

SUBJECT: Rape and Sexual Assault Allegations Against Soldiers in Iraq

1. **Purpose.** To answer Senator Mikulski's question to the Secretary of Defense concerning rape and sexual assault allegations against Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan

Question:

"[W]hether or not there have been any convictions or allegations of American Soldiers raping Muslim women in Iraq."

2. Answer:

There have been two allegations made against American soldiers for the rape of Muslim women in Iraq. Both cases were thoroughly investigated, unfounded and closed. There have been no soldiers charged or convicted of raping Muslim women in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Prepared By: COL Child (b)(6)
Approved by: BG Wright, OTJAG-MLO

INFORMATION PAPER

DAJA-CL
3 March 2005

SUBJECT: Investigations and Dispositions of Rape Allegations by U.S. Forces Against Muslim Women

1. Purpose. To provide information to the Secretary of Defense concerning allegations or convictions of US soldiers for the rape of Muslim women.

2. Discussion

a. Rape

1) No soldiers have been convicted of the rape of Muslim women in Iraq or Afghanistan.

2) Army CID has investigated two cases of rape in Iraq or Afghanistan

3) Neither rape case was substantiated. Each case is closed:

(a) One case arose when a female detainee alleged in a newspaper article that she was raped and knifed in the back by unknown soldiers at the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). CID followed all investigative leads and was unable to substantiate the allegation, and was unable to identify any soldiers alleged to have committed the acts.

(b) The second rape investigation arose when a magazine article (Playboy) alleged that numerous soldiers from the 1/15th Infantry Battalion admitted to various acts of murder, rape, and assault against Iraqi captives and civilians. The investigation revealed that the information given to the reporter was exaggerated and taken out of context. The reporter acknowledged that he did not have all the facts in connection with the incidents. No allegations of rape were substantiated.

b. Other Sexual Offenses:

There have been six sexual assault/sodomy/indecent acts investigations arising from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Three cases are closed, two of which had no subjects identified, while one resulted in disciplinary action on a separate matter. Three cases are presently under investigation, one in conjunction with the FBI as the subject is a civilian contractor.

1) Closed cases

(a) One of the closed assault cases identified US Soldiers as subjects and resulted in disciplinary action. However, the disciplinary action was not pertaining to sexual assault. A female detainee alleged she was taken to a vacant cell and kissed by a Soldier and threatened to be left in a cell with a naked male detainee. The

investigation revealed three male interrogators interrogated the female. None of the Soldiers admitted to the assault and there was insufficient evidence to prove the case. However, the three interrogators were administered non-judicial punishment for failing to follow procedures concerning a female detainee. The soldiers were returned from theater.

(b) A second closed sexual assault case arose from an allegation that an MP Guard at Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib had sexual relations with a detainee. Extensive investigation of abuse at Abu Ghraib has failed to uncover any incident of sexual relations between a detainee and a guard. Then-SPC Graner and other Soldiers have been convicted of numerous offenses of abuse at Abu Ghraib, including forcing detainees into humiliating sexual poses. However, the only established offenses involving sexual relations were sex acts between SPC Graner and PFC England. SPC Graner was also found guilty of taking photographs of a female detainee exposing her breasts.

(c) The third closed case involved a male detainee who alleged that he was assaulted and anally sodomized by three unknown US Forces (one woman and two men) at Camp Bucca and BCCF. Medical examination found no scars, but the detainee maintained his allegation. No subjects were identified and the case was closed.

2) Open cases

(a) A sexual assault/abuse case was opened when a 75 year-old Iraqi woman alleged that she was detained for 10 days, robbed, sodomized, and indecently assaulted by Coalition Forces. The report was 9 months after the alleged incident, medical reports could not confirm the assault, and there were no witnesses. The case was initially closed, but recent leads indicating that a US unit may have been in the area where the alleged assault occurred has resulted in re-opening the case for further investigation.

(b) Another open sexual assault case potentially involves Navy personnel. The case arose when a newspaper article reported that a male detainee was stripped, assaulted, sexually assaulted, and photographed by Navy SEALs at Gardez, Afghanistan. Investigation by CID has identified additional male detainees who allege physical assault at Gardez, however no subjects have been identified. The case is still open.

(c) The final open sexual assault case identified a civilian DOD contract employee who is being investigated by the FBI. A detainee reported a translator at BCCF forcibly sodomized another detainee. An unidentified female soldier reportedly took pictures.

Prepared By: COL Child (b)(6)
Approved by: BG Wright, OTJAG-MLO

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SEC. **February 7, 2005**
2005 FEB -2 AM 7:13

TO: Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *Meet the Press* Interview

Please take a look at the transcript from this interview with Tim Russert, it contains some examples of how to present some issues.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/6/05 *Meet the Press* Interview with Tim Russert

DHR:ss
020705-9

.....
Please respond by _____

000.775D

7 Feb 05

FOUO

OSD 10577-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49869

NBC "MEET THE PRESS" HOST: TIM RUSSERT GUESTS: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD; SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (D-MA) TIME: 9:00 A.M. EST DATE: SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2005

.....
Copyright 2005 by Federal News Service, Inc., Suite 500, 1000 Vermont Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20005 USA. Federal News Service is a private firm not affiliated with the federal government. No portion of this transcript may be copied, sold or retransmitted without the written authority of Federal News Service, Inc. Copyright is not claimed as to any part of the original work prepared by a United States government officer or employee as a part of that person's official duties. For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service at www.fednews.com, please email Jack Graeme at jack@fednews.com or call 1-800-211-4020.
.....

MR. RUSSERT: First, joining us now on "Meet the Press" is the secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Welcome back.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you, sir.

MR. RUSSERT: The elections have been held, as we well know. The early counting seems to indicate the Shi'ites have done very, very well, in the election. The headline in the Sunday New York Times, Mr. Secretary, "Top Iraq Shi'ites Pushing Religion in Constitution" -- that they want to use Islam as the guiding principle in drafting the constitution. How do you feel about that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, a lot of states that have a predominantly Muslim population have a way of including that without having it dominate. And certainly if you would look at Afghanistan, that's the case there. I think that of all the headlines I've seen, that's not the one I would have cited. I would have cited the ones that point out that all of the people who were involved in the election are reaching out to the Sunnis, are in fact engaged in political discussions and negotiations. Think of it -- in Iraq, after 35 years of a repressive dictatorship, what we're hearing is political debate and discussion and who should be prime minister and who should be president and deputy president, and how should this work and how should we sort that out and who's going to fashion the constitution. That's thrilling. That is absolutely thrilling.

I would say this: The Shi'a in Iraq are Iraqis. They're not Iranians. And the idea that they're going to end up with a government like Iran, with a handful of mullahs controlling much of the country I think is unlikely.

MR. RUSSERT: But when they say that they would like to have a constitution which says that daughters would get half the inheritance of sons, do you find that troubling for all the bloodshed we have spilled for Iraq?

SEC. RUMSFELD: The first thing we have to begin with is that Iraq belongs to the Iraqis. And the Iraqis are going to have a solution for Iraq that's an Iraqi solution. They're not going to have an American solution or an Afghan solution. And the wonderful thing that's taking place is that the great sweep of human history is for freedom. And we're seeing it in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in the Palestinian Liberation Authority, in the Ukraine, in Indonesia. And what's happening is healthy. It's good.

Look at our Constitution when it was first fashioned. Look what it did with respect to women not voting. Look what it did with respect to blacks and the way they were counted in the population. So you don't get from where they were to where they're going "on a feather bed," as Thomas Jefferson said. You get there through tough discussion, trials, error, mistakes, good things. And they're on that path, and I think people ought to step back and say, Isn't that amazing? Isn't that a wonderful thing for that region?

MR. RUSSERT: If they decide that they do not want Prime Minister Allawi to remain as prime minister, we would accept that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, it isn't a matter of accepting it or **not** accepting it. The Iraqis had a vote. They're going to decide who the president and the deputy presidents are going to be. They're going to decide who the prime minister is going to be. They're going to decide who the ministers of these various ministries, are going to be. That's what that's about.

MR. RUSSERT: One of the Iraqis said this -- he's the head of the Constitutional Monarchy Party: "Americans are in for a **shock**," adding that one day they would realize, quote, "We've got 150,000 troops here protecting a country that's extremely friendly to Iran." SEC. RUMSFELD: You know, I could go to the press, and I could pull out a quote on almost any side of every issue. And your question is what do I think about that particular quote. First of all, I don't think it's representative. Second, I'm always amazed at the things that can happen in the world, and I don't doubt for a minute that there are going to be some surprises for everybody. Third, let's face it, Afghanistan has Iran as a neighbor, and they talk to each other. Most countries do talk to their neighbors. And that's a very different thing from suggesting that the model that Iran has is necessarily going to be the model for Iraq. I don't believe it is. I think the Shi'a in Iraq are Iraqis first and Shi'a second. And just as in Afghanistan, you don't see Mr. Karzai fashioning a government that's a replica of one of his neighbors. He's got an Afghan solution to his problems.

MR. RUSSERT: So you're confident that we will not have an Islamic fundamentalist state in Iraq?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I think it would be just an enormous mistake for that country to think that it could succeed with all of its opportunity, with its oil, its water, its intelligent population -- to deny half of their population, women, the opportunity to participate fully, I think, just would be a terrible mistake.

MR. RUSSERT: Our next guest, Senator Kennedy, has said now that the elections are over, we should have a specific timetable for the withdrawal of American troops. The president said that would embolden the terrorists. Why?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, first of all, let's point out the truth. The president and I and anyone would dearly love to be smart enough and wise enough to know precisely when our troops could leave. It would be such a relief for people to know that. It's not knowable. The important thing to do is to see that we do not create a dependency, that we encourage them to take over that responsibility. And our forces are doing that. We're helping to train and equip the Iraqi security forces. And the president believes, and I agree with him, that we don't want to be there any longer than we have to, but we want to be there as long as we're needed. And it seems to me that the answer as to when our troops can come out is dependent upon the conditions on the ground and

whether or not the Iraqis are capable of managing the security situation there. We're working very hard to see that they can.

MR. RUSSERT: RUSSERT: Why not give the Iraqis benchmarks that in six months, we're going to withdraw 50,000 troops -- you better have 50,000 troops ready to replace them?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Because we've been -- our country has invested a lot of lives, a lot of heartbreak. The courage of our troops and the sacrifice of those that have fallen and were wounded is important. And the idea that you should just arbitrarily say this is going to happen on that date -- think of it, the last administration did that in Bosnia. They said we'd be out by Christmas.

Six, eight, 10 years later, not out. It is misleading people to think that you know something you don't know. And we know we don't know.

MR. RUSSERT: Did you believe two years ago that at this stage of the war we would have **135,000** Americans on the ground, **1,400** dead, **10,000** wounded or injured?

SEC. RUMSFELD: We were asked, and at that time we told the truth. And the truth was you can't know how long it'll last, you can't know how many troops it'll take, and you can't know how many dead and wounded there would be. No one in any war has ever been able to predict that. People who do predict it make a terrible mistake, because they set expectations based on nothing but hope.

MR. RUSSERT: One area that has created a lot of debate is the number of Iraqi forces that are now ready and trained and available. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that only about a third of Iraq's **136,000** trained security forces have enough training to engage in combat with insurgents. As he says, quote, "**40,000** who can go anywhere in the country and take on any threat. He used the figure **136,000** security forces, big umbrella. This is what Donald Rumsfeld said in February of last year, a year ago: "I would say there's not been a slowness in forming the Iraqi security forces. Indeed, if you think about it, last June or July there were no Iraqi security forces, and today, in February of **2004**, there are over 210,000 Iraqis serving in the security forces. That's an amazing accomplishment." How did we get from 210,000 a year ago --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Very simply. There are people that are trying to make this more complex, for whatever reason, than it is. It's not complex. It's simple. We did start with zero, and we ended up over 200,000, and that included **74,000** site protection people. Those people did not report to the Ministry of Interior or to the Ministry of Defense. When we took that number out of the 200 (thousand), it went down, obviously, and we no longer include them. Every paper we put out has a footnote stating exactly why that's the case.

Now, let's go to Dick Myers' comment. We have **136,000** Iraqi security forces, excluding the 70,000-plus in the site protection, and they are in the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and there's a lot of different types. Some are policemen and they walk a beat. Some are border patrol and they sit on a border in a patrol place. Others are in commando units and they operate in a region and go in on special assignments. Still others are in the regular army, and they're being trained for that type of function. A small number of them -- as Dick Myers said, something like 40,000 -- are highly mobile, can move anywhere in the country and be sustained.

Now, would you -- he answered the question perfectly honestly. We have 136,000. The implication that the rest are not useful is silly. It's nonsense. The policeman on the beat outside your office doesn't need to be mobile and sustainable and go into Los Angeles.

MR. RUSSERT: Senator Joe Biden says 40,000 is not an honest number, that it's more like 4,000 truly trained Iraqi forces that can take on the insurgents. Is he right?

SEC. RUMSFELD: It -- he's wrong, obviously. I mean, General Petraeus put this out very clearly in a press briefing and laid it out. When I say Senator Biden is wrong, what I mean is this: When you train some people to be policemen, they're very good policemen, and that's part of the Iraqi security forces. If you train them to go after the -- do a counterterrorism job, then that's a very different function, and we have a certain number of those. And we announce and release the number of those. But that's true of our military. We have people who are -- whose job is military police. We have people whose job is to be part of a special operations team that can go in and do counterterrorism-type activities. We have people who do entirely different things. And that, to suggest that therefore the numbers are wrong is incorrect.

The other thing I should say is talking numbers is not terribly useful always, because if a person comes out of training the first day, they're not a battle-hardened veteran. They are trained and they are equipped. You compare them with somebody who's been out a year, who's been in Fallujah and had a success there, or been involved in the election, where the Iraqi security forces successfully secured 5,000 election sites. The inner perimeter and the outer perimeter were all Iraqis doing that at 5,000 sites. Now, that was a major accomplishment. And I think to belittle them or to question the numbers because some do police work and some do counterterrorism work is a misunderstanding of the situation.

MR. RUSSERT: How many Iraqi security forces do we need fully trained and capable of fighting insurgents?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, the answer to that question is not complicated. We need as many as are needed. If you have an insurgency that's this level, you'll need X. If you have an insurgency that's that level, you'll need X-plus. And if you have an insurgency that's quite low, you'll need X-minus. And to think that you can sit here today and -- I mean, no one predicted the level of the insurgency as it is today. Partly it's a function of money. Partly it's a function of what the Syrians and the Iranians are doing. Partly it's a function of how many criminals they can hire to participate. Partly it's a function of how much money Zarqawi gets to hire suicide bombers. And that goes up and down.

MR. RUSSERT: But right now, knowing what *you* know about the insurgency, how many fully trained Iraqi troops do you think we need in order for the United States to withdraw?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Okay, what we've done is we made an initial assessment when the major combat operations ended. Six months later we sent in General Eichenberry and he made an assessment. General Casey then went in last June and made an assessment. We just sent in General Luck, and what we do is keep looking at the changing circumstance on the ground and reevaluating what that ought to be. You've got to remember the enemy has a brain. It isn't as though

the enemy's an inanimate object and that you can then measure what you need to deal with that inanimate object. He watches what we do and adjusts to it, just as we watch what they do and adjust to it. And, therefore, **it's** a moving target. **It's** not static.

MR. RUSSERT: The Iraqi intelligence services director said that the insurgency is larger than the U.S. Army -- it is more than 200,000 people. Is he right?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Who said that?

MR. RUSSERT: Mohammad Abdul Sussami, the Iraqi Intelligence Service director, on January 3rd, 2005. He's a general.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, I've never seen that number, and I don't know where it came from.

MR. RUSSERT: It's a lot larger than the dead-enders that you had talked about some time ago.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I talked about it?

MR. RUSSERT: Yes.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I think I've always characterized it as a mix of people. There are some Ba'athists who are dead-enders, that's true. There are some jihadists who've come in from other countries, and Zargawi and that team of people who are particularly lethal. There are criminals. There are always -- I've always included --

MR. RUSSERT: But in June of 2003, we were talking about small elements, 10 to 20 people, no large network.

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's what they were functioning as during that period immediately after the major combat operations. That's right. And the insurgency has -- MR. RUSSERT: And it's changed?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Absolutely. That's why we keep sending in assessment teams.

MR. RUSSERT: Let me turn to what we need on the ground right now. About 40 to 45 percent of our troops are National Guard and Army Reserve. The head of the Army Reserve said that we are rapidly degenerating, quote, "into a broken force." He's worried about retention, recruitment. The National Guard has reached only half its goal in January in terms of retention and recruitment.

The Marine Corps for the first time in a decade has not reached its recruiting goal. Will it be necessary to say to the National Guard, You may have to serve another 24 months -- not just the original 24 months that we sent you, but we may break you and have to send you back again?

SEC. RUMSFELD: We have no plans to do -- to change the rulings and the methods that we're operating on at the present time. For the first time we've begun to see some goals and targets not being fulfilled. And but generally recruiting and retention has been on track and **is** today generally on track.

One of the reasons that the National Guard and the Reserves are slightly down is because we're enlarging the size of the Army and in that process more people are staying in. And one of the pools that you draw on to build the Guard and Reserve is people coming off active duty, as you know. So there's fewer people coming off active duty. Therefore, we've increased the number of recruiters, we've increased the incentives, and we just simply have to recognize that the stress on the force is real, and take the kinds of steps that we've taken to anticipate that and see that we're able to attract and retain the people we need. We have still only used about 40 percent of the Guard and Reserve that's available in this country, since the beginning of the Afghan operation.

MR. RUSSERT: So you have no plans to change the rules in terms of extending tours?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, the rules -- there's been a debate in the press about whether you wanted to change 24 months to cumulative or consecutive, and it's being left at consecutive, not cumulative.

MR. RUSSERT: Let me show you some comments that some have made --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Or cumulative. I misspoke.

MR. RUSSERT: Yeah, I understand. Some things that members of Congress has said. This is Susan Collins, a Republican -- not a Democrat, a Republican: "I think there are increasing concerns about the secretary's leadership of the war, the repeated failures to predict the strengths of the insurgency, the lack of essential safety equipment for our troops, the reluctance to expand the number of troops." I want to talk -- we've talked about insurgency. I want to bring you back to the whole debate about the use of essential safety equipment for our troops, and take you back to December -- we haven't seen you since then -- when Thomas Wilson stood up and asked you a question. I want to show you that exchange and come back and talk about it.

(Begin videoclip.)

Q Now, why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass to up-armor our vehicles and why don't we have those resources readily available to us? (Applause. Cheers.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: As you know, you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time. And if you think about it, you can have all the armor in the world on a tank and a tank can be blown up. And you can have an up-armored humvee and it can be blown up.

(Endvideoclip.)

MR. RUSSERT: Now, Specialist Wilson did acknowledge he worked with a journalist in crafting that question.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, but wait a minute. Let me get into this a little bit.

MR. RUSSERT: Sure.

SEC. RUMSFELD: That was unfair and it was selectively taking out two sentences from a long exchange -- there it is -- that took place. And when you suggested that that's how I answered that question, that is factually wrong. That is not how I answered that question.

MR. RUSSERT: But, Mr. Secretary, it clearly represents the exchange between --

SEC. RUMSFELD: It does not.

MR. RUSSERT: All right, what is missing?

SEC. RUMSFELD: You want to hear the exchange? There is it. It's right here. I'll read it to you. If you're going to quote pieces of it, I'll give you the exchange. He asked that question, and I said, "I talked to the general coming out here about the pace at which the vehicles are being armored. They have been brought from all over the world, wherever they're not needed, to places where they are needed. I'm told they are being -- the Army is -- I think it's something like 400 a month are being done now. And it's essentially a matter of physics. It's not a matter of money. It isn't a matter on the part of the Army's desire. It's a matter of production and capability of doing it. As you know, you go to the war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.

"Since the Iraq conflict began, the Army has been pressing ahead to produce armor necessary at a rate that they believe -- it's a greatly expanded rate from what existed previously but a rate that they believe is the rate that can be accomplished. I can assure you that General Schoomaker and the leadership of the Army and certainly General Whitcomb are sensitive to the fact that not every vehicle has the degree of armor that would be desirable to have, but that they're working at it at a good clip. It's interesting. I've talked a great deal about this with a team of people who've been working hard at the Pentagon. And if you think about it, you can have all the armor in the world on a tank and the tank could still be blown up. And you can have an up-armored humvee and it can be blown up. And you can go down and the vehicle -- the goal we have is to have many of those vehicles as is humanly possible with the appropriate level of armor available for the troops. ! And that's what the Army's been working on. And, General Whitcomb, is there anything you want to add?" And then he spoke.

Now, that answer is totally different from picking out two lines. And I think it's an unfair representative -- and it's exactly what some of the newspapers around the country did.

Now, let's go back to Susan Collins' comment, Senator Collins --

MR. RUSSERT: Well, let me just finish on the humvees because --

SEC. RUMSFELD: You bet. I'll tell you right now where we are. By February 15th, nine days from now, there will not be a vehicle moving around in Iraq outside of a protected compound with American soldiers in it that does not have an appropriate level of armor.

MR. RUSSERT: Which is a pretty dramatic change, because Newsweek had said that of the 19,000 humvees in the Iraqi theater, according to the Army's latest numbers, only a quarter were fully armored. So the fact is that

Specialist Wilson's question in front of his troops in which he was cheered was helpful in getting people to truly focus and respond to this. Fair?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I didn't criticize his question. I thanked him for his question.

MR. RUSSERT: No, but is that a fair statement?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, you saw my answer. We'd already been focusing on it -- hard. I mean, I answered it by saying we had teams of people in Washington working on it, General Whitcomb was working on it.

Let's go back to Senator Collins. You said that she was critical because we couldn't predict the size of the insurgency. That is the job for the intelligence community. And it is unfortunate that we don't have perfect visibility into that. It is also unfortunate that it's changing and evolving, and therefore easy to say, Well, you don't know what the size is because the size is changing, but the fact of the matter is it's a difficult thing to do. And I suppose someone can sit back in an air-conditioned room and be critical of it, but the fact is the intelligence community is working as hard as they know how to try to manage those serious questions about what the size is.

Second, to say that I've resisted increasing the size of the Army is factually incorrect.

We've increased the size of the Army. We've been doing it under the emergency authority. The Congress -- some of the people in the Congress have wanted to increase the end strength by statute. And we don't need that done because under the emergency authority we can increase it and we have already increased it by tens of thousands -- 20,000.

MR. RUSSERT: There was a large debate at the Pentagon. General Shinseki -- we've talked about this before -- others saying we needed 200,000 troops on the ground.

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's a separate issue from the size of the Army -- quite different.

MR. RUSSERT: Exactly. But there were also comments made that you were going to transform the Army and have a light, more mobile force and not have as many additional members of the armed forces as some were suggesting.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Not true. Not true.

MR. RUSSERT: At all?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No. We -- the size of the Army is quite a different thing from whether it's light and agile and mobile and able to go someplace fast. That's the nature of the Army, not the size of the Army.

MR. RUSSERT: In hindsight, do you wish we had sent more troops on the ground in Iraq initially?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I wish that we could have gotten the 4th Infantry Division in from the north, so that it would have been able to put more pressure on the Ba'athist regime and probably capture more of the Ba'athists that today are part of the insurgency. But in terms of the total numbers of troops that

went in, we finally got the 4th ID in, but it had to come in from the south. So it was not as effective as had it come in through Turkey.

The answer to your other question is no. I think that General Franks and General Abizaid have been correct in calculating the number of troops that we need on the ground in Iraq. MR. RUSSERT: Bob Woodward said General Franks -

SEC. RUMSFELD: Just a minute. Just a minute.

MR. RUSSERT: Bob Woodward had said that General Franks had recommended 300,000 troops.

SEC. RUMSFELD: At any given moment, General Franks might have had some number in his mind. So what we did was I agreed with his recommendation, which was that we put in line up to 500,000 that could go in were they needed, and that at any moment where they were not needed he would pull the stooper and stoo it, and he did. And that's where it stopped. And I think he was right because the balance he faced in both Afghanistan and Iraq is you do not want to become a heavy footprint, occupying force that causes more of an irritant to the population than a benefit. And who knows what's perfect? It's not for me to judge. But when General Myers, General Pace, General Franks, General Abizaid, General Sanchez and now General Casey tell me that they believe we have the right number on the ground, that's good enough for me.

MR. RUSSERT: You said to CNN on Thursday that you tendered your resignation twice to the president of the United States.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I was asked.

MR. RUSSERT: Why?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Why? First of all, an unfortunate thing happened on my watch, and I was secretary.

MR. RUSSERT: Abu Ghraib?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Abu Ghraib. And people were not treated the way they should have been treated. And that's wrong. And it seemed to me that a president ought to have that choice. I had to make a decision if I thought I should leave. And I decided that I would leave if I thought I could not be effective. And I decided I thought I could be effective. But I also know that the president deserved a chance to make that decision himself. So I sat down with him and handed him a written resignation and urged him to think very carefully about it from his standpoint, from the country's standpoint. And that's why.

MR. RUSSERT: Why twice?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I did it first in the Oval Office. And about 10 days later, he was at the Pentagon. And I had migrated in my thinking that from his standpoint -- it might be wiser from his standpoint if he were able to step off fresh, and so I tried to persuade him that that was the case, and I failed.

MR. RUSSERT: Did you think you had done something wrong? SEC. RUMSFELD: No. Obviously the country has to be deeply concerned that people were not treated right. And I was secretary of defense when that happened. And

we've had eight or 10 investigations. We have had dozens of criminal trials, and people have pled guilty to doing things they shouldn't do. And obviously you just feel terrible about that. That is not the way our country behaves. And it was a most unfortunate thing that it happened. And I was secretary of Defense.

MR. RUSSERT: When John Kerry calls for your resignation and says he has 800,000 signatures on his Internet, John McCain says he has no confidence, Trent Lott says he's not a fan -- what does that do to your ability to be secretary of defense?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, you know, we were in a political campaign, and there are people always running for president, and that goes with the territory. We've never had a war in this country where there haven't been critics. They were calling for George Washington's resignation. In the Civil War they were constantly calling for resignations. In World War I, in World War II, in Korea. There's never been a war or a war president or a war secretary of State who has not been criticized by critics, and particularly during a political campaign or by political people who are running for president. So that's life.

MR. RUSSERT: Would you have done anything differently?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, my goodness, sure. I don't know, maybe there was a way to get the -- you mean the 4th Infantry Division, that type of thing?

MR. RUSSERT: Or Abu Ghraib?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I mean, in retrospect we've taken probably 15 or 20 administrative steps to require that people go in -- if it's the midnight shift half a world away, and we know in history people who guard people have done things wrong with respect to the people. It happens in prisons all over the United States and in other countries. So you don't want that to happen. So maybe you have to do senior officer checks at the midnight shift because apparently a lot of it happened during a relatively brief period of months -- weeks, months.

MR. RUSSERT: You're confident it cannot happen again?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Of course not. Human beings are human beings. People do things they shouldn't do. All I'm confident of is that the Army, which is the executive agent for detainees, is seized with this problem. They recognize it's their responsibility. They've worked hard to undertake a whole series of steps to try to see that it doesn't happen again. And I pray it doesn't happen again, because it's wrong. MR. RUSSERT: And you will be secretary of defense and see this war through as long as --?

SEC. RUMSFELD: We serve at the pleasure of the president.

MR. RUSSERT: But you have every expectation of staying for how long?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I serve at the pleasure of the president.

MR. RUSSERT: You don't want to see Iraq all the way through until the American troops are home?

SEC. RUMSFELD: It's not for me to tie his hands. I look at what's happened in Afghanistan, and I think of the people who've -- our soldiers who've died there and the wounded, that I -- your heart breaks when you see limbs off -

- and how proud they are of what they've accomplished, of liberating 25 million people who, for the first time in 5,000 years, have a popularly elected president, a constitution, they're going to have parliamentary elections later this spring or summer. It's a thrilling thing. It shows how important their sacrifice has been, and you see what's happening in Iraq and that election. And people who've been -- decades they've been frightened to come out of their homes, to put their heads up, to do something that the regime might not like, because they filled tens of thousands of people in mass graves. And they came out. I'm told that they wandered around in front of the election polling place and finally some woman in her 60s or 70s said, "I've waited my whole life to do this," walked in, and everyone walked in.

Now, those folks who've been killed there, those folks who were wounded there, their families and their loved ones have to feel that their sacrifice was worth it, that the effect that can have on that region and the world can just be so important. It's an amazing thing that's happening in our world.

MR. RUSSERT: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as always we thank you for your views.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you

MR. RUSSERT: Coming next: Iraq, Social Security and more through the eyes of Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy. He is next right here, only on "Meet the Press."

(Announcements.)

MR. RUSSERT: And we are back. Senator Kennedy, welcome back to "Meet the Press." SEN. KENNEDY: Thank you.

MR. RUSSERT: Senator, John Kerry, your colleague from Massachusetts, has called on the secretary of Defense to resign. Do you agree with Senator Kerry?

SEN. KENNEDY: Well, I had asked for his resignation previously at the time of Abu Ghraib. But the issue here really isn't his resignation. It's about changing of policy. And I think what we just heard in the last half-hour is why we need a strategy and why we need a policy that is going to permit the Americans to bring our troops home with honor. During the last half-hour, we heard a policy that was make it up as you go along. We need a strategy. We need a program. We need to establish goals. We need to be able to ensure that not only the political institutions are going to work in Iraq -- all of us were very hopeful, all of us were impressed by the voting -- but we also ought to be able to have the development of a strong security in Iraq. When we send over Americans that have had 12 weeks of training, like the nephew of my wife, and is a tail gunner on a Stryker -- 12 weeks -- and we have the best-trained American servicemen and the best soldiers in the world, there's no reason in the world that we can't expect Iraqis to be trained with four months, eight months, 12 months so that they are going to fight for their country and they're going to be willing to die for it. And I think that is what is missing when we hear these numbers bandied around like we did today.

MR. RUSSERT: You made a very specific proposal which I asked Senator Kerry, your colleague, about last week. Let's watch.

(Begin videoclip.)

MR. RUSSERT: Specifically, do you agree with Senator Kennedy that 12,000 American troops should leave at once?

SEN. KERRY: No.

MR. RUSSERT: Do you believe there should be a specific timetable of a withdrawal of American troops?

SEN. KERRY: No.

(End videoclip.)

MR. RUSSERT: Senator Bill Nelson, Senator Joe Lieberman, the New York Times have all editorialized, saying, No -- no, do not set timetables. The president says you are emboldening terrorists because they'll simply wait us out. We're going to be out in a year -- sure, we'll sit back and wait. Why would you advocate such a policy before the Iraqis even voted?

SEN. KENNEDY: Well, there's about three aspects of that question. First of all, there really isn't a difference between Senator Kerry and myself. Senator Kerry understands that the insurgency is part of the problem. And he also understands that this administration hasn't had a policy towards Iraq. It had a policy in order to win the war but not to win the peace. There really isn't a difference. There is a difference in terms of the goals that I established. Now, there is -- the administration --

MR. RUSSERT: Senator, there is a difference. I asked him, "Do you agree with Senator Kennedy and a fixed time table?" He said no.

SEN. KENNEDY: I agree that he doesn't agree with my call for the immediate troop withdrawals, although we've had, as we saw in the Armed Services Committee just this last week, that -- General Myers effectively announcing the withdrawal of some 15,000 troops, like I had suggested.

The fact remains, those that have been critical of this idea say that we should not set the date because somehow the insurgents are going to wait. They're going to wait for 18 months or two years. And then after we train these Iraqi troops, they're going to somehow come back in and take over Iraq? What I'm talking about is a strong, secure, democratic Iraq that has democratic institutions, and then in the next four months, eight months, 12 months, 15 months, able to train their troops to be able to provide security. The best way that you're going to see resistance to the insurgency is a strong and secure and independent Iraq. That's what I'm for. That can be achieved with this. The problem is at the present time the Iraqis do not believe that they own the country. The elections were an important down-payment on that, but still they ought to be able to have the kind of security and that ought to be training. They ought to be trained. We ought to get about the business of doing it.

Why can't they defend their own country? How long do we have to have Americans fighting and dying? How long do we have to ask the taxpayers to continue to pay out? Why can't we expect that we can train their troops in four months, eight months, 12 months, 15 months? I think we can, and I think we should. And we ought to establish as a goal -- not as a requirement, as a goal -- that we are going to negotiate that time frame with the new Iraqi government, but as a goal that we want our troops out by 2006.

MR. RUSSERT: Some observers, senator, have said that you simply opposed the war from Day One and that's your agenda. They point to a comment you made back in September of 2003. Quote, "This was made up in Texas, announced in January to the Republican leadership that war was going to take place and was going to be good politically. This whole thing was a fraud." Fourteen hundred and forty-five Americans dead, 10,770 injured or wounded. All that blood for a political fraud? Is that your view?

SEN. KENNEDY: Listen, my view is that we honor. We honor, deeply, deeply honor every one of the servicemen and women who have lost their lives. We've lost 32 in Massachusetts. I've talked to the parents and have attended a number of the funerals out at Arlington. They are heroes. And you know something, Mr. Russert? Our responsibility to those fighting men and women is to get it right, to get the right policy. That is the best way to honor them. And when I hear the secretary of Defense say this morning that he was somewhat puzzled by the level of the insurgency, the rise of the insurgency, I remember being on the Armed Services Committee when we listened to the generals that testified before that Armed Services Committee and they all predicted an insurgency. General Hoar, a former Marine, said if we get into Iraq, we fight the Iraq, we will win and you will have an insurgency that will make the last five, seven minutes of 'Private Ryan' look like a church! picnic. They were absolutely correct.

This is what the problem is. We're making it up as we go along. We heard it this morning. We've got to establish a policy. We have to establish a plan in order to get the Americans out with honor. And that plan that I put forward I think can achieve it.

MR. RUSSERT: But do you still believe that the war is a fraud and was begun for political reasons?

SEN. KENNEDY: What I believe is that this administration took their eye off the ball in fighting against terror. It was al Qaeda that saw the loss of American lives. It was Osama bin Laden that we had on the run in Afghanistan. We had him on the run, and we took our eye off that and we went to war -- that we never should have fought -- in Iraq. And I don't think -- and the reasons that we fought the war were weapons of mass destruction and because the tie with al Qaeda. Now, we found there's no weapons of mass destruction. The 9/11 Commission said there's no tie-in with al Qaeda. Now, we're talking about we're leaving Americans in there till we democratize the country. You talk about mission creep. When did that ever get -- do you possibly think that the Senate of the United States would have ratified going to war because we just want a democracy? We have stood for democracy and we haven't gone to war. We saw the restoration of democracy in Chile when Pinochet collapsed. We saw it in Argentina. We saw it in Paraguay. We saw it come in South Africa and we didn't go to war.

MR. RUSSERT: You also said, "The war in Iraq has made the mushroom cloud more likely, not less likely, and it should never have happened." How has the war in Iraq made nuclear war more likely?

SEN. KENNEDY: Well, the -- my own sense is -- I'm not sure what the whole kind of context -- I thought you were quoting the administration officials that use that as part of a justification to go to war --

MR. RUSSERT: No, this is your speech at George Washington University. "The war in Iraq has made the mushroom cloud more likely, not less likely."

SEN. KENNEDY: Well, I think the principal reason is because now with al Qaeda, we have the chance, I think, to decapitate al Qaeda, to catch Osama bin Laden. What has happened with al Qaeda is like taking mercury and pounding it and it's gone into a thousand different kinds of cells and those cells are extremely kind of dangerous. And they understand the potential uses of nuclear weapons as well as bioterrorist weapons. And they are out there searching to, in various places around, areas where you don't have careful kind of protection for nuclear weapons -- and searching for it. And I think that is the absolute result.

MR. RUSSERT: Let me ask you about something else you said in the same speech: "I thank God that President Bush was not our president at the time of the Cuban missile crisis." What does that mean?

SEN. KENNEDY: Well, I think at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, what we saw with President Kennedy is examining completely and thoroughly the range of options that were available to him and then making a judgment and decision that avoided nuclear war. In this case, rather than seeing the range of options -- number one option was the inspections. We had, according to the Defense Department, 147 sites where there were weapons of mass destructions. And rather than giving those sites to the inspectors and exhausting the possibilities that there were no weapons of mass destruction so we never would have had to go to the war, we just never gave those sites to the inspectors and decided to go to war ahead. I don't think that that considering that different kind of option was giving it the full examination that it should have been given.

I'm absolutely convinced if we had given the inspectors time, they'd have gone in there and found there was no weapons of mass destruction; then we don't have an imminent threat to the United States, and we wouldn't have had the conflict.

MR. RUSSERT: But September 11th, 2001, a crisis that George Bush encountered, did he not handle that well?

SEN. KENNEDY: Oh, I think the -- there's no question that he galvanized the nation. I admire and respect that effort and that energy in galvanizing the nation to give focus and attention to the threat here and in Afghanistan. I supported it. I admired it. And I think it was a noble effort on his part. And I think the country owes him a great appreciation for it.

My difference with it is, rather than continuing to deal with al Qaeda, we went over and started a war in Iraq that now has, we have seen, has drained the resources for our military. You know, it's incredible to me that we are the most powerful nation in the world, fighting really a third-rate country, which was -- we had the airspace, two thirds of it -- it was occupied by the Kurds in the north. We had defeated it 10 years ago. We had an embargo on it. And today it is continuing to drain our military, our Reserves and our National Guard.

MR. RUSSERT: But, senator, many observers will say we have a chance to have a democratic Iraqi state, no Saddam Hussein, a chance to remake the entire Middle East, and you want to cut and run and pull Americans out.

SEN. KENNEDY: It isn't. I'm offering the right way to do it. I'm offering the best way to do it. The program I offer is the best way to achieve

an independent and a democratic Iraq. What is the wrong way is to continue along where the occupation is spurring the resistance, as we have seen just earlier in your program, with Secretary Rumsfeld saying that it is constantly growing -- the insurgency is constantly growing. We don't know where it is going to go, and that's going to continue. I want to take the target off the backs of the American servicemen and women. And I want to let the Iraqis fight for their own security. And if they do, I think they'll be a stronger country to resist insurgency.

MR. RUSSERT: Let me turn to Social Security. The president has said that we have an impending crisis with Social Security and you said he was wrong. We went up on your website, which was interesting reading, and found the things that you have labeled crises. This is pretty revealing. "Iraq, national literacy, medical research, refugee program, mental illness, steel, nursing, higher education, youth violence, fish industry, AIDS, flu vaccine supply, hunger, teacher recruitment, unemployment, Medicare, health care, North Korea, Section 8 vouchers, gas prices, gun violence" -- you said they were all crises. We have a situation where the number on people in Social Security is going to double. People rather than spending 15 months, are going to spend 15 years. In 2018, the Social Security trust fund will begin to draw down, and in 2042 run a deficit, according to the Trustees of the fund. What is your plan? What will you do? If the president's wrong, what would you do specifically to fix Social Security?

SEN. KENNEDY: Well, first of all, all the facts that you mentioned are correct, and we have a problem beyond the 2049 problem. As you saw in those figures this morning, the CBO estimates they'll still, if we do nothing at all, be able to pay 81 percent of the budget to them. Let me tell you one thing. The president's program to make his tax cuts permanent is three times what's necessary to fix the national -- to fix Social Security. Let's start with that. MR. RUSSERT: But we have --

SEN. KENNEDY: Let's start with that. You've asked the question and I'm giving you an answer.

MR. RUSSERT: But, senator, with Social Security, with Medicare, we have \$5 trillion of unfunded mandates, and we are sitting here saying we simply roll back the tax cut on the top one percent or grow our way out of it? SEN. KENNEDY: Well, wait a second now. You asked about Social Security. Now do you want to know on Medicare how we ought to go to deal with the Medicare? I've given you a very good way to resolve the --

MR. RUSSERT: So you would roll back the president's tax cuts.

SEN. KENNEDY: That's a possible -- for one third he wants to make it permanent. You can roll back just one third of it and solve the Social Security problem. I think that ought to be on the table.

What's interesting, when the president spoke the other night, Tim, he never mentioned what his answer was. He never told us what his solution was for the out years. He talked about private savings accounts.

MR. RUSSERT: Well, he said everything should be on the table.

SEN. KENNEDY: Okay, well, I'm giving you a suggested way of doing it. Now, can we go to the Medicare?

MR. RUSSERT: Let me finish. Would you agree with him that age eligibility should be on the table?

SEN. KENNEDY: Not at this time, because I don't think we have a crisis.

MR. RUSSERT: Cost-of-living increases?

SEN. KENNEDY: I'm giving you my -- one of the ways that we ought to do it. That was your question --

MR. RUSSERT: Raise taxes?

SEN. KENNEDY: Roll back -- or he wants to make permanent, and I say you can take a third of that part, at least solve -- that is one of the alternatives.

MR. RUSSERT: But that's raising taxes.

SEN. KENNEDY: Let's roll them back, whatever way. But we have one, but he hasn't offered it. I can tell you where we're going with the Medicare and the rest if you want to know. I think you can make a -- very important -- we spend 33 cents out of every health dollar is non-clinic. The president has talked about information technology. The Veterans Administration uses information technology and has seen a reduction in the cost per patient bed over the last five years by seven percent, while the rest of the beds have gone up 65 percent. If we put in place information technology and reduce from 33 cents to 27 -- it's \$150 billion a year. We could cover all the uninsured and deal with many of the president's priorities in health care. I'm looking forward to try and work with him on this. We can take each of these items and find common ground. That's what I hope we can do with this administration.

MR. RUSSERT: I hope you come back and we'll spend a whole show on this subject. SEN. KENNEDY: Oh, okay.

MR. RUSSERT: You like the Eagles today?

SEN. KENNEDY: Oh, listen, are you -- you have -- even you, a Bills fan, have watched the Patriots over this season and even you have to recognize that they are a hot team.

MR. RUSSERT: I was talking about the Boston College Eagles -- (laughter) -- 20-and-0, undefeated. Undefeated.

SEN. KENNEDY: Listen, when BC played Notre Dame, that was a thriller, I must say. But today, it's -- I say the Patriots by at least two touchdowns.

MR. RUSSERT: Thank you very much for your views, as always, Senator.

END.
END

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MAR 03 2005

2005 JUN -3 AM 7:21

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: **DOUG FEITH**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: New Iraqi Government

Regarding the subject of getting everything done that needs to be done, between now and the time a new Iraqi government is elected and immediately thereafter, I said to Condi that I thought we ought to have either a team or each of us have a team to catalogue it all and then get work started on each of the items that are necessary. I asked Doug Feith about it. He said he already had the inventory done and sent me this paper.

I am unfulfilled.

Please take over responsibility for seeing that this gets done. Come back to me and brief me about once every two weeks as to what's happening. Someone has to get hold of this. It is very, very important.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/31/05 SD memo to USD(P) [Snowflake #013105-12]
1/28/05 SD memo to USD(P) [Snowflake #012705-21]
2/3/05 USD(P) memo to SD [OSD 02494-05]

DHR:dh
022805-17

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49886

OSD 10581-05

Iraq

Mar 05

~~FOUO~~
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ES-2196

05 FEB -4 PM 3:16

JANUARY 31, 2005

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: List of Iraq Items

I need a list of the things we are going to have to be doing over the coming year with Iraq, such as the SOFA, and the like. Let's look ahead and plan it now.

Thanks.

D:48:06
013105-12

.....
Please respond by

2/17/05

2/7 ^{2/7}
Sir _____

Attached

v/r

[Signature]

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02498-05

21-01-05 205:43 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/49887

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -4 PM 3:16

ES-2167
05/001413

JAN 28 2005

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: List of Items to Discuss with New Iraqi Government

We need to prepare a list of the things we will want to discuss with the new Iraqi government. For instance, when we do the SOFA and other types of things, what kind of briefings we want to set up for the people after they are elected, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:sa
012705-21

.....
Please respond by 2/3/05

FOUO

OSD 02494-05

23-01-05 P04:03 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/49888

234
1820

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

alt
2/28

INFO MEMO

2005 FEB -4 PM 3:16

7

ES-1267,1509,1589

I-05/001413

DepSecDef _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

PWB

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

3 FEB 2005

SUBJECT: Discussions with New Iraqi Government

You asked for a list of things to discuss with the new Iraqi government and for a recommendation on briefings for incoming senior Iraqi officials (Tab A).

- Timing: although the Transitional Administrative Law provides up to six weeks for a cabinet to be selected and empowered, the process could move much faster.
 - We should be prepared for discussions with incoming officials by February 15th or as soon thereafter as they are identified or take office.

• Key dates in 2005:

Feb 15- Mar 15: Formation of Iraqi Transitional Government

June 8: Security Council review of multinational force (MNF) mandate under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546

October 15: Ratification of Permanent Constitution

December 15: Election of New Government

December 31: Installation of New Government.

December 31: Expiration of the MNF mandate under UNSCR 1546 (based on completion of the political process)

Topics we might brief:

- To all cabinet ministers and above:
 - MNF-I Iraq Campaign Plan and transition to Iraqi local and regional control
 - The status and roles of the military in a democratic society

MA SD	SA DSD	SAB	2/9
TSA SD	SA DSD	2/9	
EXEC SEC	MZ/4		
ESR MA	KSV	2-9-05	1709

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02494-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49889

22

- To the Presidency Council, Prime Minister, National Security Advisor, Ministers of Defense and Security, and National Security Committee of the National Assembly:
 - Iraqi Security Forces (including military and police) train-and-equip program
 - Coordination with MNF-I, including planning and conducting combined operations
 - Developing the ministries and coordinating with them
 - Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (this would enable U.S. forces to provide direct logistics support to Iraqi military forces in the field)
 - Defense Attaché exchange
 - Common strategy for the required Security Council review of the MNF mandate under UNSCR **1546** (June **8, 2005**). (Note: we and the Iraqis should be prepared to counter French or other demands for a Coalition withdrawal at the end of **2005**.)

Topics the Iraqis may raise with us:

- Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). SOFA-like protections are currently afforded to the MNF pursuant to CPA Order No. **17** (revised), which like all CPA orders will remain in effect until "rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law." (TAL, *Art. 27[C]*). Therefore, the ITG could through legislation decide to rescind or amend CPA Order No. **17**. Although it is too early to know whether the ITG would want to enact such legislation, should it do so we would need to engage in negotiations of a SOFA.
- Longer-term Basing Arrangements. (We may want to consider combining SOFA and facilities access provisions for the long term into a single text for negotiation.)
- Other specific issues, e.g., MNF-I's authority to detain persons, U.S. current use of property such as the International Zone and portions of BIAP.

Prepared by C. Straub ISA-NESA-NG (b)(6)

DUSD (NESA) _____

COORDINATION

OGC: **Chuck Allen 3 Feb 05**

Joint Staff: **Col John Setter USAF 3 Feb 05**

FOUO



February 17, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Pete Domenici

IRAQ

What was the question Pete Domenici asked about the Iraqi Security Forces? I want to see we get him what he asked for - FAST.

Thanks.

DFIR:ss
021705-18

.....
Please respond by 2/23/05

DR
3/1
Sir,
Response attached.
v/n
LtCol Kengel
MAR 04 2005

19 Feb 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49892

OSD 10623-05



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

MSK
3/7

March 4, 2005 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake regarding Response to Pete Domenici

- You wanted to know what Senator Pete Domenici asked about regarding Iraqi Security Forces.
- Attached is the exchange among you, the Senator and Chairman Myers from the transcript of the Senate Appropriations Committee hearing held on February 16 and a chart provided by the USD (Comptroller) staff.

Attachments:

SECDEF Snowflake #02 1705-18
SAC Hearing Transcript Excerpt
Funding Chart

11-L-0559/OSD/49893

You do need the police, you do need the border patrol, you do need the dignitary protection and these other elements of it -- highway patrols -- but my personal view is that those are going to be the most important.

I would say one other thing. You mentioned protecting externally. I don't think we need to hang around in Iraq until they have a military capable of defending against their neighbors. That's the kind of thing that would take a good deal of time.

I think we need to help them subdue the insurgency and take charge of their own country and then we can go about our business.

DOMENICI:

Now, Mr. Secretary, some questions have been asked about do we plan to be there permanently, and I think you tried to answer that -- is that an American plan. I think the answer that you've given, if I might paraphrase it, is that you will be there, some have said, as long as we're needed; some have said, as long as they want us.

DOMENICI:

Now, let me ask first, are the Iraqis contributing significant amounts of money to training themselves now?

RUMSFELD:

They do. They have a budget and they are contributing to it. And I would have to get for the record what the precise amounts are.

DOMENICI:

Could you give us that?

RUMSFELD:

You bet.

DOMENICI:

Could you give us that portion of their budget that is going to train their men and women for military?

MYERS:

We will do that, sir.

DOMENICI:

And could you give us what they plan in the future if they have a budget, if it's 20, 30, 40 percent of what they get for their defense? Because we need to make sure that we aren't staying there because they don't spend enough of their money on defense.

I think it ought to be they're spending plenty and doing it right because we can't pay forever.

It's already a very, very expensive war. Those worried about the deficit you understand.

We can't have very many wars like this, Mr. Secretary. I hope you know that.

FUNDING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES...IRAQ & USG CONTRIBUTIONS



Current Funding Distribution 2 March 2005

Iraq Funding

\$ 468M	04 MOD Budget
600 M	04 MOD Year End
1,100 M	04 MOI Budget
1,000 M	04 Additional Funds
1,800 M	05 MOD Budget (est)
<u>810 M</u>	05 MOI Budget (est)
\$ 5,778 M	

52%

United States Fundina *

\$5,045 M	IRRF (Security)
<u>210 M</u>	Train & Equip
\$ 5,255 M	

48%

Total : \$11,033 M

se Only

T2 E7

Afghan Security Forces Update

Executive Summary

07 January 2005

ion M1

11-L-0559/OSD/49896

Afghan Security Forces

For Official Use Only

- Ministry of Interior Forces

Trained

- National Police
- Highway Police
- Border Police
- Criminal Investigator Police
- Counter Narcotics Police

33,325⁽¹⁾

- Ministry of Defense Forces

Trained & Equipped

- Afghan National Army Corps
- Afghan Air Corps
- Intermediate Commands

18,791⁽²⁾

52,116


1. MOI Forces: INL doesn't track the status of AWOL personnel after they leave school

2. MOD Forces: Afghan Policy is AWOL personnel are dropped from the ANA rolls after being AWOL for 60 days

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

Trained and Equipped ANA / Trained ANP

50 Only



INL doesn't track the status of AWOL personnel after they leave school

Afghan Policy is AWOL personnel are dropped from the ANA rolls after being AWOL for 60 days

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only




Projected Percentage of goals of Trained Police on hand over time

Security Force Element (1)	Trained (3) NLT Dec 05	6-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Sep-05
National Police	50,000	64%	75%	85%	95%
Highway Police	2,600			60%	
Border Police	12,000			51%	
Counter-Narcotics Police (2)	800			67%	

Notes:

1. Projected goals based on anticipated class convening with 100% quota utilization. Percentages may fluctuate. ANP, AHP, and ABP Training conducted by DoS/International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) representatives; CNP training conducted by DEA
2. CNPA endstate for 2007 is 1,600 officers. CNPA includes interdiction, intelligence, and investigative officers
3. MoI target is for 65,400 trained ANP

Legend

-  70-100% OF REQUIREMENT
-  40-69% OF REQUIREMENT
-  39% OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

11-L-0559/OSD/49899

Afghan Armed Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only




Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Army Units on hand over time

Afghanistan Security Forces Elements	Endstate	6-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Jan-06	%-Aug-06	1-Apr-07
Ministry of = (General Staff)	3,000	45%	51%	56%	65%		
Corps	43,000		42%	50%	63%		
Air Corps	3,000				48%		
Sustaining Institutions	21,000				43%	55%	

Notes:

- Percentages based on the Sep 07 (5 Battalion) Model starting Jan 05

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Coalition Contributors

For Official Use Only

OEF & ISAF = 42 Countries

Albania	25	Denmark	123	Ireland	11	Netherlands	312	Sweden	75
Australia	3	Egypt	65	Italy	514	New Zealand	113	Switzerland	3
Austria	3	Estonia	15	Jordan	174	Norway	279	Turkey	943
Azerbaijan	22	Finland	52	Korea	188	Poland	105	UK	527
Belgium	616	France	954	Latvia	9	Portugal	21	USA	16,900
Bulgaria	43	Germany	1902	Lithuania	24	Romania	567		
Canada	968	Greece	170	Luxembourg	10	Slovakia	56		
Croatia	49	Hungary	160	Macedonia	20	Slovenia	27		
Czech Rep	17	Iceland	12	Mongolia	16	Spain	538	Total	26,631

Afghan Forces Trained	52,116
National Police (2)	31,897
Highway	264
Border Police	1,110
Counter Narcotics Police	54
Subtotal On Hand	33,325
MOD/GS	1,345
Corps	16,284
Air Corps	0
Intermediate Commands	1,162
Subtotal On Hand (3)	18,791



Coalition Forces US Forces Afghan Forces

Notes:

1. ANP forces trained as of 31 Jan 05 DOJ/ICITAP Training Report.
2. MOI forces: INL doesn't track the status of AWOL personnel after they leave school
3. MOD Forces: Afghan Policy is AWOL personnel are dropped from the ANA rolls after being AWOL for 60 days

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

se Only

Back Up

Afghan Security Forces MoI Update

Only

PROPOSED	ON DUTY	TRAINED (1,2)	TRAINED ON 1 MAY 05	100% TRAINED
50,000	48,450	31,897	37,500	Dec 05
2,600	891	264	962	Dec 05
12,000	3,417	1110	3,720	Dec 05
800	150	54	272	Dec 05
65,400	52,908	33,325	42,454	Dec 05

ICITAP Report. Includes graduates of Basic Course 1 (Literate Recruits) + BC2 (Illiterate Recruits) + Transition (TIP) refresher course for current ANP officers

personnel are not tracked by INL once they leave the school

Afghan Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

ARMY	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	1 MAY 05 L/F CAPABILITY ⁽³⁾	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽⁴⁾
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	3,000	1,345	0	1,540/0	Sep 08
Corps	48,000	16,284	0	17,912/0	Sep 09
Air Corps	2,000	0	0	815/0	scp 09
Intermediate Commands ⁽⁵⁾	17,000	1,162	0	4,015/0	Sep 09
TOTAL	70,000	18,791	0	24,282	Sep 09

Notes:

1. Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but **continues to** receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment
2. full Operational Capability = unit is **fully** manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations
3. Data interpolated from planning figures in slide 5
4. Full Operational Capability planned for **Sep 09** utilizing the **5** battalion training model may **slip** due to the **delay** of ETT's
5. Intermediate Commands are: Recruiting, Logistics and Acquisition, Training and Education, Communications, and Intelligence

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

Afghan Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

POLICE	MISSION
National Police	Afghan National Police (ANP) forces are responsible for security and maintaining law and order. ANP enhances security in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan
Highway Police	Afghan Highway Police (AHP) enhance the security of Afghan highway network and increase government presence outside Kabul. Enforce criminal and traffic code violations.
Border Police	Afghan Border Police (ABP) responsible for border protection and control. Responsible for movement of persons and goods. Control cross border traffic and counteract threats posed by organized crime and other border conflicts, including armed conflicts.
Customs Officials	To assess and collect customs duties on imposed merchandise, prevent fraud and smuggling. Control carriers, persons, and articles entering and departing the country. Under MoF
Counter Narcotics Police	Lead Agency for CN efforts in AF. Focuses on narcotic interdiction, interrogation, and investigations primarily in urban areas.
ARMY	MISSION
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	Defend the Nation's Independent, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and establishment of law.
Corps	
Air Corps	
Institutional Commands	

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

Afghan Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

POLICE	TRAINING	IN TRAINING
National Police	Basic Course - 8 weeks for literate - 4 weeks for illiterate - 2 weeks for existing officers Instructor Development Course is 4 weeks	1,024
Highway Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks 1 week specialized training (Change from 2 weeks in last report.)	221
Border Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks 2 weeks specialized training	653
Customs Officials	Program not developed	0
Counter Narcotics Police	Special Course sponsored by the DEA	30
Total		1,928
ARMY	TRAINING	IN TRAINING
Enlisted Basic Training	Basic Training is 10 Weeks Advance Individual Training is 6 to 8 weeks Collective Training is 6 Weeks	3,544
National Military Academy - Afghanistan (Begin Feb 05)	4 Year Course	0
Command and General Staff College	12 weeks	85
Combat Leaders Course	5 weeks	172
NCO Course	6 Weeks	443
Officers' Candidate School	8 weeks	238
Total		4,482

Data As of: 06 Feb05

11-L-0559/OSD/49906

Significant Events Since Last Report

ee Only

recruits awaiting training

on-commissioned Officers entered into the Combat Leaders Course
cers entered the Command and General Staff College

ipment of Czech Donated ammunition contained over 1.5 million AK-47 rounds
ipment of Light Tactical Vehicles expected to depart from Thailand on 6 Feb

Significant Events Since La

For Official Use Only

Building:

- ANA: Nangarhar Recruiting Center opens on 9 Feb

Mentoring/Employing:

- ANA: Developing concept of an Afghan National Training Center (ANTC)
- ANA: ANTC will validate when Embedded Training Teams can leave Afghan Batta

Funding: Nothing Significant to Report

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

11-L-0559/OSD/49908

~~FOUO~~



February 17, 2005

IRAQ

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Question from Vic Snyder

There was a reasonable question from Vic Snyder we said we would supply for the record. Please be sure it is answered, and I see it.

Thanks.

DHR ss
021705-12

.....
Please respond by 3/1/05



Sir,
Response attached.
v/a
LtCol Lengye

MAR 04 2005

17 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 10624-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49909



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

all
2/7

March 2, 2005, 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

A handwritten signature of Daniel R. Stanley is written over the "FROM" line.

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake #021705-12

- Attached is the question from Rep. Vic Snyder (D-AR) from the Budget Hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on February 16 and a draft response.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake #021705-12 dated 2/17/05
2. Question and Answer

11-L-0559/OSD/49910

Excerpt from HASC Budget Hearing, February 16, 2005

REP. VIC SNYDER (D-AR):

Secretary Rumsfeld, you mentioned the election as being a wonderful step on the way and I agree with you. And one of the issues that was discussed prior to the election was would there be adequate security, and you all beefed up forces and whatever you did seemed to work well to give a period of calm there for a period of time during the elections.

One of the issues that has gone on for some time has been whether there was an adequate level of U.S. forces in Iraq. Would you respond, if you will, to this question: **It seems like you beefed up forces during the period leading up to election and that was successful, that there were less violent acts for a couple of week period there.**

Is that not evidence, and maybe still be evidence as we go forward, as we're looking for ways to achieve the success that we all want, that even now perhaps there should be higher levels of U.S. forces since it did seem to work during that two-week period around the election?

SECRETARY RUMSFELD:

That's a reasonable question, for sure.

Answer: The Commanders on the ground recommended we increase troop levels to 20 brigades, up from 17, during the period leading up to the election. The Iraqi security forces were on the front lines of the security perimeters while U.S. forces were available to assist as needed.

I don't think it's possible to make a direct correlation between the increased level of U.S. forces and the decrease in violence during the election period. I do think it is a number of factors including the money flow to the insurgents, which influences their ability to buy weapons and execute the bombings. Acquiring these weapons has increased in cost, which may be a result of our successes in capturing the weapons caches and limiting availability.

It's not possible to definitely say the peaceful election was the direct result of the greater troop presence. However, it would appear that it is more likely a number of different factors.

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY ASSISTANT
2005 JUN -3 AM 9: 57

February 7, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: List of Outreach

If you have not sent Mari Will the packet of all the positive articles, you ought to do it.

Please give me a list of all the people we're working with in and out of Congress that we keep in touch with and send things to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020705-15

.....
Please respond by

2/17/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49912

OSD 10625-05

032

m Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

March 4, 2005

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Gen Dick Myers *
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Items to Track Monthly

Here are a series of things we ought to be tracking monthly in Afghanistan. Why don't you fashion something, and see that I start getting it. This is a list I just did off the top of my head.

1. Afghan Security Forces – in detail.
2. Monthly progress on militia disarmament and putting heavy weapons in cantonments (DDR).
3. Percent of militias (formal and informal) disbanded.
4. Afghan progress in taking over prisons and Afghan prisoners.
5. Afghan progress on their criminal justice system
6. Afghan progress on their border patrols.
7. The reconciliation process – Taliban coming in.
8. Tracking where we stand in our discussions with Karzai on a U.S. presence.
9. Shift in responsibilities from US and Coalition to NATO and Afghan Security Forces

~~FOUO~~

OSD 10627-05

022805-29

11-L-0559/OSD/49913

Afghanistan

4 Mar 05

10. A series of key economic indicators, strength of the dinar, immigration, refugees returning, GDP, etc.
11. Steps required for successful parliamentary elections and whether or not there will be a need for an increase in foreign troops – US, NATO, etc.
12. Progress on counter-narcotics.
13. Progress in deciding who the new ambassador is going to be.
14. Increases in the Afghan budget – what percentage of the dollars they are currently getting from border posts, what percentage warlords are still getting.
15. Whether or not we will need to use the MEU for 60 days, adding $\pm 2,000$ troops for the election.
16. The increase in self-reliance by the Afghan forces.
17. Embassy Staffing.
18. PRT staffing and numbers and quality of PRTs – we need a grading system.
19. Fulfillment of NATO commitments and capabilities with respect to key enablers like air, intelligence, command and control and the like.
20. Etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-29

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

FOUO

March 7, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Gen Skip Sharp
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Economic Indicators

Attached is the memo I mentioned to you about various economic indicators in Afghanistan and Iraq that I sent to Doug Feith.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/4/05D memo to USD(P) [Snowflake#022805-29]

DHR:dh
030705-32

.....
Please respond by _____

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49915

OSD 10627-05

Afghanistan

7 Mar 05

4 Mar 05

~~FOUO~~

FEB 16 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Briefing for Military Analysts/Historians

I think we ought to think about getting historians and thoughtful military analysts
Naval Institute Proceedings, etc. and others who write thoughtful documents that
will become part of history, into DOD to brief them on the transformation that is
taking place. The progress shown in the testimony is major. What we have done
in the Department is significant - the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the
Special Operators, etc.

337

We could have a day long session, where they receive briefings in the morning
from all the Services and then lunch, and a talk by me at the end of the day.

Let's plan it for sometime in the next three months. Please show me a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021405-00

.....
Please respond by

2/28/05

OSD 10628-05

16 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49916

FOUO

FEB 15 2005
FILE COPY

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: My Congressional Testimony

What else are we going to do with my oral testimony, besides read it in front of television? It is very good. We should get it into some publication, somehow.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021405-14

.....
Please respond by 2/18/05

2/18 -

OSD 2/22

SecDef:

- We distributed an Op Ed version to Knight-Ridder and it has appeared in some other papers.
- We published it in Roll Call.
- We distributed it to our analyst /outreach lists.
- We distributed it to all DoD component heads
- We are developing and will distribute a talking point paper so people have a short summary of key themes.

