

7:16 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 12, 2004

SUBJECT: **Press Briefings**

Rather than send me a card like this, let's keep a running log of who carries the press briefings and each time let me look at it so we can figure it out.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
011204.02

Attach: Card accompanying SD Video on Press Briefings

Please respond by:

2/20

Col Rumsfeld
2/20
George -
- J. Rums.
D. Rums.
Larry Di Rita
4/23

Col
Can you run
with this for
Larry?

12 Feb 04

*Thanks
Jaymie*

OSD 09037-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49366

DoD Press Briefing
10 February 2004

Pentagon Channel	1339 - 1424
C-SPAN 1	1339 - 1359
CNN	1339 - 1422
Fox News Channel	1340 - 1422
MSNBC	1342 - 1349 - 1402 - 1414

3:35 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: February 12, 2004
SUBJECT: **E-Mails**

When are you going to get back to me on those McCain e-mails with some proposals as to what you think I ought to do about them all?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
011204.09

Please respond by: _____

2/19

OSD 09038-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49368


032

12 Feb 04



January 12, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: POTUS Remarks

I want you to see the film of the President delivering his remarks at Constitution Hall. It was elevating. I think you ought to think about feeding some of that type of thing into the remarks we make, particularly at town halls.

060

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011204-26

.....
Please respond by 1/16/04

OSD 09039-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49369

10 Jan 04

January 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Meeting Dates

I notice on my calendar that there is no indication of the dates for the 9/11 Commission. Both dates should be put on my calendar—the informal and the formal, even if it is still a guess and is not firmed up.

Thanks.

DfR dh
011204-31Please respond by 1/16/04LTG CRADDOCK
CC: CATHY

(b)(6)

*done-1/13**OB
1/30*

OSD 09040-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49370

*020 SD**12 Jan 04*

~~FOUO~~

April 6, 2005

CONFIDENTIAL I-05/004861
ES-2923

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: John Walters

Mr. Walters, the Drug Czar, told me he and his folks are ready to help us in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
040605-16

.....
Please respond by

4/21/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49371

OSD 09042-05

01-04-05 11:13:11

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

25 APR 2005

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____
I-05/00486 I-ES
ES-2923

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DJF 8/10/05*

SUBJECT: John Walters

- I received your note that Mr. Walters and his office are ready to help us in Afghanistan and Iraq (Tab A).
- I spoke with Mr. Walters on April 15, 2005 regarding our legislative proposal to allow the use of counternarcotics (CN) resources against terrorists.
- We are meeting with Mr. Walters sometime later this month to discuss his April 18-21, 2005 trip to Afghanistan.
- Ms. Mary Beth Long, DASD-CN, will work with the ONDCP staff to coordinate their help with our CN efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: LCDR Robert Munk, USN, ODASD(CN), (b)(6)

This may contain information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

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11-L-0559/OSD/49372

OSD 09042-05

2005-04-18 10:12

2/16
1700

FOUO

May 9, 2005

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*

SUBJECT: Draft Letters

335
50

Please have someone draft letters from me to Rockie, Keni Thomas and Craig Morgan, thanking them for coming to the Pentagon. Also, be sure to include my thanks to Rockie and Keni Thomas for the autographed photos and the tapes.

Thanks.

Attach.

Autographed Photos from Rockie and Keni Thomas

DHR:ss
050905-15

.....
Please respond by 5/19/05

FOUO

OSD 09050-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49373

9 May 05



May. 10, 2005

War on Terror

Transformation

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Updated: 6 May 2005

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


AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE

NEWS ARTICLES**Pentagon Concert Kicks Off First 'America Supports You Salute'**

By Steven Donald Smith
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 5, 2005 – All five sides of the Pentagon reverberated with the patriotic sounds of country music as more than a thousand servicemembers and DoD civilians packed around the building's courtyard stage to hear a tribute concert to the troops today.



Country musicians Craig Morgan, Keni Thomas and Rockie performed for the crowd.

All three singers have served in the Army. Morgan was an Army Ranger who saw combat while serving in Panama in 1989. Thomas is also a former Ranger and combat veteran, who served in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993. Rockie enlisted in the Army fresh out of high school and served with the 50th Signal Battalion at Fort Bragg, N.C.

The concert was part of the first America Supports You Salute to the Men and Women of the Armed Forces. America Supports You is a Defense

Department program designed to highlight how Americans across the country are supporting the troops.

The concert was broadcast live worldwide on the Pentagon Channel.

Rockie kicked-off the show with a three-song set that concluded with his patriotic tune "Red, White and Blue." The song speaks to the fact that the U.S. military is comprised of individuals from all walks of life, yet when it comes to protecting the nation, they form a selfless and cohesive unit.

Rockie's military experience was a turning point in his life, helping fund his musical

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training and giving him a deep appreciation for the sacrifices servicemembers make everyday, he said.

"The America Supports You program, in my opinion, is the single most important statement we've ever made during a conflict in our nation's history," Rockie said.

Following Rockie's performance, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld took the stage and thanked the musicians and crowd for coming.

He reassured the audience he wasn't going to sing. "But if I could sing like Rockie," he said, "you'd be darn sure I would."

Rumsfeld also thanked several special guests, wounded servicemembers from Walter Reed Army Medical Center, for their service.

The secretary turned the stage over to Keni Thomas, whose performance included the song "Not Me," an ode to the men and women of the armed forces who voluntarily serve when they could have opted out by saying "Not Me."

"Most of us go through life wondering if we made a difference, but folks in the American military don't have to worry about that problem because they make a huge difference everyday," Thomas said.

The next break between singers included the announcement that Lowe's, the home-improvement chain, had joined the America Supports You program.

Bob Gfeller, Lowe's senior vice president of marketing and advertising, introduced Jimmie Johnson, the driver of the No. 48 Lowe's Chevrolet car and current points leader of the NASCAR Nextel Cup Series. Johnson appeared via satellite from Darlington, S.C.

Johnson thanked the troops for their service and sacrifice and invited the secretary to unveil the two cloth-draped Lowe's-sponsored NASCAR vehicles parked at the front of the Pentagon courtyard concert stage.

After whipping off the covering to the sounds of piped-in roaring exhausts, Rumsfeld quipped, "Do we get to drive these things?"

Johnson then presented Rumsfeld with a NASCAR decklid (trunk) adorned with the America Supports You logo. During all of May, National Military Appreciation Month, the decklid of Johnson's No. 48 car will sport the America Supports You logo in honor of the troops.

Gfeller also announced that Lowe's will be offering free home-repair clinics at military bases around the country. The co-authors of the home improvement and repair book "Dare to Repair," Julie Sussman and Stephanie Glakas-Tenet, will accompany the tour. The authors were on hand to pass out free, signed copies of the book.

"The book is fantastic in teaching people how to maintain their home," Gfeller said.

Headline performer Craig Morgan closed out the concert. His performance included his No. 1 hit, "That's What I Love About Sundays."

Morgan said he is firmly behind the America Supports You program because it is truly about the troops.

While he was in the Army, Morgan was grateful for the support of the American people, and that he appreciates the sacrifices servicemembers make to keep America safe, he said.

"I believe with all my heart if it were not for the men and women of our armed forces, fighting terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan right now, we'd be fighting it at home," Morgan said.

Related Site:

[America Supports You](#)



Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld unveils a NASCAR car bearing the "America Supports You" decal on the deck-lid during the first America Supports You Salute to Our Military Men and Women concert May 5. Lowe's joined the America Supports You team. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Cherie A. Thurlby, USAF

[Download screen-resolution](#)



Pentagon-assigned employees and their guests enjoy the first America Supports You Salute to Our Military Men and Women concert May 5 in the building's center courtyard. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Cherie A. Thurlby, USAF

[Download screen-resolution](#)



Singer Keni Thomas performs at the Pentagon during the first America Supports You Salute to our Military Men and Women concert May 5. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Cherie A. Thurlby, USAF

[Download screen-resolution](#)



Former soldier and current country music singer Rockie performs his song, "Red White and Blue" at the Pentagon during the first America Supports You Salute to Our Military Men and Women concert May 5. Photo by Helene C. Stikkel

[Download screen-resolution](#)



Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, right, unveils the deck plate during the first America Supports You Salute to Our Military Men and Women concert May 5 at the Pentagon. The plates will be used on Lowe's NASCAR cars 48 and 5, driven by Jimmie Johnson, the current leader in points in NASCAR. Photo by Helene C. Stikkel

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 11 2005

335 SO

Mr. Keni Thomas
Moraine Music Group
437 East Iris Drive
Nashville, TN 37204

Dear Keni,

Thank you so much for supporting the troops through the *America Supports You* program. Your appearance here at the Pentagon for the first "Salute to the Men and Women of the Armed Forces" was a great morale builder for our fine men and women in uniform. I am delighted to have the album and signed photo you presented me at the event.

11 MAY 05

I also want to thank you for your service to our country. Your commitment demonstrates the true meaning of the American Spirit, and we at the Department of Defense are grateful for your contributions.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

9 MAY 05

OSD 09050-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49378



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 11 2005

Mr. Rockie Rash

(b)(6)

Dear Rockie,

Thank you so much for your consistent support of our troops. Your appearance here at the Pentagon as part of the first *America Supports You* "Salute to the Men and Women of the Armed Forces" program provided our service members with a great morale boost. I am grateful for your role in making the event a success, and am delighted to have the recording and autographed photo that you presented me.

I want you to know how much we appreciate your service to our nation in the U.S. Army. You have served our country in a number of ways, and all of us at the Department of Defense thank you.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 09050-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49379



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 11 2005

Mr. Craig Morgan
Curiosita Entertainment
Post Office Box 128052
Nashville, TN 37212

Dear Craig,

It was good to see you again, and I thank you for coming to the Pentagon as part of the *America Supports You* program. The first "Salute to the Women and Men of the Armed Forces" event was a real success, and I want to thank you for your efforts on behalf of our fine men and women in uniform. By using your gifts in such a positive way, you offer them comfort and entertainment.

I also want to thank you for your service to our nation through the U.S. Army. All of us at the Department of Defense deeply appreciate your contributions.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld", written over a large, stylized "D" that serves as a background for the signature.

OSD 09050-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49380

I think it
was America Spirit
not Spirit of America

Thank you so much for supporting the troops through the *Spirit of America* program. Your appearance here at the Pentagon for the first "Salute to the Men and Women of the Armed Forces" was a great morale builder for our fine men and women in uniform. I am delighted to have the album and signed photo you presented me at the event.

I also want to thank you for your service to our country. Your commitment demonstrates the true meaning of the American Spirit, and we at the Department of Defense are grateful for your contributions.

Why did
1st Lt. letter
SAI Spirit
Answer 2
It was a
mistake.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Rockie Rash

(b)(6)

Dear Rockie,

Thank you so much for your consistent support of our troops. Your appearance here at the Pentagon as part of the first *America Supports You* "Salute to the Men and Women of the Armed Forces" program provided our service members with a great morale boost. I am grateful for your role in making the event a success, and am delighted to have the ~~album~~ ^{we} and autographed photo that you presented me. ~~album~~ ^{recording}.

I want you to know how much ^{we} appreciate your service to our nation in the U.S. Army. You have served our country in a number of ways, and all of us at the Department of Defense thank you.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Craig Morgan
Curiosita Entertainment
Post Office Box 128052
Nashville, TN 37212

Dear Craig,

good to see you again and I thank you for coming to
It was a pleasure having you here at the Pentagon as part of the *America Supports You* program. The first "Salute to the Women and Men of the Armed Forces" event was a real success, and I want to thank you for your efforts on behalf of our fine men and women in uniform. By using your gifts in such a positive way, you offer them comfort and entertainment.

I also want to thank you for your service to our nation through the U.S. Army. All of us at the Department of Defense deeply appreciate your contributions.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/49383

FOUO



January 14, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Copy of 9/11 Commission Testimony

060.5

Please give me a copy of my testimony before the 9/11 Commission, so I can take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:gs
011305-5

.....
Please respond by _____

DR 1/18/05

Sir,

I gather you would like your testimony as delivered, but I attached a copy of your testimony "as prepared" as well, for your reference.

Thank you.

Vlr,

Suzanne

14 Jan 05

FOUO

OSD 09079-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49384

PANEL IV OF THE EIGHTH PUBLIC HEARING OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES RE: FORMULATION AND CONDUCT OF U.S.
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY CHAIRED BY: THOMAS KEAN, FORMER GOVERNOR (R-NJ) WITNESS:
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD; ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
PAUL WOLFOWITZ; AND GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. TIME: 3:31 P.M. EST
DATE: TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2004

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4020.

MR. KEAN: We will now hear from the secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld. Secretary Rumsfeld has had wide experience in several senior
positions throughout the government. We are pleased to welcome him before us
this afternoon. He's accompanied by his distinguished deputy secretary of
Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Richard Myers. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Deputy Secretary, General Myers, we would ask
you if you could raise your right hand and -- so that we may place you under
oath.

Do you swear or affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I do.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I do.

GEN. MYERS: I do.

MR. KEAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, your written remarks will be entered into the record in
full, and we would ask you to summarize any remarks in the opening statement.
You may proceed. Thank you.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Vice Chairman,
members of the commission. Thank you for undertaking this important work.

I would just mention that General Myers and Paul Wolfowitz have been
intimately involved in the work of the department prior to September 11th, on
September 11th, and subsequent to September 11th.

First, let me express my condolences to the people of Spain. The March
11th bombings will leave that nation changed. Certainly the families that lost
loved ones on September 11th -- some of whom I am sure are listening today --
must feel a bond with the families in other countries who have lost their
fathers and mothers and brothers and sisters and sons and daughters to
terrorism. They understand the pain and the heartbreak and the suffering of the

11-L-0559/OSD/49385

AS
DELIVERED

families whose loved ones perished. The recent attacks are deadly reminders that the world's free nations are at war.

I also want to thank the courageous men and women in uniform all across the globe who risk their lives so that all of us can live in freedom.

This commission has an important opportunity

Those in positions of responsibility in government are, of necessity, focused on dozens of issues. This commission, however, can focus on one important topic: get it right and provide insights that can be of great value to us. You've been asked to try to connect the dots after the fact, to examine events leading up to September 11th, and to consider what lessons, if any, might be taken from that experience to prevent future dangers.

It isn't an easy assignment, yet the challenge facing our country before September 11th and still today is even more difficult. Our task is to connect the dots not after the fact, but before the fact; to try to stop attacks before they happen, and that must be done without the benefit of hindsight, hearings, briefings, or testimony.

Another attack against our people will be attempted. We can't know where or when or by what technique. That reality drives those of us in government to ask the tough questions. When and how might that attack be attempted, and what will we wish we had done, today and everyday before the attack, to prepare for and to, if possible, prevent it?

On September 11th, our world changed. It may be tempting to think that once the crisis has passed that things will go back to the way they were. Not so. The world of September 10th is past. We have entered a new security environment, arguably the most dangerous the world has known. And if we are to continue to live as free people, we cannot go back to thinking as the way the world thought on September 10th. For if we do, if we deal with the problems of the 21st century through a 20th century prism, we will most certainly come to wrong conclusions and fail the American people.

I saw the destruction terrorists wreaked on September 11th. At the impact site, moments after the American Airlines Flight 77 hit the Pentagon, one could see the flames, smell the burning fuel, see the twisted steel and the agony of victims. And once the crisis passed, I asked the question posed to this commission: what, if anything, could have been done to prevent it?

First, I must say, I know of no intelligence during the six-plus months leading up to September 11th that indicated terrorists would hijack commercial airliners, use them as missiles to fly into the Pentagon or the World Trade Center towers.

The President set about forming what is today a 90-nation coalition to wage the global war on terrorist networks. He promptly sent U.S. and coalition forces -- air, sea and ground -- to attack Afghanistan, to overthrow the Taliban regime, and destroy that al Qaeda stronghold.

In short order the Taliban regime was driven from power, al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan was removed, nearly two-thirds of their known leaders have been captured or killed. A transitional government is in power, and a clear message was sent: terrorists who harbor terrorists will pay a price.

Those were bold steps. And today, in light of September 11th, no one questions those actions. Today I suspect most would support a preemptive action to deal with such a threat. Interestingly, the remarkable military successes in Afghanistan is (sic) taken largely for granted, as is the achievement of bringing together a 90-nation coalition.

But imagine that we were back before September 11th, and that a U.S. president had looked at the information then available, gone before the Congress and the world and said "We need to invade Afghanistan, overthrow the Taliban, and destroy the al Qaeda terrorist network," based on what little was known before September 11th. How many countries would have joined? Many? Any? Not likely. We would have heard objections to preemption similar to those voiced before the coalition-launched Operation Iraqi Freedom. We would have been asked, how can you attack Afghanistan when it was al Qaeda that attacked us, not the Taliban? How can you go to war when countries in the region don't support you? Won't launching such an invasion actually provoke terrorist attacks against the United States?

I agree with those who have testified here today -- Mrs. Albright, Secretary Cohen and others -- that unfortunately, history shows that it can take a tragedy like September 11th to waken the world to new threats and to the need for action. We can't go back in time to stop the attack. But we all owe it to the families and the loved ones who died on September 11th to assure that their loss will, in fact, be the call that helps to ensure that thousands of other families do not suffer the pain they have endured.

President came to office with a determination to prepare for the new threats of the 21st century. The bombing of the Cole on October 12th, 2000 was seen both as evidence of the al Qaeda threat and the need to adjust U.S. policy. The more one studies terrorism, the more one becomes convinced that the approach to fighting it that had evolved over several decades really wasn't working. Treating terrorism as a matter of security, combatting it through national and international law enforcement techniques, and taking defensive measures against terrorist attack simply weren't enough. After the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, the first World Trade Center attack, the embassy bombings in East Africa, and the attack on the Cole, reasonable people have concluded that the value of that approach had diminished.

A more comprehensive approach required a review not only of U.S. counterterrorism policy, but also U.S. policies with regard to other countries, some of which have not previously been at the center of U.S. relations, as Secretary Powell testified this morning.

Dr. Rice has stated that she asked the National Security Council staff in her first week in office for a new presidential initiative on al Qaeda. In early March, the staff was directed to craft a more aggressive strategy aimed at eliminating the al Qaeda threat. The first draft of that approach, in the form of a presidential directive, was circulated by the NSC staff in June of 2001, and a number of meetings were held that summer at the deputy secretary level to address the policy questions involved, such as relating an aggressive strategy against Taliban to U.S.-Pakistan relations.

By the first week of September, the process had arrived at a strategy that was presented to principals and later became NSPD-9, the president's first major substantive national security decision directive. It was presented for a decision by principals on September 4th, 2001, seven days before the 11th, and

later signed by the president, with minor changes and a preamble to reflect the events of September 11th, in October.

While this review of counterterrorism policy was under way, the Department of Defense was developing a review of U.S. defense strategy. On February 2nd, less than two weeks after taking office, I traveled to Germany for the Conference on Security Policy. Already we were focused on the problem of unconventional or "asymmetric" threats.

On the flight, I was asked about the principles that would drive our defense review. I answered that the 1991 Persian Gulf War had taught the world that taking on Western armies, navies and air forces directly was not a good idea. It was therefore likely that potential adversaries would look for so-called asymmetrical responses, everything from terrorism to cyber attacks, to information warfare, cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles, to longer-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

I won't repeat the long list of actions that Secretary Powell presented this morning in his excellent presentation.

During the last decade, the challenges facing the intelligence community have grown more complex. Director Tenet will testify tomorrow and will provide a description of the challenges facing the intelligence community. We were concerned about the risk of surprise. In June of 2001, I attended the first NATO defense ministers' meeting in the 21st century. I told my colleagues about Vice President Cheney's appearance before the Senate for his confirmation hearings as secretary of Defense in March of 1989. During his hearings, a wide range of security issues were discussed, but not one person uttered the word "Iraq." And yet within a year, Iraq had invaded Kuwait and that word was in every headline. I wondered what word might come to dominate my term in office that wasn't raised by members of the Senate Committee during my hearings.

Three months later, we learned the answer: Afghanistan and al Qaeda.

These were the kinds of threats that we were preparing to meet and deal with in the months before September 11th.

And during those early months, we made progress in the effort to transform for the era of surprise and unconventional threats.

Our actions included a congressionally required Quadrennial Defense Review, completed just days before the 9/11 attacks, where we laid out the transformation objectives of the department, identified as our first priority against a broad range of asymmetric threats; in short, homeland defense.

We developed a concept for new defense planning guidance and new contingency planning guidance. We found that many if not most of the war plans that existed were in need of updating, and that the process for developing contingency plans was too lengthy. In May of 2001 we began the process of streamlining the way the department prepares war plans, reducing the time to develop plans and increasing the frequency at which the assumptions would be updated.

I should add that, for much of that period, most of the senior officials selected by the president had not been cleared or confirmed by the Senate. Nonetheless, the few new civilians and the many civilian officials who

stayed on to help and the military leaders did a great deal of work. Indeed, because we were doing these things in the department as well as in the National Security Council Policy Review, we were better prepared to respond when the 9/11 attack came.

The day of September 11th. On the morning I was hosting a meeting for some of members of Congress, and I remember stressing how important it was for our country to be prepared for the unexpected. Shortly thereafter someone handed me a note saying a plane had hit one of the World Trade Center towers. Shortly thereafter I was in my office with a CIA briefer when I was told a second plane had hit the other tower.

Shortly thereafter, at 9:38, the Pentagon shook with an explosion of a then-unknown origin. I went outside to determine what had happened. I was not there long because I was back in the Pentagon with a crisis action team shortly before or after 10:00 a.m. On my return from the crash site and before going to the Executive Support Center, I had one or more calls in my office, one of which was with the president.

I went to the National Military Command Center where General Myers, who was the vice chairman of the Chiefs at that time, had just returned from Capitol Hill. We discussed and I recommended raising the Defense Condition level from five to three and the Force Protection level.

I joined the air threat telephone conference call that was already in progress, and one of the first exchanges was with the vice president. He informed me of the president's authorization to shoot down hostile aircraft coming to Washington, D.C.

My thoughts went to the pilots of the military aircraft who might be called upon to execute such an order. It was clear that they needed rules of engagement telling them what they could and could not do.

They needed clarity. There were standing rules of engagement, but not rules of engagement that were appropriate for this first-time situation where civilian aircraft were seized and being used as missiles to attack inside the United States. It may well be the first time in history that U.S. armed forces in peacetime have been given the authority to fire on fellow Americans going about their lawful business.

We went to work to refine the standing rules of engagement. I spent the remainder of the morning and the afternoon participating in the air threat conference, talking to the president and the vice president, General Myers and others, and thinking about the way forward. During the course of the day, the president indicated he expected us to provide him with robust options for military responses to that attack.

In my first weeks in office I had prepared a list of guidelines to be weighed before committing U.S. forces to combat, and I shared them with the president, back in January or February of 2001. The guidelines included a number of points, including one that -- if the proposed action (is) truly necessary, if lives are going to be put at risk, it must be a darn good reason, and that all instruments of national power should be engaged before, during and after any use of military force, and that it's important not to dumb down what's needed by promising not to do things: for example, by saying we won't use ground forces. A few days after September 11th I wrote down some thoughts on terrorism and the new kind of war that had been visited upon us. I noted that

it will take a sustained effort to root the terrorists out, that the campaign is a marathon, not a sprint, that no terrorist or terrorist network such as al Qaeda is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers. The coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed; rather, they'll change and evolve, and it should not be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities in which the U.S. is engaged while other countries may not. And we can live with that.

And this is not a war against Islam. The al Qaeda terrorists are extremists who views are antithetical to those of most Muslims. There are millions of Muslims around the world who we expect to become allies in this struggle, unquote.

In the following day we prepared options to deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The president issued an ultimatum to the Taliban. When they failed to comply, he initiated the global war on terror and directed the Department of Defense to carry out Operation Enduring Freedom against the al Qaeda and their affiliates and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that harbored and supported them. This, of course, was a Department of Defense where the armed forces of the United States had historically been organized, trained and equipped to fight armies, navies and air forces, not to chase down individual terrorists.

In the aftermath of September 11th, the department has pursued two tracks. We have prosecuted the global war on terror in concert with other agencies of the government and our coalition partners, but in addition, we have continued, we have had to continue, and, indeed, accelerate the work to transform the department so that it has the ability to meet and defeat the threats of the 21st century -- different threats.

There's been success on both fronts. The coalition has been successful in overthrowing two terrorist regimes, hunted down hundreds of terrorists and regime remnants, disrupted terrorist financing, disrupted terrorist cells on several continents.

We've also established Northern Command, a new command dedicated to defending the homeland. We've expanded the Special Operations Command in significant ways and given them additional authorities, authorities they need today and will certainly need in the future.

We've established a new assistant secretary for Homeland Defense for the first time, and an undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.

The coalitions's actions have sent a message to the world's terrorist states that harboring terrorists and the pursuit of weapons of mass murder carry with it unpleasant costs. By contrast, countries like Libya, that abandoned the support of terrorism and the pursuit of those weapons, can find an open path to better relations with the world's free nations.

In the period since September 11th, the administration, several committees of Congress and now this commission, have been examining what happened on that day. A number of questions have been raised.

Some have asked: When the administration came into office was there consideration of how to deal with the USS Cole?

It's a fair question. One concern was that launching another cruise missile strike months after the fact might have sent a signal of weakness. Instead, we implemented the recommendations of the Cole Commission and began developing a more comprehensive approach to deal with al Qaeda, resulting in NSPD-9.

Some have asked: Why wasn't bin Laden taken out, and if he had been hit, could it have prevented September 11th?

I know of no actionable intelligence since January 20 that would have allowed the U.S. to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. It took ten months to capture Saddam Hussein in Iraq -- and coalition forces had passed by the hole he was hiding in many times during those months. They were able to find him only after someone with specific knowledge told us precisely where he was. What that suggests, it seems to me, is that it is exceedingly difficult to find a single individual who is determined to not be found. Second, even if bin Laden had been captured or killed in the weeks before September 11th, no one I know believes it would necessarily have prevented September 11th. Killing bin Laden would not have removed the al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. Moreover, the sleeper cells that flew the aircraft into the World Trade towers and the Pentagon were already in the United States months before the attacks. Indeed, if actionable intelligence had appeared, which it did!

not, 9/11 would likely still have happened. And, ironically, much of the world would likely have called the September 11th attack an al Qaeda retaliation for the U.S. provocation of capturing or killing bin Laden.

Some have asked whether there were plans to go after al Qaeda in Afghanistan before 9/11 and, if so, why weren't they successfully implemented?

I have recently reviewed a briefing that I am told was presented to me in early February. The briefing I saw was not something that I would characterize as a comprehensive plan with al Qaeda, to deal with al Qaeda and the sanctuary in Afghanistan. It was a series of concepts or approaches. I am told that I asked the briefer many questions and that the team went back to work on refining it, and that the work they did in the ensuing months helped to prepare the department for the successful invasion of Afghanistan soon after September 11th. The NSC was at work during the spring and summer of 2001 developing the new counterterrorism policy needed to inform new war plans. And we were at the same time in the process of overhauling U.S. contingency plans.

Some have asked: Could the development of the armed Predator been accelerated?

First, let me say that any suggestion that the Predator was delayed by policy discussions or debates would be inaccurate.

I know George Tenet plans to talk about this tomorrow, but I'm told that when the development plans were presented, it was estimated that it would take several years. They were presented, I believe, to General John Jumper in one of his previous posts. In fact, it was done in less than a year, and the armed Predator was deployed and played a role in the success of Operation Enduring Freedom even before it had been officially certified as ready for deployment.

I've been asked to make a few comments about the future. Today we face adversaries who take advantage of our open borders and our open societies to attack people. They hide in plain sight. They use institutions of everyday life -- planes, trains, cars, letters, e-mails -- as weapons to kill innocent

civilians. And they can attack with handfuls of people at a cost of a few hundred thousands of dollars, while it requires many tens of thousands of people and billions of dollars to defend against such attacks.

Rooting out and dealing with terrorist enemies is tough. It will require that we think very differently than we did in the last century. The recommendations that this commission may make could help. For example, you might consider some of the following thoughts:

How can we strengthen the intelligence community and get better arranged for the 21st century challenges?

I've heard arguments in the wake of 9/11 that we need to consolidate all the intelligence agencies and put them under a single "intelligence czar." In my view, that would be doing the country a great disservice. There are some activities, like intelligence, and research and development, where it's a serious mistake to think that you're advantaged by relying on a single, centralized source. In fact, fostering multiple centers of information has proven to be better at promoting creativity and challenging conventional thinking. There may be ways we can strengthen intelligence, but centralization is most certainly not one of them.

A possibility might be to consider reducing stovepipes. It's true that the more people who know something, the more likely that information will be compromised. We know that. It's a dilemma. There's a tension there. We need to weigh that risk of expanding access, and thereby risking compromise, against the danger of keeping information so tightly stovepiped that people who need to integrate it with other information are kept in the dark. I should add that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between information that contributes to so-called national intelligence as opposed to information that is necessary for military intelligence and focuses on the battlefield. I would say that just as it would be unwise to concentrate everything under a single intelligence czar in an effort to improve national intelligence, it would be equally undesirable to concentrate everything under the Department of Defense so that one could improve military intelligence. It seems to me that either would be an unfortunate approach.

How can we wage war not just on terrorist networks, but also on the ideology of hate that they spread?

The global war on terror will, in fact, be long. And I'm convinced that victory in the war on terror will require a positive effort as well as an aggressive battle.

We need to find creative ways to stop the next generation of terrorists from being recruited, trained and deployed to kill innocent people. For every terrorist that coalition forces capture or kill, still others are being recruited and trained. And to win the war on terror, we have to win the war of ideas, the battle for the minds of those who are being recruited and financed by terrorist networks across the globe.

Can we transform the nomination and confirmation process so there are not long gaps with key positions unfilled every time there's a new administration? As I've indicated, for most of the seven months leading up to September 11th, the department's work was done without many of the senior officials responsible for critical issues. We ought to consider whether in the 21st century we can afford the luxury of taking so long to put in place the

senior officials for national security, and try to fashion the necessary reforms to the clearance, nomination and confirmation process.

Another thought: Could our nomination benefit from a Goldwater-Nichols-like law for the executive branch of the U.S. government? If you think about it, the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s helped move Department of Defense towards a more effective joint approach to warfighting. It was a good thing. But to do so, each of the services had to give up some of their turf, some of their authority. And today one could argue that the interagency process is such that the executive branch is stovepiped much like the four services were 20 years ago, and ask the question, could we usefully apply that concept of the Goldwater-Nichols law to the government as a whole?

Let me conclude by saying that despite the work of the coalition, terrorist attacks continue, most recently in Madrid. It's almost certain that in the period ahead, somewhere more terrorist attacks will be attempted. What can be done?

Not long ago we marked the 20th anniversary of a terrorist attack in Beirut, Lebanon, when the suicide bomb truck attacked the Marine barracks, and that blast killed more than 240 Americans. Soon after that attack, President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz asked me to serve as the Middle East envoy for a period. That experience taught me lessons about the nature of terrorism that are relevant today as we prosecute the global war on terror.

After the attack, one seemingly logical response was to put a cement barricade around the buildings to prevent more truck bombings, a very logical thing to do; and it had the effect of preventing more truck bombings.

But the terrorists very quickly figured out how to get around those barricades, and they began lobbing rocket-propelled grenades over the cement barricades. And the reaction then was to hunker down even more, and they started seeing buildings along the Corniche that runs along the sea in Beirut draped with metal wire mesh coming down from several stories high, so that when rocket-propelled grenades hit the mesh, they would bounce off, doing little damage. It worked, again, but only briefly.

And the terrorists again adapted. They watched the comings and goings of embassy personnel and began hitting soft targets. They killed people on their way to and from work.

So for every defense -- first barricades, then wire mesh -- the terrorists moved to another avenue of attack.

One has to note that the terrorists had learned important lessons: that terrorism is a great equalizer. It's a force multiplier. It's cheap. It's deniable. It yields substantial results. It's low-risk, and it's often without penalty. They had learned that a "single attack, by influencing public opinion and morale, can alter the behavior of great nations."

Moreover, I said that free people had learned lessons as well: that terrorism is a form of warfare that must be treated as such. Simply standing in a defensive position, absorbing blows, is not enough. It has to be attacked, and it has to be deterred.

That was 20 years ago.

When our nation was attacked on September 11th, the president recognized what had happened as an act of war and that it must be treated as such, not a law enforcement matter. He knew that weakness would only invite aggression and that the only way to defeat the terrorists was to take the war to them and to make clear to states that sponsor and harbor them that such actions would have consequences.

That's why we have forces risking their lives fighting terrorists today. And to live as free people in the 21st century, we cannot think that we can hide behind concrete barriers or wire mesh. We cannot think that acquiescence or trying to make a separate peace with terrorists to leave us alone, but to go after our friends, will work. Free people cannot live in fear and remain free. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. KEAN: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

Our questioning will be led by Commissioner Kerrey, followed by Commissioner Gorton.

ROBERT KERREY: Well, Mr. Secretary, very good to see you again. You're still a terrific witness, my favorite witness ever.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you

MR. KERREY: I would first of all like to know how many cars it took to get all you guys over here. (Laughter.) I mean, that's a big group.

Let me just read back to you what you said 20 years ago, Mr. Secretary: that simply standing in a defensive position, absorbing blows, is not enough; that terrorism must be deterred. And I say with great respect, it seems to me, up to the 11th of September, we were standing in a defensive position, taking blows. I mean, I'm going to give you the same line that I gave former Secretary Cohen when he was here earlier.

I mean --

SEC. RUMSFELD: And I'm going to give you the same answers. I thought he did a good job.

MR. KERREY: All right. Well -- (laughter) -- we'll see if they're the same answers. (Laughter)

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Laughs)

MR. KERREY: I mean, this was -- it wasn't just that we were attacked on the 11th of September, Mr. Secretary; it's the same group of people that hit the Cole on the 12th of October, the same group of people that tried to hit the Sullivan a few months before that, the same group of people that were responsible for millennium attacks against the United States that we had interrupted -- and in Jordan, the same group of people that hit our East African embassy bombings (sic) on the 7th of August, and we now believe the same group of people who were responsible for other attacks against the United States. This was an army led by Osama bin Laden who declared war on us on the 23rd of February, 1998. And we had all kinds of reasons to -- I've heard them all. And they're all wonderful -- as to why the only military attack we had was a single attack on the 20th of August, 1998, and other than that, there wasn't anything. And 19 men, as a consequence, defeated us utterly !

with less than a half a million dollars. And it -- I just -- I ask you, wouldn't a declaration of war either by President Clinton or President Bush prior to this, not just to go after bin Laden, but to say to the DOD, DI -- the CIA and other agencies, you got to work together, you got to put together a terrorist list of radical Islamists that we believe are connected to these things to prevent them from coming into the United States of America, you got to make sure you consider all options and possibilities that might be used against us. You said you received no specific intelligence about the possibility of being -- a plane being used as a bomb.

And Mr. Secretary, you're well known as somebody who thinks about all kinds of terrible possibilities that might happen that nobody else is thinking about. I mean, that's what you do -- so well -- as you're -- when you're going into a difficult situation. I mean, it seems to me that a declaration of war, either by President Clinton or by President Bush, prior to 9/11 would have mobilized the government in a way that at least would have reduced substantially the possibility that 9/11 would have happened. Do you agree or not? (Pause.) That's a different question than I gave Secretary Cohen. I'm getting better at this -- (laughter).

SEC. RUMSFELD: It is. I was going to use his answer, and now I can't. (Light laughter.)

(Pause.) Possibly. Let me -- let me put it that way. The problem with it -- it sounds good the way you said it.

I try to put myself in other people's shoes. And try to put yourself in the shoes of the new administration that had just arrived. And time had passed; we were in the process of bringing people on board. And the president said he wanted a new policy for counterterrorism. Making a declaration of war -- in February or March or April, for the sake of argument -- without having fashioned the policy to follow it up, which they were working on, without having taken the kinds of steps in the Department of Defense to review contingency plans and get them up to date, get the assumptions current for the 21st century, without having tried to strengthen the Special Operations forces, it seems to me might have been a bold stroke that would have sounded good, but when not followed up with the kind of capabilities that we were able to follow it up with on October 7th, when we put forces and capabilities into Afghanistan, might -- so it might not have been a great idea.

I don't think it would have stopped September 11th.

MR. KERREY: Well, let me put it this way to you. Let's say that the Federal Aviation Administration had heeded some warnings about the possibility of a hijacking and it altered the procedures in American airports to prevent these hijackers from being able to get onto the planes in the first place, or had different procedures on the airplanes on the morning of the 11th of September to make sure that the pilots were locked up front and that the passengers didn't remain in their seats and cooperate. (Applause.)

Let's say -- please, I'm -- let's say that 9/11 hadn't happened. Would you have gone to the American people and carried out the strategy that you say you worked on all year long and you came up with on the 4th of September? Because the president would have had to go to the American people and said, we're going to work to eliminate the al Qaeda network, we're going to use all elements of national power to so do -- diplomatic, military, economic, intel, information, law enforcement -- and we're going to eliminate sanctuaries for al

Qaeda and related terrorist networks, and if diplomatic efforts fail to do so we're going to consider additional measures. Earlier in your testimony you said all the reasons why to do such a thing would provoke angry response. Would the administration have put this policy in place were it not for 9/11?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I believe we would have. One can't announce that for a certainty because 9/11 happened, but it had been worked on, developed, and was ready to go into place. The --

MR. KERREY: Well, then, doesn't, Mr. Secretary --

SEC. RUMSFELD: In June and July, when the intelligence spike took place, there were a good number of steps that were taken. My responsibilities, as you know, were overseas and not domestically, but forces were alerted. Embassies were alerted, as Secretary Powell indicated today. There were a number of steps taken by the Transportation Department with respect to airlines and cautions and warnings there. So it's not as though the intelligence that was gathering had not been understood and addressed, and a great number of steps in addition to the development of the policy taken.

MR. KERREY: Well, I got to say, Mr. Secretary, if that's the case -- and I trust you; I believe you on this point -- then I don't think it's a good argument to say that the American people wouldn't have accepted something prior to 9/11 that was unpopular because you just said that, absent 9/11, you would have recommended to the president to put in place a policy that would have been exceptionally unpopular and difficult to sell. I believe he should of, by the way, regardless of whether or not 9/11 happened. But it doesn't work. The argument falls on its face if you say, please understand, we couldn't have done this before 9/11 if you say you would have done it absent 9/11.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I understand.

MR. KERREY: All right. Let me say -- Dr. Rice has said that the national security team was briefed on the threat of al Qaeda in the transition and that it was well understood -- this is what she said in The Washington Post yesterday -- it was well understood by the president and his national security team, the principal. In the interview that we did with you, you seemed not to be as clear as Dr. Rice was or at least Secretary Powell was. And by the way, I'm very sympathetic to that, given that the Department of Defense did not have that kind of authority over counterterrorism activity, so perhaps that would be the reason you were not.

But in the interview, you indicated that you didn't recall that briefing. And in your testimony, you also referenced -- I love to hear that even you have moments that you forget you were at a briefing and people were telling you something. Do you recall the briefings on al Qaeda by Secretary Cohen and --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Secretary Cohen commented on it today. We did have one or two meetings. He had a long list of items -- there must have been 40 or 50-plus items. I have given it to the committee. The first item was the one that concerned him the most, and it involved a sensitive item that was very much on his mind that was terrorism-related, but to my recollection, not al Qaeda-related.

MR. KERREY: It seems to me that Dr. Rice is overstating the case a bit in that statement saying that the threat of al Qaeda was well understood by the president and his entire national security team.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I don't think that's an overstatement.

MR. KERREY: No?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I think certainly the people in the administration who came in didn't arrive out of cellophane packages, they --

MR. KERREY: But you didn't get a briefing by the Counterterrorism Security Group, nor by SOLIC?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I did not get a briefing by -- that Secretary Powell got, no. I was briefed by members of the Joint Staff and other people in the policy departments of the Department of Defense.

MR. KERREY: Dr. Rice also said that she wasn't satisfied with the off-the-shelf military response options that were available after the Cole, the so-called lit-for-lit options that -- I think she was referring to 20 August, 1998, against the camps in Afghanistan. Did she ask for military options? Or were there military options requested during your term? Because our investigation shows that there were no new military plans developed against al Qaeda or bin Laden prior to September 11th.

SEC. RUMSFELD: The -- I think it's accurate to say -- (To General Myers) -- General Myers, you may want to chime in here. But I think it's accurate to say that there were military options, and I'd characterize it as "options" and not a comprehensive plan to deal with al Qaeda and countries that harbor al Qaeda, but options to react, response options, military response options to deal with specific terrorist events. And I was briefed on them, as I indicated in my testimony. And I suspect that Dr. Rice was briefed on them.

I could just say that I don't remember ever seeing -- in the first instance, I don't remember anyone seeing -- anyone being briefed on military proposals to react to something where they were fully satisfied, nor do I ever remember military people being fully satisfied with the intelligence available.

That's the nature of the world we live in.

Dick, do you want to comment?

GEN. MYERS: I would just add that we did after the Cole continue some of the planning that had gone on before -- since '98, actually -- and developed some additional options. I think we briefed the committee on those --

SEC. RUMSFELD: We did.

GEN. MYERS: -- at least the staff.

MR. KERREY: That's why I am confused when the national security advisor in the Post says that we didn't have an al Qaeda plan; no plan was given to the new administration on how to deal with al Qaeda. And then she goes on to say that -- was not satisfied with the off-the-shelf options that were available. And especially in the second case, we don't see any evidence that during the Bush administration there were any new requests that came to DOD

asking for new military options. If there was dissatisfaction with the national security advisor, you would think she would have sent a request over for alternative military options.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, first of all, my recollection is that Sandy Berger has agreed with Dr. Rice that a plan for the al Qaeda was not handed from one administration to the other; and second, my understanding is that the joint staff, after I was briefed and asked a lot of questions, went back down and continued working on those response plans throughout that period and that that was one of the reasons why we were in a position to respond so promptly after September 11th.

GEN. MYERS: That's correct.

MR. KERREY: I said it to Secretary Powell earlier, but I'll say to you as well, Mr. Secretary, I don't understand this we're-waiting-for-a-plan thing at all. I really don't. I mean, we're dealing with an individual who has led a military effort against the United States for 10 years and has serially killed a significant number of Americans over that period of time. And why, in God's name, I got to wait eight months to get a plan.

I mean, I'm very sympathetic to the problems that you mentioned. Paul wasn't on board, I guess, until March, and lots of other -- your last appointment -- I think you had in your testimony -- wasn't there, your key appointment wasn't there until August or something like that. I'm very sympathetic to all the difficulties of transition. But it's still -- I still get in my head, why do we need a brand new military -- you know, a full-blown plan like we're building a house or something here?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, let me just make one comment and maybe someone else would like to respond. But Afghanistan was harboring the al Qaeda. Afghanistan was something like 3,000 miles from the United States. It was surrounded by countries that were not particularly friendly with the United States of America. Afghanistan, as I said publicly on one occasion, didn't have a lot of targets. I mean, you can go from an overhead and attack Afghanistan, and in a very short order, you run out of targets that are lucrative. You can pound the rubble in an al Qaeda training camp 15 times and not do much damage; they can put tents right back up. It's not like -- the country has suffered for decades in drought, in civil war, in occupation by the Soviet Union. And trying to deal with them from the air, in my view -- and that is essentially what the courses of action were that I saw --

MR. KERREY: Oh, I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.

But you said earlier that even absent 9/11, your strategy would have been to eliminate the al Qaeda network, to use all the elements of national power to do so, to eliminate the sanctuaries for al Qaeda and related terrorist networks. I appreciate that is it a tough mission; yes. But your declaratory earlier was that you would carry that out even absent 9/11.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And I would say that that's one of the reasons that Secretary Powell and I and others in the department, in the government, spent time connecting with countries in that part of the world in ways that were unusual and distinctly different than had been the case previously, from the very first day of the administration.

MR. KERREY: You're off the hook. My time's up. It's off to Senator Gorton.

MR. KEAN: Senator Gorton.

MR. GORTON: Mr. Secretary, on page 10 of your written statement you express what I think is justified frustration in the extended period of time it took you to get a team in place with which to make these decisions. You list nine of your senior staff, the earliest of whom was confirmed on the 3rd of May, 2001, and the last of whom, interestingly enough an assistant secretary for international security policy, not until August 6th. And you say that the confirmation system -- that kind of confirmation system and those delays just don't work in the 21st century.

I can greatly sympathize with you on that, but you leave out one very important factor. When were those nine people nominated and actually sent to the Senate?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I wasn't suggesting in this that I -- in fact, I hope I phrased it more elegantly than you did -- (laughter). My point here -- I hope -- my point, whether I made it well or not, my point is not simply the Senate confirmation, but the clearance process, the entire process. Finding them, putting them through the FBI, putting them through multiple ethics -- it took weeks for people to fill out their ethics forms. It cost a fortune for some people to fill out their ethics forms. And then you have to go from the one in the executive branch to the one in the United States Senate and have that filled out, in different forms. Some of you may have been through this. It's an amazing process. And then some guy walks in and gives you a drug test. (Laughter.) It is not just the Senate, although the Senate can be a problem -- with all respect. (Laughter.) MR. GORTON: Thank you for that clarification. So in your view, it's the whole process.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Entirely, yes.

MR. GORTON: From a new administration finding who they want, getting them through various clearances, and then the Senate. But we don't know here how long the Senate part of that took in any one of these cases.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I know, and I could give it to you, if you're interested.

MR. GORTON: I think that -- I think I would be interested.

SEC. RUMSFELD: We tried to parse it out to see where each -- how long each piece took. And the Senate is just a part of it.

MR. GORTON: Okay, thank you.

On page 16 of your statement -- and you referred to this in connection with Senator Kerrey's questions -- you ask and answer the question with respect to why nothing was done with respect to the attack on the Cole in the Bush administration. And you say in fact, to do it four months later might have sent a signal of weakness.

Now, were the reasons for no specific response to the Cole: one, that you were still uncertain about who was responsible to (sic) it; two, that by the time you were in office, say in February of 2002, it was simply too late to

respond specifically to an incident that had taken place the previous October; or three, that there just wasn't anything to shoot at?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Let me respond this way. First of all, it was seven-and-a-half months -- someone earlier specified that it was all year, which is not really the case; it was seven-and-a-half months between the day the president was sworn in and the day of September 11th -- seven-and-three-quarters months, for the sake of precision.

You say nothing was done. A great deal was done. The Cole Commission did a good job. They made a whole series of recommendations, and the Department of Defense implemented those recommendations. In my view, that is not nothing.

You're right, as the time passed, two things were happening; time was passing since the event of the Cole attack, where 17 Americans and military personnel were killed, time passed and we became farther and farther away from that event. And the other thing that was happening is that the policy was being developed to deal with al Qaeda and the country that was harboring them. Last, and as you got closer to that and you got farther away from the Cole event, it became logical, it seems to me, to look more towards the comprehensive approach than some sort of a repeat of what had happened after the embassy bombings or after some of the earlier events which, without criticizing the responses that took place then, the fact that that had been all there was led us -- me, I should say, to feel very deeply that the president ought not to simply fire off cruise missiles; that in the event he was going to make a response, he had to put people on the ground, he had to put people at risk, he had to show a seriousness of purpose or the administration would be seen as a continuum from the lobbing cruise missiles after an attack, with relatively modest effect.

MR. GORTON: Your statement, both oral and written -- in following up on that -- is quite impressive with respect to the preparation for a broader policy that took place in the seven months prior to 9/11.

And on September 4th, there was a fairly definitive recommendation, which you say would almost certainly have been adopted even in the absence of 9/11.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I think I said that I would have favored adopting it.

MR. GORTON: Okay

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't want to prejudge what would have happened.

MR. GORTON: All right. I'll modify the question of that point.

That program, as we understand it, had three parts. First, there'd be one more diplomatic attempt with the Taliban to see if they would give up Osama bin Laden. Second, we would begin to arm the Northern Alliance and the various tribes in Afghanistan to stir up trouble there and hope that perhaps they could capture Osama bin Laden. And third, if those didn't work, there would be a military response that would be substantial, much more than lobbing cruise missiles into the desert. But as we understand it, this was seen as a three-year program if we had to go to the third stage.

My question is, given World Trade Center I, given the embassy bombings, given the millennium plot, given the Cole, given the declaration of war by Osama bin Laden, what made you think that we had the luxury of that much time, even seven months, much less three years before we could cure this particular problem?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, let me answer two ways.

Number one, I didn't come up with the three years. I tend to scrupulously avoid predicting that I am smart enough to know how long something's going to take because I know I don't know. Where that number came from I don't know. In fact, dealing with the terrorism threat is going to take a lot longer than three years, and in fact dealing with the Afghanistan piece of it took a lot less, as you point out. It seems to me that the -- it's interesting that you cite that because, in fact, the president and Secretary Powell made an attempt early on, one last try to separate the Taliban from the al Qaeda and it failed; not surprisingly -- they had been rather stiff -- but it failed flat. MR. GORTON: It even failed after 9/11, didn't it?

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's my point. After 9/11, it failed flat

And the other concern we had was that we had precious little information about the groups in Afghanistan. It was -- we had enough information that there were people knowledgeable who were concerned that if all we did was help the Northern Alliance as opposed to some other elements in the country, we may end up being quite unsuccessful; and that the goal was to try to get a broader base of support in the country, and that took some time.

And the part you left out was that we decided -- I decided, the president decided, everyone decided quite early that we had to put U.S. forces in that country. And that was not a part of that plan. That was something that came along after September 11th.

MR. GORTON: Well, Mr. Secretary, that's a good answer, but it isn't an answer to the question that I asked you. The question --

SEC. RUMSFELD: My question (sic) is, I don't know.

MR. GORTON: The question --

SEC. RUMSFELD: The three years I just don't know.

MR. GORTON: The question that I asked you was, what made you think, even when you took over and got these first briefings, given the history of al Qaeda and its successful attacks on Americans, that we had the luxury even of seven months before we could make any kind of response, much less three years?

SEC. RUMSFELD: And my answer was -- on point, I said I didn't come up with three years. And I can't defend that number. I don't know where that came from.

With respect to seven months, I've answered. My testimony today lays out what was done during that period.

Do you have -- you phrase it, "Do you have the luxury of seven months?" And reflecting on what happened on September 11th, the question is obviously, the good Lord willing, things would have happened prior to that that could have

stopped it. But something to have stopped that would have had to happen months and months and months beforehand, not five minutes or not one month or two months or three months.

And the counterargument, it seems to me, is, do you have the luxury of doing what was done before and simply just heaving some cruise missiles into the thing and not doing it right? I don't know. I -- we thought not. It's a judgment.

MR. GORTON: Let me ask you the same question that I asked of Senator (sic) Powell. At one level, you could claim -- but you're too modest and too cautious to claim -- that your policies since 9/11 have been successful; that is to say, there has not been another successful terrorist attack on the United States. We all know, as Senator (sic) Powell pointed out, that that risk is still there, and it's going to be there for as long as any of us can imagine. But nonetheless, we've now gone two and a half years without any such attack.

What do you think of -- or how do you evaluate the -- our provisional success in that connection? How much of it is just luck? How much of it is hardened targets, the steps we've taken for homeland security? How much of it is more effective intelligence and prevention, both through your department and elsewhere? How much of it is due to the fact that we've attacked the source and to a large extent, in Afghanistan, at least, eliminated it?

Give me your own views as to what you think we've done right and the importance of those things that we've done right. And how much have we ended or reduced the amount of terrorism in the world itself, and how much have we just displaced it and caused it to take place in other places?

SEC. RUMSFELD: As a former pilot, one of the things you always did was you never talked about the fact there hadn't been a flight accident for a long time --

MR. GORTON: That's true.

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- and with good reason. You start doing that, and something happens. The fact is, a terrorist can attack anytime, anyplace, using every -- any technique, and we can't defend everywhere at every moment against every technique. And we could have a terrorist attack anywhere in the world tomorrow. And we have to recognize that. This is a tough business we're in. And it is difficult. And it's challenging.

