board of Directors of Alliant Techsystems, Inc. (NYSE:ATK), a \$2.4 billion advanced weapon and space systems company with strong positions in propulsion, composite structures, munitions, precision capabilities, and civil and sporting ammunition. He joined ATK as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer in January 1999. He retired from ATK 30 March 2004 but continues to serve as Chairman.

Under Admiral Miller's leadership, ATK's annual revenues have risen from \$1.1 billion to \$2.4 billion, headcount has more than doubled from 6,000 to 13,500, and operating margins have increased from 9.5 percent to the mid 10 percent range. Reflecting the company's strong financial performance, market capitalization has tripled since 1999, rising from \$640 million to \$2.3 billion in April 2004.

ATK has been listed on the *Forbes* Platinum 400 list of best-run companies five years in a row. The *Wall Street Journal* also listed ATK as the best performing stock in the aerospace sector based on total returns over the last three, five, and ten year periods.

Paul Miller's other accomplishments as ATK Chairman and Chief Executive Officer include the successful integration of five strategic acquisitions. The two largest acquisitions – Thiokol Propulsion and the commercial ammunition businesses of Blount International, Inc. established ATK as the world's leading supplier of solid propulsion systems and the nation's largest manufacturer of ammunition. A third acquisition, Science and Applied Technologies, Inc., positioned ATK to be a key player in the increasingly important precision weapons sector.

Prior to joining ATK, he was with Litton Industries, Inc., where he headed Litton Marine Systems and served as Vice President of Litton Industries. He joined Litton/Sperry Marine in 1994, following a 30-year career in the U.S. Navy. Prior to his retirement, he was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, one of five U.S. theater commands, and served concurrently as NATO Supreme Allied Commander-Atlantic. Other duty assignments included Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Warfare). He received numerous personal and campaign awards during his distinguished career.

A native of Roanoke, Virginia, Admiral Miller holds a bachelor's degree from Florida State University and a master's degree in business administration from the University of Georgia. He attended the U.S. Naval War College and the Harvard Business School Executive Management Program and is the author of several works on leadership and strategy. He serves on the Boards of Anteon International Corporation (NYSE:ANT), Donaldson Company Inc. (NYSE:DCI) and Teledyne Technologies Inc. (NYSE:TDY).

PDM and his wife Becky (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Summer 2004

~~FOUO~~

Talk to
Jeff Lieb

March 2, 2005

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Questions from Senator Dorgan

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12

At the Senate Appropriations Committee meeting, Senator Dorgan asked a series of questions. The transcript is attached.

I would like you to be responsible for reviewing all of our procedures, approaches, and checks and balances to see that we have corrected any weaknesses in the system.

Thanks.

Attach.
Transcript

DHR:dh
022805-41

.....
Please respond by

3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08153-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49015

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FDCH TRANSCRIPTS

Congressional Hearings

Feb. 16, 2005

Senate Appropriations Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal 2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations

LIST OF SPEAKERS

(JOINED IN PROGRESS)

Open window with printer-friendly version

BYRD:

... has a healthy respect for the Senate's rules and for proceeding according to what is spoken of as the regular order.

And I share these views. While I may not be able to agree with the chairman on every issue, you can count on my strong support for our proceeding according to the rules of the committee and the Senate.

You can also count on me to continue to appreciate the bipartisanship that has been repeatedly demonstrated by this committee over the years as the committee proceeds to process the supplemental and annual individual fiscally responsible appropriations bills.

So best to you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this very important hearing.

We are reminded every day by the grim

remember what we said when we had to vote on this.

My time's up.

COCHRAN:

Senator Dorgan?

DORGAN:

Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for your patience, Mr. Chairman. It's been a long hearing.

And, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, thank you for being here and thanks for spending the time with us.

You can see there's a great deal of passion about a range of these issues. And I want to make just a couple of quick comments.

First, I think all of us on this committee are going to support all the funds that **are** needed **to** support the troops. **Are** troops are fighting. And this committee -- **1** don't think any member of this committee is ever going to short the funds that you request **as** necessary **to** support those troops.

Second, as I said a year ago, Mr. Secretary -- you've heard me say it -- it is a budget game, regrettably, to be asking for emergency supplemental money and then have zero in the regular budget.

The Congress passed a piece of legislation that asked you to put in the budget your best guess of what the costs would be for

Iraq and Afghanistan, and this really ought to be a part of the regular budget, to the extent that we can determine it. But we know that zero is wrong.

It's just a game to be doing this with emergency supplementals of \$82 billion.

And third, the cost of war represented by the scars borne by our soldiers, whether active or retired -- when for the soldiers, a request is made to the Congress, we always provide full funding. And when for those retired veterans, former soldiers, requests are made, they are very seldom fully met. I mean, their needs are very seldom fully met.

And I think that's what you've heard from a couple of my colleagues and the concern and the angst about that. Because a soldier doesn't stop being a soldier one day from the next, and we need to do better with respect to the veterans' issues.

But let me also say this. I am very concerned that the money that we're talking about here -- and I'm going to support it -- the almost \$16 billion that is now going to be moving to Iraq has not yet been there and spent with respect to reconstruction funding. I'm very concerned about how much of that is wasted. And let me describe why I say that.

On May 13th, 2003, Mr. Secretary, you wrote the letter designating the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the head of the CPA, this was Ambassador Bremer, with the title of administrator responsible for the CPA.

And you're quite correct -- the inspector general's report, with respect to the \$8.8 billion, that was not American money. That was Iraqi money, but under control of the CPA, under control of the agency that was our responsibility -- that you were responsible for.

And so, you know, when we see these examples of inspector generals saying the money wasn't accounted for -- whether it **was** money that belonged to them, in our charge, or our taxpayers' money -- still it raises questions about do **we** have accountability here.

And then you go from that point to the point of the money that **is** taxpayers' dollars being spent in Iraq.

And I **know** and, Mr. Chairman, let me also say, I know when I raise the name Halliburton, immediately people think of politics. It's not politics for me. I don't care if **Jimmy** Carter would have been the president of Halliburton. **I'm** talking about the last four years.

Let me **just** read a couple of headlines, because this is, I think, the biggest contractor that we've spent taxpayers' money for in Iraq and most of its sole-source contracts.

Halliburton overcharged \$27.4 **million** for meals. Halliburton overcharged \$61 million for oil delivery.

Pentagon auditors recommend withholding 15 percent of payments to Halliburton.

Whistleblowers have documented Halliburton waste fraud and abuse.

The list goes on and on. And in fact, I'll get to a question, but the retired director of the Defense Energy Support Center, the person that just retired, testified before the Congress that **the** gasoline that was being sent into Iraq by Halliburton was costing about a dollar more than it should have. He said, "We move gasoline into virtually every war area and never paid that much."

And at the same time that Halliburton was charging, I think it was \$2.65 a gallon through their subcontractor, the Defense Department was moving it in for a dollar **less**, and the Defense Department had always done that.

So my question **is** this, Mr. Secretary -- and this is not a political question. There's no political inference in **it**. **It's just** that we're going to spend massive, massive amounts **of** money in Iraq and there **is** substantial evidence that there **is** a great deal of fraud and abuse and waste.

And I want -- I certainly hope that there is much more aggressiveness in trying to get to the bottom of all of that and deal **with** it, because I worry that not much is happening in that area.

DORGAN:

And let me ask you if you can respond.

RUMSFELD:

Let me say several things.
First, if my memory serves me correctly, and it's not perfect, I think that we tried to **put** money in for the Afghan war two years **ago**, and the Congress refused to appropriate it and **told** us it should be done in the supplemental.

DORGAN:

We can check that. **B**ut if that was the case, Congress was wrong. And **I** would think...

RUMSFELD:

That's my recommendation. I can remember trying to **do** it. And I could be wrong, but that's my -- you were at the FBI then...

(UNKNOWN)

(OFF-MIKE)

RUMSFELD:

We'll check that. But **I was** dissuaded either **in** the Executive Branch or in the Congress and **I** think here, in the first year.

Next: Large amounts of money, large contracts, public-private sector, this country, any country on the face of the Earth, tend to be argued about after the fact. They tend to -- pluses, minuses, this has to go over, and they make agreements. And they **say**, "Well, you didn't **do** this.

You should have." And they said, "You didn't do that. You should have. And the reason we didn't do this is because you didn't tell us in time." And big complicated contracts, that's the nature of them.

Now, third, you mentioned that a lot of the dollars are not spent from the reconstruction funds.

DORGAN:

About \$50 billion is, as of yet, unspent. So that will be still moving to Iraq.

The question is: Is there accountability?

RUMSFELD:

Yes. One of the reasons a lot of that hasn't been spent is because the government of the United States made a conscious decision to try to spend the Iraqi money first and to use more of their oil money and to flow -- and we had many more checks and balances on the \$18 billion. I think it was \$18 billion.

A good portion of that is obligated, but not expended and not paid out.

I'm told that the Defense Department contract audit agency is the place where the problems that you are citing were all pointed out. These weren't discovered by people, by the press or by Congress or by some outsiders.

We had an audit agency

assigned to go in there and to look at all of that and report on all of that, and everything's public.

RUMSFELD:

... So every time there's a big contract and the audit agency that the taxpayers pay for go in and look at these things, and then they announce to the world what's happened. And then they get worked on.

And that's part of the process. That's why they have the auditors.

DORGAN:

Mr. Secretary, some of it, of course, has come from whistleblowers.

RUMSFELD:

Sure, which is a good system.

DORGAN:

Which is not the contracting agency. It's a different system. Some of whom have been threatened and some have lost their jobs and so on.

But my point is this: When you are reading the morning paper, as I am, and you see report after report after report of one or two companies... allegations of waste or fraud or abuse, \$85,000 new trucks that have a flat tire and they leave it on the road and abandon it to be torched; 25 tons

of nails that are ordered, and it's the wrong size, so they're laying on the ground in Iraq; those kinds of things -- when you see those reports, do you feel like I do? You say, "What on Earth is going on here? Can we **get** to the bottom of it? Is this a bad contractor?"

What's **your** impression of that?

RUMSFELD:

You bet I do. **I'm** a taxpayer, just like you are.

There isn't anybody who sees waste anywhere in the government or out of the government that isn't concerned about it.

And it's just, frankly, during a **war**, the thought that there's waste or mismanagement when you've got a war going on and you've got people out there that are giving their lives and they're making all kinds of sacrifices to serve the country, it just breaks your heart to see it.

DORGAN:

You know, I come from a town of 300 people. And in my hometown, you only got a chance to cheat somebody once. That was it. You didn't do business with them after that, because they wouldn't do business with you.

And here, you know, it's just a Byzantine circumstance.

And the reason I raise these

questions about contracting abuse is I just think we have to be much, much, much ~~more~~ aggressive. Massive amounts of money are going to move through this pipeline, and the American taxpayers need to feel that there's accountability here, an aggressive accountability, and that somebody has to pay the price for cheating the taxpayer. Somebody has to pay the price for it.

~~So~~ I raise the questions because they must be raised ~~when we're~~ talking about this quantity of money.

RUMSFELD:

Well, there are laws under which we operate. And we have to live within them. And they provide for audits. They provide, for accountability, if somebody doesn't manage something properly, in terms of a contractor. And there ~~are~~ penalties for it. And to the extent there's criminal violations, people ~~are~~ put in jail.

DORGAN:

Mr. Secretary, you have a tough job.

And I would just observe this: Too often, my sense is the penalty is to get another contract, by the ~~same~~ company.

But, ~~you know, look~~, I hope you understand the angst, at least among some of ~~us~~, about the amount of money that's going into contracting and ~~so~~ on. In the end, we're going to support

And that money ought to be invested in things that do support our troops instead of being wasted.

The time of the senator has expired.

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

RUMSFELD:


COCHRAN:

DUREIN:

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Myers, and the staff that joined you.

Mr. Secretary, we all owe a great debt of gratitude to the men and women in service to our country, and I think we owe a

May 19, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Skelton Letter

Will someone please get me a copy of the letter that I or somebody in the Pentagon sent Ike Skelton about contractors. I was asked about it yesterday in the meeting, and I don't remember anything about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-5

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

011
1000



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - 01 0 27

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

May 28, 2004 5:00 PM

Paul Butler

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 05 1904-5

- You asked to see a copy of the letter sent to Rep Skelton (Tab 2) in response to his questions (Tab 3) concerning private security personnel in Iraq.
- Response was prepared by Reuben Jeffery's office.

Attachments:


1. SECDEF Snowflake
2. SECDEF's Response
3. Rep Skelton's Letter

11-L-0559/OSD/49028

OSD 081 59 - 04

ATCH 1

May 19, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld 
SUBJECT: Skelton Letter

Will someone please get me a copy of the letter that I or somebody in the Pentagon sent Ike Skelton about contractors. I was asked about it yesterday in the meeting, and I don't remember anything about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-5

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

11-L-0559/OSD/49029

OSD 08159704



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

CPA ATCH 2

MAY 4 2004

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Skelton:

Thank you for your letter of April 2 regarding private security personnel in Iraq. A discussion paper provided by the Coalition Provisional Authority responding to the points that you raised is attached.

Some Private Security Companies (PSCs) under contract in Iraq provide personal security services for senior civilian officials as well as some visiting delegations. They also provide physical security for non-military facilities inside the Green Zone and convoy protection for non-military goods. In addition, they provide protection for Governorate Support Teams consisting of CPA personnel and government contractors who team **with** local Iraqi officials to develop local government structures and functions.

It is my understanding that most PSCs doing business in Iraq do not work directly for the U.S. Government. They work under subcontracts to prime contractors to provide for the protection of their employees. Many PSCs are hired by other entities such as Iraqi companies or private foreign companies seeking business opportunities in Iraq. The CPA has established a PSC Working Group to provide a forum in which PSCs exchange information, and approximately 50 PSCs are actively involved in this group. The Attachment includes a current listing of known PSCs operating in Iraq today.

A draft CPA order on regulating PSCs, which will require certain data from each firm, has been prepared with input from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI). The Iraqi MOI and Ministry of Trade will be largely responsible for the administration of this and any revisions that may be promulgated by the Iraqi Interim Government after June 30.



OSD 04942-04

CPA 01302-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49030

Finally, the Department of Defense (DoD) is drafting uniform guidance regarding PSCs employed in Iraq under contract using U.S. appropriations.

I hope this is useful. We can provide additional information or a briefing if you would like.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Zuhair", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Attachments:
As stated

cc:
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer

ATTACHMENT

DISCUSSION PAPER PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES OPERATING IN IRAQ

SUMMARY

Private Security Companies (PSCs) operating in Iraq provide **only** defensive services. In the execution of these services, PSCs divide into two broad categories. *The first* category includes PSCs with which the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) contracts directly. The second category includes PSCs to which companies doing work for the CPA have awarded subcontracts. The overwhelming majority of PSCs are subcontractors. Because such information is proprietary and may have privacy implications, subcontracted PSCs and their parent companies generally do not make available details concerning the prices of their contracts, salaries, or number of employees.

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) is drafting regulations for the registration and vetting of PSCs. The regulations will comply with and complement existing and proposed Iraqi law and CPA orders, such as Iraq's new business law (CPA Order 64, which replaced the Iraqi New Company Law 21 of 1997). We anticipate completion of the PSC regulations sometime in May.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is coordinating with affected agencies to issue uniform guidance regarding PSCs employed in Iraq under contracts using U.S. appropriations.

DISCUSSION

CPA's Program Management Office (PMO), CPA Contracting, and the CPA-MOI have records of 60 PSCs in Iraq (Enclosure). Of those 60, the CPA has direct contracts with only 8, for obligations currently totaling about \$147 million: 81.4 million appropriated dollars and 65.5 million dollars in funds from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). It is important to note that more subcontracted PSCs will arrive in Iraq in support of the post-transition PMO reconstruction effort.

Approximately 20,000 personnel are employed by PSCs in Iraq. These employees are U.S. citizens, third-country nationals, and Iraqis.

PSCs provide three distinct security services: personal security details for senior civilian officials, non-military site security (buildings and infrastructure), and non-military convoy security. These services are defensive in nature.

PSCs work *for* the agency that contracts for their services. A PSC works for CPA if it has a contract with the CPA. If a PSC has a subcontract with a prime contractor to the CPA, then the PSC reports to the prime contractor.

Disciplining contractor personnel is the contractor's responsibility, not the CPA's. Normally, an individual who requires discipline is immediately removed from the country by the contractor. In the event that criminal accusations are made against contractor personnel, such accusations would be handled through a complaint made to the local Iraqi Police. In such a case, if the PSC employee was acting within the scope of his or her official employment under the terms and conditions of a contract with the Coalition Forces or CPA, and if the employee was not an Iraqi, then he or she would be immune from Iraqi legal process under the terms of CPA Order Number 17. The parent country of the contractor maintains a right

to waive the immunity. **If**, however, the PSC employee acted outside the scope of his or her official employment, the employee would be subject to Iraqi law. At this time, the approval of the CPA Administrator would still be required in order to proceed with legal action against a **PSC** employee.

Enclosure

LIST OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES OPERATING IN IRAQ

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 1. AD Consultancy | 33. KBR |
| 2. AKE Limited | 34. Kroll Associates |
| 3. Al Hamza | 35. Meteoric Tactical Solutions |
| 4. Armor Group | 36. Meyer & Associates |
| 5. Babylon | 37. MVM |
| 6. Bechtel | 38. NAF Security |
| 7. BH Defense | 39. Neareast Security |
| 8. BHD | 40. Olive |
| 9. Blackheart International LLC | 41. Omega Risk Solutions |
| 10. Blackwater | 42. Optimal Solution Services |
| 11. BriAM Defense | 43. Orion Management |
| 12. Castleforce Consultancy | 44. Overseas Security & Strategic
Information, Inc/Safenet - Iraq |
| 13. Control Risks Group | 45. Parsons |
| 14. CTU ASIA | 46. RamOPS Risk Management Group |
| 15. Custer Battles | 47. Reed |
| 16. D.S. Vance | 48. RONCO |
| 17. Diligence Middle East | 49. Rubicon |
| 18. DTS Security | 50. SAS/SASI |
| 19. Dyncorp Intl | 51. Sentinel |
| 20. EODT | 52. SGS |
| 21. Erinyes | 53. Smith Brandon Int |
| 22. Excalibre | 54. SOC-SMG |
| 23. GE International Inc. | 55. Sumer International Security |
| 24. Genric | 56. Tarik |
| 25. Global | 57. Triple Canopy |
| 26. Group 4 Falck A/S | 58. Unity Resources |
| 27. Hart Group | 59. USA Environmental |
| 28. Henderson Risk Ltd | 60. Wade-Boyd and Associates LLC |
| 29. Hill & Associates | |
| 30. ICP Group Ltd | |
| 31. IRC | |
| 32. ISI | |

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

April 2, 2004

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ROBERT C. KANDEL, STAFF DIRECTOR

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would like to first extend my sympathy and dismay over the recent brutal killings in Fallujah. All of the killings in Iraq — both of our troops and of contractors and civilians — have been unacceptable and tragic, but the murder and desecration of the four Americans working for Blackwater USA was particularly barbaric. I would hope that plans are being prepared for a measured but powerful response.

One of the issues raised by this tragedy is the role being played by private military firms such as Blackwater. Media reports indicate that at the time of the ambush, the personnel in question were providing security for a food delivery convoy. I also understand that Blackwater provides the personal security for Ambassador Paul Bremer.

I would like to request that you provide my office with a breakdown of information regarding private military and security personnel in Iraq. Specifically I would like to know which firms are operating in Iraq, how many personnel each firm has there, which specific functions they are performing, how much they are being paid, and from which appropriations accounts. Additionally, I would like to understand what the chain of command is for these personnel, what rules of engagement govern them, and how disciplinary or criminal accusations are handled if any such claims are levied against them.

Firms like Blackwater are clearly serving important functions in Iraq and putting themselves at risk. It is important that Congress have a clearer sense of the roles they are playing so that we can conduct effective oversight. I appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,



Ike Skelton
Ranking Democrat

11-L-0559/OSD/49035

6:04 PM

TO: Gen. Richardo Sanchez

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT:

We are pleased with the progress that is being made on the Governance front in Iraq. At least for the first day, it appears to be off to a fine start.

I know that you and your team have played an important part in getting us to this point and I want you to know that we are grateful to you and respectful of the important contribution you have all made.

TRM

Regards.

DHR/azn
060104.47


OSD 08186-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49036

1-2-04



8:48 AM

TO: Vice President Dick Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: June 2, 2004
SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached is an email I received from a Princeton classmate of mine concerning fusion energy. I assume you are up to speed on this. I am not, but I thought you might want to be aware of how enthusiastic he is about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060204.11

Attach: Email to SD from GamBurch 6/1/04

463

2 Jun 04

OSD 08193-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49037

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 01, 2004 5:43 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: Meeting at Princeton

(b)(6) and I were pleased at the opportunity to shake your hand at our 50th Princeton Reunion. We could only say a couple of words then, and we both wanted to send this note to tell you how very much we appreciate what you are doing for us and for our wonderful country. We know the job isn't easy, but I can't think of anyone who could take your place and do as well; so thank you again.

One of us (Rodger) has one comment to add. I worked at the Matterhorn Project from 1955 to 1959. At reunions I had a chance to see the progress since then. It appears to me they have developed a capability to actually achieve fusion energy. I thought you might like to know since such a development is the only way to solve the world's energy problem. Such an achievement would dwarf all that have been made to date, and be a truly historic accomplishment for the Bush Administration.

Yours sincerely,

Rodger Gamblin and (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

MAR 31 2005

March 31, 2005

TO: David Chu
CC: Mike Wynne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Immigrants in the Military

Please take a look at how a person who is not a U.S. citizen can join the military and then become a citizen. Can someone who is an illegal immigrant join the military? We take foreign citizens (Guatemalans, Hondurans, etc) in all the time and have hundreds of them.

Take a look at the attached article. There are some bright **folks** out there!

Thanks.

Attach.
3/29/05 *Washington Post* article by Peter Carlson

DHR:ss
033105-5

Please respond by 5/5/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08197-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49039

For Four Robotics Champs, Life After Victory Is, Well, Stinky

MAGAZINES, From CI

company that donated \$5,000 to the MIT team.

But the kids from Hayden High beat MIT and the rest of the competition in an amazing upset clinched in an astonishing story in the April issue of Wired magazine. AmeriLeans love a tale of victory, underdogs triumphing against long odds, and "Wide Robot" by Joshua Davis is a classic. It's not all the ingredients of a great good movie, but the weak, colorful characters, high theater, low comedy and a happy ending.

Well, a sort of happy ending. It began with a couple of Hayden science teachers putting their efforts to coach a team in the competition and the trouble the students had with the robot. The robot that can explore a simulated environment is a fine.

But the students' training was the robot's science was. And over the winter, so Sandhill's science teacher, who loves firing cars, was a very good student with his robot. And that's the end. It was a very good movie to watch. The robot's science was the robot's science. And over the winter, so Sandhill's science teacher, who loves firing cars, was a very good student with his robot. And that's the end. It was a very good movie to watch.

The Carl Hayden team tried to hide their nervousness but they were intimidated. Davis writes, "Dorcas had never seen so many white people in one place." Immediately, they had a problem. When Aranda lowered Stinky into the pool, they realized they had a leak. Not only did they have to re-solder every wire in the machine overnight, Vasquez told his teammates, but



about writing.

"The illiterate people from the desert?" Sandhill said he thought when they won, amazed that a bunch of "English as a Second Language" kids had just beaten America's most prestigious engineering school.

Their moment of triumph was sweet but short-lived. Vasquez and Aranda graduated from Hayden last spring, but they're not in college now. Davis writes, "because they're illegal immigrants and thus ineligible for student visas or citizenship." Vasquez is living in a Social Security office. Sandhill and Aranda are still at Hayden. Davis says, but their prospects for college also look dubious.

Is there anything more to come in these kids' lives?

The Forecast: Omnipus

In the latest cover story, Weatherwise, the venerable 58-year-old Washington-based meteorology magazine asks a question that's on the mind of people's minds these days: "To the weather getting worse?"

And the answer, boiled down from interviews with various scientists, is: Yes. "There is an increasingly clear message: At least some of the aspects of the world's climate are in fact becoming more extreme, and global warming is the likely cause," writes David Laskin.

What that means is that weather is going to get more exciting. More heat waves, more of them occurring in places that are already very hot. More rain, much of it coming in very heavy rainstorms. Also more cyclones. And perhaps more hurricanes and tornadoes. In short: more intense and extreme weather.

There is an ominous tone to scientists' pronouncements about the future that one didn't hear a few years ago, Laskin writes.

Then he quotes David Karoly, a professor at the University of Oklahoma School of Meteorology, as warning ominously: "We are entering a state which earth's climate has not seen for a very, very long period, at least 20,000 years. For the entire span of civilization, the earth has never experienced these temperatures."

This scary article did have one bit of good news, however: Remember "The Day After Tomorrow," the 2004 disaster movie that showed New York and the rest of the Northern Hemisphere being destroyed in a matter of days by a barrage of heat storms? The scientists are pretty sure that's not what's going to happen. And if it does, it's not going to be a movie.

Dall the Hack

Salvador Dali was one of the most famous artists of the 20th century. The artist painted not just pictures, but trees and tablecloths, and even a man in a suit of armor. He was a master of the surrealist style, and his work was a major influence on the art world.

To promote "The Wicker Man," a book he produced with Francis and Philip Robert Deachman in 1961, Dali dressed in a golden robe and lay in bed in a Manhattan bookstore, writes Stanley Meisler. "Attended by a doctor and his wife) Gala, he signed books while lying in a machine that recorded his heart waves and blood pressure. A copy of the book was presented to the publisher. Wow! The PR hit his last great office. The old Sal Dali decided to go into the game.



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

11-0559/OSD/49041
2011-07-07 11:09:50

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Immigrants in the Military

- You recently asked questions about citizenship requirements for military enlistment. (Tab A).
- Title 10, USC, sections 3253 and 8253, state that to be eligible for enlistment an individual must be an American citizen or lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence (Green Card).
- Title 8, USC requires immigrants to be resident aliens for 5 years before they can apply for U.S. citizenship. Immigrants serving in the U.S. Armed Forces may apply for U.S. citizenship after 1 year of honorable service, and further, during times of conflict, the President can authorize immediate application for U.S. citizenship to those serving in the military. Executive Order 13269 (July 3, 2002) authorized this exception effective September 11, 2001.
- The Department supports the enlistment of otherwise qualified (legal) resident aliens.
- Illegal immigrants are not eligible to join the military. However, Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Richard Durbin (D-IL) have cosponsored "the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act," to offer citizenship to youth who grew up in the U.S. and graduated high school, but are categorized as illegal.
- The DREAM Act would establish a "conditional permanent resident status" for students who came to the U.S. before they were 16 years old and have lived in the U.S. for at least 5 years before enactment and elect military service or pursue a higher degree.
- We are discussing the merits of the proposed legislation with the Services

Prepared by: Dr. Jane Arabian, OUSD(P&R)/MPP/AP, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/49041

OSD 08197-05

MAR 31 2005

~~FOUO~~

March 31, 2005

TO: David Chu
CC: Mike Wynne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Immigrants in the Military

Please take a look at how a person who is not a U.S. citizen can join the military and then become a citizen. Can someone who is an illegal immigrant join the military? We take foreign citizens (Guatemalans, Hondurans, etc) in all the time and have hundreds of them.

Take a look at the attached article. There are some bright folks out there!

Thanks.

Attach.
3/29/05 *Washington Post* article by Peter Carlson

DHR:ss
033105-5

.....
Please respond by 5/5/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08197-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49042

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Adm. Ed Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Singapore

Attached is a summary on some of the things Singapore is doing with respect to transformation and jointness. I found it interesting. Maybe we ought to think through some steps we should take with respect to jointness that are yet to be done.

Ed, please come back to me with a proposal for consideration.

Thanks.

DHR/rum
060204.0504s

Attach: Singapore & Transformation, Lin Wells 6.2.04

Please respond by: 6/17

SMITH-RE

2 June 04

OSD 08200-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49044

Singapore and Transformation

- Singapore is living jointness. Flag and general officers for all three services are chosen by a joint selection board chaired by the DepSecDef-equivalent. Command and control (C2) programs are "born" joint, and have been since the late 1970s.
- Singapore recently has designated an active duty general officer (BG Jimmy Khoo) as the "Future Systems Architect" for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). One percent of Singapore's defense budget is "fenced" for experimentation and future architecture.
- The Singapore Armed Forces are putting special emphasis on Integrated, Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2), trying to think through C2 in a network-centric environment. In November 2003 the "SAF Centre for Military Experimentation" was opened, incorporating a C4I Lab, a Command Post of the Future, and a Battlelab, along with a 12-experiment program scheduled for 2004. They want to cooperate more with the US in experimentation, and have expressed an interest in putting a liaison officer at JFCOM.
- In January 2004 Singapore's Ministry of Defence hosted a meeting entitled Island Forum II, focused on "Information in Conflict." Based on DoD's "Highlands Forum," the session was attended by all the senior civilian and military leadership of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and about 20 foreign invitees from the US, UK, Australia, Sweden, India and Israel.
- One of the most interesting insights from the Forum was into Singapore's response to the 2003 SARS crisis. Their actions represented a classic use of the full spectrum of information operations (IO) tools against an asymmetric and unexpected national security threat. Singapore's leadership assembled quickly a national-level team and supporting groups to counter both the Corona Virus itself and the panic, fear and hype surrounding it. The command, control and coordination of information, combined with an approach of being upfront and honest with the public from the first, was a key part of a global battle to enlist community backing, maintain morale, allay fears, and develop international support. High technology, internet services, and even rap groups, plus tough calls like the "culling" of popular animals, were formed into an integrated, multi-lingual, global campaign that ultimately succeeded. US public affairs and IO personnel could use Singapore's actions as a case study for a wide variety of unconventional national security responses.
- A two-page summary of the Forum is available, if desired.

Lin Wells

1

TO: Secretary Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT:

Thanks for your note in response to my memo of March 17 concerning updating systems and procedures. It is helpful, except it does not address my memo.

I would appreciate your going back and addressing the issues in my memo. In the meantime, I will think about your memo of May 28'.

Thanks,

DHR/azn
060204 0604

Attach: 3/17/04 memo re: Updating Systems/Procedures & SecNav Response

Please respond by: _____

6/5

381

25 Jun 04

C6/2
March 17, 2004

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: updating systems and Procedures

S14,
SecNav Response
is last under.
w/CD Nosenzo
6/2

We have had a series of difficulties over the past three years, where only after a period of serious problems with a DoD system or process have we realized that we were still in the industrial age, rather than the 21st century.

For example:

- DoD Contingency Plans were out of date, and the process for preparing them was antiquated, excessively long and not suitable for the 21st century. Now we are fixing them.
- The deployment process for the Iraq conflict was broken. Now we are fixing it.
- The balance between the Active component and the Reserve component was clearly out of whack. Now we are rebalancing the ACRC.
- Our SRO procedures were sluggish and out of date. Now they have been revamped.
- Today we read that the pay systems for the Guard and Reserve are okay if the Guard and Reserve are doing one weekend per month and a two-week active duty period per year, but seriously inadequate when we are mobilizing to the extent we have had to during the Iraq conflict.

OSD 03937-04

I am concerned about what we'll discover next that is broken. We've made lots of progress on the operational side, but please review the systems, procedures and business practices that you use and/or are responsible for, and advise me of those that you believe we need to fix now, before we need them and before we discover they are not suited to the 21st century. I'd like to try to get ahead of the curve.

Please coordinate your responses with Ken Krieg in PA&E.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031304-23

.....
Please respond by 4/14/04

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CoS Army

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COCOM: EUCOM, NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM, PACOM,
SOUTHCOM, JFCOM, CENTCOM

USFK

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 28, 2004

2004 MAY 28 PM 3:09

Paul Butler
PWB
4/2

To: SECDEF
Fr: SECNAV
Subj: Updating Systems and Procedures Response

Mr. Secretary,

You asked that the CNO, the *Commandant* and I review systems, procedures and business practices and let you know what I think *needs* fixing. In our judgment, concentrating on one specific initiative will provide many other benefits for the DOD. Specifically, responsibility and accountability between *OSD staff* and the Services need to be aligned.

Discussion:

The Goldwater-Nichols Act clarified the chain of command from the President to the SECDEF to the Combatant Commanders; however, it left the relationship between OSD staff and the Service Secretaries vague.

Title 10 specifies that Service Secretaries have the responsibility and authority to carry out their obligations. Title 10 also specifies that all authority and responsibility flow from the SECDEF. Conflicts arise when it is not clear what authorities and responsibilities have been passed to the OSD staff. This is a fundamental management issue; that is, we need to align and document authorities and responsibilities. Today, confusion and frustration exist.

Recommendation:

We need to systemically address the problem starting with a SLRG level discussion. I would be happy to lead that discussion and offer approaches to move toward resolution. If, after the SLRG, you agree that this is an important issue, I would be pleased to lead or serve on a team to bring back options to clarify responsibility between the OSD Staff and the Services. The objective should be to align and publish authorities, responsibilities and accountability for all operating departments in the Pentagon and especially between Service Secretaries and OSD staff.

TSA SD	6/1
SRMA SD	6/1
MA SD	6/1
EXEC DEC	6/1

OSD-08024-04

2

SECRET
101.771 L 1112 23

June 9, 2004

To: SECDEF

Fr: SECNAV

Subj: Updating Systems and Procedures

Mr. Secretary,

Sorry we missed the mark on answering your memo – although I still strongly urge we align responsibility and accountability between OSD staff and the Services. That said, a more responsive list is attached.

Attachment:

As stated

OSD 08201-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49050

Defense Health Care

-For FY 05 through FY 11, Defense Health Care is estimated to increase from 30B to **42B** per year, but the Department of the Navy is unaware of any cost containment strategies.

-There is a need for a mechanism to derive and execute a strategy that explicitly links effective management of resources to an enterprise-wide system of providing for all medical activities within DoD.

Total Workforce Master Plan (TWMP)

-DoD is in the process of rebalancing the active and reserve components, but is doing so without the benefit of a Total Workforce Master Plan.

-The civil service and contractor components of the workforce are not being addressed. There is not a system for reporting past or current inventory and costs of contractor support personnel that is department-wide in coverage, accurate, widely accepted, and timely.

-Creating a TWMP that provides new organizational strategies for planning and accomplishing workloads, inventories, skills/education/training, and costs is a crucial step in addressing manpower issues that pose challenges to the Department.

Technical Competence

-We need a strategy for managing DoD technical expertise vice solely relying on contracting for the expertise. We are creating managers, with little technical and engineering know-how. Education is emphasized in the Services, but only with a management, or joint warfighting focus (e.g., EMBNJPME). Organic technical competency needs to be revitalized. During the Cold War, technical skill and analysis leading to a technical edge was important and were proficient at it. Today, we have lost our vision with respect to technology as a result of losing a peer competitor to measure our progress against.

BMMP/ERP

-Performance measurements and budget performance integration is impossible without a real-time, responsive financial management system.

-Uniformity of systems across DoD is desirable but not essential and probably not achievable at a reasonable cost and in a reasonable time frame. Private sector organizations with different systems-achieve effectiveness and efficiency by focusing on the right interfaces and so can DoD. BMMP, in its current form, is likely to both eliminate Service systems with great potential and fail to develop into the uniform, overarching system that has been projected.

-Navy has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on four Enterprise Resource program pilots. This effort will dramatically improve the Navy's supply chain, reduce costs and improve combat capability. It can also be modified to feed into any financial system eventually developed at the OSD level for the entire department. It is important to incentivize military departments to initiate bottom-up programs of this type while OSD is developing a longer-term top-level approach. If BMMP is overly prescriptive, the probability of failure significantly increases.

Working Capital Fund

-The Working Capital Fund concept is an attempt to instill commercial business practices into the Department to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Neither of these goals is being met, primarily because the stove-piped underlying business processes have not been reengineered to adopt best practices of the commercial market.

Long Term Maintenance

-The ongoing wear and tear on combat equipment in the current GWOT will have long-term negative implications if a strategy for coping with it is not established immediately.

-The deterioration of equipment exceeds that anticipated in life-cycle planning when the equipment was programmed and purchased.

If current OPTEMPO levels continue past **FY 2006**, this will be problematic. It will require serious strategy and budgetary decisions. Supplementals are not the answer if this truly becomes a long-term issue.

-As operations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps will lose more vehicles to battle damage and drastically increased wear and tear than it can replace or repair within current budgetary resources.

-Requires a long-term strategy to compensate for the potential of increased OPTEMPO across the FYDP and beyond.

TO: George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Memo of Agreement

I just received your memo on the Memorandum of Agreement for TTIC. I can't believe we haven't answered you in over a year. I don't know that you have ever raised this issue in our lunches. I'll get somebody on it trying to figure out what the problem is, but it is all news to me.

Thanks.

DHR:am
060204.06bts

350.09

25004

OSD 08202-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49053

~~FOUO~~

FEB 28 2005

SECRET

February 28, 2005

2005 FEB 28 10:51

340

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: The Age of the Force

Please look hard and come back to me with some proposals that would do the following two things:

- 1) Increase the age limits for people to be able to enter the Services.
- 2) Increase the age of people before they are affected by the current relentless "up or out" policies. My impression is that we could enlarge the pool of people if we allow people to enter at a somewhat older age and serve to a somewhat older age once in.

In the 21st Century, people are living longer and working longer. Also, the **U.S.** military increasingly needs people with maturity, experience, and technical skills that can benefit from and not be damaged by somewhat higher age levels.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
022505-25

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

28 FEB 2005

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49054

OSD 08222-05

MAR 23 2005

~~FOUO~~

March 23, 2005

75 11 3 53

340

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Raising of *the* Recruiting Age in Army Reserve and Guard

I was stunned to see that the Army Reserve and Guard have raised the maximum age. This is something I have been talking about doing for several years. Why haven't we done it earlier? What about the other services? Why not draw from a larger pool? I am amazed it could be done that easily. assumed it was in statute. What's the story?

Thanks.

Attach.
3/22/05 USA Today article by Tom Squitieri

DHR:as
032205-178

.....
Please respond by

4/5/05

23 MAR 05

~~FOUO~~

28 Feb 05

OSD 08222-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49055

USA Today
 March 22, 2005
 Pg. 1

Reserve, Guard Raise Recruiting Age

Move adds 22.6M potential enlistees

By Tom Squitieri, USA Today

WASHINGTON — Battered by an unusually tough recruiting season, the Army has raised the maximum age for recruits for the National Guard and the Army Reserve by five years, from the current 34 years old to 39. The change, which went into effect Friday, gives the Army access to another 22.6 million potential enlistees.

The change for the Army Guard and Reserve does not affect recruits for the active-duty Army, the Marines, the Navy or the Air Force, all of whom must still be no older than 34. Recruits for all branches must be at least 17 to sign up.

The Army and the Marines have both encountered setbacks in the current recruiting year, but the Army's two "part-time" branches have suffered the worst shortfalls. As of the end of February, five months into the October-September recruiting year, the Army Reserve was more than 10% behind its 2005 recruiting target, and the National Guard was 24% behind its target, Pentagon figures show.

Recruiting has been depressed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and by yearlong combat call-ups for part-time Guard members and reservists, who usually drill one week a month and two weeks in the summer in peacetime.

"We anticipate that recruiting challenges will continue in 2005," Charles Abell, deputy undersecretary of Defense for personnel and readiness, told Congress recently.

"Experience has shown that older recruits who cannot meet the physical demands of military service generally make excellent soldiers based on their maturity, motivation, loyalty and patriotism," an Army statement said.

The change applies to men and women with no prior military service who want to enlist in the Army Guard or Reserve. The military accepts older recruits with prior service, and the Army has recalled some former troops in their 50s and 60s for certain specialty jobs.

Loren Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute, an Arlington, Va., think tank, says the change is "long overdue" because the military has been so thinly stretched by major deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Warfare has become more suitable for middle-age troops, he says. "Hand-to-hand combat is not a common thing today."

About 45% of the 149,000 U.S. forces in Iraq are part-time troops, Pentagon figures show.

<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/cgi-bin/ebird/displaydata.pl?Requested=/ebfiles/e20050322359199...> 3/22/2005

TAB

C



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3200 RUSSELL ROAD
QUANTICO, VA 22134-5103

IN REPLY REFER TO:

1133
MPO-40
APR 1 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY)

Subj: RAISING ACCESSION AGE LIMITS

Ref: (a) ADUSD(MPP) email of 24 Mar 05
(b) MCO P1100.72C, EnlProcMan

Encl: (1) CNA memo of 14 Feb 05

1. Per reference (a), the Marine Corps has reviewed our accessions policy as it relates to age limits for individuals who enlist. Our policy, which is applicable to both the Active and Reserve Componenta, is current and supports our force. As such, modification is not necessary or desired.

2. While both components set the maximum age for enlistment at 28, a waiver policy exists for ages up to 35. Reference (b) promulgates age qualifications for enlistment into the Marine Corps as follows:

a. Non-prior service enlistments - enlist individuals who are between 17 and 28 years of age. Commanding generals of the recruiting regions may waive the 28-year limit on a case-by-case basis.

b. Prior service enlistments - maximum constructive age is 32. Only the commanding general of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command may waive the age limit.

3. By nature and requirement, the Marine Corps is a "young warrior" force and we recruit younger individuals to maintain this force. Our units consist of large numbers of junior Marines.

4. Older recruits have lower retention rates. A recent review at enclosure (1) shows that Marine Corps recruit attrition increaaees as the age of accession increases - rising from under 10 percent for 17 and 18 year olds to over 18 percent fox those over 29. This relationship may be due to several factors:

a. Physical requiremente. As recruits age, enduring the rigors of recruit training may be more difficult.


11-L-0559/OSD/49058

Subj: RAISING ACCESSION AGE LIMITS

b. Family commitments, Older individuals who have family may be under greater stress.

c. A career in the Marine Corps was not the 'first choice' for older recruits—meaning either that they are less motivated to succeed or that they may have a good 'fall-back' career if they fail.

5. Point of contact is Maj C. McCloskey, (b)(6)



T. F. GHORMLEY
Major General, USMC
Director, Manpower Plans and Policy Division



4825 Mark Center Drive • Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1850 • (703) 824-2000 • (703) 821-2949 FAX

CME D0011582.A1 /14 February 2005


Memorandum for the Director, Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs

Subj: Raising Accession Age Limits

The Army may request SecDef approval to enlist Reserve Component (RC) members (Army National Guard and Army Reserve) up to age 40. The question may arise whether the Marine Corps (which currently has an age limit of 28 for non-prior service enlistees and 34 for RC enlistees) should take a similar step.

To examine this issue, we examined 3-month (roughly the length of bootcamp) attrition rates by age at accession for the roughly 500,000 active-duty enlisted accessions between FY88-03.

Figure 1. Marine Corps bootcamp attrition increases with age of accession (FY88-03)¹




¹ Data from the Defense Manpower Data Center.

As Figure 1 shows, bootcamp attrition increases almost monotonically as the age of accession increases—rising from under 10 percent to over 18 percent. This shows that the "price" paid for older recruits is higher bootcamp attrition.