15 Feb 05

OSD 10630-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49917

we are publishing it into an article for publication somewhere, TBD. Di Rita

FOUO

February 15, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Trained and Equipped Construct

Why don't we get the Afghan Security Forces weekly report to use the trained and equipped construct we use for Iraq? See the attached.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/6/05 Afghan Security Forces Update Executive Summary

DHR:ss
021405-30

.....
Please respond by _____

Afghanistan

15 Feb 05

FOUO

OSD 10631-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49918

9

Only

T2 E7

Afghan Security Forces Update Executive Summary

07 January 2005

4 M1

For Official Use Only

Afghan Security Forces

- **Ministry of Interior Forces**

Trained

- National Police
- Highway Police
- Border Police
- Criminal Investigator Police
- Counter Narcotics Police

33,325⁽¹⁾

- **Ministry of Defense Forces**

Trained & Equipped

- Afghan National Army Corps
- Afghan Air Corps
- Intermediate Commands

18,791⁽²⁾

52,116


1. MOI Forces: INL doesn't track the status of AWOL personnel after they leave school

2. MOD Forces: Afghan Policy is AWOL personnel are dropped from the ANA rolls after being AWOL for 60 days

Data As of 06 Feb 05

Trained and Equipped ANA / Trained ANP

Only



INL doesn't track the status of AWOL personnel after they leave school

Afghan Policy is AWOL personnel are dropped from the ANA rolls after being AWOL for 60 days

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only




Projected Percentage of goals of Trained Police on hand over time

Security Force Element (1)	Trained (3) NLT Dec 05	6-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Sep-05
National Police	50,000	64%			
Highway Police	2,600			60%	
Border Police	12,000			51%	
Counter-Narcotics Police (2)	800			67%	

Notes:

1. Projected goals based on anticipated class convening with 100% quota utilization. Percentages may fluctuate. ANP, AHP, and ABP Training conducted by DoS/International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) representatives; CNP training conducted by DEA
2. CNPA endstate for 2007 is 1,800 officers. CNPA includes interdiction, intelligence, and investigative officers
3. MoI target is for 65,400 trained ANP

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Afghan Armed Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only




Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Army Units on hand over time

Afghanistan Security Forces Elements	Endstate	6-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Jan-06	1-Aug-06	1-Apr-07
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	3,000	45%	51%	56%	65%		
Corps	43,000		42%	50%	63%		
Air Corps	3,000				48%		
Sustaining Institutions	21,000				43%	55%	

Notes:

1. Percentages based on the Sep 07 (5 Battalion) Model starting Jan 05

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Coalition Contributors

For Official Use Only

OEF & ISAF = 42 Countries

Albania	25	Denmark	123	Ireland	11	Netherlands	312	Sweden	75
Australia	3	Egypt	65	Italy	514	New Zealand	113	Switzerland	3
Austria	3	Estonia	15	Jordan	174	Norway	279	Turkey	943
Azerbaijan	22	Finland	52	Korea	188	Poland	105	UK	527
Belgium	616	France	954	Latvia	9	Portugal	21	USA	16,900
Bulgaria	43	Germany	1902	Lithuania	24	Romania	567		
Canada	968	Greece	170	Luxembourg	10	Slovakia	56		
Croatia	49	Hungary	160	Macedonia	20	Slovenia	27		
Czech Rep	17	Iceland	12	Mongolia	16	Spain	538	Total	26,631

Afghan Forces Trained	52,116
National Police (2)	31,897
Highway	264
Border Police	1,110
Counter Narcotics Police	54
Subtotal On Hand	33,325
MOD/GS	1,345
Corps	16,284
Air Corps	0
Intermediate Commands	1,162
Subtotal On Hand (3)	18,791



■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces □ Afghan Forces

Notes:

1. ANP forces trained as of 31 Jan 05 DOJ/ICITAP Training Report.
2. MOI Forces: INL doesn't track the status of AWOL personnel after they leave school
3. MOD Forces: Afghan Policy is AWOL personnel are dropped from the ANA rolls after being AWOL for 60 days

Data As of: 06 Feb 05



Back Up

Afghan Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

POLICE	PROPOSED	ON DUTY	TRAINED (1,2)	TRAINED ON 1 MAY 05	100% TRAINED
National Police	50,000	48,450	31,897	37,500	Dec 05
Highway Police	2,600	891	264	962	Dec 05
Border Police	12,000	3,417	1110	3,120	Dec 05
Counternarcotics Police	800	150	54	272	Dec 05
TOTAL	65,400	52,908	33,325	42,454	Dec 05

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

Afghan Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

ARMY	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	1 MAY 05 L/F CAPABILITY ⁽³⁾	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽⁴⁾
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	3,000	1,345	0	1,540/0	Sep 08
Corps	48,000	16,284	0	17,912/0	Sep 09
Air Corps	2,000	0	0	815/0	Sep 09
Intermediate Commands ⁽⁵⁾	17,000	1,162	0	4,015/0	Sep 09
TOTAL	70,000	18,791	0	24,282	Sep 09

Notes:

1. Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment
2. Full Operational Capability – unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations
3. Data interpolated from planning figures in slide 5
4. Full Operational Capability planned for Sep 09 utilizing the 5 battalion training model may slip due to the delay of ETT's
5. Intermediate Commands are: Recruiting, Logistics and Acquisition, Training and Education, Communications, and Intelligence

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

Afghan Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

POLICE	MISSION
National Police	Afghan National Police (ANP) forces are responsible for security and maintaining law and order. ANP enhances security in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan
Highway Police	Afghan Highway Police (AHP) enhance the security of Afghan highway network and increase government presence outside Kabul. Enforce criminal and traffic code violations.
Border Police	Afghan Border Police (ABP) responsible for border protection and control. Responsible for movement of persons and goods. Control cross border traffic and counteract threats posed by organized crime and other border conflicts, including armed conflicts.
Customs Officials	To assess and collect customs duties on imposed merchandise, prevent fraud and smuggling. Control carriers, persons, and articles entering and departing the country. Under MoF
Counter Narcotics Police	Lead Agency for CN efforts in AF. Focuses on narcotic interdiction, interrogation, and investigations primarily in urban areas.
ARMY	MISSION
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	Defend the Nation's independent, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and establishment of law.
Corps	
Air Corps	
Institutional Commands	

Data As of: 06 Feb 05

Afghan Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

POLICE	TRAINING	IN TRAINING
National Police	Basic Course - 8 weeks for literate - 4 weeks for illiterate - 2 weeks for existing officers Instructor Development Course is 4 weeks	1,024
Highway Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks 1 week specialized training (Change from 2 weeks in last report.)	221
Border Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks 2 weeks specialized training	653
Customs Officials	Program not developed	0
Counter Narcotics Police	Special Course sponsored by the DEA	211
Total		1,928
ARMY	TWINING	IN TRAINING
Enlisted Basic Training	Basic Training is 10 Weeks Advance Individual Training is 6 to 8 weeks Collective Training is 6 Weeks	3,544
National Military Academy - Afghanistan (Begin Feb 05)	4 Year Course	0
Command and General Staff College	12 weeks	85
Combat Leaders Course	5 weeks	172
NCO Course	6 Weeks	443
Officers' Candidate School	8 weeks	238
Total		4,482

Data As of 06 Feb05

11-L-0559/OSD/49929

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Mannina:

- ANA: 1,634 recruits awaiting training

Training:

- ANA: 172 Non-commissioned Officers entered into the Combat Leaders Course
- ANA: 85 Officers entered the Command and General Staff College

Equipping:

- ANA: First shipment of Czech donated ammunition contained over 1.5 million AK-47 rounds
- ANA: First shipment of light Tactical Vehicles expected to depart from Thailand on 6 Feb

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Building:

- ANA: Nangrahar Recruiting Center opens on 9 Feb


Mentoring/Employing:

- ANA: Developing concept of an Afghan National Training Center (ANTC)
- ANA: ANTC will validate when Embedded Training Teams can leave Afghan battalions

Fundina: Nothing Significant to Report

~~FOUO~~

February 8, 2005

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Condolence Letters

293

I edited the new sample condolence letters that include wording about the elections and democracy, and I signed the letters that already contain the new wording.

After the Afghan Parliamentary elections are held, I still want to go back and send follow-on letters to the next of kin of those who died in Afghanistan, the ones to whom we previously sent condolences using the older format. The follow-on letters would mention democracy, the successful development of a Constitution and the successful, free elections of a President and the Parliament.

Then, later this year, after the final elections are held in Iraq in December and a new Constitution has been established, I want to do the same thing for the next of kin of the fallen from Iraq, the ones to whom we already sent condolences using the older format.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
020805-21

.....
Please respond by 2/24/05

8 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 10632-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49932

FOUO

February 8, 2005

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Age Requirements

340

Has any thought been given to the question of modestly raising the ages that people can enter the military?

With a volunteer force there will always be the issue of recruiting and retention. Since we are interested in having people serve longer, and because people live longer and do more at older ages, I've been asked if modestly lifting the age that people can enter the military might be appropriate.

Has any study been done on this? Do you have any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020805-2

.....
Please respond by 3/3/05

8 Feb 05

FOUO

OSD 10635-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49933

FOUO

JUN 03 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Rundown on Bases

I am going to need a complete rundown on bases in CENTCOM at some early
time, to include Afghanistan and Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:as
060205-19 (TS)

.....
Please respond by 6/22/05

FOUO

OSD 10666-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49934

W
D
W
W

37405

~~FOUO~~

JUN 03 2005

Pakistan

TO: GEN John Abizaid
CC: GEN Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Follow Up with Pakistanis

I hope you are going to continue to follow up with the Paks on liaison training and other types of assistance.

Please keep me posted.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
060205-20 (TS)

.....
Please respond by 6/22/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 10667-05

3 Jun 05

11-L-0559/OSD/49935

FOUO

May 24, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
Ken Krieg
Dan Stanley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Mark Up of Bills

I have received a number of memos from you about the results of the mark up. While informative, they are episodic and don't give me a sufficient sense of what is happening and what I should be doing.

Please set a meeting with the right people, so I can learn precisely what is happening and decide what I can do to help. Then keep me updated as we go through the process.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
052405-14

.....
Please respond by

6/1/05

FOUO

OSD 10678-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49936



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

June 3, 2005 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake on the Mark Up of Bills

- Dan Stanley and I are working to set up a meeting with you when you return.
- We will lay out the issues in the various bills, and the timelines for each as they make their way through the Congressional process.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment

cc:
ASD(LA)

Prepared By: Rebecca Schmidt (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/49937

OSD 10678-05

~~FOUO~~

June 6, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Speech by Singapore's Prime Minister

Mr. President —

Attached is the keynote speech made by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong. I think you will find it most interesting.

Respectfully,

Attach.

6/3/05 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong Speech

DHR:dh
060405-3

Lee Hsien Loong

6/6/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 10727-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49938

**Shangri-la Dialogue
The IISS Asia Security Conference**

www.iiss.org

**Keynote Address
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2005
Prime Minister of Singapore
Lee Hsien Loong
Friday 3rd June**

KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY PRIME MINISTER LEE HSIEN LOONG AT THE 4th INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES ASIA SECURITY CONFERENCE IN SINGAPORE AT THE SHANGRI-LA HOTEL, ISLAND BALLROOM, ON FRIDAY, 3 JUNE 2005

SECURING THE FUTURE FOR A NEW ASIA

A DIFFERENT WORLD

1. I welcome all delegates to the fourth Shangri-La Dialogue. The world has changed significantly since the first Dialogue in 2002. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had galvanised all countries in a global war against terrorism. Faced with a common threat, all felt instinctively the solidarity of a shared humanity.
2. The US led a coalition of nations to mobilise a swift response. In Afghanistan, the coalition overthrew the Taliban regime, and are helping an elected Afghan government to restore normal conditions. In Iraq, the swift and decisive military campaign that ended Saddam Hussein's reign of terror was followed by a difficult period of reconstruction and insurgency. However, the situation changed fundamentally for the better in January, when 8 million Iraqis defied death threats to vote in their first ever free elections.
3. The insurgents, Baathists and Al Qaeda-linked terrorists are no longer fighting an occupying US force, but an elected Iraqi government. They are now targeting and killing Iraqi Shiites. But Shiite leaders have been careful not to retaliate lest they trigger off an internecine Shiite-Sunni war. Shiite leaders know that they have democratic power within their grasp. They are willing to share power with the Sunnis by settling the constitution and holding a second round of elections in which the Sunnis are likely to participate. Hence although security remains a problem in Iraq, it is clear to all, including Sunni Iraqis, that the insurgents cannot win. Iraq is now on the path towards a better and safer future, and the outlook for the Middle East has improved.
4. Between the Israelis and the Palestinians, there is renewed hope of progress. The death of Yasser Arafat has opened a window of opportunity which if not grasped by both sides, may pass. Syria is withdrawing its army from Lebanon, which has witnessed an unprecedented show of 'people power', and just held parliamentary elections. Saudi Arabia has begun to experiment with low-level municipal elections. In Egypt, President Mubarak has promised steps towards democracy. However, it is too early to tell whether elections will lead to more open and progressive societies, or whether they will strengthen radical and fundamentalist groups which will come into conflict with the incumbent regimes and destabilise the region.
5. Globally, another worrying development is the fraying of the unity of countries that came together in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Together, the US and Europe form a vital core of global political stability. But a deep rift has emerged between the two sides of the North Atlantic alliance, arising from fundamental differences over unilateralism and the pre-emptive use of force. 9/11 left Americans with a profound sense of vulnerability, and a determination never to let it happen again. They have few inhibitions about wielding their military might against security threats, actual or potential. But many Europeans are uncomfortable with a world in which the US is the sole hyperpower. For them, the defining moment of the contemporary era is the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. Among these Europeans, 11/9 resonates more deeply than 9/11. 11/9 led to the peaceful breakup of the Soviet empire, which has diminished the relevance of NATO to Europe. So these Europeans find the security threats less pressing, and prefer to deal with problems through diplomacy, foreign aid and multilateral institutions. These differences in US and European world views represent a major change in world politics.
6. In Asia too, there have been major security and strategic developments. We have made progress in fighting

extremist terrorism, but the threat remains. The emergence of China and India is changing the strategic landscape, and requiring creative responses by all players to achieve a new stable balance. And potential trouble spots continue to need attention. These Asian security issues are the focus of my speech tonight.

RENEWING A COMMON RESOLVE AGAINST TERRORISM

7. The toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan has destroyed Al-Qaeda's base and disrupted its command and control structure. Since 9/11, nearly two-thirds of Al-Qaeda's original core leadership have been killed or captured. But, as one analyst put it, "Al-Qaeda is more lethal as an ideology than as an organisation."¹ This radical ideology continues to attract many individuals and groups round the world. Its war cry is Jihad against the infidels and a Caliphate uniting all Muslims worldwide.

8. In Southeast Asia, governments have disrupted the operational capacity of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a regional terrorist group affiliated to Al-Qaeda. A number of key JI leaders have been captured, as have the perpetrators of the Bali, Jakarta Marriott and Australian embassy bombings. But like Al-Qaeda itself, the JI is morphing into a loose web of dispersed individuals and small groups, highly resistant to penetration and detection. It is also tapping into other like-minded groups in Indonesia to provide manpower and support for its terrorist activities. So, while the JI may be weakened, it remains highly dangerous.

9. Why has it been so difficult to slay this multi-headed hydra? It is partly because some dangerous leaders remain on the loose. But a more basic problem is that the underlying infrastructure supporting terrorism remains intact. For example, the JI has used some madrasahs (religious schools) in the region as platforms to talent spot, recruit, indoctrinate and train new generations of fighters. Some of these madrasahs have been closed, but others continue to operate. And in the Southern Philippines, the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continues to host JI training facilities in its camps, as it has done since the 1990s.

10. Southern Thailand is another area of concern. Violence among the Muslim population there has been rising. This is still largely a separatist movement, not linked to Al-Qaeda or JI activities. But recently Al-Qaeda materials were seized in a madrasah in Pattani, and an International Crisis Group (ICG) report noted that "as grievances mount and the conflict escalates, however, there is a possibility that Thai groups could seek outside assistance or that individuals from JI or like-minded organisations could come to help unsolicited. If such elements enter the fray, we could begin to see ... the transformation of a low-level, ethno-nationalist insurgency into something more resembling a regional jihad."²

11. One aspect of the terrorism issue is maritime security. Every year, 50,000 ships carrying 30% of the world's trade and 50% of the world's oil pass through the Malacca Straits. At its narrowest, between Raffles Lighthouse and Batu Berhanti in the Singapore Straits, this vital corridor is only 1.2 km wide.³ With growing Asian demand for energy, this traffic will only rise. Disruption of this vital artery would have immediate economic and strategic repercussions far beyond Southeast Asia. The threat is real and urgent. We know that terrorists have been studying maritime targets across the region. The recent spate of violent pirate attacks in the Malacca Straits shows up our vulnerabilities only too clearly, but a terrorist attack would be a threat of an altogether different magnitude.

12. Securing the Malacca Straits will require shared political resolve and effective operations on the ground. The littoral states have primary responsibility for ensuring maritime security, but they need to harness the significant resources of the major user countries, without derogating from their sovereign prerogatives. The users for their part have considerable interest in contributing to this effort, as no country will want to be found wanting should an incident happen.

13. Beyond effective counter-terrorism operations, ultimately the fate of extremist Islam will have to be decided by Muslims themselves, by reference to their own values and interests. But one reason why moderate Muslims are reluctant to condemn and disown the extremists is the wide gap that separates the US from the Muslim world. The sources of this Muslim anger are historical and complex, but they have been accentuated in recent years by Muslim perceptions of American unilateralism and hostility to the faith. In 2000, three-quarters of the people in Indonesia, the world's largest Islamic country, said they were attracted to the US. By 2003, that had dropped to just 15 percent.

14. However, if we were to take a poll in Indonesia today, the percentage seeing the US positively would be considerably higher. The US response to the Boxing Day tsunami brought swift and effective relief to millions in Aceh. The generosity of the American government and people, and the unprecedented humanitarian operations by the USS Abraham Lincoln and the hospital ship USNS Mercy touched the hearts and minds of

Indonesians deeply, especially the survivors in Aceh.

15. But this singular event has not eliminated the antipathy that many Muslims still feel towards the US. Witness the recent deadly riots in several Muslim countries after a spurious *Newsweek* report that American interrogators at Guantanamo Bay had flushed a copy of the Holy Koran down the toilet. In this region, there were also demonstrations in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. The US needs to make more use of its "soft power" to win over international opinion, correct misperceptions, and build trust and credibility, especially in the Muslim world. In the long-term this is vital if the US is to prevail over terrorism, and to maintain its position of global leadership.

ADJUSTING TO A NEW ASIA

The Emergence of China and India

16. Apart from developments in the war on terror, tectonic shifts are taking place in the strategic landscape in Asia. China and India are growing faster than nearly any other major economy. Their sheer size and weight will lead to realignments in the region and beyond.

17. China's emergence is the central reality in Asia. It is already the major trading partner of many Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, and several ASEAN countries. China is also a fast growing source of tourists, and it is starting to generate investments and employment abroad. All countries in Asia want to grow these economic ties, and to strengthen their relations with China. For its part, China realizes that it needs to help other nations to benefit from China's growth, and has been doing so actively and intelligently. China is aware of the potential disruptions its growth may create, and has affirmed its determination to develop peacefully. It is assuming responsibilities commensurate with its growing weight, and stepping up to diplomatic and security challenges such as those posed by North Korea.

18. Concurrently, India is opening up after half a century of insularity. Momentum for reform is building and there is a growing sense that the changes taking place are irreversible. India has revived its "Look East" policy. Indian companies, once content to stay within their protected home market, are now venturing abroad. Indian interests in the region will grow, and so will Indian influence.

19. As India continues to open up its economy, its strategic outlook and perspective on the world will also change. From being a land power mainly focussed on the subcontinent, it is becoming a regional power with an outward orientation. India is already stepping up economic, military and other exchanges with regional countries. It has entered into Strategic Partnerships with the US and EU. At the same time, it is developing relations with China. As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said recently: "The world is large enough to accommodate the growth and ambitions of both our countries. I don't look upon our relations with the US as meant to rival China. I look forward to enhanced cooperation with China."⁴ India will define and advance its own interests, and be neither a permanent ally nor a permanent foe of the other major players.

20. The emergence of China and India brings tremendous opportunities to all, but also causes major changes to the status quo. The challenge is to integrate these two rising powers within the evolving regional architecture, while maintaining the balance and stability of the region. The US, with its economic and strategic predominance, is providing the overarching stability that enables both China and India to grow dynamically. Between the US, China and India, they will pull up growth rates in East, Southeast Asia and South Asia. America as the pre-eminent player in the region has the rare opportunity to assist these two emerging giants and Japan, no light-weight in industrial power, in settling the parameters for long term cooperation and competition.

US-China-Japan

21. Hitherto, the triangular relationship between the US, Japan and China has provided the tripod of stability for the region. In the new Asian landscape, this triangle remains a critical part of the security framework, but the balance of the three legs will have to shift.

22. The US and Japan are steady allies. From the US point of view, its Security Alliance with Japan anchors its presence throughout East Asia and the Pacific. For Japan, the alliance assures it of the security it needs, without its having to accelerate the build up of its own military forces or worse, go nuclear. Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, the alliance still remains relevant to both parties. Military forces are present in the

region on a large scale. Japan's National Defence Programme Guidelines refer to North Korea as a major destabilising factor, and China as having a major impact on regional security.⁵

23. China and Japan are the two largest economies in Asia. Amicable relations between them are critical to stability in the region. However, the two share a complex, intertwined history. While economic relations are growing, the two countries have not come to terms with the history of the Second World War. These problems cannot be solved overnight; defusing them may take another generation or longer. Sino-Japanese relations are currently going through a difficult patch, but I believe that neither country wants a collision, and that leaders of both countries see the benefits of cooperation. One Japanese political leader has told us that if the US fights with China, after 20 or 30 years they will restore relations. But if Japan fights with China, they will remain enemies for a hundred years. The two countries therefore need to find wise ways to gradually defuse the issues and work towards reconciliation.

24. US-China relations have become increasingly important in the strategic triangle. The trade and economic ties between the two have grown enormously, and provide a strong incentive for a cooperative relationship. These linkages go both ways. To take two examples, at stake are not just Walmart's huge purchases from China, but also China's substantial purchases from Boeing.

25. Chinese leaders are pushing for economic growth, and recognise that for this they need to work with the US. They also know that the US will be a more powerful and advanced country than China for many decades to come. At the same time, mainstream US policy-makers are convinced that the US needs to engage and cooperate with China, and manage the frictions and domestic political pressures which will inevitably arise from time to time, such as the current problems over China's textiles exports and its exchange rate. They recognize that a strategy of confronting China will incur its enmity without seriously blocking its growth, while any attempt to contain China will have few takers in the region.

US-Asia Ties

26. However, the US response to Asia cannot be confined to its relationship with Japan and China. Beyond this triangular core, the US must engage Asian countries across a broad front. In particular, the US needs to actively engage the ASEAN countries, both as a group and individually. Situated strategically between India and China, ASEAN is well placed to benefit from the growth of both giants. The ten ASEAN countries are strengthening cooperation among themselves, in order to hold their own in the intense global competition.

27. ASEAN countries are nurturing their ties with China and India, but this has not diminished their keenness to grow their links with the US. They know that the US presence contributes to the security of the region, and that American MNCs can generate investments and jobs which Chinese and Indian companies cannot yet do. This is true of Indonesia, the largest ASEAN country, whose President has just had a successful visit to Washington. It is also true of Singapore, almost the smallest ASEAN country, which plays host to many US MNCs and offers transit facilities to US air and naval forces. These and other linkages across the Pacific ensure that the growing cooperation among the Asian countries does not lead to a closed arrangement that splits the Pacific down the middle.

MANAGING POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS

Cross-strait Relations

28. A stable Asia also depends on managing potential trouble spots in the region. One of these is the cross-strait situation.

29. During last year's Shangri-La Dialogue, the danger that Taiwan might make a move towards independence and so provoke a cross-strait conflict dragging in the US and Japan seemed very real. Today, the tension has eased. China has passed the Anti-Secession Law. Japan has formally stated that peace in the Taiwan Strait is one of its joint security concerns with the US. The US and particularly President Bush has stated clearly that it supports One China and does not support Taiwanese independence. Clear lines have been drawn. Both the Taiwanese population and government now know that independence is now out of the question, as any unilateral move towards independence will not get US support. This has stabilised the position.

30. The visits of Lien Chan and James Soong to the mainland have also changed the tenor of the domestic debate in Taiwan. The contest is now over who can gain economic advantages for Taiwan by cooperating with China, while guarding Taiwan's political interests. The majority of the Taiwanese population favour the status

quo and are eager to participate in China's growth. China has offered sweeteners to Taiwan, such as zero tariffs on Taiwanese fruits exported to the mainland, and a pair of giant pandas with shared naming rights. If both sides demonstrate flexibility, the cross-strait situation will remain stable and win-win possibilities can be realised.

India-Pakistan Relations

31. A second hotspot is Kashmir. India and Pakistan almost came to blows over Kashmir three years ago. A war between two nuclear states would have been devastating. Fortunately, rationality prevailed and India and Pakistan are now both set on pursuing economic growth for their peoples, and have shown a new willingness to ease tensions. They have started to implement confidence building measures, including the recent series of India-Pakistan cricket matches and a bus service linking the two parts of Kashmir across the Line of Control.

32. Both India and Pakistan have said that the peace process is irreversible. Others hope that this is so, but recognise that a dispute that has gone on for almost 60 years cannot be solved overnight. The two countries must now build on the momentum and positive atmospherics to create more opportunities for people-to-people interactions, and maintain a dialogue to tackle mutual problems and concerns. Over time, this will gradually reduce tensions, and help make possible some solution that is acceptable to India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir.

North Korea

33. A third hotspot in Asia is the Korean Peninsula. A nuclearised Korean Peninsula aggravates the problem of nuclear proliferation and technology falling into the wrong hands. If North Korea goes nuclear, Japan and South Korea could also reconsider their stands not to develop nuclear weapons. Asia, and indeed the world, can ill afford this scenario.

34. The Six Party Talks provide a framework to manage the situation. But negotiations are being held hostage by North Korean brinkmanship, which raises anxiety levels and the risk of miscalculation. There are no easy solutions. Pre-emptive military strikes are too risky and may trigger a general war. Economic sanctions are unlikely to dissuade North Korea from its nuclear plans, and will only exacerbate the food crisis and cause more hardship and suffering. Exposing North Korea to the virtues of the free market will not stop its nuclear programme or the risks of proliferation. Within the framework of the Six Party Talks, the other five countries involved – China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US – must agree on the objectives to be achieved. They must work out a coordinated strategy, and apply both pressure and incentives to get North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programme and comply with international norms of good conduct.

FOSTERING REGIONAL COOPERATION

35. The Korean problem can only be solved by many countries cooperating with one another. More and more regional issues are now transborder in character, whether it is financial crises, counter-terrorism, SARS, Avian Flu or the recent tsunami. This is why Asian countries need to promote regional cooperation among themselves.

36. One way is to foster greater dialogue through various fora, for example ASEAN, ARF and APEC. This Shangri-La Dialogue itself brings together a distinguished group of leaders and policy makers to address the security challenges facing our region. Such exchanges will promote mutual trust and understanding, thereby fostering stability and a shared sense of community in the region.

37. A second way is to strengthen cooperation among regional defence and security organisations. Whether we are dealing with terrorist attacks or the aftermath of a natural disaster, the key players are the ones which possess the defence forces, capabilities and expertise to do the job. Singapore is therefore strengthening our links with friends and partners in the region, such as through the proposed Strategic Framework Agreement with the US, the Five Power Defence Arrangements, and our growing defence links with all the major powers.

38. A third way is to build an open and inclusive architecture of regional cooperation. ASEAN is launching a new grouping called the East Asian Summit. The key question of participation has been settled. In addition to the three dialogue partners in Northeast Asia, ASEAN will also welcome India, and hopefully New Zealand and Australia. This broad participation reflects the realities of the emerging pattern of cooperation in Asia, and prevents Asia from turning in on itself.

CONCLUSION – SINGAPORE'S APPROACH

39. Singapore fully backs these efforts to foster regional cooperation. Our approach reflects our perspective as a small country, vulnerable to the vagaries of global forces beyond our control. We work hard to earn a living, keep our economy open, and link up with the ever changing global network. We assume that the world is a dangerous place, and do our best to make it less dangerous for ourselves.

40. We seek to be friends with all countries, while upholding our rights and interests internationally. We will pursue win-win co-operation with all countries willing to co-operate with us. But this does not mean that we can always accommodate the views and positions of other countries. From time to time, issues will arise. When our interests diverge or even when our approaches to the same problem differ, we have to put our national interest first and so must other countries. This is the reality of the compelling pressures of relations between countries.

41. We value our close relations with our ASEAN partners and will build on them to strengthen co-operation amongst Asian countries. We believe that an open regional architecture, which gives all the major powers a stake in Asia, is most likely to produce a stable, predictable regional order in which countries big and small can prosper together. We ourselves are too small to shape the major events in Asia, but we will do our part to foster peace and security in the region. Hence we maintain capable defence forces to safeguard our own security, and contribute to the security of the region. We support a strong and effective United Nations with a reformed Security Council, as the best guarantee of an international order that is not just based on might being right.

42. Although different countries have different and sometimes conflicting interests, I believe that these principles command wide support, and provide the basis for countries to work together. Through our collective efforts, we can rise to the challenges of terrorism, capitalise on the emergence of China and India, and manage the potential trouble spots in the region, to secure a successful future for Asia.

1 Jason Burke, "Think Again: Al-Qaeda", Foreign Policy, May/June 2004.

2 International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report No. 98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad", 18 May 05.

3 Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) Commentary, "Protecting the Malacca Straits", 3 Mar 05.

4 Straits Times, "India's Strategic Ties", 1 Jun 05.

5 Japan Defence Agency (JDA), National Defence Programme Guidelines, FY2005-.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CLASSIFICATION

FAX COVERSHEET

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES**

N

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld OFFICE/DESK: Secretary of Defense PHONE NBR: _____

SUBJECT: Speech by Singapore's Prime Minister FAX NBR: _____

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: PAGES: 8
(including cover)

_____ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE
_____ IMMEDIATE/URGENT

NOTE: Furnish after duty hour contact telephone number for each addressee
requiring after duty hour delivery.

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOMNBR	PHONENBR

REMARKS:

OSD 10727-05

For Cables: Return copy of transmission receipt to OSD/CCB

WASH FAX OPERATOR (b)(6)

SECDEF CABLES (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CLASSIFICATION

11-L-0559/OSD/49945

UNCLASSIFIED

B-29

Date and Time of Receipt:

Transmission Mode:

Operator:




SECDEF CABLES B-DOCUMENT COVER SHEET

To	COL WILL GANSELEY DC. STEVE BUDD
From	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div> (g)(q)
Subject	SNOWFLAKE # 060405-3
# of Pages	8 (INCLUDING COVER)
Remarks	For Distec

UNCLASSIFIED

~~FOUO~~

June 4, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Speech by Singapore's Prime Minister

Mr. President, Attached is the keynote speech made by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong. I think you will find it most interesting.

Respectfully,

Attach.
6/3/05. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong Speech

DHR:mk
060403-3 (TS)

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49947

Shangri-La Dialogue
The 2005 Asia Security Conference

11-L-0559/OSD/49948

Keynote Address
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2005
Prime Minister of Singapore
Lee Hsien Loong
Friday 3rd June

KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY PRIME MINISTER LEE HSIEN LOONG AT THE 4th INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES ASIA SECURITY CONFERENCE IN SINGAPORE AT THE SHANGRI-LA HOTEL, ISLAND BALLROOM, ON FRIDAY, 3 JUNE 2005

SECURING THE FUTURE FOR A NEW ASIA

A DIFFERENT WORLD

1. I welcome all delegates to the fourth Shangri-La Dialogue. The world has changed significantly since the first Dialogue in 2002. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had galvanised all countries in a global war against terrorism. Faced with a common threat, all felt instinctively the solidarity of a shared humanity.
2. The US led a coalition of nations to mobilise a swift response. In Afghanistan, the coalition overthrew the Taliban regime, and are helping an elected Afghan government to restore normal conditions. In Iraq, the swift and decisive military campaign that ended Saddam Hussain's reign of terror was followed by a difficult period of reconstruction and insurgency. However, the situation changed fundamentally for the better in January, when 8 million Iraqis defied death threats to vote in their first ever free elections.
3. The insurgents, Baathists and Al Qaeda-linked terrorists are no longer fighting an occupying US force, but an elected Iraqi government. They are now targeting and killing Iraqi Shiites. But Shiite leaders have been careful not to retaliate, lest they trigger off an intermedine Shiite-Sunni war. Shiite leaders know that they have democratic power within their grasp. They are willing to share power with the Sunnis by settling the constitution and holding a second round of elections in which the Sunnis are likely to participate. Hence although security remains a problem in Iraq, it is clear to all, including Sunni Iraqis, that the insurgents cannot win. Iraq is now on the path towards a better and safer future, and the outlook for the Middle East has improved.
4. Between the Israelis and the Palestinians, there is renewed hope of progress. The death of Yasser Arafat has opened a window of opportunity which if not grasped by both sides, may pass. Syria is withdrawing its army from Lebanon, which has witnessed an unprecedented show of 'people power', and just held parliamentary elections. Saudi Arabia has begun to experiment with low-level municipal elections. In Egypt, President Mubarak has promised steps towards democracy. However, it is too early to tell whether elections will lead to more open and progressive societies, or whether they will strengthen radical and fundamentalist groups which will come into conflict with the incumbent regimes and destabilise the region.
5. Globally, another worrying development is the fraying of the unity of countries that came together in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Together, the US and Europe form a vital core of global political stability. But a deep rift has emerged between the two sides of the North Atlantic alliance, arising from fundamental differences over unilateralism and the pre-emptive use of force. 9/11 left Americans with a profound sense of vulnerability, and a determination never to let it happen again. They have few inhibitions about wielding their military might against security threats, actual or potential. But many Europeans are uncomfortable with a world in which the US is the sole hyperpower. For them, the defining moment of the contemporary era is the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. Among these Europeans, 11/9 resonates more deeply than 9/11. 11/9 led to the peaceful breakup of the Soviet empire, which has diminished the relevance of NATO to Europe. So these Europeans find the security threats less pressing, and prefer to deal with problems through diplomacy, foreign aid and multilateral institutions. These differences in US and European world views represent a major change in world politics.
6. In Asia too, there have been major security and strategic developments. We have made progress in fighting

extremist terrorism, but the threat remains. The emergence of China and India is changing the strategic landscape, and requiring creative responses by all players to achieve a new stable balance. And potential trouble spots continue to need attention. These Asian security issues are the focus of my speech tonight.

RENEWING A COMMON RESOLVE AGAINST TERRORISM

7. The toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan has destroyed Al-Qaeda's base and disrupted its command and control structure. Since 9/11, nearly two-thirds of Al-Qaeda's original core leadership have been killed or captured. But, as one analyst put it, "Al-Qaeda is more lethal as an ideology than as an organisation."¹ This radical ideology continues to attract many individuals and groups round the world. Its war cry is Jihad against the infidels and a Caliphate uniting all Muslims worldwide.

8. In Southeast Asia, governments have disrupted the operational capacity of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a regional terrorist group affiliated to Al-Qaeda. A number of key JI leaders have been captured, as have the perpetrators of the Bali, Jakarta Marriott and Australian embassy bombings. But like Al-Qaeda itself, the JI is morphing into a loose web of dispersed individuals and small groups, highly resistant to penetration and detection. It is also tapping into other like-minded groups in Indonesia to provide manpower and support for its terrorist activities. So, while the JI may be weakened, it remains highly dangerous.

9. Why has it been so difficult to slay this multi-headed hydra? It is partly because some dangerous leaders remain on the loose. But a more basic problem is that the underlying infrastructure supporting terrorism remains intact. For example, the JI has used some madrasahs (religious schools) in the region as platforms to talent spot, recruit, indoctrinate and train new generations of fighters. Some of these madrasahs have been closed, but others continue to operate. And in the Southern Philippines, the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continues to host JI training facilities in its camps, as it has done since the 1990s.

10. Southern Thailand is another area of concern. Violence among the Muslim population there has been rising. This is still largely a separatist movement, not linked to Al-Qaeda or JI activities. But recently Al-Qaeda materials were seized in a madrasah in Pattani, and an International Crisis Group (ICG) report noted that "as grievances mount and the conflict escalates, however, there is a possibility that Thai groups could seek outside assistance or that individuals from JI or like-minded organisations could come to help unsolicited. If such elements enter the fray, we could begin to see ... the transformation of a low-level, ethno-nationalist insurgency into something more resembling a regional jihad."²

11. One aspect of the terrorism issue is maritime security. Every year, 50,000 ships carrying 30% of the world's trade and 50% of the world's oil pass through the Malacca Straits. At its narrowest, between Raffles Lighthouse and Batu Berhant in the Singapore Straits, this vital corridor is only 1.2 km wide.³ With growing Asian demand for energy, this traffic will only rise. Disruption of this vital artery would have immediate economic and strategic repercussions far beyond Southeast Asia. The threat is real and urgent. We know that terrorists have been studying maritime targets across the region. The recent spate of violent pirate attacks in the Malacca Straits shows up our vulnerabilities only too clearly, but a terrorist attack would be a threat of an altogether different magnitude.

12. Securing the Malacca Straits will require shared political resolve and effective operations on the ground. The littoral states have primary responsibility for ensuring maritime security, but they need to harness the significant resources of the major user countries, without derogating from their sovereign prerogatives. The users for their part have considerable interest in contributing to this effort, as no country will want to be found wanting should an incident happen.

13. Beyond effective counter-terrorism operations, ultimately the fate of extremist Islam will have to be decided by Muslims themselves, by reference to their own values and interests. But one reason why moderate Muslims are reluctant to condemn and disown the extremists is the wide gap that separates the US from the Muslim world. The sources of this Muslim anger are historical and complex, but they have been accentuated in recent years by Muslim perceptions of American unilateralism and hostility to the faith. In 2000, three-quarters of the people in Indonesia, the world's largest Islamic country, said they were attracted to the US. By 2003, that had dropped to just 15 percent.

14. However, if we were to take a poll in Indonesia today, the percentages seeing the US positively would be considerably higher. The US response to the Boxing Day tsunami brought swift and effective relief to millions in Aceh. The generosity of the American government and people, and the unprecedented humanitarian operations by the USS Abraham Lincoln and the hospital ship USNS Mercy touched the hearts and minds of

Indonesians deeply, especially the survivors in Aceh.

15. But this singular event has not eliminated the antipathy that many Muslims still feel towards the US. Witness the recent deadly riots in several Muslim countries after a spurious Newsweek report that American interrogators at Guantanamo Bay had flushed a copy of the Holy Koran down the toilet. In this region, there were also demonstrations in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. The US needs to make more use of its "soft power" to win over international opinion, correct misperceptions, and build trust and credibility, especially in the Muslim world. In the long-term this is vital if the US is to prevail over terrorism, and to maintain its position of global leadership.

ADJUSTING TO A NEW ASIA

The Emergence of China and India

16. Apart from developments in the war on terror, tectonic shifts are taking place in the strategic landscape in Asia. China and India are growing faster than nearly any other major economy. Their sheer size and weight will lead to realignments in the region and beyond.

17. China's emergence is the central reality in Asia. It is already the major trading partner of many Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, and several ASEAN countries. China is also a fast growing source of tourists, and it is starting to generate investments and employment abroad. All countries in Asia want to grow these economic ties, and to strengthen their relations with China. For its part, China realizes that it needs to help other nations to benefit from China's growth, and has been doing so actively and intelligently. China is aware of the potential disruptions its growth may create, and has affirmed its determination to develop peacefully. It is assuming responsibilities commensurate with its growing weight, and stepping up to diplomatic and security challenges such as those posed by North Korea.

18. Concurrently, India is opening up after half a century of insularity. Momentum for reform is building and there is a growing sense that the changes taking place are irreversible. India has revived its "Look East" policy. Indian companies, once content to stay within their protected home market, are now venturing abroad. Indian interests in the region will grow, and so will Indian influence.

19. As India continues to open up its economy, its strategic outlook and perspective on the world will also change. From being a land power mainly focussed on the subcontinent, it is becoming a regional power with an outward orientation. India is already stepping up economic, military and other exchanges with regional countries. It has entered into Strategic Partnerships with the US and EU. At the same time, it is developing relations with China. As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said recently: "The world is large enough to accommodate the growth and ambitions of both our countries. I don't look upon our relations with the US as meant to rival China. I look forward to enhanced cooperation with China."⁴ India will define and advance its own interests, and be neither a permanent ally nor a permanent foe of the other major players.

20. The emergence of China and India brings tremendous opportunities to all, but also causes major changes to the status quo. The challenge is to integrate these two rising powers within the evolving regional architecture, while maintaining the balance and stability of the region. The US, with its economic and strategic predominance, is providing the overarching stability that enables both China and India to grow dynamically. Between the US, China and India, they will pull up growth rates in East, Southeast Asia and South Asia. America as the pre-eminent player in the region has the rare opportunity to assist these two emerging giants and Japan, no light-weight in industrial power, in settling the parameters for long term cooperation and competition.

US-China-Japan

21. Hitherto, the triangular relationship between the US, Japan and China has provided the tripod of stability for the region. In the new Asian landscape, this triangle remains a critical part of the security framework, but the balance of the three legs will have to shift.

22. The US and Japan are steady allies. From the US point of view, its Security Alliance with Japan anchors its presence throughout East Asia and the Pacific. For Japan, the alliance assures it of the security it needs, without it having to accelerate the build up of its own military forces or worse, go nuclear. Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, the alliance still remains relevant to both parties. Military forces are present in the

region on a large scale. Japan's National Defence Programme Guidelines refer to North Korea as a major destabilising factor, and China as having a major impact on regional security.⁵

23. China and Japan are the two largest economies in Asia. Amicable relations between them are critical to stability in the region. However, the two share a complex, intertwined history. While economic relations are growing, the two countries have not come to terms with the history of the Second World War. These problems cannot be solved overnight; defusing them may take another generation or longer. Sino-Japanese relations are currently going through a difficult patch, but I believe that neither country wants a collision, and that leaders of both countries see the benefits of cooperation. One Japanese political leader has told us that if the US fights with China, after 20 or 30 years they will restore relations. But if Japan fights with China, they will remain enemies for a hundred years. The two countries therefore need to find wise ways to gradually defuse the issues and work towards reconciliation.

24. US-China relations have become increasingly important in the strategic triangle. The trade and economic ties between the two have grown enormously, and provide a strong incentive for a cooperative relationship. These linkages go both ways. To take two examples, at stake are not just Walmart's huge purchases from China, but also China's substantial purchases from Boeing.

25. Chinese leaders are pushing for economic growth, and recognise that for this they need to work with the US. They also know that the US will be a more powerful and advanced country than China for many decades to come. At the same time, mainstream US policy-makers are convinced that the US needs to engage and cooperate with China, and manage the frictions and domestic political pressures, which will inevitably arise from time to time, such as the current problems over China's textiles exports and its exchange rate. They recognize that a strategy of confronting China will incur its enmity without seriously blocking its growth, while any attempt to contain China will have few takers in the region.

US-Asia Ties

26. However, the US response to Asia cannot be confined to its relationship with Japan and China. Beyond this triangular core, the US must engage Asian countries across a broad front. In particular, the US needs to actively engage the ASEAN countries, both as a group and individually. Situated strategically between India and China, ASEAN is well placed to benefit from the growth of both giants. The ten ASEAN countries are strengthening cooperation among themselves, in order to hold their own in the intense global competition.

27. ASEAN countries are nurturing their ties with China and India, but this has not diminished their keenness to grow their links with the US. They know that the US presence contributes to the security of the region, and that American MNCs can generate investments and jobs which Chinese and Indian companies cannot yet do. This is true of Indonesia, the largest ASEAN country, whose President has just had a successful visit to Washington. It is also true of Singapore, almost the smallest ASEAN country, which plays host to many US MNCs and offers transit facilities to US air and naval forces. These and other linkages across the Pacific ensure that the growing cooperation among the Asian countries does not lead to a closed arrangement that splits the Pacific down the middle.

MANAGING POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS

Cross-strait Relations

28. A stable Asia also depends on managing potential trouble spots in the region. One of these is the cross-strait situation.

29. During last year's Shangri-La Dialogue, the danger that Taiwan might make a move towards independence and so provoke a cross-strait conflict dragging in the US and Japan seemed very real. Today, the tension has eased. China has passed the Anti-Secession Law. Japan has formally stated that peace in the Taiwan Strait is one of its joint security concerns with the US. The US and particularly President Bush has stated clearly that it supports One China and does not support Taiwanese independence. Clear lines have been drawn. Both the Taiwanese population and government now know that independence is now out of the question, as any unilateral move towards independence will not get US support. This has stabilised the position.

30. The visits of Lien Chen and James Soong to the mainland have also changed the tenor of the domestic debate in Taiwan. The contest is now over who can gain economic advantages for Taiwan by cooperating with China, while guarding Taiwan's political interests. The majority of the Taiwanese population favour the status

quo and are eager to participate in China's growth. China has offered sweeteners to Taiwan, such as zero tariffs on Taiwanese fruits exported to the mainland, and a pair of giant pandas with shared naming rights. If both sides demonstrate flexibility, the cross-strait situation will remain stable and win-win possibilities can be realised.

India-Pakistan Relations

31 A second hotspot is Kashmir. India and Pakistan almost came to blows over Kashmir three years ago. A war between two nuclear states would have been devastating. Fortunately, rationality prevailed and India and Pakistan are now both set on pursuing economic growth for their peoples, and have shown a new willingness to ease tensions. They have started to implement confidence building measures, including the recent series of India-Pakistan cricket matches and a bus service linking the two parts of Kashmir across the Line of Control.

32 Both India and Pakistan have said that the peace process is irreversible. Others hope that this is so, but recognise that a dispute that has gone on for almost 60 years cannot be solved overnight. The two countries must now build on the momentum and positive atmospheres to create more opportunities for people-to-people interactions, and maintain a dialogue to tackle mutual problems and concerns. Over time, this will gradually reduce tensions, and help make possible some solution that is acceptable to India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir.

North Korea

33 A third hotspot in Asia is the Korean Peninsula. A nuclearised Korean Peninsula aggravates the problem of nuclear proliferation and technology falling into the wrong hands. If North Korea goes nuclear, Japan and South Korea could also reconsider their stands not to develop nuclear weapons. Asia, and indeed the world, can ill afford this scenario.

34 The Six Party Talks provide a framework to manage the situation. But negotiations are being held hostage by North Korean brinksmanship, which raises anxiety levels and the risk of miscalculation. There are no easy solutions. Pre-emptive military strikes are too risky and may trigger a general war. Economic sanctions are unlikely to dissuade North Korea from its nuclear plans, and will only exacerbate the food crisis and cause more hardship and suffering. Exposing North Korea to the virtues of the free market will not stop its nuclear programme or the risks of proliferation. Within the framework of the Six Party Talks, the other five countries involved – China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US – must agree on the objectives to be achieved. They must work out a coordinated strategy and apply both pressure and incentives to get North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programme and comply with international norms of good conduct.

FOSTERING REGIONAL COOPERATION

35 The Korean problem can only be solved by many countries cooperating with one another. More and more regional issues are now transborder in character, whether it is financial crises, counter-terrorism, SARS, Avian Flu or the recent tsunami. This is why Asian countries need to promote regional cooperation among themselves.

36 One way is to foster greater dialogue through various fora, for example ASEAN, ARF and APEC. This Shangri-La Dialogue itself brings together a distinguished group of leaders and policy makers to address the security challenges facing our region. Such exchanges will promote mutual trust and understanding, thereby fostering stability and a shared sense of community in the region.

37 A second way is to strengthen cooperation among regional defence and security organisations. Whether we are dealing with terrorist attacks or the aftermath of a natural disaster, the key players are the ones which possess the defence forces, capabilities and expertise to do the job. Singapore is therefore strengthening our links with friends and partners in the region, such as through the proposed Strategic Framework Agreement with the US, the Five Power Defence Arrangements, and our growing defence links with all the major powers.

38 A third way is to build an open and inclusive architecture of regional cooperation. ASEAN is launching a new grouping called the East Asian Summit. The key question of participation has been settled. In addition to the three dialogue partners in Northeast Asia, ASEAN will also welcome India, and hopefully New Zealand and Australia. This broad participation reflects the realities of the emerging pattern of cooperation in Asia, and prevents Asia from turning in on itself.

CONCLUSION - SINGAPORE'S APPROACH

39. Singapore fully backs these efforts to foster regional cooperation. Our approach reflects our perspective as a small country, vulnerable to the vagaries of global forces beyond our control. We work hard to earn a living, keep our economy open, and link up with the ever changing global network. We assume that the world is a dangerous place, and do our best to make it less dangerous for ourselves.

40. We seek to be friends with all countries, while upholding our rights and interests internationally. We will pursue win-win co-operation with all countries willing to co-operate with us. But this does not mean that we can always accommodate the views and positions of other countries. From time to time, issues will arise. When our approaches to the same problem differ, we have to put our national interest first and so must other countries. This is the reality of the compelling pressures of relations between countries.

41. We value our close relations with our ASEAN partners and will build on them to strengthen co-operation amongst Asian countries. We believe that an open regional architecture, which gives all the major powers a stake in Asia, is most likely to produce a stable, predictable regional order in which countries big and small can prosper together. We ourselves are too small to shape the major events in Asia, but we will do our part to foster peace and security in the region. Hence we maintain capable defence forces to safeguard our own security, and contribute to the security of the region. We support a strong and effective United Nations with a reformed Security Council, as the best guarantee of an international order that is not just based on might being right.

42. Although different countries have different and sometimes conflicting interests, I believe that these principles command wide support, and provide the basis for countries to work together. Through our collective efforts, we can rise to the challenges of terrorism, capitalise on the emergence of China and India, and manage the potential trouble spots in the region, to secure a successful future for Asia.

* Jason Burke, "Think Again: Al-Qaeda", Foreign Policy, May/June 2004.

* ICG Asia Report No. 98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad", 18 May

3 Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) Commentary, "Protecting the Malacca Straits", 3 Mar 05.

Straits Times, "India's Strategic Ties", 1 Jun 05

* Japan Defence Agency (JDA), National Defence Programme Guidelines, FY2005-.

~~FOUO~~

MAY 31 2005

TO: (b)(6)

CC: CAPT Bill Marriott

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Notes Written to Joyce

Regarding thank you notes to Joyce or to Joyce and me, they should be part of my papers. The notes are for things she has done because she is the wife of the Secretary of Defense.

Whoever ends up with my papers, probably the Library of Congress, will want them. Some of them could ~~turn~~ out to be interesting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052705-1

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49954

OSD 10851-05

SECRETARY OF LABOR
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 JUN -7 PM 2: 50

APR 22 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20320-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is with pleasure that I hereby appoint you to serve as an ex-officio member of the Advisory Committee on Veterans' Employment and Training. Your appointment is effective as of February 14, 2005.

It is the duty of the Advisory Committee to advise the Secretary with respect to carrying out the functions, including assessing the employment and training needs of veterans and determining the extent to which the programs and activities of the Department of Labor are meeting such needs (as provided in Section 4110 of Title 38) and to submit recommendations with respect thereto. I solicit your advice so that this law may be effectively administered.

I appreciate your willingness to give us your time and the benefit of your experience to help us better serve veterans. Please advise Mr. Frederico Juarbe Jr., Assistant Secretary for Veterans' Employment and Training, of your intention to serve in this capacity. His telephone number is (202) 693-4700.

Sincerely,



Elaine L. Chao

OSD 10868-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49955

Office of the Secretary of Defense

6/17

Robert -

Paul B. asked me to follow up with you on the attached memo of 16 June, re: SecDef's participation on a Veterans advisory committee.

This is covered in my 7 June memo to the SecDef.

v/r

MDonley

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

OK - Close out

6/21 - RR

Robert Rangel

6/22

CFD

RR

11-L-0559/OSD/49956

10868-05

334

17 Jun 05

22 Apr 05



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

07 JUN 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director Administration and Management *MD*

SUBJECT: List of External Organizations

- In the attached May **17, 2005** snowflake you requested a list of all external organizations of which you are a member.
- We collaborated with the Office of General Counsel and your immediate **staff** to compile the list at Tab A of the **28** outside organizations where you **are** a member. The list reflects memberships based in statute, Executive Order, or National Security Presidential Directive.
- Senior DoD staff are representing you on 23 of these **28** organizations.
- The Deputy Secretary **has** been representing you on three: the Export Administration Review Board, the Counterproliferation **Program** Review Committee and the Nuclear Command and Control System Committee of Principals.
- You have been a regular attendee at **two**: the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council.
- We will continue to look for **other** organizations where you have a formal role and report any we find to you.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Frank Learning, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/49957

09357-05

318
1430

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MAY 17 2005
2005 MAY 17 PM 3:16

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: List of Organizations

Please dig out all the things the Secretary of Defense is a member of, like the Economic Advisory Council and the Red Cross, etc. Then I will decide which ones I want Gordon England to take.

Add a separate piece of paper to our draft memo, and I will divide them up.

Thanks.

DHR:es
031005-29

.....
Please respond by 5/26/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09357-05
AM 03985-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49958

Secretary of Defense Memberships in External Organizations*

1. National Security Council (NCS), member
2. Export Administrative Review Board, member
3. Homeland Security Council, member
4. President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board
5. Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Chairman
6. Invasive Species Council, member
7. U.S. Coral Reef Task Force, member
8. Board of Directors, National Veterans Business Development corporation, nonvoting ex officio member
9. DoD Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (Federal Advisory Committee), cochairman
10. Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace, member
11. White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, member
12. Advisory Council on Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance, member
13. Professional Certification and Licensure Advisory Committee, ex officio member
14. Advisory Committee on Veterans Employment and Training, ex officio non-voting member
15. Corporation for National and Community Service, ex officio non-voting member
16. Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, ex officio member
17. Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, member
18. Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration, member
19. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board
20. Economic Adjustment Committee, chairman (yearly rotating basis w/ Secretaries of Commerce and Labor) or member
21. National Capital Planning Commission, ex officio member
22. National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, ex officio member
23. Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, member
24. Interagency Council on the Homeless
25. Civilian Community Corps Advisory Board, member
26. President's National Hire Veterans Committee
27. Board of Directors, Anacostia Waterfront Corporation, ex-officio non-voting
28. Executive Agent Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS)/Chairman of the NCCS Committee of Principals

*Details attached for each of the above

Secretary of Defense Memberships in External Organizations Under Statute or Executive Order

1. National Security Council (NSC), member

-Requirement 50 U.S.C. §402

-Established: July 26, 1947

-SecDef attends.

-Purpose: The **NSC** advises the President on domestic, **military** and foreign policies relating to national security.

2. Export Administrative Review Board, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. **12981**, 60 Fed. Reg. **62981** (Dec. 5, 1995). ~~continues~~ the **Board** established by Exec. Order No. **11533** (Jun. 4, 1970) and Exec. Order No. **12002** (Jul. 7, 1977), amended by Exec. Order No. **13020** (Oct. 12, 1996), Exec. Order No. **13026** (Nov. 15, 1996) and Exec. Order No. **13118** (Mar. 31, 1999)

-Established: June 4, 1970

-SecDef attends.

-No alternate **Board** member shall be designated, but the acting SecDef or Deputy **Secretary** may serve in lieu of SecDef

-Purpose: The **Board** is responsible for interagency dispute resolution concerning export ~~license~~ applications; **Board** meets only when necessary to resolve disputes.

3. Homeland Security Council, member

-Requirement Exec. Order No. **13228**, 66 Fed. Reg. **51812**

-Establish& October 8, 2001

-SecDef designee: SecDef attends the meetings with POTUS.
ASD(Homeland Defense) goes to the weekly meetings

-Purpose: The Council advises and assists the President with respect to all **aspects** of homeland security. It ensures coordination of homeland security-related

activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies.

4. President's Critical Infrastructure ~~Protection~~ Board

-Requirement Exec. Order No. 13231.66 Fed. Reg. 202

-Established October 16, 2001

-SecDef designee: ASD(Homeland Defense)

-Purpose: The ~~Board~~ recommends policies and coordinates programs for protecting ~~information~~ systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the physical ~~assets that~~ support such systems.

5. Counterproliferation ~~Program~~ Review Committee, Chairman

-Requirement: 22 U.S.C. §2751

-SecDef may designate a DASD-level or above representative to perform his routine duties

-Established: October 22, 1968

-SecDef designee: Formerly Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense

-Purpose: The Committee is charged with optimizing ~~funding~~, development and deployment of highly effective technologies for purposes of detection, monitoring, ~~collecting~~, processing, analyzing, and disseminating information in support of counterproliferation policy and efforts.

-Miscellaneous: USD(AT&L) chairs interagency group supporting ~~committee~~.

6. Invasive ~~Species~~ Council, member

-Requirement Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183

-Established: February 3, 1999

-SecDef designee: Alex Behlar, ADUSD(Environment, Safety and Occupational Health), OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Council prevents the spread of invasive species (species non-

native to the ecosystem ~~under~~ consideration and whose introduction is likely to cause economic ~~or~~ environmental harm or harm to human health) through interagency coordination, creation of a cross-agency budget for rapid response to emerging problems, and reauthorization and expansion of the National Invasive Species Act.

7. US. Coral Reef Task Force, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 13089, 63 Fed. Reg. 32701,
16 U.S.C. §6401 note

-Established: June 11, 1998

-SecDef designee: B.J. Penn, ASN(Installations & Environment)

-Purpose: The Task Force's mission is to protect and enhance coral reef ecosystems.

8. Board of Directors, National Veterans Business Development Corporation, nonvoting ex officio member

-Requirement: 15 U.S.C. §657c

-Established: July 18, 1958

-SecDef designee: Frank Ramos, Dir Small & Disadvantaged Business,
OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Corporation created a business model process of establishing business plans that will provide resources to veterans for businesses and cash flow to the corporation.

-Miscellaneous: Meets quarterly.

9. DoD Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (Federal Advisory committee), cochairman

-Requirement: 20 U.S.C. §929

-Established: November 1, 1978

-SecDef designee: Charles S. Abell, PDUSD(Personnel & Readiness)

-Purpose: The Council provides advice to the Director, DoDEA, regarding curriculum selection, administration, operation of the DoD Dependents Schools (DoDDS) (the Department's overseas school system), national educational best practices and programs that should be considered for inclusion in DoDDS. ACDE members include representatives from DoD and DoEd, teacher union presidents, military general officers, nationally recognized educators external to DoDEA, DoDDS parents, and a DoDDS student.

10. Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace, member

-Requirement: 22 U.S.C. §4605

-SecDef may designate a DoD **PAS** official

-Established: October 19, 1984

-SecDef designee: Douglas Feith, USD(Policy)

-Purpose: The Board debates on current conflict resolution and policy issues.

11. White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, member

-Requirement: Pub. L. No. 106-579 (36 U.S.C. §116 note)

-Established: December 28, 2000

-SecDef or designee: Babs Chase, Community Relations and Public Liaison, OASD(Public Affairs)

-Purpose: The Commission encourages people and entities at the national, State, and local level to commemorate Memorial Day and to participate in a National Moment of Remembrance in tribute to those individuals who sacrificed their lives for the United States. The commission provides national coordination for commemorative speeches, publications, exhibits, and events.

12. Advisory Council on Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance, member

-Requirement: 38 U.S.C. §1974

-Established: September 29, 1965

-SecDef designee: USD(Comptroller)

-Purpose: The Council reviews the operations of the Department of Veterans Affairs regarding Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance and advises the Veterans Affairs Secretary on matters of policy relating to the Secretary's activities under this statute.

-Miscellaneous: DoDD 1341.3, "Servicemen's Group Life Insurance," assigns the DoD Comptroller responsibility for financial policy and PDUSD(P&R) responsibility for administrative policy of the SGLI Program.

-Council meets at least once a year or more often at the call of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

13. Professional Certification and Licensure Advisory Committee, ex officio member

-Requirement 38 U.S.C. §3689

-Established: November 1, 2000

-SecDef designee: John Molino, DUSD(Military Community & Family Policy)

-Purpose: The Committee advises the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on requirements of organizations or entities offering licensing and certification tests to individuals on whose behalf the DVA pays for those tests. The Committee expands the educational opportunities for military personnel who signed up for the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB). As of March 1, 2001, individuals with MGIB benefits possess the option to test on professional certification and licensure examinations. Testing on a DVA-approved professional certification or licensure exam assures eligibility to receive after-the-fact reimbursement.

14. Advisory Committee on Veterans Employment and Training, ex officio non-voting member

-Requirement: 38 U.S.C. §4110

-Established: October 14, 1982

-SecDef or designee: Mr. John Moho, DUSD(Military Community & Family Policy)

-Purpose: The Committee's objectives are to: assess the employment and training needs of veterans; determine the extent to which the programs and activities of

the Department of Labor ~~are meeting~~ such needs; ~~carry~~ out such other activities as may be appropriate; and make recommendations to the ~~Secretary~~ of Labor with respect to the employment and ~~training needs~~ of veterans at such times and in such manner as the Committee determines appropriate.

~~Miscellaneous:~~ ~~The~~ Committee meets quarterly.

15. Corporation for ~~National~~ and Community Service, ex officio non-voting member

~~-Requirement:~~ 42 U.S.C. §12651a

~~-Established:~~ November 16, 1990

~~-SecDef designee:~~ Ernie Gonzalez, Director, Civil Military Youth Programs and Innovative Readiness Training, OASD(Reserve Affairs)

~~-Purpose:~~ The Corporation works with governor-appointed ~~state~~ commissions, nonprofits, faith-based groups, schools, and other civic ~~organizations~~ to provide opportunities for Americans of ~~all~~ ages to serve their communities.

16. Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, ex officio member

~~-Requirement~~ 38 U.S.C. §542

~~-SecDef or SecDef designee~~ (after consultation with DACOWITS)

~~-Establish&~~ August 6, 1991

~~-SecDef designee:~~ Director, DACOWITS

~~-Purpose:~~ The Committee advises the ~~Secretary~~ of VA on benefits provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs for women veterans, prepares reports and conducts studies pertaining to women veterans and the ~~needs~~ of women veterans with respect to compensation, health care, rehabilitation, outreach, and other benefits and programs administered by VA.

17. Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, member

~~-Requirement~~ 5 U.S.C. §552 ~~note~~

~~-Establish&~~ October 8, 1998

-SecDef designee: Christina Bromwell, OUSD(Intelligence)

-Purpose: The mission of the Working Group is to locate, recommend for declassification, and make available to the public through the National Archives all classified Nazi and Japanese Imperial Government war crimes records.

***Note:** The Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure ~~Act~~ of 2000 requires the President to "designate the Working Group established under the ~~Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act~~ (Public Law 105-246; 5 U.S.C. 552 note) to also carry out the purposes of this title with respect to Japanese Imperial Government records" by February 25, 2001. Extended until March 2007, by Senate bill 384 and signed by the President on March 25, 2005.

18. Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration, member

-Requirement Presidential approval, reflected in a February 25, 2002 memo signed by the Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office of the President

-Established. February 4, 2002

-SecDef designee: Ron Sega, Director, Defense Research & Engineering, OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Committee will provide recommendations concerning climate science and technology to the President and recommend the movement of funding and programs across agency boundaries.

19. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board

-Requirement 29 U.S.C. §792

-Established: September 26, 1973

-SecDef designee: Charles S. Abell, PDUSD(Personnel & Readiness)

-Purpose: The Board ensures compliance with the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which allows physically handicapped individuals accessibility to certain federal buildings.

20. Economic Adjustment Committee, chairman (yearly rotating basis w/ Secretaries of Commerce and Labor) or member

-Requirement: ~~Exec.~~ Order No. 12,788, 57 Fed. Reg. 2213 (Jan. 21, 1992)
-SecDef or designated principal deputy

-Established: May 25, 1999

-SecDef designee: DUSD(Installation & Environment), OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Committee coordinates federal technical and financial assistance for state and local economic adjustment activities in response to Defense actions, including base closures, contractor reductions, and encroachment. It also prioritizes domestic program support for Defense-affected areas.

21. National Capital Planning Commission, ex officio member

-Requirement: 40 U.S.C. §71a
-SecDef from time-to-time may designate an alternate to serve in his stead

-Established: December 24, 1973

-SecDef designee: Michael B. Donley, Director Administration and Management

-Purpose: The Commission reviews plans for the construction and renovation of buildings on federal property in the National Capital area.

22. National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, ex officio member

-Requirement: 20 U.S.C. §80

-Established: August 30, 1961

-SecDef designee: Alfred Goldberg, OSD Historian

-Purpose: The Board provides advice to the Smithsonian Institution on matters concerned with the portrayal of the contributions of the Armed Forces to American society and culture.

23. Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, member

-Requirement: ~~Exec.~~ Order No. 13122, 64 Fed. Reg. 29201 (May 25, 1999)

-Established: May 25, 1999

-SecDef designee: DUSD(Installation & Environment), OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Task Force facilitates the provision of Federal resources to spur economic development along the southwest border region.

-Miscellaneous: ~~The Task~~ Force terminates May 15, 2002, unless the Task Force reaches a consensus recommending continuation of its activities.

24. Interagency Council on the Homeless

-Requirement: 42 U.S.C. §11312

-Established: July 22, 1987

-SecDef designee: Bryant Monroe, Project Manager, Office of Economic Adjustment, OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Council provides an interagency forum for the coordination of federal policy and assistance to support the homeless.

25. Civilian Community Corps Advisory Board, member

-Requirement: 42 U.S.C. §12623

-Established: November 16, 1990

-SecDef designee: Emie Gonzalez, ~~Director~~, Civil Military Youth Programs and Innovative Readiness Training, OASD(Reserve Affairs)

-Purpose: The Board facilitates the pooling of national, state and local resources.

26. President's National Hire Veterans Committee

-Requirement: 38 U.S.C. §2033

-Established: November 7, 2002

-SecDef designee: Harvey Barnum, DASN(Reserve Affairs)

-Purpose: To establish and carry out a national program to raise awareness and furnish information to America's employers on the benefits of hiring military veterans.

27. Board of Directors, Anacostia Waterfront Corporation, ex-officio non-voting

-Requirement: D.C. Code § 2-1223.31

-Established: December 7, 2004, effective March 16, 2005

-SecDef designee: Proposed assignment Mike Donley, DA&M

-Purpose: The Board serves as an independent instrument that is responsible for the development, redevelopment, and revitalization of the lands adjacent to the Anacostia River and associated waterways, and for the environmental restoration of said waterways.