Now, to the good side. A 90-nation coalition is a big thing. The fact that all of those countries are cooperating, sharing intelligence, helping to find bank accounts, helping to put pressure on terrorists coming across their borders, helping to put pressure on things moving across their borders -- is it perfect? No. Are things still porous? Yes. Is money still getting there? Yes. But everything is harder. Everything is more difficult today. It's tougher to recruit, it's tougher to train, it's tougher to retain, it's tougher to finance, it's tougher to move things, it's tougher to communicate with each other for those folks. Someone asked me what is Saddam -- is Osama bin Laden masterminding all of this. And I said, you know, who knows? But if I were in his shoes I think I'd be spending an awful lot of time trying to not get caught. Most of his time is probably spent trying not to get caught. And so he's busy. And that's a good thing. And there's been!

a lot of pressure. How to put a value on that: I don't know.

What worries me is the last point I mentioned in my prepared remarks, and that was this issue of how many people are coming in the intake, how people are being trained to go out and kill innocent men, women and children. We've got a lot of good things going on, capturing and killing and putting pressure on terrorists today. And every day that cooperation within our government and between 90 nations gets better and better and better. The intelligence fusion cells that are taking place, the cooperative arrangements between the United States and other militaries, the cooperative arrangements between the Department of Defense and the CIA, every day they get better.

But at the same time, we know of certain knowledge that money is going to madrasa schools that are training people to kill people, and that's a problem.

MR. GORTON: Thank you, Mr. Secretary

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. KEAN: Commissioner Ben-Veniste.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary. There are a number of different questions I'd like to ask, but my time is limited.

I'd like to first mention something that Commissioner Gorton brought up, and that is the question of transition. And I think this commission ought to have a recommendation, particularly with respect to the intelligence community and those Cabinet agencies that are charged with protecting the safety of the United States, in terms of the way the transition takes place. It seems as though things are done on the fly. People have other objectives. They have many things to do coming in. It appears from what we have heard that the administration officials leaving government in the Clinton administration were willing to be generous with their time, but they didn't always connect up with the right people it seems. And I think we ought to have a recommendation with respect to institutionalizing transition in these times, which require immediate response to issues.

I want to focus on two things, I guess. One, I'm astounded that this past week, a week ago, we saw on television a videotape of the Predator. Now, the Predator, we were told, was of such a high security classification that the classification itself was secret. You couldn't even mention the name of the classification. And I just don't understand how a videotape of the Predator comes into the public access in that way, and I just make that as a commentary.

With respect to your comment about domestic intelligence and what we knew as of September 10th, 2001, your statement was that you knew of no intelligence to suggest that planes would be hijacked in the United States and flown into buildings. Well, it is correct that the United States intelligence community had a great deal of intelligence suggesting that the terrorists, back since 1994, had plans -- discussed plans to use airplanes as weapons, loaded with fuel, loaded with bombs, loaded with explosives. The Algerians had a plan in '94 to fly a plane into the Eiffel Tower. The Bojinka plot in '95 discussed flying an explosive-laden small plane into CIA headquarters. Certainly CIA was well aware of that. There were plans in '97 using a UAV. In '98 an al Qaeda-connected group talked about flying a commercial plane into the World Trade Center. In '98 there was a plot broken up by the Turkish intelligence involving the use of plane as a weapon.

In '99 there was a plot involving exploding a plane at an airport. Also in '99 there was a plot regarding an explosive-laden hang glider. In '99-- or in 2000 there was a plot regarding hijacking a 747. And in August of 2001, there was information received by our intelligence community regarding flying a plane into the Nairobi embassy -- our Nairobi embassy.

And so I suggest that when you have this threat spike in the summer of 2001 that said something huge was going to happen, and the FAA circulates, as you mentioned, a warning which does nothing to alert people on the ground to the potential threat of the jihadist hijacking, which only, it seems to me, despite the fact that they read into the Congressional Record the potential for a hijacking threat in the United States in the summer of 2001, it never gets to any actionable level. Nobody at the airports is alerted to any particular threat. Nobody flying the planes takes action of a defensive posture.

I understand that going after al Qaeda overseas is one thing, but protecting the United States is another thing. And it seems to me that a statement that we could not conceive of such a thing happening really does not reflect the state of our intelligence community as of 2001, sir.

SEC. RUMSFELD: A couple of comments. I quite agree with you, there were a number of reports about potential hijacking. I even remember comments about UAVs. I even have seen things about private aircraft hitting something. But I do not recall ever seeing anything, in the period since I came back to government, about the idea of taking a commercial airliner and using it as a missile. I just don't recall seeing it. And if it -- (To General Myers) -- Maybe you do, Dick. Do you?

GEN. MYERS: No, I do not.

SEC. RUMSFELD: (To Mr. Wolfowitz) Do you?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: No.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Well, the fact is that our staff has -- and the joint inquiry before us, I must say, has come up with eight or 10 examples which were well known in the intelligence community. My goodness, there was an example of individual who flew a small plane and landed right next to the White House -- SEC. RUMSFELD: I remember.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: -- crash-landed that.

The CIA knew that there was a plot to fly an explosive-laden plane into CIA headquarters. So we do, within our intelligence community, have very much in mind the fact that this is a potential technique.

You put that together with the fact that there is a heightened threat level; people like Direct Tenet, people like Richard Clarke are running around, as they say, with their hair on fire in the summer of 2001, knowing something big is going to happen; and yet everybody is looking overseas.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Let me make two comments on that. One, the spike in that summer -- you're correct; there was a good deal of concern about it. And you suggested that warnings did not go out. My recollection is, a lot of warnings did go out.

Now I have nothing to do with warnings inside the United States.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: I understand.

SEC. RUMSFELD: We had to do with warnings of force protection ex-U.S. And the State Department -- Colin testified to that this morning -- that the State Department had a whole lot of alerts. So there was attention to that.

The second thing I'd say is, the -- oh, how to put this? -- in three years, since I've been back in the Pentagon, there have been people running around with their hair on fire a lot of times. It isn't like it's once or twice or thrice. We are seeing so much intelligence, so much information that is of deep concern that we have scrambled airplanes; we have sent ships to sea, to protect them; we have gone up to a high level of alert on a number of occasions, because of these types of spikes in intel activity, in most instances, when something does not follow --

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Let me just --

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- maybe because we went to high alert, maybe because they go to school on us.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Let me follow that briefly, to say that we knew that terrorists had attacked us in '93 at the world Trade Center. We knew in the millennium plot in December of '99 that al Qaeda had an operative sleeper in the United States or coming to the United States, who planned to blow up LAX. That was interdicted. They were on high alert during the millennium plot, and they thought about domestic terrorism in that regard.

And now, as we get into 2001, it just seems to me like we're looking at the white truck that had everyone captivated during the hunt for the sniper. Everybody was looking in the wrong direction.

Why weren't people thinking about protecting the United States? We knew that there were two al Qaeda operatives in the United States, and yet that information does not get circulated. It doesn't get to the people at the airports. It doesn't go on "Most Wanted" on television, where people could identify such individuals. We know that a man named Moussaoui has been identified as somebody who took lessons on just how to steer an airplane; not how to take it off, not how to land it, just how to steer it. So it seems to me when you make the statement, sir, that we didn't know that planes might be used as weapons in the summer of 2001, I just have to take issue with that.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I didn't say "we" didn't know, I said "I" didn't know. And if -- I just was handed a civil aviation circular that people did know and they sent it out on June 22nd, 2001.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: They sent it out, but nobody did a thing about it. Nobody got anybody at our borders to identify individuals who might be suspect, to give them greater scrutiny.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, may I --

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Somebody was found simply through the good works of a customs agent who used his native intelligence and picked up probably the 20th hijacker in that way.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Let me put something into some context. The Department of Defense, as Senator Kerrey has indicated earlier, did not have responsibility for the borders. It did not have responsibility for the airports.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: I understand.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And the fact that I might not have known something ought not to be considered unusual. Our task was to be oriented out of this country --

MR. BEN-VENISTE: I understand.

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- and defend against attacks from abroad. And a civilian aircraft being hijacked was a law enforcement matter to be handled by law enforcement authorities and aviation authorities, and that is the way our government was organized and arranged. So that those questions you're posing are good ones and they're valid and they ought to be asked, but they ought to be asked of people who had the statutory responsibility for those things. And it seems to me that you've had that opportunity.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: The only reason I put them to you, sir, was because of your comment in your opening statement.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Right. I was confessing ignorance.

MR. KEAN: Thank you very much, Commissioner.

Commissioner Gorelick.

MS. GORELICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Secretary and your colleagues, for being here today and for sharing your thoughts with us.

I'd like to start where Commissioner Ben-Veniste left off in his dialogue with you. If one looks at the PDBs and the SEIBs that were available to you personally, if all you do --

SEC. RUMSFELD: What's a SEIB? I'm sorry.

MS. GORELICK: I'm sorry. It's the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. So these are the -- these are the daily briefings that go to people at your level and just below you. If you look at the headlines, only the headlines of those in the period that has come to be known as the summer of threat, it would set your hair on fire, not just George Tenet's hair on fire. I don't think it is fair to compare what all the intelligence experts have said was an extraordinary spike that plateaued at a spike level for months with spikes that happen, come and go, and are routine. You were right --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I was seeing the PDB, and shared that concern.

MS. GORELICK: Pardon me?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I was seeing the PDB each morning and shared that concern.

MS. GORELICK: Well, I expect that you would. So now I would like to talk about the items that -- the aspects that were in your control.

I had a conversation with Secretary Wolfowitz's -- one of his predecessors when the 1996 Olympics were being planned about what do we do when aircraft, an aircraft is being hijacked and is flying into a stadium at the Olympics. What is the military's response? What is its role? And it has always been my assumption that even though, yes, you were looking out, that you have a responsibility to protect our airspace. So my question is, in this summer of threat, what did you do to protect, let's just say, the Pentagon from attack? Where were our aircraft when they -- when a missile is heading toward the Pentagon? Surely that is in -- within the Pentagon's responsibility, to protect -- force protection, to protect our facilities, to protect something -- our headquarters, the Pentagon. Is there anything that we did to -- at the Pentagon to prevent that harm in the summer, spring and summer of '01?

SEC. RUMSFELD: First, let me respond as to what the responsibility of the Department of Defense has been with a hijacking.

As I said, it was a law enforcement issue. And the Department of Defense has had various understandings with FAA whereby when someone squawks hijack they have an arrangement with the Department of Defense that the military would send an airplane up and monitor the flight, but certainly did not have -- in a hijack situation did not have authority to shoot down a plane that was being hijacked. The purpose of a hijack is to take the plane from one place to another place where it wasn't intended to be going, not to fly into the building.

Second, with respect to the defense of the Pentagon, you're quite right. The force protection responsibilities do fall on the military. And just to put it right up on the table, we're in the flight pattern for National Airport. There's a plane that goes by, you know, how many yards from my window 50 times a day.

I don't know how far it is, but anyone who's been in that office has heard it roar right by the window. There isn't any way to deal with that at all. And force protection tends to be force protection from the ground.

Dick, do you want to comment?

GEN. MYERS: I would just say that since the Cold War, the focus of North American Aerospace Defense Command was outward, was not inward. The hijacking agreement with the FAA was as the secretary described it. It would be a call and a response to the hijack, but certainly not with the thought of shooting it down. It was to monitor -- try to get it to follow instructions and then follow it to its ultimate destination, if we could.

MS. GORELICK: That is consistent with the story that we have been told throughout the military. I would just say that to me -- and again, 20-20 hindsight is perfect, but if I were sitting at the Pentagon and seeing the kind of threats that were coming in that summer, I would say to myself is business as usual appropriate? I mean, the question I have is whether you thought to say, should our -- should we have defenses pre-positioned in a way that we don't? We know that our forces -- that our aircraft from NORAD came too late to the Pentagon.

GEN. MYERS: Well, sure, we changed our whole air defense posture at the end of the Cold War. We went from about 22 sites to down about seven, as I believe, between U.S. and Canada, purposefully and at direction of senior leadership.

Let me just mention one other thing. The threat spike that I remember and that I recall from that summer of '01, were -- and the things that I was reading -- and I was the vice chairman then, so I might not have gotten all the PDBs; but I think I probably saw them eventually, saw the intelligence eventually -- were external to the United States. That's where the threat was and that's where we took action. And we sorted ships. We changed force protection conditions -- particularly in Central Command, but other places around the world -- based on that intelligence. But I don't remember reading those documents to an internal threat.

MS. GORELICK: Well -- SEC. RUMSFELD: And it certainly was not "business as usual." When we saw those threats, a whole host of steps were taken by way of force protection.

MS. GORELICK: May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?

We can't go into the content of the PDBs and the SEIBs here, and I can't even characterize them in order to ask you the next question that I would ask. So let me ask you this: Was it your understanding that the NORAD pilots who were circling over Washington, D.C., that morning had indeed received a shoot-down order?

SEC. RUMSFELD: When I arrived in the command center, one of the first things I heard -- (to General Myers) and I was with you -- was that the order had been given, and that the pilots -- correction -- not the pilots, necessarily, but the command had been given the instructions that their pilots could, in fact, use their weapons to shoot down commercial airliners filled with our people in the event that the aircraft appeared to be behaving in a threatening way and an unresponsive way.

MS. GORELICK: You make a distinct there between the command and the pilots. Was it your understanding that the pilots had received that order?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I'm trying to get in time because -- (to General Myers) -- Do you --

GEN. MYERS: No, I think my understanding -- I've talked to General Eberhart, commander now of NORAD, and I think he's briefed the staff, and I think what he told the staff, what he told me, as I recall, was that the pilots -- at the appropriate point when the authority to engage civilian airliners was given, that the pilots knew that fairly quickly. I mean, it went down through the chain of command.

SEC. RUMSFELD: It was on a threat conference call that it was given, and everybody heard it simultaneously. The question then would be -- the reason I'm hesitant is because we went through two or three iterations of the rules of engagement, and in the end, we ended up delegating that authority to -- at the lowest level, I believe, to two stars.

GEN. MYERS: Correct.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And the pilot would be -- then describe the situation to that level. To the extent that level had time, they would come up to General Eberhart, and to the extent General Eberhart had time, he would come up to me, and to the extent I had time I might talk to the president, which in fact I did do on several occasions during the remainder of the day with respect to international flights heading to this country that were squawking hijack.

MS. GORELICK: I'm just trying to understand whether it is your understanding that the **NORAD** pilots themselves who were circling over Washington, as you refer to in your statement, whether they knew that they had authority to shoot down a plane? And if you don't know, it's fine to say that. But you mention them in your statement, and I would like to know, if you know the answer.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I do not know what they thought. In fact, I haven't talked to any of the pilots that were up there. I certainly was immediately concerned that we did know what they thought they could do, and we began the process quite quickly of making changes to the standing rules of engagement -- Dick Myers and I did -- and then issuing that. And we then went back and revisited that question several times in the remaining week or two while we were still at various stages of alert. And we have since done that in connection with several other events, such as the Prague summit.

MS. GORELICK: As you know, we were not intending to address the issues of "the day of" in this hearing, and it is the subject of a full additional hearing, and we may be back to you with these questions with a more precise timeline for you to look at.

Thank you very much.

MR. KERREY: Thank you

Congressman Roemer?

MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to just start by thanking you, Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, and Secretary Wolfowitz for your strong leadership for our men and women across the world in the armed services and the battles that they're fighting every day to protect us from this jihadist threat. We're very appreciative of your time and your statements and your recommendations here for the 9/11 commission.

Secretary Rumsfeld, my first question for you is a simple one. Did you consider al Qaeda to be a first-order threat?

And particularly in the spring and the summer of 2001, how did you practice this priority?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I and others in the administration did consider it a serious threat. The intelligence -- correction, go back through history. Their prior behavior, the statements that have been indicated by Senator Kerrey and the intelligence threat reports that one would read as we went along drove one to a conclusion that they were active, that they had been successful in some attacks and that they were planning, talking, chattering and hoping to do various types of damage.

I tried in my remarks to lay out how we addressed the concern. One level was at the National Security Council level and the planning and the process there. A second was to address the department as a whole and see if we couldn't strengthen our special forces, strengthen our agility, develop the ability to move faster, to move with smaller elements rather than large footprints, to --

MR. ROEMER: But the special ops were not used during that time period, correct?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Not against al Qaeda. They were used in some other things, as I recall.

MR. ROEMER: So with reference to al Qaeda --

SEC. RUMSFELD: But the changes to special ops are still taking place. It'll take probably another year for the process to -- for them to move from a supporting to a supported command requires them to develop the planning functions in key locations around the world and to rearrange themselves, both with respect to their organizational structure and their equipment.

MR. ROEMER: Let me put the question this way. And you're one that likes metrics and I like metrics to try to measure what kind of effectiveness we're having. The Clinton administration, fairly or unfairly, used a metric to say during the millennium that they had a small group of the principals -- secretary of Defense, secretary of State, national security adviser, the president of the United States, Mr. Clarke -- that would meet almost on a daily basis during that millennium and try to make sure that they were taking in intelligence, responding to the terrorist threat, trying to push from the top down to the bottom decision-making on how to counter al Qaeda. What was your method of trying to fight al Qaeda from the DOD during the spring and summer, when these spikes and this intelligence were coming in?

You've got some very capable people. I see Mr. Cambone, sitting behind you, that is really very proficient in this. What were you doing and how were you pushing that out to the different departments, as the Clinton administration, for good or bad, successfully or unsuccessfully -- I'm not saying their model was the best one.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, we did it differently. You've mentioned the fact that they had a principals' meeting that met frequently. Our arrangement, as Secretary Powell mentioned this morning, was to -- Colin and Condi Rice and I talked every morning. We tended to talk after our intelligence briefings. We were able to discuss the items that we felt were important and needed action. We had lunch once a week, in addition to all of the principals' committee meetings and the National Security Council meetings.

Internally, we did a great deal with respect to Paul Wolfowitz and General Myers and our team, as it came on board, in terms of focusing the department.

But it was a different approach, just a fact.

MR. ROEMER: To the metric of the Clinton administration -- and again, I'm -- we'll be talking to Mr. Clarke tomorrow, probably grilling him on what the Clinton administration did right and did wrong. One of the metrics, again, for the Clinton administration was principals' meetings and how many they had on

a particular topic, right or wrong. Were there principal meetings on al Qaeda and terrorism before September the 4th?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, there were certainly principals' meetings where it was discussed. Whether it was the sole topic or not, the records -- you have those records, and you would know.

MR. ROEMER: Right.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I left out a --

MR. ROEMER: Our records say no --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Is that right?

MR. ROEMER: -- that the first principals' meeting on terrorism was not until September 4th. SEC. RUMSFELD: Just solely on that topic.

I should add a couple of other things that were going on. The -- in addition to meeting with the president in the National Security Council meetings, I was meeting with the president every week separately. And unquestionably, as we -- Dick, General Myers, and I do it together almost always, and often Secretary Wolfowitz.

The other thing we did was, I made a decision early on that the single most important thing we could do that would benefit us in terms of these types of problems would be to develop an exceedingly close link with the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community. And as a result, George Tenet, who I knew and respected, and I started eating lunch with either Paul or Dick Myers or Steve Cambone, and one or two of his key people, depending on the topic, and have done it consistently for the last three years. And we did it during that period. And it has, in my view, been critically important to link those two institutions together, and I do believe they are as well linked together today as probably ever in history.

GEN. MYERS: I would -- I would say there's one other thing that the secretary did as well. And that was when developing the QDR, which we had to start right after the secretary came into office, by law, was to develop as part of our strategy, articulate for the first time in my memory that we had to set aside forces for homeland defense. And it's the first time we've ever articulated that in our strategy, which set us up pretty well when we wanted to create NORTHCOM, Northern Command, because we thought about it up to that point. But that was just one example. I mean, there are lots of things we did in that area that were different.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And also, I forget the timing of it, but we worked to get the Congress to allow us to establish an undersecretary for intelligence that Dr. Cambone now sits in.

MR. ROEMER: With respect to Dr. Albright's testimony this morning, some of us were critical of the Clinton administration's failure to respond to the USS Cole bombing. That took place -- as you know, 17 sailors were killed -- on October the 12th, 2000. They had several months to deal with that, and they had a CIA briefing in December which was hedged, which wanted to try to point command and control to Osama bin Laden, although they said al Qaeda was responsible. Why didn't we take action in the Bush administration? I know you said in your opening statement that it was old and stale.

The terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in 1993. And then they came back seven years later and attacked the same World Trade Centers. "Stale" and "old" and "patience" are words that I'm not sure -- you know, they're -- at least "patience" is in the jihadist lexicon. Why don't we, why didn't we adopt that kind of approach earlier, to say we are going to make you pay a price for this? Four months from now, four years from now, we're going to go after your camps. We're going to tell terrorists that come from Morocco or Algeria or other places we may not get bin Laden with a cruise missile, but we're going to maybe get some people coming from other terrorist organizations. They're going to think twice before they come to a sanctuary.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I wish that were the case. You could -- you can hit their terrorist training camps over and over and over and expend millions of dollars in U.S. weapons against targets that are dirt and tents and accomplish next to nothing. From a cost-benefit ratio, it just doesn't compute. Second, the risk -- the bigger risk is that they will assume again that the United States is -- basically that's all they can do, is to pop a weapon into a training camp, bounce the rubble another couple of times and then stop. And we've seen enough of the terrorists that they have gone to school on us, they watched what happened in Somalia, they have watched various reactions to their activities and come to conclusions about it. And to the extent they think you're weak, they'll go after you. And to the extent they think you're not weak and you put pressure on them, you complicate their lives.

And we were -- right or wrong, I and many of us were concerned that another missile attack after we get into office in February or March or April, without having a policy, without having a plan that was different, distinctly different, would be a mistake and indeed a sign of weakness, not strength.

MR. ROEMER: We've just heard, Mr. Secretary, from many people who have said that while these training camps may have been categorized as jungle gyms or playgrounds with swings, rope swings on them, that other people said that they were human conveyor belts of jihadists determined to kill Americans anywhere they could.

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's true.

MR. ROEMER: So the cost-benefit ratio of a million-dollar cruise missile to taking out some people that can come kill others was one we just didn't consider, I don't think, in the right kind of cost-benefit analysis in the long run.

One final question.

Secretary Wolfowitz, this is -- again, to be fair, and I want to shoot straight with you on this, we have Mr. Clarke coming up tomorrow, and he has a reference in his book to a December -- excuse me, to an April 30th deputies meeting where he claims -- and we want to know if this is accurate or not so that we can ask him the direct questions tomorrow -- he claims that in this meeting, when they are talking about a plan to go forward to go after bin Laden and al Qaeda, that you brought up the subject of Iraq and that you said -- you put too much attention on Iraq as a sponsor, as a state sponsor of terrorism, and not enough emphasis on al Qaeda as a transnational sponsor of terrorism. I have just two comments or two questions on that. One would be, is that fairly accurate? Is his portrayal of that deputies meeting accurate at all or accurate

to some degree? And secondly, in an interagency meeting, where dialogue and discussion of these things should take place !
-- That's what the interagency process is about -- isn't that where these discussions should take place, that opinions should be bounced back and forth and debate should be heated at times about the different threats to the world?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thanks for giving me a chance to comment. Before I do that, let me just make a comment on the last exchange you had with Secretary Rumsfeld.

MR. ROEMER: Please.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: And it applies to quite a few comments, including Senator Gorton's question about the luxury of seven months. I think there's a basic difficulty of understanding what a plan really is. A plan is not a military option. A military option is to a plan what a single play in football is to a whole game plan. And this notion that there's a single thing that if we had only done it, it would work, is like a "Hail Mary pass" in football, which is what a desperate losing team does in a hope that maybe they can pull things off at the end.

A plan has got to anticipate what the enemy will do next. It has to anticipate what the government of Pakistan will do. It has to anticipate what world reaction will be. It has to go down many pathways. And it's not a timetable. No one can tell you what's going to happen next. You have to be able to call plays and call audibles. And that's why to put a plan together in seven months wasn't a long period of time, even if we'd had everybody on board. It was actually rather fast.

And I give you as an illustration, in 2002, in January, when the president said okay, I want to see military options for Iraq, it wasn't until nine months later, I believe, that he finally said okay, I see that we have a military option against Iraq. And that still wasn't a plan because that only allowed him to go to the United Nations and be prepared to use all necessary means, it wasn't a decision to use all necessary means. And General Franks's planning continued for another five or six months.

So I think there's, A, a failure to understand just how complex planning is. And we could get into this.

But to Senator Gorton, I fail to understand how anything done in 2001 in Afghanistan would have prevented 9/11.

And certainly, Congressman Roemer, the option you present of killing a few relatively low-level al Qaeda in some camp in Afghanistan might have been a worthy thing to do as part of a general plan, but it certainly wasn't going to affect 9/11 -- MR. ROEMER: Well, Paul, just --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- except, as the secretary said, to have made 9/11 look like a retaliation.

So let's keep some clarity.

MR. ROEMER: Again, perspective. The point is not -- we're not saying that you could have prevented or should have prevented, with that particular one action, 9/11. We're saying that there's no silver bullet.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Let's be clear, the retaliation -- the retaliation

MR. ROEMER: There were a host of options that could have been out there. There are a host of things.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- for the embassy bombings did nothing to prevent the attack on the Cole, right?

MR. ROEMER: We're not just saying, you know, a cruise missile going into Afghanistan. We're talking about the breadth of policy here, Northern Alliance; covert operations --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: And Congressman, that's exactly what took seven months.

MR. ROEMER: -- cruise missiles.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: It was started in April with the notion of attriting the Taliban --

MR. ROEMER: Okay, fair enough.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- by assisting the Northern Alliance. By September, we said the goal is to eliminate Afghanistan as a sanctuary for al Qaeda, a much more ambitious thing.

With respect to Mr. Clarke, and let me say, I haven't read the book yet. I was called by a reporter on the weekend with a quote from the book attributed to me. I tried to get the book. It wasn't available in bookstores. It was only available to selected reporters. And I got it yesterday, but I did not have time to read it in the last 24 hours. I'll get to it at some point.

But with respect to the quote that the reporter presented as having been put in my mouth, which was an objection to Mr. Clarke suggesting that ignoring the rhetoric of al Qaeda would be like ignoring Hitler's rhetoric in "Mein Kampf," I can't recall ever saying anything remotely like that. I don't believe I could have. In fact, I frequently have said something more nearly the opposite of what Clarke attributes to me. I've often used that precise analogy of Hitler and "Mein Kampf" as a reason why we should take threatening rhetoric seriously, particularly in the case of terrorism and Saddam Hussein. So I'm generally critical of the tendency to dismiss threats as simply rhetoric, and I know that the quote Clarke attributed to me does not represent my views then or now. And that meeting was a long meeting about seven different subjects, all of them basically related to al Qaeda and Afghanistan.

By the way, I know of at least one other instance of Mr. Clarke's creative memory. Shortly after September 11th, as part of his assertion that he had vigorously pursued the possibility of Iraqi involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, he wrote in a memo that, and I'm quoting here, "when the bombing happened, he focused on Iraq as the possible culprit because of Iraqi involvement in the attempted assassination of President Bush in Kuwait the same month," unquote. In fact, the attempted assassination of President Bush happened two months later. It just seems to be another instance where Mr. Clarke's memory is playing tricks on him.

MR. ROEMER: You're doing pretty well for not having read the book, Paul. (Laughter)

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I read the quote.

MR. ROEMER: Let me just say --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Mr. Chairman?

MR. KEAN: Congressmen, we've got to move on to the next commissioner.

MR. ROEMER: Okay. Let me just say in conclusion, thank you for those remarks, and we do have Secretary Armitage in the private interviews with us saying that he thought that the committee process has not moved speedily before or after 9/11, the deputy meeting process and the process on a seven-month or nine-month plan.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Government doesn't move fast enough in general. I agree with that.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment also? I want to make certain there's no misunderstanding. I would have supported missile attacks on training camps anywhere had I believed that we could have achieved the goal that you suggest of killing jihadists.

And the issue is that what happens is, frequently, we know that people are posted and they know when things are going to happen, and people empty those camps from time to time. In fact, we've seen reactions when ships or planes or missiles begin to go someplace that they go to school on that and move out. So the fact that a weapon costs a lot more than a training camp is no reason not to do it. The only reason for not doing it is if you, as I indicated, are working on a plan that you think is more comprehensive and you believe you can do a better job a different way.

MR. ROEMER: Thank you.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: In case I wasn't clear, I was not dismissive of al Qaeda as a threat. The whole meeting was about al Qaeda. I also believed that state support for terrorism was a problem, but I've never been dismissive of al Qaeda, I think precisely because I think terrorism is such a serious problem, as I testified as early as my confirmation hearing.

MR. ROEMER: Thank you.

MR. KEAN: The last questioner from the commission is Secretary Lehman.

MR. LEHMAN: Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I hesitate to cite Mr. Clarke as an authority after the last exchange -- (chuckles) --

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Chuckles.)

MR. LEHMAN: -- but he is extremely critical, as has been reported, about successive responses or lack of responses over the prior eight years from the Pentagon when options -- not plans, but options -- were requested by the White House to retaliate against Khobar, against various options. You yourself are reported by another -- about the same credibility author as being

particularly unhappy about the options presented to you by the Chiefs after 9/11.

I assume from what I read in the press that what is under way now in planning and moving SOCOM from being a support team to a supported staff moves in the direction of somewhat institutionalizing the flexibility and the agility that you all demonstrated so brilliantly in the Iraq war. And that leads to the question that our staff has been looking into and others have recommended to us -- that perhaps the dichotomy that we have between the Title 50 responsibilities of CIA and the Title 10 responsibilities of your building is obsolete, and that, really, probably SOCOM, or its -- what it devolves into, may well be, or should be, designated as the chosen instrument for transnational counterterrorism particularly, and that the Title 50 issues be dealt with head on and CIA be gotten out of the covert and special operations missions and have all of them under the authority of SOCOM.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Let me make a couple of comments, Secretary Lehman.

First, the reports that I've been unhappy about military plans. Dick Myers will agree with me that that is probably partly due to the plans and partly due to my -- the fact that I'm genetically impatient. And you can be sure that the men and women in the Department of Defense, in the combatant commands, in the joint staff, do a superb job. They really do a wonderful job. When they bring up something to Dick Myers or to me, we do not accept it. We question it, we push it, we probe it, we challenge it, we test it. And we force them to go back and answer 50 other questions. And so it's not surprising that people say we're unhappy.

I think that the result of the superb job General Franks did with his team is an example of the product, and it was truly remarkable what he did and what the Special Forces people did when they were put in there in small numbers, all across that country, to work with the local militias in Afghanistan, and accomplish what they accomplished in such a short period of time, with such precision and such skill and such courage.

The question you asked, I am -- I don't feel that I've spent enough time thinking about it to know how to answer your question. It's a question that is probably fair to ask. The way we solve our problems is that on -- if you take the agency and the Department of Defense, what we have done is recognize there's a seam between us, just as there's seam between our combatant commands in the areas of responsibility, and that we have to address the seam.

And how do you do that? And very often, we do it where George Tenet will say, Look, we're going to do X, and we need X number of your people to join our team; we don't have those competences. And we'll use the authorities that he has and some of our skill sets. It might be radio people, it might be medical people, it might be something else. And they then execute an activity with people on loan to them, functioning under their authority. And the reverse. There are times when we do things under our authorities. And they send people to our activities.

Now, that's how you get around the problem. And it's -- it seems to me that it isn't perfect. But life isn't perfect. There are always going to be seams, no matter how you organize or how you arrange yourself. And you can have a lousy organizational arrangement, and you can have authorizations that date back to the Industrial Age, and you have good people, and you can find ways to

solve a lot of those problems. And you could have a perfect organizational arrangement and people that aren't working together well, and it's terrible

Dick, do you want to comment on that?

GEN. MYERS: Well, I -- you know, I probably haven't finished my thinking on this, either. But you're correct in terms of SOCOM. It was essentially a fifth service, organized, trained and equipped. What the secretary has recommended to the president and what the president has done has given them -- made them operational. And so now they're -- they have the operational responsibility. It will take some years for them to grow into that. But they're being pushed very hard to do that.

In terms of the relationship between the Department of Defense and the CIA in operations, I don't view it as a zero-sum game. I think there's room in the battle space for lots of players with different skills.

The question is, how do we put them together, I think, was what the secretary was talking about. And that teamwork -- I can only speak for the time that I've been here, but the teamwork is pretty darn good, actually.

MR. LEHMAN: Thank you very much.

GEN. MYERS: And I would make one other comment on that, Secretary Lehman. The Special Operations Command, besides having the operational responsibility, is also being provided special authorities. And I will just stop there.

MR. KEAN: Thank you very much. Thank you, General Myers, Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary Rumsfeld.

I might say this. Secretary Rumsfeld, I think people ought to know, has been extraordinarily helpful to this commission from day one. The time he spent with us, the time we (sic) spent with members of the commission, the time he spent with members of our staff is very deeply appreciated, and I hope you allow us to come back to you as we move toward the recommendation stage, because we need your help and your wisdom.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Indeed we will, and thank you very much. We -- what you're doing is enormously important, and we wish you well.

MR. KEAN: Thank you very much.

Tomorrow we'll turn our attention to the topic of clandestine and covert action and furtherance of counterterrorism policy goals and national counterterrorism policy coordination. It was a long day today. It's going to be longer tomorrow. Eight-thirty the gavel will fall. (Strikes gavel.)

END.

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Testimony Prepared for Delivery to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Testimony Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 23, 2004.

I. Introduction

Chairman, Commissioners -- Thank you for undertaking this important work.

The Commission requested that we comment on preparations during the period from January 20th through September 11, 2001, the events of September 11th, steps taken since September 11th, and any recommendations for the future.

I request that the text of my testimony be made a part of the record, along with several attachments.

Let me first express my condolences to the people of Spain. The bombings in Madrid have been called Europe's 9/11. For the Spanish people, March 11, 2004 will leave their nation changed. I have no doubt that, like September 11th, the fruits of those attacks will not, over the long run, be hatred, fear or self-doubt, as the terrorists intended.

I am persuaded the attacks there will backfire on the terrorists as they have elsewhere -- for example, as the Istanbul bombings united Turks instead of dividing them; and as terrorist bombings in Riyadh spurred the Saudis to crack down on terrorist networks in their country.

Families that lost loved ones on 9/11 -- some of whom I am sure are listening today -- must feel a special bond with families in other countries who lost fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters to terrorism. They understand the pain, and the heartbreak.

Nothing can shorten the suffering of the bereaved families whose loved ones perished, or fill the empty space in their hearts.

The attacks by terrorists around the world are deadly reminders that our nation -- and, indeed, the world's free nations -- are at war. It is a war in which we face dangerous enemies, that kill innocent men, women and children -- enemies who are working to acquire weapons that would one day allow them to kill not hundreds, as on March 11th in Spain, but tens of thousands.

So this Commission has an important opportunity. Those in government are, of necessity, focused on dozens of issues. Commissions, however, can step back and focus on one thing, get it right, and provide insights that can be of great value.

You have been asked to connect the dots -- after the fact -- to examine events leading up to September 11th, and consider whether events of that day might have been prevented -- and, what lessons, if any, might be taken from that experience to prevent future dangers. It isn't easy, even after the fact. And that's with the benefit of hindsight. You have the opportunity to hold hearings, conduct interviews, to pore over tens of thousands of pages of documents, to focus exclusively on that one topic.

I am told the Department of Defense alone has thus far:

- Had up to 150 DoD personnel work on the collection, review, and processing of information requested by the Commission;
- Made available approximately 4,000 documents, totaling more than 136,000 pages;
- Provided 48 briefings;
- and Participated in 162 interviews with the Commission.

Since May 2003, DoD has spent some 10,000 man-hours to assist the Commission.

Going through those documents and briefings, and conducting all those interviews and hearings, and trying to piece it all together and connect the dots, is difficult. Yet the challenge facing our country before September 11th and still today is vastly more difficult: our task was then and is today to connect the dots -- not after the fact, but before the fact -- to try to stop an attack before it happens. And that task must be done without the benefit of hindsight, hearings, briefings, interviews, or testimony.

Another attack against our people will be attempted. We do not know where, or when, or by what technique. It could be in weeks, months, or years -- but it will happen.

That reality drives those of us in positions of responsibility in government to ask the tough question: when that attack is attempted, what will we wish we had done -- today and everyday -- before an attack -- to prepare for, to mitigate, or if humanly possible, to prevent it?

The Commission might ask a similar question: when that next attack is attempted, what will you wish you had advised? What will you wish you had recommended our nation do to prepare for, and, if possible, to prevent an attack?

What have you learned that can inform our efforts, and help us to better understand surprise, to anticipate threats, and get better arranged to deal with them?

The unfamiliar challenges of the global war on terror are particularly tough for several reasons:

- First, it is tough because Western armed forces have been organized, trained and equipped to fight competing armies, navies and air forces -- not to conduct man-hunts for terrorists.
- It is tough because safeguarding the privacy of individuals makes it hard to satisfy the requirement to know who or what is coming across our borders or moving money through financial networks.
- It is tough because globalization has created easy access to dual-use technology, fiber optics, and the knowledge and materials to build increasingly lethal weapons.

Your Commission can help by offering your considered opinions on a number of critical questions:

- How to strike the right balance between privacy and security?
- How to adjust thinking about dealing with terrorism as a problem of national security vs. law

enforcement?

- How to address peacetime constraints in a way to reflect that we are a nation at war -- albeit a new and different war.

Not easy questions. But this much is certain: on September 11th, our world changed -- and while it may be tempting to think that once this crisis has passed and our nation has healed, things can go back to the way they were -- we cannot go back. The world of September 10th is past. We have entered a new security environment, arguably the most dangerous the world has known. And if we are to continue to live as free people, we cannot go back to thinking as we did on September 10th. For if we do -- if we look at the problems of the 21st century through a 20th century prism -- we will come to wrong conclusions and fail the American people.

You can help our country adjust. I used to think one of the most powerful individuals in America was the person who could select the annual high school debate topic. Think of the power -- to set the agenda, and determine what millions of high school students will study, read about, think about, talk about with friends, discuss with their teachers, and debate with their parents and siblings over dinner.

Your Commission has similar power. You have the opportunity to focus the attention of the nation on critical questions -- the issues we need to think about, debate, and discuss. You have an opportunity to elevate the debate above partisan interests, to lift people's eyes up and out to the horizon, to help point a way ahead.

The September 11th attacks cost the American people hundreds of billions of dollars in lost income, lost jobs, and lost GDP. But the most terrible cost of the attack was the price paid in human lives, and the suffering of the families and loved ones of the 3,000 people killed on that day -- the horrible memories and the constant sense of loss that the wives and husbands and children and parents and friends of those who were murdered on September 11th live with everyday.

I saw with my eyes the destruction terrorists wreaked on September 11th. At the impact site, moments after American Airlines Flight #77 hit the Pentagon, one could feel the heat of the flames, smell the burning jet fuel, and see the smoldering rubble, twisted steel, and the agony of the victims. Those images will forever be seared into our memories.

I spent time, once the crisis passed, asking the questions posed to this Commission: What, if anything, could have been done to prevent it? And, if something like this were to happen again, have we -- today -- done everything possible to prevent it?

First, I must say, I know of no intelligence during the roughly six plus months leading up to September 11th that indicated terrorists intended to hijack commercial airliners and fly them into the Pentagon or the World Trade Towers. If we had had such information, we could have acted on it -- as we did during the spike in intelligence chatter during the summer of 2001, when we had information that led us to move ships out of harbors in the Gulf region. Further, I believe that the actions taken since September 11th in the global war on terror, and the international coalition assembled to fight that war, would have been impossible to achieve before the September 11th attacks.

Think about it: after September 11th, the President made the decision not simply to launch cruise missile strikes as the U.S. had previously tried. Rather, he decided to deal decisively with the terrorist network responsible for the attack -- and to hold not only the perpetrators to account, but also the regime that had harbored, aided, and supported them as they trained, planned, and executed their attacks.

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The President rallied the world, and formed what is today a 90-nation coalition to wage the global war on terrorist networks. He sent U.S. and Coalition forces – air, sea, and ground – to attack Afghanistan, overthrow the Taliban regime, and destroy that al-Qaeda stronghold.

- o Within 26 days of the attack -- on October 7th, the air campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan had been launched.
- o Within 38 days -- on October 19th, the U.S. military had forces on the ground in Afghanistan.
- o Within 59 days -- on November 9th, Mazar-e-Sharif fell to a coordinated assault by Afghan and U.S. forces, aided by precision strikes from Coalition ships and aircraft
- o Within 63 days -- on November 13, 2001, Kabul was taken – and Afghanistan was liberated.

In short order:

- o The Taliban regime was driven from power;
- o Al-Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan was removed;
- o Nearly two-thirds of their known leaders have now been captured or killed,
- o Today a transitional government is in power in Afghanistan, which is transforming the country from a safe haven for terrorists to a coalition ally in the war against terrorism.
- o And a clear message was sent: henceforth there will be a price to pay for harboring terrorists.

These were bold steps – and today, in light of September 11th, no one questions those actions. Today, I suspect most would support a pre-emptive action to deal with such a threat, if it had been possible to see it coming. Today, our remarkable military success in Afghanistan is largely taken for granted, as is the achievement in bringing together countries like Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, and Oman into a 90-nation coalition.

But imagine for a moment that we were back before September 11, 2001. Imagine that a U.S. President had looked at the information then available, and gone before the Congress and the world, and said: "We need to invade Afghanistan, overthrow the Taliban, and destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist network," based on what little was known before September 11th.

How many countries would have joined in a coalition? Many? Any? Not likely.

We likely would have heard objections to "pre-emption" similar to those voiced before the Coalition launched Operation Iraqi Freedom. We would have been asked:

- o Where is the "smoking gun?"
- o How can we attack Afghanistan when it was al-Qaeda that attacked us?
- o Aren't North Korea, Iran, Iraq, or Libya more immediate threats than Afghanistan?
- o Shouldn't overthrowing the Taliban regime be the last step, not the first?
- o Why can't we just take out terrorist training camps?
- o If we go to war in Afghanistan, does it mean the U.S. will now go to war with every state that harbors terrorists before they have threatened us?
- o Should we go to war when there is no international consensus behind ousting the Taliban regime by force?
- o Wouldn't U.S. intervention enrage the Muslim world and increase support for the terrorists?
- o How can we go to war when not one country in the region publicly supports us, and many seem to be opposed?
- o Wouldn't the U.S. get bogged down in an expensive, dangerous long-term military occupation?
- o Wouldn't we open ourselves to the risk that other rogue regimes might take advantage of the fact

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that the

- U.S. is tied up in Afghanistan to invade neighbors or cause other mischief?
- Won't launching a pre-emptive strike simply provoke more terrorist attacks against the U.S.?
- If the Taliban and al-Qaeda knew we intended to overthrow their regime and destroy their network, what would they have to lose by launching a catastrophic attack in the U.S.?

Those are essentially objections that were raised against military action in Iraq. And they were voiced after September 11th, in a nation that already had experienced the loss of 3,000 innocent men, women and children to a surprise attack.

Imagine the outcry any U.S. President would have faced had he proposed what would have been labeled a pre-emptive war in Afghanistan before the experience of September 11th.

Unfortunately, history shows that it can take a tragedy like September 11th to awaken the world to new threats -- and to the need for action -- and even then there are different views.

A few weeks after September 11th, I was in the Middle East, and I met in a tent in the desert with the Sultan of Oman. He expressed his sympathy for the loss of life in America. But he said that perhaps that tragedy will wake up the world, so that nations will come together to take the steps necessary to see that there is not a September 11th that involves a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon. Perhaps, he said, the loss of those 3,000 precious lives, in the end, will help to save tens of thousands of lives.

We cannot go back in time to stop the September 11th attack. But we owe it to the families and loved ones of those who died on September 11th to ensure that their loss will, in fact, be the call that helps to ensure that tens of thousands of other families do not go through the pain and suffering they have endured.

It is my hope that this Commission's work will help our nation meet its obligations to those families -- and to future generations, whose freedom and security are in our hands today.

11. Preparing For An Era Of Surprise: January 20,2001 -- September 10,2001

President Bush came to office with instructions to his Administration to prepare for the new threats of the 21st century.

The bombing of the U.S.S. Cole on October 12,2000 was seen both as evidence of the al-Qaeda threat and the need to adjust U.S. policy. There had been no response to the Cole bombing.

I've had an interest in terrorism since my experience in Lebanon in the 1980s, during my service as Middle East Envoy for President Reagan.

The more one studies terrorism, the more one becomes convinced that the approach to fighting it that had evolved over several decades wasn't working. That strategy was essentially to treat terrorism as a matter of domestic security; to combat it through national and international law enforcement techniques; and to try to take defensive measures against terrorist attacks. From the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, to the first World Trade Center attack, to the Embassy bombings in East Africa, and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole -- that was the pattern. Reasonable people have to conclude that the value of that approach had diminished over the years.

It had become increasingly clear that we could no longer afford to treat terrorism as a manageable evil

– that we needed an approach that treated terrorism more like fascism -- as an evil that needed to be not contained, but fought and eliminated.

When this Administration came into office, the President asked the NSC to begin preparing a new counter-terrorism strategy. His instructions were to develop a strategy not simply to contain terrorism, but to deal with it more aggressively – not to reduce the threat posed by al-Qaeda, but to eliminate the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

A more comprehensive approach required a review not only of U.S. counter-terrorism policy, but also U.S. policies with regard to other countries, some of which had not previously been at the center of U.S. policy. It was a big task. Dr. Rice has stated she asked the National Security Council staff in her first week in office for a new Presidential initiative on al-Qaeda. The staff conducted an overall review of al-Qaeda policy. In early March, the staff was directed to craft a more aggressive strategy aimed at eliminating the al-Qaeda threat. The first draft of that new strategy, in the form of a Presidential directive, was circulated by the NSC staff on June 7, 2001 and I am told some five more meetings were held that summer at the Deputy Secretary level to address the policy questions involved, such as relating an aggressive strategy against the Taliban to U.S.-Pakistan relations. By the first week of September, this process had arrived at a strategy that was presented to Principals and later became National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-9.

The objectives of the new strategy were:

- To eliminate the al-Qaeda network;
- To use all elements of national power to do so -- diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence, information and law enforcement;
- To eliminate sanctuaries for al-Qaeda and related terrorist networks – and if diplomatic efforts to do so failed, to consider additional measures.

The essence of this strategy was contained in NSPD-9. It was the first major substantive national security decision directive issued by this Administration. It was presented for decision by principals on September 4, 2001 – 7 days before September 11th. The directive was signed by the President, with minor changes, and a preamble to reflect the events of 9/11, on October 25, 2001.

While this review of counter-terrorism policy was taking place, the Department of Defense was developing a review of U.S. defense strategy. When President Bush took office, he asked us to transform the Defense Department, and arrange the U.S. Armed Forces for the new threats of the 21st century, which he knew would be notably different from 20th century threats that were familiar, but unlikely.

On February 2, 2001, less than two weeks after taking office, I traveled to Germany for the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy – my first overseas trip since returning to the Pentagon. Already, at that early date, we were focused on the problem of unconventional or “asymmetric” threats. On the flight, I was asked by reporters about the principles that would drive our defense review. I answered that the 1991 Persian Gulf War had taught the world that taking on Western armies, navies and air forces directly is not a good idea. It was expensive and attackers were almost certain to lose a conventional conflict. It was therefore likely that potential adversaries would:

“look for so-called asymmetrical responses ... [everything] from terrorism through cyber attacks, to information warfare, to cruise missiles, to short-range ballistic missiles, to longer range ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction.” (See Attachment #1)

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The problem we faced was that, for most of the 20th century, the U.S. Armed Forces had been organized, trained and equipped to fight opposing armies, navies and air forces. While we need to maintain the capability to fight traditional wars, we also knew that the likely threats in the 21st century would require us to conduct much different kinds of military operations.

Even traditional adversaries would be likely to threaten us in unconventional or asymmetric ways. Moreover, we knew we would increasingly face threats from non-traditional adversaries, such as terrorist networks, and that we needed to re-arrange ourselves to be able to deter and dissuade such attacks – and to defeat such adversaries if they did attack.

The danger posed by proliferation is twofold:

- First, that hostile states will develop these weapons, and a variety of ways to deliver them against our people, and our friends and coalition partners, and thus have the power to hold our populations hostage to blackmail; and
- Second, that they might share those capabilities with terrorist networks, that could use them to attack us without fingerprints.

At the same time, the challenges facing the intelligence community were growing more complex. During my confirmation hearings, I was asked what one thing would keep me awake at night? I answered, without hesitation: “intelligence.” (See Attachment #2)

I understand CIA Director Tenet will testify tomorrow and he will provide a detailed description of the challenges facing the intelligence community. Let me simply say this: during the Cold War, we faced a principal adversary – the Soviet Union – an enemy we grew to know and understand reasonably well over many decades. Today, we face multiple potential adversaries – both state and non-state actors – operating around the globe. We are living in an age where the nature of the international economy, the volume and rate of global interactions and communication, and the spread of technologies, mean the volume of information that must be monitored and assessed has grown and is growing.

The ability of the intelligence community to monitor the rapidly growing volume of data, sort it, analyze it, and then alert policymakers to threats to the U.S. and its interests, is growing more difficult by the year.

Their challenge is compounded by the fact that the ability of the intelligence community to learn the secrets of those who wish us harm, and to convey those secrets to policy-makers in confidence, continues to be compromised by frequent leaks and unauthorized disclosures. Hardly a day goes by when the media doesn't carry a story that reveals classified information. This aids our enemies in significant ways.

The harm done to the U.S. by spies and traitors the likes of Ames, Hansen, and Pollard is substantial. The result has been that important features of our intelligence capabilities have been compromised.

As part of our complicated world, adversaries of the U.S. have chosen terrorism as the preferred instrument to force free nations to submit to their agendas by inflicting death on their innocent citizens.

We were also concerned about the risk of surprise, and the danger that new threats could emerge with little or no warning. In June 2001, I attended the first meeting of NATO defense ministers in the 21st century, and my first NATO meeting since returning to government. I told my colleagues about Vice President Cheney's appearance before the Senate for his confirmation hearings as Secretary of Defense

in March of 1989. During those hearings, a wide range of security issues were discussed – but not one person uttered the word "Iraq." Yet within a year, Iraq had invaded Kuwait and that word was in every headline and on everyone's lips. I wondered what word might come to dominate my term in office that wasn't raised by members of the Senate Committee during my confirmation hearings.

Three months later, we learned the answer -- Afghanistan and al-Qaeda.

At that June 2001 meeting, months before September 11th -- I cautioned our NATO colleagues as follows:

"We know this much for certain: it is unlikely that any of us here knows what is likely....None of us...has a crystal ball through which we can clearly see the future. [But] while it is difficult to know precisely who will threaten us or where or when in the coming decades, it is less difficult to anticipate how we will be threatened. We know, for example, that as an Alliance of democracies, our open borders and open societies make it easy and inviting for terrorists to strike at our people where they live [and] work... Our dependence on computer-based information networks make those networks attractive targets for new forms of cyber-attack. The ease with which potential adversaries can acquire advanced conventional weapons... will present us with new challenges in conventional war and force projection. Our lack of defenses against ballistic missiles creates incentives for missile proliferation which, combined with the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, give future adversaries the ability to hold our populations hostage to terror and blackmail... [T]he parallel revolutions of miniaturization, information, biotechnology, robotics, nanotechnology, and high-density energy sources are putting unprecedented power in the hands of small countries and even terrorist groups, foreshadowing changes beyond any ability to forecast." (See Attachment #3)

These are the kinds of threats that we at Defense were preparing to meet and deal with in the months before September 11th. And during those early months, we made significant progress in the effort to transform for the era of surprise and unconventional threats. They included:

- o The Congressionally required Quadrennial Defense Review, completed just days before the 9/11 attacks, laid out the transformation objectives of the Department of Defense.
 - o In it, we identified as our first priority, the defense of the territory and people of the United States against a broad range of asymmetric threats – homeland defense.
 - o And we made the important decision to move the Department from a "threat-based" to a "capabilities-based" approach to defense planning – an approach that focuses not simply on who might threaten us, or where, or when, but more on how we might be threatened, and what portfolio of capabilities we will need to deter and defend against those new threats.
- We directed the Department to accelerate work on precision strike weapons, and various intelligence capabilities designed to help us deny enemies sanctuary. Our guidance emphasized the synergy to be achieved from long-range air and ground forces.
- We also developed a concept for new Defense Planning Guidance and a new Contingency Planning Guidance. I found that many of the U.S. war plans were more than two years old. In some cases the assumptions on which they had been built had not been adjusted for three or four years. In May of 2001, we began the process of modernizing the way the Department prepares its war plans – reducing the time to develop plans, increasing the frequency with which they would be updated, and structuring the plans to be more flexible and adaptable to the continuing changes in the security environment.