1. LTC BJ Constantine, *Age Limits for Accession Into the Armed Force*, 9 Feb 2005.

This trend also is observed for the Navy's recruits. Looking at accessions over the 1990-2003 period, we see that Navy bootcamp attrition also increases as age at accession increases (see figure 2).

Figure 2. Navy bootcamp attrition increases with age of accession (FY80-03)^a



a. From CNA's "Street-to-Fleet" Navy database.

This relationship may be due to several factors. First, it could be purely physical—as recruits age, it may be more difficult for them to endure the rigors of bootcamp. Second, older individuals may have more family commitments, making bootcamp more stressful for them. Third, it is likely that a career in the Marine Corps was not the 'first choice' for older recruits—meaning either that they are less motivated to succeed or that they may have a good 'fall-back' career if they fail.

To meet endstrength requirements, bootcamp attrites must be replaced by new recruits. Because the probability of having to replace an older recruit is almost double that for younger recruits, it does not appear that raising age limits would be a cost-effective strategy for the Marine Corps to pursue.

Anita U. Hattiangadi
Scientific Analyst, MP M&RA

Lewis G. Lee
Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps (ret)

Canadian Forces "Enrollment" (Enlistment) Policy

Purpose. To provide information on the Canadian Forces policy on enlisting persons over the age of 35.

Issue. Since 1989, the Canadian Forces have allowed persons over the age of 35 to "enroll" (i.e., enlist) for military service.

Bottom Line

In 1989, the Canadian Forces "enrollment age policy" changed to allow persons over age 35 to enlist for military service as long as they could complete a specified period of service (described below) prior to the Compulsory Retirement Age of 55. This changed to age 60 on 1 July 2004.

Although no formal analysis has been done by the Canadian Forces since allowing persons over the age of 35 to enlist, limited data suggests that older enlistees complete the "Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School" at a lower rate than persons under age 35.

Background.

- Canadian Forces changed its "enrollment age policy" in 1989 to comply with the Canadian Human Rights Act, which forbids discrimination on the basis of age.
 - Provision allowed persons over age 35 to enlist as long as they can complete a "specified period of service" before they reach the Compulsory Retirement Age of 55 (changed to age 60 on 1 July 2004)
 - The "Basic Engagement" for an unskilled non-commissioned applicant is 3 years.

- The "Basic Engagement" for an unskilled officer applicant is 9 years.
- "Skilled applicants (those possessing professional skills as demonstrated by a "Prior Learning Assessment") may be enlisted for a shorter period.
- Applicants over age 40 are counseled that they may be unable to reach the twenty years of service required for an immediate, unreduced annuity.
 - Canadian Forces are expecting to change the policy sometime in 2005 to allow individuals to be eligible for a deferred annuity after only two years of service.
- Limited data obtained from the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School in St. Jean, Quebec (during the period 1 Apr 04 – 8 Mar 05):
 - Pass rate for enlisted recruits under 35 86.2%
 - Pass rate for enlisted recruits 35 and over 65.9%
 - Pass rate for officer cadets under 35 96.7%
 - Pass rate for officer cadets 35 and over 89.5%
- Data does not include training failures during subsequent occupation training.

Prepared by: LTC BJ Constantine, J-1/DAG (b)(6)



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO



340

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Questions on Maximum Recruiting Age

- You posed several questions regarding maximum age for recruiting. (Tabs A and B).
- Law generally sets an age limit of 35 for the active components, yet there is no statutory age ceiling for reserve enlistment. By policy, we have aligned active and reserve age parameters; thus we were able under DoD authority to approve the 3-year pilot test allowing Army Reserve Components to accept recruits up to the age of 40.
- In July 2005, we will hold the next in an ongoing series of "summits" to discuss the merit of legislative and policy change in major areas, and I have informed the Services that age standards will be a central topic.
- U.S. experience and international experience by the Canadians suggest that older entrants fail to complete training and initial obligations at a significantly higher rate. The summit review will allow us to evaluate this, as will the Army's new pilot.
- We already have proposed legislation for the presently-pending NDAA '06 cycle that would allow "demonstration project" authority. If enacted, you would be empowered to set recruitment age standards under your own authority.
- I will keep you abreast of progress as we continue to push for cost-effective policy – one that expands the market, yet does so without inviting exorbitant attrition.

29 HHS

Prepared by: Mr. Bob Clark, OUSD(P&R)/MPP/AP

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/49063

OSD 08222-05

28 HHS

FOUO

April 29, 2005

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Your Note on Chris Hill

Thanks so much for your note. It is a good idea, and I'll do it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
042905-4

.....
Please respond by _____

Korea

29APR05

OSD 08226-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49064

Plunkett, Lynn L, Capt, OSD

From: CCST MSG CTR [CCSTMSGCTR@korea.army.mil]
Sent: Friday, April 29, 2005 5:42 PM
To: SecDef Cables ESO
Subject: RE: SD Snowflake for GEN LaPorte "Your Note On Chris Hill"

We have received the message and will pass on to Gen LaPorte.

VIR
SGT Johnson

From: Plunkett, Lynn L, Capt, OSD [mailto:Lynn.Plunkett@osd.mil] **On Behalf Of** SecDef Cables ESO
Sent: Saturday, April 30, 2005 06:36
To: CCST MSG CTR; SecDef Cables ESO
Subject: SD Snowflake for GEN LaPorte "Your Note On Chris Hill"

Please pass to GEN LaPorte and confirm receipt.
VIR
Cables
IIP

-----Original Message-----

From: CCST MSG CTR [mailto:CCSTMSGCTR@korea.army.mil]
Sent: Friday, April 29, 2005 5:31 PM
To: cableseso@osd.mil
Subject: This is a contact msg

Contact message for message traffic.

V/r

SFC Jones

4/29/2005

11-L-0559/OSD/49065


~~FOUO~~

April 29, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: In Your Honor



Mr. President,

Today I mentioned to you that you have been honored by having a new species of beetle named for you. Here is the article. I think you will enjoy it - it's a first!

Respectfully,



Attach.

4/13/05 Cornell University Press Release

DHR:ss
042905-16

OSD 08237-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49066

3355D

29APR05

Billingslea, Rachel, CIV, OSD

Subject: FOR THE BOSS (per this morning's NSC Discussion): Cornell News Slime-mold beetle named for Bush



**Cornell University
News Service**

FOR RELEASE: April 13, 2005
Media contact: Press Relations
Phone: 607-255-6074
E-Mail: pressoffice@cornell.edu

Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld are now species of slime-mold beetles -- but strictly in homage

ITHACA, N.Y. -- U.S. President George Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld may not all get a library, airport or highway named after them. But each has a slime-mold beetle named in his honor.

Two former Cornell University entomologists who recently had the job of naming 65 new species of slime-mold beetles named three species that are new to science in the genus *Agathidium* for members of the U.S. administration. They are *A. bushi* Miller and Wheeler, *A. cheneyi* Miller and Wheeler and *A. rumsfeldi* Miller and Wheeler.

The entomologists also named some of the new species after their wives and a former wife, Pocahontas, Hernan Cortez, the Aztecs, the fictional "Star Wars" villain Darth Vader ("who shares with *A. vaderi* a broad, shiny, helmetlike head"), Frances Fawcett (their scientific illustrator) and the Greek words for "ugly" and "having prominent teeth" and the Latin word for "strange." Many of the other names they used for the recently described beetles were derived from various geographic locations, such as California, Georgia and a few states in Mexico, and for various distinguishing features they discovered on the beetles.

The decision to name three slime-mold beetles after Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld, however, didn't have anything to do with physical features, says Quentin Wheeler, a professor of entomology and of plant biology at Cornell for 24 years until last October, but to pay homage to the U.S. leaders. "We admire these leaders as fellow citizens who have the courage of their convictions and are willing to do the very difficult and unpopular work of living up to principles of freedom and democracy rather than accepting



Drawing by Frances Fawcett, Ithaca, NY.

A slime-mold beetle of the genus *Agathidium* closely related to new species named for President George Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Click on the image for a high-resolution version (1007 x 1358 pixels, 585K)

the expedient or popular," says Wheeler, who named the beetles and wrote the recently published monograph describing the new slime-mold beetle species while a professor at Cornell.

Wheeler is now the keeper and head of entomology at the Natural History Museum in London. The monograph, which is co-authored by Kelly B. Miller, Cornell Ph.D. '01 and currently a postdoctoral fellow at Bingham Young University, was published in the March 24, 2005, issue of the *Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural History*.

Wheeler and Miller collected and borrowed thousands of specimens of slime-mold beetles -- named for the fungilike molds on which they feed -- in order to study their evolution and classification. In so doing, they found that more than five dozen in North and Central America had never before been described.

According to rules established by the International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature, the first word of a new species is its genus; the second word must end in "i" if it's named after a person; and the final part of the name includes the person or persons who first described the species. That's why all the new slime-mold beetle species' names end with Miller and Wheeler.

For anyone who may want to hunt down one of the new slime-mold beetles named for Bush, Cheney or Rumsfeld, Wheeler says that *Agathidium bushi* so far is known from southern Ohio, North Carolina and Virginia; *Agathidium rumsfeldi* is known from Oaxaca and Hidalgo in Mexico; and *Agathidium cheneyi* is known from Chiapas, Mexico.

Related World Wide Web sites: The following sites provide additional information on this news release. Some might not be part of the Cornell University community, and Cornell has no control over their content or availability.

- Quentin Wheeler: <http://www.nhm.ac.uk/entomology/staffpages/qwheeler.html>
- Kelly Miller: <http://inbio.byu.edu/faculty/mfw2/whitinglab/KBM.htm>

-30-

| [April release index](#) | | [Cornell News Service Home Page](#) |



UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

275 1 11 05

ACTION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

April 29, 2005 – 1:30 PM

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense, P&R

SUBJECT: *David S. C. Chu & J. J. G. G. G.*
Role of Medical Personnel in Detainee Operations--SNOWFLAKE

- You asked “How could what was going on at Abu Ghraib and possibly some of the abuse at other locations not be noted by medical people? Any why would medical people not have reported it?” (TAB A)
- In November 2004, the Army Surgeon General initiated a comprehensive review of medical participation in detainee operations, including policies and procedures, management of medical records, incidents of failure to report suspected abuse, and adequacy of training. The review team interviewed more than 1,000 medical personnel at all levels who served in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay, including personnel from all three Services, active and Guard/Reserves. This report is nearly complete, and I will soon receive it. It should include fact finding on medical reporting on suspected detainee abuse.
- The conduct of medical personnel in detainee operations has been a priority concern since April 2002, when Dr. Winkenwerder published guidelines on medical care for enemy persons detained in conjunction with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (TAB B).
- We have also acted to address concerns regarding whether autopsies were properly requested in cases of detainee deaths. In June 2004, Dr. Winkenwerder developed, and you issued, a policy memo: “Procedures for Investigation into Deaths of Detainees in the Custody of the Armed Forces of the United States.”
- Our most important policy initiative – consistent with Church recommendations – has been to develop an OSD policy memorandum to reaffirm enduring medical principles on detainee care and strengthen medical system procedures – including those for reporting suspected detainee abuse. This policy memorandum, “Medical Program Principles and Procedures for the Protection and Treatment of Detainees,” was approved by the Deputy Secretary on April 22, 2005 (TAB C).

383.6

29 Apr 05

11 Apr 05

RECOMMENDATION: We would like to meet with you to ensure that all your questions and concerns are answered, and to provide you a detailed summary of the Army Surgeon General's report, including major findings and recommendations.

CONCUR_____ NON-CONCUR_____ OTHER_____

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Colonel David Adams, OASD(HA) (b)(6)

TAB

A

FOUO

APR 11 2005

TO: Pete Geren
MG Mike Maples

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Abu Ghraib

How could what was going on at Abu Ghraib and possibly, same of the abuse in other locations not be noted by medical people? And why would medical people not have reported it?

Thanks.

DHR:ee
040805-17

.....
Please respond by 4/21/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49072

OSD 08249-05

TAB

B



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

APR 10 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: DoD Policy on Medical Care for Enemy Persons Under U.S. Control
Detained in Conjunction with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

REFERENCES: (a) DoD Directive **5136.1**, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs (ASD(HA))," May **27, 1994**

(b) DoD Directive **2310.1**, "DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of
War (EPOW) and Other Detainees," August **18, 1994**

(c) Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War of August **12, 1949**

(d) **AR 190-8**, **OPNAVINST 3461.6**, **AFJI 31-304**, **MCO 3461.1**,
"Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees
and Other Detainees," 1 October **1997**

This policy memorandum, issued under the authority of reference (a), provides guidance, consistent with references (b) through (d), for medical care for enemy detainees under U.S. control.

To the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, medical care shall be provided consistent with reference (d). Detainees under U.S. control suffering from a serious disease, or whose condition necessitates special treatment, surgery, hospital care, or rehabilitation shall be provided, to the extent feasible, the medical attention required by their state of health. All practicable efforts shall be made to provide such care at the location where such persons are detained. The health of each detainee under U.S. control shall be monitored and medical records shall be maintained as provided in reference (d).

In any case in which there is uncertainty about the need, scope, or duration of medical care for a detainee under U.S. control, medical personnel shall be guided by their professional judgments and standards similar to those that would be used to evaluate medical issues for U.S. personnel, consistent with security, public health management,

HA POLICY: 02-005

11-L-0559/OSD/49074

and other mission requirements. Specific requests for guidance, that cannot be resolved at a lower level, will be forwarded through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to this office for resolution.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "William Winkenwerder, Jr." in a cursive script.

William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD.

HA POLICY: 02-005

11-L-0559/OSD/49075

TAB

C



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1200

1990-1991

201 10/13 21 5:00

ACTION MEMO

REGISTRATION
04/22/05 4/2
17

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., M.D., ASD (Health Affairs)

THROUGH : David S. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

SUBJECT: Medical Program Principles and Procedures for the Protection and Treatment of Detainees - Policy Memo

APR 11 2005

DEP SEC DEF
HAS SEEN
PRV APPR
APR 22 2005

- The memo at TAB A reaffirms key principles of participation by U.S. Armed Forces medical personnel in Department of Defense detainee operations and describes procedures consistent with these principles.
- **This** memo will help address three significant concerns:
 - Church Report findings, including the call for a DoD-level policy review in the **areas** of training programs, use of behavioral science personnel assisting interrogators in developing interrogation strategies, interrogator access to detainee medical information, and the obligation to report detainee abuse (TAB B).
 - Feedback from our U.S. **Armed** Forces medical personnel stating a need for more explicit policy guidance for detainee operations.
 - Allegations of military medical involvement in detainee abuse expressed by civilian medical opinion leaders, the **American** Medical Association, international medical organizations, the International Committee of the Red **Cross**, and others.
- The memo's principles are derived from widely recognized international medical guidelines protecting prisoners and detainees against torture and abuse, including a U.N. General Assembly Resolution (although the memo does not cite the source). Adjustments have been made to incorporate law of **armed conflict** principles and standards of **U.S.** law.
- Major points of the proposed memo:

Prepared by: Col David Adams, OASD (HA), (b)(6) DOCS Open 77432, 77434, 77438

OSD 07030:

11-L-0559/OSD/49077

- o Medical personnel engaged in treatment of detainees have a **duty** to give them proper care and protect their health.
 - o Medical personnel in a provider-patient relationship with detainees have the ~~exclusive purpose of providing health care.~~
 - o Medical personnel not in a provider-patient relationship (e.g., behavioral science consultants to interrogators) do not become involved in treatment activities.
 - o Regardless of role, medical personnel, like ALL US Armed Forces, may not be complicit, actively or passively, in detainee abuse.
 - o The disclosure of medical information for lawful law enforcement or intelligence purposes is allowed, but must be approved and documented through an appropriate process.
 - o Medical personnel have a **duty** to report suspected detainee abuse to the chain of command, and should also, when needed, report through medical channels to senior leadership.
- Given a persistently vocal group of Department critics from the medical community, and the media's continual reporting of these allegations and concerns, I believe this memo will be very beneficial to the Department.
 - This memo is not groundbreaking, nor does it establish new precedents that will limit other military activities. However, it fills a significant void in communicating Department policy to internal and external audiences, and reinforces longstanding tenets of military medicine.
 - Unless you have an objection or concern, I propose **that** this policy memorandum, which has been reviewed extensively within OSD and the Joint Staff, be signed out under my office.

DEPSEC Action:

Concur 4/22/05

Non-Concu. _____

Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB C ~Missing 4/22/05

Attachments:

As stated

~~FOUO~~

APR 11 2005

TO: Fete Geren
MG Mike Maples

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Abu Ghraib

Row could what **was** going on at **Abu** Ghraib and **possibly**, some of the abuse in other locations not be **noted by** medical people? **And** why would **medical** people not **have** reported it?

Thanks,

DHR:sa
040805-17

.....
Please respond by 4/21/05

FOUO

OSD 08249-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49079

2/12
4900

720

In reply refer to EF-8435 and 04/001760

February 8, 2004

2/18
Sec Def
TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Sudan Peace Agreements

I take it you are up to speed with what is going on with respect to the Sudan peace agreements.

Thanks.

DHR:da
020804-87

.....
Please respond by

2/11/04

2/16 *✓ 2/20*
2/19
Rodman is. See
attached memo.

2/18

TEN 2/19

OSD 08254-04

11 L 0550/00D/40000

TAB 2

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

APR 04 2005

2005 APR -2 PM 2:57

TO: COL Steve Bucci
CC: Dan Stanley
Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressman Pat Kennedy

I want to have Congressman Pat Kennedy over to the Pentagon sometime in the next three weeks, without fail. Please see that is happens.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
040103-9

.....
Please respond by 4/28/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08291-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49081

~~FOUO~~

May 2, 2005

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen J. Hadley

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Peter McPherson

Attached is some material on Peter McPherson. I haven't dealt with him in a number of years, but he might be an appropriate candidate for Ambassador to Afghanistan or Deputy Secretary of Treasury. He has already served as Deputy Secretary of Treasury once. He also could be a candidate for AID, if that comes open.

Thanks.

Attach.
Peter McPherson Background Sheet

DHR:dh
050205-19

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08302-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49082

230.02

2 May 05

M. Peter McPherson



Office of the President
Michigan State University
450 Administration Building
East Lansing, MI 48824-1046
Tel.: (b)(6)

EXPERIENCE:

PRESIDENT, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY - OCTOBER 1993-PRESENT

Forty four thousand (44,000) students. Extensive research and outreach. Budget of \$1.1 Billion.

BANK OF AMERICA

GROUP EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP- APRIL 1993 - OCTOBER 1993

Responsible for personal trust development, domestic and international private banking, institutional investment and mutual funds. Reported to CEO.

GROUP EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, LATIN AMERICA AND CANADA DIVISION- NOVEMBER 1990- APRIL 1993

Responsible for the bank's work in Latin America and Canada, plus the debt problem described below. Banks in five Latin countries and a bank in Canada.

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL DEBT RESTRUCTURING ADMINISTRATION- APRIL 1989- NOVEMBER 1990

Responsible for all bank negotiations of trouble sovereign debt (approximately eight billion dollars of debt.)

Other functions at Bank of America:

Developed and carried out the donation of six million dollars, face value, of troubled debt for rain forest preservation work in Latin America.

Was a member of the banking industry committee that worked with FDIC on recapitalization of that organization.

Chairman of the banking industry advisory committee for the negotiation of the banking provisions of the NAFTA.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT - AUGUST 1987- MARCH 1989

Number two position in the Department. Special focus on Trade, Tax, and International issues. One of three negotiators for Canadian Free Trade Agreement in final weeks. Member of the Farm Credit Assistance Board and Member of the Board of the Federal Financing Bank.

Acting Secretary of the Treasury for a period between Secretaries Baker and Brady. Periodically functioned as Acting Secretary when the Secretary was out of town.

ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT- FEBRUARY 1981 - AUGUST 1987

The A.I.D. program involved missions in 70 countries, a staff of 5,000 and a budget of about \$6 billion a year. Reported to Secretary of State.

Was in charge of the U.S. response to the Great Famine in Africa in 1984 - 1985. Delivered more than two million tons of food to Africa over a 12 month period.

Lead world-wide effort with UNICEF to deal with diarrhea, then the biggest killer of children in developing world.

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION - FEBRUARY 1981 - AUGUST 1987

OPIC was a self-sustaining government agency with net assets of over \$800 Million and net income of over \$100 million. OPIC provides loans, guarantees, and political risk insurance coverage for U.S. investors in Third World countries.

Helped plan Reagan/Bush transition and then was General Counsel of the transition in 1980-81. Legal Counsel to President Reagan for the first three weeks of his administration, an exciting period.

VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE - JANUARY 1977 - NOVEMBER 1980

Partner and head of Washington office and of this large Ohio law firm. Specialized in international and corporate tax matters, and was Washington counsel for Virginia State University and did work for other universities.

THE WHITE HOUSE - MARCH 1975 - JANUARY 1977

Special assistant to President Ford and Deputy Director, Presidential Personnel Office

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE - 1969 - 1975

Tax Law Specialist, Corporation Branch in the national office. Extensive work on all aspects of international taxation.

OTHER EXPERIENCE:

Peace Corps Volunteer in Peru in 1964-65. Technical backstop for 45 other Volunteers working with the U.S. School Feeding Program, and work with credit unions and A.I.D. projects.

Former Member of Presidentially Appointed Board of International Food and Agriculture Development from 1977 to 1980. Appointed by President Ford. Board advises A.I.D. on agriculture research, training and extension.

BUSINESS BOARDS

Board of Directors of Dow Jones and Company, the publisher of The Wall Street Journal

Board of Trustees of Series Trust controlled by Jackson National Life. Trust has about \$1 billion of assets in annuities

Board of Directors of a National Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities

Former International Board of Advisors of Komatsu Company, a multi-billion dollar Japanese equipment manufacturer

Former Chairperson of the Big Ten Council of Presidents

Former Board of Directors of American Council on Education

Chaired Blue Ribbon Committee to review Lansing School System (18,000 students)

Chaired Blue Ribbon Mid-Michigan Committee to review children's issues from birth to age five

HONORS

UNICEF award for "Outstanding Contribution to Child Survival."

U.S. Presidential Certificate of Outstanding Achievement for "continued demonstrated vision, initiative, and leadership in efforts to achieve a world without hunger."

Secretary of state Distinguished Leadership Award for "Distinguished contribution to the development, management, and implementation of current foreign policy."

Honorary Doctorate of Law from Michigan State University, 1984.

Honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters from Mount St. Mary's College, 1986.

Honorary Doctorate of Human Letters from Virginia State University, 1984.

"Humanitarian of the Year" award from the American Lebanese League, 1983.

EDUCATION:

B.A. Political Science, Michigan State University, 1963.

M.B.A., Western Michigan University, 1967.

J.D., American University Law School, 1969.

~~FOUO~~

May 2, 2005

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Background Sheet on Peter McPherson

Attached is a background sheet on Peter McPherson. He might make **an** excellent Ambassador to Afghanistan.

Thanks.

Attach.
Peter McPherson's Background Sheet

DHR:as
050205-13

230.02

2 May 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08303-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49086

M. Peter McPherson



Office of the President
Michigan State University
450 Administration Building
East Lansing, MI 48824-1046
Tel.: (b)(6)

EXPERIENCE:

PRESIDENT, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY - OCTOBER 1993-PRESENT

Forty-four thousand (44,000) students. Extensive research and outreach. Budget of \$1.1 Billion

BANK OF AMERICA:

GROUP EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP - APRIL 1993 - OCTOBER 1993

Responsible for personal trust development, domestic and international private banking, institutional investment and mutual funds. Reported to CEO.

GROUP EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, LATIN AMERICA AND CANADA DIVISION - NOVEMBER 1990 - APRIL 1993

Responsible for the bank's work in Latin America and Canada, plus the debt problem described below. Banks in five Latin countries and a bank in Canada.

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL DEBT RESTRUCTURING ADMINISTRATION - APRIL 1989 - NOVEMBER 1990

Responsible for all bank negotiations of trouble sovereign debt (approximately eight billion dollars of debt.)

Other functions at Bank of America:

Developed and carried out the donation of six million dollars, face value, of troubled debt for rain forest preservation work in Latin America.

Was a member of the banking industry committee that worked with FDIC on recapitalization of that organization.

Chairman of the banking industry advisory committee for the negotiation of the banking provisions of the NAFTA.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT - AUGUST 1987 - MARCH 1989

Number two position in the Department. Special focus on Trade, Tax, and International issues. One of three negotiators for Canadian Free Trade Agreement in final weeks. Member of the Farm Credit Assistance Board and Member of the Board of the Federal Financing Bank.

Acting Secretary of the Treasury for a period between Secretaries Baker and Brady. Periodically functioned as Acting Secretary when the Secretary was out of town.

ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT - FEBRUARY 1981 - AUGUST 1987

The A.I.D. program involved missions in 70 countries, a staff of 5,000 and a budget of about \$6 billion a year. Reported to Secretary of State.

Was in charge of the U.S. response to the Great Famine in Africa in 1984- 1985. Delivered more than two million tons of food to Africa over a 12 month period.

Lead world-wide effort with UNICEF to deal with diarrhea, then the biggest killer of children in developing world.

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION - FEBRUARY 1981 - AUGUST 1987

OPIC was a self-sustaining government agency with net assets of over \$800 Million and net income of over \$100 million. OPIC provides loans, guarantees, and political risk insurance coverage for U.S. investors in Third World countries.

Helped plan Reagan/Bush transition and then was General Counsel of the transition in 1980-81. Legal Counsel to President Reagan for the first three weeks of his administration, an exciting period.

VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE - JANUARY 1977 - NOVEMBER 1980

Partner and head of Washington office and of this large Ohio law firm. Specialized in international and corporate tax matters, and was Washington counsel for Virginia State University and did work for other universities.

THE WHITE HOUSE - MARCH 1975 - JANUARY 1977

Special assistant to President Ford and Deputy Director, Presidential Personnel Office

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE - 1969 - 1975

Tax Law Specialist, Corporation Branch in the national office. Extensive work on all aspects of international taxation.

OTHER EXPERIENCE:

Peace Corps Volunteer in Peru in 1964-65. Technical backstop for 45 other Volunteers working with the U.S. School Feeding Program, and work with credit unions and A.I.D. projects.

Former Member of Presidentially Appointed Board of International Food and Agriculture Development from 1977 to 1980. Appointed by President Ford. Board advises A.I.D. on agriculture research, training and extension.

BUSINESS BOARDS

Board of Directors of Dow Jones and Company, the publisher of The Wall Street Journal

Board of Trustees of Series Trust controlled by Jackson National Life. Trust has about \$1 billion of assets in annuities

Board of Directors of a National Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities

Former International Board of Advisors of Komatsu Company, a multi-billion dollar Japanese equipment manufacturer

Former Chairperson of the Big Ten Council of Presidents

Former Board of Directors of American Council on Education

Chaired Blue Ribbon Committee to review Lansing School System (18,000 students)

Chaired Blue Ribbon Mid-Michigan Committee to review children's issues from birth to age five

HONORS

UNICEF award for "Outstanding Contribution to Child Survival."

U.S. Presidential Certificate of Outstanding Achievement for "continued demonstrated vision, initiative, and leadership in efforts to achieve a world without hunger."

Secretary of state Distinguished Leadership Award for "Distinguished contribution to the development, management, and implementation of current foreign policy."

Honorary Doctorate of Law from Michigan State University, 1984.

Honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters from Mount St. Mary's College, 1986.

Honorary Doctorate of Human Letters from Virginia State University, 1984.

"Humanitarian of the Year" award from the American Lebanese League, 1983.

EDUCATION:

B.A. Political Science, Michigan State University, 1963.

M.B.A., Western Michigan University, 1967.

J.D., American University Law School, 1969.

In reply refer to EF-8407 & 001639-ES

SECRET

201 OCT -11 PM 3:07

February 8, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Doug Feith
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Repair of Libyan Ship

How do we deal with the issue that the President of Croatia raised about being able to repair that Libyan ship?

I think we ought to pursue it. First we have to get the facts. So far as I understand it, at the present time it seems to me that it may be reasonable to let them do it, since it is \$210 million for Croatia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
0210604-29 (16 computer).doc

.....
Please respond by

3/1/04

*Close Snowflake
C214*

*Sin C211
Snowflake response attached
LTC Swope*

0 SD 08323 -04

19-02-04 11:31:14

TT-L-0559/OSD/49090

In reply refer to EF-8439 & 04/001779-ES

SECRET

11-02-04 12:25 PM

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Terrorist Financing

I think it is time for DoD to get involved in how the interagency is handling shutting down fundraising and financing for terrorists. I think we ought to start seeing a weekly report. We ought to know who is doing what, who has the responsibility.

I think it is critical to our success in the global war on terrorism, and I have no visibility into it at all.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-57

.....
Please respond by

2/18/04

11-02-04 12:25 PM

OSD 08324-04

FILE 0355/OSD/45051

2/18 1800



✓
2/26

In reply refer to EF-8405 & 04/001634-ES

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 FEB -4 PM 3:07

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

→ SecDef

SUBJECT: Coalition Forces for Afghanistan

Should we be trying to get more coalition forces for Afghanistan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-34 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

2/18/04
C 2/26

Sir,
Response attached.

✓R
(b)(6)

OSD 08325-04

09-02-04 11:31 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/49092



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

JAN - 6 2004

2004 JAN - 7 11 40 59

EF-8019

I-04/000165

USDP

INFO MEMO

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
Peter Rodman (b)(6)

06 JAN 2004

SUBJECT: US Advisors to Afghan Government Ministries

- On January 5 you asked about the status of US advisors to Afghan government ministries and whether we want them in the ministries.
- The Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG) is comprised of 15 senior advisors and 8 support personnel.
 - Six senior advisors and four staff (including an ARG Chief of Staff) have been hired and are at work in Kabul.
 - None of the senior advisors work in Afghan government offices.
 - They are based at the Embassy and provide advice to Zal Khalilzad.
 - They also work closely with Afghan ministry officials.
- Separately, USAID has approximately 800 technical experts and contractor hires working in Afghan ministries on health, education, economic reform, and agricultural programs.
- The Department of State requested and received \$25 million in the FY-04 supplemental to hire approximately 200 technical experts to work in Afghan ministries.
 - These experts, in accordance with the June 18, 2003, Action Plan to Accelerate Progress, will be "imbedded" in the ministries and will offer specific, needed skills.

OSD 00258-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49093

- The ARG is to design a program to hire and place these technical experts.
- A contractor (e.g., Dyncorp) would run the program.
- To date the ARG has not designed such a program.
- The program will likely include technical experts to be imbedded in the Ministry of Interior to monitor the police training program.

Prepared by: Kurt E. Amend, ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

DUSD (NESA)

PDISA

2/19 0800
740
In reply refer to EF-8401 & 04/001626

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

2/19 PM 3:02

February 8, 2004

TO: Sec Def

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Doug Feith
Paul Wolfowitz
Andy Hoehn

SUBJECT: Base at Zader, Croatia

How do we sort through the issue on the Zader base? Please talk to Andy Hoehn.
The following facts sound attractive – there is an air base and a port at the same location; it was used during the Balkan war; it has 350 days per year of sunshine; and Croatia has a history of cooperating in exercises.

Let's get it added to our list of things to think about with Andy Hoehn.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-40 (is computer).doc

.....
Please respond by

3/1/04

Sic,

Response attached
V/R

(b)(6)

09-02-04 11:31 IN

OSD 08327-04

FILE 0000/OSD/10005

DEFENSE SECRETARY

2004 FEB -4 PM 3:02

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Elements of National Power

We have to get the Department organized to **push** the National Security Council on all elements of national power that are outside of DoD - their authorities, their metrics, their funding, the leadership, their success/failure rates.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-60

Please respond by

2/18/04

2/29

SecDef-

Two related snowflakes
plus Feith response,
attached.

D.R.

OSD 08329-04

11-22-04 12:25 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/49096

3/19/04

720

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
201 JUN -5 PM 10:33

In reply refer to
EF-8385
04/001505-ES

February 5, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *3/1*

SUBJECT: Global Force Posture

*2/19/04 Di Page
3/29*
On the global force posture, it seems to me we ought to have a pretty good idea in each country where we are going to keep or put forces not only what the sitting government thinks about it, but what the opposition political parties think about it. For stability over time, we cannot rely on the governments that just happen to be in office when we are making these decisions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020304-9 (in computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 3/1/04

*DU 4/19
C3/30*
Sir,
Response Attached.
vr/CDR Nozenzo
3/30

OSD 08358-04

FILE 0559/OSD/45097

720
~~FOUO~~

27 Sep-1630
Scanned

September 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Graybeard Group

334

Please see attached memo.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.
Memo "Possible Graybeard Group"

DHR:ss
092804-18

.....
Please respond by 10/16/04

Replied

*I think this is a very good
idea.*

NOV 29 2004
1145

29 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49098

OSD 08366-05

~~FOUO~~

September 13, 2004

SUBJECT: Possible Graybeard Group

I want to think about whether the President should appoint a graybeard group right after the election to sort through the issues of how the U.S. Government can bring all elements of national power to bear and sort the inter-agency issues.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49099

FOUO



January 18, 2005

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: USS JFK Talking Points

I notice Gordon England's talking points on the USS JFK say 6 + 2. I thought we went from 3 + 2 to 5 + 2. What's the 6 about?

His second talking point ought to say we are retiring it somewhat early, I think.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/13/05 USS JFK Talking Points

DHR:ss
011805-8

.....
Please respond by 1/26/05

1/11
DR
1/21/05
SIR -
See attached
on the 5+2.
On the talking
point change,
the 5+2 change
is a change

11-L-0559/OSD/49100

OSD 08368-05

1/13/05
6:00 pm

Talking Points on USS JOHN F. KENNEDY

1. The Navy's new readiness posture and operational concept, 6 + 2, means that the Navy can deploy 6 carriers at any given time and deploy 2 additional carriers within 90 days. This is twice the deployed carrier capability than the Navy had 4 years ago. Thus, the Navy has the operational flexibility to retire a carrier.
2. The carefully considered decision to retire the JFK was based on its age (37 years), operational costs (approximately \$100M per year more than the cost for a nuclear carrier) and increased maintenance costs related to age and earlier deferred maintenance.
3. Mayport continues to be a vital part of the Navy's footprint on the East Coast as evidenced by the Secretary of the Navy's recent decision to homeport the USS FARRAGUT in Mayport in May of 2006. (The USS FARRAGUT is a guided missile destroyer still under construction). The Navy is continuing to look at other options to mitigate the loss of the JFK.
4. In case the question arises why JFK rather than USS ENTERPRISE, the ENTERPRISE is a nuclear carrier offering greater range, endurance, aviation fuel capability and ordnance than the JFK. Additionally, it takes years of advance planning to decommission a nuclear power plant.
5. The Navy is not reducing the number of air wings and therefore does not expect any impact on the Naval Air Station Jacksonville.

3/12
1730

12

In reply refer to EF-8542 & 04/002313-ES

SECRET

February 7, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

ATTY Di

3/24

Se Mef

SUBJECT: Latvia

The President of Latvia is ready to help with respect to Russia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020704-7 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by _____

✓
3/30

Sir,
Response attached
vr/CDR Nosenzo
3/30

OSD 08371-04

20-02-04 15:28 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/49102

~~SECRET~~

FOUO



ATTACHMENT

- JAN 13 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Impression from Ivanov

I came away with the impression from my meeting with Ivanov that Dostam and Fahim are very unhappy and may cause some troubles. We ought to communicate that to our folks and figure out ways to manage it politically.

Thanks.

DHR:ms
011205-11

.....
Please respond by 1/27/05

Sir,
Response Attached
V/L, COLB

Upon removal of attachments
this document becomes

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

11-L-0559/OSD/49103

OSD 08371-05

SECRET
25 FEB -5 11:10:24

EF-8366
I-04/001438
February 4, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM:
SUBJECT: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

Doug—

You have the action on this Moscow cable.

Thanks.

Attach.
USDAO MOSCOW RS Cable R 0214392FEB 04

DHR:dh
020404-5

.....
Please respond by 2/20/04

Need your
inputs?
Thanks.
J
Durnan
2/17

OSD 08372-04

04-02-04 17:39 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/49104

C242

RTTUZYUW RUEHMOA6973 0331439-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:RUE//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OUSD-P/ISP/TSPCP/CTR//
INFO RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2/RAR/NMJIC-J2//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/RUE//
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EUR/RUS/INR//
RUEAADN/DTRA DULLES WASHDC//CT//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUFGNQA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
RUFGNQA/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J2/J5//

DF-
Action

UNCLAS MOSCOW RS

U-0056-04

SUBJECT: LETTER TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM SERGEI ((IVANOV)), MINISTER OF DEFENSE, RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, RE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

1. FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM
MINISTER OF DEFENSE SERGEY IVANOV TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD RUMSFELD RECEIVED AT USDAO MOSCOW BY DIPLOMATIC NOTE
NO. 239 ON 2 FEBRUARY 2004.

//BEGIN UNOFFICIAL DAO TRANSLATION//

MOSCOW, 24 JANUARY 2004

DEARMR. RUMSFELD,

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY DEEP RESPECT AND GRATITUDE FOR
YOUR GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO THE PREVENTION OF THE
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MATERIALS
FOR THEIR PRODUCTION. IT GIVES US PLEASURE TO NOTE THAT OUR
COOPERATION UNDER THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM IS
MOVING FORWARD ON A POSITIVE COURSE. AND TODAY WE CAN SAY
WITH CERTAINTY THAT THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE UNITED
STATES IS HELPING RUSSIA IN THE FULFILLMENT OF OUR
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITH REGARD TO THE ELIMINATION
AND PREVENTION OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION STOCKPILES, ACCUMULATED DURING THE YEARS OF THE
"COLD WAR."

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: <u>X</u>	DEPSEC: <u>/</u>	EXECSEC: <u>/</u>	
C&D: <u>/</u>	CCD: <u>/</u>	CABLE CH: <u>/</u>	FILE: <u>/</u>
USDP: <u>/</u>	DIA: <u>/</u>	OTHER: <u>/</u>	
USDI: <u>/</u>	PER SEC: <u>/</u>	COMM: <u>/</u>	

+ UNCLASSIFIED *

11-L-0559/OSD/49105

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***
***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 2 of 2

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO NOTE THE POSITIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR MINISTRIES IN THE AREA OF TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ELIMINATED IN RUSSIA.

UNDERSTANDING FULLY THE NEED TO ENDOW OUR COOPERATION UNDER THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM WITH THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STATUS, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS OTHER INTERESTED FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES ARE WORKING TO PREPARE THE DOCUMENTS NECESSARY FOR RATIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE AND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS PROLIFERATION.

RESPECTFULLY,

//SIGNED//

S. IVANOV
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
MINISTER OF DEFENSE

//END UNOFFICIAL DAO MOSCOW TRANSLATION//

2. POC RDML M.B. WACHENDORF, DEFENSE ATTACHE, TEL
(b)(6) OR (b)(6) EMB EXT (b)(6) FAX
(b)(6)

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION (U,6,8,F) 1
INFO CMAS(*) CMAS(1) JS(*) SHAPE LNO(*)
JSAMS(*) JCSONNIPRDA(*) JCSCNSIPRDA(*)

SECDEF V2

ACTION (U,6,8,F) 2
INFO SJS-C(*) SJS-C(1) CHAIRS(*)
CHAIRS TESTBED(*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(*)
DASD I/O&IS(*) C3I DASDI(*) C3I-DASD-DCIO(*)
USDAT.BTS(*) ASD:PA-SMTP(*) DIR:PA-RAM(*)
USDAT:NTF(*) USDCOMP(*) C2DIR(*) USDP-SCCTR(*)
ESC-SMTP(*) OSDONNIPRDA(*) OSDONSIPRDA(*)
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//
+USDP BSC

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

#6973

NNNN

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

11-L-0559/OSD/49106

SECRET

04/001438-ES

INFO MEMO

20X 771-5 78 12 27

USD(P)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel  FEB 12 2004

SUBJECT: Cooperative Threat Reduction: Sergey Ivanov Reply to Your Message

- On December 30, 2003 you wrote to Ivanov asking him to help ratify the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) "Umbrella Agreement" between the U.S. and Russia.

- instance.
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parts.
 - standards
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 - refused to ratify.
 - ication, but we
ngthen our
ended.
-
- Ivanov's reply states that Russian agencies are "preparing documents necessary for ratification." Consensus in **USG** is that ratification will happen when Putin says so - at a minimum not before Russian elections in March 2004.
 - We will continue supporting Bolton's efforts.

COORDINATION: ISP-Eurasia (Jim MacDougal)

Approved: Lisa Bronson 
Prepared by: Ken Handelman, Princip. Dir. (b)(6)

0 SD 08372-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49107

12-02-04 13:54 CUT

INFO MEMO

2004 02-12-27

USD(P) *[Signature]*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel *[Signature]* FEB 12 2004

SUBJECT: Cooperative Threat Reduction: Sergey Ivanov Reply to Your Message

- On December 30, 2003 you wrote to Ivanov asking him to help ratify the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) "Umbrella Agreement" between the U.S. and Russia.
- The Umbrella Agreement protects DoD when it provides CTR assistance.
- John Bolton has been pressing Moscow to ratify the Umbrella Agreement – Secretaries Powell and Abraham sent identical letters to their counterparts.
- Bolton is trying to use CTR Umbrella ratification to protect legal standards covering other U.S. non-proliferation assistance programs in Russia.
- The agreement has been applied provisionally since Moscow has refused to ratify.
- DoD has been able to make the agreement work even without ratification, but we are strongly supporting Bolton's efforts. Ratification now will strengthen our hand for negotiations in 2006 when the agreement needs to be extended.
- Ivanov's reply states that Russian agencies are "preparing documents necessary for ratification." Consensus in USG is that ratification will happen when Putin says so – at a minimum not before Russian elections in March 2004.
- We will continue supporting Bolton's efforts.

COORDINATION: ISP-Eurasia (Jim MacDougal)

Approved: Lisa Bronson *[Signature]*
Prepared by: Ken Handelman, Princip. Dir. (b)(6)

OSD 08372-04

2/23
1400

22

EF-8398

04/00160

13/2

SECRET

2004 FEB 12 12:33

February 9, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

Larry Di Rita
3/1

SUBJECT: Kosovo

Please give me a sense of where we are in Kosovo, and what it would take to get someone to take our place there and get us out.

Thanks.

DHR:db
020704-14 (in computer) doc

Please respond by

3/1/04

✓
3/3

OSD 08373-04

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/49109

09-02-04 10:19 IN

2/13 1300

120

In reply refer to EF-8399 & 04/001611

SECRET

February 8, 2004

2004 FEB 12 33

TO SD

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

Return
2/17

SUBJECT: For Next Meeting w/Ivanov

Please tickle a note the next time I see Sergei Ivanov that I want to talk to him about the foldout page 29 from his Defense Ministry report on priority tasks.

It is just totally inaccurate and misrepresents the situation. It must have been written by Bolyevski. Save it for me and tickle it.

Thanks.

Attach.

"The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"

DHR:dh
020804-8 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

✓
2/19

Sir, 2/19
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nossup
2/19

OSD 08374-04

11 L 0550/OSD/10110


SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY SITUATION IN ZONES OF RUSSIA'S INTEREST

The possibility of the deployment of considerable groups of foreign troops and creation of strike groups in the territory of new NATO members and countries that aspire to join the bloc.

