

## **Extract of National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2005**

### **SEC. 541. REVISION TO CONDITIONS ON SERVICE OF OFFICERS AS SERVICE ACADEMY SUPERINTENDENTS.**

(a) **AUTHORITY TO WAIVE REQUIREMENT THAT OFFICERS RETIRE AFTER SERVICE AS SUPERINTENDENT.—**


Title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:

(1) **MILITARY ACADEMY.—**Section 3921 is amended—

(A) by inserting "(a) **MANDATORY RETIREMENT.—**" before "Upon the"; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

**"(b) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—**The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement in subsection (a) for good cause. In each case in which such a waiver is granted for an officer, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a written notification of the waiver, with a statement of the reasons supporting the decision that the officer not retire, and a written notification of the intent of the President to nominate the officer for reassignment."



III / Legal Information Institute

## U.S. Code collection

TITLE 10 > Subtitle B > PART III > CHAPTER 403 > § 4355

### § 4355. Board of Visitors

Release date: 2005-07-12

- (a) A Board of Visitors to the Academy is constituted annually of—
- (1) the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, or his designee;
  - (2) three other members of the Senate designated by the Vice President or the President pro tempore of the Senate, two of whom are members of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
  - (3) the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, or his designee;
  - (4) four other members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, two of whom are members of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
  - (5) six persons designated by the President.
- (b) The persons designated by the President serve for three years each except that any member whose term of office has expired shall continue to serve until his successor is appointed. The President shall designate two persons each year to succeed the members whose terms expire that year.
- (c) If a member of the Board dies or resigns, a successor shall be designated for the unexpired portion of the term by the official who designated the member.
- (d) The Board shall visit the Academy annually. With the approval of the Secretary of the Army, the Board or its members may make other visits to the Academy in connection with the duties of the Board or to consult with the Superintendent of the Academy.
- (e) The Board shall inquire into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider.
- (f) Within 60 days after its annual visit, the Board shall submit a written report to the President of its action, and of its views and recommendations pertaining to the Academy. Any report of a visit, other than the annual visit, shall, if approved by a majority of the members of the Board, be submitted to the President within 60 days after the approval.
- (g) Upon approval by the Secretary, the Board may call in advisers for consultation.
- (h) While performing his duties, each member of the Board and each adviser shall be reimbursed under Government travel regulations for his travel expenses.

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Notes  
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authorities  
(CFR)  
Your  
comments

~~FOUO~~

February 01, 2006

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Service Academies

- Did we get the "rule" changed that at one time required whoever was a Superintendent at a Service Academy to be in their final assignment? If not, let's get that done this year.
- ①
- ② Also, ~~what~~ are the current rules on ~~boards~~ or visitors at the Academies? Who appoints them? Are all their deliberations public? Is that something we should look at changing legislatively?
- ④ ③

Thanks.

DHR:aa  
020106-03

.....  
Please Respond By 02/28/06

*NDAA on both?*

*MMP*

OSD 07233-06  


5/3/2006 6:18:45 PM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57415

~~FOUO~~

March 24, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

032306-16

CC: Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Helicopters in the Bahamas

Please be sure you come back with a proposal as to how we can deal with the OPBAT helicopters in the Bahamas that have been there for 20 years, and find a different solution.

Thanks.

DMK:ms  
032306-16

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 04/13/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57416



5/4/2006 9:34:36 AM

Guenov

~~FOUO~~

APR 24 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*,  
SUBJECT: Dr. Manouchehr Ganji

Please have someone take a look at Dr. Ganji. Randy Best recommends in the attached letter that we talk to him. See what we think of him.

Thanks.

Attach. 4/19/06 Best ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
042306-09

.....  
*Please Respond By May 04, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07310-06



5/4/2006 1:42:11 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57417

**RANDY BEST**

**April 19, 2006**


Mr. Donald Rumsfeld  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

**Dear** Don,

A gentleman **works** for me **whose** father **was** prominent in the **Shah's** government and Minister of Education **and** Dean of the Law School in Tehran when the **Shah** fell. He lives in the Washington area **and** has written a number of books on Iran **and** **has** been a leading proponent of civil disobedience in Iran. His most recent **book** is *Defying the Iranian Revolution: From a Minister to the Shah to a Leader of Resistance*. He is a **very** credible and outstanding person. He has recently had communications in Iran he **thinks** are important to share with Administration officials. Could you assist in getting **him** in to **see** the right **person** in the White House who could take advantage of his contacts and information? His name is Dr. Manouchehr Ganji.

I **look forward** to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



Randy

---

2200 Ross Avenue • Suite 3800 • Dallas, Texas 75201

Phone: (b)(6) • Fax: (b)(6)

OSD 06588-06



5/4/2006 12:58:31 PM

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11-L-0559/OSD/57418

## Biography of Dr. Manouchehr Ganji

**Manouchehr Ganji** was born in Tehran, Iran. He received his BA and MA degrees in Political Science and International Relations from the **University of Kentucky**, his doctorate degree in International Law - **International Protection of Human Rights** - from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in **Geneva**, and his post doctorate degree in International Law from the university of Cambridge, **England**.

Dr. Ganji was the **United Nations Commission on Human Rights' First Special Rapporteur** on the question of **Apartheid** and **Racial Discrimination** in Southern Africa during the years 1967-1969. Between 1969-1973 he served (in a personal capacity) as the U.N. Special Reporter in charge of preparation of a comprehensive **Study** on Conditions of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in member countries of the **United Nations**.

Upon returning to Iran he served as **Professor of international law** and organizations at **Tehran University** and was founder and Director of the **University's Center for Graduate International Studies**. He also served as the **Dean of Faculty of Law and Political Science** of **Tehran University** and acted as advisor to the Prime Minister of **Iran, Amir Abbas Hoveida**, between the years 1974-1976. Dr. Ganji was the **Minister of Education of Iran** between the years 1976-1979.

After the 1979 revolution, and the overthrow of the Shah's regime, Dr. Ganji went incognito and escaped Iran on foot via **Turkey** six months later with the help and assistance of friends and educational colleagues. Since his escape, he has devoted most of his efforts in the **United States, Europe** and the **Middle East** to the liberation of Iran. Through the **Flag of Freedom Organization of Iran**, which he founded in 1979 and still heads, he has been a leading advocate for freedom and democracy in Iran and has orchestrated a campaign of political defiance by advocating a non-violent, civil disobedience movement against the mullah regime in Iran. Dr. Ganji is also founder and **Secretary-General** of the organization for **Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms** for Iran.

Dr. Ganji is the author of many books and articles in Persian, English and French. These include university textbooks on **International Law** and **International Organizations**, **International Protection of Human Rights**, **Apartheid** and **Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa**, a personal political memoir *Entre Perses* in French, a political biography in Persian titled *The Hidden Fire* and his most recent book in English *Defying the Iranian Revolution: From a Minister to the Shah to a Leader of Resistance* (Praeger 2002).

Manouchehr Ganji has been a human rights protagonist for the last forty-six years of his life. His Ph.D. dissertation was entitled **International Protection of Human Rights** (published in Geneva, Switzerland in 1962). During the past **twenty-five years**, Ganji has been active in bringing to the world attention the gross and systematic violations of human rights in Iran. He is also the **founding-organizer** of the **Committee on Crimes of the "Islamic Republic" of Iran** ([www.incrimes.org](http://www.incrimes.org)). The **International Moral Court on Iran** is organized and sponsored by the **Committee on Crimes of the "Islamic Republic" of Iran**.

FOUO

FILE COPY

300.8

January 18, 2006

TO: Mike Donley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Directive on Coordination

I think we need some sort of a directive that in the future when something is going to be coordinated, I want the coordination paper to be a single sheet. It should have the person's name typed, the person's signature (legible) and it should have a date that is legible.

I need to start tracking how long it takes things to get done around here. It is taking way too long, and there are too many people chopping on things.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
011806-14

.....  
*Please Respond By February 09, 2006*

*First one Done.*  
*4/18* *DR*  
*4/19*  
*v/r*

*18 Jan 06*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57420



5/5/2006 11:42:40 AM

~~FOUO~~

May 01, 2006

050106-18

TO: Peter Rodman

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT Report to Congress on China's Military Power

I have been over the Report to Congress on China. I have not read every word, but it looks to me to be a good job.

I have the following thoughts:

- It seems to go well beyond what the law is requesting. Next year we may want to narrow it to what the law requests and make it somewhat shorter.
- It looks to be a dam good job -- very thorough and well written.
- On page 11, you might want to *think* about a paragraph or a bold heading on corruption. They have a terrible problem with corruption, and we don't highlight it in here.
- On page 41, see my suggested edits.
- It doesn't appear that Fox Fallon has had a chance to read this. I think he should and have a chance to offer his edits.
- On page 41, with respect to what Taiwan is purchasing, Fox Fallon just this week sent in a paper suggesting things they should or shouldn't buy. You might want to read that.
- You will see some edits -- not a lot of them, but some.

I don't need to see this again. If you have any questions, please let me know.

Thanks very much -- and tell the folks they did a good job.

11-L-0559/OSD/57421

OSD 07414-06



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
**FOUO**

Attach. 4/27/06 ASD(ISA) memo to SD (no OSD control number listed)

DHR dh  
050106-18

.....

**FOUO**

**OSD 07414-06**  
  
5/5/2006 3:22.51 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57422

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_  
USD(P) *W* MAY 04 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PR* MAY 3 2006

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on China's Military Power

- Regarding your May 1, 2006 memo on the Report to Congress on China's Military Power, we have added a paragraph on corruption to the report and incorporated your other edits.
- You asked why the word "power" appears in the title of the report. This comes from the ~~title~~ of the relevant legislative provision, which reads, "Sec. 1202. Annual Report on Military Power of the People's Republic of China" (Tab A). We have amended the report title to reflect the exact wording of the legislation.
- We have changed our target Congressional release date to Tuesday, May 23, out of consideration for ADM Fallon's visit to China May 9-14.
- Ryan Henry will deliver a copy of the report to ADM Fallon on Thursday, May 4. We have suggested that during ADM Fallon's visit he deliver to the Chinese the same high-level courtesy notification of the report's imminent release that you recommended Secretary Rice give last year.
  - As you may recall, Secretary Rice conveyed such a notification in Beijing, the PRC expressed appreciation, and we released the report a few days later. DUSD Lawless has explained this sequence to ADM Fallon, and he appears to be receptive to this idea.
- A May 23 release date will give us almost two weeks to frame the report prior to your visit to Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue June 2-4.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachments: a/s

Prepared by Ms Xanthi Carras, ISA Asia Pacific, (b)(6)



5/5/2006 2 31 02 PM



~~FOUO~~

May 01, 2006

050106-18

TO Peter Rodman

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT Report to Congress on China's Military Power

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- On page 41, with respect **to** what Taiwan is purchasing, Fox Fallon **just** this week sent in a paper suggesting things they should or shouldn't buy. You might want to read that.
- You will see some edits -- not a lot of them, but some.

I don't need to see this again. If you have any questions, please let me **know**.

Thanks very much -- and tell the folks they did a good job.

11-L-0559/OSD/57424

OSD 07414-06



~~FOUO~~

Attach. 4/27/06 ASD(ISA) memo to SD (no OSD control number listed)

DHR dh  
050106-18

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57425



**Public Law 106-65, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR  
FISCAL YEAR 2000 (S. 1059, Oct 5, 1999)**

**SEC. 1202. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

(a) **ANNUAL REPORT**- Not later than March 1 each **year**, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the specified congressional committees a report, in both classified and unclassified form, on the current and **future** military strategy of the People's Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable **future** course of military-technological **development** on the People's Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, and of military organizations and operational concepts, through the next **20** years.

(b) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED**- Each report under **this** section shall include **analyses** and forecasts of the following:

- (1) The goals of Chinese grand **strategy**, **security** strategy, and military strategy.
- (2) Trends in Chinese strategy that would be designed to establish the People's Republic of China **as** the leading political power in the Asia-Pacific region and as a political and military presence in **other** regions of the world.
- (3) The security situation in the Taiwan Strait.
- (4) **Chinese** strategy regarding **Taiwan**
- (5) The size, location, and capabilities of Chinese strategic, land, sea, and air forces, including detailed analysis of those forces facing Taiwan.
- (6) Developments in Chinese military doctrine, focusing on (but not limited to) efforts to exploit a **transformation** in military affairs or to conduct preemptive **strikes**.
- (7) Efforts, including technology transfers and espionage, by the People's Republic of China to develop, **acquire**, or gain **access** to information, communication, **space** and other advanced technologies that would enhance military capabilities.
- (8) **An** assessment of any challenges during the preceding **year** to the deterrent forces of the Republic of China on Taiwan, consistent with the commitments made by the United States in the Taiwan Relations **Act** (Public Law 96-8).

(c) **SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL, COMMITTEES**- For purposes of this section, the term 'specified congressional committees' means the following:

- (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
- (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.



*Handwritten mark*

**POLICY COORDINATION SHEET**

Subject: Report to Congress on China's Military Power  
I-Number: I-06/005607-AP

Title/Organization	Name	Date
PDASD/ISA	Mary Beth Long	<i>Handwritten signature</i>
DUSD/AP	Richard Lawless	<i>Handwritten signature</i>
PD/AP	BGen John Allen	<i>Handwritten signature</i> 5.3.06

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

5/8

To - Bill M

- As. secure JCS  
could given  
PACOM involvement.
- Put short response  
on it.

R.

Robert Rangel

OLD 07414-06

518 ✓  
1030

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

MAY 4 2006

INFO MEMO

DSD  
USD(P) *YB* MAY 04 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*RR* →

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *YB* MAY 3 2006

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COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachments: a/s

Prepared by: Ms. Xanthi Carras, ISA Asia Pacific, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 07414-06



5/5/2006 2:03:18 PM



\* 0 6 7 0 0 5 6 0 7 - A P W

MA SD		SMA DSD	
		SA DSD	
EXECSEC	<i>WCS</i>	<i>1030</i>	
ESRMA	<i>WCS 5/4</i>	STF DIR	

11-L-0559/OSD/57431

~~FOUO~~

May 01, 2006

050106-18

TO: Peter Rodman

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DR.*

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I don't need to see this again. If you have **any** questions, please let me know.

Thanks very much -- and to 111-0559/OSD/57432

OSD 07414-06



FILED 2006 05 01 AM

**FOUO**

**Attach. 4/27/06 ASD(ISA) memo to SD (no OSD control number listed)**

DHR dh  
050106-18

.....

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/57433

**Public Law 106-65, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR  
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- (8) An assessment of any challenges during the preceding year to the deterrent forces of the Republic of China on Taiwan, consistent with the commitments made by the United States in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8).

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- (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

**Subject:** Report to Congress on China's Military Power  
**I-Number:** I-06/005607-AP

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
PDASD/ISA	Mary Beth Long	<i>mbl</i> 5/3/06
DUSD/AP	Richard Lawless	<i>RL</i>
PD/AP	BGen John Allen	<i>John Allen</i> 5.3.06



THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

*China*

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

DJSM 0498-06  
12 May 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subject: Report to Congress on China's Military Power

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review your memorandum' suggesting that CDRUSPACOM provide Chinese leadership with a courtesy notification of the imminent release of the 2006 Report to Congress on China's Military Power. We concur in the memorandum as written.
2. As you are aware, Admiral Fallon has already provided notification as suggested. Please let me know if there are any further required actions for this request.
3. The Joint Staff point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel John P. Anderson, USA; J-5/NEA; (b)(6)

WALTER L. SHARP  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director, Joint Staff

Reference:

- 1 ASD(ISA) memorandum SD 07414-06, 4 May 2006, "Report to Congress on China's Military Power"

*(1 May 06)*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

*R07414-06*

11-L-0559/OSD/57436

FEB 14 2006  
I-06/001949  
ES-5240

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Steve Cambone  
David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: USG Program for Educational Exchanges

At the hearing in the House last week, Congressman Jim Marshall raised the subject of how we go about getting the U.S. Government to have appropriate educational exchanges with other countries. I told him we need to do it.

We need to fashion a very bold program. He will then carry the ball for us.

Please work with David Chu and Steve Cambone to come up with a program.

Thanks.

DRS:js  
DHR:14 (TS) ac

.....  
*Please respond by March 15, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07424-06



5/5/2006 5:37:43 PM

15-02-06 P12:33 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/57437

MAY 4 2006

**INFO MEMO**

DSD \_\_\_\_\_  
USDP \_\_\_\_\_  
I-06/001949

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *EE* MAY 05 2006

SUBJECT: USG Program for Educational Exchanges

- You asked me to fashion a very bold program for educational exchanges with other countries. This is a government-wide issue that will require time to develop but there are bold initiatives that we can take on our programs that may inspire other departments to do likewise.
- First, we need to reinvigorate and re-market our existing educational exchanges, tailoring them to the target country. You know the Chinese are very aggressive and we should amplify our efforts as well.
- My staff is working with David Chu and others to identify an individual who will catalogue the Department's educational institutions and opportunities. This effort should identify opportunities for expanded Department educational exchanges with other countries, as well as provide input into the QDR's highlighted need to strengthen our ability to interact with current and future foreign leaders.
  - Policy works closely with Assistant Secretary John Hillen's staff at State Pol-Mil and together, we can combine and leverage the results.
- We will use this and related efforts to propose a new USG program (including new initiatives, broader language training, placing our Service War Colleges on "wartime footing," and expansion or better utilization of existing ones) which we will take to the interagency once you have approved.
  - Related ongoing efforts that we can leverage are:
    - o the proposed conversion of the National Defense University to the National Security University; and,
    - o the Chairman and I are undertaking a study that was directed by DoD's Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) of the Regional Centers, National Defense

05-05-06 13:22 11

11-L-0559/OSD/57438

OSD 07424-06  
  
5/5/2006 5:38:15 PM

University, Senior Service Schools, and other centers and educational institutions that play a role in developing “communities of influence” (initial results to be briefed to the Deputy Secretary by May 30,2006).

- Other existing programs that we can springboard off of include:
  - o States that already have National Guard programs with countries might expand to include educational exchanges; and,
  - o expand educational exchange opportunities for service academies and ROTC Units to include students that will become career government servants, such as foreign service officers.
- I will provide you with an update on State’s response, and our efforts to catalogue the Department’s educational activities when I brief you on the outcome of the SPG brief to the Deputy.

FEB 14 2005

I-06/001949

ES-240

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Steve Cambone  
David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
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Please work with David Chu and Steve Cambone to come up with a program.

Thanks.

DRS:ec  
01/20/05 (TS) doc

.....  
*Please respond by March 15, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

15-02-06 P12:33 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/57440



~~FOUO~~

March 17, 2006

031706-13

TO: Peter Rodman  
CC: LTG Skip Sharp  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT Airplane for Qazi

Let's press ahead and try to get one of those countries to provide an airplane for Qazi.

Thanks.

DHR:sp  
031706-13

.....  
*Please Respond By 04/05/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57442

OSD 07436-06



5/8/2006 9:21:18 AM

FOUO

MAY 05 2006

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

USD(P) *WJ* MAY 05 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (IS) *PR* MAY 05 2006

SUBJECT: Airplane for Qazi

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked about getting another country to provide an airplane for Ambassador Qazi, UN Special Representative for Iraq.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The USG approached 10 UN Member States with C-130 or equivalent aircraft capability. The LJA approached 13 countries, most of which the USG also had contacted.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ State views Turkey as the most capable and willing country to provide air support for Ambassador Qazi. Therefore, State:
  - Has drafted talking points for UN Secretary General Annan to use in soliciting Turkish aircraft support.
  - Will query the Iraqi government to ensure there are no objections to Turkish support.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ If Iraq and Turkey agree to the air support mission, the next step will be to implement US-Turkey military-to-military meetings aimed at working out the logistics details.

Prepared by: Patricia Morgan, ISMESA-Iraq (b)(6)

~~Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Reasons: 1.4(d)  
Declassify On: 2 April 2016~~

FOUO



5/8/2006 9:22:03 AM

\*06/004985\*

11-L-0559/OSD/57443

~~FOUO~~

March 17, 2006

031706-13

TO: Peter Rodman

CC: LTG Skip Sharp

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Airplane for *Qazi*

Let's press ahead and *try to get* one of those countries to provide an airplane for Qazi.

Thanks.

DTR/ss  
031706-13

.....  
***Please Respond By 04/05/06***

~~FOUO~~


11-L-0559/OSD/57444

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

Subject of Memo: Airplane for Qazi

I-Number: 06/004985

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
Director NESA/NG	 John Trigilio	<u>2 May 2006</u>
Principal Director, NESA	 BGen Paula Thornhill	<u>2 MAY 06</u>
PDASD ISA	 Mary Beth Long	<u>5/2/06</u>

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11-L-0559/OSD/57445

~~FOUO~~

April 17, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.A.*

SUBJECT: MoD of Chile

Do you think we ought to invite the Minister of Defense of Chile *to* come to Washington?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
041706-04

.....  
*Please Respond By 04/27/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57446

OSD 07448-06



5/8/2006 11:47:43 AM

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Arab Republic of Egypt

Ministry of Defense

Commander - in - Chief of the Armed Forces

Minister of Defense and Military Production



جمهورية مصر العربية

وزارة الدفاع

القائد العام للقوات المسلحة

وزير الدفاع والإنتاج الحربي

*The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Rm 3E 880  
Washington, D.C. 20301*

*Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,*

*I deeply appreciate your kind invitation to visit the US and the warm hospitality we received during our stay in Washington. We felt the spirit of mutual understanding and appreciation that showed itself clearly in all the meetings we held.*

*I avail myself on this occasion to thank you and your dedicated staff for making our visit productive and memorable.*

*I would like also to convey the best regards of my wife to your honorable Madame. looking forward to receiving you in Cairo soon.*

Sincerely,

*Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi  
Commander in Chief; Minister of  
Defense and Military Production*

11-L-0559/OSD/57447



OSD 07455-06

5/8/2006 2:04:50 PM

~~FOUO~~

re: NZ

April 23, 2006

New Zealand

TO Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Policy Toward New Zealand

Please let me know what U.S. policy is on New Zealand and what the Presidential Directive is. Is there a Presidential doctrine?

Why do military folks like Abizaid, Fallon and La Porte all think they should go down there, when my understanding is that Policy doesn't think they should?

Where is the disconnect?

Thanks.

DWR:de  
042306-14

.....  
Please Respond By 05/04/06

23 APR 06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07468-06



5/8/2006 4:02:38 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57448

~~FOUO~~

March 07, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Meet w/Senator McConnell

I would like to have breakfast or lunch, or a **cup** of coffee, sometime with Mitch McConnell.

Thanks.

DHR,db  
030706-06

.....  
*Please Respond By 04/06/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07484-06



5/9/2006 8:38:06 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57449

**FOUO**

MAY 09 2006

TO: **LTG** Martin Dempsey

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: McCaffrey's Report

*333*

I just read McCaffrey's report, and I notice on Page 3, in the next to the last paragraph, he is very critical of the equipment of the Iraqi security forces. Is his paragraph accurate, or is it better than he describes? Certainly, his characterization suggests their equipment is not as good as I thought it currently was -- when we say they are trained and equipped.

Thanks.

DHR.ss  
050806-14

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/18/06*

*9 MAY 06*

OSD 07497-06



5/9/2006 11:57:01 AM

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/57450

FOUO

MAY 09 2006

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Stephen J. Hadley  
The Honorable John Negroponte

333

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Report on Iraq by Retired General **Barry** McCaffrey

Mr. President,

Attached is a report by Retired General **Barry** McCaffrey on Iraq.

I always find it useful to see some outsider's perspective on something we are looking closely at on a daily basis.

As you know, General McCaffrey has been critical of the Department and Administration policies. His report is mixed, but has a number of insights that those of us in the Department are addressing.

I think you will find it of interest.

Respectfully,

Attach General Barry McCaffrey's Report on Iraq

DHR.ss  
050806-18

OSD 07498-06



5/9/2006 12:02:55 PM

944X06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57451



*Adjunct Professor of International Affairs*

April 25, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL MIKE MEESE  
DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

COLONEL CINDY JEBB  
DEPUTY DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

Subject: Academic Report- Trip to Iraq and Kuwait  
**Thursday** 13 April **through Thursday** 20 April 2006

1. PURPOSE: This memo provides follow-on feedback reference visit 13-20 **April** 2006 to *Iraq* and **Kuwait**. Look forward to doing a faculty **seminar** with Department of Social Sciences at **your** convenience in the Fall semester.

2. SOURCES- **IRAQ**:

- a. General George Casey, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (**MNF-I**): *One-on-one* discussions and briefings.
- b. LTG Peter Chiarelli, Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (**MNC-I**): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- c. LTG Martin Dempsey, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command **One-on-one** discussions and briefings.
- d. British three-star General LTG Rob Fry (UK Army), Deputy to General George Casey, **Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)**: Update **Briefings**.
- e. Acting Chief-of-Mission US Embassy, DCM David Satterfield: One-on-one discussions and **briefing**.
- f. MG James Thorman, Commanding General, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Multi-National Division - Baghdad (**MND-B**): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- g. MG Thomas Turner, Commanding General, 101<sup>st</sup> Abn Div. Multi-National Division-North (**MND-N**): One-on-one discussions and **briefings**.
- h. MG ~~Riek~~ Lynch, Multi-National Force-Iraq (**MNF-I**) Strategic Effects: One-on-one discussions and **briefing**.
- i. MG Timothy Donovan, USMC, Chief-of-Staff Multi-National Forces-Iraq: One-on-one discussions and **out** brief.
- j. MG Joseph Peterson, Chief of Iraqi Police Transition: Discussion and **briefing**.

- k. Mr. David **Harris**, Acting Chief Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (**IRMO**): **One-on-one** lunch and **discussions**.
- l. **MG** Bob **Heine**, Deputy Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (**IRMO**), Director of Operations: **One-on-one** discussions and briefings.
- m. **BG (P)** William **H. McCoy**, Commanding General, Gulf Region Division Project and Contracting Office: Full Staff Briefings.
- n. BG John Cantwell (Australian Army): MNF-I Operations Brief.
- o. BG Alessio Ceechetti (Italian Army): Coalition Operations Update Briefing.
- p. Mr. Russ Thaden, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Multi-National Force-Iraq: Intelligence briefing on threat.
- q. Briefing: Multi-National Force-Iraq Battlefield Update.
- r. Briefing: MNF-I Effects and **Synchronization** Board.
- s. Division Battle **Staff** Briefing: 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.
- t. Division Battle **Staff** Briefing: 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division.
- u. **Briefing**: Infantry Brigade Commander, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.
- v. **Briefing**: Acting Infantry Battalion Commander, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.
- w. **Briefing**: Infantry Company Commander, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.
- x. **Lunch** Sensing Session: Soldiers and junior NCOs, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.
- y. **Dinner** Discussion: General Officers and Division Command Sergeant Major, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division
- z. **Briefing**: Infantry Brigade Commander, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division.
- aa. **Briefing**: Maneuver Effects Brigade Commander (Engineers), 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division **on** Counter-IED **Campaign**.
- bb. **Briefing**: Aviation Brigade Commander. 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division.
- cc. **Briefing**: Maneuver Battalion Commander and Company Commanders. 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division.
- dd. **Lunch** Sensing Session: Aviation Company Commander and Leaders. 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division.
- ee. **Dinner** Sensing Session: **Soldiers** and junior NCOs, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division.
- ff. **Visit** and Briefings: Brigade Detention Center and Intelligence interrogators.
- gg. **Visit** and Briefings: Special Operations Intelligence Fusion Center.
- hh. **Night** Movement: **To** 101<sup>st</sup> Maneuver Battalion Headquarters for **pinning** ceremony, Combat Infantry and Combat Action **Badges**. Discussion with junior soldiers.

### 3. SOURCES—KUWAIT

- a. Ambassador Richard LeBaron, US Ambassador to Kuwait: Office call and discussions with U.S. Ambassador and DCM.
- b. Staff Briefings: Colonel David Cordon, Acting Chief, Office of Military Cooperation - Kuwait.
- c. Briefings: U.S. Embassy Political Officer.
- d. Briefings: U.S. Embassy DAO - LTC Robert Friedenbergl.
- e. MG James Kelley, Acting Commanding General, Coalition Land Component Command One-on-one discussions.
- f. Full Staff Briefing: (3<sup>rd</sup> U.S. Army), Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).
- g. Dinner Discussion: CFLCC General Officers, Chief-of-staff, Command Sergeant Major.

### 4. THE BOTTOM LINE - OBSERVATIONS FROM IRAQI FREEDOM, APRIL 2006:

1 - The morale, fighting effectiveness, and confidence of U.S. combat forces continue to be simply awe-inspiring. In every sensing session and interaction - I probed for weakness and found courage, belief in the mission, enormous confidence in their sergeants and company grade officers, an understanding of the larger mission, a commitment to creating an effective Iraqi Army and Police, unabashed patriotism, and a sense of humor. All of these soldiers, NCOs and young officers were volunteers for combat. Many were on their second combat tour - several were on the third or fourth combat tour. Many had re-enlisted to stay with their unit on its return to a second Iraq deployment. Many planned to re-enlist regardless of how long the war went on.

Their comments to me were guileless, positive, and candidly expressed love for their fellow soldiers. They routinely encounter sniper fire, mortar and rocket attacks, and constantly face IED's on movement. Their buddies have been killed and wounded. Several in these sessions had also been wounded. These are the toughest soldiers we have ever fielded. It was a real joy and an honor to see them first-hand.

2<sup>nd</sup> - The Iraqi Army is real, growing, and willing to fight. They now have lead action of a huge and rapidly expanding area and population. The battalion level formations are in many cases excellent - most are adequate. However, they are very badly equipped with only a few light vehicles, small arms, most with body armor and one or two uniforms. They have almost no mortars, heavy machine guns, decent communications equipment, artillery, armor, or IAF air transport, helicopter, and strike support. Their logistics capability is only now beginning to appear. Their Institutional Army (Military Schools, logistics base, manufacturing) is beginning to show encouraging signs of self-initiative.

The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior have shown dramatic and rapid growth in capacity and competence since LTG Dempsey took them under his care. However, the corruption and lack of capability of the ministries will require several years of patient coaching and officer education in values as well as the required competencies. The Iraqi people clearly want a National Army. The recruiting now has gotten significant participation by all sectarian groups to include the Sunni. The Partnership Program with U.S. units will be the key to success with the Embedded Training Teams augmented and nurtured by a U.S. Maneuver Commander. This is simply a brilliant success story. We need at least two-to-five more years of U.S. partnership and combat backup to get the Iraqi Army ready to stand on its own. The interpersonal relationships between Iraqi Army units and their U.S. trainers are very positive and genuine.

**3<sup>rd</sup>** - The Iraqi police **are** beginning to show marked improvement in capability since MG Joe Peterson took **over the program**. The National Police Commando Battalions **are very** capable - a few **are** simply **superb** and on par with the best **U.S. SWAT units** in terms of equipment, courage, and training. Their intelligence collection capability is **better than ours** in direct **HUMINT**.

The **crux** of the war hangs on our ability to create urban and **rural** local police with the ability to survive **on the streets** of **this** incredibly **dangerous** and lethal environment. The police must have fortified local **stations** (more than a thousand), local jails (more than a thousand), armored Humvees (more than 3000), a **nationwide** command and control system, embedded **U.S. contractor trainers**, and in **the key battleground areas** of **Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk** - they **need** a remote area camera monitoring system such **as** we now have in most of **our** major cities.

The police **are** heavily infiltrated by both **the AIF** and the **Shia militia**. They **are** widely **distrusted** by **the Sunni** population. They **are** incapable of **confronting** local armed **groups**. They inherited a **culture** of inaction, passivity, **human rights abuses, and deep corruption**.

**This** will be a **ten** year project requiring patience, significant **resources**, and an international public face. **This** is a very, **very** tough challenge **which** is a prerequisite to the Iraqis winning the counter-insurgency **struggle** they will **face** in the **coming** decade. We absolutely can do **this**. But **this** police program is now inadequately **resourced**.

**4<sup>th</sup>** - The creation of an Iraqi government of national unity is a central requirement. We must help create a legitimate government for which the Iraqi security forces will fight and die. If we do not **see** the successful development of a pluralistic **administration** in the first **120** days of the emerging Jawad al-Maliki leadership - there **will** be significant chance of the country breaking **apart** in warring factions among the **Sunnis and Shia** - with a **separatist Kurdish** north embroiled in **their own** potential struggle with the **Turks**.

The incompetence and corruption of the interim Iraqi Administration **has** been significant. There is total lack of trust among the families, the **tribes**, and the sectarian factions created by the **35 years** of despotism **and** isolation of the criminal Saddam regime. This is a traumatized society with a malignant political culture. **There is** a huge "brain **drain**" taking place with **educated** and wealthy **Iraqis** getting out with their money. **This** is a loss of the potential leadership to **solve** the **mess** that is Iraq today. **The** pot is also being stirred **from** the outside Iraq by **six** neighboring states - none of which have provided significant economic or political assistance.

However, in my view, the Iraqis are likely to successfully create a governing entity. The intelligence picture **strongly** portrays a population that wants a **federal** Iraq, wants a national Army, rejects the AIF **as** a political **future** for the **nation**, and is optimistic **that** their life **can** be better in the coming years. Unlike the **Balkans** - **the** Iraqis want **this** to work. The bombing of the **Samarra Mosque** brought **the** country to **the** edge of all-out war. However, the Iraqi Army did not crack, the moderates held, Sistani called for **restraint**, the **Sunnis** got a chill of fear seeing what could **happen** to them **as** a minority population, and the Coalition Forces suddenly were seen correctly as a vital force that could keep the population safe in the absence of Iraqi **power**. In addition, the Shia were reminded that Iran is a Persian power with goals that conflict with **the** Shia Arabs of **southern and central Iraq**.

It is likely that the Iraqis **will** pull together enough political muscle to get **through** the coming 30 day crisis to **produce** a cabinet to submit to the Parliament - **as** well **as** the four month deadline to consider constitutional amendments. The resulting government is likely to be weak and barely functional. It may **stagger** along **and** fail in 18 months. But it is very likely to prevent the self-destruction of Iraq. **Our** brilliant and effective **U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad** will be the essential ingredient to **keeping** Iraq together. If **the U.S.** loses **his** leadership in the coming year, **this** thing could implode.

**5<sup>th</sup>** - The foreign jihadist fighters **have** been defeated **as** a strategic and operational threat to **the** creation of an Iraqi government. Aggressive small unit combat action by Coalition **Forces** combined with good **intelligence** - backed up by new Iraqi Security Forces is **making** an impact. **The** foreign fighters remain a serious tactical menace. However, they are a minor **threat** to the heavily armed and wary **U.S.** forces. They cannot successfully stop the Iraqi police and **army** recruitment. Their brutal attacks on the civil population **are** creating **support** for the emerging government. The foreign fighters have failed to spark open civil **war** from the **Shia**. The Samarra bombing may well have inoculated the

country to the possible horror of total war. The Iraqis are rejecting the vision of a religious state. The al Qaeda in-Iraq organization is now largely Sunni Iraqi - not foreign fighters. U.S. Marine and Army combat effectiveness - combined with very effective information operations--- has taken the fun out of Jihad.

6<sup>th</sup> - The U.S. Inter-Agency Support for our strategy in Iraq is grossly inadequate. A handful of brilliant, courageous, and dedicated Foreign Service Officers have held together a large, constantly changing, marginally qualified, inadequately experienced U.S. mission. The U.S. influence on the Iraqi national and regional government has been extremely weak. U.S. consultants of the IRMO do not live and work with their Iraqi counterparts, are frequently absent on leave or home consultations, are often in-country for short tours of 90 days to six months, and are frequently gapped with no transfer of institutional knowledge.

In Iraq, nothing is possible without carefully managed relationships between the U.S. officials and their Iraqi interlocutors. Trust between people is the prerequisite and basis of progress for this deeply Arab culture. The other U.S. agencies of government such as Justice, DHS, Commerce, Agriculture, and Transportation are in Iraq in small numbers for too short time periods. The U.S. Departments actually fight over who will pay the \$11.00 per day per diem on food. This bureaucratic nonsense is taking place in the context of a war costing the American people \$7 billion a month - and a battalion of soldiers and Marines killed or wounded a month.

The State Department actually cannot direct assignment of their officers to serve in Iraq. State frequently cannot staff essential assignments such as the new PRTs which have the potential to produce such huge impact in Iraq. The bottom line is that only the CIA and the U.S. Armed Forces are at war. This situation cries out for remedy.

7<sup>th</sup> - We face a serious strategic dilemma. Are U.S. combat troops operating in a police action governed by the rule of Iraqi law? Or are they a Coalition Military Force supporting a counter-insurgency campaign in a nation with almost no functioning institutions? The situation must remain ambiguous until the Iraqi government is actually operating effectively. We currently have excellent rules of engagement (ROE) governing the use of lethal force. These rules are now morphing under the pressures of political sensitivity at tactical level.

Many U.S. soldiers feel constrained not to use lethal force as the option of first instance against clearly identified and armed AIF terrorists - but instead follow essentially police procedures. Without question, we must clearly and dramatically rein in the use of lethal force - and zero out the collateral killing or wounding of innocent civilians trying to survive in this war zone. However, the tactical rules of engagement will need constant monitoring to maintain an appropriate balance.

8<sup>th</sup> - Thanks to strong CENTCOM leadership and supervision at every level, our detainee policy has dramatically corrected the problems of the first year of the War on Terrorism. Detainee practices and policy in detention centers in both Iraq and Afghanistan that I have visited are firm, professional, humane, and well supervised. However, we may be in danger of over-correcting. The AIF are exploiting our overly restrictive procedures and are routinely defying the U.S. interrogators. It is widely believed that the US has a "14 day catch and release policy" and the AIF "suspect" will soon be back in action.

This is an overstatement of reality, however, we do have a problem. Many of the AIF detainees routinely accuse U.S. soldiers of abuse under the silliest factual situations knowing it will trigger an automatic investigation. In my view, we will need to move very rapidly to a policy of the Iraqis taking legal charge of the detainees in our Brigade Detention Centers--- with us serving a support not lead role. We may need to hire U.S. contractor law enforcement teams at U.S. tactical battalion level to support the function of "evidentiary packages" as well as accompanying prisoners to testify in court in Baghdad.

9<sup>th</sup> - The stateside Army and Marine Corps needs significant manpower augmentation to continue the Iraq counter-insurgency and Iraqi training mission. In my judgment, CENTCOM must constrain the force level in Iraq or we risk damaging our ground combat capability which we will need in the ongoing deterrence of threat from North Korea, Iran, Syria, China against Taiwan, Venezuela, Cuba, and other potential flashpoints.

The stateside Army and Marine Corps also must rapidly create an enhanced Arabic language capability in the Armed Forces. We need to take 20% of each Leavenworth class and 10% of each advanced come class and put them through a 90 day total immersion Defense Language Institute Arabic come using only native speakers.

10<sup>th</sup> - CENTCOM and the U.S. Mission are **running out** of the most significant leverage **we** have in Iraq - economic reconstruction **dollars**. Having spent **\$18 billion** - we **now** have \$1.6 billion of new funding left in the pipeline. Iraq cannot **sustain** the requisite economic recovery without **serious U.S.** support. The Allies are **not** going to help. They **will** not fulfill their pledges. Most of their pledges are loans not **grants**.

It would be misguided policy to fail to **achieve our** political objective after a \$400 billion **war** because we refused to **sustain** the requirement to build a viable economic state. Unemployment is a bigger enemy than the AIF. It is my view that we will fail to achieve our political-military objectives in the **coming 24** months if **we** do not continue **economic support** on the order of **\$5-10 billion per year**. **This** is far, far less than **the cost** of fighting these people.

11<sup>th</sup> - We need to better **equip** the Iraqi Army with a capability to deter **foreign** attack - and to have a leveraged advantage over the Shia militias and the AIF **insurgents** they must continue to confront. The **resources** we are now planning to provide are inadequate by an order of magnitude or more. The cost of a coherent development of the Iraqi **security** forces is the ticket out of Iraq - and the avoidance of the constant **drain** of huge U.S. **resources** on a monthly basis.

12<sup>th</sup> - **There** is a rapidly **growing** animosity in **our** deployed military forces **toward** the U.S. media. We **need** to bridge **this** gap. Armies do not fight **wars** - countries fight **wars**. We need to continue talking to the American people through the press. They will be objective in **reporting** facts if we facilitate their information gathering mission. The **country** is **way** too **dangerous** for the media to operate in any other manner than temporarily imbedded with U.S. or Iraqi security forces. The enormous **good** will already generated by the superb performance of U.S. combat forces will ebb away if we do not continue to actively engage media at every level. We also cannot discount 2000 IED's a month, hundreds of **US** casualties a month, or the chaos of the central battlefield of the **insurgency** - which is Baghdad.

13<sup>th</sup> - U.S. public diplomacy and rhetoric about **confronting** Iranian nuclear weapons is scaring neighbors in the Gulf. They will not **support** another war. **They** have no integrated missile and interceptor air defense. They have no **credible** maritime coastal defense system to protect their ports and oil production **facilities**. **Our** Mid-East allies believe **correctly** that they are ill-equipped to deal with Iranian **strikes** to close the **Persian** Gulf and the **Red** Sea. They do not think they can handle politically or militarily a terrorist threat nested in their domestic Shia populations.

**A U.S.** military confrontation with Iran could result in **Sa&** attacking our forces in Baghdad - or along our 400 mile line of communications out of **Iraq** to the **sea**. The Iranian people have collectively decided to go nuclear. The **Chinese** and the Russians will not in the end **support serious** collective **action** against Iran. The **Iranians** will achieve their nuclear weapon purpose within **5-10** years.

Now is the time for **us** to create the **asymmetrical** alliances and defensive capabilities to hedge the Iranian nuclear threat without pre-emptive warfare. We can **bankrupt** and isolate the **Iranians** as we did the Soviet Union and create a stronger Gulf Alliance that **will** effectively deter **this** menace to our **security**.

## 5. SUMMARY:

The U.S. will remain in a **serious** crisis in Iraq during the coming **24** months. There is decreasing U.S. domestic **support** for the war; although in **my** view the American people understand that we must not fail or we **risk** a ten year **disaster** of foreign policy in the vital Gulf Oil Region. U.S. public opinion may become increasingly alienated by Iraqi ingratitude for our sacrifice on **their** behalf (huge **percentages** of both the **Shia** and **Sunni** populations believe that the MNF Coalition forces are the single greatest threat to safety and security in Iraq today) ---and by astonishingly **corrupt** and incompetent Iraqi management of their **own** recovery. (Much of the national oil and electricity problem is caused by **poor maintenance** or deliberate internal sabotage of the **infrastructure** for reasons of **criminal** corruption ---or to prevent **energy** from **flowing** away **from** the production facilities to Baghdad.)

The situation is perilous, uncertain, and extreme - but far from hopeless. The **U.S. Armed Forces** are a rock. This is the most competent and brilliantly led military in a tactical and operational **sense that** we have ever fielded. Its courage and dedication is unabated after 20,000 **killed** and wounded. The U.S. leadership on the ground is **superb** at strategic level - Ambassador Khalilzad, **General** Abizaid, and General Casey. The Iraqi **security** forces are now surging into a lead role in internal counter-insurgency operations.

The Iraqi political system is fragile but beginning to play a **serious** role in the debate over the big challenges facing the Iraqi **state** - oil, **religion**, territory, power, separatism, and revenge. The neighboring states have **refrained** from tipping **Iraq** into **open** civil war. The UN is cautiously thinking about **re-entry** and **doing** their job of helping consolidate **peace**. The Iraqis **are** going to hold Saddam and his senior leadership accountable for their **murderous** behavior over **35** years. The brave **Brits** continue to support **us** both politically and militarily. NATO is a possible modest support to **our** efforts.

There is **no** reason why **the** US cannot achieve our objectives in Iraq. **Our** aim must be to create a viable federal state under the rule of law which does not: enslave its own people, threaten its neighbors, or produce **weapons** of **mass** destruction. **This** is a ten year **task**. We should be able to draw down most of our combat forces in **3-5** years. We have few alternatives to the current **US** strategy which is painfully but gradually succeeding. **This** is now a **race** against time. Do we have the political will, do we have the military power, will we spend the **resources** **required** to achieve our **aim**?

It was very encouraging for me to see the **pr o p s** achieved in the past year. Thanks to the **leadership** and personal sacrifice of the hundreds of thousands of men and women of the CENTCOM team and the CIA - the American people are far safer today than we were in the **18** months following the **initial** intervention.

**Barry R McCaffrey**  
**General USA (Ret)**  
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs  
United States Military Academy  
West Point, **New York**

ISA

~~FOUO~~

April 12, 2006

041206-23

TO: Roger Pardo-Maurer

CC: Eric Edelman  
Robert Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Plan for Colombia and Peru Trade Agreements in Congress

Let's put together a plan as to how we can help get the trade agreements for Colombia and Peru pushed through the Congress. We want to help.

Let's get a plan laid out and see what we should be doing.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
041206-23

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/04/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57459

OSD 07499-06



5/9/2006 10:40:10 AM

~~FOUO~~

APR 04 2006  
040306-18

TO Ryan Henry  
CC: Steve Bucci  
Cathy Mainardi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT ~~Meeting~~ on Detention Operations Metrics ~~Memo~~

I need a ~~meeting~~ on this Detention Operations Metrics memo you sent me. We clearly have to find a new way to get going. We should have Gordon England at the ~~meeting~~, and decide who else should be present.

*Thanks.*

DHR:es  
040306-18



*Please Respond By April 19, 2006*

~~FOUO~~



5/9/2006 10:52:20 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57460

*CR*

~~FOUO~~

May 10, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Mark Gunzinger

*DR. DR*

You are free to go ahead and talk to Mark Gunzinger. Robert Rangel already passed that word to J.D.Crouch.

Thanks.

DHR:dt  
051006-03

OSD 07645-06



5/10/2006 5:48:55 PM

*10 MAY 2006*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57461

FOUO

May 10, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Casualty Paper

Please send me a copy of one of the blue sheets that shows casualties you mentioned in our phone conversation this morning. I would like to see what it looks like and who puts it out.

Thanks.

DHR, dh  
051006-18

*704*

OSD 07656-06



5/11/2006 12:15:14 PM

*10 May 06*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57462

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 9, 2006


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Discussion on Re-Engineering the Interagency

To support the President's agenda of adapting institutions to meet the security challenges of our time, I would like to discuss a proposal to examine interagency structures and processes during our next lunch session.

Prominent voices from inside and outside of government suggest that major change may be needed.

Read ahead materials describing a proposed interagency approach for addressing the issue are attached. I welcome your comments in the interim.

  
Stephen J. Hadley  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

Tab A Read Ahead Paper, "Re-Engineering the Interagency  
Process Proposal"  
Tab B Sample lists of interagency 'problems' and 'fixes'  
(from studies and critics)



**Read-Ahead:****Re-Engineering the Interagency Process Proposal**

- Is the interagency broken? Many critics say that it is.
- Need to address the issue, and think 'outside of the box' to examine interagency processes and organizational structures
- Proposed process:
  1. NSC leads team of trusted, creative thinkers from key agencies (with access to Principals) to review interagency design and identify problems. Team tasks:
    - Interview stakeholders, critics, and experts: What is broken? How would they fix it?
    - Survey studies on interagency reform and best business practices
    - Synthesize and report back to Principals
  2. Interagency Team analyzes findings and develops options. The team seeks frequent senior level input, and could coordinate with select members of Congress (at planned times and as needed). Examples of concerns for the team to cover:
    - What interagency re-design is warranted in the national security environment since the existing interagency structures were created in considering the issues identified in Step 1?
    - How could interagency processes better leverage new information, computer and communication technologies?
    - How could links between overseas and Washington improve?
  3. Principals identify course of action, and team builds implementation plan
- To get started, we need from you:
  - Agreement and support for beginning the effort;
  - A trusted agent for the team (senior level, 1-2 star equivalents). Expected time commitment: 3-4 meetings per week;
  - May need full-time, working level support (TBD);
  - Thoughts on press exposure; and,
  - Names for interviews? (Candidate list for consideration on next page).

**Candidates for Interviews**

- Current Stakeholders, such as: Secretary Rice, Secretary Rumsfeld, Steve Hadley, John Negroponte, General Pace, three to four ambassadors with operational experience (names TBD), Combatant Commanders, Robert Kimmitt, and J.D. Crouch 11.
- Individuals with previous Interagency experience, such as: Rich Armitage, Newt Gingrich, John Hamre, John Hannah, Henry Kissinger, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Paul Wolfowitz
- Critics and studies, such as:
  - 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report (DoD);
  - "Beyond Goldwaters-Nichols" (CSIS);
  - "Rethinking the Interagency System" (Hicks & Associates);
  - Tower Commission;
  - 9/11 Commission; and,
  - Academics and others, such as: Cindy Williams (MIT, research on resource allocation across the government); John White (Harvard, teaches on National Security Organization and Management); Jim Locher (Goldwaters-Nichols experience)

*Re-Engineering the Interagency:*  
Sample National Security Process 'Problems' (Various Sources)

---

- Need to move beyond existing policy development to more effective planning, execution and oversight of truly interagency ops;
- Cross-government processes lack authority and accountability;
- Need to incorporate domestic security issues better;
- Lack of a strong civilian organization to lead nonmilitary aspects of ops;
- Limited Department of State resources & personnel experience in planning, executing campaigns;
- Lack of regional, forward positioned interagency team to execute ops;
- Collaboration versus coordination needed;
- Need trained and experienced national security professionals; limited NSC size & capacity;
- Poor integration of effort at operational levels, vertically and horizontally;
- Poor interagency planning processes;
- Lack of deployable experts and capabilities in civilian agencies;
- Processes and programs to develop, coordinate and sustain interagency knowledge and expertise: education, training, & exercises;

*Re-Engineering the Interagency:*  
Sample National Security Process 'Fixes' (Various Sources)

---

- Congress should create a new training center for interagency and coalition operations, and fund both national and international training and exercise programs to promote cross-agency experience within the United States Government, and between the United States and potential coalition partners;
- Broaden and increase NSC authorities in planning, training and execution;
- Establish a National Security University and a National Security Officer Corps to train interagency personnel;
- Establish standard operating procedures for planning of complex operations;
- Consider merging HSC and NSC;
- Designate a Deputy Assistant to the President for Stability Operations within NSC system;
- Create new interagency institutions, separate from NSC but operating within Executive Office of the President, empowered to coordinate sharing of information and with authority to jointly plan and oversee execution by other agencies;
- NSC assigned Lead Agency, and establish 'Joint Interagency Task Forces' directed by a department head or senior official selected by the President to coordinate and direct all U.S. Government efforts pursuant to the assigned mission; and,
- Establish an independent interagency organization to coordinate military and civilian planning that would not have department-level status, nor operate from within an existing government body. Would have representatives from different departments who would make recommendations to the NSC, which would resolve differences.

MAY 26, 2006  
11:00 AM

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Eric S. Edelman *ME* MAY 8 5 2006

SUBJECT: Hadley Proposal for Re-Engineering the Interagency

- Steve Hadley would like to discuss a proposal (Tab A) to examine interagency structures and processes at your next lunch meeting, which is tentatively scheduled for Tuesday, May 30. I think the proposal is a good start.
- Before you tackle how to **fix** the process, however, it may be useful to assess what the priority problems are from the perspective of senior leadership. The slides at Tab B do a good job at cataloguing some of the thorniest problems facing the interagency.
  - One issue overlooked in the slides is the effect that Congress has on interagency interactions. Congressional lines of authority, committee jurisdictions and resource issues compound the complexity of interagency efforts.
  - This issue is not going away, so any proposed fixes should take this into consideration.
- You might also want to consider the following ideas:
  - Link DoD's part of the re-engineering effort to our broader transformation work.
    - The QDR and follow-on roadmaps (especially the one on building partnership capacity) address many of the same reform proposals. We already have work underway in some of these areas.
    - Emphasize the need for integration with State's transformation efforts, especially Amb. Tobias' foreign assistance reform and Assistant Secretary John Hillen's efforts to improve "jointness" between diplomats and the military.
  - Propose that the effort look at integrating not only planning, training, and execution, but budgeting as well.
  - Highlight the importance of congressional and public engagement early in the process to gain support for and participation in the reforms.
    - For example, you might propose that the NSC convene an outside forum, perhaps through a non-partisan think tank, to engage knowledgeable experts

334MSC

2 May 06

9 May 06



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57468 07658-06

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

and congressional representatives in a neutral setting.

- I recommend that the press be carefully exposed to the process early on to familiarize the public with our efforts.
- Note that Steve also asks that **you**:
  - Appoint a 1-2 star-level trusted agent to an NSC-led interagency team to examine the problem. My suggestion is **Ms. Kath Hicks**, Director for Policy Planning;
  - Supply names for possible interview subjects.
    - Some current U.S. ambassadors you might want to consider include Bill Brownfield (Venezuela), Bill Burns (Russia), Toria Nuland (NATO) or John Herbst (will take over S/CRS at State).
    - We could also consider some “formers” such as Walt Slocombe, **Frank Wisner**, Strobe Talbott, Carlos Pascual or General Myers.
    - Peter Rodman also has a wealth of interagency experience that could be **useful** to the effort.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Zack Cooper, OUSD(P) Policy Planning (b)(6)

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2

11-L-0559/OSD/57469

Limited Access  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2800

May 9, 2006


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

**SUBJECT:** . Discussion on Re-Engineering the Interagency

To support the President's agenda of adapting institutions to meet the security challenges of our time, I would like to discuss a proposal to examine interagency structures and processes during our next lunch session.

prominent voices from inside and outside of government suggest that major change may be needed.

Read ahead materials describing a proposed interagency approach for addressing the issue are attached. I welcome your comments in the interim.

  
Stephen J. Hadley  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

- Tab A Read Ahead Paper, "Re-Engineering the Interagency Process Proposal"
- Tab B Sample lists of interagency 'problems' and 'fixes' (from studies and critics)

Limited Access



5/11/2006 10:03:44 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57470

DETAILED, MICRO-VIEW  
MARGIN 2800  
COMMENTS = BILLINGSLEA

Read-Ahead:  
Re-Engineering the Interagency Process Proposal

- Is the interagency broken? Many critics say **that it is.**
- Need to address the issue, and think 'outside of the box' to examine interagency processes and organizational structures

IS THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS BEING RE-ENGINEERED? IS IT A PROCESS FOR INFO GATHERING (SEMINARS) OR IS IT FOR DECISION-MAKING?

- proposed process:
  1. NSC leads team of trusted, creative thinkers from key agencies (with access to Principals) to review interagency design and identify problems. Team tasks:
    - Interview stakeholders, critics, and experts: What is broken? How **would** they fix it?
    - Survey studies on interagency reform and best business—practices
    - Synthesize and report back to Principals

WHAT SHOULD THE DEPSEC'S RELATIONSHIP/ROLE BE TO THE PROCESS? FOCUS ON DEPT BUSINESS, AND LEAVE

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

• ONE-STOP SHOP OFFICE IN PRINCIPALS OFFICE.

2. Interagency Team analyzes findings and develops options. The team seeks frequent senior level input, and could **coordinate** with select members of Congress (at planned times and as needed). Examples of concerns for the team to cover:
  - What interagency re-design is warranted in the national security environment since the existing **interagency** structures were created in considering the issues identified in Step 1?

INTERAGENCY TO SECs AND UNDER SECs?

TECHNOLOGY

- NO WASH FAX

- TANDBERG MACHINES

• EYES ONLY, COURIERED

- How could interagency processes better leverage new information, computer and communication technologies?

- HOW CAN WE MAKE THIS TRANSACTION MORE EFFICIENT?

- How could links between overseas and Washington improve?

3. Principals identify course of action, and team builds implementation plan
- To get started, we need from you:
    - Agreement and support for beginning the effort;
    - A trusted agent for the team (senior level, 1-2 star equivalents). Expected time commitment: 3-4 meetings per week;
    - May need full-time, working level support (TBD);
    - Thoughts on press exposure; and,
    - Names for interviews? (Candidate list for consideration on next page).

Pre-Decisional/Close Hold

Candidates for Interviews

SNOW (TREAS)  
TOWNSEND (RSC)  
RABIANO (HSC)  
SHIRIAD (NEC)  
BOLTEN  
CABINET AFFAIRS

- Current Stakeholders, such as: Secretary Rice, Secretary Rumsfeld, Steve Hadley, John Negroponte, General Pace, three to four ambassadors with operational experience (names TBD), Combatant Commanders, Robert Kimmitt, and J.D. Crouch II.
- Individuals with previous Interagency experience, such as: Rich Armitage, Newt Gingrich, John Hamre, John Hannah, Henry Kissinger, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Paul Wolfowitz
- STAFF WHO MANAGE PROCESS: MILES, HAETLE, BILLINGSLEY, HEFFRIN, VIA, DECSI, BARTON, McDONALD, SIEGAL, COMBATANT CDR YOs, AMB EAs.
- Critics and studies, such as:
  - 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report (DoD);
  - "Beyond Goldwaters-Nichols" (CSIS);
  - "Rethinking the Interagency System" (Hicks & Associates);
  - Tower Commission;
  - 9/11 Commission; and,
  - Academics and others, such as: Cindy Williams (MIT, research on resource allocation across the government); John White (Harvard, teaches on National Security Organization and Management); Jim Locher (Goldwaters-Nichols experience)

FETH

OTHER ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

- "ON-DC" PURPOSE - IS THIS THE FORUM FOR MAKING DECISIONS?
  - HOW CAN WE DECREASE SCHEDULING/PAPER TURBULENCE
- AS ISSUES LIKE IMMIGRATION AND HURRICANE PREPAREDNESS MAKE IT FRONT AND CENTER (IN THE PLANNING + DECISION MAKING PROCESS), WHAT MIGHT BE THE MOST EFFICIENT/BENEFICIAL WAY TO ORGANIZE OURSELVES?
  - NSC, HSC, CABINET MEETINGS, "POLICY TIME"
  - WHO HAS THE LEAD FOR AGENDA AND TASKINGS?
  - WHO CAPTURES THE OUTCOME AND HOW (SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)?
- WHAT SHOULD BE THE EXTENT OF INVOLVEMENT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BE IN DCs?

(HICED-VIEN)  
MARGIN COMMENTS =  
BILLINGSLEA

*Re-Engineering the Interagency.*  
**Sample National Security Process 'Problems' (Various Sources)**

- Need to move beyond existing policy development to more effective **planning**, execution and oversight of truly interagency ops; → DOES THIS ASSUME THAT THE CURRENT PROCESS IS PRODUCING POLICY DECISIONS? ARE WE MAKING DECISIONS?
- Cross-government processes lack authority and accountability;
- ✓ Need to incorporate domestic security issues better;
- Lack of a strong civilian organization to lead non-military aspects of ops;
- Limited Department of State resources & personnel experience in planning, executing campaigns;
- Lack of regional, forward positioned interagency team to execute ops;
- Collaboration versus coordination needed; (OPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION AMONG PROCESS MANAGERS... SEE THURSDAY NIGHT WEEK AHEAD SVTC)
- Need trained and experienced national security professionals; limited NSC size & capacity;
- Poor integration of effort at operational levels, vertically and horizontally;
- Poor interagency planning processes;
- Lack of **deployable experts and capabilities in civilian agencies**;
- Processes and programs to **develop, coordinate and sustain interagency knowledge and expertise**: education, **training & exercises**; PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT FELLOWS PROGRAM (START TRAINING HERE) →

*Re-Engineering the Interagency:*  
Sample National Security Process 'Fixes' (Various Sources)

---

- Congress should create a new training center for interagency and coalition operations, and fund both national and international training and exercise programs to promote cross-agency experience within the United States Government, and between the United States and potential coalition partners;
- Broaden and increase NSC authorities in planning, training and execution;
- Establish a National Security University and a National Security Officer Corps to train interagency personnel;
- ✓ • Establish standard operating procedures for planning of complex operations;
- Consider merging HSC and NSC
- Designate a Deputy Assistant to the President for Stability Operations within NSC system;
- 3 • Create new interagency institutions, separate from NSC but operating within Executive Office of the President, empowered to coordinate sharing of information and with authority to jointly plan and oversee execution by other agencies;
- NSC assigned Lead Agency, and establish 'Joint Interagency Task Forces' directed by a department head or senior official selected by the President to coordinate and direct all U.S. Government efforts pursuant to the assigned mission; and,
- Establish an independent interagency organization to coordinate military and civilian planning that would not have department-level status, nor operate from within an existing government body.' Would have representatives from different departments who would make recommendations to the NSC, which would resolve differences.

~~FOUO~~

May 24, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: August 2002 Memo on Interagency Process

Attached is a memo I sent to Condi back in 2002 on the interagency process. I am sure you saw it then, but you might want to take a look at it.

Thanks so much for coming over with your team today. I think it was helpful to us. I hope it was to you.

Attach: 8/20/02 Memo on Interagency Process

DHR:sl  
052406-11

Rechecked  
I agree with  
my words  
in here,  
including  
and + tone.  


~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57475

August 20, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS (CONDOLEEZZA RICE)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Interagency Process

**As** we have discussed, the interagency process could be improved to help all of **us** better manage the high volume of work we have. I've talked **with** my folks about it to **see** if we could come up **with** some ideas that might be helpful.

I have just established a position in my office for a Policy person to do nothing but **staff** Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith and me regarding our **NSC** meeting schedules and papers - to **try** and help us deal with the many changes in dates, times, agendas, materials, attendees **and** the like.

We have some **suggestions** as to how we might save some time and make the process more manageable. Our suggestions are attached. A number of these suggestions **are** things I'm told we already **try** to do, but formalizing the rules could make the practice more consistent.

Steve Hadley deserves good marks for his stewardship of the process generally. If we **now** streamline and **otherwise** improve our interagency work, it could be a help generally and particularly as the number of problems we face **in** the world grows. **At** the minimum, we need a surge capability, and the way we are currently operating doesn't provide much reserve.

Attachment a/s

11-L-0559/OSD/57476

August 20, 2002 8:26 AM

**THOUGHTS ON THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS****Meetings - Scheduling:**

- Reduce the average time for PC/DC meetings. Cut scheduled one-hour meetings to 45 minutes; cut half-hour agenda items **to 20 minutes**.
  - **28 PC** and **43 DC** meetings were held between 31 May-31 July **02** - that is:
    - roughly **42** hours in PC meetings, not counting travel time **of an** additional **30** minutes per meeting, or **an** additional **14** hours.
    - **85** hours in DC meetings, not counting travel time **of an** additional 21 hours.
- Changing the time **or** date of scheduled meetings has major ripple effects on the schedules of officials throughout **all** departments.
  - Last minute changes are especially disruptive, particularly **when** the meeting time is moved up. Shifting from afternoon to morning cuts into preparation time.
  - Establish a practice for NSC to ask if a rescheduling is workable for the folks involved.
  - Make a rule **of giving** at least 48 hours notice before changing the date, **time** or subject of a meeting.

**Meetings -- General Points**

- **More PC/DC** meetings could be held via SVTS.
- **The** department with the lead on a subject matter should sum up **all** decisions at the end of the meeting.
  - It sometimes happens that a matter mentioned at a meeting is said to have been "decided" because **it** elicited no objection. That **is** not a good practice. Nothing should be deemed decided unless we expressly agree to decide **it**.

- Decisions should be included in the Summary of Conclusions and no one should subsequently include in the summary that a meeting decided **anything** more or anything different.
- There should be fewer “Principals **Only**” meetings.
  - Bringing a “plus one” saves Principal’s time, as there’s less need **for the** Principal to debrief others later.
  - This applies **both** at the Principals’ and Deputies’ levels. **Since** you always have your plus one, it puts a particular burden on the rest of **us** to be told **we** may **not** include a plus one.

**Papers -- Should be Easy to Read:**

- Papers for PCs should, as a **rule**, be two or three pages, **i.e.:**
  - Bulletized (**as** a rule, no more than two sentences per bullet),
  - Thoughtfully formatted (i.e., readable font, sufficient white space **so notes** can be made)
  - Well-edited – few, if **any**, 63-word sentences.
- papers should:
  - Let the reader know up front what the issue **is**.
  - Set out the basic facts and concepts.
  - Specify agency positions, highlighting differences.
  - Provide **pros** and cons for the options.

**Papers -- Should be Pitched High:**

- **Matters** for decision by Principals should be important enough to justify decision or discussion by Principals.
- Relatively lengthy documents (e.g., NSPDs or Findings) that require Principals’ approval should be worked at lower levels first, so that issues for Principals are clearly identified and, if necessary, discussed **in** a cover memo.

- *Important* documents that require line *in/line* out attention should be **double- or triple-spaced**.

### **Papers (PCC to PC via DC)**

- There is a place in the interagency process for longer, more discursive papers, but that place is generally the PCC or **sub-PCC**.
- If a PCC works on a matter that should be sent up the chain, it **should** complete its work by producing a short paper suitable for Principals.
- The PCC members should clear the paper so that each agency is satisfied with the way **its** position is stated.
  - Papers should not aim at a homogenized consensus. It is useful to clearly and accurately present **differences** among agencies.
  - Currently, too many papers for Principals are prepared by NSC staff members, rather than by the departments; and too few are cleared in **final form** by the departments before sending them to the Principals.
- The PCC should then send the cleared paper up to the **PC through the Deputies**.
  - Changes made in a paper should be cleared by the departments.
  - Principals should, as a rule, receive papers the Deputies have cleared.
  - The argument against having the Deputies clear PC papers is that it takes more time. That is true, but the reality is that it takes even more time when papers for Principals do not properly present the issues or the agency positions *and* have **to** get sent back down the **chain** for reworking.
    - **As** the saying goes: “If we don’t have time to do it right, how are we going to have time to redo it?”
- The NSC Staff has made an effort to distribute papers for DC/PC meetings **48** to 72 hours in advance. There are still many times, however, when this **rule** is observed in the breach, a problem for which, I suspect, every agency is, at one time or another, responsible.
  - Except for honest-to-goodness time-critical issues, a meeting should automatically be postponed if the materials are not distributed at least 48 hours in advance, or if the time or agenda have to be changed.

## **Papers (distribution)**

- Papers should not be distributed only into the **hands** of Principals.
  - This can confuse the system. The Principal's staff is cut out and **cannot** give the Principal the necessary support (tracking, read-ahead).
- *When* the NSC Staff wants to distribute an especially sensitive paper **by courier** rather **than** by fax, it would help to get a phone call and have the **option** to **send** over a trusted agent to pick it up so that hours are not lost.
  - A paper recently was sent around by courier with the result that DOD got it last, hours after it was sent out, and long after the addressee had departed for the night.
- Stamping "Eyes Only" on so many documents is unrealistic.
  - This has made the term meaningless and ignored.
  - Also, when documents **are** kept for the Principal's eyes **only**, this **makes the** Principal the action **officer, which is** rarely *appropriate*.

5/11 ✓  
0930

~~FOUO~~

May 09, 2006

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: List of Three Responsibilities

02050

Please give me a piece of paper that lists those three responsibilities you say I have as Secretary of Defense with respect to intelligence -- to show what I do have a responsibility to do and what I don't have a responsibility to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050906-12




*Please Respond By 05/12/06*

9m9180

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57481



5/11/2006 11:27:20 AM

~~FOUO~~

April 17, 2006

TO Eric Edelman  
CC Gen Pete Pace  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Kosovo Reduction

If we are going to get a disproportionate reduction out of Kosovo, we are going to have to move on the State Department pretty soon and make a good case.

Please have someone pull together the numbers: what is likely to happen and what might happen if we put a little effort on.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
041706-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/04/06*

*Serbia*

*17 Apr 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57482



OSD 07664-06

5/11/2006 12:53:32 PM

~~FOUO~~

May 10, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Dorrance Smith  
Robert Rangel  
Matt Latimer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

**SUBJECT:** Senator Hatch's Offer

Senator Orrin Hatch said he would be available to do anything he could **to** be helpful -- write an op-ed, **talk** to press people if we want to refer **them** to **him**, etc. We should **mark** that down.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
051006-16

OSD 07674-06



5/11/2006 2:19:50 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57483

~~FOUO~~

May 10, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Dorrance Smith  
Robert Rangel  
Matt Latimer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Senator Hatch's Offer

Senator **Orrin** Hatch said he would be available to do anything he could be helpful -- write **an** op-ed, talk to press people if we want to refer them to him, etc. We should mark that down.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051006-16

.....  
May 11, 2006 ; 12:00PM

Mr. Secretary,

We will do so; he may be valuable to us in the anticipated debates we face in the coming weeks.

*Robert L. Wilkie*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57484



OSD 07674-06

5/11/2006 2:22 15PM


FOUO

3837

May 11, 2006

TO: The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Summary on Border Control Issue

Attached is a quick **summary** of our thoughts on the border control issue we discussed on the phone.