- Following the incident in April where the crew of our EP-3 aircraft was taken prisoner by the Chinese, we made adjustments in the Department's crisis management organization and process.
- We completed the Congressionally required Nuclear Posture Review, and adopted a new approach to deterrence designed to enhance our security, while mandating historic reductions in our deployed offensive nuclear strategic weapons.

We did all this, I would add, with a skeletal staff. It was not until nearly 6 weeks into the new Administration that Deputy Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, was confirmed. For many weeks thereafter, he and I were the only confirmed Presidential appointees in the Defense Department. For example:

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition was not sworn in until May 10th – almost four months after the President took office.
- The Department's General Counsel and the Secretary of the Navy were not confirmed until May 24th.
- The Secretary of the Army was not confirmed until May 31st.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy – the senior official responsible for many of the issues discussed here – did not take office until July 16th, nearly 6 months into the new Administration,
- The DoD Comptroller, the Department's top budget official, was not confirmed until May 3rd.
- The Secretary of the Air Force and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness were not confirmed until June 1st.
- The Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs was not confirmed until July 16th.
- The Deputy Under Secretary for Policy was not confirmed until July 25th.
- The Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy was not confirmed until August 6th.

For most of the period before 9/11 we were working in a building where many of the most senior officials selected by the President had not been confirmed and were not available to help. So we were without their help for many months. The current system from clearance to confirmation is better suited to the industrial age and needs to be modernized to fit the 21st century.

Notwithstanding those challenges, the few new civilian and the military leaders of the Department did do a significant amount of work in the early months. I held more than 250 meetings during the period before September 11th, many on the subjects described.

- 120 meetings were devoted to strategy and policy reviews;
- More than 100 were on personnel matters to recruit and get the Administration's team on board;
- 26 focused on updating old war plans; and
- 50 or more dealt with budget issues and new priorities for the 21st century challenges.

Those investments in time and energy by senior leaders of the Department paid off. We made important decisions about the strategic direction for the Department and the Armed Forces – decisions that were to be later validated by the decisive campaign that was planned and executed after 9/11.

Indeed, because we were doing all these things -- here in the Department, as well as in the NSC policy review -- the Administration was better prepared to respond when the 9/11 attacks came. We were able to take plans which were limited in their objectives -- plans that had evolved from the late 1990s through the first months of the Administration -- and rapidly modify and enlarge them to meet our broader objectives for Afghanistan. The rapid success in Afghanistan was made possible in part because of work that had been done in previous years and in the preceding seven months -- changes in

thinking, culture, and strategy that fortunately were underway when new threats emerged -- and which allowed us to move with speed and precision to shatter al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and destroy the Taliban regime in short order.

111. The Day Of September 11th.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, I was hosting a meeting for some of Members of Congress. Ironically, in the course of the conversation, I stressed how important it was for our country to be adequately prepared for the unexpected.

Someone handed me a note that a plane had hit one of the World Trade Center Towers. Later, I was in my office with a CIA briefer when I was told a second plane had hit the other tower. Shortly thereafter, at 9:38 AM, the Pentagon shook with an explosion of a then unknown origin.

I went outside to determine what had happened. I was not there long, apparently, because I am told I was back in the Pentagon, with a crisis action team, by shortly before or after 10:00 AM.

Upon my return from the crash site and before going to the Executive Support Center (ESC), I had one or more calls in my office, one of which I believe was with the President.

I left the ESC and went to the National Military Command Center where General Dick Myers, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had just returned from Capitol Hill. We discussed and I recommended to the President raising the U.S. Defense Condition level from 5 to 3, and increasing the Force Protection level. We later requested that the Russians be notified of the change and suggested they stand down an exercise they were conducting, which they did.

A summary was provided of the forces available in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Gulf. They included: two aircraft carrier battle groups and more than 200 TLAM cruise missiles among other vessels in the area.

In the National Military Command Center (NMCC), I joined the air threat telephone conference call in progress. One of my first conversations during the conference call was with the Vice President. He informed me of the President's authorization to shoot down hostile aircraft coming toward Washington, D.C.

My thoughts went to the pilots of the U.S. military aircraft that could be called upon to execute that order. I recalled an experience in 1975, while I was serving as White House Chief of Staff, when the ship Mayaguez was seized by pirates. During that incident, communications had been beamed into a room where President Ford and the rest of us could hear U.S. pilots as they weighed intercepting a boat moving from an island to the mainland -- very likely with the crew of the Mayaguez as captives.

I remember hearing the uncertainty in a pilot's voice -- a young man charged with making a grave decision about firing at or attempting to disable that boat to keep it from reaching the mainland. I find it useful to try to put myself in the shoes of others -- whether a pilot, or a combatant commander. And I tried to put myself into the shoes of the pilots we were asking to be prepared to intercept civilian airliners, over American soil, filled with our neighbors, friends, and relatives -- and possibly having to shoot down those planes -- with row after row of their fellow Americans.

It was clear they needed rules of engagement telling them what they should and should not do. They needed clarity. And there were no rules of engagement on the books for this first-time situation where

civilian aircraft were seized and were being used as missiles. Indeed, it may well be the first time in history that U.S. armed forces in peacetime, have been ordered to fire on fellow Americans going about their lawful business.

General Myers and I went to work to fashion appropriate rules of engagement. Throughout the course of the day, we returned to further refine those rules.

I spent the remainder of the morning and into the afternoon in the NMCC and the ESC, participating in the Air Threat Conference, talking to the President or Vice President, or giving guidance and thinking about the way forward. During the course of the day, the President indicated he expected us to provide him with robust options for military responses.

In the first month of the Administration, I had prepared a list of guidelines to be weighed before committing U.S. forces to combat. I had shared them with the President so he would know that, if we were to consider engaging U.S. forces, those were the kinds of considerations I would be weighing and discussing with him.

Let me mention a few of those guidelines:

- First, is the proposed action truly necessary? If lives are going to be put at risk, there must be a damn good reason.
- Next, is the task achievable and at an acceptable risk? It has to be something that the United States is truly capable of doing. We need to understand that we have limitations.
- All instruments of national power should be engaged before, during and after any possible use of force.
- Decisions ought not to be made by committees. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition, which in my view it almost always will, it's important to avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join that it could compromise the goals or jeopardize the command structure. The mission needs to determine the coalition.
- If an engagement is worth doing, then the U.S. and coalition partners need to be willing to put lives at risk -- and leaders have to be willing to invest the political capital necessary to marshal support necessary to sustain the effort for whatever period of time conceivably could be required.
- It's important not to dumb down what's needed by promising not to do things -- by saying "we won't use ground forces," or "we won't risk lives," or "we won't permit collateral damage," or "we won't bomb below 15,000 feet," or "we'll set an arbitrary deadline that it will end as of this date." That simplifies the problem for the enemy and makes our task vastly more difficult -- and vastly more dangerous.

I prepared those and the other guidelines attached to my testimony (Attachment #4) long before September 11th -- not as rules or a formula to encourage or inhibit military action, but rather as a checklist of questions to consider, so that if we did have to engage our forces, we would do so with a full appreciation of our responsibilities, the risks, the opportunities -- and that we would do so decisively.

A few days after 9/11, I wrote down some thoughts on terrorism, and the new kind of war that had been visited upon us. I noted:

- "It will take a sustained effort to root [the terrorists] out... The world needs to have realistic expectations. This campaign is a marathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist network, such

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- as al-Qaeda, is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers.”
- “The coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed; rather, they will change and evolve... [E]ach country has a somewhat different perspective and different relationships, views and concerns. It should not be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities in which the U.S. is engaged, while other countries will not.”
- “Some will be reluctant to join an effort against terrorism or at least some aspects of our efforts. Terrorists terrorize people. We accept that fact.”
- “This is not a war against the people of any country. The regimes that support terrorism terrorize their own people as well. We need to enlist all civilized people to oppose terrorism, and we need to [help] make it safe for them to do so.”
- “This is not a war against Islam... The al-Qaeda terrorists are extremists whose views are antithetical to those of most Muslims. Their actions... are aimed in part at preventing Muslim people from engaging the rest of the world. There are millions of Muslims around the world who we expect to become allies in this struggle.”

The text of this memorandum is Attachment #5 to my statement.

In the following days, we prepared options for the President. The President issued an ultimatum to the Taliban. When they failed to comply, he initiated the Global War on Terror and directed the Department to carry out Operation Enduring Freedom against al-Qaeda, their affiliates, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that harbored and supported the terrorists.

IV. What Steps Have Been Taken Since 9/11

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of Defense has pursued two tracks simultaneously:

- We have prosecuted the global war on terror in concert with other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and
- We have continued and, where possible, accelerated, the effort to transform the Department to be able to meet and defeat the threats of the 21st century.

We are having success on both fronts.

What the courageous men and women in uniform have accomplished since our country was attacked 30 months ago is impressive. In the 2½ years since 9/11, with our Coalition partners, they have:

- Overthrown two terrorist regimes, and liberated some 50 million people;
- Hunted down thousands of terrorists and regime remnants in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries;
- Captured or killed 46 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq -- including Saddam Hussein;
- Disrupted terrorist financing;
- Interdicted shipments of chemical and nuclear weapons components bound for terrorist states;
- Disrupted terrorist cells on several continents; and
- Undoubtedly prevented a number of planned terrorist attacks.

At the same time, we have continued the defense transformation effort that began before 9/11. Our efforts have been driven by the tough question: if another attack were to occur 6 months from today, what would we wish we had done from today and each of the coming days to deter, defeat, or to prepare for it? We have done a great deal.

- We have revised the Unified Command Plan twice since 9/11 and are preparing a third revision. Among other things, we have established:
 - The Northern Command -- an entirely new command dedicated to defending the homeland;
 - A new Joint Forces Command to focus on continuing transformation;
 - A new Strategic Command responsible for early warning of and defense against missile attack and the conduct of long-range attacks; and
- We have changed the Special Operations Command in major ways, expanding its capabilities and its missions, so that it can both support missions directed by regional combatant commanders, but also plan and execute its own missions in the global war on terror, supported by other combatant commands;
- Working with Congress, the Department of Homeland Security was established, and arrangements for cooperation between it and the Defense Department were established in the event of a new terrorist attack.
- After receiving authority from Congress, we established a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, with responsibility for interaction with the new Department of Homeland Security;
- We also established an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to help ensure that the Department manages intelligence assets in a manner that best supports the global war on terror and the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence;
- The intelligence community has established a new Terrorist Threat Intelligence Center (or TTIC) -- a multi-agency joint venture designed to help the intelligence, law enforcement, and defense communities better integrate terrorist threat-related information and analysis;
- DoD assigned additional military personnel to the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center (CTC), to strengthen collaboration between the CTC and the military;
- We have taken steps to strengthen U.S. non-proliferation efforts, including the launch of the Proliferation Security Initiative -- an unprecedented international coalition to strengthen the international community's ability to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related materials at sea, in the air, and on the ground. The effort was launched in the summer of 2003, with 10 like-minded countries, and in the months since more than 40 more countries have offered support. Already there have been important successes -- including interdictions of both nuclear and chemical weapons components;
- And government has improved relationships between and among our intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies around the world. That cooperation is delivering results, including:
 - The uncovering of the A.Q. Kahn nuclear trading network;
 - The exposure and dismantling of Libya's WMD programs;
 - The rooting out of rings that finance terrorism; and
 - The prevention of planned terrorist attacks.
- We have strengthened existing defense intelligence counter-terrorism capabilities by establishing the new Joint Integrated Task Force--Counter-Terrorism (JITF-CT) under the Defense Intelligence Agency -- an intelligence fusion center to support the global war on terror focused on providing strategic and tactical warning, exposing and exploiting terrorist vulnerabilities, and preventing terrorists and their sponsors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; With our NATO Allies, we have created a new NATO Response Force to give the Alliance the kind of rapid reaction capability that, had it existed on September 11th, could have enabled NATO to contribute to combat operations in Afghanistan in a timely manner;
- The demands presented by the global war on terror have led to our establishing new strategic relationships that would have been unimaginable just a decade ago -- including the nations of Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Horn of Africa, as well as South Asia; and
- We have undertaken a comprehensive review of our global force posture, with the goal of

transforming U.S. global capabilities from an arrangement driven by where the wars of the 20th century ended, to a posture that positions us to deal with the new threats of the 21st century security environment.

In addition, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have sent a clear message to the world's terrorist states: harboring terrorists and the pursuit of weapons of mass murder carries with it unpleasant costs. By contrast, leaders who abandon the support of terrorism and the pursuit of those weapons can find an open path to better relations with the world's free nations.

V. Some Questions That Have Been Posed

In the period since the September 11th attacks, the Administration, several Committees of Congress, and now this Commission, have taken on the task of examining what happened on that treacherous day. And a number of questions have been raised.

Some have asked: When the Administration came into office, was there consideration of how to deal with the attack on the U.S.S. Cole? Were there steps that might have been taken to send terrorists a message that the U.S. Government was serious about terrorism?

That is a fair question. I do not believe that launching another cruise missile strike 4 months after the fact would have sent a message of strength to terrorists. Indeed, it might have sent a signal of weakness. Instead, we went to work implementing the recommendations of the Cole Commission and developing a more comprehensive approach to deal with al-Qaeda -- resulting in NSPD-9.

Meanwhile, a system managed by the Counter-Terrorism Security group was in place to coordinate security alerts and increased security postures at home and abroad, including force protection measures at U.S. military bases overseas.

Some have asked: Why wasn't bin Laden taken out, and if he had been hit, would it have prevented September 11th?

First, I know of no actionable intelligence since January 20, 2001 that would have allowed the U.S. to attack and capture or kill Usama bin Laden. In the 2 ½ years since September 11th, all the nations of the Coalition have focused a great deal of time, energy and resources on the task of finding him and capturing or killing him. Thus far none of us has succeeded. But we will. It took ten months to capture Saddam Hussein in Iraq -- and Coalition forces had passed by the hole he was hiding in many times during those ten months. They were able to find him only after someone with specific knowledge told us where he was. What that suggests is that it is exceedingly difficult to find a single individual who is determined to not be found.

Second, even if bin Laden had been captured or killed in the weeks before 9/11, no one I know believes it would have prevented 9/11. Killing bin Laden would not have removed the al-Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. Moreover, the sleeper cells that flew the aircraft into the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon were already in the U.S. some months before the attacks. Indeed, if the stars had aligned, actionable intelligence had appeared, which it did not, and if it had somehow been possible to successfully attack him, it would have been a good thing, to be sure, but, regrettably, 9/11 would likely still have happened. And, ironically, much of the world in all likelihood would have blamed September 11th on the U.S. as an al-Qaeda retaliation for the U.S. provocation of capturing or killing Usama bin Laden.

Some have asked whether there were there plans to go after al-Qaeda in Afghanistan before 9/11 and, if so, why weren't they implemented?

I have recently reviewed a briefing that I am told was presented to me in early February, 2001. The brief outlined some approaches for dealing with Usama bin Laden – which, as I have indicated, I believe would not have prevented 9/11. And, I would not describe the briefing I saw as a comprehensive plan to deal with al-Qaeda and its sanctuary in Afghanistan.

I am told that I asked the briefer many questions and that the team went back and worked on refining their proposed approaches. The work they did in the ensuing months helped prepare the Department for Operation Enduring Freedom and the successful invasion of Afghanistan so soon after 9/11.

One thing is clear -- as of February 2001, we had not yet developed the kind of clear new policy direction which must properly precede the development of war plans. The NSC was at work during the spring and summer of 2001 developing a new counter-terrorism policy needed to inform new war plans. And we were at the same time in the process of overhauling all U.S. contingency plans.

Some have asked if it would have been possible to arm the Northern Alliance before 9/11 and might that have tied up the Taliban and al-Qaeda in a civil war in Afghanistan and prevented 9/11?

The answer is that: while doing so might have attrited al-Qaeda somewhat, it is highly unlikely such a strategy could have prevented 9/11. What was needed at the time was a new U.S. policy for the region, including our relationship with Pakistan, India, and Uzbekistan, and a more comprehensive strategy to eliminate al-Qaeda – which is what the NSC was working on.

Others have asked: Was there a spike in intelligence and terrorist chatter in the June/July 2001 timeframe – and what did the U.S. government do about it?

The answer to the intelligence question is yes there was a spike, as has been indicated by the Director of Central Intelligence. I am reminded that most of that intelligence was focused on overseas threats and some of it focused on potential hijackings, and that steps were taken by the FAA to warn about potential hijackings. However, I don't recall receiving anything in the months prior to 9/11 that suggested terrorists might take commercial airliners and use them as missiles to fly into buildings like the World Trade Center Towers or the Pentagon.

Some have asked: Could the development of the armed Predator been accelerated?

First, let me say that any suggestion that the Predator was delayed would be inaccurate. The Air Force did a good job of bringing in the armed Predator in near record time. Indeed, I am told that when General John Jumper was presented with the development plans, he was originally told it would take several years. He said: do it in one year. In fact, it was done in less than a year. Not only did they rapidly bring that capability online, they overcame a number of technical challenges to do so – from reinforcing the UAV's wings to make sure the Hellfire missile didn't blow the wings off, to expanding the "frag pattern" of the warhead to make it somewhat more effective against intended targets. In short, the Armed Predator was deployed, and played a role in the success of Operation Enduring Freedom well before it had been officially certified as ready for deployment. The Air Force, the CIA and others involved can be properly proud.

VI. Suggestions for the Future

The nature of the war we are fighting today, and the adversary we face, is unlike anything our nation has faced before. Terrorist threats have been around before, to be sure. But the threats have changed in recent years – growing in boldness and lethality.

According to the State Department, there were 230 terrorist incidents between January 1968 and September 11, 2001 in which a total of almost 1,000 Americans were killed. (See Attachment #6) There were three times that number of Americans killed in one day on September 11th.

Today, we face adversaries who:

- Hide in plain sight;
- Take advantage of our open borders and open societies to attack our people;
- Use the institutions of everyday life – planes, trains, cars and letters – as weapons to kill innocent civilians; and
- Can attack with just handfuls of people, at a cost of just hundreds or thousands of dollars – while it requires many tens of thousands of soldiers and billions of dollars to defend against such attacks.

Rooting out and dealing with such enemies is tough. It will require many years. And it will require that we think differently than we did in the 20th century – and that we wrestle with difficult questions about how we go about fighting such an enemy.

The recommendations this Commission may make could help.

For example, you might consider some of the following questions:

How can we strengthen the Intelligence community and get it better arranged for 21st century challenges?

I have heard the argument that, in the wake of 9/11, we need to take all the various intelligence agencies, consolidate them, and put them under the leadership of a single “intelligence czar.” While these recommendations are well intentioned, we would not be doing the country a favor by centralizing intelligence. There are certain areas in life, like intelligence and research and development, where it is a mistake to rely on a single source. Instead, fostering multiple centers of information has proven to be better at promoting creativity and challenging conventional thinking. This is true of intelligence. There may be ways we can strengthen intelligence – but centralization is not one.

One possibility might be to consider reducing stovepipes. There is a good reason for having intelligence compartmentalized. It is a fact that the more people who know something, the more likely that information will be compromised. So there is a risk in breaking down stovepipes and integrating intelligence centers horizontally so that analysts have access to all the information they need. In a time when threats can emerge rapidly, with little or no warning, we need to weigh that risk of expanding access and risking compromise against the risk of not breaking down compartments and denying access. We need to consider whether they are greater than the risk of keeping information so tightly compartmentalized that people who need to know it, use it, and integrate it with other intelligence are kept in the dark.

We need to ensure that the laws and regulations that govern the gathering of intelligence make sense in today’s world, and we should re-evaluate those that may be based on outdated technologies and that did not contemplate today’s information technology environment.

We need to ensure that laws and regulations do not unduly restrict the sharing of information between U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Whatever is recommended, it is critical that the organization and management of the nation's intelligence capabilities are done in a manner that preserves the unique relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. As each year goes by, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between information that contributes to national intelligence versus information that is necessary for military intelligence and focuses on the battlefield. And we must do all this while finding a way to ensure that foreign intelligence of interest to domestic security efforts is collected and made available.

If one believes it could be necessary to centralize all intelligence under a single intelligence czar to improve national intelligence, then one can argue it equally forcefully that it is necessary to centralize all intelligence under the Department of Defense to improve military intelligence. Either course would be a major mistake and could damage our country's intelligence capability severely.

How can we wage war not just on terrorist networks, but also on the ideology & hate they spread?

The global war on terror will, in fact, be a long, hard slog. Victory will require a sustained effort, over many years, to root out terrorist networks, deny them sanctuary, disrupt their financing, and hold to account states that sponsor or provide sanctuary to terrorists. But I am convinced that victory in the global war against terrorism will require a positive effort as well.

We need to find creative ways to stop the next generation of terrorists from being recruited, trained, financed and deployed against free people. For every terrorist that coalition forces capture, kill, dissuade or deter, still others are being recruited and trained. To win the war on terror, we must also win the war of ideas -- the battle for the minds of those who are being recruited by terrorist networks across the globe.

What is the proper balance between security and privacy?

That is a tough question that our society is working through. I don't pretend to know the answers. But I do know that if we analyze, discuss and decide this issue as a 20th century problem, we will get it wrong. We need to recalibrate our thinking to fit the new century.

How can we transform the nomination and confirmation process so we don't have long gaps with key positions unfilled each time there is a new Administration?

As I have indicated, for most of the seven months leading up to 9/11, the Defense Department was working without most of the senior officials responsible for the critical issues we were tackling. We ought to consider whether, in the 21st century, our nation can afford the luxury of taking so long to clear and put in place the senior officials responsible for the security of the American people? And if we do not have that luxury, as I believe we do not, what reforms to the clearance, nomination and confirmation process might be appropriate?

Could our nation benefit from a Goldwater-Nichols-like law for the Executive Branch & the U.S. Government?

The Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s helped move DoD towards a more effective "joint" approach to warfighting -- where instead of just de-conflicting, the individual services were pressed to work together in ways that created power beyond the sum of the Services' individual capabilities. To

achieve that better joint war fighting capability, each of the services had to give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives.

Today, one could argue that the Executive Branch of Government is stove-piped much like the four services were nearly 20 years ago. So the question arises: could we usefully apply the concept and principles of DoD's Goldwater-Nichols to the U.S. Government as a whole? Should we ask whether it might be appropriate for the various departments and agencies to do what the services did two decades ago -- give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort?

And how might we work with Congress to mirror any related changes or reforms in the Executive Branch?

VII. Conclusion

Think about what has been done since the September 11th attacks: two state sponsors of terrorism have been removed from power, a 90-nation coalition has been formed which is cooperating on a number of levels -- through diplomacy, law enforcement, military action, financial and economic measures, information and intelligence. Some of these actions are public and seen -- still others are unseen, with operations that must remain secret, even in success.

All of these actions are putting pressure on terrorist networks. Taken together, they represent a collective effort that is unprecedented -- which has undoubtedly saved lives, and made us safer than before September 11th.

And yet, despite that pressure and that collective effort, terrorist attacks have continued: in Bali and Baghdad, Jakarta and Jerusalem, Casablanca and Riyadh, Mombasa and Istanbul, and most recently the bombings in Madrid. It is likely -- indeed almost certain -- that, in the period ahead, somewhere, somehow, more terrorist attacks will be attempted -- even here in the United States. Certainly intelligence powerfully points to terrorist efforts to do just that.

What can be done? We can remain vigilant. We can continue the efforts underway to transform the institutions of government -- military, intelligence, law enforcement and homeland defense -- to better focus on the threats of the 21st century. We can continue working with allies and partners around the world. And we can continue rooting out terrorist networks, dealing with the proliferation of dangerous weapons of mass murder, and denying terrorists sanctuary.

Not long ago, we marked the 20th anniversary of another terrorist attack: the suicide bomb attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut -- a blast that killed more than 240 Americans. Soon after that attack, President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz asked me to serve as Presidential Envoy for the Middle East. That experience taught me lessons about the nature of terrorism that are relevant today as we prosecute the global war on terror.

After the attack, one seemingly logical response was to put cement barricades around buildings to prevent more truck bombings. But the terrorists quickly figured out how to get around those barricades: they began lobbing rocket-propelled grenades over the cement barriers. The reaction was to hunker down even more. We started seeing buildings along the Corniche, the boardwalk that runs along the sea in Beirut, Lebanon, draped with a metal mesh, so that when rocket-propelled grenades hit the mesh, they would bounce off, doing little damage. It worked, only briefly. And the terrorists again adapted. They watched the comings and goings of embassy personnel and began hitting soft targets --

killing people on their way to and from work. So for every defense that was put up, first barricades, then wire mesh over buildings, the terrorists moved to another avenue of attack.

Not long after that experience -- in 1984 -- I spoke to the Association of the United States Army, the text of which I have submitted with my testimony today as Attachment #7. I noted that terrorists had learned important lessons. They had learned that terrorism:

"is a great equalizer, a force multiplier. It is cheap, deniable, yields substantial results, is low risk, and ... [often] without penalty." They had learned that "[a] single attack ... by influencing public opinion and morale, can alter the behavior of great nations..."

Moreover, I said, free people had learned lessons as well -- that terrorists have a sizable advantage:

"Terrorist attacks can take place at any time, [in] any place, using any technique," and "regrettably, it is not possible to defend every potential target, in every place, at all times, against every form of attack."

I said that:

"Terrorism is a form of warfare, and must be treated as such. As with other forms of conflict, weakness invites aggression. Simply standing in a defensive position, absorbing blows, is not enough. Terrorism must be deterred."

That was 20 years ago. But the lessons apply to our circumstance today.

When our nation was attacked on September 11th, the President recognized that what had happened was an act of war and must be treated as such -- not as a law enforcement matter. He knew that weakness would only invite aggression; and that the only way to defeat the terrorists was to take the war to them -- to go after them where they live and plan and hide, and to make clear to states that sponsor and harbor them that such actions will have consequences.

As the President has made clear this wasn't about law enforcement. He declared that henceforth:

"any person involved in committing or planning terrorist attacks against the American people becomes an enemy of this country Any person, organization, or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent and equally guilty of terrorist crimes. [And] any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups and seeks or possesses weapons of mass destruction is a grave danger to the civilized world -- and will be confronted."

In the ensuing two years, thousands of terrorists have been rounded up, and two terrorist regimes have learned the President meant what he said.

That is why our country and our coalition is at war today. That is why we have forces risking their lives, at this moment, fighting terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere across the world. That is why the President is marshalling all elements of national power -- military, financial, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence and public diplomacy. Because to live as free people in the 21st century, we cannot think we can hide behind concrete barriers and wire mesh. We cannot think that acquiescence or trying to make a separate peace with terrorists to leave us alone, but to go after our friends, will work. Free people cannot live in fear and remain free. The only course is to stop terrorists before they can terrorize.

That is the task.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dick Myers and I would be happy to respond to questions.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040323-secdef0923.html>

~~FOUO~~

January 21, 2005

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Talking Points on Iraqi Elections

I RAQ

Make sure these talking points are circulated to everybody. People need to have these.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/17/05 Talking Points on Iraqi Elections

DHR:ss
012105-4

.....
Please respond by 1/28/05

21 Jan 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09080-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49438

Short Version: Talking About Iraqi Elections in Advance of Vote

- o The ~~Iraqi~~ election on ~~January 30~~ will be a historic moment for ~~Iraq~~, and for the Middle East. For the first time in decades, Iraqis will be able to choose their leaders. And Iraq will move ~~from the~~ appointed government it has today to an elected one.
- These elections ~~will not be perfect~~. They ~~are~~, after all, being held in a country that is a central front in the war on terror, where terrorists are willing to kill people to stop them from voting. However, no amount of violence can erase the huge achievement of holding elections in ~~Iraq~~, which, less than two years ago, was ~~living under~~ a brutal dictator.
- The Iraqis who cast their ballots on ~~January 30~~ are brave and patriotic citizens, willing to stand up to the insurgents, former Baathists and terrorists who would take ~~Iraq~~ back to an era of dictatorship and ~~fear~~. They deserve the admiration of the world.
- Iraqis have shown their enormous enthusiasm to participate in these elections:
 - ~~More than~~ 14 million ~~Iraqis are~~ registered to vote; millions will vote in a few weeks time. Iraqi citizens in 14 countries will also be able to cast their ballots.
 - o Close to 19,000 candidates have ~~registered~~ for election to the Transitional ~~National~~ Assembly, the 18 provincial councils, and the Kurdistan National Assembly.
 - o On the national ballot alone, there are more than 100 coalition, parties and individuals that have put themselves ~~forward~~, eager to win places in the new Assembly.
- ~~Opinion~~ polls show that all communities in Iraq want to participate in the upcoming elections. Regrettably, it is the terrorists who are trying to prevent some Iraqis from exercising their right to vote. This terror and intimidation falls most heavily on the areas in which Sunnis live. But it should not distract us from the fact that almost all Iraqis want to be part of this watershed event.
- ~~Iraq's~~ elections ~~are just one step~~ in its progress toward democracy. ~~Already~~, Iraq has realized many concrete goals: the creation of the Transitional Administrative Law, the formation of the interim government, the transfer of ~~sovereignty~~, the holding of the National Conference this past summer, and the formation of the Iraqi Interim ~~National~~ Council.
- ~~After~~ the ~~January 30~~ election, there will be more steps to be reached and further opportunities for popular participation in the democratic process. There will be the selection of a Presidency Council by the Transitional National Assembly, selection of a Prime Minister by the Presidency Council, and the formation of the Council of Ministers. There will be the drafting of a constitution to reflect the rights and interests of all Iraqis.
- Finally, Iraqis will vote again 2005; in the fall they will vote to approve a new, permanent Iraqi constitution and in December 2005 they will elect a new government under that constitution.

If Asked:

- o (About expected levels of Sunni participation in the vote.) There are election lists that include **Sunnis**, together **with** representation from other **ethnic** and religious groups. It is likely there will be Sunni representation in the Transitional National Assembly as a result of this election. Moreover, all Iraqis recognize **that** the Presidency Council and Council of **Ministers that emerge from the elections** will need to be fully representative of the Iraqi people. **Those** chosen to fill **these** executive **positions** do **not** have to be elected to the Assembly.
- (About expected levels of violence after the elections.) Time will **tell** if **the** elections result in an **easing** of violence in certain areas of Iraq. Iraqis are being targeted and **killed** by **insurgents who** have no program other **than** stopping the vote. These elections are a **necessary** milestone on **the** road of Iraqi self-government **and** self-defense, but **the** violence may continue.
- (About legitimacy **and** the potential for low voter turnout.) Registration rates **and** pre-election polls indicate **that** the vast **majority** of Iraqis want to vote. Regardless of the precise level of **turnout**, the fact that the election is held is itself **an** important achievement, **and** should not **by** nay-sayed **from** the outside. Turnout, which will **vary** throughout the country, is not a measurement of **success** or legitimacy in mature democracies. It would be unfair to consider **it** a measure of "success" for a **country** that **has** never tasted freedom **and** democracy.
- o (About **meeting** international **standards**.) The International Mission for Iraqi Elections opened **an** office in Amman on **January 10** in order to organize monitors for **the** election. A **core** staff of approximately 100 will oversee Iraqi and foreign volunteers to monitor the process.

On Background:

- **There** will be important post-election opportunities in **the** **formation** of the government and **the** **writing** of the constitution to ensure adequate participation of all **communities** - including the Sunnis - in **Iraq's** future.
- Leaders of all communities **now** acknowledge the importance not **only** of holding the most inclusive election possible, but **ensuring** broad participation in these post-elections **institutions**.
- This **shows** the commitment of all communities to a single **unified** **Iraq**.
- One should remember **that** a key **goal** of the new government is to draft a **constitution**, **ratification** of which can be vetoed by a **two-thirds** super-majority vote in any three of Iraq's 18 provinces. **Sunnis** are a majority in four of Iraq's provinces. Political leaders **from** all sectors have underscored **the** importance of **Sunni** inclusion in the new government **and** the drafting of a permanent constitution.

Extended Version: Talking About Iraqi Elections in Advance of Vote

- The **upcoming** Iraqi election on **January 30** **will** be a historic moment for Iraq, and for the Middle East. For the **first time** in decades, Iraqis **will be able to** cast their votes and choose their leaders. **And Iraq** will **move from** the appointed government it **has** today to **an elected one**.
- This is **an enormous** achievement in any **country**. But it is particularly monumental in **country** that, **less than two years ago**, was living **under a brutal dictator** who suppressed all forms of expression.
- These elections will not be perfect. **As Prime Minister Allawi** told the United States Congress in September, the **January** vote will **not be the best election that** Iraq will ever hold. The election will be messy in some places, and perhaps not all Iraqis who want to vote will **be able to** at the end of the day. These elections **are, after all, being held** in a **country** that is a central front on the **war on terror**, where thousands of insurgents, **former Baathists** and terrorists are willing to intimidate and kill people to **stop them from exercising** their right to vote. However, **no** amount of violence **can** take away from the huge achievement of holding elections after **decades** of oppression.
- The Iraqis **who** cast their ballots on January 30 are brave and patriotic citizens, willing to **stand up to the** insurgents, **former Baathists** and terrorists who would **take** Iraq back to **an era of dictatorship and fear**. They deserve the admiration of the world **for** their courage in choosing, at a **turning point** in the history of Iraq and of the Middle East, to stand up to **evil**.
- Iraqis have **shown** their **enormous** enthusiasm for these elections.
 - **More than** 14 million Iraqis are registered to vote; millions will vote in **a few weeks time**. Iraqi citizens in **14 countries** **will** also be able to cast their **ballots**.
 - Close to **19,000** candidates have registered for the election to the Transitional National Assembly, the 18 provincial councils, and the Kurdistan **National Assembly**.
 - **On the** national ballot alone, there are **more than** 100 coalitions, parties and individuals that have put themselves forward, eager to win places in the new **Assembly**.
 - Election preparations – led by a number of courageous, committed Iraqis who **make up** Iraq's independent electoral commission – **are underway** in nearly all of Iraq's territory. In **80 percent** of the **country**, Iraqis expect to cast their ballot without **major** complication or fear (*possible reference to declassified chart*). In **other** parts of the **country**, the electoral commission and ordinary Iraqis **are** working with the **Iraqi Ministry** of Interior and the coalition to **ensure** that the largest number of people possible have the opportunity to cast **a vote**.
- Opinion polls **show** that all **communities** in **Iraq** – including the **Sunnis** – want to participate in the **upcoming** election. Regrettably, it is **the terrorists** who are trying to prevent **some** Iraqis **from exercising** their right to vote. **This terror** and intimidation falls most heavily on the areas in which **Sunnis** live. But it should not distract us **from** the fundamental reality that almost all **Iraqis want to be part** of this watershed event.

- Iraq's election is **just** one step in its progress toward democracy. Already, **Iraq** has realized **many** concrete goals: the creation of the Transitional Administrative **Law**, the formation of the interim government, the transfer of sovereignty, the holding of the National Conference **this past summer**, and the formation of the Iraqi Interim National Council.
- **After the January 30 election**, there will be more steps to be taken and further opportunities for popular participation in the democratic process. **There will** be the selection of a Presidency Council **by the** Transitional National Assembly, selection of a Prime Minister **by the** Presidency Council, and the formation of the Council of Ministers. **There will** be the **drafting** of a **constitution** to reflect the rights and interests of all **Iraqis**. And **Iraqis** will vote several more **times** in 2005. In October, the Iraqi people **will** vote to approve a new, permanent **Iraqi constitution**; and in **December 2005**, they will elect a new government **under** that **constitution**.
- The Coalition **has** been supportive of these elections in every possible way. But it's important to **keep in mind** that **the** actual democratization of **Iraq** – and **the** conduct of these elections – is **being** driven, first and foremost, by **Iraqis** themselves.
- **We** of course **do not h o w** what the new government will look **like**. And we do not support **any** particular candidate or party. But, **as** we have always **said**, **our** objectives are to promote **an Iraq** that is secure, prosperous, democratic, and **free**. **From** everything we **know** of the Iraqi candidate **lists** for the upcoming vote, it **is** clear that all of the major contenders agree with these basic strategic objectives.
- **We** therefore look forward to **working in partnership with** the sovereign **Iraqi** Transitional Government which **will** be formed following the **January** election – whoever is in charge. In **our** relationship with **this** government, we will remain fully committed to helping **Iraq** train **Iraqi** security forces, defeat terrorists and the insurgency, promote economic reconstruction, and advance the democratic process.


On January 31, **Iraqis will** no doubt be proud that they have **carried out** elections, **under the most** difficult of circumstances. The elections **will** be a landmark step in the democratization of **Iraq**, and the establishment of a peaceful and free political order after decades of totalitarian dictatorship.

If Asked:

- (About expected levels of **Sunni** participation in the vote.) **There are** election **lists** that include **Sunnis**, together with representation from **other** ethnic and religious groups. It is likely there **will be** **Sunni** representation in the Transitional National Assembly **as the result** of **this** election. Moreover, **all** **Iraqis** recognize that the Presidency **Council**, Council of **Ministers**, and **Constitutional Drafting Committee** **that** emerge from **the elections** **will need to** be **fully** representative of the Iraqi people. **Those chosen** to fill **these** executive positions do not have **to be** elected to the Assembly.

FOUO

JAN 7 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Working Paper Attached

110.01

You ought to **look** at this in connection with the testimony.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/14/04 Budget Outline (Working Paper)

DHR:ss
010505-22

.....
Please respond by _____

9 Jan 05

FOUO

OSD 09081-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49443

Outline


- DoD Enduring Priorities
- US Government Budget Trends and Challenges
- DoD Budget Trends

U.S. Defense Priorities

Defending America Today and Tomorrow

- Deter potential adversaries and defend America and American interests
- Counter asymmetric threats
- Fight and win the global war on terror
- Assure readiness of the Armed Forces
- Mitigate surprise
- Ensure U.S. leadership role in the world
- Transform the Department of Defense
 - Reshaping military capability for the 21st Century
 - Changing culture, business practices, processes and organizations for sustained advantage



ral Spending by Category as a Percentage of GDP, FY 1962 - FY 2009



Federal Budget Shares 1962 to 2009


Shares of Total Federal Outlays by Type of Spending, FY 1962 - FY 2009

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~~FOUO~~ Predecisional Working Paper

**Defense and Non-Defense Discretionary Outlays as a Share of Total Federal
Discretionary Outlays, FY 1962 - FY 2009**




1/6/2005

FOUO Predecisional Working Paper

5

11-L-0559/OSD/49448

Discretionary Spending Growth FY 2001 - FY 2005



1/6/2005


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11-L-0559/OSD/49449

Budget Deficit Remains Difficult Challenge

U.S. Unified Federal Budget Surplus/Deficit Projections 2003-2014



1/6/2005


FOUO Predecisional Working Paper

7

11-L-0559/OSD/49450

Challenge Even Greater Looking Beyond Mid-Term Planning Horizon

Social Security and Medicare Deficit as a Percentage of GDP




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
8

11-L-0559/OSD/49451

DoD Total Obligational Authority as a Percentage of U.S. GDP



Defense Outlays as a Percentage of GDP FY 1910 - 2005




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11-L-0559/OSD/49453


President's Budget FYDP Projections vs. Actual Defense Budget FY80-05 (TY\$B)



1/6/2005

President during Budget Submission
~~FOUO~~ Predecisional Working Paper

President's Budget FYDP Projections vs. Actual Defense Budget FY80-05 (FY05\$)




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FOUO Predecisional Working Paper


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11-L-0559/OSD/49455

Department of Defense Budget Authority by Appropriations Title, FY 1945 - FY 2009




Cost of America's Wars



11-L-0559/OSD/49457
 Predecisional Working Paper

Backups

Army TOA by Appropriation FY 1961 - FY 2009




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
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11-L-0559/OSD/49459


Navy TOA by Appropriation FY 1961 - FY 2009




Marine Corps TOA by Appropriation FY 1961 - FY 2009



Air Force TOA by Appropriation FY 1961 - FY 2009



US & China GDP and Population Projections



Legend: GDP in current PPP \$ — US GDP in current \$ - - - China Population - - - US Population

FOUO Predecisional Working Paper

Country Ranking By GDP

(2003 Billions of U.S. Dollars)

2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
U.S.	U.S.	U.S.	U.S.	U.S.	China
Japan	Japan	China	China	China	U.S.
Germany	Germany	Japan	Japan	India	India
U.K.	U.K.	Germany	India	Japan	Japan
France	China	U.K.	Russia	Russia	Brazil
Italy	France	India	U.K.	Brazil	Russia
China	Italy	France	Germany	U.K.	U.K.
Brazil	India	Russia	France	Germany	Germany
India	Russia	Italy	Brazil	France	France
Russia	Brazil	Brazil	Italy	Italy	Italy



INSIGHT

11/02/00

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2000-2050 Projections: Working Paper


4/2004

21

1

11-L-0559/OSD/49464

Supply and Demand for Oil



The big unknown: CHINA

	U.S.	China		
Population (2003, Millions)	293	1,299	U.S. Oil Consumption used for Motor Gasoline:	42%
Annual GDP Growth (1990-2001)	3.4%	10.0%	Growth in Chinese Vehicle Sales (2002-2003):	97%
Vehicles per 1000 people (1995)	740	8.5		


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~~FOUO~~ Predecisional Working Paper

22

11-L-0559/OSD/49465

US Population 2000



■ Male ■ Female


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11-L-0559/OSD/49466


Components of the Change in CBO's Budget Projection Since 2001



~~FOUO~~

January 5, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest Afghan Security Forces Update, for your information.

Respectfully,

Attach.
1/03/05 Afghan Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
01/05/05-1

Afghanistan

S Jan 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09084-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49468

For Official Use Only



Afghan Security Forces Update Executive Summary

03 January 2005




Data As of: 03 Jan 05 Version M1

11-L-0559/OSD/49469

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u><ul style="list-style-type: none">– National Police– Highway Police– Border Police– Criminal Investigator Police– Counter Narcotics Police• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u><ul style="list-style-type: none">– Afghan National Army Corps– Afghan Air Corps– Intermediate Commands	<u>Trained</u> 33,015
	<u>Trained & Equipped</u> 17,881
	<hr/> 50,896

Trained and Equipped ANA / Trained ANP

Only



Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only




Projected Percentage of goals of Trained Police on hand over time

Security Force Element	Trained NLT Dec 05	2-Jan-05	1-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Sep-05
National (1) Police	42,500					
Highway Police	8,000					
Border Police	12,000					
Counter- (2) Narcotics Police	800					

Notes:

1. Projected Goals based on anticipated class convening with **100%** quota utilization. Percentages may fluctuate dependent on ANP recruitment effort. Training conducted by **DoS/International** Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) representatives. ANP endstate for 2005 is 63,300.
2. CNPA endstate for 2007 is 1,800 officers. CNPA includes interdiction, intelligence, and investigative officers.
3. National Police and Counternarcotics Police goals changed by INL

Legend

	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data As of: 03 Jan 05

11-L-0559/OSD/49472

Afghan Armed Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only




Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Army Units on hand over time

Afghanistan Security Forces Elements	Endstate	2-Jan-05	1-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Jan-06	1-Apr-07
Headquarters (General Staff)	3,000	42%	48%	63%			
Corps	43,000			42%	54%	63%	
Air Corps	3,000				40%	63%	
Training Units	21,000						

Notes:

1. Percentages based on the Dec 06 (6 Battalion) Model starting Mar 05

Legend

	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data As of: 03 Jan 05

11-L-0559/OSD/49473


Coalition Contributors

For Official Use Only

Albania	22	Denmark	67	Ireland	5	Netherlands	311	Sweden	52
Australia	4	Egypt	65	Italy	508	New Zealand	111	Switzerland	4
Austria	1	Estonia	15	Jordan	174	Norway	298	Turkey	249
Azerbaijan	22	Finland	72	Korea	212	Poland	120	UK	490
Belgium	610	France	1,289	Latvia	9	Portugal	40	USA	16,122
Bulgaria	47	Germany	2198	Lithuania	2	Romania	566		
Canada	823	Greece	168	Luxembourg	10	Slovakia	66		
Croatia	50	Hungary	133	Macedonia	20	Slovenia	7		
Czech Rep	20	Iceland	16	Mongolia	17	Spain	570	Total	25,585

Afghan Forces On Hand	70,789
National Police	48,450
Highway	891
Border Police	3,417
Counter Narcotics Police	150
Subtotal On Hand	(1) 52,908

MOD/GS	1,245
Corps	15,501
Air Corps	0
Intermediate Commands	1,135
Subtotal On Hand	17,881



Afghan Forces Trained	50,869
National Police	31,809
Highway	220
Border Police	851
Counter Narcotics Police	54
Subtotal On Hand	(2) 33,015

MOD/GS	1,245
Corps	15,501
Air Corps	0
Intermediate Commands	1,135
Subtotal On Hand	17,881



ANP Notes: (1) Estimate provided by Ministry of Interior. (2) ANP Forces Trained as of 15 Dec05 DoJ/ICITAP Training Report.

Data As of: 03 Jan 05

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

11-L-0559/OSD/49474



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

MAY 27 2005

ACQUISITION
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

The Honorable Robert Andrew
United States House of Representatives
506-A White Horse Pike
Haddon Heights, NJ 08035

Dear Representative Andrew:

This responds to your recent letter to the Secretary of Defense on behalf of your constituent, Ms. Sally Coffey, requesting a list of contracting officers in charge of procurement of modular vault system security products for all U.S. military commands so that the manufacturer may offer this product at a reduced price.

In general, the contracting responsibilities of the Military Departments are decentralized. Each activity buys products and/or services that are required to support its mission. Therefore, Ms. Sally Coffey should first contact small business specialists located at the military bases in her surrounding area. These specialists can be found in the Small Business Specialists directory that is located on the DOD Small Business website at: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ysabu> and listed under "Publications." I would also encourage them to contact the nearest Procurement Technical Assistance Center (PTAC). PTAC's receive funding from DoD to provide procurement assistance to small business concerns. They provide assistance in understanding the procurement process, identifying contracting opportunities, submitting proposals, and exploring DoD electronic commerce. The PTAC website is: <http://www.dla.mil/db/procurem.htm>. Ms. Coffey should also explore FedBizOpps, <http://www.fedbizopps.gov/>, a website used by government buyers to publicize their business opportunities and by commercial vendors to monitor and retrieve opportunities solicited by the entire federal contracting community. This is also a useful site to identify subcontracting opportunities, since contract awards to prime contractors are also published at FedBizOpps.

I am also enclosing a guide to DoD contracting opportunities for your constituent. I hope this information will be of assistance to Ms. Coffey.

Sincerely,

Deidre A. Lee
Director, Defense Procurement
and Acquisition Policy

cc: Washington Office



11-L-0559/OSD/49475

R
OSD 07084-05

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

2005 MAY 12 PM 2:24

May 9, 2005

ES-3206

05/00 6414

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: U.S. Forces in the Sinai

Whatever happened to reducing our forces in the Sinai?

Thanks,

DHR:ss
050905-21

.....
Please respond by

5/26/05

OSD 09093-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49476

May 9, 2005

ES-3206

05/00 6414

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: U.S. Forces in the Sinai

Whatever happened to reducing our forces in the Sinai?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
050905-21

.....
Please respond by

5/26/05

5/11/05

→ SD

Rodman and I are working that. Elliott Abrams on HSC staff was at first not receptive to our proposed new approach, but I have scheduled a meeting with him and Lench and we may make headway.

I'll report back to you within a few days, after this next meeting.

Doug Feith

FOUO

05-00000 11-L-0559

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SEC. OF DEFENSE
May 5, 2005
2005 11 13 21 10 20

TO: Gordon England
Tina Jonas
Steve Cambone
Mike Wynne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Note on Science Budgets

Attached is a note on the subject of science budgets. Please take a look and let's talk about it at an early Roundtable.

Thanks.

Attach:
5/4/05 Email to SecDef re: Science Budgets

DHR:m
030403-12

.....
Please respond by _____

UNDATA
HAS BEEN
DATE 5/5
MB

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09220-05

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

05/04/05
5/4

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 11:17 AM

To: (b)(6) @OSD.MIL; peter.pece@is.pentagon.mil; james.stavridis@osd.mil

Cc: glambertani@fcom.mil

Subject: Fwd: Letter to POTUS urging him to triple the innovation budget

Frank Wolf is exactly right about the need to triple the basic science budget of the United States and to transform math and science education

we are facing a 'silent sputnik' crisis in which China and India are simply going to outstrip us over the next two decades

this is a far greater national security crisis than Iraq

newt

CC: YAGM STAVRIDIS
LARRY DILITA
PAUL BUTLER
COL STEVE BUE

5/4/2005

11 0550/OSD/10470

(b)(6)

From: Schlieter, Courtney[Courtney.Schlieter@mail.house.gov] -
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 11:02 AM
To: 'thldwave2@aol.com'
Cc: 'tyler@newt.org'
Subject: Letter to POTUS urging him to triple the innovation budget

Mr. Gingrich -

Congressman Wolf asked me to make sure you had a copy of the letter that he sent to the White House yesterday urging President Bush to triple the innovation - federal basic research and development - over the next decade. A copy of the letter is attached.

Thanks,

Courtney

Courtney Haller Schlieter
Appropriations Legislative Assistant
Congressman Frank Wolf (VA-10)
241 Cannon
Washington, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-5136

5/4/2005

FRANK A. WOLF
10th District, Virginia

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN—COMMERCE, JUSTICE,
STATE AND JUDICIARY

HOMELAND SECURITY

TRANSPORTATION, TREASURY
AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

CO-CHAIR—CONGRESSIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS CAUCUS



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
May 3, 2005

341 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6510
(202) 775-5118

13673 Park Center Road
Suite 130
Manassas, VA 20107
(703) 709-0880
(800) 545-0880 (in State)

110 North Capital Street
Winchester, VA 22601
(540) 657-0880
(800) 696-3463 (in State)

www.house.gov/wolf

The Honorable George W. Bush
The President
The White House
Washington DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

America today finds herself at a crossroads when it comes to leading the world in science and innovation. We can continue down the current path, as other nations continue to narrow the gap, or we can take bold, dramatic steps to ensure U.S. economic leadership in the 21st century and a rising standard of living for all Americans.

I know you share my concern about the future competitiveness of American industry and are committed to improving job opportunities for all Americans. However, our current levels of investment in innovative research and development are not enough to keep us at the forefront. Countries such as China and India are quickly gaining ground on the United States and few people realize it. This trend should be setting off alarm bells, especially as more high-tech products, and the high-tech jobs behind them, are located elsewhere.

The United States faces stiff competition in sheer volume because our population is a fraction of that of China and India. In 2000, Asian universities accounted for almost 1.2 million of the world's science and engineering degrees and European universities accounted for 850,000. North American universities accounted for only about 500,000. Additionally, according to the National Science Foundation, the United States has a smaller share of the worldwide total of science and engineering doctoral degrees awarded than either Asia or Europe. This is most alarming when you consider that since 1980, the number of science and engineering positions in the United States have grown at five times the rate of positions in the civilian workforce as a whole.

Foreign advances in basic science also now often rival or even exceed America's, and published research by Americans is lagging. *Physical Review*, a series of top physics journals, last year tracked a reversal in which American scientific papers, in two decades, dropped from the most published to minority status. In 2004 – the most recent year statistics are available – the total number of American papers published was just 29 percent, down from 61 percent in 1983.

America also is losing ground in the area of patents. The percentage of U.S. patents has been steadily declining as foreign nations, especially in Asia, have become more active and in some fields have seized the innovation lead. The U.S. share of its own industrial patents now stands at only 52 percent. Another measuring stick is number of Nobel prizes won. From the 1960s through the 1990s, American scientists dominated. Now, the rest of the world has caught up as our scientists only win about half of the Nobel prize with the rest going to Britain, Japan,

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE OF RECYCLED FIBERS

The Honorable George W. Bush

May 2, 2005

Page 2

Russia, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and New Zealand.

