

# TAB 2



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Rick Santorum  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Santorum,

I received your August 1<sup>st</sup> letter. I appreciate your continuing efforts to enable the Department of Defense to share the achievements and accomplishments of America's military personnel with Members of Congress.

Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, will send a memorandum to Service Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs which amends the DoD Awards Manual, DOD 1348.33-M shortly. I have asked David to send you a copy as soon as it is delivered to the Services. This change to the DoD Awards Manual will describe the procedures for Services to provide information concerning high level awards for heroism, gallantry, or valor to Members of Congress.

In the interim, the Military Departments have been reminded that, under current policy, they may release information in response to specific requests as a "routine use" exception to the Privacy Act.

I appreciate your continued concern for and support of our Nation's brave men and women in uniform and their families. With your continuing help, we will see an Iraq at peace and an ally in the Global War on Terrorism.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/58914

# TAB 3

RECK SANTORUM  
PENNSYLVANIA

REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE  
Chairman

WASHINGTON, DC  
525 Capitol Square Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510  
(202) 594-6324

## United States Senate

<http://seniorum.senate.gov>

8/2/06 AS  
COMMITTEE  
FINANCE

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS  
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY  
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION  
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

August 1, 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I write today concerning the efforts of the United States Senate to enable the Department of Defense to share the achievements and accomplishments of America's military personnel with Members of Congress.

By way of background, I authored Senate Amendment 4210 to S. 2766, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). A copy of this amendment is enclosed with this correspondence. Senate Amendment 4210 expressed the sense of the Senate that the Department of Defense and service secretaries of military departments should notify members of the Senate and House of Representatives when a constituent has received a medal, commendation or recognition for an act of extraordinary heroism, bravery, or achievement. The amendment was adopted by the Senate by unanimous consent.

The purpose of SA 4210 is to address the wave of negative stories coming from Iraq and Afghanistan concerning our ongoing military operations. The American people seldom hear about the acts of heroism, achievement and bravery carried out by American military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. This amendment was crafted to spur the Department of Defense to share with Members of Congress information on all the good things our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are doing in the fight against Islamic Fascism. This amendment seeks to change this pattern by making Americans aware of the good deeds and positive contributions our military personnel are making around the world.

The House-passed bill did not have a similar amendment so this matter must be reconciled by House and Senate conferees to the FY07 NDAA. Also by way of background, I offered the same amendment last year to the FY06 NDAA. The amendment, SA 2470, was adopted by voice vote last year. I have also enclosed a copy of last year's amendment with this correspondence. Unfortunately, last year's amendment was not retained by conferees to the bill. I am hoping that conferees will retain this position this year during conference deliberations.

ALLENTOWN  
3000 Federal Office Building  
304 West Main Street  
Allentown, PA 18103  
(610) 770-0148

ALTOONA  
Refinery Square  
Suite 202  
Route 228 North  
Altoona, PA 16601  
(814) 946-7023

COUDERSPORT  
61 Market Mall Plaza  
Coudersport, PA 16830  
(814) 664-7114

EBU  
1705 West 35th Street  
Ebu, PA 16808  
(814) 434-7114

HARRISBURG  
265 Walnut Street  
Fifth Floor  
Harrisburg, PA 17101  
(717) 633-7544

PHILADELPHIA  
Midway Building  
One South Park Square  
Suite 950  
Philadelphia, PA 19107  
(215) 564-6900

PITTSBURGH  
100 West Square Square Drive  
Lebanese Square  
Suite 250  
Pittsburgh, PA 15213  
(412) 562-0633

SCRANTON  
The First Building  
102 Whiting Avenue  
Scranton, PA 18503  
(570) 344-8799

OSD 12388-06



11-L-0559/OSD/58916

8/7/2006 8:41:17 AM



I ask that you do all you can to implement a system within the Department of Defense and military services to share the achievements and accomplishments of our military service members with Members of Congress. Armed with this information, Members of Congress can help share the accomplishments of our military personnel with our constituents.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

*Thanks Don!*

Sincerely,

*Rick*

Rick Santorum  
United States Senate

Enclosures  
RJS/gb

*Rick Santorum* SLC

**AMENDMENT NO.**

**Calendar No.**

**Purpose:** Expressing the sense of the Senate on notice to Congress of the recognition of members of the Armed Forces for extraordinary acts of heroism, bravery, and achievement.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 2d Sess.**

**S. 2768**

*James*  
*for* **AMENDMENT No. 4210**  
To auth *Santorum*  
acti *By*  
con *To: S-2766*  
mer  
suci  
par *2*  
**Page(s)**

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

**AMENDMENT** intended to be proposed by Mr. SANTORUM

**Viz:**

1 At the end of subtitle F of title V. add the following:

1 SEC. 597. SENSE OF SENATE ON NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF  
2 RECOGNITION OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED  
3 FORCES FOR EXTRAORDINARY ACTS OF  
4 BRAVERY, HEROISM, AND ACHIEVEMENT.

5 It is the sense of the Senate that the Secretary of  
6 Defense or the Secretary of the military department con-  
7 cerned should, upon awarding a medal to a member of  
8 the Armed Forces or otherwise commending or recog-  
9 nizing a member of the Armed Forces for an act of ex-  
10 traordinary heroism, bravery, achievement, or other dis-  
11 tinction, notify the Committee on Armed Services of the  
12 Senate and House of Representatives, the Senators from  
13 the State in which such member resides, and the Member  
14 of the House of Representatives from the district in which  
15 such member resides of such extraordinary award, com-  
16 mendation, or recognition.

*Richard Santorum*

AMENDMENT NO.

Calendar No.

Purpose: Expressing the sense of the Senate on notice to Congress of the recognition of members of the Armed Forces for extraordinary acts of heroism, bravery, and achievement.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—100th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. 1042

AMENDMENT No. 2470

To aut  
ac By Warner P. Santorum  
co To: S. 1042  
m  
su  
pu

Page(s)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 2000

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
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AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. SANTORUM

Viz:

1 At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:

*SENSE OF SENATE 9/2*

1 SEC. . . NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF RECOGNITION OF  
2 MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR EX-  
3 TRAORDINARY ACTS OF BRAVERY, HEROISM,  
4 AND ACHIEVEMENT.

5 It is the sense of the Senate that the Secretary of  
6 Defense or the Secretary of the military department con-  
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8 the Armed Forces or otherwise commending or recog-  
9 nizing a member of the Armed Forces for an act of ex-  
10 traordinary heroism, bravery, achievement, or other dis-  
11 tinction, notify the Committees on Armed Services of the  
12 Senate and the House of Representatives, the Senators  
13 from the State in which such member resides, and the  
14 Member of the House of Representatives from the district  
15 in which such member resides of such extraordinary  
16 award, commendation, or recognition.

# TAB 4



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ASD (LA) Staff Package with Subject: *Response to SECDEF Snowflake #080206-11*

- Concur without comment.

OFFICE

COORDINATING OFFICIAL

DATE

USD (P&R)

*David S. E. Chu*  
David S. E. Chu

AUG 14 2006

11-L-0559/OSD/58923



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



SEP 18 2005

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE **MILITARY** DEPARTMENTS  
C H A I R " OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
**UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE**  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE **DEPARTMENT** OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF **DEFENSE**  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH **AND** ENGINEERING  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION **AND** MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS **OF** THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

**SUBJECT** : Revision of Chapter 1, DOD 1348.33-M, "Manual of Military **Decorations**  
and Awards"

This memorandum announces a change to Chapter 1, DOD 1348.33-M, "Manual of Military **Decorations** and Awards." The change **directs** the **Secretaries** of the Military Departments to **release** a Service member's name, rank, title of award, and legal residence/domicile (voting district and state or city and state as determined by the Military Department concerned) to Congress when the Service member is decorated for acts of heroism, gallantry or valor by the awards listed in the revision. If a member of Congress requests more information, such as information on all or particular awards or content from citations or certificates, such information would be provided consistent with applicable law, regulation, and policy.

Implementing guidance is attached as a change to Chapter 1, which replaces the published version effective immediately. All changes mentioned in the above paragraph are incorporated within the attached revision. The latest version of this issuance can be viewed at the Department of Defense Issuances web site ([www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/](http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/)).

David S. C. Chu

Attachment:  
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/58924





LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

August 4, 2006 3:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Acting ASD/LA, (b)(6)

*Robert H. Wilkie*

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake #080206-11

- Senator Rick Santorum asked you to implement a system within DoD to share service members' achievements and accomplishments with Members of Congress.
- Principal Deputy Under Secretary Michael Dominguez has made clear to the Military Departments that they already have authorization to provide summaries or citations to Members of Congress upon their request.
- Under Secretary Dr. David Chu is in the final coordinated process for a new policy with respect to "pushing" award information to Members of Congress. The policy will specify the information that we will "push," such as type of award, name, rank and home.
- Recommend you send the attached letter as your response to Senator Santorum's letter.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake #080206-11
2. SECDEF letter to Senator Santorum
3. Letter from Senator Santorum (Aug. 1, 2006)

OSD 12538-06



8/7/2006 8:58:43 AM

Prepared by Tom Jones, Special Assistant for Personnel & Readiness (b)(6)  
11-L-0559/OSD/58925

2006

4 Aug 06

2 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

August 02, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Santorum's Letter

Attached is a letter I received from Rick Santorum. I have not read

Please look into it and get back to me within two days as to how we  
it.

ould answer

Thanks.

Attach 8/1/06 Letter from Senator Santorum to SecDef

DHR:ss  
SF080206-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/04/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58926



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Rick Santorum  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Santorum:

I received your August 1<sup>st</sup> letter. I appreciate your continuing efforts to enable the Department of Defense to share the achievements and accomplishments of America's military personnel with Members of Congress.

Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, will send a memorandum to Service Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs which amends the DoD Awards Manual, DOD 1348.33 M shortly. I have asked David to send you a copy as soon as it is delivered to the Services. This change to the DoD Awards Manual will describe the procedures for Services to provide information concerning high level awards for heroism, gallantry, or valor to Members of Congress.

In the interim, the Military Departments have been reminded that, under current policy, they may release information in response to specific requests as a "routine use" exception to the Privacy Act.

I appreciate your continued concern for and support of our Nation's brave men and women in uniform and their families. With your continuing help, we will see an Iraq at peace and an ally in the Global War on Terror.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/58927

RICK SANTORUM  
PENNSYLVANIA

REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE  
CHAIRMAN

WASHINGTON, DC  
511 Capitol Square Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510  
(202) 224-6384

## United States Senate

<http://santorum.senate.gov>

8/2/06 10 3  
COMMITTEES

FINANCE

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY

RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

August 1, 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld

I write today concerning the efforts of the United States Senate to enable the Department of Defense to share the achievements and accomplishments of America's military personnel with Members of Congress.

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ALLENTOWN  
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504 WEST HAMILTON STREET  
ALLENTOWN, PA 18105  
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ALTOONA  
REGENCY SQUARE  
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ROUTE 220 NORTH  
ALTOONA, PA 16801  
(814) 946-7023

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81 MARSH HILL ROAD  
COUDERSPORT, PA 16815  
(814) 464-7134

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ERIÉ, PA 16546  
(814) 454-7114

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505 WALNUT STREET  
FIRST FLOOR  
HARRISBURG, PA 17101  
(717) 233-7540

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WIDENER BUILDING  
SUITE 960  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107  
(PIS)

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LANCASTER BUILDING  
SUITE 250  
PITTSBURGH, PA 15203

SCRANTON  
THE PITT BUILDING  
222 WYOMING AVENUE  
SCRANTON, PA 18605  
(570) 344-8799

11-L-0559/OSD/58928

I ask that you do all you can to implement a system within the Department of Defense and military services to share the achievements and accomplishments of our service members with Members of Congress. Armed with this information, Congress can help share the accomplishments of our military personnel with our constituents.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

*Thank you!*

Sincerely,

*Rick*

Rick Santorum  
united states senate

Enclosures  
RJS/gb

*Rick Santorum* S.L.C.

AMENDMENT NO.

Calendar No.

UNITED

*Warner*  
AMENDMENT No. 4210  
To auth *by Santorum*  
acti *S. 2766*  
con. *To*  
mer  
suel  
pur. *2*  
Page(s)

GPO: 2007-57-2820-1

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. SANTORUM

Viz:

1 At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following

1 SEC. 587. SENSE OF SENATE ON NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF  
2 RECOGNITION OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED  
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9 nizing a member of the Armed Forces for an *act of?*  
10 *traordinary heroism, bravery, achievement, or other &*  
11 *function,* notify the Committee on Armed Services of the  
12 Senate and House of Representatives, the Senators from  
13 the State in which such member resides, and the Member  
14 of the House of Representatives from the district in which  
15 such member resides of such extraordinary award, com-  
16 mendation, or recognition.

HC-2

*Rick Santorum*

*X*

AMENDMENT NO.

Calendar No.

Purpose: Expressing the sense of the Senate on notice to Congress of the recognition of members of the Armed Forces for extraordinary acts of heroism, bravery, and achievement.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. 1042

AMENDMENT No. 2470

To sub  
ac By Warner for Santorum  
co To: S. 1042  
m  
su  
pu

Page(s)

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. SANTORUM

Viz:

I At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:



*SENSE OF SENATE* *CH 2*

1 SEC. NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF RECOGNITION OF  
2 MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR EX-  
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4 AND ACHIEVEMENT.

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12 Senate and the House of Representatives, the Senators  
13 from the State in which such member resides, and t  
14 Member of the House of Representatives from the distr  
15 in which such member resides of such extraordin  
16 award, commendation, or recognition.

~~FOUO~~

August 02, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA*

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Santorum's Letter

Attached is a letter I received **from Rick** Santorum. I have not read it

Please look into it **and** get back to me within *two* days as to how we should answer it.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/1/06 Letter from Senator Santorum to SecDef

DHR:ss  
SF080206-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/04/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58934

OSD 12538-06



8/7/2006 8:58:34 AM



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ASD (LA) Staff Package with Subject: *Response to SECDEF Snowflake #080206-11*

- Concur without comment.

OFFICE

COORDINATING OFFICIAL

DATE

USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu*  
David S. C. Chu

AUG 14 2006

200.6

(4 Aug 06)

2 Aug 06

R  
12538-06

11-L-0559/OSD/58935



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

3 Aug 2006

Editor  
Washington Post  
1150 15th St. NW  
Washington, DC 20001

Your July 27, 2006 online article by Joshua Partlow about troop morale makes inaccurate generalizations and conclusions about morale based on a short visit with one unit.

There is no doubt that duty in Iraq is tough. Fear, frustration and fatigue are common emotions in war. But our troops are overcoming these challenges with courage, professionalism and a tremendous sense of duty and purpose. One only has to look at the retention rates in these great units to know that these troops understand the importance of the mission they are embarked upon.

For example the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division, which is currently serving in Iraq, has a reenlistment rate of 139 percent. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, which has a Brigade in Iraq and a Brigade in Afghanistan, has a reenlistment rate of 155 percent. The 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, also currently serving in Iraq, has a reenlistment rate of 114 percent, and the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, presently in Iraq, has a reenlistment rate of 139 percent. The Marine Corps retention rates this year for first-term Marines and careerists are well over 100 percent.

Additionally, for 13 straight months each active service component has achieved their recruiting goals. More than 50 percent of the current Army force has enlisted since 9/11. This is a great tribute to the patriotic spirit of our young men and women in uniform who understand that we are a nation at war, and what they are doing is important and protects the freedoms all Americans enjoy.

These American men and women who've volunteered to serve their nation in this time of war are performing brilliantly under very difficult circumstances, and deserve our highest respect and gratitude.

Sincerely,

Bryan G. Whitman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs



11-L-0559/OSD/58936

OSD 12571-06



8/7/2006 2:54:37 PM

000.7

3154/06

~~FOUO~~

| July 31, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA.*

SUBJECT: Recent Washington Post Article on Morale

I am told there was a recent article in the Washington Post on low morale of the troops. Has anyone has gotten back to them with a reply indicating the re-enlistment rates for troops who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan? It might be a powerful rebuttal.

Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR ss  
SF073106-21

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/09/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58937

OSD 12571-06



8/7/2008 2:54:35 PM

washingtonpost.com

# 'Waiting to Get Blown Up'

Some Troops in Baghdad Express Frustration With the War and Their Mission

By Joshua Partlow  
Washington Post Staff Writer  
Thursday, July 27, 2006; A01

BAGHDAD, July 26 Army Staff **Sgt. Jose Sixtos** considered the simple question about morale for more than an hour. But not until his convoy of armored Humvees had finally rumbled back into the Baghdad military base, and the soldiers emptied the ammunition from their machine guns, and passed off the bomb-detecting robot to another patrol, did he turn around in his seat and give his answer.

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The Washington Post  
washingtonpost.com

"It sucks. Honestly, it just feels like we're driving around waiting to get blown up. That's the most honest answer I could give you," said Spec. Tim Ivey, 28, of San Antonio, a muscular former backup fullback for Baylor University. "You lose a couple friends and it gets hard."

actually doing out here."

11-L-0559/OSD/58938

next higher-up puts more back out there."

have made

up."

"You know, the point is we've lost too many Americans here already, we're committed now. So whatever the [expletive] end-state is, whatever it is, we need to achieve it -- that way they didn't die for nothing," he said. "We're far too deep in this now."

'Our Biggest Fear'

The largest risk facing the soldiers is the explosion of roadside bombs, known among soldiers as improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, the main killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. Battalion commanders say they have made great strides clearing the main highways through their southern Baghdad jurisdiction, including the north-south thoroughfare they call Route Jackson, but insurgents continue to adapt.

"We do an action, he counters it. It's a constant tug of war," said Sgt. 1st Class Scott Wilmot, an IED analyst with the battalion. "From where I sit, the [number of] IEDs continually, gradually, goes up."

Each day, U.S. and Iraqi soldiers patrolling neighborhoods such as Sadiyah, al-Amil and Bayaa -- an area of about 40 square miles where about half a million people live -- encounter an average of one to two roadside bombs, often triggered remotely by someone watching the convoys, he said.

"Motorola radios, cellphones, garage door openers, remote-controlled doorbells. Anything that can transmit, they can, in theory, use," Wilmot said. "Anybody who thinks they're stupid is wrong."

After the bombing in February of a golden domed Shiite shrine in Samarra, sectarian killings between rival Shiite and Sunni Muslim factions exploded, and have continued to take thousands of Iraqi lives despite a security crackdown in Baghdad that started last month. U.S. military commanders in Baghdad say the killings extend beyond sectarian motives, to include tribal rivalries, criminal activity and intra-sect gang warfare. Most of the killing takes place out of sight of the Americans, commanders said.

"At this point, it's getting a little difficult to tell which groups are responsible," said Capt. Eric Haas of Williamsburg, Va., an intelligence officer for the 2nd Battalion. "Our biggest fear is this turning into a Bosnia-Kosovo situation" where the police are allowing the slaughter to take place.

"We're definitely making progress," he added. "It's going to take some time to get there."

Into this fray, day and night, come the U.S. soldiers. Each infantryman conducts an average of 10 patrols a week, for a total of 50 to 60 grueling hours, "and it is having an effect," said the battalion's executive officer, Maj. Jeffrey E. Grable.

"Sometimes it's not obvious, the fruit of their labor," said Grable. But the patrols have "a deterrent effect on sectarian violence. Unfortunately, we just cannot be everywhere all the time."

### 'Only Promises'

The patrol led by Capt. Mike Comstock, 27, of Boise, Idaho -- two Humvees and a Bradley Fighting Vehicle -- started at 1 p.m. on Saturday. At about 15 miles per hour, the patrol passed down blighted Iraqi streets with dozens of cars waiting in gas lines, piles of smoldering trash, rubble-strewn vacant lots and gaping bomb craters.

On one stop, the patrol pulled up to the Saadiq al-Amin mosque in the Bayaa neighborhood. Some mosques in the city have stockpiled weapons and been operations centers for insurgents -- used, said one officer, "like we use National Guard armories back home."

"How are you doing today, sir? A little hot?" Comstock asked Walid Khalid, 45, the second-ranking cleric of the Sunni mosque, who opened the gate wearing sandals and a white dishdasha, a traditional robe.

"Our imam was killed three weeks ago," Khalid said through an interpreter.



"This is actually the first I've heard about **this**," Comstock said, taking notes.

"The people around here are afraid to come here to pray on Fridays," Khalid said, going on to explain that the mosque didn't have water or electricity. He said that he was worried at attacking the mosque, and that he needed permits for the four **AK-47** assault rifles he kept inside. corrupt Iraqi police

"Would it help if we brought the national police here so you could meet them?" Comstock asked.  
"Maybe you guys could **start** building trust together."

"We would like to cooperate, but sometimes those people come to attack us, at mosque," Khalid said. "Inside the mosque is our border, If they cross this line, we want to defend the guys." will shoot these

Comstock's patrol stopped at Bayaa homes and shops to conduct a "SWET assessment": checking the sewage, water and electricity services available to residents. Most said the sewage service was adequate, but the electricity functioned no more than four hours a day. Some said they had title *running* water and dumped their trash along the main streets. Inner neighborhood roads were blocked with slabs of concrete. lack of safety.

"I can't fix electricity or sewers all the time. We recommend projects to be done by Muhammed Adnan, a Bayaa resident. "Patrolling your neighborhood is one thing we can do. I hope that

"We just receive promises around here, nothing else," Adnan, 40, told Comstock. "Three years, just promises, and promises and promises."

Comstock wrote down the words: "only promises."

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~~FOUO~~

July 05, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA*

SUBJECT Testimony on All-Volunteer Army

The testimony you sent me is not the correct material. The actual testimony I gave  
~~was~~ during the 1960s, not during the 1970s. Please dig it up.

Thanks.

Attach. 6/27/06 SD SF#062706-16; 6/28/06 ASD(PA) response

DHR:dh  
SF070506-30

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/20/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58942

OSD 12573-06



8/7/2008 3:00:08 PM

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*5 Jul 06*

*27 Jun 06*

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~~FOUO~~

July 05, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Testimony on All-Volunteer Army

The testimony you sent me is not the correct material. The actual testimony I gave was during the 1960s, not during the 1970s. Please dig it up.

Thanks.

Attach. 6/27/06 SD SF#062706-16; 6/28/06 ASD(PA) response

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*Please Respond By 07/20/06*

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*no. 2*

*5 Jul 06*

*27 Jun 06*

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(June 27, 2006)

TO: Dorrance Smith

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
David Chu  
Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT Celebrating the Volunteer Army

David Chu told me that April 18, 2007, is the 40th anniversary of my testimony to the Senate on supporting the volunteer army. Please see if you can get a copy of my testimony before the House and Senate and the dates I did it.

We ought to see if there are some good events coming up in connection with the volunteer army that we can celebrate big at DoD and hype the terrific job the volunteer army is doing.

Thanks.

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Please Respond By 09/24/06

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JUL 05 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/58944

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8/7/2006 2:56:47 PM

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27 June 06

8/7/06

TO: **Secretary** Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith /s/  
SUBJECT: Testimony on All-Volunteer **Army**  
Ref: Snowflake

Sir,

Attached is the testimony you asked me to get that you gave during th , 960s.

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## AMENDING AND EXTENDING THE DRAFT LAW AND RELATED AUTHORITIES

TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 1967

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 1924 New Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Symington, Inouye, Byrd of Virginia, Smith, Miller, Pearson, and Dominick.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief of staff, Charles B. Kirbow, chief clerk, and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.

Chairman RUSSELL. The first witness scheduled at this morning's hearing is Senator Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon. (Pause.) The Senator apparently has a conflict in his committee arrangements this morning.

The next witness is Congressman Donald Rumsfeld of Illinois. You may proceed.

### STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Miller, I certainly appreciate the opportunity to appear before your committee to present some thoughts on manpower military recruitment. I have submitted my complete statement with attachments. You have copies of my statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed, Congressman.

Mr. RUMSFELD. In assessing the U.S. military manpower procurement system, I am handicapped personally by the lack of a comprehensive and accurate assessment of the cost of the present draft, and of such alternative systems as an all-volunteer system.

An extensive manpower study by the Department of Defense, requested by the President in response to growing criticism of the draft, was withheld upon its completion, then revised in light of the escalation in Vietnam, and finally reported to the Congress, in 1966, by Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas D. Morris in brief summary form only. The study and working papers on which the conclusions were based have never been made public. Later in my presentation,

however, I will comment on an evaluation of the DOD study, based on the opinions of an investigator who apparently has read the entire study and who is able to quote from portions of it.

More recently, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, also initiated by the President and headed by Burke Marshall, issued a 219-page evaluation of the draft and its alternatives. The Commission, in its own words, "spent more than 100 hours in meetings in Washington alone, which are recorded in more than 3,500 pages of transcript and the members read, considered, and discussed in detail hundreds of pages of staff memorandums." However, none of these working papers has been made public.

On March 24, 1967, I joined with the Honorable Thomas B. Curtis in urging the President to release the information necessary to make an adequate evaluation of his draft proposals. Our letter concluded: "Without supporting data and working papers, the strength of your proposals are seriously diminished. Thus we respectfully request that working papers of your National Commission on the points discussed be made available to us in the Congress." Thus far, the only response has been a brief acknowledgement of our letter by an aide.

Because of this information gap I am pleased that your committee and the House Committee on Armed Services are holding hearings on the draft and possible alternatives.

#### *Areas of agreement*

I appear today in a dual role—as both an advocate and an inquirer. Before I embark on either role, I would like to set before you what seem to be certain premises on which most can agree:

Military conscription is repugnant and antithetical to a free society except in time of demonstrated need. President Johnson in his recent message on Selective Service underscored this point when he said: "The volunteer tradition is strong in our Armed Forces, as it is in our national heritage. Except for the periods of major war in this century, it has been the chief source of our military manpower since the earliest days of the Republic."

Any system of involuntary military service is inherently inequitable when not all qualified men are required to serve. President Johnson in the same message declared: "For the unavoidable truth is that complete equity can never be achieved when only some must be selected and only some must serve."

Given the basic undesirability as well as the inherent inequity in military conscription, every effort must be made to make the rewards for military service commensurate with the rewards in civilian employment. No one would argue, I believe, that, in addition to the other sacrifices that Armed Forces personnel must make, they should also be obliged to subsidize their own service.

There is a point at which—given a combination of pay increases, liberalized fringe benefits, improved recruitment and retention policies, extension of education opportunities in and through the armed

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services, and/or greater utilization of civilian personnel, male and female, in noncombatant posts—that conscription would no longer be necessary to fill military requirements. There may be differences of opinion as to exactly where that point is, but it is there nonetheless.

The Vietnam conflict has both focused attention on and beclouded the issue of the draft and its alternatives. Selective service was extended in 1968 with scarce attention from the Congress and the public. With the extension of the war effort and increased involuntary induction, the draft became more directly important to more families.

I accept the obvious fact that the United States, during this period of its history, requires a sizable military capability. The question to be answered is what is the best mechanism to recruit the range of manpower required, not only during the present situation in southeast Asia, but also, hopefully, in the not too distant future when a settlement is reached. We must investigate, plan, and take action for the anticipated range of the military manpower needs of the foreseeable future.

#### *A moderate proposal*

In the full realization that the time is short between now and June 30, when the Selective Service Act expires, I would suggest consideration of a moderate course of action which this committee and the Congress might follow:

That the Selective Service Act should be extended for a maximum of 2 years.

That conscription procedures should be modified, insofar as possible, to remove the most serious inequities.

That Congress should declare its intention to establish a volunteer military force and conduct the necessary investigation and study to determine the best means to establish such a force. At the end of the 2-year extension of selective service, and to the extent that the study so indicates, the Congress should either terminate conscription or set a definite termination date for conscription.

That Congress should raise immediately the pay scales and fringe benefits for military personnel, with the goal of providing the increases necessary to bring military rewards up to a competitive posture with respect to civilian rewards.

That the Department of Defense should intensify its efforts in the recruitment and retention of military personnel and continue to expand its utilization of civilian manpower in noncombatant posts, which the Secretary has undertaken in recent years.

There are three principal questions which must be answered regarding a course of action and, particularly, in relation to the establishment of a volunteer military.

#### *Is it feasible?*

The question of the feasibility of attracting and maintaining an adequate voluntary armed force centers primarily on the issue of cost. Cost estimates have ranged from \$4 to \$20 billion for maintaining a volunteer force of approximately 2.7 million men.

I don't know what the actual cost would be and I am very ready to confess this. Nor, however, do I suspect that the Department of



Defense knows exactly what the cost would be. But the Department of Defense says it is too expensive to have a **voluntary system**.

The Department of Defense seems to be in the position of both estimating the cost of a **voluntary army** and of judging whether that cost is justified, even though it has stressed that as a "user" of personnel it is concerned only with the attraction of sufficient quantity and quality of manpower. Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in 1966, had the following colloquy with Congressman Otis Pike:

**Mr. PIKE.** . . . So long as there aren't any Federal guidelines, aren't you going to have this same inequality which is the basic objection to the draft in this country today?

**Mr. MORRIS.** Sir, again, I should limit my comments to your responsibilities as to the user of manpower and the setter of physical, mental, and moral standards.

**Mr. PIKE.** So, as the user of manpower, you are not concerned about the inequalities in the draft system which is the basic complaint which I receive in my mail regarding the draft?

**Mr. MORRIS.** We think these are matters beyond our responsibility, sir.

Notwithstanding the above, Mr. Morris, in the same 1966 hearings, concluded categorically:

Increases in military compensation sufficient to attract an all-volunteer force cannot be justified.

I disagree.

DOD claims that a volunteer army is impractical because it is too costly. However, whether a program can be financed and should be financed—given known Federal revenues and spending priorities—is a determination which must be made by the Congress and the people. DOD, and other departments and agencies, must supply facts; Congress must evaluate those facts and translate them into policy.

If DOD studies the feasibility of developing a necessary new weapons system, they would not conclude that it is impractical only because it cost between \$4 and \$20 billion. One would suspect that other considerations entered into their judgment on the draft.

Or, to put it another way, if the Department of Agriculture or the Post Office Department discovered basic needs which demanded the recruitment of thousands of additional personnel, neither Department would recommend conscription of that manpower. Rather, they would present proposals for attracting the needed manpower based on the competitive market rate and on modern personnel recruitment and retention practices.

The point, is this—We can afford to attract a volunteer army if we want to. And the costs very likely will not be as prohibitive as the Department of Defense suggests.

My suggestion is that we should at the very minimum work toward that goal.

Dr. Walter Y. Oi, a manpower expert who was with the Department of Defense in the early stages of the manpower study and is now professor of economics at the University of Washington, has conducted a comprehensive study of the costs of an all-volunteer force. Dr. Oi's conclusion:

An all-volunteer force offers a polar alternative to the draft. With its lower personnel turnover, a voluntary force of the same size could be sustained by

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recruiting only 27.5 per cent of qualified males. The budgetary payroll cost would, however, have to be raised by \$4 billion per year.

I will submit for the record, following my remarks, the complete analytic text of Dr. Oi's study which was submitted at the University of Chicago Conference on the Draft in December 1966, as well as a proposal for a military manpower procurement bill prepared at my request by Dr. Oi.

The "secret" DOD report on which Assistant Secretary Morris' 1966 testimony is based tends to refute the public DOD position that a draft is necessary even in peacetime :

In the event that active duty military force requirements revert in the closing years of this decade to the levels originally planned for the current year and remain at or below this level in the early 1970's, it is possible that these measures (more pay and better personnel policies) may result in the elimination of the need for draft calls for substantial periods as we move into the 1970's \* \* \*. It is desirable to study the implications of these trends even at a time, such as the present, when draft calls are in fact greater than at any time in the past decade.

Further, from the same DOD report:

An estimated \$4.2 to \$6.2 billion (would be needed) to rely exclusively on volunteers if military strengths were to be maintained at pre-Vietnam levels.

Author Jean Carper, who quotes the preceding passages of the suppressed Pentagon study in her forthcoming book, "Bitter Greetings: The Scandal of the Military Draft," scheduled for publication by Grossman Inter this month, gives the following commentary :

There is no real \$17 billion cost barrier to abolishing the draft, as we shall see. This figure is the reddest of red herrings, thrown to the Congress and the American people to stifle an investigation into ending the draft. By raising the pay of our soldiers to a living wage, we can be well on the way to ending the draft with the end of the Vietnam crisis.

I have focused exclusively on the payroll cost necessary to attract a volunteer force. However, considerable savings might accrue from such factors as a lower turnover rate, more skilled personnel, and a reduction in basic training needs.

But, most important, whether we turn to volunteerism or retain the draft with substantial pay boosts, military personnel would no longer be forced to subsidize their own service by accepting compensation less than they could draw in open job competition. Bruce Chapman, author of the "Wrong Man in Uniform," put it well with these words:

The \$96 a month paid an American private is about the same as the pay of a collective farm worker in Communist Eastern Europe and less than half what unemployment compensation pays \* \* \*. Even if some draft were necessary, financial relief and bettered living conditions for the draftee would be essential for maintaining any pretense of justice in the draft's rationale.

It seems to me that at the very minimum we in the Congress should attempt to correct this present, tax on the individuals who are required to serve.

*Is it flexible?*

I now turn to an examination of the second basic question concerning the voluntary approach. Would such an approach provide sufficient flexibility to meet the anticipated range of military manpower requirements?

To answer this question I should like to stress that I certainly am not opposed to conscription under all circumstances. Sudden and/or massive military buildups, such as those required in World War II, undoubtedly could not be accomplished without compulsion.

I favor having the military manpower needed by this country by conscription if necessary but voluntarily if possible.

Therefore, even if we accept a voluntary system as our goal, we must keep a workable draft system ready to be superimposed on the compulsory system when a clear need is demonstrated for greater manpower than the volunteer system can reasonably provide. We should undoubtedly retain some semblance of a Selective Service System, even to the point of registering, examining, and classifying young men as they come of military age. Our national security and leadership in the free world calls for no less.

A strengthening of the Ready Reserve and National Guard to make these forces truly ready for immediate response would also contribute to U.S. military flexibility.

In addition, the voluntary concept can have a built-in flexibility of its own. If military service is made attractive enough, we might very well have excess numbers of volunteers. Dr. Milton Friedman explained this flexibility concept at the Chicago conference:

Recruitment by voluntary means could provide considerable flexibility—at a cost. The way to do so would be to make pay and conditions of service more attractive than is required to recruit the number of men that it is anticipated will be needed. There would then be an excess of volunteers—queues. If the number of men required increased, the queues could be shortened and conversely.

Obviously, the flexibility here with the voluntary system is not as great as with the draft, but such an approach could easily accommodate moderate increases in military demand. For a fuller explanation of this concept, and of other arguments for volunteerism, I will submit for the record Dr. Friedman's full text at the conclusion of my remarks.

In short, it strikes me that the statement by the President in his message to Congress suggesting that a voluntary system might be gambling with the Nation's security is absolutely without foundation.

I think all advocates of a voluntary military recognize the need to retain a compulsory mechanism available to be triggered in, in the event some more substantial numbers of military personnel are required.

#### *Is it a threat?*

A third basic question concerning volunteerism is whether or not it presents a threat to existing political institutions.

Certainly, any fear of threat to our political institutions merits careful attention. Such a threat, however, has historically come from the officer corps, rather than enlisted personnel, and in the United States, officers of all services have always been career or voluntary. Further, our proper tradition of civil control over the military has thus far been sufficiently strong so that there has been no serious threat of military takeover.

Further, history seems to show in other nations that military threats to political institutions have come from conscript armies as well as from volunteer armies, and that many nations have not had such

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threats regardless of whether they had conscript or volunteer armies. I believe that such a threat is a serious matter—to be watched and prevented—but that with attention and care, it can be as readily avoided in a volunteer system as in a conscript army, by building in some turnover in the system.

#### *Advantages of a voluntary system*

A volunteer system, assuming it to be feasible, offers the following advantages:

Preservation of the freedom of the individual to serve or not to serve, or conversely, avoidance of the compulsion inherent in either the present system, a lottery, or universal military training.

Great efficiency in the military services resulting from a lower turnover rate, and, thus, dollar savings in man-hours currently spent in training.

Avoidance of the arbitrary discrimination and inherent inequities of the present system.

Elimination of the difficult constitutional questions relating to conscientious objectors.

Military personnel would be fairly compensated for their services.

#### *Discussion and conclusions*

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am deeply concerned that the alternatives to the draft have not been sufficiently explored by the several Presidential commissions and other manpower study groups. The Marshall Commission, for example, dismisses the possibility of moving to volunteerism in two pages of loose argument, backed by two graphs. A report to the House Committee on Armed Services, prepared by a civilian advisory panel headed by Gen. Mark Clark, disposes of a volunteer army in one paragraph, without even one graph.

To conclude: A voluntary system is wholly compatible with the principles of a free society and offers numerous advantages over a compulsory system. It appears that a volunteer military force is feasible and at the minimum we do not know conclusively that it is not feasible, that the necessary flexibility can be maintained, and that no serious threat would be posed to our political institutions.

Therefore it is my hope that your committee will recommend and that Congress will declare its intention to establish a voluntary system and take the necessary steps toward that goal. This, of course, a voluntary system is what this country has had throughout the overwhelming majority of its history. Opposition to volunteerism, it would seem, must stem from one of two views. First, that one has all the information necessary and is fully convinced that a voluntary system is not feasible. This position, I submit, is not supported by the information available to me. Or, second, one may hold the view that whether or not a voluntary system is feasible, it should be opposed in favor of a compulsory system. Such a position is inconsistent with the fundamental opposition to compulsion in a free society. I recognize the difficulty of the task charged to your committee. Military manpower requirements and the recommendations to meet them pose broad and complex questions. However, based upon the information

available to me thus far the case for a volunteer military force *seems to be overwhelming.*

I thank you for inviting me here today and would welcome your questions or comments.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think, Congressman, all of us would much prefer a volunteer system if we had the assurance that this would provide the necessary security internally and externally. It is certainly worthy of closest examination and we are glad to have your well-thought-out statement on it.

I don't agree with your comparison of the pay of the American private and the unemployment compensation of a collective farmworker. In addition to the \$96 a month, the American private is housed, fed, and clothed, and the \$96 a month is in addition which is not the case with the unemployment compensation or the collective farmworker.

Mr. RUMSFELD. This is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Miller?

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to have you before the committee, Congressman. I am concerned about two things. First of all you use the analogy to the Post Office Department or the U.S. Department of Agriculture. I would suggest to you that the computation of requirements for the domestic activities of those Departments is something that can be quite readily made without any outside factors entering in. But I am concerned about the fact that we cannot forecast what other countries, other leaders of other countries in the world are going to be doing, and this has an element of uncertainty in it which is not comparable to our own Cabinet level departments such as Agriculture and Post Office.

If a manpower study is made by USDA, and they conclude that in order to implement a certain program it is going to require 1,500 more people, those 1,500 people can be acquired, and we are not going to have to worry too much about weight. But how are we going to determine whether we need 100,000 more people in the Armed Forces or 50,000 or whether we are going to stay level? Nobody can look into a crystal ball and do that, and in order to have the flexibility, I am not sure that this voluntary force is going to do it.

I must say that I think cost is a factor. I don't think that cost is the only factor, nor necessarily the major factor. But what are we going to do? Are we going to have an all voluntary force today, with 450,000 volunteers in Vietnam, and then if the war in Vietnam is over in a couple of years, are we going to say, "Well, that was nice of you to volunteer, but we don't have any need for you any longer, so you are out."

Now, I doubt very much if you are going to have a volunteer system like that, unless you have very sensitive coverage of separation from the services. I think that we can have a voluntary, a basic voluntary armed service, and then in times of stress or in times of need, we have to expand it, and we may have to expand it quite rapidly. Now, you did admit that the conscription would be necessary in a situation such as World War II.

Mr. RUMSFELD. And conceivably in situations somewhat less serious than that.

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Senator MILLER. Yes, but where do you draw that line? Are you going to draw it at Vietnam? It would seem to me that the increasing manpower requirements of Vietnam are such, that they ought to fit into the same category. I don't know, when you talk about an adequate force—an adequate force today may be inadequate tomorrow.

Mr. RUMSFELD. This is quite true.

Senator MILLER. And our problem is to be flexible enough so that we do not take on an excessive number of people beyond the requirement. I must say that there is a ring of appeal in a voluntary force. I think that we are doing that now. We have a rather large standing voluntary force today, and we are implementing it in a time of stress and strain by conscription.

Now, you might get into a smaller war and say well, we only need 5,000 more people above our standing army, let's do that by a voluntary system. I don't know where you are going to draw the line, and I suggest to you that the flexibility inherent in the system we are now following is vital to our national security.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, it is my conviction that if we revise the incentives, we can dramatically increase the current number of volunteers. Now, you asked the question where do we draw the line. I don't have any specific knowledge as to where the line would be drawn, but the line would be drawn at that point, where during a certain point in our country's history, with reasonable incentives; we were unable to obtain the required military manpower.

Now, we all know the population trends are such that there are an increasing number of young men in the draft ages. We know also that there have not been, since World War II, really what can be called dramatic shifts in the military manpower requirements. They have not gone from 5 million down to zero. They have fluctuated within a relatively small range. I suggest that this volunteer approach would not provide total flexibility. It couldn't be expected to. It seems to me that it does provide some flexibility in that within a range of say 500,000 to 1 million you could adjust the flow into the military on the basis of the incentives and the attractiveness and the recruiting procedures, just as you do in other Government agencies, say between 2.7 million and 3.7 million.

Senator MILLER. Oh, yes.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Above that point —

Senator MILLER. What do you do once they are in there?

Mr. RUMSFELD. This is what I am getting to. If you have got to go above that point, because of a serious situation, and I don't know whether Vietnam could or could not be described as above that point, had we already adopted these incentives, that it would have required triggering in a compulsory approach. I don't know that, and I don't think anyone does because we haven't tried this. But we would have the compulsory system available to be triggered in, to bring into the military the people that this country needs to maintain our national security. Certainly I am fully convinced that this country must maintain an adequate military. Because we don't know what levels will be required, it seems to me that it is perfectly reasonable to try to set as a goal the maintenance of a voluntary system and to improve incentives so that we maximize the number of volunteers in the mili-

these people can be used. They have been used in the past and that is what their purpose is today. So you do have this extra tool that can be used to avoid the most dramatic fluctuations.

Senator MILLER. Your argument with respect to the use of the reserves is much more appealing to me than the argument for the voluntary force. I find it difficult to think that I would sit over here on the floor and vote for appropriation for an excessive number of military personnel.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, we won't, and I am not advocating that.

Senator MILLER. What are you going to do if the war in Vietnam is over and they say, "Well, now we need to have some men over there for another 2 or 3 or 4 years, but we only need, maybe, 25,000 or 50,000. We are going to phase out 400,000." What are you going to do with them if they are all volunteers?

Mr. RUMSFELD. What you do is you permit the normal retirement and attrition and resignations to take place at the outer end of the funnel and you turn faucet off at the beginning of the funnel. We are dealing with a military of 3 million. So you are working on a big base, and a fluctuation of 200,000 on a base of 3 million I think can be controlled by working the nozzle at the beginning of the funnel and closing it off, and permitting the normal retirement and resignations and military discharges and these types of things at the other end.

Senator MILLER. I think this normal attrition proposition of yours might be feasible in some cases. I don't believe it would be feasible with a contingent such as we have in the Vietnam war.

Mr. RUMSFELD. You don't think there are 200,000 people over in Vietnam that if the need were no longer there, that they wouldn't be anxious to undertake a different phase of their life, whether education or civilian employment? I would think that you would find—

Senator MILLER. No; that wasn't my point. My point was that I don't believe that if the war in Vietnam were over tomorrow, and it was decided that 400,000 were surplus to our needs, that we could say "Well, you are all volunteers and you are going to stay on board with your careers assured because we are going to have 400,000 leave this year from the top level and therefore you can move up from the bottom level."

I think it would be excessive and tremendously excessive. I recognize that if we only had, let's say, phasing out of 50,000, that it might work out that way. Here again, what the specialties and all of that would be, I don't know.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Right.

Senator MILLER. But I am afraid I am deeply concerned about the lack of flexibility in this proposal.

Mr. RUMSFELD. This is the reason that I proposed not the immediate adoption of a voluntary military, but rather a maximum extension of 2 years of the Selective Services Act, with correction of the most serious inequities and uncertainties, and then during that period, revision in the military pay and incentive practices, so that we can maximize the number of volunteers, gain some experience over that 2-year period, and see to what extent somewhere in the range between the comments you have made and I have made, to what extent this



country would be capable of controlling these varying needs, with a varying supply, because the population trends are different.

The only point I would make in addition is this: It is my guess that as we proceed through the coming decades, this country will have varying needs as we face situations such as Vietnam or others elsewhere. But it is my estimate that many of the people of this country would be influenced in their decision whether or not they would like to volunteer by the seriousness of the situation this country faces, and that you would have an increase in people who would feel that it was a worthwhile and needed function for them to participate during a period of crisis, as we have found in every period of crisis in this country's history, and that when the crisis eased many of those would establish different priorities for their lives, and would decide that they would want to undertake different vocations. So I think that there is this human element that would help to solve the problem which you have posed so well.

Senator MILLER. One other point. On page 8 of your statement you refer to an advantage which the all-volunteer system would provide; namely "preservation of the freedom of the individual to serve or not to serve." I suggest to you that there is no such freedom. That there is a duty, not a freedom, there is a duty of the individual to serve his country in time of need.

Mr. RUMFELD. No question about it.

Senator MILLER. I don't believe that we can proceed on a premise that there is a freedom of the individual to serve or not to serve his country in time of need. I think it is a responsibility of American citizenship and I think it is a duty. I don't think he has any freedom on that at all, unless perhaps it is a conscientious objection.

Mr. RUMFELD. My statement in the first page I believe said that that I believe an individual should have the freedom to serve or not to serve, except in a time of demonstrated need. This is exactly what you are now saying, only you are saying it in the reverse. That in a period of demonstrated need the people of this country have a duty to serve and certainly compulsion at a time of demonstrated need is totally compatible with our system of Government, and I quite agree with you. I think you are merely emphasizing the opposite side of the coin. We both agree that only during a period of demonstrated need should people be required by their government to allocate a period of their life to something the government decides is worth while.

Senator MILLER. When you say demonstrated need, who does the demonstrating? This gets us into considerable testimony that we have received in the last 2 days on the conscientious objector area. There are a good many people in this country who say there is no demonstrated need to serve in Vietnam at all. We shouldn't even be there in the first place. There are others who say there is no demonstrated need to resort to force to solve international problems.

Mr. RUMFELD. I am not saying any of these things. I am saying, as you say, that the Congress decides when there is demonstrated need. And, when there is demonstrated need will vary, depending on what your incentives are, because the need for a compulsion will go down as we revise the incentives and the pay policies in the military, so that it is a more attractive vocation and more competitive with civilian op-

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point of demonstrated need for compulsion is not a fixed point. It is  
a moving point.

Senator MILLER. And it certainly can vary, depending upon the in-  
centives that are put into this thing.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Exactly.

Senator MILLER. If you pay every private \$10,000—

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, I am not suggesting that.

Mr. MILLER (continuing). And if there is a demonstrated need to  
have conscription—I think we are getting ourselves into an area of  
terrible uncertainty. Now, I don't deny that we shouldn't have a  
continuing review of this thing. I think all of the members of this  
committee feel the same way, that we want to have our voluntary  
system attractive, but at the same time there are going to be about  
15 different viewpoints on where that base pay should start. Then,  
of course, you might say to some people, "Well, now, if you just volun-  
teer for 2 years, we will pay you twice as much as the private who goes  
in for career service." You are going to have a lot of discontent  
among the military personnel. I think we are headed for what typi-  
cally is called a can of worms in trying to come up with some solution  
to this thing, recognizing that we ought to try to make our military  
service as attractive, and I have long said, as compatible with or com-  
parable with outside civilian occupations as possible.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, in keeping with that question, what is the  
uncertainty if the Congress this year decides to extend it not for 4 but  
for 2 years, and during that time tries to gain some experience and  
learn what adjustments in pay policies might bring by way of addi-  
tional volunteers. In addition, what is the uncertainty if behind this  
attempt to gain more experience with volunteerism we have in the  
background a compulsory system available every time it is needed.

It seems to me there is no uncertainty.

Senator MILLER. You can argue for a 1-year extension.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I question, I don't know, but I question whether we  
could get enough experience with the movement toward a voluntary  
system during a 1-year period. To argue against myself—

Senator MILLER. Do you think 2 years would be enough?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think 2 years would be a way station where we  
could stop and see if it was enough, and if it weren't, extend it an-  
other year at that time. Now, you say \$10,000 for a private. My  
proposal that I have inserted for the record is simply to straighten  
out the pay curve. The present curve has a rather dramatic dropoff.  
We have been using compulsion as a crutch. We have been paying  
the people during their earliest years of service substantially less, as  
far as the curve goes. It isn't a straight line of increases during the  
experience of a person's military service, it is a dramatic dropoff, and  
they get substantially less. Why? Because we have used compul-  
sion as a crutch to pay them less than they deserve, less than they could  
earn on the outside, and frankly in my opinion less than we should.

Senator MILLER. Well, but you get back to this matter of duty to  
serve, and there are a good many people who might say their duty to  
serve is such that they ought to be willing to serve without pay. At  
the time of need, if you would, they might well take that into account,

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but here again you have a matter of equity between those who are called and have to go, and those who do not have to go, and the struggle that we live in the Congress is to try to reach some kind of a compromise which will be as equitable as possible and relieve as many inequities as possible. Anything we are going to do, and you well know it, is going to have its inequities.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is true.

Senator MILLER. But I do believe we ought to keep in mind the need for flexibility as you have pointed out, and the fact that the individual does have a duty to serve his country in time of need. I think there are a lot of people today who agree that we do have a time of need today, and there are others who would argue that point, but the Congress has to make that decision.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, if there were a need for people to serve without pay, then I quite agree with you we would have a duty as citizens of this country to participate in the military without pay. But there is no need for the people in the U.S. military to serve without pay today. Nor, in my view, is there a need, or is it in fact desirable, to require people during the early periods of their service to serve at substantially less than the competitive civilian market rates would pay them for similar service.

Senator MILLER. I would agree with that. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Congressman, it is a pleasure to see you. I have read your statement and am sorry I was late. It is interesting. There is a lot of appeal in a volunteer plan. I don't worry too much about the cost. There is little around this town that cannot be solved by another three or four billion American dollars, as is true in most other towns of the world today. But I wonder, do you think we could get the required technical skills if we went to a volunteer system?

Today in this country, there are serious shortages in the manpower incident to say electronics, and other highly technical skills necessary in any defense operation. Inasmuch as there is that heavy demand as against supply, these people can obtain heavy increases in salary in private work.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Right.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know we understand each other on this. That being true, how do you think that could be handled?

Mr. RUMSFELD. It seems to me that the way it should be handled would be to expand on some of the personnel practices and techniques which are currently being employed. Today there are some different incentives for undertaking training that requires a higher degree of skill, and which is of extreme urgency and importance to a particular military service. It seems to me that, just as in the private sector, you could adjust incentives so that you could control the number of individuals available with those skills.

One way that might be used is to require a longer period of service by contract for an individual who embarks upon training in these areas are paid for and sponsored by the military. If in fact it is attractive for an individual to gain some training in the military in electronics, then it is attractive to him because of what it can do for

him on the private sector.

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Well, then if it is attractive, why not take advantage of that attractiveness and instead of requiring a 2-year commitment for a person who enters school X to receive training that is attractive on the outside, require a 4-, 5-, or 6-year contract, in addition to adjusting incentives. So you have these two things that I think could help control the maintenance of the necessary number of individuals with a specific skill.

The third thing you have got in the background always is the capability of triggering in a compulsory system, because you would have to have that, to protect this country's service. My hope is that we will trigger it in as seldom as possible, and that we will maximize the number of individuals who will be willing to serve on a voluntary basis.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator INOUYE?

Senator INOUYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the Congressman for his very interesting remarks. I would like to make two observations, and if you wish to make comments, please do.

First, we have received testimony here suggesting that more than 40 percent of those who are now volunteering are volunteering because of the threat of the draft, and secondly, a few witnesses have testified that if you increased incentives as you have suggested, and most of the people who have advocated volunteer forces have advocated increased monetary incentives to make it worth their while, and by so doing, some of the witnesses have concluded that we would then have a mercenary army, an army not fully motivated or properly motivated, or one just motivated by money, one made up of professional killers, and I would just like to have your comments.

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, first of all with respect to your comment concerning the possibility that greater than 40 percent of the individuals who are now volunteering are doing it to avoid the compulsion that is waiting for them if they don't volunteer, I can only say that certainly the members of this committee have far more knowledge than I about this. The only thing I have to go on with respect to the figure is a statement that has not to my knowledge been documented or backed up with study papers or background papers or working papers by the Department of Defense. My proposal is to extend the draft for 2 years and move toward a voluntary system. During that time we could gain some hard facts with respect to what percent were or were not actually motivated in their volunteering by a desire—

Senator INOUYE. These figures were presented to us by the Department of Defense.

Mr. RUSSELL. Right, and it is based on some sampling I understand that they did in the military, to find out what motives were of volunteers. I would guess that there were a variety of factors weighing on people's minds, and my hope is that during the next 2 years we can find out how well we are able to move toward a voluntary system and gain some real experience with that figure. I can't answer you whether it is accurate or inaccurate. I just don't know. I think we ought to find out.

Senator INOUYE. Further, it has been suggested that a significant number of men in the Reserves and National Guard have so enlisted or volunteered because of the threat of the draft, also?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That again falls into the same category. I am sure that there are individuals in the Reserves, in the National Guards, who are there to avoid the possibility of being drafted. What the numbers are or what impact the revision of incentives and policies by the military that I have proposed might have on that number I don't know.

Now, with respect to your question, this same question, there is the factor that I mentioned earlier, that Secretary McNamara is already attempting to move some tasks or functions or jobs that are presently categorized as military into the civilian sector. He has moved many thousands, I am told by the Department of Defense, into the civilian sector. I think that the coming years offer an opportunity for continuing this to some extent, which then, of course, makes them available to the country as a whole.

Turning to your other question on the charge that it would be a mercenary army. This, of course, is an allegation that is made. I would make the following comments: First, that if that is so, then our country has had a mercenary army throughout the overwhelming majority of its history, during the Revolutionary War, during the entire period after that, during most of the Civil War, during the period between then and World War I, except for a brief period during World War I, right up to World War II. I haven't seen anyone complaining about that.

Senator INOUYE. Apparently the voluntary motive was not money,

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, I am sure that the voluntary motive here would not be money exclusively, and to suggest that wouldn't be accurate. Right now there is not only no incentive, but there is just the reverse. We are trying to push people away from volunteering, because during their early years of service we pay them substantially less than they could make in other comparable civilian employment.

Now a mercenary army to me is one composed of individuals who go into the particular military force for pay, and then hire out to fight wars on contract. But we are not advocating that the U.S. military be available for sale to another country to fight their battles, and that is basically what a mercenary is. We are simply saying that we would like to have a military that is composed to the maximum extent of volunteers. Anyone who says that this would create a mercenary army, then I think has to say that today we have a mercenary officer corps, because our officer corps is now and has always been totally volunteer. Is that a mercenary group? I think this is a poor word describing it.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Congressman, I don't want to prolong this, but the voluntary aspects of the officer corps are not as open and unlimited as the voluntary aspects of the military service you propose.

Mr. RUMSFELD. It is a smaller group.

Chairman RUSSELL. The option for nearly all the junior officers in the service is to go in as an officer or be drafted and go in as a private. That is about the only part that is voluntary. After they get in a great many of them decide that they will make a career of it and do volunteer. Technically, you are right. They are volunteers, but the option is not between being in the Armed Forces or not. It is

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between whether you go as an officer or whether you go as a private.

We have increased the Armed Forces of our country by about 700,000 since Vietnam fighting started. Do you think we could have made that increase by voluntary means, assuming that we had a voluntary force of 2.6 million in existence at the time that the war started?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I question whether you could have moved from the level we were, then institute at the time of the escalation a volunteer system, and still recruit the 700,000. I question whether that would have been possible. Whether it would have been possible had we previously had a volunteer system, and then worked from that stronger base during this period I don't know. What I am hoping and suggesting is that I think it would be prudent and wise and safe for the Congress this year to extend it for 2 years, and then try to gain the experience so that you and I could both ask that question without using opinion, but know reasonably conclusively what our capabilities as a country really are, by using normal incentives and personnel practices to control to some extent the size of the military.

And the end of that 2-year period, I think both of us could answer that question conclusively.

Chairman RUSSELL. You referred to the Reserve Forces. Of course you know, Congressman, that a large part of the Reserve Forces of this country is in being today because of the draft laws.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is a factor.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are well aware of that, are you not?

Mr. RUMSFELD. And because of World War II, right. I have been a member of the Navy Reserves since my release from the Navy, and not because of the draft laws.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was interested in your comparison to the Post Office Department. I must say I think there is some difference in a couple of days' delay in receiving the mail and in perhaps having your country overrun in this technological age.

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question about that, and I am certainly not suggesting that the country be overrun. I am saying that we ought to have the compulsory system available if we need it, but we ought not, in a free system, use it as a crutch because of our failure to provide the incentives to gain a maximum number of volunteers.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you introduced a bill in the House dealing with this subject?

Mr. RUMSFELD. As far as pay increases? No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am at somewhat of a loss to know just how we could experiment with this concept at the same time we have the draft in operation.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I am submitting with my statement a comprehensive statement by Dr. Waller Oi who was involved in the Defense Department studies, which sets forth at least the beginning of guidelines the way this committee might undertake the 2-year extension with an experiment, and exactly his recommendation as to what could be done. It at least might be a stepping-off point. He has used econometrics, and attempted to evaluate what different incentives would or would not provide, and I think that this might be a beginning point. I would hope that the members of the committee would have a chance to review it.

Chairman RUSSELL. It could turn out to be a rather expensive experiment. I am in favor of equal pay for the members of the Armed Forces commensurate with their responsibilities, because they can't have unions, and for other reasons. I champion pay increases. But if we were to try out the voluntary system by substantially increasing compensation, we would immediately have to increase significantly the compensation of all the \$400,000 we have in the service now.

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, sir. I think what could be done would be to

Chairman RUSSELL. I certainly wouldn't increase the pay for a volunteer and then not give that same increase to a man who has been snapped up by the nape of his neck and put in there by the draft. I would certainly see that he received the same increase in pay that the volunteers received.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think the trouble is we are talking about it in a different way. You are comparing the pay for volunteers and non-volunteers and I am not. I am talking about raising the pay for anyone during those early years, straightening out that pay scale that presently exists that is not straight. Instead of a graduated increase as most employment has over a period of years, the military curve is very low over the early years; the reason is that we have had the compulsory draft to get those people in and keep them there even though we weren't paying them what they could have gotten somewhere else. I am just suggesting straightening out the curve for both volunteers and the conscripted.

Chairman RUSSELL. Be gracious enough when you prepare your bill to send me a copy of it. I want to see it.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I will give you the statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is a great deal of difference between a statement and writing a law. It is easy to suggest a solution, but when you begin to draft a bill to accomplish what you have laid out in your hypothesis, you always run into many complications, roadblocks, mines, boobytraps, and other obstacles you hadn't expected.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I quite agree. It is a broad and complicated subject, and I certainly recognize the seriousness of the job that your committee has facing it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Pearson?

Senator PEARSON. Congressman, I had a committee conflict and did not have an opportunity to hear your testimony. The concept of a voluntary Military Establishment has been touched upon, passed on in most all the testimony we have up to date. Those arguments against it of course, lack of flexibility, and contrary to the tradition of a citizen Military Establishment, political institutions, I see you have touched on all of these in your statement. I look forward to reading it.

I wonder if you would comment on a statement by General Clark, the Chairman of the Citizens Advisory Panel, I think instituted by the House Armed Services Committee. He said at page three:

"In addition"—after enumerating some of the objections to the voluntary force—"such a force of 'mercenaries' would have serious moral and psychological shortcomings."

Would you care to comment on that observation?

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Mr. RUMSFELD. I suppose it is a little brash for a Reserve Navy lieutenant to argue with General Clark, but I just have to say that I do not find this argument of fear of a mercenary army valid. He does not as I recall from my reading of that report explain exactly what he means by mercenary. As I indicated earlier, we have had, if that is what you want to call it, a mercenary army throughout the overwhelming majority of this country's history. We have had compulsory military service only for a few decades out of the entire history of this country. At this very date we still have a voluntary officer corps. A mercenary army to me is an army that is there for the money and that then that group hires out to another country to fight someone else's war. No one is suggesting that this country's military be made available to another country to fight its war. This is not what I am advocating. I am simply advocating that we move closer to the goal of maximizing the number of people who serve in the military because they want to, and I think we will have a better military than we have today, and I recognize that any threat, any potential threat to existing political institutions, is something that must be very carefully weighed.

I don't think there is anything in our history that would indicate that we as a country could not avoid what I am advocating, developing into a mercenary arm in the context that General Clark apparently meant it.

Senator PEARSON. Do you know of any other nation or country that employs such a system as you have recommended or touched upon in your report?

Mr. RUMSFELD. In the paper I have submitted there are comments about five or six other countries who have various systems. My brief review of this question with respect to previous history is that there have been instances where political institutions have been threatened by both conscript and nonconscript armies, and in almost every case it has been by the officer corps.

Senator PEARSON. My question was whether or not you know of any country today that employs a voluntary military system, such as we are discussing this morning?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There certainly is no country like the United States which does, but Canada.

Senator PEARSON. Nor with the commitments which we have around the world actually.

Mr. RUMSFELD. There are countries. It is my understanding that Canada has an absence of compulsion in their system. There are numerous other countries that have this. The question as to whether or not this country can is something that I touched on at length earlier, and this is something I confess I don't know. I do think that we have really no legitimate excuse not to try to find out during the next 2-year period by extending the act for 2 years and trying to gain some experience to see what this country can actually do in terms of maximizing the number of volunteers.

Senator PEARSON. I want to thank you, Congressman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUMSFELD. Thank you very much, Congressman. We are glad to have you here and have your statement.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Thank you very much.  
(The material referred to by Congressman Rumsfeld in his statement follows:)

PROPOSAL FOR A MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT BILL

(By Dr. Walter Y. Oi, March 31, 1967)

This memorandum outlines a proposal for a military manpower procurement bill to replace the present draft law. We recommend that the draft authority be extended for a period of two years and that the steps outlined in this proposal be adopted by the Dept. of Defense. We endorse the two-year extension rather than the four-year extension recommended by the Marshall Commission for two reasons.

1. Our proposal entails radical departures from the current practices of the Selective Service System. The same can also be said of the Marshall Commission recommendations. Congress should have an opportunity to evaluate any new draft law without waiting for four years. Two years of operation should supply us with sufficient data to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of our proposed program.

2. Military manpower policies of the Dept. of Defense have not been well-articulated nor rationalized into a integrated coherent program of manpower utilization. The necessary studies to formulate an integrated military manpower policy should be undertaken immediately. In the light of these studies, Congress may wish to revise the military manpower procurement program.

I. OBJECTIVES

a. To assure that the Armed Services will be supplied with sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to insure the defense of the nation while placing maximum reliance on volunteers.

b. To establish a system of military compensation designed to lessen a major inequity inherent in involuntary military service.

c. To rationalize the role and function of the Reserve components in an integrated program of military manpower policies.

d. To inaugurate changes in the overall military manpower policies of the Department of Defense to achieve greater efficiency in the utilization of manpower.

The present draft law (The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1961) is due to expire on 30 June 1967. The need for modifying the present law is attested by the establishment of a Presidential study group (the Marshall Commission) as well as by a second study group (the Clark Commission). The reports of both Commissions accept as fact that a military draft is necessary, at least in the foreseeable future. The Marshall Commission carefully documents the arbitrary actions of local draft boards under the current Selective Service System. Both Commissions conclude that the current draft law is highly inequitable and must be modified. That any system of involuntary military service is inequitable when not all serve requires no further amplification. Both reports can be criticized on at least two grounds. First, the reasons why the draft is so inequitable are never listed nor are their implications examined. Second, the alternatives proposed by both Commissions deal only with the procurement of new accessions to the uniformed services, thereby neglecting the question of how the initial procurement policy fits into the larger picture of military manpower policy. The potential impact of the Marshall Commission's impartial random selection system on the supplies of voluntary accessions is only superficially discussed; no estimates appear in the 218 page report.

II. METHOD OF SELECTING DRAFTERS

a. The present draft classification system will be simplified to contain only six classifications as follows:

- (1) I-A, available for service.
- (2) I-X, available for service only after exhaustion of the I-A pool.
- (3) Hardship deferments.
- (4) Student deferments.



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(5) **Exempt from service.** This category will include the conscientious objectors as well as men rejected for service because of physical, mental, or moral reasons.

(6) **Discharged military service obligation.** This category will include men in service (active and reserve) as well as veterans who have completed service and returned to civilian life.