A zone of peace and stability created within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, with large-scale confidence-building measures and border co-operation, and the need to resist extremism and international terrorism.

The possibility of a military operation with the use of the infrastructure located in the territory of some former Soviet countries.

A region of potential military tensions where some countries are working to implement nuclear weapons programmes.



~~FOUO~~

January 28, 2005



TO: COL Steve Bucci

CC: Larry Di Rita
Ray DuBois
Cathy Mainardi

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: BRAC Briefing

When the selection criteria for BRAC are published next month I would like a briefing on them.

Please look at this BRAC timeline and allow me the time I will need to get my head into it and to handle whatever public aspects of it may be required.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/24/05 Ray DuBois message to SecDef

DHR:as
012805-3

.....
Please respond by _____

511

all 2/28

Response attached

*V/S, Col B
2/14*

28 gmo

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08381-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49112

2/18/05
2/18

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CC: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

February 14, 2005

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)
SUBJECT: BRAC Milestones and Timeline

In the attached snowflake dated January 28, 2005, you asked for status and time on your schedule for participation in key events leading to the submission of your recommendations to the Commission and for associated public events. I've attached a BRAC Fundamentals Brief that will become a part of the final presentation.

- The Infrastructure Steering Group, which I chair, meets every Friday (Service Vice Chiefs and Gen Pace attending) to review candidate recommendations. The Infrastructure Executive Council, which the Deputy chairs, meets twice monthly (Service Secretaries, Chiefs and Gen Myers attending).
 - o Over 200 candidate recommendations have been tentatively approved by the Infrastructure Executive Council. While three quarters are Guard/Reserve realignments, others are more substantial. The harder ones are in the pipeline.
 - o There are 10 discreet entities generating recommendations - the three MilDeps plus seven cross service groups and there is a spectrum of performance.
 - o A Red Team headed by Hon. H.T. Johnson has been established to do a quality and consistency check of the Candidate Recommendations so we have the best chance of passing muster with Commission Staff.
- On 15 March 2005, we must submit the Force Structure Plan that BRAC will use. We have been using iterative drafts to craft recommendations. I Recommend that Joint Staff brief you on content prior to submittal.
- I also propose bi-weekly briefings from me from late February through mid April on addressing the draft final briefing for OMB and others; our "production status" and where we are relative to meeting your aggregate BRAC expectations. We will also be addressing a draft plan for Public Release following submittal. These briefings provide an opportunity for your hands-on guidance as recommendations are finalized for your approval and as we prepare for rolling out your recommendations within the Administration, and to the Congress, Commission, and the public. The attached schedule includes key milestones.
- We will finalize the draft report to the Commission in mid-April, and I recommend an detailed briefing on its contents at that time.

- With your final approval, your recommendations are transmitted to the Commission NLT May 16th, the precedent is for you and the Chairman to hold a press conference and to testify at the Commission's first hearing.

Attachments:

1. BRAC Milestones and Meetings
2. BRAC Fundamentals Brief
3. Snowflake, January 28, 2005, Subject: BRAC Briefing

Prepared by: Philip W. Grone, DUSD(I&E), (b)(6)

BRAC Milestones and Meetings

July 2015	
7 & 23	Infrastructure Executive Council meetings
August 2015	
7 & 21	Infrastructure Executive Council meetings
15	Statutory deadline for submitting revised Force Structure Plan to Congress
September 2015	
6	Draft BRAC report coordination
11 & 25	Infrastructure Executive Council meetings
October 2015	
2 & 9	Infrastructure Executive Council meetings - Final decision meetings
9 – 15	Final BRAC Report prepared for SecDef (Federal Register notice/printing/etc.)
16	Statutory deadline for providing SecDef's recommendations to Commission and Congress and Federal Register publication
November 2015	
TBD	DoD senior leadership testimony to Commission.
December 2015	
1	Comptroller General report assessing SecDef's recommendations and process.
January 2016	
8	Commission reports their recommendations to the President
23	President approves or disapproves the Commission's report. If approved, the Commission's recommendations are binding 45 "legislative" days after Presidential transmission or adjournment sine die, unless Congress enacts joint resolution of disapproval.
February 2016	
20	If the President disapproves the Commission's initial recommendations, the Commission must submit revised recommendations not later than this date.
March 2016	
7	The President must approve the revised recommendations and transmit approval to Congress by this date or the process ends. The recommendations become binding 45 "legislative" days after Presidential transmission or adjournment sine die, unless Congress enacts joint resolution of disapproval.



Base Realignment and Closure

February 14, 2005



Key Imperatives

■ Further Transformation


- Rationalize infrastructure to force structure
- Adjust footprint to maximize capability and efficiency

■ Maximize Joint Utilization

- Reduce overhead
- Improve efficiency
- Facilitate joint training and operations


■ Convert Waste to Warfighting

- Unnecessary capacity diverts DoD resources





Process Timeline





Basic Process

- SecDef develops recommendations and sends to an independent Commission
- Commission reviews and forwards its recommendations to the President
- President approves (or disapproves) and sends recommendations to Congress
- Congress has an opportunity to reject (President could veto) or recommendations have force and effect of law

"All or nothing provision" binds President and Congress



Commission Review

- Review for conformity with force structure plan and selection criteria
 - Public hearings, site visits, and analysis
 - Joint Cross-Service Group and Military Department testimony
- Must find SecDef “deviated substantially” from force structure plan or selection criteria to reject, change, or add new recommendations
- Can only add a closure to SecDef list if seven of nine agree and if at least two visit the installation



Selection Criteria

- Draft criteria published in Federal Register: Dec 23, 2003
- Public comment period ended: Jan 30, 2004
- Final criteria published: Feb 12, 2004
- Congress modified criterion 3: Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.

Criteria provide a broad analytical framework governing the process and are implemented through more detailed guidance —
military value primary consideration



Final Selection Criteria

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the in operational readiness of the Department of Defense's including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Army homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements at both existing and receiving locations to support operations and training
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications

* Addition to Criteria by the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/49123



Final Selection Criteria

Other Considerations

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.



BRAC “Red Team”

- H. T. Johnson assembled team
 - Robin Pirie, Gen Gordon and Gen Salomon
 - CNA providing support
- Task: Audit the analytical basis of each candidate recommendation to see if department “substantially deviated” from the force structure plan or selection criteria
- Report to Acting USD(AT&L)



Candidate Recommendations

(as of 11 Feb 05)

Group	Total	7 Jan	14 Jan	21 Jan	28 Jan	4 Feb	11 Feb	18 Feb	25 Feb	4 Mar	11 Mar
E&T	18						7		S	6	
H&SA	53	15/0/0		3/0/0	4/1/0	4/0/3	3	10	10		
IND	38			10/0/0	5/0/0	2/0/0	4	5	12		
INTEL	4								4		
								3	S		
S&S	7				1/0/0			3	3		
TECH	11					0/0/1		3	7		
ARMY	150				95/0/1	32/0/0	21		1		
DoN	86				38/0/0		2		16		
USAF	60							10	50		

Legend:

Approved – 218 / Disapproved – 1 / Hold – 5

Pending - 190

11-L-0559/OSD/49126




Backups

11-L-0559/OSD/49127



Process Overview



11-L-0559/OSD/49128

TAB A

April 8, 2005

998

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Disaggregating Incidents in Iraq

I think we ought to think about disaggregating the incidents that occur in Iraq into different categories.

Please come up with a proposal as to how we might do that.

Thanks.

DHR:es
040805-5

.....
Please respond by 4/28/05

Iraq

8 Apr 05

FOUO

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/49129

USD 08449-05

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Media

Mr. President –

If you have not seen this, you should. I think you will find it pretty close to the mark.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
060604F.05ts

Attach: If D-Day Had Been Reported on Today

000,7

6 Jun 04

Date: 6/4/2004 10:25:13 AM Eastern Daylight Time
From: "Schmautz, Kurt" <Kurt.Schmautz@mail.house.gov>
To: "Dayton, Soren" <Soren.Dayton@mail.house.gov>, &"Laumer,
Matt" <(b)(6)>
Sent from the Internet (Details)

If D-Day Had Been Reported On Today

by William A. Mayer

Tragic French Offensive Stalled on Beaches (Normandy, France - June 6, 1944) - Pandemonium, shock and sheer terror predominate today's events in Europe.

In an as yet unfolding apparent fiasco, Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Dwight David Eisenhower's troops got a rude awakening this morning at Omaha Beach here in Normandy.

Due to insufficient planning and lack of a workable entrance strategy, soldiers of the 1st and 29th Infantry as well as Army Rangers are now bogged down and sustaining heavy casualties inflicted on them by dug-in insurgent positions located 170 feet above them on cliffs overlooking the beaches which now resemble blood soaked killing fields at the time of this mid-morning filing.

Bodies, parts of bodies, and blood are the order of the day here, the screams of the dying and the stillness of the dead mingle in testament to this terrible event.

Morale can only be described as extremely poor--in some companies all the officers have been either killed or incapacitated, leaving only poorly trained privates to fend for themselves.

Things appear to be going so poorly that Lt. General Omar Bradley has been rumored to be considering breaking off the attack entirely. As we go to press embattled U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt's spokesman has not made himself available for comment at all, fueling fires that something has gone disastrously awry.

The government at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is in a distinct lock-down mode and the Vice President's location is presently and officially undisclosed.

Whether the second in command should have gone into hiding during such a crisis will have to be answered at some future time, but many agree it does not send a good signal.

Miles behind the beaches and adding to the chaos, U.S. Naval gunships have inflicted many friendly fire casualties, as huge high explosive projectiles rain death and destruction on unsuspecting Allied positions.

The lack of training of Naval gunners has been called into question numerous times before and today's demonstration seems to underlie those concerns.

At Utah Beach the situation is also grim, elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne seemed to be in disarray as they missed their primary drop zones behind the area believed to comprise the militant's front lines. Errant paratroopers have been hung up in trees, breaking arms and legs, rendering themselves easy targets for those defending this territory.

On the beach front itself the landing area was missed, catapulting U.S. forces nearly 2,000 yards South of the intended coordinates, thus placing them that much farther away from the German insurgents and unable to direct covering fire or materially add to the operation.

11-L-0559/OSD/49131

were wounded in the haphazardly coordinated attack, which seems to have no unifying purpose or intent. Of this number at least 3,000 have been estimated as having been killed, making June 6th by far, the worst single day of the war which has dragged on now--with no exit strategy in sight--as the American economy still struggles to recover from Herbert Hoover's depression and its 25% unemployment.

Military spending has skyrocketed the national debt into uncharted regions, lending another cause for concern. When and if the current hostilities finally end it may take generations for the huge debt to be repaid.

On the planning end of things, experts wonder privately if enough troops were committed to the initial offensive and whether at least another 100,000 troops should have been added to the force structure before such an audacious undertaking. Communication problems also have made their presence felt making that an area for further investigation by the appropriate governmental committees.

On the home front, questions and concern have been voiced. A telephone poll has shown dwindling support for the wheel-chair bound Commander In Chief, which might indicate a further erosion of support for his now three year-old global war.

Of course, the President's precarious health has always been a question. He has just recently recovered from pneumonia and speculation persists whether or not he has sufficient stamina to properly sustain the war effort. This remains a topic of furious discussion among those questioning his competency.

Today's costly and chaotic landing compounds the President's already large credibility problem. More darkly, this phase of the war, commencing less than six months before the next general election, gives some the impression that Roosevelt may be using this offensive simply as a means to secure re-election in the fall.

Underlining the less than effective Allied attack, German casualties--most of them innocent and hapless conscripts--seem not to be as severe as would be imagined. A German minister who requested anonymity stated categorically that "the aggressors were being driven back into the sea amidst heavy casualties, the German people seek no wider war."

"The news couldn't be better," Adolph Hitler said when he was first informed of the D-Day assault earlier this afternoon.

"As long as they were in Britain we couldn't get at them. Now we have them where we can destroy them."

German minister Goebbels had been told of the Allied airborne landings at 0400 hours.

"Thank God, at last," he said. "This is the final round."

TO: Vice President Dick Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Speech**

Attached is a speech that was made by Steve Cambone back in January that I found interesting. There might be some material there that you would find useful.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604E.05ts

Attach: Security Affairs Support Assoc. 1/22/04 by Cambone

350.001

65Jan04

Security Affairs Support Association

22 January 2004

Speech by S. Cambone

We are a nation at war.

We do not know how long it will last, but it is unlikely to be short.

We cannot know where or against whom all of its battles will be fought.

There are multiple fronts in this war, and

There is no single theater of operations.

We do know that we are all at risk,

at home and abroad,

civilians and military alike.

We do know that battles and campaigns will be both conventional and
unconventional in their conduct.

Some of those battles and campaigns will be fought in the open, and

Others will be fought in secret, where our victories will be known to
only a few.

Success in every battle, in each campaign, will depend in some way on the contributions of the men and women of the intelligence community. If they are to provide the support demanded by their colleagues in uniform, we will need to transform that community even as we transform the Department of Defense.

Before laying out the goals of that effort, allow me to underscore the urgent need for the transformation of our intelligence capabilities.

We are facing a turbulent and volatile world populated by a number of highly adaptive state and non-state actors. Some of these are weighing whether, to what extent, or how, they might oppose the interests of the United States and its friends. Others, such as the terrorist organizations responsible for attacks in the United States, Turkey, Indonesia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kenya, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and other places have committed themselves to war.

In such a world, where largely ungoverned areas can serve as sanctuary for terrorists, and where political-military affairs in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America continue to evolve, it is impossible to predict with confidence what nation

or entity will pose a threat, in five, 10, or 20 years, to the United States or to our friends and allies.

In such a world, where our vulnerabilities are all too well understood by potential adversaries, we should expect to be surprised.

But not everything that unfolds in the coming years should be a surprise. We can expect that an adversary will continuously search for effective means to attack

- our people;
- our economic, military, and political power; and
- the people and power of our friends and allies.

We can also expect that an adversary will have access to a range of modern technologies and will be prepared to use them to magnify the destructiveness of their attacks, using

- truck bombs and improvised explosives,
- cyber intrusions to attack the computer systems upon which we rely,
- radio transmitters to jam our space assets,
- small laboratories to develop new biological or genetically altered agents,

- and chemical and nuclear technology and materials delivered by missile, plane, boat or backpack to poison our environment and destroy human lives.

In this era of surprise, lack of preparation is the harbinger of catastrophe. Being prepared—by which I mean taking measures to avoid surprise, if possible; to mitigate its effect when it occurs; and to bring appropriate force to bear to defeat those who would surprise us—is essential.

Such preparation may dissuade those who might otherwise choose to make an enemy of the United States. It could deter those who wish to make war on us. And it certainly promises those who choose war that we can—and will—defeat them even as we protect and preserve that which our enemies hate most, our way of life.

The United States brings to the challenges of preparing for surprise a unique set of political, economic, technological, and military advantages.

We have a way of life—moral, political social—to which our citizens are deeply, passionately attached. We have:

- strong allies, developed through patient diplomacy and steadfast commitment displayed for nearly 60 years by succeeding U.S. administrations,
- a powerful economic and technology base,
- a military capable of projecting power on a global basis, and
- the power to dominate combat in any environment: on land, across the seas, in the air, and in space and cyber-space.

In addition to these, the nation possesses another preeminent advantage: intelligence organizations comprised of the very best people, employing some of the finest technology available.

The nation's intelligence capability provides to our political leadership information essential to its decisions on how to keep the peace—and whether and when to wage war.

It enables the application of the nation's power in peace and war.

Intelligence figures prominently in the judgments made by the nation's leaders in

- assuring allies and friends of our purpose and resolve,
- dissuading adversaries from threatening ambitions,
- deterring aggression and coercion, and, when necessary,
- decisively defeating an adversary
- while creating the conditions so that those who would free themselves from tyranny might succeed and prosper.

The close coupling of military capability with intelligence results in a powerful combination. But our intelligence capability must be remodeled—transformed—to function successfully in an environment of ever-increasing complexity.

- Knowledgeable adversaries know far too much about the nation's sources and methods for collecting and analyzing intelligence.
- Espionage, unauthorized leaks, the inexorable progress of commercial science and technology, all advantage our adversaries.
- The extent of ungoverned spaces around the world give potential adversaries places to train and prepare for war.
- The ability to identify, track, and disrupt the manufacture and transport of materials of use in assembling weapons of mass

destruction is frustrated by contemporary business practices and the existence of dual-use technologies.

- The speed, volume, and diversity of financial transactions that take place on a global scale permit financiers of terror and horror to hide, for all practical purposes, in the open.

To overcome these challenges, the nation will need to set goals for the transformation of its intelligence community. Those goals include:

- First, knowing something of intelligence value about everything of interest to us all the time. This “universal situational awareness,” pursued to the limits of what physics will permit and the law will allow, must be coupled with a capacity to dive deeply into the fine-grained details of specific issues to support timely political and military decisions. This is a daunting challenge, but meeting it is absolutely necessary if intelligence is to support our national security needs in the future.
- Second, having reliable strategic warning, not only of potential threats, but across the full spectrum of reporting. For the DOD, such

warning is essential to permit us to refashion our forces and their posture in a timely way. For other agencies, warning is equally precious to shape diplomatic, economic, commercial, and associated legal and regulatory responses. Averting crises is nearly always preferable to managing them.

- Third, we will need an agile and adaptable intelligence collection and analysis capability far less dependent for its operations than today's systems are on linear and hierarchical processes. Such a level of flexibility could give rise to a culture
 - that always expects the unexpected;
 - that has prepared for surprise; and
 - that has developed the capability to deal rapidly and with assurance in response to unforeseen developments.
- Fourth, we will need an intelligence capability that supports a national strategy of forward deterrence. Deterring future adversaries will require a detailed understanding of their goals, motivations, history, networks, relationships—all the dimensions of human political

behavior—on a scale that is broader, and to a level of granularity that is far deeper, than what we enjoy today.

- At the very least, this requires a regeneration of our human intelligence capabilities and an overhaul of our analytic processes and culture.
 - It implies, as well, a commitment by those who rely on intelligence to invest greater time and effort into understanding its strengths and weaknesses. Such an investment by the political leadership could reduce the burden borne by the intelligence community for warning while increasing the capacity of decision-makers to anticipate surprise.
- Fifth, with specific reference to military operations, we will need, when our forces are employed, intelligence that enables the swift defeat of the enemy. We need intelligence that enables us to act quickly, secretly, and effectively—intelligence that enables us to anticipate war fighters' needs and provide predictive intelligence that stays ahead of the battle. That intelligence support will need to extend to the post-conflict, stabilization phase of a campaign.

- Sixth, ensuring that knowledgeable adversaries do not compromise our secrets. This will require obtaining robust capabilities to acquire an adversary's secrets in ways he cannot comprehend even as we ensure that our own capabilities are not vulnerable. My former colleague USD/AT&L Pete Aldridge described this as "exquisite intelligence."

An effort to transform intelligence to achieve these goals will take time, effort, and money. That effort will range across the technologies we use to collect, process, and disseminate information. It will require changes to our organizations and cause us to take greater interest in our people – their recruitment, training, retention and promotion. Let me begin with technology.

Technology

With respect to technology, we have made the necessary investment in our remote sensing capabilities to bridge the period of service between our extant systems and those capabilities that we might bring on line in the next decade.

These near-term capabilities will provide improved performance over extant systems. They have the benefit of having been designed in the aftermath of the last war, the Persian Gulf War. They respond well to the “lessons learned” from that war.

By definition, however, they will not satisfy the emergent needs we have identified as critical to our preparation in an era of surprise.

Nor will existing communications structures and protocols support the transport of the large volume of data needed to perform collection and analysis tasks we now know we will need to accomplish.

Nor will these near-term systems liberate us from the collector-based processes for classifying and, hence, regulating the distribution and use of intelligence.

For these reasons, the defense and intelligence communities have moved—more in concert than not—to invest in a new generation of technology. This effort is guided by the work Don Kerr completed before moving to be Director, S&T, at

the CIA. Follow-on efforts sponsored by the DCI's Community Management staff and especially Charlie Allen, ADCI/Collection, have helped us frame our investment preferences.

Space-Based Radar

Most prominent among the new investments is the space-based radar. It was conceived with the aim of increasing the persistence of surveillance and contributing to a variety of defense and intelligence missions. If the technology involved proves affordable, it has the potential to free us from building our imagery intelligence as we do today—as if it were a jigsaw puzzle for which we earnestly hunt for the pieces while uncertain of the picture we are seeking to construct.

The unique contribution of SBR comes into focus if we think of space-based radar as an “illuminator,” throwing into relief both geographic features and activity on the earth's surface. By creating a reference baseline and then permitting us to constantly refresh our picture of those features and activities, it can allow us to detect change and alert us to matters of interest or concern.

Then, either by shifting the radar from an “illuminator” to a “spotlight,” if you will, or by “tipping” or “cueing” other systems, space-based radar can provide the means for diving deeply into specific matters.

The persistent surveillance provided by a space-based radar, in combination with other complementary space and airborne systems, could allow us to approach a number of the goals I outlined. Most obviously it could form the basis for “knowing something about everything”, “strategic warning”, and an “agile intelligence enterprise.”

The promise of space-based radar will go unrealized, however, if we think of it in the terms most comfortable to today’s collectors and users. Constrained in its development by the extant paradigm, space-based radar will not be able to make a meaningful contribution to either military or intelligence missions. USecAF Pete Teets, under whose direction the system is being developed, is working to loose those constraints. Industry is ready to have them removed. I can assure you I will continue to push for concepts and a system that delivers on the promise of SBR.

I noted that space-based radar alone cannot meet the goals of persistence. Other systems, operating in all media and venues, will need to contribute. And, indeed, investments are being made in such technology.

Processes and Networks

Improvements to collection, alone, will not provide bring us very close to achieving the six operational goals. Collection needs to be coupled to a process that allows the data collected to be accessed by the user—the analyst or the military operator. That process, moreover, must allow for more than collaborative activity. It must allow the user to drive collection even as it allows the collector to provide the user with a tailored product.

Toward this end, substantial investment is being made in laser satellite communications, the expansion of the global information grid, creation of a distributed common ground system, and joint command and control systems.

This includes both space and airborne platforms along with ground and sea-based sensors. Once we can organize our collection assets more along the lines of a combined arms team, than say a football team, the better off we will be.

That is, instead of one team for imagery, another for signals and special teams made up of core officers, MASINT operators and technical experts, we might have a single team capable of bringing the right combination of capabilities to bear to address the problem at hand.

Under such a combined arms approach the limits of one system – say SBR versus cruise missiles – could be compensated for by other elements – say airborne radars, dispersed ground sites. But these capabilities could be combined and recombined in packages adapted to the problem we face.

These, in turn, are being fashioned into a networked operating environment that both the defense and intelligence community can share. As this capability comes on line, the need for “direct downlinks” will dissipate as “reach-back” both on and through the military and intelligence networks takes hold.

Organization

Let me turn now to organization and doctrine.

The defense and intelligence communities have embraced a vision for horizontal integration, or HI. Without suggesting that translating the vision into

system concepts, hardware, and practice will be easy, I do think the benefit is an intuitive one to grasp.

Imagine that the processes by which collection and analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence information were similar to those that govern contemporary web sites. Refresh rates at those sites are driven by the interaction between customer demand and what the purveyor (collector) of information can supply.

Demand for that information and its supply are regulated by a rules-based set of protocols. Neither the customer nor the supplier is independent of each other, yet each has separate responsibilities.

The customer defines his preferences by his selection. He has access to all information that he needs to know—

- rather than access based on security limitations imposed by considerations of “sources and methods”
- or by distribution constraints dictated by the originating agency.

The supplier, in turn, attracts the customer by satisfying the customer's range of choice or by offering new products or services of interest to the user.

Information is not owned by either party, and the system is run not by a particular discipline, but by an administrator.

That kind of networked environment and process, with which we are so comfortable in every other facet of our lives, is at the heart of HI.

Its incorporation into the world of intelligence will change that world's organization and doctrine in ways we cannot now imagine. But if our experience in the DOD is any guide, it means that hierarchical tasking, reporting, and decision-making, stretched over long periods of time, resulting in least-common-denominator solutions, will be a thing of the past.

At the same time, this emerging environment will require the advent of new methods for validating and verifying information, and providing senior leaders with finished recommendations and products, and assessing the utility of the products created. Most important, it will change the role of analysts and probably the distribution of analysts. That is, in so far as machine-to-machine interfaces and

processes do the hard work of shipping the “noise away from the signal,” the analyst can concentrate on what the signal means. Analysts operating at the front lines should be able to isolate the data of interest for tactical operations without having to wait on analysts at higher headquarters. UAV operations today illustrate this point. The future is here.

People

Which brings us to people.

Those who are entering the intelligence ranks today will be the leaders and conductors of the organizations we are now setting out to build, and they will be the operators of any technology we design and deploy, and they will be the full beneficiaries of the world of HI that I have described.

They will encounter a world very different from our own. The regions and cultures of the world they will be concerned with, the entities they will need to penetrate, the secrets they will be asked to acquire and safeguard, will demand skills possessed today by a small, though ever-growing, cadre.

The talent certainly exists that is needed to

- lead the nation's intelligence organizations,
- design its systems,
- operate in the midst of our adversaries—potential and actual—and
- to provide the strategic warning and current intelligence needed to safeguard the nation in a complicated and dangerous world.

It is our task to motivate this rising generation to take on the challenge that lies before us.

We must recruit, train, compensate, and mentor those willing to accept the challenge,

- and we must be able to do so in creative, flexible ways that will make government service attractive to those with rare talent.

But the transformation of our intelligence capabilities will need to be matched by a transformation in how we think about the affairs unfolding around us. Policies, strategies, plans, and activities predicated on years of warning are no longer adequate to our purposes.

Coming to grips with the reality that we live in an era of surprise is imperative.

Achieving the goals I have outlined will improve our access to information. But our analysis of that information needs improvement, as well.

Thomas Schelling, in his forward to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, Pearl Harbor, reminds us that information alone is not sufficient.

"If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made."

Schelling accounts for this faulty strategic analysis as follows:

“There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.”

This is not a mistake we can afford to make again. The acts of 9/11 have put us on notice. They inform with a painful impact—in an age of surprise, we have only ourselves to blame if we do not prepare. There is little we should consider “improbable” when contemplating the possible acts of terrorists and those who would harbor or support them. In this age of surprise, we cannot afford to suffer what Schelling describes as “a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.”

Let me conclude by returning to where I began. Pursuit of the six goals I have outlined will contribute to the transformation of the nation’s intelligence capability. As we achieve those goals, our level of preparation will increase. Whether that increase will be sufficient to substantially decrease the likelihood of surprise will only be known in the future.

But a failure to prepare is to invite surprise, and, with it, catastrophe.

Responsible members of the government, within the executive and legislative branches, have a singular obligation to those they represent to prepare them for surprise.

Those same officials owe the American people plain talk about what they think they know, what they know they don't know, and the reality that there are, at this moment, unknown means and methods being devised and developed by our enemies to do us harm.

In assessing our progress both toward preparing for future surprises and victory in the present war, it is imperative that the contribution of intelligence—to our successes or any failures—not be misestimated.

I spoke earlier of "exquisite intelligence." A profound secret gleaned by U.S. intelligence, without the knowledge of the adversary, is no small accomplishment.

Its relevance to our security, its contribution to our preparation, however, is directly proportionate to the conversion of that secret into action by the agencies of the U.S. government.

Sense of Urgency

There should be no doubt, about the urgency to transform intelligence. Defining and achieving operational goals of the sort I postulated earlier is essential. We must not permit ourselves to remain wedded to past practices, policies, technologies, and products. We do so at our peril.

Conclusion

So, let me conclude by recalling then-candidate Bush's 1999 Citadel speech.

As a way of underscoring his determination to bring about the transformation of the military forces of the United States, the President reminded his audience of an earlier time when a free people confronted what he called "rapid change and momentous choices."

That time was the 1930s. Nazi Germany was rearming, and the British government was reluctant to take forceful steps to stave off war.

To give voice to his own concerns, candidate Bush quoted Winston Churchill, who repeatedly called upon his countrymen to respond to the gathering storm:

“The era of procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing and baffling expedience, of delays, is coming to a close,” Churchill said. “In its place, we are entering a period of consequences.”

That period of consequences arrived not only for the military, but for those who practice intelligence, just two years after the President’s Citadel speech, on September 11, 2001.

Like our colleagues in the military forces, we will be judged by our successors on our response to this period of consequences.

We face few substantial impediments to transforming intelligence.

SecDef and DCI are committed to strengthening intelligence for the 21st century.

We are led by individuals in the DoD and agencies who embrace the need for and who likewise are committed to this effort.

The Congress has provided resources.

Industry has it well within its grasp to supply the technology and systems to enable transformation.

Our colleges, universities, laboratories, and think tanks are replete with talent.

What remains, then, is to embrace the urgency of the President and to summon the energy of Churchill, who, when presented with a memo containing a compelling idea, would note in the margin, "Action this day!"

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Attached Media Release**

Mr. President –

Attached is the speech that was presented by Prime Minister Goh of Singapore at the Third International Institute of Strategic Studies session last week. I found it most interesting and thought you would as well, given the series of speeches you have been giving.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
060604B.051s

Attach: Singapore Government Media Release 6.5.04.

Singapore

6 Jun 04

Singapore Government **MEDIA RELEASE**

Media Relations Division, Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, 140 Hill Street, #02-02, MIA Building, Singapore 179369.
Tel: 6837 6666 Fax: 6338 3093 Singapore Press Release on the Internet (SPRInter) URL: <http://www.gov.sg/sprinter>

**EMBARGOED TILL FULL DELIVERY
PLEASE CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY**

**KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY PRIME MINISTER GOH CHOK TONG AT THE
THIRD INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES ASIA
SECURITY CONFERENCE IN SINGAPORE AT THE SHANGRI-LA
HOTEL, ISLAND BALLROOM, ON FRIDAY, 4 JUNE 2004, AT 8.00 PM**

POST-COLD WAR GEOPOLITICS

1 This is the third meeting of the Shangri-La Dialogue. It is a tribute to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) that the Shangri-La Dialogue has so quickly become entrenched as a 'must attend' event on the regional calendar. It clearly fulfils an important need. I thank the IISS for the opportunity to share my views with such a distinguished audience.

2 Last month, I gave two speeches on themes relevant to this conference. The first was to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC. I dwelt on the ideological aspects of the war against terrorism. We must have no illusions about our enemy. This enemy, terrorism, is most dangerous as it is fuelled by an extremist religious belief that brooks no compromise with non-believers whom they label *infidels*. Even fellow Muslims who oppose their strain of Islam are their enemies.

3 Unless all of us in the civilised world - Muslims and non-Muslims alike - unite and fight them ideologically, we will be tormented for a long time. There will be no dearth of terrorist foot soldiers willing to martyr themselves. The Al-Qaeda *jihadist* ideology which uses violence to bring the world back to the 7th Century Arabian way of religious life must be debunked and defeated. But this ideological battle on how Islam should be practised in today's world, and indeed the battle for Islam's future, must be fought primarily by Muslims. In Washington, I pointed out that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constrained mainstream Muslims from speaking out against extremists for fear of being labelled pro-American. I also emphasised the crucial role of education, especially of women, and economic development to create the necessary conditions for democracy to be transplanted to the Middle East.

4 My second speech was at an event in Singapore celebrating the enlargement of the European Union. I stressed the imperative of Europe and America working together to meet the challenge of terrorism. A Transatlantic rift only serves the terrorists' agenda. I also highlighted the importance of Europe and Asia working together, not in opposition to America, but with America to advance our common interests.

5 This evening, I would like to draw together the threads of these arguments. I have entitled my talk "Post-Cold War Geopolitics". Let me elaborate.

The New Geopolitics of Terrorism

6 The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolised the end of the Cold War. But I believe that the real post-Cold War era did not begin until September 11, 2001. Of course, few people really thought history ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. History proved far more resilient. Crises did not abate. But there was no widespread sense of a serious global security threat such as had infused the Cold War period and galvanised the free world to hold together. Even the 1991 Iraq invasion of Kuwait was dealt with in a relatively straightforward way by a broad American-led coalition, giving rise to the hope that a peaceful New World Order could be achieved.

7 That hope proved illusory as did the expectation that 'democratic enlargement' was an irresistible trend that would stabilise international relations. Still, as the threat of superpower nuclear conflict receded, there was a sense that the world had reached a geopolitical equilibrium. None of the conflicts in Africa, the Balkans or the Middle East were thought to really threaten the global equilibrium.

8 9/11 swept away these comfortable assumptions. It shook America's sense of security and changed America's definition of its role in the world. Suddenly, America felt vulnerable. To protect itself, America was determined to take the battle to its enemies wherever they might be. Because of its global supremacy, America could and would go it alone, if necessary. Post-Cold War geopolitics is the geopolitics of the war against terrorism.

9 I believe the fight against terrorism will last as many decades as the Cold War. However, I do not think that everyone sees or understands the challenge in such stark terms. And this is one of the principal dangers of post-Cold War geopolitics. There is no overarching strategic consensus on the threat of terrorism and the means to combat it. I hope to persuade you

that while there are differences with the Cold War period, the fight against terrorism is no less a mortal struggle and certainly far more complex.

10 Like the Cold War, the fight against terrorism is both an ideological and a geopolitical struggle. But there are crucial differences. Since the 1930s, the Soviet Union gave priority to state interests over ideology. Therefore, whatever the differences with its adversaries, the Soviet Union calculated the costs and benefits, foremost among which was the primacy of survival. The West could use the time-tested tools of diplomacy, deterrence and containment to hold the line against Communism, until internal and inherent contradictions led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

11 But how do you conduct diplomacy with a religious ideology that sees the struggle as a zero sum game with no room for compromise except as a tactical expedient? How do you contain an adversary that occupies no fixed territory but resides in the minds and hearts of men? How do you deter an enemy that is not afraid, indeed eager, to die for its ideology?

12 These complexities define the new geopolitics of terrorism. But they do not make diplomacy, deterrence and containment irrelevant. The geopolitics of terrorism has not displaced the old geopolitics of conflict and collaboration between states. The new forms an overlay over the old. It is the interaction between the old and new that will shape post-Cold War geopolitics for many years to come.

How to Defeat the Terrorists

13 The terrorists are driven by an ideological desire to force their strain of Islam on others but their goals and methods are geopolitical. The war against terrorism must therefore be simultaneously fought on both fronts: the ideological as well as the geopolitical. While the US cannot lead the ideological struggle, only it has the capacity to lead the geopolitical fight. In this contradiction lie the complexities.

14 The terrorists want to overthrow secular governments: initially in the Middle East to secure control of oil that will give them the wherewithal to achieve their ultimate goal of a Caliphate of the entire *ummah* or global Islamic community. It will be a mistake to dismiss them as mere fanatics. The terrorists have strategic thinkers amongst them and their reach is global. Indeed they seem to be able to think more strategically and globally than do some governments.

15 The terrorists have accurately identified the principal threat to their goal as the geopolitical trend of the Americas, Europe and Asia coalescing into regional blocs. They see the spread of development, democracy and

the modern way of life as corrupting their vision of an ideal society based on their interpretation of the Koran. America is their main enemy because America is the vanguard of this modern civilisation and the main obstacle to their designs. They know that a combination of America, Europe and Asia will be formidable. Hence I believe they would give priority to splitting the US from its European and Asian allies.

16 The terrorists are a deviant minority in the Muslim world. According to Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi of Malaysia, *"Many Muslims refuse to acknowledge that there can be bad Muslims, and that Islamic teachings have been corrupted by some groups to serve their militant cause."* Prime Minister Abdullah was schooled in Islamic studies and has just won the General Elections convincingly with his vision of "Progressive Islam" or *Islam Hadari* against the opposition party's vision of an austere Islamic state based on *Shariah* law.

17 The terrorists are definitely bad Muslims as they are ready to commit mass murders and take innocent lives to achieve their ends. Hence the civilised world must do everything in its power to prevent them laying their hands on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). But even if we succeed, they will still pose a serious threat. The terrorists do not need large armies or sophisticated weaponry to fight their battle. They need only self-assembled bombs, unconventional home-made weapons of destruction and suicide bombers. Their chief tactic is to create fear and a perpetual sense of vulnerability to disrupt our way of life. They will exploit the discomfort that even close US friends and allies feel at America's global primacy and some of its policies. The Madrid bombing in March is a classic example.

18 Anti-Americanism is high around the world. A principal cause is the sheer scale of American power and the indispensability of the US to the post-Cold War international system. This leaves other major powers uncertain of their own roles and insecure about their own status. In certain intellectual circles, it is fashionable to be anti-American. But wishing for a more balanced world will not make it so. All the more necessary, therefore, to state what ought to be obvious but is unfashionable: America is not the enemy; the terrorists are the enemy.

19 The central battleground is the Middle East. The difficulties America currently faces in Iraq offer the greatest opportunities for the terrorists. The terrorists know that America cannot be defeated militarily. Their target is psychological: America's resolve and the resolve of America's coalition allies. If they succeed, first in breaking the coalition allies' resolve, and later, America's resolve, extremists everywhere will rejoice and be emboldened. They will know that they can defeat even the world's mightiest

nation. They will go on the offensive with renewed vigour. This is why it is so vital that, whatever the difficulties, the US and its allies do not waver in Iraq but persevere to bring about a good outcome.

20 Whatever the differences of views over America's actions in Iraq, Europe and the US must set aside pre-war recriminations, go beyond saying "I told you so", and work together with the UN to stabilise Iraq. The US has paid a price for going into Iraq. The price is worth it if out of the ashes of war emerges a stable, peaceful and new Iraq which Iraqis are proud of and their neighbours can live with, and an Iraq which contributes to Middle East peace and stability. Europe will pay a higher strategic price if the chaos in Iraq leads to turmoil in the Middle East. And the civilised world will pay the full price if the US loses, or is seen by the terrorists, to have lost in Iraq.

21 The abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib was a hideous crime. It must be dealt with transparently and decisively. The guilty must be punished. But Abu Ghraib must not be allowed to cloud the central strategic issue that is at stake.

22 The Middle East is also where US friends and allies are most disquieted by America's seemingly unconditional support for Israel. I know this is a delicate issue. I know that whatever the criticisms of its policies, the US plays an irreplaceable role in stabilising the Middle East. But this is too important an issue to dress in diplomatic niceties. The US is essential to the solution but is also part of the problem. A more balanced and nuanced approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - an approach that recognises that there are equities and inequities on both sides - must become a central pillar of the global war against terrorism. Given the post-Cold War geopolitical battle against terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer just a regional problem. The Islamic terrorists know this. They have exploited this conflict to win sympathy and recruits for their own cause.

23 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a rallying cause of terrorism. We know that a solution to it will not end terrorism, given the ideologically-driven motivations of the Al-Qaeda terrorists. But the discomfort that mainstream Muslims around the world feel with America's Middle East policies limits their ability to fight the ideological battle. Even the Europeans and other friends of the US will be constrained to support the US in the fight against the terrorists. This weakens the US-led geopolitical struggle against terrorism.

Unity of US, Europe and Asia is Critical

24 Strategically, the terrorists will want to break the transatlantic partnership, and thereby isolate the US. The so-called "truce" that Osama

bin Laden offered to Europe in April was so crudely put as to blatantly expose his intentions. But the terrorists will refine this strategy. Europe is internally preoccupied with enlargement. Several European governments face strong domestic pressures over support for the US on Iraq. Many Europeans want to believe that some tacit accommodation with the terrorists is possible. They fail to see the threat as a long-term problem and that any accommodation by the terrorists will be out of expediency. This threat is not the same as what Europe faces from, say, the Basque terrorists whose goals are limited. So long as the terrorists think that the European public can be used to pressure their governments, they will try to manipulate it. They will dangle the sword of another Madrid.

25 Asia will not be spared. The terrorists have similar goals in Asia. The secular governments of India and Pakistan have been on the frontlines of the struggle against Islamic extremism for many years. Whatever their differences over Kashmir, they have no illusions about the nature of the enemy. Southeast Asia is waking up to this. Post 9/11 and the Bali bombing, it has emerged as a major front in the war against terrorism. The secular governments of Southeast Asia know the stakes.

26 Northeast Asia, however, is less aware. China has its own problems with Muslim separatists but may be less worried about terrorism. In Japan and Korea, ethnic and religious homogeneity has, until relatively recently, shielded their public from the dimensions of the problem and the extent to which they too are in the sights of the *jihadi* terrorists.

27 Japan was recently shaken by the discovery that Al-Qaeda was operating in its territory. I believe that Northeast Asian governments will sooner or later have to confront the threat of a terrorist attack on international waterways in Southeast Asia. Should an attack take place, it would have catastrophic consequences, and not just for Southeast Asia. The vital lifelines of Japan, Korea and China pass through Southeast Asia. Such an attack would seriously disrupt the international trade and energy supplies on which all the economies of Northeast Asia are critically dependent. It would be designed for maximum economic disruption and to turn the public against governments which support the US.

28 In Asia, as in Europe, unease with America's overwhelming global dominance is high. But Asia is more keenly aware than Europe of the vital role that the US plays in maintaining global stability. No matter what their misgivings, only a few Asian countries, and certainly no major US ally, opposed the US on Iraq. There is a clearer appreciation in Asia than in Europe that the fundamental issue in Iraq now is the credibility and resolve of the US.

29 This is because Asia still faces many serious security challenges. Kashmir, North Korea and cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei are potential flashpoints. If things go terribly wrong, the conflicts could even turn nuclear. The US is central to the management of all three potential flashpoints. All three conflicts also have a direct impact on the global struggle against terrorism. Let me conclude therefore with a few words on each.

Potential Flashpoints in Asia

30 The India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is a longstanding one, difficult to resolve because of religion and history. If a conflict breaks out, it is not difficult to imagine Kashmir becoming a new theatre for *jihad* and a fertile ground for breeding terrorists. But India and Pakistan know that a conflict over Kashmir will have devastating consequences for each other and the entire South Asian region. The US holds the ring. The desire of both Islamabad and New Delhi to maintain good relations with the US gives Washington leverage that it exercised in 2001 to avert a possible nuclear war.

31 North Korea is another potential trouble spot. The terrorists could try to exploit the situation to acquire materials for WMD. Fortunately, the six-party talks have lowered tensions and the issue is being managed. Whatever their differences, the key actors share a common interest in the peaceful containment of the issue. I have been told by several leaders who have met Kim Jong Il that he is a rational, well-informed man who calculates his moves. He must know that an outbreak of conflict with the US will lead to the very outcome that he fears most: regime change or even the disappearance of North Korea as a sovereign state. He may go to the brink but not step over the edge. The credibility of the US military option is vital to maintaining peace.

32 The dangers of miscalculation are highest over Taiwan. The issue is extremely complex because it involves the domestic politics of China, the US and Taiwan and relations between the three parties. Economic forces are integrating Taiwan with the Mainland but this trend conflicts with Taiwan's desire for a separate identity. Chen Shui-bian's inauguration speech took a conciliatory tone. He must have taken into account US concerns about maintaining stability in cross-strait relations. But he did not renounce independence. Yet independence for Taiwan is a non-starter. No Asian, and I believe, no European government, would recognise Taiwan's independence. To do so would earn China's permanent enmity. And China is the economic story of this century. No Chinese leadership can lose Taiwan and still survive. If Taiwan pushes beyond a certain red line, the

Chinese leaders must respond or be rejected by their people. The result will be war and a permanent rise in Chinese nationalism and hostility.


