

Bryan Whitman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.  
Sept. 13, 2006

Dear Bryan,

Your letter in response to my recent column about the Secretary of Defense finally made its way to me and I must admit you have some points. Perhaps I misunderstood, although I would stand by my notation that Mr. Rumsfeld is still one handsome coot.

The point I was trying to make was that we are honored in this nation with the right and obligation to speak however we will on matters of public policy, no matter the tone. What I was attacking then, was a sense created not only by the secretary but by some of his colleagues in other addresses that there is something wrong with criticism of the war.

You might believe I misunderstood this message and you are entitled to that interpretation, but I would respectfully disagree.

We are allowed to dissent. I could launch here into a long discussion about the nature of fascism or the uses of fear to motivate people in wartime, but I won't.

I don't know why you felt the need to include your database search of misconduct stories as part of this missive. If you had actually been paying attention to what I have written over the years, and to what I have presented as an editor, you would have known that there are few in the media who hold the military in higher esteem than I. Perhaps only my good friend and colleague Joe Galloway is more ardent, but then, he has reason to be having such strong kinship, bonded in battle, with soldiers for so many years.

That respect doesn't, and shouldn't, automatically flow to our civilian and political leadership. After all, their great achievement was winning Senate confirmation, which is not quite like facing the enemy, if you know what I mean. The secretary and his peers then, are serving on a different level, in my opinion. It's not like they are actually in the military or anything.

Their comments are open to whatever criticism they create. They come and go with presidents, making them political beyond anything else.

I don't recall anyone giving them approval to define what is acceptable in the world of commentary.


I think you should ask this question, "Did we send the wrong message with this remark in front of this audience?" My guess is the answer would be "No, it was exactly what we wanted to say." The gestalt of the comment, I would argue, particularly when placed in the context of what your pals have been saying on the same subject, stretches beyond specifics, to use a comparison I am certain the secretary would understand.

It was pretty clear to me that the pack of you was suggesting anyone who is not on the team is waaaaaay **off** the team. It seems a lot of other people got the same message.

If you are genuinely suggesting that you welcome criticism of the war **from** all corners, that you believe **freedom of** political expression requires some people to protest as strongly as possible, then put that in a letter and I will publish it in the column to make certain everyone knows where you and the secretary stand.

Finally, I am answering your letter because you took the time to write it and presented your case so thoughtfully. I am always eager to hear that kind of criticism and invite your comments at any opportunity. I still think he is as handsome **as** a Barrymore, not a bad **thing**.

Regards,

  
Charles M. Madigan  
Chicago Tribune

Ps. Tell the secretary I, too, have torn my left rotator cuff and it could be my lapse into crankiness is a function of that irritating and persistent problem.



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

September 6, 2006

Editor  
AFP  
1015 15<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W. Suite 500  
Washington, DC 20005

To the Editor:

AFP's September 5, 2006 article, "Rumsfeld undergoes surgery for bum shoulder," which mentioned Secretary Rumsfeld's address to the American Legion National Convention last week, was misleading and prevented your readers from gaining an accurate summary of the Secretary's remarks.

The article stated: "Last week, Rumsfeld linked critics of the wars in Iraq and against terrorism with those who appeased Nazis before World War II." This may have been the author's interpretation, but it is not anything the Secretary actually said. As even *The New York Times* noted:

"Mr. Rumsfeld's speech on Tuesday did not explicitly mention the Democrats, and he cited only comments by human rights groups and in press reports as evidence of what he described as 'moral or intellectual confusion about who or what is right or wrong.' ... he did not directly compare current critics of the war in Iraq to those who sought to appease Hitler, his juxtaposition of the themes led Democrats to say that he was leveling an unfair charge." (emphasis added)

Instead, the Secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections -- rather than the nature of the enemy -- does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the Secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

Sincerely,

Bryan Whitman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs



11-L-0559/OSD/60415

San Francisco Chronicle  
September 13, 2006  
Pg. B8

## **What Rumsfeld Said**

Editor -- Edward Epstein's Sept. 6 article, which discussed Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's recent address to the American Legion national convention, was misleading and prevented your readers from gaining an accurate summary of the secretary's remarks.

Epstein implied the secretary's remarks referred to congressional Democrats and as "linking his critics to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policies of the late 1930s." This may have been Epstein's interpretation, but it is not anything the secretary said. Instead, the secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections-- rather than the nature of the enemy -- does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long, difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington



New York Times  
(Never published), Early Bird Sept. 19, 2006

## **Letter RE: “A Sudden Sense of Urgency.”**

Your September 7, 2006 editorial, “A Sudden Sense of Urgency,” asserts that the recent transfer of 14 CIA prisoners means that “President Bush finally has some real terrorists in Guantanamo Bay.” This merits a correction.

Since its inception, terrorists that have been held at Guantanamo Bay have included personal bodyguards of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda recruiters, trainers, and facilitators. One notable individual held at Guantánamo was Mohamed al-Kahtani, believed to be the intended 20<sup>th</sup> hijacker on September 11”.

That many of these men are terrorists intent on doing America harm is not a simply an assertion made by the U.S. government, but something many detainees themselves have claimed, indeed boasted about. For example, in open commission hearings on March 1, Mr. Al Bahlul boasted five times that he was a member of Al Qaeda involved in an ongoing war against America. In open commission hearings on April 27, Mr. Al Sharbi said, “I’m going to make this easy for you guys: I’m proud of what I did and there isn’t any reason of hiding ... I fought against the United States. I took up arms.”

It is unfortunate that one of America’s largest newspapers concludes these men are not “real terrorists.”

***DORRANCE SMITH, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs***

September 12, 2006

Editor  
*The Washington Post*  
1150 15th Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20071

To the Editor:

Al Kamen's recent column asserts that "Secretary of Defense *Donald Rumsfeld* implied last week that Iraq war critics were as misguided as *Neville Chamberlain* when he dealt with *Adolf Hitler*'s demands." This may have been Mr. Kamen's interpretation, but it is not anything the Secretary actually said. In fact, Secretary Rumsfeld never made a mention of "Iraq war critics" anywhere in his speech.

The Secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections -- rather than the nature of the enemy -- does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the Secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

Sincerely,

Bryan Whitman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60418

## **Trials And Errors In The War On Terrorism**

"Bush's Detainee Plan Is Criticized" [news story, Sept. 8] showed a lack of familiarity with military jurisprudence and was a superficial reading of the proposed legislation.

The authors asserted that "prosecutors would be permitted to use classified information to secure convictions; defendants and their lawyers would not be told about such information." The administration proposal for the admission of classified evidence does not deny defense counsel the opportunity to see and examine any evidence -- classified or unclassified -- to be introduced against an accused at trial.

Further, the accused may see classified information if the judge determines that it will not harm critical national security interests.

Finally, while it is true that "prosecutors could also rely on hearsay," such evidence must be deemed both relevant and reliable by the military judge -- the same standard *the* military judge will apply to hearsay evidence the defense offers. In addition, the administration proposal requires the military judge to exclude any evidence offered by the prosecution if its probative value -- its value in proving the case -- is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice against the accused.

BRYAN WHITMAN, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, U.S. Defense Department, Washington

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette  
September 18, 2006

## The Claim That Rumsfeld Forbade Postwar Planning Simply Isn't True

The claim in the article "General: Iraq Postwar Plan Forbidden" (Sept. 9) that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld forbade war planners from developing a plan for securing Iraq and threatened to "fire" anyone who did is absurd. It simply did not happen.

The general quoted, Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, later publicly refuted the article saying it was a "manipulation of my words to stir controversy." Contrary to the suggestion by the article, the U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam Iraq in 2002 and included input from and consultation with all parts of the U.S. government -- the secretary's own policy office, the State Department and the National Security Council. A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command was specifically assigned the task of preparing for "Phase IV" -- the transition from major combat to security and stability operations. And in January 2003, after these weeks and months of preparation, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was created to plan for and facilitate the administration of the country once the Saddam Hussein regime was disarmed and dispatched.

Furthermore, the article states the Secretary Rumsfeld "replaced" Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki after he supposedly disagreed with military leaders over troop levels in Iraq. In fact, Gen. Shinseki completed his full four-year term as service chief and retired on schedule.

Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington, D.C.

Newsweek  
September 18, 2006

## For The Record

Your depiction of Donald Rumsfeld's address to the American Legion is inaccurate. On the perspectives page and in "The 'Islamofascists'" (Sept. 11) you misrepresent his remarks as having "compared critics of the administration to those who sought to appease Hitler in the buildup to World War II." Rumsfeld did not say that. In fact, he never mentioned any critics of the Iraq war in his remarks. Instead, Rumsfeld's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in **U.S.** history. He warned against a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections—a mentality that could undermine **our** nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists. We invite readers to view the full text of the remarks at [defenseink.mil/speeches](http://defenseink.mil/speeches).

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.**



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

September 19, 2006

The Open Forum  
*The Denver Post*  
1560 Broadway  
Denver, CO 80202

To the Editor:

The assertion in your recent column ("Rumsfeld lecture out of line," 9/12/2006), that Secretary Rumsfeld declared that "those who criticize the administration suffer from 'moral and intellectual confusion'" in his remarks to the American Legion National Convention, is inaccurate. In fact, the Secretary warned that:

"[I]n any long struggle or long war, any **kind** of moral **or** intellectual confusion about who and what is right or wrong, can weaken the ability of free societies to persevere."

He did not equate this notion with critics of the administration. In fact, the secretary never mentioned any critics of the Iraq war in his remarks. This mischaracterization has been subsequently corrected by other major newspapers, such as *The New York Times*. We ask for a correction in your newspaper as well.

The Secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the Secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

Sincerely,

Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60422

Macon Telegraph  
September 26, 2006

## **Erroneous Claims**

The recent column "Time to change top leadership" contains the erroneous claims that "Secretary Rumsfeld successfully opposed the troop levels that military planners said would be necessary for the Iraq operation and the additional force needed to stabilize Iraq never materialized."

General Tommy Franks, the former commander of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate in July 2003, when he was still in command in Iraq, that "There has been the suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And in fact, I can tell you that if more troops are necessary, this secretary's going to say yes."

The secretary has regularly asked Gen. John Abizaid, the current commander of CENTCOM, and Gen. George Casey, the commander of Multinational Force - Iraq, if they have all the necessary resources, and, if not, what more is required to carry out a successful campaign. Commanders in the field have consistently said that they need more Iraqi forces, not American troops.

There are currently some 300,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces. There are 106 Iraqi army battalions currently taking part in combat operations. In fact, Iraqi forces now lead nearly 75 percent of combat operations in their respective areas. The capability of the Iraqi Security Forces continues to grow.

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Sec. of Defense, Washington, DC**

Richmond Times-Dispatch

October 4, 2006

## War Plan Needs No Further Troops

Editor, Times-Dispatch: The recent article, "Rumsfeld Criticized," contains the inaccurate claim that Secretary of Defense Donald "Rumsfeld altered [the Iraq war plan] considerably by sending in 'far too few' troops."

As Gen. Tommy Franks, the former commander of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate in July 2003, when he was still in command in Iraq: "There has been [the] suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And in fact, I can tell you. . . that if more troops are necessary, this secretary's going to say yes."

The secretary has regularly asked Gen. John Abizaid, the current commander of U.S. Central Command, and Gen. George Casey, the commander of Multinational Force-Iraq, if they have all the necessary resources, and, if not, what more is required to carry out a successful campaign. Commanders in the field have consistently said they need more capable Iraqi forces, not American troops. And with some 300,000 Iraqi Security Forces currently trained and equipped, that is exactly what is happening.

**Bryan Whitman**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.



## Editorial Wrong About Rumsfeld

The assertions in a recent editorial ("Intimidation and deception," Sept. 14) that Secretary Rumsfeld "silenced all discussion of the need for a post-invasion plan for Iraq" and "threatened to fire" anyone who did are absurd.

The general quoted in the article, Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, publicly refuted the original article, explaining it was a "manipulation of my words *to* stir controversy."

The U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam Iraq in 2002. This planning included input from and consultation with all parts of the U.S. government -- including the secretary's own policy office, the State Department and the National Security Council.

A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command was specifically assigned the task of preparing for Phase IV -- the transition from major combat to security and stability operations.

And in January 2003, after these months of preparation, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was created to plan for and facilitate the administration of post-Saddam Iraq.

Furthermore, the editorial states that Secretary Rumsfeld "fired" **Army** Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki after he supposedly disagreed with military leaders over troop levels in Iraq.

In fact, Gen. Shinseki completed his full four-year term as service chief and retired on schedule.

Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Buffalo **(NY)** News  
September 23, 2006

## **U.S. Military Did Have Elan For Postwar Iraq**

The assertions in the Sept. 15 News editorial, "Fire Rumsfeld," that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld "had forbidden military strategists to plan for securing postwar Iraq" and "threatened to fire" anyone who did are absurd. The general quoted in the column, Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, publicly refuted the original article, explaining it was a "manipulation of my words to stir controversy."

The U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam Iraq in 2002. This planning included input from all parts of the U.S. government, including the secretary's own policy office, the State Department and the National Security Council. A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command was specifically assigned the task of preparing for "Phase IV," the transition from major combat to security and stability operations. And in January 2003, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was created to plan for and facilitate the administration of post-Saddam Iraq.

Furthermore, the editorial stated that Rumsfeld "cashier[ed]" Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki after he supposedly disagreed with military leaders over troop levels in Iraq. In fact, Shinseki completed his full four-year term as service chief and retired on schedule.

Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington, D.C.

Charleston (WV) Gazette  
October 2, 2006

## War In Iraq Was Not A Secret Plot

Editor:

A recent editorial ("Iraq: War planned in 1990s," Sept. 16) purports to lay out "a chronology of what caused the Iraq war," and boldly asserts that "Bush insiders," "neoconservatives," "advisers to Israel" and an "Iran-Contra conspirator" secretly "plotted the Iraq war for at least a decade." Unfortunately, the cherry-picked quotations in the editorial omit key facts that any honest chronology would include.

In 1998, the U.S. Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which declared "it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government." President Clinton, 360 congressmen and 100 senators supported this measure.

Then, in 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution. President Bush, 296 congressmen and 77 senators supported this measure. As Sen. Hillary Clinton noted, "[Saddam] has also given aid, comfort and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaida members. ... This much is undisputed."

These pieces of legislation, passed overwhelmingly by members of Congress from both parties, and signed by Presidents Clinton and Bush respectively, put lie to the claim the war was "planned in secret" by "neoconservatives."

Bryan Whitman, Deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, Washington, D.C.

Kansas City Star  
September 23, 2006

## What Rumsfeld Said

The assertion in a recent article (9/17, Books, 'Who's to blame for the war'), that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld "accused Iraq war critics of" in his remarks to the American suffering 'moral or intellectual confusion' Legion National Convention, is inaccurate.

The secretary warned that:

"In any long struggle or long war, any kind of moral or intellectual confusion about who and what is right or wrong can weaken the ability of **free** societies to persevere."

He did not equate this notion with critics of the administration. In fact, the secretary never mentioned any critics of the Iraq war in his remarks. This mischaracterization has been subsequently corrected by other major newspapers, such as *The New York Times*. We ask for a correction in your newspaper as well.

The secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, Washington, D.C.**

## Column Misquotes Rumsfeld Remarks

The assertion in Kurt Stone's column, "Put Rumsfeld out to pasture" (Sept. 18), that Secretary Rumsfeld declared "that anyone who questions the American military's continuing role in Iraq... is morally and intellectually confused" in his remarks to the American Legion National Convention, is false.

First, Stone simply misquotes the secretary. Second, the secretary actually warned that: "[I]n any long struggle or long war, any kind of moral or intellectual confusion about who and what is right or wrong, can weaken the ability of free societies to persevere." He did not equate this notion with critics of the administration. In fact, the secretary never mentioned any critics of the Iraq war in his remarks.

Perhaps it would better serve your readers if your columnist precisely characterized Secretary Rumsfeld's speech. The secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on **American** imperfections does not undermine **our** nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.**

## Absurd Editorial

The assertions in a recent editorial ("General: Rumsfeld scotched post-war planning for Iraq," Sept. 18) that Secretary Rumsfeld forbade war planners from developing a plan for securing Iraq and threatened to "fire" anyone who did are absurd. The general quoted, Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, publicly refuted the article cited, explaining it was a "manipulation of my words to stir controversy."

Contrary to the suggestion in the column, the U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam Iraq in 2002. This planning included input from and consultation with all parts of the U.S. Government -- the Secretary's own policy office, the State Department, and the National Security Council.

A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command was specifically assigned the task of preparing for "Phase IV" -- the transition from major combat to security and stability operations. And in January 2003, after these months of preparation, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was created to plan for and facilitate the administration of post-Saddam Iraq.

Furthermore, the article states that Secretary Rumsfeld "shunted aside" Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki after he supposedly disagreed with military leaders over troop levels in Iraq. In fact, General Shinseki completed his full four-year term as service chief and retired on schedule.

Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington, D. C.

## **Iraqi Troops Are Winning The War**

The recent article ("Why we're losing", 9/19/2006) contains the erroneous claim that in Iraq "150,000 U.S. troops have been trying to win a war that, from the very beginning, called for double or triple that number." This is doubly misleading.

First, it implies that Secretary Rumsfeld has opposed sending more troops to Iraq if that proves necessary. As General Tommy Franks told the Senate in July 2003, while still in command in Iraq: "There has been [the] suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And in fact, I can tell you ... that if more troops are necessary, this secretary's going to say yes." Since then, the Secretary has regularly asked General John Abizaid, the current commander of U.S. Central Command, and General George Casey, the commander of Multinational Force – Iraq, if they have all the necessary resources, and, if not, what more is required to carry out a successful campaign. Commanders in the field have consistently said that they need more capable Iraqi forces, not American **troops**. This is what has occurred over the past three years.

There are now, in fact, "double or triple that number" of troops in Iraq, as some 300,000 Iraqi Security Forces are now trained and equipped. 106 Iraqi Army battalions are currently taking part in combat operations. In fact, Iraqi forces now lead nearly **75** percent of combat operations in their respective areas. The capability of the Iraqi Security Forces continues to grow.

Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Albany Times-Union  
September 22, 2006

## **Column Included Wrong Portrayal Of Rumsfeld**

Two assertions in Robert Seltzer's recent column ("Living in confusing times," Sept. 19) are inaccurate.

First, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld did not merely say "my goodness," responding to Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton during Senate hearings in August, nor did he treat her "as if the senator were some junior leaguer."

He offered a point-by-point response to Senator Clinton's concerns, reflecting on such issues as the level of violence in Iraq, U.S. troop levels in Iraq, how the Iraqi Army largely disbanded itself, and the steps taken by the government planning for post-war Iraq.

Second, the secretary did not liken critics of the Iraq war to "weak-kneed politicians who tried to appease the Nazis" in his remarks to the American Legion National Convention.

In fact, the secretary never mentioned any critics of the Iraq war in his remarks. This mistaken interpretation of the secretary's remarks was corrected by The New York Times and the AP.

Instead, the secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,**  
Washington, D.C.



## **A Truly Multinational Force Is Moving Afghanistan Forward**

The assertions made in Carl Robichaud's Sept. 21 Opinion piece, "Failings of the Rumsfeld doctrine," that "America's efforts in Afghanistan... are unraveling" due in **part** to America's supposed failure to lead a "genuinely multinational force" are baseless.

Today, NATO holds operational responsibility for over three-quarters of Afghanistan. Some 20,000 troops from 37 NATO and non-NATO nations are committed to the effort. (This is in addition to the roughly 20,000 US forces in the country.) One wonders exactly how many countries need to be involved before a mission moves from being a "handful of Western countries" to "genuinely multinational" in Mr. Robichaud's book.

The only efforts that are "unraveling" are those of our enemies, as Qari Mohammed Yousaf Ahmadi, generally viewed as the Taliban's chief spokesman, stated on Sept. 15: "The Taliban forces have conducted a tactical retreat."

As Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, commanding general of Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan noted last month: "NATO and US-led coalition and Afghan national security forces are moving aggressively to deny the enemy safe havens, to interdict his movement roots, and most importantly to extend the authority of the central government....[T]he progress we're making in Afghanistan is significant."

Dorrance Smith, Washington, Assistant secretary of defense for public affairs

New York Times  
September 26, 2006

## **The Rumsfeld Way: Squash As Metaphor**

To the Editor:

**"Rumsfeld Also Plays Hardball on Pentagon's Squash Courts" (front page, Sept. 24):**

Your front-page article includes a comment by someone who is acknowledged not to ever have played Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld at squash.

I have played him, probably hundreds of games. In addition to being a focused, aggressive player, Mr. Rumsfeld is fastidious about points and rules.

I have worked closely with Mr. Rumsfeld, in addition to being a frequent competitor in squash. I have learned this above all else about him:

In squash and in life, Mr. Rumsfeld succeeds precisely because he masters and adheres to the rules of whatever he is doing.

Not knowing this about him is to not know him, and clearly the individual quoted in your article does not.

**Larry DiRita, Potomac, Md., Sept. 24, 2006**

*The writer is a former Pentagon spokesman.*

El Diario/La Prensa (New York City)  
September 29, 2006

## From The Secretary Of Defense

The assertions in a recent editorial ("On Rumsfeld," 9/26/2006) that Secretary Rumsfeld "had forbidden military strategists to plan for securing postwar Iraq" and that he was either "willfully blind" or "acted to mislead" are absurd. The general quoted, Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, later refuted the original article cited in this column, explaining it was a "manipulation of my words to stir controversy."

The U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam Iraq in 2002. This planning included input from and consultation with all parts of the U.S. Government. A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command was specifically assigned the task of preparing for "Phase IV" – the transition from major combat to security and stability operations. And in January 2003, after these months of preparation, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was created to plan for and facilitate the administration of post-Saddam Iraq.

Furthermore, Secretary Rumsfeld has consistently been realistic about how difficult the War on Terror will be. For instance, in October, 2003 he noted: "It's a tough hard slog... There's no question but that what we're doing in Afghanistan and Iraq is difficult work, it's dangerous work. It is work that is important, it has to be done, and we're making progress." That observation remains true today.

Sincerely,

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs**

**Current News Editor's Note:** The editorial referred to originally appeared in the *Buffalo News* on Sept. 15, 2006. The following text is the above letter as it appeared in the Spanish-language El Diario/La Prensa.

### *Desde la Secretaria de Defensa*

*Las afirmaciones en un reciente editorial ('Sobre Rumsfeld', 9/26/2006) de que el Secretario Rumsfeld "ha prohibido que estrategias militares planeen sobre la seguridad de la Ira de postguerra" y que fue "voluntariamente ciego" o "actuó para engañar" son absurdas. El general citado, Brigadier General Mark Scheid, posteriormente refutó el artículo original citado en este editorial, explicando que se trató de una "manipulación de mis palabras para desatar controversia".*

*Las Fuerzas Armadas de EE.UU. comenzaron a planear para la Irak post-Saddam en el 2002. Este planeamiento incluyó asesoría y consulta con todas las partes del gobierno federal. A un grupo de americanos y oficiales aliados en el Comando Central le fue específicamente asignada la tarea de prepararse para la "Fase IV" — la transición de*

## **Additional 'Letters To The Editor'**

***NOTE: The following letters are unedited and reflect only the views of the author.***

Warren P. Strobel's and William Douglas's recent article ("Pentagon study **claims** U.S. broadcasts to Iran aren't tough enough") is riddled with errors, starting with the **first** sentence. The reporters' claim-that a "Pentagon Unit has drafted a report" on U.S. radio broadcasts into Iran-is incorrect in every respect.

**An** individual DoD employee-because of specific language **skills-was** asked by **an** interagency committee on Iran policy to monitor and personally evaluate U.S. broadcasting into Iran. She did so. There was no "Pentagon report." The charge made that there is a "gambit" underway by the Pentagon to take control of Iranian broadcasts **is** simply wrong.

Unfortunately, the remainder of the article follows a similar course, insinuating repeatedly that the Pentagon is preparing for a confrontation with Iran. Again, the facts interfere with a good story. The President and Secretary of State are on a diplomatic track with Iran, and there is no daylight between their policy and the Department of Defense.

Strobel and Douglas even referenced the now-defunct Office of Special Plans, even though the myths surrounding that entity-and repeated in this article-were thoroughly discredited by the Robb-Silberman Commission and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Finally, contrary to the article's insinuations, having an Iran policy office at the Pentagon is not a mystery. In both State and Defense, the Near East bureaus have offices **dealing** with Iran, as well as offices dealing with policy toward every other country in the region. These Iran offices were established to support closer interagency work on Iran policy, not for imagined or nefarious purposes.

We ask that these errors be corrected.

Dorrance **Smith**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

23 October 2006

Editor

AFP

1015 15<sup>th</sup> Street, NW, Suite 500  
Washington, D.C. 20005

To the Editor:

A recent article ("Rumsfeld admits progress..." Oct. 7, 2006) selectively quotes from Secretary Rumsfeld's recent column about Afghanistan in a way that created a misleading impression of the Secretary's views.

The Secretary did note that "not all the news about Afghanistan is encouraging," but went on to explain that "for all of the challenges the Afghan people face, there are many promising indicators." For example, he mentioned:

- "Security: The Afghan National Army has grown to more than 30,000 ... The Afghan National Police now number more than 46,000";
- "Economy: The size of Afghanistan's economy has tripled in the past five years, and is projected to increase another 20 percent next year"; and
- "Health Care: In 2001 only 8 percent of Afghans had access to at least basic health care; at least 80 percent **do** today."

Secretary Rumsfeld concluded by noting that Afghanistan's overall trajectory is "a hopeful and promising one." This summation was also conspicuously not reflected in your article.

Sincerely,

Bryan G. Whitman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs



11-L-0559/OSD/60437

The Sunday Times (London)  
Oct. 15, 2006

## **Letter RE: “Time for a change in Iraq”**

A recent article (“Time for a change in Iraq,” Oct. 8, 2006) contains a number of erroneous claims, two of which especially merit a response.

First, the claim that Iraq is in “chaos” due to “politicians making military decisions” is false. Commanders in the field have consistently determined troop levels and ~~other~~ military matters. Regarding troop levels, commanders have emphasized the need for more capable Iraqi forces, not additional American troops. As General Abizaid, Commander U.S. Central Command, explained:

“I think those ‘experts’ want the U.S. troops to do all the work. And General Casey and I don’t want U.S. troops to do all the work. It’s very, very clear to both of us that, in order to win in ~~Iraq~~, the Iraqis have to assume more and more responsibility. And they’re doing that, and we intend to keep doing that.”

Second, the claim that “Rumsfeld froze out others in the administration, refusing even to return their calls” is false. This myth is derived from a passage in Bob Woodward’s recent book where Secretary Rumsfeld supposedly refuses to ~~return~~ then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice’s phone calls. Secretary Rice has described ~~this~~ claim as “ridiculous,” and stated “Secretary Rumsfeld has never refused to return my phone calls.” Secretary Rumsfeld similarly described this as “nonsense.”

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy assistant secretary of defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington**

## An Ongoing Question

Your editorial urging the administration to commit more troops to Iraq merits comment ("More Troops," Oct. 9). **As** Secretary Rumsfeld has explained, determining troop levels is more an **art** than a science. But it is **an art** that requires a firm understanding of the present conditions on the ground.

Those with the best vantage point, the commanders in Iraq, have consistently said that **American** troops are at the level they believe is required. They say that they need more capable Iraqi forces, not American troops. **As** General Abizaid explained recently, "This notion that troop levels are static is not true, never has been true, and it won't be true. We will **ask** for what we need when we need them. But it's key that the Iraqi military take on more and more responsibility."

U.S. troop levels have fluctuated **as** the conditions in Iraq have evolved. Recently, **as** your editorial noted, troop levels in Baghdad increased to help Iraqis quell sectarian violence. It is simply incorrect to suggest, **as NR** does, that the military and civilian leadership has been Willing "to commit only enough forces not to lose." The Department of Defense is committed to victory, and will continue to rely heavily on the advice of military experts with firsthand knowledge of the battlefield.

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, The Pentagon**



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 16, 2006

Editor  
*Daily News*  
450 W. 33 Street  
New York, NY 10001

To the Editor:

Michael Daly's characterization of the National Intelligence Estimate and claims about Secretary Rumsfeld are deeply misleading ("Forget Joe, Fire Rummy," Oct. 10, 2006).

Mr. Daly selectively quoted the National Intelligence Estimate finding that Iraq has become "a cause célèbre for jihadists," but left out that it also found: "Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight."

Of equal concern is Mr. Daly's claim that Secretary Rumsfeld "pushed" for an invasion of Iraq, using 9-11 as an "excuse." That is simply not true. The United States went to Afghanistan -- not Iraq -- after 9-11. The decision to go to Iraq was not Secretary Rumsfeld's but the President's with the support of a strong bipartisan majority of Congress -- a decision only taken after 12 years of Iraq defying the demands of the UN security council.

Finally, we strongly disagree with the claim that we entered Iraq "with considerably less troops than our best military minds considered necessary." The troop level decision was based on recommendations by many exceptional military minds -- including Generals Abizaid, Casey, Franks, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Daly's insult of these decorated military leaders is unwarranted.

Sincerely,

Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60440



Christian Science Monitor  
October 16, 2006

## State Department Has Been Active In Iraq

John Hughes's Oct. 11 Opinion column, "Problems in Iraq should not deter US commitment to freedom," makes the false assertion that postwar problems in Iraq are due in part to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's "apparent decision to sideline the State Department."

The State Department was well represented on the staff of Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (US Army, ret.) and in the Coalition Provisional Authority. Many senior staffmembers with Coalition Provisional Administrator Ambassador L. Paul Bremer were from the State Department.

And senior State Department officials served as advisers heading Iraqi ministries prior to the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. To claim that the State Department was "sidelined" is simply inaccurate.

Bryan Whitman, Deputy assistant secretary of defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 18, 2006

Editor  
*U.S. News & World Report*  
1050 Thomas Jefferson Street NW  
Washington, DC 20007  
202-955-2000

To the Editor:

Mort Zuckerman's recent column ("A Sad Litany of Failures," Oct. 15, 2006) repeats a number of myths about Iraq that merit a response.

Mr. Zuckerman claims violence in Iraq may have "cost more than 600,000 Iraqis their lives," yet fails to note the study this figure is drawn from has been widely challenged. Michael O'Hanlon, an expert on Iraqi casualties at the Brookings Institution noted: "I do not believe the new numbers. I think they're way off." An Iraqi blogger wrote that the authors of this study "resorted to mathematics to ... satisfy their lust for more deaths."

Mr. Zuckerman claims one of "the single most damaging move[s] in postwar Iraq ... [was] the swift dissolution of the Iraqi military." Yet although officially disbanded by Coalition officials, the Iraqi military largely disbanded itself. As the commander of the best-equipped division in the Iraqi military, the Republican Guard Al-Nida Division, explained:

"I started the war with 13,000 soldiers. By the time we had orders to pull back to Baghdad, I had less than 2,000; by the time we were in position in Baghdad, I had less than 1,000. Every day the desertions increased. We had no engagements with American forces."

Finally, Mr. Zuckerman uses Bob Woodward's latest book to attack Secretary Rumsfeld. However, as other scenes concocted by Mr. Woodward have been variously described as "a lie" by President George H.W. Bush, "ridiculous" by Secretary Rice, and "nonsense" by Secretary Rumsfeld, his assertions are hardly "devastating."

Sincerely,

Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60442



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 18, 2006

Editor  
The *Washington Post*  
1150 15th Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20071

To the Editor:

The recent column by Congressman Murtha ("Confessions of a 'Defeatocrat,'" October 15, 2006) makes a number of inaccurate claims about Secretary Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense that merit correction.

Rep. Murtha claimed Secretary Rumsfeld has faulted democrats "for believing that 'vicious extremists can be appeased,'" by selectively quoting from the Secretary's recent address American Legion. Yet Secretary Rumsfeld did not mention Congressional Democrats in his remarks – in fact he didn't mention any critics of the Iraq war. His remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in the War on Terror.

Rep. Murtha's claim that the Department has "a new military blueprint to keep 140,000 troops in Iraq through 2010" is a mischaracterization of comments made by General Pete Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the Army. The Army plans for a variety of contingencies. General Schoomaker's comments on the Army planning for potential scenarios in Iraq is one example of this. None of this should be understood as a forecast for the actual commitment of U.S. forces in the future.

Rep. Murtha claimed Gen. Eric Shinseki's recommendation for "several hundred thousand troops ... was ignored." This is untrue. As the Gen. Myers, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs noted in Congressional testimony in June 2004, General Shinseki provided no troop level recommendation to the Joint Chiefs. Despite Gen. Shinseki's public comments, there ~~was~~ thus no recommendation to ignore.

Finally, Rep. Murtha claims that the "Iraqi army was disbanded," a decision he blames for subsequent violence. Yet although officially disbanded by Coalition officials, the Iraqi military largely disbanded itself. As the commander of the best-equipped division in the Iraqi military, the Republican Guard Al-Nida Division, explained:

11-L-0559/OSD/60443,



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

"I started the war with 13,000 soldiers. By the time we had orders to pull back to Baghdad, I had less than 2,000; by the time we were in position in Baghdad, I had less than 1,000. Every day the desertions increased. We had no engagements with American forces."

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dorrance Smith".

Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60444



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 18, 2006

Editor  
*The Weekly Standard*  
PO Box 96127  
Washington, DC 20077-7767

To the Editor:

Bill Kristol's recent article "No More Huffing and Puffing" manipulates Secretary of Defense Donald's Rumsfeld's comments at a recent press conference and misleads your readers.

Mr. Kristol's article quotes at length from a recent press conference by Secretary Rumsfeld. The Secretary opened his remarks by noting the sixth anniversary of the terrorist attack on the *USS Cole*. The Secretary then moved into a discussion of the threat posed by North Korea.

Mr. Kristol interrupts Secretary Rumsfeld's remarks by interjecting a question, asking, "But on the sixth anniversary of the attack on the *USS Cole*, what are we doing about these threats and trends?" He then proceeds to use the rest of the Secretary's remarks -- in which he discusses the need for cooperation of the international community on stopping North Korea -- to answer a question the Secretary was never asked.

Mr. Kristol conducts this misleading parsing of Secretary Rumsfeld's statement so that he can make his point that, in his words, "the lesson Rumsfeld takes ~~from~~ the *USS Cole* and all that has happened since, is this: We're dependent on the 'international community' and we need to cooperate with others." (emphasis added.)

Though it may strike **some** as odd that Mr. Kristol takes issue with the notion of the "need to cooperate with others," Secretary Rumsfeld said nothing of the sort. His discussion of the international community pertained specifically to the President's policy on North Korea, not our reaction to the *Cole* bombing or other terrorist attacks. If anything, in fact, the Secretary's comments on the international community could be read as exactly the opposite of what Mr. Kristol implies. Indeed, a few days earlier, the Secretary noted at another press event the following: "The international community's going to have to do a lot better or else face a world that will be quite different, with multiple nuclear nations and . . . the added risk of these very lethal weapons falling into the hands of non-state entities."

A full transcript of the Secretary's comments in both press conferences -- absent Mr. Kristol's commentary -- is available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/>.

11-L-0559/OSD/60445



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1400

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dorrance Smith", is written over the typed name.

Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60446



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 24, 2006

Editor  
*The Baltimore Sun*  
501 North Calvert Street  
Baltimore, MD 21278

To The Editor:

We recently became aware of your October 1, 2006 article, "More Troops Not Solution To Iraq Crisis, Experts Say." The article, by reporter David Wood, states a number of opinions as if they are facts. Simply because these criticisms were printed in books does not mean they are true. Several assertions merit correction.

Mr. Wood, for example writes that "[b]y late last year, even the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. John Abizaid, was fed up." This apparently is based on a quote that General Abizaid supposedly made to an unnamed friend, according to an account by another reporter, Bob Woodward, who was not present at the original conversation. General Abizaid has disputed Mr. Woodward's account. This was not mentioned in your article.

To cite a more egregious example, Mr. Wood writes the following: "The Army's first estimate, that 400,000 to 450,000 would be needed for the occupation, was extrapolated from its peacekeeping experience in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. But that plan was rejected by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, according to the memoirs of retired Gen. Tommy Franks, the top U.S. commander at the time."