If desired, a seventh category, I-Y, "Trainability limited" could be added.

b. The I-A pool will include all men without deferments whose draft age is between 19 and 21. The draft age for an individual who never obtains a deferment is identical to his chronological age. An individual who secures a deferment is placed in a state of suspended animation at a draft age of 19. When his deferment lapses (upon leaving school), he is placed in the I-A pool with a draft age of 19, irrespective of his chronological age. Hence, a student who is deferred to a chronological age of 25 to complete his work for a law degree is returned to the I-A pool with a draft age of 19. Each individual (whether or not he obtains a student deferment) is therefore put in the I-A pool for at most two years. For details of the proposed selection system, confer note a.

c. Men who are not selected or who do not discharge their military service obligation through voluntary entry are placed in draft classification I-X when their draft age exceeds 21. They remain in this I-X status for five years.

d. Hardship deferments will continue to be given on an individual basis with an appeal procedure similar to that now in operation. The criteria for granting such deferments should conform to the criteria of eligibility for the poverty program.

e. Student deferments will be issued to all bona-fide full- and part-time students. Individuals receiving a student deferment will, however, remain in a state of suspended animation with respect to their draft age. When the student deferment lapses (because of completion of schooling or leaving school prior to graduation), the individual is reclassified into the I-A pool and assigned a draft age of 19. Since all occupational and dependency deferments (other than hardship) are to be discontinued, every student who obtains a deferment is certain to be put in the I-A pool for approximately two years upon completion of schooling. They will enter the I-A pool with an assigned draft age of 19 irrespective of their chronological age.

f. Exemptions from the military service obligation are to be determined in the same fashion as at present. The Marshall Commission also recommends this; notice that exemption differs from deferment.

g. An individual can discharge his military service obligation through voluntary entry into any reserve or active duty component (either as an officer or an enlisted man) at any time prior to receipt of his preinduction notice. However, once he has been issued a preinduction notice, he is prevented from volunteering.

h. Draft calls will be issued on a monthly basis in a manner designed to eliminate the seasonal pattern in draft calls. The oldest men (in terms of draft ages) will be called first. If the draft call for any month is less than the number of men in the I-A pool reaching their 21st draft birth date, a random selection of birth dates will determine which men are selected.

The two salient facts which prompted the establishment of the Marshall and Clark Commissions are (1) the rapid growth in the population base of eligible males and (2) the unduly long period of draft vulnerability which created many uncertainties for youths in the affected age range. These two facts must be acknowledged in any proposal for selecting some men for involuntary induction while others are permitted to escape their military service obligations.

It is not surprising to find high personnel turnover when men are involuntarily drafted or are coerced to volunteer by the threat of a draft. The personnel turnover of a professional voluntary force would be considerably lower, meaning that fewer men from each cohort would need to be attracted into the Armed Services.

The chronological age of students reclassified into the I-A pool could vary from 19 to as high as 27 years of age. If, for example, a student continues to graduate school for an advanced degree, he may retain his student deferment. However, when he is put into the I-A pool, he is regarded as having a draft age of 19; put in another way, the six years in which he held a student deferment contribute nothing to his draft age. If the two-year period of maximum vulnerability to the draft is felt to be unduly long (creating uncertainties for the older men completing college), they could be reclassified into the I-A pool and assigned a draft age of 20. Since the oldest are called first, they will incur the same risks of being drafted as non-students.

Even with the high turnover of the present system of manpower procurement (predicated on a ~~draft~~ and the threat of being drafted), DOD projections indicate that the Armed Services will require less than one third of the males reaching the age of 19.

Under the current Selective Service System, an individual can remain in a draft-liable status for up to seven and one-half years. During this period of draft liability, a youth cannot determine whether he will be drafted or, if so, when. Of course he has the option of discharging his obligation by volunteering or asking to be drafted; many individuals choose, however, to wait or to seek means of securing deferments that eventually grant them effective evasion of their military service obligation. The DOD report (confer the June 1966 Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee) indicated that uncertainties created by the present selection system impose unnecessary costs and hardships on those youths who remain in a draft-vulnerable status. To remedy this shortcoming, the Marshall Commission has proposed an impartial random selection system which reduces the period of maximum vulnerability to less than a year; in fact, each individual can estimate his chances of being drafted during his 18th year before he reaches his 19th birth date.

The uncertainty of the present draft system is, however, not an unmitigated evil. Representatives of the Department of Defense and the Selective Service System have testified before Congressional committees that this uncertainty accounts for considerable numbers of volunteers. According to DOD surveys of men on active duty, 88.1 per cent of regular enlistments and 41.8 per cent of newly commissioned officers could be regarded as reluctant draft-motivated volunteers who were coerced to enlist by the threat of being drafted. Furthermore, 71.7 per cent of enlistments to Reserve and National Guard units enlisted because of their draft obligations. Examination of the age distribution of regular enlistments (to active duty) reveals that fully 95 per cent were under 21 years of age at the time of entry. The peak in the age distribution is at age 19. If the lottery proposed by the Marshall commission were adopted, it seems probable that many of these reluctant volunteers would fail to enter once they determined that they had been bypassed in the random selection system. Under our proposal, the 18- and 20-year-olds would—as at present—be subjected to the uncertainty of the draft; since this would continue to pose a dilemma for this age group. The Armed Services would benefit from larger numbers of regular enlistments who can be put into the training programs for technical skills. Moreover, each additional volunteer (who serves an initial tour of three to four years and who is more likely to reenlist) leads to a reduction of at least two draftees (each serving for only two years and with a reenlistment rate of less than 7 per cent). Our proposal would, therefore, result in considerably smaller draft calls, thereby further reducing the inequity of involuntary military service. This fact has not been examined nor discussed by the Marshall Commission.

### III. ADJUSTMENTS IN THE COMPENSATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

a. The pay of enlisted men and officers in their first two years of service will be raised in order to eliminate the inequity in the pay profile of military personnel.

b. The current system of retirement benefits will be modified in two ways. (1) Servicemen will contribute to their retirement funds, thereby sharing the cost of the retirement program with the government. And (2) retirement benefits in the form of separation bonuses will be granted to men who serve for less than twenty years.

That the cost of an all-volunteer force would be inordinately high has been put forth as an argument for the continuation of a military draft. The DOD study of June 1966 reported that the pay raises needed to staff an active-duty force of 2.7 million men would increase the military payroll budget by 4 to 17 billion dollars a year. Our estimate of this cost is around 4 billion dollars. The military payroll is, however, not the real cost of labor resources devoted to the Armed Services. Over the last sixteen years, the pay raises legislated by Congress have mainly benefited men in the career force with four or more years of service. Indeed, entry-level pay (for the first two years of service) has remained virtually constant from 1950 to 1964, with the consequence that the real income of enlisted men (in dollars adjusted for changes in the cost

of living) has declined appear to be (1) to comparability with men and (2) to de-reenlist. The introduction of this latter obligation has been held supplies of new recruits.

The pay profile of The annual total maintenance, and quarters the servicemen in the servicemen become measure of pay excluding medical/dental care hazardous duty, sea evident when the draft (resulting both from time in pay grades) indeed, a direct result against new recruits.

The magnitude of pay estimates of civilians of comparable recruit to regular on \$3,450 per year, while per year. The average including the value of draftee or draft-inducing roughly \$1,200 per income taxes of FY age was only \$570. considerable burden or who were coerced men who serve in the high as the average of the real cost of p

The financial inequity the entire nation. In compensation, Congress most recent is the attend colleges and however, greatest for school. A man with abilities for absorb Bill. It would seem financial compensation.

To lessen the financial burden on the average of 64 percent schedules of annual. For a force strength raises would increase year; for a strength by \$1.713 million. commissioned officers should, in our opinion, adopted.

\* The size of the draft and military incomes. pay would have to be roughly \$3,000 per year extended to officers would have to be the men.

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of living) has declined. The two prime objectives in prior military pay bills appear to be (1) to raise the pay of the career force to achieve approximate comparability with the pay of civilians of similar age and educational attainment and (2) to devise methods for attracting more first-term servicemen to reenlist. The introduction of reenlistment bonuses and proficiency pay exemptions this latter objective. Throughout, the pay of recruits in their first two years has been held down because the military draft could assure adequate supplies of new recruits.

The pay profile of enlisted men under the pay scale of 1963 is shown in Table 1. The annual total military income includes (1) base pay, (2) uniform, subsistence, and quarters allowances either in money or (if these are provided to the servicemen) in their imputed value, and (3) the tax advantage realized by the servicemen because some pay items are treated as nontaxable income. Our measure of pay excludes the value of fringe benefits (such as PX privileges and medical/dental care) as well as money payments for special duties—jump, hazardous duty, sea duty, etc. The sharp discontinuity in the pay profile is evident when the data are plotted as in Figure 1. The annual pay increases (resulting both from normal promotion to higher pay grades and from longer time in pay grades) are highest for the first two years. This discontinuity is, indeed, a direct result of the pay legislation which has overtly discriminated against new recruits.

The magnitude of the discrimination becomes even more shameful when the pay estimates of Table 1 are juxtaposed to the average full-time incomes of civilians of comparable age and educational attainment. In 1964, the typical recruit to regular enlisted ranks (volunteers) could as a civilian have earned \$3,450 per year, while the typical draftee who is older could have earned \$3,810 per year. The average military income (for the first three years of service and including the value of subsistence and quarters) was only \$2,400 per year. Each draftee or draft-induced volunteer was thus burdened with a hidden tax averaging roughly \$1,200 per year. For purposes of comparison, the Federal personal income taxes of FY 1965 show that the tax burden per person over 18 years of age was only \$570. The inordinately low levels of first-term pay thus impose a considerable burden on a minority of youths—those who happen to be drafted or who were coerced to enlist by the threat of a draft. Put in another way, the men who serve in the Armed Forces are compelled to pay a hidden tax twice as high as the average tax burden placed on all adults, and by this process a part of the real cost of procuring military manpower is concealed.

The financial inequity of involuntary military service is an embarrassment to the entire nation. In attempts to remedy this blatantly unfair system of military compensation, Congress has offered various "benefits" to veterans, of which the most recent is the postwar G.I. Bill granting stipends to ex-servicemen who attend colleges and technical training schools. Benefits from the G.I. Bill are, however, greatest for those who have the highest probability of succeeding in school. A man with a bad educational background in high school or with limited abilities for absorbing formal training realizes virtually nothing from the G.I. Bill. It would seem that a far more equitable solution is to provide direct financial compensation, allowing the individual to spend it as he chooses.

To lessen the financial inequity of involuntary military service and to compensate men who choose to volunteer, we propose to raise first-term pay by an average of 64 percent over the first two years. The present (1963) and proposed schedules of annual military income for enlisted men are shown in Table 2. For a force strength of 2.05 million men, implementation of the proposed pay raises would increase the payroll budget for enlisted men by \$1,368 million per year; for a strength of 3.3 million men, the payroll for enlisted men would climb by \$1,713 million. Corresponding adjustments would also be made for newly commissioned officers. These adjustments in the compensation of servicemen should, in our opinion, be made irrespective of the draft law that is ultimately adopted.

\*The size of the hidden tax is larger than the difference of \$1,200 between civilian and military incomes. Our study, as well as the DOD study, indicates that first-term pay would have to be raised to an entry-level pay (in the first year of service) of roughly \$3,800 per year. When pay increases similar to those proposed in Table 2 are extended to officers and enlistments to reserve components, the military payroll budget would have to be increased by roughly \$1.6 billion for a force strength of 2.05 million men.

Under the current system of compensation, a serviceman receives retirement benefits of from one-half to three-fourths of base pay only if he serves for twenty years. Moreover, the individual never contributes toward his retirement fund. The Armed Forces clearly do not want all men to serve for twenty years, as evidenced by the "selection out" of officers around the tenth to twelfth years and by the eligibility requirements for reenlistment of regular enlisted men. The Canadian Armed Forces (a professional, all-volunteer force) have adopted a retirement program with two appealing features. One is that the individual contributes on a matching basis toward his pension. The other is that he can realize benefits after eight or ten years of service, although the size of the benefit rises, of course, with length of service. Finally, the individual can elect to take his pension either in a lump sum as a separation bonus or in the form of an annuity. The retirement fund is thus put on an actuarially sound basis, unlike our present retirement system. In addition, the serviceman considering reenlistment is not forced to view a twenty-year term as prerequisite to receiving benefits that will enable him to make the adjustment to the civilian economy after retirement. We propose that the retirement system be modified to permit men to retire after ten years of service and that members contribute to their retirement, with benefits tied to the amount of the contribution, while the Department of Defense also contributes on a sharing basis.

TABLE 1.—Annual incomes of enlisted men (for pay scales of fiscal year 1963)

Years of service	Total DOD		Army						
	Total military income	Yearly Increases		Total military income	Yearly Increases		Base pay	Yearly Increases	
		Dollars	Percent		Dollars	Percent		Dollars	Percent
1.....	1,830			1,800			1,000		
2.....	2,143	313	17.1	2,304	404	21.3	1,302	327	31.0
3.....	2,991	848	39.6	3,247	943	40.9	2,002	690	44.8
4.....	3,344	353	11.8	3,711	464	14.3	2,433	431	21.5
5.....	4,130	786	23.5	4,248	537	14.5	2,878	445	15.5
6.....	4,462	332	8.0	4,462	217	5.1	2,725	160	5.8
7.....	4,649	187	4.2	4,649	181	2.9	2,804	133	4.9
8.....	4,741	92	2.0	4,737	201	4.4	3,001	165	5.5
9-12.....	5,235	494	9.4	5,377	232	4.4	3,250	111	3.7
13-16.....	5,926	691	13.2	5,643	167	3.1	3,445	151	4.4
17-20.....	6,387	461	7.3	5,414	191	3.5			

<sup>1</sup> Annual increases interpolated.

TABLE 2.—Proposed pay increases for enlisted men

(Total military income)

Years of service	Actual, 1963	Proposed	Percentage increase
1.....	1,830	3,180	71.0
2.....	2,143	3,280	57.7
3.....	2,991	3,030	21.4
4.....	3,344	3,890	16.0
5.....	4,130	4,130	
6.....	4,462	4,462	
7.....	4,649	4,649	
8.....	4,741	4,741	
9-12.....	5,235	5,235	
13-16.....	5,926	5,926	
17-20.....	6,387	6,387	

man receives retirement only if he serves for twenty years and his retirement fund. He must serve for twenty years, at least ten to twelve years and regular enlisted men. The other (former) has adopted a line is that the individual

The other is that the man, although the size of the pay, the individual can elect a bonus or in the form of an actuarially sound basis, the serviceman considering as prerequisite to receiving it to the civilian economy system be modified to permit members contribute to their tribulation, while the Depart-

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#### Army

Increase	Base pay	Yearly increases	
		Dollars	Percent
21.3	1,065	227	21.3
40.9	1,292	229	44.0
14.3	2,433	351	21.5
14.5	2,475	142	5.8
8.1	2,725	180	6.6
2.9	2,804	133	4.0
4.4	3,003	146	4.9
4.8	3,280	111	3.7
3.1	3,495	181	4.6
1.5			

#### Enlisted men

Actual, 1963	Proposed	Percentage Increase
1,834	2,130	71.0
2,148	2,300	57.7
2,801	3,030	21.4
3,344	3,800	16.0
4,130	4,180	1.2
4,402	4,402	0.0
4,640	4,640	0.0
4,741	4,741	0.0
4,286	5,283	23.3
5,920	5,920	0.0
6,387	6,387	0.0

TOTAL  
MILITARY  
INCOME

\$ 7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

YEARS OF SERVICE

## IV. ORGANIZATION OF RESERVES AND NATIONAL GUARD

a. The *strength of the reserve components on a paid-drill status should be reduced*. The smaller reserve forces can then be more *intensively trained* to serve as a true reserve to the active duty forces.

b. The Armed Services should undertake a *careful study* of the relative merits of the "unit" vs. "filler" concepts as applied to the Reserve forces.

c. The reserve components should constitute the *first source of supply of personnel* to the active duty ranks in periods of emergency.

At the present time, approximately 1.8 million men are on a paid-drill status in Reserve and National Guard units. A considerable fraction have, moreover, engaged in active duty only for training. It is not at all clear just what is the role of this large reserve force. Since the end of the Korean War, the yearly increase in the active duty strength has never exceeded 350 thousand men. Furthermore, throughout the present Vietnam build-up, no significant numbers of Reserves have been recalled to active duty. The obvious conclusion is that the reserves are not intended to bolster the active duty forces in short-run periods of mobilization. The role and function of the reserve components should be clearly articulated. We are of the opinion that they should serve as the primary source of accessions to the active duty forces in periods of wartime emergency or brush-fire wars. If this opinion is accepted, then the strength of the truly ready reserves (on a paid-drill status) could be reduced by 400 to 500 thousand men. Reserve strengths of 800 to 900 thousand men could easily accommodate the year-to-year flexibility in the active duty strengths for nearly all contingencies other than a global war.

Policies governing the organization of individual reserve units very widely across services. Some services; notably the Marine Corps and Navy, organize the reserves on the "filler" concept, whereby individual members of a unit may be called separately to active duty. The Air Force (especially the Air National Guard) and Army seem to follow the "unit" concept, wherein the entire unit is activated at once. During the Berlin build-up in the fall of 1961, several Army Reserve and Guard units were activated; the experience was less than satisfactory. The merits of the two systems have been discussed, but to the best of our knowledge there has been no determination as to what utilization of reserves can achieve the greatest defense capability for given resources of manpower and materials. Further study seems warranted.

## V. SOME SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MILITARY MANPOWER POLICIES

a. *Civilian substitution*.—The Department of Defense should carefully examine the *possibilities of substituting civilians for uniformed personnel*. This would seem to be especially important in the paramedical fields as well as in many of the maintenance, clerical, and food services. Expansion of the women's service corps does not appear to be advisable. Most of the tasks which they perform are of a clerical nature that could be handled by civilians at lower cost. When the British abandoned National Service, they experimented with expansion of the Women's Corps, only to cut back later on these programs.

b. *Officer procurement programs*.—Under the pressure of a draft liability, the Armed Services have been able to establish and maintain extremely high education standards for officers. In FY 1964, nearly all newly commissioned officers held college degrees. The value of a college education is apparent for a senior officer (of Lieutenant Colonel rank or higher) who must deal with administrative matters. However, the junior officers perform tasks which require more leadership training than formal educational achievements. The Second Lieutenant who leads an infantry platoon needs leadership abilities not easily taught in colleges. We propose that the Armed Services seriously study the possibility of expanding officer procurement channels, allowing men without a college degree to attain junior officer grades.

Under our proposal, highly qualified enlisted men could be advanced to junior officer ranks where, in a fashion similar to that adopted by the Canadian Armed Services, they would serve mainly as field officers. Their terms of service would be limited to ten or twelve years, and they would be retired at a rank of Captain (or Navy Lieutenant). The retirement plan outlined in III-b above would provide these men with separation bonuses that could be used to retain them for the civilian economy.

The introduction of this type of upward mobility from the enlisted to the officer ranks would have beneficial effects in two ways. First and most obvious

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is its effect on voluntary enlistments. If a high school graduate sees a chance to reach officer grade, he is more likely to volunteer for the Armed Forces. Second, the retirement of many junior officers after ten to twelve years of service would eliminate the need for "selection out" of officers with college degrees. The college graduate volunteering for an officers' training program would thus stand a better chance of reaching the senior officer ranks, and a military career would promise him greater rewards. We believe that a careful study of the qualification standards for junior officers will reveal that our present requirement of a college degree is unduly high and is a product of the present draft law which coerces many college graduates to volunteer for officers' commissions under threat of being drafted.

c. *Terms of service.*—The length of the first term of service for voluntary enlistments varies across services—being three years in the Army, four years in the Air Force, and three to four years in the Navy and Marine Corps. The Department of Defense has not experimented with varying these terms of service for initial enlistments; however, they have allowed wide variations in the length of the second term of service for men electing to reenlist. For example, a Navy enlisted man must commit himself to an extremely long second term (ten to twelve years) in order to qualify for the Polaris training program. We propose that the Department of Defense undertake studies to evaluate the merits of offering optional longer initial terms of service. Prospective recruits who enlist for the longer first terms could be offered initial enlistment bonuses or promise of more rapid promotion. With more men signed to longer initial tours of duty, the Armed Services could achieve far greater efficiency in training recruits to the highly technical skills.

d. *Recruitment of skilled personnel.*—Except for the Army, all other services recruit men with no special skills. Men possess skills which are transferable to military service and enter the Armed Forces at the same rank as men having no special experience or skills. We recommend that the recruitment system be changed to permit the Armed Services to offer higher rank and pay to men with special skills, perhaps through a system of differentials. The cost of recruiting highly skilled men will be reduced by adopting such a policy.

e. *Utilization of personnel.*—The utilization practices by the Armed Services are largely based on specific policies. The utilization of weapons systems and the effectiveness which have been achieved by the use of weapons systems are the result of a study, the primary cost of uniformed personnel is not the pay but the cost of labor resources of which a considerable portion has been recruited by compulsion. The primary objectives in all of these studies should be to develop a system of manpower procurement, distribution, and utilization which is the greatest benefit to the Nation for a given real cost of labor. Our opinion is that such a system should be based on maximum utilization of volunteers and thereby minimize the need for compulsory inductions.

#### THE COSTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

(By Walter X. Ol, University of Washington)

(AUTHOR'S NOTE.—A considerable amount of research for this paper was done while I served as a consultant for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense from June 1964 to July 1965. I am deeply indebted to many members of the OASD staff who provided assistance and information. The opinions and conclusions which appear in this paper are solely my responsibility and do not in any

\*The Navy offers certain recruitment programs for men with some college education but without a degree. Recruits to the NRESMP program are enlisted at a higher pay grade and have prospects for more rapid promotion. Also, all four services typically allow men with prior service experience to return to active duty at higher pay grades.

\*Skill differentials should not be confused with proficiency pay, which is paid to enlisted men in "critical" military occupations where there are shortages of qualified personnel. Under a system of skill differentials, men in the more highly skilled occupations would receive a premium (similar to an occupational wage differential) irrespective of the presence or absence of a "shortage." The Canadian system of Group Pay more nearly approximates our proposal for skill differentials.



way reflect the position of the Dept. of Defense. I am especially indebted to Mr. William A. Gorman, Dr. Harold Wool, and Prof. Stuart H. Altman who provided counsel and advice in my year of service on the manpower study. They are absolved of responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation which may still remain in this paper. A shorter version of this paper which emphasizes the economic cost of the draft is due to appear in the *Papers and Proceedings of the American Association (M 1967).*

The draft constitutes a means of supplying the Armed Services with qualified personnel. Except for a brief lapse from March 1947 to June 1948, a military draft has been in continuous operation in the United States since 1940. Under provisions of the current draft law, every qualified male incurs a liability to serve for two years in active military service and up to six years in the stand-by reserves. Some men obtain deferments or exemptions from this liability, while others discharge it through voluntary entry into military service. The remaining qualified youths have, however, been involuntarily inducted into active duty service.

In times of war when nearly everyone must serve, alternatives to a draft are judged to be too costly or infeasible. The peacetime demands for military personnel are, however, considerably smaller with the consequence that a draft becomes selective. Rules must therefore be established to determine which qualified youths will be involuntarily selected. The equity of the selection process (which under the current draft translates into deferment policies) is then questioned. These debates over the equity of a draft are testimony to the fact that some alternatives should be given serious consideration and perhaps even adopted.

One of several proposed alternatives to the current draft is the establishment of an all-volunteer force.<sup>1</sup> To say that a particular alternative such as an all-volunteer force is preferable to the current draft implies that the cost of the alternative is, in some sense, lower than the cost of procuring military personnel with the present Selective Service System. If the draft were abolished, military pay and other recruitment incentives must be improved to attract enough recruits to meet prescribed manpower objectives. In his statement before the House Armed Services Committee, the Hon. T. D. Morris (Assistant Secretary of Defense) indicated that an all-volunteer force of 2.65 million men would increase the military payroll budget by 4 to 17 billion dollars per year.<sup>2</sup>

The budgetary cost of the Department of Defense (hereafter abbreviated DOD) is not the economic cost of labor resources which are allocated to the uniformed services. The presence of a draft has affected both the level and structure of military pay. Moreover, the men who are in the Armed Forces were recruited and conscripted through manpower procurement programs which rely in differing degrees on the coercion of a draft liability. Adoption of a purely voluntary force entails increases in pay as well as substantial changes in the procurement channels through which men are recruited. The composition and structure of an all-volunteer force would thus differ significantly from that of the present force containing many men who were enlisted under the pressure of a draft liability. The structure of the Armed Forces is thus a product of manpower procurement and retention policies. In this paper, I shall compare the costs of two procurement systems: a purely voluntary system, and the system which has evolved under the current draft law.

The implications of projected military manpower demands are first examined in parts I and II for the two cases—a mixed force under a continued draft and a voluntary force. Part III presents estimates of the financial cost of the Armed Forces in terms of the value of civilian goods and services that could have been

<sup>1</sup> The three leading alternatives to the current draft are (1) an all-volunteer force, (2) lottery at a younger age, and (3) equivalent service. In the third alternative, men could discharge their draft liability by equivalent service in some other endeavor such as the Peace Corps or VISTA. Given the projected growth in male population, these "other endeavors" would have to be greatly expanded if all qualified youths are to serve their country. Adoption of this alternative would put the Federal Government into many new activities as well as a sizable rise in budgetary costs. The cost of a lottery selection system cannot be evaluated until its specific details are clarified. The impact of a lottery on voluntary accessions to enlisted ranks, officer procurement programs, and service units must be assessed. A comparison of the lottery and the present Selective Service System is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> House of Representatives, 89th Congress, Second Session, "Review of the Administration and Operation of the Selective Service System," Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services (June 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 30, 1966), [hereafter abbreviated House Hearings], pp. 9023-9065. See especially pp. 9036-9040.

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#### I. FORCE STRENGTH

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produced by men in the Armed Services. The full economic cost of the draft acknowledges the occupational preferences of prospective recruits. If a youth has an aversion to service life, he could in principle be compensated by enough to induce him to become a volunteer. Presently, many men who would demand such compensations are involuntarily inducted, while others reluctantly volunteer before they are drafted. The magnitude of these costs which are imposed on reluctant service participants is estimated in part IV. Finally, the mechanics of the current draft create uncertainties about the incidence and time of involuntary induction. Some of the costs associated with these uncertainties are briefly discussed in part V.

#### 1. FORCE STRENGTHS AND MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS UNDER A DRAFT

The labor resources demanded by the Armed Services can be approximated by force strength which is simply a stock demand for military personnel unadjusted for the quality of servicemen or for the proportion in an effective (non-training) status. The total defense establishment is conveniently divided into three force strengths, (1) officers on active duty, (2) enlisted men on active duty, and (3) paid drill reservists. The last component engages in active duty mainly for training and is rarely used to bolster active duty strengths.\*

The average force strength in all active and reserve components for the six years prior to Vietnam was just under 3.7 million men to whom 2.6 million were on active duty. The fluctuations in force strengths which are shown in the upper panel of Table 1 are largely explained by international tensions. Since a discussion of factors determining force strength objectives is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, the peacetime force strength objectives are taken to be exogenous.

A more meaningful concept of demand is provided by the gross flow demand for new accessions from civilian life. The gross flow demand is the number of required accessions  $A_t$  that must be recruited or conscripted to replace losses during the year  $L_t$  and to achieve prescribed changes in strength objectives,  $(S_t - S_{t-1})$ .

$$A_t = L_t + (S_t - S_{t-1})$$

If force strength is kept stable,  $(S_t - S_{t-1})$  will be zero. In this case, the gross flow demand is simply a replacement demand for losses which arise during the year because of voluntary separations upon completion of obligated tours of duty, retirements, deaths, and other discharges for medical or unsuitability reasons. The actual accessions between FY 1960-65 are shown in the lower panel of Table 1.<sup>4</sup>

An annual average of 645 thousand men were recruited or conscripted from civil life to maintain the average strengths which prevailed over the period FY 1960-65. The ratio of annual accessions to force strengths provides a rough measure of military personnel turnover. Using the six year averages, FY 1960-65, from Table 1, the data indicate the following implicit turnover rates.

Implied actual turnover rates by component, fiscal year 1960-65 (percentages):

Total DOD (Active Forces)	19.7
Officers	11.8
Enlisted men	21.0
Army (Active Forces)	24.8
Officers	18.7
Enlisted men	26.0
Reserves and National Guard	12.2

Since the obligated tour of a draftee is considerably shorter than that of a regular voluntary enlistee, the Army with larger inputs of draftees necessarily

\*In the last decade, reservists were recalled to active duty in significant numbers only once. During the Berlin crisis of FY 1962, some 111 thousand National Guard and Army reservists were recalled to raise Army active duty force strength from 858,000 in FY 1961 to 1,080,400 in FY 1962. This generalization does not apply to officers. In the five years, FY 1960-64, an annual average of 1,287 reserve officers were activated accounting for 3.8 per cent of total officer accessions.

<sup>4</sup>The data in the lower panel of Table 1 may differ from other estimates of accessions for a least two reasons. One is that "first enlistments" include some men with prior service while other data may pertain to non-prior service accessions. The other is that "reserves to active duty" which I have included with first enlistments except for the unusual situation prevailing in FY 1962 are often neglected. The remaining discrepancies are, however, quite small.

experiences a high turnover rate. For prescribed peacetime force strength objectives, turnover rates determine the gross flow demands for new recruits. Elimination of the draft and policies which raise re-enlistment rates thus operate to lower the gross flow demand corresponding to a given stock demand. This point is amplified in part II below.

The manpower procurement channels which have evolved under a draft have strongly influenced the characteristics of servicemen. Of the 645 thousand annual accession to military service in FY 1960-65, 639 thousand (83.6 per cent) entered through a variety of voluntary programs. An individual can discharge his draft liability by serving as an enlisted man or officer. He can accomplish the former in any of three ways: (1) as a regular voluntary enlistee, (2) as a volunteer to a two-year active duty reserve program in the Navy or Marine Corps, or (3) as a draftee.<sup>1</sup> Except for the doctors and dentists draft, all officer procurement programs are voluntary. Finally, the draft liability can be satisfied by volunteering for a Reserve or National Guard program requiring active duty only for training. Many men who discharge their draft liabilities through voluntary entry into military service can properly be called reluctant volunteers who entered a particular program in preference to being involuntarily drafted. In order to extrapolate the characteristics of men who are likely to enter military service in the future, it is convenient to study the military service experience of age classes born in specific years.

The disposition of military service obligations by men born in 1938 was estimated from a sample of Selective Service registrants. By July 1964, this age class reached the age of 26 at which the draft liability is effectively terminated.<sup>2</sup>

According to the data of Table 2, the incidence of military service was highest for men with some college education, 59.5 per cent, and lowest for college graduates, 40.3 per cent. Only 18 per cent of this age class was formally rejected and placed into draft classifications IV-F and I-Y. This low rejection rate is probably due to the fact that men obtaining dependency and occupational deferments were never examined.

Physical and moral standards for military service have remained quite stable and appear to be unrelated to educational attainment. Mental qualification standards which are based on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores have, however, been varied in response to changing manpower demands. If the minimum mental standard is set equal to the 16th percentile on the AFQT, I obtain the estimated rejection rates shown in the following Table.<sup>3</sup>

Estimated rejection rates by education

Reason for rejection	Years of education				Total
	Less than 12	12	13 to 16	16 and over	
Physical	10.0		10.0	10.0	10.0
Moral	2.5		2.0	2.5	2.5
Mental	21.4	7.8	2.0	0.9	11.0
All reasons	40.8	24.7	21.1	10.1	30.4

<sup>1</sup> The mental rejection rate is applied to the population of physically and morally qualified males. This procedure assumes that the incidence of mental rejections is uncorrelated with the other 2 causes for rejection.

<sup>2</sup> The population of men who were physically and mentally qualified for military service was thus estimated by applying these rejection rates. The in-

<sup>3</sup> Draftees have mainly been channeled to the Army. A few delinquents (usually reconvicts who failed to attend drill meetings) are drafted into the other three Services. In 1956, the Navy accepted draftees, while the Marines did so in FY 1966. A two-year active duty reserve program was offered by the Army in 1968, but the program was dropped in 1968. Finally regular enlistments are obligated to initial tours of three years in the Regular Army and four years in the Air Force. The length of initial tours is more variable in the Navy and Marines with some recruits signed to six year tours.

<sup>4</sup> The draft liability is extended to the age of 35 for men holding occupational and student deferments. However, older liable men are placed in a lower order of call so that few individuals over 26 years of age are drafted. One exception is the draft of doctors and dentists.

<sup>5</sup> More careful estimates of mental and physical rejection rates have been prepared by Dr. Bernard Carpinos of the Department of Defense. His estimates indicate that the physical rejection rate rises with educational attainment. The difference between the estimates are, however, quite small.

evidence of military highest, 83.5 per cent of military service.

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
<sup>6</sup> Earlier age classes the Korean War, ranks between 19, duty for training up, over 900 thousand higher percent.

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Robe  
7/5/06

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith   
SUBJECT: Volunteer Army Testimony  
Ref: Snowflake 062706-16

Sir,

Attached is a copy of your testimony before the House and Senate  
volunteer Army.

We will look for upcoming events to highlight the success of the  
Army.

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TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Dorrance Smith *CSA*

SUBJECT Celebrating the Volunteer **Army**

Ref: Snowflake 062706-16

Sir,

In response to your request to locate "good events coming up in conjunction with the volunteer **army**" that can be used to "celebrate big" the terrific job being done by the all volunteer force, proposed below **are** the following outreach events during the lead up to the April 18, 2007 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary. Speech writing has **secured** a copy of the original text and **our** internal media team is currently researching archive footage of the Senate testimony.

Proposed Outreach

1. February 23, 2007: Visit to Fort Benning, GA for the Army Infantry School Basic Training and the Army Ranger graduations on February 23. Speech and meet and greet with new soldiers and their families highlighting the success of the all volunteer force.
2. March 23, 2007: Visit to Parris Island, SC for new recruit graduation and speech to new Marines and their families from Alpha and Oscar Company (joint male and female graduations only happens once a month) highlighting the success of the all volunteer force.
3. April 10, 2007: Pentagon Town Hall meeting to coincide with scheduled return from Iraq and to highlight the upcoming 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of his speech in support of the all volunteer force.
4. April 11, 2007: Roundtable with civilian defense experts to highlight the upcoming 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of his speech in support of the all volunteer force. Attendees will also be briefed by P&R on the successful recruiting and retention efforts.
5. April 16, 2007: Meet and greet returning troops at Dallas/FT Worth Airport troop homecoming followed by Dallas areas speech highlighting the success of the all volunteer force.
6. April 18, 2007: Large scale swearing in ceremony in New York City, tentative locations being worked include Times Square and Liberty Island.

25 Aug 06

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8/29/2006 10:30:27 AM

FOUO

June 27, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

CC: Gen. Pete Pace  
David Chu

Robert Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*DR*

SUBJECT: Celebrating the Volunteer Army

*DSS — ?  
IDEAS:*

*VA/S  
12 Jul*

David Chu told me that April 18, 2007, is the 40th anniversary of my testimony to the Senate on supporting the volunteer army. Please see if you can get a copy of my testimony before the House and Senate and the dates I did it.

We ought to see if there are some good events coming up in connection with the volunteer army that we can celebrate big at DoD and hype the terrific job the volunteer army is doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
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Please Respond By 08/24/06

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11-L-0559/OSD/58977

## AMENDING AND EXTENDING THE DRAFT LAW AND RELATED AUTHORITIES

TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 1967

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 1224 New Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Symington, Inouye, Byrd of Virginia, Smith, Miller, Pearson, and Dominick.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief of staff, Charles B. Kirby, chief clerk, and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.

Chairman RUSSELL. The first witness scheduled at this morning's hearing is Senator Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon. (Pause.) The Senator apparently has a conflict in his committee arrangements this morning.

The next witness is Congressman Donald Rumsfeld of Illinois. You may proceed.

### STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Miller, I certainly appreciate the opportunity to appear before your committee to present some thoughts on manpower military recruitment. I have submitted my complete statement with attachments. You have copies of my statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed, Congressman.

Mr. RUMSFELD. In assessing the U.S. military manpower procurement system, I am handicapped personally by the lack of a comprehensive and accurate assessment of the cost of the present draft, and of such alternative systems as an all-volunteer system.

An extensive manpower study by the Department of Defense, requested by the President in response to growing criticism of the draft, was withheld upon its completion, then revised in light of the escalation in Vietnam, and finally reported to the Congress, in 1966, by Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas D. Morris in brief summary form only. The study and working papers on which the conclusions were based have never been made public. Later in my presentation,

however, I will comment on an evaluation of the DOD study, based on the opinions of an investigator who apparently has read the entire study and who is able to quote from portions of it.

More recently, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service also, initiated by the President and headed by Burke Marshall, issued a 219-page evaluation of the draft and its alternatives. The Commission, in its own words, "spent more than 100 hours in meetings in Washington alone, which are recorded in more than 3,500 pages of transcript and the members read, considered, and discussed in detail hundreds of pages of staff memorandums." However, none of these working papers has been made public.

On March 24, 1967, I joined with the Honorable Thomas B. Curtis in urging the President to release the information necessary to make an adequate evaluation of his draft proposals. Our letter concluded: "Without supporting data and working papers, the strength of your proposals are seriously diminished. Thus we respectfully request that working papers of your National Commission on the points discussed be made available to us in the Congress." Thus far, the only response has been a brief acknowledgement of our letter by an aide.

Because of this information gap I am pleased that your committee and the House Committee on Armed Services are holding hearings on the draft and possible alternatives.

#### *Areas of agreement*

I appear today in a dual role—as both an advocate and an inquirer. Before I embark on either role, I would like to set before you what seem to be certain premises on which most can agree:

Military conscription is repugnant and antithetical to a free society except in time of demonstrated need. President Johnson in his recent message on Selective Service underscored this point when he said: "The volunteer tradition is strong in our Armed Forces, as it is in our national heritage. Except for the periods of major war in this century, it has been the chief source of our military manpower since the earliest days of the Republic."

Any system of involuntary military service is inherently inequitable when not all qualified men are required to serve. President Johnson in the same message declared: "For the unavoidable truth is that complete equity can never be achieved when only some must be selected and only some must serve."

Given the basic undesirability as well as the inherent inequity in military conscription, every effort must be made to make the rewards for military service commensurate with the rewards in civilian employment. No one would argue, I believe, that, in addition to the other sacrifices that Armed Forces personnel must make, they should also be obliged to subsidize their own service.

There is a point at which—given a combination of pay increases, liberalized fringe benefits, improved recruitment and retention policies, extension of education opportunities in and through the armed

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services, and/or **greater** utilization of civilian personnel, male and female, in noncombatant posts—that conscription would no longer **be necessary to fill military requirements**. There may be differences of opinion as to exactly where that point is, but it is there nonetheless.

The Vietnam conflict has both focused attention on and beclouded the **issue of the draft** and its alternatives. Selective service was extended in 1963 with scarce attention from the Congress and the public. With the extension of the war effort and increased involuntary induction, the draft became more **directly important** to more families.

I accept the obvious fact that the United States, during this period of its history, requires a sizable military capability. The question to be answered is what is the best mechanism to recruit the range of manpower **required**, not only during the present situation in southeast Asia, but also, hopefully, in the not too distant future when a settlement is reached. We must investigate, plan, and take action for the anticipated range of the military manpower needs of the foreseeable future.

#### *A moderate proposal*

In the full realization that the time is short between now and June 30, when the Selective Service Act expires, I would **suggest** consideration of a moderate course of action which this committee and the Congress might follow:

That the Selective Service Act should be extended for a maximum of **2 years**.

That conscription procedures should be modified, insofar as possible, to remove the **most serious** inequities.

That Congress should declare its intention to **establish** a volunteer military force and **conduct the necessary investigation and study to determine the best means to establish such a force**. At the end of the 2-year extension of selective service, and to the extent that the study so indicates, the Congress should either terminate conscription or set a definite termination date for conscription.

That Congress should raise immediately the pay scales and fringe benefits for military personnel, with the **goal of** providing the increases necessary to **bring** military rewards up to a competitive posture with respect to civilian rewards.

That the Department of Defense should intensify its efforts in the recruitment and retention of military personnel and continue to expand its utilization of civilian manpower in noncombatant posts, which the Secretary has undertaken in recent years.

There are three principal questions which must be answered regarding a course of action and, particularly, in relation to the establishment of a **volunteer military**.

#### *Is it feasible?*

The question of the **feasibility** of attracting and maintaining an adequate voluntary armed force centers primarily on the issue of cost. Cost estimates have ranged from \$4 to \$20 billion for maintaining a volunteer Force of approximately 2.7 million men.

I don't know what the actual cost would be and I am very ready to confess this. Nor, however, do I suspect that the Department of



Defense **knows** exactly what the cost would be. But the Department of Defense **says** it is too expensive to have a voluntary system.

The Department of Defense seems to be in the position of both **estimating** the cost of a voluntary army and of judging whether that cost is justified, even though it has stressed that as a "user" of personnel it is concerned only with the attraction of sufficient quantity and quality of manpower. Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in 1966, had the following colloquy with Congressman Otis Pike:

**Mr. PIKE.** . . . So long as there aren't any Federal guidelines, aren't you going to have this same inequality which is the basic objection to the draft in this country today?

**Mr. MORRIS.** Sir, again, I should limit my comments to your responsibilities as to the user of manpower and the setter of physical, mental, and moral standards.

**Mr. PIKE.** So, as the user of manpower, you are not concerned about the inequalities in the draft system which is the basic complaint which I receive in my mail regarding the draft?

**Mr. MORRIS.** We think these are matters beyond our responsibility, sir.

Notwithstanding the above, Mr. Morris, in the same 1966 hearings, concluded categorically:

Increases in military compensation sufficient to attract an all-volunteer force cannot be justified.

I disagree.

DOD claims that a volunteer army is impractical because it is too costly. However, whether a program can be financed and should be financed—given known Federal revenues and spending priorities—is a determination which must be made by the Congress and the people. DOD, and other departments and agencies, must supply facts; Congress must evaluate those facts and translate them into policy.

If DOD studies the feasibility of developing a necessary new weapons system, they would not conclude that it is impractical **only** because it cost between \$4 and \$20 billion. One would suspect that other considerations entered into their judgment on the draft.

Or, to put it another way, if the Department of Agriculture or the Post Office Department discovered basic needs which demanded the recruitment of thousands of additional personnel, neither Department would recommend conscription of that manpower. Rather, they would present proposals for attracting the needed manpower based on the competitive market rate and on modern personnel recruitment and retention practices.

The point is this—We can afford to attract a volunteer army if we want to. And the costs very likely will not be as prohibitive as the Department of Defense suggests.

My suggestion is that we should at the very minimum work toward that goal.

Dr. Walter Y. Oi, a manpower expert who was with the Department of Defense in the early stages of the manpower study and is now professor of economics at the University of Washington, has conducted a comprehensive study of the costs of an all-volunteer force. Dr. Oi's conclusion:

An all-volunteer force offers a polar alternative to the draft. With its lower personnel turnover, a voluntary force of the same size could be sustained by

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recruiting only 27.5 per cent of qualified males. The budgetary payroll cost would, however, have to be raised by \$4 billion per year.

I will submit for the record, following my remarks, the complete analytic text of Dr. Oi's study which was submitted at the University of Chicago Conference on the Draft in December 1966, as well as a proposal for a military manpower procurement bill prepared at my request by Dr. Oi.

The "secret" DOD report on which Assistant Secretary Morris' 1966 testimony is based tends to refute the public DOD position that a draft is necessary even in peacetime:

In the event that active duty military force requirements revert in the closing years of this decade to the levels originally planned for the current year and remain at or below this level in the early 1970's, it is possible that these measures (more pay and better personnel policies) may result in the elimination of the need for draft calls for substantial periods as we move into the 1970's \* \* \*. It is desirable to study the implications of these trends even at a time, such as the present, when draft calls are in fact greater than at any time in the past decade.

Further, from the same DOD report:

An estimated \$42 to \$6.2 billion (would be needed) to rely exclusively on volunteers if military strengths were to be maintained at pre-Vietnam levels.

Author Jean Carper, who quotes the preceding passages of the suppressed Pentagon study in her forthcoming book, "Bitter Greetings: The Scandal of the Military Draft," scheduled for publication by Grossman later this month, gives the following commentary:

There is no real \$17 billion cost barrier to abolishing the draft, as we shall see. This figure is the reddest of red herrings, thrown to the Congress and the American people to stifle an investigation into ending the draft. By raising the pay of our soldiers to a living wage, we can be well on the way to ending the draft with the end of the Vietnam crisis.

I have focused exclusively on the payroll cost necessary to attract a volunteer force. However, considerable savings might accrue from such factors as a lower turnover rate, more skilled personnel, and a reduction in basic training needs.

But, most important, whether we turn to volunteerism or retain the draft with substantial pay boosts, military personnel would no longer be forced to subsidize their own service by accepting compensation less than they could draw in open job competition. Bruce Chapman, author of the "Wrong Man in Uniform," put it well with these words:

The \$60 a month paid an American private is about the same as the pay of a collective farm worker in Communist Eastern Europe and less than half what unemployment compensation pays \* \* \*. Even if some draft were necessary, financial relief and bettered living conditions for the draftee would be essential for obtaining any pretense of justice in the draft's rationale.

It seems to me that at the very minimum we in the Congress should attempt to correct this present tax on the individuals who are required to serve.

*Is it flexible?*

I now turn to an examination of the second basic question concerning the voluntary approach. Would such an approach provide sufficient flexibility to meet the anticipated range of military manpower requirements?

To answer this question I should like to stress that I certainly am not opposed to conscription under all circumstances. Sudden and/or massive military buildups, such as those required in World War II, undoubtedly could not be accomplished without compulsion.

I favor having the military manpower needed by this country by conscription if necessary but voluntarily if possible.

Therefore, even if we accept a voluntary system as our goal, we must keep a workable draft system ready to be superimposed on the compulsory system when a clear need is demonstrated for greater manpower than the volunteer system can reasonably provide. We should undoubtedly retain some semblance of a Selective Service System, even to the point of registering, examining, and classifying young men as they come of military age. Our national security and leadership in the free world calls for no less.

A strengthening of the Ready Reserve and National Guard to make those forces truly ready for immediate response would also contribute to U.S. military flexibility.

In addition, the voluntary concept can have a built-in flexibility of its own. If military service is made attractive enough, we might very well have excess numbers of volunteers. Dr. Milton Friedman explained this flexibility concept at the Chicago conference:

Recruitment by voluntary means could provide considerable flexibility—at a cost. The way to do so would be to make pay and conditions of service more attractive than is required to recruit the number of men that it is anticipated will be needed. There would then be an excess of volunteers—queues. If the number of men required increased, the queues could be shortened and conversely.

Obviously, the flexibility here with the voluntary system is not as great as with the draft, but such an approach could easily accommodate moderate increases in military demand. For a fuller explanation of this concept, and of other arguments for volunteerism, I will submit for the record Dr. Friedman's full text at the conclusion of my remarks.

In short, it strikes me that the statement by the President in his message to Congress suggesting that a voluntary system might be gambling with the Nation's security is absolutely without foundation.

I think all advocates of a voluntary military recognize the need to retain a compulsory mechanism available to be triggered in, in the event some more substantial numbers of military personnel are required.

#### *Is it a threat?*

A third basic question concerning volunteerism is whether or not it presents a threat to existing political institutions.

Certainly, any fear of threat to our political institutions merits careful attention. Such a threat, however, has historically come from the officer corps, rather than enlisted personnel, and in the United States, officers of all services have always been career or voluntary. Further, our proper tradition of civil control over the military has thus far been sufficiently strong so that there has been no serious threat of military takeover.

Further, history seems to show in other nations that military threats to political institutions have come from conscript armies as well as from volunteer armies, and that many nations have not had such

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Mr. Chairman, I am concerned that the exploration of a study group possibility backed by Services, I Clark, disapproves.

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Therefore that Congress and take a voluntary system which would see the information whether or the fundamental the manpower broad and

threats regardless of whether they had conscript or volunteer armies.

I believe that such a threat is a serious matter—to be watched and prevented—but that with attention and care, it can be as readily avoided in a volunteer system as in a conscript army, by building in some turnover in the system.

#### *Advantages of a voluntary system*

A volunteer system, assuming it to be feasible, offers the following advantages:

Preservation of the freedom of the individual to serve or not to serve, or conversely, avoidance of the compulsion inherent in either the present system, a lottery, or universal military training.

Great efficiency in the military services resulting from a lower turnover rate, and, thus, dollar savings in man-hours currently spent in training.

Avoidance of the arbitrary discrimination and inherent inequities of the present system.

Elimination of the difficult constitutional questions relating to conscientious objectors.

Military personnel would be fairly compensated for their services.

#### *Discussion and conclusions*

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am deeply concerned that the alternatives to the draft have not been sufficiently explored by the several Presidential commissions and other manpower study groups. The Marshall Commission, for example, dismisses the possibility of moving to volunteerism in two pages of loose argument, backed by two graphs. A report to the House Committee on Armed Services, prepared by a civilian advisory panel headed by Gen. Mark Clark, disposes of a volunteer army in one paragraph, without even one graph.

To conclude: A voluntary system is wholly compatible with the principles of a free society and offers numerous advantages over a compulsory system. It appears that a volunteer military force is feasible and at the minimum we do not know conclusively that it is not feasible, that the necessary flexibility can be maintained, and that no serious threat would be posed to our political institutions.

Therefore it is my hope that your committee will recommend and that Congress will declare its intention to establish a voluntary system and take the necessary steps toward that goal. This, of course, a voluntary system is what this country has had throughout the overwhelming majority of its history. Opposition to volunteerism, it would seem, must stem from one of two views. First, that one has all the information necessary and is fully convinced that a voluntary system is not feasible. This position, I submit, is not supported by the information available to me. Or, second, one may hold the view that whether or not a voluntary system is feasible, it should be opposed in favor of a compulsory system. Such a position is inconsistent with the fundamental opposition to compulsion in a free society. I recognize the difficulty of the task charged to your committee: Military manpower requirements and the recommendations to meet them pose broad and complex questions. However, based upon the information

available to me thus far the case for a volunteer military force seems to be overwhelming.

I thank you for inviting me here today and would welcome your questions or comments.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think, Congressman, all of us would much prefer a volunteer system if we had the assurance that this would provide the necessary security internally and externally. It is certainly worthy of closest examination and we are glad to have your well-thought-out statement on it.

I don't agree with your comparison of the pay of the American private and the unemployment compensation of a collective farmworker. In addition to the \$96 a month, the American private is housed, fed, and clothed, and the \$96 a month is in addition which is not the case with the unemployment compensation or the collective farmworker.

Mr. RUMSFELD. This is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Miller?

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to have you before the committee, Congressman. I am concerned about two things. First of all you use the analogy to the Post Office Department or the U.S. Department of Agriculture. I would suggest to you that the computation of requirements for the domestic activities of those Departments is something that can be quite readily made without any outside factors entering in. But I am concerned about the fact that we cannot forecast what other countries, other leaders of other countries in the world are going to be doing, and this has an element of uncertainty in it which is not comparable to our own Cabinet level departments such as Agriculture and Post Office.

If a manpower study is made by USDA, and they conclude that in order to implement a certain program it is going to require 1,500 more people, those 1,500 people can be acquired, and we are not going to have to worry too much about weight. But how are we going to determine whether we need 100,000 more people in the Armed Forces or 50,000 or whether we are going to stay level? Nobody can look into a crystal ball and do that, and in order to have the flexibility, I am not sure that this voluntary force is going to do it.

I must say that I think cost is a factor. I don't think that cost is the only factor, nor necessarily the major factor. But what are we going to do? Are we going to have an all voluntary force today, with 450,000 volunteers in Vietnam, and then if the war in Vietnam is over in a couple of years, are we going to say, "Well, that was nice of you to volunteer, but we don't have any need for you any longer, so you are out."

Now, I doubt very much if you are going to have a volunteer system like that, unless you have very sensitive coverage of separation from the services. I think that we can have a voluntary, a basic voluntary armed service, and then in times of stress or in times of need, we have to expand it, and we may have to expand it quite rapidly. Now, you did admit that the conscription would be necessary in a situation such as World War II.

Mr. RUMSFELD. And conceivably in situations somewhat less serious than that.

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Senator MILLER. Yes, but where do you draw that line! Are you going to draw it at Vietnam? It would seem to me that the increasing manpower requirements of Vietnam are such that they ought to fit into the same category. I don't know, when you talk about an adequate force—an adequate force today may be inadequate tomorrow.

Mr. RUMSFELD. This is quite true.

Senator MILLER. And our problem is to be flexible enough so that we do not take on an excessive number of people beyond the requirement. I must say that there is a ring of appeal in a voluntary force. I think that we are doing that now. We have a rather large standing voluntary force today, and we are implementing it in a time of stress and strain by conscription.

Now, you might get into a smaller war and say well, we only need 5,000 more people above our standing army, let's do that by a voluntary system. I don't know where you are going to draw the line, and I suggest to you that the flexibility inherent in the system we are now following is vital to our national security.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, it is my conviction that if we revise the incentives, we can dramatically increase the current number of volunteers. Now, you asked the question where do we draw the line. I don't have any specific knowledge as to where the line would be drawn, but the line would be drawn at that point, where during a certain point in our country's history, with reasonable incentives, we were unable to obtain the required military manpower.

Now, we all know the population trends are such that there are an increasing number of young men in the draft ages. We know also that there have not been, since World War II, really what can be called dramatic shifts in the military manpower requirements. They have not gone from 5 million down to zero. They have fluctuated within a relatively small range. I suggest that this volunteer approach would not provide total flexibility. It couldn't be expected to. It seems to me that it does provide some flexibility in that within a range of say 500,000 to 1 million you could adjust the flow into the military on the basis of the incentives and the attractiveness and the recruiting procedures, just as you do in other Government agencies, say between 2.7 million and 3.7 million.

Senator MILLER. Oh, yes.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Above that point —

Senator MILLER. What do you do once they are in there?

Mr. RUMSFELD. This is what I am getting to. If you have got to go above that point, because of a serious situation, and I don't know whether Vietnam could or could not be described as above that point, had we already adopted these incentives, that it would have required triggering in a compulsory approach. I don't know that, and I don't think anyone does because we haven't tried this. But we would have the compulsory system available to be triggered in, to bring into the military the people that this country needs to maintain our national security. Certainly I am fully convinced that this country must maintain an adequate military. Because we don't know what levels will be required, it seems to me that it is perfectly reasonable to try to set as a goal the maintenance of a voluntary system and to improve incentives so that we maximize the number of volunteers in the mili-

these people can be used. They have been used in the past and that is what their purpose is today. So you do have this extra tool that can be used to avoid the most dramatic fluctuations.

Senator MILLER. Your argument with respect to the use of the reserve is much more appealing to me than the argument for the voluntary force. I find it difficult to think that I would sit over here on the floor and vote for appropriation for an excessive number of military personnel.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, we won't, and I am not advocating that.

Senator MILLER. What are you going to do if the war in Vietnam is over and they say, "Well, now we need to have some men over there for another 2 or 3 or 4 years, but we only need, maybe, 25,000 or 60,000. We are going to phase out 400,000." What are you going to do with them if they are all volunteers?

Mr. RUMSFELD. What you do is you permit the normal retirement and attrition and resignations to take place at the outer end of the funnel and you turn faucet off at the beginning of the funnel. We are dealing with a military of 8 million. So you are working on a big base, and a fluctuation of 200,000 on a base of 8 million I think can be controlled by working the nozzle at the beginning of the funnel and closing it off, and permitting the normal retirement and resignations and military discharges and these types of things at the other end.

Senator MILLER. I think this normal attrition proposition of yours might be feasible in some cases. I don't believe it would be feasible with a contingent such as we have in the Vietnam war.

Mr. RUMSFELD. You don't think there are 200,000 people over in Vietnam that if the need were no longer there, that they wouldn't be anxious to undertake a different phase of their life, whether education or civilian employment? I would think that you would find —

Senator MILLER. No; that wasn't my point. My point was that I don't believe that if the war in Vietnam were over tomorrow, and it was decided that 400,000 were surplus to our needs, that we could say "Well, you are all volunteers and you are going to stay on board with your careers assured because we are going to have 400,000 leave this year from the top level and therefore you can move up from the bottom level."

I think it would be excessive and tremendously excessive. I recognize that if we only had, let's say, phasing out of 50,000, that it might work out that way. Here again, what the specialties and all of that would be, I don't know.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Right.

Senator MILLER. But I am afraid I am deeply concerned about the lack of flexibility in this proposal.

Mr. RUMSFELD. This is the reason that I proposed not the immediate adoption of a voluntary military, but rather a maximum extension of 2 years of the Selective Services Act, with correction of the most serious inequities and uncertainties, and then during that period, revision in the military pay and incentive practices, so that we can maximize the number of volunteers, gain some experience over that 2-year period, and see to what extent somewhere in the range between the comments you have made and I have made, to what extent this

country would be capable of controlling these varying needs, with a varying supply, because the population trends are different.

The only point I would make in addition is this: It is my estimate that as we proceed through the coming decades, this country will have varying needs as we face situations such as Vietnam or others elsewhere. But it is my estimate that many of the people of this country would be influenced in their decision whether or not they would like to volunteer by the seriousness of the situation this country faces, and that you would have an increase in people who would feel that it was a worthwhile and needed function for them to participate during a period of crisis, as we have found in every period of crisis in this country's history, and that when the crisis eased many of those would establish different priorities for their lives, and would decide that they would want to undertake different vocations. So I think that there is this human element that would help to solve the problem which you have posed so well.

Senator MILLER. One other point. On page 8 of your statement you refer to an advantage which the all-volunteer system would provide; namely "preservation of the freedom of the individual to serve or not to serve." I suggest to you that there is no such freedom. That there is a duty, not a freedom, there is a duty of the individual to serve his country in time of need.

Mr. RUMSFELD. No question about it.

Senator MILLER. I don't believe that we can proceed on a premise that there is a freedom of the individual to serve or not to serve his country in time of need. I think it is a responsibility of American citizenship and I think it is a duty. I don't think he has any freedom on that at all, unless perhaps it is a conscientious objection.

Mr. RUMSFELD. My statement in the first page I believe said that that I believe an individual should have the freedom to serve or not to serve, except in a time of demonstrated need. This is exactly what you are now saying, only you are saying it in the reverse. That in a period of demonstrated need the people of this country have a duty to serve and certainly compulsion at a time of demonstrated need is totally compatible with our system of Government, and I quite agree with you. I think you are merely emphasizing the opposite side of the coin. We both agree that only during a period of demonstrated need should people be required by their government to allocate a period of their life to something the government decides is worth while.

Senator MILLER. When you say demonstrated need, who does the demonstrating? This gets us into considerable testimony that we have received in the last 2 days on the conscientious objector area. There are a good many people in this country who say there is no demonstrated need to serve in Vietnam at all. We shouldn't even be there in the first place. There are others who say there is no demonstrated need to resort to force to solve international problems.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I am not saying any of these things, I am saying, as you say, that the Congress decides when there is demonstrated need. And, when there is demonstrated need will vary, depending on what your incentives are, because the need for a compulsion will go down as we revise the incentives and the pay policies in the military, so that it is a more attractive vocation and more competitive with civilian op-

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a moving point.

Senator MILLER. And it certainly can vary, depending upon the in-  
centives that are put into this thing.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Exactly.

Senator MILLER. If you pay every private \$10,000—

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, I am not suggesting that.

Mr. MILLER (continuing). And if there is a demonstrated need to  
have conscription—I think we are getting ourselves into an area of  
terrible uncertainty. Now, I don't den that we shouldn't have a  
continuing review of this thing. I thin all of the members of this  
committee feel the same way, that we want to have our voluntary  
system attractive, but at the same time there are going to be about  
15 different viewpoints on where that base pay should start. Then,  
of course, you might say to some people, "Well, now, if you just volun-  
teer for 2 years, we will pay you twice as much as the private who goes  
in for career service." You are going to have ot of discontent  
among the military personnel. I think we are hea d for what typi-  
cally is called a can of worms in trying to come up with some solution  
to this thing, recognizing that we ought to try to make our military  
service ns attractive, and I have long snid, as compatible with or com-  
parable with outside civilian occupations as possible.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, in keeping with that question, what is the  
uncertainty if the Congress this year decides to extend it not for 4 but  
for 2 years, and during that time tries to gain some experience and  
learn what adjustments in pay policies might bring by way of addi-  
tional volunteers. In addition, what is the uncertainty if behind this  
attempt to gain more experience with volunteerism we have in the  
background a compulsory system available every time it is needed.

It seems to me there is no uncertainty.

Senator MILLER. You can argue for a 1-year extension.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I question, I don't know, but I question whether we  
could get enough experience with the movement toward a voluntary  
system during a 1-year period. To argue against myself—

Senator MILLER. Do you think 2 years would be enough?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think 2 years would be a way station where we  
could stop and see if it was enough, and if it weren't, extend it an-  
other year at that time. Now, you say \$10,000 for a private. My  
proposal that I have inserted for the record is simply to straighten  
out the pay curve. The present curve has a rather dramatic dropoff.  
We have been using compulsion as a crutch. We have been paying  
the people during their earliest years of service substantially less, as  
far as the curve goes. It isn't a straight line of increases during the  
experience of a person's military service, it is a dramatic dropoff, and  
they get substantially less. Why? Because we have used compul-  
sion as a crutch to pay them less than they deserve, less than they could  
earn on the outside, and frankly in my opinion less than we should.

Senator MILLER. Well, but you get back to this matter of duty to  
serve, and there are a good many people who might say their duty to  
serve is such that they ought to serve without pay. At  
the time of need of our country, they might well take that into account,

but here again you have a matter of equity between those who are called and have to go, and those who do not have to go, and the struggle that we have in the Congress is to try to reach some kind of a compromise which will be as equitable as possible and relieve as many inequities as possible. Anything we are going to do, and you well know, it is going to have its inequities.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is true.

Senator MILLER. But I do believe we ought to keep in mind the need for flexibility as you have pointed out, and the fact that the individual does have a duty to serve his country in time of need. I think there are a lot of people today who agree that we do have a time of need today, and there are others who would argue that point, but the Congress has to make that decision.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, if there were a need for people to serve without pay, then I quite agree with you we would have a duty as citizens of this country to participate in the military without pay. But there is no need for the people in the U.S. military to serve without pay today. Nor, in my view, is there a need, or is it in fact desirable, to require people during the early periods of their service to serve at substantially less than the competitive civilian market rates would pay them for similar service.

Senator MILLER. I would agree with that. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Congressman, it is a pleasure to see you. I have read your statement and am sorry I was late. It is interesting. There is a lot of appeal in a volunteer plan. I don't worry too much about the cost. There is little around this town that cannot be solved by another three or four Billion American dollars, as is true in most other towns of the world today. But I wonder, do you think we could get the required technical skills if we went to a volunteer system?

Today in this country, there are serious shortages in the manpower incident to say electronics, and other highly technical skills necessary in any defense operation. Inasmuch as there is that heavy demand as against supply, these people can obtain heavy increases in salary in private work.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Right.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know we understand each other on this. That being true, how do you think that could be handled?

Mr. RUMSFELD. It seems to me that the way it should be handled would be to expand on some of the personnel practices and techniques which are currently being employed. Today there are some different incentives for undertaking training that requires a higher degree of skill, and which is of extreme urgency and importance to a particular military service. It seems to me that, just as in the private sector, you could adjust incentives so that you could control the number of individuals available with those skills.

One way that might be used is to require a longer period of service by contract for an individual who embarks upon training in these areas are paid for and sponsored by the military. If in fact it is attractive for an individual to gain some training in the military in electronics, then it is attractive to him because of what it can do for

him on the other side of the private sector.

Well, then it is a matter of attractiveness and if someone enters school and requires a 4-, 5- year service, so you have the maintenance of the

The third flexibility of trigger have that, to trigger it in a number of individual

Senator SYMINGTON. Chairman

Senator INGRAM. The Congress make two observations

First, we have a percent of the threat of it if you increase the number of people who have monetary incentives of the witness army, an army motivated by just like to have

Mr. RUMSFELD. Concerning the people who are now waiting for the members of this. The statement that with study department of and move to gain some actually not

Senator INGRAM. Department of Defense

Mr. RUMSFELD. That they do it. I want people's mind find out how gain some, whether it is ought to find

Senator INGRAM. A number of 1 or volunteer

him on the outside. This is your suggestion, competition with the private sector.

Well, then if it is attractive, why not take advantage of that attractiveness and instead of requiring a 2-year commitment for a person who enters school X to receive training that is attractive on the outside, require a 4-, 5-, or 6-year contract, in addition to adjusting incentives. So you have these two things that I think could help control the maintenance of the necessary number of individuals with a specific skill.

The third thing you have got in the background always is the capability of triggering in a compulsory system, because you would have to have that, to protect this country's service. My hope is that we will trigger it in as seldom as possible, and that we will maximize the number of individuals who will be willing to serve on a voluntary basis.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator INOUYE?

Senator INOUYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the Congressman for his very interesting remarks. I would like to make two observations, and if you wish to make comments, please do.

