

Cc: Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C

Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Brad,

Contact the SECDEF's secretary and provide the necessary addressing information so that Sgt Chandler's letter is properly routed. You might also correct the Unit title line for 1st LAR while your corresponding with her. See Col Sims note about any emails that we choose to send.

S/f

Col O'Neal

-----Original Message-----

From: Sims Col Terron D

Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 11:25 AM

To: O'Neal Col Michael C

Cc: Musca Col Joseph I

Subject: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Col O'Neal:

Secretary Rumsfeld would like to address a letter of congratulations to Sgt Chris Chandler upon successfully completing jump school. Sgt Chandler has a prosthetic leg. Per the info below, Sgt Chandler has orders to Camp Pendleton, 1st LAR Bn and is scheduled to report for duty around mid Jan04.

I believe it is appropriate for the Secretary's staff to address the letter for endorsement via Sgt Chandler's MARFORPAC chain of command. Please contact Ms. Monica Generous, Office of the Secretary of Defense, on 703 692-7134 and provide her guidance to address the letter to MARFORPAC or as you deem appropriate.

Please courtesy copy DMCS on emails to the Secretary's POC, and let me know if any other assistance is needed.

Thank you,

Colonel Terron Sims
Office of the Director Marine Corps Staff (DMCS)
DSN 224-2828

-----Original Message-----

From: Warner Capt Gilbert A

Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 3:07 PM

To: Tatum Sgt Patrick L

Cc: Sims Col Terron D; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S

Subject: RE: SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Sgt Tatum,

Sgt Chandler detached from this Headquarters during Dec 03 and is directed to

11-L-0559/OSD/21520

1/13/2004

report to 1st LAR for duty on or about 15 Jan 04. He is currently on annual leave, travel, etc. The official mailing address for the Command is:

1stLt Light Reconnaissance Battalion
Box 555564
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055

The Command SgtMaj (CCed above) is the point of contact for any other questions. As I stated above he will check into 1 MEF on 15 Jan 04 and will be engaged in the checking-in process for one to two days before going to 1st LAR. Additionally, it should be noted that 1st LAR is slated for deployment.

The SgtMaj's info is SgtMaj Nohl, DSN (b)(6)

Let me know if you have any questions.

R, Capt Warner
Force Adjutant
MARFORLANT

Tel: DSN: (b)(6)
Fax: DSN: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Tatum Sgt Patrick L
Sent: Friday, January 09, 2004 4:06 PM
To: Warner Capt Gilbert A
Cc: Sims Col Terron D
Subject: SGT CHADLER, CHRIST

Sir,

As discussed on the phone, SecDef would like to write a letter of congratulations to subject name Marine. If you could please verify the Marine's Unit address. Thank you for your time in this matter.

Sgt Patrick L. Tatum
Administrative Office of the
Director, Marine Corps Staff

(b)(6)

tatumpl@hqmc.usmc.mil

11-L-0559/OSD/21521

1/13/2004

Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD

From: Sims Col Terron D[SimsTD@hqmc.usmc.mil]
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 4:28 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

FYT.

> -__--Original Message-----
> From: Sims Col Terron D
> Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 4:25 PM
> To: O'Neal Col Michael C
> Cc: Musca Col Joseph I
> Subject: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.
>
> Col O'Neal:
>
> Secretary Rumsfeld would like to address a letter of congratulations to
> Sgt Chris Chandler upon successfully completing jump school. Sgt Chandler
> has a prosthetic leg. Per the info below, Sgt Chandler has orders to Camp
> Pendleton, 1st LAR Bn and is scheduled to report for duty around mid
> Jan04.
>
> I believe it is appropriate for the Secretary's staff to address the
> letter for endorsement via Sgt Chandler's MARFORPAC chain of command.
> Please contact Ms. Monica Generous, Office of the Secretary of Defense, on
> (b)(6) and provide her guidance to address the letter to MARFORPAC
> or as you deem appropriate.
>
> Please courtesy copy DMCS on emails to the Secretary's POC, and let me
> know if any other assistance is needed.
>
> Thank you.
>
> Colonel Terron Sims
> Office of the Director Marine Corps Staff (DMCS)
> DSN (b)(6)
>
>

7:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 6, 2004
SUBJECT: Sgt. Chandler

Why don't we write a note to this fellow, Sgt. Christopher Chandler, who jumped with a prosthetic limb.

Thanks.

*Carrie Sue!
do a draft*

DHR/azn
10604.08

Attach: *DefendAmerica* News Article: "US Marine Corp Sgt. Christopher Chandler"

Please respond by: _____

[Signature]

1

11-L-0559/OSD/21523

00615-04

Profiles

U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Christopher Chandler

Marine With Prosthetic Limb Jumps into History Books

By U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Isaac Pacheco

OR BENNING, Ga., Dec. 19, 2003 -- High above the asphalt in Alabama's moonbyside, the deafening roar of a C-130 night as it roared out the instructor's urgent commands. The troops didn't mind him respond instinctively. In the dim light, the U.S. Army Basic Airborne Course instructor can see only a few of their faces.

The troops remain focused on the task at hand and the orders of their instructor, not realizing this jump represents history in the making.

This was the first class to graduate a Marine who had been retained on active duty with a prosthetic limb.

Sgt. Christopher Chandler, 31, Col., native of his hometown of Littleton, Colo., was injured in a land mine while providing security of a peacekeeping force in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He was one of the first service members injured in the Global War on Terror, but unlike some of his wounded counterparts, he refused to let the incident diminish his ability to serve.

"I didn't have time to feel sorry for myself," Chandler, a maintenance technician for Headquarters Company, Marine Forces Atlantic, explained. "While I was in the hospital, other injured troops visited me. I saw that compared to them I had nothing to complain about."



Lt. Col. Kirk Rice, commanding officer of Marine Detachment Fort Benning, pins on Sgt. Christopher Chandler's jump wings during the drop mine graduation ceremony. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Kevin J. Ridlon

"After his injury and the loss of his leg, Chandler had to go before a Naval review. They had to make a decision as to whether he should be retained on active duty," Rice explained. "He was able to demonstrate to the Physical Evaluation Review Board that he was fit for return to full duty with no limitations. I think his success will open the door for the retention of service members who have lost a limb. It clearly demonstrates that given certain conditions, they can and should be left on active duty."

Chandler had to undergo another battery of physicals, paperwork and interviews before the airborne school would accept him. Yet, he was able to keep his sense of humor throughout the ordeal.

"Obviously, the school was going to ask questions because they were concerned about the safety of the other students," Chandler explained. "They wanted to know if I was even capable of completing the tasks they had for me. I finished all the tasks. After all I have one less ankle to trip over, he was the hardest task for me. I don't really like to run. The other guys in my class really motivated me to keep going."

One classmate said Chandler's motivation came from within and spread to the people around him.


"I was in Kandahar with him when he had his accident, and this is the first time I've seen him since then," said Sgt. Ryan Scheucher, platoon sergeant, 2nd Intelligence Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force. "If you'd known him before the accident, what he's doing right now would come as no surprise. Both in uniform and out, he's always just been one of those guys who just shuts up and gets the job done. If anything, since his accident I see a little more fire in his eyes. He gets up and he goes. He doesn't do anything to skyline himself or to showboat. If it's in the scope of his duty he just does it."

Chandler's enthusiasm and tireless commitment inspired many of his classmates and set the standard for them to follow.

"The first time I even realized he had a prosthetic leg was during one of our PT (physical training) sessions, and he was just smoking these little 18 year olds out there," said Air Force Staff Sgt. Brian Mayer, Special Operations Command Fort Bragg, N.C. "He's an inspiration because you have all these perfectly healthy people who wash out and quit while he stays in and makes it. That's a real testament to his character."

Other jump school students credited Chandler with helping them make it through the course when they were struggling.

11-L-0559/OSD/21524



Mentally preparing for his final jump, Sgt. Christopher Chandler grabs hold of his static line and awaits the go signal from his instructor. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Isaac Pacheco

It's been said that the truest test of one's character is not what he does with success but what he makes of defeat. Chandler stepped up to the challenge of jump school in the face of seemingly impossible odds. He jumped into the history books Dec. 10, becoming the only Service member retained on active duty to graduate the course with a prosthetic leg.

"I think any obstacle in life can be overcome if you believe in yourself," Chandler exclaimed. "I hope this will make it easier for other people with prosthetics who want to go through (jump school) next time. As long as they won't be extra baggage, and they can pull their own weight and accomplish the

mission. Hopefully, they won't have to put up with as much as I had to."

Chandler not only rose to the challenge but also exceeded even his own expectations when he was selected as the class' noncommissioned officer honor graduate.

"He captures the heart and soul of what it means to be a U.S. Marine," said Lt. Col. Kirk Rice, commander, Marine Corps Detachment, Fort Benning. "I mean he exemplifies all of our core values—honor, courage, and commitment. This is a courageous young man. He fought to be retained on active duty and asked for a chance to come to airborne school as a reenlistment bonus."

Chandler faced many challenges and trials during the course of his airborne training revolution, but none so rigorous as the medical boards he faced to stay on active duty.

He motivated me because at first I felt kind of down and I didn't like the course because it was so hard, but then I saw that he was doing it with only one leg and that inspired me and let me know that I could do this," said Army Sgt. Fatima Hickman, Company B, 203rd Infantry, 4th Support Bn., here. "He could have done anything else but he chose to continue in the military and to go forth with what he wants to do. He's not letting his prosthetic leg stop him from being the Marine he wants to be."

And what did Chandler have to say to his detractors: to the people who said an amputee would never make it through the school.

"I don't have to say anything to people who said I couldn't make it," he retorted. "I just graduated."

<http://www.defendamerica.mil/profiles/dec2003/pr1903a.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/21525



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-2267-05

7 January 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Memo on Abuse of Detainees Under Department of Defense Control

1. You requested I review the proposed draft memo to you from the President on abuse of detainees under Department of Defense control.
2. While the draft memo is substantially correct, I am deeply concerned about the tone. The memorandum does not focus on the positive developments; instead, it relies on past incidents to paint a bleak picture and casts the Department of Defense in a negative light. It places too much emphasis on the punishment and actions taken against those guilty of the abuse and too little emphasis on actions already taken to ensure such abuses will not occur again. In addition, this memo fails to put the abuse problem into a meaningful context; our forces have captured and held tens of thousands of detainees, with those leveling accusations of abuse numbering only in the dozens. A single instance of abuse is one too many, but recent press reports imply that abuse is systematic and widespread. This memo does nothing to dispel that notion.
3. As drafted, the memo further implies that detainee abuse is rampant and ongoing. As you are aware, the issues of abuse mentioned in the numerous articles occurred primarily in 2002 and 2003. While instances of alleged abuse have occurred recently, when it has occurred, it has been immediately reported, investigated and appropriate corrective action has been taken.
4. Our staffs should work together to change the draft memo if possible. This could be a positive exchange if done right. If the draft memo doesn't change, we need to generate a response memo, highlighting the positive, ongoing actions taken to address allegations of detainee abuse. In addition, I recommend such a response also highlight the good work of our forces involved in detention operations.

Richard B. Myers

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: _____

Reference:

- 1 Draft Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of Defense, undated, "Abuse of Detainees under Department of Defense Control"

11-L-0559/OSD/21526

OSD 00622-05

383.6

7 JAN 05

29 DEC 04

~~FOUO~~

~~SENSITIVE~~
2005 JAN -7 PM 2:15

December 29, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Lt. Col. Greg Langyel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Draft Memo

Attached is a sensitive draft memo.

It's not been signed or sent. I'd like you folks to check it and make sure it is accurate. If you have any suggestions on tone or handling of it, let me know.

We also ought *to* draft how we would respond to this. My impression is that the data in here is inaccurate, and needs *to* be updated and amended.

Please get back to me soon,

Thanks.

ATTACH.
12/29 BUTLER MEMO TO SECDEF 12/27 MEMO TO RILE
DHR:ms
122904-18 (u)

.....
Please respond by 1/4/05

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00622-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21527

To: SecDef

12/29/04

From: Paul Butler *fab*

Attached is a copy of the draft memo we discussed last night. As far as we know, it is still a draft. I relayed the message to the Deputy last night. I'm trying to find out if he has spoken with Steve Hadley. I'll report back as soon as I know something.

2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 27, 2004

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEZZA RICE

THROUGH: JOHN BREITINGER

FROM: BRAD WIEGMAN

SUBJECT: Abuse of Detainees under Department of Defense
Control

As you requested, attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he send a memorandum to the secretary of Defense on the detainee abuse issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment8

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memorandum to Secretary of

Defense

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: Abuse of Detainees under Department of Defense Control

Purpose

To sign a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on abuse of detainees in Department of Defense control.

Background

There have been many reports this year of abuse of detainees in the control of our military, most prominently the episode at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, but also reports concerning other incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan and FBI reports that have recently come to light concerning alleged abuse of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. These allegations have been or are being investigated by the Department of Defense. To date over fifty individuals have been referred to courts martial for various types of misconduct and others have been administratively disciplined. The Independent Panel, established by Secretary Rumsfeld and headed by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger made a number of recommendations this summer to improve detainee operations to ensure that abuse does not recur, and the other investigations that have been conducted into detainee abuse have also made numerous recommendations. The Department of Defense is working through these recommendations and implementing reforms and some investigations remain ongoing.

The repeated reports of detainee abuse this year have been damaging to the image of the United States abroad and have been disturbing to many Americans here at home. The memorandum at Tab A expresses your concern about this issue, while also,

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
Vice President's
Chief of Staff

expressing continued confidence in our military, and emphasizes to the Secretary of Defense the importance of continuing his efforts and making the results of the investigations and corrective actions known to the American people. It sends a clear message from you as Commander-in-Chief that you expect all detainees in the custody of our military to be treated humanely and consistent with applicable law and asks the Secretary of Defense to convey this message to our commanders in the field.

Concurrence: NSC/Legal

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Abuse of Detainees under Department of Defense
Control

The United States has the finest military force in the world, and
our

and

prevent such abuses from occurring in the future. You have my full support in working toward these objectives; You should also reemphasize to commanders in the field that they must work to ensure that all detainees under the control of our armed forces are treated in a lawful and in a humane manner.

7
TOTAL P.05

OSD #	SF #	Subject	TO
13900-04	042304-14	Location of Civil Affairs	JCS
00052-05	112404-9	Joint CONOPS	JCS
00622-05	122904-18(ts)	Draft Memo	Butler
78963-04	120204-9	Pentagon Entry	JCS
79005-04	112404-6	NATO	USP
75306-05	123004-10	Protecting Officials	

LT col Lengyel,

can you pls indicate if
you show those open or closed?

TO: → THANKS,
JASON
ESD

To: SecDef

January 21, 2005

From: Paul Butler

cc: Deputy

CJCS

~~Larry~~ Di Rita

Doug Feith

Steve Cambone

Jim Haynes

Pete Geren

Subject: Snowflake response on draft POTUS memo on detainees

You issued a snowflake (Tab A) asking the group listed above to review the draft memo from POTUS to you on detainees for accuracy and to develop a draft response. ~~Our~~ latest information is that there is no current plan to send the POTUS memo to you. Accordingly, the group decided that the proposed way ahead ought to be a memo from DoD to the NSC updating the status of detainee investigations. The attached draft memo for your review (Tab B) suggests that the memo come from the Deputy to Steve Hadley and that it review the record of investigations thus far and also address the need for interagency action on detainees in order to reinforce that this is not an issue under the sole control of DoD.

213,6

21 Jan 05

29 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

SENSITIVE

December 29, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Lt. Col. Greg Langyel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Draft Memo

To: Paul Woffowitz
Gen Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith
Steve Cambare
Jim Haynes
Pete Greven

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Please get back to me soon.

Thanks.

ATTACH.
12/29 BUTLER MEMO TO SECRET 12/27 MEMO TO RICE
DHR:ad
122904-18 (8)

.....
Please respond by 1/4/05

SENSITIVE

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21536

PROPOSED MEMO FROM DEPSECDEF TO NAT'L SECURITY ADVISOR

The Department of Defense is nearing closure on the investigations and assessments of detainee operations and known causes of abuse. I would like to update you on the status of these efforts and to raise several related issues to your attention.

As you know, DoD aggressively investigates allegations of detainee abuse. It is holding individuals accountable for their actions, and is taking steps throughout the Department to minimize the possibility of future abuse. To date, more than **fifty** service members have been referred to courts-martial and others have been disciplined through administrative action. Any allegations of abuse that arise in the future will be investigated and appropriate corrective action will be taken.

Since September 11, 2001, our forces have detained tens of thousands of fighters on battlefields around the world, and have conducted tens of thousands of interrogations. The vast majority of **U.S.** service members have conducted themselves with honor. Their efforts have been critical to the success of our operations. Our forces will continue to capture and detain individuals who commit or assist those who commit hostile acts against the United States, and our coalition partners. Our forces will take appropriate and lawful steps to obtain intelligence **from** detainees that assist us in defeating our enemies and saving American lives.

To ensure we conduct these activities in accordance with the President's order to treat all detainees humanely, Secretary Rumsfeld has commissioned several major reviews, including the Schlesinger Panel and review of detention and interrogation activities by Vice Admiral A. T. Church. The latter review – the "Church Report" – is nearing completion, and we intend to brief its results to the Congress and the public in the near future.

Altogether, the eleven major reviews, assessments and investigations have produced over five hundred specific recommendations for improving detention operations, many of which DoD has already implemented. These reviews and ongoing DoD reform efforts are intended not only to improve operations but to communicate clearly to the American people, to the world and to the **U.S.** military that detainee abuse is not something we tolerate and that when it happens we act vigorously to uncover it, to punish those responsible and to implement fixes.

We would like to brief the Principals Committee on the results of the several reviews and reports conducted by DoD, and on the efforts DoD has underway or completed to improve detention operations. In discussing these issue, all agencies

ought to be forthcoming with information they have about abuse allegations or other problems with detention operations.

As DoD moves ahead with implementing reforms to detention operations, **the** USG should also reexamine its basic policies in light of three years **of** experience in Global War on Terrorism experience. Some fixes needed to prevent or address detainee abuse require action by-or cooperation with other USG Departments and agencies. Long-term solutions to USG detainee policy issues require interagency attention: What is the plan for accelerating development of Iraqi and **Afghan** justice and **prison** capacity? How can the USG help strengthen the legal authority of Coalition partners to detain terrorists and their supporters? The Deputies Committee should be asked to meet on these issues in the near **future**.

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

December 29, 2004 11

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Lt. Col. Grey Longye
FROM: [redacted] nsfeld

SUBJECT: Draft Memo

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Please get back to me soon.

Thanks.

ATTACH.
12/29 BUTLER MEMO TO SECDEF 12/27 MEMO TO RICE
DHR:as
122904-18 (ts)

.....
Please respond by 1/4/05

SENSITIVE
~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 00622-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21539

383
L

29 Dec 04

To: SecDef .

12/29/04

From: Paul Butler *fab*

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2

720

TO: RPA
J. Amello
11/24/04

[Signature]

November 23, 2004

2005 JAN 10 AM 10:03

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gordon England
Jim Roche
Fran Harvey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Relieving Stress on the Force

Thank you for the good work on the "Tapping the Beer Keg" brief.

I'd like to see a template developed so that each Service can report on their progress in each of the areas you addressed – freeing up military for deployment by contracting, cross-training and deploying among the individual Service, task force organizing, developing visibility, and so forth.

DHR:ss
112304-3

.....
Please respond by 1/5/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21541

OSD 00656-05



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

January 6, 2005 1:38 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel and Readiness)

David S. C. Chu 7 January 05

SUBJECT: Relieving Stress on the Force—"Tapping the Beer Keg" SNOWFLAKE
(TAB A)

- After our November 23 discussion on force sustainment strategies, you asked us to return with a template that the Services could use to report on their progress in implementing these practices.
- We worked with the Army and JFCOM to craft an appropriate template for reviewing these initiatives.
- The template prompts the Services to list and quantify initiatives that alleviate OIF/OEF sourcing shortfalls (TAB B). We will review these data with the military departments over the next two weeks.
- Our intent is to empirically highlight the extent to which these good ideas have been implemented and discuss the potential for additional opportunities across the Department.
- We will schedule a session with you later this month to review our findings and recommend a way forward.

COORDINATION: As stated

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Joseph J. Angello, Jr., Director, Readiness Prog & Assessment (b)(6)



OSD 00656-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21542

TAB

A

TO: RPA
J. Amello
11/24/04

REACHES

November 23, 2004

2005 JAN 10 11:09:03

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gordon England
Jim Roche
Fran Harvey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Relieving Stress on the Force

Thank you for the good work on the "Tapping the Beer Keg" brief.

I'd like to see a template developed so that each Service can report on their progress in each of the areas you addressed - freeing up military for deployment by contracting, cross-training and deploying among the individual Service, task force organizing, developing visibility, and so forth.

DHR:ss
112304-3

Please respond by 1/5/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21544

OSD 00656-05

TAB

B

No.	Initiative Title	Cat.	Affected Capability Areas	Component	Affected UIC of Community	General Description	Sourcing Effects	Remarks
1	Example: Retraining the 30th ESB	B1	C8	G	WVASFF (note: this is the 30th ESB)	Element 1: Enlisted Personnel trained in Infantry battalions	1300	Used to fill specific sourcing requirements for 04-06 rotation.
2								
3								
4								
5								

•Initiative title

•Initiative type

(e.g. contracting out, civilianizing, cross training)

• **Affected capability area**

(e.g. air power, civil affairs, military police)

.Component

- **Affected UIC or community**

•Detailed description

•Units & Billets affected

•Remarks

Directions:

The following provides a column-by-column explanation for how each service will record their progress in force management initiatives. The reporting template accompanies these instructions.

- **Initiative Number:** Give each initiative a unique number (1, 2, 3 etc). If multiple rows are used to describe the effects of individual initiatives, use an outline numbering schema (1.1, 1.2, 1.3, etc) to identify subordinate rows.
- **Initiative Title:** Give each initiative a unique title.
- **Category:** Use one or more of these of these category codes as they apply. If the initiative does not fit any one or combination of categories, please use the category “E” and explain using the remarks column.

— Category A: Finding substitutions for military personnel

- * *A1: Using contract personnel:* Using contractors to satisfy military requirement to free up military assets (Ex: Using contractors to satisfy CONUS positions thereby freeing up military personnel.)
- * *A2: Using civilian personnel:* Using contractors to satisfy military requirement to free up military assets (Ex: Using Federal civilians to satisfy CONUS or theater requirements in lieu of military personnel.)

— Category B: Increasing the supply of high-demand skills

- * *B1: Cross training:* Training individuals to perform *outside* their general occupational field. This may or may not involve cross-Service solutions. (Ex: Training artillerymen for infantry positions).
- * *B2: Skill broadening:* Training individuals on a wider variety of skills within their general occupational field. This may or may not involve cross-Service solutions. (Ex: Training a larger pool of personnel on core “IMP-type” skills.)
- * *B3: Restructuring skills:* Shifting endstrength from low-demand skills areas to high-demand areas. (Ex: Reducing billets for musicians and increasing the number of billets for truck drivers)

— Category C: Increase the number of deployable units

- * *C1: Taskforce organizing:* Create units/organizations from individuals or small detachments. (Ex: Pulling elements from several guard or reserve units to create a deployable unit)
- * *C2: Adding forces structure:* Increase endstrength to suit demand

— **Category D: Assign personnel based on planned deployment status** (Ex: Ensure that returning “red-lined” personnel are not assigned to units likely to deploy imminently. Conversely, ensuring that available, high-valued personnel are not assigned to non-deploying positions (such as headquarters or infrastructure.)

— **Category E: Other / Not listed**

- **Affected Capability Areas:** The following are the capability areas used in OIF/OEF sourcing exercises. Identify which area(s) are affected by each initiative. Use one or more codes as they apply:

- * All: All capability areas
- * Other: Other / Not listed: Affects a capability area that is not listed here
- * AG: Adjutant General
- * AP: Air Power
- * AV: Aviation
- * CA: Civil Affairs
- * CB: Combat
- * CH: Chaplains
- * CM: Chemical
- * CF: Combatant Forces
- * CS: corps support
- * EN: Engineering
- * F: Finance
- * FS: Fire Support
- * HQ: Headquarters
- * IO: Information Operations
- * MS: Medical
- * MH: Military History
- * MI: Military Intelligence
- * MP: Military Police
- * OD: Ordinance
- * PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team
- * PO: Psychological Operations
- * PA: Public Affairs
- * QM: Quartermaster
- * SEC: Security Forces
- * SC: Signal Corps
- * TN: Trainers
- * TC: Transportation
- * WS: Waterside

- **Component:** List the affected component:

- * A: Active
- * G:
- * R:

- **Affected UIC or Community:** Explain which unit(s) was (were) affected by this initiative. For those initiatives that targeted specific UICs, please list them. If the initiative covers an entire skill area or community (thereby affecting many UICs), you can just list the applicable skill area or community.
- **General Description:** Use this space to provide enough explanation for a reader to understand how the initiative was executed, the expected duration and implementation plans.
- **Sourcing Effects:** Use this section to quantify how the initiative directly contributes to GWOT and other ongoing missions. Entries will be in the form of the units and associated billets sourced as a result of each initiative. List the GWOT forces according to the applicable OIF rotation (04-06, 05-07, 06-08, and beyond). Effects for other missions should be entered in the “other” column. Use the remarks column for all amplifying text.
- **Remarks:** Use this space to provide enough explanation for a reader to understand extenuating circumstances, impacts the initiative accomplished beyond those listed in the “sourcing” columns, and possible negative or second order effects associated with the initiative. Be sure to discuss mitigation strategies for any negative impacts.

7200
~~FOUO~~

DEC 14 2004
2005 JAN 10 10:10:14

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. Ben Carson

This fellow, Dr. Ben Carson, is a brilliant neurosurgeon at Johns Hopkins. The letter is self-explanatory. Please take a look at this, tell me what you can do about it, and keep me posted.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/10/04 Letter from Dr. Ben Carson to SecDef

DHR:ss
121304-36

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21550

OSD 00661-05



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

2005 JAN 03 11 20 AM

JAN 04 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Dr. Ben Carson's concern about Mr. (b)(6) inability to enter Army due to history of brain surgery

- Dr. Carson contends Mr. (b)(6) was qualified to enter the Army despite brain surgery performed when a child (TAB A).
- Army's waiver authority denied a waiver of the condition.
- We have asked Army's Neurosurgery consultant to review the record and call Dr. Carson to discuss the case.
- I have sent a letter to Dr. Carson explaining this situation and asking him to discuss the case with the Army consultant (TAB B).

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Colonel Bengt, C&PP, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21551

OSD 00661-05

~~FOUO~~

DEC 14 2004
205 JAN 15 11 19 14

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. Ben Carson

This fellow, Dr. Ben Carson, is a brilliant neurosurgeon at Johns Hopkins. The letter is self-explanatory. Please take a **look** at this, tell me what you can do about it, and keep me posted.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/10/04 Letter from Dr. Ben Carson to SecDef

DHR:ss
121304-36

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21552

OSD 00661-05



JOHNS HOPKINS
M E D I C I N E

Neurological Surgery

600 North Wolfe Street/ Harvey 811
Baltimore, MD 21287-8811
410-955-7888 / Fax: 410-955-0626

Benjamin S. Carson, Sr., M.D.
Professor and Director of Pediatric Neurosurgery

December 10, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary ~~Rumsfeld~~:

It has been a long time since we have communicated, but I have certainly watched what you are doing with pride and pleasure. I am delighted that you will be staying on as Secretary of Defense, and I think I can speak for all the other directors at Kellogg that we certainly miss you. As you know, Carlos will be joining you in the Cabinet soon and as you probably know, I am a member of the President's Council on Bioethics.

I am writing to explore the possibility of cutting through what seems to be insurmountable military bureaucracy on behalf of one of my patients. His name is (b)(6) and he is currently in the Corp of Cadets at the (b)(6)

(b)(6) Since he was a small boy, he has wanted to be a member of the United States Army and has geared his education in that direction. About 10 years ago, he had a cyst in his brain which I treated by inserting a shunt. This cyst has subsequently resolved, and the shunt became non-functional. It has not functioned for several years now. Unfortunately, the military has a policy that says someone with a shunt cannot join the Army, apparently, according to Dr. Delleri and Dr. Wong who have been dealing with his particular case. Needless to say, the young man is heartbroken and his family is devastated. They are considering having the shunt removed to see if possibly that will alter the opinions of the doctors aforementioned. As a physician, I always look at benefit-to-risk ratios when considering surgery and to put someone asleep and extract something from their brain, which carries it's own inherent set of risks just to be in compliance with a ruling which is largely irrelevant since the patient does not have Hydrocephalus which is the condition for which shunts are usually placed and since the shunt is no longer functional and is no longer needed, would not carry a favorable benefit-to-risk ratio.

11-L-0559/OSD/21553


Johns Hopkins Medicine is an alliance of The Johns Hopkins Health System and The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine

10:11:44 Dec 13 2004

(b)(6)

Fax

DR BENJAMIN CARSON



This young man is meeting all of the standard qualifications of the Army for physical training at his school and has even gone through a mini basic training course satisfactorily. I think our military could benefit from having dedicated soldiers who want nothing more than to dedicate their lives to defending our nation. I would be most appreciative if you could intervene for this young man.

Thanks for your attention to this matter, and thanks for the wonderful job you are doing for our nation. We are extremely proud of you.

With warm regards,



Benjamin S. Carson, Sr., M.D.
~~Director~~ of Pediatric Neurosurgery
Professor of Neurological Surgery,
Oncology, Plastic Surgery, and Pediatrics

/alj

11-L-0559/OSD/21554



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Dr. Benjamin S. Carson
Professor and Director of
Pediatric Neurosurgery
Johns Hopkins
600 North Wolfe Street/Harvey 811
Baltimore, MD 21287-8811

Dear Ben,

Thanks so much for your note. I am delighted you wrote and I thank you so much for your kind words of support.

I'm going to ask Dr. Bill Winkenwerder to take a look at this and get back to you. He is in charge of all health affairs for the Department. He's a good man, and someone you ought to know, anyway. I hope something can be worked out.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely of the Secretary of Defense, written in black ink.

11-L-0559/OSD/21555



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

JAN 04 2005

Benjamin S. Carson, Sr., M.D.
Professor and Director of Pediatric Neurosurgery
600 North Wolfe Street/Harvey 811
Baltimore, MD 21287-8811

Dear Dr. ^{Ben}Carson:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your December 10, 2004 letter to Secretary Rumsfeld in the matter of Mr. (b)(6). The Secretary asked that I investigate this matter and see what I can do.

Accession medical standards for entry into the U.S. military are governed by Department of Defense Instruction 6130.4, "*Criteria and Procedure Requirements for Physical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Armed Forces.*" The Army's application of this Instruction is contained in Army Regulation 40-501 "*Standards of Medical Fitness.*" It is our policy to access only those personnel who can be immediately deployed world-wide to perform unrestricted military duties under harsh conditions without the need for prescription medication or specialized medical treatment.

The Services have the authority to waive any condition to meet their manpower needs. In this case, the waiver authority for the Army determined that retention of a foreign object and the fact (b)(6) had undergone brain surgery precluded against granting such a waiver. However, my staff has prevailed upon the Army Surgeon's office to have their neurosurgery consultant obtain and review the medical record in detail. He will then speak with you about (b)(6) case.

I trust this explanation of our policy will be helpful to you.

Bill

William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD

I have asked the Army Medical Department to take a most careful look at this situation and to speak directly with you. It was good to speak with you. 1-203-559-0301/21556 we have the chance to meet personally in the near future —

COORDINATION

Dir, C&PPI

CAPT Jack Smith

4/21/11 2:58 PM

CoS, HA

COL Thom Kurnel

PDASD, HA


Dr. Steve Jones

Letter from Dr. Ben Carson - Snowflake

COORDINATION

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S. C. Chu


7 January 2011

11-L-0559/OSD/21558

12/8
1402

12/8
~~FOUO~~

December 8, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Write Honorees

I would like to get a list of the Kennedy Center honorees, so I can Write some of them a note.

I also want to write Billy Joel, so try to get his address.

Thanks.

DHR:dn
120804-14

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

335 50

8 Dec 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00685-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21559



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National Symphony Orchestra

27TH ANNUAL KENNEDY CENTER HONORS

The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts announced the selection, by its board of trustees, of the individuals who will receive the Kennedy Center Honors of 2004. Recipients to be honored at the 27th annual national celebration of the arts are:

Warren Beatty

Ossie Davis
&
Ruby Dee

Sir Elton John

Dame
Joan Sutherland

John Williams



The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts announced the selection, by its board of trustees, of the individuals who will receive the Kennedy Center Honors of 2004. Recipients to be honored at the 27th annual national celebration of the arts are: actor, producer, writer and director [REDACTED]; husband-and-wife actors, writers and producers [REDACTED]; singer and composer [REDACTED]; soprano [REDACTED]; and composer and conductor [REDACTED].

"This year the Kennedy Center honors not the usual five but six extraordinary individuals whose unique and abundant artistry has contributed significantly to the cultural life of our nation and the world," said Kennedy Center Chairman Stephen A. Schwarzman. "They are a film artist whose talents are astonishingly diverse; a greatly revered couple of stage and screen; a pop music icon who also composes stunning musical film and theater scores; an operatic superstar of unsurpassed artistic achievement; and one of the most influential American composers of the past four decades."

The annual Honors Gala has become the highlight of the Washington cultural year. The

THE KENNEDY CENTER HONORS

PHOTOS FROM 26TH KENNEDY CENTER HONORS GALA


Stop by the kiosks in the Hall of States and see the Kennedy Center to view videos of past honorees.

11-L-0559/OSD/21560

2004 Honorees will be saluted by stars from the world of the performing arts at a gala performance in the Kennedy Center's Opera House on Sunday to be attended by the President of the United States and Mrs. Bush, and by artists from around the world.

The President and the First Lady will receive the Honorees and members of the Artists Committee, with the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees at the White House on Sunday evening, December 5, prior to the performance. The Boeing Company is the exclusive underwriter of the 2004 Kennedy Center Honors events, which concludes with a supper dance in the Grand Foyer.

The Kennedy Center Honors will be bestowed the night before the gala on Saturday, December 4, at a dinner, hosted by the Secretary of State Colin Powell.



Candice Bergen, Michael Douglas, and Annette Bening praise the career of Jack Nicholson.

The Honors Gala will be taped for broadcast later in December for the 27th consecutive year as a two-hour prime time special.

George Stevens, Jr., who created the Honors in 1978 and co-wrote the show for the 27th consecutive year. The show is honored with five Emmy's for Outstanding Program as well as for Outstanding Contribution to Television.

Delta Air Lines, the official airline of the Kennedy Center Honors broadcast, will provide transportation for the performers arriving in Washington for the Honors Gala. Boeing is the sponsor of the Kennedy Center Honorees' Luncheon and special evening event for the Kennedy Center Honors weekend.

The Honors recipients are recognized for their lifetime contributions to American culture through the performing arts: whether in dance, music, theater, opera, motion pictures or television. The primary criterion in the selection process is excellence. The Honors are not designated by art form or category of artistic achievement; the selection process, over the years, has produced balance among the various arts and artistic disciplines.


Members of the Kennedy Center's national artists committee, as well as past Honorees, made recommendations of possible Honorees. Among the artists making recommendations were: Dan Aykroyd, Christine Baranski, Angela Bassett, Joshua Bell, Adrien Brody, Dave Brubeck, Cy Coleman, Benicio Del Toro, Michael Douglas, Suzanne Farrell, Renee Fleming, Morgan Freeman, Rosemary Harris, Paloma Herrera, Philip Seymour Hoffman, Nathan Lane, Yo-Yo Ma, Nadja Salerno-Sonnenberg, Steven Spielberg, Meryl Streep and Pinchas Zuckerman.



Julie Andrews Van Cliburn's look & style

Michael M. Kaiser, President of the Center, expressed the Center's gratitude to the many individuals in the Honors program. "In addition to recognizing our most treasured artists, the Kennedy Center Honors supports the many performing arts initiatives, education and public service programming, and national efforts to make the Center's presentations accessible to all."

Exclusive Underwriter



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11-L-0559/OSD/21561

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2700 F Street, NW

Washington, DC 20566

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11-L-0559/OSD/21562

January 4, 2005

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CBS to Broadcast "Kennedy Center Honors" Dec. 21; Tony Winners McDonald and Headley Perform

By Andrew Gans
and Kenneth Jones
17 Dec 2004

CBS-TV will broadcast the 27th annual "Kennedy Center Honors" Dec. 21 at 9 PM ET. Caroline Kennedy hosts.

The two-hour gala evening pays tribute to the 2004 Kennedy Center Honorees: actor Warren Beatty, husband-and-wife acting couple Ossie Davis and Ruby Dee, pop and Broadway composer Elton John, opera star Dame Joan Sutherland and composer-conductor John Williams. The honorees were saluted Dec. 5 at the Kennedy Center's Opera House. President and Laura Bush were among the evening's guests.

Warren Beatty was honored with tributes from Academy Award winners Faye Dunaway and Jack Nicholson; Tony Award winners Brian Stokes Mitchell and Audra McDonald as well as recent Broadway debuter Sean Combs saluted the careers of Ossie Davis and Ruby Dee; Marilyn Horne paid tribute to fellow opera star Joan Sutherland; Steven Spielberg took part in the John Williams segment; and Elton John was honored by appearances from Billy Joel, Heather Headley, Kid Rock, Fantasia and Robert Downey, Jr.

About this year's inductees, Kennedy Center Chairman Stephen A. Schwarzman said in a statement, "This year the Kennedy Center honors not the usual five but six extraordinary individuals whose unique and abundant artistry has contributed significantly to the cultural life of our nation and the world. They are a film artist whose talents are astonishingly diverse; a greatly revered couple of stage and screen; a pop music icon who also composes stunning musical film and theater scores; an operatic superstar of unsurpassed artistic achievement; and one of the most influential American composers of the past four decades."

Warren Beatty is the Hollywood film actor and director ("Bonnie and Clyde," "Heaven Can Wait," "Bulworth"), Ossie Davis and Ruby Dee are icons of black theatre in America, Elton John is the British pop writer who wrote scores to "The Lion King" and *Aida*, Joan Sutherland is the operatic superstar and composer John Williams is known for his Hollywood movie scores ("Jaws," "Star Wars," "Raiders of the Lost Ark").

Related Information

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11-L-0559/OSD/21563



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

January 12, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Opportunity to Vote During the 2004 Elections

- The memorandum at TAB A emphasizes the importance of command support and the personal attention of Voting Assistance Officers in providing the opportunity for Uniformed Services members, their dependents, and overseas citizens to vote in the 2004 elections.
- The Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) has been striving to ensure every Uniformed Services member, their voting age dependents, and overseas citizens have the opportunity to vote in the 2004 elections. Key to the effectiveness of the Program's efforts is the involvement of command leadership in emphasizing the Program and the support commands provide to Voting Assistance Officers in carrying out their duties.

COORDINATION: TAB B

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memorandum at TAB A

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: John Godley, FVAP, (b)(6)

1/14

Chu - Please hold until he can be briefed on the FVAP. He has questions. We will debrief him.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SA MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	1/16

12 JAN 04



11-L-0559/OSD/21564

OSD 00737-04

March 15, 2004

**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)**

NOTE FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Attached at Tab A are talking points on Uniformed Services
voting preparations for the 2004 elections.

At Tab B are memoranda to the Secretaries of the Military
Departments and Combatant Commanders for your signature.



David S. C. Chu

Attachments

11-L-0559/OSD/21565

TALKING PAPER

March 16, 2004 — 12:02 p.m.

SUBJECT: Absentee Voting Preparations for the 2004 Elections

- The Secretary of Defense is the Presidential Designee [to carry out the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, which covers the voting rights of the Uniformed Services and their family members - both CONUS and OCONUS - as well as all US citizens outside the United States.
- The Department publishes a biennial Voting Action Plan laying out programmatic responsibilities. Each Service has assigned a Senior Service Voting Representative (of General or Flag rank) and a Service Voting Action Officer, who is responsible for the program.
- There are more than six million potential voters: 3.7 million overseas civilians not affiliated with the Government; 1.4 million military; 1.3 million dependents of voting age; and .1 million federal civilian employees. Past Absentee voting:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Uniformed</u>	<u>Federal Civilian</u>	<u>Civilian (non-federal)</u>
2000	69%	65%	37%.

- The Federal Voting Assistance Program Office (FVAP) has been visiting mobilization sites (7 sites) and major installations. To date, 43 Voting Assistance Officer Training workshops have been completed at 41 installation sites. An additional 144 workshops are scheduled through August 2004. In addition, Voting Assistance Officer Training is offered on-line, on compact disc, and in book form.
- All States now accept the on-line version of the Federal Post Card application. We have been monitoring voting during the Primaries to detect problems and implement necessary corrective actions before the General Election.
- The NDAA FY02 directed the DoD to conduct an electronic voting demo (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE)), for 2004. In view of the inability to ensure legitimacy of votes that would be cast in the Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment thereby bringing into doubt the integrity of the election results, the Department took immediate steps to suspend the use of the system to register or vote via the Internet.
- We have established September 3 – 11, 2004, as Armed Forces Voter Registration Week to ensure timely voter registration. Absentee Voter Week will be scheduled for October 11 – 15, 2004, to ensure absentee ballots are completed and mailed prior to the general election.

11-L-0559/OSD/21566

Talking Points

Uniformed Services Voting Preparations for the 2004 Elections

- There are more than six million potential voters: 3.7 million overseas civilians not affiliated with the Government; 1.4 million military; 1.3 million dependents of voting age; and .1 million federal civilian employees.
- Absentee voting participation in the past:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Uniformed</u>	<u>Federal Civilian</u>	<u>Civilian (non-federal)</u>
1988	64%	64%	38%
1992	67%	79%	31%
1996	64%	68%	37 %
2000	69%	65%	37%.

- Voting Assistance Officers are the key to success of the absentee voting program. This is true at CONUS bases as well as overseas. We are pushing materials to the theater and training Voting Assistance Officers at every opportunity.
- The Federal Voting Assistance Program Office (FVAP) has been visiting mobilization sites and major installations to inform commanders on voting program requirements and to train Voting Assistance Officers.
- FVAP has scheduled voting workshops to be conducted in Qatar and Bahrain to train Voting Assistance Officers already in theater. Federal Post Card Applications and Write-In Absentee Ballot forms are pre-positioned in theater.
- The NDAA FY02 directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct an electronic voting demo (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE)), for 2004. In view of the inability to ensure legitimacy of votes that would be cast in the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE), thereby bringing into doubt the integrity of the election results, the Department took immediate steps to suspend the use of the system to register or vote.
- We have established September 3 – 11, 2004, as Armed Forces Voter Registration Week to ensure timely voter registration. Absentee Voter Week will be scheduled for October 11 – 15, 2004, to ensure absentee ballots are completed and mailed prior to the general election.

October 29, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo for POTUS on Military Voting

Please prepare for me a brief (one-page) memo to the President explaining what has been done by the Department of Defense on absentee ballots and voting for military personnel.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102903-8

.....
Please respond by 11/21/03

11/16
Response Attached

*Tom —
Pls see if this
even was done.
I don't recall seeing
it — he wants
it to inform the
POTUS*

11-L-0559/OSD/21568

11/13
U222337/03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 17 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
COMBATANT COMMANDERS**

SUBJECT: Opportunity to Vote During the 2004 Elections

As the men and women of our Uniformed Services serve around the world defending democracy and freedom, we are reminded of our precious right as Americans to choose our national leaders. Today, more people around the world than ever before hold this most fundamental democratic right—the right to vote. This year, Americans at home and abroad will vote in elections to fill Federal, state and local offices. We will be voting to elect the President and Vice President, 34 U.S. Senators, the entire U.S. House of Representatives, 13 State Governors, and hundreds of local officials. The outcome of these elections will shape the nation's future.

For the men and women of our Uniformed Services, the opportunity to register and cast their ballots in the 2004 elections will depend significantly on the assistance and support they receive from Service and command voting programs and from the Voting Assistance Officers assigned to their units. Those serving overseas, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, and mobilized National Guard and Reserve units, will face the additional challenges of the availability of election information and materials and the lengthened time it takes to receive and return their absentee ballots through the mails. I want your support for the following:

- Ensure command support of the voting program at all levels of command. Personal involvement of commanders is crucial to effective implementation of the voting program. Assign quality officers the duty of Voting Assistance Officers and comment on their performance as a Voting Assistance Officer on their evaluation reports. Voting Assistance Officers must be given the time and resources needed for them to perform their duties effectively, including the opportunity to complete a Federal Voting Assistance Program Training Workshop.
- Publicize the identity and location of Voting Assistance Officers within each major command, on each installation, and within each unit. Service, command, installation and unit websites should maintain prominent voting information links for the benefit of Service members.



11-L-0559/OSD/21569

OSD 00737-04

014.35


17 MAR 04

12 JUN 04

- Service Voting Assistance Officers must establish and maintain a directory of major command and installation Voting Assistance Officers and have the means by which to effectively and rapidly communicate with them and their subordinates. I will be asking Dr. David Chu to meet with the Senior Service Voting Representatives regularly between now and election day to get updates and act quickly to resolve any problems.
- Voting materials, including the Federal Post Card Application and the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot must be distributed to all units, and unit Voting Assistance Officers must be aware of the availability of such materials. These materials are available in book form, on CD and on the Internet at <http://www.fvap.gov>. I want to ensure each Service member is handed the Federal Post Card Application and is offered assistance in completing the form if needed.
- Use your command and public information capabilities to support the September 2004 Armed Forces Voter's Week and designate other special days to inform members and families of absentee voter registration and voting procedures ensuring that all voters are registered to vote by the end of September. I want each of you to designate the week of October 11-15th as Absentee Voting Week. If overseas voters complete and mail their ballots by October 15, their votes will reach any precinct in time to be counted.

We will not recommend any party or candidate. Our mission is to ensure every Service member and their families have the opportunity to vote in the appropriate Primary, Special, Runoff and General Elections and to ensure that their votes are counted.

Voting is both a privilege and a responsibility of citizens in a democracy. It is our responsibility, as leaders of the Armed Services, to do everything we can to ensure that our Service members and their families exercise their right to vote.





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 17 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Opportunity to Vote During the 2004 Elections

014.35

As the men and women of our Uniformed Services serve around the world defending democracy and freedom, we are reminded of our precious right as Americans to choose our national leaders. Today, more people around the world than ever before hold this most fundamental democratic right—the right to vote. This year, Americans at home and abroad will vote in elections to fill Federal, state and local offices. We will be voting to elect the President and Vice President, 34 U.S. Senators, the entire U.S. House of Representatives, 13 State Governors, and hundreds of local officials. The outcome of these elections will shape the nation's future.

For the men and women of our Uniformed Services, the opportunity to register and cast their ballots in the 2004 elections will depend significantly on the assistance and support they receive from Service and command voting programs and from the Voting Assistance Officers assigned to their units. Those serving overseas, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, and mobilized National Guard and Reserve units, will face the additional challenges of the availability of election information and materials and the lengthened time it takes to receive and return their absentee ballots through the mails. I want your support for the following:

17 MAR 04

- Ensure command support of the voting program at all levels of command. Personal involvement of commanders is crucial to effective implementation of the voting program. Assign quality officers the duty of Voting Assistance Officers and comment on their performance as a Voting Assistance Officer on their evaluation reports. Voting Assistance Officers must be given the time and resources needed for them to perform their duties effectively, including the opportunity to complete a Federal Voting Assistance Program Training Workshop.
- Publicize the identity and location of Voting Assistance Officers within each major command, on each installation, and within each unit. Service, command, installation and unit websites should maintain prominent voting information links for the benefit of Service members.
- Service Voting Assistance Officers must establish and maintain a directory of major command and installation Voting Assistance Officers and have the

12 JAN 04



11-L-0559/OSD/21571

OSD 00737-04

means by which to effectively and rapidly communicate with them and their subordinates. I will be asking Dr. David Chu to meet with the Senior Service Voting Representatives regularly between now and election day to get updates and act quickly to resolve any problems.

- Voting materials, including the Federal Post Card Application and the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot must be distributed to all units, and unit Voting Assistance Officers must be aware of the availability of such materials. These materials are available in book form, on CD and on the Internet at <http://www.fvap.gov>. I want to ensure each Service member is handed the Federal Post Card Application and is offered assistance in completing the form if needed.
- Use your command and public information capabilities to support the September 2004 Armed Forces Voter's Week and designate other special days to inform members and families of absentee voter registration and voting procedures ensuring that all voters are registered to vote by the end of September. I want each of you to designate the week of October 11-15th as Absentee Voting Week. If overseas voters complete and mail their ballots by October 15, their votes will reach any precinct in time to be counted.,

We will not recommend any party or candidate. Our mission is to ensure every Service member and their families have the opportunity to vote in the appropriate Primary, Special, Runoff and General Elections and to ensure that their votes are counted.

Voting is both a privilege and a responsibility of citizens in a democracy. It is our responsibility, as leaders of the Armed Services, to do everything we can to ensure that our Service members and their families exercise their right to vote.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David Chu", is centered on the page.



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

ACTION MEMO

January 7, 2005, 5:00 PM

DepSec Action _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas

SUBJECT: Appointments of Mr. John Madigan and Mr. Jerry Lindauer to the Defense Business Board (DBB)

- On July 19, 2004, you directed Larry DiRita to put Mr. John Madigan on the DBB. Also, Mr. DiRita requested that Mr. Jerry Lindauer be named to the Board. Their biographies are attached.
- As of January 1, 2005, three of the 20 DBB member seats are open.
- Gus Pagonis supports the nominations of both Mr. Lindauer and Mr. Madigan. Both men have outstanding private sector experience that will contribute to the continuing work of the DBB.

RECOMMENDATION: That you indicate your preferences to proceed with the appointments of Mr. Madigan and Mr. Lindauer to the DBB.

COORDINATION: None required.

1. Mr. John Madigan:

Yes JN JAN 12 2005

No _____

2. Mr. Jerry Lindauer:

Yes JN JAN 12 2005

No _____

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Tom Modly/Executive Director, DBB/(b)(6)

OSD 00744-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21573

MA SD	SMA DSD	5/12	1/12
TSA SD	SA DSD	1/11	
EXEC SEC	MI/11		
ESR MA	BH 1/10		

334

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1954104



John W. Madigan

Mr. Madigan has been a director at Morgan Stanley since June 2000. Mr. Madigan retired as Chairman of Tribune Company, a leading media company with television and radio, broadcasting, newspaper publishing and interactive businesses, in December 2003. He served as chief executive officer from May 1995 through December 2002. He was elected to the Tribune board of directors in 1975, the same year he joined the company as vice president/chief financial officer. He is Chairman of the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the McCormick Tribune Foundation, a director of the Associated Press and AT&T Wireless Services. Additionally, Mr. Madigan is a trustee of Northwestern University, Illinois Institute of Technology, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center and The Museum of Television & Radio in New York.



Jerry Lindauer, Chairman

As Chairman of Security Broadband Corp, Jerry Lindauer brings strong leadership in strategic planning, government relations and corporate development. A well-respected spokesman for the cable industry for twenty-three years, Mr. Lindauer served as Chairman of the Board of the National Cable Television Association (NCTA) from 1990-1991 and was a member of that board for over two decades. He served on the Board of Directors for C-SPAN and was a founding member of the Cable Alliance for Education.

Mr. Lindauer was a Principal and Partner with Prime Cable where he was instrumental in acquiring, operating and divesting major cable TV properties representing a subscriber base of over one million customers and valued in excess of \$4 billion. Mr. Lindauer began his career in telecommunications by joining Communications Properties, Inc., in 1977. He became Senior Vice President in charge of franchising and regulatory activity when the company was purchased by Times Mirror in 1979. Mr. Lindauer was also President of Times Mirror Security, later acquired by Westec.

During his twenty-year career as a Marine Corps Officer, Mr. Lindauer was a military assistant in the office of the Secretary of Defense. He also served as an Infantry Company Commander in Vietnam and was awarded two Bronze Stars and a Purple Heart among other decorations. He continues his involvement in his community and his commitment to education by serving on the Board of Trustees of Bellarmine University and on the Board of the Longhorn Foundation at the University of Texas at Austin. He is also a member of the Society of Fellows at the Aspen Institute. Mr. Lindauer, a father of two, is a graduate of Bellarmine University and the University of Texas School of Law.

Phone numbers:

Mobil (b)(6)

Work

Home

~~FOUO~~

July 19, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: John Madigan on DBB

I would like to **put** John Madigan on my Defense Business Board.

Thanks.

DHRdh
071904-26

.....
Please respond by

7/30/04

Call Tim Jones

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21576

~~FOUO~~

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TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: John Madigan on DBB

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Thanks.

DHR:dh
071904-26

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04

Call The Jones

334

19 Jul 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21577



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Phone numbers:

Mobile (b)(6)

Work

Home

~~FOUO~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SECURITY

205 JAN 10 AM 1:45

December 15, 2004

I-04/016967

ES-1703

11A9

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Update on Coalition

I have not received an update from the two of you on where we stand on getting ahead of the curve with the coalition. I now see that Poland is starting to pull back their troops, and they may do more now that six or seven of them were killed or injured in a helicopter crash.

We simply have to get ahead of the curve, and we have to get the Department of State involved.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-9

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

15DEC04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21580

OSD 00761-05

15-12-04 14:24 IN



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

January 12, 2004, 8:42PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

JAN 12 2004

SUBJECT: Final Report - Malaria Cases Among Joint Task Force Liberia Participants

- This memo is provided to summarize the findings of a Navy and Marine Corps medical investigation on the malaria cases that occurred among the Joint Task Force Liberia participants. The previous report is provided at TAB A. A conference report on the results of the medical investigation is provided at TAB B. All patients have since recovered and have been discharged from the hospital.
- **Key Facts:**
 - 225 personnel in Quick Reaction Force went ashore in Liberia.
 - 80 cases of malaria have been diagnosed and treated.
 - 51 clinical cases with positive smear for malaria parasites; 29 with negative smears.
 - 71 Marines; 7 Navy; 1 Army; 1 civilian.
 - 2 cases of cerebral malaria; 1 case of acute respiratory distress syndrome.
- **Medical investigation revealed:**
 - Mefloquine prophylaxis was readily available to the Quick Reaction Force and the drug potency and formulation were adequate.
 - This strain of malaria (*P. falciparum*) demonstrated some decreased susceptibility to mefloquine, but is not likely to have been a significant factor.
 - Laboratory tests of serum mefloquine levels suggested a majority of Quick Reaction Force members tested did not comply with required dosing schedule. This finding contrasted with early information that was based solely on the patients' self-reports.
 - Bed nets were not used on shore due to net design and mission requirements.
 - Local insect control of malaria vectors was not feasible.
 - DEET repellent was available, but the majority of personnel did not routinely use it. Most uniforms had not been adequately treated with permethrin repellent.
 - Routine pre-deployment training for physicians did not adequately cover malaria.
- It is my understanding from HQ, USMC that an investigation into this incident is ongoing by the EUCOM Judge Advocate General — although I have not been

11-L-0559/OSD/21581

OSD 00791-04

informed on any of the details. This is a very preventable disease, and we were fortunate that the failure to prevent it did not result in loss of life. The lesson relearned is the critical importance of command leadership in implementing the preventive medicine program. //

COORDINATION: USD P&R David S.C. Chu, 5 Jan 04

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs), (b)(6)

TAB

A



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

SEP 23 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Update - Malaria in Marines from Liberia as of 23 Sep 03

- This provides an update to the previous response to your snowflake dated September 10, 2003 (TAB A).
- There have been a total of 80 presumed cases of the severest type of malaria, *Plasmodium falciparum*, among the 225 US forces who were ashore in Liberia (from 12-28 August 2003). There have been no new cases detected in the last five days.
- Five were seriously ill but have recovered. There have been no deaths. Three patients remain hospitalized at National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda.
- There are several preventive (prophylactic) drugs for the prevention of malaria. Because of the likelihood that the *P. falciparum* in Liberia is resistant to the oldest such drug (chloroquine), the Marines ashore were prescribed mefloquine, a newer drug developed for such a situation.
- The occurrence of these cases prompted initial concerns that the mefloquine had failed to prevent the cases. As a result, those now ashore in Liberia are taking another drug, doxycycline, until test results return on the effectiveness of mefloquine and/or resistance of this malaria strain.
- Factors being investigated:
 - Is the parasite resistant to mefloquine?
 - Were the supplies of mefloquine fully potent?
 - Did the Marines fully adhere to the prescribed schedule of taking mefloquine ?
 - Did the Marines fully comply with other protective measures designed to protect them from the mosquito vectors, i.e., use of bed nets; use of repellants on uniforms, bed nets, and skin?

11-L-0559/OSD/21584

11/5909-03

- The investigation encompasses:
 - An anonymous survey **of** affected Marines.
 - Measuring mefloquine concentration in patients' blood to determine **if** it was adequate for prevention. This test is being conducted at the CDC.
 - Possibility of parasite resistance to mefloquine. Testing underway at Walter Reed **Army** Institute of Research.
- I have been briefed twice by the investigative team, and I am pressing them for prompt, accurate answers. **Early** indications **are** that some amount of non-adherence to prescribed medication schedules is at least partly responsible, but all the possible explanations have not been fully explored.
- Subsequent to the completion of lab tests, I expect a near complete picture to emerge within 10 days, and I will provide **further** information to you at that time. Policy and procedure implications for line and medical leadership will be pursued, based **upon** final results of the investigation.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Francis L. O'Donnell, MD, MPH, DHSD, FHP&R
PCDOCS #55146

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21585

TAB

B

Malaria Outbreak Among Members of JTF Liberia Consensus Conference Report

9 October 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/21587

Contents of Brief

Organizations Represented.....	3
Background Information.....	4
Questions. data and answers:	
1. Was there a problem with the availability of mefloquine?.....	7
2. Was there a problem with generic medication's potency or formulation?.....	8
3. Were Marines taking mefloquine according to requirements?.....	9
4. Was the malaria parasite resistant to mefloquine?	10
5. Was DEET available for use?.....	11
6. Were permethrin-treated utilities available for wear?	12
7. Were bed nets used?.....	13
8. Was local insect control adequate?.....	14
9. Were the medical staff adequately trained in diagnosis and management of malaria?.....	15
10. Can U.S. Forces deploy to highly malarious areas without suffering similar malaria outbreaks?	16
Recommendations.....	17
Continuing and Future efforts.....	19

Organizations Represented

- Food and Drug Administration
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
- World Health Organization
- Walter Reed Army Institute for Research
- Naval Medical Research Center
- Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
- U.S. Air Force Medical Support Agency
- Joint Chiefs of Staff - J4
- Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences
- Naval Medical Education and Training Command
- DoD Global Emerging Infections System
- Marine Forces, Atlantic
- II Marine Expeditionary Force
- National Naval Medical Center
- Naval Environmental Health Center
- Naval Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit – Sicily
- Headquarters, Marine Corps, PP&O
- Commander Amphibious Task Force
- Marine Expeditionary Unit **26**
- Navy Disease Vector Ecology and Control Center
- Naval Forces Europe
- Joint Task Force - Liberia
- U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command
- U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
- Headquarters, Marine Corps, Health Services
- U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon General

Historical Experience

- Navy/Marines – 62 cases worldwide from 1997-2000.
- Somalia – 1993 – 106 cases in Marines
– 127 cases U.S. Army
- Sierra Leone – 1996 – 6 cases in Marines
– 91 cases British Army
- Nigeria - 2001 – 7 cases with 2 deaths,
U.S. Army Special Forces

JTF Liberia Outbreak

- Total of JTF spending any time ashore – 290.
Quick Reaction Force – 225.
157 of MEU surveyed during investigation.
- 80 cases treated:
 - 1 civilian, 1 U.S. Army, 7 U.S. Navy, 2 FAST Marines.
 - 69 Marines of 26th MEU.
- **51** cases by positive smear, 29 by clinical criteria.
- Historical predicted malaria risk: 11-50% for unprotected personnel.
USMC experience:
 - 69/157 (44% attack rate) for 26th MEU members spending nights ashore.
 - 80/290 (28% attack rate) for JTF members spending any time ashore.

Pre-deployment Analyses and Intelligence

- Liberia known to be highest risk area for multiple vector-borne diseases.
- Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team, JUL 03:
 - limited in scope
 - assessed infrastructure, public health, sanitation, and security threats
 - focus on future civilian relief efforts vice deploying forces.
- JTF-L OPORD preventive measures consistent with survey, intelligence and recommendations from AFMIC, CDC and WHO.

1. Was there a problem with the availability of mefloquine?

- Mefloquine dispensed to Marines.
 - Verified by survey.
 - Verified by presence of tablets in Marines' pockets upon arrival at NNMCC Bethesda.
 - Verified by presence of mefloquine in serum samples.
- MEU members were taking mefloquine prior to entering Liberia.
 - Verified by mefloquine metabolite levels.
- ANSWER: No. Mefloquine readily available.

2. Was there a problem with generic mefloquine's potency or formulation?

- Mefloquine met all FDA requirements.
 - Tablets removed from Marines' pockets produced predicted blood levels in test subjects.
 - Chemical analysis by FDA within standards.
 - FDA recommends continued use of current generic mefloquine formulation.
- ANSWER: No. Mefloquine potency and formulation was adequate.

3. Were Marines taking mefloquine according to requirements?

- Steady-state ratio of mefloquine metabolite (MMQ) present in 93 of 133 indicating past use.
- Protective mefloquine (MQ) levels present in 19 of 133 specimens indicating recent use.
- Only 7 of 133 had both protective MQ and adequate MQ/MMQ ratio.
 - Inadequate levels noted despite the survey indicating 95% of Marines claimed no missed doses.
- ANSWER: No. Lab data indicates inadequate compliance with required dosing schedule.

4. Was the malaria parasite resistant to mefloquine?

- Testing at Walter Reed Army Institute for Research did NOT reveal clinically significant resistance.
 - Consensus remains that mefloquine is the drug of choice for Liberia.
- ANSWER: No. Resistance not a factor.

5. Was DEET available for use?

- 290 personnel surveyed.
- DEET use:
 - Possession of DEET was a repeated inspection item.
 - 79/290 (27%) used some type of repellent at least once.
 - Only 19 of these used 12-hour DoD-issued DEET formulation.
 - Majority used less-effective non-DoD supplied or non-DEET repellent.
- ANSWER: Yes. Long-acting DEET was available. However it was not routinely used. Other DEET formulations were more commonly used though less effective as repellents.

6. Were permethrin-treated uniforms available for wear?

- 290 surveyed. 36 (12%) wore permethrin-treated utility uniforms ashore.
 - Unable to obtain bulk permethrin for treatment, only aerosol available aboard ship.
 - Only desert utilities were treated by aerosol prior to deployment.
 - Woodland utilities worn ashore, appropriate to local environment.
- Aerosol spray can is the least effective method available for treatment.
- ANSWER: No. Few adequately treated uniforms available for use ashore in Liberia.

7. Were bed nets used?

- Bed nets not carried ashore due to:
 - Weight restrictions
 - No cots to hold poles.
 - Sleeping on paved/hard surface precluding pole use.
 - Assumed short stay with minimal exposure.
- Current issue bed net system requires soft surface for poles or cot to effectively deploy.
- ANSWER: No. Not used due to net design and mission requirements.

8. Was local insect control adequate?

- Requirements to analyze and implement insect control exceeded ARG/MEU capabilities.
 - Minimal mosquito abatement equipment routinely carried with ARG/MEU
 - No mosquito abatement expertise routinely included in ARG/MEU T/O
- Analysis requires:
 - Traps and microscope
 - Expertise to count and speciate
- Site survey following outbreak revealed:
 - Mosquito risk widely and equally spread across region
 - Large local human reservoir of malaria
 - Highly mobile mosquito species, travel > 1 mile.
- **ANSWER:** No. Local control for malaria vectors not feasible given broad distribution, and limited ARG/MEU capabilities.

9. Was the medical staff adequately trained in diagnosis and management of malaria?

- Recent formal training for one physician, who established initial diagnosis and implemented treatment.
- No laboratory technicians had recent formal training.
- No formal pre-deployment refresher training received.
 - Early diagnosis and treatment decreases morbidity and mortality in malaria.
 - Treatment requires medications not used for prophylaxis and not routinely included in AMAL.
- **ANSWER:** No. Routine pre-deployment training does not include infectious disease refresher for physicians or lab techs.

10. Can U.S. Forces deploy to highly malarious areas, without suffering similar malaria outbreaks?

- Current policy and procedures for personal protective measures effective.
- Current chemo-prophylaxis effective.
- Currently complex regimen makes implementation difficult.
- ANSWER: Yes. Present policies and measures, if routinely applied to each individual ground force combatant, are adequate to prevent malaria in Liberia and other malarious areas.

Recommendations: Near Term

- Provide USMC-wide guidance requiring:
 - Permethrin treatment for all uniforms and bed nets deployment using best available techniques.
 - Use only DoD sustained-release DEET or DEET/9 formulations.
- Provide routine tropical medicine refresher training for MEU medical staff during pre-deployment work.
- Add Malarone and oral quinine medications to the medical supply list.
- Operational planners and chain of command emphasize awareness/assessment of infectious threat.
- Improve training and equipment of ARG/MEU Preventive Medicine technicians to enhance their control capability.

Recommendations: Long-term

- Permethrin treat uniforms at the factory during procurement.
- Procure and distribute improved mosquito net system as USMC standard issue.
- When OPLANS indicate potential for entry into high malaria-risk area, obtain and assure ARG/MEU capability for continuous onsite assessment and abatement of health threats.

Medical Continuing Efforts

- Malaria antibody testing of blood samples.
- Continue ongoing monitoring for emerging permethrin resistance in mosquitos.
- Continue evaluation of these malaria parasites for mefloquine resistance.

Medical Research and Development

- Field-use malaria test kit.
- “Fire-and-forget” solutions to reduce complexity:
 - Support malaria vaccine research.
 - Support malaria medication research.

~~FOUO~~

DEC 29 2004

TO: CAPT Bill Marriott

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*SUBJECT: Letter from (b)(6)

Please handle.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/20/04 Letter from (b)(6) to SecDefDHR:ms
122704-19.....
Please respond by 1/7/05

CSC-
Please draft
note for SD signature
Thanks,
Col E.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21607

*335 SD**29 Dec 04**22 Dec 04*

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Residence

(b)(6)

*Telephone
Facsimile*

Facsimile Cover Sheet

To: Hon. Donald Rumsfeld

Date: December 20, 2004

Telephone Number: (b)(6)

Fax Number: (b)(6)

Number of pages, including this Cover Sheet: 2.

Message:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I write to offset the unjustified criticism leveled at you and the calls for your resignation or removal which have received so much publicity recently.

I am a veteran of World War II, a volunteer enlistee at the age of 18, with just under a year of combat service in Europe, mostly as a noncommissioned artillery forward observer attached to infantry with the 45th Infantry Division. That does not make me an expert on procurement, tactics, strategy or anything else, but it may put me ahead of most of the people shooting their mouths off these days, including Senator Kerry. I fought on open roads, hedgerows, open fields, and the streets of cities, notably Nuremberg, which we took block by block, house by house, and room by room, and at Aschafenburg, renowned as the only place where Hitler's Volksturm actually fought. I was awarded five (5) battle stars. I was, reputedly, the second American into Dachau and the second American through the Siegfried Line. I had never heard of body armour. I had a lot of gall, but I did not think I knew more about how to fight a war than did the then Secretary of Defense and the then ranking generals, Marshall and Eisenhower, or my Army Commanders, Patton and Hodges.

Page 1

OSD 00805-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21608

335 SD

22 Dec 04

I have the good soldier's appreciation of real leadership - at all levels, and I have at least some ability to recognize it. You may have done some things which, debatably, are called mistakes, although I don't know of any that I would classify that way, but, in my view, you have done an outstanding job and I sincerely hope that you will remain Secretary of Defense for the balance of the President's term - naysayers to the contrary notwithstanding.

Like President Bush, who is such an idiot, moron, etc., that he earned an MRA from Harvard, I also attended Harvard - for an undergraduate AB and a JD c.l., - where I had the privilege of hearing the unveiling of the Marshall Plan in 1947 - and I've been practicing law since 1951, serving in various minor offices in the process. Only my age kept me from applying for a position in Pres. Bush's first administration and, again, in the present administration. [I'm now 80.]

What I want to emphasize is that the criticism of your performance in office, like the criticism of the President's, makes it very difficult for me to live up to my mother's injunction never to believe oneself to be superior to anyone else; it is difficult not to feel superior to people who level at you and at the President such ridiculous complaints as are now current. For whatever it may be worth, I want you to know that there is at least one lawyer, ex-judge, ex-combat-soldier who hopes sincerely that you will keep up the good work and continue to fight the good fight on behalf of all of us; our lives and freedom, and those of our children and grandchildren, may well depend upon your doing so.

(b)(6)

cc: Hon. George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 11 2005

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your recent letter. I appreciate your observations on our efforts in Iraq.

I also wish to also convey my thanks to you, Mr. (b)(6) for your service in the United States Army during WWII. We owe our freedom to you and others who served.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/21610

OSD 00805-05

335510

11 Jan 05

22 Dec 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECDEF

ACTION MEMO

2004-01-25-04 2:50
20 January 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard J. Myers, CJCS *RJMY/18*

SUBJECT: Death Investigation

- **Issue.** Your request -- "Please take a look at this letter to President Bush, dig into it and get a proper response. I would like to see it." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** The proposed letter to (b)(6) is attached at TAB B. The US A-10 friendly fire investigation is complete.
- The classified report was provided to the UK Political Advisor (POLAD) at HQ USCENCOM-Tampa on 8 October 2003, and the redacted-releasable version was provided on 19 November 2003. The POLAD delivered the documents to the UK Provisional Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), whose staff does NOT want to conduct a next-of-kin notification briefing until after the holidays. USCENCOM will not issue a press release on the investigation until after (b)(6) receives her notification briefing.
- **Analysis.** The President received a letter from (b)(6) the British soldier killed by a US A-10 by friendly fire in Iraq. She asked the President to use his influence to speed the US inquiry into the incident. The President subsequently met with her and provided a hand-written note stating that he would pass on (b)(6) request for a speedy completion of the investigation.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve letter at TAB B.

Approve *RJMY* Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Col Ron Williams, USAF: OCJCS/LC (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RTA	
SI MA CRADDOCK	<i>C/12</i>
MA BACCI	
EXECSEC MARIOTTI	<i>1/21</i>

OSD 00815-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21611

293

205 Jan 04

TAB A

628
December 16, 2003

To: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ~~Death~~ Investigation

1/28
Please take a look at this letter to President Bush, dig into it and get a proper response. I would like to see it;

Thanks.

Attach.
11/20/03 (b)
(6) letter to POTUS

DEPR-2
121603-3

.....
Please respond by 12/23/03

Sir,

*Response attached.
Original attachments
included behind.*

*vr/cdr Nosenzo
1/29*

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/21612

NOV. 25. 2003 10:58 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/21613

NOV. 25. 2003 P.M.

Could send to Pentagon for inquiry

(b)(6)

*J.C. -
Dun-*

President Bush

20th November 2003

Dear President Bush,

May I firstly thank you for allowing me the opportunity to have met with you today. I hope you can understand that I have also decided to write, in the event that I may not have been able to adequately convey my thoughts to you in person.

I would like to ask for your assistance concerning the investigation into the death of my husband, (b)(6). He died on the 28th March this year, in Iraq, following an attack on his vehicle by an American A-10 aircraft.

I wish to emphasise that I am not, and neither was my husband, in any way politically minded. (b)(6) went to war as a professional soldier, believing in what he was doing and with my support. I have no issue over the justification of the conflict. I do, however, wish to see a resolution to the inquiry surrounding his death.

At the time of writing I have been informed by the British Ministry of Defence that they have completed their investigation and it has been forwarded to the coroner. However, no inquest can be opened until all the facts are with the court and so we still await the US investigation report.

(b)(6)

I sincerely hope you can begin to somehow understand, or at least empathise with, my own wishes and those of (b)(6) family. If so, I respectfully ask for you to use your influence over the US bodies concerned with this investigation, and press for it to be completed quickly.

I thank you for your time in reading this letter.

Yours Sincerely

(b)(6)

TabA

11-L-0559/OSD/21613

TAB B



**CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20318-9999**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear Mrs. Hull,

On behalf of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, please accept sincere condolences of the loss of your husband Matthew. He was a dedicated military professional who faithfully served his country and the cause of freedom.

The investigation regarding this unfortunate incident has been completed by US Central Command. The results will be provided to the appropriate British military authorities. US Central Command officials have been informed that the British military authorities will contact you to discuss the results.

May the loving memories of (b)(6) life be a source of strength and comfort to you and your family in the days ahead.

Sincerely,

RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/21614

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

**Deputy Staff Judge Advocate
USCENTCOM**

Mr. Barry Hammill

23 Dec 03

7/21
0630



CHAIR

56-12 we tell
RSTUS ?

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard J. Myer

SUBJECT: Death Investigation

SECDEF NOTE 1/29

293

- Issue. Your request -- "Please take a look at this letter to President Bush, dig into it and get a proper response. I would like to see it." (TAB A)
- Answer. The proposed letter to (b)(6) is attached at TAB B. The US A-10 friendly fire investigation is complete.
- The classified report was provided to the UK Political Advisor (POLAD) at HQ USCENTCOM-Tampa on 8 October 2003, and the redacted-releasable version was provided on 19 November 2003. The POLAD delivered the documents to the UK Provisional Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), whose staff does NOT want to conduct a next-of-kin notification briefing until after the holidays. USCENTCOM will not issue a press release on the investigation until after (b)(6) receives her notification briefing.
- Analysis. The President received a letter from (b)(6) the British soldier killed by a US A-10 by friendly fire in Iraq. She asked the President to use his influence to speed the US inquiry into the incident. The President subsequently met with her and provided a hand-written note stating that he would pass on (b)(6) request for a speedy completion of the investigation.

29 JAN 04

RECOMMENDATION: Approve letter at TAB B.

Approve AL Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Col Ron Williams, USAF; OCJCS/LC, (b)(6)

20 JAN 04

SPL ASSISTANT DIR RITA	
SA MA CRADDOCK	6/29
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	1/21

OSD 00815-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21616

7700
~~FOUO~~

file

September 2, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Timetable for Paramilitary Issue

Please advise as to the timetable you plan on with regards to analyzing the paramilitary issue we discussed with Cong. Goss.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
(090204-9)

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

DR 10/1
Sir,
Response Attached.
V/R
1 COLB
9/30

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21617

OSD 00818-05

90/1

30 September 2004, 08:45

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone *SC*

SUBJECT: Paramilitary Issue

370.64

We are pursuing this on two tracks.

SOLIC is working on "unconventional warfare" – e.g., should DoD have performed the NILE mission in Iraq?

I am working on the broader issue of whether covert action (CA) should be as closely associated with HUMINT as it is today, or whether CA is an operational activity not unlike that of a Combatant Commander. If so, then it might be possible to distribute the missions among various departments and agencies.

The advantage of the latter is that it expands the pool of available talent and distributes the workload.

It also distinguishes those efforts to collect intelligence (HUMINT) from those with an operational objective. My concern is that, at the level of CIA/CTC, the nearly indistinguishable role of the DO in HUMINT and CA deprives us of broader application for HUMINT and a potential for a bias to be developed in assessing the efficacy of CA.

I'll work this over the next 30 days or so.

SC
1/1/04
Greg -
VADM S said
they discussed
(Cambone & SD)

30 Sep 04

2 Sep 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21618

000 00818-05

7701
~~FOUO~~

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA.*
SUBJECT: Stress on the Force Memo – An Update

Please take the lead with Gen. Pace on updating my Stress of the Force Memo.
We need to know how we are doing in each of the areas set out. Gen. Dick Myers suggested a good format, with a bar for each line showing our progress with perhaps one or two explanatory bullets below.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090204-6

.....
Please respond by 9/10

3162

~~FOUO~~

2503

720
~~FOUO~~

September 2, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: U.S. Russia Partnership Proposal from Cong. Weldon

Please take a look at this proposal by Cong. Curt Weldon and let me know what you would like to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/7/01 Cong letter to Pres. Bush and US Russia Partnership Proposal

DHR:ss
090204-4

.....
Please respond by 9/10

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21620

OSD 00821-05

2 SEP 04

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

November 7, 2001

President George W. Bush
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Bush:

As you prepare for the upcoming summit with President Putin, we commend the positive approach you have established with Russia. Too often, the focus of our bilateral relations has been on defense and security – precisely the issues on which our interests often collide. It would be more useful, as we move forward with a Russian policy for the 21st century to take a more holistic approach – one that takes into account Russia's myriad concerns as well as our own.


Therefore, in consultation with many of the leading experts on Russia, we propose a series of bipartisan initiatives to engage Russia on issues such as the environment, energy, economic development, health care – as well as defense and security. We call this proposal "A New Time, A New Beginning." Some of these are new ideas, but many are not. Many of these initiatives are already underway, and need additional support to make even greater progress.

Such engagement is in the U.S. interest as well as Russia's. If the United States and Russia cooperate on issues across the board, Russia will be more likely to work closely with America on the national security issues that matter most to us – missile defense, the war against terrorism, and proliferation.


We encourage you to review the enclosed proposal and hope that some of these initiatives will prove useful to you in the ongoing discussions between Russia and America. We look forward to working with you to forge a new relationship that will benefit both our countries.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,



Richard L. Lugar



Carl Levin

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/21621

M. Anne Dingley
Mike Cote

Mr. 74

Carrie Brown

Bo Clements

Joe Wells

Mary Kaptur

John Linder

Walter Bridges

Dana Rohrer

Bud Cramer

Chris Cox

Off Edwards

John E. St.

John E. Petersen

Henry Hyde

Ray Swicker

Mark Lander

George

John T. Dittell

John Hayes

Nick Long

Ed Marking

Christopher Shays

And Kenton

Gemie Morella

Jim McLaugh

Charles H. Taylor

Mike Miller

George W. Mitternutt, Jr.

Sam Danner

Ralph M. Hall

J. J. Porter

Paul Ripton

Cass Ballenger

Nathan Deal

Clarence H. H. H.

Frank Fallon Jr.

W. Schrock

James H. H.

Robert E. H.

D. H.

Jack Campbell

Rod Blagojevich

J. E. E.

Jim J.

Mike J.

Van H.

Ed R.

Bob F.

Tom V.

Dan H.

~~James Greenwood~~

~~Kari Brown~~

Pat A. Gundy

Melissa Hunt

Phil English

John L.

Tom Allen

OOO O'Brien

Robert E. Ad

Mike Doyle

Shelley Moore Caputo

~~W. Simmons~~
CT/2

W. Todd Akin

Connie Morella
Jim Maloney

Cass Ballenger
Nathan Deal

Page 6:

Jerry Weller
Jim Gibbons
Jim Ryun
Judy Biggert
Jerry Costello
Eddie Bernice Johnson
Steph'n Horn
Kay Granger
Ed Scrock

Tom Davis
Randy Cunningham
Gary Condit
Randy Forbes
Steven LaTourette
Joe Skeen
Bob Borski
Lincoln Diaz-Balart
Chris Smith

Page 7:

Adam Putnam
Frank Pallone
Ed Schrock
Johnny Isakson
Robert Andrews
Bernie Sanders
Nick Lampson
Rod Blagojevich

Jim Saxton
Jim Turner
Mike Ferguson
Van Hilleary
Ed Royce
Bob Filner
Luis Gutierrez
Danny Davis

Page 8:

Jane Harman
Rick Boucher
Christopher John
Todd Akin
Dave Weldon
Bart Gordon
Virgil Goode Jr
Alan Mollohan
Frank Wolf

Hilda Solis
Rush Holt
Carrie Meek
Amo Houghton
Paul Kanjorski
Bob Goodlatte
Doug Bereuter
John Shimkus
J.D. Hayworth

Page 9:

James Greenwood
Kevin Brady
Bob Brady
Melissa Hart
Phil English
John Thune

Tom Allen
George Gekas
Robert Andrews
Mike Doyle
Shelly Moore Capito
Rob Simmons
Todd Akin

U.S. RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP

*A New Time
A New Beginning*



ПАРТНЕРСТВО
МЕЖДУ
США И РОССИЕЙ

*Новые Времена
Новые Начинания*

11-L-0559/OSD/21627

U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP


*A New Time
A New Beginning*

Rep. Curt Weldon
E-mail: curtpa07@mail.house.gov
Web: www.house.gov/curtweldon
Capitol Office: 2466 Rayburn Bldg. 20515
Phone: 202-225-2011
Fax: 202-2245-8137

11-L-0559/OSD/21628

~~FOUO~~

September 3, 2004

TO: Ray Dubois
CC: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Amend Info Memo to Add Year

Please enter in the year (after the weeks and months) on the attached Info Memo,
so that it is easier to read.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/31/04 Dubois Info Memo to SecDef Re: Casualty Report (12996-04)

DHR:ss
090304-4

.....
Please respond by

9 | 10 | 04

done - 9/1



~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21629

OSD 00822-05

090304-4

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 AUG 31 PM 2:43

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Operation Iraqi Freedom -- Week Ending 28 August 2004 Casualty Report

1. Weekly Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Casualty Update. For the period August 22 - August 28, 2004, there were 12 deaths (9 killed in action; 3 non-hostile) and 180 wounded in action. The attached chart depicts OIF casualties by week since the start of combat operations on March 19, 2003. Death totals do not include one captured soldier.

OIF U.S. Military Casualties by Week	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA	WIA Not RTD
Combat Operations - 19 Mar 03 thru 30 Apr 03	138	109	29	542	426
19 Mar - 22 Mar *	11	8	3	21	16
23 Mar - 29 Mar	49	46	3	152	114
30 Mar - 05 Apr	40	30	10	134	102
06 Apr - 12 Apr	22	22	0	167	130
13 Apr - 19 Apr	8	1	7	37	38
20 Apr - 26 Apr	7	2	5	23	21
27 Apr - 30 Apr *	1	0	1	8	5
Post Combat Ops - 1 May thru Present	835	617	218	6374	3414
01 May - 03 May *	2	0	2	6	6
04 May - 10 May	7	1	6	7	5
11 May - 17 May	6	2	4	12	7
18 May - 24 May	9	0	9	4	4
25 May - 31 May	13	5	8	25	20
01 Jun - 07 Jun	7	3	4	40	30
08 Jun - 14 Jun	4	2	2	34	20
15 Jun - 21 Jun	8	5	3	19	15
22 Jun - 28 Jun	11	8	3	42	36
29 Jun - 05 Jul	4	1	3	51	31
06 Jul - 12 Jul	12	5	7	39	27

TSA SD	0/1
SRMA SD	
MA SD	2/1

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21630

OSD 12996-04

OIF U.S. Military Casualties by Week	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA	WIA Not RTD
13 Jul - 19 Jul	9	4	5	64	30
20 Jul - 26 Jul	16	13	3	58	50
27 Jul - 02 Aug	7	6	1	43	27
03 Aug - 09 Aug	11	2	9	31	23
10 Aug - 16 Aug	7	4	3	31	20
17 Aug - 23 Aug	7	3	4	36	23
24 Aug - 30 Aug	9	3	6	50	36
31 Aug - 06 Sep	5	2	3	45	29
7 Sep - 13 Sep	6	4	2	71	38
14 Sep - 20 Sep	10	8	2	58	38
21 Sep - 27 Sep	5	2	3	59	37
28 Sep - 04 Oct	10	6	4	53	31
05 Oct - 11 Oct	6	6	0	82	55
12 Oct - 18 Oct	12	9	3	100	60
19 Oct - 25 Oct	9	5	4	102	62
26 Oct - 01 Nov	13	11	2	113	65
02 Nov - 08 Nov	34	32	2	124	71
09 Nov - 15 Nov	26	25	1	79	45
16 Nov - 22 Nov	10	6	4	56	38
23 Nov - 29 Nov	10	6	4	49	32
30 Nov - 06 Dec	5	4	1	49	23
07 Dec - 13 Dec	11	6	5	82	45
14 Dec - 20 Dec	7	3	4	57	34
21 Dec - 27 Dec	13	10	3	59	29
28 Dec 03 - 03 Jan 04	9	6	3	53	28
04 Jan 04 - 10 Jan 04	11	11	0	63	32
11 Jan 04 - 17 Jan 04	6	4	2	31	20
18 Jan 04 - 24 Jan 04	10	8	2	39	25
25 Jan 04 - 31 Jan 04	14	12	2	35	21
01 Feb 04 - 07 Feb 04	4	3	1	24	11
08 Feb 04 - 14 Feb 04	9	4	5	49	27
15 Feb 04 - 21 Feb 04	6	5	1	43	32
22 Feb 04 - 28 Feb 04	2	0	2	28	14
29 Feb 04 - 06 Mar 04	2	1	1	23	13
07 Mar 04 - 13 Mar 04	11	8	3	62	33
14 Mar 04 - 20 Mar 04	18	9	9	104	61
21 Mar 04 - 27 Mar 04	10	6	4	80	48
28 Mar 04 - 03 Apr 04	12	10	2	115	69
04 Apr 04 - 10 Apr 04	65	65	0	543	300
11 Apr 04 - 17 Apr 04	27	23	4	295	145
18 Apr 04 - 24 Apr 04	16	14	2	159	89
25 Apr 04 - 01 May 04	28	25	3	182	94

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21631

OIF U.S. Military Casualties by Week	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA	WIA Not RTD
02 May 04 – 08 May 04	25	20	5	166	92
09 May 04 – 15 May 04	12	8	4	187	90
16 May 04 – 22 May 04	16	11	5	150	78
23 May 04 – 29 May 04	16	14	2	181	64
30 May 04 – 05 Jun 04	17	16	1	120	53
06 June 04 – 12 June 04	6	5	1	125	65
13 June 04 – 19 June 04	9	7	2	140	61
20 June 04 – 26 June 04	12	12	0	165	78
27 June 04 – 03 July 04	11	10	1	110	57
04 July 04 – 10 July 04	20	14	6	94	46
11 July 04 – 17 July 04	12	7	5	102	53
18 July 04 – 24 July 04	11	11	0	166	72
25 July 04 – 31 July 04	5	5	0	124	65
01 Aug 04 – 07 Aug 04	18	15	3	209	103
08 Aug 04 – 14 Aug 04	8	6	2	205	89
15 Aug 04 – 21 Aug 04	24	21	3	192	92
22 Aug 04 – 28 Aug 04	12	9	3	180	52
Total Deaths & WIA 19 Mar 03 thru 28 Aug 04	973	726	247	6916	3840
* Partial Week					

2. **Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Suicide Rate Update.** The “SI & Pending – Apparent SI” column includes confirmed SI cases and unresolved cases that are still under investigation per 100,000 members. The “SI & Pending – All Cases” includes the other categories as well as other deaths under investigation such as drowning or drug overdoses where it has not been determined if the loss was accidental or purposeful. For each category, the death count used to determine the rate is shown in parentheses.

OIF U.S. Military Suicide & Pending Rates (per 100,000 members)	Confirmed Self-Inflicted (SI)	SI & Pending – Apparent SI	SI & Pending – All Cases
As of 28 Aug 04	9.5 (29)	10.8 (33)	15.1 (46)

Reference Notes:

1) The suicide rates in other major (long duration) wars include: Desert Shield – Desert Storm was 2.7/100,000; Vietnam War was 14.5/100,000; peacetime DoD average since 1980 is 11.5/100,000.

2) The CY2000 civilian population suicide rates are 17.5/100,000 for males and 4.1/100,000 for females. Using an approximate OIF deployment mix of 90% males and 10% females, an adjusted rate for comparison of OIF military suicides to civilian suicides is 16.2 suicides/100,000.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21632

September 3, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Attached is a memo concerning what we need in Afghanistan. Where do you think we are?

Thanks.

Attach.

Afghanistan Presentation for POTUS (09/02/04-2)

DHR:ss
090304-7

.....
Please respond by

9/10/04

Afghanistan

090304-7

September 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Presentation for POTUS

I need a memo for the President on Afghanistan that sets forth what to do about:

- Pulling together the Afghan security forces so they can take over security responsibility.
- Strengthening the U.S. Embassy.
- Zal's security and, when necessary, his replacement.
- Marginalizing the warloads, their militaries and their legions.
- Sealing the borders and increasing tax revenues.
- Marginalizing Iranian influence.
- How to deal with the narcotics problem.

DHR:ss
090204-2

September 7, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Two Memos from Joe Schmitz

Please take a look at these two memos from Joe Schmitz and tell me what you think I should do with them.


Thanks.

Attach.

06/24/04 Action Memo from Joseph Schmitz to SecDef re: Detainee Policy & Interrogation Standards for Afghanistan and 08/02/04 Action Memo from Joseph Schmitz to SecDef re: Working Relationship Principles for Agencies & Offices of IG.

DHR:ss
090704-13

.....
Please respond by 9/17



~~SECRET~~
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY/NAVY DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ACTION MEMO

JUN 24 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Joseph E. Schmitz*
Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Immediate need to clarify Department of Defense Detainee Policy and
Interrogation Standards for Afghanistan

- Bagram Air Base interrogators are using an unsigned SecDef Memorandum as "guidance" for conducting interrogations. During my recent trip to Afghanistan I found that the current SecDef "guidance" being followed at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, is the attached unsigned memorandum. By all reports last week at Bagram Air Base, this unsigned SecDef "guidance" has been widely circulated as policy guidance to commanders and soldiers engaged in interrogating detainees. However, the commanders and staff (e.g., SJA and IG) associated with the interrogations at Bagram Air Base were uniformly uncertain as to whether the SecDef guidance had ever been signed.
- Compounding the confusion over whether or not it was ever signed, the attached SecDef "guidance" purports to apply standards for "techniques" limited to both "interrogation of unlawful combatants held at Bagram," and "to use only at strategic interrogation facilities." To the knowledge of the leadership at the Bagram Control Point, the only DoD strategic interrogation facility is at GITMO.
- In order to immediately dispel confusion, I have already notified the CJTF76 Inspector General and Staff Judge Advocate that the unsigned memorandum currently in circulation was never signed. I have also discussed this matter and my actions taken with VADM Church.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef immediately clarify that the previously circulated, unsigned Memorandum was never signed, and promulgate interrogation policy guidance for use at Bagram and other detention facilities under U.S. Central Command control.

APPROVE: _____ DISAPPROVE: _____

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: As stated

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21636

Prepared by: Thomas F. Gimble, Deputy IG-Intel, (b)(6)

REGRADED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE

Less Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

77072-04

From: Schmitz, Joseph E., OIG DoD
Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2004 5:25 PM
To: 'blockg@cjt76.centcom.mil'
cc: Buechner, Barton D., OIG DoD; Marty Carpenter (E-mail)
Subject: Unsigned SecDef Memorandum - FOUO

Sensitivity: Private

Colonel Block: I verified today that the non-letterhead, unsigned SecDef "MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, US CENTRAL COMMAND," hand-dated "16 APR 03," a copy of which you shared with me at Bagram Air Base last week, was never signed. Even as we address the issue at the OSD level, I recommend you do at your level whatever your Commander thinks is reasonable and prudent to ensure that any doubt among the interrogators as to the existence of a signed version of the hand-dated "16 APR 03" SecDef MEMORANDUM is dispelled: there is no such signed document (other than the one similar in form and substance, but applicable only to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, dated April 16, 2003, which SecDef declassified and released today). Feel free to call or e-mail if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks again for your assistance in Bagram last week.

Joseph E. Schmitz
Inspector General
Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-4704
Dire (b)(6)
Fax: [REDACTED]



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

ACTION MEMO

August 2, 2004 5:25 pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Working Relationship Principles for Agencies and Offices of Inspector General

- You should sign the memorandum at Tab A forwarding to the DoD agency heads and their Inspectors General the subject principles as issued on July 9, 2004, by the Chairman of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and the Vice Chairmen of the PCIE and Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) to the members of the President's Management Council (PMC) (see Tab B).
- These principles were developed by the PMC, PCIE, and ECIE to help federal agencies "work most effectively together" with their respective Offices of Inspectors General. The principles provide that the OIG and the agency should strive to:
 - o Foster open communications at all levels
 - o Interact with professionalism and mutual respect
 - o Recognize and respect the mission and priorities of the Agency and the OIG
 - o Be thorough, objective, and fair
 - o Be engaged, knowledgeable, and provide feedback
- I will continue to practice these key principles with the Department, and I remain committed to fulfilling my statutory duty under the IG Act to "keep[you] and the Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of [DoD] programs and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action" (IG Act, §2(3)).

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign the memorandum at Tab A issuing to DoD agency heads and their Inspectors General the "Working Relationship Principles for Agencies and Offices of Inspector General" recently issued by the President's Council on Integrity & Efficiency.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by John Crane, Assistant Inspector General for Communications and Congressional Liaison (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21638

11577-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: "Working Relationship Principles for Agencies and Offices of Inspector General"

You get what you inspect, not what you expect. Stated differently, what you measure improves.

Last month, the Chairman of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency issued the attached "Working Relationship Principles for Agencies and Offices of Inspector General." For those of you with your own inspectors general, please discuss the attachment with your inspector general with a view toward clearly defining what the two of you consider to be a productive relationship, and then, as the Chairman of the President's Council states, "consequently manage toward that goal in an atmosphere of mutual respect."

In addition to the attached guidance, I would encourage each of you to utilize the various Offices of Inspectors General within this Department not as a "way out" whenever you face difficult leadership challenges, but rather as independent and valuable tools to assist all of us in leadership positions to make better decisions and otherwise to measure improvements in the way we take on instances of fraud, waste, and *abuse* that inevitably pop up from time to *time*.

I will continue rely to upon my Inspector General to help me inspect and measure improvements throughout this Department. I encourage you to do the same.

Attachment:
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/21639





PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL on INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL on INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY



JUL 9 2004

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY

FROM:

4 Clay Johnson III, Deputy Director for Management of OMB and
Chairman, President's Council on Integrity & Efficiency, and
Executive Council on Integrity & Efficiency
[Signature] Gaston Gianni, Inspector General, FDIC and
Vice Chairman, President's Council on Integrity & Efficiency
[Signature] Barry Snyder, Inspector General, Federal Reserve Board and
Vice Chairman, Executive Council on Integrity & Efficiency

SUBJECT:

Agency and OIG Working Relationships

We encourage you to use the attached set of principles developed by the PMC, PCIE and ECIE to help your departments/agencies and the Offices of Inspectors General work together most effectively.

11-L-0559/OSD/21640

WORKING RELATIONSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR AGENCIES AND OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

The Inspector General (IG) Act establishes for most agencies an “independent and objective” Office of Inspector General (OIG) and sets out its mission, responsibilities, and authority. The IG is under the general supervision of the agency head. The unique nature of the IG function can present a number of challenges for establishing and maintaining effective working relationships, **which** fundamentally rely upon mutual trust between not only the agency head and the IG, but also between the agency head’s other immediate subordinates and the IG. The following relationship principles provide some guidance for agencies and OIGs.

To work ~~most~~ effectively together, the Agency and its OIG need to clearly define what the two consider to be a productive relationship and then consciously manage toward that goal in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

By providing independent and objective information to promote government management, intelligent risk-taking, and accountability, the OIG contributes to the Agency’s success. The OIG is an agent of positive change, focusing on eliminating fraud, waste, and abuse, and on identifying problems and recommendations for corrective actions by agency leadership. The OIG provides the agency and Congress with objective assessments of opportunities to be more successful. The OIG, although not under ~~the~~ direct supervision of senior agency management, must keep them and the Congress fully and currently informed of significant OIG activities. Given the complexity of management and policy issues, the OIG and the Agency may sometimes disagree ~~on~~ the extent of a problem and the need for and scope of corrective action. However, such disagreements should not cause the relationship between the OIG and the Agency to become unproductive.

To work together most effectively, the OIG and the Agency should strive to:

Foster open communications at all levels. The Agency will promptly respond to OIG requests for information to facilitate OIG activities and acknowledge challenges that the OIG can help address. Surprises are to be avoided. With very limited exceptions primarily related to investigations, the **OIG** should keep the Agency advised of its **work** and its findings on a timely basis, and strive to provide information helpful to the Agency at the earliest possible stage.

Interact with professionalism and mutual respect. Each party should always act in good faith and **presume** the same from the other. Both parties share as a common goal the successful accomplishments of the Agency’s mission.

Recognize and respect the mission and priorities of the Agency and the OIG. The Agency should recognize the OIG’s independent role in carrying out its mission with the Agency, while recognizing the responsibility of the OIG to report both to the Congress and to the Agency Head. The OIG should work to carry out its functions with a minimum of disruption to the primary work of the Agency.

Be thorough, objective and fair. The OIG must perform its work thoroughly, objectively and with consideration to the Agency’s point of view. When responding, the Agency will objectively consider differing opinions and means of improving operations. Both sides will recognize successes in addressing management challenges.

Be engaged. The OIG and Agency management will work cooperatively in identifying the most important areas for OIG work, as well as the best means of addressing the results of that work, while maintaining the OIG’s statutory independency of operation. In addition, agencies need to recognize that the **OIG** also will need to carry work that is self-initiated, congressional requested, or mandated by law.

Be knowledgeable. The OIG will continually strive to keep abreast of agency programs and operations, and Agency management will be kept informed of OIG activities and concerns being raised in the course of OIG work. Agencies will help ensure that the OIG is kept up to date on current matters and events.

Provide feedback. The Agency and the OIG ¹ should implement mechanisms, both formal and informal, to ensure prompt and regular feedback.

September 7, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: IG Report

Please keep me posted on this IG Report on the CPA.

Take a look at it and ask yourself a question -- whether or not it is an unrealistic expectation on their **part** -- given the **war** zone circumstance of CPA.

Thanks.

Attach.

08/30/04 Info Memo from Tina Jonas re: CPA IG Draft Audit (12901-04)
08/30/04 Info Memo from Tina Jonas re: Audit of KBR Restore Iraqi Oil Contract
(12900-04)
08/31/04 Info Memo from Tina Jonas re: Weekly Report (13036-04)
07/12/04 CPA IG Draft Report on Oversight Funds (04-OXX)

DHR:ss
090704-28

.....
Please respond by _____



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

2004 AUG 30 PM 4:39



INFO MEMO

August 30, 2004 11:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas

SUBJECT: Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Inspector General (IG) Draft Audit:
Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries Through the National Budget
Process

- On August 23, 2004, Mr. Joe Benkert (Iraq Support Group) briefed the Deputy on the findings of a draft audit on CPA oversight of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).
- The draft audit concludes that CPA failed to provide adequate oversight of \$8.8 billion in DFI funds provided to the Iraqi Ministries (Executive Summary at Tab A).
- The Deputy will send a letter to Ambassador Bremer seeking his input on both this audit and on a letter to you from Senators Wyden, Harkin, and Dorgan on this issue (letter at Tab B).
- In addition, the CPA IG has agreed to reopen the audit to include the views of Ambassador Bremer and key members of his staff, who were not interviewed for the draft audit, but who were responsible for management of the DFI.
- CPA Order 95, published June 4, 2004, codified a requirement for Iraqi ministries to submit monthly financial reports to the Ministry of Finance. The Iraq Support Group is working with the US embassy in Baghdad and former CPA staff to obtain any records of spending reports prepared by the Iraqi ministries.
- The Iraq Support Group and Ambassador Bremer's CPA staff will continue to work with the CPA IG to address the issues raised in the report.
- Mr. Benkert will prepare a response to the Senators' letter.

COORDINATION: Iraq Support Group

Prepared By: David Norquist, (b)(6)

MA SD	9/1
SRMA SD	
MA SD	29/1
EXEC SEC	M 8/31



OSD 12901-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21643



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

August 30, 2004, 12:00 PM

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 AUG 30 PM 4: 25

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
- DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Audit of Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) Restore Iraqi Oil Contract

- Restore Iraqi Oil (NO) is a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) contract totaling \$2.6 billion. The COE has requested Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audits to establish a final price.
- Later ~~this~~ week, DCAA will issue audit reports on three task orders written for the import and distribution of fuel products to meet the domestic needs within Iraq from February 7, 2004 through March 31, 2004. The reports will state that KBR has failed to support the reasonableness of fuel prices from its Kuwaiti subcontractor.
- During the same period, the Defense Energy Supply Command (DESC) began to assume responsibility for supplying fuel to Iraq. DCAA found that DESC was able to obtain lower prices, primarily due to transportation costs, despite the fact that the same subcontractor performed work for both KBR and DESC.
- There has been considerable congressional and press scrutiny of prices paid for gasoline under these task orders due to allegations of overcharging.

COORDINATION: None

IA SD	9/1
SRMA SD	
MA SD	2 9/1
EXEC SEC	11 8/31

Prepared by: William H. Reed, DCAA Director, (b)(6)

OSD 12900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21644



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 AUG 31 PM 4: 47

COMPTROLLER

August 31, 2004, 12:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Weekly Report 08/31/04

- **Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Execution.** The budget close-out is executing on plan. The Office of Management and Budget approved around \$2.2 billion from the \$25 billion reserve fund for force protection, Army modularity requirements, and higher than anticipated current fuel costs.
- **Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).** The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has apportioned \$120 million of the \$25 billion contingency war reserve funding. These funds will finance near-term CERP requirements for Iraq. We are working with the Joint Staff and operational commanders to develop a financial plan for the remainder of the \$300 million of the fiscal year 2005 CERP authority.
- **Afghan Army Acceleration.** On August 23, \$94 million of fiscal year 2004 Supplemental funding was released under Train & Equip Authority. The money will be used to pay for accelerating the enhancement of the Afghan Army's capabilities.
- **Audit of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).** On August 17, 2004, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) issued an audit report on a Kellogg, Brown & Root's (KBR) \$502.7 million proposal under the LOGCAP III contract. Over \$75 million has been challenged in the proposal. Additional details were provided in a separate memo.
- **Audit of Restore Iraqi Oil Contract.** DCAA is nearing completion of three audits of KBR's proposal for final prices on three Task Orders for the import and distribution of fuel products. The reports will be critical of the high prices paid by KBR to supply domestic Iraqi fuel needs. A separate memo was sent to you on August 30, 2004.
- **Interagency Task Force Report.** In response to the Government Accountability Office report entitled, "Some DoD Contractors Abuse the Federal Tax System with Little Consequence," an Interagency Task Force was established. The Task Force has identified four recommendations for DoD that will significantly improve the effectiveness of the Federal Payment Levy Program. This will result in a better exchange of information between agencies and increase the number of tax levies collected. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service is implementing these recommendations.

COORDINATION: None

TSA SD	9/1
SRMA SD	
MA SD	9/1 <i>8</i>
EXEC SEC	49/1

11-L-0559/OSD/21645

OSD 13036-04

Draft Report
~~**For Official Use Only**~~
Office of the Inspector General
Coalition Provisional Authority

Report Number 04-OXX
(Project No. D2004-DCPAAC-0007)

July 12, 2004

**Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries
through the National Budget Process**

Executive Summary

Introduction: Until June 28, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was the authority responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq. In May 2003, the United Nations Security Council assigned responsibility to the CPA for the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), and it required that DFI funds be used in a transparent manner for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure, the disarmament of Iraq, the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq.

Objective: The objective of the audit was to determine whether the CPA established and implemented adequate managerial, financial, and contractual controls over DFI funds that were provided by CPA to interim Iraqi Ministries through the national budget process.

Conclusion: The CPA did not provide adequate stewardship of over \$8.8 billion in DFI funds provided to Iraqi Ministries through the national budget process. Specifically, the CPA did not establish and implement adequate managerial, financial, and contractual controls over the funds to ensure they were used in a transparent manner.

- **Managerial Controls.** The CPA did not clearly assign authorities and responsibilities over DFI funds provided to Iraqi Ministries nor did it issue clear guidance regarding the procedures and controls for disbursing the funds. Further, the CPA did not staff the CPA Ministry of Finance/Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with sufficient personnel to perform oversight of budget execution, and staff turnovers hindered financial oversight.
- **Financial Controls.** The CPA did not exercise adequate fiduciary responsibility over DFI funds provided to Iraqi Ministries. Additionally, although the CPA published approved national budgets on the Internet, it was not transparent what the DFI funds provided to the Iraqi ministries were actually used for. Lastly, the CPA did not maintain adequate documentation to support budget spend plans, cash distributions, or budget disbursements made by coalition forces.

Draft Report

~~For Official Use Only~~

- **Contract Controls.** The CPA did not adequately control contracting actions with DFI funds. Specifically, CPA senior advisors and staffs did not provide oversight of Iraqi Ministry procurements or contracting operations, and ministry senior advisors executed contracts that were not in compliance with Memorandum 4. This occurred because the CPA issued procurement and contracting policy, but did not implement any procedures to determine compliance with the policy or monitor contracting actions in the Iraqi ministries.

Draft Report

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21647

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 19, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

We are writing about recent press reports that indicate \$8.8 billion in Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) money cannot be accounted for. The reports indicate that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was in charge of the money throughout the period in question, allocated the money to Iraqi ministries earlier this year, prior to the termination of the CPA. The CPA apparently transferred this staggering sum of money with no written rules or guidelines for ensuring adequate managerial, financial or contractual controls over the funds.

Among the disturbing findings are that the payrolls of the ministries, under CPA control, were reportedly padded with thousands of ghost employees. In one example, the report indicates that the CPA paid for 74,000 guards even though the actual number of guards couldn't be validated. In another example, 8,206 guards were listed on a payroll, but only 603 real individuals could be counted. Such enormous discrepancies raise very serious questions about potential fraud, waste, and abuse.

The reports raise anew very serious questions about the quality of the CPA's oversight and accountability in the reconstruction of Iraq. Iraq is now a sovereign nation, but it is clear that the United States will continue to play a major role in the country's reconstruction. It is therefore imperative that the U.S. government exercise careful control and oversight over expenditures of taxpayer dollars. Continued Failures to account for funds, such as the \$8.8 billion of concern here, or Halliburton's repeated failure to fully account for \$4.2 billion for logistical support in Iraq and Kuwait, and the refusal, so far, of the Pentagon to take corrective action are a disservice to the American taxpayer, the Iraqi people and to our men and women in uniform.

We are requesting a full, written account of the \$8.8 billion transferred earlier this year from the CPA to the Iraqi ministries, including the amount each ministry received and the way in which the ministry spent the money, as well as a date certain for when the Pentagon will finally install adequate managerial, financial and contractual controls over taxpayer dollars and DFI expenditures in Iraq. We look forward to hearing from your office in the next two weeks.

Sincerely,


Ron Wyden


Tom Harkin


Byron Dorgan

11-L-0559/OSD/21648

January 20, 2004

TO: Ambassador Van Galbraith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

Van—

I hope you have a good trip to Iraq. It sounds like a good idea to me.

Regards,

DHR:dh
012004-20

333

20 Jan 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21649

OSD 00835-04

January 20, 2004

TO: Kiron Skinner
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Op-ed

I received a copy of your recent op-ed. An interesting thesis!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
01 1604-8

000.7

20 Jan 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21650

OSD 00836-04

January 20, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Articles on Warfare in Iraq

Attached is an article a fellow named Lind wrote and Pete Schoomaker sent me.
Also attached is General Dempsey's response.

I would be curious to know what your response is.

Thanks—regards.

Attach.

Lind, William S. "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare" (undated)
BG Dempsey's Response to 4th Generation Warfare Article (undated)

DHR:dh
012004-32

.....
Please respond by 2/13/04

Iraq

20 Jan 04

Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare

William S. Lind

Rather than commenting on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and other conflicts. The framework is the Four Generations of Modern War.

I developed the framework of the first three generations ("generation" is shorthand for dialectically qualitative shift) in the 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps. Marines kept asking, "What will the Fourth Generation be like?", and I began to think about that. The result was the article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." Our troops found copies of it in the caves at Tora Bora, the al Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan.

The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War. With the Treaty of Westphalia, the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had fought wars - families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises - using many different means, not just armies and navies (two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue). Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves.

The First Generation of Modern War runs roughly from 1648 to 1860. This was war of line and column tactics, where battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly. The relevance of the First Generation springs from the fact that the battlefield of order created a military culture of order. Most of the things that distinguish "military" from "civilian" - uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or rank - were products of the First Generation and are intended to reinforce the culture of order.

The problem is that, around the middle of the 19th century, the battlefield of order began to break down. Mass armies, soldiers who actually wanted to fight (an 18th century's soldier's main objective was to desert), rifled muskets, then breech loaders and machine guns, made the old line and column tactics first obsolete, then suicidal.

The problem ever since has been a growing contradiction between the military culture and the increasing disorderliness of the battlefield. The culture of order that was once consistent with the environment in which it operated has become more and more at odds with it.

Second Generation warfare was one answer to this contradiction. Developed by the French Army during and after World War I, it sought a solution in mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire. The goal was attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by the French as, "The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Centrally-controlled firepower was carefully synchronized, using detailed, specific plans and orders, for the infantry, tanks, and artillery, in a "conducted battle" where the commander was in effect the conductor of an orchestra.

Second Generation warfare came as a great relief to soldiers (or at least their officers) because it preserved the culture of order. The focus was inward on rules, processes and procedures. Obedience was more important than initiative (in fact, initiative was not wanted, because it endangered synchronization), and discipline was top-down and imposed.

Second Generation warfare is relevant to us today because the United States Army and Marine Corps learned Second Generation warfare from the French during and after World War I. It remains the American way of war, as we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq: to Americans, war means "putting steel on target." Aviation has replaced artillery as the source of most firepower, but otherwise, (and despite the Marine's formal doctrine, which is Third Generation maneuver warfare) the American military today is as French as white wine and brie. At the Marine Corps' desert warfare training center at 29 Palms, California, the only thing missing is the tricolor and a picture of General Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is true at the Army's Armor School at Fort Knox, where one instructor recently began his class by saying, "I don't know why I have to teach you all this old French crap, but I do."

Third Generation warfare, like Second, was a product of World War I. It was developed by the German Army, and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare.

Third Generation warfare is based not on firepower and attrition but speed, surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically, in the attack a Third Generation military seeks to get into the enemy's rear and collapse him from the rear forward: instead of "close with and destroy," the motto is "bypass and collapse." In the defense, it attempts to draw the enemy in, then cut him off. War ceases to be a shoving contest, where forces attempt to hold or advance a "line;" Third Generation warfare is non-linear.

Not only do tactics change in the Third Generation, so does the military culture. A Third Generation military focuses outward, on the situation, the enemy, and the result the situation requires, not inward on process and method (in war games in the 19th Century, German junior officers were routinely given problems that could only be solved by disobeying orders). Orders themselves specify the result to be achieved, but never the method ("Auftragstaktik").

Initiative is more important than obedience (mistakes are tolerated, so long as they come from too much initiative rather than too little), and it all depends on self-discipline, not imposed discipline. The Kaiserheer and the Wehrmacht could put on great parades, but in reality they had broken with the culture of order.

Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over from the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents such as al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.

Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian West's oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. After about three centuries on the strategic defensive, following the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic offensive, expanding outward in every direction. In Third Generation war, invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army.

Nor is Fourth Generation warfare merely something we import, as we did on 9/11. At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation war on their soil. America, with a closed political system (regardless of which party wins, the Establishment remains in power and nothing really changes) and a poisonous ideology of "multiculturalism," is a prime candidate for the home-grown variety of Fourth Generation war - which is by far the most dangerous kind.

Where does the war in Iraq fit in this framework?

I suggest that the war we have seen thus far is merely a powder train leading to the magazine. The magazine is Fourth Generation war by a wide variety of Islamic non-state actors, directed at America and Americans (and local governments friendly to America) everywhere. The longer America occupies Iraq, the greater the chance that the magazine will explode. If it does, God help us all.

For almost two years, a small seminar has been meeting at my house to work on the question of how to fight Fourth Generation war. It is made up mostly of Marines, lieutenant through lieutenant colonel, with one Army officer, one National Guard tanker captain and one foreign officer. We figured somebody ought to be working on the most difficult question facing the U.S. armed forces, and nobody else seems to be.

The seminar recently decided it was time to go public with a few of the ideas it has come up with, and use this column to that end. We have no magic solutions to offer, only some thoughts. We recognized from the outset that the whole task may be hopeless; state militaries may not be able to come to grips with Fourth Generation enemies no matter what they do.

But for what they are worth, here are our thoughts to date:

If America had some Third Generation ground forces, capable of maneuver warfare, we might be able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to fight battles of encirclement is what led to the failure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda stood, fought us, and got away with few casualties. To fight such battles we need some true light infantry, infantry that can move farther and faster on its feet than the enemy, has a full tactical repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and calling for fire) and can fight with its own weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate that U.S. Marine infantry today has a sustained march rate of only 10-15 kilometers per day; German World War II line, not light, infantry could sustain 40 kilometers.

Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to the Geneva Conventions, but might some be open to a chivalric code governing how our war with them would be fought? It's worth exploring.

How U.S. forces conduct themselves after the battle may be as important in 4GW as how they fight the battle.

What the Marine Corps calls "cultural intelligence" is of vital importance in 4GW, and it must go down to the lowest rank. In Iraq, the Marines seemed to grasp this much better than the U.S. Army.

What kind of people do we need in Special Operations Forces? The seminar thought minds were more important than muscles, but it is not clear all U.S. SOF understand this.

One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people.

Unfortunately, the American doctrine of "force protection" works against integration and generally hurts us badly. Here's a quote from the minutes of the seminar:

There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate

with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and the population protects you. The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives.

What "wins" at the tactical and physical levels may lose at the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where 4GW is decided. Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than it has inflicted. This is something the Second Generation American military has great trouble grasping, because it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates.

We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology.

What can the U.S. military learn from cops? Our reserve and National Guard units include lots of cops; are we taking advantage of what they know?

One key to success in 4GW may be "losing to win." Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generation forces. In a world where the state is in decline, if you destroy a state, it is very difficult to recreate it. Here's another quote from the minutes of the seminar:

"The discussion concluded that while war against another state may be necessary one should seek to preserve that state even as one defeats it. Grant the opposing armies the 'honors of war,' tell them what a fine job they did, make their defeat 'civilized' so they can survive the war institutionally intact and then work for your side. This would be similar to 18th century notions of civilized war and contribute greatly to propping up a fragile state. Humiliating the defeated enemy troops, especially in front of their own population, is always a serious mistake but one that Americans are prone to make. This is because the 'football mentality' we have developed since World War II works against us."

In many ways, the 21st century will offer a war between the forces of 4GW and Brave New World. The 4GW forces understand this, while the international elites that seek BNW do not. Another quote from the minutes:

"Osama bin Ladin, though reportedly very wealthy, lives in a cave. Yes, it is for security but it is also leadership by example. It may make it harder to separate (physically or psychologically) the 4GW leaders from their troops. It also makes it harder to discredit those leaders with their

followers. This contrasts dramatically with the BNW elites who are physically and psychologically separated (by a huge gap) from their followers (even the generals in most conventional armies are to a great extent separated from their men). The BNW elites are in many respects occupying the moral low ground but don't know it."

In the Axis occupation of the Balkans during World War II, the Italians in many ways were more effective than the Germans. The key to their success is that they did not want to fight. On Cyprus, the U.N. commander rated the Argentine battalion as more effective than the British or the Austrians because the Argentines did not want to fight. What lessons can U.S. forces draw from this?

How would the Mafia do an occupation?

When we have a coalition, what if we let each country do what is does best, e.g., the Russians handle operational art, the U.S. firepower and logistics, maybe the Italians the occupation?

How could the Defense Department's concept of "Transformation" be redefined so as to come to grips with 4GW? If you read the current "Transformation Planning Guidance" put out by DOD, you find nothing in it on 4GW, indeed nothing that relates at all to either of the two wars we are now fighting. It is all oriented toward fighting other state armed forces that fight us symmetrically.

The seminar intends to continue working on this question of redefining "Transformation" (die Verwandlung?) so as to make it relevant to 4GW. However, for our December meeting, we have posed the following problem: It is Spring, 2004. The U.S. Marines are to relieve the Army in the occupation of Fallujah, perhaps Iraq's hottest hot spot (and one where the 82nd Airborne's tactics have been pouring gasoline on the fire). You are the commander of the Marine force taking over Fallujah. What do you do?

I'll let you know what we come up with.

Will Saddam's capture mark a turning point in the war in Iraq? Don't count on it. Few resistance fighters have been fighting for Saddam personally. Saddam's capture may lead to a fractioning of the Baath Party, which would move us further toward a Fourth Generation situation where no one can recreate the state. It may also tell the Shiites that they no longer need America to protect them from Saddam, giving them more options in their struggle for free elections.

If the U.S. Army used the capture of Saddam to announce the end of tactics that enrage ordinary Iraqis and drive them toward active resistance, it might buy us a bit of de-escalation. But I don't think we'll that be smart. When it comes to Fourth Generation war, it seems nobody in the American military gets it.

Recently, a faculty member at the National Defense University wrote to Marine Corps General Mattis, commander of I MAR DIV, to ask his views on the importance of reading military history. Mattis responded with an eloquent defense of taking time to read history, one that should go up on the wall at all of our military schools. "Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation," Mattis said. "It doesn't give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead."

Still, even such a capable and well-read commander as General Mattis seems to miss the point about Fourth Generation warfare. He said in his missive, "Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun. For all the '4th Generation of War' intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc., I must respectfully say, 'Not really.'"

Well, that isn't quite what we Fourth Generation intellectuals are saying. On the contrary, we have pointed out over and over that the 4th Generation is not novel, but a return, specifically a return to the way war worked before the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just "the extension of politics by other means." And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what we recognize as military forces. When I am asked to recommend a good book describing what a Fourth Generation world will be like, I usually suggest Barbara Tuchman's *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century*.

Nor are we saying that Fourth Generation tactics are new. On the contrary, many of the tactics Fourth Generation opponents use are standard guerilla tactics. Others, including much of what we call "terrorism," are classic Arab light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology at the operational and strategic, not just tactical, levels.

As I have said before in this column, most of what we are facing in Iraq today is not yet Fourth Generation warfare, but a War of National Liberation, fought by people whose goal is to restore a Baathist state. But as that goal fades and those forces splinter, Fourth Generation war will come more and more to the fore. What will characterize it is not vast changes in how the enemy fights, but rather in who fights and what they fight for. The change in who fights makes it difficult for us to tell friend from foe. A good example is the advent of female suicide bombers; do

U.S. troops now start frisking every Moslem woman they encounter? The change in what our enemies fight for makes impossible the political compromises that are necessary to ending any war. We find that when it comes to making peace, we have no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. And the end of a war like that in Iraq becomes inevitable: the local state we attacked vanishes, leaving behind either a stateless region (Somalia) or a façade of a state (Afghanistan) within which more non-state elements rise and fight.

General Mattis is correct that none of this is new. It is only new to state armed forces that were designed to fight other state armed forces. The fact that no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a non-state enemy reminds us that Clio has a sense of humor: history also teaches us that not all problems have solutions.

BG Dempsey's Response to 4th Generation Warfare Article

It's probably not possible for me to respond to this without sounding defensive. However, since it's important that we capture the right lessons from our experience in OIF-1, I'll give it a shot.

I completely agree that it is necessary we be prepared to fight both state and non-state actors. Whether this is some generational evolution or simply a variety of enemies using whatever they have at their disposal against us is a matter best left to academia.

Beyond that one point of agreement, I've got to push back on several of the other ideas in the essay:

1. "One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people." I assume that the idea here is that once they get to know us, they'll trust us. That is a significant oversimplification of a very complex issue. We meet with "the local people" constantly and at every level. We've learned that Arabs are very friendly but very private. The ones who are already inclined to support us will befriend us to a point, but they will want to keep us at arms length. Furthermore, no amount of "integration" will change the opinion of those who think ill of us for what we represent. HUMINT follows success not friendship. Prove that you can take the bad guys off the street, and HUMINT goes up. No question that cultural awareness is good and that we should avoid being seen as excessively provocative. Also no question, in my mind at least, that they expect us to be who and what we are--the best fighting force in the world. For now, and until their own security forces are fully functioning, they're looking to us for security not friendship. Finally, Arabs are not put off by our basing and force protection. They can be critical if we inconvenience them in their daily lives by impeding traffic and denying them access to parts of the city. Having Armies live on well-protected bases outside of cities makes perfect sense to them. Having Armies living inside their cities does not. We're accounting for that by setting up the enduring base camps on the periphery of the city.

2. "We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology." This is simply nonsense. As I've told our soldiers over here, they--not our weapons--are what terrifies the terrorist. We are visible proof that men and women, blacks and whites, Christians, Muslims, and Jews can work together toward a common goal. We fight for positive ideas like individual rights, diversity, and freedom. Our enemies fight for negative ideas like personal gain, exclusion, and oppression. We only become the "weaker party" when we forget that.

3. "Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, thereby creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generational forces." First of all, from our perspective the war in Iraq is succeeding. The rogue regime of Sadaam Hussein is gone. We are on the offensive against terrorism. We don't know what shape the future Iraq will take, but there is every reason to be hopeful that it will be better than the old Iraq. Time and money will influence the outcome in a way that was impossible when the Baath Party was in power. Second, the initial invasion didn't destroy the state. Sadaam Hussein destroyed the state through 25 years of nepotism, favoritism, corruption, and neglect. We have made and continue to make herculean efforts to improve the quality of life for Iraq's people, and they know it. From their perspective, admitting that we've improved their lives would incur a psychological debt, a debt they are unwilling to incur. So, they will continue to be openly critical of our efforts.

4. "When it comes to Fourth Generation War, it seems nobody in the American military gets it." An incredible statement. We have made frequent adaptations in very nearly every system and function of the Division, and I know every US Army Division has done the same. We have learned never to believe we are as good as we can be, and we remain aware that pride of "authorship" is probably the most dangerous enemy we face in this environment.

The forces that follow us will probably not find the Iraq they think they will find. It will either be better or it will be worse. As we have, they will have to adjust. If under Mr. Lind's influence they arrive with well-established and pre-conceived notions about how to operate, they will probably be wrong.

As I write, we're fighting three different "kinds" of enemy in Iraq: the former regime, terrorism, and organized crime. We're also fighting against the emergence of religious extremism--mostly radical Sunni religious extremism--that in the long run may be the most dangerous influence the new Iraq will face. Overarching all of this, we are in competition for the popular support of the Iraqi people. For now, we have it, but that popular support has a shelf life, and we are working hard to "buy time" so that we can reduce the enemy forces to a level where the new Iraqi security forces can handle them.

Finally, I appreciate all you are doing to get us thinking about our profession and how we operate.

V/R BG Marty Dempsey

11-L-0559/OSD/21661

January 20, 2004

TO: Honorable John Lehman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Terrorism

Attached is a speech I gave on October 17, 1984. I would like you to read it. If you think it is worthwhile, you might want to send it to other members of the Commission. I particularly call your attention to pages 6 and 7, and the fact that the speech was given 20 years ago.

Thanks for your call on Sunday.

Warm regards,

Attach.

Rumsfeld, Donald. Speech given on the awarding of George Catlett Marshall Medal, October 17, 1984.

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P 61

REMARKS OF

DONALD RUMSFELD

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
G.D. SEARLE & CO.

On the Awarding of

THE GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEDAL

Presented By

JOHN W. DIXON
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

OCTOBER 17, 1984
WASHINGTON, D.C.

11-L-0559/OSD/21663

John W. Dixon, Chairman, Council of Trustees
The Association of the United States Army.

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, please join me at the podium. I am going to read *the citation* for the George Catlett Marshall Medal:

To Donald Rumsfeld for selfless Service to the United States of America:

His many and varied contributions are in the tradition of that great American public servant whose memory is perpetuated by this Award. In his service to both the executive and legislative branches of the government, Mr. Rumsfeld's duties have been performed with dedication and devotion.

In 1962 following three years as a naval aviator he was elected to the United States Congress as a Representative from Illinois, where he served for seven years, resigning in 1969 to become a member of the President's cabinet. During the succeeding five years he served variously as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Assistant to the president, Counsellor to the President, Director of the Economic Stabilization Program, and as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

He was recalled to Washington for the transition to the Presidency of Mr. Ford and in October of 1974, was appointed Chief of Staff of the White House. The following year he became the 13th Secretary of Defense, a position he held until January 1977.

And as an aside, while Ambassador to NATO, our honoree gained a tremendous insight into the value of landpower in Europe, which was later transferred to provide full support for Army requirements when he did become Secretary of Defense.

After 1977, returning to private life as a businessman, Mr. Rumsfeld continued his commitment to the public good by service on the president's Advisory Committee in Arms Control, the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Japanese Relations, and as Chairman for the Committee for the Free World.

In November 1983, he, then again, answered his country's call as the president's Personal Representative for the Middle East, during the crisis there. His willingness to accept this nearly impossible task is indicative of his dedication to the principle of public service as the highest form of patriotic citizenship.

with admiration and respect, the Association of the United States Army presents the George Catlett Marshall Medal to the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, presented in Washington, D.C., the 17th day of October, 1984.

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD
OCTOBER 17, 1984

Chairman Dixon, as the Army group just sang, "I," too, "am proud to be an American," as I know everyone in this room is.

Secretary Stahr -- my friend of a great many years, former Secretary of the Army Marty Hoffman -- Secretary Jack Marsh, it's hard to believe we were elected to Congress so many years ago, with our offices just three doors away, back in the days of Carl Vinson, Judge Smith, and spittoons.

General Bernie Rogers, my respects to you for your superb service to our country and our Alliance. General John Wickham, for whom I developed the highest regard during our work together when I was in NATO, in the White House, in the Pentagon. John, I like your sign, "Landpower," and that's coming from a broken-down ex-Navy pilot. John, please give my regards to General Vessey, a person I worked closely with during my time as Middle East Envoy.

We have a man who has not been introduced this evening, and I would like to do so. He is one of the truly great European statesmen of our time. He is sitting down there with General Dutch Kerwin, his Excellency, Joseph Luns, former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Joseph Luns was also a yeoman of signals in the Royal Dutch Navy. It reminds me of the wonderful story about the Navy man who rose through the ranks, finally became Captain with his four stripes, and was assigned a battleship, one of the top "black-shoe" posts one can hold as a Naval officer. He was steaming around in the Atlantic and was called from his quarters to the bridge and told, "There's a light out there." The Captain told the yeoman of signals, "Signal them to bear starboard." Back came the signal from ahead saying, "Bear starboard yourself." Well, this Captain knew he was on a battleship, three football fields long, a floating city. He said, "Signal that light again to 'Bear starboard now'." But back came the signal, "Bear starboard now, yourself." So the Captain, feeling full of himself with his great, big battleship, said, "Signal again and tell them, 'Bear starboard, I am a battleship'." And back came the signal, "Bear starboard yourself, I am a lighthouse."

Well, Joseph Luns is truly a lighthouse for our Alliance.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by this award. Few men shine as bright in modern history as General Marshall -- his dedication, his character, his contributions to freedom. He was truly a mighty warrior and a man of peace.

To be included among the distinguished group who have received this medal strengthens the gratitude I have always felt for the opportunity to serve, and for the privilege of serving **with** some of the most talented of our fellow citizens, the men and women, military and civilian, who keep the peace and defend freedom.

And Chairman John Dixon, I thank you for your introduction, even though it makes me sound like I can't hold **a job**. You know, an introduction like that makes it sound like you got up one morning and then just tripped from success to success. And it's **nice** to hear those things. The only problem is there are people in this room like former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, sitting down there -- Marty Hoffman and Jack Marsh who know the truth. They were with me all those years. And the truth really goes something like this.

I left the Navy, knocked on doors in Washington to *try to get a job*, was hired by a Congressman, managed two of his campaigns, and lost them both. I had an **0** and **2** record.

I remember when I was in Congress. I was young, thirty years old, and I was thrilled. I was ready to go out there to do **a job** for my country. I received in the mail a dissertation on Congressmen across the country. When I came to the section on the 13th District of Illinois, my District, it said:

"Now here is the exception that proves the rule. Rumsfeld is distinguished principally by his total lack of social, financial, and political standing in the community."

You laugh. At age 30, it wasn't so funny. I woke **up** my wife and said, "Listen to this, Joyce. This is terrible." She listened, looked at me, and said, "Yes, it is, Don." But go back to sleep because it's tough to argue with."

I bounced from that success to the Office of Economic Opportunity -- that was the "War on Poverty." It had been run by Sargent Shriver, the only American war run by **a** sergeant. It was tough. I came home one night, reached in the icebox for a beer, and there was **a** note that my wife, Joyce, always supportive and helpful, had taped up on the door of the icebox. It said:

"He tackled **a job** that couldn't be done, With **a** smile, he went right to it. He tackled **a job** that couldn't be done, and couldn't do **it**."

Well, I bounced back from that, and one day, George Shultz came into my office when he was Secretary of Treasury, and said, "Don, the President and I have decided that you should be in charge of the Wage-Price Controls for the United States of America." I said to George, "But I don't believe in them." He said, "I know, Don that's why we want you to do it."

That's when I learned the truth of that wonderful statement by H. L. Mencken that, "For every human problem, there's a solution that's simple, neat, and wrong." We found it.

So, John, as I listened to your introduction, I liked it, but from where I have been, it has seemed more like a roller coaster. In fact, your introduction reminded me of that comment by Speaker Sam Rayburn when he said:

"What are we doing sitting here weak and dumb, when for two drinks we could be strong and smart."

Knowing that I knew General Marshall only through the pages of history, and anticipating this evening, I thought about two friends of mine who worked with General Marshall. Ambassador Andre deStsercke, the unique and valued 25-year Dean of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, said that the extraordinary thing was the mature calm that General Marshall brought into every situation, a contagious calm. He recalled Winston Churchill observing that:

"In Marshall's heart, he had many shocks, but he never seemed surprised. That, if anyone could save us, it would be Marshall."

And John McCloy, that great statesman and your second Marshall medal honoree, said:

"Of all the people, great and near great, I have seen and known, he comes the closest to wearing the mantle of true military greatness and statesmanship. He was always a gentleman, as well as the commander."

Just as he was a mighty warrior, yet a man of peace, so, too, America strives for balance, for peace, and freedom through strength. And we do so in a very difficult world.

- Tens of thousands dead in the Iran/Iraq war,
- Well over 100,000 Soviet troops still in Afghanistan,
- Mine explosions in the Red Sea,
- Continued shellings and bombings in Lebanon,
- Terrorist attacks in Israel,
- Guerrilla war in Central America,

- Thousands of Vietnamese in Cambodia,
- Soviet missile deployments against Europe.

We see all of these, and more, in any given month on television and in the press. And all of this is to say nothing of the attacks on free world leaders we have seen in recent years -- President Reagan shot, President Sadat killed, the Pope wounded, the Korean Cabinet bombed, and, last week, Prime Minister Thatcher and her Cabinet attacked.

It is difficult not to come to the conclusion that ours is a dangerous world, a world in transition.

In assessing our world and our country's circumstance in it, several things stand out:

- We believe in freedom and we pray that others may enjoy it, but we know it is rare, it is precious, and its preservation is not automatic.
- We value our independence and believe in self-determination for others, but daily we see nations across the globe attempting to impose their will on their neighbors.
- We know ours is an interdependent world, and increasingly so, where what happens elsewhere from a political, economic or security standpoint, makes a great deal of difference to us here in the United States.
- It is a world where the relationships between nations are multifaceted -- political, economic, and security -- and that these aspects interact and impinge one on another in the minds of Parliaments, Presidents, and the people.
- It is a dynamic world. I was born in 1932, and in that year there was one superpower, Great Britain, and only 65 nations. Today there are more than 160 nations, and the Soviet Union probably has more troops in little Czechoslovakia than the entire British Army of the Rhine.
- We have seen technology evolve, communications and transportation are near instantaneous: and, given the power and reach of weapons today, it is clear that no portion of the globe is invulnerable, and that we no longer will have the luxury of leisurely preparation.

Recently, I was reminded of Churchill's phrase, "The Unnecessary War", when I read a Vermont Royster column in The Wall Street Journal. He wondered whether those born after World War II clearly see that it need not have happened, had so many in Poland, France, and Britain not ignored "the gathering storm", and, here in America, had more realized that those two great oceans had become ponds.

Those who prayed for peace were not more nor less moral, nor were those who marched in America to protest the horrors of war. But war came, because weakness invited it.

Those in Europe who laid down their arms, or had none, had peace. It was a peace of occupation and subjugation. And when war came, blame rightly fell on those in authority who had not maintained their strength and their freedom. There were debates. Some said, "Prepare." Others said, "No, it would be provocative." It's like that fable about the man, the boy, and the donkey walking down the street. People pointed and said, "Isn't it terrible that the strong man is riding the donkey and making the small boy walk?" So they changed places and people pointed and said, "Isn't that terrible, that strong young boy is riding the donkey and making the poor old man walk," so they both got on the donkey, the donkey came to the bridge, exhausted, fell into the river and drowned. And, of course, the moral of the story is, if you try to please everybody, you'll lose your donkey.

But I see reason for encouragement in the United States and elsewhere in the world. For, despite the cries to cut our defenses and for withdrawal and neutralism, those ideas are now under challenge, as they must be. There is a growing resistance to the idea that any human condition is acceptable, as long as it includes peace. We see more and more discussion and debate about our world and America's role in it which reflect perspective and realism.

One of the most significant events in my adult life has been the massive shift in power away from the United States to the Soviet Union. It is clear. And there is no question but that this shift has injected fundamental instabilities into the world equation. That the instabilities we see in the world are increasing at the time when that shift in the balance of power has occurred is not mere coincidence.

At the Marshall Award seminar in April, Secretary Marsh pointed out that the types of possible conflict in the world today range from terrorism through guerilla war, conventional conflict to nuclear. A great deal of thinking is given to the risks at the nuclear end of the spectrum, as opposed to the probabilities at the lower end of the spectrum.

Certainly, the reality of terrorism and its urgency today is clear. **As** Middle East Envoy, one rubs up against that problem each day.

Several facts about terrorism have been dramatically brought home in recent years:

- First, as Lenin wrote with characteristic terseness, "The purpose of terrorism is to terrorize."
- Terrorism is growing. In the 30 days ending last week, it is estimated that there were 37 terrorist attacks, by 13 different organizations, against the property or citizens of **20** different countries.
- Increasingly, terrorism is not random nor the work of isolated madmen. Rather, it is state-sponsored, by nations using it as a central element of their foreign policy. State-sponsored terrorism is estimated to be eight times more lethal. In short, terrorism has **a** home.
- Terrorism ~~is~~ nothing more nor less than "the sustained clandestine use of force to achieve political purposes." It is a great equalizer, a force multiplier. It is cheap, deniable, yields substantial results, is low risk, and thus far, generally without penalty.
- And, terrorism works. **A** single attack by a small weak nation, by influencing public opinion and morale, can alter the behavior of great nations or force tribute from wealthy nations. Unchecked, state-sponsored terrorism is adversely changing the balance of power in our world.
- While security is important, terrorist attacks can take place at any time, any place, using any technique. Regrettably, it is not possible to defend every potential target in every place, at all times, against every form of attack. Defense has its limits and its costs.
- Terrorism is **a** form of warfare, and must be treated as such. **As** with other forms of conflict, weakness invites aggression. Simply standing in **a** defensive position, absorbing blows, is not enough. Terrorism must be deterred.