General Franks's book in fact said that Secretary Rumsfeld asked General Franks to update the existing war plan for Iraq, but never suggested or rejected any size force that General Franks deemed necessary. According to the very source Mr. Woodward cites, it was in fact General Franks who recommended a smaller force. On page 333 of his memoirs, General Franks wrote: "As I concluded my summary of the existing 1003 plan, I noted that we'd trimmed planned force levels from 500,000 troops to around 400,000. But even that was still way too large, I told the Secretary." General Franks also notes on a number of occasions that rather than "rejecting" military advice, Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly listened to commanders' advice in designing a plan for Iraq. On page 313, for example, General Franks wrote, "Don Rumsfeld was a hard taskmaster - but he never tried to control the tactics of our war-fight."

If you cannot provide us with the documentation used to make Mr. Wood's assertion about General Franks' memoirs, we ask that you correct this error for your readers.

11-L-0559/OSD/60447

Mr. Wood then noted the following: "Rumsfeld disputed an assertion in the memoirs of L. Paul Bremer, the former top U.S. civilian official in Iraq, that Bremer had asked for additional troops in the summer of 2003 and been ignored." Mr. Wood fails to mention that in a TV interview earlier this year, Mr. Bremer himself backed away from the claim made in his book. He stated that "[Rumsfeld] said he'd received it and would consider it and he'did he consider it."

Mr. Wood also writes "a review of the record shows that the Bush administration made decisions to keep troop levels low in Iraq and that in the uncontrolled chaos that followed, the insurgency took hold." Who conducted this "review"? Was it Mr. Wood? Was it Bob Woodward? Was it based on an opinion by a retired general Mr. Wood cites? Was the Pentagon asked to comment on this "review"? Why not?

In addition to correcting errors of fact, we therefore also ask that a clarification be issued on the larger article itself – to make clear to your readers that many of the assertions made by Mr. Wood were opinions, not facts, and are disputed by the Department of Defense, which was not asked to comment for the article.

Thank you for your prompt attention.

Sincerely,



Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs



Unpublished  
October 24, 2006

## Letter To The New York Times

To the Editor:

The New York Times has once again repeated a popular myth to mislead its readers about Secretary Rumsfeld. We ask for an immediate correction.

Today's editorial claims: "There have never been enough troops, the result of Mr. Rumsfeld's negligent decision to use Iraq as a proving ground for his pet military theories, rather than listen to his generals." Whether or not the Times believes there were enough troops in Iraq, the claim that any troop level in Iraq is the result of Secretary Rumsfeld "not listening to his generals" is demonstrably untrue.

Generals involved in troop level decisions have been abundantly clear on this matter:

\*General Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command during the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom: "Don Rumsfeld was a hard task master -- but he never tried to control the tactics of our war-fight [Franks, "American Soldier," pg 313]

Rather than advancing Secretary Rumsfeld's alleged "pet theories," General Franks wrote that he based his troop level recommendations on the following: "Building up a Desert Storm-size force in Kuwait would have taken months of effort - very visible effort - and would have sacrificed the crucial element of operational surprise we now enjoyed. . . . And if operational surprise had been sacrificed, I suspected that the Iraqis would have repositioned their Republican Guard and regular army units, making for an attrition slugfest that would cost thousands of lives."

On page 333 of his memoirs, General Franks added: "As I concluded my summary of the existing 1003 plan, I noted that we'd trimmed planned force levels from 500,000 troops to around 400,000. But even that was still way too large, I told the Secretary." General Franks also notes on a number of occasions that rather than "rejecting" military advice, Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly listened to commanders' advice in designing a plan for Iraq.

\*General George Casey, Commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq: "I just want to assure you and the American people that if we need more troops we'll ask for them. Right now, we don't." [CBS News, June 27, 2005]

\*General John Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command: "... this notion that troop levels are static is not true, never has been true, and it won't be true. We'll ask for what we need when we need them." [CNN, September 18, 2006]

\*Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Pete Pace: "We have done more than honor the request of the commanders. . . . As Joint Chiefs, we have validated that; we have looked at that; we have analyzed it. We decided for ourselves, and I as an individual have agreed with the size force that's there. So we should *take* on the responsibility that we own." [Pace Confirmation Hearings, Transcript, July 10, 2005]

\*Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers: "But in the plan going in there,

11-L-0559/OSD/60449

## What Rumsfeld Said

Regarding the article "White House fires back at McCain's comment on **Iraq**," (Nation, Aug. 24), it is important to note that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has, from the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, attempted to strike a balance in his comments on the situation in that country.

The secretary has properly noted the accomplishments of the U.S. military and the progress made by the Iraqi people — accomplishments often overshadowed by the reports of violence that have come to dominate the 24-hour news cycle — while at the same time reminding the public and the press just how difficult and unprecedented the task is, and will be, for some time.

Regarding the ~~term~~ "dead enders," the secretary was specifically referring to remnants of the former regime who — harboring delusions of returning to power and privilege — were fighting the coalition and terrorizing other Iraqis along with foreign jihadists and thousands of criminals released from jail prior to the war.

On April 9, 2003, when the liberation of Baghdad by coalition forces was causing euphoria in many quarters, the secretary offered this assessment: "There is no question that there are difficult and very dangerous days ahead and that the fighting will continue for some period."

On the effort in Iraq, Mr. Rumsfeld has also said:

"This is a tough business, and wars are unpredictable and there [are] lots of difficulties." ? March 25, 2003;

"If some analysts want to say its going to be a cakewalk, and it turns out not to be a cakewalk, the fact of the matter is we have said repeatedly [that] we can't say how long it will last. We do not know. It is not knowable." ? March 25, 2003;

"I'm realistic. I'm not going to suggest it's easy. It's hard. It's very difficult. The biggest concern I have is that [the Iraqi] people are undoubtedly starved by 35 years of political repression and economic repression." ? October 10, 2003;

"It's a tough, hard slog...What we're doing in Afghanistan and Iraq is difficult work, it's dangerous work." ? October 27, 2003.

DORRANCE SMITH, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington

## For The Record

Nat Hentoff's column "Seeking Justice," about the administration's relationship with military lawyers — members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGs) — is replete with inaccuracies (Op-Ed, September 11).

For example, in the development of interrogation policies in 2002 and 2003, civilian political decision-makers did not "ignore the Uniformed Code of Military Justice" (UCMJ).

Instead, JAGs led the analysis of the UCMJ part of that work because of their expertise with that body of law. Most important, far from being "kept out" of the work on interrogations, JAGs participated actively in the 2003 working group discussions on interrogation policy, and as Rear Adm. James McPherson testified before the Senate **Armed** Services Committee in July 2005, "we did have **an** impact."

More recently, concerning draft legislation for trials of captured terrorists, the top military lawyers for each service, their staffs, and civilian Department of Defense leadership worked together closely for many hours over several weeks developing and reviewing successive proposals leading to the one President Bush submitted to Congress last week.

It is therefore a misrepresentation to claim that the administration's consultation consisted of only one meeting between Department of Justice lawyers and a working group of military lawyers. To the extent that the administration's proposed legislation differs from the recommendations of individual JAGs, that difference is not occasioned by lack of JAG involvement — rather, it results from considered administration determinations, after careful attention to all points of view.

The truth is that the Department of Defense and the administration have relied extensively on the expertise of JAGs in the field and JAGs at the Pentagon in addressing the very difficult issues that have arisen in the ongoing war against global terrorism, and it is wrong to portray the military lawyers as a distinct group who all adhere to a single viewpoint, distinct and opposed to the civilian lawyers and the administration.

Bryan G. Whitman, Deputy assistant secretary, Public affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Defense Department, Washington

Washington Times  
September 28, 2006  
Pg. 18

## In Defense Of JAG

The Sept. 15 item "JAG proliferation" (Inside the Ring) begins with an incorrect premise and then accuses Defense Department attorneys of putting self-interest above national security.

The judge advocates general of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the staff judge advocate to the commandant of the Marine Corps *are* honorable, professional, intelligent and patriotic men. They are the senior uniformed legal advisers for their respective services and together with their civilian colleagues must wrestle with some of the most profound and difficult issues in our history during a time of war. I ~~am~~ astonished that their integrity would be impugned in ~~such~~ a manner.

BRYAN G. WHITMAN, Deputy assistant secretary, Public affairs, Office of the assistant secretary, Defense Department, Washington

Washington Times  
October 16, 2006  
Pg. 20

## **Mischaracterizing Gen. Schoomaker's Remarks**

**The** article "Bush hits Democrats on N. Korea talks," (Nation, Thursday) mischaracterizes remarks made by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Schoomaker.

The Army, charged with organizing, equipping, training and providing the majority of the ground forces for the joint **fight**, must constantly plan worst case (greatest possible need) for worldwide requirements for ground forces. **I** was present at this interview. The general said future troop levels in **Iraq** are for planning purposes only, not necessarily a forecast for the actual commitment of forces.

"It's better for me to do that and be able to pull things off the table or to reduce tour lengths than it is to 'under plan,'" he said. "What we want to do is try to put as much predictability into people's lives as we can, and to anticipate in a way that they're ready in time to go."

As always, it is the Defense Department and **U.S.** Central Command -- not the Army -- who determine what forces will be deployed. **But** the Army will always have trained and ready forces available for the call in these uncertain times.

**Brig. Gen. Anthony A. Cucolo III**, Army, Washington

San Francisco Chronicle  
October 21, 2006  
Pg. B4

## Set Record Straight

Editor -- Sadly the Oct. 1 Insight piece, "U.S. is recruiting misfits for Army," by Nick Turse, blames America's armed services and ignores the facts. Americans can, and do, openly disagree over America's foreign policy, but shouldn't maliciously attack the very soldiers who volunteer to protect our freedom of speech. Turse's allegations aside, the soldiers who answer the call to duty and serve in your Army are smart, fit and morally sound. In fact, they are above average: today, less than one-third of American males between the ages of 17-24 qualify to join the Army.

Every enlistee has a high-school diploma or equivalent. More than 60 percent of those who enlist score in the top half of the nationally normed entrance **exam**. Recruits must pass stringent medical and physical fitness tests. Because we recognize some people can overcome mistakes made at a young age -- a belief we share with most Americans -- we do issue some carefully considered waivers for minor medical issues or minor brushes with the law.

A final thought for Turse: If I am willing to continue going to combat with these great Americans volunteering for military service and am confident in their quality, why should you -- someone who will never see combat -- have a problem with them?

Proudly serving you.

ANTHONY A. CUCOLO III, Brigadier General, U.S. Army, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C

## MYTHS V. FACTS

### DEBUNKING THE WASHINGTON POST'S EDITORIAL ON IRAQ:

"How To Lose A War" (Oct. 4, 2006)

In an Oct. 4, 2006 editorial, "How to Lose a War," the Washington Post makes a series of unfounded accusations, based largely on three books on Iraq written by its reporters. A few of the most egregious errors of fact are corrected below:

INCORRECT WASHINGTON POST CLAIM: *"President Bush and his most senior aides meanwhile stubbornly refused to listen to advisers who warned of the consequences of their policies."*

#### RESPONSE:

- The president listened to the advice and recommendations of a broad range of people with differing views on how to approach the situation in Iraq. The suggestion that he may have disagreed with some advisors does not mean he ignored them.
- Senior leaders thought carefully about the consequences of entering Iraq and what could go wrong. Bob Woodward himself makes this argument in his previous book, "Plan of Attack." He wrote:
  - "At an NSC meeting during this period, Rumsfeld was thinking about what could go wrong. He began doodling a list that grew to some 15 items. ... Among the items: Another state could try to take advantage of the U.S. involvement or preoccupation with Iraq. ... There could be higher than expected collateral damage. ... Iraq could experience ethnic strife among the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds as had happened before. ... The list had grown to 29 items."
- Further, the suggestion of a static and unyielding approach to Iraq also fails to take into account continuous adjustments in strategy on the battlefield:
  - The program for training and equipping the Iraqi army was revised substantially to stand up a force better suited to internal security and fighting terrorists
  - The Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) initial plan to transfer sovereignty and hold elections was moved up to an earlier date, in response to the desire of the Iraqi people to take charge of their own country.
  - The reconstruction and aid program for Iraq was adjusted to focus less on large, long-term infrastructure to funding smaller projects that could be implemented quickly with immediate impact in the community, while also providing jobs for young men who might be tempted by the insurgents or militias.

INCORRECT WASHINGTON POST CLAIM: *"Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld monopolized administration planning for Iraq ... Mr. Rumsfeld's Pentagon excluded the State Department from reconstruction planning, then failed to produce any plan of its own."*

#### RESPONSE:

- Planning for the contingency of a postwar Iraq was an *interagency* process, in which officials from the State Department, USAID, Treasury Department, National Security Council staff, Office of Management and Budget, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Department (DoD), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and others met many times a week -- at senior levels and working levels -- beginning in the summer of 2002.
- An ad hoc group of the interagency Deputies Committee met regularly -- typically twice a week -- on Iraq-related issues, including post-war planning.
- In July 2002, an assortment of working groups began forming to conduct and coordinate post-war planning, including:
  - Interagency Iraq Political-Military Cell (NSC, State, DoD, CIA, OVP):
  - Interagency Executive Steering Group (NSC, State, DoD, CIA, OVP):
  - Interagency Humanitarian/Reconstruction Group (NSC, State, DoD, CIA, OVP, Treas, DOI, USAID)
  - Interagency Energy Infrastructure Working Group (State, DoD, CIA, DOE)
  - Interagency Coalition Working Group (State, DoD)
- In January 2003, DoD created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA): an expeditionary interagency office with officials from all departments and agencies in charge of detailed planning and, if necessary, implementation.
- The State Department was well represented on the staff of Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (US **Army**, Ret.) in ORHA and in the CPA. Senior State Department officials served as advisors heading Iraqi ministries prior to the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004. The vast majority of senior staff members with Coalitional Provisional Administrator Ambassador L. Paul Bremer were from the State Department, Coalition partners, other U.S. government agencies, or volunteers from the private sector, not DoD.
- Again, Mr. Woodward's previous book supports this. Rather than ignoring post-war Iraq, Mr. Woodward writes: "Rumsfeld had been pushing everyone to prepare estimates on the reconstruction needs and costs."

INCORRECT WASHINGTON POST CLAIM: *"Staff members for Mr. Bremer's authority too often were picked on the basis of Republican political affiliation, rather than experience or competence -- with the result that people in their twenties were handed control over matters such as the Iraqi government budget."*

#### RESPONSE:

- The role of the White House personnel office in the hiring process for Iraq was quite limited. It was but one of several sources of hiring for the Coalition Provisional Authority.
- Most of those hired were career employees of DoD, the State Department, other government agencies, and personnel from Coalition partners (such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Spain and Romania). The leadership team and senior staff of the CPA included several former U.S. ambassadors from the career foreign service.
- Additionally, those who staffed the CPA represented a broad mix of people with experience in government and the private sector. They included Democrats and



Republicans, and encompassed people who had worked in both the Bush and Clinton Administrations. Some examples:

- o An undersecretary at DoD under President Clinton was a high-level aide to Paul Bremer and participated in the decisions regarding the Iraqi army.
- o A former Clinton political appointee who had served as a deputy in the DoD Comptroller's office under Secretary Bill Cohen controlled CPA finances and Iraqi monies.
- The Post's one specific allegation -- that a person "in their twenties" was handed control over "the Iraqi government budget" -- is false. The individual in question did not manage the Iraqi budget, she executed it, and the earlier claim by a Post reporter that she "had no background in accounting" has since been corrected by the Post. In fact, this person had a substantial background in accounting and an M.B.A. from one of the best business schools in Europe.

INCORRECT WASHINGTON POST CLAIM: *"Having dispatched too few troops to Iraq at the beginning of the war, Mr. Rumsfeld has perpetuated this signal failing for 3 1/2 years."*

RESPONSE:

- Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the civilian leadership at DoD has relied heavily on the advice of commanders on the ground -- those who lead and see daily operations firsthand -- to determine troop levels.
- Secretary Rumsfeld supported troop levels as high as 400,000 if they were needed during the initial planning of the war.
- U.S. CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks decided to launch a campaign that emphasized speed rather than mass. This was designed to bring down the Hussein regime quickly, and thus prevent many of the possible negative consequences of invasion that were widely predicted at the time, such as:
  - o Saddam Hussein's deliberate burning of oil fields.
  - o Large-scale refugee flows.
  - o Food or medical humanitarian crises.
  - o Destabilization of neighboring countries because of a protracted war.

The civilian and military leadership have had to balance the tension between having enough troops to provide the security necessary for economic and political progress to go forward, while not having so many troops that it breeds Iraqi resentment and dependency. It is a difficult question in which fair minded people can disagree. But to point to "more troops" as a panacea for Iraq's difficulties is simplistic and does not take into account realities on the ground.

- On July 9, 2003, Gen. Franks said in Senate testimony:  
"We have about 145,000 troops in there right now ... There has been [the] suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And in fact, I can tell you, in the presence of [Secretary Rumsfeld], that if more troops are necessary, this secretary's going to say 'yes.' I mean, we have talked about this on a number of occasions."
- On June 27, 2005, Gen. George Casey, Commander of Multi-National Force -- Iraq, said the following:

"I just want to assure you and the American people that if we need more troops we'll ask for them. Right now, we don't."

- On September 18, 2006, Gen. John Abizaid, CENTCOM Commander, said the following:

"...this notion that troop levels are static is not true, never has been true, and it won't be true. We will ask for what we need when we need them."

Tens of thousands more troops *have* been added to the force providing security in Iraq. They have been *Iraqi* troops -- more than 300,000 of which have been trained and equipped -- who our commanders agree are the key to success in Iraq over the long term.

## MYTHS V. FACTS

### DEBUNKING NEWSWEEKS ARTICLE ON AFGHANISTAN:

"The Rise of Jihadistan" (Oct. 2, 2006)

INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM: *"The 2003 invasion of Iraq did more than divert essential resources from Afghanistan; it created a test lab for new insurgent weapons and tactics that have since been adopted by the Taliban."*

#### RESPONSE:

- The assertion that the Iraq invasion "diverted" resources from Afghanistan is a talking point of critics of the Bush administration. It is an opinion, not a fact.
- Resources to Afghanistan have *increased* since Operation Iraqi Freedom began. In March 2003, the United States had about 9,500 troops in Afghanistan. Today, there are more than 21,000 U.S. forces either under U.S. or NATO command in Afghanistan or directly supporting missions there.
- The insinuation that Iraq has created new tactics is, at best, exaggerated. Guerrilla warfare techniques and terror tactics such as suicide bombings were not invented in Iraq.
- Additionally, the logic of this claim seems to be that U.S. forces should never confront terrorists far from our shores because of the danger that the enemy might fight back -- and learn new tactics in the process. This is not a coherent policy.

INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM: *"Five years after the Afghan invasion, the Taliban are fighting back hard, carving out a sanctuary where they -- and Al Qaeda's leaders -- can operate freely."*

#### RESPONSE:

- Afghanistan is undergoing a difficult transition from a state of anarchy in many areas to a country with a democratically elected central government that is reaching out to long ungoverned territories. The article frequently relies on myths, opinions, worst-case scenarios, and a disinclination to mention any positive developments.
- The strength and influence of the Taliban has grown in some areas, but the Coalition, NATO/ISAF and Afghan forces are on the offensive and will relentlessly pursue Taliban and al-Qaeda extremists, as well as any associated movements. The rise in violence is often directly attributable to OEF Coalition, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan National Army and Police offensive operations. These operations are designed to set the stage for the continued development and extension of the central government's reach into areas that have been lawless for decades. Not all the violence can be attributed to the Taliban and al-Qaeda: some arises from criminality, tribal strife, land disputes, or narco-trafficking.

**INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:** *"To impose order following the 2001 invasion, the Pentagon relied heavily on the same corrupt mujahedin chiefs whose brutal misrule first spawned the Taliban in the mid-1990s."*

**RESPONSE:**

- This is an opinion stated as a fact.
- Instead of initiating a massive military occupation along the lines of the Soviets during the 1980s, the Coalition has worked with local leaders and institutions to move Afghanistan forward from its tragic past. National disenfranchisement often encourages Afghans to fight against the Coalition, so an Afghan solution -- not a U.S.-imposed solution -- was deemed best.
- The Coalition worked quickly to help emplace an interim government that would be acceptable to the Afghan people. Hamid Karzai was selected by the Loya Jirga -- a traditional assembly of Afghan tribal and community leaders. President Karzai was democratically elected by the Afghan people in their first such vote in the country's history.
- Many of these chiefs or "warlords" did initially have their own separate militias, but most were placed under the control of the Ministry of Defense -- then disarmed and demobilized. The Afghan National Army has since grown to more than 30,000 troops, with the possibility of increasing to 70,000. The government of Afghanistan continues to work to disarm illegal armed groups in the country.

**INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:** *"After U.S. commanders failed to seal off the Pakistan border near the besieged caves of Tora Bora, letting bin Laden escape, the Qaeda leader helped rebuild Mullah Omar's decimated forces."*

**RESPONSE:**

- This claim is disputed and lacks context. In an Oct. 19, 2004, op-ed in *The New York Times*, Gen. Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander at the time, wrote: "We don't know to this day whether Mr. bin Laden was at Tora Bora in December 2001." Franks noted that some intelligence sources said bin Laden was present; other sources indicated he was in Pakistan; and still others suggested he was in Kashmir.
- Concerning the actual conduct of the battle, Tora Bora is a mountainous and difficult region of Afghanistan -- an area that was all but impossible to surround or seal off. Haphazardly sending a massive U.S. force into unfamiliar terrain would have invited intense resistance from local tribesmen, potentially bloody battles, and would have alerted al-Qaeda operatives to an impending attack, which might have given many of those we captured more time to flee.
- Gen. Franks has stated that the United States enlisted Afghan fighters to help lead the search for bin Laden and other al-Qaeda members because "[k]illing and capturing Taliban and Qaeda fighters was best done by the Afghan fighters who already knew the caves and tunnels."
- In addition, special operations forces from the United States and several other countries were also there, providing tactical leadership and calling in air strikes.
- Pakistani troops also provided significant help: As many as 100,000 took up positions along the border and rounded up hundreds of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters.

INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM: *"Washington pushed Musharraf to crack down on the never-tamed Afghan borderlands, but fierce tribal resistance led to a formal deal letting the Taliban retain their bases there."*

RESPONSE:

- This claim is disputed.
- According to Pakistan's President Musharraf, the agreement with tribal leaders had "bottom lines" that were non-negotiable. In his words, the agreement requires: "No al-Qaeda activity," and "no Taliban activity in our tribal agency or across [the border] in Afghanistan."
- Gen. James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has said that "[i]f all the elements of the agreement are, in fact, lived up to by the signatories, then the situation on the border should improve."

INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM: *"As doubts rise over Bush's global aims, NATO is hard put to find the troops it needs for the mission."*

RESPONSE:

- Each of NATO's 26 members is contributing to the Afghanistan mission -- an unprecedented commitment for the Alliance outside of its own borders.
- On Oct. 5, 2006, NATO's International Security Assistance Force took over security operations in the eastern part of Afghanistan, bringing more than 12,000 U.S. troops under NATO command. At the recent NATO ministerial in Slovenia, Poland pledged 1,000 additional troops to support ISAF.
- With nearly 20,000 non-U.S. NATO troops, plus the more than 12,000 U.S. troops under NATO command, the NATO mission is the strongest it has ever been, and Alliance forces have been directly taking the fight to the enemy in southern Afghanistan.
- In testimony before Congress, Gen. Jones stated: "[T]he opposing militant forces have tried to test NATO to see if we have the will and the capability to stand and fight. And the evidence is in: The overwhelming answer is yes."

INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:

*"In the countryside over the past year Taliban guerrillas have filled a power vacuum that had been created by the relatively light NATO and U.S. military footprint of some 40,000 soldiers, and by the weakness of Afghan President Hamid Karzai's administration."*

RESPONSE:

- Qari Mohammed Yousaf Ahmadi, generally viewed as the Taliban's current chief spokesman, stated publicly on Sept. 15, "The Taliban forces have conducted a tactical retreat." It is difficult to fill a power vacuum if your forces are retreating.
- As Gen. Jones has recently stated, much of the recent increased fighting stems from the Afghan central government extending into areas in the south that have been lawless for

decades. Much of the fighting reflects a decision by the Taliban to challenge the NATO force in southern Afghanistan. The tactic hasn't worked.

- President Karzai himself has acknowledged the importance of strengthening and improving Afghanistan's governmental institutions. A representative government **has** never before existed in Afghanistan's long history, and strengthening that government will take time and patience.

#### INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:

*"Afghanistan is 'unfortunately well on its way' to becoming a 'narco-state,' NATO's supreme commander, Marine Gen. Jim Jones, said before Congress last week."*

#### RESPONSE:

- While Gen. Jones did in fact warn of such a possibility, that was not all he said in his testimony to Congress. Left out of the *Newsweek* article was his assessment that **this** situation can be reversed if the Afghan government, NATO, and the Coalition work aggressively to reduce the cultivation and flow of opium in Afghanistan **and** provide rural economic development to improve the economic prospects of Afghan farmers. **This** is precisely the approach being taken.
- The article also leaves out other parts of Gen. Jones' statement that give fuller context to his sentiments. He went on to say, "Afghanistan should no longer be considered a failed state, but rather a fragile state."

#### INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:

*"But the harsh truth is that five years after the U.S. invasion on Oct. 7, 2001, most of the good news is confined to Kabul, with its choking rush-hour traffic jams, a construction boom and a handful of air-conditioned shopping malls. Much of the rest of Afghanistan appears to be failing again."*

#### RESPONSE:

- Afghanistan was -- and is -- one of the poorest country's on the face of the earth. It will take years of hard work by the Afghan people and the international community to reverse the effects of decades of occupation and civil war.
- Improvements are not confined to Kabul, though it is true that much of the development and growth has been in larger cities, such as Kabul, Herat, and the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Nonetheless, there has been a significant economic growth and donor efforts to improve living conditions across the country. Some examples:
  - Afghanistan's GDP was valued at \$2.4 billion in 2001. In **2006**, it was valued at **\$7.3** billion, and that number is projected to rise to \$8.8 billion next year.
  - The government of Afghanistan collected more than \$177 million in revenue in 2002-2003, and \$300 million in 2004-2005, **an** increase of 70 percent.
  - Eighty-five percent of all property deeds in Afghanistan have been restored or reorganized, decreasing land and ownership disputes.
  - There is now a Central Bank with 32 computerized provincial branches.

- o The completion of the Kabul-Kandahar highway improved transportation and commerce by dramatically reducing travel times between the two cities.
- o Thousands of kilometers of roads have been built or improved since the Taliban fell. The U.S. portion of the Kandahar to Herat highway has reduced the travel time between those two major cities from 10 hours to 4.3 hours. The average speed on 70 percent of Afghanistan's roadways has increased three-fold, from 20 kilometers per hour to 60 kilometers per hour.
- o There have been more than 28,000 micro-loans given out for agricultural activities.
- o At least 2.5 million Afghans have benefited from irrigation and road projects linking farms to market. Other agricultural improvements include 210 irrigation structures and 300 kilometers of canals that have been rehabilitated to improve 300,000 hectares of cropland.
- o At least 2.3 million animals have been vaccinated against disease.
- o In 2001, only eight percent of Afghans had access to basic health care. Now, 80 percent do.
- o There are currently more than 5 million students enrolled in schools -- 34 percent are girls.

INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:

*"Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups **now** have a place from which to hatch the next 9/11."*

RESPONSE:

- This assertion is contradicted within the same article by Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, Commander, Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan. He points out that al-Qaeda or its successors have nothing like the liberty that allowed them to plot September 11 in the open. He states: "They have no safe haven inside Afghanistan that if we find it, we will not strike against them."
- It is one thing for al-Qaeda remnants to operate within Afghanistan's borders while being vigorously pursued and attacked by Afghan, NATO, and Coalition forces -- as is happening now. It is quite another thing for a terrorist organization to have an entire nation where they can plan, train, and launch attacks with impunity -- as Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda did in Afghanistan before September 11.
- There is simply no comparison between the situation in Afghanistan when 9-11 was "hatched" to the situation today.

2 of 2 DOCUMENTS

Los Angeles Times

September 1, 2006 Friday  
Home Edition

## You can't appease terrorists

**BYLINE:** Donald H. Rumsfeld, DONALD H. RUMSFELD is the U.S. secretary of Defense.

**SECTION:** CALIFORNIA; Metro; Editorial Pages Desk; Part B; Pg. 13

**LENGTH:** 652 words

IN THE LAST FEW DAYS I have had the opportunity to speak at the annual conventions of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion. It is always a humbling experience to be in the presence of those who have served and fought for our country during some of our darkest, most trying times -- when it was unclear whether our way of life would prevail.

We are again engaged in conflicts that are testing whether we believe that the defense of liberty is worth the cost. And again, there are those who disagree with the mission, who question whether it is worth the sacrifice. This is to be expected in a time of war.

Today, some think that World War II and the Cold War were black-and-white affairs: good versus evil. But there were always those who thought that we should retreat within our borders.

In an effort to avoid repeating the carnage of World War I, much of the Western world tried to appease the growing threats in Europe and Asia in the years before World War II. Those who warned against the rise of Nazism, fascism and communism were often ridiculed and ignored.

The enemy we face today is different from the enemies we have faced in the past, but its goal is similar: to impose its fanatical ideology of hatred on the rest of the world.

In speaking to our veterans, I suggested several questions to guide us during this struggle against violent extremists:

- \* With the growing lethality and availability of weapons, can we truly afford to believe that vicious extremists can somehow be appeased?
- \* Can we really continue to think that free countries can negotiate a separate peace with terrorists?
- \* Can we truly afford to pretend that the threats today are simply "law enforcement" problems rather than fundamentally different threats requiring fundamentally different approaches?
- \* Can we truly afford to return to the destructive view that America -- not the enemy -- is the real source of the world's troubles?

These are the central questions of our time, and, as in all periods of conflict, we have no choice but to face them honestly.

The last question is particularly important, because this is the first war of the 21st century -- a war that, to a great extent, will be fought in the media on a global stage. We cannot allow the terrorists' lies and myths to be repeated without question or



challenge.

We also should be aware that the struggle is too important -- the consequences too severe -- to allow a "blame America first" mentality to overwhelm the truth that our nation, though imperfect, is a force for good in the world.

Consider that a database search of the nation's leading newspapers turns up 10 times as many mentions of one of the soldiers punished for misconduct at Abu Gbraib than of Sgt. 1st Class Paul Ray Smith, the first recipient of the Medal of Honor in the global war on terror.

Then there is the case of Amnesty International, a long-respected human-rights organization, which called the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay the "gulag of our times" -- a reference to the vast system of Soviet prisons and labor camps where innocent citizens were starved, tortured and murdered. The facility at Guantanamo Bay, by contrast, includes a volleyball court, basketball court, soccer field and library (the book most requested is "Harry Potter"). The food, served in accordance with Islamic diets, costs more per detainee than the average U.S. military ration.

With examples like these prevalent in the world media, I do worry about the lack of perspective in our national dialogue -- a perspective on history and the new challenges and threats that free people face today. Those who know the truth need to speak out against the myths and distortions being told about our troops and our country. My remarks at the Veterans of Foreign Wars and American Legion conventions have generated much discussion. I encourage everyone to read what I actually said at [defenseink.mil/speeches](http://defenseink.mil/speeches).

LOAD-DATE: September 1, 2006

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

DOCUMENT-TYPE: Opinion piece

PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newspaper

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~~FOUO~~

October 25, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: File of Articles on Myths

Please put together a file of articles on myths about me and give me a copy of the file.

Also, please give a copy of the file to (b)(6)

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF102506-10

OSD 16901-06



10/26/2006 6 13 25 PM

.....  
Please Respond By 11/07/06

*SIR,*  
*PLEASE SEE ATTACHED. RAPID RESPONSE*  
*WILL CONTINUE TO UPDATE THIS LIST. WE ARE*  
*ALSO CONTEMPLATING PUTTING THIS TOGETHER*  
*AS A PRODUCT FOR OUR SURROGATES*

*DL*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60466

OSD 16901-06



10/26/2006 6 13 21 PM

~~FOUO~~

August 31, 2006

TO: Allison Barber  
CC: Dorrance Smith  
Steve Bucci  
Cathy Mainardi  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Michael Peterson

I met Michael Peterson, the country music singer. I told him if he is in Washington sometime to stop in. Maybe you could bring him **up**, and I'll say hello and show him the office.

We may want him to entertain at the Pentagon. He is quite a good singer and seems like a good man.

DHR:ss  
SF083106-15

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/30/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60467

OSD 16902-06



10/26/2006 6:17:20 PM

~~FOUO~~

October 25, 2006

TO: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

CC: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Allison Barber *for AB*

SUBJECT: Michael Peterson

Per the Snowflake of August 31, 2006, we have contacted Michael Peterson, country music singer who you met in Utah, to inquire about a visit to the Pentagon and possible involvement with an *America Supports You* salute.

Mr. Peterson will be in the Washington, DC October 29-November 6, 2006 to be a judge at the "Military Idol" competition at Fort Belvoir.

We will work with your staff to determine the best time for an office call and will explore additional ways to involve him in our efforts.

Thank you.

11-L-0559/OSD/60468



**FOUO**

AUG 15 2006

TO: GEN Monty Meigs  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Information from Frank Gaffney on IEDs

Attached is some material on IEDs sent to me by Frank Gaffney.

Please take a look at it, and get back to me as to what you think about it.

Thanks,

Attach: 8/11/06 Note from Frank Gaffney to SecDef

DWR:as  
SPR1406-L4

.....  
Please Respond By August 31, 2006

**FOUO**

OSD 16905-06



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47.86

15 AUG 06

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26

11-L-0559/OSD/60469

8/11/04  
A.C.O.P.

8/14/06

From: Frank Gaffney  
Sent: Friday, August 11, 2006 12:55 PM  
Subject: Urgent Heads-up

Don: I know you have been profoundly vexed by the IED problem and, like the rest of us, are doubtless seized with the new national imperative of doing a better job of detecting unconventional explosives in things like Gatorade bottles, etc. The attached one-pager will, I hope, give you a basis to find out whether we could have a far more effective means of working such problems than either the IED Task Force or other agencies have come up with to date. There is a lot more background available if you or your subordinates are willing to review it. Suffice it to say, this Big Crow/LVARS initiative seems worthy of more attention and support than it has gotten to date and may provide the technology we need far faster than even DARPA can do.

On another matter, I hope we will have the pleasure of your company, at least briefly, on 20 September when we honor your friend Duncan Hunter and decorated combat veterans of the War for the Free World whose profiles in courage have been recently written up by our late friend, Cap Weinberger.

11-L-0559/OSD/60470

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**SOLVING THE IED/UNCONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES PROBLEM**

---

**'Standoff Detection Raman Spectrometer  
For  
Detection of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)  
And  
Asymmetric Terrorist Explosive Devices.(Liquids)**

**Big Crow Program Office**  
3710 Trestle Rd.  
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117  
1-877-BIG-CROW

**Opto-Forensic Technologies**  
1830 East Broadway, Suite 124-343  
Tucson, Arizona, USA 85719-5968  
Ph. 520-241-5688  
Fax 520-615-6561  
[www.opto forensic.com](http://www.opto forensic.com)

11-L-0559/OSD/60471

## SOLVING THE IED/UNCONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES PROBLEM

### THE THREAT

- Battlefield - IEDs used in the field.
- Forward - Bombs used in most troop systems, camps

### NATURE OF CHALLENGE

- Need to detect all conventional (CMT) and unconventional (CATF, IEDs) in any form (solid, liquid, gas).
- The detection should be qualitative (what) and quantitative (how much).

### SOLUTION TO PROBLEM

- The solution must offer these attributes: real-time, non-destructive analysis; qualitative results (what is there); quantitative results (how much is there); immune to interference; high throughput; affordable
- In addition, the solution must be adaptive, flexible, unaffected by temperature or weather, able accurately to analyze chemicals through multiple types of water, plastic, and glass.

### OTHER TECHNOLOGIES DO NOT WORK

- The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and numerous TSA tests have established that a very, passive detection, and "sniffer" technology do not detect unconventional explosives and many conventional ones.

### THE SOLUTION IS RAMAN

- Raman bounce fact right off a sample and compares the returned signal to a database. The NAS and others have established this as the most promising method.
- SIMPLE RAMAN - This method uses a single laser to detect and identify. All Raman devices currently on the market use simple Raman. Simple Raman is non-quantitative and has limitations that inhibit its performance. Some chemicals cannot be detected by simple Raman.
- COMPLEX RAMAN - This method uses multiple lasers and detectors. The computerized test/Raman program known as Big Crow has encouraged the development of a complex Raman device called Laser Verification Architecture Raman Spectrometer (LVARS). This method has demonstrated the potential fully to address the problem in that it can see all chemicals with absolute specificity and quantification (includes conventional and unconventional explosives) and is adaptive.