28. Executive Agent Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS)/Chairman of the NCCS Committee of Principals

-Requirement: National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 28

-Established: June 20, 2003

-SecDef designee: Formerly Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, chaired the first and only meeting held to date.

-Purpose: The Secretary of Defense is designated as the NCCS Executive Agent. The Executive Agent shall. (1) Establish a Committee of principals to coordinate interdepartmental NCCS supporting policies and programs, recommend priorities for funding, monitor corrective actions, and establish mechanisms to share best practices and lessons learned. The NCCS Committee of Principals consists of a senior official from each Department and Agency subject to the NSPD as well as the Director of the NCCS Support Staff (NSS). (2) Designate the NSS. (3) Oversees the NSS assessments of NCCS elements and facilitates NCCS integration. (4) Ensures NSS activities are conducted in conjunction and coordination with other Federal Government Departments and Agencies with NCCS and national crisis response responsibilities. (5) Make recommendations, in consultation with relevant agencies, to the NCCS Committee of principals changes in NCCS responsibilities, composition and structure. (6) Oversee the activities of the Director, NSS and provide funding and personnel support.

2005 JUN 16 PM 6:18

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

To Mike Donely
From Paul Butler -

Mike -

Did you factor this in to
your memo? Do you know
who actually participates in
this? Please send the original
back to Robert with anything
you know about it.

Thanks
Paul

OSD 10868-05

Paul Butler 6/16

334

16 Jun 05

22 Apr 05

1
1
1
SECRETARY OF LABOR
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 JUN -7 PM 2: 50

APR 22 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 ~~Defense~~ Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20320-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is with pleasure that I hereby appoint you to serve as an ex-officio member of the Advisory Committee on Veterans' Employment and Training. Your appointment is effective as of February 14, 2005.

It is the duty of the Advisory Committee to advise the Secretary with respect to carrying out the functions, including assessing the employment and training needs of veterans and determining the extent to which the programs and activities of the Department of Labor are meeting such needs (as provided in Section 4110 of Title 38) and to submit recommendations with respect thereto. I solicit your advice so that *this* law may be effectively administered.

I appreciate your willingness to give us your time and the benefit of your experience to help us better serve veterans. Please advise Mr. Frederico Juarbe Jr., Assistant Secretary for Veterans' Employment and Training of your intention to serve in this capacity. His telephone number is (202) 6934700.

Sincerely,

Elaine L. Chao

OSD 10868-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49971

FOUO

APR 18 2005

075 101-71 01 5 06

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Olmstead Scholarship Program

326.6

I understand the Olmstead Scholarship Program is sending people to a number of 21st century locations these days: China, Turkey, India, Ukraine, etc. I am told they could support many more scholarships; perhaps more than double what they are doing now.

Please check into whether doing that makes sense. It seems to me it would fit well with the Defense Language Roadmap program.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
041505-11

.....
Please respond by

5/12/05

6/9

USD	PDUSD
RA	HA
PI	Readiness
MPP	CPP
PLANS	MCAFP
CCO	

184PROS

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/49972

OSD 10938-05



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO



May 5, 2005, 11:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu
7 June 05

SUBJECT: Olmsted Scholarship Program – Snowflake (TAB A)

You asked whether we could benefit from an expanded Olmsted Scholarship Program. Of course - but:

- Olmsted wants combat arms officers. The two to three years required for the scholarship limits nominations.
- We need to target the countries and languages that fit our strategic needs.

We have met with Admiral (Ret) Larry Marsh, President of the Foundation, to discuss how we might expand our use of the program and how we might address these two issues. As a result, I will work with the Services on recommendations that would make the program a better fit with the Department's needs.

For your information, I have attached a list of this year's Olmsted Scholar class (TAB B).

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (Plans) (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/49973

OSD 10938-05

FOUO

APR 18 2005

035 10938-05

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Olmstead Scholarship Program

I understand the Olmstead Scholarship Program is sending people to a number of 21st century locations these days: China, Turkey, India, Ukraine, etc. I am told they could support many more scholarships; perhaps more than double what they are doing now.

Please check into whether doing that makes sense. It seems to me it would fit well with the Defense Language Roadmap program.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
041505-11

.....
Please respond by

5/12/05

5/9

FOUO

USD	PDU&D
RA	HA
PI	Readiness
MPP	CPP
PLANS	MC&FP
CCO	

11-L-0559/OSD/49975

OSD 10938-05

B

11-L-0559/OSD/49976

As of 4/7/05

OLMSTED SCHOLAR CLASS of 2006

SVC	Name	Rank	Specialty	Year	US University	Overseas University	City/Country	✓
USA	Smith, Jay B.	Captain	Infantry	1997	USAFA	Univ of Aix-en-Provence	Aix-en-Provence, France	
USA	Elsen, David P.	Captain	Intel	1995	Wheaton Coll	Univ of Beijing	Beijing, China	
USA	Grissom, Michael T.	Captain	Infantry	1996	USMA	Taras Shevchenko Univ	Kiev, Ukraine	
USA	Eldridge, James T.	Captain	Infantry	1998	USMA	Moscow State Univ	Moscow, Russia	
USA	Butcher, Terry A.	Captain	Special Forces	1997	Univ of Arizona	Chulalongkorn Univ	Bangkok, Thailand	
USN	Withers, Thaddeus S.	LT	Pilot	1992	Occidental College	Univ of Torcuato Di Tella	Buenos Aires, Argentina	
USN	Luther, Nathan D.	LTJG	Submariner	2001	Stanford	Jawaharlal Nehru Univ	New Delhi, India	
USN	Adams, Audrey G.	LT	Nuclear Propulsion Plant	2000	Northwestern University	National Chengchi Univ	Taipei, Taiwan	
USN	Mewett, Ryan E.	LTJG	Submariner	2001	USNA	Tokyo Univ of Foreign Studies	Tokyo, Japan	
USN	Kristensen Erik S.	LCDR	SEAL	1995	USNA	Institute of Pol Studies	Paris, France	
USMC	Fanning, Andrew L.	1st Lt	Infantry	2001	The Citadel	American Univ of Cairo	Cairo, Egypt	
USMC	Johnson, Christopher	1st Lt	Logistics	2001	USNA	Univ of Hong Kong	Hong Kong, China	
USMC	Anderson, Joshua D.	Captain	Logistics	1998	University of Richmond	Univ of Belgrade	Belgrade, Serbia & Montenegro	
USAF	Denaro, Brian A.	Captain	Engineer	2000	USAFA	Jinan Univ	Guangzhou, China	
USAF	Jonsson, Benjamin R.	Captain	Pilot	1999	USAFA	Univ of Jordan	Amman, Jordan	
USAF	Yim, Jade N.	Captain	Pilot	2000	UCLA	Qinghua Univ	Beijing, China	
USAF	Smith, Steven J.	Captain	Intel	1999	Brigham Young Univ	Fudan Univ	Shanghai, China	
USAF	Jensen, Jonathan A.	Major	Engineer	1994	USAFA	Univ of Bergen	Bergen, Norway	
USAF	Pease, John M.	Captain	Space&Missile Ops	1992	Cornell Coll	Mohammed V Univ	Rabat, Morocco	
USAF	Cosden, Sean J.	Captain	Pilot	1997	University of Notre Dame	Sofia Univ	Sofia, Bulgaria	

11-L-0559/OSD/49977

~~FOUO~~

February 7, 2005

1 9: 52

032

TO: Matt Latimer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Testimony

Please take a look at this note from Steve Cambone. I agree with it. How do we get the testimony fixed?

Thanks.

Attach.

1/31/05 USD (I) Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
020705-34

.....
Please *respond* by 2/11/05

7-Feb 05

31 Jan 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49978

OSD 11005-05

UNCLASSIFIED

1/31/2005 9:43 AM

032

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: Comment on v. 1.8 of Your Congressional Testimony

I have read version 1.8 of the testimony being prepared for you.

In substance and form I think it misses the mark. It is focused, for the most part, on your shoe laces. In those places where it tries to look forward, it does so by focusing backward, on the resolution of problems we have encountered.

I urge you to consider a new approach.

First, much has happened since you testified a year ago. Many of those events have had a profound effect upon or forever changed the landscape, or strategic environment, in which the department is operating. To list but a few:

- Abu Gharib and the changes we have implemented;
- 9/11 Commission Report
- Intelligence Reform Legislation
- Afghan elections and inauguration of a new President
- Creation of the Iraqi Interim Government
- Iraq's election
- Advancing relations with India and Pakistan
- ISAF
- NATO reform
- DoD Commitment to the Global Posture initiative
- Passage of National Security Personnel System
- Resetting of the US Army
- Navy's enormous effort to transform
- Important steps to ease the burdens on rotations
- More... ..

These are not laundry list-type items. Some of these successes are being paid for by the lives of US personnel.

11-UNCLASSIFIED-0559 OSD 49979

OSD 11005-05

31 Jan 05

They mark, in some cases individually, but in total a major step function change in what we will focus our attention on and how we will our business in the coming months and years.

They also represent not a few successes for the President's policies.

The Congress and the American people need to know of the implications of these accomplishments and initiatives and how they affect what matters to them. They need to see DoD activity as part of the larger vision laid out by the President.

Second, there are a relatively small number of big concerns among Members you should address:

- The strategy for success in Afghanistan and Iraq
- That DoD is not trying to take over "paramilitary" or covert operations
- Role for supplementals in the Army's plan
- How FY 06 budget/program decisions were made
- Others.. .

In each case the Congress needs to hear not only the "what," but the "why" of decisions you have taken.

Third, there are initiatives you may wish to announce.

It is important, as we set out on a new term, operating with real successes behind us, that you give Congress and the American people an idea of the way forward, careful always not to promise too much or underplay the difficulties we face.

As always, I am available to discuss this with you and work with the speechwriters.

~~FOUO~~

February 2, 2005
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN -8 AM 10: 06

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Condolence Letters

I would like to see a draft of the condolence letters on the troops who have died in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I think we ought to think about referencing the success in Afghanistan and how proud everyone involved can be to know that 25 million people have been liberated and are now on a path and have the opportunities offered in a free system. Their service has made a difference.

We might make some reference to the Iraqi elections and how important the work and the sacrifice have been in these achievements as well.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
020205-6

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49981

OSD 11008-05

293

2 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

February 2, 2005

OSD 11009-05

TO: Bill Schneider

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Druyun Memo

Here's the Darlene Druyun memo. I don't know if you got a copy of it before you left, but it lays out some thoughts as to how it happened.

Attach.

11/2/04 Druyun Memo

DHR:ss
020205-3

.....
Please respond by

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11009-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49982

2 November 2004

SUBJECT: Darlene Druyun and corruption in the Air Force acquisition process.
The question is: "How could such major corruption happen, over such a long period, without those serving above and around her seeing her corruption and reporting it to the proper authorities?"

The following history offers a clue as to how this might have happened:

- Druyun served as the "civilian" Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Air Force for Acquisition for ten years
- During the ten years of Druyun's service, the position of her immediate superior, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, was vacant for four of those ten years. As a result, for those four years Druyun was the senior civilian in the Air Force acquisition system and in charge of the day-to-day activities of all Air Force acquisition. In the six years that there was a confirmed Assistant Secretary, daily oversight of Druyun's activities was spotty, since there were four Assistant Secretaries who moved in and out of the post as her superior, for an average tenure of roughly 18 months.
- In addition to Druyun's post, there is also a "military" Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. During Druyun's ten-year tenure, there were four "military" Deputies moving in and out of office. But, these three-star general officers were not involved in contracting. It is notable that, under Title 10 U.S.C., even today only a senior civilian can make major acquisition decisions. Military officers, no matter how senior, cannot do so. Therefore, by virtue of her position as the senior Air Force acquisition civilian, all procurement information passed through and was controlled by her.
- To further add to the turbulence in Air Force acquisition, during her ten-year tenure, there were five Secretaries or Acting Secretaries of the U.S. Air Force. And, there were four different Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to provide oversight of Air Force acquisition organization and processes. The rapid turnover reduced continuity of adult supervision.
- However, within twelve months of the current Air Force Secretary being confirmed, and within seven months of having an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition confirmed, the Air Force acquisition organization

~~FOUO~~

and processes were altered to ensure that no one person could acquire too much independent acquisition-authority. This had the effect of removing much of the organizational power Druyun had accumulated over time. She chose to retire shortly thereafter.

The turbulence in the civilian political appointees, both the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force for Acquisition, plus the turbulence in the "military" acquisition officials, is a formula for problems. The combination of that turbulence, coupled with the statutory requirements, and the serious delays in getting political appointees through the FBI clearances, the ethics clearances and the Senate Confirmation process, all conspire to create an environment that is hospitable to corruption. And corruption is what we got.

To what extent this set of circumstances caused corruption of such magnitude will never be known with certainty. But facts are facts, and I am persuaded these facts were a nontrivial part of the problem. They need to be fixed.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49984

FOUO

FEB 05 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Update Bio

Please have someone **fix** this background sheet, so it is updated and takes into account some of the transformational things we have done and the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, and the GWOT.

Attach.
SecDef Bio

DHR:ss
020405-11

*I want to edit
the new one*

02050

.....
Please respond by

2/24/05

FOUO

OSD 11010-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49985

5-7601



DONALD H. RUMSFELD

Secretary of Defense



Donald H. Rumsfeld was sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense on January 20, 2001. Before assuming his present post, the former Navy pilot had also served as the 13th Secretary of Defense, White House Chief of Staff, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, U.S. Congressman and chief executive officer of two Fortune 500 companies.

Secretary Rumsfeld is responsible for directing the actions of the Defense Department in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The war is being waged against a backdrop of major change within the Department of Defense. The department has developed a new defense strategy and replaced the old model for sizing forces with a newer approach more relevant to the 21st century. Secretary Rumsfeld proposed and the President approved a significant reorganization of the worldwide command structure, known as the Unified Command Plan, that resulted in the establishment of the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Strategic Command, the latter charged with the responsibilities formerly held by the Strategic and Space Commands which were disestablished.



The Department also has refocused its space capabilities and fashioned a new concept of strategic deterrence that increases security while reducing strategic nuclear weapons. To help strengthen the deterrent, the missile defense research and testing program has been reorganized and revitalized, free of the restraints of the ABM treaty.

Mr. Rumsfeld attended Princeton University on academic and NROTC scholarships (A.B., 1954) and served in the U.S. Navy (1954-57) as an aviator and flight instructor. In 1957, he transferred to the Ready Reserve and continued his Naval service in flying and administrative assignments as a drilling reservist until 1975. He transferred to the Standby Reserve when he became Secretary of Defense in 1975 and to the Retired Reserve with the rank of Captain in 1989.

In 1957, he came to Washington, DC to serve as Administrative Assistant to a Congressman. After a stint with an investment banking firm, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois in 1962, at the age of 30, and was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968.

Mr. Rumsfeld resigned from Congress in 1969 during his fourth term to join the President's Cabinet. From 1969 to 1970, he served as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity and Assistant to the President. From 1971 to 1972, he was Counsellor to the President and Director of the Economic Stabilization Program. In 1973, he left Washington, DC, to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium (1973-1974).

In August 1974, he was called back to Washington, DC, to serve as Chairman of the transition to the Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. He then became Chief of Staff of the White House and a member of the President's Cabinet (1974-1975). He served as the 13th U.S. Secretary of Defense, the youngest in the country's history (1975-1977).

11-L-0559/OSD/49986

From 1977 to 1985 he served as Chief Executive Officer, President, and then Chairman of G.D. Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company. The successful turnaround there earned him awards as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry from the Wall Street Transcript (1980) and Financial World (1981). From 1985 to 1990 he was in private business.

Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation from 1990 to 1993. General Instrument Corporation was a leader in broadband transmission, distribution, and access control technologies. Until being sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman of the Board of Gilead Sciences, Inc., a pharmaceutical company.

Before returning for his second tour as Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld chaired the bipartisan U.S. Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, in 1998, and the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, in 2000.

During his business career, Mr. Rumsfeld continued his public service in a variety of Federal posts, including:

- Member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control (1982 - 1986);
- Special Presidential Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982 - 1983);
- Senior Advisor to the President's Panel on Strategic Systems (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the U.S. Joint Advisory Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1983 - 1984);
- Special Presidential Envoy to the Middle East (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the National Commission on Public Service (1987 - 1990);
- Member of the National Economic Commission (1988 - 1989);
- Member of the Board of Visitors of the National Defense University (1988 - 1992);
- Member of the Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1989 - 1991); and
- Member of the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission (1999 - 2000).

While in the private sector, Mr. Rumsfeld's civic activities included service as a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and a member of the boards of trustees of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the National Park Foundation, and as Chairman of the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, Inc.

In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld was awarded the nation's highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/rumsfeld_bio.html

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

275 11-059/005721

DepSecDef

USD(P) 6/7/05

ES-3093

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Regional Centers Outreach Networks

JUN 2 2005
3

- You asked how we can move forward with “unofficial e-mail networks” like the ones General Dunn described in his memo to you. (Tab A.)
- Your Regional Centers can use such e-mail networks with their graduates and with those of other USG-funded international education programs.
 - o The Regional Centers’ most valuable product is their network of empathetic alumni.
- All the Regional Centers have alumni outreach programs – strengthening these programs is a key aspect of the vision you articulated for the Centers.
- Elements of these outreach programs include:
 - o “Pushing” out e-mail updates to keep alumni informed and engaged.
 - o “Pulling” alumni back to the Center for additional information, resources, and interaction through interactive websites.
 - o Creating national alumni chapters that expand the reach of our message through the Centers’ alumni and maintain graduates’ connection to the Centers.
- Another key aspect of your vision for the Centers is expanding their current target audience to include interagency representation as well as non-government organizations, international organizations, and key foreign media actors and think tank experts.
 - o This approach puts U.S. military officers and civilian officials in a common venue with U.S. and foreign government and non-government counterparts.

OSD 11048-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49988

11-05 P12:07 IN

- o Creating such an alumni base provides a unique network we can use to build and integrate partnerships across relevant security actors.
- The Centers are working to leverage their alumni while increasing the quality and throughput of their residence courses that produce the alumni.
 - o Use of an integrated educational institutional network will provide significant value added to that effort.
- One way we might help the Centers in this effort is to arrange for senior USG officials to meet with Center alumni whenever our officials travel abroad.

Prepared by: John Kreul, OSD(P)/Strategy (b)(6)

Coordination:

ISP Eurasia – Dave Cate, 6/1

ISP **NATO** Policy – Scott Schless, 5/31

ISA African Affairs

ISA Asia-Pacific

ISA NESAs

ISA WHAs

PD/Strategy

FOUO

Ref: ES-3093
05/005721

INFORMATION RETENTION

May 9, 2005

31C

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo from Mike Dunn

Attached is an excellent paper from Mike Dunn. Please take a look at it, and tell me how you think we can move forward.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/25/05 SecDef Memo to Lt. Gen. Mike Dunn
5/05/05 Lt. Gen. Mike Dunn Memo to SecDef

DHR:as
050905-31

.....
Please respond by 6/16/05

FOUO

INFORMATION RETENTION
114-L-0559/OSD/49992

~~FOUO~~

NO. 220 1. 2

ES 3093
05/005721

April 25, 2005

TO: Lt Gen Mike Dunn

CC Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Paca
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT Military Educational Institution Network

Mike, it sounds like you are achieving some good results with your unofficial e-mail network among military educational institutions – good thinking.

Are there other, similar networks of which we could take advantage?

Thanks.

DHR:db
041204-14

.....
Please respond by 5/12/05

Sir, ^{alt} 5/9
Response attached.
v/r
Lt Col Kengyel

MAY 09 2005

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07736-05

11-L-0559/OSD/49993

04/5/17

5 May 05

MEMORANDUM FOR SECDEF

From: President, National Defense University (NDU)

Mike D

Subject: Military Educational Institution Network – your question

1. **Sir**, you asked the question (i in response to a note I sent you (atch 4) about our unofficial email network “Are there other, similar networks of which ~~we~~ could take advantage?”

2. **My** answer is: I **think so**. As NDU evaluates what it has learned thus ~~far~~, we have evolved a set of principles or mid-lessons learned (atch 1). We know we need **someone** to ~~run~~ the net, set up the rules of engagement, decide who can communicate to which subnets, and to coordinate the content being sent. We have hired someone to help us manage the net.

3. We also know the number of people we can reach is almost **unlimited**. I “talk” with every one of **my** students and faculty members every couple of **days**. It costs me almost **no** time to do **so**. I believe, if our outreach program is managed correctly, in the future we will have a net of subnets of customers which will number about 50,000 people.

4. Below are examples of subnets which I personally “run”:

- **NDU** Board of Visitors
- **NDU** Foundation Board of Directors
- **Capstone/Pinnacle** Senior Mentors
- **Commandants** of US military institutions (War Colleges, etc)
- **Key** OSD leaders
- **Key** JS GO/FOs
- **Key** US civilian outsiders – selected think tanks, academics, etc

5. Each “component” at NDU **runs** their own subnet. **For example**, the Industrial College of the **Armed** Forces (ICAF) is linked to businesses. Its students/faculty travel to key US and foreign business and evaluate the state of an industry. ICAF has subnets organized **by** industry, and they also keep in touch with their growing alumni base. **Another example**, our three regional centers (**Africa**, Western Hemisphere, and **NESA**) have and are creating more alumni chapters, have links to international and domestic think **tanks** and military colleges, and maintain contact with key military/civilian leaders abroad. **[As an aside, when we move the RCs to DSCA this fall, NDU will continue a strong interaction/support of the RCs.]** **Final example** – every foreign alumni of NDU (be it a week-long **course** or one which is a year long) has access to the NDU library after they graduate. We control this access so that we know who is “visiting” and what he is reading. It is widely used. **USDP’s** initiative to put major policy content on our web sites is proving to be popular with international officers/civilians.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

6. Below are examples of groups we have identified to attempt to reach and **who are** eager for interaction:

- Defense Orientation Conference Association (DOCA)
- Young Presidents Organization (**YPO**)
- World Presidents Organization (**WPO**)
- The mailing lists of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (**INSS**) and Center for Technology **and** National Security Policy (**8-9K** people/organizations)
- US Defense Attaches stationed abroad (we already include a few of these)
- Foreign Defense Attaches assigned to Washington (we already include **a few of these**)

7. Below are examples of groups **which we** could pursue:

- Business Executives for National Security (BENS)
- Council on Foreign Relations
- **NATO** Network -- ~~run~~ by Sikes
- Nets ~~run~~ by all the regional centers
- Veterans groups - VFW, American Legion, etc.
- Think **tanks** more broadly [we do **this** presently ad hoc] - a list of just the **Washington** ones is quite large (atch 2)
- US Ambassadors
- Foreign Ambassadors to the US

8. All **of** the subnets we **run**, have to be manually **built** and maintained. **As the** world becomes more digital, the following are examples of possible subnets **which** ~~could be led by~~ **DOD senior leaders**:

- The **CHODs** of every country in the world - with **subsets** for major alliances
- The **MODs**
- Elite groups you interact with - Davos, Wehrkunde, Defense Policy **Board**, etc
- Acquisition or intelligence officials in every country
- The world's Labs
- The US Press ~~run~~ by OSD/PA - especially in small markets which don't normally have strong DOD coverage (or rely on large news services like AP or Reuters for information)
- Congressional **staff** or members - run by OSD/LA
- The sub-webs ~~run~~ by other departments in the USG

9. We are always **on** the "look-out" for content. If there is one area where **we** could use assistance (besides money to pay a person or two), it is in finding suitable, thoughtful content. We have found that even if a piece is prominent in a major publication (like the **WSJ**), odds are that busy, senior people would **not** have read it had not we sent it to them. [This is especially true of key US elites.]

Very Respectfully,

CF: DSD, CJCS, USDP, DJS

11-L-0559/OSD/49995
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/49996

NDU Network Principles

Premise: It's not sufficient for us to place info on the web and expect non-researchers to find it. ~~What~~ causes someone to read a piece is that it has to be delivered to an electronic in-box - by a person (not a computer program) who is of sufficient rank or importance. The fewer keystrokes necessary to bring the piece to the screen, the more likely it is to be read. Imbedding the article in the email attracts more attention to the piece. A link is less effective.

Lessons Learned:

1. The sender of the email - the degree the receiver knows him, his rank/status, his credibility, his straight-forwardness - is important. The more personal the sender is with his note, the more likely it is that a note will be read. If a sender has a history of sending thoughtful pieces or useful info, he will be read.
2. Centralized control of the web is difficult. Each major part of NDU has customers - and we find better results if they manage their customer base and forward select pieces to their subnets. We are just getting organized here and will learn more as we build our web of subwebs. In a perfect world, different webs would be fed from an organizing central force which would provide content and data.
3. Nets that are the most robust have common interests, missions, or other external links (such as former colonies or countries in the same region).
4. There are four inhibitions to foreigners using the net. First, is their familiarity with computers. Many have their staffs screen everything that comes to them. Second is their lack of familiarity of English. I get many notes back from a Commandant's colonel or major saying, "Thank you for the piece - on behalf of my boss." Third are infrastructure limitations. Many countries do not have the same level of connectivity needed - predominantly in Africa and parts of the Middle East. (USDP is overseeing a program to help remedy this one - a program called Regional International Outreach). The fourth is that some countries are worried about electronic monitoring - and the email addresses they give us are "unofficial," personal yahoo or hotmail accounts.
5. Internationally, some countries are very appreciative of the contact. They seem "starved" for attention. They include: Pakistan, India, Jordan, and small countries in central Europe. Other countries don't want to be left out ... but also don't really want to contribute. Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, Malaysia, and Singapore fall into this area.
6. Measuring "success" is difficult. Generally, it is output oriented. Feedback is often vinnette-tized and not scientific.
7. Information we send is more effective is it's: the opinion of major decision-makers; the opinion of serious non-governmental officials; or raw facts/data. What does not work is information that appears "spun" (some of the PA releases are talking points which give DOD views on a subject - our feedback is that these are perceived with lesser importance than other articles or speeches).

8. Too much information or too many emails lowers the effectiveness of the web. Readers tend to view too ~~many~~ messages as "spam." 1-2 per week is about the max.
9. We have yet to crack major institutiondthink-tanksin crisis. For example, ~~we~~ routinely conduct VTCs with research counterparts in Japan and Korea. When the most recent dispute over control of islands in the Sea of Japan arose, we were not able to convince ~~our~~ counterparts to conduct a VTC to examine, in an academic atmosphere, the underpinnings of both sides of the dispute. Their bosses were reluctant to engage in a near-real time (**NRT**) activity with political overtones.
10. The web seems to work because it is unofficial and because non-attribution and academic ~~freedom~~ apply. It ~~is~~ interesting to speculate how a virtual, near-real time, collaborative environment session between **USDP** and every one of his counterparts around the world **might** work. ~~Or~~ even a Deputies ~~Committee~~ meeting conducted in a virtual, collaborative, interactive environment ...
11. The NDU web does not compete in the PA marketplace. Our customers are ~~mostly~~ foreign and mostly the elite. We do not reach large ~~numbers~~ (yet) of people. 1 see ~~our~~ role as supplemental to PA.
12. The power of the net to reach everyone quickly in an organization is phenomenal. Imagine the impact of a Memorial Day memo from **SECDEF** that arrives in every electronic **In-box** of every soldier, sailor, airman, and ~~marine~~ on active duty ... directly ~~from~~ the Secretary himself. It would definitely be read. We found the same effect with ~~our~~ outreach efforts.
13. E-delivery is not only fast, but economical. We ~~are~~ transitioning much of the hard-copy **NDU** press pieces to electronic documents and saving money doing it.
14. ~~Our~~ NDU library is ~~now~~ almost virtual. It ~~has~~ subscriptions to services which provide 18,000 daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly publications in over 20 languages. Almost all research at **NDU** is done virtually. Someday in the future, DOD may have only one large virtual library. Library customers would enter the library from their desktop computers. ~~Books~~ ~~are~~ increasingly available on line. Hard copy books could be managed with small numbers of branch outlets - ~~many of~~ which are resident in civilian communities. Our librarians' role today is knowledge management.
15. We do not have the capacity yet for streaming video. We are working on it. But consider a "stored" presentation ~~from~~ the **CJCS** or **SECDEF** downloaded in **NRT** and played and discussed in front of military officers in educational facilities in around the world. Powerful impact.
16. We, ~~as~~ an academic institution, have several advantages over others in government. We have email addresses in dot-edu domain (versus dot-mil). **Thus** some of our customers of information ~~do~~ not realize we are part of the USG. **And** we have both the time and the leadership intent to pursue this.

11-L-0559/OSD/49999

Selected Washington Area Research Institutions

For Profit Institutions

BAE Systems
1300 North 17th Street
Suite 1400
Arlington, VA 22209
703-907-8200

Booz Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Drive
McLean, VA 22102
(703) 902-5000

CACI International Inc
1100 North Glebe Road
Arlington, VA 22201
703-841-7800

Computer Sciences Corporation
Federal Sector Headquarters
3170 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church, VA 22042
703.876.1000

DEI International
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Thirteenth Floor
Washington, DC 20006-4614
202.452.6900

Kissinger McLarty Associates
Washington, DC
(202) 822-8182

Science Applications International Corporation
1710 SAIC Drive
McLean, VA 22102

SRI International
1100 Wilson Blvd., Suite 2800
Arlington, VA 22209-2268
703-524-2053

Stonebridge International
555 Thirteenth Street, NW
Suite 300 West
Washington, DC 20004-1109
202-637-8600

The Albright Group
901 15th Street NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20005
202.842.7222

The Scowcroft Group
900 17th Street NW
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20006
202-296-9312

Non-Profit Think Tanks

American Academy of Diplomacy
1800 K Street NW, Suite 1014
Washington, DC 20006
202/331-3721

American Enterprise Institute
1150 Seventeenth Street, **N.W.**
Washington, DC 20036
202-862-5800

American Foreign Policy Council
1521 Sixteenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
202-462-6055

Arlington Institute
3501 Lee Highway, Suite 204
Arlington, **VA** 22209
703-812-7900

Arms Control Association
1726 M Street, NW, Suite 201
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 463-8270

Aspen Institute
One Dupont Circle, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20036-1133
202.736.5800

Association on Third World Affairs
C/O DR. Loma Hahn
1717 K St. NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036
202-973-0157

Atlantic Council of the United States
1101 15th Street, NW
11th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 463-7241

Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 797-6000

Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2103
202.483.7600

Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, **N.W.**
Washington, DC 20001-5403
(202) 842-0200

Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Suite 615
Washington, DC 20005
202-332-0600

Center for Global Development
1776 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Suite 301
Washington, DC 20036
202-416-0700

Center for Intelligence Studies
1016 K Street, **NE**
Washington, DC 20002
202 397-1296

Center for International Policy
1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 801
Washington, DC 20036
202.232.3317

Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 682-1800

Center for National Security Studies
1120 19th Street, NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 721-5650

Center for Policy Alternatives
1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 710
Washington, DC 20009
202.387.6030

Center for Security Policy
1920 L Street, NW, Suite 210
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 835-9077

Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Suite 912
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 331-7990

Center for Strategic and International
Studies
1800 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006
202.887.0200

Center for the Study of the Presidency
1020 19th St. NW, Suite 250
Washington, DC 20036
202-872-9800

Chemical and Biological **Arms** Control
Institute
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Seventh Floor
Washington, DC 20006
202-296-3550

Council on Foreign Relations
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 518-3400

Economic Policy Institute
1660 L St., NW, Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 775-8810

Eisenhower Institute
915 15th St., NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20005-2311
202.628.4444

Federation of American Scientists
1717 K St., NW, Suite 209
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 546-3300

Fund for Peace
1701 K Street, NW, 11th Floor
Washington, DC 20006
202.223.7940

German Marshall Fund of the United States
1744 R Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
202-745-3950

Henry L. Stimson Center
11 Dupont Circle, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20036
202-223-5956

Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave NE
Washington, DC 20002-4999
202.546.4400

Hudson Institute
1015 18th Street, NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 223-7770

Institute for Foreign Policy Analyses
1725 Desales Street, NW, Suite 402
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 463-7942

Institute for International Economics
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
202-328-9000

Institute for Policy Studies
733 15th St NW, Suite 1020
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 234-9382

International Center on Nonviolent Conflict
1919 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Suite 725
Washington, DC 20006

International Institute for Strategic Studies
1747 Pennsylvania Ave NW
7th Floor
Washington, DC 20006
202 659 1490

International Strategic Studies Association
PO Box 20407
Alexandria, VA 22320
(703) 548-1070

Lexington Institute
1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22209
703-522-5828

Meridian International Center
164 Crescent Place, NW
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 667-6800

Middle East Policy Council
1730 M Street, NW, Suite 512
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 296-6767

National Research Council
National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20418
202-334-2000

National Council for U.S.-Arab Relations
1730 M St. NW, Suite 503
Washington, DC 20036
202.293.6466

Nixon Center
1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1250
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 887-1000

Nuclear Threat Initiative
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
7th Floor
Washington, DC 20006
202-296-4810

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
901 N. Stuart Street, Suite 200
Arlington, VA 22203
703-525-0770

Progressive Policy Institute
600 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20003
202) 547-0001

Washington Institute for Near East Policy
1828 L Street NW Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20036
202-452-0650

Academic Institutions

The Center for Congressional and
Presidential Studies
American University
4400 Massachusetts Ave NW
Ward 109
Washington, DC 20016-8130
202-885-3491

Space Policy Institute
Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University
Stuart Hall, Suite 201
Washington, DC 20052
202.994.7292

Center for Science, Trade, & Technology
Policy
George Mason University
3401 North Fairfax Dr.
Fairfax, VA 22201
703-993-8210

Center for Contemporary Arab Studies
Georgetown University
Intercultural Center 241
1316 36th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057-1052
(202) 687-5793

Center for Peace and Security Studies
Georgetown University
111 Intercultural Center
Box 571029
Washington, DC 20057-1029
202-687-8590

Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
Georgetown University
1316 36th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20007
202-965-5735

Women In International Security
Georgetown University
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service
3240 Prospect Street, NW
Washington, DC 20007
(202) 687-3366

Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
11 Dupont Circle, NW
9th Floor
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 478-3446

Hoover Institution
Stanford University
7900 Westpark Drive
McLean, VA 22102-4299

Center for National Security Studies
The George Washington University
Gelman Library, Ste. 701
2130 H St. NW
Washington, DC 20037

Applied Physics Laboratory
The Johns Hopkins University.
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
Laurel MD 20723-6099
(240)-228-5000

Center of Canadian Studies
The Johns Hopkins University
1740 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 663-5714

Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS
The Johns Hopkins University
1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 525
Washington, DC 20036
202-663-5880

**Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS
The Johns Hopkins University
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-2297
202.663.5773**

**Center for International Development and
Conflict Management
University of Maryland
0145 Tydings Hall
College Park, MD 20742
301.314.7703**

**Center for International Security Studies at
Maryland
University of Maryland at College Park
School of Public Affairs
Van Munching Hall
College Park, MD 20742
301-405-7601**

Federally Funded Research & Development Centers

Homeland Security Institute
ANSER
Suite 800
2900 South Quincy Street, Suite 800
Arlington, VA 22206
(703) 416-3134

Institute for Defense Analyses
4850 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22311
703-845-2000

C3I Federally Funded Research & Development
Center
MITRE Corp
7515 Colshire Drive
McLean, VA 22102-7508
(703) 883-6000

National Defense Research Institute
Project Air Force
Arroyo Center
RAND Corporation
1200 South Hayes Street
Arlington, VA 22202-5050
703-413-1100

Center for Naval Analyses
The CNA Corporation
4825 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22311
703.824.2000

Think Tanks with Federal Appropriations

Eurasia Foundation
1350 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 234-7370

International Republican Institute
1225 Eye Street, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005
202.408.9450

National Endowment for Democracy
1101 Fifteenth Street, NW,
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005
202/293-9072

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
2030 M Street, NW
Fifth Floor
Washington, DC 20036-3306
(202) 728-5500

The United States Institute of Peace
1200 17th Street, NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20036-3011
(202) 457-1700

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004-3027
202/691-4000

Government Think Tanks

Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency
Department of Defense
3701 North Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22203-1714

Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520
202-647-4000

School of Professional and Area Studies
Foreign Service Institute
4000 Arlington Boulevard
Arlington, VA 20004

Defense Capabilities and Management Team
Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20548
(202) 512-3000

Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
101 Independence Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20540-7500

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
The National Defense University
Coast Guard Headquarters Building
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, DC 20593-0001
202-685-4670

Center for Technology and National
Security Policy
The National Defense University
300 5th Ave SW
Ft. McNair, DC 20319
202-685-2529

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
The National Defense University
300 5th Ave SW
Ft. McNair, DC 20319
202-685-

Institute for National Strategic Studies
The National Defense University
300 5th Ave SW
Ft. McNair, DC 20319
202-685-2335

Near East South Asia Center for Strategic
Studies
The National Defense University
Coast Guard Headquarters Building
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, DC 20593
(202) 685-4131

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies
The National Defense University
300 5th Ave SW
Ft. McNair, DC 20319
202 685-7300

→ fulfordc@ndu.edu

~~FOUO~~
~~SECRET~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

JOHN JONAS
F41
JR

JUN 03 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Chairman's Program Recommendations

Attached are the Chairman's Program Recommendations. They seem sensible and relatively modest. Please *give them* appropriate attention in the upcoming budget cycle.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/31/05 CJCS Memo to SecDef (OSD 16455-05)

DJR:as
060205-3 (TS)

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~
~~SECRET~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

OSD 11173-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50009



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

June 9, 2005, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Chairman's Program Recommendations

- Thank you for your note with the Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR) (TAB A). I will ensure the issues are addressed in the upcoming FY 2007-FY 2011 program budget review.
- Where the CPR identifies specific cost estimates, they are modest. However, information assurance shortfalls and continued production of the C-17 beyond 180 aircraft will result in funding needs that are potentially billions of dollars (i.e., the unit cost of additional C-17 aircraft is \$200 million).
- The Chairman notes that issues such as Information Assurance, Deployable Joint Command & Control, and Strategic Airlift have ongoing assessments that will inform the FY 2007-FY 2011 program budget. I will work with Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Joint Staff to refine the cost estimates and provide alternatives for your consideration.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:

As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/50010

OSD 11173-05

~~FOUO~~
~~SECRET~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

JOHN TUNES
FYI
JR

JUN 03 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Chairman's Program Recommendations

Attached are the Chairman's Program Recommendations. They seem sensible and relatively modest. Please give them appropriate attention in the upcoming budget cycle.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/31/05 CJCS Memo to SecDef (OSD 76433-05)

DHR:m
060205-J (TS)

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~
~~SECRET~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50011

5/6
1032

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SEC. OF DEFENSE
MAY 08 2005
2005 JUN 13 AM 6:34

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Lee Adams

311.1

The letter from Lee Adams took over a month to get to me. I wonder if we can check the mail and find out why it takes a month for something to get to me.

Thanks.

DHR:aj
050505-9

.....
Please respond by 6/1/05

6/1

To Mike Donley
From Paul Butler

Mike -
This is a recurring source of frustration for See Det. Ray did a memo explaining how long it's suppose to take and why but I think we need to do a relook. Let's discuss and see if you can get him on up to date. Thanks

Paul
Paul Butler

5/23

6 MAY 05

11-L-0559/OSD/50012-05
OSD 11201-05



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 13 AM 6:34

10 JUN 2005

311

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD**

SUBJECT: Delays in Mail Service

- In the attached snowflake you asked why it is taking a month for a letter to get to you.
- In January **2005**, processing time for mail addressed to you at the Pentagon was taking **10-12** days (from date of postmark, handling and irradiation by the US Postal Service (USPS) at a facility in New Jersey, and additional screening procedures at the Pentagon).
- Processing time has increased since the March **2005** anthrax incident at the Pentagon.
 - USPS service has been inconsistent. A sampling taken earlier this month indicated that 85% of irradiated mail was received at the Pentagon within **7** days of postmark; but the other **15%** had postmarks **up to 75** days.
 - Pentagon mail screening operations were not adequately staffed to meet more stringent, labor intensive screening procedures, which resulted in a **7-10** day backlog accumulating in the Remote Delivery Facility.
- Actions taken/being taken to resolve the situation are as follows:
 - The Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) has assumed daily oversight of Pentagon mail screening and associated lab testing from the Army.
 - The screening and lab testing process has been reduced from **3** days to **1**
 - Additional contractor staff has been hired to handle the backlog, projected to be eliminated by **June 17, 2005**.
 - The USPS plans to open a local irradiation facility in the DC area in **CY 06**. In the interim, we are working with local USPS officials to baseline standards and identify opportunities to reduce transit and processing time for the NJ facility.
 - We are working with the Army's Defense Post Office, PFPA and others to see how we can streamline end-to-end mail operations within the Pentagon.
- I will report progress to the Deputy Secretary on a regular basis.

COORDINATION:

Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, Sandra Riley, June **8, 2005**
Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency, John Jester, June **7, 2005**

Attachment: As stated

Prepared By: Craig H. Glassner (b)(6)

11-L-0539/OSD/50013

OSD 11201-05

10 JUN 05

6 MAY 05

FOUO

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY SECRETARY

2005 JUN 13 PM 12:12
May 10, 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Marine Vest Issue

Please get back to me on the Marine vest issue. I don't accept what I am hearing.
I think there may be more to it. You ought to push and probe hard and FAST.

Thanks.

Attach
5/10/05 Washington Post Article

DHR:aa
051005-24

.....
Please respond by

6/26/05

Tab A

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/50014

OSD 11227-05

420

104405



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

2005 JUN 13 PM 12:11

CM-2545-05
10 June 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, ^{F.R.} CJCS *11/18 9 June 05*

SUBJECT: Marine Vest Issue (SF)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), in May, the Marine Corps learned about an upcoming unfavorable article in the Marine Corps Times and decided to recall 5,277 Marine Corps Outer Tactical Vests (OTVs). The basis for this decision was to alleviate any doubts in the minds of Marines in combat.
- **Analysis**
 - In August 2004, 11 production lots (totaling 5,277) of the OTVs failed the 9mm ballistic test.
 - In November 2004, the Marine Corps retested the same lots to a slightly reduced 9mm ballistic specification. The vests passed.
 - Based on this test and the urgent need for the OTVs, the Marine Corps waived the original ballistic specification and issued the vests to Marines in the field.
 - It should be noted that the revised test criteria still exceeded the muzzle velocity of the typical 9mm round. In addition, OTVs are always used in concert with small arms protective insert plates that protect the wearer against 7.62mm rifle rounds.
 - The attached draft memo from the Secretary of the Navy (TAB B) discusses this issue further. I concur in its content and in the Marine Corps' actions.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 11227-05

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

2005 JUN 13 PM 12:12
May 10, 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Marine Vest Issue

Please get back to me on the Marine vest issue. I don't accept what I am hearing.
I think there may be more to it. You ought to push and probe hard and FAST.

Thanks.

Attach
5/10/05 Washington Post Article

DHR:as
051005-24

.....
Please respond by 6/26/05

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11227-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50016

TAB B

DRAFT

FROM: Gordon England
TO: Donald Rumsfeld
CC: General Myers
SUBJECT: Marine Vest Issue

The facts as presented in the Washington Post article published on 10 May regarding the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) have been taken out of context and misrepresent the actual capabilities of the OTVs in question. The Marine Corps knew an unfavorable article was forthcoming and recalled the subject lots to remove any doubts that the article could potentially create in the minds of Marines in combat.

Of the OTVs initially fielded, eleven lots (totaling 5,277 vests) were fielded with ballistic waivers for the 9mm contract requirement. The waivers, developed in concert with Army Natick engineers, involved reduced 9mm ballistic protection requirements to 1300-1350 feet per second. Standard 9mm pistol muzzle velocities typically range between 1150 and 1200 fps. Consequently, the subject lots are clearly capable of defeating the 9mm and other ballistic threats, in addition to providing the required protection from shrapnel and fragmentation. In addition, it should be noted that the OTV was neither designed nor intended to be worn as a stand-alone vest; rather, it is part of a system that includes the Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) plates. The 5,277 OTVs in question represent approximately 3% of the total 181,000 OTVs fielded to Fleet Marine Forces.

The decision to waive these lots was made in order to urgently field the best available individual protective equipment to support the redeployment of Marines to Iraq in the Spring of 2004. OTVs, to include those lots subject to the ballistic waiver, are a significant improvement in protection from the outdated Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) flak jacket they were designed to replace. Combined with the SAPI plates they are designed to carry, the system provides protection from assault rifle rounds.

I believe the right actions were taken to provide the best equipment to our Marines and Sailors going in harm's way. I am available to discuss this issue further at your convenience.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/50017

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

COORDINATION

USMC

Col Van Dyke

18 May 05

Tab C

UNCLASSIFIED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRETARY OF THE
DEFENSE
2005 JUN 13 PM 12:21

6/13

ACTION MEMO

CM-2548-05
10 June 2005

340

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *For VR/K 9 June 05*

SUBJECT: Marine Corps Idea (SF 1017)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), I believe the Marine Corps' best recruiting practices may provide ways the other Services could improve recruiting and retention.
- **Analysis.** The draft memorandum (TAB B) to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) recommends a review and assessment of the Marine Corps strategy for possible application to other Services. An information paper on the Marine Corps Recruiting Model is attached (TAB C).

10 Jun 05

RECOMMENDATION: Request you forward the attached memorandum to USD(P&R).

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____ Other _____
JUN 14 2005

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Rear Admiral Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1

(b)(6)

MA SD	6/13	SMA DSD	
TSA SD		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	11/6/13	1445	
ESR MA	2005	6/13/1425	

20 Jun 05

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/50019

OSD 21228-05

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Marine Corps Active Duty Enlisted Recruiting Strategy

1. Purpose. To summarize the Marine Corps' recruiting and accession strategy.
2. Key Points
 - The FY 00/05 Marine Corps Accession Strategy defines the vision and guidance.
 - Marine Corps Strategy 21 Goal – to make America's Marines who comprise the premier expeditionary "Total Force in Readiness."
 - Overall recruiting objective is to provide trained and experienced Marines through the "Street to Fleet" process for mission commanders.
 - Department of Manpower and Reserve Affairs is "Street-to-Fleet" process owner.
 - Continues to refine loss estimates to improve projections
 - Keeps recruiting command up on changing accession requirements
 - Continues to find, recommend and enforce efficiencies
 - Provides oversight to unit cohesion programs with meaningful measures of effectiveness
 - Recruiting command major responsibilities:
 - Recruit to the quality standards established by the Marine Corps
 - Access Marines to meet annual end strength and steady state skill needs
 - Initiate the Marine Corps transformation process
 - Continue to improve the quality of life for recruiters
 - Serve as Marine Corps ambassadors throughout our communities
 - Active Duty Enlisted Recruiting Objectives:
 - Active duty enlisted accessions are 85 percent of **all** enlisted accessions
 - Screening. Effective screening reduces delayed entry program and recruiting attrition
 - Delayed Entry Program Management. Continue to excel
 - Start Pools. Establish FY start pool goal of 55 percent
 - Mental Group Requirements. Establish Mental Group I-III floor; **63** percent of all accessions scoring at or above 50th percentile on Armed Forces Qualification Test
 - Terms of Enlistment. Maintain an 80 percent 4-year and 20 percent 5-year contract split
 - End Strength. Access required number to meet authorized end strength
 - Accession Phasing. Trimester accession phasing on a 32, 22, 46 percent active duty enlisted pattern
 - School Seat Phasing. Optimize accession and school seat phasing to increase efficiencies in the "Street-to-Fleet" process
 - Retention. Retaining the right Marines by grade and skill is paramount
 - First-Term Alignment Plan. Manage effectively to avoid unprojected losses requiring an execution year accession increase

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/50020

~~FOUO~~


TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

20 MAY 2005 12:21

b17

340

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Marine Corps Idea

I like your idea on the Marine Corps. Please talk to Jim Stavridis about it, and get a memo drafted up for David Chu.

Thanks.

DHR:m
052005-3

.....
Please respond by 6/2/05

Tab A

20 MAY 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50021

OSD 11228-05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 14 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Review of Best Recruiting Practice

One of the critical components of a ready total force is the ability to recruit the right skills, at the right time with the appropriate return on investment. It appears the Marine Corps has it right. They provide immediate feedback to the USMC Recruiting Command when accession requirements change and maintain an 80/20 percent contract split between 4-year and 5-year initial contracts. Through their First-Term Alignment Plan they retain the right Marines by grade and skill for a second enlistment. The Marines realize that if it does not plan properly for retention into the second term, the resulting unprojected losses mean higher costs.

This recruiting strategy ensures the right first-term Marines are onboard long enough to provide stability and continuity for operations. The Marine Corps continually seeks recruiting and retention efficiencies as well. I would like you to review their strategy for best practices and give me an assessment of those that could be applied to the other Services. Please brief me by 29 June 2005.

OSD 11228-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50022

340

14 JUN 05

20 JUN 05

~~FOUO~~

JUN 13 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Liaison Teams

What do you propose we do to get movement with respect to the Pakistan liaison teams?

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:ss
060905-4 (TS)

.....
Please respond by 6/30/05

Pakistan

13 Jun 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11234-05


11-L-0559/OSD/50023

~~FOUO~~

JUN 13 2005

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Report

Thanks so much for sending along that report on your luncheon at the Blue House.
I appreciate it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061005-22

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11250-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50024

335D

13 June 05

FOUO

05/008067
ES-3492
JUN 13 2005

TO: Mira Ricardel
cc: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Note from Greek Ambassador

The Ambassador from Greece gave me this piece of paper. He said he would keep me posted. I thanked him very much. Please see that it gets to the right person.

Thanks.

Attach.
Note from Greek Ambassador

DHR:ss
060905-27 (TS)

.....
Please respond by

6/23/05

FOUO

OSD 11303-05

13-06-05 11:12 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/50025

2/10

Athens Track-I1 Middle East Meeting

Highlights

Greece is offering her good services between the Arab states and Israel to halt the long conflict and contribute to the *rapprochement* of both sides. Towards that end, the main achievements of the Athens Track-2 Middle East meeting of March 2005 **are as** follows:

1. It was announced that the leadership of Morocco will soon send a delegation of businessmen to Israel to begin talks on resuming economic ties. The head of the delegation **was** present at the Athens meeting and informed the Greek and the US sides that the resumption of economic relations among Israel and Morocco will undoubtedly pave the **way** for the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations among both countries.
2. A prominent figure from the Egyptian delegation (senator close to President Mubarak) hinted that after their presidential elections, they are thinking of proposing in all Arab *fora* the official resumption of the multilaterals.
3. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations agreed to produce a document to be released after the Gaza withdrawal of July that will focus on the **day** after and propose a new basis for negotiations among both sides. The document is to be released in Athens and therefore, **will be publicly known as** "Athens Declaration". Talk of the Road Map seems to have disappeared.
4. Israeli and Palestinian participants also concluded that a year from now a Middle East Peace and Security (MEPS) **international** conference will convene to discuss missed opportunities.
5. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations concluded on concrete provisions for making the economy of Gaza successful after the July disengagement. For example, on dealing with security problems in Gaza, it was decided to have technology substitute for human facilitation **of** border crossings, etc.

~~FOUO~~

05/008067
ES-3492
JUN 13 2005

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: ~~Donna Farmer~~
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *V*

SUBJECT: Note from Greek Ambassador

The Ambassador from Greece gave *me* this piece of paper. He said he would keep me posted. I thanked him very much. Please see that it gets to the right person.

Thanks.

Attach.
Note from Greek Ambassador

DHR:ss
060905-27 (TS)

.....
Please respond by 6/23/05

SIR,

I have the package from the Greek MOD. It deals with track II diplomacy in the Mid East. I will give it to Peter Rodman & his folks

V/R
Mira

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11303-05

13-06-05 11:12 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/50027

Athens Track-I1 Middle East Meeting

Highlights

Greece is offering her good services between the Arab states and Israel to halt the long conflict and contribute to the **rapprochement** of both sides. Towards that end, the main achievements of the Athens Track-2 Middle East meeting of March 2005 are as follows:

1. It was announced that the leadership of Morocco will soon send a delegation of businessmen to Israel to begin talks on resuming economic ties. The head of the delegation was present at the Athens meeting and informed the Greek and the US sides that the resumption of economic relations among Israel and Morocco will undoubtedly pave the way for the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations among both countries.
2. A prominent figure from the Egyptian delegation (senator close to President Mubarak) hinted that after their presidential elections, they are thinking of proposing in all Arab *fora* the official resumption of the multilaterals.
3. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations agreed to produce a document to be released after the Gaza withdrawal of July that will focus on the day after and propose a new basis for negotiations among both sides. The document is to be released in Athens and therefore, will be publicly known as "Athens Declaration". Talk of the Road Map seems to have disappeared.
4. Israeli and Palestinian participants also concluded that a year from now a Middle East Peace and Security (MEPS) international conference will convene to discuss missed opportunities.
5. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations concluded on concrete provisions for making the economy of Gaza successful after the July disengagement. For example, on dealing with security problems in Gaza, it was decided to have technology substitute for human facilitation of border crossings, etc.

~~FOUO~~

June 14, 2005

TO: The Honorable Robert B. Zoellick
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Van Galbraith and an Idea for NATO Funding

Sometime when you are in Brussels or Europe, I would appreciate it if you would visit with Van Galbraith, who is the Defense Department's representative to NATO in Brussels.

He has an interesting idea regarding bonds for NATO funding. I would appreciate your getting a sense of the concept, and letting me know what you think of it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
061305-30

7/26/05 042

~~FOUO~~


OSD 11336-05

14 June 05

11-L-0559/OSD/50029

~~FOUO~~

June 14, 2005

TO: The Honorable Robert B. Zoellick
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Van Galbraith and an Idea for NATO Funding

Sometime when you are in Brussels or Europe, I would appreciate it if you would visit with Van Galbraith, who is the Defense Department's representative to NATO in Brussels.

He has an interesting idea regarding bonds for NATO funding. I would appreciate your getting a sense of the concept, and letting me know what you think of it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
061305-30

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50030

~~FOUO~~

CJCS
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 JUN 14 11 20 AM '05

TO: Gen **Dick** Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Head of the IED Task Force

I am told someone is moving the man in charge of the IED Task Force out of his job. **If** that is one of the biggest problems we have got, why would we move the person out? I don't understand it. Why do we move people from one job to another when they are doing something that is critically important? **How** long has the person been doing the job?

Thanks.

DIR:gs
052305-24

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11383-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50031



UNCLASSIFIED

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, DC 20315-9999

SEC OFFICE OF THE
DEFENSE

CM-254405 JUN 14 PM 2:12
10 June 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY

SUBJECT: Head of the IED Task Force

- **Question.** "I am told someone is moving the man in charge of the IED Task Force out of his job. If that is one of the biggest problems we have got, why would we move the person out? I don't understand it. Why do we move people from one job to another when they are doing something that is critically important? How long has the person been doing the job?"
- **Answer.** You're correct, it is a critically important job. BG Joe Votel has served in his current capacity as the Director of the IED Task Force since November 2003. The Army has leader continuity in this area with the Vice Chief of Staff (Dick Cody) and the G3 (Jim Lovelace) who have been engaged since the inception of this effort. The organization BG Votel leads is also well-grounded. Pete Schoomaker has personally selected COL Dan Allyn to replace Joe Votel. Dan has worked in J3 for the past two years, is a Brigadier General select, and is exactly the right person to carry on this effort. He and Joe share similar backgrounds, and Dan commanded a 3d Infantry Division Brigade during OIF and the assault on Baghdad. COL Allyn will report in July and Joe Votel will spend the next six months working the range of issues with him. In January, the Army will re-evaluate the situation and release BG Votel to the 82d Airborne Division to be an Assistant Division Commander, given COL Allyn is fully on board and ready to assume the role as Director. I support the Army's plan and we will continue to ensure we have the right people in critically important jobs.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton Schwartz, USAF; Director, Joint Staff; (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

OSD 11383-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50032

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 14 PM 5:39

April 29, 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Service ~~Medical~~ Functions and Chaplains

Why don't you think about whether we should consider combining the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine ~~medical functions~~ and Chaplain ~~functions~~? They could still be members of their Service. I don't know if that is a good idea, or not, but it might be worth thinking about.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
042805-13

.....
Please respond by

6/16/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50033

OSD 11426-05

June 14, 2005

**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)**


OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 14 PM 5:39

NOTE FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Sir:

Attached is an update on my thoughts on Service
Medical Functions and Chaplains-SNOWFLAKE.



David S. C. Chu

Attachment

OSD 11426-05



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2005 JUN 14 PM 5:39

June 14, 2005, 9:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ACTING DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Service Medical Functions and Chaplains — SNOWFLAKE

Medical

- We ~~are~~ already scheduled to look at possible options for a Joint Medical Command next year as part of POM 08-11.
- That provides a sound vehicle for considering whether and how we might combine medical functions. BRAC gives us a start (consolidating Walter Reed/Bethesda in DC, and Wilford Hall/Brooke in San Antonio).

Chaplains

- We're moving part way to a joint chaplaincy. Policy is already governed by our Armed Forces Chaplain Board, under David Chu's office.
- BRAC would co-locate ~~the three~~ Service chaplain schools at FT Jackson, S.C. The next legitimate step is a merger.
- Another step could be changing the chaplains on the COCOM staffs from "attached" to "assigned" to facilitate joint perspectives in chaplaincy.



11-L-0559/OSD/50035

OSD 11426-05

~~FOUO~~

JUN 16 2005

205 11:11:54

001/SD

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
Steve Bucci

CC: CAPT Tom Mascolo
Cathy Majnardi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Invitation for Berlin

Please see the attached invitation from Richard Shriver (and my reply to him) for the Berlin **Trip** in September.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/10/05 Richard Shriver letter to SecDef
SecDef Reply to Shriver letter

DHR:ss
061405-1

.....
Please respond by _____

16 JUN 05

~~FOUO~~

JUN 16 ENT'D

11-L-0559/OSD/50036 **OSD 11434-05**

ETM

10 JUN 05



Secretary and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

June 10, 2005

Dear Don and Joyce:

First, Barb and I wanted to thank you both for your wonderful hospitality, and for having such a good and brave idea to bring a group of us folks from the Ford DoD together. Our thanks are belated due to the usual array of infirmities, including some of our own, with which we have to deal increasingly these days.

I also wanted to follow up on the thought of getting together while you @on, at least – but hopefully both of you) are in Berlin in September. Having glanced at your schedule, Don, I know it will not be easy to compete with the demands of others interested in having some of your time. My thought, simply, is this – to have a small dinner party involving a few folks who could be influential in German-American relations, though none are active with the current German government. I also know that the three people I have in mind will all enjoy meeting the two of you – and that they are likely to carry away a very different attitude toward the US as, I think, they are all pre-inclined to think the best of the US, despite an overwhelming media bias to the contrary.

The three prospective invitees (with spouses) include:

Dr. Joseph Joffe, publisher-editor of Die Zeit, and certainly one of the most influential writers in Germany concerning "Transatlantic Relations". He was raised in Berlin, received a BA from Swarthmore, an MA from Johns Hopkins and a Ph.D from Harvard.

Dr. Immo Stabreit, former Ambassador from Germany to the US (1992 – 1995) and France, former head of the German Council on Foreign Relations, and a 1959 graduate of Princeton (attended for two years only).

Dr. Jens Reich. Jens was formerly head of Germany's Green Party, and ran for president of Germany. He is one of Germany's most thoughtful and respected citizen-scientists, lived most of his life in East Berlin, and teaches bio-ethics and related policy issues at our college.

I do not know Joffe, though he was once on the board of our college, but I am certain you will both enjoy the Reichs and the Stabreits.

ECLA gGmbH
Platanenstrasse 24
D 13156 Berlin

fon +49 30 4373 3 0
fax +49 30 4373 3100
email info@eca.de

HypoVereinsbank
blz 700 202 70
kto 2 485 610

HAB Charlottenburg BAOH
Geschäftsführung:
Richard H. Shriver

I can't promise to deliver all of them, but if you are interested, we will go to work on it. It just could be a stellar evening that would be most enjoyable, **as** well. An article by Joffe alone could improve the game for whatever the US **hopes** to accomplish with Germany.

Hope you are both well, and Barb and I **hope** we'll see **you** in September (any date during your visit works with us).

~~Warm~~ good wishes.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Dick', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Richard **H.** Shriver
European College of Liberal Arts
24 Platanenstr.
13156 Berlin, Germany



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 15 2005

Mr. Richard H. Shriver
European College of Liberal Arts
24 Platanenstr.
13156 Berlin; Germany

Dear Dick,

Thanks so much for your note. As we get closer to the date I will look at the schedule and think through what might be done. However, I think the probability is low.

Best to you both,

Regards,

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely of the Secretary of Defense, written in black ink.

OSD 11434-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50039

Secretary and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

June 10, 2005

Dear Don and Joyce:

First, Barb and I wanted to thank you both for your wonderful hospitality, and for having such a good and brave idea to bring a group of us folks from the Ford Dold together. Our thanks are belated due to the usual array of infirmities, including some of our own, with which we have to deal increasingly these days.

I also wanted to follow up on the thought of getting together while you (Don, at least – but hopefully both of you) are in Berlin in September. Having glanced at your schedule, Don, I know it will not be easy to compete with the demands of others interested in having some of your time. My thought, simply, is this – to have a small dinner party involving a few folks who could be influential in German-American relations, though none are active with the current German government. I also know that the three people I have in mind will all enjoy meeting the two of you – and that they are likely to carry away a very different attitude toward the US as, I think, they are all pre-inclined to think the best of the US, despite an overwhelming media bias to the contrary.

The three prospective invitees (with spouses) include:

Dr. Joseph Joffe, publisher-editor of Die Zeit, and certainly one of the most influential writers in Germany concerning "Transatlantic Relations". He was raised in Berlin, received a BA from Swarthmore, an MA from Johns Hopkins and a Ph.D from Harvard.

Dr. Immo Stabreit, former Ambassdor from Germany to the US (1992 – 1995) and France, former head of the German Council on Foreign Relations, and a 1953 graduate of Princeton (attended for two years only).

Dr. Jens Reich. Jens was formerly head of Germany's Green Party, and ran for president of Germany. He is one of Germany's most thoughtful and respected citizen-scientists, lived most of his life in East Berlin, and teaches bio-ethics and related policy issues at our college.

I do not know Joffe, though he was once on the board of our college, but I am certain you will both enjoy the Reichs and the Stabreits.

114 34007
Bismarckstrasse 24
D-10119 Berlin

Dr. Jens Reich
c/o - 100 87/4373 3100
c/o - 100 87/4373 3100

Reichsheim
by - 100 87/4373 3100
c/o - 100 87/4373 3100

OSD 11434-05


11-L-0559/OSD/50040

10 JUN 2005


I can't promise to deliver all of them, but if you are interested, we will go to work on it. It just could be a stellar evening that would be most enjoyable, **as** well. An article by Joffe alone could improve the game for whatever the US hopes to accomplish with **Germany**.

Hope you are both well, and Barb and I hope we'll see you in September (any date during your visit works with us).

Warm good wishes,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dick", followed by a horizontal line.

Richard H. Shriver
European College of Liberal Arts
24 Platanenstr.
13156 Berlin, Germany



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 15 2005

001.1 SD

Mr. Richard H. Shriver
European College of Liberal Arts
24 Platanenstr
13156 Berlin, Germany

Dear Dick,

Thanks so much for your note. As we get closer to the date I will look at the schedule and think through what might be done. However, I think the probability is low.

Best to you both,

Regards,

15 JUN 05

OSD 11434-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50042

9

10 JUN 05

~~Beitrag~~

DRAFT

Mr. Richard H. Shriver
European College of Liberal Arts
24 Platanenstr
13156 Berlin, Germany

Dear Dick,

Thanks so much for your note. As we get closer to
the date I will look at the schedule and think through what
might be done. However, I think the probability is low.