Federal research support serves two essential purposes. First, it supports the research required to fuel continued innovation and economic growth. Second, because much of it takes place at the nation's colleges and universities, it plays a critical role in training our next generation of scientists, engineers, mathematicians and others who will comprise the future scientific and technological workforce. I am concerned that with the current levels of federal investment in research and technology our country will fall victim to the fierce manpower competition we face from developing countries.

America has a proud history of rising to the occasion. We need to be mobilized as we were after the former Soviet Union launched Sputnik, when we made a commitment in the late 1950s to build our space program and greatly enhance our educational system in the name of national defense through the passage of the National Defense Education Act. Most recently we fulfilled the commitment to double the National Institutes of Health budget to jump-start work on medical research to help find cures to debilitating and fatal diseases.

Our nation must make a similar bold commitment to invest in the future of our country by tripling the innovation budget - federal basic research and development - over the next decade. We need to inspire young people to study math and science. As chairman of the Science-State-Justice-Commerce Appropriations subcommittee, I understand the difficult budget environment the nation is facing. But bold leadership from the White House will help establish this as a national priority in your next budget request to the Congress.

We must ensure for future generations that America continues to be the innovation leader of the world. Investing in research and development is a critical part of optimizing our nation for innovation, a process that will require strong leadership and involvement from government, industry, academia and labor. We must choose whether to innovate or abdicate.

I urge you to seize this opportunity to rally our nation to the cause of innovation and stand ready to assist you in this 21st century challenge. I hope you will work with Congress, with manufacturers and other producers and services providers, and with the academic and scientific communities to develop the necessary consensus to that Will ensure America will remain the world's leader in innovation. The competitive and economic future of America is at stake.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Frank R. Wolf
Member of Congress

ACTION MEMO

Answers ES-3384
and I-05/007435

USD(P)

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY (ACTING) Mira Ricardel

JUN 2 2005

SUBJECT: Draft Letter to MoD Bono

For your signature (at Tab A) is a draft response to MoD Bono's thank you letter of 13 May 05 (at Tab B). The letter **also** acknowledges his gift and invitation to visit Spain sometime in the future.

RECOMMENDATION

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Other _____

A/DASD NATO & EUR *Noted for* JUN 02 2005
DIR/EPs *MP*

USP
Action
memo

2 Jun 05

13 May 05

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

FROM: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO: USDAO MADRID
OSD CHAIRS
INFO: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF-C/SECDEF-N
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS//
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//FILE/USDP ISP/USDP EUR POL//

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO MOD BONO'S LETTER

PLEASE TRANSLATE AND FORWARD THE FOLLOWING SECDEF
CORRESPONDENCE TO MINISTER REPSE TO THE APPROPRIATE
OFFICIALS.

(BEGIN TEXT)

HIS EXCELLENCY
JOSE BONO MARINEZ
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
PLACE DE LA CASTELLANA 109
28071 MADRID
SPAIN

DEAR MR. MINISTER

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 13 MAY 2005. I
APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU HERE IN THE
PENTAGON ON MAY 3RD. THE FRANK DISCUSSIONS ON SPANISH
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ISAF IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN AND
REMOVAL OF NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE CAVEATS, AS WELL AS
CAVEATS ON EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES, WERE VERY BENEFICIAL. I
ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT IN THE SPANISH PRESS LAST
WEEK FOR MAINTAINING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA.

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR THE STATUE OF THE SPANISH ARMY CADET.
I AM DELIGHTED TO HAVE IT. I ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR KIND
INVITATION FOR A FUTURE VISIT TO SPAIN AND LOOK FORWARD TO
IT.

SINCERELY, 11-L-0559/OSD/49484

(END TEXT)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/49485

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

2005 MAY 05 04:28:27

05/006908-EP

USD (P) Copy

ES-3328

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: MIRA R. RICARDEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (ACTING)

SUBJECT: Spanish MOD Bono's Follow-Through on EU Embargo on China

- Since his 3 May 05 visit to the Pentagon, Minister Bono has made two public statements in favor of retaining the EU embargo on China
- On 9 May during an interview with Spanish Television (TVE) about his trip to the US, he stated that while the EU embargo was a political issue, as MOD he favored retaining (not lifting) it.
- MOD Bono was the keynote speaker at the 17 May 10th Annual US-Spain Council meeting. In his speech he stated his personal opposition to lifting the EU arms embargo on China.
 - o Bono was careful to note in his speech that FM Moratinos and PM Zapatero had the ultimate word on the issue within the Spanish government, but as MOD he wanted his views to be known and appropriately factored into the equation.

A/DASD (EUR & NATO)

Dir EUR(S)

MA SD	5/27	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	5/26	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	260 For W/ 5-25		
ESR MA			

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Prepared by Patrick Graff, ISP/EUR(b)(6)
18 May 2005/1300

11-L-0559/OSD/49486

OSD 09930-05

~~FOUO~~

ES-3384
05/007435

MAY 31 2005

Spain

TO: Mira Ricardel
cc: **DOUG FEITH**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: MOD Bono

Should we write Bono a letter thanking him for saying we appreciated his follow-through on the EU embargo?

Thanks.

Attach.
5/18/05 Acting ASD (ISP) Info Memo to SecDef

DHR:as
052705-16

.....
Please respond by 6/9/05

31 May 05

13 May 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09314-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49487

Courtesy Translation

Madrid, May 13th, 2005

The Honorable
Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 MAY 17 AM 11 06

Dear friend,

Upon my return to Spain, I wish to thank you for your kind invitation to visit the United States and express my great satisfaction for the development of such a fruitful trip.

Our sincere and friendly interview in Washington, has given us the opportunity to set forth our respective points of view on issues of mutual interest and to know better the reasons in which they are based. I am convinced that we have laid down the bedrock to manage an excellent cooperation and relation in the defense field in the future.

The rest of the trip has been very interesting and very constructive. In Norfolk, I was able to see by myself the interoperability of our naval units which has been evidenced with the recent integration of frigate "Alvaro de Bazan" into the combat group of aircraft carrier "Theodore Roosevelt" and the great atmosphere of confidence, friendship and camaraderie that prevails among the crews of the ships.

In Tampa, in the Central Command of the United States, I attended a very interesting presentation in which I was briefed on its tasks and responsibilities, on the strategic importance - for the international community - of the twenty-seven countries it is in charge of and on the development of the operations that take place in this theater.

OSD 09314-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49488

As for the arms embargo on China, I believe we must maintain the embargo and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation has reaffirmed that it has no intention of favoring the lifting of the embargo within the European Union.

On the other hand, I am pleased to inform you that Spain will shortly eliminate her caveats in Afghanistan and the Balkans.

Finally, I would like to stress the emotional visit to the National Cemetery of Arlington, where U.S. soldiers of all times, who have given their lives for their homeland and for freedom are, rightly and deservedly, paid tribute.

I take this opportunity to invite you to pay an official visit to Spain, where I would feel honored to welcome you.

Sincerely

Jose Bono Martinez



El Ministro de Defensa

Madrid, 13 de mayo de 2005

Excmo. Sr.
D. Donald Rumsfeld
Secretario de Defensa de los Estados Unidos
WASHINGTON

Estimado amigo:

De regreso a España, quiero agradecerle su amable invitación para visitar los Estados Unidos y expresarle mi satisfacción por el desarrollo tan provechoso del viaje que hemos realizado.

Nuestra entrevista en Washington, franca y cordial, nos ha dado la oportunidad de exponer nuestros respectivos puntos de vista sobre cuestiones de interés mutuo y de conocer mejor las razones en que se fundamentan. Estoy convencido de que hemos sentado las bases para que en el futuro la cooperación y las relaciones entre nuestros países en materia de defensa sean inmejorables.

El resto del viaje ha sido muy interesante y de gran utilidad. En Norfolk, pude comprobar la interoperabilidad de nuestras unidades navales plasmada con la integración de la fragata "Alvaro de Bazan" en el grupo de combate del portaaviones "Theodore Roosevelt" y el gran ambiente de confianza, amistad y camaradería que reina entre las dotaciones de los buques.

En Tampa, en el Mando Central de los Estados Unidos, asistí a una presentación muy interesante en la que fui informado sobre sus cometidos y responsabilidades, de la importancia estratégica para la comunidad internacional de los veintisiete países de los que se ocupa y del desarrollo de las operaciones que tienen lugar en este teatro.

En relación con el embargo de armas a China, mi opinión es que debe mantenerse dicho embargo y desde el propio Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación también me han ratificado que no tienen intención de favorecer en el seno de la Unión Europea el levantamiento del mismo.



Por otro lado, me complace informarle que España eliminara en breve las restricciones que tiene en Afganistan y Balcanes.

Para finalizar me gustaría destacar la emotiva visita al Cementerio Nacional de Arlington, donde con toda justicia y merecimiento se rinde homenaje a los soldados norteamericanos de todos los tiempos que dieron su vida por su patria y por la libertad.

Aprovecho la ocasión para invitarlo formalmente a realizar una visita oficial a España, donde me sentiría honrado de tenerle como huésped.

Un cordial saludo.

Jose Bono Martinez

Nota: Le adjunto mis recientes declaraciones al diario ABC de Madrid sobre el embargo de armas a China, por si le resultara de interés.

11-L-0559/OSD/49491

ABC

DOMINGO

8

JOSÉ BONO

Ministro de Defensa



José Bono se muestra contrario al levantamiento del embargo de armas a China, sobre el que se interesó Rumsfeld

«Con el viaje a EE.UU., en materia de Defensa hemos pasado página tras Irak»

—Acaba de regresar de su primer viaje oficial a Estados Unidos, con un mensaje de satisfacción, de que «todo ha salido bien», y la tarea «cumplida». ¿Qué ha cambiado en las relaciones con Norteamérica tras esta visita? ¿qué se trae de su entrevista con Donald Rumsfeld?

—En materia de Defensa, creo que hemos pasado página, y el recelo se ha tornado en cordialidad mutua. En este campo se han sentado las bases para que las relaciones sean inmejorables: las propias de aliados y amigos.

—Usted ha sido agasajado por las autoridades de Defensa norteamericanas con numerosos gestos de reconocimiento a lo largo de esta semana, pero son muchos los que piensan que Estados Unidos no regala nada. ¿Qué ha puesto usted encima de la mesa para llegar a este punto?

—La cordialidad y la espontaneidad nos compran, pero son muy convenientes. Estados Unidos es una gran potencia, con unas capacidades militares muy superiores a las de España, pero ninguna nación es tan fuerte que no necesite aliados. Mantenemos una relación de lealtad, de alianza y de amistad. Hubo un paréntesis motivado por nuestro distinto modo de ver la guerra de Irak, pero hemos querido que este asunto pertenezca al pasado y que no condicionen nuestras relaciones de futuro.

—Sí, pero España tiene muchos elementos de interés para Estados Unidos, como el uso de las bases militares.

Durante mi estancia en EE.UU. no se ha mencionado ni una sola vez la palabra Rota o Morón, y en honor a la

verdad, debo decir que el secretario Rumsfeld nos ha dado un trato amistoso y sin dobleces.

—¿Acaso nos están premiando por el nuevo compromiso en el oeste de Afganistán, donde España ha decidido asumir una tarea que puede durar años?

—Los periodistas fueron testigos de la gratitud a España por su contribución a la paz en Afganistán. Recuerdan con respeto la muerte de 82 militares españoles en el accidente del Yakovlev cuando volvían de Afganistán. Saben que nuestra presencia exterior, en operaciones de paz, es muy superior a lo que de nuestro presupuesto de Defensa podría esperarse. Los Estados Unidos lo valoran.

BASES MILITARES

«Durante mi estancia en Estados Unidos no se ha mencionado ni una sola vez la palabra Rota o Morón, debo decir que el secretario Rumsfeld nos ha dado un trato amistoso y sin dobleces»

AFGANISTÁN

«Saben que nuestra presencia en operaciones de paz es muy superior a lo que de nuestro presupuesto de Defensa podría esperarse. Los Estados Unidos lo valoran»

—Entiendo que da por cerradas las heridas del repliegue de Irak, del que ahora se cumple un año. ¿Volvería a retirar las tropas?

—Sí. —¿Mantiene la decisión de que los soldados no regresarán para formar la policía iraquí ni siquiera en el marco de la OTAN, a pesar de que esta postura no está siendo bien vista por muchos países aliados?

—España ha ofrecido cursos de adiestramiento para militares iraquíes en nuestro territorio, y eso es un ofrecimiento que mantenemos y podemos ampliar. Pero no está previsto que nuestras tropas vayan a territorio iraquí en ningún caso. La OTAN es una alianza que funciona respetando la soberanía de los Estados, y ésta no

—Por cierto, cuando compareció tras la entrevista que mantuvo con usted el secretario de Estado de Defensa, Donald Rumsfeld, hizo un comentario, sin que nadie se lepidiera, acerca del levantamiento del embargo a China. ¿Está usted por la labor?

—No me corresponde tomar esa decisión, pero como ministro de Defensa creo que debe mantenerse el embargo de armas a China.

Translation
next
under

Courtesy Translation

By the way, after your meeting with the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, you talked, without anybody asking you to do so, about the lifting of the embargo on China. Are you in favor of doing so?

It is not my responsibility to take this decision, but as Minister of Defense I think we must maintain the arms embargo on China.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JUN 13 2005

SPAIN

His Excellency Jose Bono Martinez
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Paseo de la Castellana 109
28071 Madrid, Spain

Dear Mr. Minister:

Thank you for your letter of May 13, 2005 and your kind invitation to visit Spain. I am pleased we were able to meet here in the Pentagon and found our frank discussions on ISAF and Command Structure caveats useful.

I also appreciate the supportive comments you made to the Spanish press about the need to maintain the EU arms embargo on China.

Thank you for the statue of the Spanish army cadet. I am delighted to have it.

Sincerely,

13 JUN 05

OSD 09314-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49494

13 MAY 05

5/17
1710



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 MAY 17 PM 12:14

5/18

May 16, 2005, 1:00 p.m.

Paul Butler
5/17

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake on Response to Senator Byrd

- Attached is a proposed letter to Senator Byrd regarding his inquiry during your recent hearing before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The Senator brought up a constituent's experience with casualty assistance.
- The Army and P&R have worked with Mrs. Vance and addressed her concerns to her satisfaction. She has notified Senator Byrd's staff that she was previously unaware of several changes and improvements to the Services' casualty assistance processes and was pleased to learn of them.
- The Senator's staff is satisfied that Mrs. Vance's situation is resolved, but still thinks casualty assistance training and resources need improvement.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake #050905-37
2. SECDEF response to Senator Byrd

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD	5/17	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	5/17		
ESR MA	5/16	1350	

Prepared by: Rebecca Schmidt, Plans & Systems, OUSD(C) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/49495

OSD 09325-05

704

16 May 05

10 May 05

FOUO

May 10, 2005

Sent to
Sue L. DASD
5/10

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Senator Byrd

Did we ever get back to Bob Byrd with a response on Mrs. Vance, the person he raised who was not treated properly with respect to health benefits?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
050905-37

.....
Please respond by

5/19/05

OK
5/18
Sir,
Response attached.

via
Lt Col Lengyel

MAY 18 2005

FOUO

OSD 09325-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49496

May 10, 2005

Sect 5
S. L. D. D.
S. L.

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Senator Byrd

204

Did we ever get back to Bob Byrd with a response on Mrs. Vance, the person he raised who was not treated properly with respect to health benefits?

Thanks.

DHR:gs
050905-37

.....
Please respond by 5/19/05

~~FOUO~~

10 May 05

11-L-0559/OSD/49497

OSD 09325-05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 18 2005

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4801

Dear Senator Byrd:

Thank you for bringing up the case of Mrs. Lisa Vance, at our recent Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee hearing. As I told you at the time, one can't be satisfied that we are doing enough in terms of services and counseling for surviving family members when we hear a story like hers.

Happily, I am advised that Mrs. Vance is now aware of the many improvements that have been made in the area of casualty assistance and that she considers her issues satisfactorily resolved.

I am glad that we have addressed Mrs. Vance's situation, but appreciate your concern about the need to provide adequate training and resources for the casualty assistance officers who take on the solemn responsibility to assist surviving family members of our fallen heroes. Chairman Myers and I will continue to follow very closely Department and Services efforts to continually improve our casualty assistance programs. This is of utmost importance to me.

Your continued concern for and support of our Nation's brave men and women in uniform and their families are appreciated. With your help, we will see an Iraq at peace and an ally in the Global War on Terror.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/49498

OSD 09325-05

784


18 May 05

10 May 05

5/11
1430

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
May 11, 2005
2005 MAY 17 PM 3:16

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: List of Organizations

Please dig out all the things the Secretary of Defense is a member of, like the Economic Advisory Council and the Red Cross, etc. Then I will decide which ones I want Gordon England to take.

Add a separate piece of paper to our draft memo, and I will divide them up.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
051005-20

.....
Please respond by

5/26/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49499

OSD 09357-05



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 JUN 13 PM 2:44
07 JUN 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director Administration and Management **MD**

SUBJECT List of External Organizations

- In the attached May 17, 2005 snowflake you requested a list of all external organizations of which you are a member.
- We collaborated with the Office of General Counsel and your immediate staff to compile the list at Tab A of the 28 outside organizations where you are a member. The list reflects memberships based in statute, Executive Order, or National Security Presidential Directive.
- Senior DoD staff are representing you on 23 of these 28 organizations.
- The Deputy Secretary has been representing you on three: the Export Administration Review Board, the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee and the Nuclear Command and Control System Committee of Principals.
- You have been a regular attendee at two: the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council.
- We will continue to look for other organizations where you have a formal role and report any we find to you.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Frank Leaming (b)(6)

OSD 09357-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49500

210
1430

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MAY 18 2005

2005 MAY 17 PM 3:16

To: Paul Butler
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT List of Organizations

Please dig out all the things the Secretary of Defense is a member of, like the Economic Advisory Council and the Red Cross, etc. Then I will decide which ones I want Gordon England to take.

Add a separate piece of paper to our draft memo, and I will divide them up.

Thanks.

DHR:m
051005-29

.....
Please respond by

5/26/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09357-05
AM 03985-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49501

Secretary of Defense Membership in External Organizations'

1. National Security Council (NCS), member
2. Export Administrative Review Board, member
3. Homeland Security Council, member
4. President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board
5. Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Chairman
6. Invasive Species Council, member
7. U.S. Coral Reef Task Force, member
8. Board of Directors, National Veterans Business Development Corporation, nonvoting ex officio member
9. DoD Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (Federal Advisory Committee), cochairman
10. Board of Directors, **U.S.** Institute of Peace, member
11. White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, member
12. Advisory Council on Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance, member
13. Professional Certification and Licensure Advisory Committee, ex officio member
14. Advisory Committee on Veterans Employment and Training, ex officio non-voting member
15. Corporation for National and Community Service, ex officio non-voting member
16. Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, ex officio member
17. Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, member
18. Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration, member
19. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board
20. Economic Adjustment Committee, chairman (yearly rotating basis w/ Secretaries of Commerce and Labor) or member
21. National Capital Planning Commission, ex officio member
22. National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, ex officio member
23. Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, member
24. Interagency Council on the Homeless
25. Civilian Community Corps Advisory Board, member
26. President's National Hire Veterans Committee
27. Board of Directors, Anacostia Waterfront Corporation, ex-officio non-voting
28. Executive Agent Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS)/Chairman of the NCCS Committee of Principals

*Details attached for each of the above

Secretary of Defense Memberships in External Organizations Under Statute or Executive Order

1. National Security Council (NSC), member

-Requirement: 50 U.S.C. §402

-Established July 26, 1947

-SecDef attends.

-Purpose: The NSC advises the President on domestic, military and foreign policies relating to national security.

2. Export Administrative Review Board, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 12981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62981 (Dec. 5, 1995), continues the Board established by Exec. Order No. 11533 (Jun. 4, 1970) and Exec. Order No. 12002 (Jul. 7, 1977), amended by Exec. Order No. 13020 (Oct. 12, 1996), Exec. Order No. 13026 (Nov. 15, 1996) and Exec. Order No. 13118 (Mar. 31, 1999)

-Established June 4, 1970

-SecDef attends.

-No alternate Board member shall be designated, but the acting SecDef or Deputy Secretary may serve in lieu of SecDef

-Purpose: The Board is responsible for interagency dispute resolution concerning export license applications; Board meets only when necessary to resolve disputes.

3. Homeland Security Council, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 13228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51812

-Established: October 8, 2001

-SecDef designee: SecDef attends the meetings with POTUS.
ASD(Homeland Defense) goes to the weekly meetings

-Purpose: The ~~Council~~ **Council** advises and assists the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security. It ensures coordination of homeland security-related

activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies.

4. President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board

-Requirement Exec. Order No. 13231, 66 Fed. Reg. 202

-Established: October 16, 2001

-SecDef designee: ASD(Homeland Defense)

-Purpose: The Board recommends policies and coordinates programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support such systems.

5. Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Chairman

-Requirement 22 U.S.C. §2751

-SecDef may designate a DASD-level or above representative to perform his routine duties

-Established: October 22, 1968

SecDef designee: Formerly Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense

-Purpose: The Committee is charged with optimizing funding, development and deployment of highly effective technologies for purposes of detection, monitoring, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating information in support of counterproliferation policy and efforts.

-Miscellaneous: USD(AT&L) chairs interagency group supporting committee.

6. Invasive Species Council, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183

-Established: February 3, 1999

-SecDef designee: Alex Behlar, ADUSD(Environment, Safety and Occupational Health), OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Council prevents the spread of invasive species (species non-

native to the ecosystem under consideration and whose introduction is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health) through interagency coordination, creation of a cross-agency budget for rapid response to emerging problems, and reauthorization and expansion of the National Invasive Species Act.

7. U.S. Coral Reef ~~Task~~ Force, member

-Requirement Exec. Order No. 13089, 63 Fed. Reg. 32701,
16 U.S.C. §6401 note

-Established: June 11, 1998

-SecDef designee: B.J. Penn, ASN(Installations & Environment)

-Purpose: The ~~Task~~ Force's mission is to protect and enhance coral reef ecosystems.

8. Board of Directors, National Veterans Business Development Corporation, nonvoting ex officio member

-Requirement: 15 U.S.C. §657c

-Established: July 18, 1958

-SecDef designee: Frank Ramos, Dir Small & Disadvantaged Business,
OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Corporation created a business model process of establishing business plans that will provide resources to veterans for businesses and cash flow to the corporation.

-Miscellaneous: Meets quarterly.

9. DoD Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (Federal Advisory Committee), cochairman

-Requirement: 20 U.S.C. 8929

-Established: November 1, 1978

-SecDef designee: Charles S. Abell, PDUSD(Personnel & Readiness)

-Purpose: The Council provides advice to the Director, DoDEA, regarding curriculum selection, administration, operation of the DoD Dependents Schools (DoDDS) (the Department's overseas school system), national educational best practices and programs that should be considered for inclusion in DoDDS. ACDE members include representatives from DoD and DoEd, teacher union presidents, military general officers, nationally recognized educators external to DoDEA, DoDDS parents, and a DoDDS student.

10. Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace, member

-Requirement 22 U.S.C. §4605

-SecDef may designate a DoD PAS official

-Established: October 19, 1984

-SecDef designee: Douglas Feith, USD(Policy)

-Purpose: The Board debates on current conflict resolution and policy issues.

11. ~~White~~ House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, member

-Requirement: Pub. L. No. 106-579 (36 U.S.C. §116 note)

-Established December 28, 2000

-SecDef or designee: Babs Chase, Community Relations and Public Liaison,
OASD(Public Affairs)

-Purpose: The Commission encourages people and entities at the national, State, and local level to commemorate Memorial Day and to participate in a National Moment of Remembrance in tribute to those individuals who sacrificed their lives for the United States. The commission provides national coordination for commemorative speeches, publications, exhibits, and events.

12. Advisory Council on Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance, member

-Requirement 38 U.S.C. §1974

-Established: September 29, 1965

SecDef designee: USD(Comptroller)

-Purpose: The Council reviews the operations of the Department of Veterans Affairs regarding Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance and advises the Veterans Affairs Secretary on matters of policy relating to the Secretary's activities under this statute.

-Miscellaneous: DoDD 1341.3, "Servicemen's Group Life Insurance," assigns the DoD Comptroller responsibility for financial policy and PDUSD(P&R) responsibility for administrative policy of the SGLI Program.

-Council meets at least once a year or more often at the call of the Secretary of Veterans *Affairs*.

13. Professional Certification and Licensure Advisory Committee, ex officio member

-Requirement 38 U.S.C. §3689

-Established: November 1,2000

SecDef designee: John Molino, DUSD(Military Community & Family Policy)

-Purpose: The Committee advises the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on requirements of organizations or entities offering licensing and certification tests to individuals on whose behalf the DVA pays for those tests. The Committee expands the educational opportunities for military personnel who signed up for the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB). As of March 1,2001, individuals with MGIB benefits possess the option to test on professional certification and licensure examinations. Testing on a DVA-approved professional certification or licensure exam assures eligibility to receive after-the-fact reimbursement.

14. Advisory Committee on Veterans Employment and Training, ex officio non-voting member

-Requirement: 38 U.S.C. §4110

-Established: October 14,1982

-SecDef or designee: Mr. John Molino, DUSD(Military Community & Family Policy)

-Purpose: The Committee's objectives are to: assess the employment and training needs of veterans; determine the extent to which the programs and activities of

the Department of Labor are meeting such needs; carry out such other activities as **may** be appropriate; and make recommendations to the Secretary of Labor with respect to the employment and training needs of veterans at such times and in such manner **as** the Committee determines appropriate.

-Miscellaneous: The Committee meets quarterly.

15. Corporation for National and Community Service, ex officio non-voting member

-Requirement: 42 U.S.C. §12651a

-Established: November 16, 1990

-SecDef designee: Ernie Gonzalez, Director, Civil Military Youth Programs and Innovative Readiness Training, OASD(Reserve Affairs)

-Purpose: The Corporation works with governor-appointed state commissions, nonprofits, faith-based groups, schools, and other civic organizations to provide opportunities for Americans of all ages to serve their communities.

16. Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, ex officio member

-Requirement 38 U.S.C. §542

-SecDef or SecDef designee (after consultation with DACOWITS)

-Established: August 6, 1991

-SecDef designee: Director, DACOWITS

-Purpose: The Committee advises the Secretary of VA on benefits provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs for women veterans, prepares reports and conducts studies pertaining to women veterans and the needs of women veterans with respect to compensation, health care, rehabilitation, outreach, and other benefits and Programs administered by VA.

17. Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, member

-Requirement: 5 U.S.C. §552 note

-Established: October 8, 1998

-SecDef designee: Christina Bromwell, OUSD(Intelligence)

-Purpose: The mission of the Working Group is to locate, recommend for declassification, and make available to the public through the National Archives all classified **Nazi** and Japanese Imperial Government war crimes records.

***Note:** The Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act of 2000 requires the President to “designate the Working Group established under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (Public Law 105-246; 5 U.S.C. 552 note) to also *carry out* the purposes of this title with respect to Japanese Imperial Government records” by February 25, 2001. Extended until March 2007, by Senate bill 384 and signed by the President on March 25, 2005.

18. Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration, member

-Requirement: Presidential approval, reflected in a February 25, 2002 memo signed by the Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office of the President

-Established: February 4, 2002

-SecDef designee: Ron Sega, Director, Defense Research & Engineering, OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Committee will provide recommendations concerning climate science and technology to the President and recommend the movement of funding and programs across agency boundaries.

19. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board

-Requirement: 29 U.S.C. §792

-Established: September 26, 1973

-SecDef designee: Charles S. Abell, PDUSD(Personnel & Readiness)

-Purpose: The Board ensures compliance with the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which allows physically handicapped individuals accessibility to certain federal buildings.

20. Economic Adjustment Committee, chairman (yearly rotating basis w/ Secretaries of Commerce and Labor) or member

- Requirement: ~~Exec.~~ Order ~~No.~~ 12,788, 57 Fed. Reg. 2213 (Jan. 21, 1992)
-SecDef or designated principal deputy

-Established: May 25, 1999

-SecDef designee: DUSD(Installation & Environment), OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Committee coordinates federal technical and financial assistance for state and local economic adjustment activities in response to Defense actions, including base closures, contractor reductions, and encroachment. It also prioritizes domestic program support for Defense-affected areas.

21. National Capital Planning Commission, ex officio member

- Requirement 40 U.S.C. §71a
-SecDef from time-to-time may designate an alternate to serve in his stead

-Established: ~~December~~ 24, 1973

-SecDef designee: Michael B. Donley, Director Administration and Management

-Purpose: The Commission reviews plans for the construction and renovation of buildings on federal property in the National Capital area.

22. National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, ex officio member

-Requirement: 20 U.S.C. §80

-Established: August 30, 1961

-SecDef designee: Alfred Goldberg, OSD Historian

-Purpose: The ~~Board~~ provides advice to the Smithsonian Institution on matters concerned with the portrayal of the contributions of the Armed Forces to American society and culture.

23. Interagency ~~Task~~ Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 13122, 64 Fed. Reg. 29201 (May 25,1999)

-Established: May 25, 1999

-SecDef designee: DUSD(Installation & Environment), OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Task Force facilitates the provision of Federal resources to spur economic development along the southwest border region.

-Miscellaneous: The Task Force terminates May 15,2002, unless the Task Force reaches a consensus recommending continuation of its activities.

24. Interagency Council on the Homeless

-Requirement 42 U.S.C. §11312

-Established: July 22, 1987

-SecDef designee: Bryant Monroe, Project Manager, Office of Economic Adjustment, OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Council provides an interagency forum for the coordination of federal policy and assistance to support the homeless.

25. Civilian Community Corps Advisory Board, member

-Requirement: 42 U.S.C. §12623

-Established: November 16,1990

-SecDef designee: Ernie Gonzalez, Director, Civil Military Youth Programs and Innovative Readiness Training, OASD(Reserve Affairs)

-Purpose: The Board facilitates the pooling of national, state and local resources.

26. President's National Hire Veterans Committee

-Requirement: 38 U.S.C. §2033

-Established: November 7,2002

-SecDef designee: Harvey Barnum, DASN(Reserve Affairs)

-Purpose: To establish and carry out a national program to raise awareness and furnish information to America's employers on the benefits of hiring military veterans.

27. Board of Directors, Anacostia Waterfront Corporation, ex-officio non-voting

-Requirement: D.C. Code § 2-1223.31

-Established: December 7, 2004, effective March 16, 2005

SecDef designee: Proposed assignment Mike Donley, DA&M

-Purpose: The Board serves as an independent instrument that is responsible for the development, redevelopment, and revitalization of the lands adjacent to the Anacostia River and associated waterways, and for the environmental restoration of said waterways.

28. Executive Agent Nuclear Command and Control System(NCCS)/Chairman of the NCCS Committee of Principals

-Requirement: National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 28

-Established: June 20, 2003

-SecDef designee: Formerly Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, chaired the first and **only** meeting held to date.

-Purpose: The Secretary of Defense is designated **as** the NCCS Executive Agent. The Executive Agent shall: **(1)** Establish a Committee of Principals to coordinate interdepartmental NCCS supporting policies and programs, recommend priorities for funding, monitor corrective actions, and establish mechanisms to share best practices and lessons learned. The NCCS Committee of Principals consists of a senior official from each Department and Agency subject to the NSPD as well as the Director of the NCCS Support Staff (**NSS**). **(2)** Designate the **NSS**. **(3)** Oversees the NSS assessments of NCCS elements and facilitates NCCS integration. **(4)** Ensures NSS activities are conducted in conjunction and coordination with other Federal Government Departments and Agencies with NCCS and national crisis response responsibilities. **(5)** Make recommendations, in consultation with relevant agencies, to the NCCS Committee of Principals changes in NCCS responsibilities, composition and structure. **(6)** Oversee the activities of the Director, NSS and provide funding and personnel support.

FOUO OFFICE OF THE
SEC DEFENSE

2005 JUL 17 PM 5:16

APR 25 2005

1006

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bahrain School

Please let me know when the military dependents in Bahrain will be going back to the school.

Thanks.

DHR:dlh
042205-30

.....
Please respond by

5/5/05

FOUO

OSD 09379-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49513

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
MAY 12 2005
205 MAY 13 PM 12:34

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: The Facts on Overseas Basing Commission

Please get back to me on what the facts are on the leaking of classified information by the Overseas Basing Commission, and what you propose to do about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
051105-12

.....
Please respond by

5/19/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09438-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49514



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SEC
2005 MAY 18 PM 12:34

INFO MEMO

May 17, 2005, 9:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II *WJ Haynes* General Counsel of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Answer to Snowflake re: The Facts on Overseas Basing Commission

- According to USD(P), the Overseas Basing Commission (OBC) disclosed classified information to the public on its website on May 9, 2005.

- The OBC was established by statute. It consists of 6 members and about 15 staff. Staff includes some detailed DoD employees, including the Executive Director.

- The statute specifically directs the Secretary of Defense to be responsible for the handling and disposition of any information relating to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission.

- As is appropriate when there is an apparent unauthorized disclosure of classified information, the Deputy USD(I) will request an appropriate investigation. Known or suspected instances of unauthorized disclosure must be reported and investigated to determine:

- Nature and circumstances of disclosure;
- Extent of damage to national security; and
- Corrective or disciplinary (if any) action to be taken.

COORDINATION: NONE

Cc: USD(P), USD(I), ASD(PA), ASD(LA)

~~FOUO~~

May 19, 2005

TO: Gen Hoss Cartwright

c c : Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: COCOM Conference Brief

Your overview presentation on our satellite infrastructure was well done. Clearly, we need to stay on top of that part of your portfolio.

I am also looking forward to the Missile Defense presentation next week – it is time to nail down our rules of engagement and readiness conditions.

Thanks for all you are doing out there, Hoss.

DHR:ss
051905-8

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49516

OSD 09552-05

337

19 MAY 05

~~FOUO~~

May 19, 2005

TO: Gen John Craddock

c c : Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: White House Brief

Nice job over at the White House with the President. Your presentation was well done, and clearly helped him focus on an area of considerable interest.

Thanks for all you are doing down there, John.

DHR:ss
051905-9

Please respond by

335 SD

19 May 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09554-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49517



ORIGINAL

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

received by JG 6/28

CHIEF OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

out 4/30

2005 MAY 20 PM 12:23

CH-2519-05
20 May 2005



310.1

ACTION MEMO

Robert Rangel

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *10 May 5/19*

SUBJECT: Accountability Study (SF 1005)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), my legal staff and the DOD Office of the General Counsel (OGC) have identified a prospective Accountability Study Group (TAB B). They also have developed proposed terms of reference (TAB C) to evaluate all of the processes employed in resolving issues of discipline and accountability in significant departmental operational incidents.
- **Analysis.** The Accountability Study Group will consist of two military judge advocates, two DOD OGC representatives and five general/flag officers representing the Joint Staff and each of the Services. Under the proposed terms of reference, the group will evaluate existing processes and procedures, identify any deficiencies and submit proposed solutions to identified deficiencies. The group will submit its report to you via the DOD OGC and me 30 days after you approve the terms of reference and group membership.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve group composition and terms of reference

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:
As stated

copy to:
DOD OGC

Prepared By: Captain Hal Dronberger, USN; OCJCS/LC: (b)(6)

20 May 05

22 Apr 05

ORIGINAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/USD/49518

09589-05

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2005 MAY 20 PM 12:28

April 22, 2005

1605

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Jim Haynes

CC: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Accountability Study

Please put together a small group of lawyers and operators to propose a standing policy mechanism to determine the ~~proper~~ chain of command for discipline and accountability in the case of significant Departmental operational incidents.

Example of past incidents they should examine for lessons ~~learned~~ in this regard include Khobar Towers, USS COLE, Abu Ghraib and the recent submarine collision. The ~~object~~ is to establish organizational arrangements and procedures that ~~set~~ forth in an orderly way how the Department will establish discipline and accountability quickly and fairly.

Provide suggestions for any necessary changes to legislation, policy, or procedures that seem appropriate.

Please ~~get~~ back to me with a list of names and proposed ~~terms~~ of reference within a week. It should be a small group. I'd like to review the final recommendations within 30 days.

Thanks.

DDIR:als
(4/22/05-17)

Please respond by

4/29/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 09589-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49519

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

ACCOUNTABILITY STUDY GROUP

Line Officers

- Lieutenant General Franklin Hagenbeck, USA
- Major General Roger Burg, USAF
- Rear Admiral **Sam Locklear**, USN
- Brigadier General John Kelly, USMC
- Brigadier General Carte; Ham, USA, Joint Staff

Legal Representatives

- Carl Tierney, DOD GC
- Bob Reed, DOD GC
- Colonel **John** Ley, USA
- Lieutenant Colonel Steve **Woody**, USAF, OCJCS/LC

Tab B

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/49520

TAB C

ACCOUNTABILITY STUDY GROUP
TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. The report will:

b. Provide a **summary** of the investigative process used in past significant operational incidents, including Khobar Towers, **USS COLE**, Abu Ghraib and the **USS GREENVILLE** submarine collision. The **summary** should **also** include a discussion of how **issues** of accountability and discipline were addressed.

c. Identify any deficiencies in the existing processes and procedures for investigating and addressing the accountability in significant operational incidents.

d. Propose solutions to address **identified** deficiencies, including necessary changes to law, policy, regulation and procedures.

e. Recommend **an** appropriate office or individual to be responsible for ensuring all aspects of SecDef decisions resulting from **this** report **are** implemented by the Military Departments and combatant commands **in** a timely manner.

Tab C

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49521

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB D

COORDINATION

DOD GC

William J. Haynes II

9 May 05

Tab D

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/49522

BACKGROUND

August 4, 2005

To: General Myers
Fr: Gordon England
Subj: Accountability Study
Dick,

*Secretary England -
I understand the TOR
is in your office. All it needs
is your signature and
we off and running
VR Dick*

I am trying to reconcile and ~~track~~ a couple of our interrelated snowflake action items. On May 19, we were both recipients of a snowflake regarding "Clarifying Lines of Authority, Responsibility and Accountability". On April 22, Jim Haynes and yourself, with a copy to me, ~~were~~ asked to put together an accountability study group. On July 1, I received another snowflake, asking that I review the ~~Terms~~ of Reference for the accountability study group.

In summary, I am involved in three snowflakes, all of which have to do with the accountability study group. My question: is the accountability study group underway and, if not, does either of us have to initiate any specific action to put it in place and assure the accomplishment of this initiative? Thanks.

Uncle!!

Amol

*~~Richard England~~
~~change TOR.~~
~~Wappalund~~
~~Billie G. Jordan~~*

Snowflake

7/5/05

FOUO

JUL 01 2005

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Accountability Study Group

Please review the attached accountability terms of reference; make any suggestions you may **have**, and then let's get **it** going.

I need advice on this -- **FAST**.

Thanks.

Attach 4/22/05 SecDef Memo to CJCS: 5/20/05 CJCS memo to SecDef

DHR:as
063005-07

.....
Please Respond By 07/14/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49525

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

April 22, 2005


205 MAY 2 11:19 AM

1005

250

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Jim Haynes

CC: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Accountability Study

Please put together a small group of lawyers and operators to propose a standing policy mechanism to determine the proper chain of command for discipline and accountability in the case of significant Departmental operational incidents.

Example of past incidents they should examine for lessons learned in this regard include Khobar Towers, USS COLE, Abu Ghraib and the recent submarine collision. The object is to establish organizational arrangements and procedures that set forth in an orderly way how the Department will establish discipline and accountability quickly and fairly.

Provide suggestions for any necessary changes to legislation, policy, or procedures that seem appropriate.

Please get back to me with a list of names and proposed terms of reference within a week. It should be a small group. I'd like to review the final recommendations within 30 days.

Thanks.

D:\IR.dh
042205-12

.....
Please respond by

4/29/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 09589-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49526

22 Apr 05

~~FOUO~~

JUL 01 2005

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Accountability Study Group

Please review the attached accountability terms of reference; make any suggestions you may have, and then let's get it going.

I need advice on this -- FAST.

Thanks.

Attach: 4/22/05 SecDef Memo to CJCS; 5/20/05 CJCS memo to SecDef

DHR:as
063005-07

.....
Please Respond By 07/14/05

JUL 05 2005

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/49527 **OSD 09589-05**

BMP

1 JUL 05

23 APR 05

FOUO

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAY 20 PM 12: 20

1005

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



Thanks.

Sir, *6/30*
 Response attached.
4/2
4-61 Lengyel

.....JUN 29 2005
Please respond by 4/29/05

FOUO

Tab A

OSD 09589-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49528



ORIGINAL

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

received by JB 6/28

out 6/30

2005 MAY 24 PM 12:28

CH-2519-05
20 May 2005

RJ

ACTION MEMO

Robert Rangel

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

10 May 19

SUBJECT: Accountability Study (SF 1005)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), my legal staff and the DOD Office of the General Counsel (OGC) have identified a prospective Accountability Study Group (TAB B). They also have developed proposed terms of reference (TAB C) to evaluate all of the processes employed in resolving issues of discipline and accountability in significant departmental operational incidents.
- **Analysis.** The Accountability Study Group will consist of two military judge advocates, two DOD OGC representatives and five general/flag officers representing the Joint Staff and each of the Services. Under the proposed terms of reference, the group will evaluate existing processes and procedures, identify any deficiencies and submit proposed solutions to identified deficiencies. The group will submit its report to you via the DOD OGC and me 30 days after you approve the terms of reference and group membership.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve group composition and terms of reference.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION TAB D

Attachments:
As stated

copy to:
DOD OGC

Prepared By: Captain Hal Dronberger, USN; OCJCS/LC (b)(6)

ORIGINAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OSD 09589-05

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

ACCOUNTABILITY STUDY GROUP

Line Officers

- Lieutenant General Franklin Hagenbeck, USA
- Major General Roger **Burg**, USAF
- **Rear** Admiral **Sam Locklear**, USN
- Brigadier General John Felly, USMC
- Brigadier General Carter Ham, USA, Joint Staff

Legal Representatives

- Carl Tierney, DOD GC
- Bob Reed, DOD GC
- Colonel John **Ley**, USA
- Lieutenant Colonel Steve Woody, USAF, OCJCS/LC

Tab B

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/49530

TAB C

**ACCOUNTABILITY STUDY GROUP
TERMS OF REFERENCE**

1. Submit a report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense for review and decision by the Secretary of Defense.

2. The report will:

a. Provide a summary of the current investigative framework and processes the combatant commands and Military Departments use to address significant operational incidents and resolve issues of accountability and discipline. The summary should address the appointing authority, review authority, accountability and disciplinary authority.

b. Provide a summary of the investigative process used in past significant operational incidents, including Khobar Towers, USS COLE, Abu Ghraib and the **USS GREENVILLE** submarine collision. The summary should **also** include a discussion of how issues of accountability and discipline were addressed.

c. Identify any deficiencies in the existing processes and procedures for investigating and addressing the accountability in significant operational incidents.

d. Propose solutions to address identified deficiencies, including necessary changes to law, policy, regulation and procedures.

e. Recommend an appropriate office or individual to be responsible for ensuring all aspects of SecDef decisions resulting from this report are implemented by the Military Departments and combatant commands in a timely manner.

Tab C

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

PL 05590 SD 4931

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB D

COORDINATION

DOD GC

William J. Haynes II

9 May 05

Tab D

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/49532

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
March 1, 2005
2005 MAR 20 PM 1:04

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hobson's Questions

032

You remember Congressman Hobson said he wanted answers "during his
lifetime." Where do we stand on the questions? Has he submitted the questions?

If so, I want to see them, and I want to know what suspense you've put on them to
get them answered.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022801-96

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

1 Mar 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09592-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49533



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAY 20 PM 1:04

MA TO SECDEF
has been

March 8, 2005, 3:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

Dan Stanley

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake on Hobson's Questions

- Rep. Dave Hobson (R-OH) submitted a total of 31 questions for the record from the FY06 Budget Hearing before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on February 17. Questions are attached at Tab 2.
- The questions have been tasked to OUSD (Policy), OUSD (P&R), OUSD (AT&L), Army, Navy, and Marine Corps with a suspense date of March 20, 2005.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake #022805-96
2. Rep. Hobson's QFRs

Prepared by: Rebecca Schmidt, Plans & Systems, OUSD(C), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/49534

OSD 095 92-05

032

8 Mar 05

1 Mar 05

Mr. Hobson

Secretary of Defense

Thursday, 17 February 2005
Room 2359, Rayburn
2:00 PM
OPEN

Witnesses:

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Gen. Richard Myers, USAF, Chairman, JCS
Honorable Tina W. Jonas, Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)

Force Protection (*See attached questions
for the Force Protection Hearing*)
(any question from Wednesday's hearing)

Trucks (Army)

As you move forward with transformation, I want to make sure that you evaluate the promising and exciting new technology that is currently available, especially in the commercial truck sector. In light of the lessons learned from our deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD needs to review whether our current truck fleet met the mission needs and how the fleet could be improved for the future.

For example, International Truck and Engine—one of my constituents and a leader in the truck business—has developed a new prototype armored truck. I believe it can fill a niche between the current HMMWV and FMTV fleet. This truck can provide

significant cost-savings because it based on a commercial vehicle already in wide production. Further, it is designed from the ground up to accept an armor load and meet other military requirements.

- 95) • Is DOD willing to take a fresh look at this type of commercial variant for the future of the truck fleets?

Foreign-built Ship Leases (Navy)

The Navy informed Congress last year that the DOD currently has 12 foreign-built ships under long-term leases ranging from 3 to 5 years, and that DOD planned to acquire up to 10 more foreign-built ships under these types of leases over the next two years.

- 96) • Mr. Secretary, are you aware that so many foreign-built ships are being leased by the Military Sealift Command for 1) DOD dedicated sealift, 2) prepositioning of military equipment, and 3) other special purposes? Are you aware of plans to expand this practice even further?
- 97) • I find it curious that the majority of these leases are for 59 months. If they were for 60 months, DOD would have the score the entire cost of the lease in the first year. Is the use of 59-month leases a calculated way of circumventing U.S. scoring rules?
- 98) • If DOD has leased a ship for 59 months and then renews the lease of the same ship for another 59 months, you get use of that ship for a total of 10 years. If we are leasing a ship for 10 years, doesn't that show the existence of a long-term, dedicated DOD requirement for such a ship?

- 89. If we are leasing a ship for 10 years, shouldn't we classify that lease as a de facto purchase?
- 90. It seems that these leases have been designed as a means to acquire foreign-built ships in circumvention of U.S. law (Section 7309 of Title 10 US Code) that states that vessels for all branches of our armed forces shall be built in the United States. What are your thoughts on this?
- 91. Would you please provide for the record 1) a list of the foreign-built ships under 3 to 5 year lease contracts with DOD, 2) the country of origin of the ships, 3) how long each ship has been leased by DOD, 4) the age of each ship when initially leased, 5) all modifications made to the original ship to meet DOD requirements, and 6) the terms of each lease contract?

National Guard Recruiting and Retention

I've been complaining for years about the mistreatment of the National Guard and the Reserves, and predicting difficulty in recruiting and retention. While retention seems okay, recruiting is a big problem. The *New York Times* reports that the Army National Guard met only 56 percent of its recruiting goals for January and is running 80.5 percent of its goals for Fiscal Year 2005. In response, the Army Guard added 1,400 recruiters, almost doubling the recruiting team. The Army Reserve went from 1,000 to 1,800 recruiters.

- 92. Please outline the steps you have taken to begin treating the Guard and Reserve the way the Active Component is treated?

- Q3. • Are you “rebalancing” the force to have the Active Component assume military police and civil affairs jobs currently done by Reservists?

Nuclear Weapons

RNEP

I have here a copy of the January memo that you wrote to the Secretary of Energy asking DOE to include \$4,000,000 for the RNEP study after DOE and OMB decided not to include it in the FY 2006 request. As a result of your January memo, DOE included the funds in their budget request.

- Q4. • Mr. Secretary, what is the specific DOD military requirement that made you go to such extraordinary lengths to insure that the Secretary of Energy included the RNEP money in the DOE FY 2006 budget request even after Congress zeroed out the program in the final FY 2005 bill?

Q5. What other non-nuclear technologies and strategies are we pursuing to hold hard and deeply-buried targets at risk? How much is DoD spending on these alternate strategies, and what are the results to date for these alternatives?

DOD putting requirements on DOE

Q6. Mr. Secretary, I have a budget process question. When you impose a nuclear weapons requirement on the Department of Energy that has significant cost implications for DOE how does the Department of Defense do the budget trade off considerations that are part of any budget development process?

Stockpile Plan

As you know, Mr. Secretary, in late 2001, President Bush signed the Moscow Treaty committing to significant reductions in the number of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear warheads by the year 2012. In the fiscal year 2004 bill, I fenced off some weapons money until we received a revised Stockpile Plan that reflected the President's commitment to shrink the stockpile. In June 2004, DOD and DOE finally delivered received the revised Stockpile Plan that included significant reductions in the overall size of the nuclear stockpile. In January 2005, I sent a letter to President Bush requesting that he declassify the higher-level numbers in the new Stockpile Plan and make them public. I think it is a good news story for the Administration.

- 97. • Will you support declassifying the top line reduction numbers in the new Stockpile Plan?
- 98. • Do you believe we can reduce the overall stockpile numbers below the Moscow Treaty level during the decade from 2012 to 2022?

DOD Nuclear Strategy Study

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that was released in January 2002 discussed upgrading the Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex infrastructure so it was capable of being responsive to new requirements. However the NPR did not address the transformation the existing "Cold War" nuclear stockpile into a smaller, more efficient long term deterrent.

- 99. • Mr. Secretary, what is the purpose of DOD's Transformational Stockpile Report and does it address the changes necessary in the Stockpile to reduce the out year stockpile number of weapons while increasing the reliability of the weapons that remain?

Hobson Defense Hearings

Force Protection

Wednesday, 16 February 2005

Room H-140

10:00 AM

CLOSED

Witnesses:

Mr. Benjamin P. Riley, III, Asst. Dep. Under Secretary of Defense
(Protection) and

Chairman, Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force
(CTTTF)

Lt. Gen. David F. Melcher, USA, Dep. Chief of Staff

Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, Commanding General, Marine
Corps Combat

Development Command, and Dep. Commandant for Combat
Development, HQMC

M4 Carbine

The M4 represents flexibility and freedom on movement like no other infantry weapons in the world. The size and weight of the weapon are right. The ballistics of the 5.56mm round make it especially lethal on the battlefield. The characteristics of the bullet suit it well for close quarter combat within buildings. Soldiers want it, but not enough soldiers have it.

- Why isn't it more widely fielded?

101. • Why doesn't the National Guard and the Reserves have it?

Interceptor Body Armor (IBA)

A year ago, the big issue was not enough SAPI plates for Interceptor Body Armor in Iraq. This year, the big issue should be not enough Interceptor Body Armor for soldiers in other locations. Current policy states that only certain people have IBA based on their exposure levels. However, combat patrols may be the least vulnerable targets because they carry with high security with them, where supply convoys and administrative personnel are the most vulnerable. Given the asymmetric nature of the threat, all soldiers are vulnerable. When I had Thanksgiving dinner with the troops in Kosovo, I was surprised and disappointed to learn that they do not have IBA.

102. • What is your plan for providing IBA to all deployed soldiers? (or why don't you have one?)

103. • Is DOD aggressively pursuing technologies to lighten armor plates without sacrificing ballistic protection or limiting mobility?

104. • Is DOD aggressively pursuing technologies to protect limbs and extremities, the current location of injuries?

MICH/PASGT Helmet Systems

The Modular Integrated Communications Helmet (MICH) is replacing the older PASGT as the PASGT makes it difficult to 1) hear, 2) shoot while prone, and 3) be protected in a vehicle accident. To address these problems, the helmet has been reshaped

to 1) make it lighter, 2) allow greater neck motion, 3) incorporate better padding, and 4) open the sides for communications gear. Unfortunately, the result is a MICH that exposes vital areas of the neck and head, making them vulnerable to IEDs and indirect fire. At least the PASGT comes down almost to the collar.