- As is abundantly clear, the principal targets of terrorism are the values and the interests of democratic nations, and particularly the United States of America.

- In my judgement, terrorism, even today, is dangerously underestimated.

There are ways to deter terrorism, not to stop all terrorism, or to eliminate all casualties, for casualties will continue at some level, but at least to deter the growth of terrorism. And, as a country, we best get about it.

Today there are two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is a superpower not because of the pervasiveness of its political ideology and certainly not because of the dynamism of its economy. It is a superpower purely and simply because of things, ships, guns, tanks, planes, missiles, raw military power, and the options and opportunities they provide.

There is a danger in becoming fascinated with the nuances, subtleties, and intricacies of foreign policy and diplomacy, and, in focusing on them, ignore that they are either underpinned with power or they are not. To the extent they are not, sovereignty is at the sufferance of others.

Today the Soviet Union is in a vastly different set of circumstances than was the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Jack March and I were first running for Congress. 'As a result, we must conduct ourselves as a country in a manner that reflects the reality that we do not have an excess of power today. Our goal cannot be simply to manage a crisis or conflict brilliantly -- not with the power and reach of weapons today. Our goal must be to manage ourselves in a way that a crisis is less likely to occur. Given the narrower margin for error and the long lead times involved, we have to behave with a longsightedness, good sense, and willingness to invest before the fact, so that we assure our ability to contribute to peace and stability in the 1980's and 1990's.

Dr. Robert Tucker, in his article "In Defense of Containment," wrote that many today are calling for alternative policies to containment, and such calls are understandable. The alternatives are three, "confrontation, condominium, or withdrawal." While admitting the burdens of a policy of containment, staying power, steadiness of purpose, the disadvantages and burdens of each of the alternatives are vastly greater.

Indeed the record shows that containment, peace through strength, has permitted a measure of prosperity, progress and

stability that is truly remarkable, and it has been power, our deterrent strength, that has enabled America to be a nation of peace.

This, General Marshall knew and lived, for he was a man of peace.

As our leadership today, he sought a world of peaceful settlements, in which freedom and human rights are respected, a world of justice.

We seek a world where we will not read, as we did last week, of a family of five Czechoslovakians, attempting to swim the Mur River to freedom, three of whom drowned. I did not know them, but I understand and feel connected to them. Freedom is precious.

We recognize the value and uniqueness of an America -- where a Mung family, the Thaos from Laos, after being forced from their country, living in a refugee camp in Thailand for over two years, can come to the United States, receive help in settling, go to our schools, learn our language, find jobs, and become a part of America. I know this family. Joyce and I saw Vang Thao, age six or so, climb sleepily down from a TWA aircraft at midnight, with his family, at the last gate at O'Hare airport in Chicago, tattered, in need of medical attention, and carrying a badly battered teapot, one of the few possessions of the Thao family. And today, a few short years later, Vang is in school, speaking and writing English, in his words in a recent letter to us, "Getting A's and doing my best," grateful for the friendships he has found in America, enthusiastic about growing into young manhood, and optimistically looking forward in freedom and peace;.

Over my years in public life, one question has recurred. I have been asked over and over again, "Where are the great leaders, Mr. Rumsfeld? Where are the giants today?"

I answer, "They are there, and they will be there when they are needed. Let there be no doubt."

And, I ask in return, "Don't you suppose in the 1920's and the 1930's people also asked, 'Where are the great leaders, where are the giants?'"

We now know where they were. They were people whose names we had never heard, who were being paid a few thousand dollars a year, posted in dry, unpleasant forts all across the country and the world, moving their families every few years, bringing their children up in difficult circumstances, stuck in the same rank for eight, ten, twelve years, neglected by Congress, and whose

patriotism, dedication, and service were at great cost to themselves and their families, and were essentially without appreciation by the American people, whom they served.

It was not until World War II, when the need was urgent, that the American people discovered that the great leaders were there. Imagine our cause's good fortune that individuals of such character, stature, leadership qualities, and dedication, rose out of that difficult, rigorous, and thankless environment.

And when the call came, there, among the anonymous group, was a Dwight Eisenhower, an Omar Bradley, a Patton, a McAuliffe, a MacArthur, a Taylor, a Grunther, a Lemnitzer, and an Abrams, and others.

What a wonderful thing it says about the military, about the United States Army. Despite all the hardships, the lack of support, of recognition, or even awareness, on the part of the American people, when the need came, they were there. Doesn't it tell us something about an institution that can attract, develop, foster, retain, encourage and motivate individuals of that size?

And yes, there was a George Marshall, the mighty warrior, the man of peace.

It is a tribute to the institution of the United States Army, it is a tribute to each of you who has served or is serving. You are truly a national asset, a blessing for the people of our country, for our values, our freedom, and for our best hopes and aspirations for the world.

Each of you can, as I am doing, look out across the sea of patriots here this evening and know that the giants are here, some in this room, and they will be there if needed.

You have my unbounded admiration for what you do, for how well you do it, and, most importantly, for why you do it. It is worth it, for those of us privileged to be Americans, for the world, for America truly is the standard of freedom, for that Czechoslovakian family swimming for freedom, for the Laotian family, the Thais, and for the millions of Americans and the people across this globe who cherish freedom.

Thank you and God bless you.

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January 20, 2004

TO: Members of the Senior Level Review Group

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Terrorism

Attached are some remarks I made at the Association of the U.S. Army some 20 years ago, on October 17, 1984, that I thought might be of interest. I particularly call your attention to pages 6 through 9.

Regards,

Attach.

Rumsfeld, Donald. Speech given on the awarding of George Catlett Marshall Medal, October 17, 1984.

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Please respond by _____

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20 Jan 04

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REMARKS OF

DONALD RUMSFELD

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
G.D. SEARLE & CO.

On the Awarding of

THE GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEDAL

Presented By

JOHN W. DIXON
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

OCTOBER 17, 1984
WASHINGTON, D.C.

11-L-0559/OSD/21676

John W. Dixon, Chairman, Council of Trustees
The Association of the United States Army.

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, please join me at the podium. I am going to read the citation for the George Catlett Marshall Medal:

To Donald Rumsfeld for selfless service to the United States of America:

His many and varied contributions are in the tradition of that great American public servant whose memory is perpetuated by this Award. In his service to both the executive and legislative branches of the government, Mr. Rumsfeld's duties have been performed with dedication and devotion.

In 1962 following three years as a naval aviator he was elected to the United States Congress as a Representative from Illinois, where he served for seven years, resigning in 1969 to become a member of the President's cabinet. During the succeeding five years he served variously as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Assistant to the President, Counsellor to the President, Director of the Economic Stabilization Program, and as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

He was recalled to Washington for the transition to the Presidency of Mr. Ford and in October of 1974, was appointed Chief of Staff of the White House. The following year he became the 13th Secretary of Defense, a position he held until January 1977.

And as an aside, while Ambassador to NATO, our honoree gained a tremendous insight into the value of landpower in Europe, which was later transferred to provide full support for Army requirements when he did become Secretary of Defense.

After 1977, returning to private life as a businessman, Mr. Rumsfeld continued his commitment to the public good by service on the president's Advisory Committee on Arms Control, the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Japanese Relations, and as Chairman for the Committee for the Free World.

In November 1983, he, then again, answered his country's call as the president's Personal Representative for the Middle East, during the crisis there. His willingness to accept this nearly impossible task is indicative of his dedication to the principle of public service as the highest form of patriotic citizenship.

With admiration and respect, the Association of the United States Army presents the George Catlett Marshall Medal to the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, presented in Washington, D.C., the 17th day of October, 1984.

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD
OCTOBER 17, 1984

Chairman Dixon, as the Army group just sang, "I," too, "am proud to be an American," as I know everyone in this room is.

Secretary Stahr -- my friend of a great many years, former Secretary of the Army Marty Hoffman -- Secretary Jack Marsh, it's hard to believe we were elected to Congress so many years ago, with our offices just three doors away, back in the days of Carl Vinson, Judge Smith, and spittoons.

General Bernie Rogers, my respects to you for your superb service to our country and our Alliance. General John Wickham, for whom I developed the highest regard during our work together when I was in NATO, in the White House, in the Pentagon. John, I like your sign, "Landpower," and that's coming from a broken-down ex-Navy pilot. John, please give my regards to General Vessey, a person I worked closely with during my time as Middle East Envoy.

We have a man who has not been introduced this evening, and I would like to do so. He is one of the truly great European statesmen of our time. He is sitting down there with General Dutch Kerwin, his Excellency, Joseph Luns, former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Joseph Luns was also a yeoman of signals in the Royal Dutch Navy. It reminds me of the wonderful story about the Navy man who rose through the ranks, finally became Captain with his four stripes, and was assigned a battleship, one of the top "black-shoe" posts one can hold as a Naval officer. He was steaming around in the Atlantic and was called from his quarters to the bridge and told, "There's a light out there." The Captain told the yeoman of signals, "Signal them to bear starboard." Back came the signal from ahead saying, "Bear starboard yourself." Well, this Captain knew he was on a battleship, three football fields long, a floating city. He said, "Signal that light again to 'Bear starboard now'." But back came the signal, "Bear starboard now, yourself." So the Captain, feeling full of himself with his great, big battleship, said, "Signal again and tell them, 'Bear starboard, I am a battleship'." And back came the signal, "Bear starboard yourself, I am a lighthouse."

Well, Joseph Luns is truly a lighthouse for our Alliance.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by this award. Few men shine as bright in modern history as General Marshall -- his dedication, his character, his contributions to freedom. He was truly a mighty warrior and a man of peace.

To be included among the distinguished group who have received this medal strengthens the gratitude I have always felt for the opportunity to serve, and for the privilege of serving with some of the most talented of our fellow citizens, the men and women, military and civilian, who keep the peace and defend freedom.

And Chairman John Dixon, I thank you for your introduction, even though it makes me sound like I can't hold a job. You know, an introduction like that makes it sound like you got up one morning and then just tripped from success to success. And it's nice to hear those things. The only problem is there are people in this room like former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, sitting down there -- Marty Hoffman and Jack Marsh who know the truth. They were with me all those years. And the truth really goes something like this.

I left the Navy, knocked on doors in Washington to try to get a job, was hired, by a Congressman, managed two of his campaigns, and lost them both. I had an 0 and 2 record.

I remember when I was in Congress. I was young, thirty years old, and I was thrilled. I was ready to go out there to do a job for my country. I received in the mail a dissertation on Congressmen across the country. When I came to the section on the 13th District of Illinois, my District, it said:

"Now here is the exception that proves the rule. Rumsfeld is distinguished principally by his total lack of social, financial, and political standing in the community."

You laugh. At age 30, it wasn't so funny. I woke up my wife and said, "Listen to this, Joyce. This is terrible." She listened, looked at me, and said, "Yes, it is, Don." But go back to sleep because it's tough to argue with."

I bounced from that success to the Office of Economic Opportunity -- that was the "War on Poverty." It had been run by Sargent Shriver, the only American war run by a sergeant. It was tough. I came home one night, reached in the icebox for a beer, and there was a note that my wife, Joyce, always supportive and helpful, had taped up on the door of the icebox. It said:

"He tackled a job that couldn't be done. With a smile, he went right to it. He tackled a job that couldn't be done, and couldn't do it."

Well, I bounced back from that, and one day, George Shultz came into my office when he was Secretary of Treasury, and said, "Don, the President and I have decided that you should be in charge of the Wage-Price Controls for the United States of America." I said to George, "But I don't believe in them." He said, "I know, Don that's why we want you to do it."

That's when I learned the truth of that wonderful statement by H. L. Mencken that, "For every human problem, there's a solution that's simple, neat, and wrong." We found it.

so, John, as I listened to your introduction, I liked it, but from where I have been, it has seemed more like a roller coaster. In fact, your introduction reminded me of that comment by Speaker Sam Rayburn when he said:

"What are we doing sitting here weak and dumb, when for two drinks we could be strong and smart."

Knowing that I knew General Marshall only through the pages of history, and anticipating this evening, I thought about two friends of mine who worked with General Marshall. Ambassador Andre deStsercke, the unique and valued 25-year Dean of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, said that the extraordinary thing was the mature calm that General Marshall brought into every situation, a contagious calm. He recalled Winston Churchill observing that:

"In Marshall's heart, he had many shocks, but he never seemed surprised. That, if anyone could save us, it would be Marshall."

And John McCloy, that great statesman and your second Marshall medal honoree, said:

"Of all the people, great and near great, I have seen and known, he comes the closest to wearing the mantle of true military greatness and statesmanship. He was always a gentleman, as well as the commander."

Just as he was a mighty warrior, yet a man of peace, so, too, America strives for balance, for peace, and freedom through strength. And we do so in a very difficult world.

- Tens of thousands dead in the Iran/Iraq war,
- Well over 100,000 Soviet troops still in Afghanistan,
- Mine explosions in the Red Sea,
- Continued shelling and bombings in Lebanon,
- Terrorist attacks in Israel,
- Guerrilla war in Central America,

- Thousands of Vietnamese in Cambodia,
- Soviet missile deployments against Europe.

We see all of these, and more, in any given month on television and in the press. And all of this is to say nothing of the attacks on free world leaders we have seen in recent years -- president Reagan shot, President Sadat killed, the Pope wounded, the Korean Cabinet bombed, and, last week, Prime Minister Thatcher and her Cabinet attacked.

It is difficult not to come to the conclusion that ours is a dangerous world, a world in transition.

In assessing our world and our country's circumstance in it, several things stand out:

- We believe in freedom and we pray that others may enjoy it, but we know it is rare, it is precious, and its preservation is not automatic.
- We value our independence and believe in self-determination for others, but daily we see nations across the globe attempting to impose their will on their neighbors.
- We know ours is an interdependent world, and increasingly so, where what happens elsewhere from a political, economic or security standpoint, makes a great deal of difference to us here in the United States.
- It is a world where the relationships between nations are multifaceted -- political, economic, and security -- and that these aspects interact and impinge one on another in the minds of Parliaments, Presidents, and the people.
- It is a dynamic world. I was born in 1932, and in that year there was one superpower, Great Britain, and only 65 nations. Today there are more than 160 nations, and the Soviet Union probably has more troops in little Czechoslovakia than the entire British Army of the Rhine.
- We have seen technology evolve, communications and transportation are near instantaneous; and, given the power and reach of weapons today, it is clear that no portion of the globe is invulnerable, and that we no longer will have the luxury of leisurely preparation.

Recently, I was reminded of Churchill's phrase, "The Unnecessary War", when I read a Vermont Royster column in The Wall Street Journal. He wondered whether those born after World War II clearly see that it need not have happened, had so many in Poland; France, and Britain not ignored "the gathering storm", and, here in America, had more realized that those two great oceans had become ponds.

Those who prayed for peace were not more nor less moral, nor were those who marched in America to protest the horrors of war. But war came, because weakness invited it.

Those in Europe who laid down their arms, or had none, had peace. It was a peace of occupation and subjugation. And when war came, blame rightly fell on those in authority who had not maintained their strength and their freedom. There were debates. Some said, "Prepare." Others said, "No, it would be provocative." It's like that fable about the man, the boy, and the donkey walking down the street. People pointed and said, "Isn't it terrible that the strong man is riding the donkey and making the small boy walk?" So they changed places and people pointed and said, "Isn't that terrible, that strong young boy is riding the donkey and making the poor old man walk." So they both got on the donkey, the donkey came to the bridge, exhausted, fell into the river and drowned. And, of course, the moral of the story is, if you try to please everybody, you'll lose your donkey.

But I see reason for encouragement in the United States and elsewhere in the world. For, despite the cries to cut our defenses and for withdrawal and neutralism, those ideas are now under challenge, as they must be. There is a growing resistance to the idea that any human condition is acceptable, as long as it includes peace. We see more and more discussion and debate about our world and America's role in it which reflect perspective and realism.

One of the most significant events in my adult life has been the massive shift in power away from the United States to the Soviet Union. It is clear. And there is no question but that shift has injected fundamental instabilities into the world equation. That the instabilities we see in the world are increasing at the time when that shift in the balance of power has occurred is not mere coincidence.

At the Marshall Award seminar in April, Secretary Marsh pointed out that the types of possible conflict in the world today range from terrorism through guerilla war, conventional conflict to nuclear. A great deal of thinking is given to the risks at the nuclear end of the spectrum, as opposed to the probabilities at the lower end of the spectrum.

Certainly, the reality of terrorism and its urgency today is clear. As Middle East Envoy, one rubs up against that problem each day.

Several facts about terrorism have been dramatically brought home in recent years:

- First, as Lenin wrote with characteristic terseness, "The purpose **of** terrorism is to terrorize."
- Terrorism is growing. In the 30 days ending last week, it is estimated that there were 37 terrorist attacks, by 13 different organizations, against the property or citizens of 20 different countries.
- Increasingly, terrorism is not random nor the work of isolated madmen. Rather, it is state-sponsored, by nations using it as a central element of their foreign policy. State-sponsored terrorism is estimated to be eight times more lethal. In short, terrorism has a home.
- Terrorism is nothing more nor **less** than "the sustained clandestine use of force to achieve political purposes." **It** is a great equalizer, a force multiplier. It is cheap, deniable, yields substantial results, is low risk, and thus far, generally without penalty.
- And, terrorism **works**. A single attack by a small weak nation, by influencing public opinion and morale, can alter the behavior of great nations or force tribute **from** wealthy nations. Unchecked, state-sponsored terrorism is adversely changing the balance of power in **our** world.
- While security **is** important, terrorist attacks can place at any time, any place, using any. Regrettably, it is not possible to defend every target in every place, at all times, against every form attack. Defense has its limits and its
- Terrorism is **a** form of warfare, and must be treated **such**. As with other forms of conflict, weakness aggression. Simply standing in **a** defensive absorbing blows, is not enough. Terrorism must

- As is abundantly clear, the principal targets of terrorism are the values and the interests of nations, and particularly the United States of
- In my judgement, terrorism, even today, is

There are ways to deter terrorism, not to stop all terrorism, or to eliminate all casualties, for casualties will continue at some level, but at least to deter the growth of terrorism. And, as a country, we best get about it.

Today there are two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is a superpower not because of the pervasiveness of its political ideology and certainly not because of the dynamism of its economy. It is a superpower purely and simply because of things, ships, guns, tanks, planes, missiles, raw military power, and the options and opportunities they provide.

There is a danger in becoming fascinated with the nuances, subtleties, and intricacies of foreign policy and diplomacy, and, in focusing on them, ignore that they are either underpinned with power or they are not. To the extent they are not, sovereignty is at the sufferance of others.

Today the Soviet Union is in a vastly different set of circumstances than was the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Jack March and I were first running for Congress. As a result, we must conduct ourselves as a country in a manner that reflects the reality that we do not have an excess of power today. Our goal cannot be simply to manage a crisis or conflict brilliantly -- not with the power and reach of weapons today. Our goal must be to manage ourselves in a way that a crisis is less likely to occur. Given the narrower margin for error and the long lead times involved, we have to behave with a longsightedness, good sense, and willingness to invest before the fact, so that we assure our ability to contribute to peace and stability in the 1980's and 1990's.

Dr. Robert Tucker, in his article "In Defense of Containment," wrote that many today are calling for alternative policies to containment, and such calls are understandable. The alternatives are three, "confrontation, condominium, or withdrawal." While admitting the burdens of a policy of containment, staying power, steadiness of purpose, the disadvantages and burdens of each of the alternatives are vastly greater.

Indeed the record shows that containment, peace through strength, has permitted a measure of prosperity, progress and

stability that is truly remarkable, and it has been power, our deterrent strength, that has enabled America to be a nation of peace.

This, General Marshall knew and lived, for he was a man of peace.

As our leadership today, he sought a world of peaceful settlements, in which freedom and human rights are respected, a world of justice.

We seek a world where we will not read, as we did last week, of a family of five Czechoslovskians, attempting to swim the Mur River to freedom, three of whom drowned. I did not know them, but I understand and feel connected to them. Freedom is precious.

We recognize the value and uniqueness of an America -- where a Mung family, the Thaos from Laos, after being forced from their country, living in a refugee camp in Thailand for over two years, can come to the United States, receive help in settling, go to our schools, learn our language, find jobs, and become a part of America. I know this family. Joyce and I saw Vang Thao, age six or so, climb sleepily down from a TWA aircraft at midnight, with his fsmily, at the last gate at O'Hare airport in Chicago, tattered, in need of medical attention, and carrying a badly battered teapot, one of the few possessions of the Thao family. And today, a few short years later, Vang is in school, speaking and writing English, in his words in a recent letter to us, "Getting A's and doing my best," grateful for the friendships he has found in America, enthusiastic about growing into young manhood, and optimistically looking forward in freedom and peace;.

Over my years in public life, one question has recurred. I have been asked over and over again, "Where are the great leaders, Mr. Rumsfeld? Where are the giants today?"

I answer, "They are there, and they will be there when they are needed. Let there be no doubt."

And, I ask in return, "Don't you suppose in the 1920's and the 1930's people also asked, 'Where are the great leaders, where are the giants?'"

We now know where they were. They were people whose names we had never heard, who were being paid a few thousand dollars a year, posted in dry, unpleasant forts all across the country and the world, moving their families every few years, bringing their children up in difficult circumstances, stuck in the same rank for eight, ten, twelve years, neglected by Congress, and whose

patriotism, dedication, and service were at great cost to themselves and their families, and were essentially without., appreciation by the American people, whom they served.

It was not until World War II, when the need was urgent, that the American people discovered that the great leaders were there. Imagine our cause's good fortune that individuals of such character, stature, leadership qualities, and dedication, rose out of that difficult, rigorous, and thankless environment.

And when the call came, there, among the anonymous group, was a Dwight Eisenhower, an Omar Bradley, a Patton, a McAuliffe, a MacArthur, a Taylor, a Grunther, a Lemnitzer, and an Abrams, and others.

What a wonderful thing it says about the military, about the United States Army. Despite all the hardships, the lack of support, of recognition, or even awareness, on the part of the American people, when the need came, they were there. Doesn't it tell us something about an institution that can attract, develop, foster, retain, encourage and motivate individuals of that size?

And yes, there was a George Marshall, the mighty warrior, the man of peace.


It is a tribute to the institution of the United States Army, **it** is a tribute to each of you who has served or is serving. **You** are truly a national asset, a blessing for the people of our country, for our values, our freedom, and for our best hopes and aspirations for the world.

Each of you can, as I am doing, look out across the sea of patriots here this evening and know that the giants are here, some in this room, and they will be there if needed.

You have my unbounded admiration for what you do, for how well you do it, and, most importantly, for why you do it. It is worth it, for those of us privileged to be Americans, for the world, for America truly is the standard of freedom, for that Czechoslovakian family swimming for freedom, for the Laotian family, the Thaos, and for the millions of Americans and **the,** ... people across this globe who cherish freedom.

Thank you and God bless you.

January 21, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Iraq—the Continuing Debate

Mr. President—

General Schoomaker sent me the attached two papers. One is written by William Lind, who is critical and concerned. Also attached is a response to Lind's concerns by General Dempsey, our division commander in the Baghdad area.

It struck me that you might like to see the discussion that is taking place among Army thinkers.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

Lind, William S. "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare" (undated)
BG Dempsey's Response to 4th Generation Warfare Article (undated)

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Iraq

21 Jan 04

Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare

William S. Lind

Rather than commenting on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and other conflicts. The framework is the Four Generations of Modern War.

I developed the framework of the first three generations ("generation" is shorthand for dialectically qualitative shift) in the 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps. Marines kept asking, "What will the Fourth Generation be like?", and I began to think about that. The result was the article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." Our troops found copies of it in the caves at Tora Bora, the al Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan.

The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War. With the Treaty of Westphalia, the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had fought wars - families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises - using many different means, not just armies and navies (two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue). Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves.

The First Generation of Modern War runs roughly from 1648 to 1860. This was war of line and column tactics, where battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly. The relevance of the First Generation springs from the fact that the battlefield of order created a military culture of order. Most of the things that distinguish "military" from "civilian" - uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or rank - were products of the First Generation and are intended to reinforce the culture of order.

The problem is that, around the middle of the 19th century, the battlefield of order began to break down. Mass armies, soldiers who actually wanted to fight (an 18th century's soldier's main objective was to desert), rifled muskets, then breech loaders and machine guns, made the old line and column tactics first obsolete, then suicidal.

The problem ever since has been a growing contradiction between the military culture and the increasing disorderliness of the battlefield. The culture of order that was once consistent with the environment in which it operated has become more and more at odds with it.

Second Generation warfare was one answer to this contradiction. Developed by the French Army during and after World War I, it sought a solution in mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire. The goal was attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by the French as, "The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Centrally-controlled firepower was carefully synchronized, using detailed, specific plans and orders, for the infantry, tanks, and artillery, in a "conducted battle" where the commander was in effect the conductor of an orchestra.

Second Generation warfare came as a great relief to soldiers (or at least their officers) because it preserved the culture of order. The focus was inward on rules, processes and procedures. Obedience was more important than initiative (in fact, initiative was not wanted, because it endangered synchronization), and discipline was top-down and imposed.

Second Generation warfare is relevant to us today because the United States Army and Marine Corps learned Second Generation warfare from the French during and after World War I. It remains the American way of war, as we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq: to Americans, war means "putting steel on target." Aviation has replaced artillery as the source of most firepower, but otherwise, (and despite the Marine's formal doctrine, which is Third Generation maneuver warfare) the American military today is as French as white wine and brie. At the Marine Corps' desert warfare training center at 29 Palms, California, the only thing missing is the tricolor and a picture of General Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is true at the Army's Armor School at Fort Knox, where one instructor recently began his class by saying, "I don't know why I have to teach you all this old French crap, but I do."

Third Generation warfare, like Second, was a product of World War I. It was developed by the German Army, and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare.

Third Generation warfare is based not on firepower and attrition but speed, surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically, in the attack a Third Generation military seeks to get into the enemy's rear and collapse him from the rear forward: instead of "close with and destroy," the motto is "bypass and collapse." In the defense, it attempts to draw the enemy in, then cut him off. War ceases to be a shoving contest, where forces attempt to hold or advance a "line;" Third Generation warfare is non-linear.

Not only do tactics change in the Third Generation, so does the military culture. A Third Generation military focuses outward, on the situation, the enemy, and the result the situation requires, not inward on process and method (in war games in the 19th Century, German junior officers were routinely given problems that could only be solved by disobeying orders). Orders themselves specify the result to be achieved, but never the method ("Auftragstaktik").

Initiative is more important than obedience (mistakes are tolerated, so long as they come from too much initiative rather than too little), and it all depends on self-discipline, not imposed discipline. The Kaiserheer and the Wehrmacht could put on great parades, but in reality they had broken with the culture of order.

Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over from the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents such as al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.

Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian West's oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. After about three centuries on the strategic defensive, following the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic offensive, expanding outward in every direction. In Third Generation war, invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army.

Nor is Fourth Generation warfare merely something we import, as we did on 9/11. At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation war on their soil. America, with a closed political system (regardless of which party wins, the Establishment remains in power and nothing really changes) and a poisonous ideology of "multiculturalism," is a prime candidate for the home-grown variety of Fourth Generation war - which is by far the most dangerous kind.

Where does the war in Iraq fit in this framework?

I suggest that the war we have seen thus far is merely a powder train leading to the magazine. The magazine is Fourth Generation war by a wide variety of Islamic non-state actors, directed at America and Americans (and local governments friendly to America) everywhere. The longer America occupies Iraq, the greater the chance that the magazine will explode. If it does, God help us all.

For almost two years, a small seminar has been meeting at my house to work on the question of how to fight Fourth Generation war. It is made up mostly of Marines, lieutenant through lieutenant colonel, with one Army officer, one National Guard tanker captain and one foreign officer. We figured somebody ought to be working on the most difficult question facing the U.S. armed forces, and nobody else seems to be.

The seminar recently decided it was time to go public with a few of the ideas it has come up with, and use this column to that end. We have no magic solutions to offer, only some thoughts. We recognized from the outset that the whole task may be hopeless; state militaries may not be able to come to grips with Fourth Generation enemies no matter what they do.

But for what they are worth, here are our thoughts to date:

If America had some Third Generation ground forces, capable of maneuver warfare, we might be able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to fight battles of encirclement is what led to the failure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda stood, fought us, and got away with few casualties. To fight such battles we need some true light infantry, infantry that can move farther and faster on its feet than the enemy, has a full tactical repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and calling for fire) and can fight with its own weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate that U.S. Marine infantry today has a sustained march rate of only 10-15 kilometers per day; German World War II line, not light, infantry could sustain 40 kilometers.

Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to the Geneva Conventions, but might some be open to a chivalric code governing how our war with them would be fought? It's worth exploring.

How U.S. forces conduct themselves after the battle may be as important in 4GW as how they fight the battle.

What the Marine Corps calls "cultural intelligence" is of vital importance in 4GW, and it must go down to the lowest rank. In Iraq, the Marines seemed to grasp this much better than the U.S. Army.

What kind of people do we need in Special Operations Forces? The seminar thought minds were more important than muscles, but it is not clear all U.S. SOF understand this.

One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people.

Unfortunately, the American doctrine of "force protection" works against integration and generally hurts us badly. Here's a quote from the minutes of the seminar:

There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate

with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and the population protects you. The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives.

What "wins" at the tactical and physical levels may lose at the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where 4GW is decided. Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than it has inflicted. This is something the Second Generation American military has great trouble grasping, because it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates.

We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology.

What can the U.S. military learn from cops? Our reserve and National Guard units include lots of cops; are we taking advantage of what they know?

One key to success in 4GW may be "losing to win." Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generation forces. In a world where the state is in decline, if you destroy a state, it is very difficult to recreate it. Here's another quote from the minutes of the seminar:

"The discussion concluded that while war against another state may be necessary one should seek to preserve that state even as one defeats it. Grant the opposing armies the 'honors of war,' tell them what a fine job they did, make their defeat 'civilized' so they can survive the war institutionally intact and then work for your side. This would be similar to 18th century notions of civilized war and contribute greatly to propping up a fragile state. Humiliating the defeated enemy troops, especially in front of their own population, is always a serious mistake but one that Americans are prone to make. This is because the 'football mentality' we have developed since World War II works against us."

In many ways, the 21st century will offer a war between the forces of 4GW and Brave New World. The 4GW forces understand this, while the international elites that seek BNW do not. Another quote from the minutes:

"Osama bin Ladin, though reportedly very wealthy, lives in a cave. Yes, it is for security but it is also leadership by example. It may make it harder to separate (physically or psychologically) the 4GW leaders from their troops. It also makes it harder to discredit those leaders with their

followers. This contrasts dramatically with the BNW elites who are physically and psychologically separated (by a huge gap) from their followers (even the generals in most conventional armies are to a great extent separated from their men). The BNW elites are in many respects occupying the moral low ground but don't know it."

In the Axis occupation of the Balkans during World War II, the Italians in many ways were more effective than the Germans. The key to their success is that they did not want to fight. On Cyprus, the U.N. commander rated the Argentine battalion as more effective than the British or the Austrians because the Argentines did not want to fight. What lessons can U.S. forces draw from this?

How would the Mafia do an occupation?

When we have a coalition, what if we let each country do what it does best, e.g., the Russians handle operational art, the U.S. firepower and logistics, maybe the Italians the occupation?

How could the Defense Department's concept of "Transformation" be redefined so as to come to grips with 4GW? If you read the current "Transformation Planning Guidance" put out by DOD, you find nothing in it on 4GW, indeed nothing that relates at all to either of the two wars we are now fighting. It is all oriented toward fighting other state armed forces that fight us symmetrically.

The seminar intends to continue working on this question of redefining "Transformation" (die Verwandlung?) so as to make it relevant to 4GW. However, for our December meeting, we have posed the following problem: It is Spring, 2004. The U.S. Marines are to relieve the Army in the occupation of Fallujah, perhaps Iraq's hottest hot spot (and one where the 82nd Airborne's tactics have been pouring gasoline on the fire). You are the commander of the Marine force taking over Fallujah. What do you do?

I'll let you know what we come up with.

Will Saddam's capture mark a turning point in the war in Iraq? Don't count on it. Few resistance fighters have been fighting for Saddam personally. Saddam's capture may lead to a fractioning of the Baath Party, which would move us further toward a Fourth Generation situation where no one can recreate the state. It may also tell the Shiites that they no longer need America to protect them from Saddam, giving them more options in their struggle for free elections.

If the U.S. Army used the capture of Saddam to announce the end of tactics that enrage ordinary Iraqis and drive them toward active resistance, it might buy us a bit of de-escalation. But I don't think we'll that be smart. When it comes to Fourth Generation war, it seems nobody in the American military gets it.

Recently, a faculty member at the National Defense University wrote to Marine Corps General Mattis, commander of I MAR DIV, to ask his views on the importance of reading military history. Mattis responded with an eloquent defense of taking time to read history, one that should go up on the wall at all of our military schools. "Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation," Mattis said. "It doesn't give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead."

Still, even such a capable and well-read commander as General Mattis seems to miss the point about Fourth Generation warfare. He said in his missive, "Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun. For all the '4th Generation of War' intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc., I must respectfully say, 'Not really.'"

Well, that isn't quite what we Fourth Generation intellectuals are saying. On the contrary, we have pointed out over and over that the 4th Generation is not novel, but a return, specifically a return to the way war worked before the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just "the extension of politics by other means." And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what we recognize as military forces. When I am asked to recommend a good book describing what a Fourth Generation world will be like, I usually suggest Barbara Tuchman's *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century*.

Nor are we saying that Fourth Generation tactics are new. On the contrary, many of the tactics Fourth Generation opponents use are standard guerilla tactics. Others, including much of what we call "terrorism," are classic Arab light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology at the operational and strategic, not just tactical, levels.

As I have said before in this column, most of what we are facing in Iraq today is not yet Fourth Generation warfare, but a War of National Liberation, fought by people whose goal is to restore a Baathist state. But as that goal fades and those forces splinter, Fourth Generation war will come more and more to the fore. What will characterize it is not vast changes in how the enemy fights, but rather in who fights and what they fight for. The change in who fights makes it difficult for us to tell friend from foe. A good example is the advent of female suicide bombers; do

U.S. troops now start frisking every Moslem woman they encounter? The change in what our enemies fight for makes impossible the political compromises that are necessary to ending any war. We find that when it comes to making peace, we have no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. And the end of a war like that in Iraq becomes inevitable: the local state we attacked vanishes, leaving behind either a stateless region (Somalia) or a façade of a state (Afghanistan) within which more non-state elements rise and fight.

General Mattis is correct that none of this is new. It is only new to state armed forces that were designed to fight other state armed forces. The fact that no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a non-state enemy reminds us that Clio has a sense of humor: history also teaches us that not all problems have solutions.

BG Dempsey's Response to 4th Generation Warfare Article

It's probably not possible for me to respond to this without sounding defensive. However, since it's important that we capture the right lessons from our experience in OIF-1, I'll give it a shot.

I completely agree that it is necessary we be prepared to fight both state and non-state actors. Whether this is some generational evolution or simply a variety of enemies using whatever they have at their disposal against us is a matter best left to academia.

Beyond that one point of agreement, I've got to push back on several of the other ideas in the essay:

1. "One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people." I assume that the idea here is that once they get to know us, they'll trust us. That is a significant oversimplification of a very complex issue. We meet with "the local people" constantly and at every level. We've learned that Arabs are very friendly but very private. The ones who are already inclined to support us will befriend us to a point, but they will want to keep us at arms length. Furthermore, no amount of "integration" will change the opinion of those who think ill of us for what we represent. HUMINT follows success not friendship. Prove that you can take the bad guys off the street, and HUMINT goes up. No question that cultural awareness is good and that we should avoid being seen as excessively provocative. Also no question, in my mind at least, that they expect us to be who and what we are--the best fighting force in the world. For now, and until their own security forces are fully functioning, they're looking to us for security not friendship. Finally, Arabs are not put off by our basing and force protection. They can be critical if we inconvenience them in their daily lives by impeding traffic and denying them access to parts of the city. Having Armies live on well-protected bases outside of cities makes perfect sense to them. Having Armies living inside their cities does not. We're accounting for that by setting up the enduring base camps on the periphery of the city.

2. "We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology." This is simply nonsense. As I've told our soldiers over here, they--not our weapons--are what terrifies the terrorist. We are visible proof that men and women, blacks and whites, Christians, Muslims, and Jews can work together toward a common goal. We fight for positive ideas like individual rights, diversity, and freedom. Our enemies fight for negative ideas like personal gain, exclusion, and oppression. We only become the "weaker party" when we forget that.

3. "Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, thereby creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generational forces." First of all, from our perspective the war in Iraq is succeeding. The rogue regime of Sadaam Hussein is gone. We are on the offensive against terrorism. We don't know what shape the future Iraq will take, but there is every reason to be hopeful that it will be better than the old Iraq. Time and money will influence the outcome in a way that was impossible when the Baath Party was in power. Second, the initial invasion didn't destroy the state. Sadaam Hussein destroyed the state through 25 years of nepotism, favoritism, corruption, and neglect. We have made and continue to make herculean efforts to improve the quality of life for Iraq's people, and they know it. From their perspective, admitting that we've improved their lives would incur a psychological debt, a debt they are unwilling to incur. So, they will continue to be openly critical of our efforts.

4. "When it comes to Fourth Generation War, it seems nobody in the American military gets it." An incredible statement. We have made frequent adaptations in very nearly every system and function of the Division, and I know every US Army Division has done the same. We have learned never to believe we are as good as we can be, and we remain aware that pride of "authorship" is probably the most dangerous enemy we face in this environment.

The forces that follow us will probably not find the Iraq they think they will find. It will either be better or it will be worse. As we have, they will have to adjust. If under Mr. Lind's influence they arrive with well-established and pre-conceived notions about how to operate, they will probably be wrong.

As I write, we're fighting three different "kinds" of enemy in Iraq: the former regime, terrorism, and organized crime. We're also fighting against the emergence of religious extremism--mostly radical Sunni religious extremism--that in the long run may be the most dangerous influence the new Iraq will face. Overarching all of this, we are in competition for the popular support of the Iraqi people. For now, we have it, but that popular support has a shelf life, and we are working hard to "buy time" so that we can reduce the enemy forces to a level where the new Iraqi security forces can handle them.

Finally, I appreciate all you are doing to get us thinking about our profession and how we operate.

V/R BG Marty Dempsey



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

729
87
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2001 JAN 22 11 1:26

INFO MEMO

January 15, 2004, 2:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. ~~Chen~~ USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chen Xi Tan
SUBJECT: SLRG -- SNOWFLAKE

We will be pleased to provide this to you monthly, focusing on recruiting, retention, spouses' attitudes, etc. We will provide the first report one week before your 3 February testimony.

In addition, we are preparing charts for your Congressional testimony on

- Recruiting and retention
- Numbers of reserves and guard called up, and the percentage this represents of the guard and reserves
- The half to one million dollars that people receive after retirement, and the composition of this package of benefits.

Prepared By: Jeanne B. Fites, DUSD(PI) (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/21698

OSD 00981-04

7209
TAB

7:57 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

658

DATE: January 8, 2004

SUBJECT Force Rotation

We need to take a look at force rotation over a couple of years in Iraq and worldwide and see what it adds up to.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010804.06

Please respond by: _____

1/15/04 1/15/04

OSD 01011-04

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/21699



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 JAN 22 11 15 07

INFO MEMO

CH-1483-04
22 January 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC

SUBJECT: Force Rotation

- **Question.** "We need to take a look at force rotation over a couple of years in Iraq and worldwide and see what it adds up to." (TAB)
- **Answer.** The Joint Staff will host a combatant command and Service general and flag officer seminar, ELABORATE CROSSBOW IV, on 4 - 5 February 2004. The purpose of the effort is twofold: to establish and implement a recurring Global Force Management process and to address joint sourcing options for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM 3, ENDURING FREEDOM VI and other global commitments through FY 2006. A decision brief based on ELABORATE CROSSBOW IV results is tentatively scheduled for a mid-February presentation to you.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

January 12, 2004, 1:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS) *Dr. David S. C. Chu*
22 Jan 04

SUBJECT: Ft. Bragg Troop Visit - Snowflake

- (b)(6) widow of Staff Sergeant (b)(6) USA, relayed that she did not receive a rebate of \$750.00 offered by GM for the purchase of a vehicle for anyone on active duty in Afghanistan or Iraq.
- Staff Sergeant (b)(6) was killed in Iraq on 26 October 2003.
- (b)(6) purchased a 2004 Chevrolet Tahoe on 29 November 2003.
- The automobile purchase is not related to any DoD or overseas auto sales programs.
- The GM rebate program is only applicable to active duty personnel and not transferable to other family members. The rebate program did not consider the "surviving spouse" issue.
- After consultation with (b)(6) casualty assistance officer, the automobile dealership and Automotive Information Systems, Inc. (rebate program coordinator) approved the \$750.00 rebate for (b)(6).
- We will speak to her casualty assistance officer again in thirty days to confirm that she did receive the rebate.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: None.

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: Mark Ward, OFP, ODUSD(MC&FP) (b)(6) *Mark Ward*
1/16/04



11-L-0559/OSD/21701

OSD 01027-04

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

C&A-21-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21702

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December ²³~~19~~, 2003

SUBJECT: **Ft. Bragg Troop Visit**

MCFP
per PO
182
24 Dec

Please talk to General Motors. Find out what their policy is. We were told by the widow of a soldier killed in OIF that GM gives a \$750 rebate on the purchase of a GM vehicle for anyone on active duty in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Her husband was wounded and died two weeks before their car purchase. She did not get the rebate. See if you can figure out what the policy is. We will want to get back to her. at some point. I believe her name is (b)(6)

Thanks.

DHR/azn
121903.02tscom

Please respond by: 11/10/04


11-L-0559/OSD/21703

~~FOUO~~

2004 11 30 PM 4:07
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 JAN 13 PM 4:07

November 30, 2004

TO: Joe Schmitz
Mike Wynne
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

As I indicated at the staff meeting today, I believe that not only should we look at other activities that Darlene Druyun, who pled guilty, **was** involved in, but we should also **look** at other activities that the Boeing person who pled guilty was involved in.

We have a responsibility to **look** out for the taxpayers' money. Given the fact that each of them have confessed that they committed crimes, we have a responsibility to see if they committed other crimes. We know they are confessed criminals. Therefore, we ought to check and see if they committed some crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
113004-23

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21704

OSD 01028-05



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 January 13, 2005 12:55 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun (Final Response to Your Memo of November 30, 2004)

- Your Memo (Tab A) asked if Darleen Druyun or Michael Sears, both of whom have pled guilty to criminal charges, committed any other "crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged." This Memo supplements my December 1, 2004 Info Memo (Tab B), and my Deputy's January 6, 2005, Memo to your Special Assistant (Tab C).
- Although Sears' recent polygraph examination identified no further criminal activity by Sears, Boeing, Druyun or any other DoD officials, my staff continues to cooperate with Department of Justice prosecutors and others regarding potential civil litigation associated with Druyun and Sears, which activities may well uncover additional facts responsive to your 30 November Memo.
- Earlier this week, I had constructive meetings with both Senator McCain's staff and Senator Grassley's staff regarding Boeing and Druyun. Senator Grassley's staff provided me with a 1993 letter from Senator Grassley objecting to a purported Air Force exoneration and promotion of Druyun "one month after the [DoD] Inspector General recommended that she be disciplined for improper or illegal behavior" (Tab D), in response to which the Undersecretary of Defense at the time wrote to Senator Grassley, "You may be assured that we would not retain Mrs. Druyun in her present position if we felt it would jeopardize the integrity of defense acquisition" (Tab E).
- Over the next ten years, the Air Force IG investigated Druyun five times but failed to substantiate any allegations. Most recently, the Air Force IG investigated Druyun for allegedly providing "inaccurate or misleading" information to Senator McCain's staff about the 767 Tanker proposal. My December 20, 2002, letter to Senator McCain (Tab F), reported the results of that Air Force IG investigation, concluding, "I continue to believe that Ms. Druyun's response to you should have been more forthcoming." In light of this conclusion, along with my Office's 1993 "factual allegations" against Druyun, I recommend that neither you nor any other DoD official suggest, as did Marvin Sambur last Wednesday on *60 Minutes*, that Druyun's reputation was "spotless."
- Finally, I have instructed my staff to continue coordinating and cooperating with the other two addressees of your 30 November Memo (Mike Wynne and Jim Haynes), as appropriate, as well as with the Defense Contract Management Agency in its ongoing review of Druyun-related contracts and programs to identify any other instances of potentially criminal activity not yet prosecuted.
- As an ancillary matter of "good news," based on Druyun's plea admission that she had negotiated inflated payments to Boeing in connection with an AWACS software upgrade contract, in December 2004 the Air Force definitized a portion of the contract at an approximate savings of \$6 million. Boeing subsequently agreed to repay an additional \$8.6 million in overcharges.

COORDINATION: None

ATTACHMENTS: As stated

Prepared by: Richard T. Race, Deputy Inspector General for Investigations, (b)(6)

cc: DoD General Counsel
Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

~~FOUO~~ - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE OSD 01028-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21705


TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

November 30, 2004

TO: Joe Schmitz
Mike Wynne
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

As I indicated at the staff meeting today, I believe that not only should we look at other activities that Darlene Druyun, who pled guilty, was involved in, but we should also look at other activities that the Boeing person who pled guilty was involved in.

We have a responsibility to look out for the taxpayers' money. Given the fact that each of them have confessed that they committed crimes, we have a responsibility to see if they committed other crimes. We know they are confessed criminals. Therefore, we ought to check and see if they committed some crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
113004-23

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21707

OSD 01028-05

TAB

B



**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 222024704**

INFO MEMO

December 1, 2004 5:30 pm

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Boeing Suspension Regarding the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program

- After you suggested yesterday that we should be looking not only at Department of Defense contracts that might have been tainted by Darleen A. Druyun but also by any other "criminals" associated with Ms. Druyun, the General Counsel volunteered that The Boeing Company, Incorporated, (Boeing) has also been "partially debarred" from government contracting as a result of criminal allegations. Attached, for your convenience, is a brief description of this matter, which was included with my October 8, 2003, Quarterly Update to you.
- Following is a brief summary of my Office's involvement in that matter. Even before receiving your "snowflake" of yesterday, I had already instructed my staff to share whatever information we can with the Acting Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L), who agreed yesterday to address your concerns about contracts tainted by any other "criminals" associated with Ms. Druyun.
- Since September 5, 2002, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, jointly with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of Inspector General, have been investigating allegations that Boeing used Lockheed Martin Corporation's proprietary documents to successfully bid on Air Force contracts for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. On July 24, 2003, the Air Force suspended (a temporary measure short of debarment) three Boeing divisions and three former Boeing employees from government contracting. The affected Boeing divisions are the Launch Systems Division, Chicago, IL; Boeing Launch Services, Chicago, IL; and the Delta Programs Division, Huntington Beach, CA. To date, the divisions are still under suspension, and the investigation continues.
- I will respond more fully to your "snowflake" within the time you requested (1/13/05).

Attachment: As stated.

cc: Acting USD (AT&L); General Counsel

Prepared By: Charles W. Beardall, Acting Deputy Inspector General, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/21709

OSA 19325-04

TAB

C



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

FOR: Mr. Paul W. Butler, The Special Assistant to the SECDEF

FROM: Mr. Richard T. Race, First Assistant to the Inspector General  JAN 6 2005

SUBJECT: OIG Actions Regarding USAF KC-767/Boeing Matter

- On September 16, 2004, the Secretary of Defense transferred responsibility for the ongoing production of documents concerning the KC-767A Tanker Aircraft Program for the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. The collection of documents is estimated at 1 million unclassified pages and 100,000 classified pages. To date, approximately 72,466 pages comprised of 11,753 unclassified documents have been provided to the SASC.
- In a letter dated May 3, 2002 we responded to Senator McCain's request to "assess the Air Force's decision in selecting the Boeing 767 rather than the Airbus A330 for its air refueling tankers."
- In a separate letter, also dated May 3, 2002 we responded to Senator McCain's request for data on the Air Force's contractual arrangement with investment entities concerning the Boeing KC-767A lease that Air Force officials refused to provide him.
- August 29, 2003. We issued "Assessment of DoD Leasing Action" (D-2003-129) in response to a request from the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). The assessment reviewed "the decision process used by the Air Force and OSD to lease the Boeing 767 Tanker Aircraft and to assess whether DoD interaction with Congress following the Lease Decision Memorandum signed May 23, 2003, was timely and reasonable."
- March 29, 2004. We issued audit report, "Acquisition of Boeing KC-767A Tanker Aircraft" (D-2004-064) in response to request from the Deputy Secretary of Defense that addressed problems with the procurement and acquisition strategies for the program.
- December 15, 2004. We completed a review requested by the Secretary of Defense that assessed the processes and procedures used to collect the documents from January 2001 to the present. This review was provided to your office on December 23, 2004.
- Ongoing: Assessment to determine the key decisions that were/were not made by DoD acquisition officials concerning the execution of procurement and acquisition strategies for the Boeing 767A Tanker Aircraft acquisition program. This assessment should be complete by mid-February 2005.

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11-L-0559/OSD/21711

- Ongoing: Administrative investigation, at request of Senators Warner, Levin, and McCain, into allegations that Secretary Roche attempted to influence OMB on the 767 tanker lease by using his position and Government email when recommending the brother of an OMB official for employment at Northrop Grumman.
- Ongoing: Criminal investigative and prosecution actions regarding conspiracy by Ms. Druyun and Mr. Sears to violate conflict of interest statutes continue. Sentencing of Mr. Sears scheduled for February 18, 2005. Ms. Druyun reported for incarceration on January 3, 2005. Defense Criminal Investigative Service continues to assist the Department of Justice (DoJ) with the criminal investigation/prosecution and potential DoJ civil litigation.
- Ongoing: We provided an initial response on December 1, 2004 to the SECDEF's November 30, 2004 request to examine other DoD activities that Ms. Druyun and Mr. Sears were involved in. A final response is due NLT January 13, 2005.
- Also, in response to your November 30 2004 Memo, I have instructed my staff to thoroughly review the responses from my seven previous subpoenas relating to Boeing and Druyun (four subpoenas to Boeing and three subpoenas to three other contractors), with a view towards: (a) considering additional subpoenas and/or expanding the scope of the ongoing criminal matter to include, as you wrote in your Memo, "crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged"; and (b) to the extent permissible, considering ongoing activities of the two other addressees of your 30 November Memo (Mike Wynne and Jim Haynes) "with a view toward avoiding duplication and ensuring effective coordination and cooperation" (IG Act, Section 8(c)(9)).

COORDINATION: None

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/21712

TAB

D

JAN. 12. 2005 10:07AM

(b)(6)

NO. 3429 P. 2/4

- ☐ 135 SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1601
(202) 224-3744
TTY: (202) 224-4479
- ☐ 721 FEDERAL BUILDING
210 WALNUT STREET
DES MOINES, IA 50309-2140
(515) 284-4890
- ☐ 206 FEDERAL BUILDING
101 1ST STREET SE
CEDAR RAPIDS, IA 52401-1227
(515) 383-8832

United States Senate

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1501

May 5, 1993

REPLY TO:

- ☐ 103 FEDERAL COURTHOUSE BUILDING
320 8TH STREET
SIOUX CITY, IA 51101-1244
(712) 233-1860
- ☐ 210 WATERLOO BUILDING
531 COMMERCIAL STREET
WATERLOO, IA 50701-4497
(319) 232-6657
- ☐ 118 FEDERAL BUILDING
131 E. 4TH STREET
DAVENPORT, IA 52801-1513
(319) 322-4321

The Honorable Les Aspin
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon, Room 33880
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Les,

I am writing to praise your decision to hold four senior Air Force officials accountable for financial mismanagement on the C-17 contract and to raise two questions about Ms. Darleen Druyun.

First, I would like to commend you for taking this decisive step. You have sent a clear, unambiguous signal of zero tolerance toward dishonesty in the department's acquisition process. This is the best kind of deterrent to future failures of discipline and integrity. You deserve a lot of credit for having the courage to do what had to be done.

Second, I am somewhat baffled by the complete omission of Ms. Druyun's name from available documents bearing on your decision in this important matter.

The Inspector General has suggested that Ms. Druyun may have engaged in either improper or illegal conduct in connection with C-17 progress payment number 97 that resulted in a potential violation of the Antideficiency Act and other statutes. For these reasons, the Inspector General recommended that disciplinary action be taken against her and four other senior officials. You chose to discipline the four other officials but not her. Why did you decide not to punish Ms. Druyun?

Ms. Druyun presently occupies a key position in the "acquisition management area." She is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. She was placed in this position in February 1993 - one month after the Inspector General recommended that she be disciplined for improper or illegal behavior.

In view of your decision to banish Generals Barry and Nauseef and Mr. Hixenbaugh from the "acquisition management area" and in view of the fact that the Inspector General has yet to resolve all

11-L-0559/OSD/21714

Committee Assignments:

FINANCE
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY

JUDICIARY
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

BUDGET
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

U 84060-93

the issues surrounding possible Antideficiency Act violations, is it wise to leave Ms. Druyun in such an important "acquisition management" post?

Your thoughts would be appreciated. A response is requested by May 12, 1993.

Sincerely,


Charles E. Grassley
U.S. Senator

CEG/chm

TAB

E



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

08 JUN 1993

ACQUISITION

Honorable Charles E. Grassley
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1501

Dear Senator Grassley:

This is in response to your May 5, 1993, letter to Secretary Aspin regarding financial mismanagement on the C-17 contract.

You asked why the Secretary decided not to punish Mrs. Darleen Druyun and is leaving her in an important management post, whereas four other officials were disciplined. The Secretary and I carefully considered all of the evidence in this matter and concluded that punishment of Mrs. Druyun was not appropriate and that she should continue to hold her present position. Mrs. Druyun's involvement with the C-17 contract was limited and did not warrant action similar to that taken with regard to the other officials.

You may be assured that we would not retain Mrs. Druyun in her present position if we felt it would jeopardize the integrity of defense acquisition.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John M. Deutch", is written over the typed name. The signature is stylized and cursive.

John M. Deutch

11-L-0559/OSD/21717



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

DEC 20 2002

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-0303

Dear Senator McCain:

This is in further response to your letters of April 25, 2002, to the Secretary of Defense and this office that expressed concern regarding the lack of information made available to you concerning possible leases of aircraft from the Boeing Corporation. In particular, you questioned the Air Force denial of your request for "the name of the outside investment entity that provided advice and analysis on leasing arrangements, including the lease the Air Force is now pursuing with Boeing." Your question to the Air Force on the matter--"Who are the Wall Street experts which provided advice to SAF/AQ [Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)] on aircraft leasing?"--received the following response dated April 18, 2002: "SAF/AQ cannot provide an answer to this question without violating the analysts' and their firms' specific requests for confidentiality."

In response to your concerns, we requested the Inspector General (IG) of the Air Force to conduct an investigation into allegations that Ms. Darleen A. Druyun, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition and Management), and others improperly withheld information from you regarding the identity of an outside entity that provided advice on tanker leasing arrangements. Our preliminary review of the matter suggested that Ms. Druyun's terse response to you, even if factually accurate, was at best extremely poor judgment. Subsequently, we advised the Air Force IG that we uncovered information suggesting that Ms. Druyun's response may have been inaccurate or misleading.¹

The Air Force IG recently completed his investigation into the matter and did not substantiate wrongdoing on the part of Ms. Druyun or others. Based on sworn testimony from eight witnesses and relevant documentation, the Air Force IG determined that Ms. Druyun genuinely believed that she had an obligation to protect the identities of the "Wall Street experts" who provided advice to the Air Force. Her views were based on the assumption that the identities of the sources should be treated as "source selection sensitive" and, therefore, subjected to release restrictions imposed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Section 423 of Title 41, United States Code, "Restrictions on disclosing and obtaining contractor bid or proposal information or source selection information."

¹ My initial response to you of May 3, 2002, advised that, prior to May 1, 2002, the Air Force had no written contractual relationship with an outside investment entity to provide aircraft leasing advice and had obtained aircraft leasing advisory services from Babcock & Brown LP beginning May 1, 2002, via subcontract with Anteon Corporation, a prime Air Force consulting contractor. We had found no indication of a confidentiality agreement between the Air Force and Anteon or Babcock & Brown LP.

TYPE 0559/OSD/21718

I continue to believe that Ms. Druyun's response to you should have been more forthcoming. On the other hand, I have no reason to question the Air Force IG's determination that the allegation that "Ms. Druyun abused her authority by wrongfully refusing to disclose to Senator John McCain the identities of nongovernmental entities that provided investment advice and analysis to the Air Force concerning leasing of tanker and special airlift mission aircraft" was not substantiated. In view of Ms. Druyun's retirement from the Federal service effective November 15, 2002, we find insufficient basis to pursue the matter further. Nevertheless, your insistence on accountability in this situation has reemphasized the requirement to provide accurate, responsive information to Members of Congress, as reflected in Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz' letter to you of July 15, 2002.

Because information in this letter may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the letter is designated "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY." Please refer any requests for this letter to the FOIA/Privacy Act Office, Office of Administration and Information Management, Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202-4704.

Please contact me or Mr. John R. Crane, Director, Office of Congressional Liaison, at (b)(6) if we may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,



Joseph E. Schmitz

cc: The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable John Warner
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21719



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

JAN 14 2005

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

Reference the attached snowflake at (TAB A), here are the steps I have taken to address all of our concerns in this matter:

- o On November 19, 2004, I tasked the Military Departments, Missile Defense Agency, and the Special Operations Command to perform self-assessments of their acquisition organization and process. The Defense Science Board Task Force I established is reviewing their assessments and their acquisition management structures. The Task Force will brief me on February 2, 2005.
- At my direction on December 13, 2004, a multi-service/agency team led by the Deputy Director, Defense Contract Management Agency began reviewing contract actions involving Darlene Druyun. Their findings will also be briefed to me on February 2nd.
- o On December 16, 2004, I sent a letter to Harry Stonecipher, Boeing CEO, asking him to examine his own practices. I specifically asked him to examine Mr. Sears' role in Boeing's business with the Department. His December 21, 2004, reply states he is currently reviewing Mr. Sears' role and will share the results with us this month.
- o Today, I sent a memorandum to the ASN (RD&A) asking him to conduct a review of the F/A-18 program, in which Mr. Sears was also involved. I also have asked the Inspector General (IG) to look into the dealings of Ms. Druyun's husband. I understand that the IG is also assisting the Justice Department on issues associated with the Druyun/Sears convictions.
- o I will continue to coordinate with the General Counsel and the IG as these reviews proceed and report back to you on the findings.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Nancy Dowling/DPAP/PAIC/ (b)(6)

cc: DSD, GC, IG

11-L-0559/OSD/21720

OSD 01028-05


TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

November 30, 2004

TO: Joe Schmitz
Mike Wynne
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

As I indicated at the staff meeting today, I believe that not only should we **look** at other activities that Darlene Druyun, who pled guilty, was involved in, but we should **also look** at other activities that the Boeing person who pled guilty was involved in.

We have a responsibility to **look** out for the taxpayers' money. Given the fact ~~that~~ each of them have confessed that they committed crimes, we have a responsibility to see if they committed other crimes. We know they are confessed criminals. Therefore, we ought to check and see if they committed some crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
113004-23

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21722

OSD 01028-05

720
TAB A

~~FOUO~~

10/29

October 29, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq's Borders

889

J-3 action pls.

Top 10 Iraq 2 b.

~ 30

Do you feel we've got a decent **plan from** Casey on how to deal with the borders of Iraq? I don't. What do you **propose**?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-15

.....
Please respond by

11/19/04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21723

OSD 01101-05

~~FOUO~~

December 8, 2004

P+R *USD (c)*
TO: ~~VADM Jim Stavridis~~
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *P*
SUBJECT: Cost for a Soldier

Please see if you can find someone to do the calculation as to what it costs to organize, train and equip an American soldier to serve in Afghanistan. And then figure out how many ~~Afghan~~ soldiers we could recruit, train, equip and deploy for the price of one US soldier.

Then do the same calculation for Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120804-7

.....
Please respond by

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21724

OSD 01116-05

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 1/18/2005

DOCUMENT TYPE: **FRONT OFFICE DOC** ATTACHMENT:
OSD CONTROL **OSD 01116-05** DOC **12/8/2004** DOR **1/18/2005** SIGNATURE CASE:
FROM **SECDEF RUMSFELD** TO **MAS STAVRIDIS**
SUBJECT **COST FOR A SOLDIER**
KEYWORDS **STAVRIDIS, J USC UPR SNOW FLAKE**
COMMENTS **CAF. NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.**
FN SEC **U** OCN **120804-7**
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS **OSD 16953-04**
STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION
PAGES **1** ENCLOSURES **0**
SUSPENSE STATUS PACKAGE VIEW:
 FRONT OFFICE DOC
 INFO MEMO

CREATED BY: **lawson**

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES
 ADC R

11-L-0559/OSD/21725



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

January 14, 2005, 6:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jones

SUBJECT: Cost for a Soldier

- We calculated what it costs to organize, train and equip an American soldier to serve in Afghanistan or Iraq. We also estimated how many Afghan or Iraqi soldiers could be recruited, trained, equipped and deployed for the price of one U.S. soldier. These costs are summarized in the following table:

	U.S.	Afghan	Iraqi
Cost to recruit, train, equip, and deploy an individual soldier	\$107,000	\$1,800	\$6,500
Number of soldiers for the price of one U.S. soldier	1	54	15

- While determining the answer to your questions, we also calculated the sustainment costs of these soldiers once they have been deployed. These costs are summarized in the following table:

	U.S.	Afghan	Iraqi
Projected annual sustainment costs for an individual soldier	\$79,000	\$10,700	\$38,900

COORDINATION: None.

cc:
J-8

Prepared By: John Evans (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21726

OSD 01116-05

~~FOUO~~

December 8, 2004

P+R
TO: ~~VADM Jim Stavridis~~ *USD (c)*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *P*
SUBJECT Cost for a Soldier

Please see if you can find someone to do the calculation as to what it costs to organize, train and equip an American soldier to serve in Afghanistan. And then figure out how many Afghan soldiers we could recruit, train, equip and deploy for the price of one US soldier.

Then do the same calculation for Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120804-7

.....
Please respond by

~~12/16/04~~
01/16/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21727

OSD 01116-05

- Afghanistan
 - Monthly US Soldier Cost approx \$54,000
 - US monthly cost per ANA soldier is approx \$44,500
- Iraq
 - Monthly US Soldier Cost approx \$30,500
 - US monthly cost per Iraqi Security Force \$16,700