Best to you both,

Regards,

bl

OSD 11434-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50043

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
April 28, 2005
2005 JUN 15 AM 9:25

TO: Fran Harvey
Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Army Recruiting

I am concerned about **Army recruiting**. I think you ought to get with David Chu and think very carefully about beefing up the number of recruiters, the advertising and, if appropriate, incentives. Every week counts.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
042805-9

.....
Please respond by 12/5/05

CF: USA✓
CSA✓
VESA✓
DAS✓
ECC✓
SMA✓

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50044

OSD 11459-05

50404711



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005-06-15 10:06:24 SE

2005 JUN 15 11 9: 25

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army

14 Jun '05

SUBJECT: Army Recruiting

- This responds to the Secretary of Defense's memorandum, April 28, 2005, subject: Army Recruiting (TAB A). The Active Army has achieved 83% of its year-to-date mission and may not achieve its FY05 goal of 80K. The Reserve Components are at serious risk of mission failure. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard achieved 80% and 76% of their year-to-date missions, respectively. This paper addresses ongoing and proposed actions to optimize mission success both immediately and in FY06.
- **FY05:** To address the immediate challenge during the balance of FY 05, the Army has reprogrammed \$259M (\$132M in advertising and \$127M in incentives). For the total year, \$428M has been allocated to advertising, while \$690M has been allocated to incentives. Other on-going actions include:
 - Recruiter Strength: Since August, the Army has added a total of 3,741 recruiters in the three components for a total of 12,847. The Active Component has added 965 as part of their original increase, 250 as part of a second increase, and is now in the process of adding an additional 242 recruiters to ensure the 80,000 active accession mission for FY05 is met.
 - Incentives: The Army increased many incentives to include:
 - Active: Increased the Army College Fund from \$50K to \$70K. Implemented a minimum \$5K bonus for all military specialties that are projected as a FY06 shortage.
 - USAR/ARNG: Increased the Non-Prior Service maximum bonus from \$5K to \$10K. Increased the Prior Service maximum bonus from \$10K to \$15K. Increased the Student Loan Repayment Program from \$10K to \$20K.
 - Programs: We have executed other programs and incentives, including nationwide expansion of the National Call to Service Program (which is a 15-month enlistment plus training option), Operation Blue to Green, Veteran Partnering (linking up OEF/OIF veterans with Army recruiters via the Special Hometown Recruiting Program), Tier Two Attrition Study (GED and Home Schoolers), and the Call to Duty Grass Roots Speaking Campaign.

SUBJECT: Army Recruiting

Advertising: Starting with FY03, the strategic recruiting marketing plans have recognized the factors that are now making recruiting difficult [ongoing GWOT; improving economy, and increasing negative influencer impact (parents, coaches, teachers, etc., who are not "excited" about military service are a few examples)]. Plans continue to be designed to impact potential prospects and influencers, who have become increasingly important. For the balance of FY05, planned support programs include:

- **Active/Reserve:**
 - Eight new television spots for RA and USAR four for influencers, including one Spanish language spot; four for prospects.
 - Five new magazine ads for General Market, African American Market and Hispanic Market influencers and prospects.
 - Radio spots for African American and Hispanic influencers and prospects.
 - A new, dedicated influencer section for the GoArmy.com Army recruiting web site.
 - Targeted Direct Mail programs to high schools, college audiences and prospects in the workforce to generate an estimated 75K leads for Active and Reserve recruiters.
- **ARNG:**
 - Initiation of the ARNG campaign entitled "American Soldier."
 - Delivery of a major direct mail drop to high school and college students, to generate an estimated 56K leads.
- **FY06:** In addition to FY05 initiatives, Army recruiting costs for the Active Component will require the full funding of \$1.6B, to include increasing incentive limits to \$40K and initiation of the Army Home Ownership Fund that will provide recruits with \$25K after four years of service to be used as a down payment for the purchase of a house. Both of these initiatives require Congressional approval. Finally, the number of recruiters in the Active Component will be increased to a minimum of 7000, up from the current level of approximately 6300.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Shawn McCurry, (b)(6)

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 30 10:35:54
JUN 1 8 2005

246

TO: Ray DuBois
cc: FRANK MACKEY GEN DICK MYERS
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Army Pay and Allowances

Here is a letter I received from somebody I do not know. However, please look into what he is talking about, and then get back to me. Tell me what is wrong with the Army's systems that could produce that kind of a letter.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/25/05 Bickelhaupt ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
061505-18

.....
Please respond by

7/14/05

16 JUN 05

C&D
Please control

FILE
1

DM

Sir, *old 6/m*
Response attached.

✓/K
LTG/Leung

JUN 29 2005

FOUO

25 MAY 05

OSD 11476-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50047

May 26, 2005

Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 15 AM 11:05

Dear Former Neighbor,

Since North Shore days, I've moved too. Even though I'm much younger than you (b)(6) (b)(6) I had the opportunity to retire years ago and did so.


All those years ago, (b)(6) a fellow Cub Scouter, who you might remember from Searle, almost recruited me from Kendall Company, which he seemed to know was on its way to break-up. Though it dates me, in those days before "I.T." what eventually became the Data Processing Management Association was still the National Association of Machine Accountants when I served as Chapter President.

In the meanwhile I have managed to produce only a bumper crop of Grandsons, the oldest of whom at (b)(6) is a recent enrollee in your organization. Having my assurance this is no longer Grampa's army but a great outfit and a great education, he signed up for a full ride - he also got himself married with no encouragement from here.

At any rate, he's been through Fort Jackson Basic, Fort Lee Advanced and is now at Fort Hood (didn't those guys lose back then). In each organization he goes through a now familiar litany with those appointed above him who routinely determine that he is entitled to a bonus of some kind for enlisting, base pay larger than he receives, and now a spousal allowance and quarters allowance that he does not receive. "Sorry about that!" is the official word.

Now don't get me wrong, the kid is no military hero, but he doesn't deserve to live in poverty, with a handout from home, either. Other than Fort Hood, I don't know where he is, after all I'm the guy who "sold him down the river", I don't hear from him anymore. His name is (b)(6) I imagine you can find him. Could you please help bail out Grampa?

Hopetully yours



Curtis R. Bickelhaupt

(b)(6)

OSD 11476-05

May 25, 2005

Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 15 AM 11: 03

Dear Former Neighbor,

Since North Shore days, I've moved too. Even though I'm much younger than you (b)(6) (b)(6) I had the opportunity to retire years ago and did so.

All those years ago, (b)(6) a fellow Cub Scouter, who you might remember from Searle, almost recruited me from Kendall Company, which he seemed to know was on its way to break-up. Though it dates me, in those days before "I.T." what eventually became the Data Processing Management Association was still the National Association of Machine Accountants when I served as Chapter President.

In the meanwhile I have managed to produce only a bumper crop of Grandsons, the oldest of whom at (b)(6) is a recent enrollee in your organization. Having my assurance this is no longer Grampa's army but a great outfit and a great education, he signed up for a full ride - he also got himself married with no encouragement from here.

At any rate, he's been through Fort Jackson Basic, Fort Lee Advanced and is now at Fort Hood (didn't those guys lose back then). In each organization he goes through a now familiar litany with those appointed above him who routinely determine that he is entitled to a bonus of some kind for enlisting, base pay larger than he receives, and now a spousal allowance and quarters allowance that he does not receive. "Sorry about that!" is the official word.

Now don't get me wrong, the kid is no military hero, but he doesn't deserve to live in poverty, with a hand-out from home, either. Other than Fort Hood, I don't know where he is, after all I'm the guy who "sold him down the river", I don't hear from him anymore. His name is (b)(6) I imagine you can find him. Could you please help bail out Grampa?

Hopefully yours



Curtis R. Bickelhaupt
(b)(6)

OSD 11476-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50049



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 30 PM 3:54

INFO MEMO

28
June 22, 2005, 8:00 AM

240

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond E. DuBois, Acting Under Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Army Pay and Allowances

REFERENCE: Snowflake of 16 June 2005

Sir,

Your snowflake referred to a letter (see attached) from a grandfather of a young Soldier at Fort Hood. The grandfather claimed that his grandson had not received his proper enlistment bonus and housing allowance.

It turns out that the Soldier had not notified his unit that he was owed an enlistment bonus. He received it this pay period. He is due 90 days Basic Housing Allowance (BAH) (Jan - Mar 05) which will also be paid this pay period. Paperwork reflecting his recent marriage had not processed. He had in fact received his BAH since reporting to Fort Hood in April.

As to your comment: "what is wrong with the Army's system....," I would only offer that when this issue was properly raised, it was properly addressed and grandson should tell grandpa.

Sergeant Major of the Army, Ken Preston, will write to the grandfather on your behalf.

OSD 11476-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50050

23 May 05

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUN 01 2005

2005 JUN 16 PM 12:14

ES-3402
05/007566

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT Linking Services and Defense Agencies

To what extent have we, or have we not, linked the Services and the Defense Agencies and all elements – intelligence and everything else – to the security cooperation arrangements?

That would include the Navy personnel exchange programs, and all the things the Services and Agencies **do**.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
053105-30

.....
Please respond by

6/30/05

FOUO

01-06-05 15:01 1X

OSD 11589-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50051

OFFICE OF THE
INFO MEMO

ES-3402

I-05/007666-STRAT

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2005 JUN 16 PM 12:13
FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (P-100)
SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Linking Services and Defense Agencies to Security Cooperation Priorities

- You asked about the extent to which we have linked all DoD Components—including the Services, Defense Agencies, and intelligence organizations—to your security cooperation priorities (Tab A).
- In the last cycle, we asked the Services, select Defense Agencies, and Functional Combatant Commands to develop *Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG)* implementation strategies to improve adherence to your priorities (see cycle description from current draft SCG at Tab B).
 - o Geographic Combatant Commands have been writing strategies since 2001.
 - o In coming cycles, we will ask the remaining relevant Defense Agencies (including Combat Support Agencies that perform intelligence support) to also write strategies as well.
- This has helped move the Services, select Defense Agencies, and Combatant Commands to:
 - o **Think** strategically about their security cooperation efforts; and
 - o Improve the transparency of their strategies and plans.
- Much work remains to be done.
 - o Enforcement mechanisms (i.e., security cooperation assessments) are nascent.
 - o Many implementers do not collect data on their security cooperation activities in a manner that enables us to make cross-regional comparisons.
- **This** summer, we will:
 - o Submit for your review a restructured SCG that should provide more useful guidance to DoD Components with global responsibilities;
 - o Develop an improved security cooperation assessment template for the Geographic Combatant Commands to assess their return on investment; and
 - o Work with security cooperation implementers to standardize security cooperation definitions and accounting practices.

Attachments: as stated

11-L-0559/OSD/50052

OSD 11589-05

IMPLEMENTATION (U)

(U) The *SCG* is the primary driver of the security cooperation cycle. In light of the dynamic strategic circumstances we now face, the *SCG* will be reviewed periodically by the Secretary of Defense. This review will occur at least annually, and will result in the promulgation of a revised *SCG* or an update memorandum.

Security Cooperation Strategies

(U) Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders, Service Secretaries, and Defense Agency Directors will prepare security cooperation strategies and implementation plans in response to this guidance. (A recommended outline for these strategies will be issued by USD/Policy in a separate memorandum.) In the case of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, this outline will establish the framework for the security cooperation assessments, discussed below.

(U) Coherence in developing and executing these security cooperation strategies is critical. The forthcoming USD/Policy memorandum will detail a formal coordination mechanism to ensure that these strategies are mutually supporting and take into account the regional and global responsibilities assigned to the respective combatant commands and organizations. Care must be taken to ensure that all security cooperation strategies align with this *Security Cooperation Guidance*, and that the Geographic Combatant Commands are the supported entities. Other Commanders, Service Chiefs and Defense

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR~~

~~DRAFT WORKING PAPERS~~

Agency Directors will coordinate their strategies with the Geographic Combatant Commanders prior to their final publication.

(U) Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders, Service Secretaries, and Defense Agency Directors will submit their security cooperation strategies or update memoranda for review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P) on an annual basis.

Security Cooperation Assessments

(U) Sixty days after the end of the fiscal year, the Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands will be responsible for submitting to the Secretary of Defense an annual assessment of the security cooperation activities conducted in their areas of responsibility over the course of the previous fiscal year. The assessment template will be issued annually by USD/Policy and will be drawn from the template used for the security cooperation strategies.

(U) These assessments, which will constitute the primary feedback mechanism to the Secretary of Defense, will identify the returns on our security cooperation investments. The Geographic Combatant Commanders' assessments will be used to draw lessons and recommend adjustments to future versions of the SCG and the security cooperation process as a whole.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR~~

~~DRAFT WORKING PAPERS~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50054

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

235 JUN 16 PM 1:00

05/008077

ES-3495

JUN 13 2005

TO Gen Dick Myers
Ken Krieg
Doug Feith
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prepositioned Material and Equipment Stocks

We need to take a global, holistic look at all of U.S. prepositioned stocks anywhere in the world and see how their locations fit with the:

- Geopolitical realities of the 21st century
- Global Posture Review
- Current OPLANS and CONPLANS
- Unified Command Plan

My sense is that we will have a number of adjustments to make. I want this looked at carefully in the BRAC.

When I ask questions, the answer sometimes is that the host country is paying 50%. That ignores the truth that something is not a bargain until you really need it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
061005-17

.....
Please respond by

7/7/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11595-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50055



Global Posture – Way Ahead (Phase II)

- ❑ **Additional Phase I moves, e.g.:**
 - Codification of CENTCOM
 - Development of priority CSL network
- ❑ **Integration and further development of posture associated with :**
 - Missile defense
 - Pre-positioning (ashore and afloat)
 - Sea-basing
 - Joint bases
 - HQ alignment
 - ISR
 - Mobility

Coordination

Joint Staff/J-4

**William Mackie,
Deputy Division Chief**

14 June 05

11-L-0559/OSD/50057

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

2005 JUN 16 PM 1:00

DepSecDef
@ USD(P) ~~SECRET~~ 5 2005
I/05-008077
ES-3495

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *Ryan Henry* JUN 15 2005

SUBJECT Prepositioned Material and Equipment Stocks

- (U) You asked us to look globally at U.S. prepositioned stocks and how they fit with geopolitical realities, war plans, global defense posture, and UCP (Tab A).
- (U) You may recall that we briefed you last month on global posture next steps (Tab B). This includes assessing how several functional capabilities - including mobility and prepositioning - support planned posture changes.
 - o In late July we are hosting a conference specifically to address this effort.
- (U) We are developing an updated laydown of how global prepositioned assets integrate with global posture broadly. We will forward that to you by the end of the month.
 - o This assessment will address gaps between planned posture changes and current prepositioning plans.
- (U) We will expand this effort over the summer by integrating other capabilities into the global posture framework (e.g., mobility, joint basing, missile defense).

Coordination: Tab C

Prepared by: Brian Arakelian, OPDUSDP/Strategy, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
11-L-0559/OSD/50058

OSD 11595-05

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 16 PM 5:25

05/008062
ES-3488
JUN 18 2005

TO: Mira Ricardel
cc: Doug Ferris
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ukraine

I want to make sure you get a program to get other allies to help Ukraine, and we help Ukraine, and we make sure the international staff helps Ukraine on their intensive dialogue.

Thanks.

DHR:as
060905-16 (TS)

.....
Please respond by 6/30/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50059

OSD-11637-05

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUN 16 2005 5:25

05/008062

ES-3488

JUN 19 2005

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Doug Ferrer

SUBJECT Ukraine

I want to make sure you get a program to get other allies to help Ukraine, and we help Ukraine, and we make sure the international staff helps Ukraine on their intensive dialogue.

Thanks.

DHR:m
060901-16 (TS)

OSD 11637-05

.....
Please respond by _____

6/16/05

SIR,

We are developing an action plan for Allies to help Ukraine implement its defense reforms and will use ~~the~~ the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group to secure agreement to the plan.

A/DAASD Jim MacDougall is meeting today and tomorrow with the Ukrainians for bilateral defense ~~talks~~ talks and will adjust our security cooperation assistance with Ukraine's priorities.

Also, we will work with our mission at NATO to increase the number of NATO International Staff working on ~~FOUO~~ Ukraine.

We will keep you posted and report back.

4/12

16-05-05 13:15 OUT

11-L-0559/OSD/50060

OSD 11637-05

FOUO

June 1, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: List of Countries

During my meeting with the President yesterday, I mentioned I had given Andy Card a list of countries the Department of Defense has a particular interest in.

You will recall Condi said there "is a process" and "we should use it." I don't know what the process is - apparently, it is Andy Card, though Andy Card thinks it is you. Whatever it is, we need to have you - if you are the one - keep it posted when there are any upcoming planned vacancies in any of these countries, so that we can be alerted as to what people are thinking, and what the criteria are for the selection of individuals to assume those posts.

If we have opinions or concerns, we will provide them. It would be helpful to have that kind of discussion early, before the Department gets locked in or a successor.

Thanks.

Attach.
List of Countries

DHR:ss
061705-7

FOUO

OSD 1 745-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50061

092

17 JUN 05

Europe & Eurasia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Kazakhstan

Romania

Russia

Turkey

Ukraine

Uzbekistán

AP:

Japan

Korea

China

Philippines

NESA:

India

Pakistan

Afghanistan

Iraq

Kuwait

Syria

Qatar

Yemen

WHA:

Colombia

Venezuela

Africa:

Djibouti

Other

NATO

UN

FOUO

June 17, 2005

TO: Gen Hoss Cartwright

c c : Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maintenance of Surveillance Assets

Please take a look at all our surveillance aircraft doing strategic reconnaissance, to ensure we aren't overworking them to the point that we'll suddenly have a crisis.

I know the Air Force and Navy manage the airframes, but I would like you to look across Service and operational lines, and let me know how we're doing overall and any adjustments we should think about.

I don't want to be surprised.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061605-29

.....
Please respond by 7/14/05

452R

17JUN05

FOUO

OSD 11789-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50063

CA 1

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 JUN 20 AM 9:37 JUN 18 2005

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

I think you ought to get someone working to fashion a plan as to what we will *do* if we get shut out in Uzbekistan; how we will be able to handle the humanitarian and military support for Afghanistan. .

Thanks.

DHR:ss
060905-17 (TS)

.....
Please respond by

6/23/05

FOUO

OSD 11004-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50064



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2005 JUN 23 AM 9:50



ACTION MEMO

June 8, 2005, 3:30 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC _____

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Privatizing Military Mail--SNOWFLAKE

- You asked whether we could save military manpower and money by privatizing some or **all** of the military mail service.
- The memo at Tab A directs the Chairman, Defense Business Board to form a task group to make recommendations on the best business model for the delivery of mail, **as** well as change management recommendations to support an effective transition.
- In its 2004 report, the GAO cited several problems with DoD's delivery of mail during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Since then, we formed a joint working group and a Postal Oversight Board to address the concerns raised by GAO, **as** well as other system improvements.
- On May 10, 2005, the joint working group suggested - and the Board adopted - two broad avenues toward improvement: outsourcing and security.
- Outsourcing. The Board recommended a study to develop options, which will be addressed by the Defense Business Board study.
- Security. The Military Postal Service Agency and Defense Threat Reduction Agency **are** working together to address this concern and will report back to the Board in the summer.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memo at Tab A.

COORDINATIONS: Tab C

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared by: CDR Claudia McKnight, OSD(P&R)MPP/Comp (b)(6)

SP2 Staff Dir 6/20

MA SD	6/21	SMA OSD	
TSA SD	6/22	SA OSD	
EXEC SEC	6/20	1335	
ESR MA	6/20	1235	

11-L-0559/OSD/50065

OSD 11809-05

311

8 JUN 05

17 MAY 05

Robert Rangel
6/21
RL

David S. C. Chu 15 June 05

Coordination Page

Office of the General Counsel	Mr. Dell'Orto	June 2,2005
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (L&MR)	Mr. Boyanton	May 25,2005
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation	Mr. Krieg	May 24, 2005
Chairman, Defense Business Board	Ms. Van Niman	June 8,2005

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SEC
May 17, 2005
2005 JUN 20 AM 9:51

TO: David Chu
Ken Krieg

CC: Gordon England
Fran Harvey
Gen Dick Myers

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Privatizing Military Mail

I've heard some ideas about privatizing the military mail from several folks, including Newt Gingrich (see attached memo). The thought is that we could conceivably save thousands of military billets and millions of dollars by using a private company for all, or a portion of the job. It strikes me this is worth looking into.

Please get back to me within 15 days with a concept for privatization that presents the pros and cons, and provide a recommendation, working with PA & E to evaluate it.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/14/05 E-mail from Gingrich to SecDef

DHR:ss
051705-3

.....
Please respond by

6/9/05

6/7 Col Penno

FOUO

OSD 11809-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50067

311.1

17 MAY 05

Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Saturday, May 14, 2005 12:20 PM

To: james.stavridis@osd.mil

Subject: saving 3000 jobs and \$200million a year newt

PRIVATIZING
MILITARY
MAIL

From
NEWT

FROM NEWT

I AM NOT SUGGESTING (AND WOULD OPPOSE) THAT DoD SOLE SOURCE TO SIEMENS

anti's
view

I AM SUGGESTING THAT IF THEY ARE RIGHT THAT WE COULD SAVE 3000 UNIFORMED SLOTS AND \$200 MILLION PLUS A YEAR IT IS WORTH LOOKING INTO AND HAVING SOMEONE CONTRACTED FOR THIS

THEIR ANALYSIS FOLLOWS

Seiman's
Proposal

ISSUE: SHOULD THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OUTSOURCE THE NON-CORE MISSION OF DELIVERING MILITARY MAIL TO PERSONNEL OVERSEAS

BACKGROUND: Mail has been important to the morale of our military since the very earliest days of our country. In our nation's major wars and lesser contingency operations, the military services have had primary responsibility for delivering mail to military personnel deployed or assigned overseas.

In 1980 the Department of Defense established the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the Department of Defense with respect to mail operations to serve as the single agency responsible for integration, operation and transportation policy for military mail on behalf of DoD (see DoD Directive 4525.6). This Directive also provided authority for the establishment of the Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA).

During the Persian Gulf War, numerous problems were encountered in the delivery of mail to our deployed troops and hundreds of tons of mail remained undelivered at the end of the war. This mail was ultimately classified as undeliverable as addressed (UAA) and was destroyed in Kuwait.

In 1998 a DoD Military Postal Service Task Force was established to review Military Postal Operations and to improve the efficiencies of the Military Postal Service through modernization.

5/15/2005

11-L-0559/OSD/50068

automation, advanced technology and training. After two years of effort, the task force recommended a number of initiatives, including outsourcing.

As a result of the study, Mr. Joel B. Hudson, the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, wrote a letter to the Postmaster General of the United States Post **Office** dated November 14, 2000 indicating that the Department of the Army wanted to pursue the concept of outsourcing or privatization of military mail operations. He wrote:

"One of the major conclusions of the Task Force was the realization that much, if not all, of the MPS mission could potentially be outsourced,"

John Potter, then Chief Operating Officer of the **U.S.** Postal Service and now the Postmaster General, endorsed that recommendation in a February 2001 letter to Mr. Hudson where he stated that the USPS

"...would endorse DoD's efforts to outsource many of the postal tasks, functions, and management responsibilities that DoD currently executes with active duty service members and DoD civilians."

Mr. Potter noted further that:

"The increasing presence of civilian contractors in military missions around the world provides a precedence and framework for DoD to transition its postal operations and management structure... We believe that there are commercial enterprises that have the necessary capabilities, resources, and international presence that would be willing and able to enter into a contractual arrangement with DoD to provide and manage the postal support and activities of the current Military Postal Service (MPS)."

In the four plus years since the Army recommended outsourcing and the USPS concurred, no tangible progress has been made towards outsourcing.

In October 2004, Siemens Corporation, a recognized world leader in postal automation, submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Department of the Army to provide a turn-key, end-to-end mail processing and delivery **service** that included equipment, technology, personnel and on-going **support**. The proposal offered a phased approach where the Government would be committed to only one phase at a time.

On March 14, 2005 Siemens received a letter dated February 24, 2005 notifying that the proposal "has not been accepted **as** an unsolicited proposal in accordance with FAR Part 15.606-1..." The letter went on to enumerate four reasons why the proposal was not accepted. It is the view of Siemens that each of the four stated reasons for non-acceptance **is** groundless and or inaccurate.

At a time when the Department **of** Defense is looking for ways to reduce costs **and** non-war fighting personnel structure, it **seems** highly inappropriate for the Department of the Army to reject summarily a competent proposal from a global corporation recognized **as** a leader in postal automation and logistics management.

The fact that the Department of the Army review was conducted by the very agency that would have its functions outsourced and that the review was conducted without any input from the senior policy making levels of the Army or the Office of the Secretary of Defense is an indication of a management system that needs improvement.

At a time when both financial and uniformed personnel resources are in short supply, the rejection of a proposal from a responsible firm that offers hundreds of millions of dollars in annual savings and allows DoD to turn administrative roles to operational roles is consistent with Secretary Rumsfeld's transformation agenda and makes good sense.

The fact is that the Department of Defense **has** allowed the privatization of many non-core functions in military operations including contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. If food service, laundry, sanitation and other support operations can be privatized in a combat zone such as Iraq, there is no reason why postal operations cannot be outsourced, especially if there is the promise of freeing up thousands of uniformed personnel and saving hundreds of millions of dollars.

It is important to note that as recently as April 2004, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study on military mail operations and concluded that long-standing problems in military mail operations remain. The GAO found that postal operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom faced many of the same problems as those encountered in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm more than a decade earlier.

To summarize the Siemens proposal that **has** been rejected, it offered:

- A turn-key, end-to-end solution including delivery to the troops in the field utilizing private sector employees;
- Cost savings estimated to be at least \$200 million per year;
- The freeing up of several thousand uniformed personnel now assigned full-time to postal operations, and the elimination of the training infrastructure within the military services and their associated costs;
- Address recognition and processing technology that supports the existing military address structures;
- Mail sorting to the level required for delivery point processing;
- A seamless transition to contractor operation through a phased implementation.

Regardless of the conclusion of the Department of the **Army** that the Siemens proposal was unacceptable, the fact is that both the Department of the **Army** and the **U.S. Postal Service**, have recommended outsourcing of military postal operations. Siemens is a global corporation with experience in designing and implementing more than 16,000 mail systems for government and private firms in more than 30 countries. The **firm** spent thousands of man hours preparing the proposal and is confident that a state-of-the-art military mail system can be designed and implemented with substantial cost savings for the government. It would be an injustice for the proposal to be rejected after what seems like a cursory review by self-interested parties from the very agency whose operations would be outsourced.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Secretary of Defense direct the Senior Executive Council to review **the** matter of outsourcing postal operations and provide recommendations to the Secretary not later than July 1, 2005. Should the recommendation be favorable to outsourcing, then an RFP should be issued seeking bidders for a

turn-key, end-to-end solution where the contractor is required to handle the mail from the USPS International Centers all the way to end-point delivery including delivery to platoon level.

The July 1, 2005 date for completion of the review would allow for the timely implementation of any recommendations by the review panel.

Coordination Page

Office of the General Counsel	Mr. Dell'Orto	June 2, 2005
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (L&MR)	Mr. Boyanton	May 25, 2005
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation	Mr. Krieg	May 24, 2005
Chairman, Defense Business Board	Ms. Van Niman	June 8, 2005



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 21 2005

311.1

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE BUSINESS BOARD (DBB)

SUBJECT Terms of Reference - DBB Task Group on Military Postal Service

I hereby request that you form a Task Group to make recommendations to the Department of Defense (DoD) on the best business model for the delivery of mail to members of the Armed Forces and DoD civilians either deployed or assigned overseas. The Department continues to struggle to achieve the timely delivery of mail, which is an important part of morale for our employees serving the Department overseas. I seek the DBB's fresh, outside perspective for a solution to this lingering problem. The Task Group should deliver the following:

1. Recommendations for the best business model for the delivery of mail to DoD employees deployed overseas and assigned overseas.
2. Change management recommendations to support an efficient transition to the new business model.

21 JUN 05

Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) and Mr. Kenneth Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) will co-sponsor the Task Group. Mr. William Carr, Principal Director, Military Personnel Policy, will be the DoD Liaison. Ms. Barbara Barrett will be the Task Group Chairman, and Ms. Kelly Van Niman, Executive Director of the DBB, will be the Task Group Executive Secretary. The Task Group will present an interim draft report by July 28, 2005, with a final report to be delivered no later than the December 7th DBB meeting.

The Task Group will be operated in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, "the DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Group will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.

17 MAY 05



OSD 11809-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50073

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECY May 17, 2005

2005 JUN 20 AM 9:50

TO: David Chu
Ken Krieg

CC: Gordon England
Fran Harvey
Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Privatizing Military Mail

S.O.M.

I've heard some ideas about privatizing the military mail ~~from~~ several folks, including Newt Gingrich (see attached memo). The thought is that we could conceivably save thousands of military billets and millions of dollars by using a private company for all, or a portion of the job. It strikes me ~~this~~ is worth looking into.

Please get back to me within 15 days with a concept for privatization that presents the pros and cons, and provide a recommendation, working with PA & E to evaluate it.

Thanks.

Attach
5/14/05 E-mail from Gingrich to SecDef

DHR:ss
051705-3

Please respond by

6/9/05

Sir,
Response attached.
v/a
Lt Col Leary
JUN 21 2005

OSD 11809-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/50074



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2005 JUN 20 AM 9:56



June 17, 2005 - 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY (P&R)
David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Advance Charts for "Stress on the Force" Session

- You asked for an advance copy of the charts for Friday's meeting on stress on the force. This memorandum responds.

- At Friday's meeting I hope to cover:

- Personnel available for deployment, active and reserve (Tab A).

- We still have a significant number of deployable personnel, more if we could reduce infrastructure, although skill match could be problematic.

- Relative use of the Guard and Reserve (Tab B).

- Army has borne most of the burden since preparation for action in Iraq, although mobilized numbers are beginning to come down.

- Success at honoring "dwell time" promise (a day not deployed for each day deployed).

- Imperfect

- Review of the 47 initiatives from your memorandum (Tab C). Two examples of the template are at (Tab D).

- A few are completed, but we need stronger action in some important cases.

Prepared by: Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

cc: Krieg, Berkson



11-L-0559/OSD/50075

OSD 11813-05



Available Personnel: Active *As of March 05*

ACTIVE					
	Army	Air Force	Navy	*Marines	Total
Assigned Strength	491919	360381	367855	178270	1398425
-Transient, etc.	50421	24068	41459	23745	139693
- DEPLOYMENTS					
<i>Current</i>	<i>80072</i>	<i>22239</i>	<i>44408</i>	<i>30000</i>	<i>176719</i>
<i>Recent</i>	<i>80138</i>	<i>23825</i>	<i>42527</i>	<i>28000</i>	<i>174484</i>
<i>Preparing</i>	<i>80323</i>	<i>31846</i>	<i>105541</i>	<i>30000</i>	<i>247710</i>
= AVAILABLE FORCES	200965	258403	133926	66525	659819
- Committed Force	35929	107000	13048	10178	166155
- Command and Control	534	765	1968	4228	7495
- Other	105757	81267	11611	39468	238103
AVAILABLE	58745	69371	107299	12651	248066
	12%	19%	29%	7%	18%

*USMC data a/o 31 Jan 05




Available Personnel: Selected Reserve *As of Mar 05*

SELECTED RESERVES					
	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marines	Total
Assigned Strength	528800	180997	73032	40086	822915
				3200	64593
- Mobilized Today	130814	11247	4256	11984	158301
- Previously Mobilized	129618	48827	18841	12031	209317
0-6 Months	16296	10599	6405	1874	35174
6-12 Months	45273	19755	7538	7482	80048
12-18 Months	48014	8327	3014	1388	60743
>18 Months	20035	10146	1884	1287	33352
EEFORCES	212611	115257	49935	12871	390704
- Sourced OIF/OEF 04-06		TBD	3730	3178	6908
- Sourced OIF/OEF 05/07	47250	TBD	4578		51828
- Committed Forces		8003	6101		14104
Remaining Forces	121125	90866	31669	9693	253353
Remaining (Includes 0-6)	137421	101465	38074	11567	288527
Remaining (Includes 0-12)	182694	121220	45612	19049	368575



MOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENTS

Operation NOBLE EAGLE/ENDURING FREEDOM/IRAQI FREEDOM, 10 USC, section 12302







Monthly data as of the last daily report of each month. Data as of Jun 14,2005.

11-L-0559/OSD/50078



MOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENTS



Operation NOBLE EAGLE/ENDURING FREEDOM/IRAQI FREEDOM, 10 USC, section 12302





MOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENTS

Operation NOBLE EAGLE/ENDURING FREEDOM/IRAQI FREEDOM, 10 USC, section 12302



11-L-0559/OSD/50080

Version #6

September 7, 2004

SUBJECT: “Force Levels,” “End Strength” and “Stress on the Force”—Are current U.S. military forces sufficient in size and properly organized and managed to meet the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

Summary: The U.S. can afford whatever military force level is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. It is our people who distinguish the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be a mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in force levels, we increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

Background: The operational tempo of U.S. forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the statutory “end strength” of the U.S. military, but have not explained how to pay for it. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is not cheap, easy or quick.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more forces, the more force protection that is required; the more forces, the more infrastructure that is required; the more forces, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is available.

- At present, the Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. The Department is taking immediate actions to relieve this stress on the force in Iraq. There is a three-pronged strategy underway that is working to:

- Develop Iraqi capacity to conduct police and other security tasks;
- Increase international military participation in Iraq; and
- Increase actionable intelligence to disrupt attacks on coalition forces and other threats to stability.

In any event, the current stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation in addition to those immediate actions listed above. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

1. Lessons Being Learned

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the

Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military — US. and international — elements.

- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need **to** take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring **methods of** replacing the concept of “forces for a specific combatant commander” with a “Global Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in **support** of their essential missions.
- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate **mix** for the 21st century. The task is to avoid having **to** call up certain specialties **repeatedly** for tasks we know DoD **is and** will continue to be called **upon to** execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve **mix** must also be designed to **enable** more immediate action, as appropriate.
- Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. DoD will review active and reserve components **to** determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill **sets**, within existing end **strength** limits, to best satisfy the demands of the 21st century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, DoD will seek ways **to** increase **the** ratio of the number **of** months out of **the** total period of activation/mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which it was called up. We can improve **on those** instances **where** it is **as low** as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- Precision Weapons. **Our use** of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- Deployments. The old Industrial Age process is broken. **An** approach that permits only peace or war, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time **and** permit more nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.

- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system ~~from 45 – 60 days~~ to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the ~~vars~~ of the future may be over before the ~~staff~~ is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. People

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there ~~are~~ some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel ~~are~~ currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel ~~or~~ contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions ~~were~~ freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end strength” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
- Core Competencies. QSD is aggressively working to move the military out of activities that ~~are not~~ core competencies or inherently governmental. For example, housing privatization has allowed DoD to get better value and speed modernization for the same expenditure of funds.
- Contract Employees. For shorter duration missions and missions that are not military core competencies, DoD will have to make more judicious use of contract employees. This will require that we organize so we have Congressional authority and the ability to properly engage contract assistance.
- Education. The Department is working to improve joint education to create a culture that empowers younger leaders to think beyond their parent Services for creative solutions to the challenges our nation faces.
- Coalition Forces. The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. This will ~~require a diplomatic effort~~ to substantially reduce the current restrictions

and caveats ~~many~~ countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from ~~other~~ countries to help finance ~~less~~ wealthy nations' ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.

- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, ~~to~~ assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries ~~to~~ backfill for **U.S.** troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, **Kosovo**, etc. Additionally, the **U.S.** will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.
- Indigenous Forces. The **U.S.** must organize and fund ~~to~~ be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease ~~the burden on~~ coalition forces. ~~This~~ will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.
- Reserve Forces. DoD has established a policy whereby it will, ~~to the extent possible~~, first use Reserve forces ~~that~~ have not recently ~~been~~ mobilized.
- Volunteers. DoD will continue to use volunteers ~~from~~ the Reserve force, ~~to~~ the extent available.
- Holidays. ~~To the extent possible~~, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of major holidays.
- Call-ups. DoD is revising the process ~~so~~ as to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, ~~and~~ will consider a tiered **arrangement** whereby some reserve units might be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready ~~for~~ prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- Incentives. DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments.
- Peace Operations. The **USG** is considering ~~a~~ "Peace Operations Initiative" with ~~the~~ goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, ~~etc.~~ for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.

- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

3. Technology

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate **use** of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.
- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and **more** interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD will invest in technology to substitute for **human** force protection—sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be **encouraged** to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (**by** as much as **50** percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, in and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. **Services** are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners **through the** Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency

- Organization of Forces. 'In the 21st century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can **more** readily **organize** units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability **by** adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined **arms** effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint **Task Force** Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate **this** approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.

- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the U.S., thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. **OSD** and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired “effects” and “outcomes,” rather than simply responding to requests for numbers of things —troops or platforms.
- Procurement. DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure.
- Strategic Lift. DoD will continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint. Additionally, the Department must continue to **support** participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (**CRAF**) Act as a supplement to our national mobility capability.
- Rotation Ratio. The Services will **work** to find ways to reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to transport crews to their equipment.
- Headquarters Lavering. **DoD** components’ reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. **The** flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- Best Practices. **DoD** will work to move best practices from inside **and** outside DoD throughout the Department.
- Planning Tools. **DoD** is developing tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- Operational Availability. **DoD** will implement the appropriate **JROC** “operational availability” studies’ recommendations.
- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.

- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field: so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.
- Safety. DoD will move aggressively to reduce the number of mishaps as a means to protect our most valuable resources, our people.

5. Policy

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.
- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to provide protection for deployed U.S. forces.

Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the

easy and more expensive course of increasing force levels. We owe the American people no less.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/ End Snength



RESERVE / ACTIVE FORCE BALANCE

Objective: Create a more balanced and effective Force mix to meet the demands of current and future operations.

Output Metric: Positions rebalanced

Status:

SVC	Unit of Measure	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	TOT
Army	Authorizations	2500	4467	16843	11603	3239	4130	1542	0	0	44324
Air Force	Authorizations	0	3598	2789	715	18	41	225	55	0	7441
Navy	Authorizations	10313	3931	1394	582	0	0	0	0	0	16220
Marines	Authorizations	0	0	6000	3049	1115	0	0	0	0	10164
Total		112813	11996	27026	15949	4372	4171	1767	55	0	78149

Next Step: Reserve Affairs continue to monitor the impact of the above rebalancing actions, Services continue to rebalance as appropriate



MILITARY OUT OF NON MILITARY JOBS/CORE COMPETENCIES

Objective: Convert Military Billets to DoD Civilian or contract support and either reduce military end strength or stress

Output Metric: Positions converted

Status:

SVC	Unit	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	TOT
Army	Authorizations	0	4,281	8,187	1,861	718	497	51	0	0	15595
Air Force	Authorizations	0	1,790	4,029	3,613	3,023	2,348	79	0	0	14882
Navy	Authorizations	0	905	2,230	960	1,078	902	814	755	403	8047
(Marines)	Authorizations	0	664	1,659	1,120	176	17	0	0	0	3636
	Total	0	7640	16105	7554	4995	3764	944	755	403	42160

Next Step: Personnel and Readiness led conference to increase emphasis on conversion opportunities

~~FOUO~~

June 14, 2005

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Plan for Visiting Foreign Dignitaries

Please develop a plan so when anyone from a foreign country is invited to the Pentagon for a delegation meeting of some kind that we have a way of ensuring the airport security people *won't* stop them anymore

Tell me how you are going to implement it.

Thanks.

DHR:ak
061305-51

.....
Please respond by

7/7/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11821-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50092

091112

14 Jun 05



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301


JUN 20 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Department of Defense (DoD) Sponsored Travel of Foreign Nationals

As a result of the June 12, 2005 incident involving the temporary detention of a Qatari defense delegation en route to Washington, D.C. on a commercial flight, the Secretary of Defense has directed that formal procedures be put into place to better facilitate the travel of DoD-sponsored foreign delegations and personnel during official visits to the United States.

In coordination with Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), please assume the lead role in preparing an Information Memorandum and brief no later than June 27 to be presented to the Deputy Secretary of Defense outlining action taken to date, near-term solutions and long-term courses of action. The OSD Executive Secretary point of contact for this matter is LtCol Kevin Vest (b)(6) Kevin.Vest@osd.mil.


William P. Marriott
Captain, USN
Executive Secretary

cc:
USD(P)
USD(I)
ASD(HD)
Director, Joint Staff



11-L-0559/OSD/50093

OSD 11821-05

091.112

2050005

1450005

~~FOUO~~

June 20, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Zal Khalilzad

I think Zal Khalilzad should retain the title of "Special Envoy for Afghanistan" in case we need to slip him back in there and use him for something.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
062005-11

Afghanistan

20 Jun 05

OSD 11858-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/50094

~~FOUO~~

PRINCIPALS ONLY

OFFICE OF THE
June 16, 2005
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 20 FH 5:57

TO: Fran Harvey Doug Feith
Mike Dominguez Steve Cambone
Tina Jonas Mike Donley
Dan Stanley Ken Drieg
Larry Di Rita Dino Aviles
David Chu Jim Haynes

CC: Gordon England
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Division of Labor

Attached, **for** your information, is a division of labor that Deputy Secretary England and I have developed. It may be useful to you as you work **issues** in the Department. Obviously, anything you feel should come to me personally **should** do so, regardless of topic. But for routine matters, this division should serve **as** a guide

Further, you can all be helpful to Gordon and me by **making** sure that I am **kept** aware of those matters which you are working with him on.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
061605-3

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

PRINCIPALS ONLY
11-L-0559/OSD/50095

OSD 11862-05

DIVISION OF LABOR - SECDEF & DEPSECDEF**SECDEF**

GWOT

Iraq

Afghanistan

SLRG

Contingency Planning

POTUS Briefings

Deployment Orders

Special Operations

Stress on the Force/End Strength

Intelligence/DNI/CIA

SRO

Global Posture

Special Computer Programs

Nuclear Policy

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Active/Reserve Balance

Defense Policy Board

BOTH (Lead)Sr Civilian Personnel Selection
(SD)Sr Military Personnel Selection
(SD)

Budget (DSD)

Jointness (SD)

Legislative Issues (DSD)

Public Outreach (SD)

Accountability (DSD)

Public **Affairs** (SD)

Detainees (with Doug Feith)

Transformation (DSD)

QDR (DSD)

Missile Defense (SD)

Interagency (SD)

Homeland Defense (DSD)

Personnel Policy (DSD)

Quality of Life (DSD)

Compartmented Programs (SD)

Pentagon Renovation (DSD)

Defense Science **Board** (DSD)**DEPSECDEF**

DoD Reorganization

Financial Mgmt **Systems**Business Mgmt **Systems**Supply Chain **Mgmt**

Facilities and Infrastructure

Acquisition

Acquisition Reform

Procurement**IED Task Force****NSPS**

Medical Affairs

USAF **Tankers/C-130s**, etc.Network & **Info** integrationDefense **Business Board**

BRAC

Readiness

NSPSForeign **Weapons Sales****IED Task Force**Defense **Business Board**

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
May 31, 2005
2005 JUN 20 PM 6:01

TO: Steve Cambone
C C Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Iraq War Plan

Did we ever find out who leaked the war plan prior to the Iraq War?

Thanks.

DHR:as
053105-29

.....
Please respond by 6/16/05

FOUO

#

OSD 11863-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50097

~~FOUO~~

JUN 21 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Gen Pete Pace
GEN John Abizaid
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Eikenberry and Future Ops

I think you ought to suggest to Eikenberry he not mention future operations like he did in today's NSC meeting. There are too many people in there and discussing future operations is dangerous, and I wouldn't do it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
062005-15

.....
Please Respond By _____

OSD 11959-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/50098

JOS/007716
ES-3434

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 22 AM 7:42 JUN 03 2005

TO Mira Ricardel
FROM:
SUBJECT: Current Information on Usability for NATO

381

I'd like to see the most current information on metrics on usability for NATO - all the countries, including the United States - soon.

Thanks.

DHR:m
060005-12 (TS)

.....

Please respond by 6/16/05

~~FOUO~~

3 JUN 05

06-06-05 09:19 IN

OSD 11988-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50099

4/24
1230
6/24-1500

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

2005 JUN 22 AM 8:21

Answers Snowflake

ES-3487

05/008023-EP

USD(P) COPY

Robert Rangel

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Acting),
Mira Ricardel

JUN 17 2005

SUBJECT: Letter to Spanish MOD Bono re Tomahawk Sale

- During his visit to the Pentagon last month, Minister Bono asked you to consider releasing Tomahawk to Spain.
- The Services, Joint Staff, DSCA and State support release of Tomahawk to Spain.
 - Tomahawk has only been sold through Foreign Military Sales channels and this stipulation is mentioned in your reply.
- Proposed letter also expresses appreciation for Bono's recent public statements in favor of maintaining the EU arms embargo on China and responds in general terms to his invitation for you to visit Spain.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign letter at Tab A to MOD Bono providing USG concurrence on the sale of Tomahawk.

SecDef Decision:

Approve _____

Edit as indicated

see edit

Coordination:

A/DASD (EUR & NATO)

JUN 16 2005

Director, (EPS)

11/15

6/24

MA SD	6/27	8MA DSD	
TSA SD	6/27	SA OSD	
EXEC SEC	6/27	1150	
ESR MA	6/24-05	1052	

Prepared by Patrick Graff, ISP/EPS (b)(6) 14 Jun 05

OSD 11998-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
11-L-0559/OSD/50100

20-05-05 07:53 1N

27 JUN

17 JUN 05

13 JUN 05

FOUO
OFFICE OF THE
SECY OF DEFENSE
2005 JUN 22 AM 8:21

05/008001
ES-3487
JUN 13 2005

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Doug Perry

SUBJECT: Status of Items relating to Spain

Please get back to me on the status of a response to Spain on the Tomahawk.

Also, please get back to me on the letters from the Spanish MoD that I seem not to have answered. re invitation to visit Spain

Thanks.

DHR:m
060903-19 (TS)

.....
Please respond by 6/30/05

Sir. ^{MR} 6/27
Response attached.
y/n
Lt Col (enr)ed

JUN 27 2005

M

FOUO

OSD 11998-05
13-05-05 11:12 14



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-11

CAPT Marnett 6/28

His Excellency
Jose Bono Martinez
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Paseo de la Castellana 109
28071 Madrid
Spain

- Edits made
- Policy version
that come back
had "can't be in
2005"
- I changed to SEDEF's
"could not" VLB

Dear Minister Bono:

During your visit to Washington last month, you expressed interest in procuring Tomahawk missiles for Spanish frigates and submarines. I am pleased to inform you that the United States welcomes this sale and looks forward to receiving your Letter of Request.

Since the U.S. Navy is the executive agent for the Tomahawk program, your Letter of Request should be directed to the Navy International Programs Office, who will administer the sale through our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process.

Thank you for your invitation to visit Spain. I will look at my schedule to ~~determine the best time to do so.~~ *See if it might be possible, but*

~~Enjoyed seeing you at the Defense Ministerial in Brussels.~~ Your recent public statements supporting the EU arms embargo on China are appreciated and right on the mark.

Sincerely,

*It seems clear
that it could not be
in 2005.*



11-L-0559/OSD/50102



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

His Excellency
Jose Bono Martinez
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Pasco de la Castellana 109
28071 Madrid
Spain

Dear Minister Bono:

During ~~your~~ visit to Washington last month, ~~you~~ expressed interest ~~in~~ procuring Tomahawk missiles for Spanish frigates and submarines. I am pleased to inform you that the United States welcomes this sale and looks forward to receiving your ~~Letter of~~ Request (LOR).

Since the U.S. Navy is the executive agent for the Tomahawk program, your LOR should be directed to the Navy International Programs Office, who will administer the sale through our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process.

Thank you for ~~your~~ invitation to visit Spain. I will look at my schedule to see if it might be possible, but it seems clear that it can't be in 2005.

Your recent public statements supporting the EU arms embargo on China are appreciated and right on the mark.

Bozkin

Sincerely,

ES 11998-05



11-L-0559/OSD/50103

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 22 AM 8:21

05/008001
ES-3487

JUN 13 2005

TO: Mira Ricardel
cc: Doug Ferry

SUBJECT: Status of Items relating to Spain

Please get back to me on the status of a response to Spain on the Tomahawk.

Also, please get back to me on the letters from the Spanish MoD that I seem not to have answered. *re invitation to visit Spain*

Thanks.

DHR:s
060903-19 (TS)

.....
Please respond by

.....
6/30/05

Spain

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11998-05

03-06-05 11:12 IN

13 June 05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

His Excellency
Jose Bono Martinez
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Paseo de la Castellana 109
28071 Madrid
Spain

Dear Minister Bono:

During your visit to Washington last month, you expressed interest in procuring Tomahawk missiles for Spanish frigates and submarines. I am pleased to inform you that the United States welcomes this sale and looks forward to receiving your Letter of Request.

Since the U.S. Navy is the executive agent for the Tomahawk program, your Letter of Request should be directed to the Navy International Programs Office, who will administer the sale through our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process.

Thank you for your invitation to visit Spain. I will look at my schedule to determine the best time to do so.

I enjoyed seeing you at the Defense Ministerial in Brussels. Your recent public statements supporting the EU arms embargo on China are appreciated and right on the mark.

Sincerely,



FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO USDAO MADRID SP
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID SP
INFO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EUR//
JOINT STAFF//J5//
USEUCOM STUTTGART GE

SUBJECT SECDEF LETTER TO MOD BONO

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO MINISTER OF
DEFENSE BONO AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY:

2. TEXT OF LETTER

HIS EXCELLENCY
JOSE BONO MARTINEZ
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
PASEO DE LA CASTELLANA 109
28071 MADRID, SPAIN

DEAR MR. MINISTER

(PARA) DURING ***YOUR*** VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST MONTH, YOU
EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PROCURING TOMAHAWK MISSILES FOR
SPANISH FRIGATES AND SUBMARINES. I AM PLEASED TO INFORM
YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES THIS SALE AND LOOKS
FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR LETTER OF REQUEST.

(PARA) SINCE THE U.S. NAVY IS THE EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE
TOMAHAWK PROGRAM, YOUR LETTER OF REQUEST SHOULD BE
DIRECTED TO THE NAVY INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS OFFICE, WHO
WILL ADMINISTER THE SALE THROUGH ***OUR*** FOREIGN MILITARY
SALES (FMS) PROCESS.

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION TO VISIT SPAIN. **I WILL**
LOOK AT ***MY*** SCHEDULE TO DETERMINE THE BEST TIME TO DO SO.

(PARA) I ENJOYED SEEING YOU AT THE DEFENSE MINISTERIAL IN
BRUSSELS. YOUR RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING THE
EU **ARMS** EMBARGO ON CHINA ARE APPRECIATED AND RIGHT ON
THE MARK.

SINCERELY, /SIGNED/ DONALD RUMSFELD

3. HARD COPY OF LETTER MAILED TO DAO MADRID



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000**

JUN 28 2005

SPAIN

His Excellency
Jose Bono Martinez
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Paseo de la Castellana 109
28071 Madrid
Spain

Dear Minister Bono:

During your visit to Washington last month, you expressed interest in procuring Tomahawk missiles for Spanish frigates and submarines. I am pleased to inform you that the United States welcomes this sale and looks forward to receiving your Letter of Request (LOR).

Since the U.S. Navy is the executive agent for the Tomahawk program, your LOR should be directed to the Navy International Programs Office, who will administer the sale through our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process.

Thank you for your invitation to visit Spain. I will look at my schedule to see if it might be possible, but it seems clear that it could not be in 2005.

Your recent public statements supporting the EU arms embargo on China are appreciated and right on the mark.

Sincerely,



OSD 11998-05

15 JUN 05

11-L-0559/OSD/50107

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO USDAO MADRID SP
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID SP
INFO SECSTATE WASHINGTON ED//EUR//
JOINT STAFF//J5//

SUBJECT SECDEF LETTER TO MOD BONO

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF THE MESSAGE TO MOD BONO
AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. ORIGINAL LETTER WILL FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

HIS EXCELLENCY
JOSE BONO MARTINEZ
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
PASEO DE LA CASTELLANA 109
28071 MADRID
SPAIN

DEAR MINISTER BONO:

(PARA) DURING YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST MONTH, YOU
EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PROCURING TOMAHAWK MISSILES FOR SPANISH
FRIGATES AND SUBMARINES. I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT THE
UNITED STATES WELCOMES THIS SALE AND LOOKS FORWARD TO
RECEIVING YOUR LETTER OF REQUEST (LOR).

(PARA) SINCE THE U.S. NAVY IS THE EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE
TOMAHAWK PROGRAM, YOUR LOR SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE NAVY
INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS OFFICE, WHO WILL ADMINISTER THE SALE
THROUGH OUR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) PROCESS.

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION TO VISIT SPAIN. I WILL LOOK
AT MY SCHEDULE TO SEE IF IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR
THAT IT COULD NOT BE IN **2005**.

(PARA) YOUR RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING THE EU **ARMS**
EMBARGO ON CHINA ARE APPRECIATED AND RIGHT ON THE MARK.

SINCERELY,
//DONALD RUMSFELD//
(END TEXT)

OSD 11998-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50108

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 22 AM 8:37

June 3, 2005

1037

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Idea of Petraeus Visiting Afghanistan

I think it might be a good idea for Petraeus to go over and spend several days in Afghanistan taking a look at their training of security forces, and see if he has learned anything that might be helpful to them. And then give us an assessment on it.

Thanks.

DHR:m
060205-25 (TS)

.....
Please respond by 6/17/05

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12000-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50109

TAB B

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM

GEN Abizaid

6 June 2005



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OFFICE OF THE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999 SECDEF:SECDEFENSE

2005 JUN 22 AM 8:37
CH-2566-05
21 June 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RB Myer 4/17/05*

SUBJECT: Idea of Petraeus Visiting Afghanistan (SF 1037)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), the Commander, US Central Command, endorses the idea and Lieutenant General Petraeus will visit Afghanistan. The visit is tentatively scheduled for the first week of July 2005.
- **Analysis.** General Petraeus will provide to you his review and assessment of the training program for Afghan security forces upon completion.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA, Director, J-5 (b)(6)

OSD 12000-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 22 AM 8:57 May 10, 2005

1012

311 E CM

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*

SUBJECT IED Jammer Deadline

We had good success setting a firm deadline of 15 February for HMVEEs in Iraq.
Should we do something similar for IED Jammers, i.e. say that no one travels
outside a compound without IED jammer support by a date certain?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
050905-40

.....
Please respond by

5/26/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/50112

OSD 12006-05

0 MAY 05

TAB A

FOUO

15-03250
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1029 JUN 22 AM 8:57

May 31, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *Washington Post* Story on Cessna and Air Defense Timeline

There was an article in Sunday's *Washington Post* about the air defense timeline being in dispute with regards to the Cessna entering restricted airspace.

Please check into that, and let's talk about it.

Thanks.

Attach:
5/29/05 *Washington Post* story "Air Defense Timeline Cited in Cessna Dispute"

OPR:an
03103-19

.....
Please respond by 6/16/05

Received 1000 JUN 1 - 2005
Deputy EA *[initials]* EA *at 4/5*
CJCS Decision:
Memo for my Signature *ML*
Briefing for Approval _____
Provide 5x8 / slides / info paper _____
OSD OPR - coord response _____
Send to _____ for action _____
send to Staff for info _____
No Reply / No Distro _____
Copy to: J-3, PA

FOUO

CJCS-24 18/21
10F1

Tab A

OSD 12009-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50113

384

31 MAY 05

Washington Post
May 29, 2005
Pg. 13

Air Defense Timeline Cited In Cessna Dispute

By Spencer S. Hsu, Washington Post Staff Writer

A government chronology reports that senior Pentagon officials convened a classified conference call to decide whether to shoot down the small plane inside restricted airspace over Washington this month and that "appropriate engagement" procedures were "readily available."

The timeline of air defense activities was cited by two senior U.S. officials in explaining why operations center personnel from at least two federal agencies acted in the belief that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld had given authority to military officials to shoot down the stray Cessna, if necessary.

The chronology was prepared by a non-Defense agency as part of briefing documents for Congress and other government agencies. It includes the tense sequence of events at noontime May 11, when a military jet intercepted the plane and fired flares as it came within three miles of the White House.

The small plane never was deemed to be hostile, so a shootdown order was not required, the senior officials said. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of anti-terrorism activities.

Pentagon officials said that Rumsfeld was notified about what was taking place and that he was available if needed. But the Situation never reached the point of requiring his action, they said. Pentagon officials noted that the Defense Department is responsible for conducting the conference call and directing the use of military assets.

A Pentagon spokesman said Rumsfeld "never gave orders or authority to shoot down the plane." Rumsfeld said he "never even got on the phone to discuss the circumstances of the little plane."

Although the plane was approaching the executive mansion, its pilots maintained a steady course and speed, and appeared to intercepting aircrews to be lost and not aiming for a target. Operational details of the air defense system are generally classified, and Pentagon officials have declined to provide details of the exact steps taken that day.

The contrasting statements open a window on a rigorous and formal process developed by U.S. authorities since the 2001 terrorist attacks to speed the military's ability to down a hostile civilian aircraft. The different interpretations of the log help explain why military and civilian accounts of what happened diverge.

The flight of the Cessna 150 ended safely after Pennsylvania aviators Hayden "Jim" Sheaffer, 69, and Troy Martin, 36, diverted their plane and were escorted to a Frederick airport. Their flight triggered evacuations of the White House, U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court. Sheaffer is appealing the revocation of his pilot license by federal authorities.

But in the crucial minutes after the Cessna breached the D.C. Flight Restricted Zone — which stretches 16 miles out from the Mall — at 11:50 a.m., advanced preparations were made to shoot down the plane if it was deemed a threat.

Tab A

The timeline states that the Pentagon's National Military Command Center, which is responsible for tying the defense secretary and others in the government leadership to the North American Aerospace Defense Command, was online. At 12:02 p.m., the conference call was upgraded to a classified "Operation Noble Eagle" conference call; among its tasks was to decide whether a shoot-down was warranted.

At that time, military jets took over from a Black Hawk helicopter and Citation jet that were handling the intercept for the Customs and Border Protection agency. Ground antiaircraft artillery units were placed on ready status, and evacuations were ordered.

The timeline "backs up a feeling in law enforcement that he did give the green light," said one of the senior U.S. officials, whose agency responded in the incident.

"The secretary had to either have given his authority, or somebody he designated had given authority to green-light appropriate action," the senior official said. "Certainly there was the belief in the [law enforcement] community the green light was given. How that started, if it was inadvertent, if it was misheard, or if there was some misinterpretation at the [Defense Department], that's something we may never know."

Echoing that interpretation of events, one law enforcement agency command center's chronology contains an entry at 12:04 p.m.: "About to use missiles."

According to the second senior official, the head of another federal command center briefed him during the incident and said that Rumsfeld had given authority, if necessary, to act. To my understanding, it was an implied authority. I don't know if it was a verbal command — "If it became a hostile threat, you will have the authority to engage," the senior official said.

Separately, U.S. customs aircraft were given an order to immediately leave the vicinity of the Cessna, in anticipation of fire from the ground or a fighter jet, said another official, familiar with briefings by the Transportation Security Administration. TSA is the administrative agent for the multi-agency air defense command center in Herndon.

"It came over the frequency that tells the aircrews to get the heck out of dodge. . . . It's the precursor" to a decision to fire, the official said, adding that he knew of no other purpose for such an order.

At about that time, the jet dispersed warning flares, ground controllers finally established radio contact and the Cessna turned away at 12:05 p.m.

The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they did not want their agencies to appear to challenge the Pentagon and Rumsfeld's specific version of events. Previously, the officials said they discussed that day's events, despite their secret nature, to illustrate the tight time constraints that the system places on potentially life-and-death decisions.

Defense officials said the interpretation simply was wrong. Officials at two other federal agency command centers said that they understood Rumsfeld was about to be added to the conference call if needed, as Pentagon officials consistently have said, but that no declarative order or authority to fire on the Cessna was required or given.

"We were in control of the process. It's our call. It's our people. There are a number of people listening in; they have an obvious need to know what's going on. I can't explain their accounts, if they are

Tab A

different ~~from what~~ actually happened," Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said.

"You don't have engagement authority ~~until~~ it's given, and it ~~was~~ not given — nor ~~was~~ it even requested," Whitman said. "If someone was hearing this over the phone only, or ~~wasn't~~ familiar with the process, I suppose they could not have a full appreciation for actions that were *going* on."

Whitman declined to discuss military rules of engagement or detailed command protocols, citing their potential use by adversaries. Asked who at the Pentagon presided over the conference call, Whitman said, "All the necessary people that were required were involved."

The Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, carried out by four hijacked airliners, prompted changes in the nation's chain of command, known formally as the National Command Authority, as well as the communications systems and protocols for downing a hostile civilian aircraft. Some of those changes delegated the president's authority not only to the defense secretary, but to military officials, in specific emergencies.

The commission that investigated the 2001 attacks noted that President Bush expressed frustrations with poor communications that morning, during which for a period of time he could not reach key officials, such as Rumsfeld. Vice President Cheney helped establish rules of engagement for fighters over Washington, noting that it did no good to establish air patrols unless pilots were instructed on whether they had authority to shoot if an unidentified plane would not divert, according to the commission's report.

In testimony to the commission in 2003, Air Force Maj. Gen. Craig R. McKinley, then commander of NORAD's continental U.S. region in Florida, explained that authority for air patrols to shoot down a civilian aircraft, once limited to the president, had been delegated to Rumsfeld; to the NORAD commander, now Navy Adm. Timothy J. Keating; and to himself. A defense official last week said additional civilians also are involved.

Staff writer Josh White and staff researcher Eddy Palanzo contributed to this report.

Tab A

FOUO

MAY 19 2005

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Diversity - Women and Minorities

We need to get much more energy into achieving diversity at senior levels in the Services. I spoke with all the Service Chiefs and COCOMS about **this** at the Combatant Commander Conference, and tasked each of them to come to the next Conference with a progress report.

I'd like **you** to do the following:

1. Produce some readable statistics so we *can* analyze **the** problem - comparing the US population against senior officers, total military population, active/ reserve, etc. - I'd like to see these next week by Service, including the flag officers on each COCOMs staff.
2. Set up a means for the Services to exchange good ideas on how **we** can improve. My guess is that each of the Services **are** pursuing diversity, but **are not sharing** creative and potentially successful strategies **forgetting** there. I would like to know that you have **this** in place within two weeks.
3. Provide me a list of good and creative ideas **to** jump-start the process.
Some of the things that occur to me **are**:
 - a. getting senior leadership out speaking **on** this subject,
 - b. attending conventions of minority and women's associations,

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/50117

OSD 12074-05

205

19 May 05

~~FOUO~~

- c. writing articles,
- d. placing qualified minorities in front office and other high visibility positions,
- e. conducting targeted recruiting campaigns,
- f. adding language to board precepts,
- g. creating awards for deserving women and minorities,
- h. starting mentoring programs with active and retired senior women and minorities, and
- i. using popular culture – music, film, television – to recruit.

Please show me your first cut within two weeks. We have to do ~~better~~.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051805-1S

Please respond by 6/1/05

~~FOUO~~



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2005 JUN 22 PM 4: 22



June 7, 2005 - 12:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY (P&R)

SUBJECT: Diversity Results and Future Efforts — SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- Attached at Tab B are the data you requested. Key points:
 - o Among active flags, our African-American proportion (5.6%) is consistent with the national pool of African-American college graduates (6.4% of college graduates are African-American). Indeed, recent active officer commissionings are running over 8% African-American.
 - o Our low proportion of active Hispanic flags reflects a low proportion of Hispanic commissionings 20-30 years ago. Flag proportion should improve with the higher Hispanic commissionings of the 1990s.
 - o Low proportion of female flags reflects weak female officer retention, and career choices that limit flag potential. One result: at the moment we have no active female flag officers in the combatant commands (Tab C).
- We have established a mechanism for exchange of Service ideas with our Defense Human Resource Board. We have already had our first exchange; next is planned for August 16".
- On ideas to jump-start the process: Actions will speak much more effectively than words. I have discussed with LTG Schwartz the weak representation in the combatant commands; we should take action during this summer's replacement cycle to start correcting this situation, and will offer you and the Chairman, some suggestions for "non-traditional" assignments.
- Targeted recruiting might first focus on the Military Academies and the use of our ROTC scholarships. We will work with the Military Departments on this.



OSD 12074-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50119

205

4 JUN 05

19 JUN 05

- We also need to initiate “targeted retention” for our women officers. We lose too many in the early years of service. One option we **are** already exploring is to ~~offer~~ Reserve affiliation for those who would like to take a few years “off.” Navy is looking at sabbaticals.
- Articles might usefully celebrate the mid-career officers who are now holding command positions, or other assignments of high responsibility. We will work with Public Affairs to promote these.
- Speaking at outreach events might usefully focus on two targets: encouraging stronger Hispanic participation generally, and stronger African-American participation in the flying community particularly. (For reasons we do not understand, very few African Americans choose an aviation career path, which hurts us in both the Air Force and the Navy.)
- We will plan to provide you with quarterly reports of our progress.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. William Carr, Acting **DUSD** Mil Pers Policy (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

MAY 10 2005

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Diversity – Women and Minorities

We need **to** get much more energy into achieving diversity at senior levels in the Services. I spoke with all the Service Chiefs and COCOMS about **this** at the Combatant Commander Conference, and tasked each of them to come to the next Conference with a progress report.