103. e I understand that there is a retrofit kit on the market for the PASGT. Have you looked at it? Why aren't you recommending it?

104. • Why Is the Army issued communication device not as reliably as the simple in-the-ear off-the-shelf equipment soldiers are buying for themselves?

Eyewear

Protecting a soldier's eyes from everything from road debris to tree branches to fragmentary discharge is of paramount importance. To do this, ballistic goggles and eyewear such as the Wiley-X system are in the inventory and carry stock numbers.

107. • Is every soldier issued this equipment? (Why not?)

108. • Can any soldier want into a supply room and draw a new set of ballistic eyewear to replace a damaged set, at any time, and in any theater of operations?

Communications Equipment

I am told that there are not enough radios to go around and the ones that exist are subject to be heard by the enemy.

109

- Do you have enough encrypted radios?

HMMWVs

Everyone who is benefiting from the use of a HMMWV, owes a debt of thanks to Pete Visclosky — whose plus-ups kept the construction line open — and to Dave Hobson — whose plus-ups kept the up-armoring line open. Not every congressional add is “pork.” I’ve been to Iraq 3 times and each time both the HMMWV and the up-armored HMMWV requirement has increased. We never seem to catch-up.

110

- What is the current HMMWV and up-armored HMMWV requirement? How many vehicles do you actually have in use? When will you meet the requirement? And how?

A
x
MC

111

- Of the more than 4,500 HMMWVs to be bought by the Army and the Marines in Fiscal Year 2006, how many are up-armored?

112

- Is there a problem with the combat suspension system on the HMMWV? Does the gunnery on the roof make the vehicle top heavy so that the suspension cannot handle the weight?

Other Vehicles

Not just HMMWVs, other vehicles need to be up-armored as well.

A
x
MC

113

- How many tactical wheeled vehicles in support of Iraq and Afghanistan have armored packages installed?

42 • How many more need it. What is you plan to provide it?

164 • Why didn't you armor trucks when I first suggested it years ago?

~~FOUO~~

May 20, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
David Chu

CC: Gordon England
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Mike Hagee
GEN Doug Brown

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Special Operations Command – USMC Component

Please get together with USMC and SOCOM to examine the resources required for us to go forward on their proposal to create a Marine Component for SOCOM. It seems to me we should be able to accomplish this out of existing manpower resources, given the plus-ups the Marines received. We need to look hard at where the money for everything else would come. Please get back to me within two weeks with a plan that we can consider – make sure you show the trade-offs.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/19/05 Pre-Decisional Brief

DHR:ss
052005-2

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09600-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49545



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Special Operations Command Marine Component

Decision Brief

Secretary of Defense

19 May 2005

1

11-L-0559/OSD/49546



17 Mar Recommendations

- Establish SoCom Marine Component
 - Increases SoCom's Capacity
 - Relieves some SOF for Higher Level Tasks
 - Integrates Marines into SoCom
 - Increases SoCom's speed and flexibility in use of Marine Forces

19 May 2005

2



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Increased Capacity



Capability	Unit/Team Capacity	Total Structure	Marine Offset	Additional Structure
JSOTF/MARSOC Com Element	1	127		127
Martime Raid/Direct Action	9	1,292	490	802
Foreign Military Training	24	436	436	0
Small Boat Training/Ops	6	115		115
Human Exploitation Teams	18	36	36	0
Communication Plt	-	60		60
Signals Intelligence	8	25	25	0
Logistic Support to J/MARSOC	-	292		292
Fire Support Teams/Planning	6	51		51
Military Working Dogs	8	17		17
Intel Any/Prod/Plan/Spt	28	96		96
SOCOM Staff Plus up	-	78	78	0
Totals		2,625	1,065	1,560

19 May 2005

3


11-L-0559/OSD/49548



Resourcing (\$Million)


Categories	Annual		One-Time		Total
	Marine	SOCOM	Marine	SOCOM	
Manpower	\$1251				\$125
O&M	\$40	\$222			\$262
Equipment/Procurement			\$2141	\$195	\$409
MILCON			\$185		\$185
Housing			\$54		\$54
Ammo		\$8			\$8
Sub Totals	\$1651	\$2301	\$4531	\$195	
Total	\$395		\$648		\$1,043

(USMC Offset \$401 M)





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Recommendations

- Establish SOCOM Marine Component
- Authorize Additional Resources

19 May 2005

6

11-L-0559/OSD/49551



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Potential Way Ahead



- Press Release
- Assign MARSOC Cdr
- MARSOC Cdr Plan to SOCOM and USMC
 - IOC 1 Oct 05:
 - Command Element
 - Initial FMTU Capability
 - Initial Small Boat Unit Capability
 - Marine Special Operations Group HQ
 - Marine Special Operations Units
 - Marine Special Operations Support Group
 - IOC 1 Jan 06:
 - 2 x MEU with Marine Special Operations Company – continuing through FOC of 1 Jul 09
 - FOC 1 Oct 07 for MARSOC and subordinate elements

19 May 2005


7

11-L-0559/OSD/49552



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Added USMC Capabilities Since 2001



Regular

- 2 Infantry Battalions
- 1 Anti-Terrorism Bn
- 1 Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
- 3 Light Armored Recon cos.
- 2 Force Recon Plts.
- 2 Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Cos.
- 1 Foreign Military Training Unit

Reserve

- 2 Anti-Terrorism Bns
- 2 Light Armored Recon cos.
- 1 Intel Support Bn.

19 May 2005

8

11-L-0559/OSD/49553



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
Backup

19 May 2005

9

11-L-0559/OSD/49554

MARSOC





Marines Assigned to SOCOM

<u>Element</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Total</u>
HQ, SOCOM	19	10	29
USJFCOMSpecOps	2		2
USASOC	2	9	11
AFSOC	1		1
JSOC	13	25	38
SOCCENT	1	2	3
SOCEUR	2	3	5
SOC PAC	4	4	8
75th Ranger Regt	1		1
MARDET	<u>7</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>70</u>
Total	52	116	168

19 May 2005

11



WAY AHEAD

- Immediate
 - Public affairs release and press conference
 - Exchange LNOs for SOCOM/USMC QDR development
 - Assignment of MARSOC Commanding General
 - Establish SOCOM-USMC implementation working group
 - Convene implementation conference
- Phase II
 - MARSOC Staff resourced and stood up
 - Additional field grade Marine Officers assigned to SOCOM Staff
 - 1 Oct 2005 MARSOC activated

19 May 2005

12



MARINE/MARSOC CONTRIBUTION TO SOCOM

(FY05 Active Duty Programmed



	Service	SOCOM	%
Army	482,400	17,505	3.6
AF	359,700	9,680	2.7
Navy	361,228	5,242	1.3
USMC	177,381	2,683 (w/Inf Bn 3,566)	1.5 (1.9)
Total	1,380,709	35,110	2.5

19 May 2005

13



MARSOC FUNDING

	MARSOC (\$993.6M)	Inf Bn (\$308.7M)	Co (
MANPOWER *	\$170.9M	\$58.8M	\$
MANC *	\$15.3M	\$5M	\$
MILCON (1-time) (fam housing)	\$303.1M \$88.4M	\$103.7M \$29.5M	\$ \$
T/Σ	\$350M	\$89M	\$
O M *	\$5.0M	\$22.7M	\$

19 May 2005

* = *recurring*

11-L-0559/OSD/49559



What the MARSOC brings to SOCOM

- Increases the number of Counter Terrorism forces deployed world-wide.
- Increases the quantity of intelligence assets – human, tactical, signals.
- Increases the quantity of forces conducting Foreign Military Training to include infantry tactics and small boat training.
- Provides a direct conduit through Marine Special Operations Forces to deployed MEUs.
- Provides added capability to conduct direct action, raids, and special reconnaissance.
- Improves combined-arms tactical air control and fire **support.**
- Increases the quantity of logistical support assets in key locations to sustain operating units.
- Provides added numbers of military working dog **teams.**

19 May 2005

15



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MARSOC

HEADQUARTERS

- Perform Title 10 functions of manning, training, and e Marine SOF
 - a “Service-like” headquarters responsible to SOCOM
 - Identify Marine SOF-peculiar requirements
 - Provide Marine SOF funding requirements to SOCOM
 - Oversee development of Marine SOF Tactics, Tech Procedures, and Doctrine
 - Develop and sustain an enhanced Operational Security Counterintelligence Capability
- Support USSOCOM’s Research, Development, Testing Acquisition of MARSOC’s SOF-unique equipment
- Inspect and Audit Subordinate Units (IG Functions)
- Provide Administrative and Policy Direction to Subordinate units

19 May 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/49561



Bottom Line Up Front

- **Establish Special Operations Command Component**
- Strengthens SOCOM's ability to find, fix, and finish.
- Gives SOCOM flexibility.
- Fully integrates USMC into GWOT.
- Strengthens interoperability between USMC and SOCOM forces.
- Enhances Jointness and Transformation.

19 May 2005

17

~~FOUO~~

May 20, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
David Chu

CC: Gordon England
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Mike Hagee
GEN Doug Brown

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Special Operations Command - USMC Component

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Thanks.

Attach.
5/19/05 Pre-Decisional Brief

DHR:ss
052005-2

.....
Please respond by _____

SOCOM

20 May 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09600-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49563

CC



UNCLASSIFIED / Pre-Decisional/ LIMITED DISTRIBUTION



Special Operations Command Marine Component

Decision Brief

Secretary of Defense

19 May 2005

1

11-L-0559/OSD/49564



17 Mar Recommendations



- Establish SoCom Marine Component
 - Increases SoCom's Capacity
 - Relieves some SOF for Higher Level Tasks
 - Integrates Marines into SoCom
 - Increases SoCom's speed and flexibility in use of Marine Forces



UNCLASSIFIED/ Pre-Decisional/ LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Increased Capacity



Capability	Unit/Team Capacity	Total Structure	Marine Offset	Additional Structure
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Small Boat Traininglops	6	115		115
Human Exploitation Teams	18	36	36	0
Communication Plt	-	60		60
Signals Intelligence	8	25	25	0
Logistic Support to J/MARSOC	-	292		292
Fire Support Teams/Planning	6	51		51
Military Working Dogs	8	17		17
Intel Anyl/Prod/Plan/Spt	28	96		96
SOCOM Staff Plus UD	-	78	78	0
Totals		2,625	1,065	1,560

19 May 2005

3

11-L-0559/OSD/49566



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Resourcing (\$Million)


Catagories	Annual		One-Time		Total
	Marine	SOCOM	Marine	SOCOM	
Manpower	\$125				\$125
O&M	\$40	\$222			\$262
Equipment/Procurement			\$214	\$195	\$409
MILCON			\$185		\$185
Housing			\$54		\$54
Ammo		\$8			\$8
Sub Totals	\$165	\$230	\$453	\$195	
Total	\$395		\$648		\$1,043

(USMC Offset \$401 M)

19 May 2005


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11-L-0559/OSD/49567





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Recommendations

- Establish SOCOM Marine Component
- Authorize Additional Resources

19 May 2005


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11-L-0559/OSD/49569



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Potential Way Ahead



- Press Release
- Assign MARSOC Cdr
- MARSOC Cdr Plan to SOCOM and USMC
 - IOC ■ Oct 05:
 - Command Element
 - Initial FMTU Capability
 - Initial Small Boat Unit Capability
 - Marine Special Operations Group HQ
 - Marine Special Operations Units
 - Marine Special Operations Support Group
 - IOC 1 Jan 06:
 - 2 x MEU with Marine Special Operations Company – continuing through FOC of 1 Jul 09
 - FOC ■ Oct 07 for MARSOC and subordinate elements

19 May 2005

7

11-L-0559/OSD/49570



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Added USMC Capabilities Since 2001



Regular

- 2 Infantry Battalions
- 1 Anti-Terrorism Bn
- 1 Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
- 3 Light Armored Recon cos.
- 2 Force Recon Plts.
- 2 Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Cos.
- 1 Foreign Military Training Unit

Reserve

- 2 Anti-Terrorism Bns
- 2 Light Armored Recon cos.
- 1 Intel Support Bn.

19 May 2005

8

11-L-0559/OSD/49571




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Backup

19 May 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/49572

MARSOC



11-L-0559/OSD/49573



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Marines Assigned to SOCOM

<u>Element</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Total</u>
HQ, SOCOM	19	10	29
USJFCOMSpecOps	2		2
USASOC	2	9	11
AFSOC	1		1
JSOC	13	25	38
SOCCENT	1	2	3
SOCEUR	2	3	5
SOC PAC	4	4	8
75th Ranger Regt	1		1
MARDET	<u>7</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>70</u>
Total	52	116	168

19 May 2005

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11-L-0559/OSD/49574



WAY AHEAD

- Immediate
 - Public affairs release and press conference
 - Exchange LNOs for SOCOM/USMC QDR development
 - Assignment of MARSOC Commanding General
 - Establish SOCOM-USMC implementation working group
 - Convene implementation conference
- Phase II
 - MARSOC Staff resourced and stood up
 - Additional field grade Marine Officers assigned to SOCOM Staff
 - 1 Oct 2005 MARSOC activated

19 May 2005

12



MARINE/MARSOC CONTRIBUTION TO SOCOM

(FY05 Active Duty Programmed



	Service	SOCOM	%
Army	482,400	17,505	3.6
AF	359,700	9,680	2.7
Navy	361,228	5,242	1.4
USMC	177,381	2,683 (w/Inf Bn 3,566)	1.5 (1.9)
Total	1,380,709	35,110	2.5

19 May 2005

13



MARSOC FUNDING

	MARSOC (\$993.6M)	Inf Bn (\$308.7M)	Combined (\$1.3B)
MANPOWER *	\$170.9M	\$58.8M	\$229.7M
PANMC *	\$15.3M	\$5M	\$20.3M
MILCON (I-time) (fam housing)	\$303.1M \$88.4M	\$103.7M \$29.5M	\$406.8M \$117.9M
T/E	\$350M	\$89M	\$439M
O&M *	\$65.9M	\$22.7M	\$88.6M

19 May 2005

14

* = *recurring*



What the MARSOC brings to SOCOM



- Increases the number of Counter Terrorism forces deployed world-wide.
- Increases the quantity of intelligence assets – human, tactical, signals.
- Increases the quantity of forces conducting Foreign Military Training to include infantry tactics and small boat training.
- Provides a direct conduit through Marine Special Operations Forces to deployed MEUs.
- Provides added capability to conduct direct action, raids, and special reconnaissance.
- Improves combined-arms tactical air control and fire support.
- Increases the quantity of logistical support assets in key locations to sustain operating units.
- Provides added numbers of military working dog teams.

19 May 2005

15



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
MARSOC

HEADQUARTERS

- Perform Title 10 functions of ~~m~~anning, training, and e Marine SOF
 - a “Service-like” headquarters responsible to SOCC
 - Identify Marine SOF-peculiar requirements
 - Provide Marine SOF funding requirements to SOCC
 - Oversee development of Marine SOF Tactics, Tech Procedures, and Doctrine
 - Develop and sustain an enhanced Operational Sec Counterintelligence Capability
- Support USSOCOM’s Research, Development, Testin Acquisition of MARSOC’s SOF-unique equipment
- Inspect and Audit Subordinate Units (IG Functions)
- Provide Administrative and Policy Direction to Subor
units

19 May 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/49579



Bottom Line Up Front

- **Establish Special Operations Command Component**
- Strengthens SOCOM's ability to find, fix, and finish.
- Gives SOCOM flexibility.
- Fully integrates USMC into GWOT.
- Strengthens interoperability between USMC and SOCOM forces.
- Enhances Jointness and Transformation.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301



INFO MEMO

June 10, 2005, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ACTING DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *[Signature]*

[Signature]
David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Resources for Special Operations Command (SOCOM) – U.S. Marine Corps
(USMC) Component (Your request, Tab A)

- Cost estimates are still very rough. Generals Hagee and Brown plan to brief you again with more details.
- Funding: FY 2006-2011 cost estimate is about \$4.0 billion, excluding aviation and maritime mobility assets which could add significantly to the total.
 - **FY 2006 Costs**: Funding could be requested in the FY 2006 supplemental.
 - \$0.3 billion to increase end strength and \$0.3 billion for operations and equipment.
 - A one-time military construction (MilCon) cost between \$0.5 billion and \$0.9 billion. It can be difficult to get supplemental funds for MilCon in CONUS, but we would reexamine MilCon priorities in light of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendations.
 - **FY 2007-2011 Costs**: We would address during the Quadrennial Defense Review and/or the upcoming FY 2007 Program and Budget Review.
- Manpower: The USMC proposes 2,740 USMC billets -- 1,065 (about 40 percent) of those within the 178,000 awarded by Congress (~~not~~ the 175,000 that is the Department's position), and the remaining 1,675 above the 178,000.
 - Tab B lists over 5000 billets that could be used to offset the proposed increase.
- Absent contrary direction, we will proceed to resolve the resource issues consistent with the manpower offsets identified at Tab B, and the resource resolution process submitted herein.

COORDINATION: PA&E (Tab C).

Prepared by: Ms. Anne McAndrew, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/49581

OSD 09600-05

~~FOUO~~

May 20, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
David Chu

CC: Gordon England
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Mike Hagee
GEN Doug Brown

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Special Operations Command - USMC Component

Please get together with USMC and SOCOM to examine the resources required for us to go forward on their proposal to create a Marine Component for SOCOM. It seems to me we should be able to accomplish this out of existing manpower resources, given the plw-ups the Marines received. We need to look hard at where the money for everything else would come. Please get back to me within two weeks with a plan that we can consider - make sure you show the trade-offs.

Thanks.

Attach
5/19/05 Pre-Decisional Brief

DHR:as
052005-2

.....
Please respond by _____

FOUO


11-L-0559/OSD/49582

OSD 09600-05

FOUO

MAY 17 2005

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Response to Note

Please have someone write a response to the nice people who sent this card.

Thanks.

Attach.

Note from Alvarez Family

DIR:SS
051605-16

.....
Please respond by 5/26/05

*to Breck
read have
one prepared
Thanks
Paul*

Paul Butler

5/17

FOUO

OSD 09667-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49583

335 SD

17 May 05

21 Mar 05

Happy
Easter
Wishing you and staff
and our soldiers have
a warm easter dinner.

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
please let all military
personnel, the brave soldiers

335

One nation thankful

for your dedication.

The cafeteria feeding them, all
in Iraq, Afghanistan and all
parts of the world, we are
praying for their safe return
and endurance where they
are. They're the ones that
make it happen for the
freedom in all ways we
have here in USA.

21 Mar 05

my kids are tomorrow leaders
and I'm letting them know of
today's leaders - you are one.

"The eyes of the Lord run to and fro throughout the whole earth,
to show Himself strong on behalf of those whose heart is loyal to Him."
II CHRONICLES 16:9 NKJV

11-L-0559/OSD/49584

OSD 09601-05 Blessing, Elijah, Sammi

Someone Cares

I'd heard about Pearl Harbor all my life, but when I visited there I was amazed at the emotion I felt.

A gleaming white structure rests in the bay, a memorial built over the sunken *Arizona*, the final resting place for many of the 1,177 crewmen who lost their lives. After a boat ride out to the memorial, I walked onto it and looked over the side. I could see the sunken ship!

I imagined the sailors that morning, roused from their sleep. Young, confused, frightened, brave. Did they have mothers, sweethearts, wives?

I sensed someone standing next to me at the end of the rail and looked up to see a Japanese woman. For a moment I stiffened. What right did she have to be there? Then I realized what she was doing: dropping flower petals into the waves. In that instant I knew that death—like bravery and love—knows no national boundaries.

Mary Lou Carney

Thank You For *D.A.A.*
Serving Our Country



One heart
WILLING TO SERVE...

On life
LIVED FOR THE GLORY OF GOD.


DaySpring

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11-L-0559/OSD/49585



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 19 2005

Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Alvarez
& Family

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. & Mrs Alvarez,

I received your thoughtful card over Easter, and I want you and your family to know how much I appreciate it. Your words of support for me and for our fine men and women in uniform mean a great deal, and I thank you.

Sincerely,

OSD 09667-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49586

335 SD

19 May 05

21 Mar 05

May 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Advisory Boards

Please take a look at some of these advisory boards and let me know if there are any you think we could usefully discontinue.

Thanks.

Attach. *4/29/04 DuBois INFO*
PLEASE w/ DoD Advisory Boards
~~5/14/04 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef, OSD 76611-04~~

DHR:dh
052504-20

.....
Please respond by 6/25/04

OSD 09717-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49587



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

2004 JUN 25 11 05 52

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

ACTION MEMO

June 25, 2004 5:30PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action_____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Elimination of Unnecessary Committees, Boards, and Commissions

- This responds to the attached snowflake in which you requested that I review the DoD Advisory Boards and advise you as to which could be discontinued. The results of this review are as follows.
- Five Statutory Committees are either inactive, have lapsed charters, or have met less than once a year during the period FY99-FY03; i.e., Defense Environmental Task Force II, DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile, Semiconductor Technology Council, Technology and privacy Advisory Committee, and Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel. I believe that these have served their purpose and could be terminated.
- The President's Information Technology Advisory Committee, a Presidential Advisory Committee, has not met since FY00 and could also be eliminated.
- Four Statutory Committees could be combined into two. The Missouri River-North Dakota Task Force and the Missouri River-South Dakota Task Force could be merged into a single Missouri River Task Force. The DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and pre-School Children and Children with Disabilities and the Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities could be merged into a single Disabilities Advisory Body.
- The Board of Advisors, Marine Corp University, a Statutory Committee, and two Discretionary Committees, the Air University Board of Visitors and the Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College, perform similar functions, are service centric, and are not optimally structured to foster jointness in military thinking. These could be combined into a single Board of Visitors for Professional Military Education. This new Board, with multi-service representatives, would emphasize jointness at the respective institutions.

OSD 09717-04

11-L-0559/OSF 49588

- Similarly, the ~~three~~ Service Academy Boards (United States Air Force Academy Board of Visitors, the United States Military Academy Board of Visitors, and the United ~~States~~ Naval Academy Board of Visitors) could be combined into a single Board of Visitors for Military Academies, which would be constituted to foster a stronger joint focus.
- If effected, these actions would reduce the number of DoD Advisory Boards from 60 to 48, resulting in a 19% reduction.
- The committees and a brief description of each are listed at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION: If you concur, I will work with the General Counsel, Service Secretaries, and OSD Principal Staff Officials to take the actions necessary to achieve the recommended eliminations and consolidations.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Other _____

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Paul Granahan, (b)(6)

May 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Advisory Boards

Please take a look at some of these advisory boards and let me know if there are any you think we could usefully discontinue.

Thanks.

Attach. *4/24/04 DuBois ^{INFO} ~~PLEASE~~ w/ DoD Advisory Boards*
~~5/14/04 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef, OSD 76611-04~~

DHR:dh
052504-20

.....
Please respond by *6/25/04*

OSD 09717-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49590

Information Paper on DoD Advisory Boards

- The Department currently utilizes 60 advisory boards, 34 of which were established at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Twenty-five were created in statute by the legislative branch, and one was established by Executive Order. A listing of these boards and their missions is at Tab 1. This listing is also found at the DoD Federal Advisory Committees website: <http://faca.disa.mil> under the Advisory Committees tab.
- DoD advisory boards which have private citizens as members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. This statute not only recognizes the merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the government, but it allows the executive branch to receive advice that is relevant, objective, and open to the public.
- Department advisory boards can be established on a long-term basis to address continuing issues, or they can be established on a short-term basis to address a specific issue. Long-term boards can be established for two-year periods and can be renewed for additional two-year periods thereafter.
- Under the law, advisory board meetings must be announced in advance and must be open to the public. All or part of an advisory board meeting may be closed, however, based on one or more of the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c).
 - As an example, advisory board meetings may be closed to the public when the board will discuss classified information.
- The law also requires advisory boards to keep and make available to the public minutes of open and closed meetings, including an accurate description of and the resolution of each matter discussed by the board.
- Department advisory boards are independent entities. While they report their findings to the Department leadership, their recommendations are not subject to direction and control by the Department.
- It has been the Department of Defense's policy for the past 15 years to appoint all private sector board members as Consultants, also known as Special Government Employees. After agreeing to serve, potential members are vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (White House Liaison) and various Principal Staff Assistants who utilize the board

and/or receive their advice. Nominees are also required to fill out financial disclosure reports if the board they serve on makes recommendations that could affect the expenditure of government funds in the future. Board members may accept travel and per diem, but are rarely compensated directly for their work.

- o The General Counsel of the Department of Defense notifies advisory committee members by letter to contact the Standards of Conduct Office (SOCO) for advice concerning ethics issues relating to their appointment. SOCO assures that the members' confidential financial disclosure reports are completed before their first meeting. Committee members also complete a Foreign Activities Questionnaire and execute a disqualification from participation in any particular matters involving financial interests listed on the confidential financial disclosure report. SOCO attorneys provide an ethics briefing to the Committee members. A guide for current committee members is distributed at a committee meeting and can be found at http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics under "ethics resource library" and under "DoD guidance."
- o Advice provided to the Department has been critical to current transformation efforts, keeping the Department informed on cutting edge issues from the latest best business practices to state-of-the-art science and technology developments. This advice cannot be drawn exclusively from internal government sources. We simply do not have the expertise or those with professional networks with access to the kind of information needed. This advice often has a direct impact on future military operations and the welfare of the war fighter.
- If the Department were to use survey instruments and contractual arrangements to gather the advice provided by advisory boards, the costs would be significantly higher. Most support provided to these committees is done by federal employees who manage these committees as a collateral duty to their principal duties.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

As of 04/29/2004

Type of Committee: Statutory (Total - 25)

Presidential (Total - 1)

Discretionary/Established by Secretary of Defense (Total - 34)

Committee Name	Type	Description
<u>Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (ACDE)</u>	statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS), on improvements to achieve and maintain a high quality public educational program through secondary school for minor dependents in overseas areas as defined in section 1411, Public Law 95-561, as amended.
<u>Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction</u>	Statutory	Assesses the capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents in the U.S. homeland involving weapons of mass destruction. Examines response capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels.
<u>Air University Board of Visitors</u>	Discretionary	Assists the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advises the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Commander, AU.
<u>Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) Executive Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Studies the ARMS Initiative and reviews the Army's plan for its implementation; makes specific findings and recommendations concerning the concept, executability, and overall soundness of the plan; assesses government and industry expectations for the ARMS Initiative; evaluates the incentives being proposed under the ARMS Initiative Implementation Plan (AIP); reviews and makes specific recommendations on the applicability and adequacy of the loan guaranty program and planning grants; reviews and determines which existing public laws, regulations, and policies are currently available to fulfill the ARMS Initiative; and, reviews and comments on the Army's plans for Plant Reutilization, Emergency Planning, and the Disposal of Excess Plant Equipment.

<u>Armed Forces Epidemiological Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as a continuing scientific advisory body to the Surgeons General of the military departments and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) providing them with timely scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policy development and research needs for the prevention of disease and injury and promotion of health.
<u>Arm Education Adviso Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and the Army's senior leadership with expert and continuous advice on Army educational programs. Advice provided relates to educational policies, school curriculums, educational philosophy and objectives, program effectiveness, facilities, staff and faculty, instructional methods, and other aspects of organization and management.
<u>Army Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and major Army Commanders on scientific, technological, and acquisition matters of interest to the Department of the Army.
<u>Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the President, Naval War College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the Board will be made to the President, Naval War College. The President, Naval War College shall advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the Board which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
<u>Board of Advisors to the Superintendent Naval Postgraduate School</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Superintendent and the Secretary of the Navy on naval graduate education programs, assessing the effectiveness of the school in accomplishing its mission and inquires into the curricula, instruction, physical equipment, administration, state of the student body, fiscal affairs, and other matters relating to the operation of school programs.
<u>Board of Regents Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences</u>	Statutory	Provides advice and guidance to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for the operation of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences; to assure that said operation is in the best tradition of academia and in compliance with the appropriate accreditation authorities.

<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u>Joint Military</u> <u>Intelligence College</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Commandant, Joint Military Intelligence College with independent, informed advice and recommendations on matters related to policy, mission, accreditation, faculty, students, facilities, curricula, educational methods, research, and administration, in connection with the College.
<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u>Marine Corps</u> <u>University</u>	Statutory	Reviews develops, and provides recommendations on all aspects of the academic and administrative policies of the University; examines all aspects of the University's Professional Military Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice as is necessary to facilitate high educational standards and cost effective operations.
<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u>National Defense</u> <u>University</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice on matters related to mission, policy, faculty, students, cumcula, educational methods, research, facilities, and administration of the National Defense University (NDU). Principal components of NDU are: Armed Forces Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, national War College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Institute of Higher Defense Studies, and Department of Defense Computer Institute.
<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u>Western Hemisphere</u> <u>Institute for Security</u> <u>Cooperation</u> <u>(WHINSEC)</u>	Statutory	Provides to DoD expert advice on the operations and management of the Institute. Inquires into the cumculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs and academic methods of the Institution and any other matters that it or the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate. Reviews WHINSEC cumculum and determines whether it complies with applicable U.S. laws and regulations consistent with U.S. policy goals toward the Western

<u>Chief of Engineers</u> <u>Environmental</u> <u>Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as advisor to the Chief for developing policy and procedures for Corps Programs; ascertains and advises upon natural, social and cultural resource management issues associated with Corps plans, projects and programs; provides advice aimed at both identifying and resolving existing environmental issues with new or expanded Corps missions; advises on the development of workable methods for quantifying natural, social and cultural resource management costs and benefits of Corps programs and in expressing these in terms of both their tangible and intangible consequences; and, explores and advises on new directions where the Corps, acting as the national engineering agency, can continue to solve not only the engineering and economic aspects of new challenges, problems, and opportunities, but also those environmental features for which it has responsibility.
<u>Chief of Naval</u> <u>Operations Executive</u> <u>Panel Advisory</u> <u>Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides an avenue of communications by which a distinguished group representing scientific, academic, engineering, and political communities may advise the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on questions related to national seapower. In pursuing its objectives, the CEP may operate in committees composed of selected Panel members to conduct detailed examinations of matters related to national seapower.
<u>Defense Acquisition</u> <u>University Board of</u> <u>Visitors</u>	Statutory	Advise the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and the President of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) on "organization management, curricula, methods of instruction, facilities and other matters of interest" to the DAU, as directed by 10 U.S.C. 1746.
<u>Defense Advisory</u> <u>Board for Employer</u> <u>Support of the Guard</u> <u>and Reserve</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense about issues concerning Reservists and their civilian employers, to include recommending policies and priorities for employer support actions and programs.
<u>Defense Advisory</u> <u>Committee on Military</u> <u>Personnel Testing</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters pertaining to military personnel testing; reviews the calibration of personnel selection and classification tests to ensure the accuracy of resulting scores; reviews relevant validation studies to ensure that the tests have utility in predicting success in technical training and on the job; reviews ongoing testing research and development in support of the enlistment program; and, makes recommendations for improvements to make the testing process more responsive to the needs of the Department of Defense and the Military Services.

<u>Defense Advisor Committee on Women in the Services</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters and policies relating to women in the Armed Forces.
<u>Defense Business Board</u>	Discretionary	Makes recommendations to the Senior Executive Council (SEC) on effective strategies for implementation of best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Environmental Response Task Force</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Studies and provides an annual report to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned.
<u>Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Board of Advisors</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Director, DFAS, with respect to providing world class finance and accounting services to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency with scientific and technical expertise and advice on current and long-term operational and intelligence matters covering the total range of the mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency; provides a link between the scientific/technical and military operations communities of the United States and the Defense Intelligence Agency; and, in the military operations area , addresses issues including intelligence support to combat units, joint intelligence doctrine, net assessments, arms control, and integration of intelligence and operational planning.
<u>Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Authby Law)	Provides the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy; focus upon long-term, enduring issues central to strategic planning for the Department of Defense; and, responsible for research and analysis of topics, long or short range, addressed to it by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy.
<u>Defense Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition on scientific and technical matters of interest to the Department of Defense.

<u>DoD Advisory Group on Electron Devices</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Military Departments with advice and recommendations on the conduct of economical and effective research and development programs in the field of electron devices.
<u>DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children and Children with Disabilities</u>	statutory	Advises the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) unmet needs within the DDESS for the education of children with disabilities, comments publicly on any proposed DDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists DDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDESS.
<u>DoD Education Benefits Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense on the actuarial status of the DoD Education Benefits Fund; furnishes advice and opinion on matters referred to it by the Secretary; reviews valuations of the Fund; and, provides periodic reports to the Secretary and President and Congress on the status of the fund as required.
<u>DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)), and Section 330 of Public Law 102-484, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to effect a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices.
<u>DoD Historical Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the heads of such other Components as may choose to participate, regarding the professional standards, historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the DoD. These include: historical, archival, museum, library, art, curatorial, and related programs
<u>DoD Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the DoD Medicare-Eligible retiree Health Care Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the DoD under DoD retiree health care programs for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries.

<u>DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the Department of Defense under military retirement and survivor benefit programs.
<u>DoD Wage Committee</u>	Discretionary by Law	Makes recommendations regarding wage surveys and wage schedules for blue-collar employees to the Department of Defense Wage Fixing Authority.
<u>Inland Waterways Users Board</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of the Army on matters relating to construction and rehabilitation priorities on the commercial inland waterways and harbors of the United States.
<u>Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council on nuclear weapons systems surety matters that relate to protecting against inadvertent nuclear detonation or plutonium dispersal.
<u>Missouri River -- North Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>Missouri River -- South Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of South Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>National Security Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, on matters involving Signals Intelligence production, Information Security, science, technology, business procedures and management related to the mission of the NSA/CSS.
<u>National Security Education Board</u>	Statutory	Develop criteria under the National Security Education Act of 1991 for awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants to U.S. citizens and institutions; provide for wide dissemination of information regarding the activities assisted under the Act; establish qualifications for persons desiring scholarships or fellowships, and for institutions of higher education desiring grants under the Act. The Board will report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy & Resources), who is the designated representative of the Secretary of Defense.

<u>Naval Research Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Maintains an understanding of the technological needs confronting the Navy and Marine Corps, keeping abreast of the research and development which is being carried on to address them, and offering a judgment to the Navy and Marine Corps as to whether these efforts are adequate; senior scientific advisory group to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Research
<u>Ocean Research Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	Provides senior scientific advice to the National Oceanographic Research Leadership Council. Advises the Council on policies, procedures, selection of projects and allocations of funds regarding the National Oceanographic Partnership Program and on matters relating to national oceanographic data requirements as well as other responsibilities that the Council considers appropriate.
<u>Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	Advises the Director, DoDDS, of unmet needs within the system for the education of children with disabilities; comments publicly on any Office of Dependents Schools rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists ODS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.
<u>Planning and Steering Committee (Navy)</u>	Discretionary	Provides to the Advanced Technology Panel of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Board in-depth technical assessments to U.S. and Soviet ASW developments and related technologies, critically review programs which potentially impact SSBN survivability, and evaluate intelligence efforts to identify and define ASW and SSBN survivability threats.
<u>President's Information Technology Advisory Committee</u>	Presidential	Provides the National Science and Technology Council, through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications, information technology, and the Next Generation Internet.
<u>Scientific Advisory Board of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology</u>	Discretionary	Serves in the public interest as a scientific advisory body to the Director, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, to provide scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policies and procedures of the AFIP central laboratory of pathology for the Department of Defense and other federal agencies with responsibilities for consultation, education and research in pathology.

<u>Naval Research Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Maintains an understanding of the technological needs confronting the Navy and Marine Corps, keeping abreast of the research and development which is being carried on to address them, and offering a judgment to the Navy and Marine Corps as to whether these efforts are adequate; senior scientific advisory group to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Research
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<u>Semiconductor Technology Council</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Advises the Secretary of Defense on appropriate technology goals and appropriate level of effort for the research and development activities of Sematech; to <u>link</u> assessment by the semiconductor industry of future market and national security needs to opportunities for technology development through cooperative public and private investment; and, to seek ways to respond to the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education.
<u>United States Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides technical and scientific advice of qualified scientists and representative views of the scientific community to the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) during the development of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Convening upon request, the SAG will provide scientific and technical advice and representative views to the DSTP in order to enhance JSTPS planning.
<u>Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Statutory	Provides recommendations to the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Council on environmental research and development activities as prescribed in statute and assume additional advisory responsibilities as directed by the Council.
<u>Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the application of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism.
<u>Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) Charter</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) on reduction of the threat to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional and special weapons, sustainment of the nuclear weapons deterrent, chemical and biological defense, counterproliferation, technology security, weapons effects, and other matters related to the DTRA mission.
<u>Uniform Formula Beneficiary Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	Reviews and comments on the development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee.
<u>USAF Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.

<u>USAF Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides a <i>link</i> between the Air Force and the Nation's scientific community by serving as a means of communicating the most recent scientific information as it applies to the Air Force; reviews and evaluates long-range plans for research and development and provides advice on the adequacy of the Air Force program; recommends usually promising scientific developments for selective Air Force emphasis and new scientific discoveries of techniques for practical application to weapon or support systems; makes a variety of studies designed to improve the Air Force Research and Development Program; and, serves as a pool of expert advisers to various Air Force activities.
<u>U.S. Arm. Coastal Engineering Research Board</u>	Statutory	Provides broad policy guidance and review of plans and fund requirements for the conduct of research and development in the field of coastal engineering and recommends priorities of accomplishment of research projects in consonance with the needs of the coastal engineering field and the objectives of the Chief of Engineers.
<u>U.S. European Command Senior Advisory Group</u> (SAG)	Discretionary	Provides the Commander, U.S. European Command with advice, guidance, and assistance toward fulfilling its mission.
<u>U.S. Joint Forces Transformation Advisory Group</u>	Discretionary	Provides timely advice on scientific, technical, intelligence, and policy-related issues to the Commander, USJFCOM, during the development of the nation's joint warfighting concepts to provide joint forces and capabilities, improve joint warfighting capabilities, transform the joint force, and improve internal command processes.
<u>U.S. Military Academy Board of Visitors</u>		Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider.
<u>U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the state of morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Naval Academy that the Board decides to consider, and, within 60 days of its annual meeting, submits its findings and recommendation to the President of the United States.

TAB

A

1. Statutory committees that are inactive or have served their purpose.

- **Defense Environmental Task Force II:** Studies and provides an annual report to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned. (One meeting FY99-03)
- **DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile:** Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)), and Section 3306 of Public **Law** 102.484, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to **effect** a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices description. (No meetings FY99-03)
- **Semiconductor Technology Council:** Advises the Secretary of Defense on appropriate technology goals and appropriate level of effort for the research and development activities of Sematech; to link assessment by the semiconductor industry of future market and national security needs to opportunities for technology development through cooperative public and private investment; and, to seek ways to respond to the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education. (No meetings FY99-03)
- **Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee:** Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the application of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism. (Committee's work is complete)
- **Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel:** Reviews and comments on the development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee. (No meetings since FY00)

2. Committees that have not met since FY00.

- **President's Information Technology Advisory Committee:** Provides the National Science and Technology Council, through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications, information technology, and the Next Generation Internet.

3. Committees that are duplicative and could be merged.

- Merge into a single Missouri River Task Force.
 - Missouri River – North Dakota Task Force: Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
 - Missouri River – South Dakota Task Force: Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of South Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
- Merge into a single Disability Advisory Body.
 - DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and pre-School Children and Children with Disabilities: Advises the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) unmet needs within the DDESS for the education of children with disabilities; comments publicly on any proposed DDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists DDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDESS.
 - Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities: Advises the Director, DoD Dependant Schools (DoDDS), of unmet needs within the system for the education of children with disabilities; comments publicly on any Office of Dependents Schools (ODS) rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists ODS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.

4. Boards that perform similar functions for Service Schools and could be consolidated under a new charter to emphasize jointness in Professional Military Education.

- Air University Board of Visitors: Assists the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advises the Secretary of the Air Force, **through** the Commander, AU.

- **Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College:** Advises and assists the President, Naval War College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the Board will be made to the President, Naval War College. The President, Naval War College shall advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the Board which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
- **Board of Advisors, Marine Corp University:** Reviews develops, and provides recommendations on all aspects of the academic and administrative policies of the University; examines all aspects of the University's Professional Military Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice as is necessary to facilitate high educational standards and cost effective operations.

5. Boards that perform similar functions for the Military Academies and could be consolidated under a new charter to emphasize jointness in Military Education.

- **United States Air Force Academy Board of Visitors:** Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.
- **United States Military Academy Board of Visitors:** Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider.
- **United States Naval Academy Board of Visitors:** Inquires into the state of morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Naval Academy that the Board decides to consider and, within 60 days of its annual meeting, submits its findings and recommendation to the President of the United States.



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

JAN 03 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Committees, ~~Boards~~, and Commissions

- This responds to the attached snowflake in which you request that I coordinate with the DoD General Counsel and other appropriate DoD officials to consider the elimination or consolidation of 16 Federal Advisory Committees, Boards, and Commissions I had previously identified as candidates for such action.
- Five advisory bodies have been eliminated. Defense Environmental Task Force II, DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile, Semiconductor Technology Council, Defense Finance and Accounting Service Board of Visitors and the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee.
- Four advisory bodies have been consolidated into two.
 - The DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee has been consolidated into the Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel.
 - The DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children and Children with Disabilities, and the DoD Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities, has been consolidated into the DoD Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Special Education.
- As a result of these actions, the number of DoD Federal Advisory Committees, Boards, and Commissions are reduced by 12% from 60 to 53.
- We do not recommend combining the Missouri River-North Task Force and the Missouri River-South Task Force. The significant differences between upstream and downstream states in terms of issues, priorities, and resources make it preferable to maintain two separate entities.

OSD 09717-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49608



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25 May 05

- We determined that the consolidation of advisory bodies associated with the Service Academies and Professional Military Education institutions is not appropriate at this time for two reasons. First, the unique mission, needs and circumstances for each of these institutions justify separate advisory oversight. Second, the intensity of Congressional interest in the Military Academies and the uncertainties of BRAC outcomes for the staff colleges, war colleges, and Defense universities make this a particularly inopportune time to change their advisory bodies.

COORDINATION: USD(AT&L), USD(P&R), DoD GC, Army, Navy, Air Force,
Joint Staff, DFAS (Tab A)

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Paul Granahan, (b)(6)

CONCUR: General Counsel, DoD

Ray Dubois, I'm favorably disposed,
but please brief me. I'd like
to ask specifically about TAPAC,
program DoD6C PACs (including recent
statutory ones, and other ideas), and
retiring process. Thanks,
JH 11/20/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 1, 2004

TO Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Eliminating Boards, Commissions, etc.

I received your proposal on Boards and Commissions. Please get with Jim Haynes, the relevant Service secretaries and OSD people, and make a specific proposal on a way forward.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/25/04 DuBois memo to SD [OSD09717-04]

DHR:dh
070104-21

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 09717-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49610



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

ACTION MEMO

June 25, 2004 5:30PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action_____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Elimination of Unnecessary Committees, Boards, and Commissions

- This responds to the attached snowflake in which you requested that I review the DoD Advisory Boards and advise you as to which could be discontinued. The results of this review are as follows.
- Five **Statutory** Committees are either inactive, have lapsed charters, or have met less than once a year during the **period** FY99-FY03; i.e., Defense Environmental Task Force II, DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile, Semiconductor Technology Council, Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, and Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel. I believe that these have served their purpose and could **be** terminated.
- The President's Information Technology Advisory **Committee**, a Presidential Advisory Committee, has not met since **FY00** and could **also** be eliminated. ✓
- Four Statutory Committees could be combined into two. The Missouri River-North Dakota Task Force and the Missouri River-South Dakota **Task** Force could be merged into a single Missouri River Task Force. The DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and pre-School Children and Children with Disabilities and the Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities could be merged into a single Disabilities Advisory Body.
- The Board of Advisors, Marine Corp University, a **Statutory** Committee, and two Discretionary Committees, the Air University Board of Visitors and the Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College, perform similar functions, are service centric, and are not optimally structured to **foster** jointness in military **thinking**. These could be combined into a single Board of Visitors for Professional Military Education. **This** new Board, with multi-service representatives, would emphasize jointness at **the** respective institutions.



OSD 09717-04

11-L-0559/OSD/49611

- Similarly, the ~~three~~ Service Academy Boards (**United States Air** Force Academy Board of Visitors, **the United States** Military Academy Board of Visitors, and the United **States** Naval Academy Board of Visitors) could **be** combined into **a** single **Board** of Visitors for **Military** Academies, which would be constituted to foster **a** stronger joint **focus**.
- If effected, these actions would reduce the number of DoD Advisory Boards from 60 to 48, resulting in **a** 19% reduction.
- The committees and a brief description of each are listed at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION: If you concur, I **will** work with **the** General Counsel, Service Secretaries, and OSD Principal **Staff Officials** to take the actions necessary to achieve the recommended eliminations and consolidations.

Approved _____ Disapproved _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Paul ~~Granahan~~, (b)(6)

1. Statutory committees that are inactive or have served their purpose.

- **Defense Environmental Task Force II: Studies** and provides an annual ~~report~~ to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration ~~at military installations~~ closed or realigned. (One meeting FY99-03)
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- **Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee:** Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the application of ~~pattern queries/data~~ correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to ~~the~~ **war** on terrorism. (**Committee's** work is complete)
- **Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel:** Reviews and comments on ~~the~~ development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics **Committee**. (**No** meetings since FY00)

2. Committees that have not met since FY00.

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3. Committees that are duplicative and could be merged.

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 - **Missouri River - North Dakota Task Force:** Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
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May 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Advisory Boards

Please take a look at some of these advisory boards and let me know if there are any you think we could usefully discontinue.

Thanks.

Attach. *4/29/04 DuBois ^{11/20} ~~request~~ re DOD Advisory Boards*
~~5/14/04 ASD(IST) memo to SecDef OSD 76611-04~~

DHR:dh
052504-20

.....
Please respond by *6/25/04*

11-L-0559/OSD/49616

Information Paper on DoD Advisory Boards

- o The Department currently utilizes 60 advisory boards, 34 of which were established at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Twenty-five were created in statute by the legislative branch, and one was established by Executive Order. A listing of these boards and their missions is at Tab 1. This listing is also found at the DoD Federal Advisory Committees website: <http://faca.disa.mil> under the Advisory Committees tab.
- o DoD advisory boards which have private citizens as members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. This statute not only recognizes the merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the government, but it allows the executive branch to receive advice that is relevant, objective, and open to the public.
- o Department advisory boards can be established on a long-term basis to address continuing issues, or they can be established on a short-term basis to address a specific issue. Long-term boards can be established for two-year periods and can be renewed for additional two-year periods thereafter.
- o Under the law, advisory board meetings must be announced in advance and must be open to the public. All or part of an advisory board meeting may be closed, however, based on one or more of the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c).
 - o As an example, advisory board meetings may be closed to the public when the board will discuss classified information.
- o The law also requires advisory boards to keep and make available to the public minutes of open and closed meetings, including an accurate description of and the resolution of each matter discussed by the board.
- o Department advisory boards are independent entities. While they report their findings to the Department leadership, their recommendations are not subject to direction and control by the Department.
- o It has been the Department of Defense's policy for the past 15 years to appoint all private sector board members as Consultants, also known as Special Government Employees. After agreeing to serve, potential members are vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (White House Liaison) and various Principal Staff Assistants who utilize the board

and/or receive their advice. Nominees **are also required** to fill out financial disclosure reports if the board they serve on makes recommendations that could affect the expenditure of government funds in the future. Board members may accept travel and per diem, but are rarely compensated directly for their work.

- The General Counsel of the Department of Defense notifies advisory committee members by letter to contact the Standards of Conduct Office (SOCO) for advice concerning ethics issues relating to their appointment. SOCO assures that the members' confidential financial disclosure reports are completed before their first meeting. Committee members also complete a Foreign Activities Questionnaire and execute a disqualification from participation in any particular matters involving financial interests listed on the confidential financial disclosure report. SOCO attorneys provide an ethics briefing to the Committee members. A guide for current committee members is distributed at a committee meeting and can be found at http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics under "ethics resource library" and under "DoD guidance."
- Advice provided to the Department has been critical to current transformation efforts, keeping the Department informed on cutting edge issues from the latest best business practices to state-of-the-art science and technology developments. This advice cannot be drawn exclusively from internal government sources. We simply do not have the expertise or those with professional networks with access to the kind of information needed. This advice often has a direct impact on future military operations and the welfare of the war fighter.
- If the Department were to use survey instruments and contractual arrangements to gather the advice provided by advisory boards, the costs would be significantly higher. Most support provided to these committees is done by federal employees who manage these committees as a collateral duty to their principal duties.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

As of 04/29/2004

Type of committee: statutory (Total - 25)

Presidential (Total - 1)

Discretionary/Established by Secretary of Defense (Total - 34)

Committee Name	Type	Description
Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (ACDE)	statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS), on improvements to achieve and maintain a high quality public educational program through secondary school for minor dependents in overseas areas as defined in section 1411, Public Law 95-561, as amended.
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction	statutory	Assesses the capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents in the U.S. homeland involving weapons of mass destruction. Examines response capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels.
Air University Board of Visitors	Discretionary	Assists the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advises the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Commander, AU.
Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) Executive Advisory Committee	Discretionary	Studies the ARMS Initiative and reviews the Army's plan for its implementation; makes specific findings and recommendations concerning the concept, executability, and overall soundness of the plan; assesses government and industry expectations for the ARMS Initiative; evaluates the incentives being proposed under the ARMS Initiative Implementation Plan (AIIP); reviews and makes specific recommendations on the applicability and adequacy of the loan guaranty program and planning grants; reviews and determines which existing public laws, regulations, and policies are currently available to fulfill the ARMS Initiative; and, reviews and comments on the Army's plans for Plant Reutilization, Emergency Planning, and the Disposal of Excess Plant Equipment.

<u>Armed Forces Epidemiological Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as a continuing scientific advisory body to the Surgeons General of the military departments and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) providing them with timely scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policy development and research needs for the prevention of disease and injury and promotion of health.
<u>Army Education Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the Secretary of the Army , the Chief of Staff, and the Army's senior leadership with expert and continuous advice on Army educational programs. Advice provided relates to educational policies, school curriculums, educational philosophy and objectives, program effectiveness, facilities, staff and faculty, instructional methods, and other aspects of organization and management.
<u>Army Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and major Army Commanders on scientific, technological, and acquisition matters of interest to the Department of the Army.
<u>Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the President , Naval War College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the Board will be made to the President, Naval War College. The President, Naval War College shall advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the Board which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
<u>Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Superintendent and the Secretary of the Navy on naval graduate education programs, assessing the effectiveness of the school in accomplishing its mission and inquires into the curricula, instruction, physical equipment, administration, state of the student body, fiscal affairs, and other matters relating to the operation of school programs.
<u>Board of Regents, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences</u>	Statutory	Provides advice and guidance to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for the operation of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences; to assure that said operation is in the best tradition of academia and in compliance with the appropriate accreditation authorities.

<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u></u> <u></u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, Director , Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Commandant, Joint Military Intelligence College with independent, informed advice and recommendations on matters related to policy, mission, accreditation, faculty, students, facilities, curricula, educational methods, research , and administration , in connection with the College.
<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u>Marine Corps</u> <u>University</u>	Statutory	Reviews develops, and provides recommendations on all aspects of the academic and administrative policies of the University; examines all aspects of the University's Professional Military Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice as is necessary to facilitate high educational standards and cost effective operations.
<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u>National Defense</u> <u>University</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice on matters related to mission, policy, faculty, students, curricula, educational methods, research , facilities, and administration of the National Defense University (NDU). Principal components of NDU are: Armed Forces Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces , national War College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Institute of Higher Defense Studies , and Department of Defense Computer Institute .
<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u>Western Hemisphere</u> <u>Institute for Security</u> <u>Cooperation</u> <u>(WHINSEC)</u>	statutory	Provides to DoD expert advice on the operations and management of the Institute. Inquires into the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs and academic methods of the Institution and any other matters that it or the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate. Reviews WHINSEC curriculum and determines whether it complies with applicable U.S. laws and regulations consistent with U.S. policy goals toward the Western Hemispheres and adheres to U.S. doctrine appropriately emphasizing human rights, the rule of law, due process, civilian control of the military and the role of the military in a democratic society.