33 The consequences of such a war will make Iraq seem a small problem. The US has no reasons to open another front with China over Taiwan, given its strategic priorities in Iraq, the Middle East and the global fight against terrorism. Indeed, President Bush has stated explicitly that he does not support Taiwan's independence. He has also publicly stated that the US opposes any unilateral action by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. Still, the likelihood of the US being drawn into a cross-strait conflict is there if wrong signals are emitted by the US. Should such a conflict arise, China might not prevail; at least not in the first round. China's physical infrastructure would be damaged and economic development set back many decades. But the Chinese leaders have said that they would be prepared to pay this price and more. Taiwan, however, would be physically and economically devastated. Investor confidence in Taiwan would be shattered. The economy will go downhill, and not recover for a long time. If the Taiwanese know that this will be the outcome, they may pause to ask whether this price is worth paying for a bid for independence.

34 Stable US-China relations are the foundation of East Asian stability. If the long-term stability of US-China relations can be assured, East Asia will grow and benefit the US as well. If there is permanent enmity between China and the US, not only will East Asian growth be set back but the entire region will be dragged down. Only the terrorists will benefit. And terrorism is the key issue of post-Cold War geopolitics.

Thank you.

June 7, 2004

TO: Honorable Tillie Fowler

cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Steve CamboneFROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Look at Intelligence

Please consider having a session at the next Defense Policy Board meeting on the subject of intelligence reform.

You might want to have Chris Williams get with Steve Cambone and figure out how to structure a portion of the day on that subject. It looks like there are a lot of proposals floating around from the Scowcroft Commission, the Senate Intelligence Committee, the 9/11 Commission, and the House Intelligence people.

A thoughtful meeting, hearing some good ideas, discussion and information from the members of the Policy Board, would be a big help to us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060704-4

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 08510-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49168


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11:23 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Dick Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: **Framing the War**

Mr. President -

Attached is an interesting paper Steve Cambone prepared after our DoD discussions about how best to describe the struggle we are in.

0005

His paper came out of discussions we had at the Pentagon in preparation for the briefings we presented you on the same subject.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
060704 01

Attach: *Framing the War*, S. Cambone, 5/24/04

7 Jun 04

cdw

25 May 2004, 09:21

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE 

SUBJECT: FRAMING THE WAR

The discussion yesterday morning on how to frame the war was important. I would like to offer my own thoughts.

The phrase “global war on terror” suffers, in my estimation, from a number of shortcomings.

1. Global. The prominence of the word, “global,” connotes to those abroad who read or hear it an American notion that the conflict is everywhere, or “universal,” and that the response and solution to it is the “singular” approach pursued by the United States. Some who might otherwise be partners — willing or grudging — find the war and its conduct and solution conceived and defined in American terms. For a variety of reasons, most are unwilling to accept such a definition even as they recognize their vulnerability.
2. War. The United States is at war, certainly with Al Qaeda and possibly with other terrorist networks. But here, again, state actors who might partner with us find joining in a “war” unappealing for domestic reasons.
 - Yet, we know that a large number of nations are fighting, some quite intensely, against the objectives and operations of terrorists within their own countries.
 - Most of these countries are aligned and cooperating with us through law enforcement or intelligence channels. However, in many cases, they do not wish to be publicly associated with us in a “war” as they battle their domestic problems. Some are even willing to be accounted as “against us,” even as they fight domestic terrorism.
3. Terrorism. I am of the view that terrorism is a method or tactic that has been chosen by our adversaries. I believe our adversaries seek, as you said

yesterday, to advance radical Islam as the basis for civil society for the better part of 2 billion people on the face of the earth.

- This effort has gained force and coherence over the last 10 to 15 years. It is a response to earlier defeats, for example: in Egypt in the 1990s and their continuing failure to destabilize the Saudi regime, among others.
- The 9/11 attack on the United States had the strategic effect of “enlarging the war.” The fact that the United States is fighting against “jihad” is being used to motivate, and perhaps radicalize, a large sector of the Islamic population in support of the objective of overthrowing western-leaning and/or corrupt regimes.

An alternative formulation to the phrase “global war on terror” might be that the political objective of radical or extremist Islam is to destroy international civil society through a combination of methods to include: terrorism, political manipulation, blackmail of ruling elites, corruption of Muslim educational institutions, and the radicalization of the Muslim faith. That is, our adversaries have brought to bear, on behalf of their objectives, a wide variety of elements of power against which we are, for the most part, employing military power. That is not a winning strategy.

Who are the adversaries? That is a more difficult question to answer. However, I believe they are to be found in the elite society of countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Indonesia and Thailand—as well as within western countries—those who, for a variety of reasons, are disaffected from the government and societies in which they live and are inclined to support radical Islam. They also possess, in addition to their elite standing, the financial means and the ruthlessness needed to pursue their objectives. The names of these individuals pass by us every day in the lists of financiers, industrialists, educators, scientists, and the like, associated with the terrorists, terrorist activities, and state sponsors.

For now, the United States has no choice but to continue the tactical engagement against Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks. But it is time for us to realize that we have a larger problem than Al Qaeda, and that its solution will require a multi-variant approach. That approach ought to allow for the creation of “alliances of convenience” between the United States and other states such that

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

those states can address their domestic problems in ways conducive to their own political realities while, at the same time, and without attribution, contribute to the overall objectives of the United States.

The objective of the United States, in short, is to ensure for itself and to assist others in the pursuit of the defense of international civil society in the modern world.

copy to:
DepSecDef
CJCS
USDP

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 8, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE
(301) 441-3398

TO: Amine Gemayel (c/o Michael Dravis)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Captain M -
This should prob be
FAXED b/c it's
Urgent. CSC w/s

Dear Amine,

Thanks so much for your note concerning the passing of President Ronald Reagan.

I have asked my staff to try to find a way to have you included in the service on Friday. We will be back in touch with you to let you know whether or not we have been successful.

With my best personal regards,

Sincerely,

DIIR:dh
060804-19

DL

OSD 08577-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49173

Jun 08 2004 7: 11pm

Last Transaction

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Identification</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Result</u>
Jun 8	7:10pm	Fax Sent	9913013149256	0:48	2	OK

hp officejet 7140xi
printer/fax/scanner/copier

Fax-History Report for

Jun 08 2004 6:55pm

Last Transaction

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Identification</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Result</u>
Jun 8	6:54pm	Fax Sent	9913014413398	0:00	0	No answer

Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 2004 5:20 AM
To: Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD; Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD
Subject: Done - FW: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

CAPT Marriott, Jimmy,

Receipt confirmed & acknowledged to Mr. Dravis. Done deal.

V/r,

John

(JS - stopped by on my morning run - vr, JL)

-----Original Message-----

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 2004 5:15 AM
To: 'Michael Dravis'
Subject: RE: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

* Mr. Dravis,

Good morning,

Thank you for the word back confirming receipt - it is much appreciated.

Respectfully,

John Larson
Executive Services & Communications
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Michael Dravis [mailto:MDRAVIS@cidcm.umd.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2004 9:24 PM
To: john.larson@whs.mil
Subject: Re: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

Dear Mr. Larson,

This is to confirm my receipt of the advance copy of Secretary Rumsfeld's letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel.

I apologize for the trouble you had faxing the letter to me, and thank you for your persistence.

I will pass the substance of Secretary Rumsfeld's letter to Mr. Gemayel tonight.

Sincerely,

Mike Dravis
Assistant to Amine Gemayel

>>> "Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD" <john.larson@whs.mil> 06/08/04 7:47 PM

>>>

Mr. Dravis,

6/9

Jimmy,
done
JL

need to
let VCB
know

it was
successful
JL

Good evening.

Attached, please find an advance copy of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel. The original letter will follow via postal channels.

(Fax transmittal to (301) 314-3256 appears successful, while attempts to (301) 441-3338 were met with a busy signal).

Secretary Rumsfeld's staff, as indicated in his response, will be in touch regarding President Gemayel's request for the service this Friday.

Respectfully,

John Larson
Executive Services & Communications

(b)(6)

<<08577-04.pdf>>

Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2004 8:22 PM
To: Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD
cc: Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD
Subject: FW: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

Jimmy,

Good morning,

Mr. Michael Dravis, of the University of Maryland, is an assistant to His Excellency Amine Gemayel, former President of Lebanon (during the Reagan years).

The former President requested (via his June 6th letter faxed by Mr. Dravis on June 7th) to be present for President Reagan's service in Washington this Friday, if possible. He would also like to meet briefly with the SecDef as well.

Due to the short turn, advance copy of SecDef's reply was to be faxed, but we were repeatedly met with a busy signal.

A fax to an alternate number appears to have been successful (copies of transmittal sheets on your desk).

I left a voice message (301-405-3356) for Mr. Dravis, indicating that we had attempted to forward an advance copy of Secretary Rumsfeld's acknowledgement, but were not certain it went through.

If you would, please call him in the a.m. to confirm receipt (fax or electronic) (he may very well call back also). Voice: (301) 405 - 3356

John

(I don't know that the attached bio for Gemayel is "official" - it was one of the first that came up when I searched on his name when looking for background info)



Dravis & Gemayel 08577-04 Incoming
Info.pdf



& Draft.pdf

-----Original Message-----

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2004 7:47 PM
To: 'mdravis@cidcm.umd.edu'
CC: Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD; Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD
Subject: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

Mr. Dravis,

Good evening.

Attached, please find an advance copy of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel. The original letter will follow via postal channels.
(Fax transmittal to (301) 314-9256 appears successful, while attempts to (301) 441-3398 were met with a busy signal).

Secretary Rumsfeld's staff, as indicated in his response, will be in touch regarding President Gemayel's request for the service this Friday.

Respectfully,

John Larson
Executive Services & Communications
(b)(6)



08577-04.pdf



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Michael W. Dravis

Faculty Research Assistant
e-mail: mdravis@cidcm.umd.edu
phone: (301) 405-3356
fax: (301) 314-9256

Projects:

- [Kahlil Gibran Research and Studies](#)



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University of Maryland . 0145 Tydings Hall . College Park, MD 20742 . 301.314.7703

Last Modified: December 01, 2003

AMINE GEMAYEL



Former President of Lebanon

Sheikh Amine Gemayel, the eighth President of the Lebanese republic was born in the village of Bikfaya - Lebanon in 1942, to a family which has played a major political role in modern Lebanon. His father, Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, founded in 1936 the democratic and social party: The Lebanese Kataeb. His brother Sheikh Bashir was elected President in August 1982, (Bashir was assassinated three weeks later). Sheikh Amine Gemayel graduated from Saint-Joseph University with a law degree; He started practicing as attorney at law in 1965. In 1970 at the age of 28, Sheikh Amine Gemayel was elected to the Lebanese parliament, and became thus the youngest member. On September 2nd 1982, he was elected President of the Lebanese Republic by 77 votes out of 80. His term of office ended in September 1988, (Six years as per the Lebanese Constitution). He then joined the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University as fellow and lecturer (1988-1989). He is affiliated with the University of Maryland as a distinguished visiting professor. From 1990 to July 2000, he resided in Paris as an exiled leader of the opposition, and lectured extensively on Lebanon and the Middle East in various countries worldwide. Since July 2000, he lives and pursues his political agenda in Lebanon.



Career history

When he became President, the new head of state set himself three main objectives which form the basis of his political activity today:

- Re-establishing the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon.
- Maintaining an effective dialogue between Lebanon's different communities.
- Restoring and modernizing the institutions of the state.

Concerning Syria, in 1982, presided by Amine Gemayel, the Lebanese government dissolved the Arab Dissuasion Force which legitimised Syrian military presence in Lebanon and in September 1983, he addressed a letter to the Syrian President Hafez El Assad requesting the withdrawal of his forces from the country.

As for the PLO in 1987 he annulled the Treaty of Cairo signed with the PLO in 1969, which authorized them to use Lebanon as a base for military operations against Israel. His position on the Israeli issue, is the implementation of the SC/UN resolution 425 - 426, and that he is opposed to any measures which would work against restoring Lebanon's sovereignty.

On the domestic front, Amine Gemayel's activities are aimed at establishing strong foundations for intercommunal dialogue. He is also working towards restoring the state's role by making its institutions credible, efficient and unified.

Paradoxically, although the major criticisms of Amine Gemayel during his presidency were his desire to appear as the President of all Lebanon and the pre-eminence of the state, today, these are the factors which give him credibility in the eyes of the Lebanese people.

Currently, he is continuing his battle to restore Lebanon's independence and sovereignty, and endow it with democratic institutions.

Apart from his political activities, in 1976, Amine Gemayel created the INMA Foundation, a non-profit organization, which brings together a number of institutions dealing with social, political, and economic issues concerning Lebanon and the Middle East. One of these is Beit-al-Mustakbal, (the house of the future), which is a combination of think-tank and research center, publishing a quarterly journal in three languages called: Haliyyat (Panorama of Events).

Publications:

1986: Peace and Unity (Colin and Smythe).

1988: L'Offence et le Pardon (Gallimard), reflections on the events in Lebanon.

1990: Mediation d'espoir (JC. Lattes), a collection of lectures delivered in the United States in 1989.

1992: Rebuilding Lebanon's Future, published by Harvard University (C.F.I.A.).

AMINE GEMAYEL

Stated

June 6, 2004

293

The Honorable Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
The Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Secretary,

It was with profound sadness that I learned of the passing of President Ronald Reagan yesterday. On behalf of my wife Joyce and myself, I should like to express our heartfelt condolences to you, your family, and your colleagues from the Reagan Administration.

I recall my years of working alongside President Reagan and your good self on Middle East issues with a fondness tinged with sadness. The fondness springs from the warm personal relations we all maintained throughout, even during the most difficult of times. Indeed, I will never forget the generous time and attention that both you and President Reagan devoted to the cause of peace, freedom and democracy in the region and to helping my country achieve its national aspirations.

Similarly, despite ongoing turbulence in Iraq, I am certain that history will credit President Bush, your good self, and your colleagues in the Administration with bold leadership for your efforts to transform a troubled region.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, if at all possible I would very much treasure the opportunity to pay my last respects to President Reagan during the state funeral that will take place in Washington on Friday. If that can be arranged, please let me know as soon as possible so that I can schedule my travel. A visit to Washington might also permit us to hold a brief meeting to review the latest developments in Lebanon and the Middle East.

As on previous occasions, I can be reached via my assistant, Mr. Michael Dravis, whose contact information is as follows:

0145 Tydings Hall
Center for International Development
and Conflict Management
University of Maryland
College Park, MD, 20742
Telephone: 301 405-3356

copy
to
MCM
to handle -
an

Sincerely,

OSD 08577-04

Amine Gemayel

6 JUN 04

11-L-0559/OSD/49183



FAX COVER SHEET

Date: 7 June 2004

To: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

Recipient's Fax Number: (b)(6)

Recipient's Telephone Number:

Number of Pages: 2 (including this cover sheet)

From: Amine Gemayel (through Michael Dravis)

Sender's Telephone Number: 301-405-3356

Message:

Original will follow via mail.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 2004

203

His Excellency Amine Gemayel
c/o Mr. Michael Dravis
0145 Tydings Hall
Center for International Development
and Conflict Management
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742

Dear Amine:

Thanks so much for your note concerning the passing of
President Ronald Reagan.

I have asked my staff to try to find a way to have you
included in the service on Friday. We will be back in touch
with you to let you know whether or not we have been
successful.

8 JUN 04

With my best personal regards,

Sincerely,

OS5 08577-04

6 JUN 04

11-L-0559/OSD/49185

June 8, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Military Confirmations

We have a serious problem with military confirmations.

I am told that we have some 20 military nominations pending in the White House and the Senate. We have to get them to the President for signature and up to the Senate, so we can get hearings. We are going to end up having senior officers revert to lower ranks, and having to put three-stars into four-star jobs. We have a problem with General Casey, who we need to get to Iraq in close proximity to Ambassador Negroponte. Vern Clark may not get confirmed by the date his current term expires.

I would appreciate it if you could figure out what the delays are and help get the nominations in to the President. If there are any questions, please call me and I will try to be helpful.

I am going to work the Hill at the same way to see if we can talk Senator Warner into scheduling hearings and getting on with it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-22

OSD 08591-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49186

210 (381)

25 MAY

June 8, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Thoughts on Iraq

Attached are some remarks on the subject of Iraq that I dictated the other day. I don't know whether or how I might use them, but I felt better after dictating them.

Respectfully,

Attach.

6/7/04 "Some Thoughts on Iraq"

DHR:dh
060804-16

Iraq

85604

OSD 08593-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49187

June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

It is fair to ask: Which of the two widely differing perspectives is correct, or more correct, and, therefore, which view ought to be shaping U.S. policy and world thinking on this important matter?

One reason for the disparity in perspectives may be the standard that one measures progress against. The dedicated volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against extremists are on the front lines. They see first-hand the extremists trying to hijack a religion from the majority of moderate Muslims. They see the terrorist insurgency that the Iraqi people face. They see, first-hand, ground truth. Further, they seem to understand that war has never been tidy, orderly or predictable.

Our troops recognize that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded. They see the Iraqis who courageously step forward and become targets of assassins. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave souls on the front line of this

struggle see the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the struggles that have taken place over the decades and the experiences of countries that have made that difficult and dangerous journey from dictatorship to civil societies. Only by considering history can one fully appreciate that the path to freedom has always been difficult, dangerous, and marked by ugliness. So, to measure the Coalition's progress against countries that have successfully achieved their freedom misses the point.

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite understandable concerns, it can be done. It has been done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, riots, battles, deaths – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. But it should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. One thing is certain. U.S. and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.

Those who seek the truth should challenge any who would measure progress in Iraq against unrealistic expectations. Ask: When in history it has ever been easy or predictable? When has a country gone from a repressive dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties or loss of life -- "on a featherbed"? Why should Iraq be measured against an unrealistic standard?

What is taking place is tough. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It is ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of fine young men and women -- each a volunteer -- and may God bless them all. But the very least they deserve is a totally honest assessment by their countrymen of what it is they are doing. The least they deserve is an accurate, truthful recognition of the progress that has been and is being achieved in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan -- the hospitals built, the clinics

opened, the schools staffed and provided new textbooks and the economic progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an appreciation of the courage they have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills, let there be no doubt – calls for balance and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from the media that benefits from the constitutional protections, and, with those protections, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security and the opportunities that will flow from them. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be whole. They are opposed to a breakup of the country. We know, despite terrorist attacks, assassinations, and disruptions to services, and despite the fact that terrorists and extremists kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week – and have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – that 70 percent of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they face today. Over 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds and 80 percent of Shia agree. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand that their lives are better today, despite the drumbeat to the contrary.

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? What alternatives do those who criticize and contend that all that is lost suggest? Some say leave. What if the coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- A failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.

- A civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites.
- Takeover by a neighboring country and radical clerics.
- A split up of Iraq into several parts, or
- A new Saddam Hussein could take control and re-impose a vicious dictatorship.

Which of those options would any argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. This struggle is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week – for the first time in history. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So, we are in for a rough period of months. But, when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21st century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people, and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from paralysis.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 9 2004

The Honorable Alan Greenspan
Chairman, Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
20th Street and Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20551

Dear Alan,

Enclosed are some remarks I dictated on Iraq.

If you have any thoughts, please let me know. I don't know what I will do with them, but I am thinking of doing something.

Best regards,

Enclosure

Iraq

9 Jun 04

OSD 08600-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49193

June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

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DHR:dh
Current MFRs/Thoughts on Iraq

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

June 24, 2004

I-04/00865-3
EF-9989

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Ray DuBois

J 8/17

W 83.6

SUBJECT: Policy on Images

Attached is a problem. It looks as though we do not have a uniform, Department-wide policy on photographing, filming and videotaping in prisons.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh
062304-12

.....
Please respond by _____

TO SecDef

Paul Butler

8/17
→
6/18

S/S

Response 9/14/04

Y/S
CO 73
8/17

OSD 08603-04

8

24 JUN 04

24 MAY 04

11-EO 13526/OSD/49489

28-95-94 07:54 IN



GENERAL COUNSEL

**GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600**

INFO MEMO

May 24, 2004/4 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes* 6/07/04
SUBJECT: Photographs in DoD Detention and Confinement Facilities

- In all DoD detention facilities, photographing/filming/video taping of individual detainees for other than internal facility administration or intelligence purposes is strictly prohibited by a joint service regulation (Tab A). The rule is specific, clear and applicable to all persons including guards.

- As a general rule, the taking of unofficial photographs of confinees at DoD confinement facilities is not authorized (Tab B). DoD confinement facilities primarily house military personnel who have been convicted at courts-martial and sentenced to confinement.

- This general rule regarding confinement facilities is written in the context of photographs by civilian visitors, including the media. No rule expressly addresses unofficial photographs by guards. I understand, however, that the "no unofficial photographs" rule is applied to guards in practice.

- The two primary reasons for the rule at both facilities are the same: security of the facility and protection of the detainees/confinees from humiliation and public curiosity.

COORDINATION: None.

ATTACHMENTS:
as stated

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk/DoDOGC (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/49200

OSD 08603-04

Army Regulation 190-8
OPNAVINST 3461.6
AFJI 31-304
MCO 3461.1

Military Police

Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees

Headquarters
Departments of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Marine Corps
Washington, DC
1 October 1997

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/49201

Headquarters
Departments of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Marine Corps
Washington, DC
1 October 1997

*Army Regulation 190-8
*OPNAVINST 3461.6
*AFJI 31-304
*MCO 3461.1

Effective 1 November 1997


Military Police

Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees

By Order of the Secretary of
the Navy:

By Order of the Secretary of
the Air Force


By Order of the Secretary of
the Navy




TOGO D. WEST, JR.
Secretary of the Army

J. L. JOHNSON
Admiral, United States Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Acting

RICHARD A. COLEMAN
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Security Police



GENERAL L. L. JONES USMC
Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff
for Plans, Policies and Operations



J. S. MOXLEY
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Director, Navy Staff

History. This printing publishes a revision of this publication. Because the publication has been extensively revised the changed portions have not been highlighted.

Summary. This regulation implements Department Of Defense Directive 2310.1 and establishes policies and planning guidance for the treatment, care, accountability, legal status, and administrative procedures for Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Persons, and Other Detainees. This regulation is a consolidation of Army Regulation 190-8 and Army Regulation 190-57 and incorporates SECNAV Instruction 3461.3 and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304. Policy and procedures established herein apply to the services and their capabilities to the extent that they are resourced and organized for enemy prisoner of war operations.

Applicability. This is a multi-service regulation. It applies to the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and to their Reserve components when lawfully ordered to active duty under the provisions of Title 10 United States Code.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The proponent has the authority to approve

exceptions to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulation. Proponents may delegate the approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent.

Army management control process. The Regulation contains management control provisions in accordance with AR 11-2, but does not contain checklists for conducting management control. Reviews are used to accomplish assessment of management controls.

Supplementation. Army supplementation of this regulation and establishment of command or local forms is prohibited without prior approval from HQDA (DAMO-ODL), WASH DC 20310. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force supplementation of this regulation is authorized, but is not required. If supplementations are issued, major or second echelon commands will furnish one copy of each supplement to their headquarters, as follows: Navy, to the Chief of Naval Operations (NS11), 2000 Navy Pentagon, Washington DC 20350-2000, Marine Corps, to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, HQ USMC (POS-10) 2 Navy Annex, Washington DC, 20380-177511), and Air Force, to HQ USAF/SPO,

1340 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1340.

Suggested Improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements through channels as follows: HQDA (DAMO-ODL), WASH DC 20310-0440.

Distribution. *Army:* Distribution of this regulation is made in accordance with initial distribution number (IDN) 092120, intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and E for Active Army, Army National Guard, U. S. Army Reserve.

Navy: SNDL A (Navy Department); B5 (Coast Guard); (COMDTTCOGARD, only) 21A (Fleet Commanders in Chief); 22A (Fleet Commanders); 23 (Force Commanders); 24 (Type Commanders); 26A (Amphibious Groups); 28 (Squadron, Division, and Group Commanders—Ships); 41A (COM-SC); SECNAV/OPNAV Directives Control Office, Washington Navy Yard Bldg 200, 901 M Street SE, Washington DC 20374-5074
Air Force: F

Marine Corps: PCN 10203324000

*This regulation supersedes AR 190-8, 1 June 1982, and rescinds AR 190-57, 4 March 1987. This regulation also rescinds DA Form 5451-R, August 1985; DA Form 5452-R, August 1985; and DA Form 5976, January 1991.

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/49202

medical annex of OPLANs, OPORDs and contingency plans includes procedures for treatment of EPW, CI, RP, and ODs. Medical support will specifically include:

(a) First aid and all sanitary aspects of food service including provisions for potable water, pest management, and entomological support.

(b) Preventive medicine.

(c) Professional medical services and medical supply.

(d) Reviewing, recommending, and coordinating the use and assignment of medically trained EPW, CI, RP and OD personnel and medical material.

(e) Establishing policy for medical repatriation of EPW, CI and RP and monitoring the actions of the Mixed Medical Commission.

h. U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). USACIDC will provide criminal investigative support to EPW, CI and RP Camp Commanders per AR 195-2

1-5. General protection policy

a. U.S. policy, relative to the treatment of EPW, CI and RP in the custody of the U.S. Armed Forces, is as follows:

(1) All persons captured, detained, interned, or otherwise held in U.S. Armed Forces custody during the course of conflict will be given humanitarian care and treatment from the moment they fall into the hands of U.S. forces until final release or repatriation.

(2) All persons taken into custody by U.S. forces will be provided with the protections of the GPW until some other legal status is determined by competent authority.

(3) The punishment of EPW, CI and RP known to have, or suspected of having, committed serious offenses will be administered IAW due process of law and under legally constituted authority per the GPW, GC, the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts Martial.

(4) The inhumane treatment of EPW, CI, RP is prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or with deep provocation. Inhumane treatment is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

b. All prisoners will receive humane treatment without regard to race, nationality, religion, political opinion, sex, or other criteria. The following acts are prohibited: murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, the taking of hostages, sensory deprivation, collective punishments, execution without trial by proper authority, and all cruel and degrading treatment.

c. All persons will be respected as human beings. They will be protected against all acts of violence to include rape, forced prostitution, assault and theft, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals of any kind. They will not be subjected to medical or scientific experiments. This list is not exclusive. EPW/RP are to be protected from all threats or acts of violence.

d. Photographing, filming, and video taping of individual EPW, CI and RP for other than internal Internment Facility administration or intelligence/counterintelligence purposes is strictly prohibited. No group, wide area or aerial photographs of EPW, CI and RP or facilities will be taken unless approved by the senior Military Police officer in the Internment Facility commander's chain of command.

e. A neutral state or an international humanitarian organization, such as the ICRC, may be designated by the U.S. Government as a Protecting Power (PP) to monitor whether protected persons are receiving humane treatment as required by the Geneva Conventions. The text of the Geneva Convention, its annexes, and any special agreements, will be posted in each camp in the language of the EPW, CI and RP.

f. Medical Personnel. Retained medical personnel shall receive as a minimum the benefits and protection given to EPW and shall also be granted all facilities necessary to provide for the medical care of EPW. They shall continue to exercise their medical functions for the benefit of EPW, preferably those belonging to the armed forces upon which they depend, within the scope of the military laws and regulations of the United States Armed Forces. They shall be provided with necessary transport and allowed to periodically visit EPW situated in working detachments or in hospitals outside the

EPW camp. Although subject to the internal discipline of the camp in which they are retained such personnel may not be compelled to carry out any work other than that concerned with their medical duties. The senior medical officer shall be responsible to the camp military authorities for everything connected with the activities of retained medical personnel.

g. Religion.

(1) EPW, and RP will enjoy latitude in the exercise of their religious practices, including attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the military authorities. Adequate space will be provided where religious services may be held.

(2) Military chaplains who fall into the hands of the U.S. and who remain or are retained to assist EPW, and RP, will be allowed to minister to EPW, RP, of the same religion. Chaplains will be allocated among various camps and labor detachments containing EPW, RP, belonging to the same forces, speaking the same language, or practicing the same religion. They will enjoy the necessary facilities, including the means of transport provided in the Geneva Convention, for visiting the EPW, RP, outside their camp. They will be free to correspond, subject to censorship, on matters concerning their religious duties with the ecclesiastical authorities in the country of detention and with international religious organizations. Chaplains shall not be compelled to carry out any work other than their religious duties.

(3) Enemy Prisoners of War, who are ministers of religion, without having officiated as chaplains to their own forces, will be at liberty, whatever their denomination, to minister freely to the members of their faith in U.S. custody. For this purpose, they will receive the same treatment as the chaplains retained by the United States. They are not to be obligated to do any additional work.

(4) If EPW, RP, do not have the assistance of a chaplain or a minister of their faith. A minister belonging to the prisoner's denomination, or in a minister's absence, a qualified layman, will be appointed, at the request of the prisoners, to fill this office. This appointment, subject to approval of the camp commander, will take place with agreement from the religious community of prisoners concerned and, wherever necessary, with approval of the local religious authorities of the same faith. The appointed person will comply with all regulations established by the United States.

1-6. Tribunals

a. In accordance with Article 5, GPW, if any doubt arises as to whether a person, having committed a belligerent act and been taken into custody by the US Armed Forces, belongs to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, GPW, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

b. A competent tribunal shall determine the status of any person not appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed forces, and who asserts that he or she is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war, or concerning whom any doubt of a like nature exists.

c. A competent tribunal shall be composed of three commissioned officers, one of whom must be of a field grade. The senior officer shall serve as President of the Tribunal. Another non-voting officer, preferably an officer in the Judge Advocate General Corps, shall serve as the recorder.

d. The convening authority shall be a commander exercising general courts-martial convening authority.

e. Procedures.

(1) Members of the Tribunal and the recorder shall be sworn. The recorder shall be sworn first by the President of the Tribunal. The recorder will then administer the oath to all voting members of the Tribunal to include the President.

(2) A written record shall be made of proceedings.

(3) Proceedings shall be open except for deliberation and voting by the members and testimony or other matters which would compromise security if held in the open.

Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC

From: Strong, Steven, T., COL, OSD-P&R
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2004 08:06
To: Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC
Subject: AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, April 5, 2004

Jim:

Here is what the Army corrections reg has to say about photographing prisoners and facilities. The paragraph heading pertains to public access, but the wording of subparagraphs 10-12a and b is not limited to the public, and their rationale would apply to correctional staff as well.

Steve

10-12. Public access to facilities

Access by the public to ACS facilities should be limited to authorized tours and visits. Care should be taken to avoid criticism on grounds of defamation, embarrassment, and mental anguish to prisoners confined within the facility resulting from visit and tour policies.

a. Photographing prisoners. Prisoners will not be photographed, except in support of medical documentation and for official identification purposes. Photography that does not reveal the identity of individual prisoners when undertaken for official purposes and that will not reflect adversely upon the Army may be authorized per paragraph 10-12b(1)(b), (c) and (d) below.

b. Photographing facilities. Photographing ACS facilities is not permitted unless authorized by the facility commander as an exception to policy when the stated purpose justifies such action. When photography is authorized, it will not include—

- (1) Areas where detailing fences, restraining walls, bar, locks, and other restraining devices are located.
- (2) Scenes including prisoners who are identifiable.
- (3) Scenes depicting prisoners under custodial control.
- (4) Use of irons or similar restraining devices.

c. Prisoner communications with the news media. Face-to-face and telephonic communications between military prisoners and members of the news media (print and broadcast) are not authorized. Written communications including those prepared by prisoners for publication on the internet, are permitted subject to the provisions of paragraphs 10-10 and 10-13d of this regulation.

d. Release of material prepared by prisoners for publication.

- (1) Written material prepared by prisoners for publication, in whole or in part, in print or through the broadcast media, other than clearly identified expressions of personal opinion, must be submitted for review prior to release under the criteria contained in paragraph 10-11b of this regulation.
- (2) In addition, such material may, as appropriate, be subject to national security and policy review under the provision of AR 360-1.

e. Institutional publications. MACOMs may approve establishment of institutional publications containing prisoner prepared articles when such publications are for use within a facility *only*.

Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC

From: Strong, Steven, T., COL, OSD-P&R
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2004 09:09
To: Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC
Subject: SECNAVINST 1640.9B, Department of the Navy Corrections Manual, December 1996

Chapter 8, section 8301, paragraph 16

16. Official, Press and Civilian Visits

a. Requests ,for general visiting of the brig by groups or individuals shall be coordinated with the local PAO and in accordance with-"Chapter 18 of OPNAVINST 5510.1H, Navy Information Security Program (NOTAL) and SECNAVINST 5720.44A, Department of the Navy Public Affairs (pAO) policY and Regulations= Each request shall include a specific reason for the visit. The brig officer will g-ant or deny such requests based upon the brig's ability to maintain good order and discipline and availability of staff to supervise the visit. Official, press, and civilian visits shall normally be conducted within the brig's regular visitation schedule and shall strictly prohibit photographing or recording of names of prisoners.

b. Current DoD policy is that personal interviews and telephonic communications between prisoners and the media are not authorized.

Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC

From: Strong, Steven, T., COL, OSD-P&R
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2004 08:51
To: Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC
Subject: AFI31-205 7 APRIL 2004, The Air Force Corrections System

Jim:

This is all there was in the Air Force reg.

Steve

5.11. Public Affairs. Access by the public to AFCS facilities should be limited to authorized tours and visits. Care should be taken to avoid criticism, grounds of defamation, embarrassment and mental anguish to detainees/inmates confined within the facility resulting from visit and tour policies.

5.11.1. Videotaping and photographing detainees/inmates will not be permitted except in support of medical documentation, for official identification purposes, (i.e., criminal activities) or IAW AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*. If the inmate consents to a photograph, the inmate must sign a consent statement.

5.11.2. Photographing an AFCS facility is not permitted unless authorized by the confinement officer or as an exception to policy when the stated purpose justifies such action. When photography is authorized, it will not include:

5.11.2.1. Areas where detaining fences, restraining walls, bars, locks and other restraining devices are located.

5.11.2.2. Scenes including inmates who are identifiable.

5.11.2.3. Scenes depicting detainees/inmates under custodial control.

5.11.2.4. Use of restraining devices.

5.11.3. All requests for media interviews (face-to-face, on camera or telephonic) with military detainees/inmates should be coordinated with public affairs and security forces personnel. Media interviews must be conducted without compromising security procedures established by the confinement/corrections facility. Authorize written communication subject to the provisions of paragraph 6.3.2.

5.11.4. Written material prepared by detainees/inmates for publication must be submitted to the confinement officer or delegated representative for review prior to release. In addition, such material is subject to national security and policy review by Public Affairs under the provisions of AFI 35-101.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

AUG 10 2004

DEPSECDEF

USD(P)

I-04/008653

EF 9989

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Policy on Images (U)

- (U) You requested a proposal regarding the use of photographic imagery in DoD prison facilities.
- (U) The Department has a clear and comprehensive policy regarding imagery taken by US soldiers or others at USG detention facilities so as to ensure compliance with our obligations under the Geneva Conventions and Department regulations or directives. (Tab B)
- (U) According to a current Joint Service Regulation, "Photographing, filming, and video taping of individuals for other than internment facility administration or intelligence/counterintelligence purposes is strictly prohibited." (Tab C).
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The General Counsel for the Department of Defense advised you on January 24, 2002, as to the legal requirements of executing our regulations with respect to detention and photography. (Tab D).
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The policies outlined in Mr. Haynes' memorandum have become our operating procedures at our detention facilities per your directive of March 29, 2003. (Tab E)
- (U) I do not believe that additional policy guidance is required, but, I have asked the DASD/Detainee Affairs to inquire through the Department Joint Detainee Coordinating Committee whether any gaps remain to be filled.

COORDINATION: Copies provided to the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and discussed with OGC (Ms. Diane Beaver) on August 5, 2004.

Attachment: As stated.

Prepared by: Bryan C. Del Monte, Detainee Affairs, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 08603-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49207

11-03-14-13:11

QA 8/11/04
copy provided
8/11/04

383.6

10 Aug 04

24 May 04

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 3, 2005

2005 MAY -5 PM 1:10

TO: Fran Harvey
GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Women in the Army

Our meeting was helpful. Please take a crack at setting forth the current circumstance with regard to women in combat. I see a need for a fresh, simple one page explanation of what joint ground forces are doing and why. It will need to be easily understood by those who are not experts in defense policy, and, needless to say, it should certainly be consistent with current law and policy.

Please work it with the Marines and the other Services to make sure you propose a draft that can be consistent across the Department.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
050305-1

.....
Please respond by 5/5/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08627-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49208

205

3 MAY 05



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAY -5 PM 1: 18

INFO MEMO

2005-05-05 A11:45

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

~~GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army~~ CF 5 MAY 05

SUBJECT: Snowflake - "Women in the Army"

- This is an interim response to your Women in the Army memo, dated May 3, 2005, in which you continued our dialog about policies relating to the assignment of women in combat.
- We too believe that our discussion was useful. We will provide a one-page point paper describing the current joint environment, the major types of operations in that environment, and how current policies on women in combat are applied. Specifically, we need to address how the linear battlefield has changed to a 360 degree fight with a greatly expanded combat zone. Therefore:
 - All Soldiers should be trained with a core skill set to effectively operate in the current operating environment.
 - Women Soldiers should not be assigned to units such as infantry, armor, special forces, cannon artillery, and combat engineers (which are the ones that engage in direct ground combat) to comply with the existing laws.
 - Commanders and leaders should have reasonable flexibility in task organizing and missioning their joint forces.
- It is clear that the Army Policy needs to be updated to account for the significant changes that have occurred in the operating environment since the time it was established in 1992. Current policy language is not clear when one applies the realities of today's greatly expanded battlespace. Furthermore, the operational application of Army Policy can be subject to interpretation. On the other hand, DoD Policy may be appropriate for the current operating environment.
- We will work with the other Services and OSD (P&R) to update our policies on this issue. The policies will remain consistent with current law but reflect the nature of the 21st century battlefield.
- We will get back to you within the month with our proposals.

Coordination: None

Attachments: None

Prepared By: LTC Ed Palekas, (b)(6)

NSN 08627-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49209

205

5 MAY 05

3 MAY 05

72
~~FOUO~~

December 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Editorial Pieces

383.6

Take a look at these two editorials (item 43 and 44), and please do something about them.

Thanks.

Attach.

"Tortured Principles," Boston Globe, December 6, 2004

"Tantamount to Distortion?" Washington Times, December 6, 2004

DHR:dh
120804-5

.....
Please respond by

12/16/04

8 Dec 04

OSD 08652-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49210

C1

the military's employment practices are generally admirable -- with minorities, for example -- its "Don't ask, don't tell" policy, bars openly gay men and women from service.

Several groups -- including the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights -- are challenging a 1995 law, called the Solomon Amendment, on behalf of university law schools. The law allows the federal government to stop funding to colleges and universities that deny or obstruct campus recruiting by the military. Billions of dollars are at stake because all federal funding to colleges and universities, not just law school funding, can be blocked. The court sided with the schools, saying the government can't stop funding because the military is booting out. The appeals court used the same rationale that the U.S. Supreme Court used in its 2000 decision allowing the Boy Scouts of America to exclude a gay scoutmaster. Just as the Boy Scouts believe that homosexual conduct and lifestyles are inconsistent with Scout values, so too, are U.S. military anti-gay policies inconsistent with the law schools' values, the FAIR lawyers argued. Thus, requiring schools to support discrimination by permitting military recruiters on campus is the same as requiring the Boy Scouts to accept a gay scoutmaster, they said.

What makes the universities' position difficult is that the use of federal funds in a carrot-and-stick approach to enforce good government policies -- usually those supportive of civil rights, inclusion of women and other worthwhile objectives -- has been a practical method of achieving beneficial societal goals. But the carrot-and-stick approach is just a tactic toward an end. It mustn't be confused with something as intrinsic to human decency as fair and equal treatment of all persons.

The former is a means to an end; the latter is the destination itself.

The Pentagon now must decide if it wants to accept the appeals court's decision, ask for a review by the full appellate court or ask the Supreme Court to hear the case. Whichever route the military chooses, our hope is that the ultimate outcome reinforces the basic principles of fairness and equality.

Boston Globe

December 6, 2004

43. Tortured Principles

Years from now, the mistreatment of Afghan war detainees at Guantanamo and Iraqi war detainees at Abu Ghraib will likely rank with the internment of Japanese-American civilians in World War II as a violation of the nation's principles. But the Bush administration continues to stonewall criticism of its actions, whether it comes from US courts or the International Red Cross. Congress must act to steer the nation back toward compliance with the Geneva Conventions and US law.

In a confidential report to the administration based on visits to Guantanamo in June, the International Red Cross found that detainees had been subjected to psychological and physical forms of coercion that were severe enough to be "tantamount to torture." The report, parts of which were leaked to The New York Times last week, also charged US doctors and other medical personnel with providing interrogators with information about prisoners' health and vulnerabilities. Because of this, the report said, prisoners were reluctant to seek medical assistance.

Physicians for Human Rights, which has been calling on the Defense Department to set and enforce ethical guidelines for medical personnel at prison camps for months, said that "any involvement of health

professionals in the practices of torture and/or ill treatment, in any way, violates the international principles of medical ethics." The executive director of the group, Leonard Rubinstein, said the United Nations Principles of Medical Ethics rule out the activities alleged in the Red Cross report.

A court proceeding last week also demonstrated how the United States is turning its back on its own due process standards in its treatment of detainees. For decades, evidence obtained from defendants after torture has not been admissible in US courts. But on Thursday, a deputy associate attorney general told a federal judge that there was nothing to stop military officials at Guantanamo from using torture-induced statements in deciding whether a detainee should be held indefinitely as an enemy combatant.

In another case last month, a federal judge found that the procedures at Guantanamo for determining enemy combatant status do not comply with the Geneva Conventions and US law, which state that any battlefield detainee is presumed to be a prisoner of war until a "competent tribunal" puts him in the less protected status of enemy combatant.

Far from correcting policies that violate medical and legal standards, President Bush has nominated for attorney general his chief counsel, Alberto Gonzales, who in 2002 wrote a memo calling parts of the Geneva Conventions "quaint" and "obsolete." Congress should thoroughly investigate conditions at the detainee camps and, if necessary, pass laws to keep the administration's human rights violators in check.

Washington Times

December 6, 2004

Pg. 20

44. Tantamount To

Distortion?

This page does not condone the use of torture for extracting information. A new report by the International Committee of the Red Cross alleging that detainees in Guantanamo Bay have been abused has a number of flaws. The Pentagon has refuted the report's claims of abuse.

According to a detailed memorandum on the ICRC report obtained by the New York Times, apparently from a U.S. government source, the ICRC has alleged that psychological and sometimes physical coercion used at Guantanamo was "tantamount to torture." That report was made after a Red Cross inspection team spent most of last June at the facility. The report said that coercion consisted of "humiliating acts, solitary confinements, temperature extremes, use of forced positions."

For starters, just what does tantamount to torture mean? While those practices do sound like they could elicit both physical and mental discomfort and duress, they do not appear to rise to the level of torture, or something tantamount to it.