I'd like you to do the following:

1. Produce some readable statistics so we can analyze the problem – comparing the **US** population against senior officers, **total military** population, active / reserve, etc. – I'd like to **see these** next week by Service, including the flag officers on each COCOM's **staff**.
2. Set up a means for the Services **to** exchange good ideas on how we can improve. My guess is that each of the Services **are** pursuing diversity, but **are** not sharing creative **and** potentially successful strategies for getting there. I would like to know that you have **this** in place within two weeks.
3. Provide **me** a list of good and creative ideas to jump-start the process.
Some of the things that occur **to** me **are**:
 - a. getting senior leadership out speaking on this subject,
 - b. attending conventions of minority and women's associations,

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50121

OSD 12074-05

~~FOUO~~

- c. writing articles,
- d. placing qualified minorities in front office and ~~other~~ high visibility positions,
- e. conducting targeted recruiting campaigns,
- f. adding language to board precepts,
- g. creating awards for deserving women and minorities,
- h. starting mentoring programs with active and retired senior women and minorities, and
- i. using popular culture - music, film, television - to recruit.

Please show me your first cut within two ~~weeks~~. We have to do better.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051805-15


Please respond by 6/1/05

~~FOUO~~

DoD Active Duty General/ Flag Officers by Gender/ Race/ Ethnicity

Service	African American	Asia/Pacific Islander	Hispanic	Total Minority	Women
Army	8.2%	1.3%	1.6%	11.0%	4.1%
Navy	4.1%	0.0%	0.9%	5.0%	5.0%
AF	4.4%	0.3%	1.3%	6.0%	7.4%
USMC	3.8%	0.0%	1.3%	5.1%	2.5%
DoD	5.6%	0.5%	1.3%	7.4%	5.3%

DoD Active Duty General / Flag Officers by Gender / Race / Ethnicity




- Among women the Air Force and Navy have the largest proportion of General/Flag Officers
- Among African Americans and Hispanics, the Army leads with the largest proportion

Active Duty Officer Corps by Gender/Race/Ethnicity


Asian/Pacific					
Army	17%	12%	5%	4%	75%
Navy	15%	7%	5%	5%	80%
Air Force	18%	7%	4%	3%	81%
Marine Corps	6%	6%	6%	4%	78%
DoD	15%	9%	5%	4%	78%

Active Duty Officer Corps by Gender/Race/Ethnicity



- Among women, the Air Force and Army show the greatest representation
- For African Americans, the Army has the greatest proportion
- For Hispanics, the Marine Corps has the highest representation

Active Duty COCOM Flag / General Officers



Active Duty General / Flag Officers on the COCOM Staffs				
Rank	Race/Ethnic	Female	Male	Total
O-7	White	0	57	57
	Black	0	7	7
	Hispanic	0	3	3
	Asian/Pacific Is.	0	0	0
	Unknown	0	0	0
	Total	0	67	67
O-8	White	0	18	18
	Black	0	0	0
	Hispanic	0	0	0
	Amer Ind/Alaskan	0	0	0
	Asian/Pacific Isl	0	0	0
	Unknown	0	0	0
	Total	0	18	18
O-9	White	0	15	15
	Black	0	0	0
	Hispanic	0	0	0
	Total	0	15	15
O-10	White	0	11	11
	Total	0	11	11
All GFO Grades	White	0	101	101
	Black	0	7	7
	Hispanic	0	3	3
	Amer Ind/Alaskan	0	0	0
	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0
	Female	0	0	0
	Unknown	0	0	0
	Total	0	111	111



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL
2005 JUN 22 PM 5:44

June 22, 2005 3:00 p.m.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel
SUBJECT: Question about Contracting Rules

- You inquired about a statement attributed to Major General Chiarelli about contracting rules regarding insurance (number 14 on the attached e-mail). I believe that the issue involves insurance required by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651 - 1654.
- The Defense Base Act (DBA) requires contractors and subcontractors to provide worker's compensation insurance for employees in the event of injury, death, capture, or detention in connection with the performance of construction projects or defense related services outside the United States. Foreign national employees are covered. However, the Secretary of Labor may waive DBA insurance for foreign nationals if their respective countries have alternative compensation systems. Currently, Iraq has no worker's compensation system.
- The costs to contractors of this insurance and the amounts of deductibles vary from carrier to carrier. However, our clients uniformly have observed a significant increase in the cost of DBA insurance, given the risks associated with the volatile global environment.
- To address the escalating costs of this insurance, the Corps of Engineers has instituted a pilot program, based upon practices of the Agency for International Development and the State Department, under which it is conducting a competition among DBA insurance providers and will award a single contract to one provider. All contractors performing work in Iraq will be required to obtain their DBA insurance from that provider. Competition should help contain costs and ensure uniformity. Proposals from interested providers must be submitted to the Corps by July 6, 2005.
- If Iraq establishes a worker's compensation scheme, we can request the Secretary of Labor to waive DBA insurance for Iraqi nationals working on U.S. Government contracts and subcontracts.


TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

March 18, 2005

2005 MAR 20 PM 4:42

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Question about Contracting Rules

Attached is an e-mail I received. You will notice it says there are contracting rules (point #14, which I have marked). Please check into that and see if it is true, and if so, what can be done about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/17/05 E-mail to (b)(6)

DHR:sa
031803-6

Please respond by

3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05888-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50128

Joyce Rumsfeld

From: (b)(6)@rumsfeld.com>
To: "Rumsfeld, Joyce" (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2005 10:24 AM
Subject: More Lessons Learned from Iraq

Joyce,

From (b)(6) I hunted around on the Internet a bit, and the story seems to be legitimate.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2005 8:53 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Fwd: FW: More Lessons Learned from Iraq

(b)(6)

I think you might find this interesting reading, and perhaps you will forward it to Don and Joyce. Thanks.

Hope all is going well with you

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 7:17 AM
To: Undisclosed-Recipient: ;undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: Fw: More Lessons Learned

Thought you would enjoy reading an unfiltered report from a meeting of the Association of the United States Army with the 1st Cav Division Commander as the keynote speaker. Gives a bit of insight to what's happening in Iraq that will make you proud you're an American...take that back, make you understand why you ARE an American.

Went to an AUSA dinner last night at the Ft. Hood Officers' Club to hear a speech by MG Pete Chiarelli, CG of the 1st Cav Div. He and most of the Div. have just returned from Iraq. Very informative and, surprise, the Mainstream Media (MSM) isn't telling the story. I was not there as a reporter, didn't take notes but I'll make some the points I remember that were interesting, suprising or generally stuff I had not heard before.

It was not a speech per se. He just walked and talked, showed some slides and answered questions. Very impressive guy.

3/17/2005

11-L-0559/OSD/50129

1. While units of the Cav served all over Iraq, he spoke mostly of Baghdad and more specifically Sadr City, the big slum on the eastern side of the Tigris River. He pointed out that Baghdad is, in geography, about the size of Austin. Austin has 600,000 to 700,000 people. Baghdad has 6 to 7 million people.

2. The Cav lost 28 main battle tanks. He said one of the big lessons learned is that, contrary to doctrine going in, M1-A2s and Bradleys are needed, preferred and devastating in urban combat and he is going to make that point to the JCS next week while they are considering downsizing armor.

3. He showed a graph of attacks in Sadr City by month. Last Aug-Sep they were getting up to 160 attacks per week. During the last three months, the graph had flatlined at below 5 to zero per week.

4. His big point was not that they were "winning battles" to do this but that cleaning the place up, electricity, sewage, water were the key factors. He said yes they fought but after they started delivering services that the Iraqis in Sadr City had never had, the terrorist recruiting of 15 and 16 year olds came up empty.

5. The electrical "grid" is a bad, deadly joke. Said that driving down the street in a Humvee with an antenna would short out a whole block of apt. buildings. People do their own wiring and it was not uncommon for early morning patrols would find one or two people lying dead in the street, having been electrocuted trying to re-wire their own homes.

6. Said that not tending to a dead body in the Muslim culture never happens. On election day, after suicide bombers blew themselves up trying to take out polling places, voters would step up to the body lying there, spit on it, and move up in the line to vote.

7. Pointed out that we all heard from the media about the 100 Iraqis killed as they were lined up to enlist in the police and security service. What the media didn't point out was that the next day there 300 lined up in the same place.

8. Said bin Laden and Zarqawi made a HUGE mistake when bin Laden went public with naming Zarqawi the "prince" of al Qaeda in Iraq. Said that what the Iraqis saw and heard was a Saudi telling a Jordanian that his job was to kill Iraqis. HUGE mistake. It was one of the biggest factors in getting Iraqis who were on the "fence" to jump off on the side of the coalition and the new gov't.

9. Said the MSM was making a big, and wrong, deal out of the religious sects. Said Iraqis are incredibly nationalistic. They are Iraqis first and then say they are Muslim but the Shi'a-Sunni thing is just not that big a deal to them.

3/17/2005

11-L-0559/OSD/50130

10. ~~For~~ the election the Mayor of Baghdad told him that the people of the region (Middle East) are joyous and the governments are nervous.

11. Said that he did not lose a single tanker truck carrying oil and gas over the roads of Iraq. Think about that. All the attacks we saw on TV with IEDs hitting trucks but he didn't lose one. Why? Army Aviation. Praised his air units and said they made the decision early on that every convoy would have helicopter air cover. Said aviators in that unit were hitting the 1,000 hour mark (sound familiar?). Said a convoy was supposed to head out but stopped at the gates of a compound on the command of an E6. He asked the SSG what the hold up was. E6 said, "Air, sir." He wondered what was wrong with the air, not realizing what the kid was talking about. Then the AH-64s showed up and the E6 said, "That air sir." And then moved out.

12. Said one of the biggest problems was money and regs. There was a \$77 million gap between the supplemental budget and what he needed in cash on the ground to get projects started. Said he spent most of his time trying to get money. Said he didn't do much as a "combat commander" because the war he was fighting was a war at the squad and platoon level. Said that his NCOs were winning the war and it was a sight to behold.

13. Said that of all the money appropriated for Iraq, not a cent was earmarked for agriculture. Said that Iraq could feed itself completely and still have food for export but no one thought about it. Said the Cav started working with Texas A&M on ag projects and had special hybrid seeds sent to them through Jordan. TAM analyzed soil samples and worked out how and what to plant. Said he had an E7 from Belton, TX (just down the road from Ft. Hood) who was almost single-handedly rebuilding the ag industry in the Baghdad —

14. Said he could hire hundreds of Iraqis daily for \$7 to \$10 a day to work on sewer, electric, water projects, etc. but that the contracting rules from CONUS applied so he had to have \$500,000 insurance policies in place in case the workers got hurt. Not kidding. The CONUS peacetime regs slowed everything down, even if they could eventually get waivers for the regs.

There was more, lots more, but the idea is that you haven't heard any of this from anyone, at least I hadn't and I pay more attention than most.

Great stuff. We should be proud. Said the Cav troops said it was ALL worth it on Jan. 30 when they saw how the Iraqis handled election day. Made them very proud of their service and what they had accomplished.

3/17/2005

11-L-0559/OSD/50131

TAB

B



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1800



2005 MAR 28 15:42

INFO MEMO

March 28, 2005 2:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Insurance in Iraq

- You inquired about a statement attributed to Major General Chiarelli about contracting **rules** regarding insurance (number **14** on the attached e-mail). I believe that the issue involves insurance required by the Defense Base Act, **42 U.S.C. 1651 - 1654**.
- The Defense Base Act (DBA) requires contractors and subcontractors to **provide** worker's compensation insurance for employees in the event of injury, death, capture, or detention in connection with the performance of construction projects **or** defense **related** services outside the **United States**. Foreign national employees are covered. However, the Secretary of Labor may waive DBA insurance for foreign nationals if their respective countries have alternative compensation systems. Currently, Iraq has no worker's compensation system.
- The costs to contractors of **this** insurance and the **amounts** of deductibles vary from carrier to carrier. However, our clients **uniformly** have observed a significant increase in the cost of DBA insurance, given the risks associated with the volatile **global** environment.
- To address the escalating costs of **this** insurance, the Corps of Engineers has instituted a pilot **program**, **based** upon practices of the Agency for International Development and the State Department, under which it intends to conduct a competition among DBA insurance providers and award a single contract to one provider. All contractors performing work in **Iraq** will be required to obtain their DBA insurance from that provider. Competition should help contain costs and ensure uniformity.
- If Iraq establishes a worker's compensation scheme, we can request the Secretary of Labor to waive DBA insurance for Iraqi nationals working on **U.S.** Government contracts and subcontracts.



OSD 05888-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50133

~~FOUO~~

JUN 23 2005

TO: Gus Pagonis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Division of Labor Memo

Thanks for your note on Duties for the Deputy Secretary.

Attached is a division of labor that Gordon England and I have agreed on. I think you will agree the items on your list are pretty well covered by this.

If you have any further thoughts let me know.

Thanks so much,

Attach Division of Labor (SECDEF and DEPSECDEF)

DHR:ss
062105-17

020 SD

23 Jun 05

OSD 12087-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50134

DIVISION OF LABOR – SECDEF & DEPSECDEF

SECDEF

GWOT
Iraq
Afghanistan
SLRG
Contingency Planning
POTUS Briefings
Deployment Orders
Special Operations
Stress on the Force/End Strength
Intelligence/DNI/CIA
SRO
Global Posture
Special Computer Programs
Nuclear Policy
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Active/Reserve Balance
Defense Policy Board

BOTH (Lead)

Sr Civilian Personnel Selection (SD)

Sr Military Personnel Selection (SD)

Budget (DSD)
Jointness (SD)
Legislative Issues (DSD)
Public Outreach (SD)
Accountability (DSD)
Public Affairs (SD)
Detainees (with Doug Feith)
Transformation (DSD)
QDR (DSD)
Missile Defense (SD)
Interagency (SD)
Homeland Defense (DSD)
Personnel Policy (DSD)
Quality of Life (DSD)
Compartmented Programs (SD)
Pentagon Renovation (DSD)
Defense Science Board (DSD)


DEPSECDEF

DoD Reorganization
Financial Mgmt Systems
Business Mgmt Systems
Supply Chain Mgmt
Facilities and Infrastructure
Acquisition
Acquisition Reform
Procurement
IED Task Force
NSPS
Medical Affairs
USAF Tankers/C-130s, etc.
Network & Info Integration
Defense Business Board
BRAC
Readiness
NSPS
Foreign Weapons Sales
IED Task Force
Defense Business Board

r:

FOUO

JUN 23 2005

TO President George W. Bush
FROM: 
Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: President Lincoln's Speeches to Ohio Regiment, 1864

Mr. President,

Attached are some short remarks by President Lincoln to a military regiment. I have marked the two sections I thought you might find of particular interest. It is quite a statement.

Respectfully,

Attach.
President Abraham Lincoln's Speeches of August 18 and 22, 1864

DIR:m
062205-9

352 001

23 June 05

FOUO

OSD 12089-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50136

Speeches to Ohio Regiments

During the summer of 1864 when President Abraham Lincoln was deeply discouraged about the outcome of the war and his chances for re-election, he asked some Ohio soldiers to stop at the White House before returning home. The two speeches which follow express more than his appreciation -- they reveal his vision of democracy and hope for the future.

Speech to the One Hundred Sixty-Fourth Ohio Regiment

Washington, D.C.
August 18, 1864

Soldiers -- You are about to return to your homes and your friends, after having, as I learn, performed in camp a comparatively short term of duty in this great contest. I am greatly obliged to you, and to all who have come forward at the call of their country. I wish it might be more generally and universally understood what the country is now engaged in. We have, as all will agree, a free Government, where every man has a right to be equal with every other man. In this great struggle, this form of Government and every form of human right is endangered if our enemies succeed. There is more involved in this contest than is realized by every one. There is involved in this struggle the question whether your children and my children shall enjoy the privileges we have enjoyed. I say this in order to impress upon you, if you are not already so impressed, that no small matter should divert us from our great purpose. There may be some irregularities in the practical application of our system. It is fair that each man shall pay taxes in exact proportion to the value of his property; but if we should wait before collecting a tax to adjust the taxes upon each man in exact proportion with every other man, we should never collect any tax at all. There may be mistakes made sometimes; things may be done wrong while the officers of the Government do all they can to prevent mistakes. But I beg of you, as citizens of this great Republic, not to let your minds be carried off from the great work we have before us. This struggle is too large for you to be diverted from it by any small matter. When you return to your homes rise up to the height of a generation of men worthy of a free Government, and we will carry out the great work we have commenced. I return to you my sincere thanks, soldiers, for the honor you have done me this afternoon.

Speech to the One Hundred Sixty-sixth Ohio Regiment

Washington, DC.
August 22, 1864

I suppose you are going home to see your families and friends. For the service you have done in this great struggle in which we are engaged I present you sincere thanks for myself and the country. I almost always feel inclined, when I happen to say anything to soldiers, to impress upon them in a few brief remarks the importance of success in this contest. It is not merely for to-day, but for all time to come that we should perpetuate for our children's children this great and free government, which we have enjoyed all our lives. I beg you to remember this, not merely for my sake, but for yours. I happen temporarily to occupy this big White House. I am a living witness that any one of your children may look to come here as my father's child has. It is in order that each of you may have through this free government which we have enjoyed, an open field and a fair chance for your industry, enterprise and intelligence; that you may all have equal privileges in the race of life, with all its desirable human aspirations. It is for this the struggle should be maintained, that we may not lose our birthright--not only for one, but for two or three years. The nation is worth fighting for, to secure such an inestimable jewel.

Source: *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, edited by Roy P. Basler.

[Home](#) | [News](#) | [Educational Links](#) | [places](#) | [Resources](#) | [Books](#) | [Speeches](#) | [Search](#) | [Discussion](#)

Introduction copyright 2005 by Abraham Lincoln Online. All rights reserved. [Privacy Policy](#)

~~FOUO~~

JUN 23 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Information on Jim MacDougall

Here is my best information on MacDougall (one of the items we discussed today).

Thanks.

Attach Talking Points and Background on Jim MacDougall

DHR:ss
062205-22

230.02

23 June 05

OSD 12121-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/50139

SUGGESTIONS FOR CONVERSATIONS AT THE WHITE HOUSE

- The consideration of Jim MacDougall for the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ISP):
 - Under Secretary Feith first recommended MacDougall, a career employee in Policy, for the DASD–Eurasia position several months before the 2004 election. At that time, citing family financial concerns, MacDougall was unwilling to consider transferring from career to non-career (political) status in order to facilitate the appointment. PPO was unwilling to approve the appointment of a career employee into a political position.
 - PPO did agree to MacDougall's temporary service as the acting DASD until after the election.
 - Under Secretary Feith continues to recommend MacDougall for the position, and MacDougall continues to decline the transfer to political status **to** facilitate the appointment. There continues to be strong resistance to this appointment both at PPO and in the Office of Political Affairs (OPA). Were MacDougall to agree at this point to transfer to political status, it is not certain whether that would remove the opposition.

BIOGRAPHY

JIM MACDOUGALL

Mr.

**PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR FOR EURASIA
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY**

PHOTOGRAPH



CURRENT ASSIGNMENTS:

Jim MacDougall is Principal Director for Eurasia. He serves as policy analyst and advisor to the IASD Eurasia, ASD (ISP), USD (Policy) and other DoD officials on the military, political and economic aspects of U.S. security relations with the states of Eurasia. He is responsible for integrating and overseeing DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives in the region.

PAST EXPERIENCES:

Mr. MacDougall assumed his current position in September 2002. Prior to that, he served as Deputy Director for the Caucasus and Central Asia at ISP/Eurasia and as desk officer for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan since January 2002.

In 2000-2001, Mr. MacDougall served in the Defense POW/MIA Office (OSD/DPMO) as the Deputy Staff Director for the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. There he directed a wide range of research, analysis and production tasks undertaken by staff in Washington and Moscow.

In 1999, Mr. MacDougall served in the Russia/Ukraine Eurasia directorate of S&TR/OSD(P) as a foreign affairs specialist, analyst and advisor on countries of the Caucasus, Caspian and Central Asia regions.

During the academic year 1997-1998, Mr. MacDougall was an OSD Graduate Fellow at Georgetown University. While there he published articles on Russian and American foreign policy in the Caspian Basin in the academic journals Demokratizatsiya and Tsentralnaya Azia.

From 1993-1997, Mr. MacDougall served in a variety of roles of increasing responsibility on the staff of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, conducting research throughout the former Soviet Union and supporting senior-level negotiations and discussions with Russian counterparts.

Mr. MacDougall served ten years in the U.S. Army as an NCO and Warrant Officer. As a Russian

linguist he served in several key liaison positions, culminating with a tour as an arms control inspector at the On-Site ~~Inspection~~ Agency (1990-1993) where he monitored compliance during inspections of Soviet/Russian facilities subject to the INF and START treaties.

Mr. MacDougall holds an M.A. from Boston University and an A.B. from Dartmouth College. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate (International Relations) at Georgetown University, writing a dissertation on strategic alignment choices in the South Caucasus states.

EDUCATION:

PRIVACY 1 MENT

(U) FY: 10 U.S.C. 131
2. J.F. To include the Secretary, the Secretary of Defense, the Executive Secretariat and the Principal Staff
t. (PSA) with immediate access to biographical information on the OSD Staff personnel for purposes of facilitating interaction and communication in the exercise and discharge of assigned responsibilities and duties. The PSAs will only have access to those biographies for personnel who are employed, assigned or detailed to their perspective offices.

ROUTINE USE: None

DISCLOSURE: VOLUNTARY

CONSEQUENCES: None

FOUO

05/008058

ES-3486

JUN 13 2005

TO Mira Ricardel
cc: Dono FEITH

SUBJECT Issue Raised by MOD Devold

Please make sure you follow up with Ken Krieg on the issue Kristin raised about the naval missile. Be sure to let me know what you find out. It sounds like an important matter to keep Norway in the JFS program.

Thanks.

DIR:m
060805-2 (TS)

Please respond by

6/23/05

FOUO

13-06-05 11:12 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/50143

Norway

13JUN05

**DET KONGELIGE
FORSVARSDEPARTEMENT**

*The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence
The State Secretary*

The Honourable Gordon *lan*
Deputy Secretary of Def (Ac 1g)
3010 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-3010
USA

Exempt from public
disclosure §6.1.1

Your ref

Our ref
0005/01630 4/FD IV 8/BRE/11a

Date **03 JUN 2005**

Mr. Secretary

Let me first of all express that I really appreciate you finding time in your busy schedule for our meeting. I thought it was an important discussion that touched upon several relevant issues.

One of my main issues was the lack of successful Norwegian industrial participation in the JSF program. Industrial participation is an important objective for the government, and a key element in its effort to secure continued parliamentary support for Norwegian participation in the program. As you may be aware of, we are a minority government and therefore need the support from other political parties in this matter. Our participation in the SDD-phase has been debated in Parliament on several occasions. If participation by Norwegian industry is not improved, it is my judgement that future Parliament proposals to withdraw from the program may get a majority, regardless of the government's position.

Let me assure you that we are in a constructive dialog with Lockheed Martin and the engine manufacturers regarding our industrial participation, and we will continue to strive for "best value" opportunities and contracts with these companies.

Nevertheless, there is a need to overcome today's industrial shortfall, and one possible solution is a US Government approved re-direction of a certain amount of our yearly SDD-funding to support the possible future integration of Norwegian systems on the JSF. Candidate systems are the Naval Strike Missile (NSM Air-to-ground and Air-to-sea/ dual capabilities) and the 25 mm APEX non-depleted uranium ammunition.

Office : ss: Myntg 1 Telephone: +47 23 09 60 02 Telefax: 47 23 06 60
Postal address: PO Box 812 D N-0082 Oslo, Norway

C m: 2417 823
11-L-0559/OSD/50144

These are world-class solutions that will both enhance the JSF capabilities and have a significant industrial potential. The NSM has been through a phase one study, and it is confirmed to fit inside the weapons-bay of the CTOL and CV versions of the aircraft. We are now giving the go-ahead for the phase two studies for the possible NSM integration, and we are awaiting the first step in a possible 25 mm study. These, and other studies, may increase our non-financial contribution up to approximately 25 million dollar.


We are aware of the economical scrutiny of the JSF program, but we view the help from the US Government in this matter, as a win-win situation. The chances for parliamentary support for continued Norwegian participation in the program will increase, and the JSF may be equipped with new capabilities. If you agree to this approach, the value of the directed funding will be "credited" LM in their industrial effort.

Norway has gained valuable experience from cooperating with close and like-minded allies on our F-16's. Especially our experiences from participating in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan together with Denmark and the Netherlands have proved very useful. The Government would like to be in a position that makes it possible to select an aircraft solution in 2008 based on operational capabilities and the choice that our close allies make. For this to be possible, a satisfactory level of Norwegian industrial participation is necessary, and a lack of such may lead to an otherwise less preferable solution.

It is likely that this issue will be addressed during Defence Minister Devold's conversations with Defence Secretary Rumsfeld during his visit to Norway.

I hope it is possible for you to support our proposal regarding the Norwegian SDD-funding, and once more - I hope to see you in Norway in not a too distant future.

Yours sincerely,


Bård Glad Pedersen

DELIVERED BY FAX

2005 JUN 23 AM 11: 57

INFO MEMO

Acting DepSecDef

ROUSD(P) JUN 22 2005

ES-3486

I-05/008058-EP

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP)

JUN 17 2005

SUBJECT: Norwegian Concerns on Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

- You asked (Tab A) that I follow up with USD(AT&L) on Norway's request to direct their JSF System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase contribution to integration of the Norwegian Naval Strike Missile onto the JSF.
 - o Integration of the Norwegian missile is not currently in the baseline plan for the JSF.
- At Tab B is the letter to Acting DSD England from his Norwegian counterpart Bård Glad Pedersen which MOD Devold referred to in Stavanger.
- Ken Krieg's office is drafting a response to Pedersen. We will coordinate on that response and ensure you see it before it is signed.
 - o AT&L's initial reaction is that allowing the Norwegians to earmark their contribution for Norwegian industry would set an undesirable precedent for other partners.
 - o It would also force other partners to cover the baseline costs which the Norwegians had been expected to cover.

ADASD(EUR/NATO)

DIR/OUUSD(AT&L)-IC Bruce, 16 JUN

Prepared by: Jim Hirsch, ISP/EPN, (b)(6) 16 JUN 05

DIR, EPN

06/16/2005

OSD 12130-05

Policy Info Memo Template

11-L-0559/OSD/50146

Norway

sources

sources

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUN 17 2005

2005 JUN 24 AM 8:15

TO: Mike Donley
CC: ~~Larry~~ Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Directing Money to Pentagon Memorial Fund

Would you please figure out what Allison Barber can do by way of directing money to the Pentagon Memorial Fund?

I am told that some money is being directed to the Fisher House. I ~~think~~ it is important that we get ~~this~~ Pentagon Memorial done. It looks to me like it is stuck, and I am ~~worried~~ about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061605-26

.....
Please respond by 7/7/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12208-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50147

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


JUN 17 2005

2005 JUN 24 AM 8:15

005

TO: Mike Donley

CC: Jim Haynes

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT Next Combined Federal Campaign

It seems to me the next time the annual Combined Federal Campaign fundraising effort is underway in the Pentagon that we may want to find a way to encourage people to direct money to the Pentagon Memorial Fund.

I think we ought to have a promotion in the effort, so that we urge people in the Pentagon to direct their contributions to the Pentagon Memorial Fund, if they feel that would be appropriate.

Let's plan to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061605-25

.....
Please respond by 7/7/05

17 JUN 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 122 09-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50148



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1980

SECRETARY

INFO MEMO

2005 JUN 24 AM 8:15
JUN 23 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael Donley, Director, Administration & Management **MD**

SUBJECT: Interim Update on the Pentagon Memorial

- In the attached snowflakes you **asked** that I figure out how we can **better** inform people of the fundraising efforts for the Pentagon Memorial, especially in the next Combined Federal Campaign (CFC). You separately asked how our Public **Affairs** office could **inform those** interested in supporting the Pentagon Memorial.
- This note is to update you on some current developments, and I will follow shortly with **some** plans to reach **our** goal of fully funding the Pentagon Memorial project.
- For next year's CFC campaign, the family sponsored Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. is **seeking** to expand its past CFC success by affiliating with a CFC Federation better targeted to attract interest - the Military, Veteran and Patriotic Service Organizations of America. Unfortunately, OPM denied PMF, Inc.'s initial application for this affiliation. PMF, Inc. has appealed. The appeal will be decided prior to 1 August by acting **OPM** Administrator Dan Blair.
- I have spoken with Mr. Blair and his deputy to make sure they understand the importance of the Memorial project to the DoD community and of **our** disappointment if DoD personnel were to be denied an opportunity to give through the CFC next year.
- The "America Supports You" DoD web-site **run** by Allison Barber certainly may offer information and **links** to the public and direct people to the opportunity to find out more about how they can support the Pentagon Memorial. I will work with Allison to make sure that appropriate information is available through her web site.
- I **will** next meet with Jim Laychak and Lynda Webster of PMF, Inc. to clarify where we can and cannot help. I will provide you with a quarterly status report of PMF, Inc.'s fundraising efforts.

COORDINATION OASD (PA), DoDOGC

Attachments: As Stated

Prepared by: Bill Brazis, General Counsel, WHS (b)(6)

11-L-0357/OSD/50149

OSD 12209-05

~~FOUO~~


OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 24 AM 8:15

JUN 17 2005

TO: Mike Donley

CC: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT Next Combined Federal Campaign

It seems to me the next time the annual Combined Federal Campaign fundraising effort is underway in the Pentagon that we may want to find a way to encourage people to direct money to the Pentagon Memorial Fund.

I think we ought to have a promotion in the effort, so that we urge people in the Pentagon to direct their contributions to the Pentagon Memorial Fund, if they feel that would be appropriate.

Let's plan to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061605-25

.....
Please respond by 7/7/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12209-05


11-L-0559/OSD/50150

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 18, 2005

2005 JUN 24 AM 8:34

TO: Mike Donley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Leased Space

I would like to find a way to review how much leased space we have across the country. I am thinking we should make an inventory of it and start moving people into owned space, where it makes sense. How do we do that?

Thanks,

DHR:aa
051703-9

.....
Please respond by 6/16/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12211-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50151



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 24 AM 8:34

JUN 23 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD**

SUBJECT Leased Space

- In the attached 18 May 2005 snowflake, you asked me how we should go about compiling an inventory of DoD leased space throughout the country and **start** moving people into DoD owned **space**, where appropriate.
 - The Department's BRAC recommendations are a significant first step. If approved, recommendations that you've forwarded to the BRAC Commission would relocate DoD personnel **from** 12 million gross square feet, **20%** of leased space nationwide, onto military installations.
 - The biggest impact will be in the National Capital **Area**, where 7 million gross square feet of leased office space would be eliminated.
 - **As** the BRAC process **runs** its course, I recommend that we launch a follow-on analysis of the remaining inventory, using the database and talent already assembled, to identify additional opportunities.
- In a subsequent, 13 June 2005 snowflake, also attached, you **asked the** Deputy Secretary much the **same** question, but extended the focus of your inquiry to include leases outside of the United States. This could be included in the assessment which **AT&L** should lead.
- Phil **Grone**, the DUSD (Installations and Environment) has responsibility for DoD-wide policy on leased space will lead the review process for both U.S. and worldwide facilities.
- As the Director, Administration and Management, I have responsibility for DoD leases in the National Capital Region and will assist Phil, as needed.

COORDINATION DUSD (Installations and Environment)

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Ralph E. Newton (b)(6)

OSD 12211-05

11-L-055/OSD/50152

7/25

1700
7/22



ACQUISITION
AFED HINGLES005

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACTING
DEP SEC DEF
HAS SEEN
15/08
JUL 21 2005

ACTION MEMO

July 20, 2005, 2:00 P.M.

680

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Kenneth J. Kring, ^{JUL 21 2005} Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Leased Space

- Tab A is a proposed response to the Secretary's June 13th snowflake to you asking how we should accomplish a review of leased space in the U. S. and worldwide, with the purpose of moving Defense personnel into owned space (Tab B).
- Our approach will be to conduct a review, analyze resulting data and concurrently develop policy changes and implementation plans. Leasing is a tool required for comprehensive asset management. We will pursue policies and plans that employ efficient and effective leasing in support of mission requirements based on sound economic judgment that is balanced with appropriate defined risk. We plan to complete the analysis effort and have draft policies and procedures in place by mid December 2005. We will provide interim updates on progress.

RECOMMENDATION: Transmit the Info Memo at Tab A to the Secretary.

COORDINATION: DA&M (Tab C)

Attachments:
As stated

DEPSECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED: JUL 25 2005

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: _____

Prepared by: Mr. Philip Grone, DUSD (I&E) (b)(6)

2005-2715-ATL

20 Jul 05

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD		SATSD	RE 25 JUL
EXEC SEC	M 7/22	1730	
ESR MA	AL 7/22	1715	

13 JUN 05

ACTION MEMO


FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

July 15, 2005, 1700

THROUGH: Mr. Kenneth Krieg, USD(AT&L)

FROM: Philip Grone, DUSD (I&E)

SUBJECT: Leased Space Snowflake Response



- Attached is a response to the Secretary's 13 June snowflake to the Deputy regarding a review of leased space with a bias toward moving personnel into owned space.
- Starting with overseas leases, we will conduct a review and develop policy guidance and implementation plans applying business case analyses to lease utilization. Once the BRAC Commission process is finalized, we will review the domestic situation.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the attached snowflake response at TAB A.

COORDINATION: DA&M

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Dr. Get Moy, OUSD(AT&L)/I&E/IRM, (b)(6)

CF from Mr. DuBois
Mr. Grone
✓ Mr. Donley

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 24 AM 8:34 JUN 18 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Leased Space Worldwide

Please give me a proposal as to how we can survey all of our leased spaces in the U.S. and worldwide to see what we should move to owned properties. Clearly, there are places where leasing makes sense, but in general we should fashion a bias toward using owned property so as to ensure the Department makes best use of taxpayer dollars.

Thanks.

DHR:ms
061003-11

.....
Please respond by

7/7/05

FOUO

OSD 12212-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50155

~~FOUO~~

April 19, 2005

TO Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Consolidating Leased Space Worldwide

680

Please draft a memo from me to the appropriate people that discusses how the Services ought to review all of their leased space throughout the world.

Please think about how they can consolidate and cut it down, putting the purposes of the leased space on owned installations, and moving towards just-in-time delivery.

Thanks.

DHR:u
041905-4

.....
Please respond by

5/12/05

19 Apr 05

~~FOUO~~

13 Jun 05

APR 19 ENTD

11-L-0559/OSD/50156

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

July 25, 2005, 1700

FROM: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Leased Space

[Handwritten signature]
7-25

680

- In the attached 13 June 2005 snowflake, you asked about a review of leased space in the U. S. and worldwide with the bias of moving Defense missions into owned space.
- More effective management of leasing could achieve significant savings. As an example, the BRAC recommendations will achieve substantial savings by eliminating roughly 12 million square feet of leased space (20% of DoD leases nationwide).
- The DUSD(I&E), who is responsible for DoD-wide policy on leasing activity, is preparing an action plan that capitalizes on the BRAC efforts and extends it to worldwide activity. I&E will chair a joint team with the services, working through the Installations Capabilities Council, to execute the plan which will include a memo, if necessary, from you to the appropriate people as directed in your attached April 19, 2005 snowflake to Ray DuBois.
- The first phase of the plan will assess leases outside the United States. I&E expects to complete the analysis for this phase by mid-October.
- Once the BRAC Commission process is finalized, I&E will incorporate the Commission results into the assessment and review remaining domestic leases and expects to complete the post-BRAC review by March 2006.
- While assessing existing leases, I&E will also conduct a policy review to develop Department-wide policy to enable better business decisions for future lease activity. I&E will coordinate the policy review with the Director, Administration and Management.

2
Jul 05

COORDINATION: DA&M

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Philip Grone, DUSD(I&E) (b)(6)

OSD 12212-05

13 Jun 05

11-L-0559/OSD/50157

CF from Mr. DuBois:

~~FOUO~~

✓ Mr. Grone
Mr. Donley

JUN 13 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Ramsfeld *DA*
SUBJECT: Leased Space Worldwide

Please give me a proposal as to how we can survey all of our leased spaces in the U.S. and worldwide to see what we should move to owned properties. Clearly, there are places where leasing makes sense, but in general we should fashion a bias toward using owned property so as to ensure the Department makes best use of taxpayer dollars.

Thanks,

DHRms
061005-11

.....
Please respond by

7/7/05

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

April 19, 2005

TO Ray DuBois
FROM Donald Runsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Consolidating Leased Space Worldwide

Please ~~draft~~ a memo ~~from me to the appropriate people~~ that discusses how the Services ought to review all of their leased space throughout the world.

Please think about ~~how~~ they can consolidate and cut it ~~down~~, putting the purposes of the leased space on owned ~~installations~~, and moving towards just-in-time delivery.

Thanks.

DHR:sp
041905-4


.....
Please respond by 5/12/05

~~FOUO~~

APR 19 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/50159

Worldwide Review of Leased Space



INFO MEMO

23 JUN 2005

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mike Donley, Director, ~~Administration~~ and Management *MD*

SUBJECT Leased Space

- Attached is my response to an **18 May** SecDef snowflake concerning a **new** initiative to reduce the DoD leased space in **CONUS**.
- You received a similar snowflake on **13 June**, referred to **AT&L** for action, in which SecDef ~~raised the need~~ for an initiative to reduce leased space ~~both~~ in **CONUS** ~~and~~ worldwide.
- Phil Grone, DUSD (Installations & Environment), and I have coordinated our ~~responses~~ to both snowflakes on **this** subject. My response indicates Phil will ~~be~~ leading a DoD review of **CONUS** and worldwide leased space ~~after~~ the BRAC process runs its course.
- I ~~also~~ wanted to ~~let~~ you know that Phil will reply to you ~~directly~~ on the **13 June** snowflake.



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1850 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

JUN 23 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management *MB*

SUBJECT: Leased Space

- In the attached 18 May 2005 snowflake, you asked me how we should go about compiling an inventory of DoD leased space throughout the country and start moving people into DoD owned space, where appropriate.
 - o The Department's BRAC recommendations are a significant first step. If approved, recommendations that you've forwarded to the BRAC Commission would relocate DoD personnel from 12 million gross square feet, 20% of leased space nationwide, onto military installations.
 - o The biggest impact will be in the National Capital Area, where 7 million gross square feet of leased office space would be eliminated.
 - o As the BRAC process runs its course, I recommend that we launch a follow-on analysis of the remaining inventory, using the database and talent already assembled, to identify additional opportunities.
- In a subsequent, 13 June 2005 snowflake, also attached, you asked the Deputy Secretary much the same question, but extended the focus of your inquiry to include leases outside of the United States. This could be included in the assessment which AT&L should lead.
- Phil Grone, the DUSD (Installations and Environment) has responsibility for DoD-wide policy on leased space will lead the review process for both U.S. and worldwide facilities.
- As the Director, Administration and Management, I have responsibility for DoD leases in the National Capital Region and will assist Phil, as needed.

COORDINATION DUSD (Installations and Environment)

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Ralph E. Newton, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/50162

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

June 17, 2005

2005 JUN 24 AM 8:49

TO: David Chu

CC: ~~Gen Dick Myers~~
Fran Harvey
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Dan Stanley
Larry Di Rita

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Issue of Women in Combat

I have never closed with Fran Harvey and Pete Schoomaker on the women in combat issue. We have language Duncan Hunter agreed to that we have to figure out how to manage in conference.

Then I have to **do** what I said I wanted to do - get my head wrapped around **it**, and make sure we have a reasonably good approach that **is** clear **and** can **be** communicated **properly**.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
061705.2

.....
Please respond by

6/30/05

CF:
USA
CSA
VCSA
DAS
SMA
ECC

FOUO

OSD 12213-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50163



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005-06-24 10:16

INFO MEMO

2005 JUN 24 AM 8:49

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army
Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army *23.6.05*

SUBJECT: Issue of Women in Combat

- This responds to the Secretary of Defense's memorandum, June 17, 2005, subject: SAB (Tab A). The Army has thoroughly reviewed the existing law, and DoD and Army policies on Women in Combat, especially as to how they apply to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and to key Army Transformation initiatives, and determined that the Army is in compliance. Furthermore, existing DOD and Army policies are in compliance with the legislation being proposed under House Section 574 of the FY06 Defense Authorization Bill. Thus, the proposed legislation is unnecessary because it basically puts into law an existing DOD policy and, therefore, is redundant and provides no clarification. It may, in fact, cause hesitation and confusion on the part of battlefield commanders because of the need to review tactical and operational decisions with superiors prior to taking actions.
- On this basis, the Army opposes House Section 574 and urges exclusion of this provision.
- The FY06 Senate Authorization Bill has no similar provision at this time.
- In addition, I have spoken with Senator Jim Inhofe, a key player in the Women in Combat issue. He has stated to me that he fully backs the Department's position and has no plans to introduce an amendment during the floor debate on the Senate Authorization Bill.
- Finally, given the battlefield of the 21st Century, which is more of a 360 degree combat zone rather than a linear battlefield, the ideal policy would only be functional in nature and would simply state that women are excluded from infantry, armor, special forces, cannon artillery, and combat engineers and would not include the terms "direct ground combat" or "routine collocation".

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: CW5 Ed Clayton (b)(6)

OSD 12213-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50164

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

June 17, 2005

2005 JUN 24 AM 8:49

TO: David Chu

CC: ~~Gen Dick Myers~~
Fran Harvey
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Dan Stanley
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT Issue of Women in Combat

I have never closed **with** Fran Harvey and Pete Schoomaker on the women **in** combat issue. We have ~~language~~ Duncan Hunter agreed to that we have to figure out how **to** manage in conference.

Then I have to do what I said I wanted to do - get my head wrapped around it, and make sure we have a reasonably good approach that **is** clear **and** can be communicated properly.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
061706.2

Please respond by

6/30/05

CF:
USA
CSA
VCSA
DAS
SMA
ECC

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12213-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50166

~~FOUO~~

JUN 27 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Doug Feith

CC: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Amnesty Program for Insurgents in Iraq

I have heard discussion of the possibility of an Iraqi Government plan for offering amnesty to some insurgents. I'm told this is a concept which has historically enjoyed success in other challenging insurgency situations (Malaya for example). I have attached some of the background associated with this concept.

What do you think? Is this a sensible idea **that** we should get behind?

Thanks.

Attach.
Amnesty Program for Insurgents in Iraq

DHR:ss
062405-4

Please respond by JUL 14 2005

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12266-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50167

IMHO

27 June 05

06/24/05

AMNESTY PROGRAM FOR INSURGENTS IN IRAQ

The application of an amnesty program can offer a positive incentives and realistic choices, but must be combined with strict requirements. For example:

- ~~Surrendering~~ Enemy:
 - o Must publicly recant support for the insurgency
 - o Must publicly state support for the legitimate government of Iraq
 - ~~a~~ Must publicly recant use of violence to achieve political goals
 - o Must provide information on those they know are contributing to the insurgency (names, locations, relationships, types of support)
 - o Must provide sworn testimony against those they know who are contributing to the insurgency
 - o Must enter in a government-sponsored works/jobs program that includes mandatory basic education (literacy, mathematics, democratization studies) and remain active for at least 2 years. Workers are paid at a rate lower than Iraqi Security Forces.
 - o Must agree to live private lives hereafter, renouncing active participation in politics
- In return, Surrendered Enemy Personnel are granted
 - o Freedom from prosecution for their publicly recounted crimes (but not for those which they do not admit but are later discovered to have committed).
 - o Ability to live their lives in their homes without fear of arrest or detention
 - o Guarantee of an eventual withdrawal of Coalition forces from Iraq when Iraqi Security Forces are capable of providing domestic order and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror without external assistance.
 - o Turnover of detainees to Iraqi Courts for disposition
 - o House to house searches and raids only with a search warrant provided by an Iraqi Government judge upon end of Emergency restrictions by Iraqi government.

JUN 01 2005

June 1, 2005

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cause Organization

Someone ought to thank the folks who run the Cause Organization (please see attached).

Thanks.

Attach
Cause Flyer

DWR:sp
OSI103-42

Please respond by

6/23/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12292-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50169

06/03/2005 10:03AM

080

1 JUN 05

Cause

Here for those who are there for

Home

Welcome to Cause: Comfort for America's Uniformed Services Elite

Cause provides comfort and recreation items and organizes events for soldiers recuperating at military hospitals and rehabilitation centers from wounds and injuries suffered in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other military theaters.

Research shows that recreation and entertainment are vital to the healing process, especially for people injured in the prime of youth. The items donated and activities arranged by Cause are a source of relaxation and comfort for soldiers taking the long journey back to health.

Please support our soldiers: These brave young men and women often face months of care and rehabilitation, far from home and family. You can help make their recuperation easier, a bit more comfortable, as they heal from serious, life-altering injuries. Please do [online](#) or by check payable to Cause.

Cause - Comfort for America's Uniformed Services Elite
PO Box 218
Herndon, VA 20172
703 481 8830

Cause is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization registered in Virginia. All contributions to Cause are tax deductible. ©2005 Comfort for America's Uniformed Services Elite. All Rights Reserved. [Privacy Statement](#)



Dear Friends!

As most of you know, Sally and I help looking after wounded soldiers in Walter Reed. For this purpose, we have joined Cause (Comfort for America's Uniformed Services Elite), a non-profit organization that tries to bring a little comfort to those who need it most.

What is Cause?

Hundreds of wounded and injured arrive at America's military hospitals every month. These brave young men and women often face months of medical care and rehabilitation, far away from home and family.

Cause provides comfort items for troops recuperating in military hospitals and rehabilitation centers, items to make their stay a little bit easier, a bit more comfortable, items to bring some diversion into their lives as they heal from serious, life-altering injuries.

Contributions to Cause will be used to provide clothing, gift packs, refreshments, recreational items – such as TV's, CD and DVD players, and video game consoles – and practical items such as electric razors, playing cards, phone cards, and stamps. Cause is also working to make family areas more attractive and comfortable, and is developing a library of books, books on tape, videos, video games, and DVD's for the troops to use while they are hospitalized.

How can you reach Cause?

PO Box 218
Herndon, VA 20172 -0218
703-481-8830
info@cause-usa.org
www.cause-usa.org

Our Motto is:

Cause ... here for those who are there for us

Please give it a thought!

Cause is a 501 (c) (3) nonprofit organization registered in Virginia; all contributions to Cause are tax deductible. Contributions can be made online at www.cause-usa.org or by check to Cause, PO Box 218, Herndon, VA 20172





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JH 27 2005

080

Ms. Deborah Wenner
President
Comfort for America's
Uniformed Services Elite (Cause)
Post Office Box 218
Herndon, VA 20172

Dear Ms. Wenner,

Thank you so much for the important support that Cause provides to our wounded service members **and** their families. By bringing them comfort and entertainment, your efforts are helping them to heal.

27 JUN 05

All of us here at the Department of Defense appreciate everything Cause is doing on behalf of the troops. As a token of our gratitude, I have enclosed a Department of Defense Certificate of Appreciation.

Sincerely,

OSD 12292-05

1 JUN 05

11-L-0559/OSD/50172

With Appreciation



THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND *America Supports You* GRATEFULLY
RECOGNIZE THE OUTSTANDING SUPPORT OF

Comfort for America's Uniformed Services Elite

FOR OUR MILITARY MEN AND WOMEN.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Rumsfeld", written over a horizontal line.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD

JUN 27 2005

DATE

8D 12292-05



AMERICA
SUPPORTS
★ YOU ★
OUR MILITARY SEI & WOMEN

response to a SNOWFLAKE
(attached)

Ms. Deborah Wenner
President
Comfort for America's
Uniformed Services Elite (Cause)
Post Office Box 218
Herndon, VA 20172

Dear Ms. Wenner,

Thank you so much for the important support that ~~Cause~~ provides to our wounded service members and their families. By bringing them comfort and entertainment, your efforts are helping them to heal.

All of us here at the Department of Defense appreciate everything Cause is doing on behalf of the troops. As a token of our gratitude, I have enclosed a Department of Defense Certificate of Appreciation.

Sincerely,

Certificate to be signed by SECDEF
attached
TX CLK 6/20

SECDEFLETTER REQUEST FORM
For the Office of the Executive Secretary

*Note: Please try to request all letters from a specific event or at a specific organization at the same time, rather than piecemeal.

Type of Letter (Birthday, Thank You, etc.): Thank You Suspense Date: 6/23
Mail ☒ OR Return to Requestor for Delivery ☐

Name of Recipient: Deborah Wenner, President

Recipient Company/Affiliation:

Cause: Comfort for America's Uniformed Services Elite

Full Address: P.O. Box 218, Herndon, VA 20172

Requestor Name, Org, and Contact Info: Lara Jones, OSD-PA

(b)(6)

Background Info/Details (Please provide all relevant information – including event info, personal contact with SECDEF, specifics on \$/donations, etc., so letter will be pertinent.):

See attached Snowflake Flyer.

Other Documents

*Note: Please bring a **completed** package, including photos and certificates to be included with requested letter. If incomplete, package will be returned.

Number of Add'l Docs: 3 Type of Add'l Docs: Certificate

Explanation of Docs (ie, certificate for supporting xyz, photo of us at event):

Cert. from America Supports You.

Requesting SECDEF Signature on which docs, if any: crf + TY.

rev'd 6/22/05

If you have any questions, please contact Carrie Sue Casey at (b)(6) or
carrie.casey2@osd.mil.



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE
SECRETARY

ACTION MEMO

2005 JUN 27 PM 2:00

June 27, 2005, 9:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: QFRs from Rep. Walter Jones (R-NC)

- At Thursday's House Armed Services Committee hearing, Rep. Walter Jones asked you about the answers to his QFRs from the February 17 HASC FY06 Budget hearing. Our delay was caused due to the package being lost.
- The QFRs and answers are attached. Rep. Jones said he had read the book Pretext of War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies by James Bamford, which has shaped his interest in these questions.

Attachment:

QFRs and proposed answers

DECISION:

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Comment: _____

032

27 JUN 05

27 JUN 05

11-L-0559/OSD/50176

OSD 12309-05

Question for the Record
Submitted by Congressman Walter B. Jones (R-NC)
Hearing on Fiscal Year 2006 Department of Defense Budget Authorization Request
February 16, 2005

Questions for Secretary Rumsfeld:

Please answer the following with a Yes or No:

1) Did David Wurmser head the "Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group?"

Answer: David Wurmser was a member of a two-person cell with that name, and neither was "the head" of the group.

2) Did the Department of Defense have a financial relationship with the Rendon Group, and if so, can you describe that relationship?

Answer: The Rendon Group has received contracts from a variety of Department of Defense offices and agencies including the Naval Surface Warfare Center, National Defense University, DARPA, the Air Force, the Army Defense Contract Command, and the Naval Research Laboratory.

~~FOUO~~

JUN 27 2005

TO: ~~Don~~ Stanley
CC: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Unanswered Congressional Questions.

032

Yesterday Congressman Jones (I believe it was) told me he asked ~~me~~ a question at my last hearing about the Renden group, and that he had not received an answer. That is unacceptable. There is no reason why we cannot get ~~an~~ answer to a Member on a question like that.

Furthermore, I never want to go up to the Hill again without having a full report a week in advance as to every request we have pending from Congress, ~~so~~ that I know what they're waiting for, and what ~~we~~ have not done, and I ~~am~~ prepared for it. I don't like to get blindsided.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
062405-09

.....

27 JUN 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12309-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50178

~~FOUO~~

June 27, 2005

TO: Doug Feith

CC Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT ~~Status~~ of UNSCR and SOFA Agreements in Iraq

What is the status of getting a new UN resolution and a SOFA with Iraq? We need to get moving on this. I haven't heard anything about it in weeks.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
062705-06

.....
Please Respond By 07/14/05

OSD 12345-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50179

ITM


27 June 4

~~FOUO~~

June 27, 2005

TO: Doug Feith

c c : Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT Status of UNSCR and SOFA Agreements in Iraq

What is the status of getting a new UN resolution and a SOFA with Iraq? We need to get moving on this. I haven't heard anything about it in weeks.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
062705-06

.....

Please Respond By 07/14/05


OSD 12345-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50180

~~FOUO~~

JUN 29 2005

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Request from General Abizaid

Condi,

Attached is a request from John Abizaid which I fully agree with. I would appreciate it if you would look into it and keep me posted.

Thank you.

Attach 6/27/05 Letter from CMDR CENTCOM to SECDEF

DHR:ss
062805-09

Cen+com

29 Jun 05

29 Jun 05

OSD 12417-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50181



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCCE

27 Jun 05

The Honorable Donald R. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld,

I have received a memo from General **Casey** proposing the establishment of an Iraqi Liaison Team at Headquarters, USCENTCOM in Tampa, to be **led** by a General Officer. I concur with General Casey's recommendation.

Following the historic elections in January and the establishment of the Iraqi Transitional Government, one of our goals has been to establish the Iraqis as full partners in the War on Terror, both in public perception and in military practice. There are significant advantages on multiple levels, and the Iraqi flag displayed at Headquarters, USCENTCOM will elevate Iraq's standing both at the strategic military and international levels.

The current status of the Iraqi military, the Iraqi Transitional Government and the War on Terror necessitates the establishment of a liaison team at USCENTCOM. I request that you express to the Department of State our position, and that the State Department request the Iraqi Transitional Government nominate a Senior National Representative to serve with us at Headquarters, USCENTCOM.

Very respectfully,


John F. Abizaid
General, USA

11-L-0559/OSD/50182



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 28 AM 11:46

CCCC

27 Jun 05

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC


Dear **Mr.** Rumsfeld,

I have received a memo from General Casey proposing the establishment of an Iraqi Liaison Team at Headquarters, USCENTCOM in Tampa, to be led by a General Officer. I concur with General Casey's recommendation.

Following the historic elections in January **and** the establishment of the Iraqi Transitional Government, one **of** our goals **has** been to establish the Iraqis as full partners in the War on Terror, both in public perception and in military practice. There are significant advantages on multiple levels, and **the** Iraqi flag displayed at Headquarters, USCENTCOM will elevate Iraq's standing both at the strategic military and international levels.

The current status of the Iraqi military, the Iraqi Transitional Government and the War on Terror necessitates the establishment of a liaison team at **USCENTCOM**. I request that you express to the Department of State our position, and that the State Department request the Iraqi Transitional Government nominate a Senior National Representative to serve with us at Headquarters, **USCENTCOM**.

Very respectfully,


John P. Abizaid
General, USA

OSD 12417-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50183

~~FOUO~~

June 27, 2005

TO: ADM Ed Giambastiani
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich Paper on Transformation

Please take a look at this and ~~think~~ about what a Department of Defense role in this idea of national transformation might look like.

Thanks.

Attach

2/9/04 Gingrich paper: Transforming America to ~~meet~~ the Challenges of the 21st Century

DHR:dh
062705-36

.....
Please Respond By July 28, 2005

OSD 12476-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50184

381

2 June 05

Transforming America to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century

Newt Gingrich
February 9, 2004

It is the reality of the 21st century that there will be more change in scientific knowledge the next **25** years than in the last **100** years. The profound changes we will experience from **2004** to **2030** will require at least six big transformations:

1. National security
2. Math and Science education
3. Health and Healthcare
4. Inventing Entrepreneurial public management
5. Tax code
6. Litigation reform

This scale of change will require America to undergo profound transformations if we want our children and grandchildren to live in the most productive economy in the world.



More scientists are alive today than in all of previous human history combined. Furthermore, instead of sharing knowledge at the rate of the printing press and the mail, scientists are sharing knowledge through the Internet and the cell phone. This explosion of knowledge is moved from laboratory to market by a venture capital-licensing-royalty system of

unprecedented power and ability. The potential for production is being radically expanded being radically expanded by the rise of China and India as the lowest cost producers on the planet.

Drivers of change will increase knowledge and productivity on a world wide basis — virtually guaranteeing continuous down-ward pricing pressures:

- Information technology
- Communications
- Nano-scale science and technology
- Quantum mechanics
- Biology

This is much like the period 1873 to **1896** when there were advancements in steel coming on-line, electricity, electric light, steam ships and the telephone. For example, the introduction of commercial refrigerator cars for railroad and ships meant that you could deliver Texas beef anywhere that meant that it collapse the price of food. What you have is a constant explosion of productivity driving the price down.

Leading the planet over the next decade to meet the real threats to American national security will require significant improvements in the national security decision and implementation systems with by far the biggest changes outside DOD (see attached handout).

The two to three generation war with the irreconcilable wing of Islam requires a much larger strategic undertaking than we currently have —most of it non-military.

###

~~FOUO~~

June 27, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich Paper on Principles for Victory in Iraq

Given our recent conversations about the way ahead in Iraq, it might be helpful to read this memo from Newt Gingrich and see how his ideas track with our thoughts.

DR

Let me know what you think.

Attach
4/7/04 Gingrich paper: Principles for Victory in Iraq

DHR:dh
062705-34

.....
Please Respond By 07/28/05

27 June 05

OSD 12477-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50187

April 7, 2004
Newt Gingrich
PRINCIPLES FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ

After four days of talking with various senior leaders and experienced people, there are a set of principles evolving which make it more likely that we will win and the bad guys will lose in Iraq.

These 18 points are in an inelegant format because I am typing them myself but I think time is of the essence in moving to decisive action in a chaotic period.

The first

1. The center of gravity is the Iraqi people and their willingness to side with us to create democracy and to have safety, health, prosperity and freedom (which is the simple language that describes what people want for themselves and their children). If we lose the passive or active approval of the Iraqi people and being anti-American becomes the popular thing we will lose the war no matter how many people we send to Iraq, we will lose the war.

The implication of this principle is that sound management according to auditors, inspector generals and congressional staffs is not the center of gravity. Having sound decisions made by the CPA inside the green zone is not the center of gravity. Killing bad Iraqis and foreign fighters is not the center of gravity.

The center of gravity can be measured by simple metrics each morning, each week, and each month: are more Iraqis supporting us than in the last measurement? Are more Iraqis willing to be seen publicly working with us than in the last measurement? Are more Iraqis willing to fight and if necessary die next to us than in the last measurement?

These are the real tests of whether or not we believe this is the center of gravity.

2. In the immediate test of will, we need to use whatever level of force is necessary to impose our will on Sadr and on Fallujah and we need to do it quickly before European and world opinion can block us.

3. We either have to get in and win or get out. We can't just muddle.

The American public is seeing enough Americans die that people want to know if we **are** serious about winning (in which case they want to see immediate demonstrable increases in the tempo, resourcing, and intensity of effort) or they want us to withdraw.

No one should be confused about how important the next few weeks are. The American people have been surprised by the intensity of opposition and the number of American casualties and they want to know from their leaders if they should lean forward because we are really angry and going to fight to victory or if they should start cutting their emotional losses and pull back because in the end we are going to cut and run.

The Bush leadership may know it is committed but it should not underestimate how sensitive the news media and the country is to any indication we are trying to muddle through.

In the face of this week's casualty rate and combat on television people need to see vivid evidence the United States is accelerating the tempo and escalating the fight and is determined to win.

Once they believe the President is truly committed the country will rally to a fight for victory.

The country will look for action rather than words and indeed words without action will be seen as political and hypocritical.

4. We need visible immediate actions, such as loading up a C-17 with Kevlar vests and flying them to Iraq for the Iraq police and militia. Both the takeoff from the US or Europe and the distribution in Iraq should be on television and should be portrayed as a sign of our commitment to those Iraqis who are willing to fight next to us for the cause of freedom and democracy.

5. Today, we must ask the Division Commanders and Brigade Commanders to define how many personnel and financial resources they would need if their job is to ensure security (including hiring, training and equipment) for local Iraqis to succeed; to create sufficient employment that the community feels a commitment to the American-Iraqi democracy project and to ensure reasonable stability both through June 30 and then through Dec 30. How much money do they need both immediately and for each month through December, 2004.
6. The principle has to be our allies lives are as valuable as our own life
7. We need to expand out our emergency medical service to cover Iraqi police and militia wounded in the line of duty. The principle has to be that our Iraqi allies who are willing to fight and die for democracy are fully as valuable as our own young men and women. The understanding that we are prepared to give them the right equipment, back them up in a fire fight and rescue them with world class medical care if they get shot will change the morale, the determination, the pride and the fighting capabilities almost overnight
8. Churchill used a phrase "action this day" to move the British military bureaucracy in 1940. We need a similar sense of urgency imbued in the military and civilian bureaucracies right now. People in Washington have to move with the understanding that Americans and American allies are dying and every day of arguing and paperwork is killing people.
9. Far more than bringing more American troops into theater we need to develop a program modeled on the KATUSA (Koreans attached to United States Army) program which began in the crisis of the 1950 North Korean invasion. At its peak some US units were 20% Korean.

We could build an Iraqi integration program that would have at least one Iraqi ride in every humvee and every company have several squads of Iraqis. We would overnight begin to train a group of Iraqis with experience in working with Americans. We would begin to ensure that there was a much higher Iraqi presence in security situations.

No other technique is as likely to get as many Iraqis in the front lines and in the security business where it matters **as** an integrated program modeled on the Katusa program.

10. Whatever money is needed by the division and brigade commanders should be reprogrammed either through the President's emergency authority or by congressional reprogramming at the appropriations committee level

11. An instruction should go out that every time a lawyer explains why we can't do something that should be recorded and sent to a new national security council office of transformation to determine if we need to change the law or the federal regulation.

12. If it is a federal regulation a presidential order should be issued within 48 hours suspending it for Iraq for the next two years. If it is a law Congress should be asked to pass an exemption for Iraq for the next two years

13. . Again and again the battle cry should be: "our young men and women are dying in Iraq and we are trapped in peacetime red tape in Washington. Change it or accept the moral burden for the unnecessary deaths."

14. Everyone should be instructed to say "yes if" rather than "no because". If we insist on exploring how to get things done instead of explaining why things can't be done we will be amazed how much more can be accomplished.

15. We need constituency-based district elections and should veto the concept of nation-wide party slate. Constituency elections will tie the political process to local needs and local interests. Nationwide party slates will maximize the power of charismatic and publicity based

leaders and will move the process from practical local constituency satisfying to the politics of ideological identification.

16. Implementation is as important as policy. We need a major general who has served in combat and understands lives are lost everyday to serve as the deputy to Blackwell at the NSC. We spend so much time on policy decisions that we often forget that we have to actually force the policy into implementation.

17. The policy deputy will focus on calling Bremer and Abizaid each morning and getting a list of ten urgent achievements from each. They will then spend the day getting those twenty things done and at the end of the day they will report to the President, Vice President and National Security Adviser which things **are** still not done and why they have not been completed. The President acting on the advice of his senior team will then either issue a new regulation, ask congress to change the law, or replace the person who is failing to get the job done.

18. We have 4 layers of planning and implementation that must be undertaken at the present moment:

I.. What can we do immediately (6-10 days)

II. What can we do to shift resources so they can be spent effectively

III. What regulations and laws have to be changed now so we can move fast enough to win the war

IV. What systems have to be established(e.g., a national security service that would be trained and ready to move to theater for a transformational effort and a totally new and massively bigger system of information warfare) to win over the long run

FOUO

June 27, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: ~~Newt Gingrich Paper on Principles for Victory in Iraq~~

Given our recent conversations about the way ahead in Iraq, it might be helpful to read this memo from Newt Gingrich and see how his ideas track with our thoughts.

Let me know what you think.

Attach:
4/7/04 Gingrich paper: Principles for Victory in Iraq

DHR:dh
062705-34

.....
Please Respond By 07/28/05

OSD 12477-05

FOUO
11-L-0559/OSD/50193

~~FOUO~~

June 27, 2005

TO: Karen Hughes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TA.*

SUBJECT Newt Gingrich Paper on Islam

As you work on public diplomacy and the world of Islam, you might find the attached paper by Newt Gingrich worth reading.

Attach.