First, we have received testimony here suggesting that more than 40 percent of those who are now volunteering are volunteering because of the threat of the draft, and secondly, a few witnesses have testified that if you increased incentives as you have suggested, and most of the people who have advocated volunteer forces have advocated increased monetary incentives to make it worth their while, and by so doing, some of the witnesses have concluded that we would then have a mercenary army, an army not fully motivated or properly motivated, or one just motivated by money, one made up of professional killers, and I would just like to have your comments.

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, first of all with respect to your comment concerning the possibility that greater than 40 percent of the individuals who are now volunteering are doing it to avoid the compulsion that is waiting for them if they don't volunteer, I can only say that certainly the members of this committee have far more knowledge than I about this. The only thing I have to go on with respect to the figure is a statement that has not to my knowledge been documented or backed up with study papers or background papers or working papers by the Department of Defense. My proposal is to extend the draft for 2 years and move toward a voluntary system. During that time we could gain some hard facts with respect to what percent were or were not actually motivated in their volunteering by a desire—

Senator INOUYE. Those figures were presented to us by the Department of Defense.

Mr. RUSSELL. Right, and it is based on some sampling I understand that they did in the military, to find out what motives were of volunteers. I would guess that there were a variety of factors weighing on people's minds, and my hope is that during the next 2 years we can find out how well we are able to move toward a voluntary system and gain some real experience with that figure. I can't answer you whether it is accurate or inaccurate. I just don't know; I think we ought to find out.

Senator INOUYE. Further, it has been suggested that a significant number of men in the Reserves and National Guard have so enlisted or volunteered because of the threat of the draft also?

**Mr. RUMSFELD.** That again falls into the same category. I am sure that there are individuals in the Reserves, in the National Guards, who are ~~then~~ to avoid the possibility of being drafted. What the numbers are or what **impact** the revision of incentives and policies by the military that I have **pi-oped** might have on that number I don't know. Now, with respect to your question, this same question, there is the factor that I mentioned earlier, that Secretary McNamara is already attempting to move some tasks or functions or jobs that are presently categorized as military into the civilian sector. He has moved many thousands, I'm told by the Department of Defense, into the civilian sector. I think that the coming years offer an opportunity for continuing this to so extent, which then, of course, makes them available to the country as a whole.

Turning to your other question on the charge that it would be a mercenary army. This, of course, is an allegation that is made. I would make the following comments: First, that if that is so, then our country has had a mercenary army throughout the overwhelming majority of its history, during the Revolutionary War, during the entire period after that, during most of the Civil War, during the period between then and World War I, except for a brief period during World War I, right up to World War II. I haven't seen anyone complaining about that.

Senator INOUYE. Apparently the voluntary motive was not money.

**Mr. RUMSFELD.** Well, I am sure that the voluntary motive here would not be money exclusively, and to suggest that wouldn't be accurate. Right now there is not only no incentive, but there is just the reverse. We are trying to push people away from volunteering, because during their early years of service we pay them substantially less than they could make in other comparable civilian employment.

Now a mercenary army to me is one composed of individuals who go into the particular military force for pay, and then hire out to fight wars on contract. But we are not advocating that the U.S. military be available for sale to another country to fight their battles, and that is basically what a mercenary is. We are simply saying that we would like to have a military that is composed to the maximum extent of volunteers. Anyone who says that this would create a mercenary army, then I think has to say that today we have a mercenary officer corps, because our officer corps is now and has always been totally volunteer. Is that a mercenary group? I think this is a poor word describing it.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.

**Mr. RUMSFELD.** Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Congressman, I don't want to prolong this, but the voluntary aspects of the officer corps are not as open and unlimited as the voluntary aspects of the military service you propose.

**Mr. RUMSFELD.** It is a smaller group.

Chairman RUSSELL. The option for nearly all the junior officers in the service is to go in as an officer or be drafted and go in as a private. That is about the only part that is voluntary. After they get in a great many of them decide that they will make a career of it and do volunteer. Technically, you are right. They are volunteers, but the option is not between being in the Armed Forces or not. It is

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between whether you go as an officer or whether you go as a private. We have increased the Armed Forces of our country by about 700,000 since Vietnam fighting started. Do you think we could have made that increase by voluntary means, assuming that we had a voluntary force of 2.6 million in existence at the time that the war started?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I question whether you could have moved from the level we were, then institute at the time of the escalation a volunteer system, and still recruit the 700,000. I question whether that would have been possible. Whether it would have been possible and we previously had a volunteer system, and then worked from that stronger base during this period I don't know. What I am hoping and suggesting is that I think it would be prudent and wise and safe for the Congress this year to extend it for 2 years, and then try to gain the experience so that you and I could both ask that question without using opinion, but know reasonably conclusively what our capabilities as a country really are, by using normal incentives and personnel practices to control to some extent the size of the military.

And the end of that 2-year period, I think both of us could answer that question conclusively.

Chairman RUSSELL. You referred to the Reserve Forces. Of course you know, Congressman, that a large part of the Reserve Forces of this country is in being today because of the draft laws.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is a factor.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are well aware of that, are you not?

Mr. RUMSFELD. And because of World War II, right. I have been a member of the Navy Reserves since my release from the Navy, and not because of the draft laws.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was interested in your comparison to the Post Office Department. I must say I think there is some difference in a couple of days' delay in receiving the mail and in perhaps having your country overrun in this technological age.

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question about that, and I am certainly not suggesting that the country be overrun. I am saying that we ought to have the compulsory system available if we need it, but we ought not, in a free system, use it as a crutch because of our failure to provide the incentives to gain a maximum number of volunteers.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you introduced a bill in the House dealing with this subject?

Mr. RUMSFELD. As far as pay increases? No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am at somewhat of a loss to know just how we could experiment with this concept at the same time we have the draft in operation.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I am submitting with my statement a comprehensive statement by Dr. Walter Oi who was involved in the Defense Department studies, which sets forth at least the beginning of guidelines the way this committee might undertake the 2-year extension with an experiment, and exactly his recommendation as to Flint could be done. It at least might be a stopping-off point. He has used econometrics, and attempted to evaluate what different incentives would or would not provide, and I think that this might be a beginning point. I would hope that the members of the committee would have a chance to review it.

Chairman RUSSELL. It could turn out to be a rather expensive experiment. I am in favor of equal pay for the members of the Armed Forces commensurate with their responsibilities, because they can't have unions, and for other reasons. I champion pay increases. But if we were to try out the voluntary system by substantially increasing compensation, we would immediately have to increase significantly the compensation of all the 3,400,000 we have in the service now.

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, sir. I think what could be done would be

Chairman RUSSELL. I certainly wouldn't increase the pay for a volunteer and then not give that same increase to a man who has been snapped up by the nape of his neck and put in **them** by the theft. I would certainly see that he received the same increase in pay that the volunteers received.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think the trouble is we are talking about it in a different way. You are comparing the pay for volunteers and non-volunteers and I am not. I am talking about raising the pay for anyone during those early years, straightening out that pay scale that presently exists that is not straight. Instead of a graduated increase as most employment has over a period of years, the military curve is very low over the early years; the reason is that we have had the compulsory draft to get those people in and keep them there even though we weren't paying them what they could have gotten somewhere else. I am just suggesting straightening out the curve for both volunteers and the conscripted.

Chairman Russell. Be gracious enough when you prepare your bill to send me a copy of it. I want to see it.

**Mr. ROSEFELD.** I will give you the statement.

Chairman Russell: There is a great deal of difference between a statement and writing a law. It is easy to suggest a solution, but when you begin to draft a bill to accomplish what you have laid out in your hypothesis, you always run into many complications, roadblocks, mines, boobytraps, and other obstacles you hadn't expected.

.. Mr. ROUSSEAU. I quite agree. It is a broad and complicated subject, and I certainly recognize the seriousness of the job that your committee has facing it.

**Chairman Russell, Senator Pearson?**

Senator PEARSON. Congressman, I had a committee conflict and did not have an opportunity to hear your testimony. The concept of a voluntary Military Establishment has been touched upon, passed on in most all the testimony we have up to date. Those arguments against it of course, lack of flexibility, and contrary to the tradition of a citizen Military Establishment, political institutions, I see you have touched on all of those in your statement. I look forward to reading it.

I wonder if you would comment on a statement by General Clark, the Chairman of the Citizens Advisory Panel, I think instituted by the House Armed Services Committee. He said at page three:

"In addition"—after enumerating some of the objections to the voluntary force—"such a force of 'mercenaries' would have serious moral and psychological shortcomings."

Would you care to comment on that observation?

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Mr. RUMSFELD. I suppose it is a little brash for a Reserve Navy lieutenant to argue with General Clark, but I just have to say that I do not find this argument of fear of a mercenary army valid. He does not as I recall from my reading of that report explain exactly what he means by mercenary. As I indicated earlier, we have had, if that is what you want to call it, a mercenary army throughout the overwhelming majority of this country's history. We have had compulsory military service only for a few decades out of the entire history of this country. At this very date we still have a voluntary officer corps. A mercenary army to me is an army that is there for the money and that then that group hires out to another country to fight someone else's war. No one is suggesting that this country's military be made available to another country to fight its war. This is not what I am advocating. I am simply advocating that we move closer to the goal of maximizing the number of people who serve in the military because they want to, and I think we will have a better military than we have today, and I recognize that any threat, any potential threat to existing political institutions, is something that must be very carefully weighed.

I don't think there is anything in our history that would indicate that we as a country could not avoid what I am advocating, developing into a mercenary arm in the context that General Clark apparently meant it.

Senator PEARSON. Do you know of any other nation or country that employs such a system as you have recommended or touched upon in your report?

Mr. RUMSFELD. In the paper I have submitted there are comments about five or six other countries who have various systems. My brief review of this question with respect to previous history is that there have been instances where political institutions have been threatened by both conscript and nonconscript armies, and in almost every case it has been by the officer corps.

Senator PEARSON. My question was whether or not you know of any country today that employs a voluntary military system, such as we are discussing this morning?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There certainly is no country like the United States which does, but Canada.

Senator PEARSON. Not with the commitments which we have around the world actually.

Mr. RUMSFELD. There are countries. It is my understanding that Canada has an absence of compulsion in their system. There are numerous other countries that have this. The question as to whether or not this country can do something that I touched on at length earlier, and this is something I confess I don't know. I do think that we have really no legitimate excuse not to try to find out during the next 2-year period by extending the act for 2 years and trying to gain some experience to see what this country can actually do in terms of maximizing the number of volunteers.

Senator PEARSON. I want to thank you, Congressman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUMSFELD. Thank you very much, Congressman. We are glad to have you here and have your statement.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Thank you very much.

(The material referred to by Congressman Rumsfeld in his statement follows:)

PROPOSAL FOR A MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT BILL

(By Dr. Walter Y. Oi, March 31, 1967)

This memorandum outlines a proposal for a military manpower procurement bill to replace the present draft law. We recommend that the draft authority be extended for a period of two years and that the steps outlined in this proposal be adopted by the Dept. of Defense. We endorse the two-year extension rather than the four-year extension recommended by the Marshall Commission for two reasons.

1. Our proposal entails radical departures from the current practices of the Selective Service System. The same can also be said of the Marshall Commission recommendations. Congress should have an opportunity to evaluate any new draft law without waiting for four years. Two years of operation should supply us with sufficient data to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of our proposed program.

2. Military manpower policies of the Dept. of Defense have not been well-articulated nor rationalized into a integrated coherent program of manpower utilization. The necessary studies to formulate an integrated military manpower policy should be undertaken immediately. In the light of these studies, Congress may wish to revise the military manpower procurement program.

I. OBJECTIVES

a. To assure that the Armed Services will be supplied with sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to insure the defense of the nation while placing maximum reliance on volunteers.

b. To establish a system of military compensation designed to lessen a major inequity inherent in involuntary military service.

c. To rationalize the role and function of the Reserve components in an integrated program of military manpower policies.

d. To inaugurate changes to the overall military manpower policies of the Department of Defense to achieve greater efficiency in the utilization of manpower.

The present draft law (The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951) is due to expire on 30 June 1967. The need for modifying the present law is attested by the establishment of a Presidential study group (the Marshall Commission) as well as by a second study group (the Clark Commission). The reports of both Commissions accept as fact that a military draft is necessary, at least in the foreseeable future. The Marshall Commission carefully documents the arbitrary actions of local draft boards under the current Selective Service System. Both Commissions conclude that the current draft law is highly inequitable and must be modified. That any system of involuntary military service is inequitable when not all nerve requires no further amplification. Both reports can be criticized on at least two grounds. First, the reasons why the draft is no inequitable are never listed nor are their implications examined. Second, the alternatives proposed by both Commissions deal only with the procurement of new accessions to the uniformed services, thereby neglecting the question of how the initial procurement policy fits into the larger picture of military manpower policy. The potential impact of the Marshall Commission's impartial random selection system on the supplies of voluntary accessions is only superficially discussed; no estimates appear in the 210 page report.

II. METHOD OF SELECTING DRAFTTEES

a. The present draft classification system will be simplified to contain only six classifications as follows:

- (1) I-A, available for service.
- (2) I-X, available for service only after exhaustion of the I-A pool.
- (3) Hardship deferments.
- (4) Student deferments.

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(5) **Exempt from service.** This category will include the conscientious objectors as well as men rejected for service because of physical, mental, or moral reasons.

(6) **Discharged military service obligation.** This category will include men in service (active and reserve) as well as veterans who have completed service and returned to civilian life.

If desired, a seventh category, I-Y, "Trainability limited" could be added.

b. The I-A pool will include all men without deferments whose draft age is between 19 and 21. The draft age for an individual who never obtains a deferment is identical to his chronological age. An individual who secures a deferment is placed in a state of suspended animation at a draft age of 19. When his deferment lapses (upon leaving school), he is placed in the I-A pool with a draft age of 19, irrespective of his chronological age. Hence, a student who is deferred to a chronological age of 26 to complete his work for a law degree is returned to the I-A pool with a draft age of 19. Each individual (whether or not he obtains a student deferment) is therefore put in the I-A pool for at most two years. For details of the proposed selection system, confer note a.

c. Men who are not selected or who do not discharge their military service obligation through voluntary entry are placed in draft classification I-X when their draft age exceeds 21. They remain in this I-X status for five years.

d. Hardship deferments will continue to be given on an individual basis with an appeal procedure similar to that now in operation. The criteria for granting such deferments should conform to the criteria of eligibility for the poverty program.

e. Student deferments will be issued to all bona-fide full- and part-time students. Individuals receiving a student deferment will, however, remain in a state of suspended animation with respect to their draft age. When the student deferment lapses (because of completion of schooling or leaving school prior to graduation), the individual is reclassified into the I-A pool and assigned a draft age of 19. Since all occupational and dependency deferments (other than hardship) are to be discontinued, every student who obtains a deferment is certain to be put in the I-A pool for approximately two years upon completion of schooling. They will enter the I-A pool with an assigned draft age of 19 irrespective of their chronological age.

f. Exemptions from the military service obligation are to be determined in the same fashion as at present. The Marshall Commission also recommends this; notice that exemption differs from deferment.

g. An individual can discharge his military service obligation through voluntary entry into any reserve or active duty component (either as an officer or an enlisted man) at any time prior to receipt of his preinduction notice. However, once he has been issued a preinduction notice, he is prevented from volunteering.

h. Draft calls will be issued on a monthly basis in a manner designed to eliminate the seasonal pattern in draft calls. The oldest men (in terms of draft age) will be called first. If the draft call for any month is less than the number of men in the I-A pool reaching their 21st draft birth date, a random selection of birth dates will determine which men are selected.

The two salient facts which prompted the establishment of the Marshall and Clark Commissions are (1) the rapid growth in the population base of eligible males and (2) the unduly long period of draft vulnerability which created many uncertainties for youths to the affected.

These two facts must be acknowledged as a major problem for selecting some men for induction while others are permitted to postpone their military service obligations.

It is not surprising to find high personnel turnover when men are involuntarily drafted or are coerced to volunteer by the threat of a draft. The personnel turnover of a professional voluntary force would be considerably lower, meaning that fewer men from each cohort would need to be attracted into the Armed Services.

\*The chronological age of students reclassified into the I-A pool could vary from 19 to as high as 27 years of age. If, for example, a student continues to graduate school for an advanced degree, he may retain his student deferment. However, when he is put into the I-A pool, he is regarded as having a draft age of 19; put in another way, the six years in which he held a student deferment contribute nothing to his draft age. If the two-year period of maximum vulnerability to the draft is felt to be unduly long (creating uncertainty for the older men completing college), they could be reclassified into the I-A pool and assigned a draft age of 20. Since the oldest are called first, they will incur the same risks of being drafted as non-students.

Even with the high turnover of the present system of manpower procurement (predicated on a draft and the threat of being drafted), DOD projections indicate that the Armed Services will require less than one third of the males reaching the age of 18.

Under the current Selective Service System, an individual can remain in a draft-liable status for up to seven and one-half years. During this period of draft liability, a youth cannot determine whether he will be drafted or, if so, when. Of course he has the option of discharging his obligation by volunteering or asking to be drafted; many individuals choose, however, to wait or to seek means of securing deferments that eventually grant them effective evasion of their military service obligation. The DOD report (confer the June 1966 Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee) indicated that uncertainties created by the present selection system impose unnecessary costs and hardships on those youths who remain in a draft-vulnerable status. To remedy this shortcoming, the Marshall Commission has proposed an impartial random selection system which reduces the period of maximum vulnerability to less than a year; in fact, each individual can estimate his chances of being drafted during his 18th year before he reaches his 19th birth date.

The uncertainty of the present draft system is, however, not an unmitigated evil. Representatives of the Department of Defense and the Selective Service System have testified before Congressional committees that this uncertainty accounts for considerable numbers of volunteers. According to DOD surveys of men on active duty, 38.1 per cent of regular enlistments and 41.9 per cent of newly commissioned officers could be regarded as reluctant draft-motivated volunteers who were coerced to enlist by the threat of being drafted. Furthermore, 71.7 per cent of enlistments to Reserve and National Guard units enlisted because of their draft obligations. Examination of the age distribution of regular enlistments (to active duty) reveals that fully 85 per cent were under 27 years of age at the time of entry. The peak in the age distribution is at age 18. If the lottery proposed by the Marshall Commission were adopted, it seems probable that many of these reluctant volunteers would fail to enter once they determined that they had been bypassed in the random selection system. Under our proposal, the 18- and 19-year-old would—as at present—be subjected to the uncertainty of the draft; since this would continue to pose a dilemma for this age group, the Armed Services would benefit from larger numbers of regular enlistments who can be put into the training programs for technical skills. Moreover, each additional volunteer (who serves an initial term of three to four years and who is more likely to reenlist) leads to a reduction of at least two draftees (each serving for only two years and with a reenlistment rate of less than 7 per cent). Our proposal would, therefore, result in considerably smaller draft calls, thereby further reducing the inequity of involuntary military service. This fact has not been examined nor discussed by the Marshall Commission.

### III. ADJUSTMENTS IN THE COMPENSATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

a. The pay of enlisted men and officers in their first two years of service will be raised in order to eliminate the inequity in the pay profile of military personnel.

b. The current system of retirement benefits will be modified in two ways. (1) Servicemen will contribute to their retirement fund<sup>1</sup>, thereby sharing the cost of the retirement program with the government. And (2) retirement benefits in the form of separation bonuses will be granted to men who serve for less than twenty years.

That the cost of an all-volunteer force would be inordinately high has been put forth as an argument for the continuation of a military draft. The DOD study of June 1966 reported that the pay raises needed to staff all active-duty force of 2.7 million men would increase the military payroll budget by 4 in 17 billion dollars a year. Our estimate of this cost is around 4 billion dollars. The military payroll is, however, not the real cost of labor resources devoted to the Armed Services. Over the last sixteen years, the pay raises legislated by Congress have mainly benefited men in the career force with five or more years of service. Indeed, entry-level pay (for the first two years of service) has remained virtually constant from 1950 to 1964, with the consequence that the real income of enlisted men (in dollars adjusted for changes in the cost

of living) has declined, appear to be (1) to raise comparability with the present and (2) to devise reenlistment. The introduction of this latter objective years has been held down supplies of new recruits.

The pay profile of enlisted men. The annual total military assistance, and quarters of the servicemen) in their the servicemen because a measure of pay excludes medical/dental care) at hazardous duty, sea duty evident when the data (resulting both from no time in pay grades) are indeed, a direct result against new recruits.

The magnitude of the pay estimates of Table civilians of comparable recruit to regular enlist \$3,460 per year, while the average including the value of a draftee or draft-induced roughly \$1,200 per year income taxes of FY 1966 age was only \$570. The considerable burden on or which were coerced to men who serve in the A high as the average tax of the real cost of production.

The financial inequity the entire nation. In its compensation, Congress most recent is the post attend colleges and technical however, greatest for a school. A man with a abilities for absorbing Bill. It would seem a financial compensation.

To lessen the financial compensate men who choose average of 84 percent of schedules of annual pay. For a further strength raises would increase year; for a strength of by \$1.718 billion. Co commissioned officers, should, in our opinion, adopted.

<sup>1</sup>The size of the military and military incomes. (pay would have to be roughly \$3,000 per year, extended in officers and would have to be increased men.

of living) has declined. The two prime objectives in prior military pay bills appear to be (1) to raise the pay of the career force to achieve approximate comparability with the pay of civilians of similar age and educational attainment and (2) to devise methods for attracting more first-term servicemen to reenlist. The introduction of reenlistment bonuses and proficiency pay exemptions fulfills this latter objective. Throughout, the pay of recruits in their first two years has been held down because the military draft could assure adequate supplies of new recruits.

The pay profile of enlisted men under the pay scale of 1963 is shown in Table 1. The annual total military income includes (1) base pay, (2) uniform, subsistence, and quarters allowances either in money or (if these are provided to the servicemen) in their imputed value, and (3) the tax advantage realized by the servicemen because some pay items are treated as nontaxable income. Our measure of pay excludes the value of fringe benefits (such as PX privileges and medical/dental care) as well as money payments for special duties—jump, hazardous duty, sea duty, etc. The sharp discontinuity in the pay profile is evident when the data are plotted as in Figure 1. The annual pay increases (resulting both from normal promotion to higher pay grades and from longer time in pay grades) are highest for the first two years. This discontinuity is, indeed, a direct result of the pay legislation which has overtly discriminated against new recruits.

The magnitude of the discrimination becomes even more shameful when the pay estimates of Table 1 are juxtaposed to the average full-time incomes of civilians of comparable age and educational attainment. In 1964, the typical recruit to regular enlisted ranks (volunteers) could as a civilian have earned \$4,450 per year, while the typical draftee who is older could have earned \$3,810 per year. The average military income (for the first three years of service and including the value of subsistence and quarters) was only \$2,400 per year. Each draftee or draft-induced volunteer was thus burdened with a hidden tax averaging roughly \$1,200 per year. For purposes of comparison, the Federal personal income taxes of FY 1965 show that the tax burden per person over 18 years of age was only \$370. The inordinately low levels of first-term pay thus impose a considerable burden on a minority of youths—those who happen to be drafted or who were coerced to enlist by the threat of a draft. Put in another way, the men who serve in the Armed Forces are compelled to pay a hidden tax twice as high as the average tax burden placed on all adults, and by this process a part of the real cost of procuring military manpower is concealed.<sup>1</sup>

The financial inequity of involuntary military service is an embarrassment to the entire nation. In attempts to remedy this blatantly unfair system of military compensation, Congress has offered various "benefits" to veterans, of which the most recent is the postwar G.I. Bill granting stipends to ex-servicemen who attend colleges and technical training schools. Benefits from the G.I. Bill are, however, greatest for those who have the highest probability of succeeding in school. A man with a bachelors educational background in high school or with limited abilities for absorbing formal training realizes virtually nothing from the G.I. Bill. It would seem that a far more equitable solution is to provide direct financial compensation, allowing the individual to spend it as he chooses.

To lessen the financial inequity of involuntary military service and to compensate men who choose to volunteer, we propose to raise first-term pay by an average of 94 percent over the first two years. The present (1963) and proposed schedules of annual military income for enlisted men are shown in Table 2. For a force strength of 2.06 million men, implementation of the proposed pay raises would increase the payroll budget for enlisted men by \$1,368 million per year; for a strength of 3.3 million men, the payroll for enlisted men would climb by \$1,718 million. Corresponding adjustments would also be made for newly commissioned officers. These adjustments in the compensation of servicemen should, in our opinion, be made irrespective of the draft law that is ultimately adopted.

<sup>1</sup> The size of the hidden tax is larger than the difference of \$1,200 between civilian and military incomes. Our study, as well as the DOD study, indicates that first-term pay would have to be raised to an entry-level pay (in the first year of service) of roughly \$3,000 per year. When pay increases similar to those proposed in Table 2 are extended to officers and enlistments to reserve components, the military payroll budget would have to be increased by roughly \$1.5 billion for a force strength of 2.65 million men.

Under the current system of compensation, a serviceman receives retirement benefits of from one-half to three-fourths of base pay only if he serves for twenty years. Moreover, the individual never contributes toward his retirement fund. The Armed Forces clearly do not want all men to serve for twenty years, as evidenced by the "selection out" of officers around the tenth to twelfth years and by the eligibility requirements for reenlistment of regular enlisted men. The Canadian Armed Forces (a professional, all-volunteer force) have adopted a retirement program with two appealing features. One is that the individual contributes on a matching basis toward his pension. The other is that he can realize benefits after eight or ten years of service, although the size of the benefit rises, of course, with length of service. Finally, the individual can elect to take his pension either in a lump sum as a separation bonus or in the form of an annuity. The retirement fund is thus put on an actuarially sound basis, unlike our present retirement system. In addition, the serviceman considering reenlistment is not forced to view a twenty-year term as a prerequisite to receiving benefits that will enable him to make the adjustment to the civilian economy after retirement. We propose that the retirement system be modified to permit men to retire after ten years of service and that members contribute to their retirement, with benefits tied to the amount of the contribution, while the Department of Defense also contributes on a sharing basis.

TOTAL  
MILITARY  
INCOME

TABLE 1.—Annual incomes of enlisted men (for pay scales of fiscal year 1965)

Years of service	Total DOD			Army					
	Total military income	Yearly increases		Total military income	Yearly increases		Base pay	Yearly increases	
		Dollars	Percent		Dollars	Percent		Dollars	Percent
1.....	1,830			1,800			1,055		
2.....	2,143	313	17.1	2,304	404	21.3	1,382	327	31.0
3.....	2,991	848	39.6	3,247	943	40.9	2,022	620	44.0
4.....	3,344	353	11.8	3,711	364	11.3	2,453	431	21.3
5.....	4,130	786	23.5	4,248	537	12.5	2,678	225	8.4
6.....	4,462	332	8.0	4,695	247	5.8	2,725	47	1.7
7.....	4,849	387	8.7	4,695	0	0.0	2,694	131	4.9
8.....	4,741	92	2.0	4,797	56	1.2	3,003	308	10.3
9-12.....	5,230	489	9.3	5,377	177	3.3	3,280	277	8.6
13-16.....	5,978	748	14.3	6,043	67	1.2	3,445	165	4.8
17-10.....	6,387	409	6.8	6,414	27	0.4			

† Annual increase interpolated.

TABLE 2.—Proposed pay increases for enlisted men

(Total military income)

Years of service	Actual, 1963	Proposed	Percentage increase
1.....	1,830	1,130	11.0
2.....	2,143	2,380	11.7
3.....	2,991	3,630	21.4
4.....	3,344	3,880	16.0
5.....	4,130	4,130	
6.....	4,462	4,462	
7.....	4,849	4,849	
8.....	4,741	4,741	
9-12.....	5,230	5,230	
13-16.....	5,978	5,978	
17-10.....	6,387	6,387	

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	Base pay	Yearly increases	
		Dollars	Percent
1	1,055		
2	1,362	327	31.0
3	2,002	620	44.0
4	2,433	431	21.5
5	2,678	142	5.8
6	2,726	150	5.5
7	2,884	133	4.9
8	2,983	145	5.1
9	3,290	111	3.7
10	3,458	161	4.9

ated men

	Proposed	Percentage Increase
10	3,130	71.0
12	3,330	67.7
14	3,630	51.4
16	3,880	16.0
18	4,130	
20	4,482	
22	4,649	
24	4,741	
26	5,235	
28	5,928	
30	6,357	

TOTAL  
MILITARY  
INCOME

\$ 7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

YEARS OF SERVICE

## IV. ORGANIZATION OF RESERVES AND NATIONAL GUARD

a. The *strength of the reserve components on a paid-drill status should be reduced*. The smaller reserve forces can then be more *intensively trained* to serve as a *true* reserve to the active duty forces.

b. The Armed Services should undertake a *careful study* of the relative merits of the "unit" or "filter" concepts as applied to the Reserve forces.

c. The reserve components should constitute the *first source of supply* of personnel to the active duty ranks in *periods of emergency*.

At the present time, approximately 1.8 million men are on a paid-drill status in Reserve and National Guard units. A considerable fraction have, moreover, engaged in active duty *only for training*. It is not at all clear just what is the role of this large reserve force. Since the end of the Korean War, the yearly increase in the active duty strength has never exceeded 350 thousand men. Furthermore, throughout the present Vietnam build-up, no significant numbers of Reserves have been recalled to active duty. The obvious conclusion is that the reserves are not intended to bolster the active duty forces in short-run periods of mobilization. The role and function of the reserve components should be clearly articulated. We are of the opinion that they should serve as the primary source of accessions to the active duty forces in periods of wartime emergency or brush-fire wars. If this opinion is accepted, then the strength of the truly ready reserves (on a paid-drill status) could be reduced by 400 to 500 thousand men. Reserve strengths of 800 to 900 thousand men could easily accommodate the *year-to-year* flexibility in the active duty strength for nearly all contingencies other than a global war.

Policies governing the organization of individual reserve units vary widely across services. Some services, notably the Marine Corps and Navy, organize the reserves on the "filter" concept, whereby individual members of a unit may be called separately to active duty. The Air Force (especially the Air National Guard) and Army seem to follow the "unit" concept, wherein the entire unit is activated at once. During the Berlin build-up in the fall of 1961, several Army Reserve and Guard units were activated; the experience was less than satisfactory. The merits of the two systems have been discussed, but to the best of our knowledge there has been no determination as to what utilization of reserves can achieve the greatest defense capability for given resources of manpower and materials. Further study seems warranted.

## V. SOME SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MILITARY MANPOWER POLICIES

a. *Civilian substitution*.—The Department of Defense should carefully examine the *possibilities of substituting civilians for uniformed personnel*. This would seem to be especially important in the paramedical fields as well as in many of the maintenance, clerical, and food services. Expansion of the women's service corps does not appear to be advisable. Most of the tasks which they perform are of a clerical nature that could be handled by civilians at lower cost. When the British abandoned National Service, they experimented with expansion of the Women's Corps, only to cut back later on these programs.

b. *Officer procurement programs*.—Under the pressure of a draft liability, the Armed Services have been able to establish and maintain extremely high education standards for officers. In FY 1964, nearly all newly commissioned officers held college degrees. The value of a college education is apparent for a senior officer (of Lieutenant Colonel rank or higher) who must deal with administrative matters. However, the junior officers perform tasks which require more leadership training than formal educational achievements. The Second Lieutenant who leads an infantry platoon needs leadership abilities not easily taught in colleges. We propose that the Armed Services seriously study the possibility of expanding officer procurement channels, allowing men without a college degree to attain junior officer grades.

Under our proposal, highly qualified enlisted men could be advanced to junior officer ranks where, in a fashion similar to that adopted by the Canadian Armed Services, they would serve mainly as field officers. Their terms of service would be limited to ten or twelve years, and they would be retired at a rank of Captain (or Navy Lieutenant). The retirement plan outlined in III-b above would provide these men with separation bonuses that could be used to retrain them for the civilian economy.

The introduction of this type of upward mobility from the enlisted to the officer ranks would have beneficial effects in two ways. First and most obvious

is its effect a to reach office Second, the : service would degrees. The would thus E military care study of the present regul present draft commissions

c. *Terms of* listments var Air Force, at ment of Def initial enlist the second te listed man in (ears) in OM Department tional longer longer first t rapid promo Armed Servi training prog

d. *Recruit* listments to transferable pay as men recruitment ranks and p ferentials in adopting suc

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is its effect on voluntary enlistments. If a high school graduate sees a chance to reach officer grades, he is more likely to volunteer for the Armed Forces. Second, the retirement of many junior officers after ten to twelve years of service would eliminate the need for "selection-out" of officers with college degrees. The college graduate volunteering for an officers' training program would thus stand a better chance of reaching the senior officer ranks, and a military career would promise him greater rewards. We believe that a careful study of the qualification standards for junior officers will reveal that our present requirement of a college degree is unduly high and is a product of the present draft law which coerces many college graduates to volunteer for officers' commissions under threat of being drafted.

c. *Terms of service.*—The length of the first term of service for voluntary enlistments varies across services—being three years in the Army, four years in the Air Force, and three to four years in the Navy and Marine Corps. The Department of Defense has not experimented with varying these terms of service for initial enlistments; however, they have allowed wide variations in the length of the second term of service for men electing to reenlist. For example, a Navy enlisted man must commit himself to an extremely long second term (ten to twelve years) in order to qualify for the Polaris training program. We propose that the Department of Defense undertake studies to evaluate the merits of offering optional longer initial terms of service. Prospective recruits who enlist for the longer first term could be offered initial enlistment bonuses or promise of more rapid promotion. With more men signed to longer initial tours of duty, the Armed Services could achieve far greater control in the assignment of recruits to training programs for the highly technical skills.

d. *Recruitment of skilled personnel.*—Except for the Navy, all voluntary enlistments to the Armed Forces are treated alike. Men possessing skills easily transferable in military occupations enter the Armed Forces at the same rank and pay as men having no prior job experience or skills. We recommend that the recruitment system be modified to permit the Armed Services to offer higher ranks and pay to men having desirable skills, perhaps through a system of differentials in pay. The cost of recruiting highly skilled men could be reduced by adopting such a policy.

A careful study of manpower utilization practices by the Armed Forces would surely suggest other specific policies. The techniques of systems analysis and joint effectiveness which have been applied in the evaluation of weapons systems are equally applicable in a study of manpower utilization. However, in such a study, the budgetary cost of uniformed personnel is not the appropriate cost of labor resources of which a considerable portion has been recruited by compulsion. The primary objectives in all of these studies should be to design a system of manpower procurement, retention, and utilization which achieves the greatest defense capability for a given real cost of labor resources. Our opinion is that such a policy would place maximum reliance on volunteers and thereby minimize the need for involuntary inductions.

#### THE COSTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

(By Walter Y. O'L University of Washington)

(AUTHOR'S NOTE.—A considerable amount of research for this paper was done while I served as a consultant for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense from June 1964 to July 1966. I am deeply indebted to many members of the OSD staff who provided assistance and information. The opinions and conclusions which appear in this paper are solely my responsibility and do not in any

\*The Navy offers certain recruitment programs for men with some college education but without a degree. Recruits to the NROTC program are enlisted at a higher pay grade and have prospects for more rapid promotion. Also, all four services typically allow men with prior service experience to return to active duty at higher pay grades.

\*Skill differentials should not be confused with proficiency pay, which is paid to enlisted men in "critical" military occupations where there are shortages of qualified personnel. Under a system of skill differentials, men in the more highly skilled occupations would receive a premium (similar to an occupational wage differential) irrespective of the presence or absence of a "shortage." The Canadian system of Group Pay more nearly approximates our proposal for skill differentials.

way reflect the position of the Dept. of Defense. I am especially indebted to Mr. William A. Gorman, Dr. Harold Wool, and Prof. Stuart H. Altman who provided counsel and advice in my year of service on the manpower study. They are absolved of responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation which may still remain in this paper. A shorter version of this paper which emphasizes the economic cost of the draft is due to appear in the *and Proceedings of the American Economic Association* (May 1967).

The draft constitutes one means of obtaining the Armed Services its military personnel. Except for a brief lapse from March 1947 to June 1948, a military draft has been in continuous operation in the United States since 1940. Under provisions of the current draft law, every qualified male incurs a liability to serve for two years in active military service and up to six years in the stand-by reserves. Some men obtain deferments or exemptions from this liability, while others discharge it through voluntary entry into military service. The remaining qualified youths have, however, been involuntarily inducted into active duty service.

In times of war when nearly everyone must serve, alternatives to a draft are judged to be too costly or infeasible. The peacetime demands for military personnel are, however, considerably smaller with the consequence that a draft becomes selective. Rules must therefore be established to determine which qualified youths will be involuntarily selected. The equity of the selection process (which under the current draft translates into deferment policies) is then questioned. These debates over the equity of a draft are testimony to the fact that some alternatives should be given serious consideration and perhaps even adopted.

One of several proposed alternatives to the current draft is the establishment of an all-volunteer force. To my that a particular alternative such as an all-volunteer force is preferable to the current draft implies that the cost of the alternative is, in some sense, lower than the cost of procuring military personnel with the present Selective Service System. If the draft were abolished, military pay and other recruitment incentives must be improved to attract enough recruits to meet prescribed manpower objectives. In his statement before the House Armed Services Committee, the Hon. T. D. Morris (Assistant Secretary of Defense) indicated that an all-volunteer force of 2.65 million men would increase the military payroll budget by 4 to 17 billion dollars per year.

The budgetary cost of the Department of Defense (hereafter abbreviated DOD) is not the economic cost of labor resources which are allocated to the uniformed services. The presence of a draft has affected both the level and structure of military pay. Moreover, the men who are in the Armed Forces were recruited and conscripted through manpower procurement programs which rely in differing degrees on the coercion of a draft liability. Adoption of a purely voluntary force entails increases in pay as well as substantial changes in the procurement channels through which men are recruited. The composition and structure of an all-volunteer force would thus differ significantly from that of the present force containing many men who were enlisted under the pressure of a draft liability. The structure of the Armed Forces is thus a product of manpower procurement and retention policies. In this paper, I shall compare the costs of two procurement systems: a purely voluntary system, and the system which has evolved under the current draft law.

The implications of projected military manpower demands are first examined in parts I and II for the two cases—a mixed force under a continued draft and a voluntary force. Part III presents estimates of the financial cost of the Armed Forces in terms of the value of civilian goods and services that could have been

\*The three leading alternatives to the current draft are (1) an all-volunteer force, (2) lottery at a younger age, and (3) equivalent service. In the third alternative, men could discharge their draft liability by equivalent service in some other endeavor such as the Peace Corps or VISTA. Given the projected growth in male population, these "other endeavors" would have to be greatly expanded if all qualified youths are to serve their country. Adoption of this alternative would put the Federal Government into many new activities as well as a sizable rise in budgetary costs. The cost of a lottery selection system cannot be evaluated until its specific details are clarified. The impact of a lottery on voluntary accessions to enlisted ranks, officer procurement programs, and service units must be assessed. A comparison of the lottery with the present Selective Service System is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

\*House of Representatives, 86th Congress, Second Session, "Review of the Administration and Operation of the Selective Service System," Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services (June 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, and 30, 1966), [hereafter abbreviated *House Hearings*], pp. 9928-9955. See especially pp. 9936-9940.

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#### I. FORCE STRENGTH

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produced by men in the Armed Services. The full economic cost of the draft acknowledges the occupational preferences of prospective recruits. If a youth has an aversion to service life, he could in principle be compensated by enough to induce him to become a volunteer. Presently, many men who would demand such compensations are involuntarily inducted, while others reluctantly volunteer before they are drafted. The magnitude of these costs which are imposed on reluctant service participants is estimated in part IV. Finally, the mechanics of the current draft create uncertainties about the incidence and time of involuntary induction. Some of the costs associated with these uncertainties are briefly discussed in part V.

#### I. FORCE STRENGTHS AND MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS UNDER A DRAFT

The labor resources demanded by the Armed Services can be approximated by force strength which is simply a stock demand for military personnel unadjusted for the quality of servicemen or for the proportion in an effective (non-training) status. The total defense establishment is conveniently divided into three force strengths, (1) officers on active duty, (2) enlisted men on active duty, and (3) paid drill reservists. The last component engages in active duty mainly for training and is rarely used to bolster active duty strengths.

The average force strength in all active and reserve components for the six years prior to Vietnam was just under 3.7 million men to whom 2.6 million were on active duty. The fluctuations in force strengths which are shown in the upper panel of Table 1 are largely explained by international tensions. Since a discussion of factors determining force strength objectives is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, the peacetime force strength objectives are taken to be exogenous.

A more meaningful concept of demand is provided by the gross flow demand for new accessions from civilian life. The gross flow demand is the number of required accessions  $A_t$  that must be recruited or conscripted to replace losses during the year  $t$ , and to achieve prescribed changes in strength objectives,  $(S_t - S_{t-1})$ .

$$A_t = L_t + (S_t - S_{t-1})$$

If force strength is kept stable,  $(S_t - S_{t-1})$  will be zero. In this case, the gross flow demand is simply a replacement demand for losses which arise during the year because of voluntary separations upon completion of obligated tours of duty, retirements, deaths, and other discharges for medical or unsuitability reasons. The actual accessions between FY 1960-65 are shown in the lower panel of Table 1.

An annual average of 645 thousand men were recruited or conscripted from civil life to maintain the average strengths which prevailed over the period FY 1960-65. The ratio of annual accessions to force strengths provides a rough measure of military personnel turnover. Using the six year averages, FY 1960-65, from Table 1, the data indicate the following implicit turnover rates.

Implied actual turnover rates by component, fiscal year 1960-65 (percentages):

Total DOD (Active Forces).....	19.7
Officers .....	11.8
Enlisted men.....	21.0
Army (Active Forces).....	24.6
Officers .....	18.7
Enlisted men.....	20.0
Reserves and National Guard.....	12.2

Since the obligated tour of a draftee is considerably shorter than that of a regular voluntary enlistee, the Army with larger inputs of draftees necessarily

\*In the last decade, reservists were recalled to active duty in significant numbers only once. During the Berlin crisis of FY 1962, some 111 thousand National Guard and Army reservists were recalled to raise Army active duty force strength from 859.8 in FY 1961 to 1,000.4 thousand in FY 1962. This generalization does not apply to officers. In the five years, FY 1960-64, an annual average of 1,287 reserve officers were activated accounting for 8.0 per cent of total officer accessions.

The data in the lower panel of Table 1 may differ from other estimates of accessions for a least two reasons. One is that "first enlistments" include some men with prior service while other data may pertain to non-prior service accessions. The other is that "reserves to active duty" which I have included with first enlistments except for the unusual situation prevailing in FY 1962 are often neglected. The remaining discrepancies are, however, quite small.

experiences a high turnover rate. For prescribed peacetime force strength objectives, turnover rates determine the gross flow demands for new recruits. Elimination of the draft and policies which raise re-enlistment rates thus operate to lower the gross flow demand corresponding to a given stock demand. This point is amplified in part II below.

The manpower procurement channels which have evolved under a draft have strongly influenced the characteristics of servicemen. Of the 645 thousand annual accession to military service in FY 1960-65, 539 thousand (83.6 per cent) entered through a variety of voluntary programs. An individual can discharge his draft liability by serving as an enlisted man or officer. He can accomplish the former in any of three ways: (1) as a regular voluntary enlistee, (2) as a volunteer to a two-year active duty reserve program in the Navy or Marine Corps, or (3) as a draftee. Except for the doctors and dentists draft, all officer procurement programs are voluntary. Finally, the draft liability can be satisfied by volunteering for a Reserve or National Guard program requiring active duty only for training. Many men who discharge their draft liabilities through voluntary entry into military service can properly be called reluctant volunteers who entered a particular program in preference to being involuntarily drafted. In order to extrapolate the characteristics of men who are likely to enter military service in the future, it is convenient to study the military service experience of age classes born in specific years.

The disposition of military service obligations by men born in 1938 was estimated from a sample of Selective Service registrants. By July 1964, this age class reached the age of 26 at which the draft liability is effectively terminated.

According to the data of Table 2, the incidence of military service was highest for men with some college education, 50.5 per cent, and lowest for college graduates, 40.3 per cent. Only 18 per cent of this age class was formally rejected and placed into draft classifications IV-F and I-Y. This low rejection rate is probably due to the fact that men obtaining dependency and occupational deferments were never examined.

Physical and moral standards for military service have remained quite stable and appear to be unrelated to educational attainment. Mental qualification standards which are based on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores have, however, been varied in response to changing manpower demands. If the minimum mental standard is set equal to the 10th percentile on the AFQT, I obtain the estimated rejection rates shown in the following Table.

Estimated rejection rates by education

Reason for rejection	Years of education				Total
	Less than 12	12	13 to 15	16 and over	
Physical		16.0	16.0	16.0	16.0
Mental		2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
Moral	23.4	7.4	2.0	0.9	14.0
All reasons	40.3	26.7	20.1	19.1	30.4

<sup>1</sup> The mental rejection rate is applied to the population of physically and morally qualified males. This procedure assumes that the incidence of mental rejections is uncorrelated with the other 2 causes for rejection.

The population of men who were physically and mentally qualified for military service was thus estimated by applying these rejection rates. The in-

<sup>2</sup> Draftees have mainly been channeled to the Army. A few delinquents (usually juveniles who failed to attend drill meetings) are drafted into the other three Services. In 1958, the Navy accepted draftees, while the Marines did so in FY 1968. A two-year active duty reserve program was offered by the Army in 1958, but the program was dropped in 1968. Finally regular enlistments are obligated to initial tours of three years in the Regular Army and four years in the Air Force. The length of initial tours is more variable in the Navy and Marines with some recruits signed to six year tours.

<sup>3</sup> The draft liability is extended to the age of 25 for men holding occupational and student deferments. However, older liable men are placed in a lower order of call so that few individuals over 26 years of age are drafted. One exception is the draft of doctors and dentists.

<sup>4</sup> More careful estimates of mental and physical rejection rates have been prepared by Dr. Bernard Cerpione of the Department of Defense. His estimates indicate that the physical rejection rate rises with educational attainment. The difference between the estimates are, however, quite small.

idence of military is highest, 85.6 per cent 74.3 per cent of qua military service.

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<sup>6</sup> The data of Table a high school degre recruits enlist while nation. Indeed, the ably higher than that



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

4 August 2006

DeWayne Wickham  
USA Today  
7950 Jones Branch Drive  
McLean, Va. 22108

Mr. Wickham:

Thank you for recently writing about our injured troops and the debt of gratitude we all owe them. No amount of thanks is enough given their sacrifice. However, in addition to the best health care program in the nation, there are a number of important programs to help them and their families' in their time of need.

The Military Severely Injured Center is a 24/7 family support operation center providing personalized assistance, tailored to meet an individual's and family member's unique needs during recovery and rehabilitation, to include: financial resources, education training and job placement, mobility and functioning, home, transportation and workplace accommodations, and personal, couple and family issues counseling.

The U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program provides support services for wounded soldiers and their families from initial casualty notification to return to their homes. This program also tracks and monitors the Army's severely wounded soldiers for a period of five years beyond their medical retirement in order to provide appropriate assistance through an array of existing services.

The Marine for Life Injured Support Program provides information, advocacy and assistance to injured Marines, and their families in order to minimize the difficulties and worries they face as they navigate the stress and adjustments in their lives. Support begins at the time of injury and continues through return to duty or transition to civilian life.

Ordinary citizens, corporations, organizations and communities are also reaching out to say thanks to our servicemembers everyday. Many of these activities are highlighted in the "America Supports You" program that recognizes citizens' support for our military members and their families. Some 225 non-profit groups, representing communities from coast to coast, have joined this program to support the troops in many ways including writing letters and e-mails, sending care packages, and assisting military families or helping the wounded when they return home.



11-L-0559/OSD/59007

OSD 12575-06




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17 JUL 06

You are absolutely right, these men and women deserve our greatest thanks and these are only a few ways our wounded service members and their families are being taken care of. For additional information about these and other programs, please don't hesitate to contact my office at (b)(6)

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. Whitman", written over a horizontal line.

Bryan G. Whitman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
For Public Affairs

~~FOUO~~

July 19, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Runsfeld

*DA.*

SUBJECT *USA Today* Article by DeWayne Wickham

Someone ought to write this reporter and tell them all the things the Pentagon and the Services ~~are~~ doing for the wounded troops, and *thank* him for writing the article.

Thanks.

Attach: 7/18/06 *USA Today* article by DeWayne Wickham

DHR:SS  
SP071906-07

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/28/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59009

OSD 12575-06



8/7/2006 3:07:48 PM

ERS 1

## stronger show of gratitude

By DeWayne Wickham

FORT MEADE, Md. — All things considered, Army Sgt. Bryan Anderson would rather be in Iraq with members of his unit. But that opinion was taken from him one day last October when a Humvee he was driving was ripped apart by a roadside bomb.

"I just knew something was wrong — really, really wrong," Anderson says of his thoughts in the moments that followed the blast. When he raised his left arm to brush away a swarm of flies, he saw his co-the hand was gone. And so too was part of a finger on his right hand and both of his legs.

"I just remember thinking, 'This kind of sucks,'" the 25-year-old Chicago native, who hopes to land a job as a movie stuntman when he's discharged, tells me shortly after playing a round of golf in a specially designed motorized cart.

Anderson was among a small group of disabled Iraq war veterans who took part in a golf tournament last week that drew 144 golfers — but this military course should have been overrun with many more grateful Americans.

That it wasn't is a real shame.

"While we mourn our war dead, we have to take care of our disabled soldiers," says Philip Stranberg, the tournament's organizer. Since March 2003, when President Bush launched the war in Iraq, more than 2,500 U.S. military personnel have died in that conflict.

That number has gotten a lot of attention. The steady count of Americans being killed in Iraq has driven the public debate about when and how the Bush administration should pull out our forces.

**Life-changing wounds**

But largely overlooked in this political sparring are the more than 18,490 U.S. servicemen and women who have been wounded in Iraq. Like Anderson, many of them are suffering life-altering injuries that will require a lot of physical — and emotional — healing.

Stranberg heads a unit of the Army's Merkle, Welfare and Recreation (MAMWR) program at the Walter



Anderson

Anderson lost both his legs and his left hand in Iraq last fall.

radicals aware of these young people, they'll help us, help them.

That, at least, is the idea. But only 14 corporations sponsored the golf tournament, the profits from which are being used to fund other MAMWR programs. This nation can do a lot better than that.

Too far off the debate the Bush administration's war on terror took into Iraq. I think he was wrong to commit our troops there on the flimsiest of evidence, and wrong-headed to leave them in Iraq as that country slipped into a civil war.

But as someone who volunteered to serve in Vietnam, I understand that military personnel take an oath of service to the Constitution, not a political party or a politician. They deserve the gratitude of all Americans for the sacrifices they make when this democracy orders them into battle.

I didn't see enough evidence of that gratitude at the golf outing last week. The people who showed up were enthusiastic enough, but programs such as those put on by Walter Merkle's MAMWR program deserve a lot more backing.

At the very least, they deserved support that rises to the level of the sacrifices made by the servicemen and women who suffered disabling wounds in Iraq.

**No public funding**

That's because these activities are done without taxpayer funding. The golf tournament was supposed to help overcome this problem.

"It's a part of our awareness campaign," Stranberg says. "We know that if we make corpo-

DeWayne Wickham writes weekly for USA TODAY.

FOUO

July 25, 2006

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis →

Stinson

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT Report on Detention Operations

Here is the detention book that I told Edelman we wanted redone and updated fast, so we could release it in the event we decide that is the right thing to do in connection with the release of the legislation.

People ought to get it redone. People then ought to talk to the interagency to see whether we think that is the right thing to do. It strikes me that it will be the right thing to do. I would like to get that record out there, then people will have less of an excuse to say the things they say.

Also add Jim Haynes opening stat from his testimony

Thanks.

Attach. December 2005 "A Report on Detention Operations"

DHR:dh  
SF072506-05

.....  
Please Respond By 08/03/06

1200 28 JULY

← HARD DEADLINE

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/59011

OSD 12588-06



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2574/06

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-0414-06

7 August 2006

ACTION MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *VR/PA 6 Aug 06*

SUBJECT: Command Relationship (SF 031706-09) and Accountability for Investigations (SF 032006-33)

In response to your concerns (TAB A), the memorandum at TAB B clearly defines responsibility, reflects some of the recommendations of the 2005 Accountability Study Group, and is in line with the Unified Command Plan 2006.

- When an incident occurs outside the continental United States, the geographic combatant commanders **are** responsible for ensuring thorough and timely investigations, and corrective measures are taken for incidents that occur in their area of responsibility.
- When an incident occurs inside the continental United States, the appropriate Military Department has responsibility. There are two exceptions to this rule.
  - CDRUSNORTHCOM **has** responsibility over incidents occurring during operations conducted under his authority.
  - CDRUSPACOM has responsibility for incidents that occur in Alaska.
- As you suggested, combatant command and Service concerns were addressed in staffing and during discussions in the TANK.
- **This** solution addresses your concerns by clearly delineating responsibility for investigations of all incidents while maintaining current title 10 regulatory guidance and respecting the chain of command.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memorandum at TAB B.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION, TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. T. Conway, USMC, Director, J-3; (b)(6)

OSD 12598-06



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11-L-0559/OSD/59012

*3/0.1*

*7 Aug 06*

*17 Mar 07*



TAB A

~~FOUO~~

March 17, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace

CC: Jim Haynes  
Dan Dell'Orto

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA.*

SUBJECT: Command Relationships

I am deeply concerned about the confusion that results from ~~some~~ of our current command relationships.

The Haditha incident is ~~a~~ good example. ~~The~~ difference between the operational chain of command and the administrative chain of command could possibly impede an investigation and proper execution of the Uniform ~~Code~~ of Military Justice.

I would like you and Dan Dell'Orto to put together a ~~team~~ to review, and if necessary, give this place a rewiring so that we can do what we need to do, ~~and~~ do it right. Let's review our command relationships in ~~both~~ Iraq and Afghanistan, and think through the UCMJ implications of a joint and multi-national chain of command.

We are in the 21st Century. The idea that we have to go ~~through~~ three, four or five separate investigations on Tilman, Abu Ghraib, and now, possibly, Haditha is simply not acceptable to the American people.

DIR, J1  
11N 706-89

.....  
*Please Respond By 04/18/06*

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/59013

~~FOUO~~

March 20, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace

CC: Gordon England  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Accountability for Investigations

I looked over the package on investigation accountability you sent along, and I lean toward your idea that if an event happens outside the US, the COCOM is responsible for the investigation and generally handling it; and if it occurs inside CONUS, the Service would generally handle it.

Please run that by the COCOMs and through the tank, and let me know if there is general agreement.

If so, please send up a memo for my signature that lays out the premise and implements it. And make sure Jim Haynes is onboard from a legal perspective.

Thanks.

Attach. 3/14/06 CJCS note to SD; 12/12/05 CJCS memo to SD w/attachments,

DEB:lp  
032006-33

\*\*\*\*\*  
Please Respond By 04/20/06

*Ref CM-0087-05*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12599-06



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11-L-0559/OSD/59014

12/14  
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12/15



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CH-0087-05205 DEC 13 AM 9:47  
12 December 2005

ACTION MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *12/9/05*

SUBJECT: Clarifying Lines of Authority, Responsibility, and Accountability (SF 051805-16)

- Answer. Pursuant to DepSecDef approval of the Accountability Study Group (ASG) membership and terms of reference (TAB A), the ASG met three times and prepared a 52-page report. An Executive Summary of the ASG review, findings, and recommendations are attached at TAB B. A complete copy of the report is available for review, if desired.
- Analysis. ASG recommendations are summarized below.
  - The Secretary of Defense should issue policy guidance designating the combatant commander as primarily responsible for ensuring appropriate reporting, investigation, and disposition in operationally significant incidents. In addition, the Military Service component commanders should provide necessary support and resources to the combatant commanders. This designation of primacy will improve timeliness by eliminating confusion or ambiguities that contribute to unnecessary delays in such matters.
  - Sufficient statutory, regulatory, and doctrinal guidance exists to specify the operational and administrative branches of the chain of command under Goldwater-Nichols and the respective functions and responsibilities of the combatant commanders and Military Departments.
  - There is no need for legislative changes to the established chain of command.
  - No need exists for regulatory or directive guidance attempting to address the proper chain of command in every conceivable circumstance; such prescriptive guidance would limit the combatant commander's flexibility to address operationally significant incidents.

310.1

RECOMMENDATION Sign the policy memorandum at TAB C.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated

*520 12/14*

MA SD		SMA DSD	
<u>TSA SD</u>		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>12/14</i>	<i>111</i>	
ESR MA	<i>12/13/05</i>	<i>12/14/05</i>	

12 DEC 05

Prepared By Lieutenant General James T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 23911-05

11-L-0559/OSD/59015

TAB A




ORIGINAL

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-0001

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAY 26 PM 2:28  
CH-2519-03  
10 May 2005

ACTION MEMO



DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

Robert Ranger

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBW 5/14*

SUBJECT: Accountability Study (SF 1005)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), my legal staff and the DOD Office of the General Counsel (OGC) have identified a prospective Accountability Study Group (TAB B). They also have developed proposed terms of reference (TAB C) to evaluate all of the processes employed in resolving issues of discipline and accountability in significant departmental operational incidents.
- **Analysis.** The Accountability Study Group will consist of two military judge advocates, two DOD OGC representatives and five general/flag officers representing the Joint Staff and each of the Services. Under the proposed terms of reference, the group will evaluate existing processes and procedures, identify any deficiencies and submit proposed solutions to identified deficiencies. The group will submit its report to you via the DOD OGC and me 30 days after you approve the terms of reference and group membership.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve group composition and terms of reference.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated

Copy to:  
DOD OGC

Prepared By: Captain Hal Dronberger, USN; OCJCSLC; (b)(6)

Tab A

ORIGINAL

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 09509-05

11-L-0559/OSD/59016

## Executive Summary

The Accountability Study Group (ASG) **evaluated the processes** employed in resolving **issues** of discipline and accountability in significant operational incidents. **More** specifically, the ASG **was charged** with **examining the chain of command established by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986** (Goldwater-Nichols), and identifying any areas of ambiguity that might **exist** between combatant **command** (operational branch) and Military **service (administrative branch)** responsibilities for **authority**, accountability, and responsibility related to **significant operational incidents**. The ASG review focused on incidents involving forces operationally deployed and **assigned or attached to a combatant commander**, and did not **consider** plainly "**Service-specific**" matters or otherwise "**significant**" incidents unrelated to operationally significant matters.

The **framework for the ASG review** was the Terms of Reference approved by the Secretary of **Defense**, which tasked the group with the following main responsibilities:

- Summarize the current investigative framework and processes used to **address** significant operational incidents and resolve **issues** of accountability and responsibility;
- Summarize the investigative process used in past significant operational incidents, including a **discussion** of how **issues** of accountability and discipline **were** addressed;
- Identify any deficiencies in the **existing processes and procedures** for investigating and addressing accountability in significant operational incidents;
- **Propose** solutions to address identified deficiencies, including **necessary changes** to law, policy, regulation, and procedures; and
- **Recommend an** appropriate office or individual to be responsible for **ensuring** **Secretarial** decisions **are** implemented in a timely manner.

With respect to the investigative framework and processes, **while** Service customs and cultures account for some variations in investigative approach, **the basic investigatory framework for each Military Service is well established, familiar to its personnel, and contributes to an effective and responsive investigative process in support of ultimate command action**. Just as importantly, these differences in processes do not inhibit joint force **commanders** from obtaining necessary **information** concerning significant incidents, or **taking** the appropriate disciplinary actions warranted. **One area that bears scrutiny is the timeliness of the investigative process, where room for improvement appears possible**. Having said that, the **speed at which** investigations and any follow-on **discipli**n action is **completed** must necessarily be **weighed against the need** to ensure fair and comprehensive investigations, and a disciplinary process that **adequately** protects the rights of **individuals that** may be accused of wrongdoing. **One method of improving timeliness without compromising the integrity of the process is by eliminating ambiguities that contribute to unnecessary and undesirable delays in the investigation and disposition of operationally significant incidents**.

Tab B

Historically, **operational** incidents are normally investigated by the combatant commander or by delegation to a **Military Service** component command, consistent with the Goldwater-Nichols demarcations. Mission-related incidents (e.g., errant air-strikes, combat incidents and fratricides) were generally combatant command-convened investigations, while non-combat incidents (e.g., Cavalese and GREENEVILLE) were predominantly Military Service directed. Investigations of incidents of foreign policy significance with national and political overlay beyond combatant command interest (e.g., Beirut Bombing, Khobar Towers) generally have been convened at the Secretariat-level (Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State).

The accountability process for operationally significant incidents was viewed as consisting of three components: reporting, investigating, and deciding on appropriate disciplinary or corrective actions. Reporting requirements are established through a number of sources. In addition to situation and operational reports established by DOD directives, the National Military Command Center maintains matrices outlining other notification requirements, which flow from assorted policy guidance and standing executive orders. The cumulative effect of these various processes is that there are adequate reporting criteria in place to ensure that the Secretary receives notification of operationally significant incidents.

With respect to investigation and disciplinary or corrective action, the joint force (combatant) commander is responsible for the discipline and administration of military personnel assigned or attached to the combatant command. The commander may prescribe procedures or disseminate, through appropriate command directives or orders, the prescribed chain of command and guidelines or limitations on the exercise of disciplinary or corrective action by subordinate commanders within the joint organization. As a practical matter, the actual investigative and disciplinary processes are normally exercised through the appropriate Service component commanders. This is largely a function of the well-established Service-specific procedural framework, as well as the more robust staff of the Service component available for processing such actions. Ultimately, the greater the operational significance of a particular incident, the more likely and necessary it is that the combatant commander take a greater, more active role in the investigation and discipline.

Beyond the question of accountability is the need for clear responsibility for investigations and disciplinary action for operationally significant incidents. To the extent that there is ambiguity concerning authority and accountability, the ASG does not believe that the lack of clarity stems from confusion regarding the chain of command or a lack of understanding regarding authority under Goldwater-Nichols or the current doctrinal and regulatory construct. Rather, any ambiguity that may exist results from a lack of a clear designation of which branch of the chain of command is primarily responsible for investigation and discipline in operationally significant incidents. To this end, the Secretary should clearly designate which branch of the chain of command expected to be ultimately responsible for such matters in operationally significant incidents.

In attempting to define what constitutes an operationally significant incident, the ASG recommends against establishing hard and fast "triggers" (i.e., rigid and automatic criteria) for defining an incident as operationally significant, but suggests there are a variety of factors that may indicate the need for greater combatant command involvement, such as: multiple vs. a

single occurrence; clear operational impact across the command or Department of Defense; a lack of guidance or training with command or DOD-wide implications; significant media or congressional interest; and international or coalition affect.

Based on the above, the ASG concluded that substantial statutory, regulatory, and doctrinal guidance currently exists specifying the operational and administrative branches of the chain of command under Goldwater-Nichols. Given the substantial framework in existence, there is no need for legislative change to address any perceived ambiguities in the chain of command. Similarly, there is no need for regulatory or directive guidance that would attempt to address the appropriate chain of command in every conceivable circumstance. As a practical matter, attempting to anticipate and provide prescriptive guidance for every imaginable circumstance is impossible. Just as important, such restrictive guidance would severely limit the combatant commander's flexibility to address operationally significant matters as determined appropriate. This inherent flexibility is one of the greatest strengths of the current system.

The ASG recommends that the Secretary issue policy guidance to clarify expectations with respect to which branch of the chain of command expected to be primarily responsible for adequate investigation and appropriate action in operationally significant incidents. The ASG suggests that the Combatant commander is the right "responsible official" for the Secretary in operationally significant incidents, because of the very real impact such incidents can have on the combatant commander's ability to accomplish assigned missions. This responsibility does not necessarily equate to personal investigative or disciplinary action by the combatant commander. In fact, the Service component commanders are clearly better situated in most circumstances to process the required actions. Thus, the component commanders' active and responsive support is absolutely indispensable to the combatant commanders' fulfillment of their ultimate responsibility to the Secretary, and should also be clearly articulated in policy guidance. A policy memorandum consistent with this recommendation is included with this report.

Finally, although not related directly to the main purpose of this review, the ASG also recommends the Secretary consider the possibility of creating a 'POD Executive Issues Team' or similar entity to proactively identify and respond to emerging issues with potentially damaging impact, or significant media, congressional or public interest.



SECRET  
1000 DEF  
NGT

OF DEFENSE  
PENTAGON  
DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
COMBATANT COMMANDERS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL  
AND READINESS  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE

SUBJECT Combatant Commander and *Military Service* Responsibilities for  
Accountability in Operationally Significant Incidents

As a result of recent events, I am concerned that there may be some ambiguity regarding which branch of the chain of command (operational or administrative) should be responsible for ensuring appropriate accountability for operationally significant incidents. Therefore, it is important to communicate my view of the respective roles of the combatant commanders and the Military Services in these matters. In addition to clearly delineating responsibility for accountability in operationally significant incidents, this memorandum should eliminate ambiguities that contribute to unnecessary and undesirable delays in the investigation and disposition of such matters.