### BIG CROW PROGRAM'S LVARS DEVICE

- The LVARS device is the fastest, most compact technological solution, and makes the most use of COTS.
- Since all attributes associated with this method have already been demonstrated, with the availability of the required funding, the first device could be ready for production in 12 months.

### LVARS VALIDATION AND PROGRAM MILESTONES

- Funding requirements for Phase I (1 year) - \$15 million.
- Phase I Deliverable - 1 LVARS device for IED detection, ready for production (RFP).
- With additional \$15 million funding - 1 air cargo inspection device for mass threats (RFP) can be delivered 6 months after successful validation the Phase I deliverable.

### SENIOR-LEVEL INITIATIVE REQUIRED

- Successive and continuous efforts to bring or confer support for LVARS from IED Task Force, TSA, and DHS have been ignored in favor of continuing investment in inadequate and/or outdated technology.
- DABPA has recognized the utility, efficacy, and adaptability of Raman and launched an identical program to deliver an identical device - but in 34 months at a total cost of \$160 million.
- We believe the identified program advocated by the Big Crow Program can deliver one production-ready device with a one-meter detection range in 12 months for \$15 million.



To: ADM Giambastiani  
CC: SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld  
GEN Peter Pace  
FROM: GEN Montgomery  
SUBJECT: Status of Mr. Frank Gaffney's technology submission

*Mr. Gaffney's  
recommended technology  
is clearly not ready for  
prime time  
20 Oct 06*

471.86

Mr. Frank Gaffney submitted information to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding the Big Crow Program and the Laser Verification Authentication Raman Spectrometer (LVARS) on 14 Aug 2006. In this submittal, Mr. Gaffney proposed that LVARS could deliver remote, real-time, non-destructive analysis of explosives. Secretary Rumsfeld referred this proposal to JIEDDO for evaluation on 16 Aug 2006. In our 14 Sep 2006 status update to you, we reported that JIEDDO requested and received a program proposal from the LVARS contractor, OptoForensics, on 13 Sep 2006.

JIEDDO convened a panel of twelve leading explosive detection experts from DoD, DOE, TSWG, and MIT-Lincoln Laboratory on 26-28 Sep 2006. Four members of the LVARS contractor team presented and defended their proposal to this panel. The universal recommendation of all twelve panel members was not to fund the LVARS project based upon the following findings.

- The technology to complete LVARS is extremely high risk and unproven.
- other, more mature technologies under development at the Army Research Laboratory offer similar capability.
- The contractor team was unable to explain or show technical details of the system.
- The contractor has no prior experience working in this area (no publications or serious research presented), nor has the contractor built a detection system of this type or magnitude.
- The contractor does not have the qualifications to undertake such an ambitious and basic scientific research project.

The team of experts recommends that this project fits more appropriately within an extensive multi-disciplinary university research initiative, or within a DARPA funded research initiative. Funding to develop a field testable prototype should be revisited only after the contractor successfully verifies the theoretical basis for this technology and demonstrates a working prototype in the laboratory.

We have sent the contractor the attached letter thanking them for their interest, but declining to pursue their proposal further.

6 Oct 06

11-L-0559/OSD/60473

OSD 16905-06



10/27/2006 8 36 10 AM



JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION  
5000 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-5000

OCT 23 2006

Mr. ~~Frank~~ Gaffney  
Opto-~~Forensic~~ Technologies  
1830 East Broadway, Suite 124-343  
Tucson, AZ 85719

Dear Mr. Gaffney:

---

Thank you for your submission of ~~Laser Verification Authentication Raman~~ Spectrometer through Secretary Rumsfeld for review by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Additionally, please thank your corporate team for their proposal presentation at our Explosives Detection Workshop, 28 Sep 2006.

To ensure we select the ~~best~~ technology, each proposal is carefully evaluated in terms of meeting a capability gap, filling an urgent operational need of the war-fighter, Technology Readiness Level (TRL), performance, availability, interoperability, training required, sustainability, maintenance factors, schedule, and cost. As part of our evaluation, we convened a panel of twelve leading explosive detection experts. Four members of your ~~LVARS~~ contractor team presented and defended the ~~LVARS~~ proposal to this panel at the 28 Sep 2006 Workshop.

After careful consideration, we have decided not to pursue your proposal. Your technique to remotely detect and characterize explosives is extremely high risk and unproven. You have not constructed a basic test prototype of any kind, and neither your proposal nor your presentation at the Workshop included a technical plan or analysis of how OptoForensics will overcome several significant technical obstacles. Also, other developmental techniques for remote detection of explosives such as Two-Frequency Raman Backscatter and Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy have been successfully prototyped and demonstrated.

We appreciate your interest in the well-being of our men and women deployed in harm's way and encourage your continued participation in IED defeat activities. If you have any questions, you may contact Lieutenant Colonel Carl Kutsche at (b)(6)

Sincerely,

Robin L. Keesee, PhD.  
Deputy Director

11-L-0559/OSD/60474

~~FOUO~~

AUG 15 2006

TO: GEN Morry Meigs  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Information from Frank Gaffney on IEDs

Attached is some material on IEDs sent to me by Frank Gaffney.

Please take a look at it, and get back to me as to what you think about it.

Thanks.

Attach: 8/11/06 Note from Frank Gaffney to SecDef

DRP:us  
SPOB/OSD-14

.....  
*Please Respond By August 31, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

8/11/06  
2:00 PM

8/11/06

From: Frank Gaffney  
Sent: Friday, August 11, 2006 12:55 PM  
Subject: Urgent Heads-up

Don: I know you have been profoundly vexed by the IED problem and, like the rest of us, are doubtless seized with the new national imperative of doing a better job of detecting unconventional explosives in things like Gatorade bottles, etc. The attached one-pager will, I hope, give you a basis to find out whether we could have a far more effective means of working such problems than either the IED Task Force or other agencies have come up with to date. There is a lot more background available if you or your subordinates are willing to review it. Suffice it to say, this Big Crow/LVARS initiative seems worthy of more attention and support than it has gotten to date and may provide the technology we need far faster than even DARPA can do.

On another matter, I hope we will have the pleasure of your company, at least briefly, on 20 September when we honor your friend Duncan Hunter and decorated combat veterans of the War for the Free World whose profiles in courage have been recently written up by our late friend, Cap Weinberger.

---

## **SOLVING THE IED/UNCONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES PROBLEM**

---

**Standoff Detection Raman Spectrometer  
For  
Detection of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)  
And  
Asymmetric Terrorist Explosive Devices (Liquids)**

**Big Crow Program Office**  
3710 Trestle Rd.  
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117  
1-877-BIG-CROW

**Opto-Forensic Technologies**  
1830 East Broadway, Suite 124-343  
Tucson, Arizona, USA 85719-5968  
Ph. 520-241-5698  
Fax 520-515-8561  
[www.opto-forensic.com](http://www.opto-forensic.com)

11-L-0559/OSD/60477

## SOLVING THE IED/UNCONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES PROBLEM

### THE THREAT

- **Borderfront** - IEDs used in the field.
- **Homefront** - Bombs used in mass transit systems, cargo

### NATURE OF CHALLENGE

- Need to detect all *conventional* (TNT) and *unconventional* (TATP, liquids) in any form (solid, liquid, gas).
- The detection should be qualitative (what) and quantitative (how much).

### SOLUTION TO PROBLEM

- The solution must offer these attributes: *real-time, non-destructive analysis; qualitative results (what is there); quantitative results (how much is there); immune to interference; high throughput; affordable*.
- In addition, the solution must be *adaptive, flexible, unaffected by temperature or weather, able accurately to analyze chemicals through materials such as water, plastic, and glass.*

### OTHER TECHNOLOGIES DO NOT WORK

- The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and numerous TSA tests have established that x-ray, neutron activation, and "sniffer" technology do not detect unconventional explosives and many conventional ones.

### THE SOLUTION IS RAMAN

- Raman bounces laser light off a sample and compares the returned signal to a database. The NAS and others have established this as the most promising method.
- **SIMPLE RAMAN** - This method uses a single laser to detect and identify. *All Raman devices currently on the market use simple Raman. Simple Raman is non-quantitative and has limitations that inhibit its performance. Some chemicals cannot be detected by simple Raman.*
- **COMPLEX RAMAN** - This method uses multiple lasers and detectors. The compartmentalized intelligence program known as Big Crow has encouraged the development of a complex Raman device called Laser Verification Authentication Raman Spectrometer (LVARS). This method has demonstrated the potential fully to address the problem in that it can see all chemicals with absolute specificity and quantification (includes conventional and unconventional explosives) and is adaptive.

### BIG CROW PROGRAM'S LVARS DEVICE

- The LVARS device is the fastest, most compact technological solution, and makes the most use of COTS.
- Since all principles associated with this method have already been demonstrated, with the availability of the required funding, the first device could be ready for production in 12 months.

### LVARS VALIDATION AND PROGRAM MILESTONES

- Funding REQUIREMENTS for Phase I (1 year) - \$15 million.
- Phase I Deliverable - 1 LVARS device for IED detection, ready for production (RFP).
- With additional \$15 million funding - 1 air cargo inspection device for mass transit (RFP) can be delivered 6 months after successful validation the Phase I deliverable.

### SENIOR-LEVEL INITIATIVE REQUIRED

- Successive and continuous efforts to bring or enlist support for LVARS from IED Task Force, TSA, and DHS have been ignored in favor of continuing investment in inadequate and/or outdated technologies.
- DARPA has recognized the utility, salience, and adaptability of Raman and launched an identical program to deliver an identical device - but in 54 months at a total cost of \$100 million.
- We believe the streamlined program advocated by the Big Crow Program can deliver one production-ready device with a one-meter detection range in 12 months for \$15 million.

~~FOUO~~

SF 060106-08

10  
715

JUN 05 2006

TO: Admiral Tim Keating  
CC: General Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DK*  
SUBJECT: Canada



CANADA

I noticed yesterday the planner mentioned the fact that having to clear things with Canada slows you down.

If Canada is, in fact, slowing you down, you should probably go ahead and work out our plans. You can keep working with the Canadians on the side, but not allow it to delay us. Do you agree it is a problem?

Thanks.

060106-08 (11).doc

\*\*\*\*\*  
Please respond by June 29, 2006

713

*OK*  
*7/12*

*SIR —*  
*Response from*  
*ADM Keating*  
*attached.*

*v/r [signature]*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16956-06



10/27/2006 3:15:25 PM

5 JUN 06

**Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD**

**From:** Keating, Timothy JADM USA NORAD USNORTHCOM HQs CC  
(b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, July 01, 2006 10:27 AM  
**To:** Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD  
**CC:** LENGYEL, GREG (LTCOL/DEP EA SECDEF)  
**Subject:** FW: Proposed Snowflake Response



060106-08

Canada.pdf (576 KB)

Classification: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

JIM/GREG: SNOWFLAKE (ATTACHED) REPLY BELOW.

THANKS

TIMOTHY J. KEATING  
ADMIRAL USN  
NORAD/NORTHCOM

MR SECRETARY:

HAVING VERY FEW PROBLEMS COORDINATING PLANS WITH CANADA. PLEASE BE ASSURED WE  
DON'T, AND WON'T, LET FORMAL PROCESSES DELAY US. BOTTOM LINE: NOT A PROBLEM.

MY BEST AND V/R

TIM

CANADA

1 JUL 06

5 JAN 06

OSD 16956-06



10/27/2006 3:15:29 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60480




~~FOUO~~



June 5, 2006

ICAA Q

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Suggested Haditha Talking Points

Attached is an interesting e-mail from Bill Luti with an idea for how to talk about Haditha. What do you think?


Thanks.

Attach. 6/4/06 Luti e-mail to Stavridis

DHR:dh  
060506-12 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by June 9, 2006*

JUN 20 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED



5 JUN 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60481



10/27/2006 3:25:43 PM

6/20  
P230

(b)(6)

6/20/2006

6/20

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith  
SUBJECT: Suggested Haditha Talking Points  
Ref: Snowflake 060506-12

Robert Rangel

6/20

IRAD

Sir,

I'm not sure that Bill knows the chronology of events:

10 Feb 06 - Time magazine reporter Tim McGirk brings allegations to MNF-I re: Haditha.

14 Feb 06 - MNC-I LTG Chiarelli appoints an Army Colonel to conduct **AR 15-6** investigation into allegations based on information provided by Time Magazine

So, in this case, the investigation was initiated as a direct response to the Time Magazine allegation.

We have continued to **stress** that the Marines took the allegations seriously and acted responsibly and expeditiously.

20 Jun 06

5 Jun 06

11-L-0559/OSD/60482

OSD 16957-06



10/27/2006 3:26:01 PM

**Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD**

From: Luti, William J. [William\_J.\_Luti@nsc.eop.gov]  
 Sent: Sunday, June 04, 2006 8:32 AM  
 To: Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD  
 Subject: RE: Public Posture on Haditha

Jim, this is so important you have my (humble) permission to use it as you see fit, but those three are a good idea. Hanoi. Amazing. Remind me to tell you a great story Dick Stratton once told me about his time in the Hanoi Hilton. Thanks again, bill

---

From: Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD [mailto:Jim.Stavridis@osd.mil]  
 Sent: Sunday, June 04, 2006 9:25 AM  
 To: Luti, William J.  
 Subject: RE: Public Posture on Haditha

Bill,

Thanks-- we're in Hanoi. If you're OK with it, I'd like to share your email story right up with the boss. I'd also recommend I show it to Dorrance Smith. Both are your call.

Larry D has left, but he is following this closely and I'd recommend you authorize me to show it to him as well

In all three cases, I'll ask them not to show it around further.

Let me know -- I don't want to show it without your specific permission.

Thx,

Jim

---Original Message---

From: Luti, William J. [mailto:William\_J.\_Luti@nsc.eop.gov]  
 Sent: Sunday, June 04, 2006 8:20 AM  
 To: jim.stavridis@osd.mil  
 Subject: Public Posture on Haditha

Jim,

The trip looks excellent from our view here in Washington. Of course, the resident humorist is not along so it cannot possibly be perfect. We'll have to fix that later.

I am worried about our public posture on Haditha and its potential adverse affect on those brave troops in the fight. I'm also confident our senior leadership is equally concerned and is working hard to deal with it properly. It's in that spirit I (humbly) offer my thoughts.

First, let me stipulate I know nothing about the events nor the investigation. And you know I am intimately familiar with the legal concern over "command influence." Second, I could care less (other than venting anger) about the anonymous leakers and the media. My (our) concern is the troops on the ground and their perception of how "Washington" is dealing with the public face of the investigation. We both have been on the implementing end of policy and know the affect real or imagined slights can have on the honor and integrity of those in our charge at the command level. The troops are smart. They read and watch the news. They are aware of the innuendo, speculation, and at times outright falsehoods that appear in the

press from anonymous leakers and media "analysts." We cannot control that. But we can, to some extent, control our official public posture. If we are to avoid the potential for serious moral problems, we might adopt a more (slightly) forward-leaning public posture. Not so much about the investigation, but rather about the troops.

We might want to explain how the Marines operate in these matters. We might say something like this:

"There is an investigation under way, as you know, but perhaps you do not know why. The Marines did not need anonymous leakers, or magazine writers, to discover that an investigation was warranted. As a matter of course, whenever Marines are involved in lethal action, there is a detailed after action report, including photographs and observation of any fatalities. This is done for two reasons. First, the Marines want to be sure their men have behaved properly. Second, the Marines want to be sure that the terrorists are not able to falsify the event, as has often happened. They have a brutal habit of moving bodies around, tying cadavers' hands behind their backs, and putting bullet holes through their heads, in order to falsely claim that massacres have taken place.

The Haditha investigation grew out of just such a body of documentation, because there were apparent conflicts between those data and statements made by some of those involved in the action. The Marines concluded there were apparent grounds for an investigation, and the Army was asked to conduct it. so that investigators would be less likely to be accused of 'protecting their own.'

We do not have the full results of those investigations yet, nor do the leakers or the journalists.

What we do know is that the Marines are bound by a very high moral code, and they enforce it with passion and discipline. They know the standards they are expected to observe; Marine officers constantly remind their Marines of those standards, and they are the first to be outraged when, inevitably, they fall short of perfection.

Given those exemplary practices, the Marines are entitled to be considered innocent until proven guilty. And their accusers should be clearly identified for what they are: people who pretend to know more than anyone — except those who are engaged in the action — can possibly know until the investigation is complete, and even beyond that. If judicial proceedings are judged necessary, we may after all learn even more than the investigators have found.

The Marines are pursuing this matter, as they have from the beginning. They are pursuing it seriously, intensely, and honorably."

Let me know what you think and if the boss might be interested in this type of approach.

All the best,

Bill

## **HADITHA TALKING POINTS**

**21 MAY 06 14:50**

### **EVENT TIMELINE:**

- **19 Nov 05:** Deliberate ambush of U.S. Marine Corps patrol in Haditha, Iraq.
  - o Marines conducting patrol from 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 1<sup>st</sup> Marines
  - o Four vehicle convoy
  - o Ambush initiated with IED and followed by small arms fire
  - o One Marine killed, two Marines wounded, and one military vehicle destroyed as a result of IED
  - o Actions taken by Marines after IED attack resulted in the deaths of Iraqis
- **20 Nov 05:** 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division issues a press release concerning the 19 Nov 05 IED attack stating that 15 Iraqi civilians were killed by a roadside bomb in Haditha.
- **10 Feb 06:** Time Magazine reporter meets with MNF-I about allegations that US forces deliberately targeted civilians on 19 Nov 05.
- **14 Feb 06:** Commanding General, MNC-I, LTG Peter Chiarelli, USA, appoints Army Colonel to conduct AR 15-6 investigation into facts and circumstances concerning the event of 19 Nov 05 based on the information provided by the Time magazine reporter.
- **03 Mar 06:** AR 15-6 investigative report completed and recommends further investigation by US Army CID/NCIS.
- **12 Mar 06:** Commanding General, MNF-W, MGen Richard Zilmer, appoints Marine Colonel to investigate ~~the~~ reporting of information concerning the events of 19 Nov 05 at all levels of the chain of command within MNF-W and requests NCIS criminal investigation of events of 19 Nov 05.
- **13 Mar 06:** Initial NCIS team arrives in Haditha, Iraq.

- **17 Mar 06:** MNF-I press release on initiation of second AR 15-6 to investigate potential misconduct concerning actions taken by the Marines after the IED attack in Haditha.
- **19 Mar 06:** Commanding General, MNC-I, LTG Peter Chiarelli, USA, appoints MG Bargewell, USA, to conduct second AR 15-6.
  - MG Bargewell directed to investigate two major aspects:
    - Training and preparation of the Marines prior to the engagement
    - Reporting of information concerning 19 Nov 05 at all levels of the chain of command from patrol through and including MNF-W and MNC-I
  - Marine investigation appointed on 12 Mar 06 will be incorporated into AR 15-6
  - Time Magazine publishes article on Haditha

#### **NCIS OVERVIEW:**

- The Naval Criminal Investigative Service is responsible for conducting felony criminal investigations in support of the Department of the Navy.

## NCIS Talking Points—Haditha

- **12 MAR 06**: Major General Richard Zilmer, USMC, Commanding General, I MEF (Forward) and MNF-W, requested that the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) conduct a criminal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Iraqis following a **19NOV05** ambush of U.S. Marines from 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines in Haditha, Iraq.
- **19 NOV 05**: An ambush on a four-vehicle convoy of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines on patrol in Haditha, Iraq was initiated with an improvised explosive device (IED) followed by small arms fire. One Marine was killed and two Marines were wounded as a result of the IED explosion. One USMC HMMWV was destroyed by the IED explosion. The deaths of Iraqis following the IED attack are the focus of this investigation.
- **13 MAR 06**: NCIS opened the investigation and deployed a team of investigators, forensic specialists and technical support personnel to Haditha. Over the course of several weeks, NCIS special agents conducted detailed death scene investigations of the ambush site and several nearby homes, resulting in the collection of various items of potential evidentiary value.
- Additionally, interviews were conducted of Iraqis, Marines, and Iraqi Army personnel who accompanied the Marines on **19NOV05**.
- The investigation has established the following sequence of events:
  - o **19 Nov 05** between 0700 and 0715, a four-vehicle convoy consisting of 11 U.S. Marines and one US Navy Corpsman from 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines and four soldiers from Iraqi Security Forces were ambushed while traveling within the city of Haditha in a coordinated attack involving an improvised explosive device (IED) and small arms fire (SAF). As a result, one Marine was killed and two others were injured.
  - o Twenty-four Iraqis died following the IED attack. The Iraqi dead included men, women and children.

O Later that day, Marines transported the 24 Iraqi casualties to the morgue at the local hospital. They also transported two wounded Iraqi children to a hospital for treatment.

O 3rd Battalion, 1<sup>st</sup> Marines have completed their tour of duty in Iraq and returned to Camp Pendleton, CA. NCIS investigative efforts continue at Camp Pendleton as well as additional investigative efforts in Iraq and elsewhere.

- Since the start of the NCIS investigation on 13MAR05, the NCIS investigative task force investigating this incident has grown to nearly 50 NCIS special agents and support personnel. Evidence has been submitted to US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) for forensic examination; NCIS has employed other advanced criminal investigative techniques as well.
- NCIS will provide a final investigative report to the USMC for review and appropriate action.



## **HAMANDIYAH KILLING POINTS**

**21 May 06**

### **EVENT TIMELINE**

- **26 April 06**

- o Eight members of 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines reported killing an Iraqi national on route "Penguin" in Northern Hamandiyah, Khan Dhari, Iraq.

- **01 MAY 06**

- o Marines in Iraq received a complaint from an Iraqi National, who claimed U.S. Marines forcefully removed his brother from his home and subsequently killed him.

- **04 May 06**

- o Marine Regimental Combat Team Five requested that the Naval Criminal Investigative Service Resident Agency (NCISRA) Camp Fallujah initiate a criminal investigation concerning the incident on 26 April.

- **08 May 06**

- o NCIS Agents were dispatched to Northern Hamandiyah and initiated a criminal investigation.

~~FOUO~~

OCT 27 2006

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC Gen Pete Pace  
Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfel

SUBJECT: Joint Civilian Orientation Conference (JCOC) CENTCOM Trip

OSD Public Affairs has just wrapped up what I am told was a very successful JCOC trip to CENTCOM. The report I received suggests the goal of the Conference's trip to socialize and educate was met, and will likely pay dividends as the participants return to their communities.

I appreciate your help and support on this important effort.

DHR:dh  
SF102606-04

.....

339500

am

06

OSD 16962-06




10/30/2006 9:52:59 AM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60490

~~FOUO~~

October 27, 2006

TO: ~~Mac~~ Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT *New York Times Article*

Thanks for sending the story on Mexico from the *New York Times*. Fascinating.

DHR:as  
SF10Z706-05

Mexico

27 OCT 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60491

OSD 16963-06



10/30/2006 9:41:22 AM

FOUO

October 3, 2006

Central America

TO: Peter Rodman

CC Eric Edelman  
Robert Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Legislative Exchange with Central America and the U.S. Congress

I do think we have to have some sort of legislative exchange with Central America and the U.S. Congress.

Let's come up with a proposal for it.

Thanks.

DMR-4  
100306-01 (travel companion) doc

.....  
Please respond by October 26, 2006

FOUO

303406

OSD 16966-06



10/27/2006 4:37:34 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60492

~~FOUO~~

October 04, 2006

Central America

TO: Eric Edelman

C C Peter Rodman  
Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Legislative Exchange

I do think we have to organize a Legislative exchange between the U.S. Congress and the Central American countries, and the sooner the better.

Who is going to do it?

Thanks.

DHR:as  
SF100406-11

\*\*\*\*\*

*Please Respond By 10/23/06*

~~FOUO~~

400406

11-L-0559/OSD/60493

OSD 16967-06



10/27/2006 4:39:10 PM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Paul* Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (HD)

SUBJECT: Central America Legislative Exchange

DepSec Action  
USDP.

*Vik*  
*P. Verga*

Peter F. Verga  
Principal Deputy

27 2006

26 2008

Central America

- You asked us to come up with a proposal for a legislative exchange between Central America and the U.S. Congress (Tab A).
- There are several organizations capable of organizing a legislative exchange for us. These include:
  - DoD's Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.
  - Congressional Hispanic Conference (Republican members – chaired by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida) and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (Democratic members – chaired by Rep. Grace Napolitano of California).
  - United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce.
  - Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America.
- Robert Wilkie and I, and members of our staff, are consulting with these organizations and other contacts, to develop our proposal for the exchange, and to identify which organization we should choose to organize the exchange for us.
- We plan to send you our proposal, and our recommendation on which organization to select, by November 17.
- We aim to hold the legislative exchange in spring or early summer of 2007.

1706406

COORDINATION: Tab B.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Jim Alverson, OSD Policy/ WHA (b)(6)



\* S F - 1 0 0 3 0 6 - 0 3 \*



\* S F - 1 0 0 4 0 6 - 1 1 \*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60494

OSD 16967-08



10/27/2006 4:40:57 PM

406406

~~FOUO~~

October 3, 2006

TO: Peter Rodman

CC Eric Edelman  
Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Legislative Exchange with Central America and the U.S. Congress

I do think we have to have some sort of legislative exchange with Central America and the U.S. Congress.

Let's come up with a proposal for it.

Thanks.

EX-104  
100706-03 (travel compact) doc

.....  
*Please respond by October 26, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

October 04, 2006

TO Eric Edelman  
CC ~~Peter~~ Rodman  
~~Robert~~ Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*RA.*

SUBJECT Legislative Exchange

I do think we have to organize a Legislative exchange between the U.S. Congress and the Central American countries, and the sooner the better.

Who is going to do it?

Thanks.

DHR:s  
SP100406-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/23/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60496



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

Subject: Central America Legislative Exchange  
Control Number: SF-100306-03 and SF-100406-11

Title/Organization	Name	Date
USD(P)	AMB E. Edelman	
ASD(LA)	Mr. R. Wilkie	24 October 2006

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60497

~~FOUO~~

October 20, 2006

3/3

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Suggestions for ~~Graham~~

You might want to suggest that Bradley ~~Graham~~ talk to Henry Kissinger and  
James Schlesin er.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF102006-06

.....

2006-10-26

~~FOUO~~


11-L-0559/OSD/60498

OSD 16969-06



10/27/2006 4 51 07 PM

10/27/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith   
SUBJECT: Suggestions for Graham  
Ref: Snowflake 102006-06

Sir,

Spoke with Bradley Graham. He will talk to both Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger and next week he will be speaking to Andy Marshall.

He's asking for access to:

- Your Naval records
- Your Congressional files, which are in storage at the Library of Congress
- Concept papers like - Anchor Chain memo and 21<sup>st</sup> Century Transformation

He **was** scheduled to travel with us to Iraq and asked that the "travel" invitation be renewed.

11-L-0559/OSD/60499



~~FOUO~~

October 24 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT suggestions for Graham

You might want to suggest that Bradley ~~Graham~~ talk to Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF102006-06

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60500

~~FOUO~~

October 24, 2006

110.01

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA*

SUBJECT: Response to *U.S. News & World Report*

Let's get a good response on this business of Pete Schoomaker going to OMB.

Thanks.

Attach. Mulrine, Anna. "The Third Battlefront: Money," *U.S. News & World Report*, October 30, 2006, p. 42.

DHR:dh  
SF102406-13

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/26/06*

24 OCT 06

11-L-0559/OSD/60501



OSD 16970-06

10/27/2006 4:54:57 PM

~~FOUO~~

October 24, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA.*

SUBJECT: Response to *U.S. News & World Report*

Let's get a good response on this business of Pete Schoomaker going to OMB.

Thanks.

Attach. Mulrine, Anna. "The Third Battlefront: Money," *U.S. News & World Report*, October 30, 2006, p. 42.

DHR:db  
SF102406-13


.....  
Please Respond By 10/26/06

*See Attached.*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60502

OSD 16970-06



10/27/2006 4:56:26 PM

110.01

2700006



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 25, 2006

Editor  
U.S. News *and* World Report  
1050 Thomas Jefferson Street NW  
Washington, DC 20007

To the Editor:

Anna Mulrine's October 30th article on the Army and the budget ("The Third Battlefront: Money") included a fairly egregious error - one that requires a correction.

Ms. Mulrine is incorrect when she attempts to convey the Army's contact with the **Office** of Management and Budget as unprecedented, or "a shocker." Though a number of news outlets have reported on the budget process using similar language, there is simply no **truth** in the assertion whatsoever. Secretary Rumsfeld did not grant any special permission breaking with any "precedent" to General Schoomaker; any discussions the Army had with the Office of Management and Budget were part of the **usual** process by which the defense budget is constructed. There is nothing out of the ordinary about this.

Please correct this error for your readers.

Sincerely,

Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public  
Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60503

~~FOUO~~

OCT 26 2006

092

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT Brief on Weekly Events Iraq/Afghanistan

The attached brief is unclassified and it contains some interesting, positive information -- particularly the items on page 3.

Thanks.

Attach 10/24/06 Weekly Events Iraq/Afghanistan brief

DHR:as  
SF102506-15

.....

24004-06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16971-06



10/27/2006 4:57 43 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60504



14/25/06

UNCLASSIFIED



# ***WEEKLY EVENTS IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN***

***24 October 2006***

*C*

1  
UNCLASSIFIED

## Weekly Events – Iraq

- Conference Ends with **Sunn/Shia** Pact to Stop Sectarian Violence
  - The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) organized a meeting between 14 Iraqi religious leaders representing Sunnis and Shites 21-22 Oct.
  - Meeting took place in Makkah (Mecca, Saudi Arabia) and released "the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Document" calling for the end of the sectarian bloodshed.
  - PM Maliki hopes the initiative will boost his government's reconciliation efforts; "We pin hopes on every step made by people who care for the interest of Iraq and condemn the terror acts in Iraq."
- Effective Tribal Opposition to al Qaeda (AQI)
  - Iraqi Natl Sec Adv Rubay'i (~17 Oct) said, "AQI is...suffering...because of the heroic Iraqi tribes...in the provinces of Salahadin (central), Anbar (west) and now in Diyala (east-central). These tribes are carrying out operations that are worthy [of praise]" (17 Oct).
- Iraqi Army Endures First Security Test in Amara (southeast)
  - MoD spokesman Mohammed al-Askari announced the 10<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Army division has full control of security in Amara. Conflict between Iraqi police and Shiite militants had been a concern in the area but is now resolved. MoD spokesman added that the Iraqi Army took charge of the situation and are fully capable to carry out their mission.
  - No curfew will be imposed and British troops will not be needed despite earlier reports that the situation had escalated.
- Muqtada Al-Sadr Seeks to Rein in Militia
  - Al Sadr ordered his militia (17 Oct) not to take part in sectarian violence in Iraq. Sadr added that he would renounce those who attack Iraqis.
  - US commanders estimate that many of the 23 militia groups in Baghdad are linked to Sadr.

10 10/25/06

UNCLASSIFIED

## Weekly Events – Afghanistan

### Afghan Province Lauded for Growing Saffron Instead of Poppies

- **Herat Province (west) has become** the main producer of saffron in Afghanistan. A national seminar on saffron growing was held in the province to celebrate the success and maintain the level of production.
- Over **100** saffron growers participated in the 3-day seminar. The governor welcomed the plan. He said, "To eradicate unemployment and poverty, we should take serious measures to improve agriculture and provide farmers with alternative crops."

### New Medical Clinic opens in Paktika Province (south-east)

- The Khayr Khot Medical Clinic opened during a ceremony Oct. 14. The clinic will provide health care to the Sharana District of Paktika Province, and is one of the most advanced facilities in the region.
- The clinic will allow the government to provide medical care for citizens in the province, many of whom have never been treated by medical providers.
- Materials for the **\$120,000** project (USAID Funded) were purchased from Sharana District merchants, and locals were employed to build the clinic. The local Provincial Reconstruction Team donated medical equipment.

### "Accelerated Learning" Attracts Afghan Women

- Since the Taliban's collapse in 2001, more than **34%** of Afghan students are girls, highest in the history of Afghanistan.
- More than 170,000 students who range in age from 10 to 22, are in "accelerated learning" classes because their educations are so far behind. Of the accelerated learning students, about **58%** are girls.
- **USAID** funds the accelerated learning program, which prepares Afghan teachers to compress the work of one year into a few months.

10/27/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM Dorrance Smith 

SUBJECT: Brief on Weekly Events Iraq/Afghanistan

Ref: Snowflake 102506-15

Sir,

We will distribute the information out through our surrogate operation.

092

26 OCT 06

270406

OSD 16971-06



11-L-0559/OSD/60508

10/27/2006 4:58:36 PM

~~FOUO~~

OCT 26 2006

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FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Brief on Weekly Events Iraq/Afghanistan

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Thanks.

Attach 10/24/06 Weekly Events Iraq/Afghanistan brief

DHR:sg  
SF102506-15

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60509

10/25/06

UNCLASSIFIED



# ***WEEKLY EVENTS IRAQLAFGHANISTAN***

***24 October 2006***

*C*

1  
UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/60510

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10 10/25/06

UNCLASSIFIED

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~~FOUO~~

October 25, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
CC: Allison Barber  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Recording Meetings

000.7

Attached is the second article generated by **the** breakfast I had with the JCOC group.

If these folks are going to be writing about the meetings, we simply have **to** record them. We cannot have meetings where I have no record of what I **said** and articles are written about them.

Thanks.

Attach: 10/24/06 *Philadelphia Daily News* article by Smerconish

DHR:as  
SF102506-09

\*\*\*\*\*

25 Oct 06

11-L-0559/OSD/60513



~~FOUO~~

October 25, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

CC: Allison Barber

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Recording Meetings

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Thanks.

Attach 10/24/06 *Philadelphia Daily News* article by Smerconish

DHR:ss  
SF102506-09

.....

*Sir,*

*I agree. We I with FY.*

*DS*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60514

OSD 16973-08



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ACTION MEMO

USDP Action *W*

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

09 2006

FROM: Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP) *SP* NOV 9 2006

SUBJECT: Letter ~~from~~ Congressman Hunter on CFIUS

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked us to **prepare** a response to Congressman Hunter's letter on the Alcatel-Lucent transaction (Tab A).
- (U) Congressman Hunter's letter to the President (Tab B) expressed his concerns with the potential merger of Alcatel of France and Lucent Technologies under review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
- (U) His letter specifically requests that the President "allow Congress to review properly how CFIUS has analyzed the particulars of this highly sensitive merger by ensuring that CFIUS does not conclude its work until after Congress returns from recess."
  - ~~(FOUO)~~ The formal 45-day review of the transaction by CFIUS ended on 6 November. The President has 15 days (until November 21) to make his decision on the transaction.
- (U) Treasury and the NSC staff have agreed that DoD should respond to Congressman Hunter's letter, and have approved the recommended response.
- (U) In a related development, the House Armed Services Committee formally invited you to testify about the transaction, along with Treasury Deputy Secretary Kimmitt, on November 14 (Tab C).

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the letter to Congressman Hunter at Tab A.

COORDINATION: TAB D.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Beth McCormick, Director, DTSA (b)(6)

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~~FOUO~~

October 31, 2006

TO: Gordon England

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Letter from Duncan Hunter on CFIUS

Please draft a reply to this letter from Duncan Hunter on CFIUS.

Thanks.

Attach. 10/26/06 Letter ~~from~~ Duncan Hunter

DKR:is  
SF103006-28

.....

*Please Respond By 11/15/06*

~~FOUO~~



**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON**  
**WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010**

The Honorable Duncan Hunter  
**Chairman**  
Committee on Armed Services  
US House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received a copy of your letter to the President expressing concerns about the national security implications of the proposed merger between Alcatel and Lucent Technologies. The Department of Defense understands your concerns and is fully engaged in every aspect of the review of the proposed transaction.

Please rest assured that DoD is taking this matter very seriously and applying the utmost due diligence. In addition, I am personally engaged in order to ensure that all aspects of the impacts on national security are considered and weighed before a decision is made.

Thank you for your interest, I look forward to discussing the broad national security issues that transactions such as this raise.

DUNCAN HUNTER, CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN  
 CURT WELDON, PENNSYLVANIA  
 JIM KEESLY, COLORADO  
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 GARY MCNORRIS, WASHINGTON  
 L. MICHAEL CORMAN, TEXAS  
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## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

October 26, 2006

JIM BOULTON, MISSOURI  
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 KENDRICK B. NEBEK, FLORIDA  
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 DAN BROWN, OKLAHOMA

ROBERT L. SIMMONS, STAFF DIRECTOR

Honorable George W. Bush  
 The White House  
 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
 Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to follow-up on my April 28<sup>th</sup> letter regarding the level of national security scrutiny the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) places on potential mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers between foreign-owned and -controlled companies and United States businesses, and, in particular, my reservations about the potential merger of French-owned Alcatel and American-owned Lucent Technologies.