12/8/02 Gingrich draft paper: Helping Our Muslim Allies Win Their War with the Reactionary Wing of Islam

DHR:dh
062705-32

000.3

27 June 05

~~OSD~~ 12480-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50194

DRAFT

HELPING OUR MUSLIM ALLIES WIN THEIR WAR WITH THE REACTIONARY WING OF ISLAM

Newt Gingrich
December 8, 2002

SUMMARY

1. The war we find ourselves in is much bigger than Al Qaeda and Bin Laden. It has cultural-religious patterns that involve millions (and if not stopped will soon involve hundreds of millions of people) in a system of values and coercion antithetical to our way of life. The United States is currently losing this larger war.
2. The rise of Reactionary Islam and its funding by the Saudis (at least \$2 to 3 billion a year, funding 30,000 mosques and madrassas worldwide including a substantial presence in the United States and Europe) is creating a worldwide movement dedicated to the imposition of the sharia (religious law) superseding civil law and to the recruiting of people into a value structure and vision of reality that guarantee hostility to American values and a willingness to commit acts of violence to further the cause.
3. The Pew survey found overwhelming opposition to the 'war on terrorism' in most Arab countries and a big decline in support for America even in relatively secular countries like Turkey. The riots in Nigeria indicate the growing power of the sharia and of fanatic leaders to inspire violence in defense of their beliefs. The killings of Americans in Lebanon, Jordan, and Kuwait indicate a continuing spread of a belief that killing any Christian in general and American in particular is legitimate. The new bombings in Bali and Bangla Desh are just a reminder of how far this war is spreading and how random violence is becoming.

4. We deceive ourselves by the very narrowness with which we interpret events. For example, the rise of 'sympathetic' (as opposed to organized) terrorists is a growing phenomenon that the FBI refuses to even acknowledge. The Egyptian who shot people at the El Al counter in Los Angeles would not show up as a terror statistic because there is no proof he was connected to a group. Similarly the assassin from Pakistan who killed CIA agents at Langley and was recently executed was never officially a terrorist in the FBI system because there was no definitive proof of his connections. This is mindless and dangerous obscurantism by our own agency but it is far from an isolated phenomenon. Both the intelligence agencies and State Department engage in similar self deception about Saudi Arabian activities, the role of religion, etc.
5. Al Qaeda is a symptom of what has become a civil war inside Islam. Al Qaeda is the tip of a cultural movement which accepts violence against non-Muslims (and even if necessary the killing of Muslims if that is the price of killing non-believers). Defeating Al Qaeda might slow down the violence but given the growing population of young males in Islamic countries a new wave of killers will emerge within a decade if Reactionary Islam continues to spread.
6. Even though there are far more modern Muslims than reactionaries, the modernizing wing of Islam is steadily losing this civil war. The money, the energy, the fanaticism and the organization are all on the side of the minority in the Reactionary wing. The willingness to kill and to intimidate by threat of killing is overwhelmingly on the Reactionary side. This includes intimidation inside the United States (see Franklin Four, "Moral Hazard: the life of a liberal Muslim" in The New Republic Nov. 18, 2002 for a UCLA Muslim receiving death threats in California for speaking out).
- 7.. A.Q. Kahn and other Muslim arms dealers are actively seeking Muslim weapons of mass destruction. This is a serious effort to gain for Islam the weapons needed to drive the West out of its region and regain a balance of power. There are a significant number of serious Muslims who are EAGER to have a nuclear weapon go off in an

American city or a biological weapon decimate the American people. We have nothing like the urgency, decisiveness, and if necessary ruthlessness appropriate to a country that may lose one or more cities.

8. Seen in this context we are fighting a worldwide insurgency not merely a terrorist movement. An insurgency creates a resilience of financing, support and sanctuary (Mao's 'fish in the sea' analogy of communist forces surviving with peasant support applies directly to the mosque and madrassa sanctuaries of this modern conflict). Insurgencies turn martyrs into recruiting symbols. Killing Al Qaeda members without defeating the Wahhabi and Deobandi movements may simply lead to a new generation of younger, even more radical, terrorists.
9. For the United States to win we must accept a cultural-religious explanation of the larger struggle and vigorously ally ourselves with the modernizing Muslims in defeating the Reactionary Islamists. This will require a new set of metrics to measure winning and losing, a new set of strategies, new structures, and in some cases the substantial replacement of government personnel if they reject the new analysis and the new strategies.
10. This larger war is a BIG problem more comparable to the Second World War or the Cold War than to anything we have yet envisioned. There is a civil war underway in a religion which involves 1,300,000,000 people in virtually every country in the world. That civil war both threatens constant low grade violence across the planet and potential use of weapons of mass destruction in a manner that could change civilization as we know it.
11. Americans must first have a large public debate about the conflict we are in and the root causes of the Reactionary Islamist offensive. Only once a common agreement has been reached about the challenges we face will we be able to develop the strategies, structures and resources we need.
12. Every day that we continue to misdiagnose the war is a day our opponents can use to finance more mosques and madrassas, spread more language of hate, recruit more young warriors for their religious belief,

and seek to gain weapons of mass destruction. We must understand that time is not on our side and that time is not on the side of modernizing Muslims. We need a sense of historic urgency in rethinking and redirecting this war.

There are seven primary reasons we are losing the war with Reactionary Islamists:

1. The mental toughness required to confront and solve really hard problems,
2. The misdiagnosis of the nature of the war,
3. The absence of metrics to distinguish activity from progress,
4. The lack of organizational structure to implement a winning strategy once one is developed,
5. The lack of resourcing appropriate to a real war (see attached graph),
6. The almost complete lack of a strategy and system for winning the cultural struggle inside Islam,
7. The weakness of our effort to make sure the American people and the people in democratic countries understand and support the war against reactionary Islam

These seven factors require a working group to rethink the war and develop a new approach. Only a fact driven approach can create the understanding, the strategies, and the metrics needed to win.

The structures and resources can only be developed once:

- The analysis is correct.
- The vision of success is adapted by the President and his team.
- The strategies are defined.
- The metrics are explicit.

On resourcing the real war and helping our modern Muslim allies:

Compare the wartime increases of 1939-42 and 1950-51 and the Reagan build-up of 1981-85 with the tiny increases in defense and intelligence spending in 2001-2002.

Compare the scale of reconstructing Germany, Japan and Italy, the size of the Marshall plan and the investment of South Korea with the failure to plan for, structure and resource Afghanistan.

Compare the amounts we spent after World War II in Italy, Greece and other anti-communist intellectual and communications campaigns with the tiny and timid effort we are making today in what is arguably a harder fight (religious opponents have greater enemy, zeal and commitment than ideological opponents). Remember that in this case we have to help the modernizing Muslims replace both the humanitarian systems and educational systems of reactionary Islam to have a chance to win the cultural war

The American government is currently falling far short of President George W. Bush's commitment of September 20, 2001:

"We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and defeat of the global terror network."

INTRODUCTION

We are currently not winning the war with reactionary Islam. Indeed it is probable that the United States is currently losing the war with the forces of Islamist reaction.

There is every reason to believe more Muslims hate America than a year ago, that anti-American terrorist groups are adapting to the American efforts, that efforts to get weapons of mass destruction are continuing, that the financing of the Wahhabi and Deobandi missionary movements to attract recruits and indoctrinate the young is unabated and that understanding of and support for the war has declined in both the United States and the peoples of the allied nations

After a year of effort, we are adapting at a rate slower than our opponents and our bureaucracies are more resistant to change than our opponents.

The current American strategies in the 'war on terror' are doomed to fail. The frightening prospect is that the American focus on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda is intensifying the cultural and communications conditions which would lead to an even more militant generation of anti-American activists.

As the New York Times reported about a Pew Charitable Trust Poll "The United States-led campaign against terrorism was opposed by most people surveyed in several nations with Muslim majorities. The percentages opposed were 79 percent in Egypt, 85 percent in Jordan, 64 percent in Indonesia, 56 percent in Lebanon, 64 percent in Senegal, 58 percent in Turkey and 64 percent in Indonesia. Pluralities took that view in Pakistan — 45 percent — and Bangladesh — 46 percent."

Furthermore the Times reported that in one of our staunchest allies, Turkey, "favorable views of the United States have dropped from 52 to 30 percent in the past two years. Only 30 percent said they supported the campaign against terrorism and 74 percent said the United States did not pay either much or any attention to Turkey's interests when setting policy." (December 5, 2002).

Thus the most thorough poll done since September 11" indicates that people throughout the Muslim world are less favorable to the United States and by significant majorities oppose the "war on terrorism". This is very dangerous for the United States in the long run.

The lessons of Israel in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, India in Kashmir, Britain in Northern Ireland, and Russia in Chechnya are not encouraging. Large populations of young males inspired by religious-cultural values create very formidable opponents. Killing a few while alienating the many is a strategy for long term disaster. The failure of our current strategy should be obvious from the fact that out of the thousands of Al Qaeda trainees we have had no defectors (Defense Department analyst).

Combinations of a series of politically correct and bureaucratically correct analyses combined with sometimes Saudi-financed academic analyses have one thing in common. They are factually wrong, leading America into the wrong strategy to prosecute the wrong campaign.

This paper outlines:

1. The real challenge to America
2. The causes of American misdiagnosis of the challenge
3. The strategies, scale of resources, and structures that victory will require.

PART I:

The real problem that threatens our way of life.

The most important struggle on the planet today is between the modernizing and reactionary wings of Islam. There is a civil war underway in Islam and the modernizers are losing it to the reactionaries.

Modernizing Muslims believe that their future is to be found as part of a larger world. They are often devout Muslims but express their devotion as a personal behavior lived out in a secular state with modern laws. They consider women as legally equal and oppose the repression of women and 'honorkillings' of daughters by fathers and sisters by brothers. They want their children to have an education that prepares them for modern jobs and modern life.

Reactionary Islamists (largely inspired by the Wahhabi and Deobandi sects) reject the modern world as a manifestation of anti-Islamic evil. They believe in a world defined strictly by the Sharia (the religious law). In their world it is impossible to have secular law overrule the Sharia because that would place man above God. For example, in their world the repression of women and the father's right to kill his daughters or the brother's right to kill his sisters are absolutes imposed by God.

This pattern of violence against women is spreading into the cities and becoming more common. One study indicated the number of women killed in Pakistan has gone up 25% in 2002. :

- 461 women murdered by family members in 2002 for immoral behavior ranging from adultery, being raped or even cooking poorly
- In Punjab, 67 of the slain women were killed by their brothers, 49 by their husbands and the rest executed by other family members, including seven cases where sons killed their mothers.

Additionally, Reactionary Islamists idealize 9th century Islam as a Golden Age of spiritually led rulers and Arab dominance. They seek to recreate Arab and Muslim self-esteem by recreating the world of 1200 years ago. This understanding of Reactionary Islamists is captured in two powerful books Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America by anonymous ("on broaching my intention to publish, however their [senior civil servants] politically correct antennae deployed and their efforts to suppress the work ran a gamut from damning the book because it would offend Muslims to an ominous suggestion that my

personal views might well disqualify me from further performance of official duties." Pp. xiv) and The Age of Sacred Terror by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, the former director and senior director for counterterrorism of the National Security Council under President Clinton. These two books should be read by every citizen seeking to understand the war we are in and the dangers that could shatter our society.

Several circumstances have combined to put the modernizing Muslims on the defensive and to give Reactionary Islamists the advantage in moral force, missionary intensity, and aggressive recruiting of new adherents.

1. The 'modernizing' Arab states have proven to be largely corrupt dictatorships who fail to deliver prosperity or freedom. Since there is no legitimate civil society within which to critique and oppose the dictators, many of the brightest, most energetic, best educated and most idealistic have moved to the Reactionary Islamist camp as the only effective opposition to what they perceive is a sick, secular, corrupt, dictatorial elite.

2. The 'modernizing' Muslim states have been clearly impotent in confronting Israel and India. They have been so unable to earn respect through effective strength in military-diplomatic terms that they have forced young Muslims seeking self-respect to turn to militant, religiously inspired efforts to achieve victory through guerrilla war and terrorism. The same frustrations which drive young Arabs toward religious terrorism drive young Pakistanis in the same direction. The failures to 'liberate' Kashmir and Palestine both lead to an increase in religiously inspired terrorism and a desire to have weapons of mass destruction to match those possessed by India and Israel.

3. The flow of Saudi, Iranian and Iraqi money (largely in that order) into social service organizations run by religiously inspired terrorist groups (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah) has created and is still expanding a network of people who get their food, healthcare, housing, and education from proselytizing terrorist recruiting systems. As 'modernizing' Arab states fail to serve the poor they create space for the religious-terrorist groups to grow in legitimacy, popularity, and recruiting capability. In many neighborhoods these groups now have more reach than the state which theoretically runs that country.

4. Wahhabism and Deobandism are an internally coherent and self-reinforcing religious belief system. Similarly, the Reactionaries in the Shia community (Hezbollah and others) have a coherent and powerful worldview. Saudi money in particular has expanded and is still expanding the growth of mosques, madrassas, and universities with Reactionary Islamist views.

Virtually all the energy, zeal, and fervor in modern Islam is now on the side of a much stricter, Sharia based society that utterly reject modernity.

5. Failure of the secular dictatorships to deliver prosperity or victory, has created conditions that prevent modernizing Muslims from presenting a viable alternative to the worldview provided by the Reactionaries. In most of the Islamic world a religious minority that rejects modernity and advocates violent struggle as the appropriate means of creating a Sharia based medieval society is currently on the offensive. It is now the pro-Sharia, pro-religious domination, anti-modernity and pro-violence minority which has moral dominance in debates within Islam. From riots in Nigeria to a continuing guerilla war in Algeria, and to the gradual drift of Egyptian media and education towards Wahhabism to the unchecked spread of reactionary beliefs in Pakistan and the still small but growing militant sects in Indonesia and the Philippines, reactionary militants continue to gain supporters and to have the advantage of a more intense, more deeply passionate cause.

6. The spread of a doctrine of great intensity and passion is the more formidable in a population with a large number of young people. The difference between an aging European population and an explosion of the number of young males in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and elsewhere is simply staggering. This is historically a formula for an aggressive culture next to a defensive, more passive culture. The sheer number of young males makes violence historically more attractive and more likely for the Reactionary Islamists. Demography is clearly on their side for the next generation.

7. Militant Wahhabism and rejection of modernity is also spreading to the West. Several of the Al Qaeda terrorists have been Westerners who rejected modernity and converted to Islam. Saudi money in particular has subsidized mosques and missionaries in Europe, the United States and Latin America.

8. One of Bin Laden's greatest but unheralded achievements has been the knitting together of an anti-Western, anti-modern Islam coalition with Shia reactionaries. Historically the Shia and Sunni branches of Islam despised each other more than they disliked the West or modernity. Now there is clear cooperation uniting the reactionaries of the two branches of Islam into a common anti-American, anti-modern front. This is both a sign of the growing intensity of their hostility and a sign of maturing leadership capable of seeking strategic advantage through new alliances.

9. As the militants grow more confident in the righteousness of their cause and the legitimacy of killing everyone (in their beliefs it is OK to kill the innocent because they will simply go to paradise more quickly and thus are not disadvantaged by being killed) and as they grow more sophisticated

in planning-and execution, the danger of a truly horrifying attack continues to grow. The efforts to achieve biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction are the logical consequence of their openly stated desire to kill as many Americans as possible (millions is one reference).

Part II

Why America has found it so hard
to understand the real war.

America in late 2002 is almost exactly where it was in 1946-47 in trying to come to grips with 'the sources of Soviet conduct' (as Kennan's X telegram described it).

A lot of Americans saw Russia as a traditional state that happened to have a communist dictator. Their view was reinforced by the fact that Stalin had argued for 'Communism in one country' while defeating Trotsky and those who believed in worldwide revolution. This 'noncommunist' interpretation saw Russia as a traditional great power, dismissed the threat of international communism, and ridiculed the idea that there were Soviet spies in the United States. They were wrong on every count. We know that now.

Yet even as late as 1982 when President Reagan's assertion the Soviet Union was 'an evil empire' was ridiculed by the elite news media and when the Soviets were secretly financing Western European 'peace organizations' there were still millions who remained confused about the nature of the threat after nearly 40 years of experience.

We face a similar set of arguments today. The State Department's Near Eastern Bureau has an unblemished history of being wrong about the rise of Wahhabism and Deobandism.

The culture of the Near Eastern Bureau creates emissaries acceptable to Arab dictatorships as a potential ambassador, placating those dictatorships and mollifying their sensibilities while propping up the dictatorships which simultaneously create breeding grounds for future terrorists.

It would be career suicide for a State Department analyst to reject **the** secular groupthink and advocate **an** analysis based on the Reactionary Islamist threat as the core of current problems. Far better for a State Department career to focus on hunting down individual terrorists than to think too deeply about the patterns that are causing terrorists to emerge.

The Central Intelligence Agency has been better at analyzing Bin Laden and Al Qaeda and far more proactive in trying to go after terrorists. Yet the CIA shares a lot of the State Department's caution about too openly

discussing Reactionary Islamists. Analysts who understand the religious roots of Bin Laden are forced to publish anonymously and warned it could ruin their career. Senior analysts who understand how central Saudi money is to the whole problem offer their advice quietly because they know the current bureaucratic-political norms make it dangerous to tell the truth about the Saudis.

The Defense Department knows military success is necessary but by itself inadequate. Far better than State or the CIA, the military remembers Vietnam and has talked with Russians, Israelis, Indians and Brits about the difficulties of fighting terrorism.

Ironically the one truly bold communication effort after September 11th was in the Pentagon and it was promptly shut down by all the political-bureaucratic powers that neither understood the real nature of the war nor understood how central communications is to winning that war.

The pressure of political correctness powerfully reinforces the narrow, secular analysis of the bureaucracies. When 19 Arabs (not a single non-Arab) attacked America on September 11th we are told ethnic profiling would be wrong. Every major terrorist attack is by Reactionary Islamists but we are told looking at mosques and madrassas would be wrong. Not a single profiler thought the Washington sniper would be a recent convert to Islam with mysterious financing who was happy about September 11th. Those were simply unacceptable thoughts that turned out to be true.

If political correctness means dishonesty about facts how can we expect to ever understand this conflict?

Political correctness is reinforced by the secular assumptions of modern western elites. They find religious thought and language so alien that they are constantly trying to translate it into 'reasonable' meanings. Just as 'reasonable people' knew Adolph Hitler did not mean Mein Kampf and 'reasonable people' knew there were no prison camps and torture chambers in the Soviet Union, 'reasonable people' now tell us to ignore the language of Wahhabism, the severity of the Sharia, the killing of daughters and sisters, and the openly stated belief that God wants our enemies to kill as many Americans as possible.

It is a sound principle in history to believe that your enemies might actually want to kill you. Yet the very religious language of their promises of death makes it harder for secular people to comprehend the sincerity of Reactionary Islamists.

Finally, our analysis is distorted because so many American professors of Islam and the Middle East are subsidized by the Saudis and have created a groupthink that is just plain wrong.

Despite these inhibitions and blinders, the facts are gradually becoming clear:

1. The core struggle is religions and cultural with terrorist violence as the tip of an iceberg of religiously based and deeply believed hatred and alienation.

2. Our most important allies in this struggle are the modern Muslims who desire safety, health, prosperity and freedom for their families, including women, and who want to practice their religion peacefully within a diverse society.

3. The Saudis are the financial and religious center of the reactionary wing of Islam.

4. Any strategy that successfully supports and reinforces modern Muslims will threaten and undermine corrupt dictatorships including many of our 'allies'. This is a key definition of this campaign. If we are cautious and passive enough for the Saudi, the Pakistani and the Egyptian dictatorships we will certainly fail. If we are reinforcing modernizing Muslims and defeating the Reactionary Islamists we will certainly be destabilizing these dictatorships. This is why advice from the State Department's Near Eastern Bureau based on its contacts with the dictatorships is so profoundly wrong. These dictatorships know a real American cultural offensive on behalf of modern Muslims will destabilize them and make their own survival in power less likely.

5. This conflict could become 'life and death' if the reactionary Islamists acquire biological or nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan is as dangerous as Iraq or Iran in this context. The reactionary Islamists want to acquire these weapons explicitly for the purpose of using them. This is a new fact very different from traditional states seeking deterrence or negotiating positions.

6. How the Israeli-Palestinian, Indian-Kashmir, and Russian-Chechnyan struggles evolve has a big influence on Muslim perceptions of their future and their role in the world and the requirements of their future.

7. The United States is now engaged in a potentially life and death struggle with a religious-cultural opponent. In this struggle it finds itself allied with advocates of Modern Islam in a war with advocates of Reactionary Islamist beliefs. This conflict is 90% cultural-political-economic and only 10% military in nature.

8. Therefore the current American strategy is focused on the 10% and is too traditional, too timid or simply afraid to think about the 90%. Furthermore the American effort completely lacks the scale needed to match

the size of the reactionary Islamist movement as it has evolved over the last 20 years.

9. In a very real sense we are back where we were in 1947 when we decided we were in a real worldwide conflict with the Soviet Union and International Communism. Over the next few years we invented:

- The Marshall Plan

- Point 4 Program of foreign aid

- The Greek-Turkish Aid program

- Covert help for democracy in Italy and France

- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

- The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

- The Central Intelligence Agency

- The Strategic Air Command

- The hydrogen bomb

- A generation of new jet fighters and bombers (the last of which, the **B-52**, is still in use)

- Radio Free Europe

The question is whether our generation will be as bold and inventive as our parents and grandparents were.

Domestically we have taken a good first step with the Homeland Security Agency (although many domestic steps remain including the development of an MI-5 antiterrorist agency and the complete overhaul of our border system).

Overseas we have used military and intelligence systems against terrorism but have still avoided key strategic decisions, failed to invent the necessary new structures, and refused to confront the scale of resources that will be needed to assure victory.

Part III

The Strategies, Scale of Resources,
and Structures that victory will require

Strategies:

The following section assumes the United States will continue to win military victories when necessary. It was vital to our future that the American military and intelligence forces were decisively victorious in Afghanistan. It was useful to be able to kill an Al Qaeda leader in Yemen

with an unmanned Predator. If an Iraq campaign proves necessary it is vital that the United States win decisively and quickly.

This paper is not an argument against strong decisive military action. Indeed decisive military victories are the sine qua non of any other policy. Victory matters in the Middle East and the “Arab Street” can change its mood decisively if it thinks America is going to win.

These are the strategies that have to surround and build upon our military capabilities:

1. The initial strategy is to get much better information about the size and depth of the Reactionary Islamist movement:

Fifteen months after September 11, 2002 it is appalling how little we really know about the scale of resources, the networks of power, and the structures of the systems that are attacking us. There is no question that a private non-profit, the Middle East Media Research Institute (Memri.org-subscription free) does a vastly better job of monitoring Islamic Reactionaries and their consistent hatred language than does the entire United States Government. Until we reform the bureaucracies of diplomacy and intelligence every elected leader should assign someone on their staff to read Memri once a day and get a sense of the scale of ferocity of our opponents. At no cost the State Department would dramatically improve its understanding of the war by requiring its Near Eastern Bureau to read Memri every day. This is not hyperbole, it is a tragic and infuriating commentary between the level of denial in our bureaucracies and the availability of information about what people are publicly saying in the reactionary Islamist movement. The problem is not as severe as the State Department but still all too real in the intelligence community. Part of this is a resource problem (both financial and lack of appropriately trained personnel) but a great deal of the problem is strategic and structural. More money and people poured into a system that is asking the wrong questions will simply get us more expensive wrong answers. We need to define first what we are trying to learn and then build our system to learn those things. For example:.

- a. How much money comes from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and elsewhere?
- b. How much money is being raised locally by established mosques, madrassas, and missionaries?
- c. By country how many activists, supporters and followers are in the Reactionary Wing of Islam?

- d. What are the leadership networks, the communications systems, the decision making processes, in each country and between countries?
 - e. Who leaves the movement and why? Could they become recruits and allies for the United States?
 - f. What universities have been taken over by Reactionary Islamists Which have been infiltrated? Who are the academic leaders and what are their networks? What is happening to their graduates?
 - g. How much media is now controlled, penetrated or intimidated by Reactionary Islamists?
 - h. How many government and secular leaders are parts of the Reactionary Islamist movement? Which leaders are supportive of the movement? Intimidated by the movement? In which countries is the Sharia replacing secular law? How seriously is the Sharia being enforced? In which countries is there a strong movement for Sharia to replace secular law (this may be the easiest test of the movement of Reactionary Islamist thought).
 - i. Which business networks relate to the Reactionary Islamists?
 - j. Which international arms dealers relate to the Reactionary Islamists?
 - k. How do drug dealers and other criminal elements interact with Reactionary Islamists? For example does the spread of Albanian Muslim criminal organizations through Western Europe matter in terms of extending the reach of Reactionary Islam?
- Just as in the 1940's, an initial baseline of information has to be built and then it has to be updated regularly. This is a vastly bigger job than running the current counter terrorism center and it will require a much larger intelligence budget and staff.

Strategy 2.

The second strategy must be to create ongoing information about the full religious-cultural-economic-political-military conflict. We need the equivalent of a theater command with full situational awareness and a comprehensive overview of developments in close to real time. We need to know on a daily and weekly basis and with monthly, quarterly, and annual reviews and analyses:

- a. Who was killed around the world as part of the conflict?
- b. What are our opponents' media saying?
- c. What are the Reactionary Islamist Reactionaries saying?
- d. What is being said in Reactionary Islamist mosques each Friday and to what extent are their coordinated patterns? Can we learn by Saturday or

Monday what is being said each week? What does a long term analysis indicate of these patterns?

e. How are the Reactionary Islamist charitable organizations doing?

f. On a country-by-country basis what is happening in the struggle between Modern Muslims and Reactionary Islamists and is there anything we can do immediately or anything we should be planning to do to help the modern Muslims win in each country?

We need to develop a set of metrics that helps us better understand the ebb and flow of a religious-cultural-economic-political struggle. Just as body counts were misleading in Vietnam so Al Qaeda body counts are misleading today.

We do not have these metrics today. The short list above is merely an indication of the kind of information we will need on a regular and timely basis. Until now it has been politically and bureaucratically incorrect to even ask for most of this information. For us to win it will become imperative to know these things and more.

Gathering, processing, and analyzing this data on a worldwide movement (60 to 80 countries minimum) will be far bigger and more complicated than anything our intelligence agencies did during the Cold War. It will require a scale of resources, intellectual courage, and determination to develop despite what will be vicious bureaucratic and politically correct opposition. Without it we will not have the information to effectively prosecute the campaign in alliance with Modern Muslims to defeat the Reactionary Islamists. Without it we will run a real risk of losing over the next thirty years.

Strategy 3.

Our third strategy has to be the growth of an explicit alliance with Modernizing Muslims.

There are millions (actually hundreds of millions) of Muslims who want to live at peace in the modern world with a chance for their children (both male and female) to fully participate in modern life. In Turkey, still shaped by the historic achievement of Ataturk in modernizing what had been 'the sick man of Europe', the new self described Islamist government describes itself as committed to modernization and to integration with the West. In Turkey more than any other Muslim country the pattern of private religious belief with a secular society and government has taken hold and offered a dramatic alternative to either reactionary Islamist regimes or to corrupt dictatorships. It is the example toward which we wish to help all of the Muslim world develop.

Beginning with Muslims in the United States, Europe and the rest of the Americas and reaching then (often through relatives living in the West) into every country to find modernizing Muslim allies we need to develop a system of coordination in which we are their allies far more than expecting them to be our allies.

This is their conflict first and if they win the struggle for the future of their faith we will do fine. It is their faith, their communities, their families, and their lives that are on the line.

The 25 Arab scholars who courageously signed the United Nations report on the failure of the Arab world to develop should be among the first to be invited to the White House and elsewhere to advise on strategies and to be given the funds to communicate their message throughout the Arab World. They have already risked their lives and staked their futures on modernizing the Arab World and supporting them would clearly be a pro-Arab thing for America to do.

We must be clear from the beginning that the basis of all our efforts must be physical safety for our allies. In this kind of community religious civil war, violence is integral to the efforts of the militant wing to defeat the modernizing wing.

A determined minority can suppress and defeat a vastly bigger but disorganized and uncertain majority. As Mao Tse-Tung wrote in a similar context: "all power comes out of the end of the rifle."

We greatly underestimate in Pakistan, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, or even Afghanistan how much physical danger there is in openly favoring the modernizing Muslim side. This danger is compounded when that side is identified as the tools of the United States, Israel, India and Russia.

The more successful we become in networking, encouraging, and arousing those Muslims who want to live in the modern world, the more desperately the Reactionary Muslims will use violence to coerce those they cannot convert or intimidate.

This problem of coercion is even more clear and difficult in dictatorships like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, the Sudan, and Syria where the full weight of state coercion and state violence will crush any effort to be modernizing. Even with \$2 billion a year in aid we are unable to convince the Egyptian dictatorship to stop arresting modernizers (some of whom hold dual US-Egyptian citizenship). The Saudis pretend modernity in visits to America but ruthlessly impose reactionary behaviors inside the dictatorship.

If America is to truly be the ally of those who would modernize Islam we will have to confront both the decentralized physical threats of the

Reactionary Islamists and the centralized police powers of the anti-modernizing dictatorships. To date we have done neither.

This issue of physical security is central because our ultimate goal has to be the growth of a Modernizing Islam that crowds out and defeats the Reactionary Islamists. We cannot focus primarily on the negative goal of hunting down and defeating the Reactionary Islamists (even if we could develop a strategy for directly defeating millions of people who share in the Wahhabi and Deobandi sects and in the Reactionary Shia movement). Hunting down the reactionaries as an end in itself simply creates the space for the recruitment of more reactionaries.

Instead we must have the more positive goal of helping grow a modern Islam that enables its citizens to have safety, health, prosperity and freedom. Only then can we crowd out the extremists. This is a very large challenge.

Some of the key aspects of this strategy would include:

- a. Building some organizations and mechanisms which provide funding and resources for modernizing Muslims enabling them to compete with the Reactionary Islamists in communications, organizations, education and charities. This is probably a \$3 billion to \$5 billion dollar a year project and the money should be disbursed through public foundations and covert programs so the final recipients would not be tainted by being direct recipients American government money. It should start by working with the already existing modernizing Muslim organizations that exist but are often starved for cash compared to their Reactionary competitors.
- b. Creating strategies, technologies, and organizations to empower the modernizing Muslims to survive against the violence of Reactionary Islamist organizations. The lessons of the Marine Combined Action Platoons in stabilizing Vietnamese villages, arming and training them so they could protect themselves against Communist infiltration is directly pertinent as a way of thinking. The fact is "no village protected by a Combined Action Platoon was ever repossessed by the Vietcong and 60% of the Marines serving in Combined Action units volunteered to stay on with their Marine and Vietnamese companions for an additional six months when they could have returned to the United States." (Victor H. Krulak) and as Max Boot notes (in The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power) the Marines scattered through small villages actually suffered 50% fewer casualties than units on search and destroy missions. The United States can develop a system for helping people protect themselves and

- we can only expect peaceful modernizing Muslims to survive in dangerous, violent places if we help them develop this kind of system.
- c. Developing and communicating a series of worldwide messages so the anger against America is transformed into a sympathetic understanding that America is on the side of modernizing Muslims and wants to help them create societies in which their children can enjoy safety, health, prosperity, and freedom. America as a willing and supportive ally of the aspirations of hundreds of millions of Muslims who want to live peaceful, modern lives. This project will require vastly more sophistication at developing and communicating messages and with vastly more resources and a serious effort in getting the messages delivered.
 - d. Creating a systematic campaign to drive the Reactionary Islamist message off the air and out of newspapers and magazines. There is no reason a so called ally getting \$2 billion a year in aid (the Egyptian dictatorship) should be filling the air waves and the print media with anti-American poison. There is no reason a small dictatorship along the Gulf Coast should have a satellite television program that carries Bin Laden propaganda worldwide. A key part of our effort must be to eliminate the hateful and violence advocating competition by monitoring carefully what is said and printed and by bringing overt direct pressure to bear against governments that tolerate or even encourage anti-American hate. Lowering the volume of anti-American propaganda will make it dramatically easier for modernizing Muslims to win their arguments and make their case.
 - e. A systematic effort has to be undertaken to win back the universities and the madrassas. Again this is a dual function of shutting down the resources for the Reactionary Islamist institutions and financing the development of scholars and teachers and the funding of universities and madrassas. This is the strategic communications parallel to the tactical communications of daily media. In the long reach of history, professors and teachers often recruit and shape the activists of the next generation. We cannot allow that process to be dominated by Reactionary Islamists committed to hating America, imposing the Sharia and using mass violence to get their way. Again the volume of resources needed to seriously undertake this will be large but not dramatically bigger than the help we gave anti-communist forces during the most active periods of the Cold War.
 - f. A network of modernizing Muslim advisers and implementers is needed. The United States and the Catholic Church helped Solidarity

but it was a Polish movement and Polish labor union that was on the front line and brought about the changes. We helped Greeks save their own country after the Second World War but Greeks did the really hard work. We need to recruit modernizing Muslim business leaders, media and entertainment personalities and academics who can help shape the communications strategies, design and implement strategies for charitable foundations, network modernizing leaders throughout the region. We are creating a grand alliance with the forces of modernizing Islam and we need an integrated set of relationships. We should think of our allies in oppressed countries the way we thought of the French underground in World War II and the Polish, Hungarian and Czech dissenters in the Cold War. Recreating a stable safe world will require the victory of the modernizing Muslims and victory can only come if we support, nurture, finance and reinforce their growth into a legitimate movement indigenous to their culture and their religion. Allies are always more frustrating than puppets but ultimately they are vastly more desirable. Just as De Gaulle sometimes exasperated Roosevelt and Churchill and Chalaby seems to drive the State Department into irrational obstruction, we will find that having allies is vital but never easy or convenient. It is however indispensable to winning this war.

- g. We should make a large, focused effort to build networks of women activists who understand the mortal threat Reactionary Islamists represent both to their way of life and to their very lives. Modernizing Muslim women are our best allies in convincing the Europeans and other less involved people that this is not primarily about America's future but rather it is about the future of every young woman growing up in a Muslim society. Starting with American and European Muslim women it should be possible to rapidly build a worldwide network of Muslim women who want more out of life than the Sharia and the Reactionaries want them to have. This defines the conflict on our best terms and in the most human and sympathetic way possible. It is worth a considerable effort to bring together thousands and ultimately millions of Muslim women. Imagine annual conferences on the future of women in Islam attended by thousands of practicing Muslim women united in their determination to have legal equality and to protect their daughters from honor killings, the power could be enormous. Defending the right of young women not to be killed by their fathers is also one of the easiest positions for Americans to defend in any civilized society around the planet.

- h. This alliance with modernizing Muslims will require dramatically more intensive efforts to help the Muslim side of the three great conflicts in their world today. That does not mean siding with Chechnyans against Russians or siding with Pakistanis against India over Kashmir or siding with Palestinians against Israelis. It does mean that our commitment to Israeli society has to have a matching commitment to a decent life for Palestinians. Our Commitment to Indian security has to include sympathy for Muslims who seek a future in Kashmir. Our friendship with Putin has to include a concern for the human rights and future of the people of Chechnya. This is as much communications and focus as it is specific tactics. Yet modernizing Muslims will be hard put to ally with a United States which they see turning a blind eye to innocent Muslim suffering while somehow always sympathizing with and approving of the efforts of the non-Muslims. This will require much thought and some new more sophisticated approaches to finding solutions to seemingly insoluble problems.
- i. It is important to recognize that a number of Muslim countries have very strong patterns of being modern rather than reactionary. While Turkey is normally cited and Ataturk certainly won the first decisive victory for modernity in the Islamic world, there are a number of other countries the United States should be working with. In Bangla Desh the people have chosen women as their government leaders in several elections. In Tunisia there has been a long struggle for the civil law over the Sharia. In Morocco and Jordan there are traditional but modernizing governments that work with the United States at great risks to themselves (and get far less recognition or aid than the Egyptian dictatorship which tolerates the spread of anti-American hatred). In Malaysia the government has consistently been pro-modernization and anti-reactionary. In all fairness it should also be remembered that India has the second largest Muslim population in the world and a Muslim is the current President of India. It is possible to build a network of governments who actively oppose the reactionary Islamists and who could work together to build a network of pro-modernizing governments and to privately advise the United States on how to be more effective in helping their side win the civil war inside Islam. It is to these countries rather than to the Saudi, Egyptian and other dictatorships that the United States should be turning for advice and for alliance.

Strategy 4.

We must develop a modernization strategy for each of the key countries on a nation -by-nation basis.

The United States is already discovering how difficult it is to build a modern society in Afghanistan. In the not too distant future we may find ourselves in a similar project in Iraq. The logic of the problems with Saudi funding and the role of Wahhabism in Saudi society mean that an even more difficult country could soon find itself enmeshed in dramatic and possibly destructive change. The pressures of Pakistan and the dangers of Pakistani nuclear weapons require us to have a strategy for modernizing Pakistan before a Reactionary Islamist regime emerges with nuclear weapons and missiles. Palestinian societies ability to coexist with Israel will never be stabilized until the forces of modernity and moderation defeat the forces of hatred and violence. This will require a strategy for growing a healthy society within the Palestinian society.

The United States has been successful in the past in helping grow healthy societies from disasters. In Japan, Germany, and Italy we played a major role in helping decent people rebuild their societies into productive, safe and self-governing systems. In South Korea we can be very proud of our role in helping a series of authoritarian governments move toward democracy and in helping nurture a civil society of substantial resilience (even when it disagrees with us).

Similarly in Central America we helped a number of countries repudiate both Communist totalitarianism and local authoritarian dictatorships. We can also be proud of our role in nurturing democracy in the Philippines.

The simple fact is Americans will not find security in a world with failed states and repressive, corrupt dictatorships. The response to those failures and that corrupt repression has been the rise of a Reactionary Islamist movement that is spreading throughout Africa, the Middle East and much of Asia. Either we work with local forces of modernization and self government to help create safety, health, prosperity and freedom and we should expect to have future waves of angry young men seeking salvation from their failed lives by creating a religious regime of dictatorial intensity through acts of mass violence.

Merely to commit enough resources to succeed in modernizing Afghanistan would be a far bigger investment than anyone has currently envisioned. The word Marshall Plan is thrown about loosely but the Marshall Plan provided \$100 billion (in 2002 dollars) for Western Europe

between 1948 and 1952. At the same time we were investing in military defenses for Western Europe that spent additional money in their economies and we were adopting trade policies designed to encourage their economic recovery. That \$100 billion investment came from a much smaller American economy than we currently have. A comparable investment of share of GDP (1.2% per year) today would probably be at least \$145 billion annually for five years. At \$80 billion to \$145 billion a year a 21st century Marshall Plan for modernizing Muslim societies would have enormous impact. By contrast, compare the proposed \$5 million budget this year for help to Morocco (arguably with Jordan the most pro-modernizing regime in the Arab world and certainly one of the most helpful to the United States) and compare that to a true Marshall Plan.

Anyone who thinks we are going to cleverly transform the Arab world, help modernizing Muslims and defeat the forces of Reactionary Islamists while avoiding weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands and do so on the cheap is simply kidding themselves. This is a big historic challenge and it is going to take a big historic solution. The Second World War was not won on a shoestring. The Cold War was not won through timid, tiny efforts. Reestablishing security on the planet and helping modernizing Muslims defeat the forces of Reactionary Islamist violence will require an effort comparable to those efforts. This is a real war and we need to begin resourcing and managing it as one.

- a. Saudi Arabia is one of the two hardest cases (Pakistan see b below is the other). The Saudi dictatorship is helpful in many ways but its strategic pastern is to finance and support the forces of Reactionary Islamist effort. It is vital that the United States face the facts of the depth and scale of the Saudi commitment to the Wahhabi movement:

. **An** estimated 30,000 mosques and madrassas worldwide get Saudi money (State Department source)

Saudis hold the mortgage on 80% of the mosques in America.

Saudi money is financing Wahhabi missionary work in American prisons that is rapidly recruiting hardened prisoners and converting them to the Wahhabi sect of Islam. It is estimated that virtually all of the Muslim chaplains in American prisons are now Wahhabi and they are teaching a strongly anti-American message (Chuck Colson from Prison Ministries, Congressman Frank Wolf from letters received from prisoners).

- Every Saudi embassy has an official for the propagation of Wahhabism

who coordinates the flow of money and activities inside that country.

Saudi ministers routinely fly into countries with suitcases filled with cash (Washington Post)

The Saudi interior minister, Prince Nayef, argues (late November 2002) that the US media is controlled by 'Zionists, that Israel and not Bin Laden is behind the September 11 attacks, that it was 'impossible' for Al Qaeda to have carried out the attack, that it was not true that 15 of the 19 attackers were Saudi,

Prince Nayef is quoted on the Internet by a magazine that belongs to the Saudi royal family "I think they [the Zionists] are behind these events." [Washington Post]

If this is what the royal family will say publicly can we imagine what they say in private.

The Saudi Red Crescent uses its humanitarian activities to sustain and help terrorists including casing American facilities from Red Crescent vehicles (State Department source).

The Saudi dictatorship should be given precisely the choice President George W. Bush articulated in the Congressional Joint session after September 11. Either they are with us or they are against us. If they are with us they have to cut off funding worldwide and end the anti-American hate media including in the mosques and madrassas. They also have to protect modernizing Muslims in their country and accept the dissent from the sharia. It is conceivable the Saudi dictatorship could decide its future lies with the modern world but that decision would lead to a level of bloodshed which would make the 1927 massacres and the 1979 reclaiming of the Grand Mosque in Mecca (which led to the largest mass decapitation in Saudi history) seem peaceful and bloodless. Helping Saudi Arabia become modern is vital to the modern side winning the Islamic civil war but no one should underestimate how deeply the Wahhabi movement is entrenched in Saudi society and how powerful the counterattack of the reactionary Islamists would be if the Saudi royal family chose to side with the modern world.

Saudi Arabia in its current form is incompatible with the defeat of reactionary Islam. The 225 year alliance between Wahhabism and the House of Saud is too tight and too deep for Saudi Arabia in its current form to cooperate in cutting off money, interrogating terrorists and defeating the ideology of reactionary Islam.

This creates an enormous problem for the United States. If we are serious about defeating the Wahhabi and Deobandi sects we are going to have to force change in Saudi Arabia as a price of victory. If we seek to tolerate the current Saudi actions we are almost certainly going to lose the war with reactionary Islam.

Designing and implementing a strategy to defeat Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and to create a Saudi state which is helpful in cutting off money, tracking down terrorists, and discrediting the reactionaries is a major campaign comparable to the liberation of Italy in the Second World War. This is not something that can be done in a small way or with limited attention.

b. Pakistan presents a very different case than Saudi Arabia. There are more modern elements in Pakistan than in Saudi Arabia. There is a much more cooperative government in Pakistan than in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Pakistan has a very large reactionary element infused by both the Wahhabi and Deobandi traditions. The constant tension with India creates a moral fervor and a network of anti-Indian terrorist groups that combine religious and patriotic fervor. As the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons mounted on missiles Pakistan would be an extraordinarily dangerous country if the Reactionary Islamists were to seize control.

There is no current plan that realistically moves Pakistan away from a patriotic-Reactionary-anti-Indian ferment toward a more open, more modern society. There is not even a plan to gain control of the Northwest Territories (currently beyond the rule of the Pakistani central government), to truly police Karachi (in which Bin Laden and others could be hiding) or to disband the terrorist organizations which clearly violate the Bush doctrine on fighting terrorism and which could trigger a nuclear war with India.

Because of its possession of nuclear weapons Pakistan is actually a greater short and medium term threat than Saudi Arabia if there were to be a coup and an Islamist dictatorship were to take power. The relations of A Q Kahn, the Pakistani international arms dealer, to countries and movements across the Muslim world indicates how rapidly Pakistani weapons and technology could spread once an aggressive Islamist dictator decided to help fellow Islamists. The United States desperately needs a strategy to get to a more stable, more modern Pakistan.

- c. Our failure to develop a clear publicly communicated strategy in favor of the Palestinian people having safety, health, freedom, and prosperity (while defending Israel's existence and right to safety) is a continuing open wound that increases anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world with every passing month. As long as the humanitarian relief agencies are run by terrorist organizations and by elements of reactionary Islam it will be impossible for us to win this war. Seeking food, fuel, shelter, medical aid, education from reactionary Islamic and terrorist organizations creates the popular 'sea' in which the terrorist 'fish' can swim. We have not even begun to think through how hard it will be to displace Hizbollah, Hamas and other institutions that are creating large support elements through their practical work. Furthermore our efforts to displace them are likely to be met with violence. This is a hard problem and will require a hard solution.

Strategy 5

Communicating to the American people and the people of the world that the struggle between modernizing Muslims and Reactionary Islamists is extraordinarily important, highly dangerous, involves core values of civilization and will probably go on for two generations so we need to settle into a long contest.

Just as the leaders of 1945-47 had to first decide there really was an Iron Curtain, that Soviet Communism really was a threat and that we were in for a long, possibly generations long Cold War, so we need to confront how big, how dangerous and how long this struggle will be.

Then we need to communicate the legitimacy and importance of that struggle and the unavoidable nature of the American commitment to it.

Finally we have to convince the American people and our allies around the world that this is a struggle between tyranny (albeit religious tyranny) and freedom (including free Muslims) and we have no choice but to do whatever is necessary for the side of freedom and safety to win.

This fifth strategy is in the end the most important. If we cannot talk honestly about the threats to our security we cannot win the popular approval to sustain a serious effort. If we cannot discuss openly the religious-cultural-economic-political core of the challenge we cannot design and implement the strategies necessary for victory. If we cannot convince people of the seriousness, the magnitude and the probable length of the conflict we cannot sustain activities over time.

While much good has been done in the first year since September 11" it is sobering to realize that we have only just begin and that the journey is likely to prove longer and more dangerous than any of us would have guessed on September 10th, 2001.

The time to tell the truth and begin the real campaign is now. With each day that we fail to engage in this argument we lose more ground in the Muslim world and we run a greater risk of experiencing more horrifying violence. What is at stake is literally our freedoms, our society and the lives of our loved ones.

~~FOUO~~

June 27, 2005

TO: AMB Zal Khalilzad
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich Paper on Iraq

Zal--

Congratulations as you take up duties in the most important and challenging US Embassy in the world.

I thought you might find the attached paper by Newt Gingrich helpful. He is full of ideas and energy, and you might want to consider drawing on his intellect from time to time.

Attach
4/13/03 Gingrich Draft Proposals for the Post Iraq Liberation Phase

DHR:dh
062705-30

OSD 12481105

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/50222

DR

27 June 05

DRAFT
PROPOSALS FOR THE POST IRAQ LIBERATION PHASE
April 14.2003
Newt Gingrich

This paper is broken into several sections:

- Key projects that must succeed
- Helping Build the New free, prosperous Iraq
- Effective Communications
- The Israeli-Palestinian peace process
- Principles for effective long term US strategies and the vital institutional reforms needed for implementation of those strategies
- Glossary and key principles

KEY PROJECTS THAT MUST SUCCEED

In the aftermath of the great, historic military victory of Operation Iraqi Freedom there are many good things that could be done.

However there are only a few things that must be done. These key goals must be achieved or the United States could risk losing in peace the fruits of victory it won in war.

The key goals are very simple but achieving them will be very hard. They require constant attention from the President and his senior team. Much of the bureaucracy is incapable of achieving these goals on its own. Some of the bureaucracy actively opposes and will seek to undermine these goals;

Only the constant attention of the President and his senior team can force victory in peace to take advantage of the hard won victory in war.

We have an opportunity in the next few months to prove we were right by winning the argument over the nature of the Iraqi dictatorship and to prove we are competent by helping the Iraqi people grow a new, free society.

The key goals are:

1. Helping build a new, free, prosperous Iraq as the first working free government in the Arab world.
2. Communicating effectively to Europeans, the Middle East and American elites that the combination of torture, terrorism and

weapons of mass destruction made the Iraqi dictatorship unacceptable and the President was right to insist on replacing it.

3. Ensuring that the newly won American prestige is used in direct work with those Palestinians who want peace and prosperity to create a movement in Palestine that replaces the corrupt dictatorship that favors the terrorists and to then turn that movement into a government capable of defeating the terrorists and willing to live with Israel in an agreement that gives the Palestinian people safety, health, prosperity and freedom.

Everything else, and there is a lot to do, is contingent on those three projects being handled correctly.

If a new, free, prosperous Iraq does not emerge (and the efforts in Afghanistan do not encourage one to believe this will be easy) then America will have lost the peace.

If the argument about the moral nature of the war, the legitimacy of America's actions, and the rightness of President Bush's judgment are not won then America will be in a weaker position for future struggles.

If the United States is pulled into a fruitless, elaborate diplomatic charade over the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, a charade orchestrated by the State Department, the UN, the European Union and the Russians (the so-called 'quartet') then the opportunity to use American prestige to create a true break through for peace for both the Palestinian and Israeli people will have been lost and US prestige squandered.

HELPING BUILD THE NEW FREE PROSPEROUS IRAQ

___ Helping build a new, free, prosperous Iraq as the first working free government in the Arab world. This is the most important goal and without it the entire campaign for Iraqi Freedom could prove counterproductive and even destructive of American interests. There will be many forces seeking to undermine or block this achievement and it should be the top thing on the President's agenda every morning. Only constant attention will make this happen.

___The Defense Department is currently in a very dangerous position in trying to build a new Iraq. While the Department seems to be in charge in fact it is only the lead agency. The State Department has the power to do many things to undermine the Defense Department while seeming to cooperate. In virtually every area so far the initial steps have been closer to the State vision of reconstituting an Iraqi regime acceptable to its dictatorial neighbors rather than to the Bush vision of a free Iraq as a beacon of change in the region. The appointment of the former ambassador to Yemen to the Baghdad area is a disaster and the appointment of an AID official to be in charge of reconstruction makes it likely the same impotence and ineffectiveness which has plagued Afghanistan will cripple Iraq. At the end of the day State will be able to say sadly that it was a pity Defense could not get the job done while it will have been State Department employees who will have been undermining the effort.

___Iraq has some of the most important historic sites of the a branch of Islam. How the new government works with the Shia leadership and creates a relationship of dignity and respect can have tremendous impact in Iran, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia where there are large Shia populations.

___We need to provide new educational materials to replace the Baathist educational materials in Iraqi schools. These new materials should explain freedom and constitutional liberties, private property, free enterprise. They should include maps in which Israel exists on the map along with a Palestinian state. It is a high value for the US government to provide a new generation of course material for Iraqi students.

___A US Iraq free trade agreement with the new Iraqi government could lead to the right commercial, justice and property laws being instituted from the very beginning of the new government. There should be no effort to rewrite the laws of the dictatorship. Instead Free Iraq should adopt new laws from day one that encourage investment, trade and entrepreneurship and a free trade act could be an incentive for such laws. The European Community should be encouraged to also give Iraq a free trade agreement. The Gulf states beginning with Kuwait and Bahrein should also be offered such a free trade agreement.

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS

—There is a core message that should be driven home based on what we are learning about torture, terrorist relationships and WMD programs in the Iraqi dictatorship. The core message of this program should be: 'the United States was morally correct to want to replace Saddam's dictatorship. The United States did the right thing in replacing Saddam's dictatorship. The world would be a worst and more dangerous place (both for the Iraqi people and the rest of us) if Saddam were still in power. Those who opposed replacing Saddam's dictatorship were wrong. It is a good thing President Bush did what he did.' There is a brief window this summer to substantially change world public opinion with a coherent, dedicated program of public communications about the truths that are emerging in Iraq.

—The human cost of terror has to be made vivid and unforgettable. There must be an on going campaign for those who have suffered from torture and murder at the Iraqi dictatorship's hands to tell their stories and to bear witness. The parallel to other totalitarian dictatorships (Libya, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Zimbabwe, etc has to be drawn again and again). A new standard for the 21st century has to be the absolute unacceptability of innocent people facing this kind of cruelty and inhuman treatment. The human cost of terror and torture has to be driven home again and again.

It is vital to gather up the Iraqi dictatorship's archives (some of which may have to be purchased from people who looted them) and turn them over to a Hoover-Harvard consortium to study. The Hoover Institution helped with the Nazi, Soviet, and East German archives and has one of the most sophisticated archival systems in the world. Harvard has the leading scholar on Iraq and has been handling the documents captured by the Kurds in 1991. Having these two outside institutions jointly create digital files of all the archives and make them available to scholars while translating and publishing the most important would be a major service to human understanding of dictatorships, the United Nations and the last 12 years. Who cheated on the UN sanctions? Who was promising Saddam he did not have to worry about effective inspections? Who was providing help in Saddam's efforts to get weapons of mass destruction. How does a totalitarian dictatorship (like Syria, Libya, North Korea) maintain power? Much will be learned about these and other topics if we gather and organize and make available the records of the Iraqi dictatorship. The Bush

Administration should assign this work to the Hoover-Harvard team and should allocate funding to pay for this project.

The Information Campaign should initially be designed on four fronts: American media and elites, the Muslim World (and the Arab world in particular), Western Europe and our English speaking allies, and the rest of the world. There should be separate efforts for each of these areas with an understanding that global events reach out in global communications and sometimes all four can be reached by the same event or action.

___ Metrics should be established for each country for our communications program. An outside public affairs firm should be hired to report weekly on how American messages are being received in each major country (probably the top **50**) around the world. A program for retraining embassies and setting up metrics as goals and as measurements needs to be instituted. It is hard to overstate how bad we are doing in the communications field (note **95%** Turkish opposition to the **US** position in Iraq, large majorities in France, Germany, Britain and South Korea against the **US**) and internal efforts by the State Department without outside professional help, counseling, and measuring will be wasted efforts. The ability to communicate effectively is vital to our ability to lead the world and should be resourced and emphasized accordingly.

___ The President should get a weekly report on our successes and failures in communicating around the world. This challenge is so important to our ability to lead and we are doing it so badly that only by raising it to a presidential concern will we force dramatic improvements. The goal has to be measurable improvement in public and elite understanding not how much effort or money is going into the program. This will require an extensive program of polling and of outside assessments but this is absolutely critical to our ability to lead in future years and the President should get a weekly report from the special assistant for global communications (a new post parallel to the Communications Director and with coordinating authority over State, DOD and other communications efforts outside the **US**).

___ A study should be done of coverage of America and the war by state owned media in the Arab world. A direct intense effort should be made to ensure that state owned media of our so called allies (Egypt, etc) is not itself a major source of anti-American hostility. Our attitude toward free institutions attacking the **US** should be very different from our attitude toward government owned media attacking the **US**. The latter we should

communicate to their governments is an act of state hostility and will be dealt with as such.

Wherever possible American Chambers of Commerce should be recruited for a long term program of explaining and developing the rule of law, transparency and accountability in government, free markets and entrepreneurial free enterprise.

We should also develop incentives for the private sector to promote values and activities we believe would be helpful. For example we might want to give our textbook publishers tax shelters for any profits made selling textbooks in the Arab world. We might want to give a ~~tax~~ credit for expenses incurred by our news media in translating their broadcasts into Arabic and putting them on satellite into the region. We might want to do the same for translations and distribution of American magazines. The goal would be to accelerate free sector focus on the Arab world to accelerate opening that culture and making it comfortable with key values we believe essential to a healthy free society.

___ Steven Spielberg should be asked to use the system he developed for Holocaust victims to record the victims of torture and murder from the Iraqi regime capture their stories so the world can be educated.

___ The article from the CNN news editor that he had lied about Saddam's murder and torture for a dozen years in order to maintain "access" must be driven home. What do news organizations pay in silence and cover up to report from Cuba or Syria? What does a Dan Rather agree not to ask in order to interview a dictator like Saddam Hussein or Fidel Castro.

___ Embedded reporting works if you are an honest and decent country.

As part of a strategy to increase the use of English in the Arab world (where only 300 books a year are translated into Arabic according to one study) as a major step toward opening up Arab society, the United States should contract with Berlitz and other language companies to offer scholarships locally for young people to learn English. It should be possible to have a decentralized program for much less than a central bureaucracy (one recent proposal at state was \$1,000,000 to bring 70 teachers here to learn to teach English, that would probably teach 1000 people if they stayed Jordan),

6

—The US government should pick a group of children's books that explain freedom and other values, have them translated into Arabic and distribute them by the millions throughout the Arab world. The same should be done with a paperback set of books introducing the concepts of freedom and American history. This was done in the Cold War and for many young people became their first introduction to the concept of freedom and an understanding of America. For a relatively small amount millions of paperbacks could be distributed throughout the Arab world. The books should be chosen by a Presidentially appointed group and not by the Foreign Service.

—How many first and second generation Americans speak fluent Arabic and Farsi and would be available to help communicate in the Arab and Iranian worlds? To what extent should long delays for security clearance be waived if the person is going to work for the information campaign rather than the diplomatic or intelligence community? Could we develop provisional hiring where people work on probation until their clearance is done and they could become permanent? The delays of the last two years in simply getting translators are unacceptable. If eye witnesses to torture under Saddam are going to tour Europe and America they may need interpreters. If we want to truly help with education programs we need more people fluent in Arabic. Virtually every embassy needs more people fluent in the local language. We should have a language focused approach for creating this capability since the current foreign service approach will never meet the need.

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS

—The United States has a deep interest in a successful Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It is deeply in America's interests to bring peace to this 55 year old conflict. America is now too deeply involved in the Middle East to have every Arab (and potentially every Muslim) society blaming America for not working to solve the plight of the Palestinian people. One of our major concerns with badly designed efforts to move forward must be that they will lead to dead ends as the Madrid and Oslo process did. A dead end in which the conflict continues, terrorism continues, and Israeli

encroachments upon the Palestinian community inevitably then continue is destructive of American interests.

___ The United States has to design a plan in which an effective end state of safety, health, prosperity and freedom for both the Israeli and Palestinian people is the goal.

___ The center of gravity in creating such a positive end state is the ability to grow and develop a pro-peace Palestinian majority which is willing to fight to defeat the pro-terrorist, pro-dictatorship minority within the Palestinian people.

___ The proposed quartet of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia is a blueprint for a disaster. Its proposed roadmap will prove to be a minefield. The other three participants do not agree with President Bush that Arafat has to go and they do not agree that the center of gravity is within the Palestinian people. The other three members of the quarter will be anti-Israel and will be pro-Arafat and will seek to maneuver to ensure that peace is achieved on Arafat's terms (thus potentially setting the stage for the final elimination of Israel, something which would not be regretted by the UN, the EU or Russia) or to ensure that Israel and indirectly the United States will bear the blame for the failure of the 'roadmap'.

___ The quartet model is strategically disastrous because for the first time it will legitimize the UN, EU and Russia having a direct role in validating peace between Israel and Palestine. This represents a permanent shift against Israel and a long term weakening of American influence in the region to the benefit of competitors who have just proven they will undercut the United States at will.

___ Given all the difficulties of dealing with the UN Security Council, the recent meeting of Germany, France and Russia in St. Petersburg and growing evidence from Iraqi archives of just how willing our 'friends' were to endanger the lives of the British and American military and make the President's Iraq policy more difficult, it is a sign of the terminal hostility of the Near East Asia Bureau that it would design a peace plan that ensured the US would be outvoted three to one (although since the Near East Asia Bureau is also on the side of our opponents the functional vote below the elected and appointed senior decision makers would routinely be four to one against our interests).

____ The roadmap allows Syria to engage in a peace conference while still having terrorist organizations headquartered in Damascus and while still providing support and protection for Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Syria pays nothing for its continued support of terrorism and its continued effort to get weapons of mass destruction and is elevated into a peace conference by the 'quartet' with no steps toward peace by Syria.

____ Syria should only be allowed to participate in a peace conference when it has closed the terrorist offices, ended support for Hezbollah, and dismantled its **WMD** programs. Participation before it has achieved these goals simply legitimizes an illegitimate dictatorship which is actively working to undermine Israel and the United States both.

____ The current "road map" associated with the 'quartet' is a destructive fantasy that no serious person would accept. Its schedule is absurdly optimistic (peace in the next two years after 55 years of conflict). Its staging is designed to force Israel to take all the risks while requiring the Palestinians to do virtually nothing in the early stages. It is a formula for making Israel vulnerable and passive while terrorists could continue to operate thus making it impossible for any democratically elected Israeli government to remain passive. The Israeli reaction to terrorist attacks would then become further proof that it was Israel's fault there was no peace and by a three to one vote the 'quartet' could vote to condemn Israel. This is not a roadmap it is a minefield for the United States, Israel and those Palestinians who want to get rid of the corrupt dictatorship and achieve peace and prosperity.

____ As Robert Satloff has written: "the Roadmap has serious and substantial structural flaws. If implemented as written, it would almost surely fail to provide peace." This is an unacceptable outcome for America's interests in the region and an unacceptable outcome for the safety and prosperity of the Israeli and Palestinian people.

W h a t is needed is a roadmap basis on the principles outlined by President Bush in June, 2002. We want an effective roadmap for a real peace.

The real center of gravity for peace between Israel and the Palestinians is not to be found in a conference among diplomats and politicians. The real center of gravity is to be found among the Palestinian people. Only Palestinians can make and enforce a peace with Israel. Only Palestinians can enforce such an agreement with Israel by tracking down and stopping terrorists and pro-war Palestinians who value destroying Israel above the well being of the Palestinian people. Creating a climate in which a positive personal future for Palestinians and their families seems believable and then organizing those Palestinians who want such a future is the real key, the sine qua non, of a process that could actually achieve peace.

—The focus of the American search for peace between Israel and the Palestinian people should therefore turn away from complicated diplomatic maneuvers that have proven fruitless for more than a decade and should focus on building hope among the Palestinian people and helping grow a pro-peace, pro-safety, pro-health, pro-prosperity and pro-freedom movement among the Palestinian people. There are a number of practical, implementable steps which can be taken to build toward a truly real peace process by working with those Palestinians who prefer peace and prosperity to war and terrorism.

—Polls should be taken of Palestinian Americans and of Palestinians in the Middle East to determine what per cent are committed to the destruction of Israel and what per cent would be willing to coexist with Israel if there was safety, health, prosperity and freedom for the Palestinian people. These polls should also determine what phrases work and what fail in trying to describe the positive future America wants to create in the region.

—What is needed is not just static polling of current views but creative polling and focus groups for possible views. For example, Palestinians should be asked in focus groups to explore "under what circumstance would you be willing to accept Israel as a neighbor." It is important to let them tell us what they really believe and what would really motivate them to accept peace.

—An organization should be developed of Palestinian Americans who believe in safety, health, prosperity and freedom for their relatives back in

Palestine and are willing to have Israel survive as long as Palestinians achieve dignity, self governance, and the four values of safety, health, prosperity and freedom. This Palestinian Americans for Peace and Prosperity could both help educate (including by electronic means) could help invest in creating jobs and prosperity, and could be a counter weight in Europe and elsewhere to the leftist forces that favor Arafat's dictatorship and defend terrorist organizations. Such a Palestinian Americans for Peace and Prosperity organization could also provide moral encouragement for Palestinians willing to stand up to the dictatorship and the terrorists. Such an organization could be created by having a phone bank of Palestinian Americans to find those who are interested and then inviting their leaders to work with the administration to create such a movement for peace and prosperity in Palestine.

___ In Palestine a Committee for the Safety, health, Prosperity and Freedom of the Palestinian people should be created with the kind of efforts used in France and **Italy** in the 1940s and in Poland in the 1980s.

___ Special Operations Command should be asked to design an effective security plan for pro-peace Palestinians who are willing to fight to create a Palestinian State that has freedom, dignity and prosperity and is prepared to live in peace with Israel. It is presumed such 'pro-Peace Palestinians' would be under death threats from both the terrorists and ~~from~~ the corrupt clique that has run the Arafat dictatorship. The SOC plan could include hiring retired American, British, Egyptian, Moroccan, and Jordanian special operations and police specialists to live in the new Palestinian system and help train Palestinians and help implement such a security plan including fighting a civil war against the pro-dictatorship, pro-terrorism Palestinians.

___ The Jordanians should be deeply involved in developing the right kind of security system.

___ Militarily trained volunteers who could run medical clinics, food banks, schools should be recruited and should become a 'pro-security peace corps' type operation both providing an improvement in life for the average Palestinian and coming to grips with the security requirements of defeating the corrupt and the terrorists.

P e a c e between Israel and the Palestinians is impossible as long as Arafat is in a position to exert power. His entire career has been a combination of

dishonesty and support for terrorism. His dictatorship is corrupt, destructive and totally unreliable. President Bush has been right about the need for new leadership despite every effort of the State Department and their UN and European allies to undermine his position. They want Arafat to stay. President Bush wants Arafat to go. The President is right and any successful peace strategy will have Arafat's departure as a key component. However Arafat should go in a manner that avoids turning him into a martyr or giving him power from abroad.

A r a f a t should be discredited and then forced into exile after he has clearly become unacceptable to the vast majority of the Palestinian people. Arafat and his cronies and their role in stealing from the Palestinian people and living well at the expense of the Palestinian people has to be a key part of this campaign. The campaign has to be aimed both at the Palestinian people and at people in the United States and Europe,

A s a sign of the genuine American commitment to the future of the Palestinian people (as opposed to the corrupt pro-terrorist dictatorial clique which currently runs their country) the United States should announce that it will help build several new towns near refugee camps designed to allow people to move out of the camps and into the new facilities including hospitals, schools and factories. The new towns should be free trade zones with the US and Israel and there should be a conscious effort to get Palestinian Americans and Jewish Americans to agree to launch joint ventures to create jobs in the new towns. Stef Wertheimer's ideas for a Middle Eastern Marshall Plan (he is one of the most successful industrials in Israel) are an example of the kind of job creation that could be undertaken. Guarantees could be made that the refugee camps would remain part of the Palestinian area and indeed the United States could promise to build new towns where the refugee camps now are as part of this process.