<u>Chief of Engineers Environmental Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as advisor to the Chief for developing policy and procedures for Corps Programs; ascertains and advises upon natural, social and cultural resource management issues associated with Corps plans, projects and programs; provides advice aimed at both identifying and resolving existing environmental issues with new or expanded Corps missions; advises on the development of workable methods for quantifying natural, social and cultural resource management costs and benefits of Corp programs and in expressing these in terms of both their tangible and intangible consequences; and, explores and advises on new directions where the Corps, acting as the national engineering agency, can continue to solve not only the engineering and economic aspects of new challenges, problems, and opportunities, but also those environmental features for which it has responsibility.
<u>Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides an avenue of communications by which a distinguished group representing scientific, academic, engineering, and political communities may advise the chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on questions related to national seapower. In pursuing its objectives, the CEP may operate in committees composed of selected Panel members to conduct detailed examinations of matters related to national seapower.
<u>Defense Acquisition University Board of Visitors</u>	statutory	Advise the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and the President of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) on "organization management, curricula, methods of instruction, facilities and other matters of interest" to the DAU, as directed by 10 U.S.C. 1746.
<u>Defense Advisory Board for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense about issues concerning Reservists and their civilian employers, to include recommending policies and priorities for employer support actions and programs.
<u>Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters pertaining to military personnel testing; reviews the calibration of personnel selection and classification tests to ensure the accuracy of resulting scores; reviews relevant validation studies to ensure that the tests have utility in predicting success in technical training and on the job; reviews ongoing testing research and development in support of the enlistment program; and, makes recommendations for improvements to make the testing process more responsive to the needs of the Department of Defense and the Military Services.

<u>Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters and policies relating to women in the Armed Forces .
<u>Defense Business Advisory</u>	Discretionary	Makes recommendations to the Senior Executive Council (SEC) on effective strategies for implementation of best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Environmental Response Task Force II</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Studies and provides an annual report to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned.
<u>Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Board of Advisors</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Director, DFAS, with respect to providing world class finance and accounting services to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency with scientific and technical expertise and advice on current and long-term operational and intelligence matters covering the total range of the mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency; provides a link between the scientific/technical and military operations communities of the United States and the Defense Intelligence Agency; and, in the military operations area , addresses issues including intelligence support to combat units , joint intelligence doctrine, net assessments, arms control, and integration of intelligence and operational planning.
<u>Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy; focus upon long-term, enduring issues central to strategic planning for the Department of Defense; and, responsible for research and analysis of topics, long or short range, addressed to it by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy.
<u>Defense Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition on scientific and technical matters of interest to the Department of Defense.

<u>DoD Advisory Group on Electron Devices</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Military Departments with advice and recommendations on the conduct of economical and effective research and development programs in the field of electron devices.
<u>DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children, and Children with Disabilities</u>	statutory	Advises the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) unmet needs within the DDESS for the education of children with disabilities, comments publicly on any proposed DDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists DDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDESS.
<u>DoD Education Benefits Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense on the actuarial status of the DoD Education Benefits Fund; furnishes advice and opinion on matters referred to it by the Secretary; reviews valuations of the Fund; and, provides periodic reports to the Secretary and President and Congress on the status of the fund as required.
<u>DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile</u>	statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)), and Section 3306 of Public Law 102-484, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to effect a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices.
<u>DoD Historical Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the heads of such other Components as may choose to participate, regarding the professional standards, historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the DoD. These include: historical, archival, museum, library, art, curatorial, and related programs
<u>DoD Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Board of Actuaries</u>		Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the DoD

<u>DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the Department of Defense under military retirement and survivor benefit programs.
<u>DoD Wage Committee</u>	I (Auth by Law)	Makes recommendations regarding wage surveys and wage schedules for blue-collar employees to the Department of Defense Wage Fixing Authority.
<u>Inland Waterways Users Board</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of the Army on matters relating to construction and rehabilitation priorities on the commercial inland waterways and harbors of the United States .
<u>Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council on nuclear weapons systems surety matters that relate to protecting against inadvertent nuclear detonation or plutonium dispersal.
<u>Missouri River -- North Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000 .
<u>Missouri River -- South Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of South Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000 .
<u>National Security Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS , on matters involving Signals Intelligence production, Information Security, science, technology, business procedures and management related to the mission of the NSA/CSS .
<u>National Security Education Board</u>	statutory	Develop criteria under the National Security Education Act of 1991 for awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants to U.S. citizens and institutions; provide for wide dissemination of information regarding the activities assisted under the Act; establish qualifications for persons desiring scholarships or fellowships, and for institutions of higher education desiring grants under the Act. The Board will report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy & Resources), who is the designated representative of the Secretary of Defense.

<u>Naval Research Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Maintains an understanding of the technological needs confronting the Navy and Marine Corps, keeping abreast of the research and development which is being carried on to address them, and offering a judgment to the Navy and Marine Corps as to whether these efforts are adequate; senior scientific advisory group to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Research
<u>Ocean Research Advisory Panel</u>	statutory	Provides senior scientific advice to the National Oceanographic Research Leadership Council. Advises the Council on policies, procedures, selection of projects and allocations of funds regarding the National Oceanographic Partnership Program and on matters relating to national oceanographic data requirements as well as other responsibilities that the Council considers appropriate.
<u>Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities</u>	statutory	Advises the Director, DoDDS, of unmet needs within the system for the education of children with disabilities; comments publicly on any Office of Dependents Schools rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists ODS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.
<u>Planning and Steering Committee (Navy)</u>	Discretionary	Provides to the Advanced Technology Panel of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Board in-depth technical assessments to U.S. and Soviet ASW developments and related technologies, critically review programs which potentially impact SSBN survivability, and evaluate intelligence efforts to identify and define ASW and SSBN survivability threats.
<u>President's Information Technology Advisory Committee</u>	Presidential	Provides the National Science and Technology Council, through the Director of the office of Science and Technology Policy, with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications, information technology, and the Next Generation Internet.
<u>Scientific Advisory Board of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology</u>	Discretionary	Serves in the public interest as a scientific advisory body to the Director, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, to provide scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policies and procedures of the AFIP central laboratory of pathology for the Department of Defense and other federal agencies with responsibilities for consultation, education and research in pathology.

<u>Semiconductor Technology Council</u>	statutory Lapsed/Inactive)	Advises the Secretary of Defense on appropriate technology goals and appropriate level of effort for the research and development activities of Sematech; to link assessment by the semiconductor industry of future market and national security needs to opportunities for technology development through cooperative public and private investment; and, to seek ways to respond to the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education.
<u>United States Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides technical and scientific advice of qualified scientists and representative views of the scientific community to the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) during the development of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Convening upon request, the SAG will provide scientific and technical advice and representative views to the DSTP in order to enhance JSTPS planning.
<u>Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Scientific Advisory Board</u>	statutory	Provides recommendations to the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Council on environmental research and development activities as prescribed in statute and assume additional advisory responsibilities as directed by the Council.
<u>Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the application of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism.
<u>Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) Charter</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) on reduction of the threat to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional and special weapons, sustainment of the nuclear weapons deterrent, chemical and biological defense, counterproliferation, technology security, weapons effects, and other matters related to the DTRA mission.
<u>Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel</u>	statutory	Reviews and comments on the development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee.
<u>USAF Academy Board of Visitors</u>	statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.

<u>USAF Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides a link between the Air Force and the Nation's scientific community by serving as a means of communicating the most recent scientific information as it applies to the Air Force ; reviews and evaluates long-range plans for research and development and provides advice on the adequacy of the Air Force program; recommends usually promising scientific developments for selective Air Force emphasis and new scientific discoveries of techniques for practical application to weapon or support systems ; makes a variety of studies designed to improve the Air Force Research and Development Program ; and, serves as a pool of expert advisers to various Air Force activities.
<u>U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Board</u>	statutory	Provides broad policy guidance and review of plans and fund requirements for the conduct of research and development in the field of coastal engineering and recommends priorities of accomplishment of research projects in consonance with the needs of the coastal engineering field and the objectives of the Chief of Engineers .
<u>U.S. European Command Senior Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Commander, U.S. European Command with advice, guidance , and assistance toward fulfilling its mission.
<u>U.S. Joint Forces Command Transformation Advisory Group (TAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides timely advice on scientific, technical, intelligence, and policy-related issues to the Commander, USJFCOM , during the development of the nation's joint warfighting concepts to provide joint forces and capabilities, improve joint warfighting capabilities, transform the joint force, and improve internal command processes.
<u>U.S. Military Academy Board of Visitors</u>	statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction , physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider.
<u>U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors</u>	statutory	Inquires into the state of morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Naval Academy that the Board decides to consider, and , within 60 days of its annual meeting , submits its findings and recommendation to the President of the United States .



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

OCT 22 2004


MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Termination of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

Based upon my assessment of a September 2004 review, concerning whether three Statutory Boards and one Advisory Committee under my cognizance could be eliminated, the following applies:

- I non-concur on the elimination of the President's Information Technology Advisory Committee. RATIONALE: This Committee is formally chartered by Executive Order 13035, which is not due to expire until June 1, 2005.
- I concur on the elimination of the Defense Environmental Task Force II, Semiconductor Technology Council, and the DoD Government Advisory Committee on the Operation of the National Defense Stockpile.

Should you have any questions, please contact either Ms. June Woodford or Ms. Julie Bigler at (b)(6)


Michael W. Wynne
Acting



11-L-0559/OSD/49629



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

AUG 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Director, Administration and Management


SUBJECT: Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

I cannot concur with your memo of August 5, 2004 concerning the consolidation of certain defense advisory boards.

A recent study conducted by Admiral Charles Larson for the *Air* Force Academy Board of Visitors finds that the three academies are unique and recommends that policies administering the three academies recognize these differences. Even if consolidation of the Service Academy Boards of Visitors was recommended, such a recommendation would require multiple changes to the statute. As such, the first opportunity to request any legislative change would be in concert with the legislative cycle next year. Given the intense Congressional oversight of the Service Academies, the Larson Report and the Fowler Report, I do not recommend we suggest this type of change.

The memo also suggests that we consider consolidating the Boards of Visitors for several, but not all, of the professional military education war colleges. The future of the staff colleges, war colleges and the service and defense universities are at play in the BRAC process. I do not believe that we should take any actions with regard to the Boards of Visitors for these institutions until the BRAC process is complete.

In a second memo dated August 6, 2004, you requested my views with regard to a DoDEA recommendation to eliminate the DOD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children and Children with Disabilities and the Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on Education of Dependents with Disabilities and to create a newly formed board, the DOD Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Special Education. I concur with this proposal.


Charles S. Abell
Principal Deputy

11-L-0559/OSD/49630



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
CML WORKS
108 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0108



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

August 30, 2004

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, WASHINGTON
HEADQUARTERS SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON D.C. 20301-1950

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

I am responding to your memorandum of August 5, 2004, wherein you ask that I review two Statutory Boards, the Missouri River-North Dakota Task Force and the Missouri River-South Dakota Task Force to see if they lend themselves to consolidation under a single Board. I do not believe that the two Boards can or should be consolidated.

The two Boards were established under Titles VII and IX of the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-541) in order to provide a means for each state, and its sovereign Indian Nations, to be involved in assessing and addressing a host of issues of particular concern to them. While it is true that the two Boards are directed to perform generally similar functions, the two Boards were created as distinct entities and were charged by statute with preparing reports and assessments on matters peculiar to the respective states. Congress recognized that there are significant differences between upstream and downstream states in terms of priorities, resource concerns, and views regarding operation of the Missouri River System.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. Your staff may contact Mr. Chip Smith, my Assistant for Environment, Tribal and Regulatory Affairs at (b)(6) or (b)(6)

John Paul Woodley, Jr.
John Paul Woodley, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Civil Works)



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

AUG 05 2004

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

The Secretary has ~~asked~~ us to review the various Advisory Boards that have ~~been~~ established under DoD cognizance and to identify those that should be discontinued or consolidated.

~~Our~~ review indicates that two Statutory Boards under **your** cognizance, the Missouri River-North Dakota Task Force and the Missouri River-South Dakota ~~Task~~ Force, perform similar functions that may lend themselves to consolidation in a single Board.

Please advise us by **30 August 2004** if you concur with this assessment so that we may work with your staff, the Office of the DoD General Counsel, and the Office of the ASD (Legislative Affairs) to initiate the statutory changes necessary to effect **this** consolidation.

The point of contact for **this** review is Mr. Paul Granahan, Deputy Director for Planning and Evaluation, Washington Headquarters Services. He may be reached at (b)(6)

Howard G. Becker
Deputy Director

cc: ASD (Legislative Affairs)
ASD (Public Affairs)
GC, DoD

40801555

11-L-0550/ASD/49632



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

SEP 17 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

The Department of the Navy does not concur with the proposal to consolidate Department of Defense (DoD) Advisory Boards for the following reasons:

- Consolidation of the three Boards of Visitors for the service academies would require legislative action. *And might not be in the best interest of the services due to geography, culture, etc.*
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has statutory responsibility for oversight of officer joint education and has policies and organizations in place to meet this requirement.
- The proposed consolidation of the Board of Visitors of select military war colleges omits the Army professional military education institutions and National Defense University (NDU), thereby fragmenting the professional military education process. The Naval War College (NWC) has additional service-unique missions related to the development of the Navy's future strategy and research and analysis that could be impeded by the proposed consolidation. The Marine Corps University (MCU) receives direct oversight provided by the Commandant consistent with the intent of the Congress. Finally, consolidation stands to jeopardize accreditation of NWC and MCU master's degree programs.

William A. Navas, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

11-L-0559/OSD/49633



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

Office Of The Assistant Secretary

03 SEP 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: SAF/MR

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

In response to your memo regarding the consolidation of professional military education-related Advisory Boards, the Air Force reviewed our current Board structure and concurs with further exploration. Although many factors argue against a consolidated Service Academy Board of Visitors (BoV), there may be merit in pursuing, to some degree, a combined BoV for Professional Military Education (PME).


Rationale for not including the academies in this effort directly relates to the ongoing efforts to reinvigorate the USAFA BoV. An engaged USAFA BoV, with formalized by-laws and new membership requirements, meeting four times a year, is key to the changes underway in the culture and management of USAFA. We want to avoid diluting the focus of our BoV members by expanding their realm of review to the other academies.

Interaction among the Services regarding PME already occurs. For example, the Educational Alliance Memorandum of Agreement between the Air Force and the Navy has existed since December 2002. The Military Education Coordination Council and the Process for Accreditation for Joint Education already provide basic oversight for PME schools. Expanding the respective advisory boards to an across-the-board perspective, to include the Army and the National Defense University, would be another step toward increased jointness in the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols. However, this should not be accomplished at the expense of the institutions from where this "combined" BoV would be pulled.

The Air University (AU) BoV has existed since 1946 and takes its oversight responsibilities very seriously. The broad scope of this specific BoV calls for it to advise on programs and institutions that encompass much more than PME, to include precommissioning, professional continuing education, degree granting, and significant research efforts. Thus, the AU's BoV agenda is flexible and wide-ranging and addresses other AU priorities such as the Community College of the Air Force. For example, over the past five years less than half of the AU's BoV meeting agendas were spent on officer PME; the remainder of the time focused on other areas. The impact on accreditation would also have to be explored since any consolidation or expansion would constitute a formal change of governance according to regional accreditation rules. Moreover, board structure plays an important role in the accreditation of degrees awarded through the PME schools and we do not want to jeopardize that role. We also need to consider that BoV members are volunteers, and we must be sensitive to the inherent challenges of these positions, especially regarding their time commitment.

11-L-0559/OSD/49634

The Air Force supports participating in a joint working group to explore potential value and further discuss the details if OSD decides to pursue this initiative. My point of contact is Colonel Kathleen Grabowski (AF/DPLE), (b)(6)



MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

P&E

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

DJSM 0992-04
15 September 2004

MEMORANDUM **FOR** THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

Subject: Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

1. Your proposal' to consolidate Advisory Boards dealing with professional military education (PME) has been reviewed. Regarding your first proposal, a Board of Visitors (BOV) for the Military Academies should not be created, since all three are unique and should be recognized as different entities, with diverse needs and circumstances.
2. You also suggest consolidating the BOV for several, but not all, of the PME war colleges. The JCS does not concur with your recommendation to create a new BOV for PME, as the Military Education Coordination Council and the Process for Accreditation for Joint Education (both established in CJCS policy) meet the function defined for a **BOV** for PME. Additionally, the military war and staff colleges have varying requirements from their respective civilian accrediting organizations that must be considered if they **are** to continue offering degrees.

T. J. KEATING
VADM, USN
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Reference

- 1 OSD(A&M) memorandum, 5 August 2004, "Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards"

11-L-0559/OSD/49636



DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
ARLINGTON
1851 SOUTH BELL STREET
ARLINGTON, VA 22240-5291


SEP 27 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Renewal of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Board of
Advisors

In response to your memorandum of August 13, 2004, subject as above, we will be establishing a Customer Advisory Forum to replace the DFAS Board of Advisors. This forum will not fall within the guidelines of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

Questions regarding this request may be addressed to the DFAS point of contact,
Beverly Lemon, at (b)(6)


Jack E. Gaddy
Director

www.dfas.mil

Your Financial Partner @ Work


11-L-0559/OSD/49637

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

SECRET
2005 MAY 05 PM 5:23
May 5, 2005

1009

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Upcoming Transition Period

Please put down on a piece of paper what you plan as your days in town between now and the time Pete takes over. And Pete, please add Ed Giambastiani's plans between now and the time he takes over.

I would like to get a sense of who is going to be where, and how we want to manage that period.

Thanks.

DHR:ag
050405-9

.....
Please respond by 5/19/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/49638

OSD 09731-05

TAB B

Chairman / Vice Chairman - June 2005
(For Official Use Only)

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
			1	2 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Southeast Asia. Counterpart visits and Shangri-La dialogue	3 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Southeast Asia. Counterpart visits and Shangri-La dialogue	4 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Southeast Asia. Counterpart visits and Shangri-La dialogue
5 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Southeast Asia. Counterpart visits and Shangri-La dialogue	6 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Southeast Asia. Counterpart visits and Shangri-La dialogue	7 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Southeast Asia. Counterpart visits and Shangri-La dialogue	8	9 VCJCS CJCS - Leave in Europe	10 VCJCS CJCS - Leave in Europe	11 VCJCS CJCS - Leave in Europe
12 VCJCS CJCS - Leave in Europe	13 VCJCS CJCS - Leave in Europe	14 VCJCS CJCS - Leave in Europe	15 VCJCS CJCS - Leave in Europe	16 VCJCS CJCS - TDY in Europe	17 VCJCS CJCS - TDY in Europe	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

- Shaded "VCJCS" in date box denotes the Vice is acting Chairman.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/49639

Chairman / Vice Chairman - July 2005
(For Official Use Only)

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
						2
3	4		1	2		9
10	11	12	13	14		16
17	18 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Europe Counterpart visits	19 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Europe Counterpart visits	20 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Europe Counterpart visits	21 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Europe Counterpart visits	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

- Shaded "VCJCS" in date box denotes the Vice is acting Chairman.

Chairman / Vice Chairman / Vice Chairman(Designee) - August 2005
(For Official Use Only)

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8 * ADM Giambastiani arrives for duty as VCJCS	9	10	11	12	13 ADM Giambastiani assumes VCJCS duties
14 VCJCS(D) CJCS - TDY - Troop visits - EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM GEN Pace- Leave	15 VCJCS(D) CJCS - TDY - Troop visits - EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM GEN Pace- Leave	16 VCJCS(D) CJCS - TDY - Troop visits - EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM GEN Pace- Leave	17 VCJCS(D) CJCS - TDY - Troop visits - EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM GEN Pace- Leave	18 VCJCS(D) CJCS - TDY - Troop visits - EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM GEN Pace- Leave	19 VCJCS(D) CJCS - TDY - Troop visits - EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM GEN Pace- Leave	20 VCJCS(D) CJCS - TDY - Troop visits - EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM GEN Pace- Leave
21 VCJCS(D) CJCS - TDY - Troop visits - EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM GEN Pace- Leave	22 VCJCS(D) CJCS - TDY - Troop visits - EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM GEN Pace- Leave	23 VCJCS(D) CJCS - TDY - Troop visits - EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM GEN Pace- Leave	24 GEN Pace- Leave	25 GEN Pace- Leave	26 GEN Pace- Leave	27 GEN Pace- Leave
28 GEN Pace- Leave	29	30	31			

* Assuming confirmation

- VCJCS(D): ADM Giambastiani
- Shaded "VCJCS(D)" in date box denotes the Vice(Designee) is acting Chairman.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/49641

Chairman / Vice Chairman / Vice Chairman(Designee) - September 2005

(For Official Use Only)

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
				1		2 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Fall CHoD tour - Europe
4 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Fall CHoD tour - Europe	5 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Fall CHoD tour - Europe	6 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Fall CHoD tour - Europe	7 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Fall CHoD tour - Europe	8 VCJCS CJCS - TDY - Fall CHoD tour - Europe		10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

- VCJCS: General Pace
- Shaded "VCJCS" in date box denotes the Vice is acting Chairman.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/49642

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

VCJCS	Gen Pace	13 May 2005
CDRUSJFCOM	ADM Giambastiani	13 May 2005



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-2521-05
23 May 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMS/21*

SUBJECT: Upcoming Transition Period (SF 1009)

- **Answer.** In response to your request (TAB A), attached are the senior leadership schedules (TAB B) until 1 October. These schedules assume a timely confirmation of the new CJCS and VCJCS.
- **Analysis**
 - I will be in the Washington, D.C. area until retirement with the exception of the following dates.
 - 2-7 June--Southeast Asia on a counterpart visit.
 - 9-17 June--Europe on leave and visiting counterparts.
 - 18-21 July—Europe visiting counterparts.
 - 14-23 August--Conducting troop visits in USEUCOM, USCENTCOM and USPACOM.
 - 3-8 September--Europe for the fall CHOD tour.
 - General Pace
 - 14-28 August--On leave.
 - Month of September--Visiting combatant commands to receive updates in preparation for duties as Chairman.
 - Admiral Giambastiani
 - 8 August--In the Pentagon carrying out the duties of the Vice Chairman.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: General Richard B. Myers; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 09731-05

~~FOUO~~

May 31, 2005

383.6

TO: Larry Di Rita
Jim Haynes

CC: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letter from Charles Z. Wick

Attached is a letter with a couple of interesting ideas.

Please look it over and tell me if any of it makes sense for us to consider.

Thanks.

Anach.

5/23/05 Wick letter to SD and 5/24/05 letter

31 May 05

DHR:dh
053105-22

.....
Please respond by 6/30/05

~~FOUO~~

MAY 31 ENT'D

23 May 05

11-L-0559/OSD/49645

09743-05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Charles Z. Wick

(b)(6)

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your kind note and your supportive thoughts and ideas.

I will pass along your insights to our folks. The idea about listing the details as to why each prisoner at Guantanamo Bay is being detained is interesting – we'll think that through.

Sincerely,

n

11-L-0559/OSD/49646

09743 05

FROM :

FAX NO. (b)(6)

May. 23 2005 04:01PM P1

out
5/31

CHARLES Z. WICK

(b)(6)

May 23, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Via Facsimile: (b)(6)

SECRET CABLES	
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SECDEF	X
DEPSECDEF	X
SPL ASST	X
EXECSEC	X
USDP	X
USDI	X
ESD	X
CCD	X
GC	
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CABLE CH	
FILE	

Dear Mr. Secretary,

You may recall at the August 27, 2003 lunch at the Bob Hope Memorial at the Lakeside County Club, I had the pleasure of sitting with you and Joyce. You were kind enough to give me your home address (b)(6) if needed. As important as I regard the following, rather than sending this directly to your home address I thought I would try your office at the Pentagon first. It was so delightful to be welcomed by your (b)(6) who in view of the importance of the following told me that a fax machine was right behind her, and that she would be delighted to take it directly into you. You are indeed fortunate to have someone like your charming, bright (b)(6) representing your office.

I admire very much the way you and your military have taken all the unnecessary castigation in the world-wide media. I have been concerned on your behalf as our Secretary of Defense as well as that of the image of the United States with all the unfair attributions particularly in making our military the "victims" at Guantonmo and Abu Ghraib. All of a sudden the "bad guy" prisoners are the "good guys". Our patriotic "good guys" putting there lives on the line for their country are the "bad guys".

Unfortunately, the media detailing the alleged "abuses" by the U.S. military naturally have evoked sympathy around the world for the former "bad guys"! These alleged abuses are brutally characterized and unfortunately stand alone in the multi media without any refutation!

As the former head of the United States Information Agency (USIA) for two terms under my friend, President Ronald Reagan, I was charged with public diplomacy all over the world outside the United States. My public diplomacy vehicles were 218 posts in 159 countries: The Voice of America, WorldNet, Radio Marti, the USIA International Council to help the Agency in its task of strengthening foreign understanding and support, in 1988 in West Berlin the establishment of Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) and a number of projects directed to current causes or image emergencies.

I feel confident that should the Pentagon procure a list of prisoners at Guantonmo and Abu Ghraib and then release the list with specific details as to with what each prisoner is charged. It could produce a dramatic reversal of our current negative image momentum. For example, prisoner X is charged with killing four American soldiers with grenades thrown into their living quarters, prisoner Y and Z are charged with beheading three American marines and on and on

11-L-0559/OSD/49647


09743-05
1

The unassailable, horrifying content of the list of charges would be within an ethical frame of reference. The list also should be available to the media and the public under the Freedom of Information Act. Therefore, the multi-media and any biased critics would have no basis for projecting any credible refutations.

Another recommendation which may be difficult, would be to ~~law~~ put together a small documentary using available tape and film clips, showing the beheading events of a *great* number of "our boys", including for example, Wall Street Journal's, Daniel Pearl,

The above suggestions if you agree could create a *great* wave of American and international outrage in refreshing prior memories of all the horror events by the "bad guys" previously captured in the world media. The world would understand that we are still history's "good guys",

Many thanks,



Charles Z. Wick

CHARLES Z. WICK

(b)(6)

May 24, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense


Dear Secretary,

Further to my fax to you yesterday, I am attaching for your interest an editorial commentary in this morning's Los Angeles Times (5/24/05).

The cartoon strongly makes a point I was trying to express in my multi-word May 23rd fax to you!

The Los Angeles Times is thought to be a very liberal newspaper. This editorial cartoon I believe (and the LA Times must believe) reflects a view of most of the country!

Sincerely,



Charles Wick

OPINION

LOS ANGELES TIMES

Commentary

MICHAEL RAMIREZ



FROM :

FAX NO. (b)(6)

May. 23 2005 04:01PM F1

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAY 24 AM 6: CHARLES Z. WICK
(b)(6)

May 23, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Via Facsimile (b)(6)

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
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USDI	/
ESD	/
CCD	/
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RB	/
CABLE CH	
FILE	

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I admire very much the way you and your military have taken all the unnecessary casligation in the world-wide-media. I have been concerned on your behalf as our Secretary of Defense as well as that of the image of the United States with all the unfair attributions particularly in making our military the "victims" at Guantonomo and Abu Ghraib. All of a sudden the "bad guy" prisoners are the "good guys". Our patriotic "good guys" putting there lives on the line for their country are the "bad guys".

Unfortunately, the media detailing the alleged "abuses" by the U.S. military naturally have evoked sympathy around the world for the former "bad guys"! These alleged abuses are brutally characterized and unfortunately stand alone in the multi media without any refutation!

As the former head of the United States Information Agency (USIA) for two terms under my friend, President Ronald Reagan, I was charged with public diplomacy all over the world outside the United States. My public diplomacy vehicles were 218 posts in 159 countries: The Voice of America, WorldNet, Radio Marti, the USIA International Council to help the Agency in its task of strengthening foreign understanding and support. in 1988 in West Berlin the establishment of Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) and a number of projects directed to current causes or imago emergencies.

I feel confident that should the Pentagon procure a list of prisoners at Guantonomo and Abu Ghraib and then release the list with specific details as to with what each prisoner is charged. It could produce a dramatic reversal of our current negative image momentum. For example, prisoner X is charged with killing four American soldiers with grenades thrown into their living quarters, prisoner Y and Z are charged with beheading three American murines and on and on.

OSD 09743-05


11-L-0559/OSD/49651

The ~~unassailable~~, horrifying content of the ~~list~~ of charges would be ~~within~~ an ethical ~~frame~~ of reference. The ~~List~~ also should be available to the media and the public under the Freedom of Information Act. ~~Therefore~~, the multi-media and any biased critics would have no basis for projecting any credible ~~refutations~~.

Another recommendation which may be difficult, would be to have put together a small documentary using available tape and film clips, showing the beheading events of a great number of "our boys", including for example, Wall Street Journal's, Daniel Pearl.

The above suggestions if you agree could create a great wave of American and international outrage in refreshing prior memories of all the horror events by the "bad guys" previously captured in the world media. The world would understand that we are still history's "good guys".

Many thanks,



Charles Z. Wick



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 31 2005

383,6

Mr. Charles Z. Wick

(b)(6)

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your kind note and your supportive thoughts and ideas.

I will pass along your insights to our folks. The idea about listing the details as to why each prisoner at Guantanamo Bay is being detained is interesting - we'll think that through.

Sincerely,

31 MAY 05

OSD 09743-05

23 MAY 05

11-L-0559/OSD/49653

~~FOUO~~

MAY 24 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jim MacDougall

Andy,

I mentioned Jim MacDougall to you at the NSC meeting. Here's the memo I sent you sometime back.

What can you do to be helpful?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/20/05 SecDef Memo to Honorable Andrew H. Card

DHR:ss
052305-13

OSD 09745-05

~~FOUO~~


11-L-0559/OSD/49654

02015A

24MAY05

~~FOUO~~

April 20, 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasia

I would like to see a fellow over here, named Jim MacDougall, get approved in his position as our Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasia. There apparently has been some resistance because he is a career SES who doesn't want to convert to a political **spot**.

I have thought through all of that and remained convinced that he is the right pick for the job. He has depth, experience and vision, and has been acting in the job for 18 months with excellent results.

My view is that we should be pleased to put talented career people in some of these posts as long as they are doing the job the President wants.

Please take a look at it and see what can be done.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
041905-38

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07383-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49655

~~FOUO~~

CEP March 31, 2005
SECDEF DEFENSE

2005 JUL 24 AM 10:19

TO: David Chu
Bill Winkenwerder
GEN Pete Schoomaker
ADM Vern Clark
Gen John Jumper
Gen Mike Hagee

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Amputees

Given the superb medical assistance and the rapid evacuation of the wounded, the Armed Forces have a larger number who -- thank the good Lord -- have survived their wounds, but who will be functioning the rest of their lives with various restrictions, whether that be the loss of a limb or some other injury.

I wonder if we ought to be reviewing the rules we have in the Armed Forces for people who are in such a circumstance. There is no question that an amputee can work very effectively in both military and civilian positions in the Department.

I would like you folks to give some serious thought to this and get back to me within the next 60 days with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:gs
033105-8

.....
Please respond by 5/31/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49656

OSD 09776-05



UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE
DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2005 MAY 24 ~~MAY 19~~ 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

FROM: General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

SUBJECT: Amputees

- This responds to Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated March 31, 2005, Subject: Amputees (Tab A).
- As of May 1, 2005, there have been 346 amputees as a result of the GWOT. Of those 346 amputees, 209 are still in treatment or rehabilitation and 137 have been processed through our Disability Evaluation System. Of those 137 Soldiers, three were determined fit and returned to duty, six were determined unfit but returned to limited duty as they requested, and 128 were medically retired.
- Amputees who demonstrate they can perform their MOS-related duties are determined fit and returned to duty. Those who cannot perform their MOS-related duties are determined unfit, but our policy is that unfit Soldiers with combat-related disabilities may remain on active duty. All requests (six to date) from combat-related amputees have been approved.
- For the more severely injured, we have created opportunities for them to continue to serve in our acquisition community, Training and Doctrine Command, Recruiting Command, and Space and Missile Defense Command. Disabled Soldier Support System counselors assist them in pursuing opportunities within the Department of Defense, the Department of Labor, or the private sector if that's the path they choose.
- We are changing our regulations to permit amputees to complete up to a year trial of duty before they go through our disability system. We are reviewing personnel management policies to insure those desiring to remain on active duty have the same opportunities as fit Soldiers for schooling, advancement, and a professionally fulfilling career in spite of their impairment.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Dan Garvey, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/49657

OSD 09776-05

Tab A



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

JUN 06 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Retaining Members with Physical Restrictions

- You requested a review of rules regarding military and civilian positions for members with physical restrictions as a result of Service injuries. (TAB A)
- Woundings and amputations do not automatically lead to separation from the Service.
- Each case is evaluated based on type of injury and degree of physical disability as a function of the member's expected duty demands of grade, rank, or rating.
- A Medical Evaluation Board initially evaluates an injured/ill member to determine if member meets retention standards.
- Members who no longer meet retention standards are referred to the Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) for fitness for duty determination and final disposition.
- The overall effect of the disability on a member is evaluated for:
 - o How the disability affects a member's performance.
 - o How DoD will maintain and protect a member during future duty assignment, and
 - o If the member is physically qualified to perform duties.
- Even with a PEB determination of unfit for duty, under certain conditions, a member may remain on active duty with a Continuation On Active Duty waiver.

OPTIONS:

- Ensure eligible Service members are aware of the Continuation On Active Duty option early in their injury/illness recovery period.
- Reevaluate the Continuation On Active Duty eligibility criteria to ensure appropriate flexibility for Service members with potential for retention are given consideration for this program.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Ruscio, C&PP, (b)(6) DOCS Open 84178,85146

11-L-0559/OSD/49659

OSD 09776-05

~~FOUO~~

March 31, 2005

TO: David ~~Chu~~
Bill Winkenwerder
GEN Pete Schoomaker
ADM Vern Clark
Gen John Jumper
Gen Mike Hagee

CC: Gen Dick ~~Myers~~
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Amputees

7/6
6

Given the superb medical assistance and the rapid evacuation of the wounded, the Armed Forces have a larger number who -- thank the good Lord -- have survived their wounds, but who will be functioning the rest of their lives with various restrictions, whether that be the loss of a limb or some other injury.

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I would like you folks to give some serious thought to this and get back to me within the next 60 days with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:as
033105-8

.....
Please respond by

3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09776-05


11-L-0559/OSD/49660

RETAINING MEMBERS WITH PHYSICAL RESTRICTION

COORDINATION

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S. C. Chu


~~FOUO~~

May 26, 2005



TO: Larry Di Rita
Steve Cambone

CC: Dr. Steve Bucci
Cathy Mainardi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Dan Gallington

383.6

Please get Dan Gallington in and have him brief you on some background information he believes would be helpful. His contact information is attached. If I'm around, I would like to hear what he has to say as well. Let's try to set it up that way.

Thanks.


Attach.

5/1/05 Letter from Dan Gallington to SecDef

DHR:ss
0526054

26 MAY 05

.....
Please respond by 6/23/05

Sir,  7/14
Response from
USD(I) attached. Cond.
of PA complete.
V/R,

COL Grinsky

1 MAY 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49663

09782.05

2005 MAY 24 AM 11: 26

(b)(6)

May 1, 2005

OSD
5/24

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense
Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I can't stand it anymore - watching your **guys** [still] getting beaten up by Congress and the press on DOD's role in covert actions and detainee treatment. I'm referring to Steve Cambone's testimony before the SASC - and Larry DiRita's press **briefing** - both events were on CSPAN last week, and serve **as** the motivation for **this** letter.

First, while Steve seems to understand that "special activities" **as** defined in the 1981 Regan Executive Order was the concept borrowed by the Congress when they legislated "covert action" provisions in the early 90's - **as** a reaction to **Iran** - Contra - he clearly doesn't know the background. In that respect, Steve needs to read the "veto statement" President Bush sent to the Congress in 1991 when he vetoed the first bill they passed on covert action. Next, Steve should read the "signing statement" President Bush issued when he signed the bill Congress **finally** passed, and what became the law on covert action. These basic positions have remained Presidential policy ever since, and focus on the President's Constitutional powers **as** Commander in Chief, which in turn directly affect the equities of the Department of Defense.


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Second, and speaking of **Larry**, he needs to do the same homework **as** I described above; and both should read the short Op Ed, which is attached. **This** should accomplish two objectives: enable Steve to **take** advantage of the opportunity that Senator McCain gave him to speak **on** the purely intelligence authorities for coercive interrogations; and, allow Larry to differentiate between the **ordinary** custodial treatment of detainees - clearly the main focus of the issues that you have had to deal with - and their custody incident to requests from intelligence agencies. **This** latter issue set, while **also** in need of policy revision, should **essentially be** Steve's issue, allowing Larry to deal with the "Army part" of the controversy.

Neither Steve **nor** Larry are lawyers, **so** they are especially licensed to get their points in - as I outlined above - by prefacing them with "I'm not a lawyer, but as I understand it, these are inherent powers of the President **as** Commander in Chief", **or** "I'm not a lawyer, but as I understand it, this has long been the position of the President and the **NSC**", or "I'm not a lawyer, but **as** I understand it, most of this controversy is about poorly trained and led soldiers not knowing **or** following the rules and who are now being sanctioned **or** punished for it."

I **will** gladly come in and tutor them both if you want - I'm serious about this - I don't know **if** I can **handle another** episode of the "Steve and Larry Show" on CSPAN!

With **all my** usual and very best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dan", with a stylized, sweeping flourish extending from the end of the name.

Daniel J. Gallington

Attachment **As** stated

The Washington Times

www.washingtontimes.com

Any abuse justified?

By Daniel J. Gallington

Published May 16, 2004

The person we have in custody is the person who planted nuclear or biological devices in New York City, and he won't tell us where they are or when they will go off.

We have this person in custody outside the United States and he is not a "U.S. Person."

In this circumstance, the basic "rules" that govern what we can do to extract information from this person are found in the unclassified 1981 Executive Order No. 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities": While we **are** prohibited from conducting "medial experiments" on this person, the reality is we can consider nearly anything else so long **as** we get the appropriate level of approval to do it.

And, "appropriate level" in this case might be at the highest levels of elected government, perhaps with appropriate congressional notification or consultation.

What could this "authorize" and what other limitations would apply? Could you, for example, drug the person, humiliate him, threaten him, lie to him, construct various and elaborate ruses to convince him if he didn't tell you where the devices were, you would torture or kill him or torture or kill others?

~~The answer is you could probably do all these things to find the devices -- and, if approved, it would be both "legal" and morally justifiable under the circumstances.~~

~~But what happened in Iraq seems substantially different than that:~~

~~Some of those in custody may be prisoners of war, hence subject to the custodial legal regime established by the Geneva Conventions -- there are clear violations of international law in this situation.~~

*Treatment of the persons in custody by the Army was probably governed by regulations established by the Combatant or Component Service Commander or the Army -- there would seem to be clear violations of military law.

What is clearly evident is some incredibly stupid behavior by a few incredibly ignorant people.

This is, **as** is popular to say these days, a "training and equipping" issue -- read Army -- **and** if any high-level official is to be fired, it should be in the Army, working up from the soldiers in the pictures or others who engaged in this behavior.

In sum, what we have here, is a failure -- perhaps a massive failure -- of Army training and leadership.

But, illustrated by the nuclear device hypothetical, the answer that has been around since 1981 is also correct. And we shouldn't lose sight of it in the political and media hyperbola surrounding the activities of a few very stupid and poorly supervised soldiers.

In a future and very dangerous situation, we might well need to consider and authorize some otherwise very unpleasant measures to prevent thousands or hundreds of thousands of us from being blown up, gassed or poisoned.

We shouldn't hesitate.

Daniel J. Gallington is a senior research fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

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[Return to the article](#)

7/7/2005 7:26 AM

JSB
7/14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone *SC*

SUBJECT: Dan Gallington

Dan Gallington came in on July 6 to meet with Larry Di Rita and me.

Dan provided the attached brief (Tab A).

It was helpful to hear from Dan how we might frame a number of the issues we are confronting.

We asked him to meet also with Matt Waxman and Pete Geren.

(1) Covert Action

and, (2) Coercive Interrogation to Obtain Intelligence...both issues for non-lawyers dealing with lawyers

11-L-0559/OSD/49669

Both in the “never settled” category...

- Long history, at least since WW II
- Post Watergate “adjustment” of national security powers between Congress and President
- Best known is the was War Powers Resolution - unconstitutional??
- DOJ is steward of Separation of Powers

National Security Powers are “shared”...

- But, President does NOT share Commander in Chief power - it is exclusive
- Best example: war powers notifications are “consistent with” NOT “in accordance with”
- Both Democrat and Republican Administrations have share this view

“Covert Action” (CA)

- Statutory definition of CA was derived from EO 12333 and concept of “special activities”
- Context was Iran-CONTRA
- First President Bush vetoed first covert action law over “covert action” definition
- Key language is in 8/91 “signing statement”

Key Language

- “I believe that the Act’s definition of ‘covert action’ is unnecessary. In determining whether particular military activities constitute covert actions, I shall continue to bear in mind the historic missions of the Armed Forces to protect the United States and its interests, influence foreign capabilities and intentions, and...”

Trumpets..Ta Ta

- “...conduct activities preparatory to the execution of operations”.
- Also, that “legislatively directed policy determinations in the Act...are without effect because they are unconstitutional”.
- And, that: “Several provisions in the Act requiring disclosure of certain information to the Congress raise constitutional concerns. These provisions.. .”

More Trumpets...

- “...cannot be construed to detract from the President’s constitutional authority to withhold information [FROM CONGRESS] the disclosure of which could significantly impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties”.

First Principles

- Don't argue, just relate the history of the differing views on these subjects - e.g., “as I understand...”
- This is NOT a Republican/Democrat issue, this is a Legislative/Executive struggle that will never be resolved
- There are not “traditional” allies on the Hill
- Has PD 79 or current version addressed? Note, PD 79 issued last day of Bush I and kept throughout Clinton I and II

(2) Coercive Interrogations :

Collecting intelligence

11-L-0559/OSD/49677

Must Distinguish between

- Requirements for custodial care established by internal DOD rules, e.g., UCMJ and what the punishments are actually for - DOD is lead.
- The international regimes that are relevant, e.g., Geneva Conventions, Torture Conventions and implementing US law - from DOJ - DOD should NOT be lead!

EO 12333

- Establishes little constraints on custodial interrogation, except to prohibit “medical experiments”
- Rest of regime for this activity is established by Executive Department rules & regulations, issued pursuant to EO 12333
- In DOD it's 5340.1R (or latest version) - should declassify to maximum extent

Congress Will Probably Legislate

- Might be a good idea to establish an informal group to work an acceptable way to go about this
- Want to establish (somewhere) what most everyone understands the law to be for that situation most important to DOD: a non-US person, non Geneva detainee held overseas
- Need to address CIA/DOD equities, responsibilities and requirements

2005 MAY 24 11:26

(b)(6)

May 1, 2005

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The Secretary of Defense
Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-1000

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OSD 09782-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49681

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Published May 16, 2004

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in Arlington. He is a former military officer and judge advocate, Justice Department deputy counsel for intelligence policy, Senate Intelligence Committee general counsel and a recent deputy defense assistant secretary for territorial security.

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[Return to the article](#)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 26 2005

000,77

Mr. Daniel J. Gallington
Senior Research Fellow
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 N. Stuart Street, Suite 200
Arlington, VA 22203

Dear Dan,

Thanks so much for your letter of May 1; it just arrived. In the future, you may want to fax me at (b)(6)

26 MAY 05

I appreciate your thoughtful suggestions. I have asked Larry and Steve to get you in, so that they can get brought up to speed.

I appreciate it.

With my best regards,

Sincerely,

1 MAY 05

OSD 09782-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49685

~~FOUO~~

1-05/007010

ES-3312

May 19, 2005

2005 MAY 26 PM 12:09

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *m*
SUBJECT: Call from Senator Rick Santorum and the Issue of Tungsten

I received a call from Senator Rick Santorum. He raised the issue of tungsten. He said the U.S. has a stockpile; that prices are soaring, and he has companies that are adversely affected. He wondered if it might make sense to sell some portion of the stockpile, to relieve the price pressure. He believes China is involved, **and** that it has to do with making nuclear weapons.

I told him I thought OMB controls stockpiles, and that the nuclear weapons issue was one the Department of Energy handles, but that I would get smart on it and get back *to* him.

Please find out what the facts are, and let's prepare a good memo for Rick Santorum. I'd like to get back to him by next Wednesday, May 25.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
051905-5

.....
Please respond by

5/24/05

~~FOUO~~

05-19-05 10:17 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/49686

OSD 10058-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

2005 MAY 26 PM 12:09 ES-3312
05/007010-ES

May 24, 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

CC: Dan Stanley

FROM: Mira Ricardel MAY 24 2005

SUBJECT: Call From Senator Santorum on Tungsten Stockpiles

Your question is attached.

DoE stockpile and industrial base issues are handled by AT&L – we have asked them to look into Senator Santorum's question. There are no proliferation issues involved.

The responsible AT&L office is the DUSD for Logistics and Material Readiness (Bradley Berkson): my staff has been in touch with his to confirm they are providing a response for your review.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49687

25-05-05 10:25 IN

OSD 10058-05



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAY 26 PM 5:18

ACTION MEMO

May 26, 2005 - 12:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: BRAC-like Process for Military Compensation - SNOWFLAKE

- You asked about a BRAC-like process for military compensation. This memorandum responds with two alternatives, both based on the work of your Advisory Committee on Military Compensation:

1. Present the conclusions you draw from the Committee's work as a single statutory package, à la NSPS, with the FY 2006 budget.

- Pro: Capitalizes on the existing processes.
- Con: Debate over individual provisions may distract from the whole.

2. Seek authority to present the package as an "up or down" choice to the Congress.

- Pro: Focuses on the strategic questions.
- Con: Requires new statutory authority, for which we have not yet laid the foundation. (I will research how Frank Carlucci did this for the first BRAC, which began without statutory authority.)

- From his comments at the Rules' luncheon, Mr. Cole might be a potential partner. I will try to explore his interest.

DECISION: Option 1 _____

Option 2 _____

Other Get G. Espinoza to get other

See me _____

Opinions

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

MA SB	6/5/27	SMA DSD	
TSA SD		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	11/5/27	1005	1435
ESR MA	8/5/27	1002	11

11-0559 OSD/49688

OSD 10107-05

323.3


26 MAY 05

19 MAY 05

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY SECRETARY
May 19 2005
PLEASE

2005 MAY 26 PM 5:18

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: BRAC for Human Capital

Please think about the idea of some sort of a special arrangement – like BRAC –
for human capital.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051805-15

.....
Please respond by 6/16/05

FOUO

OSD 10107-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49689

FOUO

May 19, 2005
STANDARD TIME
FBI/DOJ

2005 MAY 26 PM 5:18

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: BRAC for Human Capital

Please think about the idea of some sort of a special arrangement – like BRAC –
for human capital.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051805-15

.....
Please respond by

6/16/05

FOUO

OSD 10107-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49690

323.3

19 May 05

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 26, 2005

2005 MAY 27

PM 2:54

105/007326
ES-3366

387

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **D**

SUBJECT: NSPD

Don't we need a new NSPD on who is supposed to do what with respect to homeland defense?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052505-4

.....
Please respond by

6/1/05

5/26/05

→ SD

Yes. We are working to ensure that such a document is among those that emerge from the GWOT strategy review.

Doug Feith

26 MAY 05

FOUO

26-05-05 12:15 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/49691

OSD 10168-05

26 MAY 05

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
2005 MAY 27 PM 2:54
May 26, 2005
JDS/007326
ES-3366

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **D**

SUBJECT: NSPD

Don't we need a new NSPD on who is supposed to do what with respect to homeland defense?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052505-4

.....
Please respond by

6/1/05

384

26 MAY 05

11-L-0559/OSD/49692

OSD 10168-05

FOUO


SECRET OF THE
DEFENSE
2005 MAY 27 PM 4: 22

May 9, 2005

ES-3205

05/006413

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: U.S. Forces in Kosovo

We ought to think about the possibility of reducing some of our forces in Kosovo.

Thanks.

DHR:as
050905-20

.....
Please respond by

5/26/05

FOUO

OSD 101 89-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49693

FOUO

Capt
X 770A

1145
5/18

May 18, 2005

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Defense *Daily* Article

Attached is an article, "Defense Science Board finds No Barrier to New Drayun Scandal." I cannot believe it is true, given all the work that has been done and the changes that have been made. Perhaps this report is stale, and they are unaware of all the work that has been done.

Would you put your head into it, and let me know what you think?

Attach.
5/11/05 Defense *Daily* Article

DHR:as
051705-21

.....
Please respond by 6/16/05

334 D58

18 May 05

FOUO

OSD 10262-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49694

Defense Daily
May 11, 2005
Pg. 4

AD
S118

Defense Science Board Finds No Barrier To New Druyun Scandal

By Sharon Weinberger

A senior defense advisory body **has** concluded there are still no safeguards in the Pentagon's acquisition system to prevent problems **similar** to those brought on by Darleen Druyun, the former **Air** Force weapons buyer currently serving time in prison for violating federal conflict of interest laws.

After **Druyun** admitted last year to breaking federal procurement regulations, Michael Wynne, the acting undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, asked the DSB to review the Pentagon's management structures. The **final** report was completed in March and released by the Pentagon last week.

"One of the Task Force's key findings is that while current acquisition practices make **an** incident on the scale of the Druyun case unlikely, there are currently no structural or policy mandates in place that would prevent **this** situation **from** recurring," William Schneider, the chairman of the DSB, wrote in a memo accompanying the report.

And while a repeat of a Druyun-scale fiasco is "remote," according to the study's co-chairs, the DSB recommends a number of fixes to the acquisition process. One of the "overarching" recommendations made by **the** task force is to avoid the concentration of power in a single individual--something that was widely considered the major contributing factor in the case of Druyun.

There are too many acquisition officials that can say, "no," but not enough that can say, "yes," the DSB wrote. "**This** diffusion of authority enables those who master the system to gain power."

As a longstanding civilian acquisition official, Druyun amassed considerable power and was a key decisionmaker in **Air** Force procurement. Supervisors often credited her for work on acquisition reform, but many contractors and subordinates found her abusive, according to the DSB.

The DSB's findings in many ways mirror those of the Government Accountability Office, which in its **own** investigation found that Druyun was, often able to usurp powers from officials who were not **as** experienced or knowledgeable **as** she was.

Significantly, however, the DSB's recommendations focus on process issues, rather than fundamental changes needed in federal acquisition regulations. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), whose initial investigation into the **Air** Force's tanker lease sparked the Druyun investigation, has been pushing for more comprehensive reform of the Pentagon's acquisition policy.

At issue is whether the scandal was the result of one individual, such **as** Druyun, or problems endemic to weapons buying and the relationship between the Pentagon and its contractors.

Druyun was the **Air** Force's principle deputy for acquisition until 2002, when she **retired from the** Pentagon. She took a job several months later with Boeing [BA].

In 2004, Druyun pleaded guilty to covering up job discussions she had with Boeing while still negotiating contracts with the company on behalf of the Air Force. She later also admitted to steering contracts to Boeing and inflating the price on the Air Force's tanker lease because of her and her family's employment there.

As a result of those admissions and the related investigations, the Pentagon cancelled the tanker contract and has initiated a number of investigations into other contracts Druyun was involved with.