Combatant commanders are primarily responsible for ensuring appropriate accountability in operationally significant incidents. This responsibility correlates directly with the very damaging impact such incidents can have on the operational commanders' ability to accomplish assigned missions. This assignment of responsibility means that I will look to combatant commanders as primarily responsible for making me aware, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of such incidents and keeping me informed of pertinent facts and circumstances related to the incidents. Combatant commanders are charged with ensuring proper investigation of such incidents, conducted with the right scope and at the right level, which necessarily includes recommending to me when such investigations may need to be elevated to a higher level. Finally, it requires combatant commanders to ensure appropriate disciplinary action is considered and corrective actions are taken, as warranted.

In most cases, responsibility for ensuring appropriate accountability in operationally significant incidents does not equate to personal action by the combatant commander with respect to the investigation or any resulting disciplinary or corrective action. As a practical matter, given the well-established Service-specific procedural framework and more robust staff elements, the actual investigation and disciplinary process for operationally significant incidents will normally be exercised through the





appropriate Military Service ~~component~~ commanders. However, **for** operationally significant incidents, combatant commanders must remain actively engaged with their ~~Service~~ component commanders and fully **aware of the** investigation and disposition of such matters, and **be** prepared to **personally** exercise investigative or disciplinary authority when **warranted**. Combatant ~~commanders'~~ guidance regarding general expectations, policies, and philosophy **on** accountability ~~matters~~ may be disseminated **through** command directives or orders addressing the proper chain of command and **procedures** or limitations on the exercise of disciplinary or corrective **action** by subordinate commanders.

**This** focus on the primacy of combatant commander responsibility in operationally significant incidents should not **be** viewed **as** diminishing the Service component commanders' responsibility in such matters. My expectation is that the Service component commanders will actively work with the combatant commanders - keeping them fully **informed**, providing necessary resources, and remaining responsive **to** their requirements - to help ensure fulfillment of the combatant commanders' responsibilities in a timely and comprehensive manner.

In determining what constitutes an operationally significant incident, commanders should evaluate a **particular** case based **on** a variety of **factors**, including:

- Multiple occurrences vs. a single event;
- Clear operational impact across the command or Department of Defense (DoD);
- A **lack** of guidance or training with command or DoD-wide implications;
- Significant media or congressional interest; **and**
- ~~International~~ or coalition effect.

**This** is by no means **an** exhaustive list of factors to be considered. Nor should the existence of one or more **of** these **factors** be applied **rigidly** or viewed as **automatically** constituting an operationally significant incident. Instead, combatant commanders should evaluate each incident based on these or additional factors to determine, based on the totality of the **circumstances**, whether **an** incident is operationally significant, thus dictating the **need** for greater combatant commander involvement and responsibility.

**This** memorandum should not **be** viewed **as** a change in procedure, but **as** a clarification of expectations regarding responsibility for operationally significant incidents consistent with existing statutory and doctrinal guidelines.

copy to:

Chief of staff, US Army  
Chief of Staff, US *Air* Force  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Commandant, US Marine Corps

**TAB D**

**COORDINATION**

**DOD/GC**

**Honorable William J. Haynes, III**

**4 November 2005**

**Tab D**

**11-L-0559/OSD/59023**

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

12/15

SUBJECT: OSD 23911-05

ESD,

Per Mr. Rangel, The Special Assistant to SecDef, please task to  
P&R for C&R at the DASD level or higher, coordinate with PA and  
Service Secretaries at the DASD-level equivalent or higher.

CDA Brian Helmer  
Navy Military Assistant  
OSD Executive Secretariat  
Pentagon - RM 3D720

(b)(6)

*Thank*  
*V/1*  
*Brian*

11-L-0559/OSD/59024



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL  
AND READINESS  
COMBATANT COMMANDERS  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Combatant Commander and Military Department Responsibility for  
Investigations, Individual Accountability, and Other Corrective Measures

Accountability for incidents that occur within our military is one of the most important issues in keeping the trust of the public and coalition allies. The following clearly delineates responsibility for investigations and corrective measures for incidents that involve U.S. military personnel.

Outside the continental United States, geographic combatant commanders are primarily responsible for ensuring thorough and timely investigations are conducted, individual accountability is addressed, and corrective measures are taken as necessary for incidents that occur in their area of responsibility. For incidents that occur inside the continental United States (other than Alaska), the appropriate Military Department has primary responsibility unless the incident occurs during an operation under Commander, USNORTHCOM, in which case he has primary responsibility. Commander, USPACOM, has primary responsibility for incidents that occur in Alaska.

For incidents in which a geographic combatant commander has been designated as primarily responsible for ensuring appropriate accountability, this responsibility need not equate to personal action by the combatant commander. Given the well-established Service-specific procedural framework, more robust staff elements, and independent criminal investigatory agencies, the actual investigation and disciplinary process may normally be exercised through the appropriate Military Service component commander. However, the responsible combatant commanders must remain fully aware of the investigation and disposition of such matters and shall be prepared to exercise investigative or disciplinary authority when warranted.



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59025

This focus on the primacy of geographic combatant commanders' responsibility should not be viewed as diminishing the responsibilities of Service component or other combatant commanders' responsibilities in such matters. My expectation is that the Services and combatant commanders will work to ensure fulfillment of their responsibilities in a timely and comprehensive manner in accordance with applicable law, directives, and policies. .

copy to:

- Chief of Staff, US Army
- Chief of Naval Operations
- Chief of Staff, US Air Force
- Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Inspector General of the Department  
of Defense

# UNCLASSIFIED

## TAB C

### COORDINATION

USA	COL Strong	11 April 2006
USN	CAPT Wode	7 April 2006
USAF	Col Parks	7 April 2006
USMC	Col Richey	10 April 2006
USCENTCOM	MG Austin	19 April 2006
USEUCOM	Gen Wald	7 April 2006
USJFCOM	LIG Woods	13 April 2006
USNORTHCOM	CAPT Johnson	11 April 2006
USPACOM	COL Compton	6 April 2006
USSOUTHCOM	GEN Craddock	6 April 2006
USSOCOM	BGen Flynn	10 Apr 2006
USSTRATCOM	Col Hunt	10 April 2006
USTRANSCOM	Col Williams	3 April 2006

*DoD GENERAL COUNSEL*

---

No objection but, I note that, while the Chairman coordinated with the Service Chiefs, there is no indication of any coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on this significant memo. I recommend that coordination with the Secretaries of the MilDeps be effected prior to Submitting the package to SecDef.

*WJ Haynes*  
*8/20/06*

Tab C

# UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/59027



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL  
AND READINESS  
*Commanders of the* COMBATANT COMMANDERS  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Combatant Commander and Military Department Responsibility for  
Investigations, Individual Accountability, and Other Corrective Measures

Accountability for incidents that occur within our military is one of the most important issues in keeping the trust of the public and coalition allies. The following clearly delineates responsibility for investigations and corrective measures for incidents that involve U.S. military personnel.

Outside the continental United States, geographic combatant commanders are primarily responsible for ensuring thorough and timely investigations are conducted, individual accountability is addressed, and corrective measures are taken as necessary for incidents that occur in their area of responsibility. For incidents that occur inside the continental United States (other than Alaska), the appropriate Military Department has primary responsibility unless the incident occurs during an operation under Commander, USNORTHCOM, in which case he has primary responsibility. Commander, USPACOM, has primary responsibility for incidents that occur in Alaska.

For incidents in which a geographic combatant commander has been designated as primarily responsible for ensuring appropriate accountability, this responsibility need not equate to personal action by the combatant commander. Given the well-established Service-specific procedural framework, more robust staff elements, and independent criminal investigatory agencies, the actual investigation and disciplinary process may normally be exercised through the appropriate Military Service component commander. However, the responsible combatant commanders must remain fully aware of the investigation and disposition of such matters and shall be prepared to exercise investigative or disciplinary authority when warranted.



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/59028



This focus on the primacy of geographic combatant commanders' responsibility should not be viewed as diminishing the responsibilities of Service component or other combatant commanders' responsibilities in such matters. My expectation is that the Services and combatant commanders will work to ensure fulfillment of their responsibilities in a timely and comprehensive manner in accordance with applicable law, directives, and policies.

cc:

Copy to:

← Chief of Staff, US Army  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Chief of Staff, US Air Force  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Inspector General of the Department  
of Defense



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

*Editor -  
correct typo  
and return to  
ASB to go back  
to WHS/CCD.*

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
AND READINESS  
COMBATANT COMMANDERS  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Combatant Commander and Military Department Responsibility for  
Investigations, Individual Accountability, and Other Corrective Measures

Accountability for incidents that occur within our military is one of the most important issues in keeping the trust of the public and coalition allies. The following clearly delineates responsibility for investigations and corrective measures for incidents that involve U.S. military personnel.

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For incidents in which a geographic combatant commander has been designated as primarily responsible for ensuring appropriate accountability, this responsibility <sup>NEED</sup> ~~may~~ not equate to personal action by the combatant commander. Given the well-established Service-specific procedural framework, more robust staff elements, and independent criminal investigatory agencies, the actual investigation and disciplinary process may normally be exercised through the appropriate Military Service component commander. However, the responsible combatant commanders must remain fully aware of the investigation and disposition of such matters and shall be prepared to exercise investigative or disciplinary authority when warranted. ✓



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
11-L-0559/OSD/59030

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

ch 17,2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Jim Haynes  
Dan Dell'Orto  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: ~~Command~~ Relationships

command relationships.

I would like you and Dan Dell'Orto to put together a team to review, and if necessary, give this place a rewiring so that we can do what we need to do, and do it right. Let's review our command relationships in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and think through the UCMJ implications of a joint and multi-national chain of command.

We are in the 21st Century. The idea that we have to go through three, four or five separate investigations on Tilman, Abu Ghraib, and now, possibly, Haditha is simply not acceptable to the American people.

DHR:jl  
03/17/06-09

.....  
Please Respond By 04/18/06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12598-06



8/7/2006 5:20:34 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59031

310.1

17 Mar 06

# SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division (CCD), WHS Room 3A1066, Suspense Desk (b)(6) FAX Number (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) Email: [suspense\\_desk@osd.pentagon.mil](mailto:suspense_desk@osd.pentagon.mil)

Action Agency **GC**  
 Suspense Date **10 Aug 2006**

## I. ACTION TAKEN (Check One)



- ☐ a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached) \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify Below)
- ☐ c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) Extend suspense to \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify Below)
- ☒ d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- ☐ e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify below /include POC Name & Phone Number)
- ☐ f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO \_\_\_\_\_ (Justify Below)



## JUSTIFICATION

*This is an action memo from the Joint Staff that was fasted to GC for comments + recommendation. GC got with JCS and JCS took the package back to rework.*

*ADC close out the suspense for the CTR. JCS will resubmit as a new package.*

## REPORTING AGENCY

ACTION AGENCY <b>GC</b>	e. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level)	
NAME OF ACTION OFFICER	Signature 	Date Signed 

TELEPHONE NO. _____	<b>5. ACTION TAKEN</b> (For EXSEC/ Correspondence Control Division Use Only)		
DATE _____	a. EXT	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
CCD CONTROL # <b>OSD 12598-06</b>	b. CANX	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	c. DWNGRD	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	d. TRANSFER	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	e. OTHER (Specify) _____		
	Signature 		Date Signed <b>8/11/06</b>

SD FORM 391, JAN 2000

11-L-0559/OSD/59032

12598-06

310.1

(17 Mar 06)

~~FOUO~~

March 20, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Gordon England  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA.*

SUBJECT: Accountability for Investigations

I looked over the package on investigation accountability you sent along, and I lean toward your idea that if an event happens outside the US, the COCOM is responsible for the investigation and generally handling it; and if it occurs inside CONUS, the Service would generally handle it.

Please run that by the COCOMs and through the tank, and let me know if there is general agreement.

If so, please send up a memo for my signature that lays out the premise and implements it. And make sure Jim Haynes is onboard from a legal perspective.

Thanks.

Attach. 3/14/06 CJCS note to SD; 12/12/05 CJCS memo to SD w/attachments,

DISSEM  
032006-20

\*\*\*\*\*  
Please Respond By 04/20/06

*Ref CM-0087-05*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12599-06



8/7/2006 5:22:44 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59033

210.

Omar-Dc

12/14  
11/25  
12/14  
11/25

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *12/14/05*

SUBJECT: *Clarifying* Lines of Authority, Responsibility, and Accountability (SF 051805-16)

- Answer. Pursuant to DepSecDef approval of the Accountability Study Group (ASG) membership and terms of reference (TAB A), the ASG met three times and prepared a 52-page report. An Executive Summary of the ASG review, findings, and recommendations are attached at TAB B. A complete copy of the report is available for review, if desired.
- Analysis. ASG recommendations are summarized below.
  - The Secretary of Defense should issue policy guidance designating the combatant commander as primarily responsible for ensuring appropriate reporting, investigation, and disposition in operationally significant incidents. In addition, the Military Service component commanders should provide necessary support and resources to the combatant commanders. This designation of primacy will improve timeliness by eliminating confusion or ambiguities that contribute to unnecessary delays in such matters.
  - Sufficient statutory, regulatory, and doctrinal guidance exists to specify the operational and administrative branches of the chain of command under Goldwater-Nichols and the respective functions and responsibilities of the combatant commanders and Military Departments.
  - There is no need for legislative changes to the established chain of command.
  - No need exists for regulatory or directive guidance attempting to address the proper chain of command in every conceivable circumstance; such prescriptive guidance would limit the combatant commander's flexibility to address operationally significant incidents.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the policy memorandum at TAB C.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General James T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

*500 12/14*

MA SD		SMA DSD	
<u>ISA SD</u>		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>12/14</i>	<i>111</i>	
ESR MA	<i>12/13/1305</i>	<i>12/14/1030</i>	

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
11-L-0559/OSD/59034

OSD 23911-05

310.1

12 Dec 05

TAB A

ORIGINAL

received by JO 6/28




CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0001

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAY 20 PM 12:28  
CM-2519-05  
10 May 2005

ACTION MEMO



Robert Rangel

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *1005/19*

SUBJECT: Accountability Study (SF 1005)

- Answer. In response to your issue (TAB A), my legal staff and the DOD Office of the General Counsel (OGC) have identified a prospective Accountability Study Group (TAB B). They also have developed proposed terms of reference (TAB C) to evaluate all of the processes employed in resolving issues of discipline and accountability in significant departmental operational incidents.
- Analysis. The Accountability Study Group will consist of two military judge ~~alternates from the DOD OGC representation and five general/flag officers~~ representing the Joint Staff and each of the Services. Under the proposed terms of reference, the group will evaluate existing processes and procedures, identify any deficiencies and submit proposed solutions to identified deficiencies. The group will submit its report to you via the DOD OGC and me 30 days after you approve the terms of reference and group membership.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve group composition and terms of reference.

Approve ☒ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated

Copy to:  
DOD OGC

Prepared By: Captain Hal Dronberger, USN; OCJCS/LC (b)(6)

Tab A

ORIGINAL

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 09589-05

## Executive Summary

The Accountability Study Group (ASG) evaluated the processes employed in resolving issues of discipline and accountability in significant operational incidents. More specifically, the ASG was charged with examining the chain of command established by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols), and identifying any areas of ambiguity that might exist between combatant command (operational branch) and Military Service (administrative branch) responsibilities for authority, accountability, and responsibility related to significant operational incidents. The ASG review focused on incidents involving forces operationally deployed and assigned or attached to a combatant commander, and did not consider plainly "service-specific" matters or otherwise "significant" incidents unrelated to operationally significant matters.

The framework for the ASG review was the Terms of Reference approved by the Secretary of Defense, which tasked the group with the following main responsibilities:

- Summarize the current investigative framework and processes used to address significant operational incidents and resolve issues of accountability and responsibility;
- Summarize the investigative process used in past significant operational incidents, including a discussion of how issues of accountability and discipline were addressed;
- Identify any deficiencies in the existing processes and procedures for investigating and addressing accountability in significant operational incidents
- Propose solutions to address identified deficiencies, including necessary changes to law, policy, regulation, and procedures; and
- Recommend an appropriate office or individual to be responsible for ensuring Secretarial decisions are implemented in a timely manner.

With respect to the investigative framework and processes, while Service customs and cultures account for some variations in investigative approach, the basic investigatory framework for each Military Service is well established, familiar to its personnel, and contributes to an effective and responsive investigative process in support of ultimate command action. Just as importantly, these differences in processes do not inhibit joint force commanders from obtaining necessary information concerning significant incidents, or taking the appropriate disciplinary actions warranted. One area that bears scrutiny is the timeliness of the investigative process, where more for improvement appears possible. Having said that, the speed at which investigations and any follow-on disciplinary action is completed must necessarily be weighed against the need to ensure fair and comprehensive investigations, and a disciplinary process that adequately protects the rights of individuals that may be accused of wrongdoing. One method of improving timeliness without compromising the integrity of the process is by eliminating ambiguities that contribute to unnecessary and undesirable delays in the investigation and disposition of operationally significant incidents.



Historically, operational incidents are normally investigated by the combatant commander or by delegation to a Military Service component command, consistent with the Goldwater-Nichols demarcation lines. Mission-related incidents (e.g., errant air-strikes, combat incidents and fratricides) were generally combatant command-convened investigations, while non-combat incidents (e.g., Cavalese and GREENEVILLE) were predominantly Military Service directed. Investigations of incidents of foreign policy significance with national and political overlay beyond combatant command interest (e.g., Beirut Bombing, Khobar Towers) generally have been convened at the Secretariat-level (Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State).

The accountability process for operationally significant incidents was viewed as consisting of three components: reporting, investigating, and deciding on appropriate disciplinary or corrective actions. Reporting requirements are established through a number of sources. In addition to situation and operational reports established by DOD directives, the National Military Command Center maintains matrices outlining other notification requirements,

to ensure that the

disciplinary or corrective action, the joint force  
for the discipline and administration of military personnel.  
The commander may prescribe procedures or

components  
significance of a particular  
commander take a greater, more

Beyond the question of accountability is the need for clear responsibility for investigations and disciplinary action for operationally significant incidents. To the extent that there is ambiguity concerning authority and accountability, the ASG does not believe that the lack of clarity stems from confusion regarding the chain of command or a lack of understanding regarding authority under Goldwater-Nichols or the current doctrinal and regulatory construct. Rather, any ambiguity that may exist results from a lack of a clear designation of which branch of the chain of command is primarily responsible for investigation and discipline in operationally significant incidents. To this end, the Secretary should clearly designate which branch of the chain of command expected to be ultimately responsible for such matters in operationally

In attempting to define what constitutes an operationally significant incident, the ASG recommends against establishing hard and fast "triggers" (i.e., rigid and automatic criteria) for operationally significant, but suggests there are a variety of factors that for greater combatant command involvement, such as: multiple vs. a

single occurrence; clear operational impact across the command or Department of Defense; a lack of guidance or training with command or DOD-wide implications; significant media or congressional interest; and international or coalition affect.

Based on the above, the ASG concluded that substantial statutory, regulatory, and doctrinal guidance currently exists specifying the operational and administrative branches of the chain of command under Goldwater-Nichols. Given the substantial framework in existence, there is no need for legislative change to address any perceived ambiguities in the chain of command. Similarly, there is no need for regulatory or directive guidance that would attempt to address the appropriate chain of command in every conceivable circumstance. As a practical matter, attempting to anticipate and provide prescriptive guidance for every imaginable circumstance is impossible. Just as important, such restrictive guidance would severely limit the combatant commander's flexibility to address operationally significant matters as determined appropriate. This inherent flexibility is one of the greatest strengths of the current system.

The ASG recommends that the Secretary issue policy guidance to clarify expectations with respect to which branch of the chain of command expected to be primarily responsible for adequate investigation and appropriate action in operationally significant incidents. The ASG suggests that the combatant commander is the right "responsible official" for the Secretary in operationally significant incidents, because of the very real impact such incidents can have on the combatant commander's ability to accomplish assigned missions. This responsibility does not necessarily equate to personal investigative or disciplinary action by the combatant commander. In fact, the Service component commanders are clearly better situated in most circumstances to process the required actions. Thus, the component commanders' active and responsive support is absolutely indispensable to the combatant commanders' fulfillment of their ultimate responsibility to the Secretary, and should also be clearly articulated in policy guidance. A policy memorandum consistent with this recommendation is included with this report.

Finally, although not related directly to the main purpose of this review, the ASG also recommends the Secretary consider the possibility of creating a "DOD Executive Issues Team" or similar entity to proactively identify and respond to emerging issues with potentially damaging impact, or significant media, congressional or public interest.

appropriate Military Service component commanders. However, **for operationally significant incidents, combatant commanders must remain actively engaged with their Service component commanders and fully aware of the investigation and disposition of such matters, and be prepared to personally exercise investigative or disciplinary authority when warranted.** Combatant commanders' guidance **regarding general expectations, policies, and philosophy on accountability matters may be disseminated through command directives or orders addressing the proper chain of command and procedures or limitations on the exercise of disciplinary or corrective action by subordinate commanders.**

**This focus on the primacy of combatant commander responsibility in operationally significant incidents should not be viewed as diminishing the Service component commanders' responsibility in such matters.** My expectation is that the Service component commanders will actively work with the combatant commanders - keeping them fully informed, providing necessary resources, and remaining responsive to their requirements - to help ensure fulfillment of the combatant commanders' responsibilities in a timely and comprehensive manner.

**In determining what constitutes an operationally significant incident, commanders should evaluate a particular case based on a variety of factors, including:**

- Multiple occurrences vs. a single event;
- Clear operational impact **across the command or Department of Defense (DoD);**
- A lack of guidance or training with command or DoD-wide implications;
- Significant media or **congressional** interest; and
- **International or coalition effect.**

**This is by no means an exhaustive list of factors to be considered. Nor should the existence of one or more of these factors be applied rigidly or viewed as automatically constituting an operationally significant incident. Instead, combatant commanders should evaluate each incident based on these or additional factors to determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether an incident is operationally significant, thus dictating the need for greater combatant commander involvement and responsibility.**

**This memorandum should not be viewed as a change in procedure, but as a clarification of expectations regarding responsibility for operationally significant incidents consistent with existing statutory and doctrinal guidelines.**

**TAB D**

**COORDINATION**

**DOD/GC**

**Honorable William J. Haynes, III**

**4 November 2005**

**Tab D**

**11-L-0559/OSD/59040**

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

12/15

**SUBJECT: OSD 23911-05**

**ESD,**

Per Mr. Rangel, The Special Assistant to SecDef, please ask to  
P&R for C&R at the DASD level or higher, coordinate with 7A and  
Service Secretaries at the DASD-level equivalent or higher. .

*Thanks*  
*Y/*  
*Brian*

CDR Brian Helmer  
Navy Military Assistant  
OSD Executive Secretariat  
Pentagon - RM 30720

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/59041

~~FOUO~~

April 10, 2006

Pakistan

TO: GEN John Abizaid  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Relief Operations in Pakistan

John, please pass along a "well done" to all the folks involved in the operation in Pakistan. As we wrap it up, we should let them know how important and successful their work has been.

relief  
ow important

Great job!

DHR:dh  
041006-22

.....

.....

10 Apr 06

OSD 12656-06



8/8/2006 12:58:17 PM

*DR*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59042

~~FOUO~~

April 10, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

SUBJECT Joint Staff/OSD Reorganization Concept

Last week you indicated you would send up a paper with some ideas to rationalize and reorganize the Joint Staff and OSD Staff. Will that be coming p soon?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
041006-21

.....  
*Please Respond By April 12, 2006*

*220 100*

*10 Apr 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59043

OSD 12664-06



8/8/2006 1:23:05 PM

*[Handwritten signature]*

~~FOUO~~

August 08, 2006

TO: BGen Carl Jensen, USMC

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
GEN John Abizaid  
Gen Mike Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Lebanon Task Force

As we conclude the assisted departure work of the Lebanon Task Force, please pass along a well done to all the folks on scene who have done such a fine job helping American citizens abroad.

DHR:dh  
SF080806.07

.....

OSD 12684-06



8/8/2006 6 05 38 PM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59044

Lebanon

X Hua 01



FOUO

JUL 21-2006

072006-20

TO: Richard Lawless

CC: Eric Edelman  
Peter Rodman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DR*

SUBJECT: Stephen Kim

Attached is a note ~~from~~ Stephen Kim, a fellow ~~Next~~ thinks is a great source on North Korea.

Do any of you know ~~him~~? Is he someone we should ~~tap~~ -- informally, or to consult ~~or~~ hire -- here in the Pentagon?

Thanks.

Attach. 7/10/06 Gingrich e-mail: "FW: Asymmetry in North Korean Thinking About Weapons"

DHR:dh  
SP072006-20

.....  
*Please Respond By August 03, 2006*

FOUO

OSD 12685-06



8/8/2006 4:22:58 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59045

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: asymetry in north korean thinking about weapons-newt

---

From: Thirdwave2 [mailto:thirdwave2@speakingingrich.com]

Sent: Monday, July 10, 2006 9:21 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: asymetry in north korean thinking about weapons-newt

This is a person we should find a way to get into the pentagon in a permanent serious assignment

He is my best source on north korea, is korean, speaks Korean, and is profoundly more engaged than 90% of my contacts  
newt

---

From: Stephen Kim (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, July 10, 2006 6:33 PM

To: Thirdwave2

Subject: Re: asymetry in north korean thinking about weapons-newt

Dear Speaker Gingrich:

My brief answers to your questions below:

1) There is a good chance that the nuclear weapons are not ICBM deliverable. But the detailed reasoning for that assessment will have to be briefed in person at a closed session. They are more than adequate to be ship or air deliverable.

2) This is our nightmare scenario - that they would sell ready-made bombs to Al Qaeda, et al, for cash or that they would sell it to Iran for oil. I have no evidence for this, as you know, but I would guess that the latter is more probable than the former. Yes, KJI and the regime loves and needs cash but they might have "enough" to get by. They don't have "enough" oil. This is not tantamount to saying that they will. As for the former scenario, we have made it clear that we would consider that unacceptable and that they know it would constitute the end of their country as they know it.

3) Deliver them in a harbor and blackmail a country - you've touched upon a missing link in thinking about this issue. The first portion - delivering them in a harbor - would be unlikely since we would consider that just as egregious as selling a made-weapon to a terrorist group. But the latter portion - "blackmail a country" - with the THREAT of delivering them would

7/11/2006

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11-L-0559/OSD/59046

be well within NK's asymmetric thinking. We know very little about their use doctrine. But we know (or should know) a lot about their threat doctrine.

Yrs,

Stephen (p.s. I will be sending you a longer note from my private email)

At 07:40 P M 7/8/2006, you wrote:

What is the possibility that the nuclear weapons (supposedly twelve in news media) are not icbm deliverable but are ship deliverable?

What is the potential for a north korean covert effort to either sell the bombs to al Qaeda for a lot of cash

Sell them to Iran for a lot of oil

Deliver them in a harbor and blackmail a country

Or are those so suicidal they are unthinkable  
newt





7/11/2006

11-L-0559/OSD/59047

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

Subject: Stephen Kim (U)

Snowflake Number: SF 072006-20

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
PDASD/ISA	Mary Beth Long	 070808
DUSD/AP	 Richard Lawless	
Principal Director/AP	Brig Gen John Toolan	 060802

11-L-0559/OSD/59048

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef  
USDP *EE*

AUG 08 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PR*

SUBJECT: Stephen Kim (U)

- (U) This responds to your 21 July note regarding Newt Gingrich's recommendation of Stephen Kim.
- (U) Mr. Kim is known for his academic writings on North Korea and has worked on several projects for DoD.
  - (U) He is currently employed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory as a country analyst and specialist on the technical aspects of the North Korean nuclear program. As such, he is included in many DoD activities.
  - (U) Mr. Kim is also very active on the conference circuit as a regular participant in Korea-related discussions.
- (U) Mr. Kim gave a presentation on North Korea's nuclear calculus to the Defense Policy Board in May 2005. The presentation was sufficient and well received, but did not offer any significant conclusions.
- (U) OSD Policy will look for future opportunities to utilize Mr. Kim's expertise in appropriate OSD-sponsored policy events or studies.

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by LTC Mike Finnegan, ISA/AP, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/59049

OSD 12685-06



8/8/2006 4:22:20 PM

8/8/06  
12:45 PM

~~FOUO~~

May 18, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
CC: Mary Claire Murphy  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Cal Thomas

The columnist Cal Thomas keeps writing good things, but I never see him. He is an able fellow, and he has a big syndicate. Do we ever feed him things and work with him?

Mary Claire -- please put Cal Thomas on a list to come to the house sometime.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051806-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/29/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59050

OSD 12700-06



8/9/2006 9:30:33 AM

8/07/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Dorrance Smith *for DS*

SUBJECT: Cal Thomas

Ref: Snowflake 051806-01

Sir,

Eric Ruff tells me that since receiving your snowflake about providing information to Cal Thomas we have been reaching out to him and doing just that.

We have invited him to GTMO and it has been a calendar issue for him but we remain encouraged that he will travel to see the facility. Eric has talked to Cal about high profile issues related to the department and just last week worked with Cal to get him testimony and the full committee transcript of your appearance before the SASC on Thursday.

We will continue to work with Cal.

11-L-0559/OSD/59051

OSD 12700-06



8/9/2006 9:31:41 AM

5/18/06  
12:45 PM

~~FOUO~~

May 18, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
cc: Mary Claire Murphy  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Cal Thomas

The columnist Cal Thomas keeps writing good things, but I never see **him**. He is an able fellow, and he **has** a big syndicate. Do we ever feed him **things and work** with him?

Mary Claire -- please **put** Cal Thomas on a list to come *to the house sometime*.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051806-01

.....

*Please Respond By 06/29/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59052

OSD 12700-06



8/9/2006 9:30:33 AM



~~FOUO~~

AUG 10 2006

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Accomplishments in Iraq and Afghanistan

At one of our recent meetings, Pete Pace mentioned that some constructive things had occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan, and you indicated you would appreciate hearing more of those types of things. Attached are some items Pete pulled together that might be of interest.

Respectfully,

Attach. 8/8/06 Weekly Iraq/Afghanistan Accomplishments

DHR:dh  
SF080906-12

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59053

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Weekly Iraq/Afghanistan Accomplishments  
08 August 2006

**IRAQ**

**1. Topic: Al-Qaida Leader Caught, Spills Beans on Terror Network**

- MNF announced July capture of Ja'far 'Abdallah Jasim Abdallah, an al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) terrorist from Saudi Arabia, in a Tikrit raid that netted another senior al-Qaida leader.
- Ja'far 'Abdallah provided extensive information about leadership and operations of AQI and reiterated AQI's goal of targeting innocent civilians in an attempt to encourage sectarian violence. (Provider: J2; Source: 30 Jul 06 MNF-I This Week In Iraq)

**2. Topic: Improvement of Iraqi Security Forces**

- Iraqi security forces now number a total of ~277,600 trained and equipped soldiers and police officers.
- Of these, the Ministry of Interior Forces currently stands at ~162,600. The following countries have provided trainers/liaison officers: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Iraq, Jordan, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, UK and the U.S. (Provider: J-5, MNF-I, J3; Source: 01 Aug BUA)
  - The Iraq Police Service recently graduated 3,316 police recruits from basic training courses held in Hillah, Mosul, Sulaymaniyah and Jordan. (Provider: J-3; Source: 01 Aug BUA)
- The Ministry of Defense now has ~15,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Soldiers. Training was provided by U.S. Forces transition teams, as well as British, Polish, Italian, and Australian troops throughout Iraq. Additionally, Ukrainian military personnel are providing Border and Enforcement training. (Provider: J-5, J-3; Source: 01 Aug BUA)
  - On 8 AUG, the 4<sup>th</sup> IA Division officially took primary control of its area of responsibility from the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division. This signifies the 50% mark of Iraqi Divisions assuming responsibility for providing security in their areas of operation, and is a key benchmark in Iraqis taking charge of their country. (Provider: J-5, MNF-I JPAG, August 3-9)

**3. Topic: Progress in Development of Iraq's Infrastructure**

- Several high ranking Coalition representatives celebrated the grand opening of the New Training and Doctrine Command in Baghdad. The TDC's mission is to plan, deliver, evaluate, and improve military training and education within the Iraq military. (Provider: J3; Source: 01 Aug BUA)

## UNCLASSIFIED

- On 22 July, Citigroup Inc. stated Iraq had retired \$19.76 of Saddam-era commercial debt as a result of debt-to-debt exchanges, cash buybacks of debt stock and the settling of conflicting claims. Terms were comparable to those recently negotiated with the Paris Club group of creditor nations, which forgave 80% of their debt share. (Provider: J2; Source: 2 Aug 06 DoS NEA Iraq Weekly Status Report)

## AFGHANISTAN

### ■ Topic: Positive Civil/Military effects of recently concluded Operation MOUNTAIN THRUST

- In addition to military operations that degraded the Taliban/AQ fighters in Afghanistan, the recently completed Operation MOUNTAIN THRUST (ended 30 July) had a robust Civil-Military operations component that resulted in a myriad of successes that included:
  - \$32M in additional CERP funds obligated in RC South
  - 42 Ongoing Coalition Projects in four District Centers in RC-South
  - 59 Ongoing CJTF76 CERP Projects to include 15 Water Projects, nine transportation projects, 12 Healthcare Projects, 13 Education Projects, three agricultural projects, a power project, a Telecom project, and permanent Radio Stations in Khas Uruzgan and -Kandahar (Provider: J3; Source: CJTF-76 Operation Mountain Thrust Closure Brief)

### 2. Topic: Afghanistan's improving National Army (ANA) & Police (ANP)

- First-ever Afghan Intelligence School Basic Course graduated 37 Officers; Intelligence structure now has 80% of their vehicle requirements, increasing mobility to enable intelligence collection capacity in Regional Offices.; ~29,900 ANA & ~ 42,800 ANP forces trained and equipped. (Provider: J5; Source: DOD and USAID)

### 3. Topic: International Support for Afghanistan Counter-Narcotics Program

- A delegation from Colombia, the world's biggest producer of cocaine, visited Afghanistan, the world's main supplier of opium. The countries share similar difficulties, according to Colombian counter-narcotics director Oscar Atehortua. Colombia expected to offer training to Afghan counter-narcotics teams. (Provider: J5; Source: Open source media)

~~FOUO~~

August 10, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Positive Comments about GTMO to POTUS

*HOT -  
PLEASE  
EXPEDITE*

Please get some information over to Marc Thiessen on GTMO. I want him to have something positive for a speech he is working on for **POTUS** to give sometime in the first week in September:

- The fact that many people have visited it.
- It is the best-run prison in the world.
- Even the Belgians who have looked at it are complimentary.

It would be wonderful if the Resident's speech could say that GTMO is one of the best-run facilities in the world.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF081006-25

*Show me what you  
plan to send him -  
Need to do it  
by Monday.*

*Please Respond By 08/17/06*

*0910 8/11  
HAND COPIES  
DELIVERED TO  
PA } USDP  
JLR*

OSD 12896-06



8/11/2006 4 17 58 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59056

August 11, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith *2 Aug 2006 8/11/06*  
FROM: Matt Latimer  
SUBJECT: Inquiry Response - Information on Guantanamo Bay

Mr. Secretary,

Per a snowflake from Secretary Rumsfeld, we drew the attached talking points and items of interest from extensive research we have compiled over the past months.

Attached: Guantanamo Bay Talking Points  
**Pocket Card** -- Top Ten Things You Don't Know About Guantanamo

OSD 12896-06



8/11/2006 4:18 10 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59057

## Guantanamo Bay: The Facts

*"Arguably, no detention facility in the history of warfare has been more transparent or received more scrutiny than Guantanamo. . . . The United States government, let alone the U.S. military, does not want to be in the position of holding suspected terrorists any longer than is absolutely necessary. . . . But as long as there remains a need to keep terrorists from striking again, a facility will be necessary."*

*Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, June 14, 2005*

**1. The Guantanamo Bay detention facility is a secure and safe location to detain and interrogate enemy combatants.** Since the attacks of September 11th, the U.S. military has apprehended thousands of enemy combatants in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Global War on Terror. Several hundred were deemed particularly dangerous and valuable from an intelligence perspective. There was no existing set of procedures or facilities to detain these enemies in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Guantanamo was the best option available at the time.

**2. Guantanamo Bay holds dangerous men.** Detainees are sent to Guantanamo only after a proper screening process that identifies prisoners who pose a threat to the United States or who have intelligence value.

The kind of people held at Guantanamo include:

- Al-Qaeda Recruiters and Facilitators
- Bodyguards of Osama bin Laden
- Bomb Makers
- 9 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Weapons Experts
- 9 Potential Suicide Bombers
- Terrorist Trainers
- Terrorist Financiers

Statements provided by some detainees give an insight into their mindset and intentions:

- "I will arrange for the kidnapping and execution of U.S. citizens living in Saudi Arabia. Small groups of four or five U.S. citizens will be kidnapped; held, and executed. They will have their heads cut off."
- 9 "Their day is coming. One day I will enjoy sucking their blood..."
- 9 "I pray everyday against the United States... The United States government is criminals."
- 9 "It would be okay for [Usama bin Laden] to kill Jewish persons. There is no need to ask for forgiveness for killing a Jew."
- 9 "[We] will shake up the U.S. and countries who follow the U.S."
- 9 "Not only am I thinking about threatening the American public, but the whole world."

**3. Information gleaned from detainees has proven vital in the Global War on Terror.** Only trained interrogators are allowed to question detainees — military guards and personnel are not allowed to query the prisoners. Interrogation techniques are consistent with American values and existing laws and treaty obligations.

By using methods widely available for public scrutiny, interrogators have learned very useful information from detainees, including:

- Communication and financing efforts of international terrorist networks;
- Established that 20 detainees were known Osama bin Laden bodyguards;
- Information that led to an extensive counterterrorism operation in 2005 in Europe, in which more than 700 police were involved in six cities and 22 suspected militant extremists were arrested;
- Locations of terrorist training compounds, safe houses, and terrain features;
- Travel routes used for smuggling people and equipment.

**4. Guantanamo detainees receive better treatment than prisoners in other facilities around the world.** Allegations of abuse at Guantanamo, as at any other U.S. military facility, have been thoroughly investigated. Any wrongdoing is held accountable through the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. The U.S. military has instituted numerous reforms of the conduct of detainee operations, with a renewed emphasis on standards and training.

As a detainee at Guantanamo Bay detention facility, a suspected terrorist can look forward to the following:

- Five daily calls to prayer
- A personal copy of the Koran
- Prisoners are supplied with prayer caps, beads, and oil. Detainees that behave well are rewarded by receiving a traditional Islam prayer rug and having access to special prayer rooms.
- Islamic Holy Periods Recognized.
- Muslim Dietary Practices Respected. Guantanamo takes special care to provide the suspected terrorists with the proper diet in accordance to the Muslim faith. Halal (meat from animals killed in the ritual way in accordance to Islamic law) and other food is flown in by a contractor and kept separate from food provided for U.S. military personnel.
  - Detainees can intake up to 4,200 calories daily and the annual "average weight gain for the detainees is six pounds."
- Detainees receive superb dental and medical care. Rules set forth by DOD guarantee medical-record confidentiality — much like doctor-patient privileges in the U.S. — so that interrogators, guards, and others cannot use any medical condition against the detainee. Some of the health care amenities include:
  - Access to the island's naval hospital specialists and professionals;
  - An operating room for general surgery;
  - 20 to 30 beds for in-patient care;
  - CT scan equipment and resources;
  - A dental clinic;
  - Immunization programs, including monitoring, regular check-ups and treatment (if needed) for hepatitis, tetanus, measles, mumps, rubella, tuberculosis, among others;
  - Nutrition consultation;

- o Optometry care;
  - o Orthopedic equipment and professionals;
  - o A pharmacy that supplies drugs available in the U.S.;
  - o A physical therapy department complete with therapy specialists;
  - o Prosthetics services;
  - o A radiology department;
  - o A separate health unit that treats mental health conditions;
  - o X-ray and digital x-ray capabilities.
  - o Some of the detainees have chronic medical conditions such as diabetes, high blood pressure or high cholesterol – all taken care of by medical staff. Detainees receive first-rate dental work and their overall health is exceptional. For many of them, it is the first time they have ever had dental work of any kind.
  - o Besides flying in U.S. consultants for special medical cases, the Guantanamo hospital collaborates with worldwide medical experts on many of their programs. For instance, the CDC frequently visits the facility to monitor Guantanamo's medical surveillance and in-processing programs.
- **Recreational Amenities**, such as volleyball and basketball courts, board games, TV privileges, workout equipment, among other things. Detainees enjoy a minimum of two hours and a maximum of twelve hours of recreation per day.
  - **Guantanamo Library**. The suspected terrorists have access to the library, which holds 3,500 volumes in 13 different languages. Many of these selections are Islamic books. Ironically, the most popular are the Harry Potter series, which is offered in eight different languages.

**5. No** detention facility in the history of warfare has been more transparent or received more scrutiny than Guantanamo.

- Since its inception, there have been approximately 500 separate media visits to Guantanamo Bay by more than 1,000 national and international journalists.
- 27 Senators and 120 Representatives, along with an estimated 190 congressional staffers, have visited Guantanamo. A number of Members have visited more than once.
- Congress has provided detailed and thorough oversight to detention facilities by holding more than 140 congressional briefings.
- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), whose representatives meet privately with the detainees, is the only group that is permitted to conduct private interviews with the detainees. The ICRC visits Guantanamo every few months, and acts as go-between for detainees and their families.



## **Supportive Quotes**

"Be assured the worst of the worst detainees are the ones at Gitmo. It took a lot of **effort** to get a detainee shipped over .... They are no victims... People have already lost lives because we've released Gitmo detainees.... Gitmo didn't make [the released prisoners] want to kill again. Their release allowed them to kill again."

Major John Krenson, Tennessee Army National Guard, June **19, 2005**

"I am lucky I went there, and now I miss it. Cuba was great. ... Americans are good people, they were always friendly, I don't have anything against them. If my father didn't need me, I would want to live in America. ... Americans are great people, better than anyone else. Americans are polite and friendly... if I could be anywhere, I would be in America. I would like to be a doctor, an engineer — or an American soldier."

**Asadullah Rahman**, former Guantanamo detainee, returned to Afghanistan, March **6, 2004**

"I am in Cuba, in a special room, but it is not like a jail. Don't worry about me. I am learning English, Pashto and Arabic?"

**Naqibullah**, former Guantanamo detainee, returned to his home in Afghanistan. March **6, 2004**

"Of course they wanted to stay there. ... They had human rights and good living standards there. They had dentists and good meals — everything they wanted. **And** here, in Russian prisons, there are very bad conditions and very bad punishments."

**Fatima Tekayeva**, mother of former Guantanamo detainee **Rasul Kudayev** upon her son's transfer back to Russia for prosecution, March **3, 2004**

"We have nothing against the Americans, they looked after the boy. They taught him English and other things."

**Haji Mohammad Tahir**, elder in the home village of **Asadullah Rahmau**, March **6, 2004**

"At the level of the detention facilities, [Guantanamo] is a model prison, where people are better treated than in Belgian prisons."

**Alain Grignard**, deputy head of Brussels' federal police anti-terrorism unit, March **8, 2006**

"The facilities at Guantanamo are modeled after state-of-the-art prisons in the United States and some are fully air conditioned. The terrorists have full access to medical staff, which many of them have never had access to in their lives. Their hygiene is attended to and they get three balanced and healthy meals per day. We are treating the terrorists humanely and with dignity, respecting their religion."

**Senator Jim Bunning**, July **1, 2005**

"I have personally visited our detention center at Guantanamo and found the facilities more than adequate for the housing of terrorist suspects."

House Armed Service Committee Chairman **Duncan Hunter**, June **20, 2005**

"Nobody wants to be in prison, but if you're going to be in prison, [Guantanamo] is the one to be in."

Congressman **Joel Hefley**, June **29, 2005**

"The Guantanamo we saw today is not the Guantanamo we heard about a few years ago."

Congresswoman **Ellen Tauscher**, June **26, 2005**

"We have been granted broad access to the camp. ... We are confident we have visited all of the people detained at Guantanamo, in all of the places they are being detained."

International Committee of the Red Cross, prepared statement, December **17, 2004**

## **Top 10 Things You Don't Know About Guantanamo**

1. The facility at Guantanamo Bay holds about 450 detainees — including Bin Laden's bodyguards, bomb makers, and other suspected terrorists. Amnesty International has equated the facility with a Soviet-style "gulag."
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross visits detainees at the facility every few months and has exchanged more than 20,000 messages between detainees and their families.
3. More is spent on meals for detainees than on U. S. troops stationed there. Detainees are offered up to 4,200 calories a day. The average weight gain is six pounds per year.
4. Detainees receive free medical, dental, psychiatric, and optometric care — in 2005, there were 35 teeth cleanings, 91 cavities filled, and 174 pairs of glasses issued.
5. The Muslim call to prayer sounds five times a day. Arrows point detainees toward the holy city of Mecca.
6. Facilities include a basketball court, a volleyball court, a soccer field, ping-pong tables, checkers, and chess. High-top sneakers, Gatorade, and granola bars are provided for recreational activities. Arabic language TV shows, including World Cup soccer games, are shown.
7. The library has 3,500 volumes available in 13 languages — the most requested book is "Harry Potter."
8. Departing detainees receive a Koran, a jean jacket, a white t-shirt, a pair of blue jeans, high top tennis shoes, a gym bag of toiletries, and a pillow and blanket for the flight home.
9. One soldier recalled that some detainees didn't want to leave Guantanamo: "My men and I once spent nine hours on a runway trying to get a detainee on a plane to take him home." (Minneapolis Star-Tribune, June 27, 2005)
10. The mother of a returned detainee stated: "Of course they wanted to stay there... They had human rights and good living standards there. They had dentists and good meals — everything they wanted." (The London Times, March 3, 2004)

OSD Writer's Group, Office of Public Affairs, The Pentagon

~~FOUO~~

August 08, 2006

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace  
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA*

SUBJECT: DoD Diversity Initiatives Since January 2001

I would like to have a list of the DoD initiatives to expand diversity across OSD and the Services since the Administration took office in January 2001.

I may want to show this to the President during the August 14 briefings. They could add context and flavor to the briefing Ken Krieg is giving on transformation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF080806-19

.....,.....  
*Please Respond By 08/11/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59063





PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

8/11/2006 11:30 AM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)

SUBJECT: DoD Diversity Initiatives Since January 2001 - SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- \* Summarized here are examples of initiatives since 2001 not routinely included in annual federal reports, that DoD has put in place to retain and build strategically upon diversity, in the term's broadest sense, in the military and civilian workforce in the areas of policy and guidance, leadership, recruitment, outreach, and research and studies.
- Policy and Guidance.
  - The Defense Human Resources Board, which focuses the attention of DoD senior leaders on human resource issues, exchanges information on Service "best" diversity practices and monitors Services progress on recommendations to increase diversity in the senior civilian and military grades.
  - The heads of each Military Department issued policy guidance and established a diversity office to provide a strategic vision for leveraging diversity in accomplishment of its combat mission.
  - Recent promotion board guidance acknowledged the significance of diversity and language skills in winning the Global War on Terrorism while stressing that equal opportunity and equitable consideration must be accorded all members.
- Leadership.
  - The Department's Chief Human Capital Officer meets frequently with the Human Capital Officers of each Military Department to monitor and evaluate demographic trends in the military and civilian workforce.
  - Senior DoD officials have addressed the importance of diversity to the chain-of-command including Commanders of the Combatant Commands and Superintendents of the Service academies. They have solicited support for building diversity from audiences that include members of civil rights groups, Members of Congress, and several other youth "influencers."
  - New Flag Officers and members of the Senior Executive Service participate in equal opportunity/diversity seminars as part of their Service executive orientation program.
  - Following the 9/11 attacks, DoD established the Defense Language Office to oversee policy regarding the development, maintenance, and utilization of language

11-L-0559/OSD/59064



capabilities; monitor trends in the promotion, accession and retention of individuals with these critical skills; and explore innovative concepts to expand capabilities.

- **Military Recruitment.**
  - Active and Reserve Components of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force recruiting commands employ commercial advertising agencies to produce effective messages for a diverse youth population.
  - The Department's Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies Program (JAMRS) office, complements the Services' efforts in developing targeted products and services to reach diverse audiences based on recruiting needs.
  - The Military Services have a Spanish-speaking presence in cyberspace in addition to television, print and magazine spots and ads appealing to a diverse audience.
- **Civilian Recruitment.**
  - DoD employs a civilian recruiting assistance division that aggressively markets careers and provides information to diverse populations at universities, professional meetings, and career fairs throughout the United States.
  - In addition to ads in magazines that have a broad-based audience, examples of DoD marketing initiatives are a Spanish language brochure and web site; and ads in leading magazines that target Africans, Hispanics, Asian/Pacific Islanders, native Americans, women, persons with disabilities, and veterans.
- **Outreach.**
  - DoD offices of equal opportunity/diversity, civilian personnel, military personnel, small and disadvantaged business, and Service military and civilian recruitment offices jointly travel throughout the year to locations including college and university campuses, conferences, and conventions. They provide information on DoD business and career opportunities to diverse audiences and recognize DoD personnel for contributions to the Global War on Terrorism.
  - Partnership agreements with various groups have been established to ensure their access to DoD employment, recruitment, and business information.
- **Research and Studies.**
  - DoD has several research and study projects that are focused on diversity and its influence on accessions.
    - o One important ongoing study examines the enlistment supply and resource effectiveness among different population segments. All services will benefit from this study's outline of the reasons for the recent (5-year) decline in African American Enlistments. Decision makers can use the results to formulate policies to attract young African American men and women.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For Information only.

ATTACHMENT: As Stated

PREPARED BY: Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (Plans), (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

August 11, 2006

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ~~FOUO~~  
SUBJECT: Draft Brief for POTUS Meeting

Condi,

Attached is a draft of one of the briefings we are **going** to give the President Monday morning. Since he will be coming over to see you and your folks Monday afternoon, he may have this in his head, and I did not want you to be surprised.

One of the other briefs is on Korea, but I know that Richard Lawless has been socializing that brief in the interagency over the past several weeks. I don't *think* you will find any surprises in there at all, and your folks are aware of what it is going to be.

Our third brief is on transformation, and I will be sending along a copy of that brief as soon as it is completed, so you will be aware of it.

Attach: 8/11/06 Draft Maritime Issues Brief

DHR:ss  
SF081106-09

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59067

OSD 12902-06



8/11/2006 6 05 30 PM



# **The “1000 Ship Navy”**

## ***Global Maritime Partnerships***

11-L-0559/OSD/59068






# An Inflection Point in History

## The Global Paradox

**More nations are freer than  
ever...  
...yet freedom is increasingly  
under assault.**

## National Fleet as Global Ambassador

**Leveraging the unique  
common bond and non-  
sovereignty of the sea.**



*Commodore Perry opens door to Japan*



# The Emerging Environment

- World economy is interconnected
- Regional Crises have Global Impact
  - Terrorism
  - Weapons of Mass Destruction
  - Transnational Challenges (Pandemic disease, Natural disaster, Human trafficking, Criminal organizations)
- Intense Competition for Resources





**Tension is Inevitable**

11-L-0559/OSD/59070



# Global Commerce is Linked to Maritime Security

- 75% of the earth's surface is water
- World's fleets carry around 90% of global exports - \$8.9 trillion (2004)
  - 9 \$380 billion in freight rates
  - 9 303 million containers
- 46,000 commercial ships worldwide
- Over 6300 warships worldwide
- Over 30 nations have navies with "global reach"
- 160 nations have some navy, coast guard, maritime police capability



**Global Economy Depends on the Ocean Highways**



# National Economies are Linked by the Sea

UNCLASSIFIED


## Multi-national companies Depend on Freedom of the Seas

- Primary transport for energy that powers the planet
- Commerce route for retail and manufacturing

## Key Energy Infrastructure Moving Offshore to Sea Bases

- Liquid Natural Gas Terminals
- Oil Drilling
- Communication Grids
- Electrical Distribution Grids

2005 Revenues (\$Bill)




**Our Collective  
Prosperity Depends  
on Maritime Security**



# Transnational Criminal Organization Represent Unwanted Competit

## GDP of World's Leading Economies




on 2004 IMF estimate applied to 2005 GDP figures. Figure calculated by multiplying 2005 world GDP (\$49.07 T) by 2% and 4.8

11-L-0559/OSD/59073



# Transnational Crime Thrives at Sea




11-L-0559/OSD/59074



# ...as does Human Trafficki

## Trafficking of Persons, Especially Women and Children: South East Asia



11-L-0559/OSD/59075



# Old Order Doesn't Work

- **20<sup>th</sup> Century Institutions not yet adapted to the New Order**
  - **UN, OAS, World Bank, IMF, NATO?**
- **70% of the Earth's Surface Exists Beyond the Sovereignty of any Nation**
- **Rule of Law Inconsistently Enforced**





# Shift in Mindset

## Historically

- Hide at sea for security
- Difficult to find
- Easy to avoid
- Cloaked behavior

## New Paradigm

- Transparency yields security at sea
- Hard to hide
- Access denied for untoward behavior
- Anomalies easier to detect

**A Global Maritime Network in an  
Interconnected World**



# A New Framework for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

- **Commerce Craves Security**
- **Global Maritime Partnership**
  - No One Nation can do it all
  - Leverages what Navies Do
- **Missions Determine Coalitions**
  - Multi-Lateral Bilateralism
- **Navies Help Limit and Localize Conflict**
  - De-Escalate a Crisis
- **Deterrence Value**
  - 9 Proactive
  - 9 Regional Security Cooperation – Pre-Conflict
  - Full Spectrum: Maritime Security to Missile Defense

**Enduring and Emerging Relationships through  
Maritime Security**



# The Power of a “1000 Ship Navy”

## What

- A New Approach to Maritime Security
- A Global Maritime Network flying no single flag
- Incentives:
  - Secure Growth of World Economies
  - Spread Democracy while deterring aggression and transnational crime

## Who

- Any Country, Any Company
- Any Maritime Entity – Navies, Coast Guards, Coast Harbor Patrols
- **No** Treaties, Alliances, or Encumbering ties
- National Sovereignty First

## costs

- Already Exists – But not Realized
- More a matter of Will than Money
- Must invest in Partnerships


## A Familiar Concept

- Maritime Analog of International Civil Aviation
- Shared Info
  - Anomaly detection/response (FAA)
- Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication
- Collaborative Effort

**Collective Security through Cooperation**



# FAA Model



11-L-0559/OSD/59080



# "Free Form" Operations



## 20<sup>th</sup> Century

This... Or This

## 21<sup>st</sup> Century

### The United Nations system

PRINCIPAL BODIES



- 20<sup>th</sup> Century Organization
- Bureaucratic Inertia
- Many Constraints

- Regulated but Free Form, Free Association
- Self-Organizing, Market Driven
- Cooperation and Coordination



# Global Maritime Awareness

## A Clearinghouse Institution

UNCLAS//FOUO

"The Mural"  
Managed Outside of DoD

### Information Exchange


#### System Connection



#### Information Service



#### Web VMS Service



Shippers

1  
0

Insurers

0  
0

Other Gov't  
Agencies

S  
h  
i  
p

Military

N  
a  
v  
y

Coalition

- Facilitates Spotlighting of Anomalies
- Operationalizes the "1000 Ship Navy"

- Builds Trust, Confidence and Cooperation
- Builds Partner Capacity

15




# Maritime Electronic Highway

## • Strait of Malacca

- Malaysia, . Partnership
- at Information Movement Control m
- Automated ID T
- Sea Security Teams
- Coastal and Control Center Under Construction
- Coord

**Result: Lloyds cuts insurance costs**



*Gamma Ray Scanner*





# Counter-Proliferation: A Maritime Neighborhood Watch



## Proliferation Security Initiative

- **73 Countries** participate
- **23 Exercises** conducted
- 11 Successful Actual **Interdictions**

★ PSI Exercise



## Navy Capabilities:

- **Detection** of WMD and related precursors
- **Fusion** of Intelligence to support interdiction
- **Boarding** and searching suspected vessels

■ PSI Participant

**Addressing Detection Gaps...  
Building Interdiction Capability and Capacity**






# Partnership of the Americas:

## GEORGE WASHINGTON CARRIER STRIKE GROUP

- Maritime surge to the Americas in Caribbean (April – May 2006)
- Focused on:
  - Theater Security Cooperation activities
  - Strategic Communications activities
  - Counter Narco-Trafficking operations
- Unit-level training
- Subject Matter Expert Exchanges



USS GEORGE WASHINGTON escorted by Colombian Frigate CALDAS

### 13 Countries participating:

Antigua, Aruba, Brazil, Colombia, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Maarten, St. Kitts, Trinidad and Tobago




# Operation Active Endeavor

- Formally began on 26 October 2001
  - 9 1st Article V deployment by NATO
  - 9 Response to September 11, 2001 attacks
- Includes:
  - 9 Counter terrorism in the Mediterranean
  - 9 Counter proliferation of WMD
  - 9 Mine Warfare Defense
- NATO forces at sea 60% of the time
- Recent successes:
  - 9 Increased intelligence on suspect vessels
  - 9 NATO liaison with law enforcement agencies
  - 9 Drug and illegal weapons shipments interdiction
  - 9 Trafficking-in-persons
  - 9 General shipping security enhancement
  - Increased visibility for NATO





# SE Asia Tsunami Relief Effort



11-L-0559/OSD/59087



# West and Central Africa: *Joint Continental Coast Guard*

- **Maritime Organization of West and Central African States Joint Coast Guard force to counter:**

- 9 Piracy
- 9 Illegal fishing
- 9 Illegal migration
- 9 Pollution

- **Integrated Coastal Security Plan**

- 9 Joint patrols by up to six countries
- 9 Right of hot pursuit
- Joint emergency and rescue capability




## Countries participating:

Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, and Niger



# Lebanon NEO



## Evacuation

- 170 Vessels from 17 countries.
- 121 flights from 3 countries.
- 90 land convoys from 31 countries.

### Countries participating:

Romania, Jordan, Australia, Poland, Denmark, Russia, India, Turkey, UNTSO, UNIFIL, ICRC, Sweden, Norway, UK, US, Greece, France, Ukraine, The Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Spain, China, Brazil, Italy, UAE, Malta, Slovakia, Belgium, Mexico, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Uruguay, Canada, Argentina, Philippines, Japan, Austria, Chile and Thailand



# Momentum is Building

- **25 Heads of Navies have cited the “1000 Ship Navy”**
- **Defense Industry Members are creating “1000 Ship Navy” Business Sectors**
- **Commercial Shipping Lines Cooperating**
- **U.S. National Fleet Concept**
  - **Navy and Coast Guard**
- **Embracing an Indirect Approach to Partnerships**  
**6** **National Security for Maritime Strategy, 2005 /**  
**Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006)**



# The Way Ahead

## **"1000 Ship Navy" will contribute to**



- Increased partnership capacity
- More effective Public Diplomacy
- Positive effects on transnational crime, terrorism, human trafficking, WMD proliferation
- Global prosperity through Maritime Security

## **US Initiatives will contribute to "1000 Ship Navy"**

- ***Listen*** to our International Partners' Needs
  - Possible US Presidential Speech - elevate concept to the Moral High Ground
  - DOD facilitate an Inaugural Exhibition / Conference (Diplomats, NGOs, Commercial shipping, Navies, Coast Guards, law enforcement)
- ***Launch*** the Concept by Example
  - Global Fleet Station pilot in Caribbean Basin / Latin America
  - ***Lend*** Support where invited and needed
  - Funding assistance with Automated Information System in West Africa; reconnaissance support to Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia "Eye in the **Sky**"



# Your NAVY



**Building Partnerships, Deterring Enemies  
Pacing Globalization**

11-L-0559/OSD/59092



8/28 ✓  
1830

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

10/31/06

DSD  
USDP 44

AUG 25 2006

Action  
-MEMO

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP) AUG 24 2006  
SUBJECT: Responding to Romanian MoD (U)

Robert Rangel

Romania

- (U) You asked for an explanation of the recent letter from the Romanian MoD (TAB B).
- (U) On 29 JUN 06, the Romanian MoD proposed publicly that his government withdraw its troops from Iraq as a budget saving measure.
- (U) The next day, the Romanian Supreme Council for National Defense, led by President Basescu, rejected this idea.
- (U) The MoD's letter is intended to assure you that should Romania ever decide to withdraw troops from the coalition, it would do so in an orderly fashion and only after extensive consultations.
- (U) This letter was written weeks ago and was sent prior to President Basescu's meeting with you.
- (U) During his visit to Washington, President Basescu repeatedly reassured US officials that Romania will maintain its security commitments, and will continue to support its allies.
- (U) A draft letter for your signature, acknowledging Atanasiu's letter, is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign the attached letter to Romanian MOD Teodor Atanasui.

Attachments: a/s

MA SD		SMA DSD	
ISA SD	RA 8/29	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	RA 8/28	18 OS 8/30 700	
FSR MA	RA 8/28	STF DIR	

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Prepared by LTC Pete Najera, ISP/EPS, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/59093

OSD 12924-06



8/28/2006 12:24:32 PM

25-03-00 15:02

24 Aug 06

31 Jul 06

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

Subject: *Info Memo: Responding to Romanian MoD*

I-Number: 06/010595-ES

Title/Organization

Name

Date

DASD (NATO/EUR)/ OSD ISP

Daniel Fata

*[Signature]* 19 Aug 02

DIR, Southern Europe

Al Zaccor

18 AUG 06

*[Signature]*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59094

# TAB A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

AUG 31 2006

Mr. Teodor Atanasiu  
Minister of Defense  
Ministry of Defense  
Izvor St 13-15  
Sector 5,  
70642 Bucharest, Romania

Dear Mr. Atanasiu:

Thank you for your letter clarifying your position on Romanian forces in Iraq. I had a good meeting with President Basescu, during which he assured me that Romania will maintain its international security commitments.

I greatly appreciate Romania's continued contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism. I look forward to seeing you at the NATO Ministerial in Slovenia.

Sincerely,



OSD 12924-06

8/31/2006 3:48:28 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59096

UNCLAS  
ROUTINE

FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
TO: USDAO BUCHAREST ROU  
INFO: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST ROU

SUBJECT: SECDEF RESPONSE LETTER TO MOD ATANASIU

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF THE MESSAGE TO MOD  
ATANASU. ORIGINAL LETTER WILL FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

MR. TEODOR ATANASIU  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
IZVOR ST 13-15  
SECTOR 5,  
70642 BUCHAREST, ROMANIA

DEAR MR. ATANASIU:

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER CLARIFYING YOUR POSITION  
ON ROMANIAN FORCES IN IRAQ. I HAD A GOOD MEETING WITH  
PRESIDENT BASESCU, DURING WHICH HE ASSURED ME THAT  
ROMANIA WILL MAINTAIN ITS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
COMMITMENTS.

(PARA) I GREATLY **APPRECIATE** ROMANIA'S CONTINUED  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND THE GLOBAL  
WAR ON TERRORISM. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AT THE  
NATO MINISTERIAL IN SLOVENIA.

SINCERELY,  
//DONALD RUMSFELD//

(END TEXT)

OSD 12924-06



8/31/2006 3:48:26 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59097

**TAB B**

~~FOUO~~

AUG 1 8 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Responding to Romanian MoD

I understand you folks are drafting an answer to the attached letter from the Minister of Defense of Romania.

I have read the letter, and I cannot understand what he is talking about. Do you know what he has done?

Thanks.

Attach. July 2006 MinDef Romania ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
SF081506-22

.....  
Please *Respond By* August 31, 2006

AUG 30 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

OSD 12924-06



8/31/2006 3:48:59 PM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59099

**TAB C**



ROMANIA  
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE



MINISTER

Bucharest

July 2006

del  
8/15

**Excellency,**

I would like to take this opportunity to inform you of the latest developments of the domestic political debates concerning the presence of the Romanian forces in Iraq next year.

According to internal legal procedures, by the end of June every year, the Minister of National Defense submits to the Supreme Council for National Defense decision a memorandum regarding the troops to be deployed in overseas theatres the following year. This year's proposal was aimed at reviewing the balance of the Romanian military presence in Iraq, taking into account the political and military situation of this country, and the financial constraints on the Romanian defense budget that have an impact on meeting all the international commitments assumed by Romania.

The Supreme Council for National Defense decided that Romania should continue meeting all its international obligations and commitments to Allies and Partners.

I would like to assure you, Mr. Secretary, that if the Council's political decision had favored our proposal, we would definitely have initiated consultations with our Allies and Partners for setting a timetable and planning the withdrawal to avoid any negative impact on the coalition forces in Iraq.

Hoping I was able to shed further light on the matter, I would like to extend to you my deepest content with, and appreciation of your sustained support for the good cooperation between our Departments, for the steady progress in the Romanian - US dialogue within the framework of the Strategic Partnership between our two nations, as well as for the US support of our forces in the theatres. The Romanian participation in the international coalition proved to be an excellent frame in which our military capabilities increased their operational effectiveness to the level of the other Allies. In this regard we implemented a large number of lessons learned, which proved to be an effective tool for accelerating the military reform in my country.

I conclude by reasserting our political, military and financial commitment to successfully completing our joint mission to combat terrorism.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration and appreciation.