I suggest we avoid letting this get buried in our bureaucracy -- over there or over **here**. It is something that I will need to be involved in personally with General Pace **as** you folks get closer to making a decision. The language that is used in any announcement will be ~~very important for us to review~~.

Thanks.

Attach. 5/1 1/06 "Options for Dealing with the Border Control Issue"

DHR:db  
051106-25

.....

OSD 07709-06  
  
5/12/2006 9:19:05 AM

11 May 06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57485

~~FOUO~~

5:45 pm  
May 11, 2006

SUBJECT: Options for Dealing with the Border Control Issue

The ~~task~~ of maintaining the integrity of U.S. borders is assigned by law to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which utilizes the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for those purposes. That responsibility should stay with those organizations. That mission is a law enforcement function, which is not an appropriate role for the U.S. military. We are not organized, trained, equipped, ~~or~~ resourced to do those tasks.

It should be noted that the Department of Defense (DoD) is already providing a substantial amount of assistance to CBP. A list of some of the things we have done in ~~the past or~~ are currently doing is attached (Tab A). It might make *sense* to note this in any announcement.

To the extent the President decides it is absolutely necessary to use military forces in connection with land border protection, it should be only for a very brief period of time and only until U.S. Customs and Border Protection has been able to recruit, ~~train~~, organize and deploy the additional assets on a crash basis.

By way of background, the U.S. Senate, by an amendment offered by Senator Gregg to the FY06 Emergency Supplemental, recently moved \$1.9 billion out of the DoD account and shifted it to the DHS account for border protection.

Following ~~are~~ some rough thoughts on what the President might propose:

- First, send the Congress ~~a~~ request for a special Supplemental to:
  - restore the \$1.9 billion taken from DoD;
  - cover the costs associated with any additional deployment of DoD assets, ~~as~~ discussed below; and
  - provide whatever additional funds will be required for CBP to be able to deal with this problem, as defined by the President, including recruiting, training, and deploying the necessary capabilities ~~on~~ a crash basis

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57486

- Second, instruct CBP to immediately **begin** recruiting, training, and deploying whatever capabilities they will need to protect **U.S.** land borders to the extent the President decides they need to be protected.
- Third, ask DoD to provide **U.S.** military forces on an interim basis only, until CBP **has** been able to recruit, **train**, and deploy the necessary capabilities. DoD forces likely would be National Guard under the control of the relevant governors and **funded** by the Federal Government.

Two options might be considered:

- Option 1 - A rapid DoD commitment of up to 3,000 to 4,000 National Guardsmen, probably in an **annual** training status (Title 32), on a rotational basis, to support CBP border security activities for a maximum period of up to 4 to 6 months.
- Option 2 - A commitment of up to 6,000 to 8,000 National Guardsmen, probably in an **annual** training status (Title 32), on a rotational basis, to support **CBP** border security activities for a maximum period of up to 8 to 10 months, if it can be shown that it will take that long for CBP to get up to speed.

DoD would prefer that the number be somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 National Guardsmen - maximum.

Whatever the President decides to do, DoD will need to work closely with whoever is drafting the language of the announcement to make sure we have **carefully** considered the implications across the entire force. We must not do anything that would degrade the U.S. ability to fulfill our overseas commitments. Further, to support this domestic requirement, it will be necessary to see that the Supplemental fully covers all the other DoD funding requirements.

Warning: We must make absolutely sure that DoD is able to exit this mission. It must not become a slippery slope to a permanent DoD role. There is no reason the statutory civilian agencies (DHS) cannot, in a reasonable period of time, fulfill its statutory responsibilities.

## Baseline Analysis of DoD Contributions to Border Security

### Historical Context

As a result of two incidents and subsequent policy change in the late 1990s, DoD supported border security missions at the request of civilian law enforcement agencies, such as DoJ and DHS. Active duty and National Guard units have conducted missions ranging from engineering support to aerial reconnaissance with UAVs. The terrorist attacks in 2001 resulted in increased requests for DoD support from the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney General, but the creation of the Department of Homeland Security has rooted the border security responsibility firmly in the Customs and Border Protection offices.

Recent modifications to the DoD force structure include the transformation of Joint Task Force 6 to Joint Task Force North in June, 2004. The core mission of Joint Task Force North is detection in the approaches and deterrence and defense of the Homeland through shared situational awareness and actionable intelligence. Joint Task Force North completed more than 5300 missions in support of more than 430 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and counter-drug task forces. While Joint Task Force North adopts an expanded role, it is in support of CBP.

### Current Policy, Funding, and Areas of Support

DoD provides indirect support to border security in support of civilian law enforcement activity. Illegal immigration and border security are law enforcement missions. The policy of DoD is to conduct support missions at the request of civilian law enforcement that directly or indirectly contributes to border security and that approved by the Secretary of Defense. As DHS enhances their capability, DoD augments their efforts.

Current DoD activities in support of border security are funded through FY 06 DoD Counter Narcotics activities: \$180 million for individual state counter narcotics efforts by the National Guard, \$10 million for JTF N Title 10 mission support, and \$36 million for aerostat radars used mostly on the southwest border.

DoD provides support for border security missions along several lines of operation: engineering support, night aerial reconnaissance using UAVs and helicopter infrared capabilities, multi-sensor cueing, and intelligence support. Examples of this support in action range from operations along the northern and southern border following 9/11, UAV support to the Arizona Border Control Initiative, and several operations that apply DoD resources for a fixed period of time with defined results.

### DoD Levels of Effort, Authorities, Operations and Results

JTFN is the operational arm of US Northern Command and has functional responsibility for border security and counter narcotics support. JTF N executed numerous operations in the last 24 months in support of Customs and Border Control.

**JTF-North Level of Effort for 1 Apr 05 – 1 Apr 06**

JTF-North, a subordinate organization to US Northern Command, headquartered at Ft. Bliss Texas, employs Department of Defense (OD) support to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in order to facilitate interagency intelligence, information sharing, and improve detection and interdiction of transnational threats to the United States. JTF N develops mil-to-mil relationships with Canada and Mexico to improve regional security.

Recent contributions include:

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Northern Border</u>	<u>Southwest Border</u>	<u>Interior</u>	<u>Total Effort</u>
Aviation Recon (flight hours)	0.00	1151.11	107.50	1258.61
UAV (flight hours) (Mar 05-Mar 06)	0.00	477.00	0.00	477.00
UAV (flight hours) (Mar 04-Mar 05)	0.00	1402.20	0.00	1402.20
UAV (flight hours) (Mar 03-Mar 04)	0.00	184.30	0.00	184.30
Ground Sensors (man-days)	1007.40	3949.30	0.00	4956.70
Ground Surveillance Radar	5252.35	490.00	0.00	5742.35
Tunnel Detection (man-days)	0.00	3014.90	0.00	3014.90
Engineer (man-days)	0.00	18921.60	0.00	18921.60
Aviation Refuel (man-days)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Training (man-days)	62.05	478.15	164.25	704.45
Aviation Support Operations				
Sling Load (flight hours)	0.00	72.40	0.00	12.40

Key Statutory authorities to provide this support are:

- Title 10 USC 124 and Public Law 108-136, on 1022 (Detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs)
- Title 10 USC, Chapter 18 (Support to Civil Authorities)
- Public Law 101-510, Section 1004 (Support for counter-narcotics activity)

Past Operations

**Operation WINTER FREEZE** (November, 2004) supported Customs and Border Patrol with interdiction of suspected transnational threats along the northern border. 129 personnel were deployed, including 18 in Title 10 status, 108 in Title 32 status, and 3 DoD civilians. The results were the interdiction of 47 Special Interest Aliens that led to information about the Ali, Shah, and Galdamez alien smuggling organizations.

There was no discernable cost in military readiness of the units involved.

**Operation SAN JUAN** (June, 2005) was a bi-national, interagency operational transnational threat interdiction exercise being conducted under the sponsorship of JTF N. The purpose of the exercise was air, land and maritime domain surveillance for counternarcotics/ counternarcotics interdiction and to disrupt transnational threat elements moving into the United States. The US operational lead was Customs and

Border Protection (US Border Patrol), along with the Canadian Royal Mounted Police. DoD support for Operation SAN JUAN was National Guard ground-based air surveillance radars and a USMC ground sensor platoon. The Washington National Guard also provided an LNO, a C-26 (FLIR capable), RAID (Reconnaissance and Aerial Interdiction Detachment) and a forward based C2 system. There was no discernable cost in military readiness of the units involved.

Operation WESTERN VIGILANCE (November, 2005) employed 400 soldiers in a US Army Stryker-equipped cavalry squadron along the Mexico-New Mexico border in support of the US border patrol to enhance detection and monitoring of drug smuggling and illegal immigration for a 38-day period. The results were the seizure of over 2200 lbs of marijuana and 2020 undocumented aliens along the New Mexico border. There was no discernable cost in military readiness of the units involved.

Operation GULF VIEW (February – March 2006) enhanced interdiction in the Gulf of Mexico in vicinity of Brownsville and South Padre Island. The mission duration was 43 days. The employment of the Project ATHENA sensors and software systems resulted in the seizure of 3000 lbs of marijuana, 106 lbs of cocaine, and 200 undocumented aliens. There was no discernable cost in military readiness of the units involved.

LEA Sensitive) Operation WAKE FOREST. (May 2006) JTF N staff is in the process of planning/ coordinating an emergent mission in support of the US Border Patrol, San Diego Sector to be conducted from May 8-19, 2006. This is a joint Listening Post /Observation Post and enforcement operation involving the US Border Patrol Air Mobile Unit, California National Guard CD Task Force, and JTF-N. The border patrol will focus detection efforts against smuggling traffic within a specific named area of interest. The CA ANG will then employ HH-60 helicopters to rapidly insert Border Patrol agents into locations where they can interdict smuggling traffic that has made illegal entry. Prior to the start of operations, JTF-N with TACON forces (4th Ground Sensor Platoon, USMC) will place unattended ground sensors in areas that will aid Border Patrol agents with apprehensions. Throughout the duration of the operation, Project Manager Signals Warfare will provide aviation FLIR support.

Capabilities/Units Utilized: The 4th Ground Sensor Platoon, USMC, deployed to San Diego, CA last Friday (May 5). Operations commenced on Monday, 8 May and will continue until 19 May. This week the platoon emplaced sensors in the AO. This is a multi-agency interdiction operation; participants include USBP San Diego Sector and their Air Mobile Unit, the California National Guard, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and PM Signals Warfare.

Exercise ARDENT SENTRY 06 (May 2006). This exercise started Thursday, 4 May for us. We deployed advance planning teams to Maine and Arizona and integrated the information gained during those visits with the USNORTHCOM PLANORD to begin Crisis action planning. Last weekend we conducted mission analysis, COA development, requests for forces, etc. LTG McFarren, (USA Retired) and his Joint Warfighting Center cadre are here as are our interagency partners. This week we are hosting MG Carlos

{PAGE3}

Demetrio Gaytan, Director of Operations, Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA), here to observe the exercise. He is here 9-11 May. Today he receives a command brief and exercise update. (BG Riojas, **JTF N** Commander, will take the opportunity to discuss the SEDENA LNO to JTF-North).

#### Future Operations

(LEA Sensitive) **Operation OUTLOOK. (June 2006)** JTF N staff also continues to work with interagency partners on the **U.S.** Northern Border, specifically the Spokane Sector in Spokane, WA to coordinate efforts for Operation OUTLOOK, which will be the main effort in the third quarter. Operation **OUTLOOK** will be executed from 1-30 June 06, and will employ assets from 218th MI CO (SC NG) and 5-5 ADA (**Ft. Lewis**, WA) in support of an interagency, bi-national, intelligence driven effort led by the US Border Patrol, Spokane Sector. **This** mission requires USD(P) monitoring authority which was requested via USNORTHCOM on 15 Mar 06.

(LEA Sensitive) **Operation KEY WATCH ALPHA (July - August 2006).** Mission planners are currently in the process of planning our main effort for the fourth quarter, which will consist of a multi-domain (maritime and air) reconnaissance and surveillance operation in support of the US Customs and Border Protection Miami Sector and USCG District 7 from 11 Jul to 4 Aug 06. The mission will be executed by Marine helos from HMH 772 operating in a TACON status and in coordination with Florida **ARNG** operating in a Title 32 status.

#### Current Operations (as of 19 Apr 06)

- USMC Engineers from MWSS 371 construct roads vic Naco, **AZ** in support of USBP Tucson, **AZ** Sector
- Trainers from the 100th Division (USAR) conduct interview techniques MTT for the USBP El Centro, CA Sector
- Instructors from the US Army MP School conduct a Field Tactical Police Operations MTT for the USBP El Centro, CA Sector
- 204th MI Bn conducts border reconnaissance with Aviation **FLIR** ISO USBP El Paso, TX Sector vicinity El Paso
- PM Signals Warfare conducts aviation **FLIR** support to USBP McAllen, TX Sector
- 305th MI Bn provides UAV support to USBP Tucson Sector vicinity Sonoita, **AZ**
- White Sands Missile Range **Air** Division from Holloman AFB, NM provides on-call aviation **FLIR** support to USBP Marfa Sector vic Deming, NM
- PM Signal Warfare from Albuquerque, NM provides aviation **FLIR** support to USBP vic San Diego, CA
- 305th MI BN from Ft Huachuca, **AZ** provides UAV support to USBP Tucson Sector vic Sonoita, **AZ**

#### Counter Narcotics Support

DoD prioritizes sourcing of counter-narcotics mission support for law enforcement agencies with National Guard (NG) assets, reserve forces, and active duty forces. It is

significant to note that DoD provides such support not as separate homeland defense activities, but as a response to a request by civilian law enforcement and upon the approval of the Secretary of Defense. DoD reviews National Guard support plans to indirectly enhance civilian law enforcement agencies achieve their counter-narcotics mission along the border.

Detection and monitoring of drug traffic transiting the nation's air and maritime borders is a by-product of the North American ~~Air~~ Defense Command (NORAD) Title 10 mission to monitor air and sea domains for national security threats on a daily basis.

DoD is the co-lead for 2 of 68 proposed actions from the Southwest Border Strategy. Proposed support includes assistance in (1) identifying bi-lateral information cooperation with Mexican military authorities, and (2) continuing to establish the SIPRNET in the Southwest Border Joint Intelligence Centers supported by National Guard personnel.

The funding authority for counter-narcotics missions is Public Law 101-510 Section **1004**. This law allows DoD to conduct many support missions to domestic civil authorities. Congress approved \$900 million in FY 06 to the DoD Central Transfer Account for Counter narcotics (CN) efforts, of which \$230 million **goes** for domestic counter-narcotics efforts.

DoD provides over **\$180** million to National ~~Guard~~ state counter narcotics programs and plans, mostly along the four border states. The types of support provided the state and law enforcement counter-narcotics efforts include:

- Air and ground sensor surveillance and monitoring of the border
- Coordinated use of DoD Special Use Airspace with DHS for the CBP UAV missions. Employment of engineering assets and mobile training teams.
- Use of DoD installations such as Libby Field - Fort Huachuca, Arizona for Predator operations

#### Counter Terrorism Activity

The Deputy ~~Secretary~~ of Defense recently authorized the incidental deployment of military assets in support of counter terrorism operations under the counter narcotics funding program. All of these activities would be in support of state and federal civilian law enforcement agencies.

#### UAV, Tunnel Detection, and Technology Support

Contract personnel provided Department of Defense UAV support. No reduction in DoD operational capability resulted from this support. No military personnel were involved in the operation, maintenance, or sustainment of the platforms.

- October **17,2003** to November **13,2003**. The Predator B flew **98** hours in support of Operation SAFEGUARD, a humanitarian/law enforcement effort to protect lives of illegal aliens crossing the Southwest border into the United States.
- June **18, 2004** to September **30,2004**. The Hermes **450** flew **590** hours in support for the Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI), the objective of which was to detect illegal entry and smuggling/drug activity along the Arizona – Mexico border, and to aid in the rescue of lost or injured people. The Hermes **450** is credited with **1,678** detections, **965** apprehensions, and seizure of **843** pounds of marijuana.
- = November **3,2004** to January **24,2005**, The Hunter flew sorties in support of the ABCI and is credited with **456** detections, **287** apprehensions, and the seizure of **1889** pounds of marijuana. Aircraft were assigned to the Army's UAV **training** facility.

DoD provided technological support during Operation WINTER FREEZE with chemical and biological **sensors**, and during Operation SAN JUAN with radar surveillance and ground **sensors**. During Operation WESTERN VIGILANCE, DoD provided technological support in the form of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition units. DoD aircraft with **FLIR** technology (forward-looking infrared) and day-night capable UAVs supported these operations and border security efforts.

DoD supported tunnel detection efforts by applying unique capabilities resident in the US Army Corps of Engineers, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to civilian law enforcement agencies to improve tunnel detection success for DHS and DoJ. The results were **two (2)** new tunnel detections in January – February **2005** and one in January **2006**.

#### Training and Theatre Security Cooperation.

JTF N provided training operations in support of DoD and interagency border security operations. In April **2006,2146** military personnel received realistic training while providing support to civilian law enforcement. During **this** same period, **658** law enforcement agents were trained. The results were improved interoperability and DoD capabilities against irregular threats, such as counter narcotics and transnational threats.

DoD provides mobile training teams to complement these direct support efforts.

Through US Northern Command, DoD engages the Mexican military leaders and cultivates relationships that will enhance regional security. Examples of this support include:

- Provide unique military training to the Mexican Navy (Counter drug intelligence)
- Participation in quarterly Bi-National interdiction Working Group
- Fifth Army's Border Commander's Conference
- Participation in the **2006** Northern Border Threat Assessment

~~FOUO~~

May 08, 2006

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article in the *WashingtonPost*

Do you have any idea what these people are talking about in this article, and who the retired Colonel and General are?

Thanks.

Attach: 5/6/06 *WashingtonPost* article by Dana Priest

DHR:as  
050806-01

.....  
*Please Respond By May 16, 2006*

11-L-0559/OSD/57494



5/12/2006 11:53:00 AM

washingtonpost.com

# The Fix-It Man Leaves, but The Agency's Cracks Remain

By Dana Priest  
Washington Post Staff Writer  
Saturday, May 6, 2006; A01

**Porter J. Goss** was brought into the CIA to quell what the White House viewed as a partisan insurgency against the administration and to re-energize a spy service that failed to prevent the Sept. 11 attacks or accurately assess Iraq's weapons capability.

But as he walked out the glass doors of Langley headquarters yesterday, Goss left behind an agency that current and former intelligence officials say is weaker operationally, with a workforce demoralized by an exodus of senior officers and by uncertainty over its role in fighting terrorism and other intelligence priorities, said current and former intelligence officials.

In public, Goss once acknowledged being "amazed at the workload." Within headquarters, "he never bonded with the workforce," said **John O. Brennan**, a former senior CIA official and interim director of the National Counterterrorism Center until last July.

"Now there's a decline in morale, its capability has not been optimized and there's a hemorrhaging of very good officers," Brennan said. "Turf battles continue" with other parts of the recently reorganized U.S. intelligence community "because there's a lack of clarity and he had no vision or strategy about the CIA's future." Brennan added: "Porter's a dedicated public servant. He was ill-suited for the job."

As a result of all these factors, said these sources and outside experts who work with the CIA, the number of case officers has skyrocketed, but there has been no dramatic improvement in how spies collect intelligence about terrorist targets.

As important, **Goss** -- who did not like to travel overseas or to wine and dine foreign intelligence chiefs who visited Washington -- allowed the atrophy of relations with the foreign intelligence services that helped the CIA kill or catch nearly all the terrorists taken off the streets since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, in the view of these officials and several foreign intelligence officials.

Foreign intelligence heads, who used to spend hours with Goss's predecessor, **George J. Tenet**, discussing strategy and tactics, are now more likely to meet with the director of national intelligence, **John D. Negroponte**, whose position was created in the overhaul of U.S. intelligence agencies.


One senior European counterterrorism official, asked recently for his assessment of Goss's leadership, responded by saying, "Who?"

Goss, then the Republican chairman of the House intelligence panel, was handpicked by the White

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House to purge what some in the administration viewed as a cabal of wily spies working to oppose administration policy in Iraq. "He came in to clean up without knowing what he was going to clean up," one former intelligence official said.

**Goss's** counterinsurgency campaign was so crudely executed by his top lieutenants, some of them former congressional staffers, that they drove out senior and mid-level civil servants who were unwilling to accept the accusation that their actions were politically motivated, some intelligence officers and outside *experts* said.

"The agency was never at war with the White House," contended Gary Bernsten, a former operations officer and self-described Republican and Bush supporter who retired in June 2005. "Eighty-five percent of them are Republicans. The CIA was a convenient scapegoat."

Less than two months after **Goss** took over, the much-respected deputy director of operations, Stephen R. Kappes, and his deputy, Michael Sulick, resigned in protest over a demand by **Goss's** chief of staff, Patrick Murray, that Kappes fire Sulick for criticizing Murray.

Kappes "was the guy who a generation of us wanted to see as the DDO [operations chief]. Kappes's leaving was a painful thing," Bernsten said. "It made it difficult for [**Goss**] within the clandestine service. Unfortunately, this is something that dogged him during his tenure."

The confrontation between Murray and the agency's senior leadership continued throughout **Goss's** tenure, exacerbated by the fact that **Goss** effectively allowed Murray and other close aides to run the agency, in the view of some current and former intelligence officials. Many agency officials felt the aides showed disdain for officers who had spent their careers in public service.

Four former deputy directors of operations once tried to offer **Goss** advice about changing the clandestine service without setting off a rebellion, but **Goss** declined to speak to any of them, said former CIA officials who are aware of the communications. The perception that **Goss** was conducting a partisan witch hunt grew, too, as staffers asked about the party affiliation of officers who sent in cables or analyses on Iraq that contradicted the Defense Department's more optimistic scenarios.

"Unfortunately, **Goss** is going to be seen as the guy who oversaw the agency victimized by politics," said Tyler Drumbheller, a former chief of the European division. "His tenure saw the greatest loss of operational experience" in the operations division since congressional hearings on CIA domestic spying plunged the agency into crisis, he said.

Though the agency has grown considerably in size and budget in the past four years -- the operations branch has reportedly grown in size by nearly 30 percent -- dozens of officers with more than a decade of field experience each, those who would have been tapped as new staff chiefs or division heads, chose to leave.

Pre-retirement classes, which serve as a transition out of the agency for active-duty officers, are bulging with agency employees.

While the stature and role of the CIA were greatly diminished under **Goss** during the congressionally ordered reorganization of the intelligence agencies, his counterpart at the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, continued his aggressive efforts to develop a clandestine intelligence operation within his department. The Pentagon's human intelligence unit and its other clandestine military units are expanding in number and authority. Rumsfeld recently won the ability to sidestep U.S. ambassadors

in certain circumstances when the Pentagon wants *to* send in clandestine teams to collect intelligence or undertake operations.

"Rumsfeld keeps pressing for autonomy for defense human intelligence and for SOF [Special Forces] operations," said retired Army Col. W. Patrick Lang, former head of **Middle East** affairs at the Defense Intelligence Agency. "CIA has lost the ability to control the [human intelligence] process in the community."

Now, "the real battle lies between" Negroponte and Rumsfeld, said retired **Army Lt. Gen. Donald Kemck**, a former deputy national security adviser and once a senior official at the Defense Intelligence Agency. "Rumsfeld rules the roost now."

*Staffwriter Thomas E. **Rich** and researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.*

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FOUO

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Attach 5/6/06 Washington Post article by Dana Priest

DHR:ss  
050806-01

.....  
Please Respond By May 16, 2006

*Lony is a former DIA officer, who may still be a reservist, who is a frequent source for such articles.*

*Kerrick was Sandy Berger's "J. D. Crouch."*

*SC*

MAY 11 2006

*P.S. This is "history" as told by rank-and-file at CIA who chafed under Porter's leadership.*

FOUO

OSD 07721-06



11-L-0559/OSD/57498

5/12/2006 11:54:32 AM

washingtonpost.com

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As important, Goss -- who did not like to travel overseas or to wine and dine foreign intelligence chiefs who visited Washington -- allowed the atrophy of relations with the foreign intelligence services that helped the CIA kill or catch nearly all the terrorists taken off the streets since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, in the view of these officials and several foreign intelligence officials.

Foreign intelligence heads, who used to spend hours with Goss's predecessor, George J. Tenet, discussing strategy and tactics, are now more likely to meet with the director of national intelligence, John D. Negroponte, whose position was created in the overhaul of U.S. intelligence agencies.


One senior European counterterrorism official, asked recently for his assessment of Goss's leadership, responded by saying, "Who?"

Goss, then the Republican chairman of the House intelligence panel, was handpicked by the White

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Advertisement



House to purge what some in the administration viewed as a cabal of wily spies working to oppose administration policy in Iraq. "He came in to clean up without knowing what he was going to clean up," one former intelligence official said.

**Goss's** counterinsurgency campaign was so crudely executed by his top lieutenants, some of them former congressional staffers, that they drove out senior and mid-level civil servants who were unwilling to accept the accusation that their actions were politically motivated, some intelligence officers and outside *experts* said.

"The agency was never at war with the White House," contended *Gary* Berntsen, a former operations officer and self-described Republican and Bush supporter who retired in June 2005. "Eighty-five percent of them are Republicans. The CIA was a convenient scapegoat."

**Less** than two months after Goss took over, the much-respected deputy director of operations, Stephen R. Kappes, and his deputy, Michael Sulick, resigned in protest over a demand by **Goss's** chief of staff, Patrick Murray, that Kappes fire Sulick for criticizing Murray.

Kappes "was the guy who a generation of us wanted to see as the DDO [operations chief]. Kappes's leaving was a painful thing," Berntsen said. "It made it difficult for [Goss] within the clandestine service. Unfortunately, this is something that dogged him during his tenure."

The confrontation between Murray and the agency's senior leadership continued throughout **Goss's** tenure, exacerbated by the fact that Goss effectively allowed Murray and other close aides to run the agency, in the view of some current and former intelligence officials. Many agency officials felt the aides showed disdain for officers who had spent their careers in public service.

Four former deputy directors of operations once tried to offer Goss advice about changing the clandestine service without setting off a rebellion, but **Goss** declined to speak to any of them, said former CIA officials who are aware of the communications. The perception that Goss was conducting a partisan witch hunt grew, too, as staffers asked about the party affiliation of officers who sent in cables or analyses on Iraq that contradicted the Defense Department's more optimistic scenarios.

"Unfortunately, Goss is going to be seen as the guy who oversaw the agency victimized by politics," said Tyler Drumheller, a former chief of the European division. "His tenure saw the greatest loss of operational experience" in the operations division since congressional hearings on CIA domestic spying plunged the agency into crisis, he said.

Though the agency has grown considerably in size and budget in the past four years -- the operations branch has reportedly grown in size by nearly 30 percent -- dozens of officers with more than a decade of field experience each, those who would have been tapped as new staff chiefs or division heads, chose to leave.

Pre-retirement classes, which serve as a transition out of the agency for active-duty officers, are bulging with agency employees.

While the stature and role of the CIA were greatly diminished under **Goss** during the congressionally ordered reorganization of the intelligence agencies, his counterpart at the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, continued his aggressive efforts to develop a clandestine intelligence operation within his department. The Pentagon's human intelligence unit and its other clandestine military units are expanding in number and authority. Rumsfeld recently won the ability to sidestep U.S. ambassadors

in certain circumstances when the Pentagon wants to send in clandestine teams to collect intelligence or undertake operations.

"Rumsfeld keeps pressing for autonomy for defense human intelligence and for SOF [Special Forces] operations," said retired Army Col. W. Patrick Lang, former head of Middle East affairs at the Defense Intelligence Agency. "CIA has lost the ability to control the [human intelligence] process in the community."

Now, "the real battle lies between" Negroponte and Rumsfeld, said retired Army Lt. Gen. Donald Kerrick, a former deputy national security adviser and once a senior official at the Defense Intelligence Agency. "Rumsfeld rules the roost now."

*Staff writer Thomas E. Rich and researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.*

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FOUO

MAY 10 2006

TO: Steve Cambone  
Gen Pete Pace  
Jim Haynes  
cc: *Donalawo Smith*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Investigation into CENTCOM Leaks

Here is an e-mail from Lance Smith at JFCOM. What do you think we should do?

Thanks.

Attach. ~~Updated~~ JFCOM ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
050906-08

OSD 07722-08



11-L-0559/OSD/57502

5/12/2006 11 55 59 AM

Mr. Secretary

This is to let you know that we are about to forward an internal JFCOM investigation into recent disclosures of classified information contained in a version of JFCOM's Iraqi Perspectives Project Lessons Learned brief. Per the relevant DoD directive, we will forward the report to the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence) and to the DoD General Counsel.

The disclosures were published by reporter Michael Gordon in the New York Times in February, and soon thereafter in Gordon and LTG (ret) Bernard Trainor's book, "Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq." I feel very strongly that further investigation is warranted and my endorsement will recommend that the matter be referred to the Department of Justice for further action. I respectfully request your support for further appropriate investigative action. Further background, basic findings and recommendations follow:

On February 27, 2006, the New York Times and the International Herald Tribune published articles disclosing secret information concerning the involvement of German intelligence in support of coalition operations against Iraq. As stated by the NYT in its articles, and confirmed by our investigation, this information did indeed come from a secret version of JFCOM's Iraqi Perspectives Project brief. The information also appears in Gordon and Trainor's book, which was published soon after.

Evidence indicates that NYT reporter Mike Gordon and his writing partner, LTG (ret) Bernard Trainor, improperly obtained a written copy of a secret 25 April 2005 version of the brief, and then deliberately disclosed classified information contained therein. Our JFCOM investigation could not pinpoint the source of the initial disclosure to Gordon and Trainor, but does narrow down the possibilities to certain finite time frames, and to a number of possible individuals who had access and opportunity. Not all of these persons are within JFCOM's investigative or disciplinary jurisdiction.

Additionally, in a 27 Feb 06 web edition "editor's response" to a German government denial, by NYT executive editor Bill Keller, The

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NYT explicitly admits that the source of its information on German intelligence involvement was a classified JFCOM study dated 2005.

Plus, the forward to Gordon and Trainor's book states that its "inside story" was "Informed by unparalleled access to still-secret documents." Of significant note, LTG (ret) Trainor holds a security clearance through the Center for Naval Analysis. He and Gordon's apparently deliberate and knowing disclosure of secret information very likely violates federal criminal statutes. Even if not, these facts may provide good cause to revoke LTG (ret) Trainor's clearance. Those remedial actions, which our JFCOM investigations suggests to be appropriate, are outside the scope of unilateral JFCOM authority.

My very strong view is that, as contemplated by the relevant DOD directives, the matter should be reviewed by USD (I) and DOD GC and then forwarded to DoJ for further action, with a view to discovering and holding accountable the original source of the compromise of the IPP brief to Gordon and Trainor, as well as to determining the appropriate actions to take with respect to Gordon and Trainor.

With your concurrence and support, I would like to push hard for that course of action. I am available to discuss further if you desire.

Very Respectfully,

Lance Smith  
GEN, USAF  
CDRUSJFCOM

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

7/3

SecDef-

- Jim Hynes' office confirms that Justice did refer the matter to FBI for investigation.
- GC has requested a status report from FBI.

Robert

1/8/11

1/9/10

380 01

11 May 06

10 May 06

FOUO



MAY 10 2006

TO: Steve Cambone  
 Gen Pete Pace  
 Jim Haynes  
 ce: *Dorcas Smith*  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Investigation into CENTCOM Leaks

*RR* →  
 Robert Rangel  
*S/r*

~~Here~~ is an e-mail from Lance Smith at JFCOM. What do you think we should do?

Thanks.

Attach. Undated JFCOM ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
050906-08

.....  
 Please Respond By 05/25/06

*I have endorsed his recommendation.  
 Jim Haynes's office is pursuing the matter  
 with FBI.*

*RC* MAY 11 2006

*5/15*



380.01  
11 MAY 06

10 MAY 06

MA SD	<i>S/r</i>	SMA DSD	
<u>TSA SD</u>		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>MS/12</i>	<i>1435</i>	
ESR MA	<i>RSV/12</i>	STP DIR	

FOUO



11-L-0559/OSD/57506

5/12/2006 11:57:00 AM

Mr. Secretary

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Very Respectfully,

Lance Smith  
GEN, **USAF**  
CDRUSJFCOM

~~FOUO~~

5-11 ESA

APR 24 2006

042306-10

Middle East

TO: Peter Rodman  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Note Passed from Amine Gemayel

Attached is the note Amine Gemayel gave me. Please take a look at it and see me. We'll see what we want to do.

Thanks.

Attach. Note written by Ujjwal Vikas

DRLA  
042306-10

.....  
*Please Respond By May 18, 2006*

~~FOUO~~



5/16/2006 9:06:18 AM

24/9/2006

Libya, using Mr. Abdallah Senussi as an intermediary, may render Syria acceptable by the West as a partner in the Middle East. Mr. Senussi has a direct relation with Mr. Assad, the President of Syria and can, using Mr. Assaf Shawkat, brother-in-law and confidant of Assad, construct a negotiation package for Europe and the USA.

It is important that Colonel Kadhafi not be used in the process, to avoid any conflict with President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia. Mr. Senussi knows personally both Mr. Osama Al-Baz of Egypt and Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia and he should be able to convince them to take action with their respective governments so that the application of the Libyan model to Syria gets approval from the hierarchy.

Mr. Senussi requires a green light from the French government, which is possible to give if the Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces is contacted by his counterpart in the USA. If the USA considers that the possibility of starting a different negotiation with Syria would be useful, it may contact Mr. Senussi directly. This may help us avoid a military intervention as well as neutralize Iranian influence in the region.

Written by Ujjwal Vikas

FOUO

May 15, 2006

TO: The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Teaching the Blessings of Freedom

Attached is a note I received ~~from~~ Dr. John Howard and a copy of the speech he sent. It is an interesting idea. The President might want to consider something like that.

Thanks.

Attach. 5/9/06 Howard note, with 5/31/88 Reagan speech to Moscow State University

DHR.dh  
051506-30

OSD 07883-06



5/16/2006 4:17:13 PM

350.001

15 May 06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57511

THE HOWARD CENTER  
FOR FAMILY, RELIGION & SOCIETY



934 North Main Street  
Rockford, Illinois 61103  
phone: 815/964-5819  
fax: 815/965-1826  
email: howard@profam.org

DR JOHN A. HOWARD  
Senior Fellow

9 May 2006

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Don:

I just came across this remarkable speech by Ronald Reagan to the students of Moscow University, and to the world, in 1988.

I wonder if it might be well for the President to launch an ongoing effort to teach the people of Iraq the blessings of freedom, as Reagan once did.

Warm regards wishes

John

# Introduction

*by Walter B. Wriston*

Every once in a great while a leader captures and articulates not only the historical tides of the moment, but also the dreams of the people. Standing before a picture of Lenin at Moscow State University on May 31, 1988, President Ronald Reagan spoke to these issues in his own inimitable way. He spoke of the power of freedom in a land that has seen little of it; he spoke of economic freedom to release the innovations of entrepreneurs; he spoke of the information revolution "quietly sweeping the globe, without bloodshed or conflict." A few in the media played up the symbolism of the 40th American President speaking in the heart of what he once called the "evil empire" to a class of Soviet students, but most, if not all the commentators, missed the central point he was making: The power of an idea called freedom in an age of instant communications.

Some ancient Greek thinkers used to argue that a democracy could not extend any further than a man's voice could carry. On a November day in 1863, perhaps as many as fifteen or twenty thousand people gathered to hear Abraham Lincoln deliver his address at Gettysburg. No one can say how many were within the sound of his voice or how many could actually hear him. It is possible that, in addition to those who could hear Lincoln's voice, a few thousand more may have read his words in the newspapers, although they were relegated to inside pages by the editors of the day. But it would take months for most of the country to learn of his call for a new commitment to freedom. Contrast that with the fact that technology has now provided the means for a man's voice to carry to all parts of the planet in minutes, as President Reagan's message did.

Perhaps no other leader in modern times has understood the uses of communication technology so thoroughly or used it so well in a good cause. While the President mentioned the fact that in America we have "about 1,000 local television stations, 8,500 radio stations, and 1,700 daily newspapers" that carry the news, no one in the world was the leader in the number of news stations in China and that of 500 million people—a number that is only slightly less than the total population of the world. When people learn that there is an alternative competitive political and economic systems, the seeds of change are sown. Every great change in the world has known that it is different from the old. President Reagan not only feels and believes in freedom, but he also believes in the free flow of information and he is trying to tell the world about a better way for man beings to lead their lives and govern themselves.

Walter B. Wriston was Chairman of Citibank in New York City and is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Manhattan Institute. He is the author of *Risk and Other Four-Letter Words* which was published by Harper & Row in 1986.

## Reagan's Moscow Address

Moscow State University  
31 May, 1988

**The President—**Let me say it's a great pleasure to once again have this opportunity to speak directly to the people of the Soviet Union.

Before I left Washington, I received many heartfelt letters and telegrams asking me to carry here a simple message—perhaps, but also some of the most important business of this summit—it is a message of peace and goodwill and hope for a growing friendship and closeness between our two peoples.

As you know, I've come to Moscow to meet with one of your most distinguished graduates. In this, our fourth summit, General Secretary Gorbachev and I have spent many hours together and I feel that we're getting to know each other well.

Our discussions, of course, have been focused primarily on many of the important issues of the day—issues I want to touch on with you in a few moments. But first I want to take a little time to talk to you much as I would to any group of university students in the United States. I want to talk not just of the realities of today, but of the possibilities of tomorrow.

Standing here before a mural of your revolution, I want to talk about a very different revolution that is

laking place right **now**, quietly sweeping the **globe**, without bloodshed or conflict. Its effects are **peaceful**, but they **will** fundamentally alter our world, shatter old assumptions, and **reshape** our lives.

It's **easy** to underestimate because it's **not** accompanied by banners or fanfare. It has been called the **technological or information revolution**, and as its emblem, one might **take** the tiny silicon chip—no bigger than a **fingerprint**. **One** of these chips has more computing power than a roomful of old-style computers.

As part of an **exchange program**, we now have an exhibition touring your **country** that shows how information technology is **transforming** our lives—replacing manual **labor** with **robots**, **forecasting** weather for farmers, or mapping the genetic code of DNA for **medical researchers**. These **microcomputers** today aid the design of everything from houses to cars to **spacecraft**—they even design better and faster computers. They **can** translate English into Russian or enable the **blind** to read—or help **Michael Jackson** produce on one synthesizer the sounds of a whole **orchestra**. **Linked** by a network of satellites and fiber-optic **cables**, one individual with a **desktop** computer and a telephone **commands** resources unavailable to the largest governments just a few years ago.

Like a chrysalis, we're emerging from the economy of the Industrial Revolution—an economy **confined** to and **limited** by the **Earth's** physical resources—into, as one economist titled his book, **The Economy in Mind**,\* an era in which there are no bounds on human imagination and the **freedom** to create is the most precious natural resource.

Think of that little computer chip. Its value isn't in the sand **from** which it is **made**, but in the microscopic architecture designed into it by ingenious human minds. **Or take** the example of the **satellite** relaying this broadcast around the world, which replaces thousands of tons of **copper** mined from the **Earth** and molded into wire. In the new economy, human invention increasingly makes physical **resources** obsolete. We're **breaking** through the material **conditions** of existence to a world where man **creates** his own destiny. Even as we explore the most advanced reaches of science, we're returning to the age-old **wisdom** of our culture, a wisdom contained in the **book** of Genesis in the Bible: In the beginning **was** the spirit, and it was from this spirit **that**

\* Warren T. Brookes's 1982 book commissioned and sponsored by the Manhattan Institute (Ed.)

the material abundance of creation issued forth.

But **progress** is not foreordained. The key is **freedom**—freedom of thought, **freedom** of information, **freedom** of communication. The renowned **scientist**, scholar, and founding father of this University, **Mikhail Lomonosov**, knew **that**. "It is common knowledge," he said, "that the achievements of science are considerable and rapid, particularly once the yoke of slavery is **cast off** and replaced by the **freedom** of philosophy."

You know, one of the first contacts between your **country** and mine **took** place between Russian and American explorers. The **Americans** were members of Cook's last voyage on an expedition searching for an Arctic passage; on the island of Unalaska, they **came** upon the Russians, who **took** them in, and **together**, with the native inhabitants, held a **prayer** service on the ice.

The explorers of the modern era are the **entrepreneurs**, men with vision, with the courage to **take** risks and **faith** enough to brave the unknown. These **entrepreneurs** and their small enterprises are responsible for almost all the economic growth in the United States. They are the prime movers of the technological **revolution**. In fact, one of the largest personal computer firms in the **United States** was started by two college students, no older than you, in the garage behind their **home**.

Some people, even in my **own** country, look at the riot of experiment that is the free market and **see** only **waste**. What of all the entrepreneurs that fail? **Well**, many do, particularly the **successful** ones. Often several **times**. And if you **ask** them the **secret** of their **success**, they'll tell you, it's all that they **learned** in their **struggles** along the way—yes, it's what they learned **from** failing. Like an athlete in **competition**, or a **scholar** in pursuit of the truth, **experience** is the greatest teacher.

And that's why it's **so** hard for government **planners**, no matter how sophisticated, to ever substitute for millions of individuals working night and day to make their dreams come true. The fact is, **bureaucracies** are a problem around the world. There's an old **story** about a town—it could be anywhere—with a **bureaucrat** who is known **to** be a **good** for nothing, but he somehow had always **hung on** to power. **So** one day, in a town **meeting**, an old woman got up and said to him, "There is a folk legend here where I **come from** that when a **baby** is born, an angel comes down from heaven and **kisses** it on one part of its body. If the angel kisses him on his **hand**, he becomes a handyman. If he kisses him on his **forehead**, he becomes bright and clever. And I've been **trying** to figure **out** where the angel kissed you **so** that you should

sit there for so long and do nothing."

We are seeing the power of economic freedom spreading around the world—places such as the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have vaulted into the technological era, barely pausing in the industrial age along the way. Low-tax agricultural policies in the subcontinent mean that in some years India is now a net exporter of food. Perhaps most exciting are the winds of change that are blowing over the People's Republic of China, where one-quarter of the world's population is now getting its first taste of economic freedom.

At the same time, the growth of democracy has become one of the most powerful political movements of our age. In Latin America in the 1970s, only a third of the population lived under democratic government. Today over 90 percent do. In the Philippines, in the Republic of Korea, free, contested, democratic elections are the order of the day. Throughout the world, free markets are the model for growth. Democracy is the standard by which governments are measured.

We Americans make no secret of our belief in freedom. In fact, it's something of a national pastime. Every four years the American people choose a new president, and 1988 is one of those years. At one point there were 13 major candidates running in the two major parties, not to mention all the others, including the Socialist and Libertarian candidates—all trying to get my job.

About 1,000 local television stations, 8,500 radio stations, and 1,700 daily newspapers, each one an independent, private enterprise, fiercely independent of the government, report on the candidates, grill them in interviews, and bring them together for debates. In the end, the people vote—they decide who will be the next president.

But freedom doesn't begin or end with elections. Go to any American town, to take just an example, and you'll see dozens of churches, representing many different beliefs—in many places synagogues and mosques—and you'll see families of every conceivable nationality, worshipping together.

Go into any schoolroom, and there you will see children being taught the Declaration of Independence, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights—among them life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—that no government can justly deny—the guarantees in their Constitution for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion.

Go into any courtroom and there will preside an independent judge, beholden to no government power. There every defendant has the right to a trial by a jury of his peers, usually 12 men and women—common citizens, they are the ones, the only ones, who weigh the evidence and decide on guilt or innocence. In that court, the accused is innocent until proven guilty, and the word of a policeman, or any official, has no greater legal standing than the word of the accused.

Go to any university campus, and there you'll find an open, sometimes heated discussion of the problems in American society and what can be done to correct them. Turn on the television, and you'll see the legislature conducting the business of government right there before the camera, debating and voting on the legislation that will become the law of the land. March in any demonstration, and there are many of us—people's right of assembly is guaranteed in the Constitution and protected by the police.

Go into any union hall, where the members know their right to strike is protected by law. As a matter of fact, one of the many jobs I had before this one was being president of a union, the Screen Actors Guild. I led my union out on strike—and I'm proud to say, we won.

But freedom is even more than this: Freedom is the right to question, and change the established way of doing things. It is the continuing revolution of the marketplace. It is the understanding that allows us to recognize shortcomings and seek solutions. It is the right to put forth an idea, scoffed at by the experts, and watch it catch fire among the people. It is the right to follow your dream, or stick to your conscience, even if you're the only one in a sea of doubters.

Freedom is the recognition that no single person, no single authority or government has a monopoly on the truth, but that every individual life is infinitely precious, that every one of us put on this earth has been put here for a reason and has something to offer.

America is a nation made up of hundreds of nationalities. Our ties to you are more than ones of good feeling; they're ties of kinship. In America, you'll find Russians, Armenians, Ukrainians, peoples from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They come from every part of this vast continent, from every continent, to live in harmony, seeking a place where each cultural heritage is respected, each is valued for its diverse strengths and beauties and the richness it brings to our lives.

Recently, a few individuals and families have been

allowed to visit relatives in the West. We can only hope that it won't be long before all are allowed to do so, and Ukrainian-Americans, Baltic-Americans and Armenian-Americans, can freely visit their homelands, just as this Irish-American visits his.

Freedom, it has been said, makes people selfish and materialistic, but Americans are one of the most religious peoples on Earth. Because they know that liberty, just as life itself, is not earned, but a gift from God, they seek to share that gift with the world. "Reason and experience," said George Washington, in his farewell address, "both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. And it is substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government."

Democracy is less a system of government than it is a system to keep government limited, unintrusive: A system of constraints on power to keep politics and government secondary to the important things in life, the true sources of value found only in family and faith.

But I hope you know I go on about these things not simply to extol the virtues of my own country, but to speak to the true greatness of the heart and soul of your land. Who, after all, needs to tell the land of Dostoevsky about the quest for truth, the home of Kandinsky and Scriabin about imagination, the rich and noble culture of the Uzbek man of letters, Alisher Navoi, about beauty and heart.

The great culture of your diverse land speaks with a glowing passion to all humanity. Let me cite one of the

who fear to embrace the hope of the future.

Sometimes it takes faith. It's like that scene in the cowboy movie "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid," which some here in Moscow recently had a chance to see. The posse is closing in on the two outlaws, Butch and Sundance, who find themselves trapped on the edge of a cliff, with a sheer drop of hundreds of feet to the raging rapids below. Butch turns to Sundance and says their only hope is to jump into the river below, but Sundance refuses. He says he'd rather fight it out with the

posse, even though they're hopelessly outnumbered. Butch says that's suicide and urges him to jump, but Sundance still refuses, and finally admits, "I can't swim." Butch breaks up laughing and says, "You crazy fool, the fall will probably kill you." And, by the way, both Butch and Sundance made it. In case you didn't see the movie. I think what I've just been talking about is perestroika and what its goals are.

But change would not mean rejection of the past. Like a tree growing strong through the seasons, rooted in the earth and drawing life from the sun, so, too, positive change must be rooted in traditional values—in the land, in culture, in family and community—and it must take its life from the eternal things, from the source of all life, which is faith. Such change will lead to new understandings, new opportunities, to a broader future in which the tradition is not supplanted, but finds its full flowering.

That is the future beckoning to your generation. At the same time, we should remember that reform that is not institutionalized will always be insecure. Such freedom will always be looking over its shoulder. A bird on a tether, no matter how long the rope, can always be pulled back. And that is why, in my conversation with General Secretary Gorbachev, I have spoken of how important it is to institutionalize change—to put guarantees on reform. And we have been talking together about one sad reminder of a divided world, the Berlin Wall. It's time to remove the barriers that keep people apart.

I'm proposing an increased exchange program of high school students between our countries. General Secretary Gorbachev mentioned on Sunday a wonderful phrase you have in Russian for this. "Better to see something once than to hear about it a hundred times." Mr. Gorbachev and I first began working on this in 1985; in our discussion today, we agreed on working up to several thousand exchange a year from each country in the near future. But not everyone can travel across the

continents and oceans. Words travel lighter, and *that's* why we'd like to make available to this country more of our 11,000 magazines and periodicals and our television and radio shows, that can be beamed off a satellite in seconds. **Nothing** would please us more than for the Soviet people to get to know us better and to understand our way of life.

Just a few years ago, few would have imagined the progress our two nations have made together. The INF Treaty—which General Secretary Gorbachev and I signed last December in Washington and whose instrument of ratification we will exchange tomorrow—the first true nuclear arms reduction treaty in history, calling for the elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles. And just 16 days ago, we saw the beginning of your withdrawal from Afghanistan, which gives us hope that soon the fighting may end and the healing may begin, and that that suffering country may find self-determination, unity, and peace at long

ing destruction of conflicts in many regions of the globe and that the serious discussions that led to the Geneva accords on Afghanistan will help lead to solutions in Southern Africa, Ethiopia, Cambodia, the Persian Gulf, and Central America

I have often said, nations do not distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. If this globe is to live in peace and prosper, if it is to embrace all the possibilities of the technological revolution, then nations must renounce, once and for all, the right to an expansionist foreign policy. Peace between nations must be an enduring goal—not a tactical stage in a continuing conflict.

I've been told that there's a popular song in your

In answer it says, "Go ask that silence lingering in the air, above the birch and poplar there; beneath those trees the soldiers lie. Go ask my mother, ask my wife, then you will have to ask no more. Do the Russians want a War?"

But what of your one-time allies? What of those who embraced you on the Elbe? What if we were to ask the watery graves of the Pacific, or the European battle fields where America's fallen were buried far from home? What if we were to ask their mothers, sisters, and sons, do Americans want war? Ask us, too, and you'll

find the same answer, the same longing in every heart. People do not make wars, governments do—and no mother would ever willingly sacrifice her sons for territorial gain, for economic advantage, for ideology. A people free to choose will always choose peace.

Americans seek always to make friends of old antagonists. After a colonial revolution with Britain, we have cemented for all ages the ties of kinship between our nations. After a terrible civil war between North and South, we healed our wounds and found true unity as a nation. We fought two world wars in my lifetime against Germany and one with Japan, but now the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan are two of our closest allies and friends.

Some people point to the trade disputes between us as a sign of strain, but they're the frictions of all families, and the family of free nations is a big and vital and sometimes boisterous one. I can tell you that nothing would please my heart more than in my lifetime to see American and Soviet diplomats grappling with the problem of trade disputes between America and a growing, exuberant, exporting Soviet Union that had opened up to economic freedom and growth.

And as important as these official people-to-people exchanges are, nothing would please me more than for them to become unnecessary, to see travel between East and West become so routine that university students in the Soviet Union could take a month off in the summer and, just like students in the West do now, put packs on their backs and travel from country to country in Europe with barely a passport check in between. Nothing would please me more than to see the day that a concert promoter in, say, England could call up a Soviet rock group—without going through any government agency—and have them playing in Liverpool the next night.

Is this just a dream? Perhaps. But it is a dream that is our responsibility to have come true.

Your generation is living in one of the most exciting, hopeful times in Soviet history. It is a time when the first breath of freedom stirs the air and the heart beats to the accelerated rhythm of hope, when the accumulated spiritual energies of a long silence yearn to break free.

I am reminded of the famous passage near the end of Gogol's *Dead Souls*. Comparing his nation to a speeding troika, Gogol asks what will be its destination. But he writes, "There was no answer save the bell pouring forth marvelous sound."

We do not know what the conclusion of this journey will be, but we're hopeful that the promise of reform will

be fulfilled. In this Moscow spring, this May 1988, we may be allowed that hope—that freedom, like the fresh green sapling planted over Tolstoi's grave, will blossom forth at last in the rich fertile soil of your people and culture. We may be allowed to hope that the marvelous sound of a new openness will keep rising through, ringing through, leading to a new world of reconciliation, friendship, and peace.

*Thank you all very much and da blagoslovit vas gospod'. God Bless you. □*

~~FOUO~~

February 06,2006

TO: Mike Donley  
CC: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Department of Defense Directives

I have reviewed the status report you sent up thanks.

As I see it, the good news is that since we started this effort in October 2003, we have gone from 653 directives in coordination out-of-date down to about 98 remaining. That's progress, although it has taken us way too long to get there. I would like to see us clean up the remaining directives in the next 60 days.

Please give me a report every two weeks on progress in doing so. We can do this!

Thanks.

Attach: 2/2/06 DA&M memo to SecDef

DHR:ss  
020606-25

.....  
*Please Respond By 02/21/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57520



OSD 07892-06

5/16/2006 3:25:08 PM



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD**

02 FEB 2006

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review –Phase II Update

- Current status of the 184 Directives pending coordination is attached

	Course of Action			Consolidate (combine Directives)
	Directive (remain a Directive)	Reissue (convert to Instruction)	Cancel (cancel altogether)	
Jan31	871473%	69 / 37.5%	25113.6%	311.6%

- Next update: March 1, 2006

COORDINATION None

cc: Secretary of Defense  
All OSD Components Listed

Prepared By: Ed Burbol, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/57521

OSD 01750-06

### DoD Directives Program, Pending Coordination Backlog - Component Summary

Proponent (OPR)	Evaluation on Type of Issuance				Number/Percentage Completed
	Directive (remain a Directive)	Reissue (convert to instruction)	Cancel (cancel altogether)	Consolidate (combine Directive(s))	
ASD(LA)	0	2	0	0	0 / 0%
ASD(NII)	4	1	3	0	6 / 86.7%
ASD(PA)	0	2	0	0	1 / 50%
DA&M	26	5	2	0	20 / 60.6%
DoD GC	4	2	0	0	1 / 17.7 %
DOT&E	0	1	0	0	1 / 100%
IG, DoD	0	3	0	0	0 / 0%
USD(AT&L)	10	11	6	1	13 / 46.4%
USD(C)	0	1	3	0	2 / 50%
USD(I)	13	11	0	0	11 / 45.8%
USD(P&R)	9	28	8	2	23 / 48.9%
USD(P)	21	2	3	0	8 / 30.8%
<b>Total (184)</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	<b>47.3%</b>	<b>37.5%</b>	<b>13.6%</b>	<b>1.6%</b>	<b>46.7%</b>



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1955

INFO MEMO

15 MAY 2006

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management *MD*

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review – Response to Snowflake

- The attached snowflake encourages the completion of remaining Directives requiring revision, reissue as an Instruction, consolidation, or cancellation. For clarification: In Feb 06, we had 98 Directives remaining from the 184 that were in backlog coordination - our narrowed Phase II target list from the total of 585 then requiring update. Here are the current numbers:
  - o 583 Directives in the inventory, down 70 or 10.7% from the 653 in Oct 03
  - o 126 Directives of the 583 or 21.6% are current within 2 years; 457 need work
  - o 113 Directives or 61.40% completed from the backlog of 184 in coordination
- The Deputy Secretary at TAB A approved an aggressive plan to complete the Directives Review, to expedite coordination, and to reduce the number of Directives in the inventory. Major actions include:
  - o Instituting a process for Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) to certify Directives as current two years from initial publication or last revision; full update due four years from initial publication or last revision. (Note: This proposed action was well received by senior OSD staff briefed on these changes 29 March 06.)
  - o Pushing down Directives coordination level to ASD/Deputy GC. (This will be at the discretion of the PSA.)
  - o Expediting the review of the 158 Directives older than 15 years; PSAs to show cause why a Directive must be retained to comply with law or policy; require revision or conversion to an Instruction. Otherwise, proceed with cancellation. (Note: This action is underway.)
  - o Repeating the process for expedited review of Directives older than 10 years before the end of 2006. (Note: There are 79 Directives in this age group.)
- You will continue to receive progress reports as we execute this plan.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense, OSD Components

Prepared By: Ed Burbol, (b)(6)

11-L-0359/OSD/57523

OSD 07892-06



5/16/2006 3:25:13 PM



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

MAY 24 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management *MD*

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review – Response to Snowflake

- The attached snowflake encourages the completion of the remaining Directives in coordination or out-of-date. Our priority of effort has been on 184 backlogged in the coordination process. We continue to make steady progress in eliminating this backlog. Only 71 of the 184 (38.6%) now need to be completed. OSD Components continue to work this in addition to updating and initiating other DoD issuances. Here is an updated summary of Directive Work Plans submitted by OSD staff; details at TAB A:

	Course of Action			
	Directive (remain a Directive)	Reissue (convert to Instruction)	Cancel (cancel altogether)	Consolidate (combine Directives)
18 May 06	182 / 44.5%	69 / 37.5%	130 / 16.3%	3 / 1.6%

- As directed by the Deputy Secretary, TAB B, we have begun a ~~more~~ aggressive campaign to complete the Directives backlog, further reduce the number of Directives (583, vice 653 in Oct 03), and increase the currency of those in the inventory. Major actions include:
  - Instituting a process for Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) to certify Directives as current ~~two~~ years from initial publication or last revision; full update due in four years. (Note: senior OSD staff briefed and receptive.)
  - Pushing down Directives coordination level to ASD/Deputy GC at the discretion of the PSA.
  - Expediting action on 158 Directives older than 15 years; PSAs to show cause why these Directives must be retained and when they will be updated; otherwise, they will be canceled. (Note: This action is underway.)
  - Repeating the process for expedited review of 79 Directives older than 10 years before the end of 2006.
- You will continue to receive progress reports as we execute this plan. TAB C shows the campaign metrics we will provide.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense and OSD Components Listed

Prepared By: Ed Burhol (b)(6)

11-L-0555/OSD/57524



5/25/2006 8 26 45 AM

300.8  
24 May 06  
6 Feb 06

FOUO

February 06,2006

TO: Mike Donley  
CC: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
SUBJECT Department of Defense Directives

I have reviewed the status ~~report~~ **you** sent up -- **thanks**.

As I see it, the good news is that since we started this effort in October 2003, we have gone **from** 653 directives in *coordination/out-of-date* down to about 98 remaining. **That's** progress, although it has taken us way too long to get there. I would like to see us clean up the remaining directives in the next 60 days.

Please give me a report every two weeks on progress in doing so. We can do this!

Thanks.

Attach: 2/2/06 DA&M memo to SecDef

DHR<sub>ss</sub>  
020606-25

.....  
***Please Respond By 02/21/06***

FOUO

OSD 07892-06



5/16/2008 3:25:08 PM

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11-L-0559/OSD/57525



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD**

02 FEB 2006

SUBJECT DoD Directives Review –Phase II Update

- Current status of the **184** Directives pending coordination is attached
  - **86** of the **184** Directives in coordination (46.7%) have been completed – an increase of **19** (10.3%) since last report.
  - Below is an updated summary of Directive **Work Plans** submitted by OSD staff:

	Course of Action			
	Directive (remain a Directive)	Reissue (convert to Instruction)	Cancel (cancel altogether)	Consolidate (combine Directives)
Jan 31	87 / 47.3%	69 / 37.5%	25 / 13.6%	3 / 1.6%

- In addition to the progress made in reducing the pending coordination backlog, the OSD Components completed **17** other DoD issuances during this period.
- We are reassessing the current focus of the DoD Directives Review **Program** to better address DoD priorities. The current driver is age of Directives. We need to **also** include as a driver topical priorities like QDR, BRAC, **GWOT** and other like imperatives. We **are** working with OSD Directives Focal Points now to identify these topical priorities.
- **Next update: March 1, 2006.**

COORDINATION None

cc: Secretary of Defense  
All OSD Components Listed

Prepared By: Ed Burbo [b)(6)]



OSD 01750-04

## DoD Directives Program, Pending Coordination Backlog - Component Summary

Component (OPR)	Evaluation on Type of Issuance				Number/Percentage Completed
	Directive (remain a Directive)	Reissue (convert to instruction)	Cancel (cancel altogether)	Consolidate (combine Directive(s))	
ASD(LA)	0	2	0	0	0/0%
ASD(MI)	4	1	3	0	6/66.7%
ASD(PA)	0	2	0	0	2/60%
DA&M	28	6	2	0	20/60.6%
DoD GC	4	2	0	0	6/47.7%
DOT&E	0	1	0	0	1/100%
IG, DoD	0	3	0	0	0/0%
USD(AT&L)	10	11	6	1	13/48.4%
USD(C)	0	1	3	0	1/50%
USD(I)	13	11	0	0	11/45.8%
USD(P&R)	9	28	8	2	23/148.9%
USD(P)	21	2	3	0	8/30.8%
<b>Total (184)</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	<b>47.3%</b>	<b>37.5%</b>	<b>13.6%</b>	<b>1.6%</b>	<b>46.7%</b>

# TAB A

**TABA - DoD Directives Program, Pending Coordination Backlog - Component Summary**

Proponent (OPR)	Evaluation on Type of Issuance				Number/Percentage Completed
	Directive (remain a Directive)	Reissue (convert to Instruction)	Cancel (cancel altogether)	Consolidate (combine Directive(s))	
ASD(LA)	0	1	0	0	0 / 0%
ASD(NII)	4	1	3	0	7 / 87.5%
ASD(PA)	0	2	0	0	2 / 50%
DA&M	26	5	2	0	22 / 66.7%
DoD GC	4	2	0	0	5 / 83 %
DOT&E	0	1	0	0	1 / 100%
IG, DoD	0	3	0	0	1 / 33.3%
USD(AT&L)	10	11	6	1	13 / 46.4%
USD(C)	0	0	4	0	4 / 100%
USD(I)	13	11	0	0	15 / 62.5%
USD(P&R)	9	29	8	2	29 / 60.4%
USD(P)	16	3	7	0	14 / 53.8%
<b>Total (184)</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	<b>44.5%</b>	<b>37.5%</b>	<b>16.3%</b>	<b>1.6%</b>	<b>61.4%</b>

# TAB B

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1100

5/4



ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

GEA APPROVES  
MAY - 9 2006

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Robert Rangel  
5/4

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management *MD 5/3*

SUBJECT: DoD Directives Review - Decisions from 25 April 06 Update Briefing

- During our Update Briefing (copy at TAB A), we agreed to document your guidance and decisions to serve as the cornerstone for a Directive-type Memorandum I will publish for implementation within the OSD staff. This Action Memo serves that purpose.
- Guidance:
  - Concentrate on a significant reduction in the number of Directives. Directives must have deep and definable roots in law or policy. Take prudent risk in not retaining Directives.
  - Continue to push down authority and responsibility for releasing policy to OSD Components within the criteria for a Directive issued 13 July 05 (see TAB B).
- Decisions:
  - Phase in currency standards - 50% by end 2006 and 85% by end 2007.
  - Insert process for PSAs to certify Directives as current two years from initial publication or last revision; full update due four years from initial publication or last revision.
  - Push down Directives coordination level to ASD/Deputy GC at the discretion of the PSA.
  - Expedite review of the 158 Directives older than 15 years; give PSAs two weeks to show cause why a Directive must be retained to comply with law or policy; require revision or conversion to an Instruction. Otherwise, proceed with cancellation.
  - Repeat the process for expedited review of Directives older than 10 years before the end of the year.
  - Employ existing management forums to expedite coordination.

RECOMMENDATION: Affirm this guidance and decisions by initialing below:

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

WITHDRAWN

MA SD		SMA DSD	<i>[Signature]</i>
SA SD	<i>[Signature]</i>	SA DSD	<i>[Signature]</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>[Signature]</i>	STF DIR	<i>[Signature]</i>
ESR MA	<i>[Signature]</i>		

Prepared by: Ed Burbol, WHS, (b)(6)



OSD 07225-06

5/3/2006 5 20 54 PM

# TAB C


**TAB C – New Directives Campaign Reporting Metrics**

Proponent (OPR)	Directives Pending Coordination • Course of Action				Number/ Percentage Completed
	Directive (remain a Directive)	Reissue (convert to Instruction)	Cancel (served purpose)	Consolidate (combine Directive(s))	
By Component					
Total (184)	82/44.5%	69/37.5%	30/16.3%	3/1.6%	113/61.4%

**NEW. ADDITIONAL METRICS**

**Number of Directives and Percentage Current – Component Summary**

Proponent (OPR)	Directives (#)	Current (%)
By Component		
Total (583)		



Proponent (OPR)	Directives > 15 Years Old			
	Directive (remain a Directive)	Reissue (convert to Instruction)	Cancel (served purpose)	Number/ Percentage Completed
By Component				
Total (158)	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD

~~FOUO~~

April 21, 2006

042106-08

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo and Studies from Kiron Skinner

Attached are two studies Defense Policy Board Member Dr. Kiron Skinner sent along. She would like to arrange briefings by the authors of those studies for some folks in the Policy shop or the military.

Please read the studies, see what you think, and let me know if you think the briefings would be worth doing.

Thanks.

Attach: 4/20/06 Dr. Kiron Skinner memo to SecDef

DFR:as  
042106-08

.....  
*Please Respond By May 16, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07906-06



5/17/2006 8:42:33 AM

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DEFENSE POLICY BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2100



RA →

To: **Secretary Donald Rumsfeld**  
From: Dr. Kiron K. Skinner, Defense Policy Board *KS*  
Date: April 20, 2006  
CC: The Honorable Ryan Henry

As one of the academics on the Defense Policy Board, I would like to give you two scholarly studies that I think will be of use in our activities in Iraq and Iran.

The principal author of "Iran's Nuclear Future: A Prospective Simulation" is Professor Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and chair of the Department of Politics at NYU. It uses a forecasting model that thinks through the management of the current crisis in Iran.

The principal author of "Counting Casualties: A Framework for Respectful, Useful Records." is Professor Baruch Fischhoff, a senior faculty member in the Department of Social and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University. This unique study provides a protocol for counting casualties among Iraqis.

These are both excellent studies and I would like to arrange briefings by these scholars for you or some of your deputies. I can be reached at Carnegie Mellon University at (412) 268-3238. My fax number is (412) 562-9757, and my e-mail address is [skinner@hoover.stanford.edu](mailto:skinner@hoover.stanford.edu).

# Carnegie Mellon

Kiron K. Skinner  
Assistant Professor

Department of Social and Decision Sciences  
Porter Hall 208  
Carnegie Mellon University  
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890

(412) 268-3238  
Fax: (412) 268-6938

[kskinner@andrew.cmu.edu](mailto:kskinner@andrew.cmu.edu)

DSD 06560-06

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *EE*

MAY 16 2004

SUBJECT: Memo and Studies from Kiron Skinner (U)

- You asked that we get back to you on the two studies that Kiron Skinner sent to you. We reviewed the briefings last week.
- In the first briefing, Professor Bruce Bueno de Mesquita presented his model of strategic interactions between disputing parties.
  - The model uses data collected from subject-matter experts to calculate the effectiveness of different strategies pursued by the parties and to forecast the likely outcomes of different courses of action.
  - He recently applied the model to the nuclear negotiations with Iran and North Korea.
- In the second briefing, Professor Baruch Fischhoff examined the way in which records are recorded for wartime casualties.
  - Professor Fischhoff advocates the development of an internationally recognized protocol on the information to be collected upon a person's death in war.
- We found both briefings to be of limited utility to our current Policy efforts.
  - However, we will forward Professor Fischhoff's study on recording casualties to David Chu as he may find it to be a useful tool.

Prepared by: Todd R. Lowery, OUSDP/Policy Planning, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/57536



5/17/2006 8:42:34 AM

~~FOUO~~

MAY 09 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace

cc: Eric Edelman  
Steve Cambone  
Fran Harvey  
Donald Winter  
Michael Wynne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: McCaffrey's Report on Iraq

Attached is a copy of Retired General McCaffrey's report on Iraq. There are a number of insights suggested here that merit our attention.

Please address the points that relate to your areas of activity and get back to me ~~with~~ your impressions ~~as~~ to the correctness of this perspective within seven days.

Thanks.

Attach: General McCaffrey's (Ret.) report on Iraq

DHR.as  
050806-19

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/16/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57537

OSD 07915-06



5/17/2006 10:36:35 AM



*Adjunct Professor of International Affairs*

April 25, 2006

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** COLONEL MIKE MEESE  
DEPARTMENT **HEAD**, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
UNITED STATES **MILITARY** ACADEMY

COLONEL CINDY JEBB  
DEPUTY DEPARTMENT **HEAD**, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
UNITED STATES **MILITARY** ACADEMY

**Subject:** Academic Report- **Trip to Iraq and Kuwait**  
**Thursday 13 April through Thursday 20 April 2006**

**1. PURPOSE:** This memo provides follow-on feedback reference visit 13-20 April 2006 to Iraq and Kuwait. Look forward to doing a faculty seminar with Department of Social Sciences at your convenience in the Fall semester.