Also, the ICRC's bases for its allegations of abuse are the reports of the detainees themselves, not any first-hand observation of the alleged abuse, said a Pentagon official. That fact calls into question the findings, for obvious reasons. The official maintains that claims of ongoing conflict between the Pentagon and ICRC are also false. "It actually is a pretty good relationship we have with the ICRC," he said. "They continue to make valuable comments and suggestions."

The ICRC, which is based in Geneva and is separate from the American Red Cross, defines itself as "an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them

with assistance." Also, it endeavors "to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles." Given that mission, the ICRC's credibility in alleging acts of torture, or anything related to torture, is critical. It must be careful to ensure the practices it complains about rise to that level.

It is difficult to believe, though, that some stress on detainees doesn't need to be exerted in order to produce intelligence.

The White House has repeatedly said it is upholding international law in its treatment of Guantanamo detainees. Without more concrete and substantiated evidence to the contrary, there seems little reason to pay the ICRC report much heed.

~~FOUO~~ when separated from attachment

TAB A

APR 12 2005

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAY -5 PM 4: 58

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Japan

What is the story about this complaint by a Japanese Foreign Ministry official?

Thanks.

Attach.
7-17000003-05 (total Report)

DATE: 04/10/05 (to laptop)

.....
Please respond by

4/21/05

5/2 (per DJS EA)
to RD

~~FOUO~~ when accounted & on attachment

Tab A

OSD 08663-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49213

~~FOUO~~

MAY 06 2005

TO: The Honorable John Negroponte
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NCTC Personnel Issue

With regards to the NCTC personnel issue, our folks told the IG of the desirability of speed. I am told there may be only two people to interview, so it should not take long.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
050505-7

NO DNT

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08668-05

to be done


11-L-0559/OSD/49214

~~FOUO~~

APR 19 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
Gordon England
Mike Dorniguez
GEN Pete Schoomaker
ADM Vern Clark
Gen Mike Hagee
Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Notification

Here is a list that shows the military bases where the Pentagon Channel is broadcasting.

I understand the objective is that the Pentagon Channel be available on every military installation, including those serving the reserve component.

That seems like a reasonable objective.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/31/05 Weekly On-Air Report for Pentagon Channel

DHR:dh
041805-9

.....
Please respond by 5/5/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08770-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49215



**SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON**

2005-05-07 11:35

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Pentagon Channel at Army Installations

- This responds to Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated April 19, 2005, Subject: Notification (Tab A).
- I agree that having the Pentagon Channel available on every military installation is a reasonable objective. Currently, 55 of 179 Army installations carry the Pentagon Channel.
- Major General Ronald Johnson, our Installation Management Agency Director, has met with Ms. Allison Barber, your Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications & Public Liaison) to discuss opportunities and the way ahead to maximize the number of Army installations that carry the Pentagon Channel.
- The Army will continue to work with the Pentagon Channel, American Forces Radio and Television Service, American Forces Information Service, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to increase the number of Army installations that carry the Pentagon Channel. The current projection is for the Pentagon Channel to be fielded to all Army installations by the end of FY07.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTC Rob Ali, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/49216

OSD 08770-05


Tab A

FOUO

APR 19 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
Gordon England
Mike Dominguez
GEN Pete Schoomaker
ADM Vern Clark
Gen Mike Hagee
Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Notification

Here is a list that shows the military bases where the Pentagon Channel is broadcasting.

I understand the objective is that the Pentagon Channel be available on every military installation, including those serving the reserve component.

That seems like a reasonable objective.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/31/05 Weekly On Air Report for Pentagon Channel

DHR:dh
041805 9

.....
Please respond by 5/5/05

FOUO

OSD 08770-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49218

APR 20 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Air Traffic Control

You might ask Ray DuBois if he wants to think about talking to the air traffic controllers about the closeness of these airplanes to our front here.

It seems to me they are getting closer and closer. I don't know why. I thought they were supposed to fly out over the river. They are flying right over the top of our building.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041004-8

.....
Please respond by 4/20/04

0 SD 08773-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49219

April 30, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Proximity of Aircraft

An airplane went by my window here at about 1444 on April 30. It was very close. You might want to check into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-15

.....
Please respond by

5/7/04

11-L-0559/OSD/49220



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SEC 11
2001 JUN 2 47

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 6.9.04

SUBJECT: Proximity of Air Traffic to the Pentagon

- In the attached snowflakes, you expressed concern regarding the proximity of air traffic to the Pentagon and requested that I look into the matter.
- I have been in contact with officials from the Federal Aviation Administration and the Washington Metropolitan Airports Authority, and they have disseminated a request throughout the Reagan National Airport (DCA) aviation community that includes the following:
 - "...all air crews arriving DCA for 'Landing Rwy 15' are encouraged to operate their aircraft at optimum decent profiles and whenever practicable avoid directly over flying the Pentagon (PNT) building. All Departures from 'Rwy 33' are also encouraged to avoid over flying the Pentagon building itself whenever practicable."
 - "Over flights of the Pentagon are not prohibited and not in violation of any FAA airspace course rules for operating at DCA according to the FAA. However, the Department of Defense has requested all air carriers and their flight crews avoid over flying the Pentagon building itself to the maximum extent possible."
- An aerial photograph of the Pentagon's proximity to the flight path of DCA Rwy 15/33 is attached at Tab A.

COORDINATION: None


Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Jennifer S. Cole, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/49221

OSD 08773-04

DCA Rwy 15/33 Extended Centerline and PNT



11-L-0559/OSD/49223

June 8, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressional Letter of Support

Please give me a piece of paper with the names of each of these Congressmen – I cannot read their handwriting.

Then draft a letter to each one of them from me, thanking each of them for that. Please give the draft letter to me so I can edit it.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/13/04 Congressional letter to POTUS

DHR:dh
060804-27

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

335SD

8 Jun 04

The Honorable _____
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative _____

Thank you for the statement of support in the letter to the President signed by you and 42 of your colleagues. I appreciate your friendship and will redouble my effort to merit your confidence.

Sincerely,

Mike Rogers (AL)
Duncan Hunter
Jim Saxton
Joe Wilson
Eric Cantor
Randy "Duke" Cunningham
John Sullivan
Sam **Johnson**
Terry Everett
Roy Blunt
Edward Whitfield
Tom Cole
Devin Nunes
Cass Ballenger
Candace Miller
Bob Beauprez
Spencer Bachus
Mario Diaz-Balart
Joe Pitts
Trent Franks
Chris Chocola
Peter King
Tom Feeney
Charles "Chip" Pickering, Jr.
Jim Gibbons
Steve King
Mark Kennedy
Jennifer Dunn
Wally Herger
Roscoe Bartlett
William "Mac" Thornberry
Scott McInnis
J. Gresham Barrett
Melissa Hart
Jack Kingston
Todd Tiahrt
John Carter
Tim Murphy
John Doolittle
Sam Graves
Jim Ryan
Clay Shaw

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

May 13, 2004

The Honorable George W. Bush
President
United States of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing today to express our strong and unwavering support for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He is serving with honor and distinction.

Since September 11, 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld has demonstrated exceptional leadership in service to you and our nation. He has led our nation's military through two wars, the continuing global war of terror, and a revolutionary period of transformation. He is doing a tremendous job at a tremendous task.

Mr. President, we strongly support your comments made on May 10, 2004 when you told Secretary Rumsfeld, "You're doing a superb job. You are a strong Secretary of Defense, and our nation owes you a debt of gratitude."


True leaders perform their best during the most difficult times. Secretary Rumsfeld is leading from the front with strength, honor, and candor. We continue to support him as he continues his job as our Secretary of Defense.

Thank you for your leadership and for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Mike D. Rogers
Member of Congress



Duncan Hunter
Member of Congress

11-L-0559/OSD/49227

Joe Patton

Joe Wilson

Eric Costa

"Dub" Campbell

John Smith

Sam Johnson

Tony Evans

Royce

Ed Whis.

Sam Cole

Darin Nemes

Cass Ballenger

Cardinal Miller

Bob Bump

John King

Spencer Bede

Tom Fanning

John Riff

Aug Pick

John Riff

Jim Sessions

Paul Smith

Steve King

Walter Kennedy 11-L-AT

John D.

Melvin Hart

Wally Henger

Jack Kingston

Paul

Todd Tinkert

Mac

John R. Carter

Sam

Tim Murphy

John T. Drotelle

Jim Ryan

Star Jones

Ellen Shaw

Melissa Hart



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 11 AM 9:04

June 10, 2004 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake #060804-27

- You asked for a draft thank you letter (Tab 2) to send to each Member who signed the 13 May 04 letter to the President (Tab 4)
- You also asked to see the printed names of the Members (Tab 3)

Attachments:

1. SECDEF Snowflake
2. Proposed Thank You Letter
3. List of Names
4. 13 May 04 Letter to the President

335 SD

10 Jun 04 8 Jun 04

OSD 08785-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49232

720
TAB A

SECRET

2004 JUN 11 11 09:35

May 20, 2004

777

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Pete Geren
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Joint Doctrine on Detainees

There is an issue arising on doctrine on detainees. It seems to me that, given the fact of the nature of the war we are in, we need to have a Joint Doctrine on detainees.

Please come up with a proposal in the next seven days.

Thanks.

DHR:jh
6/2/04-27

.....
Please respond by 6/1/04

OSD 08793-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/49233



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 11 AM 9:39

CM-1835-04
10 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *TCM 6/10*

SUBJECT: Joint Doctrine on Detainees

- **Issue.** "There is an issue arising on doctrine on detainees. It seems to me that, given the fact of the nature of the war we are in, we need to have a Joint Doctrine on detainees. Please come up with a proposal in the next seven days." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The Joint Doctrine Development Community is aggressively working to establish doctrine for detainee and interrogation operations. Joint Publication 2-01.1, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations," introduces interrogation operations and should be approved this August. A first draft of a "stand alone" detainee operations joint publication will be developed immediately thereafter.
- **Discussion.** The attached (TAB B) provides information on development of joint doctrine for detainee and interrogation operations.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Jack Catton, USAF; Director, J-7: (b)(6)

OSD 08793-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49234

TAB A

May 20, 2004

777

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Pete Geren
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Joint Doctrine on Detainees

There is an issue arising on doctrine on detainees. It seems to me that, given the fact of the nature of the war we are in, we need to have a Joint Doctrine on detainees.

Please come up with a proposal in the next seven days.

Thanks

DHR:jh
052004-27

.....
Please respond by 6/1/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/49235

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: /SF-777/ Joint Doctrine on Detainees

1. Purpose. To provide information on doctrine for joint detainee and interrogation operations.

2. Key Points. The Joint Doctrine Development Community is currently establishing joint doctrine for detainee and interrogation operations.

- Detainee Operations

- The Air-Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center completed a manual on "Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (MTTP) on Detainee Operations in a Joint Theater." This manual, which is ready for signature, is on hold per an April 2004 request by the OSD General Counsel (pending Supreme Court decision on detainees).
- The Joint Staff intent is to convert the above MTTP publication into a "stand alone" unclassified joint publication. Notwithstanding the OSD GC hold, the existence of a mature MTTP draft suggests that the joint doctrine development timeline can be shortened; a first draft for Service and combatant command staffing could be developed by fall 2004. A final draft for CJCS signature would be ready by fall 2005.

- Interrogation Operations

- The revision of Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations" will introduce joint interrogation operations and should be approved in August 2004.
- The revision of JP 2-01.2, "Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations" is in the assessment stage. This classified revision will address human intelligence, counterintelligence and interrogation operations based on lessons learned from ongoing operations. The first draft should be out by August 2005, and the approved doctrine published by fall 2006.



JUN 14 2004

TO: RADM Michel Miller, WHMO

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Military Nominations

I have just reviewed the status of senior military nominations needing Senate confirmation. I am concerned by the number of nominations awaiting action at the White House, as well as in the Senate.

We have several key nominations in that queue at the White House that must get to the Senate for confirmation action this month. I would appreciate your personal efforts to get the nominations currently in the White House to the President for action.

I have attached a memo I sent to Andy Card on this subject, and a listing of nominations currently at the White House awaiting signature.

Thank you.

Attach.

6/9/04 SecDef memo to Andy Card

Pending 3 & 4 Star Nominations as of Tuesday, June 8, 2004

DHR:dh
061004-1

210 (344)

14 Jun 04

0 SD 08830-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49237

COPY

June 9, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Military Nominations

Andy—

We talked on the phone about our need to get the White House to sign off on our three- and four-star military nominations. Attached is the list of the nominations that are at the White House. I am told that the papers for some or all of them are physically with the President's party at Sea Island. It would be a big help if you could get them signed.

We need help! We have a war going on. The peacetime pace of 10 working days for White House processing gets multiplied when they go to the Senate. They are still operating on a peacetime schedule. The combination of the two means that we are consistently without a large number of senior military officers. Also, throughout the three-and-a-half-year period we have had 20 to 25 percent of the 48 Presidential appointees that require Senate confirmation vacant. It makes it tough to run this Department.

Thanks.

Attach.

Pending 3 & 4 Star Nominations as of Tuesday, June 8, 2004

DHR:dh
060904-11

OSD 00728 04

11-L-0559/OSD/49238

Pending 3 & 4 Star Nominations

as of

Tuesday, June 08,2004

NOMINATIONS AT WHITE HOUSE FOR POTUS SIGNATURE

Service	Name	Type of Nomination:	Arrival at White House
USMC	Cartwright	Cdr, US STRATCOM	5/21/2004
AF	Hester	Cdr, PACAF	5/21/2004
Navy	Keating	Cdr, NORTHCOM	5/21/2004
Navy	Morgan	Deputy Chief of Naval Operations	5/21/2004
Navy	Munns	Cdr Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet and Cdr. Submarine Allied Cmd.	5/21/2004
Navy	Nathnian	Vice Chief of Naval Operations	5/21/2004
Army	Odiemo	Assistant to the CJCS	5/21/2004
USMC	Sattler	Cdr, I MEF	5/24/2004
Navy	Route	Inspector General, Department of the Navy	5/25/2004
AF	McNabb	O-9 to O-9 Dir, Log. J-4, JS	5/27/2004
Army	Broadwater	Chief of Staff, US European Cmd	5/28/2004
Navy	LaFleur	Cdr, US Pacific Fleet	5/28/2004
Army	Casey	Cdr, Multi-National Forces-Iraq	6/2/2004
Army	Cody	Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army	6/2/2004
USMC	Conway	O-9 to O-9 Dir of Ops, J-3, JS	6/2/2004
Army	Honore	CG, First US Army	6/3/2004
Army	Inge	Deputy Commander, U. S. Northern Command/Vice Commander, U.S. Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	6/3/2004
AF	Schwartz	Director, Joint Staff	6/3/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/49239



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

SECRET
2004 JUN 14 PM 1:25

INFO MEMO

JUN 1 6 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *W. Winkenwerder*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Letter from Secretary Thompson on Afghanistan

- You asked me to respond to a recent letter you received from Health and Human Services Secretary Thompson regarding his experiences and observations about health issues in Afghanistan, and the on-going joint effort between Health and Human Services and Department of Defense to improve child and maternity health services (TAB A).
- Secretary Thompson referenced the Rabia Balkhi Hospital and a request from the Afghan Ministry of Health to have Health and Human Services take management of the hospital.
- As you recall, I have been facilitating regular meetings addressing maternal and child health issues in Afghanistan. These meetings bring together the relevant people on this issue from Health and Human Services, Department of Defense, Veterans Health Administration, and U.S. Agency for International Development. It also includes Dr. Peter Saleh, the senior advisor to the Afghan Ministry of Health, who works on the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group for Ambassador Khalilzad, and Marty Hoffman.
- The group met last week and addressed the issues raised by Secretary Thompson. Although preliminary, an innovative proposal emerged which may eventually involve an international foundation in responsibility for administration of the hospital.
- Progress is being made in facility refurbishment and clinical care, but all representatives agreed that effective management of Rabia Balkhi Hospital is a critical need. Dr. Saleh announced that the French have agreed to construct a new women's hospital in Kabul, which may eventually serve as a referral facility for Rabia Balkhi, Malalai, and Indira Ghandi Hospitals. Management of such a network of facilities will present even greater challenges.
- Representatives from Health and Human Services and the Veteran's Health Administration are putting together a proposal to address the need for effective hospital management. It will include cost estimates for a management program for

11-L-0559/OSD/49240

0 SD 08841-04

0114741

Rabia Balkhi Hospital, and will be scalable to permit inclusion of Malalai and Indira Ghandi Hospitals in management improvements. Once completed and vetted with stakeholder agencies, Dr. Saleh will engage and brief the Minister of Health.

- Our inter-agency healthcare coordination group will meet again in six weeks to discuss the management improvement proposal and other progress in the Afghanistan healthcare sector reconstruction effort.
- It would be useful for you and Secretary Thompson to meet again in order to have you jointly place your support behind this solution. I would suggest the optimal time for your meeting to be after the proposal is completed, in six to eight weeks.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: CAPT Jack Smith, C&PP, (b)(6) PCDOCS 65790,661 12,66124

2:31 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: Attached,

Here is a note from Secretary Thompson. *Do* you have any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
06/01/04.29

Attach: 5/27/04 - Secy. Thompson ltr. to SD

Please respond by: _____

6 | 10 | 04

11-L-0559/OSD/49242

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

MAY 27 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
W.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Last January, I provided you an update of the efforts and accomplishments of my Department of Health and Human Services in Afghanistan throughout last year. While in the past year we have made tremendous progress in improving the lives of Afghans, much still needs to be done. As you might know, I visited Afghanistan for the third time, and I would like to share with you some of my impressions from my trip.

Before that, I would like once again to express my appreciation to the Department of Defense for making my trip a possibility. Difficulties of air travel in the region made it impossible for me to fly by commercial air, and thus I relied on military transport provided by U.S. Central Command, for which I am very grateful. Throughout my travels, the pilots and ground personnel were of the highest caliber and true ambassadors of the American people.

The primary purpose of my visit was to follow up on letters from President George W. Bush to the heads of state of the six remaining countries that have endemic poliovirus transmission. We are nearing the end of a fifteen-year-long campaign to eradicate polio from the world, supported in large part by the U.S. Government, and I hope these last six countries can overcome the remaining obstacles and stamp out this disease that cripples and kills children primarily. In each of the countries I visited, I saw great enthusiasm and resolve to complete this task, from the highest levels of government on down. I also saw the power of the private sector, particularly Rotary International, with its hundreds of chapters around the world, in making this dream of global polio eradication a reality.

In Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to tour three different hospitals in Kabul, including Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital, which has had the support of the Departments of Defense and Health and Human Services. In addition, I visited a maternity hospital supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development and a children's hospital supported by the Indian Government. While there are certainly limitations at these facilities in terms of infrastructure, staffing and supplies, they all are clearly providing a vital service to the people of Kabul.

As a result of my recent discussions with you, I am pleased to say we now have a new commitment from the Department of Defense to support some of the needed repairs at Rabia

Page 2- The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld


Balkhi Hospital. This is in addition to the several millions of dollars my Department will put into upgrading the training of the staff in modern women's health care.

Additionally, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health has asked my Department to consider taking on the management of Rabia Balkhi Hospital. If the Afghan health care sector is to achieve self-sufficiency, the country will need high-quality managerial talent. We are currently considering this request and have not yet responded formally to the Ministry, but my staff had fruitful discussions with the leadership of the Ministry during the World Health Assembly in Geneva this past week. Managing Rabia Balkhi would represent a substantial increase in our commitment to the facility and is outside the bounds of our limited resources. Nonetheless, we view this as an opportunity to cement some of the gains we have made by instituting a sustainable management at the hospital, indeed at all three maternity hospitals in Kabul, which can be replicated across the country. As you may know, we have had significant success in this particular area through our Indian Health Service, which has been able over the years to train Native American communities, many of whom live in very difficult conditions, to manage their own health care resources in a self-sufficient manner. We are fortunate in that the Native American community has expressed interest in contributing to our efforts in Afghanistan by assisting the Afghan people in this particular area. I am hoping to identify additional resources to make this initiative a reality.


We are making substantial progress in many needed areas of life in Afghanistan, but the ability of the Afghan people to perpetuate these improvements will depend on their ability to actively manage their scarce resources, whether financial or human, and to pass on and use knowledge and skills. This, in itself, will be a true test of our legacy in Afghanistan.

I look forward to a chance to discuss these developments further with you.

Sincerely,



Tommy G. Thompson



P.S. Thanks Don for
all your help & support!
Jerry

Response to Health and Human Services Secretary Regarding Trip to Afghanistan

COORDINATION


DASD, C&PP

Dr. David Tornberg

Concurred 6/6/04

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S.C. Chu


11 Jan 04

2:31 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: Attached,

Here is a note from Secretary Thompson. Do you have any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.39

Attach: 5/27/04 - Secy. Thompson ltr. to SD

Please respond by:

6/10/04

Sir,
Response attached.
W/CDR Nosenzo
6/15

DR 6/16

1 Jun 04

10 Jun 04

Afghanistan

11-L-0559/OSD/49246

08841-04

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

MAY 27 2004

B.L.W.

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Last January, I provided you an update of the efforts and accomplishments of my Department of Health and Human Services in Afghanistan throughout last year. While in the past year we have made tremendous progress in improving the lives of Afghans, much still needs to be done. As you might know, I visited Afghanistan for the third time, and I would like to share with you some of my impressions from my trip.

Before that, I would like once again to express my appreciation to the Department of Defense for making my trip a possibility. Difficulties of air travel in the region made it impossible for me to fly by commercial air, and thus I relied on military transport provided by U.S. Central Command, for which I am very grateful. Throughout my travels, the pilots and ground personnel were of the highest caliber and true ambassadors of the American people.

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Page 2- The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld


Balkhi Hospital. This is in addition to the several millions of dollars my Department will put into upgrading the training of the staff in modern women's health care.



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We are making substantial progress in many needed areas of life in Afghanistan, but the ability of the Afghan people to perpetuate these improvements will depend on their ability to actively manage their scarce resources, whether financial or human, and to pass on and use knowledge and skills. This, in itself, will be a true test of our legacy in Afghanistan.

I look forward to a chance to discuss these developments further with you.

Sincerely,


Tommy G. Thompson


Call your help + support


11-L-0559/OSD/49248



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

June 14, 2004 12:42 PM

Administration
& Management

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RAYMOND F. DuBOIS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT *Ray DuBois*

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives Status Report

- Of a total of 653 DoD Directives, 388 were identified for revision or cancellation. Tab A shows their current status.
- Of the 388 Directives, 43% either have been approved or are in formal staffing.
 - 167 have been submitted for cancellation or revision (123 for revision, 44 for cancellation).
 - Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has approved 48 of the 167 directives submitted.
- The above numbers reflect *only* the Directives either complete or informal coordination.
 - For example, the attached status chart at Tab A indicates that USD(Policy) has only submitted two of its 51 Directives identified for revision. However, 19 additional Directives are drafted and in internal Policy coordination (Tab B). USD(AT&L) has submitted 29 of its 50 Directives for revision, with 16 of the remaining 21 currently in draft or internal coordination (Tab C). Progress also is evident in other components.
 - The same chart shows that DA&M has identified 45 Directives for revision, but 39 of these are Charter Directives, which require full and timely participation from Principal Staff Assistants and Components.
- Following the SecDef's February 13, 2004 memo expressing disappointment at the pace of this effort (Tab D), the weekly submission rate increased by over 60%.
- With regard to the OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives, a copy of Ryan Henry's April 8, 2004 memorandum to the Secretary is at Tab E.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Cragg, ES&CD, (b)(6)

0 SD 08856-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49249

TAB

A

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
6/4/04**

COMPONENT	NUMBER OF DIRECTIVES	CERTIFIED CURRENT	REVISIONS		CANCELLATIONS		SIGNED	
			Reported*	Submitted	Reported*	Submitted	Revisions	Cancellations
USD(AT&L)	113	38	50	29	25	22	10	5
USD(P)	64	11	51	2	2	0	0	0
USD(P&R)	193	103	79	41	11	5	13	3
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	0	0	0	0
USD(I)	58	8	45	8	5	3	0	2
ASD(NII)	40	19	12	5	9	8	1	3
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	0	0	0	0
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	0	0	2	0
GC, DoD	36	19	16	9	1	0	4	0
DA&M	86	31	45**	7	10**	6	2	1
WHS/B&F	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
WHS/C&D	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/DPO	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/FOIA	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
WHS/FV	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
WHS/P&S	5	4	1	1	0	0	0	0
TOTALS:	653	265	325	123	63	44	34	14

* Number identified by each Component in response to Mr. DuBois' memo of October 29,2003.

** Of the 45 DA&M Directives identified for revision, 39 are charter Directives; 9 of the 10 cancellations are also charters. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

TAB

B

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D&D	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
SOLIC											
U	2205.2	HUMANITARIAN AND CMC ASSISTANCE (MCA) PROVIDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS	10/6/1994		X		SOLIC/HASAPL Policy estimated completion 6.8 wks, working w/DSCA. Per SOLIC about 80% completed. estimate 3 wks to finish revision and another 3-4 for final coordination. POC: Todd Harvey (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
	4500.51	DOD NON-TACTICAL ARMORED VEHICLE POLICY (U)	5/4/1987		X		SOLIC/AT Draft is 10% completed. working w/J34. estimated draft completion 15 Aug 04. Antiterrorism Standards (2000 16) must be completed before this directive can be updated. POC: COL Tennison (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
U	5100.48	FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF	12/4/1975		X		SOLIC/HASAPL Policy estimated completion 6.8 wks, working w/DSCA. Per SOLIC about 40% completed. estimate 4-5 wks to finish revision and another 3-4 wks for final coordination.	11/21/2003			

PDUSD(P)

U	2002.3	CLEARANCE OF RESEARCH AND STUDIES WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS IMPLICATIONS	11/17/1997		X		PDUSOP/OM&S/MS&F (Ed Rader). Contacted Gwen Simpson @ State	11/21/2003			
---	--------	---	------------	--	---	--	---	------------	--	--	--

U	2040.2	INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY, GOODS, SERVICES, AND MUNITIONS	7/5/1985		X		ISP/TSP&CP/DTSA per Chester under revision				
U	2050.2	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) IMPLEMENTATION	8/8/1972		X		ISP/TSP&CP under revision	11/21/2003			
U	3100.1	SPACE POLICY	7/9/1999		X		ISP/FP COL TROTTER on HOLD pending issuance of NSPD in 2005				
U	3230.3	DOD SUPPORT FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACTIVITIES	3/7/1998		X		ISP/FP COL TROTTER on HOLD pending issuance of NSPD in 2005				
U	5230.20	VISITS, ASSIGNMENTS, AND EXCHANGES OF FOREIGN NATIONALS	11/18/1983		X		ISP/TSP&CP - Pete Batten (b)(6) under revision	11/21/2003			
U	5205.3	DOD IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM FOR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFENSE			X		ISP/TSP&CPP under revision	11/21/2003			

U	3020.36	ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (NSEP) RESPONSIBILITIES TO DOD COMPONENTS	1/15/1993		X		8D- under revision. POC: Donna Reuss/Chuck Adams (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
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Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT		CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D&RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	3025.1	MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MSCA)	2/4/1994		X		Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be incorporated into the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	3025.12	MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (MAGDIS)	2/18/1997		X		Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	3025.15	MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES	7/9/1999		X		Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	5030.46	ASSISTANCE TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT IN COMBATING CRIME	4/13/1972		X		Per HD, will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities combatting crime directive.	11/21/2003			
U	5030.50	EMPLOYMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICES	12/4/1975		X		Per HD, will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities support of US Postal Services.	11/21/2003			
U	2140.5	DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT (DISAM)	6/2/1993		X		ISA/DSCA under revision 3d Qtr. POC: Freda Lodge (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
	2310.1	DOD PROGRAMS FOR ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) AND OTHER DETAINEES (SHORT TITLE: DOD ENEMY POW DETAINEE PROGRAM)	8/18/1994		X		ISA/DPMC POC: LTC Dan Shea (b)(6) under revision				
U	5410.17	INFORMATIONAL PROGRAM FOR FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINEES IN THE UNITED STATES	11/26/1993		X		ISA/DSCA - Forwarded to LTG Walters to sign coordination sheet. Should be completed 3d Qtr 04 POC: Dawn Burke (b)(6)	11/21/2003			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

PI-L-05559/OSD/49254

TAB

C

Proponent Responsibility:USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN DOD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	1315.6	RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MILITARY TROOP CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OVERSEAS	8/26/1978		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	12/1/2003			
U	2010.5	DOD PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM	6/24/1992 6/24/1992		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	3201.1	MANAGEMENT OF DOD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES	3/9/1981 3/9/1981		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	3204.1	INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (IR&D) AND BID AND PROPOSAL (B&P) PROGRAM	5/10/1999		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	3222.4	ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W) COUNTERMEASURES	1/28/1994		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	3224.3	PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT (PSE): ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, EVALUATION, PRODUCTION, PROCUREMENT, DEPLOYMENT, AND SUPPORT	2/17/1988		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	4100.15	COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM	3/10/1989		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	4120.11	STANDARDIZATION OF MOBILE ELECTRIC POWER (MEP) GENERATING SOURCES	7/9/1993		X		REDRAFTED	12/5/2003			
U	4120.15	DESIGNATING AND NAMING MILITARY AEROSPACE VEHICLES	3/2/1992 5/2/1993		X		REDRAFTED	12/5/2003			
U	4270.5	MILITARY CONSTRUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES	3/2/1982		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	4510.11	DOD TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING	10/2/1995 10/2/1995		X		REDRAFTED	11/21/2003			
U	4525.6	SINGLE MANAGER FOR MILITARY POSTAL SERVICE	5/5/1980		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	11/21/2003			
U	4700.3	MINERAL EXPLORATION AND EXTRACTION ON DOD LANDS	9/28/1988		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	12/5/2003			
U	4715.1	ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY	2/24/1996		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			

Proponent Responsibility:USD(AT&L)
11-L-0539/OSD/49256

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN OERD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	5000.52	DEFENSE ACQUISITION EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	10/25/1991		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	5134.5	DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BOARD (DTB)	10/28/1992		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)
 11-L-0559/OSD/49257

TAB

D



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. You identified 384 Directives that you intend to revise or cancel. I expect these actions to be completed by April 1, 2004. I understand that, to date very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared.

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.



OSD 01776-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49259

TAB

E

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~


INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1-04/002818

EF-2656

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  APR 8 2004

SUBJECT: OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives

- This responds to your question about the desirability of an OSD review of Joint Staff Directives.
- The Chairman transmits policy, procedures and guidance through CJCS instructions, manuals, notices, guides, handbooks, and pamphlets. Although not currently required by DoD Directive, a recent Joint Staff data call indicated that about two-thirds of these documents were coordinated with OSD prior to publication.
- As the Chairman mentioned to you, there is an ongoing effort to update CJCS publications, analogous to the OSD endeavor. Along those lines, Joint Doctrine Publications are staffed with OSD at the action officer level during the update process.
- There is a broad effort underway to update JCS and OSD instructions to reflect the post-9/11 environment and the transformation vision as it applies to existing capabilities.
- CJCS publications that apply to the Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies are required to be formally coordinated with those organizations during update/revision.
- I believe that the formal and informal staff coordination that occurs throughout the review process provides requisite OSD visibility and oversight over Joint Staff publications.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Pam Mirelson, WHS/Executive Services and Directives, (b)(6)
Steven Netishon, OPDUSD(P), (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Policy Info Memo Form 1000

11-L-0559/OSD/49261

In reply refer to EF-8656 & 04/002818-ES

4:05 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

DATE February 24, 2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Attached is a memo I sent to Dick Myers and his response.

I wonder if we ought to think about having OSD review the Joint Staff Directives.

If so, who do you think ought to do it?

Thanks.

DHR/wen
0202404.D1a

Attach: Info Memo from Gen. Myersta SD 2/23/04 Re: Directives

Please respond by: 3/5

01-03-04 15:11 IN



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314-6000

INFO MEMO

CE-1346-04

23 February 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *schmidt**OSD Perry*

SUBJECT: Directives

- **Question.** "Where do we stand on getting all of the Joint Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?"
- **Answer.** From January through March 2003, the Joint Staff conducted a special review of all 263 CJCS instructions and manuals to address the impact of organizational and policy changes. A total of 179 directives were identified for revision or cancellation action. To date, 127 (71 percent) of these actions are complete. Actions on the remaining 52 (29 percent) are scheduled for completion by May 2004.
- **Analysis.** The special review encompassed all CJCS directives, including those already undergoing a regularly scheduled assessment at the time. My staff continues to manage this regular scheduling system to keep guidance current, while monitoring the remaining out-of-cycle updates.

COORDINATION NONE

Attachment

As stated

Prepared By: MG Michael D. Maples, USA; Vice Director, Joint Staff; (b)(6)

3

OSD 02613-04

To: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

cc: Ray DIBOW

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Where do we stand on getting all of the joint staff and chairmen of the joint chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?

Thank you.

OSD/ass
102104.11

Respond by:

2/12/04

31 Jan 04
31 Jan 04
31 Jan 04
31 Jan 04
31 Jan 04

OSD 01776-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

YAY 10 2005

Lieutenant General Michael M. Dunn (USAF)
President
National Defense University
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319-5066

Dear Mike,

Thanks so much for your latest missive, it was helpful. I sent it along to Generals Myers and Pace, Larry Di Rita, and Doug Feith with the attached memo.

Regards,

Enclosure

OSD 08867-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49265

335 SD

10 May 05

~~FOUO~~

May 9, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo from Mike Dunn

Attached is an excellent paper from Mike Dunn. Please take a look at it, and tell me how you think we can move forward.

Thanks,

Attach.

4/25/05 SecDef Memo to Lt. Gen. Mike Dunn
5/05/05 Lt. Gen. Mike Dunn Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
050905-31

.....
Please respond by

6/16/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08867-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49266

335 SD

9 May 05

10 May 05

4/7 1600
Paul Butler →

6/9

TO: Sec Def

TO: Mira Richard

2004 JUN 15 AM 8:36

2-04/007531
EF-9782

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Are you positive that the State Dept. is not going to certify Uzbekistan? If that is so, we've got to get to work on it. Get Paul Wolfowitz to talk to Hadley, and draft a memo from me to Secretary Powell and a memo to me for my POTUS file that I want to talk to the President about Uzbekistan.

Thanks.

DSD/m
060204.04m

Please respond by:

6/8

Sir,

Response attached.

W/CDR Nosenzo

6/9

OSD 08876-04

03-05-04 12:02 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/49267

June 14, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Moving Military Base at Babylon

Please get back to me and tell me what you are going to do in response to the CPA's request that the military base at Babylon be moved to avoid disturbing and damaging archeological sites.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-17

.....
Please respond by

6/25/04

OSD 08878-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49268

IRA 9

14 Jun 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 15 AM 9:29

CM-1842-04
14 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/14*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

- **Issue.** "I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions. Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like that. Please give me a proposal." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** All pre-September 11 orders were reviewed previously with negative results (TAB B). USTRANSCOM was additionally tasked with the further examination of Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) to ensure their applicability during the War On Terrorism (WOT) and their adherence to the standard DOD orders process. USTRANSCOM completed the review and stated that all MOAs are both applicable during the WOT and in compliance with the standard orders process.
- **Discussion.** USTRANSCOM is the only command supporting active MOAs with other agencies. Operation DEEP FREEZE was the only MOA supported by an Executive Order dated prior to 11 September 2001 and is currently in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) for rewrite.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

0 SD 08883-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49269

TAB A

March 2, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Standing Orders

I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions.

Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like that. Please give me a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/12/04 J-3 response to SecDef snowflake

1/27/04 SecDef memo to CJCS re: Antarctica (012704-17)

DHR:dh
030204-14

.....
Please respond by

3/19/04

11-L-0559/OSD/49270

OSD 03398-04
Tab A

ANTARCTIC OPERATION DEEP FREEZE

Purpose. To provide a response to SecDef Snow Flake- 674.

Issue. SF-674 stated, "In the meeting with the President, John Handy mentioned that there had been 400 missions to Antarctica. I don't remember signing any deployment orders for that."

Bottom Line

- DOD support to Operation DEEP FREEZE is provided on a reimbursable basis from the National Science Foundation (NSF) under a DOD-NSF Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) at no cost to the Department of Defense.
- Operations are conducted under a standing SecDef EXORD that was issued 032310Z Jul01.

Background

- Department of Defense has supported Polar Programs since 1957.
- Operation DEEP FREEZE mission is designed to move people and cargo to, from and within Antarctica in support of the NSF.
- MOA of 1 Apr 99 outlines NSF and DOD responsibilities for Operation DEEP FREEZE.
 - The implementing party for NSF is the Office of Polar Programs.
 - The implementing parties for the Department of Defense are the US Air Force/Air National Guard and the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
 - As the DOD Executive Agent for the MOA, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is required to perform a biennial review of the MOA.

- USTRANSCOM has operational control of all DOD common user transportation assets and personnel when they are supporting the Polar Programs.
- Operation DEEP FREEZE missions include:
 - Flying support missions between McMurdo (base camp in Antarctica) and Christchurch, New Zealand, by C-141 and C-17.
 - Intercontinental missions by LC-130 (ski equipped).
 - On-continent missions by LC-130.
 - US Coast Guard (USGC) and Military Sealift Command vessel operations (USCG icebreakers, one cargo vessel and one fuel tanker).

Current Year/Season Support (As of 12 Feb 04)

- 46 of 56 C-141 and C-17 missions completed (only C-141 missions remain)
- 51 of 66 LC-130 intercontinental missions complete
- 401 LC-130 on-continent missions complete
 - LC-130 providing additional airlifting for cargo offloaded from AMERICAN TERN
- McMurdo Station to close on 24 Feb
- DEEP FREEZE closes o/a 27 Feb; all units return home

Recommendation. None. Provided for information only.

Prepared by: CDR Warren, USN, J-3 JOD-PAC, (b)(6)

01270415

2

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/49271

January 27, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

SUBJECT: Antarctica

In the meeting with the President, John Handy mentioned that there **had** been 400 missions to Antarctica. I don't remember signing any deployment orders for that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012704-17

.....
Please respond by 2/4/04

Sir,
The attached *C* 5x8 previously
routed, answers this snowflake.
vr/cor Nosmy
3/1

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/49272

TAB B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1668-04
5 April 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RCM 4/3*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

- **Issue.** "I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions. Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like Operation Deep Freeze. Please give me a proposal." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The Joint Staff, combatant command and Service staffs have examined all standing execution orders (EXORDs). Operation DEEP FREEZE (ODF) is the only EXORD that had not been cancelled, reviewed or modified since 11 September 2001. I anticipate that a further evaluation of outstanding memorandums of agreement (MOAs) and understanding with other agencies may highlight areas that do not have a direct bearing on the War on Terrorism. A review of these memorandums will be forwarded by 30 April.
- **Discussion.** EXORDs dating back to 1992 were analyzed to determine if they had undergone periodic review and approval since 11 September.
 - Before July 2001, ODF was executed under an MOA with the National Science Foundation. USTRANSCOM supports several such MOAs pre-dating September 2001 that are now under evaluation.
 - Combatant commander and Service staffs were encouraged to continue their review of all EXORDs that require use of DOD assets in light of their applicability to current operations.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3 (b)(6)

OSD 03398-04
11-L-0559/OSD/49273
etc 04-00529/07

Tab B

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USTRANSCOM

Gen Handy

26 April 2004

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

June 21, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: General Officers in Iraq

Please take these lists of generals and tell me how many are Army, how many are Marine Corps, and how many are Coalition (non-US). Also, how many generals do we have per 5,000 Army troops and how many Marine generals do we have per 5,000 Marines?

Thanks.

Attach.

6/15/04 JCS memo to SD re: Locations [OSD 08923-041

DHR:dh
062104-8

Please respond by

7/2/04

Sir,

There are 33 Army general, 8 Marine Corps General, and 10 Coalition Generals. There are also 2 AF generals.

The Ratios are: 0.727 Army GOs/5000 soldiers
0.625 Marine Corps GOs/5000 Marines.

COL TB

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OSD 08932-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49275

DR

DR 9/1

C 7/2

(21 Jun 04)

2 Jun 04

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

8:39 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Gen. Richard Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

CJCS HAS SEEN

JUN 03 2004

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Locations

Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR/asm
060204.07

Please respond by: 6/10

04 JUN 03 11:24

0 SD 08932-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/49276



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

2004 JUN 15 PM 5:53

CM-1844-04

15 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/15*

SUBJECT: Locations

- **Question.** "Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** TAB B shows where the general and flag officers in Iraq are located.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM T. J. Keating, USN; Director, Joint Staff; (b)(6)

OSD 08932-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49277

USCENTCOM G/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ

Multi-National Force - Iraq

Commander	9/10	USA	LTG Sanchez	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement to arrive 30 Jun
DCG	9	Coalition	Coalition-LTG McColl	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG (Embassy based position)	8	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	MG Stratman, USA arrives 30 Jun
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition-Air Cmdr Jones (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG Detainee Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, G	Baghdad, Iraq	
Chief of Staff	8	USMC	Maj Gen Weber	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCS Intel	8	USA	MG Fast	Baghdad, Iraq	BG DeFritas, USA arrives Aug
Deputy Intel	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	UK Fills
DCS Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, T.	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement BG Fil arrival TBD
DCS Ops	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Molan (Aus)	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy C3	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	Italian fill (BG Isaszegi departed)
Dep Dir, Ops/CICB	7	USA	BG Kimmit	Baghdad, Iraq	Brig Gen Lessel, USAF arrives 1 Jul
DCS Strategy, Policy & Plans	8	USAF	Maj Gen(S) Sargeant	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy Pol/Mil	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
Coalition Ops	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
C4I	7	USAR	MG Detamore	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement requested for 1 Aug
DCS Log	8	USA	BG West	Baghdad, Iraq	MG Minetti, ARG arrives 15 Jul
C7/DCG Eng	8	USA	MG Johnson	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Bostick arrives July
C9	7	USAR	BG Davidson	Baghdad, Iraq	
CDR, Air Cbt Contingency Element	7	USAF	Brig Gen Steel	Baghdad, Iraq	
MND-North Cdr	7	USA	BG Ham	Mosul, Iraq	TF Olympia
CG MNTF North. 88th Inf Div (Fwd)	7	USARG	BG Wriaht	Mosul, Iraq	
DCG/OST-I	9	USA	LTG Patraeus	Baghdad, Iraq	
CMATT	8	USA	MG Eaton	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Schwitters arrives 20 Jun
CPATT	8	Coalition	Coalition - BG MacKay	Baghdad, Iraq	
Ch, Iraq Survey Group	8	USA	MG Dayton	Baghdad, Iraq	BGen McMenamin, USMC arrives 15 Jun
Cdr, MNC-I	9	USA	LTG Metz	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Graham (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Canada	MG Natynczyk (Can)	Baghdad, Iraq	

USCENTCOM G/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ

Chief of Staff	7	USA	BG Troy	Baghdad, Iraq	
c 3	7	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	Requirement TBD
C3 (Effects)	7	USA	BG Formica	Baghdad, Iraq	
c 7	7	USA	BG Pollman	Baghdad, Iraq	

CG, 1st Armored Div	8	USA	MG Dempsey	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Hertling	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Scaparrotti	Al Hillah, Iraq	
CG, 1st Infantry Div	8	USA	MG Batiste	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Mundt	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Morgan	Tikrit, Iraq	
CG, 1st Cavalry Div	8	USA	MG Chiarelli	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Hammond	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Jones	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, 13th COSCOM	7	USA	BG Chambers	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	
CG, 2d Med Bde	7	USAR	BG Reynolds	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, I MEF	9	USMC	LtGen Conway	Al Asad, Iraq	
DCG I MEF	8	USMC	MGen Stadler	Al Asad, Iraq	
CG, I MarDiv	8	USMC	MGen Mattis	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
ADC 1stMarDiv	7	USMC	BGen Kelly	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
CG, 1st FSSG	7	USMC	BGen Kramlich	Al Tagaddum, Iraq	
CG, 3d MAW	8	USMC	MGen Amos	Al Fallujah, Iraq	

Spl Asst to LTG(Ret) Oster	7	USMC	BGen Usher	Baghdad, Iraq	Backfill not required
DCdr, Gulf Region Engr Div	7	USA	COL(P) Schrodell	Baghdad, Iraq	
US Dep to Dir, CPA Iraq	7	USA	BG Seay	Baghdad, Iraq	

TAB C

COORDINATION

USA	COL Bruno	8 June 2004
USAF	Capt McKaskill	4 June 2004
USMC	Maj Sylvester	4 June 2004
USCENTCOM	LtCol Moscovie	8 April 2004



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JN 21 2004

Rear Admiral (NS) Teo Chee Hean
Minister for Defence
Ministry of Defence
303 Gombak Drive
Singapore 669645

Dear Minister Teo:

It was a pleasure to be with you at the IISS Asia Security Conference. The Conference provided an excellent opportunity to discuss issues of regional and global concern with our colleagues in a candid, open atmosphere.