sustain
- repair
- medical

12/9
Sir —
you asked for
these #'s...
v/e
jm

→ Re-run but include
medical, retirement, etc.
sustainment,

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

September 15, 2009 PM 4:45

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Tina Jonas
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq
~~~~~

We need some basic "rules of thumb" reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include:

- Cost per soldier per month / year
- Total Cost per month / year

I'm sure there are other good metrics. I think it would be helpful to have these in our heads as we look at trade-offs with regard to U.S. and local forces as well as our longer range planning in both countries.

Thanks.

DHR:sa
091504-1

.....
Please respond by 23 sep 09

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/21729

Tab A

11212
NSN 14053-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-0990

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CH-2136-0704 OCT 25 PM 4:45
25 October 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RAM 10/24*

SUBJECT: 'Rules of Thumb' for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

- **Issue.** "We need some basic 'rules of thumb' reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include: **Cost per soldier** per month/year, **Total Cost per month/year**... it would be helpful to have **these** in our heads as we look at trade-offs with regard to **US** and local forces as well as our longer range planning in **both** countries." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** Monthly per US Service member cost for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is \$30.5K; annual per Service member cost is \$365.9K. **Total US cost per month** for OIF is \$4.2B; **annual total cost** is \$50.5B. Monthly per US Service member cost for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) is \$53.7K, annually \$644.6K. Monthly total US costs for OEF is \$752M, annually \$9.0B. Only operational and recurring costs (TAB B) are included in these figures. Differing force packages, operational concepts, logistics networks and other cost elements for OIF and OEF result in higher costs in Afghanistan.
- **Discussion.** You must be careful when using these figures to estimate savings from future force reductions. The cost avoidance will be less than the per Service member cost. A drawdown plan is required to compute cost avoidance. The drawdown strategy would describe how much of the support structure remains in place as ground combat elements redeploy. Since the more costly support will likely drawdown more slowly than the ground combat elements, costs will not go down at the per Service member rate described above. In addition, the per Service member cost avoidance must be offset by the costs of a prolonged US sustainment of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Another rule of thumb for the security costs is the FY 2005 US costs to build the Iraqi security force and the ANA. The US cost per Iraqi security force member is \$16.7K and per ANA soldier is \$44.5K. The US costs for Iraq are lower because the Iraqi government offsets costs for Iraqi security.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral R. F. Willard, USN; Director J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21730

OSD 16953-04/21

TAB B

Operational and Recurring Costs

- The costs per US Service member in support of Operation **ENDURING FREEDOM** (OEF) are calculated **by using** the burn rate; that is, the average of **the** monthly costs **per** contingency operation. **The burn** rate costs are **the recurring**, operational (incremental) costs **that Services** and agencies **report** through the Defense Finance and Accounting System to Congress.
- These **costs** include both direct **and** indirect costs for OEF.
 - Direct Service costs include **full pay and** allowances for **Guard** and Reserve, incremental pay for active duty personnel (allowances such **as** imminent danger pay and family **separation** pay), personnel support, operations support, **transportation** and military construction.
 - Other direct costs include depot maintenance, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency operations, Defense Intelligence Agency operations, other intelligence and the Defense Health Program.
 - Indirect **costs** in support of OEF include costs for **USCENTCOM** Headquarters in **Qatar**, military overstrength, **military** construction in Southwest Asia **external** to **Iraq** and Afghanistan, the military tribunal and defense health **care** costs for military personnel **in** Southwest Asia, **external** to Iraq and Afghanistan. Since these costs **are** contingency related and must be **reported as a** contingency cost, **they are** shown **as a** cost against the first contingency in the Global **War** on Terrorism, OEF.
- The costs per US Service member in support of Operation **IRAQI FREEDOM** reflect **only** direct **costs** incurred for Iraq.

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USDC

MS. TINA JONAS


9/28/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/21732

Tab C

TAB A

3:25 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: January 5, 2004
SUBJECT: **Kuwait**


Apparently everything is going to be going in and out of the same port in Kuwait.
Have you **folks looked** at using an alternative to spread it around a little **bit**?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.12

1/17/04

Please respond by: _____



Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/21733



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1478-04

22 January 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM 1/21

SUBJECT: Kuwait

- **Question.** "Apparently everything is going to be going in and out of the same port in Kuwait. Have you folks looked at using an alternative to spread it around a little bit?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM analyzed all feasible air and seaports as debarkation and embarkation options. Kuwait City International Airport and the seaport at Ash Shuaybah, Kuwait, best support movement requirements in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 2 (OIF 2). Kuwait Naval Base will be utilized to offload amphibious shipping and ammunition. Umm Qasr, Iraq, is currently being utilized for limited container offload operations to relieve the strain on Ash Shuaybah.
- **Analysis.** For OIF 2, USCENTCOM reviewed the possibility of movement by air and ground lines of communication through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey. The requirement for timely approval from these countries and political considerations precluded most options. In addition, the reception, staging and onward integration (RSOI) required in theater at multiple sites would further complicate an orderly and timely rotation of forces. These factors precluded USCENTCOM from choosing several other primary ports.
- Additional actions to relieve air and seaport strain during OIF 2 include utilizing C-17 aircraft for intra-theater movement of personnel from Iraq to Turkey. Onward movement to destination will be accomplished by contracted commercial airlift from Incirlik Air Base. Finally, units requiring minimal integration training prior to deployment into the theater (decreased RSOI) such as I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) and 82nd Airborne Division will be transported directly into Iraq on inter-theater airlift.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

copy to:

DepSecDef

Prepared By: VADM Gordon Holder, USN; Director, J-4;


(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21734

OSD 01123-04

TAB A

3:25 PM


TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: January 5, 2004
SUBJECT: **Kuwait**

Apparently everything is going to be going in and out of **the** same port in Kuwait.
Have you folks looked at using an alternative to spread it around a little bit?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.12

Please respond by: _____

1/17/04


11-L-0559/OSD/21735

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USCENTCOM	MG Mortensen, USA	12 January 2004
USTRANSCOM	Col Richtsmeier, USMC	12 January 2004

January 13, 2005

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information to McCain

Senator McCain told the Vice President he sent three letters to us complaining to somebody in the Department that we are sending him too much material – things he does not need. The VP said McCain said, “I don’t need testimony that I heard when I was sitting in the Committee.”

One day we are not sending enough; now we’re sending too much. McCain said he did not trust the Air Force, so the OSD General Counsel’s office started handling it. Then McCain said he didn’t trust them, so we had the Inspector General handle it, and it is that office that currently handles it.

Someone needs to speak to the IG’s office and see if they can separate information McCain thinks he does not need or want. I’m reluctant to not send him anything, because he could say we are not sending him everything. It is a difficult problem. Maybe we try to separate things we think he would want from things we think he may not want, but continue to send him everything. .

Thanks.

DHR:ss
011105-3

.....
Please respond by 1/27/05

452 T
13 Jan 05
22 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

January 13, 2005

TO:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

FROM:

TO Sec Def

1/13

SUB:

From Paul Butler

Sena

some

he di

who

Subject: McCain letters complaining
of too much material being
sent to him

One

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Dr

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F

ExecSec and Legislative Affairs have
found no letters addressed to you or
the Deputy on this topic. The only
letter we've found is a letter from
Sen. McCain dated Oct. 22 to Joe
Schmitz. In one sentence on the
second page he says that public
transcripts, press releases, etc need
not be produced. (Letter is attached
to snowflake - comment is highlighted
on page 2).

We will work with IG to develop
a protocol to segregate out those documents

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21738

To Dave Patterson
From Paul Butler
Dave -

Please send
sent into SecDef
Snowflake to the
you call Ith and
they segregate to
does not want. Mac
index a list of the
are not sending
his staff the index
want to see some
index we can see

22 OCT 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21739

13 JAN 05

52 T

ARIZONA

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATIONCOMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0303
(202) 224-22354450 SOUTH RURAL ROAD
SUITE 8-120
TEMPE, AZ 85282
(480) 897-02832400 EAST ARIZONA
BAYVIEW CORP
SUITE 1100
PHOENIX, AZ 85016
(602) 952-2410450 WEST PASEO REBOUNDO
SUITE 200
TUCSON, AZ 85701
(520) 679-8334TELEPHONE FOR HEARING IMPAIRED
(202) 224-7182
(602) 962-0170

October 22, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE AND FIRST CLASS MAIL

The Honorable Joseph E. Schmitz
Inspector General
~~Department~~ of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Re: Production of Tanker-Related Documents Requested by Congress

Dear Mr. Schmitz:

It was a pleasure meeting with you and your colleagues on Friday, October 8, 2004. As I indicated during our meeting, I have been concerned about the Defense Department and the Air Force's failure to produce documents responsive to congressional requests related to the tanker matter, most recently the mail between Secretary Roche and OMB senior official Robin Cleveland. Accordingly, I welcome your office's involvement in helping assure the integrity of the Defense Department and the Air Force's production of all responsive documents. With this letter, I highlight some issues that we discussed during our meeting.

First, in my view, your office's involvement in this effort does not relieve the Defense Department or the Air Force of their obligation to produce all responsive documents fully and completely. In other words, notwithstanding your office's welcomed involvement in the Defense Department and the Air Force's production of documents, if it is discovered that any more responsive documents are improperly withheld, I expect that whatever recourse needs to be taken will be directed at the Defense Department and/or the Air Force (and those officials within them responsible for not producing these documents). On Friday, October 1, 2004, my staff conveyed my view in this regard to John Sullivan, the Deputy General Counsel to the Defense Department.

Second, I understand that you are obtaining from the Defense Department and the Air Force certifications as to the completeness of their production of documents as to each request-

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/21740

01130-05

452T

22 OCT 04

category. When your office completes its production of all documents responsive to each of these categories, please indicate whether you have received these certifications.


Third, my staff also told Mr. Sullivan that no redactions were to be made to documents for "responsiveness" or "relevance." As my staff conveyed to Mr. Sullivan, such redactions fall outside the August 11, 2004, agreement made among me, Chairman Warner, White House Counsel, and the Defense Department. As such, I expect that your office will not be making such redactions before producing them,

Fourth, your office need not produce hearing transcripts, press releases, and other publicly available material that might otherwise be responsive to the requests for documents.

Finally, during our meeting you expressed concern about the provision in the August 11, 2004, agreement that documents produced be redacted for the names of, or references to, Members of Congress. You indicated that, in your view, the use of resources required to make these redactions is particularly burdensome and, under the circumstances, questionable. I understand that the Defense Department has provided your office with about 57 compact discs and two xerox boxes of potentially responsive documents, totaling about 700,000 pages. In addition, I understand that the Air Force produced voluminous documents in response to Senate requests related to the tanker replacement program. But, the number of documents actually produced remains relatively modest. In that context, I agree that all reasonable measures that can alleviate undue burden on your end should be undertaken. Given your salient concerns and our desire to expedite our review of the documents you produce, this element of the August 11th agreement should probably be revisited. By copy of this letter to those below, I ask that our staff work together to do this.

Thank you for your continuing assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,



John McCain

cc: The Honorable John Warner, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense
The Honorable Judge Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President
The Honorable Bill Frist, Senate Majority Leader

11-L-0559/OSD/21741

TOTAL P.03

January 26, 2004

TO: Honorable William Cohen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Topics for Discussion

Bill—

As you requested, here is what I believe was your list of breakfast topics.

Thanks.

Attach.

Cohen-Rumsfeld Breakfast Topics

DHR:dh
012604-1

000 7150

26 Jan 04

OSD 01161-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21742

Cohen-Rumsfeld Breakfast topics

DOE issue

Iraq sanctions -

Iraq – Mobile CBN

Iran buildup

Syria CW/BW .

NMD

NATO – EU

NATO enlargement

Israel – tech transfer issues

Jordan

MEADS – Germany/Italy

China – Taiwan

Indonesia

N. Korea/S. Korea

Okinawa

Force Protection

TAC Air allocations

QDR

V-22 panel

Export Control

APL

ICC

Ukraine/Georgia

Mixed Gender Training

C-17/C-5A

Tricare

Housing allowances

Plan Colombia

Anthrax

Vieques


CTBT – Shali Report

Start 3 numbers

Bosnia/Kosovo

Army Transformation

11-L-0559/OSD/21744



Homeland defense

Budget plus-up over FYDP

India/Pakistan

Base closings



O MUNDO FOI ATACADO

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☐ Services

About Us

The Cohen Group opened its doors in January 2001 with the objective of helping multinational clients explore opportunities overseas as well as solve problems that may develop. A strategic alliance with Piper Rudnick, a national law firm specializing in business, real estate and technology, empowers The Cohen Group with the unique ability to provide our clients with truly comprehensive tools for understanding and shaping their business, political, legal, regulatory, and media environments.

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[TOP](#)

The Cohen Group
1200 19th Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
202-689-7900 voice
202-689-7910 fax

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11-L-0559/OSD/21746

January 24, 2004

TO: Ambassador Nick Burns

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Belgian MoD

I am sure you are wired into what is going on with the Belgian MoD. It is outrageous.

Any thoughts?

DHR:dh
012404-3

Belgium

24 Jan 04

OSD 01162-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21747

720
January 13, 2004

TO: Dina Habib Powell, Assistant to the President for Presidential
Personnel and Deputy to the Chief of Staff

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Don-*

SUBJECT: Powell Moore (background sheet attached)

As you know, Powell is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. He would be a fine ambassador for one of the former Warsaw Pact or Soviet bloc countries, particularly one that may be part of the NATO expansion.

As you will see in his background sheet, he served in the Department of State. He has done a first-rate job here at the Pentagon, has an enormous following on Capitol Hill and knows the issues.

Regards,

Attach.
Moore Background Sheet

DHR:dh
011304-15

0220 LA
13 Jan 04
OSD 01163-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21748

POWELL A. MOORE

Powell A. Moore is Chief of Staff for Senator Fred D. Thompson, Republican of Tennessee and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. He has held this position since September 1, 1998.

Active in public policy affairs in Washington for more than 30 years, Moore is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs under President Reagan and has served on the White House staff under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan.

Moore began his Washington career in 1966 as Press Secretary to Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia and served in this capacity until Senator Russell's death in January of 1971. He then joined the Nixon Administration, first serving as Deputy Director of Public Information for the Department of Justice and later as a member of the White House Legislative Affairs staff.

He left the White House in 1975, and for the subsequent six years, engaged in government relations and legislative affairs consulting, representing a variety of corporations and associations.

Moore returned to the White House in January 1981 on the day following Ronald Reagan's inauguration as the 40th President of the United States. As Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs during 1981, he managed the Senate component of the legislative affairs office at the White House.

In January of 1982, President Reagan nominated him to be Assistant Secretary of State for Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs, and he was confirmed by the Senate on February 4, 1982. As Assistant Secretary of State, Moore traveled with Congressional delegations to more than 35 countries and participated in meetings between U.S. Congressional leaders and 19 heads of state.

During his service in two key legislative affairs positions of the Reagan Administration, he assisted President Reagan in realizing a number of significant legislative achievements. He managed the Senate confirmation strategy for several of President Reagan's high level nominations, including the historic nomination of Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.

Moore worked on the presidential campaign staffs of Richard Nixon in 1972, Gerald Ford in 1976, and Ronald Reagan in 1980. He also worked as a volunteer for the presidential campaigns of George Bush in 1988 and 1992 and Bob Dole in 1996.

After leaving government in late 1983 and before returning in 1998, Moore advised and represented business interests as Vice President for Legislative Affairs of the Lockheed Corporation and as a consultant. In this capacity, he compiled a substantial list of measurable public policy achievements on behalf of a wide variety of clients.

Moore was born in Milledgeville, Georgia on January 5, 1938. He graduated from the University of Georgia in Athens in 1959 after attending preparatory school at Georgia Military College in Milledgeville. The University of Georgia's Henry W. Grady School of Journalism selected him as its Outstanding Alumnus for 1985, and he was similarly honored by Georgia Military College in 1986. After graduation, he was commissioned as an officer in the United States Army where he served for three and one-half years with tours in Baumholder, Germany, and Fort Benning, Georgia. After leaving the Army and before coming to Washington, he worked as a weekly newspaper editor in Georgia.

(b)(6)

OCT 06 2004

TO: David Chu

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Fellowships

I spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York yesterday, and found four colonels. I don't know how many others are assigned up there.

I would like to see the full rack up of all the fellowships: who is assigned where all over the world for non-military duties like that - how many to the State Department, how many to Congress, etc.

We need to get our arms around it. While some number of fellowships is desirable, we should do a complete baseline examination of exactly where our troops are serving. Let's ensure we are getting maximum benefit for the buck.

Please get back to me with a complete lay-down and your recommendations for changes -- soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100504-15

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

080

6 OCT 04

7209
~~FOUO~~

November 4, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Innovative Health Care Options for the Force

101

You mentioned that you were working on some new ideas for health care packages for our forces, including some kind of medical savings account concept.

I'm very interested in seeing your ideas so we can consider moving forward on a pilot project or even some wholesale changes.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
110404-17

.....
Please *respond* by 12/1/04


4 pages

~~FOUO~~

OSD 01166-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21751

December 16, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Fringe Benefit Computation

I looked at this letter. I just can't believe that that is the correct number for the fringe benefit computation for me. It looks way too low.

You ought to check into how they do the computing and whether or not Syd Sullivan is calculating it properly, and including everything that's personal, which he must.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/9/04 Letter to SecDef ~~from~~ H. Becker

DHRss
121604-16

.....
Please *respond* by _____

430

16 Dec 04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1 155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



Honorable Donald R. Rumsfeld
2206 Kalorama Rd N. W.
Washington, DC 20007

09 DEC 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to amendments made to the tax code in 1984, the Department is required to place a value on the personal use of the official vehicles and drivers and provide this value to employees for use in preparing their tax returns. Under IRS regulations, commuting is considered personal use and the term "employer" includes the Federal Government. You fall under the scope of the regulations because of the portal-to-portal service given you by this Department.

We have calculated this amount, based on our best information regarding your use of the Government furnished vehicle. The period covered this year is from November 1, 2003 to October 31, 2004. This amount will appear on a separate W-2 form, which you will be receiving in the near future. Attached is a work sheet explaining this amount. You may wish to share this information with your tax accountant or attorney.

Please have your staff contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,


Howard G. Becker
Howard G. Becker

Director

Attachment:
a/s



11-L-0559/OSD/21753

ATTACHMENT

PORTAL TO PORTAL 2004 FRINGE BENEFIT COMPUTATION
FOR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD

The **Commuting Valuation Rule** (Business-Orientated Security Concerns) bases the taxable benefit on \$1.50 value for each one-way commute of an employer-furnished vehicle. This rule applies only to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The figure for the number of one-way commutes is based on information provided by your office.

$$613 \text{ trips} \times \$1.50 = \text{\$919.50}$$



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

JUL 17 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT FOR ADMINISTRATION
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Subject: Accounting for Home-to-Work Transportation Fringe Benefits

The purpose of this memorandum is to **clarify** the Department's duty to account for the home-to-work transportation that is provided to certain senior officials of the Department.

You are reminded that Government vehicles may be used only for **official** purposes. Statute provides that certain specifically delineated senior officials may be provided home-to-work transportation (31 U.S.C. § 1344); such use is considered official use. However, home-to-work transportation is considered a "fringe benefit" and is thus taxable to the official. Treasury regulations §§ 1.61-21 and 1.132-5 describe the method used to determine the value of the fringe benefit, and that value is reflected in a **W-2** prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service for the official. All other use of Government vehicles is considered official use, for the benefit of the Government, and is not a taxable benefit to the official.

For purposes of determining which trips are considered "home-to-work" transportation, you should consider each trip that originates at the official's residence, and each trip that terminates at the official's residence, as "home-to-work" transportation, regardless of the number of intermediate stops. The only exception to this rule is that trips that originate or terminate at the official's residence as **part** of a TDY/TAD trip are provided to Government travelers as a non-taxable reimbursable expense.

If you have questions concerning this matter, please do not hesitate to contact John S. Albanese in the WHS Office of General Counsel (b)(6)
(b)(6)


Raymond F. DuBois
Director 7.17.03

11-L-0559/OSD/21755



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

11-0559/OSD/21756
SECRET

175 JAN 10 PM 12:57

INFO MEMO

14 JAN 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration & Management

SUBJECT: Fringe Benefit Computation

- In the attached snowflake, you asked that I verify again this year that you are paying as much as you are supposed to pay for your DoD-provided home-to-work transportation fringe benefit.
- We continue to take a very conservative approach in this area, and consider all trips originating or terminating at any of your residences as taxable events. I issued guidance in 2003 that clearly directs this approach (also attached). This assures that you pay all that you should be paying, and nothing less.
- The taxable portion of your home-to-work transportation is predicated upon the fact that you receive security protection. In such cases, the taxable benefit imputed for home-to-work transportation, as established by Treasury Regulation sections 1.61-21 and 1.132-5, is \$1.50 for each trip.
- Your personal driver and the head of your security detail have provided data in response to our request for an accounting of your use of this fringe benefit. I am confident that they have provided data in accordance with applicable guidance, and that the accounting for taxable year 2004 is correct.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Howard Becker,

(b)(6)

OSD 01178-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21756




AM 02831-05

430

14 Jan 05

16 Dec 04

December 16, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Fringe Benefit Computation

I looked at this letter. I just can't believe that that is the correct number for the fringe benefit computation for me. It looks way too low.

You ought to check into how they do the computing, and whether or not Syd Sullivan is calculating it properly, and including everything that's personal, which he must.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/9/04 Letter to SecDef from H. Becker

DHRss
121604-16

Please *respond* by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/21757



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1 155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



Honorable Donald R. Rumsfeld
2206 Kalorama Rd N. W.
Washington, DC 20007

09 DEC 2004


Dear Mr. Secretary:

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We have calculated this amount, based on our best information regarding your use of the Government furnished vehicle. The period covered this year is from November 1, **2003** to October 31, **2004**. This amount will appear on a separate **W-2** form, which you will be receiving in the near future. Attached is a work sheet explaining this amount. You may wish to share this information with your tax accountant or attorney.

Please have your staff contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,


Howard G. Becker
Howard G. Becker
Director

Attachment:
a/s



11-L-0559/OSD/21758

ATTACHMENT

PORTAL TO PORTAL 2004 FRINGE BENEFIT COMPUTATION
FOR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD

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$$613 \text{ trips} \times \$1.50 = \$919.50$$



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

JUL 17 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT FOR ADMINISTRATION
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Subject: Accounting for Home-to-Work Transportation Fringe Benefits

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For purposes of determining which trips are considered "home-to-work" transportation, you should consider each trip that originates at the official's residence, and each **trip** that terminates at the official's residence, **as** "home-to-work" transportation, regardless of the number of intermediate stops. The only exception to this rule is that trips that originate or terminate at the official's residence **as part** of a TDY/TAD trip are provided to Government travelers as a non-taxable reimbursable expense.

If you have questions concerning this matter, please do not hesitate to contact John S. Albanese in the WHS Office of General Counsel (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Raymond F. DuBois
Raymond F. DuBois
Director

7.17.03

11-L-0559/OSD/21760

10:40 AM

TO: Col. John Baxter
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 9, 2004
SUBJECT:

Can you check and see if Walter Reed Hospital has a higher than normal incident of staph infection? I've heard of two incidents recently which make me wonder.

Thanks.

DIR/az:
010904.23

Please respond by:

1/15/04

11-L-0559/OSD/21761



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

JAN 22 2004

HEALTH AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Incidence of Staph Infections at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC)

- This memo is provided in response to your snowflake of January 9, 2004 (TAB A), subject as above. An Executive Summary from the Commander, Walter Reed Healthcare System, is attached (TAB B).
- Walter Reed Army Medical Center constantly monitors infection rates and prevalence of certain antibiotic resistant species. Surveillance indicates WRAMC maintains a lower than normal incidence rate for staph infections in comparison to national standards.
 - WRAMC incidence of nosocomial (hospital-acquired) infections consistently fall below numbers reported by the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance system.
 - WRAMC also falls well below the mean and median of nationally reported hospitals for incidence of antibiotic resistant species, particularly methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus. The most recent data available shows methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus comprised 31% of all WRAMC staph isolates compared to National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance reported ranges of 21-67% (median of 45%; mean of 51%) for intensive care units and 24-58% for non-intensive care units (median of 43%; mean 41%).
 - A 2002 study found the vast majority of WRAMC patients came into the hospital already colonized with methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus, and very few patients (only 4.5% in our study) actually acquired the organism at WRAMC.
- Methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus is a growing problem nationally with the overall prevalence increasing the same way penicillin resistant staph aureus increased in the 1950's and 1960's. All military hospitals continually monitor and make every effort to prevent transmission of multi-drug resistant organisms to susceptible patients.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R)

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC Strawder, OASD (HA)

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21762

OSD 01183-04

TAB

A

10:40 AM

TO: Col. John Baxter
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 9, 2004
SUBJECT:

Can you check and see if Walter Reed Hospital has a higher than normal incident of staph infection? I've heard of two incidents recently which make me wonder.

Thanks.

DIRR/270
010904.23

Please respond by: _____

1/15/04

11-L-0559/OSD/21764

TAB

B

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

15 January 2004

(U) Incidence of staph infections at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC). (U) (MCHL-DC) SECDEF recently heard of two cases of staph infections at WRAMC and questioned if WRAMC has a higher than normal incidence of staph infection. The Infection Control Service at WRAMC monitors infections, nosocomial infection rates, and certain antibiotic resistant species. Ventilator associated pneumonias, Blood stream infections and urinary tract infections are nosocomial infectious that are monitored and reported quarterly. These data are also reported by a large number of outside institutions to the CDC and compared through the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance (NNIS) system. WRAMC incidence of these nosocomial infections consistently fall below the NNIS Standards. The incidence of antibiotic resistant species, particularly methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is also closely monitored. At WRAMC MRSA is monitored by comparing the percentage of MRSA isolates to all other staph aureus isolates. In 2002 (the most recent data available) MRSA comprised 31% of all WRAMC staph isolates in the microbiology laboratory. The 2002 corresponding NNIS data reported ranges of 21-67% with a median of 45% (mean of 51%) for intensive care units and 24-58% for non-intensive care unit locations with a median of 43% (mean of 41%). WRAMC falls well below the mean and median of the nationally reported hospitals. In 2002 a prospective surveillance project was conducted to examine WRAMC's effectiveness of controlling the spread of resistant organisms and in particular MRSA. The vast majority of WRAMC patients actually came into the hospital already colonized with MRSA. These patients comprise more than 50% of the infections that occur in hospitalized patients, and very few patients (only 4.5% in our study) actually "acquire" the organism at WRAMC. There is no evidence that WRAMC has a higher rate of infections compared to the remainder of the country overall. MRSA is a growing problem nationally with the overall national prevalence increasing exactly the way penicillin resistant staph aureus increased in the 1950's and 1960's. We will continually monitor for nosocomial infections and make every effort to prevent transmission of multi-drug resistant organisms to our susceptible patients.

Thomas M. Fitzpatrick, COL, MC, DCCS, WRAMC (b)(6)

E-mail: thomas.fitzpatrick@na.amedd.army.mil

APPROVED BY: Jonathan H. Jaffin, COL, MC, Commander WRHCS

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/21766

1,27-04

January 27, 2004

*Advance
copy sent to Dr. Chu
1/27 0830*

TO: David Chu

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Statistics

I need the data soon—tomorrow—as to:

1. The percentage of Reserves that have never been called up or not been called up in five or ten years.
2. The percentage of Reserves and Guard used in each of the Services for Iraq so far.
3. The number of people under stop-loss and stop-move.

I would like the data to be arranged in a way that is persuasive.

Please get me the first draft no later than Wednesday, January 28, so we can get it reworked the rest of the week before the testimony.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012704-9

.....
Please respond by 1/28/04

OSD 01258-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21767



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

USD

2004 JUN 28 11:40

January 28, 2004, 1400

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Statistics -- SNOWFLAKE

- You requested specific information regarding percentages and numbers of Reserve component members called-up, and not called-up, for mobilizations over time, and the number of Total Force members impacted by Stop Loss.
- Attached is an Information Paper that I believe answers your questions and provides an accurate picture of Reserve component mobilizations, using current DoD personnel data.
- The information provided:
 - is consistent with the approach that has been used and explained over the past year.
 - shows that about 38% of the Selected Reserve force has been involuntarily called-up for the current operation – or that about 62% has not been called-up.
 - shows that only a small percentage of the Selected Reserve has been called-up more than once since 1996.
 - describes the use of the Selected Reserve as the base population for calculations vice the Ready Reserve (which also includes the Individual Ready Reserve).
 - depicts the number of Active and Reserve members impacted by Stop Loss and Stop Move.
- This information also supports the rebalancing actions initiated by the Department.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P) (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/21768

OSD 01258-04

Statistics

1. Reserve Members Involuntarily Called-up:

e

	Desert Shield/Storm (Aug 90-Aug 91)	Haiti (Sep 94- May 96)	Bosnia (Dec 95- Present)	Southwest Asia (SWA) (Feb 98-Present)	Kosovo (Apr 99- Present)	ONE/OEF/OIF (Sep 01-Present)
# RC Invol Called-Up*	239,187	6,250	32,404	6,108	11,426	338,221

- e Since 09/11/01 we have involuntarily mobilized about 338,221 members of the Selected Reserve, or about 38% of RC members filling structured billets (877,060). This means that about 62% of Selected Reserve members have not been called-up.

(Note: The baseline does not include the approximately 283,000 members in the RC manpower pool - the Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard.)

- e Of the 338,221 RC members who have served/are serving in the current operations, 11,802 have served in previous operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, or SWA) going back to Dec 1995. (This equates to about 1.3 % of the SelRes force of today)
- e Additionally, of the 338,221 members who have served/are serving in the current operations, 15,982 have been called up more than once for this contingency. (This equates to about 1.8% of the SelRes force of today).
- e So, overall, less than 4% of the SelRes force of today has been involuntarily called-up more than once since 1996.
- e A review of the overall numbers called-up, and those who have been called up more than once, shows that the stress (or usage) is focused in certain areas. This has lead to the force rebalancing efforts that have been initiated in DoD.

2.

D of Selected Reserve

ARNG	USAR	USNR	USMCR	ANG	USAFR	USCGR	TOTAL
135,737	93,943	20,506	24,725	31,775	24,013	7,522	338,221
39.1%	44.4%	23.5%	60.3%	29.5%	32.4%	98.3%	38.6%

- ### 3. Members Impacted by Stop Loss:
- The current Army Stop Loss policy applies to approximately 20,342 Active Component, and 25,538 Reserve Component soldiers involuntarily extended beyond eligible separation or retirement dates.

- Active Component Stop Loss affects soldiers/units deployed, or preparing to deploy, in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM/ENDURING FREEDOM, and continues through redeployment to permanent duty stations plus 90-days.
- Reserve Component Stop Loss affects Ready Reserve soldiers assigned to an alerted or mobilized unit, and continues up to 90-days after demobilization.
- For the Active Component the Army has elected to Stop Move, in support of OIF1/OEF4, 27,397 Soldiers and, in support of OIF2/OEF5, 5,628 Soldiers.
- Currently, only the Army is utilizing Stop Loss or Stop Move policy:
- Stop Loss and Stop Move policies are a necessary tool during periods of conflict or national emergency. The decision to execute such policy is driven by the need to maintain unit readiness, and the intent to keep units intact down to the squad and crew level thereby ensuring the best trained and cohesive fighting force on the battlefield. The unit rotation schedule and pace of execution does not allow for incorporating newly assigned personnel into trained units before redeployment. Impact on retention is a consideration the Services heavily weigh when deciding to execute Stop Loss or Stop Move actions. While the impact is being closely monitored, historical review and current leading indicators would suggest retention trends, currently half of all first term enlistments stay in, deviates little after a Stop Loss or Stop Move period.

7:35 PM

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: **Fowler Panel Recommendations**

Attached is a response from the Air Force on the Fowler recommendations. Please pull together the responses from all the services and give me your recommendations.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021804.24

Attach: Air Force Response to Fowler Panel Recommendations 1/22/04

Please respond by: _____

3/1/04

OSD 01280-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21771

000.5

18 Feb 04

22 Apr 04

SECRET



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

2004 JAN 22 PM 1:51

JAN 22 2004

(7)

Durnan
2/10

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Air Force Response to the Fowler Panel Recommendations

The purpose of this memo is to provide an update of the Air Force actions regarding recommendations in the "Report of The Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the US Air Force Academy."

We are in the process of implementing each of the 21 recommendations (many of which were also recommended by the Air Force Working Group's Report), with the exception of #18, #15, and #14. Recommendation #18 concerns the issue of cadet infractions committed in association with a sexual assault. We discovered in our review, that one of the major reasons cadets did not report sexual assaults was for fear of getting themselves and their peers in trouble based on cadet infractions that occurred along with the sexual incident (e.g., underage drinking, fraternizing, being off base without authority). In order to increase reporting of this already underreported crime, we decided to provide amnesty from cadet discipline to both cadet victims and witnesses in these circumstances. This allows them to come forward with the promise of absolution from cadet discipline for their infractions. (We allowed for three exceptions: the alleged perpetrator, the senior ranking cadet in attendance, and any witness who covers up the incident or hinders the reporting or investigation of the incident.) I spoke with Mrs. Fowler regarding this plan and she concurred. Since the Agenda for Change, this amnesty policy has not extended to actions under the Honor Code or the UCMJ. With the Academy's migration from cadet discipline to conventional Air Force administrative and UCMJ corrective actions, the amnesty concept will be applied to these corrective actions for the same types of misconduct. Amnesty will continue to be inapplicable to Honor Code violations. It is our plan to implement this policy for one year from its inception and then review it on an annual basis.

As to Recommendation #15, I conferred with Mrs. Fowler and she agreed that the management of our cadet ~~CASIE~~ program is a function of command and should, therefore, be managed by someone in the chain of command. This is a change from her Recommendation #15 that states the psychotherapist should manage this program.


With regard to Recommendation #14, the issue of opening another avenue of confidential reporting for cadets, we are currently in the final stages of formulating an appropriate policy that differs somewhat from Mrs. Fowler's recommendation but

11-L-0559/OSD/21772

* CASIE - CADETS ADVOCATING Sexual
Integrity & Education

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JAN 22 2004	
FBI - WASHINGTON	
11-L-0559/OSD/21772	
2/10	

responds to the spirit of it. We are developing a new policy to be applicable to the entire Academy (including cadets and non-cadets). The preferred and encouraged route for reporting sexual assault is to command authorities. When reporting through command channels, the victim's privacy will be protected and details of the incident, including names of the victim and alleged perpetrator, will be provided to appropriate authorities. However, victims will now have an option to report sexual assault to a designated counselor in the Cadet Counseling Center in lieu of reporting to command. (The option of discussing a sexual assault with a chaplain or an off base counseling service remains.) Counselors will have limited confidentiality, will not be in the Academy chain of command, and will not divulge names to command authorities absent extreme circumstances (e.g., when the safety of the victim or other Academy personnel is at risk); they will report the relevant facts, without identifiers, to appropriate authorities while continuing to provide victims the counseling they need and encouraging them to provide information to command authorities when ready. The command chain retains the potential of overriding the limited confidentiality in extreme circumstances and AFOSI retains the option of appealing a decision not to override to the Secretary. Also, no organization of cadets or victim peers will be an official assault reporting channel, counselor or investigator; instead, selected cadets will be trained to guide victims to established sources of professional care. I am confident this new policy will balance the needs of commanders to maintain good order and discipline with the needs of victims who have suffered a traumatic experience. When finalized, we will forward our plan to Dr. Chu and his staff.



James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

Attachment:
Fowler Recommendations

cc:
AF/CC
USD (P&R)

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

After performing the study required by H.K. 1559 and reviewing the policy changes being implemented by the *Agenda for Change*, the Panel has made various recommendations throughout this report. Those recommendations, organized according to the major area of this report to which they apply, are summarized below.

Awareness and Accountability – Section III

1. The Panel recommends that the DoD IG conduct a thorough review of the accountability of Academy and Air Force Headquarters leadership for the sexual assault problems at the Academy over the last decade. This review should include an assessment of the actions taken by leaders at Air Force Headquarters as well as those at the Academy, including General Gilbert, General Wagie and Colonel Slavec. The review should also consider the adequacy of personnel actions taken, the accuracy of individual performance evaluations, the validity of decorations awarded and the appropriateness of follow-on assignments. The Panel further recommends that the DoD IG provide the results of the review to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and to the Secretary of Defense. (Page 42)

Command Supervision and Oversight at the Academy – Section IV

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3. The Panel recommends that the Air Force extend the tour length of the Superintendent to four years and the tour length of the Commandant of Cadets to three years in order to provide for greater continuity and stability in Academy leadership. (Page 46)

4. The Panel recommends that the Air Force prepare a legislative proposal to revise 10 U.S.C. § 9335(a) to expand the available pool of potential candidates for the position of Dean of Faculty beyond the current limitation to permanent professors. (Page 46)

5. The Panel recommends that the Academy Board of Visitors:

- Operate more like a corporate board of directors with regularly organized committees charged with distinctive responsibilities (e.g., academic affairs, student life, athletics, etc.). The Board should meet not less than four times per year, with at least two of those meetings at the Academy. To the extent practical, meetings should include at least one full day of meaningful participation and should be scheduled so as to provide the fullest participation by Congressional members. Board members must have unfettered access to Academy grounds and cadets, to include attending classes and meeting with cadets informally and privately; and
- Receive candid and complete disclosure by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Academy Superintendent of all institutional problems, including but not limited to, all gender related matters, cadet surveys and information related to culture and climate and incidents of sexual harassment and sexual assaults. (Page 49)

6. The Panel recommends that the Air Force prepare a legislative proposal to revise 10 U.S.C. § 9355. The suggested revisions should include both the foregoing and following recommendations:

- Changing the composition of the Board to include fewer Congressional (and, therefore, more Presidential-appointed) members, more women and minority individuals and at least two Academy graduates;
- Requiring that any individual who accepts an appointment as a Board member does, thereby, pledge full commitment to attend each meeting of the Board, and to carry out all of the duties and responsibilities of a Board member, to the fullest extent practical;
- Terminating any Board member's appointment who fails to attend or fully participate in two successive Board meetings, unless granted prior excusal for good cause by the Board Chairman;
- Providing clear oversight authority of the Board over the Academy, and direct that, in addition to the reports of its annual meetings required to be furnished to the President, it shall submit those reports and such other reports it prepares, to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force, in order to identify all matters of the Board's concerns with or about the Air Force Academy and to recommend appropriate action thereon; and
- Eliminating the current requirement for Secretarial approval for the Board to visit the Academy for other than annual visits. (Pages 49-50)

Organizational Culture & Character Development – Section V

7. The Panel recommends that the Air Force conduct the same review of Non-Commissioned Officer assignment policies and tour lengths at the Academy as it is conducting for officer assignments policies. (Page 56)

8. The Panel recommends that the Academy draw upon climate survey resources at the Air Force Personnel Center Survey Branch for assistance in creating and administering the social climate surveys. Further, the Panel recommends that the Academy keep centralized records of all surveys, responses and reports and keep typed records of all written comments (not abbreviated or paraphrased) – to be provided as an appendix to any report. All such reports must be provided to Academy leadership. (Page 58)

9. The Panel recommends that the Academy place a renewed emphasis on education and encouragement of responsible consumption of alcohol for all cadets. (Page 61)

10. To ensure the safety of every cadet, the Panel recommends that the Academy implement a policy permitting unrestricted (i.e., no explanation required at any time) private access to telephones for the use by any cadet, including Fourth-Class cadets, in an emergency. (Page 62)

11. The Panel recommends that the Center for Character Development education instruction be mandatory for all cadets. The Panel further recommends the cadet curriculum require completion of at least one course per year that emphasizes character values, for which cadets shall receive a grade and academic credit. (Page 68)

12. While the Panel appreciates that the demands on the time of new cadets are significant, we recommend reassessing the training calendar to place prevention and awareness training at a time of day in which cadets will be most receptive to the training session. (Page 73)

13. The Panel recommends that the Academy focus on providing better training to the trainers of prevention and awareness classes including enlisting the aid of faculty members who are well-skilled in group presentation techniques that are effective and energize the cadets, developing small group training sessions which will be more effective than large audience presentations, developing training sessions that educate the students on the reporting process and Air Force Office of Special Investigations investigatory practices and procedures, and establishing a review process for training session materials that includes the use of the

Academy Response Team and cadet cadre or some other multi-disciplinary group of experts. (Page 74)

Intervention and Response to Sexual Assault – Section VI

14. The Panel recommends that the Air Force establish a policy that achieves a better balance of interests and properly employs psychotherapist-patient counseling, and its associated privilege, for the benefit of cadet victims. The Panel recommends that the Academy's policy for sexual assault reporting clearly recognize the applicability of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and that the Academy staff the Cadet Counseling Center with at least one Victim Advocate provider who meets the legal definition of "psychotherapist." Further, the Panel recommends that the individual assigned to serve as the initial point of reporting, whether by "hotline" or in person, be a qualified psychotherapist who has completed a recognized rape crisis certification program. Optimally, the Victim Advocate psychotherapist should be in charge of the sexual assault program within the Cadet Counseling Center and will provide direction and supervision to those assistants supporting the assigned psychotherapists. (Page 80)

15. The Panel recommends that the Academy establish a program that combines the existing CASIE program with a Victim Advocate psychotherapist managing the program, and which offers cadets a choice in reporting either to the psychotherapist or to a cadet peer. If reports to CASIE representatives continue to be considered non-confidential, then the Panel recommends that cadets be clearly advised of this fact and further advised that a confidential reporting option is available through the Victim Advocate psychotherapist. As an alternative, it is possible for CASIE cadet representatives to come within the protective umbrella of the psychotherapist-patient privilege if they meet the definition of being an "assistant to a psychotherapist." (Pages 86-87)

16. The Panel recommends that once the psychotherapist reporting option is fully implemented, the Air Force Academy conduct a thorough review of the CASIE program with a view toward either reducing the size of the program or eliminating it entirely. As an interim measure, the Panel recommends that the Academy consider modeling the CASIE program after the Respect Program at West Point, and expand the program to include assisting cadets with issues such as homesickness, respect for fellow cadets and academic difficulties. (Page 87)

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RECOMMENDATIONS

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19. The Panel recommends that the Academy **ensure** that the Academy Response Team **is always** proactively involved in cases in which the victim and potential witnesses **are** also alleged to have committed misconduct. The Panel also recommends that the Academy Response Team continue to **remain** involved in a case, in the event that a **particular** allegation is suspected to be false. (Pages 94)

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21. The Panel recommends that the **Academy** take measures to ensure that transportation to the hospital, **and** any other necessary logistical support, is always available to a cadet who chooses to receive a rape kit examination. In particular, transportation **must** be provided by an appropriate individual, such **as the** psychotherapist or Academy Response Team member, who **will** be discreet and can address the victim's emotional needs during the long car trip to the hospital. (Page 100)



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 2004 JUN 22 11:15:51
WASHINGTON

JUN 22 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Air Force Response to the Fowler Panel Recommendations

The purpose of this memo is to provide an update of the Air Force actions regarding recommendations in the "Report of The Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the US Air Force Academy."

We are in the process of implementing each of the 21 recommendations (many of which were also recommended by the Air Force Working Group's Report), with the exception of #18, #15, and #14. Recommendation #18 concerns the issue of cadet infractions committed in association with a sexual assault. We discovered in our review, that one of the major reasons cadets did not report sexual assaults was for fear of getting themselves and their peers in trouble based on cadet infractions that occurred along with the sexual incident (e.g., underage drinking, fraternizing, being off base without authority). In order to increase reporting of this already underreported crime, we decided to provide amnesty from cadet discipline to both cadet victims and witnesses in these circumstances. This allows them to come forward with the promise of absolution from cadet discipline for their infractions. (We allowed for three exceptions: the alleged perpetrator, the senior ranking cadet in attendance, and any witness who covers up the incident or hinders the reporting or investigation of the incident.) I spoke with Mrs. Fowler regarding this plan and she concurred. Since the Agenda for Change, this amnesty policy has not extended to actions under the Honor Code or the UCMJ. With the Academy's migration from cadet discipline to conventional Air Force administrative and UCMJ corrective actions, the amnesty concept will be applied to these corrective actions for the same types of misconduct. Amnesty will continue to be inapplicable to Honor Code violations. It is our plan to implement this policy for one year from its inception and then review it on an annual basis.


As to Recommendation #15, I conferred with Mrs. Fowler and she agreed that the management of our cadet CASIE program is a function of command and should, therefore, be managed by someone in the chain of command. This is a change from her Recommendation #15 that states the psychotherapist should manage this program.

With regard to Recommendation #14, the issue of opening another avenue of confidential reporting for cadets, we are currently in the final stages of formulating an appropriate policy that differs somewhat from Mrs. Fowler's recommendation but

11-L-0559/OSD/21779

OSD 01280-04

responds to the spirit of it. We are developing a new policy to be applicable to the entire Academy (including cadets and non-cadets). The preferred and encouraged route for reporting sexual assault is to command authorities. When reporting through command channels, the victim's privacy will be protected and details of the incident, including names of the victim and alleged perpetrator, will be provided to appropriate authorities. However, victims will now have an option to report sexual assault to a designated counselor in the Cadet Counseling Center in lieu of reporting to command. (The option of discussing a sexual assault with a chaplain or an off base counseling service remains.) Counselors will have limited confidentiality, will not be in the Academy chain of command, and will not divulge names to command authorities absent extreme circumstances (e.g., when the safety of the victim or other Academy personnel is at risk); they will report the relevant facts, without identifiers, to appropriate authorities while continuing to provide victims the counseling they need and encouraging them to provide information to command authorities when ready. The command chain retains the potential of overriding the limited confidentiality in extreme circumstances and AFOSI retains the option of appealing a decision not to override to the Secretary. Also, no organization of cadets or victim peers will be an official assault reporting channel, counselor or investigator; instead, selected cadets will be trained to guide victims to established sources of professional care. I am confident this new policy will balance the needs of commanders to maintain good order and discipline with the needs of victims who have suffered a traumatic experience. When finalized, we will forward our plan to Dr. Chu and his staff.



James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

Attachment:
Fowler Recommendations

cc:
AF/CC
USD (P&R)

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SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

2004 JAN 27 PM

JAN 22 2004

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AF:
What is
CASE?

DID AF talk
to Tillie about
her view on their
proposed #14?
Jaymie

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Response to the Fowler Panel Recommendations

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
3 Feb 04

22 Jan 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21786

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE	
MAJ CRADDOCK	
OSD 0	280-04
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James G. Roche
Secretary of the Air Force

Attachment:
Fowler Recommendations

cc:
AF/CC
USD (P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/21787

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

December 1, 2004

2005 JAN 21 AM 6:57

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Friedman on DBB

Let's think about putting Steve Friedman on the Defense Business Board.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-27

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

1/A
Tom Modley / Tina Jonas

Please let
disarm Mrs. Also,
what is the status of
Indiana?

Q/R

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/21788

OSD 01304-05



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JAN 21 AM 7:00

INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

January 19, 2005 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Steve Friedman and the Defense Business Board (DBB)

- I spoke with Steve Friedman today about your interest in having him serve on the DBB. Steve told me that he is currently weighing prospective opportunities that may preclude him from serving on the Board. Steve also mentioned that he had spoken to you recently about his situation.
- The DBB currently has one open position for a new member. We will hold this position open until Steve's situation is resolved.

Prepared by: Thomas Modly, (b)(6) / January 19, 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/21789

OSD 01304-05

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY OF THE
DEFENSE
2005 JAN 21 AM 6:57

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1/1
Tom Modley F.N.A. Jones

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di Rita know. Also,
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Indiana?

Di Rita

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21790

OSD 01304-05

January 29, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: January 24 Event

Attached is some material my staff received from Richard Perle in response to our inquiry about the conference that was held by a consortium of Iranian-American groups last weekend at the Washington Convention Center.

Attach.
1/14/04 e-mail

DHR:dh
012904-8

Iran
275-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21791

OSD 01313-04

(b)(6)

1-28-; PAX

(b)(6)

4 pages

From: Brian Lord**Sent:** Wednesday, January 14, 2004 9:03 AM**To:** (b)(6)**Subject:** Mr. Richard Perle-AEI

Hi, (b)(6) Here is some more information about the event and the issues involved in it. Please also find more information which the client put together and is attached to this email. Please let me know if you have any questions. Thank you.

Brian Lord

Premiere Speakers Bureau

Dear Mr. Perle,

The January 24 event at the Washington Convention Center is intended to pay tribute to the victims of the devastating earthquake in the southern Iranian city of Bam, where by some accounts nearly 70,000 people perished.

All aid for the victims would be coordinated through the American Red Cross, as few, if any, have any confidence that the Iranian regime would provide the survivors with funds and goods donated from outside the country.

Already, there have been many reports of thousands of blankets, tents and sacks of rice being diverted from Bam to the warehouses of the Revolutionary Guards Corps. In one case, 35,000 blankets disappeared. In another case, sacks of rice sold in the markets of northern Iran had labels, indicating that they had been sent for the victims of the tremor in Bam.

At the same time, the participants, most of whom Iranians, are coming together to state their support for the demands of the Iranian people for a secular, democratic government, which they hope to be erected through a United Nations supervised referendum for regime change.

After all, in the eyes millions of Iranians, particularly those in the exile community, the ruling clerics are held entirely responsible for the staggering dimensions of the tragedy in Bam.

Some 25 years of neglect and plundering of Iran's national wealth has left the tens of thousands of those in Bam and other cities across the country vulnerable to such natural disasters. When a similar quake struck the northern Iranian city of Rudsar in 1990, 35,000 were killed. Obviously, nothing has been done or will be done to prepare the nation for such tragedies.

Many of the organizations and associations that have sponsored this event, while pursuing differing professional objectives, share the view that if there is going to be any hope for the situation in Iran to improve, it would be after the current regime is unseated and replaced with a government, which shows respect for the rights of its own citizens and abides by internationally recognized norms of conduct. Iranians are yearning for a government that would devote its policies, resources and attention to improve the lives of Iranians instead of spending billions of dollars to WMD programs, supporting subversive groups that oppose a peaceful Middle East and sponsoring terrorism outside Iran.

In short, given that everything about Iran is inevitably political, those active in various cultural, academic or professional causes outside Iran are necessary politically oriented and most, if not all, opposed the current

1/14/04

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regime.

The organizers have already made it clear that the distinguished speakers who would participate in the event ought to address some of the concerns enumerated above, particularly the issue of a referendum as the last peaceful means to regime change in Iran. Many are inspired by President Bush's unequivocal and repeated messages to the Iranian leadership that it must heed the demands of the Iranian people for democracy or lose the last claim to its legitimacy.

If the current political crisis, emanating from the row over the upcoming parliamentary elections, is any indication, however, Iran's turbaned rulers are unlikely to take the President's advice. The intolerance shown by the dominant faction towards its bed fellows, the so-called moderate faction of the government, speaks volumes about how ordinary Iranians, non-conformists and dissidents have been treated in all these years.

The Iranian Diaspora in the United States in general and the sponsoring organizations in particular are aware fully of Mr. Perle's views on Iran and the approach he has promoted in dealing with regime that would result in the emergence of a humane, responsible and accountable government in that tormented land. This explains why among the many distinguished scholars and political dignitaries, they chose to invite him to join others to address this gathering so as to demonstrate to the millions of suffering Iranians at home that they are not alone and that their cry for freedom is being heard and echoed here in the United States.

If I can be any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully,

Nasser Rashidi
Public Relations-USA, INC.

RE: EVENT IN SOLIDARITY WITH EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS IN IRAN

1. The event, "In Solidarity with Earthquake Victims in Iran and an evening for Iranian Resistance," is scheduled for Saturday, January 24, 2004 at the Grand Ball Room of Washington Convention Center. Some where between 4,600 to 5,000 people (depending on the seating arrangement) would be attending the event, which will begin at 5:00 pm and continue until midnight, with speeches and artistic performances by American and Iranian performers. The event will be broadcast in its entirety live via satellite in Iran, the United States, Europe and the Middle East.
2. **Partial list of sponsoring organizations and associations:**
 - US for Democracy and Human Rights in Iran;
 - AdHoc Committee for Iran Solidarity Evening (ACISE);
 - Iranian-American Community of Northern Virginia (I.A.C.of NV);
 - Iranian-American Cultural Association of Missouri (IACA-MO);
 - Colorado's Iranian-American Community (CIAC);
 - Iranian-American Society of Texas (IAS-TX);
 - Association of Iranian Americans in New York (AIA-NY);
 - Society of Iranian Americans in Dallas (SIA-D);
 - Iranian-American Community of New Mexico (IAC-NM);
 - Association of Iranian-American Scholars in Southern California (AIAS-SC);
 - National Coalition of Pro-Democracy Advocates (NCPDA);
 - Committee in Support of Referendum in Iran (CSRI);
 - National Committee of Women for a Democratic Iran (NCWDA);
 - Women's Freedom Forum (WFF);
 - Public Relations-USA (PRUSA);
 - Near East Policy Research (NEPR);
 - Sa'atchi Jewelers of New York.
3. All proceeds from the event will go to the victims through the American Red Cross.
4. **Partial list of U.S. dignitaries expected to attend and speak at the event:**
 - Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS);
 - Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX);
 - Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL);
 - Congressman Thomas Tancredo (R-CO);
 - Congressman Bob Filner (D-CA);
 - Dr. Mervyn Dymally, former member of the United States House of Representatives from California;
 - Prof. Daniel Pipes, Director of the Peace Institute;
 - Prof. Raymond Tanter, Adjunct Scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy;
 - James Akins, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia;
 - Prof. Donna M. Hughes, Women's Studies Program, University of Rhode Island;
 - Mr. Steven Schneebaum, Patton Boggs LLP;

- Mr. Paul F. Enzinna, Baker Botts LLP;
- Mr. Ronald G. Precup of Carpenter, Precup LLP.

5. Partial list of foreign dignitaries invited to attend and speak at the event:

- Lord Alton of Liverpool;
- Lord Corbett of Castle Vale;
- Paolo Casaca, member of the European Parliament from Portugal;
- Ms. Perline Frohm, member of the European Parliament from Denmark;
- Prof. Maurice Danby Copithorne, Special Representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission on the situation of human rights in Iran (1991-2001);
- Prof. Marc Henzelin of International Swiss Law firm, LA LIVE;
- Prof. Jean-Yves de-Cara, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law expert at the University of Lyons, France,
- Several distinguished Sheikhs, tribal leaders and scholars from Iraq (who will discuss the situation in Iraq and Iranian meddling in that country).

6. Partial list of Iranian dignitaries and political, cultural figures:

- Ayatollah Jalal Ganje'i, renowned scholar on Islamic studies and Islamic fundamentalism. He studied Islamic jurisprudence and Shia *fiqh* at the Grand Seminary in the Holy city of Najaf, Iraq in 1960s;
- Moslem Eskandar Filabi, Olympic Wrestling Champion, Iranian national hero and representative of Iranian athletes and sports champions in exile;
- Dr. Mohammad Ghorbani, World Wrestling Champion;
- Amb. Parviz Khazai, former Iranian Ambassador to Sweden and Norway;
- Mr. Mansour Lavaii, from the Iranian Zoroastrian Community in the United States;
- Ms. Mahvash Attarzadeh, from the Iranian Jewish Community in the United States;
- Mr. Parviz Sayyad, the most renowned Iranian actor and activist in Iran's exiled artistic community;
- Andranik Khachatourian, Iranian-Armenian conductor, composer and song writer;
- Professor Hossein Saeedian, University of Kansas;
- Professor Hossein Jahansouz, Merk Laboratories;
- Professor Ali Parsa, University of Californian, Los Angeles (UCLA);

12:48 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 9, 2004

SUBJECT: **Beyond Goldwater Nichols**

Attached is John Hamre's preliminary report. I think he's got some good ideas. What do you say we get you, Gen. Pace, Paul Wolfowitz and possibly Steve Cambone and whoever else you would like; possibly Adm. Keating.

We can sit down with Hamre and whoever he wants to bring and have him give us a report. We will see what we think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
030904.07
020904 07

Attach: Hamre 2/3/04 memo Re: Progress on study "Beyond Goldwater Nichols"

Please respond by: 3/1

OSD 01330-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21796

030 001


040604

26 Jan 04



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: John J. Hamre 
Date: February 3, 2004
Subject: Progress on our study "Beyond Goldwater Nichols"

Mr. Secretary, a year back we met with you at the outset of a study we planned to undertake in order to examine concepts for the next phase of reform for the Defense Department. Throughout the past year we have met extensively with experts in and outside the Department. We have met with the individuals you directed us to contact, as well as each of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries, and many members of your senior leadership team. We are now in the process of briefing our findings. We anticipate issuing a public report in March.

I would like to use this memo to briefly indicate some of the more significant ideas we will be proposing. If at any time you wish to be briefed in more detail, however, we would be honored to do so.

Integrating OSD and the Joint Staff

We started with a threshold question: Has the Joint Staff evolved to the extent that its capabilities overshadow that of the OSD staff? Our conclusion was that we are now at a stage where we need to integrate aspects of the Joint Staff and OSD.

It is our view that there needs to be an independent Joint Staff in key operational areas, but that others can be integrated. We already have an integrated OSD-Joint Staff in one key area—the J2. The J2 is the operational intelligence arm for both you and the Chairman. In the other J directorates, however, there is some duplication with OSD. We understand that some duplication is desirable as we need divergent perspectives in key areas, but in several other areas the duplication is wasteful, counterproductive and inefficient. We will, therefore, recommend that you retain the J2, J3, J5, and J8. We believe that the J7 should be disbanded, since most of its functions now logically belong to the Joint Forces Command. Our proposal for the J6 is contained in the next section of this memo.

When it comes to the J1 and the J4, we believe that these staffs can be integrated into OSD (USD, Personnel and Readiness and USD, Acquisition, Technology and

11-L-0559/OSD/21797

Logistics respectively). In these instances, the general/flag officer would become a military assistant to the under secretary. The J4 has always been a capable officer with modest duties. By contrast, it has always been hard to recruit a talented individual to head up logistics in the acquisition directorate of OSD. We feel that these are logical ways to integrate.

Remove Title 10 authority from the Military Departments

Our second major recommendation concerns the need for true enterprise-wide solutions for command, control and communications. We know that 25 years of pushing interoperability has still not corrected the problem of inter-service communication on the battlefield. We argue that it will not be possible to get truly seamless communications as long as the acquisition process for C3 systems remains a service-specific authority.

We believe that you should create a new program 12 that is for enterprise-wide C3. The acquisition of C3 would be assigned to a Joint Battle Management C2 Command. The J6 would be disestablished and assigned the JBMC2 Command leadership. The JBMC2 would be given the same kind of acquisition authority that the Special Operations Command or the ballistic missile defense directorate have. The Commander, JBMC2 would report to you through USD C3I. (I know you will not agree with this, but we believe that USD Intelligence should be reconfigured as USD C3I.)

We understand that this recommendation will engender a good deal of controversy with junior offices and retired senior officers, but we believe that the senior leadership of the military departments is genuinely open to this idea.

Unification of Secretariats in Military Departments

We understand that there has been considerable progress in this area, but we believe that the staffs for the service chiefs and the service secretaries can be completely integrated, with one very important exception. The general counsel should be accountable only to the Service Secretary.

Revitalizing civilian leadership in the Department

We were surprised to find the widely held view that the professional cadre of civilians in the Department is weak and deteriorating. We found a strong desire among military personnel to want to strengthen their civilian counterparts. In general, military officers believe that their ideas are now seriously impeded by weakness in OSD and in the military secretariats. We have developed a series of recommendations to help strengthen civilian leaders. We also believe that you need the authority to deploy civilians and will have some recommendations in this regard in our final report.

Improving Interagency Coordination

11-L-0559/OSD/21798

We believe that there are serious deficiencies in the interagency process. The non-defense departments lack the capacity to support their obligations. There are inadequate mechanisms for coordination and follow up to ensure that we have the resources and actions we need in order to follow through. I know that there are developments under way to strengthen the various department capabilities, but we need to learn more about those initiatives before we go final on our report.

Second Phase of the Study

Let me reiterate that we are prepared to meet with you at any time in order to review these ideas, as well as others that go beyond the major recommendations I have summarized above. We have also deferred some topics to the second phase of this study. In the second phase we intend to examine new missions and new organizational concepts for operations. I am aware that you have done a lot to advance new organizational concepts for operational missions. We have not yet had a chance to examine these ideas, but will do so this spring. We also intend to examine the questions regarding the role and structure of the National Guard and Reserve components, a topic that virtually everyone has argued that there is an urgent need to examine. We will accelerate our efforts in this area. I would especially welcome any perspective you have in this regard.

END

11-L-0559/OSD/21799



POLICY

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PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

INFO MEMO

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JAN 26 AM 9:34

EF-8289

January 26, 2004

I-04/000998-PDUSDP

Durham
1/26
FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSECDEF

USDP *copy made 1/26/04*

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: "Beyond Goldwater Nichols" Report of Meeting with John Hamre, CSIS (U)

- (U) On Friday, 23 January, I met with Dr. John Hamre and discussed CSIS' current "Beyond Goldwater Nichols" ideas:
 - (U) Integrating parts of Joint Staff and OSD in J1(Manpower/Personnel), J4(Logistics), J6 (Communications), and J7(Plans) functions
 - (U) Restructuring the active reserve mix
 - (U) Deploying DoD civilians
- (U) John Hamre will be conducting his first public "Beyond Goldwater Nichols" briefings in two weeks on Capitol Hill.
- (U) To give a clearer understanding of the CSIS proposals, John Hamre will send a private memo to you, through me, highlighting the points he presented at our meeting.
- (U) I expect to receive the memo in the next few days and will provide it to John Craddock upon receipt.
- (U) The information contained in the memo may be the subject of some "member questions" during your upcoming Hill testimony.

Prepared by: Steven Netishen, OPDUSD(P) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21800

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SP4 ASSISTANT IN CHARGE	<i>[Signature]</i> 1/30
SP4 MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	

OSD 01330-04
25-01-04 12:43 PM

TAB

~~FOUO~~

DEC 27 2004

923

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Runsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief Senator Sessions

Jeff Sessions needs a briefing on UAVs, Army UAVs in particular. He thinks we are not paying enough attention to the Army's needs for UAVs.

Thanks.

DNK:aa
12204-13

Please respond by

1/20/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/21801

OSD 01370-05

4522

27 Dec 04

February 3, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Statutory End Strength

It is not clear to me that I should have redelegated the President's authority during a period of national emergency to waive any statutory end strength ceilings for that fiscal year to the Services.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to whether or not you think that was a good idea, or whether we think now maybe we ought to hold it **up** here so we know what is going on.

Thanks.

Attach.

USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Statutory End Strength [OSD 01375-04]

DHR:dh
020304-4

.....
Please respond by 2/16/04

OSD 01375-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21802



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2004 JAN 30 PM 4:03

INFO MEMO

January 30, 2004 - 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Shu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Statutory End Strength

- As you know, Congress sets maximum peacetime end strength in the National Defense Authorization Act. (FY04 active duty numbers at Tab A). In the FY02 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress increased the Department's peacetime latitude to exceed these limits (10 U.S.C. 115, Tab B):
 - The Secretary of Defense, in the national interest, may increase active duty end strength by up to 3 percent; and
 - The Secretary of a military department, if such action will enhance manning and readiness, may increase his Service's authorized end strength for that fiscal year by not more than 2 per cent.
 - Together, these increases may not total more than 3 percent.
- Congress also establishes minimum end-strengths for active duty personnel under 10 U.S.C. 6916, which, for FY04, are the same as the maximum strengths (Tab C). This statute does not have a waiver provision.
- During this period of national emergency, the President delegated to you his authority under 10 U.S.C. 123a to waive any statutory end strength ceilings for that fiscal year (Tab D), and you have re delegated that authority to the Service Secretaries.

COORDINATIONS: Tab E

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM. (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DIR	NO
SR MA CRADDOCK	2/2
MA RUCCI	2/2
EXECSEC MARIOTT	ca 1/30

OSD 01375-04



11-L-0559/OSD/21803

FY 04 National Defense Authorization Act

SEC. 401. END STRENGTHS FOR ACTIVE FORCES.

The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of September 30, 2004, as follows:

- (1) The Army, 482,400.
- (2) The Navy, 373,800.
- (3) The Marine Corps, 175,000.
- (4) The Air Force, 359,300.

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TOC: United States Code Service: Code, Const, Rules, Conventions & Public Laws > /.../ >

CHAPTER 2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE > § 115. Personnel strengths: requirement for annual authorization

Citation: 10 USC 115

10 USCS § 115

UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE
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*** CURRENT THROUGH P.L. 108-187, APPROVED 12/16/03 ***
*** WITH GAPS OF 108-173, 177, 178 and 183 ***

TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES
SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW
PART I. ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
CHAPTER 2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

◆ **GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION**

10 USCS § 115 (2003)

§ 115. Personnel strengths: requirement for annual authorization

(a) Active-duty and Selected Reserve end strengths to be authorized by law. Congress shall authorize personnel strength levels for each fiscal year for each of the following:

(1) The end strength for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) for (A) active-duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for active-duty personnel, and (B) active-duty personnel and full-time National Guard duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for reserve personnel.

(2) The end strength for the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the armed forces.

(b) Limitation on appropriations for military personnel. No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year to or for--

(1) the use of active-duty personnel or full-time National Guard duty personnel of any of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) unless the end strength for such personnel of that armed force for that fiscal year has been authorized by law; or

(2) the use of the Selected Reserve of any reserve component of the armed forces unless the end strength for the Selected Reserve of that component for that fiscal year has been authorized by law.

(c) Military technician (dual status) end strengths to be authorized by law. Congress shall authorize for each fiscal year the end strength for military technicians (dual status) for each reserve component of the Army and Air Force. Funds available to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year may not be used for the pay of a military technician (dual status) during that fiscal year unless the technician fills a position that is within the number of such positions authorized by law for that fiscal year for the reserve component of that technician. This subsection applies without regard to section 129 of this title. In each budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, the end strength requested for military technicians (dual status) for each reserve component of the Army and Air Force shall be specifically set forth.

TAB B

11-L-0559/OSD/21805

(d) End-of-quarter strength levels.

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and include in the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the President's budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year the Secretary's proposed end-of-quarter strengths for each of the first three quarters of the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, in addition to the Secretary's proposed fiscal-year end-strengths for that fiscal year. Such end-of-quarter strengths shall be submitted for each category of personnel for which end strengths are required to be authorized by law under subsection (a) or (c). The Secretary shall ensure that resources are provided in the budget at a level sufficient to support the end-of-quarter and fiscal-year end-strengths as submitted.

(2) (A) After annual end-strength levels required by subsections (a) and (c) are authorized by law for a fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall promptly prescribe end-of-quarter strength levels for the first three quarters of that fiscal year applicable to each such end-strength level. Such end-of-quarter strength levels shall be established for any fiscal year as levels to be achieved in meeting each of those annual end-strength levels authorized by law in accordance with subsection (a) (as such levels may be adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

(B) At least annually, the Secretary of Defense shall establish for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) the maximum permissible variance of actual strength for an armed force at the end of any given quarter from the end-of-quarter strength established pursuant to subparagraph (A). Such variance shall be such that it promotes the maintaining of the strength necessary to achieve the end-strength levels authorized in accordance with subsection (a) (as adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

(3) Whenever the Secretary establishes an end-of-quarter strength level under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2), or modifies a strength level under the authority provided in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2), the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives of that strength level or of that modification, as the case may be.

(e) Authority for Secretary of Defense variances for active-duty and Selected Reserve end strengths. Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is in the national interest, the Secretary may--

(1) increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) for a fiscal year for any of the armed forces by a number equal to not more than 3 percent of that end strength;

(2) increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B) for a fiscal year for any of the armed forces by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of that end strength; and

(3) vary the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(2) for a fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of any of the reserve components by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of that end strength.

(f) Authority for service Secretary variances for active-duty end strengths. Upon determination by the Secretary of a military department that such action would enhance manning and readiness in essential units or in critical specialties or ratings, the Secretary may increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) for a fiscal year for the armed force under the jurisdiction of that Secretary or, in the case of the Secretary of the Navy, for any of the armed forces under the jurisdiction of that Secretary. Any such increase for a fiscal year--

(1) shall be by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of such authorized end strength; and

(2) shall be counted as part of the increase for that armed force for that fiscal year authorized under subsection (e)(1).

(g) Adjustment when Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy. The authorized strength of the Navy under subsection (a)(1) is increased by the authorized strength of the

11-L-0559/OSD/21806

Coast Guard during any period when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy.

(h) Certain active-duty personnel excluded from counting for active-duty end strengths. In counting active-duty personnel for the purpose of the end-strengths authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1), persons in the following categories shall be excluded:

(1) Members of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty under section 12302 of this title.

(2) Members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty under section 12304 of this title.

(3) Members of the National Guard called into Federal service under section 12406 of this title.

(4) Members of the militia called into Federal service under chapter 15 of this title [10 USCS §§ 331 et seq.]

(5) Members of reserve components on active duty for training.

(6) Members of reserve components on active duty for 180 days or less to perform special work.

(7) Members on full-time National Guard duty for 180 days or less.

(8) Members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve on active duty for more than [than] 180 days to support programs described in section 1203(b) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (Title XII of Public Law 103-160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(b)).

(9) Members of reserve components (not described in paragraph (8)) on active duty for more than 180 days but less than 271 days to perform special work in support of the combatant commands, except that

(A) general and flag officers may not be excluded under this paragraph; and

(B) the number of members of any of the armed forces excluded under this paragraph may not exceed the number equal to 0.2 percent of the end strength authorized for active-duty personnel of the armed force under subsection (a)(1)(A).

(10) Members of reserve components on active duty to prepare for and to perform funeral honors functions for funerals of veterans in accordance with section 1491 of this title.

(11) Members on full-time National Guard duty to prepare for and perform funeral honors functions for funerals of veterans in accordance with section 1491 of this title.

HISTORY:

(Added Nov. 5, 1990, P.L. 101-510, Div A, Title XIV, Part H, § 1483(a), 104 Stat. 1710; Dec. 5, 1991, P.L. 102-190, Div A, Title III, Part B, § 312(a), 105 Stat. 1335; Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 401(c), Subtitle B, § 415, Title V, Subtitle B, § 513 (a)(1), Title X, Subtitle F, § 1061(c), Title XV, § 1501(c)(3), 110 Stat. 286, 288, 305, 442, 498; Nov. 18, 1997, P.L. 105-85, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle B, § 413(b), Subtitle C, § 522(i)(1) 111 Stat. 1720, 1736.)

(As amended Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle B, § 415, 113 Stat. 587; Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-398, § 1, 114 Stat. 1654; Dec. 28, 2001, P.L. 107-107, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle C, §§ 421(a), 422, 115 Stat. 1076, 1077; Dec. 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 403, 116 Stat. 2525; Nov. 24, 2003, P.L. 108-136, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 403(a), (b), 117 Stat. 1450.)

HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES

Explanatory notes:

The bracketed word "than" has been inserted in subsec. (h)(8) as the word probably intended by Congress.

The amendment made by § 1 of Act Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-398, is based on § 422 of Subtitle C of Title IV of Division A of H.R. 5408 (114 Stat. 1654A-96), as introduced on Oct. 6, 2000, which was enacted into law by such § 1.

A prior § 115 (Act Nov. 16, 1973, P.L. 93-155, Title VIII, § 803(a), 87 Stat. 612; July 14, 1976, P.L. 94-361, Title III, § 302, 90 Stat. 924; Nov. 9, 1979, P.L. 96-107, Title III, § 303 (b), 93 Stat. 806; Dec. 12, 1980, P.L. 96-513, Title I, § 102(a), (b), 94 Stat. 2840; July 10, 1981, P.L. 97-22, § 2(b), 95 Stat. 124; Dec. 1, 1981, P.L. 97-86, Title IX, § 902, 903, 95

11-L-0559/OSD/21807

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CHAPTER 39. ACTIVE DUTY > § 691. Permanent end strength levels to support two major regional contingencies

Citation: 10 USC 691

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10 USCS § 691

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*** CURRENT THROUGH P.L. 108-187, APPROVED 12/16/03 ***
*** WITH GAPS OF 108-173, 177, 178 and 183 ***

TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES
SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW
PART 11. PERSONNEL
CHAPTER 39. ACTIVE DUTY

◆ **GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION**

10 USCS § 691 (2003)

§ 691. Permanent end strength levels to support two major regional contingencies

(a) The end strengths specified in subsection (b) are the minimum strengths necessary to enable the armed forces to fulfill a national defense strategy calling for the United States to be able to successfully conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.

(b) Unless otherwise provided by law, the number of members of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) on active duty at the end of any fiscal year shall be not less than the following:

- (1) For the Army, 482,400.
- (2) For the Navy, 373,800.
- (3) For the Marine Corps, 175,000.
- (4) For the Air Force, 359,300.

(c) The budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year as submitted to Congress shall include amounts for funding for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) at least in the amounts necessary to maintain the active duty end strengths prescribed in subsection (b), as in effect at the time that such budget is submitted.

(d) No funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be used to implement a reduction of the active duty end strength for any of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) for any fiscal year below the level specified in subsection (b) unless the reduction in end strength for that armed force for that fiscal year is specifically authorized by law.

(e) [Repealed]

(f) The number of members of the armed forces on active duty shall be counted for purposes of this section in the same manner as applies under section 115(a)(1) of this title.

11-L-0559/OSD/21808

TAB C

TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

Sec. 123a. - Suspension of end-strength limitations in time of war or national emergency

(a) DURING WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY- If at the end of any fiscal year there is in effect a war or national emergency, the President may waive any statutory end strength with respect to that fiscal year. Any such waiver may be issued only for a statutory end strength that is prescribed by law before the waiver is issued.

(b) UPON TERMINATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY- Upon the termination of a war or national emergency with respect to which the President has exercised the authority provided by subsection (a), the President may defer the effectiveness of any statutory end strength with respect to the fiscal year during which the termination occurs. Any such deferral may not extend beyond the last day of the sixth month beginning after the date of such termination.

(c) STATUTORY END STRENGTH- In this section, the term 'statutory end strength' means any end-strength limitation with respect to a fiscal year that is prescribed by law for any military or civilian component of the armed forces or of the Department of Defense.'

COORDINATION SHEET

General Counsel

D. J. Dell'Antoni *as edited 1/15/04*
Principal Deputy

DUSD (PI)

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM, (b)(6)


11-L-0559/OSD/21810

TAB E

COORDINATION SHEET

General Counsel

 DUSD (PI)



Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21811



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

CL -
274 JED, 27 4 03

INFO MEMO

January 30, 2004 - 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Statutory End Strength

- As you know, Congress sets maximum peacetime end strength in the National Defense Authorization Act. (FY04 active duty numbers at Tab A). In the FY02 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress increased the Department's peacetime latitude to exceed these limits (10 U.S.C. 115, Tab B):
 - The Secretary of Defense, in the national interest, may increase active duty end strength by up to 3 percent; and
 - The Secretary of a military department, if such action will enhance manning and readiness, may increase his Service's authorized end strength for that fiscal year by not more than 2 per cent.
 - Together, these increases may not total more than 3 percent.
- Congress also establishes minimum end-strengths for active duty personnel under 10 U.S.C. 6916, which, for FY04, are the same as the maximum strengths (Tab C). This statute does not have a waiver provision.
- During this period of national emergency, the President delegated to you his authority under 10 U.S.C. 123a to waive any statutory end strength ceilings for that fiscal year (Tab D), and you have redelegate that authority to the Service Secretaries.

COORDINATIONS: Tab E

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM. (b)(6)

OSD 01375-04



11-L-0559/OSD/21812

FY 04 National Defense Authorization Act

SEC. 401. END STRENGTHS FOR ACTIVE FORCES.

The **Armed** Forces are authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of September 30, 2004, as follows:

- (1) The Army, 482,400.
- (2) The Navy, 373,800.
- (3) The Marine Corps, 175,000.
- (4) The Air Force, 359,300.

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TOC: [United States Code Service: Code, Const. Rules, Conventions & Public Laws > /.../ >](#)
[CHAPTER 2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE > § 115. Personnel strengths: requirement for annual authorization](#)

Citation: 10 USC 115

10 USCS § 115

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*** CURRENT THROUGH P.L. 108-187, APPROVED 12/16/03 ***
*** WITH GAPS OF 108-173, 177, 178 and 183 ***

TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES
SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW
PART 1. ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
CHAPTER 2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

• **GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION**

10 USCS § 115 (2003)

§ 115. Personnel strengths: requirement for annual authorization

(a) Active-duty and Selected Reserve end strengths to be authorized by law. Congress shall authorize personnel strength levels for each fiscal year for each of the following:

(1) The end strength for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) for (A) active-duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for active-duty personnel, and (B) active-duty personnel and full-time National Guard duty personnel who are to be paid from funds appropriated for reserve personnel.

(2) The end strength for the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the armed forces.

(b) Limitation on appropriations for military personnel. No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year to or for--

(1) the use of active-duty personnel or full-time National Guard duty personnel of any of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) unless the end strength for such personnel of that armed force for that fiscal year has been authorized by law; or

(2) the use of the Selected Reserve of any reserve component of the armed forces unless the end strength for the Selected Reserve of that component for that fiscal year has been authorized by law.

(c) Military technician (dual status) end strengths to be authorized by law. Congress shall authorize for each fiscal year the end strength for military technicians (dual status) for each reserve component of the Army and Air Force. Funds available to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year may not be used for the pay of a military technician (dual status) during that fiscal year unless the technician fills a position that is within the number of such positions authorized by law for that fiscal year for the reserve component of that technician. This subsection applies without regard to section 129 of this title. In each budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, the end strength requested for military technicians (dual status) for each reserve component of the Army and Air Force shall be specifically set forth.

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(d) End-of-quarter strength levels.

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and include in the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the President's budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year the Secretary's proposed end-of-quarter strengths for each of the first three quarters of the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, in addition to the Secretary's proposed fiscal-year end-strengths for that fiscal year. Such end-of-quarter strengths shall be submitted for each category of personnel for which end strengths are required to be authorized by law under subsection (a) or (c). The Secretary shall ensure that resources are provided in the budget at a level sufficient to support the end-of-quarter and fiscal-year end-strengths as submitted.

(2) (A) After annual end-strength levels required by subsections (a) and (c) are authorized by law for a fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall promptly prescribe end-of-quarter strength levels for the first three quarters of that fiscal year applicable to each such end-strength level. Such end-of-quarter strength levels shall be established for any fiscal year as levels to be achieved in meeting each of those annual end-strength levels authorized by law in accordance with subsection (a) (as such levels may be adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

(B) At least annually, the Secretary of Defense shall establish for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) the maximum permissible variance of actual strength for an armed force at the end of any given quarter from the end-of-quarter strength established pursuant to subparagraph (A). Such variance shall be such that it promotes the maintaining of the strength necessary to achieve the end-strength levels authorized in accordance with subsection (a) (as adjusted pursuant to subsection (e)) and subsection (c).

(3) Whenever the Secretary establishes an end-of-quarter strength level under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2), or modifies a strength level under the authority provided in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2), the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives of that strength level or of that modification, as the case may be.

(e) Authority for Secretary of Defense variances for active-duty and Selected Reserve end strengths. Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is in the national interest, the Secretary may--

(1) increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) for a fiscal year for any of the armed forces by a number equal to not more than 3 percent of that end strength;

(2) increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B) for a fiscal year for any of the armed forces by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of that end strength; and

(3) vary the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(2) for a fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of any of the reserve components by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of that end strength.

(f) Authority for service Secretary variances for active-duty end strengths. Upon determination by the Secretary of a military department that such action would enhance manning and readiness in essential units or in critical specialties or ratings, the Secretary may increase the end strength authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) for a fiscal year for the armed force under the jurisdiction of that Secretary or, in the case of the Secretary of the Navy, for any of the armed forces under the jurisdiction of that Secretary. Any such increase for a fiscal year--

(1) shall be by a number equal to not more than 2 percent of such authorized end strength; and

(2) shall be counted as part of the increase for that armed force for that fiscal year authorized under subsection (e)(1).

(g) Adjustment when Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy. The authorized strength of the Navy under subsection (a)(1) is increased by the authorized strength of the

11-L-0559/OSD/21815

Coast Guard during any period when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy.

(h) Certain active-duty personnel excluded from counting for active-duty end strengths. In counting active-duty personnel for the purpose of the end-strengths authorized pursuant to subsection (a)(1), persons in the following categories shall be excluded:

- (1) Members of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty under section 12302 of this title.
- (2) Members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty under section 12304 of this title.
- (3) Members of the National Guard called into Federal service under section 12406 of this title.
- (4) Members of the militia called into Federal service under chapter 15 of this title [10 USCS §§ 331 et seq.]
- (5) Members of reserve components on active duty for training.
- (6) Members of reserve components on active duty for 180 days or less to perform special work.
- (7) Members on full-time National Guard duty for 180 days or less.
- (8) Members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve on active duty for more than [than] 180 days to support programs described in section 1203(b) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public Law 103-160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(b)).
- (9) Members of reserve components (not described in paragraph (8)) on active duty for more than 180 days but less than 271 days to perform special work in support of the combatant commands, except that
 - (A) general and flag officers may not be excluded under this paragraph; and
 - (B) the number of members of any of the armed forces excluded under this paragraph may not exceed the number equal to 0.2 percent of the end strength authorized for active-duty personnel of the armed force under subsection (a)(1)(A).
- (10) Members of reserve components on active duty to prepare for and to perform funeral honors functions for funerals of veterans in accordance with section 1491 of this title.
- (11) Members on full-time National Guard duty to prepare for and perform funeral honors functions for funerals of veterans in accordance with section 1491 of this title.

HISTORY:

(Added Nov. 5, 1990, P.L. 101-510, Div A, Title XIV, Part H, § 1483(a), 104 Stat. 1710; Dec. 5, 1991, P.L. 102-190, Div A, Title III, Part B, § 312(a), 105 Stat. 1335; Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 401(c), Subtitle B, § 415, Title V, Subtitle B, § 513 (a)(1), Title X, Subtitle F, § 1061(c), Title XV, § 1501(c)(3), 110 Stat. 286, 288, 305, 442, 498; Nov. 18, 1997, P.L. 105-85, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle B, § 413(b), Subtitle C, § 522(i)(1) 111 Stat. 1720, 1736.)

(As amended Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle B, § 415, 113 Stat. 587; Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-398, § 1, 114 Stat. 1654; Dec. 28, 2001, P.L. 107-107, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle C, §§ 421(a), 422, 115 Stat. 1076, 1077; Dec. 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 403, 116 Stat. 2525; Nov. 24, 2003, P.L. 108-136, Div A, Title IV, Subtitle A, § 403(a), (b), 117 Stat. 1450.)

HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES

Explanatory notes:

The bracketed word "than" has been inserted in subsec. (h)(8) as the word probably intended by Congress.

The amendment made by § 1 of Act Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-398, is based on § 422 of Subtitle C of Title IV of Division A of H.R. 5408 (114 Stat. 1654A-96), as introduced on Oct. 6, 2000, which was enacted into law by such § 1.

A prior § 115 (Act Nov. 16, 1973, P.L. 93-155, Title VIII, § 803(a), 87 Stat. 612; July 14, 1976, P.L. 94-361, Title III, § 302, 90 Stat. 924; Nov. 9, 1979, P.L. 96-107, Title III, § 303 (b), 93 Stat. 806; Dec. 12, 1980, P.L. 96-513, Title I, § 102(a), (b), 94 Stat. 2840; July 10, 1981, P.L. 97-22, § 2(b), 95 Stat. 124; Dec. 1, 1981, P.L. 97-86, Title IX, § 902, 903, 95

11-L-0559/OSD/21816

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[CHAPTER 39. ACTIVE DUTY > § 691](#). Permanent end strength levels to support two major regional contingencies

Citation: 10 USC 691

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10 USCS § 691

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*** CURRENT THROUGH P.L. 108-187, APPROVED 12/16/03 ***
*** WITH GAPS OF 108-173, 177, 178 and 183 ***

TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES
SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW
PART II. PERSONNEL
CHAPTER 39. ACTIVE DUTY

4 GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION

10 USCS § 691 (2003)

§ 691. Permanent end strength levels to support two major regional contingencies

(a) The end strengths specified in subsection (b) are the minimum strengths necessary to enable the armed forces to fulfill a national defense strategy calling for the United States to be able to successfully conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.

(b) Unless otherwise provided by law, the number of members of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) on active duty at the end of any fiscal year shall be not less than the following:

- (1) For the Army, 482,400.
- (2) For the Navy, 373,800.
- (3) For the Marine Corps, 175,000.
- (4) For the Air Force, 359,300.

(c) The budget for the Department of Defense for any fiscal year as submitted to Congress shall include amounts for funding for each of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) at least in the amounts necessary to maintain the active duty end strengths prescribed in subsection (b), as in effect at the time that such budget is submitted.

(d) No funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be used to implement a reduction of the active duty end strength for any of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) for any fiscal year below the level specified in subsection (b) unless the reduction in end strength for that armed force for that fiscal year is specifically authorized by law.

(e) [Repealed]

(f) The number of members of the armed forces on active duty shall be counted for purposes of this section in the same manner as applies under section 115(a)(1) of this title.

11-L-0559/OSD/21817

TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

Sec. 123a. - Suspension of end-strength limitations in time of war or national emergency

(a) DURING WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY- If at the end of any fiscal year there is in effect a war or national emergency, the President may waive any statutory end strength with respect to that fiscal year. Any such waiver may be issued only for a statutory end strength that is prescribed by law before the waiver is issued.

(b) UPON TERMINATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY- Upon the termination of a war or national emergency with respect to which the President has exercised the authority provided by subsection (a), the President may defer the effectiveness of any statutory end strength with respect to the fiscal year during which the termination occurs. Any such deferral may not extend beyond the last day of the sixth month beginning after the date of such termination.

(c) STATUTORY END STRENGTH- In this section, the term 'statutory end strength' means any end-strength limitation with respect to a fiscal year that is prescribed by law for any military or civilian component of the armed forces or of the Department of Defense.'

COORDINATION SHEET

General Counsel

D. J. Dell'Acta *on edited 1/15/04*
Principal Deputy

DUSD (PI)

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21819

COORDINATION SHEET

General Counsel

J DUSD (PI)

A. Gallant

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo, OUSD (P&R)(MPP) OEPM

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21820

January 28, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Dov Zakheim
Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bu

We are going to h
don't want to leav
very long.

DHR:dh
012804-10

Please respond by

1/30/04

*Response from Acting
Sec Army attached!*

1/31

OSD 01387-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21821

110.01

28 Jan 04

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: **Budget Proposal for Army**

I sent a memo to Les Brownlee about how we were going to pay for the Army situation. I got a memo back from him. I cannot tell if he's agreeing with me or not. I want to know precisely whether or not he agrees with my memo.

I do not want a separate memo and have two ships passing in the night.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
103 104.19

Respond by: _____

✓ 2/2

SecDef -

- No ships are passing in the night.*
- See Brownlee's memo is in response to a snowflake you sent the Deputy. (red tab) on 28 Jan*
- You sent out a more detailed snowflake, with more guidance, on 30 January. To DeplectDef, Brownlee, Schoemaker, and Zatkheim.*
- At this point no daylight between your guidance & Army effort.*

C 2/2

110 C



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

✓
2/2

INFO MEMO

January 29, 2004, 2:00 p.m.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Budget Proposal for Army

Brownlee

110.01

- This responds to your January **28, 2004**, comments regarding the Army's budget proposal. (~~Feb 11~~)
- I share your concern about quickly clarifying and unifying a position on the issue of increasing Army capabilities and the impact any such increase would have on the Army's budget. To that end, my staff has been fully engaged with your staff (Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)) coordinating the size, intent, and cost of this initiative.
- The answer, in short, is that the Army will use the temporary increase in strength levels you have authorized, in combination with internal restructuring and other efficiencies, to transform while responding to the demands of the on-going war on terrorism. We will not need the Department of Defense to request additional supplemental funding in fiscal year (FY) **2004**. We will address FY **2005** costs in a FY **2005** supplemental.
- We are providing your staff detailed responses to questions, but in the meantime I wanted to assure you the Army and your staff are fully engaged on this issue and will speak with one voice.

29 Jan 04

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As Stated

Prepared By: Mr. Bill Campbell (SES), (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	01/31
MA BUGGI NOSENZO	1/31
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	22 Jan 1:30

28 Jan 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21823

OSD 01387-04

January 30, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Middle East Roadmap

Condi—

Attached is a paper that was dropped off to me by a long-time friend of mine, David Kimche. It is self-explanatory. He thinks that this approach, with a modest headquarters in Cairo, possibly even including Turkey, would be acceptable to all the countries involved.

Why don't you take a look at it and tell me if it is anything you want to get involved in.

Regards,

Attach.

"Restoring the Ceasefire and Resurrecting the Roadmap" (undated)

DHR:dh
013004-7

Middle East

30 Jan 04

OSD 01392-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21824

The enclosed paper was developed by a group of high level Israelis and Palestinians acting in their private capacities. These ideas are offered in the spirit of providing suggestions for restoring the cease-fire and resurrecting the roadmap. This meeting occurred as part of the Track Two Mid-East Program sponsored by the UCLA Burke Center for International Relations. It was held at the Dead Sea Marriott in Jordan November 7-8, 2003.

Participants included:

Abed Alloun

David Kimche

Mohammed Rashid

Zeev Schiff

Ephraim Sneh

Steven Spiegel

Rapporteur, Anita Sharma

Restoring the Ceasefire and Resurrecting the Roadmap

Executive Summary

This document was prepared by a group of Israelis and Palestinians who were committed to focusing on the immediate present and ways of restoring the ceasefire and resurrecting the roadmap. In this purpose it differs markedly from other recent private Israeli-Palestinian efforts that focused on a permanent settlement. In the light of the formation of the new Palestinian government, the group is also trying to take advantage of this opportunity and prevent the deterioration of any remaining understandings still in effect. The group also believes that the inevitable deterioration that would occur if nothing is done would lead to a worsening of attitudes toward the United States in the region. The group is confident that its new proposals will address some of the past problems that the parties confronted and therefore improve the prospects for success. It recommends that the primary elements of the renewed initiative should be:

- An indefinite ceasefire between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israelis, which would be monitored by a Trilateral Committee (TC) consisting of Israel, the PA, and the United States.
- The issue of the security fence is addressed below with the fundamental emphasis that it should be basically along the Green Line.
- A series of measure of outlined below and overseen by the Trilateral Committee.
- A Middle East Association on Terrorism (MEAT) should be established, consisting of the United States, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine and the Iraqi Governing Council, with headquarters in Cairo.
- As a corridor between Phases I and II of the roadmap, a pilot program should be implemented in Gaza, which would be based upon the evacuation of Israeli settlements following the achievement of a period of stabilization and full cessation of terror.
- Improvement of the economic situation is critical to the success of the peace process. A long-term Economic Roadmap is presented below.

Introduction

The U.S. backed plan for peace, the "Roadmap," is on the verge of collapse. Only the United States can break the vicious circle and jumpstart the process again. It can do so by bringing the two parties to fulfill their commitments to the Roadmap. When both sides take the measures they are committed to, a constructive momentum can be created.

The U.S. administration concentrates its efforts now in stabilizing Iraq and in its reconstruction. The administration is reluctant to invest energy and attention, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The common wisdom in Washington considers it as a useless distraction.

We, a group of Palestinians and Israelis, firmly believe that the U.S. interest requires a renewed effort. An American success in reviving the Roadmap, resuming of the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, cessation of hostilities and terror, a relief of the suffering of both peoples, a progress towards a two-state solution—all these would strengthen the U.S. position in the region, and would create an atmosphere which is more favorable to the United States and its interests. It will demonstrate that the only stabilizing power in the region is the United States. A major Israeli-Palestinian violent confrontation would be interpreted as a failure of President Bush's policy, will increase anti-American feelings, and would encourage the adversaries of the United States.

The Ceasefire

Now that the Abu Ala government has formed, the first step should be to negotiate an indefinite ceasefire between the PA and Israel (in contrast to the previous cease fire which was between the PA and the militant groups and had a time limit of three months)

Immediately after the establishment of the ceasefire, a Trilateral Committee consisting of the United States, Israel and the Palestinians would be established. It would not only supervise and monitor the ceasefire, but would determine the reciprocal measures that would have to be taken and their timing. Examples of the necessary measures include:

For Palestinians:

1. take practical steps to prevent Hamas, Jihad, Al-Aqsa Brigades and others from being able to resort to terror;
2. shut down workshops which produce explosives, rockets, mortars;
3. dismantle illegal militias and the clandestine network which prepare terror operations;
4. curb illegal weapons smuggling;
5. make sure that no political organization has a military arm.

Immediately upon its formation the Committee should commission an examination of current Palestinian security forces capabilities and the additional force and training the forces may require in order to fulfill their obligations under this plan. Enhancing the efficiency and organization of the Palestinian security system must be addressed.

For Israelis:

1. releasing of substantial numbers of prisoners and detainees;
2. lifting of part of the roadblocks between Palestinian villages and towns;
3. more permits for Palestinians working in Israel;
4. measures for reviving trade and Palestinian business activity;
5. dismantling illegal outposts as indicated in the text of the roadmap.

With regard to the release of prisoners and removal of roadblocks, the installation of social services and the need for Palestinian reform, the following could act as guidelines to the Trilateral Committee:

- a. The Security Fence—If construction of the security fence continues, it should be basically along the green line. Efforts should be made to facilitate the movement of people during daylight hours via access points. A priority will be given to the construction of two terminals out of the five projected in the Jenin [Galame] and Tulkarem areas. Of course no fence can be the basis of the final border between the two states.
- b. Prisoners—Israel must be encouraged to release incrementally a significantly larger number of prisoners than it has so far discussed. Of the more than 6000 security prisoners in Israeli hands, only some 600 can be defined as having 'blood on their hands' and are therefore ineligible for release according to Israeli definition.
- c. Barriers—Israel should be urged to remove roadblocks and closures and allow the gradual restoration of freedom of movement for the Palestinians between towns and districts. The handover of towns by the IDF to the Palestinian Authority is, however, in itself insufficient. One of the major problems in the present situation is the cut in links between the villages and their provincial centers. Villagers need to be able to visit neighboring towns. Their well-

being depends on it. It is, therefore, necessary to address the removal of the IDF presence from districts, and not only from towns, so that a real improvement in the daily lives of the people can be attained. Again, gradual withdrawals will serve as reinforcing confidence building measures over time. As a pilot project, the Israeli and Palestinian security authorities should jointly consider the handing over of two security barriers to the Palestinian Authority, whether they are in Area A or B.

- d. Social Services—The disastrous economic situation of the Palestinian people enables the extremist Islamist organizations to strengthen their position by supplying social services that are otherwise unavailable. This activity on their part has increased to such an extent that there exists a real danger that a majority of Palestinians would become further radicalized and vote for Hamas if given the opportunity. There is, therefore, an urgent need for immediate and coordinated help to the PA so that it can be seen as the party which brings an improvement in the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian populace.
- e. Palestinian Reform—The constitutional reforms demanded in the roadmap must be completed, and elections should be held at such a time when the present Palestinian government feels fit to hold them. An improvement in the Palestinian economic conditions would significantly enhance the prospects that the PA would win the elections and become the consensus Palestinian source of power. In addition, the Palestinians must be pressured to expand their security judicial and legal reforms to meet the commitments they have made to the international community.

The Mid-East Association on Terrorism (MEAT)

The core problem remains the continuation of violence and terror which threatens the successful implementation of the roadmap. In the past the assumption had been that if the Palestinians take action against terrorist elements within their own community, the problem of terrorism could be solved. Of course it is true that the Palestinians must take action; however, the problem is more complex than originally envisioned. Neighboring states, especially Syria, harbor Palestinian terrorist leaders who are ultimately the decisive factor in determining Hamas actions, often against the wishes of leaders inside the territories. Unless this problem is addressed energetically, it will be very difficult to eradicate terrorist acts.

We should also remember that Iran provides the lion's share of funding for Islamic Jihad and certain Gulf states are still the primary source of financial support to Hamas. We therefore urge the creation of a U.S. led regional association, the Mid-East Association on Terrorism (MEAT) to combat terrorism which would include the United

States, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine and the Iraqi Governing Council, with headquarters in Cairo. This association would be an ongoing operation to address such issues as state-harboring of terrorists; official and private funding of terrorist organizations and their affiliates, and illegal supply of weapons.

The Palestinians will not be genuinely successful until external sources end financial support for terror, which must continue to be a top priority of U.S. policy. External sources encompass many different avenues, including Iran and Arab governments and other international fundraising efforts. Incitement to violence from outside sources such as certain Arab satellite media must also be addressed on an urgent basis.

Until governments in the region take a clear, demonstrable stand, backed up by actions, against terrorism—specifically, to cease all forms of support for those groups that use terror in Palestine and Israel—they will be considered to have aided and abetted terror. All the states in the region should make a clear and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The MEAT may eventually become a platform for expanding cooperation and dialogue in other spheres.

The Role of the Arab States

To restore peace and quiet and reengage the peace process, it would aid immeasurably if Egypt and Jordan returned their ambassadors to Israel, and other Arab states, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Qatar initiate the resumption of diplomatic ties with Israel. Arab states can further encourage the Palestinian leadership toward peaceful reconciliation while preventing the continuation of illicit activity, including arms smuggling. The Saudi initiative should be addressed in a more positive manner through constructive dialogue.

The Gaza Pilot

A detailed proposal called the Roadmap Reinforcement Package (RRP) is contained in addendum 1. Its main emphasis is on a pilot project in Gaza premised on nine months of the cessation of hostilities and terror in and from Gaza. Based on the termination of violence, the Israeli government will evacuate the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli troops which protect them.

The Economic Roadmap

It is clear that the success of the roadmap depends very much on an economic one. The current economic conditions in the PA may have a negative impact on the Palestinian public's support for implementation of the roadmap. An improvement of the economic situation may help convince the population that the roadmap has produced tangible results and a change in their lives. The financial and fiscal reforms carried out by the Palestinian Minister of Finance in recent months should be commended. The proposal tackles both the immediate term and the medium-to-long term.

Phase I

Labor

Work permits should be increased to about 50,000, assuming that the Israeli market can absorb them. The Palestinian G.N.P. depends for the foreseeable future on this element and therefore it is important to use this vehicle. Israel will also increase the number of permits for businessmen to travel to Israel.

Financial and Economic support

1. Israel should accelerate the transfer of collected duties to the P.A. An immediate transfer of about \$200 million (U.S.) could have a dramatic effect on the budgetary situation of the P.A.
2. Continued delays in disbursement from countries in the region such as Kuwait, Libya and Qatar, who have not delivered on their funds, jeopardize the viability and stability of the Palestinian government. Failure to receive this money could result in salaries not being paid, and will undermine the Abu Ala government. It is imperative that the US government exert its influence immediately, using all necessary measures, in the strongest possible way.
3. The international community, including G-8 and some Arab countries, should also devise an emergency fund of about \$1 billion (US) to finance immediate projects with the aim of enhancing job creation and, in addition to the funds transferred from Israel, for the following four financial purposes:
 - a. Palestinian budget support
 - b. Direct support to Palestinian families in dire economic conditions

- c. Support early retirement of advance aged public sector employees to allow the entry of younger ones
 - d. Support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
 - e. Start work on rebuilding Gaza airport
4. U.S. and E.U. should grant special duty-free entry to joint Israeli-Palestinian products from the joint industrial zones and joint enterprises.
 5. A joint Israeli-Palestinian decision on the creation of several industrial parks and an international donor community decision to assist in their establishment and functioning. Such industrial parks can create between 10,000 – 15,000 jobs.
 6. Both sides should re-activate the Joint Economic Committee.

Stages II and III

In these stages the aims should be to further stabilize the Palestinian economic situation, and further ameliorate the labor conditions, the infrastructure and other related issues.

1. Housing – A massive movement on this matter can transform the Palestinian economic and political environment. This entails, of course, serious questions of financing, the creation of a mortgage market, etc.
2. A – Infrastructure – a comprehensive plan has to be put in place dealing with transportation, telecommunication and energy.
B – Start operational activities of the Gaza airport including cargo facilities (subject to the bi-lateral agreement), and begin work on the Gaza port.
3. Water is a major cause of friction between all neighbors in this sub-region of the Middle East. The U.S., E.U., and the World Bank, together with Israel, the P.A. and Jordan, should prepare a plan to improve the use of existing water resources and desalination on a regional basis.
4. Environment – The proximity of Israel, the P.A. and Jordan makes it necessary to develop coordinated projects to improve conditions and protect against environmental damages that can be created by an accelerated process of building and industrialization.
5. Tourism – All countries in the region suffered from the impact of both September 11, 2001 events and the intifada. A joint action plan including joint promotional activities will encourage third countries' tourists, who are a major source of income.

All of the above items will need major financial support from the international community (Israel included.) This can be achieved through the creation of a fund of \$2 – 4 billion (U.S.) which will finance directly, help to raise funds by guarantees, and channel other available funds.

Trade

Bilateral trade with Israel is of utmost importance to the Palestinian economy. The current economic regime is based on the Paris agreement of 1994, which established a custom union between Israel and the PA.

The absence of borders and a Palestinian government were major factors in tilting the balance towards a custom union rather than a Free Trade Agreement. So were the considerations of labor in Israel and the wish to enter the Israeli market duty free.

Both sides should review the bilateral trade relations with the view of strengthening trade and removing restrictions. Both sides should minimize the obstacles to bilateral trade and should create a sufficient number of crossing points, with the necessary security facilities to allow the free flow of goods.

The E.U. and the U.S. should, for a limited period, consider removal of certain customs limitations on Palestinian goods with no other sales outlet.

Economic Reforms

Throughout all phases, the Palestinian Government should continue the economic and financial reforms, with the assistance of the international community and institutions. All financial transfers to the Palestinian Government should be governed by existing policies and transparency.

Why will this plan work when previous efforts met with little success?

1. Stronger U.S. support is essential to assure that both parties will implement the measures to which they are obligated.
2. Abu Mazen failed to receive adequate support either from the United States or Israel in order to succeed. Palestinians, both in the public as well as in the leadership, perceived that he conceded too much without receiving anything in return.
3. Unlike previous efforts, this one would be underpinned by a regional association to address problems of terrorism.
4. Unlike previous efforts, there would be no time limits to the ceasefire and it would include Israel.

5. This proposal is unique because it involves a trilateral committee comprised of the United States, Israel and the Palestinians to monitor the ceasefire.

Why should the United States embark on this effort now?

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is no stable status quo—conditions either improve or deteriorate. The elapse of time without any initiatives will only aggravate the conflict. It will further threaten American interests in the region as escalating tensions will exacerbate anti-American sentiment and increase the chances for increased terrorist activity. The growing despair on both sides offers an unusual opportunity for achieving success. The time is ripe to restore the ceasefire and resurrect the roadmap.

Addendum 1

Roadmap Reinforcement Package (RRP) (Fourth draft April 8, 2003)

The international Roadmap is the only plan that has the support of all parties to the conflict as well as the personal commitment of President Bush to its implementation. The object of the Roadmap Reinforcement Package (RRP) proposed below is to energize the Roadmap and give it concrete shape thus providing a visible demonstration of the prospects of progress towards a full peace agreement. The RRP will consist of three phases to be implemented over twelve months as an integral part of and in parallel to other agreed elements of the Roadmap:

Phase 1: 3 Months

During the first phase of the RRP, the two sides undertake the following:

A. Security measures

- The IDF will redeploy to positions outside the cities, town, and refugee camps of the Gaza Strip (G.S.) to avoid unnecessary friction with the population.
- Palestinian security forces will be granted full access to the areas vacated by the IDF and will deploy within them, with the object of imposing law and order, providing security and preventing any acts of violence against Israel or Israelis originating from the areas under their control.
- Palestinian security forces will ensure that there will be no para-military or illegal armed groups or forces operating in the areas under their control.
- The PA and government of Israel (GOI) will commence security coordination and exchange of intelligence.
- With the commencement of the RRP, the IDF will refrain from any preventive attacks, targeted operations against Palestinians, or incursions into areas under PA security control. PA security forces will assume full responsibility for responding to any sporadic acts of violence.
- Subject to the cessation of violence, the IDF will withdraw to the lines of September 28, 2000 in the Gaza Strip. as soon as possible and no later than the end of the first phase of the RRP.

B. Economic measures

Parallel to improved security conditions, the GOI will take steps to improve the economic welfare of the inhabitants of the G.S including:

- Granting a minimum of 5,000 work permits per month.
- Allowing for the repair and rehabilitation of major infrastructural projects in the G.S, including Dahaniya airport, Electricity, Gas, and Desalination projects.
- Reactivating the full fishing zone.
- Reactivating and expanding the industrial zones in Karni and Erez.

- Lifting restrictions on the import and export of goods from the G.S., contingent on security arrangements.

C. Other measures

In tandem with other agreed steps in the Roadmap, the first phase of the RRP will also comprise the following additional measures:

- The GOI will freeze all settlement activities in the G.S.
- The PA will act to end hostile incitement and propaganda.
- The GOI and PA will implement three parallel pilot projects on the West Bank.
- With the commencement of the first phase of the RRP, the PA will resume full security control in Jenin area, and the IDF will withdraw fully to the lines of September 28, 2000 as soon as possible and no later than six weeks, subject to the cessation of violence. The industrial park in Mukeible north of Jenin will be revived with support from Federal Republic of German (FRG).
- As above, the PA will resume full security control in the Qaliqilyah area and the IDF will withdraw fully to the lines of September 28, 2000 as soon as possible and no later than six weeks, subject to the cessation of violence. Steps will be taken to improve the economic situation of the Palestinian residents of the area.
- As above, the PA will resume full security control in Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahur, and the IDF will withdraw fully to the lines of September 28, 2000 as soon as possible and no later than six weeks, subject to the cessation of violence. An international effort led by the Government of Italy and other EU states will be directed at rehabilitating the hotels and tourist infrastructure and encouraging the return of tourists to the area.
- Similar arrangements for Nablus will be agreed upon, contingent upon the success of the above projects.

NOTE: The PA and the GOI agree that progress in implementing the RRP in the Gaza Strip is not contingent on progress in the West Bank or vice versa. The same applies to the different areas of the West Bank mentioned in (C) above.

D. Monitoring and Implementation

A U.S led committee including the EU, the UN and Russia will be established to monitor the progress of the RRP and decide the move from one phase to another in the G.S. The committee will be the final adjudicator in settling any disputes between the parties over the implementation of the RRP. Decisions of the committee will be taken by consensus.

Phase 2: 6 months

Upon the approval of the committee, the second 'Stabilization' phase of the RRP will commence. The Stabilization phase will last for six months and will build upon the achievements of the first phase. Subject to the cessation of violence, it will reinforce progress by:

- Measure taken by the PA to maintain and consolidate security arrangements agreed and implemented in phase one
- Further agreed Israeli withdrawals, and the expansion of PA areas of control in the G.S. subject to the same terms as above.
- Further steps to improve the economic and living conditions in the G.S.
- Palestinian prisoners will be released.
- Measures taken by the GOI allowing freedom of movement and access in the G.S. and facilitating movement in and out of the Strip.
- The GOI and the PA will reinstate previously agreed safe passage arrangements between the G.S. and the West Bank.
- The GOI will take steps to allow for the rehabilitation of Gaza Seaport.

Phase 3: 3 months

Upon the successful completion of the Stabilization phase as agreed by the Monitoring and Implementation Committee, the third and final phase of the RRP will begin. The third and final phase will last for three months, and will build on the achievements of the first and second phases. By the end of the third and final phase of the RRP, and as agreed by the Monitoring and Implementation Committee.

- The IDF will implement a full and final withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the G.S.
- All Israeli settlements in the G.S will be evacuated
- The PA will assume full security and administrative control of the entire territory of the Gaza Strip
- All other relevant elements of the RRP, and other agreed steps taken within the framework of the roadmap will remain operative.

All elements of the RRP are to be seen as parallel to and part of the Roadmap.

1-27-04

January 27, 2004

*Advance
copy sent to Dr. Chu
1/27 0830*

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Statistics

I need the data soon—tomorrow—as to:

1. The percentage of Reserves that have never been called up or not been called up in five or ten years.
2. The percentage of Reserves and Guard used in each of the Services for Iraq so **far**.
3. The number of people under stop-loss and stop-move.

I would like the data to be arranged in a way that is persuasive.

Please get me the first draft no later than Wednesday, January 28, so we can get it reworked the rest of the week before the testimony.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012704-9

.....
Please respond by 1/28/04

OSD 01400-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21838



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

020021 000000
0217 1 1 0 15

INFO MEMO

January 30, 2004, 6:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Statistics--SNOWFLAKE

- You requested specific information regarding percentages and numbers of Reserve component members called-up, and not called-up, for mobilizations over time, and the number of Total Force members impacted by Stop Loss.
- Attached is an Information Paper that I believe answers your questions and provides an accurate picture of Reserve component mobilizations, using DoD personnel data as of December 31, 2003.
- The key facts are as follows:
 - About 36% of the Selected Reserve has been involuntarily called-up for the current operations.
 - Conversely, about 64% has not been called-up.
 - Since December 1995, about 42% have been called-up.
 - About 20,342 (1.4%) Active and 25,538 (2.9%) Reserve members are currently impacted by Stop Loss
- This information also supports the rebalancing actions initiated by the Department.

Attachment

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P)

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/21839

OSD 01400-04

Statistics

1.

•

	Desert Shield/Storm (Aug 90-Aug 91)	Haiti (Sep 94-May 96)	Bosnia (Dec 95-Dec 03)	Southwest Asia (SWA) (Feb 98-Dec 03)	Kosovo (Apr 99-Dec 03)	ONE/OEF/OIF (Sep 01-Dec 03)
# RC Invol Called-Up*	239,187	6,250	32,404	6,108	11,426	319,193

- From September 11, 2001 through December 31, 2003 we have involuntarily mobilized about 319,193 members of the Selected Reserve, or about 37% of RC members filling structured billets (875,609). This means that about 63% of Selected Reserve members have not been called-up.
(Note: The baseline does not include the 287,332 members in the RC manpower pool - the Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard.)
- Of the 319,193 RC members who have served/are serving in the current operations, 11,802 have also served in previous operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, or SWA) going back to Dec 1995. (This equates to about 1.3 % of the SelRes force of today)
- Additionally, of the 319,193 members who have served/are serving in the current operations, 15,982 have been called up more than once for this contingency. (This equates to about 1.8% of the SelRes force of today).
- So, overall, less than 4% of the SelRes force of today has been involuntarily called-up more than once since 1995.
- A review of the overall numbers called-up, and those who have been called up more than once, shows that the stress (or usage) is focused in certain areas. This has led to the force rebalancing efforts that have been initiated in DoD.

2. Reserve Members Called-Up (ONE/OEF/OIF) & % of Selected Reserve

ARNG	USAR	USNR	USMCR	ANG	USAFR	USCGR	TOTAL
125,353	87,758	20,052	23,299	31,599	23,737	7,404	319,193
36.2%	41.5%	23.0%	57.3%	29.4%	32.0%	95.0%	36.5%

(%s do not account for SelRes attrition over 2 years - therefore %s may be overstated)

3. Members Impacted by Stop Loss:

Approximately 20,342 Active Component, and 25,538 Reserve Component members.

The above information does not account for attrition in the Selected Reserve.

We have not normally calculated percentages using the IRR/ING population - since only a limited number (about 6,000) have been called-up for the current operations, and none could legally be mobilized (involuntarily) for Bosnia, Kosovo, or SWA operations.

1-27-04

January 27, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statistics

*Advance
copy sent to Dr. Chu
1/27 0830*

I need the data soon—tomorrow—as to:

1. The percentage of Reserves that have never been called up or not been called up in five or ten years.
2. The percentage of Reserves and Guard used in each of the Services for Iraq so far.
3. The number of people under stop-loss and stop-move.

I would like the data to be arranged in a way that is persuasive.

Please get me the first draft no later than Wednesday, January 28, so we can get it reworked the rest of the week before the testimony.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012704-9

.....
Please respond by 1/28/04

11-L-0559/OSD/21841

TO: David.Chu...
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 9, 2004
SUBJECT: Reserve Forces

We are going to have to make sure that the services, when they finish rebalancing, that I can see how many units are still going to be in the newly balanced reserves and guard who have never been called up or have not been called up in 13 years and have only been called up once every decade.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
01090402

Please respond by: _____

1/14/04 1/15/04

OSD 01401-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21842



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

January 30, 2004 – 6:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Visibility – SNOWFLAKE

- We will put in place a data system that meets the objectives you outlined (Tab A).
- For this hearing cycle, we compiled a short paper that describes the Department's rebalancing effort, and that you reviewed, asking that I summarize its main points. Tab B provides the requested summary.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/21843

OSD 01401704

TAB

A

TO: David, Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 9, 2004
SUBJECT Reserve Forces

We are going *to* have to make sure that the services, when they finish rebalancing, that *I* can see how many units are still going to be in the newly balanced reserves and guard who have never been called *up* or have not been called *up* in 13 years and have only been called *up* once every decade.

Thanks.

DDR/azn
01000403

Please respond by: 1/14/04 1/15/04

OSD 01401-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21845

TAB

B

Cohesive Rebalancing Strategy to Reduce Stress on the Force

STRATEGY

- Move later deploying AC forces forward in the plan and early deploying RC forces later in the plan; shift assets between combatant commanders
- Introduce innovative management techniques:
 - Enhance volunteerism to provide trained, ready individual reservists and units who can respond immediately without requiring mobilization (e.g. aircrews, transportation support, PSYOPs, IMAs)
 - Expand the use of reachback to reduce the footprint in theater through virtual connectivity to CONUS locations (e.g. IO, intelligence, finance)
 - Streamline the mobilization process to improve responsiveness; provide additional resources to enhance readiness of RC units
- Rebalance capabilities by converting lower priority structure to higher priority structure both within and between the AC and RC

Multiple approaches are needed to resolve force imbalances

OBJECTIVES

- Enhance early responsiveness: Structure forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization during early stages of a rapid response operation
- Resolve stressed career fields: Structure forces to limit involuntary mobilization to reasonable and sustainable rates
- Employ innovative management practices: Achieves the greatest degree of flexibility while reducing stress on critical career fields and the need for involuntary mobilization
 - Continuum of Service – a new availability and service paradigm on a scale from 0-365 days, provides greater flexibility for supporting Dept's mission
 - Enhanced volunteerism, reachback, and rotational overseas presence are additional approaches
 - Mobilization process improvements – underway, already reduced approval timeline significantly; continuing to work

RESULT

The Department's cohesive rebalancing strategy has resulted in about 10,000 changes in military spaces both within and between the Active and Reserve components in FY 03; and about 20,000 in FY 04. The FY 05 budget supports an additional 20,000 changes.

~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Fran Harvey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter from Richard Gamin

Attached is a letter I received from a very bright man, Richard Garwin. It has some interesting thoughts that you might take advantage of.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/10/04 Richard Garwin letter to SecDef

DHR:ag
121404-8

.....
Please respond by

1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21848

OSD 01419-05

451

14 Dec 04



(b)(6)

something that is pretty good. For instance, one should note that our vehicles suffer IED attacks from the right, much more than from the left. Therefore, if one has a shortage of time or materiel, the right side should be armored more heavily than the left.

I do not expect my Secretary of Defense to go out there with a drill and wrench or a welding torch, but I do expect the Army and the Marines to be beating down the doors with expedient armoring schemes.


And these should be practiced in a competition, so that we don't have totally unarmored trucks carrying people in one of these high-speed convoys.

We are where we are, but the question is what can be done in four weeks, for instance.

I am in Washington until Saturday, available by Email at RLG2 at us.ibm.com, in the remote event that anyone wishes to contact me.

very best regards.

Sincerely yours,


Richard L. Garwin

RLG:jah:4345DHR:121004.DHR

~~FOUO~~

JAN 31 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
CC: Gen Dick Myers
GEN Pete Schoomaker
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Dr. Garwin

I think you ought to go ahead and get an appropriate letter back to Dr. Garwin. I have read your memo. Why don't you handle it and tell him I asked you to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/14/04 SecDef Memo to DSD, et al.

12/10/04 Letter to SecDef from Dr. Richard Garwin

DHR:ss
012805-5

.....
Please respond by

2/10/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21851

OSD 01419-05

451

31 Jan 05

14 Dec 04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0700

INFO MEMO

January 19, 2005, 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army
Peter J. Schoomaker, General, ~~Chief of Staff, Army~~ *19.04.05*

SUBJECT: "Letter from Richard Garwin" (Army Measures to Protect Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV)).

- The purpose of this memo is to respond to your memo dated, December 14, 2004, regarding a letter from Richard Garwin. (Tab A)
- All TWVs used in conduct of operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) [Iraq and Afghanistan] will have some level of armor protection (Level I, II, or III) by March 2005.
- The Army is working diligently to meet CENTCOM TWV protection requirements by evaluating both materiel and non-materiel solutions to provide the maximum protection possible for Soldiers conducting missions in TWVs.
- The Army is using three distinct levels of TWV armor protection. The first category, referred to as level I, refers to fully integrated armor installed during production and retrofit. The second, level II, includes officially approved add-on armor kits that can be installed on vehicles, either in the United States or in the theater of operations. Finally, the third category, level III, includes locally fabricated armor using approved steel, which provides added protection as an interim measure until a level I or II kit can be applied. Together, these various levels, along with ongoing efforts to assess and test other technological improvements will ensure that all TWVs involved in operational missions are equipped with the best protection available.
- No later than February 15, 2005, all TWVs operating in Iraq outside of forward operating bases will have some level of armor protection. The J4 led fusion cell is ensuring that all services are working together to achieve up-armoring sooner than the February 15, 2005 objective.

451

19 Jan 05

14 Feb 05

SUBJECT: "Letter from Richard Garwin" (Army Measures to Protect Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV)).

- Considerable efforts as well as significant progress have been made in the endeavor since late 2003, and the pace has been accelerated in response to the rapidly changing operational requirements. The initial priority was placed on up-armoring light tactical wheel vehicles, primarily the high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle, by a combination of increased production and providing add-on armor kits for older vehicles. The requirement for armoring these vehicles has escalated dramatically from a few hundred in March 2003 to over 8,000 by December 2004. The Army has already provided over 6,000 and expects to meet current requirements by March 2005. The priority has now shifted to providing armor protection for medium and heavy TWVs. Current Level I and II requirements will be met by June 2005.
- Up-armoring is not the only solution to protect Soldiers from the improvised explosive device (IED) threat. The Army is aggressively integrating a host of capabilities and measures in an effort to better protect Soldiers and TWVs. Units in theater have successfully employed IED countermeasures to reduce their vulnerability to IEDs. Units in theater are adapting and evolving their tactics, techniques and procedures to counter enemy IED tactics. All Army units conduct live, virtual and constructive predeployment training at home station and at our training centers using the most current lessons learned provided by units currently operating in theater. When possible, almost all of the Army's predeployment training encompasses a training period for units of no less than six months in length and immerses the Soldier in a realistic theater-like combat environment. Our commanders and Soldiers in theater not only rely on armor protection, but also realize that force protection requires the integration of a host of different capabilities. Thus, up-armoring is not the only solution to protect Soldiers.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: ~~None~~ As stated

Prepared By: LTC Ed Agee, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Fran Harvey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letter from Richard Garwin

Attached is a letter I received from a very bright man, Richard Garwin. It has some interesting thoughts that you might take advantage of.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/10/04 Richard Garwin letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
121404-B

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21854



Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598-0218

(b)(6)
FAX: (b)(6)
INTERNET (b)(6)

December 10, 2004

(Via FAX to (b)(6))

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
US . Department of Defense
1000 Defense: Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don.

I saw excerpts from your meeting with the troops in Kuwait, and just now (Thursday, 10:30 pm Washington time) I saw on C-SPAN a session with LGEN Steven Whitcomb about armored vehicles.

I thought that Whitcomb did a good job, but the reporters were very smart, and had good questions.

Whitcomb said that there was no shortage of material, no shortage of vehicles, and no shortage of people, and they were making good progress against their schedule.

But there are two problems. First, a lot of trucks don't seem to have armor at all, and a good many HUM-Vs do not have armor.

Whitcomb said that the Congress has provided \$1.2 B, and so there was no shortage of armor. But he said also, "I don't know the specifics."

LGEN Whitcomb should not have had to appear without "knowing the specifics."

The troops in the field are highly motivated to protect themselves and their colleagues. If they can do the job with steel and glass they scrounge from landfills, they can do the job a lot better with steel and glass that are provided from U.S. military stores, that they can mount on their own vehicles. Our people are smart, and they are motivated and when they are not in combat they have a good deal of time to do what needs to be done.

If we don't have the materiel ready, we should (and should have) consider getting such materiel produced for us by China or other places where there are people who are hungry and capable. We don't need to have them produce the best we know how to do— only

something that is pretty good. For instance, one should note that our vehicles suffer IED attacks from the right, much more than from the left. Therefore, if one has a shortage of time or materiel, the right side should be armored more heavily than the left.

I do not expect my Secretary of Defense to go out there with a drill and wrench or a welding torch, but I do expect the Army and the Marines to be beating down the doors with expedient armoring schemes.


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We are where we are, but the question is what can be done in four weeks, for instance.

I am in Washington until Saturday, available by Email at RLG2 at us.ibm.com, in the remote event that anyone wishes to contact me.

very best regards.

Sincerely yours,


Richard L. Garwin

RLG:jah:4345DHR:121004.DHR



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

10 FEB 2005

Mr. Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights, New York 10598-0218

Dear Mr. Garwin:

Secretary Rumsfeld asked that I write to you regarding the Army's ongoing efforts to improve the armored protection for our wheeled vehicles. This is a critically important subject to both the Army and other United States military forces, especially for those forces operating today in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Army is working diligently to meet United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV) protection needs by evaluating both materiel and non-materiel solutions to provide the maximum protection possible for Soldiers conducting missions in TWVs. The Army recently established an Armoring Task Force to accelerate fielding of armor solutions to the force.

Since the fall of 2003, when the insurgency in Iraq began to intensify, there were approximately 250 armored TWVs in theater. With the support of Congress, acting in full partnership with industry, the Army has dramatically increased the pace of both production and fielding. By the end of this month, at least 32,000 TWVs in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters will be protected. Most important, after February 15, 2005, no vehicle carrying an American Soldier will leave a protected base without armor. This overall effort has increased the number of armored vehicles in theater by a factor of over one-hundred since August 2003.

The Army is using three distinct levels of TWV armor protection. The first category, level I, is fully integrated armor installed during production and retrofit. The second, level II, includes officially approved add-on armor kits that can be installed on vehicles, either in the United States or in the theater of operations. Finally, the third category, level III, includes locally fabricated armor using Department of the Army approved steel, which provides added protection as an interim measure until a level I or II kit can be applied. Together, these various categories, along with ongoing efforts to assess and test other technological improvements, will ensure that all TWVs involved in operational missions are equipped with the best protection available.

11-L-0559/OSD/21857

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10 Feb 05

14 Dec 04

It is also important to note that up-armoring is not the only solution to protect Soldiers from the improvised explosive device (IED) threat. Our commanders and Soldiers in theater not only rely on armor protection, but also realize that force protection requires the integration of a host of different capabilities, such as employment of IED countermeasures to reduce unit vulnerability to IEDs. Units in theater are adapting and evolving their tactics, techniques and procedures to counter enemy IED tactics. Furthermore, all Army units are conducting live, virtual and constructive predeployment training at home station and at our training centers using the most current lessons learned provided by units currently operating in theater.

The nature and extent of the challenge has changed rapidly over the past months, and the Army has made every effort to adjust rapidly to the escalating requirement we face in providing the best protection possible to our Soldiers. With excellent support from the Department of Defense, Congress and Industry, we have made considerable progress and have additional initiatives underway to meet those requirements.

Thank you for your professional and personal interest in this vitally important area, and we appreciate your continuing support for our military forces and our Soldiers.

Sincerely,

Francis J. Harvey



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 24 2005

Mr. and Mrs.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. and Mrs. (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your Christmas card. I deeply appreciate your good wishes and kind words of support.

I also thank you for your service to our country, and wish you all the best in the New Year.

Sincerely,

3355 ✓

24 Jan 05

28 Dec 04

OSD 01463-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21859

Mr. and Mrs. (b)(6)


(b)(6)

Dear Mr. and Mrs. (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your Christmas card. I deeply appreciate your good wishes and kind words of support.

I also thank you for your service to our country, and wish you all the best in the New Year.

Sincerely,



Paul Butler
1/21

re: shorttake request

hang

CSC 12/29

~~FOUO~~

DEC 2-8 2004

TO: CAPT Bill Marriott

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Note to Mr. & Mrs. (b)(6)

Please draft a nice note back to these folks who sent this Christmas card. It is quite interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.

Christmas Card from Mr. and Mrs. (b)(6)

DHR:es
122704-13

.....
Please respond by 1/3/04

CSC-
Please draft note
as requested.
Thanks.
E

~~FOUO~~

OSD 01463-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21861

335510

28 Dec 04



Best Wishes For



The Holidays

Merry Christmas &
Prosperous New Year
for you Sir and your family!
We former U.S. Marines don't believe
the media liars!
Respectfully R.C. + A.J.

(b)(6)

Karlo Florida
Please forward our
RF number
to our friends
V.P. & friends



11-L-0559/OSD/21863

God Bless
You Honorable
Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Our Wife
My self
I am a former President of America and our troops
stand in support of your every decision!
and our protect America and our troops
equip and protect the middle east + around the world!
I will be a regular supporter of you!
Thank you!
God Bless
You!

February 2, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Intelligence Commission

Attached is a Newt Gingrich op-ed piece that apparently is in the works.

I very much agree with his point that the commission ought to be focused on the 21st century challenges. Unfortunately, the draft I have seen of the commission keeps leaving out the subject of asymmetric threats.

Attach.

2/1/04 Gingrich e-mail: "The Right Intelligence Commission"

DHR:dh
020204-3

334

2 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21865

OSD 01479-04

cc: LTG Craddock
D. Rita

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, February 01, 2004 10:50 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
 John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@jack.patterson@osd.mil;
 stephen.cambone@OSD.mil
Cc: damicorj@js.pentagon.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: the right intelligence commission-newt

the following is a proposed op ed I am submitting,

Newt

America does not need a narrowly focused commission looking only at the question of American intelligence on Iraq.

America does not need a backward oriented commission that only seeks to find fault.

America does not need one more cycle of self righteous politicians undermining and demoralizing the intelligence professionals who risk their lives and risk their careers rendering judgement about secret dictatorships with inadequate information and inadequate resources.

Intelligence professionals especially do not need to be lectured by the very politicians who cut their funding, undermined their capacity for human intelligence, and established systems of oversight which periodically lead to scapegoating but seldom lead to serious reform or improvement.

However, America does need a thorough review of the new, harder, and more complex 21st century worldwide intelligence challenges which have become obvious since 9/11.

The weakening of the intelligence community began with the Church Committee and was compounded by the Carter administration's dismantling of our human intelligence capability (as Ambassador David Kay noted in his recent testimony). It was then further compounded by the Clinton Administration's starving the intelligence community of resources.

It is now time for a commission aimed at strengthening the intelligence community rather than undermining it.

The President should establish a commission on 21st Century American intelligence requirements in the age of weapons of mass murder (biological and chemical) and

11-L-0559/OSD/21866

2/2/2004

mass destruction(nuclear).

The commission should begin by reviewing the level of denial and deception countries now use to hide their programs. The Iranian, Libyan, North Korean, and Iraqi examples are four of the cases the commission should review.

The scale of Pakistani scientist involvement in the illegal international arms trade including nuclear capabilities and the involvement of North Korea in systematic illegal international arms deals should be a focus of the commission.

The commission should also review foreign intelligence efforts around the world and the degree to which they know more or less than the American intelligence community.

Finally, the Commission should make recommendations about the size, structure, and culture of intelligence to fit it for the extraordinary challenges of a 21st century worldwide war involving weapons of mass murder and weapons of mass destruction.

This is the right kind of commission focused on the right questions and it would be an asset to the intelligence community.

This is a Commission appropriate to a time when we are each day seeing new terrorists threats, new bombings around the world, and new losses of American life.

It is time to rise above political concerns and put the country's needs first. This is a real war and we need a Commission appropriate to waging war.,

11-L-0559/OSD/21867

2/2/2004

February 3, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Draft Remarks

Attached are draft remarks that I may use ~~today~~ ^{tomorrow} in my hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

I would appreciate any suggestions you might have fast.

Regards,

Attach.
Draft remarks

DHR:dh
020304-1

000.5

3 Feb 04

OSD 01533-04

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DRAFT 3

INSERT ON WMD/PRESIDENT'S NEW INTELLIGENCE COMMISSION
[1494 Words, 11 Minutes]

- During my confirmation hearings before this Committee three years ago, I was asked what would keep me up at night. I answered: "intelligence."
- I said that because the challenge facing the intelligence community then and today is truly difficult. Its task is to penetrate closed societies and organizations – to try and learn things that our adversaries don't want us to know, often not knowing precisely what it is they should be looking for – while our adversaries know precisely what it is they don't want us to know. That is a very tough assignment.
- Intelligence agencies are operating in an era of surprise – when new threats can emerge suddenly with little or no warning, as happened on September 11th. And it is their responsibility to warn policymakers about threats *before* they emerge, to try to connect the dots before the fact -- so we can take action to protect the American people.
- They must do this in an age when their margin for error has all but disappeared. In the 21st century, we are dealing with multiple potential adversaries – terrorist networks and terrorist states – that are pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them. The consequences of underestimating a threat could be the losses of not hundreds or thousands of lives, but potentially tens of thousands of lives, or more – losses that but for timely warning and response might otherwise be averted.

DRAFT 3

- The men and women in the intelligence community have a tough, and often thankless job. If they fail, the world knows it. And when they succeed – as they often do – their accomplishments often remain secret. Though we cannot discuss those successes in open session, it would be worth the Committee's time to hear of them. They are many and they are impressive.
- We are blessed that so many fine individuals have stepped forward to serve in the intelligence community, and are willing to work under great pressure, and in more than a few cases risk their lives.
- They faced a difficult challenge in the case of Iraq. They knew the history of the Iraqi regime – its use of chemical weapons on its own people and its neighbors. They knew what had been discovered during the inspections after the Persian Gulf War – much of which was far more advanced than the pre-Gulf War intelligence had indicated. They were keen observers of the reports of UNSCOM in the 1990s. And they and others did their best to penetrate the secrets of the regime of Saddam Hussein after the inspectors were kicked out in 1998.
- It was the consensus of the intelligence community – and of successive administrations of both parties and the Congress that reviewed the same intelligence – and much of the international community -- that Saddam Hussein was pursuing WMD.
- An objective look at Saddam Hussein's behavior throughout that period reinforced that conclusion. He did not behave like someone who was disarming and wanted to prove he was doing so. He did not open up his country to the world – as Kazakhstan, Ukraine,

DRAFT 3

and South Africa had previously done – and as Libya is doing today.

- Instead, he chose the path of deception and defiance. He continued to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue under U.N. sanctions, when he could have had the sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had disarmed. Why? His regime filed what almost everyone agreed was a fraudulent declaration with the United Nations, and ignored the "final opportunity" afforded him by UNSC Resolution 1441. Why?
- The Congress, and the national security teams of both the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration, looked at essentially the same intelligence, and came to the same conclusion: that the Iraqi regime posed a gathering danger and had to be changed.
- There was no debate in the U.S. or the UN as to the nature of the problem.
- In the end, a large Coalition of nations decided to enforce the UN's resolutions. And as a result, the Iraqi people are now free.
- David Kay, the Director of Central Intelligence's Special Advisor, served in Iraq for some six months, directing the work of the Iraq Survey Group – the ISG. He and the ISG have worked hard, under difficult and dangerous conditions. They have brought forward important information. Dr. Kay is a scientist and an experienced weapons inspector. He has outlined for this Committee his hypothesis on the difference between pre-war estimates of Iraq's WMD and what has been found thus far, on the ground.

DRAFT 3

- While it is too early to come to final conclusions, given the work still to be done, there are several possibilities:
 - It's possible the WMD did not exist at the start of the war – possible, but not likely;
 - It's possible they existed, but were transferred in whole or in part to one or more countries;
 - It's possible it was dispersed and hidden throughout Iraq;
 - It's possible it was destroyed;
 - It's possible Iraq had small quantities and the capability for a rapid build up;
 - Or, it's possible that it was a big charade:
 - That Saddam Hussein fooled the world;
 - That Saddam Hussein fooled his own people;
 - Or even that Saddam Hussein was fooled *by* his own people, who told him he had capabilities he really didn't have;
- It is the job of Dr. Kay's successor and the Iraq Survey Group to pursue this issue wherever the facts in Iraq take it. It is a difficult task. Think: it took us some ten months to find Saddam Hussein – a human being. Interestingly, that hole he was found hiding in was large enough to hold enough weapons of mass destruction to kill thousands of human beings. And unlike Saddam Hussein, such objects, once buried, can stay buried. So they are no less difficult to find. Iraq is the size of California -- the chances of finding something buried in the ground without being led to it is minimal.
- As Dr. Kay has testified, what we have learned thus far has not proven Saddam had the things our intelligence indicated he had. On the other hand, the Iraq Survey Group's work has not concluded. There are some 1,300 people in the ISG in Iraq,

DRAFT 3

working hard, at personal risk, to find ground truth. When that work is complete, we will know more. While the evidence has not confirmed what we thought we knew, it also has not proven the opposite.

- Whatever the outcome, it is important that we seize the opportunity to derive lessons learned to inform the future. In DoD, Joint Forces Command has done an extensive review of the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom from the perspective of both Coalition forces and the Iraqi perspective. These lessons learned are helping identify ways our intelligence performance can be improved for the future.
- In addition to lessons learned from Iraq, it is important that we step back, and take look at the bigger picture -- that we examine whether U.S. intelligence capabilities are properly structured to meet the threats and challenges of the 21st century.
- The President has announced he will form a Commission on Strengthening the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States to do this. The Commission will review the past successes of the intelligence community, as well as cases where it has been less successful, to examine whether the intelligence community is properly organized and has sufficient skills among its agents and analysts and proper resources and the appropriate authorities to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
- Intelligence is not perfect. It is more art than a science. We do not, will not, and cannot know everything that is going on in the world. If at this important moment we mistake intelligence for irrefutable evidence, analysts will be reluctant to inform policymakers of what they think they know, what they know that

DRAFT 3

they don't know, and what they think. Policymakers bereft of intelligence will find themselves unable to make the prudential judgments necessary to protect our nation.

- I believe the President did the right thing in Iraq. I advised the President based on the intelligence we all saw – just as everyone here made their judgments, and cast their votes, based on that same information.
- The President has sworn to preserve, protect, and defend the nation. With respect to **Iraq**, he took the available evidence into account. He took into account September 11th. He took into account Saddam Hussein's behavior. He took into account his ongoing defiance of the UN, and the fact that until the end, the Iraqi regime was still shooting at U.S. and UK aircraft and their crews that were enforcing the UN resolutions in northern and southern no-fly zones.
- He went to the United Nations – and the Security Council passed a 17th resolution giving Iraq a "final opportunity" to disarm. And he went to this Congress – and based on that same intelligence, you voted to support military action if the Iraqi regime failed to take that "final opportunity." And then, after that "final opportunity," the President gave Saddam Hussein a final ultimatum – and only then, when all meaningful alternatives had been exhausted, the Coalition liberated Iraq.
- I believe that the world is today safer, and the Iraqi people are far better off.

##

February 8, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Senator Collins and Union Issues w/NSPS

I just read your February 2 memo on the National Security Personnel System.

I should mention that besides seeing the articles in the press about union leaders complaining, Senator Collins raised it in my hearing. She obviously is hearing from them, and she expressed how deeply concerned she was. I don't know why she is concerned, and she didn't say.

Nonetheless, it seems to me that you ought to find a way to keep her informed as you go along, so she knows what is going on and is at least informed, if not in agreement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-14(is computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 01559-04

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230

8 Feb 04

20 Jan 04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

✓ 2/8

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

February 2, 2004 - 11:28 AM

FOR:

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM:

DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: National Security Personnel System (NSPS) Design--SNOWFLAKE

- We are already using our new authorities. We have implemented voluntary early retirement and buyout authority (helping close Roosevelt Roads), and will soon implement our authority to hire highly qualified experts and federal annuitants (which will immediately assist the Department in recruiting for hard-to-fill jobs).
- Most of the remaining steps to create a new civil personnel system require joint action with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as well as collaboration with employee unions.
 - o I met with Clay Johnson, Deputy Director for Management, OMB, on January 20, and with Kay Coles James, Director, OPM, on January 30, to discuss OPM involvement.
 - o OPM would like a more intrusive and time-consuming approach than we are pursuing, but Clay Johnson is working to help us maintain our schedule--first 300,000 DoD employees brought under NSPS by the start of FY05. We held our first national level meeting with unions on January 22 to discuss the labor relations system, per the statutory requirement, with subsequent meetings scheduled for late February. While the meeting with the unions was friendly, in other forums some union leaders have stated their opposition to the concepts we are advancing.
- We have three major tasks ahead:
 1. Create the rules for how people will be hired, managed, evaluated and rewarded in the new system. To do so, we are building on the lessons learned from our demonstration programs, reflected in what we call our "Best Practices" initiative. This was developed in collaboration with the Military Departments and Defense Agencies; they are all participating in the working and review



SPL ASSISTANT IN CHARGE	2/3
SR MA CHADDOCK	OSD 0115
MA BUCH	NOV 20 2/3
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	2/3

9-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21876

groups we have established for the design effort. We aim to have a consensus draft completed before the end of the month for OPM review.

2. Design the new employee appeals procedures. We will be working with the Merit Systems Protection Board, since it will be the interim reviewing authority for actions taken. We will also be involving the unions, since this is one of the issues of greatest concern to them.

3. Structure the new labor management relations system. We will be working closely with the unions as required by statute, sharing our initial ideas with them this week (and with OPM first).

- Throughout the design process, we will be seeking the best advice we can secure, both inside and outside the Department. For example, the General Counsel recently convened his Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordinating Committee to advise us on the appeal process; we asked the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to assist us with labor/management relations; and we have asked the Defense Business Board its advice on structuring blue collar wages.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Brad Bunn, ODUSD(CPP), (b)(6)

For Civil Service in 2003, No Shortage of Defining Events

By Stephen Barr

Sunday, December 28, 2003; Page C02

As the year draws to an end, there's no doubt that 2003 represents a turning point for the civil service.


Asked to identify the most significant civil service development in 2003, a number of experts pointed to the new law that allows the Department of Defense to establish its own pay and personnel system.

The National Security Personnel System, as the Pentagon calls it, will overhaul how 746,000 defense civilians are paid, promoted and disciplined. Its approval by Congress and the president came a year after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which was granted the authority to revamp its work rules for 180,000 employees.

Once the two departments have their systems up and running -- probably in about two years -- more than half of the civil service will be outside the General Schedule, the system of 15 grade levels and 10 pay rates per level that has provided uniformity and stability to the federal government since shortly after World War II.

John M. Palguta, a vice president with the nonprofit Partnership for Public Service, said 2003 represents "the beginning of the end for the federal government's outdated, inflexible pay and job classification system established by the Classification Act of 1949."

He added, "It's now only a matter of time before the General Schedule fades away entirely, and 2003 will be marked as the beginning of its end."



Paul C. Light, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a New York University professor, said: "I think the DoD breakout is the most significant event not just of the past year, but of the past 25. It has the potential to remake the civil service system. If done well, it could open the way to a new era in high-performance government. If done poorly, it could confirm every worst fear of how politics has come to shape personnel policy. I'm betting on [Defense Undersecretary] **David Chu** to produce the right plan, but am worried that DoD managers lack the training to implement the system effectively. They're being asked to do things they've never done before."

There were other developments, however, that were viewed as just as important by federal employees who work outside the Beltway and outside the defense-homeland security arena.

Paul Barnes, regional commissioner for the Social Security Administration in Atlanta, said changes that provide greater flexibility in hiring won his vote for most significant development of 2003. "Replacing people when they retire -- hiring new people -- is a huge deal for us," Barnes said.

Software improvements at USAJobs, where the government posts job openings on the Internet, has "allowed us to significantly reduce how long it takes to hire quality people," he said.

In addition, he said, the new federal career intern program allows managers to establish local job registers. That leads to fewer people turning down job offers and helps managers address their needs, such as recruiting bilingual employees to help serve the growing Hispanic population in the Southeast, Barnes said.

George Lydford, a revenue agent with the Internal Revenue Service in Phoenix, said, "My opinion is the budget deficit is the most significant thing that is happening now, and it will affect federal employees more later than now."

The deficit, he said, "will cause the government to tighten its belt. . . . At some time down the road, it is going to have to be paid for, so the programs of the federal government -- the civilian part -- will be cut or severely reduced until we won't be able to hire the staff we need."

Sonya Kimberlin, an Agriculture Department community development manager in Scott County, Ind., cited the "continuing resolution" -- the interim funding measure that keeps the government open through Jan. 31 because not all appropriations bills were enacted by the Oct. 1 deadline.

The CR "does not allow us to effectively deliver our programs," Kimberlin said. "Our customers don't understand why we don't have any more control over our funding. It makes us look like 'the typical government program' that they hear about." She added, "We don't like getting the negative image caused by that."

As part of Agriculture's rural development agency, Kimberlin helps provide housing loans for people building or purchasing their first home. Under the CR, she said, her office can spend at a rate equal to 25 percent of last year's budget.

"It puts our customers in a hardship," she said.

E-mail: barrs@washpost.com.

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11-L-0559/OSD/21879

January 20, 2004

TO: David Chu

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Pete Geren
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Redesign of DoD Civil Service

Here is an article highlighting our national security personnel system.

From what I understand of the legislation, we have an opportunity to redesign the DoD civil service in a manner that better fits the times.

How confident are we that we are prepared to take advantage—soon—of the authorities granted in the law?

Is a product of that scope likely to bubble up out of our existing organization, or should we be thinking about finding some world-class personnel expertise to give us some thoughts and guidance?

Please get back to me soon with your thoughts.

Thanks.

Attach.

Barr, Stephen. "For Civil Service in 2003, No Shortage of Defining Events," *Washington Post*, December 28, 2003, p. C2.

DHR:dh
122903-4(1s computer)

Please respond by

2/13/04

Sir,
Response attached. Original attachment included behind.

OSD 01559-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21880

1/31
→ David Chu -

When are you
on this. An update
to SecDef would be
helpful. Thanks
D. R.

3/12

2/2

SD

I am
asking
David if
he has
specific
names.

1/12

John
1/12

VR/
CORNSEN
2/3



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

February 9, 2004 - 3:30 PM ^{277 655 77} at 6:01

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Senator Collins and Union Issues w/NSPS—SNOWFLAKE

- We are seeking a meeting with Senator Collins (attached), and have already met with her staff. We hope that Senator Warner will join that meeting. We are also seeking meetings with Congressmen Hunter and Davis to keep them informed, too.
- The union comments received thus far signal opposition to any change in the status quo. We held our initial meeting with the unions on January 22, 2004, inviting their suggestions. The unions declined to make any, and asked for DoD's ideas as the basis for beginning a dialogue. We circulated these last Friday (after first briefing Hill staff)—hence the union comments you are seeing today. The strident reactions indicate that we will need to redouble our efforts to make this a constructive dialogue. Mr. Gage, head of American Federation of Government Employees, *our* largest union, did not attend the initial meeting himself, but sent relatively junior representatives.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

Attachment:
As Stated

cc: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
Mr. Powell Moore, ASD(LA)

OSD 01559-04



11-L-0559/OSD/21881

230

9 Feb 04



~~CLOSE HOLD~~

February 3, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Draft Executive Order for the Commission on Intelligence

334

Mr. President —

I am concerned about the latest draft Executive Order.

I continue to feel strongly that for a decent Commission product, it will require that there be a rule for a quorum requiring that at least six or seven of the nine members be present for the conduct of business. I have chaired a couple of these commissions and served on six or seven. It will either produce a "Commissioners' product" or a "staff product." If it is a staff product, it will not be unanimous and will likely end up gathering dust on a shelf. Only if the Commissioners do the work, participate in drafting and are available to defend it is the Report likely to have impact.

Further, the country will not be well served if the only issue addressed by the Commission is counterproliferation, weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Commission should look forward, as well as back. That says to me that the Commission must look at the kinds of asymmetric threats our country faces in the 21st century. It would be a mistake to narrowly limit their charter.

Besides cyber-threats, there are a variety of new technologies and nano-technologies that can and will be used as means of conducting asymmetric attacks on the US and our friends and allies around the world. This Commission needs to be able to look at what we are facing in the broadest context. All that is required is to change a few words in two or three places, and the Commission will have that flexibility. The way it is currently written, they will not. I believe that would prove to be a big mistake. In at least the early portion of the 21st century, the US is not likely to be facing wars against big armies, navies or air forces. Instead, we

3 Feb 04

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

OSD 01570 04

11- L-0559/OSD/21882

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

are certain to be faced with a range of asymmetric challenges. It is those attacks that we have the responsibility to be prepared to deter and defend against.