**2 SOURCES- IRAQ:**

- a. General George Casey, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) : **One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- b. LTG Peter Chiarelli, Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) : **One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- c. LTG Martin Dempsey, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command : **One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- d. British three-star General LTG Rob Fry (UK Army), Deputy to General George Casey, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) : Update Briefings.
- e. Acting Chief-of-Mission US. Embassy, DCM David Satterfield: **One-on-one discussions and briefing.**
- f. MG James Thurman, Commanding General, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Multi-National Division - Baghdad (MND-B) : **One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- g. MG Thomas Turner, Commanding General, 101<sup>st</sup> Abn Div. Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) : **One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- h. MG Rick Lynch, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Effects: **One-on-one discussions and briefing.**
- i. MG Timothy Donovan, USMC, Chief-of-Staff Multi-National Forces-Iraq: **One-on-one discussions and Out brief.**
- j. MG Joseph Peterson, Chief of Iraqi Police Transition: **Discussion and briefing.**

- k. **Mr. David Harris**, Acting Chief Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO): **One-on-one lunch and discussions.**
- L. MG Bob Heine, Deputy Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), Director of Operations: **One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- m. **BG (P) William E. McCoy**, Commanding **General**, Gulf Region **Division Project and Contracting Office**: Full Staff Briefings.
- n. BG John Cantwell (Australian Army): **MNF-I Operations** Brief.
- o. BG Alessio Ceccchetti (Italian Army): **Coalition Operations Update Briefing.**
- p. **Mr. Russ Thaden**, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Multi-National Force-Iraq: **Intelligence briefing on threat**
- q. Briefing: Multi-National Force-Iraq Battlefield Update.
- r. Briefing: **MNF-I Effects and Synchronization Board**
- s. Division Battle **Staff Briefing: 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry** Division.
- t. **Division Battle Staff Briefing: 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne** Division
- a. Briefing: **Infantry** Brigade Commander, **4<sup>th</sup> Infantry** Division.
- v. Briefing: Acting Infantry Battalion Commander, **4<sup>th</sup> Infantry** Division.
- w. Briefing: Infantry Company Commander, **4<sup>th</sup> Infantry** Division.
- x. Lunch Sensing Session: **soldiers and junior NCOs, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry** Division.
- y. Dinner Discussion: **General Officers and** Division Command Sergeant Major, **101<sup>st</sup> Airborne** Division.
- z. Briefing: **Infantry** Brigade Commander, **101<sup>st</sup> Airborne** Division.
- aa. Briefing: **Maneuver Effects** Brigade Commander (**Engineers**), **101<sup>st</sup> Airborne** Division on **Counter-IED** Campaign.
- bb. Briefing: **Aviation** Brigade Commander, **101<sup>st</sup> Airborne** Division.
- cc. **Briefing: Maneuver Battalion** Commander and Company Commanders, **101<sup>st</sup> Airborne** Division.
- dd. **Lunch** Sensing Session: **Aviation Company Commander and Leaders, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne** Division.
- ee. Dinner Sensing Session: **Soldiers and junior NCOs, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne** Division.
- ff. Visit and Briefings: Brigade **Detention Center and** Intelligence interrogators.
- gg. Visit and **Briefings: Special Operations** Intelligence Fusion Center.
- hh. Night Movement: To **101<sup>st</sup> Maneuver Battalion** Headquarters for pinning ceremony, **Combat Infantry and** **Combat Action** Badges. **Discussion with junior soldiers.**

### 3. SOURCES - KUWAIT

- a. Ambassador Richard LeBaron, US Ambassador to Kuwait: Office call and discussions with U.S. Ambassador and DCM.
- b. Staff Briefings: Colonel David Gordon, Acting Chief, Office of Military Cooperation - Kuwait
- c. Briefings: U.S. Embassy Political Officer
- d. Briefings: U.S. Embassy DAO - LTC Robert Friedenber.
- e. MG James Kelley, Acting Commanding General, Coalition Land Component Command: One-on-one discussions.
- f. Full Staff Briefing: (3<sup>rd</sup> U.S. Army), Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).
- g. Dinner Discussion: CFLCC General Officers, Chief-of-staff, Command Sergeant Major.

### 4. THE BOTTOM LINE - OBSERVATIONS FROM IRAQI FREEDOM, APRIL 2006:

1<sup>st</sup> - The morale, fighting effectiveness, and confidence of U.S. combat forces continue to be simply awe-inspiring. In every sensing session and interaction - I probed for weaknesses and found courage, belief in the mission, enormous confidence in their sergeants and company grade officers, an understanding of the larger mission, a commitment to creating an effective Iraqi Army and Police, unabashed patriotism, and a sense of humor. All of these soldiers, NCOs and young officers were volunteers for combat. Many were on their second combat tour - several were on the third or fourth combat tour. Many had re-enlisted to stay with their unit on its return to a second Iraq deployment. Many planned to re-enlist regardless of how long the war went on.

Their comments to me were guileless, positive, and candidly expressed love for their fellow soldiers. They routinely encounter sniper fire, mortar and rocket attacks, and constantly face IED's on movement. Their buddies have been killed and wounded. Several in these sessions had also been wounded. These are the toughest soldiers we have ever fielded. It was a real joy and an honor to see them first-hand.

2<sup>nd</sup> - The Iraqi Army is real, growing, and willing to fight. They now have lead action of a huge and rapidly expanding area and population. The battalion level formations are in many cases excellent - most are adequate. However, they are very badly equipped with only a few light vehicles, small arms, most with body armor and one or two uniforms. They have almost no mortars, heavy machine guns, decent communications equipment, artillery, armor, or IAF air transport, helicopter, and strike support. Their logistics capability is only now beginning to appear. Their Institutional Army (Military Schools, Logistics base, manufacturing) is beginning to show encouraging signs of self-initiative.

The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior have shown dramatic and rapid growth in capacity and competence since LTG Dempsey took them under his care. However, the corruption and lack of capability of the ministries will require several years of patient coaching and officer education in values as well as the required competencies. The Iraqi people clearly want a National Army. The recruiting now has gotten significant participation by all sectarian groups to include the Sunni. The Partnership Program with U.S. units will be the key to success with the Embedded Training Teams augmented and nurtured by a U.S. Maneuver Commander. This is simply a brilliant success story. We need at least two-to-five more years of U.S. partnership and Combat backup to get the Iraqi Army ready to stand on its own. The interpersonal relationships between Iraqi Army units and their U.S. trainers are very positive and genuine.

**3<sup>rd</sup> - The Iraqi police are beginning to show marked improvement in capability since MG Joe Peterson took over the program. The National Police Commando Battalions are very capable - a few are simply superb and on par with the best U.S. SWAT units in terms of equipment, courage, and training. Their intelligence collection capability is better than ours in direct HUMINT.**

**The crux of the war hangs on our ability to create urban and rural local police with the ability to survive on the streets of this incredibly dangerous and lethal environment. The police must have fortified local stations (more than a thousand), local jails (more than a thousand), armored Humvees (more than 3000), a nationwide command and control system, embedded U.S. contractor trainers, and in the key battleground areas of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk - they need a remote area camera monitoring system such as we now have in most of our major cities.**

**The police are heavily infiltrated by both the AIF and the Shia militia. They are widely distrusted by the Sunni population. They are incapable of confronting local armed groups. They inherited a culture of inaction, passivity, human rights abuses, and deep corruption.**

**This will be a ten year project requiring patience, significant resources, and an international public face. This is a very, very tough challenge which is a prerequisite to the Iraqis winning the counter-insurgency struggle they will face in the coming decade. We absolutely can do this. But this police program is now inadequately resourced.**

**4<sup>th</sup> - The creation of an Iraqi government of national unity is a central requirement. We must help create a legitimate government for which the Iraqi security forces will fight and die. If we do not see the successful development of a pluralistic administration in the first 120 days of the emerging Jawad al-Maliki leadership - there will be significant chance of the country breaking apart in warring factions among the Sunnis and Shia - with a separatist Kurdish north embroiled in their own potential struggle with the Turks.**

**The incompetence and corruption of the interim Iraqi Administration has been significant. There is total lack of trust among the families, the tribes, and the sectarian factions created by the 35 years of despotism and isolation of the criminal Saddam regime. This is a traumatized society with a malignant political culture. There is a huge "brain drain" taking place with educated and wealthy Iraqis getting out with their money. This is a loss of the potential leadership to solve the mess that is Iraq today. The pot is also being stirred from the outside Iraq by six neighboring states - none of which have provided significant economic or political assistance.**

**However, in my view, the Iraqis are likely to successfully create a governing entity. The intelligence picture strongly portrays a population that wants a federal Iraq, wants a national Army, rejects the AIF as a political future for the nation, and is optimistic that their life can be better in the coming years. Unlike the Balkans—the Iraqis want this to work. The bombing of the Samarra Mosque brought the country to the edge of all-out war. However, the Iraqi Army did not crack, the moderates held, Sistani called for restraint, the Sunnis got a chill of fear seeing what could happen to them as a minority population, and the Coalition Forces suddenly were seen correctly as a vital force that could keep the population safe in the absence of Iraqi power. In addition, the Shia were reminded that Iran is a Persian power with goals that conflict with the Shia Arabs of southern and central Iraq.**

**It is likely that the Iraqis will pull together enough political muscle to get through the coming 30 day crisis to produce a cabinet to submit to the Parliament - as well as the four month deadline to consider constitutional amendments. The resulting government is likely to be weak and barely functional. It may stagger along and fail in 18 months. But it is very likely to prevent the self-destruction of Iraq. Our brilliant and effective U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad will be the essential ingredient to keeping Iraq together. If the U.S. loses his leadership in the coming year, this thing could implode.**

**5<sup>th</sup> - The foreign jihadist fighters have been defeated as a strategic and operational threat to the creation of an Iraqi government. Aggressive small unit combat action by Coalition Forces combined with good intelligence - backed up by new Iraqi Security Forces is making an impact. The foreign fighters remain a serious tactical menace. However, they are a minor threat to the heavily armed and wary U.S. forces. They cannot successfully stop the Iraqi police and army recruitment. Their brutal attacks on the civil population are beating support for the emerging government. The foreign fighters have failed to spark open civil war from the Shia. The Samarra bombing may well have inoculated the**

country to the possible horror of total war. The Iraqis are rejecting the vision of a religious state. The al Qaeda in-Iraq organization is now largely Sunni Iraqi - not foreign fighters. U.S. Marine and Army combat effectiveness - combined with very effective information operations--- has taken the fun out of Jihad.

6<sup>th</sup> - The U.S. Inter-Agency Support for our strategy in Iraq is grossly inadequate. A handful of brilliant, courageous, and dedicated Foreign Service officers have held together a large, constantly changing, marginally qualified, inadequately experienced U.S. mission. The U.S. influence on the Iraqi national and regional government has been extremely weak. U.S. consultants of the IRMO do not live and work with their Iraqi counterparts, are frequently absent on leave or home consultations, are often in-country for short tours of 90 days to six months, and are frequently gapped with no transfer of institutional knowledge.

In Iraq, nothing is possible without carefully managed relationships between the U.S. officials and their Iraqi interlocutors. Trust between people is the prerequisite and basis of progress for this deeply Arab culture. The other U.S. agencies of government such as Justice, DHS, Commerce, Agriculture, and Transportation are in Iraq in small numbers for too short time periods. The U.S. Departments actually fight over who will pay the \$11.00 per day per diem on food. This bureaucratic nonsense is taking place in the context of a war costing the American people \$7 billion a month - and a battalion of soldiers and Marines killed or wounded a month.

The State Department actually cannot direct assignment of their officers to serve in Iraq. State frequently cannot staff essential assignments such as the new PRTs which have the potential to produce such huge impact in Iraq. The bottom line is that only the CIA and the U.S. Armed Forces are at war. This situation cries out for remedy.

7<sup>th</sup> - We face a serious strategic dilemma. Are U.S. combat troops operating in a police action governed by the rule of Iraqi law? Or are they a Coalition Military Force supporting a counter-insurgency campaign in a nation with almost no functioning institutions? The situation must remain ambiguous until the Iraqi government is actually operating effectively. We currently have excellent rules of engagement (ROE) governing the use of lethal force. These rules are now morphing under the pressures of political sensitivity at tactical level.

Many U.S. soldiers feel constrained not to use lethal force as the option of first instance against clearly identified and armed AIF terrorists - but instead follow essentially police procedures. Without question, we must clearly and dramatically rein in the use of lethal force - and zero out the collateral killing or wounding of innocent civilians trying to survive in this war in e . However, the tactical rules of engagement will need constant monitoring to maintain an appropriate balance.

8<sup>th</sup> - Thanks to strong CENTCOM leadership and supervision at every level, our detainee policy has dramatically corrected the problems of the first year of the War on Terrorism. Detainee practices and policy in detention centers in both Iraq and Afghanistan that I have visited are firm, professional, humane, and well supervised. However, we may be in danger of over-correcting. The AIF are exploiting our overly restrictive procedures and are routinely defying the U.S. interrogators. It is widely believed that the US has a "14 day catch and release policy" and the AIF "suspect" will soon be back in action.

This is an overstatement of reality, however, we do have a problem. Many of the AIF detainees routinely accuse U.S. soldiers of abuse under the silliest factual situations knowing it will trigger an automatic investigation. In my view, we will need to move very rapidly to a policy of the Iraqis taking legal charge of the detainees in our Brigade Detention Centers--- with us serving a support not lead role. We may need to hire U.S. contractor law enforcement teams at U.S. tactical battalion level to support the function of "evidentiary packages" as well as accompanying prisoners to testify in court in Baghdad.

9<sup>th</sup> - The stateside Army and Marine Corps needs significant manpower augmentation to continue the Iraq counter-insurgency and Iraqi training mission. In my judgment, CENTCOM must constrain the force level in Iraq or we risk damaging our ground combat capability which we will need in the ongoing deterrence of threat from North Korea, Iran, Syria, China against Taiwan, Venezuela, Cuba, and other potential flashpoints.

The stateside **Army** and **Marine Corps** also must rapidly create **an enhanced Arabic language capability** in the **Armed Forces**. We **need** to take 20% of each Leavenworth class and 10% of each advanced course class and **put them** through a 90 **day** total Immersion Defense Language Institute Arabic course **using only** native speakers.

10<sup>th</sup> - CENTCOM and the **U.S. Mission** are **running out** of the most significant leverage we have in **Iraq** - **economic reconstruction** dollars. Having spent **\$18 billion** - we **now** have **\$1.6 billion** of new **funding** left in the pipeline. **Iraq cannot sustain the requisite economic recovery** without **serious U.S.** support. The **Allies are not** going to help. **They will not fulfill** their pledges. Most of their pledges are **loans** not **grants**.

It would be **misguided policy** to fail to achieve our political **objective** after a **\$400 billion war** because we **refused** to sustain the **requirement** to build a viable economic state. Unemployment is a **bigger enemy** than the **AIF**. It is **my view** that we **will fail** to achieve our political-military objectives in the **coming 24 months** if we **do not continue** **economic support** on the order of **\$5-10 billion** per year. **This is far, far less** than the **cost of fighting these people**.

11<sup>th</sup> - We need to **better equip** the **Iraqi Army** with a capability to **defeat foreign attack** and to have a leveraged advantage over the **Shia militias** and the **AIF** **insurgents** they must **continue** to **confront**. The resources we **are** now **planning** to provide **are inadequate** by an **order** of magnitude or more. The cost of a **coherent development** of the **Iraqi security forces** is the **ticket out of Iraq** and the avoidance of the constant **drain** of **huge U.S. resources** on a **monthly** basis.

12<sup>th</sup> - **There is** a rapidly growing animosity in our deployed military forces **toward** the **U.S. media**. We **need** to **bridge** this **gap**. Armies do not **fight wars** - **countries** **fight wars**. We need to **continue** talking to the **American people** through the **press**. **They will be objective** in reporting facts if we facilitate their information gathering **mission**. The **country** in **way** too **dangerous** for the **media** to operate in any other manner than temporarily **imbedded** with **U.S.** or **Iraqi security** forces. The enormous **good** will **already** generated by the **superb performance** of **U.S. combat forces** **will ebb** away if we **do not** **continue** to actively engage **media** at **every** level. We also **cannot** discount 2000 **FED's** a **month**, **hundreds** of **US casualties** a **month**, or the **chaos** of the **central battlefield** of the **insurgency** - which is **Baghdad**.

13<sup>th</sup> - **U.S. public diplomacy** and **rhetoric** about **confronting Iranian nuclear weapons** is **scaring neighbors** in the **Gulf**. **They** will not support another war. **They** have **an** integrated **missile** and **interceptor** air **defense**. **They** have no **credible maritime coastal defense system** to **protect** their **ports** and **oil production facilities**. **Our** **Mid-East allies** **believe correctly** that they are **ill-equipped** to **deal** with **Iranian strikes** to **close** the **Persian Gulf** and the **Red Sea**. **They** do not think **they can** handle **politically** or **militarily** a **terrorist threat** **nested** in their **domestic Shia** populations.

A **U.S. military confrontation** with **Iran** could result in **Su&** attacking our forces in **Baghdad** - **or** **along** our **400 mile** line of **communications** **out of Iraq** to the **sea**. The **Iranian people** have collectively decided to go **nuclear**. The **Chinese** and the **Russians** will not in the end **support serious collective action** against **Iran**. The **Iranians will** achieve their **nuclear weapon purpose** within **5-10 years**.

**Now** is the time for us to create the **asymmetrical alliances** and **defensive capabilities** to **hedge** the **Iranian nuclear threat** without **pre-emptive warfare**. We **can** **bankrupt** and **isolate** the **Iranians** as we did the **Soviet Union** and **create** a **stronger Gulf Alliance** that **will** effectively **deter** **this menace** to our **security**.

## 5. SUMMARY:

**The U.S. will remain in a serious crisis** in **Iraq** during the **coming 24 months**. **There is** **decreasing** **U.S. domestic support** for **the war**, although in **my** view the **American people** understand that we must not **fail** or we **risk** a **ten year disaster** of foreign policy in the vital **Gulf Oil Region**. **U.S. public opinion** may become **increasingly alienated** by **Iraqi ingratitude** for our **sacrifice** on their behalf (**huge percentages** of both the **Shia** and **Sunni** populations believe that the **MNF** **Coalition** forces **are** the single **greatest** threat to **safety** and **security** in **Iraq** today) - and by **astonishingly corrupt** and **incompetent** **Iraqi management** of their **own recovery**. (Much of the **national** oil and **electricity** problem is caused by **poor maintenance** or **deliberate internal sabotage** of the **infrastructure** for **reasons of criminal corruption** - or to **prevent energy** from **flowing** away from the **production facilities** to **Baghdad**.)

The situation is **perilous, uncertain, and extreme - but far from hopeless. The U.S. Armed Forces are a rock.** This is the most competent and brilliantly led military in a tactical and operational sense that we have ever fielded. Its courage and dedication is unabated after 20,000 killed and wounded. The U.S. leadership on the ground is superb at strategic level - Ambassador Khalilzad, General Abizaid, and General Casey. The Iraqi security forces are now surging into a lead role in internal counter-insurgency operations.

The Iraqi political system is fragile but beginning to play a serious role in the debate over the big challenges facing the Iraqi state - oil, religion, territory, power, separatism, and revenge. The neighboring states have refrained from tipping Iraq into open civil war. The UN is cautiously thinking about re-entry and doing their job of helping consolidate peace. The Iraqis are going to hold Saddam and his senior leadership accountable for their murderous behavior over 35 years. The brave Brits continue to support us both politically and militarily. NATO is a possible modest support to our efforts.

There is no reason why the U.S. cannot achieve our objectives in Iraq. Our aim must be to create a viable federal state under the rule of law which does not: enslave its own people, threaten its neighbors, or produce weapons of mass destruction. This is a ten year task. We should be able to draw down most of our combat forces in 3-5 years. We have few alternatives to the current US strategy which is painfully but gradually succeeding. This is now a race against time. Do we have the political will, do we have the military power, will we spend the resources required to achieve our aims?

It was very encouraging for me to see the progress achieved in the past year. Thanks to the leadership and personal sacrifice of the hundreds of thousands of men and women of the CENTCOM team and the CIA - the American people are far safer today than we were in the 18 months following the initial intervention.

Barry R McCaffrey  
General USA (Ret)  
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs  
United States Military Academy  
West Point, New York



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

16-05-2006 10:21:57

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey 

SUBJECT: General (Retired) McCaffrey's Report on Iraq

- This responds to Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated May 09, 2006. Subject: McCaffrey's report on Iraq (Tab A).
- On Saturday, I returned from a 3-day visit to Iraq. While many of General McCaffrey's observations are more appropriately addressed by General Pace, LTG Dempsey, or the Defense Undersecretaries, I want to comment on a couple of his observations.
- Observation #1 – Morale. I agree that morale remains high and I again came back from my visit impressed and inspired by the Soldiers at every level. The Soldiers understand the larger mission and are committed to our nation's efforts. Reenlistment remains above goals for both the 4<sup>th</sup> and 101<sup>st</sup> Divisions, even for many on their second year long tour. For the first time, I did note some concern, especially among the junior officers and mid-career NCOs, on the prospect of a 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> long year tour in the future. I believe a reduction in the length of the tour to less than a year would help. We are evaluating the feasibility of such a reduction for upcoming deployments.
- Observation #6 – US Interagency Effort. I concur that adequate interagency support remains a systemic problem for a number of reasons. In the long term, NSPDD 44 and DoD 3000.05 (Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations) provide a framework to improve planning, programming and budgeting across the interagency spectrum. This directive is more weighted towards long-term improvements. In the near term, the challenge of appropriate resources, skills and personnel stability from non-DoD organizations remains a very serious challenge.
- Observation #9 – Foreign Language Skills. In line with General McCaffrey's sentiments, the Army recognizes the critical nature of foreign language skills/cultural awareness and is taking steps to ensure that leaders at all levels receive pre-deployment training in these areas. His call for 90-day immersion in Arabic courses could be beneficial and is in line with our current efforts. For example, the Defense

11-L-0559/OSD/57545



5/17/2008 10:41:20 AM

SUBJECT: General McCaffrey's Report on Iraq

Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) just began a six week course in Arabic for 128 (16%) of the Army Majors who are students at Fort Leavenworth. However, it is a very difficult language and even rudimentary language proficiency is very perishable without sustained reinforcement. We are working a number of different language initiatives as part of the DoD Language Roadmap that also consider Soldier aptitude for difficult languages and follow-on assignments. Additionally, we increased funding for the United States Military Academy to ensure one third of graduates attain advanced foreign language proficiency and have made language training available to all Soldiers through the DLIFLC website and with Rosetta Stone software through the Army Knowledge Online system.

- Observation # 2 and #11 – Equipping Iraq Security Forces (ISF). The Army has been a full participant in DoD plans for equipping the Iraqi Security Forces. Most recently MNSTC-I provided the Army with a list of required equipment that will fill ISF shortfalls, including gun trucks, cargo trucks, material handling equipment, generators and light sets. Most of the vehicles and equipment are currently in Iraq and although not excess to the Army's total requirements, are being transferred to facilitate accelerated ISF capabilities. The vehicles will be given a complete refurbishment before turnover to the ISF. The Army will also procure a number of new vehicles with the funding provided by MNSTCI. Continuing financial, equipment and other support for Iraqi Security Forces is essential for the foreseeable future. As we further reduce our footprint over time we will face a number of important challenges with respect to stay behind equipment, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Fund (ESF), and other developmental assistance programs. We need to develop an overall plan which includes an outreach effort with congressional leaders to achieve financial support and changes to legislative authorization, as required.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: LTC John S. Kern. (b)(6)

**FOUO**

April 19, 2006

**TO:** Peter Rodman  
**C C** Eric Edelman  
**FROM** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Tunisia and the De-Mining Issue

I do want to push hard on Italy and Germany to help with the de-mining in Tunisia. I think we, along with the State Department, should put a full court press on it.

Please report back as to what you plan to do.

Thanks.

DIR:s  
041906-17

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/16/06*

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/57547

OSD 07983-06



5/18/2006 8 00 21 AM

MAY 12 2006

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DSD  
USDP *76*

INFO MEMO

MAY 17 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*for* FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA *5/16/06*

SUBJECT: Tunisia and the De-Mining Issue

- You asked for a way ahead on pushing Italy and Germany to assist with de-mining efforts in Tunisia.
  - Your meeting with Defense Minister Morjane was the first time the Government of Tunisia expressed interest in approaching Europe for support.
- Our Embassies in Rome and Berlin have contacted the governments of Germany and Italy with informal requests for support.
- Germany and Italy may be more likely to respond favorably if Tunisia makes an official request to each government.
  - Embassy Tunis is gauging Tunisian interest in making an official request.
  - [In working-level meetings, the Tunisians have expressed the desire to work solely with the USG.]
- Thus far, USG progress includes:
  - In January 2006, a USG team visited Tunisia to assess the possibility of extending de-mining assistance to GOT.
  - In February 2006, the interagency approved an assistance program.
  - Stability Operations is working with the Tunisians to begin implementation, and anticipates a start date before Jan 2007.
    - Wyoming National Guard has offered to facilitate the de-mining, but requires Army funding for "man-days" in order to support.

Prepared by Greg Archetto, OSD/ISA/NESA, (b)(6).



OSD 07983-06

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5/18/2006 7:56:16 AM

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POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

**Subject:** Tunisia and the De-Mining Issue (FOUO)

**I-Number:** 06-004917

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
PD for Stab Ops, SO/LIC	Todd Harvey	5/9/06
DASD for ISP, EUR/NATO	Dan Fata	5/10/06
PD for ISA-NESA	Brig Gen Paula Thornhill <i>5/16</i>	<i>AL 5/12/06</i>
PDASD for ISA	Mary Beth Long	<i>MRL 5/12/06</i>

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11-L-0559/OSD/57549

~~FOUO~~

MAY 18 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Dates in June

*080 SD*

I am scheduled to return at 9 p.m. on June 8. I am going to hold June 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 for the project we talked about.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
051706-23



5/18/2006 12:44:04 PM

*18 MAY 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57550

FOUO

MAY 18 2006

000.4

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
CC: The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: June 15 Groundbreaking

We are tentatively planning to have a Pentagon Memorial Groundbreaking over here on June 15. You may want to think about whether it makes sense for the President to be involved in that in any way.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
051706-24



*1/11/06*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57551



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

JUL 11 2006

32

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC ACTION \_\_\_\_\_

FROM Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force

Robert Rangel  
7/11

SUBJECT: Senator William H. Frist (TN) Request for Information on Future of 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing, Nashville, Tennessee

- Please sign the response at **TAB A** to Senator Frist.
- Senator Frist wrote you (**TAB B**) with concerns that the Tennessee National Guard has not received **any** information regarding the future of the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing since the **BRAC** announcement to eliminate the **118 AW C-130** mission.
- Senator Frist requested you consider the **118 AW** for a potential Joint Cargo Aircraft mission.
- Phase **II** of the Total Force Integration plan calls for investigating the **118 AW** as a potential location for the JCA mission. The final decision is pending approval of the aircraft and mission by Air Force and Army leadership.
- Response to Senator Frist states the Department has announced the **118 AW** is being considered for the JCA mission, but that much is yet to be determined.
- Senator Frist issued a press release on June 6, 2006; praising DoD for consideration of a new flying mission for the **118<sup>th</sup> AW**.

11 Jul 06

RECOMMENDATION. SECDEF sign letter at **TAB A**.

COORDINATIONS: **TAB C**

Attachments:  
As stated

PREPARED BY Capt Deborah Balentine, (b)(6)

18 May 06

MA SD	105/12	SMA DSD	
NSA SD	107/11	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	11/11	1410	100
ESR MA	11/17	STF DIR	



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7/11/2006 9:04:01 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57552

COORDINATION PAGE

Assistant Secretary of Defense (LA)

Robert L. Wilkie



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

The Honorable William H. Frist, M.D.  
Majority Leader  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-4205


Dear **Mr.** Majority Leader:

**Thank** you for **your** letter concerning the **future of the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing** in Nashville, Tennessee. The accomplishments of the **118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing** are well **known**, including their contributions to the Hurricane Katrina disaster response and their participation in the Global **War** on Terrorism. It is indeed a unit with a distinguished track record and contains a wealth of valuable expertise.

The Air Force **has** committed itself to shaping the Total Force – Active, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve – to meet our Nation's defense needs **both at** home and abroad. The Total Force Integration process is a phased-approach to identify the new and emerging missions for all components of the Air Force. As **part of the Total Force Integration process we** announced that the **118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing** is being considered for a **Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)** flying follow-on mission. The JCA program is in its infancy and many details require additional definition before assignment of the mission and aircraft can occur.

*The Air Force wants to*  
assure you that the Tennessee **Air** National Guard will continue to play a vital role in our Nation's defense. Shaping the Total Force is an ongoing, collaborative process between your State, the National Guard **Bureau**, and the Air Force. Again, thank you for your continued support of the Department and the Tennessee Air National Guard.

Sincerely,



*The Air Force*

*See orders 890-*



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

APR 6 2006

SAF/LL  
1160 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1160

The Honorable William H. Frist, M.D.  
Majority Leader  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-4205

Dear Majority Leader Frist

Thank you for your letter to the Secretary of Defense concerning the future of the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing in Nashville, Tennessee. We understand your concern regarding the projected loss of the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing C-130 aircraft due to the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission. The accomplishments of the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing are well known, including their contributions to the Hurricane Katrina disaster response and their participation in the Global War on Terror. It is indeed a unit with a distinguished track record and contains a wealth of valuable expertise.

The Air Force is continuing the process of shaping our Total Force to win the war and meet future defense needs. This process is an on-going and collaborative process between your State, the National Guard Bureau and the Air Force. This multi-faceted process entails not only implementing BRAC, but also modernizing and recapitalizing the Total Force. We are in the process of identifying transformational opportunities in new missions to utilize the breadth of talent across the Air National Guard. These missions will be very relevant to the future of the Air Force and the Air National Guard.

We will continue to work with the National Guard Bureau to identify and implement future opportunities for the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing. Again, thank you for your continued support of the Air Force and the Tennessee Air National Guard.

Very respectfully

DANIEL J. DARNELL  
Major General  
Director, Legislative Liaison

11-L-0559/OSD/57555

WILLIAM H. FRIST, M.D.  
TENNESSEE



United States Senate  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 18, 2006

Mr. Secretary,

The Nashville National Guard community has expressed their concern to me that the Pentagon has not made a statement regarding the future of the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing since the BRAC process determined they will no longer operate C-130 aircraft. They feel that if a clear message is not sent before I leave office then Nashville will not be awarded a flying follow-on mission and will effectively shutter Tennessee's only Aero Medical unit.

As you move forward with plans to put the newly designated Joint Cargo Aircraft into service, it is my hope that you will be able to announce that 118<sup>th</sup> will be one of the units tasked with the Joint Cargo Aircraft mission. Nashville is uniquely qualified to operate this new type of aircraft mission and making it clear that unique abilities of the Nashville Guard community are not lost is of the utmost importance to me. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Frist".

William H. Frist, M.D.

004  
518

FEB-03-2006 17:52

HR/ALL

(b)(6)

WILLIAM H. FRIST, M.D.  
Tennessee

**United States Senate**

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER  
WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 20540-1000

December 13, 2005

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1600 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20304-1600

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing with regard to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission's decision to remove the C-130 aircraft from the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing in Nashville, Tennessee. As you know I strongly disagreed with this decision, but the BRAC Commission determined this consolidation would help improve the efficiency of existing C-130 operations. As our country looks to the future of the National Guard and the Air Force, I believe that Nashville should be assigned a follow-on flying mission given the 118<sup>th</sup>'s history of distinguished service to our country and the strong support the military has from the local community.

The 118<sup>th</sup> has served our nation and the state of Tennessee nobly for over 50 years, and always with the full support of the community. This service was evident most recently in Iraq, and in the National Guard's support of relief operations in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Providing the men and women of the Nashville Guard community with the opportunity to serve the country as they do best is both right and fitting; a flying mission acknowledges their service and honors their commitment.

I strongly urge the Department of Defense to designate a follow-on flying mission for the 118<sup>th</sup> that not only takes into consideration the skills, facilities and exemplary performance of this unit, but also the needs of the state of Tennessee and the region to respond to domestic crises and disaster. This issue is as important to the nation's defense and security of the homeland as it is to the people of Tennessee.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter. As you know, I share your deep respect for the men and women who serve this country in the military, and look forward to continuing to work with you to make our armed forces more effective and our nation more secure.

Sincerely,

*William H. Frist*  
William H. Frist, M.D.  
Minority Leader  
United States Senate

050 01825-06

TOTAL PAGES

11-L-0559/OSD/57557

Date: 2006  
Release: XX  
Contact: TN State PAO  
Phone: ##  
Email:

## Media Release

### Tennessee Air National Guard and the Air Force establish joint facilities

As part of the Air Force Total Force Integration initiatives, the Air Force and the National Guard Bureau are directing three new missions to the Tennessee Air National Guard.

Leveraging the experience of members of the Tennessee Air National Guard's 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing, the unit is being considered for a future Joint Cargo Aircraft mission and an Intelligence Production Squadron at the Nashville Metro Airport.

At McGhee-Tyson Air National Guard Base, the 119<sup>th</sup> Command and Control Squadron will enhance its current operations in support of the Air Force space mission. Additional personnel will leverage the experience of the Tennessee ANG to expand its current operation and to possibly assume additional or new space missions.

Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau, is encouraged by these new missions and continues to work to ensure that the ANG remains an important partner in the Nation's defense.

"This move is one of many showing the Air Force is committed to involving the Air National Guard in all missions," he said.

The Air Force, Tennessee Air National Guard, and the National Guard Bureau are working on a transition and training schedule to ensure an effective transition for the units involved.

-END

## Press Releases

### **FRIST, ALEXANDER, BREDESEN PRAISE DOD CONSIDERATION OF NEW FLYING MISSION FOR 118TH AIRLIFT WING** *New Aircraft Would Preserve Unit's Presence, Keep 700 Jobs in Nashville*

June 8th, 2006 - WASHINGTON, D.C. - U.S. Senators Bill Frist and Lamar Alexander joined Governor Phil Bredesen today in applauding the Department of Defense's announcement that three new missions are being directed at the Tennessee Air National Guard. As part of the process, the 118th Airlift Wing is being considered for a joint cargo aircraft flying follow-on mission.

If awarded, the mission would ensure that the 118th continues its operation at Berry Field and would keep approximately 700 jobs in the Nashville area, including the state's only Aero Medical Unit.


"This announcement is great news for the 118th and the Nashville area. This new assignment would allow the unit to continue its work without facing any loss of personnel," Frist said. "I will continue working hard to ensure the valuable contributions of the 118th are recognized and that the unit continues flying. Today's announcement marks tremendous progress for the community and for the experienced, dedicated men and women of the 118th who help keep our state and nation safe."

"This would maintain a flying mission for the 118th and I'm pleased the Defense Department is considering it," Alexander said. "This is just one more example of how Tennessee benefits from Bill Frist being the Majority Leader of the United States Senate. This would not be happening without his leadership, and we'll continue to work together throughout this process."

"The 118th is one of the premier flying wings in the Air National Guard. It's rewarding to know that we are being considered for these missions and we hope to receive definitive word shortly," Bredesen said. "I'd like to thank Majority Leader Frist, Senator Alexander and our entire congressional delegation for their strong support of the Tennessee Guard so they can continue to serve and protect our citizens of Tennessee."

Last year, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission recommended the removal of the 8 C-130 aircraft operated by the 118th at Berry Field.

Frist, Alexander and Bredesen strongly opposed the commission's recommendation because of the 118th's many contributions to homeland security and emergency response across Tennessee, and they have worked to secure a flying follow-on mission.



Senator Bill Frist, M.D.

X\*\*



# U.S. Senator Lamar Alexander

June 6th, 2006

## ALEXANDER, FRIST, BREDESEN PRAISE DOJ CONSIDERATION OF NEW FLYING MISSION FOR THE 118TH AIRLIFT WING New Aircraft Would Preserve Unit's Presence, Keep 700 Jobs in Nashville

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###

# THE City Paper

Monday, June 26, 2006 9:46 AM



**Sweet dreams**  
Jade Reynolds  
babies her  
career in art



**Preds draft fan**  
Brentwood resident  
Blake Geoffrion  
drafted by Preds



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## News briefs

June 07, 2006

### Supreme Court to hear gay marriage ban arguments

The state supreme Court will hear arguments today regarding whether a proposed constitutional amendment banning gay marriage should be included on the ballot this November. In February, Davidson County Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle ruled against the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) procedural case and decided to allow state voters to vote the amendment up or down.

The ACLU appealed, however, to the state supreme court, which will hear arguments today regarding notice of the amendment.

In its case, ACLU attorneys argue the state gave only four months notice of the amendment. State law requires six months. Lyle had found that there was sufficient media coverage to inform the public of the proposed amendment.

— John Rodgers

### 118th Airlift Wing considered for mission

U.S. Senators Bill Frist and Lamar Alexander joined Gov. Phil Bredesen Tuesday in applauding the Department of Defense's announcement that three new missions are being directed to the Tennessee Air National Guard.

As part of this process, the 118th Airlift Wing is being considered for a joint cargo aircraft flying follow-on mission.

If awarded, the mission would ensure that the 118th continues its operation at Berry Field and would keep approximately 700 jobs in the Nashville area, including the state's only Aero Medical Unit

— Staff reports

#### Features

- Blog
- Comics
- Community Camera
- Crossword
- Enter to Win

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- Sudoku
- Traffic Cam
- World In Photos

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- Bryson strives despite underdog
- Rex and the C

#### Busin

- Conversation

#### Lifes

- New book details evolution of song Nashville
- City Confident Reynolds babies
- City picks

#### Spe

- Brentwood res Predators' first loc
- Preds' conditio

~~FOUO~~

May 18, 2006

To: Robert Wilkie

CC: Michael Wynne  
Ken Krieg  
Robert Rangel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: 116th Airtft Wing and Senator Frist

Attached is a letter Majority Leader Frist gave me when I saw him this morning. It is self-explanatory. Please let me know where this stands and keep me posted on it.

Thanks.

Attach. 5/18/06 Frist ltr to SecDef

DNR:ak  
051806-19

.....  
Please Respond By June 22, 2006

JUL 12 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

FOUO

08056-06

325

18 May 06

18 May 06

WILLIAM H. FRIST, M.D.  
TENNESSEE



WLA  
5/18

**United States Senate**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 18, 2006

Mr. Secretary,

The Nashville National Guard community has expressed their concern to me that the Pentagon has not made a statement regarding the future of the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing since the **BRAC** process determined they will no longer operate C-130 aircraft. They feel that if a clear message is not sent before I leave office then Nashville will not be awarded a flying follow-on mission and will effectively shutter Tennessee's only Aero Medical unit.

As you move forward with plans to put the newly designated Joint Cargo Aircraft into service, it is my hope that you will be able to announce that 118<sup>th</sup> will be one of the units tasked with the Joint Cargo Aircraft mission. Nashville is uniquely qualified to operate this new type of aircraft mission and making it clear that unique abilities of the Nashville Guard community are not lost is of the utmost importance to me. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. H. Frist".

William H. Frist, M.D

OSD 08056-06



5/18/2006 6 08:03 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57563



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON DC 20330-10 W

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MAY 24 2006

325

SAF/LL  
1160 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1160

The Honorable William H. Frist, M.D.  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-4205

Dear Senator Frist

We received your letter of May 18, 2006, to the Secretary of Defense regarding a follow-on flying mission for the 11<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing, Tennessee Air National Guard. We will research the issue raised and ensure you receive a more detailed response as soon as this review is complete.

Thank you for your letter and continued support of the United States Air Force.

Very respectfully

JUDITH A. FEDDER  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Director, Legislative Liaison

(18 May 06)

IR

08056-06

11-L-0559/OSD/57564



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JUL 13 2006

325

The Honorable William H. Frist, M.D.  
Majority Leader  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-4205

Dear Mr. Majority Leader:

Thank you for your letter concerning the future of the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing in Nashville, Tennessee. The accomplishments of the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing are well known, including their contributions to the Hurricane Katrina disaster response and their participation in the Global War on Terrorism. It is indeed a unit with a distinguished track record and contains a wealth of valuable expertise.

The Air Force has committed itself to shaping the **Total** Force – Active, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve – to meet our Nation's defense needs both at home and abroad. The Total Force Integration process is a phased-approach to identify the new and emerging missions for all components of the Air Force. As part of the Total Force Integration process, the Air Force announced that the 118<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing is being considered for a Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) flying follow-on mission. The JCA program is in its infancy and many details require additional definition before assignment of the mission and aircraft can occur.

The Air Force wants to assure you that the Tennessee Air National Guard will continue to play a vital role in our Nation's defense. Shaping the Total Force is an ongoing, collaborative process between your State, the National Guard Bureau, and the Air Force. Again, **thank** you for your continued support of the Department and the Tennessee Air National Guard.

Sincerely,

13 Jul 06

18 May 06

OSD 08056-06



7/13/2006 6:14:00 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57565

**FOUO**

MAY 10 2006

OSD

**TO:** Peter Rodman  
**CC:** Eric Edelman  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
**SUBJECT:** Japanese Provide G130

In the *meeting* we had with the Japanese, they mentioned they might be appropriate to help with a C-130 for the UN. You might want to take a look at that.

Thanks.

Attach. ASD(ISA) memo to SD (OSD 07436-06) response to SF #031706-13

DHR  
030906-10

\*\*\*\*\*

*Please Respond By June 08, 2006*

10 MAY 06

**FOUO**

OSD 08065-06



5/19/2006 19:39 AM

~~FOUO~~

March 17, 2006

031706-13

TO: Peter Redman  
CC LTG Sidp Sharp  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Airplane for Qazi

Let's press ahead and try to get one of those countries to provide an airplane for Qazi.

Thanks.

OSD 07436-06  
031706-13

.....  
Please Respond By 04/05/06

*DR*  
*SR*

MAY 09 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07436-06



5/19/2006 8:27:56 AM

26  
1420

FOUO

MAY 1 2006  
JAG  
5/9

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

USD(P) 44 MAY 05 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Robert Ranger  
5/1

FROM: Peter W. Rodnan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) PRC MAY 5 2006

SUBJECT: Airplane for Qazi

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked about getting another country to provide an airplane for Ambassador Qazi, UN Special Representative for Iraq.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The USG approached 10 UN Member States with C-130 or equivalent aircraft capability. The UN approached 13 countries, most of which the USG also had contacted.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ State views Turkey as the most capable and willing country to provide air support for Ambassador Qazi. Therefore, State:
  - Has drafted talking points for UN Secretary General Annan to use in soliciting Turkish aircraft support.
  - Will query the Iraqi government to ensure there are no objections to Turkish support.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ If Iraq and Turkey agree to the air support mission, the next step will be to implement US-Turkey military-&military meetings aimed at working out the logistics details.

Prepared by: Patricia Morgan, ISA/NESA-Iraq (b)(6)

~~Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Reasons: 1.4 (d)  
Declassify On: 2 April 2016~~

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07438-06



5/8/2006 9 22:00 AM

\*06/004985\*

MA SD	S/A	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	M/S	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	M/S	1416	5/1 0720
ESR MA	K/S	STP DIR	

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ON

Subject of Memo: Airplane for Qazi

I-Number: 06/004985

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
Director NESA/NG	 John Trigilio	<u>2 May 2006</u>
Principal Director, NESA	 BGen Paula Thornhill	<u>2 MAY 06</u>
PDASDISA	 Mary Beth Long	<u>5/2/06</u>

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

May 18, 2006 - 5:00 PM  
DepSecDef Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

SUBJECT: *David S. C. Chu 18 May 06*  
Following Up with Wounded Service Members Separated from Active Duty  
-- SNOWFLAKE

- You requested a comprehensive proposal to provide information to Governors on wounded Service members who were subsequently released from the military (Tab 1).
- His intent is to obtain contact information for all veterans choosing Florida as their residence.
- States are provided this information through current DoD procedure, if the Service member requests option of providing a copy of their DD Form 214 (with separation address) to the State Director of Veterans Affairs in the State they select.
- Washington State has worked this coordination and the Governor sends letters to separating Service members, with very few of these letters returned as undeliverable.
- We will reinforce the importance of providing accurate post separation address information and indicating whether or not you wish to have a copy of your DD Form 214 sent to your State Director of Veterans Affairs.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter to Governor Bush (Tab 2).

COORDINATION: N/A

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated.

PREPARED BY: George Schaefer, DoD-State Liaison Office, DUSD(MC&FP),

(b)(6)

292

18 MAY 06

17 APR 06



11-L-0559/OSD/57570



OSD 08099-06

5/19/2006 2:17:22 PM

**TAB**

**1**

~~FOUO~~

April 17, 2006

TO: David Chu  
CC: Fran Harvey  
Donald Winter  
Michael Wynne

292

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Following Up with Wounded Service Members Separated from Active Duty

At a meeting I had with four governors yesterday, Governor Jeb Bush said he would like a list of all the people who were wounded and subsequently were released from the military. The State of Florida would like to help to see if they get employed. They would like to stay in close touch with them and help. I think that is a great idea.

I told him the Services were doing that, and the VA had that responsibility. He said, nonetheless, that he would like the list.

Please figure out how you might do that, and get back to me with a comprehensive proposal for all the Services.

Thanks.

DEB:dh  
043406-07

.....

*Please Respond By 05/18/06*

194 PR 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57572



5/19/2006 2 16 42 PM

**TAB**

**2**



**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Jeb Bush  
Governor of Florida  
The Capitol  
400 South Monroe Street  
Tallahassee, FL 32399

Dear Governor Bush:

Thank you for meeting to discuss the support of Service members and their families. **Your** commitment to their well being is clearly evident in Florida's policies and programs.

During our meeting in April you asked for a list of wounded Service members from Florida who were subsequently released from the military. There are a number of privacy issues, governed by federal law, which would have to be overcome in order to share such a list. However, there is a way this information can be provided to you based on individual releases.

At the time Service members separate, they can elect to have a copy of their Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty (DD214/5 Series) sent to their designated State Director of Veterans Affairs. This document contains personal address information for contact following separation, which can be disseminated for use by other State agencies. We have used this procedure successfully with Washington State.

We will therefore be emphasizing to separating Service members the benefit of choosing to share their address information with their state governments. Let's see if this meets your needs, and we can assess our results in six months or so, as we review the legal changes needed to provide a list directly.

Thank you again for your continued support of military personnel and their families.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/57574

~~FOUO~~

MAY 22 2006

Afghanistan

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT: Counter-narcotics Effort in Afghanistan**

I continue to believe that we need some overarching counter-narcotics effort in **Afghanistan** that will monitor and provide imperus to the government and all countries participating in it.

Some in the interagency disagree and say we don't need it, but the record shows we do. Let's push to revisit this issue. It is important!

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051806-16

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57575



5/22/2006 1:09:13 PM

22 May 06

~~FOUO~~

A

**May 10, 2006**

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Ruinsfeld  
SUBJECT: Number of Meetings on Hill

On page 2 your status report dated May 8 says I have met with a total of 117 Members of Congress this calendar year. Is that correct?

I would think the meetings I have had with the House and Senate on ops-intel, plus my hearings, plus all the breakfasts and Blunt meetings must add up to more.

Please double check

Thanks

attach. 5/8/06 ASD(LA) memo to SD re: Legislative Affairs Status Report (OSD 07469-061

DHR,dh  
051006-02

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/25/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57576



5/22/2006 1:57:17 PM



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED  
INFO MEMO

May 19, 2006 2:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
For Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response – Number of Meetings on Hill

You asked me to confirm the number of Members you have met with this calendar year as reflected in my recent Status Report dated 8 May.

- o The "total number" of 117 reported on my Status Report represents your personal meetings with Members of Congress.
- o When we include all of your other appearances before Members of Congress (Hearings, Ops-Intel Briefings, Speeches, etc.) to date you have appeared before a total of 125 Members, 85 Senators and 190 Representatives (including this week's SAC-D Hearing).

The comprehensive report of your contacts with Members of Congress for calendar year 7006 is attached at Tab B.

Attachments:  
Snowflake #051006-02 (TAB A)  
SecDef Contacts with Members of Congress (Tab B)

OSD 08153-06



5/22/2006 1:57:45 PM

Prepared by: MGySgt Sue Hines-Laboy, Executive Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/57577

~~FOUO~~

A

May 10, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Ruinsfeld  
SUBJECT: Number of Meetings on Hill

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Please double check

Thanks

Attach: 5/8/06 ASD(LA) memo to SD re: Legislative Affairs Status Report (OSD 07469-06)

DIR.dh  
051006-02

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 05/25/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57578

1812



LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

*Handwritten initials/signature*

INFO MEMO

May 8, 2006, 3:00 PM.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*Handwritten: RR 5/9*

FROM: Robert L. Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

*Handwritten signature: Robert L. Wilkie*

SUBJECT: Legislative Affairs Status Report

This weekly report summarizes major Legislative Affairs issues, challenges, and activities for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Hot Issues:

• SECDEF Hearings/Engagements:

- May 11: You are scheduled to meet Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) to discuss Iraq. The meeting is scheduled for 9:15-10:15 A.M. in the Speaker's office (H-202).
- May 17: You and CJCS Pace are scheduled to testify before the SAC-D on the FY07 Defense Budget. The hearing is scheduled for 10:00 AM in Dirksen 192.

• DEPSECDEF Hearings/Engagements:

- May 11: You are scheduled to meet Chairman Thad Cochran (R-MO) from 5:30-6:00 P.M. in Dirksen 113 to discuss the FY '06 Supplemental Conference.
- May 12: You are scheduled to participate in Congressman Clay Shaw's (R-FL) fly-in from 10:00-10:30 A.M. at the D.C. Holiday Inn.
- May 12: You are scheduled to meet Chairman Jerry Lewis (R-CA) from 11:00-11:30 A.M. in Rayburn 2112 to discuss the FY '06 Supplemental Conference.

FY07 Defense Authorization Bill:

- The HASC marked and passed the Committee's Report for the FY07 Defense Authorization Bill on May 3. The full House will consider the bill on May 10. A complete summary of the HASC's Report has been provided separately.
- The SASC marked and passed the Committee's Report for the FY07 Defense Authorization Bill on May 4. The full Senate is expected to consider the bill over the ten days prior to the July recess. We do not yet have the Senate bill, only a press release from the SASC. Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty what is in the Senate bill. A complete summary will be provided separately.
- Of our ten DoD legislative priorities, four are included in at least one of the two bills. Those are the three train and equip provisions for the GWOT and the

SA SD	6-5/9	SMA DSD	
SA SD	5/8	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	MS/8	1745	5/10/06
ESR MA	1/4	STP DIR	

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proposal to delete the requirement (enacted last year) to maintain at least 12 operational aircraft carriers.

- **Sustaining the Military Health Care Benefit:** The HASC Full Committee mark blocks the proposed increases in TRICARE fees until December 31, 2007 and restores the estimated \$735 million savings from fee increases to the Defense Health Program. It does not provide co-pays for mail order prescriptions, but raises retail pharmacy charges to \$6 for generic prescriptions and \$16 for formulary prescriptions. It also expands TRICARE Reserve Select benefits to those in the Selected Reserve at 28% of the premium for a member. My office, in conjunction with OASD(HA), continues to educate individual Members about the magnitude of the financial burden DoD faces because of health care costs.
- **Section 1206:** The Section 1206 Train and Equip authority was not mentioned during the HASC Full Committee markup. The executive summary, however, noted the passage of two related provisions: logistical support for allied forces participating in combined operations and temporary authority for using Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements to lend military equipment to foreign forces in Iraq and Afghanistan for personnel protection.
- **Emergency Supplemental:** On May 4, the Senate passed 78 to 20 its version of the FY06 emergency supplemental appropriations, totaling about \$109 billion, which is about \$17 billion more than the President's request and the House's version. The conference may be contentious because House leaders intend to hold down the amount of spending in the supplemental. The President has threatened to veto a bill that exceeds 594.5 billion.
- **Defense Oversight Engagement Plan:** This calendar year, you have met with 50 of the 148 Members of Congress assigned to leadership positions, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the Senate and House Defense Approps Subcommittees, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In total you have met with 117 Members of Congress.
- **Nominations:**
  - o The nominations of Ben Cohen (Army General Counsel), Anita Blair (USAF Manpower & Reserve Affairs), and Sue Payton (USAF Acquisition) are in the Senate with a hearing date projected for June.
  - o Senator John McCain (R-AZ) continues to hold the nomination of Michael Dominguez, (DUSD (P&R)) over C-130J contract issues.

Emerging Topics:

- **SOCOM Operational Plans in support of the GWOT:** The Department of Defense and the Department of State are preparing a briefing for Senate and House Members on the newly approved SOCOM operational plans for supporting the GWOT. Members requested this briefing after "The Washington Post" published an article about the plans.

#### Hill Concerns/Controversies:

- **Contractor Security Clearances:** Many Members are concerned that Defense Security Service has stopped accepting new requests for contractor security clearances because of a funding shortfall. OUSD(I) and OUSD(C) are working to solve the problem. However, the House Government Reform Committee and Senate Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management have scheduled hearings for May 17.

#### Hearings/Briefings/Meetings:

##### Past:

- **SECDEF/SECSTATE Iraq Briefings:** On May 3, the SECDEF joined SECSTATE Rice and VCJCS Giambastiani for a briefing to 80 Members of the House and 35 Members of the Senate. The briefings focused on the recent visit to Iraq.
- **Al-Qaeda's Use of Strategic Communications:** On May 4, ASD(ISA) Rodman and Daniel Deviin (OUSD(P)) testified before the HPSC about al-Qaeda's propaganda efforts beyond Iraq and the broader Middle East. The hearing included a briefing, based on two and a half years of research, on the ways in which al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-inspired groups have used the internet to spread Jihadist propaganda about U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

##### Future:

- **DoD and the Upcoming Hurricane Season:** The HASC will hold a hearing on DoD's preparations for the upcoming Hurricane Season at 10:00 AM on May 25. The witnesses will be ASD (Homeland Defense); McHale, LTG Blum (Chief, National Guard Bureau) and ADM Keating ; Commander NORTHCOM). A second panel will be made up of selected state Adjutants General.

**Hearing/CODEL Calendar  
May 2006**

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
1	2	3 CODEL Faleomavaega (C) (3-8 May) Germany	4 CODEL Pence (M) (4-9 May) Iraq, Greece, Turkey, Kuwait, Germany	5 CODEL Manzullo (M) (5-8 May) Charleston, SC  CODEL Crapo (M) 5-8 May Charleston, SC
8 CODEL Harkin (M) (7-8 May) Costa Rica  CODEL Goodlatte (M) (7-9 May) Colorado, Texas  CODEL Calvert (M) (7-9 May) Alabama  CODEL Burton (M) (6-9 May) Costa Rica, Nicaragua	9 <u>HGR/National Security &amp; Emerging Threats</u> 1000 2247 Rayburn Anthrax Protection Witnesses: ASD(HA), DASHHS(Public Health Preparedness), Director, Terrorism Preparedness & Emergency Response, CDCP, Deputy Director, Biological Countermeasures, Portfolio, DHS	10		12 CODEL Issa (M) (13-15 May) Haiti
15	16	<u>SAC - Defense</u> 1000 192 Dirksen Witnesses: SECDEF, OCS  <u>House Homeland Security</u> 1000 2118 Rayburn National Security Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. Witnesses: PDASD(HD), DHS, HHS, USDA  <u>HGR</u> 1300 2154 Rayburn Processing Requests for Security Clearances Witnesses: USD(I) or DUSD(C&S), OPM, OMB  <u>Senate Homeland Security &amp; Government Affairs/Oversight of Government</u> 1430 324 Dirksen Federal Government's Security Clearances Process Witnesses: USD(I) or DUSD(C&S), OPM, OMB, GAO	CODEL Hatch (M) (18-22 May) England, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq	CODEL Kolbe (M) (19-22 May) Egypt

\*(C) Commercial Air (M) MILAIR

**FOUO**

**May 10,2006**

**TO:** Robert Wilkie  
**CC:** Robert Rangel  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld  
**SUBJECT:** Number of Meetings on Hill

On page 2 your status report dated May 8 says I have met with a total of 117 Members of Congress this calendar year. is that correct?

I would think the meetings I have had with the House and Senate on ops-intel, plus my hearings, plus all the breakfasts and Blunt meetings must add up to more.

Please double check.

Thanks.

Attach. 5/8/06 ASD(LA) memo to SD re: Legislative Affairs Status Report (OSD 07469-06)

DHR:dh  
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***Please Respond By 05/25/06***

**FOUO**

**11-E-0559/OSD/57583**

B.

SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)

ate	Event	Location	Members	Other DoD Attendees	ime
19-Jan	Breakfast QDR	Pentagon	Sens: Alexander, Burns, Coleman, Domenici, Warner Reps: S. Davis, Marshall, Skelton, Taucheer	DepSec, CJCS, Cambone, Henry, Wilkie, Rangel	1 hr
25-Jan	Meeting	White House	Sens: Bayh, DeMint, Ensign, Johnson, Lincoln, Lott, Murkowski, B. Nelson, Obama		1 hr
26-Jan	Breakfast - QDR	SC-6 Capitol	Sens: Allard, Coburn, Cornyn, Ensign, Martinez, Ben Nelson, Sessions, Talent	Jonas, Henry, Schoomaker, Wilkie	1/2 hr
26 Jan	Meeting QDR	S-128 Capitol	Sen: Cochran	Jonas, Henry, Schoomaker, Wilkie	10 mins
26-Jan	Senate Republican Conference	Library of Congress	Senators: Alexander, Allen, Bond, Bunning, Chambliss, Collins, DeMint, Dole, Ensign, Frist, Grassley, Hutchinson, Isakson, Lott, Martinez, McConnell, Roberts, Sessions, G. Smith, Thomas, Warner, Allard, Bennett, Burns, Coburn, Coleman, Cornyn, DeWine, Fosi, Graham, Gregg, Hatch, Inhofe, Kyl, Murkowski, Santorum, Shelby, Stevens, Talent, Voinovich	Wilkie	1 hr
31-Jan	Conservative Members Retreat - QDR	Harbour Court Hotel, Baltimore	Reps: Aderholt, Akin, Bachus, Barrett, Bartlett, Bishop, Blackburn, Boozman, Brady, H. Brown, Burgess, Campbell, Cantor, Carter, Chabot, Chocola, Cole, Conaway, Cubin, Culberson, Doolittle, Feeney, Flake, Fortuno, Fox, Franks, Garrett, Gingrey, Haro, Gohmert, Gutknecht, Hensarling, Herger, Issa, S. Johnson, S. King, Kline, Lammgren, McHenry, McKeon, McMorris, Musgrave, Neugebauer, Pearce, Pence, Pitts, T. Price, Reynolds, Royce, P. Ryan, Soder, Tiahart, Turner, Wamp, D. Welch, Wicker, Westmoreland, T. Wilson	Wilkie, Rangel, DiRita	1/2 hrs

**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

	US Capitol	Sen: Warner		1 1/2 hr
ence -	Germany	Sen: McCain, Lieberman, Baile, Hutchinson, Latham. Reps: Hannan, Lautcher, Schwarz, Udall		
ense Budget	Pentagon	Sen: Warner, Stevens, Inouye. Reps: Hunter, Johnson	DepSec: Harvey, Winter, Wymie, CJCS: Krieg, Jonas, Chu, Cambone, Giambastiani, Schoomaker, Mullen, Moseley, Hagee, Henry, Winkenwerder, Smith, Wilkie, Rangel, DiRita	
ement	S-Darksen	Sen: Warner, Levin, McCain, Inhofe, Kyl, B. Nelson, Byrd, Talent, B. Nelson, J. Dole, Lieberman, Dayton, Thune, Ham, Cornyn, Furgur, Collins, Sessions	CJCS: Schoomaker, Wilkie, Broome	
	RHOB 2117A	Reps: Hunter, Skelton	CJCS: Rangel, Wilkie, Gen Meigs	30 mins
ement	RHOB 2117	Reps: Abernethy, Andrews, Bardallo, Butterfield, Hunter, S. Davis, Franks, Hayes, W. Jones, Larsen, Marshall, McHugh, Meek, Ortiz, Saxton, Stuster, Skelton, Snyder, G. Taylor, J. Wilson, V. Weldon	CJCS: Schoomaker, Wilkie	1 1/2 hr
all	LHOB 1011	Rep: Boehner	CJCS, Wilkie	15 mins
et, QDR	RHOB 2407	Reps: B. Young, Murtha	CJCS, Wilkie	30 mins
et	RHOB 2359	HAC-D: Young, Murtha, Tiahrt, Frelinghuysen, Dicks, Hobson, Olav Sabo, Latta, Viselovsky, Granger, Moran, Kingston, Kaptur, Wicker	CJCS: Jonas, Schoomaker, Wilkie	1 hr
eremony	Pentagon	Sen Warner	DepSec, Winter et al	1 hr
	Pentagon	Sen Ted Stevens	CJCS: Abizaid, Edelman, Wilkie	20 mins
	SD-119	Sen Ted Stevens	CJCS: Wilkie	15 mins
et	SD-106	SAC-Sens: Cochran, Stevens, Domenici, Bond, Burns, Bennett, Brownback, Allard, Byrd, Leahy, Mikulski, Kohl, Murray, Dorgan, Durbin	SFCSTATE, CJCS, Abizaid, Wilkie	1 hr

**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

9-Mar	Ops Intel - Iraq Update	RHOB 2118	Representatives: Akita, Bartlett, Beauprez, Bilirakis, Blackburn, Boozman, Boustany Jr., Burgess, Capito, Castle, Chabot, Chocola, Conaway, Dent, F. Diaz, Balart, Drake, Duncan, Feeney, Flake, Colman, Hefley, N. Johnson, Jones Jr., Kline, Kuhl, R. Lewis, Lungren, Marchant, McCaul, McCrery, McKeon, Pearce, Pence, Platts, T. Price, Ramstad, M. Rogers (AL), Ros-Lehtinen, Schmidt, Simons, Stearns, Thornberry, Upton, Wamp, D. Weldon, H. Wilson, J. Wilson, Aikenman, Bishop Jr., Blumenthauer, Cardoza, S. Davis, Deeks, Etheridge, Herseth, Kind, Langevin, Levin, Lofgren, Maloney, McCollum, Mehan, Moran, Neal, Pomeroy, Sherman, Skelton, A. Smith, G. Taylor, M. Udall, T. Udall, Waters	CJCS, Gen Abizaid, Wilkie
9-Mar	Ops Intel - Iraq Update	S-407 Capitol	Sens: Bingaman, Cantwell, Reed, Sununu, Sessions, McConnell, Chambliss, Lott, Bennett, Warner, Nelson(NH), Lautenberg, Martinez, Salazar, Kyl, Dayton, Chafee, Craig, Lugar, Cornyn, Alexander, Lincoln, McCain, Biden, Thune, Murkowski, Collins, Feingold, Voinovich, Sarbanes, Obama, Durbin	CJCS, Gen Abizaid, Wilkie
16-Mar	Meeting - House Theme Team	H-236 Capitol	Reps: Kingston, Putnam, J. Wilson, Pitts, Burgess, T. Price, Wamp, Wicker, Calvert, Foxx, M. Kennedy, S. Johnson, Drake, Elders, Gohmert, Keller, Akin, Conaway, S. Kelly, Gingrey, Adairholt, T. Murphy, Boustany, H. Brown, Foley, Gerlach, Tiberi, Tamarzo, Osbourne, Titus	Wilkie

**SECDEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

28-Mar	Visit to Memorial	Shanksville, PA	Reps: Platts, Shuster	Wilkie, Smith, MG Humoon
30-Mar	Breakfast	S-230 Capitol	Sen: Frist	CJCS
30-Mar	Meeting - Outreach	H-326 Capitol	Reps: Blunt, Dent, McCaul, Lucas, Brown-Waite, T. Bishop, Campbell, Reichert, Sodrel, Westmoreland	Rangel, Ruff, Broome
<b>NEW YORK</b>				
25-Apr	Meeting	SR-333	Sens. Sessions, Kyl & Cornyn	Rangel
25-Apr	Breakfast	SR-188	Sens: Frist, McConnell, Roberts, Santorum, Sessions, Domenici, Cornyn, BlunTING, Thune, Hatch, Chambliss, Hutchinson, Inhofe, Bennett, Allard, Ensign, Thomas	Wilkie
3-May	Ops Intel - Iraq Update	5 Capitol	Reps: Bachus, Bass, Blunt, Bond, Boustany, K. Brady, Burton, Buyer, Cantor, Case, Chocofa, Clay Jr., Coble, Cole, Costello, Cramer, G. Davis, Deal, Ehlers, Eschco, Farr, Gilebreath, Golman, Hart, A. Hastings, Hensarling, Higgins, Jackson-Lee, P. Johnson, Keller, P. Kennedy, Kucinich, Lantos, Larson, Lipinski, McCarthy, McKeon, Millender-McDonald, J. Miller, Norwood, Pitts, T. Price, M. Rogers, M. Rogers, Rohrabacher, Ros-Lehtinen, Rosten, Schakowsky, Schiff, Schmidt, D. Scott, Sherman, A. Smith, Stearns, G. Taylor, Tiahrt, Tiberi, Van Hollen, Visclosky, Walsh, D. Weldon, Wicker, H. Wilson, J. Wilson	Rice, Wilkie
3		407 Capitol	Sens: Frist, Snowe, Lott, Carper, McConnell, Ensign, Stevens, Durbin, Warner, Graham, Cornyn, Kerry, Stabenow, Kyl, Smith, Martinez, Allen, Gregg, Lautenberg, Lieberman, Reid, Brownback, Lugar, Byrd, Dodd, Bailey, Hatchison, McCain, Inhofe, Boxer, Feinstein, Bennett, Kohl, Feingold, Salazar, Sarbanes	Rice, Wilkie

**SEODEF CONTACT WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (CY 2006)**

17-May	Meeting		Rep: DODIG, L. Lewis, Granger, Dworkin, J. Wilson, McCaul, Kingston, Hayes, Shuster, Brown, T. Price	
17-May	Hearing - SAC-D	S-Dirksen 102	Sens: Stevens, Cochran, Specter, Domenici, Bond, McConnell, Shelby, Gregg, Bailey-Hutchison, Burns, Inouye, Byrd, Leahy, Harkin, Dorgan, Durbin, Reid, Feinstein, Mikulski	CJCS, Jonas, Wilkie, Blum, Br Cheney
18-May	Meeting - Supplemental	H-208 Capitol	Rep: Saxton	CJCS, Jonas, Wilkie, Blum, Ch

**Total: 35**

**Briefings: 4**  
**Breakfasts: 4**

**Hearings: 5**  
**Lunches: 2**

**Meetings: 13**  
**Others: 7**

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FOUO

May 22, 2006 |

TO The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Stephen J. Hadley

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Jimmy Carter's 1980 State of the Union

Attached is President Carter's 1980 State of the Union where he engages in declaratory policy with respect to the Gulf area, for your information.

Attach 1/23/80 President carter's State of the Union Address

DHR:ss  
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11-L-0559/OSD/57589

# Jimmy Carter

## State of the Union Address 1980

January 23, 1980

This last few months has not been an easy time for any of us. As we meet tonight, it has never been more clear that the state of our Union depends on the state of the world. And tonight, as throughout our own generation, freedom and peace in the world depend on the state of our Union.

The 1980's have been born in turmoil, strife, and change. This is a time of challenge to our interests and our values and it's a time that tests our wisdom and our skills.

At this time in Iran, 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy. Also at this moment, massive Soviet troops are attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan. These two acts--one of international terrorism and one of military aggression--present a serious challenge to the United States of America and indeed to all the nations of the world. Together, we will meet these threats to peace.

I'm determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain secure--a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is.

Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges: the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran.

Each of these factors is important in its own right. Each interacts with the others. All must be faced together, squarely and courageously. We will face these challenges, and we will meet them with the best that is in us. And we will not fail.

In response to the abhorrent act in Iran, our Nation has never been aroused and unified so greatly in peacetime. Our position is clear. The United States will not yield to blackmail.

We continue to pursue these specific goals: first, to protect the present and long-range interests of the United States; secondly, to preserve the lives of the American hostages and to secure, as quickly as possible, their safe release, if possible, to avoid bloodshed which might further endanger the lives of our fellow citizens; to enlist the help of other nations in condemning this act of violence, which is shocking and violates the moral and the legal standards of a civilized world; and also to convince and to persuade the Iranian leaders that the real danger to their nation lies in the north, in the Soviet Union and from the Soviet troops now in Afghanistan, and that the unwarranted Iranian quarrel with the United States hampers their response to this far greater danger to them.