As I explained in my last communication to you on this subject, I have several grave concerns about the potential merger of Alcatel and Lucent Technologies. These concerns arise in large part because Lucent Technologies and Bell Labs, a critical component of the parent company Lucent Technologies, conduct a significant amount of highly classified work for the United States government, including the Department of Defense. I am skeptical whether the CFIUS investigation now underway could result in adequate, verifiable assurances that such sensitive work will be protected. Moreover, I am doubtful whether any mitigation agreement *can* sufficiently diminish the national security risks raised by this merger.

Specifically, I am concerned about potential transfers of technology or sensitive information to other countries with which Alcatel has business dealings, which have included Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. I note that many of these countries are subject to sanctions under U.S. laws. When negotiating the merger with Lucent, Alcatel sold satellite and security operations, which are sensitive French government projects, to French-owned Thales, illustrating how the French government protects its critical interests. The United States government must be able to protect its national security interests to the same degree as the French government.

11-L-0559/OSD/60518


President George W. Bush  
October 26, 2006  
Page 2

Finally, it is my understanding that the 45 day CFIUS investigation of the Alcatel-Lucent merger will conclude on November 6, 2006 - the day prior to election-day. As a result, Congress will not be in session - and will not be able to carry out effective oversight - during this critical period of the CFIUS process.

Therefore, I am requesting that you allow Congress to review properly how CFIUS has analyzed the particulars of this highly sensitive merger by ensuring that CFIUS does not conclude its work until after Congress returns from recess.

Mr. President, I am confident you share my concerns and will do everything in your power to protect the United States. I look forward to working with you to achieve this end.

Sincerely,



Duncan Hunter  
Chairman

cc: Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Honorable Henry M. Paulson, Jr.  
Honorable J. Dennis Hastert  
Honorable John Boehner

DUNCAN HUNTER, CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN  
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 BILL LUSTER, PENNSYLVANIA  
 THELMA DRAKE, VIRGINIA  
 JOE SCHWARTZ, MICHIGAN  
 CATHY McMONIS, WASHINGTON  
 KIMBERLY CONWAY, TEXAS  
 GERRY DAVIS, KENTUCKY

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

November 8, 2006

MIKE SHELTON, MISSOURI  
 JOHN SPINATT, SOUTH CAROLINA  
 SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, TEXAS  
 LANE EVANS, ILLINOIS  
 GENE TAYLOR, MISSISSIPPI  
 NEIL ABERCROMBIE, HAWAII  
 MARTY MEEHAN, MASSACHUSETTS  
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 VIC SNYDER, ARKANSAS  
 ADAM SMITH, WASHINGTON  
 LONNETTA SAMPSON, CALIFORNIA  
 MIKE MCINTYRE, NORTH CAROLINA  
 ELLIEN O. TAUSCHER, CALIFORNIA  
 ROBERT A. BRADY, PENNSYLVANIA  
 ROBERT ANDREWS, NEW JERSEY  
 SUSAN A. DAVIS, CALIFORNIA  
 JAMES A. LARGIER, RHODE ISLAND  
 STEVE ISRAEL, NEW YORK  
 RICK LARSEN, WASHINGTON  
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 CYNTHIA MCINCHY, GEORGIA  
 DAN BROWN, OKLAHOMA

ROBERT L. SIMMONS, STAFF DIRECTOR

Secretary Gordon England  
 Deputy Secretary of Defense  
 1010 Defense Pentagon  
 Washington, D.C. 20301-1010

Dear Secretary England


You are invited to testify before the House Armed Services Committee on the national security implications of the Lucent Technologies/Alcatel merger as part of the second panel of witnesses on Tuesday, November 14, 2006, at 2:00 PM in room 2118 Rayburn House Office Building.

Committee Rule 13 provides that witness statements must be delivered to the committee at least 48 hours in advance of the hearing to facilitate distribution to the members. Due to the timing of the hearing, it is requested that 120 copies of your prepared statement be delivered to room 2120 Rayburn House Office Building by the morning of Monday, November 13, 2006. In addition, consistent with the House rules requirement to make materials from hearings electronically available to the general public, Committee Rule 13 requires that witness statements be provided to the committee in electronic form. This request may be satisfied by a transmittal via e-mail or disk.

I appreciate your willingness to appear before the committee and look forward to your testimony. Should you have any questions, please contact Roger Zakheim on the committee staff at (202) 226-4444.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Duncan Hunter  
 Chairman

DH:rb

11-L-0559/OSD/60520



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**POLICY COORDINATION SHEET**

**Subject: Letter from Duncan Hunter on CFIUS**  
**Control Number: SF103006-28**

<b>Title/Organization</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Date</b>
OSD/General Council	W.J. Haynes	11/8/06
OSD/Legislative Affairs	Robert Wilkie	11/9/06

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11-L-0559/OSD/60521



**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON**  
**WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010**

The Honorable Duncan Hunter  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear **Mr.** Chairman:

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Thank you for your interest. I look forward to discussing the broad national security issues that transactions such as this raise.

DUNCAN HUNTER, CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN  
 CUT, WILSON, PENNSYLVANIA  
 JOEL HEFLEY, COLORADO  
 JIM SAXTON, NEW JERSEY  
 JOHN M. MCCLURG, NEW YORK  
 TERRY EVERETT, ALABAMA  
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 JOE SCHWARTZ, MICHIGAN  
 CATHY MC MORRIS, WASHINGTON  
 K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, TEXAS  
 GREGG DAVIS, KENTUCKY

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

October 26, 2006

KE SHELTON, MISSOURI  
 JOHN SPART, SOUTH CAROLINA  
 SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, TEXAS  
 LANE EVANS, ILLINOIS  
 DEBBE TAYLOR, MISSISSIPPI  
 NEL. ABERCROMBIE, HAWAII  
 MARTY MEEHAN, MASSACHUSETTS  
 SILVESTRE REYES, TEXAS  
 VIC SANTOR, ARKANSAS  
 ADAM SMITH, WASHINGTON  
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 CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, GEORGIA  
 DAN BOREN, OKLAHOMA

ROBERT I. SIMMONS, STAFF DIRECTOR

Honorable George W. Bush  
 The White House  
 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
 Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to follow-up on my April 28<sup>th</sup> letter regarding the level of national security scrutiny the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) places on potential mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers between foreign-owned and -controlled companies and United States businesses, and, in particular, my reservations about the potential merger of French-owned Alcatel and American-owned Lucent Technologies.

As I explained in my last communication to you on this subject, I have several grave concerns about the potential merger of Alcatel and Lucent Technologies. These concerns arise in large part because Lucent Technologies and Bell Labs, a critical component of the parent company Lucent Technologies, conduct a significant amount of highly classified work for the United States government, including the Department of Defense. I am skeptical whether the CFIUS investigation now underway could result in adequate, verifiable assurances that such sensitive work will be protected. Moreover, I am doubtful whether any mitigation agreement can sufficiently diminish the national security risks raised by this merger.

Specifically, I am concerned about potential transfers of technology or sensitive information to other countries with which Alcatel has business dealings, which have included Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. I note that many of these countries are subject to sanctions under U.S. laws. When negotiating the merger with Lucent, Alcatel sold satellite and security operations, which are sensitive French government projects, to French-owned Thales, illustrating how the French government protects its critical interests. The United States government must be able to protect its national security interests to the same degree as the French government.

OSD 17007-06



11-L-0559/OSD/60523

10/30/2006 10:56:23 AM

President George W. Bush  
October 26, 2006  
Page 2

Finally, it is my understanding that the **45** day CFIUS investigation of the Alcatel-Lucent merger will conclude on November 6, 2006 – the day prior to election-day. **As** a result, Congress will not be in session – and will not be able to carry out effective oversight – during this critical period of the CFIUS process.

Therefore, I **am** requesting that you allow Congress to review properly **how** CFIUS has analyzed the particulars of this highly sensitive merger by ensuring that CFIUS does not conclude its work until after Congress returns **from** recess.

Mr. President, I **am** confident you share my concerns and will do everything in your power to protect the United States. I look forward to working with you to achieve **this** end.

Sincerely,

  
Duncan Hunter  
Chairman

cc: Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld ✓  
Honorable Henry M. Paulson, Jr.  
Honorable J. Dennis Hastert  
Honorable John Boehner

11-L-0559/OSD/60524

11/13/06  
26 Oct 06  
004

~~FOUO~~

October 31, 2006

TO: Gordon England

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA.*

SUBJECT Letter from Duncan Hunter on CFIUS

Please draft a reply to this letter from Duncan Hunter on CFIUS.

Thanks.

Attach. 10/26/06 Letter from Duncan Hunter

DHRL:u  
SF103906-28

.....  
Please Respond By 11/15/06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17007-06



11/13/2006 11:04:18 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60525

31 Oct 06

26 Oct 06

DUNCAN HUNTER, CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN  
CURT WELDON, PENNSYLVANIA  
JOEL HEFLEY, COLORADO  
JIM SAXTON, NEW JERSEY  
JOHN M. McRUGH, NEW YORK  
TERRY EVERETT, ALABAMA  
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, MARYLAND  
HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, CALIFORNIA  
MAC THORNBERY, TEXAS  
JOHN N. MOSTETTLER, INDIANA  
WALTER B. JONES, NORTH CAROLINA  
JIN RYUN, KANSAS  
JIM GIBBONS, NEVADA  
ROBIN HAYES, NORTH CAROLINA  
KEN CALVERT, CALIFORNIA  
BOB SIMMONS, CONNECTICUT  
JO ANN DAVIS, VIRGINIA  
W. TODD AKIN, MISSOURI  
J. RANDY FORBES, VIRGINIA  
JEFF MILLER, FLORIDA  
JOE WILSON, SOUTH CAROLINA  
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, NEW JERSEY  
JEB BRADLEY, NEW HAMPSHIRE  
MICHAEL TURNER, OHIO  
JOHN KLINE, MINNESOTA  
CANDICE S. MILLER, MICHIGAN  
MIKE ROGERS, ALABAMA  
TRENT FRANKS, ARIZONA  
BILL SHUSTER, PENNSYLVANIA  
THELMA DRAKE, VIRGINIA  
JOE SCHWARTZ, MICHIGAN  
CATHY McMORRIS, WASHINGTON  
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, TEXAS  
GEORGE DAVIS, KENTUCKY

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

October 26, 2006

IKE SKELTON, MISSOURI  
JOHN SPRATT, SOUTH CAROLINA  
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, TEXAS  
LANE EVANS, ILLINOIS  
GENE TAYLOR, MISSISSIPPI  
NEIL ASERCRUMBIE, HAWAII  
MARTY MEEHAN, MASSACHUSETTS  
SYLVESTER REYES, TEXAS  
VIC SNYDER, ARKANSAS  
ADAM SMITH, WASHINGTON  
LORETTA SANCHEZ, CALIFORNIA  
MIKE MCINTYRE, NORTH CAROLINA  
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, CALIFORNIA  
ROBERT A. BRADY, PENNSYLVANIA  
ROBERT ANDREWS, NEW JERSEY  
SUSAN A. DAVIS, CALIFORNIA  
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, RHODE ISLAND  
STEVE ISRAEL, NEW YORK  
RICK LARSEN, WASHINGTON  
JIM COOPER, TENNESSEE  
JIM MARSHALL, GEORGIA  
KENDRICK B. MECK, FLORIDA  
MADELENE Z. BORDALLO, GUAM  
TIM RYAN, OHIO  
MARK E. UDALL, COLORADO  
G. K. BUTTERFELD, NORTH CAROLINA  
CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, GEORGIA  
DAN BOREN, OKLAHOMA

ROBERT L. SUMMERS, STAFF DIRECTOR

Honorable George W. Bush  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to follow-up on my April 28<sup>th</sup> letter regarding the level of national security scrutiny the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) places on potential mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers between foreign-owned and -controlled companies and United States businesses, and, in particular, my reservations about the potential merger of French-owned Alcatel and American-owned Lucent Technologies.

As I explained in my last communication to you on this subject, I have several grave concerns about the potential merger of Alcatel and Lucent Technologies. These concerns arise in large part because Lucent Technologies and Bell Labs, a critical component of the parent company Lucent Technologies, conduct a significant amount of highly classified work for the United States government, including the Department of Defense. I am skeptical whether the CFIUS investigation now underway could result in adequate, verifiable assurances that such sensitive work will be protected. Moreover, I am doubtful whether any mitigation agreement can sufficiently diminish the national security risks raised by this merger.

Specifically, I am concerned about potential transfers of technology or sensitive information to other countries with which Alcatel has business dealings, which have included Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. I note that many of these countries are subject to sanctions under U.S. laws. When negotiating the merger with Lucent, Alcatel sold satellite and security operations, which are sensitive French government projects, to French-owned Thales, illustrating how the French government protects its critical interests. The United States government must be able to protect its national security interests to the same degree as the French government.

OSD 17007-06



11-L-0559/OSD/60526

10/30/2006 10:56:23 AM

President George W. Bush  
October 26, 2006  
Page 2

Finally, it is my understanding that the 45 day CFIUS investigation of the Alcatel-Lucent merger will conclude on November 6, 2006 – the day prior to election-day. As a result, Congress will not be in session – and will not be able to carry out effective oversight – during this critical period of the CFIUS process.

Therefore, I am requesting that you allow Congress to review properly how CFIUS has analyzed the particulars of this highly sensitive merger by ensuring that CFIUS does not conclude its work until after Congress returns from recess.

Mr. President, I am confident you share my concerns and will do everything in your power to protect the United States. I look forward to working with you to achieve this end.

Sincerely,



Duncan Hunter  
Chairman

cc: Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld ✓  
Honorable Henry M. Paulson, Jr.  
Honorable J. Dennis Hastert  
Honorable John Boehner

11-L-0559/OSD/60527



# DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

004

November 16, 2006

The Honorable Duncan Hunter  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman,

**This** letter is in response to your communication to the President expressing concerns regarding the **national** security implications of the proposed merger between Alcatel and Lucent Technologies. **As** discussed during the Committee on **Armed** Services hearing on November 14, **this** transaction was examined and analyzed in great detail by knowledgeable personnel from all government agencies associated with the CFIUS process. The issues that you **raised** were fully considered as part of the **CFIUS** comprehensive review of the proposed transaction.

**As** soon as the President has made **his** decision regarding **this** transaction, he will provide to the Congress a report dealing with the transaction. At ~~that~~ time, CFIUS members will be pleased to discuss in detail specific findings and recommendations with you and other Committee members ~~at~~ your convenience.

16 Nov 06

26 Oct 06

OSD 17007-08




11-L-0550SD/60528

11/16/2006 3:21 05 PM



~~FOUO~~

October 30, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT Letter from Duncan Hunter

Regarding this Duncan Hunter letter, I think we ought to have a very good answer drafted – possibly by Pete Pace.

Thanks.

Attach. 10/24/06 Letter from Duncan Hunter, et al

DHR:ss  
SF103006-27 (Temp)

*Please respond by November 15, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17008-06



11-L-0559/OSD/60529

10/31/2006 2 18:42 PM

IRAD

30 Oct 06

24 Oct 06

Ms 10/30/06

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

Dear Mr. President:

The recent increase in insurgent operations highlights the urgent need to deploy Iraqi military forces into critical **areas**, such as downtown Baghdad, that can test - and hopefully, validate - their new capabilities.


Since late 2003, we have **trained** and equipped over 100 Iraqi Army battalions. We understand that of these forces, **6** Iraqi Army division headquarters, 30 brigades, and 89 battalions **are** in the lead in their respective areas of operations, representing about a **25** percent increase over the last 3 months. Moreover, Iraqis **are** now responsible for the stability and security of 2 of the 18 Iraqi provinces - Muthanna and Dhi Qar.

In light of this progress, we urge you to accelerate the process of deploying Iraqi forces to security environments that force **them** to engage in actual difficult **military operations**. Such operations will allow the forces to become battle-hardened. **Those** experiences would help coalition forces, which are responsible for training Iraqis, to gauge Iraqi military capabilities and make the adjustments necessary to effect a successful transition of security responsibilities. Finally, those experiences would help validate to the Iraqi people that their **own** military forces can indeed take on responsibility for stability and security throughout the entirety of their country.

It is crucial that both the **U.S.** and Iraqi governments recognize that as **the** battle in **Iraq** has intensified, so has the need to send Iraqi battalions into the heart of battle. Now **is** exactly the time to do so.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Cc: Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

OSD 17008-06



10/31/2006 2:15:33 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60530

John M. McHugh  
Bill Shuster

Helms Drake

Geoff Garrow

John Boozma  
~~Mark~~

John Kline

Zach Wamp

John Ding

Ed Whiford

Hita Rogn (AL-03)

Don Rubechuk

Terry Everett

Paul Gray

~~Jeff Feltner~~

Marciyn Musgrave

Phil English

Robert B. Adenheiser

Kent Franks

Jim Thatt

Rodney Alexander

John A. L. Bunde

Honorable George W. Bush  
October 24, 2006  
Page 3

Phil Gingrey

Don Lyman

W. O. O'Brien

Joel Hefley

Wally Hergen

John T. Doolittle

R. Simmons  
α/2

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

Dear Mr. President:

The recent increase in insurgent operations highlights the urgent need to deploy Iraqi military forces into critical areas, such as downtown Baghdad, that can test – and hopefully, validate – their new capabilities.





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It is crucial that both the U.S. and Iraqi governments recognize that as the battle in Iraq has intensified, so has the need to send Iraqi battalions into the heart of battle. Now is exactly the time to do so.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Cc: Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

11-L-0559/OSD/60533

OSD 17008-06



10/30/2006 11 03 04 AM

John M. McHugh  
Bill Shuster

Helma Drake

Jeff Davis

John Boozman  
Mum

John Kline

Zach Wamp

John Derr

Ed Whiford

Hita Roy (AL-03)      John A. L. Bui

Don Rumsfeld

Terry Everett

Pat Gray

Off-Fuller

Marciyn Musgrave

Phil English

Robert B. Adenholz

Kent Franks

Jim Thant

Rodney Alexander

Phil Hingray

W. Todd Akin

Wally Hergen

Don Lyman


Joel Hefley

John T. Doolittle

R Simmons  
CA/2

~~FOUO~~

CLASSIFIED  
OCT 26 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT JCOC Meeting

If the JCOC meeting ~~was~~ off-the-record, why have there been two articles in the Early Bud?

Thanks.

Attach: 10/18/06 SD memo to Matt Latimer; 10/19/06 ASD (PA) memo to SD

DHR:as  
SP102506-18

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/31/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17057-06



10/30/2006 5 13 30 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60536



100 10/25/06

~~FOUO~~

October 18, 2006

TO: Matt Latimer

CC: Dorrance Smith

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*RA*

SUBJECT Material from JCOC Meeting

Please see if you can get a transcript of what I said to the JCOC group yesterday, if it was taped. Several people have said it was really good. We might want to use some of it.

Let me see a transcript.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF101806-08

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 10/26/06*

OCT 25 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16865-06



10/24/2006 3:52:32 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60537

10/24 ✓  
1800

10/19/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith *DS*  
SUBJECT: Material from JCOC Meeting  
Ref: Snowflake 101806-08

Sir,

We are unable to meet this requirement. As the event was considered "off the record," the only recording made was by the Armed Forces Press Service with a hand-held recorder. During the playback of the file it was found to be inaudible. In the future, we will ensure to record these events with redundant systems.

SD CA	10/17/25	DSD SA	
SD SMA		DSD SMA	
SD MA	18 10/25	DSD MA	
CSA	10/24	DSD CA	
STF DIR			
ES	11/10/24	1745 10/25 0710	
ESR MA		ESD	


OSD 16665-08



10/24/2006 3 52 38 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60538

10/30/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith   
SUBJECT: JCOC Meeting

The taping of your remarks at the JCOC breakfast has resulted in our department instituting a new procedure. Your remarks will always be recorded, whether the event is ~~off~~ or on the record.

The confusion at the JCOC event was that although the session was closed to external media, the briefing was on the record as there were journalists who were JCOC participants.

We will do a better job communicating the environment to you **prior** to briefings and we will always record your remarks.

11-L-0559/OSD/60539



10/30/2006 5:13:07 PM

~~FOUO~~

CLASSIFIED  
OCT 26 2008

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: JCOC Meeting

If the JCOC meeting ~~was~~ off-the-record, why have there been two articles in the Early Bud?

Thanks.

Attach: 10/18/06 SD memo to Matt Lutimer; 10/19/06 ASD (PA) memo to SD

DHR:js  
SF102506-18

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/31/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17057-06



11-L-0559/OSD/60540

10/30/2006 5:13:30 PM

10/25/06

~~FOUO~~

October 18, 2006

TO: Matt Latimer

c c : Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Material from JCOC Meeting

Please see if you can get a transcript of what I said to the JCOC group yesterday, if it ~~was~~ taped. Several people have said it was really good. We might want to use some of it.

~~Let~~ me see a transcript.

Thanks.

DHR:ah  
SF101806-08

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/26/06*

OCT 25 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16665-06



10/24/2006 3:52:32 PM

11-I -0559/OSD/60541

10/24 ✓  
1000

10/19/2006

12-A  
TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith *DS*  
SUBJECT: Material from JCOC Meeting  
10/24 Ref: Snowflake 101806-08

Sir,

We are unable to meet this requirement. As the event ~~was~~ considered "off the record," the only recording made ~~was~~ by the Armed Forces Press Service with a hand-held recorder. During the playback of the file it ~~was~~ found to be inaudible. In the future, we will ensure to record these events with redundant systems.

SD CA	10/1/25	DSD SA	
SD SMA		DSD SMA	
SD MA	11/10/25	DSD MA	
CSA	11/10/25	DSD CA	
STF DIR			
ES	11/10/24	145	11/25 0700
ESR MA	11/10/24	ESD	

OSD 18865-08



10/24/2006 3:52:38 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60542

~~FOUO~~

11/15/06

November 13, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*



SUBJECT Media Events Conducted

Please give me a summary of the Media Events Conducted as of today.

Thanks.

Attach: 10/30/06 memo from ASD (PA) to SecDef

DHR:ss  
SF111306-31

-----  
*Please Respond By 11/15/06*

NOV 14 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

000.75D

13 NOV 06

26 OCT 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60543

OSD 17059-06



1/16/2007 5:53:40 PM

10/30/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
 FROM: Dorrance Smith *DS*  
 SUBJECT: Media Events Conducted  
 Ref: Snowflake 102506-19

*Robert Rumsfeld*

Sir,

You asked for a *summary* of media events you have conducted in the categories listed below; here is the data we have on record:


EVENT	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Press Briefings	39	56	41	12	27	25	200
Stakeouts	7	13	30	11	22	17	100
Overseas Press Events	35	27	48	41	34	33	218
Off the Record Interviews	*	*	*	*	4	6	10
Talk Radio Interviews	4	4	5	36	33	44	126
Local TV Interviews	2	7	13	4	0	4	30
National TV Interviews	46	29	26	22	6	6	135
Media Lunches	*	*	*	*	*	6	6
Town Hall Meetings	2	12	15	10	9	8	56
Public Speeches	4	2	23	31	23	24	107
Editorial Boards	5	2	7	1	1	3	19
Public Congressional Hearings	5	12	11	8	10	6	52

\* - no data available

We will continue to update these numbers.

SD CA	<i>10/13</i>	DSD SA	
SD SMA	<i>10/13</i>	DSD SMA	
SD MA	<i>10/13</i>	DSD MA	
ISA	<i>10/13</i>	DSD CA	
STF DIR			


11-L-0559/OSD/60544





~~FOUO~~

OCT 26 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Summary of SecDef Media Events

Let's see what we can fill in on the attached Media Events paper and improve it, and going **forward**, let's have different categories. I would include:

- public Congressional hearings
- public speeches -- where the press is present
- additional categories

Please go back and capture **as** much of the data as you can, and where you can't, put an asterisk and indicate "data not available." Then we can at least keep the information going forward.

Please get back to me quickly on **this**, if you can.

Thank you.

Attach: 10/10/06 ASD (PA) memo to SecDef; 10/24/06 ASD (PA) memo to SecDef

DHR:sg  
SF102306-19

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/31/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17059-06



11-L-0559/OSD/60545

10/30/2006 5:25:54 PM

~~FOUO~~

October 10, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA.*

SUBJECT *Summary of Press*

Please give me a *summary* of the following by year:

- Press briefings
- Stakeouts
- Press events overseas
- Off the record interviews (including while airborne)

Thanks.

DHRdh  
SF101006-40

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/19/06*

OCT 25 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~



11-L-0559/OSD/60546

10/24 ✓  
1800

10/24/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Dorrance Smith *DS*

SUBJECT: Media Evens Conducted

Ref: Snowflake 101006-40

Sir,

You asked for a *summary* of media events you have conducted in the *categories* listed *below*; here is the data we have on record

EVENT	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Press Briefings	39	56	41	12	27	25	200
Stakeouts	7	13	30	11	22	17	100
Overseas Press Events	35	27	48	41	34	33	218
Off the Record Interviews	*	*	*	*	4	6	10

\* - no data available

This is a partial list. For instance you have done 44 radio talk show interviews this year, 6 media lunches, and 8 town hall meetings. We will continue to update these numbers.

Talk Radio Interviews

44

Media Lunches

6

Town Hall Meetings

8

Total for year

SD CA	<i>DS</i>	DSD SA	
SD SMA	<i>DS</i>	DSD SMA	
SD MA	<i>DS</i>	DSD MA	
SD CA	<i>DS</i>	DSD CA	

11-L-0559/OSD/60547

OSD 16862-06



10/24/2006 3:47:09 PM

10/30/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith *DS*  
SUBJECT: Media Events Conducted  
Ref: Snowflake 102506-19

Sir,

You asked for a summary of media events you have conducted in the categories listed below; here is the data we have on record:

EVENT	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Press Briefings	39	56	41	12	27	25	200
Stakeouts	7	13	30	11	22	17	100
Overseas Press Events	35	27	48	41	34	33	218
Off the Record Interviews	*	*	*	*	4	6	10
Talk Radio Interviews	4	4	5	36	33	44	126
Local TV Interviews	2	7	13	4	0	4	30
National TV Interviews	46	29	26	22	6	6	135
Media Lunches	*	*	*	*	*	6	6
Town Hall Meetings	2	12	15	10	9	8	56
Public Speeches	4	2	23	31	23	24	107
Editorial Boards	5	2	7	1	1	3	19
Public Congressional Hearings	5	12	11	8	10	6	52

\* - no data available

We will continue to update these numbers.

11-L-0559/OSD/60548




OSD 17059-06

10/30/2006 5:25:48 PM

~~FOUO~~

OCT 26 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Summary of SecDef Media Events

Let's see what we can fill in on the attached Media Events paper and improve it, and going forward, let's have different categories. I would include:

- public Congressional hearings
- public speeches -- where the press is present
- ~~additional~~ categories

Please go back and capture ~~as~~ much of the ~~data as~~ you can, and where you can't, put ~~an~~ asterisk ~~and~~ indicate "data not available." Then we can ~~at~~ least keep the information going forward.

Please get back to me quickly on this, if you can.

*Thank* you.

Attach 10/10/06 ASD (PA) memo to SecDef; 10/24/06 ASD (PA) memo to SecDef

DHR:fr  
SF102506-19

-----  
*Please Respond By 10/31/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17059-06



10/30/2006 5 25 54 PM

11-I -0559/OSD/60549

~~FOUO~~

October 10, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA.*

SUBJECT: *Summary of Press*

Please give me a *summary* of the following by year:

- Press briefings
- Stakeouts
- Press events overseas
- Off the record interviews (including while airborne)

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF101006-40

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/19/06*

OCT 25 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16662-06



10/24/2006 3:47:19 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60550

10/24 ✓  
1800

10/24/2006

TO Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM Dorrance Smith *DS*  
SUBJECT: Media Evens Conducted

Robert Ranger

Ref: Snowflake 101006-40

Sir,

You asked for a **summary** of media events you have conducted in the categories listed below; here is the data we have on record:

EVENT	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Press Briefings	39	56	41	12	27	25	200
Stakeouts	7	13	30	11	22	17	100
Overseas Press Events	35	27	48	41	34	33	218
Off the Record Interviews	*	*	*	*	4	6	10

\* - no data available

This is a partial list. For instance you have done 44 radio talk show interviews this year, 6 media lunches, and 8 town hall meetings. We will continue to update these numbers.

Talk Radio Interviews

44

Media Lunches

6

Town Hall Meetings

8

Total for year

SD CA	10/25	DSD SA	
SD SMA	10/25	DSD SMA	
SD MA	10/25	DSD MA	
ES	10/25	DSD CA	
STF DIR	10/25		
ESR MA	10/25	ESD	


OSD 16662-06



10/24/2006 3:47:09 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60551

10/30/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith   
SUBJECT: David Kennerly to Iraq  
Ref: Snowflake 102706-03

Sir.

Noted. PA will add David Kennedy to the list of journalists who will receive an invitation to travel on your next trip to Iraq in December.

11-L-0559/OSD/60552

OSD 17060-06



10/30/2006 5 30 37 PM



(Hide) Snowflake Information: [View Signed Snowflake](#)

Control Number: 102706-03

Suspense Date: November 07, 2006

Action Status: OPEN

Classification: FOUO

Created on: October 27, 2006

Action Type: BUSINESS

Created by: (b)(6)

Closeout Type:

Keywords:

Closeout Date:

Handling Instructions:

Subject: Inviting David Kennerly on the next trip to Iraq and Afghanistan

(Hide) Snowflake Distribution: ☐ View Access History

Status	Address	Sent Date	Suspense	Completion Date	DistributionType	Response Req?	Response Type
PENDING	TO: DORRANCE SMITH	10/27/06	11/07/06		INBOX	YES	

(Hide) Attachments/Comments:

Document Type

Sent By

Created On

Document Menu

Subject

11-L-0559/OSD/60553

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Peru-Colombia Free Trade Agreement

We have to do whatever we can on the Peru-Colombia Free Trade Agreement. It is enormously important in both countries.

Thanks.

DHR:dl  
100206-02 (through computer) doc

-----  
*Please respond by October 26, 2006*

\*\*\*\*\*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17070-06



10/31/2006 8:15:11 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60554

091.31

405706

~~FOUO~~

OCT 31 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT NSC Meeting Attendees

At the NSC meeting on Iraq on Friday there were **21** people in the room while the **V.P.** was there -- by actual count. That number doesn't include all the folks on the other end with Zal and Casey that probably included six or more.

Is that the right size for an NSC meeting of that type?•

DHR:gs  
SF102706-18

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60555

OSD 17082-06



10/31/2006 1:21:54 PM

334 NSC

31064206

~~FOUO~~

October 31, 2006

TO: Gen Michael Hayden  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Speech: "Secrecy and the Press"

350.001

Mike --

I just got around to reading your speech, "Secrecy and the Press." It is first-rate.  
Good for you! Make sure you move it around. People need to read it.

DHR:dh  
SF103106-06

.....

3106486

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60556



OSD 17106-06

10/31/2006 5:02:40 PM

~~FOUO~~

October 23, 2006

TRAD

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Benchmarks in the Interagency

You folks are doing a good job on the benchmarks. *Let's* make sure we move them in the interagency.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
SF102006-29

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/02/06*

23 Oct 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60557

OSD 17181-06



11111200624455 PM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OCT 31 2006

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef  
USD(P) *[Signature]* OCT 31 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Benchmarks in the Interagency (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked us to make sure we move the benchmarks in the interagency.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ On Thursday, October 26<sup>th</sup> 2006, we presented the benchmarks to the Iraq Steering Group (ISG).
  - The ISG had a general discussion and decided to present the benchmarks to the Deputies Committee.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The benchmarks are on the agenda to be discussed at the next Deputies Committee meeting.

Attachments: Tab A - Coordination Sheet

Prepared by: Peter McVety, ISA/ME-Iraq, (b)(6)



\* S F 1 0 2 3 0 6 - 2 9 \*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60558



OSD 17161-06

11/1/2006 2:44:44 PM

ISAO  
D/Oct 06  
23 Oct 06

~~FOUO~~

October 13, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Benchmarks in the Interagency

You folks are doing a good job on the benchmarks. Let's make sure we move them in the interagency.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF-102306-29

.....

*Please Respond By 11/02/06*



~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60559

**POLICY COORDINATION SHEET**

**Subject: Benchmarks in the Interagency**

**Snowflake Number: 102306-29**

<b><u>Title/Organization</u></b>	<b><u>Name</u></b>	<b><u>Date</u></b>
PDASD/ISA	<u>Mary Beth Long</u>	
DASD, ME	<u>Mark Kimmitt</u>	
Director, ME-NG	<u> John Trigilio</u>	<u>10/30/06</u>
Special Advisor	<u> Abe Shulsky</u>	<u>10/30/06</u>



~~FOUO~~

October 23, 2006

TO Eric Edelman

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*DA.*

SUBJECT Memo on Sirai to Interagency

Please prepare a memo for me to send to the interagency on the Sirai. We are now at 687, and we need to get it down.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF102306-32

.....  
Please Respond By 11/02/06

*CAF to  
Files*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17178-06



11/1/2006 10:36 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60561


37002

2300706

~~FOUO~~

COMPLETED

October 30, 2006

TO: GEN John Abizaid  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
LTG Karl Eikenberry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: CH-47s in Pakistan

Pakistan

Ambassador Ryan Crocker sent a nice cable thanking the Department, you, and Karl Eikenberry for support in Pakistan during the anniversary of the earthquake relief effort – MISSION PAKISTAN. It was especially important for the men and women of the three CH-47s and associated ground crew, since it was the same unit tasked to perform the mission a year ago.

I am sending a note to the commander of Company B, 7<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 158<sup>th</sup> Aviation Regiment, LTC Walt Bradley, to thank him and his people for their work. The Pakistani people know that the United States will be there when they are in need, and Colonel Bradley's people brought that to life.

I know you and Karl played a big part, and I would ask you both to pass my thanks to your staffs.

Thanks.

DHR:sa  
102706-12

30 OCT 06

~~FOUO~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION					
GROUP 1	EXCLUDED	GROUP 2	EXCLUDED	GROUP 3	EXCLUDED
FOUO	FOUO	FOUO	FOUO	FOUO	FOUO

OSD 17238-06

11-L-0559/OSD/60562




11/2/2006 4:17:45 PM

~~FOUO~~

October 30, 2006

PAKISTAN

TO: GEN John Abizaid  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
LTG Karl Eikenberry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: CH-47s in Pakistan

Ambassador Ryan Crocker sent a nice cable thanking the Department, you, and Karl Eikenberry for support in Pakistan during the anniversary of the earthquake relief effort - MISSION PAKISTAN. It was especially important for the men and women of the three CH-47s and associated ground crew, since it was the same unit tasked to perform the mission a year ago.

I am sending a note to the commander of Company B, 7<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 158<sup>th</sup> Aviation Regiment, LTC Walt Bradley, to thank him and his people for their work. The ~~Pakistani~~ people know that the United States will be there when they are in need, and Colonel Bradley's people brought that to life.

I know you and Karl played a big part, and I would ask you both to pass my thanks to your *staffs*.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102706-12

30 OCT 06

~~FOUO~~

SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION					
SECDEF	100SEC	SECDEF	SECDEF	SECDEF	SECDEF
USCIB	ISD	ISD	CABLES	ISD	ISD

OSD 17242-06

11-L-0559/OSD/60563



11/2/2006 2:16 08 PM

~~FOUO~~

September 25, 2006

333.1

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Gordon England  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*RA.*

SUBJECT: Proposal For Bringing Investigative Process into the 21st Century

I would like you and the Joint Staff legal shop to come up with a proposal as to how we can bring the process for investigations into the 21st century. One year before anything specific starts, by way of action on the matter, is too long.

Please get back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach: 9/25/06 Press Release on Hamdania, Iraq Investigation

DHIL:as  
SP072306-13

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/25/06*

Copy to: G1 Recd

PJHP

PDGC

→ GC

25 SEP 06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17244-06



11-L-0559/OSD/60564

11/2/2006 2:18:11 PM

~~FOUO~~

0615  
44-04  
125

August 02, 2006

333.1

TO Gordon England

CC: Gen Pete ~~Pace~~  
Fran Harvey  
Donald Winter  
Michael Wynne  
Jim Haynes

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

DR.