I am sorry to bother you with this, but I have sent in these suggestions twice, and they seem to never find their way into the draft Executive Order. I don't know where they are being derailed, but I do think they are *important* enough for you to at least be aware of these concerns.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
020304.1S

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

~~CLOSEHOLD~~

are certain to be faced with a range of asymmetric challenges. It is those attacks that we have the responsibility to be prepared to deter and defend against.

I am sorry to bother you with this, but I have sent in these suggestions twice, and they seem to never find their way into the draft Executive Order. I don't **know** where they are being derailed, but I do think they are important enough for you to at least be aware of these concerns.

Respectfully,

P.S. Note for Andy Card: For the benefit of whoever has the pen and is doing the drafting of the Executive Order, I have attached a copy that has penciled in additional suggestions.

Attach.

Draft 2/3/04 11:17 AM

DHR:dh
020304.JS

~~CLOSEHOLD~~

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DRAFT 2/3/2004 11:17 AM

Strengthening
COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS

DESTRUCTION

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is established, within the Executive Office of the President for administrative purposes, a Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction ("Commission").

Sec. 2. Mission. (a) For the purpose of advising the President in the discharge of his constitutional authority under Article II of the United States Constitution to conduct foreign relations, protect national security, and command the armed forces of the United States, and to ensure the most effective counterproliferation capabilities of the United States, the Commission shall assess whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). In doing so, the Commission shall examine the capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals) relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery, and other asymmetric capabilities.

(b) With respect to that portion of its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order that relates to Iraq, the Commission shall specifically examine the intelligence prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom and compare it with the findings of the Iraq Survey Group and other relevant agencies or organizations concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of Iraq relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery.

(c) With respect to its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order, the Commission shall—

11-L-0559/OSD/21885

and unprovoked spaces

development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, ^{Then} or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and related means of delivery [in closed societies]; and

*then relevant
of interest*

and asymmetric capabilities

(including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). The Central Intelligence Agency and other components of the Intelligence Community shall utilize the Commission and the resulting report.

7 ? FACA

Sec. 3. Membership. The Commission shall consist of nine members designated by the President, one of whom the President shall designate as Chairman and one of whom the President shall designate as Vice Chairman. Members shall be citizens of the United States.

Sec. 4. Meetings of the Commission and Direction of Its Work. The Chairman of the Commission shall convene and preside at the meetings of the Commission, determine after consultation with other members of the Commission its agenda, direct its work, and, as appropriate to deal with particular subject matters, establish and direct subgroups of the Commission that shall consist exclusively of members of the Commission. The Vice Chairman shall perform the functions of the Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman, or when the position of Chairman is vacant.

*from it 6
quorum
of
six*

Sec. 5. Access to Information. (a) The Commission shall have full and complete access to information in the possession, custody, or control of any executive department or agency to the maximum extent permitted by law and consistent with Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended. Heads of departments and agencies shall promptly furnish such information to the Commission upon the request of the Chairman. The Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure the expeditious adjudication of the clearances necessary for the members of the Commission to have access to all information that it may require.

(b) Promptly upon commencing its work, the Commission shall adopt, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence, rules and procedures of the Commission for physical, communications, computer, document, personnel and other security in relation to the work of the Commission. The Secretary of

Defense, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly and jointly report to the President their judgment whether the security rules and procedures adopted by the Commission are clearly consistent with the national security and protect against unauthorized disclosure of information required by law or executive order to be protected against such disclosure. The President may at any time modify the security rules or procedures of the Commission to provide the necessary protection.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) In implementing this order, the Commission shall solely advise and assist the President.

(b) In performing its functions under this order, the Commission shall, subject to the authority of the President, be independent from any executive department or agency, or of any officer, employee, or agent thereof.

(c) This order does not impair or otherwise affect the authorities of any department, agency, entity, officer, or employee of the United States under applicable law.

(d) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative or legislative proposals.

(e) The Director of the Office of Administration shall, with the assistance of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, provide or arrange for the provision of administrative support and funding for the Commission consistent with applicable law. The Director of the Office of Administration shall ensure that such support and funding meets the Commission's reasonable needs and that the manner of provision of support and funding is consistent with the authority of the Commission within the executive branch in the performance of its functions.

(f) Members of the Commission shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Commission. Members who are not officers or employees in the executive branch, while engaged in the work of the Commission, may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in Government service (5 U.S.C. 5701 through 5707); consistent with the availability of funds.

(g) The Commission shall have a staff headed by an Executive Director. The Chairman shall hire and employ, or obtain by assignment or detail from departments and agencies, the staff of the Commission, including the Executive Director. The Chairman shall obtain the concurrence of the Vice Chairman for employment of the Executive Director.

(h) If an individual who is a member of the Commission is also an elected or appointed holder of office or employment in the legislative or judicial branch of the United States Government--

(i) nothing in this order shall affect the conduct of such individual in the individual's capacity as such holder of office or employment; and

11-L-0559/OSD/21887

(ii) no rule, regulation or order of such branch shall affect the function of the individual in the individual's capacity as a member of the Commission.

(i) The term "Intelligence Community" is given the same meaning **as** contained in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

(j) The term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" is given the **same** meaning as contained in section 1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1)). — ?

Sec. 7. Judicial Review. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government, and is not intended to, and does not, create **any** right **or** benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, **or** any other person.


Sec. 8. Termination. The Commission shall terminate ~~thirty~~ days after the date on which its report is due to the President under section 2 of this order.

gke-

February 8, 2004

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318

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Charter of Intelligence Commission

Please **give** me the final draft of the charter of the Intelligence Commission the President set **up**.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-9 (is computer).doc

.....

Please respond by _____

OSD 01570-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21889

Received @ 3:00pm Thursday. Thursday - noon 2/5
Conbone's edits - sent back to
WH @ 5:30 Thursday. Marking next version.

DRAFT

EXECUTIVE ORDER

COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
 OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

And other related threats of the 21st Century.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is established, within the Executive Office of the President for administrative purposes, a Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction ("Commission").

Sec. 2. Mission. (a) For the purpose of advising the President in the discharge of his constitutional authority under Article II of the United States Constitution to conduct foreign relations, protect national security, and command the armed forces of the United States, in order to ensure the most effective counterproliferation capabilities of the United States, the Commission shall assess whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other related threats of the 21st Century and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). In doing so, the Commission shall examine the capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of such foreign powers relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery, *and other related threats of the 21st Century.*

(b) With respect to that portion of its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order that relates to Iraq, the Commission shall specifically examine the Intelligence Community's intelligence prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom and compare it with the findings of the Iraq Survey Group and other relevant agencies or organizations concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of Iraq relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery.

(c) With respect to its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order, the Commission shall—

(i) specifically evaluate the challenges of obtaining information regarding the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery in closed societies; and

and other related threats of the 21st Century

(ii) compare the Intelligence Community's intelligence concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction programs and other related threats of the 21st Century in Libya prior to its recent decision to open its programs to international scrutiny and in Afghanistan prior to removal of the Taliban government with the current assessments of organizations presently examining those programs.

and other foreign powers as agreed by the

(d) The Commission shall submit to the President by March 31, 2005, a report of the findings of the Commission resulting from its examination and its specific recommendations for ensuring that the Intelligence Community of the United States is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other related threats of the 21st Century, and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). The Central Intelligence Agency and other components of the Intelligence Community shall utilize the Commission and its resulting report.

*as agreed by the
under
Sec. 3*

Sec. 3. Membership. The Commission shall consist of nine members designated by the President, two of whom the President shall designate as Co-Chairs. Members shall be citizens of the United States. It shall take six members of the Commission to constitute a quorum.

Sec. 4. Meetings of the Commission and Direction of Its Work. The Co-Chairs of the Commission shall convene and preside at the meetings of the Commission, determine after consultation with other members of the Commission its agenda, direct its work, and assign responsibilities within the Commission. *A quorum shall consist of one Co-Chair and six members.*

Sec. 5. Access to Information. (a) To carry out this order, the Commission shall have full and complete access to information in the possession, custody, or control of any executive department or agency to the maximum extent permitted by law and consistent with Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended. Heads of departments and agencies shall promptly furnish such information to the Commission upon request. The Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure the expeditious processing of all appropriate security clearances necessary for the members of the Commission to fulfill their functions.

(b) Promptly upon commencing its work, the Commission shall adopt, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, rules and procedures of the Commission for physical, communications, computer, document, personnel, and other security in relation to the work of the Commission. The Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly and jointly report to the President their judgment whether the security rules and procedures adopted by the Commission are clearly consistent with the national security and protect against

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unauthorized disclosure of information required by law or executive order to be protected against such disclosure. The President may at any time modify the security rules or procedures of the Commission to provide the necessary protection.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) In implementing this order, the Commission shall solely advise and assist the President.

(b) In performing its functions under this order, the Commission shall, subject to the authority of the President, be independent from any executive department or agency, or of any officer, employee, or agent thereof.

(c) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authorities of any department, agency, entity, officer, or employee of the United States under applicable law.

(d) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(e) The Director of the Office of Administration shall, with the assistance of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, provide or arrange for the provision of administrative support and funding for the Commission consistent with applicable law. The Director of the Office of Administration shall ensure that such support and funding meets the Commission's reasonable needs and that the manner of provision of support and funding is consistent with the authority of the Commission within the executive branch in the performance of its functions.

(f) Members of the Commission shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Commission. Members who are not officers or employees in the executive branch, while engaged in the work of the Commission, may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in Government service (5 U.S.C. 5701 through 5707), consistent with the availability of funds.

(g) The Commission shall have a staff headed by an Executive Director. The Co-Chairs shall hire and employ, or obtain by assignment or detail from departments and agencies, the staff of the Commission, including the Executive Director.

(h) The term "Intelligence Community" is given the same meaning as contained in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

(i) The term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" is given the same meaning as contained in section 1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1)).

Sec. 7. Judicial Review. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch, and is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or

procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 8. Termination. The Commission shall terminate thirty days after the date on which its report is due to the President under section 2 of this order.

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

February 3, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Draft Executive Order for the Commission on Intelligence



034

Mr. President—

I am concerned about the latest draft Executive Order.

I continue to feel **strongly** that for a decent Commission product, it will require that **there** be a rule for a **quorum** requiring that at least six or seven of the **nine** members be present for the conduct of business. I have chaired a couple of these commissions and served on **six** or **seven**. It will either produce a "Commissioners' product" or a "staff product." If it is a staff product, it will not be unanimous and will likely end up gathering dust on a shelf. Only if the Commissioners do the **work**, participate in drafting and are available to defend it is the **Report** likely to have impact.

Further, the **country** will not be well served if the only **issue** addressed by the Commission is counterproliferation, weapons of **mass** destruction and their delivery systems. The **Commission** should **look forward**, as well as back. That **says** to me that the **Commission** must look at the kinds of asymmetric threats our **country** faces in the 21st century. It would be a mistake to narrowly **limit** their charter.

5 Feb 04

Besides cyber-threats, there are a variety of new technologies and nano-technologies that can and will be used **as** means of conducting asymmetric attacks on the US and our friends and allies around the world. **This Commission needs** to be able to look at what **we** are facing in the broadest **context**. All that is required is to change a few words in two or three places, and the Commission will have that flexibility. **The** way it is currently written, they will not. I believe that would prove to **be** a big mistake. In at **least** the early portion of the 21st century, the **US** is not likely to be facing wars against big **armies**, navies or air forces. **Instead**, we

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11-L-0559/OSD/21894

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are certain to be faced with a range of asymmetric challenges. It is those attacks that we have the responsibility to be prepared to deter and defend against.

I am sorry to bother you with this, but I have sent in these suggestions twice, and they seem to never find their way into the draft Executive Order. I don't know where they are being derailed, but I do think they are important enough for you to at least be aware of these concerns.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
020304.IS

11-L-0559/OSD/21895

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~~CLOSE HOLD~~

are certain to be faced with a range of asymmetric challenges. It is those attacks that we have the responsibility to be prepared to deter and defend against.

I am sorry to bother you With this, but I have sent in these suggestions twice, and they seem to never find their way into the draft Executive Order. I don't know where they are being derailed, but I do think they are important enough for you to at least be aware of these concerns.

Respectfully,

P.S. Note for Andy Card: For the benefit of whoever has the pen and is doing the drafting of the Executive Order, I have attached a copy that has penciled in additional suggestions.

Anach.
Draft 2/3/04 11:17 AM

DHR:dh
020304.1S

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11-L-0559/OSD/21896

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~~SECRET~~
DRAFT 2/3/2004 11:17 AM

EXECUTIVE ORDER

Stronger
COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is established, within the Executive Office of the President for administrative purposes, a Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction ("Commission"). *in the 11/1/04*

and Sec. 2. Mission. (a) For the purpose of advising the President in the discharge of his constitutional authority under Article II of the United States Constitution to conduct foreign relations, protect national security, and command the armed forces of the United States, and to ensure the most effective counterproliferation capabilities of the United States, the Commission shall assess whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals). In doing so, the Commission shall examine the capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks, or other entities or individuals) relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery, and other asymmetric capabilities. *other asymmetric capabilities*

their (b) With respect to that portion of its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order that relates to Iraq, the Commission shall specifically examine the intelligence prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom and compare it with the findings of the Iraq Survey Group and other relevant agencies or organizations concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of Iraq relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related means of delivery.

(c) With respect to its examination under paragraph 2(a) of this order, the Commission shall — *10*

11-L-0559/OSD/21897

and unwarmed spaces

with the current assessments of organizations presently examining those programs.

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(d) The Commission shall submit to the President by March 33, 2005, a report of the findings of the Commission resulting from such examination and its specific recommendations for ensuring that the Intelligence Community of the United States is organized, equipped, trained, resourced, and possessed of the appropriate authority to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and

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Sec. 3. Membership. The Commission shall consist of nine members designated by the President, one of whom the President shall designate as Chairman and one of whom the President shall designate as Vice Chairman. Members shall be citizens of the United States.

Sec. 4. Meetings of the Commission and Direction of Its Work. The Chairman of the Commission shall convene and preside at the meetings of the Commission, determine after consultation with other members of the Commission its agenda, direct its work, and, as appropriate to deal with particular subject matters, establish and direct subgroups of the Commission that shall consist exclusively of members of the Commission. The Vice Chairman shall perform the functions of the Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman, or when the position of Chairman is vacant.

from 6
Quorum
of
Six

Sec. 5. Access to Information. (a) The Commission shall have full and complete access to information in the possession, custody, or control of any executive department or agency to the maximum extent permitted by law and consistent with Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended. Heads of departments and agencies shall promptly furnish such information to the Commission upon the request of the Chairman. The Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure the expeditious adjudication of the clearances necessary for the members of the Commission to have access to all information that it may require.

(b) Promptly upon commencing its work, the Commission shall adopt, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence, rules and procedures of the Commission for physical, communications, computer, document, personnel and other security in relation to the work of the Commission. The Secretary of

11

Defense, the ~~Attorney General~~ and the Director of Central intelligence shall promptly and jointly report to the President their judgment whether the security rules and procedures adopted by the Commission are clearly consistent with the national security and protect against unauthorized disclosure of information required by law or executive order to be protected against such disclosure. The President may at any time modify the security rules or procedures of the Commission to provide the necessary protection.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) In implementing this order, the Commission shall solely advise and assist the President.

(b) In performing its functions under this order, the Commission shall, subject to the authority of the President, be independent from any executive department or agency, or of any officer, employee, or agent thereof.

(c) This order does not impair or otherwise affect the authorities of any department, agency, entity, officer, or employee of the United States under applicable law:

(d) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative or legislative proposals.

(e) The Director of the Office of Administration shall, with the assistance of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, provide or arrange for the provision of administrative support and funding for the Commission consistent with applicable law. The Director of the Office of Administration shall ensure that such support and funding meets the Commission's reasonable needs and that the manner of provision of support and funding is consistent with the authority of the Commission within the executive branch in the performance of its functions.

(f) Members of the Commission shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Commission. Members who are not officers or employees in the executive branch, while engaged in the work of the Commission, may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in Government service (5 U.S.C. 5701 through 5707), consistent with the availability of funds.

(g) The Commission shall have a staff headed by an Executive Director. The Chairman shall hire and employ, or obtain by assignment or detail from departments and agencies, the staff of the Commission, including the Executive Director. The Chairman shall obtain the concurrence of the Vice Chairman for employment of the Executive Director.

(h) If an individual who is a member of the Commission is also an elected or appointed holder of office or employment in the legislative or judicial branch of the United States Government--

(i) nothing in this order shall affect the conduct of such individual in the individual's capacity as such holder of office or employment; and

(ii) no rule, regulation or order of such branch shall affect the function of the individual in the individual's capacity as a member of the Commission.

(i) The term "Intelligence Community" is given the same meaning as contained in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

(j) The term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" is given the same meaning as contained in section 1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1)). — ?

Sec. 7. Judicial Review. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government, and is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 8. Termination. The Commission shall terminate thirty days after the date on which its report is due to the President under section 2 of this order.

gk-

13

February 2, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Jaymie Durnan

Mr. President—

I am forwarding the enclosed letter to you from Jaymie Durnan. He is a fine talent who has decided, for personal reasons, to withdraw from consideration for the position to which you nominated him.

We will miss him; he has served the Administration well.

Respectfully,

Attach.

1/20/04 Durnan memo to President Bush

DHR:dh
020204-24

11-L-0559/OSD/21901

OSD 01574 04

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2 Feb 04

January 20, 2004

Memorandum for the President of the United States

Through the Secretary of Defense

From: Jaymie Duman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jaymie Duman", with a horizontal line underneath.

Subject: Resignation

I respectfully request that you withdraw my name from consideration by the Senate Armed Services Committee for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations & Environment).

As I have discussed with Secretary Rumsfeld, I have been commuting to New Hampshire every weekend for the last three years and I need to reconnect with my four children who live there with my ex-wife.

I have requested a resignation date of June 30, 2004.

I am proud of having served my country in such perilous times and I pray for success in the war on terrorism.

11-L-0559/OSD/21902

February 4, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wehrkunde Remarks

Condi—

Here is the early draft of the remarks for Wehrkunde. If you have any thoughts, please feed them in soon.

Thanks.

Attach.
Draft Wehrkunde remarks

DHR:dh
020404-3

356.001 SD

4 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21903

DRAFT 2

REMARKS BY U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD H. RUMSFELD
MUNICH CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY
FEBRUARY 7, 2004
MUNICH, GERMANY

Good morning. [Dr.] Horst [Teltschik], ministers, parliamentarians, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you so much. It's a pleasure to see so many old friends.

I am delighted to be back in Munich for this important gathering. I have been coming to this conference over many years now -- both during my years in government and also as a private citizen. I have always found the exchanges of ideas both informative and invigorating.

But just as fascinating has been watching all the remarkable changes that have taken place from year-to-year, between our meetings -- and the last year has been no exception.

Indeed, I would suggest that few periods have been filled with more dramatic change -- in the world and in the Atlantic Alliance -- than the 12 months since we last met.

Consider what has taken place in that brief period of time:

In one year, NATO has undergone more positive change than in perhaps most ten-year periods in the history of the Alliance:

- In June, we streamlined the NATO Command Structure, and stood up a new command to drive Allied transformation.
- In September, NATO helped Poland and Spain stand up a new Multinational Division in south central Iraq;
- In October, we stood up a new NATO Response Force designed to deploy in days or weeks, instead of months or years.
- In December, we stood up the initial rotation of the new NATO Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Battalion.
- And, at this moment, we are preparing to welcome seven new members to the Alliance at the Istanbul Summit.

DRAFT 2

When we last met, NATO had never undertaken a mission outside of the North Atlantic area.¹ In August, NATO went "out of area" for the first time in its history – sending forces to Central Asia to take over leadership of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

When we last met, the Iraqi people lived in fear of a cruel dictator, who was in brazen defiance of his 17th UN Security Council Resolution. The world still hoped for a peaceful solution – and Saddam Hussein faced a choice: to prove that he was meeting his international obligations to disarm, or face the consequences of his continued defiance. He chose unwisely. And today, because 35 nations² came together to enforce the will of the free world, Saddam Hussein spends his days not in a palace, but in a jail cell; and the Iraqi people are moving along the tough path of building a free society from the ruins of decades of tyranny.

The Coalition effort in Iraq is contributing to results beyond one country, or even one region. In North Africa, for example, Libya's leader took stock of Saddam Hussein's fate, and decided that voluntary disarmament was the better path. In December, Libya agreed to disclose and eliminate all of its chemical and nuclear weapons programs, as well as all ballistic missiles beyond a 300 km range and a 500 kg payload – and to submit to inspections and monitoring by the United States and international organizations, so Libya's compliance can be confirmed.

Last week, Libya handed over 55,000 pounds of equipment and documents to the U.S. relating to its nuclear and missile programs, including long-range ballistic missile guidance sets and centrifuge parts used to for uranium enrichment. The week before, Libya handed over a payload of sensitive documents, detailing the development of its nuclear weapons program – and Libyan authorities are providing information that will not only assist with the dismantling their WMD programs, but also in stopping the worldwide proliferation of these dangerous capabilities.

As we proceed, our approach with Libya will be the same as it was with the former Soviet Union: "trust but verify." But by its actions thus far, Libya has announced to the world: we want to disarm and prove we are doing so.

Now compare Libya's recent behavior to the behavior of the Iraqi regime. Saddam Hussein also had an international obligation to give up his weapons of mass destruction, and prove that he had done so. He could have opened up his country to the world – just as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa had previously done – and just as Libya is doing today.

¹ Ian Brzezinski says the term "North Atlantic area" includes the Balkans and the United States, where NATO has conducted recent operations.

² Including the United States.

DRAFT 2

Instead, he chose the path of deception and defiance. He repeatedly forced UN inspectors out of the country – and did everything in his power to undermine their work when they were allowed in. He continued to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue under U.N. sanctions, when he could have had those sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had disarmed.

His regime passed up the “final opportunity” afforded him by Resolution 1441 to prove that his programs were ended and his weapons were destroyed.

Not only did he pass up that final opportunity – his defiance continued even *after the fall of his regime*. As Secretary Powell pointed out recently op-ed, the Iraq Survey Group found evidence that:

[QUOTE] “... elaborate efforts to shield illicit programs persisted... even after the collapse of Hussein’s regime.... In a wide range of offices, laboratories, and companies suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction, computer hard drives were destroyed, files were burned, and equipment was carefully cleansed of all traces of use – and done so in a pattern that was clearly deliberate and selective, rather than random.” [UNQUOTE]

Think about that: even after the statues of Saddam Hussein were falling in Baghdad, the Iraqi regime continued to hide and destroy evidence.

We may never know why Saddam Hussein chose the destruction of his regime over peaceful disarmament. But we know this much for certain: it was *his* choice. And if he had chosen differently – if the Iraqi regime had taken the steps Libya is now taking – *there would have been no war*.

The last 12 months have provided the world’s rogue regimes with two different models of behavior – the path of cooperation and the path of defiance. And the lessons of those experiences should be clear: the pursuit of weapons of mass murder can carry with it costs. By contrast, leaders who abandon the pursuit of those weapons, and the means to deliver them, will find an open path to better relations with the and free nations of the world.³

As the recently released EU Security Strategy makes clear, the “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security... [and] the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction.”

On September 11th, we saw the willingness of freedom’s adversaries to kill on a massive scale – and in the months since, the killing has continued: in Bali and Baghdad, Jakarta and Jerusalem, Casablanca and Riyadh, and Mombassa and

³ Last two sentences in this paragraph are based on language from both President’s announcement of the Libya agreement and Vice President Cheney’s address in Davos.

DRAFT 2

Istanbul. Unless the spread of these dangerous capabilities is stopped, such attacks will likely only grow bolder – and still more deadly.

In a world where a small minority of extremists have the power to kill innocents on a mass scale, every other hope of mankind is threatened – our aspirations for economic growth, opportunity for our people, and the alleviation of disease. What good are our efforts to slow the global spread of AIDS, for example, if terrorist networks and terrorist states are successful in gaining access to virulent bio-weapons that can kill millions? What happens to prosperity, when years of progress can be wiped out in an instant by a WMD attack that destroys millions of jobs, billions in lost GDP, and untold innocent lives?

To prevent the spread of these weapons to terrorist networks, we must work together to accomplish three important goals:

First, we must strengthen multi-lateral cooperation to stop spread of WMD.

That is why, in May of last year, the United States and 10 other like-minded countries launched the PSI – the Proliferation Security Initiative – a new international coalition to interdict shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials at sea, in the air, and on the ground.

The PSI was launched with Australia, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, France, and Spain – and in the months since Canada, Denmark, Norway, Singapore, and Turkey have all joined the effort. Together, we have already had several important successes – including interdictions of nuclear and chemical weapons components. We urge all governments to consider how they might contribute, or expand their contributions, to this important initiative.

Second, we must strengthen our alliances – and alliance capabilities. The United States is transforming both our Armed Forces, and our global force posture – so we can improve our ability to work with our Allies and to meet our security commitments. NATO is also transforming – launching the new NATO Response Force and the new Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Battalion.

But if these are to become real Alliance capabilities, then Allies must be willing to make the necessary reforms and investments. Today, the trends are not promising. ⁴[Germany recently announced that it is closing 100 unneeded military bases – a positive step. But instead of investing those savings in new 21st century military capabilities, it has also announced that it is reducing its defense budget by some \$33 billion. Or take the study recently released by Canadian university, which concluded that if Canada does not turn around the decline in its defense budget, its air force and its army or navy may *cease to exist* by 2013.]

⁴ You indicated we should leave this in for now, but that you might cut it.

DRAFT 2

The problems will only grow worse if the decline in Allied defense investments is not reversed. The credibility and relevance of the NATO Alliance depend on it.

Third, we must wage war not just on terrorist networks, but also on the ideology of hatred that they seek to spread. Professor Bernard Lewis has put it eloquently: "The war against terror and the quest for freedom are inextricably linked, and neither can succeed without the other."

That is why President Bush recently outlined what he calls a "forward strategy for freedom in the Middle East." Promoting democratic change in this region is a matter of international security. Because, as he put it, "so long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export."

Governments across the Middle East and North Africa are beginning to see the need for change. Morocco now has a diverse new Parliament, and the King has called for it to extend rights to women. In Bahrain, citizens recently elected their own Parliament for the first time in three decades. Oman has extended the right to vote to all its adult citizens. Qatar has adopted a new constitution. Yemen has a multiparty system. Kuwait now has a directly-elected national assembly. And Jordan held historic elections last summer.

We must encourage still further progress – and NATO can make an important contribution to this initiative. Through the expansion of the Alliance, NATO has helped the nations emerging from the "East Bloc" transform their societies and claim their rightful place in the West. And through the Partnership for Peace, it has helped build relationships and linkages with many newly independent nations that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

By engaging these countries, NATO has been a catalyst for military reform. But because ours is an alliance of democracies, the desire to be more closely associated with this alliance of free nations makes it a catalyst for political reform as well. We have seen evidence of this in Georgia, where democratic progress is taking place – progress that Georgia's new leaders insist was inspired by the Georgian people's desire to turn West and become a full member of the community of free nations.

Our challenge is to think creatively about how we can harness the power of this Alliance to contribute to similar democratic progress across in the Middle East. For example, we should look at ways to expand NATO's "Mediterranean Dialogue" so the Alliance can better engage the nations of North Africa and the Middle East. This should be at the top of our agenda in Istanbul.

**

Let me close by saying that our objective is not simply to defend the free world, but to expand it. In 1941 there were only about a dozen democracies on the face of the Earth. Yet by the close of the 20th century, there were more than

DRAFT 2

120. And now, at the start of the 21st century, two more nations – Iraq and Afghanistan -- have thrown off the shackles of tyranny and joined the ranks of the free.

Some have expressed doubt about the capacity of Middle Eastern people for democracy and self-government. Many said the same thing about Germany and Japan at the end of World War II. But because the Allies were steadfast, freedom did take root in both countries. And today Japan has sent its Self-Defense Forces to Iraq – the first time Japanese forces have deployed outside the country since World War II. Germany has sent its forces to help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. And many of the recently liberated nations of Europe have been at the forefront of the effort to help the Iraqi and Afghan peoples recover their freedoms and maintain them.

It teaches us an important lesson: that the seeds of freedom, when planted, can do more than simply take root where they're sown. They can have the power to spread freedom across the globe.

That is why it is so critical that our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan succeed. Because once seeds of freedom are sown in Middle Eastern soil, they can spread across the region – just as they here across Europe during the course of the last half-century.

Those are our goals: strong and capable alliances; a growing coalition to stop the spread of weapons of mass murder; and a free Middle East, where there is opportunity for all, and the ideology of terror holds no attraction for a new generation brought up in the bright light of freedom.

Thank you. I'd be happy to respond to questions.

##



7:14 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT: Hearings on **Active/Reserve Forces**

Give me a time table on this David Chu memo on when I'm going to get told what things we are going to do, and when I will be getting briefed.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.04

Attach: Snowflake to Chu 11/3/03 Re: Hearings on Active/Reserve Forces

Please respond by: _____

1 | 10 | 04

326

5 Jan 04

11/5/03
1139

11/3
October 30, 2003

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hearings on Active/Reserve Forces

Unless there is a good reason not to, I am inclined to ask Congress for hearings this year on the issue of the Active/Reserve **mix**, stress on the Reserve component and the like. We have a lot of members who want to help, and we want these issues examined in a systematic way.

Please get back to me quickly with a proposal after you have discussed it with Larry Di Rita and Powell Moore.

Thanks.

.....
Please **respond** by 11/7/03

11-L-0559/OSD/21911

12/31
SecDef - Based on the SLRG meeting just prior to the holidays, in which this issue was discussed, we are developing a series of proposals with Dr. Chu, Joint Staff, etc. Next SLRG will review it. Pete Geren has the lead.
U21069 / 03
DR

7:30 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT:

Let's find out who actually gave the order on the aircraft issue and who took the order as though it were valid and executed on it. I am referring to the AIR CAP cover that just took place in the last week without my knowing about it.

I think someone said it was transportation safety and they must have given it to someone in NORAD. We've got to get that ironed out so it doesn't happen again.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.08

Please respond by:

1/15/04

384

5 Jan 04

January 21, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Congressman Blunt

Any News?

V/R
Jaymie

Burnan
213

326

Congressman Blunt saw me last night and said he would like to visit on the Guard and Reserve sometime. Why don't we get him down for breakfast or lunch. He is impressive.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012104-1

.....
Please respond by 2/13/04

OSD 01686-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21913

21Jan07

January 21, 2004

TO: ~~Powell Moore~~
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressman Blunt

Any News?
i/r

Jaymie

Durham
213

Congressman Blunt saw me last night and said he would like to visit on the Guard and Reserve sometime. Why don't we get him down for breakfast or lunch. He is impressive.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012104-1

.....
Please respond by 2/13/04

OSD 01686-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21914

1/14
0800

120

1/30

January 13, 2004

320.2

TO: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Congressional Breakfast on End Strength

We are thinking about having a bipartisan breakfast with Ike Skelton, possibly Murtha and maybe Ellen Tauscher, some of the leaders in the "end strength" issue. We could get Schoomaker, Chu and Myers or Pace and have a discussion—to start to get them to consider this key issue before the season opens.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011304-14

Please respond by 1/23/04

0 0 01689-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21915

13 JAN 04

1/14
0800

1/30

January 13, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Breakfast on End Strength

Powell:
Duke
Jaymie
Burns
2/3

We are thinking about having a bipartisan breakfast with Ike Skelton, possibly Murtha and maybe Ellen Tauscher, some of the leaders in the "end strength" issue. We could get Schoomaker, Chu and Myers or Pace and have a discussion—to start to get them to consider this key issue before the season opens.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011304-14

Please respond by 1/23/04

OSD 01689-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21916



February 2, 2004

*Adverse
copy provided*

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
CC: *DOV Zakheim*
SUBJECT: Halliburton

I have to be ready to answer questions on Halliburton. Apparently there is a new story today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020204-21

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 01691-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21917

1/5/04

January 2, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
 LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Issues

Attached is a piece of paper Joyce gave me from a meeting she had in Norfolk.

It is pretty clear that one of the toughest-problems we have is to see that there are internal communications that are effective.

What process do we have to train people and to monitor and track and see what kind of a job people do in terms of that?

Thanks.

Attach.
 Undated paper

DHR:dh
 010204-28

.....
 Please respond by

1/30/04

cc: David Chu —

*Ask MCDP to
 prepare a note to
 Mr. Di Rita and
 LTG Craddock providing
 them our views
 S: Jan 16*



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

January 13, 2004 3:00 PM

FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Snowflake — Military Issues

- The Secretary of Defense requested information on the availability, quality, and cost of telecommunication services for deployed Service members (**Tab A**).
- U.S. Central Command provides two phone services that enable Service members to call anywhere in the world — *Health, Morale and Welfare* (HMW) calls using official phone lines and *unofficial telecommunications* provided by the Armed Service Exchanges. HMW calls are made during non-duty hours so as not to interfere with the mission. On average, 50,000 HMW calls are made each day, representing **45** percent of all calls made using official phones. Nearly 4.4 million calling minutes each month are connected using unofficial telephone service.
- HMW calls use the Defense Information System Network (DISN) and unofficial calls use the AT&T commercial network. Both systems are supported with commercial uplinks and bandwidth support, which are constrained by limited infrastructure. HMW calls are netted to installations in the U.S. where they are switched to the commercial network that the service member designates. These connections may result in interference, especially when using satellite telephones.
- The cost per calling minute is more expensive for unofficial calls than for HMW calls. HMW calls to the U.S. are charged at domestic rates (from U.S. point of entry to service member's home), while unofficial calls are charged at international rates (from overseas point of origin to Service member's home). Unofficial calling rates range from \$0.19 per minute to \$1.00 per minute. The Armed Services Exchanges and AT&T are continually working to reduce the unofficial calling rates.
- The PDUSD(P&R) initiated a pre-deployment information campaign to prepare Service members, families and friends for the unavoidable challenges of communicating from theater. The Armed Services are working to improve the availability of telecommunication services, acceptance of gifts or donations of calling cards, and to lower the calling rates.



11-L-0559/OSD/21919

OSD 01735-04

- The FY 2004 National Defense Authorization Act requires that prepaid phone cards, or equivalent telecommunications benefit, be provided without cost to Service members serving in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The telecommunications benefit may not exceed \$40 or 120 calling minutes each month. The military departments are working on ways to measure the current level of “free service” provided through the DoD official phone service and donations and, if there is a shortfall, are determining other methods to fully implement the Act.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For Information Only.

COORDINATION: Tab B

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: George McNamara, Resale Activities & NAF Policy, ODUSD(MCFP),

(b)(6)

GM
1/17/04

TAB

A

1/5/04

January 2, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Issues

Attached is a piece of paper Joyce gave me from a meeting she had in Norfolk.

It is pretty clear that one of the toughest problems we have is to see that there are internal communications that are effective.

What process do we have to train people and to monitor and track and see what kind of a job people do in terms of that?

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated paper

DHR:dh
010204-28

.....
Please respond by

1/30/04

cc: David Chu —

*Ask MCDP to
prepare a note to
Mr. Di Rita and
LTG Craddock providing
them our views
5: Jan 16*

11-L-0559/OSD/21922

*Don't
given to me
at Norfolk
for your
to see*

Information flow: The overarching issue is that leadership needs to **keep** soldiers informed. **As much** information **as** reasonable **should be** put **out**, and the chain of command should ensure it is disseminated. Then, when information is **unknown** or can't be passed out later it isn't such an important issue. Soldiers **will** have **learned** to **trust** the leadership.

Reservist:

- Activated and prepared, then sat locked on Fort Eustis, little training, not allowed to leave for a month ...**no** details of what was happening until nearly the last minute before deployment.
- While waiting to deploy, and locked down on post, were put in ancient barracks that for much of the time had no toilets or running water.
- Told the unit would return in the Fall, then changed dates, then decided that half the unit would return, half stay until the Spring. Now it appears the unit will finally return to the US (the half of the unit still remaining.)
- Reservists are very uncertain about their return...there are many rumors that the Army will leave them alone a month or so then re-mobilize. High level leadership should do what it can to explain the needs of the Service and what will probably happen.

Active:

- Never clear what **process** was used to tell **people** what **was** going on. One of the first units to deploy, then watched exact same units come after and very quickly redeploy to their home stations. (Probably are good reasons...soldier deserve to know.)
- Followed this up** with many uncertainties **about** final redeployment schedule.
- Pace **of** operations...some units still in Iraq are being alerted about deployment to other regions such as the Balkans or Afghanistan soon after their return. May be necessary, but doesn't do much for morale.

All:

- Telephones...AT&T are gouging the soldiers, often not easy to find; and hard to make connections in the States. Connections, when made, are very poor. Fort Benning operators are being wonderful helping soldiers make connections.
- Environmental leave policy should **be** stated...let soldiers, officers and enlisted, **know** what the policy is **and** where they stand.

Intel Com

TAB

B

**COORDINATION
SNOWFLAKE – MILITARY ISSUES**

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

CRA 1-21-09

11-L-0559/OSD/21925



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 15 2004

The Right Honorable Geoffrey Hoon, M.P.
Secretary of State for Defence
Room 203, Old War Office Building
Whitehall, London SW1A 2EU
UNITED KINGDOM

Dear Geoff:

Thank you for responding to my question on the status of negotiations for an Article 98 agreement. Your letter confirms my understanding of where negotiations stand.

It is true that the U.S. has not provided a new Article 98 text that comports with the EU Guiding Principles. We have offered several options informally that we hoped could bridge our differences, but so far we have been unsuccessful.

The U.S. has now signed Article 98 agreements with 82 countries; thirty-four of these agreements are with Parties to the ICC Treaty. There is a growing base of support for the view that the U.S. Article 98 agreement text is consistent with the ICC Treaty.

As you know, it is a matter of principle that the U.S. Government protect all Americans and that the U.S. should not be subject to a treaty of which we are not a party. We are not trying to interfere with the right of any other country to participate in the ICC.

I believe the ICC issues of controversy between us are matters of interpretation that should be resolvable consistent with the key interests of the U.S. and UK. Various lawyers have various views on the relevant language, but I think that the political will to accommodate each other on our respective key interests should allow us to reach agreement. It's important that we do so.

Can we designate high level policy people from our departments and from State and the FCO to meet with instructions to find a solution?

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/21929

OSD 01740-04

015

15 MAR 04

28 JAN 04



720

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

Administration
& Management

ACTION MEMO

FEB 5 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration And Management


SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

- In an October 27 snowflake (Tab E) you expressed concern about the currency of DoD directives. Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) were asked to conduct a review of all Directives under their purview to determine if they should be canceled, revised or continued in effect (Tab D).
- On December 16 you were provided with a listing of the 653 Directives presently in effect, including 50 the PSAs identified for cancellation and 334 they earmarked for revision.
- To assist PSAs in this effort and convey a sense of urgency, I implemented an accelerated coordination timeline, communicated in a January 30 memo (Tab C). To date, only 53 of the 384 Directives identified for cancellation or revision have been submitted for coordination. To get this done by the April 5 target date, we need to start seeing significant numbers moving into the staffing process very soon.
- In response to your snowflakes of January 31 (TAB B), regarding Service and Joint Staff directives, recommend we follow up with a memo for your signature directing them to update and ensure compliance once the DoD directives have been revised.
- To demonstrate your personal interest in this effort, the memorandum for your signature at Tab A tells the PSAs to take a personal interest in this endeavor and to release their proposed revisions and cancellations for coordination as soon as possible.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments :
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/21930

Mirelson, Pam, CIV, WHS/ESCD

From: Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2004 10:51 AM
To: Mirelson, Pam, CIV, WHS/ESCD
Subject: RE: Memo for SecDef Sig on Directives

Thanks
Brett

-----Original Message-----

From: Mirelson, Pam, CIV, WHS/ESCD
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2004 10:51 AM
To: Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL
Subject: Memo for SecDef Sig on Directives

Brett,

Jaymie Durnan had sent the paper back to us saying we should move the suspense to get revisions/cancellations into coordination from April 5 to Mar 15. Larry Curry had a hallway conversation with him and explained that making it too soon would be counterproductive. Jaymie agreed to an April 1 suspense. We have changed the memo and returned it to the ExecSec.

Pam

11-L-0559/OSD/21931



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

I understand that

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

MARCH 15, 2004

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. *You* identified 384 Directives that you intend to revise or cancel, and I expect these actions to be completed by April 5, 2004. To date, very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared. ~~At this rate, our goal for updating and disseminating the Department's policies is in jeopardy.~~

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.



11-L-0559/OSD/21932

*Change it,
otherwise you
will get it
by then.*



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

JAN 30 2004

Administration
& Management


MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago, you reviewed the DoD Directives under your purview and identified 384 that you intend to revise or cancel. The suspense for completion of these actions is April 5, 2004. To date, only 49 revisions or cancellations have been prepared and disseminated for coordination. At this rate, our goal for updating and disseminating the Department's policy will not be met.

It is imperative that draft revisions or cancellations of all the directives you earmarked be placed in coordination as soon as possible. To assist you in this effort, I have approved an initiative to accelerate the coordination process. Effective immediately the maximum amount of time allowed for coordination is 20 working days from the date a directive is formally proposed for revision or cancellation.

As the Secretary so aptly stated, "September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake." I ask that you engage your organization with the same sense of urgency as we approach this deadline. Questions may be referred to Mr. Neeley at (b)(6)


Raymond E. DuBois

11-L-0559/OSD/21933



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

OCT 29 2003

Administration
& Management

**MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION**

SUBJECT: Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

Reference: DA&M Memorandum, "Mandatory Review of DoD Issuances for Currency,"
dated December 30, 2002.

In the referenced memorandum, addressees were requested to **certify** the **currency** of all DoD issuances under their cognizance that were over five years old. Since that **effort** was initiated, the Secretary of Defense has noted out-of-date DoD Directives and **has** directed that they **be** reviewed and recertified for **currency**. **He is** concerned that **the** DoD Directives should reflect recent actions **taken** within the Department to respond **to** world events and the realignment **of** functions.

Because **the** Secretary **has asked** for a **current** listing **of** all directives, a **timely** review and certification of each directive (see attached list) **is required by the responsible** Principal **Staff** Assistant (PSA). **Your** response is **requested** by November 21, 2003, and shall indicate **whether the listed** directives **are current, need revision or** should be cancelled. Upon receipt and compilation of **your** input, **this** information **will** be provided to **the** Secretary.

For directives no longer current, proposed **revisions** should be **processed through the** DoD Directives System for signature **by the** Deputy **Secretary of** Defense within **90 days**. **Requests** to cancel a directive should **be processed within 45 days**. **The support** and cooperation of coordinating officials are requested to ensure **that** these suspenses **are met**.

In order **to** facilitate implementation of a systematic **review** process **for maintaining the** currency of DoD Directives, **the mandatory** review period **for** directives in DoD Directive 5025.1, "DoD Directives System," **will be reduced from five years to two years**. This change is effective immediately and **will be reflected in a forthcoming revision to that Directive**.

11-L-0559/OSD/21934

Your certification of the listed directives should be provided to the Directives and Records Division, C&D, 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 501 , Arlington, VA 22202. My action officer is Mr. H.D. Neeley, chief, Directives and Records Division, who may be contacted at telephone (b)(6) or by e-mail at hdneeley@c&whs.mil.


Raymond E. DeBorja

Director

Attachment:
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/21935

✓
October 27, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Old Directives

I don't know if you were in the room when we found out that the SOLIC directive is dated 1995. It seems to me that you ought to set up a system where we review every directive that exists, listed by date and name, and let me look at it. I can select the ones I want to start having people review, so that we can get them up to date.

September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake. We owe it to ourselves. It may require getting some outside outfit like IDA to assist with a systematic review. I am sure there are a lot of directives.

Please let me know, and let's put some structure into this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:db
102403-17

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/21936

U18026 /03



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. You identified 384 Directives that you intend to revise or cancel. I expect these actions to be completed by April 1, 2004. I understand that, to date very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared.

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.



11-L-0559/OSD/21937

OSD 01776-04

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Where do we stand on getting all of the joint staff and chairmen of the joint chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?

Thank you.

DHR/azn
10310412

Respond by: _____

2/12/04

11-L-0559/OSD/21938

OSD 01776-04

300.8

31 Jan 04

Feb 04



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
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11-L-0559/OSD/21939

OSD 01776-04

3008

13 Feb 04

ST Feb 04

February 20
18, 2004

TO: Art Cebrowski

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
David Chu
ADM Ed Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Transformation and Leadership

381

I received your ideas concerning transformation and the DoD academies and institutions. You might want to wash it by Ed Giambastiani at JFCOM, and maybe David Chu.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/6/04 Dir, OFT memo to SecDef [OSD 01809-04]

DHR:dh
021804-2

.....
Please respond by

3/1/04

25 Feb 04

6 Feb 04

OSD 01809-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21940

219
1300

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SECRET
2004 FEB -6 PM 2:40



FORCE TRANSFORMATION

February 6, 2004, 10:00 AM

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Office of Force Transformation *AK Cebrowski 2/6*

SUBJECT: Cultural Change and Education for Transformation

- You have rightly said that culture is at the heart of transformation. We have taken the temperature of the cultural change within the force. This is included in the Strategic Transformation Appraisal that you have tasked me to do. I look forward to providing it to you.

- As revolutionaries have taught us "If you are going to break the grip of the old culture, you have to seize control of schools." Accordingly, I have begun several efforts with the Department's academic institutions. These are summarized in the enclosure.

Ultimately, cultural change is a leadership issue. The selection of the leaders for our academic institutions and schoolhouses is key to influencing the attitudes, values, and beliefs of these future leaders. I recommend that you consider this an item of personal interest as we move forward with our transformation agenda.

Enclosure:
Office of Force Transformation Initiatives

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	2/16
SR MA CRADDOCK	2/18
MA BUCCHINO	2/18
EXECSEC MARIOTT	2/9

11-L-0559/OSD/21941

OSD 01809-04

**Overview of
Office of Force Transformation (OFT) Initiative:
Education for Transformation**

“If you are going break the grip of old culture, seize control of the schools”

Background:

One of the major challenges of transformation is developing leaders with the competencies to size, shape, operate, and **change** the force. Over the past several months OFT has held a series of workshops with key stakeholders to explore in some depth key aspects of the human elements of transformation: education, innovation, and cultural change.

These workshops identified the previously unarticulated need for:

- **Balancing the Curriculum:** Our schools need to balance their curriculum to ensure that our future leaders are prepared to deal with the challenges of transformation: sizing, shaping, operating and changing an **information age force**.
- **An Increased Focus on Research:** Our schools’ current capabilities for cutting edge research that can support transformation are limited. A research initiative oriented to multi-enterprise collaboration can get our learning institutions working together efficiently to advance understanding of the rapid pace of globalization and technological innovation and the implications for US forces, those of our allies and coalition partners, inter-agencies and industry, as well as the forces of potential adversaries.
- **High Quality Continuing Education:** The leaders of today and those of tomorrow need and deserve access to high quality information and analytic approaches to emerging topics of significance to transformation, such as network-centric operations, innovation & experimentation, and capabilities based planning. This content needs to be provided at times and places and in formats that are convenient to our leaders, suggesting short and modular courses.

With the intent of contributing to near-term progress towards these goals, OFT is initiating the following educational initiatives:

- **Transformation Chair Program**

The Office of Force Transformation will work to establish a Transformation Chair at each major DoD learning institution (e.g., Senior Service Colleges, Military Academies, and Postgraduate Schools). The

objective is to establish an authoritative champion for transformational studies at each major institution to create courses, spur research, and help providers of existing curriculum incorporate transformational considerations. The intent of the Office of Force Transformation is to create a network of educators who are resourced and have the incentives to collaborate in the development and offering of cutting edge courses on fundamental elements of transformation. The Transformation Chairs will initially be supported by a series of Network Centric Operations case studies funded by the Office of Force Transformation. Other case studies, examining innovation, experimentation, and cultural change are planned.

- **Transformation Research Program**

The Office of Force Transformation is initiating a Transformation Research Program with the objective of providing faculty at DoD institutions with resources to perform advanced research that supports goals of Defense Transformation. This program will provide research grants in the range of \$25-200K per year. The program is structured to facilitate collaborative research between military and civilian educational institutions domestically and internationally.

- **Transformation Short Courses**

The Office of Force Transformation, in collaboration with faculty from DoD educational institutions and the institutions of selected Allied and Coalition partners, will develop and offer a range of short course on topics of significant importance to Defense Transformation. Courses to be offered in the near-term include *Network-Centric Operations* and *Innovation & Experimentation*.

- **Transformational Leadership Certificate Program**

The Office of Force Transformation, in collaboration with NDU's School for National Security Executive Education, is developing a Transformational Leadership Certificate Program. This program is geared to provide Military and Civilian leaders with a high quality educational experience. It is specifically focused on preparing future leaders with the knowledge and skills to size, shape, resource, and change the force. Courses will be offered in both short and longer formats.



FORCE TRANSFORMATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

2004 FEB -6 PM 2:27

February 6, 2004, 10:00 AM

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Office of Force Transformation *AK Cebrowski* z/c

SUBJECT: Cultural Change and Education for Transformation

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Enclosure:

Office of Force Transformation Initiatives

11-L-0559/OSD/21944

OSD 01809-04

COORDINATION: None

cc: DEPSEC

Attachment: DEPSEC

Attachment: Office of Force Transformation Initiatives

Prepared by: Terry J. Pudas, Deputy Director, Force Transformation (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21945

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913 AM

TO Tom O'Connell

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM :

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT: Rewards Program

I think \$160,000 in ~~reward~~ money is amazingly low. I can't imagine why we haven't done more.

Please see me on it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.03

Ref: Rewards Program Update

Please respond by: _____

1/15/04

✓ 1/14
1/12
Sir,
Response attached. Original
attachment included behind.
vr/cdr Noseny
1/12/03

09-01-04 18:27 IN

OSD 01813-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21948

000.5

March 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Cong. Kennedy

Please see if we ever answered Congressman Kennedy.

If we did not, please get a very good answer drafted fast, and I will sign it, or we'll get someone to sign it.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/8/04 SecDef memo (020804-26)

DHR:dh
030804-6

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

OSD 01842-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21949

IR-10

8/11/04

8/11/04

February 8, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Gen. Pete Schoomaker
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers Doug Feith
Paul Wolfowitz Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Response to Cong. Kennedy

Attached is a letter I received from Congressman Pat Kennedy, which included this article by Lucian Truscott IV, a 1969 West Point graduate. It is self-explanatory.

Likely some of the matters he raises represent only one view. On the other hand, some of them likely need to be looked into. Dick Myers—I think a note from you to the Congressman thanking him for his letter and the article to me and giving a thoughtful answer as to how these things happen and what is going on would be helpful. For a starter, the fact that the US has 115,000 troops and CPA has roughly 1,000 suggests it ought not to be a surprise that the military is able to do a great deal more than the CPA. That was the intention. The USG does not have the authority to deploy 115,000 civilians to Iraq.

In addition, it may be that we would want to get somebody to write something as an op-ed piece for the papers that carried Truscott's article.

Anyone who has a good thought on how to handle it, I would appreciate it.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/9/03 Kennedy ltr to SecDef w/attachment: Truscott, Lucian K., IV. "A Million Miles from the Green Zone to the Front Lines," *New York Times*, December 7, 2003.

DHR:dh
020804-26 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/21950

OSO 01842-04



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20616

PATRICK J. KENNEDY
RHODE ISLAND


December 9, 2003

Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
Room E880
The Pentagon, 20301-1155

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Enclosed is a copy of the **New York Times** Opinion Editorial that we discussed last evening. As I mentioned to you, I believe that you will find it an interesting perspective.

Most Sincerely,


Patrick J. Kennedy
Member of Congress

*PS After having visited Kirkuk
this opinion piece captures my very
same impressions of how we need to
give people like Col Mayville more room
for his own to speak and he can tell
us that the job is done by those who
know what needs to be done*

11-L-0559/OSD/21951

A 86-2

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nytimes.com

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December 7, 2003

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

A Million Miles From the Green Zone to the Front Lines

By LUCIAN K. TRUSCOTT IV

MOSUL, Iraq

Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the Army's 101st Airborne Division, has a large office on the second floor of what was once Saddam Hussein's northernmost palace in Mosul. He's got a desk **and** some chairs and a G.I. cot in an ornate room with marble floors and a tent-like ceiling fashioned from a latticework of wooden beading. The palace is yet another of Saddam Hussein's many-columned, Mussolini-style monsters, faced with **the** dun-colored polished stone and multihued marble he favored. The entire division staff is **billeted** in **two** bedrooms upstairs and **in** a cavernous **marble** basement **that appears** to have been a sort of spa/bunker.

The other day I told General Petraeus about a young specialist fourth class I had met while waiting for a military flight out of **Baghdad**. The specialist was a college student from Iowa whose National Guard unit had been called **up for** the war. He had told **me** about a **prolonged** firefight that **took place** the **week** before, outside **Camp** Anaconda on the outskirts of the city of Balad, 40 **miles** from Baghdad.

"We began **taking** small arms fire about 8 a.m., from **Abu** Shakur, the village just north **of** the base camp's gate," the **specialist** told me. "Our guys **responded with** small arms and then mortars. Someone on **patrol** outside the **wire** got wounded, and they sent Bradley Fighting Vehicles out, and they hit the Bradleys pretty hard, **and** by 10 a.m., **they were** firing 155-millimeter howitzers, and attack helicopters were firing missiles into **the** village, **and** you could see tracers and **smoke** everywhere.

11-L-0559/OSD/21952

A 86 - 3

"I had just gotten off a **night** shift, and I **was** sitting outside my tent about 100 meters from the gate in my pajamas reading a book. Right near me, guys **were** doing laundry and standing in line for chow. I was sitting **there thinking**: 'Have we had wars like this before? Shouldn't we drop everything and **help**? I mean, **we were** spectators! **What** kind of **war** is this, **sir**?' "

General Petraeus, who graduated from West Point in 1974, just in time **to** witness the ignominious end to the war in Vietnam, didn't say anything. **But** slowly, and it seemed, unconsciously, his head began to nod, and his mind seemed far, far away. It seemed clear he knew the answer: yes, specialist, **we** have had wars like this before.

Commanding generals have had lavishly appointed offices before, as well. **My** grandfather, Gen. Lucian K. Truscott Jr., occupied the Borghese Palace **when** his VI Corps swept into Rome in **1943**. His aide kept a record of the meals prepared for him by his three **Chinese** cooks, while every day **dozens** — and on **some** days, hundreds — of his soldiers perished on the front lines at Anzio, only a **few miles** away from his villa on the beach.

So there may be nothing new about this war and the way we are **fighting it** — with troops on day and night patrols from base camps being hit by a **nameless**, faceless enemy they cannot see and whose language they do not speak. **However**, the disconnect between the **marbled** hallways of the Coalition Provisional Authority palaces in Baghdad and the grubby camp in central Mosul where I spent last **week** as a guest of Bravo Company, First Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, is profound, and perhaps unprecedented.

An colonel in Baghdad (who will go nameless here for obvious reasons) **told** me just after I arrived that senior **Army** officers feel every order they **receive** is delivered with **next** November's election in mind, so there is little doubt **at** and near the top about who **is** really being used for what over here. The resentment in **the** ranks toward the civilian leadership in Baghdad **and** back in Washington is palpable. Another officer described the two camps, military and civilian, inhabiting the heavily fortified, gold-leafed presidential palace **inside** the so-called Green Zone in Baghdad, as "a divorced couple who won't leave the house." ✓

Meanwhile in Mosul, the troops of Bravo Company bunker down amid smells of diesel **fuel** and burning trash and rotting vegetables and dishwater and human waste from open sewers running through **the** maze of stone and mud alleyways in **the** Old City across the street. Bravo Company's area of operations would be **an** assault on

the senses even without the nightly rattle of AK-47 fire in the nearby streets, and the two rocket-propelled grenade rounds fired at the soldiers a couple of weeks ago.

It is difficult enough for the 120 or so men of Bravo Company to patrol their overcrowded sector of this city of maybe two million people and keep its streets safe and free of crime. But from the first day they arrived in Mosul, Bravo Company and the rest of the 101st Airborne Division were saddled with dozens of other missions, all of them distinctly nonmilitary, and most of them made necessary by the failure of civilian leaders in Washington and Baghdad to prepare for the occupation of Iraq.

The 101st entered Mosul on April 22 to find the city's businesses, civil ministries and utilities looted and its people rioting in the streets. By May 5, the soldiers had supervised elections for mayor and city council. On May 11, they oversaw the signing of harvest accords and the division of wheat profits among the region's frequently warring factions of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians. On May 14, a company commander of Alpha Company, Third Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment of the 101st re-opened the Syrian border for trade, and by May 18, soldiers had largely restored the flow of automobile gas and cooking propane, shortages of which had been causing riots.

Since that time, soldiers from the 101st have overseen tens of millions of dollars worth of reconstruction projects: drilling wells for villages that had never had their own water supply; rebuilding playgrounds and schools; repairing outdated and broken electrical systems; installing satellite equipment needed to get the regional phone system up and running; restoring the city's water works; repairing sewers and in some cases installing sewage systems in neighborhoods that had never had them; policing, cleaning and reorganizing the ancient marketplace in the Old City; setting up a de facto social security system to provide "retirement" pay to the 110,000 former Iraqi soldiers in the area; screening and, in most cases, putting back to work most of the former Baath Party members who fled their jobs at the beginning of the war.

So many civil projects were reported on at a recent battle update briefing I attended that staff officers sometimes sounded more like board members of a multinational corporation than the combat-hardened infantry soldiers they are.

Why were the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division — who were trained to clean latrines but not to build them — given the daunting task of making the cities and villages of northern Iraq work again? Because when they were ordered 300 miles north of Baghdad after the city fell, there was no one else around to do it. Even

today, seven months later, it is still largely the job of the soldiers in Bravo Company and the other units of the 101st to make the system work in Mosul and its outlying **provinces**.

The Coalition Provisional Authority nominally **has the** job of "rebuilding" Iraq — using \$20 billion or so of the \$78 billion that recently **flew** out of America's deficit-plagued coffers. But during the time the 101st has been in Mosul, **three** regional coalition authority directors have come and gone. Only recently, long after the people of Mosul elected their mayor and city council, **was** a civilian American governance official sent to the area. And, according to the division leadership, not a **nickel** of the \$20 billion controlled by the provisional authority **has reached** them.

"First they want a planning contractor to come in here, and even that step takes weeks to get approved," one officer in Mosul complained of the civilian leadership. "The planners were up here for months doing assessments, and then **more** weeks **go** by because everything has to **be** approved by Baghdad. If we sat around waiting for the **C.P.A.** and its civilian contractors to do it, we still wouldn't have electricity and **running** water in Mosul, so we just took our own funds and our engineers and infantry muscle and **did** it ourselves. We didn't have the option of waiting **or the** guys in the Green Zone."

But the guys in the Green Zone seem to have plenty of time on their hands. The place is something to behold, surrounded on one side by the heavily patrolled Tigris River, and on the three others by a 15-foot-high concrete wall backed by several rows of concertina razor wire and a maze of lesser concrete barriers. There's only one way in and out, through a heavily fortified checkpoint near **the** Jumhuriya Bridge guarded by tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles **from the First Armored** Division and an invisible array of British commando teams. More tanks **guard** key intersections inside the walls, machine gun towers **line the wide** boulevards, snipers **man firing** positions atop palaces **great** and small.

In all, hundreds of uniformed soldiers and heavily armed civilian security guards stand watch all day, every day over a display of **grim** garishness that would have given Liberace nightmares. If you're curious about how your tax dollars **are** being spent in Baghdad, you should get one of the many colonels strolling about the **Green Zone** to take you on a tour of the rebuilt duck pond across the road **from the** marble and gold-leafed palace serving as headquarters of an Army brigade. As I went to sleep one night a couple of weeks ago in the Green Zone, listening to the gurgle of the duck pond fountain and the comforting roar of **Black Hawk** helicopters patrolling overhead, it occurred to me **that** it was the safest night I've

spent in about 25 years.

Which was a blessing for me, but a curse on the war effort. The super-defended Green Zone is the biggest, most secure American base camp in **Iraq**, but there is little connection between the troops in the field and the bottomless pit of planners and deciders who live inside the palace. Soldiers from the 101st tell me that they waited months for the Bechtel Corporation to unleash its corporate might in northern Iraq. "Then one of the Bechtel truck convoys got ambushed on the way up here three weeks ago, and one of the security guys got wounded," an infantryman told me. "They abandoned their trucks on the spot and pulled out, and we haven't seen them since."

That event occurred in November, the deadliest month of the war for the 101st, which had more than 20 of its soldiers killed in guerrilla attacks. Not given the option of abandoning the job and pulling out when the bullets start flying, soldiers of the 101st have stepped up their defensive patrols to around 250 a day and undertaken an aggressive campaign of cordon and search missions aimed at enemy strongholds in central Mosul and the outlying villages to the south near the Syrian border. Incidents involving attacks on troops with small arms and improvised explosive devices have been cut from more than 20 a day to fewer than 10. And last week the division took 107 enemy prisoners in a series of attacks on enemy strongholds in its area.

Still, Mosul and the rest of northern Iraq — an enormous area stretching from the flat desert at the Syrian border on the southwest to the mountainous border with Iran on the northeast — is a very dangerous place. Three 101st soldiers have been killed since I arrived, two by small arms and one by mortars. Three weeks ago, 17 soldiers flying home for leave were killed when an attack with rocket-propelled grenades took down two Black Hawk helicopters.

"It's really not helpful when people down in Baghdad and politicians back in Washington refer to the 'disorganized and ineffective' enemy we supposedly face," said one young officer, as we walked out of a battalion battle briefing that had been concerned largely with the tactics of an enemy force that is clearly well organized and very, very effective. After spending more than a week with the soldiers of Bravo Company, I know that they resent not only the inaccuracy of such statements, but the implication that soldiers facing a disorganized and ineffective enemy have an easy job.

No matter what you call this stage of the conflict in Iraq — the soldiers call it a guerrilla war while politicians back home often refer to it misleadingly and

inaccurately as part of the amorphous "war on terror" — it is without a **doubt** a **nasty**, deadly **war**. **And** the people doing the fighting are soldiers, not the civilian employees of Kellogg, Brown & Root, or the officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority, or the visiting bigwigs from the Defense Department.

The troops in Bravo Company don't pay much attention to the rear-guard political wars being waged back in Washington, but they loved President Bush's quick visit to Baghdad on Thanksgiving. While it was clearly a political stunt, they were quick to credit the risks he took. I can **confirm** that flying in and out of Baghdad — **even** at night, when it's safest — is not for the faint of heart. A C-130 on approach takes a nervous, dodgy route, banking this way and **that**, gaining and losing altitude. Hanging onto one of those **web-seats** by only a seat belt (no shoulder harnesses), you're nearly upside down half the time — it would feel **like** the ultimate roller-coaster ride, **except** it's very much for **real**.

When Bravo Company troops roll out of the rack at 2 a.m. for **street** patrols, they walk **the** broad boulevards and narrow alleyways **spread** out as if they're walking a jungle trail — wheeling to **the** rear, sideways, back to the front; their eyes searching doorways, alleys, windows, rooftops, passing cars, even **donkey** carts — trying to keep one another alive for another day, **another** week, another **month**, whatever it takes to get home.

Meanwhile, two soldiers armed with M-4 carbines and fearsome M-249 Saws machine guns stand guard inside concrete and sandbag bunkers atop the Bravo Company camp's roof, while squads of soldiers patrol alleys with no names in Mosul's Old City, and **everyone** prays.

Lucian K. Truscott IV, a 1969 graduate of West Point, is a novelist and screenwriter.

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February 8, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Gen. Pete Schoomaker
Jerry Bremer

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Paul Wolfowitz Powell Moore

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SUBJECT: Response to Cong. Kennedy

Attached is a letter I received from Congressman Pat Kennedy, which included this article by Lucian Truscott IV, a 1969 West Point graduate. It is self-explanatory.

Likely some of the matters he raises represent only one view. On the other hand, some of them likely need to be looked into. Dick Myers—I think a note from you to the Congressman thanking him for his letter and the article to me and giving a thoughtful answer as to how these things happen and what is going on would be helpful. For a starter, the fact that the US has 115,000 troops and CPA has roughly 1,000 suggests it ought not to be a surprise that the military is able to do a great deal more than the CPA. That was the intention. The USG does not have the authority to deploy 115,000 civilians to Iraq.

In addition, it may be that we would want to get somebody to write something as an op-ed piece for the papers that carried Truscott's article.

Anyone who has a good thought on how to handle it, I would appreciate it.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/9/03 Kennedy ltr to SecDef w/attachment: Truscott, Lucian K., IV. "A Million Miles from the Green Zone to the Front Lines," *New York Times*, December 7, 2003.

DHR:dh
020804-26 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 01842-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21958

Iraq

8 Feb 04



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20616

PATRICK J. KENNEDY
RHODE ISLAND

December 9, 2003

Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
Room E880
The Pentagon, 20301-1155

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Enclosed is a copy of the New York Times Opinion Editorial that we discussed last evening. As I mentioned to you, I believe that you will find it an interesting perspective.

Most Sincerely,

Patrick J. Kennedy
Member of Congress

*PS After having visited Kirkuk
this opinion piece captures my very
some impressions / how we need to
give people like Col Mayville more room
/ his own to speak on he now has
so that the job is done by those who
know what needs to be done*

11-L-0559/OSD/21959

A 86-2

The New York Times
nytimes.com

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December 7, 2003

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

A Million Miles From the Green Zone to the Front Lines

By LUCIAN K. TRUSCOTT IV

MOSUL, Iraq

Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the Army's 101st Airborne Division, has a large office on the second floor of what was once Saddam Hussein's northernmost palace in Mosul. He's got a desk and some chairs and a G.I. cot in an ornate room with marble floors and a tent-like ceiling fashioned from a latticework of wooden beading. The palace is yet another of Saddam Hussein's many-columned, Mussolini-style monsters, faced with the dun-colored polished stone and multihued marble he favored. The entire division staff is billeted in two bedrooms upstairs and in a cavernous marble basement that appears to have been a sort of spa/bunker.

The other day I told General Petraeus about a young specialist fourth class I had met while waiting for a military flight out of Baghdad. The specialist was a college student from Iowa whose National Guard unit had been called up for the war. He had told me about a prolonged firefight that took place the week before, outside Camp Anaconda on the outskirts of the city of Balad, 40 miles from Baghdad.

"We began taking small arms fire about 8 a.m., from Abu Shakur, the village just north of the base camp's gate," the specialist told me. "Our guys responded with small arms and then mortars. Someone on patrol outside the wire got wounded, and they sent Bradley Fighting Vehicles out, and they hit the Bradleys pretty hard, and by 10 a.m., they were firing 155-millimeter howitzers, and attack helicopters were firing missiles into the village, and you could see tracers and smoke everywhere.

"I had just gotten off a night shift, and I was sitting outside my tent about 100 meters from the gate in my pajamas reading a book. Right near me, guys were doing laundry and standing in line for chow. I was sitting there thinking: 'Have we had wars like this before? Shouldn't we drop everything and help? I mean, we were spectators! What kind of war is this, sir?'"

General Petraeus, who graduated from West Point in 1974, just in time to witness the ignominious end to the war in Vietnam, didn't say anything. But slowly, and it seemed, unconsciously, his head began to nod, and his mind seemed far, far away. It seemed clear he knew the answer: yes, specialist, we have had wars like this before.

Commanding generals have had lavishly appointed offices before, as well. My grandfather, Gen. Lucian K. Truscott Jr., occupied the Borghese Palace when his VI Corps swept into Rome in 1943. His aide kept a record of the meals prepared for him by his three Chinese cooks, while every day dozens — and on some days, hundreds — of his soldiers perished on the front lines at Anzio, only a few miles away from his villa on the beach.

So there may be nothing new about this war and the way we are fighting it — with troops on day and night patrols from base camps being hit by a nameless, faceless enemy they cannot see and whose language they do not speak. However, the disconnect between the marbled hallways of the Coalition Provisional Authority palaces in Baghdad and the grubby camp in central Mosul where I spent last week as a guest of Bravo Company, First Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, is profound, and perhaps unprecedented.

An colonel in Baghdad (who will go nameless here for obvious reasons) told me just after I arrived that senior Army officers feel every order they receive is delivered with next November's election in mind, so there is little doubt at and near the top about who is really being used for what over here. The resentment in the ranks toward the civilian leadership in Baghdad and back in Washington is palpable. Another officer described the two camps, military and civilian, inhabiting the heavily fortified, gold-leafed presidential palace inside the so-called Green Zone in Baghdad, as "a divorced couple who won't leave the house."

Meanwhile in Mosul, the troops of Bravo Company bunker down amid smells of diesel fuel and burning trash and rotting vegetables and dishwater and human waste from open sewers running through the maze of stone and mud alleyways in the Old City across the street. Bravo Company's area of operations would be an assault on

the senses even without the nightly rattle of **AK-47** fire in the nearby streets, and the two rocket-propelled grenade rounds fired at the soldiers a couple of weeks ago.

It is difficult enough for the 120 ~~ox~~ so men of Bravo Company to patrol their overcrowded sector of this city of maybe two million people and keep its streets safe and free of crime. But from the first day they arrived in **Mosul**, Bravo Company and the rest of the 101st Airborne Division were saddled with dozens of other missions, all of ~~them~~ distinctly nonmilitary, and most of them made necessary by the failure of civilian leaders in Washington and Baghdad to prepare for the occupation of Iraq.

The 101st entered Mosul on April **22** to find the city's businesses, civil ministries and utilities looted and its people rioting in the streets. By May 5, the soldiers had supervised elections for mayor and city council. On May 11, they oversaw the signing of harvest accords and the division of wheat profits among the region's frequently warring factions of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians. On May 14, a company commander of Alpha Company, Third Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment of the 101st re-opened the Syrian border for trade, and by May 18, soldiers had largely restored the flow of automobile gas and cooking propane, shortages of which had been causing riots.

Since that time, soldiers from the 101st have overseen tens of millions of dollars worth of reconstruction projects: drilling wells for villages that had never had their own water supply; rebuilding playgrounds and schools; repairing outdated and broken electrical systems; installing satellite equipment needed to get the regional phone system up and running; restoring the city's water works; repairing sewers and in some cases installing sewage systems in neighborhoods that had never had them; policing, cleaning and reorganizing the ancient marketplace in the Old City; setting up a de facto social security system to provide "retirement" pay to the 110,000 former Iraqi soldiers in the area; screening and, in most cases, putting back to work most of the former ~~Beath~~ Party members who fled their jobs at the beginning of the war.

So many civil projects were reported on at a recent battle update briefing I attended that staff officers sometimes sounded more like board members of a multinational corporation than the combat-hardened infantry soldiers they are.

Why were the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division — who were trained to clean latrines but not to build them — given the daunting task of making the cities and villages of northern Iraq work again? Because when they were ordered 300 miles north of Baghdad after the city fell, there was no one else around to do it. Even

today, seven months later, it is still largely the job of the soldiers in Bravo Company and the other units of the 101st to make the system work in Mosul and its outlying provinces.

The Coalition Provisional Authority nominally has the job of "rebuilding" Iraq — using \$20 billion or so of the \$78 billion that recently flew out of America's deficit-plagued coffers. But during the time the 101st has been in Mosul, three regional coalition authority directors have come and gone. Only recently, long after the people of Mosul elected their mayor and city council, was a civilian American governance official sent to the area. And, according to the division leadership, not a nickel of the \$20 billion controlled by the provisional authority has reached them.

"First they want a planning contractor to come in here, and even that step takes weeks to get approved," one officer in Mosul complained of the civilian leadership. "The planners were up here for months doing assessments, and then more weeks go by because everything has to be approved by Baghdad. If we sat around waiting for the C.P.A. and its civilian contractors to do it, we still wouldn't have electricity and running water in Mosul, so we just took our own funds and our engineers and infantry muscle and did it ourselves. We didn't have the option of waiting on the guys in the Green Zone."

But the guys in the Green Zone seem to have plenty of time on their hands. The place is something to behold, surrounded on one side by the heavily patrolled Tigris River, and on the three others by a 3.5-foot-high concrete wall backed by several rows of concertina razor wire and a maze of lesser concrete barriers. There's only one way in and out, through a heavily fortified checkpoint near the Jumhuriya Bridge guarded by tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles from the First Armored Division and an invisible array of British commando teams. More tanks guard key intersections inside the walls, machine gun towers line the wide boulevards, snipers man firing positions atop palaces great and small.

In all, hundreds of uniformed soldiers and heavily armed civilian security guards stand watch all day, every day over a display of grim garishness that would have given Liberace nightmares. If you're curious about how your tax dollars are being spent in Baghdad, you should get one of the many colonels strolling about the Green Zone to take you on a tour of the rebuilt duck pond across the road from the marble and gold-leafed palace serving as headquarters of an Army brigade. As I went to sleep one night a couple of weeks ago in the Green Zone, listening to the gurgle of the duck pond fountain and the comforting roar of Black Hawk helicopters patrolling overhead, it occurred to me that it was the safest night I've

spent in about 25 years.

Which was a blessing for me, but a curse on the war effort. The super-defended Green Zone is the biggest, most secure American base camp in Iraq, but there is little connection between the troops in the field and the bottomless pit of planners and deciders who live inside the palace. Soldiers from the 101st tell me that they waited months for the Bechtel Corporation to unleash its corporate might in northern Iraq. "Then one of the Bechtel truck convoys got ambushed on the way up here three weeks ago, and one of the security guys got wounded," an infantryman told me. "They abandoned their trucks on the spot and pulled out, and we haven't seen them since."

That event occurred in November, the deadliest month of the war for the 101st, which had more than 20 of its soldiers killed in guerrilla attacks. Not given the option of abandoning the job and pulling out when the bullets start flying, soldiers of the 101st have stepped up their defensive patrols to around 250 a day and undertaken an aggressive campaign of cordon and search missions aimed at enemy strongholds in central Mosul and the outlying villages to the south near the Syrian border. Incidents involving attacks on troops with small arms and improvised explosive devices have been cut from more than 20 a day to fewer than 10. And last week the division took 107 enemy prisoners in a series of attacks on enemy strongholds in its area.

Still, Mosul and the rest of northern Iraq — an enormous area stretching from the flat desert at the Syrian border on the southwest to the mountainous border with Iran on the northeast — is a very dangerous place. Three 101st soldiers have been killed since I arrived, two by small arms and one by mortars. Three weeks ago, 17 soldiers flying home for leave were killed when an attack with rocket-propelled grenades took down two Black Hawk helicopters.

"It's really not helpful when people down in Baghdad and politicians back in Washington refer to the 'disorganized and ineffective' enemy we supposedly face," said one young officer, as we walked out of a battalion battle briefing that had been concerned largely with the tactics of an enemy force that is clearly well organized and very, very effective. After spending more than a week with the soldiers of Bravo Company, I know that they resent not only the inaccuracy of such statements, but the implication that soldiers facing a disorganized and ineffective enemy have an easy job.

No matter what you call this stage of the conflict in Iraq — the soldiers call it a guerrilla war while politicians back home often refer to it misleadingly and

inaccurately as **part** of the amorphous "war on terror" — it is without a doubt a nasty, deadly war. And the people doing the fighting are soldiers, not the civilian employees of Kellogg, Brown & Root, or the officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority, or the visiting bigwigs from the Defense Department.

The troops in **Bravo** Company don't **pay** much attention to the rear-guard political wars being waged back in Washington, but they loved President Bush's quick visit to Baghdad on Thanksgiving. While it was clearly a political stunt, they were quick to credit the risks he took. I can confirm that flying in and out of Baghdad — even at night, when it's safest — is not for the faint of heart. A **C-130** on approach takes a nervous, dodgy **route**, banking this way **and** that, **gaining and** losing altitude. Hanging onto one of those web-seats by only a seat belt (no shoulder harnesses), you're nearly upside down half the time — it would feel like the ultimate roller-coaster ride, except it's very much for real.

When Bravo Company troops roll out of the rack at **2 a.m.** for **street** patrols, they **walk** the broad boulevards and narrow **alleyways** spread out as if they're walking a jungle trail — wheeling to the rear, sideways, back to the front; their eyes searching doorways, alleys, windows, rooftops, passing cars, even **donkey** carts — trying to keep one another alive for another day, another week, another month, whatever it takes to get home.

Meanwhile, two soldiers armed with M-4 carbines and fearsome M-249 **Saws** machine guns stand guard inside concrete and sandbag bunkers atop the Bravo Company camp's roof, while squads of soldiers patrol alleys with no names in Mosul's Old City, and everyone **prays**.

Lucian K. Truscott IV, a 1969 graduate of West Point, is a novelist and screenwriter.

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POLICY

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

DepSecDef _____
USD(P) _____
I#/04-001439-STRAT

ACTION MEMO

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Global Posture Snowflakes

- As you will recall, the Strategic Planning Council discussed global posture on January 28th. A number of good ideas came out of that session.
- Recommend that you send out the attached snowflakes to ADM Fargo, Gen Jones, and GEN Hill to keep the momentum going on several proposed posture changes.

Mr. Secretary,

These 3 snowflakes for your signature were drafted by Andy Nothin and coordinated with LTG Cantwight, MDM Stan Szymanski and myself. Ray Durbin 2/4/04

Attachments:
Tab A—Draft snowflakes

OSD 01876-04



11-L-0559/OSD/21966

*(called Grace) 2/5
-Dik 2/5*

3202 Strategic

5 Feb 04

TO: Gen Jim Jones

c c : Gen Myers, Gen Pace, Doug Feith, GEN Schoomaker, Gen Jumper, Ray DuBois, Andy Hoehn

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  FEB 9 2004

SUBJECT: Strategic Planning Council Global Posture Follow-up

I am interested in following up on our discussion on global posture:

- Please get back to me on Stryker in Europe. Tell me more about why you think Germany is the best option. What do we get from it? How would deployment times differ from the U.S.? How would they differ from elsewhere in Europe, say Romania? What about costs? Please work closely with Pete Schoomaker.
- What is your overall plan for the Air Force in Europe? Is Turkey the right answer for fighters? Is it feasible? How much military construction would be required in Incirlik? Where else should we think about having fighters operate? What about North Africa? Would we need to keep any force structure in Spangdahlem? Please work with John Jumper.

I would like to see your proposals by 1 March. We need to include the relevant Service Chiefs.

Thanks.

.....
Please respond by _____

320.2 Strategic

9 Feb 04

5 Feb 04


720
~~FOUO~~

file

ES-0920
04/013189-ES

October 1, 2004

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Afghan Currency

Find out what has been happening with the Afghan currency - has it been stable?
Strengthening? Please give me an update.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100104-5

.....
Please respond by 10/6/04

10 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/21968

OSD 01885-05

01-10-04 17:26 0263

~~FOUO~~*file*ES-1067
04/013847

OCT 15 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: US. Contributions to NATO

We've got to find a way to make sure that our US. contributions to ISAF -- the Quick Response Force, and all of that -- are credited within NATO.

You need to **work** with Nick Burns on it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101404-31

.....
Please respond by _____

DU 11/3

*Sir
Response attached.*

*✓
Lt Col Bengel 11/2*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21969

OSD 01895-05

NATO 092

ISOTOY

2004
~~FOUO~~

File

16 Oct - 0630
Scanned

October 25, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: State Department Analysis Project

000.3

Please take a **look** at this material the CIA gave me titled "Vertical Analysis."
Apparently, it is from the Department of State.

How do you think we ought to organize the Department of Defense to do a better
job in that area?

Thanks.

Attach.
US Dept of State "Muslims for Understanding" Campaign

DHR:as
102504-13

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

2506704

OSD 01934-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21970

~~For Official Use Only~~

Content Analysis Project

① Pw
② Hw as DoD

Vertical Analysis

United States Of America
Department of State
"Muslims for Understanding" Campaign

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21971

~~For Official Use Only~~

Scope of Campaign

- Multi-media campaign
- Released in Islamic countries world wide*
- Released during Ramadan*

Objective: Positively impact Muslim's perceptions of the United States

*Source: www.state.gov, U.S. Department of State Web Site, 1/16/03 Press Briefing
Paid advertising

*Source: www.opendialogue.com, Council of American Muslims for Understanding Web Site

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21972

Foundation for Analysis

- PhaseOne's Organizational Knowledge base of what makes communications work
 - Including analysis of 250,000+ communications
- Understanding of the Islamic world
 - Access to Area Experts and 2002 Gallup Poll
- Detailed understanding of Indonesia
 - 6 months of intensive research, area experts and 2002 Gallup Poll

Scope of this Analysis

- 4 Two-minute TV ads
 - “Small Business Owner – Abdual Hammuda”
 - “Dir of NIH – Dr. Zerhouni”
 - “School Teacher – Rawia Ismail”
 - “College Student – Devianti Faridz”
- ■ One-minute ad:
 - “Paramedic and Chaplin – Malik and Muhammad”

Assumption: Recognizing that this was a multimedia campaign, we assume that these TV executions received the greatest media weight.

~~For Official Use Only~~

Analytical Process

Stage I: Systematic Deconstruction

- Separate communications into their individual building blocks.
- Code content and structure into “data.”



Stage II: Systematic Reconstruction

- Map data onto frameworks to allow analysis.
- Frameworks are an important aid in drawing reliable conclusions.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21975

~~For Official Use Only~~

Analytical Process

For this Assignment:

- Six Trained analysts
- 323 hours of analysis on the 9 minutes of video
 - 14 observations developing scripts and fine-tuning to capture production subtleties and nuances
 - 176 hours of Deconstruction
 - 148 hours of Reconstruction

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21976

~~For Official Use Only~~

Analytical Objectives

- Provide in-depth understanding of the TV ads
 - Net effect of the messages delivered
 - The campaign's strengths
 - Opportunities for strengthening

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21977

~~For Official Use Only~~

Outline for Discussion

- Impact of the campaign on the International Muslim population
- Impact of the campaign on Indonesians
- Actions Indicated

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21978

~~For Official Use Only~~

Outline for Discussion

- Impact of the campaign on the International Muslim population
 - The Communication Vehicle
 - The Communication Structure
 - The Message

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21979

~~For Official Use Only~~

Risk: Advertising as a vehicle Undermines Credibility

- On a global scale, people have been conditioned to expect that advertising persuades and sells.
- The intent of this campaign is likely to become transparent to the target – it is selling the U.S.
- For anyone with a negative attitude toward the U.S., this gives them reason to discount the message.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21980

~~For Official Use Only~~

Risk: U.S. Sponsorship Undermines Credibility

- Studies in Persuasion Theory find that it is that someone will perceive a message as credible if they mistrust the
- The close of each execution indicates that it “brought to you by the American
 - Such a broad identification thinly veils the U.S. Government’s involvement.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21981

~~For Official Use Only~~

Risk: Campaign Exploits Ramadan

- Ramadan is consistently ‘presented as the driving reason for the message – “On the occasion of Ramadan...”
- However, there are no explicit cues to convey that the individuals portrayed are observing Ramadan.
 - Some executions contain cues that are counter to Ramadan.
- There are no cues in the campaign to acknowledge the significance of Ramadan.

*As such, it may be inappropriate to
use*

~~For Official Use Only~~

Ramadan as a selling vehicle.

11-L-0559/OSD/21982

Potentially Strong Structure

- Testimonials are proven to be successful at breaking through clutter and engaging viewers by allowing viewers to identify with the spokesperson.
 - Persuasion research has shown that testimonials can help build acceptance of a message:
Trust the messenger, trust the message
 - Key to success, is for the target audience to *identify* with the messenger

There are elements in the campaign which can both facilitate as well as undermine the contribution of the testimonials.

~~For Official Use Only~~

Elements that allow the target to identify with the spokespeople

- Demographic insights
 - Each execution uses a real person, identified by name.
 - Each person is identified as Muslim.
 - Most are identified as from another predominately Muslim country – Lebanon, Algeria, Indonesia and Libya.
 - Each has a respectable profession, e.g, teacher, doctor, EMT, small business owner, college student.
 - Most are highly educated.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21984

~~For Official Use Only~~

Elements that allow the target identify with the spokespeople

Psychographic insights into their attitudes and values

In all but one commercial, the importance of Islam and Islamic tradition is upheld.

“Teacher” and “Baker” highlight the importance of family.

Each values success and prosperity.

- Small Business Owner and College Student are the strongest with these cues.
- All (except for EMT) depict individuals as being comfortably Western middle class.

~~ee Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21985

~~For Official Use Only~~

Barriers to the target identifying with the spokespeople

Each execution subtly sets up an *ingroup* – *outgroup* distinction between spokesperson and target.

Each spokesperson is introduced as an “*American Muslim*.” This highlights how they are different from the target -- “they are *American*” -- rather than highlighting their commonality -- they are Muslims.

Within specific ads, there are elements that could further prevent the target from identifying with the spokespeople.

- Example: “College Student” features going abroad to college. Only 4% of Indonesians go to College. A much smaller percent is likely to go abroad to college.

~~Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21986

~~For Official Use Only~~

Audience that is most likely to *identify* with profile

- Muslims
 - The majority of the commercials highlight the importance of Islam to each person.
 - The importance of the Muslim family is also upheld in two of the commercials.
- People who value personal success. (primarily middle and upper class)
 - Example – Baker
 - Highlights that **his self view is as a business man** – “The U.S. had a lot of opportunities for me as a business man.”
- Educated individuals, or those who see education as obtainable
 - Example – College Student

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21987

~~For Official Use Only~~

The commercials lack single-minded structure

- Memory studies show that when people are presented with multiple ideas at one time it places a burden on short-term memory.
 - This can result in the communication being cluttered and confusing.
- Communication studies find that when audiences are introduced to an idea they are interested in, but it is not developed (i.e., there is a switch-in-focus), they are likely to drop out.
- Advertising studies also find that the most successful communications are those that are focused on a single-minded idea.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21988

~~For Official Use Only~~

The commercials lack single-minded structure

Idea Tracking: Example – Director of NIH

- Commercial opens by drawing a parallel between Islam and medicine (could be a strong appeal for the target).
- Idea dropped as facts about the spokesperson are introduced.
- Commercial switches to detailed information about the NIH and its global influence.
- The commercial switches back to the Dr. with information about his home country, family and recognition by the U.S. President.
- It is only at the close that he again brings up Islam.

The lack of a single-minded focus undermines the ability of the campaign to keep the target engaged.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21989

~~For Official Use Only~~

Three Threads to the Campaign Message

1. There are no barriers to Muslims following their faith here.
2. The spokespeople value the opportunity they had to succeed in the U.S.
3. The U.S. accepts and welcomes Muslims.

Each of these has merit and can make a contribution to changing attitudes.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21990

~~For Official Use Only~~

No Barriers to Faith with Opportunity to Succeed

- Could begin to address current perceptions of life in the U.S. (Gallup 2002).
 - Those in Islamic countries felt the West doesn't have respect for Arabs, Islamic culture or religion
 - A majority had deep-seated disrespect for what they see as the West's undisciplined and immoral lifestyles
 - They felt the West has a weakening of family structure and a decline in social courtesy
 - They also felt the West is unsafe with a high crime and violence.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21991

~~For Official Use Only~~

US. Accepts and Welcomes Muslims

- The notion of "acceptance" is a potentially rich idea because it provides insight into the US.' value system.
- ***Absence of barriers*** is a step removed from that of ***acceptance*** which also encompasses embracing and welcoming into a community.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21992

~~For Official Use Only~~

U.S. Accepts and Welcomes Muslims

- Suggests that the U.S. has demonstrable respect for Muslims.
- Could address a majority of those in Islamic countries who felt the West doesn't have respect for Arabs, Islamic culture or religion (Gallup 2002).
- Could also begin to change attitudes about life in the U.S. (discussed previously).

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21993

~~For Official Use Only~~

Imbalance in how the Ideas are Presented

Dominant Focus: The spokespeople value the opportunity they had to succeed in the U.S.

Secondary Focus: There are no barriers to Muslims following their faith here.

Mild: Suggestion that the U.S. accepts and welcomes Muslims.

- This is a missed opportunity. The campaign could convey a richer idea about the values the U.S. upholds than is the dominant or secondary idea.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21994

~~For Official Use Only~~

Islam is subordinate to U.S. as a place of opportunity

e – College Student

e dominant focus is on her participation in the local TV
station.

the idea that a student can have such a significant role at a TV
station is likely to be perceived as unusual and thus will be the
more memorable aspect of the execution.

the creative energies emphasize the excitement of the TV
station, increasing likelihood that this is what will be most
remembered.

While the commercial contains cues to establish that she is
Muslim, little is present within her role at the TV station to
highlight that she is a Muslim, rather than a fellow student.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21995

~~For Official Use Only~~

Imbalance in how th Ideas are Presented

BACK-UP

The creative energy of the campaign highlights the notion that the U.S. is a place of opportunity.

Consequently, the commercials suggest that what the spokespeople value most is the ability to prosper.

As such, the campaign is likely to appeal most to those who value prosperity and opportunity.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21996

~~For Official Use Only~~

Observation

It is important to recognize that by focusing on how Muslims live in the US., there is little present to provide the audience with insights into the US.' attitudes towards Muslims *outside of its borders.*

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21997

~~For Official Use Only~~

Outline for Discussion

Impact of the campaign on the International Muslim population

- Impact of the campaign on Indonesians
- Actions Indicated.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21998

~~For Official Use Only~~

The Lens of the Indonesian Target(s)

- Tendency is to think of the target as one target, *"Indonesians."*
- The target is really several distinct subgroups.
- Each subgroup is unique.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21999

~~For Official Use Only~~

Key Insights into Indonesia and its people

Population

Fourth most populous nation in the world – 220 million+
Highly diverse (300+ languages, 350+ ethnic groups)
Largest Islamic nation – 87% of population

Economy

Slowly recovering from economic collapse of 1998
High rates of unemployment and underemployment.
Most live below the poverty level (85%)
Very small wealthy class (est. 5% of population)
Emerging Middle Class (10% of population)

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22000

~~For Official Use Only~~

Key Insights into Indonesia and its People

tion

% Literacy Rate – yet reading habits not developed
Education is highly valued
Less than 4% attend University

There is a growing move toward core Islam.*

1960 – 60% self identified as abangan (Nominal) Late '90's 80% self identified as santri (Conservative).

Islam in Indonesia has a history of tolerance and moderation.*
Movement for Shari'ah and the establishment of an Islamic state have been blunted.

Organizations represent about 30% of the Muslim population.

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 35 million members. Loosely run and decentralized.

Muhammadiyah with 30 million Muslims. Centrally controlled, tightly run.

~~Secret~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22001

*Source: Dr. Hefner

~~For Official Use Only~~

Key Insights into Indonesia and its people

Indonesians – Not One homogenous group

Muslims in Indonesia self-identify into three groups

Nominal (Abangan) 3% of the population. *Abangan* are followers of *Kebatinan* an amalgam of animist, Hindu-Buddhist, and Islamic mystical elements *

Conservative (Santri) 60% of the population Orthodox Muslims, also referred to as *putihan* (white ones), an allusion to their purity, especially contrasted to *abangan* *

Moderate (Neither Abangan or Santri) – 37% of the population

~~Secret Only~~

*Source: www.memory.loc.gov Library of Congress, Federal Research Division & Dr. Hefner

11-L-0559/OSD/22002

~~For Official Use Only~~

Key Insights into Indonesia and its people

Views about the US are mixed.*

Positive/Neutral Attitudes re US

There was tertiary split among those who had favorable and unfavorable opinions of the U.S with 28% Favorable, 28% Negative, the rest Neutral.

53% were concerned about a better understanding between Western and Islamic cultures vs 16% who were not concerned.

82% felt that the U.S. was scientifically / technologically advanced

*Gallup Poll 2/16/02

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22003

~~For Official Use Only~~

Key Insights into Indonesia and its people

- Attitudes about the US are mixed.*
 - Negative Attitudes re U.S.
 - 93% felt that Western Nations did not respect Arab/Islamic values.
 - 86% felt that Western nations did not treat minorities in their society fairly.
 - 71% Felt that Western nations did not have equality for citizens in terms of rights and duties.
 - 91% Felt that Western nations took positions that do not support Arab Causes in International Organizations.
 - Only 10% felt that the U.S. was trustworthy.

~~For Official Use Only~~

*Gallup Poll 2/16/02

11-L-0559/OSD/22004

The Lens of the Target(s)

- To understand the effect of this campaign in Indonesia, it must be analyzed in context with the attitudes the targets have.

Moderate Muslim	Conservative Muslim
<i>Positive/Neutral Attitudes re US</i>	<i>Positive/Neutral Attitudes re US</i>
<i>Negative Attitudes re US</i>	<i>Negative Attitudes re US</i>

~~For Official Use Only~~

Net Impact on Targets

	MOU-411-01 USIP	Conservative Muslim
<i>Positive/ Neutral Attitudes re US</i>	<i>The campaign is likely to reinforce current attitudes toward the U.S.</i>	
<i>Negative Attitudes re US</i>		

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22006

Net Impact on Targets

	Moderate Muslim	Conservative Muslim
Positive / Neutral Attitudes re US	<i>The campaign is likely to reinforce current attitudes toward the US.</i>	
Negative Attitudes re US	<i>The campaign could begin to change attitudes about life in the U.S.</i> <i>Effectiveness is undermined by the concerns raised in this analysis.</i>	

~~For Official Use Only~~

Net Impact on Targets

	Moderate Muslim	Conservative Muslim
Positive / Neutral Attitudes re US	<i>The campaign is likely to reinforce current attitudes toward the U.S.</i>	<i>The dominant focus on prosperity and the other concerns, undermines the campaign's ability to have much impact on this group.</i>
Negative Attitudes re US	<i>The campaign could begin to change attitudes about life in the U.S.</i> <i>Effectiveness is undermined by the concerns raised in this analysis.</i>	

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22008

~~For Official Use Only~~

Net Impact on Targets

	Moderate Muslim	Conservative Muslim
e / ral JS	<i>The campaign is likely to reinforce current attitudes toward the U.S.</i>	<i>The dominant focus on prosperity and the other concerns, undermines the campaign's ability to have much impact on this group.</i>
tive US	<i>The campaign could begin to change attitudes about life in the U.S. Effectiveness is undermined by the concerns raised in this analysis.</i>	<i>A number of elements in the campaign are likely to reinforce Negative attitudes toward the U.S.</i>

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22009

~~For Official Use Only~~

Outline for Discussion

- Impact of the campaign on the International Muslim population
- Impact of the campaign on Indonesians
- Actions Indicated

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22010

~~For Official Use Only~~

Actions Indicated

and foremost, determine if advertising is the best
vehicle for positively impacting attitudes towards the

If the decision is made to move forward with
advertising, it will be imperative to:

Identify the desired concept to convey about the U.S.

- Rather than focusing on the prosperity the U.S. offers, it may be worthwhile to focus on Islam in the U.S. and how Muslims have been embraced.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22011

~~For Official Use Only~~

Actions Indicated

- Other Opportunities:
 - The campaign should be single-mindedly focused on the desired message or the desired perception.
 - It may be desirable to consider shorter commercials that are tightly focused on a strategic idea.
 - Reconsider how directly the ads are associated with the U.S. Government.
 - The further removed from the USG, the less resistant a skeptical audience will be to the message.
 - Titles, Committees and Groups are so prevalent in Indonesia that they may be price-of-entry.
 - Make sure that each spokesperson stands for values that the target holds dear, e.g, Islam and family.
 - The ability of the target to identify with the spokesperson is dependent upon this.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22012

~~For Official Use Only~~

Actions Indicated

- Other Opportunities:
 - Avoid elements that could introduce barriers and prevent the target from identifying with the spokesperson, for example:
 - American Muslim vs. A Muslim in America.
 - Portraying individuals who have opportunities beyond the reach of the target.
 - If aired during a period such as Ramadan, ensure that the commercials are sensitive to this and that the people portrayed are in observance.

~~For Official Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22013

~~For Official Use Only~~

Questions & Discussion

~~Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22014


~~For Official Use Only~~

Thank You


~~Use Only~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22015

INFO MEMO

USDP(P) 
I-04/0 14293-ES

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Luti (DUSD/NESA) 

SUBJECT: State Department Analysis Project (DSD Snowflake)

- You asked for our thoughts on the SecDef's snowflake (attached) concerning the State Department's "Vertical Analysis" of its advertising campaign to Muslims.
- This advertising campaign, costing some \$15 million, was undertaken when Charlotte Beers was the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and the emphasis was on "branding" the United States.
- This is an interesting analysis of State's campaign. It seems to demonstrate that a message resonates only if it promotes a long-term, single-minded focus on the audience's concerns.
 - Because State's TV advertising is a fleeting form of influence, it may deserve a less prominent place in the US public diplomacy arsenal.
- As to "how we ought to organize the Department of Defense to do a better job in that area," perhaps we should:
 - Increase our efforts through the NDU fellows programs to reach and form a cadre of defense officials in foreign countries who will have an in depth understanding of and appreciation for US principles and goals.
 - Support a reinvigorated public diplomacy from the State Department or a new USIA-like agency that will undertake not simply to change perceptions but to engage the new war of ideas on a substantive level.
 - Insure through an information program within OSD that Defense Department personnel themselves understand the terms of this new war of ideas so they can fight it more effectively.

Attachments: As stated

ASD/ISA copy provided

11-L-0559/OSD/22016

OSD 01934-05

0000.3

8 Nov 04

2565704

~~FOUO~~

October 14, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Article by Bruce Gelb

080

Please have someone dig up an article by Bruce Gelb on USIA. Apparently he is interested in the subject and I want to talk to him about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ee
101404-4

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 01945-05

14 OCT 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22017

~~FOUO~~

October 14, 2004

TO: Matt Latimer, Larry D. Rite
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Bullet Points in Speeches

When we are doing speeches whether on paper or cards, to the extent there is a series of points being made, they should be separated and made bullet points so that when I read them and present them, it is easier to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:ee
101404-3

.....

Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

October 14, 2004

TO: Bill Luti
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photo of Korean Peninsula

If I've not already done so, I want to send the satellite photo of the Korean Peninsula to the Korean General, the Crown Prince of Bahrain and all the MODs who were at the dinner with the Crown Prince of Bahrain.

Thanks.

DHR:as
101404-19

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22019

OSD 01948-05

Korean

140-04

~~FOUO~~

October 4, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CIO

What is the next step in the Kasich Group and the CIO for the Department?

And how do we empower a CIO for the Department?

Thanks.

Attach.

8/13/04 Ken Krieg Memo to SecDef re: Snowflake Response on CIO

DHR:ss
100404-19

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

*Sir,
Response attached.
v/n
LT Col Longyel
10/25*

OSD 01970-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22020

020064

400704

October 25, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ken Krieg 

SUBJECT: CIO (Kasich Group) Snowflake

This memorandum is in response to your questions in subject snowflake. The views are mine alone. My first question – and the key insight from the roundtable discussion – is will this area be one of your key priorities in the next period of time? The clear consensus was that the effectiveness of the CIOs stemmed from the commitment of their CEOs to this area. Assuming that it will be in the top tier (a crowded level, I realize), here are some thoughts on your two questions.

How do we empower a CIO for the Department?

To be effective, the CIO must be perceived as a DoD vice OSD official. The CIOs worldview has to be broad (operational and business, now and in the future), his focus has to be on customers (joint war fighters and key decision-makers), and his style has to be balanced (integrating strategy vice advocating specific programs). There are three areas of empowerment – perceived authority, actual authority, and the individual's capability to use the authority.

- Perceived authority is derived from the Secretary by the level of the position, in part, and, more fully, by the time and attention you give to it. The CIO is now a dual-hat position with the Assistant Secretary for Networks and Information Integration. I would respectfully argue that the role is a little lost in the noise right now.
- Actual authorities probably could be strengthened in three areas -- by practice more than by legislation:
 1. The establishment of a DoD implementation strategy led by the CIO and agreed to by the SLRG/SEC – setting out direction, standards, and responsibilities. This should be of the 500-day variety vice the “hard-to-measure” grand strategy statements.
 2. The CIO would oversee implementation of the strategy and report regularly to you (and the SLRG/SEC) on performance and accountability.
 3. To add a little pressure to the system, you should establish dual-reporting lines for the component CIOs linking them to both the Component heads (i.e., Service Secretaries, etc.) and the DoD CIO.

11-L-0559/OSD/22021

OSD 01970-05

020444

25 Oct 04

4 OCT 04

- The individual's capability to use that authority will come from picking the right person. This is a key hire.

Much of this is in the Department's control. To work, the CIO will have to be and be seen as a key member of the senior leadership group.

What is the next step in the Kasich Group?

As we work through this issue, I think we can use John and his team in the following ways:

- As a red team to bounce development ideas off of.
- Potentially help with the personnel search.
- Use a combination of CIOs plus their chairman for a "seminar discussion" with SLRG at kick-off for a QDR topic.
- Lastly, you might think about bringing one or two of them on either DBB or DSB.

Hope this helps.

TAB A

SECRET (S) 11/11/18

201 FEB 10 PM 2: 58

December 27, 2003

322

TO: David Chu
Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reporting on Reducing Stress on Force

~~We~~ need to have a periodic report on how we are doing in reducing stress on the force.

For example, Dov Zakheim told me the other day that he has returned to the Services for reassignment 300 military personnel that he doesn't need in the Comptroller's shop.

~~We~~ need to see where else that is happening.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-37 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by

1/31/04

OSD 01976-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22023

27 Dec 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9000

INFO MEMO

CM-1511-04
10 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Reporting on Reducing Stress on the Force

- You requested a periodic report on how we are doing in reducing stress on the force (TAB A).
- Program Budget Decision 712 directs the Services to convert 20,070 military billets to civilians and/or contractors in FY 04 and FY 05.
- Services are rebalancing the Active and Reserve Component mix to relieve stress and realigning billets as follows: Army – 100,000, FY 04-09; Navy – 2000, FY 04-05; Air Force – 7000, FY 04-05; Marine Corps – 2029, FY 04-05.
- Defense Agency Manpower Review Process is identifying positions in defense agencies that could be eliminated or civilianized, resulting in military billets returned to the Services: Defense Finance and Accounting Service – 20, FY 05; Defense Contract Management Agency – 24, FY 05; Defense Threat Reduction Agency – 257, FY 03.
- General Defense Intelligence Program converted 305 military billets to civilian and returned those to the Services: Army – 142; Navy – 73; Marine Corps – 8; Air Force – 82.
- Long-term efforts, such as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, force modularity and global force management could provide a significant capability to further reduce stress on the force.
- Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) will provide periodic reports on other stress-related indicators such as impacts on recruiting and retention, family satisfaction, etc.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Brigadier General Maria C. Owens, USAF; Director, J-1 (b)(6)

OSD 01976-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22024

TAB

A

TAB A

11-L-0559/OSD/22026

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu
Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reporting on Reducing Stress on Force

We need to have a periodic report on how we are doing in reducing stress on the force.

For example, Dov Zakheim told me the other day that he has returned to the Services for reassignment 300 military personnel that he doesn't need in the Comptroller's shop.

We need to see where else that is happening.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-37 (to computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

OSD 01976-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22026

TAB

B

TAB B

OSD(P)	Mr. Richard Davison	January 29,2004
OSD(P&R)	Mr. Al Gallant	January 29,2004
OSD(PA&E)	Mr. Greg Wise	January 26,2004
OSD(RA)	Mr. Dan Kohner	January 26, 2004
USA	COL Randy Wright	January 22,2004
USN	CAPT D. Thompson	January 27, 2004
USAF	Col Shelby Ball	January 27,2004
USMC	Col Van Dyke	January 26,2004
DIA	Ms. Barbara Mays	January 29,2004



8:55 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: February 10, 2004

SUBJECT: **Attached Publication**

If you have not seen this piece on Mass Graves, you should see it. It tells the story of what Saddam Hussein did to his people.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
021004.14


Attach: "Iraq's Legacy of Terror – Mass Graves" US Agency for Int'l Development

IT-27

1070604

OSD 01993-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22029




Iraq's Legacy of Terror

MASS GRAVES

U.S. Agency for International Development

LOCATIONS OF FIRST MASS GRAVES DISCOVERED IN IRAQ



Mass Graves was edited by USAID Senior Writer Ben Barber with assistance from Stephen Epstein of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.

Cover: Iraqis search for relatives and friends among victims found in a mass grave in Musayib, 75 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. The victims are thought to be from the 1991 uprising against the Iraqi government. The bodies, wrapped in linen shrouds, are being held in a makeshift morgue in a nearby youth center.

All photos by USAID/Thomas Hartwell except photo on inside back cover, which is by U.S. Department of State/Sandra L. Hodgkinson.

A Vast Human Tragedy

In a decade and a half of humanitarian work I have witnessed the aftermath of much human tragedy, including the Rwandan genocide and the killing fields of Cambodia. In June 2003, I visited Iraq's mass graves, the most recent addition to mankind's legacy of mass murder.

Rows of white bundles containing bones filled room after room. Families filed by, searching for signs of those who had disappeared, some stolen during the night, others taken in daylight. Even small children were not spared the butchery.

The graves that Saddam Hussein's henchmen dug and filled with human beings are a bitter sign that mankind still has a long way to go before every person has the basic human rights promised by all our religions and cultures—the rights of life and liberty.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari told the United Nations that under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was "a murderous tyranny that lasted over 35 years." "Today we are unearthing thousands of victims in horrifying testament," Zebari said.

I walked across the sandy plains of Iraq and saw the mass graves that were just found and are beginning to yield their tragic secrets. The bones tell a story of horror and shame: arms bound together, skulls pierced from behind. Hundreds in one long trench.

Those who survived inside Iraq, and those who watched helplessly from abroad, have joined together to begin the long, painful process of accounting for the dead. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said on November 20, 2003, that as many as 400,000 Iraqis lie in these mass graves.

They are Kurds, killed because of their ethnicity. They are Shiites, killed because of their religion. They are Sunnis, killed for their political views. They are Egyptians, Kuwaitis, and Iranians, killed because their lives meant nothing to Saddam Hussein, his sons, and their followers.

As Saddam's evil regime collapsed in April and May, 2003, and his Baath Party mass murderers retreated into the shadows, Iraqis began to act on their formerly hidden grief. They searched for their loved ones rounded up over the years in campaigns of terror. They had heard rumors about shots in the night, mass burials, and vanished prisoners. Now they followed those bloody trails to the mounds of earth they suspected entombed their beloved children and parents.

The new leaders in Al Hillah, Karbala, Najaf, and a dozen other cities and towns around Iraq worked with U.S. and British forces to try and protect some of the mass graves. We hope to preserve the evidence of these crimes against humanity.

Human rights groups have formed, assisted by USAID and working with the Coalition Provisional Authority, to urge people to record the names of those being exhumed and describe the circumstances under which they were seized and slain.

Yes—people want to find the remains of their loved ones and give them a proper burial in consecrated ground. But the Iraqi people also want justice—to punish those who callously killed their fellow citizens by the busload, day after day, year after year.


Above all, if people in Iraq and around the world hope to learn from the crimes of the past, the mass graves of Iraq must be documented, reported, and never forgotten or denied.

This booklet is a small, early marker on that path.

Andrew S. Natsios

Andrew Natsios, Administrator
U.S. Agency for International Development
January 2004

Iraq's Mass Graves



A victim, still blindfolded, found in a mass grave in Musayib.

A LEGACY OF TERROR

Since the Saddam Hussein regime was overthrown in May, 270 mass graves have been reported. By mid-January, 2004, the number of confirmed sites climbed to fifty-three. Some graves hold a few dozen bodies—their arms lashed together and the bullet holes in the backs of skulls testimony to their execution. Other graves go on for hundreds of meters, densely packed with thousands of bodies.

"We've already discovered just so far the remains of 400,000 people in mass graves," said British Prime Minister Tony Blair on November 20 in London. The United Nations, the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch (HRW) all estimate that Saddam Hussein's regime murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent people. "Human Rights Watch estimates that as many as 290,000 Iraqis have been 'disappeared' by the Iraqi government over the past two decades," said the group in a statement in May. "Many of these 'disappeared' are those whose remains are now being unearthed in mass graves all over Iraq."

If these numbers prove accurate, they represent a crime against humanity surpassed only by the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Pol Pot's Cambodian killing fields in the 1970s, and the Nazi Holocaust of World War II.

REPORTS OF MASS KILLINGS

Beginning in the 1980s, reports of mass murder began filtering out of Iraq. Saddam's Baathist loyalists and police rounded up members of the Dawa party—they were never heard from again. Human rights groups said 180,000 ethnic Kurds were rounded up and killed in the Anfal campaign in which hundreds of mountain villages were destroyed. Those left alive were moved into bleak collection cities that still dot the plains between Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. It was a crime so staggering that, without hard evidence of bodies to back it up, many refused to believe it possible.

Then in 1988 came the use of nerve and mustard gas against Iraqi-Kurdish civilians in Halabjah. Five thousand were killed in a single day. The world was shocked, but still, the missing people rounded up over the previous months and years remained vanished.

After the 1991 Gulf War, Shiites and Kurds revolted, but the rebellion was quickly crushed by Iraqi tanks and troops loyal to Saddam Hussein. While Kurds got protection from U.S. and British aircraft, creating an autonomous region in northeastern Iraq where they were safe from persecution, the Shiites were brutally repressed in the south, and tens of thousands vanished.

The following pages include first-hand accounts from three Iraqis who survived the mass murders. Each tells what took place in a way that no formal report can match. Yet the world is duty-bound to learn the facts—cold, brutal, and numbing—of what happened over these years and how a modern government, equipped with the powers of a modern army and police, turned against its own people.

A HISTORY OF DENIAL

The reports of mass murder under Saddam Hussein had been made for years by the United Nations, the U.S. Government, HRW, independent journalists, and the families of people who were arrested and then vanished. But the Iraqi regime denied the reports, refused to allow U.N. investigations, and stonewalled human rights groups.

"As in previous years, the regime continued to deny the widespread killings of Kurds in the north of the country during the 'Anfal' campaign of 1988," said the U.S. State Department's 2002 human rights report. "Both the [U.N.] Special Rapporteur and HRW concluded that the regime's policies against the Kurds raised questions of crimes against humanity and violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention."

Finally, the regime was swept away by U.S., British, and other allied forces in May, 2003, and the truth emerged. It came as no surprise that once the country was thrown open to the world press and international organizations, they might find evidence of these crimes against humanity. But few imagined the full extent of the slaughter that came to light.

SEARCHING FOR THE GRAVES

In early May, Saddam's police, paramilitary troops, and army fled from their prisons, barracks, and killing fields. Thousands of Iraqi men, women, and children began a grim trek to the forbidden places they feared they would find their missing children, parents, and friends.

Reports that mass graves had been discovered reached officials at the first U.S. administrative body in Iraq, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was later replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). A human rights expert from the U.S. Agency for International Development was one of the first outsiders to follow the Iraqis to the site of their grim discoveries.

"South of Al Hillah in early May I heard about bones," said Sloan Mann of USAID. "When I showed up, people

were randomly digging through the site. I went there two days after the mass grave was discovered.

"The site was very disturbed. Children walked barefoot in the grave. There were many families. Some were mourning. Some were curious onlookers."

Mann stood on the edge of a ditch some 20 meters long and 2 meters wide. About 25 sets of remains were showing, all in neat piles, along with the clothes the victims had worn when they died. Some were the clothes of children.

THE UNITED STATES OFFERS TO HELP

To help the Iraqis exhume their loved ones, the CPA authorized Mann and other U.S. officials to assist. Mann was part of the first deployment of Abuse Prevention Units (APUs), created by USAID to protect human rights in emergencies or conflict. The teams offered quick grants to buy everything from shovels to exhume graves to computers for logging in victims as they were unearthed. Money was provided for training Iraqis in forensic medicine—the science of determining the legal cause of death—so that evidence might be obtained for prosecution of those responsible for the killings. Help was also given to several Iraqi human rights groups, including the Free Prisoners Association and the Lawyers Association. They began compiling lists of missing Iraqis, suspected mass grave sites, confirmed victims, and documents relating to disappearances.

In some cases, former Iraqi guards, burial workers, and even executioners themselves came forward to tell what had happened. Some said that if they had refused to arrest and kill as ordered, they would have been thrown into the pits themselves.

The CPA and USAID officials working with the Iraqis quickly decided to divide the mass graves into three groups:

- **Emotionally overrun sites**
These are sites that have already been overrun by people seeking the remains of their missing relatives and friends. Since the sites are disturbed—and it would be unthinkable to intervene to stop people from completing their search—U.S. aid is aimed to train Iraqis to assist the community emotionally and to collect whatever information is possible: victim names, circumstances of disappearance, etc.
- **Humanitarian exhumation sites**
In these sites, trained Iraqi professionals teach the community how to put together all the bones and

other remains from each victim, properly identify the remains, and help families obtain the best accounting of what happened to their loved ones. The primary purpose of these excavations is to identify missing persons, although some evidence will also be recovered by local forensic teams.

■ Full criminal investigation sites

Between eight and 20 sites are expected to be selected for full exhumation for accountability purposes in the Iraqi Special Tribunal, which was recently established by the Iraqi Governing Council to try cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.

THE TASK AHEAD

At the donor conference held in Madrid in October, funding, forensic teams, equipment, mortuary assistance, and training programs were requested from the international community to assist the Iraqi people in uncovering mass graves. These donations and assistance will be necessary for many years to come as the Iraqis move forward in their reconciliation process, according to the CPA senior human rights official Sandy Hodgkinson. The CPA Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has sent out staff to communities and talked about the need to have patience, preserve the sites, and respect the dead. So far, 270 suspected mass grave sites have been found by Iraqis, the CPA, and the U.S. Army's Criminal Investigative Division. However, in some cases, mass grave reports have turned out to be either simply old cemeteries, or falsely reported to attract attention or to obtain funds.

Another difficulty facing the effort to find and document mass graves is that those who carried out the murders, and other supporters of Saddam's regime, have threatened the human rights groups collecting evidence of crimes against humanity. The Free Prisoners Association has been attacked, and two assassination attempts have taken place.

Another challenge is the weather—the rainy winter prevented the opening of most mass graves until February 2004. Nevertheless, the first of some 40 international investigators began arriving in January 2004. They will prepare evidence for the Iraqi Special Tribunal, an Iraqi institution that will prosecute some of the estimated 6,000 people linked to Saddam-era crimes. The plan is to begin prosecutions with Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as "Chemical Ali"), a cousin of Saddam Hussein accused of ordering the gassing of the Kurds in 1988.

CPA official Hodgkinson states that overall, the mass grave program will differ slightly from the process used in Bosnia, and will be specific to the needs in Iraq. Scientific methods of excavation for investigative purposes will be the same. Programs to identify the missing, however, will differ from Bosnia, where to date, only 8,000 of the 30,000 bodies believed to be buried as a result of the conflict have been recovered.

Mass graves are not evident to the untrained eye. Many are concealed under tons of earth or hidden in inaccessible military camps. Satellite and aerial imagery is being used to identify disturbed earth; ground-probing radar also helps locate remains.

When a possible site is identified, a team including an archaeologist, anthropologist, surveyor, geologist, crime-scene officer, and satellite image technician—plus military support—goes to assess the site.

The CPA's Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has compiled a list of 270 reported sites across the country. Many sites are in the southwest and central areas around the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Exhumations require heavy machinery as well as excavation, mortuary, security, military, and explosives experts. The team of 20–30 people will need living accommodations for four to six weeks.

Iraqi Human Rights Minister Abdul-Basit Turki said that in addition to families' need to find the bodies of missing relatives, excavating mass graves is important in building criminal cases against members of the former regime.

IRAQIS WERE NOT THE ONLY VICTIMS

It was not just Iraqi citizens who disappeared into the mass graves.

"Despite several well-publicized exchanges with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, the regime effectively ignored



Workers remove remains from a mass grave. After identification, bodies are wrapped in shrouds and carried to a makeshift morgue.

11- L-0559/OSD/22035

requests from those governments to account for those who disappeared during Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, and prisoners of war captured in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war," said the State Department report.

After the liberation of Iraq, reports surfaced that all 600 Kuwaitis carried into captivity in Iraq by retreating troops in 1991 were executed.

Egyptian officials also said they were seeking information about hundreds—possibly thousands—of Egyptian citizens who died or disappeared after they traveled to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war to take jobs. Many were returned home in coffins—without explanations of how they died.

A PLAN FOR ACTION

Iraqi and U.S. foreign aid officials have prepared a plan for a long-range process of excavation that will meet all the needs for humanitarian, emotional, and judicial resolution of the mass graves. First, Iraqis with skills in forensic anthropology or simply archaeology are being identified to receive training by international forensic experts. Second, communities are being asked to recommend academics and professionals who want to learn the basics of forensic science. They will undergo training in humanitarian exhumation and the fundamentals of basic skeletal anatomy to facilitate the identification process.

The nuts and bolts of the exhumation process have also been planned: exhumation protocols, nationwide standard operating procedures, administration, and logistical support. Construction is underway to renovate a storage facility into a centralized evidence repository. Local human rights organizations are being funded to increase their capacity to organize and collect documents, evidence, and names of the missing. This will eventually tie in to a national outreach program for families seeking information on missing relatives. Information on missing persons that local organizations are collecting will be moved to the central evidence repository. There a full-time Iraqi staff will work to compile a comprehensive database. The information will then be passed to human rights organizations in communities across Iraq.

There are ongoing efforts to collect, verify, and combine information on suspected mass grave sites. A Danish forensic team arrived in Iraq in October, and a Finnish team was expected soon after. Swedish and German governments have also offered varying levels of assistance. Until the international teams are in place,



Remains unearthed in a mass grave in Musayib are prepared for reburial by family members.

forensic site assessments are being used to prioritize 8-16 carefully selected mass graves for a full forensic exhumation based on the following criteria:

- the grave represents a main period of atrocity
- the grave is relatively untouched
- the grave may give evidence of crimes against humanity
- the local population permits securing and exhumation of the site

A media campaign has begun through the daily newspaper *Al Sabah*, Iraqi Media Network, and other media outlets to explain the need to preserve grave sites. Getting the word out on a national level will help identify the missing and encourage citizens to come forward with evidence of atrocities. Although there are few reports of local impatience with the exhumation process, local and religious leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and the media must be continually engaged on the need to protect grave sites and encouraged to have patience with the process.

The Iraqi Governing Council set a major marker on the path to resolving the issue of the mass killings when it announced there will be a national tribunal for criminals. This is the next, unwritten chapter of this story. ■

Survivor Stories

The following testimonials are from survivors of executions that occurred outside Mahawil, a city north of Al Hillah, approximately 60 miles south of Baghdad.

ALI'S STORY

Ali,* 36, an aircraft mechanic, was driving his family from Al Hillah to his farm in Mahawil on March 6, 1991, during the Shiite uprising after the end of the Gulf War. The city was being bombed.

Ali was stopped at a military checkpoint outside the city near a brick factory and ordered to get out. His wife, newborn baby, and handicapped mother were ordered to drive away.

Ali was ordered to remove his jacket, and uniformed men tied his hands and feet with his jacket and pieces of cloth and placed a blindfold over his eyes.

Ali could still see through the blindfold, however, and saw about 12 other people, including men, women, children, and elderly, pulled from cars, bound, and blindfolded.

They were dragged to a white Toyota Land Cruiser and piled on top of each other over the seats. No words were spoken, because when others attempted to speak they received severe blows to the head and body.

It was approximately 10 a.m. when they arrived at the Mahawil military camp on the outskirts of the city. There they were unloaded, registered, and escorted into a large assembly hall filled with approximately 200 people. Everyone was sitting on the floor with their hands

and feet tied. They were blindfolded and positioned facing the walls.

Ali was placed near the door and could see outside. At about 4:30 p.m., the military men built a large ring of tires about 20 feet wide and set it on fire. Next to the fire were large buses, and the soldiers began escorting people from the hall to the buses. At this time, people were also being carried out of the hall and thrown into the fire. Ali believes that because the military was in a hurry to execute them and not everyone would fit on the buses, they decided to burn some people alive. After about 30 minutes of witnessing this, he was escorted from the hall and loaded onto a bus.

At approximately 6 p.m., they were taken on a short drive to a swampy area behind the brick factory. It was dark and he saw headlights in front of the buses. He believes the lights were headlights from the Land Cruisers driven by Saddam's men. He could hear shots but not voices. Ali was paralyzed with fear. Everyone in the bus was blindfolded.

After about 15 minutes, the bus in front of his drove away and the headlights were directly on his bus. They pulled seven to 10 people off the bus. Shots rang out. Ali's group was the next to be pulled from the bus. In his group was a blind man, three brothers, a woman, and her five year old son. The group was led to the front of the bus where the headlights were directly on them.

* All names have been changed.

11-L-0559/OSD/22037



Iraqi women seek to identify remains of lost family members.



An identification card found in a mass grave in Musayib.



Remains unearthed in a mass reburial.

They were pushed to the ground and then were pulled up one at a time to be executed. They were pushed a couple of feet to the edge of the swamp and shot. Most would fall before being shot because they were overcome with fear. Ali does not remember any words being spoken—except the plea of the three brothers who begged that at least one be spared. They were executed one at a time. Next, the woman was shot in front of her five-year-old child. The child lunged at the legs of the executioner and was kicked away and shot in the face. The blind man was then executed and his chest exploded on Ali.

There were three executioners. They took turns shooting and reloading. Ali was last in the group to be shot, and the soldier who was to execute Ali shot between his legs. The soldier was then shot dead by another soldier. During this commotion, Ali turned to the swamp, jumped over bodies, and ran through the water. They shot after him. He was hit in the left hand and foot and fell, breaking his nose. He continued on and made it to the other side of the swamp.


A tractor with soldiers came in his direction looking for him, so he tossed his robe into the water and hid in a thicket of cane. The soldiers saw his robe and sprayed it with bullets thinking they had shot him. A bulldozer appeared next and began shoveling dirt on it to cover what they thought was his body. Ali was very near and

was knocked unconscious by falling rocks, but he was not completely buried. When the bulldozer left, he pulled himself out of the dirt and crawled to an empty canal. He could still hear shots in the distance: a third bus had arrived during his escape.

Ali crawled through the canal for about 30 minutes, making his way to a farmhouse. He knocked on the door, and was taken in by the family, which told him later that he "was a piece of blood." He doesn't remember much about the care they provided him except for the yogurt they fed him and the heater they placed near him. The family knew his uncles, so they clothed him, gave him a donkey and a cane, and told him to follow the canal to an uncle's house. Ali made it there, and his uncle cleaned him and took him to Baghdad the next day. He hid there for one month without telling anyone except his uncle. He returned home to discover his two brothers had been executed in similar roundups.

He left the neighborhood and changed his identity. He was also protected by an intelligence officer in his neighborhood. When Saddam was toppled, he resumed his identity after having been in hiding for over 12 years. He is a member of the Human Rights Association of Al Hillah. ■

11-L-0559/OSD/22038



grave are prepared for

After identification and preparation for reburial, a victim is moved from the morgue by family members

Iraqis look at lists of victims unearthed from a mass grave in Musayib

MUHANED'S STORY

Muhaned,* 32, is from Al Hillah. From 1984 to 1991, he worked as a nurse in the army. During the 1991 Shiite uprising he was stationed in the north. On March 5, he traveled by bus to Al Hillah to see his parents. It was winter and he arrived early in the morning. Upon entering the city near a brick factory, his bus encountered an army unit near the statue of Saddam. The army unit stopped the bus and would not allow entrance into the city. The bus driver was told there was a curfew and to return to Baghdad. Several people, Muhaned included, got off the bus to walk to Al Hillah. In his group were six men (all Army and in uniform), an old man, two children, and a woman. The army unit saw them approaching and took them into custody. One of the men refused to be taken and was beaten in front of the group. They were escorted to a military bus and loaded in the back. Those who spoke were beaten and called traitors.

They were taken to the Mahawil military camp, where their hands were tied behind their backs, and they were blindfolded. They were escorted into a large assembly hall. Muhaned could hear whispering, but he does not believe there were many people in the hall at that time. He sat on the floor and fell asleep. Around noon, somebody kicked him and took his name, and he fell asleep again. Around 3 p.m., he awoke to see that the hall was filled with well over 100 people. His ties had loosened and he was able to see. He saw his neighbor. He also saw Ali (see first survivor story). They spent the entire day without water, food, or toilets. People were forced to go to the bathroom where they sat.

At about 5 p.m. they began loading people onto buses. Muhaned was at the back of the hall and was one of the last to be escorted out. There was no light in the hall, but through the windows, he could see the glow of a large fire. He could smell rubber burning.

People were being escorted out to the buses in groups of about 20 at a time. Some people, however, were picked up and thrown into the fire. Muhaned and those around him could hear the screaming. A woman yelled at a soldier, "Why are you burning these people?" She was told, "They are criminals." From this, Muhaned felt safe because he had done nothing wrong.


As the hall emptied, a soldier pointed at his group and said "Take them. Captain Abbar has signed for them." Muhaned did not understand what this meant and began crying and praying. When he exited the hall, the fire was only three to four meters from the entrance. Those who were walking slowly, or whose feet were tied, were thrown in the fire. The rest, including Muhaned, were escorted to the buses.

Around midnight, they drove to a muddy road next to the swamp behind the brick factory. On one side was a swamp and on the other side a canal. He saw a white Toyota Land Cruiser and a bulldozer on the edge of the swamp. The Land Cruiser's headlights acted as a spotlight on the front of the bus at the edge of the swamp.

Baath party members piled out of the Land Cruiser and another bus and began loading their weapons. Muhaned and the others were escorted off their bus and forced to crouch at the edge of the swamp in several rows of six. At their feet were dead bodies. A woman stood up and silently wrapped herself in her long black

* All names have been changed.

11-L-0559/OSD/22039



An Iraqi holding the name of a victim on a scrap of paper, searches a list of victims.



Iraqis dig for remains.



Workers identify and sort remains, are wrapped in shrouds and taken to the cemetery.

robe in the same fashion people are wrapped for a funeral. Although he was blindfolded, Muhaned's hands were free, and he moved his ID card into an internal pocket, hoping to preserve it so that his body might be identified. Everyone was praying.

Six Baath party members lined up in front and to the side of the crouching rows. Muhaned was in the back row on the very edge of the swamp. Spotlights shone on them. A very large Egyptian man near Muhaned kept asking why they were being executed. At that moment, gunfire erupted and the man jumped to his feet. His body was sprayed with bullets and the force of his body knocked Muhaned back, flattening him and pushing him partially into the swamp. The Egyptian's body completely covered him. The shooting lasted for about 30 seconds. The soldiers surveyed the bodies and discovered one person was still alive and moaning. They killed him. They did not discover Muhaned.

The buses and Land Cruisers left the area. The bulldozer began to approach. At this point, Muhaned pulled himself out from under the dead Egyptian and hid in the cane so the bulldozer driver would not discover him. He could taste blood, but found no wounds on his body. He watched the bulldozer push the bodies into the swamp and cover them with mud.

After the bulldozer left, Muhaned made his way to the canal and followed it until sunrise. He ended up in Al Hillah near the courthouse. He went to the river to wash the remains of the Egyptian from his body. A man spotted him and questioned him about the human remains on his shoulder. Muhaned refused to tell him anything and the man offered to help. He provided

Muhaned with food and set him on the path to his house, telling him to stay within the farms. When Muhaned arrived home, he found that the army had bombed his house. Thankfully, his family had not been injured and he was reunited with them shortly afterward. He did not tell his family what happened, but his wife discovered through his recurrent nightmares.

Muhaned went to see a psychologist but did not tell the true story. A few months later he ran into Ali again, whom he had seen in the hall. Both believed the other had been executed. They agreed never to speak of what happened. "Our lives depend on our tongues now," they said. They made a pact to claim to dislike each other so that if either were caught and forced to speak about the other's capture and attempted execution, the other could claim it was a lie. They both forged documents, obtained new identities, and did not speak about their shared horror. They've lived in constant fear for over 12 years—fear of being discovered, recaptured, tortured, or killed. Muhaned was suspicious of everything. Any time a car parked in front of his house he felt panic.

Finally, out of fear, Muhaned left Iraq for Syria in 2000, but returned after the fall of Saddam. Now, Muhaned and Ali are close friends. "For the first time in over 12 years, I am free and living without fear in my country," says Muhaned, who is working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Al Hillah Human Rights Association. ■

11-L-0559/OSD/22040



ains. When identified, victims taken to a makeshift morgue.



A victim found in a mass grave in Musayib still wears a blindfold.



Remains of Iraqis removed from a mass grave in Musayib lie wrapped in linen shrouds.

HAMID'S STORY

Hamid* was born in Al Hillah in 1963, left school after the ninth grade, and began working in his family's bakery. In 1982, like all Iraqi men, Hamid was required to join the military. He fought in the Iran-Iraq war, was wounded and disabled in 1985, but continued to serve in the army until 1991.

Hamid participated in the uprising that followed Saddam's retreat from Kuwait and southern Iraq. Many former army men participated in killing Baath party members in the south. In March 1991, Saddam's revenge was brutal: executions were carried out all over Iraq. Saddam sent forces throughout the country, imposing curfews and ruthless military rule.

Hamid recalled seeing a woman and child crossing a road after having received permission to do so. When the child dropped something and his mother went to pick it up, she was shot. Military planes flew over Al Hillah and dropped leaflets informing people to evacuate the city because chemical weapons would follow. People were in a state of panic. Military units patrolled the city with loudspeakers telling soldiers to return to their units and advising them that there would be an amnesty. No one believed it.

Hamid and his brother Hyder, then 19 and also a former soldier, decided to escape to Baghdad, where they believed it would be safer. As they were crossing a bridge leading into Baghdad they were stopped at a checkpoint, blindfolded, and had their hands tied behind their backs. They and 18 others were driven to the Mahawil military camp.

In the camp's yard, they could hear the sound of pipes and cables hitting people and of people's screams. His

group was forced to squat in the yard for hours. Anyone who fell or spoke was beaten. Then they were "lined up like cattle" and forced to march as the soldiers jeered at them.

Their blindfolds were removed near the entrance of a large hall. Hamid heard the sound of a skull cracking. He turned and saw an old man lying on the ground, blood gushing from his head. The man had fallen out of line during the march.

They were packed tightly into a hall with about 400 people. Hamid was in the corner of the hall and near a window. There was a fire outside—a large ring of burning tires. He saw a man he knew being led from another hall. The man was bleeding and stumbling in the yard. Soldiers surrounded him and beat him with cables. Soldiers from Hamid's hall went outside to join in the beating. The man fell to the ground and was knocked unconscious. The soldiers then picked him up and threw him into the fire.

Hamid could see an officer named Abu Diba in the yard. Abu Diba ordered the soldiers to throw one of his own men into the fire: the man had appeared to object to what was happening. Three soldiers grabbed him and shoved him into the fire. Hamid could see the soldier struggling to get up but his legs were tangled in the tires. Hamid blacked out.

After hours of standing in the hall, the soldiers filled the floor of the hall with about six inches of water. This prevented anyone from sitting on the floor or sleeping. It was winter and very cold. They stood like this for 24 hours. During this time, soldiers would enter and call out a name and say "Ahmed Hassan, your family is here for you. Please come forward." As the person came for-

* All names have been changed.

11-L-0559/OSD/22041



Aweda Abed Al-Amer grieves over two members of her family found in a mass grave in Musayib.



Iraqis dig for remains from a mass grave in Musayib.



After identification and sorting, bodies are taken to a...

ward, he would be escorted to the yard where his feet would be tied to a pole or a piece of wood. Then he would be suspended upside down and soldiers would whip his feet and back with cables. When the prisoner lost consciousness, the soldiers would splash him with water and continue the beating.

A soldier entered the hall and told them, "We have killed the criminals and we are taking you to your units." They were then blindfolded and escorted out. He could hear the buses. They were told to run straight ahead where someone would receive them. Those who fell or who did not run were beaten to death with pipes. He could hear people falling to the ground and the sound of bones cracking and of blood splattering. He could hear the screaming and moaning of people being beaten to death.

The 50 survivors were loaded onto the bus. The buses pulled out and traveled for approximately 15 minutes; the road was rough.

When they stopped, people were unloaded in groups of three or four and led to the tops of small mounds of dirt. He heard a guard ask if there were any more left and when another answered no, gunfire erupted. Hamid's neck was grazed by a bullet; he felt bullets entering his leg. The force of the shots knocked him backward into a hole—a grave. He landed upside down with his feet in the air. Other bodies fell on him and pushed him down a slope. The executioners fired another round of "mercy bullets" directly into the holes, trying to ensure that the people were dead. Then there was silence.

A few moments later the buses left and a bulldozer pushed dirt over the graves. Hamid's gravesite was on a slope that descended to a swamp. Because he slid down

the slope, he was only partially buried. He could hear someone near him moaning. The man, an Egyptian, told him that the soldiers had left and that he could see the headlights on the main road. Hamid asked the Egyptian where he was shot, and the man replied that only his toes were injured. Hamid couldn't move due to his injuries, and he was partially buried. The Egyptian, Muhammed, pulled him out of the mud and up the slope to the edge. Hamid's leg was severely broken—the bone had pierced through his skin.

They crossed the river. Muhammed helped him crawl up the bank by pulling him up with a cane. They hid in a canal. Hamid was very cold and thought he was dying. He asked Muhammed to go back and look for his brother. Muhammed confirmed that everyone at the site was dead.

They continued through the canal and then crossed some farmlands, drinking water from rivers. They traveled like this for days. A farmer discovered them on his land and shot at the Egyptian. Hamid convinced him to hold his fire. The farmer took them in and provided shelter in one of his buildings, but he told them they could not remain long. He left them and promised to return in one hour. Hamid and Muhammed were sure he would return with the military. Hamid urged Muhammed to leave to save himself, but he refused.

The farmer returned with food and hot tea. After they ate, he treated the wound on Hamid's neck but told him he couldn't treat the leg until the morning. At dawn he returned and said he couldn't sleep and was praying for him throughout the night. He gave Hamid a pillow to put over his face and proceeded to remove two bullets from Hamid's leg. He used a pair of rusty pliers and scissors to dig the bullets out. He removed fragments of

11-L-0559/OSD/22042



Remains are wrapped in makeshift morgue.

Workers search remains for identifying items.

After identification and sorting, remains are tagged, wrapped in linen shrouds, and taken to a makeshift morgue.

bone as well. He placed a splint on his leg and wrapped it with cloth. He gave them a donkey and a three-day supply of food.

Hamid rode on the donkey and Muhammed led the way. He lost track of time. They felt they were being followed.

They made it to a village near Al Hillah—where Hamid's aunt lived. The aunt took him to the family farm. Muhammed stayed the night and continued north the next day. Hamid received medical care from a family friend who came to the farm.

Hamid then decided he should return to his army unit. He went to Amara because he had many friends in the town. He put on his military uniform, and his family drove him to Amara. There were checkpoints all along the route, but they had no problems. Their car ran out of fuel and he saw a truck carrying regular army troops. He told them he had been injured but provided no details. He felt they had a good idea of what happened, and they viewed him as a hero and allowed him to join them. They took him to a military hospital where he was treated by Saddam loyalists. He told them he was in an accident and made no mention of bullets. When the x-ray showed that a third bullet remained in his leg, he became worried that he would be discovered.

Soon after, he was offered a job in Baghdad with the highest level of the party as a supervisor for a building contractor. He decided instead to buy a car and work as a taxi driver. He also opened a flower shop in Baghdad.

In 1994, the "economic police" arrested him and he was tortured for 34 days. He was beaten and given electric shocks on his ears, tongue, and nose. They wanted him to confess that he was a member of another party—all parties other than Baath were illegal. He was finally released, but his "criminal" file prevented him from gaining employment, so he returned to his flower shop.

Two years later, in 1996, he was arrested by the "intelligence police." He was beaten and tortured for 18 days and questioned about the uprising. He was finally released but was ordered to close his flower shop because he was accused of holding political meetings there.

Hamid closed the shop and returned to Al Hillah with his wife and two young children. Since the fall of Saddam's regime, he has helped the Al Hillah Human Rights Association identify suspected criminals and has assisted in the location of evidence pertaining to mass graves. ■

11-L-0559/OSD/22043



Logo for the volunteer grassroots organization, the Association of Free Prisoners and Missing Persons.



Volunteer takes a break from sorting documents to pray.



USAID Abuse Prevention Officer Jean Geran, carries out an assessment of a mass grave site.

For more information, contact
U.S. Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523-1000
Telephone: 202-712-4810
Internet: www.usaid.gov
PN-ACW-223
Arabic version: PN-ACW-224



12:45 PM

TO: John J. Hamre
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 9, 2004
SUBJECT: **Beyond Goldwater-Nichols**

Thanks so much for your memo of February 3rd. I had a chance to read it today. It is interesting, constructive and helpful. I would be delighted to have you come in and brief me and possibly some others. I'll see that our folks get in touch with you to try to find a mutually convenient time.

Thanks.

DHR/azh
030904.06

020 D00

9 Feb 04

OSD 01995-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22046

12:42 PM

TO: Secretary Andy Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
DATE: February 9, 2004
SUBJECT: **Intelligence Commission**

I would like a copy of the final charter for the new intelligence commission so I can look at it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
030904.05

334

9 Feb 04

OSD 01990-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22047

5:50 PM

TO: Dina Powell
Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 4, 2004
11

SUBJECT: Leonard Schaffer

Attached is a note from an acquaintance of mine recommending a person for HHS if Tommy Thompson were to decide to leave.

I do not know Mr. Leonard Schaffer and cannot recommend him, but I pass it along for your possible interest.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
030404.07

Attach: Letter from William Grant 3/3/04

040 HHS

11 Mar 04

3 Feb 04

OSD 01998-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22048



GALEN ASSOCIATES

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 FEB 11 AM 8:10

WILLIAM R. GRANT
CHAIRMAN

February 3, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon (Room 3F)
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Don,

Please forward this letter to the proper channel.

This is a strong recommendation to consider Leonard Schaeffer as a replacement for Secretary Thompson when he moves on. I've known Leonard for a decade and observed him as a fellow board member for seven years as an outstanding contributor to the proper board governance for Allergan, a very successful healthcare company.


During the last twelve years he led WellPoint to become the second largest managed care company. He is a configural strategist and was a leader in controlling Rx costs for WellPoint's patients. Recently he merged Wellpoint into Anthem and will remain as non-executive Chairman for a while. He will move on to another career. You and I are familiar with career changes.

As someone who has rambled around the healthcare business for 50 years I couldn't think of a better Secretary. I don't know his politics but he is committed to controlling healthcare costs as Witness his achievements. Probably nothing more important to the Administration for the next few years.

Many thanks.

All the best.

William R. Grant



OSD 01998-04

610 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center, New York, NY 10020

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22049



GALEN ASSOCIATES

2004 FEB 11 PM 6:10

WILLIAM R. GRANT
CHAIRMAN

February 3, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon (Room 3E)
Washington, D. C. 20301

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This is a strong recommendation to consider Leonard Schaeffer as a replacement for Secretary Thompson when he moves on. I've known Leonard for a decade and observed him as a fellow board member for seven years as an outstanding contributor to the proper board governance for Allergan, a very successful healthcare company.


During the last twelve years he led WellPoint to become the second largest managed care company. He is a configural strategist and was a leader in controlling Rx costs for WellPoint's patients. Recently he merged Wellpoint into Anthem and will remain as non-executive Chairman for a while. He will move on to another career. You and I are familiar with career changes.

As someone who has rambled around the healthcare business for 50 years I couldn't think of a better Secretary. I don't know his politics but he is committed to controlling healthcare costs as witness his achievements. Probably nothing more important to the Administration for the next few years.

Many thanks.

All the best.

William R. Grant



OSD 01998-04

610 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center, New York, NY 10020

(b)(6)

FAX (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22050



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 5 2004

Mr. William R. Grant
Chairman
Galen Associates
610 Fifth Avenue
Rockefeller Center
New York, **NY** 10020

Dear Bill:

Thanks so much for your note about Leonard Schaeffer. I
will certainly pass it along to the proper people.

I hope things are going well with you.

With my best regards,

Sincerely,



OSD 01998-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22051

040 HHS

5 MAR 04

3 FEB 04

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP

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EXE



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

Mr. William R. Grant
Chairman, Galen Associates
610 Fifth Avenue
Rockefeller Center
New York, NY 10020

Dear Mr. Grant:

Thank you for your letter to Sec
recommending Mr. Leonard Schaeffer
information to those responsible for su

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Lawrence
The Spec
Secret:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

3/4

Sec Def -

Are you comfortable
with this letter being
handled as I propose,
or do you prefer
to respond personally

Larry Di Rita

3/4

J. R. R. R.



October 25, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Log



I look forward to receiving the log of all the dollars that I have paid that I need not have, so we have that up-to-date.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102504-16

.....

Please respond by _____

117005

25 OCT 04

February 8, 2004

TO: LTG Skip Sharp

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: C2 Arrangements

A friend of mine suggested that a simple solution for C2 arrangements with Iraqi forces post-1 July are:

— Police report to the MOI and chop to coalition commander only for specific operations in support of the military.

— ICDC and NIA report to MoD for Title X-type functions, but are put under the operational control of the coalition commander.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-68

.....
Please respond by

2/18/04

Iraq

8 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22054

OSD 02005-04

720
~~FOUO~~

file

October 25, 2004

885

322

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Implementation of Decisions

If the President and the Secretary of Defense make a decision to do something, the Secretary and the Chairman communicate it to the Combatant Commanders, and then the Services don't support it - there's a problem. How do we fix that problem?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102504-11

.....
Please respond by

10/29/04

1 Dec

*JFcom Brief
closes this
section.
m. Jensen*

2504704

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22055

2/9
0800

7200

February 8, 2004

000.71SD

TO: Jaymie Duman
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Beverly Shaver

Please set me **up** with a meeting with Jerry Jennings to discuss these two letters from Beverly Shaver. Let him read them before the meeting and then be prepared to discuss them with me.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/19/03 Shaver ltr to Sec Def
5/29/03 Shaver ltr to Sec Def

DHR:dh
020804-24 (its computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

cc: Jerry Jennings

9 Feb 04

6-12-04

(b)(6)

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
C/O (b)(6)

Dear Rummy:

I **am** enclosing this May 29th letter because, as I had not heard from you, I was concerned that it might never have reached you. I think the letter speaks for itself.

I realize that some of the issues I've raised are sensitive matters, and that it might be awkward for you to answer anything specifically (God knows, you have enough other things to do nowadays). However, I **am** trying so hard to get some sort of resolution to this case, and it would help enormously if you could let me know whether or not I can expect anything through the efforts of your Office along these lines. I know the DPMO is pursuing this case, but frankly, I **am** very pessimistic that their present efforts will bear fruit.

Please let me know if you feel you have reached the limit of what help you can offer, and I will understand. If you would prefer not to reach me by mail, I can be reached now at (b)(6) or, for most of January at (b)(6) when we'll be with (b)(6) in Bethesda.

Thank you for all the help you've given me in the past, and for the wonderful Christmas present you and the troops gave to this country this week.

My best to you and Joyce for a great Christmas and New Years.

RECEIVED
DEC 22 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/22057

11-22-03/107

(b)(6)

May 29, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
C/o (b)(6)

Dear Rummy:

Since before 9/11, I have been planning to write you, but naively have been waiting until things cooled down a bit in your schedule. It is obvious that that isn't going to happen. I **am** hoping that, along with the many other demands for your attention, you can give this some serious consideration.

I know you are aware that I **am** less than satisfied with the USG's efforts to determine that fate of Jim Deane. I have received sympathy, but little substantive cooperation from the DPMO in several areas I have brought to their attention. I have been *so grateful* for your generous help in the past, but I now seem to have no other recourse than to **ask** for your help again.

I certainly am not in a position to have all the answers, but I can identify at least three things that the USG could and should do to resolve Jim's case. In each of these areas, I have sought help on the agency level without success. These areas are:

1. Colonel Xu Junping, director of the U.S. liaison office in the Foreign Affairs Office of the Chinese Ministry of Defense, who defected to the U.S. in March 2001, *has no?, to my knowledge, been questioned regarding Jim Deane*. Five months previous to this defection, his direct superior, General Zhan Maohai, Director of the Foreign Affairs Office in the Defense Ministry, received Ambassador Prueher's request for information on the Deane case (enclosed) and promised a response. Surely, Xu, as the **US** liaison head would have involved in preparing such a response, and should have knowledge of what information the Chinese are holding .

I asked **DASD** Jerry Jennings at the DPMO last summer to have Xu interrogated, but he denied having any knowledge whatsoever of this defector. I don't believe it is too much to ask that Xu be interrogated on this matter, with copies of the original intelligence reports to jog his memory. He could have not only some of the answers regarding Jim, but possibly all of the answers. Is there any way you can make this happen?

2. The DPMO and/or other agencies have failed to follow-up on the considerable new information I brought them after my two trips to China in 1999 and 2000 (see attached letter to DASD Bob Jones). After I supplied names and contact information

11-L-0559/OSD/22058

.. D S T O S - 1 7

of those who identified the Chinese pilot and confirmed that two prisoners were indeed taken from the P4M, there was absolutely no action taken by the USG on any of it. Is there any reason why the intelligence resources of the USG can't be used to follow-up?

While I support the DPMO's excavation efforts to repatriate remains, I fail to understand it virtually ignoring what needs to be done in a "last known alive" case, a case that conceivably could result in a live prisoner.

3. The CIA should go back to its pre-computer age files and come up with its information on this case. I know that they did a search at your and James Woolsey's request in the early 1990's. Nevertheless their fingerprints are all over it in the copies of the intelligence reports they received and in the comments of Samuel Klaus (memos enclosed). Almost every former intelligence person I interviewed in the last 10 years believes that the CIA, more than ONI, would have been responsible for monitoring what became of the two prisoners. The CIA has so far come up with absolutely nothing. They should be asked to look again.

Knowing that you probably do not have in your present office any of the documents I have sent in the past, I am enclosing a few pertinent ones, marked for your convenience. Please let me know if you need anything else.

I could not help but react with some bitterness by the use of the word "closure" in some of the televised Memorial Day speeches. There is no lack of closure more terrible than not even knowing whether someone is alive or dead. Jim Deane just deserved better than this.

I am desperately hoping that sometime during your tenancy in the Pentagon, that I can have that closure. Can you help?

Regards to all the Rumsfelds.

Beverly Deane Shaver

Encl..

Contact info:

Until July 21:

(b)(6)

After July 21:

(b)(6)

2/9
0800

February 8, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Beverly Shaver

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Thanks.

Attach.
12/19/03 Shaver ltr to Sec Def
5/29/03 Shaver ltr to Sec Def

DHR:dh
020804-24 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

cc: Jerry Jennings

11-L-0559/OSD/22060

OSD 02011-04

602
1004

(b)(6)

December 19, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
C/C (b)(6)

Dear Rummy!

I am enclosing this May 29th letter because, as I had not heard from you, I was concerned that it might never have reached you. I think the letter speaks for itself.