If the American hostages are harmed, a severe price will be paid. We will never rest until every one of the American hostages are released.

But now we face a broader and more fundamental challenge in this region because of the recent military action of the Soviet Union.

Now, as during the last 3 1/2 decades, the relationship between our country, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in global conflict.

Since the end of the Second World War, America has led other nations in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power. This has not been a simple or a static relationship. Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation.

In the 1940's we took the lead in creating the Atlantic Alliance in response to the Soviet Union's suppression and then consolidation of its East European empire and the resulting threat of the Warsaw Pact to Western Europe.

In the 1950's we helped to contain further Soviet challenges in Korea and in the Middle East, and we rearmed to assure the continuation of that containment.

In the 1960's we met the Soviet challenges in Berlin, and we faced the Cuban missile crisis. And we sought to engage the Soviet Union in the important task of moving beyond the cold war and away from confrontation.

And in the 1970's three American presidents negotiated with the Soviet leaders in attempts to halt the growth of the nuclear arms race. We sought to establish rules of behavior that would reduce the risks of conflict, and we searched for areas of cooperation that could make our relations reciprocal and productive, not only for the sake of our two nations but for the security and peace of the entire world.

In all these actions, we have maintained two commitments: to be ready to meet any challenge by Soviet military power, and to develop ways to resolve disputes and to keep the peace.

Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That's why we've negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties--SALT I and SALT II. Especially now, in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort to control nuclear weapons will not be abandoned.

We superpowers also have the responsibility to exercise restraint in the use of our great military force. The integrity and the independence of weaker nations must not be threatened. They must know that in our presence they are secure.

But now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It's using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.

The vast majority of nations on Earth have condemned this latest Soviet attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Moslem world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned. But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression.

While this invasion continues, we and the other nations of the world cannot conduct business as usual with the Soviet Union. That's why the United States has imposed stiff economic penalties on the Soviet Union. I will not issue any permits for Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters of the United States. I've cut Soviet access to high-technology equipment and to agricultural products. I've limited other commerce with the Soviet Union, and I've asked our allies and friends to join with us in restraining their own trade with the Soviets and not to replace our own embargoed items. And I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.

The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest? The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values.

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened.

Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

During the past 3 years, you have joined with me to improve our own security and the prospects for peace, not only in the vital oil-producing area of the Persian Gulf region but around the world. We've increased annually our real commitment for defense, and we will sustain this increase of effort throughout the Five Year Defense Program. It's imperative that Congress approve this strong defense budget for 1981, encompassing a 5-percent real growth in authorizations, without any reduction.

We are also improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas. We've helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances, and recently we and other NATO members have decided to develop and to deploy modernized, intermediate-range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increased threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union.

We are working with our allies to prevent conflict in the Middle East. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is a notable achievement which represents a strategic asset for America and which also enhances prospects for regional and world peace. We are now engaged in further negotiations to provide full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, and to preserve the peace and security of Israel. Let no one doubt our commitment to the security of Israel. In a few days we will observe an historic event when Israel makes another major withdrawal from the Sinai and when Ambassadors will be exchanged between Israel and Egypt.

We've also expanded our own sphere of friendship. Our deep commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs has improved our relationship with much of the Third World. Our decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the Western Pacific.

We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.

We've reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and its integrity. The United States will take action consistent with our own laws to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression. And I'm asking the Congress specifically to reaffirm this agreement. I'm also working, along with the leaders of other nations, to provide additional military and economic aid for Pakistan. That request will come to you in just a few days.

Finally, we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all.

All these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and of the nation which we represent and those of our allies--in Europe and the Pacific, and also in the parts of the world which have such great strategic importance to us, stretching especially through the Middle East and Southwest Asia. With your help, I will pursue these efforts with vigor and with determination. You and I will act as necessary to protect and to preserve our Nation's security.

The men and women of America's Armed Forces are on duty tonight in many parts of the world. I'm proud of the job they are doing, and I know you share that pride. I believe that our volunteer forces are adequate for current defense needs, and I hope that it will not become necessary to impose a draft. However, we must be prepared for that possibility. For this reason, I have determined that the Selective Service System must now be revitalized. I will send legislation and budget proposals to the Congress next month so that we can begin registration and then meet future mobilization needs rapidly if they arise.

We also need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guarantee that abuses do not recur, but we

must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information, and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence.

The decade ahead will be a time of rapid change, as nations everywhere seek to deal with new problems and age-old tensions. But America need have no fear. We can thrive in a world of change if we remain true to our values and actively engaged in promoting world peace. We will continue to work as we have for peace in the Middle East and southern Africa. We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence which they have struggled so hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights.

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together through open, democratic methods, the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring. That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character.

Peace—a peace that preserves freedom—remains America's first goal. In the coming years, as a mighty nation we will continue to pursue peace. But to be strong abroad we must be strong at home. And in order to be strong, we must continue to face up to the difficult issues that confront us as a nation today.

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: Our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our Nation's security. The need has never been more urgent. At long last, we must have a clear, comprehensive energy policy for the United States.

As you well know, I have been working with the Congress in a concentrated and persistent way over the past 3 years to meet this need. We have made progress together. But Congress must act promptly now to complete final action on this vital energy legislation. Our Nation will then have a major conservation effort, important initiatives to develop solar power, realistic pricing based on the true value of oil, strong incentives for the production of coal and other fossil fuels in the United States, and our Nation's most massive peacetime investment in the development of synthetic fuels.

The American people are making progress in energy conservation. Last year we reduced overall petroleum consumption by 8 percent and gasoline consumption by 5 percent below what it was the year before. Now we must do more.

After consultation with the Governors, we will set gasoline conservation goals for each of the 50 States, and I will make them mandatory if these goals are not met.

I've established an import ceiling for 1980 of 8.2 million barrels a day—well below the level of foreign oil purchases in 1977. I expect our imports to be much lower than this, but the ceiling will be enforced by an oil import fee if necessary. I'm prepared to lower these imports still further if the other oil-consuming countries will join us in a fair and mutual reduction. If we have a serious shortage, I will not hesitate to impose mandatory gasoline rationing immediately.

The single biggest factor in the inflation rate last year, the increase in the inflation rate last year, was from one cause: the skyrocketing prices of OPEC oil. We must take whatever actions are necessary to reduce our dependence on foreign oil—and at the same time reduce inflation.

As individuals and as families, few of us can produce energy by ourselves. But all of us can conserve energy—every one of us, every day of our lives. Tonight I call on you—in fact, all the people of America—to help our Nation. Conserve energy. Eliminate waste. Make 1980 indeed a year of energy conservation.

Of course, we must take other actions to strengthen our Nation's economy.

First, we will continue to reduce the deficit and then to balance the Federal budget.

Second, as we continue to work with business to hold down prices, we'll build also on the historic national accord with organized labor to restrain pay increases in a fair fight against inflation.

Third, we will continue our successful efforts to cut paperwork and to dismantle unnecessary Government regulation.

Fourth, we will continue our progress in providing jobs for America, concentrating on a major new program to provide training and work for our young people, especially minority youth. It has been said that "a mind is a terrible thing to waste." We will give our young people new hope for jobs and a better life in the 1980's.

And fifth, we must use the decade of the 1980's to attack the basic structural weaknesses and problems in our economy through measures to increase productivity, savings, and investment.

With these energy and economic policies, we will make America even stronger at home in this decade--just as our foreign and defense policies will make us stronger and safer throughout the world. We will never abandon our struggle for a just and a decent society here at home. That's the heart of America--and it's the source of our ability to inspire other people to defend their own rights abroad.

Our material resources, great as they are, are limited. Our problems are too complex for simple slogans or for quick solutions. We cannot solve them without effort and sacrifice. Walter Lippmann once reminded us, "You took the good things for granted. Now you must earn them again. For every right that you cherish, you have a duty which you must fulfill. For every good which you wish to preserve, you will have to sacrifice your comfort and your ease. There is nothing for nothing any longer."

Our challenges are formidable. But there's a new spirit of unity and resolve in our country. We move into the 1980's with confidence and hope and a bright vision of the America we want: an America strong and free, an America at peace, an America with equal rights for all citizens--and for women, guaranteed in the United States Constitution--an America with jobs and good health and good education for every citizen, an America with a clean and bountiful life in our cities and on our farms, an America that helps to feed the world, an America secure in filling its own energy needs, an America of justice, tolerance, and compassion. For this vision to come true, we must sacrifice, but this national commitment will be an exciting enterprise that will unify our people.

Together as one people, let us work to build our strength at home, and together as one indivisible union, let us seek peace and security throughout the world.

Together let us make of this time of challenge and danger a decade of national resolve and of brave achievement.

Thank you very much.

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Please send comments or questions to [carter.library@nara.gov](mailto:carter.library@nara.gov)

Last modified: September 13, 2004.

FOUO

May 19, 2006

0948  
22 May 06  
**ACTION**

500

TO: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Costs to Transport

I had a meeting with TRANSCOM the other day. Apparently, it costs ten times as much to transport via ~~air~~ compared to sea or ground.

We ought to institute a very serious effort on the part of the Department of Defense to reduce costs. It if is ten times **as** much to airlift compared to sealift or ground, we ought to have a very systematic effort taking a look at everything we are doing and figuring out how we **can** reduce aviation and increase the land and sea effort. This is an important thing that can save us a **fortune**.

Please come back to **me** with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051906-13

.....  
**Please Respond By 06/29/06**



5/23/2006 2:07:41 PM

19 May 01

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57595



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-0381-06  
12 July 2006

INFO MEMO

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *12/9/06*

SUBJECT: Airlift vs. Sealift Costs

In response to your request (TAB A), a memorandum from CDRUSTRANSCOM is attached (TAB B).

COORDINATION: **TAB C**

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General C. V. Christianson, USA; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57596

OSD 08229-06



7/12/2006 4:13:26 PM

~~FOUO~~

0946  
22 May 06  
123  
~~ACT ON~~  
May 19, 2006

TO: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Costs to Transport

I had a meeting with TRANSCOM the other day. Apparently, it costs ten times as much to transport via air compared to sea or ground.

We ought to institute a very serious effort on the part of the Department of Defense to reduce costs. If it is ten times as much to airlift compared to sealift or ground, we ought to have a very systematic effort taking a look at everything we are doing and figuring out how we can reduce aviation and increase the land and sea effort. This is an important thing that can save us a fortune.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DRE:dm  
DR:R6613

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 06/29/06*

OSD 06229-08  
  
6/23/2006 2:07:41 PM

~~FOUO~~

Tab A



TAB B

UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

508 SCOTT DRIVE  
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-8357

9 June 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THRU: CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHEWS OF STAFF

FROM: TCCC

SUBJECT: Airlift vs Sealift Cost (OSD 08229-06)

*Sir,*  
1. You recently requested the Joint Staff to provide a draft SECDEF response focusing on actual air/ground cargo costs, modal cost benefit analysis, and a way-ahead that analyzes both economic and logistical factors.

2. Capitalizing on its designation as Distribution Process Owner (DPO), the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and its partners worked closely to maximize overall economic savings and logistical efficiency. One of the early focus areas was on the use of sealift to achieve the greatest value and stewardship of DoI transportation funds. Sealift is most efficient at moving large quantities of materiel over long distances. Airlift, on the other hand, is most effective at moving smaller quantities quickly. Cost per pound for airlift is significantly more than sealift; though the actual cost is affected by numerous variables, a 10 to 1 cost ratio has historically been accepted within USTRANSCOM for planning purposes.

3. Numerous planning events, techniques and tools are used to balance operational effectiveness and efficiency of movement through the deployment and distribution enterprise:

a. Bi-annual Force Flow and Sustainment Conferences with the Services, Combatant Commands, and Agencies establish COCOM movement priorities.

b. Management reviews by USTRANSCOM, supported COCOMs and major Service commands are used to support transportation mode decisions. Continuing examples of DPO management review techniques include:

(1) USTRANSCOM review of the "Top 100" items moved by air: the list includes commodities and items coordinated with Army Materiel Command, Defense Logistics Agency, USCENTCOM, CFLCC and MNE-I. Highest priority cargo in support of combat troops is excluded from review due to its time-critical nature. Since program inception in Jan 06, the "Top 100" has resulted in over 700 short tons per month being diverted from the airlift system to sealift.

(2) Army Materiel Command, through the Army Air Clearance Authority, challenges routine operational support cargo where the cost delta between airlift/sealift is greater than \$5 thousand or where the cargo is high cube/low weight (e.g., bubble wrap, styrofoam packaging, etc). USCENTCOM has confirmed 90 percent of recommendations to divert cargo from airlift to sealift. Moreover, using the same management review technique, DLA air-shipments of routine support cargo have decreased 66 percent in the past three months.

Tab B

OSD 08229-06



11-L-0559/OSD/57598

7/12/2006 4:08:12 PM

(3) The DLA-initiated Defense Distribution Center Kuwait, SWA, has provided a forward stocking point for thousands of the highest-use stock items including the amount needed to shift distribution workload from airlift to sealift. To date, DLA has avoided \$364.5 million in transportation costs.

(4) The USTRANSCOM component, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), developed a management review process that allowed DLA to divert CONUS truck shipments to rail. Over \$11 million in cost has been avoided.

c. Computer-based tools provide visibility of air, sea and land transportation assets, aggregated reporting of cargo and passenger movements, and provide a rough-order-of-magnitude calculator to assist with modal cost decision support.

4. The following examples highlight the variance in the air to sea cost ratio for narrow segments of deployment/sustainment supplies. Actual costs vary widely based on commodity, packaging, mode, whether lift is provided by contract or organic assets, and prior year budget actions affecting rates.

a. All high priority and routine support cargo moved by air and sea to the CENTCOM region from Oct 05 to May 06 was analyzed. The average shipping costs per pound was \$3.10 for airlift and \$0.35 for sealift. The ratio was 8.9 to 1.

b. In Jul 05, data on the movement of up-armored HMMWVs was provided for the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation final report to Congress. From Sep 03 through Jun 05, 8,982 HMMWVs were shipped at a cost of \$42.3 million: 555 were shipped by air at an average unit cost of \$24.7 thousand and 8,437 were shipped by sealift at an average unit cost of \$3.4 thousand. The ratio was 7.3 to 1.

5. We will continue to pursue vigilant management of supply requisitions with our warfighting and Service partners and employ our planning tools against DoD goals. Although the 10 to 1 ratio is not a perfect measure, it is a good estimate, is easily applied, and emphasizes the continued need to compare transportation modes. USTRANSCOM maintains the expertise to assist planners develop actionable cost comparisons, and will respond to SD Snowflake 06-02881, with our first 60-day review, no later than 31 Aug 06. Additionally, we will continue to encourage USCENTCOM to pursue local purchases, obviating the need for transportation by air or sea.

  
NORTON A. SCHWARTZ  
General, USAF  
Commander

Tab B

# UNCLASSIFIED

## TAB C

### COORDINATION

USA	Mr. Gonano	20 June 2006
USN	CAPT Wode	20 June 2006
USAF	Col Hollerbach	20 June 2006
USMC	Col Richey	20 June 2006
USCENTCOM	COL Roldan	20 June 2006
USEUCOM	COL D'Angelo	20 June 2006
USJFCOM	COL Washington	20 June 2006
USNORTHCOM	COL Smith	19 June 2006
USPACOM	COL Gitto	20 June 2006
USSOUTHCOM	COL Regner	20 June 2006
USSOCOM	Mr. Lamneck	20 June 2006
USTRANSCOM/J-8	Mr. Folen	20 June 2006

Tab C

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
11-L-0559/OSD/57600

INFO MEMO

JUL 14 2006 - HC 1413

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Gordon England

SUBJECT: Costs to Transport

500

TRANSCOM uses a 10 to 1 cost ratio for planning purposes when measuring airlift vs. sealift costs. Several of the processes in place to help manage these costs include:

- Reviewing the 'Top 100' items moved by air, resulting in 700+ short tons per month being diverted from airlift to sealift since January 2006
- Diverting cargo from airlift to sealift when AMC measures a cost delta between airlift/sealift greater than \$5K
- Stocking thousands of high-use items in DLA's Defense Distribution Center Kuwait, saving \$364.5 million in transportation costs to date
- Developing a management review process in Surface Deployment and Distribution Command which converts CONUS truck shipments to rail at a savings of \$11 million to date

Despite the high costs for airlift, I'm comfortable TRANSCOM has the proper procedures in place to minimize airlift and increase our land and sea transport.

*I've personally talked to  
Norty numerous times -  
he's got it!*

*14 Jul 06*

*Anderson  
7-14*

*19 May 06*

OSD 08229-06



7/21/2006 11:35:30 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57601

0700  
6/20



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

508 SCOTT DRIVE  
SCOTT AIR FORCEBASE, ILLINOIS 62225-5357

9 June 2006

PLEASE MAKE SURE  
SECDEF HAS RECEIVED  
A COPY.  
ALSO - PROVIDE TO  
VECS.  
THANKS  
6/18  
500

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THRU: CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM: TCCC

SUBJECT: Airlift vs Sealift Cost (OSD 08229-06)

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9 on 06

19 May 06

08229-06

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
c. Computer-based tools provide visibility of air, sea and land transportation assets, aggregated reporting of cargo and passenger movements, and provide a rough-order-of-magnitude calculator to assist with modal cost decision support.

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NORTON A. SCHWARTZ  
General, USAF  
Commander

SJS 06-02881

24 May 2006

DISTRIBUTION C PLUS, J-4,  
J-8, J-3, OCJCS/LC

SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTIVE

on

/DSD ACTION ITEM/ AIRLIFT VS SEALIFT COSTS

1. The attached is referred to J-4 for DJS REPLY in collaboration/coordination with OCJCS/LC, J-3, J-8, Services and the Combatant Commands.
2. The suspense for this action is 12 June 2006, unless an extension is coordinated with the Secretary, Joint Staff.

Joint Secretariat

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~FOUO~~

9/28  
6

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

23 May 2006 - 0730 Hours

MEMORANDUM **FOR** DJS

SUBJECT: Airlift vs Sealift **Costs**


Sir,

DSD requests that the Joint Staff provide a draft SECDEF response focusing on:

- Actual cargo and ground costs
- **Cost** Benefit Analysis of aircraft utilization over the alternate transport modes
- Way ahead proposal that maximizes economic savings and logistical efficiency

Please provide a copy of this memo with your response.

Very Respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch  
CAPT, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE 12 Jun 06  
ATTACHMENT: SD Snowflake to DSD re  
**Costs** to Transport

500

23 May 06

19 May 06

OSD 08229-06



5/23/2006 2:07:44 PM

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57605

FOUO

May 19, 2006

227142  
0998  
325  
ACTION

TO: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Six Sigma

I was asked in the town hall about whether the Six Sigma is going to be done in the other branches besides the Army. Do you know what is happening elsewhere in the Department?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051906-18

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/22/06*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57606

5/22  
1340

~~FOUO~~

May 17, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Visits Before Hearings

In the future, I *think* I should go up and visit with some of the key people before I am going to testify.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
051706-11



OSD 08253-06



5/23/2006 2:22:41 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57607

5/22  
1300

~~FOUO~~

May 17, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
SUBJECT: Visits Before Hearings

In the future, I *think* I should *go up and visit* with some of the key people before I ~~am~~ going to testify.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051706-11

.....

.....

*May 19, 2006*

*Mr. Secretary -*

*I agree. For your recent SAC-D hearing, we attempted to schedule an official visit with Senator Stevens. Your White House meeting and the Committee schedule prevented us from doing so.*

*We will be sure to continue this practice in the future.*

*Robert L. Wilkie*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57608

OSD 08253-06



5/23/2006 2 22 35 PM

~~FOUO~~

MAY 10 2006

TO: Steve Cambone  
Gen Pete Pace  
Jim Haynes  
CC: *Donalaco Smith*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Investigation into CENTCOM Leaks

Here is an e-mail from Lance Smith at JFCOM. What do you think we should do?

Thanks.

Attach. Undated *JFCOM* ltr to SecDef

DHR/ah  
050906-08

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/25/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08265-06



11 L 0559/OSD/57600

5/23/2006 3:44:24 PM

Mr. Secretary

This is to let you know that we are about to forward an internal JFCOM investigation into recent disclosures of classified information contained in a version of JFCOM's Iraqi Perspectives Project Lessons Learned brief. Per the relevant DoD directive, we will forward the report to the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence) and to the DoD General Counsel.

The disclosures were published by reporter Michael Gordon in the New York Times in February, and soon thereafter in Gordon and LTG (ret) Bernard Trainor's book, "Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq." I feel very strongly that further investigation is warranted and my endorsement will recommend that the matter be referred to the Department of Justice for further action. I respectfully request your support for further appropriate investigative action. Further background, basic findings and recommendations follow:

On February 27, 2006 the New York Times and the International Herald Tribune published articles disclosing secret information concerning the involvement of German intelligence in support of coalition operations against Iraq. As stated by the NYT in its articles, and confirmed by our investigation, this information did indeed come from a secret version of JFCOM's Iraqi Perspectives Project brief. The information also appears in Gordon and Trainor's book, which was published soon after.

Evidence indicates that N M reporter Mike Gordon and his writing partner, LTG (ret) Bernard Trainor, improperly obtained a written copy of a secret 25 April 2005 version of the brief, and then deliberately disclosed classified information contained therein. Our JFCOM investigation could not pinpoint the source of the initial disclosure to Gordon and Trainor, but does narrow down the possibilities to certain finite time frames, and to a number of possible individuals who had access and opportunity. Not all of these persons are within JFCOM's investigative or disciplinary jurisdiction.

Additionally, in a 27 Feb 06 web edition "editor's response" to a German government denial, by NYT executive editor Bill Keller, The

NYT explicitly admits that the source of its information on German intelligence involvement was a classified JFCOM study dated 2005.

Plus, the forward to Gordon and Trainor's book states that its "inside story" was "Informed by unparalleled access to still-secret documents." Of significant note, LTG(ret) Trainor holds a security clearance through the Center for Naval Analysis. He and Gordon's apparently deliberate and knowing disclosure of secret information very likely violates federal criminal statutes. Even if not, these facts may provide good cause to revoke LTG (ret) Trainor's clearance. Those remedial actions, which our JFCOM investigations suggests to be appropriate, are outside the scope of unilateral JFCOM authority.

My very strong view is that, as contemplated by the relevant DOD directives, the matter should be reviewed by USD (I) and DOD GC and then forwarded to DoJ for further action, with a view to discovering and holding accountable the original source of the compromise of the IPP brief to Gordon and Trainor, as well as to determining the appropriate actions to take with respect to Gordon and Trainor.

With your concurrence and support, I would like to push hard for that course of action. I am available to discuss further if you desire.

Very Respectfully,

Lance Smith  
GEN, USAF  
CDRUSJFCOM



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

MAY 23 2006

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense 

SUBJECT: Investigation into CENTCOM Leaks

- Lance Smith emailed his recommendation that there be an investigation of a leak of classified information revealed in the book Cobra II.

- I think we should report this matter to the Department of Justice, as recommended by General Smith.

- Advance copies of the relevant investigations have already been provided to the Department of Justice Department, National Security Division.

cc:

CJCS  
USDJ



11-L-0559/OSD/57612



OSD 08265-06

5/23/2006 3:44:04 PM

~~FOUO~~

May 19, 2006

TO: Jim Haynes

c c : David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Town Hall Follow-up: Spouse Act

Please get the transcript from my Town Hall meeting. A woman who said she is a victim of spousal abuse said the **spouse** act is bad and that there is a suit being tried somewhere in the south. She said our lawyers down there are saying that women like her are shortsighted and something else, and she is unhappy about it.

Would you check into it?

Thanks.

DHR,dh  
051906-17

.....  
***Please Respond By 06/15/06***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57613

OSD 08300-06



5/24/2006 10:55:47 AM



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

May 23, 2006, 3:33 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Town Hall Follow-up: Spouse Act (Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act (USFSPA))

- The USFSPA (10 U.S.C. § 1408) governs the division of military retired pay in divorce cases.
- In April 2004, a group called the USFSPA Litigation Support Group initiated a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Virginia, Tammy Adkins v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, seeking to overturn the USFSPA on Constitutional grounds. The Government is represented by the Department of Justice.
- The District Court decided against the plaintiffs by concluding that any remedy in this case that Plaintiff is seeking should come from Congress and not the courts.
- The plaintiffs then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Richmond.
- As alleged at the town hall meeting, the Department of Justice does use terms such as "short-sighted" and "self-serving" in two places in its Reply Brief; however, these terms are not atypical in legal briefs. They reference specific arguments put forward by plaintiffs in their brief and are not meant to imply that the plaintiffs as a group are "short-sighted" and "self-serving."
- Oral arguments were held at the court yesterday in Richmond. A decision in this case is not expected for at least several months.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Jim Smyser, ODGC (P&HP), (b)(6)

*PS. - Your comments  
the town hall meeting  
were perfect!  
JH* \*



11-L-0559/OSD/57614



OSD 08300-06

5/24/2006 10:56:43 AM



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

24-05-2006 A09:20

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) Progress Report

- This is an update on the Army's actions to increase participation in TSP in response to the Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated November 30, 2005, subject: Thrift Savings Plan (TAD A).
- The Army has been working diligently to increase awareness of the potential benefits of TSP among our Soldiers. In December, we established a TSP Working Group to increase Army TSP participation.
- The Army has developed an aggressive strategic communications plan to increase Soldier awareness of the TSP program. The Army renewed its effort to encourage participation through the release of a Green Top press release, ARNEWS story release, as well as links to the TSP website and information on TSP through our Army Knowledge Online (AKO) website. We have included TSP articles in the two most recent issues of *Soldiers* magazine, and information on TSP will be a feature article in future issues. We are also producing several TV and radio broadcasts for Army Newswatch and Soldiers Radio News that highlight the features and benefits of TSP.
- From a retention perspective, we have also been working aggressively to disseminate information regarding TSP through retention channels. TSP information is now a mandatory part of regular retention counseling. In April, over 40 of our Sergeant Major Command Retention Counselors received information and training on TSP during a Sergeants Major Steering Committee Conference from a representative of the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Review Board (FRTIB).
- With regard to our recruiting efforts, the Army has incorporated information on TSP into the benefits section of the recruiter's Army Recruiting Information Support System (ARISS) and the Army interview. We also worked successfully with the FRTIB to develop an information brochure for use by recruiters and financial counselors that provides targeted information for new recruits and Soldiers not currently participating in TSP. In accordance with the NDAA for FY 2006, we have also successfully initiated the TSP Matching Funds Pilot Program for new recruits starting 3 April 2006. The program is open to new recruits who enlist in a critical

11-L-0559/OSD/57615



5/24/2006 11:24:26 AM

**SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) Progress Report**

specialty for five or more years. As of 9 May, 527 new recruits enlisted with this option.

- We have included information on TSP in our financial readiness training that is available at Army Community Service centers. Specifically, all first-term Soldiers now receive information on TSP as part of their mandatory financial readiness training when they report to their first permanent duty station.
- As a result of our continued efforts in this area, participation across the Army increased by 7,305 to 156,903 from 17 January 2006 through 4 May 2006. The percentage of participation increased from 14.8% to 15.4% from mid-January to 30 April 2006 (20.9% Active Component, 10.3% Reserve Component).

**COORDINATION: NONE**

**Attachments:**

As stated

**Prepared By: Major Onus George, (b)(6)**

# Tab A

**FOUO**

NOV 3 0 2805

TO: Fran Harvey  
Michael Wynne  
GEN Pete Schoomaker  
Gen Mike Moseley  
GEN Mike Hagee

CC: Gordon England  
Dino Aviles  
ADM Mike Mullen  
David Chu

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan

Attached is some material on the Thrift Savings Plan figures. It is clear the Navy has worked the **program and been** successful. It seems the Army, Air Force and **Marine Corps** may have not done so.

The **Thrift Savings Plan** is an enormous Benefit. It ought to be of **significant interest and attraction** to the people you are **trying** to recruit and retain.

 Please tell me what you are doing to get your Service to do a better job in communicating the **Thrift savings Plan program**.

In addition I would like a **report** every six **months**, beginning June 1, 2006, on progress or the lack thereof.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/10/05 SecDef memo to USD P&R, 10/13/05 USD P&R memo to SecDef

DIR.ss  
11280542

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

**FOUO**

OSD 23959-05



5/24/2006 11:22:15 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57618

May 22, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Range *RR*

SUBJECT: Saxton letter

- Attached is draft letter to Congressman Saxton for your review.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

See edits \_\_\_\_\_



5/26/2006 11:35:56 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57619

*IR 9*

*22 May 06*

*22 May 06*

5/23  
1108

Honorable Jim Saxton  
U.S. House of Representatives

Dear Congressman Saxton:

I welcomed the opportunity to visit last week regarding your insights on terrorism, Iraq and the challenges facing the new Iraqi unity government.

Your assessment on the various points raised strikes me as about **right** and I appreciated hearing your ~~helpful~~ <sup>you</sup> perspective. ~~Keep~~ <sup>Please</sup> me posted on your thoughts as events develop in Iraq in the ~~weeks~~ <sup>month</sup> ahead.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

DR



5/22  
1000

~~FOUO~~

Trag

MAY 22 2006

TO: ~~Robert~~ Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Draft Letter to Saxton

Please draft a letter ~~from~~ to Saxton thanking him for taking the time to fill me in and that I certainly agree with the essence of what he was saying.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051906-02

.....  
*Please Respond By May 25, 2006*

*DR 5/23*

MAY 23 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

OSD 08397-06



5/26/2006 11:33:45 AM

22 May 06

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/57621



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAY 25 2006

Iraq

The Honorable Jim Saxton  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Saxton,

I welcomed the opportunity to visit last week regarding your insights on terrorism, Iraq, and the challenges facing the new Iraqi unity government.

Your assessment on the various points you raised strikes me as about right and I appreciated hearing your perspective. Please keep me posted on your thoughts as events develop in Iraq in the months ahead.

With best wishes,

Sincerely

25 May 06

22 May 06


OSD 08397-06



5/25/2006 4:09:14 PM

~~FOUO~~

MAY 25 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Dempsey's Response to McCaffrey Report

373

I sent the attached memo to *Marty Dempsey* about the McCaffrey Report. Here is his response, which might be of interest.

Attach: 5/18/06 SecDef memo to LTG Dempsey; 5/19/06 LTG memo to SecDef

DFR:aa  
052406-17

as may be

OSD 08409-06



5/25/2006 12:16:21 PM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57623

~~FOUO~~

May 08, 2006

TO: LTG Martin Dempsey

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
GEN George Casey

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: McCaffrey's ~~Report~~

I just read McCaffrey's report, and I notice on Page 3, in the next to the last paragraph, he is very critical of the equipment of the Iraqi security forces. Is his paragraph accurate, or is it better than he describes? Certainly, his characterization suggests ~~their~~ equipment is not *as good as* I thought it currently was -- when we say they ~~are~~ trained and equipped.

*Thanks.*

DHR:ss  
050806-14

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/18/06*

MAY 24 2006

*out  
5/24*

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57624

211  
424



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ  
BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09348

MNSTC-I-CG

19 May 2006


MEMORANDUM THRU

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq APO AE 09342  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 999 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-9999

FOR Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT: Response to GEN (R) McCaffery's Trip Report Concerning Iraqi Security Forces  
Equipping

1. The Iraqi Army is somewhat lightly but not poorly armed. In fact, the equipment in an Iraqi light infantry battalion is similar to that found in its American counterpart. The Iraqi light infantry battalion currently has 80 light machineguns and 24 RPGs. By the end of the year, each battalion will have 8 heavy machineguns, 8 light mortars, and 10 sniper rifles. The ISF is becoming increasingly armored and mobile. Over the next nine months, each battalion will receive 15 armored HMMWVs (UAH), and each brigade will have approximately 48 wheeled armored personnel carriers providing enhanced quick reaction capability and force protection.
2. From the start, the Iraqi Army was built on a light infantry model. This is the right model based on the nature of the threat they face and because it takes advantage of their greatest strength—their ability to interact with the Iraqi populace. By providing the Iraqi Army with both equipment and the “intangibles—that define a military force, we have helped them achieve moral and physical ascendancy over their enemies through superior training, marksmanship, unit cohesion, and increasingly good leadership.
3. We recently completed an in-stride assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces and based on that assessment we are in the process of making several changes that will improve their sustainability, enhance their force protection, and increase their force projection.
4. The Iraqi Army as currently planned will be complete by the end of 2006, and it will be demonstrate its ability to provide internal security for Iraq. However, Iraq will require long-term security guarantees from the United States and other Coalition Nations to ensure its external security until it can determine and meet its future defense requirements. Work on that process in the two security ministries will begin in earnest as the new government forms.

  
MARTIN E. DEMPSBY  
Lieutenant General, US Army  
Commanding

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57625

FOUO

MAY 25 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: August 2002 Memo on Interagency Process

*334 NSC*

Attached is a memo I sent to Condi back in 2002 on the interagency process. I am sure you saw it then, but you might want to take a look at it.

Thanks so much for coming over with your team today. I think it was helpful to us. I hope it was to you.

Attach 8/20/02 Memo on Interagency Process

DHR:ss  
052406-18

*25 MAY 06*

OSD 08410-06



5/25/2006 12:17:34 PM

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57626

August 20,2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT **FOR** NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS (CONDOLEEZZA RICE)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Interagency Process

**As** we have discussed, the interagency process could be improved to help all of us better manage the high volume of work we have. I've talked with my folks about it to see if we could come up with some ideas that might be helpful.

I have just established a position in my office for a Policy person to do nothing but staff Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith and me regarding our NSC meeting schedules and papers – to try and help us deal with the many changes in dates, times, agendas, materials, attendees and the like.

We have some suggestions **as** to how we might save some time and make the process more manageable. **Our** suggestions are attached. A number of these suggestions are things I'm told we already try to do, but formalizing the rules could make **the** practice more consistent.

Steve Hadley deserves good marks for his stewardship of the process generally. If we now streamline and otherwise improve our interagency work, it could be a help generally and particularly as the number of problems we face in the world grows. At the minimum, we need a surge capability, and the way we are currently operating doesn't provide much reserve.

Attachment **ah**

11-L-0559/OSD/57627

## **THOUGHTS ON THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS**

### **Meetings -- Scheduling:**

- Reduce the average time for PC/DC meetings. Cut scheduled one-hour meetings to 45 minutes; cut half-hour agenda items to 20 minutes.
  - 28 PC and 43 DC meetings were held between 31 May-31 July 02 – that is:
    - roughly 42 hours in PC meetings, not counting travel time of an additional 30 minutes per meeting, or an additional 14 hours.
    - 85 hours in DC meetings, not counting travel time of an additional 21 hours.
- Changing the time or date of scheduled meetings has major ripple effects on the schedules of officials throughout all departments.
  - Last minute changes are especially disruptive, particularly when the meeting time is moved up. Shifting from afternoon to morning cuts into preparation time.
  - Establish a practice for NSC to ask if a rescheduling is workable for the folks involved.
  - Make a rule of giving at least 48 hours notice before changing the date, time or subject of a meeting.

### **Meetings -- General Points**

- More PC/DC meetings could be held via SVTS.
- The department with the lead on a subject matter should sum up all decisions at the end of the meeting.
  - It sometimes happens that a matter mentioned at a meeting is said to have been "decided" because it elicited no objection. That is not a good practice. Nothing should be deemed decided unless we expressly agree to decide it.

- Decisions should be included in the Summary of Conclusions and no one should subsequently include in the summary that a meeting decided **anything** more or anything different.
- There should be fewer “Principals Only” meetings.
  - Bringing a “plus one” saves Principal’s time, as there’s less need for the Principal to debrief others later.
  - This applies both at the Principals’ and Deputies’ levels. Since you always have your plus one, it puts a particular burden on the rest of us to be told we may not include a plus one.

**Papers -- Should be Easy to Read:**

- Papers for PCs should, as a rule, be two or three pages, i.e.:
  - Bulletized (as a rule, no more than two sentences per bullet),
  - Thoughtfully formatted (i.e., readable font, sufficient white space so notes can be made)
  - Well-edited – few, if any, 63-word sentences.
- Papers should:
  - Let the reader know up front what the issue is.
  - Set out the basic facts and concepts.
  - Specify agency positions, highlighting differences.
  - Provide pros and cons for the options.

**Papers -- Should be Pitched High:**

- Matters for decision by Principals should be important enough to justify decision or discussion by Principals.
- Relatively lengthy documents (e.g., NSPDs or Findings) that require Principals’ approval should be worked at lower levels first, so that issues for Principals are clearly identified and, if necessary, discussed in a cover memo.

- Important documents that require line in/line out attention should be double- or triple-spaced.

### **Papers (PCC to PC via DC)**

- There is a place in the interagency process for longer, more discursive papers, but that place is generally the PCC or sub-PCC.
- If a PCC works on a matter that should be sent up the chain, it should complete its work by producing a short paper suitable for Principals.
- The PCC members should clear the paper so that each agency is satisfied with the way its position is stated.
  - Papers should not aim at a homogenized consensus. It is useful to clearly and accurately present differences among agencies.
  - Currently, too many papers for principals are prepared by NSC staff members, rather than by the departments; and too few are cleared in **final** form by the departments before sending them to the Principals.
- The PCC should then send the cleared paper up to the PC *through the Deputies*.
  - Changes made in a paper should be cleared by the departments.
  - principals should, as a rule, receive papers the Deputies have cleared.
  - The argument against having the Deputies clear PC papers is that it takes more time. That is true, but the reality is that it takes even more time when papers for Principals do not properly present the issues or the agency positions and have to get sent back down the chain for reworking.
    - As the saying goes: “If we don’t have time to do it right, how are we going to have time to redo it?”
- The NSC Staff has made an effort to distribute papers for DC/PC meetings 48 to 72 hours in advance. There are still **many** times, however, when this rule is observed in the breach, a problem for which, I suspect, every agency is, at one time or another, responsible.
  - Except for honest-to-goodness time-critical issues, a meeting should automatically be postponed if the materials are not distributed at least **48** hours in advance, or if the time or agenda have to be changed.

## Papers (distribution)

- Papers should not be distributed only into the **hands** of Principals.
  - This can confuse the system. The Principal's staff is cut out and cannot give the Principal the necessary support (tracking, read-ahead).
- When the NSC Staff wants to distribute an especially sensitive paper by courier rather than by fax, it would help to get a phone call and have the option to send over a trusted agent to pick it up so that hours are not lost.
  - A paper recently was sent around by courier with the result that DOD got it last, hours after it was sent out, and long after the addressee had departed for the night.
- Stamping "Eyes Only" on so many documents is unrealistic.
  - This has made the term meaningless and ignored.
  - *Also*, when documents are kept for the Principal's eyes only, this makes the Principal the action officer, which is rarely appropriate.

~~FOUO~~

May 17, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Memo to POTUS on Central Asia

Please draft a good memo from me to the President on Central Asia. I don't think we are getting anywhere with the State Department, and I think we need to get his head engaged in it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051706-12

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/25/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08418-06



5/25/2006 11:54:59 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57632

**FOUO**

May 15, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Ryan Henry

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board Meeting Hosted by State Department

334

I would like to take up Henrietta Fox's offer to host a DPB meeting at the State Department.

Please work to schedule it in the near future.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
051506-10

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

15 May 06

OSD 08451-06



5/26/2006 8:40:23 AM

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/57633

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_  
USDP MAY 25 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

MAY 24 2006

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board Meeting Hosted by ~~State Department~~

- Regarding your May 15, 2006 memo on Henrietta Fore hosting a Defense Policy Board Meeting (Tab A), we are working with Henrietta and have scheduled the September 21-22, 2006 Board meeting to be held at the State Department.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Ann Hansen, DPB, (b)(6)

OSD 08451-06



5/26/2006 8:40:22 AM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



\* 0 6 / 0 0 6 1 9 3 - E 5 \*

11-L-0559/OSD/57634

**TAB**

**A**

~~FOUO~~

May 15, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board Meeting Hosted by State Department

I would like to take up Henrietta Fore's offer to host a DPB meeting at the State Department.

Please work to schedule it in the near future.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
051508-10

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

OSD 08451-06



5/26/2006 8:40:23 AM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57636

~~FOUO~~

FILE COPY

May 15, 2006

TO: Tina Jonas

CC: Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reprogramming Away from Conventional Trident

*A-471.61*

I would like to better understand the \$20 million reprogrammed within the Department away from conventional Trident.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
051506-12

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED *DR*

MAY 30 2006

*115 May 26*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57637



5/26/2006 9:16:18 AM

5/28  
0830/1200



COMPTROLLER

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



0830/1200

INFO MEMO

May 25, 2006, 12:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Conventional Trident Modification

cc →  
Robert Rangel  
JRW

- In response to your question concerning the Conventional Trident Modification program (TAB A), \$20 million has not been reprogrammed away from the effort.
- The Conventional Trident Modification program has been sent to the Congress as part of the FY 2007 President's Budget. No funding has been expended to date.
- Earlier this year, the Strategic Command worked with my staff to explore initiating the Conventional Trident Modification effort in FY 2006.
- We continue to pursue with General Cartwright putting approximately \$10 million of FY06 (current year) funding towards technologies that would benefit the program when it does initiate in FY 2007. General Cartwright has agreed to this course of action.

A-471.61

25 May 06

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

15 May 06

Prepared By: John P. Roth, (b)(6)

MA SD	5/30	SMA DSD	
NA SD	MS/26	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	MS/26 1130		
ESR MA	5/24	STF DIR	



11-L-0559/OSD/57638



OSD 08454-06

5/26/2006 9 19 24 AM

June 7, 2006

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Unemployment Compensation

I generally agree with your May 5 memo regarding unemployment compensation for ex-service members.

**Do the savings accrue to DoD or the Department of Labor?**

Before going forward, please talk to the proper people in Tina's shop, Pete Pace, Public Affairs and Robert Wilkie to make sure we know what the reaction is going to be if we wanted to do it fast. It might make sense to do it very soon, given the fact Congress has not acted on the Supplemental and they are cutting our budget. We could link the desirability of doing it to the Congressional cuts in our budget.

It is unclear from your memo whether or not this also applies to people who simply retire after 20 or 20-plus years. Do they get this as well? If so, that certainly ought to be fixed.

Thanks.

Attach. 5/5/06 USD(P&R) memo to SD re: Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Service Members (UCX) (OSD 08455-06)

DHR:dh  
060706-09 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 29, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08455-06



6/8/2006 3:40:15 PM



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MFM0

May 5, 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chiu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Service Members (UCX)

- You asked why it makes sense to pay unemployment benefits to Service members who voluntarily leave the service. It does not, now that we have a volunteer force.
- Congress terminated benefits for voluntary departures in 1981, but restored them in 1982, at a reduced level.
  - The Department of Labor (DoL) believes the reversal was due to criticism from former Service members who voluntarily left the military and were denied benefits.
  - DoL also notes that no benefits result in unequal treatment of Service members in comparison to civilian contract workers who may be eligible for benefits when their contract ends, even if they had the opportunity to renew the contract.
- We are considering, as an alternative to full benefits, requiring a 4-week vs. 1-week wait to apply for a maximum of 13 weeks vs. 26 weeks of benefits. This would result in an improved retention initiative and a first year savings of \$132M (nearly \$800M over 6 years). *For DoD or DoL?*
- We want benefits offered to encourage people to stay, not leave.
- The revision would revert to the benefits paid between 1982 and 1991. Benefits were increased to support the major drawdown of the Armed Forces in the early 1990s.
- Terminal leave, transition leave and permissive TDY already provide additional pay to most members for at least 4 weeks following separation.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: C. Witschonke, (b)(6)

MAJSD	615	SMC/DSE	
ASD	615	SA/DSD	
DATE REC	MS/16	1200	6/3 1750
ENR/MA	7505	ST/DOO	



*[Handwritten signature]*



*A-131-2*



UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

May 5, 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: *Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Service Members*  
Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Service Members (UCX)

- You asked why it makes sense to pay unemployment benefits to Service members who voluntarily leave the service. It does not, now that we have a volunteer force.
- Congress terminated benefits for voluntary departures in 1981, but restored them in 1982, at a reduced level.
  - o The Department of Labor (DoL) believes the reversal was due to criticism from former Service members who voluntarily left the military and were denied benefits.
  - o DoL also notes that no benefits result in unequal treatment of Service members in comparison to civilian contract workers who may be eligible for benefits when their contract ends, even if they had the opportunity to renew the contract.
- We are considering, as an alternative to full benefits, requiring a 4-week vs. 1-week wait to apply for a maximum of 13 weeks vs. 26 weeks of benefits. This would result in an improved retention initiative and a first year savings of \$132M (nearly \$800M over 6 years).
- We want benefits offered to encourage people to stay, not leave.
- The revision would revert to the benefits paid between 1982 and 1991. Benefits were increased to support the major drawdown of the Armed Forces in the early 1990s.
- Terminal leave, transition leave and permissive TDY already provide additional pay to most members for at least 4 weeks following separation.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: C. Witschonke, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/57641



5/26/2006 9:47:15 AM

## Things to consider regarding the Department of Defense (DOD) Issue Paper on Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Service Members (UCX)

We are not entirely clear about whether your current proposal is to deny benefits entirely to those who fail to reenlist when they are eligible or to reduce the maximum benefits they could receive after a 4-week waiting period. As you note, these policies were in effect in 1981-91, and our comments are based on experience during that period.

Denial of benefits to servicemembers who voluntarily leave the service:

- This policy was in effect for a short time and received criticism from former servicemembers who had voluntarily left military service and who had been denied benefits. They cited the fact that other servicemembers received their benefits when they left service because it was in the best interest of the military (for a variety of reasons). They felt their denial of benefits constituted unequal treatment. We would expect similar criticisms if this policy were adopted today, especially since many of the separating servicemembers will have served in combat.
- You should also note that this treatment of former servicemembers does not parallel treatment (under many state laws) of civilian contract workers. They may be eligible for benefits under certain conditions when their contracts end even if they had the opportunity to renew their contracts.

Reduction of maximum benefits to 13 weeks after a 4-week waiting period:

- When eligibility of servicemembers who voluntarily left the military was restored in 1982, the maximum benefit entitlement was set at 13 weeks after a 4-week waiting period.
- In considering adopting a similar benefit structure in the future, you should note that in fiscal year (FY) 2005, the average duration of claims for the UCX program was 18.8 weeks.
- By 1991, the UCX program was changed again to undo the changes from the early 1980s. Other than the 10-year period starting with the early 1980s, ex-servicemembers received the same number of weeks of benefits as civilians and served the same waiting period as civilians. Similarly, during most of its history—including much of the time that the U.S. had a volunteer force—ex-servicemembers were eligible for UCX if they voluntarily chose not to reenlist.
- State UI program operations are highly automated, and any changes to UCX that make its administration different from state UI benefits will require lead time and funding for modifications to state information technology systems. If DOD proposes these (or other changes) to UCX, DOL would like to be closely involved in the development of such change(s).



**UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

June 28, 2006, 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. G. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. G. Chu*  
SUBJECT: Unemployment Compensation — SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- You asked whether savings that result from reduced unemployment compensation benefits would accrue to the Department of Defense or the Department of Labor. All savings would accrue to Defense since the program is fully funded by us.
- You also asked whether retirees are eligible for this benefit. They are, but any unemployment compensation would be fully offset by retired pay and, consequently, it is unlikely that retirees would enroll in this program.
- I will consult with Joint Staff, Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs on the wisdom of going forward with this proposal sooner rather than later.

COORDINATIONS: LA, PA

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Dr. Saul Pleeter, ODUSD(MPP)/Compensation, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/57643



OSD 08455-06

7/5/2006 10:02:24 AM

~~FOUO~~

June 7, 2006

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Unemployment Compensation

I generally agree with your May 5 memo regarding unemployment compensation for ex-service members.

Do the savings accrue to DoD or the Department of Labor?

Before going forward, please talk to the proper people in Tina's shop, Pete Pace, Public Affairs and Robert Wilkie to make sure we know what the reaction is going to be if we wanted to do it fast. It might make sense to do it very soon, given the fact Congress has not acted on the Supplemental and they are cutting our budget. We could link the desirability of doing it to the Congressional cuts in our budget.

It is unclear from your memo whether or not this also applies to people who simply retire after 20 or 20-plus years. Do they get this as well? If so, that certainly ought to be fixed.

Thanks,

Attach. 5/5/06 USD(P&R) memo to SD re: Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Service Members (UCX) (OSD 08455-06)

DIRM-8  
060706-09 07:01 AM

.....  
*Please respond by June 29, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08455-06



7/5/2006 10 03 01 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57644



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

*2011  
6/7*

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

May 5, 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chm. USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: *David S. C. Chm. USD (P&R)*  
Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Service Members (UCX)

*RL*

- You asked why it makes sense to pay unemployment benefits to Service members who voluntarily leave the service. It does not, now that we have a volunteer force.
- Congress terminated benefits for voluntary departures in 1981, but restored them in 1982, at a reduced level.
  - o The Department of Labor (DoL) believes the reversal was due to criticism from former Service members who voluntarily left the military and were denied benefits.
  - o DoL also notes that no benefits result in unequal treatment of Service members in comparison to civilian contract workers who may be eligible for benefits when their contract ends, even if they had the opportunity to renew the contract.
- We are considering, as an alternative to full benefits, requiring a 4-week vs. 1-week wait to apply for a maximum of 13 weeks vs. 26 weeks of benefits. This would result in an improved retention initiative and a first year savings of \$132M (nearly \$800M over 6 years). *DoD or DoL?*
- We want benefits offered to encourage people to stay, not leave.
- The revision would revert to the benefits paid between 1982 and 1991. Benefits were increased to support the major drawdown of the Armed Forces in the early 1990s.
- Terminal leave, transition leave and permissive TDY already provide additional pay to most members for at least 4 weeks following separation.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: C. Witschanke, (b)(6)

*[Handwritten signature]*

*A-191-2*

MA SD	6/5	NSA DSD	
SA SD	<i>[Handwritten]</i>	SA DSD	
DATA SEC	MS/46	200 6/5 1750	
ENRMA	5/5	STEDP	



OSD 08455-06

0267008 9:41 (S. AM)

**Coordination Page**

**SUBJECT:** Unemployment Compensation—SEC DEF SNOWFLAKE (06/07/2006)

<i>Office</i>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
Legislative Affairs	Robert Wilkie	22 June 2006
Public Affairs	Bryan Whitman	26 June 2006

~~FOUO~~

APR 24 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
LTG Skip Sharp

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Disbanding the Iraq Army

*TRAC*

Here is a statement in an article in the April 21 *New York Times* that does not ring true to me. The full article is attached.

"The decision of L. Paul Bremer III, the head of the occupation authority, to disband the Iraq army only added to the deficit of forces. That decision was approved by Mr. Rumsfeld. Neither Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, nor the Joint Chiefs were consulted about the decision."

It is difficult for me to imagine that I approved something of this nature without the kind of interaction we normally have around here that involves the Chairman or the Vice Chairman.

It would be helpful if people who may have been involved at the time (probably May 2003) would review briefing and meeting notes from that period to refresh all of our memories on the way this issue may have been discussed with Jerry Bremer.

Please give your material to Larry Di Rita, so he can organize it and give it to me all at one time.

Thanks.

Attach. Gordon, Michael R. "Criticizing an Agent of change as Failing To Adapt," *New York Times*, April 21, 2006.

DER:ab  
042106-10

.....  
Please Respond By 05/25/06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08468-06



5/26/2006 11:39:01 AM

*04 APR 06*

New York Times

April 21, 2006

**News Analysis**

## Criticizing An Agent Of Change As Failing To Adapt

By Michael R. Gordon

In defending himself against his critics, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has described himself as an agent of change and suggested that the complaints come from old thinkers who oppose reforming the military.

"Change is difficult," Mr. Rumsfeld said Tuesday. "It also happens to be urgently necessary."

It is true that since the day he arrived at the Pentagon, the defense secretary has been a man on a mission. Convinced that the generals were locked in a cold-war mindset — "legacy thinking," he dubbed it — Mr. Rumsfeld promoted the virtues of relying on precision weapons and fast-paced operations instead of huge numbers of troops.

Instead of endorsing Clinton-style nation building, Mr. Rumsfeld said the United States should rely more on the locals to shoulder the burden after "regime change."

But as a half-dozen retired Army and Marine generals have called for Mr. Rumsfeld's resignation, some criticize him in his own terms. The change-agent defense secretary, they say, is resistant to change.

Mr. Rumsfeld, the critics assert, was slow to acknowledge a growing insurgency in Iraq and to counter it. The military is overstretched by the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, but Mr. Rumsfeld has also resisted expanding the Army and Marines.

Paul D. Eaton, a retired two-star Army general who used to command the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga., and later helped train the new Iraqi military, said in an interview, "I was stunned," when a Pentagon review did not call for enlarging the Army and Marines. General Eaton, who called for Mr. Rumsfeld's resignation in March, said, "They failed to account for the contemporary operating environment."

While the conduct of the war has provoked the critics, tensions between officers and their civilian boss began long before Iraq. Mr. Rumsfeld's pursuit of his "transformation" agenda stirred some of it.

So did the manner in which he executed it, viewed by many officers as overbearing. Calling himself "genetically impatient," Mr. Rumsfeld gave a talk the day before the Sept. 11 attacks in which he said the Pentagon bureaucracy was a threat to national security.

Douglas Macgregor, a retired Army colonel who has long argued that Army leaders were unimaginative and too cautious, recalls a Rumsfeld aide's jesting that the defense secretary thought the Army's problems could be solved by lining up 50 generals and gunning them down.

Certainly, there are experts who have argued that the Pentagon has long been in need of change. Mr. Rumsfeld's agenda to reshape the military, in fact, has long been shared by President Bush.

In a 1999 **speech**, Mr. Bush pledged to develop **light, mobile** and lethal **units** that could be **quickly** deployed. **He** vowed to appoint a **secretary** of defense who would **change** the **military** structure. Once in office, Mr. **Bush** decided that the strong-willed Mr. Rumsfeld was the **man**.

The new **secretary** wasted **no** time promoting his program. **He** was **enamored** of missile defense and precision weapons. He was skeptical about the Army leadership, which he considered **old-fashioned**, wedded to heavy forces and slow to **change**. The Army **was** pursuing its own version of transformation, **but** it fell **short** of what Mr. Rumsfeld had in **mind**.

### **Tension Developed**

Some **longstanding** critics of the Army leadership felt they finally had an ally at the top with Mr. Rumsfeld in charge. But **soon** there **was** **friction** between the new defense secretary and the **generals** he viewed as **Clinton** holdovers. **As** the **United** States began to plan its Afghan **operation**, Gen. Hugh Shelton, an Army **general** who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Mr. Rumsfeld **first** took up his **post** at the **Pentagon**, became concerned that Mr. Rumsfeld's transformation agenda would get a field test before the **military** was ready.

**Days** before he retired, **General** Shelton ran into Maj. Gen. Dell Dailey, the **two-star** head of the Joint Special Operations Command, in the **White House** parking lot. The **Afghan** war plan depended heavily on Special Operations **forces**, and General Shelton warned that **the** **military** had to resist the defense secretary's push to **pare** **forces**. Lives and **the** **success** of the mission hung in the balance, he **argued**.

**Mr. Rumsfeld** would later argue that the **Afghan** operation had been a **major** success as the **United** States toppled **the** Taliban and eliminated Al Qaeda's **camp**s by **relying** on Special Operations forces, Afghan allies, air strikes — and by avoiding the commitment of substantial ground forces. Critics, **though**, **argued** that the absence of adequate American **soldiers** had made it easier for Osama bin Laden to **escape**.

By the **time** the **Iraq** war approached, Richard B. Myers, an **Air Force** general, had **been** **installed** as the new Joint Chiefs chairman. Mr. Rumsfeld's supporters considered General **Myers** and his **eventual** successor, **Gen. Peter** Pace of the **Marine Corps**, to be helpful in overcoming deeply entrenched **institutional** resistance to transformation.

### **Dissent Discouraged**

Critics **say** Mr. Rumsfeld **discouraged** dissent by elevating those who supported his program. We tended to **surround** himself with those that support his agenda," said Maj. Gen. John **Estis**, former **commander** of First Infantry Division and one of the **retired** **generals** who has criticized Mr. Rumsfeld. "We was **involved** with the selection of **flag** officers to an unprecedented level."

With his **team** in place, **Mr. Rumsfeld** summoned **the** senior **military** leadership to his Pentagon office in late 2001 to review **the** military's contingency **plan** for war with **Iraq**.

**As** Greg Newbold, the **retired** three-star general who served as **chief** operations deputy for the Joint Chiefs, **outlined** the plan, which called for as many as **500,000** troops, it was clear that Mr. Rumsfeld was increasingly **irritated**. He said he did not see why more than 125,000 troops would be required.

"My **regret** is that **at** the **time** I did not say, 'Mr. Secretary, if you **try** to put a number on a mission **like** this you may cause enormous mistakes,'" General Newbold recalled in an interview. "Give **the** **military**

the task, give the military what you would like to see them do, and then let them come up with it. I was the junior military guy in the room, but I regret not saying it"

Former aides to Mr. Rumsfeld said he never told Gen. Tommy Franks, the head of the Central Command, how many troops to deploy. But Mr. Rumsfeld repeatedly asked why the force could not be smaller and deployed more quickly. He also planted ideas and sent papers — a process his aides called "suasion" — in line with his agenda. General Franks initially proposed a force of up to 385,000 troops. That number shrank as the war plan morphed from a version called the Generated Start, to the Running Start, to the Hybrid, to Cobra II. Next, Gingrich, the former House speaker who was an adviser to Mr. Rumsfeld, described the discussions between General Franks and the defense secretary as one of "constant negotiation."

In a departure from typical practice, President Bush gave Mr. Rumsfeld and not the secretary of state responsibility for post-war Iraq. A month before the invasion, Mr. Rumsfeld outlined his philosophy in a speech called "Beyond Nation Building." By avoiding a large troop presence and major reconstruction, the United States would guard against the creation of a culture of dependence on the part of the Iraqis.

Eleven days after that speech, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, appeared before Congress and was asked how many troops might be required to secure post-war Iraq. His response was several hundred thousand. On Mr. Rumsfeld's instruction, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz complained about the remark to Thomas E. White, the Army secretary, the next morning. General Shinseki, Mr. Wolfowitz said, had spoken out of turn and was off base. (Mr. White dug in his heels in support of the general and was fired by Mr. Rumsfeld soon after Baghdad fell.)

#### Rumsfeld's Plan Different

For all of the controversy, General Shinseki's numbers were similar to those generated by the Central Command. General Franks had projected that the attack would begin with just a portion of the invasion force, which would grow to 250,000 troops by the time Saddam Hussein's force was defeated and the United States began to stabilize Iraq. There was, however, a subtle but significant difference. Secretary Rumsfeld hoped to off-ramp — that is, cancel the deployment — of some units if the Iraqi military's resistance crumbled, and he wanted to reduce the occupying force as quickly as possible.

As the war unfolded, there were enough troops to defeat the Republican Guard and take the Iraqi capital. But as American forces advanced on Baghdad, Secretary Rumsfeld pressed the question of off-ramping the First Cavalry Division, which was the final division in the war plan. General Franks went along. Lt. Gen. David McKiernan, the chief allied land war commander, was unhappy about the move, but did not protest.

The United States soon found there were not enough soldiers to control the borders, establish order in the capital or deprive the enemy of sanctuaries. The decision of L. Paul Bremer III, the head of the occupation authority, to disband the Iraq army only added to the deficit of forces. That decision was approved by Mr. Rumsfeld. Neither Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, nor the Joint Chiefs were consulted about the decision.

For months, Mr. Rumsfeld and General Myers refrained from describing the resistance in Iraq as an insurgency. Finally, on July 16, 2003, Gen. John P. Abizaid, who succeeded General Franks at the Central Command, told a Pentagon news conference that the United States was dealing with a "classical guerrilla-type campaign."

Some generals say that General Franks and other military leaders bear responsibility for many of the mistakes in Iraq. Gen. Jack Keane, the former acting Army chief of staff, said that the Bush administration's failure to nation building was wrong for Iraq. But he faults the generals in addition to himself, for failing to develop a comprehensive plan for a potential insurgency.

'The problem is that the Ba'athist insurgency surprised us and we had not developed a comprehensive option for dealing with this possibility,' he said. "This was not just an intelligence community failure, but our failure to anticipate it."

In an Op-Ed article last month in The New York Times, General Eaton wrote that another factor contributed to the problems: "I have seen a climate of groupthink become dominant and a product of that is a reluctance of military leaders to challenge the decisions of the senior leadership."

Michael R. Gelles is the author of the book *The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. This article is drawn from his book *The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. He is the co-author with Bernard E. Trainor, a retired Marine lieutenant general and former military spokesman for the Pentagon.

~~FOUO~~

APR 24 2006

042306-19

TO Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: ~~State~~ and Defense Issues on Title 10 and Title 22

Thanks for your note outlining an approach to address the Title 10/Title 22 problems. Your idea of using the next Security Cooperation Strategy Conference in December to focus on the issue is fine.

But I still need some specifics on the nature of the problems, with a few real-world examples. Please keep it a high level and to one page.

Thanks.

Attach. 4/18/06 USD(P) memo to SD re: Title 10/22 (OSD05049-06); SF #030606-22

DHR:sh  
042306-19

.....  
*Please Respond By May 25, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08471-06



5/26/2006 12:50:45 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57652

INFO MEMO

DSD  
USD(P) *[Signature]* MAY 26 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]*

MAY 24 2006

SUBJECT: State and Defense Issues on Title 10 and Title 22

- You asked for details on problems with titles 10 and 22 (note next under).
- Most difficulties arise from overlapping authorities and responsibilities between State and Defense, and a lack of flexible appropriations to fund programs that effectively train and equip foreign forces to meet GWOT demands. For example:
  - As you are aware, Congress generally earmarks 80+% of Foreign Military Financing (FMF); also, FMF is programmed up to three years in advance, leaving little flexible funding available to respond to international crises or emerging opportunities.
    - This problem is likely to become more acute when funding for Iraq and Afghanistan moves from supplemental appropriations to the baseline title 22 (FMF) budget.
  - Except under supplemental authorities for Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD ~~train and equip~~ title 10 funds normally cannot be used to train foreign civilian police or other non-military personnel.
    - Although title 22 funds can be used, generally title 22 authority does not permit U.S. trainers to accompany coalition partners in operations. Furthermore, State does not have adequate resources to meet GWOT needs.
  - The lack of authority to pre-purchase defense items and long procurement lead times inhibit our ability to support coalition partners. This difficulty caused the Polish Multi-National Division to deploy to Iraq with only 80% of its equipment.
- Proposed modifications to the recently enacted Section 1206 authority and legislation to create a Defense Coalition Support Account to pre-purchase and stockpile items for partners would help. Neither fared well during markups, but we are working to get both in the final bill.
- We are working with State to make foreign assistance more agile and responsive.

COORDINATION: Office of the General Counsel Mr. Dell'Orto May 23, 2006

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Zack Cooper, OUSD(P) Policy Planning (b)(6)

11-L-0550/GSD/57653



OSD 08471-06  
5/26/2006 12:50:22 PM

**FOUO**

May 18, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Strmecki

We ought to think about getting **Marin Strmecki** to think about Afghanistan again, and develop a strategy to deal with the current situation, which is weak provincial governments and corruption. I am thinking of something along the line of what he did on the warlords.

Thanks.

DKR:dh  
051806-14

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/22/06*

**FOUO**



5/26/2006 10:44 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57654

~~FOUO~~

INFO MEMO

DSD

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Eric S. Edelman  MAY 25 2006

SUBJECT: Strmecki

- Per your recent note (next under), I spoke with Marin Strmecki and asked him to think about doing some work for us on the current situation in Afghanistan (similar to the work he did on warlords).
- Marin has been spending the bulk of his time supporting Zal in Iraq and is also preparing for the Smith Richardson board meeting next week.
- He promised to get back with us next week with some thoughts. I will keep you posted on what he ultimately pulls together.

OSD 08472-06



5/26/2006 1 02:46 PM

~~FOUO~~



11-L-0559/OSD/57655

~~FOUO~~

May 05, 2006

TO: Tina Jonas  
c c : Fran Harvey  
Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Army National Guard

Has the Army submitted an amendment to the President's budget request for '07 that would allow us to fully man, train, and equip the Army National Guard? If not, when will that happen?

The last information I saw says that the Army National Guard's recruiting and retention is such that their end strength goal of 350,000 might be achieved by the end of this fiscal year.

Has the '06 funding been completely established so as to allow for full execution of the Guard's recruiting and retention initiatives and their training plans?

We have been telling the world that the Army National Guard will be fully equipped. I am curious to know if any equipment shortages within the Army National Guard, especially those things, which would conceivably most needed for domestic catastrophes, have been identified and funded. If not, when will we be able to say that the Army's commitment to fully equip the Guard has been met?

We have been concerned about the fact that the Guard was not involved in the strategic resource decision making the last time around. What has been done to see that they are included in a timely manner?

Thanks

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57656



5/26/2006 12:56:22 PM

~~FOUO~~

DHR.ss  
050806-15

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/25/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57657

Step  
0830



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

May 25, 2006, 12:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas 

SUBJECT: Army National Guard

The following information is provided in response to your questions on the Army National Guard. (TAB A)

- You asked if the Army submitted an amendment to the President's budget request for FY 2007 that would allow us to fully man, train, and equip the Army National Guard.
  - Funding the Army National Guard in FY 2007 will be accomplished without a formal budget amendment. We are working with the committees to realign \$470 million from the active Army to the National Guard.
- You mentioned that the Guard's end strength goal of **350,000** might be achieved by the end of this fiscal year and asked if FY 2006 funding has been completely established to allow for full execution of their initiatives and training plans.
  - As of the end of April 2006, the Army National Guard end strength was 338,849. This is an increase of **5,672** since the end of FY 2005. The Army is optimistic that the Guard will achieve its strength goal of 350,000 in the next **5** months.
  - We are conducting a midyear execution review of FY 2006 funding. We anticipate the Army will reprogram funds to the Guard to pay for recruiting and training.
- You asked if any equipment shortages within the Army National Guard, especially those things, which would be conceivably most needed for domestic catastrophes, have been identified and funded. If not, when will we be able to say that the Army's commitment to fully equip the Guard has been met?
  - Over the FY 2006 – FY 2011 time period, the Department plans to invest over \$19 billion for new Army National Guard equipment, including equipment for domestic catastrophes such as the interoperable communications package. Army's commitment to fully equip the Guard should be met in the next 8 years.



11-L-0559/OSD/57658



OSD 08473-06

5/26/2006 12:57:31 PM

- Since September 11, 2001, the Department has invested over \$10 billion in Guard and Reserve equipment. The FY 2007 budget requests a total of \$2.7 billion for new Guard and Reserve equipment, including armored Humvees, Stryker vehicles, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and missiles and other munitions.
- **You** asked what has been done to see that the Guard is included in the strategic resource decision **making** in a timely manner.
  - To address the Guard's involvement in strategic resource decision making, the Army established a task force to work with the Guard and 12 State Adjutant Generals to develop and resource the right mix of roles and missions for the Guard modular Brigade Combat Teams.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
See attached

Prepared by: Anne McAndrew, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

May 08, 2006

TO: Tina Jonas  
CC: Fran Harvey  
Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Army National Guard

Has the Army submitted an amendment to the President's budget request for '07 that would allow us to fully man, train, and equip the Army National Guard? If not, when will that happen?

The last information I saw says that the Army National Guard's recruiting and retention is such that their end strength goal of 350,000 might be achieved by the end of this fiscal year.

Has the '06 funding been completely established so as to allow for full execution of the Guard's recruiting and retention initiatives and their training plans?

We have been telling the world that the Army National Guard will be fully equipped. I am curious to know if any equipment shortages within the Army National Guard, especially those things, which would conceivably most needed for domestic catastrophes, have been identified and funded. If not, when will we be able to say that the *Army's* commitment to fully equip the Guard has been met?

We have been concerned about the fact that the Guard was not involved in the strategic resource decision making the last time around. What has been done to see that they are included in a timely manner?

Thanks

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57660



5/26/2006 12:56:22 PM

**FOUO**

DHR.ss  
050806-15

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/25/06*

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/57661

~~FOUO~~

May 19, 2006

310.1

TO: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Six Sigma

I was asked in the town hall about whether the Six Sigma is going to be done in the other branches besides the Army. Do you know what is happening elsewhere in the Department?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051906-18

.....