SUBJECT Military and ~~Criminal~~ Investigations

The more I watch the DoD criminal investigations and military investigations, it becomes increasingly clear that the pace of events in the 21st century is such that the leisurely speed at which these investigations proceed is leaving the world with the impression that DoD is not open, we are not transparent, and that we are not serious.

We ought to give thought to requiring that the currently sequential reviews be concurrent. We could cut months off the time it takes to bring closure to these investigations.

Please look into this and get back to me with a proposal.

DHR:gg  
SF080206-25

.....  
Please Respond By 08/30/06

2 HUC06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60565

OSD 17245-06



11/2/2006 2:22:51 PM

November 02, 2006

TO: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: (b)(6)

33558

(b)(6)

The doctor I work with here at the Pentagon (b)(6) said (b)(6) is one of the best hand surgeons he knows of. (b)(6) said if (b)(6) is not still active, he knows (b)(6) could recommend **surgeons** he has **trained** in his surgery techniques.

If you want to visit about this with (b)(6) you might want to **give** him a call at (b)(6)

Best regards,

DHR:lh  
SP110206-02

2 NOV 06

11-L-0559/OSD/60566



11/3/2006 7:44:47 AM

OCT 04 2006

TO: Peter Rodman  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: AIDs Rates

Please have someone get me the AIDs rates in the countries in this hemisphere.

Thanks.

DWR:ds  
102304-12 (unvrt computer).doc

\*\*\*\*\*  
Please respond by October 26, 2006

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17287-08



11/3/2006 8:45:59 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60567

### HIV/AIDS – Adult Prevalence rate (%)


Antigua and Barbuda	NA
Argentina	0.7% (2001 est.)
Barbados	1.5% (2003 est.)
Bolivia	0.1% (2003 est.)
Brazil	0.7% (2003 est.)
Canada	0.3% (2003 est.)
Chile	0.3% (2003 est.)
Colombia	0.7% (2003 est.)
Costa Rica	0.6% (2003 est.)
Cuba	less than 0.1% (2003 est.)
Dominica	NA
Dominican Republic	1.7% (2003 est.)
Ecuador	0.3% (2003 est.)
El Salvador	0.7% (2003 est.)
Grenada	NA
Guatemala	1.1% (2003 est.)
Honduras	1.8% (2003 est.)
Jamaica	1.2% (2003 est.)
Mexico	0.3% (2003 est.)
Nicaragua	0.2% (2003 est.)
Panama	0.9% (2003 est.)
Paraguay	0.5% (2003 est.)
Peru	0.5% (2003 est.)
Saint Kitts and Nevis	NA
Saint Lucia	NA
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	NA
Suriname	1.7% (2001 est.)
United States of America	0.6% (2003 est.)
Uruguay	0.3% (2001 est.)
Venezuela	0.7% (2001 est.)

Source: CIA World Factbook (Last update: 17 October 2006)




## A global view of HIV infection

38.6 million people [33.4–46.0 million] living with HIV



11-L-0559/OSD/60569

# HIV prevalence (%) in adults in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2005



11-L-0559/OSD/60570

**POLICY COORDINATION SHEET**

**Subject:** AIDS Rates

**Control Number:**



4 5 F - 1 0 0 3 0 4 - 1 2 \*

<b><u>Title/Organization</u></b>	<b><u>Name</u></b>	<b><u>Date</u></b>
ASD/Health Affairs		Copy provided, 10/26/06
USSOUTH Command Surgeon	Col. Sean Murphy	E-mail, 10/26/06

-----

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef  
USDP *the*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (HD)

NOV 03 2006

*PM* NOV 2 2006

SUBJECT: AIDS Rates

- o You asked us to provide you AIDS rates for the Western Hemisphere.
  - Table at Tab A is drawn from the CIA World Factbook. The maps are from the World Health Organization.
  - The data are not solid Health Affairs cautions that there are widely varying degrees of accuracy in global/country reporting of HIV and AIDS rates.
- With the exception of a few “hot spots” in the Caribbean such as Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, The Bahamas, Guyana, and Belize, the Western Hemisphere is in reasonable shape compared with much of the rest of the developing world, especially Africa, Southeast Asia, and Russia.
- DoD supports international HIV/AIDS prevention activities in 67 countries, predominantly in Africa, Southeast and Central Asia, and the Caribbean. Funding is from both the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), administered by State, and the Defense Health Program (DHP).
- USSOUTHCOM administers the DoD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program in the Hemisphere and currently provides training, technical advice, equipment and supplies to support military-based prevention programs in the Dominican Republic, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras, Suriname, Belize, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala (FY 06 funding: \$100K from DHP, plus \$859K from State’s PEPFAR for Guyana, Dominican Republic, and Honduras).

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: M. M. MacMurray, HD&ASA/WHA, (b)(6)



\* S F - 1 0 0 3 0 6 - 1,2 \*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60572

02-11-06 14:44 IN

OSD 17287-06



11/3/2006 8:45:54 AM

~~FOUO~~

November 03, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bolten to Lunches

What do you *think* about perhaps inviting Josh Bolten to join us at the VPJ Rice/  
Hadley/ Rumsfeld lunches? He seems to be into our issues. *Your* call.

DHR:dh  
SP110206-09

.....

339 E/H

3200006

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60573



OSD 17315-06

11/3/2006 1:08:39 PM



UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER  
7701 TAMPA POINT BOULEVARD  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5323

October 17, 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301-5000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You asked the question, "Why do we even use the term Psychological Operations anymore? There must be few areas of activity where that term actually adds value in the world we live in today." We completed extensive analysis to possibly change the name and determined several courses of action. The Working Group included representatives from your staff, four Geographic Combatant Commanders, U.S. Special Operations Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Army staff. We are coordinating a staff action that addresses possible changes through the Services and Combatant Commanders. During that process, we will brief the Strategic Communications Roadmap Working Group and the Deputy Advisors Working Group and coordinate with your Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Public Affairs offices to staff the name change decision for Ambassador Edelman's signature.

This has been a lengthy process but I wanted you to know it is still progressing.

Sincerely,

  
Bryan D. Brown  
General, U.S. Army  
Commander

OSD 17321-06



11/3/2006 1:55:43 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60574

~~FOUO~~

February 02, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Steve Cambone  
Larry Di Rita

06/001415  
ES-5170

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: The term "Psychological Operations"

Why do we even use the term "Psychological Operations" anymore?

There must be very few areas of activity where that term actually adds value in the world we live in today.

~~Please come back to me with a proposal to rethink the matter~~

Thanks.

ENCL. is  
000004-03

.....  
*Please Respond By 02/28/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04442-06

11/15 ✓  
1200



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

INFO MEMO

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION  
INTEGRATION

November 3, 2006 12:07 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: John G. Grimes, Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)/DoD CIO

SUBJECT: Military Commissions and the FBI

- Background: SECDEF Snowflake dated October 26, 2006 conveyed concern over FBI's ability to properly support subject Commissions due to information system incompatibilities. SECDEF requested DOD CIO to investigate and provide assessment.
- Discussions were held with Special Agent DoD lead for the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF)--Mr. Dennis Gwozdz, and the CIA Counsel--Mr. John Martinez, whose task is to set up and manage war room activities for the prosecution efforts. Both conclude they are prepared to receive, access, process, and evaluate the FBI information. Subsequent to Pete Geren's visit to the "facility" three weeks ago, Mr. Martinez advises that obstacles to sharing or exchange of information with the FBI have been resolved and the FBI continues to provide excellent IT support to the team.
- For very sensitive controlled information, the CIA established a stand-alone system called "Eagle" that allows read only access to the databases and requires a physical storage device (CDs) for access to information to ensure protection and control access.
- This office will continue to monitor the IT support to the commission to ensure adequate services.

COORDINATION: TAB B

SD CA		DSD SA	
SD SMA		DSD SMA	
SD MA		DSD MA	
TSA		DSD CA	
STF DOR			
ES	11/11/06		
ESR MA	11/11/06	ESD	

Prepared By: Toin Scruggs (b)(6)

11-L-0559/080/60576

OSD 17334-06



11/3/2006 3:24 20 PM



# TAB A

~~FOUO~~

October 26, 2006

TO: John Grimes

CC: Gordon England  
Steve Cambone  
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld \$-

SUBJECT Military Commissions and *the* FBI

I ~~was~~ told today that, in preparing for the military commissions, every agency of the government ~~that~~ is involved has ~~systems~~ that are compatible except the ~~FBI~~, and ~~the~~ ~~FBI~~ are not able to properly assist in preparing materials ~~for~~ the commission trials because of the lack of compatibility and the antiquated systems they have.

Please look into this and get back to me with the ground truth and what, if any, steps are being taken to *make* the ~~FBI~~ system compatible.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
SF102506-23

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/09/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60578



OSD 17334-06

11/3/2006 3:24:31 PM

# TAB B

**Coordination:**

**Director Congressional Liaison**

**Chris Condon**

**November 1, 2006**

**DoD CIIF Special Agent in Charge**

**Mr. Dennis Gwozdz**

**November 1, 2006**



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

INFO MEMO

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION  
INTEGRATION

November 3, 2006 12:07 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: John G. Grimes, Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)/DoD CIO

SUBJECT: Military Commissions and the FBI

- Background SECDEF Snowflake dated October 26, 2006 conveyed concern over FBI's ability to properly support subject Commissions due to information system incompatibilities. SECDEF requested DOD CIO to investigate and provide assessment.
- Discussions were held with Special Agent DoD lead for the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF)--Mr. Dennis Gwozdz, and the CIA Counsel--Mr. John Martinez, whose task is to set up and manage war room activities for the prosecution efforts. Both conclude they are prepared to receive, access, process, and evaluate the FBI information. Subsequent to Pete Geren's visit to the "facility" three weeks ago, Mr. Martinez advises that obstacles to sharing or exchange of information with the FBI have been resolved and the FBI continues to provide excellent IT support to the team.
- For very sensitive controlled information, the CIA established a stand-alone system called "Eagle" that allows read only access to the databases and requires a physical storage device (CDs) for access to information to ensure protection and control access.
- This office will continue to monitor the IT support to the commission to ensure adequate services.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: Tom Scruggs

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/60581

OSD 17334-06



11/3/2006 3:24:20 PM



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
8000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

INFO MEMO

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION  
INTEGRATION

November 29, 2006 3:38 PM

FOR **THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT**

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: John G. Grimes, Assistant Secretary Of Defense (ASD)/DoD CIO

SUBJECT: Follow-up on Military Commissions and the FBI Questions

- Background: SECDEF Snowflake dated October 26, 2006 conveyed concern over FBI's ability to support Commissions due to information system incompatibilities. SECDEF requested DOD CIO to investigate and provide assessment.
- DoD CIO provided an initial response (TABB) indicating that obstacles to exchange of information with the FBI have been resolved and the Commission "War Room" is prepared to receive, access, process, and evaluate the FBI information. This was confirmed in an update on November 21, 2006 from the CIA War Room Manager, Mr. John Martinez, and the FBI CIO's office which reported good progress in exchanging information between FBI and the War Room. Plans are to upload FBI information, provided via CD, to the stand-alone War Room "Eagle" system, which the CIA created to allow access to CD inputted information.
- Action: In your review of the initial response at TAB B, you requested identification of the people on the coordination page – either DoD, CIA or FBI, and the requirement for a Pete Geren chop on the response.
- All responses provided have been chopped through Pete Geren.
- Affiliation of persons identified on the coordination page are as follows:
  - Chris Condon, Director Congressional Liaison (DoD)
  - Dennis Gwozdz, CITE Special Agent in Charge (DoD)
  - John Martinez, CIA Counsel and War Room Manager (CIA)
  - Zalmay Azmi, FBI CIO (FBI)
  - Peter Geren, Under Secretary of the Army (DoD)

COORDINATION: TAB C

Prepared By: Tom Scruggs (b)(6)

11-L-0559-OSD/60582

OSD 17334-06



12/1/2006 1:15:37 PM

015

29 Nov 06

26 Oct 06

**Coordination:**

**Director Congressional Liaison**

**Chris Condon**

**November 1,2006**

**DoD CTF Special Agent in Charge**

**Mr. Dennis Gwozdz**

**November 1,2006**

**Coordination:**

<b>CIA Counsel War Room Manager</b>	<b>Mr. John Martinez</b>	<b>November 22,2006</b>
<b>FBI CIO</b>	<b>Mr. Zalmay Azmi</b>	<b>November 22,2006</b>
<b>Under Secretary of the Army</b>	<b>Mr. Peter Geren</b>	<b>November 22,2006</b>





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

November 15, 2006

*Iraq*

The Honorable Vic Snyder  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Snyder:

Thank you for your letter regarding Military Transition Teams in Iraq. I have asked General Pete Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to address this matter. He will get back to you as soon as possible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

*15 Nov 06*

*3 Nov 06*

11-L-0559/OSD/60585



OSD 17355-06

11/16/2006 8:41:52 AM

~~FOUO~~

NOV 14 2006

Irq

TO: Gen Pete Pace

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Congressman Vic Snyder

I understand you are going to answer this letter from Vic Snyder. It is not clear to me that we ought to answer those questions on an unclassified basis.

Thanks.

Attach 11/3/06 ~~Letter~~ from Congressman Vic Snyder to SecDef

DHR:as  
SF111306-20

.....

14260006

32000006

OSD 17355-06



~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60586

1/16/2007 5:56:17 PM



VIC SNYDER  
2D DISTRICT, ARKANSAS

HOME OFFICE:  
PROSPECT BUILDING, SUITE 130  
1801 N. UNIVERSITY AVENUE  
LITTLE ROCK, AR 72207-5242  
(501) 324-5941  
FAX (501) 324-6029  
TDD (501) 324-6022

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, DC 20515-0402

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC OFFICE:  
1330 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0402  
(202) 775-0500  
FAX (202) 725-0803  
SNYDER@CONGRESS.MAIL.HOUSE.GOV  
web: www.house.gov/vicnyder/

November 3, 2006

The **Honorable** Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

TASKED CHAIRMAN, JCS  
FOR DIRECT REPLY

Dear **Secretary Rumsfeld**:

I am writing to ask for information concerning the Military Transition Teams being wed to train Iraqi military forces.

In recent weeks, I have received several communications from military personnel and their families about the Military Transition Teams (MiTTs), and I am writing to ask for information that would help me confirm or correct their concerns. Please provide answers to the following questions, preferably with the appropriate supporting documentation. Please know that I share your belief that the best way to establish the conditions allowing us to withdraw our troops is to help the Iraqis develop the capability to secure their own country, and it is this belief that motivates these questions.

- How many MiTTs are in Iraq now?
- How many MiTTs are planned? How was this level established?
- What is the composition of a MiTT?
- How are the members of a MiTT selected?
- How are members of a MiTT trained? How long is this training?
- I have received information that MiTT commanders and senior NCOs frequently meet with their teams for the first time after the team has been deployed. Is this accurate? How often has this happened?
- What tasks and specialties are MiTTs charged with training? Are the Iraqi forces trained in maintenance and logistics as well as in direct combat-related tasks?
- For how long are the Iraqi forces trained?
- How are the Iraqi troops graded during training? I have received allegations that the training teams are pressured to pass some Iraqi units before they are ready. Are you aware of anything like this occurring, and is there an independent auditor charged with evaluating the training and state of the Iraqi forces?
- What support and funding are the MiTTs provided?
- Do the Iraqi forces have sufficient equipment, weapons, and ammunition on which to train? How are the criteria established to make this judgment?

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OSD 17355-06



11/6/2006 7:47:28 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60587

- Are the Iraqis provided with maintenance manuals for equipment and spare parts? Is there a logistics system to provide spare parts and repairs?
- What sort of follow on training is provided to the Iraqi forces?

Thank you for your kind cooperation with this request. Should you have any questions or require a clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Vic Snyder', written over a horizontal line.

Vic Snyder  
Member of Congress

VS:mc

VIC SNYDER  
2d DISTRICT, ARKANSAS

HOME OFFICE:  
PROSPECT BUILDING, SUITE 150  
1501 N. UNIVERSITY AVENUE  
LITTLE ROCK, AR 72207-5242  
(501) 326-5941  
FAX (501) 374-6029  
TDD (501) 324-5922

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, DC 20515-0402

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC OFFICE  
1330 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0402  
12021 225-2566  
FAX (202) 225-5903  
SNYDER.CONGRESS@MAIL.HOUSE.GOV  
web: www.house.gov/snyder

November 3, 2006

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I am writing to ask for information concerning the Military Transition Teams being used to train Iraqi military forces.

In recent weeks, I have received several communications from military personnel and their families about the Military Transition Teams (MiTTs), and I am writing to ask for information that would help me confirm or correct their concerns. Please provide answers to the following questions, preferably with the appropriate supporting documentation. Please know that I share your belief that the best way to establish the conditions allowing us to withdraw our troops is to help the Iraqis develop the capability to secure their own country, and it is this belief that motivates these questions.

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11-L-0559/OSD/60589

OSD 17355-06



11/6/2006 7:47 26 AM

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- What sort of follow on training is provided to the Iraqi forces?

Thank you for your kind cooperation with this request. Should you have any questions or require a clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Vic Snyder', with a stylized flourish extending from the end.

Vic Snyder  
Member of Congress

VS:mc



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0000

06-05737  
OSD 1735-06

DEC 28 2006

The Honorable Vic Snyder  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515-0402

Dear Mr. Snyder,

The Secretary of Defense has asked me to respond to your 3 November letter concerning Military Transition Teams (MITTs) in Iraq.

The MITT mission is crucial to the success of the Iraqi Security Forces. Our Service members serving in MITT billets are performing beyond our expectations, and the results of their efforts can be seen daily in the progression of the fledgling Iraqi security apparatus.

Due to the security classification of answers provided by the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, we are unable to send the response directly to you. In lieu of a personal delivery, my staff will submit the document to the Committee on Armed Services via courier. My legislative affairs office will coordinate delivery directly with the committee staff as well as your own.

Thank you for your interest and continued support of the welfare of our men and women in uniform.

Sincerely,

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI  
Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Acting Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

R 17355-06

Iraq  
(3 Nov 06)

~~FOUO~~

NOV 06 2006

TO Dr. J.D. Crouch  
CC Stephen J. Hadley  
Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Weekly Events in Iraq and Afghanistan

Attached is an unclassified summary of weekly events in Iraq and Afghanistan,  
along the lines we discussed.

Regards,

Attach. 10/31/06 "Weekly Events Iraq/Afghanistan"

DHR:dh  
SF110206-03

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~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60592

OSD 17375-06



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# ***WEEKLY EVENTS IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN***

***31 October 2006***

## Weekly Events – Iraq

- **Iraqi Army Assumes Another Operational Command**
  - On 24 Oct, 3rd Battalion 1st Brigade of the 7th IAD assumed responsibility for military operations in northern Ramadi (Al-Anbar Province; west-central). This is the second transfer of command in Ramadi in the last 2 weeks.
  - Currently, 6 out of 10 Iraqi Army divisions, 30 of 36 brigades and 90 of 112 battalions are in the lead with Coalition support (as of 27 Oct).
- **70 Ton Cache Discovered**
  - Local tribesmen and Iraqi Police discovered the cache containing arms, rockets and chemicals (explosive powder) used to target civilians in Al-Anbar province (west).
  - The al Anbar Salvation Council (local tribes fighting insurgents) stated they found the cache while fighting terrorists in al Tharthar (western province). During the raid, they uncovered plans to attack neighborhoods in Baghdad.
  - Brig. Gen. Hamid al-Shawkaw, Chief of Al-Anbar Governorate Police, said: "al Anbar tribesmen are helping police forces eliminate terrorists sheltered in Ramadi...the cooperation "will contribute to stabilizing the situation and imposing the rule of law."
- **Japan Pledges \$3.5B to Boost Iraq Oil Exports**
  - Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani said Japan will lend Iraq \$3.5 billion to fund several projects to increase the country's oil exports.
  - He said the oil sector, which accounts for ~70% of Iraq's GDP and 90% of its national income, will get a boost by a new hydrocarbon law expected by the end of the year. The law will provide additional guarantees for foreign investment.
  - Iraq is exporting about 2.5M barrels/day and hopes to increase that to 3M by year's end and ultimately 4-4.5 million barrels by 2010. "We are determined to go beyond 6 million barrels by cooperating with foreign companies," al-Shahristani said at a news conference.

## Weekly Events – Afghanistan

- Pakistani Forces Attack AQI Facility
  - Pakistani troops attacked a purported AQI training facility near Khar, Pakistan (30 Oct) on the Afghan/Pakistan border.
  - Liaquat Hussain, a local cleric, was killed in the attack. He was running the AQI camp and may have been sheltering AQI militants. A senior intelligence official in Bajur (NW Pakistan) reported that a local AQI leader Faqir Mohammed, who led a recent rally in support of the Taliban, was possibly inside.
- Truce negotiated in western Afghan province
  - Two opponent tribes in Shindand (Herat Province, west) announced a truce on 24 Oct after President Karzai sent a delegation to the region to negotiate.
  - The delegation, headed by the deputy head of parliament, put an end to the tension in that region. He told the Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) that both tribes disarmed and agreed to hold the truce for at least 1 month.
- School Reopens 7 Months After Taliban Torching
  - Gelan district officials (Ghazni Province east-central), Afghan National Policeman and Coalition leaders joined 300 children and area villagers to celebrate reopening (24 Oct).
  - "Since we've been here...the Taliban have fled and the people have been able to live their lives normally without fear," Task Force VIGILANT ARCHER Commander.
  - "Islam is about knowledge, [not] destroying schools and preventing teachers from teaching," said Gelan district sub-governor, Mir Ahmad.

# DEFENSE

Heroes in the Global War on Terror



Bronze Star  
recipient

Oregon Army National Guard's Sgt. Nathaniel "Brad" Lindsay

Sgt. Lindsey and his ~~convoy~~ were attacked when Taliban fighters set up a false checkpoint in Afghanistan on Sept. 9, 2006. The enemies hit the ~~convoy~~ with either a roadside bomb or a rocket-propelled grenade, and then opened up small-arms fire on the vehicles. Lindsey, a gunner who had recently switched from a desk job at a secure base in Kandahar to a job training Afghan soldiers, died in the attack. He had volunteered for deployment to Afghanistan after having already served in Iraq and during Hurricane Katrina to protect an officer he had driven for since June 2004. Lindsey was posthumously awarded the Bronze Star, the Purple Heart and the Meritorious Service Medals on Sept. 22, 2006.



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recipient

Missouri Air National Guard's Master Sgt. Letitia Whitaker

During her deployment at Kirkuk Air Base from March to July 2003, Master Sgt. Whitaker helped establish the first air-control service in northern Iraq since 1990. The service supported approximately 4,800 combat sorties, including covert operations, humanitarian airlifts and medical evacuations. She also supervised several covert flight operations using tactical radios and night vision goggles, and developed explosive-ordnance disposal procedures for the base. She co-authored airfield operating procedures for aero-medical evacuation of wounded Coalition forces that resulted in the rapid evacuation of more than 86 critically wounded soldiers and airmen. In May 2008, Whitaker became the first woman in history in the Missouri Air National Guard to receive the Bronze Star Medal.



Bronze Star  
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Army Reserve Sgt. Ryan Gallucci


Then-Spc. Gallucci and his six-member civil affairs team spent almost a year in Iraq between 2003 and 2004 helping to rebuild the infrastructure and improve the quality of life for the Iraqis. The team worked and lived in towns near the Iranian border, performing tasks such as getting schools and municipal governments up and running, and making sure the teachers and workers were on the payroll. Gallucci was responsible for about \$4.7 million in public works projects during his deployment. In a village just outside the city of Khanaqin, Gallucci worked closely with Iraqi contractors to build a water pumping station and three wells, and located generators to help run the pumping station. He and his contractors also laid \$20,000 worth of pipe, bringing water to several homes for the first time in 17 years. The team also built a landfill outside Khanaqin, and helped get the landfill workers on the payroll. In September 2005, Gallucci was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for his work.

For more information on the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces, please visit the "Face of Defense" link on the DoD homepage.

11-L-0559/OSD/60596

~~FOUO~~

NOV 06 2006

**TO:** Dr. J.D. Crouch  
**CC:** Stephen J. Hadley  
Eric Edelman  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld   
**SUBJECT:** Weekly Events in Iraq and Afghanistan

Attached is an unclassified summary of weekly events in *Iraq* and Afghanistan, along the lines we discussed.

Regards.

Attach. 10/31/06 "Weekly Events Iraq/Afghanistan"

DHR:dh  
SF110206-03

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60597

OSD 17375-06



11/6/2006 1:29:50 PM

UNCLASSIFIED



# ***WEEKLY EVENTS IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN***

***31 October 2006***

1  
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11-L-0559/OSD/60598

## Weekly Events – Iraq

- Iraqi Army Assumes Another Operational Command
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# DEFENSE

## Heroes in the Global War on Terror



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11-L-0559/OSD/60601

~~FOUO~~

November 03, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Delay in getting copies of POTUS Telecons with Karzai and Maliki

The delay in my getting copies of the President's conversations with Karzai and Maliki is a problem.

I wonder if there is some way, at least with respect to those two countries, that when the President talks to those folks, the NSC can get the report out within 48 hours.

There is so much going on, it would really be a help.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF110306-14

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3 Nov 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60602

OSD 17425-06  
11/6/2006 5:58:48 PM

~~FOUO~~

NOV 07 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Piece by Alexander Downer

Interesting speech by Alexander Downer of Australia.

Attach Sydney Cable

DHR:ss  
37110606-16

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720606

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60603

OSD 17508-06



11/7/2006 5:53:03 PM

10 11/6/06

**Subject: FOREIGN MINISTER'S IDEOLOGICAL BATTLEPLAN FOR WAR ON TERROR**

BT

UNCLAS SYDNEY 001451

SENSITIVE

CANBERRA FOR POL

E.O. 12950: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PROP, PING, PINR, AS

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER'S IDEOLOGICAL BATTLEPLAN FOR WAR ON TERROR

1. (U) SUMMARY: Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer outlined a strategy for "winning the battle of ideas" in the war on terror. "We will only be able to declare victory when their ideology no longer attracts young recruits," Downer said of terrorists in a speech delivered to a Sydney think tank November 1. Downer reaffirmed his government's strong resolve to confront terrorism, noting "the worst thing we can do is send out a message of faint-heartedness." **END SUMMARY.**
2. (U) Foreign Minister Downer delivered a speech, entitled "Terrorism: Winning the Battle of Ideas," to the Sydney Institute. In his opening comments, Downer noted that the Australian government's commitment of over 8 billion Australian dollars (6.16 billion USD) to counter-terrorism activities since September 11 "is essential, but by itself it will not be enough." Downer said, "the heart of the contest is about the totalitarian mentality of violent extremism." "This ideology can and will be defeated," proclaimed Downer, "if people of good faith everywhere stand up against it." Downer articulated four ways to achieve victory on the ideological front.
3. (U) The first of four ways to "win the battle of ideas," Downer argued, is "to make plain what the extremist ideology means in practice." Downer pointed out that under the Taliban, this ideology meant brutal repression. Women were banned from work. Girls' schools were shut down. Entertainment was prohibited, and "public floggings, stonings, and executions were regular events." Second, Downer continued, "we need to emphasize that there is no conflict between the West and Islam." Inter-faith dialogues are one forum for Muslims and non-Muslims to focus on shared values and concepts that unite them. To that end, Downer noted, Australia has participated in two regional inter-faith conferences. Australia has also explored how schools can teach "an Islamic curriculum in conjunction with the Australian curriculum." The concept of democracy must also be emphasized in these dialogues, argued Downer, because "a democratic system is better able to deliver prosperity, security, and personal happiness."
4. (U) Thirdly, "we must be aware that... a good part of the debate has to be conducted between Muslims." Downer argued that condemnation of extremism by Muslims is critical. King Abdullah II of Jordan, for example, convened a conference of eight main schools of Islamic religious law, which resulted in a consensus on the illegitimacy of terrorism. Finally, Downer asserted "all countries

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need to work harder in their international public diplomacy." The democracies confronting extremism ~~must~~ dispel any notion that the confrontation is ~~over~~ religion or that it is with the entire Muslim world.

5. (U) Downer's remarks drew thoughtful questions from the audience probing the underlying roots of terrorism and potential outcomes for the struggle. Notably, none of the questions were critical of Australia's engagement in the struggle or its deployment in Iraq. One person simply asked what Downer considered an acceptable outcome for operations in Iraq. In response, Downer said that coalition forces are working towards the goal of strengthening an Iraqi government that can take control and sustain itself.

6. (SBU) COMMENT: Downer sent a clear message that his government remains strongly committed to the war on terror, at a time when the political opposition has escalated its anti-war rhetoric. The war on terror and operations in Iraq will be a key issue in next year's federal election. Downer signaled that for the time being, domestic politics has not shaken his government's resolve. END COMMENT.

SMITH  
END OF MESSAGE

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11-L-0559/OSD/60605



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

November 7, 2006, 11:00 AM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert L. Wilkie, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: DepSecDef response to Senator Warner and Senator Levin concerning  
the interrogation plan of al-Khatani Snowflake#102406-18

- You asked to see Secretary England's response to a letter from Senator Warner and Senator Levin concerning the interrogation plan for al-Khatani.
- Response letter is attached.
- LTG Inge will arrive in D.C. today. He will brief the staff leadership of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Wednesday, November 8'.
- My office is prepping LTG Inge and will accompany him to the briefing.

Attachments:

- 1) Secretary England's response
- 2) Senator Warner and Senator Levin letter of October 19, 2006
- 3) Snowflake#102406-18

OSD 17509-06



11/7/2006 5:05:22 PM

Prepared by: CAPT S.R. Greiner, 11-L-0559/OSD/60606 (b)(6)

**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

November 3, 2006

The Honorable John Warner  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Senator Warner,

This letter is in response to your correspondence to me on October 19 concerning the interrogation plan for al-Khatani. Because of questions raised surrounding the specific interrogation plan that was ultimately implemented, I tasked LTG Inge, USA, to conduct a thorough review of the matter. LTG Inge has recently completed his work.

The Department suggests that LTG Inge personally address this matter with the Committee. In this manner, the Department can be more responsive to your inquiry. Robert Wilkie, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, will contact your office to arrange the briefing/discussion.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Andrew England".

cc:

The Honorable Carl Levin  
Ranking Member



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

November 3, 2006

The Honorable Carl Levin  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Senator Levin,

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A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "Andrew Engel", is located to the right of the main text.

cc:  
The Honorable John Warner  
Chairman



JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN  
 JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA  
 JAMES INHOFE, OKLAHOMA  
 PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS  
 JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA  
 WILLIAM V. COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI  
 JOHN EHRHART, MISSISSIPPI  
 JAMES M. TALIAFERRO, MISSISSIPPI  
 KERRY CHAMBERLAIN, GEORGIA  
 LINDSEY O. GRHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA  
 ELIZABETH DOLE, NORTH CAROLINA  
 JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
 JOHN THUNE, SOUTH DAKOTA  
 CHARLES E. SCHUMER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
 MICHAEL D. GREGG, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

OK  
 10/24

October 19, 2006

Honorable Gordon R. England  
 Deputy Secretary of Defense  
 1010 Defense Pentagon  
 Washington, D.C. 20301-1010

*Tasked to ASD for Legislative Affairs  
 to prepare a reply for the  
 Deputy Secretary.*

Dear Secretary England:

Senator Warner's letter to Secretary Francis J. Harvey dated July 24, 2006, enclosed a July 17, 2006 letter from Senator Levin on behalf of a bi-partisan group of Senators outlining steps to prepare for a Committee hearing with regard to Major General Geoffrey Miller's, USA, role in the alleged mistreatment of detainees. One of those steps was that the Department of Defense provide the Committee the previously-requested full interrogation plan for al-Khatani that was signed by Major General Geoffrey D. Miller.

In response to that request, the Committee received on October 3, 2006, a 4-page, unsigned interrogation plan for al-Khatani. This document is similar to the interrogation plan for al-Khatani included as an annex to the report of Generals Schmidt and Furlow on alleged detainee abuse at Guantanamo.

Please confirm in writing, whether the 4-page document represents the entire interrogation plan and explain any discrepancies with the Department of the Army Inspector General report.

We look forward to your assistance in providing the full interrogation plan to the Committee.

Sincerely,

*Carl Levin*  
 Carl Levin  
 Ranking Member

*John Warner*  
 John Warner  
 Chairman

cc: Honorable Francis J. Harvey

OSD 16430-06



10/20/2006 8:38:32 AM

~~FOUO~~

TO. Robert Wilkie  
CC Gordon England  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Answer to Warner and Levin

OCT 25 2006

Please let me see Gordon England's ~~answer~~ to the attached letter from Warner and Levin.

Thanks.

Attach. 10/19/06 Warner/Levin ltr to DSD re: Interrogation Plan (OSD 16430-06)

DHR:da  
SP102406-18

.....  
*Please Respond By November 02, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

October 24, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Answer to Warner and Levin

Please let me see Gordon England's answer to the attached letter from Warner and Levin.

Thanks.

Attach. 10/19/06 Warner/Levin ltr to DSD re: Interrogation Plan (OSD 16430-06)

DHR:dh  
SF102406-18

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 11/02/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60611

~~FOUO~~

October 23, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo on Kosovo for the Interagency

Please prepare a memo for me on Kosovo to send to the interagency.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
SF102306-33

.....  
Please Respond By 11/02/06

*[Handwritten signature and large 'K' mark]*

*Kosovo*

*23 Oct 06*

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/60612

OSD 17532-06  
  
11/8/2006 12:55:17 PM

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Steve Bucci

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Brief on Center for Hemispheric Studies and IADB

Please have someone brief me on the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and also on the Inter-American Defense Board.

Thanks.

*— 10 min.*

DH:dh  
100306-26 (travel computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by November 2, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60613

OSD 17533-06




11/8/2006 2:56:47 PM

334

4 Oct 06

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM:  Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (HD)

SUBJECT: Brief on Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and IADB

USDP  NOV 14 2006

VIA  NOV 14 2006

Peter F. Verga  
Principal Deputy

- You asked to be briefed on the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (C.H.D.S.) and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).
- The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (C.H.D.S.) is one of Policy's five regional centers for security studies. It was established in 1997 with an initial focus on developing civilian cadres to support newly-formed civilian defense ministries throughout Latin America. Briefing at Tab A.
- The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was formed in 1942 and is today an entity of the Organization of American States with the mission to provide the OAS and its member states with technical and educational advice and consultancy services on military and defense issues. Briefing at Tab B.
  - The IADB also operates the Inter-American Defense *College* at Ft. McNair.
  - Only 26 of the 34 active OAS member-states are represented on the Board.
    - o This is due to a lack of military establishments and general antipathy toward military authorities.
- My staff and I are prepared to discuss these institutions with you in person and answer any questions you may have.

COORDINATION: N/A

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: M. M. MacMurray, HD&ASA/WHA (b)(6)



\* S F - 1 0 0 3 0 6 - 2 6 \*

11-L-0559/OSD/60614

OSD 17533-06



11/15/2006 11 05 37 AM

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Steve Bucci

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Brief on Center for Hemispheric Studies and IADB

Please have someone brief me on the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and also on the Inter-American Defense Board.

Thanks.

*— PD mia.*

DHR:db  
100306-36 (travel computer).doc

.....  
***Please respond by November 2, 2006***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60615

OSD 17533-06



11/15/2006 11:03:29 AM



# *Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies*



INFORMATION


*"mens et fides magna"*

11-L-0559/OSD/60616






# *Regional Centers*



11-L-0559/OSD/60617



# *Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies*



11-L-0559/OSD/60618



# *Chain of Supervision and Control*

*(as of 1 Nov 06)*

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

( Sr Rater)

**SOUTHCOM  
(OPCON -)  
(Rater)**

**DRCA  
(Exec Agent)**

**PRESIDENT, NDU  
PROVOST  
(Academic  
Oversight)**

**CENTER for  
HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE  
STUDIES (CHDS)**

Academic Oversight and Affiliation  
Contract Award Collaboration  
Executive Agent (Financial and Manpower)  
Academic Oversight

11-L-0559/OSD/60619

# *Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies*

## *-- Background --*



# *Mission*

...to promote effective collaboration  
in democratic societies and

- To contribute to a cooperative international security environment and mutual understanding of U.S. and regional defense and international security policy.