TEODOR ATANASIU

Minister of National Defense

The Honorable

DONALD RUMSFELD

Secretary of Defense of the United States of America

- WASHINGTON, DC

OSD 12924-06



8/14/2006 12:40:58 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59101

București *Julie 2006*.....



MINISTRUL

Excelență,

Doresc să folosesc acest prilej pentru a vă informa cu privire la evoluția ultimelor dezbateri politice interne pe tema prezentei forțelor române din Irak în anul viitor.

Potrivit procedurilor legale interne, în fiecare an, până la sfârșitul lunii iunie, ministrul apărării naționale propune Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Țării opțiunea pentru forțele care armează să fie dislocate în teatre de operațiuni externe în anul următor. Propunerea din acest an a avut în vedere rebalansarea prezentei forțelor militare ale României din Irak, ținând cont de situația politico-militară din această țară și de constrângerile financiare ale bugetului apărării din România ce pot influența îndeplinirea angajamentelor internaționale pe care ni le-am asumat.

Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Țării a decis ca România să-și respecte, în continuare, toate obligațiile și angajamentele asumate față de aliați și parteneri.

Vreau să vă asigur, domnule secretar al apărării, că, și în cazul în care decizia politică a Consiliului ar fi fost favorabilă propunerii, noi am fi inițiat cu certitudine consultări cu aliații și partenerii noștri, în vederea stabilirii calendarului și planificării procesului de retragere, pentru a evita orice impact negativ asupra forțelor de coaliție din Irak.

Cu speranța că am adus clarificările necesare, îmi exprim satisfacția și mulțumirea față de sprijinul dumneavoastră constant pentru buna cooperare dintre departamentele noastre, pentru cursul ascendent al dialogului româno-american, în cadrul parteneriatului strategic dintre țările noastre, precum și pentru susținerea forțelor militare române în teatru. Participarea trupelor românești în coaliția internațională s-a constituit într-un excelent cadru în care capacitățile noastre militare au atins un nivel de operaționalizare similar cu cel al statelor aliate. În acest context am implementat o serie de lecții învățate, care s-au dovedit a fi un instrument eficient în accelerarea reformei militare în țara mea.

În final, reiterez angajamentul nostru politic, militar și financiar pentru finalizarea cu succes a misiunii noastre comune, de a combate terorismul.

Vă rog să acceptați, domnule secretar al apărării, expresia celei mai înalte stime și considerații.

TEODOR ATANASIU

Ministrul apărării naționale al României

Excelenței sale,

DONALD H. RUMSFELD

Secretar al apărării al Statelor Unite ale Americii

11-L-0559/OSD/59102

Bucharest, July 2006



MINISTER

*Excellency,*

I would like to take this opportunity to inform you of the latest developments of the domestic political debates concerning the presence of the Romanian forces in Iraq next year.

According to internal legal procedures, by the end of June every year, the Minister of National Defense submits to the Supreme Council for National Defense decision a memorandum regarding the troops to be deployed in overseas theatres the following year. This year's proposal was aimed at reviewing the balance of the Romanian military presence in Iraq, taking into account the political and military situation of this country, and the financial constraints on the Romanian defense budget that have an impact on meeting all the international commitments assumed by Romania.

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TEODOR ATANASIU  
Minister of National Defense

The Honorable

DONALD RUMSFELD

Secretary of Defense of the United States of America

- WASHINGTON, DC -

OSD 12924-06



8/14/2006 12:40:58 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59103

București *17 iulie 2006*



MINISTRUL

Excelență,

Doresc să folosesc acest prilej pentru a vi informa cu privire la evoluția ultimelor dezbateri politice interne pe tema prezenței forțelor române din Irak în anul viitor.

Potrivit procedurilor legale interne, în fiecare an, până la sfârșitul lunii iunie, ministrul apărării naționale propune Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Țării opțiunea pentru forțele care urmează să fie dislocate în teatre de operațiuni externe în anul următor. Propunerea din acest an a avut în vedere rebalansarea prezenței forțelor militare ale României din Irak, ținând cont de situația politico-militară din această țară și de constrângerile financiare ale bugetului apărării din România ce pot influența îndeplinirea angajamentelor internaționale pe care ni le-am asumat.

Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Țării a decis ca România să-și respecte, în continuare, toate obligațiile și angajamentele asumate față de aliați și parteneri.

Vreau să vă asigur, domnule secretar al apărării, că, și în cazul în care decizia politică a Consiliului ar fi fost favorabilă propunerii, noi am fi inițiat cu certitudine consultări cu aliații și partenerii noștri, în vederea stabilirii calendarului și planificării procesului de retragere, pentru a evita orice impact negativ asupra forțelor de coaliție din Irak.

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În final, reiterez angajamentul nostru politic, militar și financiar pentru finalizarea cu succes a misiunii noastre comune, de a combate terorismul.

Vă rog să acceptați, domnule secretar al apărării, expresia celei mai înalte stime și considerații.

TEODOR ATANASIU

Ministrul apărării naționale al României

Excelenței sale,

DONALD H. RUMSFELD

Secretar al apărării al Statelor Unite ale Americii

11-L-0559/OSD/59104

# SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division  
 WHS Room 3A1066, Suspense Desk: (b)(6) FAX Number: (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) Email: suspense-desk@oas.p.mil

Action Agency **USP**

Suspense Date **23 Aug 2006**


## ACTION TAKEN (Check One)

- ☐ a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- ☐ b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO  (Justify Below)
- ☐ c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) Extend suspense to  (Justify Below)
- ☐ d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- ☐ e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO  (Justify below / include POC Name & Phone Number)
- ☐ f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO  (Justify Below)

## 2 JUSTIFICATION

NO RESPONSE EXPECTED OR REQUIRED - ISSUES IN THE LETTER WERE FURTHER ADDRESSED DURING RO PRESIDENT BASECU'S MEETING W/ SECDEF ON 27 JUL06 AND SUBSEQUENTLY AGAIN IN SD SNOWFLAKE (081506-22) OR (06/010595-ES).

## REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY <b>USP</b>		e. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level) Signature: <b>SCOTT W. PAPPANO, CDR, USN</b> Military Assistant		Date Signed <b>AUG 22 2006</b>
b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER <b>LTC PETE NAJERA</b>				
c. TELEPHONE NO. (b)(6)	5. ACTION TAKEN (For EXSEC/ Correspondence Control Division Use Only)			
d. DATE <b>19 AUG 06</b>	a. EXT	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	
4. CCD CONTROL # <b>OSD 12924-06</b>	b. CANX	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	
	c. DWNGRD	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	
	d. TRANSFER	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	
	e. OTHER (Specify) <input type="text"/>			
Signature		Date Signed		

SD FORM 391, JAN 2000

I-06/010489

11-L-0559/OSD/59105

R 12924-06

Romania

(31 Jul 06)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

AUG 31 2006

Mr. Teodor Atanasiu  
Minister of Defense  
Ministry of Defense  
Izvor St 13-15  
Sector 5,  
70642 Bucharest, Romania

Dear Mr. Atanasiu:

Thank you for your letter clarifying your position on Romanian forces in Iraq. I had a good meeting with President Basescu, during which he assured me that Romania will maintain its international security commitments.

I greatly appreciate Romania's continued contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism. I look forward to seeing you at the NATO Ministerial in Slovenia.

Sincerely,



OSD 12924-06

8/31/2006 3:48:28 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59106

Romania

31 Aug 06

31 Jul 06

UNCLAS  
ROUTINE

FM: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
TO: USDAO BUCHAREST ROU  
INFO: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST ROU

SUBJECT: SECDEF RESPONSE LETTER TO MOD ATANASIU

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF THE MESSAGE TO MOD  
ATANASU. ORIGINAL LETTER WILL FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

MR. TEODOR ATANASIU  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
IZVOR ST 13-15  
SECTOR 5,  
70642 BUCHAREST, ROMANIA

DEAR MR. ATANASIU:

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER CLARIFYING YOUR POSITION  
ON ROMANIAN FORCES IN IRAQ. I HAD A GOOD MEETING WITH  
PRESIDENT BASESCU, DURING WHICH HE ASSURED ME THAT  
ROMANIA WILL MAINTAIN ITS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
COMMITMENTS.

(PARA) I GREATLY APPRECIATE ROMANIA'S CONTINUED  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND THE GLOBAL  
WAR ON TERRORISM. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AT THE  
NATO MINISTERIAL IN SLOVENIA.

SINCERELY,  
//DONALD RUMSFELD//

(END TEXT)

OSD 12924-06



8/31/2006 3:48:26 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59107

NE SA

~~FOUO~~

July 13, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Steve Bucci  
Cathy Mainardi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Briefings on Afghanistan and Iraq Budgets

I would like to be briefed on the budget of Afghanistan: What they spend their money on, where the money comes from - maybe the last year or two, as well as a two year projection.

I would like the same briefing for Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:ks2  
SF071206-08

.....  
*Please Respond By August 01, 2006*

Distro To PT, NB, LC, Ateam  
Date 7/14/06  
Time 1039

06/009025-ES

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12967-06



8/15/2006 10:23:51 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/59108



~~FOUO~~

## INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_  
USDP   *ML*  

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

AUG 14 2006

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Briefings on Afghanistan and Iraq Budgets (U)

- You asked for “briefings on the Afghan and Iraqi Budgets for the past year or two as well as a two year projection.”
- We will provide you with more detailed briefings on the budgets over the past two years.
- In the interim, an initial summary of the budgets in both countries is provided below.

### IRAQ

- 2004 Budget
  - Total Budget of \$22.27B; MoD budget of \$453M and MOI Budget of \$1.12B.
- 2005 Budget
  - Total Budget of \$23.99B; MoD budget of \$1.33B and MOI Budget of \$810M.
- 2006 Budget
  - Total Budget of \$33.17B; MoD budget of \$3.44B and MOI Budget of \$1.92B.
- The budget was under spent by \$900M in 2004 and by \$6.4B in 2005.
  - Of the unspent money in 2005, \$3.7B is being used to fund the projected 2006 deficit. The remaining amount will be used as a reserve against future **risk**.
- The United States has supplemented the Iraqi budget/economy with \$30B in reconstruction **funds** since 2004. The international community has donated another \$13B.
- The IMF projects future Iraqi budgets to be:
  - \$39B in 2007 and \$53B in 2008. (We do not have insight into actual Iraqi projections.)

~~FOUO~~

OSD 12967-06



59109



\* 0 6 / 0 0 9 0 2 5 - E S \*

8/15/2006 10:21:14 AM

- The Iraqi Government receives approximately 96% of its revenue from the oil sector. Other revenue comes from taxes and state-owned enterprises.

## AFGHANISTAN

- The Afghan FY 2005 and FY 2006 budgets were \$1.75B and \$2.14B, respectively.
  - The vast majority of the expenditures have been and will continue to be directed to projects for infrastructure, development of natural resources, agriculture, and the rural sector.
  - The GoA budget does not account for the billions of dollars contributed by donors for major reconstruction projects, or the \$1.908B from the FY 2006 DoD supplemental to support the Afghan National Security Forces.
  - Detailed ~~data~~ for the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) FY 2007 budget is not yet available.
- The GoA receives roughly 24% of its funding via domestic revenues and roughly 76% external financing (including donor contributions for budget support through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan).
- Domestic revenues have been rising steadily. The Afghan FY 2006 domestic revenues are expected to be \$520M, an increase of 36% from the previous year.
  - The increase is largely attributed to the customs reforms, introduction of road tolls, and introduction of the excise tax.
  - The majority of the Afghans' domestic revenues are used for operating or recurrent expenditures, e.g., salaries.

Attachments  
TAB A - Coordination Sheet

**TAB A**

~~FOUO~~

Policy Coordination Sheet

**Subject:** Briefings on Afghanistan and Iraq Budgets

**I-Number:** 061009025-NESA

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
Acting Dir NESA /SA	Ms. Laura Cooper	<u>Laura Cooper 8/1/06</u>
Director, NESA/NG	John Trigilio	<u>H/S 8/1/06</u>
PDASD ISA	Ms. Mary Beth Long	<u>MBL 8/9/06 AS EDITED</u>



## CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-0519-06  
10 October 2006

## ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *11/18/06*

SUBJECT: Letter From State Senator Gary Wilken (SF 083106-28)

In response to your issue (TAB A), the attached letter (TAB B) responds to Alaska State Senator Wilken regarding the Automatic-Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS).

- There have been 292 F-16 losses over its 31-year history, and tragically 39 have been because of spatial disorientation.
- The Services currently use manual ground collision warning systems, but those systems do not provide protection when the pilot is incapacitated, as provided by Auto-GCAS.
- The Defense Safety Oversight Council highlighted Auto-GCAS as a mature technology that would help mitigate loss of life due to spatial disorientation and other controlled flight into terrain mishaps.
- Auto-GCAS is compatible with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), F-22, and some blocks of the F-16 and F-18. Auto-GCAS is not funded for F-16 and F-18 in the FYDP.
- A JSF Auto-GCAS fielding decision for Block 3 will be made in April 2007. If deferred, JSF will reach initial operational capability without Auto-GCAS.
- The Services are balancing the need to field robust combat capability with flight safety enhancements.

RECOMMENDATION Sign letter at TAB B.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral E. M. Chanik, USN; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

OSD 12975-06

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

11-L-0559/OSD/59113

MA SD	SMA DSD	SA DSD	SFT DIR
EXERCISE	1730	11/13	11/13
ESR MA	11/13	11/13	11/13

413.77

10 Dec 06 285106

TAB

A

TAB A

FOUO

sup. dated.  
copy

NOJCS

5/5/06

SEP 01 2006

Pls Pass a  
copy to all  
Vice Chiefs  
+ J8.

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Donald Winter  
Michael Wynne  
Ken Krieg  
ADM Mike Mullen  
Gen Mike Moseley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Letter from State Senator Gary Wilken

Attached is a letter I received from Alaska State Senator Gary Wilken. It is self-explanatory.

I would appreciate it if the Air Force and the Navy would work with Ken Krieg and General Pace to sort through this issue, and get back to me with a coordinated response.

Thanks,

Attach: 7/28/06 Letter from Senator Wilken to SecDef

DFB  
SEP03106-28

NOV 03 2006

Please Respond By September 26, 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHE

(b)(6)  
11/4

CAPT HGLMER  
for your SA  
to ESD FORAK  
M

I HAVE NOT SEEN  
THIS BEFORE. WILL  
TALK ACCORDING TO  
SD'S INSTRUCTIONS

FOUO

OSD 12975-06




Tab A

1011012006 12:35 07PM

11-L 0559/OSD/59115

GARY WILKEN  
SENATOR  
Fairbanks



State Capitol Building  
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1502  
Tel: 451-5301 (from Fbks)  
Tel: (907) 465-3709 (outside Fbks)  
Fax: (907) 465-4714  
www.akrepub/seans.org/wilken  
E-Mail: Senator.Gary.Wilken@legis.state.ak.us

July 28, 2006

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
United States Department of Defense  
1400 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

On February 25, 2004 Captain Jonathan P. Scheer, a talented and impressive air force pilot and the 354<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing Commander of the Year, crashed into the Chena River flood plain, near Fairbanks, Alaska, during a routine nighttime training exercise. The cause of the crash, which resulted in the untimely death of one of America's fighting brave, was spatial disorientation.

As you know, Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System technology (Auto-GCAS), designed specifically to minimize && tragedies due to spatial disorientation, has been available since 1999. Unfortunately, this technology has not been adopted and implemented on all American fighter jets. Almost 300 F-16 aircraft have been lost in spatial disorientation non-combat accidents with 45 pilot deaths. Three hundred multi-million-dollar fighter jets may not have been destroyed and 45 lives may not have been lost if the Auto-GCAS had been installed on these aircraft.

America's pilots are courageous and dedicated, and our country owes them the safest possible jets to fly. As a state senator and as a father whose son-in-law was flying wingman with Captain Scheer at the time of accident, I strongly urge you to research the merits of Auto-GCAS, compute the savings in dollars and lives,

OSD 12975-06



8/15/2008 12:00:51 PM

Proudly Representing the Golden Heart of Alaska

11-L-0559/OSD/59116



The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
July 28, 2006  
Page 2

and then soundly recommend this technology be implemented in all of our military aircraft. Our fighting men and women deserve nothing less.

Thank you for your serious consideration of this request. If I can help in any way, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gary Wilken".

Gary Wilken, Father-in-Law  
Major Select Cam Curry  
75<sup>th</sup> Fighter Squadron  
Pope Air Force Base N.C.

Alaska Joint Armed Services  
Committee, Co-chair

Cc: Mr. and Mrs. Ron Scheer

# **TAB B**



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

NOV 6 2006

The Honorable Gary Wilken  
Alaska Senate  
State Capitol Building  
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182

Dear Senator Wilken:

Thank you for your July 28, 2006 letter concerning Automatic-Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS) capability for military aircraft. We value the lives of all men and women in uniform and regret the loss of Captain Jonathan Scheer.

I assure you the Department takes flight safety seriously. In June, I directed the Services to fund as a first priority those technologies and devices that will save lives and equipment. We currently use a combination of training and predictive ground collision avoidance systems to mitigate the loss of life and aircraft. There have been 292 F-16 losses over its 31-year history, and tragically 39 have been because of spatial disorientation. Automatic collision avoidance technology is a next step in reducing these mishaps.

The Auto-GCAS technology available in 1999 was developmental only, but it did prove this technology would help prevent accidents when the pilot is temporarily incapacitated, such as spatial disorientation mishaps. The technology has reached a level of maturity sufficient for operational integration and the Air Force is continuing Auto-GCAS development by integrating and testing the technology in an operationally representative F-16 in order to assess the inclusion of Auto-GCAS in latter blocks of the F-16. In addition, actions are underway to include this technology in our latest fifth generation aircraft, the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. Auto-GCAS can only be used on aircraft equipped with digital flight controls, thus preventing its use on many aircraft, such as the F-15 and A-10.

Once again, thank you for your letter on this critical issue. The Department remains committed to enhancing combat capability while reducing mishaps and the unnecessary loss of life. We will work closely with the Services in fielding Auto-GCAS technology at the earliest opportunity.

Sincerely,



OSD 12975-06



11-L-0559/OSD/59119

11/6/2006 10:51:38 AM

# TAB

# C

# UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

## COORDINATION PAGE


USAF	Col Venable	14 September 2006
USN	CAPT Wode	14 September 2006
USMC	Col Desens	14 September 2006
OSD/LA	Mr. Wilkie	25 September 2006
OUSD(P&R)	Mr. Angelo (for USD(P&R))	14 September 2006
OUSD(AT&L)	<del>Mr. Seibert (for USD(AT&amp;L))</del> Mr. Krieg	<del>15 September 2006</del> 30 October 2006

~~FOUO~~

August 31, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace

CC: Donald Winter  
Michael Wynne  
Ken Krieg  
ADM Mike Mullen  
Gen Mike Moseley

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letter from State Senator Gary Wilken

Attached is a letter I received from Alaska State Senator Gary Wilken. It is self-explanatory.

I would appreciate it if the Air Force and the Navy would work with Ken Krieg and General Pace to sort ~~through~~ this issue, and get back to me with a coordinated response.

**Thanks.**

Attach: 7/28/06 Letter from Senator Wilken to SecDef

DHR:ss  
SEP 3 10 5 28

.....

*Please Respond By September 26, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59122

OSD 12975-08



9/1/2006 52 12 PM

**GARY WILKEN**  
SENAMR  
Fairbanks



State Capitol Building  
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182  
Tel: 451-5501 (from Fbks)  
Tel: (907) 465-3709 (outside Fbks)  
Fax: (907) 465-4714  
[www.akrepublicans.org/wilken](http://www.akrepublicans.org/wilken)  
E-Mail: Senator.Gary.Wilken@legis.state.ak.us

July 28, 2006

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
United States Department of Defense  
1400 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000


Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

On February 25, 2004 Captain Jonathan P. Scheer, a talented and impressive air force pilot and the 354<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing Commander of the Year, crashed into the Chena River flood plain, near Fairbanks, Alaska, during a routine nighttime training exercise. The cause of the crash, which resulted in the untimely death of one of America's fighting brave, was spatial disorientation.

As you know, Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System technology (Auto-GCAS), designed specifically to minimize such tragedies due to spatial disorientation, has been available since 1999. Unfortunately, this technology has not been adopted and implemented on all American fighter jets. Almost 300 F-16 aircraft have been lost in spatial disorientation non-combat accidents with 45 pilot deaths. Three hundred multi-million-dollar fighter jets may not have been destroyed and 45 lives may not have been lost if the Auto-GCAS had been installed on these aircraft.

America's pilots are courageous and dedicated, and our country owes them the safest possible jets to fly. As a state senator and as a father whose son-in-law was flying wingman with Captain Scheer at the time of accident, I strongly urge you to research the merits of Auto-GCAS, compute the savings in dollars and lives,

OSD 12975-06



8/15/2006 12:00:51 PM

Proudly Representing the Golden Heart of Alaska  
11-L-0559/OSD/59123

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

July 28, 2006

Page 2

and then soundly recommend this technology be implemented in all of our military aircraft. Our fighting men and women deserve nothing less.

**Thank** you for your serious consideration of this request. If I can help in any way, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gary Wilken". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Gary" being more prominent than the last name "Wilken".

Gary Wilken, Father-in-Law  
Major Select Cam Curry  
75<sup>th</sup> Fighter Squadron  
Pope Air Force Base N.C.

Alaska Joint Armed Services  
Committee, Co-chair

Cc: Mr. and Mrs. Ron Scheer





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

SEP 1 2006

413.77

The Honorable Gary Wilken  
Alaska State Senate  
State Capitol  
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182

Dear Gary,

It was good to see you at the memorial  
and on the pleasant cruise that evening.

I have read the letter you handed me, with  
a great deal of interest. I will certainly see that  
these questions are raised with the proper  
authorities here in the Department of Defense.

We will be back in touch with you when  
we learn more.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

1 Sep 06

28 Jul 06

OSD 12975-06



9/1/2006 3:01:55 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59125

DRAFT

The Honorable Gary Wilken  
Alaska State Senate  
State Capitol  
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182

Dear Gary,

It was good to see you at the memorial  
~~and the most~~ pleasant cruise that evening.

I have read the letter you handed me, with  
a great deal of interest, ~~and~~ will certainly see that  
these questions are raised with the proper  
authorities here in the Department of Defense.

We will be back in touch with you when we  
learn more.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

ok



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

NOV 6 2006

The Honorable Gary Wilken  
Alaska Senate  
State Capitol Building  
Juneau, Alaska 99801-1182

Dear Senator Wilken:

Thank you for your July 28, 2006 letter concerning Automatic-Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS) capability for military aircraft. We value the lives of all men and women in uniform and regret the loss of Captain Jonathan Scheer.

I assure you the Department takes flight safety seriously. In June, I directed the Services to fund as a first priority those technologies and devices that will save lives and equipment. We currently use a combination of training and predictive ground collision avoidance systems to mitigate the loss of life and aircraft. There have been 292 F-16 losses over its 31-year history, and tragically 39 have been because of spatial disorientation. Automatic collision avoidance technology is a next step in reducing these mishaps.

The Auto-GCAS technology available in 1999 was developmental only, but it did prove this technology would help prevent accidents when the pilot is temporarily incapacitated, such as spatial disorientation mishaps. The technology has reached a level of maturity sufficient for operational integration and the Air Force is continuing Auto-GCAS development by integrating and testing the technology in an operationally representative F-16 in order to assess the inclusion of Auto-GCAS in latter blocks of the F-16. In addition, actions are underway to include this technology in our latest fifth generation aircraft, the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. Auto-GCAS can only be used on aircraft equipped with digital flight controls, thus preventing its use on many aircraft, such as the F-15 and A-10.

Once again, thank you for your letter on this critical issue. The Department remains committed to enhancing combat capability while reducing mishaps and the unnecessary loss of life. We will work closely with the Services in fielding Auto-WAS technology at the earliest opportunity.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/59127



OSD 12975-06

11/6/2006 10:51:38 AM

413.77

6 Nov 06

28 Jul 06

~~FOUO~~

ALB 17 2006

TO: The Honorable Rob Portman  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Financial Management Progress

Attached is a summary from the DoD Comptroller of some progress ~~with~~ respect to financial management that **might** be of interest. We are still **working** it hard!

Thanks.

Attach. 8/14/06 USD(C) memo to SD re: Financial Management Progress (OSD 13006-06)

DHR:db  
SP081606-13

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59128

OSD 13006-06



8/17/2006 5:10:01 PM

100.5

17 Aug 06

14 Aug 06



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFOMEMO

August 14, 2006, 5:00 PM

cc →  
FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas  
*for David Patterson*

SUBJECT: Financial Management Progress

Over the past several years, the Department has made measurable progress toward its goals of audit readiness, improved accuracy and timeliness, and improved business practices.

The ~~Office~~ of Management and Budget recently elevated the Department of Defense's (DoD's) progress rating from "yellow" to "green," and the Government Accountability Office has issued two consecutive reports citing important progress in the Department's business systems modernization efforts. In addition, the Comptroller General has publicly acknowledged our progress and the approach that we **are** taking to improve financial management and achieve audit readiness.

**Audit Readiness.** We currently have a "clean" audit opinion on **16%** of our assets and **48%** of our liabilities. By the end of fiscal year 2009, we expect a "clean" opinion on **65%** of our assets and **79%** of our liabilities. To achieve **this**, we **are** taking steps to improve the accuracy and reliability of the following balance sheet accounts, which are **currently** not auditable:

Military Equipment	\$350 billion	27 % of Total Assets
Real Property	\$99 billion	8 % of Total Assets
Fund Balance with Treasury	\$153 billion	12 % of Total Assets
Medicare-Eligible Health Care Fund	\$537 billion	29 % of Total Liabilities
Environmental Liabilities	\$65 billion	3 % of Total Liabilities

MA SD	26 8/15	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	26 8/15	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	1/18/15	1000 8/16/06	
ESR MA	11/15	STF DIR	

11-L-0559/OSD/59129



OSD 13006-06

8/15/2006 4:20:53 PM

Component Progress. In addition to focusing on these portions of the balance sheet, certain Components have made good progress in preparing for audits.

- The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers is undergoing an audit on its fiscal year (FY) 2006 financial statements.
- The Marine Corps expects to be ready for audit in FY 2007.

#### Improved Business Practices.

- Since 2001, we have reduced manpower costs at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service by approximately \$238 million, while improving productivity and service. New systems implementations and the Base Realignment and Closure process will cut manpower costs an additional 45% with a projected annual savings of \$357 million.
- We reduced the rate of past due individual travel accounts from 18.4% in 2001 to an all time low of 3.2% today. This results in greater public credibility and improves our position when negotiating new card service contracts.
- We increased the use of electronic payments to 95% of all payments, thereby reducing the cost of issuing payments by \$6 million since 2001.
- We reduced overdue amounts owed to the Department by \$1.1 billion in the last year.
- We are implementing a standard financial language throughout the Department, which will enable us to consistently manage costs, value assets, forecast future needs, develop historical trends, move toward performance based budgeting, and make better trade-off decisions. We have completed 20% of this implementation and expect to have it fully implemented by March 2007.
- We reduced unsupported accounting adjustments by an additional \$63 billion in 2005. Overall, we have achieved an 86% reduction from the \$2.3 trillion in 1999.
- We have steadily reduced overpayments to vendors by approximately \$39 million.
- We reduced late payment penalties by 63% (from \$343 per million of payments in 2001 to \$127 per million in 2006). Between 2001 and 2005, we have avoided interest payments in the amount of \$140 million.

COORDINATION: NONE.


Prepared By: Tem McKay, DCFO, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

AUG 17 2006

TO: **The** Honorable Rob Portman  
cc: Vice Resident Richard B. Cheney  
**The** Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Financial Management Progress

Attached is a summary from the DoD Comptroller of some progress with respect to financial management that might be of interest. We are still working it hard!

Thanks.

Attach. 8/14/06 USD(C) memo to SD re: Financial Management Progress (OSD  
**13006-06)**

DHR:dh  
SF081606-13

.....

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59131

~~FOUO~~

AUG 17 2006

**TO:** The Honorable Rob Portman

**CC:** Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
Stephen J. Hadley

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld 

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DHR:db  
SF081606-13

.....


~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59132



~~FOUO~~

AUG 17 2006

TO: The Honorable Rob Portman  
cc: Vice Resident Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
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DHR:dh  
SP081606-13

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59133



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFOMEMO

August 14, 2006, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas

SUBJECT: Financial Management Progress

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11-L-0559/OSD/59134

OSD 13006-06



8/15/2006 4:20:52 PM

**Component Progress.** In addition to focusing on these portions of the balance sheet, certain Components have made good progress in preparing for audits.

- The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers is undergoing an audit on its fiscal year (FY) 2006 financial statements.
- The Marine Corps expects to be ready for audit in FY 2007.

**Improved Business Practices.**

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- We reduced overdue amounts owed to the Department by \$1.1 billion in the last year.
- We are implementing a standard financial language throughout the Department, which will enable us to consistently manage costs, value assets, forecast future needs, develop historical trends, move toward performance based budgeting, and make better trade-off decisions. We have completed 20% of **this** implementation and expect to have it fully implemented by March 2007.
- We reduced unsupported accounting adjustments by an additional \$63 billion in 2005. Overall, we have achieved an 86% reduction from the \$2.3 trillion in 1999.
- We have steadily reduced overpayments to vendors by approximately \$39 million.
- We reduced late payment penalties by 63% (from \$343 per million of payments in 2001 to \$127 per million in 2006). Between 2001 and 2005, we have avoided interest payments in the amount of \$140 million.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: Terri McKay, DCFO, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Military Assistant

14 August 2006 - 1820 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(C)


SUBJECT Budget Assistance to the FBI

Ma'am,

The Deputy Secretary requests you prepare a response to the attached snowflake on budget assistance to the FBI. Please coordinate your response with USD(I).

Please provide a copy of this memo with your response. Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch  
CAPT, USN  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE: Tuesday, 22 Aug 06  
ATTACHMENT: Snowflake 081006-24  
cc: USD(I)

OTO Justice

14 Aug 06

11 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13010-06



8/15/2006 5:26:58 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59136

~~FOUO~~

August 11, 2006

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Steve Cambone  
Tina Jonas  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Budget Assistance to the FBI

040 Justice

I got a phone call from Director Mueller of the FBI. He said the FBI benefits and enjoys working closely with the US military overseas. They want to expand their efforts in the fusions cells, if they are able, and they are doing work on IED analysis.

The FBI budget is funded through the Commerce, State, and Justice appropriations bill, but they are mostly interested in domestic law enforcement and keep moving money into those areas. If there is some way we can do it, he would like some help out of our intelligence budget, so he can expand his efforts. He has already discussed this with John Negroponte, but wanted our help as well

Please take a look at this, and let me know what you propose.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF081006-24

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/24/06*

11 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59137

OSD 13010-08



8/15/2006 5:25:25 PM



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

August 15, 2006, 6:00 PM

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dave Patterson

*Dave* & --

SUBJECT Snowflake: "Budget Assistance to the FBI"

- The Secretary of Defense asked you to take a look at helping to fund **FBI** activities overseas that benefit the Department of Defense.
- At Mrs. Jonas' request, I have assembled a working group that includes representatives from the FBI (Including Deputy CFO), USD/I, OGC and appropriate members of the Comptroller staff.
- This group will meet on Thursday, August 17<sup>th</sup> to evaluate needs, funding sources and appropriate mechanisms to reimburse the FBI.
- I will keep you informed of the progress of this initiative.

COORDINATION: None.

Copy to Dr. Steve Cambone


040 Justice

15 Aug 06

11 Aug 06



11-L-0559/OSD/59138



OSD 13010-08

8/16/2006 8:03:33 AM

9/11  
1030



ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY

# THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

## ACTION MEMO

September 7, 2006

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ken Krieg (USD) AT&L SEP 07 2006

SUBJECT: Military Housing Built Without Air-Conditioning

- Attached at TAB A you will find ~~our~~ proposed reply to a letter at TAB B from Senator Coburn about military housing built without air-conditioning. Mr. Philip W. Grone, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) will sign the reply. You had asked to see a copy prior to it being signed (TAB C).

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary of Defense approve the proposed reply.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

SEP 12 2006

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. George Mino, ODUSD(I&E)(H&CS), (b)(6)

MA SD	JS 9/11	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	10/11	SA DSD	
EXEC SRC	10/11	0932	9/11 1445
ESR MA	10/11	STF DIR	

11-L-0559/OSD/59139

OSD 13013-06



9/8/2006 21:16 PM

620

7 Sep 06

27 0106

# TAB A





OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

The Honorable Tom Coburn  
United States Senate  
Washington DC 20510-3604

Dear Senator Coburn:

This is in response to your letter of July 27, 2006 to the Secretary of Defense concerning military housing built without air-conditioning.

New military family units owned and operated by the Government are not authorized air-conditioning unless average weather conditions exceed at least one of two thresholds specified in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-45, Rental and Construction of Government Quarters. Although privatized military housing generally does not have to comply with the same criteria as Government-owned housing, the decision on whether or not to provide air-conditioning takes into consideration Circular A-45. However, this decision also considers whether similar houses in the community have air-conditioning, and whether the specific privatization project can afford the additional construction and operating costs.

According to weather data compiled by DoD, last updated in 2003, the average weather conditions at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, greatly exceed both Circular A-45 thresholds with the result that all of the privatized housing at Fort Sill will be air-conditioned. Weather conditions at Fort Hood, Texas, also exceed both thresholds, so all the privatized housing there is air-conditioned. However, the average weather conditions at Camp Pendleton, California, do not meet either of the Circular A-45 thresholds, and similar housing in that community has traditionally not been air-conditioned. In addition, a costly electrical distribution system upgrade would be required by the developer to air-condition the privatized housing units. The Marine Corps priority was to maximize the number of houses in the privatization project to improve access to quality housing options for Marine Corps families. As a result, there are no plans to incorporate air-conditioning in the ongoing construction and renovation of privatized housing at Camp Pendleton.

Regrettably, this summer many military installations experienced much greater than average heat and humidity for which some of the housing and facilities at certain installations were not designed. We have directed the Services to monitor this situation and take appropriate steps, as necessary, to ensure the health, safety, and comfort of residents of privatized and Government-owned housing.



11-L-0559/OSD/59141

**We appreciate your support for the Department's initiatives and for our brave men and women in uniform.**

**Sincerely,**

**Philip W. Groue  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Installations and Environment)**

**TAB B**

TOM COBURN, M.D.  
OKLAHOMA

PHONE: 202-224-5754  
Fax: 202-224-6008

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3604

July 27, 2006

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,  
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

CHAIRMAN  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
INCARCERATION AND REHABILITATION

COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
US . Department of Defense  
1300 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1300


Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I would like to apprise you of an issue brought to my attention in a letter I received from a constituent of mine.

I am sure you will also find it to be of great concern that military housing may feature inadequate air conditioning in a region of the country that has experienced record temperatures this summer. I would greatly appreciate your looking into this matter and informing me of your findings.

Again, thank you in advance for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Tom Coburn  
United States Senator

TC: kw

1800 NORTH BALTIMORE AVENUE  
SUITE 800  
TULSA, OK 74115  
PHONE: 918-581-7601

100 NORTH BROADWAY  
SUITE 1820  
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102  
PHONE: 405-231-4941

www.coburn.senate.gov

OSD 13013-06



8/15/2006 6:16:48 PM

711 SW D AVENUE  
SUITE 202  
LAWTON, OK 73501  
PHONE: 580-357-8879

11-L-0559/OSD/59144

capitol correspond ,  
Incoming Email Message

constituent ID: 54441

Mr. Samuel Hopkins

(b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

Phone(s): (H) (b)(6)

Activity Created: 7/14/2006

File Location: 64691

Interest Code(s): MILITARY

---

Incoming Message:

Date Received: 7/14/2006 6:25:03 PM

Topic/Subject Desc: Housing

Dear Senator coburn,

I am just making a plea to you and the rest of the O.K. Legislators to be aware of a shortage of military housing units with air-conditioning; at least in some southwestern states.

Although the particular one which has drawn my attention is the Marine Corps base of Camp Pendleton, CA. I had heard about a similar problem on Ft. Hood, and some other posts.

I do not know about Ft. Sill, but I would hope they do, at least this summer, as the temperatures have been reaching the 105 degrees farhenheit avg. for quite a while.

Anyway, I am a retiree from the US Army, and know many soldiers right now, in theater in Iraq, and a few in Afghanistan, I would hope the military can square their financial situation away. I understand that there are debates in Congress/Senate about how, and where to appropriate funding for the military, i.e. weapons systems, maintenances, logistical support etc. . .

I just hope that military families are part of the big picture; because they ought to be: mine made it through 20 years with me being in Germany twice, without me in Korea, without me in Bosnia/Kosovo, and many FTX's.

But the bottom line is I believe in the hotter parts of the country the homefront is just as important as the frontlines, to many of these brave and wonderful servicemen, and women!

I also know that you are one of the best senators in the nation (I lead up on your voting record), and that is not empty praise, you really are!

Thank You very Much For Your Time,  
Respectfully Yours,  
Samuel P. Hopkins

**TAB C**

~~FOUO~~

August 23, 2006

TO Ken Krieg

CC Robert Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*RA.*



SUBJECT: *Air* Conditioning in Military Housing

Please let me see the draft response to Senator Coburn before it is sent out to him.

Thanks,

Attach. 7/27/06 Coburn ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
SF081306-04

.....  
*Please Respond By 09/07/06*

SEP 1 1 2006

(b)(6)

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED *g/n*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59147

**TAB D**



**COORDINATION TAB**

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Senator Coburn, dated 27 July 2006,  
Concerning Military Housing Built Without Air-conditioning

Component	Office/Title	Name	Date:
OASN(I&F)	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Facilities), Director for Housing	Mr. Steve Keating	6 Sep 2006 *
OASD(LA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), Special Assistant for Installations, Environ, and Intergovernmental Affairs	Mr. Andrew Kavaliunas	6 Sep 2006 *
OUSD (AT&L)	Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis	Dr. Nancy Spruill	6 Sep 2006 *

\* See attached correspondence

Prepared by: Mr. George Mino/ODUSD(I&E)H&CS (b)(6) FAX (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/59149

Sent By: DUSD(I&amp;E)DIR,H&amp;CS;

(b)(6)

Sep-6-06 4:35PM;

Page 1/1

**COORDINATION TAB**

**SUBJECT Response to Letter from Senator Coburn, dated 27 July 2006,  
Concerning Military Housing Built Without Air-Conditioning**

Component	Office/Title	Name	Date:
OASN(I&F)	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Facilities), Director for Housing	<i>Steve Keating</i> Mr. Steve Keating	6 Sep 2006 *
OASD(LA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), Special Assistant for Installations, Environ, and Intergovernmental Affairs	Mr. Andrew Kavalunas	6 Sep 2006 *
OUSD (AT&L)	Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis	Dr. Nancy Spruill	6 Sep 2006 *

- See attached correspondence

Prepared by: Mr. George Mino/ODUSD(I&amp;E)H&amp;CS (b)(6) FAX (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/59150

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Kavaliunas, Andrew CIV OSD LA [mailto:Andrew.Kavaliunas@osd.mil]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 06, 2006 12:33 PM  
**To:** Mino, George, Mr, OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** RE: Coordination Request - Military Housing Built Without Air-conditioning

do you need hard copy? if not, looks alright from here-  
-Andrew

---

**From:** Mino, George, Mr, OSD-ATL  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 06, 2006 10:48 AM  
**To:** Keating, Steve CIV ASSTSECNAVIE PTGN, ,BF986; Kavaliunas, Andrew CIV OSD LA; Taylor, Chad, CTR, OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** Coordination Request - Military Housing Built Without Air-conditioning  
**Importance:** High

Request your coordination on TAB D for the proposed response to Senator Coburn at TAB A.

The SECDEF wants to review the reply before it is signed so I would greatly appreciate your coordination today (SECDEF Suspense is 7 Sep).

For ease of review, I attached a pdf file for the entire package, and the MS Word files for the Congressional Response and Action Memos.

Thanks! George

George L. Mino, P.E.  
Senior Program Analyst  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Installations & Environment  
Directorate of Housing & Competitive Sourcing  
(b)(6) [redacted] george.mino@osd.mil

**COORDINATION TAB**

**SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Senator Coburn, dated 27 July 2006,  
Concerning Military Housing Built Without Air-Conditioning**

Component	Office/Title	Name	Date:
OASN(I&F)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Facilities)		
OASD(LA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), Special Assistant for Installations, Environ, and Intergovernmental Affairs	Mr. Andrew Kavaliunas	
DUSD (AT&L)	Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis	Dr. Nancy Spruill <i>N. Spruill</i>	7/6/06

Prepared by: Mr. George Mino/ODUSD(I&E)H&C (b)(6) FAX (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/59152

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010



ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY

ACTION MEMO

September 7, 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Ken Krieg, (USD) AT&L SEP 07 2006

SUBJECT: Military Housing Built Without Air-conditioning

- Attached at TAB A you will find our proposed reply to a letter at TAB B from Senator Coburn about military housing built without air-conditioning. Mr. Philip W. Grone, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) will sign the reply. You had asked to see a copy prior to it being signed (TAB C).

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary of Defense approve the proposed reply.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

SEP 12 2006

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. George Mino, ODUSD(I&E)(H&CS), (b)(6)

MA SD	9/11	SMA DSD	
USA SD	9/11	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	MS/4	0930	9/11/06
ESR MA	9/11	STF DIR	

11-L-0559/USD/59153

OSD 13013-06



9/8/2006 4:21:16 PM

620

7 Sep 06

27 4 1 06

# TAB A



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

The Honorable Tom Coburn  
United States Senate  
Washington DC 205 10-3604

Dear Senator Coburn:

This is in response to your letter of July 27, 2006 to the Secretary of Defense concerning military housing built without air-conditioning.

New military family units owned and operated by the Government **are** not authorized air-conditioning unless average weather conditions exceed at least one of two thresholds specified in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-45, Rental and Construction of Government Quarters. Although privatized military housing generally does not have to comply with the same criteria as Government-owned housing, the decision on whether or not to provide air-conditioning takes into consideration Circular A-45. However, this decision also considers whether similar houses in the community have air-conditioning, and whether the specific privatization project **can** afford the additional construction and operating costs.

According to weather data compiled by DoD, last updated in 2003, the average weather conditions at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, greatly exceed both Circular A-45 thresholds with the result that all of the privatized housing at Fort Sill will be air-conditioned. Weather conditions at Fort Hood, Texas, also exceed both thresholds, so all the privatized housing there is air-conditioned. However, the average weather conditions at Camp Pendleton, California, do not meet either of the Circular A-45 thresholds, and similar housing in that community has traditionally not been air-conditioned. In addition, a costly electrical distribution system upgrade would be required by the developer to air-condition the privatized housing units. The Marine Corps priority was to maximize the number of houses in the privatization project to improve access to quality housing options for Marine Corps families. As a result, there are no plans to incorporate air-conditioning in the ongoing construction and renovation of privatized housing at Camp Pendleton.

Regrettably, this summer many military installations experienced much greater than average heat and humidity for which some of the housing and facilities at certain installations were not designed. We have directed the Services to monitor this situation and take appropriate steps, as necessary, to ensure the health, safety, and comfort of residents of privatized and Government-owned housing.



11-L-0559/OSD/59155

**We appreciate your support for the Department's initiatives and for our brave men and women in uniform.**

**Sincerely,**

**Philip W. Grone  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Installations and Environment)**



# TAB B

TOM COBURN, M.D.  
OKLAHOMA

Phone: 202-224-5754  
Fax: 202-224-8008

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3604

July 27, 2006

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,  
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

CHAIRMAN  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
INCARCERATION AND REHABILITATION

COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1300 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1300


Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I would like to apprise you of an issue brought to my attention in a letter I received from a constituent of mine.

I am sure you will also find it to be of great concern that military housing may feature inadequate air conditioning in a region of the country that has experienced record temperatures this summer. I would greatly appreciate your looking into this matter and informing me of your findings.

Again, thank you in advance for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Tom Coburn  
United States Senator

TC: kw

1800 NORTH BALTIMORE AVENUE  
SUITE 800  
TULSA, OK 74119  
PHONE: 918-651-7861

100 NORTH BROADWAY  
SUITE 1620  
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102  
PHONE: 405-231-4841

[www.coburn.senate.gov](http://www.coburn.senate.gov)

OSD 13013-06



8/15/2006 6:16:48 PM

711 SW/D AVENUE  
SUITE 202  
LAWTON, OK 73501  
PHONE: 580-367-6878

11-L-0559/OSD/59158

iawmsg.txt  
Capitol correspond  
Incoming Email Message

Constituent ■ 54441

Mr. Samuel Hopkins

(b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

Phone(s): (b)(6)

Activity Created: 7/14/2006

File Location: 64691

Interest Code(s): MLRY

Incoming Message:

Date Received: 7/14/2006 6:25:03 PM

Topic/Subject Desc: Housing

Dear Senator coburn,

I am just making a plea to you and the rest of the O.K. Legislators to be aware of a shortage of military housing units with air-conditioning: at least in some southwestern states.

Although the particular one which has drawn my attention is the Marine corps base of Camp Pendleton, CA. ■ had heard about a similar problem on Ft. Hood, and some other posts.

■ do not know about Ft. Sill, but I would hope they do, at least this summer, as the temperatures have been reaching the 105 degrees farhenheit avg. for quite a while.

Anyway, I am a retiree from the us Army, and know many soldiers right now, in theater in Iraq, and a few in Afghanistan. ■ would hope the military can square their financial situation away. ■ understand that there are debates in Congress/Senate about how, and where to appropriate funding for the military, i.e. weapons systems, maintenans, logistical support etc....

■ just hope that military families are part of the big picture: because they ought to be: mine made it through 20 years with me being in Germany twice, without me in Korea, without me in Bosnia/Kosovo, and many FTX's.

But the bottom line is ■ believe in the hotter parts of the country the homefront is just as important as the frontlines, to many of these brave and wonderful servicemen, and women!

I also know that you are one of the best senators in the nation (■ lead up on your voting record), and that is not empty praise, you really are!

Thank You very Much For Your Time.  
Respectfully Yours,  
Samuel P. Hopkins

**TAB C**

~~FOUO~~

August 23, 2006

TO: Ken Krieg

CC Robert Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*RA.*



SUBJECT Air Conditioning in Military Housing

Please let me ~~see~~ the draft response to Senator Coburn before it is sent out to him.

Thanks.

Attach. 7/27/06 Coburn ltr to SecDef

DNR:dh  
EF062306-04

.....  
Please Respond By 09/07/06

SEP 11 2006

(b)(6)

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

*9/12*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59161

**TAB D**

**COORDINATION TAB**

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Senator Coburn, dated 27 July 2006,  
Concerning Military Housing Built Without Air-conditioning

Component	Office/Title	Name	Date:
OASN(I&F)	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Facilities), Director for Housing	Mr. Steve Keating	6 Sep 2006 *
OASD(LA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), Special Assistant for Installations, Environ, and Intergovernmental Affairs	Mr. Andrew Kavaliunas	5 Sep 2006 *
OUSD (AT&L)	Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis	Dr. Nancy Spruill	5 Sep 2006 *

\* See attached correspondence

Prepared by: Mr. George Mino/ODUSD(I&E)H&CS (b)(6) /FAX (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/59163

Sent By: OUSD(I&amp;E)DIR,H&amp;CS;


(b)(6)

Sep-6-06 4:35PM;

Page 1/1

**COORDINATION TAB**

**SUBJECT** Response to Letter from Senator Coburn, dated 27 July 2004  
Concerning Military Housing Built Without Air-conditioning

Component	Office/Title	Name	Date:
OASN(I&F)	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Facilities), Director for Housing	 Mr. Steve Keating	6 Sep 2006 *
OASD(LA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), Special Assistant for Installations, Environ, and Intergovernmental Affairs	Mr. Andrew Kavallunas	6 Sep 2006 *
OUSD (AT&L)	Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis	Dr. Nancy Spruill	6 Sep 2006 *

\* See attached correspondence

Prepared by: Mr. George Mino/ODUSD(I&amp;E)H&amp;CS (b)(6) FAX (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/59164



-----Original Message-----

**From:** Kavaliunas, Andrew CIV OSD LA [mailto:Andrew.Kavaliunas@osd.mil]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 06, 2006 12:33 PM  
**To:** Mino, George, Mr, OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** RE: Coordination Request- Military Housing Built Without Air-conditioning

do you need hard copy? if not, looks alright from here-  
Andrew

---

**From:** Mino, George, Mr, OSD-ATL  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 06, 2006 10:48 AM  
**To:** Keating, Steve CIV ASSTSECNAVIE PTGN, ,BF986; Kavaliunas, Andrew CIV OSD LA; Taylor, Chad, CTR, OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** Coordination Request- Military Housing Built Without Air-conditioning  
**Importance:** High

Request your coordination on TAB D for the proposed response to Senator Coburn at TAB A.

The SECDEF wants to review the reply before it is signed so I would greatly appreciate your coordination today (SECDEF Suspense is 7 Sep).

For ease of review, I attached a pdf file for the entire package, and the MS Word files for the Congressional Response and Action Memos.

Thanks! George

George L. Mino, P.E.  
Senior Program Analyst  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Installations & Environment  
Directorate of Housing & Competitive Sourcing  
(b)(6) [redacted] george.mino@osd.mil

**COORDINATION TAB**

**SUBJECT: Response to Letter ~~from~~ Senator Coburn, dated 27 July 2006,  
Concerning Military Housing Built Without Air-conditioning**

Component	Office/Title	Name	Date:
OASN(I&F)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Facilities)		
OASD(LA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), Special Assistant for Installations, Environ, and Intergovernmental Affairs	Mr. Andrew Kavaliunas	
OUSD (AT&L)	Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis	Dr. Nancy Spruill <i>N. Spruill</i>	<i>9/6/06</i>

Prepared by: Mr. George Mino/ODUSD(I&E)H&CS (b)(6) /FAX (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/59166

~~FOUO~~

August 23, 2006

To: Ken Krieg

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*RA.*

FILE  
COPY

SUBJECT: Air Conditioning in Military Housing

Please let me see the draft response to Senator Coburn before it is sent out to him.

Thanks.

Attach. 7/27/06 Coburn ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
SF052306-04

.....  
*Please Respond By 09/07/06*

SEP 11 2006

(b)(6)

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED *9/12*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59167

6

23 Aug 06

27 Jul 06

~~FOUO~~

August 23, 2006

To: Ken Krieg  
CC: Robert Wilkie  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld

PA.



SUBJECT, Air Conditioning in Military Housing

Please let me see the draft response to Senator Coburn before it is sent out to him.

Thanks.

Attach. 7/27/06 Coburn ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
SF082106-04

Please Respond By 09/07/06

SEP 11 2006

(b)(6)

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

9/12

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59168

OSD 13013-06

620

23 Aug 06

27 Jul 06

TOM COBURN, M.D.  
OKLAHOMA

PHONE: 202-224-5754  
FAX: 202-224-6008

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3604

July 27, 2006

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,  
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

CHAIRMAN  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
INCARCERATION AND REHABILITATION

COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1300 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1300


Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I would like to apprise you of an issue brought to my attention in a letter I received from a constituent of mine.

I am sure you will also find it to be of great concern that military housing may feature inadequate air conditioning in a region of the country that has experienced record temperatures this summer. I would greatly appreciate your looking into this matter and informing me of your findings.

Again, thank you in advance for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Tom Coburn  
United States Senator

TC: kw

1800 NORTH BALTIMORE AVENUE  
SUITE 800  
TULSA, OK 74119  
PHONE: 918-561-7651

100 NORTH BROADWAY  
SUITE 1820  
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102  
PHONE: 405-231-4941

OSD 13013-06



711 SW D AVENUE  
SUITE 202  
LAWTON, OK 73501  
PHONE: 580-357-9878

11-L-0559/OSD/59169

8/15/2006 6:16:48 PM

lawmsg.txt  
capitol correspond  
Incoming Email Message

constituent ■ 54441

Mr. Samuel Hopkins

(b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

Phone(s): (H) (b)(6)

Activity created: 7/14/2006

File Location: 64691

Interest Code(s): MILITARY

-----  
Incoming Message:

Date Received: 7/14/2006 6:25:03 PM

Topic/Subject Desc: Housing

Dear Senator coburn,

I am just making a plea to you and the rest of the O.K. Legislators to be aware of a shortage of military housing units with air-conditioning; at least in some southwestern states.

Although the particular one which has drawn my attention is the Marine Corps base of camp Pendleton, CA, ■ had heard about a similar problem on Ft. Hood, and some other posts.

■ do not know about Ft. Sill, but ■ would hope they do, at least this summer, as the temperatures have been reaching the 105 degrees farhenheit avg. for quite a while.

Anyway, ■ am a retiree from the US Army, and know many soldiers right now, in theater in Iraq, and a few in Afghanistan, ■ would hope the military can square their financial situation away. ■ understand that there are debates in Congress/Senate about how, and where to appropriate funding for the military, i.e. weapons systems, maintenanca, logjstical support etc....

■ just hope that military families are part of the big picture, because they ought to be; mine made it through 20 years with me being in Germany twice, without me in Korea, without me in Bosnia/Kosovo, and many FTX's.

But the bottom line is ■ believe in the hotter parts of the country the homefront is just as important as the frontlines, to many of these brave and wonderful servicemen, and women!

I also know that you are one of the best senators in the nation (■ lead up on your voting record), and that is not empty praise, you really are!

Thank You Very Much For Your Time,  
Respectfully Yours,  
Samuel P. Hopkins



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

SEP 18 2006

620

The Honorable Tom Coburn  
United States Senate  
Washington DC 20510-3604

Dear Senator Coburn:

This is in response to your letter of July 27, 2006 to the Secretary of Defense concerning military housing built without air conditioning.

New military family units owned and operated by the Government are not authorized air-conditioning unless average weather conditions exceed at least one of two thresholds specified in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-45, Rental and Construction of Government Quarters. Although privatized military housing generally does not have to comply with the same criteria as Government-owned housing, the decision on whether or not to provide air-conditioning takes into consideration Circular A-45. However, this decision also considers whether similar houses in the community have air-conditioning, and whether the specific privatization project can afford the additional construction and operating costs.

According to weather data compiled by DoD, last updated in 2003, the average weather conditions at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, greatly exceed both Circular A-45 thresholds with the result that all of the privatized housing at Fort Sill will be air-conditioned. Weather conditions at Fort Hood, Texas, also exceed both thresholds, so all the privatized housing there is air-conditioned. However, the average weather conditions at Camp Pendleton, California, do not meet either of the Circular A-45 thresholds, and similar housing in that community has traditionally not been air-conditioned. In addition, a costly electrical distribution system upgrade would be required by the developer to air-condition the privatized housing units. The Marine Corps priority was to maximize the number of houses in the privatization project to improve access to quality housing options for Marine Corps families. As a result, there are no plans to incorporate air-conditioning in the ongoing construction and renovation of privatized housing at Camp Pendleton.

Regrettably, this summer many military installations experienced much greater than average heat and humidity for which some of the housing and facilities at certain installations were not designed. We have directed the Services to monitor this situation and take appropriate steps, as necessary, to ensure the health, safety, and comfort of residents of privatized and Government-owned housing.



11-L-0559/OSD/59171


R 13013-06

(22 Jul 06)

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We appreciate your support for the Department's initiatives and for our brave men and women in uniform.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Philip W. Grone". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "P" and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Philip W. Grone  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Installations and Environment)



FYF

FOUO

v/r Greg

August 10, 2006

TO Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Event Honoring Chairman Hunter

Is there any reason I cannot attend the event when Frank Gaffney's outfit honors  
Duncan Hunter?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF081006-29

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/17/06*

001.15D

10 Aug 06

11-L-0559/OSD/59173

OSD 13037-06



8/16/2006 10:19:02 AM



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

August 15, 2006 (3:28pm)

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Event Honoring Chairman Hunter

- You asked if you may accept Frank Gaffney's invitation to the Center for Security Policy's "Keeper of the Flame" dinner on September 20 at Union Station. Approximately **400** invited guests will attend **this** fundraiser honoring Chairman Duncan Hunter.
- Because this is a fundraiser, you may attend only if:
  - ◆ You give an official speech in your capacity as Secretary regarding the Department or national security matters, or:
  - ◆ You make **remarks** in your personal capacity (not as the Secretary), based on your personal relationship with Chairman Hunter, or:
  - ◆ You "merely attend," meaning that you do not play an active or visible role in the official program.
- Although **the** invitation is considered a gift from the Center offered because of your official position, you may accept it since the event qualifies **as** a widely attended gathering, and I have determined as your ethics counselor that it is in the Department's interest that you attend.
- Of course, in any remarks you may choose to make, you may not endorse the Center or request donations or other support for it.
- I have attached a point paper addressing in detail considerations involved in making your decision.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by Steve Epstein (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/59174

OSD 13037-06



8/16/2006 10:19:32 AM

601.150

15 Aug 06

10 Aug 06

August 15, 2006 (5:00pm)

## POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: Invitation to SecDef to Attend the Center for Security Policy "Keeper of the Flame" Dinner

This responds to the Secretary's question regarding the invitation to the Center for Security Policy's "Keeper of the Flame" dinner to be held in Washington, DC, on September 20, 2006. It is the Center's annual major fundraiser. The Center gives an award each year to recognize individuals who devote their public careers to democratic principles and the rights of individuals throughout the world. The awardee at this year's dinner is Congressman Duncan Hunter. Mr. Rumsfeld received the award in 1998, and former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger received the first award in 1990. Approximately 400 people (Members of Congress, the uniformed services, and the executive branch, diplomats, representatives of industry, and the media) are expected to attend.

### I. Official Capacity

Under 5 C.F.R. § 2635.808, unless authorized, the Secretary may not "participate in fundraising in an official capacity." Subsection 3-210 of the Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), DoD 5500.7-R, provides such authorization for fundraising on behalf of certain listed organizations. The Center is not a listed organization. There are only two circumstances that allow the Secretary to be associated, in an official capacity, with a fundraising event for the Center. First, under 5 C.F.R. § 2635.808(a)(2), the Secretary may merely attend a fundraising event as long as the organization, to his knowledge, does not use the fact of his attendance to promote the event. Second, under 5 C.F.R. § 2635.808(a)(2) & (3), the Secretary may deliver an official speech, which includes one given in his official capacity on programs or operations of the Department.

Before accepting the invitation in his official capacity, the Secretary must first decide that the event provides an appropriate forum for the official speech. Under subsection 3-211 of the JER and DoD Directive 5410.18, the Secretary must make the following determinations:

- a. His appearance and speech does not interfere with the performance of official duties or detract from readiness.
- b. DoD community relations or public affairs interests are served by his appearance.
- c. The Center and the Dinner are appropriate for association with DoD and the speech.
- d. The event is of interest and benefit to the local civilian community, as well as DoD.
- e. The Secretary is able and willing to make a similar speech to comparable events sponsored by similar organizations.

f. Since the Dinner is a fundraiser, his speech must be incidental to the entire event, in accordance with public affairs guidance.

If the Secretary makes these determinations and accepts the invitation, certain precautions must be taken to prevent the appearance that his participation is an endorsement of the Center, its fundraising efforts, or the Dinner. First, the Secretary may not request donations or other support for the Center. Second, his attendance and presentation may not be used to promote attendance at the event. The Center may include in its invitation package the fact that the Secretary will make an official speech, but must be careful not to use that fact to promote attendance.

## II. Personal Capacity

It is DoD's position that the Secretary's personal capacity is minimal, especially in the area of fundraising, and should be used only on rare occasions. Determination of personal capacity depends on how much the public identifies the Secretary with his office, and his past history of association with the organization. Mr. Rumsfeld is a prior recipient of the award and has a personal friendship with Congressman Hunter, the current awardee. There are probably sufficient facts in this instance to determine that the Secretary may make remarks in his personal capacity. If he decides to accept the invitation in his personal capacity, his remarks should avoid reference to DoD policy, program or operations, as he would not want to make an official speech. In addition, DoD resources may not be used in the preparation of his remarks. He may also accept the gift of free attendance in his personal capacity. This gift would include the Dinner, because the event will be widely attended and the invitation is from the Center, which is the sponsor of the event.

If he elects this option, there are also certain restrictions that must be observed. The Secretary may not personally solicit for the Dinner from subordinates, which, for the Secretary, is every DoD employee. He may also not personally solicit from a prohibited source, which includes, at a minimum, every contractor listed on the DoD Contractors List. Personal solicitation includes using, or letting others use, his name in correspondence. It does not include mass-produced correspondence addressed to a group of many persons, as long as the solicitation is not targeted at subordinates or prohibited sources.

The Secretary may not use, or permit others to use, his official title or position to assist the fundraising. However, "The Honorable" may be used as a term of address. The Secretary may permit the inclusion of his current title and position in a biography, provided that they are given no more prominence than other significant biographical details. Finally, he must do everything possible to eliminate the appearance that he is officially endorsing the Center, its fundraising efforts, or the Dinner.

FYI

~~FOUO~~

v/r Greg

August 10, 2006

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Event Honoring Chairman Hunter

Is ~~there~~ any reason I cannot attend the event when Frank Gaffney's outfit honors  
Duncan Hunter?

Thanks,

DHR:ds  
SP081006-29

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/17/06*

11-L-0559/OSD/59177

~~FOUO~~

AUG 16 2006

334 NSC

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Notes from Eric Davis

Please send me a copy of Eric Davis's notes. He said he was going to leave them with your staff.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF081506-08

.....

1604506

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59178



OSD 13072-06

8/16/2006 19:57 PM

~~FOUO~~

AUG 16 2006 -

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Notes from Eric Davis

Please send me a copy of Eric Davis's notes. He said he was going to leave them with your staff.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF081506-08

.....

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/59179

OSD 13072-06  
  
8/16/2006 3:19:57 PM

~~FOUO~~

AUG 16 2006

*Lebanon*

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: E-mail from Newt

Attached is an e-mail from Newt.

Attach. 8/10/06 Gingrich e-mail re: Hezbollah

DHR:dh  
SF081506-10

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59180



OSD 13074-06

8/16/2006 3 28 43 PM

*1604506*

*SP*



(b)(6)

(b)(6)  
8/15

From: Thirdwave2[thirdwave2@speakingingrich.com]  
Sent: Thursday, August 10, 2006 10:57 AM  
To: GundersonB@state.gov; (b)(6) hugheskp@state.gov  
Subject: from newt

The concept of having the united nations forces in Lebanon expanded is **an** act of absolute surrender to Hezbollah

There was some limited, if very unlikely, possibility that a nato-led force *might* have intimidated Hezbollah, iran, and Syria. There is zero possibility that the UNIFIL force expanded in numbers would be anything but a screen for terrorism and a facilitator of Iranian Syrian domination of south Lebanon

Accepting this united nations force would be precisely the defeat for long term peace that president bush and secretary rice have warned against for four weeks

It should be rejected decisively by the united states

The only two ways to disarm Hezbollah are

1. to support an Israeli offensive as deep into Lebanon as necessary with collateral threats against Syria and iran if they intervene

Or

2. convince the Lebanese government that we are reliable and have the Lebanese army work with special forces and American air power to destroy hezbollah

as long as Lebanon is more afraid of Syria and iran then they are the united states the second option is probably not available

however, if Israel destroys most of Hezbollah it is conceivable that that show of force and that demonstration of Syrian Iranian weakness will lead to a Lebanese decision to work with the united states to fill the vacuum created by the destruction of Hezbollah

newt

~~FOUO~~

AUG 16 2006

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: E-mail from Newt

Attached is an e-mail from Newt.

Attach. 8/10/06 Gingrich e-mail re: **Hezbollah**

DHR:dh  
SP081506-10

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59182

OSD 13074-06



8/16/2006 3 28 43 PM

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

8/15

**From:** Thirdwave2 [thirdwave2@speakingingrich.com]  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 10, 2006 10:57 AM  
**To:** GundersonB@state.gov (b)(6) hugheskp@state.gov  
**Subject:** from newt

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newt

FOUO

AUG 1 6 2006

TO: ~~Fran~~ Townsend

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Playbook for Times of Disaster

I sent you the attached memo on June 16. I read Michael Chertoffs June 30 response (also attached). He believes that the lawyers from all the agencies have come to a consensus on how to employ these authorities in times of disaster, and he suggested that there be an agreed-upon playbook in that area.

I have heard nothing from you. Is there an agreed-upon playbook? Don't you agree there should be? If so, who is going to do it and when?

Thanks.

Attach. 6/6/06 SD memo to Townsend re: "DoD Preparations for Disaster Relief;  
6/30/06 Chertoff memo to Townsend

DHR:dh  
SF081506-12

.....

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/59184

OSD 13075-06

000.92


6 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

JUN 16 2006

TO: Fran Townsend

CC: Honorable Joshua Bolten  
Honorable Michael Chertoff  
Gordon England  
General Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
Paul McHale  
ADM ~~Tim~~ Keating

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: DoD Preparations for Disaster Relief

I have had **good** meetings with Admiral Tim Keating at NORTHCOM about preparations DoD has undertaken for natural or man-made disasters.