*Please Respond By 06/22/06*

~~FOUO~~



5/30/2006 7:21:23 AM

19 May 06

11-L-0559/OSD/57662

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Military Assistant

26 May 2006 - 0600 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR AT&L Dr. Krieg


SUBJECT: SIX SIGMA

Sir,

DSD requests a one page brief on what the Services are doing with regard to Six Sigma. He is specifically interested in any quantitative data on Six Sigma training and/or course work at our service schools (NDU, War College etc). He is also interested in how many certified black and green belt personnel are in DoD.

Please provide a copy of this memo with your response.

Very respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch  
CAPT, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

<sup>JUN</sup>  
SUSPENSE: 05 ~~24~~ 2006  
ATTACHMENT AS STATED

310.1

26 May 06

19 May 06

UNCLASSIFIED



5/30/2006 7:21:02 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57663

5 July 2006 -HC 0905 716

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Gordon England

SUBJECT: Six Sigma

- A good news story. All the services have aggressive Six Sigma **training**.
- Six Sigma has five belts, or training levels: Yellow Belt (basic), Green Belt (project participant), Black Belt (project manager), Master Black Belt (senior leader/trainer), and Champion (senior management leader).
- Following number of trained Black Belts and Green Belts is indicative of program progress:
  - o DON: 677 Black Belts and 2,687 Green Belts
  - o Army: 20 Master Black Belts, 250 Black Belts, 1,300 Green Belts
  - o Air Force: will begin training/certifying Level 2s (Black Belt-equivalent) and Level 1s (Green Belt-equivalent) in summer 2006
  - o DLA: 48 Green Belts and 2 Black Belts
  - o DAU: 40 Yellow Belts certified

*John*

310.1  
5 June  
19 May 06



7/6/2006 3:01:06 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57664

~~FOUO~~

May 19, 2006

TO: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Six Sigma

I was asked in the town hall about whether the Six Sigmas going to be done in the other branches besides the Army. Do you know what is happening elsewhere in the Department?

Thanks.

DRB:m  
051906-18

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/22/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08498-06



5/30/2006 7:21:23 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57665



UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

SUBJECT: *David A. Chao & James O.*  
Reducing Surgeons General

- This is in response to your memorandum asking for an answer to a 7 February Snowflake on Reducing Judge Advocate Generals and Surgeons General (TAB A).
- We currently have three (three star) Surgeons General and a Medical Officer of the Marine Corps (typically a one star Navy admiral).
- The number of surgeons could be reduced, but any reduction should be considered as part of a broader restructuring of the Military Health System (MHS) to improve its performance. One option is at TAB B.
- Restructuring should unify in joint organizations the major "business lines" of the health enterprise: the health insurance function (already unified under the TRICARE Management Activity), the direct provision of medical services (now split among the three Military Departments), research and development, education and training, and supporting operations (e.g., information technology).
- A Joint/Unified Medical Command working group (chartered by the Director Joint Staff and my office) with representation from the Services, Joint Staff, Comptroller and Health Affairs has been developing unification options.
- We plan to bring the options for your consideration when ready.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (HA), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/57666

OSD 08499-06  
6/13/2006 5:43:57 PM

# TAB

# A

~~FOUO~~

February 07, 2006

TO Gordon England  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Reducing JAGs and Surgeons General

Should we reduce down the number of JAGs and surgeons general, and pull the Department together a little bit?

Thanks.

DHR:bj  
020406-23

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 03/02/06*

~~FOUO~~



5/26/2006 3:25:31 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57668

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
*The Military Assistant*

26 May 2006 - 1430

MEMORANDUM FOR DR CHU  
CC DR. WINKENWERDER

SUBJECT: REDUCING SURGEON GENERALS

Sir,

DSD requests that you prepare a response to the attached snowflake describing the JMC way ahead concept that you and Dr. Winkenwerder are working. Please address only the Surgeon General portion of the snowflake.

Very Respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch  
CAPT, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE 01JUN06 COB  
ATTACHMENT: As Stated

OSD 08499-06



5/28/2006 3:25:47 PM


11-L-0559/OSD/57669

**TAB**

**B**



# Integrated Health System Model



~~FOUO~~

May 15, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Article on Iran

Please make sure you are on top of this article about Iran that I mentioned to you at this morning's Round Table.

Thanks.

Attach: 5/15/06 "Inside the Navy" by Christopher Castelli

DfR.es  
051506-25

.....

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08503-06



5/26/2006 5:07:00 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57672

Inside the Navy  
May 15, 2006  
Pg. 1

## House Seeks Classified Report On DOD's Iran-Related War Plans

By early next year, the House wants the Pentagon to submit a classified report to Congress outlining U.S. military options that could be used against Iran.

The United States and other countries have accused Iran of secretly developing nuclear weapons, a charge Iran denies. The White House has publicly stressed that diplomacy is the first and most important option that can be used to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb.

But now the House is asking the Defense Department to lay out its strategy for attacking Iran. A provision directing the Pentagon to submit the classified report by Jan. 31, 2007, is included in the lengthy congressional report that accompanies the House Armed Services Committee's version of the fiscal year 2007 defense authorization bill, which was approved by the full House May 11.

The panel writes that Iran "currently poses a serious threat to the security of the United States, as well as to the peace and stability of the international community by continuing dangerous nuclear activities, including development of uranium enrichment capabilities; violating the human rights of the Iranian people; supporting terrorists; calling for the destruction of the State of Israel; creating instability in Iraq; and undermining the spread of freedom and democracy in the Middle East."

The classified Pentagon report that lawmakers want would outline DOD's "strategy for addressing current and foreseeable Iranian threats to U.S. security and international security" for the present period through 2016.

"The report shall describe the range of U.S. military options, including possible scenarios in which the use of U.S. military force may be appropriate and any limits or obstacles to using such force," the committee writes. "The report shall also specifically address Iran's nuclear activities; support for terrorists; influence in the Middle East region, particularly Iraq; and any broader destabilizing ambitions of the Iranian regime."

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was asked at a Pentagon press briefing last month whether he had recently directed the Joint Staff or U.S. Central Command to update, refine or modify contingency plans for possible military options against Iran.

"We have I don't know how many various contingency plans in this department," Rumsfeld replied. "And the last thing I'm going to do is to start telling you or anyone else in the press or the world at what point we refresh a plan."

Some experts argue that attacking Iran is not a realistic option, noting such a strike could have very bad consequences for U.S. national security.

"But even if you destroy some particular sites, you have to ask yourself, what does that do to the American position in the world? What does it do to Iraq?" Morton Halperin, a former State Department official who served in the Clinton administration, said April 10 on PBS' "Newshour with Jim Lehrer."

Halperin continued, "Yes, it may be **true** that the Iranians are causing trouble in Iraq. I assure you they can cause a great deal more trouble, and I think most people would agree they would do so if **we** attack."

This month's issue of *The Atlantic Monthly* recounts an unofficial war game sponsored by the magazine in 2004 to examine what choices the United States might have in a crisis with Iran. Participants were nearly unanimous that the idea of conducting a pre-emptive **air strike** on Iranian nuclear facilities is a "fantasy," with "more dangers than rewards" for the United States, correspondent James Fallows writes. The war **game** found it is impossible to be certain where all of Iran's research is located, the U.S. is too vulnerable to Iranian influence in Iraq and in world oil markets, and any attack is likely to delay Iran's nuclear projects by only a few years at best, while increasing Iran's hostility toward the United States and its determination to acquire a bomb.

"Realism about Iran starts with **throwing out any plans to bomb**," writes Fallows.

In addition to the classified Pentagon report on Iran, the committee wants DOD to provide House and Senate authorizers with regular, timely briefings with detailed political-military assessments on potential threats posed by Iran and DOD plans to address such threats.

The committee wants the **briefings** to be coordinated with the State Department or other relevant government agencies, according to the House report. Further, the **briefings** are supposed to include alternative intelligence analyses from these agencies; the status of negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear activities and involvement in Iraq; and the impact of Iran's nuclear activities, support for terrorists, and influence in Iraq and the Middle East, on the security of the United States **and** the peace and stability of the international community, the committee writes.

In the event the United States participates in direct talks with Iran on the subject of Iraq, the House report urges U.S. officials to address the need for Iran to **stop** the flow of any Iranian-supplied explosives to Iraq, withdraw any presence of Iranian troops in Iraq, and end Iranian financial support to insurgent groups in Iraq.

-- *Christopher J. Castelli*



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

May 26, 2006, 2:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Snowflake #051506-25, Article on Iran

You sent me a copy of the Christopher Castelli article entitled "House Seeks Classified Report on DoD's Iran-Related War Plans" and asked me to stay on top of it.

- The article accurately quotes from the HASC Report (No. 109-452), accompanying the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act.
- The report purports to require the Secretary of Defense to provide to the [SASC and HASC] , by January 31, 2007, a classified report from the present through 2016, which describes DoD's strategy for addressing current and foreseeable Iranian threats to U.S. and international security. The report:
  - o Shall describe the range of U.S. military options, including possible scenarios in which the use of U.S. military force may be appropriate and any limits or obstacles to using such force.
  - o Shall address Iran's nuclear activities; support for terrorists; influence in the Middle East region, particularly Iraq; and any broader destabilizing ambitions of the Iranian regime.
  - o Requires regular, timely follow-up briefings to the HASC and SASC.
- This reporting requirement is only in the report language -- it is not in the proposed legislation, nor are there similar requirements in the Senate bill or report.
- During the Conference Committee, we will endeavor to ensure that the NDAA, as finally enacted, does not impose this reporting requirement on the Department (consistent with our policy not to comment on contingency operations or military plans).

Attachment:

Snowflake #051506-25, Article on Iran

OSD 08503-06



5/26/2006 5:06:20 PM

Prepared By: Samuel F. Wright, Special Assistant, OSD(LA), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/57675

ACTION MEMO

USDP *EG*

MAY 8 6 2006

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

*May 3 2006 01:19:02*

SUBJECT: Plan for Colombia and Peru Trade Agreements in Congress

*Colombia*  
*MR. SECRETARY,*  
*I AM TOLD*  
*THAT ROB*  
*BATMAN IS*  
*SPILLING THE*  
*THE USTR.*

You asked for a plan to help ratify the Colombia and Peru trade agreements. Before we start working on Congress, we recommend you write USTR offering to help during the ratification process (Tab A).

- USTR should know we want to help, and give us the cue on when to weigh in.
- As with CAFTA, our role should be to help explain the national security arguments, and how these countries should be seen as part of a friendly strategic system.

*EG*

The agreements will have to be ratified separately.

- Peru: Agreement signed, GOP claims its Congress will ratify in June. However, with presidential elections in June this seems unlikely. USTR plans to get Peru's FTA to our Congress before the summer recess (and before Toledo leaves office).
- Colombia. Almost there, but unfortunately not quite. Some discrepancies remain in the final texts of the agriculture chapter. Colombia's Ambassador Pastrana indicates that a quick reconciliation of the agricultural chapter will ease critics' suspicions.
  - The difficulties have strengthened the hand of the opposition in the GOC. Uribe's opponents in the election claim that the U.S. and GOC negotiators are hiding provisions deep within the agriculture text.
- Ambassador Pastrana urged DASD Pardo-Maurer to have DoD weigh-in with USTR to quickly move on the Colombia FTA as the best way to manage Chavez' efforts to destroy the Community of Andean Nations (CAN). Since then, senior USTR and GOC officials have met to review differences, after lower-level efforts to reconcile the texts were not successful.
- There is little chance Congress will approve Colombia's FTA before the end of the year. After verification USTR must provide 90-day notification to Congress in

*19 May 06*

*12 Apr 06*

OSD 08534-06



5/30/2006 11:55:56 AM



06/002691-ES\*

advance of signing. Once signed the FTA must undergo a 45-to-90 days of International Trade Commission review.

We propose the following immediate action:

- Letter to **USTR** offering to help move the trade agreements through Congress.

Then, when appropriate we could take these steps:

- As Congress considers each FTA approval, invite the Colombian and Peruvian MODs to Washington **as** part of a broader campaign focused on regional stability and prosperity, not trade alone.
- Host a reception for key members of Congress as you did for the CAPTA-DR.
- Write an Op-ed on security implications of FTAs.
- In coordination with USTR, communicate with select members of Congress.
- Provide senior DoD officials specific Talking Points on FTA's security links.
- If necessary make phone calls during the vote arguing for the agreements' approval.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- SecDef signs letter to USTR.

\_\_\_\_\_ Agree / \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree / \_\_\_\_\_ Other

- SecDef approves next steps.

\_\_\_\_\_ Agree / \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree / \_\_\_\_\_ Other

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachment: USTR Letter

ISA

FOUO

April 12, 2006

041206-23

TO: Roger Pardo-Mauret

CC Eric Edelman  
Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Plan for Colombia and Peru Trade Agreements in Congress

Let's put together a plan as to how we can help get the trade agreements for Colombia and Peru pushed through the Congress. We want to help.

Let's get a plan laid out and see what we should be doing.

Thanks.

DHR:es  
04/20/06

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/04/06*

.....  
MAY 10 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57678



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Ambassador Robert J. Portman  
United States Trade Representative  
600 17<sup>th</sup> St. N.W.  
Washington, DC **20508**

Dear Mr. Portman,

Congratulations on your nomination **as** Director of the Office of Management and Budget. You are the right man for the job.

I am writing to you about Peru and Colombia's Free Trade Agreements. I understand Peru's FTA is on track and you plan to send to Congress before the summer recess. Colombian Ambassador Pastrana asked for my help to get our Congress to approve Colombia's FTA.

We have been through this drill before with Central America. **As** with CAFTA-DR, I can help explain the national security arguments for these agreements, and how Peru and Colombia should be seen as **part** of a friendly strategic system.

I look forward to helping you win support **from** Congress to secure these important agreements.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/57679

COORDINATION SHEET

Subject: Plan for Colombia and Peru Trade Agreements in Congress

Control Number:   
\* 0 6 / 0 0 2 6 9 1 - E S \*

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
USD (P)	Amb. Eric Edelman	
PDUSD for Policy	Ryan Henry	
PDAS for ISA, OUSDP	Mary Beth Long	
Joint Staff/J5/Americas Division	COL Phil Battaglia	May 15,2006
PD for WH, OUSDP	Caryn Hollis (Drafter)	May 17,2006



THE SEC  
1000  
WASHIN

UCB, 5/30

Please  
have  
corrected  
thank you,

\* Ambassador Robert J. Portman  
United States Trade Representative  
600 17<sup>th</sup> St. N.W.  
Washington, DC 20508

United JL  
65D

Dear Mr. Portman:

Congratulations on your nomination as Director of the Office of Management and Budget. You are the right man for the job.

I am writing to you about Peru and Colombia's Free Trade Agreements (FTA's). I understand Peru's FTA is on track and you plan to send to Congress before the summer recess. Colombian Ambassador Pastrana asked for my help to get our Congress to approve Colombia's FTA.

We have been through this drill before with Central America. As with CAFTA-DR, I can help explain the national security arguments for these agreements, and how Peru and Colombia should be seen as part of a friendly strategic system.

I look forward to helping you win support from Congress to secure these important agreements.

Sincerely,



USA

~~FOUO~~

April 12, 2006

041206-23

TO: Roger Pardo-Maurer

C C Eric Edelman  
Robert Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *RA.*

SUBJECT Plan for Colombia and Peru Trade Agreements in Congress

Let's put together a plan as to how we can help get the trade agreements for Colombia and Peru pushed through the Congress. We want to help.

Let's get a plan laid out and see what we should be doing.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
041206-23

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/04/06*

MAY 10 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57682

OSD 08534-06



5/30/2006 11:56:41 AM

~~FOUO~~

May 30, 2006

230-02

TO: The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Attracting Quality Personnel

Attached is an interesting paper on the Presidential personnel process.

I think you might want to give some thought to serving the country by getting **this** process fixed. The way to do it would be to appoint a group of people -- some former House and Senate members and some Executive Branch people who **are** frustrated by it -- to look into it and make recommendations.

You might want to think about that.

Regards.

Attach. "Attracting Quality to Government: Disciplining the Presidential Personnel Process." Stephen E. Herbits and William P. Roesing, February 24, 2004.

DHR:dh  
053006-16

OSD 08569-06

30 May 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57683

# **ATTRACTING QUALITY TO GOVERNMENT**

## **Disciplining the Presidential Personnel Process**

**Stephen E. Herbits  
William P. Roesing  
February 24, 2004**

# **ATTRACTING QUALITY TO GOVERNMENT**

## **Disciplining the Presidential Personnel Process**

### **CONTENTS**

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## INTRODUCTION

The Twentieth Century saw the development of the most powerful office in the history of mankind – the Office of the President of the United States.

Yet, this chief executive officer of an organization with a \$2 trillion budget and several million civilian employees and men and women in military uniform usually operates with many of its cylinders not fully engaged, because the system and process to select, vet, clear and confirm the senior executives does not work well. As a consequence, our elected leader's policies fail to be implemented and the government's effectiveness to implement policy is compromised.

There has been an extraordinary effort to diagnose the problem of appointing Presidential personnel, identify the symptoms, assess who is at fault and describe what steps are necessary to restore a well-functioning process. Many of the experts who have assessed problem use the same word: "broken."

In reviewing those assessments, analyses and recommendations, two contrary conclusions stand out. On the one hand, the public policy sphere in

America knows what the process should look like and now it should behave. On the other hand, there are few pressures or incentives to avoid the sort of interference that prevents the system from behaving correctly.

This paper offers a mechanism to force those responsible for the failures in the system to make the necessary changes in this most important American personnel process.

The corrosive forces disrupting the orderly filling of these executive branch positions include hundreds of guilty parties in the White House, executive agencies, the Congress, the press, and among our political and idea leaders.

Few of them are proud of the role they play. Virtually all of them would plead guilty to the charge of complicity in causing this problem or, at a minimum innocent by reason of addiction. Many have added their names and their energies to efforts to describe how the system should work. Yet there is little energy or incentive to resist the temptation to undermine the system

The mechanism presented in this paper is designed to provide that energy and incentive.

A great deal of work by a group of very knowledgeable and insightful experts provides the foundation of this strategy. The sponsor of this paper, the American Enterprise Institute, joins the Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution, the National Academy of Public Administration, the Council for Excellence in Government and many other centers of study and analysis in providing an understanding of what is wrong, where it went wrong and how the process should work. These efforts involved an unprecedented assembly of men and women who have been participants, students or victims of the Presidential personnel process in every conceivable capacity over several decades. The appendices to this paper represent our tribute to that work. We offer little ~~further~~ analysis. That work is done. The work that remains is the creation of a mechanism to compel change.

There is a common thread to this body of analysis. The pre-eminent tool used by those who undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of the Presidential personnel selection process is delay. Delay the presentation of options to the nation's present or imminent Chief Executive. Delay the

moment when the paperwork of the President's choice is ready. Delay the moment when the clearances **are** complete. Delay the moment when the hearing is held or the vote. The motive for every delay is, in the minds of the perpetrators, a public spirit action. Yet taken together, the delays are a burden on the American Presidency that the American public should not tolerate and cannot afford. The strategy of this paper is to cause those public-spirited players to recognize that penalty for delay of game is going to be unbearably tough.

While new thinking is always welcome, the astonishing array of good ideas to make the system work that have been created, articulated and circulated already is fully sufficient. The missing step is implementation. By making delay more unpleasant for the perpetrators than it is today for the victims, all of the wise and reasonable ideas to make the system work as it should will come to life. When promptness is a necessity, problems like redundancies and other inefficiencies, overzealous inquiries, even insufficient pay will be discovered as unacceptable throwbacks to a different era. And heaven help some politician who causes a delay to advance an unrelated agenda.

Imagine a day when someone in the personnel process – a staffer, a senator, a Secretary, a President – intrudes in the decision-making for a purpose, however noble, that is completely unrelated to the decision to approve or disapprove of a candidate for a Presidential appointment and wakes up a week later to find fifty letters from leaders of important interest groups on all sides, calls from seven senators and six governors and twenty newspaper editorials attacking his unacceptable departure from the national interest.

Imagine.

## SECTION ONE

# WE KNOW WHAT IS WRONG

Joseph Schmitz is the Inspector General of the Department of Defense. This is his official biography:

President Bush nominated Joseph E. Schmitz to be the Inspector General of the Department of Defense on June 18, 2001. The Senate confirmed him on March 21, 2002.

From 1987 to 2002, Mr. Schmitz' private-sector law practice focused on complex civil litigation, aviation regulatory matters, international trade, administrative law, and constitutional appellate litigation, most recently as a partner at Patton Boggs LLP.

His prior public service includes: 27 years of naval service, first on active duty and then as a reserve officer; Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, Honorable Edwin Meese III; and law clerk to Honorable James L. Buckley, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

As a Captain in the Naval Reserve, he graduated from both the Naval Inspector General School and the Army Inspector General School. Between 1995 and 2001, he served in senior leadership positions in the Naval Reserve, culminating in service as the Deputy Senior Inspector for the Naval Reserve Intelligence Program, responsible for Command Inspections/Audits, Investigations, and

Intelligence Oversight of more than 4,000 Naval Reservists nationwide (a position he held through September 2001).

His 1989 article in the Wall Street Journal, "Selling to Moscow Without Selling Out America," reviewed regulatory hurdles associated with the first-ever licensing of commercially leased Boeing aircraft to a Warsaw Pact country. Mr. Schmitz has also published numerous articles, presented lectures, and testified as a constitutional expert before the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs and Judiciary Committees. From 1995 until 2002, he was an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, where he developed and taught a seminar in advanced Constitutional Law.

During his active naval career, he served as Midshipman Director of the Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference, as an engineering division officer on board a gas turbine-powered U.S. destroyer, as the Navigator of a German destroyer (through the Personnel Exchange Program), and as a Ship Superintendent in the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Mr. Schmitz has also participated in exchange programs with the British Royal Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force; and has served as Liaison Officer with the Colombian and Mexican Navies during extended port calls. He still maintains German and limited Spanish language proficiency.

Mr. Schmitz graduated with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1978, and received his J.D. degree from Stanford University in 1986. He has served on the Steering Committee of the Washington Lawyers Chapter of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, and is a Young Leader Alumnus of the American Council on Germany. In 1999, he was invested into the Sovereign Military Order of Malta.

Mr. Schmitz was confirmed by the Senate on March 21, 2002. That is 281 days after his nomination – a period that represents nearly a fifth of the Presidential term.

As his resume suggests, this is an eminently well-qualified public servant. At no time during those nine months was any question raised regarding his credentials, integrity or ability to hold the job for any reason. Indeed, it was always generally assumed that he would be confirmed – as are 99 percent of all nominations. The system provides acceptable decisions, but at an unacceptable pace.

The source of this delay was a hold placed upon the nomination by Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa, an unofficial but totally effective action taken for reasons often little related to the merits of the candidacy.

Compare Mr. Schmitz' experience with another recent Presidential selection.

On a Friday towards the end of **2003**, a Bush Administration official announced an appointment of a prominent person to an important position. A week later the New York *Times* editorialized that the announced choice, while "supremely qualified," raised a familiar and troubling set of conflict of interest questions. The editorial went on to warn that the designee should not begin work until he can "...show that he will be free of any private business entanglements that could raise legitimate questions about this recommendation." At a news briefing the afternoon of the editorial, the President was asked about the choice and the conflict of interest charges.

But these events were not the beginning of a drawn-out debate now so familiar in the Presidential personnel process with Senators calling hearings and placing holds, committee staffers and ethics watchdogs piecing through mountains of personal and private data, barely veiled exasperation **from** the nominee prior to final grudging approval on a day so far off that the opportunity so well matched to the appointee's qualifications has lost the momentum.

In fact, the following Monday former Secretary of State James A Baker III boarded a plane for Europe to begin the process of reducing Iraqi debt, an important assignment that could not have been better timed given the capture of Saddam Hussein during the intervening weekend.

The issues raised by the Baker choice were not ignored. One concession to conflict was arranged. Mr. Baker will forego earnings from clients with obvious connections to Iraqi debts.

The question to the President was not ignored. President Bush answered by saying, "Jim Baker is a man of high integrity... We are fortunate to have Jim Baker agree to serve our country. We're fortunate he decided to take time out of what is an active life, but one out of the press, and one that's probably not nearly as stressful as it has been when he's been involved in public service, to step forward and serve America."

The Baker appointment involved a number of exceptional circumstances. While he was obviously given a very important job, it was not a position that appears on any list of Presidential personnel slots. Baker was to be a special envoy from the President to those nations that hold Iraqi debt. The

distinctive nature and pressing importance of the task marginalized the focus of concern regarding conflicts, clearances or Senate confirmation.

In a matter of weeks there were no reservations about Mr. Baker and his efforts and considerable approval for his ability to move swiftly and effectively. In this case the process of selecting, vetting, clearing and installing a person chosen by the President for an important assignment worked as if it was taking place in a 21<sup>st</sup> Century government of the most powerful nation in history operating as if its responsibilities are not only serious, but urgent.

The differences in the experience of these two distinguished Americans is the point of entrance to this paper, which is a plan based upon the proposition that Americans involved in future selections to serve this country as Presidential appointees are entitled to an acceptably orderly decision-making process.

While it is obvious that a 28 1-day delay is unsatisfactory, the speed of the Baker installation may not be a reasonable aspiration. Nor is it necessary or responsible to bias the process toward approving nominations, whether that approval must come in the form of a security clearance, an ethics clearance or a Senate confirmation. Saying "no" in a timely fashion is perfectly acceptable.

These two examples are offered with full appreciation of the distinctions between his position as a sort of *ad hoc* personal envoy from the President and Mr. Schmitz' position as a full time and enduring job in the Pentagon hierarchy. They are useful in their contrast because they provide clues into the building of the mechanism necessary to change the way the process works.

While no Senator could not place a hold on the Baker selection, any Senator could have raised a ruckus and many senators could have called a hearing as a first step in slowing down the train. Why did that not happen?

The answer to that question rests in a consensus among the centers of power capable of hitting the brakes that such an action in the case of Mr. Baker and his assignment was not in anyone's interest. Period.

Such a consensus did not surround the Schmitz nomination but, importantly, it was absent not because more people had reservations about Mr. Schmitz. Indeed, indeed more influential forces in the process were concerned about Mr. Baker than even knew about Mr. Schmitz.

The difference between the two cases rests in the default position of those who did not particularly care about the outcomes. Senator Grassley was free to impose a delay on the Schmitz nomination entirely **of** his own doing because there was no price to be paid by him for superimposing his own agenda in place of the straightforward up or down approval.

But this freedom to intervene was not present in the Baker case – and not because Senate confirmation was unnecessary for the former Secretary of State to become the President’s envoy. Someone who sought to delay Mr. Baker’s progression could have reasonably expected one **of** two results. Either the effort would be ignored, as the New York Times discovered, or it would meet a world of criticism and approbation. The public and virtually all interested parties wanted Mr. Baker to get to work. Any obstacle to that happening in this very high profile situation would have met with derision.

Of course, anyone was entitled to say that the Baker choice was a bad idea. But there was no benefit for those with that view to come from hitting the brakes and a great deal of risk for anyone who tried. And a more remote possibility would be for some party to try to hold the Baker decision hostage to the outcome in some other matter. The American public wanted progress in Iraq. They wanted the President to pursue his course. They gave him tremendous leeway to do just that. Even if the Baker choice was subject to confirmation, that vote would surely have been timely.

A timely outcome is also what Mr. Schmitz, his bosses and the American taxpayer surely wanted. . . and deserved.

The Presidential personnel process is an immense and cumbersome undertaking for four fundamental reasons. First, our nation **has** decided **to** have a huge federal apparatus. Second, it has decided that the senior officials in that apparatus must be subject to close scrutiny in a number of areas by a variety of scrutinizers. Third, it has made a great **many** of these positions subject to Senate confirmation, although there can be unacceptable delay often in situations where the Senate has no direct role.

But it is the fourth reason that is responsible for a large measure of the cumbersome nature of the process. Virtually everyone involved in choosing, vetting, clearing and confirming a nominee senses great freedom to take advantage of involvement in the process, whatever that involvement might be, to gain leverage for any purpose – regardless of the relevance or irrelevance of their agenda to the nomination in question.

Senator Grassley, for example, thought it would be better for America and certainly for Senator Grassley if the Inspector General at the Pentagon was chosen from among Senator Grassley's staff. But it was not good for America and apparently did little even to advance the career of the Senator's choice, to delay the decision for nine months.

Consider the advantages of a political world where those involved in any way in the Presidential personnel process were certain that the American public placed a very high priority on timely outcomes and paid close attention.

Such a world would make for a very much better America.

Getting to that America begins with an appreciation for how we got into the predicament.

To begin with a slightly encouraging note, the problem is relatively new. As Brookings Institution's eloquent scholar, Jonathan Rauch, notes, the late New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan served four Presidents in assignments ranging from sub-cabinet posts to far off embassies to the United Nations to the West Wing without filing a single ethics form longer than a page. While Mr. Baker probably filled fewer forms than most, we can state with confidence that even this esteemed national leader did not get away with completing a brief form for few problems in American governance are as well documented as the complexity, delay, uncertainty and intrusiveness of the process by which one is given the opportunity to serve in the upper levels of the United State Government.

When AEI Senior Fellow Fred Thompson chaired the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, he commissioned in 2001 a study of the studies of staffing Presidential administrations. Its first citation was the so-called Brownlow Committee established by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1937 to "recommend to him ways to improve the management of the

Executive Branch...” Three of those recommendations pertaining to personnel were cited in the Thompson study: extending the merit system, reducing the number of appointees reporting directly to the President and increasing pay. Nothing in that report suggested the difficulties that are now so common.

Sixty-four years later, preparations for the transition to our 43<sup>rd</sup> President, organized in what was called The White House 2001 Project, were built upon a keen awareness of the problem. Terry Sullivan, the Associate Director of the project wrote this summary of the state of the challenges in that year:

These studies agree that the process seems broken in a number of ways, including:

1. ***The Overwhelming Scale of Recruitment.*** The Presidential personnel operation cannot accommodate the scale of operations necessary to locate the qualified nominees the government needs. For example, the Texas Governor’s personnel system accommodates around 2,300 individuals. The Presidential personnel operation in the Clinton White House kept tabs on some 195,000 names or roughly 80 times more. Yet the Bush White House operation is only twice the size of Governor Bush’s Texas operation. The issue of scale devolved into two related issues: the growing number of nominated positions in government and shrunken number of personnel staff that must recruit for these positions.
2. ***The Immense Complexity of Vetting Nominations.*** Appointees find the inquiries they must face intrusive and burdensome. Both the Century Fund’s task force and the Presidential Appointees Initiative report called for finding ways to restrain the intrusiveness of nominee inquiries and diminish the burdens of filings. Some have suggested the need for a common inquiry or questionnaire shared by all of the Executive agencies and the Senate.
3. ***The Unnecessary Length of the Vetting Process.*** Primarily associated with the national security background investigations, vetting periods have lengthened as the FBI sorts nominees through its “one size investigates all” process, providing the same level of scrutiny for the National Security Advisor as is provided for the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
4. ***The Increasingly Indeterminate Confirmation Process.*** Individual senatorial agendas have begun to play a more prominent role in making the appointments process more indeterminate. No longer can competent, well qualified nominees count on moving through the confirmation process with certainty. Instead, good candidates suffer delays in confirmation as Senators vie for strategic positions on unrelated legislation or separate appointments. One detailed study covering appointments from 1985 through 1999 concludes that “political conflict induced by divided government and polarization clearly leads to a more drawn out

confirmation process. The ease with which...dilatory tactics can be employed is likely to give the opposition much more leverage over the process than it would have in a majoritarian body.”

Each of Mr. Sullivan’s points can be spelled d-e-l-a-y. He builds upon a consensus. Three leaders deserve enormous credit and thanks for assembling the analysis that created the agenda of solutions represented in that consensus.

G. Calvin Mackenzie, the Goldfarb Family Distinguished Presidential Professor of American Government at Colby College and the dean of these analysts in this field wrote in the introductory essay in *Innocent Until Nominated*, a Brookings Institution book published in 2001 :

The contemporary Presidential appointment process is slower, more cumbersome, more contentious, more repellent to talented Americans and more distant from the purposes of good government than it has ever been.

Another distinguished student of this problem, AEI’s Norman Omstein, writing with Thomas Donilon in *Foreign Affairs*, reached this conclusion in 2000:

That the nomination and confirmation process is broken is a truism now widely accepted by both Republicans and Democrats. It is also clear that the problems did not *start* with Clinton’s administration but have been building for at least 30 years.

Paul Light, the leader of the very important Brookings Presidential Appointments Initiative, writing with Virginia L. Thomas of The Heritage Foundation, summarized a survey of 435 senior-level appointees from the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations this way:

At least according to those who have experienced the frustrations first hand as nominees, it is safe to conclude that the Presidential appointments process verges on complete collapse.

Consider a summary of the obstacles often cited to be placed in the way of an American considering or being considered for service at high levels in the government. Taken together, a candidate is forced to confront the question of whether such service is worth the effort. While sacrifice is not new to public service, this broken process is requiring unreasonable sacrifice even prior to public service.

From the moment of first consideration to the taking of office, any or all of the following hurdles may be placed in the path of any candidate.

- There will be costs to the process of consideration, borne by the candidate.
- Time must be devoted to interviews.
- Travel to Washington, often more than once, must be done at the candidate's expense.
- Financial and personal data must be assembled and submitted, **often** in differing formats from various asking entities in the White House, ethics inquirers, security inquirers and the Senate – all **often** at personal expense.
- On the way to being chosen by the President, a candidate must survive the many political agendas involved in any decision associated with personnel.
- Personal attacks must be borne regardless of their merit.

The American political system needs to be weaned off of addictive practices that seem somehow acceptable in an immediate circumstance but, **taken** together, constitute a mortal threat to the very vitality of our liberal democracy.

Among the ways that these practices handicap our government, these four are the most powerfully damaging:

- The average period of time necessary to complete the process at the beginning of an administration has quadrupled in the past 40 years. This means that one fifth of the President's term is history before the President's team is satisfactorily in charge. This can be fairly characterized as a direct insult to citizens as voters and the taxpayers.
- For this reason and others related to cost and intrusiveness, it is increasingly difficult for administration recruiters to attract desired

talent to office. Successful people are asked to place their lives on hold for an uncertain time with an uncertain outcome. As the delays have lengthened, the number of people willing – or even capable – of accepting such a predicament is shrinking.

- Clearances may take a great deal of time without any control or knowledge of a timetable.
- The Senate – and indeed, any Senator – can be capricious and laborious in making decisions without even being required to oppose the choice.

Yet again, note two points well:

- The tactic central to virtually every obstacle is delay.
- The central rationale for delay is often unrelated to the qualifications of the nominee or the prerogative of the President to choose.

It is also crucial to this analysis to point out again that virtually all nominees ultimately take office. This is the most compelling piece of evidence that the image of decision-makers contemplating the appointees are not, as they say, sitting up at night thinking about the republic.

Far from that lofty practice, these decision-makers are simply going about the business of seeking advantage by means that seem to exact no cost upon the individuals or forces causing the delay.

The solution will require making the previous sentence inoperative.

## Section Two

# THE THREE THIRTIES

The first step in preventing delay is defining it. The second step **is** ending the tolerance of it.

Delay is taking too long to do a job. But what is too long? What is a reasonable period necessary for the pickers, vetters, clearers and confirmers to perform their public service?

An appropriate and widely accepted timetable will serve **as** the standard which the players must achieve and the rulebook to know when penalties **are** called. The combination will be the essence of a new political discipline.

The goal is **to** make the elements of this discipline accepted as logical, reasonable and achievable national norms to be violated only at peril to the violator – or with a very good excuse.

Once these rules are in effect woe will be upon the sub-cabinet official who wishes that the agency head or the White House should consider someone else and stalls for time, the officials responsible for the budget **of** a security clearing agency that cannot do its job in timely fashion, the Senate committee that does not hold a hearing on time, or the interest group that

works to stretch the process in order to scream longer into the microphones opened by the process. \*

What is the appropriate discipline over the three essential, sequential and fully transparent stages in moving into a powerful and important office in a President's administration?

Consider the nature of each of the three stages.

**Stage One** – A vacancy is created. When a new President takes office, every position involving a Presidential appointment is considered vacant on Inauguration Day. Obviously the President-elect and the incoming White House personnel officials will have several weeks of official transition time following the election to ponder their choices. It is also advisable for the Congress to consider making an official provision for party nominees to have the resources and information necessary to consider personnel questions prior to the election. Nevertheless, the official creation of a vacancy occurs on the first day of a new Administration. During this first stage, three steps are taken. A person to fill the vacancy is identified. The candidate is asked to complete the necessary paperwork. The President announces the Administration's intent to nominate the candidate. How long should this stage take? Either in circumstances of a new Administration or a vacancy occurring because of the departure of an official during an Administration, it can and should be common for a potential nominee to have long since been tentatively identified and begun work on assembling the necessary information and making the necessary decisions on matters related to asset holdings. With this sort of advance preparation and, in the case of a new vacancy in an existing Administration, orderly succession planning, the first stage of the process should be limited to thirty days or less. This timetable will be facilitated if a new President announces all cabinet and senior staff nominees by December 15, following the election.

- **This** paper does not cover the subject of picking, vetting, clearing and confirming judicial candidates. That process is legitimately seen as a three-branch exercise involving selection by the executive, confirmation by a body of the legislative branch for service in the judiciary. Factors intrude in that process that should not be considered relevant to the process of placing nominees into executive branch offices. Perhaps ironically, the judicial confirmation process is garnering the ~~sort~~ of attention that most executive nominees can today only dream about.

**Stage Two** – The second stage of the process involves the agencies responsible for security and ethics clearances completing their work and reporting it to the White House and, when confirmation is involved, being forwarded to the Senate. The clearances agencies will know when their works loads will be dramatically increased by the arrival of a new Administration. Preparations including enhanced **staffing**, perhaps involving calling back experienced retirees, should allow all clearance work to be completed in thirty days from the day the intent to nominate is public.

**Step Three** – When confirmation is required, appropriate Senate committees will receive a nominee’s paperwork and clearance agencies **reports** within sixty days on the creation of the vacancy. Under this discipline, Senators will know the identity of nominees thirty days after the vacancy occurs. When stages one and two are completed in a timely fashion, the Senate should hold all necessary hearings and conduct a confirmation vote within thirty days of the receipt of clearance reports.

The entire public process of identifying, vetting, nominating, clearing and confirming a candidate should take place within **90** days of the creation of a vacancy.

While this paper does not hold ulterior motives in high regard, there is a motive to the determination that each decision-making process will be given the same time period. It is good marketing. Ultimately in a democracy the rules are imposed by the people. While this is a complex world, it is also a modern world where information moves instantly, personal communication is no slower and there is a growing expectation that human decision-making is expected to keep up. The least that can be done for the owners of the system is to be ever-so-slightly arbitrary to make the data base for their role easily remembered.

Hence, the new discipline is to be known as The Three Thirties.

One concession is made to the Senate: The clock on the confirmation process is to be measured in “session days.”

While the recommendation of a rigid and public timetable for each of the three stages in the process of filing a vacancy may be new, work on solving the problems and making the changes necessary to meet this timetable has been underway for many years. It has involved, as noted in Section One,

hundreds of distinguished Americans who know the process well and have created a wide-ranging consensus on appropriate reforms. Appendix V lists all of these recommendations in detail, but a summary at this point is offered as evidence that the discipline of The Three Thirties is achievable and proper to restore the effectiveness of the Presidential personnel process. Again, we issue this disclaimer: Virtually none of these ideas are original to this paper.

***The First Thirty: Within thirty days of the creation of a vacancy and with the replacement candidate's paperwork complete, the President publicly announces the "intent to nominate" the candidate.***

From the first moment that the possibility of assuming the Presidency is a reasonable notion, the candidate should initiate several preparatory steps with regard to personnel in order to have a strong possibility of meeting the discipline of The First Thirty. Those steps are:

- Step up an appropriate team to address personnel issues that is separate from the campaign and reporting to the candidate. The team should have experience in the Federal government, recruitment and interview skills at the highest levels and no personal agendas in the process.
- **An** immediate assignment of the team is to **draft** for candidate approval a list of principal objectives for each job in the Administration-to-be to be used as criteria for each to be filled.
- The team should also draft for approval a description of the generally required criteria for all appointees ranging from the obvious such as loyalty to the philosophical such as fiscal conservatism.
- Define the role that Cabinet Secretaries and agency heads have with the recruitment and selection of their subordinate political appointees and ensure that Secretaries and agency heads clearly understand the role of the White House Personnel Office from the outset.
- Keep job descriptions up to date.

Those who have studied the process also recommend several standard operating procedures such as the immediate preparation of a talent bank, aggressive in outreach rather than relying on resumes received, careful respect for confidentiality and the setting of specific rules for press relations to be followed by all involved in the process.

To facilitate meeting The First Thirty timetable by a new Administration it is recommended that federal transition funds be made available to each non-incumbent candidate of a party receiving federal campaign funds to support these preparations at the conclusion of the conventions.

Other changes in public policy and procedure will help incumbent and incoming Residents alike to attract a stronger pool of talent in a timely fashion. For incumbent Administrations, the most pervasive solution involves constant and comprehensive succession planning for every position requiring Presidential decision-making.

Other proposals include:

- Delay the impact of the capital gains taxes incurred when nominees are forced to divest assets.
- Grant up to three months of severance for transition out of government.
- Reduce the number of executive positions requiring full-field **FBI** investigations.
- Reduce public exposure of nominees' personal lives and unnecessary intrusions into their medical and psychological histories.
- Minimize post-employment restrictions whenever possible.
- Ease conflict-of-interest laws, using recusal and full disclosure as the primary remedy.
- Consolidate, simplify and clarify forms imposed upon candidates from all sources.

- Improve the common electronic nominations forms available through the White House website.
- Create a special unit within the Presidential Personnel Office to assist new appointees in handling personal and official difficulties.
- Appointees should provide previous forms where possible.

Finally, it goes without saying that careful consideration must always be given to government pay levels to assure that appropriate talent is always available to the leadership levels of the Executive Branch. Thorough details regarding these proposals are included in Appendix V.

***The Second Thirty: Agencies responsible for security and ethics clearances of candidates will complete their work within thirty days of receipt of appropriate paperwork.***

This Thirty may be simplest and most procedural of the disciplines to achieve. It will require the successful implementation of two processes. First, those who are responsible for the resources of these agencies must be certain that the proper resources are available. Second, those who manage the agencies must be effective planners and they must be certain that they are capable of meeting the deadlines or they will become a political liability to the President, their bosses and their agency.

To meet the requirements of the deadline, students of the process recommend the following steps:

- Streamline the clearance process for nominees not currently in government.
- Streamline the clearance process for those nominated for new positions while occupying an already confirmed position.
- Create an environment that insists that the FBI process be accelerated.
- Designate about 100-150 potential appointees that are very likely to get nominations, have them prepare their paperwork early, and

provide the paperwork to the FBI immediately after the election, regardless of whether a specific position has been determined.

- Identify, recruit and retain or short period of time experienced retirees to augment to clearing agencies staff.

Again, further explanations and definitions associated with these reforms are provided in Appendix V.

**The Third Thirty: The Senate will make a decision regarding confirmation of any nominee within thirty session days of receipt of the nomination.**

The one uniform conclusion involved in the expert consensus on how to make the process work for all is that the Senate must reform its "hold" system. In addition, the Senate should adopt one personnel form to be used by all committees that is as consistent as possible to the forms used by Executive Branch. Finally, the Senate should reconsider its practice of holding hearings on all nominations and its requirement of net worth statements from all nominees.

Every idea listed above, if ignored, triggers delay. So the first proposition of this paper is to define delay specifically so that it can be identified without dispute from any source except the delayers. The second proposition is that a mechanism can be created to minimize acceptable defenses for the crime of delay to circumstances where delay is indisputably defensible. The delay in certifying the winner of the 2000 election is a good example of how unusual and significant the excuse must be. Only a very small percentage of the nominees are ultimately rejected. Some have estimated that the number is around one per cent. This is the Achilles heel of the delayers. They accomplish nothing that they can explain or defend. Yet these perpetrators seldom require any defense at all, because only the few who sympathize with their ulterior motives pay any attention to the crime.

In the next section, the mechanism will be presented to fix this situation.

*It is time to go on to The Ark.*

## **SECTION THREE**

### **THE ARK**

The many books, papers, and proposals related to the Presidential personnel process span many years, involve many distinguished authorities and offer many good analyses of the challenges that cause the process to be declared broken and the steps useful to fixing it.

The entire multi-decade effort has only one short-coming. It **has**, to date, failed to improve the situation.

What is needed now is not an additional policy analysis or systems review. For the Presidential personnel process to work as it should on behalf of a President and the country, the nation needs a strategy to cause the right reforms to be made and to enforce the necessary discipline.

The strategy to make The Three Thirties become the discipline to achieve the many reforms so widely praised and so little considered must be a mechanism to organize the energy and sentiment now presumed to be overwhelmingly directed in favor of proper reform, but so diffused as to be ineffective.

Consider this anomaly in the predicament: every delay in the personnel process is likely to be executed by someone who wishes that the process

would not be burdened by such delays in every instance except the one he or she is perpetrating. The goal of this plan is to organize the weight of those wishes so that the delays are truly politically unacceptable.

The mechanism to do that must be permanent, non-partisan, non-ideological, mostly self-enforcing and capable of sustaining itself with little staff and modest resources.

The fuel for the mechanism will be the assumption that many political opposites will unite against delays in the process caused by interests of no concern to them. In addition competitors in an arena such as Presidential candidates or groups in a category such as former Presidents, will also be induced to unite in similar opposition

Indeed, the rocket fuel will come from the assumption that such opposites will even become convinced that they should jointly oppose delay when one – or more likely both – has a political, philosophical or vested interest in the nomination's future. This can and must happen. It will happen because one opposite will goad and cajole the other to do the right thing for the good of the country and to take this tactic off the table so it cannot be used to hurt them.

The task is to create a mechanism that causes these opposites to activate themselves immediately and to inspire each other for years to come.

The mechanism is to be called The Ark. It would come into being by having the appropriate people and entities take the following steps.

1. The **CEOS** of two leading Washington intellectual and policy centers with reputations toward opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum will agree to launch the mechanism.
2. Each CEO designates a major leader – perhaps a board member – from his organization to serve as a leader in creating the Ark. These leaders will be known as Noahs.
3. The Noahs work together to take the first step to assemble the Ark – a virtual space where pairs of people or organizations with often opposing viewpoints state two irrevocable commitments, first to support The Three Thirties and, second, to join efforts to chastise

publicly any individual or group in America that undermines the execution of The Three Thirties at any time or in any way.

4. The Noahs will seek funding with a goal of \$750,000 to run the Ark for three years. The initial budget will cover comprehensive planning, the initial organizing steps, staff and the cost of publicity and advocacy.
5. The Noahs cause a website to be built – perhaps called webARK.org to serve as the communications center for the entire ongoing effort.
6. At the announcement at the creation of the Ark, the Noahs will propound the “Statement of the Three-Thirties” written as follows:

### **The Three Thirties Agreement**

*Any person or entity that joins The Ark is committed to doing everything possible to facilitate adherence to the four standards of thirty day windows to move Presidential personnel nominations forward to a decision as herein described:*

## **THE THREE THIRTIES**

1. Within thirty days of making a selection and with the candidate’s paperwork complete, the President publicly announces an “intent to nominate” the candidate.
2. Agencies responsible for security and ethics clearances of candidates will complete their work within thirty days of receipts of appropriate paperwork.
3. The Senate will make a decision regarding the confirmation of any nominee within thirty session days of receipt of the nomination,

*Members of the Ark pledge to oppose any policy, proposal, procedure or action that presents an obstacle to The Three thirties.*

7. The Noahs will assemble a small staff to initiate preparation and constant augmentation of a list of possible opposites and categories akin to that suggested as follows.

## **A SAMPLING OF OPPOSITES AND CATEGORIES TO BE INVITED ON TO THE ARK**

The American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution  
The Democratic National Committee and the Republican National  
Committee Chairs  
The Presidential nominees (announced at their first debate)  
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO  
Presidents Carter, Ford and Bush  
Every Senate Committee Chairman and Ranking Member  
The editorial page leaders of the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street  
Journal*  
The editorial page leaders of the *Boston Herald* and the *Boston Globe*  
Rush Limbaugh and Al Franken  
Al Gore and Dan Quayle  
Bill O'Reilly and Chris Matthews  
The Senate Majority and Minority Leaders  
Chairs of all national political ethics watchdogs  
The heads of NARAL, Pro-choice America and National Right to Life  
The heads of NOW and Concerned Women of America  
The heads of the Family Research Council and the Human Rights Campaign  
The heads of the National Association of Manufacturers and the United Auto  
Workers  
Leaders of the National Council of Churches and the Catholic Church  
Robert Novak and James Carville  
Editors of the National Review and Nation, the New Republic and the  
Weekly Standard, the Hill and Roll Call  
Grover Norquist and John Podesta  
Fred Barnes and Juan Williams  
Heads of the Heritage Foundation and the Democratic Leadership Council  
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Ambassador Sargeant Shriver  
Heads of Meet-up and Move-on  
Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes  
Paul Harvey and Andy Rooney  
Kathleen VandenHeuvel and **Ann** Coulter  
Laura Ingraham and Susan Estrich

8. With funds committed, staff in place and the website prepared for launching, the Noaahs will send letters of invitation to the leaders of a hundred pairs of organizations. That letter reads as follows:

*Dear*

*We are writing to you about an opportunity being presented to all of us who care about public policy and the effective functioning of our federal government.*

*There are few topics in this arena that generate a virtually complete consensus, but one such topic is the breakdown of the Presidential personnel process.*

*Consider the conclusions offered by perhaps the leading authorities studying this aspect of our federal government:*

The contemporary Presidential appointment process is slower, more cumbersome, more contentious, more repellent to talented Americans and more distant from the purposes of good government than it has ever been.

G. Calvin Mackenzie  
The Goldfarb Family Distinguished Professor of American  
Government at Colby College and Editor of *Innocent Until  
Nominated from* the Brookings Institution Press

At least according to those who have experienced the frustrations first hand as nominees, it is safe to conclude that the Presidential appointments process verges on complete collapse.

Paul C. Light, The Brookings Institution and Virginia L.  
Thomas, The Heritage Foundation

That the nomination and confirmation process is broken is a truism now widely accepted by both Republicans and Democrats. It is also clear that the problems did not start with Clinton's administration but have been building for at least 30 years.

Norman Omstein, American Enterprise Institute and  
Thomas Donilon of Fannie Mae

*The most important single fact about this problem is that virtually all nominees ultimately take office. Delay is used, not to find a better choice, but rather to use the system to achieve some other end. In some cases, the ulterior motive relates to the responsibilities of the nominee. In too many cases, the motive is completely unrelated to the nominee who simply*

*becomes an innocent hostage to some policy objective. No matter how meritorious such objectives can be, the sum of these delays and distractions produces perhaps an often unintended but now crisis level consequence. Identifying, recruiting, vetting, clearing and placing those who must lead and manage the most important institution in the history of the world, the American government, is a process that must come to work efficiently and effectively.*

*We bring to you an idea to achieve this goal. It has Pogo-like simplicity. If we want this problem to be solved, let's agree to stop tolerating it.*

*A new scheme is being organized to achieve precisely and exclusively that goal. It is called the Ark, which is refreshingly not an acronym. Rather it is a metaphor. Individuals like us are not going to solve this problem by courageously and unilaterally leaving the opportunity to advance some special cause by using the arena of appointments to others without some company. The Ark is the place where Americans unite in the resolve to achieve policy objectives some other way.*

*We ask you and [the opposite] to consider joining us. We agreed on three broad sets of principles. First, we agreed that our two institutions will never use the triggering of delays of Presidential appointees as a mechanism to advance a policy or political cause. We, of course, reserve the right to oppose a nominee. We simply forgo the tactic of seeking or causing delay in making a decision.*

*Second, we commit our organizations to the principles embodied in what is known on the Ark as The Three Thirties. An articulation of those principles is enclosed, but they can be briefly stated. It should take less than thirty days to select a candidate, once chosen, to prepare and submit his filings for the position and for the President to announce the intent to nominate. It should take less than thirty days for any and all clearing organizations to complete their work, once they are in receipt of the candidate's paperwork. It should take less than thirty session days for the Senate to confirm a vetted and cleared nominee. The Three Thirties are performance standards representing a sequence of time periods totaling 90 days. Surely in the information era these goals can be met – every time.*

*Third and finally we agree to join other members of the Ark and particularly the partner with whom we joined in drawing critical attention to anyone,*

*Ark member or not, who is responsible for a failure to meet the standards of The Three thirties.*

*The Ark has received generous seed support from [ ].*

*The Ark will run a web site webARK.org, and an e-mail alert system to keep our obligations to The Three Thirty principles front of mind and when necessary on the front page.*

*Please **join** [the opposite] and, together walk on to the Ark. Together we can make American government a much more efficient and effective tool to keep us safe and served.*

*Sincerely,*

9. As a general and continuing practice for years to come, **Ark** staff will look for delays and soon be apprised of them by victims. Each delay will be posted on the web**ARK** and an e-mail alert system will be developed to inform members of delays in areas where they have a particular geographic or substantive interest.
10. The campaigns will be conducted according to the guidelines described below:

### **ARK CAMPAIGNS**

When the Ark is launched, ten public information campaigns will be conducted within two years to achieve the goal of collectively raising public awareness of the validity and importance of The Three Thirties and the presence and potential clout of the Ark to expose and chastise those who trigger delays that violate the new standards.

Each campaign will focus public attention on a particular violation **of** one of the Thirties. The Noaahs and staff will identify a range of violations, which should not be difficult in the short term given how common they are today. They will choose violations to be targeted based upon their relevance to members and the importance of the position involved.

Each campaign will be planned and staffed separately using political and public relations firms for execution. It is expected that a campaign would last about a month and cost less than **\$50,000** including fees and communications tools.

Soon the Ark will be fully launched; the use of delay for narrow purposes in politics and policy will be replaced by a scramble to make the necessary changes in the way the Presidential personnel process operates so that delay is seldom preferable or necessary.

# APPENDICES

## Introduction to the Appendices

The five appendices that follow are designed to help the reader to appreciate the breadth and diversity of those individuals and institutions that have contributed to understanding the nature of the problem and proposing specific fixes to it and to provide a mechanism for locating specific articles, descriptions, recommendations that have come before.

- Appendix I.** A bibliography of thirty-six major studies reviewed for this study, listed chronologically. The number preceding each item is used as a key for the Appendices that follow.
- Appendix II.** Institutions that have undertaken to study the increasing difficulty in putting Presidential Appointees into office in a prompt manner. These come from the studies listed in Appendix I and are listed alphabetically to help illustrate the breadth of institutions and points of view that have participated in the discussion of these issues. (The antecedent number is keyed to the Bibliography)
- Appendix III.** This list of individuals has been also extracted from the Bibliography. Titles are presented to make the point yet again of the extent to which those who have participated have come from either personal experience or in a position to know the issue well. (The preceding number is keyed to the Bibliography.)
- Appendix IV.** The Need to Fix. The excerpts contained in this appendix are simply additional references to the description made in Section II: The Four Thirties included here as further texture of the growing crisis. (The succeeding numbers is keyed Appendix I.)
- Appendix V.** Elements of Reform. While many of these have been mentioned in the narrative of the paper, a more precise listing is made here, again with antecedent numbers referencing the bibliography.

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## APPENDIX 11.

### INSTITUTIONS

American Bar Association (8)  
American Enterprise Institute (11, 17)  
The Brookings Institution (11, 13, 16, 22, 23, 26-29, 32-34)  
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government (6)  
Council for Excellence in Government (11, 15, 19)  
Defense Science Board (12)  
Governance Institute (11)  
Government Accounting Office (7)  
Heritage Foundation (14, 22, 23, 26-29, 32-34)  
The Hoover Institution (11)  
Institute of Medicine (6)  
The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (20, 21, 25)  
National Academy of Engineering, National Research Council Fund of the Academies (6)  
National Academy of Public Administration (2)  
National Academy of Sciences, The National Research Council Fund of the Academies (6)  
National Commission on Public Service (Volker Commission) (2)  
Pew Charitable Trusts (11, 13, 22, 23, 26-29, 32-34)  
President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform (Wilkey Commission) (4)  
President's Commission on the Federal Appointment Process (5)  
President's Committee on Administrative Management (Brownlow Committee) (1)  
The Transition to Government Project (22, 21, 25)  
Twentieth Century Fund (Century Foundation) (9,10)  
United States Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century (Hart-Rudman) (24)  
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (20, 21, 25)  
University of Maryland Foundation, James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership (11)  
The White House Project. 2001. (20, 21, 25)

## APPENDIX III.

### PARTICIPANTS

1. Presidential Management Expert (Louis Brownlow)  
Member of Franklin Roosevelt's "Brain Trust" (Charles E. Memam)  
Director, Institute of Public Administration (Luther Culick)  
Director of Research (Joseph P. Harris)
  
2. Former Director General, US Foreign Service (Carol C. Lake)  
Former Director, Office of Government Ethics (J. Jackson Walter)  
Former Chairman, US Civil Service (John W. Macy)  
Former Secretary of Commerce (Philip Klutznick)  
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense (Frank C. Carlucci)  
Professor Emeritus, University of Georgia (Frederick C. Mosher)  
Project Director: G. Calvin Mackenzie  
Experts: Paul C. Light; Linda L. Fisher, James P. Pfiffner
  
3. Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve (Paul A. Volcker)  
President of New York University, former US Representative  
(John Brademas)  
Former CEO of Cabot Corp. (Dr. Robert A. Charpie)  
Chairman & CEO, General Foods (James L. Ferguson)  
Former Secretary of Health Education and Welfare; founder of  
Common Cause (John W. Gardner)  
President Emeritus of Notre Dame (Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh)  
Former Director, USIA (Leonard H. Marks)  
Senior VP for R.H. Macy & Co. (GG Michelson)  
President, League of Women Voters (Nancy M. Neuman)  
Former Attorney General; former Secretary Health Education and  
Welfare (Elliot L. Richardson)  
Former official, Dept. of State, Budget Bureau (J. Robert Schaezel)  
Former Comptroller General (Elmer B. Staats)  
Former Counselor to Presidents Nixon and Ford (Anne Armstrong)  
Chairman and CEO, Johnson and Johnson (James E. Burke)  
Former Secretary of Transportation (William T. Coleman, Jr.)  
Former President Gerald R. Ford  
Former Commander, NATO (General Andrew J. Goodpaster)  
Attorney (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.)

Former Senator (Charles M.C. Mathias, Jr.)  
Former Vice President and Senator (Walter F. Mondale)  
Former Director, OMB; Chairman and CEO, ALCOA (Paul H. O'Neill)  
Former Senator (Charles S. Robb)  
Chancellor, University of Wisconsin (Donna E. Shalala)  
President, National Association of Manufacturers, Former Secretary of Commerce (Alexander B. Trowbridge)  
President of Harvard University (Derek Bok)  
Former U. S. Representative (Yvonne Brathwaite Burke)  
**Chairman** of R.A. Debs & Co; former office **of** the Federal Reserve (Richard A. Debs)  
Former President, United Auto Workers (Douglas A. Fraser)  
Honorary Chairman of Levi Strauss & Co. (Walter H. Haas, Jr.)  
President of Stanford University (Donald Kennedy)  
Former Secretaries of Defense (Robert S. McNamara)  
Former Senator (Edmund S. Muskie)  
Former Secretary of Defense (Donald Rumsfeld)  
Former Chairman and CEO of Ticor (Rocco C. Siciliano)  
Lecturer and Educational Leader (Carolyn Warner)  
Executive Director: L. Bruce Laingen  
Senior Advisor: Paul C. Light

4. Judge, US Court of Appeals (Malcolm Richard Wilkey)  
Attorney (Jan Witold Baran)  
EVP, Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America (Judith Hippler Bello)  
Former Attorney General (Griffin B. Bell)  
Former Counsel to President Carter (Lloyd N. Cutler)  
Former Counsel to President Reagan (Fred Fisher Fielding)  
Former Senator (Harrison H. Schmitt)  
Former State Department Lawyer (Amy L. Schwartz)  
Former Undersecretary of the Navy; General Counsel to Senate Armed Services Committee (R. James Woolsey)
5. Deputy Secretary of Commerce (Thomas J. Murrin)  
Executive Assistant to the Speaker of the House (Werner Brandt)  
Floor **Assistant** to the Republican leader of the House (William R. Pitts, Jr.)

Director, Office of Government Ethics (Stephen D. Potts)  
 Judge, US Court of Appeals (Clarence Thomas)  
 Director of Presidential Personnel for George H. W. Bush (Chase  
 Untermeyer)  
 Counsel to President George H. W. Bush (Boyden Gray)  
 Chief Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee (Ronald Klain)  
 Director, Office of Personnel Management (Constance Barry  
 Newman)  
 Secretary for the Majority, Senate (C. Abbott Saffold)  
 Chief of Staff to the Republican Leader (Senate) (Sheila Burke)  
 Assistant Secretary of Education (Nancy Mohr Kennedy)  
 Assistant Attorney General (J. Michael Luttig)  
 Executive Director Alvin S. Felzenberg  
 Note: The Study refers to 76 other officials/experts in the field)

6. VP, IBM, interim President and CEO, The United Way (Kenneth W. Dam)
  - Attorney (William T. Coleman, Jr.)
  - Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (John M. Deutch)
  - John S. Foster, Jr., Redondo Beach, California
  - Former Director, Presidential Personnel Office, Reagan Administration (E. Pendleton James)
  - Professor, Colby College (G. Calvin Mackenzie)
  - Senior Fellow, Brookings (Charles Schultze)
  - Senior Lecturer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Robert C. Seamans, Jr.)
  - President, National Trust for Historic Preservation (J. Jackson Walter)
  - Chairman, Wexler, Reynolds (Anne Wexler)
  - Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency (R. James R. Woolsey)
  - Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Sciences and Institute of Medicine (James B. Wyngaarden)
  - Study Staff: Michael McGeary, James Pfiffner
  
7. Director, Federal Human Resources Management Issues, Government Accounting Office, Bernard L. Ungar
  
8. Attorney, Sally Katzen
  - Former Solicitor of Department of Labor, Senior Fellow Foundation (Marshall J. Berger)
  - Former US Attorney General (Benjamin R. Civiletti)

Former Counsel to President George H.W. Bush (Boyden Gray)  
Special Assistant to the Comptroller General, GAO (James F. Hinchman)  
Former Director Office of Management and Budget (James C. Miller)  
Assistant Attorney General (John H. Shenefield)  
Supreme Court Justice (Stephen G. Breyer)  
Former Ambassador to the European Commission (Stuart E. Eizenstat)  
Former Solicitor General (Erwin N. Griswold)  
Chairman of the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service's Advisory Group (James P. Holden)  
Co-Director, Common Cause (Alan B. Morrison)  
Member, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (R. Gaull Silberman)  
Chairman, Intercontinental Bank, Miami (William H. Allen)  
Former General Counsel, Department of Defense (Kathleen A. Buck)  
Former Director, FBI (Webster)  
Attorney (Ernest Gelhorn)  
Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Geoffrey Hazard)  
President of the American Intellectual Property Law Association (Jerome G. Lee)  
Attorney (Steven R. Ross)  
Former Assistant Attorney General (Administration) (L. Lawrence Wallace)  
Judge, 3<sup>rd</sup> U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Walter Stapleton)  
Chief Counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee (Thomas M. Susman)  
Senior VP and General Counsel (Catherine Walker)  
Former Director, FBI (William H. Webster)

9. Former US Senator (John C. Culver)  
Editor, Columbia Journalism Review (Suzanne Braum Levine)  
Dean of the Faculty, Princeton (Amy Gutmann)  
President Drew University, Former Governor of New Jersey (Thomas J. Kean)  
Former Special Counsel to JFK (Theodore C. Sorensen)  
Former Chairman, Federal Reserve (Paul A. Volcker)  
Former US Senator (Charles M.C. Mathias)  
Former Counsel to President Reagan (Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr.)  
Professor, Columbia University (Charles V. Hamilton)

Former Director, Presidential Personnel Office for President Carter)  
(Arnie Miller)

President Emeritus Columbia University (Michael I. Sovern)

Former Congressman (John Brademas)

Former Counsel to Presidents Carter, Clinton (Lloyd N. Cutler)

Former Director Office of Personnel Management, Former Director  
Presidential Personnel Office (President G.W.H. Bush)  
(Constance Homer)

Former Staff Secretary for President Clinton (John D. Fodesta)

Dow Jones & Co. (Richard J. Tafel)

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense (John Whitehead)

Executive Director: G. Calvin Mackenzie

Task Force Consultant: David A. Smith

11. Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute (Norman J. Omstein)  
Director, Government Studies, Brookings Institution (Thomas E.  
Mann)  
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution (David W. Brady)

## 12. John Foster

General Larry Welsh (USAF Ret.)

Norman Augustine

General Billy Boles (USAF Ret.)

Beverly Byron

Dr. Ash Carter

Major General Arthur Dean (USA Ret.)

Dr. John Deutch

John Ford

General Andrew Goodpaster (USA Ret.)

Dr. Patricia Ingraham

Admiral David Jeremiah (USN Ret.)

Dr. Larry Korb

Peter Lennon

Lieutenant General Michael McGinty (USAF Ret.)

Stan Pace

Dr. David Segal

Frank Sullivan

Chase Untermeyer

General Jack Vessey (USA Ret.)