11-L-0559/OSD/60621



# *Snapshot of CHDS : 1997-20*

22,000

6,490

Civilians (73%)

✓ Military (27%)

## Resources

✓ Personnel: 42 (Ldr: 2, Faculty: 8, Admin: 10, Support: 10, Student: 12)

✓ Budget:

— FY07: \$8.3M

— FY08: \$8.3M

— FY09: \$10.6M

- **Highly respected international faculty offers multi-lingual fluency, expertise, and cross-cultural awareness.**


11-L-0559/OSD/60622





# CHDS International Outreach Program

**Senior**



**Emerging**

Civilian, Military,  
& Police

**Senior Executive Dialogue**  
1 week; 2 x per year

**Washington Diplomatic  
Seminar** 1 week; 2 x year

**Amistad/IADC**  
1 week

**Advanced Defense  
Studies: DL & Residence**

- Stability Operations
- Combating Terrorism (CbT)

10 weeks / 3 weeks at CHDS

**Strategy and Defense Policy  
Course**

3 weeks, 2 x per year

**Interagency Coordination &  
Combating Terrorism Course**  
3 weeks

**National Security Planning  
Workshop** 3-3 days

**Legislative Leaders Seminar**

**MOD V**

**\* Subregional Conference**  
2-3 days 2-3 x per year

**\* Advanced Policymaking Seminar**  
1 week

**CbT Workshops** 2-3 days

**Faculty Outreach  
Seminars x 12-16**

**National  
X 5-8**

**Caribbean Defense and  
Security Course**  
2 weeks

**Combating Terrorism &  
Emerging Threats Seminar**  
1 week

**CD/COM influence location and thematic loc**

11-L-0559/OSD/60623



# *National Security Planning Work*

- Align Cooperation
- Develop U.S. Counter-Terrorism Relationships with PN Functions Counterparts
- Builds PN Confidence w/ CHDS
  - Leads to other high-level events



11-L-0559/OSD/60624





# *SENIOR EXECUTIVE DIALOGUE*



11-L-0559/OSD/60625

# NORTHCOM Programs

Army Operations Center (AOC) and  
y Outreach Seminars (AOC) and  
dence courses  
licated seats for Mexico military personnel  
adians generally send Washington-based personnel  
Funding restrictions for Developed Nations



# *Building Partner Capacity*

## *-- Electoral Cycle Civ-Mil Program Template*

- Combating Ideological Support to Terrorism
- Harmonizing Threat Awareness
- Educating on the role of security forces in a democratic society

Nat'l Elections

New Government  
takes office

NSS Published

NSD Workshop

Leg Seminar

Budget Seminar

Other Seminars

11-L-0559/OSD/60627



# *Alumni Organizations*

El Salvador - 105

Guatemala

Ecuador - 142

Costa Rica - 106

Colombia - 200

Alumni Encuentros - Central American Defense Institute

11-L-0559/OSD/60628



# *Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies*



*Dr. Richard D. Downie*


*Director*

*max@cdc-studies.org*

11-L-0559/OSD/60629



# *CHDS Mission Focus*



DOD Directives/  
Objectives,  
Combatant  
CDR TSCs

- National Security Planning
- Defense Decision Making
- Policy Formulation
- Regional Security Forum

11-L-0559/OSD/60630



# **INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD (IADB)**


# **INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE (IADC)**



# Inter-American Defense Board Organizational Chart

VDJ5  
Chief, **U.S. Delegation**

## COUNCIL OF DELEGATES



DIR GENERAL \*



CHAIRMAN \*



SECRETARY \*



STAFF DIR \*



**U.S. LEADERSHIP**  
(Assigned)

\* ELECTED POSITION





## IADB Leadership

- U.S. has always held the Chairman IADB position
  - On 1 July 2006 the U.S. delegation relinquished Chairman billet
- U.S. has always held the Director IADC position
  - U.S. is 'assured' of its retention under Host Nation status
- U.S. GO/FO dual-hatted as Chairman, IADB and Director, IADC since 1992
  - 9 Unilateral U.S. move – unpopular with Council
- OAS Statutes for IADB require senior positions be elected



## Way Ahead

- U.S. Vision: A strong IADB and IADC in support of the OAS that promotes U.S. objectives
- JS Funding to IADC: JS provides partial funding to IADC with J5 Program Manager monitoring IADC expenditures to ensure JS funds are used for purpose intended
- U.S. continues to support the IADB and IADC under the new statutes



# Historical Perspective

- **1942:** IADB established by the American Republics as an independent agency to study and recommend measures for the "common defense of the continent"
- **1948:** OAS established – IADB not incorporated in OAS. (OAS agreed to fund IADB and accept military advice, but did not establish official link)
- **1962:** IADC opened at Ft McNair as an international educational institution
- **1993: OAS** resolution re-affirmed need for clear juridical link between OAS and IADB
- **2006:**
  - Juridical Link (15 Mar)
  - US terminates mandate as Chairman of IADB (30 Jun)
  - Transition Period:
    - Elections: (1<sup>st</sup> round – 22 Jun) (2<sup>nd</sup> round - 20 Sep) (3<sup>rd</sup> round - 14 Dec)
    - MOU entered between **JS** and IADC (28 **Aug**)

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2006

TO Eric Edelman  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT "Plan Colombia" for Central America

I think we ought to do more for Central America - we need a "Plan Colombia" for Central America.

-----  
Please come back to me with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:ah  
100306-25 (travel computer).doc

.....  
***Please respond by November 2, 2006***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60636

OSD 17534-06  
11/8/2006 12:58:06 PM

*Central America*

*4 Oct 06*

~~FOUO~~

September 25, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
SUBJECT: Bonn Process in Afghanistan

Recently a Senator raised the point about how the Bonn process seems not to be working in Afghanistan.

Please work this with Marin Strembecki, and get back to me on what the United States Government and the Department of State is planning to do to fix that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF092506-07

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/26/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60637

OSD 17535-06



11/8/2006 12:59:55 PM

*0/0 han, DAN*

*2585P 06*

~~FOUO~~

OCT 12 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Follow Up Items ~~from~~ Today's Meeting with Iceland's Prime Minister

ICELAND

We ought to follow up on the meeting with the prime Minister of Iceland. Specifically, we need to track the following:

1. **Think** about mentioning our evolving relationship with Iceland in the President's remarks at Riga.
2. **How** can we increase cooperation with the police and the Coast Guard?
3. **How** can we increase cooperation on intel?
4. Cooperate on the Proliferation Security Initiative.
5. Have our office work with NATO to encourage them to involve NATO in exercises with Iceland.
6. Schedule a special ops exercise in Iceland
7. Link into the U.S./U.K./Canadian search and rescue cooperation.

In three months, give me a report back as to what you have done to get those things going.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF101106-17

.....  
Please Respond By January 11, 2007

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60638

OSD 17538-06



11/8/2006 1:01:28 PM

2 of 6

~~FOUO~~

November 08, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Gulf Dialogue

You suggested to me that if I am not going to go to the Gulf Dialogue, you might reschedule yourself to go. Given the circumstances, I think it is best if you go, and I will not go.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF110806-02

■■■

092.3

090006

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60639

OSD 17544-06



11/8/2006 00:02 PM

~~FOUO~~

NOV 08 2006

TO: ADM Jim Stavridis  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Latin American Intelligence Assessment

Thanks for sending along the Latin American intelligence assessment. I appreciate it. It is useful.

DHR:dh  
SF110706-08

Latin America

ESD  
LAUNCH  
M

2 Nov 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60640

OSD 17645-08



11/8/2006 4:07:05 PM



~~FOUO~~

October 24, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Record on Confirmations

We ought to do a *summary* sheet on the last six years of the Senate Armed Services Committee's record on confirmations. I need the precise data **as to** how they have handled confirmations cumulatively.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF102306-52

.....

*Please Respond By 11/16/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60641

OSD 17552-06



11/9/2006 2 52 03 PM



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

November 8, 2006, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert L. Wilkie, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Senate confirmed DoD Nominations – Snowflake #102306-52

- You asked for a summary on the Senate confirmation record over the last six years for Department nominees.
- Summary of the 47 Senate confirmed positions since 2001 is attached. The overall average time for confirmation, from the date the nomination is submitted to the Senate until confirmation, is two months and nine days.
- A few nominations stand out from the average:
  - o Gordon England - 12 months - Held by Sen. Snowe and Sen. Collins over shipbuilding issues
  - o Dorrance Smith - 7 months - Held by Sen. Levin over published article
  - o Eric Edelman - 9 months - Held over prewar intel
  - o Charlie Abell - 8 months - No specific reason
  - o Michael Dominguez - 6 months - Held over issues as a result of time as Acting AF Sec
  - o Joe Schmitz - 9 months - Held over family issues and Washington Times letter to the Editor
  - o Dino Aviles - 7 months - No holds, just slow as he was already an Assist SecNav (Comp)
  - o Ben Cohen - 6 months - Held over Army Corps of Engineers issues

Attachment:

- 1) Nomination timeline summary
- 2) Snowflake #102306-52

OSD 17552-06



11/8/2006 2:54:22 PM

Prepared by: CAPT S.R. Grenier, Director, Senate Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/6964

(b)(6)

## Time to Confirmation for DoD Civilian Nominees

Position	Name	N	C	# of Months
<b>Defense</b>				
Secretary	Donald Rumsfeld	01/20/01	01/20/01	1
Deputy Secretary	Paul Wolfowitz	02/15/01	02/28/01	1
	Gordon England	04/07/05	04/06/06	12
ASD (Legislative Affairs)	Powell Moore	04/23/01	05/01/01	1
	Dan Stanley	05/16/05	06/30/05	1
	Robert Wilkie	06/26/06	09/29/06	3
ASD (Public Affairs)	Victoria Clark	04/05/01	05/17/01	1
	Larry Di Rita			Acting
	Dorrance Smith	09/23/05	04/07/06	7
USD (Acq, Tech & Log) [ATL]	Kenneth Krieg	04/04/05	05/26/05	1
	Michael Wynne	09/03/03	4/01/04**	recess
	Pete Aldridge	04/23/01	05/08/01	1
DUSD (ATL)	Michael Wynne	06/12/01	07/12/01	1
	James Finley	12/20/05	02/17/06	2
DUSD (L&MR)	Diana Morales	06/05/01	07/12/01	1
	Jack Bell	06/29/05	07/29/05	1
DDR&E	Ron Sega	07/12/01	08/03/01	1
	John Young	07/28/05	10/28/05	3
ATSD (Nuclear, Chem, Bio)	Dale Klein	10/18/01	11/08/01	1
USD (Policy) PN507	Doug Feith	04/30/01	07/12/01	3
	Eric Edelman	05/16/05	02/09/06	9
DUSD (P)	Ryan Henry	01/09/03	02/04/03	1
ASD (ISP) PN70	J.D. Crouch	05/07/01	08/01/01	3
	Peter Flory	01/24/05	8/2/05**	recess
ASD (ISA)	Peter Rodman	05/14/01	07/12/01	2
ASD (SOLIC)	Tom O'Connell	05/01/03	07/21/03	2
ASD (Homeland Defense)	Paul McHale	01/09/03	02/04/03	1
USD (Comptroller & CFO)	Dov Zakheim	03/13/01	05/01/01	2
	Tina Jonas	03/11/04	07/23/04	4
ASD (NII)	John Stenbit	07/12/01	08/03/01	1
	John Grimes	06/17/05	10/28/05	4
USD (Personnel & Readiness)	David Chu	04/30/01	05/26/01	1
DUSD (Personnel & Readiness)	Charlie Ahell	03/20/02	11/12/02	8
	Michael Dominguez	12/13/05	06/29/06	6
ASD (Health Affairs)	William Winkenwerder	09/21/01	10/16/01	1
ASD (Reserve Affairs)	Tom Hall	04/22/02	10/02/02	6
USD (Intelligence)	Steve Cambone	02/04/03	03/07/03	1
General Counsel	Jim Haynes	04/23/01	05/17/01	1
Dir. (OT&E)	Tom Christie	05/24/01	07/12/01	2
	Charles McQueary	06/30/06	07/21/06	1
Inspector General	Joe Schmitz	06/18/01	03/21/02	9
	David Laufman	06/05/06		

2.82 Avg Months to be Confirmed for OSD Noms

11-L-0559/OSD/60643

Time to Confirmation for DoD Civilian Nominees

**Navy**

Secretary	Gordon England	09/03/03	09/26/03	1
	Donald Winter	09/06/05	11/10/05	2
Under Secretary	Sue Livingston	05/07/01	07/19/01	2
	Dino Aviles	02/06/04	09/28/04	7
Acquisition	John Young	06/12/01	07/12/01	1
	Delores Etter	09/06/05	10/28/05	1
Financial Management	Dino Aviles	06/12/01	07/12/01	1
	Richard Greco	09/14/04	10/10/04	1
Personnel	Bill Navas	06/07/01	07/12/01	1
Installations & Env.	Buddie Penn	01/24/05	02/17/05	1
General Counsel	Alberto Mora	06/12/01	07/19/01	1
	Frank Jimenez	06/30/06	09/21/06	3

1.83 Avg Months to be Confirmed for Navy Noms

**Air Force**

Secretary	Jim Roche	05/07/01	05/24/01	1
	Michael Wynne	09/06/05	10/28/05	1
Under Secretary	Peter Teets	10/30/01	12/07/01	2
	Ron Sega	06/29/05	07/29/05	1
Acquisition	Martin Sambur	09/04/01	11/08/01	2
	Sue Payton	04/26/06	07/21/06	3
Financial Management	Michael Montelongo	06/12/01	07/12/01	1
Personnel	Michael Dominguez	07/12/01	08/03/01	1
	Anita Blair	04/24/05		
Installations & Env.	Nelson Gibbs	07/12/01	08/03/01	1
	William Anderson	05/26/05	10/28/05	5
General Counsel	Mary Walker	09/25/01	11/08/01	2

1.82 Avg Months to be Confirmed for Air Force Noms

**Army**

Secretary	Tom White	05/01/01	05/24/01	1
	Fran Harvey	09/15/04	11/16/04	2
Under Secretary	Pete Geren	01/18/06	02/17/06	1
Acquisition	Claude Bolton	11/07/01	12/20/01	1
Financial Management	Sandy Pack	10/10/01	11/08/01	1
	Nelson Ford	08/04/06	09/29/06	1
	Val Baldwin	07/08/04	07/23/04	1
Personnel	Nelson Ford	08/04/06	09/29/06	1
	Ronald James	07/21/06	09/29/06	2
Installations & Env.	Mario Fiori	07/12/01	08/03/01	1
	Keith Eastin	06/30/05	07/29/05	1
General Counsel	Steve Morello	06/07/01	07/12/01	1
	Ben Cohen	02/06/06	08/03/06	6
Civil Works	Mike Parker	06/19/01	09/26/01	3
	J.P. Woodley	01/24/05	05/12/05	4

1.80 Avg Months to be Confirmed for Army Noms

2.32 Avg Months to be Confirmed for all DoD Nominations

11-L-0559/OSD/60644

~~FOUO~~

October 24, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

CC: Robert Rangel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Record on Confirmations

We ought to do a **summary** sheet on **the** last six years of the Senate Armed Services Committee's record on confirmations. I need **the** precise data as to how they have handled confirmations cumulatively.

Thanks.

DWR:dh  
SF102306-52

.....  
***Please Respond By 11116/06***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60645

OSD 17552-06  
  
11/8/2006 2:52:03 PM

~~FOUO~~

MAY 11 2006

TO: Dan DellOrto  
CC: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Leftovers from Goldwater-Nichols

322

I would like you to do a complete review of the Department, and give me a list of all the leftovers from pre-Goldwater-Nichols that should be moved out of train and equip organizations into the operational side of the Department.

For instance, you should take a look at the issue of the 500-plus emergency preparedness officers who now operate out of the military Services rather than **NORTHCOM**.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051006-19

.....  
*Please Respond By 06/15/06*

*CLOSED  
OUTBOX*

11 MAY 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60646

OSD 17554-06



11/8/2006 3:36:55 PM

~~FOUO~~

October 24, 2006

020

TO: Robert Rangel

c c : Robert Wilkie  
Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT Coordinating LA and PA

How do we get the Public Affairs shop linked well with the Legislative Affairs shop? They are both constantly engaged in the same issues, but I don't feel that the messages we communicate ~~through~~ LA are necessarily the ones we are communicating through PA. I would think we could do that in a way that would reinforce what we are trying to do.

Robert Rangel, please work with Robert Wilkie and Dorrance Smith to give me an answer to what you think about this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF102406-17

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/30/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60647

OSD 17582-06



11/9/2006 9:44:13 AM

2406406



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

INFO MEMO

November 7, 2006, 5:00 PM

FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response -- Coordinating LA and PA, #SF102406-17

- SECDEF asked us to develop an effort to better coordinate our LA and PA messages.
- Dorrance and I have discussed this matter and have agreed on the following approach.

**Endstate:** Deliver integrated, coordinated strategic messages that communicate the Department's strategies, policy, priorities, and budget to multiple audiences, including but not limited to the American people, our allies, our enemies, our internal DoD audience, the defense industry and the United States Congress.

**Means:** OSD Legislative Affairs and Public Affairs will develop integrated processes that institutionalize our efforts to achieve this goal. Bottomline: Deliberate processes, not personalities, will drive our efforts.

**Ways:** Employ a variety of measures to improve communication, awareness, and integration.

**Strategic**

- Principles will meet on a weekly basis to review priorities, hot issues, and emerging controversies;
- Create DoD "Posture Team" to integrate outreach efforts across functional areas
  - o Initial effort underway to deliver coordinated communications modules for Posture testimony on DoD Legislative Priorities
  - o Includes integration of USD (Comptroller), Joint Staff, OGC, LA and PA
- Create LA/PA "Outreach Team" to bring together key communicators to develop and disseminate a unified, targeted message;
- Exchange of senior level staffers who will be designated to meet with LA and PA principles in each office.

**Operational**

- Selected LA review of SECDEF and DEPSECDEF "as prepared" press statements
  - o Legislative Affairs delivery of "as prepared" statements to key/influential members concurrent with media events



020

710 006

240606



- Deliberate planning and coordination of LA and PA roll out plans for public announcements with Congressional and national strategic interest.
- Senior level staffers will attend LA and PA daily strategy meetings.
- Assign LA and PA action officers to corresponding portfolios (ie; Policy, USDI, etc) and require LA/PA coordination on media inquiries in their area of responsibility
- Coordinate with PA on DoD correspondence addressed to the Congressional Big 12 (Leadership and oversight committees).

***Tactical***

- LA will provide info copies to ASD/PA of all internal memos to SECDEF and DEPSECDEF to improve his situational awareness of current LA issues.
- ASD/PA will be provided the weekly Legislative Affairs Status Report

Coordination: ASD/PA

Attachments: Snowflake # SF102406-17

~~FOUO~~

October 24, 2006

TO: Robert Rangel

CC: Robert Wilkie  
Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*PA.*

SUBJECT: Coordinating LA and PA

How do we get the Public Affairs shop linked well with the Legislative Affairs shop? They are both constantly engaged in the ~~same~~ issues, but I don't feel that the messages we communicate through LA are necessarily the ones we are communicating through PA. I would think we could do that in a way that would reinforce what we are trying to do.

Robert Rangel, please work with Robert Wilkie and Dorrance Smith to give me an answer to what you think about this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF102406-17

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/30/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60650

~~FOUO~~

received 5/19

March 29, 2006

TO Jim O'Beirne  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *R*  
SUBJECT: Jonathan Arnold

207

Please take a look at this fellow and let me know what you think of him.

Thanks.

Attach: 3/12/06 Email regarding Jonathan Arnold

DHR.m  
032906-05

.....  
*Please Respond By April 13, 2006*

27 MARCH

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17869-06



11/13/2006 1:11:02 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60651

**Joyce Rumstfeld**

**From:** "Jonathan Arnold" (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 12, 2006 7:13 PM  
**Subject:** Defense Business Board

**Sent:** Wednesday, December 14, 2005 4:09 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:**

Dear Margaret,

I am interested in serving on the Defense Business Board. I believe that with my education and background I can make a valuable contribution to the DBB's mission. I include some of the reasons in bullet points below:

**Education:**

BA, MBA, and PhD (Industrial Organization Economics), The University of Chicago.

CPA, State of Illinois

Pilot (Commercial, Instrument, Multi-engine ratings, Advanced and Instrument Ground Instructor)

**Employment:**

Principal, Chicago Partners, LLC (an economics consulting firm)

**Specialized skills:**

I serve as an economics expert and expert economics witness on a wide variety of economics questions. I regularly testify on the economics of intellectual property, antitrust, and securities matters. In addition, I am an expert on corporate governance and have testified in federal cases on this subject as well.

My dissertation focused on the economics of regulation and financial institutions.

With these skills, I believe that I can make a valuable contribution to the DBB, in particular with recommending policies and procedures that will enhance efficiency and productivity at low cost (or ~~was~~ reductions in cost).

I am a U.S. citizen and former USAF officer.

Thanks in advance for your assistance,

3/28/2006

11-I-0559/OSD/60652

Jonathan

The information contained in this communication (i) may be confidential, (ii) may be legally privileged, (iii) may be subject to a protective order instituted by a federal court or other competent authority\* (iv) may constitute inside information, and (v) is intended only for the use of the addressee. Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by return e-mail and destroy this communication (and all copies) including all attachments.

FOUO

October 24, 2006

TO:

Robert Rangel

FROM:

Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Jonathan Arnold and the Defense Business Board

Please sort out what happened with Jonathan Arnold and the issue of his candidacy to serve on the Defense Business Board.

Thanks.

Attach. 10/17/06 Arnold e-mail

DHR:db  
SF102406-03

.....  
*Please Respond By November 09, 2006*

*Closed at 11/6 stand-up*

*R.*

*840506*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/60654

OSD 17670-06



11/13/2006 11:04 PM

**Joyce Rumsfeld**

*Don is a very good friend of Margaret's. Margaret is probably 45 - very conservative.*

From: "Jonathan Arnold" (b)(6)  
 To: (b)(6)  
 Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 5:27 PM  
 Attach: Arnold\_CV.pdf  
 Subject: Fw: Defense Business Board



I finally tracked down what happened to me at OSD. The person handling my file left and I got lost in the shuffle. Below, please find the latest email to his replacement. Is there anything more you can do to help?

thanks, jia

----- Forwarded by Jonathan Arnold/AGI on 10/17/2006 04:26 PM -----

**Jonathan Arnold/AGI**

To: Holland.patterson@osd.mil

cc:

Subject: Defense Business Board

10/17/2006 04:26 PM

Dear Ms. Patterson,

It was a pleasure to speak with you this afternoon about my candidacy to serve on the Defense Business Board. I have pasted in the correspondence between Mr. Duffey and me from last March below for your reference. In addition, since that correspondence I moved to a new firm - Analysis Group - as a Managing Principal. Accordingly, I have attached an updated curriculum vitae.

I can be reached at (b)(6) and look forward to hearing from you soon.

Many thanks in advance for considering my interest. I very much look forward to the opportunity to serve on the DBB.

Jonathan Arnold, Ph.D.  
 Analysis Group, Inc  
 1 South Dearborn Street - Suite 2100  
 Chicago, Illinois 60603

-----Original Message-----

From: Jonathan Arnold (b)(6)  
 Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2006 11:04 AM  
 To: 'Duffey, Michael P, CTV, OSD'  
 Subject: RE: Resume Request

Dear Mr. Duffey,

I am indeed interested in serving on the Defense Business Board and can be reached at (b)(6) (office) or (b)(6) (cell). I have also attached a Current Business curriculum vitae. It is somewhat different from most c.v.s insofar as it lists extensive expert economics and accounting testimony I have offered over the last several years. This is a required disclosure in federal court proceedings, hence its presence.

My home address, if you need it for a background check or other purposes is: (b)(6)

Thank you in advance for considering me.

Jonathan Arnold

11-L-0559/OSD/60655

10/23/2006

-----Original Message-----

From: Duffey, Michael P, CTV, OSD (mailto:Michael.Duffey@osd.mil)

Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2006 10:44 AM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: Resume Request

Dr. Arnold,

Your name has come through the White House liaison Office here at the Department of Defense as someone who is interested in being considered for an appointment to the Defense Business Board. At your earliest convenience, could you reply to this e-mail confirming your interest in being considered and attach a latest resume/CV for consideration? Also, I do not have a current contact number for you - if you could pass one along that would be appreciated.

If you have any questions, please feel free to call me at (b)(6)  
Thank you.

Mike Duffey

special Assistant to the White House liaison Office of the Secretary of Defense United States Department of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301

(b)(6)

Michael.Duffey@osd.mil <mailto:Michael.Duffey@osd.mil>



~~FOUO~~

November 14, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT Response to MoD of Nicaragua

Please have someone draft a response to the attached letter ~~from~~ MoD Ramirez of Nicaragua.

Thanks.

Attach. 11/8/06 Ramirez ltr

DHR:dh  
SF111406-17

.....  
*Please Respond By November 21, 2006*

*335SD*

*14 Nov 06*

*8 Nov 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60657

OSD 17704-06



11/27/2006 4 03 13 PM

## UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Government of Nicaragua

Ministry of Defense  
Managua, 8 November 2006

Excellency (Dear Friend)

I wish to manifest to Your Excellency my recognition for your arduous work realized during the period that you exercised the position of Secretary of Defense of the United States of America and the excellent relationships of friendship and cooperation promoted between our nations.

In reiterating my recognition and desiring you success in your future plans, I take this opportunity to manifest the demonstrations of my most highest consideration and personal esteem.

Attentively,

Avil Ramirez

Col Fernando Gonzalez, Policy-Western Hemisphere

(b)(6)

OSD 17704-08



11/13/2006 1:39:31 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60658



**Gobierno de Nicaragua**  
Ministerio de Defensa  
MIDEF

Ministro de Defensa

Managua, 8 de noviembre de 2006  
DMD-ARV-773-11-06

Excmo. Sr.  
Excelencia:

*Dean Fierch*

Deseo manifestar a V.E. mi reconocimiento por el arduo trabajo realizado durante el período que ejerció el cargo de Secretario de Defensa de los Estados Unidos de América y las excelentes relaciones de amistad y cooperación promovidas entre nuestras naciones.

Al reiterarle mi reconocimiento y desearle éxitos en sus planes futuros, aprovecho la oportunidad para manifestarle las muestras de mi más alta consideración y estima personal.

Atentamente,

*Arvi Ramírez*

Arvi Ramírez



Excelentísimo Señor  
Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretario de Defensa  
Estados Unidos de América  
Washington, D.C.

cc: Archivo.

11-L-0559/OSD/60650

(b)(6)

09/11/2006 04:37 FAX

# SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division (CCD), WHS Room 3A948. Suspense Desk: (b)(6) FAX Number: (b)(6) Email: suspense\_desk@osd.pentagon.mil

Action Agency: USP  
Suspense Date: 11/27/2006

335 SD

## 1. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)

- ☒ a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)  
☐ b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO (Justify below)  
☐ c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) **EXTEND** SUSPENSE TO (Justify below)  
☐ d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)  
☐ e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO (Justify below /include POC Name & Phone Number)  
☐ f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO (Justify below)

## 2. JUSTIFICATION

On 11/21/06 the SecDef's office requested this response via email, see attached.

## 3. REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY USP	e. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level) Signature: <i>[Signature]</i> Date Signed: 11/22/2006
b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER COLONEL FERNANDO GONZALEZ	FRANK JOHNSTON, LTCOL, USMC ASD/HD MILITARY ASSISTANT

## c. TELEPHONE NO.

(b)(6)

## 5. ACTION TAKEN (For EXSEC/Correspondence Control Division Use Only)

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| a. EXT      | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |
| b. CANX     | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |
| c. DWNGRD   | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |
| d. TRANSFER | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |

## 4. CCD CONTROL #

17704-06

## e. OTHER (Specify)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

SD FORM 391, Jan 2000

Jay -

SD DICTATED A-  
response. this is orig.

J3  
11/27

(9 Nov 06)

11-L-0559/OSD/60660

A1??04-06

**Ingrodi, George, CTR, OSD-POLICY**

---

From: Moorer, Darryl L CTR OSD POLICY  
Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2006 3:25 PM  
To: Ingrodi, George, CTR, OSD-POLICY  
CC: Washabaugh, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Gonzales, Adam CTR OSD POLICY  
Subject: FW: SecDef-Nica MOD ~~(FOUO)~~

~~**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**~~

ASD/HD Reps,

The E-Mail traffic below answered the IMMEDIATE ACTION tasker (OSD Control #17704-06) & (SecDef SNOWFLAKE SF1 11406-17). MA(s) from USDP & SecDef Offices requested the response today via email.

Respectfully,

D.L. Moorer  
WHA  

(b)(6)

---

From: Gonzalez, Fernando, Col (USAF), OSD-POLICY  
Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2006 1:10 PM  
To: Moorer, Darryl L CTR OSD POLICY  
Subject: FW: SecDef-Nica MOD ~~(FOUO)~~

~~**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**~~

Fernando Gonzalez  
Colonel, US Air Force

(b)(6)

---

From: Gonzalez, Fernando, Col (USAF), OSD-POLICY  
Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2006 12:59 PM  
To: Stoner, Troy CDR SD  
Subject: FW: SecDef-Nica MOD ~~(FOUO)~~

~~**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**~~

Fernando Gonzalez  
Colonel, US Air Force

(b)(6)

---

From: Gonzalez, Fernando, Col (USAF), OSD-POLICY

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 21, 2006 12:57 PM  
**To:** Stoner, Troy A, CDR, OSD  
**Cc:** Guenov, Tressa, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Huston, Jay Col OSD POLICY; King, Chris COL OSD POLICY  
**Subject:** SecDef-Nica MOD ~~(FOUO)~~  
**Importance:** High

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



SecDef to  
sragw MOD.doc (2)

Fernando Gonzalez  
Colonel, US Air Force

(b)(6)

EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INCIDENT TO A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT  
(FOIA) REQUEST.

His Excellency  
Avil Ramirez Valdivia  
Minister of Defense of the Republic of Nicaragua  
Managua

Dear Mr. Minister:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of 8 November. It was a pleasure working with you. You did a terrific job hosting this year's Defense Ministerial of the Americas. **Your** leadership and hard work was also evident in the cooperation you have developed with your Central American neighbors. You created a model for transformation to address the transnational threats that affect us all.

I wish you and your armed forces continued success **as** you prepare to receive a new Administration.

Sincerely,



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOV 27 2006

33582

His Excellency  
Avil Ramirez Valdivia  
Minister of Defense  
of the Republic of Nicaragua  
Managua

Dear Mr. Minister,

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of 8 November. It was a pleasure working with you. You did a terrific job hosting this year's Defense Ministerial of the Americas. Your leadership and hard work was also evident in the cooperation you have developed with your Central American neighbors. You created a model for transformation to address the transnational threats that affect us all.

27 Nov 06

I wish you and your Armed Forces continued success as you prepare to receive a new Administration.

Sincerely,

8 Nov 06

OSD 17704-06



11/27/2006 2:15:20 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60664



~~FOUO~~

November 13, 2006

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: POTUS Remarks



Marc--

When I stood there in the Oval Office last Wednesday listening to the Resident say all those nice things about me, it was clear to me who had written it -- either my mother had come back from her grave, or your fine hand was involved!

Thanks so very much.

DHR:dh  
SF111306-10

350.061.34

13 NOV 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60665

OSD 17724-06



11/14/2006 11:34:12 AM

~~FOUO~~

November 03, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.A.*

SUBJECT Material on Senator Durbin

Please give me that material on Senator Durbin when you have it pulled together.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF110306-02

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/10/06*

NOV 14 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

032

3 NOV 06

*AS 11/14*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60666

OSD 17795-06



11/14/2006 4:25:08 PM

**Here** is a brief compellation of some of the comments Senator Durbin has made regarding the Department of Defense:

- Compares U.S. Soldiers **To Nazis**, Soviets, Others. "If I read this to you and did not tell you that it was an **FBI** agent describing what Americans had done to prisoners in their control, you would most certainly believe this must have been done by Nazis, **Soviets** in their gulags or some mad reginie — Pol Pot or others — that had no concern for human beings." (6/14/2005)
- **Nou-Apology Apology.** "I **am** sorry if anything I said caused any offense or pain to those who have such bitter **memories** of the Holocaust, the greatest moral tragedy of our time. **Nothing**, nothing should **ever** be said to demean or diminish that moral tragedy. I **am** also sorry if anything I said cast a negative light on our fine men and women in the military. ... I never ever intended any disrespect for them. **Some** may believe that my remarks crossed the line. To them I extend my heartfelt apology." (6/22/05)
- Claimed Bush Administration **"Had An Agenda [In Iraq] ... Misled About Weapons Of Mass Destruction."** "The American people were misled by this administration. And **many** of my colleagues in the House and Senate, both parties, were absolutely misled about weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, connections with 9/11. I **just** have to tell **you**, when you take a look at the public statements made by the vice president, not only leading up to the invasion of Iraq, but since, you just see a litany of falsehoods. Let me tell you, the neo-cons with Vice President Cheney and Pearl and Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld and **this** whole gang, they had **an** agenda here. It was the invasion of **Iraq** and any excuse would do. And sadly, we end up in a **position** today having lost so many soldiers, in a position where we're continuing to lose our soldiers because of **this** failed foreign policy." (MSNBC, 10/25/06)
- Claimed "Civil War Continues **To Rage In Iraq**." "...the fact **that** the civil war continues to rage in Iraq, and they discovered 60 corpses over the weekend of people who had been killed gangland style in this raging civil war, it's an indication to me that **Iraq is more** violent and more dangerous." (10/11/06)
- Claimed "Iraqis Will Not Stand And Fight." "Many of **us** believe that the **Iraqis** will not **stand** and fight and defend their own country **as** long as they believe the American **soldiers** will do the job. ... The best military in the world is there to protect them at no **expense**." (9/6/06)
- Claimed Soldiers Were Forced To "Scrounge **Through** Garbage Heaps." "U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) lashed out Thursday at Defense Secretary Donald **Rumsfeld**, saying soldiers are forced to 'scrounge through garbage heaps' to armor their vehicles even as an Illinois plant stands ready to produce Humvee armor kits." (Chicago **Sun Times**, 12/10/04)
- Claimed DoD Did Not Provide Adequate Armor. "As injuries and deaths mounted in the field, why was a move not made earlier to provide additional plating and **enhanced** coverage to soldiers and marines in the field? Clearly, concerns about weight and heat dissipation were part of the equation, but as injuries increased, particularly injuries occurring while riding in

vehicles, the need for greater protection must have become increasingly apparent. One media report quotes military medical examiner Dr. Craig Mallak as telling a medical panel in 2003 that the information "screams to be published." (Durbin Release, 1/12/06)

- Claimed **SecDef** Ignored Military Advice, Failed To Provide Adequate Armor. "Donald Rumsfeld should resign for one simple reason: Our troops will not be **as safe** and the success of our mission will not be served if he continues **as** Defense secretary. The Pentagon's failures in Iraq began in the earliest stages, when the secretary ignored the warnings of top military experts that success would require far more troops and that we would meet with active, long-term resistance, not parades and flowers. Our troops went into combat Without adequate personnel and vehicle armor or proper defensive systems on helicopters. Some estimates indicate that one in four **U.S.** combat deaths in Iraq might have been avoided if the Pentagon had just provided basic armor for the Humvees. How can we explain this failure to protect our troops when the administration has received every penny it asked for in Iraq?" (USA Today op-ed, 6/10/04)
- Claimed **U.S.** Tortures Prisoners At GTMO. "I believe the **torture techniques** that have been used at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo and other places fall into that same category. I am confident, sadly confident, as I stand here, that decades from now people will look **back** and say: What were they thinking? **America**, this great, kind leader of a nation, treated people who were detained and imprisoned, interrogated people in the crudest way? I am afraid **this** is going to be one of the bitter legacies of the invasion of **Iraq**. Who are the Guantanamo detainees? Back in 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld described them **as** 'the hardest of the hard core.' However, the administration has since released many of them, and it **has now** become clear that **Secretary** Rumsfeld's assertion was not completely true. Military sources, according to the media, indicate that many detainees have no connection to al-Qaida or the Taliban and were sent to Guantanamo over the objections of intelligence personnel who recommended their release. One military officer said: 'We're basically condemning these guys to a long-term imprisonment. If they weren't terrorists before, they certainly could be now.' The United States, which each year issues a human rights report, holding the world accountable for outrageous conduct, is engaged in the **same** outrageous conduct when it comes to these prisoners." (6/14/05)
- Claimed "The Bush Administration **...Has Failed**. It Has Made **The World Less Safe**." "I think the rhetoric of 'axis of evil' did not help a bit. I think it created a confrontational atmosphere that was followed up by this pre-emptive strike doctrine instead of diplomacy, which had at least contained the threat of North Korea under the Clinton administration. You had a new chapter, a new approach by the Bush administration, a confrontational approach which has failed. By every objective standard, it has failed. It has **made** the world **less safe**." (10/11/06)
- Claimed DoD General Counsel William Haynes Inappropriately Pressured JAGs. "We recently learned of allegations that, in meeting earlier this week, the White House and Department of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes pressured senior judge advocates general into signing a letter on the Administration's proposed revisions to the War Crimes Act and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. It is alleged that the JAGs were kept

in ~~this~~ meeting for several hours, until they agreed to sign the letter. That letter was subsequently used to suggest that the JAGs supported the Administration's proposals. These allegations are disturbingly similar to other allegations that Mr. Haynes has ignored, circumvented, or overruled the nation's senior military lawyers. The Judiciary Committee has explored Mr. Haynes' attempts to overrule the JAGs in preparing interrogation guidelines that departed from long-standing military tradition and led to detainee abuses." ~~(Letter with Ted~~ Kennedy, 9/15/06)

Voted **YES** on redeploying troops out of Iraq by July 2007. (Jun **2006**)

Voted **YES** on investigating contract awards in Iraq & Afghanistan. (Nov 2005)

Voted YES on \$86 billion for military operations in Iraq & Afghanistan. (Oct 2003)

Voted NO on authorizing use of military force against Iraq. (Oct 2002)

~~FOUO~~

November 14, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Information from al-Qaeda

ADVANCE  
COPY

000,5

Please pull together all the information where al-Qaeda is crowing about the fact that I have resigned.