I realize that some of the issues I've raised are sensitive matters, and that it might be awkward for you to answer anything specifically (God knows, you have enough other things to do nowadays). However, I am trying so hard to get some sort of resolution to this case, and it would help enormously if you could let me know whether or not I can expect anything through the efforts of your Office along these lines. I know the DPMO is pursuing this case, but frankly, I am very pessimistic that their present efforts will bear fruit.

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My best to you and Joyce for a great Christmas and New Years.



RECEIVED
DEC 22 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/22061

42209/03

(b)(6)

May 29, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
C/o (b)(6)

Dear Rummy:

Since before 9/11, I have been planning to write you, but naively have been waiting until things cooled down a bit in your schedule. It is obvious that that isn't going to happen. I am hoping that, along with the many other demands for your attention, you can give this some serious consideration.

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11-L-0559/OSD/22062

U 03905-03

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Regards to all the Rumsfelds,

Beverly Deane Shaver

Encl..

Contact info:

Until July 21:

(b)(6)

After July 21:

(b)(6)

1435
214

February 2, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
cc - DSD / Dave Patterson
FROM: Donald umsfeld
SUBJECT: Tanker Issue

Advanced
copies provided

452T

I need an answer on the tanker issue.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020204-22

.....
Please respond by _____

2 Feb 04

4SAT

2/4 08 00

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2/4

To: Jaymie

Durnan

Whats the question?

Dave Patterson

I guess

"where are we?"

Is this OBE?

JUST ATTACH the package
w/a couple of bullets in the
way ahead. Thanks J
Durnan 4/10

10 Feb 04 2 Feb 04

1435
2/4

February 2, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
CC: DSD / Dave Patterson
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA* *Durham*
SUBJECT: Tanker Issue *7/2*

*Advance
copy provided*

I need an answer on the tanker issue.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
02/02/04-22

.....
Please respond by _____

December 1, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Military Recruiters on Campus

340

The attached article talks about Harvard Law School barring military recruiters on campus. What can we do about that?

Thanks.

Attach.

Associated Press. "Harvard Law ~~Bans~~ Service Recruiters," *Los Angeles Times*, December 1, 2004.

DHR:dh
120104-18

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

1 Dec 04



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

January 28, 2005, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Military Recruiting at Harvard Law School

- You asked about military recruiting at Harvard Law School in light of the recent decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit finding the Solomon Amendment unconstitutional and preliminarily enjoining its enforcement.
- The Dean of the Harvard Law School is reported as stating that colleges and universities are now free to bar recruiters without fear of losing federal money and Harvard can again enforce its nondiscrimination policy without exception.
- If that report is accurate, Harvard Law School would revert to its pre-2001 recruiter-access policy:
 - o The military, unlike other employers, was not allowed to participate in school-sponsored job fairs.
 - o Assistance to military recruiters was solely dependent upon volunteer student organizations.
 - o School assistance involving notices and publicity about visits by potential employers was denied to military recruiters.
- Although Harvard Law School is not located within the Third Circuit's geographic jurisdiction (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and the Virgin Islands), the Department of Justice and DoD are currently evaluating whether a preliminary injunction would apply because members of the Harvard faculty and Harvard student organizations are plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Regardless, DoD and DoJ will vigorously seek reversal of the Court's decision.
- DoJ is seeking Supreme Court review of the Third Circuit's decision. In the interim, the Third Circuit has tentatively agreed to stay its mandate until the Supreme Court decides whether to hear the case.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: John J. Sullivan, DGC (LC) (b)(6)



OSD 02014-05

11-L-0559/OSD/22068

340

28 Jan 05

1 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Military Recruiters on Campus

The attached article talks about Harvard Law School barring military recruiters on campus. What can we do about that?

Thanks.

Attach.

Associated Press, "Harvard Law Bars Service Recruiters," Los *Angeles Times*, December 1, 2004.

DHR:dh
120104-18

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22069

OSD 02014-05

7200
~~FOUO~~

f.i/o

October 20, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*

SUBJECT: Casey Meeting

Please get a debrief from Gen Pace on the portion of the Casey meeting you did not attend.

One of the key things I said to Casey was, that if the Iraqis think they can reconstitute two mechanized divisions, why don't we let them try to do it. They will find it's harder than they think. They will come to us for advice and we'll have an opportunity to talk about the vetting process, relative priorities, costs, timing, etc.

They are a sovereign country. Why don't we just say, fine -- go ahead and do it. We don't have to do it for them.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101904-25

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

10/20

10/20

SIR —

*Done — good session
w/VCSCS. He agrees
with the "go ahead! do
it" approach — will*

~~FOUO~~ push it too.

11-L-0559/OSD/22070

OSD 02016-05 *v/r Jan*

Iraq

200204



~~FOUO~~

October 21, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Les Brownlee
GEN Pete Schoomaker
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Casualty Assistance

I wonder whether we handle casualty assistance to military forces as well as we must. Injured soldiers receive superb medical treatment, but I have a feeling they are receiving industrial age assistance after that. There have been several recent anecdotes and press coverage of cases that seemed not to be handled as well as we must.

Please get back to me soon with some thoughts about how we should re-evaluate the whole system. I am concerned about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102104-2

.....
Please **respond** by 11/5/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22071

OSD 02018-05

noy

2102704

720
~~FOUO~~

October 21, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Protective Detail

IRAQ

We have got to get a proposal that will free up DoD from the protective detail around Prime Minister Allawi and get Department of State to move ahead, so we don't have to have another extension. Please see that that happens.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102104-7


.....
Please respond by _____

21 OCT 04

OSD 02019-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/22072

October 26, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Next of Kin Notification

Please take the lead and come up with a proposal where we would form an outside group – probably headed up by someone like Jack Keane and maybe the CEO of Home Depot, and head of the Red Cross – three or four people to help the Pentagon get into the 21st Century with respect to the period of notification of injury or death and how the Department deals with relatives, friends, and the like.

Please work closely with David Chu and Dick Myers. The sooner we can do this, the better.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102604-5

.....
Please respond by 11/15/04

704
26 OCT 04

October 26, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Review of Directives Progress Report

Please get me an updated progress report where you separate *Revised or Canceled* and bring it up to date.

Thanks.

Attach. ' Review of Directives Progress Report for week ending 09/03/04

DHR:ss
102604-15

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

300.8

26 Oct 04

(44)

REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES

PROGRESS REPORT FOR WEEK ENDING 2/03/04

COMPONENT	TOTAL NUMBER	CERTIFIED CURRENT	TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED	SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*	% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED	DEPSECDEF SIGNED
USD(AT&L)	111	37	74	54	(73%)	21
USD(P)	66	11	35	7	(13%)	0
USD(C)	15	8	7	6	(86%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	98	94	58	(62%)	23
USD(I)	55	2	47	10	(22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	(0%)	0
ASD(NII)	40	17	23	16	(70%)	7
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	1
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	(56%)	5
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	(86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	15	(27%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	(0%)	0
WHS	15	-	7	7	(100%)	5
TOTALS:	654		396	193	(49%)	70

* Of the 193 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

** Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

~~FOUO~~

OCT 18 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Plan for Syria

Please get back to me on what you think is an appropriate plan for Syria.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101504-18

.....
Please respond by _____

Syria

18 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02022-05

11-L-0559/OSD/22076

February 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Trial of Saddam Hussein

Please tell me how we can get Saddam Hussein tried soon and have the process start. The things he has done need to be shown to the world.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-90

.....
Please respond by

2 / 12 / 04

Iraq

8 Feb 04

Report Date: 1/25/2005 *IRAQ**(11 FEB 04)*
Deputy Secretary of Defense Priority Actions Report*8 FEB 04*

Control Number	FROM	SUBJECT	TYPE ACTION	ACTION AGY	DOC	DOR	SUSPENSE DATE	STATUS
<i>02037-04</i>	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: TRIAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN	AMN	USP	2/11/2004	2/11/2004	CLOSED	
OSD 76059-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	DSD NOTE REF: COORDINATED DOD WAY AHEAD ON INDONESIA MIL TO MIL	ADN	USP	4/26/2004	4/27/2004	CLOSED	
OSD 77000-04	DEPSEC HELMICK	DSD NOTE REF: PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN	ADN	USP	6/22/2004	6/23/2004	CLOSED	
OSD 77793-04	DEPSEC HELMICK	DSD NOTE REF: DETENTION OPERATIONS METRICS	ADN	USP	9/8/2004	9/9/2004	CLOSED	
OSD 78126-04	DEPSEC HELMICK	DSD NOTE REF: U.S. - RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP PROPOSAL	ADN	ISP	10/13/2004	10/14/2004	CLOSED	
OSD 78412-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	DSD NOTE REF: DOD DETAINEE BIOMETRIC POLICY	ADN	USP	11/1/2004	11/2/2004	11/9/2004	
OSD 18463-04	DEPSEC OCONNOR	DSD NOTE REF: LETTER FROM FORMER SECDEF CASPER WEINBERGER	ADN	NII	11/18/2004	11/18/2004	11/24/2004	
OSD 17731-04	DEPSEC NAGI	DSD NOTE REF: BAHRAIN SCHOOL	ADN	UPR	11/22/2004	11/23/2004	CLOSED	
OSD 78794-04	DEPSEC WOLFOWITZ	DSD NOTE REF: NON-LETHAL WEAPONS	ADN	USA	12/3/2004	12/6/2004	CLOSED	
OSD 19113-04	DEPSEC WOLFOWITZ	DSD NOTE REF: FAO DIRECTIVE	ADN	UPR	12/8/2004	12/9/2004	12/15/2004	
OSD 20188-04	DEPSEC HELMICK	MAD NOTE REF: AIRMOBILE UNITS FOR IRAQ	ADN	USP	12/15/2004	12/15/2004	CLOSED	
OSD 10962-04	DEPSEC WOLFOWITZ	DSD NOTE REF: PROPOSED RESPONSE TO HIRC/HASC LETTER EXPRESSING CONCERNS ON TWO PENDING AGREEMENTS WITH THE UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE	ADN	USP	12/23/2004	12/27/2004	CLOSED	
OSD 18762-04	DEPSEC WOLFOWITZ	DSD NOTE REF: DEFENSE LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP	ADN	UPR	12/22/2004	1/4/2005	1/10/2005	
OSD 01362-05	DEPSEC HELMICK	DSD NOTE REF: LETTER FROM NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES OF AMERICAN PRISONERS MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	ADN	USP	1/21/2005	1/21/2005	1/28/2005	

11-L-0559/OSD/22078

R 02037-04



~~FOUO~~

October 22, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letter from Hungarian Ambassador

The attached letter to Pete Pace from the Ambassador from Hungary referring to Allawi's letter to Hungary's Prime Minister is a message. We need to make sure Iraq keeps this up with all the Members of the Coalition and keeps them under the umbrella.

They need to know that Iraq wants them, cares about it, respects it and appreciates it.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/20/04 Letter from Amb Simonyi to Gen Pace

DHR:ss
102204-6

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

OSD 02047-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22079

The Ambassador of Hungary

General Peter Pace
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
U.S. Department of Defense
Pentagon, Room 23860
Washington, DC 20301-1000

October 20, 2004

Dear General Pace,

It was a real pleasure to see you again this afternoon and discuss with you important issues pertaining to our co-operation. Thank you for the exchange on the Iraqi situation and for the "cautious" optimism for the future of our mission. As I explained to you it is our firm intention to make sure that Hungary has a continued input to the stabilization efforts and for the creation of an environment on which democracy can flourish.

I would also like to thank you for the substantive discussion on the future of co-operation between our militaries. I was pleased to hear about your personal commitment to further the relationship and I look forward to work with you to prepare for your counterpart to visit the United States as well as you to visit Hungary next year.

For your personal information I enclose a copy of the letter of Prime Minister Allawi addressed to my Prime Minister, which you might find useful.

I look forward to stay in touch with you in our efforts to further co-operation between our two countries and for the success of our joint endeavors in the war against terror.

Yours sincerely,


András Simonyi

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

جمهورية العراق
مكتب رئيس الوزراء

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

Prime Minister's Office

المسند:

التاريخ:

The Honorable Peter Medgyessy
Prime Minister
Republic of Hungary

Dear Prime Minister Medgyessy,

I am writing to thank you for the invaluable contribution your military has made to securing peace and safety for the people of Iraq, and to ask that you favorably consider renewing their mandate, which I understand is set to run out in December. I am sure you appreciate the many challenges we are encountering here. I am relying on your personal understanding of the enormous task my government is facing in rebuilding this country as I ask you to maintain your current level of forces in Iraq for the coming year or so, until we reach the point when MNF is able to withdraw its forces.

The troops of the Transportation Battalion you have provided have been providing an essential mission to assist the people of Iraq. In fact, your 300 troops may be needed most during the upcoming key moments in Iraq's political transition: the elections for a transitional government, drafting of a new constitution, a referendum on that constitution, and elections for a permanent government. A drawdown of Hungarian forces in the near term could have serious consequences for Iraq and the international community. It would indicate that important Coalition Partners are not willing to stay the course with us until Iraqi Security Forces are able to provide for the security of this nation; it would embolden the terrorists and insurgents who want to hold Iraq back from the peace, prosperity and democracy that our people have earned; and it would undo all the good your armed forces have done by their efforts to date in Iraq. The need for Multinational Forces in Iraq as outlined in UNSCR 1546 has, sadly, not diminished.

11-L-0559/OSD/22081

One day Iraq will stand firmly and proudly on its own, That day will come sooner if our friends and partners continue to stand by us in our time of need. We will remember those who stood with us then, and we will seek to deepen the partnership now on economic, political and other levels.

The IIG looks forward to working closely with Hungary on ways to contribute to the reconstruction and revitalization of the Iraqi economy. We understand the reality of the resource and political constraints that you must be facing, and the Iraqis can relate to what your nation went through as it emerged from its own era of dictatorship and despair. Just as Hungary needed and received assistance then, we need it now, particularly as we face the reality of global terrorism.

let me thank you once again for the Republic of Hungary's contribution to the improvement of Iraq's security, economy and governance, since liberation .

Sincerely yours,



Ayad H. Allawi
Prime Minister
Republic of Iraq

11 Feb -0730
Scanned

February 9, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Jointness" in the USG

Years back Congress passed Goldwater-Nichols. It has had a favorable effect. It may be time to review and possibly adjust it, but it has led to jointness in a number of respects. To do so, each of the Services gave up something to achieve the greater good – jointness. It has been a good thing.

020 DDD

It could be that it is time to consider a Goldwater-Nichols type exercise for the USG and the interagency process.

It is conceivable that if each department and agency gave up something for the greater good of speed, unity of command on policy and execution, etc. – the effect might be to achieve greater effectiveness for the USG. In effect, there might be a way to rearrange authority and responsibilities to fit the 21st century in a way that would reduce the time currently needed for coordination and improve clarity for our interaction around the world.

9 Feb 04

Let's discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-49

.....
Please respond by

2 / 20 / 04

OSD 02048-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22083

11 Feb -0730
Scanned

February 9, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Jointness" in the USG

Years back Congress passed Goldwater-Nichols. It has had a favorable effect. It may be time to review and possibly adjust it, but it has led to jointness in a number of respects. To do so, each of the Services gave up something to achieve the greater good – jointness. It has been a good thing.

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Let's discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-49

.....
Please respond by 2 / 20 / 04

OSD 02048-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22084

Robinson, Sandra M, TSgt, WHS/ESCD

From: Archard, Darrell, TSGT, OSD
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2004 9:24 PM
To: Robinson, Sandra M, TSgt, WHS/ESCD
Subject: FW: Priority Action Report 022004

TSgt Robinson,

FYI.

v/r

TSgt Darrell L. Archard
Admin Assistant
Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(703) 692-7150 DSN 222-7150
Fax: 703-697-7374 DSN 227-7374

030 DSD

-----Original Message-----

From: Archard, Darrell, TSGT, OSD
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2004 9:16 PM
To: Bianco, Pat, TSgt, WHS/ESCD
cc: Bryant, Michael, MSgt, OSD
Subject: FW: Priority Action Report 022004

TSgt Bianco,

The items marked in red are closed.

good!

v/r

TSgt Darrell L. Archard
Admin Assistant
Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(703) 692-7150 DSN 222-7150
Fax: 703-697-7374 DSN 227-7374

-----Original Message-----

From: Bianco, Pat, TSgt, WHS/ESCD
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2004 7:22 AM
To: Archard, Darrell; Bryant, Michael
Subject: Priority Action Report 022004

See attached,



par2_dsd.rtf

(11 Feb 04)

11- L-0559/OSD/22085

R 02048-04

Report Date: 2/20/2004


Deputy Secretary of Defense Priority Actions Report

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TYPE ACTION</u>	<u>ACTION AGY</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>DOR</u>	<u>SUSPENSE DATE</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
X036143-03	DEPSEC CALDWELL	MAD NOTE REF: USMC CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF II/III	AMN	PAE	10/22/2003	012212003	10/27/2003	
197631A-03	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	DSD NOTE REF: CPA CHIEF FINANCIAL MANAGER CFM	AMN	USC	12/11/2003	2/12/2003	12/18/2003	AWAITING DSD APV U21372-03 12/29/03
X04661A-03	DEPSEC CALDWELL	DSD NOTE REF: AL-JAZEERA UPDATE	ADN	ISA	12/31/2003	1212004	1/7/2004	
X04581A-03	DEPSEC GANYARD	DSD NOTE REF: SUCCESSOR	ADN	USP	1/7/2004	1/7/2004	1/14/2004	
ISD 75171-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	MAD NOTE REF: SHORTAGE OF FERTILIZER	AMN	CPA	1/20/2004	1/20/2004	1/27/2004	
ISD 00610-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	DSD NOTE REF: ON-CAMPUS RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY RECRUITING	AMN	UPR	1/20/2004	112012004	1/22/2004	
ISD 00929-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	DSD NOTE REF: REPLY TO MOC KUCINICH REGARDING IRAQI WEAPONS	AMN	USP	1/21/2004	1/22/2004	1/23/2004	
ISD 75244-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	MAD NOTE REF: BACKGROUND AND DEBRIEFING REPORTS ON DETAINEE	AMN	DJS	1/26/2004	1/26/2004	1/30/2004	
ISD 75215-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	MAD NOTE REF: CAPTURED IRAQI DOCUMENT REQUEST	AMN	DIA	1/23/2004	1/23/2004	1/30/2004	
OSD 75259-04	DEPSEC WOLFOWITZ	DSD NOTE REF: KURDS	ADN	JCS	1/29/2004	1/30/2004	2/4/2004	
OSD 75353-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	DSD NOTE REF: DPB CHINA PRESENTATION	ADN	FSA	2/6/2004	2/9/2004	2/10/2004	
OSD 02455-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: MZOUDE	AMN	DJS	211012004	2/10/2004	2/11/2004	
OSD 02037-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: TRIAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN	AMN	USP	2/11/2004	211112004	2/12/2004	
ISD 02128-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: HEARING ON REBALANCING	AMN	UPR	2111/2004	2/12/2004	2/17/2004	
ISD 01702-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	DSD NOTE REF: PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS	AMN	USP	2/11/2004	2/12/2004	2/18/2004	

11-L-0559/OSD/22086

Report Date: 2/20/2004

Deputy Secretary of Defense Priority Actions Report

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TYPE ACTION</u>	<u>ACTION AGY</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>DOR</u>	<u>SUSPENSE DATE</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
OSD 75424-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: SYRIA AND LEBANON	AMN	DJS	2/11/2004	2/11/2004	2/17/2004	
OSD 02048-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: JOINTNESS IN USC	AMN	USP	2/11/2004	2/11/2004	2/19/2004	
OSD 02251-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: QUICK PIPELINE REPAIR TEAMS STATUS	AMN	CPA	2/17/2004	2/17/2004	2/20/2004	
OSD 75333-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: AMENDING IRAQ CODEL POLICY	AMN	CPA	2/11/2004	2/12/2004	2/18/2004	
OSD 02261-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	MAD NOTE REF: CLASSIFYING AI	AMN	USI	2/17/2004	2/17/2004	2/20/2004	
OSD 02219-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: HUMANITARIAN SERVICE MEDAL	AMN	UPR	2/13/2004	2/13/2004	2/18/2004	

11-L-0559/OSD/22087

11 Feb -0730
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February 9, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Command Headquarters

The more I reflect on the discussion at the CINC conference, it seems to me we need to consider an end to the idea of having ad hoc headquarters. We are fighting against enemies that don't respect borders in a globalized society.

It may be that we shouldn't have headquarters that are anything other than joint and standing. Let's discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:db
020804-50

.....
Please respond by

2/20

322

9 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22088

OSD 02049-04

C2 D copy

Military Assistant

11 February 2004 - 1300

MEMORANDUM FOR: DJS - *Hand Carried*


SUBJECT: Command Headquarters

Sir,

The Deputy asks that the Joint Staff take the attached SecDef snowflake for action. Please work with USD (P) and provide coordinated talking points to the Deputy by Tuesday, Feb 19.

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Mark R. Hegerott
Commander, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE: 19 Feb 04

cc: USD (P), VCJCS EA

OSD 02049-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22089

322

11 FEB 04

0 Feb 04

11 Feb -0730
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February 9, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Command Headquarters

The more I reflect on the discussion at the CINC conference, it seems to me we need to consider an end to the idea of having ad hoc headquarters. We are fighting against enemies that don't respect borders in a globalized society.

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Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-50

.....
Please respond by 2120

OSD 02049-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22090

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division (CCD), WHS Room 3A948, Suspense Desk: (b)(6) FAX Number: (b)(6)

Action Agency

DJS

Suspense Date

2/19/2004

1. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)

- ☒ a. ACTION **HAS BEEN COMPLETED** (Copy attached)
- ☐ b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO (Justify below)
- ☐ c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO (Justify below)
- ☐ d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- ☐ e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO (Justify below /include POC Name & Phone Number)
- ☐ f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO (Justify below)

2. JUSTIFICATION

Action completed by CICS briefing the SecDef at roundtable, 8 Mar 2004

3. REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY

DJS

c. APPROVING AUTHORITY

(Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level)

Signature

SJS/ACB

(b)(6)

Date Signed

b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER

Maurice A. Shields

9 Mar 04

c. TELEPHONE NO.

5. ACTION TAKEN

(For EXSEC/Correspondence Control Division Use Only)

a. EXT

☐ Approved

☐ Disapproved

b. CANX

☒ Approved

☐ Disapproved

c. DWNGRD

☐ Approved

☐ Disapproved

d. TRANSFER

☐ Approved

☐ Disapproved

e. OTHER (Specify)

4. CCD CONTROL #

OSD 02049-04

Signature

[Signature]

Date Signed

3/16/04

SD FORM 391, JAN 2000

11-L-0559/OSD/22091

R 02049-04

322

(11 FEB 04)

ANN 1st CANX

October 20, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo from (b)(6)

Attached is some material that was sent to me by a very good friend, (b)(6)
Please take a look at it and tell me what you think we ought to do with it.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/9/04 Project Family Ties Memo

8/6/04 McClaugherty Letter to Sen Byrd

11/16/04 LETTER FROM (b)(6)

DHR:ss
102004-6

.....
Please respond by 11/15/04

335 SD

20 Oct 04

OSD 02067-05

MEMORANDUM

To: US Senator Robert C. Byrd
From: Major General Allen E. Tackett
Re: Project Family Ties
Date: July 9, 2004

Introduction. Project Family Ties (PFT) is a video and telephonic communication system that provides families of deployed military service men and women access to professional counselors on a 24/7/365 basis. Additionally, this same system would allow a deployed military member to meet in a virtual environment with family members to celebrate significant events, to discuss private matters, to participate in family or individual counseling, or to merely ease the loneliness of separations. Project Family Ties is a joint venture between The Military Family Support Foundation (MTSF), a 501(c)(3) non-profit, public benefit foundation and beBetter Networks, Inc, a Charleston, West Virginia company.

On-Going Problem. Global terrorism has changed the level of the National Guard and Reserve's role in global peace keeping. The result being longer and more frequent deployments which have led to increased family separations. The problems caused by these prolonged family separations will soon threaten our ability to recruit and retain the necessary personnel to keep our country safe.

Scope of Problem. The West Virginia National Guard receives an average of 750 calls per week from family members of deployed guard members. Nation-wide, the call volume is approximately two million calls. These calls should be going to professionally trained counselors.

Objective of PFT. The objective of PFT is to boost the morale of deployed military members, while supporting their extended families at home, by helping to resolve the long-standing problems associated with extended separations. To achieve this objective, we address two major initiatives: 1) to normalize the family dynamic as much as possible during the stressful time of separation, and 2) when problems occur in the family dynamic, to correct those problems as soon as possible through timely, professional family counseling. We will compassionately assist the military member and his/her family to make and achieve quality of life decisions that positively impact their overall wellbeing and effectiveness.

11-L-0559/OSD/22093

Who, What, and When. Those eligible for primary support services would include, but not necessarily be limited to:

- All members of the National Guard and Reserves.
- Spouses.
- Significant others including: common-law spouses; girlfriends, boyfriends; etc.
- **Children of personnel. This country has spent billions on “No Child Left Behind,” yet these children are being neglected by no fault of anyone’s.**
- Parents of personnel.
- Grand-parents of personnel.
- Family members – brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles.

The second tier of support would include coaching and consulting services which would be provided to **businesses** (you would be touching all employers) and community organizations. These services would be designed to minimize the impact that such mobilizations and deployments have on a community at large.

Assistance and guidance would be available on issues related to:

- Parenting issues and dilemmas
- Relationship issues
- Emotional issues
- Stress Management
- Financial guidance
- Care Giver issues
- Problem solving
- Substance use issues
- Personal and family wellness
- Educational and vocational issues

Problems do not occur according to schedules.. schedules don’t always match from one family to another, and situations don’t always arise in a predetermined order. beBetter Networks technology based services will be available when the family needs support – 24//365. beBetter Networks strives to help those at home maintain their quality of life so that the service personnel can focus on their mission knowing that their family has the best support possible until they return home. Services will be provided in a compassionate, discreet, and professional manner by highly skilled staff with extensive experience in helping people solve problems.

These services will be offered pre-deployment, during the mobilization and deployment and when these men and women have returned home. Recently released studies show the severity and likelihood of depression among recently returned service personnel.

Page-three

Why MFSF and beBetter Networks - MFSF is a foundation set up for the sole purpose of supporting our troops and they have determined that the National Guard and the Reserves is where the need is the greatest. Full time military personnel are clustered around bases and have access to other support services. Members of the Guard and Reserves are scattered through out the country and they lack equal support, yet we have more Guard and Reserve personnel dying in the war to protect America than we have full-time military personnel.

beBetter Networks, Inc is a company headquartered in West Virginia. beBetter Network's CEO is **John W. McClaugherty**, the son of **John L. McClaugherty**. Mr. McClaugherty has already invested in the State of West Virginia and he is in the process of bringing hundreds of high paying jobs to Charleston. However, a commitment from the National Guard and Reserves would serve to make beBetter Networks one of the largest employers in the State. Economic forecasts predict this business alone would pump an additional \$80mm annually into the local economy. _

Maior General's Personal Viewpoint

I met with **John McClaugherty** and his team last week. They have pulled outstanding people into their organization such as Brigadier General **John Barnett**. (General Barnett is the country's leading expert in military family support.) Their model for the distribution of support services is unique and unmatched in the industry. Once again, we have another opportunity to make West Virginia the leader in helping to train and prepare our military personnel.

I will tell you what I told them, "if this program was available today it would be a GODSEND! If we want to retain our current troops and be able to attract new recruits, we must have this program in place and fully operational.

I respectfully request your full support of this ambitious project.

Major General Allen E. Tackett
West Virginia National Guard
The Adjunct General

11-L-0559/OSD/22095



August 6, 2004

The Honorable Senator Robert C. Byrd
311 Hart Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Byrd:

The global war against terrorism necessitates that American citizens who make up our National Guard and Reserves stop their daily lives and travel to foreign soil for extended periods of time where they risk their lives for our safety. beBetter Networks (BNI) is intimately aware that these men and women, and their families, are challenged **as** never before in previous conflicts.

Spouses, children and extended families of these Guard and Reserve have had to rely primarily on unskilled volunteers from the National Guard Family Program for support. Currently, these family members are **placing over two** million calls per year to the various National Guard headquarters in the **fifty** states. Not surprisingly, the Guard could not have anticipated the volume or content of these calls. As a result, the service men and women themselves are having to shoulder the additional burden of their family's needs in a time when focus and safety are of the utmost importance. This is where BNI can help.

BNI has developed a unique program – National Guard and Reserve Support (NGRS) – which would handle these calls with highly skilled and experienced professionals. BNI will assist these families with everyday problems including:

- Stress Management
- Emotional Issues
- Resiliency
- Relationship Issues
- Family Issues
- Parenting Concerns
- Financial
- Career Decisions
- Child Care Issues
- Family Care Plans
- Caregiver Issues
- Personal and Family Wellness
- Alcohol and **Drug** Issues

Problems do not occur according to schedules. BNI's services will be available when the family needs support: twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.¹ **As** a result, the troops will know their families have the best support possible until they return home and can better focus on their mission? We believe this support can save lives.

¹ Per Maj. General Allen Tackett, WV Adjutant, over 10% of his soldiers are divorcing during deployment.

² A recently returning Commanding Officer tells of soldiers preoccupied with arranging flights home to deal with family issues during the heat of deployment. Their lack of focus could be life threatening.

BNI requests your assistance in bringing the NGRS program to the Guard and Reserve, including your help in securing immediate funding for this procurement. The cost to launch Phase I of National Guard and Reserve Support is **\$9.85** million. Under Phase I, BNI would provide the following for one year:

- Telephonic and Internet support for Families of Deployed Troops (150,000)
- Round-the-clock, 24/7/365, support provided by highly skilled and experienced professionals
- Primary receiver of two million (2,000,000) annual calls
- Sort and prioritize needs
- Develop and distribute Family Service Support materials
- Training for the National Guard Family Program (Train-the-Trainers)
- Developmental team of Subject Matter Experts and Trainers
- Utilization Reporting and Outcome Measurement
- Outreach and support services to the State Family Program Coordinators, Wing Family Program Coordinators, and Family Assistance Centers
- Develop educational and informational materials targeted to National Guard and Reserve members and their families
- Provide a dedicated clearinghouse for resources for the coordinators, FAC ~~staff~~, volunteers, and families
- A program for Continuous Quality Improvement

In BNI's meetings and conversations with Guard and Reserve personnel, there appears to be a consensus that the need for NGRS services is of an unusual and compelling urgency. Furthermore, without an immediate and comprehensive support program for the Guard and Reserves, and their families, there could be the potential for harm to our troops, their families, and the United States of America as a whole. It does not appear, therefore, to be in the public or the government's best interest to require a full and open competitive process to acquire these essential emergency services.

Phase II of the proposed NGRS program would involve the provision of additional services that could, if funds are available immediately, be implemented co-jointly with Phase I. However, if immediate funding at a more robust level is a significant impediment, Phase II could be implemented beginning in year two, as follows:

- Telephonic/Internet Support for all Guard and Reserve Members (600,000), and their families
- Round-the-clock, 24/7/365, support provided by highly skilled and experienced professionals
- Exclusive receiver of calls placed by the Guard and Reserves, by members of their immediate and their extended families
- Sort and prioritize needs
- Full video conferencing access, including family support services, to troops and families on a global basis
- Ongoing development and distribution of Family Service Support materials
- Training for the National Guard Family Program (Train-the-Trainers)
- Subject matter experts and trainers
- Utilization Reporting and Outcome Measurement
- Ongoing design and evaluation to ensure consistency and uniformity of service delivery


In Phase II, BNI proposes to expand NGRS to assume 100% of the call volume coming from troops and their families. Phase II also includes full videoconferencing capabilities to allow deployed soldiers of the National Guard and Reserve to visit directly with family members and interact with professional ~~staff~~. We propose delivering this expanded version of NGRS in conjunction with the Military Family Support Foundation (MFSF), a 501(C) [3] non-profit, public benefit foundation. This combined effort between BNI and MFSF has been named Project Family Ties (PFT). This same system allows deployed service

women and men to meet in a virtual environment with their loved ones to enhance and reinforce family connections. If necessary and appropriate, Phase II services may be able to be competitively awarded.

Senator Byrd, I urge you to fully consider both phases of BNI's program to provide critical support to the National Guard and Reserves. We ~~are~~ ready to employ the personnel required to deliver these necessary and critical support services to the honorable men and women serving our country. We can do this almost immediately from right here in West Virginia.

BNI expresses our gratitude and appreciation of your efforts on behalf of our service men and women enduring in the global war on terrorism. Please feel free to call me to discuss this proposal in more detail.

Very truly yours,



John W. McClaugherty
Chief Executive Officer
beBetter Networks, Inc.

(b)(6)

cc: Major General Allen Tackett

Oct. 15, 2004

Dear Don,

Thank you Mr. Secretary for your dedication to your job, to America and Americans. There has never been a better Secretary of Defense - and we have sorely needed the best! It seems you have to put up with so much c----. I continually marvel at your gracious demeanor and calm.

I am hoping you might take the time to read the enclosed letters. Our son Stanley, Jr. sent them to us in August when we were at the GOP Convention in N.Y. Then all hell broke loose in Palm Beach with Frances & Jeanne and I finally went through

mountains of mail this past week. We had no power or phones for eighteen days and as awful as it was for us, many are worse off.

I have thought a great deal about this proposal, and think it is exciting.

Stanley, Jr. works for John McLaugherty, and they have received Pentagon clearance for a meeting with Secretary Hall of the Army Reserve on Friday, October 29th. Just in case you can weigh in on the decision making process, on behalf of two wonderful young men, I wanted to bring it to your attention. If this forward thinking, compassionate plan goes forward, I am hoping that Republicans as well as

3.
Democrats will get the credit.

I am on my way to Mount Vernon for our five day fall board meeting. I so hope that sometime after I become Regent next Tues. & after the election & maybe in the new year, I can have you & Joyce be my guests at George Washington's home. He would have loved you both and admired you both.

If you need to reach me I will be checking messages on my cell phone:

(b)(6)

I return to Florida Wed. & will work every day on the re-election of President Bush.

With high regard and deep affection,

(b)(6)

October 18, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Ray DuBois, Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Organization

020 PA

Please get with Ray DuBois and some people who know organization and let's revamp how Public Affairs is handled. We can't have multiple messages coming out of the Department – strategic communications are too important. We need to move toward a more joint approach – a Department of Defense Public Affairs approach, rather than a Service approach. Some possibilities include:

- 1) Have the senior PR people, not in the Services, but in the Combatant Commands, and with the CJCS and VCJCS.
- 2) Address the numbers and ranks in Public Affairs and reprioritize.
- 3) Determine how Joint Forces Command could integrate public affairs into their training and preparation.

The heft and weight of the efforts ought to be on working the problems for the U.S. Government, rather than promoting individual services.

Another aspect is language skills. We need to build a better bench and develop an overall plan.

Thanks.




DHR:ss
101404-20

18 OCT 04

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

~~FOUO~~

November 11, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Letterman and O'Reilly

I ought to think about doing Letterman and O'Reilly at some point, since I have put them off.

Thanks.

DIR:dr
111104-5

.....
Please respond by

12/3/04

O'Reilly 12/2
Letterman?

done

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22103

OSD 02072-05

OCC. 7-50

11 Nov 05

November 22, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Karen Ballard on next Mid East **trip**

Let's talk about Karen Ballard going on the next Middle East **trip**.

Thanks.

DHR:gs
112204-18

.....
Please respond by 11/24/04

*Karen never got
back to CD.
OBE now.
12/2*

December 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letterman

I think we ought to do Letterman sometime.

Thanks.

DIR:ss
120304-2

.....
Please respond by _____

done

000.1130

3 Dec 05

October 27, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Talking Points

Please get me a complete set of these DoD talking points, since they started coming out. And as others are released, please keep a copy of them in a file and let me have the complete set when this campaign is over.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/18/04 US Department of Defense Talking Points

DIIRSS
102704-2

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Please respond by 11/5/04

done
11/2004

The copy is in the file
done

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27 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22106

OSD 02075-05



US Department of Defense
Talking Points – Oct. 18, 2004 – 343rd Quartermaster Company

Following are talking points on recent stories in the news about the 343rd Quartermaster Company.

Brig. Gen. James Chambers, commanding general of the 13th Corps Support Command, has ordered two investigations. Following are talking points.

Operations throughout the Iraqi Theater are inherently dangerous and Commanders at all levels have the safety of their soldiers as a primary concern.

There has been an incident in which a few members of a Quartermaster Company allegedly refused to participate in an assigned convoy mission.

On any given day there are approximately 250 convoys on the road consisting of a daily average of 2,500 vehicles with over 5,000 soldiers delivering goods every day and night.

In a 24-hour period convoys on average deliver 110,000 cases of bottled water, 202,000 meals and 1 --million gallons of fuel.

As a result of this incident the convoy failed to depart at its assigned time, but the mission proceeded later in the day with other soldiers and leaders from the company.

Actions being taken by the commander:

- Brig. Gen. Chambers has appointed his Deputy Commander to lead two investigations into the incident - one investigation into the status of the equipment, the other into the failure to execute their mission.
- The investigation will determine if any offenses to the Uniform Code of Military Justice were committed and, if so, whether disciplinary measures are warranted.

*Box
Full Get*

11-L-0559/OSD/22107

~~FOUO~~

file

October 27, 2004

f

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Talking Points

Please get me a complete set of these DoD talking points, since they started coming out. And as others are released, please keep a copy of them in a file and let me have the complete set when this campaign is over.

Thanks.

Attach.
10118/04 US Department of Defense Talking Points
DHRss
102704-2

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

11/19

Not a list

Re 11/19 FYI 2004 Year-to-date collection.

D. Rita

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22108



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 18, 2004 – 343rd Quartermaster Company

Following are talking points on recent stories in the news about the 343rd Quartermaster Company.

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Operations throughout the Iraqi Theater are inherently dangerous and Commanders at all levels have the safety of their soldiers as a primary concern.

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*Get
full set*

11-L-0559/OSD/22109



US Department of Defense

Update: Nov. 1, 2004 – 60 Minutes Story

Following are talking points in response to a story aired Oct. 31, 2004, on CBS' 60 Minutes regarding equipping U.S. servicemen and women serving in Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), specifically an Army National Guard unit from Oregon. This particular unit deployed in late April 2003. The President has asked for and Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to address the concerns since then.

- On September 10th, the United States Army remained organized, trained and equipped to face the large, static forces of the Cold War.
 - On September 11th, the United States faced a new challenge and embarked upon a Global War on Terror.
 - The President's pledge to transform the Department of Defense to be better suited to the 21st century, rather than the last century, became an urgent national priority.
- The Army has begun to transform itself to be more mobile, more readily deployable in smaller units, with greater involvement of special forces.
- The rapid military successes in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the effectiveness of speed and precision versus mass and formations.
- The Army has addressed new equipment requirements as the nature of the conflict in Iraq has changed.
 - As major combat operations in Iraq were concluding in May 2003, the security environment was changing.
 - Commanders on the ground determined that the Up Armored High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV – or “up-armored” Humvee) was better suited for the scenarios that troops would now face. This is a switch from major combat operations, when tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were best suited to defeat the Iraqi army.
 - Production of the up-armored Humvee has been accelerated – it is now 30 times greater now (450 vehicles per month) than it was in May 2003 (15 vehicles per month).
 - More than 5,000 up-armored Humvees have arrived in the theater. The rest are expected to arrive by March 2005.
- The Army has added other protection for our soldiers while the up-armored Humvees are being built and shipped to the theater.
 - Production of the add-on armor kits for wheeled vehicles in the theater has been accelerated.
 - To date almost 9,300 kits have been produced.
 - Body armor protection has been accelerated.
 - By January 2004, the Army had provided enough Interceptor Body Armor, including Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI), to the theater sufficient to equip every soldier in Afghanistan and Iraq.
 - As of September 2004, the Army had purchased more than 400,000 sets of Interceptor Body Armor,

- **The Army is also focusing on the serious requirements of ensuring that soldiers have enough bullets to fight and train and the right kind of guns.**
 - The first obligation is to the soldier in combat, and the Army takes no risk in this area. Units in the field or preparing to deploy have top priority for stockpiles of ammunitions.
 - Currently there is no shortage of machine guns in Iraq.
 - Units are deployed with their authorized quantities; in fact, nearly 5,000 more machine guns have been issued to face the changing tactical situation.
 - Some soldiers are issued M16A2's ("M-16's"). The M-16 is the primary combat weapons for U.S. soldiers, and has proven itself since the Vietnam era.
 - The current radio shortage is being addressed – 17,000 commercial, secure radios for individuals are being procured.
- **The President's \$87 billion fiscal year 2004 supplemental request included funds for up-armored**
 - The supplemental included \$239.4 million to purchase 1,065 up-armored Humvees.
 - There is \$840 million for up-armored Humvees and add-on armor kits in this year's defense spending bill.
 - The fiscal year 2005 defense authorization bill signed by the president Oct. 28, 2004, along with the fiscal year 2005 appropriations bill, provides \$740 million to procure more up-armored Humvees and \$100 million for add-on armor kits.
 - More than more than \$40 billion went to operations to support the war effort in fiscal year 2004.
 - Approximately one-third of these funds went for pay, and two-thirds were used for soldier requirements including up-armored Humvees, add-on armor and radios.
- **The U.S. Army and the Department of Defense remain committed to deploy trained and ready soldiers and units.**
 - The Army has invested \$1.7 billion to equip and prepare early OIF rotations and has committed an additional \$2.3 billion for additional rotations.
- **The Army does not distinguish whether a unit is Guard, Reserve or Active duty when planning equipment distribution.**
 - The Army follows a plan of distributing equipment to those units that need it most.
 - It does not matter whether the unit is Guard, Reserve or Active duty.
 - All Guard and Reserve units are equal and essential members of the joint team fighting the Global War on Terror.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 29, 2004 – Al-Qaqaa – 24th Ordnance Company with quotes

Following are updated (adds quotations) talking points on the 2003 timeline regarding U.S. and Iraqi military activities in the vicinity of the former Al-Qaqaa military facility.

- **March 17,2003: Satellite photos show unusual vehicular activity outside a bunker in Al-Qaqaa**
 - Former chief weapons inspector David Kay noted on Oct. 26,2004, “The Iraqi behavior when they believed they were going to be attacked would be to empty the bunkers and scatter the material around the site.”
- **March 19,2003: Operation Iraqi Freedom**
- **April 3: the 3-15th Infantry Battalion, 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division arrived site as part of the Coalition push to**
 - Their mission was to secure the bridge crossing site so follow-on troops from the 3rd ID could continue to cross the bridge and move into Baghdad.
 - When the U.S. forces arrived, the Al-Qaqaa facility was not secure.
 - Fedayeen Saddam, Special Republican Guard and other Iraqi military units were at the facility defending it.
 - These enemies were firing from inside the facility. The 3-15th engaged them and found that the gates to the facility were open.
 - The 2d Brigade commander was aware that following standard procedure, a follow-on unit of experts (the 75th Exploitation Task Force) would arrive to perform an inspection/analysis of the site.
- **April 10: the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne (an NBC news team was embedded the brigade) were on site at Al-Qaqaa, but stayed on the**
 - The brigade halted their advance temporarily near the facility.
 - While occupying their temporary position, the brigade only secured the immediate area around the unit. Soldiers found bombs and other munitions, but no chemical weapons in their immediate area.
- **On or about April 13,2003, the 24th Ordnance Company, 24th Corps Support entered objective Elms (Al-Qaqaa facility) on an ammunition collection**
 - Unit was ordered to the facility by the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC).
 - This was a routine mission. The company dealt with ammunition/munitions that were open and easily accessible and posed the greatest risk of being seized by the enemy. Some buildings were not easily accessible due to berming, a military practice of using mounds of sand and gravel to block access.
 - During their half-day mission, a detail of 25 personnel (“Bullet 6”) collected approximately 250 tons of ammunition (TNT, plastic explosives, detonation cords, initiators, white phosphorus, munitions) on 17 flat racks (trucks with trailers attached) that held approximately 16.5 tons each.
 - The munitions were transferred to the Captured Ammunition Holding Area (CAHA) at Logistics Support Area Dogwood, about 25 km away from Al-Qaqaa. There were approximately 7,000 tons of munitions that had already been taken to Dogwood.

- Ordnance observed by the unit was of the kind seen in multiple locations across Iraq.
 - The unit routinely recovered ammunition from all over Iraq --- housing developments, schools, parks, and other facilities. At one upscale residential building development in downtown Baghdad, for example, it took the unit five hours to recover seven million rounds of AK-47 ammunition hidden in one house alone.
- **The Al-Qaqaa facility is one of dozens of ammunition storage points the 3rd Division encountered on its march toward Baghdad from the Iraq-Kuwait**
- **To date, there is no evidence of any large-scale movement of explosives from the facility from April 6 when the 3-15th battalion departed to the arrival of the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne.**
- The movement of 377 tons of heavy ordnance would have required dozens of heavy trucks and equipment moving along the same roadways as U.S. combat divisions occupied continually for weeks subsequent to the 3rd I.D.'s arrival at the facility.
 - Military and Coalition officials have stated it is all but inconceivable that a massive movement of explosives could have taken place without detection by U.S. forces.
 - Col. David G. Perkins, commander of the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division stated on Oct. 27, "That is something that we would be very mindful of and it would be almost impossible to do that because there is not a very well-developed road network in Iraq, as you know. And there was one main road that kind of went east-west that cuts across the top of those weapons facility coming out of the bridge across the Euphrates. That was packed for weeks, bumper to bumper almost, with U.S. convoys continuing to re-supply our vehicles...So it would really be highly improbable [that] the enemy puts together this convoy of trucks and sneaks them in and loads them off in the dark of night...I mean, that's just kind of stretch too far."
- **According to the Duelfer report, as of mid-September 2004 Coalition forces reviewed and cleared more than 10,000 caches of**
- This includes 240,000 tons of munitions that have been destroyed and another 160,000 tons secured and awaiting destruction.
 - The 377 tons of munitions from the Al-Qaqaa facility is less than 1/10th of one percent of the 400,000 tons of total munitions Coalition forces have destroyed or have lined up to destroy.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 29, 2004 – Al-Qaqaa - 24th Ordnance Company

Following are talking points on the 2003 timeline regarding U.S. and Iraqi military activities in the vicinity of the former Al-Qaqaa military facility.

- **March 17, 2003: Satellite photos show unusual vehicular activity outside a bunker in Al-Qaqaa facility.**
 - Former chief weapons inspector David Kay noted on Oct. 26, 2004, "The Iraqi behavior when they believed they were going to be attacked would be to empty the bunkers and scatter the material around the site."
- **March 19, 2003: Operation Iraqi Freedom**
- **April 3-4: the 3-15th Infantry Battalion, 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division arrived part of the Coalition push to**
 - Their mission was to secure the bridge crossing site so follow-on troops from the 3rd ID could continue to cross the bridge and move into Baghdad.
 - When the U.S. forces arrived, the Al-Qaqaa facility was not secure.
 - Fedayeen Saddam, Special Republican Guard and other Iraqi military units were at the facility defending it.
 - These enemies were firing from inside the facility. The 3-15th engaged them and found that the gates to the facility were open.
 - The 2d Brigade commander was aware that following standard procedure, a follow-on unit of experts (the 75th Exploitation Task Force) would arrive to perform an inspection/analysis of the site.
- **April 10: the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne (an NBC news team was embedded with the brigade) arrived at Al-Qaqaa, but stayed on the perimeter.**
 - The brigade halted their advance temporarily near the facility. They continued on their mission the next day.
 - While occupying their temporary position, the brigade only secured the immediate area around the unit. Soldiers found bombs and other munitions, but no chemical weapons in their immediate area.
- **On or about April 13, 2003, the 24th Ordnance Company, 24th Corps Support entered objective Elms (Al-Qaqaa facility) on an ammunition collection**
 - Unit was ordered to the facility by the Rear Area Operations Center
 - This was a routine mission. The company dealt with ammunition/munitions that were open and easily accessible and posed the greatest risk of being seized by the enemy. Some buildings were not easily accessible due to berming, a military practice of using mounds of sand and gravel to block access.
 - During their half-day mission, a detail of 25 personnel ("Bullet 6") collected approximately 250 tons of ammunition (TNT, plastic explosives, detonation cords, initiators, white phosphorus, munitions) on 17 flat racks (trucks with trailers attached) that held approximately 16.5 tons each.

- The munitions were transferred to the Captured Ammunition Holding Area (CAHA) at Logistics Support Area Dogwood, about 25 km away from Al-Qaqaa. There were approximately 7,000 tons of munitions that had already been taken to Dogwood.
 - Ordnance observed by the unit was of the kind seen in multiple locations across Iraq.
 - The unit routinely recovered ammunition from all over Iraq--- housing developments, schools, parks, and other facilities. At one upscale residential building development in downtown Baghdad, for example, it took the unit five hours to recover seven million rounds of AK-47 ammunition hidden in one house alone.
- The Al-Qaqaa facility is one of dozens of ammunition storage points the 3rd Infantry Division encountered on its march toward Baghdad from the Iraq-Kuwait border.
 - To date, there is no evidence of any **large-scale** movement of explosives from the facility from April 6 when the 3-15th battalion departed to the arrival of the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne.
 - The movement of 377 tons of heavy ordnance would have required dozens of heavy trucks and equipment moving along the same roadways as U.S. combat divisions occupied continually for weeks subsequent to the 3rd I.D.'s arrival at the facility.
 - According to the Duelfer report, as of mid-September 2004 Coalition forces have reviewed and cleared more than 10,000 caches of weapons.
 - This includes 240,000 tons of munitions that have been destroyed and another 160,000 tons secured and awaiting destruction.
 - The 377 tons of munitions from the Al-Qaqaa facility is less than 1/10th of one percent of the 400,000 tons of total munitions Coalition forces have destroyed or have lined up to destroy.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 27, 2004 – Al-Qaqaa Weapons Facility

Following are talking points on the 2003 timeline regarding U.S. and Iraqi military activities in the vicinity of the former Al-Qaqaa military facility.

- According to the Duelfer report, as of mid-September 2004 Coalition forces have reviewed and cleared more than **10,000** caches of weapons.
 - This includes 240,000 tons of munitions that have been destroyed and another 160,000 tons secured and awaiting destruction.
 - The 377 tons of munitions from the Al-Qaqaa facility is less than 1/10th of one percent of the 400,000 tons of total munitions Coalition forces have destroyed or have lined up to destroy.
- On March 19, Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched.
 - Shortly before that date the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had left Iraq.
 - The initial goal of Coalition forces was to collapse Saddam's regime and go after its command and control elements. This was done with an emphasis on speed in order to minimize the loss of life.
- The **3-15th** infantry Battalion, **2nd** Brigade of the **3rd** Infantry Division arrived as part of the Coalition push to Baghdad on April **3-4**.
 - Their mission was to secure the bridge crossing site so follow-on troops from the 3rd ID could continue to cross the bridge and move into Baghdad.
- The **Al-Qaqaa** facility is one of dozens of ammunition storage points the **3rd** Division encountered on its march toward Baghdad from the Iraq-Kuwait
 - Former chief weapons inspector David Kay noted on Oct. 26, 2004, "The Iraqi behavior when they believed they were going to be attacked would be to empty the bunkers and scatter the material around the site."
 - U.S. troops reported hundreds of caches of weapons from Kuwait to Baghdad.
 - U.S. forces discovered dispersed weapons in countless locations, including schools, mosques and hospitals and even zoos.
- When the U.S. forces arrived, the **Al-Qaqaa** facility was not secure.
 - Fedayeen Saddam, Special Republican Guard and other Iraqi military units were at the facility defending it.
 - These enemies were firing from inside the facility. The 3-15th engaged them and found that the gates to the facility were open.
- IAEA acknowledged in January 2003 that it could not account for **32** tons of HMX.
 - The IAEA apparently accepted Saddam's contention that the missing explosives were used for industrial purposes.

- **Al-Qaqaa** is a large industrial
 - **Al-Qaqaa** was just one of more than 900 designated sites of interest for post-hostilities WMD exploration.
 - The facility had streets that stretched city blocks, more than 80 buildings, and dozens of bunkers traditionally built to store weapons. There were six designated sensitive sites on the facility.
- At **Al-Qaqaa**, the 2d Brigade uncovered ordnance, material believed to be biological or chemical agents, and other weapons-related
 - The material was tested and found not to be biological or chemical agents.
- The 2d Brigade commander was aware that following standard procedure, a follow-unit of experts (the **75th** Exploitation Task Force) would arrive to perform inspection/analysis of the
 - In fact, the **75th** inspected the facility on May 8, May 11 and May 27 and reported no IAEA material. The facility had been looted and stripped and vandalized. The **75th** recommend no further exploitation of the facility.
- On April 6 the **3-15th** battalion departed the
 - The **3-15th** then joined the rest of the 2nd Brigade for the push to Baghdad.
- On April **10** the 2nd Brigade of the **101st** Airborne (an NBC news team was with the brigade) arrived at **Al-Qaqaa**, but stayed on the
 - The brigade halted their advance temporarily near the facility. They continued on their mission the next day.
 - While occupying their temporary position, the brigade only secured the immediate area around the unit. Soldiers found bombs and other munitions, but no chemical weapons in their immediate area.
- To date, there is no evidence of any large-scale movement of explosives from facility from April 6 when the **3-15th** battalion departed to the arrival of the 2nd **101st**
 - The movement of 377 tons of heavy ordnance would have required dozens of heavy trucks and equipment moving along the same roadways as U.S. combat divisions occupied continually for weeks subsequent to the 3rd I.D.'s arrival at the facility.



US Department of Defense
Talking Points – Oct. 26, 2004 – Bin Laden Tora Bora

The allegation that the U.S. military allowed Osama bin Laden to escape Tora Bora in December 2001 is utterly false and has been refuted by the commanders of that operation. Following are talking points on the issue.

- **Both Gen. Tommy Franks, then commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Gen. Michael DeLong, then CENTCOM's deputy commander, assert there was no to conclusively determine bin Laden's whereabouts at the**
 - Gen. Franks recently wrote, "We don't know to this day whether Mr. bin Laden was at Tora Bora in December 2001," (New York Times op-ed, Oct. 19, 2004).
 - Gen. Franks noted that some intelligence sources said bin Laden was present; other sources indicated he was in Pakistan; and still others suggested he was in Kashmir.
 - Gen. Franks also stated in his op-ed, "Tora Bora was teeming with Taliban and Qaeda operatives, many of whom were killed or captured, but Mr. bin Laden was never within our grasp."
 - Lt. Gen. DeLong said in an Oct. 14 interview in the Wall Street Journal, "Was Osama bin Laden there? I don't know."
- **Tora Bora is one of the most difficult terrains in Afghanistan – an area that was all but impossible to surround or seal off.**
 - The Tora Bora region is on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is mountainous - altitudes range from 8,000 to 13,000 feet.
 - Haphazardly sending a massive U.S. force into unknown, impenetrable terrain would have invited intense resistance from local tribesmen, potentially bloody battles, and would have alerted al Qaeda operatives to an impending attack, which might have given many of those we captured more time to flee.
- **Military action was not 'outsourced' to Afghans. CENTCOM was always in control.**
 - Overall command and control of the Tora Bora operation was in CENTCOM's hands.
 - A special task force of conventional and special missions unit forces executed the mission.
 - Their training, equipment and experience made them suited for the high altitude and cold weather in Tora Bora.
 - Hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda operatives were captured and killed.
- **The Afghans were essential to the fight. Their contributions were significant, and they deserve to be recognized, not ridiculed.**
 - According to Gen. Franks, the Coalition relied heavily on Afghans because they knew Tora Bora.
 - The Afghans were far more familiar with the caves where terrorists could hide, and they were acclimated to the altitudes.
 - The U.S. Special Operations Forces trusted the Afghans, in many cases with their own lives.
 - Close bonds were formed during the operation that have continued to produce valuable intelligence and assistance.
 - The Afghan allies who fought at Tora Bora took numerous casualties during the fight.

- **Afghans weren't left to do the job alone.**
 - Special forces from the United States and other Coalition countries provided tactical leadership and called in air strikes.
 - The effort at Tora Bora is in fact an excellent example of U.S. soldiers working with new Coalition allies to confront global extremists within their borders.

New York Times
October 19, 2004

War Of Words

By Tommy Franks

President Bush and Senator John Kerry have very different views of the war on terrorism, and those differences ought to be debated in this presidential campaign. But the debate should focus on facts, not distortions of history.

On more than one occasion, Senator Kerry has referred to the fight at Tora Bora in Afghanistan during late 2001 as a missed opportunity for America. He claims that our forces had Osama bin Laden cornered and allowed him to escape. How did it happen? According to Mr. Kerry, we "outsourced" the job to Afghan warlords. As commander of the allied forces in the Middle East, I was responsible for the operation at Tora Bora, and I can tell you that the senator's understanding of events doesn't square with reality.

First, take Mr. Kerry's contention that we "had an opportunity to capture or kill Osama bin Laden" and that "we had him surrounded." We don't know to this day whether Mr. bin Laden was at Tora Bora in December 2001. Some intelligence sources said he was; others indicated he was in Pakistan at the time; still others suggested he was in Kashmir. Tora Bora was teeming with Taliban and Qaeda operatives, many of whom were killed or captured, but Mr. bin Laden was never within our grasp.

Second, we did not "outsource" military action. We did rely heavily on Afghans because they knew Tora Bora, a mountainous, geographically difficult region on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is where Afghan mujahedeen holed up for years, keeping alive their resistance to the Soviet Union. Killing and capturing Taliban and Qaeda fighters was best done by the Afghan fighters who already knew the caves and tunnels.

Third, the Afghans weren't left to do the job alone. Special forces from the United States and several other countries were there, providing tactical leadership and calling in air strikes. Pakistani troops also provided significant help - as many as 100,000 sealed the border and rounded up hundreds of Qaeda and Taliban fighters.

Contrary to Senator Kerry, President Bush never "took his eye off the ball" when it came to Osama bin Laden. The war on terrorism has a global focus. It cannot be divided into separate and unrelated wars, one in Afghanistan and another in Iraq. Both are part of the same effort to capture and kill terrorists before they are able to strike America again, potentially with weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist cells are operating in some 60 countries, and the United States, in coordination with dozens of allies, is waging this war on many fronts.

As we planned for potential military action in Iraq and conducted counterterrorist operations in several other countries in the region, Afghanistan remained a center of focus. Neither attention nor manpower was diverted from Afghanistan to Iraq. When we started Operation Iraqi Freedom we had about 9,500 troops in Afghanistan, and by the time we finished major combat operations in Iraq last May we had more than 10,000 troops in Afghanistan.

We are committed to winning this war on all fronts, and we are making impressive gains. Afghanistan has held the first free elections in its history. Iraq is led by a free government made up of its own citizens. By the end of this year, NATO and American forces will have trained 125,000 Iraqis to enforce the law, fight insurgents and secure the borders. This is in addition to the great humanitarian progress already achieved in Iraq.

Many hurdles remain, of course. But the gravest danger would result from the withdrawal of American troops before we finish our work. Today we are asking our servicemen and women to do more, in more places, than we have in decades. They deserve honest, consistent, no-spin leadership that respects them, their families and their sacrifices. The war against terrorism is the right war at the right time for the right reasons. And Iraq is one of the places that war must be fought and won. George W. Bush has his eye on that ball and Senator John Kerry does not.

Tommy Franks, a retired general and former commander in chief of the Central Command, is the author of "American Soldier." He is a member of Veterans for Bush.

Tora Bora Baloney

By Melanie Kirkpatrick

As John Kerry tells it, Tora Bora is the place where President Bush let Osama bin Laden get away. In the candidate's oft-repeated formulation, the al Qaeda leader was "surrounded" and escaped only because the president "outsourced" the job of capturing him to Afghan warlords.

Well, that's not the way the battle's commanders remember it. The Afghanistan war was led by Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. Central Command, and his deputy, Lt. Gen. Michael "Rifle" DeLong. As it happens, both men, now retired, have books out that tell a different story. Nor are the ex-soldier and ex-Marine bashful about speaking out to correct the former Navy lieutenant. To them, Mr. Kerry's version of the battle of Tora Bora is revisionist history.

Start with OBL. Gen. Franks, on the campaign trail in Florida for George W. Bush, this week, said it's wrong to assume that bin Laden was hiding out in Tora Bora. Some intelligence reports put him there, he says, but others placed him in Pakistan, Kashmir or Iran -- or at a lake 90 miles northwest of the Afghan city of Kandahar. Gen. DeLong concurs. "Was Osama bin Laden there?" he said in an interview. "I don't know."

The battle of Tora Bora took place in the White Mountains of eastern Afghanistan in late November and early December of 2001. Kabul had just fallen and a thousand or more al Qaeda leaders had fled to Tora Bora, where they holed up in the mountains' vast network of caves. The cave complex was built in the 1980s as a sanctuary for the mujahedeen fighting the Soviets and was equipped with food, water, weapons, electricity and a ventilation system. Bin Laden used it as his headquarters in the mid-1990s. There were hundreds of tunnels, some many miles long, with exits over the border in Pakistan.

Afghanistan is full of rough country, and the jagged peaks of the Tora Bora area are about as rough as it gets -- up to 13,000 feet and covered in snow and ice. "Surrounding" the area -- in the sense of sealing it off -- was impossible. If the U.S. had sent in a massive force, it would have run the risks of clashing with local tribesmen, killing civilians and alerting al Qaeda to the impending attack. Working with Afghan forces was "essential," Gen. Franks has been quoted as saying. If U.S. forces had gone in alone, says Gen. DeLong, "arguably today we'd still be fighting in Afghanistan and there couldn't have been a government."

The U.S. commanders made the decision to embed a team of U.S. special forces and CIA agents into every Afghan unit. Like the Afghans, the Americans rode horses or, in the higher altitudes, walked. The special forces carried communications equipment that allowed them to talk to their commanders and to call in air power. Which they did with stunning effect -- demolishing cave-openings and skipping bombs with delayed fuses deep inside. Hundreds of al Qaeda fighters died. No American life was lost.

No one disputes that some al Qaeda men got away, and it's possible that bin Laden was among them. In his book, Gen. Franks says that Pakistan rounded up "hundreds" of al Qaeda fighters as

they straggled over the border. But Pakistan's frontier forces were susceptible both to bribes and al Qaeda's ideology and some of the fighters got through.

Getting the Tora Bora story right is important because Mr. Kerry's accusation goes to the heart of his broader charge against Mr. Bush -- that he bungled the war in Afghanistan. It's hard to be convincing on this point, when, less than three years later, 10 million Afghans have just gone to the polls in the first free election in their 5,000-year-old history. It's even harder to see how sending in thousands of U.S. troops to secure Tora Bora would have helped win that war faster -- even if it had resulted in bin Laden's death or capture. Mr. Kerry's criticism of the Tora Bora campaign also belies his promise to rely more on allies if he were commander in chief.

Meanwhile, if the U.S. has the good fortune to find bin Laden before Nov. 2, watch for Democrats to revive Madeleine Albright's half-jest that the Bush administration captured him long ago and has been holding onto him for an October Surprise. President Bush has said we'll get him eventually, dead or alive. As for me, my own hope is that bin Laden is buried somewhere under the rubble of Tora Bora -- forever.

Ms. Kirkpatrick is associate editor of the Journal's editorial page.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 25, 2004 – Missing Explosives In Iraq

Recent stories in the media report that the Iraqi government has notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that several hundred tons of explosives are missing from the former Al-Qaqaa military facility in Iraq, about 30 miles south of Baghdad. Following are talking points on the issue.

- Since Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003, Coalition forces have discovered that Saddam's regime stored weapons in countless locations, including schools, mosques and hospitals. Citizens were forced to hide weapons in their homes and neighborhoods. Many Iraqis have bravely stepped forward with information leading to more weapons.
- Weapons searches have been successful in Iraq. The Duelfer Report states that as of mid-September, Coalition forces have reviewed and cleared more than 10,000 caches of weapons and destroyed more than 240,000 tons. Another 162,000 tons of munitions are awaiting destruction.
- Some weapons were stored at the Al-Qaqaa Complex. Coalition forces were present in the vicinity at various times during and after major combat operations. The forces searched 32 bunkers and 87 other buildings at the facility, but found no indicators of WMD. While some explosive material was discovered, none of it carried IAEA seals.
- Although some believe the Al-Qaqaa facility may have been looted, there is no way to verify this. Another explanation is that regime loyalists or others emptied the facility prior to Coalition forces arriving in Baghdad in April.
- The material does not pose any nuclear proliferation risk.
- During the 1990s, the IAEA reportedly destroyed or rendered harmless all "single use" (i.e., uniquely usable in the context of a nuclear program) equipment and material in Iraq.
- The material in question is "dual-use" equipment (which could have conventional applications), high explosives that are somewhat more powerful than TNT. This dual-use equipment was generally permitted to remain in Iraq.
- Explosives of the nature reported missing from Al-Qaqaa are available around the world. It would be nearly impossible to verify that these materials ever left Iraq or are being used for any specific purpose.
- The Administration takes the report of missing munitions very seriously. The Iraqi Survey Group is evaluating this recent report by the Iraqi government.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 20, 2004 – Afghanistan Progress

Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, recently briefed the Pentagon press corps on progress in Afghanistan, including the country's historic elections. Earlier, the ambassador met with Secretary Rumsfeld and thanked him for the work of the U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan.

Following are highlights of the ambassador's remarks. [\[transcript\]](#)

- The election in Afghanistan was a remarkable event, with millions of Afghans voting in an orderly and massive fashion.
 - Afghans stood in line for hours to vote, even in the face of threats from al Qaeda and the Taliban.
 - Afghans took advantage of the opportunity that the Coalition provided to them to move toward building a democratic society.
- U.S. and Coalition forces provided a secure environment for Afghans to
 - The U.S. and Coalition forces took preventive and pre-emptive action to prevent the Taliban and al Qaeda from disrupting the election.
- Afghans are rebuilding their country, and making great progress in just three
 - More than 15,000 Afghans serve in the Afghan National Army; more than 30,000 serve in the police force.
 - Three years ago, the country was fragmented, and the armed forces were in the hands of regional leaders. Today:
 - More than 20,000 of the 50,000 militia forces have been civilized, and nationwide, 57 percent of the heavy weapons have been cantoned.
- Although it is important to capture Osama bin Laden, the struggle against terror isn't just against one person, it is against networks.
 - Destroying networks and transforming regions and countries that produce extremism and terror will take a long time.
- Afghanistan is firmly heading in the right direction.
 - The Afghan people want to succeed – they want economic progress and security.
 - Afghans also want a democratic government, which they demonstrated by voting, even in the face of threats.

Links:

[Afghanistan Election Process: Key Facts](#)

[www.defendamerica.mil](#) photo essays [Afghanistan elections](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 18, 2004 – Sanchez/Casey Letters About Readiness

Following are talking points in response to reports in the media about a letter sent Dec. 4, 2003, from Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez in Iraq to Gen. George Casey, then vice chief of staff of the Army, about readiness. Attached with these talking points are a copy of Lt. Gen. Sanchez's letter, and a copy of a memorandum from Gen. Casey.

In December of last year, the insurgent activity had increased and it did have a direct impact on the readiness of a number of Army systems.

The Army Staff and Army Materiel Command have been fully engaged in working to resolve all of the logistical concerns raised by Lt. Gen. Sanchez in his Dec. 4 letter, and addressed by Gen. Casey in a response dated December 13, 2003.

- For example, just seven weeks after Lt. Gen. Sanchez wrote the letter, all soldiers were fully equipped with Interceptor Body Armor.
- Included in the solution, and addressed by Gen. Casey, were an increase in funding of spare parts, additional forward repair capability in the theater, and expedited removal of broken equipment for repair.
- Also, as outlined in Gen. Casey's response, the Defense Logistics Agency had immediately undertaken steps to eliminate supply and delivery backlogs and increase the speed of the delivery of supplies.

Over the past 10 months the Army logistics community has greatly improved its ability to deliver spare parts throughout the theater via a number of transportation means using all modes of delivery -- air, sea and ground.

Today, the readiness rates for M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles is the highest its been all year - now over 90 percent readiness rate.

- The Army still uses peacetime readiness standards, which does not consider the fact that in times of war vehicle usage increases five fold in some instances.
- The peacetime standard is used to identify priorities and track any serious readiness issues.

It is also important to note the defense industry has greatly expanded its production capability to meet wartime demands.

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 08082-1408

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

December 4, 2003

DAS,
64/48
DJP PLS.
E

Office of Commanding General

General George W. Casey, Jr.
Vice Chief of Staff,
United States Army
201 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0201

General Casey,

While our readiness rates and Class IX performance statistics have slightly improved in the last 60 days, we are still well below the Department of the Army standards in almost all areas. For example, current readiness rates for some key systems are M1 - 84%; M2/3 - 85%; Q-36/37 Radars - 88%; UH-60A - 88%; UH-60L - 72% and CH-47D - 63%. Frankly, we are struggling just to maintain these relatively low readiness rates.

The key factor inhibiting our readiness is the availability of repair parts. Our current customer wait time is 40 days, 28 days above the DA average. Current ground ASL zero balance rates for our key SSA's vary from 28-40% while our air ASL zero balance rates are between 8-34%. I cannot continue to support sustained combat operations with rates this low.

Additionally, I need help with the fielding of Interceptor Body Armor. CJTF-7 has an outstanding requirement of approximately 72,200 Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). Recently, we were informed that the projected "get-well-date" for completion of fielding had slipped from end of December 03 to end of January 04. This is the second time the get well date has slipped in the past month.

I need the Army's assistance to improve our force protection and operational readiness posture. CJTF-7 is working hard to get our material readiness rates and class IX ASL performance measures to the DA standard. Our soldiers deserve nothing less while in combat, but I cannot sustain readiness without Army level intervention.


Ricardo S. Sanchez
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

CF:
LTG Richard A. Hack, DCG, AMAC
LTG Claude V. Christianson, Army G4
LTG Benjamin S. Griffin, Army G8

31202330

L-0559/OSD/22127



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
201 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0210

13 DEC 2003

Ric
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN,
BAGHDAD, IRAQ, APO AE 09302-1400

SUBJECT: Force Protection and Operational Readiness Posture

1. I share your concern about our Army's operational readiness and force protection posture. Units engaged in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are the Army's first priority.
2. We are tackling supply of repair parts to support your equipment readiness. During fiscal year 2003, we increased spares funding by \$3.9 billion to support both inventory augmentation and increased demands. As of 30 November 2003, we have \$7.1 billion of supplies due-in from both commercial vendors and repair facilities. The increased funding is beginning to pay off as your zero balance rates slowly improve. Repair is a key source of supply. We have provided additional forward repair capability for critical spares needed to support readiness. Expedited retrograde of unserviceable/reparable items that cannot be repaired in theater will ensure we can best support your needs. Another factor impacting availability of repair parts is the accuracy of supply records in theater. We are developing measures to assist your units in completing a thorough reconciliation, from the customer to the source.
3. As of November 2003, Defense Distribution Center (DDC) is building pure Supply Support Activity pallets, eliminating the need to break down pallets once they arrive in theater and significantly reducing delivery time. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has increased manpower at DDC to eliminate backlogs. In January 2004, a Department of the Army distribution management team will determine additional measures to speed delivery of supplies.
4. Both DLA and Army have taken steps to maximize production of Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) and are on track to meet the original December 2003 goal. The recently identified requirement of 11,902 additional SAPI is scheduled for completion in January of 2004.

George
GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
General, United States Army
Vice Chief of Staff

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11-L-0559/OSD/22128



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 18, 2004 – Corrected 343rd Quartermaster Company

Following are talking points on recent stories in the news about the 343rd Quartermaster Company.

Two investigations have been ordered, as has an inspection of the vehicles. Following are talking points.

Operations throughout the Iraqi Theater are inherently dangerous and Commanders at all levels have the safety of their soldiers as a primary concern.

There has been an incident in which a few members of a Quartermaster Company allegedly refused to participate in an assigned convoy mission.

On any given day there are approximately 250 convoys on the road consisting of a daily average of 2,500 vehicles with over 5,000 soldiers delivering goods every day and night.

In a 24-hour period convoys on average deliver 110,000 cases of bottled water, 202,000 meals and 1 million gallons of fuel.

As a result of this incident the convoy failed to depart at its assigned time, but the mission proceeded later in the day with other soldiers and leaders from the company.

Actions being taken:

- Brig. Gen. Chambers has appointed the Deputy Commander to conduct an investigation and determine the circumstances and facts surrounding what occurred.
- The commander of the 300th Area Support Group has directed a separate inquiry to determine if any offenses to the Uniform Code of Military Justice were committed and if so whether disciplinary measures are warranted.
- Brig. Gen. Chambers has also directed the unit conduct a safety-maintenance stand down during which all vehicles will be thoroughly inspected and retraining conducted.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 15, 2004 – Iraqi Security Forces

At a town hall meeting with U.S. troops in Al Asad, Iraq, on Oct. 10, Secretary Donald H. Rumfeld said the situation on the ground in Iraq will dictate how many American troops are needed there. The secretary said Iraqi security forces must be strong enough to maintain order throughout their country before there can be a large redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq.

Following are highlights of progress by Iraqi security forces.

- Approximately 100,000 Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped.
- By the January elections, there should be an additional 50,000 Iraqi security forces.
- U.S., Coalition and Iraqi officials are concentrating on measures to ensure the January elections are successful.
- The goal is to have 200,000 to 250,000 trained Iraqi security troops.
- The Iraqi Police Service is scheduled to graduate its largest class ever this week from the basic training course. The 1,137 police recruits have been training at the eight-week program at the Jordan International Police Training Center in Amman. Instructors come from 16 countries, including the United States.
- Eighty-five Iraqi Police Service officers will graduate this week from the Election Security Course. The six-day course is part of the Iraqi government's ongoing efforts to provide security for the upcoming elections. The curriculum includes crowd control and officer safety training, local election and constitutional law classes, and practical exercise scenarios.
- The Iraqi air force is scheduled to take possession of two SAMA CH2000 light air surveillance aircraft at the end of October. Last month the air force commenced solo operations with two Seeker reconnaissance aircraft. Air force missions will continue to concentrate on infrastructure, including pipeline and electrical facilities, and border security.
- Recruiting and training continues for the Iraqi armed forces medical corps, which should eventually number more than 2,500 personnel. An \$18.6 million Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq project is helping to build 11 new Iraqi armed forces medical clinics at seven locations. The first clinic, at the Al Kasik base in northern Iraq, is scheduled to open in mid-December and the others should be finished in January.
- More than 20,000 Glock pistols have been distributed in the past two weeks to police officers and police recruits.
- Among the hundreds of officers who graduated from various training classes Oct. 7 in Baghdad were 35 who graduated from a course in basic investigation; 50 who completed classes in techniques to investigate criminal bombings and explosives recognition; 31 who finished a one-week course on how to successfully resolve kidnapping and hostage situations; and 34 who completed a three-week course in basic skills to investigate organized crime.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 13, 2004 – Secretary's NATO meetings

Secretary Rumsfeld is in Romania today for two days of NATO informal defense ministerial meetings in Poiana Brasov. The stop is just one of several for the secretary, who began his trip in Bahrain. Following are highlights.

NATO Meetings – Romania

- Romania is one of NATO's newest members. The country joined the 26-member alliance on March 29, 2004.
- Approximately 700 Romanian forces are serving in Iraq.
- Likely topics for discussion at the NATO meetings include NATO military transformation, and the status of alliance operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans.
- The secretary toured Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase in Constanta, Romania, on the Black Sea.
 - The Romanians invited the secretary to tour the airbase, which is a facility the United States could potentially use as part of President Bush's policy to realign U.S. global force posture.
 - About 3,500 U.S. service members conducted air transportation and logistics operations at the base in February and March 2003 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
 - Any potential renewed U.S. military presence at the base or an adjacent Romanian army base would mostly involve the rotation of troops in and out of the facility for joint training exercises.

Macedonia

- Earlier in the week, the secretary met with President Branko Crvenkovski and other officials in Macedonia, where he thanked Macedonian soldiers for their contributions in Iraq.
- The secretary signed an agreement calling for U.S.-Macedonian military cooperation to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq

- **Al Asad Air Base** - met with U.S., Coalition and Iraqi troops, and heard from more than 2,000 Marines and other service members at a town hall.
- **Baghdad** - conferred with senior U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi military and government officials.
- **Kirkuk** - was briefed by Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste and other leaders on the situation in this northern city.
 - The general characterized Kirkuk as becoming more stable each day.
 - The general described the successful joint U.S.-Iraqi military campaign launched Oct. 1 that defeated anti-Coalition insurgents in Samarra. About 5,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops worked to reclaim the city.
 - Forces in the area have confiscated 24 million pounds of enemy ammunition in the past eight months.
- **Irbil** - The secretary met with Republic of Korea troops. Approximately 3,700 South Korean forces are deployed in Iraq.

Aboard the USS John F. Kennedy

- The secretary was flown from Bahrain at the start of his trip to this aircraft carrier patrolling the Persian Gulf. He met with sailors and was briefed on the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Defense ministers from 18 countries assisting the United States in the Global War on Terror joined the secretary aboard the carrier.
- The secretary also participated in a reenlistment ceremony for 80 Kennedy sailors. The ship has more than 5,000 crewmembers; it has been deployed almost four months in the Persian Gulf. The ship's aviators have been flying into Iraq to conduct bombing and other support missions.

Links: USS John F. Kennedy (["Big John" web site](#))



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 8, 2004 – Afghanistan Progress

Army Lt. Gen. David Barno, commander of Combined Forces Afghanistan, outlined progress in Afghanistan recently in an interview with the Pentagon Channel. Following are highlights from his interview plus other accomplishments in the country three years after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom.

- Initially Operation Enduring Freedom focused on removing Taliban and al Qaeda and hunting down
 - Today the Coalition has shifted to a broader-based approach that focuses on creating conditions in Afghanistan to reject terrorists and their activities outright.
- Three years ago, the Taliban were still ruling Afghanistan and al Qaeda was still very active in the country. Tomorrow Afghans will cast their votes in democratic presidential elections.
 - Eighteen candidates are vying for the Afghan presidency. The field is representative of all ethnic groups and constituencies in the country.
 - More than 10 million Afghans have registered to vote.
 - More than 40 percent of the registered voters are women.
 - Next spring Afghans will elect members of a new Parliament.
- Conditions around Afghanistan demonstrate the country's
 - The economy is growing at the rate of 20 percent a year.
 - More than 5 million children are in school this year compared to just 1 million last year.
 - The portion of the "Ring Road" that links Kabul to Kandahar is completed and construction is continuing from Kandahar to Herat.
 - More than 3 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan since 2002.
- Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are operating throughout Iraq, allowing the government to expand reconstruction, outreach efforts and
 - PRTs are small groups of civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces.
 - There are 19 provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan (14 U.S. and five NATO). A year ago there were four.
- Afghanistan's security structure is growing.
 - Approximately 15,000 soldiers serve in the Afghan National Army. The ANA is a highly professional, multi-ethnic force, which is rapidly becoming a pillar of the country's security.
 - ANA soldiers have been deployed alongside Coalition force to prepare for the election.
 - Approximately 25,000 police have been trained.
 - The United States has developed an integrated program to address the country's drug trade. The program complements the United Kingdom's efforts – the lead nation for counter-narcotics assistance to Afghanistan.
- Afghan security forces are working side by side with Coalition forces to hunt down and remove terrorists and confront the forces of lawlessness.
 - Success in Afghanistan has deprived al Qaeda of a sanctuary there.

Links: www.pentagonchannel.mil; OEF timeline; PRTs fact sheet; OEF 3-year anniversary web page; [map of Afghanistan](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 6, 2004 – Draft Bill Defeated

The House of Representatives on Oct. 5 defeated H.R. 163, a bill to reinstitute the draft. The bill garnered just two votes.

Secretary Rumsfeld has spoken vociferously against reinstituting the draft, pointing out that the All Volunteer Force method of recruiting men and women to the U.S. military is working well. The secretary has a long record of opposing the draft going back to his days as a U.S. Representative from Illinois, when he was one of the first members of Congress to introduce legislation to create an All Volunteer Force.

Following are highlights from a letter outlining his opposition to the draft that Secretary Rumsfeld sent yesterday to the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. ([link to letter](#))

- **First and foremost -- the United States does not need a draft.**
 - There are 295 million people in the United States.
 - Some 2.6 million of them serve in the Active and Reserve Forces.
 - The military can attract and retain the people it needs through pay and other incentives.
- **The stress on the force is not from a shortage of uniformed personnel; there is stress on force because it isn't organized properly for a post-Cold War**
 - Too many of the needed skills are heavily concentrated in the Reserve components.
 - Too many of the Active forces are organized in large, heavy divisions that aren't readily deployable.
 - Too many military personnel are performing tasks that should be civilian jobs, because the complex civilian personnel rules make it easier to give the task to someone in uniform.
- **The Department of Defense has taken action to reduce the stress on the**
 - Using emergency authority provided by Congress, the size of the Active Army has been increased by as many as 30,000 troops since the Sept. 11th attacks.
 - The Army is increasing the number of active, deployable brigades from 33 to 43 or more. They will be redesigned to take into account post-Cold War capabilities and needs.
 - The Army is retraining and restructuring the Active and Reserve components to ensure useable skill sets are better appropriated. This will improve overall responsiveness and deployability.
 - The Services rebalanced about 10,000 military spaces both within and between the Active and Reserve components in 2003. This year they expect to rebalance another 20,000 spaces. The goal is that individual Reservists and Guardsmen will mobilize less often, for shorter periods and with somewhat more predictability.
- **The All Volunteer Force is a professional force that is performing**
 - The men and women who serve in the military are committed, enthusiastic and are contributing to the defense of the nation.
 - Each stepped forward to volunteer. All serve proudly.

Additional Information:

- For the fifth year in a row, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command met its fiscal year active-duty and Reserve recruiting goals.
- Army National Guardsmen whose units have been mobilized are re-enlisting at a higher rate than those who haven't been mobilized. ([story](#))
- The National Guard will end its fiscal year making 86 percent of its recruiting goal. To reach its goal next year, the Guard is adding 1,000 new recruiters and doubling retention bonuses.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 5, 2004 – Afghanistan Security and Justice

Afghans will vote in their first democratic presidential election on Saturday, Oct. 9. While the legitimacy of an elected government will help isolate the extremists in Afghanistan politically, the Coalition and Afghans are working side by side to defeat the extremists militarily.

Following are talking points on the progress in Afghanistan to build the country's security forces and justice system, and efforts to create a more peaceful and stable country by demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating militia groups.

- **The Afghan National Army (ANA) is rapidly becoming the principal pillar of Afghanistan's security.**
 - Approximately 15,000 soldiers serve in the Afghan National Army. It is a highly professional, multi-ethnic force.
 - Afghan National Army soldiers are deployed alongside Coalition forces to fight the insurgency and to prepare for the election.
- **The new regional command headquarters of the Afghan National Army are helping extend the national government's authority.**
 - In addition to the Kabul regional command (Central Corps), four regional commands of the ANA have been stood up in Kandahar, Gardez, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat.
 - Establishing these regional commands is a milestone for the country's general security and for strengthening the Afghan government.
 - This permanent Afghan National Army presence demonstrates to Afghans and the international community that the Afghan national government authority extends throughout the country.
 - Before the regional commands were established, troops from the ANA's Central Corps in the Kabul region were frequently deployed around the country. They carried out combat operations alongside the Coalition in the east and north and conducted security and stability operations in the west and north.
 - After 25 years of war, opening the regional commands is another positive step for Afghanistan as it moves toward a democratic and peaceful future.
- **Afghans are working to patrol and stabilize their country.**
 - Al Qaeda, Taliban and other indigenous military groups remain the greatest threat to Afghanistan.
 - U.S. Coalition and Afghanistan troops are conducting a wide range of counterinsurgency operations against these groups including reconnaissance, interdiction and patrols, many of which are joint patrols.
- **Afghanistan's growing police force is helping to support the rule of**
 - Approximately 25,000 police have been trained.
 - The goal is to train 50,000 national police, 12,000 border police and 2,600 highway police by the end of 2005.
 - Germany has been designated as the lead country for policing. It has developed an intensive training academy to address long-term institution building.

- **Afghanistan is establishing the operational elements for**
 - Italy is the lead nation in the reform and rebuilding of Afghanistan's justice sector.
 - Comprehensive U.S. and Italian training programs are training judges, prosecutors and defense counsels.
 - A conscious effort is being made to reintegrate women into the legal sector.

- **The Afghan militia demobilization program is helping get weapons off the street and reintegrate militiamen into civilian life.**
 - In two weeks in September alone, almost 2,000 Afghan militiamen turned in their weapons and entered the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration program.
 - The program is sponsored by Japan.
 - The program also helps train the men so they can get jobs that can take the place of their militia salaries, offering instruction in such skills as farming or trade. Other militiamen enter the ANA or go into the demining program.
 - More than 13,000 men have completed the program.

For more information: House International Relations Committee hearing Sept. 23, 2004;
demobilization story; Kandahar regional command story; Gardez regional command story.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Oct. 4, 2004 – Afghanistan Elections

Oct. 7, 2004, marks the third-year anniversary of the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Just two days later, Oct. 9, Afghans are scheduled to hold their first ever democratic presidential elections. Following are talking points on the elections and the security precautions the country and the Coalition are taking to ensure Afghans can vote.

- **A successful presidential election will be the first step in developing a tradition democratic elections in Afghanistan that will carry over into next spring's and local**
 - Afghans are electing a sovereign government. Presidential elections are scheduled for Oct. 9. Parliamentary and local elections will follow next spring.
 - Eighteen candidates are vying for the Afghan presidency. The field is representative of all ethnic groups and constituencies in the country.
 - More than 10 million Afghans have registered to vote.
 - More than 40 percent of the registered voters are women.
 - The vote count is expected to last several weeks.
 - There will be a run-off if no candidate wins a majority.
- **Taliban and other insurgents will continue to try to disrupt the election Afghanistan and the international community have taken action to secure environment for Afghanistan**
 - Three rings of security will be in place during election time.
 - The first layer or inner ring is primarily Afghan police office at polling stations.
 - The second layer is the trained and equipped Afghan National Army, who will be patrolling the areas. They will have quick reaction forces able to go to areas of violence.
 - The third layer will be forces from some 40 countries from the Coalition and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.
 - These forces are working to defend the integrity of the election process and the right of the Afghan people to vote.
- **The election of a sovereign government is a key building block in**
 - The legitimacy of this political process is a way of strengthening the moderate elements in Afghanistan against the extremists.
 - Other key building blocks include security improvements and reconstruction efforts.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 29, 2004 – 9-11 and the Global War on Terror

- **Since the September 11th attacks, the world has made progress in the Global War**
 - The Taliban regime is gone.
 - Osama bin Laden is on the run.
 - Saddam Hussein is in jail. His sons are dead.
 - More than three-quarters of al Qaeda's key members and associates have been detained or killed.
 - Pakistan used to support the Taliban. Now it is a strong ally against terrorists.
 - A.Q. Khan's clandestine network that had provided nuclear technologies to Libya, North Korea and possibly other nations, has been shut down.
 - Libya's Moammar Ghadafi has given up his nuclear weapons program.
- **Since the September 11th attacks, 50 million people in Iraq and Afghanistan have freed from brutal**
 - The citizens of both these nations are resolved to move forward with their democratic futures.
 - Afghans will hold elections on October 9.
 - Iraqis will hold elections in January.
 - Both countries are on their way to becoming America's newest allies in the fight for freedom.
 - The success of democracy in both countries will represent a major defeat for terrorists, including associates of al Qaeda.
- **September 11th was not the beginning of terrorism, and the war in Iraq did not**
 - International terrorists declared war on the world's nations.
 - Over decades, these terrorists have killed thousands of Americans and citizens of other countries.
 - Two of these killers were sentenced to death today by a Yemeni judge for their roles in the attacks on the USS Cole in October 2000. The United States will continue to work with our allies to pursue, capture, kill and bring to justice those who attack our homeland, our troops and our values.
- **One lesson of September 11th is that the United States can no longer continue to with terrorism as an evil but inescapable fact of international**
 - Every threat cannot be eliminated, but the United States can hope to eliminate global terrorist networks and end state sponsorship of terrorism.
 - The United States must stay on the offense. The extremists have shown their resolve to terrorize men, women and children around the world. They want us to change our policies and retreat within our borders.
 - Americans must be patient: A problem that grew up in 20 or 30 years is not going away in two or three years.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 28, 2004 – A New Iraq

Following are talking points on progress in Iraq.

➤ **Eighteen months ago,**

- Was firing at our aircraft in the no-fly zones on a weekly basis.
- Harbored and sheltered terrorists.
- Was offering \$25,000 to families of suicide bombers.

Today in Iraq:

➤ **Iraq has been removed from the list of state sponsors of**

- President Bush issued a determination allowing the State Department to remove Iraq from the list on Sept. 24.
- Iraq was first placed on the list in September 1990.
- According to the determination:
 - (1) There has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government of Iraq.
 - (2) Iraq's government is not supporting acts of international terrorism.
 - (3) Iraq's government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

➤ **Tens of thousands of Iraqis are courageously volunteering to serve in the Iraqi forces and in the interim**

- The largest single contributor to Iraq's security is the Iraqi people, who continue to step forward to join the various Iraqi Security Forces.
- More than 700 Iraqi security force members have been killed since Jan. 1, 2004.
- Today approximately 164,000 Iraqi police and soldiers (of which about 100,000 are trained and equipped) and an additional 74,000 facility protection forces are performing a wide variety of security missions.

➤ **Iraq is preparing for elections in January**

- The stage is being set for successful elections.
- Commanders in the field are confident about the military mission and the ability to have an election period that is fair and relatively stable.
- The conditions will not be perfect. The goal is that the election will be able to be held in the vast majority of the country under good circumstances.

➤ **A free and peaceful Iraq is a powerful blow to the extremists in the world who determined to have the world their**

- Free and fair elections in Iraq are the greatest danger to the terrorists, foreign fighters and former regime.

Links: U.S. Embassy – Baghdad [release](#)

Battling for Iraq

By David H. Petraeus
The Washington Post
Sunday, September 26, 2004; Page B7

BAGHDAD -- Helping organize, train and equip nearly a quarter-million of Iraq's security forces is a daunting task. Doing so in the middle of a tough insurgency increases the challenge enormously, making the mission akin to repairing an aircraft while in flight -- and while being shot at. Now, however, 18 months after entering Iraq, I see tangible progress. Iraqi security elements are being rebuilt from the ground up.

The institutions that oversee them are being reestablished from the top down. And Iraqi leaders are stepping forward, leading their country and their security forces courageously in the face of an enemy that has shown a willingness to do anything to disrupt the establishment of the new Iraq.

In recent months, I have observed thousands of Iraqis in training and then watched as they have conducted numerous operations. Although there have been reverses -- not to mention horrific terrorist attacks -- there has been progress in the effort to enable Iraqis to shoulder more of the load for their own security, something they are keen to do. The future undoubtedly will be full of difficulties, especially in places such as Fallujah. We must expect setbacks and recognize that not every soldier or policeman we help train will be equal to the challenges ahead.

Nonetheless, there are reasons for optimism. Today approximately 164,000 Iraqi police and soldiers (of which about 100,000 are trained and equipped) and an additional 74,000 facility protection forces are performing a wide variety of security missions. Equipment is being delivered, Training is on track and increasing in capacity. Infrastructure is being repaired. Command and control structures and institutions are being reestablished.

Most important, Iraqi security forces are in the fight -- so much so that they are suffering substantial casualties as they take on more and more of the burdens to achieve security in their country. Since Jan. 1 more than 700 Iraqi security force members have been killed, and hundreds of Iraqis seeking to volunteer for the police and military have been killed as well.

Six battalions of the Iraqi regular army and the Iraqi Intervention Force are now conducting operations. Two of these battalions, along with the Iraqi commando battalion, the counterterrorist force, two Iraqi National Guard battalions and thousands of policemen recently contributed to successful operations in Najaf. Their readiness to enter and clear the Imam Ali shrine was undoubtedly a key factor in enabling Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani to persuade members of the Mahdi militia to lay down their arms and leave the shrine.

In another highly successful operation several days ago, the Iraqi counterterrorist force conducted early-morning raids in Najaf that resulted in the capture of several senior lieutenants and 40 other members of that militia, and the seizure of enough weapons to fill nearly four 7 1/2-ton dump trucks.

Within the next 60 days, six more regular army and six additional Intervention Force battalions will become operational, Nine more regular army battalions will complete training in January, in time to help with security missions during the Iraqi elections at the end of that month.

Iraqi National Guard battalions have also been active in recent months. Some 40 of the 45 existing battalions -- generally all except those in the Fallujah-Ramadi area -- are conducting operations on a daily basis, most alongside coalition forces, but many independently. Progress has also been made in police training. In the past week alone, some 1,100 graduated from the basic policing course and five specialty courses. By early spring, nine academies in Iraq and one in Jordan will be graduating a total of 5,000 police each month from the eight-week course, which stresses patrolling and investigative skills, substantive and procedural legal knowledge, and proper use of force and weaponry, as well as pride in the profession and adherence to the police code of conduct.

Iraq's borders are long, stretching more than 2,200 miles. Reducing the flow of extremists and their resources across the borders is critical to success in the counterinsurgency. As a result, with support from the Department of Homeland Security, specialized training for Iraq's border enforcement elements began earlier this month in Jordan.

Regional academies in Iraq have begun training as well, and more will come online soon. In the months ahead, the 16,000-strong border force will expand to 24,000 and then 32,000. In addition, these forces will be provided with modern technology, including vehicle X-ray machines, explosive-detection devices and ground sensors.

Outfitting hundreds of thousands of new Iraqi security forces is difficult and complex, and many of the units are not yet fully equipped. But equipment has begun flowing. Since July 1, for example, more than 39,000 weapons and 22 million rounds of ammunition have been delivered to Iraqi forces, in addition to 42,000 sets of body armor, 4,400 vehicles, 16,000 radios and more than 235,000 uniforms.

Considerable progress is also being made in the reconstruction and refurbishing of infrastructure for Iraq's security forces. Some \$1 billion in construction to support this effort has been completed or is underway, and five Iraqi bases are already occupied by entire infantry brigades.

Numbers alone cannot convey the full story. The human dimension of this effort is crucial. The enemies of Iraq recognize how much is at stake as Iraq reestablishes its security forces. Insurgents and foreign fighters continue to mount barbaric attacks against police stations, recruiting centers and military installations, even though the vast majority of the population deplores such attacks. Yet despite the sensational attacks, there is no

shortage of qualified recruits volunteering to join Iraqi security forces. In the past couple of months, more than 7,500 Iraqi men have signed up for the army and are preparing to report for basic training to fill out the final nine battalions of the Iraqi regular army. Some 3,500 new police recruits just reported for training in various locations. And two days after the recent bombing on a street outside a police recruiting location in Baghdad, hundreds of Iraqis were once again lined up inside the force protection walls at another location -- where they were greeted by interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi.

I meet with Iraqi security force leaders every day. Though some have given in to acts of intimidation, many are displaying courage and resilience in the face of repeated threats and attacks on them, their families and their comrades. I have seen their determination and their desire to assume the full burden of security tasks for Iraq.

There will be more tough times, frustration and disappointment along the way. It is likely that insurgent attacks will escalate as Iraq's elections approach. Iraq's security forces are, however, developing steadily and they are in the fight. Momentum has gathered in recent months. With strong Iraqi leaders out front and with continued coalition -- and now NATO -- support, this trend will continue. It will not be easy, but few worthwhile things are.

The writer, an Army lieutenant general, commands the Multinational Security Transition Command in Iraq. He previously commanded the 101st Airborne Division, which was deployed in Iraq from March 2003 until February 2004.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 27, 2004 – Gen. Abizaid on Iraq

Gen. John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, appeared Sunday, Sept. 26 on NBC's Meet the Press. Following are highlights of his interview.

- Iraq is moving in the direction that will allow it to emerge as one of the first democratic and representative states in the Middle East.
 - The Coalition's military activities in Iraq have moved the country ahead in a positive manner.
 - The fight in Iraq is tough, and will continue through the Iraqi elections, but we mustn't lose heart.
- Commanders in the field are confident about the military mission and the ability to have an election period that is fair and relatively stable.
 - Commanders are under no illusion about all Iraq being stable, nor are they under the illusion that the entire country is dangerous.
 - The environment is complex – there are stable areas in the north and south, but there are areas around Fallujah and the Sunni heartland that are dangerous to government officials and U.S. forces.
 - The Coalition has moved very fast in building security institutions in Iraq that will provide a stable atmosphere for the elections.
 - Just four months ago, people were saying the Iraqi interim government would never emerge, but it did. It is possible to move the process forward from occupation to partnership to full independence in Iraq.
- The National Intelligence Estimate prepared in July is an overly pessimistic estimate of the situation in Iraq.
 - Many people -- U.S. and Coalition troops, Iraqis defending their country and serving in the government -- are working for a better future and fighting the extremists.
 - Iraq will emerge as an independent nation that sets the standard for good government in the region. It will take continued focus and perseverance, plus help from courageous U.S. troops and people in Iraq and the Middle East.
- The problem of ideologically motivated terrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia must be faced.
 - Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be looked at through a soda straw. Ideologically motivated terrorism must be confronted region-wide, most importantly with moderates in the region who don't want extremists dictating what kind of life they have.
 - The greatest danger to the foreign fighters, the terrorists and the former regime are free and fair elections.
- The constant Washington drumbeat that the war is being lost and can't be won and the resistance is out of control doesn't square with the facts on the ground.
 - The resistance is hard, but Iraqis and Coalition members will battle it together through economic, political and military means. It won't be easy, but it is possible.

- **The stage is being set for successful elections in**
 - Iraq's armed forces are being built up with an additional 25,000 forces that will help secure elections in conjunction with U.S. forces.
 - It will be a tough fight, and there will be a lot of violence between now and then.
 - The conditions will not be perfect. The goal is that the election will be able to be held in the vast majority of the country under good circumstances.
- **Iraqi security forces have undergone extensive renovations since March**
 - The forces were destroyed and there have been setbacks and revisions to the strategy to rebuild them.
 - The current forces are serious about their duties – they are fighting and dying for their country.
 - The key is to build an effective, well-trained security force loyal to the civilian government that can eventually protect the country.
 - Approximately 100,000 armed forces and police forces now are trained and equipped by the measure of the standard Lt. Gen. Petraeus uses that is accepted by Prime Minister Allawi. The numbers will continue to grow.
- **People in the Middle East do not like the extremist ideological**
 - They do not want it to be successful, and they need American help.
 - The process will be long and difficult, but it can be fought successfully if Americans come together at home and with people in the region and the international community to set standards for good government and a moderate lifestyle.

Links: Gen. Abizaid [biography](#).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 24, 2004 –Secretary Rumsfeld Iraq Quotations

Following are quotations from Secretary Rumsfeld at media availability today at the Pentagon, where the secretary hosted Prime Minister Ayad Allawi of Iraq. ([transcript](#))

Prowess in Iraq

"Iraq is a free nation, with a new government determined to defeat extremists and to hold elections."

"Tens of thousands of Iraqis are courageously volunteering to serve in the Iraqi security forces... and in the interim government."

Goals in Iraq

"... an Iraq that was a single country, not broken into pieces; that was at peace with its neighbors and didn't have weapons of mass destruction; and that fashioned a government that was respectful of the various women, religious groups, all the diversity that existed in that country. We did not fashion a template and (say) it had to look like this. We said it's going to be an Iraqi solution."

Iraqi Elections

"We and the government of Iraq intend to see that the elections are held, intend to see that they are held on time, and to do...everything possible to see that that happens and to see that every Iraqi has the right to vote."

"We recognize that there is an increased level of violence as we move toward these elections. We recognize a free and peaceful Iraq is a powerful blow to the extremists in the world who are determined to have the world their way. The road ahead will take courage."

Stress on the Force and Numbers of U.S. Troops in Iraq

"We have...underway something like 35 or 45 initiatives to reduce stress on the force. We have used the emergency authorities to increase the size of the force."

"We've said it a hundred times; if General Abizaid decides he needs more forces, obviously there will be more U.S. forces. We know we're seeking more Coalition forces, and some additional Coalition forces have already agreed to participate, for example, with respect to protecting the U.N. during the election period."

The Draft (Secretary Rumsfeld before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sept. 23, 2004)

"...it is absolutely false that anyone in this Administration is considering reinstating the draft. That is nonsense. We've got 295 million people in the United States of America. We need 1.4 million people to serve in the Active force. We are having no trouble attracting and retaining the people we need. If we were managing this force better -- and it takes years to rearrange it properly -- it has been malorganized, malarranged as between the Active and the Reserve components, and we've got too darn many people in uniform doing civilian jobs. And if we have to increase the numbers above 1.4 million, we can do it under the emergency authorities. We are not having trouble maintaining a force of volunteers. Every single person's a volunteer. We do not need to use compulsion to get people to come in the armed services! We've got an ample number of talented, skillful, courageous, dedicated young men and women willing to serve. And it's false."



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 23, 2004 – SecDef Hill Global Posture Testimony

Secretary Rumsfeld testified today before the Senate Armed Services Committee about the U.S. military's global posture. Global posture, explained simply, is the worldwide deployment of military personnel, equipment and installations, particularly in overseas areas. Following are highlights of his prepared testimony ([full text](#)).

➤ **Rearranging our nation's global posture is essential to winning the Global War**

- Rearranging global posture is part of a broader set of undertakings – we also must change mindsets and perspectives.
- The military must transform into a more agile and more efficient force, ready and able to combat today's asymmetric challenges.

➤ **The U.S. military is already working to transform**

- The size of the Army has been increased, it is being reorganized into more agile, lethal and deployable brigades.
- The Active and Reserve components are being retrained and restructured to improve the total force's responsiveness to crises. These changes mean when individual guardsmen and reservists are mobilized, it will be less often, for shorter periods, and be more predictable.
- Jointness between the services is being increased.
- Communications and intelligence activities are being improved.
- New commands have been established and others improved – such as the Northern Command and the Strategic Command.

➤ **Civilian personnel systems are being**

- Tens of thousands of uniformed people today are doing essentially non-military jobs – yet reservists are being called up to fight in the Global War on Terror.
- Converting jobs being done by military personnel to civilians or contractors will free up the military personnel for military jobs.
- The new National Security Personnel System will expedite the hiring process for civilian employees and reward those who are outstanding. It will also streamline the complex regulations that frustrate efficiency.

➤ **In this new era, enemies are scattered in small cells across the globe. U.S. however, are arranged essentially to fight large armies, navies and air forces. DoD has developed new concepts to govern the way the military is aligned in the**

- Troops should be located where they are wanted, welcomed and needed.
- Troops should be located in environments that are hospitable to their movements.
 - Now some host countries or their neighbors impose restrictions.
- Locations must allow our troops to be usable and flexible.
 - In the future, we can't expect to have six months of planning like the 1991 Gulf War.
- DoD must take advantage of advanced capabilities that allow the military to do more with less.
 - The old reliance on presence and mass reflects industrial-age thinking from last century.

- **By thinking in new ways, DoD has developed plans for a more flexible and force posture for the 21st**
 - Main operating bases in places like Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and Korea will be consolidated but retained. Instead, DoD will:
 - Use forward-operating sites and locations with rotational presence and prepositioned equipment; and
 - Work to gain access to a broader range of facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence but with periodic service or contractor support.
 - In Asia – build on current ground, air and naval access to overcome vast distances and bring additional air and naval capabilities forward into the region, plus consolidate facilities and headquarters in Japan and Korea.
 - In Europe – seek lighter and more deployable ground capabilities and strengthened special operations forces, both positioned to deploy more rapidly to other regions if necessary.
 - In the broader Middle East – maintain “warm” facilities for rotational forces and contingency purposes. DoD will build on cooperation and access from host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
 - In Africa and the Western Hemisphere – DoD envisions an array of smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access.
- **The proposed new arrangements will significantly improve the lives of U.S.**
 - In the coming years, up to 70,000 troops and some 100,000 family members and civilian employees will transfer home.
 - Future deployments should be somewhat shorter. Families will have fewer permanent changes of station, which will mean less disruption in their lives.
- **Global posture and BRAC 2005 (Base Realignment and Closure) are tightly linked – depend on each other.**
 - Both global posture and BRAC are key components of the President's transformation agenda.
 - Global posture progress has allowed DoD to provide specific input on overseas changes for BRAC. This input will allow domestic implications of the global posture review – with forces and personnel either returning to or moving forward from U.S. territory – to be accounted for in the BRAC decision-making progress.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 22, 2004 – Global War on Terror Progress

Following are talking points on Progress in the Global War on Terror.

Resolve to Win the Global War on Terror

- The United States is committed to winning the Global War on Terror. More than 80 nations are working together as an integrated team to ensure the world is a safer, more secure place. The Coalition is removing the threat of terrorism by the roots and building the foundation for enhanced national and international security.
- The battle between moderation and extremism requires that all nations engage. This is not just a military fight. We must encourage the types of reform that lead to moderation – economic, political, diplomatic, judicial, social and military.
- We are winning. We have not lost an engagement at the platoon level (approximately 30 people) or above in three years of war. This enemy knows he cannot defeat us, but he is focused on winning the battle of perception, attacking civilians to spread fear among local populations in Afghanistan and Iraq. His goal is to win the perception battle and force us to lose our will. We must remain committed.
- Coalition forces continue to put pressure on extremist groups operating throughout the world. We have been successful in areas like Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa in many ways, but there remains much more to do to counter the forces of extremism.

Signs of Change in Afghanistan

- Coalition and Afghan forces are setting the conditions for a stable and safe environment for successful presidential elections in October, followed by parliamentary elections in the spring.
- The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reports that over 10 million voters are registered as of Aug. 29 for the Oct. 9 presidential election. More than 41 percent of registered voters are women.
- Operation Lightning Resolve began July 14, 2004. More than 18,000 Coalition forces, together with the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, are increasing their security operations in towns and villages.

Status in Iraq

- The Coalition remains fully committed to assisting the Iraqis in restoring security and rebuilding their nation.
- The Iraqi National Conference met and selected the Interim National Council. The Interim Iraqi Government is now planning for elections in January.
- The enemy is unscrupulous and has no vision of the future; it represents a return to a bankrupt past.
- The overwhelming majority of Iraqis want to rebuild their country and defend it from fringe groups who want to tear it apart.
- The largest single contributor to Iraq's security is the Iraqi people, who continue to step forward to join the various Iraqi Security Forces.
- Fallujah: Current operations in and around Fallujah are designed to eliminate anti-Coalition forces that have conducted terrorist-like acts in an attempt to intimidate the population, and disrupt the progress towards peace, stability and self-governance for the Iraqi people.
- Najaf: Najaf and Kufa are in the hands of the legitimate Iraqi government. Security is being maintained by Iraqi security and police forces. Coalition forces remain in the Najaf area at the request of the Prime Minister.
- Improvised Explosive Devices: The Coalition detects more IEDs than are detonated, and commanders continue to improve tactics, techniques and procedures to mitigate this risk.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 20, 2004 – Iraq security

Iraqis continue to line up to volunteer to protect their country as part of the military and police, even as attacks are launched on the forces by militants trying to disrupt Iraq's progress. The Coalition is making tremendous progress training Iraqi Security Forces. Following are highlights. For more information, please refer to the attached slides from the Joint Chiefs.

- More than 400,000 security forces are conducting stability operations in Iraq.
 - The largest single contributor to Iraq's security is the Iraqi people -- more than 238,000 Iraqis serve as part of their country's security force.
 - Throughout Iraq, Multi-National Forces are working to transfer responsibility to the Iraqi police, border police and Iraqi National Guard.
- The Iraqi government, in close consultation with Coalition training commanders, has established several entities to provide security in Iraq. More than **96,000** Iraqis (in addition to 74,000 Facilities Protection Service members) have been trained in their respective security areas including:
 - Iraqi Police Service – almost 39,000
 - Iraqi National Guard – more than 38,000
 - Department of Border Enforcement – more than 14,000
 - Iraqi Army – more than 4,700
 - Iraqi Intervention Force (the counterinsurgency arm of the army) – more than 1,900
- In addition to the more than **99,000** Iraqis who have been trained for the various Iraqi Security Forces, almost **20,000** are in training, including:
 - Iraqi Police Service – more than 3,000 in training
 - Iraqi Army – more than 7,900 in training
 - Iraqi Intervention Force – almost 5,500 in training
- All told, more than **62,000** members of the military are working or training to protect their country (almost **46,000** have been trained; another **16,000** are in training).
- The Iraqi Police Service and the Department of Border Enforcement have more than 53,000 trained officers.
 - As Iraq continues to grow its military forces, these other security elements are in place to provide the immediate security needed in the country now as it transitions to democracy.
 - More than 100,000 are on duty in different capacities. The current goal is to have 172,000 police forces on duty.
- The training of Iraqi security troops is about halfway complete.
 - All 27 battalions of the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Intervention Force will be operational by January. All other training should be essentially finished by June 2005.
- Iraqi Security Forces continue to improve, but performance varies by region. Recent operations by elements fighting in Najaf demonstrate capability.
- Recruiting efforts for the Iraqi Security Forces continue to be very successful.

- More than 850 law enforcement students graduated from training last week; another 2,500 candidates started police training.
- More than 250 recruits started basic training in the army last week; another 7,100 available and qualified recruits were awaiting transportation to training.
- **More than 715 Iraqi Security Forces have died defending their country.**



Ministry of Interior Forces: Man, Train, and Equip

AS OF 20 SEP 04

		MANNING		TRAINING			EQUIPPING							
		AUTH	ON DUTY	UN TRAINED	IN TRAIN-ING	TRAIN-ED	WEAPONS		VEHICLES		COMMS		BODY ARMOR	
	COMPONENT						REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H
Iraqi Police	IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	135K	84,950	42,964	3,065		213,185	94,120	22,395		67,565		135,000	
	CIVIL INTERVEN-TION FORCE	4,920		0	0		11,490		1,002		10,240		4,800	
	EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270		0	0		1,020	500	58		352		270	
Dept of Border Enforcement		32,000	16,151	1,375	463*	14,313	42,601		8,271		8,271		28,626	
TOTAL		172,190	101,177	44,339	3,528*		268,296	111,062	31,726		86,428		168,696	

	70-100% OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

(Does not include 73,992 personnel in Facilities Protection Service)

11-L-0559/OSD/22151



Ministry of Defense Forces: Man, Train, Equip

AS OF 20 SEP 04

		MANNING		TRAINING			EQUIPPING							
FORCE	COMPONENT	REQ'D	O/H	UN- TRAINED	IN TRAIN- ING	TRAINED	WEAPONS		VEHICLES		COMMS		BODY ARMOR	
							REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H
ARMY	IRAQI ARMY	27,000	12,699	0	7,910		23,606	15,432	2,298		3,596		20,949	
	IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	41,405	0	2,744	38,661	68,760	37,635	2,142		11,208		62,032	
	IRAQI INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584		0	5,489		8,850		583		1,798		6,584	2,741
	IRAQI SPECIAL OPS FORCE	1,967		0	75		2,473	1,049	408		1,368		1,967	
AIR FORCE		502	206	0	39		383	0	34		21		502	
COASTAL DEFENCE FORCE		409		0	130	282	486	12	15		156		409	
TOTAL		98,366	62,795	0	16,387	46,408	104,558	57,428	5,480	2,819	18,147		71,152	32,988

Legend

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

11-L-0559/OSD/22152



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 15, 2004 – Hispanic American Heritage Month

Today marks the beginning of Hispanic American Heritage Month. Thousands of Hispanic Americans serve in the U.S. Armed Forces, including Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Commanding General, 5th Corps. Lt. Gen. Sanchez spoke today at a Salute to Hispanic WW II Veterans hosted by the Hispanic War Veterans of America. Following are highlights of his prepared remarks and highlights of other Hispanic Americans who have served.

- The Services continue to be a place where all Americans can find unlimited opportunities for professional development and success.
- American service members embrace a common value system that transcends race, color and ethnicity to serve for the common good.
- There is no better ambassador than America's Army with its diversity. This diversity makes the U.S. Army the best in the world, and it is embracing democracy that is so difficult for other nations.
- Common threads that bind Hispanic Americans and all Americans in the military include loyalty to the constitution and to fellow soldiers, honor, and a sense of duty that results in the accomplishment of any mission despite even seemingly insurmountable odds.
- In the end, the strength of American society lies in its ability to embrace the American ideals of democracy and equal opportunity for all.

Lt. Gen. Sanchez also recognized the accomplishments of several Hispanic Americans, including:

- David Barkeley, a private in the U.S. Army and the Army's first Hispanic Medal of Honor recipient. On Nov. 9, 1918, he swam the icy Meuse River in France, crawled 400 yards behind enemy lines, and drew maps of the enemy artillery unit locations. He drowned while swimming back to his unit; his partner completed the mission. During Hispanic heritage celebrations in 1989, Barkeley was finally awarded the Medal of Honor.
- Luis R. Esteves was the first Puerto Rican graduate of West Point and was the founder of the Puerto Rican National Guard. He was the first member of the West Point Class of 1915 to become a general officer, ahead of his classmates Eisenhower, Bradley, Van Fleet and McNamara.

Earlier this month, the Department of Defense hosted an award luncheon in conjunction with the First National Latina Symposium.

- Keynote speaker Air Force Brig. Gen. Maria Owens, director for manpower and personnel on the Joint Staff, told the audience how the Air Force has taught her to be a leader as well as a manager. A Mexican American, Brig. Gen. Owens said she inherited a legacy of service from her parents. Her father enlisted in the Navy at age 15, then went on to serve as both an enlisted member and officer in the Army and later the Air Force. Her mother, a nurse, served in the Army and Air Force.
- At the Sept. 8 luncheon, John M. Molino, acting deputy undersecretary of defense for equal opportunity, said DoD has made considerable progress in Hispanic representation in the military, but needs to do more. Since DoD began to draw down the force in the late 1980s, Hispanic representation in the active duty military has more than doubled.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 14, 2004 – DepSec RAND Speech

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz addressed the RAND Conference on Terrorism in Washington last week. The topic was "A Strategic Approach to the Challenge of Terrorism." Following are highlights of his remarks ([full text](#)).

- **Four basic principles must guide the United States in its strategy to combat terrorist fanaticism:**
 - (1) Recognize the struggle will be long. The United States will win, but the victory will probably not be marked by an event as dramatic as the signing aboard the USS Missouri or the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
 - (2) The United States must use all the instruments of national power, including military force, but not solely or even primarily military force. Different elements of national power, including the "softer" ones, reinforce each other.
 - (3) The struggle will be waged in multiple "theaters," including the United States. Americans cannot ignore any of the theaters. Efforts must be sequenced so energies are focused in the right places at the right times.
 - (4) The struggle is both physical and ideological. There must be a vision of life, hope and freedom to counter the terrorists' vision of tyranny, death and despair.
- **One lesson of September 11th is that the United States can no longer continue to live with terrorism as an evil but inescapable fact of international life.**
 - While every individual terrorist threat cannot be eliminated, the United States can hope to eliminate global terrorist networks and end state sponsorship of terrorism.
 - Americans must be patient: A problem that grew up in 20 or 30 years is not going away in two or three.
 - The same values that held the Allies together for four decades of often contentious debates have brought more than 80 countries into the larger Coalition in the Global War on Terror.
 - A longing for freedom penetrated the Iron Curtain and brought about the peaceful end to the Cold War. Today, the same universal desire for liberty is the strongest weapon to fight fanaticism.
- **Combating terrorism involves many and varied**
 - Efforts must be sequenced in a way that makes sense – what happens in one theater impacts others. Success in one theater can provide a platform for success in others.
 - Success in Afghanistan has deprived al Qaeda of a sanctuary there, supported President Musharraf's position as a friend of the United States, and driven al Qaeda terrorists into Pakistan, where it has been possible to capture them.
 - The capture of terrorist operatives in Pakistan has led to arrests of key associates in places as distant as London and Chicago, and provided new information about terrorists' plans.
 - The Saudis have killed or captured more than 600 al Qaeda associates. Their counter-terrorist efforts have benefited from the ability of the United States to remove the threat of Saddam as well as the burden of supporting a large military presence on Saudi territory, which was made possible by the liberation of Iraq.

- **Afghanistan and Iraq are the two central fronts in the Global War on Terror for military**
 - Fifty million people in Afghanistan and Iraq have been freed from brutal tyranny.
 - Afghanistan and Iraq are on their way to becoming America's newest allies in the fight for freedom.
 - Both countries are moving toward self-government.
 - The success of democracy in both countries will represent a major defeat for terrorists, including associates of al Qaeda.

- **Victory in the Global War on Terror requires sowing seeds of hope and expanding the appeal of freedom, particularly in the Middle East.**
 - Winning in Afghanistan and Iraq is imperative, but these victories are only part of the larger Global War on Terror.
 - As democracy grows in the Middle East, it will become easier for peacemakers to succeed throughout the region.
 - As President Bush said in a speech in November marking the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, the United States must work with its partners in the greater Middle East and around the world to promote tolerance, the rule of law, political and economic openness and the extension of greater opportunities so that all people can realize their full potential.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 10, 2004 – SecDef National Press Club Speech

Secretary Rumsfeld today addressed the National Press Club on progress in the Global War on Terror three years after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Following are highlights of his opening remarks.

- Some are tempted to think if the United States pulled back from the global war extremists and let events run their course, that somehow the combat and would go away and the nation could return to a more comforting pre-9/11 world. consider the world of Sept. 10,
 - Two Americans and six others were on trial by the Taliban for the “crime” of preaching their religion.
 - The leader of the opposition Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud, lay dead. His murder was ordered by Taliban co-conspirator Osama bin Laden.
 - Iraqis bragged about having shot down a U.S. reconnaissance drone in late August.
 - A.Q. Khan and his secret network were aiding the nuclear programs of Libya, North Korea, Iran and other countries.
 - Hani Hanjour and his associates checked into a hotel near Dulles Airport in Virginia, preparing to board American Airlines Flight 77 the next day. In New Jersey, Todd Beamer postponed his business trip for a day to spend some time with his family.
- Sept. 10, 2001, was not the last day of world innocence. It was, however, the last day America's lack of understanding of a worldwide extremist movement determined terrorize, defeat and destroy civilized people everywhere. In the world three years the
 - The Taliban regime is gone. Those not captured are on the run. More than 10 million Afghans have registered to vote.
 - Saddam Hussein's regime is finished; he is in jail; his sons are dead.
 - Libya has renounced its illicit weapons programs and is seeking to re-enter the community of civilized nations.
 - A.Q. Khan's arms network has been shut down. The Pakistani government is a staunch ally against extremism and terrorism.
- While some find false comfort in September 10th thinking, our enemies have been in a September 11th world for a very long
 - Al Qaeda first attacked the World Trade Center in 1993.
 - Attacks targeted the Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996, U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, and U.S. Sailors on the USS Cole in 2000.
 - Attacks continue today, with extremists killing hundreds in Spain, Turkey, Kenya, Indonesia and Russia.
 - If the enemies of civil society gain the chemical, biological or nuclear weapons they seek, it is not inconceivable that an attack could cause the deaths of not 3,000 people, but 30,000 or 300,000.
- For the past 3 ½ years, the Defense Department has been reforming and improving way U.S. forces are organized, equipped and positioned in order to meet 21st security

- DoD is reshaping and modernizing its global force posture, away from Cold War obsolescence.
 - DoD is restructuring and transforming the military. The Army is rebalancing specialties between the active and reserve components, and increasing the number of self-sufficient brigades available for rapid deployment overseas.
 - DoD is developing, testing and beginning to deploy limited defenses against ballistic missiles to deter rogue states from attempting to think they can blackmail America or its allies.
 - The United States is updating existing alliances and building new relationships. Countries like Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Pakistan and India are now partners in the fight against extremism.
- **Tactics of terrorists and extremists vary, but their objectives are consistent – intimidate and demoralize the United States and its allies with threats and**
- They are conducting reigns of terror against mayors and city council members, Afghan women who register to vote, volunteers for the Iraqi security forces – all those who represent hope and freedom.
 - They know the rise of a free, self-governing Afghanistan and Iraq will give momentum to reformers across the region.
- **Freedom has always required sacrifice and regrettably cost**
- The civilized world passed the 1,000th casualty mark at the hands of extremists long ago – more than 3,000 killed on Sept. 11 – in a series of attacks including the bombings at embassies and military barracks overseas.
 - It was the murder of so many on one morning on U.S. soil that brought home what America is up against in this ongoing struggle.
 - As long as the United States and the Coalition continue the mission, work to change the terrorists' way of life before they change ours, and avoid returning to the false comfort of September 10th thinking, victory will come, as it has in past conflicts.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Sept. 7, 2004 – SecDef Press Briefing

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the Pentagon press corps today on progress in the Global War on Terror. Following are highlights from the secretary's opening remarks.

- **Those who choose violence and terror think nothing of taking innocent**
 - The civilized world watched in horror last week as Russian children were taken hostage on their first day of school and hundreds of Russians were killed and wounded.
 - Because extremists seek to terrorize innocent men, women and children whoever they are and wherever they live, the Coalition must stay on offense.
- **Taking the offense in the Global War on Terror will have its own**
 - American forces will soon suffer the 1,000th casualty at the hands of terrorists and extremists in Iraq.
 - When combined with U.S. losses in other theaters in the Global War on Terror, the country has already lost more than 1,000 men and women in uniform. The American people honor their courage and sacrifice, and mourn with their families.
 - The civilized world has already passed the 1,000th casualty mark – hundreds were killed in Russia last week, and this week the United States marks the 3-year anniversary of the September 11th attacks, when more than 3,000 people from dozens of countries died.
- **September 11th was not the beginning of terrorism, and the war in Iraq did not**
 - International terrorists declared war on the world's nations.
 - Over decades, these terrorists have killed thousands of Americans and citizens of other countries.
- **Since the September 11th attacks, the world has made progress in the Global War**
 - The Taliban regime is gone and Osama bin Laden is on the run.
 - Pakistan, which once supported the Taliban, is now a strong ally against terrorists.
 - Saddam Hussein is in jail, soon to be on trial.
 - Uday and Qusay Hussein are dead.
 - The people of Iraq are forming a representative government that will not threaten their people, their region or the world.
 - A.Q. Khan's clandestine network that had provided nuclear technologies to Libya, North Korea and possibly other nations, has been shut down.
 - Libya's Moammar Gadhafi has given up his nuclear weapons program.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 25, 2004 – Additional Schlesinger Points

Following are talking points on the Schlesinger Panel Report.

- The report by the Schlesinger Panel is the first independent report into detainee abuse Abu
 - The Panel found there was no policy of abuse at Abu Ghraib.
 - The Panel acknowledged the access and cooperation it received throughout the investigation.
- In this new age and the Global War on Terror, the government was organized for a
 - This has been a common conclusion of the 9/11 Commission, the Intelligence Report on WMD, and other assessments.
 - The Department of Defense is reviewing Army force structure across the spectrum of disciplines to better reflect the 21st century.
 - In this context, the Schlesinger Panel recommendation concerning the missions and force structure of military police and military intelligence is better understood.
- The Panel report states, “serious leadership problems in the **800th** Military Police and the **205th** Military Intelligence Brigade, to include the **320th** Military Police Commander and the Director of the Joint Debriefing and Interrogation Center, allowed abuses at Abu
 - The Panel concluded that there were serious lapses of leadership in both units from junior NCOs to battalion and brigade levels.
 - The Panel found no evidence that organizations above the 800th MP Brigade or 205th MI Brigade level bear direct responsibility for the incidents at Abu Ghraib.
- The Panel made several recommendations to improve oversight of detainee
 - The Panel recommended the creation of an Office of Detainee Affairs.
 - The Secretary of Defense established the Office of Detainee Affairs on July 16, 2004.
 - DoD has also established new procedures for the review of International Committee of the Red Cross reports.
 - The remaining recommendations will be reviewed together with recommendations from other investigations DoD has undertaken to assess what further improvements can be made.
- The Panel reiterated the importance of interrogation as a means of gaining information in the global war on
 - The Panel expressed concern for the “chilling effect” investigations may have on gaining additional intelligence. We must keep intact our ability to conduct effective interrogation.
- The Panel found that abuses depicted in the widely circulated photographs are not the result of authorized interrogation procedures.
 - The Panel reported that prisoners depicted were not part of intelligence gathering efforts.
 - As the Panel reported] “they were the freelance activities on the part of the night shift at Abu Ghraib.”

Links: [Read the Report](#); DoD [web site Detainee Investigations page](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 24, 2004 – Schlesinger Panel Report

The Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (the “Schlesinger Panel”) today released its report regarding allegations and investigations of abuse at DoD detention facilities. Following are talking points.

Panel Membership

- The panel was appointed by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. [\[Secretary's memo\]](#)
- Panel members were charged by the Secretary to provide independent professional advice on detainee abuses, what caused them and what actions should be taken to preclude their repetition.
- The chairman of the panel was former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. Panel members were former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, former Rep. Tillie K. Fowler and Gen. Charles A. Horner (USAF-Ret.).

The Panel's Work

- The panel conducted more than 20 interviews of relevant persons ranging from Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, senior DoD officials, the military chain-of-command and their staffs, plus other officials directly or indirectly involved with incidents of Abu Ghraib prison and other detention operations.

Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the Independent Panel Report (Secretary's statement)

- The panel's information and recommendations are important and will assist the Department's ongoing efforts to improve detention operations.
- As the Secretary emphasized during his congressional testimony in May, the Department has an obligation to evaluate what happened and to make appropriate changes. The panel's contributions will help with this effort.
- The Secretary reiterated the Department would see that the incidents were fully investigated, make findings, make the appropriate corrections and make them public.
- As the reports are completed, they will be made available to the Congress and to the press, as appropriate.

Links: [Read the Report](#); DoD [web site Detainee Investigations page](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 23, 2004 – Afghanistan Update

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Afghanistan in mid-August, where they met with U.S. troops and Afghan and U.N. officials. Following are highlights of progress in Afghanistan.

Voter Registration

- The surge in voter registration for the Oct. 9 presidential election demonstrates the Afghan people's determination to make democracy work.
 - More than 9.4 million Afghans have registered to vote. More than 41 percent are women.
 - U.N. officials expect that 9.8 million voters could be registered by end of the registration process.
- The United Nations is leading the effort on the presidential election and the parliamentary elections that will follow, scheduled for spring 2005.

Election Security

- The threat to Afghanistan's presidential election comes from the remnants of the Taliban, who will try to disrupt the process, using terror as a weapon.
 - Coalition forces are working with the Afghan government to stop the violence.
 - Forces will shift their emphasis to election security as the election date draws closer to ensure Afghans can get to the polls and the process is not disrupted.
 - An extra U.S. brigade was put in the country for the springtime offensives and the elections.
 - Spain and Italy are both sending battalions to support the election process.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

- Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are helping curb the Taliban's influence in Afghanistan.
 - PRTs are small groups of civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces.
 - Sixteen PRTs are spread throughout Afghanistan.
 - The PRTs extend the central government's reach and provide infrastructure that will help keep the country stable.
 - PRTs are an example of the international community's coordination and willingness to join the Coalition in the Global War on Terror. Some of the leaders of the PRTs include New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Germany, under the auspices of NATO.
 - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers met with members of the Jalalabad provincial reconstruction team.

Confronting the Opium Problem

- The narcotics trade is one of the biggest threats to Afghan stability.
 - Afghanistan's largest cash crop is the poppy.
 - The Afghan government is working to confront the opium problem and the other problems drug money can bring.

[Rumsfeld, Karzai press conference transcript]



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 20, 2004 – Global Posture – International Response

International Response to President's Announcement on U.S. Global Force Restructuring

"In Berlin yesterday, Chancellor Gerhard Schroder's co-ordinator for U.S. German relations was upbeat, arguing the U.S. changes were part of the 'modernization' of relations between Berlin and Washington. Karsten Voigt said: 'We can understand Washington's need to restructure its military - our military is doing the same thing - and we do not perceive this as a political move directed against us', despite tensions over Iraq.

"He said Washington was pulling troops out because the cold war threat to Germany and Europe no longer existed. 'This is positive: let's not make a crisis out of something that is in reality a success story.'"

Financial Times
Aug. 18, 2004

"The troop withdrawal by the United States from Germany is, according to the words of Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (SPD), not a reaction by U.S. President George W. Bush to the German Iraq policy. The planned withdrawal of up to 70,000 U.S. soldiers from Europe and Asia in the next ten years comes as no surprise, said Schroeder today in Berlin. The discussion on the troop presence of the United States is much older than (the discussion) over Iraq. Germany will indeed continue to have the largest proportion of U.S. soldiers in Europe."

dpa -- German Press Agency
Aug. 18, 2004

"Seoul has dismissed fears of a security vacuum on the Korean peninsula after U.S. President George W. Bush on Monday confirmed his plan to withdraw 70,000 U.S. troops from around Europe and Asia, including 12,500 stationed in South Korea. Ban Ki-moon, minister of foreign affairs and trade, said Tuesday the troop reduction plan is nothing new for South Korea and the government is working out measures to ensure the nation's security is not compromised. 'The South Korean government has been well aware of this plan, as Washington notified us of it some time ago,' Ban told reporters before entering a Cabinet meeting. He said South Korean defense officials are in talks with the United States Forces Korea (USFK) to decide details for the withdrawal..."

The Korea Times (Internet Version)
Aug. 17, 2004

"Japan welcomes the review of the U.S. military framework that will better suit the global security environment and further contribute to peace and stability."

From Japanese Foreign Ministry Statement
Reported by Associated Press
Aug. 17, 2004

"The U.S. has consulted closely with Australia over its plans for the global force posture review and we see this initiative as a positive development for both regional and global security. It will improve the U.S. capability to contribute to international efforts to defeat global threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and enable the U.S. to engage more effectively in regional contingencies."

Australian Defense Minister Robert Hill
Reported by Agence France Presse
Aug. 17, 2004

"Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said he was not concerned about the planned increase in the U.S. presence on the territory of former Soviet allies such as Poland and Romania, and the ex-Soviet republic of Uzbekistan in Central Asia.

"I don't see anything alarming in these plans," he told reporters."

BBC News on the Internet
Aug. 17, 2004

When asked if President Bush's planned restructuring of U.S. force abroad means "a weaker commitment or not," Italy's Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini said, "Absolutely not. The Cold War is a thing of the past. America has signaled a major acknowledgement of the importance of the Mediterranean by moving the headquarters of the United States Navy from London to Naples."

From Corriere della Sera
August 17, 2004

"According to the coordinator for German-US cooperation in the Foreign Ministry, Karsten Voigt (Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD]), the planned reduction of U.S. troops in Germany does not signify a deterioration of the security situation in Europe. The FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] will remain the largest deployment area of the United States in Europe, the SPD politician told Deutschlandfunk on Tuesday [17 August]. By restructuring its armed forces in Europe, the United States wanted to have more mobile units at its disposal to meet the changed threats worldwide. In addition, the planned withdrawal was an expression of the fact that the Cold War was over and that Europe's division had been eliminated, Voigt pointed out."

Berlin ddp in German
Aug. 17, 2004



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 18, 2004 – SECDEF Missile Defense

Secretary Rumsfeld today addressed the 7th Annual Space and Missile Conference in Huntsville, Ala. The topic of his speech was missile defense. Following are highlights.

Background

- It has been two years since President Bush announced the decision to deploy an initial missile defense capability.
 - In the past few weeks, the first interceptor was put in place at Fort Greely, Alaska.
 - By the end of this year, we expect to have a limited operational capability against incoming ballistic missiles.

Threats Still Exist

- Although the Cold War is over, threats to our nation still remain.
 - Roughly two dozen countries, including some of the world's most dangerous regimes, possess ballistic missiles and are attempting to acquire missiles of increasing range and destructive capability.
 - The intelligence community estimates a number of these states have nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs.
 - North Korea is working to develop and deploy missiles capable of reaching not just their neighbors, but the United States as well. The same can be said of Iran.
 - More countries are sharing information – as demonstrated by Libya's recent admission.

Weakness, Delays and Threats

- Terrorists are searching for signs of vulnerability and weakness. History has taught us weakness is provocative.
 - The longer the delay in deploying even a limited defense against these kinds of attacks, the greater the likelihood of an attempted strike.
 - Without any defense against missiles, terrorists and rogue nations could use the *threat* of an attack to try to intimidate America or our allies from acting against them.

Answering the Critics

- Testing continues to show missile defenses can work.
- Missile defense is not potentially destabilizing.
 - Missile defense continues to be a means of building closer relations with allies such as Japan, Italy and Israel, as well as new friends and allies.

Adapting and Evolving

- As our enemies continue to adapt and evolve, so must U.S. capabilities.
- President Bush has directed DoD to pursue an evolutionary approach to developing and deploying missile defense.

Testing and Developing

- Rather than waiting for a fixed and final architecture, the United States is deploying an initial set of capabilities for missile defense
 - The capabilities will evolve over time as technology advances.

- Fielding modest capabilities in the near-term will allow the United States to gain operational input from combatant commanders.
- Dozens of tests have been conducted over the past three years. We have learned from both the successes and the failures.

A Comprehensive Strategy

- Missile defense is just one component of the President's comprehensive strategy.
- The United States is also working with its growing list of allies to push forward the Proliferation Security Initiative, forming a new international coalition to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 17, 2004 – Global Posture Background Briefing

Following are some of the highlights from a background briefing on global posture yesterday to the Pentagon press corps. To read the entire transcript, please go to the www.defenselink.mil, DoD's web site.

In an address yesterday morning at the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Cincinnati, President Bush announced plans to rearrange U.S. military force posture around the world ([speech transcript](#)). Over the next decade, about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and about 100,000 family members and civilian employees will be redeployed from overseas bases to the United States.

Deliberations: Timing and Scope

- The process for thinking about the realignment of U.S. global defense posture has been under way for some time; it has roots in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
- The changes will take place over the next decade. Divisions returning from Germany will not move until fiscal year 2006 at the earliest.
- Deliberations have been ongoing not just in the Department of Defense. There have also been interagency deliberations and talks with U.S. allies. Part of the timing considerations include ensuring U.S. allies have time to prepare and accommodate.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders were the authoritative voices in this process; they were the source of the advice used by the Secretary that he took to the President.
- Although they are separate efforts, global posture and BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure Process) are two sides of a coin. It is important to have a good sense of what the United States is going to do overseas before decisions are made about military facilities stateside.

Numbers

- In the 21st century, the strength of U.S. warfighting and commitment cannot be measured strictly in numerical terms; advances in technology and organization must be taken into account.
- The focus in realigning global posture has been on capabilities, not just numbers.
- This is not a troop cut or a force structure reduction in the armed forces. It is a realignment globally of U.S. forces and capabilities.
- Among the changes in Europe will be two divisions returning from Germany (the 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division). However, a substantial U.S. military ground presence will remain in Germany.
- A Stryker Brigade will be going to Germany. The Stryker Brigade is more relevant to the kind of challenges in Europe and beyond than are the legacy forces there today.
- Shifting forces to the east from Germany is not a goal. U.S. troops will likely rotate in and out of eastern Europe to conduct joint exercises with allied nations.
- The 5th Corps in Germany will be restructured. It is being made more deployable.
- Numbers of troops affected by force structure changes in the Pacific theater under the plan will not be very dramatic. U.S. forces in South Korea already are slated to move away from the demilitarized zone and out of the capital city of Seoul to locations further south.
- There are 230 major U.S. military bases in the world, 202 of which are in the United States and its territories. There are 5,458 distinct and discrete military installations around the world – some can be as small as 100 acres or less.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 16, 2004 – POTUS Global Posture

During a speech today before the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Cincinnati, President Bush today announced the largest restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. Following are talking points on the issue.

- **The restructuring will realign U.S. forces from a post-Cold War defense posture to a that is designed to address 21st century**
 - Explained simply, global posture is the worldwide deployment of military personnel, equipment and installations, particularly in overseas areas.
 - The President's plan will bring home many Cold War-era forces while deploying more flexible and rapidly deployable forces in strategic locations around the world.
 - These changes will result in:
 - The repositioning of some elements of existing forces. Some military units now based overseas will return to the continental United States; others will move to different overseas locations; still others, with advanced capabilities, may move from the United States to forward locations.
 - The consolidation a number of overseas facilities; and
 - The replacement of Cold-War "legacy forces" with cutting-edge, transformational capabilities for combined training and coalition operations.
- **The Defense Department has been reviewing U.S. posture around the world for some and it will take time to put the plan in**
 - DoD's post-Cold War review, as outlined in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, has been underway since well before operations began in Iraq.
 - Iraqi operations, however, have shown the need to obtain and maintain strategic flexibility and multiple avenues of access to potential trouble spots.
 - It will take several years to implement the President's transformation plan.
 - Over the next 10 years, the plan will bring home 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel, and nearly 100,000 families and civilian employees and close hundreds of U.S. bases overseas.
- **The United States is not changing its commitments to friends and allies around the**
 - The United States has been consulting with its allies on this matter and also with the U.S. Congress.
 - The new global posture plan will allow the United States to take better advantage of technology and innovative war-fighting concepts, which will improve our ability to meet our alliance commitments and global responsibilities.
 - The new strengthened posture will put the United States in a better position to be in both "supporting" and "supported" relationships with allies.
- **The transformation plan benefits both the U.S. servicemen and women and the American people.**
 - Troops will have more time on the home front and fewer moves over their career. Their spouses will have fewer job changes and their families will have greater stability.
 - The new plan will save taxpayers money by closing unneeded foreign bases and facilities around the world.

For more information, please refer to the [transcript](#) from a June 9, 2004, DoD briefing.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 10, 2004 – SecDef Interviews on the Draft

Following are highlights of recent radio interviews of Secretary Rumsfeld on the subject of a draft.

➤ **The United States does not need a draft.**

- There are 1.4 million people in the active force.
- The military does not have a problem maintaining a force that is appropriate.
- Recruiting and retention is going well across the board. The Navy and the Air Force are having no issues whatsoever. For the Army for fiscal year 2004:
- Recruiting for Active components is at 101 percent of the goal set for FY '04. The Reserve is above its target recruitment rate – at 102 percent of its goal. The National Guard is at 88 percent, somewhat below their target.
- Retention for Active components is over 100 percent of the target set. Reserve retention is about 99 percent. National Guard retention is above its target rate, at almost 101 percent.
- Army National Guardsmen whose units have been mobilized are re-enlisting at a higher rate than those who haven't been mobilized. ([story](#))
- A conscious decision has been made to have a "total force concept" – some people on active duty, and some in the Guard and Reserves who are not needed full time, but may be called on from time to time to go on active duty and assist the country.
- The men and women in the U.S. military are all volunteers who have stepped forward to serve their country and have put their lives at risk to make the world better.

9 **The United States cannot use 20th century thinking to fight in the 21st century.**

- Capability should not always be equated with numbers – one smart bomb is better than 10 dumb bombs.
- The country must think in 21st century terms about lethality, speed of deployability, and usability of the military's capabilities, rather than just the numbers of things.

➤ **The size of the Army has been increasing fairly steadily since Operation Enduring Freedom began.**

- The Army has been running from 15,000 to 20,000 over its authorized end strength and can do so because of the emergency authorities that the president signed.

➤ **The military has the ability to have as many people on active duty as it needs adjusting**

- The military has the ability to pay people what they are worth and to adjust incentives to attract and retain the people needed.

Additional stories: Guard Seeks Stabilization Guarantee to Attract Recruits ([story](#)); Army Reserve Concerned About Prior-Service Recruiting ([story](#)). For transcripts of radio interviews, go to www.defenselink.mil.

The Washington Post

TUESDAY, JULY 27, 2004

Army Chief Sees No Need For Draft

Schoomaker Upbeat on Recruiting, Concedes Some Concerns

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

Page Two

The Army's top officer said he expects to hit recruiting targets next year and does not foresee a circumstance under which resumption of the draft might be needed to satisfy the global demands placed on the U.S. military.

Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, also explicitly rejected the idea of sharply boosting the Army, as some in Congress have recommended, saying at a Pentagon news conference that "we are currently growing the Army as fast as we can." Congress recently authorized a short-term addition of 30,000 troops, bringing the active-duty Army to about 512,000, and Schoomaker said the Army will consider in 2006 whether to support making the increase permanent.

He also said that the fighting in Iraq, far from hurting the Army's modernization efforts, actually has had "very positive" effects on the effort to adjust the service to the new demands of the 21st century. "We are changing and we are making great progress in this regard," Schoomaker said. "We're making some of the most significant changes in our Army that we have made since World War II."

Schoomaker's comments focused almost exclusively on the question of how Iraq and other deployments are affecting Army personnel and modernization. He said he was speaking in part because some news stories "have been inaccurate or misleading." He did not elaborate.

In recent months the Army has taken a series of unusual steps to cope with the strain of meeting its deployment needs in Iraq. The number of U.S. troops there has risen to about 141,000 in recent months to confront the insurgency, instead of declining as planned earlier.

That has prompted the Army to keep thousands of soldiers in Iraq beyond their planned tours of 12 months, to impose "stop-loss" orders requiring some soldiers to stay in the Army even after their scheduled exit dates and to plan to send to the Middle East two units that specialize in training troops at home.

More recently, the Army has recalled several thousand soldiers who left active duty but are still contractually obligated to serve if called upon. The troops, part of the Individual Ready Reserve, will fill empty positions in units scheduled for deployment overseas, including combat support roles, such as mechanics, logistics and civil affairs. It was the first time since the Persian Gulf War that the Pentagon has drawn on the Individual Ready Reserve.

Schoomaker and other generals at the news conference conceded that there are some worrisome signs, including that the number of recruits in the delayed entry program -- those waiting to ship

11-L-0559/OSD/22169

out -- has shrunk to its lowest level in three years. "We will be working very hard over the fall to increase that," Schoomaker said.

He also noted that while the active-duty Army and Army Reserve are meeting their recruiting goals, the Army National Guard currently is at only 88 percent of its target. He said he is "cautiously optimistic that we will make our goal."

Some state officials recently have expressed concern that deployments of Guard units to Iraq are making them less able to respond to fires, hurricanes and other natural disasters. Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, the head of the National Guard Bureau, who was also at the news conference, conceded that four states -- Idaho, Montana, Vermont and New Hampshire -- have half their Army Guard contingents deployed. But he said that any situation can be handled by using those states' Air Guard troops or nearby states' Army Guard troops. So, Blum concluded, "they are well prepared to handle forest fires or acts of Mother Nature or acts of a terrorist."

Discussing Iraq, Schoomaker said the sustained combat there has been a "forcing function" for change. "This war. . . provides momentum and focus and resources to transform," he said.

Under Schoomaker, the Army has accelerated a reorganization aimed at making troops more easily deployable, better able to fight once they get to a war zone and better able to withstand the strain of long missions, such as Iraq, which Army officers expect will be the rule for decades to come.

The continuing combat in Iraq has focused the Army on what it needs to do, and made it easier to remove some barriers to change, Schoomaker indicated. "It is a tough management challenge, but it's a unique strategic opportunity for us to take advantage of, and that's what we're doing."

The Washington Times

TUESDAY, JULY 27, 2004

Army Meeting Recruiting Goal; Guard Still Short

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times
Page Three

The Army National Guard is coming up short on new recruits, but is retaining sufficient numbers of soldiers, as is the rest of the service, top generals said yesterday.

Delivering remarks on the state of the Army in time of war and rapid transformation, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the chief of staff, said, "It's really important. I think, that the American people and our soldiers and their families understand what we're doing to keep the Army relevant and ready, and that's why we're here today."

Flanked by generals who run the National Guard and the Army Reserve, Gen. Schoomaker said that despite frequent overseas deployments, the service will meet its active-duty recruiting goal of more than 70,000 soldiers in the fiscal year that ends Sept. 30.

"We have raised our recruiting goals this year over what they were last year, and we're meeting them," Gen. Schoomaker told a Pentagon press conference. "We've increased our retention goal by over 5,000 this year, over last year, and we are meeting the increase."

But the National Guard risks missing its induction goals by 12 percent. Outside analysts attribute the falloff to the demands that the Army is placing on Guardsmen to leave the civilian world and fight wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, the top National Guard officer in Washington, attributed the shortfall to another factor.

"While we're a little bit off in our recruiting ramp, it's because we set the ramp very high, because we didn't expect the success we saw in our re-enlistment ramp or our retention ramp or to preserve the force," Gen. Blum said.

"We're having better success re-enlisting our experienced soldiers, some of which have now been on active duty as much as two years, with one year boots on the ground in a combat zone."

Army officers say the 482,000-soldier active-duty force is facing its most challenging times since the all-volunteer armed forces was created 31 years ago.

Simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, plus other commitments in Europe and Asia, are stretching thin the Army's 10 active-duty divisions.

11-L-0559/OSD/22171

At the same time, Gen. Schoomaker is rearranging those 10 divisions to comply with the strategy of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld for a more mobile army.

The 3rd Infantry Division, for example, led the invasion of Iraq from Kuwait, fought against a deadly insurgency, then returned to Georgia only to find itself the first division to undergo transformation into smaller brigades. In a few months, the division is returning to Iraq.

In all, 600,000 soldiers are on active duty, counting reserves and National Guardsmen. The Army soon will dip into the individual ready reserve for more than 5,000 soldiers, a call-up last used in the last big war — Operation Desert Storm. It is pulling young people from a delayed entry program to meet this year's recruiting targets.

Still, Gen. Schoomaker says combat divisions are meeting 100 percent of retention goals.

"They really get it," he said. "I mean, they don't question our motives and the need for their being there, and they're proud of what they're doing."

Mr. Rumsfeld and Gen. Schoomaker have resisted calls from some lawmakers to increase the Army's permanent standing force by 40,000, or about two divisions.

Instead, the chief of staff is gradually increasing the active Army by 30,000 soldiers over several years to meet current demands. The plan is to reduce the force once wartime deployments decrease. But this scenario rests on subduing the insurgency and turning over most security duties to Iraqis.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 4, 2004 – Navy Summer Pulse '04

The U.S. Navy is currently finishing up a massive exercise called Summer Pulse '04. The three-month operation involves 46,000 sailors and Marines and seven carrier strike groups operating in five theaters with other U.S., allied and Coalition military forces.

Summer Pulse '04 is designed to demonstrate the Navy's ability to provide credible combat power across the globe. It is another example of the Department of Defense transforming its forces to better protect the nation and fight the Global War on Terror. Following are highlights.

- **Summer Pulse '04 is the Navy's first full-scale demonstration of naval readiness enabled by the new Fleet Response Plan.**
 - Historically the Navy has been as predictable as clockwork – employing a “two-plus-two” operation (two carriers deployed, another two ready to go, one off each U.S. coast).
 - The rest of the carriers were generally tied up in maintenance or were tiered down into a “readiness bathtub,” where they were not fully manned, not fully equipped and didn't have the training to be responsive.
 - Lessons learned from 9/11 and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom showed that operational availability of the Navy's 12 carrier strike groups (carriers plus their associated ships and air wings) had to increase, as did the response speed.
 - The Navy's new Fleet Response Plan (FRP) dramatically increases the Navy's capability to surge forces in response to both national security needs 21st-century world events.
 - Summer Pulse '04 is the Navy's first exercise of the Fleet Response Plan.
 - During Summer Pulse '04, the Navy is using the full range of skills involved in simultaneously deploying and employing seven carrier strike groups around the world.
 - Summer Pulse '04 will include scheduled deployments, surge operations, joint and international exercises, and other advanced training and port visits.
- **Summer Pulse '04 demonstrates the Navy's ability, under the Fleet Response Plan, to provide the regional combatant commanders with operational flexibility and joint response options they can scale to the situation.**
 - Six carrier strike groups – half the fleet – are now deployable globally in fewer than 30 days.
 - Two additional carrier strike groups are available within 90 days.
 - Prior to the new Fleet Response Plan, the total surge-force availability was limited to only three or four of the 12 carrier strike groups.
 - The FRP is designed to more rapidly develop and then sustain readiness in ships and squadrons so that, in a national crisis or contingency operation, the Navy can quickly surge significant combat power to the scene.
 - Achieving this goal required the Navy to rethink how to maintain its ships and aircraft between deployments, while trying to avoid spending significantly more money for readiness or maintenance or placing additional burden on the shoulders of its sailors.
- **The Fleet Response Plan, as demonstrated by Summer Pulse '04, furthers four of Secretary of Defense's objectives for 2004.**
 - Successfully pursue the Global War on Terror.
 - FRP ensures that the Navy can “reset” the force while at the same time providing forces to regions where the Global War on Terror is being prosecuted.
 - Strengthen combined/joint warfighting capabilities.

- Summer Pulse '04 is enhancing Allied and Coalition interoperability by including 13 exercises with 23 nations over the three-month duration (June-August) of the exercise.
- Transform the Joint Force.
 - FRP expands the combatant commanders' options for employment of scalable joint forces.
- Reorganize the Department of Defense to deal with post-war responsibilities.
 - FRP creates and institutionalizes a robust surge capability' so the Navy can respond with half its fleet with only 30 days' notice.

For more information' please visit the Navy's [Summer Pulse '04 web page](#), an [overview press release](#), a [Questions & Answers sheet](#), and a [roundtable discussion](#) with Rear Admiral John D. Stufflebeem.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 2, 2004 – SecDef Interviews on Iraq

Following are highlights of radio interviews of Secretary Rumsfeld on July 29, 2004. For full transcripts, go to the transcript page of www.defenselink.mil, the Defense Department's web page. For more information about the Global War on Terror, please visit www.defendamerica.mil.

Number of U.S. Troops in Iraq

- Secretary Rumsfeld relies on the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders whether there are enough troops on the ground in Iraq. All say there are about the right number.
 - Fewer troops could lead to a less secure situation.
 - Many more troops would have a heavier footprint - a greater occupation presence.
 - More troops would require more force protection, more logistic support of the force protectors and the additional troops, and would be more intrusive into the Iraqi people's lives.
- The real task is not putting in more Americans. The task is getting more Iraqis providing for their own security so we can begin bringing Americans out.

Intelligence in Iraq and Iraqi Troops

- Intelligence is improving every week in Iraq. It will improve geometrically as Iraqis take increasing responsibility for their country's security.
- Joint patrols with the Iraqis and Iraqis patrolling by themselves will result in better situational awareness than would U.S.- or Coalition-only patrols.
- More than 200,000 Iraqis are now part of their country's security forces.
 - Iraqis are lining up to volunteer to join the security forces and protect their country, even as some of those already in the force are being killed in the line of duty.

Prowess in the Global War on Terror

- The Coalition is making excellent progress in the Global War on Terror by:
 - Stopping financing
 - Arresting and capturing people and killing terrorists
 - Stopping terrorist activities
 - Making it more difficult to raise money and more difficult for the terrorists to communicate with each other.

Iraq Update

- Several shifts in authority over the weekend demonstrate Iraqis are assuming more control within their own country.
 - The Iraqi Army activated its seventh battalion with the graduation of 723 recruits during an Aug. 1 ceremony at Kirkush Military Training Base, east of Baghdad. ([link to CENTCOM release](#))
 - The battalion is the third Iraqi army battalion solely trained by Iraqis.
 - The Iraqi Army ultimately will consist of 27 battalions, nine brigades and three divisions.
 - The 22 remaining Iraqi Army battalions will begin and complete training in the coming months at various bases throughout Iraq. The final unit is slated to come on line in February 2005.
 - Multi-National Force-Iraq handed back control of the Baghdad International Airport's control tower on Aug. 1. ([link to CENTCOM release](#))
 - Royal Australian Air Force personnel spent the past six months training Iraqi civil air traffic personnel.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 27, 2004 - Army CoS Briefing

U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker addressed the Pentagon press corps on July 26 about the state of the Army – its composition and its ongoing efforts to both fight the Global War on Terror and continue transforming itself for the 21st century. Following are some of the highlights. For a full transcript, go to the [transcript](http://www.defenselink.mil) page of www.defenselink.mil, the Pentagon's web site.

The Numbers

- Currently there are more than one million soldiers in the Army.
 - More than 276,000 are deployed around the world in more than 120 countries.
- Despite the increases in deployments and missions, the Army is well on track to meet its recruiting and retention goals for fiscal year 2004.

The Challenge

- The Army is making some of its most significant changes since World War II.
 - Even while Army soldiers are fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and remain alert in other areas, the Army is still transforming.
 - Gen. Schoomaker has compared such a transformation to tuning a car engine while the engine is running.
- The Army is transforming along three primary avenues:
 - First – the Army is restructuring the force into modular formations.
 - Second – the Army is rebalancing the force between the Active component of the Army and the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
 - Part of rebalancing the force is looking at the skill sets the Army needs to fight in the 21st century instead of fighting the Cold War. Ensuring there are enough people in the Active Army with these skill sets will help reduce the number of Guard and Reserve who need to be activated.
 - Third – the Army is stabilizing the force.
- These three changes – restructuring, rebalancing and stabilizing the force – will result in:
 - More cohesive and combat-ready formations;
 - More stability;
 - More high-demand units and skills;
 - More commonality across the entire Army; and
 - A more predictable lifestyle for soldiers and their family.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 26, 2004 – SecDef Message to the Troops

Secretary of Defense Message to Troops on Why We Fight in Iraq

More than 15 months ago, a global coalition ended the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein and liberated the people of Iraq.