Dr. John Warner

Dr. John White  
Kim Wincup  
Executive Secretary: Dr. Curtis Gilroy  
Government Advisors: Judith Fernandez, Lt.Col. Brandy Johnson  
(USAF)

13.Princeton Survey Research Associates  
The Brookings Institution (Paul C. Light)  
The Heritage Foundation (Virginia L. Thomas)

14.Roundable Discussion: Keys to a Successful Presidency

Former White House Counselor to President Reagan (Edwin Meese)  
Former Director Presidential Personnel Office (Reagan  
Administration) (E. Pendleton James)  
Former Director Presidential Personnel Office (G.H.W. Bush  
Administration) (Chase Untermeyer)  
Former Director Presidential Personnel Office (Clinton  
Administration) (Veronica Biggens)  
Former Director Presidential Personnel Office (Carter and Clinton  
Administrations) (James King)  
Professor, George Mason University (James Pfiffner)  
Vice President, Director of Government Studies, Brookings Institute  
(Paul C. Light)

Roundtable Discussion: Keys to a Successful Transition

Executive Vice President, The Heritage Fonnation (Phil Trulick)  
Former Counsel of President George H.W. Bush (Boyden Gray)  
Former Counsellor, President Reagan (Edwin Meese **111**)  
Former Counsel to President Kennedy (Theodore C. Sorensen)  
Former Special **Assistant** to President Johnson (Jack Valenti)  
Former Chief of Staff to President Carter (Jack Watson)  
Professor, University of Vermont (John Burke)  
Professor, Towson University (Martha Kumar)  
Professor Emeritus, Harvard University (Richard E. Neustadt)

Note: 54 Speakers also participated in these studies

14. Former Assistant to the President, Communications (Clinton Administration) (Mark Gearan)  
The Brookings Institution (Stephen Hess)  
Former Director Presidential Personnel Office (Reagan Administration) (E. Pendleton James)  
The Heritage Foundation: Alvin Felzenberg
15. The Brookings Institution (Stephen Hess)
17. Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution (Thomas Mann)  
Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution (Richard V. Allen)  
Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution (Annelise G. Anderson)  
Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution (Martin Anderson)  
Chief of Staff to President Carter (Jack Watson)  
Hoover Institution (David Brady)  
Hoover Institution (John Raisian)
18. Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute (Norman Orenstein)  
Executive Vice President, Law and Policy, Fannie Mae, Former  
Assistant Secretary, Department of State (Thomas Donilon)
21. American Association of Public Administration (Bradley H. Patterson)  
Professor, George Mason University (James P. Pfiffner)
22. The Brookings Institution (Michael H. Armacost)  
Presidential Appointment Initiative Co-Chair, former Senator (Nancy Kassenbaum Baker)  
Presidential Appointment Initiative Co-Chair, Chairman & CEO,  
Fannie Mae (Franklin Raines)  
Vice President, Director of Governmental Studies, Brookings Institute  
(Paul Light)
23. Princeton Survey Research Associates  
The Brookings Institute (Paul C. Light)  
The Heritage Foundation (Virginia L. Thomas)
24. Former Senator (Gary Hart)  
Former Senator (Warren Rudman)

Former Assistant to President Reagan (Anne Armstrong)  
Former Undersecretary of the **Army** (Norm Armstrong)  
Former Asst Secretary of State (Les Gelb)  
Former Speaker of the House of Representatives (Newt Gingrich)  
Former US Representative (Lee Hamilton)  
Former Secretary of the Air Force, Chair of Rand (Donald Rice)  
Former Secretary of Defense, CIA (James Schlesinger)  
Former Ambassador to the United Nations (Andrew Young)

#### 26. Presidential Appointments Initiative Advisory Board

Former Senator (Nancy Kassenbaum Baker)  
President, The Brookings Institution (Michael H. Armacost)  
Former Secretary of State (Lawrence S. Eagleburger)  
Former Deputy Chief of Staff (Mark D. Gearan)  
Former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Former  
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Carla A. Hills)  
Former Secretary of Labor (Lynn M. Martin)  
Former Senator (Daniel Patrick Moynihan)  
Former Director Office of Personnel Management, Undersecretary of  
the Smithsonian (Constance Barry Newman)  
Former Chief of Staff, former Director OMB. Former Representative  
(Leon E. Panetta)  
Former Secretary of Defense (William J. Perry)  
Former Senator, Director of the Institute for Politics, Kennedy School  
at Harvard (David H. Pryor)  
Former Secretary of Health and Human Services, President University  
of Miami (Donna E. Shalala)  
Former Senator (Alan K. Simpson)

#### Presidential Appointments Initiative Advisory Board

Former Senator, Former Chief of Staff to President Reagan (Howard  
H. Baker, Jr.)  
Former Presidents Carter and Ford  
Former Senators Robert J. Dole and Mike Mansfield

27. Professor, George Washington University, Fellow, Brookings Institute  
(Sarah A. Bidner)  
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute (E. J. Dionne, Jr.)  
Professor, Texas A&M University (George C. Edwards III)

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute (Stephen Hess)  
Deputy Director, Brookings Center for Public Service (Judith M. Labiner)  
Vice President and Director, Brookings Institute Government Studies Program (Paul C. Light)  
Professor, University of Kansas  
Professor, Colby College (G. Calvin Mackenzie)  
Professor, George Mason University (James P. Pfiffner)  
Professor, University of North Carolina (Terry Sullivan)

32. Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution (Gary Burtless)  
Former Secretary of Defense (Frank Carlucci)  
President, Committee for Economic Development (Charles E. Kolb)  
Vice President and Director, Governmental Studies, Brookings Institution (Paul Light)  
Professor, Colby College (G. Calvin Mackenzie)  
Associate Director, Presidential Appointee Initiative (Carole M. Plowfield)
35. Associate Professor, Middlebury College (Matthew Dickinson)  
Guest Scholar, Government Studies, The Brookings Institution (Kathryn Dunn Tenpas)

## APPENDIX IV.

### THE NEED TO FIX

#### Comment

With thirty years of experience, I have reached three conclusions regarding the President Personnel process: it's important; it's properly structured; and it urgently needs discipline because the people in it don't always respect it. (SEH)

#### Delays

“Time required to fill Presidentially appointed positions at the beginning of new administrations has grown steadily over the past 40 years, from 2.4 months in the Kennedy Administration to 8.5 months in the Clinton Administration. Of appointees who served between 1964 and 1984, only 1 in 20 reported spending more than 6 months in the appointment process. Of those who served between 1984 and 1999, that share had grown to almost one in three. Every component of the process now takes longer than ever.” (27)

“Forty years ago, when John F. Kennedy became President, cabinet and subcabinet officers were nominated and confirmed expeditiously. On average, the 196 top-level positions requiring Senate confirmation were filled less than two and a half months after the Presidential inauguration. Thirty-two years later, when Bill Clinton assumed the presidency, it was a different story. The 786 top-level Clinton nominees requiring Senate confirmation took an average of almost nine months after inauguration to assume their posts –meaning they missed more than a sixth of the Presidential term!” (18)

“The ordeal of being appointed repels the successful and creative people needed to run a modern government. For many positions it now takes six months to a year just to find a nominee willing to serve. Some people agree to be considered, then withdraw when they find out how intrusive and extensive the scrutiny has become. Some go through all the investigations and questionnaires, then withdraw

because there is still no end in sight. Talented people...give up in frustration.” (27)

## National Security

Concern over implications for delays in the area of national security began even before 9/11. With heightened challenges facing especially the Defense, State and Homeland Security departments, particularly in the fight against terrorism, politics as usual compounds the **risk** of government failure. This paper does not specifically address nominations in either the uniformed services or foreign service (or the judicial branch). While there are special circumstances for each, the underlying problems with the current system apply, nearly exactly, and would benefit from the **Ark**. Some additional notes regarding national security.

“DoD [Department of Defense] data illustrates that while the number of PAS positions has increased over the years, the amount of time all PAS [Presidential Appointments requiring Senate confirmation] positions are filled has decreased. At the same time, the rate has decreased. today PAS candidates wait longer to assume positions, typically serve less than two years, and the now-more-plentiful positions sit vacant more often. For example, during the Truman Administration, 99% of the time, all DoD [Department of Defense] PAS positions were filled. During the current administration [Clinton], DoD PAS positions are filled only 80 percent of the time.” (2002 - 12)

“While career personnel provide much-needed expertise, continuity, and professionalism, Presidential appointees are a source of many valuable qualities as well – fresh ideas, experience outside government, specialized expertise, management skills, and often an impressive personal dynamism. They also ensure political accountability in policy execution, by transmitting the President’s policies to the departments and agencies of government. Indeed, the tradition of public-spirited citizens moving in and out of government is **an** old and honorable one, serving the country well from the days of George Washington. This infusion of outside skills is truly indispensable today, when the private sector is the source of so much of the country’s managerial and technological innovation.

“What a tragedy, then, that the system for recruiting such outside talent has broken down.

“...the appointments process feeds the pervasive atmosphere of distrust and cynicism about government service. The encrustation of complex rules is based on the presumption that all officials, and especially those with experience in or contact with the private sector, are criminals waiting to be unmasked. Congress and the media relish accusations or suspicions, whether substantiated or not. Yet the U.S. government will not be able to function effectively unless public service is restored to a place of honor and prestige, especially for private citizens who have achieved success in their chosen fields.” (2001 – 24)

“The panel concluded – after examining the record, reviewing reports, and conferring with government recruiting officials and with current and past incumbents of S&T [science and technology] related positions – that there is considerable evidence of increasing difficulty in recruiting and keeping the highly qualified appointees the government needs to serve in S&T leadership positions. We are very concerned by this deterioration in the government’s ability to manage ongoing programs and to undertake new initiatives. If the situation continues, the government’s ability to make key decisions in the face of rapid scientific and technology change – and to design, carry out, and evaluate effective and responsive programs – will be very seriously affected. The nation can ill afford the consequences of leaving unattended this problem of executive recruitment... Continued leadership of the United States in such areas as biotechnology, manufacturing, medical sciences, space, energy, and defense is threatened.” (1992 – 6)

“Military promotions are on hold in the Senate, sources say. The senate approves promotions of officers, but an unidentified senator is blocking them from moving forward. Senate sources speaking on condition of anonymity said Thursday.” Associate Press 11/6/03 Nancy Zuckerbrod. The story was related to the fact that ALL officers were being held up in **the** Senate because of controversy surrounding one promotion to Lt. General, a nomination that had been pending for nearly two years and was eventually confirmed.

In 2003, the Senate was asked to act on 22,000 military officer promotions, 165 of these are general and flag officers. When delays occur in processing these nominations, some may have to retire because their terms were up or the position they were holding was up for rotation. Stagnation at the highest levels affects the careers, training and experience of virtually all senior officers.

“On August 1, [2000] Peter Burleigh one of America’s most seasoned and effective diplomats, quietly tendered his resignation after 33 years in the U.S. Foreign Service. Burleigh’s nomination to be Ambassador to the Philippines had been held up for nine months in the Senate. With no prospects for movement through the remainder of the year, Burleigh decided to move on with his life. He had been in limbo not because of questions about his qualifications or actions, but because Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) upset about the State Department’s treatment of an American whistle blower at the United Nations, had exercised his senatorial prerogative to hold up Burleigh’s nomination and two other ambassadorial appointments indefinitely.” (2000- 18)

### Prospective Candidate Perceptions

A survey of Presidential Appointees who had been confirmed and in office compared the periods 1964-1984 and 1984-1999 and included the following data for the more recent period:

20.6 % said they had made a great financial sacrifice and another 30.6 percent made a moderate financial sacrifice in accepting their initial PAS position.

Considering possible changes to the system, the respondents ranked various recommendations from “little or no help; somewhat helpful; moderately helpful; greatly helpful; and very greatly helpful.” The first number below represents “*very* greatly and greatly; the second moderately and somewhat.

Ease conflict of interest: 45.9, 36.2 %  
Ease financial disclosure: 34.2, 48.5  
Simplify and limit FBI investigation: 37.6, 44.1  
Shorten time for White House Counsel Clearance: 39.3, 47.6  
Make Senate process less intrusive: 40.9, 42.0

Raise salaries: **55.3, 30.8**

Waive double dipping restrictions: **30.8, 39.8**

Simplify the entire process: 71.8, 22.4 (2)

Another survey of the attitudes of some **580** potential appointees -- Fortune 500 executives; university Presidents; non-profit CEOs; think tank scholars; lobbyists; government officials -- towards Presidential appointments concluded as follows:

“The survey shows that the spirit of service is willing, but the process for entry is weak. To the extent that the nation wants Presidential appointees who represent the talent and wisdom that resides across the sectors covered in this report, it must address the persistent strains it places on appointees as they enter office. Posts of honor merit no less.”

“Forty-seven percent of the respondents who had been considered for an appointment either turned it down (21%) or said they would have turned it down had the conversation moved to a formal offer (27%). The number of respondents involved here, while small in absolute terms, speaks to broader concerns among all potential appointees about how their nominations would be handled at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. Although one cannot know how they felt before their first contact, these respondents suggest that entering the appointments process can turn enthusiasm into confusion, embarrassment, and a sense of unfairness in short order.”

“Almost one in two people pulled back from the process once they got a little taste of it.”

The panel discussion announcing the results of this survey included the following comment: “Secondly, for those that don’t have the proximity to the D.C. area, we found that the media becomes a very important lens on the process to those who are seeking to serve their country in this way. We found that **60%** of the corporate CEOs thought that the media had a great deal or a significant amount of influence on what they thought about the appointment process, and even a higher percentage of lawyers and lobbyists and think tankers in

Washington though the media played a tremendous role in deciding what the appointment process was going to be like.”  
(2001 - 23)

“No systematic, quantitative evidence suggests a drastic drop-off in the recruitment of America’s best and brightest to top public policy position. But every available piece of anecdotal evidence suggests that the recruitment problem has mushroomed into a recruitment crisis. Fewer and fewer prominent people in business, industry, or the professions, such as law, medicine, architecture, or science will even consider positions in the federal government...” (18)

Comment: One of the authors has been recruiting senior positions for the Department of Defense for **30** years. His personal experience is replete with testimony of the difficulty in attracting the kind of talent American deserves. This entire paper is generated in part because of the frustration growing over these years in the ability to convince prospective candidates to go through a process that itself is the barrier to their willingness to serve. (SEH)

## **APPENDIX V.**

### **THE FIXES**

#### **A. The First Thirty: Presidential Selection and Candidate Preparation**

1. Candidates for President (including incumbents) should begin preparing early in the year of a Presidential election. (2,5,9,11,14,20,21)
  - a. Plan to have key appointments for senior White House and Cabinet ready for final decision within two to three weeks of the election. (16)
2. Candidates for President should set up an appropriate organization (6,14,20,21)
  - a. Create a small, separate team to consider Presidential appointments
  - b. Create the team to include those with experience in the Federal government, recruitment skills, sophisticated interview skills, and no personal agenda that may be in conflict with the President's goals.
  - c. Maintain total confidentiality of the names being gathered (15)
  - d. Include a science and technology advisor on the team (6)
  - e. Set specific rules for dealing with the press throughout the process.
3. The Candidate's Presidential Personnel Team should actively recruit; not just process applications from the interested. (3,14,20,21)
  - a. Develop "principal objectives" criteria for each significant position against which to judge candidates. "Principal objectives" are specific goals the Administration wants to achieve in each specific job.
  - b. Develop "general criteria" for all Presidential Appointees. The Reagan model included philosophical commitment to Ronald Reagan; unquestioned integrity; toughness to withstand the

- buffeting one gets in the Executive Branch; competence; team player. (3)
- c. Develop talent banks as early as possible
  - d. Define the role that Cabinet Secretaries and agency heads have with the recruitment and selection **of** their subordinate political appointees and ensure that Secretaries and agency heads clearly understand the role of the White House Personnel Office from the outset. Utilize the Secretaries and agency heads as much as possible, while retaining final approval at the White House. (3,6)
  - e. Keep job descriptions for PAS positions up to date and make available to the public (2)
4. The President and the Congress should pass legislation that will aggressively remove obstacles to attracting the best talent to Presidential appointee positions. (14,24)
- a. Overall, speed up the process. (3,5,6,12,13)
  - b. Appointees should be permitted to delay the impact of the capital gains taxes incurred in divesting assets to comply with conflict of interest laws and mandates of Senate Committees (Some relief granted in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989; the Act needs to be updated.) (2,3,4,6,8)
  - c. Appointees with genuine financial need should be granted up to three months of severance for transition out of government. Potential nominees and appointees should not be permitted to discuss post-government employment plans for a period of three months before or during their employment (2,3)
  - d. Increase the pay for all public officials, including political appointees (1,2,3,6,12)
  - e. Reduce the number of executive positions requiring full-field **FBI** investigations. (1,6,9)
  - f. Reduce public exposure of nominees personal lives by the Senate's adoption of Executive Sessions Questions regarding mental health background of candidates should minimize any unnecessary intrusion into their medical and psychological histories (5,9,18)
  - g. Post-employment restrictions should be revised to balance the public's interest in ensuring the integrity in government

- operations with its interest in attracting the best talent to government service. (2,6,24)
  - h. Conflict-of-interest laws are too stringent and should be eased, with recusal and full disclosure being the primary remedy in most cases.(4,6,24) Grant the Office of Government Ethics regulatory authority over the contents of **SF-278** and **SF-450** to reduce unnecessary intrusiveness and balance the proper needs of disclosure.
  - i. Conflict-of-interest laws should be streamlined and clarified, and periodically evaluated for effectiveness. **(4,8)**
  - j. Decriminalize the appointment process. (4,9,18)
5. The President and the Congress should reduce the number of positions requiring Senate confirmation (1,3,6,9,12,18,24)
6. The President and the Congress should revise the forms and formats of the information it requires from candidates to reduce the burdern of redundancies and improve efficiencies.
- a. The President should direct the Office of Government Ethics to work with the US Senate to consolidate, simplify and clarify financial disclosure forms. (2,3,4,5,6,8,12,13,18,24,25)
  - b. The President should direct the Office of Government Ethics to work with the US Senate to reduce the requirements for detailed information on income and holdings, including family reporting. **(3,5,6,8,12,13,18)**
  - c. The President, with the concurrence of the US Senate, eliminate the 1953 Executive Order requiring all nominees requiring Senate confirmation to obtain a full-field FBI investigation. All national security positions should retain the requirements; other positions should be eliminated from the requirement all together; others should be permitted with truncated investigations. Alternatively, the President should direct the FBI to develop a "menu" system of levels of investigation depending on the position. (2,5,18)
  - d. The President and the Senate should improve the common electronic nominations forms available through the White House website. The current system's User's Guide is itself **58** pages and doesn't solve the problem of multiple forms for different government users. And that presumes you are lucky

enough to have someone associated with the process instruct you as to where you can find the system on the Web. (11,18,25,29)

- e. The President should create a special unit within the Presidential Personnel Office to assist new appointees in handling personal and official difficulties. (2,3,5,9,13,20,21)
- f. The Presidential Personnel Office should provide prospective appointees with briefing papers outlining the process of clearances and reviews and should conduct orientation programs. (2,3,5)
- g. Prospective appointees should, themselves, attempt to provide previously filed forms **SF-86** along with completed new forms for FBI clearances. (5,16)

#### B. The Second Thirty: Clearing Prospective Appointees for Nomination

- 1. The President should streamline the clearance process for nominees not currently in government. (Same as 11.1)
- 2. The President should further streamline the clearance process for those nominated for new positions while occupying an already confirmed position. (5)
- 3. Working with the Director, the President should speed up the FBI process overall.
- 4. The President should designate about 100-150 potential appointees that are very likely to get nominations, have them prepare their paperwork early, and provide the paperwork to the FBI immediately after the election, regardless of whether a specific position has been determined. (14)
- 5. The FBI should provide nominees awaiting Senate confirmation copies of their files within days of their requests. (5)

#### C. The **Third** Thirty: Confirming nominees

- 1. The Senate should reform their "hold" system. (2,9,18)
- 2. The Senate should adopt one basic form for all committees, with the

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committees reserving the right to include addenda customized *to* suit their particular requirements. Development of a “model” form should be undertaken to be as consistent as possible with Executive Branch forms. (5,6)

3. Each Senate committee should reconsider the need for appointees to submit net worth statements. The Senate should consider using Executive Branch Form SF-278. (5)
4. **The** Senate should schedule nominations for a floor vote within 20 legislative days after nomination has been voted out of committee. (18)
5. Senate committees should waive hearings where possible. (18)

D. For all the Thirties – Civility

The Century Foundation captured a recommendation underlying years of frustration when the said: The Task Force also called for greater civility from all parties that comprise the modern nomination, confirmation, and appointment system. Many nominees in recent years have been subjected to damaging treatment by politicians, the media and the public. When the system becomes hostile, the entire political system is discredited in the public mind. (9)

~~FOUO~~

May 11, 2006

TO Eric Edelman

CC Gen Pete Pace

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Energy Behind NATO Train and Equip in Afghanistan

I don't sense that there is strong energy behind the NATO train and equip effort in Afghanistan. We need more diplomatic support.

What do we do?

Thanks.

DHR:db  
051106-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

.....

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/57740



5/31/2006 8 01 04 AM

FOUO

May 30, 2006

*1509*

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: "The Real Iraq" by Amir Taheri

The attached might be of interest to the President. I found it most interesting.

Attach "The Real Iraq" by Amir Taheri

DHR:ss  
053006-12

FOUO

OSD 08582-06

*30 May 06*

11-L-0559/OSD/57741

## The Real Iraq

Amir Taheri

Spending time in the United States after a tour of Iraq can be a disorienting experience these days. Within hours of arriving here, as I can attest from a recent visit, one is confronted with an image of Iraq that is unrecognizable. It is created in several overlapping ways: through television footage showing the charred remains of vehicles used in suicide attacks, surrounded by wailing women in black and grim-looking men carrying coffins; by armchair strategists and political gurus predicting further doom or pontificating about how the war should have been fought in the first place; by authors of instant-history books making their rounds to dissect the various fundamental mistakes committed by the Bush administration; and by reporters, cocooned in hotels in Baghdad, explaining the carnage and chaos in the streets as signs of the country's impending or undeclared civil war. Add to all this the days alleged scandal or revelation of an ousted CIA operative, a reportedly doctored intelligence report, a leaked pessimistic assessment and it is no wonder the American public registers disillusion with Iraq and everyone who embroiled the U.S. in its troubles.

It would be hard indeed for the average interested citizen to find out on his own just how grossly this image distorts the realities of present-day Iraq. Part of the problem, faced by even the most well-meaning news organizations, is the difficulty of covering so large and complex a subject; naturally, in such circumstances, sensational items rise to the top. But even ostensibly more objective efforts, like the Brookings Institutions much-cited *Iraq Index* with its constantly updated array of security, economic, and public-opinion indicators, tell us little about the actual feel of the country on the ground.

To make matters worse, many of the newsmen, pundits, and commentators on whom American viewers and readers rely to describe the situation have been contaminated by the increasing bitterness of American politics. Clearly there are those in the media and the think tanks who wish the Iraq enterprise to end in tragedy, as a just comeuppance for George W. Bush. Others, prompted by noble sentiment, so abhor the idea of war that they would banish it from human discourse before admitting that, in some circumstances, military power can be used in support of a good cause. But whatever the reason, the half-truths and outright misinformation that now function as conventional wisdom have gravely disserved the American people.

For someone like myself who has spent considerable time in Iraq, a country I first visited in 1968, current reality there is, nevertheless, very different from this conventional wisdom, and so are the prospects for Iraq's future. It helps to know where to look, what sources to trust, and how to evaluate the present moment against the background of Iraqi and Middle Eastern history.

Since my first encounter with Iraq almost 40 years ago, I have relied on several broad measures of social and economic health to assess the country's condition. Through good times and bad, these signs have proved remarkably accurate as accurate, that is, as is possible in human affairs. For some time now, all have been pointing in an unequivocally positive direction.

The first sign is refugees. When things have been truly desperate in Iraq in 1959, 1969, 1971, 1973, 1980, 1988, and 1990 long queues of Iraqis have formed at the Turkish and Iranian frontiers, hoping to escape. In 1973, for example, when Saddam Hussein decided to expel all those whose ancestors had not been Ottoman citizens before Iraq's creation as a state, some 1.2 million Iraqis left their homes in the space of just six weeks. This was not the temporary exile of a small group of middle-class professionals and intellectuals, which is a common enough phenomenon in most Arab countries. Rather, it was a departure *en masse*, affecting people both in small villages and in big cities, and it was a scene regularly repeated under Saddam Hussein.

Since the toppling of Saddam in 2003, this is one highly damaging image we have not seen on our television sets and we can be sure that we *would* be seeing it if it were there to be shown. To the contrary, Iraqis, far from fleeing, have been returning home. By the end of 2005, in the most conservative estimate, the number of returnees topped the 1.2-million mark. Many of the camps set up for fleeing Iraqis in Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia since 1959 have now closed down. The oldest such center, at Ashrafiyah in southwest Iran, was formally shut when its last Iraqi guests returned home in 2004.

A second dependable sign likewise concerns human movement, but of a different kind. This is the **flow** of religious pilgrims to the Shiite shrines in Karbala and Najaf. Whenever things start to go badly in Iraq, this stream is reduced to a trickle and then it dries up completely. From 1991 (when Saddam Hussein massacred Shiites involved in a revolt against him) to 2003, there were scarcely any pilgrims to these cities. Since Saddam's fall, they have been flooded with visitors. In 2005, the holy sites received an estimated 12 million pilgrims, making them the most visited spots in the entire Muslim world, ahead of both Mecca and Medina.

Over 3,000 Iraqi clerics have also returned from exile, and Shiite seminaries, which just a few years ago held no more than a few dozen pupils, now boast over 15,000 from 40 different countries. This is because Najaf, the oldest center of Shiite scholarship, is once again able to offer an alternative to Qom, the Iranian holy city where a radical and highly politicized version of Shiism is taught. Those wishing to pursue the study of more traditional and quietist forms of Shiism now go to Iraq where, unlike in Iran, the seminaries are not controlled by the government and its secret police.

A third sign, this one of the hard economic variety, is the value of the Iraqi dinar, especially as compared with the regions other major currencies. In the final years of Saddam Hussein's rule, the Iraqi dinar was in free fall; after 1995, it was no longer even traded in Iran and Kuwait. By contrast, the new dinar, introduced early in 2004, is doing well against both the Kuwaiti dinar and the Iranian rial, having risen by 17 percent against the former and by 23 percent against the latter. Although it is still impossible to fix its value against a basket of international currencies, the new Iraqi dinar has done well against the U.S. dollar, increasing in value by almost 18

percent between August **2004** and August **2005**. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis, and millions of Iranians and Kuwaitis, now treat it as a safe and solid medium of exchange

My fourth time-tested sign is the level of activity by small and medium-sized businesses. In the past, whenever things have gone downhill in Iraq, large numbers of such enterprises have simply closed down, with the country's most capable entrepreneurs decamping to Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, Turkey, Iran, and even Europe and North America. Since liberation, however, Iraq has witnessed a private-sector boom, especially among small and medium-sized businesses.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as numerous private studies, the Iraqi economy has been doing better than any other in the region. The country's gross domestic product rose to almost **\$90 billion in 2004** (the latest year for which figures are available), more than double the output for **2003**, and its real growth rate, as estimated by the **IMF**, was **52.3** per cent. In that same period, exports increased by more than **\$3 billion**, while the inflation rate fell to **25.4** percent, down from **70** percent in **2002**. The unemployment rate was halved, from 60 percent to **30** percent.

Related to this is the level of agricultural activity. Between **1991** and **2003**, the country's **farm** sector experienced unprecedented decline, in the end leaving almost the entire nation dependent on rations distributed by the United Nations under Oil-for-Food. In the past two years, by contrast, Iraqi agriculture has undergone an equally unprecedented revival. Iraq now exports foodstuffs to neighboring countries, something that has not happened since the **1950s**. Much of the upturn is due to smallholders who, shaking off the collectivist system imposed by the Baathists, have retaken control of land that was confiscated decades ago by the state.

Finally, one of the surest indices of the health of Iraqi society has always been its readiness to talk to the outside world. Iraqis are a verbalizing people; when they fall silent, life is incontrovertibly becoming hard for them. There have been times, indeed, when one could find scarcely a single Iraqi, whether in Iraq or abroad, prepared to express an opinion on anything remotely political. This is what Kanan Makiya meant when he described Saddam Hussein's regime as a republic of fear.

Today, again by way of dramatic contrast, Iraqis are voluble to a fault. Talk radio, television talk-shows, and Internet blogs are all the rage, while heated debate is the order of the day in shops, tea-houses, bazaars, mosques, offices, and private homes. A catharsis is how Luay Abdulilah, the Iraqi short-story writer and diarist, describes it. This is one way of taking revenge against decades of deadly silence. Moreover, a vast network of independent media has emerged in Iraq, including over 100 privately-owned newspapers and magazines and more than two dozen radio and television stations. To anyone familiar with the state of the media in the Arab world, it is a truism that Iraq today is the place where freedom of expression is most effectively exercised.

That an experienced observer of Iraq with a sense of history can point to so many positive factors in the country's present condition will not do much, of course, to sway the more determined critics of the U.S. intervention there. They might even agree that the images fed to the American

public show only part of the picture, and that the news from Iraq is not uniformly bad. But the root of their opposition runs deeper, to political fundamentals.

Their critique can be summarized in the aphorism that democracy cannot be imposed by force. It is a view that can be found among the more sophisticated elements on the Left and, increasingly, among dissenters on the Right, from Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska to the ex-neoconservative Francis Fukuyama. As Senator Hagel puts it, You cannot in my opinion just impose a democratic form of government on a country with no history and no culture and no tradition of democracy.

I would tend to agree. But is Iraq such a place? In point of fact, before the 1958 pro-Soviet military coup d'etat that established a leftist dictatorship, Iraq did have its modest but nevertheless significant share of democratic history, culture, and tradition. The country came into being through a popular referendum held in 1921. A constitutional monarchy modeled on the United Kingdom, it had a bicameral parliament, several political parties (including the Baath and the Communists), and periodic elections that led to changes of policy and government. At the time, Iraq also enjoyed the freest press in the Arab world, plus the widest space for debate and dissent in the Muslim Middle East.

To be sure, Baghdad in those days was no Westminster, and, as the 1958 coup proved, Iraqi democracy was fragile. But every serious student of contemporary Iraq knows that substantial segments of the population, from all ethnic and religious communities, had more than a taste of the modern world's democratic aspirations. As evidence, one need only consult the immense literary and artistic production of Iraqis both before and after the 1958 coup. Under successor dictatorial regimes, it is true, the conviction took hold that democratic principles had no future in Iraq, a conviction that was responsible in large part for driving almost five million Iraqis, a quarter of the population, into exile between 1958 and 2003, just as the opposite conviction is attracting so many of them and their children back to Iraq today.

A related argument used to condemn Iraq's democratic prospects is that it is an artificial country, one that can be held together only by a dictator. But did any nation-state fall from the heavens wholly made? All are to some extent artificial creations, and the U.S. is preeminently so. The truth is that Iraq, one of the 53 founding countries of the United Nations, is older than a majority of that organization's current 198 member states. Within the Arab League, and setting aside Oman and Yemen, none of the 22 members is older. Two-thirds of the 122 countries regarded as democracies by Freedom House came into being after Iraq's appearance on the map.

Critics of the democratic project in Iraq also claim that, because it is a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state, the country is doomed to despotism, civil war, or disintegration. But the same could be said of virtually all Middle Eastern states, most of which are neither multi-ethnic nor multi-confessional. More important, all Iraqis, regardless of their ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian differences, share a sense of national identity *wuruqa* (Iraqi-ness) that has developed over the past eight decades. A unified, federal state may still come to grief in Iraq history is not written in advance but even should a divorce become inevitable at some point, a democratic Iraq would be in a better position to manage it.

What all of this demonstrates is that, contrary to received opinion, Operation Iraqi Freedom was *not* an attempt to impose democracy by force. Rather, it was an effort to use force to remove *impediments* to democratization, primarily by deposing a tyrant who had utterly suppressed a well-established aspect of the country's identity. It may take years before we know for certain whether or not post-liberation Iraq has definitely chosen democracy. But one thing is certain: without the use of force to remove the Baathist regime, the people of Iraq would not have had the opportunity even to contemplate a democratic future.

Assessing the progress of that democratic project is no simple matter. But, by **any** reasonable standard, Iraqis have made extraordinary strides. In a series of municipal polls and two general elections in the past three years, up to **70** percent of eligible Iraqis have voted. This new orientation is supported by more than **60** political parties and organizations, the **first** genuinely free-trade unions in the Arab world, a growing number of professional associations acting independently of the state, and more than **400** nongovernmental organizations representing diverse segments of civil society. A new constitution, written by Iraqis representing the full spectrum of political, ethnic, and religious sensibilities was overwhelmingly approved by the electorate in a referendum last October.

Iraq's new democratic reality is also reflected **in** the vocabulary of politics used at every level of society. Many new words: accountability, transparency, pluralism, dissent, have entered political discourse in Iraq for the first time. More remarkably, perhaps, all parties and personalities currently engaged in the democratic process have committed themselves to the principle that power should be sought, won, and lost only through free and fair elections.

These democratic achievements are especially impressive when set side by side with the declared aims of the enemies of the new Iraq, who have put up a determined fight against it. Since the country's liberation, the jihadists and residual Baathists have killed an estimated **23,000** Iraqis, mostly civilians, in scores of random attacks and suicide operations. Indirectly, they have caused the death of thousands more, by sabotaging water and electricity services and by provoking sectarian revenge attacks.

But they have failed to translate their talent for mayhem and murder into political success. Their campaign has not succeeded in appreciably slowing down, let alone stopping, the country's democratization. Indeed, at each step along the way, the jihadists and Baathists have seen their self-declared objectives thwarted.

After the invasion, they tried at first to prevent the formation of a Governing Council, the expression of Iraq's continued existence as a sovereign nation-state. They managed to murder several members of the council, including its president in 2003, but failed to prevent its formation or to keep it from performing its task in the interim period. The next aim of the insurgents was to stop municipal elections. Their message was simple: candidates and voters would be killed. But, once again, they failed: thousands of men and women came forward **as** candidates and more than 1.5 million Iraqis voted in the localities where elections were held.

The insurgency made similar threats in the lead-up to the first general election, and the result was the same. Despite **killing** 36 candidates and 148 voters, they failed to derail the balloting, in which the number of voters rose to more than 8 million. Nor could the insurgency prevent the writing of the new democratic constitution, despite a campaign of assassination against its drafters. The text was ready in time and was submitted to and approved by a referendum, exactly as planned. The number of voters rose yet again, to more than **9** million.

What of relations among the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, the focus of so much attention of late? For almost **three** years, the insurgency worked hard to keep the Arab Sunni community, which accounts for some 15 percent of the population, out of the political process. But that Campaign collapsed when millions of **Sunnis** turned out to vote in the constitutional referendum and in the second general election, which saw almost 11 million Iraqis go to the polls. As **I write**, all political parties representing the Arab Sunni minority have joined the political process and have strong representation in the new parliament. With the convening of that parliament, and the nomination in April of a new prime minister and a three-man presidential council, the way is open for the formation of a broad-based government of national unity to lead Iraq over the next four years.

As for the insurgency's effort to foment sectarian violence, a strategy first launched in earnest toward the end of 2005 this too has run aground. The hope here **was** to provoke a full-scale war between the Arab Sunni minority and the Arab Shiites who account for some **60** percent of the population. The new strategy, like the ones previously tried, has certainly produced many deaths. But despite countless cases of sectarian killings by so-called militias, there is still no sign that the Shiites as a whole will acquiesce in the role assigned them by the insurgency and organize a concerted campaign of nationwide retaliation.

Finally, despite the impression created by relentlessly dire reporting in the West, the insurgency has proved unable to shut down essential government services. Hundreds of teachers and schoolchildren have been **killed** in incidents including the heheading of two teachers in their classrooms this April and horrific suicide attacks against school buses. But by September **2004**, most schools across Iraq and virtually all universities were open and functioning. By September 2005, more than 8.5 million Iraqi children and young people were attending school or university an all-time record in the nation's history.

A similar story applies to Iraq's clinics and hospitals. Between October **2003** and January **2006**, more than **80** medical doctors and over 400 nurses and medical auxiliaries were murdered by the insurgents. The jihadists also raided several hospitals, killing ordinary patients in their beds. But, once again, they failed in their objectives. By January **2006**, all of Iraq's **600** state-owned hospitals and clinics were in full operation, along with dozens of new ones set up by the private sector since liberation.

Another of the insurgency's strategic goals was to bring the Iraqi oil industry to a halt and to disrupt the export of crude. Since July 2003, Iraq's oil infrastructure has been the target of more than 3,000 attacks and attempts at sabotage. But once more the insurgency has failed to achieve its goals. Iraq has resumed its membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC) and has returned to world markets as a major oil exporter. According to projections, by the end of 2006 it will be producing its full OPEC quota of 2.8 million barrels a day.

The Baathist remnant and its jihadist allies resemble a gambler who wins a heap of chips at a roulette table only to discover that he cannot exchange them for real money at the front desk. The enemies of the new Iraq have succeeded in ruining the lives of tens of thousands of Iraqis, but over the past three years they have advanced their overarching goals, such as they are, very little. Instead, they have been militarily contained and politically defeated again and again, and the beneficiary has been Iraqi democracy.

None of this means that the new Iraq is out of the woods. Far from it. Democratic success still requires a great deal of patience, determination, and luck. The U.S.-led coalition, its allies, and partners have achieved most of their major political objectives, but that achievement remains under threat and could be endangered if the U.S., for whatever reason, should decide to snatch a defeat from the jaws of victory,

The current mandate of the U.S.-led coalition runs out at the end of this year, and it is unlikely that Washington and its allies will want to maintain their military presence at current levels. In the past few months, more than half of the 103 bases used by the coalition have been transferred to the new Iraqi army. The best guess is that the number of U.S. and coalition troops could be cut from 140,000 to 25,000 or 30,000 by the end of 2007.

One might wonder why, if the military mission has been so successful, the U.S. still needs to maintain a military presence in Iraq for at least another two years. There are three reasons for this.

The first is to discourage Iraq's predatory neighbors, notably Iran and Syria, which might wish to pursue their own agendas against the new government in Baghdad. Iran has already revived some claims under the Treaties of Erzerum (1846), according to which Tehran would enjoy a *droit de regard* over Shiite shrines in Iraq. In Syria, some in that country's ruling circles have invoked the possibility of annexing the area known as Jazirah, the so-called Sunni triangle, in the name of Arab unity. For its part, Turkey is making noises about the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which gave it a claim to the oilfields of northern Iraq. All of these pretensions need to be rebuffed.

The second reason for extending America's military presence is political. The U.S. is acting as an arbiter among Iraq's various ethnic and religious communities and political factions. It is, in a sense, a traffic cop, giving Iraqis a green or red light when and if needed. It is important that the U.S. continue performing this role for the first year or two of the newly elected parliament and government.

Finally, the U.S. and its allies have a key role to play in training and testing Iraq's new army and police. Impressive success has already been achieved in that field. Nevertheless, the new Iraqi army needs at least another year or two before it will have developed adequate logistical capacities and learned to organize and conduct operations involving its various branches.

But will the U.S. stay the course? Many are betting against it. The Baathists and jihadists, their prior efforts to derail Iraqi democracy having come to naught, have now pinned their hopes on creating enough chaos and death to persuade Washington of the futility of its endeavors. In this, they have the tacit support not only of local Arab and Muslim despots rightly fearful of the democratic genie but of all those in the West whose own incessant theme has been the certainty of American failure. Among Bush-haters in the U.S., just as among anti-Americans around the world, predictions of civil war in *Iraq*, of spreading regional hostilities, and of a revived global terrorism are not about to cease any time soon.

But more sober observers should understand the real balance sheet in Iraq. Democracy is succeeding. Moreover, thanks to its success in Iraq, there are stirrings elsewhere in the region. Beyond the much-publicized electoral concessions wrung from authoritarian rulers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, there is a new democratic discourse to be heard. Nationalism and pan-Arabism, yesterdays hollow rallying cries, have given way to a big idea of a very different kind. Debate and dissent are in the air where there was none before a development owing, in significant measure, to the U.S. campaign in Iraq and the brilliant if still checkered Iraqi response.

The stakes, in short, could not be higher. This is all the more reason to celebrate, to build on, and to consolidate what has already been accomplished. Instead of railing against the Bush administration, Americas elites would do better, and incidentally display greater self-respect, to direct their wrath where it properly belongs: at those violent and unrestrained enemies of democracy in Iraq who are, in truth, the enemies of democracy in America as well, and of everything America has ever stood for.

Is Iraq a quagmire, a disaster, a failure? Certainly not; none of the above. Of all the adjectives used by skeptics and critics to describe today's Iraq, the only one that has a ring of truth is messy. Yes, the situation in Iraq today is messy. Births always are. Since when is that a reason to declare a baby unworthy of life?

*AMIR TAHERI, formerly the executive editor of Kayhan, Iran's largest daily newspaper, is the author of ten books and a frequent contributor to numerous publications in the Middle East and Europe. His work appears regularly in the New York Post.*

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FOUO

MAY 31 2006

110.01

TO: The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Consequences re: Supplemental

Attached is what I have been provided as to the difficulties of not getting a supplemental passed.

It varies by Service. What you may be hearing is that someone on the ~~HILL~~ asked someone from the Navy, Air Force or Army and got a different answer.

The place to get the correct answer is from the Office ~~of~~ the Secretary of Defense, as opposed to second-hand by the Services. OSD can provide a Department-wide look at it.

Regards.

Attach. "Consequences of Congress Failing to ~~Pass~~ the Supplemental in a Timely Manner" (undated)

DHR:dh  
053006-31

.....

OSD 08583-06

3/11/06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57751

Consequences of Congress Failing to  
Pass the Supplemental in a Timely Manner

*The following timing and cost saving actions by the Army are predicated on having approval for \$1.6 billion reprogramming, if there is no passage of the President's Emergency Supplemental budget request by the dates indicated.*

Timing	Action	Consequence
26 May '06	Letter to Commanders directing the following	
	1. Impose supply restraint, hold non-critical requisitions	Non-critical spare parts accounts go zero balance and equipment becomes unserviceable; readiness suffers
	2. Pay for individual <b>task</b> orders within contracts <b>as they are</b> accomplished - executing the smaller contracts piecemeal.	Will pay for contracts as they become due causing significant inefficiencies and incurring additional <b>total</b> cost for products and services
	3. Curtail travel and transportation	Will slow movement of supplies and people to the theater
6 Jun '06	1. Impose hiring freeze	Will gap workforce by another 1% below requirement
	2. Will withdraw current Operations and Maintenance to Procurement Acct. reprogramming	Impacts being able to equip those units deploying next. <b>De</b> facto cuts to procurement programs
15 Jun '06	1. Reprogram more from investment accounts	Will stretch investment programs <b>and</b> result in higher unit and program cost
26 Jun '06	1. Stop recruiting new soldiers	Will gap accessions and cause skill levels to be unevenly distributed. Training base will experience severe turbulence

	2. Defer reenlistments	Will cause disruptions in retention and promotion cycles
	3. Cancel Permanent Change of Station moves	Will cause significant disruption in <del>total</del> force management and unit manning
	4. Freeze promotions	Will cause significant disruption in retention of high skill levels and impact morale negatively
30 Jun '06	1. Curtail payroll payments	Significant retention, morale and personal financial disruption
10 Jul '06	1. Defer death gratuity benefits	Significant political backlash and loss of confidence in the Department of Defense
	2. Defer Serviceman's Group Life Insurance payments	Significant political backlash and loss of confidence in the Department of Defense

FOUO

MAY 30 2006

334 NSC

TO GEN George Casey

cc: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Comments in This Morning's NSC

My apologies to you for the comments that were made in the NSC meeting this morning. It is a pattern. There is not much anyone seems to be able to do about it. I thought the President summed it up pretty well when he said, "On that happy note, we will adjourn."

Thanks for all you are doing out there, and for your patience today as well.

You were right on the MARK!

DHR:aa  
052806-09

.....

CC: GEN JOHN ABIZAID

OSD 08603-06  
  
5/31/2006 4:28:01 PM

30 May 06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57754

~~FOUO~~

May 08,2006

TO: GEN Mike Hagee

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Comment by Marine re: **Iraq Duty**

I ran into a Marine the other day who told **me** he had served in Iraq **for** only 11 weeks. **I am curious** to know how that can happen.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
050806-11

.....  
***Please Respond By 05/24/06***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57755



6/1/2006 3 21 15 PM



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

IN REPLY REFER TO.

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps

*Hagee 5/25*

SUBJECT SECDEF Snowflake, "Comment by Marine re: Iraq Duty"

1. On May 08, 2006 you asked the following question: "I ran into a Marine the other day who told me he had served in Iraq for only 11 weeks. I am curious to know how that can happen."

2. ANSWER. As you are aware, our boots on the ground (BOG) policies state Battalion/Squadron formations and below deploy for 210 days BOG and our Regimental and above formations deploy for 365 days BOG. However, there are a variety of reasons that a Marine may be short-toured to OIF/OEF.

- First, there are several teams that deploy focused, short-duration missions. Examples of these teams include being a part of an: IG Team, Marine Armor Kit Installation Team, and IED Countermeasure Equipment Team.
- Second, individuals redeploy early for humanitarian and medical reasons.
- Third, Marine Expeditionary Units conduct operations and training ashore that range from weeks to months.
- Finally, not all Marines deploy with their organic unit. For example, a Marine may be flown into theater as a Combat Casualty Replacement and redeploy with the unit at its scheduled return date.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: GS-13 R. J. Titi, (b)(6)

Reviewed by: Colonel D. H. Wilkinson, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/57756



**FOUO**

May 08, 2006

TO: GEN Mike Hagee

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Comment by Marine re: Iraq Duty

I ran into a Marine the other day who told me he had served in Iraq for only 11 weeks. I am curious to know how that can happen.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
050806-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/24/06*

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/57757



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

MAY 31 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force

*For Red M. Sja*

SUBJECT: Air Force Participation in Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)

- The Air Force has improved TSP participation rates but we have more to do
- We helped the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board develop the TSP Uniformed Service Information Leaflet available to all services. We will ensure that we are providing these leaflets to Airmen prior to key decision points.
- We engage with Airmen at various levels: Basic Training, OTS, AFROTC, USAFA, and, for enlisted, after they arrive at their initial duty assignment through the First Term Airman Center (FTAC), a one- to two-week indoctrination. While at FTAC, Airmen receive between 1-2 hours of financial counseling to include a TSP overview. Many bases use senior mentors to discuss the value of savings programs with the new Airmen. As a result, by the time our Airmen finish in processing at their first duty station, they will have received 4-6 hours of counseling on the benefits of financial planning.
- Our Active **Duty** participation has improved from 27% in October 2005 to 30.9% as of April 2006. Participation for all enlisted ranks is at 26.1% and officers (01-06) at 49.9%. While these numbers are not significant, they indicate the beginning of a positive trend that we can nurture.
- Way Ahead: We will continue to promote the benefits of TSP as part of a long-term, personal financial strategy. Additionally, to aid in data reporting and analysis, we will implement monthly metrics to track TSP participation and guide our course of action.

COORDINATION: NONE

OSD 08701-06



6/1/2006 5:16:35 PM


11-L-0559/OSD/57758

~~FOUO~~

NOV 3 0 2005

TO: Fran Harvey  
Michael Wynne  
GEN Pete Schoomaker  
Gen Mike Moseley  
GEN Mike Hagee

CC: Gordon England  
Dino Aviles  
ADM Mike Mullen  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan

Attached is some material on the Thrift Savings Plan figures. It is clear the Navy has worked the program and been successful. It seems the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps may have not done so.

The Thrift Savings Plan is an enormous Benefit. It ought to be of significant interest and attraction to the people you are trying to recruit and retain.

Please tell me what you are doing to get your Service to do a better job in communicating the Thrift Savings Plan program.

In addition I would like a report every six months, beginning June 1, 2006, on progress or the lack thereof.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/10/05 SecDef memo to USD P&R, 10/13/05 USD P&R memo to SecDef

DHR:ss  
112805-42

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

~~FOUO~~



6/1/2006 5:13:10 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57759

FOUO

SECNAV

August 16, 2005

TO: David Chu  
CC: Larry DiRita  
Service Secretaries  
Service Chiefs

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan Figures

Attached is a memo David Chu sent me by request. What it says basically is a person who joins the Service ends up with a nest egg of a substantial sum.

To my knowledge, this has never been communicated. It is not a part of the recruiting activity, it is not a part of the retention activity, and it is not even on the radar screen of most of the men and women who serve in the military.

My personal view is it would be an attractive addition to be injected into their considerations for recruited and being retained.

Please think about this and get back to me through David Chu.

David, I would like you to consider this and get back to me and get back to me with a memorandum no later than August 22.

Thank you.

Attach: 7/18/05 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef

DRL  
080905-40

Please Respond By 08/22/05

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
w/ challenge*

NOV 23 2005

21 01 10 AM '05

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF THE  
NAVY

~~FOUO~~

*OSD 14286-05*

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO 2005 NOV 04 11:54

October 13, 2005

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

*Army*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 17 Nov 05*

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) Figures - SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

*Robert Ringer  
11/23*

- All of the Services agree that **additional** and continuous education regarding the benefits of the Thrift Savings Plan is necessary.
- The Navy and Marine Corps are the only Services that specifically target recruits and new inductees with information on the TSP.
- Newly accessed Navy recruits receive **1.5 hours of instruction and information on the TSP** and its benefits. Their participation rates illustrate the success of this method.
  - Over **40** percent of the active Navy force participates in TSP. Participation rate for active duty in the other services is: Army 18 percent; Air Force 27 percent, Marine Corps 28 percent.
  - Forty-eight percent of Navy and **30** percent of Marine Corps junior enlisted participate in TSP compared to 6 percent in the Army and 13 percent in the Air Force.
  - Sixty percent of Navy company grade officers participate in TSP compared to 34 percent of Army, 47 percent Marine Corps, and 54 percent of Air Force.
- The Navy incorporates TSP information in its traveling ~~Career~~ symposia, which goes to ships and installation town hall meetings worldwide.
- The Marine Corps includes TSP information to all applicants in its recruiting material on financial security. Army is developing a marketing plan for inclusion in their recruiting campaign.
- All Services are committed to increasing awareness and information regarding TSP to the force and recruits. We will ensure this occurs by working with the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Attachment:

As stated

*SP3 11/21*

MA SD	<i>11/23</i>	SMA (S&R)	
ISA SD	<i>11/23</i>	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>11/23</i>	<i>11/23</i>	<i>11/23</i>
ESR MA	<i>11/23</i>	<i>11/23</i>	<i>11/23</i>

st Fenton, LISA (JAG Corps), OUSD(P&R), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/57761

OSD 22746-05



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

MAY 31 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force

*For* 

SUBJECT Air Force Participation in Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)

- The Air Force has improved TSP participation rates but we have more to do
- We helped the Federal Retirement ~~Thrift~~ Investment Board develop the TSP Uniformed Service Information Leaflet available to all services. We will ensure that we are providing these leaflets to Airmen prior to **key** decision points.
- We engage with Airmen at various levels: Basic Training, OTS, AFROTC, USAFA, and, for enlisted, after they arrive at their initial duty assignment through the First Term Airman Center (FTAC), a one- to two-week indoctrination. While at FTAC, Airmen receive between 1-2 hours of financial counseling to include a TSP overview. Many hases use senior mentors to discuss the value of savings programs with the new Airmen. As a result, by the time our Airmen finish in processing at their first duty station, they will have received **4-6** hours of counseling on the benefits of financial planning.
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- Way Ahead We will continue to promote the benefits of TSP as part of a long-term, personal financial strategy. Additionally, to aid in data reporting and analysis, we will implement monthly metrics to track TSP participation and guide our course of action.

*240*

COORDINATION: NONE



*31 May 06*

11-L-0559/OSD/57762

~~FOUO~~

NOV 3 *cm*

TO: Fran Harvey  
Michael Wynne  
GEN Pete Schoomaker  
Gen Mike Moseley  
GEN Mike Hagee

CC: Gordon England  
Dino Aviles  
ADM Mike Mullen  
David Chu

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan

Attached is some material on the Thrift Savings Plan figures. It is clear the Navy has worked the program and been successful. It seems the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps may have not done so.

The Thrift Savings Plan is an enormous Benefit. It ought to be of significant interest and attraction to the people you are trying to recruit and retain.

Please tell me what you are doing to get your Service to do a better job in communicating the Thrift Savings Plan program.

In addition I would like a report every six months, beginning June 1, 2006, on progress or the lack thereof.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/10/05 SecDef memo to USD P&R, 10/13/05 USD P&R memo to SecDef

DHR:cc  
112805-42

.....  
Please Respond By 06/01/06

~~FOUO~~



6/1/2006 5:13:10 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57763

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

August 19, 2005

TO: David Chu  
CC: Larry DiRita  
Service Secretaries  
Service Chiefs

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan Figures

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To my knowledge, this has never been communicated. It is not a part of the recruiting activity, it is not a part of the retention activity, and it is not even on the radar screen of most of the men and women who serve in the military.

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Please think about this and get back to me through David Chu.

David, I would like you to consider this and get back to me and get back to me with a memorandum no later than August 22.

Thank you.

Attach: 7/18/05 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef

DNR  
082005-05

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/r  
W. H. Longel*

Please Respond By 08/22/05

NOV 23 2005

205 JUN 10 AM 12 12

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF THE  
NAVY

~~FOUO~~

*OSD 14286-05*

11/20  
1719  
11/22  
0780



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY



Old  
11

INFO MEMO 2005 NOV 01 09 11: 54

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

October 13, 2005

Army

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC \_\_\_\_\_

Robert Ringer  
11/22

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 19 Nov 05*

SUBJECT: Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) Figures - SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

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- All Services are committed to increasing awareness and information regarding TSP to the force and recruits. We will ensure this occurs by working with the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Attachment:  
As stated

SP3 11/21

MA SD	11/21	SMA D&D	
TSA SD	11/21	SA D&D	
EXEC SEC	11/21	11/21	11/21
ESR MA	11/21	11/21	11/21

at Fenton, USA (JAG Corps), OUSD(P&R), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/57765

OSD 22746-05

~~FOUO~~

May 24, 2006

TO: GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Summary

Please give me a summary of your comments in the Combatant Commanders' Conference about the first troops being fully equipped, the first ones fully staffed, etc., etc.

Thanks.

DFER:dh  
052406-15

.....  
\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57766



6/2/2006 9 06 45 AM

~~FOUO~~

June 14, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Robert Wilke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Follow Up with ~~Senator~~ Harry Reid

Would you follow up with Minority Leader *Harry Reid* on the issue of Haditha and the call he received from one of his constituents?

Thanks.

DFR:as  
SP051406-12

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/29/06*

~~FOUO~~

ITAG

14 Jun 06

31 May 06

HARRY REID  
NEVADA

DEMOCRATIC LEADER

**United States Senate**  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7012

May 31, 2006

**Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:**

Like **most** Americans, I **was** disturbed by recent press **accounts** that indicate more than two dozen civilians were **killed in Haditha, Iraq by U.S. Marines**. I **was** even **more** disturbed to learn that the alleged incident occurred over **six months ago, raising questions** as to whether there was a cover up by military officials. I **understand** there are **two separate** investigations **on-going**, but I believe Congress **and** the American people are **entitled to more** complete information about this tragedy. Specifically, Mr. Secretary, I would like to know:

- why there **was** a delay in reporting **and investigating** this incident;
- who in **the Marine Corps or other services** knew about the incident and what **actions** did they take, if any;
- the status of **the current** investigations and **what** the Defense Department has **learned to date** about **the** alleged cover-up;
- what **your** plans are to keep Congress fully **informed** about **this** incident; and
- whether there have been other **incidents in Iraq** involving the intentional **killing of** civilians by U.S. **forces and**, if so, the **status** of any ongoing investigation(s).

Finally, I **would** strongly encourage **you** to appoint an outside **commission** or panel of experts to investigate **the Haditha** incident, to more **broadly** investigate civilian casualties in Iraq, and to **report and** recommend **measures** the Defense Department **can take** to prevent **future** incidents in Iraq and elsewhere like those alleged in Haditha

**I look forward to your prompt reply.**

Sincerely,

**HARRY REID**  
Democratic Leader

OSD 08735-06



6/2/2006 9 40 58 AM

# U.S. Senator Harry Reid

Senator for Nevada, Democratic Leader

528 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

PHONE (202) 224 - 3542  
FAX (202) 224 - 7327



## FAX TRANSMISSION

<b>FAX TO:</b>	David Broome, Department of Defense, Legislative Affairs	
<b>FAX NUMBER:</b>	(b)(6)	
<b>FROM:</b>	Jessie Daniels	
<b>DATE:</b>	5/31/06	
<b>SUBJECT:</b>	Letter from Senator Reid to Secretary Rumsfeld	
<b>TOTAL PAGES (Including Cover):</b>	2	

### COMMENTS:

Attached, please find a letter from Senator Reid to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding the incident in Haditha, Iraq. Should you have any questions, please call Jessie Daniels at 202-224-4713. Thanks.

\* Tried to fax this yesterday, but not sure if it went through

**Disclaimer:** The document(s) accompanying this cover sheet may contain confidential information. The information is intended only for the use of the recipient(s). If you are not the intended recipient, you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution, or any other action involving the contents of this transmitted information is not allowed. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately at the telephone number provided on this sheet.



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0000

12 July 2006

The Honorable Harry Reid  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510-7012

Iraq

Dear Senator Reid,

Thank you for your letter concerning allegations that US forces killed Iraqi civilians in Haditha, Iraq. The Secretary of Defense requested that I respond on his behalf.

These allegations are currently under criminal investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and under administrative investigation by Multi-National Corps-Iraq. Many of the questions in your letter are the focus of these investigations. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to speculate as to what the findings may reveal.

The Department of Defense will continue to ensure that Congress is informed of the developments in this case, and we look forward to meeting with members to discuss this important issue once the investigations are concluded and we have been briefed on the results.

Concerning your question on whether there have been other incidents involving allegations of the intentional killing of civilians in Iraq, I am aware of a small number of ongoing investigations being conducted by Army Criminal Investigation Division and NCIS. Similar to the Haditha investigations, some of these investigations are ongoing and it would be premature to address any preliminary findings. As you are aware, US Service members have been formally charged in two of these cases.

Finally, thank you for your recommendation to appoint a commission or panel of experts to investigate the facts and circumstances of events that occurred in Haditha. I will discuss this recommendation with the Secretary of Defense.

Very Respectfully,

PETER PACE

General, United States Marine Corps  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(31 May 06)

h  
OSD 08735-06

MBL

~~FOUO~~

May 01, 2006

050106-22

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Senators Bond and Mikulski

Senators Bond and Mikulski apparently have indicated a desire to be helpful in Afghanistan with respect to agriculture.

Please get them down sometime and talk to them about it, or go up and see them. Let's figure out what can be done.

Thanks.

DHR:ds  
050106-22

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

*Distro To* PT, LC, A-team  
*Date* 5/16/06  
*Time* 1308

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08739-06



11-L-0559/OSD/57771

6/2/2006 10:10:12 AM



MBL

~~FOUO~~

May 01, 2006

050106-22

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Senators Bond and Mikulski

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Please get them down sometime **and talk** to them about it, **or go** up and see them.  
Let's figure out what can be done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050106-22

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/01/06*

Distro To PT, LC, A-team  
Date 5/16/06  
Time 1306

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57773

COORDINATION  
Engaging Senators Bond and Mikulski on Afghanistan Agriculture

PDASD ISA	Ms. Mary Beth Long	<u>TBY</u>
Principal Director, NESA	Brig Gen Paula Thornhill	<u>Paula 5/31</u>
Deputy Director, SA	Ms. Laura Cooper	<u>LCooper 5/31/06</u>
Afghan Reachback Office	Secretary Hoffmann	May 31, 2006
OSD-Comptroller	Mr. Joe Draudt	May 31, 2006
OSD-Legislative Affairs	Mr. Shawn Sullivan	<u>Shawn Sullivan</u> May 31, '06

~~FOUO~~

May 23, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
cc: **ADM** Mike Mullen  
Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
**SUBJECT:** "Thousand Ship Navy" Concept

I really like the concept of the "Thousand Ship Navy" and the ease of getting cooperation from other countries in maritime activities.

Do you want to come up with a concept **and** see how we can tie it to counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and counter-proliferation, **and** figure out how that can be handled? You may want to get Dorrance Smith involved with it **as** well.

*Thanks.*

DHR ss  
052306-17

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/20/06*

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/57775

OSD 08742-06  
  
6/2/2006 10:14:46 AM

INFO MEMO

DSD

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUN 14 2006

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Interim Response to Your Memorandum Regarding the "1000-Ship Navy"

- You wrote that you liked the concept of the 1000-Ship Navy and getting cooperation from other countries in maritime activities (next under).
- I have attached a copy of the Naval Institute *Proceedings* article written by VADM Morgan and RADM Martoglio that discusses ADM Mullen's 1000-Ship Navy concept (Tab A).
- The 1000-Ship Navy concept has significant potential to help confront maritime problems such as piracy, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and proliferation.
  - This concept could help to pull together many regional and bilateral efforts already underway, such as:
    - EUCOM's Gulf-of-Guinea initiative, and
    - The recently announced Framework for Maritime Security with India.
- The March edition of *Proceedings* published the responses of 25 foreign admirals to the 1000-Ship Navy article (Tab B).
  - All generally supported the concept
  - The willingness to provide support varies by capacity and geography.
    - Some are willing to participate on a global scale,
    - Some are willing to participate in their own region (to deploy capacity or receive capacity); and
    - Some, while agreeing with the concept, feel it should be under an international institution, such as the U.N.

Prepared by: CDR Chip Denman, OCSD(P)-Policy Planning, (b)(6)

OSD 08742-06



6/2/2006 10 15 56 AM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57776



\* 0 6 / 0 0 7 0 0 7 - S T R A T \*

- The 1000-Ship Navy concept also may enhance DoD's efforts to support the President's global maritime vision as outlined in his National Strategy for Maritime Security.
- We will provide a more comprehensive response by 20 June.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: **As stated**

~~FOUO~~

May 23, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: ADM Mike Mullen  
Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT "Thousand Ship Navy" Concept

I really like the concept of the "Thousand Ship Navy" and the ease of getting cooperation from other countries in maritime activities.

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Thanks.

DHR ss  
052306.17

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/20/06*

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/57778

 [Subscribe to free Military Ins](#)



## Global Maritime Network

Proceedings | John Morgan Jr. and Charles Martoglio | November 16, 2005

The changing nature of the international security environment was made abundantly clear to Americans on 11 September what some in the international community might think, the events of that day have done more to make the United States security partner than any event in recent history. AS a result, the United States is fostering a global approach to internatic one that includes focusing on transnational challenges to free nations everywhere. While the United States' role in the Glo Terror (GWOT) may be the most visible symbol of its commitment to global security, the transnational threat is much broi terrorism — and many aspects of that threat are interrelated, feed on the same root causes, and are universally detrimen interaction between nations necessary for prosperity and peace. As the U.S. Navy refocuses its capabilities to include cour transnational threat by incorporating the global war on terror, stability operations (like humanitarian relief operations in tt December 2004 earthquake off Indonesia and September 2005's international response to Hurricane Katrina), and homel, into its existing capability to conduct major naval operations in cases of regional or even global conflict, it will take a fleet 1,000 ships to address all the new challenges, more complex contingencies, and broader range of maritime missions.

### Realities of the Emerging Security Environment

Today, more than ever, the security of an individual nation is tied to global security. The process of globalization has inext nations together in a de facto security arrangement that has resulted in increased interdependence and reliance on intern. cooperation as a prerequisite for national prosperity. Promoting and maintaining the security of the global maritime comm element because freedom of the seas is critical to any nation's long-term economic well-being. The impact of the common international commerce, and the movement of people is significant, making security on the high seas, and in the world's li harbors, and ports a cornerstone of prosperity. Likewise, the exploitation of the maritime commons by nations, groups, or who seek to disrupt, destroy or otherwise degrade Security in the maritime domain must be considered a global challenge protecting the maritime commons against a wide spectrum of threats is a high priority for all nations interested in the eco prosperity and security that comes from a safe and free maritime domain.

### Trends in the Emerging Security Environment

The trend is for more — not less — international cooperation in economic and Security issues. Globalization continues apace ; political, military, and economic influence ebbs and flows, creating a constantly changing security landscape that requires consideration. The response to this dynamic security landscape will increasingly rely on regional nations to organize and c activities in their areas in order to create an Environment that, along with global stability, leads to their own region's pros security. In many ways, the "Think Globally, Act Locally" slogan, popular with the environmental movement, applies equal developing a stable security environment that enables global, regional, and national prosperity.

Predicting the future security environment is a difficult, Some would say impossible, task. That notwithstanding, many nat already ining themselves challenged by a series of common threats, among them piracy, smuggling, drug trading, Hieg, banditry, human smuggling and slavery, environmental attack, trade disruption, weapons proliferation including weapons destruction, political and religious extremism, and terrorism. While these threats do not typically share causal factors with regional or global conflicts, cumulatively they can result in an outcome that generates serious political or economic effect increasing lawlessness in the maritime domain — thereby impacting peace and prosperity in a globally interconnected econ. Identifying which of these elements pose the greatest threat to a particular nation varies from country to country, but it is that all nations are dealing with some or all of these issues now or will face them in the future.

These threats to security in the maritime domain are becoming increasingly important because the level of security there or indirectly impacts an increasingly larger number of people around the globe. Currently, 2.2 billion people live within 100 a coastline; the maritime domain is home to 50,000 large ships that carry about 80% of the world's trade; and each year billion tons of petroleum is shipped by maritime transportation — approximately 60% of all the petroleum produced. Shippi around the world are taking advantage of the booming economy in China — shipping tonnage can barely keep pace with de Chinese exports grew 37% in 2004. In addition, a record 10.5 million people embarked on cruise ships in 2004, an increa 10% over 2003. Cruise industry analysts predict more than 11 million cruise passengers for 2005.

Running contrary to the security and safety valued by increasing numbers of people who rely on and use the maritime dor of the transnational threats mentioned above, including:

. Pirates, who operate like urban gangs, threatening and killing people while eroding confidence in political systems that a

protect their citizens

- . Organized crime, which seeks to use the maritime domain as a transportation safe haven and highway for criminals and goods
- . Human smugglers, who deal in modern day slavery and spread incredible misery and suffering to those being smuggled to their families
- . Drug dealers who cripple and kill too many of the world's children before they have an opportunity to grow up.

It is specifically against these multi-faceted transnational threats, faced by most nations, that the powers of the international community's maritime organizations can be harnessed in order to effectively and efficiently confront these challenges.

### **Imperatives of the Emerging Security Environment**

Taken together, several imperatives for maritime security can be discerned. First, it is clear that maritime security is an international problem that requires an international solution. Second, no single nation has the sovereignty, capacity, or co-located assets, resources, or venues from which transnational threats endanger global security. It requires close cooperation between minded nations to eliminate the root causes and persistent enablers of these transnational threats. Third, that level of cooperation also pays dividends in other circumstances, as the tsunami relief efforts in the Indian Ocean area demonstrated, the success driven in large part by the unity of purpose and the diverse multi-national capabilities of all of the participants. This kind of cooperation is the prototype for organizing the international community to address the maritime security challenges faced in the future security environment.

### **Building the 1,000-ship Navy**

Policing the maritime commons will require substantially more capability than the United States or any individual nation can provide. It will take a combination of national, international, and private-industry cooperation to provide the platforms, people, and processes necessary to secure the seas against the transnational threat. In effect, the 1,000-ship Navy is about the voluntary development of a network that vastly increases the number of sensors available to monitor security in the maritime domain while increasing the number of responders capable of ensuring maritime security. Such a network is already emerging. It has been self-synchronizing and self-organizing, driven by the concerns and principles outlined above. Examples of emerging security networks include Black Sea Eastern Europe, Caspian Guard in the Caspian Sea, and the counter-piracy initiative in the Strait of Malacca. The challenge is for individual nations to come together by determining where their national interests intersect and to determine what contributions they can make to this already-emerging network to meet those common interests. Plugging into a regional or global maritime network is not a one-size-fits-all proposition. Capabilities that cover the spectrum from blue-water operations to maritime law enforcement play important roles in delivering the kind of maritime security that is helpful to the global community, and that means virtually all nations can contribute in some way to security in the maritime domain.

Without question, the first and predominant contributors to the 1,000-ship Navy are navies of the international community. As a whole, only these navies are capable of operating across the globe's entire maritime domain, from local ports and territorial waters to the high seas. While individual navies have vastly different capabilities, it is their synergy when voluntarily coordinating maritime security activities that yields a network in which regional and local results are determined by regional and local interests. Designing a network of maritime nations in which navies voluntarily participate in activities that match their national interests is, arguably, an important element in developing a maritime security regime that efficiently and effectively addresses the transnational challenges of the future security environment.

But the 1,000-ship Navy must incorporate more than willing navies. It also has to include the shipping industry, on an international scale. The shipping industry could provide sensors in a global version of the familiar neighborhood watch program in which a neighborhood voluntarily looks out for the neighborhood's security, notifying authorities if something unusual is noted. Such an approach applied to the maritime domain would take advantage of the large number of ships and people spread across the globe—a large number of people who have the knowledge to know when something is wrong. This approach would vastly increase the number of eyes patrolling the maritime domain and would greatly complement the intelligence and information gathering activities of navies around the world.

The U.S. shipping industry may also be able to add to the 1,000-ship Navy by developing economically viable, high-speed sealift that could be called into national service in an emergency. A similar construct—the civil reserve air fleet—already exists in the U.S. Air Force; it allows militarization of civilian airlift assets in time of national emergency. Taking that approach to the maritime domain could build on America's already significant logistics capability, increasing its capability to support voluntarily coalition operations responding to crises or emergencies around the globe. Such a partnership between private industry and the U.S. Navy may be particularly valuable to the nation's shipbuilders as it could contribute to the shipbuilding industrial base in the United States.

Some within the U.S. government also see the value of producing large numbers of patrol craft, and providing those at the lowest cost to navies around the world in order to increase the number of ships voluntarily participating in establishing security in the maritime domain—especially in remote areas of the globe. Such a program could significantly increase the capability of smaller navies around the world, improve interoperability across a network dedicated to maritime security, and have strategic impact on maritime security. Another gap in the maritime domain would be closed to those who would exploit the sea for illegal or dangerous purposes. In the sealift discussion above, these patrol boats could also add significantly to the U.S. shipbuilding industry's industrial

Taken together, such a voluntary network has the potential to vastly exceed 1,000 ships. It also leverages ships around the world to serve as the network's eyes and it increases participating navies' ability to respond when the network's sensors detect something of investigation.

### Employing the 1,000-ship Navy

The overarching goal of the 1,000-ship Navy is to increase the Security of the maritime domain so that the maritime commons is safely used by all nations. Within the overarching maritime security goal are two objectives:

- Increasing maritime domain awareness (the knowledge of anything at sea that affects a nation's security, safety, economic environment)
- Posturing assets to rapidly respond to crises or emergencies that occur at sea or in the littorals

The 1,000-ship Navy facilitates achieving both objectives

Perhaps the easiest way to think about improving maritime security with this large fleet is to think of security as an important exportable product – importing it into regions where it is lacking and exporting it from regions that have the capability and so. Actually, there are two related products for importing or exporting: maritime security and security assistance.

Many nations and navies around the world have the capability to export maritime security by sailing their navies beyond their waters or exclusive economic zone to bolster maritime security in other parts of the world. Such navies also have the ability to provide security assistance to other, sometimes distant nations. In the former, nations voluntarily bring security to critical, large, and important parts of the maritime domain. Examples would include the internationally supported Task Force 150 operating from the Red Sea and the Straits of Hormuz, NATO's Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean, and the previously mentioned counter-piracy operations between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia in the Strait of Malacca.