Thanks.

DHR:sk  
SF111306-36

.....  
Please Respond By 11/17/06

NOV 14 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

Sir,  
Here's A First Cut.

DR

14 NOV 06

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/60670



OSD 17800-06

11/14/2006 5:58:35 PM

## Terrorists On The Departure Of Secretary Rumsfeld

**Al-Qaeda In Iraq Leader Abu Hamzah Al-Muhajir:**

"The American people have put their feet at the beginning of the right path to save themselves from their predicament, and they have begun to realize the treachery and subservience of their president and his clique to Israel. Thus, they voted with some sense in their latest elections. I wonder if politicians will keep the promises they made to their citizens and relieve the pain of mothers by saving their sons from the lions of the Land of the Two Rivers: Are they going to redress the huge deficit of budget, which was wasted away in a stupid losing war? Will they realize that the tax payers are actually paying the price for the bullet with which their sons are killed in the quagmire of Iraq? I urge you, the lame duck, not to escape quickly as your lame defense secretary did because we have not quenched our thirst from your blood yet. O coward, stand firm in the battlefield. We know that the Romans are not ashamed of defeat. (Abu Hamzah Al-Muhajir, 11/10/2006)

The Iraqi Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) Spokesman Muhammad Bashir **al-Faydi:**

"[Donald Rumsfeld's departure] is a victory for the gallant Iraqi resistance men who sacrificed themselves for the sake of God and their homeland, and victory for the anti-occupation forces that refrained from getting involved in any political project that would keep the feet of the United States firmly in the region. [He was] responsible for the scandals of Abu Ghraib and the storming of cities." (Al-Jazeera Via BBC Monitoring: 11/9/2006)

The 1920 **Revolution** Brigades Spokesman Abdallah Sulayman al-Umari:

"We consider [Rumsfeld's departure] a victory, a fall of one of the 'Black House' tyrants, and a defeat of the occupation's schemes and hopes. Here they are collapsing and their faces are being rubbed in the mud of defeat by the blows of the mujahidin of the Iraqi resistance." (Al-Jazeera Via BBC Monitoring, 11/9/2006)

~~FOUO~~

November 13, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith *DS*

CC: Matt Latimer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT Information on Blitzer

You and Matt Latimer mentioned all of the information you have on Blitzer.

Please let me see it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF111306-26

.....  
Please Respond By 11/17/06

NOV 14 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60672

OSD 17801-06



11/14/2006 5:55:56 PM

00.77

(13 Nov 06)



## WOLF BLITZER: CALLING FOR RUMSFELD TO STEP DOWN SINCE 2004

### SUMMARY OF POINTS OF CONCERN:

- Repeated questioning of guests if Rumsfeld should resign, often several times in the same broadcast
- Routinely repeats myths about Rumsfeld and the war or leaves myths unchallenged ["Rumsfeld wanted to fight the war on the cheap;" "pushed for lower troop levels," "Shinsheki" etc.]
- Tends to repeat arguments at length of Rumsfeld critics and even finds ways to bolster their reputations ["excellent reporter" "very respected"] or says things like: "[Ratiste] feels passionately that **Rumsfeld should** resign, given the blunders that were made"; "He says he's not a good secretary of **defense**, didn't prepare the troops and didn't prepare the country for what was going to ensue after the collapse of Saddam Hussein."
- Aims attacks on SecDef using the cover words of "some say" or "**most** experts now agree" or "the critics say" or poses his slanted criticisms as questions ["Is Rumsfeld that despised around the world?"] ["Was he derelict in his responsibility...?"]
- Continually shows taped clips of retired generals, airing their nastiest attacks
- Rarely challenges attacks on Rumsfeld or to set record straight but will counter Rumsfeld supporters with a catalogue of accusations

### **WOLF BLITZER REPORTS - DEC 20, 2004**

BUTZER: Also, President Bush standing by his embattled defense secretary. Stand by for hard news on **WOLF BLITZER REPORTS**.

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BLITZER: To our viewers, here's your chance to weigh in on this story. Our web question of the day is this. Do you think Donald **Rumsfeld** should stay on as defense secretary? You can vote now at [CNN.com/wolf](http://CNN.com/wolf) and we'll have the results later in **this** broadcast.

BLITZER: When you were defense secretary, indeed, throughout the '90s, there were contingency plans at the Pentagon, as there always are contingency plans, military options, if you will, on how to engage in regime change to get rid of Saddam Hussein, beginning with General Norman Schwarzkopf after the first Gulf War that required, what, 300,000, 400,000 troops, 500,000 U.S. troops, roughly the same number as were used to liberate Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion.

COHEN: That's correct. Those war plans were on the shelf, so to speak. They were regarded, as I understand it, as being insufficient to deal with the Saddam Hussein

regime change that was undertaken by the Bush administration. But, nonetheless, it was a very large operation that was planned in order to not invade the country, should it become necessary, but then to actually occupy it in a way that would secure it and stabilize it. But, frankly, we didn't anticipate moving into Iraq or attacking it in the absence of any move by Saddam against his neighbors or by his -- any attack upon U.S. forces.

BLITZER: But you had a huge contingency plan on the shelf, as you say.

COHEN: Yes.

BUTZER: But when **Rumsfeld** came in, they scaled that back dramatically. They thought that was old-line thinking. [FACT CHECK: Tommy Franks in his book says scaling back the size of the force for Iraq was his plan, not Rumsfeld's.]

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BUTZER [TO COHEN]: You've been around Washington for a long time, going back to when you were a young Republican member of the House, then a Republican senator and then the secretary of defense. Give us your bottom-line assessment. What's happening with Donald **Rumsfeld** right now politically, the mood, as we see some Republican senators like McCain and Hagel and others express a lack of confidence in **Rumsfeld**?

#### THE SITUATION ROOM -- DEC. 12, 2005

BLITZER: You were a Republican senator from Maine, long time in the Senate, before that, in the House of Representatives. And you were tapped by a Democratic president, Bill Clinton, to come in to the Defense Department and become the secretary of defense. Now there are rumors that **Joe Lieberman**, a longtime Democratic senator. ...

COHEN: Right.

BUTZER: ... could possibly be tapped by this Republican president to come in and become defense secretary. First of all, what does your gut tell you? Is that even realistic to think about?

COHEN: Well, I attended a Southeastern defense ministerial recently with Secretary **Rumsfeld**. I did not get the impression that he has any plans to resign.

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COHEN: I think he is. To the extent that the president wants this policy, Secretary **Rumsfeld** is carrying it out.

BUTZER: And the other question is, would the president want an independent thinker, like Joe Lieberman, in such a critical position? That's always a. . . (CROSSTALK)

COHEN: Particularly if he comes under attack from the Democratic base.

BLITZER: Right.

#### ~~THE SITUATION ROOM - FEB. 19, 2006~~

BLITZER: Congressman Harman, I'll start with you. Do you have confidence in the Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff?

REP. JANE HARMAN (D), CALIFORNIA: I think he's a strategic thinker. He came with high hopes from all of us. He has taken personal responsibility for Katrina. He has a huge amount of work to do. I'm ready to wait and see if he fixes his department. In contrast, by the way, our secretary of defense continues to stonewall after these new pictures of Abu Ghraib. If I were advising President Bush, I'd say the defense department is where I'd make the cabinet change right away.

BLITZER: So you're calling on **Rumsfeld** to **resign** or be fired?

HARMAN: I think that his leadership post-war in Iraq has been very damaging to the United States.

BLITZER: So should he be fired?

HARMAN: That's the president's call, but I think if I were going to change a cabinet department, that's the one I would change.

BUTZER: Senator Chambliss, do you have confidence in Michael Chertoff?

#### ~~THE SITUATION ROOM - MARCH 20, 2006~~

**BLITZER:** Any direct reaction at the Pentagon to that suggestion he **resign**?

MCINTYRE: Well, they said that the retired major general is entitled to his opinion, but that **Rumsfeld** serves at the pleasure of the president.

BLITZER: Jamie, thanks very much.

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BLITZER: There is an increasing drumbeat that your former boss Donald **Rumsfeld** should either be forced to **resign** or should step down. I asked Senator Joe Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee about this yesterday. Listen to what he said.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) SEN. JOE BIDEN: Imagine what would happen if announced tomorrow in the headlines of the papers in America and throughout the world that **Rumsfeld** was fired. It would energize, energize the rest of the world to be willing to

help us. It would energize American forces. It would energize the political environment. Yes he should step down.(END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: Is **Rumsfeld** that despised around the world?

CLARKE: I disagree **completely** with your characterization. I don't think there is an increasing drum beat about this. The president gets to decide whether or not **Rumsfeld** stays or goes. The president has said **repeatedly** he's thinks he's doing a very good in very difficult circumstances and wants him to stay.

BEGALA: Shinseki was the Army Chief of Staff, the number one general in America. He testified under oath that we needed hundreds of thousands of troops. Mr. **Rumsfeld** and this pinhead Professor Wolfowitz who worked for him, **publicly** insulted him and trashed him and **effectively** relieved him from his duty.

CLARKE: Urban **legend**. Months before General Shinseki testified and said **it would** take **several** hundred thousand troops. months before it was **publicly** known that Shinseki was not coming back. Do not propagate the myth.(CROSSTALK)

BLITZER: We're going to do some **fact checking** on this and get back to both of you on this, maybe tomorrow. Good discussion.

#### **CNN LATE EDITION - MARCH 26, 2006**

BLITZER: Major General Paul Eaton, retired, wrote in The New York Times. he said: "In sum, he has shown himself incompetent," referring to **Rumsfeld**, "**strategically**, operationally and tactically and is far more than anyone else responsible for what has happened to our important mission in Iraq. Mr. **Rumsfeld** must step down."In your book, "Cobra II," you write this, together with Michael Gordon, your co-author: "In their own way, **Rumsfeld** and the U.S. administrator, Paul Bremer, each contributed to the security problem. **Rumsfeld** limited the number of American troops in Iraq, and Bremer limited the number of Iraqi forces that were **immediately** available. The two decisions combined to produce a much larger security vacuum."Question. Based on all of the research you did with Michael Gordon in writing this book, how much responsibility does **Rumsfeld** have for the mistakes that were made?

TRAINOR: Well, I don't know that you could put a figure on something like that. What we did was **relate** the information that came through when we did our research, which was exhaustive.

BLITZER: Do you know retired Major General Eaton?

TRAINOR: No, I don't.

BLITZER: Do you know him?

JOULWAN: No.

BLITZER: Because he was on this program about a month ago. He **feels** passionately that **Rumsfeld should resign**, given the blunders that were made. And I'll ask both of you to just comment on that. General?

BLITZER: Here's another quote from the book, "Cobra II." "The American war plan was never adjusted on high. General Tommy Franks, who was the overall commander, never acknowledged the enemy he faced nor did he comprehend the nature of the war he was directing. He denigrated the Fedayeen as little more than a speed bump on the way to Baghdad and never appreciated their resilience and determination." I read carefully your book. So many of the problems the U.S. military is currently facing in Iraq were clear, were evident, were foreseen, but people decided not to pay attention to them.

TRAINOR: There was a grand canyon between the field commanders and the central command and the administration, particularly the secretary of defense.

BLITZER: It seems as if there was wishful thinking more than there was, you know, listening to the commanders on the ground. But General, you've been in that situation.

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BLITZER: Welcome back to "Late Edition." We're talking with the Republican chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Pat Roberts of Kansas and Democratic Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, a key member of the Armed Services Committee. Senator Reed, listen to what the president said earlier in the week on Donald Rumsfeld, whether he should resign. And listen to Rumsfeld's response to a similar question a couple days later. Listen to this.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) BUSH: No, I don't believe he should resign. I think he's done a fine job of not only conducting two battles, Afghanistan and Iraq, but also transforming our military. (END VIDEO CLIP)

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) DONALD RUMSFELD, DEFENSE SECRETARY: Those kinds of calls have been going on for five-plus years. And the president has asked me not to get involved in politics. And that's politics. (END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: Should Donald Rumsfeld resign?

REED: Yes, he should. I've said that for several months now, when asked. I think, first, it's becoming increasingly clear that his influence on the planning for the operations, particularly the occupation of Iraq, inhibited our ability to really stabilize the country. And (inaudible) in position today is that we have significant challenges there. And more importantly, my view, I think he's created a very acrimonious atmosphere within the military, in some respects, devaluing the opinion of military officers. I remember when General Shinseki stood up and was asked about the size of the forces and he said upwards of 200,000 and he was disparaged. I don't think that's the kind of atmosphere you need. I think a secretary of defense has to be able to get unbridled advice from military leaders. And again, I was listening to General Joulwan and General Trainor about General Wallace's comments about the difficulty of fighting the Fedayeen. And he was essentially threatened with dismissal. That's not the kind of atmosphere -- my sense is, you know, a good captain goes down with the ship, but a good president gets a new captain. I think this is the president's call. I think he has to step up and make a change.

BLITZER: Senator Roberts?

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BUTZER: If it were not an election year, would you want him out?

ROBERTS: No, I didn't say that. **It's** like Jack said. It's the president's call. And he has his detractors. And **I** would agree in terms of listening to the troops.

#### **CNN THE SITUATION ROOM APRIL 16, 2006**

BLITZER: And it's 5:00 p.m. over at the Pentagon, where the defense secretary coming under friendly fire. Former top generals, retired, all of them, calling on Donald Rumsfeld to **resign**. I'm Wolf Blitzer. You're in THE SITUATION ROOM.

#### **CNN LATE EDITION APRIL 16, 2006**

BLITZER: And just ahead, Donald Rumsfeld under fire from former members of the U.S. military brass. Two leading members of the United States Congress weigh in on whether the president's defense secretary should **resign**. **Plus:** perspective on Secretary Rumsfeld's conduct of the war in Iraq from three retired U.S. military generals.

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BLITZER: I want to get to Iraq, Iran, immigration, lots of other issues. But **first**, let's talk about the defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. Senator Feinstein, there's increasing calls on him from some retired U.S. military officers for the secretary to resign. Do you think he should?

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BLITZER: Most of the criticism aimed at the defense secretary, Mr. Chairman, is that he didn't have enough troops prepared for the post-invasion, for the takeover of Iraq, a huge country, nearly 30 million people. Listen to what retired U.S. Major General John Batiste, the former commander of the 1st Infantry Division that went into Iraq. Listen to what he said.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) MAJ. GEN. JOHN BATISTE (RET.), U.S. ARMY: When decisions are made without taking into account sound military recommendations, sound military decision-making, sound planning, then we're bound to make mistakes. When we violate the principles of war with mass and unity of command and unity of effort, we do that at our own peril. (END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: General Batiste wants Rumsfeld to resign. He says he's not a good secretary of defense, didn't prepare the troops and didn't prepare the country for what was going to ensue after the collapse of Saddam Hussein. Do you think, Mr. Chairman, Rumsfeld should resign?

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BLITZER: But Mr. Chairman, a couple of these generals were directly involved in moving into Baghdad, like General Batiste with the 1st Infantry Division. These are not generals sitting at the Pentagon, sitting at home, sitting in retired locations in Florida or elsewhere. These were generals who were intimately involved in that operation.

HUNTER: Well, but Wolf, again, if you look at the statistics on the very low number of casualties that we took in the offensive part of this campaign, where we went up against a military that.. .

BLITZER: Well, let me interrupt, ~~Mr.~~ Chairman. Let me interrupt, Mr. Chairman. They're not criticizing the move into Iraq. They're criticizing the lack of planning for what happened after the downfall of Saddam Hussein, the 2,400 U.S. troops, the thousands of others who have been injured, and the hundreds of billions of dollars that have been spent. That could have been avoided if they would have had a better plan, and they're blaming Rumsfeld directly for responsibility.

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HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE: Nice to talk to you.

BLITZER: What do you make of these retired generals, six now, calling for Donald Rumsfeld to resign?

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BLITZER: Well, you say it was dealt with at the time. The debate was apparently going on even before the U.S. began the invasion of Iraq. The former Army chief of staff, Eric Shinseki said several hundred thousand troops were **needed**. **Rumsfeld**, the argument goes, wanted to do it supposedly on the cheap. And U.S. troops are dying now. U.S. funds are being used up in Iraq to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars because of that initial decision by Rumsfeld to go in, as they say, on the cheap as opposed to having a much more robust force.

KISSINGER: The initial decision had the correct allocation of forces. The initial decision dealt with how to win the war. The next key decision was whether we should undertake a military government of Iraq on the model of the occupations of Germany of Japan and bring the people to democracy through a process of occupation. That required...

BLITZER: Let me interrupt, Mr. Secretary. Don't you think that given the fact that the U.S. knew it could defeat the Republican Guard of Saddam Hussein, that these decisions should have been made long in advance, what would happen in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's downfall?

BLITZER: Mr. secretary, on the specific point, throughout the '90s, there were extensive planning procedures underway at the Pentagon that stipulated that to really occupy Iraq, you need at least 380,000 troops in place. Which was a number that was even less than what the U.S. deployed to liberate Kuwait in 1991. A half a million U.S. troops were deployed to liberate a much smaller country with only a couple three million people, a very small geographic area.

And that Rumsfeld said 380,000 troops, way too many, 150,000, 160,000 was more in his liking. And argument that has been made by these retired generals is that he browbeat the military into going with this much smaller force.

KISSINGER: Well, I don't know how you browbeat generals who have direct access to the president. The line of command comes from the chairman of the joint chiefs to the president so that I would think that generals ought to have direct access to the president. Still, I would say the distinction is as follows. I believe that the general view was that after the Iraqi forces were defeated, that then one could undertake an occupation against very little resistance. That was a misjudgment that had nothing to do with the number of forces. If one had -- one did not match the number of forces one needed for the occupation to the political objectives that were sent, if one wanted to stay to occupy, then one needed more forces. And this was undoubtedly a mistake in judgment.

BLITZER: Here's the criticism, Mr. Secretary, of Rumsfeld, and I want to move on and talk about Iran and some other issues in Iraq. But the criticism is that he went in on the cheap, too few troops. Obviously, the decision to go ahead and disband the 400,000-member Iraqi military, most experts now agree that was a blunder. And that all of these decisions should have been well thought out in advance.

KISSINGER: Well, from what I've observed of Rumsfeld, his decisions are carefully thought out. It is possible sometimes you get to a strategic point, and you make the wrong decision. And there's no doubt that there was an underestimation of what it would take to occupy the country, not what it would take to defeat the country. And, but the decision to occupy the whole country and to make it part -- to make America alone responsible for the political evolution, that was not Rumsfeld's alone.

BLITZER: Here's what Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, who was involved months earlier in the planning for the takeover of Iraq wrote in Time magazine last week. He said, "the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions -- or bury the results." What a stinging criticism from a retired U.S. Army officer of the defense secretary.

KISSINGER: You're talking about something that may or may not have happened three years ago. The key problem we now face is that we are in a very difficult situation throughout the Middle East. And the question is whether you deal with it best by the sort of dramatic changes in leadership structure and the implication that everything can be changed in an administration that has only two and a half years more to go and only two years before the electoral process starts. I believe that it is better for Rumsfeld to stay, and that I think on key issues like transformation, and also getting the force ready to go in, there was this one window where I have personally disagreed from the beginning, but that was not simply a force decision. That was a decision on what one wanted to achieve and that may have been over-optimistic.

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Other news we're following, a fresh vote of confidence this week from President Bush for Donald Rumsfeld, despite a firestorm of criticism over his conduct in the war in



Iraq from six retired U.S. generals. Should **Rumsfeld resign**? For insight on that and more, we're joined by military analysts.

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BLITZER: But-- I want to bring our other generals in in a moment. But based on your firsthand observations, your firsthand knowledge, General Marks, did the defense secretary reject recommendations from military commanders for more troops?

MARKS: Sure. Oh, absolutely. I mean, that's been documented if you read General Franks' book, and the current book, "Cobra II," indicates very, very clearly, and in fact, that is in fact what happened. We requested the 1st Cavalry Division. That was denied. At a very critical point in the war, I might say.

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BLITZER: What do you make of this chorus that's now developing of these former commanders saying **Rumsfeld should resign**?

BRIG. GEN. DAVID GRANGE (RET.), U.S. ARMY: It's nothing near a revolt. It's the comments from actually a small number of general officers, and some are very credible. I've served with many of these people that are making these comments. The micromanage remarks that are being made are being made by retired brigadier major generals and a three-star, except for the exception of General Zinni, who did not serve with Secretary **Rumsfeld** during this particular time.

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BLITZER: General Shepperd, earlier this year on February 19, U.S. Army Major General Paul Eaton retired, who recently has come out for **Rumsfeld to resign**, a former Pentagon planner. He said this on "Late Edition." Listen to what he said.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) MAJ. GEN. PAUL EATON (RET.), U.S. ARMY: From the very beginning, we did not put enough boots on the ground to prosecute phase four as this -- of this war. And we still have not awarded the appropriate resources to the men and women charged with assisting Iraq rebuild its security forces. (END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: He blames **Rumsfeld**. Is **Rumsfeld** derelict in his responsibilities, General Shepperd, based on what you know?

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BLITZER: But if a defense secretary, General Shepperd, is what the critics are saying, **derelict**, and U.S. troops are dying and they're being injured, taxpayer funds are being squandered to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars because of miscalculations, shouldn't retired U.S. military officers stand up and say enough is enough?

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BLITZER: Even if that defense secretary is not necessarily doing a good job, would you agree with that?

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BLITZER: Welcome back to "Late edition." We're talking about Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who's coming under increasing fire for his handling of the Iraq war.

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BUTZER: General Grange, listen to what retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, the co-author of the book "Cobra 2" told me the other day about the defense secretary's style. Listen to this.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) MAJ. GEN. BERNARD TRAINOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RET.): The defense secretary had a unique management arrangement. He would just bear down on people, keep asking them questions, sometimes unrelated to the issue at hand. And I think, essentially, he wore down General Franks. He wore down everybody. But I will say this. I think the military, given their knowledge, should have pushed back harder against some of the decisions that Rumsfeld made. (END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: General Grange, a lot of that kind of talk -- we're hearing, increasingly, that talk from respected retired military officers. And you just heard your colleague, General Marks, say he was not happy with the way he felt Rumsfeld was treating some senior military officers. What do you make of this?

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BUTZER: General Zinni, Anthony Zinni, General Shepperd, was on CNN this past week, and he made this specific criticism of Rumsfeld.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI, FMR. CENTCOM CMDR.: I think the biggest mistake was throwing away 10 years' worth of planning, plans that had taken into account what we would face in an occupation of Iraq. And it had to be an occupation. We couldn't do it on the cheap with too few troops. (END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: That sounds like an extraordinarily severe charge, General Shepperd. I want you to respond.

#### THE SITUATION ROOM, APRIL 12, 2006

WOLF BLITZER, CNN ANCHOR: Thanks very much. And to our viewers you are now in THE SITUATION ROOM, where new pictures and information are arriving all the time. Standing by, CNN reporters across the United States and around the world to bring you today's top stories. Happening now, the Bush White House is on notice. New staff changes may be coming. It's 4:00 p.m. here in Washington where the new chief of staff is urging some people to leave sooner rather than later. What's Josh Bolten planning and can it help the president's embattled team regroup.

Also this hour, retired U.S. generals keep battling over Donald Rumsfeld. Why is the president still standing behind his defense secretary. We'll examine the political pros and cons of showing Rumsfeld the door.

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BLITZER Zain, thank you very much. Moving on back to politics here in Washington. As the violence continues in Iraq, President Bush insists Donald Rumsfeld is the right man to lead the Pentagon during some very **challenging** times. But Mr. Bush no doubt has additional reasons for standing behind his defense secretary. Let's bring in our senior political analyst Bill Schneider, he's watching this story. Bill?

WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, CNN SR. POLITICAL ANALYST: Wolf, why is the White House closing ranks behind Donald Rumsfeld? Stubbornness, unwillingness to admit a mistake or is there a more political reason?

GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI (RET.), FORMER CENTCOM COMMANDER: Poor military judgment has been used throughout this mission.

MAJ. GEN. PAUL EATON (RET.), U.S. ARMY: What I've got a problem with is a number of decisions that the secretary of defense made and I think that we need to change him out so that we don't repeat it in the future.

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Coming up, the battle over Donald Rumsfeld. We'll have more. I'll ask James Carville and J.C. Watts who's winning this political war.

BLITZER: Today, in our "Strategy Session," the debate over the defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, continuing to rage -- should the top man at the Pentagon step down, or would a change in leadership hurt the war effort? Joining us now, our CNN political analysts, Democratic strategist James Carville, former Republican Congressman J.C. Watts.

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BLITZER: At what point do you think -- and is this -- is this even realistic -- that Rumsfeld, who is a good Republican, says to himself, "You know what, I don't want to hurt my party, and I'm going to have to step down"?

BLITZER: Here's a hypothetical...

WATTS: And I think that's a lot of what we're seeing.

BLITZER: Here -- here is a hypothetical for you, James.

CARVILLE: All right.

BLITZER: Let's say Rumsfeld, on his own, decided...(CROSSTALK)

BLITZER: ...you know what, I don't want to hurt my party...

CARVILLE: Right.

BLITZER: ...and I am becoming a lightning rod. I am ~~so~~ controversial. I will step down. The president then -- and this name has been out there for a while ...

CARVILLE: Right.

BLITZER: ... brings in Joe Lieberman...

CARVILLE: Right.

BUTZER: ... to be his defense **secretary**. What does that do for the Republican prospects in November?

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BUTZER: But, when you have the former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, the former commander of the 1st Infantry Division going out and saying, **Rumsfeld** must go, that's -- that's news.

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BLITZER: Still to come: Are retired generals doing the right thing by **calling** for Donald **Rumsfeld** to resign? Or are they violating the military's marching orders, some code of ethics?

#### **CNN THE SITUATION ROOM, APRIL 18, 2006**

**WOLF BLITZER**, CNN ANCHOR: To our viewers, you're in THE SITUATION ROOM, where new pictures and information are arriving all the time. **Standing** by, CNN reporters across the United States and around the world to bring you today's top stories. **Happening** now, it's 5:00 p.m. here in Washington. A developing story we're watching as President Bush won't budge in the war over Donald **Rumsfeld**. Neither will the defense secretary himself. As retired generals form battle lines, I'll ask our retired commanders what they think of the controversy.

I'm **Wolf Blitzer**. You're in THE SITUATION ROOM. He's been under sharp attack by some retired generals who want him to join them in retirement. But Defense Secretary Donald **Rumsfeld** vigorously defended his own record today. Just minutes ago, he finished making his **case** to retired U.S. military officers. And President Bush, earlier in the day, offered strong backing, even as he announced other changes in his administration.

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BUTZER: And we're going to ask our generals about the war over **Rumsfeld**. Three retired military commanders and CNN analysts will join me here in THE SITUATION ROOM. We'll discuss the defense secretary and the controversy. All that coming up at the bottom of the hour. **After** interrupting his vacation last week to defend his defense secretary, President Bush today stood his ground, saying he's the decider.

That's his word. He's the decider and that he's decided Donald Rumsfeld should remain.

BLITZER: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld launched a PR offensive today, meeting with a number of retired U.S. military commanders turned military analysts.

BLITZER: Here's what General Batiste said on "LOU DOBBS TONIGHT" last night. And he was a military commander, served in Iraq. Listen to these words that are very strong.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) MAJ. GEN. JOHN BATISTE (RET.), U.S. ARMY: And that's why we need a new secretary of defense. We have one now who has repeatedly made strategic mistakes, one after the other. And my question is, if we're going to continue the war on terrorism for a long time -- and I suspect we are -- why would we want to continue riding the same horse, where he has such a dismal track record? (END VIDEO CLIP)

BUTZER: Now, General Batiste, correct me if I'm wrong, he speaks with a lot of authority given his battle record, General Marks.

BUTZER: This is how the defense secretary, General Grange, put it earlier today. Listen to this. (BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) RUMSFELD: I think that it's important to put all of what's going on in context, and recognize that people who are often talking about what's taking place inside here don't know what's taking place inside here. (END VIDEO CLIP) BLITZER: Except in General Batiste's case, General Grange, he obviously knew what was going on in the Pentagon. He also knew what was going on, on the battlefield in Iraq.

BLITZER: Donald Rumsfeld says no one is indispensable. The defense secretary isn't giving up on those calls for his resignation. Our senior analyst, Jeff Greenfield, has been thinking about Donald Rumsfeld and his political predicament -- Jeff.

#### **CNN LATE EDITION - APRIL 23, 2006**

BUTZER: Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, thanks very much for joining us. Always good to have you on "Late Edition." Be careful where you are. We have to take a short break.

Just ahead, what does the formation of this new Iraqi government potentially mean for American troops in Iraq? We'll get reaction from two key U.S. senators, Arlen Specter and Carl Levin. They're standing by live. Plus, this.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) THOMAS FRIEDMAN, NEW YORK TIMES: As long as Don Rumsfeld is at the head of the Pentagon, we're going to have no allies at home and abroad. (END VIDEO CLIP)

BUTZER: Is it time for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to go? The New York Times columnist and author Thomas Friedman is standing by. He'll weigh in.

BLITZER: And on CBS's "Face the Nation," retired U.S. Army Major General John Batiste, the former commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, explains why he thinks Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should step down right now.

(BEGIN VIDEO CUP) MAJ. GEN. JOHN BATISTE (RET.), U.S. ARMY: We need to hold the current secretary of defense accountable for some very bad strategic decisions. Just around the corner, there are some huge decisions that this country will have to make. And we need senior leadership at the Department of Defense whose instinct and judgment we trust.(END VIDEO CUP)

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BUTZER: Here's the president on Donald Rumsfeld, who is coming under enormous fire, as you well know. Listen to this.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I have strong confidence in Don Rumsfeld. I hear the voices, and I read the front page, and I know the speculation, but I'm the decider and I decide what is best, and what's best is for Don Rumsfeld to remain as the secretary of defense.(END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: Now, you totally disagree.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah. I believe that Don Rumsfeld's performance in Iraq has been utterly incompetent, and on a very specific metric. The role of any occupation army is to monopolize force, OK, to control a country, to truly occupy it. Don Rumsfeld seems to have gone into Iraq with the image, with the plan to basically smash Saddam's government, and leave.

He clearly had no idea what he was going to do afterwards, by evidence of what happened there, and clearly was unwilling to deploy the forces necessary to create a secure political context so Iraqis could make hopefully the right choices. Why are Iraqis running to their private militias? Because they live in a completely violent and chaotic environment. We are in part responsible for that environment because of the decisions our Pentagon took about how to fight this war.

BLITZER: So if Rumsfeld were to be fired or resign, and somebody else comes in, would it make a difference?

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BLITZER: And now, in case you missed it, let's check some of the highlights from the other Sunday morning talk shows here in the United States. On ABC's "This Week," former Democratic presidential candidate Senator John Kerry reacts to the latest alleged audiotape from Osama bin Laden, and blames the Bush administration for failing to catch him back in 2001.(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)U.S. SENATOR JOHN KERRY (D-MA): It underscores the failure of this administration to capture him. This is one of the reasons that Donald Rumsfeld should resign. Osama bin Laden is loose today because we allowed him to escape at Tora Bora. It's that simple.(END VIDEO CLIP)

**CNN LATE EDITION, JUNE 4, 2006**

BLITZER: For our North American viewers, CNN reporters will be "On the Story." That comes up right after "Late Edition," 1p.m. Eastern and 10 a.m. Pacific, a little bit more than an hour from now. And there's much more ahead on "Late Edition," including insight on the troubles facing U.S. troops in Iraq. We'll talk with one man who led the U.S. Army's 1st Infantry Division there and has called for the Defense Secretary Donald **Rumsfeld** to step aside, retired U.S. Army Major General John **Batiste**. Plus, we'll get perspective from our own panel of top U.S. generals.

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BLITZER: But the question is, was [Rumsfeld] derelict in his responsibility to defense secretary by not deploying enough troops to get the job done?

\*\*\*

BLITZER: General Marks, you were there during the initial invasion of Iraq. General **Batiste** referred to criticism coming from General Wallace. At the time, he was rebuked by the secretary of defense. Remind our viewers what General Wallace's job was, what he said and why he was criticized.

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BLITZER: I want General Shepperd to respond to Congressman John Murtha, Democrat of Pennsylvania, who has been outspoken on the war in Iraq. He said this the other day. Listen to this. (BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MURTHA, (D-PA): I think it's a fair analogy except for the numbers. There was about 124, I think, in the My Lai incident, and there was 24 here. But it's the same thing. Overstress, these troops going out every day. IEDs go off. Some of them have seen 30 IEDs go off without (inaudible) they're killed or one of their friends is killed. So the pressure is tremendous. (END VIDEO CLIP) BLITZER: You served in Vietnam. You remember the My Lai incident, the massacre of Vietnamese civilians that had a tremendous impact on the American public. Is this Haditha incident, if in fact it bears out that it did occur -- is that likely to undermine the U.S. public support for this war in Iraq, as My Lai did during Vietnam?

\*\*\*

BLITZER: On NBC's "Meet the Press," the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joe Biden, blamed Defense Secretary Donald **Rumsfeld** for the Haditha incident and other alleged misconduct against civilians in Iraq.

**THE SITUATION ROOM - AUG 4, 2006**

BLITZER: Later, the latest call for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to step down. Does it offer an opening for the Bush administration to change the way the political battle over Iraq is being fought? Stay with us. You're in THE SITUATION ROOM.

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BLITZER: Also, Senator Hillary Clinton's new call for Donald Rumsfeld to resign, is there a bigger statement about the state of politics in Iraq? We're watching that story, as is our Jeff Greenfield. He's going to read between the lines.

\*\*\*

BUTZER: Democrats angry at Senator Hillary Clinton's muted criticism of the Iraq war may be weighing her latest words very carefully. Now that she's calling for Donald Rumsfeld to resign as defense secretary, does it change the way the war is playing politically? Let's bring in our senior analyst, Jeff Greenfield.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE) JEFF GREENFIELD, CNN SENIOR ANALYST: Wolf, when Senator Clinton confronted Defense Secretary Rumsfeld with a call for his resignation, the chatter that followed was inevitable: What does this mean for her presidential prospects? OK. But it also raises a different question: What if the Bush administration radically changes the whole terrain on which the Iraq issue will be fought out?

SEN. HILLARY CLINTON (D), NEW YORK: You are presiding over a failed policy.

GREENFIELD (voice-over): If Senator Clinton was trying to move closer to the anti-Iraq sentiments of most of her party, she is coming very late to the dance,

SEN. JOHN KERRY (D), MASSACHUSETTS: I call for the resignation...

GREENFIELD: Senator John Kerry called for Rumsfeld's resignation during his presidential race two years ago. Evan Bayh, John Edwards, Mark Warner, Joe Biden, and Wesley Clark have all joined the chorus. In fact, as late as this past April, Senator Clinton was conspicuous by her refusal to call for Rumsfeld's head.

CLINTON: As far as I can tell, Secretary Rumsfeld is doing what the president wants him to do.

GREENFIELD: Potential Republican presidential candidates have also kept their distance. Senator John McCain says the president is entitled to his own man, but says he has no confidence in Rumsfeld's judgments. Senator Chuck Hagel has made his disaffection with the secretary's judgment crystal clear.

SEN. CHUCK HAGEL (R), NEBRASKA: I think things are getting worse.