As in all conflicts, this has come at a cost in lives. Some of your comrades made the ultimate sacrifice. For your sacrifices, our country and the President are deeply grateful.

In a free, democratic country we have vigorous debates over important public policy issues – none more heated than a decision to go to war. But this should not distract us from the mission at hand or lessen the magnitude of your accomplishments.

The threat we face must be confronted. And you are doing so exceedingly well. Indeed it has been an historic demonstration of skill and military power.

On September 11, 3,000 citizens were killed by extremists determined to frighten and intimidate our people and civilized societies. The future danger is that, if the extremists gain the potential, the number of casualties would be far higher. Terrorists are continuing to plot attacks against the American people and against other civilized societies. This is a different kind of enemy and a different kind of world. And we must think and act differently in this new century.

These extremists think nothing of cutting off innocent people's heads to try to intimidate great nations. They have murdered citizens from many countries – South Korea, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and others – hoping to strike fear in the hearts of free people.

Theirs is an ideology of oppression and subjugation of women. They seek to create radical systems that impose their views on others. And they will accept no armistice with those who choose free systems.

They see the governments of the Middle East, the United States and our stalwart allies all as targets.

Consider the background. In the span of 20 years, Hussein's Iraq invaded two neighbors, Iran and Kuwait, and launched ballistic missiles at two more. He employed poison gas against soldiers in Iran and against Kurdish villagers in his own country.

The United Nations and the U.S. Congress shared the view that Saddam's regime was a threat to the region and the world. Indeed, in 1998, our Congress passed a resolution calling for the removal of the regime. And over the years the U.N. passed 17 resolutions condemning Saddam's regime and calling on him to tell the UN about his weapons programs. He ignored every one.

Information gathered since the defeat of Saddam's regime last year confirms that his last declaration to the United Nations about his weapons programs was falsified. The U.N. resolutions had called for "serious consequences" should Saddam not comply. He did not.

The President issued a final ultimatum to Saddam to relinquish power to avoid war. Saddam chose war instead.

By your skill and courage, you have put a brutal dictator in the dock to be tried by the Iraqi people and restored freedom to 25 million people. By helping to repair infrastructure, rebuild schools, encourage democratic institutions and delivering educational and medical supplies, you have shown America's true character and given Iraq a chance at a new start.

But most importantly, your fight – and ultimate victory – against the forces of terror and extremism in Iraq and the Middle East will have made America safer and more secure.

You are accomplishing something noble and historic – and future generations of Americans will remember and thank you for it.

Donald H. Rumsfeld



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 22, 2004 – 9-11 Report

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission) will issue its final report today. Since September 11th, the United States has better prepared itself for attacks and led a worldwide Coalition to defeat terrorism. The nation is safer and the terrorists are weaker because the United States and its allies acted. Following are talking points.

- **The United States is safer today than it was on Sept. 10,**
 - The nation is better protected and better prepared.
 - There is a higher level of vigilance among the American people.
 - Government agencies are better coordinated with forward-looking scenarios and action plans.
 - The United States is leading a worldwide Coalition to defeat terrorism.
 - More than 80 nations are cooperating to share intelligence, put pressure on the terrorists' bank accounts, and make it harder for terrorists to recruit and retain people, communicate with each other or move between countries.
 - We are improving every day, while our enemies are becoming more desperate and their efforts are being degraded.
- **Global terrorism has been dealt a severe**
 - The Taliban has been removed from power in Afghanistan, a brutal dictator is gone from Iraq and the seeds of freedom and democracy have been planted in the Middle East.
 - Terror cells have been disrupted on most continents.
 - Forty-six of the 55 most wanted in Iraq have been captured or killed, including Saddam Hussein.
 - Two-thirds of the known al-Qaeda leaders have been captured or killed.
- **The Bush Administration and the Defense Department took the threat of warfare seriously, before the terrorist**
 - Early on, the Department recognized the danger posed by asymmetric and terrorist threats, and began preparing new strategies and the building blocks necessary to carry them out.
 - Preparations made throughout 2001 enabled the U.S. to build a Coalition to immediately launch the Global War on Terror.
 - Work done throughout 2001 formed the basis of Operation Enduring Freedom and allowed the United States to pursue the perpetrators of the 9-11 attacks in Afghanistan just 26 days after they occurred.
- **In responding to a terrorist attack, there are only two choices – take the fight to enemy or wait until they hit you again. America chose the**
- **Ultimately, the most important thing that can come out of the various reports are recommendations for how the United States can improve its**



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 20, 2004 - SecDef Media Interviews GWOT, Iraq

Following are highlights from recent media interviews of Secretary Rumsfeld.

Measuring Progress in the Global War on Terror

- The Coalition is making progress in the Global War on
 - More than 80 nations have joined the Global War on Terror. These Coalition nations are putting pressure on the terrorists by:
 - Sharing intelligence.
 - Putting pressure on bank accounts and making it more difficult to move money.
 - Making it harder for terrorists to recruit people and retain them.
 - Complicating terrorists' ability to communicate with each other and move between countries.
 - The Coalition has brought down the Abdul Qadeer Khan network.
 - The network was trading in nuclear materials and technologies.
 - Khan was the father of Pakistan's gas centrifuge program. He was removed from his post as advisor to Pakistan's prime minister for providing nuclear technology, components and equipment to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
 - Libya has come forward and decided to forego weapons of mass destruction.

America Is Safer

- America is safer today than it was on Sept. 11.
 - Terrorists have been captured and killed and their cells have been disrupted.
 - Forty-six of the 55 most wanted in Iraq – including Saddam Hussein and his sons Uday and Qusay -- have been captured or killed.
 - Close to two-thirds of known senior al-Qaeda leaders have been captured or killed.
 - Thousands of terrorists and regime remnants in Iraq and Afghanistan have been hunted down, and terrorist cells on most continents have been disrupted.
 - Even before Sept. 11, plans were underway to transform the Department of Defense from a post-Cold War department to a 21st century department to better face new threats.
 - The Department has moved from a "threat-based" to a "capabilities-based" approach to defense planning. This means not just focusing on who might threaten the United States and where and when, but also how we might be threatened and what capabilities are needed to deter and defend against those threats.
 - The attacks on Sept. 11 prove the urgent need to transform the Department so it is better arranged for the threats and difficulties of the new century.

Troop Strength and Length of Stay in Iraq

- The date for bringing home U.S. forces is not calibrated to a calendar, it is calibrated to circumstances on the ground and what the security situation
 - If the situation in Iraq deteriorates because the Ba'athists and former Saddam elements become more desperate to stop representative government before the elections in Iraq, the Department will react appropriately.
 - If the situation in Iraq improves and the number of forces could be reduced, the Department will also consider that alternative.

To read transcripts of the Secretary's July 16 interviews, go to transcript section of Defenselink.mil/link

New York Times
July 20, 2004
Pg. 1

Rebuilding Iraq, A Well At A Time

By James Glanz

MOSUL, Iraq, July 17 - Across the hardscrabble Iraqi countryside, dozens of modest construction initiatives, many so tiny and inexpensive that they could be called microprojects, are generating at least a taste of the good will that Congress envisioned when it approved billions of dollars for grandiose rebuilding plans that have mostly been delayed.

Typical of the little projects is a hole in the ground that was being dug last week by an ungainly contraption, chugging along with big, spinning wheels and an enormous weight that smacked the muddy earth again and again outside the isolated village of Khazna, south of Mosul.

The machine was gouging out a well as part of a civil reconstruction program led by American military forces stationed here in the north of Iraq, financed mostly by Iraqi oil revenues.

As a convoy of big armored vehicles picked their way, rut by rut, over the village's zigzagging lanes toward the well, the dubious scene easily evoked the skepticism that has dogged the rebuilding effort all over the country.

But then a villager named Rabaa Saleh, standing among the swarms of children who had run out to meet the vehicles, gave his view of the proceedings.

"It makes people think good things are on the way," Mr. Saleh said through a translator. "When this well is done, each time somebody takes a drink of water they will say the Americans did something good."

Still, while local citizens like Mr. Saleh say they appreciate the work and are willing to credit Americans for paying for it, they often do not want to see Western faces at the projects themselves, fearing terrorist attacks and general hostility from ordinary Iraqis. At a ribbon-cutting for a major school renovation in Mosul on that same morning, the city's education director refused to invite the American officers who had financed the project.

The man digging the well in Khazna was a Syrian Kurd subcontractor. That project will cost the United States Army just \$35,000 and affect no more than a couple of hundred lives in a dusty village that has never had its own well.

It is hardly a match for the ambitious program of \$18.4 billion approved by Congress last fall for rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure, money funneled largely through nonmilitary government agencies and major American contractors.

But for various reasons, ranging from the lack of security in Iraq to bureaucratic red tape, the projects in that huge pot of money have taken so much longer to begin than initially promised that Iraqis - those who have heard about the work at all - often have a hard time believing that they will ever really happen.

Around Mosul and elsewhere in Iraq, the American military, whether through wisdom or sheer luck, has hit upon an approach that seems able to overcome that skepticism, at least locally.

From building a new soil laboratory to making improvements at a famous archaeological site to repairing a single elevator in a hospital, the projects are all small, fast and undertaken in response to a highly specific need identified by local Iraqis.

The army here is working on dozens of projects, using about \$20 million in financing, although that number constantly shifts as new sources of money are identified. Until the new Iraqi government took over on June 28, for example, the projects were financed from Iraqi oil revenues, and some of that money is still being spent. A little over \$5 million, from the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid program, is being split among 113 projects involving water supplies, sewers, wells and clinics.

The approach may be generating some of the good will that has been so elusive for America and its allies in a nation based on identification with neighborhood and clan. The results also come with the uncomfortable suggestion that the expensive rebuilding plan approved by Congress may never have the impact that lawmakers envisioned when they appropriated so much money.

"At the end of the day, it is about the small things that touch people's lives," said Nesreen M. Siddeek Berwari, the minister of municipalities and public works in the new Iraqi government. "The big billions number that has been mentioned doesn't mean much."

That sentiment certainly seems to hold true at the Nimrud archaeological site, south of Mosul, where a \$28,000 grant to refurbish what remains of an ancient Assyrian capital has brought it several steps back from garbage-strewn chaos, said Muzamim Mahmoud, director of the Mosul museum and antiquities director for the province.

Walking proudly among the ancient chambers lined with huge bas-reliefs of kings and servants and bird-headed gods, Mr. Mahmoud said foreign tourists had visited Nimrud as recently as 2002. But looting after the American-led invasion last year left behind an abandoned place with little more than heavy carved stones to mark the glory that once inhabited this spot.

The money let Mr. Mahmoud rehabilitate the gate and guardhouse - now manned by Iraqi security officers - and clean up the entire site and make major repairs on a trailer used by archaeologists during their digs. Now there are even little pitched sheet-metal roofs over the carvings to protect them from erosion as Mr. Mahmoud seeks new international donors for permanent facilities.

"Step by step they need to repair the site for tourists," Mr. Mahmoud said, "and this amount of money comes just in time."

Projects in such isolated locations, across a dusty countryside that is still troubled by killings, bombings and mortar attacks, also illustrate the relative ease with which military forces can move about in the kind of territory that Western civilian contractors have often fled, leaving their work unfinished.

Approvals for the projects can take from a few days to a few weeks, said Maj. Wayne Bowen, a history professor at Ouachita Baptist University in Arkadelphia, Ark., and a reservist who is overseeing projects that touch on higher education.

But with that speed comes a great reliance on the judgment of the Iraqis. Most proposals have been well considered, Major Bowen said, but there have been a few clinkers, like the time a university professor requested money to buy a pistol.

The informality of the process was evident during a visit by Maj. Glenn Mundt to a project intended to erect 31 electrical transmission towers as part of a plan to bring power down from Turkey. Led by Khalaf Dahan Hamoud, chief engineer at the Rashidiya substation near Mosul, the project was ahead of schedule.

Standing next to a half-assembled tower on a remote hill, Mr. Hamoud casually mentioned a much larger project that would restore a huge electrical loop in the north that had been severed years ago.

"Can you give me that project by Tuesday?" Major Mundt said. "Approximately. Within a couple of million dollars."

Mr. Hamoud, looking surprised, pointed out again that it was a much larger project than the one he was about to complete.

"Just come up with a basic scope of work," Major Mundt said, "and I'll push it down to Baghdad."

It was an exchange that the officials in charge of the Congressionally earmarked \$18.4 billion could only dream about.

"We have to follow United States contracting laws and procedures," said John Procter, a spokesman for the Project and Contracting Office, which is affiliated with the Pentagon

and the State Department and is administering the Congressional money. "That's where I think some of the frustration is coming from."

Even so, some of the oil money was parceled out by the contracting office in a program called the accelerated Iraq reconstruction effort, and \$500,000 of that money worked its way through the northern military authorities and into a project to rehabilitate the main terminal at the Mosul airport.

Amid the pounding of hammers and the bustle of workers tearing down a stained old drop ceiling, the assistant manager of the airport, who asked to be identified only as General Muhammad, said there was a \$10 million to \$20 million project afoot to restore the entire airfield. But that money would come from Congress, and there had been no sign of it.

"There is no bureaucratic channel," General Muhammad said of the \$500,000 in accelerated money. "It will be quick."

General Muhammad, who asked that no pictures be taken of his face, referred to himself as "invisible," clearly another reference to the dangers of being identified as a recipient of American money.

But for all those concerns, the projects are rolling forward, even where the strange contrivance was pounding away at the ground next to the village of Khazna. The technician who was running the machine, a Syrian Kurd named Khalid Esa, said he was within 15 feet of water.

Miami Herald
July 20, 2004

Iraqi Police Show Resilience After Deadly Attack At Station

When insurgents attacked Baghdad's biggest police station, killing nine Iraqis, officers stood their ground instead of running, as they did after a bombing last fall.

By Ken Dilanian, Knight Ridder News Service

BAGHDAD - Just as nearly 300 police officers were gathering in their station's parking lot for a shift change Monday morning, a white tanker truck came barreling down a nearby street, crashed into a brick wall and exploded.

With timing that suggested inside knowledge of police routines, the blast killed nine Iraqis, including two police officers, and injured at least 62, the Health Ministry said. It was the fifth vehicle bombing in the past week, including one suicide attack that narrowly missed the justice minister -- but killed five bodyguards -- and another that killed 11 people outside the protected area that houses the interim Iraqi government.

After a relatively calm period following the June 28 transfer of sovereignty, the strikes underscored the insurgency's undiminished resolve to destabilize the country. In a separate act Monday, militants killed a top official in the Defense Ministry in a drive-by shooting as he walked to his Baghdad home.

"They don't want security to prevail. They want the chaos to continue," said Officer Hatham Fawzi, standing where dozens of his colleagues had been wounded.

While some young officers sat speechless, dazed or distraught after the attack, many expressed a grim determination to continue their jobs.

"Surely this won't shake us," said Sgt. Raad Saad, who left the hospital to return to the police station despite a bruised leg that he could barely walk on.

Their resilience contrasted with officers' behavior following an attack on the station in October 2003 -- after which police fled the scene -- suggesting the police force has matured considerably.

WIDESPREAD DAMAGE

Monday's bomb carved a giant crater at the impact site, and the blast waves devastated the interior of the al Bayaa police station, Baghdad's largest. Inside the two-story building, every door was blown off its moorings, every window shattered into bits and shards. Files lay strewn about and blood spattered the floor.

In the parking lot beside the crater, 80 police vehicles were damaged, some crushed beyond recognition. Charred flesh stained the ground.

Although some U.S. military police work in the station, none were there when the bomb exploded.

The bomber struck around 8:30 a.m., as night-shift officers were returning from patrol and day-shift officers were receiving their assignments -- all standing together in the parking lot. Asked about the possibility of an inside tip-off, Col. Khaldoun Abdullah, the station commander, said: "They had very accurate information, and I don't want to go further."

Iraqi police officers are a prime target for militants who consider them collaborators. Hundreds have been shot dead or blown up across the country in the past year.

At nearby Yarmuk Hospital, where most of the injured were taken, every emergency room bed was filled, and patients were being treated on the floor. Doctors ran short of sutures and chest tubes.

"I was standing with my colleagues waiting for the morning assignment, when suddenly a massive explosion happened," said Officer Ali Subal, 40, his head covered with a bandage. "I was thrown to the ground and hit my head on a rock.

"I saw huge smoke and dust in the area. Flames were coming from everywhere. I saw most of my friends lying on the ground bleeding. I tried to rescue one of them but he was dead -- something penetrated his chest."

Muthema Faiz, 23, a patrol officer whose arms had been cut by shrapnel and glass, said: "We had just arrived at the police station after finishing our patrol. I heard a loud explosion. I saw a lot of bodies and burned cars. I'm worried about my two friends. I couldn't find them."

OCTOBER BOMBING

Sixteen people, including six Iraqi police officers and one U.S. soldier, were killed when the building was hit by a suicide bomber Oct. 27.

Tall concrete blast shields had been placed at the front of the building, but none were in the rear, which abuts a street in a residential and business district.

That's where the truck exploded Monday. Although the bomb went off more than 400 feet from the police station, the explosion was large enough that its kill zone reached the gathering of officers. Police on the scene said 28 officers were wounded.

Also among the dead and injured were residents, shop owners and their patrons.

"I was preparing breakfast for my husband, when suddenly my ceiling collapsed on my head," said Hayat Abed Ali, 59, who was being treated for head injuries and a broken arm. Her house also was damaged in the October attack. "We can't withstand this situation anymore."



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 19, 2004 - Troop Strength

Earlier this month, the Army began notifying approximately 5,600 soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of their pending mobilization to active duty.

IRR soldiers have completed an active-duty enlistment but they are still within eight years of when they entered the military. All enlistees agree to an eight-year commitment, usually served in a combination of active, reserve-component and IRR service.

Following are talking points on the IRR call up and Army end strength numbers.

- The activation of several thousand IRR soldiers will allow the Army to fill critical and spaces in the units called up for Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 and Operation Freedom 6.
 - Having access to IRR soldiers means less disruption across the force – it allows the Army to fill holes in units without having to call up other units simply to make up for shortfalls.
 - IRR is a manpower tool in the Ready Reserve. The IRR is designed to meet the Army's individual manpower requirements during times of national emergency.
 - There are approximately 111,000 IRR soldiers, both officers and enlisted personnel.
 - Letters were sent on July 6 to 5,674 IRR soldiers; approximately 4,000 will be brought to active duty.
- Before calling up IRR soldiers, the Army will look first for active Army soldiers who match the grade and skill requirements needed.
 - Most of the soldiers brought to active duty will be in the specialties of military intelligence, engineers, truck drivers and other combat-service support forces.
- The Army recognizes deploying IRR soldiers affects their
 - Because generally these families have no access to support systems in place at military bases or through reserve-component family-readiness groups, the Army has a process in place to help the IRR families meet their special needs and challenges.
 - The soldiers will be given a minimum of 30 days advance notice to report.
 - IRR soldiers will not be involuntarily mobilized if they have returned from a combat zone or hardship tour within the past 12 months of the notification of possible mobilization.
- Since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, the operational tempo for **U.S.** forces increased as troops have helped remove two terrorist regimes, hunt down Hussein and senior al-Qaeda operatives and break up terrorist cells. DoD has dozens long-term initiatives underway to relieve stress on the force and increase its
 - Investing in new information-age technologies, precision weapons, unmanned air and sea vehicles;
 - Increasing the jointness of U.S. forces;
 - Rebalancing the active force and the Guard and Reserves; and
 - Converting jobs being performed by military personnel to civilian jobs, thus freeing troops for military tasks.

- **Increasing “end strength” – or the total number of military personnel – is not the solution to reducing the stress on the force.**
 - The capability of the force is more critical than the number of troops.
 - For instance, Coalition forces in Iraq defeated a larger adversary with speed, power and agility, not mass.
 - A permanent end strength increase is very likely the slowest, least effective and most expensive option for increasing capability and reducing stress on the force.
 - Because of the time necessary to recruit, train and integrate new troops, the benefits of increasing end strength will not be felt for some time.
 - A permanent increase in end strength would require cuts in other areas, which would mean less funding for transformational capabilities that will allow DoD to do more with fewer forces than there are currently.
- **The United States can afford the military force necessary to ensure national security, but end strength is a last, not first, choice.**

For more information about the Individual Ready Reserve call up, please link to a [July 16](#) story with highlights of an interview with Gen. Richard A. Cody, vice chief of staff of the Army, and a [June 30](#) story. Both stories are posted on www.defenselink.mil, the Defense Department's web site. Gen. Cody's interview will appear soon on [the Pentagon Channel](#).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 14, 2004 - Women's Progress in Afghanistan

Women have made great progress in post-Taliban Afghanistan – their lives are better, they have more opportunities, and they are helping to shape their government. Following are highlights.

Afghan women are:

- **Receiving better health care.**
 - Afghanistan has the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world. It also has a significantly high child mortality rate (one in four children die before age five). Adult life expectancy is 46, lower for women.
 - In the short term, the U.S. is putting a priority on rebuilding health clinics and schools, training midwives and teachers and providing supplies such as medical equipment and textbooks.
 - The U.S. has rehabilitated or constructed 140 health clinics and expects to double the number in 2004.
 - More than \$10 million in grants is being used to deliver health services by women-focused non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and for vocational training for women as community health care workers and midwives.
 - In the long term, the goal is to build the capacity of Afghans to sustain the positive changes.
- **Getting educations.**
 - Afghan girls are attending school. According to the Afghan Ministry of Education, girls comprise 35 percent of the 5.8 million Afghan children attending schools. This is the highest number by far in Afghan history. Female illiteracy countrywide in Afghanistan is estimated to be 86 percent.
 - Approximately 80 percent of schools were damaged or destroyed in the decades of conflict in Afghanistan. More than 200 schools have been rebuilt, 7,000 teachers have been trained and 25 million textbooks have been provided.
 - Because Afghan women have identified jobs as one of their major concerns, U.S. programs stress education and skill training, plus financial help for women and assistance for widows. Included are programs to educate women on their property rights and legal processes.
- **Participating in government.**
 - Two Cabinet ministers are women.
 - A woman heads the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.
 - When the Loya Jirga met in January to create a new constitution, 102 of the 500 delegates were women.
 - The constitution gives the right to vote to all citizens, men and women, and guarantees freedom of expression, assembly and religion.
 - Women can now register to vote in the upcoming elections this fall.
 - Over one third of registered voters are women.
 - In cities where there are U.S.-funded women's radio stations (Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif) almost half of the women have registered.

For more information, link to a report for Congress prepared by the State Department ([report](#)). The Defense Department has an [Afghanistan Update](#) link on www.defendamerica.mil, its web page about the Global War on Terror.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 9, 2004 - Global War on Terror

Iraqis continue to rebuild their lives and their nation less than a month after the transfer of sovereignty. While Coalition troops remain in Iraq to help establish the stability and security that democracy requires, Iraqis are also stepping forward to protect their own country.

Forty Iraqi women soldiers will graduate today from a military training course in Jordan, the second of three classes of women soldiers planned to train at the base. Earlier this week, the Iraqi Army's 6th Battalion completed its basic training and activated at a graduation ceremony for more than 500 soldiers at the Kurkush military training base. This course marks the second Iraqi Army battalion solely trained by Iraqis.

More than 50 million people have been freed from brutal dictatorships in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are central fronts on the Global War on Terror. Following are talking points on the Coalition's efforts, successes and challenges in the two countries.

➤ **Why is the Coalition in Iraq and**

- Iraq and Afghanistan were state sponsors of terrorism and harbored terrorists. In the case of Iraq, they also had the potential to give WMD to terrorists.
- In both cases, the Coalition went in after U.N. resolutions gave the Taliban and Saddam Hussein a last clear chance to comply with the international community. They failed that chance.
- Neither action was about stockpiles of weapons or imminent threats. It was about the clear lesson of September 11th: The United States cannot wait for a threat to become imminent; the dots must be connected early to defeat the threat before it is too late.

➤ **Why is it important to win**

- The Coalition cannot turn away and allow these two countries to slide back to the havens for terrorism they once were.
- Iraq and Afghanistan are in the early stages of building democracies. They will be more stable countries with representative governments, just as so many eastern European countries have become.
- Terrorists understand that winning in Iraq and Afghanistan is a major defeat for them.

➤ **How is the Coalition is going to**

- The key to victory is Iraqi and Afghan self-government and self-defense
- The most promising development in both countries is Iraqis and Afghans stepping forward to govern their own countries and to defend themselves. They are being led by brave Iraqi officials who know first-hand the personal risks they take by standing up to the enemy. The great majority of Iraqis want a free and democratic Iraq, at peace with itself and its neighbors. Iraqis know that they must not retreat in the face of evil.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 7, 2004 - National Security Personnel System

The Department of Defense is restructuring the way it hires, pays, promotes and disciplines its more than 650,000 civilian employees. Although the efforts to update the personnel system began before Sept. 11, 2001, the changes will allow the Department to better utilize the tremendous skill and talent of not only its civilian workforce, but also the men and women in uniform as the United States fights the Global War on Terror. Secretary of the Navy Gordon England was asked by Secretary Rumsfeld to help develop a new National Security Personnel System (NSPS). Following are talking points.

- The National Security Personnel System will allow DoD to transform the civilian personnel system to make it more agile and responsive.
 - The new system introduces changes in the way DoD hires, pays, promotes and disciplines its civilian employees.
 - Currently 19th century rules limit the Department's ability to use personnel to execute 21st century missions.
 - The system is still in the development stage. The process will be both careful and thoughtful. DoD employees and union representatives are being asked to provide input throughout the development. Secretary England has set a goal of having draft regulations published in the Federal Register by the end of this year, and pilot projects in place next summer.
 - The task is to design a system that:
 - Supports DoD's national security mission.
 - Treats workers fairly and protects their rights.
- The National Security Personnel System will develop personnel rules for the Department's 650,000 civilian employees so the right person can be placed in the right job. The NSPS will:
 - Speed up the hiring process.
 - Introduce pay-for-performance bonuses.
 - Streamline the promotion process.
 - Give DoD senior managers flexibility to place civilian workers where they are most needed, without delay.
 - Better utilize the active duty force by making it easier to employee civilian employees in jobs currently being filled by uniformed military personnel.
 - More than 300,000 military personnel are now doing jobs that could be carried out by civilians.
 - Moving some fraction of those people in uniform out of civilian jobs and back into military jobs will reduce the stress on the force, allowing them to focus on their military duties.
- 9 Congress authorized the NSPS as part of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act.
 - The new National Security Personnel System is the most significant improvement to the civilian personnel management since the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
 - The law passed by Congress covers the following areas: job classification, pay banding, staffing flexibilities and pay for performance.
 - The NSPS legislation passed by Congress ensures:
 - Veterans' preference is protected.
 - Merit systems principles govern changes in personnel management.
 - Whistleblowers are protected.
 - Discrimination remains illegal.
- 9 The new personnel system is a collaborative effort. DoD is working with other government agencies as it develops the new system. DoD are consulting with the Office of Personnel Management, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government Accounting Office. Officials are also looking at the Department of Homeland Security, which built its own personnel system after it was formed last year. DoD civilians and others interested in the system should check a special web site launched by the Department to give employees current information on the system's implementation. The NSPS web site is central source of information on NSPS. The address is:
www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 2, 2004 - July 4th Messages

As America celebrates Independence Day this weekend, the Department of Defense would like to recognize the men and women who serve to protect our Nation, and the families, employers and communities that support them.

Following are highlights of Defense Department leaders' messages to the troops.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

From an interview yesterday with the American Forces Press Service and the Pentagon Channel.

"As we go into the July 4th weekend, it seems to me that people will be reminded of our independence and of the freedoms that we value and how important the people in uniform are to the protection of those freedoms and to the defense of freedom. We have to be grateful. We are grateful, And I know the American people are deeply grateful."

Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, C J Chiefs of Staff

Excerpt of the July Fourth message from Gen. Myers

"This Independence Day we celebrate our Nation's 228th birthday and honor the legacy of our founding fathers. Pioneers like Presidents Washington and Jefferson set a young nation on a course for democracy guided by the values of liberty and justice that have shaped our national character. As we pay tribute to the past, we must also look to the future and face the challenges of the 21st century.

"Today, as throughout our history, the proud members of our Armed Forces are meeting these challenges head on, engaged around the world keeping the peace and demonstrating our firm resolve. Through your unwavering service and commitment you have secured America's shores and given hope to millions that liberty and justice can be theirs too."

Marine Gen. Peter Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

In an interview with the American Forces Press Service and the Pentagon Channel yesterday Gen. Pace said that as July Fourth approaches, each service member should "Take a minute to really appreciate the fact that every single one of them is making a difference.

"There's no doubt in my mind that each of them would rather be home with family, friends, loved ones. But there is also no doubt in my mind that the vast majority of our troops overseas understand exactly what they are doing and why they are doing it. They are proud to be serving."

Links:

American Forces Press Service [story](#) AFPS/Pentagon Channel interview with Secretary Rumsfeld

Gen. Myers July Fourth [Message](#)

American Forces Press Service [story](#) – AFPS/Pentagon Channel interview with Gen. Pace

Watch excerpts from the interviews of Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace on www.pentagonchannel.mil.

Read Defense Department news at www.defenselink.mil and www.defendamerica.mil.

Learn how Americans are thanking the troops at the [Operation Tribute to Freedom](#) web site.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – June 30, 2004 – Individual Ready Reserve Mobilization

Beginning July 6, the Army will begin notifying approximately 5,600 soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of their pending mobilization to active duty. Following are talking points on the announcement.

Messages

- The Army Reserve is an integral part of an Army that is serving the nation in the Global War on
- President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have pledged that if American commanders ask for more troops, will get
- Secretary Rumsfeld has pointed out there are too few of some essential skills and capabilities in the Active and Reserve forces and too many in others.
 - The Army is restructuring its force during the next few years to create more units in stressed fields and reduce units that have not been needed in recent years.
 - DoD has dozens of long-term initiatives underway to relieve stress on the force, and increase its capability by:
 - Investing in new information age technologies, precision weapons, unmanned air and sea vehicles;
 - Increasing the jointness of U.S. forces;
 - Rebalancing the Active force and the Guard and Reserves; and
 - Converting jobs being performed by military personnel to civilian jobs, thus freeing troops for military tasks.
- America is grateful for the sacrifices that our troops, their families and their employers make while the nation at

Background

Why are Individual Ready Reserve soldiers being called up?

- IRR soldiers are being mobilized to meet unique manpower and mission requirements in support of the Global War on Terror.
- Using the IRR allows the Army to build the future rotational force into a structure that has some predictability.
- The soldiers will fill vacancies in the National Guard and Army Reserve units scheduled to rotate into Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
- These are seasoned and experienced soldiers who can contribute significantly to Army readiness and operational capabilities.
- Before calling up IRR soldiers, the Army will look first for active Army soldiers who match the grade and skill requirements needed.

What is the Individual Ready Reserve? Who serves in it?

- The IRR does not include retirees. There are no retirees associated with this call-up.
- The IRR is a manpower pool in the Ready Reserve. The IRR is designed to meet the Army's individual manpower requirements during times of national emergency.
- IRR soldiers have had training, have served previously in the Active Army or the selected Reserve, and may have some period of military service obligation remaining.
- There are approximately 111,000 IRR soldiers.
- The IRR consists of both officer and enlisted personnel.

How much notice will the IRR soldiers be given? How long will they serve?

- Soldiers will be given a minimum of 30 days advance notice to report.
- The soldiers will be mobilized for approximately 18 months (including 12 months of "boots on the ground" in theater); their actual period of service may be adjusted on the needs of the Army for service of up to 24 cumulative months.
- The soldiers will be assigned to designated mobilizing Army National Guard and Reserve units based upon the needs of the Army.
- The soldiers will be brought on active duty over an extended period in several groups, from July through December 2004.
- IRR soldiers will not be involuntarily mobilized if they have returned from a combat zone or hardship tour within the past 12 months of their notification of possible mobilization.
- Soldiers who require more than 60 days of reclassification training will generally not be mobilized.

Have IRR soldiers been used before?

- Yes. During the Gulf War, more than 20,000 IRR soldiers were mobilized and deployed. Since then, there have been several other voluntary and involuntary soldier call-ups, including approximately 2,500 IRR soldiers mobilized since Sept. 11, 2001, in the Global War on Terror.

Under whose authority are the troops being mobilized?

- The Secretary of Defense approved the Army's request for further access to the IRR on Jan. 20, 2004. The approval authorizes the mobilization of up to 6,500 IRR soldiers involuntarily.
- Every effort has been made to minimize the impact of the call up by first contacting individual IRR soldiers and soliciting volunteers prior to initiating mandatory call-ups.
- More than 1,000 IRR soldiers have volunteered to mobilize in support of the Global War on Terror.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – June 29, 2004 – Supreme Court Detainee Decision

The Supreme Court on June 28 ruled on three cases concerning enemy combatants being held in the Global War on Terror. Following are talking points on what the decisions mean and some short background on the cases and the Court's decisions.

What the Decisions Mean

- The ruling is important in that it affirms the President's authority to detain enemy combatants, including U.S. citizens, in the Global War on Terror.
- The Court recognizes that these essential authorities are necessary to defend America against its enemies.
- The Court also held that certain procedural rights must be afforded to enemy combatants to contest their detention.
- The Court's decision reaffirms the Administration's right to try enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo by military commissions.

The Review Process

- The Department of Defense has initiated a new review process to conduct an annual review of each enemy combatant held by the department in Guantanamo.
- These reviews are an opportunity for detainees at Guantanamo to challenge their detention and for the U.S. government to determine whether to release or continue to detain each combatant.
- The department will be reviewing the Court's ruling to see how to modify existing procedures to satisfy the court.

Yasser Hamdi

- Yasser Hamdi is an American who was raised in Saudi Arabia. He was captured in Afghanistan fighting with the Taliban against U.S. forces and is being held in the Charleston Consolidated Navy Brig since being moved there in the summer of 2003.
- The Court said Hamdi has the right to contest his detention.

Jose Padilla

- Jose Padilla is an American citizen. He was arrested in O'Hare airport. He is being detained in connection with a plot to detonate a "dirty bomb" and is alleged to be associated with al-Qaeda.
- The Court ruled the lawsuit filed on behalf of Padilla saying that since Padilla is now jailed in South Carolina, the New York court where his habeas petition was filed does not have jurisdiction. He must refile his petition in South Carolina.

Consolidated Cases of Rasul v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United States

- This case involved a group of 16 detainees who brought suit against the Department of Defense contesting that enemy combatants held at Guantanamo have the right to bring habeas corpus cases – in short, they have the right to contest their detention in federal courts.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – June 28, 2004 – Iraqi Sovereignty

The Coalition Keeps Its Word – Sovereignty Is Transferred to Iraq, Ahead of Schedule

- Legal documents were signed this morning in Baghdad transferring sovereignty of Iraq from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the Interim Iraqi Government on behalf of the Iraqi people.
- The Coalition has kept its word to:
 - End a dangerous regime.
 - Free the oppressed.
 - Restore sovereignty.
- U.S. Ambassador to Iraq John Negroponte has arrived in Iraq. He will lead the new U.S. embassy in Baghdad.

International Support For Iraq Is Growing

- The NATO Alliance has agreed to help train Iraqi security forces.
- Iraq's interim government has gained broad international support and has been endorsed by the U.N. Security Council.

U.S. Will Maintain Its Commitment to the Iraqi People

- The commitment of the U.S. military in Iraq has not changed. U.S. and Coalition forces will remain in Iraq and will operate under American command as part of a multinational force authorized by the U.N.
- As leaders of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF), provided for under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, the United States will continue as full partners in helping the new government bring democracy and security to Iraq. The aid will focus on:
 - Supporting Iraq's political transition.
 - Equipping and training Iraqi security forces.
 - Helping set the stage for national elections at the end of the year.
- U.S. and Coalition forces have served honorably in Iraq.
 - The dedication of the servicemen and women, and that of thousands of civilians, has helped to restore freedom to Iraq and rebuild the country.
 - The Department of Defense is grateful for the sacrifices they and their families have made.

Five Steps Toward a Free and Democratic Iraq

As outlined by President Bush before the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. (May 24 transcript)

1. Hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government.
2. Help establish the stability and security in Iraq that democracy requires.
3. Continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure.
4. Encourage more international support.
5. Move toward free, national elections that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people.

Links: [Defenselink story](#) [Defenselink story](#) [photo essay of signing](#) [President Bush remarks](#)

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz answers questions about Iraq on ["Ask the White House."](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – June 25, 2004 – Public Opinion in Iraq

Despite attempts by terrorists and insurgents to sow instability in Iraq as the June 30 date for transition to sovereignty draws nearer, a recent poll of Iraqis shows many feel positive about their country and their future. Because of the sacrifice and determination of U.S. and Coalition soldiers and the Iraqi people, Iraq has made great progress toward the five steps toward a free and democratic Iraq outlined by President Bush ([transcript](#)). Following are talking points on Iraqi views and accomplishments.

Step One:

Hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government.

- On June 30, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will transfer full sovereignty to Iraq.
- The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) will become the ruling body in Iraq.
 - The Iraqi Interim Government will consist of a president, two deputy-presidents, a prime minister and 26 ministries.
 - Control of all 26 ministries has already been turned over to Iraqi ministers.
- The Iraqi Interim Government will operate under the rules defined in the Transitional Administrative Law, the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world.
- On June 8, the U.N. Security Council unanimously endorsed the Iraqi Interim Government and the holding of democratic elections no later than January 2005.

Iraqi snapshot:

- 80 percent of Iraqis approve of the interim government and 68 percent of Iraqis have confidence in it.
- 79 percent of Iraqis think the interim government will make things better for Iraq.
- 84 percent of Iraqis approve of President Al-Yawer; 73 percent approve of Prime Minister Allawi.

Step Two

Help establish the stability and security in Iraq that democracy requires.

- Iraqi Security Forces are growing. More than 200,000 Iraqis are on duty or in training to protect their country.
- Iraqi police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) have recently captured several terrorists, including a key al-Zarqawi lieutenant.
- The ICDC is conducting joint patrols throughout Iraq with other Coalition forces and Iraqi police forces.

Iraqi snapshot:

- 52 percent of Iraqis say that security is the most urgent issue facing Iraq. This is the lowest number ever for "security." Infrastructure placed second at 22 percent; the first time it has been deemed more urgent than "economy."
- 70 percent of Iraqis express confidence in the New Iraqi Army.
- 82 percent of Iraqis express confidence in the Iraqi Police Service.

Step Three

Continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure.

- Estimated crude oil export revenue is more than \$6.9 billion for 2004.
- All 22 universities and 43 technical institutes and colleges are open.
- Coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500 schools and an additional 1,200 are expected to be completed by the end of the year.

11-L-0559/OSD/22197

- All 240 hospitals and more than 1,200 health clinics are open. Health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times over pre-war levels.
- An estimated 85 percent of Iraqi children have been immunized.
- There are now 55,000 Internet subscribers in Baghdad; in 2002 there were 3,000.
- The number of telephone subscribers, including cell phones, is now more than 1.2 million – more than 45 percent above pre-war levels.

Iraqi snapshot:

- Infrastructure issues are rising in importance for Iraqis.
- Infrastructure needs are seen as the second most urgent issue in Iraq after security.

Step Four

Encourage more international support.

- Thirty-one countries have forces in Iraq.
- Prime Minister Allawi has written NATO ahead of the upcoming summit in Istanbul, requesting additional international forces in Iraq. After June 30, U.S. and Coalition forces will remain in Iraq and will operate under American command as part of a multinational force authorized by the U.N.
- Prime Minister Ayad Allawi announced a plan regarding the country's militias. Nearly 90 percent of the 100,000 militia members will transition into new occupations prior to the elections.

Step Five

Move toward a national election that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people.

- By the end of 2005, Iraqis are scheduled to vote on a new constitution that will protect the rights of all Iraqi citizens regardless of their religion or ethnicity. This is the historic point when Iraq will have the necessary legitimacy for durable self-rule. During this process Iraqis will decide for themselves the exact structure of their permanent government and the provisions of their Iraqi constitution.
- The U.N. Security Council on June 8 unanimously passed Resolution 1546, endorsing the transition timetable adopted by Iraqis and encouraging other U.N. members to add their support.
- The international community at large will continue to play a key role in helping Iraq stand on its own feet through actions such as economic assistance, debt relief and continued military support.

Iraqi Snapshot

- Over 50 percent of Iraqis believe that elections will be free and fair (36 percent believed that there will be minor problems).
- 75 percent of Iraqis believe that the best guarantee of free and fair elections is the careful watch by international election experts.
- 64 percent of Iraqis believe that all political parties, regardless of their policies, should be allowed to have access to TV in order to reach voters.
- Just 13 percent of Iraqis believe that the area where they live is controlled by parties or other organizations that would force their vote.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – GTMO Interrogation Documents - June 23, 2004

On June 22, the Department of Defense released documents relating to interrogation procedures for detainees at Guantanamo. Following are talking points on the issue.

➤ **Detainees at Guantanamo have been treated humanely.**

- The documents released show that the President gave clear direction that all detainees were to be treated humanely.
- The process was respectful of people. No procedures approved for use ordered, authorized, permitted or tolerated torture. Some of the approved techniques were never used.
- Techniques approved included changing sleep patterns of the detainees, staring at the detainee to encourage discomfort, and the use of mild, noninjurious physical contact such as poking.
- The guidelines issued for interrogations protected the detainees, our institutions and the troops responsible for carrying out these operations.
- It has always been the policy and practice of the Defense Department and the U.S. government doctrine to treat detainees humanely, and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention.

➤ **The process to review detainee interrogation procedures was careful and**

- It was clear from the moment the United States was attacked on September 11th that we were in a new kind of war, with a new kind of enemy, which required reviewing detainee interrogation procedures.
- Opinions were sought and considered from many government and military officials.

➤ **The United States is at war with an enemy that will stop at nothing to kill innocent people.**

- In the Global War on Terror, the United States faces a new kind of enemy, and consequently a new group of people from whom to gather intelligence.
- There is no doubt that interrogating detainees saves lives. The detainees have information about our enemy: how he works, operates, and finances his activities. Getting this information has helped us prevent attacks.
- Detainee interrogations are an invaluable tool in the Global War on Terror.
- The same day the Department released documents to show American openness and reassure its commitment to humane treatment, our enemy cut off the head of a South Korean businessman.

USA Today
June 23, 2004
Pg. 1

Rumsfeld OK'd Harsh Treatment

Interrogation documents made public

By John Diamond, USA Today

WASHINGTON — In an extraordinary disclosure of classified material, the Bush administration released 258 pages of internal documents Tuesday that portray harsh interrogation techniques — including stripping terror suspects and threatening them with dogs — as a necessary response to threats from al-Qaeda terrorists.

The release of lists of interrogation techniques and other documents previously kept secret even from U.S. allies was a bid by the administration to quiet harsh criticism over its handling of prisoners in the war on terror and the conflict in Iraq.

Though some of the memos argued that Bush had the right to approve torture, the administration said it had never done so, and pointed to techniques it said fell far short of torture. In a separate press briefing Tuesday, the Justice Department backed away from a memo written in 2002 that appeared to justify the use of torture in the war on terror. That memo argued that the president's wartime powers superseded anti-torture laws and treaties.

Bush made his most explicit comments yet about the issue Tuesday: "We do not condone torture. I have never ordered torture. I will never order torture," Bush said.

The documents reveal Bush, senior administration officials and hard-pressed commanders in the field grappling with the need to extract information about future terror attacks from suspects skilled at defeating many interrogation techniques. In a Feb. 7, 2002, finding, Bush said the Sept. 11 terror attacks require "new thinking in the law of war."

Bush said al-Qaeda members and their Taliban allies in Afghanistan were not covered by the protections of the Geneva Conventions. But he ordered U.S. armed forces to treat them "humanely" anyway, and to observe Geneva Conventions standards "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity."

Just such a necessity arose months later when the first anniversary of Sept. 11 brought new fears of terror attack. Intelligence officers at the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, told their superiors that Mohamed al-Kahtani, believed to be the would-be 20th hijacker in the Sept. 11 plot, was withholding information about new attacks. Daniel Dell'Orto, the Pentagon's deputy general counsel told reporters at a White House briefing Tuesday.

The alert set in motion a review that culminated with a N o ~27,2002, "action memo" in which Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved interrogation techniques that included "removal of clothing" and "inducing stress by use of detainee's fears (e.g. dogs)."

Rumsfeld also approved placing detainees in "stress positions," such as standing for up to 4 hours, though he apparently found this approach unimpressive. Rumsfeld, who works at a stand-up desk, scrawled on the memo, "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to four hours? D.R."

Eventually, after military officers raised moral and legal concerns about the techniques and the Pentagon conducted an internal review, Rumsfeld issued revised rules for Guantanamo in April 2003 that omitted the stripping and use of dogs.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – GTMO Interrogation Process – June 23, 2004

The Department of Defense today released approximately a hundred pages of declassified documents related to how interrogation procedures for detainees at Guantanamo were developed. Following are talking points.

(The declassified documents will be available on www.defenselink.mil.)

Release of the Documents

Release of the documents demonstrates:

- The Department's concern to balance law with the need to obtain intelligence on the Global War on Terror.
- The actions of the Defense Department are bound by law and guided by American values.
- The transparency with which the Department is conducting inquiries into abuse allegations.

The Interrogation Procedures

The interrogation procedures:

- Are developed and reviewed with strict legal and policy reviews so that the detainees, our institutions and our troops who carry out the operations are all protected.
- Are reviewed and modified when deemed necessary and appropriate.

The February Decision

The February decision set the policy for the operations at Guantanamo.

- The processes and procedures that followed:
 - Reflect America's values.
 - Call for all detainees in custody to be treated humanely.
 - Call for all detainees in U.S. custody to be treated to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in accordance with the principles of the Convention.

Timeline

Following is a brief timeline that led to the development of the documents and the interrogation procedures in effect today at Guantanamo.

Jan. 11, 2002

- The first detainees arrive at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-Guantanamo).
- From January to December 2002 interrogations are guided by doctrine contained in Field Manual 34-52.
 - The manual sets forth basic interrogation principles for the U.S. Armed Forces in a conventional military conflict.
 - The interrogation procedures include 17 techniques such as direct questioning and providing incentives.

Summer 2002

- The U.S. is in a high-threat environment. Intelligence continues to indicate planning by al-Qaeda for attacks in the U.S. and elsewhere.
- Among the detainees at Guantanamo are individuals with close connections to al-Qaeda leadership and people who demonstrated they had been trained by al-Qaeda to resist interrogation methods set out in Field Manual 34-52.

Oct. 11, 2002

- The commander of JTF-Guantanamo requests the use of additional techniques for an individual who is believed to have close al-Qaeda connections.
- The commander requests approval for 20 other interrogation techniques.

11-L-0559/OSD/22202

Oct. 25, 2002

- The commander of U.S. Southern Command forwards the JTF-Guantanamo commander's request to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

Nov. 27, 2002

- The General Counsel, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommends the Secretary of Defense approve 17 of the 20 techniques requested by Southern Command.

Dec. 2, 2002

- The Secretary of Defense approves the 17 techniques recommended by the General Counsel.
- The techniques approved are arranged on a three-tiered system that require approval from different levels of the chain of command before they can be used. A number of the techniques approved are never used.
- The guidelines are in effect from Dec. 2, 2002, until Jan. 15, 2003.

Jan. 15, 2003

- The Secretary of Defense rescinds the Dec. 2, 2002, guidance when he learns some advisors outside the process are concerned about this decision.
- The Secretary directs the Defense Department's general counsel to establish a working group of representatives from offices in DoD to address the legal, policy and operational issues related to interrogating detainees held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the Global War on Terror.
- The Justice Department advises the working group in its deliberations.
- The working group reports 35 techniques as appropriate for consideration. It rejects several as inappropriate or lacking sufficient information to permit review.

(Note, for more information about the working group, read the transcript from a DoD background briefing on May 20, 2004, posted on DefenseLINK under the [transcripts](#) section.)

April 16, 2003

- After this deliberative and determinative legal and policy review from the working group, the Secretary of Defense approves the use of 24 techniques for use at Guantanamo.
- Seventeen of the techniques approved come from Field Manual 34-52.
- Four of the techniques require Secretary notification before use.

Detainee Treatment

- It has always been the policy and practice of the Defense Department and the U.S. government doctrine to treat detainees humanely, and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention.
- No procedures approved for use ordered, authorized, permitted or tolerated torture.
- Individuals who have abused the trust and confidence in them will be held accountable.
- There are a number of inquiries that are ongoing to look at specific allegations of abuse. Those investigations will run their course.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – June 16, 2004 – Prisoner Treatment

Following are talking points on the prison abuse scandal and the legal and military context of holding and interrogating prisoners.

INVESTIGATIONS

- The Administration is taking the allegations of abuse
 - A series of investigations have been initiated to find those responsible for wrongdoing, bring them to justice, and ensure that such behavior does not happen again.
 - The ongoing investigations relate to both specific allegations of abuse and to address potential systemic problems.
 - While the abuses at Abu Ghraib are horrific, the Iraqi people, the American people and the world are seeing that the U.S. democratic system functions and operates transparently.
- The great majority of U.S. service members conduct themselves in strict accordance with their training represent themselves, the United States and the Coalition
 - The military is a values-based organization committed to respecting the international laws of armed conflict.

LEGAL CONTEXT

- After 9111, the United States faced a new kind of enemy. The United States had to review its process of people who were detained are
 - The Administration's decision-making process on how to proceed with interrogations in the post-9111 world was a careful legal analysis of complicated issues.
 - The process was deliberative, involving experts from several agencies. Many opinions were expressed.
 - After carefully reviewing the recommendations, the President issued very clear guidance and expressed his firm commitment against torture.
 - The decisions were made within the existing legal framework of the Geneva Conventions that would enable the United States to effectively defend itself against future attacks while respecting international standards.
- The Administration is firmly committed to the Geneva
 - The Administration has made clear that Geneva Conventions apply in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 - While the prisoners at Guantanamo are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions, they are treated in accordance with the provisions of the Conventions.

MILITARY CONTEXT

- The President has a responsibility to protect the American
 - After 9111, the nation found itself at war with a new kind of enemy, and consequently, a new group of people from whom to gather intelligence.
 - Terrorists will stop at nothing to kill innocent people around the world -- in New York, in Riyadh, in Madrid and in Bali.
 - While the U.S. must be ever vigilant to protect against attacks, terrorists need only be lucky once.

FACTS V. MYTHS

- The photographs from Abu Ghraib are shocking. Such tactics were never condoned by the
 - The facts bear repeating: Every standing policy and every order articulated by senior officers from the President on down stated clearly that humane treatment is to be afforded to prisoners.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Afghanistan Update - June 15, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld welcomed President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan to the Pentagon yesterday.

The secretary commended President Karzai's leadership and noted the movement to democracy is always difficult, especially in a country that endured 23 years of war, five years of Taliban repression, and seven years of drought.

Following are talking points about the progress in Afghanistan.

Accomplishments - ghts

- A transitional government was established in June 2002.
- A new constitution was ratified in January.
- Nearly 10,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers have been trained. They have participated in joint patrols and combat missions.
- The Kabul-to-Kandahar road was completed in December 2003, cutting the travel time between the two cities from 15 to five hours, and construction of the Kandahar-Herat portion of the "ring road" is underway. The ring road will link major Afghan cities and other areas to help facilitate commerce, security, attract foreign investment and better unify the country.

Coalition's Goals in Afghanistan

As outlined by Army Gen. John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, the Coalition's goals in Afghanistan are:

- To conduct "robust combat operations" around the country's border with Pakistan to defeat al Qaeda.
- To destroy Taliban remnants and increase the presence of the Afghan National Army throughout the country.
- To increase reconstruction efforts through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and further internationalize PRTs.
- To increase the capacity of the Afghan national government to control the country's security.

International Contributions

- Approximately 18,000 U.S. soldiers and 2,000 soldiers from Coalition countries are deployed in Afghanistan.
- Army Lt. Gen. David Bamo is the Commanding General of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan.
- There are also 6,000 International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) under the control of NATO.
- In early 2002, during a G-8 meeting in Geneva, certain nations were designated as the "lead country" relative to Afghanistan reconstruction and security. For example, the United States is taking the lead on the Afghan National Army; Japan on disarming former militia; the United Kingdom on counter-narcotics, Italy on judicial reform and Germany on police training.

Security

- The Afghan government is taking an increasing role in providing for its own security.
- Currently, more than 9,700 soldiers have been trained for the new Afghan National Army and more than 12,500 Afghan National Police have been trained.
- More than 6,000 former combatants have been demobilized as part of a pilot program designed to eliminate private militias.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

PRTs are small groups of civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces. There are 15 PRTs now in Afghanistan, with another expected by the end of June.

- PRTs extend the reach of the Afghan national government.
- They enhance security in their respective areas.
- They facilitate reconstruction.
- PRTs are an example of the international community's coordination and willingness to join the Coalition in the Global War on Terror. Some of the leaders of the PRTs include New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Germany, under the auspices of NATO.

Governance and Elections

- A transitional government was established in June 2002.
- The Constitutional Loya Jirga approved the Afghan constitution on Jan. 4, 2004.
 - The adoption of the constitution is a significant milestone in Afghanistan's path toward a moderate, democratic society.
 - The Constitution is an effective system and balances power between a strong president, parliament and independent judiciary.
- Direct presidential elections will be held in the coming months.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – SecDef in Singapore - June 4, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld left Wednesday for a trip to Singapore and Bangladesh, where he will meet with Prime Minister Zia.

In Singapore the secretary is participating in the Institute of Scientific Studies Conference, otherwise known as the "Shangri-la Dialogue", a conference of Pacific nations. He will also meet with Singapore officials and with representatives of other US Pacific-region allies.

This morning the secretary held a town hall meeting aboard the USS Essex, which was ported at Changi Naval Base in Singapore. He also administered the Oath of Enlistment to 30 sailors and two Marines aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Essex.

During the town hall meeting, the secretary made several points on the shape and progress of the Global War on Terror.

- Terrorists don't have armies, navies, air forces or even countries – they have little to defend. They must therefore be found through intelligence – such as how and where they move their money, move between countries, and communicate with each other.
- The hunt for Osama bin Laden continues, and the al Qaeda terrorist is under pressure. Saddam Hussein hid in his "spider hole" for months, with troops passing by every day. Eventually someone led soldiers to the right spot. Finding bin Laden will come by successful interrogations, and tracking people who have a connection with him.

The secretary also discussed the future of the Navy.

- The Navy is trying to invest in increasingly capable and lethal military equipment that is less manpower-intensive.
- Capabilities that make the Navy more agile and lethal mean new and better ships can operate with fewer people, so the Navy may see its personnel numbers remain level or drop modestly.
- The term "downsizing" leaves a misunderstanding in people's minds. The Navy of the future will be a more capable and more lethal force.

The secretary also acknowledged this weekend's ceremonies marking the 60th anniversary of the Allied forces invading Normandy and the mission of today's troops serving around the world.

- D-Day troops went overseas to defend American freedoms and "fight the designs of tyrants." The call to defend freedom is clear again today, and the duty falls to today's troops.
- The attacks of September 11th changed the world, which has struck back against terrorism.
 - A global Coalition has overthrown two vicious regimes, liberated 50 million people, disrupted terrorist cells and thwarted terrorist attacks.
 - To prevail against extremists and radicals, the Coalition must root out the terrorists before they develop more powerful means to inflict greater damage on innocent people.
- The country is grateful for the commitment, courage and resolve of the U.S. troops who volunteered for a cause larger than themselves.

Links: [USS Essex](#), [Shangri-la Dialogue link](#), [DoD Defense link](#) articles

Normandy Sacrifices Places Debt on All

Commentary by Jim Garamone

American Forces Press Service ([link to article on defenselink.mil](http://defenselink.mil))

WASHINGTON, June 4, 2004 – No matter how many military operations have been, or will be, launched: To Americans, D-Day will always be June 6, 1944.

D-Day was the "Greatest Generation's" ultimate operation and represents a lasting legacy.

The invasion at Normandy – code-named Operation Overlord – was the largest amphibious operation in history. Planning took years and required massive amounts of shipping, aircraft, equipment, supplies and, most of all, personnel.

As we look back on the invasion, it can seem that the invasion was pre-ordained for success. Nothing could be further from the truth. It was a daring operation into the teeth of a well-entrenched enemy.

Many "what-ifs" could have doomed the Allied invasion. What if Hitler had realized early that the landings in Normandy were the main Allied efforts? What if German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel had the time to perfect the defenses on the beaches? What if Panzer divisions had arrived at the beaches the day of the invasion? What if the men of the 1st and 29th Infantry divisions hadn't fought and clawed their way off "Bloody Omaha" Beach?

These what-ifs-turned-into-certainty could have changed the course of history. Even with these what-ifs not being factors, the invasion's success was still not a sure thing. At nightfall on June 6, Allied commander Army Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower could only say that his forces had established a beachhead. Holding it was another story.

But the men of the American, British, Canadian and French forces fought tenaciously. Other men landed more supplies, more tanks, more artillery pieces and more fighting men. Thousands of those fighting men paid the ultimate price.

It is now 60 years later, and those young men that defeated the Nazi menace are now old. This anniversary could be their last large-scale celebration and remembrance.

As we look to the years ahead, D-Day – June 6 – is a date that later generations need to remember. The cause our fathers and grandfathers fought for needs to live on. And we need to celebrate the world they made and left for us to maintain.

The American cemetery above Omaha Beach is freedom's sacred ground. More than 5,300 Americans lie in honored glory in that graveyard – and that's just a small portion of those killed in battle.

The row upon row of crosses and Stars of David should give every American an idea of the sacrifice that an earlier generation made on our behalf. They should also inspire this generation and all future ones to maintain the light of freedom handed to us.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Overseas Ballots - June 2, 2004

The Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States Postal Service (USPS) are committed to ensuring that U.S. military personnel serving abroad, their families, and civilians overseas have the opportunity to vote in the 2004 election and that their ballots are counted.

To ensure that these ballots are given the highest priority, DoD and USPS are working together on a series of initiatives. Following are highlights.

- The purpose is to ensure that the ballots sent to and from military personnel serving abroad are sent expeditiously.
- The first step will be postal employees at the local level contacting each of the approximately 3,000 county election offices throughout the country. Together they will coordinate the mailing of absentee ballots from the applications for absentee ballots they have received.
- Next, after the ballots are prepared for mailing, the local post offices will hold out the military ballots, sort them, and send them by Overnight Express Mail to three military “gateways,” approximately 30 to 45 days prior to Election Day:
 - San Francisco for service members based around the Pacific Rim.
 - New York for service members in Europe and the Middle East.
 - Miami for service members in Central and South America.
- After the initial wave of ballots is mailed, remaining ballots that need to be sent will be expedited on a daily basis from local post offices to military gateways.
- At the gateways, USPS will sort the ballots by destination and place them in specially marked trays to ensure they receive first priority for transportation and processing.
- Then the Military Postal Service Agency will take over. (The MPSA is a division of DoD; it operates as an extension of the USPS). MPSA will work to ensure that ballots are given priority handling at overseas destinations, and will make every attempt to deliver them as expeditiously as possible.
- After service members vote and return their ballots to the APO (Air/Army Post Office) or FPO (Fleet Post Office), the MPSA will ensure that each ballot is given a proper, legible postmark when it is mailed. The ballots will be sorted into easily identifiable containers to ensure they are given priority back to the USPS gateways.
- Once the ballots arrive back at the gateways, they will then be given priority processing for delivery to county election officials.
- The Federal Voting Assistance Program has designated the week of Sept. 6 as Get Out the Vote Week.
- The week of Oct. 11 has been designated as Overseas Voting Week.

Related Sites:

Military Postal Service Agency (<http://hqdainet.army.mil/mpsal/>),

Federal Voting Assistance Program (<http://www.fvap.gov/>).

DoD release ([ballot initiative release](#)).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraqi Interim Government - June 2, 2004

Within the past few days, the prime minister, president, deputy presidents and cabinet ministers have been chosen for the new Iraqi Interim Government.

Following are highlights of the Iraqi Interim Government's structure and duties.

Q: When will the Iraqi Interim Government take power? Will they have full sovereignty?

A: On June 30, the Coalition will transfer power to the Iraqi Interim Government. The Iraqi Interim Government will have full sovereign powers for the State of Iraq.

Q: What are the primary responsibilities of the Iraqi Interim Government?

A: The primary responsibility of the Iraqi Interim Government will be to administer Iraq's affairs by providing for the well being and security of the Iraqi people, promoting economic development, and preparing Iraq for the national elections that will be held no later than Jan. 31, 2005.

Q: What offices comprise the new Iraqi Interim Government?

A: The Iraqi Interim Government includes a president who acts as head of state, two deputy presidents, and a prime minister who leads the Council of Ministers and oversees the administration of the government.

Q: How was the Iraqi Interim Government chosen? Is it really representative?

A: The Iraqi Interim Government was chosen by Iraqis through a consultation process led by the United Nations. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, who serves as the special advisor on Iraq to the Secretary General of the United Nations, facilitated the process. The process to form the interim government was wide ranging and a broad spectrum of Iraqis, including political, religious and tribal leaders and civic associations were consulted.

Q: How long will the interim government exist?

A: The interim government will serve for seven months, until Jan. 31, 2005, at the latest. Then a new Transitional Government, chosen through democratic elections, will take over.

Q: How is the Iraqi Interim Government preparing to take power on June 30?

A: This month they are busy engaging in outreach with Iraqis across the country, setting an agenda for when they take office and assume full responsibility for Iraq's affairs. Fourteen of Iraq's ministries have already transitioned to full Iraqi control.

Q: What is the legal framework for the Iraqi Interim Government?

A: The legal framework for the Iraqi Interim Government is the Transitional Administrative Law (the TAL), which will become the supreme law of the land on June 30. The TAL provides a bill of rights and a roadmap to a permanent constitution in 2005.

Q: What happens to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on June 30?

A: The CPA will dissolve on June 30 and the occupation will end. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the administrator of the CPA, will return to the United States.

(continued)

Q: What happens to the multi-national forces? What will the relationship of the Interim Iraqi Government be with nations contributing troops?

A: Multi-national forces will stay in Iraq to help maintain security. The relationship will be one of partnership; the detailed arrangements will be a matter of discussion between the Iraqi Interim Government and the nations contributing troops.

Q: Who will control the Iraqi Armed Forces, the police and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)? What about the oil revenues?

A: The Iraqi Interim Government will control the Iraqi Armed Forces, the police and the ICDC. They also will have full control over Iraq's oil revenues and natural resources.

Key Dates: Iraq's Path to Democracy

- | | |
|--|----------------|
| • Liberation | April 2003 |
| • Governing Council Established | July 2003 |
| • First Cabinet Formed | September 2003 |
| • Deadlines Announced for Sovereignty
And Transitional Administrative Law | November 2003 |
| • Transitional Administrative Law Signed | March 2004 |
| • Interim Government Announced | June 1, 2004 |
| • Sovereignty
(Interim Government Assumes Power) | June 30, 2004 |
| • National Conference Convened
National Council Established | July 2004 |
| • Democratic Elections
(Transitional Government Elected) | January 2005 |
| • Constitution Ratified | October 2005 |
| • Constitutionally-based Elections
(Constitutional Government Elected) | December 2005 |



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Halliburton Contract Facts - June 1, 2004

Media reports claim that a sole-source contract awarded to Halliburton to restore the Iraqi oil sector was "coordinated" through Vice President Cheney's office. The Vice President was formerly chairman of Halliburton.

The reports are wrong. Here are the facts.

Background:

The reports quote an internal Pentagon email dated March 5, 2003, by an Army Corps of Engineer official who wrote:

"Accompanied OHRA leader to get release of declassification and authority to execute RIO [Restore Iraqi Oil]. DepSecDef sent us to UnderSecPolicy Feith [sic] and gave him authority to approve both.

"Declass – Feith [sic] approved, contingent on informing the WH [White House] tomorrow. We anticipate no issues since action has been coordinated with VP's office."

Explanation of the email: This e-mail (written in 2003 before the war started) referred to the need to declassify a U.S. government project to be ready to restore the Iraqi oil infrastructure following potential hostilities in Iraq, and to approve the execution of plans that the U.S. government had developed for this purpose. The project came to be known as Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO).

It was decided in March 2003 to declassify the project. By declassifying the project, teams could be ready to begin the restoration work as soon as possible, thus minimizing damage from sabotage or combat operations.

Myth: The Vice President's office "coordinated" the contract.

Facts: The Vice President exercised no role or influence whatsoever in the Department's decision to select Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) for this work.

The only "coordination" with the Vice President's office was that the office was informed the Defense Department was soon to make public the prior decision to award the contract to KBR. The Vice President was informed because of his former affiliation with the company.

Myth: The contract with Halliburton was approved by Douglas Feith, undersecretary of Defense for policy.

Facts: Mr. Feith was *not* the approval authority for awarding this contract. The approval authority was the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. He approved a temporary sole-source contract to Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), a Halliburton subsidiary.

The Office of Reconstruction (ORHA) was situated in the Department of Defense by Presidential Directive. That office was overseen for policy purposes by the Under Secretary for Policy. The Under Secretary had no contractual authority and took no contractual actions.

As the executive agent for the oil restoration work, the Army instructed KBH to be ready to start the work and continue until the U.S. government was able to hold an open competition (which it has since done).

Mr. Feith was the original classifying authority for the contingency plans the Department developed before the war for restoring Iraqi oil. That is why the Deputy Secretary referred the declassification action to Mr. Feith.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Transition to Iraqi Self-Government - May 28, 2004

The Iraqi Governing Council today unanimously accepted the nomination of Iyad Allawi to be the new transitional prime minister of Iraq. A member of the Governing Council, he is a Shiite Muslim and a physician. Expected to be nominated soon are a president, two vice presidents and a 26-member cabinet.

Following are highlights of Iraq's transition to democracy, as outlined by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week ([link to prepared statement](#)).

➤ **Iraqis continue to experience unprecedented political**

- The Transitional Administrative Law (the TAL) will govern Iraq's transition period beginning June 30.
- The TAL is the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world.
- Assurances in the TAL include:
 - Freedom of religion.
 - Freedom of expression.
 - Freedom of the press.
 - freedom of assembly.
 - Equal rights for all Iraqis regardless of ethnicity, denomination or sex.
- Iraqis are participating in their government and letting their voices be heard.
 - More than 90 percent of Iraqi towns and provinces have local councils.
 - More than half of Iraqis are active in community affairs, and one in five belong to a non-governmental organization.

➤ **The TAL establishes how the permanent constitution will be drafted and ratified and how representatives will be elected.** Iraq's political transition is scheduled to evolve over three

- Phase I (June 30, 2004) – Iraqi Interim
 - The Interim Government will assume full sovereignty on June 30.
 - The Interim Government is being selected based on intensive consultations among Iraqis.
 - These consultations are being led by Ambassador Brahimi, the UN Secretary General's Special Advisor on Iraq.
 - Under the plan, there will be a president, two deputy presidents a prime minister and a ministerial cabinet.
 - In July a national conference will convene to choose a "consultative" council.
- Phase II (January 2005) – Iraqi Transitional Government
 - The Interim Government will serve until the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) is elected in either December 2004 or January 2005.
 - The TNA will then elect a three-person Presidency Council.
 - The Presidency Council will consist of a President and two Deputies.
 - The Presidency Council will appoint by unanimous vote the Prime Minister, and on the Prime Minister's recommendation, a Council of Ministers.
 - The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers must obtain a vote of confidence from the TNA before taking office.
 - The TNA, the Presidency Council (the president and two Deputies) and the Council of Ministers will comprise the Iraqi Transitional Government.
 - In addition to being the legislature, the TNA will draft a permanent constitution for Iraq, which will be submitted for popular ratification by Oct. 15, 2004.
 - Elections under the new constitution are to be held by Dec. 15, 2005.
 - The newly elected government, operating under the permanent constitution, will take office by Dec. 31, 2005.
- Phase III (January 2006) – Iraqi Government under a Permanent Constitution.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraqi Visitors, Victim Justice - May 26, 2004

Iraqis to Lay Wreath at Tomb of Unknowns

- Tomorrow, May 27, a delegation of seven Iraqi men who were tortured by Saddam Hussein will Americans who have died in Operation Iraqi Freedom by placing a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknowns Arlington National
 - Each man had his right hand cut off for trading U.S. currency. In addition, each had his forehead tattooed with a cross.
 - After learning of the torture from an American documentary filmmaker, a team of plastic surgeons in Houston volunteered to surgically attach donated prosthetic hands and remove the tattoos.
 - Yesterday the Iraqis and those who helped them met with President Bush at the White House. The president called their plight an example of Saddam's brutality. ([link to White House page on visit](#))
 - In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explained to the senators that Saddam ordered their hands amputated to make them scapegoats for Iraq's economic failure. The deputy relayed a statement by one of the men, 'The age of tyrants is over, the age of good remains. God willing. Good is coming in Iraq.' ([prepared remarks](#))

Special Task Force Created For Compensation For Victims of Former Regime

- Ambassador Bremer today announced the creation of a special task force on compensation for the victims Saddam's
 - With the establishment of the task force, Iraqis will determine justice for these victims.
 - Ambassador Bremer emphasized that while no government or institution can erase the past abuses, compensation can provide an element of justice.
 - The head of the task force is Dr. Malek Dohan Al Hassan, the president of the Iraqi Bar Association.
 - Dr. Malek and his staff will work with victims and ministries to define what types of injustices should be compensated and how individuals can demonstrate they are eligible. His report is due by August 1. It will be given to the interim government as soon as possible after the transfer of sovereignty so Iraq's leaders, in the best interests of the people, can act on the recommendations.
 - The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is reserving \$25 million for initial compensation and to operate the task force. ([CPA release](#))

Fact Sheet: The Transition to Iraqi Self-Government

- President Bush announced a five-step plan to achieve freedom and democracy in Iraq during his Monday
 - Hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government.
 - Help establish the stability and security in Iraq that democracy requires.
 - Continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure.
 - Encourage more international support.
 - Move toward free, national elections that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people.

Read more about the plan at the Coalition Provisional Authority's web site ([link here](#)).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Progress in Iraq - May 24, 2004

As Iraq transitions to sovereignty on June 30, the Coalition's goal remains a prosperous, unified Iraq on the path to a democratic government, at peace with itself and its neighbors.

Despite the recent violence aimed at creating chaos, Iraq has been transformed in the past year. Saddam Hussein has been captured, the country's economy is recovering, essential services are being restored and the political system is moving forward. Following are some of the highlights of this progress.

Economy: Iraq's economy is on the path to recovery and prosperity:

- Unemployment has fallen by nearly one-half over the past year.
- Inflation is a quarter of what it was before the war.
- For the first time in decades, Iraqi marketplaces are filled with consumer goods.
- The Coalition Provisional Authority has created more than 395,000 jobs for Iraqis.

Education

- All 22 universities and 43 technical institutes and colleges are open.
- Almost 2,500 schools have been rehabilitated
- 32,000 secondary school teachers and administrative staff have been trained;
- More than 8.7 million textbooks have been printed and distributed.

Health Care:

- Health care spending in Iraq is 30 times greater than its pre-war levels.
- All 240 hospitals and more than 1,200 health clinics are open.
- More than 5 million children have been immunized for measles, mumps and rubella.

Essential Services: Essential services are improving:

- Electricity generation has surpassed prewar levels and is more evenly distributed.
- The number of telephone subscribers, including cell phones, is nearly one-third above pre-war levels.
- As of May 4, estimated crude oil export revenue was more than \$5.6 billion for 2004.

Governance and Political Freedoms:

- The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which was signed by all members of the Iraqi Governing Council in March, will govern Iraq's transition period beginning June 30. Assurances include:
 - freedom of religion;
 - freedom of expression;
 - freedom of the press (170 newspapers are being published in Iraq); and
 - freedom of assembly.
- The TAL also calls for equal rights for all citizens regardless of ethnicity, denomination or sex.
- More than 90 percent of Iraqi towns and provinces have local councils.
- More than half of Iraqis are active in community affairs, and one in five belongs to a non-governmental organization.
- Twelve government ministries have transitioned to full Iraqi authority.
- Iraq has a functioning judiciary to provide equal justice for all.

Security

- Saddam Hussein is in prison. His sons are dead. Forty-six of the 55 "most-wanted" have been captured or killed.
- More than 200,000 Iraqis are serving in their country's security forces.
- More than 30 countries are contributing some 25,000 troops to help Iraq.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Abu Ghraib - May 20, 2004

- **The Defense Department has been actively investigating allegations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.**
 - On Jan. 13, a soldier brought his concerns to the attention of the chain of command.
 - A criminal investigation was initiated the next day.
 - A press release and background briefing followed within 72 hours.
 - Seven soldiers now face or may soon face criminal charges.
 - The charges include dereliction of duty, conspiracy to maltreat subordinates (detainees), maltreatment of subordinates, indecent acts and battery.
 - Additionally, two noncommissioned officers were charged with aggravated assault.
 - An additional six soldiers in the chain of command were given letters of reprimand; two of them were relieved of their duties.
 - A seventh soldier received a letter of admonition.
- **Those who engaged in the abuses at Abu Ghraib will be brought to justice.**
 - Today is the first of several trials expected in the Abu Ghraib abuse accusations.
- **While the abuses at Abu Ghraib are horrific, the Iraqi people, the American people and the world see that the U.S. democratic system functions and operates**
 - The world will see that Americans will not accept dishonorable behavior.
 - The courts-martial proceedings are open to the media. In addition to U.S. journalists, members of the Iraqi and international media also attended the proceedings today at the Baghdad Convention Center.
 - During a press conference May 18 in Baghdad, BG Mark Kimmitt emphasized that there is a commitment by the Coalition and its soldiers to increase the transparency at Abu Ghraib and other facilities.
 - For instance, media, Iraqi notables and families have visited the prison. These visits demonstrate that the abuses shown in the photographs were rare and isolated events, and on a day-to-day visit that is not how those prisons are run.
- **Americans were outraged at the photographs of the abuses at Abu Ghraib, but the actions of these few do not represent America or American values.**
 - The great majority of U.S. troops are serving honorably. They are helping to reconstruct Iraq, train its security forces, and transition the country after 35 years of brutal dictatorship to a nation at peace with itself and its neighbors.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – SecDef, Chairman Troop Visit - May 13, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, today made a surprise visit to Baghdad, where they spoke with U.S. troops serving there, met with military and Coalition Provisional Authority officials and toured Abu Ghraib prison. Following are highlights of their remarks at a town hall meeting with the troops at Camp Victory. ([transcript](#))

- U.S. troops have helped to liberate 25 million people in Iraq. They have also performed numerous acts of kindness, generosity and compassion and showed the world the character of the United States and the character of its armed forces.
- The abuse alleged at Abu Ghraib is stunning. Investigations are underway and those involved will be brought to justice.
- It will not be an easy path to turn Iraq from a repressive dictatorship to a stable and prosperous country that respects all groups, understands human rights and is at peace with its neighbors. But when U.S. troops fighting in the Global War on Terror look back on their service, they will be proud of and say it was worth it.
- The goal is not to have U.S. troops in Iraq; rather, it is for Iraqis to take charge of their country and their security. U.S. troops are working hard to help recruit, train, equip, deploy and mentor the Iraqi security forces, so responsibility can be passed to them as soon as they are capable of taking it.

Prowess in Iraq

- Two ceremonies were held today in the northern Iraqi city of Qarrayah. Sixty Iraqi soldiers graduated from Iraqi Civil Defense Corps basic training, and 20 graduated from the primary leader development course. U.S. Army soldiers teach the basic six-week training program, which is designed to transform Iraqi civilians into soldiers. Instruction includes basic rifle marksmanship, the law of war, human rights, and security and communication skills. The leader development course is a two-week program that trains junior soldiers, teaching them the skills they need to become non-commissioned officers. ([CENTCOM release](#))
- Iraq's soccer team earned a place at the Summer Olympics in Athens by defeating Saudi-Arabia 3-1 yesterday. The visit will be the first by the team to the Olympics. Player Hawar Mulla Mohammed, who scored the winning goal, said the entire country deserves the win. National Olympic Committee of Iraq President Ahmed Al-Samarrai called the victory the biggest moment in Iraqi Olympic history. ([CPA release](#))
- Full authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was formally handed back to the Iraqi people during a ceremony yesterday in Baghdad at the ministry's headquarters. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer congratulated Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoshiyar Zebari and his staff for their accomplishments, including Iraq's reinstatement into the Arab League, the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. ([CPA release](#))



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – FY05 Budget - May 12, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified today before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense regarding the fiscal year 2005 budget request. Following are highlights from his prepared remarks.

- The Department of Defense must ensure U.S. forces, the finest in the world, will have what they need to defend the nation in the years ahead. The Department is doing so in a number of
 - By giving troops the tools they need to win the Global War on Terror.
 - By transforming for the 21st century, so troops will have the training and tools they need to prevail in future wars, which could be notably different from today's challenges.
 - By ensuring the force is managed properly, so the best and brightest continue to be attracted to serving, and so the quality of the all-volunteer force is sustained.
- The United States must provide its warfighters all the resources they need to conduct their operations and complete their missions.
 - While the exact costs for operations in 2005 are not known, the Department needs to plan for contingencies so there is no disruption in resources for the troops.
- The President has asked Congress for a \$25 billion contingency reserve fund that can be used for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq until a clearer picture emerges of what will be necessary for fiscal year 2005
 - This reserve fund would be used primarily for operation and maintenance requirements such as personnel support costs, combat operations, supplies, force protection and transportation.
 - The \$25 billion reserve fund will not be all that is needed for 2005. The Department anticipates submitting a full fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriation request early next year when costs can be better estimated.
- The President has asked Congress for \$401.7 billion for fiscal year 2005, an increase over last
 - The request is a large amount of the taxpayers' hard-earned money. Such investments will be likely be required for some years because the nation is engaged in a struggle that could well go on for a number of years.
 - The objective is to ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces remain the best trained, best equipped fighting force in the world and that the volunteers who make up the force are treated with respect equal to their sacrifices and dedication.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Overview - May 10, 2004

President Bush reaffirmed commitments in Iraq during remarks today at the Pentagon. To read the transcript, please link to the White House web page (www.whitehouse.gov).

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz spoke to the World Affairs Council of Greater Philadelphia on May 6 about the Global War on Terror. Following are some of the highlights of his remarks. (To read the entire transcript, link to the Defense Department's [transcript page](#).)

Coalition Successes in the Global War on Terror

- The Coalition has overthrown two terrorist regimes, rescued two nations and liberated 50 million people.
- The Coalition has captured or killed close to two-thirds of the known senior al Qaeda operatives; has captured or killed 46 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq, including Saddam Hussein; and disrupted terrorist cells on most continents.
- \$200 million in terrorist assets has been seized or frozen.
- The Coalition has dismantled a dangerous nuclear proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan, the former head Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The network had been providing nuclear technology to dangerous regimes around the world, including Iran and North Korea.
- The Coalition persuaded Libya to eliminate its chemical and nuclear-related programs and to accept international inspections.

The Adversaries

- The adversaries in the Global War on Terror are unlike any the United States has known.
 - They do not seek an armistice.
 - They have no territory to defend, and no populace to answer to.
 - They only need to be lucky once. As defenders, the Coalition must be lucky all the time.
- The only way to win the war is to root out terrorists at their source and to put pressure on them to change their way of life.
- The defeat of tyranny and violence in Iraq and the rise of democracy in the heart of the Middle East will be a crucial setback for international terror.

Progress in Iraq

- The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) approved by the Iraqi Governing Council is the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world.
 - The TAL assures freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly. The TAL also includes fundamental rights for women.
- Iraq's new currency is the most heavily traded currency in the Middle East.
- Oil production and power generation have surpassed pre-war levels.
- All 22 universities and 43 technical institutes and colleges are open.
- Coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,200 schools.
- All 240 hospitals and more than 1,200 health clinics are open. Health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times over pre-war levels.
- 170 newspapers are being published.

Abu Ghraib

- The actions of the soldiers in the photographs are totally unacceptable. They betrayed their comrades, who serve honorably every day, and they have damaged the cause for which brave men and women are fighting and dying.
- The offenders will be dealt with, and action will be taken to prevent such situations from happening again.

**TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
BEFORE THE SENATE AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES
As Prepared
MAY 7, 2004**

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee -- Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

In recent days, there has been a good deal of discussion about who bears responsibility for the terrible activities that took place at Abu Ghraib. These events occurred on my watch. As Secretary of Defense, I am accountable for them. I take full responsibility. It is my obligation to evaluate what happened, to make sure those who have committed wrongdoing are brought to justice, and to make changes as needed to see that it doesn't happen again.

I feel terrible about what happened to these Iraqi detainees. They are human beings. They were in U.S. custody. Our country had an obligation to treat them right. We didn't do that. That was wrong.

To those Iraqis who were mistreated by members of U.S. armed forces, I offer my deepest apology. It was un-American. And it was inconsistent with the values of our nation.

Further, I deeply regret the damage that has been done:

- First, to the reputation of the honorable men and women of our armed forces who are courageously, skillfully and responsibly defending our freedom across the globe. They are truly wonderful human beings, and their families and loved ones can be enormously proud of them.
- Second, to the President, the Congress and the American people. I wish we had been able to convey to them the gravity of this was before we saw it in the media;
- Third, to the Iraqi people, whose trust in our coalition has been shaken; and finally
- To the reputation of our country.

The photographic depictions of U.S. military personnel that the public has seen have unquestionably offended and outraged everyone in the Department of Defense.

If you could have seen the anguished expressions on the faces of those of us in the Department upon seeing the photos, you would know how we feel today.

We take this seriously. It should not have happened. Any wrongdoers need to be punished, procedures evaluated, and problems corrected.

It's important for the American people and the world to know that while these terrible acts were perpetrated by a small number of the U.S. military, they were also brought to light by the honorable and responsible actions of other military personnel. There are many who did their duty professionally and we should mention that as well:

- First the soldier, Specialist Joseph Darby, who alerted the appropriate authorities that abuses of detainees were occurring. My thanks and appreciation to him for his courage and his values.

- Second, those in the military chain of command who acted promptly upon learning of those activities by initiating a series of investigations -- criminal and administrative -- to ensure that the abuses were stopped, that the responsible chain of command was relieved and replaced, and that the Uniform Code of Military Justice was followed;
- Third, units singled out for praise in General Taguba's Report for the care they provided detainees in their custody and their intolerance of abuses by others.
- And finally, the CENTCOM chain of command for taking action and publicly announcing to the world that investigations of abuse were underway.

The American people and members of the committee deserve an accounting of what has happened and what's being done to fix it.

Gathered today are the senior military officials with responsibility in the care and treatment of detainees.

The responsibility for training falls to the U.S. Army. The responsibility for the actions and conduct of forces in Iraq falls to the combatant commander. And the ultimate responsibility for the department rests with me.

Each of us has had a strong interest in getting the facts out to the American people.

We want you to know the facts. I want you to have all the documentation and the data you require. If some material is classified, we will ensure members get an opportunity to see it privately.

Having said that, all the facts that may be of interest are not yet in hand. In addition to the Taguba Report, there are other investigations underway. We will make the results of these investigations available to you. But because all the facts are not in hand, there will be corrections and clarifications to the record as more information is learned. If we have something to add later, we'll do so. If we find something that we've said that needs to be corrected, we'll correct it.

From the other witnesses here, you will be told the sequence of events and investigations that have taken place since these activities first came to light.

What I want to do is to inform you of the measures underway to remedy some of the damage done and to improve our performance in the future.

Before I do that, let me make one further note: As members of this Committee are aware, each of us at this table is either in the chain of command or has senior responsibilities in the Department. This means that anything we say publicly could have an impact on legal proceedings against those accused of wrongdoing in this matter. Our responsibility at this hearing, and in our public comments, is to conduct ourselves consistent with that well known fact. So please understand that if some of our responses are measured, it is to ensure that pending cases are not jeopardized by seeming to exert "command influence" and that the rights of any accused are protected.

Now let me tell you the measures we are taking to deal with this issue.

When this incident came to light and was reported within the Chain of Command, we took several immediate actions. These will be discussed in detail by others here today, but let me highlight them.

- General Sanchez launched a criminal investigation immediately.
- He then asked for an administrative review of procedures at the Abu Ghraib facility. That is the so-called Taguba Report.

These two investigations have resulted thus far in criminal or administrative actions against at least 12 individuals, including the relief of the prison chain of command and criminal referrals of several soldiers directly involved in abuse.

- The Army also launched an Inspector General Review of detainee operations throughout Afghanistan and Iraq. That review continues.
- The Army has initiated an investigation of Reserve training with respect to military intelligence and police functions.
- General Sanchez also asked for an Army Intelligence review of the circumstances discussed in General Taguba's report and that is ongoing.
- And, I also asked the Navy Inspector General to review procedures at Guantanamo and the Charleston Naval Brig.

As these investigations mature, we will endeavor to keep you informed. But there is more to be done.

First, to ensure we have a handle on the scope of this catastrophe, I will be announcing today the appointment of several senior former officials who are being asked to examine the pace, breadth, and thoroughness of the existing investigations, and to determine whether additional investigations need to be initiated. They are being asked to report their findings within 45 days of taking up their duties. I am confident these distinguished individuals will provide a full and fair assessment of what has been done thus far – and recommend whether further steps may be necessary.

I will encourage them to meet with members of Congress to keep them apprised of their progress. I look forward to their suggestions and recommendations.

Second, we need to review our habits and procedures. One of the things we've tried to do since September 11th is to get the Department to adjust its habits and procedures at a time of war, and in the information age. For the past three years, we have looked for areas where adjustments were needed, and regrettably, we have now found another one.

Let me be clear. I failed to identify the catastrophic damage that the allegations of abuse could do to our operations in the theater, to the safety of our troops in the field, the cause to which we are committed. When these allegations first surfaced, I failed to recognize how important it was to elevate a matter of such gravity to the highest levels, including leaders in Congress. Nor did we anticipate that a classified investigation report that had not yet been delivered to the senior levels of the Department would be given to the media. That was my failing.

In the future, we will take whatever steps are necessary to elevate to the appropriate levels charges of this magnitude.

Third, I am seeking a way to provide appropriate compensation to those detainees who suffered grievous and brutal abuse and cruelty at the hands of a few members of the U.S. military. It is the right thing to do. I'm told we have the ability to do so. And so we will – one way or another.

One of the great strengths of our nation is its ability to recognize failures, deal with them, and to strive to make things better. Indeed, the openness with which these problems are being dealt is one of the strengths of our free society. Democracies are imperfect, because they are made up of human beings who are, by our nature, imperfect. Of course, we wish that every person in our government and our Armed Forces would conduct themselves in accordance with the highest standards of ethics. But the reality is some do not.

One mistake we have made during our initial investigation into these charges, for example, was failing to sufficiently call to your attention the information made public in the CENTCOM press release regarding the investigations they had initiated back in January. We also failed to sufficiently call your attention and brief you on the preliminary findings of the criminal investigation announced on March 20 by General Kimmitt. I am advised the Army has had periodic meetings to inform Congressional staffs.

There are indications that the information provided was penetrating at some level, however. On January 20th, for example, CNN reported that a CID investigation was being conducted into allegations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, and mentioned the possible existence of photographs taken of detainees.

Nonetheless, I know that we did not fully brief you on this subject along the way and we should have done so.

I wish we would have known more sooner and been able to tell you more sooner. But we didn't. For that, I apologize.

We need to discuss a better way to keep you informed about matters of such gravity in the future.

The fact that abuses take place – in the military, in law enforcement, and in our society – is not surprising. But the standard by which our country and our government should be judged is not by whether abuses take place, but rather how our nation deals with them. We are dealing with them forthrightly. These incidents are being investigated and any found to have committed crimes or misconduct will receive the appropriate justice. Most of the time, at least, the system works.

None of this is meant to diminish the gravity of the recent situation at Abu Ghraib. To the contrary, that is precisely why these abuses are so damaging -- because they can be used by the enemies of our country to undermine our mission and spread the false impression that such conduct is the rule and not the exception – when, in fact, the opposite is true.

Which is why it is so important that we investigate them publicly and openly, and hold people accountable in similar fashion. And that is exactly what we are doing.

QUESTIONS:

When we first were told about these activities and saw those photographs, I and everyone at this table was as shocked and stunned as you were.

In the period since, a number of questions have been raised -- here in the Congress, in the media, and by the public. Let me respond to some of them.

Some have asked: Why weren't those charged with guarding prisoners properly trained?

If one looks at the behavior depicted in those photos, it is fair to ask: what kind of training could one possibly provide that would stop people from doing that? Either you learn that in life, or you don't. And if someone doesn't know that doing what is shown in those photos is wrong, cruel, brutal, indecent, and against American values, I am at a loss as to what kind of training could be provided to teach them.

The fact is, the vast majority of the people in the United States Armed Forces are decent, honorable individuals who know right from wrong, and conduct themselves in a manner that is in keeping with the spirit and values of our country. And there is only a very small minority who do not.

Some have asked: Hasn't a climate allowing for abuses to occur been created because of a decision to "disregard" the Geneva Convention?

No. Indeed, the U.S. Government recognized that the Geneva Conventions apply in Iraq, and the armed forces are obliged to follow them. DoD personnel are trained in the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions. Doctrine requires that they follow those rules and report, investigate, and take corrective action to remedy violations.

We did conclude that our war against al-Qaeda is not governed precisely by the Conventions, but nevertheless announced that detained individuals would be treated consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions.

Some have asked: Can we repair the damage done to our credibility in the region?

I hope so and I believe so. We have to trust that in the course of events the truth will eventually come out. And the truth is that the United States is a liberator, not a conqueror. Our people are devoted to freedom and democracy, not enslavement or oppression.

Every day, these men and women risk their lives to protect the Iraqi people and help them build a more hopeful future. They have liberated 25 million people; dismantled two terrorist regimes; and battled an enemy that shows no compassion or respect for innocent human life.

These men and women, and the families who love and support them, deserve better than to have their sacrifices on behalf of our country sullied by the despicable actions of a few. To that vast majority of our soldiers abroad, I extend my support and my appreciation for their truly outstanding service.

One final thought:

Today we'll have a full discussion of this terrible incident and I welcome that. But first, let's take a step back for a moment.

Within the constraints imposed on those of us in the chain of command, I want to say a few additional words.

First, beyond abuse of prisoners, we have seen photos that depict incidents of physical violence towards prisoners – acts that may be described as blatantly sadistic, cruel, and inhuman.

Second, the individuals who took the photos took many more.

The ramifications of these two facts are far reaching.

Congress and the American people and the rest of the world need to know this.

In addition, the photos give these incidents a vividness – indeed a horror – in the eyes of the world.

Mr. Chairman, that is why this hearing today is important. And why the actions we take in the days and weeks ahead are so important.

Because however terrible the setback, this is also an occasion to demonstrate to the world the difference between those who believe in democracy and human rights and those who believe in rule by the terrorist code.

We value human life; we believe in their right to individual freedom and the rule of law.

For those beliefs we send the men and women in the armed forces abroad – to protect that right for our own people and to give millions of others who aren't Americans the hope of a future of freedom.

Part of that mission -- part of what we believe in -- is making sure that when wrongdoing or scandal occur that they are not covered up, but exposed, investigated, publicly disclosed -- and the guilty brought to justice.

Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the world: Judge us by our actions. Watch how Americans, watch how a democracy deals with wrongdoing and scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and weaknesses.

And then after they have seen America in action -- then ask those who preach resentment and hatred of America if our behavior doesn't give the lie to the falsehood and slander they speak about our people and way of life. Ask them if the resolve of Americans in crisis and difficulty -- and, yes, the heartache of acknowledging the evil in our midst -- doesn't have meaning far beyond their code of hatred.

Above all, ask them if the willingness of Americans to acknowledge their own failures before humanity doesn't light the world as surely as the great ideas and beliefs that first made this nation a beacon of hope and liberty to all who strive to be free.

We know what the terrorists will do. We know they will try to exploit all that is bad to obscure all that is good. That is the nature of evil. And that is the nature of those who think they can kill innocent men, women and children to gratify their own cruel will to power.

We say to the enemies of humanity and freedom:

Do your worst.

Because we will strive to do our best

I thank you Mr. Chairman. My colleagues each have a brief statement.

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US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Abu Ghraib, Troop Deployment - May 4, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the Pentagon press corps today on allegations of abuse by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib and troop deployment. Following the secretary and vice chairman's briefing, Gen. George Casey, vice chief of staff of the Army, spoke about the situation at Abu Ghraib. Highlights from his comments are also included.

Abu Ghraib

- **The images shown in the media of the U.S. soldiers and prisoners at the Baghdad Correctional Facility at Abu Ghraib are deeply disturbing.**
 - The photographs depict actions that are fundamentally unacceptable.
 - These actions do not in anyway represent the values of the United States or the Armed Forces, the vast majority of whom serve with honor.
- **The Secretary and the Department of Defense are taking the charges and allegations seriously.**
 - On Jan. 14, one day after allegations first came to light, a criminal investigation was initiated to examine the charges. On Jan. 16, CENTCOM issued a press release, and Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt briefed that an investigation had been initiated into reported incidents of detainee abuse.
 - On Jan. 31, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, at the request of Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, was appointed to conduct an administrative investigation of procedures at Abu Ghraib.
 - In February, the acting Secretary of the Army directed the Army Inspector General to conduct an assessment of doctrine and training associated with detention operations throughout the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
 - In March, the Chief, Army Reserve initiated an assessment of Army Reserve training with an emphasis on military police and military intelligence activities related to prisoners.
 - On April 23, at Gen. Sanchez's request, the head of Army intelligence provided an investigating officer to investigate military intelligence practices in Iraq.
 - Early this month, the U.S. Navy Inspector General was asked to assess the detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay and at Charleston Naval Station Brig.
- **The Department will continue to take whatever steps are necessary to hold accountable those who may have violated the code of military conduct.**
 - Such violations betray the trust of the American people and the men and women in uniform who serve honorably each day.
 - Thus far, from these investigations, six individuals have been identified for Article 32 criminal hearings. At least six other individuals have been given letters of reprimand, and two of these six were relieved of their responsibilities.
- **As Gen. Casey emphasized in his opening statement to the press, the Army is extremely disappointed that anyone would engage in the mistreatment and humiliation of detainees or take such pictures.**
 - The U.S. Army is a values-based organization that respects the International Law of Armed Conflict and human dignity. More than 300,000 Army soldiers are deployed around the world, defending the United States and its values.
 - The behavior that led to the images is clearly unacceptable. It does not reflect Army training or values, and is a complete breakdown in discipline.
 - The Army is committed to treating all persons with dignity, respect and humanity.
 - U.S. soldiers recognize they have a moral and legal obligation to provide humane treatment to the personnel in their custody.

- Commanders will continue to investigate all allegations of detainee mistreatment and take appropriate action. Commanders will continue to set appropriate climate and standards with regard to humane treatment of detainees.

➤ **The Army has taken action in Iraq to address the allegations of prisoner**

- There is new unit leadership at Abu Ghraib, and close coordination between the military intelligence brigade commander and the military police brigade commander.
- There is now one single person responsible for all the detainee activities. On April 15, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller took charge of all the detainee operations in Iraq.
- Additional training on the Geneva Convention and the rules of engagement has been given to all of the new units that have gone into these facilities.
- A mobile training team of corrections and legal experts is on the ground working at the detention facilities and helping train soldiers to improve operations at the facilities.
- A lessons-learned process is ongoing and recommended changes are being incorporated into the Army's schools, doctrine and combat training centers.

Secretary Rumsfeld also announced some additional troop deployments during the press briefing.

Troop Deployment

➤ **Gen. John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, has indicated a desire to retain the level of forces at approximately**

- Recently, 20,000 troops had their deployments extended by up to 90 days to keep force levels at 135,000.
- These troops will not have their deployments extended further. Instead, Secretary Rumsfeld has approved the deployment of approximately 10,000 replacement personnel.

For more information, please see the news release posted on www.defenselink.mil (link to [release](#)).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Abu Ghraib Prisoners - May 3, 2004

Following is information about the reported abuse at the Baghdad Correctional Facility at Abu Ghraib.

➤ **The Department of Defense is taking allegations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib**

- On Jan. 14, one day after allegations were first reported by a concerned soldier, a criminal investigation was initiated to examine the allegations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.
- On Jan. 31, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command began an administrative investigation into potential systemic problems relating to detention operations in Iraq, including training of units assigned to the detention facilities and command policies and procedures.
 - The investigation's findings were approved on April 6. They included actions against several commanders and military personnel operating detention and internment facilities in Iraq. Also included were administrative and training recommendations.
- In February, the Army Inspector General began an assessment of doctrine and training associated with detention operations.
- In March, the Chief, Army Reserve initiated an assessment of Army Reserve training with an emphasis on military police and military intelligence activities related to prisoners.
- On April 23, at Gen. Sanchez's request, the head of Army intelligence provided an investigating officer to investigate military intelligence practices in Iraq.

➤ **Individual misconduct is being**

- Six preliminary charges have been levied against soldiers allegedly involved in the incident. Separately, six other personnel have been issued Memorandums of Reprimand- two of them were relieved of their positions.
- Abuse of prisoners will not be tolerated by the Defense Department.
- The photographs of prisoners in Abu Ghraib shown by various media outlets in the United States and the Middle East are heinous.
- The great majority of U.S. service members conduct themselves in strict accordance with their training, and represent themselves, the United States and the Coalition honorably. The military is a values-based organization committed to the respect of the international laws of armed conflict.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Fallujah Operations – April 30, 2004

Below are highlights from a briefing today by Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Coalition Provisional Authority spokesman Gareth Bayley about operations in Fallujah.

➤ **The Coalition's objectives in Fallujah remain**

- Eliminate the armed groups in Fallujah.
- Collect the heavy weapons.
- Restore law and order.
- Rebuild the judicial system.
- Bring to justice those who have committed crimes.

➤ **A number of initiatives are underway to bring peace in**

- The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force is overseeing the formation of the first battalion of the proposed Fallujah brigade.
- The battalion will include 600 to 1,100 soldiers.
- The mission of this interim organization is to work cooperatively with Coalition forces and eventually assume responsibility for security and stability throughout Iraq.
- The battalion will be recruited largely from former soldiers of the Iraqi army.
- The 1st MEF will have operational control of the battalion, and will provide them the resources and equipment they need to accomplish their mission.

➤ **Marines will continue to maintain a strong presence in and around Fallujah until all units of the demonstrate they have the capacity to man checkpoints and**

- Coalition forces will maintain the right of freedom of movement in all areas of responsibility.
- As calm is restored, families will be allowed to return to the city.
- Investigations will continue to find those responsible for the murder of the four American contractors and when they are captured, they will be tried in Iraq's judicial system.

➤ **Negotiations will continue in**

- The Marines are not withdrawing.
- As long as there is progress, the Coalition will continue to pursue the peaceful track.
- Iraqis are coming forward, asking to be part of the process. The Coalition welcomes their contributions, which will benefit Fallujah, al Anbar province and the country.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Missile Defense – April 28, 2004

The United States currently does not have the ability to defend itself from a limited long-range missile attack. In December 2002, President Bush announced plans to begin fielding a missile defense capability, with the goal of beginning initial defensive operations in 2004 and 2005. The United States is on track to meet that goal this year.

Following are highlights about missile defense: U.S. capabilities, adversaries' capabilities and an outlook for developing a U.S. system.

➤ **Several nations are developing or acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. They are sharing capabilities and technologies and acquiring it from others. For instance:**

- North Korea continues to move forward with the development of the long-range Taepo Dong 2 missile.
- Iran has successfully flight tested the 1,300 km Shahab 3 missile.

➤ **The United States must defend itself against these**

- New acquisition management processes like spiral development and capabilities-based acquisition allow a new technology like missile defense to engage in realistic, challenging development and testing, while at the same time making the technology available for limited defensive operations.
- This new acquisition system is important because the United States cannot wait until a future threat is fully developed before it deploys missile defenses.
- The Missile Defense Act of 1999 mandates that the Department of Defense take the necessary steps to deploy as soon as technologically possible effective missile defenses capable of defending all 50 states.

➤ **Since 2001, it has been the Administration's policy to develop and deploy missile defenses as soon**

- The capability to be fielded this year carries out the President's policy and the mandate of the 1999 law.
- The direction from the President states that ballistic missiles also endanger U.S. allies and friends around the world and affirms the need to work together to defend against these threats.
 - The United States has kept Russia well informed of U.S. missile defense policy and is engaging in discussions with Russia on future cooperative efforts on numerous missile defense technologies.
- The United States is spending billions of dollars to protect against terrorist threats to infrastructure, ports, aviation and agriculture. Missile defense will comprise less than three percent of the Defense Department's budget over the next several years.

➤ **The missile defense development program is set in two-year blocks that will deliver enhanced at the end of each**

- The plan for the 2004 block that ends with calendar year 2005 is to deliver a system testbed in the Pacific Ocean for realistic testing, while also providing an operational capability against a limited threat.
 - The testbed will include a capability against long-range ballistic missiles with required radars and other sensors, a command and control network, and a limited number of interceptors based in Alaska (up to 16 by the end of 2005) and California (up to four in 2004-2005) utilizing the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

Wall Street Journal
April 27, 2004
Pg. 18

Australia Won't Cut And Run

By Alexander Downer

CANBERRA -- As Australia's foreign minister, I respect the right of countries to take decisions they perceive to be in their national interest. But I do not always agree with the choices they make. The announcement by Spain, and subsequently, by Honduras, to withdraw troops from Iraq is a case in point.

It is perhaps understandable that Spain's new government would want to withdraw its troops from Iraq. After all, this had been Prime Minister Zapatero's position for some time. Spain's decision, however, is extremely disappointing. For there has never been a greater need for the international community to pull together to help Iraqis in their hour of need.

We are no longer debating the just cause of removing forcefully Saddam Hussein's vile regime. That debate is over. The fall of Saddam ended decades of brutal tyranny and removed the threat his regime posed to international peace and security by ensuring Iraq's compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. The issue now is how to ensure that Iraq succeeds in its transition from brutal dictatorship to a democratic state in which Iraqis can enjoy the rights and freedoms that we, in the West, often take for granted.

Transforming Iraq was never going to be easy. The legacy of Saddam and his henchmen runs deep. And terrorists have made Iraq the frontline in their unholy war. But to abandon the Iraqi people at this critical stage would be a slap in the face for them. Even worse, such "cut and run" defeatism would deliver an unprecedented victory to the terrorists.

Advocates of a "cut and run" strategy must consider the consequences of their proposed actions. If other governments were to follow the lead of Spain, Iraq would be left in a precarious state. At its worst, Iraq could become a failed state, embroiled in civil strife, a haven for terrorists and a source of instability in the region.

The Australian government and, I believe, most Australians understand the consequences of a premature and predetermined withdrawal of forces. And that's why Australian defense force personnel will remain in Iraq until their task is complete. Australians understand that we cannot sit back and expect others, principally the U.S., to bear the load of making the world a safer place. Such isolationist thinking is dangerous and ill-conceived.

While considerable progress has been made in building up the Iraqi police and security forces, an international military presence will be necessary for some time. This reality is

understood by most Iraqis, who according to a recent Oxford Research International poll, do not wish to see the immediate departure of international forces.

The international community needs to stand ~~firm~~ in the face of violent threats and actions. We need to encourage Iraq's various religious and ethnic groups to work together to prepare to assume full responsibility for their affairs, and to develop robust institutions that can deal with the myriad challenges facing the country.

We need to sustain the U.N.'s most welcome re-engagement in Iraq's political transition, including electoral preparations. International solidarity in support of Iraq will send a clear and strong message to those violently opposed to a peaceful transition, who feed on division and signs of weakness. International solidarity, in short, will create the best chance for peaceful progress toward a brighter future for Iraqis.

Mr. Downer is Australia's foreign minister.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update – April 26, 2004

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, senior spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority] briefed the media today in Baghdad about the situations in Fallujah and Najaf. Following are highlights.

- **While Iraqis understandably express opposition to the occupation, the silent majority of Iraqis grateful appreciation for being**
 - Iraqis also express concern that if the Coalition departs, the security situation will destabilize.
 - The majority of Iraqis and the Coalition have a common enemy, whether it is the small bands of former Fedayeen Saddam, the former Mukhabarats (Iraq's former intelligence service), international terrorists or Muqtada al-Sadr's militia.
- **The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force is following its orders to suspend offensive operations in Fallujah. The Coalition wants a peaceful resolution to the situation in Fallujah.**
 - The Marines maintain the inherent right of self-defense.
 - Soon joint patrols will begin in Fallujah with Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces becoming a visible presence in the city. The commanders on the ground will make the decisions about the exact timing of the patrols.
 - No weapons were turned in during the past 24 hours in Fallujah. The Coalition is hopeful that tomorrow there will be a large weapons turn-in, which would demonstrate a good-faith effort on the part of the insurgents to meet the Coalition halfway.
 - The end state in Fallujah remains restoring Iraqi control to the city, either through negotiations, a political track or through force of arms.
- **Regarding Najaf, the Coalition has made its position clear: It will not tolerate using shrines, mosques schools to store**
 - Places of worship are not protected under the Geneva Conventions in the event of military action if they are used as bases for operations and bases to store weapons and other tools of violence.
 - The process to restore the holy places must begin immediately; holy places must cease to be used as sites where violence is organized.
- **Ambassador Bremer issued the following statement today regarding**

"A dangerous situation is developing in Najaf, one that is putting all the law-abiding citizens of that holy city at even greater risk. Weapons are being stockpiled in schools, mosques and shrines. This explosive situation cannot be tolerated by those who seek a peaceful resolution to this crisis. The Coalition certainly will not tolerate this situation. The restoration of these holy places to calm places of worship must begin immediately."



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Remains Transfer Policy – April 23, 2004

Following are talking points on the Department of Defense's policy regarding media coverage of troops' remains being returned to Dover Air Force Base. For additional information, please refer to the transcript of a briefing given yesterday to the Pentagon press corps ([transcript](#)).

- The principle focus of the Department's policy is to protect the wishes and the privacy of the families of service members during their time of great loss and grief.
 - Military funeral honors are rendered only at graveside. The ceremony is a way to show the Nation's deep gratitude to those who, in times of war and peace, have faithfully defended their country.
- The Department's policy regarding no media coverage of remains transfer has been in effect since 1991.
 - Courts have repeatedly upheld the Department's policy, citing two key points:
 - To reduce the hardship on the families and friends of the war dead, who may feel obligated to travel great distances to attend arrival ceremonies at Dover AFB if such ceremonies were held.
 - To protect the privacy of the families and friends of the dead, who may not want media coverage of caskets being unloaded at Dover AFB. In this regard, the court noted that the bereaved might be upset at public display of the caskets of their loved ones.
- The policy balances the desires of the families to maintain their privacy against the media's First Amendment rights.
- The purpose of sending the remains to Dover AFB is to prepare them for return to their family and loved ones.
 - Honors are not rendered at Dover because their mission is to identify the remains, conduct necessary forensic examinations, and prepare the remains to be transported to the family so they can be properly and respectfully laid to rest in a place of the family's choosing.
 - The preparation is clinical in nature and does not lend itself to media coverage.
- The National Association of Military Families, an independent organization, has stated, "The current policy is sensitive to the needs of the families."



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Fallujah and former Ba'athists – April 22, 2004

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority, briefed the press today in Baghdad. Following are highlights on the situation in Fallujah, and the issue of former members of the Ba'ath party serving in the new Iraqi army.

Attached to this set of talking points is a news article about Fallujah's violent history. It was written by Jim Garamone of the American Forces Press Service, who traveled to Iraq and the Middle East region last week with Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The article is also posted to the Defense Link web site (www.defenselink.mil).

Fallujah

- **Discussions are continuing in Fallujah to resolve the situation peacefully.**
 - The Coalition's message to the people of Fallujah remains the same:
 - Heavy and illegal weapons must be turned in.
 - Of the weapons received thus far, few are in working order. The Coalition is seeking a serious show of commitment and wants the heavy weapons responsible for the recent engagements in Fallujah brought in.
 - Fallujans must work to remove foreign fighters, Special Republican guard, former Fedayeen Saddam, Mukhabarat (Iraqi intelligence service), drug users and other dangerous and violent criminals from using Fallujah as a base of operations to conduct their operations of violence and terrorist acts.
- **While the Coalition remains willing to continue discussions in Fallujah, time is running out.**
 - The U.S. military stands poised and ready to act, ready to resume hostilities on short notice.
 - The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force continues aggressive patrols and offensive operations outside Fallujah, as well as providing humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Fallujah.

De-Ba'athification

- 9 **The de-Ba'athification of Iraq is both a difficult and necessary process that Iraqis must go through in order to come to terms with their past.**
 - There is no room in the new Iraq for the Ba'athist ideology and for the senior members of the former regime who played a role in the worst Ba'athist crimes and brutality.
- **While the policy on de-Ba'athification must remain as it is, its implementation should be reformed.**
 - Some Iraqis have complained the appeals process is slow, and excludes innocent and capable people who were Ba'athists in name only from playing a role in Iraq's reconstruction.
 - The exceptions and appeals process must be timely in order to be effective.
 - Ambassador Bremer will address these issues in an address he delivers to the Iraqi people Friday.
- **As the Iraqi army increases in size and responsibility, it will need senior commanding officers.**
 - It takes 10 to 15 years and more to train senior colonels and generals.
 - There are many senior officers remaining in Iraq who can meet the criteria established in the de-Ba'athification process and contribute to Iraq's future.
 - It has always been expected that senior-level military officers would play a role in the new Iraqi army. It has also always been part of the plan that these individuals would be fully vetted to ensure that had no hand in the Ba'athist horrors.
 - The policy on including senior level military in Iraq's new army has not changed. The Coalition is studying how to improve implementation of the de-Ba'athification process, so Iraq's army can benefit from the expertise of thoroughly vetted senior military officers.

- To take disparate memos, reports and legal memoranda, regardless of their context or purpose, and put them together to suggest the government told people to torture prisoners is distorting the facts.

INTERROGATION INTELLIGENCE - SAVING LIVES

- Detention and interrogation operations at Guantanamo and other locations support the Global War on and save lives by removing enemies from the
 - The interrogations at Guantanamo are an example of how the United States has worked meticulously to collect life-saving intelligence, while consistently going above and beyond what is required by international law.
- Conditions at Guantanamo are stable, secure, safe and humane.
 - Such an environment sets the conditions for interrogators to work successfully and to gain valuable information from detainees because they have built a relationship of trust, not fear.
 - Those who have visited the prison – including many members of Congress -- agree that the conditions are clearly humane.
- The interrogations that have been conducted over the past two and a half years have saved the lives of U.S. and Coalition soldiers in the field.
 - The information also saves the lives of innocent civilians at home and abroad.
- In **Iraq** intelligence
 - Led to the capture of Saddam Hussein, the deaths of his sons, the capture of his top lieutenants.
 - Has helped Coalition forces intercept weapons caches and communications, plus identify terrorist and insurgent groups and intercept their funds.
 - Has resulted in information Coalition forces can use to conduct raids to gather more intelligence and stop insurgents from more destruction.
 - Helped Coalition forces conduct successful raids against insurgents and other enemies of the Iraqi people.
- At **Guantanamo** the government is holding and interrogating people who are a clear danger to the States and the Coalition. These detainees are providing valuable information in the Global War on Information has been gathered from individuals
 - An individual who attempted to enter the United States who was later captured in Pakistan. The individual has links to a financier of the 9/11 plot.
 - An al Qaeda member who served as an explosives trainer for the terrorist group and designed a prototype shoe bomb for destroying airplanes and a magnetic mine for attacking ships.
 - Individual associated with senior al Qaeda members who were working on explosives to use against U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, April 21, 2004 – A certain amount of lawlessness has always been a part of life in Fallujah, Defense Department officials said recently.

While U.S. Marines stand ready inside the city, anti-coalition forces continue to attack in defiance of a ceasefire agreement. The city is a hotbed of anti-coalition activity, and has been since the U.S. troops entered the area in April last year.

But Fallujah's reputation for violence didn't start when the coalition rolled into town. It has always had the taste of what Americans would call the Wild West.

While Iraq is laced with antiquities, Fallujah isn't one of them. Just after World War II, the population of the town was around 10,000. The city, about 40 miles west of Baghdad, is on the edge of the desert, and now has about 300,000 citizens. It is a dry and arid landscape, made productive only because of extensive irrigation from the nearby Euphrates River.

It was, however, located on the main routes into Jordan and Syria. And in crime, as in real estate, location is everything. The city was on the main route for smugglers, and sheltered a number of very successful crime lords. The area is poor, and the villages surrounding the city still shelter subsistence farmers and their families. The smugglers were a source of money – even wealth – for those in the region. Even government officials sheltered the smugglers, DoD officials said.

When Saddam Hussein took power in 1979, the city received a boost. Many of the people in Fallujah supported Saddam, and many of his closest advisors, highest-ranking military officers and high-ranking members of the Baath Party came from Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit and other areas in the center of the Sunni Triangle. Arab tribes in and around the city also owed fealty to Saddam and became bastions of the regime.

Hussein returned the favor by building factories in the city and providing jobs for his chosen people.

Fallujah took a number of hits in the first Gulf War. News reports indicate that in one instance, a U.S. bomber tried to take out Fallujah's bridge over the Euphrates. The bomb missed and allegedly killed 200 Iraqis in the city market.

Following the Gulf War, the city became an even larger smuggling center, this time with government encouragement, officials said. Saddam encouraged the smugglers to skirt the U.N.-imposed sanctions on Iraq.

Since the U.S.-led liberation of Iraq, former regime supporters have allied themselves with foreign fighters who seem to be entering Iraq via Syria, officials said. U.S. officials suspect that members of al Qaeda affiliate Ansar al-Islam have cells in the city. Other terror groups have allied themselves with former regime elements and Sunni extremists, making for a very volatile mix.

Officials said these groups intimidate the larger population of Fallujah, and these citizens seem to be caught in the middle. If the people of Fallujah cooperate with the former regime members, then coalition forces will come after them. If they cooperate with the coalition, then they will be killed.

Terrorists have launched attacks against coalition forces, Iraqis supporting coalition efforts such as police and members of the Civil Defense Corps and against everyday civilians.

The Sunni Triangle became a haven for foreign fighters and anti-coalition elements. Attacks mounted against coalition and Iraqi targets. When coalition forces captured Saddam in December, the number of attacks dipped. But on Feb. 12, former regime elements launched an attack against U.S. Central Command chief Army Gen. John Abizaid, who was visiting the area.

On March 31, anti-coalition forces attacked an SUV with four American security specialists. The attackers killed the men, and then a crowd mutilated their bodies. The Marines of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force launched Operation Vigilant Resolve on April 4.

On April 10, the Marines announced a unilateral ceasefire that allows humanitarian relief to reach the residents of the city. The Marines have remained in this posture since then, replying only when fired upon by anti-coalition forces. (end)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update – April 20, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld, Gen. Pace Briefing

Secretary Rumsfeld and Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, today briefed the Pentagon press corps on progress in Iraq, including the situations in southern Iraq and Fallujah. Following are highlights.

- The Coalition is working with moderate Shi'a leadership in southern Iraq to resolve the stand-off with militia from radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
 - The moderate Shi'as, like the vast majority of Iraqis, want freedom and the rule of law take root in Iraq.
- Discussions in Fallujah continue, led by local and national Iraqi leaders.
 - The current state of affairs cannot continue indefinitely.
 - The Coalition will not allow the thugs and assassins in Fallujah who oppose peace and freedom to carve out portions of the city.
 - These dead-enders are trying to hold back progress through terror and intimidation. They aim to foment civil war among Sunnis and Shi'as, block the progress on the path to Iraqi self-rule and drive out the Coalition.
 - The dead-enders will fail in this test of wills. Saddam's remnants will not be allowed to determine the fate of 25 million Iraqis.
- U.S. forces are performing well, and the American people are grateful for their skill and courage. Their strength and sacrifices are a reflection of the strength of the American people. Americans remember those wounded or killed and their families.

BG Kimmitt, Dan Senor Briefing

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, senior spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority, today briefed press in Baghdad. Following are highlights.

- The Coalition has reemphasized to all parties involved in talks to end the stand-off in Fallujah that the Coalition remains very serious in its goal to peacefully resolve the situation.
 - If the peaceful track does not play itself out and there is not a serious effort by all parties, major hostilities will resume on short notice.
- The 36th Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Battalion's performance during recent combat operations in Fallujah is noteworthy. In the view of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, the battalion distinguished itself as a trustworthy and capable Iraqi security force. Their performance will serve as an ICDC benchmark for future operations.

Announcement on U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

President Bush yesterday announced his intention to nominate John Negroponte as U.S. ambassador to Iraq. Currently Mr. Negroponte serves as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, a post he has held since September 2001.

If the U.S. Senate confirms him, he would be the first ambassador at the new U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, which is slated to open following the June 30 transfer of sovereignty. At that time, the Coalition Provisional Authority will be dissolved.

([Link to the ambassador's response to the president's announcement](#); [link to the ambassador's biography](#).)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Detainee Policy – April 19, 2004

Tomorrow the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on three cases involving detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The court will decide a narrow aspect of detainee policy - whether or not federal district courts have the jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus cases for detainees at Guantanamo. The consolidated cases are *Al Oda v. United States*, *Rasul v. Bush* and *Ghrebi v. Bush* and *Rumsfeld*.

Below is background on the detainee situation and military commissions.

Guantanamo Detainee Status

- There are approximately 595 detainees at Guantanamo.
- The numbers of detainees in Guantanamo are a small percentage of those scooped up in the Global War on Terror. Of the roughly 10,000 people originally detained in Afghanistan, fewer than 10 percent were brought to Guantanamo.
- One hundred forty-six detainees have departed Guantanamo,
 - 134 were transferred for release.
 - 12 have been transferred for continued detention (seven to Russia, four to Saudi Arabia and one to Spain).
- Decisions to transfer or release detainees are based on many factors, including whether the detainee is believed to pose a threat to the United States and whether he has further intelligence value.
- The releases are not without risk. At least one released detainee has gone back to the fight. This is further evidence that these individuals are dedicated to their cause and have been trained to be deceptive.
- Detainees are treated humanely: They are given three culturally appropriate meals, have opportunity for prayer and receive exceptional medical attention.
- The United States does not permit, tolerate or condone torture by its employees under any circumstances; U.S. personnel are required to follow this policy when questioning the detainees.

Military Commissions

- The military commission process provides for a full and fair trial while protecting national security information.
- The commission includes fundamental principles of justice such as: the presumption of innocence, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, representation by defense counsel, and the ability to present evidence and call witnesses.
- The concept of detaining those captured during armed conflict is not new.
 - In every war the United States has fought, the U.S. has detained the enemy without lawyers, without charges, and released them at the end of the conflict when the threat had passed.
- Removing enemy combatants from the battlefield allows Coalition troops to move more freely. Detaining and interrogating them helps the Coalition gain valuable information about terrorist activities.
- The Department of Defense has no desire to hold detainees longer than necessary. The Department will work diligently to resolve all cases.
- Military commissions have historically been used to try violators of the law of war. The commissions take into account national security interests and the unique battlefield environment associated with the Global War on Terror.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Troop Extensions in Iraq – April 15, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld and Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced today that about 20,000 troops in Iraq will have their tours extended for 90 days in Iraq and up to 120 days deployed before returning home. Following is information on the announcement.

- The United States is committed to providing a secure environment in Iraq that will allow the country to become free, democratic and at peace with itself and its neighbors.
- As the June 30 date for transition to sovereignty draws nearer, forces in Iraq that oppose the country's progress are becoming more desperate.
- The commanders on the ground have requested additional combat capability for Iraq. Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have pledged that commanders will get the troops and equipment they need to accomplish their mission.
- The Secretary has approved the extension of about 20,000 forces currently in theater, of which about one-quarter are National Guard and Reserve personnel, for up to 90 additional days in Iraq and up to 120 days deployed.
- The 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment comprise the bulk of combat forces being extended in Iraq; they are being supported by Army National Guard and Reserve combat support and combat support personnel.
- Of the roughly 115,000 troops that have been scheduled to rotate out, some 36,000 are still in the theater. Of those 36,000, about 20,000 will be retained for a period while the remainder will continue their rotations home.
- The troop extensions will allow the United States and the Coalition to meet the short-term security challenges in Iraq. The plan minimizes the impact on current and future force rotations requirements, and on service members, their families and their employers.
- The troop extensions demonstrate both the ability of the United States to provide the force structure that the commanders need, and the commitment of the United States to providing a safe and secure environment for the Iraqi people as they transition to a new government and rebuild their country.
- The plan is capability based; when a unit's capabilities are no longer needed, the unit will be released.
- The Department of Defense remains committed to managing the force by making sure that the right people with the right skill sets are in the right jobs. The Department will continue to transform the force for the future.
- America is grateful for the sacrifices that our troops, their families and their employers make while our nation is at war.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – April 12, 2004

- **Areas in the south that have been under attack by Muqtada al-Sadr's militia have been**
 - Al Kut, Nasariyah and the Hillah area are under control.
 - The holy city of Najaf is still under the control of al-Sadr, and his forces have some presence in Karbala. Coalition forces are in the vicinity of Najaf, a holy city where religious celebrations were taking place, and are prepared to conduct offensive operations to eliminate the final elements of al-Sadr's influence.
 - The Iraqi people have cooperated in stabilizing the area. The situation was not a Shi'a uprising.
 - The mission of the Coalition forces is to kill or capture al-Sadr.
 - The Iraqi Governing Council intends to bring al-Sadr to justice.
- **Coalition forces have continued to suspend offensive operations in Fallujah order to allow**
 - Marines in Fallujah remain equipped and ready to continue operations if ordered. However, the Coalition at this point is working a political track to restore legitimate Iraqi control of the city.
- **Iraq's security problems must ultimately be solved by Iraqis, not the United**
 - It will take time to stand up credible and capable Iraqi security forces that will be able to assume the internal and external security missions in the country.
 - There were a number of police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units in the south which did not stand up to the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr; however, there have been strong performances by units in other locations, such as Fallujah,
 - Iraq's security forces will become the bulwark against terrorism and anti-democratic forces in the country, because the Iraqi people support them in their mission.
 - Special operating forces will help train the Iraqi security forces.
- **The military operations in Iraq have been very precise.**
 - U.S. troops have attempted to protect civilians to the best of their ability.
 - Arab press, in particular Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, are falsely reporting that U.S. Marines are targeting civilians.
- **The Coalition will continue to confront the organizations and elements who want to use mob violence intimidation to determine who rules**
 - As the June 30 transition to sovereignty date draws closer, those who oppose democracy in Iraq will become more desperate. They will use any means necessary – including combat, intimidation and terror – to try to derail the process.
 - Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces remain resolved to attack, defeat and kill these elements in order to provide a security situation in Iraq that allows the democratic process to move forward.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – April 9, 2004

- The Coalition's offensive and civil military operations are continuing throughout Iraq in support of the Coalition's multiple objectives:
 - To restore order and eliminate anti-Coalition forces in Fallujah.
 - To destroy Muqtada al-Sadr's militia in the central and southern provinces.
 - To continue progress made in rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, its economy and its transition to sovereignty.
- Coalition forces unilaterally suspended offensive operations in Fallujah today in order to facilitate:
 - A meeting of Iraqi Governing Council representatives with leaders of the community and anti-Coalition forces.
 - The distribution of humanitarian relief supplies and tending to the wounded.
 - Coalition forces are retaining the inherent right of self-defense and will respond to continued attacks accordingly while offensive operations have been suspended.
 - The operations in Fallujah are not punitive. Those citizens who want democracy in Iraq have nothing to fear from the Coalition.
 - Approximately 25 to 30 percent of the operation conducted inside Fallujah is being conducted by an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps unit.
 - Coalition troops go to extraordinary lengths to minimize civilian casualties and minimize collateral structural damage.
- The United States and Coalition forces are conducting offensive operations against militia led by Muqtada al-
 - The Coalition intends to destroy the Sadr militia and all of its elements.
 - The vast majority of moderate Shi'a are denouncing al Sadr's activities.
- U.S. forces are restoring order and are in
 - In the west in al Anbar province (which includes Ar Ramadi and Fallujah), Ramadi has been quiet today.
 - Coalition forces are firmly in control of Baghdad, including Sadr City.
 - In Karbala, the Coalition and Iraqi security continue their presence inside the city.
 - Sadr militia have been observed in some parts of the city.
 - To allow the observance of Arba'in, the Coalition will take a passive role to allow the estimated number of 1.2 million pilgrims to make their observances with Iraqi security forces and local authorities to take the lead.
 - In Najaf, Sadr militia are currently the predominant force inside the city.
 - The Coalition bases outside and ringing the city remain vigilant, maintaining force protection status, and carefully watching the Arba'in festivities.
 - In Kut, the Coalition expects to have firm control of all government facilities and Iraqi police stations on Saturday.
 - In Nasiriyah – the Italian brigade reports that resistance is minor and manageable.
- There is a small faction representing different elements which does not want democracy to succeed
 - These elements are becoming more desperate as the June 30 sovereignty date approaches.
- Coalition military forces will conduct powerful, deliberate and very robust military operations until the job is done. The Coalition will continue the attacks until Sadr's influence is eliminated and his militia is no longer a threat to Iraq and its citizens.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – April 7, 2004

9 **The U.S. will take military action against enemies of the Iraqi people.**

- The U.S. will take robust military action as necessary to deal with challenges to Iraq's transition to sovereignty.
- U.S. forces are on the offense, The United States, its Coalition partners and Iraqi security forces are taking the battle to the terrorists,
- Military plans are being implemented that systematically address the situations currently faced by the U.S. in Iraq.
- Due to a major troop rotation, there is a planned increase in the number of U.S. troops in the CENTCOM area of responsibility and in Iraq. The military is taking advantage of that increase and will likely manage the pace of redeployments to allow seasoned troops with relationships with local populations to see the current situation through.

➤ **The vast majority of Iraqis want freedom for their country.**

- This is an important moment in Iraq's history -- the future of the Iraqi people is at stake. The stakes are high for Iraq, the region, and the world.
- Iraq is in a power play between those who favor terrorism and a return to oppression and those determined to have freedom and self-government.
- The U.S. has no intention of allowing Iraq's movement toward a better future to be undermined by former regime elements -- the enemies of a free Iraq, who include:
 - Ba'athists, Iraqi extremists and extremists from outside Iraq.
 - Members of the Zarqawi network.
 - The estimated few thousand lightly-armed members of the so-called Mahdi Army -- gangs associated with Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

➤ **As the June 30 date for Iraq's transition to self-governance approaches, those opposed to a free Iraq will grow increasingly desperate.**

- The terrorists are threatened by the Iraqi people's progress toward self-government, because they know that they will have no future in a free Iraq.
 - They know, as al Qaeda associate Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi wrote in a recently-intercepted letter: "Democracy is coming," and there will be no excuse thereafter for their attacks.
 - They know that the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people oppose them and that, given a free choice, the Iraqi people will choose the rule of law, not rule by murderers.

➤ **The United States will stay until the job is done.**

- As President Bush said, the United States did not charge hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq and pay a bitter cost of casualties to liberate 25 million people, only to retreat before a band of thugs and assassins.
- The U.S. is facing a test of will, and will meet that test.
- The will of the Iraqi people is also being tested. They will choose freedom and the chance to live a decent life over more tyranny and oppression.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – NATO and Iraq – April 6, 2004

NATO

Secretary Rumsfeld today is in Norfolk, Va., for a NATO meeting on transformation.

- Last week, NATO welcomed seven new countries to the Alliance -- Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. These countries understand the meaning of political freedom, and value it greatly.
- All 26 NATO allies have forces in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and 17 have forces in both.
- In the past year, NATO has made impressive accomplishments, including:
 - Standing up the Transformation Command in Norfolk;
 - Working to help Poland stand up the multinational division in south-central Iraq; and
 - Deploying NATO forces to lead the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan – NATO's first mission outside of Europe and North America.
- NATO countries must have militaries that are organized, trained, equipped, and deployable in a relatively short period of time so they can contribute to peace and stability in the world.

U.S. Troops in Force Levels in Iraq

- The United States is currently managing the largest troop rotation since World War II.
- The combatant commanders are in the best position to determine troop level needs. They review their needs continuously, and are given the resources they require to meet their mission. They have announced no change in their plans. The current plan is to have approximately 115,000 troops in Iraq after the rotation.
- The Department of Defense is taking action to relieve the temporary stress on the force by:
 - Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces, which now number more than 200,000.
 - Increasing international military participation.
- The June 30 deadline for the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq refers to the political governance of the country; it does not apply to security responsibility. U.S. and Coalition forces will stay in Iraq to help the Iraqi people secure and stabilize their country.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – Operation Vigilant Resolve – April 5, 2004

Following are highlights of Operation Vigilant Resolve and the arrest of Mustafa al-Yacoubi, who is accused of brutally murdering an ayatollah one year ago in front of a shrine.

- **Iraqi security forces, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and special operations forces have Operation Vigilant Resolve in Al Anbar Province in western**
 - The operation's mission is to confront anti-Coalition and anti-Iraqi elements in Fallujah.
 - More than 1,300 personnel have established traffic control points around the city. A curfew from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. has also been imposed.
 - These actions are the first in a series to attack anti-Coalition and anti-Iraqi forces, reestablish security in the city and begin the process of civil military assistance projects.
- **The Coalition is working with community leaders and authorities in Fallujah who wish to move forward to establish an Iraq that is free, democratic and peaceful.**
 - The violence in Fallujah is in no way representative of the overall situation in Iraq.
 - Fallujah is a small part of the country and the people who murdered Americans last week are a small minority of the population there.
 - The vast majority of Iraqis have expressed their outrage and shame at the incident-- they say it is not representative of the people of Iraq.
 - The operation's tactics are appropriate. The operation is directed at a small number of individuals who are trying to thwart progress in Iraq.
- **Iraqi police today formally arrested Mustafa**
 - Al-Yacoubi was arrested in connection with the murder of Ayatollah Sayyed Abdul Majeed al-Khoi, a respected advocate for human rights who was shot and stabbed to death last April in front of one of the world's holiest shrines.
 - An Iraqi judge issued a warrant for al-Yacoubi's arrest as the result of an Iraqi criminal investigation and indictment.
 - Al-Yacoubi is in Iraqi police custody. He will be tried by Iraqi judges in Iraqi courts under Iraqi laws.
 - Coalition authorities on Monday announced that an Iraqi judge has issued an arrest warrant for Muqtada al Sadr, a Shi'ite cleric. The warrant is based on evidence that connects al Sadr to the murder of Ayatollah al-Khoi.

Coalition Forces Update

- **More than 3,700 South Korean soldiers will deploy to Iraq, Korean officials announced recently.**
 - The soldiers are expected to deploy mid-June to Irbil or As Sulimaniyah provinces in northeast Iraq. The unit will contain engineers, medics, truck drivers and security and civil affairs personnel.
 - Five hundred South Korean soldiers are based in Nasiriyah. They are mostly engineers and medical personnel.
 - The commitment will make the South Korean contingent the third largest foreign contribution in Iraq after the United States and the United Kingdom.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – Fallujah – April 2, 2004

"[The] events in Fallujah are a dramatic example of the ongoing struggle between human dignity and barbarism. ... The acts we have seen were despicable and inexcusable. They violate the tenets of all religions, including Islam, as well as the foundations of civilized society. Their deaths will not go unpunished. Our sympathy goes out to the families of all, civilian and military, Iraqi and Coalition, who have given their lives in the war to liberate Iraq and free it from terrorism. They have not died in vain.

"These acts are also a crime under law and a crime against the future of Iraq. The Coalition, Americans and others, came here to help the people of Iraq. They came to help Iraq recover from decades of dictatorship, to help the people of Iraq gain the elections, democracy and freedom desired by the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people."

- L. Paul Bremer, Administrator [Coalition Provisional Authority] April 1, 2004.

- The murder and mutilation of four civilian contractors in Fallujah is an unspeakable depravity. Those responsible will be dealt with sternly.
- Coalition forces will respond in a manner that is deliberate, precise and overwhelming.
- U.S., Coalition and Iraqi security forces are resolute in their determination to hunt down and capture these criminals.
- Fallujah is in no way representative of the overall situation in Iraq. Fallujah is a small part of the country and the people who did this are a small minority of the population there.
- The vast majority of Iraqis have expressed their outrage and shame at the incident-- they say it is not representative of the people of Iraq.
- These murders are a painful outrage, but they will not derail the march to stability and democracy in Iraq.
- Iraq remains on track for its transition to sovereignty -- a real opportunity for the Iraqi people to build an Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors and the world; respectful of human rights and the rights of individuals; that sustains a viable economy; and utilizes its resources to benefit the Iraqi people instead of bankrolling weapons and palaces.
 - Over time, progress toward these goals will diminish the root causes of terrorism in the region.
- The U.S. and Coalition will not walk away from its shared commitment to the people of Iraq and to justice. For as long as it takes, the Coalition will continue to do what is necessary for Iraq to defend itself against murderers and terrorists.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Troop Rotation to Iraq – April 1, 2004

The largest U.S. troop rotation since World War II is continuing in Iraq. More than 250,000 U.S. service members are involved. Following are details.

- **Planning for the rotation has been underway for months.**
 - The new units deploying worked with units in Iraq to plan movements and learn their missions.
 - New units began flowing into the region in December.
The rotation is expected to continue through May, when 110,000 service members will be in place, replacing 130,000 troops who have been serving in the region.
- **Approximately 95 percent of the service members deploying to Iraq have arrived in the**
 - More than 90 percent of the cargo has arrived.
 - More than 60 percent of personnel due to return to their home stations have done so.
- **Units rotating out**
 - The 101st Airborne Division (Fort Campbell, Ky). They have been replaced in Mosul by Task Force Olympia, which includes the Stryker Brigade from Fort Lewis, Wash.
 - The 82nd Airborne Division (Fort Bragg, N.C.)
 - The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Fort Carson, Colo.)
 - The 1st Armored Division (Germany and Fort Riley, Kan.)
 - The 173rd Airborne Brigade from Vicenza, Italy;
 - The 4th Infantry Division (Fort Hood, Tex., and Fort Carson, Colo.).
- **Arriving Army units**
 - The 1st Cavalry Division (Fort Hood, Tex.), which will command the 39th Brigade Combat Team from the Arkansas National Guard. The Division will relieve the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad around April 15.
 - 1st Infantry Division (Wurzburg, Germany, and Fort Riley, Kan.) has relieved the 4th ID and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The 30th Brigade Combat Team of the North Carolina National Guard is part of the 1st ID.
- **Arriving Marines**
 - The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Camp Pendleton, Calif.) last week relieved the 82nd Airborne and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Fallujah, Ramadi and western
 - The 1st MEF will command the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley and the 81st Armored Brigade of Washington State National Guard.
- **Iraqi security forces continue to grow.**
 - More than 210,000 Iraqis are involved in security work in their country.
 - A new Iraqi army brigade should be operational when Iraq assumes sovereignty on June 30.

Related Sites:

[3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division \(Stryker Brigade\)](#)

[101st Airborne Division](#)

[82nd Airborne Division](#)

[1st Armored Division](#)

[173rd Airborne Brigade](#)

[4th Infantry Division](#)

[1st Cavalry Division](#)

[39th Brigade Combat Team](#)

[1st Infantry Division](#)

[1st Marine Expeditionary Force](#)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Reconstruction – Partnership for Prosperity – March 30, 2004

Following are highlights from a briefing yesterday by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), retired Admiral David Nash, the director of CPA's Program Management Office, and members of the Iraqi Governing Council. Ambassador Bremer discussed reconstruction in Iraq and the new Partnership for Prosperity. The 2,300 construction projects planned for Iraq that will provide jobs and contribute to the country's economic growth. [\[transcript\]](#)

➤ **Iraq's reconstruction is a major**

- The World Bank estimates that after decades of mismanagement by Saddam Hussein, Iraq needs between \$55 billion and \$60 billion to regain its economic balance.
- The United States has contributed more than \$18 billion for this effort. This commitment is the bedrock of the Partnership for Prosperity.

➤ **An immediate effect of the Partnership for Prosperity will be the rapid creation of jobs in**

- More than 50,000 Iraqis will be working on jobs funded by the Partnership for Prosperity when Iraq assumes sovereignty on June 30.
- Tens of thousands more jobs will be created for Iraqis as the 2,300 projects of the Partnership get underway. These projects will help raise the standard of living in Iraq by improving principal services.

➤ **The Partnership for Prosperity will propel Iraq out of a decades-long economic slump toward a future**

- Managed properly, Iraq's economy can once again provide a decent life with good jobs for all Iraqis.
- Iraq's economic transformation is a twin complement to its political transformation. A free and prosperous Iraq is the best response to the continued threat of terrorism.

➤ **Of the \$18.4 billion grant from the United States, approximately \$12 billion is being spent on construction work, and \$6 billion is being spent on other efforts.**

- Construction work falls into six sectors: electricity; water resources and public works; security and justice; transportation and communications; buildings, health and education; and oil.
- Examples of non-construction work include projects such as civic education, and outright purchases for goods and services such as training, vehicles, weapons and uniforms.

Progress on Health Services

The Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraq's ministries are working to bring fundamental change to the way the Iraqi health system operates. Under the leadership of the Minister of Health, under the direction of the CPA's Director of Health, Dr. Khudair al-Khatib and Jim Havens, the political and technical advisor for Health, we laid the foundation for a stronger, more efficient health care system in Iraq. The Ministry has developed a short and long-term strategic plan, a budget, reorganized its administration, and instituted a financial and balances system to deter and root out corruption.

Other achievements of Iraq's Ministry of Health include:

- Increasing Iraq's health budget: Iraq's health budget in 2002 under Saddam was \$16 million. This year, Iraq's health budget is \$948 million.
- Health care supplies: 30,000 tons of pharmaceuticals and health care supplies have been delivered to facilities across Iraq.
- Hospitals and health centers: 240 Iraqi hospitals and 1,200 primary health centers are operating.
- Vaccinations: More than 30 million doses of children's vaccinations have been distributed.

(For additional information, link to the [CPA web site](#) and the [CPA release](#).)

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U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – 100 Days to Sovereignty – March 24, 2004

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer today marked 100 days until Iraqi sovereignty with a speech to the Iraqi people that notes both successes of the past year and challenges ahead. Following are highlights. The full text can be read on the Coalition Provisional Authority's web site (www.iraqcoalition.org).

The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)

- The TAL, Iraq's interim constitution, lays out the country's path to sovereignty, elections democracy. It protects the vital interests of all
 - The TAL recognizes that Islam enjoys a special place as the religion of most Iraqis, but guarantees the religious beliefs and practices of all citizens.
 - The TAL protects the rights of every Iraqi. They have the right to speak their mind on any subject, to assemble peacefully, to travel freely and the right to privacy.
 - The TAL creates a nation of laws. Every citizen is entitled to the protection of the law. No citizen is above the law.

The Elections Calendar Under the TAL

- Under the TAL, there will be four national elections before the end of
 - The first election, to elect a 275-member National Assembly, must take place no later than Jan. 31, 2005, and earlier if possible.
 - Iraqi voters will elect governorate councils no later than Jan. 31, 2005.
 - A constitution written by the National Assembly must be presented to the people in a general referendum no later than Oct. 15, 2005.
 - The fourth election, for a government elected under the terms of the new constitution, must be held no later than Dec. 15, 2005. This fourth election will bring a directly elected government to power in Iraq.

New Institutions Created in the Next 100 Days

- To ensure that Iraq has the structures to protect its citizens from foreign aggression, an Iraqi Ministry of Defense and a cabinet-level National Security Committee will be created later this week.
 - These institutions will begin working immediately with the Coalition Provisional Authority on security matters.
- To protect Iraqis from the corruption that was rampant in Saddam Hussein's rule, three but cooperating agencies will be created to protect the public
 - The Commission on Public Integrity will enforce anti-corruption laws.
 - The Commission will work with a revitalized Board of Supreme Audit and a newly established Inspectors General.
 - Inspectors have already been appointed to 19 ministries.
- To regulate publicly owned media, an Iraq Public Service Broadcaster Commission will be
 - Under Saddam, the government owned and ran all media outlets.
 - In the new Iraq, government-owned media exist to inform the public, not to promote the political interests of the leaders.
 - This new Commission will be completely independent of the government.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – September 11th Commission - March 23, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld today testified before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Following are highlights from his prepared testimony, which was divided into seven sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Preparing for an Era of Surprise: January 20, 2001 – September 10, 2001; (3) The Day of September 11th; (4) What Steps Have Been Taken Since September 11th; (5) Some Questions That Have Been Posed; (6) Suggestions for the Future; and (7) Conclusion. ([link to full text](#))

Introduction

The world of September 10th is past. We have entered a new security environment, arguably the most dangerous the world has known. And if we are to continue to live as free people, we cannot go back to thinking as we did on September 10th. For if we do -- if we look at the problems of the 21st century through a 20th century prism -- we will come to wrong conclusions and fail the American people.

Preparing for an Era of Surprise: January 20, 2001 – September 10, 2001

It had become increasingly clear that we could no longer afford to treat terrorism as a manageable evil -- that we needed an approach that treated terrorism more like fascism -- as an evil that needed to be not contained, but fought and eliminated.

When this Administration came into office, the President asked the NSC to begin preparing a new counter-terrorism strategy. His instructions were to develop a strategy not simply to contain terrorism, but to deal with it more aggressively -- not to reduce the threat posed by al-Qaeda, but to eliminate the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

The Day of September 11th

A few days after 9/11, I wrote down some thoughts on terrorism, and the new kind of war that had been visited upon us. I noted:

- "It will take a sustained effort to root [the terrorists] out.... The world needs to have realistic expectations. This campaign is a marathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist network, such as al-Qaeda, is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers.
- "The Coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed; rather, they will change and evolve... [E]ach country has a somewhat different perspective and different relationships, views and concerns. It should not be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities in which the U.S. is engaged, while other countries will not.
- "Some will be reluctant to join an effort against terrorism or at least some aspects of our efforts. Terrorists terrorize people. We accept that fact.
- "This is not a war against the people of any country. The regimes that support terrorism terrorize their own people as well. We need to enlist all civilized people to oppose terrorism, and we need to [help] make it safe for them to do so.
- "This is not a war against Islam.... The al-Qaeda terrorists are extremists whose views are antithetical to those of most Muslims. Their actions... are aimed in part at preventing Muslim people from engaging the rest of the world. There are millions of Muslims around the world who we expect to become allies in this struggle."

11-L-0559/OSD/22251

What Steps Have Been Taken Since September 11th

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of Defense has pursued two tracks simultaneously:

- We have prosecuted the Global War on Terror in concert with other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and
- We have continued and, where possible, accelerated, the effort to transform the Department to be able to meet and defeat the threats of the 21st century.

We are having success on both fronts.

What the courageous men and women in uniform have accomplished since our country was attacked 30 months ago is impressive. In the 2½ years since 9/11, with our Coalition partners, they have:

- Overthrown two terrorist regimes, and liberated some 50 million people;
- Hunted down thousands of terrorists and regime remnants in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries;
- Captured or killed 46 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq -- including Saddam Hussein;
- Disrupted terrorist financing;
- Interdicted shipments of chemical and nuclear weapons components bound for terrorist states;
- Disrupted terrorist cells on several continents; and
- Undoubtedly prevented a number of planned terrorist attacks.

Some Questions That Have Been Posed

Some have asked: Why wasn't bin Laden taken out, and if he had been hit, would it have prevented September 11th?

First, I know of no actionable intelligence since January 20, 2001 that would have allowed the U.S. to attack and capture or kill Usama bin Laden. In the 2½ years since September 11th, all the nations of the Coalition have focused a great deal of time, energy and resources on the task of finding him and capturing or killing him. Thus far none of us has succeeded. But we will. It took ten months to capture Saddam Hussein in Iraq -- and Coalition forces had passed by the hole he was hiding in many times during those ten months. They were able to find him only after someone with specific knowledge told us where he was. What that suggests is that it is exceedingly difficult to find a single individual who is determined to not be found.

Second, even if bin Laden had been captured or killed in the weeks before 9/11, no one I know believes it would have prevented 9/11. Killing bin Laden would not have removed the al-Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. Moreover, the sleeper cells that flew the aircraft into the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon were already in the U.S. some months before the attacks. Indeed, if the stars had aligned, actionable intelligence had appeared, which it did not, and if it had somehow been possible to successfully attack him, it would have been a good thing, to be sure, but, regrettably, 9/11 would likely *still* have happened. And, ironically, much of the world in all likelihood would have blamed September 11th on the U.S. as an al-Qaeda retaliation for the U.S. provocation of capturing or killing Usama bin Laden.

Conclusion

Think about what has been done since the September 11th attacks: two state sponsors of terrorism have been removed from power, a 90-nation Coalition has been formed which is cooperating on a number of levels –through diplomacy, law enforcement, military action, financial and economic measures, information and intelligence. Some of these actions are public and seen – still others are unseen, with operations that must remain secret, even in success.

All of these actions are putting pressure on terrorist networks. Taken together, they represent a collective effort that is unprecedented -- which has undoubtedly saved lives, and made us safer than before September 11th.

And yet, despite that pressure and that collective effort, terrorist attacks have continued: in Bali and Baghdad, Jakarta and Jerusalem, Casablanca and Riyadh, Mombasa and Istanbul, and most recently the bombings in Madrid. It is likely -- indeed almost certain -- that, in the period ahead, somewhere, somehow, more terrorist attacks will be attempted -- even here in the United States. Certainly intelligence powerfully points to terrorist efforts to do just that.

What can be done? We can remain vigilant. We can continue the efforts underway to transform the institutions of government – military, intelligence, law enforcement and homeland defense -- to better focus on the threats of the 21st century. We can continue working with allies and partners around the world. And we can continue rooting out terrorist networks, dealing with the proliferation of dangerous weapons of mass murder, and denying terrorists sanctuary.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – OIF Operation Iron Promise - March 22, 2004

Operation Iron Promise

The 1st Armored Division, under the command of MG Martin Dempsey, launched Operation Iron Promise in Iraq last week. Following are details about the operation.

- **Iron Promise targets former regime elements and other extremists in Baghdad who threaten the Iraqi people and stand in the way of a new Iraq.**