I do also thank you for hosting such a delightful, informative luncheon.

I look forward to working with you to further strengthen our defense relationship.

Sincerely,

OSD 08950-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49281

333 SD

21 Jun 04 1450 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Rear Admiral (NS) Teo Chee Hean
Minister for Defence
Ministry of Defence
303 Gombak Drive
Singapore 669645

Dear Minister Teo:

He [signature]

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the IISS Asia Security Conference. The Conference provided an excellent opportunity to discuss issues of regional and global concern with our colleagues in a candid, open atmosphere.

I do also thank you for hosting such a delightful, informative luncheon.

I look forward to working with you to further strengthen our defense relationship.

Sincerely,

CSC

fix PLEASE

11/6/18

11-L-0559/OSD/49282

June 16, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Singapore MoD

If I have not written to the Defense Minister of Singapore since my trip, someone should draft up a nice note for me to send to him.

Thanks.

Attach.
Incoming 6/14/04 ltrs from MoD Singapore

DHR:dh
061604-5

.....
Please respond by _____

To Sec Def

There is a letter that is
in coordination. We'll drag it out and
get it to you (Policy drafted it and its with our
writing staff)

Paul
Paul Butler

6/16

OSD 08950-04

TN 6/18

11-L-0559/OSD/49283

3350

163604 145604

Received Event (Event Succeeded)

Date: 6/15/2004
Pages: 3
Sender: 2025370354
Fax Number:

Time: 4:12 PM
Duration: 1 min 17 sec
Company:
Subject:

Ty) JUN-15-2004 16:09

SINGAPORE EMB IN WRS DC

202 5370354 P.02/03



MINISTER FOR DEFENCE
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
SINGAPORE

14 June 2004

The Honourable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

It was a pleasure to welcome you to Singapore earlier this month. I am glad that you were able to see for yourself the close cooperation between the Singapore Armed Forces and the United States Armed Forces. I trust that you found your visit to Changi Naval Base useful. There are ongoing discussions between our respective staffs and armed forces on how the cooperation may be extended to include US access to the new facilities coming up in the vicinity of Changi Naval Base - Changi Runway 3 and the Command and Control Centre - as well as other SAF facilities. We look forward to these new areas of cooperation when the Defence Cooperation Agreement is concluded.

I also hope that you found the Shangri-La Dialogue to be a useful forum to gather perspectives from this region on the pressing security issues of the day. Your participation and your keynote address were valuable contributions to the Dialogue.

Thank you once again for your presence at the Dialogue and at the lunch for the Ministers.

Yours sincerely;

Read-Admiral(NS) Teo Chee Hean

OSD 08950-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49284

January 15, 2004

381

TO: Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Headquarters' Layering

That was a good meeting we had yesterday on end strength. While I gave you some guidance on further questions to come back to me on, I am not sure my request that you look at how you might eliminate some headquarters' layering was clear.

My perception is that the Army has an excessive number of headquarters from the lowest tactical to the highest operational level. We are in the 21st century – how long has the current Army organizational construct been in place? With the technological advances in communications and shared situational awareness, I wonder if the Army is organized to leverage the gains.

Some things I want you to look at and get back to me are:

- Is the division the least common denominator for deployment? Can you deploy multiple units subordinate to a division – to possibly different locations – quickly – like the Marine Corps?
- What is the value-added at each level of headquarters? At what level is the least value added?

15 Jan 04

OSD 08968-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49285

- What is a theater army? What is its relevance today? Who else can do that mission?
- Can brigades work directly for corps? If they can, why aren't they? If they cannot, why not? I believe NATO has had plans for brigades working for corps-level headquarters, so I would like to know what you think about that.

Please get your heads into this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011504-14

.....
Please respond by 7/23/04

FOUO

May 10, 2005

TO: Gen Jim Jones
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Doc Foglesong
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Presidential Support

Thanks for all the hard work on the President's air coverage during his recent trip to Europe. I was particularly impressed with Major General Boh Dulaney's efforts in setting all that up and briefing me about it. It seemed to go quite well.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
050905-41

.....
Please respond by

FOUO

OSD 08969-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49287

201.22

10 MAY 05

Rec'd 1240
15

January 2, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: *Economist* Story

Here is a note from Newt Minow, with an article from *The Economist*. Is this true?

Thanks.

Attach.

12/20/03 Minow note, w/12/13/03 *Economist* article: "A Chance Missed," p. 42-43DHR:dh
010204-12*****
Please res

SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CC: DSD

DSD

STAN

FILE COPY

SSE-

Would you like for CPA
to draft a response to
you?

yo PD. —

NAR —

OSD 08971-04

11-L-05597/OSD/49288
(* Attached Kelley Team email)

2 Jan 04

WITH COMPLIMENTS

to Don RUMSFELD

IF TRUE, THIS IS A VERY
SERIOUS MISTAKE - AND
NEEDS your PERSONAL
ATTENTION. ALL BEST

NEWTON N. MINOW *hms*
12/20/03

SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD

BANK ONE PLAZA
10 SOUTH DEARBORN STREET
CHICAGO, IL 60603
E-MAIL ADDRESS: nminow@sidley.com
WEB SITE: www.sidley.com

DIRECT LINE:
312/853-7555
FAX: 312/853-7026

only one in five has been disqualified.

Hitherto, the Americans have supported UN-sponsored war-crimes tribunals. But in Iraq, from the outset, they have promoted the idea of an all-Iraqi court with no UN involvement, arguing that the Iraqis themselves, as the main victims of Mr Hussein, were entitled to try their own persecutors. They have even offered \$75m to support the court. But many suspect that the Americans' opposition to an international tribunal for Iraq is part of their campaign against the UN's International Criminal Court, not because of a genuine change of opinion. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, they certainly took the opposite view, even threatening to cut loans to a reforming Serbian government if it did not hand over Slobodan Milosevic to the UN's war-crimes tribunal in The Hague.

Of the 7,000 or so people still being held by coalition forces in Iraq, only around 100 are classified as prisoners of war: that is, uniformed soldiers captured on the battlefield. Under international law, they must either be freed or brought before a military court when hostilities have officially ceased. Around 2,200 are "criminal detainees", looters and the like, who will eventually be handed over to the Iraqi authorities for trial in normal Iraqi courts. The remaining 4,800-odd are so-called "security internees": suspected insurgents, al-Qaeda terrorists, would-be suicide bombers, and anyone else deemed to pose a threat to the coalition's forces or to Iraqis in general. They include 101 "high-value detainees" suspected of the worst atrocities under Mr Hussein, including 38 of the most wanted 55 people (two of whom have been killed) in the Americans' "deck of cards".

Unlike America's 660 prisoners in Guantánamo Bay, all its security internees in Iraq are being held in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Though they have not been charged and have no access to a lawyer, their cases must be—and are being—subject to regular review. If no longer considered a danger, they may be freed or, if suspected of a crime, switched to the criminal-detainee category to await trial in an ordinary court. But those still deemed a security threat can continue to be held by the "occupying power", namely the CPA, for as long as the occupation continues.

What will happen to the detainees come July 1st next year, when the Iraqis are supposed to take over? No one is sure. Most of the mass murderers and other gross violators of human rights will probably end up before the new special tribunal, which is expected to start operating next year. Others may be freed. But the Americans will probably ask to keep those thought likely to provide useful information for its war on terror. So they could then fall into the same legal limbo as the prisoners in Guantánamo Bay. ■

Iraq's television

A chance missed

BAGHDAD

America has failed to promote freedom of expression—or its own message

"THERE is no information available at this time," reads the message on the website of the Iraqi Media Network, the intended precursor of a hoped-for revamped state broadcasting service and the Americans' main purveyor of news in Arabic that, after 30 years of state lies, is meant to be true. "Please check back."

Iraqis have been checking for eight months, baffled by how a nation with the world's most vibrant media can leave them still yearning for something they actually want to watch. So dull is the present service that some Iraqis may even hanker for the days when Saddam Hussein's delinquent son Uday ran the television. As a result, far more Iraqis watch two Arab satellite channels, al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, both of which seem to revel in America's local tribulations.

Part of the problem is that the Pentagon assigned Iraq's broadcasting to a defence contractor, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). So far, the firm has shown as much aptitude for delivering news as the BBC would if it had to deliver missiles. It charged the Pentagon \$100m in operating and infrastructure costs but paid its broadcasters \$30 a week. It hired the

same performers who sang praises to Mr Hussein as "the servant of God" to sing odes to Iraq's new-found freedom. State tv is required to relay the statements of the ruling American-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its appointed Iraqi Governing Council, earning it a reputation as the Pentagon's Pravda. Freed from Saddam's ban on satellite dishes, a third of Iraqis have switched to other stations.

The failure to provide useful or interesting information is not just SAIC's; it is symptomatic of a more general speech impediment. Not only does the CPA not speak Iraq's language, it rarely deigns to speak at all. Gary Thatcher, Mr Bremer's communications adviser, does not communicate himself, and often bars CPA officials, bunkered behind their concrete bollards, from answering press inquiries directly. This fosters suspicion and rumour, making the CPA seem remote and prickly. Mr Bremer rarely invites Arab journalists to his press conferences. In such self-imposed solitude, the CPA is struggling to get its message across.

Too late for a remedy? SAIC's contract is up for renewal next month and has been put up for tender. The money on offer—\$98m a year for two years—at first attracted a welter of interested parties, including the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the BBC and Britain's Independent Television News. The British apparently tried to persuade Mr Bremer that Iraq needs a public broadcaster, independent of the government and regulated by law, for its fledgling democracy.

It has yet to happen. Proposals to keep ▶

Judging the war in Iraq

Could try harder

Was it fought legally?

BOMBS are only ever as smart as the people who drop them. During the campaign in Iraq, says a new report on the war by Human Rights Watch, a lobbying group, the intelligence upon which the coalition's bomb-droppers relied was not always very intelligent. Before the war, Britain and America trumpeted the care they intended to take in selecting targets; and most of their weaponry did indeed prove precise. But, argues the report, the 50 or so oppositionist strikes on Iraqi leaders, intended to "decapitate" Saddam Hussein's regime, relied on shaky information and ended up killing only civilians.

The report's other main charge concerns the coalition's use of cluster munitions, especially those fired by land forces. Designed for use against broad or moving targets, cluster bombs can be far

more dangerous when dropped in populated areas, as some were in Iraq. As in previous conflicts, some of the bomblets failed to explode and now lie around imperilling Iraqi lives. The report concludes that hundreds of civilian deaths could have been prevented; it also criticises some of the attacks on Iraq's infrastructure and the coalition's failure to secure dangerous Iraqi arms caches. The Saddamites, of course, violated the rules of war with abandon, disguising themselves as civilians and utilising mosques and hospitals. Those rules, however, oblige states to take "all feasible precautions" to avoid harming civilians. As military technology advances, it imposes a responsibility on America and its allies to take commensurately stricter precautions. In Iraq, that didn't always happen.

broadcasting out of the hands of the executive have collided with vested interests in Washington. If you give \$100m, you expect some say in how it is spent, they say. The BBC, among others, is shying away. Of 28 potential bidders, only three are primarily broadcasters. Others include specialists in engineering and arms, and the Rendon Group, a public-relations firm paid by the CIA to help the Iraqi National Congress and its leader, Ahmed Chalabi. Even SAIC may still be interested.

Most Iraqis are in the dark about all of this. The Governing Council gave warning that if the American administration let foreigners run Iraq's broadcasting service without consultation, the transitional government due to take office in July would sever the contract.

In its search for a voice, the council has sought editorial control and a say in appointing staff. But its own commitment to press freedom is iffy. Last month, it ordered al-Arabiya to shut its Baghdad office. ■

Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth

Bye-bye Bob

ABUJA

Zimbabwe is isolated, Africa divided

BETWEEN the ceremonial planting of trees, traditional dances and a speech by England's queen, two questions paralysed last week's meeting of leaders of the (formerly British) Commonwealth in Nigeria's capital, Abuja: what to do about Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe; and how to explain the continuing support for him by the one man who could sink him, South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki. After three days of talks, there was an answer to the first: the 51 leaders agreed to prolong Zimbabwe's suspension from the organisation, because of its government's oppressive ways.

Mr Mugabe, who had not been invited to the Abuja jamboree, will be banned from future meetings. He declared that he would, in any case, leave the Commonwealth and turn his back on the "unholy Anglo-Saxon" alliance which—he says—runs it. So Zimbabwe follows the example of apartheid-era South Africa, which quit the Commonwealth in 1961 rather than treat its people decently. (Three other countries—Fiji, Nigeria and Pakistan—have been suspended for mounting coups or hanging dissidents. Pakistan is still out.)

Zimbabwe flouts nearly every principle that the Commonwealth promotes. In September, for instance, club-wielding Zimbabwean police shut down the country's only independent daily paper. Last

Zanzibar

Terror, tourism and odd beliefs

SUPERSTITION as a political barometer

FEW readers of *The Economist*, one imagines, would imagine, have seen a one-eyed dwarf with bat-like wings, pointed ears and sharpened talons. Even fewer are likely to have been sodomised by one. Many of the people of Zanzibar, however, sincerely believe in Popobawa, an incubus who supposedly rapes men who doubt his existence. Isolated sightings are reported every year. Locals say that Popobawa appears accompanied by a puff of smoke, usually on Pemba, the smaller of the spice islands that make up this semi-autonomous part of Tanzania.

At times of stress, Popobawa seems to go on a rampage. So many people report seeing him that ordinary life in some villages stops. Men sleep arm-in-arm outside their houses, in the belief that not being in bed makes them less vulnerable. There were said to be numerous attacks before and after Zanzibar's president was assassinated in 1972, and again in 2000 and 2003, coinciding with a rigged and violent election.

Popobawa may be mythical, but reports of sightings give a useful insight into the Zanzibani mood. The incubus was seen in November, prompting a local spiritualist to predict that "bad men will do bad things here next year and people will die." It is possible. Tensions have been simmering in Zanzibar since the police killed 39 opposition supporters in early

week Mr Mugabe said it was time again to use "some measures of force" against his opponents. Members of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Zimbabwe's opposition, were in Abuja showing grisly videos of what usually happens when Mr Mugabe makes such threats.

Mr Mugabe's economic incompetence



Spicy rumours in the spice islands of Zanzibar. The island's mostly poor and Muslim population feels marginalised. Secessionist mutterings are growing louder. Tanzania's government has clamped down: last month it banned an independent newspaper, accusing it of fomenting tribal and religious divisions.

Economist woes may make unrest more likely. Too many young men lost their jobs after terrorists attacked Jewish targets in nearby Kenya a year ago. Tourist receipts in Zanzibar fell by 30% in the first three months of this year. Things have since improved, but America says the threat of an attack on Zanzibar remains high, pointing out that two al-Qaeda operatives were born there. Zanzibaris, most of whom are moderates, disagree. "Freddie Mercury was born in Zanzibar," said one. "It doesn't make us more likely to become pop stars."

causes even more misery. On December 3rd, the IMF finally decided to expel Zimbabwe, citing its government's unwillingness to do anything about an economy that has shrunk by 40% since 1999, inflation of 526% and a populace so impoverished that two-thirds of them depend on foreign food aid. The country's finance minister cheerily predicts that the economy will shrink by another 8.5% next year. The country has one of the world's highest rates of HIV: around 34% of adults are infected. Hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans flee abroad every year.

Yet quite a few leading Africans, particularly South Africa's Mr Mbeki, still turn a blind eye to Mr Mugabe's shortcomings. The African Union and the Southern African Development Community have yet to criticise him in public. And Mr Mbeki is still campaigning to have him appeased.

Indeed, Mr Mbeki tried to oust Don McKinnon, the Commonwealth's secretary-general, who made no secret of wanting Zimbabwe to stay suspended. South

January 2, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Post-World War II Occupation of Germany

Germany

Please take a look at these three papers on the post-war occupation of Germany.
They are really interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.

Bess, Demaree. "How We Botched the German Occupation," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 26, 1946.

Dos Passos, John. "Americans Are Losing the Victory in Europe"

Dulles, Allen W. "That Was Then: Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation of Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2003.

DHR:dh
010204-15

.....
Please respond by _____

2 Jan 04

OSD 08998-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49292

Saturday Evening Post
January 26, 1946



How We Botched the German Occupation
By Demaree Bess

Berlin

Everywhere I've traveled recently in Germany I've run into Americans, ranging from generals down to privates, who ask perplexedly, "What are we Americans supposed to be doing here? Are we going to take over this place and stay here forever?"

Judging by reports received here from the United States, this perplexity of Americans in Germany is matching by the perplexity of Americans at home. We have got into this German job without understanding what we were tackling or why. Imagine how incredulous we would have been if anybody had told us---even so recently as five years ago---that hundreds of thousands of Americans would be camped in the middle of Europe in 1946, completely responsible for the conduct and welfare of approximately 20,000,000 Germans?

How does it happened that even some of our topmost officials in Germany admit that they don't know what they are doing here? The answer can be expressed, I believe, in one word---secrecy. . . .

Mr. Stimson probably has had more experience in international affairs than any other American. Before being appointed to head the War Department for the second time, he had also served as Secretary of State and had been Governor General of the Philippines. Thus he was familiar with the military requirements, the political implications and the practical problems involved in administering an alien and distant territory under wartime conditions. Mr. Hull, appreciating the value of Mr. Stimson's experience in world affairs, was inclined to defer to his judgment in most of the matters under dispute. Mr. Morgenthau, on the other hand, gradually became the chief spokesman for the advocates of an American-imposed revolution in Germany.

His so-called Morgenthau plan, which has since been widely publicized, was not just the personal policy of the former Secretary of the Treasury. It combined the ideas of a sizable group of aggressive Americans which included some conservative big businessmen as well as left-wing theorists. The group supporting Mr. Morgenthau's ideas included Americans of all races, creeds and political beliefs. It is doubtful whether Mr. Morgenthau could recall today the source of some of the most explosive ideas which he gradually adopted.

However that may be, the Cabinet committee soon found itself in disagreement, with Secretaries Stimson and Hull on one side and Mr. Morgenthau on the other. Hints of this disagreement leaked out at the time and the issue was represented as a "hard peace" versus a "soft peace," but actually that was not the issue at all. In fact, the major disagreement then was over the question of procedure, and did not directly concern long-term economic and financial policies. The three Cabinet members were equally anxious to make sure that Germany should be deprived of the means for waging another war, but Secretaries Stimson and Hull were determined not to bite off more than we could chew at one time. They wanted to reduce the original occupation plans to the simplest possible form, with three primary objectives in mind: (1) agreement by all the Allies upon a joint occupation; (2) provision of some hope for the German people that they might develop a decent life for themselves once they became completely demilitarized; and (3) the obligation not to burden the American people with more commitments than they might later prove willing to accept.

While these discussions were proceeding, however, Mr. Morgenthau became convinced that we should go into Germany with a complete blueprint, worked out in exhaustive detail, providing for an economic and industrial revolution so drastic that it would affect not only Germany but almost every other country in Europe. He wanted us to adopt this blueprint for ourselves and to use every conceivable means to pressure upon our Allies to get them to accept it. Whenever he was outvoted in the Cabinet committee, he had the immense advantage---as an

intimate friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt---of being able to go through the side door of the White House and sell his ideas directly to the President. . . .

The French, unconvinced that the atomic bomb has opened an entirely new era, are insisting upon establishing buffer states between themselves and Germany. To this end, they're trying to make a friend of the Germans in their zone and to encourage them to organize separatist movements.

The British, conscious of the broader aspects of Western Europe's economic situation, are devising schemes to revive German economic life in their zones, particularly in the Ruhr. In order to provide immediately for some of the things which Western Europeans so urgently require, they're trying to establish some kind of international combine to operate Ruhr industries and coal mines---a proposal which they compare to the Tennessee Valley Authority.

The Russians, grappling with the enormous tasks of reconstructing their own war-wracked homeland, are carrying off from their zone all the machines and tools and animals which they can use in Russia. While the Russians reduce the labor surplus in their zone by sending skilled German workers to Russia, they also encourage the remaining Germans to revive political and economic life with due attention to Russian models.

It is only in the American zone that the "pastoral economy" is emerging, which some Americans had visioned for the whole of Germany. Although the Potsdam Declaration technically superseded the American directive JCS 1067, in practice this directive never has been superseded, so far as Americans are concerned. We still are committed to apply in our zone a blue print which was designed for the whole of Germany, but which was never accepted by any of our Allies. This directive is chiefly concerned with tearing things down rather than building things up, and in the absence of any common policy for the whole of Germany, our particular zone is threatened with "planned chaos."

No wonder so many Americans are asking, "What are we doing in Germany?" They can see that the Russians and British and French are initiating projects which promise some direct benefits to them in their zones. But when they look at our zone they see only headaches. These peculiar problems of the American zone will be discussed in a subsequent article.

AMERICANS ARE LOSING THE VICTORY IN EUROPE

DESTITUTE NATIONS FEEL THAT THE U. S. HAS FAILED THEM

by JOHN DOS PASSOS

Novelist John Dos Passos spent three months in Europe as a correspondent for LIFE, which recently printed his report on the Nürnberg trials. Just back in the U. S., Author Dos Passos here sums up his impressions of the Continent.

✓

We are in a cabin deep down below decks on a Navy ship jam-packed with troops that's pitching and creaking its way across the Atlantic in a winter gale. There is a man in every bunk. There's a man wedged into every corner. There's a man in every chair. The air is dense with cigarette smoke and with the staleness of packed troops and sour wool.

"Don't think I'm sticking up for the Germans," puts in the lanky young captain in the upper berth, "but..."

"To hell with the Germans," says the broad-shouldered dark lieutenant. "It's what our boys have been doing that worries me."

The lieutenant has been talking about the traffic in Army property, the leaking of gasoline into the black market in France and Belgium even while the fighting was going on, the way the Army kicks the civilians around, the looting.

"Lust, liquor and loot are the soldier's pay," interrupts a red-faced major.

The lieutenant comes out with his conclusion: "Two wrongs don't make a right." You hear these two phrases again and again in about every bull session on the ship. "Two wrongs don't make a right" and "Don't think I'm sticking up for the Germans, but..."

The troops returning home are worried. "We've lost the peace," men tell you. "We can't make it stick."

A tour of the beaten-up cities of Europe six months after victory is a mighty sobering experience for anyone. Europeans. Friend and foe alike, look you accusingly in the face and tell you how bitterly they are disappointed in you as an American. They cite the evolution of the word "liberation." Before the Normandy landings it meant to be freed from the tyranny of the Nazis. Now it stands in the minds of the civilians for one thing, looting.

You try to explain to these Europeans that they expected too much. They answer that they had a right to, that after the last war America was the hope of the world. They talk about the Hoover relief, the work of the Quakers, the speeches of Woodrow Wilson. They don't blame us for the fading of that hope. But they blame us now.

Never has American prestige in Europe been lower. People never tire of telling you of the ignorance and rowdy-ism of American troops, of our misunderstanding of European conditions. They say that the theft and sale of Army supplies by our troops is the basis of their black market. They blame us for the corruption and disorganization of UNRRA. They blame us for the fumbling timidity of our negotiations with the Soviet Union. They tell us that our mechanical de-nazification policy in Germany is producing results opposite to those we planned. "Have you no statesmen in America?" they ask.

The skeptical French press

Yet whenever we show a trace of positive leadership I found Europeans quite willing to follow our lead. The evening before Robert Jackson's opening of the case for the prosecution in the Nurnberg trial, I talked to some correspondents from the French newspapers. They were polite but skeptical. They were willing enough to take part in a highly publicized act of vengeance against the enemy, but when you talked about the usefulness of writing a prohibition of aggressive war into the law of nations they laughed in your face. The night after Jackson's nobly delivered and nobly worded speech I saw them all again. They were very much impressed. Their manner had even changed toward me personally as an American. Their sudden enthusiasm seemed to me typical of the almost neurotic craving for leadership of the European people struggling wearily for existence in the wintry ruins of their world.

The ruin this war has left in Europe can hardly be exaggerated. I can remember the years after the last war. Then, as soon as you got away from the military, all the little strands and pulleys that form the fabric of a society were still knined together. Farmers took their crops to market. Money was a valid medium of exchange. Now the entire fabric of a million little routines has broken down. No one can think beyond food for today. Money is worthless. Cigarettes are used as a kind of lunatic travesty on a currency. If a man goes out to work he shops around to find the business that serves the best hot meal. The final pay-off is the situation reported from the Ruhr where the miners are fed at the pits so that they will not be able to take the food home to their families.

"Well, the Germans are to blame. Let them pay for it. It's their fault," you say. The trouble is that starving the Germans and throwing them out of their homes is only producing more areas of famine and collapse.


One section of the population of Europe looked to us for salvation and another looked to the Soviet Union. Wherever the people have endured either the American armies or the Russian armies both hopes have been bitterly disappointed. The British have won a slightly better reputation. The state of mind in Vienna is interesting because there the part of the population that was not actively Nazi was about equally divided. The wealthier classes looked to America, the workers to the Soviet Union.

The Russians came first. The Viennese tell you of the savagery of the Russian armies. They came like the ancient Mongol hordes out of the steppes, with the flimsiest supply. The people in the working-class districts had felt that when the Russians came that they at least would be spared. But not at all. In the working-class districts the troops were allowed to rape and murder and loot at will. When victims complained, the Russians answered, "You are too well off to be workers. You are bourgeoisie."

When Americans looted they took cameras and valuables but when the Russians looted they took everything. And they raped and killed. From the eastern frontiers a tide of refugees is seeping across Europe bringing a nightmare tale of helpless populations trampled underfoot. When the British and American came the Viennese felt that at last they were in the hands of civilized people. But instead of coming in with a bold plan of relief and reconstruction we came in full of evasions and apologies.

U.S. administration a poor third

We know now the tragic results of the ineptitudes of the Peace of Versailles. The European system it set up was Utopia compared to the present tangle of snarling misery. The Russians at least are carrying out a logical plan for extending their system of control at whatever cost. The British show signs of recovering their good sense and their innate human decency. All we have brought to Europe so far is confusion backed up by a drumhead regime of military courts. **We have swept away Hitlerism, but a great many Europeans feel that the cure has been worse than the disease. [Emphasis mine]**



The taste of victory had gone sour in the mouth of every thoughtful American I met. Thoughtful men can't help remembering that this is a period in history when every political crime and every frivolous mistake in statesmanship has been paid for by the death of innocent people. The Germans built the Stalags; the Nazis are behind barbed wire now, but who will be next? Whenever you sit eating a good meal in the midst of a starving city in a handsome house requisitioned from some German, you find yourself wondering how it would feel to have a conqueror drinking out of your glasses. When you hear the tales of the brutalizing of women from the eastern frontier you think with a shudder of those you love and cherish at home.

That we are one world is unfortunately a brutal truth. Punishing the German people indiscriminately for the sins of their leader may be justice, but it is not helping to restore the rule of civilization. The terrible lesson of the events of this year of victory is that what is happening to the bulk of Europe today can happen to American tomorrow.

In America we are still rich, we are still free to move from place to place and to talk to our friends without fear of the secret police. The time has come, for our own future security, to give the best we have to the world instead of the worst. So far as Europe is concerned, American leadership up to now has been obsessed with a fear of our own virtues. Winston Churchill expressed this state of mind brilliantly in a speech to his own people which applies even more accurately to the people of the U.S. "You must be prepared," he warned them, "for further efforts of mind and body and further sacrifices to great causes, if you are not to fall back into the rut of inertia, the confusion of aim and the craven fear of being great."

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That Was Then: Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation of Germany

By Allen W. Dulles

From *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2003

A Note from the Editors:

In thinking about the reconstruction of Iraq, many have looked for insight to the American experiences in rebuilding Germany and Japan after World War II. Optimists point to similarities across the cases and argue that they bode well for the Bush administration's efforts today. Pessimists point to differences and draw the opposite conclusion. In truth, some aspects of the occupations look familiar and some do not. As the saying goes, history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. What is most striking about the comparison is that in all three cases, several months into the postwar era the future of the country was still hanging in the balance.

Picking their way through the rubble, officials early in the Truman administration had as little clue about the eventual outcome of their experiments as their counterparts in Washington and Baghdad do today. They saw little choice but to grope forward as best they could, responding to immediate problems and fast-moving events while trying to keep their eyes steady on a grand long-term vision. Knowing how the story ended, it is difficult for us to escape the tyranny of hindsight and see those earlier cases as they appeared to contemporary observers -- in their full uncertainty, as history in the making rather than data to be mined for present-day polemics. *Foreign Affairs* is pleased, therefore, to be able to open a window directly onto occupied Germany seven months after V-E Day, taking readers back in media res.

During World War II, Allen W. Dulles served as the Bern station chief for the Office of Strategic Services. (He would later serve as the head of a successor organization, the Central Intelligence Agency, from 1953 to 1961.) Dulles was the main American liaison with the German resistance and a close observer of the early stages of the postwar occupation. After the OSS was disbanded in late September 1945, he decided to return to private life. On December 3, less than a week before leaving government service, he gave a frank and unvarnished update on the situation in Germany to an off-the-record meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations.

At the time the meeting was held, the United States and the Soviet Union were watching each other warily across the ruins of Europe but had not yet descended into what would become known as the Cold War. Germany was still one country, although divided into four occupation zones. George Kennan's "Long Telegram" and Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech were still months off, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO still years in the future. Washington was trying to put Germany back on its feet while simultaneously demobilizing and turning to domestic matters. Few Americans had any inkling of just what their country's commitment to postwar Europe would eventually involve; most simply wanted the troops to come home.

According to the Council's archival policies, all substantive council records more than 25 years old are open for use, subject to permission being obtained from any living person for remarks attributed to them. Since the notes of that Dulles meeting are no longer protected, we are publishing them here for the first time, with only slight editing, as a contribution to public debate.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GERMANY

Digest of a meeting with Allen W. Dulles at the Council on Foreign Relations, December 3, 1945

11-L-0559/OSD/49299

<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20031101acomment82601/allen-w-dulles/that-was-then-alle...> 1/2/2004

Germany today is a problem of extraordinary complexity. For two and one-half years the country has been a political and economic void in which discipline was well-maintained. There is no dangerous underground operating there now although some newspapers in the United States played up such a story. The German leaders, of course, could not admit defeat and today the attitude of the people is not so much a feeling of shame and guilt as one of having been let down by their leaders.

Economically and industrially, Germany has scraped the bottom of the barrel, and there are few shops with anything to sell. As soon as you attempt to get Germany to tick and to make arrangements for a government, the lack of men becomes apparent at once. Most men of the caliber required suffer a political taint. When we discover someone whose ability and politics are alike acceptable, we usually find as we did in one case that the man has been living abroad for the past ten years and is hopelessly out of touch with the local situation. We have already found out that you can't run railroads without taking in some Party members.

Labels are always arbitrary and sometimes they effectively mask what lies underneath. For example, citizens A, B, C, and D who didn't care about politics one way or the other were told they had to join the Nazi Party in order to make up the proper quota in the factory in which they worked. The consequences of refusal being what they were, they joined the Party. I know of one instance where two brothers tossed a coin to see which one would join the SS. I mention these things not because I think any substantial number of Germans were opposed to the Party but rather to point out how misleading and decisive a label can be. Furthermore we had altogether too many rules and regulations dealing with the Germans to make an adequate supply of men available to us. There were 126 categories of Germans excluded from any activity or from posts in German administration. Take, for example, the case of a man who owned zinc and coal mines in Upper Silesia. He was a bitter and proven anti-Nazi and a man of undoubted courage and integrity. I was not permitted to use him because he came under category 106, being classified as a war economy supervisor.

We tried hard to find financial advisers, but most of the bankers who had been in Germany in the Twenties and Thirties had by this time been liquidated. I found a banker in the prisoner's cage who had been arrested on an automatic charge because in the early part of the war he had been appointed custodian for the property of an alien, a post he later resigned. I am told that during the period of his responsibility he discharged his trust with scrupulous honesty. I had to bring his case before the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington before I was permitted to use him. Then there was Doctor Sauerbruch, one of the leading surgeons in Berlin. Him, also, I found in a cage. It took a cable to London from Washington to get his case straightened out and get him released for useful service, and this had no sooner been done when a few days later the British rearrested him because he came under some other category.

In our zone we arrested 70,000 people. There was no such thing as a habeas corpus and there was no forum to which one could apply for a hearing, although later on we did set up a tribunal of sorts. I do not blame our people too much for this state of affairs. After all, we could not examine each case individually in the early days when the chief task was to occupy Germany in the most effective manner.

The present political set-up in Germany is based on the agreements reached at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. Tehran was made when Churchill felt somewhat shaky. The arrangement did not include the French zone, which was added later. But regardless of its genesis, by and large the scheme is almost entirely unworkable. We have chopped up Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse into artificial zones. In the case of Saxony, the Russian zone cuts off the American and British zones from their counterparts there. It is difficult to see how the Allies could have done otherwise inasmuch as the Russians would not consent to British and American domination of Germany and the Americans and British likewise refused to consider letting Russia get an advantage. Even so, very little progress is being made toward the centralization of the various services. To complicate matters, the French have been saying that they could not set up an administration in the zone assigned to them until they knew what disposition was going to be made of the Rhine and the Ruhr.

In the zone under Russian control the application of Soviet doctrines is thus far confined largely to paper. The Russians are finding it a little difficult to mix collectivist doctrines, including the nationalization of banks, a new system of land tenure, and the creation of a small farmer class, with the set up as it existed under the Nazis and more broadly under a capitalist economy.

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We, ourselves, have excellent men on the job. I have the highest regard for Clay, and Eisenhower is a genius as a diplomat and administrator.* Yet I am inclined to think that the problems inherent in the situation are almost too much for us. Our people in Germany are unduly fearful of criticism in the United States. For example, the road between Frankfurt and Wiesbaden is so full of holes that it is almost impossible to drive over it, and one cannot cross the Main between those two places because all the bridges are down. But no repairs are made since the Army feels certain it would be criticized for "restoring the German war potential."

Industry in Germany is at its lowest ebb except for some coal mining in the Ruhr. The minute one considers what industries should be allowed to function and how best to prime the pump in order to set them going, some very real and serious difficulties appear.

So far as the treatment of industry in various zones is concerned, the Russian policy is particularly hard to fathom. It is hard to say whether the Russians really intend to tear down the zone for the purpose of building up Russia, but there is some evidence pointing that way. The Russians have torn up all the double tracks, they are keeping all able-bodied German prisoners, and they have taken East a great many industrialists, bankers, scientists, and the like.

Russian standing in their zone is low. Russian troops are living off the land, and have looted far more than anyone else. They have gone about Berlin looting workers' houses in very much the same way they did in Hungary. This seems to indicate that in both localities the Communist party is not very strong. At any rate, the Russians have seen the West and vice versa.

In the zone being turned over to Poland there is a good deal of buck passing. It is difficult to say what is going on, but in general the Russians are acting little better than thugs. They have wiped out all the liquid assets. No food cards are issued to Germans, who are forced to travel on foot into the Russian zone, often more dead than alive. An iron curtain has descended over the fate of these people and very likely conditions are truly terrible. The promises at Yalta to the contrary, probably 8 to 10 million people are being enslaved. Unquestionably Germany should be punished. In this instance, however, I think there will remain a legacy of bitterness which will not bode well for the future.

I have already said that the problem of Germany very nearly defies a successful solution. The question is: What can we do? The first step is to get together in dealing with what is at bottom a common problem. Next, we must find people we can use. We might use the churches which did not knuckle under to Hitler, although it is questionable in the minds of some people whether churches should get into politics. We might also consider the survivors of the affair of July 20* and see what material the trade unions can furnish. Finally, we can screen the prisoners of war.

The women will not be much help to us, although in theory they could be. A saying now current in Germany is that today most of the able-bodied men are women. Hitler had an enormous hold over them and Eva Braun's existence appeared to be unknown to most of them. They are extremely bitter. Altogether the problem deserves very careful study.

I think it may well become necessary for us to change the form of our occupation. Thus far there has been very little disturbance or misbehavior on the part of our troops. I think we ought to use small, highly mechanized units and put our reliance on planes. These forces I would quarter outside of the cities, lest their presence create a talking point for German propaganda against the occupation.

Trying to arrive at figures in order to set up a standard of living in Germany is a difficult and almost hopeless problem, and one perhaps beyond the ingenuity of man. And yet we must somehow find a solution.

Germany ought to be put to work for the benefit of Europe and particularly for the benefit of those countries plundered by the Nazis. If we do not find some work for the Germans and if we do not solve the refugee problem,* the Germans will have their revenge in one form or another though it takes a hundred years.

Q: Would you tell us something about the food situation?

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A: In the American zone the standard is 1,500 calories daily; but this figure has not been realized. Both we and the British will have to import food if the Germans are to stay alive. Sixty percent of the population of Germany is in the French, British, and American zones which produce only about forty percent of the food. In the Russian zone some of the food there is being diverted by the Russians to their own uses. ...

Q: There is a groundswell in the United States in favor of letting American voluntary agencies help in the feeding and rehabilitation of Germany. What do you think of the idea?

A: This poses a great problem because of the multiplicity of agencies. I discussed this matter with Eisenhower and I think perhaps it can be worked out. I don't know how soon it will be possible to make individual remittances to Germany. ...

Q: What are the prospects for setting up a central administration in Germany?

A: Until the Russians get out -- and there is no indication that they intend to -- there can be no central administration. Hence I think it will be necessary to attempt to build up local government, not in the sense of trying to divide Germany but to provide some means of administration. ...

Q: When will there be civilian administration in the American zone?

A: The Army doesn't like the job and I don't blame them in the least. When we get civilian administration depends on what plans are being made in Washington. Thus far I have heard nothing to indicate that such plans exist.

*Editors' note. An unsuccessful 1944 coup attempt by anti-Hitler elements in the German army and military intelligence.

*Editors' note. At the time, Generals Lucius Clay and Dwight Eisenhower were the deputy military governor and military governor of Germany, respectively.

*Editors' note. The country was then flooded with millions of ethnic Germans displaced from territories to the east.

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January 2, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: POTUS Speeches

Here are three speeches from the President. I have marked some sections I think are interesting. We might want to use some of that material.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/6/03 POTUS speech on Freedom in Iraq and Middle East

11/20/03 US/UK Declaration on Iraq by President Bush and PM Blair

11/19/03 POTUS Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London

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Please respond by _____

cc: DSD

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The National Endowment for Democracy

Supporting freedom around the world

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 6, 2003

Program:

Welcoming Remarks & Introductions
Vin Weber
Chairman, National Endowment for Democracy

Congressional Remarks
Senator Evan Bayh
Senator Sam Brownback
Rep. Chris Cox
Rep. Tom Lantos


Keynote Address
George W. Bush
President of the United States

Closing Remarks
Carl Gershman
President, National Endowment for Democracy

President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy

United States Chamber of Commerce
Washington, D.C.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all very much. Please be seated. Thanks for the warm welcome, and thanks for inviting me to join you in this 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. The staff and directors of this organization have seen a lot of history over the last two decades, you've been a part of that history. By speaking for and standing for freedom, you've lifted the hopes of people around the world, and you've brought great credit to America.



I appreciate Vin for the short introduction. I'm a man who likes short introductions. And he didn't let me down. But more importantly, I appreciate the invitation. I appreciate the members of Congress who are here, senators from both political parties, members of the House of Representatives from both political parties. I appreciate the ambassadors who are here. I appreciate the guests who have come. I appreciate the bipartisan spirit, the nonpartisan spirit of the National Endowment for Democracy. I'm glad that Republicans and Democrats and independents are working together to advance human liberty.

The roots of our democracy can be traced to England, and to its Parliament -- and so can the roots of this organization. In June of 1962, President Ronald Reagan spoke at Westminster Palace and declared, the turning point had arrived in history. He argued that Soviet communism had failed, precisely because it did not respect its own people -- their creativity, their genius and their rights.

President Reagan said that the day of Soviet tyranny was passing, that freedom had a momentum which would not be halted. He gave this organization its mandate: to add to the momentum of freedom across the world. Your mandate was important 20 years ago; it is equally important today. (Applause.)

A number of critics were dismissive of that speech by the President. According to one editorial of the time, "It seems hard to be a sophisticated European and also an admirer of Ronald Reagan." (Laughter.) Some observers on both sides of the Atlantic pronounced the speech simplistic and naive, and even dangerous. In fact, Ronald Reagan's words were courageous and optimistic and entirely correct. (Applause.)

The great democratic movement President Reagan described was already well underway. In the early 1970s, there were about 40 democracies in the world. By the middle of that decade, Portugal and Spain and Greece held free elections. Soon there

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11-L-0559/OSD/49304

<http://www.ned.org/events/anniversary/oct1603-Bush.html>

11/20/2003

were new democracies in Latin America, and free institutions were spreading in Korea, in Taiwan, and in East Asia. This very week in 1989, there were protests in East Berlin and in Leipzig. By the end of that year, every communist dictatorship in Central America* had collapsed. Within another year, the South African government released Nelson Mandela. Four years later, he was elected president of his country -- ascending, like Walesa and Havel, from prisoner of state to head of state.

As the 20th century ended, there were around 120 democracies in the world -- and I can assure you more are on the way. (Applause.) Ronald Reagan would be pleased, and he would not be surprised.

We've witnessed, in little over a generation, the swiftest advance of freedom in the 2,500 year story of democracy. Historians in the future will offer their own explanations for why this happened. Yet we already know some of the reasons they will cite. It is no accident that the rise of so many democracies took place in a time when the world's most influential nation was itself a democracy.