—An American led, Palestinian focused genuine peace process would include getting Israel to give up the indefensible and irritating settlements in Gaza. It is inconceivable that these settlements can exist in the long run. Their departure under American auspices and in a setting of American power would not be a sign of Israeli weakness (the normal defense for keeping them) but rather would be a sign that the United States was interested in achieving real peace in the region.

___ The United States should publicly explore whether Egypt would be willing to sell some of the unoccupied land around Gaza. Egypt is not using the land and it would be a good public test to see if Egypt cared enough about the Palestinians to consider giving them enough room so the refugees who wanted to could return to Palestinian areas.

___ The United States should express its strong desire to help Palestinians move out of the refugee camps around the Middle East. The United States should propose two programs.

F i r s t , those Palestinians who wanted to stay in the country they were in could get aid from the UN to create a decent job and buy a decent home and move out of the camps. The United States should pledge a significant amount toward this program. The host countries will probably refuse to accept Palestinians the restrictions in Lebanon are total on land ownership, citizenship etc.). However the act of proposing it will put Arab governments on the spot and reveal them to be hypocrites about the Palestinians. Those governments who are willing to accept the refugees should be praised and given economic assistance to make it successful.

___ Second, those Palestinian refugees who want to move back into Palestinian occupied territory should be given substantial economic aid to make the move and the transition to a job and to prosperity possible.

I t should be a major goal of the United States to communicate that years in a refugee camp the longest period of any refugees in the modern world) is inexcusable and that a solution must be found which would give individual Palestinians an opportunity to have safety, health, prosperity and freedom while still providing for a survivable and safe Israel. The two goals are not incompatible if people want to work to make them compatible. We should put the burden of rejecting positive outcomes on others.

PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE LONG TERM US STRATEGIES AND THE VITAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS NEEDED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE STRATEGIES

___ The United States is now engaged in the fourth great struggle between tyranny and freedom in the last **90 years**. Like the Cold War (and unlike

World Wars one and two), this is likely to be a long struggle with some military events but many more communications, economic, political, and diplomatic events. Each campaign within the larger struggle has to be seen in context. In a World War II parallel the Afghan Campaign was like Guadalcanal and the Iraq Campaign is like North Africa. No one in the Second World War would have mistaken them for the larger conflict. **Our** strategies and institutions must be rethought in the context of this larger conflict.

The United States is now in a period of ferment and debate about the nature of the threat and the requirements of American security comparable to the 1945-47 argument about the nature of the Soviet Union. We are looking for Kennan's X telegram (1947) explaining the essence of what we face and what we must do. We are probably several years away from NSC-68 (April 1950) that codified the Cold War strategy after it had evolved.

Periods of new threats and new strategies are inherently periods of institution building and resource allocation toward new goals and new requirements. This new Fourth great struggle will require similar inventions. Early in the Cold War those inventions included a unified DOD, the CIA, SAC and NATO. Some similarly very large changes may be required by this conflict.

—We are in a contest among the democracies (including in the United States) between two worldviews. One worldview believes in process, politeness, and accommodation. The other worldview believes in facts, values and outcomes (what William James would have called pragmatism). The reaction to the statement “Libya chairs the Human Rights Commission” defines which worldview a person has. The process, politeness, accommodation worldview notes that Libya won the vote in the UN so who **are** we to complain. The facts, values, outcomes worldview notes that Libya is a dictatorship and their victory explains how much the UN has to be reformed. The struggle over liberating Iraq was a struggle between these two worldviews. Many of the policy struggles of the next few years will reflect these two worldviews with the State Department and the elite media reflecting the first and President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld and others reflecting the second.

—The US must create strategies for shaping the battlefields of freedom versus dictatorship on a country by country basis and recognize that there

must be many instruments of power (information, diplomacy, people to people, organizing first generation Americans from those countries, encouraging local people to develop movements for freedom, economic support, etc) brought to bear beyond the military.

The process for effecting very large scale change in existing institutions is:

1. establish new principles
2. articulate the principles so people can understand them
3. create metrics for the implementation of the new principles so we can know whether we are making progress or merely engaging in activities
4. create a reshaping of institutions and reallocating of resources to achieve the metrics
5. keep measuring on a regular basis and change personnel, structures, and resources as needed until the metrics are being met and the principles being implemented

—Decisions about the future have to include learning from the mistakes of the recent past. While the military and intelligence components of Operation Iraqi Freedom were brilliant the diplomatic run up from September 2002 until the war itself was an unmitigated disaster. A study needs to be made of Defeats that preceded military victory: What went wrong with our diplomacy. Only by having the courage to confront failure and learn from it can we have a chance of not repeating it in the next round of this struggle.

There must be a substantial increase in resources and numbers for the Foreign Service but it must be coupled with a profound retraining of the Foreign Service based on metrics of effectiveness in both understanding the outside world and in communicating and representing America in that world. The current Foreign Service is too small and too inbred in its culture and its promotion system. The depth of this reshaping cannot be underestimated.

—A reshaped Foreign Service is vital because we need a decentralized on site leadership style which enables our embassies to be effective in promoting freedom and combating tyranny and that level of decentralization requires Ambassador's who have been educated to the new metrics and who understand what President Bush is trying to accomplish.

—A reshaped Foreign Service is also essential because we need a new optimum, positive effective model of an embassy that allows personnel to have the time and the incentive to focus on communicating with local people rather than filling out reports for Washington and to have local language proficiency and local interactions as an integral part of the job.

—Values imperialism: we believe every person deserves safety, health prosperity and freedom, we are in favor of core values of constitutional liberty, the right to private property, free speech (including a free press), independent judiciaries, free markets, free elections, transparency and accountability in government, the work ethic, the equality of women and opportunities for women, the equality of all races, free exercise of religious beliefs). We have to win the argument within our own elites (including the Foreign Service) about whether we actually stand for these values. Without these values it is hard to imagine a world in which we can secure American safety. We are not values neutral and we do not confuse respect for others with acceptance of their values if they violate these principles. We want to support education systems and public communications programs which develop these values. We favor legal systems which contain these values.

—Maneuver warfare at the level of grand strategy. In Iraq the military demonstrated a brilliant version of maneuver warfare when the Third Division bypassed virtually all the Iraqi strong points and drove toward Baghdad. Similarly in planning activities beyond Iraq we should choose between hard and soft targets. Some countries will be more resistant to change than others. We should look for countries that could be changed relatively easily toward more open, free societies. We should look for terrorist centers that are relatively easy rather than hard. We should also recognize that just as the American military has a suite of tools to choose from (special operations, heavy armor, precision guided bombs, predators, etc) so the American nation has many tools to choose from. In some countries we need a communications program. In other countries we may need to bring economic pressure to bear. In yet other countries we may want to support an opposition movement, in some cases we may use covert activities, in a few cases we may use direct but limited military force, and when no other choice remains we may actually invade and liberate the country. We must remember that whenever possible America should retain the initiative and America should decide which tools to use and how deeply to be engaged.

Encouraging and advocating change should be distinguished from engineering or forcing change. We should encourage change in every society which limits the rights of men and women and which retains a cruel and dictatorial government (and by definition almost every dictatorship is as cruel as they have to be to stay in power). However while we can encourage and advocate change everywhere that is necessary (and indeed that should be the embassy's assignment in those countries) we can engineer or compel change in only a limited number of countries. Too often we fail to encourage and advocate because we know we cannot engineer or compel. This is exactly wrong because it sends a signal to the local forces of change that America is on the side of the dictatorship. We may have to work with dictators on a tactical basis but we should never give up advocating freedom to make a local dictator comfortable (Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia are examples). People should know that America wants them to be free and advocates their freedom even if we may not be prepared to fight for it at this time.

G r o w i n g civil society should be a key long term strategy in virtually every country. ~~Our~~ model of constitutional liberty and freedom requires a vastly stronger civil society than exists in dictatorships. Growing such a civil society takes time and should be a consistent American strategy in every underdeveloped country and dictatorship. This requires tax breaks for those willing to help, new institutional developments and new programs.

—Patience as a strategic characteristic. Governor Ronald Reagan first called for the Berlin Wall to be torn down in 1967 and repeated that call as President in 1988 (“Mr. Gorbachev tear down this wall!”). The wall actually fell under President Bush in 1989. Reagan understood the power of advocating even that which he could not achieve immediately. We have to have a bold decisive vision of safety, health, prosperity and freedom for every human being and communicate that vision across the planet and then understand that this week's task will inherently be more limited but it should be designed to incrementally move us toward that vision.

P r e s i d e n t Chirac and his government are following a deliberate strategy of trying to undermine and defeat American initiatives and trying to create an alternative center of power to the United States. This reality has to be recognized and addressed by the United States for two very different reasons. First, the world must learn that to directly attack the United States and take positions and actions that increase the risk to American lives is

something which can be very expensive. It is very dangerous for the United States to allow countries to believe that the French strategy is cost free. Second, there is every reason to believe this is a long term French strategy which will effect NATO and the European Common Market and in which French diplomats are busily trying to embarrass the United States in the third World and the United Nations (as they did in knocking America out of the Human Rights Commission in 2001). There must be a well developed American strategy to overmatch the French and to grow a network of alliances in Europe and the Third World that renders France impotent in trying to become an alternative center of gravity. Designing and implementing this strategy is more important than our relations with Russia and China in the next two years. Without a countervailing strategy against the French there is grave danger they will become an effective counterweight and they will use that to effect our relations with Russia and China. Ironically we have no more determined competitor on the planet today than President Chirac.

MISCELLANEOUS

___ The United States should announce immediately that we have completed the job of defending Saudi Arabia which we began in 1990 and with the fall of the Iraqi dictatorship all American troops will be pulled out of the Kingdom. Since having infidels in the land of Mecca and Medina is a major problem for Muslims it will be healthier for Americans to leave Saudi Arabia as quickly as possible. This decision should be announced as rapidly as possible to ensure that it is seen as a reflection of strength in victory. If the decision is not announced promptly a terrorist incident or a movement among Saudis might make it seem the United States was being forced to withdraw. America will never be stronger and in a better position to reallocate forces to Kuwait, Iraq and the Gulf States and away from Saudi Arabia.

___ As a signal we have learned some lessons about who is effective we should add six to ten military attaches to the Embassy in countries where there is a dictatorship and/or support for terrorism.

___ Three National Guard construction battalions at a time should be rotated into Afghanistan on a regular basis to build roads throughout the country. This system has worked very effectively in Honduras and other Central American countries. The impact of three National Guard battalions

working throughout the paving season would be to rapidly develop the best road network Afghanistan has ever had. Suddenly average Afghans could see a tangible advantage from cooperating with America. The current fiasco in which after 14 months the Agency for International Development has not paved a single mile of road is a testament to the victory of red tape and bureaucracy over common sense—and the entrepreneurial spirit. The (President should cut through the bureaucratic baloney and impose a National Guard solution and the number of miles of paved road would be astounding within a few years and at a dramatically lower cost than AID could deliver,

GLOSSARY AND KEY ARGUMENTS

—Dictatorship should be used instead of ‘regime’ or ‘government’ when describing dictatorships. It automatically weakens them in the listener’s or reader’s mind.

___ Dictatorships that come to power by force and stay in power by prison, torture and murder should be morally open to replacement by force. Their legitimacy should constantly be undermined and denied. While sovereign they cannot be legitimate.

Freedom versus democracy. We are for freedom, we are not necessarily for democracy. The Founding Fathers all distrusted democracy because their reading of Greek and Roman history led them to believe democracies were unstable and led toward mob rule and dictatorship. They would have understood thoroughly the “one vote one time” pattern we have seen in many developing countries. That is why they developed a constitutional Republic with many checks and balances and an emphasis on the rule of law.

Freedom is a complicated system of constitutional liberties, the rule of law, independent judiciary, private property, free speech, limited government, the ability to fire those to whom you loan power through secret ballot elections, and a host of other characteristics. We want people to be free. We support constitutional systems that ensure and maintain freedom beyond the charisma or any one person or movement.

M o d e r n Islam. We favor Modern Islam and find it impossible to ultimately coexist with reactionary Islamists. We are in favor of a reinterpretation of the Sharia to exclude slavery and to include the rights of women. This is a nonnegotiable part of the kind of civilization America represents. This is inevitably a challenge to those Muslims committed to an unbending medieval interpretation of the Sharia but we will get much further by being clear and direct about this than by trying to twist our values into contortions so we can accommodate people whose views on the rights of women are utterly incompatible with our way of life (Saudi Arabia for example). This will require retraining of some in the Foreign Service who prefer accommodating foreign cultures to standing up for core American values. This also requires a tougher minded approach to things like the annual report on religious freedom (where Saudi Arabia fails totally).



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 29 2005

Mrs. Jane Wilson

(b)(6)

Dear Mrs. Wilson,

Joyce and I were so saddened to learn that our friend, Lou, had passed away. What a dear friend and outstanding patriot he was.

It was a great privilege for me to serve with him here in the Department of Defense so many years ago. I remember him, our relationship, and his service to our nation with fondness and great respect.

Please know that we are thinking of you during this difficult period.

With my deepest sympathies,

Sincerely,

OSD 12494-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50243

293

29
quart

~~FOUO~~

June 24, 2005

TO: Steve Bucci
CC: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: General Wilson's Funeral

Please let me know when General Wilson's funeral will be held. Also, let me know if his wife is still living. If so, I would like to dictate a note to her.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cable on General Wilson

DIR:rs
062405-1

Please respond by _____

SIR,

THE FUNERAL SERVICE INFORMATION WILL BE FORTHCOMING FROM STEVE BUCCI. IN THE MEANTIME, I DO HAVE A GOOD ADDRESS FOR MRS. JANE WILSON, IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO DICTATE A CONDOLENCE NOTE.



V/r.

(b)(6)

OSD 12494-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50244

293

24 Jun 05

29 June 05

FOUO

1.05/007830-ES

ES-3457

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 29 PM 12:55

June 7, 2005

TO: Peter Rodman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: F-16s for Pakistan

I want you to put a push on the F-16s for Pakistan, and I would like a weekly report on Where the impediments are.

Thanks.

DRR:m
060703-5 (TS)

.....
Please respond by _____

Pakistan

7 Jun 05

OSD 12550-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50245

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

205 JUN 29 PM 1:15

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Command Relationships for Afghanistan

We need to talk about the command relationships for Afghanistan. The Secretary General of NATO raised it with me, and I have not heard from you or Dick on the subject.

Thanks.

DDO
04220-01 (10)

Please respond by 6/16/05

AFGHANISTAN

OSD 12554-05

Tab A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50246

2 pages

June 16, 2005

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Send my Speech to Birgit Smith

Let's send Birgit, Paul R. Smith's widow, my speech to the **Army's 230th** birthday.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
061605-14

.....
Please respond by

6/23/05

350 001 517

Bir,
I've attached Mrs Paul
SMITH'S ADDRESS. CAN WE
SEND IT JUST LIKE THIS?
SD did not indicate he
wanted to send a note. *Thnx*
(b)(6)

*mailed thru UCB, 6/30.
no letter w/ speech. ~~FOUO~~*

OSD 12767-05

J3
61125-0559/OSD/50247

16 June 05

~~FOUO~~

JUL 01 2005

TO: MG Stan McChrystal

CC: Gen Dick Myers
GEN John Abizaid

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Your attendance at the NSC Meeting

Thanks for coming in for today's National Security Council meeting on such short notice. Your presentation was a tremendous help to the President and the NSC in understanding the complexities and challenges of your important assignment.

Keep up the great work!

DHR:ss
062905-07

You did a superb job! -

OSD 12785-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50248

334 NSC

1 JUL 05

~~FOUO~~

July 01, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Response to *America Supports You* Remarks

Mr. President,

Attached is some information that shows you the enormous effect your speech of June 28 had on the *America Supports You* effort. As you can see, they are experiencing a very positive response to your remarks. Thank you for mentioning the organization.

335SD

Have a terrific 4th of July.

Respectfully,

Attach Allison Barber Memo to SecDef re: *America Supports You* activity

DHR:ss
070105-13

10 Jul 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12794-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50249

To: Secretary Rumsfeld
From: Allison Barber
Date: 7/1/2005
Re: Update on America Supports You Statistics

Pre-Speech Activity	Post-Speech Activity
Average of 500 messages sent to the troops per day	14,551 messages sent to the troops day after speech
Average of 2,766 people visiting the site per day	40,715 people visiting the site the day after the speech

Some representative comments from other organizations that are linked to website:

A Soldier's Wish List Organization

"THANKYOU, THANK YOU, THANK YOU. Since the speech the other night by our Great President. I've been on the computer since 6am yesterday and again to day. With donations and wanting to "adopt" soldiers and get involved and even wanting to start their own organization. It has been great. And so needed."

Letters From Home Organization

"We went from 100 hits per day to 500 hits in the last couple days. And the emails have increased dramatically. Thanks very much."

Children of Fallen Soldiers Relief Fund Organization

"Our website had an increase in hits after and because of the President's speech we received over 300 hits and received online 6 donations from individuals."

U.S. Troop Care Packaae Organization

"Five minutes after the President's speech we began receiving numerous E-Mail's and phone calls from all across the country from Florida, New York, California, to Washington State where we are located. We are very grateful to the Commander in Chief of this great nation not only for mentioning the America Supports You program, but for his leadership on the war on terror."

NESA-NG

~~FOUO~~

June 27, 2005

TO: Peter Rodman

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iran's Election

1844

Please let me know how many million people voted in the Iranian election; the population of Iran; and the number of eligible voters in that country.

Thanks.

DHR:as
062705-22

Please Respond By June 29, 2005

Is there any indication it's a rigged election?

27 JUN 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12808-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50251

JUN 30 2005

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1-05/008853

ES-3616

2005 JUL -1 PM 3: 73

USDP

Copy Provided
6-30-05

18AM

MEMORANDUM FOR **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

From: Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman (IS) *PR* 30 JUN 2005

Subject: Iranian Election Questions

- You asked how many millions of people voted in the Iranian election; the population of Iran; and the number of eligible voters in that country. Here is what we know:
- First round election results, 17 June 05:
 - According to Iranian Ministry of Information figures, 29.3 million voters participated out of 48 million eligible voters (61% official turnout).
- Election run-off results, 24 June 05:
 - According to Iranian Ministry of Information figures, 27.9 million voters participated out of 48 million eligible voters (56% official turnout).
- The population of Iran is 68 million.
- There have been press reports of wide-spread voter fraud and irregularities including:
 - Individuals voting with fraudulent credentials, voting inspectors beaten up and officials arrested, a Rafsanjani representative stabbed, and some women refused the right to vote based on dress.

30 JUN 05

Acting Principal Director *D. H. [Signature]* NEA

PDASD (ISA) *[Signature]*

OSD 12808-05

27 JUN 05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50252

30-06-05 11:45 AM

~~FOUO~~

JUN 21 2005

TO: Mike Donley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Personal Security Details and Car/Driver

380.01

Please take a fresh look at *this* list of people who receive Personal Security Details and Car/Driver support. It seems too generous to *me*. I have put question marks next to ones that should be carefully reviewed.

Thanks.

Attach: 12-14-04 DIR A&M Memo to SecDef

DHRL:s
062005-19

.....

Please Respond By 06/30/05

21 Jun 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12812-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50253

INFO MEMO

2/24/05

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 12/14/04

SUBJECT: Personal Security Details (PSDs)

In response to your snowflake of 6 December, Subject: "Vehicles and Security," I submit the following:

- Attached listing of all DoD officials, civilian and military, was forwarded to Peter Sobich, Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Cabinet Secretary, on 17 November 2004. Sobich had requested that each Department provide the White House a list of all officials who are assigned a PSD.
- Six DoD Civilian officials and 21 Military officials are assigned 24/7 PSD here and abroad.
- The following civilian officials, (five Under Secretaries of Defense) have dedicated cars and drivers and are eligible for home to office transportation, but do not have a PSD assigned Mike Wynne, Doug Feith, Tina Jonas, David Chu and Steve Cambone.

?

RECOMMENDATION None

Attachments:

DoD Inventory of Personal Security Details, November 2004

T 6/1

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NOVEMBER 2004
Inventory of Personal Security Details

Department of Defense

Donald H. Rumsfeld	Secretary of Defense	(b)(6)	PAS Level I	Army CID	FTT	CONUS/OCONUS
Paul D. Wolfowitz	Deputy Secretary of Defense		PAS Level II	Army CID	FTT	CONUS/OCONUS

GEN Richard Meyers	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	(b)(6)	General, USAF	Army CID	FTT	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Peter Pace	Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff		General, USMC	Army CID	FTT	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN James L. Jones	CDR, EUCOM		General, USMC	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Charles Wald	Deputy CDR, EUCOM		General, USAF	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
ADM E. P. Giambastiani	CDR, JPCOM		Admiral, USN	USA MP/ USAF SP	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN James E. Cartwright	CDR, STRATCOM		General, USMC	USAF SP	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOVEMBER 2004

Inventory of Personal Security Details

ADM Timothy Keating	CDR, NORTHCOM	(b)(6)	Admiral, USN	AFOSI	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Leon J. LaPorte	CDR/CFC USFK		General, USA	Army MP	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
ADM Thomas Fargo	CDR, PACOM		Admiral, USN	Navy NCIS	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN John Handy	CDR, TRANSCOM (also USAF Air Mobility Command Commander)		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ /all OCONUS
GEN Bantz J. Craddock	CDR, SOUTHCOM		General, USA	Army	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Bryan Brown	CDR, SOCOM		General, USA	SOCOM PSD	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
VADM Lowell E. Jacoby	Dir, DIA		Vice Admiral,	DIA (Federal Law Enforcement Officers)	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN John Abizaid	CENTCOM CDR		General, USA	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
LT GEN Lance Smith	CENTCOM DCDR					IUS based; NTIC DET
VADM David Nichols Jr.	5 th Fleet/ NAVCENT CDR		Lieutenant General, USAF Vice Admiral, USN	USCENTCOM NCIS	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
			Lieutenant General, USA	CFC-A	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LT GEN Walter Buchanan III	9 th AF/ CENTAF CDR		Lieutenant General, USAF	CENTAF	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD

¹ Provides personal security detail as necessary in CONUS.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NOVEMBER 2004

Inventory of Personal Security Details

LTG Steve Whitcomb	3 RD ARMY/ ARCENT CDR	(b)(6)	Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LTG Thomas Metz	MNC-I CDR		Lieutenant General, USA	MNC-I (PSU)	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
MG Eric Olsen	CTJF-180 CDR		Major General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
MG Gary Harrell	SOCENT CDR		Major General, USA	SOCENT	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
Maj Gen Samuel Helland	CJTF-HOA CDR		Major General, USMC	CTJF-HOA	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD

Department of Army

FRAN AMESLEY Gen Brownlee (dtd 19 Nov 04)	Acting Secretary of the Army	(b)(6)	PAS Level IV	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Peter J. Schoomaker	Chief of Staff of the Army		General, USA	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Richard A. Cody	Vice Chief of Staff of the Army		General, USA	Army CID	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN B. B. Bell	USAREUR		General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	FTT	CONUS/OCONUS
LTG Tim Kinnan	NATO U.S. Rep.		Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military police	FTT	CONUS/OCONUS
LTG David McKiernan	CG CFLCC		Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	FTT	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD

?

11-L-0559/OSD/50257

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NOVEMBER 2004

Inventory of Personal Security Details

MG Gary Speaks	DCG CFLCC	(b)(6)	Major General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LTG Ricardo Sanchez	V Corps CDR		Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LTG Thomas F. Metz	III Corps CDR		Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
LTG David Barno	CG, CFC-A		Lieutenant General, USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
BG(P) Lloyd Austin	CG, CJTF-180		Brigadier General(P), USA	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD
Maj Gen Craig P. Weston	C, OMC-A		Major General, USAF	Army CID/ Military Police	F/T	OCONUS based; no CONUS PSD

Department of Navy

HON Gordon England	Secretary of the Navy	(b)(6)	PAS Level II	NCIS	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
ADM Vernon Clark, USN	Chief of Naval Operations		Admiral, USN	NCIS	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
GEN Michael Hagee, USMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps		General, USMC	NCIS	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50258

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NOVEMBER 2004

Inventory of Personal Security Details

ADM Michael G. Mullen	COMUSNAVEUR (Italy)	(b)(6)	Admiral, USN	NCIS	F/T
VADM Harry Ulrich	CDR, US Sixth Fleet		Vice Admiral, USN	NCIS	F/T
ADM Walter Doran	CDR, USPACFLT		Admiral, USN	NCIS	F/T
VADM Jonathan Greenert	CDR, US Seventh Fleet		Vice Admiral, USN	NCIS	F/T
BGEN Larry New, USAF	Deputy Commander, Combined Air Operations Center 7		Brigadier General, USAF	NCIS	F/T

Department of Air Force

Dr. James D. Roche	Secretary of the Air Force	(b)(6)	PAS Level II	AFOSI	F/T
Peter B. Teets	Under Secretary of the Air Force		PAS Level IV	AFOSI	F/T
GEN John P. Jumper	Chief of Staff of the Air Force		General, USAF	AFOSI	F/T
GEN T. Michael Moseley	Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50259

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NOVEMBER 2004

Inventory of Personal Security Details

?	GEN Robert Foglesong	US Air Forces in Europe Commander	(b)(6)	General, USAF	AFOSI	F/T	CONUS/OCONUS
?	GEN Hal M. Hornburg	Air Combat Command Commander		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ ; All OCONUS
?	GEN Donald G. Cook	Air Education and Training Command Commander		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ ; All OCONUS
?	GEN Gregory S. Martin	Air Force Material Command Commander		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ ; All OCONUS
?	GEN Lance W. Lord	Air Force Space Command Commander		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ ; All OCONUS
?	GEN Paul V. Hester	Pacific Air Forces Commander		General, USAF	AFOSI	P/T	Some CONUS ¹ ; All OCONUS

We are seeking an inventory of both political and career agency officials possessing full-time, part-time or conditional (i.e. foreign travel only, etc.) personal security details. In each case, we would like to know which organizations are providing security services (USSS, etc.).

Please return completed form(s) to Peter Sobich at the Office of Cabinet Affairs (psobich@who.eop.gov) by COB Monday November 15.

¹ Provides personal security detail as necessary in CONUS.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50260



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUL -1 PM 4: 54
01 JUL 2005

INFORMATIONMEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director Administration and Management *MD*

SUBJECT Personal Security Details and Car/Driver Assignments

- In the attached snowflake, you asked that I take a fresh look at the list of people who receive Personal Security Details (PSD) and Car/Driver support.
- To accomplish this review I have asked the Military Departments and the Director of the Joint Staff to provide baseline information describing the extent of PSD assignments, with details about who is currently receiving protective services and under what condition such services are being provided.
- I intend to review these submissions to determine what common tenets support the Department's assignment practices for PSDs.
- I will report the findings and my opinions on these practices, highlighting any deviations from these common tenets. My report will include recommendations. It may be appropriate as a result of this review to produce Department-wide standards to guide these assignments.
- I am separately looking at the car and driver support provided to the Under Secretaries of Defense. I'll look at the provision of these resources to the Under Secretaries from the context of security of high risk personnel, economy, efficiency and effectiveness. I will develop a distinct recommendation for this aspect of your snowflake.
- I will report my findings to you by 1 August.

380.01

1 quos

Prepared by: Stephen J. Linder, O&MP, ODA&M (b)(6)

OSD 12812-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50261

21 quos

~~FOUO~~

JUL 01 2005

TO: Vice President Richard B Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jerry Jones

2004 WH

Mr. ~~Vice~~ President,

Attached is a background sheet on Jerry Jones. The White House personnel shop is completely broken, in my view. I think Jerry could do the job for the President. At a minimum, he could put some structure into it as Deputy, but something needs to be done.

Thanks.

Attach Background Sheet on Jerry Jones

DHR:as
063005-05

19405

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12826-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50262

Jerry H Jones

Mr. Jones has had significant Executive Branch experience, having served in key positions in the Nixon and Ford Administration. He has served in major positions in three presidential campaigns.

Mr. Jones graduated from Harvard College with an A.B. in History and from Harvard Business School with an MBA. Upon receiving his MBA, Mr. Jones joined McKinsey and Company, Inc., a worldwide management consulting firm and worked to solve challenging problems for multinational companies in the U.S. and abroad. In 1967, Mr. Jones founded his own firm to pursue acquisitions of small manufacturing companies on a leveraged buyout basis.

In 1971, he joined the Nixon Administration and served as Staff Assistant to the President, Special Assistant to the President in charge of the White House Personnel Office, and Staff Secretary to the President. From April to November 1972, Mr. Jones served at the Committee to Reelect the President, where his chief responsibility was to organize and direct the Political Division, which was responsible for conducting the Nixon campaign in each of the 50 states.

Mr. Jones subsequently served President Ford as Staff Secretary and then as Deputy Assistant, with responsibility for planning and implementing the President's day-to-day schedule and campaign activities.

In 1977, Mr. Jones returned to his family business in Texas. He organized and directed a major agribusiness (cotton seed crushing) and an oil and gas exploration company. He also developed and served as general partner of an office complex in Midland, Texas.

In 1988, Mr. Jones returned to the New York area and worked on special projects for several small companies. He served as President of a troubled company and directed a turnaround effort that resulted in a profitable liquidation. He also served as organizer and director of a successful landfill gas-to-energy power plant and as a Chairman and CEO of a company that undertook an effort to develop the largest proposed plant in the U.S. to compost municipal solid waste. His experience also includes President and CEO of a company that developed and manufactured systems to purify industrial waste water for reuse.

In June 1996, Mr. Jones joined the Dole for President Campaign, with responsibility for organizing and directing the policy group and, as such, served as a deputy to the Campaign Chairman. Subsequently, he served as President of three Washington area public policy consulting firms, Global USA, Inc. 1997-2000, GANTABS, Inc. 2000-2003 (Co-founder) and JH Jones & Associates, LLC 2003-present (Founder).

He has served as a member of the board of trustees of an Episcopal school, on the vestry of his church, on the board of directors of a major teaching hospital, and on several boards appointed by the Governor of Texas to study various agriculturally-related problems.

Mr. Jones is a member of the University of Virginia's Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), with a special focus on issues related to bioterrorism and defense.

June 13, 1939	Born in Lamesa, TX
1961	Graduated cum laude, Harvard College
1964	MBA, Harvard Graduate School of Business
1964-67	Management Consultant, McKinsey & Company, New York, NY
1967-70	President, Jones Simonds, Inc., New York, NY
1968-70	President, Symcon, Inc., McHenry, IL
1971	Staff Member, White House Personnel Office
1972	Staff Member, Field Division of the Committee to Re-Elect the President

November 1972	Staff Assistant, White House Personnel Office
1973	Director, White House Personnel Office
April 1974	White House Staff Secretary
June 1975	Special Assistant to the President; Director, Scheduling and Advance Office
September 1976	Deputy Assistant to the President
(1989)	President, Alta Acquisition Corporation, New York, NY
1996	Deputy to the Campaign Chairman, Dole for President
1997-2000	President, Global USA, Inc. (public policy)
2000-2003	Former President, CANTABS, Inc (public policy)
2003-present	Co-founder, JH Jones & Associates, LLC (public policy)
Current	Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
Current	Member, University of Virginia's Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG)

~~FOUO~~

JUL 01 2005

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kip Ward

Condi,

We will try to work out the late October date for General Kip Ward.

My understanding from our conversation is you are not looking for a replacement.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
062905-11

210 Army (344)

1 Jul 05

OSD 12827-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50265

UNCLASSIFIED
BUT SENSITIVE

July 01, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Request to Secretary Rice

I sent your request over to Condi. Attached is her response.

Thanks.

Attach 6/30/05 SecState Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
070105-01

DMG

1 Jul 05


UNCLASSIFIED
BUT SENSITIVE
11-L-0559/OSD/50266

OSD 12828-05

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

JUN 30 2005

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Condoleezza Rice 
SUBJECT: RE: Request from General Abizaid

Don,

Thanks for forwarding John Abizaid's request. We will make the request of the Iraqi government.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-0559/OSD/50267

HOLD



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

2005 JUL -5 AM 9:06



July 1, 2005, 5:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu
1 July 2005

SUBJECT: Defense/State/Education National Foreign Language Initiative

• Goals:

1. Interest school boards and universities in foreign language programs and provide resources to assist them;
2. Incentivize students to study languages;
3. Increase the number of foreign language teachers;
4. Provide employment opportunities for those who study language.

• Immediate action in Fiscal Year 2006, using our existing National Security Education Program.

1. This program currently provides grants to eight universities to help establish programs in the languages of interest to DoD, and it provides fellowships and scholarships to students to study these languages, in return for national service.
2. Through one of these universities, we are also conducting a pilot language program to create a pipeline that teaches Chinese beginning in kindergarten and advancing through college.

• The National Security Education Program can expand these initiatives by:

- Adding five new university programs (in Farsi, Hindi, and central Asian languages).
- Adding two new pilot pipeline programs.
- Enhancing our current university programs in Arabic, Chinese and Korean and our immersion programs in Egypt, Syria, China and Korea.

• The added annual program cost to DoD would be \$9M. This would produce 2000 graduates with high levels of proficiency in Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Russian, Persian, Hindi, and central Asian languages by Fiscal Year 2009. If you approve, I will work with the Comptroller to secure funds beginning in Fiscal Year 2006.



11-L-0559/OSD/50268

05D 12829-05

091.4

1 Jul 05

- The Department of Education will need to make the greatest financial investment in Fiscal Year 2007, but has limited ability to undertake new initiatives in Fiscal Year 2006.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve FY 2006 start

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (Plans) (b)(6)



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MILITARY SUPPORT REQUEST DISPATCH FORM



TO: C&D

DATE: 7/5

FOR: 1

- A MES MUBIN: THIS WILL

FROM: 1

- C PERM. A COORDINATION

SUBJECT: 1

- PAGE THAT INCLUDES

• Goal

- OGL & COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW

- IT CAN BE FORWARDED.

1

CHECK

IF,

IS and

2

LIE JOHN FENDEL

file.

3

(b)(6)

the

4

--- - Copy back to me.

• Imm
Prog

y Education

COMMENTS.

PLS RETURN TO ACTION

1. 1

FOR COORDINATION.

6

FENDEL

establish
tips and
service.

2. 1

Military Assistant

usage
garten and

1

Attachment:
As stated

• The National Security Education Program can expand these initiatives by:

- Adding five new university programs (in Farsi, Hindi, and central Asian languages).
- Adding two new pilot pipeline programs.
- Enhancing our current university programs in Arabic, Chinese and Korean and our immersion programs in Egypt, Syria, China and Korea.

• The added annual program cost to DoD would be \$9M. This would produce 2000 graduates with high levels of proficiency in Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Russian, Persian, Hindi, and central Asian languages by Fiscal Year 2009. If you approve, I will work with the Comptroller to secure funds beginning in Fiscal Year 2006.

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC			
ESR MA	7/5	1200	



11-L-0559/OSD/50270

OSD 12829-05

COORDINATION PAGE

OSD, General Counsel

OSD, Comptroller

4/22 7/25

NSEP / #921

Robert J. Henke

- The Department of Education will need to make the greatest financial investment in Fiscal Year 2007, but **has** limited ability to undertake new initiatives in Fiscal Year 2006.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve FY 2006 **start**


SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____

COORDINATION:

 7/27/00
P D G C (b)(6)

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (Plans), (b)(6)



~~FOUO~~

AUG 18 2005

TO: Robert Rangel
CC: Steve Bucci
Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT ~~Meeting~~ re: Foreign Language Initiative

Please set a meeting with me, David Chu, Steve Cambone, Gordon England and Eric Edelman to discuss the attached memo from David Chu.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/1/05 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Defense/State/Education National Foreign Language Initiative
[OSD 12829-05]

DHR:dh
081705-2278.doc

.....
Please respond by September 22, 2005

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12829-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50273

0914

18 AUG 05

17 JUL 05



PERSONNEL AND
REACHNESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



2005 JUL -5 AM 9:08

ACTION MEMO

July 1, 2005, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu
1 July 2005

SUBJECT: Defense/State/Education National Foreign Language Initiative

• Goals:

1. Interest school boards and universities in foreign language programs and provide resources to assist them;
2. Incentivize students to study languages;
3. Increase the number of foreign language teachers;
4. Provide employment opportunities for those who study language.

• Immediate action in Fiscal Year 2006, using our existing National Security Education Program.

1. This program currently provides grants to eight universities to help establish programs in the languages of interest to DoD, and it provides fellowships and scholarships to students to study these languages, in return for national service.
2. Through one of these universities, we are also conducting a pilot language program to create a pipeline that teaches Chinese beginning in kindergarten and advancing through college.

• The National Security Education Program can expand these initiatives by:

- Adding five new university programs (in Farsi, Hindi, and central Asian languages).
- Adding two new pilot pipeline programs.
- Enhancing our current university programs in Arabic, Chinese and Korean and our immersion programs in Egypt, Syria, China and Korea.

- The added annual program cost to DoD would be \$9M. This would produce 2000 graduates with high levels of proficiency in Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Russian, Persian, Hindi, and central Asian languages by Fiscal Year 2009. If you approve, I will work with the Comptroller to secure funds beginning in Fiscal Year 2006.

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD		SA DSD	
DEC REC	REV EDC N/17	7-28-05	
ESS MA	F715	12/10	21/11/05

SAB 7/25



OSD 12829-05

A-45-2

- The Department of Education will need to make the greatest financial investment in Fiscal Year 2007, but has limited ability to undertake new initiatives in Fiscal Year 2006.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve FY 2006 start

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____

COORDINATION: None Attached (DLE & COMPTROLLER)

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (Plans), (b)(6)

45-3

- The Department of Education will need to make the greatest financial investment in Fiscal Year 2007, but has limited ability to undertake new initiatives in Fiscal Year 2006.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve FY 2006 start

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____

COORDINATION: ~~None~~

[Signature] 7/27/06
FDG C (b)(6)

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (Plans), (b)(6)

45-4

COORDINATION PAGE

OSD, General Counsel

OSD, Comptroller

422 7/25

NSEP/921

Robert J. Henke

45-5

FOUO

- McQuinn

May 18, 2005

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rating System for Language Study

When people study languages, do we use a rating system as they reach certain levels, like the Department of State does?

Thanks.

DHR:as
051705-14

.....
Please respond by 6/2/05

09/1/4

18 May 05

FOUO

OSD 12830-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50278



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

JULY 1, 2005, 5:00 PM



FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)
SUBJECT: Rating System for Language Study — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- You asked "When people study languages, do we use a rating system as they reach certain levels, like the Department of State does"?
- We use the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) skill level scale--cooperatively developed and used by all U.S. Government agencies.
- The system measures 6 levels of proficiency (0-6) in listening, reading, speaking, and writing:
 - 0 no proficiency
 - 1 elementary proficiency
 - 2 limited working proficiency
 - 3 general professional proficiency
 - 4 advanced proficiency
 - 5 functionally native proficiency
- In the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, the Department is increasing the proficiency levels of language professionals from 2/2/2 to 3/3/3 (listening, reading, and speaking).
 - General Hayden requested this change to meet increased demands, e.g. translating cell phone conversations.
- With PBD 753, you have already provided an additional \$362M to the Defense Language Institute across FY06-11 to revise curriculum, reduce class sizes, etc., to get students to this higher level of proficiency in the GWOT languages.

RECOMMENDATION: None

cc: General Dick Myers

Prepared by: Susan S. Kelly, (b)(6)

MA SD		SMA DSD	
TSA SD	7/6	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	7/5		1545
ESR MA	7/5		1205

11-L-0559/OSD/50279

OSD 12830-05

1091.4

(150105)

18 May 05

R2 →
Robert Rangel
7/7

FOUO

JUN 29 2005

TO: Jim OBeirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dr. Mario Fiori

Have you taken a look at Dr. Mario Fiori?

Please do so and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach 6/27/05 Rooney letter to SecDef

DHR:es
062805-11

SD briefed on response 7/1
RL
Robert Rangel 7/1

020 Navy

.....
Please Respond By July 12, 2005

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Jim O'Beirne
SUBJECT: Dr. Mario Fiori

The President authorized the removal for cause of Dr. Mario Fiori from the PAS position of Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment on October 16, 2003, which action had been requested by then Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee with your concurrence. See attached. Brownlee subsequently relieved Fiori with a departure date in early December 2003, subsequently extended to January 10, 2004.

After the 2004 election, Fiori made contact with DOD-WHLO seeking to be reappointed to the Department. I told him that the circumstances of his departure a year earlier made such a possibility extremely unlikely. He has steadfastly disregarded this assessment and continues to call from this from time to time. Since Gordon England's nomination for the Deputy Secretary position, Fiori has increased his efforts and contacts with the goal to be appointed Secretary of the Navy.

I strongly advise against any consideration of him for this post. It would certainly never be approved at the White House. With your permission, I will be more persuasive in my future contact with him to bring this issue to a close once and for all.

29 Jun 05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/50280

OSD 12831-05

CASSIDY & ASSOCIATES

700 THIRTEENTH STREET, N.W., SUITE 400

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-5917

Tel. (202) 347-0773

Fax. (202) 347-0785

www.cassidy.com

June 27, 2005

Department of Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20230

Dear Mr. ~~Secretary~~, 


I ~~am~~ writing to offer my recommendation of Dr. Mario Fiori for consideration as your next Secretary of the Navy.

Dr. Fiori has a wealth of Navy background, more importantly he has been much involved in Department of Defense matters during his naval and government civilian careers. Specifically, he served as liaison between DOD and Federal Energy Administration, senior assistant to Dr. George Keyworth, President Reagan's Science Advisor, Admiral Watkin's liaison with a regulatory board when Watkin's ~~was~~ Secretary of Energy, manager of Savannah River Site (a nuclear weapons facility) and finally served exceptionally well as Assistant Secretary of the Army where he was instrumental in transforming the way the Army did housing and operated their garrisons. In every one of these positions he dealt with senior executive branch and congressional leaders and has developed the skill to get the job done, while working within a large and difficult bureaucracy.

Dr. Fiori is a solid Republican, exceptionally loyal to the Administration and to the goals of your defense policies. He is a strong advocate of transformation and developed much of the **BRAC** program for the Army.

Dr. Fiori has been confirmed and should easily be confirmed again. His resume is impressive. I certainly believe that he would ably serve as Secretary of the Navy and I strongly recommend that you interview him, to convince yourself.

Best Regards,



Fredrick B. Rooney
United States Congress, retired

11-L-0559/OSD/50281

~~FOUO~~

JUN 29 2005

020 Navy

TO: Jim OBeirne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Dr. Mario Fiori

SD briefed on response 7/1

Robert Rangel 7/1

Have you taken a look at Dr. Mario Fiori?

Please do so and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach 6/27/05 Rooney letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
062805-11

.....
Please Respond By July 12, 2005

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Jim O'Beirne

SUBJECT: Dr. Mario Fiori

1 J1 05

The President authorized the removal for cause of Dr. Mario Fiori from the PAS position of Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment on October 16, 2003, which action had been requested by then Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee with your concurrence. See attached. Brownlee subsequently relieved Fiori with a departure date in early December 2003, subsequently extended to January 10, 2004.

After the 2004 election, Fiori made contact with DOD-WHLO seeking to be reappointed to the Department. I told him that the circumstances of his departure a year earlier made such a possibility extremely unlikely. He has steadfastly disregarded this assessment and continues to call ~~from~~ this from time to time. Since Gordon England's nomination for the Deputy Secretary position, Fiori has increased his efforts and contacts with the goal to be appointed Secretary of the Navy.

I strongly advise against any consideration of him *for* this post. It would certainly never be approved at the White House. With your permission, I will be more persuasive in my future contact with him to bring this issue to a close once and for all.

29 Jun 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50282

OSD 12831-05

**JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REMOVAL OF
DR. MARIO FIORI,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (ASA)
FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT (I&E)**

Mario Fiori has consistently demonstrated a lack of situational awareness that has made collaboration within his own organization and with other agencies both in and outside the Department exceedingly difficult. He has failed to adjust to the reality that in order to achieve continued success in the area of installation management, one must be willing to engage the concerns and reservations of other parties with equities in the discussion in a manner that inspires confidence and cooperation.

This lack of sensitivity has been especially troublesome in dealing with members and staffs of the legislative branch and with members of communities affected by DOD policies. The controversy between the community of Anniston, Alabama and the Department of Defense that erupted regarding the destruction of chemical weapons stocks at Fort McClellan is also illustrative of this managerial deficit.

The appropriate DOD official with oversight responsibility in the area of installations and environment rates Fiori as the weakest of the three military department officials with similar responsibilities and reports that he is required to spend an inordinate amount of supervisory time and attention on oversight of Fiori's work. In addition, with the realignment of the Army's logistics function into the portfolio of the ASA-I&E, it has been determined that Fiori does not have the necessary experience to absorb the new supervisory burden.

For the reasons set forth above, the Secretary of Defense has requested permission to remove Mario Fiori from his appointed position immediately.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SECRET

1 Jul 05

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2005 JUN -5 PM 2:57
CHAIRMAN, JCS CY FOR

FROM: PRESIDENT, NDU

Subject: National Security Education Program (NSEP) Board Meeting – 14 Jun 05

- Sirs, as you may know, I serve as an ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the NSEP [NDU oversees this program.] The NSEP Board is separate from the NDU Board of Visitors. Its members (atch 1) include seven statutory federal members and six members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate

- As a reminder, NSEP is a language program which has become an integral part of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. NSEP has three sub-parts:

1. NSEP Scholarships and Fellowships -- it gives grants to undergraduate and graduate students to study abroad in a foreign language which is important to national security. Coupled with the grant is a service obligation of one year for every year abroad. An integral part of NSEP's mission is to help these young people find positions in DOD or the intelligence community upon graduation.

2. A new NSEP program is the National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI). The NFLI mission is to produce language experts with professional proficiency in critical foreign languages such as Arabic, Chinese, etc. As with part 1 – those who receive a fellowship have a service commitment.

3. Also new is English for US heritage populations. This part seeks native speakers in languages needed in the national security community, whose English skills are not up to par and provides them with education to improve their English. As with parts 1 and 2 – those who receive a fellowship have a service commitment.

- Funding for NSEP is \$16M – half from a trust fund and half through the Intelligence Community Management Account.

- The Board met on 14 Jun 05. A brief summary of discussions is at atch 2.

- Some issues identified by the Board:

1. Placement of scholars is still challenging. We heard vignettes from four people (atch 3) on the challenges they faced in finding positions. The good news is NDU has been marketing the program and we have significantly increased the number of scholars who

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50284

OSD 12894-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

find positions in DOD. I have sent letters to some (non-DOD) organizations where we are having the most problems. [Many of them relate to the security clearance process.]

2. We need to increase the number of Farsi (Persian) scholars. Presently we do not permit students to go to Iran. But both Bahrain and UAE have reputable programs in Farsi and we will tap into them. We are also working closely with major US universities to encourage them to teach Farsi in the US, to create student interest and to increase the number of applicants.

3. NSEP attracts too few minorities. Here we need to market the program with minority colleges. My Senior VP and former US Ambassador to Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Uganda will make contact with key minority colleges to encourage more applicants.

- In sum, this is a great program that is making a difference for DOD and the nation. An example of where some of these young people are serving is in atch 4 [recommend you scan this briefly]

Very Respectfully,

CF: USDP&R, USDP, DJS, DJ7

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

2

11-L-0559/OSD/50285

1

National Security Education Board
Current Board Members

Michael M. **Dunn**, Lt Gen, US Air Force
Chairman
President
National Defense University
Washington, DC
[Secretary of Defense Designee]

Dr. James **W.** Carr
Executive Vice President
Harding University
[Presidential Appointee]
carr@harding.edu

Dr. Bruce Cole
Chairman
National Endowment for the Humanities
Washington, DC
bcol@neh.gov

Mr. Arthur James Collingsworth
San Francisco, California
[Presidential Appointee]
ajcollingsworth@es.com

Dr. George Dennison
President
The University of Montana
[Presidential Appointee]
maryellen.ardouny@mso.umt.edu

Dr. Mark Falcoff
Resident Scholar
American Enterprise Institute
[Presidential Appointee]
MarkFalcoff@aol.com

Mr. Andrew McKenna*
Chairman and CEO
Schwarz Paper Company

Ms. JoAnne Phipps
Director, Office of International Operations
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of Energy
Joanne.Phipps@hq.doe.gov

Mr. Timothy J. Hauser
Deputy Under Secretary for International Trade
International Trade Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce
Timothy-Hauser@ita.doc.gov

Mr. William Nolte
Deputy Assistant Director of Central Intelligence,
Analysis and Production
Washington, DC
[DCI Representative]
williamn@odci.gov

Ambassador Katherine Peterson
Director
Foreign Service Institute
U.S. Department of State
FisherMA@state.gov

Dr. Kiron Skinner
Assistant Professor, Carnegie Mellon University
and Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University
[Presidential Appointee]
skinner@hoover.stanford.edu

Honorable Sally Stroup
Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education
Office of Postsecondary Education
U.S. Department of Education
sally.stroup@ed.gov

*Nominated, awaiting confirmation

Board Executive Director:

Dr. Robert **O.** Slater
Director, National Security Education Program

2

National Security Education Program (NSEP)

Report to National Security Education Board May 2005

This report is provided to members of the National Security Education Board for their review in advance of the June 14, 2005 meeting. It updates issues involving NSEP since fall 2004, serves as a resource for discussions that will take place at the meeting later this month, and provides specific recommendations to be considered at the meeting.

Background

We have witnessed, during the past nine to twelve months, significant advances in the development and implementation of a comprehensive federal language agenda. These advances are in recognition that U.S. national security depends upon our capacity to become more proficient in foreign languages and to better understand and respect the diverse cultures of the world. NSEP has been a major contributor to the important dialogue that has taken place and has become more of a focal point for efforts to establish effective partnerships between the federal sector and higher education:

- Congress, in the fiscal year 2005 Intelligence Authorization Act included strong endorsement of NSEP and dramatically increased funding to implement the National Flagship Language Initiative and a new program in English language for U.S. heritage populations. Numerous additional legislative actions regarding language issues reference NSEP or propose increases in mission and funding.
- The Department of Defense (DoD) Language Transformation Plan released by the Department in February 2005 provides an aggressive and comprehensive plan for languages, including significant roles for NSEP.
- Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) in an April 2005 Report to Congress stated that ***“our vision is that NSEPs role in Defense Language Transformation will be to serve as the premier scholarship and fellowship source and model for U.S. students to pursue rigorous and in-depth culture and language study to meet national needs.”***
- The NSEP proposed Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps has been increasingly recognized as a necessary and vital component of a long-term plan to identify and mobilize, when necessary, language resources in the U.S. population.

As we move ahead through the coming months, NSEP faces a number of important challenges. The response to these challenges will play a significant role in the structure and funding of a robust program in the years to come. This report summarizes these important challenges:

1. NSEP in the Department of Defense
2. NSEP Funding
3. NSEP Boren Scholars and Fellows
4. Successful placement of NSEP Scholars and Fellows
 - a. Clarifying and expanding the definition of NSEP federal service
 - b. Obstacles to hiring in DoD and intelligence communities
 - c. Internships and placement in DoD and the intelligence community.
5. National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI)
6. English Language for U.S. Heritage Populations
7. Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps

NSEP in the Department of Defense

Since its establishment in 1992, NSEP has not always enjoyed strong support from within the Department of Defense. The early years of the program were characterized by uncertain support from within the Department and repeated DoD and Congressional efforts to eliminate funding for the program. The major result of these controversial years was Congressional action that resulted in a more than fifty percent reduction of the National Security Education Trust Fund, from \$150 to \$68 million.

Responsibility for NSEP within DoD resided with the Under Secretary (Policy) from 1993-1998. The relationship between NSEP and OSD Policy was characterized by ambivalence since NSEP was viewed as distinctly ancillary to core functions of the organization. In reality, issues involving foreign language learning and education had no strong advocate within the Department. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense transferred responsibility for NSEP from OSD Policy to the National Defense University (NDU). The rationale for this transfer extended from an objective to divest OSD Policy of programs not central to its mission (and, concomitantly, to reduce the organization's size) and to identify a DoD organization that would represent a stronger intellectual match. NDU has, indeed, been an ardent supporter of NSEP and each NDU President and Vice-President has undertaken active and effective efforts on behalf of the program.

The post-September 11th environment has brought sustained attention to language issues from within the national security community and particularly DoD. The recent designation of a Senior Language Authority and establishment of a Defense Language Office within the Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (P&R) has dramatically raised the profile of the issue

provided major support for SEF. Current proposals are under review for Department of Defense Directive to re-establish a formal linkage between the program and OSD P&R while maintaining NSEP's location at NDU. Success of this initiative is in the best interest of NSEP because it will integrate the program directly within the DoD office and ensure for the entire trust's life policy while, at the same time, preserving the program's intellectual and intellectual energy within the NDU environment.

NSEP's goal is to realize the goals stated by the Chairman of the Commission to establish itself as the critical link between the Department of Defense and the National Security Education Board.

NSEP Funding

Program funding remains as complicated as any issue. NSEP has, since 1994, been funded at \$8 million per year through assets made available from the National Security Education Trust Fund. The initial Trust Fund concept, designed to "shield" the program from the annual appropriations process, has simply not been successful. Increasingly, the lack of an "appropriations line" for the program with the Department's budget has also been a significant handicap to preserving and expanding the program's budget. Indeed, since Fiscal Year 1995, NSEP has operated at \$8 million per year (including all administrative expenses) without a single increase for inflation.

Because resources in the Fund were not adequate to support a robust program, we have experienced an accelerated draw down of the Fund's principal. The Fund, at the end of fiscal year 2005, will no longer be sufficient to support another year of program operations. In anticipation of this Trust Fund "endgame" strategy, Congress, in early 2004, required the Department of Defense to provide an approach that would insure funding for the program in the future. In February 2005, DoD recommended conversion of NSEP funding from the Trust Fund to an annual appropriations. The recommendation, however, did not include a proposed level of funding.

During this time period, Congress, and particularly the Intelligence authorizing committees (House Permanent Select Committee and Senate Select Committee), were directly embracing and addressing the language issue. These committees have been the focal point of many of the post-September 11th commission studies and have been extraordinarily proactive in addressing the issue. These same committees were concerned that DoD was not adequately addressing future funding for NSEP. They set in motion a set of decisions that were very supportive of NSEP but have also caused confusion with DoD.

¹ It is important to note that the National Security Education Act of 1991 was part of the FY1991 Intelligence Authorization Act. The two Congressional intelligence committees continue to see themselves as the NSEP authorizing committees.

**NSEP Report to the National Security Education Board... May/June 2005
FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY –NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OR DISSEMINATION**

The Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005 (passed by Congress in November 2004) includes major increases in funding for NSEP. This funding (in the unclassified budget) is transferred directly to the Secretary of Defense. Language in this Act provided the following provisions:

1. \$8 million per year for NSEP Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants
2. \$6 million per year for NSEP's National Flagship Language Initiative
3. \$2 million per year for a Congressionally authorized program of English for U.S. heritage populations.

At the same time, the fiscal year 2005 Defense Appropriations Act included a provision for NSEP to draw \$8 million from the Trust Fund.²

The complications arise in the development of the fiscal year 2006 budget now being considered by Congress. Because NSEP funding was provided in the intelligence authorization and appropriations process, the Department of Defense did not request funding for the program. This has the potential to create considerable confusion; a program, housed appropriately under the Secretary of Defense, and fully embraced by the Department in the Language Transformation Plan, has no request for funding from DoD.

It is vital to NSEP's future that funding for the program is adopted as a regular and routine part of the annual appropriations process. We are confident that movement in this direction is in process. However, critical decisions must still be made concerning the appropriate approach to this funding.

NSEP Boren Scholars and Fellows

It is good to report that, notwithstanding the issue of federal service for NSEP award recipients, there are no major issues involving Boren Undergraduate Scholars and Graduate Fellows. Both programs have been consistently attracting outstanding and qualified applicants. Applicants remain extraordinarily responsive to languages of most salience to the national security community. In fact, there remains a risk, as always, of too much focus on a smaller number of languages than might be advisable for the long-term. The 2005 competition deleted the identification of specific languages for emphasis. This change did not result in major changes in the distribution of languages among applicants.

NSEP would like to make two recommendations:

1. Annual Award for Outstanding NSEP Boren Scholar and NSEP Boren Fellow. NSEP Scholars and Fellows are making extraordinary

² To make matters more complicated, while the intelligence authorization provided \$16 million for NSEP, only \$8 million was included in the appropriations – primarily because the appropriators had already approved \$8 million from the Trust Fund. Consequently, NSEP began the 2005 fiscal year with \$18 million in funding (a 100% increase over fiscal year 2004).

contributions to U.S. national security. They represent some of the 'best and brightest' in America and the program needs to do more to highlight their accomplishments. We would like to institute annual awards for the outstanding Scholar and Fellow who epitomize the objectives of NSEP: (1) superior academic achievements; (2) commitment to learning of critical languages and cultures; (3) contribution to U.S. national security. Nominations and awards would be vetted through a sub-group of the NSEP Advisory Group and the National Security Education Board. They will be named in honor of individuals who optimize the same values. We are already considering Ambassador Sol Linowitz for the NSEP Fellow award. Ambassador Linowitz, who just recently passed away, was a strong advocate of international education and NSEP, and was the epitome of the public servant. This recommendation was endorsed by the NSEP Advisory Group at its April 2005 meeting.

2. Focus on quality of language programs. NSEP proposes to provide more rigorous guidelines for program applicants. The national security community has increasingly recognized the need for professionals with language proficiency and, as demonstrated in the DoD Language Transformation Plan, sees NSEP as a principal source of such talent. However, NSEP must seek to do better in providing quality opportunities for language learning. Many study abroad programs do not provide quality language learning opportunities and undergraduates, in particular, are not always aware of what criteria should be considered in selecting a program. Graduate Fellowship applicants could also benefit from an enumeration of more specific criteria that should be addressed. We recommend changes in the Scholarship and Fellowship application process that will add more emphasis to the choice and design of programs by requiring applicants to consider and address important criteria in structuring their proposed language learning initiatives. This recommendation was endorsed by the NSEP Advisory Group at its April 2005 meeting.

Federal Service for NSEP Scholars and Fellows

The most significant and controversial component of NSEP has been the definition of service to the federal government and successful placement of NSEP Scholars and Fellows in the national security community. Almost without exception, NSEP Scholars and Fellows are highly motivated to serve in the federal national security community. The challenge remains where they may work and how they gain access to federal jobs.

Clarifying and Modifying the Federal Service Requirement. What began, in 1992, with a concept of "general service to the federal government or education" has now dramatically narrowed to a point where Scholars and Fellows may find it increasingly difficult to satisfy the requirement. A brief review of the

chronology of the service requirement provides important background for this discussion:

1. National Security Education Act of 1991 provided for service payback, limited almost exclusively to NSEP Graduate Fellows, either in the federal government or in the "field of education."
2. Congress amended NSEP's legislation in 1996 to restrict federal service to national security related positions in the federal government or to higher education, in an area related to the subject of the award. Congress also extended the requirement to include Undergraduate Scholars as well as the Graduate Fellows.
3. Congress amended NSEP's legislation in 2003 to restrict federal service only to the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community and to eliminate any non-federal employment option.

The continuing narrowing of the NSEP service requirement represents both a threat to the integrity of the program and, more importantly, an illogical and unduly narrow definition of national security:

- As an academic program within the Department of Defense and Intelligence community, NSEP walks a "fine line" between the U.S. academic community and the federal sector. Because NSEP provides funding for U.S. students to study overseas in many areas of the world in significant turmoil, association of award recipients, either directly or indirectly, with the U.S. defense and intelligence establishment is extremely dangerous.

NSEP Service to the federal government should be determined in terms of the job performed by the individual, not the agency or organization paying the salary. Each year, Boren Undergraduate Scholars and Graduate Fellows make significant contributions to U.S. national security. Consider the following contributions made to U.S. national security where a strict interpretation of the new law might not allow them to fulfill their mandated federal service:

- U.S. Foreign Service in Karbala, Iraq during 2004.
- Department of Labor assigned to and completed his federal service in Iraq and is now returning to that country
- U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics, overseeing the counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan.

- USAID, Democracy and Governance Bureau, detailed to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq on governance and democracy issues
- Department of Agriculture in food security, researching and implementing regulations on agro-terrorism
- USAID, Water Resources Office on the West Bank overseeing construction of a water pipeline to serve population of **Gaza**
- Subcommittee on Financial Management, Budget and International Security Subcommittee of U.S. Senate Government Affairs Committee, working on issues of nuclear proliferation and national missile defense

We strongly believe that the decision regarding service **should** be determined by the nature of the position and not the agency or organization where an individual works. Each and every day, federal workers make extraordinary contributions to U.S. national security; the measure of their contribution is the work they do, not the organization that pays them.

NSEP is working closely with major national higher education associations to obtain modification of the definition of service. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, as the responsible party organization overseeing NSEP, be given broader authority to determine the definition of qualified service for each Boren Scholar and Fellow.

Obstacles to Hiring NSEP Scholars and Fellows. NSEP, together with its partners – the Institute of International Education (IIE) and the Academy for Educational Development (AED) -- continue to identify paths to federal service for NSEP Scholars and Fellows. Indeed, remarkable progress has been made in the last several years both in identifying award recipients who are not only outstanding students but whose primary goal is to work for the federal national security community.

Unfortunately, the federal hiring process remains daunting to job applicants and is frequently characterized by perplexing delays in the hiring process. NSEP Scholars and Fellows routinely report frustrations and delays in responses to their inquiries and applications. Although NSEP Scholars and Fellows enjoy an "excepted hiring authority" that provides "special" access to jobs in the federal sector, Human Resource departments **often** profess ignorance of the authority or an unwillingness to apply it.

Security clearances also continue to present a major abstacle. Delays of eighteen to twenty-four months from the offer of a job to actual hiring are not uncommon. Furthermore, NSEP Scholars and Fellows confront an even more

daunting challenge obtaining security clearances because of their overseas study.

Lieutenant General Dunn, President of NDU and Chair of the NSEP Board, has been extraordinarily proactive in the NSEP hiring process. He is in regular contact, by letter and in-person, with the DoD leadership to create opportunities for NSEP Scholars and Fellows.

We have asked a number of NSEP Scholars and Fellows to report to the Board on their experiences in the federal hiring process. We hope that the information and personal stories they share will not only provide valuable insights but also help us to identify ways to mitigate these problems.

Internships and Placement in DoD and the Intelligence Community. NSEP has experienced dramatically increased success in placement of Scholars and Fellows within DoD and the IC. However, we need to do better. It is imperative that we explore new approaches to increase the number of NSEP Scholars and Fellows within DoD and the IC. We are proposing to the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community a program that will offer NSEP Scholars and Fellows one-year internships. This internship program would be managed by NSEP in collaboration with National Defense University. Requirements would be generated by organizations within DoD and the IC. NSEP would work with each organization to identify Scholars and Fellows who meet these criteria. Each organization would provide funding for these one-year internship positions that would be managed by NSEP/NDU. Internship "billets" would be housed in NDU. NSEP is currently experimenting with this model through the development of a "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)" between NDU and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We are hoping this MOU will provide a model that can be expanded throughout the DoD and the intelligence community.

Innovative Models for Placement in DoD and the Intelligence Community. NSEP remains committed to identifying paths for Scholars and Fellows into positions within DoD and the intelligence community. We have initiated a pilot effort involving work with experts drawn from the community who are exploring alternative approaches. We will have a report on these approaches at the Board meeting.

National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI)

NSEP's NFLI effort has received an extraordinary level of attention both within the government and in higher education. The Flagship concept for advanced language learning has established roots throughout the language profession and is the subject of discussion at virtually every language conference throughout the U.S. During the Fall 2004 session of Congress, a number of

legislative initiatives endorsed NSEP. Most importantly, the FY2005 Intelligence Authorization Act included NSEP in the FY2005 Intelligence Authorization Act, which provides \$6 million per year in support of NFLI.

NFLI now consists of programs in Arabic (Georgetown University, University of Maryland); Chinese (Brigham Young University, Ohio State University); Korean (UCLA, University of Hawaii), and Russian (overseas only). In addition, there are active overseas flagship programs in Arabic, Chinese, and Korean and we will be awarding grants for the development of a U.S.-based program in Russian and Persian.