 - Iraqi security forces are contributing significantly to Operation Iron Promise. The operation is city-wide, and it involves members of the Iraqi Police Service, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the Iraqi Army and Coalition Forces.
 - The operation will counter the new threats emerging in Baghdad in the past few months, including the linkage between international terrorism and Iraqi extremism.
 - To date, 1st AD troops have conducted 76 battalion operations, captured 115 enemy personnel, 208 weapons, 107 artillery and rocket rounds, and significant quantities of improvised explosive device (IED) materials.
 - The operation's name was carefully chosen to convey to the Iraqi people that as the 1st AD transfers authority to the 1st Cavalry Division, the Coalition will remain committed to defeating Iraq's enemies.
 - Operation Iron Promise is just one of many military actions conducted by the U.S. military, Coalition partners, and Iraqi security forces to bring stabilization and security to Iraq.

Update on Iraqi Security Forces

Iraqis continue to volunteer to protect their country. Following is an update on Iraqi security forces as provided by MG Martin Dempsey during a press briefing in Baghdad on March 18.

Police:

- The goal for the city of Baghdad is to have 19,000 police (a ratio of one-to-300, generally the accepted standard for a modern city).
- There are currently 10,000 police in Baghdad.
- Approximately 2,000 officers will graduate in the next month.
- For every slot available, there are five or six candidates who apply.

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps:

- The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) is fully recruited. They are trained through the platoon level, and within a month they will be trained at the company level.

The New Iraqi Army:

- The 1st AD is mentoring an Iraqi army battalion in Taji.
- By July there will be two additional battalions in Taji, for a total of three battalions.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – Wolfowitz Perspective – March 19, 2004

Following are highlights of a March 18 interview of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz with Jim Lehrer on The NewsHour.

On Avman al-Zawahiri (bin Laden's deputy) and Dismantling al Qaeda

"He's regarded as the number two, but, you know, sometimes Americans, I don't know what it is, but we get obsessed with the silver bullet solution. Obviously getting bin Laden would be a very big thing, but anyone who thinks that that's going to be the end of al Qaeda, the end of these terrorists networks, doesn't understand how they work. They are very decentralized operations, the kind of killing that we saw in Spain just a few days ago. It's not a large number of people. They don't need support from Afghanistan, so you've got to go after them one by one."

On Going to War

"The reason for going to war was because Iraq was in violation of the U.N. Security Council resolution. In fact, there were three major reasons, and if you go back and read Secretary Powell's speech to the U.N. in February of last year, he said specifically it is weapons of mass destruction, it is their support for terrorism, and it's the oppression of their people and we had agreed in fact with Resolution 1441 to limit it to weapons of mass destruction and give them one last and final chance to come clean and he did not come clean."

On Expectations and Challenges

"We expected a war. We expected a very difficult fight. Some things have gone better than we expected. Some things have been tougher. I think what is the heart of our challenge there is the fact that this regime that is defeated and the leader was captured hiding in a hole, nevertheless, has some significant numbers, in the thousands, not in the tens of thousands, but in the thousands of killers who still want to destabilize the society and believe that somehow they can bring back some version of the tyranny. That's the main problem we confront... The other problem we confront is people like Zarqawi, who were basically, if they are not literal members of al Qaeda, they are from the same mind set and they're associated (with those) who believe that if they kill enough people, they can destabilize the country, they can defeat democracy. So that is a challenge."

On the Year Since the War

"I think 25 million of some of the most talented people in the Muslim and Arab world have been liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of the last 100 years. Iraq is no longer a government that supports terrorism. We don't have to worry about them restarting nuclear programs or restarting biological weapons programs, and if you have any doubt about it, I guess I'd encourage people to go read this letter that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, probably the most dangerous terrorist in Iraq today, sent to his colleagues in Afghanistan... They understand that this is a battle for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world, and I think they are afraid they are losing it. I think they are losing." ([link to text of al Zarqawi letter](#))

On the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces

"(The) Coalition is now 35 countries, plus the U.S. The 35th country is Iraq. (There are) some 200,000 Iraqis in the police force, in the civil defense corps and the army who are out there on the front lines fighting for their country, risking their lives, unfortunately sometimes losing their lives. That's where the future lies and that's what has Zarqawi so discouraged. That's why they are one of his big targets."

On Troop Numbers and Intelligence

"It's the combatant commanders who have made the recommendations about what troops are required, and they have gotten what they've asked for. They say that what they need is more intelligence and more Iraqis, not more American troops. Unless you have better intelligence, you are just going to have people there for people to take shots at them and that's not a good thing either. We have a very large force there. It's probably larger than we expected we'd have at this point, but General Abizaid (commander, U.S. Central Command) is asked regularly by the president and by the secretary of defense, do you have what you need and... he gets what he needs."

Links: ([DefendAmerica.mil - Iraq - A Year of Progress](#)); ([DefendAmerica.mil - Iraq Time Line](#))

Following is an op-ed by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld.

New York Times
March 19, 2004

The Price Of Freedom In Iraq

This week, as we mark the one-year anniversary of the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is useful to recount why we have fought. Not long ago I visited South Korea, just as the Korean government was debating whether to send troops to Iraq. In Seoul, I was interviewed by a Korean journalist who was almost certainly too young to have firsthand recollection of the Korean War. She asked me, "Why should Koreans send their young people halfway around the globe to be killed or wounded in Iraq?"

As it happened, I had that day visited a Korean War memorial, which bears the names of every American soldier killed in the war. On it was the name of a close friend of mine from high school, a wrestling teammate, who was killed on the last day of the war. I said to the reporter: "It's a fair question. And it would have been fair for an American to ask, 50 years ago, 'Why should young Americans go halfway around the world to be killed or wounded in Korea?'"

We were speaking on an upper floor of a large hotel in Seoul. I asked the woman to look out the window — at the lights, the cars, the energy of the vibrant economy of South Korea. I told her about a satellite photo of the Korean peninsula, taken at night, that I keep on a table in my Pentagon office. North of the demilitarized zone there is nothing but darkness — except a pinprick of light around Pyongyang — while the entire country of South Korea is ablaze in light, the light of freedom.

Korean freedom was won at a terrible cost — tens of thousands of lives, including more than 33,000 Americans killed in action. Was it worth it? You bet. Just as it was worth it in Germany and France and Italy and in the Pacific in World War II. And just as it is worth it in Afghanistan and Iraq today.

Today, in a world of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and states that sponsor the former and pursue the latter, defending freedom means we must confront dangers before it is too late. In Iraq, for 12 years, through 17 United Nations Security Council resolutions, the world gave Saddam Hussein every opportunity to avoid war. He was being held to a simple standard: live up to your agreement at the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf war; disarm and prove you have done so. Instead of disarming — as Kazakhstan, South Africa and Ukraine did, and as Libya is doing today — Saddam Hussein chose deception and defiance.

Repeatedly, he rejected those resolutions and he systematically deceived United Nations inspectors about his weapons and his intent. The world knew his record: he used chemical weapons against Iran and his own citizens; he invaded Iran and Kuwait; he launched ballistic missiles at Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain; and his troops repeatedly fired on American and British aircraft patrolling the no-flight zones.

Recognizing the threat, in September 2002 President Bush went to the United Nations, which gave Iraq still another "final opportunity" to disarm and to prove it had done so. The next month the president went to Congress, which voted to support the use of force if Iraq did not.

And, when Saddam Hussein passed up that final opportunity, he was given a last chance to avoid war: **48** hours to leave the country. Only then, after every peaceful option had been exhausted, did the president and our coalition partners order the liberation of Iraq.

Americans do not come easily to war, but neither do Americans take freedom lightly. But when freedom and self-government have taken root in Iraq, and that country becomes a force for good in the Middle East, the rightness of those efforts will be just as clear as it is today in Korea, Germany, Japan and Italy.

As the continuing terrorist violence in Iraq reminds us, the road to self-governance will be challenging. But the progress is impressive. Last week the Iraqi Governing Council unanimously signed an interim Constitution. It guarantees freedom of religion and expression; the right to assemble and to organize political parties; the right to vote; and the right to a fair, speedy and open trial. It prohibits discrimination based on gender, nationality and religion, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention. A year ago today, none of those protections could have been even imagined by the Iraqi people.

Today, as we think about the tens of thousands of United States soldiers in Iraq — and in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world fighting the global war on terrorism — we should say to all of them: "You join a long line of generations of Americans who have fought freedom's fight. Thank you."

(end)

Following is an op-ed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

March 19, 2004
The New York Post

Terror is Losing

After the horrific March 2 bombing that killed 170 at Shi'a shrines in Baghdad and Karbala, one Iraqi had an answer for those in the West who wonder if such tactics can work. His words speak to the horror of the events in Spain last week and in Baghdad on Wednesday.

His name is Ali and his Web log said this about the terrorists and their allies: "They are spitting in the face of the wind."

One of the interesting developments in post-Saddam Iraq is the appearance of amateur Web sites, where Iraqis are taking advantage of modern technology to give voice to their newfound freedom. One such site shows Iraqi women demonstrating against Resolution 137, passed by the Iraqi Governing Council, which threatened women's rights.

These women - who were exercising their right of free speech to demonstrate for women's rights - were dressed in very conservative Muslim fashion. Yet, as one of them put it: "We didn't wait all these years without the most basic rights to be denied them now."

An Arab reporter asked if she were Sunni or Shi'a. She snapped: "I'm an Iraqi citizen first and foremost, and I refuse to be asked such a question."

In increasing numbers, likeminded Iraqi women - and men - are making it clear they expect basic rights. People are listening. Not only did this pressure force the repeal of Resolution 137, but, when the new Iraqi interim constitution was signed March 8, it contained assurances of equal rights - and substantial representation - for women.

It also provides for other fundamental pillars of true democracy, including separation of powers and an independent judiciary, rule of law, fundamental civil rights and civilian control of the military. That's a significant step forward that came from heated and healthy political debate - debate that would have been impossible a year ago.

While such debates do show that Iraqis disagree among themselves, they demonstrate - more importantly - that Iraqis can debate those issues openly and democratically. Significantly, in a recent opinion poll of Iraqis, 56 percent said things were going better today than a year ago; 71 percent said they thought they would be better off a year from now.

Last March, Iraqis were suffering under the thumb of one of the most brutal dictatorships of the last hundred years - a regime that industrialized brutality, tortured children to coerce their parents and raped women to punish their relatives. A U.S. Army commander in Iraq told me last July about the excavation of one mass grave where they discovered remains of 80 women and children - with little dresses and toys.

Today, Iraq's era of systematic savagery is over. Thanks to the dedication and courage of American and Coalition military and civilians, the support of the U.S. Congress and the American people, life in Iraq is improving steadily:

* Electricity reached pre-war levels last October, and is on track to reach 150 percent of pre-war levels, despite an infrastructure devastated by Saddam.

* Oil production has reached 2.5 million barrels per day, well ahead of projections.

* Funding for public health care is up **26** times the level under Saddam.

* All 22 universities, **43** technical institutes and colleges opened on time last fall.

* Some 72 million new textbooks will go to primary and secondary schools by the end of this school year, so children will no longer learn arithmetic from books that say "2 Saddams plus 2 Saddams equals 4 Saddams."

One of the most important developments is the increasing role played by Iraqis in providing for the security of their country. Since Baghdad was liberated, Iraqi security forces went from almost none to the 200,000 who currently serve in various security roles.

Today, Iraqis who are fighting and dying for the "New Iraq" are numerically the largest member of the Coalition. While they are not as well-trained or equipped as American forces, they have many advantages because they know the country and the language. They're the "home team" and enjoy tremendous popular support - to the terrorists' frustration.

It is altogether appropriate that Iraqis should fight to defend their country, and it is heartening that they continue to volunteer in large numbers despite the enemy's attempts to frighten them.

A few weeks ago, after an attack on a police station in Fallujah, when the U.S. offered Iraqi Civil Defense Corpsmen help in subduing the attackers, they said, no thanks - we want to do this job ourselves so people will know we can.

Ali, the Iraqi blogger, put such attacks into a larger perspective: "Some people still wonder what would be the relation between the liberation of Iraq and [the] war on terrorism. I think that the fact that nearly all the terrorists are gathered on our land to fight so fiercely should be more than enough explanation." He added: "We are . . . showing [other Arabs] what they can achieve once they are free . . . I see these evil powers show their true and ugly face and play their last card - surer than ever that we are winning."

WHEN 9/11 changed everything, it was that same determination that led America to take up our own fight against terrorists. Perhaps no one understands better than New Yorkers just how much changed that day. What happened in lower Manhattan, at the Pentagon and in Shanksville meant we could no longer allow the world's most brutal tyrants to traffic with terrorists - or allow the Middle East to breed terrorists on a massive scale.

Today, nothing is more important to world security than fighting these terrorists where they live. Or sustaining progress in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Winning in both countries is imperative. But it is only part of the larger war on terrorism. It won't be over with one victory in Afghanistan or another in Iraq - important as they are. It won't be over when we capture or kill Bin Laden.

The recent homicide bombings in Spain - a country that has taken a courageous lead against global terrorism - warn us that every free and open society is vulnerable. Free nations must remain united in fighting for freedom against a threat that is as evil and as dangerous as the totalitarian threats of the last century.

It's an enormous job. In Iraq alone, as the president often reminds us, it won't be quick and it won't be easy. Saddamist killers and foreign terrorists are doing all they can to stop progress. However, a recently intercepted letter from Abu Masab al-Zarqawi - a major terrorist mastermind in Iraq - to his al Qaeda associates in Afghanistan suggests that he is getting discouraged: The geography is unfriendly and Iraqis are too, the writer laments. Every time they mount an attack to drive Iraqis apart, they come together instead.

"Democracy" in Iraq, he writes, "is coming," and that will mean "suffocation" for the terrorists. Zarqawi says his best hope is to start a Shi'a-Sunni civil war by killing Shi'a.

Democracy is coming to Iraq. And we'll be there to see it. When sovereignty is handed over to Iraqis on July 1, our engagement will change. But our commitment will not. We'll stay in Iraq until our job is done.

Last July, an American Army colonel in the 101st Air Assault Division told me that he explained that job to his soldiers like this: He told them that what they're doing in Iraq is every bit as important as what their grandfathers did in Germany or Japan in World War II or what their fathers did in Korea or in Europe during the Cold War.

Those soldiers are changing history in a way that will make America and the world safer. Our soldiers are making it possible for people to build free and stable governments that will join the fight against terrorism - and our children and grandchildren will be safer for it.

Someday, Iraq will be one of these free and prospering nations. As Ali put it so well: "It's just a matter of time."

(end)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq - International Support, Security- March 17, 2004

International Support

- A broad coalition of nations is providing support for efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq: 34 countries, including 11 of the 19 NATO countries, have provided more than 25,000 troops to secure in Iraq.
- There are two multinational divisions in Iraq: one led by the United Kingdom in central-south Iraq and one led by Poland with forces from 17 nations.
- In southern Iraq, the transition to Multinational Division Southeast and Multinational Division South is complete.
- Japanese troops are now part of Multinational Division South. In their first deployment into a combat environment since World War II, they are providing medical assistance, water supplies and helping to reconstruct public facilities.
- The international community has pledged at least \$32 billion to improve schools, health care, roads, water and electricity supplies, agriculture and other essential services.
- The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and 38 countries have pledged to extend loans and grants to Iraq. Other nations are contributing humanitarian assistance, extending export credits and reducing Iraqi debt.
- The UN Security Council on Oct. 16, 2003, unanimously approved Resolution 1511 that calls on member states to support the work of the multinational force in Iraq.

Security

- Forty-six of the 55 most wanted Hussein regime members have been captured or killed, including the brutal dictator himself, whose capture sent a powerful message to the Iraqi people that the tyranny is over.
- More than 200,000 Iraqis now provide security for their fellow citizens. Iraqi security forces now account for the majority of all forces in Iraq.
 - Nationwide, approximately 77,000 police officers have been hired.
 - The new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps has more than 30,000 personnel operating and another 3,800 in training.
 - Approximately 20,000 Iraqis serve in the Border Police Force.
 - 73,000 are in the Facility Protection Service Service, protecting vital infrastructure from sabotage and terrorist attacks.
 - More than 3,000 soldiers serve in the new Iraqi Army.
- Intelligence in Iraq has improved since the capture of Saddam Hussein: more Iraqis are telling Coalition soldiers about anti-Coalition forces, foreign fighters, and the locations of improvised explosive devices and weapons caches. Saddam's capture is also allowing the Coalition to apprehend more mid-level financiers and organizers.
- Success in training Iraqis as security forces is allowing U.S. troops to rotate back to their home stations. In May, the Coalition's forces will decrease from approximately 130,000 troops to approximately 110,000.

Washington Post
March 13, 2004
Pg. 11

Pentagon Shadow Loses Some Mystique

Feith's Shops Did Not Usurp Intelligence Agencies on Iraq, Hill Probers Find

By Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer

In February 2002, Christina Shelton, a career Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, was combing through old intelligence on Iraq when she stumbled upon a small paragraph in a CIA report from the mid-1990s that stopped her.

It recounted a contact between some Iraqis and al Qaeda that she had not seen mentioned in current CIA analysis, according to three defense officials who work with her. She spent the next couple of months digging through 12 years of intelligence reports on Iraq and produced a briefing on alleged contacts Shelton felt had been overlooked or underplayed by the CIA.

Her boss, Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy and the point man on Iraq, was so impressed that he set up a briefing for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who was so impressed he asked her to brief CIA Director George J. Tenet in August 2002. By summer's end, Shelton had also briefed deputy national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley and Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby.

Shelton's analysis, and the White House briefings that resulted, are new details about a small group of Pentagon analysts whose work has cast a large shadow of suspicion and controversy as Congress investigates how the administration used intelligence before the Iraq war.

Congressional Democrats contend that two Pentagon shops -- the Office of Special Plans and the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group -- were established by Rumsfeld, Feith and other defense hawks expressly to bypass the CIA and other intelligence agencies. They argue that the offices supplied the administration with information, most of it discredited by the regular intelligence community, that President Bush, Cheney and others used to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.

But interviews with senior defense officials, White House and CIA officials, congressional sources and others yield a different portrait of the work done by the two Pentagon offices.

Neither the House nor Senate intelligence committees, for example, which have been investigating prewar intelligence for eight months, have found support for allegations that Pentagon analysts went out and collected their own intelligence, congressional officials from both parties say. Nor have investigators found that the Pentagon analysis about Iraq significantly shaped the case the administration made for going to war.

At the same time, the Pentagon operation was created, at least in part, to provide a more hard-line alternative to the official intelligence, according to interviews with current and former defense and intelligence officials. The two offices, overseen by Feith, concluded that Saddam Hussein's Iraq and al Qaeda were much more closely and conclusively linked than the intelligence community believed.

In this sense, the offices functioned as a pale version of the secret "Team B" analysis done by administration conservatives in the mid-1970s, who concluded the intelligence community was underplaying the Soviet military threat. Rumsfeld, in particular, has a history of skepticism about the intelligence community's analysis, including assessments of the former Soviet Union's military ability and of threats posed by ballistic missiles from North Korea and other countries.

Rumsfeld's known views -- and his insistence before the war that overthrowing Hussein was part of the war on terrorism -- only enhanced suspicion about the aims and role played by Feith's offices.

Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), a member of the intelligence panel, charged that Feith's work "reportedly involved the review, analysis and promulgation of intelligence outside of the U.S. intelligence community."

Levin pressed Tenet on Tuesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee: "Is it standard operating procedure for an intelligence analysis such as that to be presented at the NSC [National Security Council] and the office of the vice president without you being part of the presentation? Is that typical?"

"My experience is that people come in and may present those kinds of briefings on their views of intelligence," responded Tenet, who said he had not known about the briefings at the time. "But I have to tell you, senator, I'm the president's chief intelligence officer; I have the definitive view about these subjects. From my perspective, it is my view that prevails."

Hussein's Role

Feith, who worked on the NSC staff in the Reagan administration, is a well-known conservative voice on Israel policy who once urged the Israeli prime minister to repudiate the Oslo peace accords. His views are a source of tension between him and foreign policy officials at the State Department and elsewhere who advocate concessions be made by Palestinians and Israel to achieve a peace settlement.

No sooner had Bush announced that the United States was at war on terrorism than it became Feith's job to come up with a strategy for executing such a war.

"We said to ourselves, 'We are at war with an international terrorist network that includes organizations, state supporters and nonstate supporters. What does that mean to be at war with a network?' " Feith said in an interview.

But Feith felt he needed to bring on help in the Pentagon for another reason, too, said four other senior current and former Pentagon civilians: the belief that the CIA and other intelligence agencies dangerously undervalued threats to U.S. interests.

"The strategic thinking was the Middle East is going down the tubes. It's getting worse, not better," said one former senior Pentagon official who worked closely with Feith's offices. "I don't think we thought there was objective evidence that could be got from CIA, DIA, INR," he added, referring to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's main intelligence office, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Feith's office worked not only on "how to fight Saddam Hussein but also how to fight the NSC, the State Department and the intelligence community," which were not convinced of Hussein's involvement in terrorism, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Feith set up the first of his two shops, the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, to "study al Qaeda worldwide suppliers, chokepoints, vulnerabilities and recommend strategies for rendering terrorist networks ineffective," according to a January 2002 document sent to DIA.

The group never grew larger than two people, said Feith and William J. Luti, who was director of the Office of Special Plans and deputy undersecretary of defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

The evaluation group's largest project was what one participant called a "sociometric diagram" of links between terrorist organizations and their supporters around the world, mostly focused on al Qaeda, the Islamic Resistance Movement (or Hamas), Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. It was meant to challenge the "conventional wisdom," said one senior defense official, that terrorist groups did not work together.

It looked "like a college term paper," said one senior Pentagon official who saw the analysis. It was hundreds of connecting lines and dots footnoted with binders filled with signals intelligence, human source reporting and even thirdhand intelligence accounts of personal meetings between terrorists.

One of its key and most controversial findings was that there was a connection between secular states and fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups such as al Qaeda.

If anything, the analysis reinforced the view of top Pentagon officials, including Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Paul N. Wolfowitz and Feith, that Hussein's Iraq had worrisome contacts with al Qaeda over the last decade that could only be expected to grow.

The evaluation group's other job was to read through the huge, daily stream of intelligence reporting on terrorism and "highlight things of interest to Feith," said one official involved in the process. "We were looking for connections" between terrorist groups.

From time to time, senior defense officials called bits of intelligence to the attention of the White House, they said.

Feith said the worldwide threat study itself never left the Pentagon. It helped inform the military strategy on the war on terrorism, but it was only one small input into that process, he said.

Mainly, the work of the evaluation group, Luti said, "went into the corporate memory."

'Very Helpful'

In the summer of 2002, Shelton, who had been working virtually on her own, was joined by Christopher Carney, a naval reservist and associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. Together they completed their study on the links between al Qaeda and Iraq.

"It was interesting enough that I brought it to Secretary Rumsfeld because Secretary Rumsfeld is well known for being a particularly intelligent reader of intelligence," Feith said.

Rumsfeld told Feith, " 'Call George and tell him we have something for him to see,' " Feith said. On Aug. 15, 2002, a delegation from Pentagon was buzzed through the guard station at CIA headquarters for the Tenet meeting. Shelton and Carney were the briefers; Feith and DIA Director Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby accompanied them.

"The feedback that I got from George right after the briefing was, 'That was very helpful, thank you,' " Feith said.

CIA officials who sat in the briefing were nonplussed. The briefing was all "inductive analysis," according to one participant's notes from the meeting. The data pointed to "complicity and support," nothing more. "Much of it, we had discounted already," said another participant.

Tenet, according to agency officials, never incorporated any of the particulars from the briefing into his subsequent briefings to Congress. He asked some CIA analysts to get together with Shelton for further discussions.

Feith also arranged for Shelton to brief deputy national security adviser Hadley and Libby, Cheney's chief of staff.

"Her work did not change [Hadley's] thinking because his source for intelligence information are the products produced by the CIA," White House spokesman Sean McCormack said.

Nor did the briefing's content reach national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Cheney or Bush, according to McCormack and Cheney spokesman Kevin Kellems. (In November 2003, a written version of her PowerPoint briefing, a version submitted to the intelligence committees investigating prewar intelligence, was published in the conservative Weekly Standard magazine.) The briefing openly challenged the prevailing CIA view that a religion-based terrorist, Osama bin Laden, would not seek to work with a secular state such as Iraq. "They were the ones who were intellectually unwilling to rethink this issue," one defense official said. "But they were not willing to shoot it down, either."

Whatever the agency really thought of Shelton's analysis, on Oct. 7, 2002, CIA Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin sent a letter to the Senate intelligence committee which, in a general sense, supported her conclusion: "We have solid evidence of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qa'ida going back a decade," it said. ". . . Growing indications of a relationship with al-Qa'ida, suggest that Baghdad's link to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action."

A Nondescript Name

In August 2002, as the possibility of war with Iraq grew more likely, Luti's Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NESA) was reorganized into the Office of Special Plans and NESA. Its job, according to Feith and Luti, was to propose strategies for the war on terrorism and Iraq.

It was given a nondescript name to purposefully hide the fact that, although the administration was publicly emphasizing diplomacy at the United Nations, the Pentagon was actively engaged in war planning and postwar planning.

The office staff never numbered more than 18, including reservists and people temporarily assigned. "There are stories that we had hundreds of people beavering away at this stuff," Feith said. ". . . They're just not true."

The office's job was to devise Pentagon policy recommendations for the larger interagency decision-making on every conceivable issue: troop deployment planning, coalition building, oil sector maintenance, war crimes prosecution, ministry organization, training an Iraqi police force, media strategy and "rewards, incentives and immunity" for former Baath Party supporters, according to a chart hanging in the special plans office, Room 1A939, several months ago.

The insular nature of Luti's office, and his outspoken personal conviction that the United States should remove Hussein, sparked rumors at the Pentagon that the office was collecting intelligence on its own, that it had hired its own intelligence agents. Even diehard Bush supporters, some of whom were critical of Feith's and Luti's management style, were repeating the rumors.

Yesterday, Rumsfeld addressed the controversy, saying critics of the Office of Special Plans had a "conspiratorial view of the world." Shelton's analysis, he emphasized, was shared with the CIA, and White House briefings were not unusual.

"We brief the president. We brief the vice president. We brief the [CIA director]. We brief the secretary of state. . . . That is not only not a bad thing, it's a good thing."



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Progress in Iraq - March 16, 2004

Freedom & Sovereignty in Iraq

- On March 8, the Iraqi Governing Council approved the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The TAL will serve as Iraq's interim constitution between June 30, 2004, and December 31, 2005. An interim government will assume sovereignty on June 30th. Elections for a national assembly will be held in December 2004, paving the way for a transitional government until a permanent constitution is written and ratified by referendum in the fall of 2005.
- The TAL includes a historic Bill of Rights that is unprecedented for Iraq and the region. It guarantees the basic rights of all Iraqis, including freedom of religion and worship, the right to free expression, to peacefully assemble, to organize political parties, and to form and join unions. It also guarantees the right to peacefully demonstrate and strike, to vote, to receive a fair trial and to be treated equally under the law. Discrimination based on gender, nationality, religion or origin is strictly prohibited.
- In nearly all major cities and most towns and villages, Iraqi municipal councils have been formed.
- Approximately 24 Iraqi cabinet ministers also contribute leadership on a day-to-day basis to the business of the government.
- For the first time in more than a generation the Iraqi judiciary is fully independent. More than 600 Iraqi judges preside over more than 500 courts that operate independently from the Iraqi Governing Council and from the Coalition Provisional Authority.
- More than 170 independent newspapers are in print. "Al Iraqia" (formerly the Iraqi Media Network) is broadcasting 20 hours per day.

Iraqis Upbeat About Future in Public Opinion Poll

According to a new poll by U.S. and international media organizations, a majority of Iraqis believe life is better now than it was under Saddam Hussein's regime. Among the results:

- 57% said life was better now than under Saddam.
- 49% believe the liberation of their country by U.S. and British troops was right; 39% said it was wrong.
- 71% said they expected things to be better in a year's time.
- 68% voiced approval the new Iraqi police force.
- 56% voiced approval of the new Iraqi army.

For complete poll results, please see ABCNEWS.com.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Contractors in Iraq - March 11, 2004

Contractors are contributing to the success of the Coalition mission in Iraq.

- Contractors are supporting our troops, helping restore vital services and establishing stability in Iraq.
 - The support of contractors in Iraq has freed at least 24,000 soldiers for war fighting who would otherwise be required for logistical tasks.
 - Contractors are providing food, shelter and logistical support for U.S. troops, Coalition partners and staff working in Iraq.
 - Contractors in Iraq are repairing and rebuilding schools, banks, railway stations, clinics, mosques, and water treatment plants. Contracts have also been awarded to provide police and fire fighting equipment, hospital supplies, electrical power equipment and buses. In addition, contractors are building playgrounds, youth centers, housing, roads, sewers and irrigation systems.
 - More than 55,000 Iraqis are employed by contractors, at an average wage of \$4.00 - \$5.00 dollars per day -- far exceeding what most Iraqis earned under the regime of Saddam Hussein.
- For contractors, doing business in Iraq is not like doing business anywhere else: it is difficult and often dangerous.
 - It is estimated that several dozen civilian contractors from at least four different countries (South Korea, U.S., France, Columbia) have died in Iraq, and many more have been injured.
- With the help of contractors, significant progress has already been achieved:
 - The Coalition has successfully helped in reopening all 240 Iraqi hospitals and 95 percent of Iraq's 1,200 medical clinics.
 - Today Iraq is producing more than 2 million barrels of oil per day, of which more than 1.7 million barrels per day is exported to the world market-- resulting in \$7.4 billion in revenue to date to support the Iraqi economy and reconstruction efforts
 - Approximately 400 Iraqi courts are back in operation.
 - The new Iraqi dinar is in circulation.
 - Approximately 170 newspapers are being published.
 - 5.1 million Iraqi students are back in the classroom, and 51 million new textbooks have been issued; 97,000 Iraqis applied to attend college for the 2003 fall semester.

The Department of Defense's oversight system effectively saves American taxpayers dollars.

- Shortly after conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) was asked to audit major contracts.
 - A 20-member interagency team of auditors has been in Iraq since April 2003. This team will have auditors on staff by May
 - DCAA has issued more than 180 audit reports related to contractors in Iraq during fiscal year 2004. These reports address pricing proposals, costs incurred in existing contracts, contractor policies and internal controls.
- DoD's oversight system works: nearly every significant contracting problem to date has been discovered by DoD's own auditors. The Department is addressing problems identified by DCAA audits:
 - DoD believes that Kellogg Brown & Root did not have adequate subcontract pricing evaluation prior to the award of the Reconstruct Iraqi Oil (RIO) contract, resulting in overpricing as high as \$61 million through September 30th. DoD recently launched a criminal investigation in connection with a whistleblower complaint made regarding the contract.
 - DoD also believes that KBR failed to adjust a subcontract price submitted for dining halls and cafeteria service under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract. There was a \$42 million overcharge that was caught in the proposal process. DoD auditors rejected that proposal and returned it for re-pricing.
- Improprieties uncovered are a small percentage of the \$4 billion awarded in 1,500 contracts thus far for rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure.
- The Department of Defense will continue vigorous oversight of contractors in Iraq to ensure that taxpayer dollars are used effectively.

Facts for Iraq's reconstruction are awarded through a process that is fair, inclusive and

- The Coalition is a responsible steward of Americans' tax dollars. Rigorous and effective oversight ensures proper contractor performance and redress in the event of any irregularity.
 - Multiple in-country contracting agencies-- State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-- are used in concert with the Coalition's Program Management Office (PMO), which makes financial, contractual and project progress information available in real time and files periodic progress reports.

(For more information, please see: DefenseLINK News: Iraqi Rebuilding Contracts Proceeding Well, Nash Reports)

Q&A: The "LOGCAP" Contract

What is the "LOGCAP" contract and why is it necessary?

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) allows the U.S. Army to have a company on standby that is capable of providing massive amounts of logistical support should the need arise. It allows the U.S. Army to be more lethal and agile -- in Iraq, it frees up to 24,000 war-fighters from many logistical tasks so they may concentrate on fulfilling the mission.

Is the LOGCAP just for Iraq?

Operation Iraqi Freedom is not the first operation supported by the LOGCAP contract. The LOGCAP was used during operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, and is estimated to have saved millions of dollars in logistical costs to the U.S. Army. The current contract supports U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Djibouti, the Republic of Georgia and Uzbekistan.

What types of services are provided by this contract?

The current LOGCAP contract makes vital services possible in Iraq, including food, shelter, electricity, communications, and transportation for U.S. troops and civilian authorities.

Was the LOGCAP awarded competitively?

The LOGCAP contract was competed under full and open competition, and was awarded based on technical and management capability, past performance and the cost value to the American taxpayer.

How long has DoD used the LOGCAP?

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded the first LOGCAP contract to Brown & Root Services, Inc. after a competitive solicitation in August 2002. Management of LOGCAP was transferred to Army Materiel Command (AMC) in October 1996, and AMC awarded its first LOGCAP contract to DynCorp in 1997. The current LOGCAP was awarded in December 2001 to the Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root, which competed against Raytheon Technical Services and DynCorp International for the contract award.

How does DoD address allegations of contractor impropriety?

The Department of Defense takes allegations of wrongdoing seriously. Anyone with information about potential contracting improprieties is urged to contact the Inspector General hotline at 1-800-424-9098, or by email at hotline@dodig.osd.mil.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – U.S. Global Defense Posture - March 10, 2004

The U.S. Defense Strategy, as outlined in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, identified the need to reorient U.S. global defense posture — where U.S. military personnel, equipment, and installations are located overseas — given the different security environment now faced by the United States.

- DoD's global posture study seeks to support the new Defense Strategy's four policy goals: Assure allies and friends; dissuade competition by influencing the strategic choices of key states; deter adversaries with forward forces; and defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.
- New strategic circumstances demand review of an overseas footprint that by-and-large still reflects the realities of the Cold War. Defining elements of these new circumstances:
 - Terrorist groups and outlaw states are seeking access to unprecedented destructive power, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons.
 - As we learned on September 11, 2001, the U.S. homeland is threatened in new ways by active and capable terrorist groups. Allied territory is vulnerable as well.
 - The U.S. and Allies face growing challenges from anti-access capabilities, including NBC weapons and missiles.
 - A number of failed or failing states have emerged that contain ungoverned areas that may serve as breeding grounds or sanctuary for terrorism.
 - Various regional powers are at strategic crossroads, leading to uncertainty about their intentions and future strategic direction.

The Department's approach to changing U.S. global posture seeks to strengthen U.S. defense relationships with key allies and partners; improve flexibility to contend with uncertainty; enable action both regionally and globally; exploit advantages in rapid power projection; and focus on overall capabilities instead of numbers.

- Develop flexibility to contend with uncertainty.
 - The U.S. changing strategic circumstances defy prediction. Therefore, DoD will develop new and expanded security relationships to emphasize flexibility in force posture and basing.
- Strengthen allied roles.
 - The U.S. will expand opportunities for combined training with allies, with the goal to bring relevant allied capabilities to the War on Terror.
 - The U.S. footprint will be tailored to match emerging relationships and local conditions, and also to reduce the impact of U.S. presence on host nations.

- Focus both within and across regions.
 - Although the U.S. must be prepared to act regionally and locally, it must also promote an understanding that forces should not be tied to any single area or region. The U.S. will work with key allies not simply on regional problems, but also on global issues such as terrorism and proliferation. Allies will help us to develop global reach-back capabilities.
- Exploit advantages in rapid power projection.
 - Since forces will not likely fight in place, U.S. regional presence requires realignment to improve rapid response capabilities for distant contingencies. This means an updated transport and support infrastructure to facilitate movement of forces and to operate in remote areas. It also means updated command structures for deployable operations.
- Focus on capabilities instead of numbers.
 - Overmatching power — leveraging U.S. advantages in knowledge, speed, precision, and lethality — supplanted overwhelming force as a defining concept for military action. The specific number of forward-based forces in a given area is no longer an accurate representation of the effective military capability the U.S. can bring to

The Department of Defense has intensified public outreach to inform and consult with allies and Congress about these changes.

- On November 25th, the President announced the intent to accelerate discussions on the Global Posture Review. However, no decisions have been made yet on the shape of the U.S.' future global posture.
- The Departments of Defense and Department of State provide regular briefings to Congressional staff and Members on the progress of the review.
- Over the past year, the Secretaries of Defense and State, as well as other senior level officials, have had various consultations with Asian allies and partners about the global posture review.
- Senior-level State and DoD officials conducted intensive discussions in European capitals in December 2003 and in Asian capitals during January and February 2004.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Progress in Iraq - March 9, 2004

Following are highlights of remarks by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on Iraq's interim constitution given at a press briefing today by the secretary and Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- **The brief delay in the final signing of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) is a sign of the progress being made in Iraq.**
 - Iraqis from a range of ethnic, political and religious traditions settled their debate peacefully.
 - The debate, discussion and free exchange of views of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) members are hallmarks of a democratic society.
 - Americans are accustomed to delays while proposed legislation is debated. However, the process of political debate and discussion is new to Iraqis, who barely a year ago lived under one of the world's most brutal dictatorships.
- **Iraq now has an interim constitution, with a Bill of Rights that protects all Iraqi**
 - Iraqis are now guaranteed freedom of religion and worship, the right to free expression, to assemble and demonstrate, to organize political parties and to vote, and the right to equal treatment under the law and a fair trial.
 - Discrimination based on gender, nationality, religion and origin is prohibited.
- **The process by which the TAL was established is as important as the document itself.**
 - The process required both vigorous debate and peaceful compromise.
 - The leaders of the IGC have not only enacted a landmark law, but also shown the world Iraqis are ready for the difficult work of democracy.

Progress in Iraq

- Some Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers are spending the month training at Baghdad International Airport's Camp Slayer with soldiers from the 1st Armored Division's 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment. Their training includes both classroom and hands-on instruction, including performing route security and conducting raids and searches.
- Reconstruction on the Al Mat Bridge is complete. More than 3,000 trucks per day travel over the bridge on the main highway from Jordan to Baghdad, bringing reconstruction and humanitarian aid. A bypass was constructed around the damaged bridge in July 2003, allowing repairs to begin.
- Iraqi children will soon be able to participate in Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts. Scouting was first introduced in Iraq in 1921, but was terminated under Saddam Hussein's regime. The initiative to bring scouting back to Iraq was launched recently with the backing of the World Scouting Organization and the Arab Scout Organization.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Transitional Administrative Law Signing – March 5, 2004

The signing ceremony for the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), scheduled for today in Baghdad, has been postponed. Following are talking points on the situation from interviews given by Dan Senor, senior spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

- The TAL is an historic document for Iraq and the region. It will serve as the country's interim constitution between June 30, when the CPA returns sovereignty to the Iraqi people, and the completion of a permanent constitution by a parliament that is directly elected.
- Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the CPA administrator, recognizes that the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and the future Iraqi government will have to work through the democratic process. He has taken the position of observing the procedures instead of forcing a resolution.
- The IGC is making a lot of progress on resolving the issue and working through it themselves. The timetable for the conclusion of the discussions and signing of the document is up in the air at this point.
- The discussion on Iraq's interim constitution is the most interesting and important debate taking place in the Middle East now. Iraqis are able to relay their concerns without fear of winding up in a mass grave or a torture chamber, a real possibility under Saddam Hussein's regime.
- The TAL will govern affairs for the Iraqi people in the transition to Democracy.
- The TAL was to have been signed by the IGC earlier in the week, but was postponed out of respect for the mourning period for Iraqis lost in Tuesday's suicide bombings in Baghdad and Karbala.
- Within the last 24 hours, a few members of the IGC had technical concerns about one specific article in the document, which is now under discussion.
- It is important to keep in mind that the IGC had reached agreement on 98 percent of the document, including issues such as the definition of Islam in the state and the role of women, and there is still agreement on these important issues.
- The debate among the IGC members is an example of democracy in action in Iraq.

The following opinion piece appeared in yesterday's *Los Angeles Times*.

(Link to LA Times web site).

Los Angeles Times
March 4, 2004

Democracy's Bus Is Rolling In Iraq

By Max Boot

Iraq is starting to resemble the 1994 movie "Speed." Like the bus on which Sandra Bullock and company were trapped, the country is in constant danger of blowing up. To avoid disaster, it has to keep moving, crashing through some obstacles and avoiding others. As long as it maintains momentum, its occupants will survive.

11-L-0559/OSD/22274

Too many real bombs have been blowing up in Iraq recently. But as horrifying as their consequences are, the political bombs that haven't blown up are even more significant.

There has been a danger of outright civil war erupting among Sunnis intent on regaining their old privileges, Shiites bent on holding early elections that would give them governmental control and Kurds determined to maintain their autonomy. L. Paul Bremer III has been playing the Keanu Reeves role, trying to keep the bus in one piece.

Bremer's efforts were rewarded this week when the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council agreed on an interim constitution that is a marvel of liberalism. It guarantees free speech, free religion, free assembly and numerous other rights that are taken for granted in the West but are conspicuously absent in the Arab world. Despite an attempt by some clerics to impose Islamic dictates, the constitution says only that Sharia will be one source among many for Iraqi law. Sure, the document leaves important issues unresolved, such as the future role of political militias, but it's pretty impressive that agreement was reached at all by a fractious group of Iraqis.

The biggest outstanding issue is how to select an interim government after the formal U.S. occupation ends June 30. Bremer pushed for caucuses; Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the leader of Iraq's Shiites, insisted on elections. In a development reminiscent of Winston Churchill's famous quip about battleship procurement ("The admiralty asked for six ships, the government offered four, so they compromised on eight"), they seem to be heading for neither elections nor caucuses. Though the exact mechanism remains undetermined, power is likely to pass on June 30 to an unelected provisional government, probably an expanded Governing Council, which will prepare for elections by Jan. 30.

Sistani deserves kudos for abandoning his earlier insistence on immediate nationwide balloting, which would have been unworkable. The ayatollah's willingness to compromise suggests a keen awareness of his adopted country's troubled history.

In 1920, Iraqi Shiites led a bloody rebellion against British rule. The British, eager to pull out, handed over authority to Sunnis led by a Hashemite royal family imported from Hijaz. The Shiites were frozen out of power for the next eight decades. Sistani doesn't want to repeat that mistake by forcing out coalition troops prematurely or making Iraq ungovernable. Thus he was willing to back down after U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi agreed that elections couldn't be held right away.

There is more good news coming from Iraq. Thanks in part to the much-maligned work of Halliburton, the country's oil production and electricity generation will soon surpass prewar levels. The number of coalition soldiers killed in January and February (75) was 52% lower than in November and December (158). The number of U.S. soldiers wounded fell even more during that period — to 260 from 638.

Of course, the glad tidings shouldn't be exaggerated. One reason why attacks on coalition soldiers are down is that, as Tuesday's atrocities in Baghdad and Karbala demonstrate, terrorists are finding Iraqis an easier target. But although the terrorists can kill and maim, they cannot win public support. In the Sunni Triangle, where most of the violence is occurring, 21 imams issued a *fatwa* condemning "any act of violence against Iraqi state government workers, police and soldiers."

As responsibility for fighting insurgents and criminals falls more squarely on Iraqi shoulders, the number of foreign casualties should decline still further. Coalition troops won't be able to leave Iraq for years, but they will be able to concentrate their efforts outside major cities, where they will be less vulnerable to attack. Having Iraqis, not Americans, patrol city streets should also remove some of the resentments fostered by foreign occupation.

More bombs, both real and metaphorical, are certain to go off in the days ahead, but Iraq already has confounded many Western "progressives" who doubted that the Arab world could ever make progress. The bus may be rickety and it may have lost some passengers, but — guess what? — it's on schedule toward its final destination: democracy.

Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes a weekly column for the Los Angeles Times.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Haiti Operational Update - March 4, 2004

Brig. Gen. David Rodriguez and Lawrence Di Rita, Pentagon spokesman, briefed the Pentagon press corps today. Following are highlights from the press conference about the situation in Haiti.

- **Approximately 1,000 U.S. Marines have arrived in Haiti. The forces are well-prepared to carry out their mission, which is to:**
 - Secure the capital city of Port-au-Prince;
 - Help promote the constitutional political process;
 - Create conditions for the arrival of the U.N. multinational force;
 - Secure key sites, including the U.S. embassy, the presidential palace and the international airport to support multinational force movements.

- **Gen. Hill, the head of U.S. Southern Command, continues to monitor the situation in Haiti and with international**
 - Approximately 600 troops from Canada, France and Chile have arrived.
 - The United States is working to secure commitments from other countries as well.

- **The security situation has improved.**
 - The majority of the looting tailed off significantly as the multinational force arrived.
 - The United States will continue to support the Haitian police in the security and stabilization process.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Detainee Review Process - March 3, 2004

The Department of Defense today outlined an annual review process to assess the detention of individual enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. The draft review process memorandum is available online at <http://www.dod.mil/news/mar2004/d20040303ar.pdf>.

Highlights below.

A review board will assess a detainee's threat to the United States and its allies.

- A review board comprised of three military officers will assess whether a detainee remains a threat to the United States and its allies in the Global War on Terror.
- The review board process will be overseen by a senior civilian Defense Department official.
- Based on its assessment, the board will recommend to that senior official whether a detainee should continue to be detained. That senior civilian will make the determination of whether the detainee should remain at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
- Where the constraints of national security permit, the detainee's country of origin will be notified of the review process and permitted to submit information regarding the detainee.
- Where the constraints of national security permit, the detainee's family may also be permitted to present information on behalf of the detainee.
- A designated military officer will be responsible for presenting all available information to the review board. This officer is not an advocate for or against detention.
- The review board will also assess information provided about the detainee from the Department of Justice, the CIA and the Department of Homeland Security.

Detainees will be allowed to present information to the review board.

- Detainees will be permitted to present information on their own behalf that explains why they no longer pose a threat to the United States and its allies.
- To the extent necessary and consistent with national security, detainees will also be granted access to information presented to the board. This information will be made available to the detainees in advance of their hearings and in a language they understand.
- A military officer will be assigned to help each detainee present his information to the review board. That military officer may act as a spokesman before the board for the detainee. Detainees will be permitted to meet with that officer in advance of the review, and will have access to an interpreter.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Interim Constitution - March 2, 2004

The 25-member Iraqi Governing Council on Feb. 29 passed an interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). Following are highlights.

➤ **The TAL is an historic document for Iraq and the**

- It will serve as the country's interim constitution between June 30, when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) returns sovereignty to the Iraqi people, and the completion of a permanent constitution by a parliament that is directly elected.
- The Iraqi Governing Council has met a significant milestone by passing the TAL by the end of February. The date was set in the November 15 agreement between the Iraqi Governing Council and the CPA, which sets forth the steps for Iraq's transition to sovereignty.

➤ **The TAL will govern affairs for the Iraqi people in the transition to**

- The passage of the TAL is a tremendous sign of progress in Iraq, and a signal to the terrorists of the will of the Iraqi people to move forward.

➤ **The TAL includes unprecedented individual rights for all**

- With the passage of the TAL, Iraq has moved from a country ruled by one brutal individual to a country where the rights of every individual are protected.
- Under the TAL, the Iraqi government answers to the people instead of oppressing them.

➤ **The TAL guarantees basic rights of all Iraqis,**

- The freedom of religion and worship;
- The right to free expression, to peacefully assemble and demonstrate, to organize political parties, and to form and join unions.
- The right to be treated equally under the law. The TAL prohibits discrimination based on gender, nationality, religion or origin.
- The guarantee of a fair, speedy and open trial. Iraqi authorities may not subject anyone to arbitrary arrest or detention.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Bremer Statement - March 2, 2004

The Coalition Provisional Authority released the following statement from Ambassador L. Paul Bremer about the bombings today in Baghdad and Karbala.

Statement by L. Paul Bremer Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority

Today terrorists have again struck the Iraqi people. We of the Coalition offer our deepest sympathy to the families of those who were murdered and to the wounded. We pray for your strength in this time of sorrow. Along with civilized people everywhere we share your horror at these evil acts and utterly condemn the acts and those who carried them out.

We of the Coalition will not abandon the people of Iraq. The Coalition is even now providing all possible medical care for the wounded. And I pledge the full capacity of the Coalition to bring these murderers to justice as Iraq continues its march to democracy and sovereignty.

Terrorists have murdered and maimed on one of the holiest days of the year, the day that commemorates the death of Imam Hussein. We know they did this as part of an effort to provoke sectarian violence among Muslims. We know they chose this day so that they could kill as many innocents as possible.

Why would anyone want sectarian violence? The terrorists want sectarian violence because they believe that is the only way they can stop Iraq's march toward the democracy that the terrorists fear. We know that the terrorists fear democracy because they said so. In a recent letter the terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi wrote that democracy was coming to Iraq and that once Iraq was democratic there would be no pretext for attacks. And so Zarqawi has admitted that the terrorists are in a race against time. It is a race they will lose.

They will lose because the Iraqi people want and will have democracy, freedom and a sovereign Iraqi government. An Iraqi government is coming. This week, after an appropriate period of mourning, the Iraqi Governing Council will sign the Transitional Administrative Law. That law brings with it all that the terrorists fear:

- They fear an Iraqi government controlled only by Iraqis.
- They fear equality before the law for all of Iraq's citizens.
- They fear Democracy.

After the law is signed, Iraq's journey to a future of hope will continue. On June 30, the Coalition will turn sovereignty over to the Iraqi people. Next year there will be three elections and Iraq will end 2005 with an elected government.

Iraq stands at the forefront of the war on terrorism. It is, at heart, a war between the forces of decency and the forces of evil. It is a war between those who value and defend the innocent and those who murder the innocent and hold them valueless. It is a war for Iraq's future, a war between a future of hope and a future of fear.

The Coalition stands firmly with the forces of decency, with those who protect the innocent, with those who will bring about Iraq's future of hope.

Aash al-Iraq! (Long live Iraq!)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Haiti – March 1, 2004

Following are details of a press briefing today by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and U.S. Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- **President Bush ordered the deployment of U.S. Marines to Haiti at the request of Haiti's new former Supreme Court Chief Justice Boniface**
 - An initial contingent of U.S. Marines arrived in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, last night.
 - Additional forces will be deploying over the next several days.
 - Former President Aristide and his wife have arrived in the Central African Republic.

- **The forces are securing key sites in Port-au-Prince. Their mission is**
 - Contribute to a more secure and stable environment in the capital city in order to help support the constitutional political process;
 - Protect U.S. citizens;
 - Facilitate in the repatriation of any Haitians who are interdicted at sea; and
 - Help create the conditions for the anticipated arrival of a U.N. multinational force.

- **The United States will initially lead the multinational interim**
 - The final size of the United States contribution is still being determined.
 - The secretary has ordered additional forces to deploy as necessary to fill the U.S. contribution to the multinational interim force.
 - The United States is working with the new Haitian government, the United Nations and the Organization of American States to stand up the interim force.
 - The leadership of the final multinational U.N. force will be determined in the days ahead.
 - The United States is in contact with a number of countries that have expressed a willingness to contribute forces.
 - The U.N. Security Council last night passed a resolution authorizing support for the transition in Haiti.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – New U.S. Landmine Policy - Feb. 27, 2004

The indiscriminate use of persistent landmines is a serious humanitarian problem around the world. (Persistent landmines are munitions that remain lethal indefinitely. They do not self-destruct or self-detonate.) At the same time, landmines provide the U.S. military with capabilities to protect the forces by enabling commanders to shape the battlefield and deny the enemy freedom to maneuver.

The Bush Administration today announced a new U.S. policy on landmines. The policy will help reduce humanitarian risk and save the lives of U.S. military personnel and civilians. The policy addresses both persistent anti-personnel and persistent anti-vehicle landmines. Following are highlights.

- 9 **The United States has committed to eliminate persistent landmines of all types from its arsenal.**
 - After 2010, the United States will not employ persistent anti-personnel landmines or persistent anti-vehicle landmines.
 - Today, persistent anti-personnel landmines are only stockpiled for use by the United States to fulfill treaty obligations with the Republic of Korea.
 - Between now and the end of 2010, persistent anti-vehicle mines will only be employed outside the Republic of Korea when specifically authorized by the President.
 - Within two years, the United States will begin destroying persistent landmines that are not needed for the protection of Korea.
- 9 **The United States will seek a worldwide ban on the sale or export of all persistent landmines.**
 - The ban will help prevent the spread of technology that kills and maims civilians.
- 9 **The United States will continue to develop non-persistent anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines.**
 - These mines self-destruct or self-deactivate. After they are no longer needed on the battlefield, non-persistent landmines detonate or turn themselves off, eliminating the threat to civilians.
 - Self-destructing/self-deactivating landmines have been rigorously tested and have never failed to destroy themselves or become inert within a set time.
- 9 **The United States is one of the world's strongest supporters of humanitarian action regarding mines.**
 - The United States was one of the first countries to support humanitarian demining efforts in 1988 when it funded the first such programs in Afghanistan.
 - The United States has provided nearly \$800 million to 46 countries since 1993 when the United States Humanitarian Mine Action program was formally established.
 - Funds for the State Department's portion of this program will be increased by an additional 50 percent over fiscal year 2003 baseline levels to \$70 million a year, significantly more than any other single country.
 - The Department of Defense trains countries on landmine clearance, mine awareness and victim assistance.
- **The U.S. will not join the Ottawa Convention because its terms would require giving up a needed capability. However, the new U.S. policy dramatically reduces the danger posed to civilians from landmines left behind after military**
 - The Ottawa Convention does not restrict the entire class of more powerful anti-vehicle landmines. The new policy put forth by the United States addresses both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines.
 - The United States has already ratified the Amended Mines Protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and is also a party to the Geneva Conventions.

Notes: Antipersonnel landmines are primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person. Anti-vehicle or anti-tank landmines are designed to explode by the presence or proximity of, or contact with a vehicle; the presence of a person is not normally enough to trigger them. They are usually used on or along roadways to prevent movement of enemy vehicles.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points –Secretary Rumsfeld’s Trip, Feb. 26, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld’s Trip

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld returns Friday from a trip to Kuwait, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan.

- The Secretary praised those Iraqis stepping forward to defend their country, despite terrorist attacks on the forces. He said the story of Iraq will include Iraqis fighting for their own freedom and putting their own lives at risk. In remarks at the Baghdad Police Academy, the Secretary said the police recruits are helping to build an Iraq that is free and at peace with its neighbors.
- In Uzbekistan, the Secretary met with Uzbek leaders to discuss military, political and economic
 - Uzbekistan has 25 million citizens and borders
 - The United States has approximately 1,000 military people plus contractors in Uzbekistan working on support operations and humanitarian missions at Karshi-Khanabad.
 - Karshi-Khanabad has been pivotal to operations in Afghanistan. Support and humanitarian operations into Afghanistan are conducted from the base there.
- In Kazakhstan, Secretary Rumsfeld said that if Saddam Hussein had followed Kazakhstan’s example, the in Iraq never would have happened. The country renounced nuclear weapons in
 - Drug-running operations originating in Afghanistan are a concern to Kazakhstan.
 - Secretary Rumsfeld said the Coalition, led by the United Kingdom, is working with Afghanistan to solve the problem.
 - The focus on Afghanistan’s drug problem will increase now that the country has a newly approved constitution and elections on the horizon.
 - Secretary Rumsfeld and Kazakhstan leaders discussed further strengthening of military relationships. The Secretary also met with Kazakhstani troops who have just returned from Iraq. The troops worked in the Polish-led division, where they helped dispose of unexploded ordnance.
 - About 15 million people live in Kazakhstan, which borders Russia, China and the Caspian Sea.

Allegations of Sexual Assault During Overseas Deployment

- Sexual assault will not be tolerated in the Department of Defense. The department is committed to preventing sexual assault in the military.
- On Feb. 5, Secretary Rumsfeld directed a special 13-member task force to investigate reports of alleged sexual assaults on service members serving overseas and to examine how the Department of Defense treats and cares for victims.
- The task force is to report its findings by April 30. Ellen P. Embrey, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for force health protection in readiness, is in the Central Command area of operations now to investigate the issue and begin fact-finding.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Army's Comanche Helicopter: Feb. 24, 2004

"As the people who were doing the study ... determined that what we needed to do was significant, and as we looked at our aviation budget over the years of the program, about 40 percent of that budget for aviation was devoted to Comanche. So when you looked at what we could do with those resources and the capabilities we could provide our troops within that timeframe, it just became apparent that [it] was the right decision."

Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee

"First of all, [it is] very important to emphasize this is an Army initiative as a result of our studies, and it is about fixing Army aviation for the future, for today and for tomorrow, not just about terminating Comanche. It's a big decision. We know it's a big decision. But it's the right decision."

Gen. Peter Schoomaker

As the result of a study initiated several months ago, the Army is restructuring and revitalizing its aviation programs. One result is the termination of the RAH-66 Comanche, an armed reconnaissance helicopter. Following are highlights of a briefing on this announcement yesterday by Les Brownlee, the acting Secretary of the Army, and Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff.

9 The Army's aviation study reflects the operational environment of the future and takes into account combat lessons learned in the Global War on Terror.

- When the Comanche was envisioned, starting in 1983, the program made sense in the context of the threat faced at the time. The program makes less sense in today's national security environment.
- It is not prudent for the Army or the taxpayers to spend \$39 billion on a program that is not a good idea for the 21st century battlefield. (Approximately \$6.9 billion has been spent thus far on Comanche.)
- The decision must be reviewed in the context of restructuring and other Army initiatives -- including modularity and balancing the Active and Reserve components.
- It is critical to the Army now for the ongoing War on Terror and for the future that funds that were identified for the Comanche program remain with Army aviation. An amendment to the fiscal year 2005 budget currently before the Congress will be submitted to reflect those changes.

9 Roughly \$14 billion allocated for the Comanche through fiscal year 2011 will be applied to other Army aviation programs.

- The revised plan includes procuring almost 800 new aircraft -- including Apache and Blackhawk helicopters -- for the Active and Reserve component; and
- The enhancement, upgrade, modernization and recapitalization of more than 1,400 aircraft.
- The relevant technologies developed in the Comanche program will be applied to future aviation initiatives. Such programs include the Joint Multirole Helicopter and the Joint Airlift Aircraft.

Links: [\(transcript\)](#), [\(American Forces Press Service story\)](#), [\(Army News Service story\)](#).



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Haiti - Feb. 23, 2004

Approximately 50 Marines will depart today for Haiti, where an estimated 42 people have been killed in an armed uprising that began Feb. 5 in the central coast city of Gonaives.

➤ **The United States is committed to providing for the safety of its**

- In response to a request from the U.S. ambassador, U.S. Southern Command has dispatched small military team to Haiti to provide the ambassador and the embassy staff with an capability to monitor the current
 - A Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) leaves today from Norfolk, Va., for Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The team is based at Camp LeJeune, N.C.
- As a precautionary measure, U.S. Southern command has also directed deployment of a SOUTHCOM Situational Assessment Team (SSAT) to assist the ambassador and his staff in Haiti.
 - The SSAT is a small military team that will perform a technical assessment of the situation. They will review existing action plans and make recommendations should those plans be executed. The team arrived within a matter of days following the rebellion's outbreak and will remain for an indeterminate period of time.

➤ **The U.S. military is prepared to protect Americans in**

- Already on the ground are: An eight-person Mobile Security Detachment (MSD) from the Department, a seven-Marine Security Detachment (standard for most embassies) and 10 security guards at the
- While there is currently no active consideration of a non-combatant evacuation operation in the U.S. military is trained and prepared for such operations should they be



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Transition to Sovereignty - Feb. 19, 2004

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer today reviewed overall goals of the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA) for the transfer of power to the Iraqi people. The Iraqi Governing Council is drafting the temporary law of administration that will guide the transitional period of Iraq into full sovereignty. By the summer of 2005, Iraqis will go through a constitutional convention, write a constitution and elect a democratic parliament.

Below are highlights of the Ambassador's press conference.

- **On June 30, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) passes sovereignty back to the Iraqi but the Coalition will continue to help Iraq rebuild itself after 30 years of**
 - The Iraqi Governing Council and the CPA promised the Iraqi people sovereignty on this date, and it will hold.
 - There may be changes in the way an interim government is formed, but the date is certain.
 - The occupation will end, and Coalition forces will no longer be occupying forces, they will be in partnership with the Iraqi people to protect Iraqi security.
 - The United States at that time will not abandon Iraq – it will stay until its mission is complete.
 - U.S. and Coalition troops will stay in Iraq to assist with security as Iraqi citizens continue to build their own forces.
 - Thousands of American government officials will stay in Iraq to work with the Iraqi people on reconstruction and governance.
- **Iraq's new government will protect fundamental rights and provide a stable political**
 - The transitional administrative law will give Iraqis freedoms they did not have under Saddam Hussein's brutal regime. Iraqis will now have:
 - Freedom of speech;
 - Freedom of assembly;
 - Freedom of religious beliefs and practice.
 - Iraqis will be equal in the law regardless of ethnicity, religion and gender.
 - The new Iraq will be a single country with:
 - One foreign policy;
 - One army, one police force, one border patrol; and
 - One currency.
- **The transitional law will include the fundamental right to freedom of religion, while recognizing Islamic nature of Iraq**
 - In the November 15th agreement, the Iraqi Governing Council committed itself to a transitional law that respects this important fundamental right.
- **As the sovereign power now, the United States has an obligation to ensure that an appropriate democratic structure is put in place in**
 - The United States and its Coalition partners share the same vision with the Iraqi people: an Iraq that is unified, stable and at peace with itself and its neighbors.

L. Paul Bremer
Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority
Opening Remarks
Press Conference 19 February 2004

We are in the middle of the largest troop rotation since the Second World War. Over 100,000 American troops will depart Iraq and be replaced by their compatriots. Many Coalition partners have carried out or will be carrying out similar rotations.

Before those completing their service depart, I want to speak directly to the men and women from around the world who make up Coalition Forces.

After months of arduous, dangerous and uncomfortable duty, many of you are now being relieved by your compatriots. People everywhere know, understand and appreciate the sacrifice you have made.

You have made America, each of your countries and the world a safer place. You can rightly tell your children and their children:

"We liberated Iraq and put it on the road to democracy."

Thank you for your service to your country, your service to the world and your service to the people of Iraq.

* * *

There are 133 days left before sovereignty returns to an Iraqi government on June 30.

Changes in the mechanism for forming an interim government are possible, but the date holds.

And hold it should: In the November 15 agreement the Governing Council and the Coalition promised the Iraqi people sovereignty on date certain. And we will give it to them. The Coalition's

goal has always been an Iraq that is free and democratic, peaceful and prosperous, sovereign and united.

The plan to achieve that goal is divided into three interdependent parts:

- security
- governance, and
- the economy.

We have made great progress in all three.

Turning first to security—

It has always been obvious that Iraqis are the ultimate guarantors of their own security. We always knew what would begin as a Coalition effort would have to become an Iraqi effort in partnership with the Coalition countries and, eventually, a wholly Iraqi effort. This transformation is underway and, in spite of painful losses, it is progressing:

- Iraqis continue to swell the ranks of their armed forces.
- Our Iraqi comrades in arms and Coalition Forces continue to capture or kill foreign terrorists, subversives and others who would derail Iraq's movement toward democracy,
- It is increasingly apparent that the terrorists and subversives cannot win—and it is apparent that they know it.

The letter drafted by al-Qaida associate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi lays out, in his own words, the facts as seen by the subversives and terrorists:

Zarqawi and his terrorists have failed to intimidate the Coalition:

“...Americadid not come to leave, and it will not leave no matter how numerous its wounds become and how much of its blood is spilled.”

Zarqawi knows that attacks on Iraqis provoke hatred of and resistance to the terrorists.

*“How can we fight their cousins and their sons and under what pretext after the Americans... pull **back**?”*

Zarqawi and all the others know they are falling behind in a race against time—a race against Iraqi self-government.

*When he says, “Democracyis coming, and there will be no excuse thereafter” for the **attacks**.*

In their desperation they are trying to provoke a chaotic blood bath. They see it as their only hope to retrieve an otherwise hopeless situation. They explicitly want to set Iraqi on Iraqi in a cynical effort to effort to kindle sectarian violence.

They will not succeed.

The growing strength and confidence of Iraq's security forces will eventually overwhelm the subversives and terrorists. Iraqis will, in time, secure their own country.

Make no mistake, the last terrorist in Iraq will be killed or captured by Iraqis.

On the subject of governance and political development, all of you have reported on the likely changes and adjustments on the road to sovereignty. And well you should. Iraqi sovereignty is important to people all around the world not just to Iraqis. But the changes should not distract us from reaching the goals we in the Coalition set out at liberation.

- We seek a representative and sovereign government.
- That government should be bound by a Transitional Administrative Law that protects fundamental rights and provides a stable political structure.
- Under that law Iraqis will enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the freedom of religious belief and practice.
- All Iraqis will stand equally before the law, regardless of ethnicity, regardless of religion, regardless of gender.
- Iraq will be a single country with one currency, one foreign policy, one army, one police force and one national border.

These are core values and precepts of the Coalition countries and they will be embodied in the Transitional Administrative Law.

The changes being worked out at the national level are of course important, but the seed beds of participatory democracy are thriving and this is crucial.

Democracy is much more than elections. Democracy rests on pluralism and the balance of power at multiple levels. That is why the United States is spending almost half a billion dollars to promote civil society.

These programs are working:

- Hundreds of local and provincial councils have been formed.
- Student councils, women' forums and Parent Teacher Associations have been created in thousands of schools.

- Professional organizations of women, of physicians and lawyers and engineers have come into being all over the country.

These are the essential elements of democracy.

And finally we turn to the Economy.

Neither security nor government can be sustained without money, without economic activity. A moribund economy sooner or later leads to a moribund and insecure society.

Iraq's once moribund economy is coming to life:

- As all of you know when you drive around, Consumer goods are widely available.
- The Iraqi Central bank, which was wholly subservient, is now fully independent.
- The currency exchange was one of the most successful in history, even under extremely daunting circumstances. We put 4.62 trillion New Iraqi Dinars in place and finished on-time and on-budget.
- Iraq now enjoys observer status at the World Trade Organization.
- The restoration and expansion of electrical services continues. Last week electrical production hit its highest point since the war on a seven-day average. Yesterday we generated 98,917 MW Hours of power—a record since liberation. We continue to project 6,000 megawatts of peak wattage capacity by July 1, 2004.
- Telephone service continues to expand with more than 95 percent of service restored outside Baghdad and substantial progress in Baghdad.
- Hospitals, schools, food supplies and water resources are all at or above pre-war levels. It is not yet good enough, but progress has been made.

And all this economic activity will be further boosted by the \$10.2 billion in reconstruction contracts funded by the supplemental budget we expect to let before July 1.

Progress in each of these areas-- economics, security and governance-- reinforces each of the others. Not every piece will move just when we thought; there will be bumps in the road, but we have made great progress.

Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Guantanamo Detainees - Feb. 18, 2004

The United States and its Coalition partners remain at war against al Qaeda and its affiliates, both in Afghanistan and in operations around the world. The law of armed conflict governs this war and establishes the rules for detention of enemy combatants.

- **Approximately 650 enemy combatants are being detained at the U.S. military facility in Bay,**
 - The detainees include:
 - Rank-and-file soldiers who took up arms against the Coalition in Afghanistan; and
 - Senior al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, including some who have expressed a commitment to kill Americans if released.
- **Enemy combatants are being detained because they are**
 - Enemy combatants are not common criminals. They are being detained for acts of war against the United States, which is why different rules apply to them.
 - If they were not detained, they would return to the fight and kill innocent men, women and children.
- **Detaining the enemy provides the Coalition with intelligence that can help prevent future acts of terrorism.**
 - Detainees have revealed how al Qaeda structures its leadership, gets its funds, communicates and trains. They have also provided information on plans for attacking the United States and its allies.
 - Coalition leaders have used this intelligence to help forces on the battlefield, and to protect the homeland.
- **The United States does not want to hold enemy combatants any longer than necessary.**
 - The United States is working to release enemy combatants that are judged to no longer be a threat or no longer have information that could prevent future acts of terrorism. Eighty-seven detainees have been transferred for release.
 - The United States prefers to transfer detainees who continue to be a threat but are not guilty of war crimes to their native country for detention or prosecution. To date, four detainees have been transferred to Saudi Arabia for continued detention, and one to Spain.
 - The United States is instituting a process for annual review of detainees who continue to pose a threat.
- **A thorough process is in place for determining enemy combatant status.**
 - The United States follows an extensive, multi-step process for determining who is detained as an enemy combatant, and which enemy combatants should be transferred to Guantanamo.
 - Guantanamo detainees represent only a small fraction of those taken in to custody in the Global War on Terror.
 - Of the roughly 10,000 people originally detained in Afghanistan, fewer than 800 have been brought to Guantanamo.
 - The detainees are being treated humanely and in a manner that is consistent with the Geneva Convention.
- **Detainees prosecuted by the United States will likely be tried by military**
 - Under the law of war such tribunals are a recognized way to try enemy combatants. They are not new.

Links: ([DoD Briefing on Detainee Operations at Guantanamo Bay](#)); ([transcript of Secretary Rumsfeld's Remarks at the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce](#)); ([military commissions](#)).



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Progress in Afghanistan - Feb. 17, 2004

The Coalition continues to make progress in Afghanistan, a key front in the global war on terror. Through its 11 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) the Coalition is building relationships with local Afghans and bringing security and stability to the country. NATO is exploring the creation of five additional PRTs in the next several months, a positive development as the number of nations joining the Global War on Terror grows.

Building a Secure and Stable Afghanistan

PRTs are small groups of civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces to provide security for aid workers and help with reconstruction work.

- PRTs enable and integrate the reconstruction process in Afghanistan:
 - They help the Coalition build relationships with local Afghans.
 - They extend the reach of the Afghan national government.
 - They establish security in their respective areas.
 - They encourage nongovernmental and international assistance organizations to move in.
- PRTs are an example of the international community's coordination and willingness to join the Coalition in the Global War on Terror.
 - Eleven of the PRTs are fully operational; the 12th will open this week.
 - Eight of the PRTs are led by the United States.
 - New Zealand leads one PRT; the United Kingdom leads one PRT; and Germany, under the auspices of NATO, leads the third.
 - NATO has set a commitment internally to deliver approximately five more PRTs before the next NATO summit in Istanbul, Turkey, in June. The lead countries have not been officially determined, but several have expressed interest.

The Coalition's Mission in Afghanistan

- Afghanistan is a key front on the Global War on
 - The Coalition will continue its mission of helping Afghans build a country that is free of terror, oppression and intolerance.

The Global War on Terror – On the Offensive

- Ultimately it is the Iraqi people who must secure their own country. The Coalition ~~is~~ working with Iraqis to ensure they have the capabilities, training and support they need to do the job.
 - Iraqi police on Sunday arrested Muhammad Zimam abd al-Razzaq al-Sadun, No. 41 on the top 55 most wanted list. Al-Sadun is a former Central Ba'ath Party regional chairman for the Ninawah and Ta'mim governorates. His arrest follows the Feb. 7 capture last week of Muhsin Khadr al-Khafaji, No. 48.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq's WMD: Feb. 12, 2004

What Was Known About Iraq's WMD

- The world knew the following about Iraq and Saddam's WMD:
 - Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people and Iran at least 10 times.
 - Saddam launched missiles against Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
 - Iraq had a nuclear program discovered after the Persian Gulf War that was far more advanced than pre-Gulf War intelligence had indicated.

Discoveries Since the End of Major Combat Operations in Iraq

- Dr. David Kay served in Iraq for some six months directing the work of the Iraq Survey Group and reporting to CIA Director George Tenet. While the ISG's work is far from over, the following has been discovered (Source www.cia.gov):
 - Evidence of an aggressive missile program concealed from the U.N. and international community, including plans and advanced design work for liquid and solid propellant missile with ranges of up to 1,000 kilometers.
 - Confirmation of prewar intelligence that Iraq was in secret negotiations with North Korea to obtain some of its most dangerous missile technology.
 - Work underway on two unmanned aerial vehicles: one developed in the early '90s and another under development in late 2000 -- both intended for the delivery of biological weapons.
 - Evidence of research and development on a biological weapons program that included a network of laboratories and safe houses containing equipment for chemical and biological research] and a prison laboratory complex possibly used in human testing for biological weapons agents.

Widespread Consensus on Saddam's Threat

- From review of the same intelligence information there was consensus among:
 - The intelligence community.
 - Successive administrations of both political parties.
 - The U.S. Congress.
 - Much of the international community (the U.N. passed 17 resolutions regarding Saddam's WMD).

Saddam's Behavior Reinforced Conclusions About Iraq's WMD

- Saddam did not behave like someone who was disarming and wanted to prove he was doing so.
- He did not open up his country to the world, as did Kazakhstan, Ukraine, South Africa, and as Libya is doing today.
- Instead, he continued to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenues under U.N. sanctions when he could have had the sanctions lifted and received those billions of dollars simply by demonstrating that he'd disarmed, if in fact he had.
- His regime filed a fraudulent declaration with the United Nations and ignored the final opportunity to avoid war afforded him by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Choices and Consequences - Feb. 10, 2004

Choices and Consequences for Terrorist Regimes

- In the past year, two terrorist regimes – Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and Libya under Moammar Gadhafi – have chosen different paths.
 - Saddam Hussein chose going to war.
 - He ignored 17 U.N. resolutions.
 - He was given an opportunity to leave the country, but refused.
 - He passed up his final opportunity – UN Resolution 1441 – to show the world he had ended his programs and destroyed his weapons.
 - Libya chose to cooperate, and open itself to the world.
 - Libya has announced its decision to disclose and eliminate its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, as well as its ballistic missiles.
- The lessons are clear – choices carry costs.
 - If Saddam had chosen differently, there would have been no war with Iraq.
 - By choosing to disclose its weapons programs, Gadhafi has opened Libya's path to better relations with nations of the free world.
 - The advance of freedom and democracy will be a powerful long-term deterrent to terrorist activities.

Attacks Against Iraqis -- Failed Attempts at Intimidation

- An explosion today outside a police station south of Baghdad has killed up to 50 people. While the cause of the blast is being investigated, this much is clear: those who oppose Iraq's transition to freedom and democracy will continue their attacks as Iraq moves toward sovereignty.
 - These attacks are attacks against progress in Iraq.
 - Iraqis are not intimidated. They continue to volunteer to become part of Iraq's security forces. More than half the forces in Iraq are Iraqis.
 - The Coalition will continue to train Iraqis to protect their own country, because they know the language, customs and neighborhoods best.
 - Attacks on Iraqis and Coalition forces are an attempt to create instability. The Coalition will continue to follow through with its mission: To create a free, stable and prosperous Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbors.

Coalition Forces – On the Offensive

- The Coalition remains on offense – to attack, kill or capture enemies of the Iraqi people and anti-Coalition elements.
 - Combined Joint Task Force-7 today announced the capture of Muhsin Khadr al-Khafaji, No. 48 on the "Top 55" Iraqi most wanted list. Al Khafaji is a former Ba'ath Party Regional Commander and Chairman for the Qadisiyah District. He was captured in Baghdad on Feb. 7.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points –Secretary Rumsfeld's Trip, Feb. 6, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld departed Thursday for a five-day, three nation European tour that will include stops in Germany, Croatia and the United Kingdom.

- **Today Secretary Rumsfeld attended an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in**
- **On Saturday, the secretary will attend the Wehrkunde Conference, an annual security attended by defense ministers from countries throughout NATO and**
 - The conference will lay the groundwork for an international summit in Istanbul, Turkey, in June.
 - This is the first conference the secretary will attend with new NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.
 - During the conference, he will have bilateral meetings with his counterparts from Spain, Canada, Germany, Georgia, Singapore and India. He will attend a working breakfast with representatives from countries recently invited to join NATO.
- **Topics at the Wehrkunde Conference are likely to include Afghanistan, Iraq and the future of forces in Bosnia-**
 - During his comments to reporters on the flight to Germany, Secretary Rumsfeld praised NATO's efforts in Afghanistan as a first "major out-of-Europe activity for the international body.
 - There is a proposal that NATO troops take over the mission of the provincial reconstruction teams throughout Afghanistan.
 - The secretary raised the possibility that NATO's mission in Bosnia is coming to an end, and said it is possible NATO troops there could be replaced by a force from the European Union.
 - He noted that NATO probably needs a very small headquarters there to assist with indicted criminals.
 - Mr. Rumsfeld called NATO's eventual withdrawal from Bosnia a success story for NATO when it happens and also for the Bosnian people.
- **The secretary will visit Zagreb, Croatia on**
 - Croatia has provided strong support to the US-led war on terrorism and is working toward NATO membership.
- **Mr. Rumsfeld will end his trip in London on Monday, where he will meet with British Secretary of for Defense Geoffrey**

Links:

NATO's web page on the informal ministerial [\[NATO\]](#).

NATO in Afghanistan ([NATO International Security Assistance Force](#)).

NATO information on provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs).

Biography of Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer ([Scheffer biography](#)).

Transcript of the secretary's remarks to reporters en route to Germany [\[transcript\]](#).



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points - Intelligence and Iraq's WMD, Feb. 5, 2004

"Intelligence will never be perfect. We do not, will not and cannot know everything that's going on in this world of ours. If at this important moment we mistake intelligence for irrefutable evidence, analysts might become hesitant to inform policymakers of what they think they know and what they...don't know, and even what they think. And policymakers bereft of intelligence will find themselves much less able to make prudential judgments -- the judgments necessary to protect our country."

- Secretary Rumsfeld
Senate Armed Services Committee
Feb. 4, 2004

What the Intelligence Community Knew About Iraq

- The intelligence community knew the history of the Iraqi regime and its use of chemical weapons on its own people and its neighbors.
- They knew what had been discovered during the inspections after the Persian Gulf War, some of which was far more advanced, particularly the nuclear program, than the pre-Gulf War intelligence had indicated.
- They were keen observers of United Nations weapons inspection reports in the 1990s, and they did their best to penetrate the secrets of Saddam Hussein's regime after the inspectors left in 1998.
- They rightly determined that Iraq was exceeding the U.N.-imposed missile range limits. Documents found by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) show evidence of high-level negotiations between Iraq and North Korea for the transfer of long-range missile technology.
 - If Iraq had a surge capability for biological and chemical weapons, its missiles could have been armed with weapons of mass destruction and used to threaten neighboring countries.

pre r on am Threat

- From review of the same intelligence information there was consensus that Saddam was pursuing weapons of mass destruction among:
 - The intelligence community.
 - Successive administrations of both political parties.
 - The U.S. Congress.
 - Much of the international community (the U.N. passed 17 resolutions regarding Saddam's WMD).
- Congress and the national security teams of both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations looked at essentially the same intelligence and came to similar conclusions that the Iraqi regime posed a danger and should be changed.
 - Congress passed regime-change legislation in 1998.

is eha Reinforced C n: b t Ira WMD

- Saddam did not behave like someone who was disarming and wanted to prove he was doing so.
- He did not open up his country to the world, as did Kazakhstan, Ukraine, South Africa, and as Libya is doing today.

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- Instead, he continued to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenues under U.N. sanctions when he could have had the sanctions lifted and received those billions of dollars simply by demonstrating that he'd disarmed, if in fact he had.
 - His regime filed with the United Nations what almost everyone agreed was a fraudulent declaration, and ignored the final opportunity afforded him by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441.

Ongoing Work on Iraq's WMD

- Dr. David Kay served in Iraq for some six months directing the work of the Iraq Survey Group, and reporting to CIA Director George Tenet. Dr. Kay and the ISG have worked hard under difficult and dangerous conditions. They have brought forward important information.
- Kay has outlined his hypothesis on the difference between prewar estimates of Iraq's WMD and what has been found thus far on the ground. While it is too early to come to final conclusions, there are several alternative views currently postulated:
 - WMD may not have existed at the start of the war -- possible, but not likely,
 - WMD did exist, but was transferred in whole or in part to one or more countries.
 - WMD existed, but was dispersed and hidden throughout Iraq.
 - WMD existed, but was destroyed at some moment prior to the beginning of the conflict.
 - Iraq had small quantities of biological or chemical agents and also a surge capability for a rapid buildup.
 - Iraq's WMD could have been a charade by the Iraqis -- that Saddam Hussein fooled his neighbors and the world, or members of his own regime.
 - Saddam Hussein himself might have been fooled by his own people, who may have tricked him into believing he had capabilities that Iraq really didn't have.
- It has not yet been proven that Saddam Hussein had what intelligence indicated regarding Iraq's WMD -- but the opposite has also not been proven.
- The Iraq Survey Group's work is some distance from completion. There are 1,300 people in the ISG in Iraq, working hard to find ground truth. When that work is complete, we will know more. It is the job of ISG to pursue these issues wherever the facts may take them.

The Decision to Take Military Action Against Saddam Hussein

- The President has sworn to preserve, protect and defend the nation. With respect to Iraq, the following issues were taken into account:
 - The available evidence.
 - The attacks of September 11th.
 - Saddam Hussein's behavior of deception.
 - Iraq's ongoing defiance of the U.N.
 - The fact that Saddam's forces were shooting at U.S. and United Kingdom aircraft in the northern and southern no-fly zones.

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- The fact that Saddam's was a vicious regime that had used weapons of mass destruction against its own people and its neighbors, and had murdered and tortured the Iraqi people for decades
 - The President went to the United Nations, and the Security Council passed a 17th resolution.
 - The President went to Congress, which voted to support military action if the Iraqi regime failed to take a final opportunity to cooperate with the United Nations.
 - When Saddam Hussein did pass up that final opportunity, the President gave him an ultimatum -- a final, final opportunity to leave the country.
 - Only then, when all alternatives had been fully exhausted, did the Coalition act to liberate Iraq.
 - The world is safer today and the Iraqi people far better off for that action.

Improving & Strengthening Intelligence

- U.S. intelligence capabilities must be strengthened to meet the threats and challenges of the 21st century.
- The President has announced that he will form a bipartisan commission on strengthening U.S. intelligence capabilities.
 - The commission will review past successes of the intelligence community, as well as cases that have not been successes, to examine whether the intelligence community has the right skills, proper resources and appropriate authorities to meet the challenges and the threats of the 21st century.

Wall Street Journal
January 28, 2004

So Where's The WMD?

Iraq weapons inspector David Kay speaks to the Senate today, and our (probably forlorn) hope is that his remarks will get wide and detailed coverage. What we've been hearing from him in snippets so far explains the mystery of whatever happened to Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.

His answers, we should make clear, are a long way from the "Bush and Blair lied" paradigm currently animating the Democratic primaries and newspapers. John Kerry of all people now claims that, because Mr. Kay's Iraq Study Group has not found stockpiles of WMD or a mature nuclear program, President Bush somehow "misled" the country. "I think there's been an enormous amount of exaggeration, stretching, deception," he said on "Fox News Sunday." This is the same Senator who voted for the war after having access to the intelligence and has himself said previously that he believed Saddam had such weapons.

The reason Mr. Kerry believed this is because everybody else did too. That Saddam had WMD was the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community for years, going back well into the Clinton Administration. The CIA's near east and counterterrorism bureaus disagreed on the links between al Qaeda and Saddam -- which is one reason the Bush Administration failed to push that theme. But the CIA and its intelligence brethren were united in their belief that Saddam had WMD, as the agency made clear in numerous briefings to Congress.

And not just the CIA. Believers included the U.N., whose inspectors were tossed out of Iraq after they had recorded huge stockpiles after the Gulf War. No less than French President Jacques Chirac warned as late as last February about "the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq" and declared that the "international community is right . . . in having decided Iraq should be disarmed."

All of this was enshrined in U.N. Resolution 1441, which ordered Saddam to come completely clean about his weapons. If he really had already destroyed all of his WMD, Saddam had every incentive to give U.N. inspectors free rein, put everything on the table and live to deceive another day. That he didn't may go down as Saddam's last and greatest miscalculation.

But Mr. Kay's Study Group has also discovered plenty to suggest that Saddam couldn't come clean because he knew he wasn't. In his interim report last year, Mr. Kay disclosed a previously unknown Iraq program for long-range missiles; this was a direct violation of U.N. resolutions.

Mr. Kay has also speculated that Saddam may have thought he had WMD because his own generals and scientists lied to him. "The scientists were able to fake programs," the

chief inspector says. This is entirely plausible, because aides who didn't tell Saddam what he wanted to hear were often tortured and killed. We know from post-invasion interrogations that Saddam's own generals believed that Iraq had WMD. If they thought so, it's hard to fault the CIA for believing it too.

Mr. Kay has also made clear that, stockpiles or no, Saddam's regime retained active programs that could have been reconstituted at any time. Saddam tried to restart his nuclear program as recently as 2001. There is also evidence, Mr. Kay has told the London Telegraph, that some components of Saddam's WMD program "went to Syria before the war." Precisely what and how much "is a major issue that needs to be resolved." The most logical conclusion is that Saddam hoped to do just enough to satisfy U.N. inspectors and then restart his WMD production once sanctions were lifted and the international heat was off.

By all means let Congress explore why the CIA overestimated Saddam's WMD stockpiles this time around. But let's do so while recalling that the CIA had *underestimated* the progress of his nuclear, chemical and biological programs before the first Gulf War. We are also now learning that the CIA has long underestimated the extent and progress of nuclear programs in both Libya and Iran. Why aren't Democrats and liberals just as alarmed about those intelligence failures?

Intelligence is as much art and judgment as it is science, and it is inherently uncertain. We elect Presidents and legislators to consider the evidence and then make difficult policy judgments that the voters can later hold them responsible for. Mr. Kay told National Public Radio that, based on the evidence he has seen from Iraq, "I think it was reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat." He added that "I must say I actually think what we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially, than in fact we thought it was even before the war."

As intelligence failures go, we'd prefer one that worried too much about a threat than one that worried too little. The latter got us September 11.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Wolfowitz Iraq Trip: Feb. 3, 2004

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has returned from Iraq, where he met with commanders, troops and Ambassador Paul Bremer.

The deputy also visited with families of soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division (the Big Red One), 14,000 of whom are deploying to Iraq to replace the 4th Infantry Division. Following are highlights of the deputy's comments.

- **The main role of the 1st ID, and all troops in Iraq, is to help the Iraqi people become independent and build a free and democratic nation.**
 - At the division level, the soldiers will work with Iraqis to build their confidence and defeat those terrorizing and intimidating them, and they will help Iraqis build their new government and security forces.
 - A primary mission of the 1st ID will be to train Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers in the triangle areas north and west of Baghdad.
 - More than 200,000 Iraqis are now serving in the new Iraqi army and the security forces.
 - 1st ID soldiers will face tactical challenges, and will have to build relationships with the Iraqis. Because the soldiers have been deployed to the Balkans, they have a sense of what kind of stabilization requirements this mission entails.
- **The family support effort is crucial to the mission of the soldiers in Iraq.**
 - The soldiers' family network helps the troops concentrate on their mission, knowing that their families are being taken care of.
 - Division officials will use the American Forces Network, the division newspaper and a special deployment paper to keep families informed.
- **The United States and its Coalition partners have made enormous progress on many fronts in the Global War on Terror.**
 - Both Afghanistan and Iraq have been liberated from an evil, bureaucratic regime.
 - Iraq's liberation demonstrates to Arabs there is a better path to follow than the one the terrorists are offering.
 - The Coalition is hunting and capturing a large number of terrorists.
 - While the Coalition is making progress, the problem of terrorism will not disappear overnight.

Links: [1st Infantry Division](#) [4th Infantry Division](#)

For stories on the deputy's trips, please visit [Defenselink.mil](#). For a transcript of an interview with the Armed Forces Network, please visit [\(DoD transcripts\)](#).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Defense Budget: Feb. 2, 2004

Following are highlights of a briefing by Dov Zakheim, Under Secretary Comptroller for the Department of Defense, on President Bush's fiscal year 2005 budget request.

FY 2005 Defense Budget Priorities

- **Successfully pursue the Global War on**
 - The budget includes robust readiness and acquisition funding, important legislative authorities, and other essentials vital to winning the Global War on Terror.
- **Support the**
 - The budget will support the high morale and quality of U.S. men and women in uniform by giving them good pay and good benefits.
 - The budget requests a 3.5 percent military pay raise.
 - The budget keeps DoD on track to eliminate nearly all inadequate military family housing units by fiscal year 2007, with complete elimination in fiscal year 2009.
- **Manage demand on the**
 - Recent operations have placed a heavy demand on America's military.
 - DoD leaders believe that a permanent increase to military personnel levels would be the most expensive option for managing demand on the force, and has other disadvantages as well.
 - Instead, DoD is developing initiatives to reduce demand on the force, including rebalancing the force, and converting positions currently filled by military personnel to positions that could be supported by DoD civilians or contractors.
- **Reshape global defense posture and**
 - DoD will continue to scrutinize all aspects of America's global defense posture – including personnel, infrastructure, equipment, sourcing and surge capabilities,
- **Transform military**
 - Transforming America's military capabilities involves developing and fielding new military systems that can combat current and future security threats. Programs include missile defense, the Army's Future Combat Systems and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.
- **Improve and integrate intelligence**
 - The budget includes funding for technologies and initiatives that will strengthen intelligence activities and capabilities, including improving human intelligence.
- **Further streamline DoD management**
 - Recent operations reinforce the importance of transforming DoD management processes so they work better and cost less. Initiatives include the National Security Personnel System (NSPS).
 - The new NSPS manages DoD civilian personnel in a way that provides needed flexibility and incentives, but keeps important safeguards. Initial implementation will cover 300,000 employees.

For additional information, please link to the press release posted on DoD's web site ([press release](#)).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update: January 30, 2004

Following are highlights from a press briefing today in Baghdad by Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy director for operations for Coalition Joint Task Force 7, and Dan Senor, senior advisor for the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Improving Security

- **The Coalition continues to pursue former regime cells, criminals inside Iraq and foreign terrorists, pose a threat not only to the Coalition but also to the Iraqi**
 - Each of these groups has different techniques and procedures. The Coalition uses any actionable intelligence about these elements to capture or kill them.
 - The Coalition has suspected the presence of Al Qaeda in Iraq; the recent capture of Hassan Ghul, a senior member of Osama bin Laden's network, provided confirmation.
 - The Coalition also has suspected over the past few months that tactics were shifting. The use of suicide bombings, plus information gleaned from detainees, have indicated an Al Qaeda presence, but the Coalition still does not think it is a large number of cells.
 - The Coalition is thoroughly examining the evidence and using all intelligence to hunt down enemies of the Coalition and the Iraqi people.
- **Iraq's security forces continue to**
 - Yesterday 466 new Iraqi police officers graduated in Jordan, the first to graduate from the center there. A second class of 500 students has begun its training, and a third class of 1,000 will arrive for training early next month.
 - Within three months, the training center in Jordan will have the space to train 3,000 students at any one time. Countries providing trainers in addition to Jordan include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, Finland and Austria.

The New Iraqi Dinar

- **The appreciation of the dinar against the dollar is a good**
 - When the new dinar was announced last year, some speculated that the dinar would fluctuate wildly. These predictions have not proven accurate.
 - Iraq's currency has remained fairly steady, and even appreciated slightly and gradually. These are good indications Iraq's economy is stabilizing and its financial situation is improving.

Transfer of Sovereignty

- **A United Nations security team is in Iraq, assessing the situation before an electoral team**
 - The Coalition is cooperating closely with the security team, providing them with the resources and information they need to take the next step in assessing conducting direct elections.
 - The Coalition has conducted a number of briefings with the U.N. security team, and expects that they will be traveling across the country to assess the situation.

Showcasing Iraq's Progress

- **Approximately 200 Members of Congress, several members of President Bush's cabinet, and from Coalition countries – including Spain, Poland and the United Kingdom – have visited Iraq since**
 - These visits reflect Iraq's progress and the willingness of leaders around the world to support the reconstruction of Iraq.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – End Strength: January 29, 2004

Following are highlights from testimony yesterday by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker before the House Armed Services Committee on why he opposes an end-strength increase to the size of the Army.

- **The current stress on the Army from worldwide operations is a temporary spike. Plus-ups can be carried out with current resources and without asking for a permanent increase in troops.**
 - Secretary Rumsfeld has agreed to allow the Army to temporarily increase by 30,000 soldiers above its congressionally approved limit of 482,000, giving it the personnel needed to handle the stress of ongoing operations.
 - It costs \$1.2 billion a year for every 10,000 people added to the Army. But Congress often gives the military an unfunded order – meaning the service must take the money from other areas to fund the requirement.
 - An unfunded end-strength increase puts readiness, training, modernization and transformation at risk.
- **The Army is not facing a recruiting and retention crisis.**
 - In 2003, the Army made all its retention goals except one – Army Reserve mid-careerist missed its goal by 6 percent.
 - Indications this year are that the Army is on track to make 100 percent of its goals across all components.
- **Allowing the Army to pursue the course now charted will mean a better Army, more capable of carrying out its mission with the current level of resourcing. These initiatives include:**
 - Stabilizing the force by giving soldiers longer tours, which will increase retention.
 - Reviewing positions that could be converted from military to civilian, thus freeing these troops for military duties.
 - Continuing to search for efficiencies as the Army examines its global footprint and restructures its overseas overhead and headquarters.
 - Expanding the 33 active brigades under the 10 active-duty division headquarters to 48 active brigades, allowing the Army to become more strategically agile. This includes:
 - Reassigning some units -- such as air defense, signal intelligence and other support groups-- to units with skills in greater demand, such as military police and civil affairs.
 - Going forward with five Stryker brigades in the active structure.
 - Retaining the eight division headquarters in the Reserve, but increasing from 15 to 22 the number of enhanced brigades, increasing the Reserve brigades' levels of readiness, and outfitting them with the best equipment available.
 - Such moves would increase the capability of the brigades to become part of a broader rotation base to meet the future strategy.

Additional Efforts

- 9 **The Army is continuing to rebalance its force, and plans to restructure more than 100,000 jobs in its active and Reserve components.**
 - This rebalancing and restructuring will provide ready and more capable forces to the regional combatant commanders, and relieve stress on forces in high demand.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Town Hall Meetings in Iraq: January 28, 2004

- **As Iraq transitions to a sovereign nation, town hall meetings are being held throughout the country give citizens an opportunity to shape their**
 - The town hall meeting tomorrow in Ba'quba will be the first of its kind in Diyala province, north of Baghdad.
 - Citizens of Baghdad held their town hall meeting at the Palestine Hotel today.
 - The meeting followed a panel and roundtable discussion where citizens discussed topics in small groups, then reported their suggestions to an assigned panel member.
 - Panel members included Dr. Adnan Pachachi, current president of the Iraqi Governing Council.
 - More than 220 people attended the Mosul town hall meeting on Dec. 12.
 - At the Basra town hall meeting Dec. 29, topics included the role of Islam in the new government, timing of direct elections, the extent of United Nations involvement in the transition and women's participation in government.
- **The town hall meetings are a forum for Iraqis to candidly and respectfully exchange**
 - Iraqis will determine their ultimate form of government.
 - At this early stage in Iraq's new democracy, the success of the forums may not produce consensus, but the forums do give Iraqis an opportunity to become involved in the political process and feel as though they have a stake in their government.
- **Self-government continues to expand in Iraq: the majority of towns and cities in Iraq have local governments and citizens are learning about how to set up and participate in**
 - Citizens in each of Baghdad's 88 neighborhoods have chosen representatives for local governing councils. These representatives, in turn, choose members of nine district councils and the 37 members of the Baghdad City Council – in all, more than 800 representatives serving their fellow citizens.
 - A lecture at Al Hillah University tomorrow will feature participants who have just returned from a democracy training forum in Jordan.
 - More than 1,500 people in south central Iraq attended a democracy discussion on Jan. 21 in Hillah. Topics included how to choose leaders, how citizens participate in a democracy, rights in a democracy and the rule of law.

Links: [\(Mosul town hall meeting\)](#), [\(map of Iraq\)](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Women in Democratic Iraq: January 26, 2004

Freed from Saddam Hussein's regime and the Ba'athist government, women in Iraq are participating in national, regional and local government, gaining a greater voice and helping to shape their country's political future.

Democracy Training for Women

- The Women's Rights Center in Diwaniyah in south-central Iraq held one of an ongoing series of democracy training seminars on Jan. 24. Topics included the basics of democracy and participation in a democratic government.
- The Center assists widowed, impoverished and otherwise vulnerable women as they work to improve their lives and those of their children.
- The Center also helps provide women the crucial opportunity to focus on leadership and participate in reconstructing their country.
- Dr. Maha Al-Sagban, a Women's Rights Center board member, explained:
"They want democracy now, but it takes a long process... They are now allowed to take part in life. Because of the previous regime, they didn't speak, but that is changing... First, we have to rebuild a woman's self-confidence and return (her) lost pride... I think democracy is progressing. It is going on nicely... already democracy is being implemented."
- Sessions on democracy, the qualities of a good candidate for public office, caucuses and organizing public advocacy groups are some of the topics at democracy training classes at the Women's Rights Center being held in Hillah tomorrow.

Women In Government

- Leaders at the national level include Minister of Public Works Sasreen Sideek Barwari; Rend Al-Rahim, the Principal Representative of Iraq to the United States; and three women serving on the Iraqi Governing Council.
- Six of the 37 members of the Baghdad City Council are women.
- More than 80 women serve on neighborhood and district councils in Baghdad, and many others have been elected to district, local and municipal councils in other regions.

Programs for Women

- The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is working with local women's groups to establish women's centers in Baghdad to provide education, job skills, rights awareness and mentoring programs.
- Women's centers are also being established in Hillah, Karbala, Najaf, Al Kut and Sulaimaniyah.
- At the Women's Forum in Baghdad, courses include health care, computer skills and dress making. Staff are also working to set up a library and start English classes.
- The United States has given more than \$6.5 million to local women's groups including non-governmental, community and professional organizations. One example is the New Horizons of Iraq, an organization of businesswomen, which meets weekly at the Baghdad Community Center.
- The United States sponsored a delegation of Iraqi women leaders to the Global Women's Summit in Marrakech, Morocco, in June 2003. Plans are underway for a Partnership for Learning conference in Istanbul, Turkey, this year.
- Links: [\(CPA fact sheet\)](#), [\(\(Women U.S. House members delegation trip to Iraq\)](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Defense Department FY '05 budget: January 23, 2004

The Department of Defense today announced that President Bush will request \$401.7 billion in discretionary defense funding authority for fiscal year 2005.

➤ **The budget**

- Is a seven percent increase over fiscal 2004 funding levels after taking into account congressionally-directed recissions.
- The specific numbers making up the \$401.7 billion will be announced during a DoD press briefing scheduled for Feb. 2.

➤ **The budget request balances defense priorities and commitments abroad and at home. The**

- Reflects the president's commitment to prosecute the global war on terrorism;
- Balances the military's long-term needs to transform technology and defense capabilities with needs for current operations;
- Invests in better-integrated intelligence capabilities;
- Emphasizes readiness and training;
- Supports continued transformation of the joint force;
- Highlights the president's commitment to providing the pay, benefits and other quality-of-life measures to recruit and retain troops; and
- Provides for homeland defense needs.

➤ **The budget request capitalizes on the new National Security Personnel System passed by and signed by the president in November 2003 as part of the defense authorization**

- The NSPS system better utilizes the active duty force by making it easier to place civilian employees in jobs currently being filled by uniformed military personnel.
- Under the NSPS system, DoD officials will be able to more effectively manage the department's 700,000-person civilian workforce by giving senior managers flexibility to place civilian workers where they are needed most, speeding up the hiring process and introducing pay-for-performance bonuses.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – 4th ID Update: January 22, 2004

Following are highlights from a press briefing today in Tikrit by Maj. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno.

- The former regime elements the Coalition has been combating have been brought to their
 - Capturing Saddam Hussein was a major operational and psychological defeat for the enemy.
 - Saddam's capture has resulted in an increase in accurate information from Iraqis. The information has allowed Coalition forces to conduct raids to capture or kill financiers, mid-level former regime leaders and those who make improvised explosive devices.
 - Iraqis clearly understand the Ba'ath party is gone. They are ready to move forward.
- The number of enemy attacks against Coalition forces has been declining since a peak Ramadan in
 - In their desperation, the enemy is targeting civilians and Iraqi security forces, and ambushing convoys.
 - These attacks demonstrate their disdain for peace and prosperity in Iraq and for Iraqis.
 - Attacks against Iraqi security forces have not deterred Iraqis from signing up to protect their country.
 - These forces are conducting joint patrols with Coalition troops, as well as independent operations.
- The Coalition continues to focus on extensive civil-military
 - In the past 10 months, nearly 2,000 projects worth \$10 million have been completed in the 4th Infantry Division's area of operation.
 - More than 600 schools, 70 mosques and 75 medical facilities have been refurbished; 500 miles of roads have been improved, and hundreds of projects that benefit children – such as soccer fields and youth centers have been completed.
 - Another 700 projects are in progress.
- The 4th Infantry Division is readying a transition of the area's mission to the 1st Infantry
 - The division's area of operations includes the region west and north of Baghdad, which has seen the most attacks against the Coalition.
 - The two staffs are already are working together to ensure a seamless transition.

Progress in Iraq

- A third battalion of the new Iraqi Army will graduate on Saturday, Jan.
 - The ceremony for the 750 soldiers will be at the Kirkush military training base.
- A medical clinic in Hatra has been refurbished and is open for
 - The clinic in northern Iraq has 13 medical staff and 11 technicians, plus an ultra-sound machine, a computer system and other equipment purchased with \$60,000 from the 101st Airborne and the Coalition Provisional Authority.
- Members of the 82nd Airborne in Ar Ramadi, west of Baghdad, have begun delivering 2,000 first aid bags Sunday to the fire chief, Iraqi security forces and schools in the schools, and Iraqi security
 - The aid bags are being distributed as an adjunct to the "first responder" training given to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the Force Protection Services and Iraqi Police. Schools will use the bags as first aid kits.
- Three million children under age five have been
- Links: [\[Gen. Odierno biography\]](#); [\[4th ID web site link\]](#); [\[1st ID web site\]](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – New Iraqi Army Training: January 21, 2004

Following are highlights from a press briefing today in Baghdad by Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, commander of the Coalition's military assistance and training team in Iraq.

➤ **The Coalition plans to train and equip nine infantry brigades (27 battalions) in the new Iraqi**

- Three battalions have been trained thus far; a fourth is being trained now.
 - The first battalion graduated on Oct. 4. It is based at Kirkuk with the 4th Infantry Division.
 - The second battalion graduated on Jan. 6. It is based at Taji with the 1st Armored Division.
 - The third battalion will go to Mosul after its graduation Jan. 24.
- There are three recruiting hubs: in Basra, Baghdad and Mosul.
- A majority of new recruits have prior military service.
- Soldiers are given medical and physical tests and interviews, and are checked for any history of affiliations with the Special Republican Guard, intelligence services and the Ba'ath Party.
- Nearly 1,000 men are recruited in order to produce an active battalion of 757 soldiers.
 - Attrition is due to such reasons as voluntary withdrawal or failure to meet standards.
 - Soldiers were previously being paid \$60 to \$180 a month; salaries now are \$120 to \$240 a month.

➤ **The Coalition is also training a small coastal defense force and the beginning of an aviation**

- The Coastal Defense Force will consist of a patrol boat squadron of five 30-meter boats and a naval infantry regiment, which is currently training with the army.
- The Coastal Defense Force will also train in the Umm Qasr and Basra for boat training, where they will learn interdiction and boarding operations in order to protect the 80 kilometers of Iraqi coastline.
- The Iraqi Army Air Corps will focus primarily on troops and logistic movements.
- Helicopter and transport pilots are currently being trained; the first operational squadron will be fielded this summer.

➤ **Creating an army in Iraq improves both the country's security and its**

- In addition to the soldiers, hundreds of Iraqi civilians must be hired to build garrisons and provide security.

➤ **The new Iraqi Army will serve the nation**

- The new Iraqi Army values compassion and respect for human rights.
- In addition to learning fundamental fighting skills, soldiers are taught how to function as a member of a multi-ethnic team.
- The new Iraqi army will defend the territorial sovereignty of Iraq.
- Soldiers in the new Iraqi Army are treated with respect.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Message to the Troops/Afghanistan: January 16, 2004

A Message to the Troops from Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff

"We are entering the most challenging period for our Army since World War II. As we deploy and redeploy nearly one quarter of a million soldiers over the next four months, we all will be required to make sacrifices to ensure that we safely and successfully accomplish the mission. Soldiers' contributions to Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and other expeditionary operations have been critical to our nation's successes and to keeping the American people safe.

"We are warriors, and that entails a special ethos: I will always place the mission first, I will never accept defeat, I will never quit, and I will never leave a fallen comrade. When our nation calls upon us we have to be motivated by things that come from deep in our souls. It is called service for a reason. It is about giving more than you get. It is about duty. It is about sacrificing for the good of the whole."

Afghanistan Update

- The U.S. and its Coalition partners are helping the Afghan people rebuild a country that has struggled through 23 years of war, five years of Taliban repression and four years of drought. The challenge is great: in 2001 Afghanistan was a failed state with a destroyed infrastructure-- it ranked 169 out of 174 states on the United Nations human development index (in 1996, the last year it was ranked).
- Afghanistan's political and economic reconstruction is underway.
 - Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are up and running in Gardez, Bamiyan, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, Parwan and Kandahar.
 - Afghanistan has a secular constitution, formulated through the democratic loya jirga process, that enshrines human rights and democratic principles. It provides for a president, bicameral legislature and independent judiciary.
 - The influence of the Afghan central government is spreading through the national development framework, effective engagement with local warlords and plans for national elections in the coming months.
- Security progress:
 - The U.S. has trained 13 battalions of the Afghan National Army.
 - Military operations are ongoing against remaining Taliban and al Qaeda elements.
 - Germany is helping train 24,000 new police officers.
 - Italy is working to establish an effective judicial system in Afghanistan.
 - Japan and the United Nations are aiding demobilization and integration efforts.
 - The United Kingdom is undertaking counter-narcotics operations and initiatives.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points: Progress in Iraq – Jan. 15, 2004

Saddam's Capture

- Since Saddam's capture on Dec. 13, more Iraqis, including former Ba'ath Party officials, are coming forward with actionable intelligence on weapons caches and wanted individuals.
- Those Iraqis who still have loyalties to Saddam can turn themselves in and become part of Iraq's future, instead of its past.

Iraqi Security Forces

- Iraqi forces now number more than 200,000, making them the largest security force in Iraq.
- The quality of intelligence the Coalition is receiving is improving in large measure because of the increasing engagement of Iraqis in security activities.

International Support

- There are more than 24,000 Coalition troops in Iraq from 34 countries.
- The world community is coming together to help build a free Iraq. There is a broad, international effort to reconstruct the country.
- More than 70 countries participated in the Madrid donors' conference in October, pledging more than \$13 billion in aid in addition to the United States contribution.
- The Coalition continues to solicit international participation for the reconstruction of Iraq.
- Former Secretary of State James Baker, serving as a personal envoy for President Bush, is meeting with world leaders to discuss restructuring and reducing the debt burden on the Iraqi people.

Education

- All 22 universities and 43 technical institutes and colleges are open.
- Teachers are earning from 12 to 25 times the salaries they earned under Saddam's regime.

Health Care

- Public health spending is 26 times higher than the amount spent during Saddam's reign, and doctors' salaries are eight times higher.
- All 240 hospitals and more than 1,200 clinics are open.

Governance

- On Nov. 15, the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council agreed to for framework for transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi people.
- The Nov. 15 agreement provides for:
 - An interim but fully sovereign government by next summer;
 - Direct elections for a constitutional convention; and
 - A date for the directly elected constitutional government.



US Department of Defense

Iraq Update: No. 54 Captured; Democracy Building Jan. 14, 2004

Following are highlights of a press conference today in Baghdad by Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority ([link to transcript](#)).

- **The Coalition remains on offense to attack, kill or capture enemies of the Iraqi and anti-Coalition**
 - **The Coalition today announced the capture of No. 54 on the Top 55 deck of cards ([link to deck of cards](#)), ([list of 55 most wanted](#)).**
 - Members of the 82nd Airborne and Special Operations Forces captured al-Muhammad near Ar Ramadi, west of Baghdad, on Jan. 11.
 - Al-Muhammad is a former Ba'ath Party regional chairman for the Karbala governate.
 - Al-Muhammad was an enabler for many of the attacks on the Iraqi people and Coalition forces. His capture is another significant step in reducing anti-Coalition resistance.
 - Forty-two of the 55 most wanted have been captured or killed.
 - **An early morning raid in Samarra has netted four nephews of Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, No. 6 on the Top 55 most-wanted list.**
 - Soldiers from the 720th Military Police Battalion acted on a tip to find the men, who have been detained for questioning.
 - A \$10 million reward has been posted for Al-Duri, who is believed to be a key leader in coordinating attacks against Coalition forces and innocent Iraqi citizens.
- **Democracy continues to take root in Iraq as its citizens participate in town meetings across the**
 - A town hall meeting in Baghdad scheduled for Jan. 28 is expected to be the largest yet. More than 200 residents of Mosul turned out for a town hall meeting on Jan. 12.
 - The meetings are part of the Coalition's overall democracy-building initiative.
 - The Coalition will continue to work closely with the Governing Council, provincial and city councils, and the more than 200 local political parties now in Iraq.
 - More than 600 meetings – some as small as 20 people and some with hundreds of participants – were held in December.
- **The Coalition has devoted a significant amount of funding for democracy-programs for Iraq – more than \$450**
 - This is the largest amount of funding dedicated to the early stages of a country's democratic development since the end of the Cold War.
 - The training includes the basics of democracy, such as the accountability of government employees, the importance of transparent government action and processes, and how citizens can participate in their government.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Troop End Strength: January 13, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the Pentagon press corps today. Following are highlights.

- Since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, the operational tempo for U.S. has increased as troops have helped remove two terrorist regimes, hunt Saddam Hussein and senior al-Qaeda operatives, and break up terrorist
 - The current stress on the force from these missions is a spike in activity that is expected to be temporary.
 - The Department of Defense (DoD), for instance, does not anticipate having 120,000 troops permanently deployed in a single campaign, such as they are now for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
- DoD is taking immediate action to relieve stress on the force,
 - Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces, which now number close to 200,000;
 - Increasing international military participation in Iraq; and
 - Dealing aggressively with those elements that threaten Iraq's transition to self-reliance.
- Increasing “end strength” – or the total number of military personnel – is not best solution to reducing the stress on the
 - The capability of the force is more critical than the number of troops.
 - For instance, Coalition forces in Iraq defeated a larger adversary with speed, power and agility, not mass.
 - A permanent end strength increase is very likely the slowest, least effective, and most expensive option for increasing capability and reducing stress on the force.
 - Because of the time necessary to recruit, train and integrate new troops, the benefits of increasing end strength will not be felt for some time.
 - A permanent increase in end strength would require cuts in other areas, which would mean less funding for transformational capabilities that will allow the Department to do more with fewer forces than there are currently.
- DoD has dozens of long-term initiatives underway to relieve stress on the force, and increase its capability by:
 - Investing in new information age technologies, precision weapons, unmanned air and sea vehicles;
 - Increasing the jointness of U.S. forces;
 - Rebalancing the active force and the Guard and Reserves; and
 - Converting jobs being performed by military personnel to civilian jobs, thus freeing troops for military tasks.
- The United States can afford the military force necessary to ensure national security, but end strength is a last, not first, choice.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update: January 12, 2004

- **More than 220 people attended a town hall meeting in Mosul in Ninevah Province today regarding Iraq's transitional political process.**
 - The cross section of political, social and civic leaders asked a range of questions of the four panelists during the two and one-half hour forum, in particular federalism and the power structure between Baghdad and the provinces.
 - The panelists said federalism does not mean separation, and emphasized Iraq will remain a unified nation.
 - The panelists said under federalism the rights of ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds, would be respected, but everyone would continue to think of themselves as Iraqis.
 - The panelists and audience agreed that democracy was the only acceptable option for the future Iraqi government.
 - The four panelists included a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, the governor and deputy governor of Ninewa, and a Ninewa Provincial Council member. A professor from Mosul University moderated the forum.

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senior, spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority, held a press conference today in Baghdad. Following are highlights.

- **The Iraq Governing Council's (IGC) announcement of the new de-Ba'athification policies and procedures marks the final step in transferring de-Ba'athification authority to the IGC and the Iraqi people.**
 - The IGC now has full command of de-Ba'athification.
 - The policy strikes a balance between being tough on senior-level Ba'athists while allowing for the reintegration of nominal Ba'athists into society.
 - Ambassador Bremer has maintained that de-Ba'athification should be a policy that is implemented and managed by the Iraqi people.
 - The announcement marks another step in the transition of authority to the Iraqi people, which will culminate with the June 30 transfer of sovereignty.
 - Ambassador Bremer signed the first de-Ba'athification decree May 16 and delegated authority to the Governing Council Nov. 4.
- **A Nov. 15 agreement reached by Ambassador Bremer and the Governing Council is being implemented.**
 - The agreement lays the foundation s for a free, democratic and sovereign Iraq.
 - The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council are working closely on the next steps to move toward a basic law, an agreement on the status of forces, and toward establishing a transitional government.
 - It is a healthy sign of a new Iraq that some political and religious leaders take issue with certain provisions in the agreement, and that they express these views openly.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update: January 9, 2004

Iraq Operations Update

- Over the past week there have been 18 daily engagements against Coalition military on average, slightly more than two attacks against Iraqi security forces, and slightly more than one attack against Iraqi civilians on a daily basis.
- In the past 24 hours, the Coalition conducted 1,601 patrols, 28 offensive operations, 19 raids, and captured 47 anti-coalition suspects.
- In the northern zone of operations, Coalition forces conducted a neighborhood engagement in west Mosul, where they searched 223 houses. They detained six individuals and seized weapons, ammunitions and extensive amounts of explosives.
- Ba'ath Party weapons turn-ins continue. A Shua'bah-level Ba'ath Party member from Tall Afar turned in a total of 76 AK-47s and 108 AK magazines. A Shua'bah-level Ba'ath party member from Zumar turned in 98, 82mm mortar rounds and one complete 82mm mortar system and a sandbag full of mortar fuses. The weapons turn-ins continue in the north, and is evidence of the former Ba'ath party members' willingness to support Coalition activities and assist in the reconstruction of a new Iraq.
- In the north-central zone of operations, Coalition and Iraqi security forces conducted 157 patrols, one raid, and captured 10 individuals. Coalition forces conducted a raid near Tikrit, capturing Sulwan Ibriham Omar al-Mussiit, a former regime-element leader. Coalition forces conducted another joint raid south of Dibs, detaining Salah Shahab. Salah is wanted for murdering eight Iraqi soldiers who attempted to desert during the ground-combat operations phase of the war and is now believed to be involved in terrorist acts. Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers yesterday conducted a raid near Ash Sinya. The intended target was a suspected weapons dealer. ICDC forces captured two individuals and confiscated extensive small arms and ammunition.
- In Baghdad, Coalition forces conducted six offensive operations; forces performed 569 patrols, of which 77 were joint patrols with Iraqi police service and ICDC soldiers. These operations resulted in the capture of 11 people including two suspected anti-coalition planners. Forces conducted a cordon and search for Abdal Razakh, suspected of the bomb attack on a local interpreter's house. The unit captured Razakh and confiscated weapons and ammunition.
- In the western zone of operations, Coalition forces conducted 187 patrols, including nine joint patrols and four offensive operations, capturing 20 individuals. Coalition forces conducted a cordon and search near Nasir wa-al-Salam to kill or capture members of a former regime element cell operating in that area. The operation was conducted without incident and resulted in the capture of six of the eight primary targets.
- Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in Ar Ramadi continue to conduct independent combat operations to disrupt enemy activity and prevent enemy forces from placing bombs and selling black-market fuel along Highway 10. This operation will continue for several more days, and those soldiers began to conduct limited visibility operations yesterday.

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US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Detainee Release, Afghanistan PRTs: January 7, 2004

Iraq: Conditional Release Announcement of Detainees

Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator L. Paul Bremer announced today that the Coalition will release 506 low-level detainees in Iraq; the first 100 will be released tomorrow. Approximately 9,000 cases were reviewed. Adnan Pachachi, the current head of the Iraqi Governing Council, approved the releases. Following are highlights of the announcement ([link to transcript](#)).

- **The release of the nonviolent detainees is an opportunity for reconciliation in**
 - The release of the detainees is a new chance for Iraqis to reconcile with their countrymen, and join in rebuilding their country.
- **The releases are conditional. The detainees**
 - Renounce violence; and
 - Have a guarantor, such as prominent person in his community or a religious tribal leader who will accept responsibility for the good conduct of the individual being set free.
- **This not a program for those with blood-stained**
 - Anyone involved in the death or serious injury of another person will not be released.
 - Anyone accused of torture or crimes against humanity will not be released.
- **The Coalition remains committed to pursuing major criminals and those who attack Iraqis and**
 - The Coalition will continue to attack, capture or kill enemies of the Iraqi people and anti-Coalition elements.
 - The Coalition today announced rewards of up to \$200,000 for information leading to the capture of lesser criminals or information that such criminals are dead.
 - Earlier this week the Coalition announced rewards for members of the 13 remaining "Top 55" members of Saddam Hussein's regime still at large.
 - A \$1 million reward was posted for 12 of the men.
 - The reward for Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, No. 4 on the most-wanted list, is \$10 million.
 - Saddam's capture on Dec. 13 brings the total to 42 former Ba'athists on the Top 55 list that have been captured or killed.

fi Provincial Reconstruction Teams

- **The Coalition-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz, Afghanistan, transferred to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in a ceremony Jan.**
 - The team is led by Germany.
 - The PRT is the first in Afghanistan to operate under NATO control, marking another milestone in the planned expansion of the program.
 - The mission of the PRTs is to help the interim government establish effective control over the country by:
 - Restoring the rule of law in the region;
 - Getting weapons off the street; and
 - Helping the country recover after two decades of conflict.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update: January 6, 2004

National Army Day in Iraq

- Today is National Army Day in Iraq, a national holiday that pre-dates the former regime.
- This year, the holiday coincides with the graduation of 705 recruits of the second battalion of the New Iraqi Army.
- The first battalion has already graduated and is deployed, serving alongside Coalition troops.
- The Iraqi leadership and Coalition are building this all-volunteer Army for the purposes of defending Iraq, not to engage in reckless offensive operations or domestic repression and brutality.
- Today's graduates will assist the U.S. Army in and around Baghdad, and also help train new recruits of subsequent battalions whose mission -- unlike that of Saddam Hussein's army -- is to protect and defend the Iraqi people, not oppress them.

Iraq I U

Following are highlights of today's Baghdad press briefing by Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., 82nd Airborne Division commander:

- Attacks against Task Force All-American forces in the Anbar province in western Iraq have decreased almost 60 percent in the past month.
- The number of attacks in the region dropped from 15-19 a day in October to a current rate of 0-4 per day. The effectiveness of the attacks has also decreased -- improvised equipment and untrained forces cause attacks to misfire.
- Reasons for the decline in attacks:
 - The task force uses aggressive tactics to find, kill or capture anti-Coalition forces. U.S. forces have killed or captured a large number of the leaders, financiers and facilitators of the insurgency.
 - The capture of Saddam Hussein provided a boost to intelligence throughout western Iraq -- tips on the task force's command hotline have jumped 50 percent. Local Iraqis are telling Coalition soldiers about anti-Coalition forces, foreign fighters, and the locations of improvised explosive devices and weapons caches.
 - The task force has developed, trained and equipped Iraqi security forces. Division soldiers helped train 1,300 Iraqi Civil Defense Corps members. Of the 6,500 Iraqi police in the Anbar province, some 370 have been retrained and are working to teach the new tactics and policies to their fellow officers.
 - The task force has consolidated and destroyed vast amounts of military hardware left over from Saddam's regime. Soldiers and local Iraqis have destroyed 72 of 91 known weapons caches.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Afghanistan Constitution – Jan. 5, 2003

Delegates to Afghanistan's loya jirga (grand council) approved the country's new constitution January 4.

- **The adoption of the constitution is a significant milestone in Afghanistan's path toward a democratic society. The new**
 - Balances power between a strong president, parliament and independent judiciary.
 - Extends equal status to both men and women.
 - Allows Afghans to exercise tolerance for all people.
 - Refers to the country as an Islamic state, but Islamic Sharia law is not specifically mentioned in the document. The rights of minorities are respected.
 - Names Dari and Pashtu as the national languages.
- **The new constitution was debated by the loya jirga, a body that reflects and respects Afghanistan's diversity.**
 - The loya jirga comprises 502 Afghans, including:
 - 114 women;
 - Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks; and
 - Neglected minorities such as refugees, Hindus, Sikhs and nomads.
- **The draft process was thorough and**
 - A 35-member independent constitutional commission worked eight months before unveiling the proposed constitution on Nov. 3.
 - The loya jirga began debating the draft Dec. 14.
- **The new constitution paves the way for elections in**
 - Voters will elect a president and two vice presidents.
 - The president must receive more than 50 percent of the votes cast through "free, general, secret and direct voting. The term is five years, and the president may serve a maximum of two terms.
 - The president's duties include: commander-in-chief of the armed forces and appointing the cabinet and the nine members of a supreme court, subject to approval by the national assembly.
 - The constitution proposes a bicameral parliament (national assembly): the lower house, called the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) and the upper house is the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders).
- **The United States will remain steadfast in its support of**
 - Approximately \$1.7 billion in assistance was included in the supplemental bill recently signed by President Bush.
 - There are approximately 11,000 U.S. service members, 2,000 Coalition forces, and 5,000 International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) under the control of NATO deployed in Afghanistan. The troops will provide security and stability so the constitutional process can go forward.
 - The United States and its Coalition partners will continue to hunt down remnants of the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update – Jan. 2, 2003

Following are highlights of recent efforts in Iraq and the region to locate and capture enemy personnel and weapons, and key points from a briefing today in Baghdad by Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), on the growing number of Iraqi forces.

Valu Target Captured in Al Anbar Province

- Soldiers from the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment captured Abu Mohammed, a high-value target, on 1.
 - Mohammed is believed to be responsible for moving foreign fighters and large sums of cash throughout western Iraq.
 - Mohammed was found in a cab 200 meters from the border. He and his driver were taken into custody.
 - A subsequent cordon and search operation in the area netted three additional suspects, small arms weapons and a large number of documents potentially linked to Mohammed's activities.

Reward Amounts Announced for Members of Former Regime

- The CPA and Coalition Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) have announced rewards for the thirteen "Top 55" members of Saddam Hussein's regime still at
 - A \$1 million reward was posted for 12 of the men [\[link to release with CPA list\]](#).
 - The reward for Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, No. 4 on the most-wanted list, stands at \$10 million.
 - Saddam's capture on Dec. 13 brings the total to 42 former Ba'athists on the Top 55 list that have been captured or killed.

Task Force "All American" and Iraqi Police Capture Enemy Personnel, Weapons

- Al Haswah police (Al Anbar Province) and 82nd Airborne Division (Task Force "All American") captured six enemy personnel and confiscated small arms during a joint cordon and search Jan. 2.
 - The purpose of the operation was to capture those responsible for the recent attack on Al Haswah's police station; the operation was based on information provided by the local police.
- Eighty-second Airborne soldiers also discovered a cache of weapons east of Ar
 - The site contained a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, 24 RPG rounds, a box of explosives and thousands of rounds of ammunition.

U.S. and Australian Vessels Seize Drugs, Suspects in North Arabian Sea

- U.S. and Coalition maritime forces seized 15 individuals and \$11 million street value worth of (2,800 pounds) from an intercepted ship in the North Arabian Sea on Jan. 1.
 - An Australian P-3 located and tracked the ship after receiving information about possible smuggling activities. Units from the Expeditionary Strike Group 1 intercepted the vessel.
 - The interception is the third in two weeks by Coalition maritime forces.
 - On Dec. 15 forces from USS Decatur detained a ship and its 12 crewmembers, and seized approximately \$10 million in hashish.
 - On Dec. 20 forces from USS Philippine Sea detained two vessels, their 21 crewmembers, and seized 95 pounds of heroin and more than 50 pounds of methamphetamines.
 - Of the 33 crew detained in those interceptions, 10 have been transferred for further questioning after initial interrogations revealed possible Al Qaeda affiliations.

Updates on Iraqi Police and Protection Forces

➤ **Iraqis continue to step forward to help protect their country as part of the Iraqi army and protection**

- One hundred members of the Iraqi Diplomatic Protection Service (IDPS) graduated Jan. 2.
 - The IDPS is a new division of the Iraqi Facilities Protection Service; its members will protect foreign embassies in Iraq.
- Sixty members of the new Iraqi Correctional Service will graduate this week; 200 are scheduled to graduate next week.
- On Jan. 6, the 2nd Battalion of the new Iraqi army will graduate.
- Six hundred army officer candidates departed this week for Jordan for 11 weeks of officer training.
- By the end of January, more than 450 Iraqis are scheduled to graduate from the International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan.

OCT 06 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Procurement Laws

DR

What should we do about getting our procurement laws changed so we can go to a single vendor, as the CIO Group suggested?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100504-12

.....

Please respond by 10/29/04

400.13

6 OCT 04

OSD 02076-05

OCT 06 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
cc: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CIO in the QDR

3101

I think the CIO and changes to get information superiority ought to be part of the QDR.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100504-17

.....
Please respond by _____

6 OCT 04

7201
~~FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~ / GE / AS / TE

ATTACHMENT

OCT 21 2004

2005 11 11 11:13:57

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paul McHale's Memo on DoD Support

Please review this memo from Paul McHale and chop it around to the Joint Staff and others and get back to me with your recommendation. And talk to Paul McHale about getting something like this staffed properly.

351

I notice he talks about "fixed wing," why does he care whether it is fixed or rotary wing?

Thanks.

Attach.
10/18/04 ASDHD Memo to SecDef re: DoD Support to Emergency Preparedness Planning

DHR:ss
101904-16

.....

Please respond by

~~SECRET~~ / GE / AS / TE

ATTACHMENT

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22324

OSD 02104-05

OCT 08 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned on Detainees

Someone ought to do a lessons learned on what mistakes we may be making in releasing GITMO detainees who then go back to the battlefield. There ought to be something we can learn about that.

Please prepare a proposal for me as to what you think we might do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100704-16


.....
Please *respond* by

10/22/04

383,6

8 Oct 04

OCT 06 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
David Chu
CC: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Adjusting of Guard and Reserve Units

Please be sure to talk to Ray DuBois about how you plan to adjust the Guard and Reserve Units to fit recruiting and how that might link to BRAC.

Thanks.

DHR:as
100504-19

.....
Please respond by _____

326

to Ostry

OSD 02120-05

Bianco, Pat TSgt WHS/ESCD

From: Archard, Darrell, TSgt, OSD
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 16:51
To: Bianco, Pat TSgt WHS/ESCD
cc: DepSecDef Workflow
Subject: FW: Priority Action Report 052704

11 FEB 07
11 FEB 07
11 FEB 07

326

TSgt Bianco,

The items marked in red have been closed.

v/r
TSgt Darrell L. Archard
Admin Assistant
Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Bianco, Pat TSgt WHS/ESCD
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 7:13 AM
To: Archard, Darrell; Bryant, Michael; DSD Workflow
Subject: Priority Action ~~Report~~ 052704

See attached,



par2_dsd.rtf

11 FEB 04

8 FEB 04

Report Date: 5/27/2004

Deputy Secretary of Defense Priority Actions Report

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TYPE ACTION</u>	<u>ACTION AGY</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>DOR</u>	<u>SUSPENSE DATE</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
OSD 02512-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	DSD NOTE REF: UPDATES ON IRAQI JUDICIAL ACTIONS	AMN	CPA	2/19/2004	2/19/2004	2/23/2004	
OSD 01702-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	DSD NOTE REF: PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS	AMN	USP	2/11/2004	2/12/2004	2/18/2004	
<u>OSD 02128-04</u>	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: HEARING ON REBALANCING	AMN	UPR	2/11/2004	2/12/2004	2/17/2004	
OSD 75333-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: AMENDING IRAQ CODEL POLICY	AMN	CPA	2/11/2004	2/12/2004	2/18/2004	
OSD 02037-04	DEPSEC HAGEROTT	MAD NOTE REF: TRIAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN	AMN	USP	2/11/2004	2/11/2004	2/12/2004	
OSD 00610-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	DSD NOTE REF: ON-CAMPUS RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY RECRUITING	AMN	UPR	1/20/2004	1/20/2004	1/22/2004	
OSD 00929-04	DEPSEC GANYARD	DSD NOTE REF: REPLY TO MOC KUCINICH REGARDING IRAQI WEAPONS	AMN	USP	1/21/2004	1/22/2004	1/23/2004	
NO4581A-03	DEPSEC GANYARD	DSD NOTE REF: SUCCESSOR	ADN	USP	1/7/2004	1/7/2004	1/14/2004	

11-L-0559/OSD/22328

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Military Assistant

11 February 2004 - 1200

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Chu (USDP&R)

SUBJECT: Hearing on Rebalancing

Mz/r

Sir,

The Deputy asks that you take the attached SecDef snowflake for action. Please coordinate with PA, LA, and the Joint Staff.

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Mark R. Hagerott
Commander, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE: 17 Feb 04

cc: DJS, ASD/PA, ASD/LA

11-L-0559/OSD/22329

OSD 02128-04

11 Feb-0730
Scanned

February 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hearing on Rebalancing

What do you think about asking the Congress to hold a hearing on the rebalancing of the Guard and Reserve? We could do it once we think we know where we want to go, so we can let the air out of it before all the people in the country get concerned about it and start calling their representatives and senators.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-95

.....
Please respond by

2 / 17 / 04


11-L-0559/OSD/22330

OSD 02128-04

7:43 AM

TO: Adm. Ellis
Lt.Gen. Kadish

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Mike Wynne
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: February 12, 2004

SUBJECT: **Garner Memo**

Attached is an interesting note from retired Gen. Jay Garner. I would appreciate you folks discussing his suggestions and letting me know what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
011204.01

Attach: 1/23/04 memo to SecDef from J. Garner

Please respond by: _____ 2 | a?

373.24

12 Feb 04

OSD 02135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22331

✓
2/8

January 23, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary

I read the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's report on the ability to assess the mission capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense Initial Defense Capability. The report is fair in its concerns about assessing the system effectiveness, that "at this point in time, it is not clear what mission capability will be demonstrated and that assessments will be "based primarily on modeling and simulation" "not end-to-end operational testing of a mature integrated system." However, the assessment is not a "scorching criticism, and we can change it to a positive assessment as follows:

The Missile Defense Agency, DOT&E and STRATCOM can work together to tailor the use of the Initial Defensive Capability to provide an initial limited operational capability, and a developmental and operational test bed. This cannot be achieved if the system is tested using the old requirements based model of operational testing.

The Initial Defensive Capability is not the full operational capability and the system has not completed a holistic operational test. A capabilities based test approach can be used to characterize and document the system's initial operational performance capability. Flight-testing, simulations, command and control exercises and system integration checkouts completed prior to Initial Defensive Capability can be used to determine the system's initial performance capability and expected level of protection. The basis for this is:

Components of the initial Ballistic Missile Defense System have undergone a series of intercept flight tests demonstrating its ability to detect, track, intercept and destroy Intercontinental Ballistic Missile reentry vehicles.

The integrated functions of the system, to include battle management, command and control, communications, sensor performance and integration, ground-based interceptors, have been demonstrated.

Flight tests, simulations and command and control exercises have stressed the systems operational software and computer systems.

System Integration and Checkout ground testing (no flight intercept test: of the actual system hardware and software will be conducted and should provide a reasonable level of confidence that the system is integrated and operational.

The Initial Defensive Capability is the first increment of a capabilities based approach to developing and providing Ballistic Missile Defense. Trying to take early limited operational advantage of the system's antimissile capabilities under development is prudent. After Initial Defensive Capability the Director Operational Test and Evaluation, working with the Missile Defense Agency and STRATCOM, should continue testing and assessing the initial Ballistic Missile System. Further, they collectively should establish a comprehensive capabilities based test program tailored to increasingly stress the system with operationally realistic testing, to achieve block capability enhancements and to grow the system to full operational performance capability.

Thanks for the opportunity to respond.


Jay

11-L-0559/OSD/22332

7:43 AM

TO: Adm. Ellis
Lt.Gen. Kadish

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Mike Wynne
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: February 12, 2004

SUBJECT: **Garner Memo**

Attached is an interesting note from retired Gen. Jay Garner. I would appreciate you folks discussing his suggestions and letting me know what you think we ought to do.

Thanks,

DHR/azn
01 1204.01

Attach: 1/23/04 memo to SecDeffrom J. Garner

Please respond by: _____

2 | a?

OSD 02135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22333

✓
2/8

January 23, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary

I read the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's report on the ability to **assess** the mission capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense Initial Defense Capability. The report is fair in its concerns **about** assessing the system effectiveness, that "at this point in time, it is not clear what mission capability will be demonstrated and that assessments will be "based primarily on modeling and simulation" "not end-to-end operational testing of a mature integrated system." However, the assessment is not a "scorching criticism, and we can change it to a positive assessment as follows:

The Missile Defense Agency, DOT&E and STRATCOM can work together to tailor the use of the Initial Defensive Capability to provide an initial limited operational capability, and a developmental and operational test bed. This cannot be achieved if the system is tested **using** the **old** requirements based model of operational testing.

The Initial Defensive capability is not the full operational capability and the system has not completed a holistic operational test. **A** capabilities based test approach can be used to characterize and document the system's initial operational performance capability. Flight-testing, simulations, command and control exercises and system integration checkouts completed prior to Initial Defensive Capability can be used to determine the system's initial performance capability and expected level of protection. The basis for this is:

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Flight tests, simulations and command and control exercises **have** stressed the systems operational software and computer systems.

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The Initial Defensive Capability is the first increment of a capabilities based approach to developing and providing Ballistic **Missile** Defense. Trying to take early limited operational **advantage** of the system's antimissile capabilities under development is prudent. After Initial Defensive Capability the Director Operational Test and Evaluation, working with the Missile Defense Agency and STRATCOM, should continue testing and assessing the initial Ballistic Missile System. Further, they collectively should establish a comprehensive capabilities based test program tailored to **increasingly** stress the system with operationally realistic testing, to achieve block capability enhancements and to **grow** the system to full operational performance capability.

Thanks ~~for~~ the opportunity to respond.

Jay

11-L-0559/OSD/22334

TAB

~~FOUO~~

December 10, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Answers to Town Hall Questions

I want to personally get clear answers to the three questions that were asked at the town hall in Kuwait:

- 1) What happened to that unit's pay
- 2) The armor issue
- ③ The antiquated equipment for Guard and Reserve

Thanks.

DHR:es
121004-2

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

*Sir,
Response attached.*

*Dr
Lt Col Bengel*

DEC 16 2004

Tab

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22335

OSD 021 68-05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

08-2309-050 8:02
1 February 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM 2/1*

SUBJECT: Answers to Town Hall Questions

- In response to your issue (TAB), the following information is provided.
- There are no material differences in the way that Army Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers or units are equipped when deploying from Kuwait into Iraq.
- Decades of tiered resourcing strategies and early shortages across all components created a perception that RC units may deploy into Iraq without adequate vehicle armor and body armor while deploying AC units are adequately equipped.
- Unit readiness resourcing in all components was based upon how quickly units were expected to deploy. Earliest deploying units were equipped with the most up-to-date equipment first.
- Army readiness strategy prior to 9/11 allowed for an average of 65 percent mission-essential equipment authorized for RC. The Army goal was to equip all units from 90 to 100 percent before entering the combat zone.
- Equipment shortfalls are largely corrected during predeployment preparations in CONUS and remaining shortfalls are corrected in Kuwait before units cross the line-of-departure into Iraq.
- Unit personnel are trained and certified on the equipment they will use in combat.
- Coalition Forces Land Component Command, in coordination with the Army Materiel Command, established a Theater Augmentation Set as a source from which to issue modernized mission-essential equipment to units prior to deployment to Iraq.
- Risk of mission, independent of component, determines the priority for equipping Army forces.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: MG C. Vaughn, USA; ACJCS/National Guard Matters (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22336

OSD 021 68-05

120

~~FOUO~~

file

20 October 29, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: HUMINT Question

330

Do we have a way of attracting and utilizing U.S. citizens who are Muslim -- people who are in business or retired military -- to help us with HUMINT?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-14

.....

Please respond by 11/19/04

DD 12/10

*Sir,
Response attached.
v/r,
Lt Col Langye/*

DEC 03 2004

330

~~FOUO~~

OSD 021 85 -05

11-L-0559/OSD/22337

720
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SECRET

2005 FEB -2 11 9:36

ES-0032

04/008979

July 1, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Put Iceland on Hold

Please put Iceland on hold for three or four months, and then bring it back up with me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070104-35


.....
Please respond by 11/1/04

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

July 21, 2004

Captain Marriott,

Regarding the subject issue, USDP
will follow up with SecDef on September 1.

VR -

June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

11-L-0559/OSD/22338

OSD 021 93-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Iceland

21 JUL 04 15:04

720

~~FOUO~~

file

October 29, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iceland

What is the status on Iceland and the changes we want to make there?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-1

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

DR 12/14

12/12

*you have
latest
talking
points.*

V/R Jo

~~FOUO~~

11- L-0559/OSD/22339

OSD 02194-05

11/1/04

2004-07



October 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Accomplishments

ITag

I think we've got to come up with a calculation of all the things that were done:

- the millions of people that move back and forth
- the millions of tons
- the millions of meals
- all of the weapons that were captured

The military is getting a bum rap and they've done a great job. Someone needs to go out there and explain what's been done and how magnificent it's been done. I need data for that, so let's get it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-4

.....
Please respond by 11/3/04

29 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/22340

OSD 02195-05

7701
~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 Program

4522C

Here's a memo from Jim Haynes on the C-130 Program. You have been involved with this. Please grab a hold of it and figure out what we ought to be doing in this Department in connection with it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/8/04 SecDef Memo re: C-130 Issue
10/22/04 DoD OGC Memo to SecDef re: C-130 Program

DHR:ss
102904-29

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

290404

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22341

OSD 02196-05

10/21/1730

~~FOUO~~

October 8, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: C-130 issue

There are allegations in the press concerning a C-130 contract or situation. It came **up** recently in a Congressional hearing also.

2004 OCT 22 PM 4:50
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I would like you to **look into** and tell me what you recommend the Department do about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100804-12

.....
Please respond by _____

TO See Def
✓
Paul Butler
10/27

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16863-04

11- L-0559/OSD/22342

0/25
1230



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600


UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

SECRET
2004 OCT 22 PM 4:
THE
EFE

October 22, 2004, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: C-130 Program

- Recent reports in the press concerning the Air Force's C-130 program relate to two distinct issues: 1) the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG's) audit of the Air Force's commercial procurement of C-130J aircraft; and 2) recent protests by Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, challenging the Air Force's conduct of certain competitive procurements in which Darleen Druyun was involved as an employee of the Air Force.
- In its report of July 23, 2004, the OIG concluded that the acquisition of the C-130J aircraft as a commercial item was improper, and that the aircraft does not meet contractual requirements and cannot perform its mission.
- Senator McCain cited the OIG's report in a hearing before the SASC regarding the 9/11 Commission, and in a letter to you concerning the analysis of alternatives for the recapitalization of the tanker aircraft fleet.
- On August 18, 2004, you requested that the Deputy Secretary look into Senator McCain's concerns. In response to your request and the OIG's report, the Acting USD(AT&L) has undertaken a review of the C-130J program. That review is ongoing, and may result in a plan to address the concerns. The Acting USD(AT&L) informed Senator McCain of the review in a letter dated September 29, 2004.
- Following reports of Ms. Druyun's plea agreement, Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems addressed their protests to officials in the Air Force. The protests challenge the award of contracts to Boeing under the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, and in other competitive procurements in which Ms. Druyun participated. My staff is reviewing the protests in coordination with attorneys in the Air Force Office of General Counsel.



TSA SD	10/27
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	11/19/04

OSD 16063 04/25

11-L-0559/OSD/22343

COORDINATION: TAB A

Prepared By: Charles Bidwell, (b)(6)

TAB A -- COORDINATION: INFO MEMO RE C-130 PROGRAM

Mr. Krieg, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, October 21, 2004

Mr. Patterson, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, October 21, 2004

October 29, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: SOF Paper

Here's a paper Tom O'Connell sent me. I started to make some edits, but it is really not what I'm looking for.

When I came in I decided Special Ops were enormously important to our country. We began expanding them. There were several specific things we did. For example:

- We decided they should be a supported, as well as a supporting, command with all the implications of that.
- I decided I wanted the Marines involved.
- I decided we ought to stop using the SOF people for the lower tier activities, such as training and equipping the Georgian forces, and stop using them for things other people could do just as well such as guarding Karzai, and the like.
- I wanted the regular Services to step up and do some of the lower-end of some of the current SOF responsibilities and move the SOF forces up to concentrate more on those activities in the higher tiers.

What I would like is a one or two page point paper without a lot of sentences, without using the word "enhanced" over and over, that shows precisely what we've done in a thoughtful, punchy way. See if you can get someone to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/18/04 ASD (SO/LIC) Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
102904-26

.....
Please **respond** by 11/19/04

11-L-0559/OSD/22346

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02197-05

W
2
e

29 OCT 04

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

USD(P) _____

1-04/014071

ES-1118

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

Chenille
18 Oct 04

SUBJECT: SOF Enhancements

- You asked me to provide you with a summary of the Department's efforts to improve Special Operations Forces (SOF) since January 2001. A summary is attached.
- The Department's efforts have been considerable, with the SOF budget in FY 2005 nearly doubling since FY 2001.
- The SOF program will continue to add people and platforms for several years beyond FY 2005.
- You have assigned USSOCOM the lead for planning and synchronizing the Global War on Terrorism effort. USSOCOM has undergone a significant reorganization and refocus as a result.
- To aid in this effort, Congress recently gave you the authority you requested to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals who can support military operations by SOF to combat terrorism.
- With this and other granted authorities, expanded command and control, and improved intelligence capabilities, USSOCOM has greater flexibility to meet and respond to current and future challenges.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: LtCol Kevin Ross

(b)(6)

21-10-04 10:10 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/22347

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Special Operations Forces ~~Enhancements~~

BACKGROUND

- o ~~The Department of Defense has~~ ^{DOD} recognized Special Operations Forces (SOF) as an essential capability needed to lead the global war on terrorism.
- e ~~SOF can not be mass produced.~~ ^{DOD} Since January 2001, ~~the Department has been embarked on a~~ ^{executed} program to expand SOF to meet current and future operational needs and to modernize and transform SOF capabilities. ^{However,}

DISCUSSION

- Budget
 - USSOCOM's budget increased 77.1%, to \$6.6B in FY2005 ^{from \$3.7B in FY2001.}
 - USSOCOM received \$4.4B in supplemental appropriations and Defense Emergency Response funds between FY2002 and FY2004 to provide immediate enhancements.
- Personnel
 - USSOCOM end strength increased 12.5%, to 51,411 (47,977 military/3,464 civilians) from 45,719 (42,866 military/2,853 civilians) between FY2001 and FY2005.
 - Personnel include Special Forces, SEALs, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, special mission and aviation units. Personnel were also added to enhance combat service support, Theater Special Operations Commands, communications and maintenance, institutional training, and headquarters operational support.
 - 1,118 more personnel are programmed through FY2009 to support additional ^{SOF} aircraft.
- o Planning for and synchronization of the war on terrorism
 - USSOCOM created the Center for Special Operations as the war-fighting hub within USSOCOM. This joint/interagency directorate is solely focused on and responsible for planning, supporting, and executing special operations in the war on terrorism.
 - ^{not in} USSOCOM requested specific authorities that provide increased capabilities and freedom of action against terrorists. Congress recently authorized SECDEF authority to expend up to \$25M/yr to "support foreign forces, irregular forces, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitation ongoing military operations by SOF to combat terrorism."

- Theater Special Operations Commands manning was increased and communications capabilities were enhanced to provide better command and control of theater special operations. USSOCOM is now capable of forming three deployable Joint Task Forces to support Combatant Commander's requirements or unilateral USSOCOM operations.
- Additional investment in threat and analysis systems has provided new capabilities such as the Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (SOJICC). Used extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq, the SOJICC provides USSOCOM the capability to integrate and analyze data from interagency intelligence sources to support SOF priorities.
- Mobility
 - Provided **24** additional **MH-47** Chinooks helicopters, **4** additional AC-130U gunships, and 10 additional MC-130H Combat Talons, providing an expanded rotational base to support additional US Central Command and worldwide war on terrorism demands.
 - Established service life extension-programs for Army special operations **MH-47s** and **MH-60s** that will extend their service lives for an additional 20 years while increasing performance, reliability, and mission capability.
 - Added an MC-130H aerial refueling capability, more than tripling the number of penetrating tanker aircraft to conduct and support deep SOF helicopter infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply missions.
 - Provided additional infrared and radio frequency countermeasure systems for SOF aircraft to counter the proliferating surface-to-air threats.
 - Added over **1,300** additional vehicles to meet increased ground mobility requirements, allowing unprecedented agility and flexibility.
- Other
 - Significant investment into soldier systems like body armor, protective clothing, night vision equipment, medical support equipment, and enhanced weapons and sensors
 - Enhanced command and control by funding additional tactical wireless networks, mobile and fixed command, control, and communication systems, high-capacity satellite communication systems, and coalition video conferencing systems.
 - Improved psychological operations capabilities through additional PSYOP radio and television broadcast systems, deployable print media systems, leaflet delivery systems, and upgrades to the EC-130 Commando Solo airborne broadcast platform.

October 29, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Q*
SUBJECT: Herbits Memo Attachment

000.5

Please see if you can find the attachment Steve Herbits refers to in the attached memo. I cannot locate it.


Thanks.

Attach.
11/24/03 Herbits Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
102904-18

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

2906704



November 24, 2003

TO: SecDef
FROM: Steve Herbits
SUBJECT: Larger War on Terrorism

Don,

If we are going to start to win that aspect of the war on terrorism we call the "war for minds," we should begin at home, with our own behavior, our own justice, our own Justice Department. I fear we are creating the motivation for terrorists; not educating the world of the incompatibility of terrorism and civilization.

The attached Miami *Herald* magazine insert from yesterday is eloquent testimony for broader thinking.

All the best,

SH 112403 0900

11-L-0559/OSD/22351

7201
~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004

TO: Jim Roche
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Druyun Paper

000.5

Please edit this paper on **Darlene Druyun** and add any embellishments you think would be helpful.

Thanks very much.

Attach.
Draft Druyun ~~Memo~~

DHR:ss
102904-17

.....
Please respond by 11/1/04

29 OCT 04

October 29, 2004

SUBJECT: Darlene Druyun and Corruption in the AF acquisition process –
“How could that corruption happen, over such a long period, without
the others above and around her seeing it?”

The Air Force says the following:

- Druyun was the “civilian” Deputy for Acquisition of the Air Force for 10 years.
- During that 10-year period, the post of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, to whom she reported, was vacant. She was the “Acting” Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition for four of those years. Over the remaining six years, there were **four** Air Force Assistant Secretaries for Acquisition moving in and out of the post as her superior.
- There is also a “military” Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisition in the Air Force. During Druyun’s 10 years, there were four military Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Acquisition.
- But, it is particularly notable that, under Goldwater-Nichols, only the “civilian” deputy Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition can make acquisition decisions.
- During the same 10-year period that Darlene Druyun served, there were five Secretaries of the Air Force or Acting Secretaries of the Air Force.

That high amount of turbulence in the civilian political appointees, plus the turbulence in the military acquisition officials, is a formula for disaster.

The combination of Congressional micro management, plus the extensive delays in getting political appointees through the FBI clearances, and through the ethics requirements and through the Senate confirmation process, coupled with the rigidities in the civil service system that protect a senior SES, all conspire to create an environment hospitable to corruption.

And that is exactly what happened.

DHR:ss
102804-9

7209
~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004

TO: Brad Berkson
cc: Mike Wynne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Supply Chain Performance

I had lunch with Newt Gingrich yesterday and he was talking about logistics. He believes there is still opportunity for DoD supply chain improved performance, and I'm sure you agree. I suggested he get together with you. He's very bright and interested, and I'm confident, can be helpful.

Attached is a paper he left with me regarding this subject.

Thanks.

Attach.

Paper: Opportunity Remains in DoD's Supply Chain for Improved Performance

DHR ss
102904-2

.....
Please *respond* by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22354