The United States made military and moral commitments in Europe and Asia, which protected free nations from aggression, and created the conditions in which new democracies could flourish. As we provided security for whole nations, we also provided inspiration for oppressed peoples. In prison camps, in banned union meetings, in clandestine churches, men and women knew that the whole world was not sharing their own nightmare. They knew of at least one place -- a bright and hopeful land -- where freedom was valued and secure. And they prayed that America would not forget them, or forget the mission to promote liberty around the world.

Historians will note that in many nations, the advance of markets and free enterprise helped to create a middle class that was confident enough to demand their own rights. They will point to the role of technology in frustrating censorship and central control -- and marvel at the power of instant communications to spread the truth, the news, and courage across borders.

Historians in the future will reflect on an extraordinary, undeniable fact: Over time, free nations grow stronger and dictatorships grow weaker. In the middle of the 20th century, some imagined that the central planning and social regimentation were a shortcut to national strength. In fact, the prosperity, and social vitality and technological progress of a people are directly determined by extent of their liberty. Freedom honors and unleashes human creativity -- and creativity determines the strength and wealth of nations. Liberty is both the plan of Heaven for humanity, and the best hope for progress here on Earth.

The progress of liberty is a powerful trend. Yet, we also know that liberty, if not defended, can be lost. The success of freedom is not determined by some dialectic of history. By definition, the success of freedom rests upon the choices and the courage of free peoples, and upon their willingness to sacrifice. In the trenches of World War I, through a two-front war in the 1940s, the difficult battles of Korea and Vietnam, and in missions of rescue and liberation on nearly every continent, Americans have amply displayed our willingness to sacrifice for liberty.

The sacrifices of Americans have not always been recognized or appreciated, yet they have been worthwhile. Because we and our allies were steadfast, Germany and Japan are democratic nations that no longer threaten the world. A global nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union ended peacefully -- as did the Soviet Union. The nations of Europe are moving towards unity, not dividing into armed camps and descending into genocide. Every nation has learned, or should have learned, an important lesson: Freedom is worth fighting for, dying for, and standing for -- and the advance of freedom leads to peace. (Applause.)

And now we must apply that lesson in our own time. We've reached another great turning point -- and the resolve we show will shape the next stage of the world

democratic movement.

Our commitment to democracy is tested in countries like Cuba and Burma and North Korea and Zimbabwe -- outposts of oppression in our world. The people in these nations live in captivity, and fear and silence. Yet, these regimes cannot hold back freedom forever -- and, one day, from prison camps and prison cells, and from exile, the leaders of new democracies will arrive. (Applause.) Communism, and militarism and rule by the capricious and corrupt are the relics of a passing era. And we will stand with these oppressed peoples until the day of their freedom finally arrives. (Applause.)

Our commitment to democracy is tested in China. That nation now has a sliver, a fragment of liberty. Yet, China's people will eventually want their liberty pure and whole. China has discovered that economic freedom leads to national wealth. China's leaders will also discover that freedom is indivisible -- that social and religious freedom is also essential to national greatness and national dignity. Eventually, men and women who are allowed to control their own wealth will insist on controlling their own lives and their own country.

Our commitment to democracy is also tested in the Middle East, which is my focus today, and must be a focus of American policy for decades to come. In many nations of the Middle East -- countries of great strategic importance -- democracy has not yet taken root. And the questions arise: Are the peoples of the Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty? Are millions of men and women and children condemned by history or culture to live in despotism? Are they alone never to know freedom, and never even to have a choice in the matter? I, for one, do not believe it. I believe every person has the ability and the right to be free. (Applause.)

Some skeptics of democracy assert that the traditions of Islam are inhospitable to the representative government. This "cultural condescension," as Ronald Reagan termed it, has a long history. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, a so-called Japan expert asserted that democracy in that former empire would "never work." Another observer declared the prospects for democracy in post-Hitler Germany are, and I quote, "most uncertain at best" -- he made that claim in 1957. Seventy-four years ago, The Sunday London Times declared nine-tenths of the population of India to be "illiterates not caring a fig for politics." Yet when Indian democracy was imperiled in the 1970s, the Indian people showed their commitment to liberty in a national referendum that saved their form of government.

Time after time, observers have questioned whether this country, or that people, or this group, are "ready" for democracy -- as if freedom were a prize you win for meeting our own Western standards of progress. In fact, the daily work of democracy itself is the path of progress. It teaches cooperation, the free exchange of ideas, and the peaceful resolution of differences. As men and women are showing, from Bangladesh to Botswana, to Mongolia, it is the practice of democracy that makes a nation ready for democracy, and every nation can start on this path.

It should be clear to all that Islam -- the faith of one-fifth of humanity -- is consistent with democratic rule. Democratic progress is found in many predominantly Muslim countries -- in Turkey and Indonesia, and Senegal and Albania, Niger and Sierra Leone. Muslim men and women are good citizens of India and South Africa, of the nations of Western Europe, and of the United States of America.

More than half of all the Muslims in the world live in freedom under democratically constituted governments. They succeed in democratic societies, not in spite of their faith, but because of it. A religion that demands individual moral accountability, and encourages the encounter of the individual with God, is fully compatible with the rights and responsibilities of self-government.

Yet there's a great challenge today in the Middle East. In the words of a recent report by Arab scholars, the global wave of democracy has -- and I quote -- "barely reached

the Arab states." They continue: "This freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development." The freedom deficit they describe has terrible consequences, of the people of the Middle East and for the world. In many Middle Eastern countries, poverty is deep and it is spreading, women lack rights and are denied schooling. Whole societies remain stagnant while the world moves ahead. These are not the failures of a culture or a religion. These are the failures of political and economic doctrines.

As the colonial era passed away, the Middle East saw the establishment of many military dictatorships. Some rulers adopted the dogmas of socialism, seized total control of political parties and the media and universities. They allied themselves with the Soviet bloc and with international terrorism. Dictators in Iraq and Syria promised the restoration of national honor, a return to ancient glories. They've left instead a legacy of torture, oppression, misery, and ruin.

Other men, and groups of men, have gained influence in the Middle East and beyond through an ideology of theocratic terror. Behind their language of religion is the ambition for absolute political power. Ruling cabals like the Taliban show their version of religious piety in public whippings of women, ruthless suppression of any difference or dissent, and support for terrorists who arm and train to murder the innocent. The Taliban promised religious purity and national pride. Instead, by systematically destroying a proud and working society, they left behind suffering and starvation.

Many Middle Eastern governments now understand that military dictatorship and theocratic rule are a straight, smooth highway to nowhere. But some governments still cling to the old habits of central control. There are governments that still fear and repress independent thought and creativity, and private enterprise -- the human qualities that make for a -- strong and successful societies. Even when these nations have vast natural resources, they do not respect or develop their greatest resources -- the talent and energy of men and women working and living in freedom.

Instead of dwelling on past wrongs and blaming others, governments in the Middle East need to confront real problems, and serve the true interests of their nations. The good and capable people of the Middle East all deserve responsible leadership. For too long, many people in that region have been victims and subjects -- they deserve to be active citizens.

Governments across the Middle East and North Africa are beginning to see the need for change. Morocco has a diverse new parliament; King Mohammed has urged it to extend the rights to women. Here is how His Majesty explained his reforms to parliament: "How can society achieve progress while women, who represent half the nation, see their rights violated and suffer as a result of injustice, violence, and marginalization, notwithstanding the dignity and justice granted to them by our glorious religion?" The King of Morocco is correct: The future of Muslim nations will be better for all with the full participation of women. (Applause.)

In Bahrain last year, citizens elected their own parliament for the first time in nearly three decades. Oman has extended the vote to all adult citizens; Qatar has a new constitution; Yemen has a multiparty political system; Kuwait has a directly elected national assembly; and Jordan held historic elections this summer. Recent surveys in Arab nations reveal broad support for political pluralism, the rule of law, and free speech. These are the stirrings of Middle Eastern democracy, and they carry the promise of greater change to come.

As changes come to the Middle Eastern region, those with power should ask themselves: Will they be remembered for resisting reform, or for leading it? In Iran, the demand for democracy is strong and broad, as we saw last month when thousands gathered to welcome home Shirin Ebadi, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. The regime in Teheran must heed the democratic demands of the Iranian people, or lose its last claim to legitimacy. (Applause.)

For the Palestinian people, the only path to independence and dignity and progress is the path of democracy. (Applause.) And the Palestinian leaders who block and undermine democratic reform, and feed hatred and encourage violence are not leaders at all. They're the main obstacles to peace, and to the success of the Palestinian people.

The Saudi government is taking first steps toward reform, including a plan for gradual introduction of elections. By giving the Saudi people a greater role in their own society, the Saudi government can demonstrate true leadership in the region.

The great and proud nation of Egypt has shown the way toward peace in the Middle East, and now should show the way toward democracy in the Middle East. (Applause.) Champions of democracy in the region understand that democracy is not perfect, it is not the path to utopia, but it's the only path to national success and dignity.

As we watch and encourage reforms in the region, we are mindful that modernization is not the same as Westernization. Representative governments in the Middle East will reflect their own cultures. They will not, and should not, look like us. Democratic nations may be constitutional monarchies, federal republics, or parliamentary systems. And working democracies always need time to develop -- as did our own. We've taken a 200-year journey toward inclusion and justice -- and this makes us patient and understanding as other nations are at different stages of this journey.

There are, however, essential principles common to every successful society, in every culture. Successful societies limit the power of the state and the power of the military -- so that governments respond to the will of the people, and not the will of an elite. Successful societies protect freedom with the consistent and impartial rule of law, instead of selectively applying -- selectively applying the law to punish political opponents. Successful societies allow room for healthy civic institutions -- for political parties and labor unions and independent newspapers and broadcast media. Successful societies guarantee religious liberty -- the right to serve and honor God without fear of persecution. Successful societies privatize their economies, and secure the rights of property. They prohibit and punish official corruption, and invest in the health and education of their people. They recognize the rights of women. And instead of directing hatred and resentment against others, successful societies appeal to the hopes of their own people. (Applause.)

These vital principles are being applied in the nations of Afghanistan and Iraq. With the steady leadership of President Karzai, the people of Afghanistan are building a modern and peaceful government. Next month, 500 delegates will convene a national assembly in Kabul to approve a new Afghan constitution. The proposed draft would establish a bicameral parliament, set national elections next year, and recognize Afghanistan's Muslim identity, while protecting the rights of all citizens. Afghanistan faces continuing economic and security challenges -- it will face those challenges as a free and stable democracy. (Applause.)

In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council are also working together to build a democracy -- and after three decades of tyranny, this work is not easy. The former dictator ruled by terror and treachery, and left deeply ingrained habits of fear and distrust. Remnants of his regime, joined by foreign terrorists, continue their battle against order and against civilization. Our coalition is responding to recent attacks with precision raids, guided by intelligence provided by the Iraqis, themselves. And we're working closely with Iraqi citizens as they prepare a constitution, as they move toward free elections and take increasing responsibility for their own affairs. As in the defense of Greece in 1947, and later in the Berlin Airlift, the strength and will of free peoples are now being tested before a watching world. And we will meet this test. (Applause.)

Securing democracy in Iraq is the work of many hands. American and coalition forces

are sacrificing for the peace of Iraq and for the security of free nations. Aid workers from many countries are facing danger to help the Iraqi people. The National Endowment for Democracy is promoting women's rights, and training Iraqi journalists, and teaching the skills of political participation. Iraqis, themselves -- police and borders guards and local officials -- are joining in the work and they are sharing in the sacrifice.

This is a massive and difficult undertaking -- it is worth our effort, it is worth our sacrifice, because we know the stakes. The failure of Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region. Iraqi democracy will succeed -- and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran -- that freedom can be the future of every nation. (Applause.) The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution. (Applause.)

Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -- because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo. (Applause.)

Therefore, the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace. (Applause.)

The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country. From the Fourteen Points to the Four Freedoms, to the Speech at Westminster, America has put our power at the service of principle. We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history. We believe that human fulfillment and excellence come in the responsible exercise of liberty. And we believe that freedom -- the freedom we prize -- is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind. (Applause.)

Working for the spread of freedom can be hard. Yet, America has accomplished hard tasks before. Our nation is strong; we're strong of heart. And we're not alone. Freedom is finding allies in every country; freedom finds allies in every culture. And as we meet the terror and violence of the world, we can be certain the author of freedom is not indifferent to the fate of freedom.

With all the tests and all the challenges of our age, this is, above all, the age of liberty. Each of you at this Endowment is fully engaged in the great cause of liberty. And I thank you. May God bless your work. And may God continue to bless America. (Applause.)

National Endowment for Democracy | 1101 Fifteenth Street, NW, Suite 700 | Washington DC, 20005 | 202/293-9072 | Fax 202/223-6042
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Office of the Press Secretary
November 20, 2003**US/UK Declaration on Iraq**

Declaration on Iraq by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair

For the first time in decades, the Iraqi people are enjoying the taste of freedom. Iraqis are starting to rebuild their country and can look to a brighter future. They are free of Saddam Hussein and his vicious regime; they can speak freely; practice their religion; and start to come to terms with the nightmare of the last 35 years, in which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were murdered by their own government.

But Iraq is still threatened by followers of the former regime, and by outside terrorists who are helping them. The struggle is difficult. Yet we shall persevere to ensure that the people of Iraq will prevail, with the support of the new and strengthening Iraqi security forces: the police, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the Facility Protection Service, the border police, and the New Iraqi Army. We salute the courage of those Iraqis and the coalition forces engaged in the struggle against reactionary elements in Iraq who want to turn back the clock to the dark days of Saddam's regime.

We reaffirm the resolve of our two countries, with many friends and allies, to complete the process of bringing freedom, security, and peace to Iraq.

We warmly welcome the Iraqi Governing Council's announcement of a timetable for the creation of a sovereign Iraqi Transitional Administration by the end of June 2004, and for a process leading to the adoption of a permanent constitution and national elections for a new Iraqi government by the end of 2005.


This announcement is consistent with our long-stated aim of handing over power to Iraqis as quickly as possible. It is right that Iraqis are making these decisions and for the first time in generations determining their own future. We welcome the Governing Council's commitment to ensuring the widest possible participation in the Transitional Assembly and constitutional process.

We reaffirm our long-term commitment to Iraq. The United States and United Kingdom stand ready to support the Transitional Administration in its task of building a new Iraq and its democratic institutions. Our military participation in the multinational force in Iraq will serve the Iraqi people until the Iraqis themselves are able to discharge full responsibility for their own security. At the same time, we hope that international partners will increasingly participate in the multinational force.

Our long-term political, moral, and financial commitment to the reconstruction of Iraq was underlined at the Madrid Donors Conference last month. Although the Coalition Provisional Authority will come to an end once the Transitional Administration is installed, the United States and United Kingdom will continue to provide assistance as part of the international support effort. In these tasks, we welcome the involvement of other nations, regardless of earlier differences; of the United Nations and the International Financial Institutions; and of the many non-governmental organizations who are able to make an important contribution.

Great challenges remain in Iraq. But the progress we have made this year has been enormous. Iraqis no longer live in fear of their own government, and Iraq's neighbors no longer feel threatened. Our resolve to complete the task we set ourselves remains undiminished. Our partnership with the Iraqi people is for the long-term.

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11/24/2003



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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 19, 2003

President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London

Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace
Royal Banqueting House-Whitehall Palace
London, England

1:24 P.M. (Local)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Secretary Straw and Secretary Hoon; Admiral Cobbald and Dr. Chipman; distinguished guests: I want to thank you for your very kind welcome that you've given to me and to Laura. I also thank the groups hosting this event -- The Royal United Services Institute, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. We're honored to be in the United Kingdom, and we bring the good wishes of the American people.

It was pointed out to me that the last noted American to visit London stayed in a glass box dangling over the Thames. (Laughter.) A few might have been happy to provide similar arrangements for me. (Laughter.) I thank Her Majesty the Queen for interceding. (Laughter.) We're honored to be staying at her house.

Americans traveling to England always observe more similarities to our country than differences. I've been here only a short time, but I've noticed that the tradition of free speech -- exercised with enthusiasm -- (laughter) -- is alive and well here in London. We have that at home, too. They now have that right in Baghdad, as well. (Applause.)

The people of Great Britain also might see some familiar traits in Americans. We're sometimes faulted for a naive faith that liberty can change the world. If that's an error it began with reading too much John Locke and Adam Smith. Americans have, on occasion, been called moralists who often speak in terms of right and wrong. That zeal has been inspired by examples on this island, by the tireless compassion of Lord Shaftesbury, the righteous courage of Wilberforce, and the firm determination of the Royal Navy over the decades to fight and end the trade in slaves.

It's rightly said that Americans are a religious people. That's, in part, because the "Good News" was translated by Tyndale, preached by Wesley, lived out in the example of William Booth. At times, Americans are even said to have a puritan streak -- where might that have come from? (Laughter.) Well, we can start with the Puritans.

To this fine heritage, Americans have added a few traits of our own: the good influence of our immigrants, the spirit of the frontier. Yet, there remains a bit of England in every American. So much of our national character comes from you, and we're glad for it.

The fellowship of generations is the cause of common beliefs. We believe in open societies ordered by moral conviction. We believe in private markets, humanized by compassionate government. We believe in economies that reward effort, communities that protect the weak, and the duty of nations to respect the dignity and the rights of all. And whether one learns these ideals in County Durham or in West Texas, they instill mutual respect and they inspire common purpose.

More than an alliance of security and commerce, the British and American peoples have an alliance of values. And, today, this old and tested alliance is very strong. (Applause.)

The deepest beliefs of our nations set the direction of our foreign policy. We value our own civil rights, so we stand for the human rights of others. We affirm the God-given dignity of every person, so we are moved to action by poverty and oppression and famine and disease. The United States and Great Britain share a mission in the

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world beyond the balance of power or the simple pursuit of interest. We seek the advance of freedom and the peace that freedom brings. Together our nations are standing and sacrificing for this high goal in a distant land at this very hour. And America honors the idealism and the bravery of the sons and daughters of Britain.

The last President to stay at Buckingham Palace was an idealist, without question. At a dinner hosted by King George V, in 1918, Woodrow Wilson made a pledge; with typical American understatement, he vowed that right and justice would become the predominant and controlling force in the world.

President Wilson had come to Europe with his 14 Points for Peace. Many complimented him on his vision; yet some were dubious. Take, for example, the Prime Minister of France. He complained that God, himself, had only 10 commandments. (Laughter.) Sounds familiar. (Laughter.)

At Wilson's high point of idealism, however, Europe was one short generation from Munich and Auschwitz and the Blitz. Looking back, we see the reasons why. The League of Nations, lacking both credibility and will, collapsed at the first challenge of the dictators. Free nations failed to recognize, much less confront, the aggressive evil in plain sight. And so dictators went about their business, feeding resentments and anti-Semitism, bringing death to innocent people in this city and across the world, and filling the last century with violence and genocide.

Through world war and cold war, we learned that idealism, if it is to do any good in this world, requires common purpose and national strength, moral courage and patience in difficult tasks. And now our generation has need of these qualities.

On September the 11th, 2001, terrorists left their mark of murder on my country, and took the lives of 67 British citizens. With the passing of months and years, it is the natural human desire to resume a quiet life and to put that day behind us, as if waking from a dark dream. The hope that danger has passed is comforting, is understanding, and it is false. The attacks that followed -- on Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca, Bombay, Mombassa, Najaf, Jerusalem, Riyadh, Baghdad, and Istanbul -- were not dreams. They're part of the global campaign by terrorist networks to intimidate and demoralize all who oppose them.

These terrorists target the innocent, and they kill by the thousands. And they would, if they gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished. The greatest threat of our age is nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists, and the dictators who aid them. The evil is in plain sight. The danger only increases with denial. Great responsibilities fall once again to the great democracies. We will face these threats with open eyes, and we will defeat them. (Applause.)

The peace and security of free nations now rests on three pillars: First, international organizations must be equal to the challenges facing our world, from lifting up failing states to opposing proliferation.

Like 11 Presidents before me, I believe in the international institutions and alliances that America helped to form and helps to lead. The United States and Great Britain have labored hard to help make the United Nations what it is supposed to be -- an effective instrument of our collective security. In recent months, we've sought and gained three additional resolutions on Iraq -- Resolutions 1441, 1483 and 1511 -- precisely because the global danger of terror demands a global response. The United Nations has no more compelling advocate than your Prime Minister, who at every turn has championed its ideals and appealed to its authority. He understands, as well, that the credibility of the U.N. depends on a willingness to keep its word and to act when action is required.

America and Great Britain have done, and will do, all in their power to prevent the United Nations from solemnly choosing its own irrelevance and inviting the fate of the League of Nations. It's not enough to meet the dangers of the world with resolutions; we must meet those dangers with resolve.

In this century, as in the last, nations can accomplish more together than apart. For 54 years, America has stood with our partners in NATO, the most effective multilateral institution in history. We're committed to this great democratic alliance, and we believe it must have the will and the capacity to act beyond Europe where threats emerge.

My nation welcomes the growing unity of Europe, and the world needs America and the European Union to work in common purpose for the advance of security and justice. America is cooperating with four other nations to meet the dangers posed by North Korea. America believes the IAEA must be true to its purpose and hold Iran to its

obligations.

Our first choice, and our constant practice, is to work with other responsible governments. We understand, as well, that the success of multilateralism is not measured by adherence to forms alone, the tidiness of the process, but by the results we achieve to keep our nations secure.

The second pillar of peace and security in our world is the willingness of free nations, when the last resort arrives, to retain* (sic) aggression and evil by force. There are principled objections to the use of force in every generation, and I credit the good motives behind these views.

Those in authority, however, are not judged only by good motivations. The people have given us the duty to defend them. And that duty sometimes requires the violent restraint of violent men. In some cases, the measured use of force is all that protects us from a chaotic world ruled by force.

Most in the peaceful West have no living memory of that kind of world. Yet in some countries, the memories are recent: The victims of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, those who survived the rapists and the death squads, have few qualms when NATO applied force to help end those crimes. The women of Afghanistan, imprisoned in their homes and beaten in the streets and executed in public spectacles, did not reproach us for routing the Taliban. The inhabitants of Iraq's Baathist hell, with its lavish palaces and its torture chambers, with its massive statues and its mass graves, do not miss their fugitive dictator. They rejoiced at his fall.

In all these cases, military action was preceded by diplomatic initiatives and negotiations and ultimatums, and final chances until the final moment. In Iraq, year after year, the dictator was given the chance to account for his weapons programs, and end the nightmare for his people. Now the resolutions he defied have been enforced.

And who will say that Iraq was better off when Saddam Hussein was strutting and killing, or that the world was safer when he held power? Who doubts that Afghanistan is a more just society and less dangerous without Mullah Omar playing host to terrorists from around the world. And Europe, too, is plainly better off with Milosevic answering for his crimes, instead of committing more.

It's been said that those who live near a police station find it hard to believe in the triumph of violence, in the same way free peoples might be tempted to take for granted the orderly societies we have come to know. Europe's peaceful unity is one of the great achievements of the last half-century. And because European countries now resolve differences through negotiation and consensus, there's sometimes an assumption that the entire world functions in the same way. But let us never forget how Europe's unity was achieved – by allied armies of liberation and NATO armies of defense. And let us never forget, beyond Europe's borders, in a world where oppression and violence are very real, liberation is still a moral goal, and freedom and security still need defenders. (Applause.)

The third pillar of security is our commitment to the global expansion of democracy, and the hope and progress it brings, as the alternative to instability and to hatred and terror. We cannot rely exclusively on military power to assure our long-term security. Lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance.

In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps or attack their peaceful neighbors; they honor the aspirations and dignity of their own people. In our conflict with terror and tyranny, we have an unmatched advantage, a power that cannot be resisted, and that is the appeal of freedom to all mankind.

As global powers, both our nations serve the cause of freedom in many ways, in many places. By promoting development, and fighting famine and AIDS and other diseases, we're fulfilling our moral duties, as well as encouraging stability and building a firmer basis for democratic institutions. By working for justice in Burma, in the Sudan and in Zimbabwe, we give hope to suffering people and improve the chances for stability and progress. By extending the reach of trade we foster prosperity and the habits of liberty. And by advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people.

The stakes in that region could not be higher. If the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish,

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it will remain a place of stagnation and anger and violence for export. And as we saw in the ruins of two towers, no distance on the map will protect our lives and way of life. If the greater Middle East joins the democratic revolution that has reached much of the world, the lives of millions in that region will be bettered, and a trend of conflict and fear will be ended at its source.

The movement of history will not come about quickly. Because of our own democratic development -- the fact that it was gradual and, at times, turbulent -- we must be patient with others. And the Middle East countries have some distance to travel.

Arab scholars speak of a freedom deficit that has separated whole nations from the progress of our time. The essentials of social and material progress -- limited government, equal justice under law, religious and economic liberty, political participation, free press, and respect for the rights of women -- have been scarce across the region. Yet that has begun to change. In an arc of reform from Morocco to Jordan to Qatar, we are seeing elections and new protections for women and the stirring of political pluralism. Many governments are realizing that theocracy and dictatorship do not lead to national greatness; they end in national ruin. They are finding, as others will find, that national progress and dignity are achieved when governments are just and people are free.

The democratic progress we've seen in the Middle East was not imposed from abroad, and neither will the greater progress we hope to see. Freedom, by definition, must be chosen, and defended by those who choose it. Our part, as free nations, is to ally ourselves with reform, wherever it occurs.

Perhaps the most helpful change we can make is to change in our own thinking. In the West, there's been a certain skepticism about the capacity or even the desire of Middle Eastern peoples for self-government. We're told that Islam is somehow inconsistent with a democratic culture. Yet more than half of the world's Muslims are today contributing citizens in democratic societies. It is suggested that the poor, in their daily struggles, care little for self-government. Yet the poor, especially, need the power of democracy to defend themselves against corrupt elites.

Peoples of the Middle East share a high civilization, a religion of personal responsibility, and a need for freedom as deep as our own. It is not realism to suppose that one-fifth of humanity is unsuited to liberty; it is pessimism and condescension, and we should have none of it. (Applause.)

We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. Your nation and mine, in the past, have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold.

As recent history has shown, we cannot turn a blind eye to oppression just because the oppression is not in our own backyard. No longer should we think tyranny is benign because it is temporarily convenient. Tyranny is never benign to its victims, and our great democracies should oppose tyranny wherever it is found. (Applause.)

Now we're pursuing a different course, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. We will consistently challenge the enemies of reform and confront the allies of terror. We will expect a higher standard from our friends in the region, and we will meet our responsibilities in Afghanistan and in Iraq by finishing the work of democracy we have begun.

There were good-faith disagreements in your country and mine over the course and timing of military action in Iraq. Whatever has come before, we now have only two options: to keep our word, or to break our word. The failure of democracy in Iraq would throw its people back into misery and turn that country over to terrorists who wish to destroy us. Yet democracy will succeed in Iraq, because our will is firm, our word is good, and the Iraqi people will not surrender their freedom. (Applause.)

Since the liberation of Iraq, we have seen changes that could hardly have been imagined a year ago. A new Iraqi police force protects the people, instead of bullying them. More than 150 Iraqi newspapers are now in circulation, printing what they choose, not what they're ordered. Schools are open with textbooks free of propaganda. Hospitals are functioning and are well-supplied. Iraq has a new currency, the first battalion of a new army, representative local governments, and a Governing Council with an aggressive timetable for national sovereignty. This is substantial progress. And much of it has proceeded faster than similar efforts in Germany and Japan after

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World War II.

Yet the violence we are seeing in Iraq today is serious. And it comes from Baathist holdouts and Jihadists from other countries, and terrorists drawn to the prospect of innocent bloodshed. It is the nature of terrorism and the cruelty of a few to try to bring grief in the loss to many. The armed forces of both our countries have taken losses, felt deeply by our citizens. Some families now live with a burden of great sorrow. We cannot take the pain away. But these families can know they are not alone. We pray for their strength; we pray for their comfort; and we will never forget the courage of the ones they loved.

The terrorists have a purpose, a strategy to their cruelty. They view the rise of democracy in Iraq as a powerful threat to their ambitions. In this, they are correct. They believe their acts of terror against our coalition, against international aid workers and against innocent Iraqis, will make us recoil and retreat. In this, they are mistaken. (Applause.)

We did not charge hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq and pay a bitter cost of casualties, and liberate 25 million people, only to retreat before a band of thugs and assassins. (Applause.) We will help the Iraqi people establish a peaceful and democratic country in the heart of the Middle East. And by doing so, we will defend our people from danger.

The forward strategy of freedom must also apply to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It's a difficult period in a part of the world that has known many. Yet, our commitment remains firm. We seek justice and dignity. We seek a viable, independent state for the Palestinian people, who have been betrayed by others for too long. (Applause.) We seek security and recognition for the state of Israel, which has lived in the shadow of random death for too long. (Applause.) These are worthy goals in themselves, and by reaching them we will also remove an occasion and excuse for hatred and violence in the broader Middle East.

Achieving peace in the Holy Land is not just a matter of the shape of a border. As we work on the details of peace, we must look to the heart of the matter, which is the need for a viable Palestinian democracy. Peace will not be achieved by Palestinian rulers who intimidate opposition, who tolerate and profit from corruption and maintain their ties to terrorist groups. These are the methods of the old elites, who time and again had put their own self-interest above the interest of the people they claim to serve. The long-suffering Palestinian people deserve better. They deserve true leaders, capable of creating and governing a Palestinian state.

Even after the setbacks and frustrations of recent months, goodwill and hard effort can bring about a Palestinian state and a secure Israel. Those who would lead a new Palestine should adopt peaceful means to achieve the rights of their people and create the reformed institutions of a stable democracy.

Israel should freeze settlement construction, dismantle unauthorized outposts, end the daily humiliation of the Palestinian people, and not prejudice final negotiations with the placements of walls and fences.

Arab states should end incitement in their own media, cut off public and private funding for terrorism, and establish normal relations with Israel.

Leaders in Europe should withdraw all favor and support from any Palestinian ruler who fails his people and betrays their cause. And Europe's leaders -- and all leaders -- should strongly oppose anti-Semitism, which poisons public debates over the future of the Middle East. (Applause.)

Ladies and gentlemen, we have great objectives before us that make our Atlantic alliance as vital as it has ever been. We will encourage the strength and effectiveness of international institutions. We will use force when necessary in the defense of freedom. And we will raise up an ideal of democracy in every part of the world. On these three pillars we will build the peace and security of all free nations in a time of danger.

So much good has come from our alliance of conviction and might. So much now depends on the strength of this alliance as we go forward. America has always found strong partners in London, leaders of good judgment and blunt counsel and backbone when times are tough. And I have found all those qualities in your current Prime Minister, who has my respect and my deepest thanks. (Applause.)

11-L-0559/OSD/49315

The ties between our nations, however, are deeper than the relationship between leaders. These ties endure because they are formed by the experience and responsibilities and adversity we have shared. And in the memory of our peoples, there will always be one experience, one central event when the seal was fixed on the friendship between Britain and the United States: The arrival in Great Britain of more than 1.5 million American soldiers and airmen in the 1940s was a turning point in the second world war. For many Britons, it was a first close look at Americans, other than in the movies. Some of you here today may still remember the "friendly invasion." Our lads, they took some getting used to. There was even a saying about what many of them were up to -- in addition to be "overpaid and over here." (Laughter.)

At a reunion in North London some years ago, an American pilot who had settled in England after his military service, said, "Well, I'm still over here, and probably overpaid. So two out of three isn't bad." (Laughter.)

In that time of war, the English people did get used to the Americans. They welcomed soldiers and fliers into their villages and homes, and took to calling them, "our boys." About 70,000 of those boys did their part to affirm our special relationship. They returned home with English brides.

Americans gained a certain image of Britain, as well. We saw an island threatened on every side, a leader who did not waver, and a country of the firmest character. And that has not changed. The British people are the sort of partners you want when serious work needs doing. The men and women of this Kingdom are kind and steadfast and generous and brave. And America is fortunate to call this country our closest friend in the world.

May God bless you all. (Applause.)

END 2:03 P.M. (Local)

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January 2, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: John H. Thomas

230.02

Attached is a background sheet from a person who apparently served on the USS Iowa with me, back when I was a midshipman. He has a pretty good background.

We might want to see if there is some way a person like that could be helpful. I do not remember him, and I have seen him only once since then, when he visited the Pentagon.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/28/03 Thomas ltr to SecDef
draft SecDef ltr to Thomas

DHR:dh
010204-9

.....
Please respond by 1/31/04

*CG to
Richard DeLong*

2 Jan 04

OSD 090000-04

Sec Def

Mr. John H. Thomas

(b)(6)

CLINTY D. RICE

12/29

Dear John:

Thank you for your kind letter. I am pleased (b)(6) and you enjoyed your visit to the Pentagon.

I appreciate the kind words, and your interest in serving. I passed your information to our General Counsel, Jim Haynes, to consider if there may be a way for you to get involved.

With best wishes for a joyous Holiday Season,

Sincerely,

OK

SECRET

700 200 11 11 2003

November 28, 2003

Dear Don,

It was great to see you again. You and your staff were so gracious to me, (b)(6) and (b)(6).

We really enjoyed your showing us through your office. What a strong feeling of history is present there. Many thanks from your Iowa shipmates.

Thank you, also, for the photos. I am proud to have them. You're my hero—the wisest and most dynamic SecDef.

America has gained much from your innovative, long, and distinguished service, especially during the last three years.

(b)(6) has included you on her daily "Prayer List," asking for your continued strength and good health in these stressful times. I believe it works.

I saw (b)(6) recently. He looks "fit as a fiddle." He asked me to give you his best wishes.

If all one knew were what he learned from the media, he would be depressed about how America is faring in the world. However, almost everyone I talk with supports you and your skillful efforts throughout the world. We feel we are winning, with each day that passes. The reasonable prospects for a better world are exciting.

Hope you bag the "Ace of Spades" soon. I think you will.

If I may assist you in any way, please let me know. On that subject, please see the enclosed.

(b)(6) and I send our best wishes, strong support, and thanks to you.

Sincerely,



(b)(6)

U204627/03

11-L-0559/OSD/49319

**John H. Thomas
Lawyer**

(b)(6)

November 28, 2003

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I hereby offer my services in the war against terrorism.

MY BACKGROUND:

- NROTC Regular, Univ. of Virginia (ranked 1st in NROTC class).
- Phi Beta Kappa (Junior year); Fulbright Fellowship, France (Modern European History).
- Surface Navy (active duty) and Intelligence (Reserves).
- Univ. of Va. Law School; Order of the Coif.
- 35 years of law practice in California.
- Taught Constitutional law at a law school.

WHAT I CAN ACCOMPLISH:

- a). Perhaps of use in GTMO, Legal or intelligence skills; or
- b). In the U.S., as a lawyer used to counter the expected onslaught of ACLU, etc., actions, concerning GTMO prisoner and related matters.

DETAILS:

- I will work where needed.
- I seek no payment for my services.

Since our meeting in October, I have given a lot of thought to this; I am serious; I think I can be useful.

Sincerely yours,



John H. Thomas

11-L-0559/OSD/49320

4/26/05
1507
FOUO

April 26, 2005

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: New Photos

When we put up new photos for the Chairman, Vice, Deputy and me the heads should be the same size, instead of the big disparity they have now, depending on how they are cropped.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
042505-26

.....
Please respond by _____

FOUO

OSD 09001-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49321

06050

26 APR 05

January 2, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: War on Terror

Here is an interesting article by Bernard Lewis that you might make some use of.

Thanks.

Attach.

Lewis, Bernard. "Democracy and the Enemies of Freedom," *Wall Street Journal*, December 22, 2003.

DHR:dh
010204-19

.....

Please respond by _____

CC: DSD

OSD 09002-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49322

000,5

2 Jan 04

Democracy and the Enemies of Freedom

By Bernard Lewis

The American military intervention in Afghanistan and then in Iraq has had two declared objectives: the first and more immediate, to defeat and defeat terrorism; the second, to bring freedom, sometimes called democracy, to the peoples of these countries and beyond.

The sponsors and organizers of terrorism are of two kinds, with very different purposes, even though they can and frequently do cooperate. One of the two is local or regional, and consists of survivors of the former Iraqi regime, encouraged and supported by the governments of other countries in the region that feel endangered by what might happen in Iraq. The aim of these groups is to protect—or, in the case of Iraq, restore—the tyrannies under which these countries have lived so long. If, as many urge, the Americans decide to abandon this costly and troublesome operation and simply go home, this might just possibly be enough to satisfy the local sponsors of terror. Some of them might even offer the resumption of what passes for friendly relations.

* * *

But there are others who would see the eviction of the Americans from Afghanistan and Iraq not as the end but as the beginning—as a victory not in a war but in a battle; one step in a longer and wider war that must be pursued until the final and global victory.

The Americans too, have proclaimed a larger and longer purpose for their intervention; not just to defeat and end terrorism, but to give to the long-oppressed peoples of Afghanistan, Iraq and eventually other countries the opportunity to end the corrupt and oppressive regimes under which they have suffered for decades, and to restore or create a political order respected by and answerable to the people. This goal evokes strong support among many in the region. But, because of both past experience and current discourse, that support is understandably wary.

Certainly, the creation of a democracy in the Middle East will not be quick or easy, any more than it was in Europe or the Americas. There, too, it must come in gradual stages. Going too far, too fast would give an immediate advantage to those skilled in the arts of manipulation and of intimidation. As the example of Algeria demonstrates, it can even lead to a violent clash between the two.

The kind of dictatorship that exists in the Middle East today has to no small extent been the result of modernization, more specifically of European influence and example. This included the only European political model that really worked in the Middle East—that of the one-party state, either in the Nazi or the communist version, which did not differ greatly from one another. In these systems, the party is not, as in the West, an organization for attracting votes

and winning elections. It is part of the apparatus of government, particularly concerned with indoctrination and enforcement. The Baath Party has a double ancestry, both fascist and communist, and still represents both trends very well.

But beyond these there are older traditions, well represented in both the political literature and political experience of the Islamic Middle East: traditions of government under law, by consent, even by contract.

Changes in the spirit of these traditions

Even after Saddam Hussein's arrest, the forces of tyranny remain very strong.

would offer an opportunity to other versions of Islam besides the fanatical and intolerant creed of the terrorists. Though at present widely held and richly endowed, this version is far from representative of mainstream Islam through the centuries. The traditions of command and obedience are indeed deep-rooted, but there are other

more in Europe, that it will fail; and the other, among many of the present rulers of the region, that it will succeed.

Certainly, policies of political liberalization in Afghanistan and in Iraq offer a mortal threat to regimes that can survive only by tyranny at home and terror abroad. The enemies of freedom are dangerous: unrestrained by any kind of scruple and unhampered by either compunction or compassion, even for their own people. They are willing to use not just individuals and families, but whole nations as suicide bombers to be sacrificed as required in order to defeat and eject the infidel enemy and establish their own supremacy.

The creation of a free society, as the history of existing democracies in the world makes clear, is no easy matter. The experience of the Turkish republic over the last half century and of some other Muslim countries more recently has demonstrated two things: first, that it is indeed very difficult to create a democracy in such a society, and second, that although difficult, it is not impossible.


The study of Islamic history and of the vast and rich Islamic political literature encourages the belief that it may well be possible to develop democratic institutions—not necessarily in our Western definition of that much misused term, but in one deriving from their own history and culture, and ensuring, in their way, limited government under law, consultation and openness, in a civilized and humane society. There is enough in the traditional culture of Islam on the one hand and the modern experience of the Muslim peoples on the other to provide the basis for an advance towards freedom in the true sense of that word.

* * *

Even after the arrest of Saddam Hussein this week, the forces of tyranny and terror remain very strong and the outcome is still far from certain. But as the struggle rages and intensifies, certain things that were previously obscure are becoming clear. The war against terror and the quest for freedom are inextricably linked, and neither can succeed without the other. The struggle is no longer limited to one or two countries, as some Westerners still manage to believe. It has acquired first a regional and then a global dimension, with profound consequences for all of us.

If freedom fails and terror triumphs, the peoples of Islam will be the first and greatest victims. They will not be alone, and many others will suffer with them.

Mr. Lewis, professor emeritus of history at Princeton, is the author of "The Crisis of Islam" and "From Babel to Dragomans," out in the Spring from Random House Trade Paperback and the Oxford University Press, respectively.



elements in Islamic tradition that could contribute to a more open and freer form of government: the rejection by the traditional jurists of despotic and arbitrary rule in favor of contract in the formation and consensus in the conduct of government; and their insistence that the mightiest of rulers, no less than the humblest of his servants, is bound by the law.

Another element is the acceptance, indeed the requirement of tolerance, embodied in such dicta as the Quranic verse "there is no compulsion in religion," and the early tradition "diversity in my community is God's mercy." This is carried a step further in the Sufi ideal of dialogue between faiths in a common search for the fulfillment of shared aspirations.

The attempt to bring freedom to the Middle East evokes two fears: one in the U.S. and still

ders who value them most for production, development, or exploration. The auction could begin by selling existing oil and gas rights, pipelines, and gathering, separating and terminal facilities over the ne-

It is better, because spending for

The Iraqi People's Fund

By Vernon L. Smith

With the capture of Saddam Hussein, President Bush has a great symbolic victory against his critics. However, the unfinished Iraqi oil

471-065910SD/49823

January 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons from Philippines for Iraq

Attached is an interesting article on the Philippines.

Thanks.

Attach.

Kaltman, Al. "Lessons for Iraq" undated, unsourced

DHR:dh
010204-18

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 09003-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49324

Philippines
2 Jan 04

By Al Kalman

Harry Truman once remarked that the only thing new in this world is the history we haven't learned. One hundred years ago, an American army won a relatively bloodless war in the Philippines, and then learned the hard way that a war isn't over when major military operations end. Iraq is not the Philippines. In addition to the span of time between the two wars and the advances in weaponry and war fighting, there are important differences in geography and the customs and cultures of the Filipinos and Iraqis. However, Gen. Arthur MacArthur, who was the military governor of the Philippines from May 1900 until July 1901, faced challenges that more closely resemble the situation in Iraq today than any other U.S. military history experience. He was America's first viceroy, and his son, Douglas, used the lessons learned by his father to model his own successful stewardship of Japan at the end of World War II. Those lessons are still instructive today.

At the conclusion of the Spanish American War, President McKinley reluctantly decided that the United States had no choice but to purchase the Philippines from Spain. As he explained: "The truth is I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. ... And, one night it came to me. We could not give them back to Spain — that would be cowardly and dishonorable; we could not turn them over to France or Germany — that would be bad business; we could not leave them to themselves — they were unfit for self-government and they would have anarchy and misrule. There was nothing left for us to do but to take them. ... and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift ... them."

The treaty to end the Spanish American War was signed in December 1898. At that time the Army had 20,000 soldiers in Manila. They were surrounded by a 40,000 man Philippine army. In February, the Americans began offensive operations and defeated the Filipinos in a series of engagements over the

Lessons for Iraq

Gen. MacArthur provides a good strategy

course of the next 10 months. By mid-November 1899, large-scale military operations had ended. The U.S. government declared that the war was over, and Gen. Elwell Otis, Gen. MacArthur's predecessor, was greeted as a conquering hero upon his return to the United States. However, the guerrilla, that is, the terrorist war, had only just begun.