I **am** generally satisfied with DoD's readiness, which includes:

- Pre-identified force packages that can be put into action immediately upon a request from DHS, including capabilities such **as**:
  - Active, Reserve and Guard manpower
  - Communications
  - Sensors **for** situational awareness
  - Medical and mortuary affairs
  - Engineers
  - Public affairs

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59185

DoD is also actively working with other agencies to help in developing planning capabilities. Our goal is to get their planning capabilities up to a higher level, so they can take over and do a good job of both planning and executing.

It is important for you to be clear that many of the ~~state~~ Governors may well not be forthcoming with permission for Federal forces, ~~as~~ opposed to National Guard forces, to be involved early in an emergency. DoD will be ready to do so, and we ~~are~~ aware that the President might see a need to send in Federal forces. However, I see a need to think through, early on, what kind of authorities and/or arrangements might be needed, including memoranda of agreement that ~~set~~ forth responsibilities and command/control arrangements. It would be much better to think these issues through now, prior to an incident.

**Thanks.**

DHR:dh  
060106-15 (TS).doc




# Homeland Security

June 30, 2006

**TO:** Fran Townsend, Assistant to the President for  
Homeland **Security** and Counterterrorism

**CC:** Donald Rumsfeld, **Secretary** of Defense  
Joshua Bolten, Assistant to the President and Chief of **Staff**  
Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense  
General Peter Pace, **Chairman** of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Amb. Eric Edelman, Under **Secretary** of Defense for Policy  
Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense  
Adm. Tim Keating, Commander, NORTHCOM

**FROM** Michael Chertoff 

**SUBJECT:** Department of Defense's Preparations for Disaster Relief

I have read Don's recent memo to you. ~~Let~~ me begin by saying that DoD has been a valuable ~~partner~~ in preparing for the upcoming hurricane season. ~~Our~~ Departments have been working together to identify capabilities that DoD can provide if another ~~disaster—~~ either natural or man-made—strikes. Particularly valuable is the work that DoD has done on ~~both~~ pre-identified "force packages" and planning capabilities.

I agree with Don that we should make ~~sure~~ we have adequately advanced the authorities and arrangements necessary for employing Federal forces in disaster relief, if the President ~~sa~~ orders. On the authorities' side, I believe lawyers from DHS, DoD, and DOJ ~~have~~ looked at the issues surrounding the Posse Comitatus Act, the Insurrection ~~Act~~, and other applicable statutes, and come to a consensus about how to employ them in times of disaster. I would ~~suggest~~ that we compile an ~~agreed-upon~~ "playbook" in that area.


~~As~~ far as practical ~~arrangements~~ that we might wish to consider for the employment of ~~Federal~~ forces, I agree that this is a ~~matter~~ that deserves ~~further~~ attention ~~from our~~ respective ~~staffs~~. I will ~~ask~~ Michael Jackson to discuss ~~the~~ forum for such discussion with Gordon England.

Attachments (1)

11-L-0559/OSD/59187

~~FOUO~~

AUG 16 2006

TO: Fran Townsend  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Playbook for Times of Disaster

I sent you the attached memo on June 16. I read Michael Chertoff's June 30 response (also attached). He believes that the lawyers from all the agencies have come to a consensus on how to employ these authorities in times of disaster, and he suggested that there be an agreed-upon playbook in that area.

I have heard nothing from you. Is there an agreed-upon playbook? Don't you agree there should be? If so, who is going to do it and when?

Thanks.

Attach. 6/6/06 SD memo to Townsend re: "DoD Preparations for Disaster Relief;  
6/30/06 Chertoff memo to Townsend

DHR:dh  
SF081506-12

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59188




~~FOUO~~

JUN 16 2006

TO: **Fran** Townsend

CC: Honorable Joshua Bolten  
Honorable Michael Chertoff  
Gordon England  
General Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
Paul McHale  
ADM Tim Keating

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: DoD Preparations for Disaster Relief

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I am generally satisfied with DoD's readiness, which includes:

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  - Active, Reserve and Guard manpower
  - Communications
  - Sensors for situational awareness
  - Medical and mortuary affairs
  - Engineers
  - Public affairs

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59189

DoD is also actively working with other agencies to help in developing planning capabilities. Our goal is to get their planning capabilities up to a higher level, so they can take over and do a good job of both planning and executing.

It is important for you to be clear that many of the state Governors may well not be forthcoming with permission for Federal forces, as opposed to National Guard forces, to be involved early in an emergency. DoD will be ready to do so, and we are aware that the President might see a need to send in Federal forces. However, I see a need to think ~~through~~, early on, what kind of authorities and/or arrangements might be needed, including memoranda of agreement that set forth responsibilities and command/control arrangements. It would be much better to think these issues ~~through~~ now, prior to an incident.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060106-15 (TS).doc




## Homeland Security

June 30, 2006

**TO:** Fran Townsend, Assistant to the President for  
Homeland **Security** and Counterterrorism

**CC:** Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense  
Joshua Bolten, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff  
Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense  
General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Amb. Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense  
Adm. Tim Keating, Commander, **NORTHCOM**

**FROM:** Michael Chertoff 

**SUBJECT** Department of Defense's Preparations for Disaster Relief

I have read Don's recent memo to you. Let me begin by saying that DoD has been a valuable partner in preparing for the upcoming hurricane season. Our Departments have been working together to identify capabilities that DoD can provide if another disaster—either natural or man-made—strikes. Particularly valuable is the work that DoD has done on both pre-identified "force packages" and planning capabilities.

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As far as practical arrangements that we might wish to consider for the employment of Federal forces, I agree that this is a matter that deserves further attention from our respective staffs. I will ask Michael Jackson to discuss the forum for such discussion with Gordon England.

Attachments (1)

11-L-0559/OSD/59191

~~FOUO~~

AUG 15 2006

TO: GEN Monty Meigs  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Information from Frank Gaffney on IEDs

Attached is some material on IEDs sent to me by Frank Gaffney.

Please take a look at it, and get back to me as to what you think about it.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/11/06 Note from Frank Gaffney to SecDef

DHR:ss  
SF081406-14

.....  
*Please Respond By August 31, 2006*

471.86

5 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13097-06



11-L-0559/OSD/59192

8/17/2006 11:27:30 AM

8/11/06  
2:00 PM

8/14/06

AL →

From: Frank Gaffney  
Sent: Friday, August 11, 2006 2: 5 PM  
Subject: Urgent Heads-up

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**On** another matter, I hope we will have the pleasure of your company, at least briefly, on 20 September when we honor your friend Duncan Hunter and decorated combat veterans ~~of~~ the War for the Free World whose profiles in courage have been recently written up by our late friend, Cap Weinberger.

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**SOLVING THE I.E.D./UNCONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES PROBLEM**

---

**Standoff Detection Raman Spectrometer  
For  
Detection of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)  
And  
Asymmetric Terrorist Explosive Devices (Liquids)**

**Big Crow Program Office**  
3710 Trestle Rd.  
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117  
1-877-BIG-CROW

**Opto-Forensic Technologies**  
1830 East Broadway, Suite 124-343  
Tucson, Arizona, USA 85719-5968  
Ph. 520-241-5698  
Fax 520-615-6561  
[www.oDtoforensic.com](http://www.oDtoforensic.com)

# **SOLVING THE I.E.D./UNCONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES PROBLEM**

## **THE THREAT**

- Battlefront - IEDs used in the field.
- Homefront - Bombs used in mass transit systems, cargo

## **NATURE OF CHALLENGE**

- **Need** to detect all *conventional* (TNT) and *unconventional* (TATP, liquids) in any form (solid, liquid, gas).
- The detection should be qualitative (what) and quantitative (how much).

## **SOLUTION TO PROBLEM**

- The solution must ~~offer~~ these attributes: *real-time, non-destructive* analysis; *qualitative results (what is there); quantitative results (how much is there); Immune to interference; high throughput; affordable.*
- In addition, the ~~solution~~ must be *adaptive, flexible, unaffected* by temperature or weather, able accurately to *analyze chemicals through materials such as water, plastic, and glass.*

## **OTHER LOGICS DO NOT WORK**

- The ~~Acad~~ *efficient* (NAS) and numerous TSA tests have established that x-ray, neutron activation, and "sniffer" technology do not detect unconventional explosives and *many* conventional ones.

## **THE SOLUTION IS RAMAN**

- Raman bounces laser light off a sample and compares the returned signal to a database. The NAS and others have established this as the most promising method.
- **SIMPLE RAMAN** - This method uses a single laser to detect and identify. All Raman devices **currently** on the **market** use simple Raman. Simple Raman is non-quantitative and **has** limitations that inhibit its **performance**. Some chemicals cannot be detected by simple Raman.
- **COMPLEX RAMAN** - This method uses multiple lasers and detectors. The compartmentalized intelligence program known as Big Crow has encouraged the development of a complex Raman device called Laser Verification Authentication Raman Spectrometer (LVARS). This method has demonstrated the **potential fully** to address the problem in that it can see **all** chemicals **with** absolute specificity and quantification (includes conventional and unconventional explosives) and is adaptive.

## **BIG CROW PROGRAM'S LVARS DEVICE**

- The LVARS device is the ~~fastest~~, most compact technological solution, and makes the most use of COTS.
- Since all principles ~~associated~~ with this method have already been demonstrated, with the availability of the required funding, the first device could be ready for production in 12 months.

## **LVARS VALIDATION AND PROGRAM MILESTONES**

- Funding REQUIREMENTS for Phase I (1 year) - \$15 million.
- Phase I Deliverable - 1 LVARS device for IED detection, ready for production (RFP).
- With additional \$13 million funding - 1 air cargo inspection device for mass transit (RFP) can be delivered 6 months after successful validation the Phase I deliverable.

## **SENIOR-LEVEL INITIATIVE REQUIRED**

- Successive and continuous efforts to bring or enlist support for LVARS from IED Task Force, TSA, and DHS have been ignored in favor of continuing investment in inadequate and/or outdated technologies.
- DARPA has recognized the utility, salience, and adaptability of Raman and launched an identical program to deliver an identical device - but in 54 months at a total cost of \$100 million.
- We believe the streamlined program advocated by the Big Crow Program can deliver one production-ready device with a one-meter detection range in 12 months for \$15 million.

~~For Official Use Only (FOUO)~~

TO: SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld

AUG 16 2006

CC: GEN Peter Pace

FROM: GEN ~~Montgomery~~ Meigs *Mr. Meigs 06*

SUBJECT: Information from Frank Gaffney on IEDs

Thank you for forwarding Frank Gaffney's comments regarding the Big Crow Program and the Laser Verification Authentication Raman Spectrometer (LVARs).

JIEDDO is evaluating proposals on the general topic of using spectroscopy for **standoff** detection of explosives. They include swept-wavelength resonant Raman methods, recently developed by the Naval Research Laboratory, and other variants of complex **Raman** spectroscopy. The Army, Navy, Air Force, industry and academic institutions have submitted ideas. Raman spectroscopy continues to generate considerable interest, with projects ranging from basic research to engineering development.

JIEDDO has not received technical details on LVARs. We will send you a more detailed response **after** our staff examines the background information that Mr. Gaffney mentioned, and we have the opportunity to look closely at this specific variant of the technology.

471.86

6 Aug 06

15 Aug 06

~~For Official Use Only (FOUO)~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/59196

OSD 13097-06



8/17/2006 11:27:14 AM



~~FOUO~~

AUG 15 2006

TO: GEN Monty Meigs  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Information from Frank Gaffney on IEDs

Attached is some material on IEDs sent to me by Frank Gaffney.

Please take a look at it, and get back to me as to what you think about it.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/11/06 Note from Frank Gaffney to SecDef

DHR:as  
SP081406-14

.....  
*Please Respond By August 31, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13097-06



11-L-0559/OSD/59197

8/17/2006 11:27:30 AM

8/11/06  
2:00 PM

8/11/06 -

rr →

From: Frank Gaffiey  
Sent: Friday, August 11, 2006 12:55 PM  
Subject: Urgent Heads-up

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FOUO

July 31, 2006

TO Stephen J Hadley

CC null  
Dan Dell'Orto

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RA.*

SUBJECT Briefing by Dan Dell'Orto

Dan Dell'Orto, Deputy ~~General Counsel~~ at the Department of Defense, has been working the legal issue *that* you were going to put some people on. He talked with Harriet Miers, and no one in the White House *is* cleared. Dan has *put together* a small team of 3-4 people -- mostly NSA lawyers -- and they have *worked* it. Dan can brief you, if you are *interested*.

DHR:m  
SP073106-45

.....

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/59201

OSD 13142-06



8/17/2006 3:28 39 PM

337

3150106



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600  
INFO MEMO

August 16, 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Briefing to Steve Hadley

- On July 31, 2006 you sent a note to Steve Hadley (enclosed) about a briefing on legal issues that I had presented to you several days earlier.
- Steve asked Harriet Miers to contact me about it. I briefed her on Monday, August 14.
- Ms. Mien arranged to have me brief Steve Hadley today. I did so with Bill Lutti and Harriet both present.
- My sense is that Steve understood the briefing and thought it was informative.
- At the briefing's conclusion, he asked whether I knew what you wanted to happen next. I told him that I didn't know but thought that you would be interested in knowing his reaction to the briefing.
- He concluded by saying that he would discuss the issues with Bill Lutti and Harriet.
- I would not be surprised if he called you to discuss the way forward.

357

16 Aug 06

3150106



11-L-0559/OSD/59202

OSD 13142-08



8/17/2006 3:29:08 PM

~~FOUO~~

July 31, 2006

TO Stephen J Hadley

CC: null  
Dan Dell'Orto

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

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DHR:ss  
SF073106-45

\*\*\*\*\*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59203

FOUO

AUG 25 2006

TO: Donald Winter  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
ADM Mike Mullen  
Gen Mike Hagee  
DAVID CHU  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT Navy Report on Reducing Preventable Accidents

Thanks for the detailed look at the Department of the Navy's actions to reduce preventable accidents. I appreciate your efforts to review policies and directives, your pursuit of better technology, and your prioritization of funding for safety systems. It appears these actions are showing some results.

You are right when you say leadership is the key, and placing increased value on safety as a part of Navy and Marine culture is a great step forward. I look forward to seeing the trends continue and to seeing reversals in some of the areas of concern.

Thanks.

Attach. 8/17/06 SecNav memo to SecDef re: Reducing Preventable Accidents (OSD 13188-06)

DHR:db  
SF082406-19

.....

729

25 AUG 06

17 AUG 06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/59204



OSD 13188-06

12/5/2006 8:03:01 AM





THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350-1000

August 17, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Reducing Preventable Accidents

The Department of the Navy is engaged and dedicated to enhancing our safety performance. Along with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I have identified safety as one of Navy's five objectives for 2006 (attachment (1)). We are targeting safety improvement with the same focus as the Global War On Terror.

We will never accept losing a Sailor or Marine in an avoidable mishap as the cost of doing business. Our Navy and Marine Corps leadership has embraced the first ever Department-wide Safety Strategy, attachment (2). We are executing a plan that is already changing how safety is valued within our organizational culture. It is a plan with great potential to significantly reduce mishap rates over the next three years.

Leadership, accountability and enforcement are critical components of our safety objectives. Our Navy and Marine Corps Inspector Generals are now conducting a thorough assessment of Fleet compliance with current traffic safety policy and legal directives. Their recommendations will drive policy changes and improve accountability for safety at both the unit and individual level. After visits to over 15 bases, their initial feedback confirms we have much work to do.

We are actively pursuing emerging safety technology such as HMMWV rollover sensors and man overboard indicators and are refocusing efforts on the prioritization, funding and acquisition of proven safety systems for our aircraft.

Attachment (3) highlights performance in our eight primary mishap categories. We have seen improvement over our FY02 baseline numbers in four Navy and four Marine Corps categories. While we have made progress, there is room for a great deal more, and we have significant challenges ahead.

I am personally reviewing Departmental safety statistics and objectives on a quarterly basis. I will keep you informed of the Navy's progress.

Donald C. Winter

Attachments:  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/59205

OSD 13188-06



8/18/2006 11:56:22 AM

**cc:**

**CNO**

**CMC**

**DNS**

**ASN(RDA)**

**ASN(M&RA)**

**ASN(I&E)**

**DASN(S)**

**COMNAVSAFECEN**

**CMC(SD)**



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 22 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS  
SERVICE CHIEFS

SUBJECT Reducing Preventable Accidents

I have ~~set some~~ very specific mishap reduction goals ~~for the Department~~ to achieve. My congratulations to those ~~who~~ are progressing toward their respective goals, ~~but~~ others are not. We must rededicate ourselves to those goals – and achieve them.

~~Too often~~ we excuse mishaps ~~by~~ citing the difficult ~~circumstances~~ in which we operate. We have ~~trained our~~ men and women to operate safely in very ~~trying~~ conditions. There is ~~no~~ excuse for losing lives given proper planning, attention to detail, and the active involvement of the ~~chain of command~~.

Accountability is essential to effective leadership. I ~~expect~~ all the Department's ~~leaders~~, from the Commander to ~~the~~ first line ~~supervisors~~, to be accountable for mishaps under their watch. We simply will ~~not~~ accept ~~status quo~~.

If we ~~need~~ to change ~~our training~~, improve ~~our material~~ acquisition, or ~~alter our~~ business practices to save the precious lives of ~~our~~ men and women, we will do it. We will fund as a first priority those ~~technologies~~ and ~~devices that~~ will save lives and equipment. We will retrofit existing systems, and ~~consider~~ these devices as a "trust fund" priority for all new systems. We ~~can no longer~~ consider ~~safety as~~ "nice-to-have."

I want to hear what you are doing to ~~improve your safety performance~~ and I want to see the ~~results of your~~ actions.



OSD 09859-06



6/22/2006 2:59:37 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59207

11-L-0559/OSD/59208

# Notes



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-1000

8 February 2006




MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OBJECTIVES FOR 2006

The Leadership of the Department of the Navy (DON) provides the attached objectives for accomplishment this year. Success in these priorities will increase the effectiveness of the entire Department, improve the lives of Sailors and Marines, and result in greater security for our Nation.

These objectives are not intended to be a comprehensive list of all that needs to be done in the Department. Neither does their position in the list of objectives reflect any relative priority. The list does, however, reflect our consensus on areas we personally intend to track to achieve the desired effects this year.

Support for the accomplishment of the attached objectives for 2006 is necessary and appreciated. Lead organizations are assigned for each objective. The lead organization is responsible to team with supporting organizations to build a course of action with applicable metrics. The initial reports should include the schedules, milestones and measures to ensure accomplishment in 2006. Monthly reports from each lead organization will document continued progress.

		
Michael G. Mullen Admiral, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations	Michael W. Hagee General, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine Corps	Donald C. Winter Secretary of the Navy

Attachment:  
As stated

(See Distribution on next page)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OBJECTIVES FOR 2006

Distribution:

UNSECNAV

VCNO

ACMC

ASN (M&RA)

ASN (FM&C)

ASN (I&E)

ASN (RD&A)

GC

DNS

OPA

DON CIO

JAG

NIG

CHINFO

OLA

ONR

AUDGEN

NCIS

AAUSN

DMCS

## 2006 Department of the Navy Objectives

**1. Execute the Department of Navy (DON) strategy to optimize the workforce with emphasis on attracting and retaining the proper mix of high quality people and maximizing the synergy of the people in the Navy-Marine Corps Team.**

- Take care of returning Marines and Sailors and their families.
- Implement the National Security Personnel System - Spiral 1.
- Develop, groom and properly deploy innovative leaders at all levels in the DON.
- Implement the 2006 priorities per Force Management Oversight Council Strategic Plan.

*(Lead: ASN(M&RA). Primary supporting: CNO, CMC, CHINFO)*

**2. Use the Navy-Marine Corps Team to aggressively prosecute the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).**

- Provide the Combatant Commanders with skilled forces for combat operations, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, including tools to counter Improvised Explosive Devices.
- Optimize Naval contribution to Special Operations Forces, including the implementation of Marine Corps Special Operations Command.
- Continue to develop and expand the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to include its interdependence with the Marine Corps.

*(Lead: CNO, CMC. Primary supporting: ASN(RD&A))*

**3. Build the Navy-Marine Corps Force for Tomorrow.**

- Strengthen the Navy and Marine Corps role in the Joint/Interagency Team, emphasizing the Naval Services' strengths of access, persistent presence, and small footprint.
- Establish a Shipbuilding Plan which has the consensus of the administration, Congress, and contractor teams to build the required type and number of ships.
- Establish and implement a strategy for Marine Corps modernization and reconstitution programs (ground and aviation systems).
- Continue development of the Department of the Navy mission in Homeland Defense/Security including the integration of multi-national and commercial maritime industry support into Maritime Domain Awareness.

*(Lead: CNO, CMC, UNSECNAV, ASN(RD&A). Primary supporting: ASN(FM&C), ASN(I&E), CLA, DON CIO, NCIS)*

**4. Emphasize Safety. Manage risk to improve mission effectiveness and to safeguard the people and resources of the Navy-Marine Corps Team.**

- Improve safety performance across DON to meet Secretary of Defense Strategic Planning Guidance to reduce baseline mishap rates by 75% by the end of FY2008.
- Promulgate and execute the Naval Safety Strategy and Action Plan.
- Establish a corporate risk management and mitigation strategy and ensure that Department leaders and managers use risk-based approaches for planning and problem solving.

*(Lead: ASN(I&E). Primary supporting: CNO, CMC, CHINFO)*

**5. Reinforce ethics as a foundation of conduct within the Department of the Navy.**

- Continue emphasis on coordination and training of ethics counselors.
- Teach and enforce ethics and standards of exemplary conduct consistently, starting at the earliest career stages.

*(Lead: General Counsel. Primary supporting: CNO, CMC, ASN(RD&A), ASN(FM&C), ASN(M&RA), ASN(I&E), NAVINSGEN, JAG, CHINFO, AUDGEN)*





# Notes



# **Department of the Navy**

# **NAVAL SAFETY STRATEGY**

**1 March 2006**

11-L-0559/OSD/59215

# Naval Safety Strategy

## *Purpose*

The Naval Safety Strategy provides overarching guidance for the Navy and Marine Corps to achieve safety excellence in support of mission accomplishment. This Strategy provides a unified framework and a catalyst from which Navy and Marine Corps elements will derive localized safety strategies and annual plan priorities.

## *Naval Safety Vision*

“Mission First, Safety Always”

Safety and risk management principles are integrated into all that we plan and execute, both on and off duty. As a world-class organization, we seek to prevent mishaps. We shall achieve a mishap-free Navy and Marine Corps team by managing the risks inherent in our operations and by creating an environment in which our personnel accept no unnecessary risk.

## *Naval Safety Mission*

Enhance Naval operational capabilities by preventing loss of resources due to mishaps through effective leadership, accountability, and imbedding safety and risk management principles into all we do both on and off duty.

## *Context*

The Naval Safety Vision supports Naval Power 21, a Naval vision jointly issued by Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps in October 2002. The Naval Safety Vision is consistent with Service strategies represented in Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21. Naval Power 21 focuses on four fundamental qualities of Naval Forces: decisiveness, sustainability, responsiveness, and agility, with people as the heart of the team.

In May 2003 Secretary of Defense challenged Military Department Secretaries to reduce mishaps by 50 percent from baseline FY02 to the end of FY05. Secretary of the Navy established this goal for Department of the Navy in July 2003. Strategic Planning Guidance published March 2004 directs further mishap reductions of a total of 75 percent from baseline FY02 to the end of FY08. Sea Enterprise, the Sea Power 21 resource enabler, was issued in 2001. It focuses on balancing our naval

priorities, delivering the right force, with the right level of readiness, at the right cost, and challenging assumptions, encouraging innovation, maximizing productivity, managing by metrics, and driving execution to accomplish mission.

### ***Goals***

The overarching objective is to enhance and sustain a culture of safety and risk management in the Department of the Navy (DON). **Six** specific goals to accomplish this overarching objective are stated here and are further detailed in the Action Plan enclosed with this document.

1. Enhance Naval readiness by sustaining and preserving the fighting force through the prevention of mishaps; reduce mishaps by 75% by end FY 2008 from the FY 2002 baseline.
2. Engage leadership at all levels to establish a positive organizational culture based on understanding that safety is a readiness and force multiplier.
3. Imbed safety and risk management principles into all levels of policy, operations, acquisition, training, and education.
4. Employ accountability mechanisms to foster a more vibrant safety climate centered on readiness, mission accomplishment and mishap prevention.
5. Leverage new technologies and best practices to support mishap prevention.
6. Link safety requirements to resources and prioritized safety initiatives based on their Return on Investment (ROI) and scope of impact.

### ***Guiding Principles***

- o Our Sailors, Marines, and DON Civilian employees are our most treasured resource. Without them, the most advanced ships, aircraft and weapons in the world are of no benefit to our nation.
- o Naval war fighting capabilities are optimized by mishap prevention.
- o All personnel are responsible and accountable for their actions.
- o **All** levels of leadership are responsible and accountable for the safety climate of their organization.
- o We eliminate future hazards by incorporating emerging safety technology and by engineering safety design early in systems acquisition, modernization, and life cycle extension programs.
- o We will partner with other Military Departments, Federal agencies and the private sector to develop innovative safety initiatives and to optimize resources.
- o Application of safety and risk management principles in planning and execution promotes optimum protection and preservation of resources.
- o The integration of safety throughout DON is an all hands effort and not limited to safety and occupational health personnel.

## ***Responsibilities***

Responsibilities for developing and executing Naval Safety Strategy are:

- Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Safety), through Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment), provides safety policy, oversight, and advocacy for Secretary of the Navy and defines the Naval Safety Strategy.
- Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) provides acquisition policy and oversight that ensures safety is incorporated early and throughout the acquisition process.
- Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) provide active and essential advocacy to promote realization of the Naval Safety Strategy. Special Assistant for Safety to CNO and Director, Safety Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, advise CNO and CMC respectively on developing and executing follow-on plans to Naval Safety Strategy.
- Staff principals of the Secretary of the Navy, the Operational Navy, and Headquarters, Marine Corps staffs execute follow-on plans to Naval Safety Strategy in accordance with their respective missions.
- Commander, Naval Safety Center, collects, analyzes and disseminates appropriate safety data and measures successful implementation of Naval Safety Strategy, providing DON-wide warning when corrective action is required.
- Flag and General Officers comprising the Navy and Marine Corps Safety Council leadership and General Officers of the Executive Safety Board:
  - Provide direction to guide execution of the Naval Safety Strategy.
  - Endorse and forward Fleet feedback to refine and modify the Naval Safety Strategy.
- Commanders at all levels implement plans developed in concert with Naval Safety Strategy as directed by higher authority and in accordance with their respective missions.
- The Inspector General provides oversight and evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of safety programs.

## ***Linkage to Resources***

Naval Safety resource requirements derived from Naval Safety Strategy and follow-on plans shall be quantified, supported, and be given high priority in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process from the perspective of mishap costs and mishap prevention ROI..

## ***Plans of Action and Milestones***

Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps will develop Plans of Action and Milestones to achieve the following goals and objectives of the Naval Safety Strategy.

## ***Naval Safety Strategy Goals and Objectives***

***Goal 1: Enhance Naval readiness by sustaining and preserving the fighting force through the prevention of mishaps; reduce mishaps by 75% by end of FY 2008 from the FY2002 baseline.***

**Purpose:** Our Sailors, Marines, and DON civilian employees are our most treasured resource. Without them the most advanced ships, aircraft and weapons in the world are of no benefit to our nation. Preventing mishaps optimizes Naval war fighting capabilities by preserving human and materiel assets. Preventive efforts must be defined, performance tracked, and goals established.

**Accomplished in FY04 and FY05:**

- From baseline FY02 until the end of FY05 Navy achieved a 23% average mishap rate reduction, and USMC achieved an average 35% mishap rate reduction in the top three Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC) metrics compared to an overall DoD reduction of 16%.
  - Navy reduced the Private Motor Vehicle (PMV) fatality rate by 21%, USMC by 29%, compared to overall DoD reduction of 17%
  - Navy reduced aviation Class A mishap rate by 23%, USMC by 47%, compared to overall DoD reduction of 10%
  - Navy reduced the civilian lost day rate by 25%, USMC by 29%, compared to overall DoD reduction of 20%
- Established DON safety goals and monthly reporting charts to SECNAV, CNO, and CMC
- CNO and CMC each established a 50% mishap reduction plan of action and milestones for FY04 and 05
- Analyzed information for biggest payoff through a first time corporate collaboration of prioritized safety initiatives
- Completed chain-of-command drill down of civilian injury data to ensure commanding officers have correct information
- Initiated analysis of 4" and final DSOC top level metric, military injury case rate, in order to target interventions

OBJECTIVE 1.1: Focus on private motor vehicle and recreation off-duty mishaps as key areas with the greatest losses of personnel due to mishaps.
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OBJECTIVE 1.2: Focus on key areas causing the highest lost work time rates.
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OBJECTIVE 1.3: Provide periodic situation reports to flag leadership with timely performance data to aid in setting goals and tracking mishap prevention and reduction progress.
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OBJECTIVE 1.4: Perform continual in-depth analysis of data and identify specific problem areas and mishap leading indicators and distribute the information accordingly.
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OBJECTIVE 1.5: Establish baselines, develop performance metrics and conduct analysis to support and measure the effectiveness (e.g. Return on Investment (ROI), mishap reduction, etc.) of Navy and Marine Corps safety initiatives.
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OBJECTIVE 1.6: Manage military lost work time and civilian injury case management in coordination with DoD efforts.
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OBJECTIVE 1.7: Identify, research, and fund new initiatives for mishap prevention with the highest Returns on Investment (ROI) that will contribute to achieving the 75% mishap reduction goals.
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***Goal 2: Engage leadership at all levels to establish a positive organizational culture based on understanding that safety is a readiness and force multiplier.***

Purpose: Senior leaders drive transformation and create cultures of continuous improvement. Leadership levels of support and attention to safety program management significantly impact the safety climate in any unit, activity or command and will, over time, build a positive organizational culture. Evaluating the safety climate throughout DON can provide a key indicator of readiness posture, as it influences the protection of mission assets.

Accomplished in FY04 and FY05:

- Established Navy and Marine Corps Safety Council and convened semi-annual meetings
- Held semi-annual Marine Corps Executive Safety Board meetings
- Under Secretary and other Naval personnel active participants in Defense Safety Oversight Council
- Mishap reduction included in SECNAV/CNO/CMC Objectives for 2004 and in DoD Strategic Planning Guidance through FY08
- Expanded development and implementation for on-line climate assessments and safety cultural workshops

OBJECTIVE 2.1: Set the tone through policy and demonstrated behavior that safety, mishap prevention, and operational risk management are valued parts of the organizational culture to enhance readiness.

OBJECTIVE 2.2: Ensure cultural workshops are available to all Navy and Marine Corps activities.

OBJECTIVE 2.3: Ensure on-line command safety climate assessment surveys are available to all Navy and Marine Corps activities.

OBJECTIVE 2.4: Ensure aviation, shore, ground, and afloat on-site safety surveys are available to all Navy and Marine Corps activities..

OBJECTIVE 2.5: Engage Navy and Marine Corps Flag/General Officers through Navy & Marine Corps Safety Council, Marine Corps Executive Safety Board, Navy Echelon II Commands, and Marine Corps Major Commands to guide future direction of Naval safety.

OBJECTIVE 2.6: Develop policy to measure and track DON safety climate and its contribution to overall readiness and report results.

OBJECTIVE 2.7: Assist SECNAV, CNO, AND CMC in the development of safety policies and policy interpretation, as needed.



***Goal 3: Imbed safety and risk management principles into all levels of policy, operations, acquisition, training and education.***

Purpose: Preserving assets through diligent application of safety and risk management principles enhances operational readiness and mission capabilities. Safety and risk management principles must be promoted in acquisition and used in all evolutions and operations, on and *off* duty, on and *off* base, by military and civilian personnel.

Accomplished in FY04 and FY05:

- Updated operational risk management policy
- Implemented and refined Fleet-wide Aviation **ORM** Fundamentals Campaign

OBJECTIVE 3.1: Institutionalize Operational Risk Management as an integral decision-making tool for workplace, operational, and off-duty activities.
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OBJECTIVE 3.2: Review and revise safety directives to ensure risk management principles are included as appropriate.
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OBJECTIVE 3.3: Ensure safety and risk management principles, responsibilities, and safety culture are embedded throughout the training continuum for every service member and civilian employee.
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OBJECTIVE 3.4: Revise and implement system safety directives to provide for application of risk management in system life-cycle management.
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OBJECTIVE 3.5: More closely align Naval safety in acquisition processes with Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).
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**Goal 4: Employ accountability mechanisms to foster a more vibrant safety climate centered on readiness, mission accomplishment and mishap prevention**

**Purpose:** From the highest level of leadership down to the field and deck plates, accountability for safety must be mandated by policy, expectation, and core values. Safety standards must be supported by strong, clear consequences.

**Accomplished in FY04 and FY05:**

- Increased and made more visible leadership accountability when weak safety climate was identified as mishap causal factor
- VCNO published message requiring chain-of-command briefing of fatalities; USMC had instituted this requirement previously.
- SECNAV, CNO, and CMC held 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> annual DON Safety Excellence Awards ceremonies
- 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> annual Navy League presentations of Admiral Vern Clark and General Jim Jones Safety Awards

**OBJECTIVE 4.1:** Strengthen safety-related directives and standards to increase oversight, enforcement, and accountability.

**OBJECTIVE 4.2:** Promote command and workforce participation in **OSHA's** (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) Voluntary Protection Program (VPP), a safety management system.

**OBJECTIVE 4.3:** Ensure annual military and civilian performance evaluations noticeably address safety performance..

**OBJECTIVE 4.4:** Promote a partnership between HRO and safety offices to ensure that civilian worker's compensation claims are managed effectively.

**OBJECTIVE 4.5:** Establish policy at the base and regional levels to ensure accountability for the enforcement of safety regulations, such as traffic safety.

**OBJECTIVE 4.6:** Recognize safety achievement through awards.

**OBJECTIVE 4.7:** Ensure the IG inspection processes effectively identify hazard recognition and hazard correction shortfalls..

**Goal 5: Leverage new technologies and best practices to support mishap prevention.**

Purpose: Use of emerging technologies could prevent mishaps. Advances in operational hardware, information technology and human systems integration must be identified and brought into the force. Customers of safety information must be afforded service comparable to that available in the private sector. Web-based information, rapid response to information requests, and easy accessibility to hazard and mishap data enables leadership to target and focus mishap prevention efforts.

Accomplished in FY04 and FY05:

- Funded Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA) across the Fiscal Year Defense Plan. Began demonstrations.
- Improved the Web-Enabled Safety System (WESS) to enhance reporting and data analysis tools.
- Facilitated the development of a new chain-of-command drilldown capability on a DoD web-based lost workday civilian employee database.
- Funded continued aviation safety research and data analysis at Naval Postgraduate School
- Evaluated and identified ESAMS as the sole installation safety management software tool for WESS compatibility.

OBJECTIVE 5.1: Ensure the Web-enabled Safety System (WESS) fully supports Commander and Commanding Officer data retrieval needs and reporting requirements capabilities.
OBJECTIVE 5.2: Achieve 100 per cent reporting of mishaps and hazards.
OBJECTIVE 5.3: Accelerate the research in and development of technology that can be used to assist in identifying and combating identified human-factors causes.
OBJECTIVE 5.4: Apply technological advances, such as the Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA) process, Integrated Maintenance Diagnostics/Health and Usage Monitoring System (IMD/HUMS), Operational Risk Management Assessment System (ORMAS), Coherent Analytical Computing Environment (CACE), and Computer-assisted Performance Assessment System (CAPAS), to improve aviation operational safety.
OBJECTIVE 5.5: Evaluate and apply technological advances to improve ground tactical vehicle (recorders) and afloat operational safety (automated bridge technology/Surface Operational Quality Assurance (SOQA) safety).
OBJECTIVE 5.6: Connect information systems in a comprehensive manner through Defense Safety Enterprise System (e.g. military injury databases).
OBJECTIVE 5.7: Evaluate and develop methodology to evaluate/report operational safety readiness (SORTS, DRRS, ORMAS).
OBJECTIVE 5.8: Plan procurement and implementation of a Safety and Occupational Health management tools that include WESS and other safety data systems for DON-wide availability.
OBJECTIVE 5.9: Continue to expand the safety research initiatives, and look to explore other safety related research efforts, with the Naval Postgraduate School, other Navy and Marine Corps Commands, federal agencies and the private sector.
OBJECTIVE 5.10: Collect and maintain a web-based data bank of Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) results as a resource for safety professionals.
OBJECTIVE 5.11: Identify and disseminate safety best practices gained from other federal agencies and the private sector.

**Goal 6: Link safety requirements to resources and prioritize safety initiatives based on their Return on Investment (ROI) and scope of impact on operational efficiency and effectiveness; leverage our Safety professionals to ensure effectiveness.**

**Purpose:** Safety requirements and the associated costs for training, equipment, manning, administrative support, etc. are ineludible expenses linked to our mission. World class organizations allocate a specific percentage of their operating costs to the support of safety. We must design clear and specific funding schemes at both the enterprise (TYCOM) and corporate (CFFC) levels. Funds expended on safety initiatives should be linked to a measurable Return on Investment, be it increased readiness, reduced mishap rates, increased morale, improved retention, etc. There is no accurate figure currently available on how much DON is spending on safety. To justify future safety expenditures, requirements must be linked to the safety benefit. Identifying corporate/enterprise level funding sponsors will improve our ability to identify safety program costs. In order to carry out requirements effectively we must attract, develop and retain a vibrant, effective safety and occupational health professional cadre and promote their capabilities. We must integrate safety professionals into the organization to optimize their contribution to mission success. Safety professionals should be viewed as an integral team member when planning and executing organizational actions, projects and missions. This is critical to the success of the DON-wide Safety program.

**Accomplished in FY04 and FY05:**

- Safety participated in PPBE for first time at DON level with funding resulting for several initiatives
- First DON consolidated prioritization of safety initiatives and funding
- Completed in-depth Business Case Analysis on the cranial as a model for a method to show return on investment for safety issues
- DASN(S) named Safety Civilian Community leader
- Established Safety Civilian Community Planning Board
- First civilian community to complete SkillsNet® identification and 5 Vector Model
- Completed safety civilian community Business Plan and Communications Plan
- Marine Corps and Navy personnel attended the Army Safety Intern Training Program to evaluate future use
- Provided focus to the military and civilian safety community

OBJECTIVE 6.1: Issue policy guidance that identifies safety funding sponsors at the Echelon 2 and 3 leadership levels.
OBJECTIVE 6.2: Develop and require training for safety personnel to become proficient in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.
OBJECTIVE 6.3: Develop business case analysis guidance for linking expenditures to expected benefits.
OBJECTIVE 6.4: Embed safety in the budget process at both the Enterprise and corporate levels, cost of prevention and cost of mishaps are identified.
OBJECTIVE 6.5: Promote installation and military construction projects that will improve the safety of personnel living and working places.
Objective 6.6: Integrate safety professionals into the organization to optimize their contribution to improve the effectiveness of the DON-wide safety program
OBJECTIVE 6.7: Evaluate and develop training, retention and retention programs to enhance the overall effectiveness of DON safety and occupational health personnel.
OBJECTIVE 6.8: Ensure leadership has the resources required to effect changes to shortfalls identified during cultural workshops, safety surveys and on-line command climate surveys
OBJECTIVE 6.9: Mandate and resource traffic safety and off-duty safety programs at installation safety offices.

## Appendix A

### References Used to Develop Naval Safety Strategy

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













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
**Department of the Navy Mishap Reduction Progress**  
**In Our 8 Primary Mishap Categories**  
(Shown as percent change ~~from~~ FY2002 Baseline)

<b><u>Mishap Category</u></b>	<b><u>USN</u></b>	<b><u>USMC</u></b>
Class A Flight Mishap Rate	10% (+)	52% (-)
Class A <del>Shore</del> /Ground OP Mishap Rate	25% (+)	58% (+)
Total <del>Class</del> A Operational Mishap Rate	15% (-)	11% (+)
Civilian Lost Work Day Rate	53% (-)	52% (-)
Private Motor Vehicle Fatality Rate	9% (+)	16% (-)
<del>Off</del> Duty/Recreational Fatality Rate	16% (-)	17% (-)
USN Afloat Class A Mishap Rate	51% (-)	N/A
USMC <del>Tactical</del> Veh Class A Mishap Rate	N/A	187% (+)










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# SECNAV COORDINATION PAGE

<u>Office/ Dept</u>	<u>Point of Contact/Title</u>	<u>Phone</u>	<u>Date</u>
OPNAV(NO9F)	Mr. Alan Lewis EA, COMNAVSAFECEN	(b)(6)	17 Jul 06
HQMC (SD)	COL Fred Wenger Director, Safety Div		18 Jul 06
VCNO	ADM <del>Robert</del> Willard		25 Jul 06
ACMC	GEN <del>Robert</del> Magnus		27 July 06

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PACKAGE Reworked:

<u>Office/ Dept</u>	<u>Point of Contact/Title</u>	<u>Phone</u>	<u>Date</u>
HQMC (SD)	COL Fred Wenger Director, Safety Div	(b)(6)	07 Aug 06
OPNAV(NO9F)	RADM Richard Mayer COMNAVSAFECEN		07 Aug 06

Dr Bucci - FYI

~~FOUO~~

August 01, 2006

SUBJECT Spectator Function

I need to decide on the Bob Tyrrell invitation to the Spectator function

DHR:sa  
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.....

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~~FOUO~~

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# The American Spectator

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(b)(6)

8/17

August 14, 2006

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Don:

I am delighted to have **your** letter of **August 8**. Your **fighting** spirit is the **kind of** spirit this magazine **has** lived **by** for almost four decades. No **one** in **public life** could exemplify our **stand** for freedom better **than** you. Perhaps the explanation resides in both of **us** coming **from** Chicagoland!

For **the** purposes of **organizing** our **annual** dinner we begin about **this** time. To **allow** us to **get** started, could **you** **accept** our invitation **now** with the understanding you **may** have to change your **plans** in **late September**, **We** would, of **course**, understand.

I **look** forward to hearing from you and to standing with you in these times of challenge.

As ever,

*R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.*  
R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.  
Editor in Chief

Sir,  
Do you want us to  
respond?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

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*V/R Dr. B*

11-L-0559/OSD/59234



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July 25, 2006

The Honorable Peter W. Rodman  
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
2400 Defense Pentagon  
Room 3C676  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Peter:

Thank you for [redacted] to help facilitate the invitation to Secretary Rumsfeld to sneak at  
The American Spectator's [redacted] on [redacted] at the [redacted]  
DC. [redacted] the letter to [redacted] tary Rumsfeld. Please pass it on to the boss.

Thanks again for your help. I will touch base with you early next week

Yours faithfully,

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.  
Editor in Chief

ret



# The American Spectator

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July 25, 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

It seems **that** every time I encounter you we discuss inviting you to **an American Spectator** dinner and the invitation falls **through** the cracks. **Now** a large opportunity presents itself. Allow me make bold to invite you to be the keynote speaker at **a** very special **Spectator** dinner,

For years we have held a **great** dinner in **Washington** for the magazine's **friends** and writers called **the Washington Club Dinner**. **This** autumn we **are** renaming the dinner after **a** special **friend**, the now deceased Wall Street Journal editor Robert L. Bartley. We conservatives must honor **our** own.

I would like you to dine **with us** and speak at the first Robert L. Bartley Dinner. Keynote speakers in the past have included Vice President George H. W. Bush, Henry Kissinger, and Mayor **Rudolph** Giuliani. More recently Karl Rove and Ambassador John **Bolton** spoke, and last year Justice **Anton Scalia** **was** our keynote speaker. **Given** the boldness and resolve that you have demonstrated **as** secretary of defense, your presence **this** year would be ideal and a great honor.

The dinner is to be November 15 at the Mandarin Oriental, Washington DC. As I do not **want this** invitation to slip **through** the cracks again, I **am faxing** it through **my** old friend Peter Rodman. I hope to **hear from** you in the affirmative shortly, **as there** is no better man **than** you to demonstrate the grace under fire that we at the *Spectator* admire.

Yours faithfully,

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.  
Editor in Chief

ret

cc: The Honorable Peter W. **Rodman**





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

AUG 18 2006

Mr. R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.  
Editor in Chief  
*The American Spectator*  
Suite 901  
1611 North Kent Street  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Bob.

Thanks for your note. On a tentative basis, I am going to hold November 15. I will try to get back to you by October 5 to give you a sense of how it looks.

Thanks so much.

Sincerely,



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0913

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

NOV 02 2006

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Kicklighter Briefing (U)

- (U) You asked me how we should build upon LTG (R) Kicklighter's briefing.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ PDASD Long met with Lt GENs Sharp and Sattler, Director, DA&M Donley and Lt GEN (R) Kicklighter on an agreed-upon way-ahead. I concur with their recommendation that Kicklighter and his team discontinue operating as a joint State-DoD resource, and continue working for DOD.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Kicklighter will initially focus his continued efforts on the following priority tasks:

Security Transition in Iraq: Transition to a long term security assistance effort in Iraq.

1. Based on the required Iraq Security Forces force structure and cost, determine a feasible resource strategy that shares the burden appropriately among the GOI, the USG, and international partners.
2. Develop a proposed out-year strategy for USG security assistance (FMF, FMS, DOD 1206, Supplementals, and Bridge Supplementals) and identify constraints that may limit the ability to sustain this strategy.
3. Formulate a conditions-based strategy, likely timelines, and associated decision points to transition from the USG Iraq train and equip mission (MNSTC-I) to an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) configuration.
4. Assist in the review of the current and potential effectiveness and resourcing of PRTs and the transition of their functions to the Iraqis.

Security Transition in Afghanistan: Transition to a long term security assistance effort in Afghanistan.

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1. Based on the required Afghan Security Forces force structure and cost, determine a feasible resource strategy that shares the burden appropriately among the GOA, the USG and international partners (particularly NATO).
2. Develop a proposed out-year strategy for USG security assistance (FME, FMS, DOD 1206, Supplementals, and Bridge Supplementals) and identify constraints that may limit the ability to sustain this strategy.
3. Formulate a conditions-based strategy, likely timelines, and associated decision points to transition the Afghan train and equip mission to an OSC-like configuration with the potential for NATO leadership and international participation and support.
4. Assist in ongoing efforts to achieve US-NATO PRT "unity of effort" and in transition of PRT functions to the Afghans.

#### Possible Additional Tasks

- ~~(FOUO)~~ We anticipate subsequent strategic-level projects could be identified by the USD (P), Joint Staff, or Kicklighter to follow once the above efforts are completed. All additional projects will be subject to your and the Chairman's approval. For example:
  - Assistance may be requested from Kicklighter in the implementation of aspects of the staff studies his group has already completed.
  - GEN Abizaid has requested that Kicklighter establish a 5-10 year regional vision.
  - Kicklighter and his group would like to develop an action plan to synchronize and integrate health care planning for Iraq and Afghan security forces and veterans.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ As for State Department, subsequent to LTG (R) Kicklighter's favorably received briefing to Secretary Rice on Aug. 22, State Under Secretary for Management has indicated her office may continue working with Kicklighter on a number of projects, including the transition of Embassy Baghdad. We are working to facilitate that cooperation on a case-by-case basis.

#### Team Organization and Administrative Arrangements

- (U) Lt GEN (R) Kicklighter will remain in his current work spaces and retain as many of his current interagency team members as possible.

- ~~(FOUO)~~ To ensure the integration of his efforts, Lt GEN Kicklighter's day-to-day coordination and partnering will be with OUSD(P) and the J5. His protocol status will remain the same and he will retain **his** current title (as a "direct report" to you and the Chairman). He will continue to receive logistical and administrative support from Washington Headquarters Services (WHS).
  - Kicklighter has requested additional DoD personnel (particularly if he works more than the priority **tasks**) and a budget of approximately **\$3-4** million (assuming any costs of non-DoD personnel are borne by the parent agency). We will work with him to better define **his** resource requirements.
- (U) The team will not be terminated earlier than December, 2007.

Way Ahead

- ~~(FOUO)~~ With your concurrence, we will: 1) focus Lt GEN Kicklighter's efforts initially and determine what, if any, additional resources are required to accomplish the priority tasks, 2) draft Terms of Reference, if required; 3) draft proper contractual arrangements; and 4) finalize guidelines for any travel and for liaison teams in country (if necessary).

Concur, \_\_\_\_\_

Non-concur \_\_\_\_\_

Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: OSD-POLICY/ISA (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

August 16, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT Follow-up to Kicklighters' Briefing

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how we follow up with Kicklighter's briefing and recommendations.

I need it soon, and it should be reasonably comprehensive.

Thanks.

DER db  
SFO81606-10

=====

*Please Respond By 09/07/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59241

OSD 13231-06



11/3/2006 8:30:28 AM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~


POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

**Subject:** Follow-up to Kicklighter Briefing

**I-Number:**



\* S F 0 8 1 6 0 6 - 1 0 \*

Title/Organization	Name	Date
PDASD (ISA)	Mary Beth Long 	25 October 2006
Director Joint Staff	LTG Skip Sharp	25 October 2006

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59242

~~FOUO~~

August 16, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Follow-up to Kicklighters' Briefing

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how we follow up with Kicklighter's briefing and recommendations.

I need it soon, and it should be reasonably comprehensive.

Thanks.

DWR db  
SP981606-10

.....  
*Please Respond By 09/07/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59243

OSD 13231-06



8/21/2006 9:09:14 AM

2913

16 Aug 06

18 Aug 06

AUG 18 2006

## INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_  
SF08 1606-10

## MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *ES* AUG 18 2006

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Kicklighter Briefing

- You asked me how we should build upon GEN (Ret.) Kicklighter's briefing.
- PDASDASA Long met with LTG Fraser and LTG Sharp and agreed upon a way-ahead. I concur with their recommendation that GEN Kicklighter and his team stop operating as a joint State-DoD resource after he briefs SecState, but that he continue working for DoD to follow-up on issues he has raised.
- Kicklighter should focus his efforts in two areas:
  - Security Assistance Transition Project. GEN Kicklighter and the DoD component of his current team should immediately focus on a transition plan for long-term security assistance programs in Afghanistan and Iraq. This will include examining current plans, resources, and funding mechanisms.
    - This issue will have to be worked closely with GEN Abizaid and the field.
    - GEN Kicklighter eventually will need core groups in Afghanistan and Iraq to assist the commanders and the MOD/MOI staffs in transitioning.
  - NATO Afghanistan PRT Transition. In parallel or as follow-on to the security assistance project, GEN Kicklighter's team should examine PRT roles, and how PRTs will be sustained after Stage III in Afghanistan.
- GEN Kicklighter will have a "Special Assistant to the Secretary" title, and report directly to both DJ5 and USDP.
  - GEN Kicklighter could stay in his current work spaces and retain as many of his interagency team members as possible. We will have to determine what, if



\* 0 8 1 6 0 6 - 1 0 \*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/59244

OSD 13231-06



8/21/2006 9:06:50 AM

091.3

100490



any, additional resources he will need and the proper contractual arrangements (including length of employment). We envision the above projects will take no less than six months to plan and implement.

- GEN Kicklighter is scheduled to brief Secretary Rice the week of 21 August. We are also arranging a briefing for Steve Hadley, as you suggested.
  - Kicklighter will soon brief Comptroller and Lt Gen Kohler at Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
- We will keep you updated.

Prepared by: Mary Beth Long, OSD-POLICY/ISA, (b)(6)



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

ACTION MEMO

September 8, 2006, 5:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *Tina W. Jonas*

SUBJECT: USSTRATCOM Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Operating Budget

- Attached for your approval and signature at TAB A is a draft response to General Cartwright, Commander, USSTRATCOM, regarding **his** request (TAB B) for your review of the reduction to the USSTRATCOM FY 2007 O&M operating budget.
- The particular USSTRATCOM situation is driven by the Air Force's proposed transformation plan, Department-directed reductions implemented during the FY 2007 budget review and anticipated congressional action in the FY 2007 Department of Defense Appropriation Act.
- We are addressing executive agent resource issues as part of ~~the~~ Joint Task Assignment Process (**JTAP**) and have included FY 2007 funding levels as part of the discussion to ensure that the COCOMs have the resources they need to meet their assigned missions. The Deputy will provide a proposal for your consideration on the overall issue once we have a chance to address it in the JTAP. We have indicated that in our draft response to General Cartwright.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the proposed correspondence at TAB A

COORDINATION NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Sheryl McNair (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/59246

OSD 13238-08



9/11/2006 10:36:01 AM

*Stratcom*

*8 Sep 06*

*11 Aug 06*

TAB

A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM **FOR** COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

SUBJECT USSTRATCOM Operation & Maintenance Reductions

I appreciate your memorandum regarding **fiscal** year 2007 funding levels and understand your concern in trying to implement new missions with reduced funding.

I have asked the Under **Secretary** of Defense (Comptroller) to work with the Air Force and your organization to ensure that you have adequate FY 2007 funding to meet the Department's priority efforts.

At the **same** time, it is essential that we proceed with business **transformation** efforts to reduce the costs of **our** ongoing operations and apply those efficiencies to new mission requirements. The challenge is to **achieve** our transformation goals within a constrained topline.

My staff is reviewing Executive Agent resource issues as part of the Joint Task Assignment Process (JTAP) and they will be presenting recommendations **for** process improvements. **This** kind of issue will be part of their review.



11-L-0559/OSD/59248



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

MEMORANDUM **FOR** COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC **COMMAND**

SUBJECT USSTRATCOM Operation & Maintenance Reductions

I appreciate your memorandum regarding fiscal year 2007 funding levels and understand your concern in trying to implement new missions with reduced funding.

I have ~~asked~~ the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to work with the Air Force and your organization to ensure that you have adequate FY 2007 funding to meet the Department's priority efforts.

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My staff is reviewing Executive Agent resource issues as part of the Joint Task Assignment Process (**JTAP**) and they will be presenting recommendations for process improvements. ~~This~~ kind of issue will be part of their review.

# TAB

# B



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Reply To:  
USSTRATCOM/J0CC  
901 SAC BLVD STE 2A1  
OFFUTT AFB NE 68113-6000

11 Aug 06  
SM# 184-06

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF *VR/PA AUG 06*

Subject: **USSTRATCOM O&M Reductions**

1. FY07 budget actions are disconnected with the strategic direction outlined for USSTRATCOM. The Air Force, as our Executive Agent, directed USSTRATCOM absorb a \$73.5M or 18% reduction in FY07 O&M funding as part of the USAF transformation initiative. As codified in the Air Force FY08-13 Planning and Programming Guidance, these reductions increase in the out-year and approach 25% of USSTRATCOM's O&M by FY11.

2. These actions contradict OSD FY07 budget decisions directing the Air Force to increase USSTRATCOM funding levels to accommodate assignment of the Combating WMD mission and close Missile Defense network and OPSEC vulnerability gaps. Likewise, the reductions eliminate validated funds underpinning the Command's Unified Command Plan assignments. Specific impacts include:

- Reduces efforts to defend the GIG at a time of increasing vulnerability / attack
- Reduces IO support to Combatant Commanders at a time of increasing requests
- Extends planning timelines across the breadth of Command's mission set
- Delays implementation of the PDM III directed National Command Capability
- Derails Partnership To Defeat Terrorism (PTDT) initiative to combine expertise of DoD, academia, and industry on the GWOT

3. Though we continue to work this issue, the disconnect between USAF implementation of the transformation initiative and OSD direction to fund USSTRATCOM new mission assignments remains unresolved. To that end and before I begin force reduction actions, I respectfully request your review of this situation to insure the Department is meeting your priorities.

*[Signature]*  
JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT  
General, USMC  
Commander

Copy to:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Staff United States Air Force

OSD 13238-06



8/21/2006 11:17:55 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/59251

~~FOUO~~

August 21, 2006

TO: Tina Jonas  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT: STRATCOM FY07 Operating Budget

The attached message from General Cartwright suggests that the Air Force either has or is about to levy a reduction of about 18 percent to STRATCOM's FY07 operating budget.

Given that FY07 has yet to start **and**, at this point, no **one** really knows what level of appropriations we will have to work with, I am surprised to learn that the Services are imposing FY07 reductions on the COCOMs.

Please look into this, and let me know what you find out and what steps should be taken to ensure the COCOMs are being properly supported by military service executive agents.

Thanks.

Attach. 8/11/06 STRATCOM memo to SecDef re: USSTRATCOM O&M  
Reductions

DHR:dh  
SF082106-22

.....  
***Please Respond By 09/07/06***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59252

OSD 13238-06



9/5/2006 7:21:34 AM





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

(b)(6)  
8/21

Reply To:  
USSTRATCOM/J0CC  
901 SAC BLVD STE 2A1  
OFFUTT AFB NE 68113-6000

11 Aug 06  
SIS 184-06

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF *11/8/06*


Subject: USSTRATCOM O&M Reductions

1. **FY07** budget actions **are** disconnected with the **strategic direction** outlined for USSTRATCOM. The Air Force, **as our** Executive Agent, directed USSTRATCOM absorb a \$73.5M or **18%** reduction in **FY07** O&M funding **as** part of the USAF transformation initiative. **As** codified in the Air Force FY08-13 Planning and Programming Guidance, these **reductions** increase in the out-years and approach **25%** of USSTRATCOM's O&M by **FY11**.

2. These **actions** contradict OSD **FY07** budget decisions directing the **Air Force** to increase USSTRATCOM funding levels to accommodate assignment of the Combating WMD mission and close Missile Defense **network** and **OPSEC** vulnerability gaps. Likewise, the **reductions** eliminate validated funds underpinning the Command's Unified Command Plan assignments. Specific **impacts** include:

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- Extends planning timelines across the breadth of **Command's** mission **set**
- Delays implementation of the PDM **III** directed National Command Capability
- Derails Partnership To Defeat Terrorism (**PTDT**) initiative to combine expertise of DoD, academia, and industry **on** the GWOT

3. Though we continue **to** work **this** issue, the disconnect **between** U S M implementation of the transformation initiative **and** OSD direction to fund **USSTRATCOM** new mission assignments remains unresolved. **To that** end, and **before** I begin force reduction actions, I respectfully request your review of this situation **to** insure **the** Department is **meeting your** priorities.

  
JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT  
General, USMC  
Commander

Copy to:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of **Staff**  
Chief of Staff United States **Air** Force

OSD 13238-06



9/5/2006 7:19:16 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/59253



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Reply To:  
USSTRATCOM/J0CC  
901 SAC BLVD STE2A1  
OFFUTT AFB NE 68113-6000

11 Aug 06  
SM# 184-06

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF *VR/S 16 AUG 06*


Subject: USSTRATCOM O&M Reductions

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JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT  
General, USMC  
Commander

Copy to:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Staff United States Air Force

11-L-0559/OSD/59254

OSD 13238-06



8/21/2006 11:17:55 AM



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 100  
INFO MEMO

September 1, 2006, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas 

SUBJECT: USSTRATCOM FY 2007 Operating Budget

- You requested that we look into the specific situation with the ~~Air~~ Force's support to STRATCOM as well as the overall support provided by the military services as executive agents to the Combatant Commanders (TAB A).
- The particular STRATCOM situation is driven by the Air Force's proposed transformation plan, built into the FY 2007 President's Budget, to reduce contractor support and streamline organizational structure. Their distribution of the transformation initiative resulted in reductions to STRATCOM because of their heavy reliance on contractors.
- While we now understand the details of the reduction to STRATCOM, we have more work to do to better understand the implications and the overall process within the military services. The Joint Task Assignment Process (JTAP) is part of the solution, which is working on executive agent resources issues.
- The Deputy will provide a proposal for your consideration on the overall issue once we have had the chance to address the issue within the JTAP and with all the military services.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Sheryl McNair, 695-2808

11-L-0559/OSD/59255

OSD 13238-06



9/5/2006 7 22 38 AM

~~FOUO~~

August 15, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

c c : Gen Pete Pace  
ADM Mike Mullen

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT POTUS Speech and Conference on 1,000 Ship Navy

Let's follow through on the proposal for a Presidential speech and a conference in connection with Mike Mullen's presentation yesterday on the "1,000 ship Navy."

You have the action to work with them and come back to me.

Thanks..

DHR:dh  
SF081506-11

\*\*\*\*\*

*Please Respond By 09/07/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59256

OSD 13242-06

560.2

15 Aug 06  
21 Aug 06

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *EE* AUG 21 2006

SUBJECT POTUS Speech and Conference on 1,000 Ship Navy

- You asked us in the memo next under to follow through on the proposal for a Presidential speech and a conference in connection with ADM Mullen's 1,000 Ship Navy presentation (at Tab A).
- NSC Staff has already stepped out on the POTUS speech concept with full support from my staff and the Navy staff as well as coordination from the Joint Staff.
  - Navy staff has provided NSC staff with several recommended opportunities for a Presidential speech.
  - Attached at Tab B is a ~~draft~~ NSC memo outlining recommended 1,000 Ship Navy (now renamed the Global Maritime Partners Initiative—GMPI) implementation actions.
    - o Actions include: Seek an opportunity for the President to publicly announce the initiative.
- Navy is scheduled to present the GMPI at the International Maritime Security Symposium at John Hopkins *this* September. ADM Mullen *and/or* his staff will also make GMPI presentations at other domestic and international conferences.
- We will continue to support the NSC staff and the Navy in implementing the GMPI, and will inform you when the venue for the President's speech is set.

COORDINATION: NSC Staff, Joint Staff J-5, Navy Staff, N3/N5

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: CAPT Chip Denman, OUSD(P) Policy Planning (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/59257

35000 WH

21 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

August 15, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

C C Gen Pete Pace  
ADM ~~Mike~~ Mullen

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: POTUS Speech and Conference on 1,000 Ship Navy

Let's follow through on the proposal for a Presidential speech and a conference in connection with Mike Mullen's presentation yesterday on the "1,000 ship Navy."

You have the action to work with them and come back to me.

Thanks..

DHR:dh  
SF081506-11

.....