OSD 02200-05

Opportunity Remains in DoD's Supply Chain For Improved Performance

DoD's supply chain has successfully supported the War on Terrorism. DoD and WalMart are driving the implementation of passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies within consumable supply chains. Notwithstanding these and other successes, significant opportunity remains for DoD to reduce cost and cycle time within its extended and complex supply chains. During the past decade, America's private sector has demonstrated that a body of proven supply chain methods and technologies, not theories, has routinely produced large savings.

During this period of business change, industry leaders have built business-to-business exchanges, created collaborative value chains, and implemented the technology enablers to build more effective supply chains. These technology enablers are finally enabling commercial companies to integrate and fully leverage the changes that took place in the late 1990s. These changes include restructuring and business process standardization, the integration of global capital markets, a focus on core skills, and emphasis on value drivers. Those value drivers include: leverage, speed, flexibility, process transformation, change leadership, and the strategic options they create.

Many of these approaches are under investigation or deployment within DoD. Notwithstanding DoD performance improvements, when compared, on average, with commercial supply chain leaders, the world-class performers:

- Meet scheduled delivery dates 17% more often;
- Met requested dates over 95% of the time;
- Carry 60% less inventory; and
- Spend 45% less on supply chain costs.

World class leaders use an integrated supply chain as the key to achieve results.

Opportunity exists within the Defense supply chain to yield faster, more accurate, and transparent services to the warfighter. \$25-\$30 billion in cost savings over a 3 to 5 year period are achievable.

* * * * *

The Key First Step: A Single Supply Chain Leader To Drive Supply Chain Integration

Private sector experience clearly demonstrates that success requires a single leader for their integrated supply chain.

Many Defense supply chain activities are fragmented and not well integrated. Achieving end-to-end integration of supply chain activities is a key for success. Most large private sector companies have addressed similar problems by creating a single point of accountability for supply chain integration. In the private sector, the Integrated Supply Chain Leader is empowered to coordinate all the relevant activities/functions of the supply chain such as transportation, warehousing, procurement, distribution, etc.

The DoD supply chain has unique organizational restrictions under law, and complex operational requirements which are different than commercial supply chains, but a single unifying authority is required to lead the requisite changes. Thus, an empowered leader of an Integrated Supply Chain is a fundamental requirement.

The definition of supply chain within DoD must encompass more than just the supply functions within the Department. The supply chain (or another term that DoD can embrace) needs to include all aspects from manufacturing of raw materials to disposal of obsolete stuff. It needs to be inclusive of all the functions that deal with that time line (raw materials-->disposal) and the associated information and financials. Thus, truly integrated supply chain activities enables the reduction or removal of redundancies and duplications, shrinks complexity, allows systems to be consolidated, reduces the logistics footprint, and reduces warfighter total cycle time. With projected losses of skilled personnel due to retirement in the near future, it results in more capable supply chain which requires fewer personnel.

This first step is the key enabler to unlock the value within DoD's Supply Chain.

Much Has Been Done, But More Remains To Be Done

Much hard work and many initiatives have taken place, and improvements have been achieved in DoD's supply chain, e.g. DoD's order to receipt cycle times have been halved in the past decade, but defense still remains an order of magnitude less capable than America's private sector.

A number of compelling forces for change are in motion. These forces include the looming retirement of 50% of the Acquisition workforce; pressure on National

priorities by potential increase in interest rates and federal deficits; increasing effectiveness of Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) technologies.

Readiness Impacts are Substantial

The accelerated application of commercial practices to Defense should enable a much leaner and more efficient service for the transformed war fighter. This would be measured in increased readiness, lower response cycle time, reduced inventories, and less infrastructure required to support the operating units. Aggressive implementation focused on readiness would permit savings of \$9-10 billion or more to be achieved annually over the baseline condition within 3-5 years. Equivalent levels of savings should be targeted for achievement out of the support infrastructure transformation. Thus, by the year 2008 a substantial body of savings could be harvested to serve more urgent and vital requirements.

Private Sector Actions Require: Speed and Focus

The private sector demands more rapid Time to Results (TTR). For example, a recent review of Enterprise Resource Process (ERP) systems implementation demonstrates that commercial implementations are done on much shorter timelines. This willingness to accept longer implementation times delays benefit realization for DoD.

Focus is a second differentiator. An Integrated Supply Chain leader selects improvement initiatives which optimizes the "end-to-end" supply chain rather than only an element of the supply chain. Due to DoD's less integrated supply chain many current initiatives focus at optimization of a part of the process, and may sub-optimize the whole.

A Higher Velocity Supply Chain Requires Less Infrastructure

The fundamental shift in the US Defense strategy from a threat-based strategy to a capabilities based strategy already has significant ramifications for the operating forces. Based on financial analyses, it is reasonable to believe that more than 25% excess capacity exists in Defense infrastructure. Shrinking this footprint will permit savings in billions of dollars in facilities operating and maintenance expenses.

###



DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500

INFO MEMO

February 16, 2005, 9:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef _____

THROUGH: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

DefSec 2/24/05

FROM: Mr. Bradley Berkson, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Logistics & Materiel Readiness)

BB 2/17/05

SUBJECT: DoD Supply Chain Performance

- Pursuant to your memo of October 29, 2004 (Tab A), we have established an ongoing dialogue with Speaker Newt Gingrich regarding opportunities for improving DoD's Supply Chain performance. Using his white paper, and based on an initial meeting held in December, we developed two "breakthrough" transformational concepts for discussion, concepts which could leverage his stature and influence to positively affect their outcomes.
- On February 14, 2005, the Speaker participated in a three hour session here in the Pentagon. We reviewed our ongoing L&MR transformational initiatives including Lean, Industrial Prime Vendor (IPV), Performance Based Logistics (PBL), Commodity Councils, Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative, RFID, and Regional Inventory & Material Management. We also proposed the following two "breakthrough" transformational logistics concepts for his consideration:
 - Creating a process owner to manage all material readiness across the DoD.
 - Using commercial logistics vendors to provide global storage and distribution access similar to CRAF.
- The Speaker complimented us on the results of our Lean efforts at DoD maintenance activities, our DLA Prime Vendor program (especially in the area of pharmaceuticals), and Performance Based Logistics. He took copies of the brief to share with HHS Secretary Leavitt.

11-L-0559/OSD/22358



OSD 02200-05

- We agreed to the following next steps:
 - Review DLA's Pharmaceutical Prime Vendor program with him for possible expansion across the USG.
 - Detail several DoD Lean best practices examples which we can use to generate positive Congressional interest and eventual Committee hearings in order to showcase DoD logistics transformation efforts. He believes this could provide a catalyst for spreading these approaches across the USG.
 - Develop a pilot program (perhaps diesel engine overhaul) which uses reverse auctions to award work among our organic depots. This would allow us to test the power of market forces to create competition, increase quality, and reduce prices.
- We plan to reconvene in two months to assess progress and discuss additional opportunities.

RECOMMENDATION: None. Information only.

Prepared By: CAPT Rob Bianchi, USN, Military Advisor to DUSD (Logistics & Materiel Readiness) (b)(6)

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004

TO: Brad Berkson
CC: Mike Wynne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Supply Chain Performance

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Thanks.

Attach.

Paper: Opportunity Remains in DoD's Supply Chain for Improved Performance

DHR:ss
102904-2

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22361

OSD 022 00-05

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###

October 29, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Regional Centers

I just looked at this page on the Regional Centers. I think over a 3-4 year period we ought to migrate:

- o The Marshall Center down from \$26.9M to \$11M.
- o The Asia Pacific from \$13.8M up to \$16M
- o The Center for Hemispheric Defense from \$5.5M up to \$8M
- o The Africa Center from \$10.3M up to \$11M
- o The Near East-South Asia Center from \$6.8M up to \$17M.

Why don't you consider that, see me about it, and let's think about refining it and then getting a program to move in that direction.

Thanks.

Attach.
DOD Regional Centers Background

DHR:ss
102904-7

.....
Please respond by 11/27/04



DoD Regional Centers Background

POLICY

*Person
participate
4/46*


fix

Regional Center	Year	Service	Command	Budget	Participants	Participant Days	Dollars Spent per Participant (FY04)
Marshall Center	1993	Army	EUCOM	\$26.9M	2,304	64,566	\$416
Asia-Pacific Center	1995	Navy	PACOM	\$13.8M	1,012	27,732	\$498
Center for Hemispheric Defense	1997	NDU	SOUTHCOM	\$5.5M	862	5,953	\$924
Africa Center	1999	NDU	EUCOM	\$10.3M	905	2,913	\$3,530
Near East-South Asia Center	2000	NDU	CENTCOM	\$6.8M	1,458	5,543	\$1,227
Total				\$63.3M	5,940	106,000	

FY04 Budget

FY04 Participants

FY 04 ParticipantDays



(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only.
Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

11-L-0559/OSD/22366

~~FOUO~~

fite

OCT 29 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brownlee Memo on AMD

Please take a look at this memo from Les Brownlee and see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/09/04 Acting SecArmy Memo to SecDef re: AMD Transformation

DHR:ss
102804-21

.....
Please respond by 10/12/04

Ready at your convenience

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/22368

OSD 02202-05

2003-04

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUL 16 JUN 14 2004
14 10 22

TO: Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: History

I would like to visit with you about when the last time was that the US fired from the ground at aircraft attacking US forces. My guess is that it was probably Korea. I don't think it happened in Vietnam, and likely not since. All we have seen lately have been Scuds.

What personnel and investment do we have in the Army air defense forces? Do you have any proposals with respect to the future?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-22

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

#066-035 14 Jun 04 11-L-0559/OSD/22369

OSD 10554-04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

23 JUL 16 14:01:22

July 9, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army
~~Peter J. Schoomaker, General, Chief of Staff, United States Army~~

SUBJECT: Army Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Transformation

- Reference your memo dated 14 June 2004 at Tab A.
- The last time the Army fired at an attacking manned aircraft was in 1950 during the Korean War. Currently, our Air Forces have attained a level of deterrence that dissuades potential and current adversaries from pursuing large manned air forces. As a result, the Army began reorganization and modernization efforts within AMD. The Joint Force identified capability gaps that include the need for improved defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, rockets, artillery, mortars, combat identification, and a Single Integrated Air Picture. Of particular concern are cruise missiles and the proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles. *when what?*
- This concern resulted in the shift of personnel and investments as indicated in the attached chart at Tab B. Specifically, the Army terminated Stinger Based Systems, received transfer of Patriot and Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) programs from the Missile Defense Agency, and stood up a National Guard Brigade and Battalion for Ground Based Midcourse Defense. These efforts support National Security Presidential Directive - 23.
- The centerpiece of the Army's AMD transformation is the conversion to composite battalions. These battalions are capable of operating from tactical to strategic levels, interdependent with other services, as well as providing for Homeland Security. The Army has reassigned 29 AMD battalions to other missions. The remaining organizations are transforming into a minimum of 14 Active Component AMD Task Forces and eight Homeland Defense battalions. *of?*
- A recent review of Army Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) capability resulted in increased funding for this mission by \$1.1 billion in President's Budget 05. The Army will deploy a CMD capability by fiscal year 2008. The Army will field an aerostat-based elevated sensor and an integrated fire control capability while executing an acquisition effort with the United States Marine Corps on a Surface Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM) System.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: COL Ralph M. McGee, (b)(6)

TSA SD	7/18
SRMA SD	
MA SD	SPB 7/18
EXEC SEC	7-16-04 SC


11-L-0559/OSD/22370

OSD 10554-04



Army AMD Transformation Since 1999


PB99




Investment

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PB05



1999




Personnel

?

?

2005



*Reflects Total Army Analysis-11 (TAA-11) Decisions, Modularity and AMD Task Forces

Legend:

ABT - Air Breathing Threat
BMC2 - Battle Management Command and Control
GMD - Ground Based Midcourse Defense
MAMD - Maneuver Air and Missile Defense

AMD TF - Air and Missile Defense Task Force
CMD - Cruise Missile Defense
HLS - Homeland Security
TBMD - Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense

11-L-0559/OSD/22371

~~FOUO~~

OCT 29 2004

TO: Ken Krieg

c c : Doug Feith
David Chu
Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Longer Tours/Longer Tenure

Attached is some material from David Chu. I think we need to have a SLRG on this subject -- we can't just go forward. Are there other pieces of this that should be included?

What do you propose?

Attach.
9/20/04 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R) re: Two Major Initiatives
10/8/04 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef re: Longer Tours/Longer Tenure

DHR:ss
102804-18

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

210 (344)

2905704

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/22372

OSD 02204-05

4/2/04

~~FOUO~~

SEP 20 2004

OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY ASSISTANT
2004 OCT 13 PM 10:05

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Two Major Initiatives



I plan to put forth a major initiative with respect to longer tours for people and, for those that are successful, somewhat longer service.

I am also going to put forth a major initiative for Standing Joint Headquarters, so that when we have to fight a next war, we will have the headquarters set up, and won't end up with the headquarters half-filled when the war is over. I have been pushing this for three years, but the resistance is powerful.

We need to get both of them done. Please get back to me with proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.
CJTF-7 Joint Manning Timeline (2 pages)

DHR:ss
091304-25

Please respond by 10/29/04

Sir,
Longer tour initiative
response attached.

v/r
LTC/1 Leagel
10/14

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22373

OSD 15889-04

10/13
1730



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 OCT 13 14:05



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

ACTION MEMO

October 8, 2004; 4:15 PM

Paul Rittler

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

RUB

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu & Oct 04

(Signature and Date)

10/14

SUBJECT: Longer Tours—and Longer Tenure—SNOWFLAKE

- You asked for a proposal initiating action on your desire that senior officers serve longer tours
- I believe three steps will accomplish your objective:
 1. Announce that you expect most four-star officers to serve at least four years in their posts (Tab C lists four-star posts, and average tenure over the past decade).
 2. Confer with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs on the three-star posts that should likewise carry a tenure of three or four years, with the balance assumed to be two-year tours (Tab D lists three-star posts, nominating as four year candidates those that are normally "capstone" posts—i.e., last post of career).
 3. Invite the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to provide you with a similar list for one and two-star officers, for your review and approval.
- This is a simple approach, to begin changing our culture. Actual tours may vary somewhat from the new norms—and you may want some to be of intermediate length. As such a system is implemented, it will be critical to encourage prompt retirement of those not advancing, and to assure those staying longer will be properly compensated. (The latter requires statutory change and will require your personal backing. We have already failed twice to persuade Congress.)
- Memoranda to initiate this action are attached for your consideration.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum to the Service Secretaries and CJCS at Tab A.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Lernes Hebert (b)(6)

TSA SD	10/14
SRMA SD	
MA SD	2 w/13
EXEC SEC	M 10/13



11-L-0559/OSD/22374

OSD 15889-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHIEFS OF SERVICES

SUBJECT: Expectations for the Tenure of Senior Officers

Senior officers must enjoy sufficient tenure in their posts to be effective. They must have sufficient time to size up what is to be accomplished, to develop the appropriate plans to put those plans into effect, and to see them through to success.

Regrettably, the data I've seen suggest that the average time in post for our flag officers is frequently less than two years. This is too short.

As we plan for the future, we should assume that those confirmed for a four-star post will typically serve at least four years in that position. This should likewise be the expectation for several of our three-star posts, and I will be meeting with you to discuss the posts where longer tenure could be meritorious. A list of three-star billets with recent tour averages is provided to aid in this review.

I invite you to provide me, in advance of our meeting, but no later than November 1, 2004, your recommendations on tenure length for the one and two-star posts in your domain. I will ask the Chairman and Combatant Commanders for their recommendations on joint positions.

cc: CJCS



11-L-0559/OSD/22375



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Tenure of Senior Officers in Joint Assignments

We must give senior officers assigned to joint posts sufficient tenure to be effective. Regrettably, the data I've seen suggest the average is often less than two years. For some operational posts this may be acceptable. But in other cases this will not be enough time to size up the situation, decide what must be accomplished, and see the plans through to success.

In consultation with the Combatant Commanders, I would like your recommendations on the tenure we should expect for those officers occupying joint assignments in the grades of O7 through O9. I look forward to discussing these recommendations with you at your earliest convenience.

cc: Combatant Commanders



11-L-0559/OSD/22376

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-10 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Commander, US Central Command	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	37	3.1	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Commander, US Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	29	2.4	4
Commander, US Northern Command	Joint/External			4
Commander, US Pacific Command	Joint/External	33	2.8	4
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US Southern Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	4
Commander, US Special Operations Command	Joint/External	34	2.8	4
Commander, US Strategic Command	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Commander, US Transportation Command	Joint/External	33	2.7	4
Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	48	4.0	2*
Vice Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	35	2.9	2*
Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	36	3.0	4*
Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	25	2.1	4
	Air Force	27	2.2	4
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	34	2.8	4
Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	26	2.2	4
Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	24	2.0	4
	Air Force	25	2.1	4
Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command	Army	30	2.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Forces Command	Army	18	1.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	36	3.0	4
Chief of Staff, USA	Army	49	4.1	4
Commanding General, USA Europe and Seventh Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Vice Chief of Staff, USA	Army	20	1.7	3
Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	48	4.0	4
Assistant, Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	25	2.0	3
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (SEA-08)	Navy	72	6.0	8*
Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	42	3.5	4*
Commander, US Atlantic Fleet	Navy	25	2.1	4
Commander, US Naval Forces, Europe	Navy	30	2.5	4
Commander, US Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	4
Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	22	1.8	3

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Joint/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Joint/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Joint/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Joint/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Joint/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Joint/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Joint/External	29	2.4	3
Director of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems, J-6, Joint Staff	Joint/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
President, National Defense University	Joint/External	34	2.8	3
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency	Joint/External			3
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Joint/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Joint/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Joint/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Joint/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Joint/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Joint/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center [Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe [Dep Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Joint/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Joint/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	24	2.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	47	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force			3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force			2

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Army/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.2	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Navy	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Navy	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Navy			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Navy	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Navy			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Navy	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Navy	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Navy			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Navy	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Navy	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Navy	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Navy	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH Fleet	Navy			2

11-L-0559/OSD/22379

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions


Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Twelfth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command; Commander Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	28	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

OCT 29 2004

340

TO: Les Brownlee
GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Army Retention Rate

I notice the Army active retention is down in the 89-95% range for initial mid-career and career. It's the only Service where that is the case.

I would be curious to know what you think about it and what you are doing about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102704-15

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

29 OCT 04

October 28, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Pete Pace
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tour Lengths

Attached is a report on average tour lengths that is disturbing. The short tours are a problem I have brought up repeatedly. We need to **fix** this.

Attach.
GPO Tour Lengths

DHR:ss
102804-17

.....
Please respond by _____

2004

28 OCT 04

**GFO Tour Lengths
10 Year Average**

Service	Position	Grade	Avg Mos	Avg Yrs
Joint	CJCS	O-10	48	4
Joint	VCJCS	O-10	35	2.9
Joint	CENTCOM	O-10	36	3
Joint	EUCOM	O-10	37	3.1
Joint	JFCOM	O-10	29	2.4
Joint	PACOM	O-10	33	2.8
Joint	SOUTHCOM	O-10	20	1.7
Joint	SPACECOM/NORAD	O-10	27	2.3
Joint	SOCOM	O-10	34	2.8
Joint	STRATCOM	O-10	28	2.4
Joint	TRANSCOM	O-10	33	2.7
Joint	DEUCOM	O-10	32	2.7
ARMY	CG, TRADOC	O-10	36	3
ARMY	CG, FORSCOM	O-10	18	1.5
ARMY	CG, AMC	O-10	30	2.5
ARMY	CG, USAEUR	O-10	31	2.6
ARMY	VCSA	O-10	20	1.7
NAVY	PACFLT	O-10	30	2.5
NAVY	LANTFLT	O-10	25	2.1
NAVY	NAVEUR	O-10	30	2.5
NAVY	VCNO	O-10	22	1.8
USMC	ACMC	O-10	25	2
AF	ACC	O-10	25	2.1
AF	AETC	O-10	27	2.2
AF	USAFE	O-10	24	2
AF	PACAF	O-10	24	2
AF	AFMC	O-10	34	2.8
AF	SPACECOM	O-10	26	2.2
AF	VCAF	O-10	25	2.1
O-10 Average:			29	2

Joint	DIA	O-9	32	2.7
Joint	DSPACECOM/NORAD	O-9	27	2.3
Joint	DTRANSCOM	O-9	27	2.2
Joint	DPACOM	O-9	26	2.2
Joint	J3	O-9	22	1.8
Joint	J8	O-9	21	1.8
Joint	J5	O-9	20	1.7
Joint	DJFCOM	O-9	20	1.7
Joint	DSTRATCOM	O-9	19	1.6
USMC	DCSPlansPrgrmsOps	O-9	19	1.6
Joint	DCENTCOM	O-9	18	1.5
ARMY	DCSOPS (G3)	O-9	18	1.5
NAVY	DEPCHIEF OPS	O-9	17	1.4
AF	DCSAIRSPACEOPS	O-9	16	1.3
Joint	DJS	O-9	16	1.3
Joint	DSOCOM	O-9	14	1.2

O-9 Average: **21** **2**

Global Average: **26** **2**

724

File

~~FOUO~~

October 27, 2004
ES-1181
I-04/014389

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Draft NSPD on **Space** Transportation

I agree with Steve Cambone's memo. Would you please draft up the appropriate memo?

Thanks.

Attach.
10/26/04 USD (I) Memo to SecDef re: Draft NSPD on Space Transportation
DHR ss
102704-3

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

November 10, 2004

Captain Marriott.

Policy provided Dr. Cambone's proposed changes to the draft NSPD to the National Security Council.

Attached is the transmittal memo from Ryan Henry to NSC/Steve Hadley.

VA *June Bartlett*
June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

*Done.
Attached.
V/R
Jim*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02208-05
27-10-04 10:11

11- L-0559/OSD/22384

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

10/26/04 9:00 AM

DL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *sc*

SUBJECT: Draft NSPD on Space Transportation

Attached is the second of two NSPD's on space currently being circulated by Dr. Rice for final concurrence. I provided to you yesterday my comments on the draft NSPD addressing Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Policy (i.e., GPS).

This NSPD seeks to update space transportation policy to ensure U.S. access to space and in light of the new Mars mission for NASA. I believe this NSPD on Space Transportation can be improved with the following change:

- Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
 - Language should be inserted to page 5, paragraph 4(a) to read as follows:

The Secretary of Defense will maintain overall management responsibilities for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program and will fund the annual fixed costs for both launch services providers unless/until such time as the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, can provide an alternative to the EELV that

11-L-0559/OSD/22385

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18/98-04

10/26/04 9:00 AM

provides an equivalent payload capability and reliably provides assured national security access to space.

- o Page 5, paragraph 4(b) should be deleted altogether.
- o The proposed language replaces direction to fund EELV until 2009. EELV is very expensive to maintain. We need a better approach. Assuring the EELV launch providers (Boeing and Lockheed) of funding through 2009 does not improve prospects for the competition for less expensive launch vehicles called for in Section III.1.a (page 7).

In general, I believe the draft NSPD is overly long and prescriptive. The majority of the language, however, affects the civil and commercial sectors.

I recommend that you direct Policy to draft a memo to Dr. Rice requiring the inclusion of the language detailed above as the condition for your concurrence in the NSPD.

CC: DSD
CJCS
USDP

6019

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


September 15, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Draft NSPD on Space Transportation

Pursuant to the President's direction in NSPD-15, National Space Policy Review, the Space PCC has reached consensus and completed work on the draft NSPD on U.S. Space Transportation Policy. I request that you provide your concurrence on the attached draft by September 30, 2004, in order that we might forward it to the President for signature.


Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

'Attachment

Tab A Draft U.S. Space Transportation Policy

11-L-0559/OSD/22387

14004-34

DRAFT**NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-XX****MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT**

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC POLICY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

SUBJECT: U.S. Space Transportation Policy

This directive establishes national policy, guidelines, and implementation actions for United States space transportation programs and activities to ensure the Nation's ability to maintain access to and utilize space for U.S. national and homeland security, and civil, scientific, and commercial purposes. This directive supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/National Science and Technology Council-4, National Space Transportation Policy, dated August 5, 1994, in whole, and the following portions of Presidential Decision Directive/National Science and Technology Council-8/National Security Council-49, National Space Policy, dated September 14, 1996, that pertain to space transportation programs and activities: Civil Space Guideline 3b, Defense Space Sector Guideline c, Commercial Space Guideline 5, and Intersector Guideline 2.

11-L-0559/OSD/22388

2

DRAFT**Background**

For over four decades, U.S. space transportation capabilities have helped the Nation secure peace and protect national security, enabled the Nation to lead the exploration of our solar system and beyond, and increased economic prosperity and our knowledge of the Earth and its environment. Today, vital national security and economic interests are increasingly dependent on U.S. Government and commercial space assets. U.S. space transportation capabilities -- encompassing access to, transport through, and return from space -- are the critical foundation upon which U.S. access to and use of space depends.

In accordance with my direction in National Security Presidential Directive-31, U.S. Space Exploration Policy, dated January 14, 2004, the United States is embarking on a robust space exploration program to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests. A central component of this program is to extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations. The Space Shuttle will be returned to flight as soon as practical, based on the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, used to complete assembly of the International Space Station, planned for the end of this decade, and then retired. A new crew exploration vehicle will be developed to provide crew transportation for missions beyond low Earth orbit.

Access to space through U.S. space transportation capabilities is essential to: (1) place critical United States Government assets and capabilities into space; (2) augment space-based capabilities in a timely manner in the event of increased operational needs or minimize disruptions due to on-orbit satellite failures, launch failures, or deliberate actions against U.S. space assets; and (3) support government and commercial human space flight. The United States, therefore, must maintain robust, responsive, and resilient U.S. space transportation capabilities to assure access to space.

Assuring access to space requires maintaining a viable space transportation industrial and technology base. A significant downturn in the market for commercial launch services has undermined for the time being the ability of industry to recoup its significant investment in current launch systems and effectively precludes industry from sustaining a robust industrial and technology base sufficient to meet all

11-L-0559/OSD/22389

DRAFT

United States Government needs. To assure access to space for United States Government payloads, therefore, the United States Government must provide sufficient and stable funding for acquisition of U.S. space transportation capabilities in order to create a climate in which a robust space transportation industrial and technology base can flourish.

To exploit space to the fullest extent, however, requires a fundamental transformation in U.S. space transportation capabilities and infrastructure. In that regard, the United States Government must capitalize on the entrepreneurial spirit of the U.S. private sector, which offers new approaches and technology innovation in U.S. space transportation, options for enhancing space exploration activities, and opportunities to open new commercial markets, including public space travel. Further, dramatic improvements in the reliability, responsiveness, and cost of space transportation would have a profound impact on the ability to protect the Nation, explore the solar system, improve lives, and use space for commercial purposes, while there are both technical and budgetary obstacles to achieving such capabilities in the near term, a sustained national commitment to developing the necessary technologies can enable a decision in the future to develop such capabilities.

Goal and Objectives

The fundamental goal of this policy is to ensure the capability to access and utilize space in support of national and homeland security, civil, scientific, and economic interests.. To achieve this goal, the United States Government shall:

- 1) Ensure the availability of U.S. space transportation capabilities necessary to provide reliable and affordable space access -- including access to, transport through, and return from space;
- 2) Demonstrate an initial capability for operationally responsive access to and use of space -- providing capacity to respond to unexpected loss or degradation of selected capabilities, and/or to provide timely availability of tailored or new capabilities -- to support national security requirements;
- 3) Develop space transportation capabilities to enable human space exploration beyond low Earth orbit, consistent with

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the direction 'contained in National Security Presidential Directive-31, U.S. Space Exploration Policy, dated January 14, 2004;

- 4) Sustain a focused technology development program *for* next-generation space transportation capabilities that dramatically improves the reliability, responsiveness, and cost of access to, transport through, and return from space, and enables a decision to acquire these capabilities in the future;
- 5) Encourage and facilitate the U.S. commercial space transportation industry to enhance the achievement of national security and civil space transportation .. objectives, benefit the U.S. economy, and increase the industry's international competitiveness; and.
- 6) Sustain and promote a domestic space transportation industrial base, including launch systems, infrastructure, and workforce, necessary to meet ongoing United States Government national security and civil requirements.

Implementation of this 'directive will be within the overall policy and resource guidance of the President, the availability of appropriations, and applicable law and regulations.

Implementation Guidelines

To achieve the goals of this directive, Departments and Agencies shall take the following actions:

I. Assuring Access to Space

- 1) "Assured access" is a requirement for critical national security and civil missions and is defined as a sufficiently robust, responsive, and resilient capability to allow continued space operations, consistent with risk management and affordability. The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as appropriate, are responsible for assuring access to space.
- 2) The Secretary of Defense will be the launch agent for the national security sector and will maintain the Capability to develop, evolve, operate, and purchase services for those space transportation systems, infrastructure, and

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Support activities necessary to meet national security requirements.

- 3) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will be the launch agent for the civil sector and will maintain the capability to develop, evolve, operate, and purchase services for those space transportation systems, infrastructure, and support activities necessary to meet civil requirements, including the capability to conduct human and robotic space flight for exploration, scientific, and other civil purposes. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall engage in development activities only for those requirements that cannot be met by capabilities being used by the national security or commercial sectors.
- 4) For the foreseeable future, the capabilities developed under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program will be the foundation for access to space for intermediate and larger payloads for national security and civil purposes to the maximum extent possible consistent with mission, performance, cost, and schedule requirements. New U.S. commercial space transportation capabilities that demonstrate the ability to reliably launch intermediate or larger payloads will be allowed to compete on a level playing field for United States Government missions.
 - a) The Secretary of Defense will maintain overall management responsibilities for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program and will fund the annual fixed costs for both launch services providers through, at a minimum, fiscal year 2009.
 - b) To support a decision on funding after fiscal year 2009, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation, and the Director of Central Intelligence, will evaluate whether to continue to maintain two Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle families to provide access to space for intermediate and larger national security and civil missions. This evaluation will consider whether a single Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle provider has the reliability and performance necessary to meet national security and civil requirements and the potential benefits of maintaining two families of Evolved

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Expendable Launch Vehicles. In addition, management and funding responsibilities will be re-evaluated dependent on the relative role of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle systems and infrastructure in national security and civil-space missions.

- c) Any Department or Agency seeking to significantly modify or develop new launch systems derived from the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles or its major components, including human rating, shall be responsible for any necessary funding arrangements and shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense and, as appropriate, the Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
- 5) Before 2010, the United States shall demonstrate an initial capability for operationally responsive access to and use of space to support national security requirements. In that regard, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of 'Central Intelligence, 'shall:
- a) Develop the requirements and concept of operations for launch vehicles, infrastructure, and spacecraft to provide operationally responsive access to and use of space to support national security, including the ability to provide critical space capabilities in the event of a failure of launch or on-orbit capabilities; and
 - b) Identify the key modifications to, space launch, spacecraft, or ground operations capabilities that will be required to implement an operationally responsive space launch capability.
- 6) The Federal space launch bases and ranges are vital components of the U.S. space transportation infrastructure and are national assets upon which access to space for national security, civil, and commercial purposes depends. The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will operate the Federal launch bases and ranges in a manner so as to accommodate users from all sectors; and will transition these capabilities to a predominantly space-based range architecture to accommodate, among others, operationally responsive space launch systems and new users.

DRAFT**II. Space Exploration**

The space transportation capabilities necessary to carry out space exploration will be developed consistent with National Security Presidential Directive-31, U.S. Space Exploration Policy, dated January 14, 2004. Consistent with that direction, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall develop, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense as appropriate, options to meet potential exploration-unique requirements for heavy lift beyond the capabilities of the existing Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles. These options will emphasize the potential for using derivatives of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles to meet space exploration requirements. In addition, the Administrator shall evaluate the comparative costs and benefits of a new dedicated heavy-lift launch vehicle or options based on the use of Shuttle-derived system. The Administrator and Secretary shall jointly submit to me a recommendation regarding the preferred option to meet future heavy-lift requirements. This recommendation will include an assessment of the impact on national security, civil, and commercial launch activities and the space transportation industrial base.

III. Transformation of Space Transportation Capabilities

- 1) The United States shall sustain a focused technology development program for next-generation space transportation Capabilities to transform U.S. access to and use of space. In that regard, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in cooperation with industry as appropriate, shall:
 - a) Within two years of the date of this directive, develop the requirements, concept of operations, technology roadmaps, and investment strategy for next-generation space transportation capabilities with the objective of dramatically improving the reliability, responsiveness, and cost of Earth-to-orbit space transportation for deployment of spacecraft and other payloads in Earth orbit, exclusive of human space flight; and
 - b) Pursue research and development of in-space transportation capabilities to enable responsive space transportation capabilities and the transformation of the Nation's ability to navigate in space. These efforts

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shall include, but not be limited to: automated rendezvous and docking, and the ability to deploy, service, and retrieve payloads or spacecraft in Earth orbit. The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in cooperation with the Secretary of Energy and other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, shall pursue research and development of space nuclear power and advanced propulsion technologies to more quickly, affordably, and safely expand the reach of exploration into the solar system and beyond.

IV. Commercial Space Transportation

- 1) The United States Government is committed to encouraging and facilitating a viable U.S. commercial space transportation industry that supports U.S. space transportation goals, benefits the U.S. economy, and is internationally competitive. Toward that end, United States Government agencies shall:
 - a) Purchase commercially available U.S. space transportation products and services to the maximum extent possible, consistent with mission requirements and applicable law;
 - b) Provide a timely and responsive regulatory environment for licensing commercial space launch and reentry activities;
 - c) Maintain the liability risk-sharing regime for U.S. commercial space transportation activities set forth in the Commercial Space Launch Act, as amended (49 USC, Subtitle IX, Chapter 701), including provisions for indemnification by the United States Government?
 - d) Refrain from conducting activities with commercial applications that preclude, deter, or compete with U.S. commercial space transportation activities, unless required by national security;
 - e) Involve the U.S. private sector in the design and development of space transportation capabilities to meet United States Government needs;
 - f) Provide stable and predictable access to the Federal space launch bases and ranges, and other government facilities and services, as appropriate, for commercial purposes on a direct-cost basis, as defined in the

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Commercial Space Launch Act, as amended (49 USC, Subtitle IX, Chapter 701). The United States Government reserves the right to use such facilities and services on a priority basis to meet national security and critical civil mission requirements;

- g) Encourage private sector, State, and local government investment and participation in the development and improvement of space infrastructure, including non-federal launch and reentry sites; and
 - h) Provide for the private sector retention of technical data rights in acquiring space transportation capabilities, limited only to the extent necessary to meet United States Government needs.
- 2) The Secretary of Transportation will license and have safety oversight responsibility for commercial launch and reentry operations and for operation of non-federal launch and reentry sites, as set forth in the Commercial Space Launch Act, as amended (49 USC, Subtitle IX, Chapter 701), and Executive Order 12465. The Secretary of Transportation will coordinate with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other United States Government agencies, as appropriate.
- a) The Secretaries of Transportation and Defense will establish common public safety requirements and other common standards, as appropriate, taking into account launch vehicle type and concept of operation, for launches from Federal and non-federal launch sites. The Secretaries of Transportation and Defense will coordinate these requirements with the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and other Departments and Agencies as appropriate.
- 3) The Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation will encourage, facilitate, and promote U.S. commercial space transportation activities, including commercial human space flight.

U.S. Space Transportation Industrial and Technology Base

- 1) A viable domestic industrial and technology base is the foundation of a successful U.S. space transportation capability and is critical to assuring access to space for

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national security and civil purposes. To assure access to space and ensure that national security and civil space transportation needs will continue to be met in the future:

- a) United States Government payloads will be launched on space launch vehicles manufactured in the United States, unless exempted by the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
 - This policy does not apply to use of foreign launch vehicles on a no-exchange-of-funds basis to support the following: flight of scientific instruments on foreign spacecraft, international scientific program, or other cooperative government-to-government programs. This policy also does not apply to the use of foreign launch vehicles to launch United States Government secondary scientific payloads for which no U.S. launch service is available.
 - The proposed use of a non-U.S.-manufactured launch vehicle will be subject to interagency coordination as early in the program as possible and prior to the sponsoring agency's request for authority to negotiate and conclude an agreement. Interagency coordination will take into account national security and foreign, policy concerns, civil and scientific interests, and the performance, availability, and economic and budgetary considerations associated with use of the proposed launch vehicle.
- b) The use of foreign components or technologies, and the participation of foreign governments and entities, in current and future U.S. space transportation systems is permitted consistent with U.S. law and regulations, as well as nonproliferation, national security, and foreign policy goals and commitments and U.S. obligations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Such use or participation will not be permitted where it could result in critical national security or civil space launches being jeopardized by delays or disruptions in receipt of foreign-produced system, components, technology, or expertise.

11-L-0559/OSD/22397

DRAFT**vff. Nonproliferation and Use of Excess Ballistic Missiles**

- 1) In order to prevent the proliferation of missile technology and to limit the adverse impact of use of excess ballistic missiles on U.S. space transportation capabilities:
 - a) Excess U.S. ballistic missiles will either be retained for government use or destroyed. United States' Government agencies may use such assets to launch payloads into orbit on a case-by-case basis, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, when the following conditions are met: (1) the payload supports the sponsoring agency's mission; (2) such use is consistent with international obligations, including the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty; and (3) the sponsoring agency certifies that such use results in a cost savings to the United States Government compared to the use of available commercial launch services that would also meet mission requirements, including performance, schedule, and risk and limits the impact on the U.S. space transportation industry;
 - b) The United States Government encourages other nations that possess excess ballistic missiles to limit their use to government purposes only or destroy them. The United States Government will consider on a case-by-case basis requests from U.S. companies to use foreign excess ballistic missiles for space launch purposes. Any such use must be in conformity with arms control agreements, U.S. nonproliferation policies, U.S. technology transfer policies, and the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines; and
 - c) The United States Government will consider on a case-by-case basis requests to launch foreign space transportation systems in the United States for commercial purposes, including exhibitions and demonstrations. Any such use will be subject to interagency coordination and must be in conformity with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, arms control agreements, U.S. nonproliferation policies, U.S. technology transfer policies, the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, and launch and re-entry licensing regulations.

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DRAFT**Implementing Actions**

Within 180 days from the date of this directive, the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and Transportation, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as appropriate, shall jointly submit to me a national space transportation strategy that includes requirements, implementation plans, schedules, and resources required for:

- 1) Reliable and affordable space access, including assuring access to space for critical national security and civil missions. The strategy shall address how the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program will be managed through 2009, and efforts to modernize the Federal space launch bases and ranges;
- 2) Demonstration of an initial capability for operationally responsive access to and use of space to support national security requirements;
- 3) Access to, transport through, and return from space for space exploration, including options to meet exploration-unique requirements for heavy lift beyond the capabilities of existing launch vehicles;
- 4) Focused technology development efforts to transform U.S. access to and use of space, including development of next-generation space transportation capabilities for deployment of spacecraft or other payloads in Earth orbit and in-space transportation; and
- 5) Measures to encourage and facilitate the U.S. commercial space transportation industry to enhance the achievement of national security and civil space transportation objectives, benefit the U.S. economy, and increase the industry's international competitiveness. The strategy shall consider the development of markets and plans for commercial human space flight.

11-L-0559/OSD/22399



POLICY

**PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE**
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100




NOV 8 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

**SUBJECT: Review of Draft National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on
U.S. Space Transportation Policy**

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft NSPD. I concur with the attached changes. They were previously provided to your staff.


Ryan Henry



11-L-0559/OSD/22400

October 26, 2004

**Department of Defense Proposed Changes to the Draft NSPD on Space
Transportation**

Page 5 and 6, Change as follows:

For the foreseeable future, the capabilities developed under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program will be the foundation for access to space for intermediate and larger payloads for national security and civil purposes to the maximum extent possible consistent with mission, performance, cost, and schedule requirements. New U.S. commercial space transportation capabilities that demonstrate the ability to reliably launch intermediate or larger payloads will be allowed to compete on a level playing field for United States Government missions.

- a) The Secretary of Defense will maintain overall management responsibilities for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program and will fund the annual fixed costs for both launch services providers ~~through, at a minimum, fiscal year 2009~~ unless/until such time as the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, can provide an alternative to the EELV that provides an equivalent payload capability and reliably provides assured national security access to space.
- b) ~~To support a decision on funding after fiscal year 2009, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation, and the Director of Central Intelligence, will evaluate whether to continue to maintain two Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle families to provide access to space for intermediate and larger national security and civil missions. This evaluation will consider whether a single Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle provider has the reliability and performance necessary to meet national security and civil requirements and the potential benefits of maintaining two families of~~

~~Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles. In addition, management and funding responsibilities will be reevaluated dependent on the relative role of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle systems and infrastructure in national security and civil space missions.~~

e/b) Any Department or Agency seeking to significantly modify or develop new launch systems derived from the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles or **its** major components, including human rating, shall be responsible for any necessary funding arrangements and shall coordinate with the Secretary **of** Defense and, as appropriate, the Secretaries **of** Commerce and Transportation and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

October 27, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GEN Shinseki's Retirement

General Shinseki's retirement ceremony was held on June 11, 2003. I was in Europe during that time, including Brussels -- attending a NATO meeting that had been set the year before.

DHR:ss
102704-9

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/22403

27 Oct 04

October 27, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Washington Post Article of Oct. 26

Check with Jim Haynes, but I don't believe the Pentagon should be included in this list on item 40 in the *Early Bird*.

Attach.
10/26/04 Early Bird (pg. 33)

DHR:ss
102704-10

.....
Please respond by _____

year arrived at a strikingly different conclusion. After investigating whether pre-war intelligence had been "cooked" by "Mr. Feith's shop" when it raised questions with the intelligence community about evidence of ties between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and al Qaeda, the committee unanimously declared: "The committee found that none of the analysts or other people interviewed by the committee said that they were pressured to change their conclusions related to Iraq's links to terrorism."

Elsewhere, the SSCI went so far as to note, "In some cases, those [intelligence community] analysts interviewed stated that the questions had forced them to go back and review intelligence reporting, and that during this exercise they came across information they had overlooked in initial readings. The committee found that this process — the policy-makers probing questions — actually improve the Central Intelligence Agency's products."

Interestingly, Mr. Levin joined every other member of the intelligence committee in endorsing this report.

Equally peculiar is the Levin charge that "the intelligence community was consistently dubious" about a connection between Iraq under Saddam and al Qaeda. In a letter sent on Oct. 7, 2002, by the CIA's director to the then-chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Sen. Bob Graham, George Tenet wrote:

"We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda going back a decade. Credible information indicates that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression. We have credible reporting that al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The reporting also

stated that Iraq has provided training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs."

In short, Mr. Feith's staff did in the run-up to war precisely what one would expect a policy organization to do: Evaluate and, where appropriate, challenge available intelligence about the threat that might make military operations necessary. And, having done so — as the SSCI found, through established channels — the Feith organization contributed accordingly to the development of policy.

If anything, information that has emerged from liberated Iraq has made the Levin critique even more untenable. In the Oct. 19 edition of the New York Sun, Laurie Mylroie noted, for example, that "an 11-page document [found in Iraq and] dated Jan. 25, 1993, lists various organizations with which Iraqi intelligence maintained contacts. It recommends 'the use of Arab Islamic elements which were fighting in Afghanistan and now have no place to go and who are currently in Somalia, Sudan and Egypt.' Saddam approved the suggestion, with the order to 'concentrate on Somalia.'" At the time, the network that would become known as al Qaeda was among the "Arab Islamic elements" operating in these countries.

The danger associated with allowing Saddam's ties to such terrorist organizations to metastasize further is now clear as well. In the Wall Street Journal on Oct. 14, Richard Spertzel, a former U.N. weapons inspector and member of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), noted that the ISG uncovered a plan concocted by Iraqi intelligence's M16 directorate "to bottle sarin [a lethal nerve agent] and sulfur mustard in perfume sprayers and medicine bottles which they would ship to the United States and Europe."

The effort to smear conscientious public servants who, thankfully, did their jobs to protect this country may fit with Mr. Kerry's anything-goes campaign for the White House. It does not inspire confidence, however, about either his ability to prosecute the war on terror or to select competent people to help him do it.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is president of the Center for Security Policy and a columnist for The Washington Times.

Washington Post
October 26, 2004
Pg. 24

40. The CIA's Disappeared

THE BUSH administration pretends, and many Americans may believe, that the abuse of U.S.-held prisoners abroad ended after the release of sensational photographs from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Sadly, it did not. While blaming the crimes at Abu Ghraib on a small group of low-ranking soldiers, the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA have fought to preserve the exceptional and sometimes secret policies that allow U.S. personnel to violate the Geneva Conventions and other laws governing the handling and interrogation of foreign detainees. Under those policies, practices at odds with basic American values continue -- even if there are no sensational photos to document them.

The latest example concerns "ghost prisoners," suspects captured in Iraq and Afghanistan who are interrogated by the CIA in secret locations, sometimes outside those countries, and whose identities and locations are withheld from relatives, the International Red Cross and even Congress. For all practical purposes, they have "disappeared," like the domestic detainees of some notorious dictatorships. The first official Army

investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib called this practice "deceptive, contrary to Army doctrine and in violation of international law." Yet, according to reporting by The Post's Dana Priest, the CIA subsequently transported as many as a dozen more "ghost detainees" out of Iraq to interrogate them in its secret prisons.

The Geneva Conventions, which the administration says it is following in Iraq, require the registration of all detainees with the Red Cross. They also prohibit "forcible transfers as well as deportations" of individuals, and ban all "physical or moral coercion ... in particular to obtain information." To get around these rather clear-cut standards, the CIA seems to be relying once again on secret legal opinions whose conclusions -- once they leak out -- are disputed by nearly every authority other than Mr. Bush's political appointees. One, submitted to White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales on March 18, is titled "Protected Persons in Occupied Iraq"; it argues that certain people captured there may be excluded from the conventions -- an interpretation at odds with that of the Red Cross. Another draft memo, drawn up by the Justice Department around the same time but never formally issued, argues that even "protected persons" may be taken out of Iraq and interrogated "for a brief but not indefinite period."

It's not clear what legal standards the CIA is using for its ghost prisoners, because it refuses to explain the standards even to the congressional committees charged with oversight, much less to the public. What ought to be clear, however, is that the practice of holding detainees incommunicado in secret prisons without any outside oversight violates basic standards of human rights. A number of members of Congress, including several

Republican senators, have expressed outrage about the ghost detainees and have promised to investigate; to date they have not done so. Now would be a good time to start.

New York Times
October 26, 2004

41. Making Things Worse

President Bush's misbegotten invasion of Iraq appears to have achieved what Saddam Hussein did not: putting dangerous weapons in the hands of terrorists and creating an offshoot of Al Qaeda in Iraq.

The murder of dozens of Iraqi Army recruits over the weekend is being attributed to the forces of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who has been identified by the Bush administration as a leading terrorist and a supposed link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. That was not true before the war - as multiple investigations have shown. But the breakdown of order since the invasion has changed all that. This terrorist, who has claimed many attacks on occupation forces and the barbaric murder of hostages, recently swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and renamed his group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.

The hideous murder of the recruits was a reminder of the Bush administration's dangerously inflated claims about training an Iraqi security force. The officials responsible for these inexperienced young men sent them home for leave without weapons or guards, at a time when police and army recruits are constantly attacked. The men who killed them wore Iraqi National Guard uniforms.

A particularly horrific case of irony involves weapons of mass destruction. It's been obvious for months that American forces were not going to find the chemical or biological armaments that Mr. Bush said were stockpiled in Iraq. What we didn't know is that while they were looking

for weapons that did not exist, they lost weapons that did.

James Glanz, William J. Broad and David E. Sanger reported in The Times yesterday that some 380 tons of the kinds of powerful explosives used to destroy airplanes, demolish buildings, make missile warheads and trigger nuclear weapons have disappeared from one of the many places in Iraq that the United States failed to secure. The United Nations inspectors disdained by the Bush administration had managed to monitor the explosives for years. But they vanished soon after the United States took over the job. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was so bent on proving his theory of lightning warfare that he ignored the generals who said an understaffed and underarmed invasion force could rush to Baghdad, but couldn't hold the rest of the country, much less guard things like the ammunition dump.

Iraqi and American officials cannot explain how some 760,000 pounds of explosives were spirited away from a well-known site just 30 miles from Baghdad. But they were warned. Within weeks of the invasion, international weapons inspectors told Washington that the explosives depot was in danger and that terrorists could help themselves "to the greatest explosives bonanza in history."

The disastrous theft was revealed in a recent letter to an international agency in Vienna. It was signed by the general director of Iraq's Planning and Following Up Directorate. It's too bad the Bush administration doesn't have one of those.

Los Angeles Times
October 26, 2004

42. Worse Than The Usual Bad

The confirmation Monday that U.S. forces in Iraq failed to prevent the looting of 380 tons

of conventional explosives represents a new chapter for the "just when you thought things could not get much worse" file. Further, the execution-style murder Saturday of dozens of Iraqis being trained as soldiers, the very men to whom the United States planned to transfer the job of guarding the country, demonstrates an abject failure by Iraqis and occupation officials to learn from past mistakes.

The International Atomic Energy Agency announced Monday what it told the interim Iraqi government and the Bush administration earlier this month: High-powered explosives that could demolish buildings, bring down aircraft or detonate nuclear weapons have disappeared from a former Iraqi army site about 30 miles south of Baghdad. A Pentagon official said troops searched the site soon after the March 2003 invasion and found the explosives that had previously been counted by the United Nations. But U.S.-led coalition forces failed to guard the site, and the explosives later disappeared.

President Bush has repeatedly said his generals have not told him they need more than the 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. But it's now clear that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and his Pentagon colleagues should have listened to Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, then the Army chief of staff, when he warned that "several hundred thousand" troops would be required to win the peace as well as the war. Instead, Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, disparaged Shinseki and shoved him aside.

The ineptness of the Pentagon's civilian leadership surfaced as well in its confused attack-and-retreat from the Sunni stronghold of Fallouja. Times reporters Alissa J. Rubin and Doyle McManus reported Sunday that after the March 31 killing and mutilation of four American security guards, a

Marine general said that rather than besiege the city out of anger, his troops should first enlist moderates to provide intelligence. Rumsfeld did not tell Bush of the Marines' objections, and the president authorized the attack. Yet when the Marines reported that they were close to retaking the city, the White House, worried about backlash, ordered a cease-fire. Fallouja remains under insurgent control and is the base of one of Iraq's main terrorist leaders, Abu Musab Zarqawi.

Zarqawi's followers claimed responsibility for the Saturday attack on the unarmed army recruits. Rebels dressed as police or soldiers stopped three vehicles, ordered the passengers out and shot them. Iraqi police and military trainees have been targets for months. The recruits should have been protected by other soldiers or given weapons to defend themselves.

The U.S. military prides itself on the lessons it learns in combat. Yet the continued assaults on Iraqi police and military trainees, and the evidence that insurgents keep infiltrating those squads, indicate a failure to adapt tactics to an increasingly powerful and sophisticated enemy.

There have been better days in the Iraq war, but not many worse ones.

Wall Street Journal
October 26, 2004
Pg. 24

43. War And 'Competence'

A week before Election Day, John Kerry and his allies have once again changed their line of attack on Iraq. The issue isn't any longer whether we should have fought the war at all ("wrong war, wrong place, wrong time"), it is that the Senator would fight it with more "competence."

The peg for this line is yesterday's story that a stockpile of explosives was

11-L-0559/OSD/22406

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

OFFICE
SECRETARY

2005 December 31, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Protecting Officials

I just read the attached cable. We're simply going to have to find a way to get that responsibility moved to the Iraqis. There's no way DoD can keep using SOW for these personal security responsibilities.

If we have to, we should quickly put a team of people together to train Iraqis to train other Iraqis how to do this. The USG can't keep doing it all. In the meantime, they should use more contractors.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

This is something that could be done without Iraq!

Thanks.

Alleged
12/29/04 Cable (RUEHGBA2346)

DAR:ca
12/29/04 (u)

.....
Please respond by

1/10/04

Tab A

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11-L-0559/OSD/22407

OSD 02227-05

1040

31 Dec 04

72 (04)

~~SECRET~~

1435
12/7

USF II
December 6, 2004

205 PM -11 11 03

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM :

SUBJECT: Commando Solo

Please check to see how much longer we plan to go on with these Commando Solo flights relating to Cuba. Everything costs money.

Thanks.

CRS:ab
(30604-1)

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~SECRET~~

~~FOUO~~

I-04/016523

ES-1611

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

7 December 2004 - 1525 Hrs


MEMORANDUM FOR: USD(P)

SUBJECT: Commando Solo

Sir,

DSD requests that you prepare a response to the attached snowflake.

Very respectfully,



Sean O'Connor

CAPT, USN

Military Assistant to the

Deputy Secretary of Defense

cc: D S

Response: 14Dec04

~~FOUO~~

07-12-04 17:47 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/22409

OSD 02229-05

720
TAB

26
January 23, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

Let's make sure we have a joint CIA-CENTCOM Konar Valley lessons learned effort.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012304-15

.....
Please respond by 2/6/04

Iraq

26 Jan 04

OSD 02266-04

11-L-0559/OSD/22410


Tab

TAB A

January ²⁶~~23~~, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Article on Army Supply Issues

Please read this article and tell me if you could understand what this is **all about**. I am dumbfounded.

Thanks.

Attach.

Wood, David. "Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems in Iraq War."
Newhouse.com, January 22, 2004.

DHR:dh
012304-5

.....
Please respond by _____

400

26 Jan 04

17 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/22411

OSD 02280-04

Tab A

Newhouse.com
January '22.2004

Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems In Iraq War

By David Wood, Newhouse News Service

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. military juggernaut that swept into Iraq last March was plagued by shortages of ammunition, spare parts and fuel, an epic logistics mess for which the old military term "snafu" might have been invented.

Battalions of tanks and armored vehicles, dashing forward under grueling conditions, got no repair parts for three weeks. Broken-down vehicles had to be stripped of usable parts and left behind. Some units ran dangerously low on ammunition and couldn't get resupplied; others in desperate need of M-16 and machine gun rounds got unneeded rank shells instead, according to logistics officers. Some troops had virtually no water while receiving truckloads of stuff they didn't need and couldn't carry.

"We weren't as effective as we could be," the Army's logistics chief, Lt. Gen. Claude V. Christianson, acknowledged in an interview.

In a devastating self-critique, Christianson and his staff have produced an analysis that concludes, in essence, that the Army's logisticians can't see what is needed on the battlefield, can't respond rapidly when they do find out what's needed, and can't distribute what they have when it's needed.

Christianson, who ran the war's logistics operation from Kuwait before he was brought back to the Pentagon to fix the mess, confirmed that these problems will require scarce money and sustained attention to fix.

But the supply problems were exacerbated, officers said, by the decision of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to deploy mostly combat units in the weeks before the invasion, and to hold back Army and Marine Corps logistics and support units until weeks or months later -- gambling that the war would be over quickly enough that sustained resupply wouldn't be needed.

According to combat units' after-action reports, that shaved it too close.

Even now, nine months after the fall of Baghdad, it takes the Army 34 to 38 days to move a requested spare part from a depot in the United States to the soldier in Iraq who needs it.

During the war, it was worse.

Days into combat, with tank and mechanized infantry units streaking across empty desert toward Baghdad and then fighting into the city, the Army struggled to send forward ammo and water in huge truck convoys that quickly came under fire on ungarded two-lane highways. Soon, the 400 miles between Kuwait and Baghdad were nearly impassable with stalled traffic.

That meant combat units couldn't evacuate their wounded by road, the 3rd Infantry Division reported, and had to compete for scarce helicopter space instead.

Combat engineers struggled to build fortified supply depots along the way but lacked critical equipment

and supplies, which "extended the time troops were operating while exposed to enemy fires," according to an after-combat report by the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

With some combat units like the 3rd Infantry Division desperately short of water, ammo, spare parts and food, crates and pallets of supplies piled up at depots and ports in Kuwait. At least \$1.2 billion worth of supplies got lost, according to an audit by the General Accounting Office.

Then the Army ran out of trucks.

American forces managed to prevail only because of the "creative ability of individual soldiers to pull the pieces together," Gen. Paul Kern, who oversees Army supplies and maintenance, said in an interview. "They are heroes."

Until the problems are fixed, U.S. military operations are subject to the same snafus that threatened the campaign to topple Saddam Hussein:

-- When troops are on the move on distant battlefields, the Army doesn't know which supplies are running low because there are no reliable, fast communications between front-line units and the rear. **As** a result, Army logisticians ship a mix of fuel, tires, ammunition and food according to what planners working years ago imagined units might need.

The fix: a new satellite communications system dedicated to logistics, and data links tracking supplies from depot to user.

-- Once the Army figures out what soldiers actually need, it can't get the materiel to the battlefield, and can't distribute it to individual units when it arrives. There is no military equivalent of FedEx or United Parcel Service on the battlefield.

The fix: Create one, reorganizing transportation units and equipping them with more data-linked trucks. The cost, Christianson said, will be \$500 million a year -- for the next **20** years.

-- When the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines **work** side by side in the same region, as they did in Iraq, the combined supply system is a clashing mismatch of different cultures, incompatible communications systems, different stock numbers for similar items, even different vocabularies. Keeping track of a spare Marine Corps tank transmission as it moves from a Marine *Corps* depot to an Air Force cargo plane to an Army truck, for instance, "is one of our biggest challenges," Christianson said.

The fix: The U.S. Transportation Command, a multiservice agency, has been put in overall charge. The services and other agencies will have to adapt. "It's a cultural issue, not a technology issue," Christianson said.

The next hurdle is getting the Pentagon and Congress **to** invest more money than traditionally is spent on logistics.

"This isn't a terribly sexy business," Kern said. "It's hard to get people interested in it until you run out of something."



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9998

INFO MEMO

CN-1526-04
17 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC

SUBJECT: Article on Army Supply Issues

- **Issue.** Please read this article and tell me if you could understand what this is all about. I am dumbfounded (TAB A).
- **Answer.** LTG Christianson answered the reporter's questions in the context of solving logistics challenges from the perspective of the Army White Paper, "Delivering Materiel Readiness to the Army" (TAB B). The article contains incorrect perceptions and does not provide a good representation of the overall logistics picture. Attached information paper addresses incorrect perceptions in the article and lists some key points to provide a more complete picture of OIF logistics (TAB C).
- **Analysis**
 - The additional editorial comments and viewpoints in the article are Mr. Wood's and were not discussed during the interview.
 - The US Army (USA) G4 provided an executive *summary* to the Chief of Staff, USA, on 23 January that provides background and the context of LTG Christianson's portion of the interview given to Mr. Wood (TAB D).

COORDINATION: TAB E

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM Gordon S. Holder, USN; Director for Logistics;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22414

OSD 02280-04

400

17 Feb 04

Army Logistics White Paper

“Delivering Materiel Readiness to the Army”

The Army G-4 exists to deliver materiel readiness to our Soldiers - a task that has remained the same for years. Today's operating environment has changed; we are an Army at War... relevant and ready. Our most critical task is to **sustain the combat readiness of our Deployed Force and to maintain the operational readiness of the Current Force**. The Current Force provides the war fighting readiness that serves our Nation. The Current Force must adapt to a changing enemy and fight and win decisively against any threat. Our fundamental challenge within G-4 is to enhance our current capabilities while transforming Army Logistics for tomorrow. We will accomplish this vital task by focusing our efforts on four clear objectives.

This White Paper describes four G-4 Focus Areas we will hold preeminent over the next two years. It addresses known shortfalls in our current structure that require immediate action, and directly supports our Army's transition to an expeditionary force that is agile, versatile, and capable of acting rapidly and effectively. These Focus Areas are the Army G-4's highest priority, and we will apply our policies, processes, and resources to ensure success.

Focus Area #1 - Connect Army Logisticians. Today's Army Logistician cannot see the requirements on the battlefield. Our customers cannot see the support that is coming their way. As a result, we rely on pushing support based on our best estimate of what we think the Soldier needs. Soldiers order the same item several times because they have no confidence support is on the way. We will solve this problem by connecting Army Logisticians. Army Logisticians will be an integral part of the joint battlefield network with satellite-based communications that provide 24/7 connectivity on demand, enabling them to pass and to receive key data from the battlefield to the industrial base. This connectivity will cover the battlefield, and it will provide Army Logisticians the agility and flexibility to quickly plug into and unplug from a dedicated network with an asynchronous (stand-alone) capability.

The G-4, along with the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), will work with the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (CSA) Task Force Network to ensure logistics communications solutions are embedded within the Army's network and will optimize joint and combined operations in an expeditionary environment. Our Enterprise Resource Planning work in Battle Command Sustainment and Support System (BCS3), Global Combat Support System - Army (GCSS-A), Logistics Modernization Program (LMP), and Product Life-cycle Management (PLM+) are critical to implementing fully this Focus Area from foxhole to factory to foxhole. The logistics common operating picture (LCOP) will be improved by this network connectivity, and it will provide the vital link in the joint commander's ability to see his force and to make decisions based upon accurate, real-time logistics information.

Focus Area #2 - Modernize Theater Distribution. Today's Army is not able to respond rapidly and precisely when support requirements are identified. We do not have the battlefield distribution system that we need. We cannot provide time-definite delivery schedules, and we cannot effectively control physical movements across the new battle environment. Effective theater sustainment rests solidly on the fundamental concepts of distribution-based logistics. We need a single focus on the simple task of **guaranteeing** delivery -- on time, every time. We must have a distribution system that reaches from the Soldier at the tip of the spear to the source of support, wherever that may be. Our success will be measured at the last tactical mile with the Soldier.

We will build warfighter confidence by increasing visibility and establishing flexible, responsive distribution Capabilities. We will not need to store large quantities of supplies forward because we will respond to customer requirements with speed and precision. The G-4 will work with CASCOM and the U.S. Transportation Command, the DOD distribution process owner, to develop this solution from factory to foxhole in the joint environment. Along with AMC and the Defense Logistics Agency, we are committed to enabling an effective distribution-based sustainment process. We will work with the CSA Task Force Modularity to develop this objective in the near term.

Final – published version

Focus Area #3 – Improve Force Reception. We have invested heavily over the past 10 years in improving our ability to deploy rapidly from our continental U.S. platforms. The strategic movement of forces by Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) vessels and C-17 aircraft has significantly enhanced our capabilities. However, we have not invested at the other end -- in our ability to receive forces in the theater. We are hamstrung by the lack of an organizational construct that focuses on joint theater opening tasks. Today, we build ad hoc support organizations to execute aerial and sea port of debarkation operations, and we depend on forces from several organizations to establish the theater sustainment base. This process of receiving forces in theater takes time, a luxury we will not have as the Army develops an expeditionary structure that is capable of rapidly deploying joint-capable force modules.

In order to effectively facilitate the immediate operational employment and sustainment of the expeditionary force flow, we will design an integrated theater-opening capability that can respond on extremely short notice and can execute critical sustainment tasks immediately upon entry. That theater-opening capability will not be an ad hoc organization. It must be a support organization that has trained to the task. It must be enabled with the right tools to succeed, and it must have the capacity to expand to meet theater growth. The critical operational tasks for this organization include: (1) providing operational sustainment command and control with reach-back capability and initial network visibility; (2) conducting theater reception, staging onward movement and integration operations, to include life support, force protection and port of debarkation operations; and (3) sustaining forces in theater with theater distribution and requirements visibility.

Focus Area #4 – Integrate the Supply Chain. Over the past several years the Army has taken supply reductions at many levels for various reasons. We changed Army policy several years ago to reduce the amount of items carried on unit prescribed load listings while simultaneously reducing stock levels in many authorized stockage lists across the field army. Additionally, we took risks at the strategic level by under funding strategic spares programs. The cumulative result of these reductions is a lean supply chain without the benefit of either an improved distribution system or an enhanced information system. As a result, our Soldiers are at the end of a long line of communication with reduced inventories and an old distribution system.

We will view the supply chain in a holistic manner to ensure we understand the impact of actions across the entire chain, not just at a single level or within a single service. This joint, end-to-end view is essential if we are to provide the kind of support our Soldiers deserve. The solution is an enterprise view of the supply chain, and an agency and a service integration of processes, information, and responsibilities. We are committed to developing the Army's Enterprise Solution to the supply chain in close coordination and alignment with DOD's Focused Logistics Initiative. Ultimately, joint information will be freely and automatically shared among strategic, operational and tactical level headquarters and agencies. Consumers and logisticians from all agencies and services will enter local supporting systems, plug into the sustainment network, and be afforded end-to-end joint total asset visibility (JTAV). As a result of our Theater Distribution efforts, combatant commanders will be capable of seeing inventory in motion, as well as seeing what is available at storage locations, and they will be able to rapidly and effectively execute decisions that meet their requirements.

Conclusion. We will build confidence in the minds of the combatant commanders by delivering sustainment on time, every time. We can do that only if we provide Army Logisticians the capability to see the requirements every day and to control the distribution to guarantee precise, time-definite support. Army Logisticians will be part of joint and combined logistics processes that increase speed to deliver focused logistics. We will integrate real-time total asset visibility and seamlessly connect to the industrial base. This will give us an LCOP that will enable the kind of end-to-end control that always delivers the right support to the exact location at the precise time needed. If we do not connect Army Logisticians, improve the capability of the distribution system, modernize force reception, provide integrated supply management and give the joint force combatant commanders JTAV, we will study these same lessons after the next major conflict. The Army G-4 is committed to ensure that we will not have to relearn these same lessons.

28 January 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: David Wood Article, "Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems in Iraq War"

1. Purpose. To address incorrect perceptions in the article and highlight logistics successes not addressed for a complete picture of OIF logistics.

2. Key Points

- Incorrect Perceptions in Article

- o No evidence supports the assertion that mostly combat units were deployed before invasion and that USA and USMC logistics and support units were held back for weeks/months. Priority of flow was to combat units but support units were moved and integrated accordingly. (See Enclosure (A))
- o Article states, "it takes the Army 34-38 days to move a requested spare part from a US depot to the soldier in Iraq who needs it." This is an accurate portrayal of the length of time from the submission of the requisition until the requesting soldier has the part in his hands. LTG Christianson was illustrating that the strategic distribution processes may get the part from CONUS to Kuwait in 5-7 days, but additional time can be attributed to three factors. (1) Logisticians do not have access at all levels to a dedicated data network to rapidly pass the requisition. (2) There is not an integrated supply chain to efficiently locate the spare part from both Army and joint sources and then provide visibility of the requisition status to the user. (3) The distribution system is not responsive enough to swiftly deliver the part to the soldier once it arrives in theater.
- o Article states, "combat units couldn't evacuate their wounded by road." Generally, *aeromedical evacuation is intentionally used as primary means of evacuation* due to evacuation distances and ground route challenges.
- o Upon checking with USA Engineer School, no evidence supports the statement, "Combat engineers struggled to build fortified supply depots along the way." A quote was taken out of context and wrongly applied to another unrelated issue from a draft OIF after action report made available at GlobalSecurity.org. Per doctrine, the *combat engineer mission* is to support fast-moving maneuver forces (not to build fortified depots) while *general engineers* support logistics functions in the rear.

Tab C

While fast-paced maneuver may temporarily extend supply lines, *all* engineers are trained and equipped to operate in a hostile environment.

- o Article states, "There is no military equivalent of FedEx or United Parcel Service on the battlefield." These companies embody the attributes of the strategic and tactical distribution models of future military logistics: in-transit visibility of shipments and flexible, responsive employment of transportation assets by a single distribution process owner.
- o Article alludes to logistics disconnects among Services. Items moving through the Defense Transportation System are requisitioned and delivered to a DOD Activity Address using standard MILSTRIP format. *The same procedures apply to all four Services.* The locations of units are constantly updated as they move with combat formations. The combatant commander establishes priorities for sustainment based on overall operational requirements, not by individual Service.
- Highlights of logistics successes (from Enclosure (B)) are below:
 - o Theater-wide, logistics was a big-picture success. Air Force and Navy experienced little to few logistics problems. Ground maneuver units, however, did experience localized logistics challenges as reported by the Wood article. These were largely caused by tactical-level transportation and/or communications and are not uncommon during the fog of war.
 - o Since DESERT STORM, there has been significant progress at strategic/operational levels with In Transit Visibility (ITV) from CONUS to an arial port of debarkation (APOD) or a seaport of debarkation (SPOD). The challenge is to sustain this and extend to tactical level.
 - o Even though radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is in its infancy, experiences with RFID during OIF were so positive that DOD now *mpndates* RFID use.
 - o Recent designation of USTRANSCOM as Distribution Process Owner (DPO) results in one organization managing entire supply chain. Pallets and containers now configured in United States for rapid distribution in theater.
 - o Services will continue to "push" most sustainment items to task forces until ITV methods improve. Efficiencies with DPO and ITV should *negate* need to push sustainment in future.

- o Medical evacuation and treatment was very successful. OIF experienced lowest died of wounds rate in history; 98 percent of patients seen at level I and III facilities were returned to duty.
- o Global Combat Support System being developed to link battlefield supply and distribution network into a common logistics operating environment.

Prepared by: VADM Gordon S. Holder, USN; Director for Logistics:
(b)(6)

DEPORD Reviews on Force Flow of Logistics Units
Summary of Findings

- Forces were deployed via numbered deployment orders (DEPORD).
 - Some DEPORDs were small; others encompassed hundreds of individual units.
- Combat operations began 19 Mar 03.
- DEPORD 36B released 10 Oct 02.
 - Main units in DEPORD 36B were USCENTCOM-requested logistics enablers.
 - Fuels units.
 - AMMO.
 - Engineer/construction units.
- DEPORD 165 released 25 Nov 02.
 - Major unit types.
 - Communications.
 - Port opening.
 - AOR arrival dates were mainly between Dec 02 and Feb 03.
- DEPORD 167 released 25 Nov 02.
 - Another major request by USCENTCOM for logistical prep forces.
 - Similar to forces in DEPORD 165.
 - Arrival dates for deploying units to AOR were Dec 02 - Feb 03.
- DEPORD 172 released 26 Nov 02.
 - Another logistical prep request for forces with arrival dates into AOR Dec 02 - Mar 03.
- DEPORD 174B released 24 Dec 02.
 - One of the major DEPORDs with well over a hundred units tasked to deploy.
 - AOR arrival dates from Jan - Apr 03.
 - Encompassed both logistical support and combat forces based upon USCENTCOM request for forces timelines.

Logistics Successes Related to David Wood Article

"What Went Right and Ongoing Efforts"

- Asset Visibility
 - To provide in-transit visibility (ITV) of shipments into AOR, the United States and United Kingdom implemented an extensive RFID infrastructure. Pallets and containers were marked with RFID tags that would report shipment location to a central database as tag passed RFID interrogators placed at strategic locations along supply chain. This allowed logistics to track supplies, resulting in increased confidence in the supply system and a decrease in supply reorders. Even though this technology is in its infancy, experiences with RFID during OIF were so positive that DOD now mandates RFID use.
 - In order to provide tactical asset visibility, CENTCOM requested funding for the Joint Logistics Warfighting Initiative (JLWI). J4 championed initiative and submitted requests for supplemental funding, resulting in over \$7M being earmarked for JLWI in CENTCOM AOR. JLWI enables logistician to see on-hand stock levels in units to allow commanders to exert directive authority for logistics. Although extremely useful to the tactical logistician, Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) never incorporated JLWI into its "architecture umbrella" thus limiting its effectiveness.
 - Bandwidth limitations for logistics information systems down to tactical level are well documented. The logistics community is responding in two ways to mitigate limitations: increasing the bandwidth available to logistics information systems and decreasing the bandwidth requirements of these same systems. Logistics information systems are migrating toward a network-centric approach that processes information on strategic servers located in data centers with access to high-capacity data pipes and sending only the results forward to the user through lightweight hyper text markup language (HTML) information exchange.
 - The Army used Joint Deployment Logistics Modules (JDLM) as its logistics command and control (C2) system during OIF. While appearing to be a capable system, infrastructure requirements to provide feeder information, including security accreditation, were not fully in place. At the Joint level, the Global Combat Support System - Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force (GCSSCC/JTF) provides a limited logistics C2 capability and work is ongoing to modernize/integrate the Service logistics systems so they will provide decision support tools and asset visibility to identify "what is needed on the battlefield" by FY06. Since GCSS CC/JTF has a wide infrastructure and is fully accredited for

operation on the SIPRNET, work is also in progress to provide tools down to Service staff and component headquarters levels.

- Asset Distribution

- o Recent designation of USTRANSCOM as Distribution Process Owner (DPO) should optimize global supply chain distribution by assigning one activity to control the process from wholesale to soldier. This should alleviate congestion at aerial ports and seaports.
 - During OIF, a significant amount of cargo arrived in theater at transportation nodes requiring reconfiguration by supply personnel. Due to limited aerial ports and seaports, there was not the time, space or capability to store or reconfigure supplies at transportation hubs. This resulted in delays. Battlefield distribution includes both a supply and a transportation capability. Key to battlefield distribution is minimum handling between origin and destination.
- o Current distribution policy is for ALL eligible break-bulk freight to flow to a Defense Distribution Center (DDC) in the United States. Pure pallet/containers are configured at the DDCs (all items on pallet are designated for a single supply support activity). This has dramatically reduced in-theater distribution time by eliminating the requirement to handle break-bulk or to reconfigure containers/pallets at in theater transportation nodes.

- Fuel (Class III)

- o OIF fuel support is a true joint success story -- no fuel shortages from Kuwait into Iraq. LTG Christianson highlighted this to reporter.
- o 260 miles of Army's Inland Petroleum Distribution System were constructed, and augmented by 70+ miles of the USMC system.
- o Over 2,000 host nation, USMC, USA and contractor trucks delivered fuel from bulk farms to individual combat units.
- o To support future fast-paced operations, US Army is developing Rapidly Installed Fuel Transfer System (RIFTS). RIFTS is in RDT&E and received a \$5.2M Congressional plus-up in FY04. It requires \$29.7M to complete testing in FY05-FY07, and \$280M in production funds.

- Construction Material & Engineering (Class IV)
 - Per doctrine, while combat engineers were forward supporting maneuver forces, general engineers in the rear constructed a series of supply depots supporting operations spanning hundreds of miles, constructed numerous base camps, and provided other critical support with minimal casualties.
- Ammunition (Class V)
 - Pre-positioned and call-forward stocks ensured no strategic or operational shortages against spectrum of munitions support during major combat operations. Due to adequate theater stock levels, only one of two Army ammo ships was offloaded.
 - Tactical air units strategically pre-positioned sufficient preferred munitions to sustain air war throughout combat operations and beyond.
 - Army theater ammunition supply agencies had sufficient stocks to provide combat loads to Marine ground units until Marine Corps pre-positioned ships were downloaded. This allowed Marine combat units to reach combat readiness status earlier than expected.
 - All ground ammunition resupply requests were headed north from Kuwait within hours of receipt of the requisition at theater storage areas.
 - Munitions for five divisions, two armored cavalry units, aviation units, air defense units, CSS, 1 MEF, 1 MAW, and one UK division were brought into theater through one airfield and two seaports, and subsequently managed by a single distribution center.
- Medical (Class VIII)
 - Medical evacuation and treatment were very successful. OIF experienced lowest died of wounds rate in history; 98 percent of patients seen at level II and III facilities were returned to duty.
 - To mitigate risk at tactical level associated with having to move patients long distances for care, Services have established resuscitative surgical capabilities at brigade/division medical companies to stabilize seriously injured patients far forward prior to evacuation for more definitive care.
 - Air Force established Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facilities (MASF) at far forward landing strips as soon as they were secured. Helicopters rapidly moved patients to MASF for evacuation by fixed wing aircraft leaving medical evacuation helicopters forward to evacuate the most seriously wounded patients.

Tab C

Enclosure B

- Repair Parts (Class IX)

- o CENTCIOM now working with DLA's Defense Distribution Command (DDC) to build all cargo pallets and multi-packs consigned to a single address within Iraq as unit packs at wholesale level rather than transferring workload to CJTF-7 ground units in difficult combat conditions. Action is improving corps distribution and cutting weeks off customer wait time.
- o Army successfully operated per current doctrine. Army ground forces deployed in combat with a Prescribed Load List (PLL) of repair parts. PLL is designed to support units with small quantities of demand supported repair parts to meet immediate demands for organizational-/unit-level equipment repairs. PLL is intentionally small so combat units are not overburdened with parts. Army Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL) are designed to replenish PLLs. ASLs stocks are located within combat service support units.
 - During combat operations, units conducted controlled exchange, and in some cases cannibalization of non-mission capable vehicles in order to maintain operational momentum. However, as logistics units followed combat units toward objectives in Iraq, many of the disabled vehicles were recovered, repaired and returned to mission-capable status in designated maintenance collection points. This is doctrinal for US Army combat maintenance operations.
 - Army parts automation systems are designed to "push" requirements for Class IX from combat units to combat support units. During initial stages of combat operations, it was difficult for combat units to establish connectivity with their support units making it extremely difficult for logisticians to establish visibility of parts requirements.

Once combat operations stabilized and units were able to conduct operational halts, automation systems were established and repair parts flow was established.

- o Despite soaring numbers of requisitions, Operational Readiness (OR) rates remain high for most systems. Armored HMMWV OR rate as of 1 Sep 03 was 89 percent. Nine of eleven ground Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) achieved at least 90 percent readiness during this period. A team of Subject Matter Experts is currently reviewing repair parts distribution flow into the Iraqi theater.

- Unexpectedly high demand rates resulted from increased OPTEMPO and a punishing environment. Tank treads normally lasting 1 year wore out in 2 months. Vehicle tire tread wear outpaced Army's ability to resupply. Equipment requisitions soared from a pre-war annual rate of 67,000 Bradley tracks to a FY03 order of 480,000 tracks. HMMWV tire orders went from 48,000 to 204,000; transmission requests doubled from 6,000 to 12,000.

TAB D

EXSUM

Interview of DCS, G4 on the White Paper, "Army Logistics: Delivering Materiel Readiness" Interview conducted by Mr. Wood of Woodhouse News Service on 12 January 2004. I answered questions about my experiences as the CFLCC, C4 in support of OIF, to include; shortages of trucks; difficulty in seeing the battlefield; changes in the nature of warfare; problems with distribution and what keeps me awake at night. I answered these questions in the context of solving these problems through the lens (focus areas) of our White Paper. Those focus areas are: Connect the Logistician, Modernize Theater Distribution, Improve Force Reception, and Integrate the Supply Chain. My overall message was that logistics worked well as a result of individual Soldier effort. Our support was not as fast or effective or precise as we would like, but logisticians knew the challenges and solved them. I explained that without the ability to "see" in real time it becomes very difficult to control or adjust to a changing battlefield. Class I & III support went pretty well, as those commodities are easier to plan for (more predictable). But commodities such as Class V & IX are harder to estimate given the dynamics of the battlefield. The solution to this problem is to have the capability to transmit those requirements 24/7 using satellite communications and wireless technology, enabling a rapid response and the ability to adjust to a changing battlefield. In response to the question about needing more trucks, I stated that the capacity of the road would not allow for more trucks, which was not really the issue. The solution is not more trucks but updating current trucks with new technology. I said that we think we would need about \$500m a year to provide a cyclic renewal of truck capability. Lastly, I stated that our logisticians are problem solvers; that is what we do. At no time did LTG Christianson discuss the issue of force deployment.

TAB E

COORDINATION

US Army |

Col Chappell

29 January 2004

8:10 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld Yh
DATE: ~~February~~ ^{March} 26, 2004
SUBJECT: **Suicide and Depression**

Please draft a letter from me to Senator Dominici responding to this question as you have indicated.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022604.05

Attach: Winkenwerder memo to SD 2/17/04 Re: Suicide

Please respond by: 3/7

11-L-0559/OSD/22428

OSD 02313-04

702

11-L-0559

2/25/04



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

February 17 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD. ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Suicide & Depression-- SNOWFLAKE: (Tab A)

- The Office of Legislative Affairs has made several attempts to schedule a presentation, and we are prepared to brief Senator Domenici at his convenience.
- The suicide rate in-theater is consistent with the annual suicide rates for the period 1990-2002 for all of the Services (TAB B). Suicide rates for the Services have remained in the range of 10-15 per 100,000 per year, while the civilian rate (matched by age and gender) is approximately 20 per 100,000 per year.
 - There have been 22 medical examiner confirmed suicides in the Iraqi theater (18 Army, 2 Navy and 2 Marine Corps). (Each service Criminal Investigation Division provides the final determination.)
 - The in-theater suicide rate for the Army is 13.5/100,000/year, compared against an overall Service rate of 11.6/100,000/year
 - The Marine Corps reports an in-theater rate of 5.3/100,000/year.
 - The Navy has experienced 2 confirmed suicides; with conservative estimates of the size of the naval force in theater, the rate would be less than the overall Service rate of 11.7/100,000/year.
 - The Air Force reports no suicides in theater.
- Each Service has a Suicide Prevention Program; I have reviewed them all. The Army, in particular, has developed a comprehensive program, consisting of
 - A formal training program, Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST), to educate leaders and service members.
 - Combat Stress Control units assigned throughout the theater
 - A Deployment Cycle Support Program which includes activities at each phase of deployment (pre-, during, and post-deployment).

COORDINATION: USD (P&R)

Attachments:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	12/26
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	2/18

Prepared By: LTC Guy Strawder, OASD (Health Affairs)

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22429

OSD 02513-04

4.8
1800
1

October 16, 2003

TO Bill Winkenwerder

CC Powell Moore
David Chu

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Depression

Senator Pete Domenici called me yesterday.

He noticed articles about suicides in the Army. He said something like the following. Suicide is frequently caused by depression, which can be a matter of the inability to sleep or indecisiveness. He wonders if the Army is doing a good job of looking into the possibility of depression in the military. He said a high percentage of certain age groups have some sort of depression, and that there is a relatively high teenage suicide rate now from depression.

His recommendation is that we get some psychiatrists or psychologists to take a look at the issue of depression. He is convinced a lot of it can be fixed with modern medicines.

Please tell me what you think. Also, please get with Powell Moore and go back to Senator Domenici to tell him what we know and are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101503-22

.....
Please respond by 11/21/03

U21311 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/22430



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

February 17 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Suicide & Depression -- SNOWFLAKE: (Tab A)

- The Office of Legislative Affairs has made several attempts to schedule a presentation, and we are prepared to brief Senator Domenici at his convenience.
- The suicide rate in-theater is consistent with the annual suicide rates for the period 1990-2002 for all of the Services (TAB B). Suiciderates for the Services have remained in the range of 10-15 per 100,000 per year, while the civilian rate (matched by age and gender) is approximately 20 per 100,000 per year
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 - The in-theater suicide rate for the Army is 13.5/100,000/year, compared against an overall Service rate of 11.6/100,000/year
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 - A formal training program, Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST), to educate leaders and service members.
 - Combat Stress Control units assigned throughout the theater
 - A Deployment Cycle Support Program which includes activities at each phase of deployment (pre-, during, and post-deployment).

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *Wend V. D. LHM 17 Feb 04*

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Guy Strawder, OASD (Health Affairs) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22431

02313-04

TAB

A

October 16, 2003

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Powell Moore
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Depression

Senator Pete Domenici called me yesterday.

He noticed articles about suicides in the Army. He said something like the following: Suicide is frequently caused by depression, which can be a matter of the inability to sleep or indecisiveness. He wonders if the Army is doing a good job of looking into the possibility of depression in the military. He said a high percentage of certain age groups have some sort of depression, and that there is a relatively high teenage suicide rate ~~now~~ from depression.

His recommendation is that we get some psychiatrists or psychologists to take a look at the issue of depression. He is convinced a lot of it can be fixed with modern medicines.

Please tell me what you think. Also, please get with Powell Moore and go back to Senator Domenici to tell him what we know and are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101503-32

.....
Please respond by 11/21/03

U21311⁰/03

11-L-0559/OSD/22433

TAB

B

The
Washington
Times

The Washington Times

Front Page

Go

What's on the minds of the
leading conservatives?



LATEST NEWS

Top Stories

U.S.

World

Business

Personal Finance

Technology

sports

Entertainment

Health

Politics

Offbeat

Weather

NEWS SEARCH

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Go

Text Archive

SPECIAL SECTIONS

Hourly News Summary
(AUDIO)

Today in History

Washington in Depth

Video of the Day

The Day in Photos

PhotoWeek

SportsWeek

MULTIMEDIA

Portrait of War

Destination Mars

Homeland Security

Struggle for Peace

U.S. Oil Addiction

U.S. Crime Database

U.S. Census Database

Jan 14, 3:51 PM EST

U.S. Soldiers' Suicide Rate Is Up in Iraq

By MATT KELLEY
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- U.S. soldiers in Iraq are killing themselves at a high rate despite the work of special teams sent to help troops deal with combat stress, the Pentagon's top doctor said Wednesday.

Meanwhile, about 2,500 soldiers who have returned from the war on terrorism are having to wait for medical care at bases in the United States, said Dr. William Winkenwerder, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs. The problem of troops on "medical extension" is likely to get worse as the Pentagon rotates hundreds of thousands of troops into and out of Iraq this spring, he said.

Both situations illustrate the stresses placed on the troops and the military's health system by the war in Iraq.

Suicide has become such a pressing issue that the Army sent an assessment team to Iraq late last year to see if anything more could be done to prevent troops from killing themselves. The Army also began offering more counseling to returning troops after several soldiers at Fort Bragg, N.C., killed their wives and themselves after returning home from the war.

Winkenwerder said the military has documented 21 suicides during 2003 among troops involved in the Iraq war. Eighteen of those were Army soldiers, he said.

That's a suicide rate for soldiers in Iraq of about 13.5 per 100,000, Winkenwerder said. In 2002, the Army reported an overall suicide rate of 10.9 per 100,000.

The overall suicide rate nationwide during 2001 was 10.7 per 100,000, according to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

By contrast, two U.S. military personnel killed themselves during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, although that conflict only lasted about a month. The Army recorded 102 suicides during 1991 for a rate of 14.4 per 100,000. The Army's highest suicide rate in recent years came in 1993, when the rate was 15.7 per 100,000.

The Marine Corps has the military's highest suicide rate. Last year the Marines'



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11-L-0559/OSD/22435

rate was 12.6 per 100,000. During 1993, the Marines' rate was 20.9 per 100,000.

The military investigates every death and some of those probes may be incomplete, meaning the actual suicide rate could be even higher, Winkenwerder said. He said health officials haven't identified any common threads among the confirmed suicides.

"We don't see any trend there that tells us that there's more we might be doing," Winkenwerder told a breakfast meeting of Pentagon reporters.

The military has nine combat stress teams in Iraq to help treat troops' mental health problems, and each division has a psychiatrist, psychologist and social worker, Winkenwerder said. Of more than 10,000 troops medically evacuated from Iraq, between 300 and 400 were sent outside the country for treatment of mental health problems, he said.

The military prefers to treat mental health problems such as depression by keeping troops in their regular duties while they get counseling and possibly medication, Winkenwerder said. Less than one percent of the troops in Iraq are treated for mental issues during an average week, he said.

Winkenwerder said he had no specifics on the number of soldiers being treated for battlefield stress, although the military is focused on treating that problem.

"We believe they are being identified, they are being supported," Winkenwerder said.

The military also is working to solve the issue of soldiers awaiting non-emergency medical care. Since November, about 1,900 of 4,400 waiting for medical care have been treated, Winkenwerder said.

But the military expects more problems when tens of thousands of troops are rotated in and out of Iraq this spring, Winkenwerder said. Many of those troops leaving Iraq may have to wait at various bases in the United States for medical treatment such as physical therapy for injuries, he said.

The Army is working to sign contracts with civilian medical providers and bringing in more staff from the Navy, Air Force and Department of Veterans Affairs to help, Winkenwerder said.

Another source of the problem has been a large number of National Guard and reserve troops activated for duty in Iraq who have to be treated for underlying health problems, Winkenwerder said. The Army is working to solve that problem by screening those reservists at their home bases, rather than later.

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Comments and questions

11-L-0559/OSD/22436

Washington Post
January 15, 2004
Pg. 14

Army's Suicide Rgte Tops Recent Average

No Trend Found, Health Officials Say

By Vernon Loeb, Washington Post Staff Writer

At least 22 U.S. service members committed suicide in Iraq last year, prompting concern among defense officials who describe the rate as elevated but not alarmingly high.

Soldiers accounted for 19 suicides, officials said yesterday. The tally included a spike in deaths in July that prompted the Army to dispatch a 12-member mental health assessment team to Iraq in September.

William Winkenwerder Jr., assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, said in an interview yesterday that military health officials have not discovered "any trend" or identified specific steps the Army could have taken that would have prevented the suicides. Nothing has been found, he said, "that tells us that there's more we might be doing."

Col. James K. Gilman, director of health policy and services for the Army surgeon general, said July's spike in suicides caused "great concern," but that no obvious common factor has emerged linking the individual cases. July's high rate, he said, did not reappear.

"You don't see worsening over time," Gilman said. The findings of the mental health team sent to Iraq in September have not been publicly released, he said.

The 19 Army deaths represented a suicide rate of more than 13.5 per 100,000 troops, officials said, which is higher than the Army's average of 10.5 to 11 per 100,000 troops in recent years. The overall suicide rate in the 1.2 million-member, active duty military is about one-third lower than that of the civilian population of about the same age range, defense officials said.

One official who spoke on the condition of anonymity called suicides in Iraq "an issue of concern, not an epidemic. It certainly is not at the oh-my-God stage or panic or anything. But when the Army saw the numbers start to go up, they took very swift action, and have been working very hard ever since."

The Army and the Marines have stressed suicide prevention since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, after suicides that officials say may be at least partly attributable to lengthy deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The numbers last year run counter to experience in past conflicts, when military suicides dropped during times of combat, officials said. During those conflicts, officials thought the reduction could be linked to troops' preoccupation with surviving combat, and with their removal from domestic problems and other personal pressures.

Whatever the cause of the elevated number of suicides in Iraq, Gilman said, "we want to get the rate lower. These are soldiers, and we care about every one of them. We want to get inside the problem even more and try to drive the rate down, in Iraq and in the Army as a whole."

To date, the 22 suicides represent about 14 percent of 153 nonhostile deaths in Iraq since the war began in March. An additional 343 service members have been killed in combat, bringing the total number of dead to 496, the Pentagon reported yesterday.

Winkenwerder said the military has committed considerable resources to treating soldiers' mental health problems, with the Army deploying nine combat stress company detachments to Iraq. Each Army division in Iraq, he said, has a

psychologist, a psychiatrist and a social worker, with an emphasis on trying to treat soldiers' stress problems as close to the front lines as possible.

"We believe they are being identified, they are being supported," Winkenwerder said. Of 10,128 service personnel transported out of Iraq for medical reasons since the war began, he noted, 300 to 400 have been for mental health problems.

As Winkenwerder expressed concern about suicides in Iraq during an interview with reporters, he said military doctors and medical personnel have proven more successful than ever in saving the lives of wounded service members.

Of 2,413 soldiers wounded in action as of Jan. 8, he said, about 37 were said officially to have "died of wounds" after arriving at a combat medical facility, a rate of about 1.5 percent. "That is stunning. It is remarkable. It has never been seen before," said Winkenwerder, a physician who became the Pentagon's top health official in late 2001 after serving as executive vice president of health care services for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts.

He attributed the low rate of soldiers who died of wounds to a combination of high-tech body armor worn by all soldiers in Iraq, surgical teams much closer to the front lines than in previous wars, new clotting agents that help stop bleeding on the battlefield, and new, portable ultrasound devices to determine whether soldiers are bleeding internally.

"All of our people have been working on these things for years, and I think it all came to fruition" in Iraq, Winkenwerder said. "We're saving people."

11-L-0559/OSD/22438

TAB

C

Depression and Suicide

William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD


Briefing for
Senator Domenici

11-L-0559/OSD/22440

Suicide in the Department of Defense

- Suicide rates for the Services have been stable in the range of 10-15 per 100,000 per year since 1990.
- The rate for a civilian population matched for age and gender is approximately 20 per 100,000 per year
- Despite the stable rates, the Services continue their efforts to bring the suicide rate down, because every life lost is a tragedy for families and a detriment to military readiness.

DoD Suicide Rates 1990-2003



11-L-0559/OSD/22442

Operation Iraqi Freedom - 2003

- **Army**
 - 18 confirmed suicides
 - Suicide rate 13.5 per 100,000 soldiers
- **Marine Corps**
 - 2 confirmed suicides
 - Suicide rate 5.3 per 100,000 Marines
- **Navy**
 - 2 confirmed suicides in forces supporting OIF
 - Rate not available because of small onshore presence
- **Air Force**
 - No suicides in forces supporting OIF

Risk Factors for Suicide

- Malegender
- Age 18-25
- Untreated depression
- Alcohol or drug abuse
- Relationship problems
- Financial problems
- Legal problems
- Easy access to firearms

Diagnostic Criteria for Depression

- Sleep disturbance
- Loss of interest or pleasure
- Feelings of guilt
- Lack of energy
- Difficulty with concentration or memory
- Loss of Appetite
- Slowed movements
- Suicidal ideation

Treatment of Depression

- Behavioral Health Care (psychiatry, psychology, social workers)
- Psychotherapy
- Medication

Suicide Prevention Programs

- Each Service has its own program tailored to its organizational structure
- Each provides education to leaders and service members on
 - Risk factors for suicide
 - Signs and symptoms of depression
 - Appropriate actions to take to intervene with a suicidal person

Army Suicide Prevention

- Combat Stress Control units
 - Dedicated units for support of forces in combat
 - Provide outreach and education on sources of stress, stress control, signs and symptoms of depression, risk factors for suicide
 - Provide far-forward treatment of combat stress casualties with rapid return to duty

Army Suicide Preventic

- Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST)
 - Formal training program to teach the skills for recognition and intervention with a suicidal person
 - 2 day workshop and interactive computer simulation

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Developed as a result of
 - The Army Well-being Initiative (2001)
 - Recommendations after the investigation of domestic violence deaths at Fort Bragg (2003)
 - Post Deployment Clinical Practice Guidelines from Deployment Health Clinical Center

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase I – Pre-deployment
 - Identify potential family issues
 - Suicide awareness and prevention training
 - Information briefing to spouses
 - Pre-deployment health evaluation

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase 2 – During deployment
 - Combat Stress Control units
 - Outreach facilitated by stationing CSC units with combat units
 - Suicide prevention and depression awareness education
 - Far-forward treatment of combat stress casualties
 - Military Healthcare System
 - Treatment for mental health casualties

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase 2 – During deployment
 - Pre-redeployment briefing
 - Manage expectations
 - Communication with family
 - Control alcohol use
 - Educate regarding Deployment Health Clinical Center and Army One Source
 - Provide information on transition benefits to reservists leaving active duty

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase 3 – Post-deployment
 - Post deployment health screening for
 - Exposure to combat, violence
 - Depression
 - Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
 - One week of half-days of work before block leave
 - Care managers embedded in primary care
 - trained in post-deployment health issues

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase 3 – Post-deployment
- Deployment Health Clinical Center
 - Located at Walter Reed Army Medical Center
 - Established to evaluate soldiers returning from first Gulf War with health problems
 - Mission is to improve military occupational health care by providing healthcare services, clinical consultation and practice improvement; develop health information and education programs; and conduct research to ensure evidence-based care.

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase 3 – Post-deployment
- Army One Source
 - Available to all active duty, mobilized reservists, and deployed civilians
 - 1-800 access – no preauthorization and no chain of command knowledge
 - Telephone advice and up to 6 face-to-face counseling visits for a problem

Navy Suicide Prevention

- Shipboard mental healthcare assets
- Increased emphasis on education, awareness, and prevention
- Training for leaders and sailors to make each person a “first responder” to a shipmate in crisis

Marine Corps Suicide Prevention

- Marine Corps adding division level mental health providers and Combat Stress Control units similar to the Army
- Return and reunion training through the “Warrior Transition” Program
- Chaplain Religious Enrichment Development Operation (CREDO) – Navy Chaplain outreach Program

Air Force Suicide Prevention

- Developed with a community philosophy
 - Healthcare system
 - Commanders
 - Chaplains
 - Families
- Medical records screen pre-deployment
- Mental Health Rapid Response Teams
 - Training
 - Command consultation
 - Individual and group therapy
- Reunion and reintegration briefings
- Post deployment surveillance and education


Summary

- Depression is a risk factor for suicide
- Depression is actively looked for and treated
- Each Service has a Suicide Prevention Program
- The Service-specific suicide rates for 2003 are similar to those for the past decade
- The Service-specific suicide rates for Operation Iraqi Freedom are within the range of overall suicide rates for the last decade

TAB

D

DOD Suicide Rates 1990-2000



11-L-0559/OSD/22462

Operation Iraqi Freedom -

- **Army**
 - 18 confirmed suicides
 - In-theater suicide rate 13.5 per 100,000 soldiers
 - Overall suicide rate 11.6 (difference not significant)
- **Marine Corps**
 - 2 confirmed suicides
 - In-theater suicide rate 5.3 per 100,000 Marines
 - Overall rate 12.6 (in-theater rate not significantly different)
- **Navy**
 - 2 confirmed suicides in forces supporting OIF
 - Rate not available because of small onshore presence
- **Air Force**
 - No suicides in forces supporting OIF

13
0800



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

call
24

2005 FEB -2 [illegible]

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef _____

1-04/015884
ES-1495

Pal: Butler
2/3
mb

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

FEB 2 2005
[Signature]

SUBJECT: Meetings for Defense Ministers

- You asked whether there were groups of defense ministers, like the Defense Ministerial of the Americas, that we ought to pull together (attached).
 - o You suggested a triennial gathering of Central American MODs as an example.
 - o Regarding your specific suggestion, the DoD Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) is considering holding two-day seminars for MODs and defense chiefs by sub-region of the Western Hemisphere.
- You also might consider gathering defense ministers to address specific functional priorities for the Global War on Terrorism, particularly:
 - o Building partner nation security capacity
 - o The Proliferation Security Initiative.
- If you approve, we will come back to you shortly with proposed timing, agenda, and participants for each gathering.
- RECOMMENDATION: That you invite key defense ministers to summits on the topics listed above.

Approve [Signature] Disapprove _____ Other _____

FEB 4 2005

Attachment: as stated

Cc: Dr. Downie, CHDS

Prepared by: John Kreul, Strategy (b)(6)

092.3

2 Feb 05

22 Nov 04

FEB 03 2005

MA SD	SMA DSD		
TSA SD	SA DSP		
EXEC SEC	142/3		
ESR MA	165V	2-3-05	7:26

11-L-0559/OSD/22464

OSD 02316-05

02-02-05 10:23 IN

~~FOUO~~ OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -2 PM November 22, 2004

I-04/015884

ES-1495

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Meetings of Defense Ministers

Are there groups of ministers of defense, like the Defense Ministerial of Latin America, that we *ought* to pull together on our own? For example, should we have a defense ministers meeting of Central America once every third year? Are there ~~other~~ parts of the world where that would be smart?

Thanks.

DHR:es
112204-22

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

Sr, *SH 2/4*
Response attached.
v/n
Lt Col *Lamm*
FEB 03 2005

23-11-04 10:33

~~FOUO~~
23-11-04 07:31 1X

11-L-0559/OSD/22465

08D 02316-05

~~SECRET~~

November 22, 2004

I-04/015884

ES-1495

092.3

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Meetings of Defense Ministers

Are there groups of ministers of defense, like the Defense Ministerial of Latin America, that we *ought* to pull together on our own? For example, should we have a defense ministers meeting of Central America once every third year? Are there other parts of the world where that would be smart?

Thanks.

DHR ss
112204-22

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

23-11-04 12:33

~~SECRET~~

23-11-04 07:31 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/22466

OSD 02316-05

22 NOV 04

7701
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2005 FEB 03 10:00

ACTION MEMO

CM-2315-05

3 February 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 2/3*

SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief (SF 909)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue the attached implementing memorandum (TAB B) captures the initiatives CDRUSJFCOM briefed to you on 1 December 2004. The contribution that Reserve Component (RC) personnel may play in Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQs) requires further study.
- **Analysis.** On 1 December 2004, CDRUSJFCOM briefed you on a broad range of actions to accelerate DOD's ability to make JTF HQs immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of air, land, maritime and information capabilities. You questioned using RC personnel to supply JTF HQs. The memorandum proposes to study the role the RC should fill in both the rapid deployment and the longer-term sustainment of JTF HQs and recommends an RC mobilization process supporting this role. The memorandum also adds a second operational Standing Joint Force Headquarters within USJFCOM.
- During coordination, OSD(P&R) proposed a rewrite (TAB C) of the implementing memorandum with significant changes, to include: creation of permanent JTF HQs from Service Operational HQs through expansion of the Joint Manpower Exchange Program by 800 billets; CJCS validation of requirements for Joint RC augmentation units and eliminating the proposed study; USJFCOM publish Joint Training Guidance that would apply to the other combatant commands; and direct all policy changes be effective 31 March and personnel moves take place by 31 August.
- CDRUSJFCOM and I recommend not incorporating these additional items in this implementing document. To do so would negate some of the original intent of the memorandum and your discussion with CDRUSJFCOM.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the implementation memorandum (TAB B).Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____ Other _____FEB 4 2005
COORDINATION: TAB DAttachments:
As stated

MA SD	MA DSD	FEB 04 2005	
TSA SD	SA DSD		
EXEC SEC	<i>11 2/3</i>		
ESR MA	<i>FEB 04 2005</i>		

Prepared By: LtGen J.T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3 *(b)(6)*

11-L-0559/OSD/22467

OSD 02374-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

322

3 Feb 05 2 Dec 04

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
 UNDERSECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
 ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
 DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES
 CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Policy Implementation to Improve Formation and Sustainment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters.

On 1 December 2004, I approved a broad range of actions to accelerate the Department's ability to make Joint Task Force headquarters immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of our air, land, maritime and information capabilities. In order to meet that expectation, the following actions and responsibilities are directed.

Individual Augmentees

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, will assign a priority level to existing and planned Joint Task Force headquarters to guide manning and resourcing decisions. With support from the Combatant Commanders and the Services, the Chairman will establish an improved process for sourcing and training individual augmentation personnel assigned to JTF headquarters, using Execute Orders where appropriate.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense Agencies and the Services, will establish policy to ensure appropriate sources of active and reserve military personnel are available to fill individual augmentation requirements for JTF headquarters. As a part of this effort, the Chairman will establish standard tour length policy for military personnel who are individually assigned to serve on the staff of a JTF headquarters. Additionally, Service Secretaries will assess their ~~field grade end strength skill inventories~~ against individual augmentation requirements for JTF headquarters and resource these requirements in future personnel program objectives.

~~The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the Combatant Commanders, the Chief, National Guard Bureau and the Secretaries of the Military Departments will study the role that the Reserve Components should fill in both the rapid deployment and the longer term sustainment of JTF headquarters and recommend a Reserve Component mobilization process that fulfills this role. As a part of this study, the use of Joint Reserve Units to plug into JTF headquarters in key functional roles will be considered.~~

Service Operational Headquarters

Combatant Commanders will designate selected Service Operational Headquarters as enduring JTF headquarters. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the Combatant Commanders, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments will validate requirements for Joint Reserve component augmentation units to support expansion capability of

TAB C

these JTF headquarters. Combatant Commanders, in conjunction with the Services, will direct and oversee implementation of an expanded Joint Manpower Exchange Program to man these JTF headquarters totaling not less than 800 spaces.

——— Commander, USJFCOM will recommend sourcing solutions, supervise the implementation of sourcing decisions including the provision of individual augmentation to JTF headquarters designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will assist other Combatant Commanders in developing Joint Manning Documents for JTF headquarters. To improve the immediate operational performance of new JTF headquarters, Commander, USJFCOM will establish a second operationally-ready and immediately deployable Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element).

Personnel Policies

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and USD (P&R), in coordination with Commander, USJFCOM, will develop a common tracking mechanism to identify active and reserve personnel with JTF headquarters experience and to track the joint skill sets of individuals. Service Secretaries will use this information for career management, as appropriate, and make it available to USJFCOM for use in managing individual augmentation of JTF headquarters.

——— USD (P&R) will develop and submit proposed legislative changes and DoD policy to grant appropriate joint duty credit for serving 12 months on a JTF headquarters in a combat zone. ~~Combatant Commanders will direct and oversee implementation of an expanded Joint Manpower Exchange Program to encompass all Service operational headquarters that are designated by their Combatant Commander as potential JTF headquarters.~~

USD (Policy) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish a process and working relationships with appropriate offices of the U.S. Government to persuade coalition partner nations to assign highly skilled staff officers to man the suggested coalition positions in high priority, combined JTF headquarters.

Readiness Reporting

Combatant Commanders will certify and report the readiness of assigned headquarters staffs designated to perform as a JTF or functional component headquarters staff in the Defense Readiness Reporting System. Commander, USJFCOM, in collaboration with the other Combatant Commanders and the Service Chiefs will develop JTF headquarters training programs and readiness standards for approval by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commander, USJFCOM will publish Joint Training Guidance to guide development of joint training programs

All policy and process changes will be effective by 31 March. All actions requiring personnel moves will be in place by 31 August. These actions and responsibilities will be included in the next Strategic Planning Guidance and appropriate doctrine and policy documents. Because of the vital nature of these improvements to our ability to form and sustain JTF headquarters, I would like to be updated periodically on the progress of the initiatives directed herein.

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

Mr. Shepherd	USJFCOM	6 January 2005
Mr. Gardner	OSD(P&R)	4 January 2005
Mr. Gunziner	(OSD(Policy)	29 December 2004

TAB D

Tab D

UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-0559/OSD/22470

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

12/02

December 2, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

CC: **ADM** Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief

I was impressed with Ed Giambastiani's concept for the JTF HQ. Clearly a lot of good work by his ~~staff~~ and the Joint ~~Staff~~ as well went into it.

I do want to see **you** carefully think through whether it ought to be **an** active cadre of folks instead of reserves. I cannot see any reason whatsoever to use **reserves**. Once you think that through, I'd like to see an implementing document that I can **sign** in the next two weeks. We need to move out on **this**.

Thanks.

DHR:as
120204-10

.....
Please respond by 17 Dec 04

Thanks.

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22471

OSD 02374-05

322

2 Dec 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 000

FEB 4 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Policy Implementation to Improve Formation and Sustainment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters

On 1 December 2004, I approved a broad range of actions to accelerate DOD's ability to make Joint Task Force headquarters (JTF HQs) immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of air, land, maritime and information capabilities. To meet that expectation, the following actions and responsibilities are directed.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commanders, will assign a priority level to existing and planned JTF HQs to guide staffing and resourcing decisions. With support from the combatant commanders and the Services, the Chairman will establish an improved process for sourcing and training individual augmentation personnel assigned to JTF HQs, using execute orders where appropriate.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense agencies and the Services, will establish policy to ensure appropriate sources of Active and Reserve military personnel are available to fill individual augmentation requirements for JTF HQs. As a part of this effort, the Chairman will establish standard tour length policy for military personnel who are assigned as individual augmentees to serve on the staff of a JTF HQs. Additionally, Service Secretaries will assess their skill inventory and field grade end strength against individual augmentation requirements for JTF HQs and accommodate these requirements in future personnel program submissions.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the combatant commanders, the Chief, National Guard Bureau and the Secretaries of the Military Departments will study the role that the Reserve Components (RCs) should fill in both the rapid deployment and the longer-term sustainment of JTF HQs and recommend an RC mobilization process that fulfills this role. As a part of this study, the use of Joint Reserve Units in key functional roles will be considered.



11-L-0559/OSD/22472

OSD 02374-05

322

4 Feb 05

2 Dec 04

Commander, USJFCOM, will recommend sourcing solutions, supervise the implementation of sourcing decisions including the provision of individual augmentation to JTF HQs and assist other combatant commanders in developing joint staffing documents for JTF HQs. To improve the immediate operational performance of new JTF HQs, Commander, USJFCOM, will establish a second operationally ready and immediately deployable Standing Joint Force Headquarters (core element).

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) (USD(P&R)), in coordination with Commander, USJFCOM, will develop a common tracking mechanism to identify Active and Reserve personnel with JTF HQs experience and to track the joint skill sets of individuals. Service Secretaries will use this information for career management, as appropriate, and make it available to USJFCOM for use in managing individual augmentation of JTF HQs.

USD(P&R) will develop and submit proposed legislative changes and DOD policy to grant appropriate joint duty credit for serving 12 months on a JTF HQs in a combat zone.

Combatant commanders will direct and oversee implementation of an expanded Joint Manpower Exchange Program to encompass all Service operational headquarters that are designated by their combatant commander as potential JTF HQs.

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish a process and working relationships with appropriate offices of the US government to persuade coalition partner nations to assign highly skilled staff officers to combined JTF HQs.

Combatant commanders will certify and report the readiness of assigned headquarters staffs designated to perform as a JTF or functional component headquarters staff. Commander, USJFCOM, in collaboration with the other combatant commanders and the Service Chiefs, will develop JTF HQs training programs and readiness standards for approval by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These actions and responsibilities will be included in the next Strategic Planning Guidance and appropriate doctrine and policy documents. Because of the vital nature of these improvements, I would like to be updated periodically on the progress of the initiatives directed herein.



~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Register

I received the "draft register" for my personal papers that are already on deposit with the Library of Congress. I have several questions.

I'd like to see the following items before I include them in the gift:

- 1) White House personal file #125.
 - 2) The memorabilia and photographs referred to on page 7.
 - 3) The photographs in 615 referred to on page 7.
 - 4) In container 546, it mentions photographs. And also 547, 559, and 615.
 - 5) CL 18 has a file that says "DR Personal Save" container 559, CL 20, there are two folders that say "DR Personal Save" in container 575.
 - 6) SCI-1 says "DR Personal Save" in container CL 20.
 - 7) And then there's something called oversized 1 and 2.
- OS*

I'd like to see all of the above, plus any photographs, memorabilia or oversized items before I include them in the deed of gift.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121304-22

.....
Please respond by

1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22474

OSD 02375-05

14 Dec 04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



February 3, 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

D. J. Dell'Orto

SUBJECT: Donation of Papers to Library of Congress -- Update

- In December you asked to see certain items listed in the "draft register" for your personal papers already on deposit with the Library of Congress (Tab A).
 - A Library historian has located what he believes to be the material responsive to your request and has summarized the material (Tab B).
 - I have reviewed the summary of the items, but I have not examined them to confirm that they are the items you seek.
 - Based on the description in the historian's letter, it appears that the items you seek are contained in approximately 25 small and 2 large boxes that I estimate to total in excess of 10 linear feet of material.
 - Some of the items are classified and will require appropriate storage if removed from the Library.
 - You may view these materials either at the Library or request that they be delivered to you upon 48 hours' notice to the Library. I will arrange for their transportation from the Library if you would prefer to view them either in your office or at your home.
- In December you asked a number of questions about the draft instrument of gift (Tab C).
 - I am available to discuss these at your convenience.
 - I have scheduled a meeting with an attorney at the Library on Tuesday, February 8 to discuss the intellectual property question and to compare notes on some of the terminology in the draft instrument of gift.

314.7

3 Feb 05

14 Dec 04



OSD 02375-05

11-L-0559/OSD/22475

~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Register

I received the "draft register" for my personal papers that are already on deposit with the Library of Congress. I have several questions.

I'd like to see the following items before I include them in the gift:

- 1) White House personal file #125.
- 2) The memorabilia and photographs referred to on page 7.
- 3) The photographs in 615 referred to on page 7.
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- 5) CL 18 has a file that says "DR Personal Save" container 559, CL 20, there are two folders that say "DR Personal Save" in container 575.
- 6) SCI-1 says "DR Personal Save" in container CL 20.
- 7) And then there's something called oversized 1 and 2.

I'd like to see all of the above, plus any photographs, memorabilia or oversized items before I include them in the deed of gift.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121304-22

.....
Please respond by

1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22476

13 January 2005

To: Mr. Craig Glassner

Acting Director, ES CD

Fax: (b)(6)

From: John ~~Earl~~ Haynes 

20th Century Political Historian

Manuscript Division, Library of Congress

Phone: (b)(6)

e-mail: jhay@loc.gov

Subj: Secretary Rumsfeld's Personal Papers

Dear Mr. Glassner:

Attached is a description of what we believe to be the material designated in the fax you send on 12 January. The description is keyed to the eight items in your fax. In addition, the relevant pages of the register (finding aid) are also included.

The material outlined represents roughly twenty-five archival boxes and two oversize flat containers. Archival boxes are sized 12 1/4 x 10 1/4 x 5, much smaller than a record center carton which is roughly 12 x 12 x 12.

Secretary Rumsfeld can examine the material in two ways. He can come to the Manuscript Division and the material will be made available to him in the Manuscript Division Conference Room. Alternately, the material can be picked up and transported to Secretary Rumsfeld

If the latter is preferable, please note that the material in items #5 and #6 contain security classified documents (Secret and SCI and currently stored in our vault room for security classified material). Consequently whoever picks up the material should have appropriate authority to courier classified material. If Secretary Rumsfeld would prefer to have the material brought to him, we can have the boxes ready for pickup at the Library of Congress Madison Building loading dock within 48 hours.

Please let us know Secretary Rumsfeld's preference and we will do our part.

[7 pages follow]

11-L-0559/OSD/22477

1. **White House personal file #125:**

This refers to the Personal File subseries (Containers 528-548) in the White House series. Its contents are listed starting on page 125 of the container list. Here is a general description of the subseries (see the container list for a more precise breakdown):

Personal File, 1962-1976, n.d.

Correspondence, casework files, memberships, photographs, congratulations, clippings, memorabilia, and invitations. Arranged alphabetically by type of material, name of person, organization, or topic and filed thereunder as received.

2. **Memorabilia and photographs referred to on page 7:**

This refers to a Scope and Content Note mention of memorabilia and photographs in the White House Personal File (See #1 above).

I took a look at the memorabilia. It consists of printed ephemera such as invitations, programs, tourist map and brochures, inaugural printed ephemera, name tags, dinner place cards, and stationery. **Quantity:** three large folders in boxes 545-546 and additional material in OV 1.

3. **The photographs in 615 referred to on page 7:**

Photographs of Rumsfeld as a Boy Scout (6 photographs) and naval officer (8 photographs) located in Box 615 and mentioned on page 7 of the Scope and Content Note.

4. **Photographs in containers 546, 547, 559 and 615:**

Containers 546-547: White House series photographs

Cost of Living Council, 1972

Miscellaneous, 1970-1976 (2 folders) *See also* Oversize

Office of Economic Opportunity, 1969-1970

Oval office meetings, 1974-1975 *See also* Oversize

Pay Board, 1972

Portraits *See also* Oversize

Others, 1975-1976

Rumsfeld, 1970-1975 (3 folders)

Rumsfeld with

Kissinger, Henry, 1975

Mayor of San Juan, P.R., 1969

Members of Congress, 1970, n.d.

Members of the press, 1971, n.d.

Moynihan, Daniel P., 1969

Staff party on Sequoia (yacht), 1975

State of the Union speech, 1976

Travel

11-L-0559/OSD/22478

Container 559: NATO series photographs

Award ceremonies, 1973

Ministerial meetings, 1973-1974 (3 folders)

Miscellaneous, 1973-1974, n.d.

Oval Office meetings, 1973-1974 See Oversize

Public relations, 1973

Reception at the residence, 1973

Summit meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 1974 See also Oversize

Container 615: Miscellany series (Boy Scout and navy photos)

5. "DR Personal Save" files in CL 18 container 559 and CL 20 container 574 (two folders of "DR Personal Save")

"DR Personal Save" was the original title of several folders in the NATO and DOD series. The folders contain copies of official memoranda, agenda, and reports which DR probably wanted segregated for easy reference. These folders do not contain personal information about him.

NATO series (Container CL18-classified items removed from Container 559)

Department of Defense (Containers 575/CL20/SCI)

6. SCI-1 "DR Personal Save" file in CL 20

See #5 above

7. Oversize 1 and 2

These boxes contain oversize photographs and memorabilia.

8. All of the above, plus any photographs, memorabilia or oversize items:

The only other photographs and memorabilia not listed above are in the Congressional File series and Department of Defense series.

Congressional File:

Memorabilia: Campaign buttons, earrings, matchbook, brochures, and bumper stickers.

1962	Box 58	1 folder
1964	Box 69	2 folders
1966	Box 73	1 folder
1968	Box 78	1 folder

Photographs

Campaign

1962	Box 58	(1 photograph)
	Box 67	(2 folders)
1964	Box 72	(2 folders)
1966	Box 76	(2 folders)
1968	Box 81	(2 folders)

11-L-0559/OSD/22479

Congressional File**Other Congressional photographs (see findingaid, pp. 85-86)****Box 317 (6 folders)****Box 318 (11 folders)****Defense Department (Containers 579-580)****Photographs***Greece, 1976**Miscellany, 1975-1976 See also Oversize**Swearing-In ceremony, 1975 See also Oversize**Veterans of Foreign Wars ceremony, n.d.***White House****Bill-signing ceremony, Fiscal Year 1978 defense appropriation,
1976****Dinner honoring Defense Department officials, 1976**

11-L-0559/OSD/22480

Papers of Donald Rumsfeld

Page 125

WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, n.d. (Continued)

<i>Container Nos.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
528 (cont.)	Personal File Acknowledgments, 1968-1975 (2 folders) Book proposal re House of Representatives, 1969
529	Business executives, lists, 1970-1972, n.d. (2 fold —) Casework 1969-1971 (6 folders)
530	1972-1975 (5 folders) Clippings Cabinet members, 1968-1969 Friends and associates, 1966-1970 People and projects, 1969 People in politics, 1969 Condolences and get-well wishes, 1969-1976
531	Congratulations Received Ford administration, 1974-1975 A-R (6 folders)
532	S-Z (2 folders) Nixon administration Counselor to the president, appointment, 1970-1971 (2 fold —) Office of Economic Opportunity, appointment as director, 1969 (2 folders)
533	(4 folders) Sent, 1969-1972 (2 folders)
534	(1 folda)

11-L-0559/OSD/22481

(b)(6)

97%

P. 05

Papers of Donald Rumsfeld

Page 126

WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, n.d. (Continued)

<i>Container Nos.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
534 (cont.)	Personal File Correspondence American Political Science Association, fellowship program, 1967-1977 Brady, James S., 1977-1982 English, Robert E., 1969-1970 Robson, John E., 1962-1974 Searle, Daniel C., 1962-1967, 1975 Invitations regretted 1969, Apr.- June (3 folders)
535	1969, July-1970, June (9 folders)
536	1970, July-1971, June (8 folders)
537	1971, Aug.-1972, Feb. (8 folders)
538	1972, Mar.-Nov. (11 folders)
539	1972, Dec.-1974, June (16 folders)
540	1974, July-Dec. (7 folders) <i>See also Classified</i> 1975 Jan. (2 folders) <i>See also Classified</i>
541	(1 folder) Feb.-Mar. (5 folders)
542	Apr.-May (6 folders) June (1 folder)
543	(1 folder) July-Sept. (4 folders)

11-L-0559/OSD/22482

Papers of Donald Rumsfeld

Page 127

WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, a.d. (Continued)

Container Nos.	Contents
543 (cont.)	Personal File Invitations regretted 1975 Oct. (2 folders)
544	(1 folder) Nov.-Dec. (4 folders) See also <i>Classified</i> Memberships and sponsorships Regretted, 1963-1976 Terminated, 1963-1976 (1 folder)
545	(3 folders) Memorabilia, 1967-1977 See also <i>Oversize</i> (1 folder)
546	(2 folders) Photographs Cost of Living Council, 1972 Miscellaneous, 1970-1976 (2 folders) See also <i>Oversize</i> Office of Economic Opportunity, 1969-1970 Oval Office meetings, 1974-1975 See also <i>Oversize</i>
547	Pay Board, 1972 Portraits See also <i>Oversize</i> others, 1975-1976 Rumsfeld, 1970-1975 (3 folders) Rumsfeld with Kissinger, Henry, 1975 Mayor of San Juan, P.R., 1969 Members of Congress, 1970, n.d. Members of the press, 1971, n.d. Moynihan, Daniel P., 1969 Staff party on <i>Sequoia</i> (yacht), 1975 State of the Union speech, 1976

11-L-0559/OSD/22483

Papers of Donald Rumsfeld

Page 128

WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, n.d. (Continued)

<i>Container Nos.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
547 (cont.)	Personal File Photographs Travel Nigeria and Senegal, 1971 Vail, Colo., 1974 Thank-you letters Ford administration, 1974-1975 A-H (3 folders)
548	I-Z (5 fold —) Nixon administration, 1969-1973 (2 folders)

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 1966-1977, n.d.

548	Alphabetical file (correspondence received and copies of correspondence sent), 1973-1974 A-B (2 folders)
549	(1 folder) C-G (5 folders) <i>See also Classified</i>
550	H-L (5 folders) M-O (1 folder)
551	(3 folders) P-R (3 folders) <i>See also Classified</i> S-U (2 folders) <i>See also Classified</i>
552	(1 folder) V-Z (2 folders)

11-L-0559/OSD/22484

December 14, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Terry Robbins
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Instrument of Gift

Thanks for the draft Instrument of Gift.

I have the following questions and thoughts.

- 1) It says "residing in Washington, D.C." I think my legal residence is still in Illinois. I ought to talk to Terry to see if I want to use Illinois or Maryland, but I'm pretty sure I won't want to use Washington, D.C.
- 2) On line 5, it refers to the type of papers, but it does not mention "business," unless that's what professional means.
- 3) On the next to the last line, on page 1, it says that I may retain any of the originals of my personal papers and furnish a copy. Does that permit me to do it after digitization, when I have had a chance to look at everything and see what I might like the original of? Or do I need to decide before digitization?
- 4) Page 2, paragraph 1: I would like to discuss what "intellectual property" means, and how you solve that.
- 5) Page 3: I'd like to discuss the fact that it does not transfer title to classified information and how that gets handled.
- 6) Page 3, paragraph 2, line 5: I wonder if we ought to make it ten years.
- 7) Page 3, paragraph 2, Line 7 (under Access): I'd like to discuss those policies.
- 8) Page 3, next to last paragraph: When it mentions those that should be restricted from public access, for what length of time is that, and who makes the judgment?

- 9) Page 3, last line: I'd like to discuss that.
- 10) Page 4, item E: It talks about adversely affecting the security. I also think the reputation of the United States, or there may be something other than security. Let's discuss it.
- 11) Page 5, paragraph 1, line 2: Let's discuss this triple X series.
- 12) Page 5, paragraph 1: Let's discuss the five years.
- 13) Page 5: I wonder about case work and possible embarrassment for the constituents when I was a Member of Congress.
- 14) Page 5: I'd like to talk about press access.
- 15) Page 6, last three lines: Let's discuss.
- 16) Page 7, paragraph 5: I think that I should agree to pay for some or all of the digitization. Let's discuss that.
- 17) Page 7, paragraph 5: We may want to add "except as designated by the donor" and under the add, we may want to include "for all or most."
- 18) Page 8: We should include the George W. Bush Library, if/when it ever exists.
- 19) Page 8, Item 7: Let's discuss.
- 20) Page 9, middle of the first paragraph: Let's discuss a timeframe.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/30/04 Draft Instrument of Gift

DHR:ss
121304-25

.....
Please respond by _____

DRAFT
11/30/04

INSTRUMENT OF GIFT

Borell?
I, Donald H. Rumsfeld, residing in Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as Donor), hereby give, grant, and set over to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library of Congress (hereinafter Library) and for administration therein by the authorities thereof a collection of my personal and professional papers and associated material documenting my life and career in public service and government (hereinafter referred to as Collection), more particularly described by the attached schedule. Donor warrants that he **owns** the physical property in the Collection free and clear of any liens. Donor does not represent that the papers and materials donated constitute the entirety of the personal and professional papers and associated material in his possession.

This is a gift of only the physical property contained in the materials constituting the Collection, and Donor reserves to himself all rights, title, and interest he may have in and to all of the intellectual property associated with the Collection including, but not limited to copyright. Further, Donor, in his complete discretion, may retain the original of any of his personal papers and furnish a copy of that original to the Library.

*Attch
for gift?
of disputation?*

Don. Rumsfeld

By accepting this gift, however, the Library does *so* to improve the national collections, and such acceptance of the physical property shall not be construed as a conclusive determination by the Library that the Donor does, in fact, have or possess with regard to these materials such intellectual property as above identified or described.

blue glue?

The Collection shall be subject to the following conditions:

1. Classified Materials. All materials in the Collection that are specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and are, in fact, properly classified pursuant to such statute or executive order, shall be safeguarded and administered by the Library in accordance with such statutes ~~or~~ executive orders. Access to these materials shall be allowed only in accordance with procedures established by the United States Government to govern the availability of such information. All classified materials shall be reviewed from time to time by the Library (and, at the Library's request, by appropriate security classification authorities), and materials which, because of the passage of time or other

17
2

DRAFT

circumstances, no longer require classification restrictions shall, upon declassification, be opened to public access, subject to the access requirements of provision #2 below. This gift does not transfer title to classified information, in whatever form in the collection; and, in accepting the gift, the Library agrees to receive classified information only as a deposit for administration under the terms of this document. ?

2. Access. With the exception that the entire Collection shall at all times be available to the staff of the Library for administration purposes, access to the Collection is reserved to Donor and to others only with Donor's written permission, or, in the event of the death of Donor, with the permission of Donor's literary executor for a period of 5 years ¹⁰ from the later of the date of death of the Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld; thereafter the Collection shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature. ✓
—
2

Donor recognizes that the Collection may contain some or all of the following classes of material that should be restricted from public access: ✓ H-
P-2.

(a) Papers and other historical materials the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a living 7

person or persons.

(b) Papers and other historical materials that are specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be restricted from public disclosure in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

(c) Materials relating to the personal, family, and confidential business affairs of Donor or other persons referenced in the Collection.

(d) Materials containing statements made by or to Donor in confidence.

(e) Materials containing statements or information the divulgence of which might prejudice the conduct of foreign relations of the United States or which could affect adversely the security of the United States.

(f) Materials relating to law enforcement investigations of individuals or organizations, to proposed appointments to office, or to other personnel matters directly affecting individual privacy.

[Add: Except for papers that contain national security information as described in (2)(b), all the papers in the Collection shall be made available to researchers after the restriction period described above.]

Those requesting access to the Collection shall provide Donor with their subject of interest and purpose of their research. Those granted access also must

DRAFT

agree in writing to obtain written permission of Donor or his designee prior to quoting for publication any unpublished material in the Collection.

Additionally, access to that section of the collection designated on the attached schedule as the xxx series will be reserved to the Donor and to others only with the Donor's written permission during the Donor's lifetime and the lifetime of President Gerald R. Ford, whichever comes later. In the event of the death of Donor, access to the xxx series will be restricted to those with the permission of the Donor's literary executor for a period of 5 years from the date thereof or during the life of President Gerald R. Ford, whichever is later. Thereafter, the xxx series shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature.

The Donor will appoint his literary executor. Upon Donor's death, Joyce P. Rumsfeld may appoint a new literary executor, including herself. Upon the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld, their surviving children may jointly appoint a new literary executor, who may not be any of the surviving children.

The Library will notify the Donor or, upon his death, his literary executor, promptly of any requests, claims, or legal actions relating to the papers or materials of the Collection.

Conc. 6.2

Pratt?

3. Reproduction. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned reservation of rights and interest in and to the intellectual property as above identified, persons granted access to the Collection may obtain single-copy reproductions of the materials contained therein for research purposes, and, consistent with Library practices and procedures, such additional copies as may be allowed by copyright law (e.g., by the fair use doctrine or expiration of the copyright term). The Library **may** make preservation copies of the materials in the Collection in any format as determined by the Library.

4. Use. Use of the materials constituting the Collection shall be governed by the Library's policies for the administration and service of materials of this nature. The Library is also permitted to exhibit any or all of the material in the Collection on- and off-site and may display any or all of the materials in the Collection on its website or in any other electronic form or successor technology, provided, however, that the Library first obtains the permission of the Donor or the Donor's literary executor *{Delete: during the period of Donor's life and for 10 years thereafter}* ¹⁰ *[Add: for a period of 5 years from the later of the date of death of the Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld]* and subject to the other

DRAFT

conditions expressed in provision 2 of this Instrument. Donor reserves the right to make selected unclassified materials available to the public at any time upon written notification to the Library.

5. Digitization of Material Currently on Deposit. {Delete: Donor agrees to ^{donor or} pay for the cost of digitization of the papers either currently on deposit or to be deposited with the Library, which under this Instrument become the Library's physical property. Upon a mutually agreed-upon schedule, the Library agrees to make these papers available to Donor or his designee for the purpose of their digitization. Donor or his designee agrees to ensure that the original papers are returned to the Library in good order and condition upon completion of their digitization. Donor also will provide the Library a digital copy of these papers). ^{exhibit 1} ^{Ag 1/2021} ✓

[Add: Donor agrees to donate to the Library funds to be used to pay for the ^{for all or most} cost of digitization of the papers currently on deposit at the Library and those papers to be placed on deposit at the Library. The Library agrees to use [name of company] to perform the digitization. The Library agrees to provide the Donor or Donor's literary executor, upon either's request, digital copies of all papers the Donor gives to the Library.] Donor reserves the right to provide digitized copies of the collection to other institutions, including but not limited to

6 W Books

the Ronald Reagan Library, Gerald R. Ford Library, George H. W. Bush Library, Richard M. Nixon Library, Herbert Hoover Institute [?], and Princeton University, subject to the same conditions as provided for in ~~this~~ instrument.

6. Additions. Such other and related materials as the Donor may from time to time donate to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library shall be governed by the terms of this Instrument of Gift or such written amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon between the Donor and the Library. At the discretion of the Donor, future additions to the Collection ~~may~~ be transferred to the Library under a separately negotiated Instrument of Gift.

7. *{Delete: Removal. Donor or a representative acting on Donor's behalf pursuant to his written authorization may remove any or all of the Collection at Donor's complete discretion during Donor's lifetime.}* [Add: Original Items. The Donor may borrow original items from the Library for such periods of time as will be mutually agreed to by the Donor and the Library at the time of the loan of the original items.]

8. Disposal. Should any ~~part~~ of the Collection be found by the Library to

DRAFT

include materials which the Library deems inappropriate for retention with the Collection or for transfer to other collections in the Library, the Library shall offer to return the materials to the Donor and allow the Donor ninety (90) days from the date of such offer to reply. If the Donor does not wish to receive said materials or designate another repository to receive them, or has not responded to the Library's offer by the end of the aforesaid ninety (90) days, the Library **may** dispose of such materials in accordance with its procedures for disposition of materials not needed for the Library's collections. Should the Library determine, subsequent to acceptance and transfer of the Collection that any part of the Collection includes classified information which the Library deems inappropriate for permanent retention with the Collection, it shall notify the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense shall then notify the Library in writing of the appropriate disposition of these classified materials.

Tim
Hare

9. Communications. The Donor will provide the Library with a current address and other contact information in order that the Library can meet its responsibilities as herein described. The Library will send notices and requests to addresses of record as provided and updated by the Donor.

In witness whereof, I have set my hand and seal this _____ day of

_____, 2004 in the City of _____

Donald H. Rumsfeld


Accepted for the United States of America

The Librarian of Congress (seal)

Date

~~FOUO~~

January 31, 2005

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Gift Statement

Where do we stand on that gift statement for the Library of Congress?

Thanks.

DHR:aa
013105-7

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22497

720
~~FOUO~~

OCT 06 2004

230.02

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tracking PAS

We need to capture the Presidential appointees-Senate confirmed vacancies that have occurred over the entire time we have been here.

Specifically, I would like to know what percentage of the DoD PAS positions have been vacant over the first three years, through today. For example, of the 365 days in a year, what percentage of the days was each job vacant? Some would be vacant a year or a year and a half, and many would be vacant six or eight months.

My guess is if you add it all up, it will end up that we have been operating at about a 20 to 25 percent vacancy rate.

Please get back to me with that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100504-16

.....

Please respond by 10/22/04

6 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02385-05

11-L-0559/OSD/22498

October 4, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
CC: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Force Level Updates

Please arrange a briefing for me to get a report on everything that's happening on each of these items in my Force Level memo.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/07/04 Working Paper on Force Levels (v.6)
9/27/04 CJCS Info Memo to SecDef re: Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
100404-18

Please respond by 10/29/04

280.2

406-104

~~FOUO~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Tina Jonas
David Chu
Ken KriegFROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

Get m to

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.

9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
090704-41

Please respond by

9/14

OSD 14746-04

*Closed**9/14/04*~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/22500

WORKING PAPER

Version #6

September 7, 2004

SUBJECT: “Force Levels,” “End Strength” and “Stress on the Force” — Are current U.S. military forces sufficient in size and properly organized and managed to meet the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

Summary: The U.S. can afford whatever military force level is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. It is our people who distinguish the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be a mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in force levels, we increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

Background: The operational tempo of U.S. forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the statutory “end strength” of the U.S. military, but have not explained how to pay for it. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is not cheap, easy or quick.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more forces, the more force protection that is required; the more forces, the more infrastructure that is required; the more forces, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is available.

- At present, the Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. The Department is taking immediate actions to relieve this stress on the force in Iraq. There is a three-pronged strategy underway that is working to:

- Develop Iraqi capacity to conduct police and other security tasks;
- Increase international military participation in Iraq; and
- Increase actionable intelligence to disrupt attacks on coalition forces and other threats to stability.

In any event, the current stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation in addition to those immediate actions listed above. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

1. **Lessons Being Learned**

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the

Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military — U.S. and international — elements.

- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of “forces for a specific combatant commander” with a “Global Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in support of their essential missions.
- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate mix for the 21st century. The task is to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.
- Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. DoD will review active and reserve components to determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill sets, within existing end strength limits, to best satisfy the demands of the 21st century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, DoD will seek ways to increase the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation/mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which it was called up. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- Precision Weapons. Our use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- Deployments. The old Industrial Age process is broken. An approach that permits only peace or war, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time and permit more nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.

- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. People

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end strength” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
- Core Competencies. OSD is aggressively working to move the military out of activities that are not core competencies or inherently governmental. For example, housing privatization has allowed DoD to get better value and speed modernization for the same expenditure of funds.
- Contract Employees. For shorter duration missions and missions that are not military core competencies, DoD will have to make more judicious use of contract employees. This will require that we organize so we have Congressional authority and the ability to properly engage contract assistance.
- Education. The Department is working to improve joint education to create a culture that empowers younger leaders to think beyond their parent Services for creative solutions to the challenges our nation faces.
- Coalition Forces. The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. This will—require a diplomatic effort—to substantially reduce the current restrictions

WORKING PAPER

and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations' ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.

- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. Additionally, the U.S. will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.
- Indigenous Forces. The U.S. must organize and fund to be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease the burden on coalition forces. This will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.
- Reserve Forces. DoD has established a policy whereby it will, to the extent possible, first use Reserve forces that have not recently been mobilized.
- Volunteers. DoD will continue to use volunteers from the Reserve force, to the extent available.
- Holidays. To the extent possible, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of major holidays.
- Call-ups. DoD is revising the process so as to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, and will consider a tiered arrangement whereby some reserve units might be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready for prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- Incentives. DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments.
- Peace Operations. The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.

- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

3. Technology

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate use of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.
- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and more interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD will invest in technology to substitute for human force protection — sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by as much as 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, in and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. Services are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency

- Organization of Forces. In the 21st century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.

WORKING PAPER

- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the U.S., thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. OSD and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired “effects” and “outcomes,” rather than simply responding to requests for numbers of things — troops or platforms.
- Procurement. DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure.
- Strategic Lift. DoD will continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint. Additionally, the Department must continue to support participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Act as a supplement to our national mobility capability.
- Rotation Ratio. The Services will work to find ways to reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to transport crews to their equipment.
- Headquarters Layering. DoD components’ reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. The flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- Best Practices. DoD will work to move best practices from inside and outside DoD throughout the Department.
- Planning Tools. DoD is developing tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- Operational Availability. DoD will implement the appropriate JROC “operational availability” studies’ recommendations.
- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.

- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.
- Safety. DoD will move aggressively to reduce the number of mishaps as a means to protect our most valuable resources, our people.

5. Policy

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.
- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to provide protection for deployed U.S. forces.

Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the

WORKING PAPER

easy and more expensive course of increasing force levels. We owe the American people no less.

DHR:dh

Current MFRs/ End Strength

~~TOP~~
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 28 14 08:55

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Tina Jonas
David Chu
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
090704-41

.....
Please respond by 9/14

320.2

7 Sep 04

~~TOP~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22510

OSD 14746-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP 28 AM 8:55

INFO MEMO

CW-2086-04
27 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 9/27*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

- **Question.** "Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Yes. OSD(P&R) has the Department of Defense lead using the process developed by OSD(Policy) last year. The Joint Staff uses the Joint Staff Action Processing system to manage actions for which it has the lead.
- **Analysis**
 - The Joint ~~Staff~~ will assist OSD(P&R) in developing its briefing and revising the action agenda. The current action agenda is attached (TAB B).
 - The OSD(PA&E) DOD Balanced Scorecard **risk** metrics and the Joint Staff/OSD(P&R) co-chaired Force Management Functional Capabilities Board also track force level initiatives.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

copy to:

DUSD(P&R)

Prepared By: VADM Robert F. Willard, USN; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/22511

OSD 14746-04

3202

21 SEP 07

10 SEP 07

WORKING PAPER

Version #6

September 7, 2004

SUBJECT: “Force Levels,” “End Strength” and “Stress on the Force”—Are current **U.S.** military forces sufficient in size and properly organized and managed to meet the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

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- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is available.

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Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22512

WORKING PAPER

- At present, the Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. The Department is taking immediate actions to relieve this stress on the force in Iraq. There is a three-pronged strategy underway that is working to:

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1. Lessons Being Learned (J7 lead with J1/J3/38/35)

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the

Tab A

WORKING PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/22513

WORKING PAPER

Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military—U.S. and international—elements.

- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
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WORKING PAPER

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/22514

WORKING PAPER

- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of "relief-in-place" and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff **up** a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. People (filled with JS/J3/JA)

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater **use** of the civil service, rather **than** being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed **up** for military duty, it would increase usable "end strength" by 50,000. We won't know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
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WORKING PAPER

1a b A

11-L-0559/OSD/22515

WORKING PAPER

and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations' ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.

- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, **such** as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. Additionally, **the U.S.** will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.
- Indigenous Forces. The U.S. must organize and fund to be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease the burden on coalition forces. This will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.
- Reserve Forces. DoD has established a policy whereby it will, to the extent possible, first use Reserve forces that have not recently been mobilized.
- Volunteers. DoD will continue to use volunteers from the Reserve force, to the extent available.
- Holidays. To the extent possible, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of major holidays.
- Call-ups. DoD is revising the process so **as** to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, and will consider a tiered arrangement whereby some reserve units might be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready for prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- Incentives. DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments.
- Peace Operations. The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.

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- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among **U.S.** agencies.

3. Technology (J8 lead with J4/J5/J6)

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate use of **new** information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.
- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and more interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD will invest in technology to substitute for human force protection — sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by **as much as** 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, in and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. Services are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve **its** interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency (J8 lead with J1/J2/J3/J4)

- Organization of Forces. In the 21st century one **size** doesn't fit all. DoD **will** modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve **improved** modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize **units** to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing **the** force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this **approach**. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation: force rotation, and employment flexibility.

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- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the **U.S.**, thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. OSD and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired “effects” and “outcomes,” rather than simply responding to requests for numbers of things —troops or platforms.
- Procurement. DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure.
- Strategic Lift. DoD will continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint. Additionally, the Department must continue to support participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Act as a supplement to our national mobility capability.
- Rotation Ratio. The Services will work to find ways to reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to transport crews to their equipment.
- Headquarters Layering. DoD components’ reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. The flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- Best Practices. DoD will work to move best practices from inside and outside DoD throughout the Department.
- Planning Tools. DoD is developing tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- Operational Availability. DoD will implement the appropriate JROC “operational availability” studies’ recommendations.
- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.

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- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.
- Safety. DoD will move aggressively to reduce the number of mishaps as a means to protect our most valuable resources, our people.

5. Policy (JS level with JS)

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that 'deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.
- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to provide protection for deployed U.S. forces.

Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the

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easy and more expensive *course* of increasing force levels. We **owe** the American people no less.

DHR:db
Current MFRs/ End Strength

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TAB B
Final DRAFT Version 10 (as of 11 Oct)

ACTION AGENDA – REDUCING STRESS ON THE FORCE
(without increasing military end strength)

I. Lessons Being Learned

Action Item	Near-Term Action	Mid-term Action
a. Contingency plans	<p><u>USD(P)</u> - Update Contingency Planning Guidance to include action items from 18 Aug SECDEF “Operational Availability Action Items” memo (Sept 03).</p> <p><u>CJCS</u> – Within 6 months of Contingency Planning Guidance publication, update Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Direct Combatant CC’s to delineate forces required to seize the initiative, additional forces required to achieve SDTE objectives, and follow-on forces required to achieve objectives of win decisive.</p>	<p><u>USD(P)</u> – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process that encompasses the full spectrum of military operations. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p> <p><u>USD(P&R)</u> – Implement a new Defense Readiness Reporting System that uses adaptive planning constructs for force readiness assessment (IOC in FY04)</p>
b. Jointness	<p><u>CDR JFCOM</u> – Publish & oversee implementation of DoD’s Integrated Interoperability Plan as tasked in the Transformation Planning Guidance. (Nov 03)</p>	<p><u>CJCS</u> - Develop DPG language supporting initiatives that improve jointness and add synergy to joint force operations. (Dec 03)</p> <p><u>USD(P&R)</u> – Implement Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System to capture joint experience and training of military personnel. Ensure personnel systems uniformly define and track joint training qualifications and experiences for the selection of qualified personnel for joint assignments. (Oct 04).</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions -	Mid-term Actions
c. Training and Exercises	<p>USD P&R – Update the Training Transformation [mplementationPlan as appropriate to include lessons from recent real world experience (Jan 04).</p> <p>CDRJFCOM – Implement an initial Joint National Training Capability training event in FY04.</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Evaluate progress on implementing the three enabling Training Transformation capabilities (Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, Joint National Training Capability, Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability), and recommend adjustments, if required, for POM 06. (Aug 04)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM - Create a Joint National Training Capability to routinely incorporate joint context into major Service training events (FY 04)</p>
d. Global Force Management	<p>CJCS – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p>	<p>USD(P) – Oversee implementation of the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Study. (ongoing)</p> <p>CDRJFCOM – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p> <p>USD (P&R) – work with CJCS to implement capabilities-based force allocation into defense readiness assessment and planning (June 04)</p>