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS

Processes

Findings

- The Air Force, under Druyun's later tenure, operated differently from the rest of the Department
- All acquisition organizations require some added checks and balances to guard against a repeat of Druyun situation

Recommendations

- For major procurements, USD(AT&L), codify best practices into policy-
 - Written recommendations by advisory bodies to the source selection authority (SSA)
 - SSA documentation of decision and rationale
- USD(AT&L) ensure process for meaningful feedback to bidders
- USD(AT&L) ensure distribution of delegated acquisition responsibilities for major procurements
- Oversight, source selection, and contract negotiations should not reside in one person
- Provide many avenues for voicing concerns

Oversight

Findings:

More rules and restrictions are not the solution

Environment does not support critical self-assessment

USD(AT&L) has not exercised authorities to oversee processes (structure, policies, and practices) as fully as programs of acquisition organizations

Recommendations:

USD(AT&L) should oversee processes as well as programs

- ID and share best practices
- Question unusual practices and organizational structures
- Use mistakes and failures as case studies, and communicate them broadly
- Require defense components to perform periodic critical self-assessments and demonstrate continuous self-improvement
- Develop and periodically review metrics roll-up on senior acquisition leaders

Leadership

Findings:

- Leadership is at the center of high integrity organizations
- DoD has some of the pieces for the ethically grounded organization, but not all
- DoD lacks the systematic, integrated approach of “best in class”

Recommendations:

- DoD should articulate more explicitly its vision and values as a high integrity organization and expect the same of its contractors
- Secretary of Defense should:
 - Put ethics at the forefront of Department communications
 - Institutionalize an orientation program in the Office of the Secretary for incoming senior leadership that addresses:
 - The values and objectives of DoD and the Secretary
 - Importance of leadership to sustain an ethical culture
 - Performance expectations tied to both of the above
 - Senior DoD leadership ensure flow-down

People

Findings:

- People issues at senior levels compromise performance
- Senior appointed acquisition positions go unfilled for far too long
- SES performance management lags best practices
- Senior military personnel in acquisition positions rotate frequently

Recommendations:

- SecDef place priority on filling appointed acquisition positions
 - Champion reforms to streamline nomination and confirmation processes
 - Institute a succession planning process
 - Avoid more restrictions that would limit interest by experienced personnel
- USD(P&R) modernize SES performance management practices
 - Institute 360° feedback
 - Implement 5-year DoD-wide rotation policy
 - Revise bonus and reward system
 - Require continued leadership development

- o Standards of Conduct add disclosure requirement for employment of majority children

ADDITIONAL ISSUES

- The Department undertake a top-down internal assessment to simplify and streamline the acquisition system and better align the workforce as a result.
- USD (AT&L) closely monitor the new defense component services acquisition oversight processes as they mature to assure the effectiveness of the processes, especially in confirming that these contracts represent the best use of DoD resources.



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

May 26, 2005, 2:30 PM

TO: ACTING DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board (DSB) Finds Likelihood of Similar (Druyun) Scandal
Possible but Remote

- An 11 May Defense Daily article quoted conclusions of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force (TF) on Management Oversight of Acquisition Organizations that "there are currently no structural or policy mandates in place that would prevent this situation from recurring." The SECDEF asked whether the report was stale, and if the DSB TF was unaware of all the work that has been done.
- The DSB report does not address the results of the actions I have taken to date since the actions commenced as the TF was completing its efforts. The Defense Daily article chose to sensationalize one aspect of the DSB report, missing other key points. I am taking the recommendations seriously, and collaborating with the acquisition community to ensure that policy changes under consideration address the underlying issues without causing unintended harm to the acquisition system. I have attached a summary of the TF's findings and recommendations for your information.
- The following efforts are underway (listed chronologically):
 - On February 25, 2005, I signed a letter to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies stating my intention to implement a 360° evaluation process. Feedback was very positive. The Defense Acquisition University is currently developing an appropriate 360° assessment instrument and working the implementation details.
 - On March 1, 2005, I requested all Component Acquisition Executives review and codify their overarching acquisition oversight structure such that the functions for acquisition oversight, source selection decisions, contract negotiation or award responsibilities do not reside in one person. We have received 15 of 23 submissions and these responses are currently being evaluated.
 - I directed that the codified processes above be included in procurement management reviews.

- On March 25, 2005, I designated Air Force ACAT IC programs as ACAT 1D programs due to the vacancies in the Air Force and the uncertainties of the planned management structure.
- I continue to emphasize to the Acquisition Community, its leaders, and to defense industry leaders that ethics and integrity are the backbone of acquisition. To that end, I provided the widest possible dissemination of a memo in March emphasizing our leadership and people's long-term institutional commitment to high integrity and ethics in the Acquisition Community.
- I am continuing to explore additional initiatives to address the findings of the DSB TF. I will continue to update you regularly on our progress.

COORDINATION: DSB

Attachment
As stated

Prepared by: Nancy Dowling/DPAP/PAIC/(b)(6) 2005-0671

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

18 May 05 - 1838


MEMORANDUM FOR: AT&L
cc PAE

SUBJECT: Defense Daily Article

"Sir,

Acting Secretary England requests memorandum detailing changes to the acquisition system made in response to the Druyun scandal. Could a similar scandal recur, given the current structures and procedures? If **so**, please recommend additional revisions to preclude a recurrence of such an event."

Very Respectfully,



John Nagl
LTC, USA
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: 27 May 2005

2 Attachments: 1) SECDEF SNOWFLAKE 051705-21
2) 11 MAY **DEFENSE** DAILY ARTICLE

OSD 102 62 -05

11-L-0559/OSD/49702

~~FOUO~~

Cap
X TPA

1145
5/18

May 18, 2005

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *Defense Daily Article*

Attached is an article, "Defense Science Board **finds** No Barrier to New Drayun Scandal." I cannot believe it is true, **given** all the work that has been done and the changes that have been made. Perhaps **this** report is stale, and they **are** unaware of all the work that has been done.

Would you put your head into it, and let me **know** what you think?

Attach.
5/11/05 *Defense Daily Article*

DR:es
051705-21

.....
Please respond by 6/16/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 102 62 -05

11-L-0559/OSD/49703

Defense Daily
May 11, 2005
Pg. 4

AW
5/11

Defense Science Board Finds No Barrier To New Druyun Scandal

By Sharon Weinberger

A senior defense advisory body **has** concluded there are still no safeguards in the Pentagon's acquisition system to prevent problems similar to those brought on by Darleen Druyun, the former **Air** Force weapons buyer currently serving time in prison for violating federal conflict of interest laws.

After Druyun admitted last year to breaking federal procurement regulations, Michael Wynne, the acting undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, asked the DSB to review the Pentagon's management structures. The final report was completed in March and released by the Pentagon last week.

"One of the Task Force's key findings is that while current acquisition practices make an incident on the scale of the Druyun case unlikely, there are currently no structural or policy mandates in place that would prevent this situation from recurring," William Schneider, the chairman of the DSB, wrote in a memo accompanying the report.

And while a repeat of a Druyun-scale fiasco is "remote," according to the study's co-chairs, the DSB recommends a number of fixes to the acquisition process. One of the "overarching" recommendations made by the task force is to avoid the concentration of power in a single individual--something that was widely considered the major contributing factor in the case of Druyun.

There are too many acquisition officials that can say, "no," but not enough that can say, "yes," the DSB wrote. "This diffusion of authority enables those who master the system to gain power."

As a longstanding civilian acquisition official, Druyun amassed considerable power and was a key decisionmaker in **Air** Force procurement. Supervisors often credited her for work on acquisition reform, but many contractors and subordinates found her abusive, according to the DSB.

The DSB's findings in many ways mirror those of the Government Accountability Office, which in its own investigation found that **Druyun** was often able to **usurp** powers from officials who were not as experienced or knowledgeable as she was.

Significantly, however, the DSB's recommendations focus on process issues, rather than fundamental changes needed in federal acquisition regulations. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), whose initial investigation into the Air Force's tanker lease sparked the Druyun investigation, has been pushing for more comprehensive reform of the Pentagon's acquisition policy.

At issue is whether the scandal was the result of one individual, such as Druyun, or problems endemic to weapons buying and the relationship between the Pentagon and its contractors.

Druyun was the **Air Force's** principle deputy for acquisition until 2002, when she retired from the Pentagon. She took a job several months later with Boeing [BA].

In 2004, Druyun pleaded guilty to covering up job discussions she had with Boeing while still negotiating contracts with the company on behalf of the Air Force. She later also admitted to steering contracts to Boeing and inflating the price on the Air Force's tanker lease because of her and her family's employment there.

As a result of those admissions and the related investigations, the Pentagon cancelled the tanker contract and has initiated a number of investigations into other contracts Druyun was involved with.

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS

Processes

Findings

- The Air Force, under Druyun's later tenure, operated differently from the rest of the Department
- All acquisition organizations require some added checks and balances to guard against a repeat of Druyun situation

Recommendations

- For major procurements, USD(AT&L), codify best practices into policy-
 - Written recommendations by advisory bodies to the source selection authority (SSA)
 - SSA documentation of decision and rationale
- USD(AT&L) ensure process for meaningful feedback to bidders
- USD(AT&L) ensure distribution of delegated acquisition responsibilities for major procurements
- Oversight, source selection, and contract negotiations should not reside in one person
- Provide many avenues for voicing concerns

Oversight

Findings:

More rules and restrictions are not the solution

Environment does not support critical self-assessment

USD(AT&L) has not exercised authorities to oversee processes (structure, policies, and practices) as fully as programs of acquisition organizations

Recommendations:

USD(AT&L) should oversee processes as well as programs

- ID and share best practices
- Question unusual practices and organizational structures
- Use mistakes and failures as case studies, and communicate them broadly
- Require defense components to perform periodic critical self-assessments and demonstrate continuous self-improvement
- Develop and periodically review metrics roll-up on senior acquisition leaders

Leadership

Findings:

- Leadership is at the center of high integrity organizations
- DoD has some of the pieces for the ethically grounded organization, but not all
- DoD lacks the systematic, integrated approach of “best in class”

Recommendations:

- DoD should articulate more explicitly its vision and values as a high integrity organization and expect the same of its contractors
- Secretary of Defense should:
 - Put ethics at the forefront of Department communications
 - Institutionalize an orientation program in the Office of the Secretary for incoming senior leadership that addresses:
 - The values and objectives of DoD and the Secretary
 - Importance of leadership to sustain an ethical culture
 - Performance expectations tied to both of the above
 - Senior DoD leadership ensure flow-down

People

Findings:

- People issues at senior levels compromise performance
- Senior appointed acquisition positions go unfilled for far too long
- SES performance management lags best practices
- Senior military personnel in acquisition positions rotate frequently

Recommendations:

- SecDef place priority on filling appointed acquisition positions
 - Champion reforms to streamline nomination and confirmation processes
 - Institute a succession planning process
 - Avoid more restrictions that would limit interest by experienced personnel
- USD(P&R) modernize SES performance management practices
 - Institute 360° feedback
 - Implement 5-year DoD-wide rotation policy
 - Revise bonus and reward system
 - Require continued leadership development

- Standards of Conduct add disclosure requirement for employment of majority children

ADDITIONAL ISSUES

- The Department undertake a top-down internal assessment to simplify and streamline the acquisition system and better align the workforce as a result.
- USD (AT&L) closely monitor the new defense component services acquisition oversight processes as they mature to assure the effectiveness of the processes, especially in confirming that these contracts represent the best use of DoD resources.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

18 May 05 - 1838


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Very Respectfully,



John Nagl
LTC, USA
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: 27 May 2005

2 Attachments: 1) SECDEF SNOWFLAKE051705-21
2) 11 MAY DEFENSE DAILY ARTICLE

OSD 102 62 -05

11-L-0559/OSD/49710

334 DSE

18 May 05

18 May 05

~~FOUO~~

MAY 31 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Steve Friedman

Steve Friedman was "no" on a Service Secretary post, as you predicted.

DHR:ss
052705-17

020

~~FOUO~~

OSD 10314-05

31 May 05

11-L-0559/OSD/49711

FOUO

May 18, 2005

TO: Mike Wynne
CC: Gordon England
VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Briefing by the Overseas Basing Commission

I *think* you ought to get a group of people together to ~~be~~ briefed by the Overseas Basing Commission, and have Gordon England sit in ~~as~~ well. — *DR + not me.*

Thanks.

DEIR:ss
051705-15

.....
Please respond by 6/2/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49712

OSD 10387-05



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

0517
100-200000-000000

INFO MEMO

May 27, 2005, 3:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Briefing from the Overseas Basing Commission (OSBC)

- The lead staff element to coordinate the briefing of the OSBC referenced in the attached snowflake is USD(P).
- My staff has been in contact with Policy staff who are working the issues associated with the OSBC
- Policy has coordinated a briefing by the Commission to Acting Deputy Secretary England on 8 June.

COORDINATION: USD(P)

cc:
Acting DSD

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: CDR Kirk Wilson, ODUSD(I&E), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/49713

OSD 10387-05

FOUO

May 18, 2005

TO: Mike Wynne
cc: Gordon England
VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *M*
SUBJECT: Briefing by the Overseas Basing Commission

I think you ought to get a p u p of people together to be briefed by the Overseas
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DHR:m
051705-15

.....
Please respond by 6/2/05

FOUO

OSD 10387-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49714

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
March 1, 2005

2005 JUN -1 PM 3: 08

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Gingrich Briefing

Please go through the attached briefing Newt Gingrich's gave Hadley, Blackwill, Cheney, Libby and Rice, and let me know if you think there is something we ought to be doing in connection with it.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/21/04 Gingrich Briefing: "Meeting the Challenges of American Security in the 21st Century"

DHR:dh
022805-57

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

381

1 Mar 05

FOUO

OSD 10467-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49715

For Sandy
From Neut 6/24/09

Briefing I gave

Rice Hadley Blackwell 6/14

Clancy Libby 6/20

Neut

To SD
From Neut

Briefing I gave Rice, Hadley &
Blackwell on 6/14
Briefing given to VP, Libby 6/20

Meeting the Challenges of American Security in the 21st Century

***The Strategic Choice for America:
Forcing Transformation to Achieve Success
or
Accepting More Limited Goals to Meet the Limitations of our
Current System***

Newt Gingrich
with
Mark Kester & Bill Sanders
June 21, 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/49717

1
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American Enterprise Institute
Ph: (202) 862-5948

Overview of Agenda

- I. Premise: The Current System is Not Capable of Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century
- II. How Americans Have Successfully Met Major Challenges in the Past
- III. The Nature of the 21st Century
- IV. Why U.S. National Security Planning and Implementation is Really Hard
- V. A Vision and Strategy to Maximize American Success and Safety: Creating a Successful American 21st Century
- VI. Why Reform is Inadequate and Transformation is Necessary
- VII. Transformational Strategies for National Security
- VIII. Metrics
- IX. First Steps

Central Principle

- It is impossible to fly a Boeing 777 with the control mechanisms and electronics of a DC-3 aircraft.
- The world has changed dramatically in the last 60 years but the capacity of the US government has not changed comparably.
- In aircraft flight, this situation would guarantee a crash.

Key Realities as of June 2004

- It is a fact that we are not where we would like to be in national security
- From 1993 to today, the Irreconcilable Islamists have been waging war on the United States. They are stronger today and have more adherents than in 1993.
- While we have had some tactical successes, we are not winning.

The Danger Grows Daily

- Weapons of Mass Destruction (nuclear) and Weapons of Mass Murder (biological) are so dangerous that every day we do not win, the danger grows of a catastrophic event.
- The danger is compounded because we do not have a clear enemy order of battle, any significant intelligence on the enemy's systems and plans, or any real knowledge of the enemy's networks inside our country and the territories of our allies.

Symptoms of Not Winning

murder of Americans on satellite television (the beheading of Nicholas Berg and the execution of Robert Jacob) are funding and recruiting armies for our enemies

security situation in Iraq continues to decay with serious impediments for getting to victory (note the road to airport problems, electricity problems, Iraqi allies getting killed as examples).

openness of the irreconcilable wing of Islam to new money and move it through sources not acceptable to Treasury intervention is substantial.

number of militants available to the irreconcilables is growing much much faster than we are killing them.


Symptoms of Not Winning (cont)

- The confusion over interrogation and detention gives us a triple defeat—it humiliates us and puts us on the moral defensive, it gets very little useful information from would be martyrs steeled by religious conviction, and we release people out of exhaustion who have been killed fighting Americans since they were released. This is a symptom of our confusion about the nature of this war and lack of clarity about our strategies for winning it.

Symptoms of Not Winning (cont)

- We have no effective communication strategy to overmatch Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya who are multi-million (maybe multi-billion) dollar force multipliers for the Irreconcilables.
- Our moral position is so muddled, we are not even prepared to stop Salafi (largely Wahhabi) chaplains from recruiting felons in American prisons.
- Consider one analysis of the scale of the real war with the Irreconcilable wing of Islam:

The Nature of the Real War



The Long War with the Irreconcilables

“...the truth is, we are closer to the beginning of this struggle—this global insurgency—than to its end.”

**Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
May 29, 2004
USMA Commencement Address**

- Political correctness and analytical error have led to four strategic mistakes in analyzing the current threat.
- Because we refuse to accept the real nature of the long war we have consistently underestimated how hard, how long, how difficult and how big this will be.

The Long War - Basic Facts

1. The Irreconcilable wing of Islam's primary motivation is religious and they have the intensity, appeal, and staying power of a religious cause.
2. The heart of the Irreconcilable Islamist effort is a civil war against the modernizing and traditional wings of Islam.
3. The center of gravity in the war is cultural, economic, political and religious. The military and terrorist efforts are manifestations of the larger struggle. While the Irreconcilables have to be fought militarily they can never be defeated in a purely military campaign.
4. This is not primarily about terrorism. This is a worldwide insurgency against the modern world and counterinsurgency strategies are more important than anti-terrorist strategies.

The Long War - Duration

- Because this is a conflict with millions of Salafi and because they are still growing in numbers (the fastest growing part of Islam) and because their religious beliefs are truly irreconcilable with our world, this is going to be a long war.
- A reasonable estimate would be that we might win by 2070 if we can win. Alternatively, this conflict may be a fact of life for several centuries.

The Long War - Why it is so Hard to Analyze in the West

- The Irreconcilables are genuinely religious people fighting for, their God and therefore for salvation.
- The analysts of a post Modern culture simply find it almost impossible to accept the irrational wellsprings of conviction which motivate people of religious passion. Their contempt for fundamentalist Christians and Orthodox Jews carries over into a refusal to take seriously Irreconcilable Islamists.
- This leads us to consistently underestimate our opponents sincerity, patience, ruthlessness, willingness to die, and willingness to kill.

The Long War – Consequence of Wrong Analysis

Because secular post-modern analysts refuse to take the war seriously we describe 'suicide' bombers while our opponents describe 'martyrs'. We focus on body counts while our opponents see their dead as tools for recruitment. We focus on weeks and months while our opponents cheerfully focus on decades and generations. There is a fatal mismatch of planning and understanding. The result is a war that on our side is based on the wrong elements and emphasizes the wrong institutions.

The Long War – Reasonable Expectations

- Once we understand our opponents are defined and driven by religion and have the historic qualities of religious opponents, any good team of historians could begin to outline the problem:
- Our opponents will have zealots in their midst, will be very attractive to young idealists, will lie effortlessly because they are lying to infidels and heretics, will kill without mercy because they are killing for God, will die willingly and enthusiastically because they are going to Paradise, and will have patience beyond any rational person's comprehension.

The Long War - Planning and Refining

- Understanding this new model of a religiously inspired insurgency will take time and will be deeply resisted by the post modern analysts and bureaucracies. It will require a critical mass of intellectual knowledge brought to bear over time.
- There should be a permanent government group and a permanent outside advisory system (with some members permanently attached and others brought in for specialties or for fresh viewpoints).
- The existing bureaucracies (both civilian and military) should be trained into this new strategy based on opposing a religiously inspired insurgency with a long time horizon and a center of gravity that is non-military.

The Long War : The *Sine Qua Non* of Victory

- Until we are prepared to tell the truth about our opponents, tell the truth about how long and hard it will be, and tell the truth about the costs of our vision of success and our strategies for success we will be unable to even begin winning this war.

The Long War : First You Win the Argument

- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher consistently argued: “First you win the argument, then you win the vote.”
- President Reagan understood that the vision of his “Evil Empire” speech was a foundation for his strategy of military strength of which putting Pershing 2 missiles in Europe was a project. He had to win the vision and strategies arguments to sustain the project of missiles in Europe.

The Long War: Making the Case

to develop a strategy for making the vision level. This is a civil war inside Islam, we are on the side of modernizers and the traditionalists against the intransigents, the Irreconcilables are genuinely unable to deal with the modern world, and the campaign is going worldwide against an intelligent, determined minority motivated by religious belief that they are doing right.

When we can make this case persuasively will the press, the news media, the American people, and our allies around the world begin to understand how dangerous the extremists are, how difficult this will be, and how vital it is to our daily lives, our safety, our freedoms, and the future of our civilization that we win it.

The Long War : Developing Strategies

- Only after we have thoroughly developed the intellectual framework (which could be done initially in 60 days) can we begin to lay out the strategies necessary to win.
- We should assume going in that these strategies will be as large and as daunting as Lincoln faced in 1862, Churchill and FDR faced in 1939-42 or Truman faced in 1946-1952.
- This is a real war against real opponents.

The National Security Challenge is Bigger than the Long War with the Irreconcilable Islamists

- The national security of the United States is being threatened by much more than the Islamists. The rise of China and India, the evolution of the European Union, the existence of rogue dictators and of chaotic, violent impoverished areas, the emergence of new methods of worldwide communication—all these problems require a profound new approach to national security if America is to succeed in the 21st century.

Key Decision for the Bush Administration

- It is important to stop and consider whether in fact this assess'ment is accurate.
- If it is accurate, then we are in an historic period of learning, experimenting, and transforming.
- If it is not true, we are in a period of repairing and improving.

Democracies Can Cope with Defeat and Difficulty and move to victory

- Lincoln had to change his views of the nature, intensity, and scale of the Civil War throughout 1861 and 1862.
- Churchill had to lead the British through profound change from the Phony War to the American entry (1940 to 1942).
- FDR had to endure a bitter year of defeat (1942) before beginning to win on offense.

The Power of Vision in War

When the vision is clear, the definitions of the war are accepted and the goals understood, even minor setbacks leads to increased focus on clarity of purpose, commitment of strength, courage of action and an increased determination to win.

When people are confused about the enemy, the nature of the war, and the goals even modest defeats leads to confusion, cowardice, loss of morale and momentum and a desire to appease

Key Step

- The key step is to admit we are not where we want to be and to invest the time and effort into confronting reality, thinking through our options and developing a vision, strategies and projects that can lead to victory as we define it.

Iraq as the Immediate Crisis

- Iraq is a mess.
- It is going to remain a mess.
- We are trying to take a brutalized people, a bankrupt infrastructure, a shattered civil society, and virtually no experience of self government and move the Iraqis to self-governing with safety, health, and prosperity.
- Effective organized elements both within Iraq and from outside Iraq are determined to stop this from happening.

Iraq as the Immediate Crisis (cont)

- We have been consistently underestimating how hard Iraq will be and how long it will take.
- The current maneuvers between the UN, the westernized political class of Iraqis and the Coalition is important but not sufficient.
- There is no evidence an Iraqi system allied with the Coalition and supported timidly by the UN will be able to defeat either the internal insurgents or the foreign insurgents.

Iraq as the Immediate Crisis (cont)

- We need a reality based theory of victory (see “Strong Inference” by John Platt, Appendix 6 for the importance of a theoretical base of decisions, see also Deming’s works on quality).
- We have not been confronting reality and we have not insisted on a theory of victory nor on a theory of how we are going to manage until we achieve victory.
- The result has been a mess that is decaying rather than improving.

Iraq as the Immediate Crisis (cont)

- We need a tough minded assessment of the region, our opponents and the mountains we are trying to climb.
- We need an equally tough minded, no holds barred “lessons learned” assessment of what has worked and what has failed in the last 18 months.
- We need to then develop a four level plan for victory.

Iraq as the Immediate Crisis (cont)

The four levels of achieving victory in Iraq:

1. What are the current realities and the correlation of forces?
2. What is our theory of eventual victory despite our opponents' best efforts?
3. What is our theory of managing the mess and the violence that will be on going until we achieve victory?
4. What is our system for communicating with the American people, the Congress, the news media and our allies so we can maintain the credibility and the authority to survive the long struggle to victory?

Iraq as the Immediate Crisis (cont)

- Once the four steps have been outlined we need metrics for weekly, monthly and quarterly review and tough minded willingness to keep changing strategies, systems and personnel until things work at all three implementation levels.

Our Model:

“The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion.

As our case is new we must act anew and think anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.”

President Abraham Lincoln
Annual Report to Congress
December 1, 1862

Assumptions

- National Security is founded on economic, cultural, political, diplomatic, intelligence and military capabilities.
- National Security Planning has to take into account all elements of national power and all threats to that national power
- There's a big difference between "getting it" and "getting it done right." Washington gets so focused on policy debates and so exhausted by forcing policy choices that almost no attention is paid to the implementation deficit, which has grown wider and more dangerous over the past 50 years.

Key Premise

- We either have to transform our national security capabilities to meet the challenges and achieve President George W. Bush's stated vision of success ...

or

We have to reshape our goals and objectives to the meet the pace and pattern that our current institutions can sustain.

Americans Have Successfully Met Challenges in the Past:

*role of facts, theories, visions, strategic planning
and institutional transformation.*

• examples of success (see appendix 1)

• principles of success with big national security challenges:

• recognize the size of the problem

• create a vision of success

• set metrics for measurable achievement

• throw the resources to overwhelm the problem—mass, not

carelessness, is the American model

• change institutions until they work and invent new institutions as
needed

• ruthlessly eliminate inadequate performers (Between June 19 19

and June 1940, Marshall fired 54 generals and 445 colonels in

the Army numbering only about 225,000.)

Nature of the 21st Century World

- Change and surprise may be the largest constants of the 21st century
- The scale of scientific and technological change will continue to accelerate exponentially. The scale of change 2004-2030 will equal or surpass that of 1903-2003. (see appendix 2)
- The reality of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD - mostly nuclear) and Weapons of Mass Murder (WMM - mostly biological) cannot be overstated.
 - WMD could kill millions, and
 - WMM could kill scores of millions
 - **All** security planning must start with this reality and all public education about security has to start with this reality

Nature of the 21st Century World (cont)

- The Salafi wing of Islam, the most rapidly growing and the most militant, is incompatible with the modern world and is increasingly threatened by the modern world.
- There will continue to be ungoverned areas (see *Possible Remote Havens for Terrorist and Other Illicit Activity* map), including large parts of cities. This will make a “no sanctuaries” strategy impossible to enforce.
- The Gray World is the criminal underside of the global system. It creates opportunities for even small groups of terrorists to have large resources and effects (see appendix 4 Washington Post article).
- Identities and loyalties may increasingly shift away from nation states to other values, symbols and relationships.
- The rise of China and India as economic, scientific and familial systems will be comparable to the rise of America and Russia in the 19th century. Note the scale of Chinese and Indian migratory patterns. Their reach as people will vastly exceed their reach as governments.

Nature of the 21st Century World (cont)

- The European Union (EU) will continue to draw together 25 countries (and more may be added) and Brussels will continue to grow in importance.
- Brussels, Beijing and to a lesser extent New Delhi, will be the most important power centers outside Washington.
- Some regimes will remain very unstable, very dangerous and not susceptible to diplomatic coercion (Syria, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan under a different regime and Cuba).
- There is an increasingly powerful worldwide virtual real-time communications web:
 - 24-hour worldwide television news,
 - Internet and email connectivity and
 - Cellular phones.
- The rise of democracies within a worldwide communications web makes public opinion very important and transforms foreign policy communications from state to state diplomacy into a new pattern of people to people communication on a scale we do not understand.

of the 21st Century World (cont)

of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as a force that
built into planning.

NATO and other International organizations are a FACT not a

gly complex alliance relationships will be driven by continued
inance and the reaction to that dominance.

absence of a decisive threat, the U.S. has to renew its right
d with both governments and people on a continuing basis.
re moving to higher and higher expectations of performance
ments:

ation, genocide, disease, poverty and brutality are less and
acceptable.

asing demands for intervention will be fueled by media and
s. Every problem will become the organized world's problem.

phic changes will have a substantial impact on 21st Century
(see appendix 4).

Nature of the 21st Century World (cont)

- Faced with these changes the current American education, health, litigation, and tax systems are not capable of sustaining an America that can compete with China and India in 2040.
- Faced with these changes, the American government systems cannot move at the speed, complexity and subtlety needed for success.

Why US National Security Planning and Implementation is Really Hard

There are essentially five large challenges that could decisively end the 228 year period of prosperity and freedom that have characterized America:

1. The need for transformational change domestically to enable the US to compete successfully with China and India;
2. The need to master the extraordinarily more complex and demanding nature of global leadership in a real-time television, cell phone, internet system with more and more democracies and no natural threat to compel unity of people of nations;
3. The difficulty of helping the modernizing wing of Islam in its battle with the irreconcilable wing of Islam;
4. The challenge of surviving of a WMM and/or WMD attack; and
5. The necessity of integrating the strategies and systems necessary to meet the other four challenges into a single planning, deciding, implementing and coordinating system.

“We are dealing with the foothills. The Himalayas lie beyond.”

Washington Post, May 1, 2004 Patrick Clawson

11-L-0559/OSD/49757

The Key Decision for America's Future

- This is the heart of the matter: for our children and grandchildren to have a successful 21st century America will have to transform its abilities in learning, health, productivity, and government effectiveness.
- Without this scale of change our children and grandchildren will be in a nation that can no longer lead the world nor sustain its own security.

Creating a Successful American 21st Century

A Vision and Strategies to Maximize American Success and Safety

- The American people want to live in the safest, most prosperous and freest country in the world. They support the goal of a successful American 21st Century.
- While a vocal minority will object, the vast majority of the American people want to give their children and grandchildren an America that continues to lead the world in economic and military capability.

Vision and Strategies (cont)

- A substantial majority of Americans will support the levels of change in government and society needed to ensure that the United States can:
 - Sustain such intelligence capabilities as are necessary both at home and abroad to minimize risks in an age of weapons of mass murder and weapons of mass destruction;
 - Defeat those who would destroy our freedoms, our prosperity, and our safety whether at home or abroad;

Vision and Strategies (cont)

- Take advantage of new breakthroughs in science for health, the economy, and defense;
- Remain the most successful economy in the world in order to compete successfully with increasingly productive economies including China and India; thus sustaining the highest standard of living, the greatest wealth creation (especially important for retirees) and the greatest high value job creation system in the world;
- Lead the world on a collaborative, positive basis that maximizes support and minimizes friction and conflict among allies;
- Operate both domestically and overseas with the speed, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Information **Age**;

Vision and Strategies (cont)

communicate with the people of the world and create
people-to-people programs, that maximize support
American values and goals and minimize
position;

actively assist in the transformation of poor,
sick, and unhealthy regions into communities of
prosperity, health, prosperity and freedom; and

create a Homeland Security system and a health
security system that minimizes the damage and
maximize the rate of recovery from any weapon of
mass destruction (nuclear) or weapon of mass
destruction (biological) whose use could not be
prevented or preempted.

Implementing the Vision and Strategies

- Achieving the goals inherent in this vision will require a series of strategies, a culture of achievement, a new series of institutional structures, and a new scale of resources, that are beyond the capability of the current system.
- Understanding the scale of the challenges, the definition of success most Americans would support and the complexity and interrelationship of the goals is the first step toward designing strategies and institutions capable of creating a successful American 21st century.

Why Reform is Inadequate and Transformation is Necessary

Institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed."

*President George W. Bush
National Security Strategy September 2002*

Century realities are so different, the challenges are so different, the requirements of success are so different that the tools, cultures, systems, and resources for success will also be different.

Faced with a change on the scale of moving from the 20th industrial world to the 21st century information age world and from the centralized threat of the Soviet Union to the proliferation of a worldwide irreconcilable Islamist opponent, rogue states and widespread areas of dysfunction unacceptable to us and as dangerous as breeding grounds of violence, it would be surprising if the inherited institutions and systems of the Cold War were adequate. They are not.

Transformation is Very Different From Reform

Transformation is a process of visualizing a new system, design, process, and structure and migrating the current systems to the new.

Reform is a process of improving an existing system.

Two approaches are profoundly different and have fundamentally different requirements for success.

Transformation might work, reform will likely fail.

Transformation might rather than will work because we may fail the first few times and have to keep transforming until we have the formula that succeeds (Lincoln 1861-1864, Churchill 1940-42, Marshall 1942, Cold War 1946-52 are examples of churning to success).

Transformation is a Learned System of Leadership

- Transformations occur so rarely there is almost no current experience in very large scale transformations.
- The process of leading transformations can be learned (see appendix 5).

The Key to Transformational Leadership in Complex Environments

Transformational leaders have to think simultaneously eight principles as they act in virtually real time. This is very different from a linear learn-plan-decide-act model.

This is also different from a delegate, supervise, motivate model.

In the information age the transformational leader is simultaneously acting on eight different principles and so with such clarity that they are role models for others to learn from and emulate-they are learning-deciding-training-acting simultaneously.

The Eight Simultaneous Principles of Transformational Leadership

(Remember these eight are parallel and simultaneous, not sequential)

1. What is your vision-strategies-projects-tasks planning model and the listen-learn-help-lead process which has informed it (see appendix 5)?
2. What is the center of gravity of your efforts to succeed and as you move to each new challenge what is the center of gravity of its success?
3. What is your deep-mid-near plan (always done in that order)?
4. Are there guns whose sounds you have to move to this minute?

The Eight Simultaneous Principles of Transformational Leadership (cont)

5. As you learn from the sound of the guns, are you using an observe-orient-decide-act loop (the OODA Loop) to be inside your competitor's decision and implementation cycle?
6. What are the antelopes you are trying to get and what are the chipmunks that are distracting you and need to be delegated (see appendix five)?
7. What do you need for your visible and invisible allies to sustain the invisible bridges that hold people together across institutional boundaries?
8. Above all, since it is the ultimate center of gravity in a free society—how are you leading the information and people to people efforts to sustain the entire process's legitimacy?

Metrics for Entrepreneurial Public Management

- One of the keys to develop effective government in the information age is to focus on metrics of outside effect rather than reports on inside processes.
- The 1880s civil service model of **Bureaucratic Public Administration**, that we inherited, is based on an era of quill pens. It is inherently process oriented.
- A 21st Century model of **Entrepreneurial Public Management** will require an entirely new definition of acceptable outcomes, a method for monitoring outcomes and changing behaviors, and a coordinating system of accurate timely information unlike anything we currently have.

Developing a Metrics-Based System

- Recognizing that the current agency-siloed, process oriented system simply cannot deliver at the speed and accuracy of the Information Age is the key first step.
- Even with computers we have Information Age technology with Industrial Era work processes.
- The private sector is proving every day that we can achieve far more agility, with far more effectiveness, at far lower cost.
- The scale of the transformation will be very large and the rewards will be very great.

Why an Entrepreneurial Public Management System is Both Necessary and Worth the Effort

- It is the nature of an entrepreneurial, market oriented system in an age of science and technology to produce:
 - More choices
 - Of higher quality
 - **At lower cost**
- When these three things are the natural pattern of an entrepreneurial public management system in government, the results in speed and effectiveness will more than justify the investment.

Why the Transformation to a Metric-Based System Should be a Very High Priority

- It is impossible for the current systems, bureaucratic cultures, and patterns of silo-focus and process orientation to keep up with the complexities and speed of the modern world, or to implement policy decisions in a timely, effective manner in a rapidly changing world.
- Until we have made the transition from bureaucratic public administration to entrepreneurial public management, we will continue to be overwhelmed by events and frustrated by the inability to implement decisions even when they have been made at the highest level.
- We are not having policies undermined by personality problems of incompetence. We are being undermined by culturally and systemically obsolete processes. Only cultural and systemic change will make us effective once again.

First Steps

1. The President should establish a small Transformational Working Group on transformation modeled on Nitze's efforts from December 1948 to April 1950 to develop NSC-68. This group should be empowered to reach out to all federal agencies including Congress, to bring in outside advisers, and to consult with our allies. It should be assigned the tasks of reporting by December 1, 2004 on:
 - A. Defining the scale and nature of the desired results (what is success for America out to 2040)?
 - B. What are the methods necessary to achieve those results?
 - C. What transformational changes should be undertaken to achieve those results?
 - D. What are the metrics the President should use to monitor progress and insist on improvements?

First Steps (cont)

- This Transformational Working Group should use a system of iterative briefings and listening sessions to spread widely the network of people thinking through the key challenges and helping develop the very large transformation projects.
- This iterative briefing-listening system developed at the Army's Training and Doctrine Command in 1979 maximizes the quality of advice in the planning process, surfaces problems in the formulative stage, and makes buy in dramatically easier.

First Steps (cont)

- There are a number of obvious areas that require transformational change. Work can begin on them while the larger study is underway. Some of these transformational requirements are urgent and vital. Others are desirable.
- Urgent transformations are those without which success in national security is impossible.
- The list of urgent transformations should be launched in July 2004. The desirable transformations could unfold over a longer period of time.

First Steps - Urgent Transformations

Urgent Transformations include:

1. Create an effective information strategy system with special focus on the United States, among our allies, in Iraq and in the Muslim world. Our current limited capacity to match our opponents and our critics and to communicate clearly in a chaotic changing environment is so weak that solving this should be the highest priority every day until there is a working system. In a world of information and democracy, this is the center of gravity of our ability to function.
- The underlying concepts of the long war against a determined opponent with religious intensity who will seek weapons of mass murder and weapons of mass destruction must be communicated to the Executive Branch, the Congress, the news media, the American people, and our allies in that order so people learn how hard this is going to be and how long and difficult the war will be. People have to re-center themselves into an expectation of 'blood, sweat toil and tears' rather than of easy victory.

First Steps - Urgent Transformations (cont)

2. Create a system of Integrated Operations to replace the Interagency system. We cannot continue to rely on the military as the only effective, reliable instrument of national power. The Interagency system is broken (first reported to me by General Thurmond in 1991 after Panama, again by General Hartzog in 1995 after Haiti and now by virtually every military person).
 - This Integrated Operations system would have clear metrics of achievement, accountability for assignments, training of personnel and power of assignment for the duration as defined by the Commander in Chief. It would be a first step toward Entrepreneurial Public Management and away from Bureaucratic Public Administration.
 - Without such an Integrated Operations doctrine and system we will not be able to function effectively in complex environments.
 - **A** true Integrated Operations system will require a Goldwater Nichols for the Interagency and the Bush Administration should lead the way in calling for it.

First Steps - ent Transformations (cont)

a rigorous metrics based “Lessons Learned “ analysis of events since 9/11 across the planet. Look at everything from science to military to information to diplomacy etc. What did we do wrong? What did we do right but inadequately? What policies and systems need to be changed? What doctrines need to be changed? While the military does some of this there is no comprehensive tough minded system for doing it (see Nagler *Insurgency Lessons from Malaya and Viet Nam*).

For ‘lessons learned’ to be profound, the team members must have to be oriented to the Long War, to the nature of Preeminent Public Management, to the concept of Joint Operations, etc.

First Steps – Urgent Transformations (cont)

4. Create a small working group to develop a transformational strategy for Iraq (mentioned earlier in analyzing the Iraq situation).
- Iraq will be a mess for a long time and we need a new approach to managing and communicating while stuck in such a mess.

First Steps - Urgent Transformations **(cont)**

5. A working group on Entrepreneurial Public Management should be created to assess what is working in the private sector, develop the principles of an Information Age system of Entrepreneurial Public Management and outline the changes needed in regulation and legislation to implement such a system.

First Steps - Urgent Transformations(cont)

6. The new Director of Central Intelligence and his/her immediate team should be recruited with the explicit intent of leading a transformation of our intelligence capabilities both at home and abroad.
 - The United States must have a seamless, collaborative real-time system of intelligence with vastly greater capabilities (in gathering, analysis and operations) than we have today.
 - The gap between the intelligence we have and the intelligence we need **is** enormous.
 - The new leader of the Intelligence Community should be given a broad grant of authority to design a 21st century intelligence community (both foreign and domestic) and to report to the President on the changes that would require.

First Steps - Urgent Transformations (cont)

6. (cont) The current intelligence community as of 6-14-04 is:

- Not seamless
 - Not truly collaborative
 - Does not function in a deep-mid-near model
 - **Is** not capable of surging when confronted with new challenges
 - **Is** not able to penetrate our opponents
- In the Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Weapons of Mass Murder “doing the best we can” is a formula for disaster.
- We have to learn to “do what we need to do to get the job done and do it within the rule of law.”

First Steps - Urgent Transformations (cont)

7. The issue of interrogation and detention goes to the heart of a societal long war against a religiously inspired opponent willing to destroy our country and murder millions of Americans.
 - We need the right language to describe the war, the opponents and the threat and then the right language to describe the principles of interrogation and detention.
 - We already have people fighting us and trying to kill us who we released
 - This is a long war against fanatics. We will either kill them in the field, execute them within the rule of law for acts of terrorism or keep them detained for a very, very, long time (maybe their entire life).

First Steps - Urgent Transformations (cont)

7. (cont)

- A free society cannot do in secret what it cannot explain and defend in public.
- The American experience of interrogating fanatics is limited.
- The experiences of the last two years in interrogation have been of very very limited value and of great cost.
- The Congress and the public must be intimately involved in setting the rules of engagement.
- The Constitution specifically gives the Congress the authority to define interrogation, detention and punishment for the kind of war we are fighting. See Article 1, Section 8:
- Clause 10: To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
- The Administration's legal advisers have been legally, politically and strategically wrong on this and they have done us a great deal of unnecessary harm.

First Steps - Urgent Transformations (cont)

8. Urban warfare and policing are a zone in which the American military has failed to invest both intellectually and financially.
- The military should be charged with an aggressive lessons learned **policy** about urban policing, an aggressive willingness to experiment to get better results, and a rigorous willingness to shift from doctrine and systems that don't work to doctrine and systems that do work. Again, Nagl's *Lessons of Counterinsurgency from Malaya and Viet Nam* is a very educational but disheartening look at this problem.


First Steps - gent Transformations (cont)

eland Security has to set much higher standards for
ponse and recovery from a weapon of mass destruction or a
upon of mass murder. While a lot of focus has been on
ing and stopping the individual terrorist (e.g. total cost to the
iety of airport screening), not nearly enough is being done to
pare for our response and recovery after an attack occurs.

re should be very tough metrics for recovery and response
oth nuclear and biological events and they should be tested
the results should be used honestly to force continuous
nge until we get to the results we want.

First Steps - Urgent Transformations (cont)

10. Involve the Congress in this process of rethinking and transforming.
 - The scale of change required is far too large to be carried out by the Executive Branch.
 - Both members of Congress and their staffs have to be involved in understanding the new requirements of national security and in helping think through and implement the required transformation.
 - In the short run this makes things more difficult for the Executive Branch but in the longer run it makes things much easier.
 - Under our Constitution we have to have an informed and supportive Congress or no strategic change can be sustained.



**“It is the eternal struggle
between two principles,
right and wrong,
throughout the world.”**

Abraham Lincoln



74


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Appendix 1 : Examples of American Leadership Responding to Large Scale Challenges that Required Large Scale Change

- The founding fathers 1770 – 1789
- Lincoln and the preservation of the Union 1860 -1865
- The generation that grew American dominance:
 - Wilson and the defeat of German imperialism 1917 – 1919
 - FDR, Churchill, George C. Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the rise of the global war 1941 – 1942 (especially the 14 day planning session in January, 1942)
 - Recognizing the Soviet Communist Threat and designing the strategy of containment and transforming the institutions of national security
 - Kennan's "Long Telegram", NSC-68, creation of NSC, CIA, SAC, NATO, Marshall Plan, Point Four, Radio Free Europe...

Appendix 2: Scale of Change



There are literally more scientists alive today than in all of previous human history combined—sharing knowledge not at the rate of the printing press and mail, but through the Internet and cell phones. This explosion of knowledge is moving from laboratory to market by a venture capital-licensing-royalty system of unprecedented power and ability.

Appendix 2 (cont): Drivers of Change

- Information technology
- Communications
- Nano-scale science and technology
- Quantum mechanics
- Biology

Drivers of change will increase knowledge and productivity on a world wide basis—virtually guaranteeing continuous downward pricing pressures that produce more choices of higher quality at lower costs (like the period 1873-1896) .

Appendix 3: The Gray World

An Example: Cigarette Smuggling Linked to Terrorism

Washingtonpost.com

Tuesday, June 8, 2004; Page A01

Cigarette Smuggling Linked to Terrorism

By Sari Horwitz

Washington Post Staff Writer

- Smugglers with ties to terrorist groups are acquiring millions of illegal cigarette sales and funneling the cash to organizations like Qaeda and Hezbollah, federal law enforcement officials say, part of a nationwide crackdown on black market tobacco.
- The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has more than 300 open cases of illicit cigarette trafficking -- including several with terrorist links -- up from only a handful five years ago, ATF sources say.

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
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Appendix 4: Demographic Changes in the 21st Century



- Aging Europe and Japan
- Collapsing population in Russia
- Rising waves of young males in Islam
- African demographics stunningly young, poor and susceptible to early death
- U.S. as a relatively youthful, balanced population
- Christianity increasingly centered in Africa, Latin America and Asia where they are also the most militant Christians
- The Salafi-Christian border areas in Africa may be a zone of intense conflict

Planning & Leadership Model



Transforming Tools for Success

“Cheerful Persistence”

<p>Connecting Islands of Excellence with Invisible Bridges</p> 	<p>Deep, Mid, Near Campaigns</p> <p>*Design for all three campaigns</p> <p>•Focus first on the Deep Campaign to learn how to shape the Mid and Near Campaigns</p> <p>Deep – 10%</p> <p>Mid – 20%</p> <p>Near – 70%</p>	<p>Discover</p> <p>Develop</p> <p>Deliver</p>
<p>The Lion—Chipmunk—Antelope Theory</p> <p>*Leadership must focus on large changes.</p> <p>•Lions cannot hunt chipmunks; they will starve to death. They must hunt antelopes to stay alive.</p> <p>*Define the antelopes and don't get distracted by the chipmunks.</p>	 <p>Observe</p> <p>Orient</p> <p>Decide</p> <p>Act</p> <p>OODA Loop</p>	<p>Questions to Ask</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What do you want to accomplish? 2. Who must say yes? 3. How will you implement if they say yes? 4. When will they listen to you?

“Move to the sound of the guns”

“Always Say ‘Yes—If ...’ instead of ‘No—Because...’”

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Designing Transformation Change



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Overview of Presentation

Designing Transformational Change

- + Definition and examples of Transformational Change
- ❖ A Planning and Leadership Model
- ❖ Principles for Designing Transformational Change
- ❖ Communication Principles for Transformational Change
- # Summary: The Ideal Fight

The Nature of the 21st Century


- The nature of the 21st Century is to have:
 - More Choice
 - With Greater Quality
 - At lower cost

Any place that this is not occurring needs reform.

Watersheds

Rainforest

Bring your
raincoat




Desert

Bring
your
canteen

The Watershed of Fundamental Change

Lead the Transformation

**Manage the
sustaining
system**




**Manage the
sustaining
system**

Vail-AT&T Watershed

1887

Vail fired;

ATT
produces
phones to
make
optimum
profit




1907

Vail rehired;

ATT commits
to universal
service with
regulated,
acceptable
profit

Series of Watershed

Ford/Sloan Example




Recommended Reading: James Womack, *The Machine that Changed the World*

Copyright © 2003 The Gering Group, LLC Peter Drucker, *The Concept of the Corporation*

Alfred Sloan, *My Years at General Motors* and *My Years at General Motors*

Planning & Leadership Model



Principles for Design Transformational Ch

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Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle One *A RIGHT vision*

- Vision becomes the attracting and organizing common reference
- Your vision must be functionally accurate as well as sound right– you must “walk your talk”

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Two

Focus on large changes

- Lions, antelopes and chipmunks
- Define your antelopes and don't get distracted by the chipmunks

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Three

Marketing vs. selling

- Marketing = listening to your audience's needs and utilizing your skills to fill their needs
- Selling = convincing people to think they need what you are offering
- Marketing will last longer than selling

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Four

Incentives work




- Change can be incentive-pulled, but not punishment driven
- Punishers get fired

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Five

Near/Mid/Deep Campaigns

- Design for
 - Near campaigns (immediate)- 70%
 - Mid campaigns (1-2 years)- 20%
 - Deep campaigns (3-8 years)- 10%
- Always focus on the deep campaign first to learn how to shape near and mid campaigns



Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Six

Build a Matrix

- Design projects that advance as many strategies as possible
- Get the most bang for your buck

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Seven

Take context into account

- Everything is in the context of current opportunities and cultural history, often country or region specific.
- Move towards the sound of the guns

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Eight

Plan for Exponential Industries

- When building a plan, take into account the exponential growth curve of 3 areas:
 - Computing
 - Biology
 - Communications

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Eight

Plan for Exponential Industries

- When building a plan, take into account the exponential growth curve of 3 areas:
 - Computing
 - Biology
 - Communications

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Nine

Largest gains will be outside your industry

- Concept of Sustaining vs. Disruptive Technologies
- Sustaining: Improvements in the current system
- Disruptive: radically new way of doing things or a way of doing new things.

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Nine

Largest gains will be outside your industry

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- Sustaining: Improvements in the current system
- Disruptive: radically new way of doing things or a way of doing new things.

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Ten

Acquire Allies

- You cannot validate yourself
- You must have validating allies who have interest in achieving the vision
- Manage coalitions: In large public policy change, you are coordinating coalitions, managing direct activities
- What is their self-interest? How do they benefit? How is this vision going to positively impact them?

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Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Eleven

Plans should reflect future reality

Try to design arguments where over time,
reality reinforces your point

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Twelve

Plan back from victory

Plan back from victory rather than
forward from present

Principles for Designing Transformational Change

Principle Thirteen

Measure Success

- ✱ What is the right measurement for success?
 - For the industry?
 - For association?
 - For your business/association?
 - For yourself?

Strong Inference

Certain systematic methods of scientific thinking may produce much more rapid progress than others.

John R. Platt¹

Scientists these days tend to keep up a polite fiction that all science is equal. Except for the work of the misguided opponent whose arguments we happen to be refuting at the time, we speak as though every scientist's field and methods of study are **as good as** every other scientist's and perhaps a little better. This keeps us all cordial when it comes to recommending each other for government grants.

But I think anyone who looks at the matter closely will agree that some fields of science are moving forward very much faster than others, perhaps by an order of magnitude, if numbers could be put on such estimates. The discoveries leap from the headlines - and they are real advances in complex and difficult subjects, like molecular biology and high-energy physics. As Alvin Weinberg says (*1*) "Hardly a month goes by without a stunning success in molecular biology being reported in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences."

Why should there be such rapid advances in some fields and not in others? I think the usual explanations that we tend to think of - such as the tractability of the subject, or the quality or education of the men drawn into it, or the size of research contracts - are important but inadequate. I have begun to believe that the primary factor in scientific advance is an intellectual one. These rapidly moving fields are fields where a particular method of doing scientific research is systematically used and taught, an accumulative method of inductive inference that is so effective that I think it should be given the name of "strong inference." I believe it is important to examine this method, its use and history and rationale, and to see whether other groups and individuals might learn to adopt it profitably in their own scientific and intellectual work.

In its separate elements, strong inference is just the simple and old-fashioned method of inductive inference that goes back to Francis Bacon. The steps are familiar to every college student and are practiced, off and on, by every scientist. The difference comes in their systematic application. Strong inference consists of applying the following steps to every problem in science, formally and explicitly and regularly:

1. Devising alternative hypotheses;
2. Devising a crucial experiment (or several of them), with alternative possible outcomes, each of which will, as nearly is possible, exclude one or more of the hypotheses;
3. Carrying out the experiment **so as** to get a clean result;

4. Recycling the procedure, making subhypotheses or sequential hypotheses to refine the possibilities that remain, and so on.

It is like climbing a tree. At the first fork, we choose - or, in this case, "nature" or the experimental outcome chooses - to go to the right branch or the left; at the next fork, to go left or right; and so on. There are similar branch points in a "conditional computer program," where the next move depends on the result of the last calculation. And there is a "conditional inductive tree" or "logical tree" of this kind written out in detail in many first-year chemistry books, in the table of steps for qualitative analysis of an unknown sample, where the student is led through a real problem of consecutive inference: Add reagent A; if you get a red precipitate, it is subgroup alpha and you filter and add reagent B; if not, you add the other reagent. B; and so on.