*Please Respond By 09/07/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59258



# **Global Maritime Partne Initiative**

11-L-0559/OSD/59259




# An Inflection Point in Hist

## The Global Paradox

**More nations are freer than  
ever...  
... yet freedom is increasingly  
under assault.**

## National Fi Global Amba

**Leveraging th  
common bond  
sovereignty of**



*Commodore Perry opens door to Japan*

11-L-0559/OSD/59260





# The Emerging Environment

- World economy is interconnected
- Regional Crises have Global Impact
  - Terrorism
  - Weapons of Mass Destruction
  - Transnational Challenges (Pandemic disease, Natural disaster, Human trafficking, Criminal organizations)
- Intense Competition for Resources

**Tension is Inevitable**



# Global Commerce is Linked to Maritime Security

- 75% of the earth's surface is water
- World's fleets carry around 90% of global exports - \$8.9 trillion (2004)
  - \$380 billion in freight rates
  - 303 million containers
- 46,000 commercial ships worldwide
- Over 6300 warships worldwide
- Over 30 nations have navies with "global reach"
- 160 nations have some navy, coast guard, maritime police capability



**Global Economy Depends on the Ocean Highways**



# National Economies are Linked by the Sea


## Multi-national companies Depend on Freedom of the Seas

- Primary transport for energy that powers the planet
- Commerce route for retail and manufacturing

## Key Energy Infrastructure Moving Offshore to Sea Bases

- Liquid Natural Gas Terminals
- Oil Drilling
- Communication Grids
- Electrical Distribution Grids

2006 Revenues (\$Bill)




**Our Collective  
Prosperity Depends  
on Maritime Security**




# Transnational Criminal Organizations Represent Unwanted Competition

## GDP of World's Leading Economies



\*Based on 2004 IMF estimate applied to 2005 GDP figures. Figure calculated by multiplying 2004 world GDP (\$43.97 T) by 2% as

11-L-0559/OSD/59264




11-L-0559/OSD/59265



# ...as does Human Traffick

## Trafficking of Persons, Especially Women and Children: South East



11-L-0559/OSD/59266



# **Old Order Doesn't Work**

---

- **20<sup>th</sup> Century Institutions not yet adapted to the New Order**
  - **UN, OAS, World Bank, IMF, NATO?**
- **70% of the Earth's Surface Exists Beyond the Sovereignty of any Nation**
- **Rule of Law Inconsistently Enforced**



# Shift in Mindset

## Historically

- Hide at sea for security
- Difficult to find
- Easy to avoid
- Cloaked behavior

## New Paradigm

- Transparency yields security at sea
- Hard to hide
- Access denied for untoward behavior
- Anomalies easier to detect

A Global Maritime Network in an  
Interconnected World





# A New Framework for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

- **Commerce Craves Security**
- **Global Maritime Partnership**
  - **No One Nation can do it all**
  - **Leverages what Navies Do**
- **Missions Determine Coalitions**
  - **Multi-Lateral Bilateralism**
- **Navies Help Limit and Localize Conflict**
  - **De-Escalate a Crisis**
- **Deterrence Value**
  - **Proactive**
  - **Regional Security Cooperation – Pre-Conflict**
  - **Full Spectrum: Maritime Security to Missile Defense**

**Enduring and Emerging Relationships through  
Maritime Security**



# The Power of a "1000 Ship Navy"

## What

- A New Approach to Maritime Security
- A Global Maritime Network flying no single flag
- incentives:
  - Secure Growth of World Economies
  - Spread Democracy while deterring aggression and transnational crime

## Who

- Any Country, Any Company
- Any Maritime Entity - **Navies**, Coast Guards, **Coast/Harbor** Patrols
- No Treaties, Alliances, or Encumbering ties
- National Sovereignty First

## Costs

- Already Exists - But not Realized
- More a matter of Will than Money
- Must invest in Partnerships

## A Familiar Concept

- Maritime Analog of International Civil Aviation
- Shared Info
  - **Anomaly detection/response** (FAA)
- Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication
- **Collaborative** Effort

**Collective Security through Cooperation**



# FAA Model



11-L-0559/OSD/59271





# "Free Form" Operation

20<sup>th</sup> Century

This... Or This

21<sup>st</sup> Century

## The United Nations system



- 20<sup>th</sup> Century Organization
- Bureaucratic Inertia
- Many Constraints

- Regulated but Free For
- Self-Organizing, Market
- Cooperation and Coordination

11-L-0559/OSD/59272






# Global Maritime Awareness

## A Clearinghouse Institution

**"The Mural"**  
Managed Outside of DoD

### Information Exchange



- Facilitates Spotlighting of Anomalies
- Operationalizes the "1000 Ship Navy"

- Builds Trust, Confidence and Cooperation
- Builds Partner Capacity



# Maritime Electronic Highway

## • Strait of Malacca

- Malaysia Singapore, Inc  
Partnership
- Traffic Information and  
Movement Control System
- Automatic ID Transponders
- Security Teams
- Command and Control Center  
Under Construction
- Additional

**Result: Lloyds cuts insurance costs**

*Gamma Ray Scanner*






# Counter-Proliferation: A Maritime Neighborhood Watch



## Proliferation Security Initiative

- 73 **Countries** participate
- 23 **Exercises** conducted
- 11 Successful Actual **Interdictions**

✦ PSI Exercise



## New Capabilities:

- **Detection** of WMD and related precursors
- **Fusion** of **Intelligence** to support interdiction
- **Boarding** and searching suspected vessels

■ PSI Participant

Addressing Detection Gaps...  
Building Interdiction Capability and Capacity



# Partnership of the Americas: GEORGE WASHINGTON CARRIER STRIKE GROUP

- Maritime surge to the Americas in Caribbean (April – May 2006)
- Focused on:
  - Theater Security Cooperation activities
  - Strategic Communications activities
  - Counter Narco-Trafficking operations
- Unit-level training
- Subject Matter Expert Exchanges

USS GEORGE WASHINGTON escorted by  
Colombian Frigate CALDAS

## 13 Countries participating:


Antigua, Aruba, Brazil, Colombia, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Maarten, St. Kitts, Trinidad and Tobago






# Operation Active Endeavor

- Formally began on 26 October 2001
  - 1st Article V deployment by NATO
  - Response to September 11, 2001 attacks
- includes:
  - Counter terrorism in the Mediterranean
  - Counter proliferation of WMD
  - Mine Warfare Defense
- NATO forces at sea 60% of the time
- Recent successes:
  - Increased intelligence on suspect vessels
  - NATO liaison with law enforcement agencies
  - Drug and illegal weapons shipments interdiction
  - Trafficking-in-persons
  - General shipping security enhancement
  - Increased visibility for NATO





# SE Asia Tsunami Relief Effort






# West and Central Africa: Joint Continental Coast Guard

- **Maritime Organization of West and Central African States Joint Coast Guard force to counter:**

- Piracy
- Illegal fishing
- Illegal migration
- Pollution

- **Integrated Coastal Security Plan**

- Joint patrols by up to six countries
- Right of hot pursuit
- Joint emergency and rescue capability



## Countries participating:

Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of  
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea,  
Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone,  
Togo, Togo, Central African Republic, Mali, and



# Lebanon NEO



## Evacuation

- 170 Vessels from 17 countries.
- 121 flights from 3 countries.
- 90 land convoys from 31 countries.

### Countries participating:

Romania, Jordan, Australia, Poland, Denmark, Russia, India, Turkey, UNTSO, UNIFIL, ICRC, Sweden, Norway, UK, US, Greece, France, Ukraine, The Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Spain, China, Brazil, Italy, UAE, Malta, Slovakia, Belgium, Mexico, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Uruguay, Canada, Argentina, Philippines, Japan, Austria, C h i and Thailand



# Momentum is Building

- **25 Heads of Navies have cited the “1000 Ship Navy”**
- **Defense Industry Members are creating “1000 Ship Navy” Business Sectors**
- **Commercial Shipping Lines Cooperating**
- **U.S. National Fleet Concept**
  - **Navy and Coast Guard**
- **Embracing an Indirect Approach to Partnerships**  
**(National Security for Maritime Strategy, 2005 /**  
**Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006)**



# The Way Ahead

## **“1000 Ship Navy” will contribute to**


- Increased partnership capacity
- More effective Public Diplomacy
- Positive effects on transnational crime, terrorism, human trafficking, WMD proliferation
- **Global** prosperity through Maritime Security

## **US Initiatives will contribute to “1000 Ship Navy”**

- Listen to our International Partners' Needs
  - Possible US Presidential Speech - elevate concept to the Moral High Ground
  - DOD facilitate an Inaugural Exhibition ■Conference (Diplomats, NGOs, Commercial shipping, Navies, Coast Guards, law enforcement)
- Launch the Concept by Example
  - Global Fleet Station pilot in Caribbean Basin ■Latin America
- Lend Support where invited and needed
  - Funding assistance with Automated Information System in West Africa; reconnaissance support to Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia ‘Eye in the Sky’

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

# Your NAVY



**Building Partnerships, Deterring Enemies,  
Pacing Globalization**

25

11-L-0559/OSD/59283

**Global Maritime Partners Initiative (GMPI) Concept Paper**

Issue. During the August 14 meeting at the Pentagon, the president indicated he was very intrigued by ADM Mullen's Global Maritime Partners Initiative and was ready to put it in place. Secretary Rumsfeld expressed a desire to expand the initiative beyond DOD, perhaps by establishing an interagency working group. This paper proposes initial steps for introducing the GMPI to the interagency, developing an action plan, *and* announcing it to potential partners and the public.

**Background.** Over the past year, ADM Mullen has addressed international maritime symposia and foreign chiefs of navy on the role of sea power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Citing the pace of globalization with its profound impact on global markets, competition for energy, and the rapid spread of ideologies, ADM Mullen has pointed to the role navies can play in positively influencing history. No one nation can face the significant challenges in this new era of globalization alone, and yet the "old order" of alliances and organizations is proving insufficient. By leveraging the common bond of the sea, navies are uniquely well-placed to promote the growth of free markets and societies while deterring the challenges of this new era.

During his address to the 2005 International Seapower Symposium, ADM Mullen introduced the concept of developing a global fleet of vessels from partner nations with a shared stake in international commerce, security, and freedom of the seas. This "fleet" would be a federation of mariners who see the promise of sea power to unite to provide collective security on the oceans' highways through a global maritime network. ADM Mullen's concept offers an opportunity to further the goals of the National Security Strategy, including promoting the global economy, increasing partner nation capabilities for maritime security and information sharing, reducing transnational crime, interdicting piracy, protecting resources, preventing WMD proliferation, and supporting counter-terrorism.

**Recommended Initial Implementation Actions.** ADM Mullen's briefing stresses a global maritime partnership is already in the early stages of implementation (e.g., the Strait of Malacca partnership between Indonesia and Singapore). Proposed next steps to expand the emerging naval coalition of the willing:

1. Expand GMPI concept development and implementation to appropriate U.S. Government departments and agencies;
2. Develop an action plan for engaging with potential foreign and domestic GMPI partners;
3. Seek an opportunity for the President to publicly announce the initiative; and



4. Refine the international standards and protocols of the United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO).

#### **Discussion.**

Expanding Beyond DOD. We propose adopting a two-track approach to expanding the Global Maritime Partners Initiative beyond DOD. The Navy could lead an interagency "roadshow" to brief the concept to the leadership of appropriate U.S. Government departments and agencies (e.g., State, Homeland Security, Justice, Commerce, and Transportation). At the same time, DOD could introduce the concept to interagency staffs through a working group or PCC (the HSC/NSC Maritime Security FCC will review the briefing this week).

Developing an Action Plan. An action plan should outline steps to incentivize participation in the global partnership and lower the barrier for participation. Direct incentives might include increasing the velocity of commerce by reducing transit times through strategic straits and streamlining port access for active participants. It might also entail reducing costs for installing automated transponders and other information sharing technologies. Indirectly, participants should realize savings through insurance premium reductions.

Presidential Speech. The President could announce the Maritime Global Partners Initiative in an upcoming speech, ideally within the next several months. There are a number of upcoming speeches on the War on Terror and 9/11 that may be appropriate for announcing the concept. The Navy has invited the President to attend the christening of the USS George H.W. Bush in Norfolk, VA on October 7. There are also several maritime related public events occurring in the next two months that may be candidates for announcing the initiative, including the International Maritime Security Symposium in Laurel, Maryland sponsored by Johns Hopkins University (September 12-14).

Leverage International Maritime Organization Standards and Expand Protocols to Global Shipping. The UN established the IMO in 1948 to "provide the machinery for cooperation in technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping." Standardized communication protocols adopted in the last several years as part of the IMO's Safety of Life At Sea Conventions could serve as the technical basis for greatly improving the transparency and security of the maritime environment as well as the world's ports and harbors. We should take an interagency approach to examine the International Civil Aviation Organization's networked standards and protocols and engage the UN IMO to adopt and refine its standards in a manner that would support the development of a similar network for the global maritime environment.

~~FOUO~~

July 25, 2006

334

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Organize a Team

We are in a long war, **as** we all understand, but it is, in a real sense, in major **part** a long "propaganda war."

Within five **days**, please come back to me with a proposal as to how we organize a team of people to fight the propaganda war we are in. We **are** not organized, we are not equipped, we are not trained to fight this war. We need to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF072506-02

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/02/06*

25 JUL 06

11-L-0559/OSD/59286

OSD 13244-06



8/21/2006 1:15:40 PM

~~FOUO~~

August 18, 2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith *DS*  
RE: Snowflake 072506-02.

---

Sir,

The DOD Strategic Communication Integration Group is being designed **as** the best way to institutionalize the OSD staff, COCOMs and Services' collaboration and engagement in the information aspect of the war. The products of this DOD group, **as well as** our Rapid Response, will have a direct impact on the propaganda war as well as support efforts in the interagency, including State Department's public diplomacy efforts.

334

18 Aug 06

25 Jul 06

OSD 13244-08



912112006 1:16:58 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59287

FOUO

August 10, 2006

517

SUBJECT: Congressman LaHood

On the morning of August 21 I have to find out from Robert Wilkie where we stand on Ray LaHood and then give Ray a call.

DHR:dt  
SF081006-27

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

8/17

Sec Def

- Robert Wilkie is scheduled to talk with Ray LaHood on 8/21
- I have asked Robert to give you a read out from his call.

Robert R.

T 8/21

10 Aug 06

8 Aug 06

OSD 13253-06



8/22/2006 1:12:18 PM

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/59288



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

August 8, 2006, 1:00 PM

READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD  
PHONE CALL WITH CONGRESSMAN LAHOOD

From: Robert Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

Tuesday, August 8, 5:00 PM, 33718.

Contact numbers:

C: (b)(6) (Congressman LaHood's cell)  
O: (b)(6), POC is Joan DeBoer  
(Joan DeBoer's cell)

**Key Attendees:** This is a one-on-one phone call with Congressman Ray LaHood (R-IL), House Appropriations Committee on Defense. Bio at **Tab 1**.

**Background:** This phone call is in response to an urgent request from Rep. LaHood to travel to Lebanon on DoD aircraft.

- Rep. LaHood is requesting DoD aircraft support to travel to Lebanon from September 1-5, 2006. Senators Durbin and Sununu have confirmed participation in trip.
- Rep. LaHood and other trip participants are Lebanese-American and want to meet with Lebanese government officials over the current state of hostilities with Israel.
- Rep. LaHood spoke with Stephen Hadley, NSC, concerning this trip. Mr. Hadley told Rep. LaHood he thought the trip would be a good idea.
  - o Robert Wilkie followed up with Mr. Hadley and confirmed that Hadley said the trip would be useful, but Mr. Hadley did not commit DoD. He told Mr. Wilkie he understood the risks and concerns associated with travel in Lebanon at this time.
- Rep. LaHood is aware that Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA) is currently in Lebanon. However, The Department did not support Rep. Issa's CODEL request.
  - o He is traveling to the region via combination of commercial aircraft to Cyprus and UN aircraft to Lebanon.

OSD 13253-06



Prepared by: COL Michael Hadley, Director of House Affairs, OSD-LA (b)(6) 8/22/2006 1:10:05 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59289

517

8 Aug 06

- OSD-LA is currently discouraging members from taking CODELs into Lebanon at this time based on the current political unrest and the ongoing military operations.
  - While CENTCOM has no written guidance on travel to Lebanon, they would prefer no CODELs travel to the country at this time.

**Objectives:**

- Listen to Rep. LaHood's concerns on traveling to Lebanon.
- Recommend that Congressman LaHood and his delegation plan their trip for a later date when the situation in Lebanon has stabilized.
- Offer to make DoD aircraft available if the situation permits at a later point in time.

**Attachments:**

1. Rep. LaHood bio

*Examiner*  
*9/1-5*

*0x15'*

## Ray LaHood R-ILLINOIS (18<sup>th</sup>)



**Hometown:** Peoria  
**Born:** December 6, 1945; Peoria, Ill.  
**Religion:** Roman Catholic  
**Family:** Wife, Kathy LaHood; four children  
**Education:** Spoon River Community College, attended 1963-65; Bradley U., B.S. 1971 (education)  
**Military Service:** None  
**Career:** Congressional aide; youth bureau director; urban planning commission director; teacher  
**Elected:** 1994 (6th term)

GWOT Travel	Trips	Date
Iraq	1	6/06
Afghanistan	0	
GTMO	2	3/02, 10/03

### BRAC/ Bases / Major Defense Industry

- Greater Peoria Regional AGS (gain 2005 BRAC, 341); Capital Airport AGS (realign 2005 BRAC, loss 163).
- Firefly Energy Inc landed a \$2.5 million contract to develop its new generation of lighter, more powerful batteries for the U.S. military
- Caterpillar launched Firefly as a spin off in 2003.

### Notes

- **Committees:** Appropriations (Agriculture, Rural Development & FDA - vice chairman; Defense); Select Intelligence (Oversight - vice chairman; Terrorism/Human Intelligence, Analysis & Counterintelligence - vice chairman)
- **Caucuses/Organizations:** Congressional Navy and Marine Corps Caucus; National Guard & Reserve Components Congressional Members Organization.
- **Lebanese-Americans and District:** Grandfather immigrated from Lebanon.
- Has visited Lebanon 10 times since becoming a Member of Congress.
- Many constituents in the Peoria-area are of Lebanese ancestry and regularly visit family members in Lebanon during the summer.
- Said that hundreds of his constituents were stranded in Lebanon when hostilities erupted between Hezbollah and Israel.
- **The Middle East:** Concerned that Members of Congress, while having a good understanding of Israel and the Palestinians, exhibit "sketchy understanding" of other countries in the region, such as Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt.
- **Israeli Bombardment of Lebanon:** Said that Israel had a right to go into Lebanon after its soldiers were captured, but not a right "to bomb the whole country." (7/16/06)  
 Called on the President and Secretary of State to urge the Israeli government to use restraint.
- Said that the some of the Beirut neighborhoods Israel bombed contained "just common, ordinary, decent people who have [no part] in this fight at all." (7/19/06)
- **Congressional Condemnation of Recent Attacks:** Voted for resolution condemning recent attacks against Israel, but believed it should have shown humanitarian concern for Lebanese people and supported driving Hezbollah from the country "but not to shut down every way and every means of people to escape the country" (7/19/06).
- **Iraq:** Has been a strong supporter of the Administration's policy in Iraq.

Rep. LaHood (R-IL) CODEL to Lebanon/Israel  
August 31 – September 5, 2006  
Trip Update

(b)(6)

8/24 517

CODEL Overview:

- Rep. LaHood has requested Military Air support for a trip to Lebanon and Israel leaving Andrews AFB on August 31 and returning on September 5, 2006. Other Members traveling with Rep. LaHood include, Rep. Nick Rahall (D-WV) and Rep. Charles Boustany (R-LA) along with Senator John Sununu (R-NH) and two staffers.
- During a phone call between the SECDEF and Rep. LaHood on August 8<sup>th</sup>, the SECDEF told Rep. LaHood that the current situation in Lebanon at that time was not safe for travel but, that Robert Wilkie would follow up with the Congressman on Monday August 21<sup>st</sup> to address the status of his CODEL trip request. Since the 8<sup>th</sup> of August, a cease fire has been implemented in Lebanon.
- On August 19<sup>th</sup>, OSD-LA followed up with the State Department and NSC and we were told that both had no objections over CODEL LaHood traveling to Lebanon and Israel. We were told both embassies are prepared to support the trip.
- OSD-LA has assigned a G-5 to support CODEL LaHood travel to Cyprus and Israel—our Gulfstream cannot land in Beirut and will not be allowed to RON in Jordan. We will provide helo support for the CODEL from Cyprus into Lebanon.
- Robert Wilkie is prepared to call Rep. LaHood on Monday, August 21<sup>st</sup>, at 11:00 AM Eastern time, and let him know the CODEL is being arranged. Unless, SECDEF decides he would rather make the call, Rep. LaHood will be traveling in Idaho. Due to poor cellular reception, he will make himself available on a land line at 9:00 AM Pacific time—11:00 AM Eastern time. He can be reached at (b)(6)

21 Aug 06

8 Aug 06

SECDEF call ☒

Wilkie call ☐

*Done*

*US*

OSD 13253-06



8/22/2006 11:32:55 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/59292



FOUO

1537

21 Aug

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Military Assistant

21 August 2006 - 1515 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)


SUBJECT Funding Humanitarian Activities

1  
Sir,

The Deputy Secretary requests you prepare a response to the attached snowflake on funding humanitarian activities, using the conflict in Lebanon as a reference point. Please coordinate your response with USD(C) and the Joint Staff.

Please provide a copy of this memo with your response. Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Russell L. Mack

Lt Col, USAF

Military Assistant to *the*

Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE: Tuesday, 5 Sep 06  
ATTACHMENT: Snowflake 081706-20  
cc: USD(C), DJS

FOUO

OSD 13256-06



8/21/2006 5:57:16 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59293

000.92

21 Aug 06

17 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

17 Aug  
1155

August 17, 2006

000,92

TO: Gordon England

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA.*

SUBJECT: Funding Humanitarian Activities

Let's think through what kind of proposal we could develop, so we could increase DoD's ability to help in humanitarian activities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF061706-20

.....  
*Please Respond By 09/14/06*

17 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13256-06



8/21/2006 5:57:52 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59294

**INFO MEMO**

**SEP 14 2006**

**FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: Gordon England**

**SUBJECT: Funding Humanitarian Activities**

Improving the Department's humanitarian efforts, in Lebanon and elsewhere, requires additional authorities and resources. We are working the following to address these shortfalls:

- Policy and the Joint Staff are working to expand the Department's Overseas Humanitarian and Disaster Assistance Account for the FY08 budget from \$63 million to \$103 million.
- Policy is pressing Hill authorizers to make the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) permanent and global. Currently, CERP is restricted to Iraq and Afghanistan.

These actions will help ensure a timely, sufficient response to humanitarian crises, as well as provide commanders much-needed flexibility worldwide.



11-L-0559/OSD/59295

**OSD 13256-06**



9/14/2006 5:22:57 PM

8/21/06 AS

Iran

August 17, 2006

To: **SECDEF**

Fr: Gordon England

Subj: Italian Assistance

Don.

FYI, the Ambassador from Italy, Giovanni Castellaneta, **was** previously the Italian Ambassador to Iran and lived in Tehran for three years. **Also**, the Ambassador's wife is Iranian.

The Ambassador, his wife and the Italian Defense Attache would like to be helpful to the U.S. in **our** dealings with Iran and have proposed meeting with me for lunch or dinner. Obviously, if this materializes, I will invite Eric. However, **I thought you** might be interested in a lunch in your office **as** they could provide some **insights**. Let me **know** if interested.

*England*

17 Aug 06

21 Aug 06

11-L-0559/OSD/59296

OSD 13259-06



8121120065:47:12 PM

~~FOUO~~

August 21, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ambassador Castellaneta

Attached is an interesting note. Gordon England ~~talked~~ to the Italian Ambassador to the U.S., who used to be Italy's Ambassador to Iran. I ~~am~~ not involved much with Iran, but you, Condi and the President are. You might want to be ~~aware~~ of this.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/17/06 DSD memo to SecDef

DHB:js  
SF082106-17

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59297

OSD 13259-06



8/21/2006 5:46:33 PM

*Iran*

*2104804*

8/21/06 JJ

August 17, 2006

To: SECDEF  
Fr: Gordon England  
Subj: Italian Assistance

Don,

FYI, the Ambassador ~~from~~ Italy, Giovanni Castellaneta, ~~was~~ previously the Italian Ambassador to Iran and lived in Tehran for three years. *Also*, the Ambassador's wife is Iranian.

The Ambassador, his wife and the Italian Defense Attache would like to be helpful to the **U.S.** in ~~our~~ dealings with Iran and have proposed meeting with me for lunch or dinner. Obviously, if ~~this~~ materializes, I will invite Eric. However, I **thought** you might be interested in a lunch in your office as they could provide some insights. Let me know if interested.



11-L-0559/OSD/59298

FOUO

AUG 28 2006

091.4

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Dorrance Smith  
David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Arabic Language Training

I am told by David Chu that in the Department of Defense in the 2001 academic year, there were a total of 776 students receiving Arabic language training. In the 2006 academic year, there were 4,451 students studying Arabic.

We might want to aggregate some additional data like that and then communicate it in an appropriate way.

Thanks.

Attach. USD(P&R) memo to SD re: Final Response on Arabic Language Enrollment (OSD 13310-06)

DRR:dh  
08/26/06-0273

.....

28 AUG 06

FOUO

44606

B4-2

OSD 13310-06



10/5/2006 6:00:26 PM

11 L 0000/OSD/00200

~~FOUO~~

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

5 October 2006 - 1530 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR RADM Thorp, DASD/Joint Communications/OASD/PA

SUBJECT Arabic Language Training

Sir,

The Deputy Secretary provides the attached snowflake from Secretary Rumsfeld for use by you and the SCIG as appropriate.

Very respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch

CAPT, USN

Military Assistant to the

Deputy Secretary of Defense

ATTACHMENT Snowflake 082606-02TS

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13310-06



10/5/2006 6:02:53 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59300

091.4

5 Oct 06

7 AUG 06



~~FOUO~~

AUG 28 2006

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Dorrance Smith  
David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Arabic Language Training

I am told by David Chu that in the Department of Defense in the 2001 academic year, there were a total of 776 students receiving Arabic language training. In the 2006 academic year, there were 4,451 students studying Arabic.

We might want to aggregate some additional data like that and then communicate it in an appropriate way.

Thanks.

Attach. USD(P&R) memo to SD re: Final Response on Arabic Language Enrollment (OSD 13310-06)

DRR:  
082606-0779

.....

~~FOUO~~

*B4-2*  
OSD 13310-06



11-L-0550/OSD/50001

10/5/2006 6:00:26 PM



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
INFO MEMO



(b)(6)

8/24

August 18, 2006, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USDP (P&R)

SUBJECT: Final Response on Arabic Language Enrollment

- o Recently you asked about Arabic language enrollment in the Department on January 1, 2001 and today. (Snowflake at Tab A).
- Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center overall enrollment in Arabic has increased 61 percent since 2001. This includes:
  - o Current resident enrollment of 727 compared to 531 in 2001 (27 percent increase).
  - o Current non-resident enrollment of 750 compared to 39 in 2001 (95 percent increase).
- Enrollment in Arabic at Service Academies has increased over 65 percent since 2001.
  - o US Military Academy current enrollment at 249 vice 102 in 2001.
  - o US Naval Academy current enrollment at 128. There was no Arabic program in 2001.
  - o UA Air Force Academy current enrollment at 171 vice 88 in 2001.
- Other sources of Arabic language classroom instruction include:
  - o The Marine Corps established a new program in FY05 and is training 202 students at their Command and Staff College.
  - o The National Security Education Program has increased scholarships in Arabic to 76 in 2005 from 16 in 2001.
  - o The National Security Agency has trained 1,373 personnel in Arabic this fiscal year.
- The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center produces familiarization kits and Language Survival Kits that incorporate aspects of Arabic language instruction. 138,000 Iraqi Language Survival Kits have been distributed and predeployment Iraqi familiarization courses have been conducted for over 80,000 personnel.
- All three Military Departments have initiated contracts with commercial computer-based language instruction packages. The Army's contract is the most far-reaching, currently enrolling 1,500 soldiers.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Peter L. Gillis,

(b)(6)

OSD 13310-06



8/23/2006 7:57:56 AM

## ARABIC CLASS ENROLLMENT 2001 vs 2006

	FY/AY 2001	FY/AY 2006	% Change
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>776</b>	<b>4451</b>	<b>82.6</b>
<b>DLIFLC</b>	<b>570</b>	<b>1477</b>	<b>61.4</b>
Resident	531	727	26.9
Non-resident	39	750	94.8
<b>Service Academies</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>548</b>	<b>65.3</b>
USMA	102	249	59.0
USNA	0	128	100.0
USAFA	88	171	48.5
<b>Other</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>94.2</b>
Marine Corps CSC	0	202	100.0
NSEP Scholarships	16	76	78.9
<b>Commercial Computer/Web-based Instruction</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2157</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Army	0	1500	100.0
Air Force	0	648	100.0
Navy (See Note 1)	N/A	N/A	
Marine Corps (See Note 2)	N/A	N/A	

Note 1: Navy programmed for a web-based language training capability in POM-08. The capability will be purchased in FY08, posted on Navy Knowledge Online (NKO), and made available to the total Navy force. In the interim, some commands have independently purchased commercial language programs with internal discretionary funds, but they are not web-based. Since these programs are not centrally managed by Navy, there is no Echelon 1 accounting of them. The Navy Foreign Language Office estimates less than 200 commercial language programs have been purchased independently.

Note 2: Marine Corps contract was effected mid-August and the program has yet to be released to the Service.

844

~~FOUO~~

August 07, 2006

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

SUBJECT: Number of Folks enrolled in Arabic Classes

Please tell me how many people in the Department were enrolled in Arabic classes on January 1, 2001, and how many are enrolled in Arabic classes today.

-----P

File  
Distribution

\*\*\*\*\*

Please Respond by 08/15/06

091.4

7 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13310-06



8/23/2006 7:57:50 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/59304



UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

August 18, 2006, 3:30 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Final Response on Arabic Language Enrollment

- Recently you asked about Arabic language enrollment in the Department on January 1, 2001 and today. (Snowflake at Tab A).
- Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center overall enrollment in Arabic has increased 61 percent since 2001. This includes:
  - Current resident enrollment of 727 compared to 531 in 2001 (27 percent increase).
  - Current non-resident enrollment of 750 compared to 39 in 2001 (95 percent increase).
- Enrollment in Arabic at Service Academies has increased over 65 percent since 2001.
  - US Military Academy current enrollment at 249 vice 102 in 2001.
  - US Naval Academy current enrollment at 128. There was no Arabic program in 2001.
  - UA Air Force Academy current enrollment at 171 vice 88 in 2001.
- Other sources of Arabic language classroom instruction include:
  - The Marine Corps established a new program in FY05 and is training 202 students at their Command and Staff College.
  - The National Security Education Program has increased scholarships in Arabic to 76 in 2005 from 16 in 2001.
  - The National Security Agency has trained 1,373 personnel in Arabic this fiscal year.
- The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center produces familiarization kits and Language Survival Kits that incorporate aspects of Arabic language instruction. 138,000 Iraqi Language Survival Kits have been distributed and predeployment Iraqi familiarization courses have been conducted for over 80,000 personnel.
- All three Military Departments have initiated contracts with commercial computer-based language instruction packages. The Army's contract is the most far-reaching, currently enrolling 1,500 soldiers.

091.4

18 Aug 06

7 Aug 06

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Peter L. Gillis (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/59305

OSD 13310-08



812312006 7 58 02AM

# **TAB A**

~~TO:DO~~

August 17, 2006

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Number of Folks enrolled in Arabic Classes

Please tell me how many people in the Department were enrolled in Arabic classes on January 1, 2001, and how many are enrolled in Arabic classes today.

Thanks,

DR

-----

Please Respond By 08/15/06

~~TO:DO~~


~~FOUO~~

August 22, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Report on Afghan National Development Poll from LTG Eikenberry

Mr. President

Attached is a report on Afghanistan that I received from General Eikenberry. I thought you might find it of interest.

Respectfully,

Attach: 8/14/06 Memo from LTG Eikenberry

DHR:ss  
SF082206-02

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59308

OSD 13397-06



-8/24/2006 8 1902 AM



From: Eikenberry, Karl LTG USA CFC-A CMD GRP CG [mailto:LTG.Karl.Eikenberry@cfc-a.centcom.mil]

Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 12:52 AM

To: Ablzaid John

Cc: Smith, COL Jefforey A. (USA)

Subject: Afghan National Development Poll

General: I think you will find this of interest. You may wish to send it on to CJCS and SECDEF:

We recently completed a comprehensive survey of Afghan sentiments on a variety of subjects, the third such survey since August 2005. Titled "Afghan National Development Poll 3.0" and conducted by Altai Consulting, the surveys have proved very helpful in clarifying our understanding of the situation on the ground.

The results, gathered in May 2006, were generally in line with our direct observations and presented few surprises. Although national confidence, in the immediate aftermath of the 29 May Kabul riot was temporarily shaken, our sense is that as the government and the people have regained much of their former optimism over the past two months.

The CFC-A commissioned poll was conducted in all 34 provinces by locally recruited research. 3600 interviews were conducted in urban and rural areas, including an even split of men and women. A large number of questions remained consistent across all three surveys to allow us to conduct trend analysis on key sentiment indicators.

- **Governance.** President Karzai remains quite popular: large majority of respondents view him as effective (77%), representing their views (66%), non-corrupt (72%), and expected to improve their future (76%). At the other end of the governance spectrum, local leaders (Shuras, Elders) also received high approval ratings (59%). Intermediate governance actors fared less well indicating a breakdown in connection to the citizens; Members of Parliament (45%), Governors (39%), and Provincial Councils (43%) scored lower. The overall trend in this area is very slightly down from previous surveys. A new question in this survey revealed that 74% of respondents think Governors should be elected instead of appointed, a good endorsement of the appeal of representational democracy.
- **Security.** Perceptions of security remain high (82% rate security as "good") however, this is down from ANDP 10 where 90% of respondents rated security as "good." Police are perceived to have improved, while respondents lack confidence in other Justice sectors such as courts, prisons, judges, and defense attorneys.
- **Reconstruction & Economy.** Lack of jobs/slow economic growth cited as number one failure of President Karzai and the central government (32%). Only 35% of respondents cited security as the top failure. The top needs were cited as basic services & infrastructure (roads, electricity, clinics, etc.) at 68%, which is a slight increase from ANDP 2 where 61% cited reconstruction as the top need. Despite the perceived disappointments with current progress, Afghans remain optimistic about their future with

64% responding **positively**. This is only a slight drop from the previous surveys (ANDP 1.0 - 69%, ANDP 20 - 68%).

This poll **seems to validate** our **observation** that the Afghanistan campaign must **increasingly focus on non-military** aspects - establishing reasonable **governance**, developing a **fair justice system**, and delivering basic social services **underpinned** by essential **economic infrastructure**.

In order to better **inform our** work in the security sector, we have already begun to develop the fourth survey in the series which will focus on the Afghan National Security **Forces** (Army and Police). We have derived great value from the results and have encouraged **NATO-ISAF** to assume funding for the fifth and future surveys to continue to have access to **this** valuable information.

**VR**

Karl

10/4  
1713

SEP 29 2006

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b)(6)

ACTION MEMO

USD(P)

OCT 02 2006

SEP 29 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Response to Representative Brown-Waite Letter on Deadlines for Iraq (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ Rep. Ginny Brown-Waite wrote to you advocating that we set deadlines for the Iraqis in order to prompt them to assume responsibility for critical functions.
  - The proposed response explains that the State Department leads all USG efforts in Iraq other than security.
  - The proposed response states that the Government of Iraq is not dragging its feet with respect to assuming security responsibilities.

(U) Recommendation: Sign the attached response to Rep. Brown-Waite (Tab A).

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter for signature and slide

Tab B - Coordination Sheet

Prepared by: Shawn Steene, ISA/NESA-NG (b)(6)



\* S F 0 3 2 5 0 6 - 0 9 \*

MA SD	SA DSD
TSA SD	SA DSD
EXEC SEC	SA DSD
11 L 0559/05D/59311	

OSD 13399-06



10/4/2006 11 53 42 AM

29 Sep 06

23 Aug 06

Robert Rangel  
10/4

# TAB

# A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 10 2006

The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite  
U.S. House of Representatives  
414 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-1002

Dear Representative Brown-Waite:

Thank you for your recent letter following up on your concerns regarding setting deadlines for the Government of Iraq (GoI) to take over various governmental functions. Given that the Defense Department leads the U.S. Government (USG) security efforts in Iraq, while all other USG activities in Iraq are led by the State Department, my response will focus on the Iraqis assuming security responsibilities.

Over the past year, as the attached graphic illustrates, the number of Iraqi combat units operating "in the lead" and the land area for which they are responsible have grown dramatically. Iraqi security forces now have the lead in roughly 65 percent of Iraq's territory – an area populated by about 60 percent of the Iraqi people. Since July 2006, the provinces of Muthanna and Dhi Qar have passed into Provincial Iraqi Control. The GoI's goal is for all 18 Iraqi provinces to be under Provincial Iraqi Control by the end of 2007.


The GoI is a broad-based unity government and building a consensus on the difficult issues facing Iraq can be time-consuming. Nevertheless, the GoI is not dragging its feet with respect to assuming security responsibilities.

Thank you for your continued interest in Iraq's future and your support for the U.S. Armed Forces.

Sincerely




11-L-0559/OSD/59313



# Iraqi Army Lead and National Police Lead

UNCLASSIFIED



11-L-0559/OSD/59314

# **TAB B**

**POLICY COORDINATION SHEET**

**Subject:** Rep. Brown-Waite Letter on Setting Deadlines for the Iraqis  
**Snowflake Number:** SF 082506-09

<b>Title/Organization</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Date</b>
PDASD (ISA)	<u>TDY</u> MaryBeth Long	<u>TDY</u>
Special Advisor, USD(P)	<u>absh</u> Abe Shulsky	<u>9/20/06</u>
Director, NESA-NG	<u>John Trigilio</u> John Trigilio	<u>9/20/06</u>
ASD Leg. Affairs	Robert Wilkie	14 September 2006
OGC (International Affairs)	Chuck Allen	18 September 2006
Division Chief, J-5 Iraq	COL Joe DiSalvo	18 September 2006
State Department (Acting DAS/NEA-Iraq)	Victor Hurtado	20 September 2006



~~FOUO~~

AUG 28 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Robert Wilkie  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Brown-Waite

Attached is the letter from Ginny Brown-Waite. It may be that we ought to refer it to the Department of State to be answered. We could answer part of it, and then refer it over to them. State is the one who would be setting deadlines, not DoD.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/23/06 Letter from Rep Ginny Brown-Waite to SecDef

DRM  
8/23/06

.....  
*Please Respond By September 12, 2006*

OCT 06 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59317

GINNY BROWN-WHITE

New Congress, New Rules

Serving the American People

Congressional  
Publicity DirectorAssigned as  
Legislative Affairs

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**

Washington, DC 20515

August 21, 2006

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WASHINGTON, DC 20001  
(202) 225-1100

LEGISLATIVE  
1100 NEW YORK STREET, SUITE 200  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001  
(202) 225-1100  
WWW.HOUSEGOVERNMENT.ORG

1100 NEW YORK STREET, SUITE A  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001  
(202) 225-1100  
WWW.HOUSEGOVERNMENT.ORG

4

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary Of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

*Tasked to Policy to prepare a  
Reply for your signature.*

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

On April 5, 2006, I sent to your attention a letter highlighting my concerns about the rampant corruption that is poisoning the Iraqi government. Although I do appreciate the thoughtful response that I received from your office, with all due respect Mr. Secretary, your staff did not address another important issue I raised - setting deadlines for the Iraqi government to assume various functions.

In my letter, I mentioned the Iraqi government's incessant foot-dragging, which is hindering the nation's ability to lift itself from chaos. Too many projects of critical importance to the Iraqi people are behind schedule or poorly managed. Even worse, some of this foot-dragging may be of our own doing - the billions of dollars in American support given to the Iraqi government in some cases, is only encouraging the corruption.

Weaning the Iraqis off this American support is critical to the future of both of our nations. Establishing deadlines for the Iraqi government, on which continued American economic assistance would be contingent, might provide the incentives needed to accomplish difficult tasks. For example, setting dates by which the Iraqi military must reach a certain manpower level and have a police force trained and capable of securing the country would be steps in the right direction.

The American taxpayers, along with Members of Congress, need to know that the Iraqi government is not just using our soldiers and funding as an excuse for their dilatory tactics in protecting their own country. I want to make clear that I am not advocating a timeline for troop withdrawals, as I certainly understand the tenuous ground on which the issue of setting these deadlines rests. However, a lack of firm demands from the Department of Defense (DOD) on the Iraqi progress could someday prompt congressional action, and I trust we both agree that subjecting this issue to the political winds would not be prudent.

However, if the DOD is developing deadlines for Iraqi responsibility levels and you do not want to commit these dates to writing, then we should sit down and talk. Other Members of Congress feel as I do on this issue and had I circulated a letter for cosignatories, I would likely have a surprising number of Republicans that would sign. I look forward to your prompt reply.

Sincerely,

*Ginny Brown-White*  
Ginny Brown-White  
Member of Congress

OSD 15389-06



8/24/2006 8:04:01 AM



POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2000

MAY 19 2005

The Honorable Clary Brown-Waltz  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Brown-Waltz:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding corruption in Iraq and other concerns. I have been asked to respond on his behalf.

I appreciate your concern over U.S. taxpayers' funds being spent wisely, and not reaching the insurgency or lining the pockets of Iraqi officials. There are, in fact, sound financial controls in place for U.S. appropriated funds that have been expended on Iraq reconstruction and other assistance efforts. Moreover, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has done a rigorous job of uncovering problems where they do exist. Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies take their fiduciary responsibilities for U.S. appropriated funds very seriously.

From the days of the Coalition Provisional Authority, there have been attempts to address the corruption problem. The Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) was established in 2004 to investigate allegations of corruption, act on anonymous complaints of graft, and propose legislation to strengthen ethical standards for public officials and employees. As you noted, two inspectors were assassinated. Each Iraqi government ministry appointed an inspector general to investigate waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.

Some progress has been made. As a result of a May 2005 audit by the CPI of some \$1.2 billion in procurements by the Ministry of Defense, arrest warrants were issued for the former defense minister and two dozen other officials for various improprieties. While the exact amount of Iraqi money that was siphoned off to corruption has yet to be determined, as DoD has informed Congress, no U.S. taxpayers' funds were involved in this alleged corruption. Notably, significant quantities of equipment procured using these funds have, in fact, been delivered to the Iraqi forces. Moreover, DoD and UK advisors concerned about the handling of these procurements have worked with Iraqi officials to put in place better oversight processes with the Ministry of Defense for equipment acquisition. They also have worked to develop the contracting capacity of the ministry.

R 05752-06

The U.S. Government also has carried out an extensive program of audit and oversight of funds appropriated for Iraq reconstruction through organizations, including the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). These institutional safeguards are in place to thwart potential fraud, waste and abuse of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

In testimony on February 8, 2006 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), reported that there is little evidence of crimes involving appropriated funds, saying: "Corruption is not a pervasive problem on the U.S. side of the reconstruction program."

As you point out, the responsibility for tackling Iraqi corruption is now an Iraqi responsibility. It is a matter of the political will of the Iraqi leadership to overcome the culture of kleptocracy imbued by Saddam Hussein. I think this message has been heard. On April 24, Prime Minister-designate Nouri Al-Maliki said Iraqi society must be cleansed of terrorists and the government must be rid of "administrative corruption." We will work closely with the new Iraqi government to help it achieve that goal.

You mention a number of other serious problems, such as the unhealthy dependence of the Iraqi economy on oil and "death squads." The prerequisite for solving any of them is the formation of a competent government with the political support to take serious action. Thanks to U.S. and Iraqi resolve, this is happening. Your understanding and personal attention to these matters - demonstrated by your two trips to Iraq - is an important part of that resolve.

Thank you for your continued support of our troops.

Sincerely,



Eric S. Boehman

CAROL BROWN-WHITE

For Delivery: Please

Call 202-541-1234

CLASSIFIED BY  
REASON FOR  
EXEMPTION  
DATE OF REVIEW

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

For Delivery: Please Contact

Washington, DC 20515

For Delivery: Please

Washington, DC 20515

For Delivery: Please

Washington, DC 20515

For Delivery: Please

Washington, DC 20515

For Delivery: Please

April 4, 2006

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1400 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

This letter is to express my grave concerns about the public perception of the situation in Iraq. Media reports, as well as anecdotal evidence from people returning from the region claim that we are not making progress and that the situation is steadily deteriorating. As you know, I have visited Iraq this year and while I do not agree with the media driven assessment of degradation, I am very concerned with the growing reports of crippling corruption within the Iraqi government. It is my firm belief that this epidemic may hurt our chances of victory.

On my travels to the region and in my meetings with businessmen who have returned from Iraq, corruption is the overriding concern. In fact, many feel that the current security situation is exacerbated by a necessary system that relies solely on cash transactions and that has little or no financial oversight of U.S. funding. This situation leads to a steady erosion in American cash, significant amounts of which are bound to fall into the wrong hands.

There are some major headlines which have been in the news or have been reported to me:

- In 2004, Iraq set up the Commission on Public Integrity to investigate allegations of corruption. At any given time, there are 31 inspectors. Since the Commission was established, two inspectors have been assassinated, and every word and no frightened that they cannot effectively perform their job.
- About six months ago, 27 senior officials within the Iraqi government were arrested under suspicion of "misappropriating" nearly \$1 billion from the defense industry. This included the former Minister of Defense, Haidar al-Shawi.
- The Ministry of the Interior, which includes the police force and which is predominantly Shiite, has been accused of extorting "death squads" against Sunni. Hundreds of bodies have turned up in recent months. While in Iraq, the Suni elected officials pointed this out to our delegation travelling there. From all reports, the situation has since worsened.
- There are numerous reports that Iraqi government officials abuse their travel expense accounts and demand cash payments for official work.

- A police trainer estimates that within six months 80% of the trainers will be "on the take." The corruption in the police force is well known there by the U.S. contractors performing the training. I

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14-L-0558/OSD/59321

was told that trained officers are assigned to a police unit and the head of the unit offers to the officers the following, "Stay home and give me half of the \$400 per month salary." I have also heard that police officers are selling their weapons and/or ammunition and asking for replacements, pocketing the cash.

- The military facilities in Iraq are hampered by the sole source interpreter contract. It is just not feasible and poses problems in the field where they are desperately in need of more interpreters.

- The Iraqi government needs to seek world-wide business partnerships to expand their revenue sources. Currently 92% of that country's budget comes from oil revenues. Yet, the natural gas reserves are virtually untapped and could help the Iraqi government become less dependent on U.S. tax dollars for reconstruction.

I can also envision that within the President's remarks and strategic plan for victory there are some references to tackling corruption. By DOD estimates, we are spending nearly \$6 billion a month in Iraq. I would like to have specific and additional assurances that this money is spent wisely and is not reaching the insurgency or lining the pockets of Iraqi officials.

The points highlighted above lay out what I believe, and what I believe the President and you feel as well, is that the Iraqi government must take more responsibility for the day-to-day operations of their country. Mulhary and civilians returning home said the Iraqis will bleed us dry as long as we supply the money.

I have consistently voted against a troop withdrawal date because I think it would be foolhardy to let the terrorists know when we will be removing troops. This policy of retreat and run is not one that will prevent the spread of terrorism. However, setting some dates for the Iraqi government to be more responsible for their own security and their country's future would be prudent.

I suggest we set some specific dates for the new Iraqi government to assume various functions. Without these deadlines, the foot dragging will continue. In the long run, these deadlines for the Iraqi government to step up and let us step down will mean fewer U.S. expenditures both in military and reconstruction funds.

*Shirley*  
*Clary Brown-Fate*  
Clary Brown-Fate  
Member of Congress

FOUO

AUG 28 2006

To: Eric Edelman

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Brown-Waite

Attached is the letter from Ginny Brown-Waite. It may be that we ought to refer it to the Department of State to be answered. We could answer part of it, and then refer it over to them. State is the one who would be setting deadlines, not DoD.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/23/06 Letter from Rep Ginny Brown-Waite to SecDef

DESM  
200204-9

.....  
*Please Respond By September 12, 2006*

FOUO

OSD 13399-06



11-L-0559/OSD/59323

28 Aug 06

23 Aug 06

GINNY BROWN-WAITE  
5TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON  
FINANCIAL SERVICES

COMMITTEE ON  
VETERANS' AFFAIRS

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

August 23, 2006

414 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20575  
(202) 225-1002

DISTRICT OFFICES

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BAGDAVILLE, FL 34401  
(352) 796-8364  
(888) GWAITE5

38006 MENDHAM AVENUE, SUITE A  
DADE CITY, FL 33525  
(132) 5574787  
(888) GWAITE5

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary Of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

On April 5, 2006, I sent to your attention a letter highlighting my concerns about the rampant corruption that is poisoning the Iraqi government. Although I do appreciate the thoughtful response that I received from your office, with all due respect Mr. Secretary, your staff did not address another important issue I raised - setting deadlines for the Iraqi government to assume various functions.


In my letter, I mentioned the Iraqi government's incessant foot-dragging, which is hindering the nation's ability to lift itself from chaos. Too many projects of critical importance to the Iraqi people are behind schedule or poorly managed. Even worse, some of this foot-dragging may be of our own doing - the billions of dollars in American support given to the Iraqi government in some cases, is only encouraging the corruption.

Weaning the Iraqis off this American support is critical to the future of both of our nations. Establishing deadlines for the Iraqi government, on which continued American economic assistance would be contingent, might provide the incentives needed to accomplish difficult tasks. For example, setting dates by which the Iraqi military must reach a certain manpower level and have a police force trained and capable of securing the country would be steps in the right direction.

The American taxpayers, along with Members of Congress, need to know that the Iraqi government is not just using our soldiers and funding as an excuse for their dilatory tactics in protecting their own country. I want to make clear that I am not advocating a timeline for troop withdrawals, as I certainly understand the tenuous ground on which the issue of setting these deadlines rests. However, a lack of firm demands from the Department of Defense (DOD) on the Iraqi progress could someday prompt congressional action, and I trust we both agree that subjecting this issue to the political winds would not be prudent.

However, if the DOD is developing deadlines for Iraqi responsibility levels and you do not want to commit these dates to writing, then we should sit down and talk. Other Members of Congress feel as I do on this issue and had I circulated a letter for cosignatories, I would likely have a surprising number of Republicans that would sign. I look forward to your prompt reply.

Sincerely,

  
Ginny Brown-Waite  
Member of Congress

11-L-0559/050/59324

OSD 13399-06



8124120068 04 51 AM



U.S. Congresswoman

**Ginny Brown-Waite***Representing Citrus, Hernando, Lake, Levy,  
Marion, Pasco, Polk, and Sumter Counties*

To: SECRETARY RUMSFELD

Fax number:

Re:

Number of pages: 2 (including cover)

Date: 8/23/06

From:

Congresswoman Ginny Brown-Waite



Tillie Fowler, Chief of Staff



Charlie Keller, Communications Director



Kathleen Smoak, Scheduler / Office Manager



Amie Woher, Legislative Director



Carol Beck, Legislative Assistant



Aaron Gilbride, Legislative Assistant



Jennifer Cunningham, Legislative Assistant




Nate Caldwell, Legislative Correspondent



James Zarsadiaz, Staff Assistant



Notes:





POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2000

MAY 10 2006

The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Brown-Waite:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding corruption in Iraq and other concerns. I have been asked to respond on his behalf.

I appreciate your concern over U.S. taxpayers' funds being spent wisely, and not reaching the insurgency or lining the pockets of Iraqi officials. There are, in fact, sound financial controls in place for U.S. appropriated funds that have been expended on Iraq reconstruction and other assistance efforts. Moreover, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has done a rigorous job of uncovering problems where they do exist. Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies take their fiduciary responsibilities for U.S. appropriated funds very seriously.

From the days of the Coalition Provisional Authority, there have been attempts to address the corruption problem. The Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) was established in 2004 to investigate allegations of corruption, act on anonymous complaints of graft, and propose legislation to strengthen ethical standards for public officials and employees. As you noted, two inspectors were assassinated. Each Iraqi government ministry appointed an inspector general to investigate waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.

Some progress has been made. As a result of a May 2005 audit by the CPI of some \$1.2 billion in procurements by the Ministry of Defense, arrest warrants were issued for the former defense minister and two dozen other officials for various improprieties. While the exact amount of Iraqi money that was siphoned off to corruption has yet to be determined, as DoD has informed Congress, no U.S. taxpayers' funds were involved in this alleged corruption. Notably, significant quantities of equipment procured using these funds have, in fact, been delivered to the Iraqi forces. Moreover, DoD and UK advisors concerned about the handling of these procurements have worked with Iraqi officials to put in place better oversight processes with the Ministry of Defense for equipment acquisition. They also have worked to develop the contracting capacity of the ministry.

R 05952-06

11-L-0559/OSD/59326

X

Iraq

(5 Apr 06)

The U.S. Government also ~~has carried out an~~ extensive program of audit and oversight of ~~funds~~ appropriated for Iraq reconstruction ~~through~~ organizations, including the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) . These ~~institutional~~ safeguards are ~~in place to~~ thwart potential fraud, waste and abuse of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

In testimony on February 8, 2006 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), ~~reported that~~ there is little ~~evidence~~ of crimes involving appropriated ~~funds~~, saying: "Corruption is not a ~~pervasive~~ problem on the U.S. side of the reconstruction program."

As you point out, the responsibility for tackling Iraqi corruption is ~~now~~ an Iraqi responsibility. It is ~~a~~ matter of the political will of the Iraqi leadership to overcome the culture of kleptocracy imbued ~~by~~ Saddam Hussein. I think this message has been heard. ~~On~~ April 24, Prime Minister-designate Nouri Al-Maliki said Iraqi society must be cleansed of ~~terrorism and~~ the government must be rid of "administrative corruption." We will work closely with ~~the new~~ Iraqi government to help it achieve ~~that~~ goal.

You mention a number of other ~~serious~~ problems, such as the unhealthy dependence of the Iraqi economy on oil and "death ~~squads~~." The prerequisite for solving any of them is the formation of a competent government with the political ~~support~~ to take serious action. ~~Thanks~~ to U.S. and Iraqi resolve, ~~this~~ is happening. Your ~~understanding~~ and personal attention ~~to~~ these matters – demonstrated ~~by~~ your two trips to ~~Iraq~~ – is an important ~~part~~ of ~~that~~ resolve.

Thank you for your continued support of our troops.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Eric S. Edelman", written in a cursive style.

Eric S. Edelman

GINNY BROWN-WAITE  
5TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON  
FINANCIAL SERVICES

COMMITTEE ON  
VETERANS' AFFAIRS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

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WASHINGTON, DC 20515  
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(888) GWAITE5

3808 MERIDIAN AVENUE, SUITE A  
DADE CITY, FL 33825  
(352) 567-6797  
(888) GWAITE5

April 5, 2006

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary Of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

~~Dear~~ Secretary Rumsfeld

This letter is to express my grave concerns about the public perception of the situation in Iraq. Media reports, as well as anecdotal evidence from people returning from the region claim that we **are** not making progress and that the situation is steadily deteriorating. As you know, I have visited Iraq this year and while I do not agree with the media driven assessment of stagnation, I **am** very concerned with the growing reports of crippling corruption within the Iraqi government. It is my firm belief that this epidemic may hurt our chances of victory.

On my travels to the region and in my meetings with constituents who have returned from Iraq, corruption is the overriding concern. In fact, many feel that the current security situation is exasperated by a monetary system that **relies** solely on cash transactions and that has little or no financial oversight of U.S. funding. This situation leads to a society awash in American cash, significant amounts of which are bound to fall into the wrong hands.

**Here are** some major incidents which have been in the news or have been reported to me:

- In 2004, Iraq set up the Commission on Public Integrity to investigate allegations of corruption. At any given time, there **are** 31 inspectors. Since the Commission was established, two inspectors have been assassinated, and **many more are** so frightened that they cannot **effectively perform** their job.
- About six months ago, **27** senior officials within the Iraqi government were arrested under suspicion of "misappropriating" nearly \$1 billion from the defense ministry. This included the former Minister of Defense, Hazim al-Shaalan.
- The Ministry of the Interior, which includes the police force and which is predominantly Shiite, has been accused of commissioning "death **squads**" against Sunnis. Hundreds of bodies have **turned up** in recent months. While in Iraq, the Sunni elected officials pointed this out to our delegation traveling there. From all **reports**, the situation has since worsened.
- There are numerous reports that Iraqi government officials abuse their travel expense accounts and demand cash payments for official work.
- A police trainer estimates that within six months 80% of the trainees will be "on the take." The corruption in the police force is **well** known there by the U.S. contractors performing the training. I

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was told that trained officers **are** assigned to a police unit and the head of the unit **offers** to the officers the following, "Stay home and give me half of the \$400 per month salary." I have also heard that police officers are selling their weapons **and/or** ammunition and asking for replacements, pocketing the cash.

- e **The** military facilities in Iraq are hampered by the sole source interpreter contract. It is just not feasible and poses problems in the field where they are desperately in need of more interpreters.
- The Iraqi government needs to **seek** world-wide business partnerships to expand their revenue sources. Currently 92% of that country's budget comes from oil revenues. Yet, the natural **gas** reserves are virtually untapped and could help the Iraqi government become **less** dependent on U.S. tax dollars for reconstruction.


I **am** also concerned that within **the** President's remarks and strategic plan for victory there are scant references to tackling corruption. By DOD estimates, we are spending nearly \$6 billion a month in Iraq. I would like to have specific and additional assurances that **this** money is spent wisely and is not reaching the insurgency or lining the pockets of Iraqi officials.

The points highlighted above lay out what I believe, and what I believe the President and you feel as well, is that **the** Iraqi government must take more **responsibility** for the day-to-day operations of their country. Military and civilians returning home said the Iraqis will bleed us **dry** as long as we supply the money.

I have consistently voted against a troop withdrawal date because I think it would be foolhardy to let the terrorists **know** when we will be removing troops. This policy of retreat and run is not **one** that will prevent the spread of terrorism. However, setting some dates for the Iraqi government to **be** more responsible for their own security and their country's **future** would be prudent.

I suggest we set some specific **dates** for the new Iraqi government to assume various functions. Without these deadlines, the feet dragging will continue. In the long **run**, these deadlines for the Iraqi government to step up and **let** us step down will mean fewer U.S. expenditures both in military and reconstruction funds.

Sincerely,



Ginny Brown-Waite  
Member of Congress



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 10 2006

IN-42

The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite  
U.S. House of Representatives  
414 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-1002

Dear Representative Brown-Waite:

Thank you for your recent letter following up on your concerns regarding setting deadlines for the Government of Iraq (GoI) to take over various governmental functions. Given that the Defense Department leads the U.S. Government (USG) security efforts in Iraq, while all other USG activities in Iraq are led by the State Department, my response will focus on the Iraqis assuming security responsibilities.

Over the past year, as the attached graphic illustrates, the number of Iraqi combat units operating "in the lead" and the land area for which they are responsible have **grown** dramatically. Iraqi security forces now have the lead in roughly 65 percent of Iraq's territory – an area populated by about 60 percent of the Iraqi people. Since July 2006, the provinces of Muthanna and Dhi Qar have passed into Provincial Iraqi Control. The GoI's goal is for all 18 Iraqi provinces to be under Provincial Iraqi Control by the end of 2007.


The GoI is a broad-based unity government and building a consensus on the difficult issues facing Iraq can be time-consuming. Nevertheless, the GoI is not dragging its **feet** with respect to assuming security responsibilities.

Thank you for your continued interest in Iraq's future and your support for the U.S. *Armed Forces*.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/59330



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
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23 Aug 06

# Iraqi Army Lead and National Police Lead


UNCLASSIFIED



Component	DIV HQs	BDE HQs	BNs
Iraqi Army	1	4	23
National Police	0	2	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>29</b>

Source: MNC-I, C3 as of 30 Oct 2005

As of: 18 September 2006



Component	DIV HQs	BDE HQs	BNs
Iraqi Army	6		88
National Police	0		2
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>90</b>

Source: MNC-I, C3 as of 18 Sep 2006

Iraqi Army Lead  
 National Police Lead

11-L-0559/OSD/59331

~~FOUO~~

AUG 23 2006

TO: Marc Thiessen  
CC: Matt Latimer  
Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: E-Mail from Newt

Attached is a piece I received from Newt.

Attach: 8/9/06 E-Mail from New Gingrich

DHR:as  
SF082206-01

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59332

OSD 13448-06



8/24/2006 5:37 PM



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

8/23

**From:** Thirdwave2 [thirdwave2@speaker Gingrich.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 09, 2006 11:04 PM  
**To:** jboffert@who.eop.gov  
**Subject:** a system for outlining real change

To **regain** the momentum and have the support of a majority of the American people we need a Joint Session address.

Only a major address in front of the Congress has the historic weight to potentially get the country's approval and to set the stage for **real** change. Normal speeches will simply be shrugged off.

Furthermore developing a truly historic Joint Session address will require the tough **internal** assessments and the tough decisions about real change.

Henry Kissinger once said that all the really big decisions he was involved in took 48 hours. You did not always know when the 48 hours would begin but when they did you could bring to bear a lifetime of thought and reach the decisions.

We are in a one to ~~two~~ week period of hard thinking by the top five people (Bush, Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Pace) with some help from others. We are not in a period where a long bureaucratic process will do any good.

This core group might want to ask a lot of questions and seek a number of experts for specific advice but the **core** development of an outline of reality, a theory of success and a set of key very large proposals for change is really a senior level process. Trying to staff it at lower levels just takes all the creativity and drive out of it.

The questions to be asked (with possible briefs from appropriate people in response) are pretty simple:

1. where did we think we would be 5 years after 9/11?
2. Where are we?
3. Which of the differences are a result of outside forces we did not anticipate?
4. Which of the differences reflect strategic mistakes on our part?
5. Which of the differences reflect bureaucratic incapability to meet the requirements of the modern world?
6. Now that we have assessed where we are, what does victory require?
7. What strategies will be necessary?
8. What fundamental changes in our systems will be required to carry out those strategies?
9. How will we explain this to the American people, the news media and the Congress.

When these nine steps have been worked through it is time to prepare a Joint Session Address and outline the hard painful lessons of the first five years of our war with terrorism and dictatorship.

I will send you some specific examples but the examples are less important than the process.

The President has to personally come to grips with the fact that we are not where he wanted us to be. He has to tackle the redefinition of the war and the requirements of survival. Only then can this have any real meaning.

8/10/2006

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*Ron White's The Eloquent President is a good start in this kind of thinking.*

newt

8/10/2006

11-L-0559/OSD/59334



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300  
ACTION MEMO

August 25, 2006 10:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

*Robert L. Wilkie*

SUBJECT: Congressional Engagement Strategy and Snowflake Response (#80406-06)

You asked us to prepare a list of issues where we would like assistance from Congressional Members. The below list represents the authorization and appropriations Conference priorities you have identified.

We have also developed an integrated plan designed to allow you and other senior defense leaders to engage on our legislative priorities in the authorization and appropriations conferences scheduled to begin when Congress returns on September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2006.

- Congress will be in session for three and a half weeks in September 5-29<sup>th</sup>.
- Recommend SECDEF and all other DoD principles engage Members of the House and Senate to push for DoD priorities in the final FY 07 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills.
- See attached timeline for schedule of planned engagement. (Tab 2)

DOD AUTHORIZATION PRIORITIES:

1. Expand Train and Equip Authorities to win the Global War on Terrorism.

a) DoD's number one priority is Sec. 1206 (of both the House and Senate Defense Authorization bills), Building Partnership Security Capacity.

- Eliminate 2007 sunset clause.
- Include use of security forces.
- Allow President and SecState to waive restrictions.
- Move authority from the President to the SECDEF and SecState

b) Modify language concerning Global CERP

- Allow program to expand beyond operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
- Eliminate 2008 sunset provision.
- Eliminate limited funding clause of \$200,000 per country per year—limits ability to use this authority as intended.

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2. Remove provisions which affect the Department's ability to manage the force.
  - Support a 2.2% pay raise.
  - Restrictions on our ability to adjust TRICARE fees and co-pays must expire on January 1, 2007 rather than December 2007.
3. Remove congressional provisions which restrict the Department's ability to retire U-2, KC-135E, F-117, C-130E/H and B-52 aircraft.
  - Restrictions limit the Department's ability to field critical new technologies.
  - Associated maintenance and repair costs of older equipment continue to rise.
4. Fully fund Conventional Trident Modification program.
  - Failure to fund CTM delays capability to respond promptly and precisely to time-sensitive, high-value targets anywhere.
  - Department's initiative to modify Trident Missiles with conventional warheads is crucial element in transformation effort and pivotal to achieving objectives of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
5. Army and Marine Corps reset funds.

#### DOD APPROPRIATIONS PRIORITIES:

1. Recommend Congress pass the FY 07 Defense Appropriations Bill by September 30, 2006.
2. Urge Members to support the DoD base budget topline.
3. Emergency funding for critical GWOT priorities:
  - Ask for Member support of the \$13.1 billion added by the Senate to the Bridge for Army and Marine Corps reset—for a total of \$63.1 billion in the Bridge.
  - Ask for full funding, \$3.2 billion, for Security Forces Funding in the Bridge fund to train and equip Iraqi and Afghan security forces.
  - Ask for full funding, \$1 billion, for Coalition Support Funding in the Bridge to support key allies such as Jordan and Pakistan in border operations.
  - Ask for full funding, \$2.1 billion, for Joint IED Defeat Organization.
4. Recommend full funding, \$127 million, for Conventional Trident Modification.

COORDINATION. USD(C)

SECDEF DECISION:

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Other: \_\_\_\_\_

#### ATTACHMENTS

1. SECDEF Snowflake#SF080406-06
2. Engagement Timeline Graphic
3. Engagement Timeline Details
4. Appropriations Engagement 11-L-0559/OSD/59336

~~FOUO~~

August 04, 2006

TO Robert Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: List of Items for Congressional Members

There are people in Congress who want to help us. Please pull together a list of things we want Congress to do.

Once you have a draft completed, please give it to me, so I can start working it.

Thanks.

DHR:es  
SF080406-06


.....  
*Please Respond By 08/17/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59337

# Defense Appropriations & Authorization Engagement Timeline

## August/September 2007 Key Dates



JUL 27 – Dr. Cambone

Engagement: Letter to Senators Warner/Levin and Reps. Hunter/Skelton

Issue: Military Intelligence Program (MIP) Funding

AUG 26 – SECDEF

Engagement: Reception W/Senator Stevens

Issues: Top 4 Appropriations Conference Priorities —Pass bill by Sept 30; Restore base budget topline; Emergency funding for GWOT (Reset, Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces, Coalition Support, IEDs); Full funding for Conventional Trident Modification (CTM).

AUG 27 – SECDEF

Engagement: Press Event, Missile Defense Site FT Greely, AK

Issue: Missile Defense

AUG 28 – SECDEF

Engagement: Phone Call to Chairman Warner and Chairman Hunter

Issues: Authorization Conference Priorities-Expanding Building Partnership Capacity, Global CERF, Force Management issues—pay raises and TRICARE fees, Deletion of program retirement restrictions, Conventional Trident Modification, Army and Marine Corps reset funds.

AUG 31 – CENTCOM/Comptroller

Engagement: Briefing to HAC-D Staff

Issue: Coalition Support, Afghan/Iraq Security Forces Funding

SEPT 5 – SECARMY

Engagement: Letter to Warner/Levin/Hunter/Skelton

Issue: Support for full funding Future Combat Systems(FCS)

SEPT 5 – Chairman Pace

Engagement: Letter to Senators Warner/Levin and Reps. Hunter/Skelton

Issues: JCS Key Priorities-Finish bill by September 30, 2006, CTM, JIEDDO, Reset Fund for Army and Marine Corps

SEPT 5 – Dr. Chu

Engagement: Letter to Senators Warner/Levin and Reps. Hunter/Skelton

Issues: MILPERS, TRICARE, cuts to O&M

SEPT 5 – SECDEF

Engagement: Letter to White House Chief of Staff Bolton (copy Vice President Cheney, as President of the Senate)

Issues: Request assistance in urging Senate to pass bill by September 8 and move immediately to conference, and to support President's request for Defense base budget.