In addition to exporting security to increase freedom in the maritime domain, many nations can also export security to assist nations in providing maritime security for their own area of responsibility. Such security cooperation could focus on counter-human smuggling, and terrorism; maritime law enforcement; building maritime domain awareness; visit, board, search, and seizure procedures; and facilitating regional maritime security initiatives – as agreed between the providing and receiving nations.

Key to the willingness of some nations to export security assistance is the willingness of other nations to accept such assistance. Increasing the capability of all nations to provide security in their own littorals and territorial waters is something that is in every nation's interest. The acceptance of security assistance, however, is not always a given. Overcoming resistance based on national concerns is often a delicate issue. The influence of allies, peers, or other nearby nations can be reassuring and often tip the balance in favor of accepting what is offered.

Lastly, the United States and its Navy do not have the capability or desire to be the sole exporter of security or security assistance in the maritime domain. It is the voluntary contribution of nations and navies in areas that match their national interests that will determine the level of security in the maritime global commons. In a similar manner, nations and navies in undergoverned maritime areas will be encouraged and reassured that accepting security assistance is in their national interests and that accepting such assistance will not negatively influence their national sovereignty.

As nations improve their own capacity and capability for maritime law enforcement, interdiction, and national defense, their contributions to the security of the global maritime commons will increase. When nations are united through common goals and objectives, their effectiveness as individual powers will also grow. Again, the impact of regional leadership and trusted friends is a key factor in achieving this security, particularly when dealing with partner nations whose forces are under-equipped or untrained. As nations play a more active role in the security of their respective waters, the international community can take a less active focus more on supporting and enabling other nations that may require and desire assistance in their part of the world.

### Conclusion

The United States and the international community need the 1,000-ship Navy because highly adaptable, present, and powerful forces illustrate a crucial point—the proactive cost of ensuring the day-to-day Security in the maritime domain is drastically more affordable than the reactive costs of going to war or mounting a reactive, large-scale security operation.

The 1,000-ship Navy is not a thousand gray hulls flying the American flag, but rather a voluntarily global maritime network that leverages together the collective capabilities of free nations to establish and maintain a dramatically increased level of international maritime domain security. The U.S. Navy is in a unique position to facilitate voluntary enlistment of nations as members in this global partnership, to include leaders in the shipping industry – but the U.S. Navy cannot do this without strong and sustained support from maritime nations and maritime interests across the globe. This global network will not only increase security in the maritime domain, it can also foster the economic and political growth and development of participating nations. In the end, partner nations can benefit individually from these security improvements, and the global community will be increasingly free of the threat of instability.

1,000-ship Navy maintains watch over the global maritime domain

***Vice Admiral Morgan is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans and Strategy, N3/N5. Rear Admiral Martoglio is the Director of the Navy's Strategy and Policy Division.***

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## The Commanders Respond

# The Commanders Respond

*Proceedings*, March 2006

In our November issue, key aides to CNO Admiral Mike Mullen-Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr. and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio-wrote [The 1,000-Ship Navy: Building a Global Maritime Network](#). *Proceedings* asked the commanders of the world's navies: What do you think of the concept described in the article?

**Vice Admiral Russell E. Shalders**  
**Royal Australian Navy**



Mariners through the ages have shared a common interest in ensuring the oceans are a safe and secure place for commerce and the business of nations. The 1,000-ship Navy concept builds on this historic bond and is a logical extension of the outcomes of globalization. As an aim point, Admirals Morgan and Martoglio articulate well the value of addressing maritime security in a collaborative fashion. Their proposals recognize the many capacity-building activities already under way on a regional basis. The Royal Australian Navy's involvement in the successful Pacific Patrol Boat program is an example of the type of regional initiative that their concept espouses. The provision by Australia of 22 patrol boats and critical ongoing support, including experienced maritime advisers, to 12 Pacific island countries has assisted these nations in developing the capacity to address maritime security issues.

Similarly, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium is achieving results in increasing understanding and cooperation in the conduct of operations in our region. Shaping bilateral and multilateral exercises to reflect the national interests of participating nations is another approach to improve capacity and share information and best practices.

The concept acknowledges the many users of the sea and the diverse agencies involved in maritime security. An interagency or "whole of government" approach to maritime security is at varying stages of development around the globe. It is perhaps the biggest opportunity and challenge proffered by the concept. While navies are generally already in the business of sharing information and capacity, the involvement of other government and commercial agencies has latent potential. In Australia, the establishment of a Joint Offshore Protection Command, a collaborative Defense-Customs organization led by a navy admiral and established within the Australian Customs Service, is an example of one nation's solution to interagency coordination.

As noted in the article, a number of specific challenges will have an impact on the 1,000-ship construct. It is too easy to find barriers to the success of visionary ideas, and I will not dwell on this aspect. The considerable progress already made in regional attempts to mutually prosecute the maritime security threat highlights what can be achieved. However, perhaps the greatest challenge in globalizing the effort to secure the sea will be to generate the necessary mindset, trust, and transparency. There are potential sovereignty, legal, and technical issues, but with time, these can be addressed. We have seen this happen when nations face common threats, for example in the implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative.

The admirals raise a number of important points in their thought-provoking article, and I congratulate them for articulating a most worthwhile vision. From the Royal Australian Navy

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perspective, we look favorably on any initiative that increases maritime security awareness and cooperation. In my view, this is the true value of the 1,000-ship Navy concept. The Royal Australian Navy continues to engage with our regional partners to build capacity and to encourage cooperation wherever possible. We are on board and willing to pursue the ideas outlined so cogently by John Morgan and Charlie Martoglio.

### ***Rear Admiral Minko Kavaldzhiev*** ***Bulgarian Naval Forces***

The changes in the contemporary security environment, globalization, the fight against terrorism, asymmetric threats, and efforts in the wake of natural calamities have shown clearly and unambiguously that no single country can manage by its own means today's challenges. These points prove the need for an increasing role of international cooperation in all spheres. In view of these considerations, I support the admirals' concept. I think it is indicative of a process that has started and provides a chance for naval cooperation between many countries for the benefit of security at sea as a whole.


I fully agree with the opinion that the 1,000-ship Navy should integrate the naval forces and ship industry on a worldwide scale with a view to increasing the number of sensors providing global surveillance of the marine environment. Because most of the attacks against merchant ships and illegal human, drug, and weapon traffic are effected near the coastline, I think military and civil coastal surveillance systems as well as coast guard personnel and border police could also be employed. Participation of the latter would close the circle starting from identification of illegal acts or security threats and ending with punitive measures undertaken by the appropriate executive authorities. The mutual exchange of information and harmonized collective actions will prevent criminals from finding shelter and safe refuge, escaping the territorial waters of one country and hiding in another.

In many cases, however, the process of mutual exchange of information and concordance of actions is impeded by bureaucratic hindrances, which could slow information exchange to the point of making it useless. In most cases, local legislation is too restrictive with respect to providing such information to other countries. Although unable to ensure their security in their own waters, some states zealously guard their sovereignty, unwilling to accept help from outside. Combined, these factors bring about many questions for the practical accomplishment of the 1,000-ship Navy concept.

I feel optimistic with respect to the concept establishing a global network, which could provide sea security. Common interests and countries seeking their further economic development will inevitably lead to closer cooperation.

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**Vice-Admiral Drew W. Robertson**  
**Canadian Navy**



The idea of a 1,000-ship Navy is an important question to put before this forum. In the broadest sense, the general concept fits well with the world view of the Canadian government. Our recent International Policy Statement commits to "a new global role that will serve our national interests and contribute to a safer and fairer world."

In North America, our maritime security cooperation with U.S. authorities is being enhanced across all relevant government departments. Abroad, for much of the past decade the Canadian Navy has been actively engaged in operations as foreseen for the 1,000-ship Navy. Since the mid-1990s, our frigates have deployed as fully interoperable members of U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to the Persian Gulf region. Following 11 September 2001, as the initial national commander in Operation Enduring Freedom, I watched our role evolve from the close protection of U.S. Navy amphibious ready groups into the leadership of a multinational group of warships in the campaign against terrorism, ultimately under the designation of Coalition Task Force 151.

Our success at coalition command and control is a function not only of a high level of interoperability with the U.S. Navy, but also our national predisposition to multilateral cooperation. The Canadian Navy is sensitive to the differences between formal alliance commitments and the varied objectives of individual members of "coalitions of the willing." These attributes align well with our interests and our capability to facilitate cooperation among other nations.

Many positive opportunities frequently arise. The 1,000-ship Navy concept is possible because of the classic confluence of the military-diplomatic-constabulary roles of navies. Regional matters—be they diplomatic in nature, or criminal or terrorist activities, or environmental issues dealing with oceans governance, or pure military operations—might best be addressed through encouraging common procedures and standards, and the development of suitable, affordable platforms, and networked technologies.

The challenges, however, revolve around national disparities and interests. Command-and-control arrangements will need to limit security restrictions to allow for maximum situational awareness and action. We will need to manage the natural competition between coalitions of the willing and the formal alliance structures that will continue to exist. And in public discussion of the concept, we should not allow the mistaken impression to develop that the higher end of the conflict can be left to only a few nations. The unique flexibility of navies to perform a wide range of roles flows from the qualities inherent in a combat-capable multi-purpose force.

In the end, however, the security of the maritime commons is necessary for the general benefit of our increasingly globalized world. It is in the interests of all nations to contribute to the goals of the 1,000-ship Navy concept and the broader enhanced security cooperation that would underwrite the effort at sea. The experience of recent operations gives me great confidence that we have taken useful steps toward making it happen.

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### **Admiral Rodolfo Codina Diaz** **Chilean Navy**



Admirals Morgan and Martoglio's position is consistent with the necessary international cooperation the global world demands. Their proposal is also consistent with the idea stated by Admiral Vern Clark at the Sea Power Symposium 2003, when he pointed out that ". . . Sea Power 21 is about projecting joint and combined, decisive-and I underline decisive-capabilities from the sea, operating in an information-rich environment . . ."

Undoubtedly, the Chilean Navy's position is in accordance with the Chilean government's view, stating that national development can only be achieved through international cooperation and, along these lines, is also consistent with the authors' proposal. The participation of states willing to join this endeavor should begin with a review of those capabilities that provide effective combined-force operation.

When analyzing the needed operational capabilities, it is of significant importance to review the judicial implications-both global and regional-to advance the establishment of a framework that allows facing new threats in the different maritime spaces.


Similarly, it is of utmost importance to analyze our service capabilities to interoperate with other navies, not only those with high technological development, but also those of the same region. This will not only enhance cooperation, but will provide an invaluable opportunity to advance confidence-building measures supporting regional integration.

Further, the initiative to include the private sector-the shipping industry in particular-in this global security network is an opportunity to improve technological capabilities in countries such as Chile. Our nation, aware of the need to conduct efficient surveillance and control activities in the vast Pacific Ocean, has begun construction of an Offshore Patrol Vessels program.

Finally, the transnational threat assessment affecting global security has been a permanent concern for the Chilean Navy. Aware of the relevance of global maritime security, the main subject of the IV Exponaval and International Conference for Latin American Defense, to be held in Chile in November 2006, is "Global Commerce and Maritime Power." This event will allow participating countries to exchange views on this important subject and further their contribution to the freedom, security, and well being of nations.

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### **Vice Admiral Zdravko Kardum** *Croatian Navy*



The idea to establish a naval network with 1,000 international-community ships, aimed at sustaining maritime security, is an excellent project that should be given attention by all navies and maritime countries in the world. There is no doubt we can build and sustain maritime security necessary for the common good, only through total cooperation.

The Croatian Navy is extremely interested in the security of not only the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas, but also globally, because the Republic of Croatia is a maritime country and a responsible member of the international community.

The issue of establishing maritime security on the Adriatic Sea has been considered at great length by the Croatian Navy with those involved in general maritime security. The oldest Croatian maritime university has initiated a project involving all Adriatic countries in the establishment of regional maritime security. This micro-location initiative is compatible with the ideas proposed by the admirals.

To maintain maritime security, it is important to involve merchant ships and coastal stations in the global maritime network. We need to have our eyes wide open and the exchange of information provided on time and in good faith.

This is a very good opportunity for the Croatian Navy, which has operational forces for homeland defense-traditional naval tasks-and a coast guard. The admirals' idea is extremely encouraging for small navies as it gives them a significant role in a very important mission. The sense of worth and self-confidence in those navies will increase. Further, the project will not threaten national interests; rather, it will enhance those interests because national and regional security is an integral part of global security. The Croatian Navy wants to be a littoral Navy, sized and shaped to be capable of protecting Croatian sovereignty and national interests within its internal waters, territorial sea, and the Zone of Ecological Protection and Fisheries, with no intent to endanger any other nation. At the same time, our navy would like to be a respected and reliable factor in international maritime security. This strategic commitment is fully in accordance with the article. That concept can only strengthen our position.


We believe that the idea itself should pose no problems and that, in good faith, it is possible to find good and practical solutions. The Croatian Navy is able to participate as an active and respected member of global maritime security. Croatian Navy and Croatian merchant ships could be a part of the global maritime network by operating for the benefit of maritime security on national, regional, and global levels.

The Croatian Navy is committed to this idea. It is also aware that the Adriatic Sea is our main economic resource and the initiator of development for the Republic of Croatia.

I express my gratitude to you for the honor and opportunity of expressing the visions of our small navy and nation with a rich maritime tradition and, in this way, conveying our ideas on this internationally important issue.

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### **Rear Admiral Nils Wang** **Royal Danish Navy**

 Being a straightforward and very logical proposal, the initiative and the bold visions behind it are welcome. I certainly see opportunities in the concept. I do not think one should take the term "1,000-ship Navy" as an exact figure, but more as a philosophy or way of thinking aimed at creating a global maritime network.

The philosophy behind the proposal and the types of operations envisioned fit hand in glove with Danish naval thinking. A littoral nation, Denmark relies heavily on undisrupted maritime supply lines. Vital bridges, offshore oil installations, and more than 100,000 ships passing through Danish waters every year make for potential risks across the full array of threats. Danish prosperity depends to a high degree on the freedom of the seas. Danish merchant shipping operates worldwide, earning some \$26 billion annually. At any one time Danish merchant ships will be found in the major choke points all over the world. Hence, the threats described are very much a Danish problem, at home as well as abroad.

As one of the founding members of NATO, Denmark has a long-standing tradition for cooperation with alliance navies. Over the years cooperation has been established with the Baltic rim nations in a number of constabulary areas. In the last 15 years Danish naval units have taken part in NATO- or U.S.-led operations. In addition, Denmark has participated regularly in NATO's standing naval forces for many years. Hence, the Danish Navy has acquired solid experience in cooperation with navies from a variety of nations.

Through the procurement of the *Absalon*-class combat support ships and the follow-on of three large frigates, the Danish Navy will possess modern ships with a global reach, yet with a littoral-operations capability. The *Flyvefisken*-class' participation in Allied Harvest (mine countermeasures) and Active Endeavor (choke-point protection) proved that smaller Danish units also have a part to play in a future 1,000-ship Navy.

The flexible design of the *Absalon*-class enables the ships-in addition to traditional maritime roles-to take on the role of a grey hospital ship with a 70-man medical staff. The necessary medical equipment is being procured, and operational status in this role is expected in 2007. However, accentuated by the tsunami catastrophe, smaller humanitarian aid packages (tents, blankets, water purifiers, etc.) will be procured this year and be a permanent part of the ships' standard outfit, regardless of role, deployment area, or tasks, to enable them to provide basic assistance at all times. The concept is planned to include all major units.

As for problems, or rather challenges, behind the 1,000-ship Navy philosophy, information sharing and intelligence fusion are the first to spring to mind. Second-realizing that no one has sovereignty on the high seas-creating common protocols and perhaps even common rules of engagement, which could ultimately allow use of force to counter threats in international waters, could prove another challenge.

Interoperability, communications, and information exchange could also be obstacles. However, more than a decade of Partnership for Peace activities, including the development of the NATO/Partnership for Peace Stanag 1,000 series, has shown the way and could provide the foundation for worldwide maritime cooperation. An internet-type maritime global network with a controlling agency and a common database may be required. New

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automatic identification and electronic nautical chart systems, among others, will undoubtedly be useful tools for information exchange.

All in all, I strongly subscribe to the philosophy of creating a global maritime network to counter the menaces that exist today in the maritime domain.

***Vice Admiral Hans Holmstrom***  
***Finnish Navy***



The Finnish Navy welcomes the concept of the 1,000-ship Navy. As a small nation we are very familiar with the challenges that Admirals Morgan and Martoglio point out. Nearly 90% of our foreign trade is transported on a hull, which makes Finnish society very much dependent on global maritime security. Despite this fact, our own capability to protect the sea lines of communications is very limited outside our territorial waters. The Finnish Navy is mainly designed for national defense and the protection of territorial integrity of Finnish waters. The posture of the Navy provides tools for countering threats against shipping in our own area of responsibility, but the farther we sail from the Finnish coast, the more we have to rely on others.


I believe Finland definitely should be an exporter of security. Unfortunately both the structure and size of our navy restrict our ability to provide assets outside our own area of operations. Nevertheless, we are developing our capabilities to participate in multinational operations within all European waters.

Besides direct participation in multinational naval operations, the article also offers an alternative method to increase global maritime security—security assistance. In this I see an opportunity for small navies like ours. Security assistance does not require a large fleet. Exporting security know-how could be an economically feasible way for all small navies to extend their reach. It may also be easier, for some countries, to accept security assistance from a small nation rather than from an alliance or a single power. Assistance from a small nation is not a threat to the sovereignty of the receiving nation.

I encourage everyone to benchmark other, more distant areas of the globe to find the best practices for maintaining and increasing maritime security. For example, Finland has had good experience from national cooperation and regional maritime safety arrangements with Sweden, Estonia, and Russia. These have had a positive influence on our own national security, and we are ready to share them with other willing nations.

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### **Admiral Alain Oudot de Dainville** **French Navy**



According to its roles and missions, the French Navy has developed a vision: comprehensive protection and prevention. Its tenets are similar to the proposals made by Admirals Morgan and Martoglio.

We have always thought that threats to stability must be addressed within a global and broad perspective and *not* solely focused on terrorist activities. In 2003 we promulgated the maritime safeguard concept to federate, in a comprehensive perspective, all the contributions of the Navy to maritime security and safety, spanning the whole range of operations at sea: from rescue to military support to law enforcement activities, from coastal surveillance to anti-pollution operations, and from Caribbean narcotics operations patrols to Indian Ocean maritime and leadership interdiction operations. In our vision, navies have a role to play in countering or mitigating all threats and dangers occurring at sea that may affect human beings. High-intensity warfare at sea or in the littorals, our core business, stands at the end of such a continuum.

Since the 19th century, French public services' assets have operated with interagency coordination. In the maritime domain, the service lies in the office of the "prefet maritime," an active duty admiral. As a unique representative of the Prime Minister, he is entitled to act as the coordinating authority for all government agencies involved in law enforcement duties or in the protection of people, property, and environment at sea. During recent years, the scope of this security posture has been increasingly affected by high-seas activities. We fully support the "think globally" part of the slogan, in full compliance with the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, which remains essential in this position. We also promote regional cooperation as a first step, as we intend to share our concept with our European partners.

Today, French naval forces maintain a global-reach capability. Manned by people who have been educated and trained in such contingencies, they could provide security cooperation or support disaster relief anywhere in the world. We fully endorse the principle of voluntary participation in a global network of cooperating navies. We will be ready to bring our expertise and capabilities to such an effort with one thought: cooperation is mainly to help others in helping themselves. Because maritime and littoral activities are pivotal to national interests, we must encourage and attract all partners without trespassing on their legitimate sovereignty claims.

In our countries, there is not enough awareness of the daily contributions of maritime activities to society's and individual welfare and way of life. Promoting the standing role of navies around the world in keeping these activities safe and functioning should also increase our fellow citizens' perception of the role of their navy.

As solidarity at sea is not an empty word, cooperation against all the dangers, threats, and risks at sea is a goal we should share.

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### *Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt* *German Navy*



Global challenges cannot be handled by individual countries alone, hence, the concept of a virtual 1,000-ship Navy developed by the U.S. Navy and aiming at a global maritime network is a logical consequence of this fact and a step in the right direction.

Because Germany, more than almost any other country, heavily depends on the use of the sea for its imports and exports, it has a vital interest in being able to use the sea lines of communication freely and unhindered. Maritime security, however, is an issue that touches on the tasks and responsibilities of more than a navy. This becomes particularly clear when the civilian-shipping sector is to be incorporated-as in the 1,000-ship Navy concept.

Crucial for the success of such a concept is a common understanding of the importance of the sea and its use, which has many facets: Indirect economic use as a transportation route, direct economic use (fishing, crude oil and gas production), and recreational use.

These aspects, each touching on the security and safety in the maritime domain, should be dealt with in an overarching concept.

To some degree, maritime networks already exist, stemming from various global and regional sea power symposia. Further, Germany contributes in a substantial way to international maritime security in the context of the global war on terrorism, in particular its continuous participation in operations Enduring Freedom and Active Endeavor. In addition, the German Navy has assigned units, primarily frigates and mine countermeasures ships, to the four NATO maritime groups on a permanent basis. Thus Germany, in close cooperation with other nations, exports security into regions not immediately within its sphere of influence, yet still within its sphere of interests. In a European context, the German Navy is actively involved in shaping the maritime portion of the European Union battle groups, thus further developing and strengthening capabilities. Moreover, as a littoral state, Germany has one of the largest navies in the Baltic Sea area, playing a lead role regarding the integration of new NATO and EU members of this region. A prominent example is its participation in the Baltic Naval Squadron working group, which it has chaired from the beginning.

The German Navy has a broad assortment of maritime capabilities and experience that could be contributed to a global maritime network. For instance, Germany is in the process of creating a Center of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters located in Kiel. Among others, this center will investigate issues and prospects regarding maritime security provisions such as warding off mine threats by terrorists in coastal areas. Germany will invite other nations to participate once the center is accredited by NATO with the results made available to all alliance members.

The German Navy's capabilities were also evident during the tsunami disaster humanitarian relief operations in the form of a combat support ship. Thanks to its excellent logistic and medical capacities, we were able to provide help independent of any land-based infrastructure.

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The broad range of capabilities that navies possess can be connected to global maritime security networks. The growing awareness in political circles that comprehensive security and safety can be ensured only in an inter-governmental approach to adequately meet future challenges and risks is cause for optimism. This will also offer maritime options to be brought into effect more frequently in the future and enable them to be integrated into a comprehensive security concept.

A global maritime network, however, can only become reality if all parties involved agree that this will generally enhance security and safety. Consequently, one basic requirement for the successful implementation of such a concept is that economic interests of individual countries be deemphasized in favor of the overall gain. Implementation must be rooted in true partnership and be transparent to everyone involved. The German Navy is actively supporting multilateral actions in the widespread arc of global maritime security.

### **Rear Admiral A. R. S. Nuno** **Ghana Navy**



The maritime domain is constantly challenged by traditional and new threats, all increasing in quantum, actors, nature, and scope. The cumulative effect is that the great maritime commons, from which we have built, communicated, and created our civilization, is being held for ransom.

The international community is becoming more responsive to these threats, however, the issue of collective policing and action has not been adequately addressed. In this regard, the 1,000-ship Navy is of seminal importance. My colleagues' thoughts are incisive, and their arguments are strong.

Conflicts from Sierra Leone through Liberia to Côte d'Ivoire, have had a negative impact on the stability and development of the region. Illegal importation of small arms and weapons by air and sea facilitates these conflicts. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region continues to increase. Nearby Somali waters were rated among the most pirate-infested waters in 2004/2005.

The west coast of Africa is infamous for the transit of drugs. In September 2004, a French warship intercepted a Togolese tugboat, *Pitea*, off the coast of Ghana with more than two tons of cocaine worth \$50 million. Coupled with drug trafficking is the related problem of illegal immigration by sea.

With the 9/11 experience, a new threat surfaced: the possibility of using the ocean highways and platforms as instruments of terrorist attack. It is a collective danger that requires a collective response.

These points make it important for the Gulf of Guinea region to cooperate in building a security regime, which would be a part of the 1,000-ship Navy. The Ghana Navy, as part of its desire for a regional and global security regime, supports the U. S. European Command initiatives on African coastal security. Ghana hosted a May 2005 conference that was a follow-up to the Gulf of Guinea Security Conference held in Naples, Italy, in October 2004, and which my predecessor attended.

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We are therefore already in the cooperative sphere and importing maritime security. In the face of growing poverty, poor nations including Ghana need the support of big navies and the international community to procure and equip their navies.

The imperatives of the 1,000-ship Navy are many and diverse but can be outlined as spatial, legal, and operative.

. To be effective, there should be no sea area or region that the 1,000-ship Navy could not cover. There will be varying strengths depending on threat thresholds, priorities, and capabilities, but any sea space uncovered serves as a fault line that can be exploited to derail the whole. This is the spatial imperative.

. The legal imperative is the constitutional framework for the operational apparatus. The ocean space can be defined in terms of sovereignty, sovereign rights, and global commons. These must be factored in with the competencies and operational capacities of the differing navies. Our discourse must hammer out the appropriate legal framework.

. The third imperative-the operative-is in some respects derived from the first two. We need the ships and equipment to have a 1,000-ship Navy. We must define the end state and establish command-and-control procedures. There must be synergy of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

. To achieve the laudable objectives, the suggestion that bigger navies and industry should cooperate in making available ships at cheaper cost to smaller navies is very important.

There are collective actions in some regions. The Gulf of Guinea region must come on board. Globally, the 1,000-ship Navy offers appropriate deterrence and response. We can export and import security and create overarching efficacy. The imperatives may be many, but the three outlined here are important. We cannot have a seamless result, but we need the 1,000-ship Navy.

### ***Admiral Arun Prakash Indian Navy***



If the daring proposal put forth by the authors strikes a chord in this part of the world, it is for two reasons. First, the Indian economy, having emerged from many years of self-imposed isolation, has been experiencing the joys as well as the tribulations of globalization for the past decade and a half. And second, when terrorism struck a savage blow in the heart of New York and Washington on 9/11, we had already been battling this dreaded scourge for many years in a conflict that extends from our mountains to our seas.

Globalization has led to tremendous growth in seaborne commerce and increasing exploitation of the seas for other purposes. This in turn has been inevitably accompanied by an increasing trend toward piracy and other maritime crimes; we thus see the new "silk routes" attracting latter-day buccaneers who respect neither national laws nor international boundaries. Man-made borders are meaningless before natural disasters, and we have seen the devastation wrought by earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones, floods, or droughts cutting

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across nations and clearly demonstrating that no single country can by itself hope to cope with such catastrophes.

As I write, a biennial event, Milan 2006, is taking place in Port Blair in our Andaman and Nicobar group of islands. Milan is Hindi for "confluence," and nine navies have gathered here from the extended Bay of Bengal neighborhood to meet and glean mutual benefits that professional and cultural fraternization bring. This year's Milan has special significance, because Port Blair and the surrounding islands suffered major damage from the 2004 tsunami. Among activities at Milan is a seminar on regional maritime cooperation, which will discuss the security of international sea lanes and disaster management.

Living in a dangerous neighborhood, having established bilateral patrols and initiated regional maritime cooperative endeavors, albeit in a small way, we understand what the authors are talking about. We agree that such cooperation, if extended globally, will require resources that go well beyond the capability of any single nation or even a group of nations.

The 1,000-ship Navy envisioned by the authors will, however, be an international "force in being" which presupposes not just "willing navies" but also political consensus across the board, and reassurances related to sovereignty issues, intelligence sharing, command and control, and other transnational concerns. There also needs to be a clear understanding and commitment for contributors to this "dormant navy" to respond when the call comes. In real life however, it is possible that this excellent concept may founder on the rocks and shoals of national sensitivities.

A possible method for establishing the 1,000-ship concept would be under the aegis of the United Nations, with each member asked to earmark certain units as UN forces. The UN, through its maritime agencies, has demarked areas of responsibility for hydrographic survey, issue of navigational warnings, and search and rescue responsibilities. This format could be replicated or modified for policing and maintenance of good order at sea, as envisaged by the 1,000-ship Navy.

### ***Admiral Slamet Soebijanto*** ***Indonesian Navy***

 I agree with the wonderful 1,000-ship Navy concept to establish and maintain a dramatically increased level of international security in the maritime domain. I also agree that today, more than ever, the security of an individual nation is tied to global security.

That Navy, however, will require large sums to support the ships. It will need a standard operating procedure, interoperability, and internal command-and-control procedures. It must include the shipping industry on an international scale and the cooperation of our maritime industry.


The Indonesian Navy has actively contributed to counter piracy efforts and transnational crime through cooperative efforts with Malaysia and Singapore in the Strait of Malacca. These actions demonstrate our concern for maritime security. However, our national interests cannot be ignored. Our navy's priority is cooperation with all neighboring countries that share a sea border with Indonesian territory to maintain maritime security and to foster

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mutual confidence. No less important is our navy's obligation to patrol Indonesian territorial waters. These constraints would limit our opportunity for joint operations with the 1,000-ship Navy.

Moreover, the Indonesian Navy's participation in the concept requires the permission of the Indonesian armed forces, its Department of Defense, and our government.

### **Admiral Sergio Biraghi** *Italian Navy*



The 1,000-ship Navy concept, presented in its essential features at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, is a very bright and comprehensive approach toward building a global maritime network, highly required today in the complex and challenging security arena we have to cope with. As understood, the details of this initiative have to be further investigated, but I am convinced it offers a wide array of opportunities to the navies that agree to this global partnership.

I believe the strength of the concept lies in the flexibility of its implementation, in the fact that all nations are called to deal with a series of common threats, and within the contribution that every nation can offer to security in the maritime domain. It should be measured by how each nation's national interests match global interests.

As very clearly defined in the article, maritime security is an international problem that requires an international solution, and no single nation can manage the issues on its own. International cooperation thus becomes imperative.

How does Italy and the Italian Navy plug into the concept? I feel safe to say, "in a very smooth manner." Indeed, we have been actively operating according to the plotted track. In fact, the Italian Navy, while thinking globally, has been acting regionally. In the Wider Mediterranean—a concept that includes the Black Sea, Atlantic approaches, Middle East, Arabian Gulf, and western Indian Ocean—a robust surveillance posture is paramount, through continuous presence and control of our surrounding maritime spaces. Nevertheless, well aware that such activity is in itself insufficient, we have invested tangibly in the field of international cooperation and cross-agency coordination.

Besides promoting various cooperative initiatives—ADRION, the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative with the Hellenic Navy, and 5+5, involving five navies each from the European Union and North Africa—a series of bilateral training activities have been launched with Algeria, Croatia, Israel, Libya, Malta, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro, and Tunisia. The added value of these initiatives is to bring together countries with different cultures and economies, but all sharing the desire of cooperation in maritime security.

We have decided to venture farther. The occasion was offered by the Regional Seapower Symposium, which the Italian Navy hosts in Venice every two years. At the 2004 meeting, I presented to the 25 foreign delegations and several international institutions attending, an innovative project called Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Center.

This network, operational in an interim capacity since last June, is aimed at improving the exchange of information about merchant traffic transiting, inbound, and outbound, the

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Wider Mediterranean. The formula for its success lies in the combination of pragmatism and transparency.

Some of the problems that could arise with the 1,000-ship Navy concept are those linked to political sensitivities and technical factors. Not all nations and/or navies are ready to take such a historical leap. The solution could be a very patient activity keyed to building confidence, so that age-old ideological barriers can be torn down and operational and technological assistance can be provided to the less able navies. Further, an effective step-by-step approach-working on regional maritime networks at first and later tying them up if and when they flourish-will prove a winning hit.

Last, a concept that can never be overestimated is the conviction by each and every nation that to contribute to global security is the most cost-effective manner of safeguarding their security and interests.

### **Admiral Takashi Saito** **Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force**



All the personnel of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and I respect the significant efforts of the United States and the U.S. Navy to maintain the present international order. However, no single nation, not even the United States, can deal with all of the various problems facing the international community today. As the authors mentioned, international cooperation is essential to ensure global security. Additionally, the establishment of a global maritime network through regional and international cooperation is indispensable to promoting maritime security, for example, when dealing with transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and weapons proliferation.

To respond to the changing security environment, the Japanese government adopted new National Defense Program Guidelines in December 2004. These state that Japan's security policy is to improve the international security environment through cooperation with the international community. Support activities for Operation Enduring Freedom and commitment to Proliferation Security Initiative activities conducted by the JMSDF are examples of our efforts to bring Japan's security policy to fruition. These activities also lead to the establishment of a network for ensuring security in the maritime domain.

This type of network among navies has been developing steadily through regional naval frameworks such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. We have many challenges to be solved, however, to realize the 1,000-ship Navy. The first is the promotion of cooperation at the regional level. To encourage many countries to join the maritime network, it is necessary for it to be flexible to account for the regional security environment. The next challenge is the promotion of cooperation at the domestic level. Interagency cooperation at home, particularly between the navy and maritime law enforcement agencies such as the coast guard and maritime police-a pressing matter to most countries-is a prerequisite for an effective network. Establishment of a global maritime network depends on a shared sense of value and a code of conduct, which can be developed through the efforts cited here. Such a network is vital to promoting maritime security in the 21st century, and it will appear when a strategic convergence of regional cooperation and domestic cooperation is achieved. The establishment of this global maritime network is an important mission for us as we face the new threats in the 21st century.

**Vice Admiral J. W. Kelder**  
**Royal Netherlands Navy**

The concept of the 1,000-ship Navy is in line with the current focus of the Netherlands Navy. At present the navy is being reorganized and modernized with the aim of adapting our capabilities to the new operational environment. This environment demands not only that navies are increasingly focused on maritime expeditionary operations in support of land operations but also that our fleets are capable of protecting maritime interests against a diversity of asymmetric threats. In short, navies must be able to provide security at sea and from the sea.

Doing this, the Netherlands Navy is deployed not only in its home waters, including the Caribbean Sea, but is also conducting expeditionary operations by contributing to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean and CTF 150 in the Arabian Sea. Our marines have been providing election support in Afghanistan and are still there as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. They also provide force protection to fleet personnel operating in a Provincial Reconstruction Team under International Security Assistance Force command.

Maritime security threats-piracy, drug trafficking, illegal immigrants, weapons smuggling, and weapons of mass destruction-as well as potential conflict areas, are diverse and unpredictable. Many nations experience common threats to maritime security such as the attacks on USS Cole and MV *Limburg*, which showed the world the vulnerability of shipping to maritime terrorism.

With globalization and the continuing increase of maritime trade comes a growing dependency of Western economies and prosperity on the free and secure use of the sea. But globalization not only affects the economic ties that bind us, but also in the effects of the threats to maritime security. Drug trafficking affects not only one country but a whole region. The consequences of piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean are felt on the stock exchange in Amsterdam. A terrorist attack against shipping, off shore or at harbor installations, will reverberate around the globe.


This global outlook is not only important for military operations but is also increasingly relevant when providing humanitarian aid to civil authorities. Recent experiences with the tragic consequences of major natural disasters indicate that this task is not limited to our national boundaries but evolves globally as well. Security-sector reform is a globally growing task field; further exploring use of advanced information systems or helping other nations to develop an adequate naval or coast guard element may also create a more secure maritime environment.

All this leads to the conclusion that a secure maritime environment can only be maintained in a global setting; just protecting our home waters is not enough. No nation can do it alone. The critical success factors for providing global maritime security are the ability to cooperate and to communicate within a joint environment with units not only from traditional alliances, but increasingly with those from a much broader coalition. Global maritime security requires a global maritime picture, very much in line with the air pictures maintained by air traffic control centers. This picture would make potential threats to the maritime environment more visible and facilitate our reaction to developing threats.

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As such, the concept of the 1,000-ship Navy is warmly supported and is completely in line with the mission statement of the Royal Netherlands Navy Command: one navy-marine corps team providing security at sea and from the sea.

**Rear Admiral David I. Ledson**  
**Royal New Zealand Navy**



A helicopter view of 1,000 ships patrolling the world's oceans would make a magnificent sight-but would those ships genuinely make an effective global maritime network against global terrorism and in providing humanitarian relief?

The concept of such a network-roaming across the global maritime commons-as envisaged in the article is an interesting one. However, if the opportunity it promotes is to be seized across the globe, then discussion of its pros and cons is important; especially if the 1,000-ship Navy is not to be just another worthy vision languishing as a bumper sticker on the office notice board.

The concept and the characteristics that frame it seem to hint that geo-strategic changes in recent years require navies to adopt new roles. Since the early 1990s, however, significant changes across the landscape have been remarkably few, and the traditional roles of navies continue to be relevant.

It is also important to note that navies have had at various times in their history to deal with many of the threats that some contemporary commentators characterize as new. The nature and characteristics of national and human interactions has not yet changed to the extent that navies are irrelevant and reduced to trying to invent new uses for old capabilities.

Some thought needs to be given to the practicality, or otherwise, of considering the oceans as a commons-and, indeed, whether the oceans in this sense include the high seas, exclusive economic zones, and territorial seas.

There are significant difficulties in taking too broad an approach that, perhaps, become more apparent if the sea is considered not just as a maritime highway, but also as a supplier of resources. Unsurprisingly, the terrestrial concept of sovereignty-ownership-is being applied to increasing maritime areas and being able to exercise this sovereignty is seen as an important national responsibility.

An Atlantic-Europe strategic perspective rather than a Pacific-Asia one may also shape the view of the oceans as a commons. In a general sense, archipelagic geography exerts an influence on Asian relationships and on Asian maritime strategies that does not appear evident in the Atlantic context.

Care needs to be taken to ensure that we are not seduced by the intellectual and visual attraction of simple ship numbers away from the more complex but more important issues associated with defining credible capabilities for those ships.

The concept of large numbers of ships patrolling the farthest reaches of the oceans on the off-chance of doing some good needs to be replaced by the concept of ships with the

## The **Commanders** Respond

capabilities that enable them to share maritime domain awareness, and to respond appropriately to incidents, operating in response to targeted information and with agreed measures of success.


The last point is very important. While ships may not complain about endless patrols away from home, sailors will. Ultimately, it is they who do the hard yards, and those who send them to sea need to be able to demonstrate that they are making a difference.

There are dangers in using the analogy of maritime security in the navy context as "an importable or exportable product." While this approach may be acceptable for commercial organizations, the analogy risks creating a misalignment with the core purpose and culture of navies around the world-in fact, with their reason for being. The principal purpose of any navy is to contribute to the prosperity and security of its country's citizens, and this is done through service on the sea.

The assurance of maritime security in its broadest sense is an important task for navies; it always has been and always will be. In the past, navies have tended to regard this as a navy-only job. Today, there is increased recognition that navies working inside an inter-agency network provide a more effective strategy.

As great a challenge as providing an effective and networked 1,000-ship Navy is that of proving an effective and networked "whole of government" approach to the array of security threats that face us on and around the seas, an approach that provides both roads and resources-some on the commons and many on "private land."

### **Rear Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth** **Royal Norwegian Navy**



Illegal activities such as piracy, smuggling, and terrorism know no borders and are rarely connected to a specific state. Neither are natural disasters or environmental hazards. Maintaining sea trade and international regulations, search and rescue, and the provision of comfort following disasters are among the traditional naval tasks of all free nations. As such, the ideas of a Global Maritime Network and the 1,000-ship Navy are very interesting.

Norway is a maritime nation largely dependent on free trade directly for its own needs and through its huge merchant fleet. Offshore oil and natural gas production and extensive fisheries make our country totally dependent on law and order at sea and of global security. To achieve this at home we must be able to contribute abroad. While humanitarian relief rarely is a difficult political issue, a global war on terrorism may be subject to debate. Under all circumstances, all deployments of units of the Royal Norwegian Navy would need political backing.

The Royal Norwegian Navy normally restricts its operations to the Norwegian Sea and the Mediterranean. Operations in the littorals are our strength, and our navy is designed and trained with this in mind. At the same time, the Norwegian merchant navy is regularly operating worldwide and clearly represents a source of information.

The importance of civilian shipping and our dependence on free trade cannot be overstated. Piracy or terrorism, asymmetric warfare or simply the random laying of a few sea mines,

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would seriously disrupt trade and increase transportation costs dramatically. This would affect most, if not all, nations. It is easy to agree with the authors that this remains a common, international task.

In addition to cooperation among navies, a robust system of naval cooperation and guidance of shipping must be created when needed. In this aspect Norway considers itself one of the lead nations in NATO. We have the right deployable equipment and experienced personnel, secure communications, and contacts in the shipping environment to add a useful capability in a geographic area.

The littoral combat skill of the Royal Norwegian Navy would effectively fit into the tasks and outlined ideas behind the 1,000-ship Navy. Sustainability outside traditional waters would pose a challenge that could, however, be mitigated through NATO cooperation. All deployments would be subject to political approval, which a UN mandate calling for military assistance would make much more likely.

The authors introduce a principle that should be given international attention-the collective responsibility of all free nations to uphold and support the economic and other interests of each other. In this aspect, most navies could contribute.



**Admiral Jorge Ampuero Trabucco**  
**Peruvian Navy**

The concept of a global maritime network, which would allow the naval power of the world states to be used in a coordinated manner, is a proposal that deserves to be considered. In a globalized world, where new transnational threats replace traditional threats at an accelerated rate, this network would allow the implementation of an intra-state alliance against those new actors who threaten our people through organized crime and international terrorism, and force them to face the consequences of their acts.

Internationally, this would become a symbol of mankind's capacity to face a common enemy. Such a network would imply the desire to develop an interoperable capability among our navies. It would, without a doubt, represent a unique challenge for states with developing economies because of costs required for common equipment. For these reasons, imaginative and cooperative solutions are necessary. The most important issue in facing a common enemy, however, is to reinforce peace and trust among the states, which would help create a dynamic integration, particularly at the regional level.

In like manner, this concept could extend to combat various illegal activities on the world's oceans, contributing to maritime security and marine ecosystems protection.

The main problems with this concept are driven by the states' internal policies. Many would face legal restrictions, lack of political will, and nationalist sentiment, mainly among smaller nations who will see their sovereignty sacrificed for the international relationship.

In that context, such an arrangement would force the negotiation of rules for coordination and engagement, as well as rules for the use of network capacities; to review the scope of the "principle of no intervention in others' state matters;" and to establish a relationship and interdependency with international organizations.

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On the operational level, the development of adequate platforms for command and control, as well as a transparent intelligence sharing system for efficient operation would be necessary.

### ***Fleet Admiral Roman Krzyżelowski*** ***Polish Navy***

Much has been said about change and emerging threats after the attacks on 11 September 2001. We must understand that the threats did not suddenly appear on 9/11. They existed for a long time before, but never on such a scale. During the Cold War the terrorist threat was a local hazard overshadowed by a bigger danger—the possibility of a global conflict between two power blocs. That great threat forced bloc members to closely cooperate with each other. The end of that global threat with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the end of the bipolar world brought a feeling of relief. But that was only an illusion, the local threats had mutated into a global danger, the best evidence being 9/11.

As much as those of the 1990s cherished the relief and illusion of global security, today, everyone is aware of the mutated threats. The maritime community, dealing every day with forces of nature and taking advantage of the freedom of the seas, is especially aware of how sensitive that environment is to hostile activities.

As a seaman and a naval officer, I cannot disagree with the 1,000-ships concept and fail to notice profit from such a solution. It should be noted that the concept is not an entirely new idea within the maritime Community. Similar solutions on a smaller scale were and are successfully implemented in many regions of the world. It would be a great achievement to implement the concept globally. Close cooperation among the various institutions would ensure not only a global security but also, thanks to that variety, would be cost effective. The concept's implementation, however, is not an easy task.

Any coalition or cooperation is based on a common objective. For regional solutions the common objective is usually easily defined; that of the 1,000-ship Navy may be more difficult. Terrorism has a broad definition and it is hard to find any one meaning suitable for all interested parties. Even with agreement on a common, specific definition, there remains the matter of priorities. Various institutions see different threats as the most dangerous; we always consider a direct threat as most serious.

Another crucial problem is the matter of information exchange. The issue has been discussed many times in forums, and the problem's complexity is generally recognized. It is clear that the most important information is usually confidential and, as much as everyone is eager to receive such data, one is not so willing to share it.

The idea of the 1,000-ship Navy is definitely an aim we should strive for, however, the procedures and regulations required for its creation and conduct need much effort and some changes in thinking. It seems logical that in the meantime we should focus on developing regional programs and build them with a global system in mind. That requires close cooperation, coordination, and experience exchange between the regional programs.

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### **Admiral Melo Gomes** **Portuguese Navy**



I am convinced that, more than an opportunity, this concept should be viewed as a growing reality. Rather than identifying problems, I will focus on two main ideas: The concept's strengths and way ahead, and the Portuguese Navy's contribution.

Globalization is straining national security systems that cannot cope with some non-state actors who are far more powerful than their systems. Further, the law of the sea is friendly to those who do not comply with the rule of law, allowing them freedom of maneuver until reaching shore. Then, incipient coastal surveillance systems, combined with scarce maritime assets because of insufficient investment mainly related to the peace dividend following the Cold War, provides safe ground for unlawful activities to flourish. This generates vast sums of money that are invested in increasingly sophisticated assets and processes to nourish this chain.

With such a tremendous enemy, how can democracies prevail?

I believe the only way is to adopt a different approach, one of enhanced cooperation and information exchange that brings national security systems together, sharing vital information, and acting before the crucial moment occurs. A network-centric global security system, based on trust, information exchange, and credibility, is needed. Among those I include coastal surveillance systems, such as the vessel traffic system, and above all, efficient command and control of the diverse coastal and maritime patrolling assets needed to team for success.


Having said this, it is incumbent upon world's navies to take the step, cooperate, and win, or stay behind trans-national and global enemies, non-accountable and ruthless, driven by profit and indifferent to a civilized code of conduct.

Although small, the Portuguese Navy's centuries of experience securing overseas territories against enemies and pirates and today, cooperating with African nations-Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Saõ Tomé et Príncipe, and Cape Verde-may be of value to networking the world's navies for a common goal. This accumulated knowledge has given us a thorough understanding of the road to success: cooperation. This is the simple and mighty factor that can make the difference. We are ready to pursue it, as we know there is no alternative.

In sum, I support the overarching concept. More than an opportunity, the 1,000-ship Navy should be seen as a stimulating challenge to be pursued, bringing a new sense to the concept of fleet-in-being. I therefore recommend bringing responsible people together, create the networks, and enhance mutual trust to make this idea work.

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### ***Vice Admiral J. Mudimu*** ***South African Navy***



The concept of the 1,000-ship Navy within the context of a global maritime network capable of countering global terrorism and providing humanitarian relief during natural disasters is not only a tall order but, while noble in its intent, is derived from a critical assumption. This assumption pre-supposes a global maritime security charter; a charter that not only implies agreement of internationally acceptable maritime security principles, but recognizes national and regional interests and priorities. Proceeding from this and within the context of an African (national and regional) perspective, the comments that follow have been formulated.

A determination is growing in Africa that African problems, including security issues, should and will be solved by Africans. African governments, including the South African government, have launched numerous initiatives to give effect to this determination. We understand that economic and social development cannot take place in the absence of a peaceful and stable environment. Threats to security are numerous and wide-ranging. Some are rooted in colonial and post-colonial history, others in the competition for land and resources or in criminal greed. Still others have an ethnic or cultural dimension. Africa has not escaped friction arising from the evolution of global geo-politics. It is contended that the greatest threat to security on the African continent is that of poverty, declining health status, and a lack of education. It is furthermore a continent of great diversity in beliefs and value systems, yet there is a strong sense of common purpose and mutual dependency.

The South African government firmly believes that the future of South Africa is inextricably linked to the future of the African continent and that of our neighbors in southern Africa. Therefore, it is our contention that socio-economic development cannot take place without political peace and stability, as they are prerequisites for socio-economic development. It is thus within this context that the South African Navy finds itself in a position whereby national interests, coupled to regional interests on the continent of Africa, determines its strategy, posture, and force design. The South African Navy intends to achieve this through the promotion of confidence and security-building measures. These will be accomplished by engaging in cooperative ventures with its counterparts throughout the region in such fields as maritime defense planning, combined exercises, procurement of arms and equipment, training and education, and the conduct of exchange visits. In this regard it seeks to:

- Promote the development of a regional maritime regime such as the establishment of a regional maritime authority.
- Promote the development of a standing regional force for regional disaster relief and peacekeeping, having common doctrine and operational procedures.
- Promote the development of a regional search-and-rescue regime.
- Promote upkeep and repair assistance.
- Promote the transfer of technology.
- Further the development of a regional hydrographic regime.
- Further the conduct of regular combined exercises by regional forces.
- Further the sharing of training facilities.
- Further the attachment of personnel.

The vision for maritime cooperation on the continent of Africa will be translated into reality by the South African Navy through the following actions:

## The Commanders Respond

- Contributions to the African Standby Force.
- Growing the capabilities of their own and South African navies.
- Establishing Regional Maritime Capability Nodes (Centers of Excellence)

Thus, the global maritime network concept may be a viable option if it can be aligned to regional initiatives. Regional interests must be addressed by recognizing their security needs and links bound to a global maritime security regime or charter. The concept needs to be read within this context. The African regional narrative requires a unique response from the South African Navy, and it is envisaged that similar, yet different narratives will reside within other non-African regions. The art in establishing the global maritime network will lie in creating a framework that allows regional responses to these unique narratives, within the broader parameters of the global maritime network and its associated charter.

### **Admiral Sebastian Zaragoza Soto** *Spanish Navy*



Maritime security is recognized as a top concern by most countries. Any multinational initiative in this area needs to be proactive with full political support from the governments involved. Once political support is granted, navies know how to face this challenge in strict compliance with international law. An increasing number of maritime security initiatives in response to the new threats demands common global coordinated effort by the navies. The proposed worldwide maritime security network has, in some ways, already erupted in a self-synchronizing and self-organizing manner. All free nations have instinctively reacted and developed the embryo of a multinational maritime force without even knowing it.

Our individual efforts have shown that no independent approach will be successful given that now, more than ever, we need each other to control and safeguard the maritime space. In this regard, every man and woman, every sensor, every ship, and every bit of information we can gather for this common task is needed and will make a valuable contribution for a safer ocean. We do not need to develop new equipment, but we need to efficiently use what we have.

The global network will probably be too complex to be led by just one nation or organization; however, we need to assure a permanent coordination among all navies, agencies, and international organizations.

Spain has a very important role to play in any maritime security initiative, whatever its ultimate form. Our country is in a unique geographical location on the southern border of Europe with the African continent, at the Strait of Gibraltar. Spain is a crossroads, where the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug trafficking at sea are becoming ever more important.

The Spanish Navy is expeditionary in nature and consequently is well prepared to export maritime security abroad in coordination with other friendly and allied navies.

As far as challenges go, I envision the following:

- Inter-agency coordination at the international level. This task is more political than naval. Fighting crime at sea goes beyond the "just military" approach. Navies can do the job and find it easy to work together, as we have been doing for years, but it will not be the same when it comes to cooperation with civilian agencies. They have different procedures, mentality, and rules, and work

## The Commanders Respond


in different areas. In this sense, one of the most important challenges we face is to ensure understanding and cooperation among these diverse bodies by efficiently sharing information, avoiding undesirable overlaps, and coordinating action. This will be impossible without a clear and committed political will.

- Legal aspects. Some recent multinational activities, mostly in the fight against terrorism, have not paid the deserved dividends because the international community lacks the appropriate legal framework. Together we must find a legal solution to preserving the natural flow of friendly maritime trade while denying freedom of action to those criminals who attempt to use the maritime space for illegal activities. In this regard, international political consensus will definitely be of the greatest importance.
- Involvement. I believe that the widespread involvement of littoral nations in sensitive areas around the world is vital. Anything they can do at sea, no matter their capabilities, in this common effort is most welcomed.

In fact, we can build a 1,000-ship Navy by joining efforts instead of building new units. If nations realize that their efforts, even though limited, are useful for the common task and represent a gain for them in terms of security and developments, and if we are able to build their confidence and trust in us and learn from our methods, then we enlarge our own capabilities to a limit that we could never reach on our own.

I fully agree that this concept of many different navies under many different flags working together for a common objective is the way we should proceed.

### **Rear Admiral Anders Grenstad** **Royal Swedish Navy**



Sweden has a long maritime tradition because of both its geographical position and its strategic location in northern Europe. During the Cold War, the Baltic Sea was an arena in which NATO forces struggled with Warsaw Pact forces for control and dominance. As a non-aligned country, Sweden was obliged to develop a maritime strategy of its own, as well as a variety of defense material. As a result, Sweden has very strong maritime capabilities, which can prove to be useful in the littorals such as mine clearing and antisubmarine warfare, submarine, and amphibious operations.

Today the most serious threats, which can be used to foster and encourage increased joint, interagency, and international cooperation, are transnational. Since the end of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea countries have entered into agreements on a number of subjects for example, maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental control-to strengthen maritime security in our part of the world.

The 1,000-ship Navy concept transfigures many regional initiatives into one large global concept. It is indeed true that, if we are to effectively challenge transnational threats, regional initiatives must be scaled up. To be successful, we need to extend early-warning time and shrink reaction time. For example, we need to receive accurate information on suspicious cargo or ships early, long before they enter our region.

The idea of a global maritime network is strongly supportable, and will, in my opinion, increase security in the maritime domain. It is prudent, however, to let the network grow out of the local and regional initiatives, as we must be certain that all political and legal issues have been addressed and resolved. I also foresee many practical problems with interoperability and rules of engagement, among other issues, but we must start now.

## The Commanders Respond

I welcome the initiative and am looking forward to the continued development of the program.

### **Admiral Yener Karahanoglu**

#### **Turkish Naval Forces**



There is no doubt that the world oceans and seas are becoming smaller as globalization takes effect and emerging technologies change every aspect of human activity on the seas. The steady increase in maritime shipping in the last decade had both positive and negative effects on maritime security. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 appeared as the dark results of globalization and altered the dynamics of security paradigms worldwide. The reaction was widespread and produced an array of actions and precautions.

The post-9/11 period saw the "safety first" maxim in the maritime domain change into the "security first" maxim, with chain reactions in many fields including economic, legal, operational, and technological. This change is reflected in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and its activities over the past few years, including the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code System and the revision of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1540, and 1566, along with the Palermo and Vienna protocols, provide a necessary legal framework to combat terror, human and drug trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery. In addition, the continuous increase of technical innovations is helping to make the maritime domain more manageable and controllable.

The 1,000-ship Navy is synergetic, calling for the integration of the world navies in security, rather than defense tasks. It, however, needs an implementation paradigm.

First, a globally recognized maritime picture will have to be established. The nations' individual efforts must be integrated, under most preferably IMO or NATO aegis, to increase situational awareness.

Second, increased maritime vigilance and deterrence, while enhancing dialogue and cooperation among neighboring littorals, can be promoted by joint naval and coast guard presence operations along with information exchange within and outside the region.

Third, regional maritime security operations-either individual or collective-can be affiliated with global and regional large-scale maritime security operations, thus broadening the scope of security.

The activities of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group since 27 September 2001 and Operation Black Sea Harmony being conducted by the Turkish Navy since 1 March 2004 are examples of this vision, a microcosm of what the 1,000-ship Navy aims to achieve.

The Black Sea task group, a cooperative of six littoral navies of the area, promotes interoperability and a common security vision. The force's combined training focuses on basic naval warfare disciplines as well as maritime security operations.

The Black Sea littoral coast guards are cooperating through joint exercises as well as periodic meetings at the commandant level. The Border Coordination and Information


## The Commanders Respond

Center, located in Burgas, Bulgaria, and supported by six littoral coast guards, is a center of information regarding illegal activities in the Black Sea area.

Operation Black Sea Harmony provides year-round maritime security in the Black Sea through presence operations involving shadowing, trailing, and interdiction with the full cooperation of all Turkish agencies. It has become affiliated with NATO's Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean. The multilateralization of the operation continues through discussions with the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Other littorals have also been invited to join the operation.

These initiatives are solid examples of regional cooperation in maritime security around the Black Sea, where no terrorist incident has taken place in the last decade. The 1,000-ship Navy concept would meet the 21st century needs for maritime security. Since the required technology is available and ongoing regional applications and experiences prove its utility, it would be applicable as long as the political wills of the nations are incorporated. This does not seem difficult to achieve because every nation, regardless of their political disputes, prefers the smooth, uninterrupted flow of maritime shipping, protected against terrorist threats and other risks.

### **Admiral Sir Alan West** *Royal Navy*



I was delighted that I was able to travel to Rhode Island in September last year with many other heads of navies to hear Admiral Mike Mullen, Vice Admiral John Morgan, and Rear Admiral Charles Martoglio put forward the case for developing the 1,000-ship Navy at the International Seapower Symposium. I was even more delighted to be asked to comment on the excellent article that appeared in the November edition of Proceedings, which set out more fully the concept for building a global maritime network.

I applaud this initiative. For many years it has been my strongly held belief that ensuring the security of our trade routes is as much of a problem now as it was many years ago when merchant ships were armed to protect themselves from attack. Today the security and economic prosperity of our nations is utterly dependent on ensuring that the freedom of the seas is maintained and this will continue to be the case as the pace of globalization continues. We simply cannot afford to have disruptions to shipping or increased costs of shipping as the result of threats of attack. Fortunately acts of piracy have mostly consisted of small-scale robbery, which has not affected global shipping. However, in recent years maritime terrorism has appeared as a very real threat. There have been some notable attacks but we have been fortunate in that a concerted and sustained attack on the lifeblood of the global economy has not yet emerged. Add to this the other threats to security and economic well being posed by smuggling, drug trading, illegal immigration, and human smuggling and it is very clear to me that maritime security is an international problem that requires an international solution.

Much has been done in recent years to establish regional dialogue, and in some cases coordination, but we are sadly a long way from achieving a global network. The key to successful and meaningful progress in establishing such a network is to move it on beyond an exercise in building a recognized maritime picture to one that brings all the interested parties together, or at least gets them all talking to each other, and places greater reliance

## The Commanders Respond

on intelligence for the cueing of reactive forces. This is not purely military activity and to be fully effective in building a common picture of maritime activity from which the correct reactive forces can be cued, it needs to encompass all the possible sources of information in an international and interagency approach, along the lines of the model so well developed in Key West, Florida, for counter narcotic operations. As well as the traditional military sources of information provided by ships and aircraft supported by electronic, signals, human and image intelligence feeds, maritime security operations need to encompass more effectively national sources of information from customs forces, law enforcement agencies, the shipping companies, financial institutions, other non-government organizations and agencies, and transportation authorities.

Because maritime security operations need to include more than military forces, and more than just ships, my only concern with the concept concerns the term "The 1,000-ship Navy." We need the global maritime network but nationally we need to promote our individual contributions to this international effort as a cross-government approach working hand-in-glove with other national non-government authorities and interests. In some countries the term may be misinterpreted and opinion may be alienated before the concept gets established.

The article correctly identifies the current sensitivities to the exchange of information and other issues, which have so far prevented regional dialogue from developing into effective regional coordination and action. Overcoming these regional difficulties is essential before we can move on to a more global approach. Pressure will need to be brought to bear from national concerns and the international community to break down these barriers to progress and to ensure that we invest in the security structures that we need-a small price to pay to ensure the freedom of the seas and the continued uninterrupted development of the global economy. Of course the resources that will be required to develop these international structures are in short supply and richer nations may need to give incentive to the concept by reaching into their pockets.

In summary-we need the global maritime network and I support the thrust of the article, however, our initial priority must be the development of effective regional structures involving more than just ships.

FOUO

August 30, 2006

5602

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith *DS*

RE: Snowflake Response - Memo on "Thousand Ship Navy" Concept (062906-19)

Sir,

The "1 000 Ship Navy" will be one aspect of the Maritime Strategy currently in development.

An ambitious communication plan has begun, and is being further refined, for the development of the Navy's Maritime Strategy. The plan calls for extensive Congressional and general public outreach, as well as an aggressive media program. Navy has assigned an O-6 public affairs officer, full time, to oversee development and execution of the communication plan.

Specifically, the Navy has begun a multi-step process which will actively engage operational experts, analysts and futurists in considering the challenges the Navy will face in the decades ahead. The CNO is interested in getting input from the leading citizens in communities around America, in what he calls a "conversation with the country". The concepts and themes associated with the 1000 Ship Navy will permeate the Maritime Strategy discussion.

Some of that work has already kicked off with the hosting of the Maritime Security Conference in Norfolk this month. Navy will conduct a Future of Maritime Strategy Conference and a European Seapower Symposium in October, as well as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in November.

30 Aug 06

Navy is also planning to host a number of more public engagements around the U.S. that will invite academics, businesspeople, community and political leaders to participate. Some proposed locations are Boston/Newport, New York, Chicago, San Francisco (or Monterey where the Naval Post-Graduate School is located), Seattle, Atlanta, and Miami. We anticipate 200-400 participants at each event. These symposia would not solicit input from the attendees, but it will also be an opportunity to increase the awareness of the community as a whole through news media coverage.

Additionally, there will be some more focused and intimate Maritime Strategy Executive Seminars at locations such as Stanford, Notre Dame and Georgetown. Anticipate 20-25 executive level attendees at those.

I have met with Admiral Mullen and with General Pace. We agree to work aggressively to raise the awareness of the 1000 ship Navy. OSD (PA) will look for opportunities, i.e. speech, event - in the near future for you to focus on the issue.

23 Nov 06

OSD 08742-06



11-L-0559/OSD/57809

8/30/2006 4 31 55 PM

**We also intend to generate much discussion in the national security/defense trade press and professional journals on this topic. The overall objective is to raise the subject of the need for a maritime strategy to the national agenda.**

Thorp/060830 - 1000 Ship Navy Snowflake response

~~FOUO~~

May 11, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Robert Rangel  
VADM Jim Stavridis  
Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Turning Over Detainees

I have to be briefed on how we are doing on detainees. Specifically, how are we doing on getting:

- Afghan detainees turned over to Afghanistan
- Iraqis turned over to Iraq
- GTMO detainees turned over to their untions
- Etc.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
05/13/06-06

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/26/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08743-06



6/2/2006 10:25:23 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57811

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

Iraq

May 10, 2006

TO: **GEN** George Casey  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT Coalition Countries in Iraq

I think it would be helpful if I started seeing a report on the number of coalition countries that have forces in Iraq in one way or another. I would like to know their plans to reduce or increase those forces, so we can track that over time and have a sense of it.

Thanks.

DIR dh  
051006-10

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/18/06*

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 08848-06

11-L-0559/OSD/57812



6/5/2006 12:58:30 PM

10 May 06

June 7, 2006

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Jim Haynes  
Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Loss of Data

Please see the attached memo from David Chu on the compromise of the personal data of active duty and reserve personnel.

After you have had a chance to son through it, please come back to me with a proposal as to what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks,

**Attach.** USD(P&R) memo to SD re: "Department of Veterans Affairs Data Loss Affects up to 2M Military" (OSD 08927-06)

DHR:dh  
060706-05 (15) doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 22, 2006*





PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

June 5, 2006, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSECDEF: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense

(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu*  
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) Data Loss Affects Up to 2M Military

- A laptop was stolen from an employee of DVA; it held data drawn from CD-ROMs (about 25M records) the employee took home. DVA reported that the loss affects veterans; it also appears to affect the presently-serving military.
- Based on matches of those 25M potentially-compromised records with DoD data, we identified matches for up to 1.1M active military, along with 420K Guard and 360K Selected Reserve -- 50% of active force and 90% of Selected Reserve.
- Numbers are not firm since DVA presently is unable to verify that the "problem" population (automated records the employee took home) is the same as that which DVA transmitted to us for SSN matching over the weekend. We will not have a firm number until DVA conveys its true "problem set" to us, perhaps tomorrow (Tuesday).
- DoD shares much data with DVA as the latter administers education programs (Montgomery GI Bill) and provides benefits reliant on in-service events (awards or campaigns) ... or in-service medical history. Data are encrypted prior to transfer or are sent over secured lines.
- We provide a "skeleton" record for every new accession, update it when a person comes on or off active duty, and again at the time of separation or retirement. The older the record, the richer the data set within the record.
- Such transfers began in November 2000, and continue. They are consistent with the President's Management Agenda which states: "...transition should be seamless from the veteran's perspective and could be made seamless through data sharing between VA and DoD, as well as within VA."
- I will update you as this develops. Aside from public affairs announcements being developed by DVA and DoD, the DVA plans to notify each person affected, by letter.

Prepared by: Bill Carr, Acting DUSD (MilPers Policy), OUSD-P&R, (b)(6)

MA SD	6/6	SMA DSD	
SA SD	6/6	SA DSD	
ENEC SEC	MOS	1745	6/6/06
ENR MA	8/15	STP DIR	



OSD 08927-08

15/0606 4 58 38 PM



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

June 5, 2006, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense

EPSECDEF: \_\_\_\_\_  
DEP  
*D. S. C. Chu*  
P&R (Signature and date)  
7/1/06

SUBJECT: Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) Data Loss Affects Up to 2M Military

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- I will update you as this develops. Aside from public affairs announcements being developed by DVA and DoD, the DVA plans to notify each person affected, by letter

Prepared by: Bill Carr, Acting DUSD (MilPers Policy), OUSD-P&R, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/57815



OSD 08927-06

6/5/2006 4:58:37 PM

June 4, 2006

TO: Steve Bucci

CC: VADM Jim Stavridis  
 CAPT Tom Mascolo  
 Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Brunei

*B. UNFI*

We should go to Brunei the next time we are out in this part of the world.

Thanks.

DIR:0  
060406-01 (TS).doc



*Please respond by*

*4 June 06*



June 5, 2006

000-71 SD

TO: Steve Bucci  
 CC: Cathy Mainardi  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Phone Call this Friday

I would like a 40-minute phone call with Terry Robbins and Tom Opferman this coming Friday morning. I don't think it will *take* that long, but I need to be able to have that much time in case it does.

Please tell them the subject is *the* agreement they sent me for Marcy.

Thanks.

LS1R:dk  
 060508-01 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 9, 2006*

5 JUN 06



June 5, 2006

Singapore

TO: Steve Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D  
SUBJECT Call Ambassador Harold (b)(6)

Please tickle a note for when I get back to Washington that I want to check (b)(6)

(b)(6) U.S. Ambassador to Singapore Harold. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060506-04 (15) doc



*Please respond by June 9, 2006*

5 JUN 06



June 5, 2006

TO: Peter Rodman  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Robert Wilkie  
Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: India and Nuclear Issue

INDIA

We better see what we can do about the India nuclear issue on the Hill.

Thanks.

131R db  
060506-08 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 22, 2006*

5 JUN 06



June 5.2006

383,6

TO: Gordon England

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ISAF Capturing Detainees

Someone is going to have to figure out what happens when ISAF *takes over* in Afghanistan and some NATO country captures somebody.

Who *do* they turn them over to - the Afghans? Us? Or do they keep them? It is particularly important if it is a high value target.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
06/05/06-09 (TS) doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 29, 2006*

5 JUN 06

Secretary

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC 20525



Homeland Security


206  
6/1

325

May 31, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld  
Department of Defense

Deputy Secretary Gordon England  
Department of Defense

FROM: Michael Chertoff   
Secretary

SUBJECT: DHS Readiness to Receive National Guard

The Department of Homeland Security has been working closely with the Department of Defense and the National Guard Bureau to plan OPERATION JUMP START. The collaboration between the Departments and the Bureau has been strong. On behalf of DHS, I want to reaffirm our appreciation of the support being extended by our colleagues at DOD and NGB to fulfill the mission set before us collectively by the President to secure our nation's borders.

Consistent with the original timetable, DHS delivered its Mission Requirements to DOD and NGB on May 17<sup>th</sup>. We currently await delivery of the DOD plan to meet these mission requirements. We recognize that this part of the planning process is complex and that the burden to complete troop-to-task analysis in a thoughtful and thorough fashion is a difficult one. We are pleased to report that while we have been awaiting delivery of that complete analysis, we and our DOD colleagues have continued to advance other elements of the deployment plan.

Fortunately, because many of the initial deployment roles involve either straightforward field planning functions or support roles, it is possible for the Border Patrol to swiftly integrate an initial National Guard deployment. As a result, we are pleased to report that DHS continues to stand ready to receive 2,500 Guard soldiers during the period of June 1-14, as quickly as they become available. We can ramp up to the full 6,000 over the following several weeks.