On any new problem, of course, inductive inference is not ~~as~~ simple and certain ~~as~~ deduction, because it involves reaching out into the unknown. Steps 1 and 2 require intellectual inventions, which must be cleverly chosen so that hypothesis, experiment, outcome, and exclusion will be related in a rigorous syllogism; and the question of how to generate such inventions is one which has been extensively discussed elsewhere (2,3). What the formal schema reminds us to do is to ~~try~~ to make these inventions, to take the next step, to proceed to the next fork, without dawdling or getting tied up in irrelevancies.

It is clear why this makes for rapid and powerful progress. For exploring the unknown, there is no faster method; this is the minimum sequence of steps. Any conclusion that is not an exclusion is insecure and must be rechecked. Any delay in recycling to the next set of hypotheses is only a delay. Strong inference, and the logical tree it generates, are to inductive reasoning what the syllogism is to deductive reasoning in that it offers a regular method for reaching firm inductive conclusions one after the other ~~as~~ rapidly ~~as~~ possible.

"But what is so novel about this?" someone will say. This ~~is~~ *the* method ~~of~~ science and always has been, why give it a special name? The reason is that many of us have almost forgotten it. Science is now an everyday business. Equipment, calculations, lectures become ends in themselves. How many ~~of~~ us write down our alternatives and crucial experiments every day, focusing on the *exclusion* of a hypothesis? We may write our scientific papers so that it looks as if we had steps 1, 2, and 3 in mind all along. But in between, we do busywork. We become "method-oriented" rather than "problem-oriented." We say we prefer to "feel our way" toward generalizations. We fail to teach our students how to sharpen up their inductive inferences. And we do not realize the added power that the regular and explicit use of alternative hypothesis and sharp exclusion could give us at every step of our research.

The difference between the average scientist's informal methods and the methods of the strong-inference users is somewhat like the difference between a gasoline engine that fires occasionally and one that fires in steady sequence. If our motorboat engines were ~~as~~ erratic ~~as~~ our deliberate intellectual efforts, most of us would not get home for supper.

Molecular Biology

The new molecular biology is a field where I think this systematic method of inference has become widespread and effective. It is a complex field, yet a succession of crucial experiments over the past decade has given us a surprisingly detailed understanding of hereditary mechanisms and the control of enzyme formation and protein synthesis.

The logical structure shows in every experiment. In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick proposed that the DNA molecule - the "hereditary substance" in a cell - is a long two-stranded helical molecule (4). This suggested a number of alternatives for crucial test. Do the two strands of the helix stay together when a cell divides, or do they separate? Matthew Meselson and Franklin Stahl used an ingenious isotope-density-labeling technique which showed that they separate (5). Does the DNA helix always have two strands, or can it have three, as atomic models suggest? Alexander Rich showed it can have either, depending on the ionic concentration (6). These are the kinds of experiments John Dalton would have liked, where the combining entities are not atoms but long macromolecular strands.

Or take a different sort of question: Is the "genetic map" - showing the statistical relationship of different genetic characteristics in recombination experiments - a one-dimensional map like the DNA molecule (that is, a linear map), as T. H. Morgan proposed in 1911, or does it have two-dimensional loops or branches? Seymour Benzer showed that his hundreds of fine micro-genetic experiments on bacteria would fit only the matrix for the one-dimensional case (7).

But, of course, selected crucial experiments of this kind can be found in every field. The real difference in molecular biology is that formal inductive inference is so systematically practiced and taught. On any given morning at the Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge, England, the blackboards of Francis Crick or Sidney Brenner will commonly be found covered with logical trees. On the top line will be the hot new result just up from the laboratory or just in by letter or rumor. On the next line will be two or three alternative explanations, or a little list of "what he did wrong." Underneath will be a series of suggested experiments or controls that can reduce the number of possibilities. And so on. The tree grows during the day as one man or another comes in and argues about why one of the experiments wouldn't work, or how it should be changed.

The strong-inference attitude is evident just in the style and language in which the papers are written. For example, in analyzing theories of antibody formation, Joshua Lederberg (8) gives a list of nine propositions "subject to denial," discussing which ones would be "most vulnerable to experimental test."

The papers of the French leaders Francois Jacob and Jacques Monod are also celebrated for their high "logical density," with paragraph after paragraph of linked "inductive syllogisms." But the style is widespread. Start with the first paper in the *Journal of Molecular Biology* for 1964 (9), and you immediately find: "Our conclusions . . . might be invalid if. . . (i). . . (ii). . . or (iii) We shall describe experiments which eliminate these alternatives." The average physicist or chemist or scientist in any field accustomed

to less closely reasoned articles and less sharply stated inferences will find it a salutary experience to dip into that journal almost at random.

Resistance to Analytical Methodology

This analytical approach to biology has sometimes become almost a crusade because it arouses so much resistance in many scientists who have grown up in a more relaxed and diffuse tradition. At the 1958 Conference on Biophysics, at Boulder, there was a dramatic confrontation between the two points of view. Leo Szilard said: "The problems of how enzymes are induced, of how proteins are synthesized, of how antibodies are formed, **are** closer to solution than is generally believed. If you do stupid experiments, and finish one a year, it can take 50 years. But if you stop doing experiments for a little while and *think* how proteins can possibly be synthesized, there are only about **5** different ways, not **50!** And it will take only **a** few experiments to distinguish these."

One of the young men added: "It is essentially the old question: How *small* and *elegant* an experiment can you perform?"

These comments upset a number of those present. An electron microscopist said. "Gentlemen, this is off the track. This is philosophy of science."

Szilard retorted. "I was not quarreling with third-rate scientists: I was quarreling with first-rate scientists."

A physical chemist hurriedly asked, "Are we going to take the official photograph before lunch or after lunch?"

But this did not deflect the dispute. A distinguished cell biologist rose and said, "No two cells give the same properties. Biology is the science of heterogeneous systems." And he added privately. "You know there are *scientists*, and there are people in science who are just working with these over-simplified model systems - **DNA** chains and in vitro systems - who are not doing science at all. We need their auxiliary work: they build apparatus, they make minor studies. but they are not scientists."

To which Cy Levinthal replied: "Well, there are two kinds of biologists, those who are looking to see if there is one thing that can be understood and those who keep saying it is very complicated and that nothing can be understood. . . . You must study the *simplest* system you *think* has the properties you are interested in."

As they were leaving the meeting one man could be heard muttering, "What does Szilard expect me to do - shoot myself?"

Any criticism or challenge to consider changing our methods strikes of course at all our ego-defenses. But in this case the analytical method offers the possibility of such great increases in effectiveness that it is unfortunate that it cannot be regarded more often **as** a challenge to learning rather than as challenge to combat. Many of the recent triumphs in

molecular biology have in fact been achieved on just such "oversimplified model systems," very much along the analytical lines laid down in the 1958 discussion. They have not fallen to the kind of men who justify themselves by saying "No two cells are alike," regardless of how true that may ultimately be. The triumphs are in fact triumphs of a new way of thinking.

High-Energy Physics

This analytical thinking is rare, but it is, by no means restricted to the new biology. High-energy physics is another field where the logic of exclusions is obvious, even in the newspaper accounts. For example, in the famous discovery of C. N. Yang and T. D. Lee, the question that was asked was: Do the fundamental particles conserve mirror-symmetry or "parity" in certain reactions, or do they not? The crucial experiments were suggested: within a few months they were done, and conservation of parity was found to be excluded. Richard Garwin, Leon Lederman and Marcel Weinrich did one of the crucial experiments. It was thought of one evening at suppertime; by midnight they had rearranged the apparatus for it; and by 4 a.m. they had picked up the predicted pulses showing the non conservation of parity (10). The phenomena had just been waiting, so to speak, for the explicit formulation of the alternative hypotheses.

The theorists in this field take pride in trying to predict new properties or new particles explicitly enough so that if they are not found the theories will fall. As the biologist W. A. H. Rushton has said (11), "A theory which cannot be mortally endangered cannot be alive." Murray Gell-Mann and Yuval Ne'eman recently used the particle grouping which they call "The Eightfold Way" to predict a missing particle, the Omega-Minus, which was then looked for and found (12). But one alternative branch of the theory would predict a particle with one-third the usual electronic charge, and it was not found in the experiments, so this branch must be rejected.

The logical tree is so much a part of high-energy physics that some stages of it are commonly built, in fact, into the electronic coincidence circuits that detect the particles and trigger the bubble-chamber photographs. Each kind of particle should give a different kind of pattern in the electronic counters, and the circuits can be set to exclude or include whatever types of events are desired. If the distinguishing criteria are sequential, they may even run through a complete logical tree in a microsecond or so. This electronic preliminary analysis, like human preliminary analysis of alternative outcomes, speeds up progress by sharpening the criteria. It eliminates hundreds of thousands of the irrelevant pictures that formerly had to be scanned, and when it is carried to its limit, a few output pulses, hours apart, may be enough to signal the existence of the antiproton or the fall of a theory.

I think the emphasis on strong inference in the two fields I have mentioned has been partly the result of personal leadership such as that of the classical geneticists in molecular biology, or of Szilard with his "Midwest Chowder and Bacteria Society at Chicago in 1948-50, or of Max Delbruck with his summer courses in phage genetics at Cold Spring Harbor. But it is also partly due to the nature of the fields themselves.

Biology, with its vast informational detail and complexity, is a "high-information" field, where years and decades can easily be wasted on the usual type of "low-information" observations or experiments if one does not think carefully in advance about what the most important and conclusive experiments would be. And in high-energy physics, both the "information flux" of particles from the new accelerators and the million-dollar costs of operation have forced a similar analytical approach. It pays to have a top-notch group debate every experiment ahead of time; and the habit spreads throughout the field.

Induction and Multiple Hypotheses

Historically, I think, there have been two main contributions to the development of a satisfactory strong-inference method. The first is that of Francis Bacon (13). He wanted a "surer method" of "finding out nature" than either the logic-chopping or all-inclusive theories of the time or the laudable but crude attempts to make inductions "by simple enumeration." He did not merely urge experiments as some suppose, he showed the fruitfulness of interconnecting theory and experiment so that the one checked the other. Of the many inductive procedures he suggested, the most important, I think, was the conditional inductive tree, which proceeded from alternative hypothesis (possible "causes," as he calls them), through crucial experiments ("Instances of the Fingerpost"), to exclusion of some alternatives and adoption of what is left ("establishing axioms"). His Instances of the Fingerpost are explicitly at the forks in the logical tree, the term being borrowed "from the fingerposts which are set up where roads part, to indicate the several directions."

Many of his crucial experiments proposed in Book II of *The New Organon* are still fascinating. For example, in order to decide whether the weight of a body is, due to its "inherent nature" as some had said, or is due to the attraction of the earth, which would decrease with distance, he proposes comparing the rate of a pendulum clock and a spring clock and then lifting them from the earth to the top of a tall steeple. He concludes that if the pendulum clock on the steeple "goes more slowly than it did on account of the diminished virtue of its weights . . . we may take the attraction of the mass of the earth as the cause of weight."

Here was a method that could separate off the empty theories!

Bacon, said the inductive method could be learned by anybody, just like learning to "draw a straighter line or more perfect circle . . . with the help of a ruler or a pair of compasses." "My way of discovering sciences goes far to level men's wit and leaves but little to individual excellence, because it performs everything by the surest rules and demonstrations." Even occasional mistakes would not be fatal. "Truth will sooner come out from error than from confusion."

It is easy to see why young minds leaped to try it.

Nevertheless there is a difficulty with this method. As Bacon emphasizes, it is necessary to make "exclusions." He says, "The induction which is to be available for the discovery

and demonstration of sciences and arts, must analyze nature by proper rejections and exclusions, and then, after a sufficient number of negatives come to a conclusion on the affirmative instances." "[To man] it is granted only to proceed at first by negatives, and at last to end in affirmatives after exclusion has been exhausted."

Or, as the philosopher Karl Popper says today there is no such thing as proof in science - because some later alternative explanation may be **as** good or better - so that science advances only by disproofs. There is no point in making hypotheses that are not falsifiable because such hypotheses do not say anything, "it must be possible for all empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience" (14).

The difficulty is that disproof is a hard doctrine. If you have a hypothesis and I have another hypothesis, evidently one of them must be eliminated. The scientist seems to have no choice but to be either soft-headed or disputatious. Perhaps this is why ~~so~~ many tend to resist the strong analytical approach and why some great scientists are ~~so~~ disputatious.

Fortunately, it seems to me, this difficulty can be removed by the use of a second great intellectual invention, the "method of multiple hypotheses," which is what was needed to round out the Baconian scheme. This is a method that was put forward by T.C. Chamberlin (15), a geologist at Chicago at the turn of the century, who is best known for his contribution to the Chamberlain-Moulton hypothesis of the origin of the solar system.

Chamberlin says our trouble is that when we make a single hypothesis, we become attached to it.

"The moment one has offered an original explanation for a phenomenon which seems satisfactory, that moment affection for his intellectual child springs into existence, and **as** the explanation grows into a definite theory his parental affections cluster about **his** offspring and it grows more and more dear to him. . . . There springs up also unwittingly a pressing of the theory to make it fit the facts and a pressing of the facts to make them fit the theory..."

"To avoid this grave danger, the method of multiple working hypotheses is urged. It differs from the simple working hypothesis in that it distributes the effort and divides the affections. . . . Each hypothesis suggests its own criteria, its own method of proof, its own method of developing the truth, and if a group of hypotheses encompass the subject on all sides, the total outcome of means and of methods is full and rich."

Chamberlin thinks the method "leadsto certain distinctive habits of mind" and is of prime value in education. "When faithfully followed for a sufficient time, it develops a mode of thought of its own kind which may be designated the habit of complex thought ..."

This charming paper deserves to be reprinted in some more accessible journal today, where it could be required reading for every graduate student - and for every professor.

It seems to me that Chamberlin has hit on the explanation - and the cure - for many of our problems in the sciences. The conflict and exclusion of alternatives that is necessary to sharp inductive inference has been all too often a conflict between men, each with his single Ruling Theory. But whenever each man begins to have multiple working hypotheses, it becomes purely a conflict between ideas. It becomes much easier then for each of us to aim every day at conclusive disproofs - at **strong** inference - without either reluctance or combativeness. In fact, when there are multiple hypotheses, which are not anyone's "personal property," and when there are crucial experiments to test them, the daily life in the laboratory takes on an interest and excitement it never had, and the students can hardly wait to get to work to see how the detective story will come out. It seems to me that this is the reason for the development of those distinctive habits of mind and the "complex thought" that Chamberlin described, the reason for the sharpness, the excitement, the zeal, the teamwork - yes, even international teamwork - in molecular biology and high energy physics today. What else could be so effective?

When multiple hypotheses become coupled to strong inference, the scientific search becomes an emotional powerhouse **as well as** an intellectual one.

Unfortunately, I think, there are other other areas of science today that are sick by comparison, because they have forgotten the necessity for alternative hypotheses and disproof. Each man has only one branch - or none - on the logical tree, and it twists at random without ever coming to the need for a crucial decision at any point. We can see from the external symptoms that there is something scientifically wrong. The Frozen Method, The Eternal Surveyor, The Never Finished, The Great Man With a Single Hypothesis, The Little Club of Dependents, The Vendetta, The All-Encompassing Theory Which Can Never Be Falsified.

Some cynics tell a story, which may be apocryphal, about the theoretical chemist who explained to his class.

"And thus we see that the C-Cl bond is longer in the first compound than in the second because the percent **of** ionic character is smaller."

A voice from the back of the room said, "But Professor X, according to the Table, the C-Cl bond is shorter in the first compound."

"Oh, is it?" said the professor, "Well, that's still easy to understand, because the double-bond character is higher in that compound."

To the extent that this kind of story is accurate, a "theory" **of** this **sort** is not a theory at all, because it does not exclude anything. It predicts everything, and therefore does not predict anything. It becomes simply a verbal formula which the graduate student repeats and believes because the professor has said it so often. This is not science, but faith; not theory, but theology. Whether it is hand-waving or number-waving, or equation-waving, a theory is not a theory unless it can be disproved. That **is**, unless it can be falsified by some possible experimental outcome.

In chemistry, the resonance theorists will of course suppose that I am criticizing *them*, while the molecular-orbital theorists will suppose I am criticizing *them*, but their actions - our actions, for I include myself among them - speak for themselves. A failure to agree for 30 years is public advertisement of a failure to disprove.

My purpose here, however, is not to call names but rather to say that we are all sinners, and that in every field and in every laboratory we need to try to formulate multiple alternative hypotheses sharp enough to be capable of disproof.

Systematic Applications

I think the work methods of a number of scientists have been testimony to the power of strong inference. Is success not due in many cases to systematic use of Bacon's "surest rules and demonstrations" as much as to rare and unattainable intellectual power? Faraday's famous diary (16), or Fermi's notebooks (3, 17), show how these men believed in the effectiveness of daily steps in applying formal inductive methods to one problem after another.

Within 8 weeks after the discovery of x-rays, Roentgen had identified 17 of their major properties. Every student should read his first paper (18). Each demonstration in it is a little jewel of inductive inference. How else could the proofs have gone so fast, except by a method of maximum effectiveness?

Organic chemistry has been the spiritual home of strong inference from the beginning. Do the bonds alternate in benzene or are they equivalent? If the first, there should be five disubstituted derivatives; if the second, three. And three it is (19). This is a *strong-inference* test - not a matter of measurement - of whether there are grams or milligrams of the products, but a matter of logical alternatives. How else could the tetrahedral carbon atom or the hexagonal symmetry of benzene have been inferred 50 years before the inferences could be confirmed by x-ray and infrared measurement?

We realize that it was out of this kind of atmosphere that Pasteur came to the field of biology. Can anyone doubt that he brought with him a completely different method of reasoning? Every 2 or 3 years, he moved to one biological problem after another, from optical activity to the fermentation of beet sugar, to the "diseases" of wine and beer, to the disease of silk-worms, to the problem of "spontaneous generation," to the anthrax disease of sheep, to rabies. In each of these fields there were experts in Europe who knew a hundred times as much as Pasteur, yet each time he solved problems in a few months that they had not been able to solve. Obviously it was not encyclopedic knowledge that produced his success, and obviously it was not simply luck, when it was repeated over and over again; it can only have been the systematic power of a special method of exploration. Are bacteria falling in? Make the necks of the flasks S-shaped. Are bacteria sucked in by the partial vacuum? Put in a cotton plug. Week after week his crucial experiments build up the logical tree of exclusions. The drama of strong inference in molecular biology today is only a repetition of Pasteur's story.

The grand scientific syntheses, like those of Newton and Maxwell, are rare and individual achievements that stand outside any rule or method. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that several of the great synthesizers have also shown the strong-inference habit of thought in their other work, as Newton did in the inductive proofs of his *Opticks* and Maxwell did in his experimental proof that three and only three colors are needed in color vision.

A Yardstick of Effectiveness

I think the evident effectiveness of the systematic use of strong inference suddenly gives us a yardstick for thinking about the effectiveness of scientific methods in general. Surveys, taxonomy, design of equipment, systematic measurements and tables, theoretical computations - all have their proper and honored place, provided they are parts of a chain of precise induction of how nature works. Unfortunately, all too often they become ends in themselves, mere time-serving from the point of view of real scientific advance, a hypertrophied methodology that justifies itself as a lore of respectability.

We praise the "lifetime of study," but in dozens of cases, in every field, what was needed was not a lifetime but rather a few short months or weeks of analytical inductive inference. In any new area we should try, like Roentgen, to see how fast we can pass from the general survey to analytical inferences. We should try, like Pasteur, to see whether we can reach strong inferences that encyclopedism could not discern.

We speak piously of taking measurements and making small studies that will "add another brick to the temple of science." Most such bricks just lie around the brickyard (20). Tables of constraints have their place and value, but the study of one spectrum after another, if not frequently re-evaluated, may become a substitute for thinking, a sad waste of intelligence in a research laboratory, and a mistraining whose crippling effects may last a lifetime.

To paraphrase an old saying. Beware of the man of one method or one instrument, either experimental or theoretical. He tends to become method-oriented rather than problem-oriented. The method-oriented man is shackled; the problem-oriented man is at least reaching freely toward that is most important. Strong inference redirects a man to problem-orientation, but it requires him to be willing repeatedly to put aside his last methods and teach himself new ones.

On the other hand, I think that anyone who asks the question about scientific effectiveness will also conclude that much of the mathematizing in physics and chemistry today is irrelevant if not misleading.

The great value of mathematical formulation is that when an experiment agrees with a calculation to five decimal places, a great many alternative hypotheses are pretty well excluded (though the Bohr theory and the Schrodinger theory both predict exactly the same Rydberg constant!). But when the fit is only to two decimal places, or one, it may

be a trap for the unwary; it may be no better than any rule-of-thumb extrapolation, and some other kind of qualitative exclusion might be more rigorous for testing the assumptions and more important to scientific understanding than the quantitative fit.

I know that this is like saying that the emperor has no clothes. Today we preach that science is not science unless it is quantitative. We substitute correlations for causal studies, and physical equations for organic reasoning. Measurements and equations are supposed to sharpen thinking, but, in my observation, they more often tend to make the thinking noncausal and fuzzy. They tend to become the object of scientific manipulation instead of auxiliary tests of crucial inferences.

Many - perhaps most - of the great issues of science are qualitative, not quantitative, even in physics and chemistry. Equations and measurements are useful when and only when they are related to proof; but proof or disproof comes first and is in fact strongest when it is absolutely convincing without any quantitative measurement.

Or to say it another way, you can catch phenomena in a logical box or in a mathematical box. The logical box is coarse but strong. The mathematical box is fine-grained but flimsy. The mathematical box is a beautiful way of wrapping up a problem, **but** it will not hold the phenomena unless they have been caught in a logical box to begin with.

What I **am** saying is that, in numerous areas that we call science, we have come to like our habitual ways, and our studies that can be continued indefinitely. We measure, we define, we compute, we analyze, but we do not exclude. And this is not the way to use our minds most effectively or to make the fastest progress in solving scientific questions.

Of course it is easy - and all too common - for one scientist to call the others unscientific. My point is not that my particular conclusions here are necessarily correct, but that we have long needed some absolute standard of possible scientific effectiveness by which **to** measure how well we are succeeding in various areas - a standard that many could agree on and one that would be undistorted by the scientific pressures and fashions of the times and the vested interests and busywork that they develop. It is not public evaluation I **am** interested in so much **as** a private measure by which to compare one's own scientific performance with what it might be. I believe that strong inference provides this kind of standard of what the maximum possible scientific effectiveness could be - as well **as** a recipe for reaching it.

Aids to Strong Inference

How can we learn the method and teach it? It is not difficult. The most important thing is to keep in mind that this kind of thinking is not a lucky knack but a system that **can** be taught and learned. The molecular biologists today are living proof of it. The second thing is to be explicit and formal and regular about it, to devote a half hour or an hour to analytical thinking every day, writing out the logical tree and the alternatives and crucial experiments explicitly in a permanent notebook. I have discussed elsewhere (3) the value

of Fermi's notebook method, the effect it had on his colleagues and students, and the testimony that it "can be adopted by anyone with profit."

It is true that it takes great courtesy to teach the method, especially to one's peers - or their students. The strong-inference point of view is so resolutely critical of methods of work and values in science that any attempt to compare specific cases is likely to sound but smug and destructive. Mainly one should try to teach it by example and by exhorting to self-analysis and self-improvement only in general terms, as I **am** doing here.

But I will mention one severe but useful private test - a touchstone of strong inference - that removes the necessity for third-person criticism, because it is a test that anyone can learn to carry with him for use **as** needed. It is our old friend the Baconian "exclusion," but I call it "The Question." Obviously it should be applied as much to one's own thinking as to others'. It consists of asking in your own mind, on hearing any scientific explanation or theory put forward, "But sir, what experiment could disprove your hypothesis?"; or, on hearing a scientific experiment described, "But **sir**, what hypothesis does your experiment disprove?"

This goes straight to the heart **of** the matter. It forces everyone to refocus on the central question of whether there is or **is** not a testable scientific step forward.

If such a question were asked aloud, many a supposedly great scientist would sputter and turn livid and would want to throw the questioner out, as a hostile witness! Such a man is less than he appears, for he **is** obviously not accustomed to think in terms **of** alternative hypotheses and crucial experiments for himself; and one might also wonder about the state of science in the field he is in. But who knows - the question might educate him, and his field too!

On the other hand, I think that throughout most of molecular biology and nuclear physics the response to The Question would be to outline immediately not one but several tests to disprove the hypothesis - and it would turn out that the speaker already had two or three graduate students working on them!

I almost **think** that government agencies could make use of this kind of touchstone. It is not true that all science is equal; or that we cannot justly compare the effectiveness **of** scientists by any method other than a mutual-recommendation system. The man to watch, the man to put your money on, is not the man who wants to make "a survey" or a "more detailed study" but the man with the notebook, the man with the alternative hypotheses and the crucial experiments, the man who knows how to answer your Question of disproof and is already **working** on it.

There **are** some really hard problems, some high-information problems, ahead **of** us in several fields, problems of photosynthesis, of cellular organization, of the molecular structure and organization of the nervous system not to mention some **of** our social and international problems. It seems to me that the method of most rapid progress in such complex areas, the most effective way **of** using our brains, **is** going to be to set down

explicitly at each step just what the question is, and what all the alternatives are, and then to set up crucial experiments to try to disprove some. Problems of this complexity, if they can be solved at all, can be solved only by men generating and excluding possibilities with maximum effectiveness, to obtain a high degree of information per unit time - men willing to work a little bit at thinking.

When whole groups of us begin to concentrate like that, I believe we may see the molecular-biology phenomenon repeated over and over again, with order-of-magnitude increases in the rate of scientific understanding in almost every field.

¹ The author is professor of biophysics and physics at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. This is the text of an address given before the Division of Physical Chemistry of the American Chemical Society in September 1963, under the title "The New Baconians."

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3. J.R. Platt, *The Excitement of Science* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1962); see especially chapters 7 and 8.
4. J.D. Watson and F.H.C. Crick, *Nature*, **171**, 737 (1953).
5. M. Meselson and F. Stahl, *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.* **44**, 671 (1958).
6. A. Rich, in *Biophysical Science: A Study Program*, J.L. Oncley et al., Eds. (Wiley, New York, 1959), p. 191.
7. S. Benzer, *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.* **45**, 1607 (1959).
8. J. Lederberg, *Science* **129**, 1649 (1959).
9. P.F. Davison, D. Freifelder, B.W. Holloway, *J. Mol. Biol.* **8**, 1 (1964).
10. R.L. Garwin, L.M. Lederman, M. Weinrich, *Phys. Rev.* **105**, 1415 (1957).
11. W.A.H. Rushton. Personal communication.
12. See G.F. Chew, M. Gell-Mann, A.H. Rosenfeld, *Sci. Am.* **210**, 74 (Feb. 1964); *ibid.* **210**, 60 (Apr. 1964); *ibid.* **210**, 54 (June 1964).
13. F. Bacon, *The New Organon and Related Writings* (Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1960), especially pp. 98, 112, 151, 156, 196.
14. K.R. Pepper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Basic Books, New York, 1959), p. 41. A modified view is given by T.S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962), p. 146; it does not, I believe, invalidate any of these conclusions.
15. T.C. Chamberlin, *J. Geol.* **5**, 837 (1897). I am indebted to Professors Preston Cloud and Bryce Crawford, Jr., of the University of Minnesota for correspondence on this article and a classroom reprint of it.
16. M. Faraday, *Faraday's Diary 1820-62* *bell, London, 1932-36).
17. H.I. Anderson and S.K. Allison, *Rev. Mod. Phys.* **27**, 273 (1955).
18. E.C. Watson, *Am. J. Phys.* **13**, 281 (1945), gives an English translation of both of Roentgen's first papers on x-rays.

19. See G.W. Wheland. Advanced Organic Chemistry (Wiley, New York, 1949),
chapter 4, for numerous such examples.
20. B.K. Forscher. Science, 142,339
21. (1963).

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SEC. OF DEFENSE
FEB 25 2005
2005 JUN -1 PM 3:42

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Legislation on Replacement Surety Program

Where do we stand on getting legislation that is discussed in the attached letter?

Thanks.

Attach.
1/14/05 Letter from Kaiper Wilson to SecDef

DHR:ss
022405.3

.....
Please respond by 3/4/05

619

257605

14 Jan 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49836

OSD 10468-05

700 Quaker Lane, Warwick, RI 02886
Tel 401 827-2660 Fax 401 827-2358
k.wilson@metlife.com

MetLife® Auto & Home

205 JAN -1 PM 3:42

A. Kaiper Wilson
Vice President and General Counsel

January 14, 2005

Donald H. Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In response to the request dated December 10, 2004, of Alberto J. Mora, General Counsel of the Navy, MetLife Auto & Home has agreed to reconsider the expiration of your Individual Risk Surety Agreement.

The decision to temporarily extend your Agreement is based on an understanding obtained from Mr. Mora that you have been unable to secure alternative coverage, and that an effort is underway to obtain legislative relief from the Congressional requirement for this Agreement. We have agreed to extend the term of your Agreement to a maximum of three (3) additional months, expiring on the earlier of April 20, 2005; your leaving your appointed office; or within 10 days of the passage of the above referenced legislation.

In the near future, we will be forwarding you an Addendum to your Agreement that will provide this extension. Please also note that a condition of the extension is the timely payment of the required fee as outlined in the Addendum.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Assistant General Counsel Maura C. Travers of my staff at (401) 827-2661.

Very truly yours,



A. Kaiper Wilson

cc: A. J. Mora
General Counsel of the Navy

M. C. Travers
Assistant General Counsel
Law Department
MetLife Auto & Home

OSD 10468-05

May 24, 2005

I-05/007248
ES-3354

TO: Paul McHale
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Homeland Security Item

Please find out what this business is of Homeland Security talking about asking for shoot-down authority in the U.S., the capital region, and elsewhere. I just can't imagine having two different organizations with their fingers on the trigger.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
052405-18

.....
Please respond by 6/2/05

~~FOUO~~

25-05-05 09:25 18

OSD 10491-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49838

~~FOUO~~

February 23, 2005

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Druyun Matter

Here are a couple of papers on the Darlene Druyun matter. Would you please get on top of the McCain/Wynne/Roach/Druyun set of issues and manage them down to the ground? If you need help, let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/30/04 SecDef memo to Schmitz, Wynne, Haynes
1/14/05 Acting USD (AT&L) memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
022205-20

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49839

OSD 10502-05


250

23 Feb 05

408 0420.
FOUO

November 30, 2004

TO: Joe Schmitz
Mike Wynne
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

As I indicated at the staff meeting today, I believe that not only should we look at other activities that Darlene Druyun, who pled guilty, was involved in, but we should also look at other activities that the Boeing person who pled guilty was involved in.

We have a responsibility to look out for the taxpayers' money. Given the fact that each of them have confessed that they committed crimes, we have a responsibility to see if they committed other crimes. We **know** they are confessed criminals. Therefore, we ought to check and see if they committed some crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
113004-23

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49840

OSD 01028-05



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JAN 14 PM 2:58

JAN 14 2005

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

Reference the attached snowflake at (TAB A), here are the steps I have taken to address all of our concerns in this matter:

- o On November 19, 2004, I tasked the Military Departments, Missile Defense Agency, and the Special Operations Command to perform self-assessments of their acquisition organization and process. The Defense Science Board Task Force I established is reviewing their assessments and their acquisition management structures. The Task Force will brief me on February 2, 2005.
- o At my direction on December 13, 2004, a multi-service/agency team led by the Deputy Director, Defense Contract Management Agency began reviewing contract actions involving Darlene Druyun. Their findings will also be briefed to me on February 2nd.
- o On December 16, 2004, I sent a letter to Harry Stonecipher, Boeing CEO, asking him to examine his own practices. I specifically asked him to examine Mr. Sears' role in Boeing's business with the Department. His December 21, 2004, reply states he is currently reviewing Mr. Sears' role and will share the results with us this month.
- o Today, I sent a memorandum to the ASN (RD&A) asking him to conduct a review of the F/A-18 program, in which Mr. Sears was also involved. I also have asked the Inspector General (IG) to look into the dealings of Ms. Druyun's husband. I understand that the IG is also assisting the Justice Department on issues associated with the Druyun/Sears convictions.
- o I will continue to coordinate with the General Counsel and the IG as these reviews proceed and report back to you on the findings.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Nancy Dowling/DPAP/PAIC/ (b)(6)

cc: DSD, GC, IG

	SMA DSD	1/19
TSA SD	SA DSD	1/19
EXEC SEC	MV/18	
ESR MA	E 6/14	

11-L-0569 OSD/49841

OSD 01028-05B



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

205 JAN 13 PM 4:26
January 13, 2005 12:55 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun (Final Response to Your Memo of November 30, 2004)

- Your Memo (Tab A) asked if Darleen Druyun or Michael Sears, both of whom have pled guilty to criminal charges, committed any other "crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged." This Memo supplements my December 1, 2004 InfoMemo (Tab B), and my Deputy's January 6, 2005, Memo to your Special Assistant (Tab C).
- Although Sears' recent polygraph examination identified no further criminal activity by Sears, Boeing, Druyun or any other DoD officials, my staff continues to cooperate with Department of Justice prosecutors and others regarding potential civil litigation associated with Druyun and Sears, which activities may well uncover additional facts responsive to your 30 November Memo.
- Earlier this week, I had constructive meetings with both Senator McCain's staff and Senator Grassley's staff regarding Boeing and Druyun. Senator Grassley's staff provided me with a 1993 letter from Senator Grassley objecting to a purported Air Force exoneration and promotion of Druyun "one month after the [DoD] Inspector General recommended that she be disciplined for improper or illegal behavior" (Tab D), in response to which the Undersecretary of Defense at the time wrote to Senator Grassley, "You may be assured that we would not retain Mrs. Druyun in her present position if we felt it would jeopardize the integrity of defense acquisition" (Tab E).
- Over the next ten years, the Air Force IG investigated Druyun five times but failed to substantiate any allegations. Most recently, the Air Force IG investigated Druyun for allegedly providing "inaccurate or misleading" information to Senator McCain's staff about the 767 Tanker proposal. My December 20, 2002, letter to Senator McCain (Tab F), reported the results of that Air Force IG investigation, concluding, "I continue to believe that Ms. Druyun's response to you should have been more forthcoming." In light of this conclusion, along with my Office's 1993 "factual allegations" against Druyun, I recommend that neither you nor any other DoD official suggest, as did Marvin Sambur last Wednesday on *60 Minutes*, that Druyun's reputation was "spotless."
- Finally, I have instructed my staff to continue coordinating and cooperating with the other two addressees of your 30 November Memo (Mike Wynne and Jim Haynes), as appropriate, as well as with the Defense Contract Management Agency in its ongoing review of Druyun-related contracts and programs to identify any other instances of potentially criminal activity not yet prosecuted.
- As an ancillary matter of "good news," based on Druyun's plea admission that she had negotiated inflated payments to Boeing in connection with an AWACS software upgrade contract, in December 2004 the Air Force definitized a portion of the contract at an approximate savings of \$6 million. Boeing subsequently agreed to repay an additional \$8.6 million in overcharges.

COORDINATION: None

ATTACHMENTS: As stated

Prepared by: Richard T. Race, Deputy Inspector General for Investigations, (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD		
TSA SD	SA DSD	1/18	
EXEC SEC	M1/19		
ESR MA	KSV	1-14-05	

cc: DoD General Counsel
Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

~~FOUO~~ - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE OSD 01028-05
11-L-0559/OSD/49842

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

November 30, 2004

2005 JAN 13 PM 4: 07

TO: Joe Schmitz
Mike Wynne
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT Boeing and ~~Druyun~~

As I indicated at the staff meeting today, I believe that not only should we look at other activities that Darlene Druyun, who pled guilty, was involved in, but we should also look at other activities that the Boeing person who pled guilty was involved in.

We have a responsibility to look out for the taxpayers' money. Given the fact that each of them have confessed that they committed crimes, we have a responsibility to see if they committed other crimes. We know they are confessed criminals. Therefore, we ought to check and see if they committed some crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
113004-23

.....
Please respond by

1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49844

OSD 01028-05

TAB

B



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

December 1, 2004 5:30 pm

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Boeing Suspension Regarding the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program

- After you suggested yesterday that we should be looking not only at Department of Defense contracts that might have been tainted by Darleen A. Druyun but **also** by any other "criminals" associated with Ms. Druyun, the General Counsel volunteered that **The Boeing Company, Incorporated, (Boeing)** has also been "**partially** debarred" from government contracting as a result of criminal allegations. Attached, for your convenience, is a brief description of this matter, which was included with my October 8, 2003, Quarterly Update to you.
- Following is a brief summary of my Office's involvement **in** that matter. Even before receiving your "snowflake" of yesterday, I had already instructed my staff to share whatever information we can with the Acting Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L), who agreed yesterday to address your concerns about contracts tainted by any other "criminals" associated with Ms. Druyun.
- Since September 5, 2002, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, jointly with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of Inspector General, have been investigating allegations that Boeing used Lockheed Martin Corporation's proprietary documents to successfully bid on Air Force contracts for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. On July 24, 2003, the Air Force suspended (a temporary measure short of debarment) three Boeing divisions and three former Boeing employees from government contracting. The affected Boeing divisions are the Launch Systems Division, Chicago, IL; Boeing Launch Services, Chicago, IL; and the Delta Programs Division, Huntington Beach, CA. To date, the divisions are still under suspension, and the investigation continues.
- I will respond more fully to your "snowflake" within the time you requested (1/13/05).

Attachment: As stated.

cc: Acting USD (AT&L); General Counsel

Prepared By: Charles W. Beardall, Acting Deputy Inspector General (b)(6)

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LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/49846

OSD 19325-04

TAB


C



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFOMEMO

FOR: Mr. Paul W. Butler, The Special Assistant to the SECDEF

FROM: Mr. Richard T. Race, First Assistant to the Inspector General  JAN 6 2005

SUBJECT: OIG Actions Regarding **USAF KC-767/Boeing Matter**

- o On September 16, 2004, the Secretary of Defense transferred responsibility for the ongoing production of documents concerning the KC-767A **Tanker Aircraft Program** for the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. The collection of documents is estimated at 1 million unclassified pages and 100,000 classified pages. To date, approximately 72,466 pages comprised of 11,753 unclassified documents have been provided to the SASC.
- o In a letter dated May 3, 2002 we responded to Senator McCain's request to "assess the Air Force's decision in selecting the Boeing 767 rather than the Airbus A330 for its air refueling tankers."
- o In a separate letter, also dated May 3, 2002 we responded to Senator McCain's request for data on the **Air Force's** contractual arrangement with investment entities concerning the Boeing KC-767A lease that Air Force officials refused to provide him.
- o August 29, 2003. We issued "Assessment of DoD Leasing Action" (D-2003-129) in response to a request from the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). The assessment reviewed "the decision process used by the Air Force and OSD to lease the Boeing 767 Tanker Aircraft and to assess whether DoD interaction with Congress following the Lease Decision Memorandum signed May 23, 2003, was timely and reasonable."
- o March 29, 2004. We issued audit report, "Acquisition of Boeing KC-767A Tanker Aircraft" (D-2004-064) in response to request from the Deputy Secretary of Defense that addressed problems with the procurement and acquisition strategies for the program.
- o December 15, 2004. We completed a review requested by the Secretary of Defense that assessed the processes and procedures used to collect the documents from January 2001 to the present. This review was provided to your office on December 23, 2004.
- o Ongoing: Assessment to determine the key decisions that were/were not made by DoD acquisition officials concerning the execution of procurement and acquisition strategies for the Boeing 767A Tanker Aircraft acquisition program. This assessment should be complete by mid-February 2005.

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11-L-0559/OSD/49848

- o Ongoing: Administrative investigation, at request of Senators Warner, Levin, and McCain, into allegations that Secretary Roche attempted to influence OMB on the 767 tanker lease by using his position and Government email when recommending the brother of an OMB official for employment at Northrop Grumman.
- o Ongoing: Criminal investigative and prosecution actions regarding conspiracy by Ms. Druyun and Mr. Sears to violate conflict of interest statutes continue. Sentencing of Mr. Sears scheduled for February 18, 2005. Ms. Druyun reported for incarceration on January 3, 2005. Defense Criminal Investigative Service continues to assist the Department of Justice (DoJ) with the criminal investigation/prosecution and potential DoJ civil litigation.
- o Ongoing: We provided an initial response on December 1, 2004 to the SECDEF's November 30, 2004 request to examine other DoD activities that Ms. Druyun and Mr. Sears were involved in. A final response is due NLT January 13, 2005.
- o Also, in response to your November 30 2004 Memo, I have instructed my staff to thoroughly review the responses from my seven previous subpoenas relating to Boeing and Druyun (four subpoenas to Boeing and three subpoenas to three other contractors), with a view towards: (a) considering additional subpoenas and/or expanding the scope of the ongoing criminal matter to include, as you wrote in your Memo, "crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged"; and (b) to the extent permissible, considering ongoing activities of the two other addressees of your 30 November Memo (Mike Wynne and Jim Haynes) "with a view toward avoiding duplication and ensuring effective coordination and cooperation" (IG Act, Section 8(c)(9)).

COORDINATION: None

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/49849

TAB

D

☐ 135 SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1501
(202) 224-3744
TTY: (202) 224-4479

☐ 721 FEDERAL BUILDING
210 WALNUT STREET
DES MOINES, IA 50309-2140
(319) 284-4890

☐ 206 FEDERAL BUILDING
101 1st STREET SE
CEDAR RAPIDS, IA 52401-1227
(319) 383-8832

United States Senate

CHARLES E. GRASSLM

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1501

May 5, 1993

REPLY TO:

☐ 103 FEDERAL COURTHOUSE BUILDING
320 6TH STREET
SIOUX CITY, IA 51101-1244
(712) 233-1880

☐ 210 WATERLOO BUILDING
531 COMMERCIAL STREET
WATERLOO, IA 50701-5497
(319) 232-6657

☐ 118 FEDERAL BUILDING
131 E. 4TH STREET
DAVENPORT, IA 52801-1513
(319) 322-4231

The Honorable Les Aspin
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon, Room 33880
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Les,

I am writing to praise your decision to hold four senior Air Force officials accountable for financial mismanagement on the C-17 contract and to raise two questions about Ms. Darleen Druyun.

First, I would like to commend you for taking this decisive step. You have sent a clear, unambiguous signal of zero tolerance toward dishonesty in the department's acquisition process. This is the best kind of deterrent to future failures of discipline and integrity. You deserve a lot of credit for having the courage to do what had to be done.

Second, I am somewhat baffled by the complete omission of Ms. Druyun's name from available documents bearing on your decision in this important matter.

The Inspector General has suggested that Ms. Druyun may have engaged in either improper or illegal conduct in connection with C-17 progress payment number 97 that resulted in a potential violation of the Antideficiency Act and other statutes. For these reasons, the Inspector General recommended that disciplinary action be taken against her and four other senior officials. You chose to discipline the four other officials but not her. Why did you decide not to punish Ms. Druyun?

Ms. Druyun presently occupies a key position in the "acquisition management area." She is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. She was placed in this position in February 1993 - one month after the Inspector General recommended that she be disciplined for improper or illegal behavior.

In view of your decision to banish Generals Barry and Nauseef and Mr. Hixenbaugh from the "acquisition management area" and in view of the fact that the Inspector General has yet to resolve all

Committee Assignments:

FINANCE
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY

JUDICIARY
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
111-0550/0554/49851

U84060-93
BUDGET
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

the issues surrounding possible Antideficiency Act violations, is it wise to leave Ms. Druyun in such an important "acquisition management" post?

Your thoughts would be appreciated. A response is requested by May 12, 1993.

Sincerely,


Charles E. Grassley
U.S. Senator

CEG/chm

TAB

E



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

08 JUN 1993

ACQUISITION

Honorable Charles E. Grassley
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1501

Dear Senator Grassley:

This is in response to your May 5, 1993, letter to Secretary Aspin regarding financial mismanagement on the C-17 contract.

You asked why the Secretary decided not to punish Mrs. Darleen Druyun and is leaving her in an important management post, whereas four other officials were disciplined. The Secretary and I carefully considered all of the evidence in this matter and concluded that punishment of Mrs. Druyun was not appropriate and that she should continue to hold her present position. Mrs. Druyun's involvement with the C-17 contract was limited and did not warrant action similar to that taken with regard to the other officials.

You may be assured that we would not retain Mrs. Druyun in her present position if we felt it would jeopardize the integrity of defense acquisition.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John M. Deutch".

John M. Deutch

11-L-0559/OSD/49854

TAB

F



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

DEC 20 2002

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-0303

Dear Senator McCain:

This is in further response to your letters of April 25, 2002, to the Secretary of Defense and this office that expressed concern regarding the lack of information made available to you concerning possible leases of aircraft from the Boeing Corporation. In particular, you questioned the Air Force denial of your request for "the name of the outside investment entity" that provided advice and analysis on leasing arrangements, including the lease the Air Force is now pursuing with Boeing." Your question to the Air Force on the matter--"Who are the Wall Street experts which provided advice to SAF/AQ [Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)] on aircraft leasing?"--received the following response dated April 18, 2002: "SAF/AQ cannot provide an answer to this question without violating the analysts' and their firms' specific requests for confidentiality."

In response to your concerns, we requested the Inspector General (IG) of the Air Force to conduct an investigation into allegations that Ms. Darleen A. Druyun, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition and Management), and others improperly withheld information from you regarding the identity of an outside entity that provided advice on tanker leasing arrangements. Our preliminary review of the matter suggested that Ms. Druyun's terse response to you, even if factually accurate, was at best extremely poor judgment. Subsequently, we advised the Air Force IG that we uncovered information suggesting that Ms. Druyun's response may have been inaccurate or misleading.¹

The Air Force IG recently completed his investigation into the matter and did not substantiate wrongdoing on the part of Ms. Druyun or others. Based on sworn testimony from eight witnesses and relevant documentation, the Air Force IG determined that Ms. Druyun genuinely believed that she had an obligation to protect the identities of the "Wall Street experts" who provided advice to the Air Force. Her views were based on the assumption that the identities of the sources should be treated as "source selection sensitive" and, therefore, subjected to release restrictions imposed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Section 423 of Title 41, United States Code, "Restrictions on disclosing and obtaining contractor bid or proposal information or source selection information."

¹ My initial response to you of May 3, 2002, advised that, prior to May 1, 2002, the Air Force had no written contractual relationship with an outside investment entity to provide aircraft leasing advice and had obtained aircraft leasing advisory services from Babcock & Brown LP beginning May 1, 2002, via subcontract with Anteon Corporation, a prime Air Force consulting contractor. We had found no indication of a confidentiality agreement between the Air Force and Anteon or Babcock & Brown LP.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49856

I continue to believe that Ms. Druyun's response to you should have been more forthcoming. On the other hand, I have no reason to question the Air Force IG's determination that the allegation that "Ms. Druyun abused her authority by wrongfully refusing to disclose to Senator John McCain the identities of nongovernmental entities that provided investment advice and analysis to the Air Force concerning leasing of tanker and special airlift mission aircraft" was not substantiated. In view of Ms. Druyun's retirement from the Federal service effective November 15, 2002, we find insufficient basis to pursue the matter further. Nevertheless, your insistence on accountability in this situation has reenphasized the requirement to provide accurate, responsive information to Members of Congress, as reflected in Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz' letter to you of July 15, 2002.

Because information in this letter may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the letter is designated ~~"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."~~ Please refer any requests for this letter to the FOIA/Privacy Act Office, Office of Administration and Information Management, Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202-4704.

Please contact me or Mr. John R. Crane, Director, Office of Congressional Liaison, at (b)(6) if we may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,


Joseph E. Schmitz

cc: The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable John Warner
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

May 18, 2005

1013

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Humanitarian Assistance to Ethiopia

Were we asked to give any humanitarian assistance for the floods in Ethiopia?

Thanks.

DIR ss
051705-11

.....
Please respond by 5/26/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/49858

OSD 10512-05

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM	Mr. Mike Shaw	24 May 2005
CJTF-HOA, J-3	COL Carroll	24 May 2005
DAO Addis Ababa	LTC(P) Whiteside	23 May 2005
OASD (ISA/AF)	Ms. Theresa Whelan	23 May 2005

Tab B

UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-0559/OSD/49859



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2533-05
1 June 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY/6/1*

SUBJECT: Humanitarian Assistance to Ethiopia (SF 1013) (U)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB A), the Department of Defense was not asked to provide any humanitarian assistance for the floods in Ethiopia.
- **Analysis.** The Defense Attaché Office in Addis Ababa, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, USCENTCOM, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs/Africa) have indicated that they were not asked to provide any humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia after the recent flooding.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA: Director, J-5 (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 10512-05

~~FOUO~~

March 2, 2005

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: U.S. Army Reserve Availability

Here is a memo from Fran Harvey about the Reserves. I have not read it, but it is an important subject.

Please review it, get with Fran and the Joint Staff if necessary, and give me your views.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/25/05 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: U.S. Army Reserve Availability

DHR:dh
022805-1

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Please respond by

3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49861

OSD 10570-05

326

2 March

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INFO MEMO

February 25, 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: U.S. Army Reserve Availability

- In light of recent Congressional testimony and media coverage regarding stress on the United States Army Reserve (USAR), I want to provide you with information on the status of USAR manpower issues and a game plan for addressing the challenges.
- While sourcing for OIF 5/OEF 7 at the current level of effort will be challenging, the Army will meet combatant commander requirements.
- The USAR missed its retention and end strength objectives for FY 2004. Currently, the USAR has an authorized end strength of 205,000 and is operating with an end strength of approximately 198,000 Soldiers. The primary cause was a lack of available prior service Soldiers for transition into the USAR. The recruiting pool shrunk because "Stop Loss" policies and a strong Active Component retention program were successful in helping the Army keep soldiers in the AOR. As you are aware the USAR historically garnered numerous soldiers each year from the prior service community.
- To reverse this negative trend in personnel strength levels, the Army has increased the number of recruiters in the field, adding over 735 authorizations in the USAR. Additionally, we have implemented a number of bonus and incentive programs and increased the value of existing recruiting options. In the near term, projections are that the USAR will remain below its end strength objectives in 2005. I believe, however, the initiatives the USAR has in place should reverse the negative trends this year and allow us to meet our end strength objectives in 2006.
- The Army is also taking an aggressive approach to resolving USAR company grade officer shortages that developed over a 10-year period. In addition to increased accessions, solutions include: changes in the promotion system; additional Officer Basic Course seats and tighter management; greater continuum of service for those leaving the active component to serve in the USAR, and efforts to lower officer attrition.
- Because of the importance of the USAR in sustaining our global commitments, I plan to establish a Task Force composed of working groups and an outside review panel to assess the future availability of Reserve Forces and a corresponding plan to meet a range of projected force levels. This plan may recommend changes to current policies and authorities needed to accommodate the 21st Century Strategic Environment of sustained operations with an all-volunteer force. The Chief of Staff and I believe the Army Modular Force will eventually alleviate the significant stress that is being experienced today by our forces.
- I will keep you apprised of our efforts and emerging insights. As needed, I will come to you for relief where proposed solutions to fulfill Army requirements exceed my authority.

11-L-0559/OSD/49862

OSD 10570-05


FOUO

February 23, 2005

11-L-0559-05

TO: Tina Jonas
Dan Stanley
Matt Latimer

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Congressional Testimony

Nice job on the preparation and execution of this cycle of budget testimony. It all flowed smoothly, and I appreciate your hard work getting everyone ready.

Thanks!

DHR:ss
022205-7

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Please respond by _____

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February 17, 2005

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TO: Dan Stanley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Mikulski

I want to be sure we get an answer to Mikulski, and I want to see it before it goes out.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021705-21

.....
Please respond by 3/1/05

Snake

*Sir,
Response attached.
✓R
Lt Col Lengyel*

MAR 04 2005

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FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49864

OSD 10575-05



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

705 311-1211

March 4, 2005 5:00 PM

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FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SecDef Snowflake #021705-21

- You wanted to see the response (Atch 2) to Sen Mikulski's question concerning rape and sexual assault allegations against soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Attachment 3 is a detailed info paper.

Attachments:

1. SECDEF Snowflake #021705-21
2. Proposed Response
3. Info Paper

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