SEPT 6 – GEN Meigs

Engagement: Meeting with Senators Warner/Levin

Issue: JIEDDO

**SEPT 7 – SECARMY**

Engagement: Meeting with Senators Warner/Levin and Reps. Hunter/Skelton

Issues: FCS (Future Combat Systems)

**SEPT 7 – SECDEF**

Engagement: Phone call to Senator Frist and Rep. Hastert

Issues: Budget Topline – finish bill by Sept 30, 2006

**SEPT 12 – SECDEF**

Engagement: Phone call to Senators Cochran/Byrd and Reps. Lewis/Obey

Issues: Top 5 Appropriations Conference Priorities —Pass bill by Sept 30; Restore base budget topline; Emergency funding for GWOT (Reset, Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces, Coalition Support, IEDs); Conventional Trident Modification (CTM); missile defense.

**SEPT 12 – SECDEF/DSD/USD's/CJCS/VCJCS**

Engagement: Lunch with Senators Stevens/Inouye and Reps. Young/Murtha

Issues: Top 5 Appropriations Conference Priorities —Pass bill by Sept 30; Restore base budget topline; Emergency funding for GWOT (Reset, Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces, Coalition Support, IEDs); Conventional Trident Modification (CTM); missile defense.

**SEPT 12 – GEN Abizaid**

Engagement: Letter to Senators Stevens/ Inouye  
and Reps. Young/Murtha

Issues: Finish bill by September 30, 2006, Coalition support funding.  
Security Forces Funding

**SEPT 13 – Dr. Cambone**

Engagement: Letter to Senators Stevens/ Inouye  
And Reps. Young/Murtha

Issues: Military Intelligence Program (MIP) Funding

**SEPT 13 – Chairman Pace**

Engagement: Letter to Senators Cochran/Stevens/Byrd/Inouye  
And Reps. Lewis/Young/Murtha/Obey

Issues: JCS Key Priorities-Finish bill by September 30, 2006, CTM, JIEDDO,  
Reset Fund for Army and Marine Corps, Joint Cargo Aircraft

**SEPT 13 – SECDEF**

Engagement: Letter to Senators Cochran/Stevens/Byrd/Inouye  
And Reps. Lewis/Young/Murtha/Obey

Issues: Top 5 Appropriations Conference Priorities —Pass bill by Sept 30; Restore base budget topline; Emergency funding for GWOT (Reset, Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces, Coalition Support, IEDs); Conventional Trident Modification (CTM); missile defense.



SEPT 13 – Dr. Chu

Engagement: Letter to Senators Stevens/Inouye and Reps. Young/Murtha

Issues: MILPERS, cuts to O&M

SEPT 13- Mr. Kreig

Engagement: Letter to Senators Stevens/Inouye and Reps. Young/Murtha

Issues: Conventional Trident Modification (CTM), Joint Strike Fighter, Joint Cargo Aircraft, DD(X), Future Combat System, EA-18G, Space Radar[?], Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, Littoral Combat Ship, T-AKE cargo ship, Transformational Medical Technology Initiative, reject congressional acquisition reductions

SEPT 13 – DSD, Jonas, VCJCS

Engagement: Meeting with Senators Stevens/ Inouye

And Reps. Young/Murtha

Issues: Conference Priorities- Base Budget topline, finish bill by September 30, 2006, Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), Missile Defense, General Transfer Authority, Conventional Trident Modification (CTM)

SEPT 13 – SECNAV

Engagement: Letter to Senators /Stevens/Inouye and Reps. Young/Murtha

Issues: Split Funding DDX, Littoral Combat Ships

SEPT 13 – LT Gen Obering

Engagement: Meeting with Senators /Stevens/Inouye and Reps. Young/Murtha

Issues: Missile Defense

SEPT 14 – Service Chiefs

Engagement: Meeting with Senators /Stevens/Inouye and Reps. Young/Murtha

Issues: MILPERS, O&M, finish bill by September 30, 2006, Reset Fund

SEPT 14 – DSD, Jonas, VCJCS

Engagement: Meetings with Senators Leahy, Shelby, Mikulski, McConnell,

And Reps. Hobson, Bonilla, Dicks

Issues: Acquisition Transfer Fund, Missile Defense, JIEDDO, General Transfer Authority (MILPERS and O&M)

SEPT 14 – Dr. Cambone

Engagement: Meeting with Senators /Stevens/Inouye and Reps. Young/Murtha

Issues: MIP Funding

SEPT 20 – SECDEF

Engagement: Meeting with targeted House Members

Issue: Pep talk before elections

SEPT 29 – Target Adjournment

**SECDEF TOP 4 APPROPRIATIONS CONFERENCE PRIORITIES:**

1. Recommend Congress pass the FY 07 Defense Appropriations Bill by September 30, 2006.
2. Urge Members to support the DoD base budget topline.
3. Emergency funding for critical GWOT priorities:
  - Ask for Member support of the \$13.1 billion added by the Senate to the Bridge for Army and Marine Corps reset—for a total of \$63.1 billion in the Bridge.
  - Ask for full funding, \$3.2 billion, for Security Forces Funding in the Bridge fund to train and equip Iraqi and Afghan security forces.
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  - Ask for full funding, \$2.1 billion, for Joint IED Defeat Organization.
4. Recommend full funding, \$127 million, for the Conventional Trident Modification program.

**DEPSECDEF APPROPRIATIONS CONFERENCE PRIORITIES:**

1. Recommend Congress pass the FY 07 Defense Appropriations Bill by September 30, 2006.
2. Urge Members to support the DoD base budget topline for Defense.
3. Urge Congress reject proposed large acquisition funding reductions and minimize unrequested adds and cuts.
4. Ask for full funding, \$2.1 billion, for Joint IED Defeat Organization.
5. ~~General~~ Transfer Authority of \$5 billion.

**CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF APPROPRIATIONS CONFERENCE PRIORITIES:**

1. Recommend Congress pass the FY 07 Defense Appropriations Bill by September 30, 2006.
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  - Ask for full funding, \$2.1 billion, for Joint IED Defeat Organization.
4. Recommend full funding, \$127 million, for the Conventional Trident Modification program.
  5. Joint Cargo Aircraft.

**UNDER SECRETARIES, VICE CHAIRMAN JCS, SERVICES, AND COCOM  
APPROPRIATIONS CONFERENCE PRIORITIES:**

1. SECDEF Top 4 Appropriations Priorities.
2. \$843 million request for the Military Intelligence Program is needed to fund additional tactical intelligence activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as Predator and Global Hawk operations and force protection.
3. Reductions to personnel (House cut \$1.1 billion) and operating funds (Senate cut \$3.6 billion) would impair the Department's ability to fund essential requirements, threaten military quality-of-life and combat readiness and training ultimately undermine the U.S. war efforts.
4. Full funding for key transformational programs: Future Combat System, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Joint Cargo Aircraft, EA-18G, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, Transformational Satellite, Space Radar, Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, Littoral Combat Ship, T-AKE cargo ship, tanker replacement, split funding for the two DD(X) lead ships, and the Transformational Medical Technology Initiative.
5. Urge Congress reject proposed large acquisition funding reductions and minimize unrequested adds and cuts. This diversion of resources can negatively impact our military's most pressing funding requirements.
6. Restoration of needed cost-saving measures requested by the President. For instance, elimination of the JSF alternate engine would save the Department \$1.8 billion through FY 2011, thereby yielding the best taxpayer value for this program.
7. Approval of \$5 billion in general transfer authority, which will provide the flexibility needed to operate the Department efficiently while fighting the GWOT.

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~~FOUO~~

August 04, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: List of Items for Congressional Members

There are people in Congress who want to help us. Please pull together a list of things we want Congress to do.

Once you have a draft completed, please give it to me, so I can start working it.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
SP080406-06

.....

Please Respond By 08/17/06

AUG 29 2006

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SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

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Abb-2

25 AUG-06

11-L-0559/OSD/59344

Action to  
NESA

~~FOUO~~

August 17, 2006

Middle East

TO Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA.*

SUBJECT: Economic Info on Israel

Please give me the total gross domestic product and GDP per capita of Israel compared to its Arab neighboring states, excluding Saudi Arabia, which has oil.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF081706-13

\*\*\*\*\*

*Please Respond By 08/24/06*

~~FOUO~~

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11-L-0559/OSD/59345

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8/25/2006 2:36:25 PM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Economic

Information on Israel and Neighboring States (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked for some statistics on Israel and neighboring Arab states.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The table below is based on World Bank statistics for calendar year 2004.
  - Statistics for 2005 are still being revised.

	(\$ GDP	(\$ GDP Per Capita	Population
Israel	116.9B	17,191	6.8M
Egypt	78.8B	1,085	72.6M
Syria	24B	1,290	18.6M
Lebanon	21.8B	6,228	3.5M
Jordan	11.5B	2,127	5.4M



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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59346

OSD 13504-06



8/25/2006 2:38:12 PM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(U) POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

**Subject:** Economic Information on Israel and Neighboring States (U)

**I-Number:** 06/010702

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
USD(P)	Eric Edelman	<i>EE</i> 8/24/08
PDASD(ISA)	Mary Beth Long	<i>MB Long</i> 8/23/08
Dir MENA	<i>Shelly</i> Paul Hufley	8-22-08

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59347

*Action to  
NE SA*

~~FOUO~~

August 17, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Economic Info on Israel

Please give me the total gross domestic product and GDP per capita of Israel compared to its Arab neighboring states, excluding Saudi Arabia, which has oil.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
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\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 08/24/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59348

OSD 13504-06



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ADD 2 1 1006

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*8/23/06*  
FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)  
SUBJECT: Economic Information on Israel and Neighboring States (U)

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Egypt	78.8B	1,085	72.6M
Syria	24B	1,290	18.6M
Lebanon	21.8B	6,228	3.5M
Jordan	11.5B	2,127	5.4M

Middle East

23 Aug 06



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59349

24-00-

OSD 13504-06



8/25/2006 2:38:12 PM

1704506

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(U) POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

**Subject:** Economic Information on Israel and Neighboring States(U)

**I-Number:** 06/010702


<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
USD(P)	Eric Edelman	<i>EE</i> 8/14/06
PDASD(ISA)	Mary Beth Long	<i>MB Long</i> 8/23/06
Dir MENA	<i>Shirley</i> Ruth Hume	8-22-06

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59350

~~FOUO~~

August 07, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Web Casting my Speeches

Are we web casting my speeches? Please see the attached.

Attach: 5/17/06 Duman e-mail to Larry Di Rita

DHR:aa  
SP080706-10

.....  
*Please Respond By August 15, 2006*

*over from Allison*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59351

OSD 13522-06



8/28/2006 6 58 46 AM

8/25/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith)  
SUBJECT: Web Casting


Your speeches are web cast on the Pentagon Channel internet site.

When there is a live feed of **your** speech, the Pentagon Channel carries it live on the internet and then it is archived so people can view it at a different time or multiple times.

When your speech is not carried live, the Pentagon Channel receives a tape of the speech and then web casts it on the internet.

Speeches given at smaller venues that are not recorded on video, are not web cast but the transcript is posted on Defenselink.

11-L-0559/OSD/59352



~~FOUO~~

August 08, 2006

TO: Allison Barber

c c : Dorrance Smith  
Robert Rangel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.A.*

SUBJECT: Frank Gannon

Frank Gannon might be able to help out with the wounded or maybe with America Supports You. Why don't you think about getting him in, brief him on what you are doing, and ask if he has any ideas. He used to be my White House fellow, and he has done a lot of things over the years. He is an interesting person.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SFO80706-26

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/24/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59353


OSD 13523-06



8/28/2006 7:07:43 AM

8/25/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Allison Barber 

SUBJECT: Frank Gannon

I have called and left messages for Frank but have yet to hear back from him.  
Your front office provided the number to me. I will continue to try.

11-L-0559/OSD/59354

OSD 13523-06



8/28/2006 7:07:34 AM

~~FOUO~~

AUG 28 2006

TO: The Honorable Joshua Bolten  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Warner Proposal for Hearings on "Civil War"

I talked to Senator Ted Stevens yesterday about Senator Warner's concept of Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on "civil war" and whether or not there ought to be a new Resolution.

He was negative, and he agrees it is not a good idea. He said he believed it is pressure - probably from Ted Kennedy, John McCain and some others on the Committee - causing John Warner to raise that issue, which is understandable.

Senator Stevens suggested one way to deal with it might be to have the President invite down Senators Stevens, McConnell, Roberts, Frist, McCain, and Warner and maybe some others and talk about it. The Senators could work with the President to avoid it.

Thanks

Don R  
20060828

.....

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13555-06



11-L-0559/OSD/59355

8/29/2006 8:35:20 AM

~~FOUO~~

AUG 28 2006

TO: The Honorable Joshua Bolten  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Warner Proposal for Hearings on "Civil War"

I talked to Senator Ted Stevens yesterday about Senator Warner's concept of Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on "civil war" and whether or not there ought to be a new Resolution.

He was negative, and he agrees it is not a good idea. He said he believed it is pressure -- probably from Ted Kennedy, John McCain and some others on the Committee -- causing John Warner to raise that issue, which is understandable.

Senator Stevens suggested one way to deal with it might be to have the President invite down Senators Stevens, McConnell, Roberts, Frist, McCain, and Warner and maybe some others -- and talk about it. The Senators could work with the President to avoid it.

Thanks

cc: [redacted]  
[redacted]

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59356



OSD 13555-06

8/29/2006 8:35:10 AM



~~FOUO~~

AUG 28 2006

To: **Vice** Resident Richard B. *Cheney*  
Stephen J. Hadley

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Marin Strmecki and **Afghanistan** Briefing

I asked Dr. **Marin** Strmecki to spend some weeks in **Afghanistan** and provide me an assessment of the ~~situation~~ and his recommendations. He is the individual who helped fashion the warlord strategy that Zal implemented so skillfully with President Karzai several years ago.

I just saw his briefing and found it to be most impressive. Given the new level of the insurgency there, he proposes a strategy that I think merits our careful attention.

If you folks are willing to take this briefing, which I hope you will, I think you will agree that it is an excellent job. If you agree, I think it would be useful for the President to see it.

Please let me know ~~what~~ we can do to ~~set~~ it up.

Thanks.

DER:zh  
082606-01TS

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59357

B-2  
2


~~FOUO~~

AUG 28 2006

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Marin Strmecki and Afghanistan Briefing

I asked Dr. Marin Strmecki to spend some weeks in Afghanistan and provide me an assessment of the situation and his recommendations. He is the individual who helped fashion the warlord strategy that Zal implemented so skillfully with President Karzai several years ago.

I just saw his briefing and found it to be most impressive. Given the new level of the insurgency there, he proposes a strategy that I think merits our careful attention.

If you folks are willing to take this briefing which I hope you will, I think you will agree that it is an excellent job. If you agree, I think it would be useful for the President to see it.

Please let me know what we can do to set it up.

Thanks.

DJR:dh  
082606-0175

11-L-0559/OSD/59358

~~FOUO~~

August 10, 2006

TO: Dorrance ~~Smith~~

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Speakers for Devon Cross

Attached is a list of people who could possibly speak to the groups Devon Cross gathers in London. It is just a starter list.

You and Eric Edelman ought to develop a better list and categorize the speakers. When you have done that, please let me see it.

Thanks.

Attach. List of potential speakers for Devon Cross

DHR:dh  
SF081006-28

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/31/06*

358.021

10 Aug 06

11-L-0559/OSD/59359

OSD 13592-06



8/29/2006 10:15:00 AM

~~FOUO~~

August 23, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*RA.*

SUBJECT: List of Potential Speakers for Devon Cross

Do you have an interim response for me regarding the attached August 11 memo concerning getting speakers lined up for Devon Cross?

Thanks.

Attach. 8/11/06 SD memo to PA (SF081006-28)

DHR:dh  
SF082306-06

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/31/06*

352.001

23 Aug 06

10 Aug 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59360

OSD 13592-06



8/29/2006 10:18:54 AM

~~FOUO~~

INFO MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Eric S. Edelman

SEP 01 2006

SUBJECT: Speakers for Devon Cross

- Per your request (note next under), Dorrance Smith and I have suggested additional names to your list of possible speakers to work with Devon Cross on her initiative with London-based Arab and European press.
- Attached (Tab A) is a matrix with proposed speakers and a breakdown of their likely areas of expertise. Names that we suggested **are** highlighted in yellow.
- I think that Devon's efforts are useful. I traveled to London on August 30-31 to participate in a series of press roundtables and interviews arranged by Devon. I thought the sessions were productive and reached an audience that we normally do not tap. (NOTE: A complete report of my trip has been provided to your office under separate cover.)

Attachments: As stated.

Coordination: Dorrance Smith, ASD-PA



~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59361

OSD 13592-06



9/5/2006 9:08:16 AM

8/11/06  
11:15

FOUO

August 10, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Speakers for Devon Cross

Attached is a list of people who could possibly speak to the groups Devon Cross gathers in London. It is just a starter list.

You and Eric Edelman ought to develop a better list and categorize the speakers. When you have done that, please let me see it.

Thanks.

Attach. List of potential speakers for Devon Cross

DELA  
SF081006-28

.....  
Please Respond By 08/31/06

FOUO

OSD 13592-06



9/5/2006 9:08:59 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/59362

August 10, 2006

**Devon Cross List**

**Military**

Abizaid  
Casey  
Chiarelli  
Craddock  
Dempsey  
Eikenberry  
Fallon  
Giambastiani  
Jones  
Maples  
Moseley  
Mullen  
Odierno  
Pace  
Schoomaker  
Willard

**Civilian**

Dave Barno  
Marshall Billingslea  
Josh Bolten  
Steve Bradbury  
Steve Cambone  
J.D. Crouch  
Dan Fata  
Van Galbraith  
Carlos Gutierrez  
John Hillen  
Bob Joseph  
Zal Khalilzad  
Bob Kimmitt  
Mary Beth Long  
Jim MacDougall  
John Negroponte  
Toria Nuland  
Hank Paulson  
Roger Pardo-Maurer  
John Rood  
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer  
Henry Schlesinger  
Josette Shiner  
Marin Strmecki  
Ruth Wedgwood  
Theresa Whalen

# Experts and Possible Interview Topics for Devon Cross

Name	Topics of Specialization							
	CIVILIANS							
Dave Boren	X	X	X			X		Military education building partner capacity
Marshall Billingslea							X	U.S. role in NATO
Josh Bolton		X				X		President's Freedom Agenda
Steve Bradburn				X				International legal issues
Steve Canine	X	X		X	X			Intelligence sharing/networks
J.D. Crouch	X	X	X	X				All regional issues
Eric Edelman	X	X	X	X		X		All regional issues
Dan Fata			X				X	ISAF in Afghanistan EU; NATO and country-specific issues
Van Gulerath							X	NATO/EU
Carlos Gutierrez	X	X	X					Regional economic development; regional Department of Commerce projects
Ryan Henry		X		X	X	X		QDR goals; security cooperation
Jim Haynes		X	X	X				International legal issues
John Hillan		X	X					Peacekeeping operations; foreign military assistance
Bob Joergs				X				CBRNE issues; nonproliferation; technology transfer
Zal Marshall	X	X	X			X	X	Latest issues in Baghdad; comments on the insurgency and state of security in Iraq, etc.
Bob Kinnear		X	X					Economic development; terrorist financial networks
Richard Lawless				X		X		U.S. relations with countries in Asia with large Muslim populations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Philippines); impact of GWOT in Asia
Mary Beth Long		X	X		(FOUO)			Counternarcotics; Gulf States, India, Pakistan



# Experts and Possible Interview Topics for Devon Cross

Name	Topics of Specialization								
Tom McDonnell				X			X		U.S. security relationship in Central Asia; Russia and the Balkans
Paul McHale				X					Homeland defense; building partner capacity; countering terrorist networks
John McQuinn		X	X	X					Intelligence sharing/networks
John Nelson			X				X	X	ISAF in Afghanistan; NATO's expeditionary capabilities
Mark Paulson	X								Regional economic development
Robert Rando-Martin				X		X			Trends in Western Hemisphere; comparison/contrast to Middle East political situation
John Rhee				X					CBRNE issues; nonproliferation
Mark de Vries				X		X		X	NATO, EU
Jim Schindler	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	All regional issues
Janette Shinn	X	X	X						Regional economic development; Central Asia
Cully Stimson					X				GTMO; implications of Hamdan case
Mark Stuenkel		X	X						Development of police forces
Mike Taha				X					International legal issues
William T. ...				X					GWOT in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa; counterterrorism cooperation; Somalia; Sudan/Darfur

(FOUO)

11-L-0559/OSD/59365

## Experts and Possible Interview Topics for Devon Cross

Name	Topics of Specialization									
	MILITARY									
Conway										
Dayton										
Reith										
Stufflebeam										
Ulrich										
Wald										
Ward										

~~(FOUO)~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59366

~~FOUO~~

August 10, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Speakers for Devon Cross

Attached is a list of people who could possibly speak to the groups Devon Cross gathers in London. It is just a starter list.

You and Eric Edelman ought to develop a better list and categorize the speakers. When you have done that, please let me see it.

Thanks.

Attach. List of potential speakers for Devon Cross

DRR:dh  
SF081006-28

.....  
Please Respond By 08/31/06

*SIR,  
HERE IS THE LIST THAT HAS BEEN  
DEVELOPED WITH POLICY AND DEVON.  
I'M MEETING WITH DEVON ON TUESDAY 8/30 ON  
THE LIST AND HOW WE CAN MOVE AHEAD.  
ERIC EDELMAN IS TRAVELLING TO LONDON THIS  
WEEK. AMONG HIS ACTIVITIES, HE WILL SPEAK TO  
DEVON'S GROUP.  
I WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF  
ANY ERRORS*

~~FOUO~~

*DR*  
11-L-0559/OSD/59367

OSD 13592-08



8/29/2006 10:21:03 AM

350.001

18 AUG 06

10 AUG 06

# Experts and Possible Interview Topics for Devon Cross

Name	Topics of Specialization								
	CIVILIANS								
Dave Barno	X	X	X			X			Mili cap
Marshall Billingslea								X	U.S.
Josh Bolton		X				X			Pre
Steve Bradbury				X					Inte
Steve Cambone	X	X		X	X				Inte
J.D. Crouch	X	X	X	X					All
Eric Edelman	X	X	X	X		X			All
Dan Fata			X					X	ISA cou
Carlos Gutierrez	X	X	X						Reg reg pro
Ryan Henry		X		X	X	X			QDI
Jim Haynes		X	X	X					Inte
John Hiltner		X	X						Pos mill
Bob Joseph				X					CBI tecl
Zai Khalilzad	X	X	X			X	X		Lat on sec
Bob Kennedy		X	X						Ecc fling
Richard Lawson				X		X			U.S wlt (Inc Phi)
Mary Beth Long		X	X						Col Pat

(FOUO)

11-L-0559/OSD/59368

# Experts and Possible Interview Topics for Devon Cross

Name	Topics of Specialization								
Jim MacDougall				X			X		U.S. Asia Hom capa netw
Paul McHale				X					
John Negroponte		X	X	X					Intel
Toria Nuland			X				X	X	ISAF expt
Hank Paulson	X								Regl
Roger Pardo-Ma				X		X			Tran com polli
John Rood				X					CBF
Jaap de Hoop Schaffer				X		X		X	
Jim Schlesinger	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	All r
Josette Shiner	X	X	X						Reg Cen
Cully Stimson					X				GTH
Marin Strassick		X	X						Dev
Ruth Wedgwood				X					Inte
Theresa Whelan				X					GW Afri coo

(FOUO)

11-L-0559/OSD/59369

### Experts and Possible Interview Topics for Devon Cross

[illegible]

~~(FOUO)~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59370



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



ACTION MEMO

July 31, 2006; 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

Signature & Date

SUBJECT: Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) Additions and Deletions (June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendations)

- Vice Director, Joint Staff, requests approval of the results of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) Validation Board held on June 28, 2006 (Tab B).
  - Delete 8 positions and add 178 positions in permanent organizations.
  - Add 64 temporary positions in Joint Task Force Headquarters and other warfighting related organizations.
- Adding qualifying temporary positions to the JDAL, as an exception to policy, recognizes the intensely joint nature of deserving billets within the construct of our operational forces.
- By exercising your authority under title 10 U.S.C., section 664(b) to waive statutory tour lengths (Tab C), officers serving 12 consecutive months in approved billets would be eligible for award of full joint duty credit under title 10 U.S.C., section 664(F) (Tab D).
  - Full joint tour credit may be awarded these officers if, on a case-by-case basis, you determine the service completed by each is considered to be of sufficient intensity and scope to equate to a full tour of duty in a standard joint duty assignment.
- The list of positions recommended for deletion and inclusion on the JDAL is at Tab A. Full supporting documentation detailing the duties is on file.
- Subject to the exception for temporary positions, these positions meet the definition of a joint duty assignment as defined by DoDI 1300.20, paragraph E2.1.7. (Tab E).

RECOMMENDATION: Initial below to approve results of the JDAL Validation Board held in June 2006 (Tab A).

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DECISION

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: Tab F

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Col Hogg, OEPM, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/59371

3600-08  
8/29/2006  
10:40:55 AM

211

310610

# TAB A



## June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendations

### PROPOSED POSITIONS TO ADD

TAB	Activity	Position Number	Title	Svc
1	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051411	HQ's Commandant	Army
2	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051447	Chief, CENTCOM LNO	Army
3	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051448	CENTCOM LNO Operations Chief	Army
4	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051453	Pakistan LNO	Army
5	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051559	Intel Analyst (Day)	Army
6	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051569	Exercise Planner	Army
7	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051580	Log Planner	Army
8	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	100051620	CJ6 KMO	Navy
9	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051624	Director of Engineering, CJ7	Army
10	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051631	CJ7 Plans Liaison Officer	Army
11	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051673	IO Planner	Navy
12	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051674	IO Targeting Officer	Navy
13	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	100051675	PYSOP Chief	Army
14	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051677	IO Ops Officer	Navy
15	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051679	Chief, Joint Effects and Assessment Cell (JEAC)	Army
16	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051694	Media Plans Officer	Navy
17	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00051724	Asst Information Operation Planner	Navy
18	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00063799	Executive Officer	Army
19	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00064000	Force Protection Officer	Army
20	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00064299	Operations Officer	Army
21	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00064313	Ops Officer - Regional Engagement	Army
22	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00064335	Team Chief, MET-Ministry of Commercial Affairs	Navy
23	USCENTCOM - CFC - A	00065212	Chief, Political-Military Integration	Navy
24	USCENTCOM - CJTF HOA	00059589	Effects Officer	Navy
25	USCENTCOM - CJTF HOA	00064151	SE Country CMD Element OIC	Navy
26	USCENTCOM - CJTF HOA	00064155	UG Country CMD Element OIC	Navy
27	USCENTCOM - CJTF HOA	00064239	Contingency Contracting Officer	Navy
28	USCENTCOM - CJTF HOA	100064191	Special Projects Officer	Navy
29	USCENTCOM - CJTF HOA	00059488	SR Analyst, Fusion Cell Chief	Navy
30	USCENTCOM - CJTF HOA	00059592	IO Planner	Navy

## June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendations

31	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00058762	Intelligence Support OIC	Army
32	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00058948	IAP North Program Officer	Army
33	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00058652	IMET Officer	Army
34	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00058676	Ops Support Officer	Army
35	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00058541	Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General	Army
36	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00065181	Deputy Commandant, COIN CFE	Army
37	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00065180	Commandant, COIN CFE	Army
38	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00058673	(Plans) Officer	Army
39	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00065784	Operational Research and System Analyst (ORSA)	Army
40	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	100065785	Operational Research and System Analyst (ORSA)	Army
41	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00065786	Operational Research and System Analyst (ORSA)	Army
42	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00065783	Acquisition Officer/System Development	Air Force
43	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	00065781	Comptroller	Air Force
44	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	J8 0019	Comptroller	Air Force
45	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	J8 0020	Comptroller	Air Force
46	USCENTCOM - MNSTC	J8 0021	Comptroller	Air Force
47	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053373	Deputy Inspector General (Salem)	Army
48	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00064316	Deputy Inspector General (Bagram)	Army
49	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00064317	Deputy Inspector General (Kandahar)	Army
50	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053372	Inspector General	Army
51	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053328	Deputy CJ1	Army
52	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	OW53274	Detainee Operations OIC (Intel)	Army
53	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053099	Force Modernization/Integration OIC	Army
54	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00052981	Deputy CJ7	
55	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00052950	Deputy CJ8, Funds Control Officer	Army
56	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053513	Chief, CMO/IO and Effects	Army
57	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053487	Joint Planning Group CMO Plans Officer	Army
58	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053486	Civil-Military Coordination Officer	Army
59	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053534	Public Services Officer	Army
60	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053547	HCA Team Chief	Army
61	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053473	Chief, Civil Military Operations	Army
62	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053516	Chief for Reconstruction and Development	Army

## June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendations

63	USCENTCOM - CJTF 76	00053368	Chief, Detainee Operations	Army
64	USCENTCOM - JCC - I/A	00064682	Principle Asst Responsible for Contracting (PARC)	Army
65	ODNI	3V0074231	Special Assistant to the PDDNI	Nominative
66	ODNI	3V0051117	Executive Officer for Intelligence Support	Nominative
67	DSCA	00110	Navy Programs Officer	Navy
68	DSCA	91700	Country Program Manager	Navy
69	DLA	M8....01	Commander, Defense Distribution Mapping Activity	Navy
70	DLA	M9....01	Commander, Defense Dist Center, Sigonella Italy (DDSI)	Navy
71	DLA	MV....01	Commander, Defense Dist Center, Kuwait, SWA	Army
72	DLA	P...07	Deputy Director, DESC	Navy
73	DLA	PC....01	Commander, Defense Energy Support Center - Europe	Army
74	DLA	PK....01	Commander, DESC Middle East	Army
75	DLA	J4S...01	Commander, DLA Central	Army
76	DLA	J67D...01	Commander, Defense Logistics Information Service	Marine Corps
77	DLA	IA....02	Chief, Forward Support Operations	Air Force
78	DLA	COL....01	Director, Land Supply Chain Customer Operations	Army
79	DLA	J4DO...08	Liaison Officer, The Joint Staff	Navy
80	JUAS COE	TBD	Deputy Commander, Joint UAS Center of Excellence	Rotational
81	JUAS COE	TBD	Division Chief, Joint Doctrine and Training Div	Rotational
82	JUASCOE	TBD	Division Chief, Joint UAS Battlelab Div	Rotational
83	JUASCOE	TBD	Concepts Branch Chief, Joint Doctrine and Training Div	Army
84	JUAS COE	TBD	Concepts Branch Proj Officer, Joint Doctrine & Train Div	Army
85	JUASCOE	TBD	Interoperability Branch Proj Off, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Army
86	JUAS COE	TBD	Interoperability Branch Proj Off, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Army
87	JUASME	TBD	Training Branch Proj Off, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Army
88	JUASCOE	TBD	Joint Combat Effects Branch Chief, Battlelab Div	Army
89	JUAS COE	TBD	Joint C4ISR Branch Chief, Battlelab Div	Army
90	JUAS COE	TBD	Concepts Branch Proj Off, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Marine Corps
91	JUASCOE	TBD	TTP Branch Chief, JT Doctrine and Training Div	Marine Corps
92	JUAS COE	TBD	Deputy Division Chief, Joint UAS Battlelab Div	Marine Corps
93	JUAS COE	TBD	Executive Asst, JUAS COE Headquarters and Staff	Navy
94	JUASCOE	TBD	TTP Branch Proj Off, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Navy

## June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendations

95	JUAS COE	TBD	TTP Branch Proj Off, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Navy
96	JUASCOE	TBD	Interoperability Branch Proj Off, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Navy
97	JUASCOE	TBD	Training Branch Chief, Joint Doctrine & Train Div	Navy
98	JUASCOE	TBD	Training Branch Proj Off, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Navy
99	JUASCOE	TBD	Integration Branch Proj Off, Battelab Div	Navy
100	JUAS COE	TBD	Joint C4ISR Branch Proj Off, Battelab Div	Navy
101	JUAS COE	TBD	Deputy Division Chief, JT Doctrine & Training	Air Force
102	JUASCOE	TBD	Concepts Branch Proj Officer, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Air Force
103	JUASCOE	TBD	TTP Branch Proj Off, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Air Force
104	JUASCOE	TBD	Interoperability Branch Chief, JT Doctrine & Train Div	Air Force
105	JUASCOE	TBD	Integration Branch Chief, Battelab Div	Air Force
106	JUASCOE	TED	Joint Combat Effects Branch Proj Off, Battelab DN	Air Force
107	DISA	023A 15	Program Manager, MNIS/CENTRIXS	Army
108	MDA	0074556	Director, Ground-Based Midcourse Defense- Test & Eval	Air Force
109	NRO	0052144	Director, National Systems Operations	Air Force
110	NRO	001-02	Program Officer	Army
111	NRO	001-05	Communications Systems Engineer	Army
112	NRO	001-07	Project Engineer	Army
113	NRO	0071922/440	Space Project Tech/Head Advanced Concept Evison	Navy
114	DTRA	3171000/03	Chief, Information Ops and Communication Assessments	Air Force
115	DTRA	3173000/04	Chief, Red Team Operations	Navy
116	DTRA	3161000/004	Pacific Technical Support Group Chief	Navy
117	DTRA	3152000/008	Bioenvironmental Engineer	Air Force
118	DTRA	3153000/003	Chemical Officer	Army
119	DTRA	3132100/004	Ordnance Submarine Officer	Navy
120	DTRA	3161000/003	Central Technical Support Group Chief	Navy
121	DTRA	3142000/002	Doctrine Coordinating Review Authority	Air Force
122	DTRA	3152000/006	Operations & Plans Officer	Air Force
123	DTRA	3152000/007	CMAT Operations	Air Force
124	DTRA	3152000/009	CMAT Operations	Marine Corps
125	DTRA	HCHL 6000000 003	Military Assistant	Air Force
126	DTRA	6010000 005	Defense Capability Branch Action Officer	Air Force

## June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendations

127	DTRA	6020000005	CWC Coordinator	Arm
128	DTRA	YLLM 6030000004	CBT WMD Planner	Army
129	DTRA	HCHL 6010000006	Integration Branch Action Officer	Army
130	DTRA	HCHL 6040000003	WMD Chief, Knowledge Branch	Army
131	DTRA	3323000/003	Policy Analyst	Air Force
132	DTRA	3323000/005	Policy Analyst	Army
133	DTRA	3323000/007	Policy Analyst	Air Force
134	DTRA	3323000/008	Policy Analyst	Marine Corps
135	DTRA	3326000/001	Policy Analyst	Marine Corps
136	DTRA	3325000/006	Chemical Officer	Army
137	DTRA	3325000/003	Foreign Area Officer	Army
138	DTRA	3357000-005	Mission Commander	Air Force
139	DTRA	3358000-005	Mission Commander	Air Force
140	DTRA	3331000-002	Mission Commander	Army
141	DTRA	3131-400	Chief, Weapons Maintenance	Air Force
142	DTRA	1010000/003	Chief, Inspector General Investigations	Army
143	JSSEO	00/001/0756 923V	Director	Air Force
144	JSSEO	00/03/TBD	Director, Staff, Plans, and Resources	Army
145	JSSEO	00/004/TBD	Technical Director	Navy
146	JSSEO	01/001/0075 6893V	Chief, Business Division	Air Force
147	JSSEO	02/001/0075 6863V	Chief, Acquisition Roadmap Division	Air Force
148	JSSEO	02/002/TBD	Acquisition Professional	Army
149	JSSEO	02/003/TBD	Acquisition Professional	Navy
150	JSSEO	03/001/TBD	Chief, Coalition Warfighting Division	Air Force
151	JSSEO	04/001/5230	Chief, Requirements Division	Marine Corps
152	JSSEO	04/002/0075 6933V	Deputy Chief, Requirements Division	Air Force
153	JSSEO	06/002/0075 6913V	Chief, Functional Architecture Team	Air Force
154	JSSEO	07/001/5003	Chief, Engineering and Architecture Division	Marine Corps
155	JSSEO	08/002/TBD	Deputy Chief, Test and Analysis Division	Air Force
156	JSSEO	08/003/TBD	Chief, Test Branch	Navy
157	DARPA	930000R11A 01	Operational Liaison	Air Force
158	DARPA	93H000R15A 01	Special Asst to the Director/Operational Liaison	Navy

## June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendations

159	DARPA	93000R11A 69	Special Asst to the Director/Operational Liaison	Army
160	SDDC	17200	Traffic Management Officer	Navy
161	SDDC	012/02/0020 A	Deputy Director, Information Management	Navy
162	SDDC	14100	Transportation Officer	Navy
163	DIA	00465	Collections Requirements Manager	Air Force
164	DIA	86225	SR PREC WEN SP ANAL	Air Force
165	DIA	01068	Vice Deputy Director, Collection Management	Air Force
166	DIA	01838	Military Deputy to the Chief, Collection Operation Group	Army
167	DIA	06680	Office for Collection Management, Senior	Navy
168	DIA	00595	Office for Collection Management, Senior Collections Off	Navy
169	DIA	00844	Office for Collection Management, Senior	Navy
170	DIA	01560	Office for Collection Management, Senior Collections Off	Air Force
171	DIA	00263	Officer for Collection Management, Operations	Air Force
172	DIA		Joint Operations Officer	Navy
173	DIA	05107	Joint Operations Officer	Marine Corps
174	DIA	05052	Joint Operations Officer	Army
175	DIA	171009	Joint Operations Officer	Navy
176	DIA	188881	Joint Operations Officer	Army
177	DIA	188882	Joint Operations Officer	Marine Corps
178	DIA	89003	Joint Operations Officer	Navy
179	DIA	N00837	Joint Operations Officer	Air Force
180	DIA	14079	Assistant Air Attache', USDAO Bangkok, Thailand	Air Force
181	DIA	13236	Assistant Army Attache', USDAO Bogota', Columbia	Army
182	DIA	13410	Assistant Army Attache', Republic of Macedonia	Army
183	DIA	14123	Air Attache', USDAO Addis, Ethiopia	Air Force
184	DIA	15091	A/ALUSNA, USDAO Panama City, Panama	Navy
185	DIA	13212	Assistant Army Attache', Republic of the Philippines	Army
186	White House	00100	Military Aide to the Vice Resident	Navy
187	White House	090212M	Military Aide to the Vice President	Marine Corps
188	White House	10400	Special Advisor to the Vice President (Defense and Africa Affairs)	Navy
189	White House	0051207	Special Advisor to the Vice President (European Affairs)	Air Force
190	White House	090212M	Special Advisor to the Vice President (Gulf States and North Africa)	Marine Corps

## June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendations

191	White House	005/01	Special Advisor to the Vice President (Middle East)	Army
192	White House	10310	Special Advisor to the Vice President (Strategic Planning)	Navy
193	White House	10225	Special Advisor to the Vice President (Homeland Security)	Navy
194	White House	0075747	Staff Secretary for National Security Affairs (OVP)	Air Force
195	JFCC-NW	63164	Operation/Exercise Planner	Air Force
196	JFCC-NW	57040	CAN Planner	Air Force
197	JFCC-NW	023J-01	J2 Staff Officer/Project Manager	Army
198	JFCC-NW	76906	CNO Planner	Navy
199	JFCC-NW	98106	Computer Network Operations Officer	Navy
200	NSA	0100099OU	Commander, NSA/CSS Menwith Hill Station	Air Force
201	NSA	0161842	Deputy Chief, Mission Operations, NSA/CSS Menwith Hill	Navy
202	NSA	0043909OU	Commander, NSA/CSS Misawa Security Ops Center	Air Force
203	NSA	0095746	Vice Commander, NSA/CSS Misawa Security Ops Center	Navy
204	NSA	0079292OU	Director of Operations, S3	Air Force
205	NSA	00815480	Commander, NSA/CSS Texas	Air Force
206	NSA	<del>20005-1334202-0</del>	Vice Commander, NSA/CSS Texas	Navy
207	NSA	107 01-1	Operations Director, (J3)	Army
208	NSA	101-01	(Chief, FTS1 Customer Relations	Army
209	NSA	0090591OU	Deputy Chief, FTS2, Analysis and Production	Air Force
210	NSA	0056631OU	(Deputy Chief, FTS3, Data Acquisition	Air Force
211	NSA	1334203	Deputy Chief, FTS3G, SIGINT Development	Navy
212	NSA	0090591OU	Signals Intelligence Directorate Operations Officer	Air Force
213	NSA	MTOE 32702AA0A2	Commander, NSA/CSS Georgia	Army
214	NSA	0091216OU	Vice Commander, NSA/CSS Georgia	Air Force
215	NSA	0142962/500 05	Director of Operations, J3	Navy
216	NSA	0090598OU	(Chief, FGS2E (National & Regional), NSA/CSS Georgia	Air Force
217	NSA	101-02	Chief, FGS2 (Transnational), NSA/CSS Georgia	Army
218	NSA	0097107	Chief, FGS2J/K (TechSIGINT/Information Operations)	Navy
219	NSA	216-06	Chief, FGS1 (Customer Relations), NSA/CSS Georgia	Army
220	NSA	0097107	Deputy Chief, FGS3 (Data Acquisition), NSA/CSS Georgia	Navy
221	NSA	0090733OU	Commander, NSA/CSS Colorado	Air Force
222	NSA	0093269OU	Chief of Staff	Air Force

## June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendations

223	NSA	0097112	Director of Operations, 53	Navy <sup>1</sup>
224	NSA	01041940U	System Engineering Lead	Air Force
225	NSA	14060220	Commander, NSA/CSS Hawaii	Navy
226	NSA	14060203	Vice Commander, NSA/CSS Hawaii	Army
227	NSA	14060071	Director of Joint Operations, J3	Air Force
228	NSA	0129200	Chief, FHS232, Office of China	Navy
229	NSA	0161849	Deputy Chief, FHS3, Data Acquisition	Navy
230	NSA	110-01	Deputy Chief, FHS1, Customer Relations	Army
231	NSA	0082538	Chief, FHS13, National Tactical Integration	Navy
232	NSA	00904640U	Chief, Hawaii Security Operations Center	Air Force
233	NDU/JFSC	00041465	Military Faculty	Navy
234	NDU/JFSC	00040855	Joint IO Instructor	Navy
235	NDU/JFSC	00040856	Joint IO Instructor	Navy
236	USEUCOM WPC	0268648	Support Commander (WPC/CC)	Air Force
237	USEUCOM WPC	410/01	Vice Commander (WPC/CV)	Army
238	USEUCOM WPC	410A/02	Director of Intelligence and Security (52)	Army
239	USEUCOM WPC	410A/01	Director of Operations (J3)	Army
240	USEUCOM WPC	0268662	Director of Plans, Program and Strategy (J5)	Air Force
241	USEUCOM WPC	410B/04	Deputy, Director of Plans, Program and Strategy (J5)	Army
242	USEUCOM WPC	0268662	Director of Communications (J6)	Air Force



## June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendation

<b>TAB</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>JDAL Number</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Svc</b>
1	DTRA	14700179	PLNS, PRGMS & REQ OFF	Air Force
2	DTRA	14700089	ENGINEER	Air Force
3	DTRA	14700053	NUC RESEARCH OFF	Navy
4	DTRA	14700164	NUCLEAR RESEARCH OFF	Army
5	DTRA	14700067	OPERATIONS OFFICER	Army
6	DTRA	14700165	MILITARY ASSISTANT	Air Force
7	DTRA	14700001	SR ASST ARMS COOP	Navy
8	DTRA	14700173	SENIOR NATIONAL SCT	Air Force

# TAB B



THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:  
203 18-0300

DJSM-0717-06  
26 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Subject: Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) Additions and Deletions

1. The Joint Staff conducted a JDAL Validation Board on 28 June. The board considered 320 positions (enclosure) with below results:

Temporary positions recommended for addition:	64
Permanent positions recommended for addition:	178
Permanent positions recommended for deletion:	8
Temporary positions not recommended for addition:	12
Permanent positions not recommended for addition:	44
Positions retracted:	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>320</b>

2. In accordance with 10 USC 668 and DODI 1300.20, enclosed are two spreadsheets with the 250 recommended additions/deletions: 178 permanent and 64 qualifying temporary positions located in joint task forces and other warfighting organizations for JDAL inclusion, and 8 positions for deletion.

3. We appreciate your support of this recommendation for SecDef approval. The Joint Staff point of contact is Commander Larry Grippin, USN; J-1/Joint Manpower Division; (b)(6)

SCOTT S. CUSTER  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/59383

**TAB C**



Cornell Law School

LII / Legal Information Institute

## U.S. Code collection

TITLE 10 &gt; Subtitle A &gt; PART II &gt; CHAPTER 38 &gt; § 664

Prev | Next

### § 664. Length of joint duty assignments

Release date: 2005-07-12

**(a) General Rule.**— The length of a joint duty assignment—

- (1) for general and flag officers shall be not less than two years; and
- (2) for other officers shall be not less than three years.

**(b) Waiver Authority.**— The Secretary of Defense may waive subsection (a) in the case of any officer.

**(c) Initial Assignment of officers With Critical Occupational Specialties—**

The Secretary may for purposes of section 661 (c)(2) of this title authorize a joint duty assignment of less than the period prescribed by subsection (a), but not less than two years, without the requirement for a waiver under subsection (b) in the case of an officer—

- (1) who is nominated for the joint specialty;
- (2) who has a military occupational specialty designated under section 661 (c)(2) of this title as a critical occupational specialty; and
- (3) for whom such joint duty assignment is the initial joint duty assignment.

**(d) Exclusions From Tour Length.**— The Secretary of Defense may exclude the following service from the standards prescribed in subsection (a):

- (1) Service in a joint duty assignment in which the full tour of duty in the assignment is not completed by the officer because of—

- (A) retirement;
- (B) release from active duty;
- (C) suspension from duty under section 155 (f)(2) or 164 (g) of this title; or
- (D) a qualifying reassignment (as described in subsection (g)(4)).

- (2) Service in a joint duty assignment outside the United States or in Alaska or Hawaii which is less than the applicable standard prescribed in subsection (a).

- (3) Service in a joint duty assignment in a case in which—

- (A) the officer's tour of duty in that assignment brings the officer's cumulative service for purposes of subsection (f)(3) to the applicable standard prescribed in subsection (a); and
- (B) the length of time served in that assignment (in any case other than an assignment which is described in subsection (g)(4)(B)) was not less than two years.

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(CFR)  
Your  
comments |

11-L-0559/OSD/59385

TAB D

11-L-0559/OSD/59386

**(e) Average Tour Lengths.—**

(1) The Secretary shall ensure that the average length of joint duty assignments during any fiscal year, measured by the lengths of the joint duty assignments ending during that fiscal year, meets the standards prescribed in subsection (a).

(2) In computing the average length of joint duty assignments for purposes of paragraph (1), the Secretary may exclude the following service:

(A) Service described in subsection (c), except that not more than 12 1/2 percent of all joint duty assignments shown on the list published pursuant to section 668 (b)(2)(A) of this title may be so excluded in any year.

(B) Service described in subsection (d).

(C) Service described in subsection (f)(6), except that no more than 10 percent of all joint duty assignments shown on the list published pursuant to section 668 (b)(2)(A) of this title may be so excluded in any year.

**(f) Full Tour of Duty.—** An officer shall be considered to have completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment upon completion of any of the following:

(1) A joint duty assignment that meets the standards prescribed in subsection (a).

(2) A joint duty assignment under the circumstances described in subsection (c).

(3) Cumulative service in joint duty assignments as described in subsection (g).

(4) A joint duty assignment outside the United States or in Alaska or Hawaii for which the normal accompanied-by-dependent tour of duty is prescribed by regulation to be at least two years in length, if the officer serves in the assignment for a period equivalent to the accompanied-by-dependent tour length (except that not more than 6 percent of all joint duty assignments may be considered to be under this paragraph at any time).

(5) A joint duty assignment with respect to which the Secretary of Defense has granted a waiver under subsection (b), but only in a case in which the Secretary determines that the service completed by that officer in that duty assignment shall be considered to be a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment.

(6) A second joint duty assignment that is less than the period required under subsection (a), but not less than two years, without regard to whether a waiver was granted for such assignment under subsection (b).

**(g) Cumulative Credit.—**

(1) Cumulative service for purposes of subsection (f)(3) is service in joint duty assignments which totals in length not less than the applicable standard prescribed in subsection (a) and which includes at least one tour of duty in a joint duty assignment that—

(A) was performed outside the United States or in Alaska or Hawaii; or

(B) was terminated because of a qualifying reassignment (as described in paragraph (4)).

# TAB E



## E2. ENCLOSURE2

### DEFINITIONS

E2.1.1. Assimment. The position in an organization to which an officer permanently belongs for manpower accounting purposes. Temporary duty (TDY) with other organizations does not alter the officer's permanent assignment status.

E2.1.2. Combatant Command Positions. A category of positions defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Incumbents of those positions **are** responsible for unified command and control of combat operations or **operations** other than war.

**E2.1.3.** Critical Joint Duty Assignment (JDA). Designation of a "JDA position" for which, considering the duties and responsibilities of the position, the incumbent should be previously experienced and educated in joint matters, **or** at a minimum, the position would be greatly enhanced by such an incumbent. Critical positions **are** not necessarily the most key and essential billets in an activity. Critical positions **are** proposed **by** heads of joint activities, approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy (ASD(FMP)) with the advice and assistance of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Requirements and Resources (DUSD(R&R)) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of **Staff**, and documented in the JDAL. Critical positions **are** filled by Joint Specialty Officers unless waived by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**E2.1.4.** Critical Occupational Specialty (COS). A military occupational specialty designated by the ASD(FMP) from among the combat arms in the Army or equivalent military specialties in the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps (see enclosure 7) and a severe shortage **of** trained officers in that skill exists. Equivalent military specialties **are** those engaged in the operational **art** to attain strategic **goals** in a theater of conflict **through** the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. COS provisions do not apply to GFOs.

**E2.1.5.** Direct Entry Students. An officer, neither a graduate from an accredited and/or certified PJE Phase I course of instruction nor a Phase I equivalency program, who is allowed to attend PJE Phase II by a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff waiver.

E2.1.6. Grade. The grade at which the officer is paid. It does not include frocked i or promotion select status.

E2.1.7. Joint Duty Assignment (JDA). An assignment **to** a designated position in a multi-Service or multi-national command or activity **that** is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three Military Departments. The preponderance of the officer's duties involves producing or promulgating national military strategy, joint doctrine, joint policy, strategic plans **or**

contingency plans, or to commanding and controlling operations under a Combatant Command. Assignments in an officer's own Military Department or assignments for joint education or joint training or to over-strength and/or temporary positions **are** not covered by this definition. Medical officers, dental officers, veterinary officers, medical service officers, nurses, biomedical science officers, chaplains, and judge advocates may not be assigned to a JDA position. The joint positions designated for such officers **are** excluded from this definition regardless of the position description.

**E2.1.8. Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL).** A consolidated list of JDAs approved by the ASD(FMP). Positions held by GFOs and critical JDAs are shown separately.

**E2.1.9. Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS).** The automated management information system data base managed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center, and updated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Services. Joint activities that do not have JDAMIS update capability keep the Military Services informed of changes that affect JDAMIS. JDAMIS supplements existing Military Service manpower and personnel information systems by providing automated files reflecting the approved JDAL and personnel data on officers who **are** JSOs or JSO nominees and other officers who have served or **are** serving in JDA positions ~~or~~ have completed or **are** attending RJE. Current and historical data files in JDAMIS **are** used to manage, analyze, and oversee the Joint Officer Management Program and **are** used to prepare the "Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report Annex to the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress."

**E2.1.10. Joint Duty Credit**

**E2.1.10.1.** Full joint duty credit is the joint credit designation granted for the completion of a tour, or accumulation of tours, of duty in a JDA that meets all statutory requirements.

**E2.1.10.2.** Cumulative joint duty credit is the joint credit designation granted for continuous time served in a JDA of at least 10 months, but less than the duration needed to qualify for full joint duty credit (see enclosure 4) or for periods of qualifying service in a qualifying JTF headquarters temporary assignment (see enclosure 13).

**E2.1.11. Joint Matters.** Matters relating to the integrated employment of land, ~~sea~~, and air forces, including matters relating to national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a Combatant Command.

**E2.1.12. Joint Specialty Officer (JSO).** An officer designated by the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is educated and trained in joint matters and has completed the requirements for "JSO designation."

# TAB F

**SUBJECT: Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) Additions and Deletions (June 2006 JDAL Validation Board Recommendations)**

**COORDINATION**

	Mr. Bourque	<u>Bourque 8/1/06</u>
	Mr. Retherford	<u>Ann Retherford 1 Aug (ret) 1 Aug 1 Aug</u>
DoD GC	<del>Mr. Dell'Orto</del>	<u>Frank Timenez 9 Aug 06</u>
PDUSD (PI)	Ms Fites	<u>James A. Fites AUG 16 2006</u>
ACTING PD (MPP)	Ms Earle	<u>Earle 21 Aug 06</u>
PDUSD	Mr. Dominguez	<u>M Dominguez</u>

**FILE NAME/LOCATION:**

S:\MPP\OEPM\303 Joint Officer Policy\JDAL Actions\Jul 06 Validation Bd

# **Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel Policy)**

**Directorate of Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management**



## **Joint Officer Management Room 3D259**

(b)(6)

M  
8/31/06 8/31

Sir -

DAVID'S FOLK HAVE DONE A GOOD  
JOB ON THIS. IT REALLY REFLECTS  
THE EXPANDING JOINT ENVIRONMENT  
YOU DESCRIBE WHEN YOU TALK.


RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE

V/R - *Gene*

~~FOUO~~

SEP 01 2006

211

TO: Lt Gen Gene Renuart  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Joint Duty Assignment Memo

Attached is the Joint Duty Assignment paper, which I have signed. Please find out when I first asked David Chu and Pete Pace to revise the posts that provide joint credit. I think it was five years ago. I can't believe it is coming to me now.

Attach 7/31/06 USD (P&R) memo to SecDef

DHR:ss  
SF083106-27

.....  
*Please Respond By September 07, 2006*

1 Sep 06

OSD 13600-06



9/5/2006 9:57:14 AM

3105u/06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/59395



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 2006

The Honorable Ellen Tauscher  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Tauscher:

**Thank** you for the letter you signed with your colleagues regarding operationally realistic missile defense testing. I appreciate your attention to this matter and have asked Mr. Ken Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to address the points you raise in greater detail. He will get back to you as soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 13640-06



9/6/2006 12:20:54 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59396

373,24

6 Sep 06

29 Aug 06





**,THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON**

September 6, 2006

The Honorable Ike Skelton  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

**Dear Ike:**

**Thank** you for the letter you signed with your colleagues regarding operationally realistic missile defense testing. I appreciate your attention to this matter and have asked Mr. Ken Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to address the points you raise in greater detail. He will get back to you as soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

**OSD 13640-06**



9/6/2006 12:20:54 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59397



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 2006

The Honorable Vic Snyder  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Snyder:

**Thank** you for the letter you signed with your colleagues regarding operationally realistic missile defense testing. I appreciate your attention to this matter and have asked Mr. Ken Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to address the points you raise in greater detail. He will get back to you **as** soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. M. Gates", written over a horizontal line.

OSD 13640-06



9/6/2006 12:20:55 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59398



,THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 2006

The Honorable John Spratt  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Spratt:

Thank you for the letter you signed with your colleagues regarding operationally realistic missile defense testing. I appreciate your attention to this matter and have asked Mr. Ken **Krieg**, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to address the points you raise in greater detail. **He** will get back to you **as** soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 13640-06



9/6/2006 12:20:55 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59399



,THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 2006

The Honorable Mark Udall  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Udall:

Thank you for the letter you signed with your colleagues regarding operationally realistic missile defense testing. I appreciate your attention to this matter **and** have asked Mr. Ken Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, **and** Logistics, to address the points you raise in greater detail. He will get back to you **as** soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 13640-06



9/6/2006 12:20:56 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59400



**,THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON**

September 6, 2006

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC **20515**

Dear Representative Abercrombie:

**Thank** you for the letter you signed with your colleagues regarding operationally realistic missile defense testing. I appreciate your attention to this matter and have asked Mr. Ken Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to address the points you raise in greater detail. He will get back to you as soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

**OSD 13640-08**



9/6/2006 2:20:56 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59401



, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 2006

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Sanchez:

**Thank** you for the letter you signed with your colleagues regarding operationally realistic missile defense testing. I appreciate your attention to this matter **and** have asked Mr. Ken Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, **and** Logistics, to address the points you raise in greater detail. He will get back to you **as soon as** possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 13640-06



9/6/2006 12:20:57 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59402

9/12  
1600 J



ACQUISITION  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

# THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

## ACTION MEMO

September 12, 2006 07:40 AM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Ken K. *[Signature]* USD(AT&L)

SUBJECT: Response to Letter on U.S. Missile Defense Capability (SF090106-14)

- Attached you will find our proposed reply to several Congressmen's questions on Missile Defense Capability. You had asked to see our proposed reply (TAB A).

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary of Defense approve the proposed replies (TAB B).

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

SEP 18 2006

COORDINATION: TAB C

373.24

12 Sep 06

29 Aug 06

Prepared by: Ms. Jacqueline Morales, (b)(6)

MA SD	9/12/06	SMA DSD	
TSA SD	9/12/06	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	9/12/06	SPC NOV	9/12/06
ESR MA	9/12/06	STF DIR	11-L

0559/OSD/59403

OSD 13640-06

9/12/2006 12:30:41 PM

# TAB A



FOUO

9/15/06  
JP

September 01, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA



SUBJECT: Response to Letter on U.S. Missile Defense Capability

I would like to see the response that is drafted on this missile defense letter from Skelton, et. al, and make sure it has been cleared with Steve Cambone before the draft is given to me.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/29/08 Letter to SecDef

DHR:sa  
SP090106-14

.....  
Please Respond By 09/14/06

SEP 14 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

JK-  
JP

FOUO

OSD 13640-06



9/12/2006 12:31:01 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/59405

**Congress of the United States**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

August 29, 2006

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
 Secretary of Defense  
 1000 Defense Pentagon  
 Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

We are writing to inquire about your comments Sunday at Fort Greeley, Alaska that you would like to see a full test of the U.S. missile defense capability. You stated that you wanted to have a test "where we actually put all the pieces together, *that just hasn't happened.*" We could not agree with you more regarding the need to perform a full end-to-end test of the existing limited missile defense system in operationally realistic conditions.

As you know, in the 10 previous tests of interceptors based in California and Alaska, only 5 have successfully intercepted a target. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system was last tested in December 2005 without a live target. In December 2004 and February 2005, the interceptor rocket failed to lift off the launch pad. Tests have been highly scripted with unrealistic countermeasures; the time of the enemy launch was known; and the threat only came from a single enemy missile. The next test, planned for this week will not actually seek to defeat an incoming target but simply to determine if the kill-vehicle can recognize an incoming warhead.

On July 4<sup>th</sup>, North Korea test fired seven missiles including its long range Taepodong 2 missile for the first time. While the latter failed within a minute of launch and the missile's range is unknown, it marked North Korea's break with a unilateral moratorium it has observed since 1999. Documents supporting the Missile Defense Agency's fiscal year 2007 budget request, observe that "Without major technical hurdles, an adversary could choose to launch a missile at the United States from a forward-based sea platform within a few hundred kilometers of U.S. territory."

We support your call for an operationally realistic test of our current missile defense system to know the actual state of our capabilities. Since the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was launched in the mid 1980s, the United States has spent nearly \$100 billion on missile defense programs and studies with little to show for it. You have asked the American people to pay for over \$10 billion in missile funding in the 2007 fiscal year.

Unfortunately, after reviewing the Missile Defense Agency's test schedule, we see no evidence of the comprehensive *and* realistic end-to-end test of the limited missile defense

OSD 13640-06



8/30/2006 8:12:06 AM

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11-L-0559/OSD/59406

system that you called for at Fort Greeley. When is such a test planned? As supporters of fielding a limited missile defense capability that works, we would also like to know when you believe that the American people can be sure that this limited system will truly defend our country against a threat such as North Korea.

We look forward to your timely response,

Sincerely,

Ellen Taucher

Lee Sutton

Neil Abernethy  
Mark Udall

Vi Goh

John Smau

Luis Sanchez

**TAB B**



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

## THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

The Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Tauscher:

Thank you for your August 29 letter concerning Ground-based Midcourse Defense System testing. The Secretary of Defense asked that I respond.

Since the Secretary's comments at Fort Greely and your recent letter to him, the Missile Defense Agency completed a successful end-to-end flight test of the long-range missile defense capability on September 1. This test began with the launch of a threat representative target on a realistic trajectory across an operational, upgraded, early warning radar manned by warfighters in California. An intercept solution was then generated using the operational command and fire control system, also manned by warfighters, and an operational interceptor was launched from an operational site. Given necessary range and safety limitations, a 5-hour target launch window was defined, but the warfighters operating the system did not receive prior notice of target launch.

The flight test was representative of an attack by a single, relatively unsophisticated, but lethal, hostile missile. While this test was a success, the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) test program is by no means complete. Later tests will involve different trajectories and engagement geometries, different target characteristics and countermeasures, and different raid patterns and composition. Some will be successful, and some will not, but all will contribute to moving the program forward.

Each of these tests, and those of the other components of the BMDS, builds on the knowledge gained from previous tests and adds new and challenging objectives to demonstrate enhanced capability. The goal is to devise scenarios that test each system to the maximum extent possible to increase knowledge of, and confidence in, system performance, while maintaining safety and keeping pace with the advancing threat.

This last point is important. In July, we saw one manifestation of that threat from North Korea in its effort to test an advanced missile capability that could threaten the United States. Iran's intentions also seem increasingly clear as its missile programs progress. That is why the Secretary of Defense has endorsed a capability-based acquisition approach to developing missile defenses, allowing us to deploy militarily useful capability while we continue to enhance it.



11-L-0559/OSD/59409

Over the past 2 decades, you noted the United States has devoted some **\$100** billion to missile defense. This has occurred under several Administrations and with ever-increasing Congressional support. A substantial portion of this funding went to early research and space-based programs that were cancelled in **1993**. Approximately **\$21** billion has been invested in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program over the last **10** years.

The remaining funds have permitted the PATRIOT PAC-3 capability to evolve, so that when it ~~was~~ employed in combat during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, it was a complete success against Iraqi missiles. The funding supported the sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program, which has succeeded in 7 of 8 intercept attempts, with its **18** ships programmed for modification. Aegis ballistic missile defense-equipped ships started operational long-range surveillance and tracking patrols in the Sea of Japan almost 2 years ago. The funding supported the restructured Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, capable of intercepting threats in the upper atmosphere as well as just outside the atmosphere, which completed a successful intercept test in July. In addition, the funds were used for sensors and C2 systems integrating all of these components into a layered defensive system that is much more capable than any of the individual elements alone. And finally, the funds support the development of future capabilities including the Airborne Laser, more capable interceptors and space-based sensors to enhance discrimination, and lethality across the entire spectrum of missile defense.

This latest test of the long-range interceptor increases our confidence in the approach to enhance the system's performance. We have a limited, but increasing, capability where none existed before. Four years ago, with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in effect, this could not have been possible. Today, the Department is on a path to provide critically-needed missile defense protection for our citizens, deployed forces, friends, and allies.

Your continued support of our efforts will ensure we can reach this goal.

Sincerely,

Kenneth J. Krieg



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

## THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

The Honorable Ike Skelton  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Skelton:

Thank you for your August 29 letter concerning Ground-based Midcourse Defense System testing. The Secretary of Defense asked that I respond.

Since the Secretary's comments at Fort Greely and your recent letter to him, the Missile Defense Agency completed a successful end-to-end flight test of the long-range missile defense capability on September 1. This test began with the launch of a threat representative target on a realistic trajectory across an operational, upgraded, early warning radar manned by warfighters in California. An intercept solution was then generated using the operational command and fire control system, also manned by warfighters, and an operational interceptor was launched from an operational site. Given necessary range and safety limitations, a 5-hour target launch window was defined, but the warfighters operating the system did not receive prior notice of target launch.

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This last point is important. In July, we saw one manifestation of that threat from North Korea in its effort to test an advanced missile capability that could threaten the United States. Iran's intentions also seem increasingly clear as its missile programs progress. That is why the Secretary of Defense has endorsed a capability-based acquisition approach to developing missile defenses, allowing us to deploy militarily useful capability while we continue to enhance it.



11-L-0559/OSD/59411

Over the past **2** decades, you noted the United States has devoted some \$100 billion to missile defense. This has occurred under several Administrations and with ever-increasing Congressional support. A substantial portion of this funding went to early research and space-based programs that were cancelled in 1993. Approximately **\$21** billion has been invested in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program over the last 10 years.

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Your continued support of our efforts will ensure we can reach this goal.

Sincerely,

Kenneth J. Krieg