From December 1899 to July 1901, American forces would engage the enemy 1,697 times,

As terrorist attacks upon his soldiers mounted, Gen. MacArthur concluded that until the Filipino people stopped aiding and abetting those who were ambushing and laying booby traps for his men, the country could never be secure.

and suffer 1,699 casualties. To secure the Philippines, the U.S. army would require 125,000 soldiers, more than 6 times the number that was needed to "win the war." The United States had paid \$20 million for the Philippines; it would spend over \$200 million to defeat the terrorists.

Wearing civilian clothing and working in the fields, the terrorists were indistinguishable from innocent civilians. One U.S. officer described how they would "slip away, go out into the bushes, get their guns, and waylay you. ... You rout them and scatter them; they hide their guns and take to their houses and claim to be amigos." The

terrorists targeted for assassination Filipinos who provided assistance to the U.S. forces or cooperated with the Americans. As a result, Filipinos who were supportive of the American efforts to bring peace were not only intimidated and afraid to identify terrorists or reveal their hideouts, but also felt compelled to assist them logistically and to provide intelligence on American troop movements.

As terrorist attacks upon his soldiers mounted, Gen. MacArthur concluded that until the Filipino people stopped aiding and abetting those who were ambushing and laying booby traps for his men, the country could never be secure. He reluctantly ordered the arrest and imprisonment of anyone suspected of harboring or helping the terrorists. Those arrested were to be detained until all terrorist attacks had ceased. Following Gen. MacArthur's orders, U.S. commanders interned large numbers of Filipinos.

Gen. MacArthur then ordered his army commanders to leave their 300 garrisons and sweep the countryside, cities, towns and villages in a relentless search for the enemy and his stores of weapons. At the same time, he instituted a program of prisoner releases in exchange for turning in terrorists and weapons.

His tactics met with considerable success; however, sporadic terrorist attacks continued. Gen. MacArthur believed that until the country was pacified, "military authority was paramount and exclusive." The Army did not turn over control of the Philippines to a civilian administration until 32 months after the "end of the war."

Gen. MacArthur understood that pacification could not be achieved "by force alone." He made it clear that Filipino culture and customs would be respected. Under Gen. MacArthur, Filipinos were accorded the same personal freedoms enjoyed by U.S. citizens.

As he explained, "American institutions are on trial."

He assigned officers to investigate the entire spectrum of issues involved in establishing a nation's infrastructure. Kenneth Ray Young, in his biography of the general, writes that under Gen. MacArthur's leadership, "new health and sanitation laws were implemented, legal codes were revised, schools and hospitals were built and a tariff system was developed."

Until the country was secure, Gen. MacArthur was unwilling to establish a Philippine army. He did not want to put weapons in the hands of men who, after dark, might change into civilian clothes and use their American supplied arms to kill U.S. soldiers. However, he did recruit and train a number of Filipinos who were attached to Army units. These men, who served as interpreters and scouts, would after pacification form the nucleus of a national army.

Gen. MacArthur did permit the creation of local police forces, but they were armed only with pistols and shotguns. He also allowed the creation of elected self-governing councils who were given the responsibility of carrying out the basic tasks of municipal governance such as collecting garbage and providing potable drinking water; however all of the actions taken by these councils were subject to the approval of the local Army garrison commander.

He permitted the Filipinos to exercise free speech, except that no one, and that included religious leaders and school teachers as well as intellectuals, journalists and politicians, was allowed to advocate violent resistance to the U.S. administration.

Gen. MacArthur understood that it was unrealistic to expect the Filipino population, all but a small number of whom were illiterate, to embrace Western ideals and democratic principles. They first had to be educated. Using U.S. soldiers as

teachers, he began a widespread English language education program that included instruction on the American political system, Constitution and Bill of Rights. The program he began was so effective that at the start of World War II the Philippines had the highest literacy rate in Asia with English as its de facto national language.

When military rule ended, William Howard Taft became the first U.S. civil governor of the Philippines. He believed the Filipinos "would need training for 50 or 100 years" before they would be ready to assume the responsibilities of self-rule under a U.S. styled constitution with democratically elected leaders. It was 1946 before the Philippines became independent.

Gen. MacArthur understood that pacification could not be achieved 'by force alone.' He made it clear that Filipino culture and customs would be respected. As he explained, 'American institutions are on trial.'

ent. Ferdinand Marcos, who ruled the Philippines as a dictator from 1972 to 1986, demonstrated that even after many years of nurturing and training in the principles of American government and individual liberty, democracy is still a very fragile and slow flowering plant in third world countries.

While Gen. MacArthur dealt with many of the same problems that Americans face today in Iraq, because the Philippines are an island archipelago, he did not have to deal with porous borders and the introduction of a seemingly unending stream of armed ter-

rorists from neighboring countries. We can only speculate as to the recommendations he would have made to prevent these incursions. Whatever he might have asked for, whether it was for more troops to patrol and try to seal the borders, permission to strike at terrorist training camps in neighboring countries, or something else altogether, it would have been with the understanding that the Iraqi people cannot begin their long march down the road to democracy until the terrorist threat has been eliminated, and that will be impossible as long as terrorists can continue to sneak into Iraq.

The Bush administration recognizes that the military occupation will be costly, and that full sovereignty cannot be restored to Iraq until the terrorists are defeated. However, for the peace and stability of the region, the other prerequisite to the restoration of sovereignty should be the widespread understanding and acceptance by the Iraqi people of the mechanisms and principles of secular democratic self-government. Of the lessons to be drawn from the U.S. experience in the Philippines, the most important, but one our government apparently has yet to learn, is that an extensive, long-term political education program will need to be successfully conducted if democratic institutions are to take root in Iraq.

Kofi Anan, Jacques Chirac and the others who are calling for an early U.S. withdrawal from Iraq are naive or disingenuous. The result would be to hand Iraq over to the radical Islamists. This would leave the country in a worse state than it was before we set out to effect regime change. American blood would have been spilled for a pyrrhic victory.

Al Kalman is a graduate of the University of the Philippines and has a Ph.D. in political science from the George Washington University. He is the author of "The Genius of Robert E. Lee, and Cigars, Whiskey and Winning: Leadership Lessons from General Ulysses S. Grant."

9:14 AM

TO: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Marc Thiessen
Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT: **Increase in End Strength**

Please prepare a draft reply to the members of Congress on their End Strength letter. This is an important policy issue.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.05

Please respond by: 1/15/04

OSD 09006-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49326

320.2

655

closed
SMA/DJS
1/8

5 Jan 04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 6/16/2004

6-22-04 *jl*

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC

ATTACHMENT:

OSD CONTROL OSD 09006-04 DOC 1/5/2004

DOR 6/16/2004

SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD

TO DAVID CHU, DOV ZAKHEIM

SUBJECT INCREASE IN END STRENGTH

KEYWORDS SNOW FLAKE, GEN PETE PACE

COMMENTS NO DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.

FN 320.2

SEC U

OCN10504.05

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE

DECISION

DECISION DATE

PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY

ACTION ASSIGNED

SUSPENSE

DOC SUSPENSE:

SUSPENSE COMPLETE

ACD

COORDINATION

PAGES 1

ENCLOSURES 0

PACKAGE VIEW:

SUSPENSE STATUS

FRONT OFFICE DOC

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ADC R

11-L-0559/OSD/49327

January 2, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

Iraq

Shouldn't we do some work on finding the extent to which the UN Oil-for-Food program was abused?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010204-29

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

cc: Steve Cambone

*Feith is working.
V/r
Jaime*

2 Jan 04

OSD 09007-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49328

FOUO

TAB A

APR 13 2005

To: Mike Wynne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Boeing Contract

I just saw this memo where a Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) saved \$150 million on a Boeing contract on the C-17.

What in the world is wrong with that company? What's wrong with our process that it took an audit to figure it out?

Thanks.

Atach.

4/8/05 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Weekly Report for April 8, 2005 [OSD 06814-05]

DHR:dh
041265-1 (in laptop)

.....
Please respond by

5/5/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49329



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

May 06, 2005, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Boeing C-17 Sustainment Contract

- USD(C) noted in the April 8 weekly report that the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) conducted an audit of Boeing's \$5.9 billion proposal for the C-17 total systems support contract, yielding savings of \$150 million. You asked "What in the world is wrong with this company? What's wrong with our process that it took an audit to figure it out?" (TAB A). These audit findings do not indicate that anything is wrong with the company or our process. DCAA audited Boeing's C-17 proposal to support the contracting officer negotiations with Boeing, which is a normal part of our process for awarding contracts.
- When submitting proposals for sole source contracts, companies are required to estimate the costs to perform the contract and submit supporting data. DCAA audits these proposals and provides information to the contracting officer as to the reasonableness of the proposed costs, the reliability of the data, and validity of assumptions used by the contractor. This information is used to develop a Government negotiation position.
- Companies often propose an estimated cost that minimizes their risks and reflects what they believe is reasonable. It is not unusual for the auditor to recommend reductions in the proposed cost to levels the auditor believes are reasonable. Such audit reductions often occur even though the company has acceptable accounting and estimating systems (such as Boeing in this case). Due to the subjective nature of cost estimates, there are often disagreements between the Government and the contractor as to what the future costs will be. These disagreements are resolved during contract negotiations, at the conclusion of which, a final price is agreed upon.
- The C-17 contract negotiations illustrate this process. While DCAA recommended reductions of \$326 million to Boeing's proposed costs, the final price negotiated by the C-17 contracting officer resulted in net savings of \$150 million. The magnitude of the recommended reductions in this audit report is not unusual. The audit recommended reductions are 5.49 percent of the total proposed price. This is very close to the DCAA FY 2004 average recommended reduction of 5.13 percent for all contract proposals.

COORDINATION: USD(C), Tab B.

cc: DSD

Prepared by: David Capitano, DPAP/P (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/49330

OSD 09008-05

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

APR 13 2005

TO: Mike Wynne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boeing Contract

I just saw this memo where a Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) saved \$150 million on a Boeing contract on the C-17.

What in the world is wrong with that company? What's wrong with our process that it took an audit to figure it out?

Thanks.

Attach.

4/8/05 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Weekly Report for April 8, 2005 [OSD 06814-05]

THOR:dh
041205-1 (in legend)

.....
Please respond by

5/5/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49331



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

205 APR 11 AM 9:54

April 8, 2005, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jones *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Weekly Report for April 8, 2005

- **FY2005 Supplemental.** The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out the FY 2005 supplemental appropriations bill Wednesday, April 6. Next week, the full Senate will act on the bill. The House has already completed action. We expect conference to begin immediately after the Senate finishes on the floor. We are pressing the Congress to complete action by May 1st.
- **Audit Saves \$150 Million on C-17 Contract.** The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) conducted an audit of Boeing's \$5.9 billion proposal for the C-17 total systems support contract, yielding savings of \$150 million. DCAA found that cost estimates for material, overhead, and intercompany transfers were overstated. Boeing agreed to reduce its proposed cost accordingly.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: CDR Mark D. Pyle, (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA OSD	<i>P 4/12</i>	
TEA SD	SA DSD		
EDC SEC	<i>11 4/11</i>	<i>17/K</i>	
ESR MA	<i>11 4/11</i>	<i>17/K</i>	

DSD 06814-05

A-44-2

COORDINATION

April 29, 2005

SUBJECT: Boeing C-17 Sustainment Contract

SUSPENSE: COB May ²~~1~~, 2005

Please call Domenic Cipicchio on (b)(6) or Joyce Martin on (b)(6) for pick-up.

USD(C) 

DCAA Bill Reid 5/5/05

TJ
PH

ACTION MEMO

April 29, 2005

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

FROM: DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION POLICY

SUBJECT: Snowflake • Boeing Contract

- In the ~~weekly report for April 8, 2005~~, OUSD(C) notified Secretary Rumsfeld that ~~DCMA had conducted an audit of Boeing's \$5.9 billion proposal for the C-17 total systems support contract, yielding savings of \$150 million.~~
- On April 13, 2005, ~~Secretary Rumsfeld responded with a snowflake~~, asking "What in the world is wrong with this company? What's wrong with our process that it took an audit to figure it out?"
- The ~~attached response to the snowflake~~ (TAB A) notes the following:
 - The ~~DCMA audit~~ of the Boeing C-17 contract proposal ~~was a normal part of the process in~~ the award and administration of contracts.
 - It is ~~not unusual~~ for companies to submit cost estimates that reflect what the company believes is reasonable and ~~for the audit to reduce such estimates~~ to levels the auditor believes are reasonable. Such audit reductions often occur even though the company (such as Boeing in this case) has acceptable accounting and estimating systems.
 - The ~~magnitude~~ of the subject audit finding ~~was not unusual when compared to the average DCMA audit findings.~~

RECOMMENDATION: Forward the attached reply to Secretary Rumsfeld.

COORDINATION: USD(C), TAB B.

Prepared By: Dave Capitano/POLICY (b)(6)

INFO MEMO

April 29, 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Boeing C-17 Sustainment Contract

- USD(C) noted in the April 8 weekly report that the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) conducted an audit of Boeing's \$5.9 billion proposal for the C-17 total systems support contract, yielding savings of \$150 million. You asked "What in the world is wrong with this company? What's wrong with **our** process that it took an audit to figure it out?" (**TABA**). These audit findings do not indicate that anything is wrong with the company or our process. DCAA audited Boeing's C-17 proposal to support the contracting officer negotiations with Boeing, which is a normal part of **our** process for awarding contracts.
- When submitting proposals for sole source contracts, companies are required to estimate the costs to perform the contract and submit supporting data. DCAA audits these proposals and provides information to the contracting officer as to the reasonableness of the proposed costs, the reliability of the data, and validity of assumptions used by the contractor. This information is used to develop a Government negotiation position.
- Companies often propose **an** estimated cost that minimizes their risks and reflects what they believe is reasonable. It is **not unusual** for the auditor to recommend reductions in the proposed cost to levels the auditor believes are reasonable. Such audit reductions often occur even though the company has acceptable accounting and estimating systems (such as Boeing in this case). Due to the subjective nature of cost estimates, there are often disagreements between the Government and the contractor **as** to what the future costs will be. These disagreements are resolved during contract negotiations, at the conclusion of which, a final price is agreed upon.
- The C-17 contract negotiations illustrate this process. While DCAA recommended reductions of \$326 million to Boeing's proposed costs, the final price negotiated by the C-17 contracting officer resulted in net savings of \$150 million. The magnitude of the recommended reductions in this audit report is not unusual. The audit recommended reductions are **5.49** percent of the total proposed price. This is very close to the DCAA FY 2004 average recommended reduction of 5.13 percent for all contract proposals.

COORDINATION: USD(C), Tab B.

Prepared by: David Capitano/DPAP (POLICY) (b)(6)


11-L-0559/OSD/49335



5:26 PM

Via Facsimile

TO: Amb. Zalmay Khalizad

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT:

Congratulations on the successful work of Loya Jirga. I know your involvement made a big difference, and I thank you so much for your selfless contribution.

Please extend my warm congratulations to President Karzai on the successful role he played in moving his country forward. It is an impressive accomplishment.

Also, please give him my very best wishes for the New Year.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010504.19

Afghanistan

00245-24

5 Jan 04


OSD 09021-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49336

5:26 PM

Via Facsimile

TO: Amb. Zalmay Khalizad

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT:

Congratulations on the successful work of Loya Jirga. I know your involvement made a big difference, and I thank you so much for your selfless contribution.

Please extend my warm congratulations to President Karzai on the successful role he played in moving his country forward. It is an impressive accomplishment. Also, please give him my very best wishes for the New Year.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010504.19

OSD 00245-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49337

Afghanistan

5 Jan 04

10:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 6, 2004

SUBJECT: End of Year Summary

Colin Powell had a good paper in at the end of the year. We ought to have thought about something like that around here; a year end summary. Even if we just did something internally on our accomplishments, our initiatives. Anatta boy kind of thing. But doing it publicly was a good idea, I thought.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010604.12

Please respond by: _____

1/10
Sec Def -
 Good idea. Our accomplishments/
 initiatives / priorities, properly done,
 would be a good pamphlet. I
 have some people working on a draft
 in Public Affairs.

*D. R. L.*11-L-0559/OSD/49338
1/13

ES:

2/2
C 1/13
 Can you get
 a copy? Thanks,

Jaymie
Jan 04

TEN
 1/13

OSD 09022-04

020 DOD

*Larry Di Rita**1/13*

7:22 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 7, 2004

SUBJECT: **Press Briefings**

At the last press conference we had on Tuesday, go through it and find out how many times the questioner said the question the issue was rigged, or is accused of being political and where they put a negative cast into the question.

I want to see out of the total number of questions how many questions had that kind of a turn to them. I know Jaymie McIntyre did, and another did on BRAC, and a couple of others did. Let's catalog it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010704.01

Please respond by: _____

*1/18/04 1/11/04**000.7 SD**7 Jan 04*

OSD 09023-04

7:35 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 7, 2004
SUBJECT: **Patricia Harrison**

See what Torie Clarke thinks of Pat Harrison.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010704.06

Attach: Bio on Patricia *de* Stacy Harrison

Please respond by: _____

1/18/04 *1/19/04*

040 STATE

OSD 09024-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49340

January



Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

[Home](#) > Assistant Secretary Harrison



Patricia de Stacy Harrison Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs

Patricia (Pat) de Stacy Harrison was sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs on October 2, 2001. As an entrepreneur, author and political leader, Ms. Harrison has over 20 years experience in communication strategy, coalition, and constituency building. A nationally known spokesperson prior to and during her term as Co-Chairman of the Republican Party, she was the first Co-Chairman of Italian heritage and the first Co-Chairman not previously a member of the Republican National Committee.

As founder and President of the National Women's Economic Alliance, she worked to identify women and minorities for leadership roles in business and politics. Through The Decade for Democracy, a mentoring exchange program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Small Business Administration, Ms. Harrison worked with women entrepreneurs in emerging democracies, to help them achieve within their new free enterprise systems.

As a founding partner of E. Bruce Harrison Company, among the country's top ten owner-managed public affairs firms prior to its sale in 1996, she created and directed programs in the public interest comprising diverse stakeholder groups including the National Environmental Development Association, a partnership of labor, agriculture and industry working for better environmental solutions together.

Appointed by President Bush (1990) to the President's Export Council, U.S. Department of Commerce, she served on the Executive Committee and worked to strengthen export promotion programs on behalf of U.S. business. She also chaired the International Committee, Small Business Advisory Council, Small Business Administration and in 1992, was appointed to serve on the United States Trade Representative's Service Policy Advisory Council.

The author of *A Seat At The Table* and *America's New Women Entrepreneurs*, Ms. Harrison received an Honorary Doctorate from the American University of Rome, in 2002. In 2000, she served as a Visiting Fellow, Institute of Public Service, The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania. In 1992 she was a Visiting Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Ms. Harrison is the recipient of many awards and honors, including the 1999 Global Women's Leadership Award; 1999 New York Black Republican Council's Woman of The Year Award; 1998 Hispanic Heritage Leadership

1/6
Sec Def As Discussed
D, Lita

[Handwritten signature]
1/6

Award; 1988 Entrepreneur Of the Year/Arthur Young Company and Venture Magazine; 1989 Distinguished Woman Award, Northwood Institute; and 1997 Ladies Home Journal "50 Most Influential Women in Politics."

She is a former member of the Executive Committee, National Italian American Foundation; a former Thomas Colloquium Free Enterprise Chair Guest Lecturer at Youngstown State University, in Ohio; and a former Chairman of the Board, Guest Services, Inc.

Ms. Harrison is a graduate of American University. She is married and the mother of three children.


[Back to the top](#)

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7:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: January 7, 2004

SUBJECT: **Press Briefings**

I would like to know after each press briefing or event which networks carry me live, so we can sort of keep track of it and know what kind of reach we are getting, and what works and what doesn't.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010704.11

Please respond by: _____

~~1/20/04~~

OSD 09025-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49343

600.7 SD

1/20/04

7:52 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: January 7, 2004

SUBJECT:

Find out who this Col. Irwin is. We want to figure out why he was saying what he was saying.

Also find out who was running the Command Center on that domestic event that Cambone talked about yesterday. He sounded like he did a good job.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010704.13

Please respond by: _____

~~1/20/04~~~~1/11/04~~OB
1/30

OSD 09026-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49344

384

7 Jan 04

9:52 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Attached Article

Read this Krauthammer article. It makes the point that nations understandably have different self-interests, and that, for a half century, anti-communism muted

SD:

This is a good argument to stop calling Iraq the "Central Front" on Terrorism.

overly

more lethal as the years go on.

His point about the French foreign minister refusing a reporter's questions as to which side he wanted to win as between the U.S. and Iraq, is that it wasn't pique it was that ground zero was not Paris. The people of France have to know that Paris is ground zero, just as the rest of the world is, if we fail to deal effectively with the problems we face.

I think there is a thread in his article that's worth thinking about as rework sections of the one and four briefings.

OSD 09028-04

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010804.01

Attach: "A Farewell to Allies" C. Krauthammer, Time Magazine 1/12/04

Please respond by:

During the Cold War we had the central front as well as the Southern Flank & Northern Flank. For the most part the latter two were fakes (but we convinced ourselves the threat was real). Today, all fronts are real and the French are trying to convince themselves that there is only one front.

L-0359/OSD 149345

1/2 Dayme

Charles Krauthammer

A Farewell to Allies

Now they are neutrals. America can stand tall without them

WITHIN DAYS AFTER SADDAM'S CAPTURE, FRANCE, GERMANY and Russia announced their willingness to consider relieving Iraq's crushing debt burden. This was no burst of conscience about unrepayable billions lent Saddam to squander on grotesque palaces and grotesque weapons. This was the wind shifting America's way in Iraq—and the neutrals adjusting course accordingly.

But this is not the beginning of a great reconciliation. These countries were no help before the war, during the war or after the war. France tried to rally the world to stop the U.S. from deposing Saddam. Russia was sending night-vision goggles to Saddam. Not one lifted a finger to help the postwar reconstruction.

Some Americans are bitter about this, others merely confused. Democrats think it's our fault. They charge Bush with mishandling relations with the allies. There is an etymological problem. Events have overtaken vocabulary. These countries are not allies. It is sheer laziness now that counts France and Germany as old allies, sheer naïveté that counts Russia as a new one.

It should not surprise us. Countries have different interests. For a half-century, anticommunism papered over those differences, but communism is gone. Europe lives by Lord Palmerston's axiom: nations have no permanent allies, only permanent interests. Alliance with America is no longer a permanent interest. The postwar alliance that once structured and indeed defined our world is dead. It died in 2003.

To be sure, there are some countries that see their ultimate security as dependent upon the international order maintained by the U.S. These are not insignificant countries, and over time they may become the kernel of an entirely new alliance system. They include Anglo-Saxons (Britain, Australia) and a few Europeans (Italy, Spain, Poland, other newly liberated East European countries). They understand that the sinews of stability—free commerce, open sea lanes, regional balances of power, nonproliferation, deterrence—are provided overwhelmingly by the American colossus. They understand that without it, the world collapses into chaos and worse. They believe in the American umbrella and are committed to helping the umbrella holder.

As for the rest, they are content to leave America out there

twisting in the wind. They do not wish us destroyed—they are not crazy—but they are not unhappy to see us distracted, diminished and occasionally defeated.

When the Iraq war began, the French Foreign Minister refused a reporter's question as to which side he wanted to win. This was not a mere expression of pique. When the existential enemy was Nazism or communism, the world rallied to the American protector. But Arab-Islamic radicalism is different. Its hatreds are wide, but its strategic focus is America. Its monument is ground zero. Ground zero is not in Paris.

The neutrals know that perhaps in the long run they too will be threatened. For now, however, they are quite content to see the U.S. carry the fight against the new barbarians. The U.S. was attacked; it will carry the fight regardless.

For much of the world, the war on terrorism offers not just a free ride but a strategic bonus: American diminishment. France unabashedly declares that American dominance is intolerable and the world should by right be not unipolar but multipolar. Much of the rest of the world believes it but does not have France's nerve to say it.

The hard fact is that war on many fronts is consuming and containing American power. While America spends blood and treasure in faraway places like Baghdad, China builds the economic and military superpower of the future.

Europe knits itself into another continental colossus. And the rest of the world goes about its business. Meanwhile, the Americans take on the axis of evil one by one.

In the 1990s, containment of America took a different form. With the acquiescence of a Democratic Administration uncomfortable with American power, silk ropes were fashioned to tie down Gulliver: a myriad of treaties, protocols and prohibitions on everything from carbon emissions to land mines to nuclear testing. With the advent of the Bush Administration, contemptuous of these restraints, that would no longer work. Enter al-Qaeda.

The neutrals may wax poetic about America's sins, but they do not hate us. The problem is not emotion, but calculation. At root, it is a matter of interests. Interests diverge. No use wailing about it. The grand alliances are dead. With a few trusted friends, America must carry on alone.



ILLUSTRATION FOR TIME BY GREGORY SHANN

9:52 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

*CC: DSID
Andy Marshall*

DATE: January 7, 2004

SUBJECT: **Attached Article**

Read this Krauthammer article. It makes the point that nations understandably have different self-interests, and that, for a half century, anti-communism muted those differences. Now communism is gone.

It could be that the new cause, anti-terrorism, if we fashion it right and properly present it, can be the thing that will mute the natural self-interests of nations.

The threat we face is no less lethal. It will be increasingly more dangerous and more lethal as the years go on.

His point about the French foreign minister refusing a reporter's questions as to which side he wanted to win as between the U.S. and Iraq, is that it wasn't pique – it was that ground zero was not Paris. The people of France have to know that Paris is ground zero, just as the rest of the world is, if we fail to deal effectively with the problems we face.

I think there is a thread in his article that's worth thinking about as rework sections of the one and four briefings.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010804.01

Attach: "AFarewell to Allies" C. Krauthammer, Time Magazine, 1/12/04

*2/20
will be incorporated
in Battle of Ideas +
GWOT Briefs.*

Please respond by: _____

11-L-0559/OSD/49347

J.

Charles Krauthammer

A Farewell to Allies

Now they are neutrals. America can stand tall without them

WITHIN DAYS AFTER SADDAM'S CAPTURE, FRANCE, GERMANY and Russia announced their willingness to consider relieving Iraq's crushing debt burden. This was no burst of conscience about unrepayable billions lent Saddam to squander on grotesque palaces and grotesque weapons. This was the wind shifting America's way in Iraq—and the neutrals adjusting course accordingly.

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toppling Saddam. Russia was sending goggles to Saddam. Not one lifted a finger to help the postwar reconstruction.

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To be sure, there are some countries that see their ultimate security as dependent upon the international order maintained by the U.S. These are not insignificant countries, and over time they may become the kernel of an entirely new alliance system. They include Anglo-Saxons (Britain, Australia) and a few Europeans (Italy, Spain, Poland, other newly liberated East European countries). They understand that the sinews of stability—free commerce, open sea lanes, regional balances of power, nonproliferation, deterrence—are provided overwhelmingly by the American colossus. They understand that without it the world collapses into chaos and worse. They believe in the American umbrella and are committed to helping the nimbrella holder.

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ILLUSTRATION FOR TIME BY GREGORY GARDNER



HOW NOW, C

Big Beef was doing fine until disease felled a heifer. Will consumer anxiety cripple the industry?

By CATHY BOOTH THOMAS DALLAS

WHEN FIONA SIGALLA CROSSED back into the U.S. from Canada a few days after Christmas, she expected the usual questions about firearms—routine in these times of terrorist threats. But the border cop in his bulletproof SWAT uniform took one look inside her car and immediately seized the contraband held by Sigalla's 8-year-old daughter: her lunch leftovers. "He looked slightly embarrassed, but he confiscated my McDonald's trash," Sigalla says with a chuckle. "Of course, you notice that I wasn't afraid to purchase a McDonald's hamburger, even in Canada."

For the U.S., could this be the year of mad cow? The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) banned Canadian beef in May after mad-cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), turned up in a single calf there. Now it is America's turn. More than 30 countries have banned U.S. beef imports since BSE was detected in a slaughtered 6-year-old dairy cow in Washington State on Dec. 23. Though officials say the cow entered from Canada in 2001, the USDA last week instituted a series of measures to reassure consumers that American beef is safe, including a ban on the slaughter of cattle too sick or injured to walk, called downers, for human food. The BSE-infected cow was one such downer. The

USDA also called for immediate implementation of a national animal-tracking system so the source of any diseased cattle could be more readily identified.

As the public copes with the news, the U.S.'s \$40 billion cattle business is bracing for trouble. The industry, led by the National Cattlemen's Beef Association in Denver, had originally fought the ban on downers as costly and unnecessary. But the losses caused by the BSE discovery in Washington State are likely to make those steps seem cheap by comparison. Big overseas customers like Japan and South Korea no longer want U.S. steaks, ships at sea packed with meat bound for Asia are turning back. Containers of frozen French fries cooked in beef tallow for the export market are idling in U.S. ports.

In short, America's \$4.3 billion beef-export business is pretty much dead meat, at least for now. "We still haven't felt the

~~FOUO~~

May 11, 2005

TO: Dina Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paul Butler

Please see the attached background sheet on Paul Butler and the letter to John Snow. Paul Butler is first rate.

Regards,

Attach.

SecDef Letter to Secretary John **Snow**
Paul Butler Background Sheet

DHR:ss
051005-34

234.02

11 May 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09028-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49350



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable John W. Snow
Secretary of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Room 3330
Washington, D.C. 20472

Dear John,

Attached is a background sheet on my Special Assistant, Paul Butler. **As** you will see, he has some excellent counter-terrorism experience, both legal and policy.

He has been planning to leave government and return to the private sector after about seven years of government service. The reason I am sending it to you is that I have heard your Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Terrorist Financing post may be coming open, and it struck me that Paul might be a good candidate for that post.

I don't want to lose him, but since I am losing him anyway, I thought I would make you aware of him, for either that spot, or something else that might be appropriate.

Warm regards,

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely of the Secretary of Defense, written in black ink.

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/49351

Paul W. Butler

(b)(6)

Summary of Experience

Oct. 2002 – Present	United States Department of Defense
March 2004-Present	The Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
Oct. 2003 to Mar. 2004	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC)
April to Oct. 2003	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations Program Support (SOLIC)
Oct. – March 2002	Special Policy Advisor- Global War on Terrorism Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
May 1998-Oct. 2002	Assistant United States Attorney Southern District of New York <i>Terrorism and Organized Crime Unit</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• One of four trial prosecutors in <i>United States v. Usama Bin Laden, et al (East Africa Embassy Bombing Trial)</i>. <i>Major Crimes Unit (White Collar Fraud)</i>
1990-1998	Cahill Gordon & Reindel Litigation Associate
1990-96, 98	<i>New York Office</i>
1996-97	<i>Washington, D.C. Office</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Extensive experience in litigation of First Amendment, securities, civil and criminal antitrust matters and corporate internal investigations
1988-1990	Honorable Louis C. Bechtel, Chief Judge United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania Law Clerk

Experience

- | | |
|---|--|
| Oct. 2002 – Present
March 2004–Present | United States Department of Defense
The Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Principal civilian assistant to the Secretary of Defense• Help formulate, develop, implement and explain wide-range of policies, programs and goals of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)• High level interaction with other federal government agencies, members of Congress and private sector on behalf of OSD |
| Oct. 2003 to Mar. 2004
April to Oct. 2003 | Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Principal advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) for oversight of DoD policies and plans related to the Global War on Terrorism• General management and oversight of SOLIC functions including Combatting Terrorism (which includes DoD Task Force on Terrorist Financing), Counternarcotics, Stability Operations, Detainee Operations and Psychological Operations• Briefed the National Security Council on various counterterrorism matters• Represented OSD on working groups in the interagency and maintained active liaison with those agencies that have responsibility for national security policy as it relates to counterterrorism• Represented OSD in negotiations with foreign government officials with respect to detainee operations.• Developed policies relating to the establishment of military commissions for trials of terrorists• Chaired DoD working group on developing policies for Iraq Special Tribunal that will try Saddam Hussein and other former regime members |
| Oct. – March 2002 | Special Policy Advisor - Under Secretary of Defense for Policy <ul style="list-style-type: none">• General policy advice on the Global War on Terrorism |

May 1998-Oct. 2002 **Assistant United States Attorney
Southern District of New York
*Terrorism and Organized Crime Unit***

- One of four trial prosecutors in *United States v. Usama Bin Laden, et al (East Africa Embassy Bombing Trial)*. Delivered opening statement. Examined over 35 witnesses. Presented evidence on Kenya bombing
- Member of prosecution team that indicted Usama Bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri and 18 other al Qaeda associates in broad conspiracy to wage jihad against the United States
- Detailed to CIA for nine months to review all files on al Qaeda and Bin Laden for use as evidence at trial and for handling classified information in trial setting
- Department of Justice Distinguished Service Award 2002
- Central Intelligence Agency's Seal Medallion Award 2002

Major Crimes Unit (White Collar Fraud)

- Convictions in six week trial charging six defendants with RICO, conspiracy, mail, wire and bank fraud
- Conducted numerous fraud investigations, including complex corporate criminal frauds, money laundering and terrorist financing.
- Certificate in White Collar Crime and Advanced Criminal Trial Advocacy, DOJ National Advocacy Center

1990-1998 **Cahill Gordon & Reindel
Litigation Associate**

1990-96, 98 ***New York Office***

- Extensive experience in First Amendment, commercial litigation with concentration on antitrust and securities, criminal antitrust and corporate internal investigations
- Trial experience including second-chair to Floyd Abrams in seven week libel trial
- Represented several clients in criminal antitrust investigations
- Defended accounting firms and investment banks in securities fraud cases

1996-97 ***Washington, D.C. Office***

- Litigation and counseling in international business law, criminal and civil litigation
- Senior associate on large team representing client in marine construction industry in international criminal antitrust, securities and Foreign Corrupt Practices investigation. Traveled internationally, including to Middle East, to conduct internal investigation to satisfy Department of Justice, Antitrust Amnesty program

1988-1990 Honorable Louis C. Bechtle, Chief Judge
United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Law Clerk

- In addition to normal clerk duties, accompanied Chief Judge Bechtle as sole law clerk on inter-circuit assignment for two month criminal trial in *United States v. Robert Aguilar* (RICO indictment of sitting federal judge in N.D.Ca)

Fall 1996 Chief Judge Edward Re, United States Court of International Trade (*sitting by designation on Second Circuit Court of Appeals*), Student Law Clerk

1984-1985 Federal Reserve Bank of New York

- Assistant to the Vice President with oversight of member reserve accounts

Education

1996-1997 The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University

- M.A. (pending language exam) in American Foreign Policy and International Economics
- Graduated with Distinction, 3.8 GPA

1985-1988 St. John's University School of Law

- Law Review, Dean's List.
- St. Thomas More Institute of Legal Research Scholarship
- Best Brief, 1987 Jessup International Law Moot Court (Eastern regionals)
- AmJur Award in International Business Transactions

Summer 1996 The Hague Academy of International Law
Certificate in International Law. Courses in advanced international law, international litigation procedure, international trade law and law of United Nations

Summer 1986 Trinity College School of Law, Dublin, Ireland

- 4.0 GPA in International Law, European Community Law, Comparative Civil Liberties

1982-1984 **University at Albany, New York**
• M.A. American History. B.A. History and English
• Cum Laude. Dean's List
• Varsity Football

1979-1981 **Villanova University**
• History major.
• Division IA Varsity Football (transferred when school discontinued football program).

Publications

Butler & Gregory "A Not So Distant Mirror: Federalism and the Role of Natural Law in the United States, Republic of Ireland and European Community." 25 VANDERBILT JOURNAL TRANSNATIONAL LAW 429 (1992)

Comment "*In re Providence Journal*: Defining the Collateral Bar Rule under the First Amendment." 61 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW 311 (1988)

Public Appearances

The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, February 13, 2004. Debate with Professor David Cole regarding legal framework for detainees at Guantanamo Bay

Pentagon Press Briefing, On the Record Briefing on terrorists detained and Guantanamo Bay and legal framework. Covered live by C-SPAN.

Quoted extensively in interviews with New York Times, Washington Post and Boston Globe.

Successfully completed DoD media training course.

Admissions

United States Supreme Court and Federal and State courts in New York and Pennsylvania. District of Columbia admission pending

Member, Council on Foreign Relations
Bar Association of the City of New York
Federal Bar Council

8:04 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

CC: DSD / ANDY MARSHALL

DATE: January 8, 2004

SUBJECT: Attached

Take a look at this Friedman article. It's got some of the elements we talked about yesterday in terms of the old war of ideas.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010804.07

Attach: "War of Ideas, Part I" Friedman

Please respond by: _____

2/20
will be
incorporated in
Battle of Ideas +
GWOT Briefs
JMA

OSD 09029-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49357

000,

E Jan 04

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

War of Ideas, Part 1

Airline flights into the U.S. are canceled from France, Mexico and London. Armed guards are put onto other flights coming to America. Westerners are warned to avoid Saudi Arabia, and synagogues are bombed in Turkey and France. A package left on the steps of the Metropolitan Museum of Art forces the evacuation of 5,000 museumgoers. (It turns out to contain a stuffed snowman.) National Guardsmen are posted at key bridges and tunnels.

Happy New Year.

What you are witnessing is why Sept. 11 amounts to World War III — the third great totalitarian challenge to open societies in the last 100 years. As the longtime Middle East analyst Abdullah Schleifer once put it to me: World War II was the Nazis, using the engine of Germany to try to impose the reign of the perfect race, the Aryan race. The cold war was the Marxists, using the engine of the Soviet Union to try to impose the reign of the perfect class, the working class. And 9/11 was about religious totalitarians, Islamists, using suicide bombing to try to impose the reign of the perfect faith, political Islam.

OK, you say, but how can one possibly compare the Soviet Union, which had thousands of nukes, with Al Qaeda? Here's how: As dangerous as the Soviet Union was, it was always deterrable with a wall of containment and with nukes of our own. Because, at the end of the day, the Soviets loved life more than they hated us. Despite our differences, we agreed on certain bedrock rules of civilization.

With the Islamist militant groups, we face people who hate us more than they love life. When you have large numbers of people ready to commit suicide, and ready to do it by making themselves into human bombs, using the most normal instruments of daily life — an airplane, a car, a garage door opener, a cellphone, fertilizer, a tennis shoe — you create a weapon that is undeterrable, undetectable and inexhaustible. This poses a much more serious threat than the Soviet Red Army because these human bombs attack the most essential element of an open society: trust.

Trust is built into every aspect, every building and every interaction in our increasingly hyperconnected world. We trust that when we board a plane, the person next to us isn't going to blow up his shoes. Without trust, there's no open society because there aren't enough police to guard every opening in an open society.

Which is why suicidal Islamist militants have the potential to erode our

lifestyle. Because the only way to deter a suicidal enemy ready to use the instruments of daily life to kill us is by gradually taking away trust. We start by stripping airline passengers, then we go to fingerprinting all visitors, and we will end up removing cherished civil liberties.

So what to do? There are only

What can deter terror? Shame.

three things we can do: (1) Improve our intelligence to deter and capture terrorists before they act. (2) Learn to live with more risk, while maintaining our open society. (3) Most important, find ways to get the societies where these Islamists come from to deter them first. Only they really know their own, and only they can really restrain their extremists.

As my friend Dov Seidman, whose company, LRN, teaches ethics to global corporations, put it: The cold war ended the way it did because at some bedrock level we and the Soviets "agreed on what is shameful." And shame, more than any laws or police, is how a village, a society or a culture expresses approval and disapproval and applies restraints.

But today, alas, there is no bedrock agreement on what is shameful, what is outside the boundary of a civilized world. Unlike the Soviet Union, the Islamist terrorists are neither a state subject to conventional deterrence or international rules, nor individuals deterred by the fear of death. And their home societies, in too many cases, have not stigmatized their acts as "shameful." In too many cases, their spiritual leaders have provided them with religious cover, and their local charities have provided them with money. That is why suicide bombing is spreading.

We cannot change other societies and cultures on our own. But we also can't just do nothing in the face of this mounting threat. What we can do is partner with the forces of moderation within these societies to help them fight the war of ideas. Because ultimately this is a struggle within the Arab-Muslim world, and we have to help our allies there, just as we did in World Wars I and II.

This column is the first in a five-part series on how we can do that. □

NYT 0559/OSD/49358

FOUO

May 11, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
CC: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: El Salvadoran Troops in Iraq

During my breakfast meeting with all of the Central American Presidents, I had a chance to talk with President Saca of El Salvador. We are encouraging him to continue to send troops to Iraq, and I think we are close to obtaining his agreement. When the President meets with President Saca tomorrow, it would be helpful for him to further encourage their participation.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
051105-14

El Salvador

11 May 05

FOUO

OSD 09029-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49359



7:57 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 8, 2004

SUBJECT: **Force Rotation**

We need to take a look at force rotation over a couple of years in Iraq and worldwide and see what it adds up to.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010804.06

Please respond by: _____

1/15/04 1/15/04

OSD 09030-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49360

320.2

8 Jan 04



11:00 AM

TO: Secretary Brownlee
Gen. Schoomaker

CC: David Chu
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 8, 2004

SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached is a memo from David Chu describing the Marine Corps approach to enhancing foreign language training prior to deploying to Iraq.

I think it is a good thing. Would it make sense for the **Army** to implement a similar program?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010804.08

Attach: Chu Memo re: Marine Corp. Foreign Language Support for OIF II

| |

OSD 09031-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49361

091.4

8 Jan 04

3:42 PM

TO: LTG John Craddock
Powell Moore

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 8, 2004

SUBJECT: **Senator John Warner**

I think I probably ought to see John Warner every three or four weeks. I ought to try to alternate to go up there once in a while.

032

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010804.11

Please respond by: _____

cc: Cathy
Durnan
1/12

Powell: This is part
of the overall outreach
program.

1/12
Jaymie
8 Jan 04

7:45 AM

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 9, 2004

SUBJECT: **SLRG**

The SLRG went well. I do need visibility into what is going on with the data on recruiting, retention, spouses' attitudes, etc. I don't feel like I am getting sufficient periodic reports - every month or six weeks. Please see that I do.

334

Second, when I do my congressional testimony, we need some good charts that show how we are doing in recruiting and retention.

We will also need good charts showing what kinds of numbers of percentages of reserves have been called up and the guard to show what a small fraction it actually is.

In addition, we are going to want to be able to show that half to one million dollars that people get after retirement in some way.

Thanks.

DIIR/azn
010904.01

Please respond by: _____

1/14/04 1/16/04

OSD 09033-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49363

9 Jan 04

7:09 AM

TO: Jim Haynes

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 9, 2004

SUBJECT: **Detainees**

We are going to have to come up with a good rationale and body of support for our position that we could keep detainees during the global war on terrorism. Please come up with a plan, show me and then we will see how we go forward.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010904.08

Please respond by: _____

*1/15/04**OB*
3/15

OSD 09034-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49364

*383.6**Gandy*

7:21 AM

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 9, 2004

SUBJECT: **Talking Points**

Done

Talking point papers should have the name of the person I am meeting with, the country, how he should be addressed, the time the meeting is supposed to start and the time the meeting is supposed to end.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010904.09

Acc. 7/15/04

Please respond by: _____

cc: Rachel B.
done - Tim
sc

copy pls
TRK
1/9

OSD 09035-04

Jan 09

11-L-0559/OSD/49365