As is customary, DOD and NGB are leads on coordinating with the States on legal matters regarding Guard deployment. The Memoranda of Agreement with the States have been cleared by DHS, DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel, and the White House Counsel's Office. Please let us know if there is anything we can do to assist you in expediting this critical matter.

cc: Frances Fragos Townsend  
Homeland Security Advisor

08959-06 A-16  
3 of 3

www.dhs.gov

11-L-0559/OSD/57821

31 May 06

JUN 05 2006

325

TO: Honorable Michael Chertoff

CC: Gordon England  
Eric Edelman  
General Pete Pace  
Paul McHale  
LTG Steve Blum

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT National Guard to the Border

I received your note of May 31 concerning DHS's readiness to begin working with the National Guard troops on the border as soon as possible. I agree that cooperation between our Departments has been good. We are working hard to finalize plans for the initial deployment, consistent with the challenges imposed by the current lack of a supplemental funding bill.

As I am out of the country, Gordon England and Paul McHale will work with you and your staff to ensure that we present the best possible plan.

We look forward to working on this key mission with DHS.

Thanks.

Attach. 5/3 1/06 DHS memo to SD

DIR:JH  
060106-14 (TS).doc

5 Jun 06

31 May 06

OSD 08959-06



6/6/2006 1:36:34 AM

JUN 05 2006

TO: GEN B.B. Bell

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
ADM Fox Fallon  
Peter Rodman  
Richard Lawless

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Korean Issues

Thanks for your note concerning various Korean issues. it caught up with me as we were flying to Singapore.

I will probably not decide to have a bilateral with the Koreans, but your material is helpful as I prepare for the conference in general. I have passed it to the Policy team here to use in our briefings.

*100274*

Personally, I am not certain that mounting an effort to persuade North Korea not to test a missile is the right approach. It might simply encourage them to do so. I know the Washington interagency is wrestling with this now.

On the base remediation issue, I continue to Favor the "LaPorte Plan" - turn the bases over to the ROK. It is a decision that will need to go through the interagency, of course. I am awaiting a final recommendation from the Chairman and our Policy folks, who are working this in the interagency now.

Please continue to coordinate your material with Richard Lawless and the Policy team in the Pentagon, as I know you are.

We will look at the other issues you mentioned and continue to press on them.

Thanks.

*S. Janda*

DHR:dh  
06/06/20 (TS).doc



6/6/2006 11:59:12 AM

FOUO

JUN 05 2006

TO: **Honorable Joshua Bolton**  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Supplemental

Attached is some more information on the need for the supplemental, as we discussed.

Thanks.

Attach. *National Journal's CongressDailyPM*, "Lacking Needed Funds, Army Beings to Cut Rack Spending, Mag 31.2006

DHR:dh  
060306-17 (TS).doc

*1/8.01*



6/6/2006 1:47:07 AM

FOUO

*5 June 06*

... can almost expect this to happen periodically."

As of yet, they are rare enough that the only obvious parallel to the current allegations in the history of military law is My Lai itself. There, Mr. Eckhardt says the military-justice system proved its worth - pressing forward against the wishes of Congress, the president and some elements of the military. In others, however, experts see the pressures of the day impacting the proceedings.

After the Korean War, an American soldier freed from a Korean prisoner of war camp was prosecuted for being a communist sympathizer. "During the cold war, we didn't want soldiers to look like communists," says Elizabeth Hillman, a military-justice expert at Rutgers School of Law in Camden, N.J. "Today, we don't want our soldiers to look like terrorists."

The danger, she says, is in proceedings that become less about justice and more about the broader culture wars. "It's very hard for a justice system - civilian or military - to work when it is under so much pressure."

Though neither military investigation has been released yet, there are indications that they will take a hard line. Two weeks ago, Rep. John Murtha (D) of Pennsylvania, a critic of the war in Iraq, said one report would claim that marines had killed the civilians "in cold blood." Since then, several media reports have indicated that the probe will include at least one murder charge.

To some, the whole process has been an example of the system working correctly. Though the media accounts provided a catalyst for the investigations, "these things are helpful," says former judge advocate general Mr. Huffman. "We can't be everywhere."

"The onus is on the military to act quickly" once the allegations surface, he says.

Others, however, see the need for reform. There is no

position in the Department of Defense akin to an attorney general - someone whose job it is solely to follow up on credible allegations. Under the current system, investigations are convened by local commanders, who have many other duties - and perhaps conflict of interest.

Says Eugene Fidell, president of the National Institute for Military Justice: "The bar has been raised for the public's expectation of transparency."

National Journal's  
CongressDailyPM  
May 31, 2006

### 32. Lacking Needed Funds, Army Begins To Cut Back Spending

With House and Senate negotiations on the FY06 emergency supplemental spending bill still unresolved, the Army has started pinching pennies to make its funding for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan last until at least early July. The plan, according to an internal e-mail from Army Vice Chief of Staff Richard Cody, is to gradually restrict spending over the next few weeks, with options growing as dire as suspending recruitment efforts and postponing promotions if Congress does not send the supplemental to President Bush for signing before the July 4 congressional recess.

"These are painful actions but they are absolutely necessary in order to continue operations during the month of June," Cody wrote in an e-mail circulated last week, a copy of which was obtained by CongressDaily. "This measured response will provide appropriate controls on our spending of [operations and maintenance] resources and will minimize the impact on our mission." Resources, he said, should be spent on the "highest priority missions."

The service's operations and maintenance accounts for

FY06 now stand at \$5.6 billion, not including any budgetary reprogramming efforts. The Army expects to receive more than \$36 billion out of the \$92 billion-plus spending package for military operations and hurricane recovery efforts.

This week, Army leaders have been ordered to hold orders of any "non-critical" supply parts and postpone or cancel all non-essential travel, training and conferences. By Tuesday, the Army intends to put a freeze on all civilian hires. "You may continue recruiting efforts but cease all final offers of employment," Cody's e-mail said. If Congress does not pass the supplemental by June 15, the Army plans to release all temporary civilian employees performing operations and maintenance work, including depot workers. The service also will freeze all contract awards and suspend the use of government purchase cards. The longer the time before the supplemental is approved, the more ominous Cody's instructions become. Beginning June 26, the Army will have to release contract employees, including recruiters, "if doing so will not carry penalties or termination costs equal to or in excess of the cost of continuing the contract," according to the e-mail.

The service, Cody wrote, may retain "a minimum number of personnel performing mission-essential services." That week, Cody said he will demand a list of activities the Army would have to take in July to trim military personnel accounts. Those options should include delaying recruitments, deferring re-enlistments and freezing promotions.

"We are realists on the supplemental passing in June. [The] next backstop where Congress has to try to finish up is 4th [of] July," a senior military official said. "We hope it's in early June, but can't count on that." Last week,

House Appropriations Chairman Lewis said the Pentagon would accept delaying passage of the supplemental to early June. House and Senate appropriators still have not scheduled a formal conference meeting amid concerns in the House over Gulf Coast rebuilding and agriculture disaster aid sought by senators.

-- by Megan Scully

Los Angeles Times  
June 1, 2006

### 33. Corps Touts Fixed Levees As Storm Season Starts

By Times Wire Reports

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has met its goal of fixing battered levees around New Orleans as the new hurricane season starts, senior officials said.

Standing on a clay-and-dirt levee in St. Bernard Parish, which was inundated after Hurricane Katrina, Maj. Gen. Ronald Johnson said the Corps had repaired 169 miles of the 350-mile system.

"I think New Orleans can be confident in its hurricane protection system because it is better and it is stronger," Johnson said after a helicopter tour.

The hurricane season begins today.

Washington Post  
June 1, 2006  
Pg. B1

### 34. Marine Corps History Getting A Higher Profile

The \$140 million National Museum of the Marine Corps, a massive pyramid-like structure rising near Quantico along Interstate 95, is scheduled to open Nov. 10, a date already etched into its cornerstone.

On any given day, some 115 workers are dangling, rappelling and crawling all over the structure and the



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFORMATION MEMO

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUN 6 2006

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director of Administration and Management *MD*

SUBJECT: Third Weekly Update on Status of DoD Appropriations Act FY-2006  
Section 8098 Grants

- Section 8098 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act directed that Secretary of Defense award grants to 21 institutions (Tab A). Consistent with Capt. Munch's request of May 26, which is next under, Tab B lists each granted institution, the amount of the grant, and its purpose.
- We have Grant Program Officers (GPOs) identified from DoD Components and functional OSD staff offices for each of the grants. Delegations of authority to contracting offices with grant authorities have been issued in the case of all 21 grants. This closes those requirements out.
- Our contracting offices have requested grant proposals. These proposals are being received, so we are moving into formal negotiations on all grants. In the next phase, the terms of the grants will be specified and agreements reached.
- We are seeing benefits from involvement of Component representatives in the grant process. In addition to necessary visibility for the Components, the GPOs have helped to leverage advantages for the DoD from these grants. For example, the Museum of Flight grant will provide support for the "60" Anniversary of the Air Force" activities this Fall.
- We expected the Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space Foundation to be the first to receive award of their grant, but questions regarding their proposal have arisen. The Intrepid proposes to apply the entire \$3.85 million grant towards estimated pre-award costs. This is not acceptable, so our representatives are working with the Intrepid to resolve this issue. *I am looking into this. MD*
- We aim to complete the award of all grants by the end of July.
- I will continue to provide weekly status updates, reporting progress as grants are awarded.

cc:  
USD (C)  
ASD (LA)  
Dir, WHS

Coordination: None

Prepared by: Stephen J. Linder, O&MP, ODA & M (b)(6)

11-E-0559/OSD/37620

OSD 08986-06



6/6/2006 12:32:12 PM

Revised Dep Sec guidance  
on updates. AM  
05/26

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

26 May 2006 - 1410 Hours

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONLEY, DIRECTOR / A&M**


**SUBJECT: Status of DoD Appropriations Act FY-2006 Section 8098 Grants**

**Sir:**

The Deputy Secretary requests your next update include a description of each of the grants described in the attached memo, including the recipient, amount and purpose of the grant.

Please attach a copy of this memo to your reply. Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Military Assistant to  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:  
OSD 08048-06

Suspense: Week of 29 May 2006

5/19  
1430



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

*Handwritten:* FIE 5/17/06  
2740

**INFORMATION MEMO**

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM Michael B. Donley, Director of Administration and Management *MD*

MAY 17 2006

**SUBJECT: Status of DoD Appropriations Act FY-2006 Section 8098 Grants**

*Handwritten:* RR  
5/22

- Section **8098** of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act directed that DoD award **grants** to 21 institutions.
- On April 4, 2006, you delegated to me the authority and responsibility for administering these grants. In the package supporting this delegation, I committed to providing weekly updates (starting the week of May 15, 2006) on the **status** of our efforts to award these grants. This is the **first** of the **weekly** updates.
- Delegations of authority to contracting offices with grant authorities have been issued in the case of 20 of the 21 **grants**. The American Red Cross delegation is pending; we are **working** with them to identify their grant point of contact. All grant recipients have been contacted and dialog **is** underway.
- On April 18, 2006, I **tasked** the DoD Component Heads or OSD Principal Staff Assistants whose **mission** or function most closely aligned to that of the grant institutions to identify Grant **Program** Officers (GPOs) to **assist** the grant officer in overseeing the grants. To **date**, we have identified **GPOs** for **19** of the **21 grants**. We **are** engaged with staff in P&R to identify the GPO for **the** Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund Teach Vietnam Initiative; we **are** working with AT&L to identify the **GPO** for the Center for Applied Science and Technology, Jordan Valley Innovation Center.
- We **are** working to complete the award of all **grants** by the end of July.
- The first grant to be awarded will be for the Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space Foundation. P&R has provided a GPO for this grant. We anticipate **an** award date of June 15, 2006.
- I will continue to provide weekly **status** updates for your information.


cc:

USD (C)  
ASD (LA)

Coordination: None

Prepared by: Stephen J. Linder, O&MP, ODA&M (b)(6)

MA SD		SMA DSD	
<u>USA SD</u>	<i>MS/19</i>	SA DSD	<i>RE WMAH</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>MS/19</i>	<i>RIS</i>	<i>5/22/06</i>
ESR MA	<i>MS/19</i>	STP DIR	



# TAB

# A

Section 8098. In addition to the amounts appropriated or otherwise made available elsewhere in this Act, \$39,350,000 is hereby appropriated to the Department of Defense, concerning the following:

(a) \$3,500,000 to the Trepid Sea-Air-Space Foundation; \$1,000,000 to the Pentagon Fund, Inc.; \$4,400,000 to the Center for Applied Science and Technology at the Sandia National Laboratories; \$1,000,000 to the National Center for the Study of the Vietnam War; \$1,000,000 to the Veterans of Foreign Wars for America Memorial Foundation; \$2,000,000 to The Presidio Trust; \$500,000 to George Mason University for the Clinic for Legal Assistance to Servicemembers; \$850,000 to the Fort Leavenworth National Education Center; \$1,000,000 to the American Civil War Center; \$1,000,000 to the Museum of the American Revolution; \$1,000,000 to the National South Atlantic Foundation; \$2,500,000 to the United Negro College Fund; \$1,000,000 to the Dwight D. Eisenhower World Commission; \$1,000,000 to the Iraq Cultural Heritage Project; \$500,000 to the Red Cross Consolidated Blood Services Facility; \$150,000 to the Tallahassee Adaptive Sports Program; \$1,000,000 to T.H.A.N.K.S. (Texas Heritage and National Knowledge) to Restore and Preserve the Battle of San Jacinto; and \$1,000,000 to the Pennsylvania National Guard Armory.

**TAB**

**B**

<b>Granted Institution</b>	<b>Section 8098 Amount</b>	<b>Grant Purpose</b>
Westchester County World Trade Center Memorial	\$500,000	Construction of the memorial
Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission	61,700,000	Construction of the memorial
Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc.	\$1,000,000	Construction of the memorial
Women in Military Service for America Memorial Foundation	\$1,000,000	Operating expenses supporting the mission of the memorial
Museum of Flight American Heroes Collection	51,500,000	Educational exhibits
The Presidio Trust	\$2,000,000	Construction and restoration of the main parade field
Pennsylvania Veterans Museum Media Armory	\$1,000,000	Educational exhibits
Fort Des Moines Memorial Park and Education Center	\$850,000	Operational expenses and educational exhibits
American Civil War Center at Historic Tredegar	\$1,000,000	Educational exhibits
Pacific Aviation Museum - Pearl Harbor	\$1,350,000	Construction (environmental remediation and restoration of Ford Island facilities.)
Battleship Texas Foundation to Restore and Preserve the Battleship Texas	\$1,500,000	Construction funding for supporting facilities such as the memorial plaza, interpretive center and restored wharf
Center for Applied Science and Technologies at Jordan Valley Innovation Center	\$4,400,000	Construction of research facility
Iraq Cultural Heritage Assistance Project	\$1,000,000	Preservation/cataloging of artifacts recovered in 1930's archeological expedition in the ancient city of Kish; Hosting Iraqi museum curators for

		professional education
George Mason University for the Clinic for Legal Assistance to Service members	\$500,000	Operating expenses for legal support staff
Intrepid Sea Air Space Foundation	\$3,850,000	Operating expenses
Vietnam Veteran's Memorial Fund for the Teach Vietnam Initiative	\$1,000,000	Development and production of educational materials
National Guard Youth Foundation	\$1,000,000	Program activities for at risk youth
United Services Organization	\$2,550,000	Entertainment support for deployed U.S. military personnel
Red Cross Consolidated Blood Services Facility	\$1,500,000	Procurement of IT, administrative, and security and surveillance systems to support operations at the Consolidated Blood Services Facility Toledo
Telluride Adaptive sports Program	\$150,000	Program activities for disabled personnel engaged in outdoor activities
T.H.A.N.K.S.USA	\$4,000,000	Scholarships for families of U.S. military personnel serving on active duty during the period from Sept 11,2001, until the present

~~FOUO~~

May 26, 2006

TO: GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: GEN Doug Brown  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs and Psy Ops

I am confused about where the Active and Reserve components' Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations people currently are located. Could someone please explain it to me?

Thanks.

DHR:js  
052606-08

.....  
**Please Respond By 06/13/06**

~~FOUO~~

372

5642Y06

11-L-0559/OSD/57834



61112006 11:49:53 AM

~~FOUO~~

May 31, 2006

TO: Gordon England

CC: Michael Wynne  
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Use of airspace by UAVs

During my recent testimony on the Hill, the issue of deconflicting military UAV flights with civilian aircraft traffic in the United States was raised. I am told that the current FAA procedures are inflexible and a significant impediment to our ability to continue to expand the use and training of military UAVs.

I understand that a number of efforts are underway by the Air Force and others within the Department to obtain more flexibility from the FAA. However, I think it would be useful to take a look at whether the DoD end of this effort is properly resourced and enabled to accomplish the task. Given the tremendous investments we are making in UAVs and the increasing reliance on them for military operations, we must ensure that the U.S. regulatory framework governing their use similarly keeps pace.

Let me know what you find out and recommend as a way forward.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
053106-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/30/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57835



UNCLASSIFIED  
~~FOUO~~

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

07 June 2006 - 1700 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Use of Airspace by UAVs

Sir,

DSD requests that you prepare a response to the attached snowflake. Response should summarize current DoD initiatives in this area and a strategy to ensure Interagency/FAA buy-in.

Please provide a copy of this memo with your response.

Very Respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch  
CAPT, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE: 26 Jun 06  
ATTACHMENTS: As stated  
CC: SECAF, USD(AT&L)

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57836

OSD 09116-06



6/8/2006 8:46:42 AM

~~FOUO~~

May 31, 2006

TO: Gordon England  
cc: Michael Wynne  
Ken Krieg  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Use of airspace by UAVs

During my recent testimony on the Hill, the issue of deconflicting military UAV flights with civilian aircraft traffic in the United States was raised. I am told that the current FAA procedures are inflexible and a significant impediment to our ability to continue to expand the use and training of military UAVs.

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Let me know what you find out and recommend as a way forward.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
053106-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/30/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57837





OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-9999

INFO MEMO

MCM-005-06  
25 July 2006

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, JCS  
For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

*MMS 7/24/06*

SUBJECT: Use of Airspace by UAVs (SF 053106-01)

In response to your issue (TAB), there are significant impediments to our ability to fly unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in national airspace. Currently the FAA grants the certificates of authorization for DOD access to the national airspace. However, this process, which averages at least 60 days for DOD UAS, is increasingly cumbersome and unresponsive to current growth and training requirements. A permanent solution will require technology development, manning, and funding.

- UAS integration into the national airspace cuts across three primary DOD organizations: the Joint UAS Center of Excellence works operational issues; the Policy Board on Federal Aviation addresses policy issues; and OUSD(AT&L) works standards and technology challenges. However, no single organization has been designated as the lead for UAS integration.
- Governance and responsive policy development are required. The three aforementioned organizations and the Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Material Review Board will meet in August and recommend an appropriate DOD lead organization as well as the resources required to coordinate and implement unmanned flying in our Nation's airspace.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

OSD 09116-06



7/25/2006 4:40:11 PM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57838

TAB A  
UNCLASSIFIED  
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Military Assistant

07 June 2006 - 1700 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Joint Staff

SUBJECT Use of Airspace by UAVs

Sir,

DSD requests that you prepare a response to the attached snowflake. Response should summarize current DoD initiatives in this area and a strategy to ensure Interagency/FAA buy-in.

Please provide a copy of this memo with your response.

Very Respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch  
CAPT, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE 26 Jun 06  
ATTACHMENTS: As stated  
CC SECAF, USD(AT&L)

Tab A

OSD 09116-06



5/8/2008 8:46:42 AM

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57839

~~FOUO~~

May 31, 2006

TO: Gordon England

CC: Michael Wynne  
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Use of airspace by UAVs

During my recent testimony on the Hill, the issue of deconflicting military UAV flights with civilian aircraft traffic in the United States was raised. I am told that the current FAA procedures are inflexible and a significant impediment to our ability to continue to expand the use and training of military UAVs.

I understand that a number of efforts are underway by the Air Force and others within the Department to obtain more flexibility from the FAA. However, I think it would be useful to take a look at whether the DoD end of this effort is properly resourced and enabled to accomplish the task. Given the tremendous investments we are making in UAVs and the increasing reliance on them for military operations, we must ensure that the U.S. regulatory framework governing their use similarly keeps pace.

Let me know what you find out and recommend as a way forward.

Thanks.

OSD-06  
053106-01

\*\*\*\*\*

*Please Respond By 06/30/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09116-06



7/25/2006 4:41:08 PM

Tab A

# UNCLASSIFIED

## TAB B

### COORDINATION

USA	COL Strong	6 July 2006
USN	CAPT Wode	29 June 2006
USAF	Col <b>Parks</b>	7 July 2006
USMC	Col Haines	6 July 2006
USJFCOM	Mr. Laird	6 July 2006
USNORTHCOM	COL Hill	6 July 2006

Tab B

# UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/57841

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Gordon England

SUBJECT: Use of Airspace by UAVs

*[Handwritten signature]*  
7/28

452 R

Don,

The FAA's current process for deconflicting airspace for UAVs is indeed cumbersome. UAV-airspace integration cuts across three DoD organizations:

- Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence (operational issues)
- Policy Board on Federal Aviation (policy issues)
- AT&L (standards and technology challenges)

These three organizations and the Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Material Review Board will meet in August to recommend a lead DoD organization and identify the resources required for implementation.

Will keep you posted on this and the resources challenges that lie ahead.

28 Jul 06

31 May 06

11-L-0559/OSD/57842



OSD 09118-06

7/31/2006 9:10:34 AM

~~FOUO~~

June 7, 2006

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Somalia

Please get a briefing on what is going on in Somalia and be prepared to let me know. I am in the blind.

Thanks.

DER:dh  
060706-18 CFS.doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 15, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57843



6/8/2006 3:38:43 PM

~~FOUO~~

May 09, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
SUBJECT Codifying Security Agreement with Iraq

Please think through this issue of who should codify whatever agreement we come to with the new Iraqi government concerning our way forward on transferring security responsibilities.

On a couple of occasions, George Casey has said he thought someone from here -- probably you, me, Gordon England, or somebody -- ought to go out there and sign something and maybe have a Brit with us, so it gets codified.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050906-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/25/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57844



OSD 09136-06

6/8/2006 10 15 33 AM

JUN 06 2006

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

FOUSD(P) JUN 08 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *6/6/06*

SUBJECT: Codifying Security Agreement with Iraq

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked for thoughts on “who should codify whatever agreement we come to” with the Government of Iraq (GoI) concerning transferring security responsibilities.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Since the document concerns the transfer of security responsibility from Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) to the GoI, one option would be to authorize GEN Casey, as the commander of MNF-I, to sign the document.
  - Before the document is signed, its language should be agreed upon within the US Government and among our MNF-I partners.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ A preferable alternative would be for the Senior Principals’ Group of the Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility to sign the document. The following are members of the Senior Principals’ Group:
 

The Iraqi National Security Advisor	UK Ambassador Patey
The Iraqi Minister of Defense	GEN Casey
The Iraqi Minister of Interior	UK LTG Fry
Ambassador Khalilzad	

  - This would ensure personal buy-in from the relevant Iraqi ministers and it would also underscore that the conditions include political and governance elements.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ If the signing is part of a larger “national reconciliation” or “cessation of hostilities” event, it would be appropriate for higher-level officials representing the USG and other Coalition governments to participate.
  - The level of representation would depend on the extent to which the reconciliation appeared to signal a definitive end to the conflict.
  - In that case, you and/or Secretary Rice, with your counterparts from Britain and other Coalition partners, might be the appropriate representatives to travel to Iraq for the signing.

Prepared by: Shawn Steene, ISA/NESA-NG (b)(6)




6/8/2006 10:16:02 AM



UNCLASSIFIED

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

Subject: Codifying Security Agreement with Iraq  
I-Number: I-06/005073

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
PDASD ISA	 Mary Beth Long	<u>6/6/06</u>
Principal Director (NESA)	 Brig. Gen. Thornhill	<u>1 June 06</u>
Director, NESA-NG	 John Trigilio	<u>1 June 06</u>
Deputy General Counsel / OGC	Dan Dell'Orto	31 May 2006
Iraq Div. Chief / JCS J-5	COL Keith Walker	01 June 2006

UNCLASSIFIED  
11-L-0559/OSD/57846

~~FOUO~~

May 09, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: Codifying Security Agreement with Iraq

Please *think through this issue* of who should codify whatever agreement we come to with the new Iraqi government concerning *our* way forward on transferring security responsibilities.

On a couple *of* occasions, George Casey has said he thought someone from here -- probably you, me, Gordon England, or somebody -- *ought* to go out there and sign something and maybe have a Brit with *us*, *so* it gets codified.

Thanks.

DHR:ab  
050906-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/25/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57847

~~FOUO~~

May 23, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Phil Merrill

Here's a note indicating Phil Merrill is interested in coming back to government. He has done a lot of things. You probably know him, he is a friend of the Vice President's.

Do you have any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach: 5/23/06 Note from Larry DiRita to SecDef

DIR:as  
092306-18

.....  
*Please Respond By June 13, 2006*

~~FOUO~~



6/8/2006 10 18 47AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57848

(b)(6)

**From:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 23, 2006 2:08 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Rangel, Robert S, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** Pls Pass to SecDef..txt

I was speaking with phil merrill today about something.

During the conversation, he resmphasized just how prepared he is to get back into government into just about any assignment that made sense.

He might be worth thinking about in the context of that Policy shop reorganization that you and edelman/henry have been worrying through

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

USD(P) *copy provided*  
JUN 06 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *R. Henry* JUN 07 2006

SUBJECT: Phil Merrill

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on Phil Merrill returning to government (next under).
- We feel that we have identified a good position for him as director of the Defense Technology and Security Administration (DTSA).
- We look forward to discussing our rationale for why Phil Merrill is a good fit for this position during our next briefing to you on OSD Policy reorganization.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment: None.

Prepared by: John Geis, PDUSSDP, (b)(6)

OSD 09138-06



6/8/2006 10:19:18 AM



\* 0 6 / 0 0 6 7 3 9 - E S \*

UNCLASSIFIED

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Military Assistant**

08 June 2006 - 1100

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)

SUBJECT: DoD personnel in Uzbekistan

Sir,

“DSD request that you provide an information memo on U.S. DoD personnel in Uzbekistan to include number of personnel, their roles and mission. This will be routed through him to SECDEF. Many thanks!”

Please provide a copy of this memo with your reply.

Very Respectfully,

  
Russell L. Mack  
Lt Col, USAF  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

CC:

SUSPENSE: 6/16/2006

OSD 09142-06



618120063.07:51 PM

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/57851

~~FOUO~~

7 June 06  
1513

June 7, 2006

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Personnel in Uzbekistan

Please find out how many U.S. DoD personnel are currently in Uzbekistan. It seems to me we ought to get a grip on the numbers, what their functions are, and whether we are comfortable having them in those roles.

Thanks.

DJR:dh  
060706-12 (TS) ddc

.....  
*Please respond by June 29, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09142-06



6/8/2006 07:50 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57852

~~FOUO~~

June 7, 2006

TO: Liz Phu  
CC: Peter Rodman  
BGen John Allen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Good Job in Southeast Asia

Liz, your work was impressive and certainly contributed a great deal to a successful trip. Thanks for all you are doing.

DIR DA  
060706-06 (TS) doc

.....

■

OSD 09143-06



6/8/2006 3:36:48 PM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57853

June 1, 2006

TO: Tom Wedige  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT Defense Telephone Link Members

Thanks for this sheet on direct telephone links. Why do we have one with Austria?

What do the two ones marked "classified" mean?

Thanks.

Attach. Jan 2005 "Current Defense Telephone Link Members"

D:\FR\dh  
N0106-25 (TS) doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 15, 2006*

~~FOUO~~



6/8/2006 3:41:46 PM


You asked how many of these we have

Jan 2005

have

# SECDEF COMMUNICATIONS

## Current Defense Telephone Link Members




~~FOUO~~

June 8.2006

000.5

TO: LTG Stan McChrystal

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
GEN John Abizaid  
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Congratulations

Congratulations on completing the mission on Zarqawi, one of the most dangerous of our enemies.

You have done extraordinary work in one of the most important jobs in this Department. Keep up the great work and please extend my congratulations to your team.

DHR:js  
(060606)07:15:10

8 Jun 06

OSD 09230-06



6/9/2006 7:49:07 AM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57856

FAX

(b)(6)

JUN 09 2006

TO: Nancy Pardo  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: *An Army at Dawn*

107

Please get me a copy of the book: *An Army at Dawn* by Rick Atkinson. I think it mentions François de Rose.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060806-01 (1S).doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 29, 2006*



6/9/2006 11:33:07 AM

0012406

11-L-0559/OSD/57857

~~FOUO~~

JUN 09 2006

IRAQ

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
 CC: Dorrance Smith  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Outreach by Iraqis and Afghans

Members of Congress seem convinced that one of the most useful things we could do would be to get Iraqis and Afghans to come to the U.S. and speak this summer and fall across the country - at Rotary Clubs, churches, and other gatherings.

Why don't you try to drum up a program? Some of it was done a couple of years ago by the Department of State. I heard a couple of young women speak and POTUS nict with Iraqis with their hands chopped off. They were terrific. It could make a difference.

Thanks.

DJH,da  
 060105-13 (15) doc



61912006 11:59:51 AM

9JUN06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57858

JUN 09 2008

TO: Ambassador Toria Nuland  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ambassador David Litt

NATO 230

I passed a note to Jaap during the lunch and then talked to him about David Litt. His response was. "He is very, very well qualified, but this is going to be a hard one for me."

I made a conscious decision not to say it in front of all the ministers. Let's keep working it. Let me know what else I should do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
000006-11 (15) dsc

qjuno6



6/9/2008 2:06:57 PM

~~FOUO~~

April 19, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Implementing Kicklighter Studies

I talked to Steve Hadley about this note on Kicklighter. His people (meaning Meghan and Kevin, I suppose) have the impression that State and Defense have different ~~views~~ about ~~what~~ the transition in Iraq is about.

Please look into that and tell me ~~what~~ you find out

Thanks.

Attach. 4/5/06 Memo on Kicklighter Studies

DHR,db  
041906-24

.....  
*Please Respond By May 11, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57860



~~FOUO~~

April 05, 2006

SUBJECT Kicklighter Studies

I have to talk to Steve Hadley about who is going to implement the Kicklighter studies and how we get State to agree to allow Kicklighter to get into all the areas, since unless all the threads come through the needle head, it will not work. There's no way we can push that wet noodle from the Department of Defense.

DHR:as  
040506-07

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57861

JUN 8 2006

DSD —  
 I-06/004 945  
 3 DR JUN 8 2006  
 FOUO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*W. M. B. ... 6/6/06*  
 FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Kicklighter Studies

- You asked about talking to Steve Hadley regarding who is going to implement the Kicklighter studies and how to get State to agree to permit GEN Kicklighter access to all areas.
- The Kicklighter effort is at a critical juncture. State wants to revisit Kicklighter's role and narrow the scope of his tasks (attached is a draft of State's proposed revised agreement concerning the future of the Kicklighter effort).
  - NSC staff is aware of State's interest in modifying the scope of the Kicklighter effort and has proposed that it be integrated into existing interagency working groups on Iraq and Afghanistan.
- We see two general alternatives: 1) continue his effort as a joint one with State and seek its agreement to support his having broad access to Iraq and Afghan programs; or, 2) agree to a revised Kicklighter plan and terminate the joint effort after Kicklighter completes those tasks both State and the Department agree upon (including an implementation plan), and then examine whether Kicklighter's team should be absorbed into a Department or other effort to continue certain tasks.
- We are available to discuss options as your schedule permits.
  - GEN Kicklighter recently returned from a Doha meeting where he met with U.S. military and State representatives working on building the police programs in Afghanistan and Iraq. We can backbrief you on that effort, as well.

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57862



6/9/2006 12:02:04 PM

Dear General Kicklighter

We have enjoyed your comprehensive briefings about your team's work in Afghanistan and Iraq, and your views on the entire gamut of State-Defense activities and transition challenges. We are passing on your briefing to our embassies and various offices. Your briefing was a good chance to take a wide view of our efforts. That was a valuable service, and we are grateful to you and your team. We would both welcome still more of your help.

Your team has effectively completed Phase One of its planned work. For Phase Two, we both would welcome analysis of the following topics:

- Standup of an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq and the eventual transition from MNSTC-I.
- Future management and transition of the "International Zone" and its security arrangements.
- Estimates of likely Iraqi needs, at least through CY 2009, for outside financial assistance or direct budget support to acquire, operate, and maintain appropriate armed forces, national police, and detention facilities.
- Estimates for an FMF package appropriate to the situations we would face in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
- For Afghanistan, views on the future of the PRTs in the increasingly complex, multinational environment.

Again, thank you for the contribution you and your team have already made to planning the way forward. We look forward to Phase Two.

/s/ Condoleezza Rice

/s/ Donald Rumsfeld

~~FOUO~~

MAY 18 2006

TO: Michael Wynne  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cannon Air Force Base

In the hearing, Senator Domenici asked me about Cannon Air Force Base. How are we doing?

When do you think we will have a decision on that?

Thanks.

DRM:R  
05/18/06

.....  
*Please Respond By June 01, 2006*

~~FOUO~~



6/9/2006 12:11:09 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57864

Questions of Senator Pete V. Domenici for a Hearing before the Senate  
Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, May 17, 2006

Cannon Air Force Base

As you know, in the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report, Cannon Air Force Base was given "enclave" status and the Department of Defense was instructed to search for a new mission for the base. In March, an information workshop regarding Cannon Air Force Base was held to provide interested Federal agencies with the opportunity to consider potential use of the installation's facilities, infrastructure, and resources.

1. Please update me on the Department of Defense's long term plan for Cannon Air Force Base and your efforts to find a new mission for the base.

A: The Air Force is at step seven of an eight-step process to evaluate Cannon Air Force Base for a possible new mission. They prepared an extensive database of the assets at Cannon, conducted reviews and site visits, and used a commercial-type real estate prospectus to generate interest among other Federal Agencies. The Air Force also conducted a Federal workshop in March. They are now evaluating a proposal for a possible new mission. The Air Force will complete its analysis in late spring, and come to me with a recommendation in mid-summer. The department has worked closely with the New Mexico delegation, and state and local officials throughout this evaluation process - and will continue to do so.



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

07 JUN 2006

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT: Cannon Air Force Base

- SECDEF asked SECAF for the status of how the Air Force is doing with Cannon Air Force Base (AFB) and when the Air Force will have a decision on a mission for Cannon
- The Air Force is on track with the eight-step mission search for Cannon AFB
- Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is the only organization that has indicated interest to date
- Cut off for submission of indication of interest was 31 May 2006
- The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations, Environment and Logistics), SAF/IE will receive the final AFSOC brief on 2 June 2006 (after SOCOM coordination)
- SAF/IE will be prepared to brief the SECAF and CSAF the week of 5 June 2006
- SECDEF will be briefed on the AF proposed plan by June 30, 2006
- The plan will call for a simultaneous release to the New Mexico delegations and to the concerned citizens of the Cannon AFB communities

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Stephen P. Mallott, SAF/IEI PMO, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/57866



ARR200612 10 50 PM

~~FOUO~~

May 03,2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Visits to War Colleges

Here is a note back from David Chu on war colleges. Why don't you folks take a look at it and think through what we ought to do.

Thanks

Attach. 4/27/06 USD(P&R) memo to SD re: Visits to War Colleges (OSD 06877-06), SF #011906-12

DHR dh  
050306-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/08/06*

~~FOUO~~



6/9/2006 12:58:56 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57867

11267



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

5/3

INFO MEMO

April 27, 2006 - 2:00 PM

Robe

301  
RR →  
S/1

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Visits to War Colleges — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- It would be very useful to plan on visiting each of the war colleges once a year.
- The officers in the senior class (05s and 06s) will be commanding the battalions, squadrons, and ships that are on the front line in the Global War on Terror.
- They will benefit immensely from hearing the strategic perspective directly from you, and the tasks you would like them to address.
- You, in turn, will be able to hear their concerns.
- Feedback from the Army War College visit indicates that your prepared **remarks** were "exactly right", and resonated with the students.
- But you will get a better dialogue with the students in the future if the session is "off the record/non-attribution" (i.e., no press). *(Handwritten initials in a circle)*
- This is the standard format for Department speakers at the war colleges, and encourages an open dialogue.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

OSD 06877-06

11-L-0559/OSD/57868

**FOUO**

January 19, 2006

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: War Colleges

Please think through how we can better use the war colleges. Should I go *speak* there more often? Should we have them get assigned tasks from us, so that they are more real world?

Thanks.

DHR:m  
011906-12

.....  
*Please Respond By 02/14/06*

*DR  
5/4*

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

MAY 02 2006

**FOUO**

OSD 06877-06  
  
4/28/2006 7:25:56 AM

513112006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith   
SUBJECT: Dr. Chu's memo on war colleges  
Snowflake#050306-01

It is a good idea to visit the war colleges and underscore the messages of the global war on terrorism and the military of the future.

You have visited the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA and are scheduled to visit the Navy's in Newport, RI, in August.

I recommend adding Maxwell AFB to your October trips to Kansas (Ft Riley/Eisenhower Museum) or to Miami (Change of Command).

Quantico could be an easy day trip in the fall since the school year is winding down now.

\*\*\*\*\*Summary\*<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup>

Army	Carlisle War Barracks, PA	3/06	Completed
Navy	Newport, RI	8/06	On Schedule
Air Force	Maxwell AFB, AL	10106	Proposed
Marines	Quantico, VA	TBD	

OSD 09323-06



6/9/2006 12:58:56 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57870

~~FOUO~~

May 03, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Visits to ~~War~~ Colleges

Here is a note back from David Chu on war colleges. Why don't you folks take a look at it and think through what we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach. 4/27/06 USD(P&R) memo to SD re: Visits to ~~War~~ Colleges (OSD 06877-06), SF #011906-12

DHR:dh  
050306-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/08/06*

~~FOUO~~



6/9/2006 12:58:56 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/57871

11:28  
15207



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

5/3

INFO MEMO

April 27, 2006 - 2:00 PM

Robe:

301  
RA  
5/1

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu*  
27 April 2006

SUBJECT: Visits to War Colleges--SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- It would be very useful to plan on visiting each of the war colleges once a year.
- The officers in the senior class (05s and 06s) will be commanding the battalions, squadrons, and ships that are on the front line in the Global War on Terror.
- They will benefit immensely from hearing the strategic perspective directly from you, and the tasks you would like them to address.
- You, in turn, will be able to hear their concerns.
- Feedback from the Army War College visit indicates that your prepared remarks were "exactly right", and resonated with the students.
- But you will get a better dialogue with the students in the future if the session is "off the record/non-attribution" (i.e., no press).
- This is the standard format for Department speakers at the war colleges, and encourages an open dialogue.

*(Handwritten initials)*

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

FORM 887

OSD 06877-06

11-L-0559/OSD/57872

~~FOUO~~

January 19, 2006

TO David Chu  
CC Gordon England  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: ~~War~~ Colleges

Please *think through* how we *can* *offer* use the war colleges. Should I go speak there more often? Should we have them get assigned tasks from us, so that they are more real world?

Thanks.

DHR:aa  
011906-12

.....  
Please Respond By 02/14/06

*DR*  
*5/4*

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED


MAY 02 2006

~~FOUO~~

OSD 06877-06  
4/28/2006 7:26:56 AM

FOUO

June 9, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command

While in Hanoi, I spent a little time getting a brief from **our** team that is working throughout Vietnam, as well as Laos and Cambodia, to achieve the fullest possible accounting of all missing American service members. They have found the remains of many of **our** people in a variety of locations throughout Vietnam.

704

When you got to Hanoi for the APEC in November, you might want to drop by their headquarters and take the brief – it is about 30 minutes.

Attached is a flyer that tells a little about their work.

Respectfully,

Attach. Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC)

DHR:dh  
060706-01 (TS).doc




9 June 06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57874

# JOINT POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC)



est. Oct. 1, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD

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# Mission and History



The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), located on the island of Oahu in Hawaii, was activated on Oct. 1, 2003. JPAC's mission is to achieve the fullest possible accounting of all Americans missing as a result of our nation's previous conflicts. **Our** highest priority is the return of any living Americans that remain prisoners of war.

JPAC was created from the merger of the 30-year-old U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, and the 11-year-old Joint Task Force - Full Accounting. This 425-person organization, commanded by a flag officer, is committed and dedicated to bringing home the nation's service members and civilians who made the ultimate sacrifice.

PAC recognizes that the efforts and involvement of our POW/MIA families contribute significantly to our success. PAC owes a great deal of gratitude to the families and veterans who support our mission.

We are a jointly manned unit with handpicked Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines with specialized skills and Department of the Navy civilians who make up about 25 percent of the organization. The laboratory portion of PAC, referred to as the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL), is the largest forensic anthropology laboratory in the world.

Our mission is daunting, with approximately 78,000 Americans missing from World War II (of those, an estimated 35,000 are deemed recoverable, with the others lost at sea or entombed in sunken vessels), 8,100 missing from the Korean War, 1,800 missing from the Vietnam War, 120 missing from the Cold War, and one serviceman missing from the Gulf War.

To accomplish its mission, JPAC is organized to support five main areas: analysis, negotiations, investigations, recovery and identification.



---

# Analysis



*Photo by Sgt. Richard M. Ho*

*A casualty data analyst pulls a case file from the records room.*

The search process begins with historians and analysts gathering information from multiple sources and is primarily archival in nature. Information regarding POW/MIAs comes from multiple sources, including unaccounted-for personnel records, outsider researchers, the national archives, and record depositories maintained by foreign governments. In addition, veterans, historians and amateur researchers are interviewed regularly. In some cases, families of missing Americans provide information such as pre-war medical or dental records.

Researchers then create a loss incident case tile for each unaccounted-for individual which includes: general and specific histories from each conflict, archival documents from each of the service branches, official correspondence, maps, photographs, unit histories, records of the daily activities of servicemen in the field, and military medical and personnel records of the missing individual.

Once the background work is concluded, analysts provide the operations and laboratory sections of JPAC with information regarding the loss. An investigative or recovery team then deploys with an understanding of the location, including any material evidence or unexploded ordnance at the site. They are also briefed on the individuals associated with the incident and the circumstances surrounding the incident, and any local witnesses who may be able to provide additional details. The analysis is an ongoing process as new information is continuously added to each file, and which will continue until the individual has been accounted-for. In addition to conducting research to support ongoing field activities, the research/intelligence section also provides historical analyses to help with the identification of remains obtained in unilateral turnovers from foreign governments.

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# Negotiations

**J**PAC routinely carries out technical negotiations and talks with representatives of foreign governments, including Russia, **Germany France**, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, China, Papua New Guinea, Burma, and other nations, in order to ensure positive **in-country** conditions are created for JPAC investigative and recovery operations.

**J**PAC works closely with other U.S. agencies involved in the POW/MIA issue such as the Department of State, the Joint **Staff**, Office of Secretary of Defense/Personnel and Readiness, U. S. Pacific Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, and Armed Forces Institute of Pathology as well as other agencies as **required**.

# Investigations

Field investigative teams deploy to locations around the world with three primary goals. The first goal is to document and survey potential recovery sites so that recovery **teams** have the **most** accurate and up-to-date information about a case prior to their arrival. These **sites** include locations previously identified by archival research, as well as leads from investigations conducted by the host country (unilateral investigations). Secondly, teams try to generate new **leads** that may result in future recoveries. Investigators operating in countries with media or a strong community network often gain new,



*A JPAC team member repels down the side of a mountain in Phou Pha Thi, Laos.*

---

valuable information about additional sites simply by being on site and talking with individuals. Finally, investigative teams assist in the planning of future recovery selections. The recommendation by the investigative team, which has physically been to the potential crash or burial site, is crucial in the recovery process.

JPAC maintains six investigative teams consisting of four to nine members with specialized skills, including a team leader, assistant team leader, analyst, linguist, and a medic. In some instances an anthropologist, explosive ordnance technician, and/or a life support technician will augment the team. The investigative teams, normally deploying 35 days at a time,



*A local man from Jilin Province, China, who witnessed the crash of an aircraft some 50 years ago, describes the suspected crash site area to a JPAC team member.*

act independently of a normal recovery operation, interviewing potential witnesses, conducting on-site reconnaissance, and surveying terrain for safety and logistical concerns. The goal is to obtain enough information to correlate or connect a particular site with an MIA, at which time the

site may be recommended for recovery.

Until analysis is complete and a determination is made that a recovery is feasible, a case is classified as requiring further investigation. This may occur in instances where the case has safety concerns, further witness information is required or additional documentation is needed.

Investigative teams are part of the standard joint field activities conducted in Southeast Asia and joint recovery operations in North Korea. Additionally, PAC sends out investigative teams worldwide to such places as Palau, Papua New Guinea, and South Korea along with Russia, Germany and France. JPAC is assisted with investigations in Southeast Asia by representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Stony Beach.

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# Recovery


All cases recommended for recovery have been previously investigated by JPAC. Once adequate information has been collected and analyzed, the intelligence, operations, and laboratory sections make recommendations as to whether or not to pursue a recovery. Most often, these cases have firm locations, and in some cases remains have been determined to be present at the site.

Other factors such as weather, terrain challenges, site accessibility, and various logistical and operational concerns help to determine the planning and staging of recoveries. If a site is determined to be in jeopardy (due to

urbanization, environmental, regulatory, or political issues beyond the control of JPAC), a recovery is recommended so the site is not lost.

JPAC has 18 recovery teams - ten teams dedicated to those missing from the war in Southeast Asia, five teams dedicated to the Korean War missing and three teams to recovering missing Americans from World War II, the Cold War and the Gulf War.

A typical recovery team size is 10 to 14 personnel, and is commanded by the team leader. He is responsible for the operation, safety and welfare of his team. His command group includes a team sergeant (typically an Army sergeant first class trained in the field of mortuary affairs) and a forensic anthropologist (the only civilian team member) who oversees the scientific aspects of the recovery.



*An anthropologist examines a boot found at an excavation site in Vietnam.*



*A team member digs at an excavation site in Laos.*

Additional team members include a **linguist**, medic, life support technician, forensic photographer, explosive ordnance disposal technician, and several mortuary affairs specialists. As the mission dictates, the teams will be augmented with mountaineering specialists, communication technicians and mechanics.


**Standard** recovery missions range from **35** to **60** days depending on the location, terrain and recovery methods. Recovery teams use standard field archaeology methods in the excavation as dictated by the anthropologist. Teams either set up base camps adjacent to the recovery

area or stay at a nearby guesthouse or hotel.

Teams walk through jungles, traverse difficult terrain in 4 x 4 vehicles, rappel cliff-sides, hike mountains and glaciers, ride on horseback, in boats, or trains to reach sites. The most common method of reaching remote sites is via helicopter. Teams travel with up to 10,000 pounds in survival and excavation equipment, **making** transport difficult.

JPAC has three forward deployed detachments for command and control, each commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The detachments assist with logistics and support, and are located in Bangkok (Thailand), Hanoi (Vietnam) and Vientiane (Laos). A fourth roving detachment is maintained for command **and** control of all other geographical areas.

In order to facilitate ready support to teams, JPAC **maintains** eight storage facilities in Hawaii, Thailand, Vietnam, Germany, Laos, North Korea **and** (two) in **Papua** New Guinea. Having these facilities strategically placed around the world saves the cost of shipping, and more importantly, provides ready access to supplies for teams in remote locations. The equipment necessary to support a recovery mission is extensive, from



*Varying environmental conditions make it imperative that teams have all required equipment and supplies.*

generators, wet-screening stations, tents, and medical supplies, to batteries, bottled water, eating utensils, and **film**. Recovery teams also work closely with host nation officials to determine the number of local workers needed at a recovery site and any additional equipment that may be required. The number of local workers can range anywhere from **10 to** more than 100.

The recovery process is best described as physically **painstaking**, sweaty, arduous and meticulous due to the terrain, climate and the need to implement scientific recovery procedures. The anthropologist, typically with a doctorate in forensic archaeology (excavating human **remains**) and/or forensic anthropology (identifying human **remains**), *directs* the excavation at a recovery site much like a detective oversees a crime scene. They develop the manner in which all operations will proceed, including the extent of the excavation area, depth of digging, and the techniques employed

Other specialists **are** critical in processing the site. The explosive ordnance disposal technician conducts searches for buried metal, and the life-support technicians (primarily Air Force and Navy enlisted personnel) analyze the life support evidence in the field.

The site **is** initially sectioned into **4 x 4** meter **grids** for excavation. Each ounce of soil is sifted through quarter-inch wire screens. When dictated by the environment or soil conditions, teams employ wet-screening techniques, where all soil/mud is washed through wire mesh with high-pressure hoses. Wire screens allow the team members to catch the **smallest** portion of remains, artifacts, or personal effects.

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
Recovery sites have been as small as a few meters for individual burials in North Korea, to areas exceeding the size of a football field for aircraft crashes in places such as Vietnam and



*Photo by Sgt. Christine Patti*

***An aerial view of an excavation site in Vietnam.***

Cambodia. The variable terrain encountered by recovery teams has included rice paddies in Southeast Asia, frozen ground in the Korean Peninsula, cliff sides in Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, 16,000 foot mountaintops in the Himalayas, and underwater sites off the coasts of Tunisia and England.



***Remains recovered from Southeast Asia are escorted to JPAC's Central Identification Laboratory.***

Repatriation ceremonies are conducted to honor the sacrifice made by those individuals whose remains have been recovered. As a sign of respect, the remains are placed into an aluminum transfer case and draped with a U.S. flag. An arrival ceremony is held in Hawaii with a joint service honor

*guard* and senior officers from each service. Veterans, community members and local active-duty military often attend the ceremonies to pay their respects as the remains are transported from a U.S. *military* plane to PAC's CIL.


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# Identification

Upon arrival at the laboratory, all **remains** and artifacts are assigned an accession number, signed over to the custody of the CIL and stored in a secure area during all stages of analysis. A small percentage of PAC personnel have access to the remains to **maintain** the highest level of **security**, and all access to the remains is carefully monitored.

A variety of techniques are used to establish the identification of missing Americans. The tools include analysis of skeletal and dental remains, mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), material evidence, personal effects and life-support equipment. The PAC scientific director, who maintains control over the entire identification process, evaluates these overlapping lines of evidence.

The CIL's staff of forensic anthropologists examines all recovered skeletal remains in order to produce a "biological profile." This profile includes the sex, race, age at death, and height of the individual. Anthropologists also analyze any trauma caused at or near the time of death and pathological conditions of bone such as arthritis or previous (healed) breaks.



*An anthropologist in the lab measures a femur to determine the stature of an individual.*

This entire procedure is carried out "blind." The forensic anthropologist assigned the case in the laboratory is not the individual who completed the recovery in the field. This anthropologist does not **know** the suspected identity or details of the loss incident at the time of analysis. The blind analysis is completed in order to prevent any subconscious bias from influencing the scientist's analysis.

*"For two generations, you have demanded a full accounting of Americans whose fate is undetermined, and my administration will not rest until that accounting is complete,"*

*-George W. Bush*

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Dental remains are extremely important to the identification process, both because they offer the best means by which to positively identify an individual and because they are durable and may contain surviving mtDNA. An individual's dental records are often the best means of identification due to the unique characteristics that are available from teeth, including commonly observed dental treatments such as extraction, fillings, crowns, and partial dentures. The dental records from an individual's personnel file are compared with remains received at the laboratory by the forensic odontologists (dentists) who are U.S. military officers. Ideally, the forensic odontologist will have antemortem (before death) X-rays to use for comparison, but even handwritten charts and treatment notes can be critical to the identification process.



*Dental analysis is a tool used in the identification of recovered Americans.*

JPAC uses mtDNA in about half of its cases. Because using mtDNA adds approximately a year to the identification process, it is only used in the identification if a final piece of evidence is needed. This type of DNA consists of very short strands that are contained in a person's cells. Unlike nuclear DNA, which is unique to that person, mtDNA is passed directly from a person's mother. Thus, all persons of the same maternal line will have the same mtDNA sequences. These sequences are very rare but are not unique within the general population, and therefore cannot stand-alone as a piece of evidence for an identification. In order to compare mtDNA obtained from unidentified remains, a DNA sample is required from a living maternal relative, i.e. an individual's mother, siblings, or descendents of female siblings.

All mtDNA samples taken at the CIL are analyzed at the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL), located in Rockville, Md. AFDIL extracts and amplifies surviving mtDNA, and determines the genetic pattern present. This pattern is then compared with those patterns from family reference samples given from each (suspected) unidentified service member's family.

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All items relating to an unresolved case, excluding skeletal or dental remains, **are** considered "material evidence" and may include such items as aircraft data plates, ordnance, and pieces of issued items such as weapons, packs, mess **kits**, and uniforms. All such artifacts **are** examined in the field, and those lacking evidentiary value **are** photographed and left behind. **Items** considered relevant to the identification are selected by the anthropologist or life-support technician and brought back to the laboratory for analysis. This material evidence may aid in the identification of sought-after missing Americans.



*A wedding band was recovered during an excavation in Southeast Asia.*

Personal effects are a special category of material evidence. Every effort is made to recover, all personal effects from the excavation sites since these aid in the identification process, and are invaluable mementos for surviving family members. Once the identification process is complete, these items,

which include such things as watches with inscribed names, pilot's wings, medals, wallets, personal letters, photographs, jewelry and identification tags or cards, are returned to families and loved ones.

Life-support equipment includes any piece of equipment associated with a pilot that would indicate **his** presence within a crashed aircraft. **Items** such as parachute parts or helmet pieces can be critical in determining if a pilot was in the aircraft at the time of impact and if the crash was survivable. Furthermore, multiple life-support items may indicate the number of individuals associated with a crash site. JPAC works closely with the U.S. Air Force Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory at Brooks City-Base, Texas, to help analyze items recovered in the field.

# The Closure Process Begins

While JPAC's CIL identifies two Americans a week on average, the recovery and identification process may take years to complete. In addition to the factors previously mentioned, each separate line of evidence must be examined at the CIL (bones, teeth, and material evidence) and correlated with all historical evidence. All reports must also undergo a thorough peer review process. Additionally, if mtDNA is part of the



*Family members place a wreath on the memorial at Punchbowl Cemetery.*

process, the search for family reference samples for mtDNA comparison can add a significant amount of time to the identification process.

Completed cases are forwarded to the appropriate service mortuary affairs office, who then notifies the family personally of the identification. If the family disagrees with the identification, the case is sent to the Armed Forces Identification Review Board (AFIRB) in Alexandria, Va., for arbitration.

This board is composed of senior military officers with one voting member from each military service. The AFIRB evaluates all the evidence and determines whether the identification is complete or if the case should be returned to the CIL for further clarification.

*"We write no last chapters. We close no books. We put away no final memories. An end to America's involvement in Vietnam cannot come before we've achieved the fullest possible accounting of those missing in action."*

*~ Ronald Reagan*



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# Commitment

The U.S. Government, the Department of Defense and the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command remain committed to scientific excellence and the fullest possible accounting of all Americans still missing or unaccounted for in defense of this great country. JPAC will continue to fulfill our nation's promise to the POW/MIA families and those Americans still waiting to come home.



*"I pray that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom."*

*-Abraham Lincoln*

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## We need your help.

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Today's technology allows JPAC to identify some remains through mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) analysis. If you know of a family member who is from the maternal bloodline of an American missing as the result of a previous conflict, please ask them to contact the appropriate service casualty office to provide a family reference sample. Individuals should call one of the offices listed on the following page.

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# Contact Information

## Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC)

Attn: Public Affairs Office

3 10 Worcester Ave. Bldg 45

Hickam AFB, HI 96853-5530

Phone: (808)448-1934 Fax: (808)448-1998

Email: [webmaster@jpac.pacom.mil](mailto:webmaster@jpac.pacom.mil)

JPAC is on the internet at <http://www.jpac.pacom.mil>

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For specific information on a missing American write or call:

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**USAF Missing Persons Branch** (800) 531-5501

HQ AFPC/DPWCM

550 C Street West, Suite 15

Randolph AFB, TX 78150-4716

<http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/powmia/>

**Department of the Army** (800) 892-2490

US Army Human Resources Command

Attn: AHRC-PED-F

200 Stoval Street

Alexandria, VA 22332-0482

<http://www.perscomonline.army.mil/tagd/cmaoc/cmaoc.htm>

**Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps** (800) 847-1597

Manpower and Reserve Affairs (MRA)

Personal and Family Readiness Division

3280 Russell Road

Quantico, VA 22134-5103

[https://inweb1.manpower.usmc.mil/manpower/mi/mra\\_ofct.nsf/MR/](https://inweb1.manpower.usmc.mil/manpower/mi/mra_ofct.nsf/MR/Personal+and+Readiness+Division+Home)

[Personal+and+Readiness+Division+Home](https://inweb1.manpower.usmc.mil/manpower/mi/mra_ofct.nsf/MR/Personal+and+Readiness+Division+Home)

**Department of the Navy** (800) 443-9298

Navy Personnel Command

Casualty Assistance and Retired Activities Branch

POW/MIA Section (PERS-P665)

5720 Integrity Drive

Millington, TN 38055-6210

<http://www.persnet.navy.mil/pers62/POW/MIA/62P.htm>

**Department of State** (202) 647-6169

Office of American Citizens Services and Crisis Management

CA/OCS/ACS/EAP

2201 C Street, Northwest, Room 4811

Washington, DC 20520-4818

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The creation of the JPAC logo was an important endeavor with the goal of conveying the various aspects of the command's mission.

The eagle and shield represent the United States and its service members. We are a country dedicated to honoring and standing by those who defend our nation.

Celest blue denotes the role of the Department of Defense and symbolizes the worldwide scope of the command's operation.

Dark blue and gold signify devotion to duty and excellence; scarlet and white depict sacrifice and integrity, the ideals held by those lost during previous wars as well as those dedicated to seeking answers.

The pentagon denotes the joint nature of the command. Each branch of service is actively involved in accounting as fully as possible for lost comrades.

The stylized double helix border represents the modern techniques of laboratory analysis in the examination and identification of remains. Techniques are available today that allow for the identification of Americans that families once believed lost forever.

The yellow ribbon is in recognition of service members away from home, a constant reminder of our commitment to bringing comrades home.

The folded American flag symbolizes the command's mission to bring home and identify Americans who have made the ultimate sacrifice and return them to their families and friends.

FOUO

June 09, 2006

TO: The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
 Stephen J. Hadley

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on **Chain** of Command

381

We ought to sit down sometime and talk about what happened on September 11 -- how people in the White House got involved in the chain of command in an unusual way, and how we can avoid having confusion were something like that to occur again.

I would like to schedule a meeting sometime with you two, plus General Pace, so we can talk it through. And possibly we ought to have someone from the Vice President's office.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 060906-09

.....

OSD 09378-06  
  
 6/12/2006 12:21:15 PM

704706

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57891

**FOUO**

June 09, 2006

**TO:** The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
Stephen J. Hadley

**CC:** Gen Pete Pace

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld 

**SUBJECT** Meeting on Chain of Command

We **ought** to sit down sometime **and** talk about what happened on September 11 -- how people in the White House **got** involved in the chain of command in an unusual way, and how we can avoid having confusion were something like that **to** occur again.

I would like to schedule a meeting sometime with you two, plus General Pace, so we can talk it **through**. And possibly we **ought** to have someone from the Vice President's office.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
060906-09

.....

OSD 09378-06



6/12/2006 12:21:15 PM

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/57892

FOUO

May 24, 2006

TO: Richard Lawless

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT Demonstrations Outside ~~Base~~ in ROK

I am concerned about these demonstrations in connection with the base in the southern part of Korea. If that is the environment there, it is not clear to me that we want to be there. Maybe we ought to reconsider that.

Let's talk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052406-20

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/08/06*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/57893



6/12/2006 1:31:43 PM

FOUO

CF

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef  
USDP *44*

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUN 09 2006

*John* FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *6/8/06*

SUBJECT: Demonstrations Outside Bases in ROK (U)

- You expressed concern about demonstrations at Pyongtaek where we will relocate U.S. forces from 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division and Yongsan Garrison. These demonstrations have subsided over the last two weeks.
  - While the situation is getting better, it is possible that we will see a major effort by anti-Alliance groups, organized by professional agitators, 10-12 June.
  - These dates are the fourth anniversary of the "Highway 56" incident in which two school girls were tragically killed by a U.S. Forces Korea tactical vehicle.
- Minister Yoon and the Ministry of National Defense are managing this issue well. Public opinion is decidedly against the demonstrators.
  - Recent media coverage, inspired in part by the violence of the protestors, has been much more balanced. The media has focused on the fact that the demonstrators are being led by "outside" groups having little or no relation to the farmers being relocated.
- We can expect these demonstrations to occur periodically through October when the landowners are finally required to vacate their property.
- We can discuss this more fully with GEN Bell during your meeting with him 14 June.

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by LTC Mike Finnegan, ISA/AP (b)(6)



OSD 09390-06



6/12/2006 1:31:14 PM


11-L-0559/OSD/57894

FOUO

**POLICY COORDINATION SHEET**

**Subject: Response to Snowflake: Demonstrations Outside Bases in ROK**

**Snowflake Number:**   
\* 0 5 2 4 0 6 - 2 0 \*

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
PDASD/ISA	<b>Mary</b> Beth Long	_____
DUSD/AP	Richard Lawless	 _____
Principal Director/AP	Brig Gen John Allen	_____

~~FOUO~~

May 30, 2006

TO: David Chu  
CG: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Starting Salaries for Enlisted and Officers

Please tell me the starting salaries for enlisted personnel and brand new officers.

Thanks,

DRR  
05/30/06

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/09/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57896

OSD 09405-06



6/12/2006 12:26:11 PM



UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

June 8, 2006, 11:05 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S.C. Chu 8/7/06*  
SUBJECT: Starting Salaries for Enlisted and Officers - SNOWFLAKE (Tab B)

- You asked what the starting salaries are for enlisted personnel and brand new officers.
- Regular Military Compensation (RMC), defined in law, is the salary equivalent of military pay and allowances.
- RMC is the total of Basic Pay, the cash or in-kind equivalent value of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) and Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), and the Tax Advantage of the tax-free allowances.
- The Tax Advantage is the amount of cash necessary to provide members their current take-home pay, if the housing and subsistence allowances were taxable.
- The RMC for a new single E-1 is \$29,239 for the first year.
- The RMC for a new married E-1 is \$32,462 for the first year.
- The RMC for a new single O-1 is \$45,176 for the first year.
- The RMC for a new married O-1 is \$47,831 for the first year.
- The table at Tab A breaks out the components of RMC for the E-1 and O-1.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Ms. Virginia S. Penrod, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/57897



OSD 09405-06

6/12/2006 12:29:01 PM

# TAB

# A

**Starting Salaries - New Enlisted and Officer Personnel  
Annual Compensation**

	<b>Basic Pay</b>	<b>BAH**</b>	<b>BAS</b>	<b>Cash Pay</b>	<b>Tax Adv</b>	<b>RMC</b>
<b>E-1'</b>	14,995.80	9,382.43	3,267.12	27,645.35	2,007.47	529,653
<b>O-1</b>	28,994.40	11,862.30	2,249.88	43,106.58	2,959.69	<b>\$46,066</b>

**BAH** **Basic Allowance** for Housing

**BAS** **Basic Allowance** for Subsistence

**Cash Pay** Total of **Basic Pay**, **BAH** and **BAS**

**Tax Adv** **Tax Advantage** - Additional pay needed to receive current take-home pay if the housing and subsistence allowances were taxable

**RMC** **Regular Military Compensation** - Basic Pay, **BAH**, **BAS** and the **Tax Advantage**  
Defined in 37USC Sec 101 to provide a Salary equivalent for military pay and allowances.

\* For the first 3 months, an E-1 has basic pay of \$1,178.10 per month.  
For the next 9 months, basic pay is \$1,273.50 per month.

\*\* Assumes that the member lives off base; members do not receive BAH if they live in government quarters.

**TAB**

**B**

**FOUO**

May 30, 2006

**TO** David Chu

**CC:** Gen Pete Pace

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT** *starting salaries for Enlisted and Officers*

Please tell me the starting salaries for enlisted personnel and brand new officers.

Thanks.

DRL:m  
053006-07

**Please Respond By 06/09/06**

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/57901

OSD 09405-06



6/12/2006 12:26:11 PM

~~FOUO~~

JUN 05 2006

TO: Admiral Fox Fallon  
CC: General Pete Pace  
David Chu  
William Winkenwerder  
FROM: Donald Kunisfeld   
SUBJECT: Avian Flu in Java

I notice that there are avian flu cases in Java.

I hope you have our folks very sensitive to that issue, and that they handle themselves with the utmost care while they are in Java assisting with the earthquake relief.

Thanks.

DHR/ab  
060106-16 (TS) doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 9, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09472-06



6/13/2006 9:33:55 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/57902



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

HEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

JUN 9 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., M.D., ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Avian Flu in Java

- I spoke directly with the PACOM Surgeon, RADM Tom Burkhard, upon the decision to deploy troops to Indonesia for the relief effort.
- As part of on ongoing planning, DoD prepositioned a significant contingency supply of Tamiflu in the PACOM AOR prior to the recent earthquake.
- I personally reviewed the PACOM Pandemic Influenza Response Plan and am confident appropriate precautions are in place to protect the force.
- I will continue to keep you apprised of any new developments.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *Donna C. Linn 9/5/06*

Attachment:

TAB A – SecDef memo, subject: Avian Flu in Java, 6/5/06

Prepared by: LTC Joe Pisciotta, OASD (HA) (b)(6) DOCS Open 108148, 108463

11-L-0559/OSD/57903



**TAB**

**A**

~~FOUO~~

JUN 05 2006

TO: Admiral Fox Fallon  
CC: General Pete Pace  
David Chu  
William Winkenwerder  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Avian Flu in Java

I notice that there are avian flu cases in Java.

I hope you have our folks very sensitive to that issue, and that they handle themselves with the utmost care while they are in Java assisting with the earthquake relief.

Thanks.

DHR:ah  
060106-10 (TS) dec

.....  
*Please respond by June 9, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57905

---

~~FOUO~~

June 09, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Specialist

The new MoD from the UK mentioned that a woman named Clwyd, apparently a Member of Parliament and an expert on Iraqis, is coming to Washington, DC.

He said she *is coming* at the request of the Prime Minister and that she wants access. Please find out if that is true. If so, you should mention that to Steve Hadley - he might **want** to help her.

Thanks.

DHR ks2  
060806-04

.....

*Please Respond By June 22, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57906



6/13/2006 10:12:50 AM

~~FOUO~~

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

*ES* JUN 12 2006

SUBJECT: Iraqi Specialist

- You asked about the visit to Washington by Ms. Ann Clwyd, a Member of Parliament and an Iraqi specialist (note next under).
- I spoke with NSC staff who said that 10 Downing Street had contacted them to support Ms. Clwyd's visit. NSC staff are working to arrange appropriate appointments for her here in Washington.
- Ms. Clwyd is currently on Gordon's calendar for Wednesday. Schedules permitting, I will try to meet with her as well.

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09476-06



6/13/2006 10:17:57 AM



\* 0 6 0 8 0 6 - 0 4 \*

11-L-0559/OSD/57907

**FOUO**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 22, 2006

TO: GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT Percentages re: Recruits

You mentioned some percentages about the young people in the military today and the group we are trying to get. You mentioned three out of ten are qualified, two percent are in jail, and so forth.

Please give me those percentages.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052206-26

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/25/06*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/57908

OSD 09486-08



6/13/2006 10:46:27 AM

~~FOUO~~

May 30, 2006

TO: GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Fran Harvey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Market for Soldiers

I notice you are looking at just the male market for soldiers. I would have thought we would be looking at male and female.

Attach: Slide "Primary Market"

DHR:ss  
05300644

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/15/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/57909




6/13/2006 10:48:01 AM

# Primary Market

Consists of 17-24 year old young men who are high school graduates, excel on our entrance tests, meet moral and physical qualifications, and are not in college.

This age group provides about 213 of Army contracts.





UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

JUN 13 2006

*Approval*

SUBJECT: Market for Soldiers

- This responds to Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated May 30, 2006, subject as above (Tab A).
- We are looking at both males and females. While females represent 3.1 million of the 17-24 year old market, ~~the~~ 3.5 million males are the Army's primary market, based on the DoD QMA Study (April 2005).
- The Army's goal for female accessions for fiscal year 2006 is 18 to 20 percent. We have no issues recruiting females and expect to meet our recruiting goals for females in fiscal year 2006.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Jeffrey Spara, (b)(6)

CF: SECARMY  
CJCS

**TAB**

**A**