NSEP has also been asked to address an urgent need for the development of pipelines for language students from elementary, middle school, and high schools into higher education. This issue was identified during a major "language policy summit" sponsored by the American Council of Teachers of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) in early 2005 as part of its *Year of Language*. The K-16 pipeline pilot project has received unanimous endorsement from representatives from throughout the federal government including DoD, the Department of State, and intelligence community. NSEP has issued a major solicitation to fund the development of the nation's first fully articulated K-16 program focusing on Chinese as the pilot. DoD has identified an additional \$750,000 to support the startup of this effort.

During early 2005, NSEP made a decision to transition oversight and administration of NFLI from the National Foreign Language Center at University of Maryland to the Academy for Educational Development. AED already oversees administration of NFLI Fellowships. This decision was made based on potentially damaging conflict of interest issues involving the award of an NFLI Flagship grant to the University of Maryland (UMD) at the same time the program was being administered by another organization under the UMD umbrella. NSEP is also establishing a relationship with the new Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL), a University-affiliated research center at UMD, to provide substantive expertise for NFLI. Because CASL will not be involved in selection or administration of NFLI grants, there is no conflict issue.

English for U.S. Heritage Populations

The FY2005 Intelligence Authorization Act also included an additional requirement for NSEP to develop a program offering opportunities for certain U.S. heritage populations to improve their English proficiency. Congress provided \$2 million per year for this effort. The objective here is to identify U.S. citizens who are interested in working for the federal government and whose first language is not English. Historically, the problem is that individuals whose native language is not English do not possess sufficient English skills to work in certain critical jobs in the federal sector. The goal of this effort is to develop a program

that offers U.S. citizens, whose native language is not English, an opportunity to improve their English proficiency. NSEP is collaborating with the Center for Applied Linguistics on this new initiative.

Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps

During 2003-2004, NSEP delivered to the Department of Defense and Congress a major feasibility study on the formation of a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps (CLRC). The CLRC has now been identified as a critical component of the DoD Language Transformation Plan. Unfortunately, funding for the next stages of the CLRC has not been forthcoming. NSEP is eager to support efforts to take the CLRC concept to the next level. We are hopeful that funding will be identified to support the next steps in the process.

3

Steven Cook

Steven is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Steven ~~was~~ a Boren Fellow in Egypt and Turkey in 1999-2000, where he did research ~~on~~ the role of the military in the political development of those countries. He ~~has~~ published ~~on this~~ subject in many journals including *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and *the Middle East Quarterly*. Steven received an MA and PhD in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania. He has a B.A. in International Studies from Vassar College, and an M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Steven ~~speaks~~ Arabic and Turkish.

Bartholomew Goldyn

Bart is an Intelligence Research Specialist at the F.B.I. He ~~was~~ a Boren Fellow in 2000-2001 in Poland, where he did research for his PhD ~~on~~ the Polish ~~Communist~~ State's ability to control urban life and residents' willingness ~~to~~ resist pressure from the central authority. Bart received his PhD in History from Georgetown University in 2003. He holds an undergraduate degree in Russian Studies from Brown University, and an MA in History from the University ~~of~~ London. ~~Bart speaks~~ Russian and Polish.

Darby Parliament

~~On~~ May 1 Darby, began training at the Foreign Service Institute to become a Foreign Service Officer. He ~~was~~ a Boren Fellow in 2002-2003 in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Darby did intensive language training and research on the relationship between ~~conflict~~ and development in the Middle ~~East~~. Darby received his MA in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies in 2003. His undergraduate degree was from the University of Colorado at Boulder in Journalism. Darby speaks Arabic.

Adrienne Sheasley

Ms. Sheasley received an NSEP scholarship in 1997 for ~~her~~ year in Russia, where she studied Russian ~~through the~~ Virtus Institute "Russia As She Is" program. She graduated from Wilkes University in Pennsylvania, with a degree in Eastern European and Russian - U.S. Relations. In April 2004, Ms. Sheasley began working ~~in~~ the Department of Defense, where she continues to serve.

4

Examples of NSEP Scholar and Fellow Service to the Federal Government

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is deployed overseas with the U.S. Army in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. As a criminal justice major at Penn State University - Lehigh Valley, the scholar used his NSEP scholarship to study during the summer at Universidad Central de Venezuela in Caracas, Venezuela.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is an intelligence specialist with the U.S. Air Force. The Scholar completed her undergraduate studies in comparative politics at the University of Texas at San Antonio, with previous studies at the Defense Language Institute. While enrolled at the University of Texas, her NSEP Scholarship funded study for a year at the American University in Cairo.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is a Foreign Service Officer for the U.S. Department of State. He used the NSEP scholarship to study for a semester and summer at Beijing Normal University in China. Upon graduating, he completed his service requirement while in Foreign Service officer training. Since completing his training, he has fulfilled a two-year tour of duty as a Foreign Service officer in Syria, and is currently serving a tour in Taiwan.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is an analyst in the U.S. national security community. As a business major and Chinese minor at the University of California, Riverside, he used his NSEP scholarship to study Mandarin at Beijing Normal University.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is an analyst in the U.S. national security community. A Slavic language and literature major at the University of Kansas, she used her NSEP scholarship to study at the Virtus Institute in Russia.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is a Middle East military analyst in the U.S. national security community. As a double major in biology and Middle Eastern studies, she studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo. She has completed her service requirement and continues to contribute to U.S. national security as an intelligence analyst.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is an environmental engineer with the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. As an engineering major at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, his NSEP scholarship funded his environmental engineering program at the Indian Institute of Technology in New Delhi, India. He has fulfilled his requirement and continues to work for the Department of Energy.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is a research specialist with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. She majored in economics at the University of Kentucky studied for an academic year at the Beijing Language and Culture University in China. Upon graduation, she accepted an internship on the China Desk at the U.S. Department of Defense. She completed her internship and has obtained a permanent position as an intelligence research specialist with the FBI.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar completed his service as a debriefer for the Defense Intelligence Agency. As an International Affairs major at Boston College, he studied Balkan security issues and Serbo-Croatian at the Institute for Foreign Students in Sofia, Bosnia. He has worked for DIA as a debriefer, supporting military operations in the Balkans region and interviewing individuals who may have had information relating to a particular locality that would be useful to U.S. military personnel.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow fulfilled his service requirement and continues to work at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Office. He now works in DTRA's anti-terrorism office, and also took part in operation Enduring Freedom with the Army National Guard. As an NSEP Fellow he traveled to Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow is currently putting her knowledge of Russia to work at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in the Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security office. Her NSEP fellowship provided the opportunity for her to study the agri-business sector in Russia and the country's business climate in general.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow works as an Asian analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he is a specialist in Asian political and security analysis. He was awarded an NSEP Fellowship as a master's degree student in international affairs at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. His NSEP Fellowship supported 14 months of language study and research at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow works as an international trade specialist at the Commerce Department's International Trade Administration. She received an NSEP Fellowship while pursuing a master's degree in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Her fellowship supported nearly two years in China, where she studied Mandarin at Beijing University.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow works at the Treasury Department's Office of Middle East and South Asia as an International Economist. In this position, she fulfilled her service requirement by monitoring structural reform and market developments in these regions. Her NSEP fellowship allowed her to perfect her Indonesian language skills and study Indonesia's rural banking sector over a one-year period.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow is currently a program officer in the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Afghanistan and Middle East Bureau. She traveled to India and Pakistan as an NSEP Fellow to study the conflict between the two countries and to perfect her Hindi language skills. Upon graduating from Syracuse University, she became an Afghanistan analyst for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which fulfilled her service requirement. She subsequently worked on UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant**

7 July 2005 - 1242 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. DAVID S.C. CHU, USD/P&R M

4/7/ SUBJECT: National Security Education Program (NSEP) Board Meeting - 14 Jun 05


Sir:

Please respond to Secretary England's note to you on the attached:

"David -
Interesting report. See page 7 - our new system should
make this easier. Can we implement for NSEP?
Gordon"

Thank you.

Very respectfully,


Frank G. Helmick
Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachments:
OSD 12894-05

Dispatch: Thursday, 14 July 2005

OSD 12894-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50304

David —

JUL - 7 2005

Interesting report.

See p. 7. Our
new system should
make this easier.

Can we implement
for NSEP?

Adam

OSD 12894-05

A.O. _____
ACTION 2/12
COORD _____
DUE _____

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DSD COMB

7/5

original to G-2 SD

1 Jul 05

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2005 JUL -5 PM 2:57
CHAIRMAN, JCS CY FOR

FROM: PRESIDENT, NDU

Mike D

Subject: National Security Education Program (NSEP) Board Meeting – 14 Jun 05

- Sirs, as you may know, I serve as an ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the NSEP [NDU oversees this program.] The NSEP Board is separate from the NDU Board of Visitors. Its members (atch 1) include seven statutory federal members and six members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate

- As a reminder, NSEP is a language program which has become an integral part of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. NSEP has three sub-parts:

1. NSEP Scholarships and Fellowships -- it gives grants to undergraduate and graduate students to study abroad in a foreign language which is important to national security. Coupled with the grant is a service obligation of one year for every year abroad. An integral part of NSEP's mission is to help these young people find positions in DOD or the intelligence community upon graduation.

2. A new NSEP program is the National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI). The NFLI mission is to produce language experts with professional proficiency in critical foreign languages such as Arabic, Chinese, etc. As with part 1 – those who receive a fellowship have a service commitment.

3. Also new is English for US heritage populations. This part seeks native speakers in languages needed in the national security community, whose English skills are not up to par and provides them with education to improve their English. As with parts 1 and 2 – those who receive a fellowship have a service commitment.

- Funding for NSEP is \$16M – half from a trust fund and half through the Intelligence Community Management Account.

- The Board met on 14 Jun 05. A brief summary of discussions is at atch 2.

- Some issues identified by the Board:

1. Placement of scholars is still challenging. We heard vignettes from four people (atch 3) on the challenges they faced in finding positions. The good news is NDU has been marketing the program and we have significantly increased the number of scholars who

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50306

OSD 128941-05

DSD

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

find positions in DOD. I have sent letters to some (non-DOD) organizations where we are having the most problems. [Many of them relate to the security clearance process.]

2. We need to increase the number of Farsi (Persian) scholars. Presently we do not permit students to go to Iran. But both Bahrain and UAE have reputable programs in Farsi and we will tap into them. We are also working closely with major US universities to encourage them to teach Farsi in the US, to create student interest and to increase the number of applicants.

3. NSEP attracts too few minorities. Here we need to market the program with minority colleges. My Senior VP and former US Ambassador to Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Uganda will make contact with key minority colleges to encourage more applicants.

- In **sum**, this is a great program that is making a difference for DOD and the nation. An example of where some of these young people are serving is in atch 4 [recommend you scan this briefly]

Very Respectfully,

CF: USDP&R, USDP, DJS, DJ7

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/50307

1

National Security Education Board
Current **Board** Members

Michael M. Dunn, Lt Gen, US Air Force
Chairman
President
National Defense University
Washington, DC
[Secretary of Defense Designee]

Dr. James W. Carr
Executive Vice President
Harding University
[Presidential Appointee]
carr@harding.edu

Dr. Bruce Cole
Chairman
National Endowment for the Humanities
Washington, DC
hcol@neh.gov

Mr. Arthur James Collingsworth
San Francisco, California
[Presidential Appointee]
ajcollingsworth@cs.com

Dr. George Dennison
President
The University of Montana
[Presidential Appointee]
maryellen.ardouny@mso.umt.edu

Dr. Mark Falcoff
Resident Scholar
American Enterprise Institute
[Presidential Appointee]
MarkFalcoff@aol.com

Mr. Andrew McKenna*
Chairman and CEO
Schwarz Paper Company

Ms. JoAnne Phipps
Director, Office of International Operations
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of Energy
Joanne.Phipps@hq.doe.gov

Mr. Timothy J. Hauser
Deputy Under Secretary for International Trade
International Trade Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce
Timothy.Hauser@ita.doc.gov

Mr. William Nolte
Deputy Assistant Director of Central Intelligence,
Analysis and Production
Washington, DC
[DCI Representative]
williamn@odci.gov

Ambassador Katherine Peterson
Director
Foreign Service Institute
U.S. Department of State
FisherMA@state.gov

Dr. Kiron Skinner
Assistant Professor, Carnegie Mellon University
and Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University
[Presidential Appointee]
skinner@hoover.stanford.edu

Honorable Sally Stroup
Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education
Office of Postsecondary Education
U.S. Department of Education
sally.stroup@ed.gov

*Nominated, awaiting confirmation

Board Executive Director:

Dr. Robert O. Slater
Director, National Security Education Program

2

National Security Education Program (NSEP)

Report to National Security Education Board
May 2005

This report is provided to members of the National Security Education Board for their review in advance of the June 14, 2005 meeting. It updates issues involving NSEP since fall 2004, serves as a resource for discussions that will take place at the meeting later this month, and provides specific recommendations to be considered at the meeting.

Background

We have witnessed, during the past nine to twelve months, significant advances in the development and implementation of a comprehensive federal language agenda. These advances are in recognition that U.S. national security depends upon our capacity to become more proficient in foreign languages and to better understand and respect the diverse cultures of the world. NSEP has been a major contributor to the important dialogue that has taken place and has become more of a focal point for efforts to establish effective partnerships between the federal sector and higher education:

- Congress, in the fiscal year 2005 Intelligence Authorization Act included strong endorsement of NSEP and dramatically increased funding to implement the National Flagship Language Initiative and a new program in English language for U.S. heritage populations. Numerous additional legislative actions regarding language issues reference NSEP or propose increases in mission and funding.
- The Department of Defense (DoD) Language Transformation Plan released by the Department in February 2005 provides an aggressive and comprehensive plan for languages, including significant roles for NSEP.
- Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) in an April 2005 Report to Congress stated that "our vision is that *NSEP's* role in Defense language *Transformation* will be to serve as the premier scholarship and fellowship *source* and model for *U.S.* students to pursue rigorous and in-depth culture and language study to meet national needs."
- The NSEP proposed Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps has been increasingly recognized as a necessary and vital component of a long-term plan to identify and mobilize, when necessary, language resources in the U.S. population.

As we move ahead through the coming months, NSEP faces a number of important challenges. The response to these challenges will play a significant role in the structure and funding of a robust program in the years to come. This report summarizes these important challenges:

1. NSEP in the Department of Defense
2. NSEP Funding
3. NSEP Boren Scholars and Fellows
4. Successful placement of NSEP Scholars and Fellows
 - a. Clarifying and expanding the definition of NSEP federal service
 - b. Obstacles to hiring in DoD and intelligence communities
 - c. Internships and placement in DoD and the intelligence community.
5. National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI)
6. English Language for U.S. Heritage Populations
7. Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps

NSEP in the Department of Defense

Since its establishment in 1992, NSEP has not always enjoyed strong support from within the Department of Defense. The early years of the program were characterized by uncertain support from within the Department and repeated DoD and Congressional efforts to eliminate funding for the program. The major result of these controversial years was Congressional action that resulted in a more than fifty percent reduction of the National Security Education Trust Fund, from **\$150** to **\$68** million.

Responsibility for NSEP within DoD resided with the Under Secretary (Policy) from 1993-1998. The relationship between NSEP and OSD Policy was characterized by ambivalence since NSEP was viewed as distinctly ancillary to core functions of the organization. In reality, issues involving foreign language learning and education had no strong advocate within the Department. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense transferred responsibility for NSEP from OSD Policy to the National Defense University (NDU). The rationale for this transfer extended from an objective to divest OSD Policy of programs not central to its mission (and, concomitantly, to reduce the organization's size) **and** to identify a DoD organization that would represent a stronger intellectual match. NDU has, indeed, been an ardent supporter of NSEP and each NDU President and Vice-President has undertaken active and effective efforts on behalf of the program.

The post-September 11th environment has brought sustained attention to language issues from within the national security community and particularly DoD. The recent designation of a Senior Language Authority and establishment of a Defense Language Office within the Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (P&R) has dramatically raised the profile of the issue

and provide a port of call for NSEP. Current efforts are under way to revise NSEP Department of Defense to re-establish a formal linkage between the program and the P&R while maintaining NSEP location at NDU. Success of this initiative is in the best interests of the program because it will align the program directly within the DoD or the responsible for the entire language policy at the same time as the program's academic and intellectual energy within the NDI environment.

NSEP's challenge is to realize the goals stated by Under Secretary Chu: to continue to establish itself as the critical link between the national security and U.S. educational system.

NSEP Funding

Program funding remains as complicated as ever. NSEP has, since 1994, been funded at \$8 million annually from the National Security Education Trust Fund. The Trust Fund since 1994 to "shield" the program from the budget process. has not been sufficient. The lack of an "off-budget" line for the program with the Department's budget has also been a significant handicap to planning and funding the program. Indeed, since FY 1995, NSEP has operated at \$8 million per year (including all administrative costs) with a slight increase for inflation.

Because resources in the Trust Fund were not sufficient to support the program, we have experienced an annual draw down of the Trust Fund principal. The Fund, at the end of fiscal year 2004, will no longer be sufficient to support another year of program operations. In February of this Trust Fund management board meeting in 2004 required the Department of Defense to provide an approach that would insure funding of the program in the future. In February 2005, DoD recommended conversion of the Trust Fund to an annual appropriation. The Department, however, did not include a proposed level of funding.

During this time period Congress, and particularly the Intelligence authorizing committees (House Intelligence Select Committee and Senate Select Intelligence Committee) were embracing and addressing the language issue. These committees have been the subject of many of the post-September 11th commission studies and have been extraordinarily proactive in addressing the issue. These same committees were concerned that DoD was not adequately addressing future funding for NSEP. They set in motion a set of decisions that were very supportive of NSEP but have also caused tension with DoC.

¹ It is important to note that the National Security Education Act of 1991 was part of the FY1991 Intelligence Authorization Act. The two Congressional intelligence committees continue to see themselves as the NSEP authorizing committees.

The Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005 (passed by Congress in November 2004) includes major increases in funding for NSEP. This funding (in the unclassified budget) is transferred directly to the Secretary of Defense. Language in this Act provided the following provisions:

1. \$8 million per year for NSEP Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants.
2. \$6 million per year for NSEP's National Flagship Language Initiative
3. \$2 million per year for a Congressionally authorized program of English for U.S. heritage populations.

At the same time, the fiscal year 2005 Defense Appropriations Act included a provision for NSEP to draw \$8 million from the Trust Fund.²

The complications arise in the development of the fiscal year 2006 budget now being considered by Congress. Because NSEP funding was provided in the intelligence authorization and appropriations process, the Department of Defense did not request funding for the program. This has the potential to create considerable confusion; a program, housed appropriately under the Secretary of Defense, and fully embraced by the Department in the Language Transformation Plan, has no request for funding from DoD.

It is vital to NSEP's future that funding for the program is adopted as a regular and routine part of the annual appropriations process. We are confident that movement in this direction is in process. However, critical decisions must still be made concerning the appropriate approach to this funding.

NSEP Boren Scholars and Fellows

It is good to report that, notwithstanding the issue of federal service for NSEP award recipients, there are no major issues involving Boren Undergraduate Scholars and Graduate Fellows. Both programs have been consistently attracting outstanding and qualified applicants. Applicants remain extraordinarily responsive to languages of most salience to the national security community. In fact, there remains a risk, as always, of too much focus on a smaller number of languages than might be advisable for the long-term. The 2005 competition deleted the identification of specific languages for emphasis. This change did not result in major changes in the distribution of languages among applicants.

NSEP would like to make two recommendations:

- ①
1. Annual Award for Outstanding NSEP Boren Scholar and NSEP Boren Fellow. NSEP Scholars and Fellows are making extraordinary

² To make matters more complicated, while the intelligence authorization provided \$16 million for NSEP, only \$8 million was included in the appropriations - primarily because the appropriators had already approved \$8 million from the Trust Fund. Consequently, NSEP began the 2005 fiscal year with \$18 million in funding (a 100% increase over fiscal year 2004).

contributions to U.S. national security. They represent some of the "best and brightest" in America and the program needs to do more to highlight their accomplishments. We would like to institute annual awards for the outstanding Scholar and Fellow who epitomize the objectives of NSEP: (1) superior academic achievements; (2) commitment to learning of critical languages and cultures; (3) contribution to U.S. national security. Nominations and awards would be vetted through a sub-group of the NSEP Advisory Group and the National Security Education Board. They will be named in honor of individuals who optimize the same values. We are already considering Ambassador Sol Linowitz for the NSEP Fellow award. Ambassador Linowitz, who just recently passed away, was a strong advocate of international education and NSEP, and was the epitome of the public servant. This recommendation was endorsed by the NSEP Advisory Group at its April 2005 meeting.

2. Focus on quality of language programs. NSEP proposes to provide more rigorous guidelines for program applicants. The national security community has increasingly recognized the need for professionals with language proficiency and, as demonstrated in the DoD Language Transformation Plan, sees NSEP as a principal source of such talent. However, NSEP must seek to do better in providing quality opportunities for language learning. Many study abroad programs do not provide quality language learning opportunities and undergraduates, in particular, are not always aware of what criteria should be considered in selecting a program. Graduate Fellowship applicants could also benefit from an enumeration of more specific criteria that should be addressed. We recommend changes in the Scholarship and Fellowship application process that will add more emphasis to the choice and design of programs by requiring applicants to consider and address important criteria in structuring their proposed language learning initiatives. This recommendation was endorsed by the NSEP Advisory Group at its April 2005 meeting.

Federal Service for NSEP Scholars and Fellows

The most significant and controversial component of NSEP has been the definition of service to the federal government and successful placement of NSEP Scholars and Fellows in the national security community. Almost without exception, NSEP Scholars and Fellows are highly motivated to serve in the federal national security community. The challenge remains where they may work and how they gain access to federal jobs.

Clarifying and Modifying the Federal Service Requirement. What began, in 1992, with a concept of "general service to the federal government or education" has now dramatically narrowed to a point where Scholars and Fellows may find it increasingly difficult to satisfy the requirement. A brief review of the

chronology of the... provides important ground for this

1. National Education Act of 1991... for service payback... almost exclusively to NSEP Graduate Fellows either in the federal government or in the "field of education."
2. Congress... NSEP's... in 1996 to... federal service to national security related positions in the federal... or to higher... in an area related to the subject of the... also extended the requirement to include... Scholars as well as the Graduate Fellows.
3. Congress amended NSEP's legislation in 2003 to restrict federal service to the Department of Defense Intelligence Community and to eliminate any non-federal option.

The narrowing of the... represents both a threat to the integrity of the program... and a narrow financial of national...

- As an academic... within the... of... intelligence... NSEP walks a line between the U.S. academic community and the... sector. NSEP provides... for U.S. to study overseas in many areas of the world in... turmoil, associated award... directly or indirectly with the U.S. defense and... is extremely dangerous.

NSEP Service to the federal government should be determined in terms of the job performed by the individual, not the agency or organization. Undergraduate Scholars and Graduate Fellows make significant contributions to U.S. national security. Consider the following contributions made to U.S. national security where a strict interpretation of the new law might not then to fulfill their mandated federal service:

- U.S. Foreign Service in Karbala, Iraq during 2004.
- Department of Labor assigned to and completed his federal service in... and is now... to that...
- U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International... the counter... program in Afghanistan.

NSEP Report to the National Security Education Board.. May/June 2005
FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY –NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OR DISSEMINATION

- USAID, Democracy and Governance Bureau, detailed to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq on governance and democracy issues
- Department of Agriculture in food security, researching and implementing regulations on agro-terrorism
- USAID, Water Resources Office on the West Bank overseeing construction of a water pipeline to serve population of Gaza
- Subcommittee on Financial Management, Budget and International Security Subcommittee of U.S. Senate Government Affairs Committee, working on issues of nuclear proliferation and national missile defense

We strongly believe that the decision regarding service should be determined by the nature of the position and not the agency or organization where an individual works. Each and every day, federal workers make extraordinary contributions to **U.S.** national security; the measure of their contribution is the work they do, not the organization that pays them.

NSEP is working closely with major national higher education associations to obtain modification of the definition of service. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, as the responsible party organization overseeing NSEP, be given broader authority to determine the definition of qualified service for each Boren Scholar and Fellow.

Obstacles to Hiring NSEP Scholars and Fellows. NSEP, together with its partners -- the Institute of International Education (IIE) and the Academy for Educational Development (AED) -- continue to identify paths to federal service for NSEP Scholars and Fellows. Indeed, remarkable progress has been made in the last several years both in identifying award recipients who are not only outstanding students but whose primary goal is to work for the federal national security community.

Unfortunately, the federal hiring process remains daunting to job applicants and is frequently characterized by perplexing delays in the hiring process. NSEP Scholars and Fellows routinely report frustrations and delays in responses to their inquiries and applications. Although NSEP Scholars and Fellows enjoy an "excepted hiring authority" that provides "special" access to jobs in the federal sector, Human Resource departments often profess ignorance of the authority or an unwillingness to apply it.

Security clearances also continue to present a major obstacle. Delays of eighteen to twenty-four months from the offer of a job to actual hiring are not uncommon. Furthermore, NSEP Scholars and Fellows confront an even more

daunting challenge obtaining security clearances because of their overseas study.

Lieutenant General Dunn, President of NDU and Chair of the NSEP Board, has been extraordinarily proactive in the NSEP hiring process. He is in regular contact, by letter and in-person, with the DoD leadership to create opportunities for NSEP Scholars and Fellows.

We have asked a number of NSEP Scholars and Fellows to report to the Board on their experiences in the federal hiring process. We hope that the information and personal stories they share will not only provide valuable insights but also help us to identify ways to mitigate these problems.

③ Internships and Placement in DoD and the Intelligence Community. NSEP has experienced dramatically increased success in placement of Scholars and Fellows within DoD and the IC. However, we need to do better. It is imperative that we explore new approaches to increase the number of NSEP Scholars and Fellows within DoD and the IC. We are proposing to the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community a program that will offer NSEP Scholars and Fellows one-year internships. This internship program would be managed by NSEP in collaboration with National Defense University. Requirements would be generated by organizations within DoD and the IC. NSEP would work with each organization to identify Scholars and Fellows who meet these criteria. Each organization would provide funding for these one-year internship positions that would be managed by NSEP/NDU. Internship "billets" would be housed in NDU. NSEP is currently experimenting with this model through the development of a "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)" between NDU and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We are hoping this MOU will provide a model that can be expanded throughout the DoD and the intelligence community.

Innovative Models for Placement in DoD and the Intelligence Community. NSEP remains committed to identifying paths for Scholars and Fellows into positions within DoD and the intelligence community. We have initiated a pilot effort involving work with experts drawn from the community who are exploring alternative approaches. We will have a report on these approaches at the Board meeting.

National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI)

NSEP's NFLI effort has received an extraordinary level of attention both within the government and in higher education. The Flagship concept for advanced language learning has established roots throughout the language profession and is the subject of discussion at virtually every language conference throughout the U.S. During the Fall 2004 session of Congress, a number of

initiatives endorsed. Most importantly the FY2005 Intelligence Authorization Act provides for an additional \$6 Million per year in support of NFLI.

NFLI now consists of programs in Arabic (University of Maryland); Chinese (Indiana University, Ohio State University); Korean (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). In addition, there are overseas flagship programs in Arabic, Chinese, and Korean and we will be awarding grants for the development of a Russian and Persian.

NSEP has also been asked to address an urgent need for the development of pipelines of language students from middle school, and into higher education. This issue was identified during a major "language policy summit" sponsored by the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) in early 2004 as part of its Year of the Teacher. The K-16 pipeline project has received endorsement from representatives from all levels of the federal government including DoD, the Department of State, and intelligence community. NSEP has issued a request for solicitation to fund the development of the nation's first full articulated K-16 pipeline focusing on Chinese as the pilot. NSEP has been awarded an additional \$7.5 million to support the startup of this effort.

During early 2005, NSEP made a decision to transition oversight and management of NFLI from the National Foreign Language Center to the University of Maryland. This decision was made based on potentially damaging conflict of interest issues involving the director of an NFLI program who was moving to the University of Maryland. At the same time the program was transferred to another organization under the UMD umbrella. NSEP is also establishing a relationship with the new Center for Advanced Study of Language, a University-affiliated research center at UMD, to provide substantial support for NFLI. Because NFLI will not be involved in the distribution of federal grants, there is no conflict issue.

English for U.S. Heritage Populations

The FY2005 Intelligence Authorization Act also included an additional requirement for NSEP to develop a program offering opportunities for certain U.S. heritage populations to improve their English proficiency. Congress provided \$2 million per year for this effort. The objective here is to identify U.S. citizens who are interested in working for the federal government and whose first language is not English. Historically, the problem is that individuals whose native language is not English do not possess sufficient English skills to work in certain critical jobs in the federal sector. The goal of this effort is to develop a program

NSEP Report to the National Security Education Board...May/June 2005
FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY –NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OR DISSEMINATION

that offers U.S. citizens, whose native language is not English, an opportunity to improve their English proficiency. NSEP is collaborating with the Center for Applied Linguistics on this new initiative.

Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps

During 2003-2004, NSEP delivered to the Department of Defense and Congress a major feasibility study on the formation of a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps (CLRC). The CLRC has now been identified as a critical component of the DoD Language Transformation Plan. Unfortunately, funding for the next stages of the CLRC has not been forthcoming. NSEP is eager to support **efforts** to take the CLRC concept to the next level. We are hopeful that funding will **be** identified to support the next steps in the process.

3

Steven Cook

Steven is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Steven was a Boren Fellow in Egypt and Turkey in 1999-2000, where he did research on the role of the military in the political development of those countries. He has published on this subject in many journals including *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and *the Middle East Quarterly*. Steven received an MA and PhD in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania. He has a B.A. in International Studies from Vassar College, and an M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Steven speaks Arabic and Turkish.

Bartholomew Goldyn

Bart is an Intelligence Research Specialist at the F.B.I. He was a Boren Fellow in 2000-2001 in Poland, where he did research for his PhD on the Polish Communist State's ability to control urban life and residents' willingness to resist pressure from the central authority. Bart received his PhD in History from Georgetown University in 2003. He holds an undergraduate degree in Russian Studies from Brown University, and an MA in History from the University of London. Bart speaks Russian and Polish.

Darby Parliament

On May 1 Darby, began training at the Foreign Service Institute to become a Foreign Service Officer. He was a Boren Fellow in 2002-2003 in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Darby did intensive language training and research on the relationship between conflict and development in the Middle East. Darby received his MA in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies in 2003. His undergraduate degree was from the University of Colorado at Boulder in Journalism. Darby speaks Arabic.

Adrienne Sheasley

Ms. Sheasley received an NSEP scholarship in 1997 for her year in Russia, where she studied Russian through the Virtus Institute "Russia As She Is" program. She graduated from Wilkes University in Pennsylvania, with a degree in Eastern European and Russian - U.S. Relations. In April 2004, Ms. Sheasley began working in the Department of Defense, where she continues to serve.

4

Examples of NSEP Scholar and Fellow Service to the Federal Government

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is deployed overseas with the U.S. Army in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. As a criminal justice major at Penn State University - Lehigh Valley, the scholar used his NSEP scholarship to study during the summer at Universidad Central de Venezuela in Caracas, Venezuela.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is an intelligence specialist with the U.S. Air Force. The Scholar completed her undergraduate studies in comparative politics at the University of Texas at San Antonio, with previous studies at the Defense Language Institute. While enrolled at the University of Texas, her NSEP Scholarship funded study for a year at the American University in Cairo.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is a Foreign Service Officer for the U.S. Department of State. He used the NSEP scholarship to study for a semester and summer at Beijing Normal University in China. Upon graduating, he completed his service requirement while in Foreign Service officer training. Since completing his training, he has fulfilled a two-year tour of duty as a Foreign Service officer in Syria, and is currently serving a tour in Taiwan.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is an analyst in the U.S. national security Community. As a business major and Chinese minor at the University of California, Riverside, he used his NSEP scholarship to study Mandarin at Beijing Normal University.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is an analyst in the U.S. national security community. A Slavic language and literature major at the University of Kansas, she used her NSEP scholarship to study at the Virtus Institute in Russia.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is a Middle East military analyst in the U.S. national security community. As a double major in biology and Middle Eastern studies, she studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo. She has completed her service requirement and continues to contribute to U.S. national security as an intelligence analyst.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is an environmental engineer with the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. As an engineering major at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, his NSEP scholarship funded his environmental engineering program at the Indian Institute of Technology in New Delhi, India. He has fulfilled his requirement and continues to work for the Department of Energy.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar is a research specialist with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. She majored in economics at the University of Kentucky studied for an academic year at the Beijing Language and Culture University in China. Upon graduation, she accepted an internship on the China Desk at the U.S. Department of Defense. She completed her internship and has obtained a permanent position as an intelligence research specialist with the FBI.

An NSEP Undergraduate Scholar completed his service as a debriefer for the Defense Intelligence Agency. As an International Affairs major at Boston College, he studied Balkan security issues and Serbo-Croatian at the Institute for Foreign Students in Sofia, Bosnia. He has worked for DIA as a debriefer, supporting military operations in the Balkans region and interviewing individuals who may have had information relating to a particular locality that would be useful to U.S. military personnel.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow fulfilled his service requirement and continues to work at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Office. He now works in DTRA's anti-terrorism office, and also took part in operation Enduring Freedom with the Army National Guard. As an NSEP Fellow he traveled to Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow is currently putting her knowledge of Russia to work at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in the Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security office. Her NSEP fellowship provided the opportunity for her to study the agri-business sector in Russia and the country's business climate in general.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow works as an Asian analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he is a specialist in Asian political and security analysis. He was awarded an NSEP Fellowship as a master's degree student in international affairs at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. His NSEP Fellowship supported 14 months of language study and research at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow works as an international trade specialist at the Commerce Department's International Trade Administration. She received an NSEP Fellowship while pursuing a master's degree in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Her fellowship supported nearly two years in China, where she studied Mandarin at Beijing University.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow works at the Treasury Department's Office of Middle East and South Asia as an international Economist. In this position, she fulfilled her service requirement by monitoring structural reform and market developments in these regions. Her NSEP fellowship allowed her to perfect her Indonesian language skills and study Indonesia's rural banking sector over a one-year period.

An NSEP Graduate Fellow is currently a program officer in the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Afghanistan and Middle East Bureau. She traveled to India and Pakistan as an NSEP Fellow to study the conflict between the two countries and to perfect her Hindi language skills. Upon graduating from Syracuse University, she became an Afghanistan analyst for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which fulfilled her service requirement. She subsequently worked on UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia.

1 - 1 (1)

Suspense Tracking Number
(Click to See Suspense)
200507050041

Active Suspenses

All First Prev Next Last

Control Number

Suspense Subject

Date In

Delete

7Jul05 1242

~~12894-05~~

1Jul05

LTG Michael Dunn, President/NDU-Multi [SD/DHR CJCS/Myers w/cc P&R/Chu
USDP/Feith DJS/Schwartz J7/??] [cc GE/ActDSD], subject: ~~(FOUO)~~ National Security

Education Program (NSEP) Board Meeting - 14 Jun05 ~~(FOUO)~~ -----

----- GE/ActDSD-P&R: FGH /s/

snowflake 7Jul05 1242 to P&R/Chu, subject: National Security Education Program
(NSEP) Board Meeting - 14 Jun05 -- Please respond to Secretary England's note to you
on the attached: " David - interesting report. See page 7 - Our new system should make
this easier. Can we implement for NSEP? Gordon" -----

----- Still working per Capt

Rogers on 4Aug05 printout -----

----- 18Aug05 - CLOSE THIS OUT AS OBE - per ColNagle to Captain Rogers
[ARMY INTER]] [email 19Aug05 12051 - DONE / CASE CLOSED

C+D
F+T

Adc (Jag) -
Re: 12894-05
Pls close ques
more per DSS
Davis. Add to
to file.

J3
8/26

R
12894-05

50102,
<http://dsdibrowseibrowse.cfm?qryNextStart=1>

(50102)
11-L-0559/OSD/50326

H'160 8/23/2005

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

073

011

June 14, 2005

1049

TO: Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Latin American Assessment Room

I think we need to fashion a Latin American Assessment room, in the same location as the Iraq room, as a starter.

Please see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:rs
061205-1

.....
Please respond by 6/24/05

Latin American

14 June 05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 12939-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50327

FOUO



March 1, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: DAVID CHU
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: News on Recruitment and Retention

If there is bad news coming on recruitment and retention, we should be the ones to put it out, so we *can make sure* the story is correct.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
030105-18

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

3/7 DR 3/7

SecDEF - The Army has been doing a lot of briefing on this. Most of the stories I have seen reflect information the Army is putting out. We will keep engaging Di Rita

FOUO

340

MacOS

11-L-0559/OSD/50328

OSD 12940-05

~~FOUO~~

TABA

ACB

June 17, 2005

1051

360.7

To: Gm Dick Myers
Gm Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Air Routes

Please have someone send up a simplified view of the commercial air routes running through Southeast Asia over the Strait of Malacca.

Thanks.

DHR:dk
061605-30

.....
Please respond by

6/23/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12942-05

Tab A

11 Spans

11-L-0559/OSD/50329



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-4099

DEPT. OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CH-2604-05 2105 JUL -6 AM 7:56
5 July 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{FIL} *VA/8 2 Jul 05*

SUBJECT: Air Routes (SF 1051)

- Answer. In response to your inquiry (TAB A) regarding air routes, the attached diagram (TAB B) provides a simplified view of the commercial air routes running through Southeast Asia over the Straits of Malacca.
- Analysis. Data provided by the Commander, US Pacific Command.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT
~~FOUO~~ ATTACHMENT

OSD 12942-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

360.7

5 Jul 05

1 June 05



UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

COORDINATION

USPACOM

CAPT Smith

21 June 2005

Tab C

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/50332

~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2005

TO: Pete Geren
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *Washington Post* Article

383.6

Here is ~~the~~ *Washington Post* article about the State Department citing torture of prisoners on Rumsfeld approved practices.

Please take a look at it and get back to me on what this is about.

Thanks.

Attach.

Washington Post Article: State Dept Study Cites Torture of Prisoners

DHR:ss
030105-21

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12943-05

1 Mar 05

11-L-0559/OSD/50333

State Dept. Study Cites Torture of Prisoners

Rumsfeld Approved Similar Practices

By Graham K. Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department's latest human rights report released yesterday outlined conditions in a range of "abrogating practices" it labeled as torture, including sleep deprivation, beatings, shackling prisoners in crowded conditions, exposing them to freezing temperatures and burning them with cigarettes. The report said that these practices are "in some cases" approved or tolerated by the Bush administration but are "in violation of U.S. law."

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld approved in December 2001 a list of "abrogating practices" including the planning of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and other detention facilities. The report revealed that he also approved such practices as "prolonged interrogations" including 24-hour interrogations, "harsh sleep deprivation, beatings, and a feeling of helplessness and desperation," and other "abrogating practices."

The State Department report also said that the U.S. government has policies in such countries as Syria and Libya, where the United States has troops, and other countries to "prevent a practice known as 'torture.' The report also said that the U.S. government has policies that "prevent a practice known as 'torture.' The report also said that the U.S. government has policies that "prevent a practice known as 'torture.'"

The report also said that the U.S. government has policies that "prevent a practice known as 'torture.' The report also said that the U.S. government has policies that "prevent a practice known as 'torture.'"

The report also said that the U.S. government has policies that "prevent a practice known as 'torture.' The report also said that the U.S. government has policies that "prevent a practice known as 'torture.'"

~~FOUO~~

March 2, 2005

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Possible Candidate for Policy Position

Here's a candidate for the Policy job that Paul Wolfowitz forwarded me.

Thanks.

.....
Attach:

2/7/05 Letter from Karl Jackson to DSD

DHR:ss
030205-1

.....
Please respond by _____

23002

2 Mar 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12946-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50335

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies

1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20038
202.663.5897 / 202.663.7711 fax
seasia@mail.jhuwash.jhu.edu
www.sais-jhu.edu

Southeast Asia Studies Program
Karl Jackson
Frederick Z. Brown
Bridget Welsh

February 7, 2005

Dr. Paul Wolfowitz
Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon, Room 3E944
Washington, D.C. 20301-1010

Dear Paul:

The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy requires in-depth knowledge of a broad array of foreign areas and disciplines, sound judgment, and leadership capacity. My past activities in academia, business, and government have supplied me with the knowledge and experience necessary to contribute my skills and passion for policy-making to the Pentagon at this critical time in the post-9/11 world. Having entered government as an assistant desk officer in OSD/ISA, I became DASD for Asia and the Pacific in the Reagan Administration before moving to the White House as Senior Director for Asia on the National Security Council under President George H.W. Bush and subsequently as the National Security Advisor to Vice President Quayle. Rather than returning to the University of California, Berkeley when the Bush Administration ended, I entered the business world, learning the foreign exchange business as well as several aspects of investment banking. This knowledge of practical business broadened my analytic capabilities and brought me into contact with a wider range of leaders, especially in Asia. As you know, I returned to academia at Johns Hopkins in 1995 in order to build the largest and best Southeast Asia studies department in the country. After ten years this has been accomplished to a sufficient extent to allow me to return to government service.

So why would I exchange short hours for long, high for moderate income and privacy for the vortex of public life? It comes down to a desire to serve the country in wartime and to the fact that there is no satisfaction like the satisfaction of doing the people's business well. Steady but bold policy making won the Cold War. I want to contribute my knowledge of Islamic rebellions, my acquaintance with leaders, my experience in the inter-agency arena, and every ounce of my energy to assist in transforming the world by winning the war on terror.



11-L-0559/OSD/50336

If I can be of assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Karl D. Jackson", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Karl D. Jackson

C.V. Starr Distinguished Professor of
Southeast Asian Studies and Director of
the Asian Studies Program

December 2004

KARL D. JACKSON**CURRICULUM VITAE****Present Activities**

Director, Asian Studies, *School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University*, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 202-663-5980 (phone), 202-663-7711 (fax). Concurrently, as C.V. Starr Distinguished Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, he serves as the Director of the Southeast Asia Studies Program.

Private Sector:

Managing Director, International Foreign Exchange Concepts, 225 West 34th Street, N.Y., N.Y. From January 1993 to December 1996.

Senior Advisor, Cerberus Capital Management, 299 Park Avenue, N.Y., N.Y. From January 2000 to present.

Government Service

Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, 1991-1992.

Advising the Vice President on national security matters throughout the world;

Representing the Vice President on the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council;

Supervising Vice Presidential travel to Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Great Britain, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Haiti, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Malawi, Namibia, and the Ivory Coast;

Managing the U.S.-Japan relationship; increasing sales of U.S.-made auto parts to Japanese companies; partially opening the Japanese market to American cars; facilitating the sale of AWACS aircraft to Japan; creating the U.S.-Japan Manufacturing Technology Initiative; negotiating joint U.S.-Japan financing of small entrepreneurs in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia;

Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia, National Security Council, 1989-1991.

Advising the President, Vice President and Secretary of State during official visits to Japan, China, Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and France;

Coordinating U.S.-Japan relations; implementing the FSX agreement, organizing the Palm Springs Summit; facilitating the settlement of trade disputes with Japan on telecommunications, semi-conductors, and wood products;

Negotiating Japan's \$13 billion contribution to Desert Shield and Desert Storm;

Participating in the negotiation of the U.N. peace agreement on Cambodia;

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 1986-1989.

Formulating security policy for Japan, the Koreas, China, Taiwan, the ASEAN countries, Indochina, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands;

Advising the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State during official visits to China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and Singapore;

Increasing Japanese contributions to U.S.-Japan defense burden-sharing; negotiating the FSX agreement with Japan; reviewing the U.S.-Philippine Base Agreement, 1988; increasing U.S. assistance to the non-communist resistance in Cambodia; strengthening the U.S.-China military relationship; and maintaining the U.S.-ROK defense relationship.

Deputy Director for Policy Planning, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), 1983-1984. Special Assistant to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 1982-1983.

Renewing U.S.-Philippine Base Agreement, 1983; airlifting critical medical supplies to war victims in Afghanistan; and increasing DOD participation in international humanitarian assistance efforts.

Academic Appointments

C.V. Starr Distinguished Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, 1996-present.

Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1989-1991.

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, **University of California**, Berkeley, 1980-1989.

Scholar-in-Residence, United Nations **Asian and Pacific Development Institute**, **Bangkok**, 1977-1978.

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, **University of California**, Berkeley, 1972-1980.

Postdoctoral Fellow, East-West **Center**, Communication Institute, 1971-1972.

Teaching Fields

Political Communication and Political Behavior; Comparative Politics of **Southeast Asia**; Social Science Research Methods.

Chairman, graduate and undergraduate Group Major in Asian Studies, **University of California**, Berkeley,

Chairman, undergraduate Group Major in Mass Communication, **University of California**, Berkeley.

Professional Services

Acting Editor, **Asian Survey**, 1981-1982. Editorial Board Member, 1974-present.

Editor, **Antara Kita**; Bulletin of the Indonesian Studies Committee, Association of **Asian Studies**, 1981-1983.

Villages: Implications for Communication Strategy. Honolulu: **East-West Communication Institute**. 1972.

_____ and _____. "Participation in Rebellion: The Darul Islam in West Java," Political Participation in Modern Indonesia R. William Liddle (ed.) New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph No. 19, 1973.

Karl D. Jackson (ed.). The San Francisco Research Planning Conference on Asian Immigration. Washington: National Science Foundation, 1975,

Karl D. Jackson. "Cambodia 1977: Gone to Pot," Asian Survey. Volume 18, No. 1 (January 1978).

_____. "Cambodia 1978: War, Pillage and Purge in Democratic Kampuchea," Asian Survey. Volume 19, No. 1 (January 1979).

_____. Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

Karl D. Jackson and Paul Seabury, "Reagan's Bipartisanship - A Promising Start," New York Times, November 8, 1980.

Karl D. Jackson "U.S. Policy, ASEAN, and the Kampuchean Crisis," Economic, Political and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980's. Robert A. Scalapino and Jusuf Wanandi (eds.) Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1982.

Karl D. Jackson and M. Hadi Soesastro (eds.) ASEAN Security and Economic Development Berkeley; Institute of East Asian Studies, 1984.

Karl D. Jackson. "Indochina: War Without End," Jackson and Soesastro, op. cit.

Karl D. Jackson and Jacqueline Desbarats, "A Methodology for Estimating Political Executions: Vietnam 1975-1983." Prepared for the annual meeting of the Association of Asian Studies of the Pacific Coast, Los Angeles, 1984.

_____. "Indochina in Early '84: Doves of Peace or Dogs of War," Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis. Donald E. Weatherbee (ed.) Boulder Westview Press, 1985.

_____. "Post Colonial Rebellion: Lessons from Southeast Asia." Internal and External Security Issues in Asia. Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, and Jusuf Wanandi (eds.) Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985.

Karl D. Jackson and Jacqueline Desbarats. "Postwar Vietnam Was a Blood Bath After All" Asian Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1985,

_____ and _____. "Research Among Vietnam Refugees Reveals a Blood Bath," Wall Street Journal, April 22, 1985.

_____ and _____. "Peacetime Bloodbath Takes Its Toll on Vietnam, Too." Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1985.

_____ and _____. "Vietnam 1975-1982: The Cruel Peace," Washington Quarterly, Volume 8, Fall 1985.

Karl D. Jackson. "Post Colonial Rebellion and Counter-Insurgency." Armed Communist and Separatist Movements in Southeast Asia. Chandran Jeshuran (ed.) Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1986.

_____. "ASEAN: Politics, Economics, and Security in the 1980's." U.S.-China Forum on the Pacific Asian Region. Robert A. Scalapino and Chen Qimao (eds.) Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986.

_____. "Indochina 1982-1985: Peace Yields to War." The Soviet Far East Military Building. Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986.

Karl D. Jackson, Sukhumband Paribatra, and Djiwandono J. Soejati (eds.) ASEAN in Regional and International Context. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986.

_____. "U.S.-Southeast Asian Security Relations," Jackson, Paribatra, and Soejati, op. cit.

Karl D. Jackson and Wiwat Mungkandi (eds.) United States - Thailand Relations. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986.

_____. "U.S.-Thai Security Relations." Jackson and Mungkandi, op. cit.

Karl D. Jackson and Jacqueline Desbarats. "Political Violence in Vietnam: The Dark Side of Liberation." Indochina Report, No. 6. Singapore: Executive Publications, Ltd., April-June 1986.

Karl D. Jackson. "The Philippines: The Search for a Suitable Democratic Solution," Democracy in Developing Countries. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.) Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988.

_____. "Indonesia" Worldbook Encyclopedia. Chicago: World Book, Inc., 1988.

_____. "U.S.-Thai Security Relations." United States - Thailand Relations. Ansil Ramsay (ed.) Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988.

Karl D. Jackson (ed.) Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous With Death Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

_____. "The Khmer Rouge in Context." Jackson, op. cit.

_____. "Ideology of Total Revolution." Jackson, op. cit.

_____. "Intellectual Origins of the Khmer Rouge." Jackson, op. cit.

Karl D. Jackson, "How to Rebuild America's Stature in Asia," Orbis, Winter 1995.

Karl D. Jackson (ed.) Asian Contagion: Causes and Consequences of a Financial Crisis, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999.

_____. "The Roots of the Crisis." Jackson, op. cit.

Karl D. Jackson, Cultures of Democracy in Asia, (in preparation)

Education

Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, B.A., 1965.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, Ph.D. 1971.

Personal

Born Salem, Massachusetts, 1942 (b)(6)

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

March 14, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Follow-up from Hearing

I would like to see the answers to Congresswoman McKinney.

I also would like to see the answers to Congressman Marshall.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031405-13

.....
Please respond by

3/24/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12947-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50344

032

14 Mar 05

FOUO

March 14, 2005

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*
SUBJECT: Comptroller's Office

I need to know more about Tina Jonas's organization: the senior staff, the deputies, the other key people, who does what (with a brief description), whether she has vacancies, who she has brought in, if anyone.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031405-10

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

DB USC

14 Mar 05

FOUO

OSD 12949-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50345

FOUO

MAR 15 2005

TO: COL Steve Bucci
CC: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Phone Call w/General Jones

Please set up a phone call for me to talk to *General* Jones about his detailing the posture. I will need this memo.

Thanks.

Attach

Anderson, Jon R. "EUCOM Commander Details Likely Posture of Post-transformation Army.) *Stars and Stripes*, March 6, 2005.

DHR:dh
031405-30

.....
Please respond by

3/17/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/50346

OSD 12950-05

*DR
Army*

15 March

End
not Author
Have it all

[Home](#) [Career](#) [Education](#) [Shop](#) [Finance](#) [Stripes Club](#)

Sections

- [News](#)
- [Letters](#)
- [Pulse](#)
- [Scene](#)
- [sports](#)
- [Stripes Accent](#)
- [Stripes Travel](#)
- [Sunday magazine](#)

STARS AND STRIPES.

Sunday, March 6, 2005

EUCOM commander details likely posture of post-transformation Army

By [Jon R. Anderson](#), Stars and Stripes
European edition, Thursday, March 3, 2005

Information

- [About us / Contacts](#)
- [Archive highlights](#)
- [Archive Photo of the Day](#)
- [Buy Stripes photos](#)
- [Classified ads](#)
- [Library research](#)
- [Links](#)
- [Stripes Lite](#)

ARLINGTON, Va. — U.S. military officials are in negotiations with host nations to consolidate Army, Navy and Air Force special operations units now spread throughout Europe to a consolidated outpost either in Spain or Sicily, according to the top commander of military forces in Europe.

Any plan would go to Congress for funding.

In an exclusive interview with Stars and Stripes, Marine Gen. James Jones, the chief of U.S. European Command, said the proposal is part of his sweeping reorganization of forces in Europe that will return thousands of troops back to the United States and consolidate remaining units into a small group of new basing hubs.

Jones hopes to reorganize forces to tackle emerging threats in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and much of Africa.

The Army will see the most changes, with 239 installations spread across 16 major communities mostly in Germany whittled down to a few dozen installations at five main hubs — four in Germany and one in Italy.

Jones said those five hubs would include the Grafenwöhr training area including Wiesbaden; Hohenfels-Vilseck; posts near Ramstein Air Base, including Kaiserslautern; a new consolidated aviation brigade hub in the Ansbach-Illesheim area; and Army facilities around Vicenza, Italy, including an expanded Dal Molin air field to make room a third airborne infantry battalion and new support units under the Southern European Task Force.

Also, the Stuttgart area will remain as the host for U.S. European Command headquarters.

Congress is getting the bill for the initial stages for Jones' plan now, including more than \$1 billion earmarked for next year for

Search Stars & Stripes

Current Articles ☒
Archives ☐

improvements to "enduring" facilities in Europe.

"There's sticker shock here. It's very expensive," Jones told Stripes. Although he could not immediately put a price tag on the effort, he added, "It's a big bill. It's a huge bill."

Also, the upcoming Base Realignment and Closure process in the United States will play a key role in Europe's plans, said Jones, especially in determining where units will relocate as they leave.

Meanwhile, he said, "tweaking continues" on the overall plan.

Tucked inside Jones' prepared testimony before Congress this week are a slew of new details on what that plan includes. Among them:

¶ **Special Operations** — Currently the Army's 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group is based in Germany, the Navy's SEAL teams split are between Spain and Germany and the Air Force's 352nd Special Operations Group based at RAF Mildenhall, England. Jones said he hopes to consolidate the units onto one base. The two best candidates, he said, are existing Navy bases in either Rota, Spain, or Sigonella, Sicily. "We are looking for a position south of the Alps to better place our center of mass for special operations," Jones told Stripes.

¶ **Aviation Brigade** — A "Multifunction Aviation Brigade" will be created in the Ansbach/Illesheim area. It will include two Apache battalions, plus lift and aviation support units.

¶ **Enabler Brigade** — A new "combat enabler" brigade will be created at Grafenwohr, where new barracks and family housing units are now being built. The brigade will include artillery, engineer, MPs, signal and logistics units.

¶ **Stryker Brigade** — One of the new all-wheeled Stryker brigades will go to Vilseck, adjacent to Grafenwöhr, expected sometime around 2007.

¶ **Eastern European Task Force** — The new Army headquarters will be based in Eastern Europe, with brigade-sized rotational units from Europe and the United States going to new bare-bones "forward operating sites" in Romania and Bulgaria. One of the Stryker brigade's battalions will be the first to rotate to Eastern Europe shortly after it arrives in Grafenwöhr.

¶ **Black Sea pre-position site** — Jones told Stripes he hopes to establish an additional brigade-sized storehouse of gear and equipment on the Black Sea to augment existing sites in Italy and Norway, as well

as beef up his flotilla of sea-based gear. "As we get out of the heavy divisions, we don't want to get out of the heavy equipment so that we can rapidly transition to a bigger force if we need it," said Jones.

¶ Re-basing schedule — Plans call for 1st Infantry Division to return to the United States first, beginning in the summer of 2006, said Jones, followed by 1st Armored Division after it gets back from its upcoming deployment to Iraq. The merger of V Corps and USAREUR at Wiesbaden will be the last major movement. Jones emphasized, however, that the time line is subject to change as the war in Iraq, the BRAC process and competing funding priorities all play out.

"The plan is on the table," Jones. "There are a lot of eager people out there waiting to do things, but we need decisions and we need resources."

[Home](#) | [Shopping](#) | [Archives](#) | [Stripes Lite](#)
[Ombudsman](#) | [Advertising](#) | [About Us](#) | [Feedback](#) | [Contact Us](#)
[Careers](#) | [Stocks](#) | [Press Releases](#)

© 2003 Stars and Stripes. All Rights Reserved. [Disclaimer](#) / [Web Notice](#)
Site Design by [LaserNet, LLC](#)

FOUO

MAR 15 2005

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Observations from Tony Hall

You might want to send this to Newt Gingrich piece on the UN over to John Bolton.

Thanks.

Attach
3/7/05 Gingrich e-mail: "Observations from Tony Hall"

DHR:dh
031405-42

.....
Please respond by _____

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/50351

OSD 12952-05

UN

15 MAR 05

U to 1/4

3/14

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Monday, March 07, 2005 4:47 PM

To: (b)(6)@CSD.Mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)
jack.patterson@osd.mil; james.stavridis@osd.mil

Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil

Subject: observations from tony hall-newt

rom newt
3/07/05

I had a useful hour with ambassador tony hall the **US** representative to the world food program as someone who has visited many of the worst places on the planet Tony has a lot of insights

on north korea where hall has visited a number of times

1. it is an astonishingly policed, internally isolated country
2. the north korean military gets its food from china
3. there are **20** million food bags in north korea with the **US** flag on them and they are recycled by the north korean people for a wide variety of uses

on the **UN**

1. make every **UN** organization accept an outside audit of performance every year by a genuinely independent and professional group
2. every **UN** organization should be required to have plans with metrics and defined outcomes and the audits should focus on outcomes not on processes
3. nutrition is a big component of keeping hiv/aids patients alive and the aids support systems tend to be too medically focused and not enough nutrition focused
4. The **US** is actually providing the food for 50 to 60% of the people who are being fed by the **UN**
5. in ethiopea 70% of the food aid is **US**
6. **US** commitments worldwide in aid have grown dramatically under Bush, if you

3/7/2005

11-L-0559/OSD/50352

would compare the **US** and EU under Clinton and under Bush it is clear President Bush has provided far more help and has grown it much more rapidly than Europe

~~FOUO~~

March 29, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dov Zakheim Piece

Attached is the Dov Zakheim piece. I thought he did a **very** good job. We ought to have more of these types of articles here in this country's newspapers.

Thanks.

Attach
3/29/05 FT Article by Dov Zakheim

DHR:ss
032905-6

.....
Please respond by _____

000.753

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12953-05

29 Mar 05

11-L-0559/OSD/50354

London Financial Times
March 29, 2005
Pg. 15

Money Drives Rumsfeld's Changes

By Dov Zakheim

The US defence budget continues to grow at a remarkable pace. At Dollars 419bn in the coming fiscal year, it has grown by more than 40 per cent in just five years. Indeed, in the current fiscal year alone, the defence portion of the proposed US emergency supplemental budget brings defence spending to nearly **Dollars** 500bn. But America's growing deficit, rising healthcare costs and other obligations have generated considerable pressure, leading to significant reductions, even terminations, in some defence programmes. Among the most notable cuts are the proposed cancellation of the C-130 line of military transport aircraft, after decades of production, reduction in the air force's fleet of F-22 aircraft, the world's most advanced fighter, and the retirement of an aircraft carrier, leaving the **navy** with 11 of these ships, its lowest such force level in many years.

Lost in the debate over both the size of the budget and the wisdom of such reductions is the fact that the proposed budget nevertheless has virtually guaranteed that "defence transformation" is no longer a slogan but a reality. Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, **has** managed to apply billions of dollars to programmes that constitute the cornerstone of his transformation strategy. To begin with, the wars in **Iraq** and **Afghanistan** have re-oriented the way defence planners see the future. Both conflicts underscored the importance of a restructured military force whose operational ethos, **as** much as its technical capabilities, reflect far greater responsiveness, flexibility and interconnectedness (termed "net centricity") than previous models of conventional warfare. In particular, the employment of special operations forces as essential elements of combat operations, supported by other branches of the armed services, marks a significant departure from the past, when these forces were seen **as** sideshows to combat on the battlefield.

US operations in conventional conflicts would also be transformed by the approaches advocated by **Mr** Rumsfeld. Most notably, the army's conversion to a force whose main combat element is the 4,500-strong brigade, rather than a division three to four times **as** large, will fundamentally alter the way the army fights conventional wars. Plans by Peter Schoomaker, the army's chief of staff, for 10 additional brigade combat teams mark the most significant change in **army** force structure in well over a century.

In addition, the allocation of duties between the army's active and reserve forces is also undergoing significant change. A key example is the planned creation of civil affairs units within the active force. Until now these units - which played a key role in **Iraq** - have been housed within the reserve forces. Redistributing them between the army's active and reserve components will relieve some of the stress the Iraq conflict has placed on the reserves while giving greater flexibility to the active forces. The army's transformation is hardly unique. The navy continues to fund its conversion of Trident ballistic missile submarines to cruise missile carriers, a concept seen as novel only a few years ago but that now attracts little attention. Among other changes, the navy is planning to base more ships in the Pacific island of **Guam**. "Homeporting" in **Guam** and similar changes in long-distance permanent naval deployments (termed "forward deployments") enable the navy not only to respond more quickly to crises in the Pacific and Indian ocean theatres but enables downsizing of the increasingly costly fleet. All these are fundamental changes that have long been debated in **navy** circles but never implemented. Other transformational programmes continue apace. In particular, the air force is spending billions managing a programme for both armed and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that saw

action in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Under the missile defence programme, no longer confined to being purely a research programme for land-based systems, the development of sea-based and space-based capabilities will continue. Finally, development of the transformational satellite, a satellite whose laser communications capability will radically change the nature of military communications, gains nearly Dollars 1bn in the new budget.

The new defence budget request also **seeks** funds for various other activities aimed at furthering US military transformation, including training, personnel policy and business management.

Clearly, without significant reform, especially in the management sector, the future of such important programmes cannot be assured. Nevertheless, earmarking huge sums for programmes to produce new equipment, new modes of organisation, new approaches to military operations and new management structures will alter the defence department's culture.

Ultimately, "money talks" and more money than ever is being spent on transformation. In a world in which **security threats** have also undergone a transformation, nothing could be **more** important for maintaining its momentum beyond **Mr** Rumsfeld's tenure.

The writer, vice-president at Booz Allen Hamilton, was US undersecretary of defence (comptroller) and chief financial officer 2001-04.

~~FOUO~~

APR -0 1 2005

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Tracking System

020 SD

We need to fashion a system so there is automatic tracking. We should assign someone - maybe Rachel - to automatically track all the things I ask to have done, and help me with the Round Table files, for example, as well as other things.

Let's *think* about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
033105-28

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

1 Apr 05

OSD 12955-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50357

SP4

~~FOUO~~

MAR 23 2005



TO:

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Possible Briefing and Lunch for Commission Members

I may want to have the Ballistic Commission Members, the Space commission Members and the Debt Commission Members in for a briefing, and possibly lunch.

Please get me a list of names of those commission members, so I can decide.

Thanks.

DHR:ad
032205-128

.....

Please respond by _____

.....

Sir

Response Attached

V/R, COLB

3/23

334

83 MAR 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12957-05

11-L-0559/OSD/50358

A-136-2

DEBT

U.S. TRADE DEFICIT REVIEW COMMISSION

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION



The members of the Commission are (pictured above from left to right):

(Click on names for biography)

- C. Richard D'Amato, Maryland House of Delegates, **Annapolis, MD**
- Michael R. Wessel, **Downey McGrath Group**, Washington, DC
- Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, (Vice Chairman, **USTDRC**) , Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY
- Donald Rumsfeld, Chicago, IL
- Carla A. Hills, Hills & Company International **Consultants**, Washington, DC
- Wayne Angell **Bear Stearns and Company**, New York, NY

-
- **Kenneth Lewis, Portland, OR**
 - **Robert B. Zoellick, Washington, DC**
 - **Murray Weidenbaum, (Chairman, USTDRC), Washington University, St. Louis, MO**
 - **George Becker, United Steelworkers of America, Pittsburgh, PA**
 - **Anne Krueger, Stanford University, Stanford, CA**
 - **Lester Thurow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA**
-

[USTDRC HOME](#)

MISSLE

PRE-PRODUCTION COPY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
of the
REPORT
of the
COMMISSION TO ASSESS
THE BALLISTIC **MISSILE THREAT**
TO THE UNITED STATES

July 15, 1998

Pursuant to Public Law 201
104th Congress

Members of
The Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States were nominated by the
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
the Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate and the
Minority Leaders of the **U.S.** Senate and the
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable **Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman**
Dr. **Barry M. Blechman**
General Lee Butler, USAF (*Ret.*)
Dr. Richard L. Garwin
Dr. William R. **Graham**
Dr. William Schneider, Jr.
General **Larry** D. Welch, USAF (*Ret.*)
Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz
The Honorable R. James Woolsey
and appointed by the
Director of Central Intelligence

I. Charter and Organization

A. Statutory Charter of the Commission

threats posed by ballistic missiles:

- Deployed on the territory of a potentially hostile state.
- Launched from a surface vessel or submarine operating off the coasts of the United States or from an aircraft.
- Deployed by a potentially hostile nation on the territory of a third party to reduce the range required of its ballistic missiles to strike the United States.

The Commission examined the potential of both existing and emerging powers to arm ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction. The examination included the domestic design, development and production of nuclear material and nuclear weapons as well as the potential for states to acquire, through clandestine or covert sale, transfer or theft, either technology, material or weapons. The Commission examined biological and chemical weapons programs of the ballistic missile powers, as well as the potential means for delivering such agents by ballistic missiles.

The Commission reviewed U.S. collection and analysis capabilities to gain an appreciation for the capability of the U.S. Intelligence Community, today and into the future, to warn of the ballistic missile threat.

SPACE