#### THE SITUATION ROOM - SEPT 6, 2006

I'm Wolf **Blitzer**. You're in THE SITUATION ROOM. Tonight, a dramatic bombshell from the president, the 9/11 mastermind is moved with other top al Qaeda suspects from secret prisons to face trial at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. At the same time the



president is taking some serious heat over his policies in Iraq, a dramatic Senate debate as Democrats call for the removal of the defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld.

Let's go live to our congressional correspondent Dana Bash -- Dana.

DANA BASH, CNN CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENT: Well Wolf, the Senate tonight is still debating that resolution calling for Secretary Rumsfeld's resignation. And it's a debate over a resolution that is expected to die without even getting a vote. That's just fine with Democrats.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE) BASH (voice-over): In politics a simple message gets more mileage. This Democratic message is about as simple as it gets.

SEN. EDWARD KENNEDY (D), MASSACHUSETTS: It is long pastime for Secretary Rumsfeld to go.

BASH: The resolution calling for the defense secretary to be replaced was doomed from the start, but Democrats are trying to make Donald Rumsfeld the symbol of Iraq mismanagement and misjudgment and this debate gave that more play.

SEN. HARRY REID (D), MINORITY LEADER: This amendment is bigger than Donald Rumsfeld. This is about changing course in Iraq and the president demonstrating to the American people he understands America cannot stay the course when the present course is taking our country in the wrong direction.

BASH: Noticeably absent was a robust Republican defense of Rumsfeld. ~~FALSE!~~ Instead GOP senators talked up the president's successes in fighting terror and slammed Democrats for playing politics.

BLITZER All right Dana thank you. So is the situation in Iraq like a ticking time bomb waiting to explode? Today one of Iraq's top political leaders is suggesting Iraq could simply collapse if bickering political leaders don't reconcile their differences and if the unyielding violence does not end. Scenes of bloodshed did not end today at all. CNN's Michael Holmes is in Baghdad with more -- Michael.

#### **LATE EDITION-- OCT 1, 2006**

BLITZER: And coming up, more of my conversation with Dan Bartlett about how his boss, the president of the United States, is running the country and the war. And I'll ask him whether Donald Rumsfeld should be dumped as the defense secretary. And later, is Iraq out of control? I'll speak with two senior members of the Senate foreign relations committee.

\*\*\*

BLITZER: In this book, "State of Denial," and you read it now, basically, the other theme that comes across is that this has been an administration, a dysfunctional administration where you have bitter internal battles, that the president was under enormous pressure from some of his top advisers to fire the defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. He resisted. He obviously has not done that. But the dysfunctional

White House, as it's depicted in this book, comes across. I'll read to you from page 428: "After Thanksgiving, then-White House Chief of Staff Andy Card made another concerted effort to get the president to replace **Rumsfeld**. Many of the Republican and Democratic leaders were telling Card privately that they could just not deal with him. He was more arrogant and unresponsive than ever. Card was also hearing from members of the old foreign policy establishment connected to the president's father - the gray beards, as he called them -- who were complaining more and more. A focus was **Rumsfeld**. "Is this true, that so many of the president's *top* advisers -- Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Andy Card, among others -- were urging the president to **dump Rumsfeld?**"

~~DATE EDITED: October 29, 2006~~

BLITZER Joining us, now, in Seattle, retired U.S. Army Major General Paul Eaton. He's the former U.S. military commander of Iraq troop training. And in Washington, the New York Times chief military correspondent Michael Gordon. He's the co-author of the best seller "Cobra II: Inside the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq," ~~a terrific reference~~

\*\*\*

BLITZER The bottom line, because I read all of your dispatches, is ~~that~~ the Iraqi military, specifically, at any one point, there's a large number of Iraqi troops who are AWOL. They simply go away for a week at a time. They simply don't show up. They don't have the kind of training; they don't have the kind of commitment that the U.S. military clearly has.

\*\*\*

BLITZER You believe it would make a difference if [Rumsfeld] personally *stepped* down?

EATON Wolf, it would make a terrific difference. We need to change our strategy, our operational approach and our tactical approach. And we need a new team in the Pentagon to do it.

BLITZER: Well, what would be the specific difference if there were a new defense secretary?

\*\*\*

BLITZER Michael Gordon, you've always been a great reporter. You've always been very, very candid with your readers in the New York Times, going back to our mutual days when we both covered the Pentagon during the first Gulf War.

Would it ~~make~~ a difference for U.S. military commanders if Rumsfeld were to go?

\*\*\*

**BLITZER** Well, let me just rephrase the question, Michael Gordon. What are you hearing from military commanders in Iraq and elsewhere? What do they say about Donald Rumsfeld behind the scenes, active duty U.S. military personnel?

~~FOUO~~

November 02, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

CC: Robert Rangel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Congressional Outreach on November 16

*(Op-Intel)*

I can not do the Congressional Outreach on November 16 if it is the Op-Intel brief in the Senate S-407 or the House -- the large groups.

I would have a breakfast or lunch, or meeting with some of the Members that week.

I will have a lot of **things** in my head on the subject, and I don't think it is a good time for me.

I think we ought to have Condi and Negroponte do it. The issues **are** mostly governance. Eric Edelman and a military person could do the briefing with them. I have done it with second, third, and fourth level people from State many times.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF110106-17

.....

11-L-0559/OSD/60692

OSD 17826-06



11/15/2006 9:25 18 AM

032

920206

~~FOUO~~

November 02, 2006

TO: Robert Wilkie

CC: Robert Rangel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Congressional Outreach on November 16

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Thanks.

DHR:as  
SF110106-17

.....

November 9, 2006

Sir -

Our congressional outreach will be focused on immediate consideration of the MILCON/GOA bill. We will not schedule you for additional engagements on the Hill.

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17826-06



11/15/2006 9:24:35 AM

*Robert L. Wilkie*

032

2 Nov 06

9 Nov 06

~~FOUO~~

November 03, 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: File of Rebuttal Letters

I have asked for the file of rebuttal letters and have not received it.

Please send it up today.

Thanks,

DHR:sa  
SF110306-04



000.7

32006

11-L-0559/OSD/60694



OSD 17829-06

11/15/2006 9:37:18 AM

~~FOUO~~

November 03, 2006

000.7

TO: Dorrance Smith *JG for DS*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: File of Rebuttal Letters

I have asked for the **file** of rebuttal letters and have not received it.

Please send it **up** today.



Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF110306-04

.....  
Please **Respond** By 11/03/06

NOV 08 2006  
SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

11/13/06

*CDR Stoner.*

*Here is the  
file to answer this  
SF. It was also  
provided for 102506-10*

*(3 Nov 06)*

SD CA		DSD SA	
SD SMA		DSD SMA	
SD MA		DSD MA	
TSA		DSD CA	
STF DIR			
ES			
FSR MA	# 11/15	ESD	

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60695

OSD 17829-06



11/15/2006 9:37:53 AM

## RAPID RESPONSE: Setting The Record Straight

Since Sept. 1, 2006 the OSD Writers Group has sent out 61 Letters to the Editor. 37 have been published.

TWO detailed rebuttals were also posted on the For the Record page on defenselink.mil.

### Published Responses

Letters To The Editor In Response To:

1. "Rumsfeld: Iraq critics morally confused," *USA Today*, 8/29/06
2. "Rumsfeld says critics appeasing fascism," *LA Times*, 8/30/06 (Ran Op-Ed instead)  
Letters also sent to the following papers which syndicated the original *LA Times* story:
  1. *San Jose Mercury News*,
  2. *Seattle Times*,
  3. *Pittsburgh Post Gazette*,
  4. *St. Paul Pioneer Press*, (Ran Op-Ed instead)
  5. *Contra Costa Times* (Ran letter from reader instead)
3. "Rummy's dangerous ruminations," *Star Democrat (Maryland)*, 9/1/06  
Responding to 9/1 Snowflake
4. "Five years on," *The Economist*, 9/2/06
5. "A handsome, but cranky, coot," *Chicago Tribune*, 9/5/06
6. "Rumsfeld undergoes surgery for bum shoulder," *Agence France Presse*, 9/5/06 (NOTE: AFP does not publish letters to the editor)
7. "Security front and center in new Capitol Hill session," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 9/6/06
8. "A sudden sense of urgency," *The New York Times*, 9/7/06 (Used by Fox News' Brit Hume, Posted on the Early Bird)
9. "No firing of Rumsfeld to appease democrats," *Washington Post*, 9/8/06
10. "Bush's detainee plan is criticized," *Washington Post*, 9/8/06
11. "Iraq post-war plan forbidden," *Pittsburgh Post Gazette*, 9/9/06
12. "The Islamofascists" and "perspectives page," *Newsweek*, 9/11/06
13. "Rumsfeld lecture out of line," *Denver Post*, 9/12/06
14. "Time to change top leadership," *The Macon Telegraph*, 9/13/06
15. "Rumsfeld criticized," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 9/13/06
16. "Intimidation and deception," *The Chattanooga Times Free Press*, 9/14/06
17. "Fire Rumsfeld," *The Buffalo News*, 9/15/06
18. "Iraq: War planned in 1990s," *The Charleston Gazette*, 9/16/2006
19. "Who's to blame for the war," *Kansas City Star*, 9/17/06
20. "Put Rumsfeld out to pasture," *Sun Sentinel*, 9/18/06
21. "General: Rumsfeld scotched post-war planning for Iraq," *Pensacola News Journal*, 9/18/06
22. "Why we're losing," *National Post (Canada)*, 9/19/06
23. "Living in confusing times," *Times Union (Albany)*, 9/19/06
24. "Failings of the Rumsfeld doctrine," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9/21/06
25. "Rumsfeld Also Plays Hardball On Pentagon's Squash Courts," *The New York Times*, 9/24/06  
(Ran letter from Larry Di Rita instead)
26. "On Rumsfeld," *El Diario*, 9/26/06 (Bilingual Spanish & English letter)
27. "U.S. Broadcasts Into Iran Called Too Soft," 16 *Knight-Ridder Newspapers*, 9/27/06 (Ran in the Early Bird)
  1. *Miami Herald*, 9/27/06
  2. *Belleville News Democrat*, 9/26/06
  3. *Bradenton Herald*, 9/26/06
  4. *Centre Daily Times*, 9/26/06



5. *Columbus Ledger-Inquirer*, 9/26/06
6. *Contra Costa Times*, 9/26/06
7. *Fort Wayne News Sentinel*, 9/26/06
8. *Knight-Ridder Washington Bureau*, 9/26/06
9. *Macon Telegraph*, 9/26/06
10. *Myrtle Beach Sun News*, 9/26/06
11. *Sacramento Bee*, 9/27/06
12. *San Jose Mercury News*, 9/26/06
13. *The State* (South Carolina), 9/26/06
14. *Charlotte Observer*, 9/26/06
15. *San Luis Obispo Tribune*, 9/26/06
16. *The Monterey Herald*, 9/26/06
28. "Rumsfeld admits progress in Afghanistan not all encouraging," AFP, 10/7/06 (NOTE: AFP does not publish letters to the editor)
29. "Time for a change in Iraq," *Sunday Times (London)*, 10/8/06
30. "The Week," *National Review*, 10/9/06
31. "Forget Joe, Fire Rummy," *NY Daily News*, 10/10/06
32. "Problems in Iraq should not deter U.S. commitment to freedom," CSM, 10/11/06
33. "A Sad Litany of Failures," *U.S. News & World Report*, 10/15/06
34. "Confessions of a 'Defeatocrat,'" *Washington Post*, 10/15/06
35. "Army leads way in battle for the budget," *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, 10/15/06
36. "No More Huffing and Puffing," *The Weekly Standard*, 10/18/06
37. "More Troops Not Solution To Iraq Crisis, Experts Say," *The Baltimore Sun*, 10/23/06
38. "Hyde asks Rumsfeld to bolster fight against Afghan Heroin," *USA Today*, 10/24/06 'Trying to Contain the Iraq Disaster,' *New York Times*, 10/24/2006 (Posted on the Early Bird 10/25; 2<sup>nd</sup> letter sent to Dep. Editorial Page editor following up)
39. "Rumsfeld Tells Iraq Critics to 'back off,'" *Washington Post*, 10/26/06
40. "Army to spread burden of combat," *USA Today*, 10/27/06
41. "The third battlefield: money," *U.S. News and World Report*, 10/30/06
42. "Casualties, votes and the battle for hearts and minds," *The Oregonian*, 10/31/06

#### Other Published Letters to the Editor From The Dept. Based On The Early Bird:

1. "White House fires back at McCain's comment on Iraq," *The Washington Times*, 9/1/06
2. "Seeking Justice," *The Washington Times*, 9/11/06
3. "JAG proliferation," *The Washington Times*, 9/28/06
4. "U.S. is recruiting misfits for the Army," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 10/1/06
5. "Bush hits Democrats on N. Korea talks," *The Washington Times*, 10/12/06
6. "Older recruits fill out military," *Boston Globe*, 10/29/06
7. "Marines downrange to get new body armor," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 10/23/06

#### Other Responses:

Detailed rebuttals posted in response to:

1. "How to Lose a War," *Washington Post*, 10/4/06
2. "The Rise of Jihadistan," *Newsweek*, 10/19/06

An Op-Ed responding to misrepresentations of the American Legion speech was published by:

1. *The LA Times*  
and syndicated to:
2. Ft. *Wayne Journal Gazette*,
3. *Orlando Sentinel*,

4. *St. Paul Pioneer Press,*
5. *San Jose Mercury News.*

Reporters were contacted from the following news organizations via telephone or e-mail regarding issues related to the Dept. of Defense: Associated Press, Agence France Presse, Reuters, ABC (Martha Raddatz), CNN (John Roberts), and **Fox** News (Ed Rollins).

USA Today  
September 14, 2006  
Pg. 12

## Misleading Headline

USA Today's article on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's address to the American Legion's national convention misled readers regarding his remarks. The headline, "Rumsfeld: Iraq critics morally confused," suggests that Secretary Rumsfeld labeled critics of the Iraq war as "morally confused."

In fact, the secretary never mentioned any critics of the Iraq war in his remarks.

Secretary Rumsfeld reminded people of the similarities between past and current conflicts and **warned** against a "blame America first" mentality that could undermine our efforts in the current struggle against violent extremism.

Judging by the response — three standing ovations — his remarks struck a chord.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the secretary's remarks at <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/>.

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington**

San Jose Mercury News  
September 3, 2006

## **Rumsfeld Story Missed Key Point**

The article (Page 6A, Aug. 30) discussing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's address to members attending the American Legion National Convention on Aug. 29 was misleading and prevented your readers from gaining an accurate summary of the secretary's remarks.

For example, it stated, "By likening today's U.S. foreign policy to that during World War II and the Cold War, Rumsfeld sought to portray skeptics of the **Bush** administration as being on the wrong side of history." This is not anything the secretary actually said.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

The secretary's remarks were **an** effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats does not undermine **our** nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long **and** difficult struggle against violent extremists.

Dorrance **Smith**, Assistant Secretary of Defense **for** Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

Seattle Times  
September 13, 2006

## **Rumsfeld In Context**

"Rumsfeld: Bush critics similar to Nazi appeasers" [News, Aug. 30], discussing Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's address to members attending the American Legion National Convention on Aug. 29, was misleading and prevented your readers from gaining an accurate summary of the secretary's remarks.

For example, Los Angeles Times staff writer Julian E. Barnes wrote, "By likening today's U.S. foreign policy to that during World War II and the Cold War, Rumsfeld sought to portray skeptics of the Bush administration as being on the wrong side of history."

This may have been Mr. Barnes' interpretation, but it is not anything the secretary actually said.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches)

The secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

**Dorrance Smith, assistant secretary of Defense for public affairs, Washington, D.C.**

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette  
September 13, 2006

## **Rumsfeld's Remarks**

The Aug. 30 article discussing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's address to members attending the American Legion National Convention on Aug. 29 was misleading and prevented your readers from gaining **an** accurate summary of the secretary's remarks ("Rumsfeld: Bush Critics Are Like Nazi Appeasers").

For example, the article said, "By likening today's U.S. foreign policy to that during World War II and the Cold War, Rumsfeld sought to portray skeptics **of the Bush** administration **as** being on the wrong side of history." This may have been the reporter's interpretation, but it is not anything the secretary actually said.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

The secretary's remarks were **an** effort to remind people of the similarities between **past** and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.**

Boston (MD) Star Democrat  
September 19, 2006

## **Spitzer Misquotes Secretary Rumsfeld**

Carlton Spitzer's Sept. 1 column, which discussed Secretary Rumsfeld's recent address to the American Legion National Convention, was inaccurate.

Mr. Spitzer wrote that Secretary Rumsfeld claimed "critics of the administration's policies 'weaken the ability of free societies to persevere.'"

This it is not what the Secretary said. In fact, the Secretary warned that:

"[I]n any long struggle or long war, any kind of moral or intellectual confusion about who and what is right or wrong, can weaken the ability of free societies to persevere."  
(emphasis added)

He did not equate this notion with critics of the administration. Mr. Spitzer also falsely claimed that the Secretary "equate[d] constructive dissent in a free society to efforts by some leaders 67 years ago to appease Adolf Hitler."

He said nothing of the kind, which is why Mr. Spitzer could not quote the Secretary as having said anything of the sort.

In fact, the Secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the Secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

**DORRANCE SMITH**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

## Defending Strategy In Iraq,

**SIR** – You assert that difficulties in Iraq can be explained by errors such as “disbanding Iraq’s army [and] committing too few American troops”, which you claim are the fault of Donald Rumsfeld, America’s secretary of defence (“Five years on”, September 2nd). A few facts are in order. Although officially disbanded in May 2003 by coalition officials in Iraq, the Iraqi military had already largely disbanded itself by then. As the commander of the top division in the Iraqi Republican Guard explained: “I started the war with 13,000 soldiers. By the time we had orders to pull back to Baghdad, I had less than 2,000; by the time we were in position in Baghdad, I had less than 1,000. Every day the desertions increased.”

It is also incorrect to suggest that Mr Rumsfeld opposed sending more troops to Iraq. The secretary has regularly asked General John Abizaid, who took command of the mission in the summer of 2003, if he had all the necessary resources, and, if not, what more was required to carry out a successful campaign. Commanders in the field have consistently said that they need more intelligence and Iraqi forces, not American troops. General Tommy Franks, General Abizaid’s predecessor, told the Senate in July 2003, when he was still in command in Iraq, that: “There has been [the] suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And in fact, I can tell you...that if more troops are necessary, this secretary’s going to say yes.” Reliance on the counsel and advice of experts continues today.

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant secretary of defence for public affairs, Department of Defence, Washington, DC**





OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

September 6, 2006

Editor  
*Chicago Tribune*  
435 N. Michigan Ave.  
Chicago, IL 60611-4041

To the Editor:

Charles Madigan's September 5, 2006 column, which discussed Secretary Rumsfeld's address to the American Legion National Convention last week, was misleading and prevented your readers from gaining an accurate summary of the Secretary's remarks.

Madigan wrote, "[Rumsfeld] suggested opponents of the war are suffering some kind of 'moral and intellectual confusion' and somehow have forgotten the lessons of history. There were references to Hitler and appeasement in the speech, Critics, then, are quislings?" This may have been Mr. Madigan's interpretation, but it is not anything the Secretary actually said. As even *The New York Times* noted

"Mr. Rumsfeld's speech on Tuesday did not explicitly mention the Democrats, and he cited only comments by human rights groups and in press reports as evidence of what he described as 'moral or intellectual confusion about who or what is right or wrong.' ..he did not directly compare current critics of the war in Iraq to those who sought to appease Hitler, his juxtaposition of the themes led Democrats to say that he was leveling an unfair charge." (emphasis added)

The Secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections -- rather than the nature of the enemy -- does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

When a database search of America's leading newspapers turns up literally 10 times as many mentions of one of the soldiers who has been punished for misconduct at Abu Ghraib than the mentions of Sergeant First Class Paul Ray Smith, the first recipient of the Medal of Honor in the Global War on Terror, something is seriously wrong.



11-L-0559/OSD/60705

Mr. Madigan's devotion of almost an entire column to the Secretary belies his claim that Rumsfeld **has** "not very engaging of late," and we invite your readers to see why that is for themselves. The full text of the Secretary's remarks can be found at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. Whitman", written over the printed name.

Bryan Whitman

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

Bryan Whitman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.  
Sept. 13, 2006

Dear Bryan,

Your letter in response to my recent column about the Secretary of Defense finally made its way to me and I must admit you have some points. Perhaps I misunderstood, although I would stand by my notation that Mr. Rumsfeld is still one handsome coot.

The point I was trying to make was ~~that~~ we are honored in this nation with the right and obligation to ~~speak~~ however we ~~will~~ on matters of public policy, no matter the tone. What I was attacking then, was a sense created not only by the secretary but by some of his colleagues in other addresses ~~that~~ there is something wrong with criticism of the war.

You might believe I misunderstood this message and you are entitled to that interpretation, but I would respectfully disagree.

We ~~are~~ allowed to dissent. I could launch here into a long discussion about the ~~nature~~ of fascism or the uses of fear to motivate people in wartime, but I won't.

I don't ~~know~~ why you felt the need to include your database ~~search~~ of misconduct stories ~~as~~ part of this missive. If you had actually been paying attention to what I have written over the years, and to what I have presented as an editor, you would have ~~known~~ that there are few in the media who hold the military in higher esteem ~~than~~ I. Perhaps only my good friend and colleague Joe Galloway is more ardent, but then, he has reason to be having such strong kinship, bonded in battle, with soldiers for so many years.

That respect doesn't, and shouldn't, automatically ~~flow~~ to ~~our~~ civilian and political leadership. After all, their great achievement was winning Senate confirmation, which is not quite like facing the enemy, if you ~~know~~ what I mean. The secretary and his peers then, are serving on a different level, in my opinion. It's not like they ~~are~~ actually in the military or ~~anything~~.

Their comments are open to whatever criticism they create. They come and go with presidents, making them political beyond anything else.

I don't recall anyone giving them approval to define what is acceptable in the world of commentary.

I think you should ask this question, "Did we send the wrong message with this remark in front of this audience?" My guess is the answer would be "No, it was exactly what we wanted to say." The gestalt of the comment, I would argue, particularly when placed in the context of what your pals have been saying on the same subject, stretches beyond specifics, to use a comparison I am certain the secretary would understand.

It was pretty clear to me that the pack of you was suggesting anyone who is not on the team is waaaaay off the team. It seems a lot of other people got the same message.

If you are genuinely suggesting that you welcome criticism of the war from all corners, that you believe freedom of political expression requires some people to protest as strongly as possible, then put that in a letter and I will publish it in the column to make certain everyone knows where you and the secretary stand.

Finally, I am answering your letter because you took the time to write it and presented your case so thoughtfully. I am always eager to hear that kind of criticism and invite your comments at any opportunity. I still think 'he is as handsome as a Barrymore, not a bad thing.

Regards,



Charles M. Madigan  
Chicago Tribune

Ps. Tell the secretary I, too, have torn my left rotator cuff and it could be my lapse into crankiness is a function of that irritating and persistent problem.



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

September 6, 2006

Editor

AFP

1015 15<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W. Suite 500  
Washington, DC 20005

To the Editor:

AFP's September 5, 2006 article, "Rumsfeld undergoes surgery for bum shoulder," which mentioned Secretary Rumsfeld's address to the American Legion National Convention last week, was misleading and prevented your readers from **gaining** an accurate summary of the Secretary's remarks.

The article stated: "Last week, Rumsfeld linked critics of the wars in Iraq and against terrorism with those who appeased Nazis before World War II." This may have been the author's interpretation, but it is not anything the Secretary actually said. As even *The New York Times* noted:

"Mr. Rumsfeld's speech on Tuesday did not explicitly mention the Democrats, and he cited only comments by human rights groups and in press reports as evidence of what he described as 'moral or intellectual confusion about who or what is right or wrong.' ...he did not directly compare current critics of the war in Iraq to those who sought to appease Hitler, his juxtaposition of **the themes** led Democrats to say that he was leveling an unfair charge." (emphasis added)

Instead, the Secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people **bf** the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, *so* that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections -- rather than the nature of the enemy -- does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the Secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

Sincerely,

Bryan Whitman

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs



11-L-0559/OSD/60709

San Francisco Chronicle<sup>†</sup>  
September 13, 2006  
Pg. B8

## What Rumsfeld Said

Editor -- Edward Epstein's Sept. 6 article, which discussed Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's recent address to the American Legion national convention, was misleading and prevented your readers from gaining an accurate *summary* of the secretary's remarks.

Epstein implied the secretary's remarks referred to congressional Democrats and as "linking his critics to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policies of the late 1930s." This may have been Epstein's interpretation, but it is not anything the secretary said. Instead, the secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections -- rather than the nature of the enemy -- does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long, difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,**  
Washington

New York Times  
(Never published), Early Bird Sept. 19, 2006

## Letter RE: "A Sudden Sense of Urgency."

Your September 7, 2006 editorial, "A Sudden Sense of Urgency," asserts that the recent transfer of 14 CIA prisoners means that "President Bush finally has some real terrorists in Guantanamo Bay." This merits a correction.

Since its inception, terrorists that have been held at Guantánamo Bay have included personal **bodyguards** of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda recruiters, trainers, and facilitators. One notable individual held at Guantánamo was Mohamed al-Kahtani, believed to be the intended 20<sup>th</sup> hijacker on September 11<sup>th</sup>.

That many of these men are terrorists intent on doing America harm is not a simply an assertion made by the U.S. government, but something many detainees themselves have claimed, indeed boasted about. For example, in open commission hearings on March 1, Mr. Al Bahlul boasted five times that he was a member of Al Qaeda involved in an ongoing war against America. In open commission hearings on April 27, Mr. Al Sharbi said, "I'm going to make this easy for you guys: I'm proud of what I did and there isn't any reason of hiding ... I fought against the United States. I took up arms."

It is unfortunate that one of America's largest newspapers concludes these men *are* not "real terrorists."

**DORRANCE SMITH**, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs*

September 12, 2006

Editor  
*The Washington Post*  
1150 15th Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20071

To the Editor:

Al Kamen's recent column asserts that "Secretary of Defense *Donald Rumsfeld* implied last week that Iraq war critics were as misguided as *Neville Chamberlain* when he dealt with *Adolf Hitler*'s demands." This may have been Mr. Kamen's interpretation, but it is not anything the Secretary actually said. In fact, Secretary Rumsfeld never made a mention of "Iraq war critics" anywhere in his speech.

The Secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections -- rather than the nature of the enemy -- does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the Secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

Sincerely,

**Bryan Whitman**  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60712



## **Trials And Errors In The War On Terrorism**

"Bush's Detainee Plan Is Criticized [news story, Sept. 8] showed a lack of familiarity with military jurisprudence and was a superficial reading of the proposed legislation.

The authors asserted that "prosecutors would be permitted to use classified information to secure convictions; defendants and their lawyers would not be told about such information." The administration proposal for the admission of classified evidence does not deny defense counsel the opportunity to see and examine any evidence -- classified or unclassified -- to be introduced against an accused at trial.

~~Further~~, the accused may see classified information if the judge determines that it will not harm critical national security interests.

Finally, while it is true that "prosecutors could also rely on hearsay," such evidence must be deemed both relevant and reliable by the military judge -- the same standard the military judge will apply to hearsay evidence the defense offers. In addition, the administration proposal requires the military judge to exclude any evidence offered by the prosecution if its probative value -- its value in proving the case -- is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice against the accused.

BRYAN WHITMAN, ~~Deputy~~ Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, U.S. Defense Department, Washington

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette  
September 18, 2006

## **The Claim That Rumsfeld Forbade Postwar Planning Simply Isn't True**

The claim in the article "General: Iraq Postwar Plan Forbidden" (Sept. 9) that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld forbade war planners from developing a plan for securing Iraq and threatened to "fire" anyone who did is absurd. It simply did not happen.

The general quoted, Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, later publicly refuted the article saying it ~~was~~ a "manipulation of my words to stir controversy." Contrary to the suggestion by the article, the U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam Iraq in 2002 and included input from and consultation with all parts of the U.S. government -- the secretary's own policy office, the State Department and the National Security Council. A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command was specifically assigned the task of preparing for "Phase IV" -- the transition from major combat to security and stability operations. And in January 2003, after these weeks and months of preparation, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance ~~was~~ created to plan for and facilitate the administration of the country once the Saddam Hussein regime was disarmed and dispatched.

Furthermore, the article states the Secretary Rumsfeld "replaced" Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki after he supposedly disagreed with military leaders over troop levels in Iraq. In fact, Gen. Shinseki completed his full four-year term as service chief and retired on schedule.

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington, D.C.**

Newsweek  
September 18, 2006

## For The Record

Your depiction of Donald Rumsfeld's address to the American Legion is inaccurate. On the perspectives page and in "The 'Islamofascists'" (Sept. 11) you misrepresent his remarks as having "compared critics of the administration to those who sought to appease Hitler in the buildup to World War II." Rumsfeld did not say that. In fact, he never mentioned any critics of the **Iraq** war in his remarks. Instead, Rumsfeld's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history. He warned against a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections—a mentality that could undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists. We invite readers to view the full text of the remarks at [defenselink.mil/speeches](http://defenselink.mil/speeches).

Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

September 19, 2006

The Open Forum  
*The Denver Post*  
1560 Broadway  
Denver, CO 80202

To the Editor:

The assertion in your recent column ("Rumsfeld lecture out of line," 9/12/2006), that Secretary Rumsfeld declared that "those who criticize the administration suffer from 'moral and intellectual confusion'" in his remarks to the American Legion National Convention, is inaccurate. In fact, the Secretary warned that:

"[I]n any long struggle or long war, any kind of moral or intellectual confusion about who and what is right or wrong, can weaken the ability of free societies to persevere."

He did not equate this notion with critics of the administration. In fact, the secretary never mentioned any critics of the Iraq war in his remarks. This mischaracterization has been subsequently corrected by other major newspapers, such as *The New York Times*. We ask for a correction in your newspaper as well.

The Secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the Secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

Sincerely,

Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60716

Macon Telegraph  
September 26, 2006

## **Erroneous Claims**

The recent column "Time to change top leadership" contains the erroneous claims that "Secretary Rumsfeld successfully opposed the troop levels that military planners said would be necessary for the Iraq operation and the additional force needed to stabilize Iraq never materialized."

General Tommy Franks, the former commander of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate in July 2003, when he was still in command in Iraq, that "There has been the suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And in fact, I can tell you that if more troops are necessary, this secretary's going to say yes."

The secretary has regularly asked Gen. John Abizaid, the current commander of CENTCOM, and Gen. George Casey, the commander of Multinational Force - Iraq, if they have all the necessary resources, and, if not, what more is required to carry out a successful campaign. Commanders in the field have consistently said that they need more Iraqi forces, not American troops.

There are currently some 300,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces. There are 106 Iraqi army battalions currently taking part in combat operations. In fact, Iraqi forces now lead nearly 75 percent of combat operations in their respective areas. The capability of the Iraqi Security Forces continues to grow.

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Sec. of Defense, Washington, DC**

Richmond Times-Dispatch  
October 4, 2006

## War Plan Needs No Further Troops

Editor, Times-Dispatch The recent article, "Rumsfeld Criticized," contains the inaccurate claim that Secretary of Defense Donald "Rumsfeld altered [the Iraq war plan] considerably by sending in 'far too few' troops."

As Gen. Tommy Franks, the former commander of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate in July 2003, when he was still in command in Iraq: "There has been [the] suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And in fact, I can tell you . . . that if more troops are necessary, this secretary's going to say yes."

The secretary has regularly asked Gen. John Abizaid, the current commander of U.S. Central Command, and Gen. George Casey, the commander of Multinational Force-Iraq, if they have all the necessary resources, and, if not, what more is required to carry out a successful campaign. Commanders in the field have consistently said they need more capable Iraqi forces, not American troops. And with some 300,000 Iraqi Security Forces currently trained and equipped, that is exactly what is happening.

**Bryan Whitman**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

## Editorial Wrong About Rumsfeld

The assertions in a recent editorial ("Intimidation and deception," Sept. 14) that Secretary Rumsfeld "silenced all discussion of the need for a post-invasion plan for Iraq" and "threatened to fire" anyone who did are absurd.

The general quoted in the article, Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, publicly refuted the original article, explaining it was a "manipulation of my words to stir controversy."

The U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam Iraq in 2002. This planning included input from and consultation with all parts of the U.S. government -- including the secretary's own policy office, the State Department and the National Security Council.

A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command ~~was~~ specifically assigned the task of preparing for Phase IV -- the transition from major combat to security and stability operations.

And in January 2003, after these months of preparation, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was created to plan for and facilitate the administration of post-Saddam Iraq.

Furthermore, the editorial states that Secretary Rumsfeld "fired" Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki after he supposedly disagreed with military leaders over troop levels in Iraq.

In fact, Gen. Shinseki completed his full four-year term as service chief and retired on schedule.

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs**

Buffalo (NY) News  
September 23, 2006

## **U.S. Military Did Have Plan For Postwar Iraq**

The assertions in the Sept. 15 News editorial, "Fire Rumsfeld," that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld "had forbidden military strategists to plan for securing postwar Iraq" and "threatened to fire" anyone who did are absurd. The general quoted in the column, Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, publicly refuted the original article, explaining it was a "manipulation of my words to stir controversy."

The U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam ~~Iraq~~ *in 2002*. This planning included input from all **parts** of the U.S. government, including the secretary's own policy office, the State Department and the National Security Council. A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command was specifically assigned the task of preparing for "Phase IV," the transition **from** major combat to security and stability operations. And in January 2003, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was created to plan for and facilitate the administration of post-Saddam Iraq.

Furthermore, the editorial stated that Rumsfeld "cashier[ed]" Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki after he supposedly disagreed with military leaders over troop levels *in Iraq*. In fact, Shinseki completed his full four-year term as service chief and retired **on schedule**.

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington, D.C.**



## War In Iraq Was Not A Secret Plot

Editor:

A recent editorial ("Iraq: War planned in 1990s," Sept. 16) purports to lay out "a chronology of what caused the Iraq war," and boldly asserts that "Bush insiders," "neoconservatives," "advisers to Israel" and an "Iran-Contraconspirator" secretly "plotted the Iraq war for at least a decade." Unfortunately, the cherry-picked quotations in the editorial omit key facts that any honest chronology would include.

In 1998, the U.S. Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which declared "it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government." President Clinton, 360 congressmen and 100 senators supported this measure.

**Then**, in 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution. President Bush, 296 congressmen and 77 **senators** supported **this** measure. As Sen. Hillary Clinton noted, "[Saddam] has **also** given aid, comfort and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaida members. ... **This** much is undisputed."

These pieces of legislation, passed overwhelmingly by members of Congress from both parties, and signed by Presidents Clinton and Bush respectively, put lie to the claim the war was "planned in secret" by "neoconservatives."

**Bryan Whitman**, Deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, Washington, D.C.

Kansas City Star  
September 23, 2006

## What Rumsfeld Said

The assertion in a recent article (9/17, Books, "Who's to blame for the war"), that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld "accused Iraq war critics of" in his remarks to the American suffering 'moral or intellectual confusion' Legion National Convention, is inaccurate.

The secretary warned that:

"In any long struggle or long war, any kind of moral or intellectual confusion about who and what is right or wrong can weaken the ability of free societies to persevere."

He did not equate this notion with critics of the administration. In fact, the secretary never mentioned any critics of the Iraq war in his remarks. This mischaracterization has been subsequently corrected by other major newspapers, such as *The New York Times*. We ask for a correction in your newspaper as well.

The secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

Dorrance Smith, Assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, Washington, D.C.

Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel  
October 2, 2006  
Pg. 16

## **Column Misquotes Rumsfeld Remarks**

The assertion in **Kurt Stone's** column, "Put Rumsfeld out to pasture" (Sept. 18), that Secretary Rumsfeld declared "that anyone who questions the American military's continuing role in Iraq...is morally and intellectually confused" in his remarks to the American Legion National Convention, is false.

First, Stone simply misquotes the secretary. Second, the secretary actually warned that: "[I]n any long struggle or long war, any kind of moral or intellectual confusion about who and what is right or wrong, can weaken the ability of free societies to persevere." He did not equate this notion with critics of the administration. In fact, the secretary never mentioned any critics of the *Iraq* war in his remarks.

Perhaps it would better serve your readers if your columnist precisely characterized Secretary Rumsfeld's speech. The secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists,

We invite your readers to read the full text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.**

## **Absurd Editorial**

The assertions in a recent editorial ("General: Rumsfeld scotched post-war planning for Iraq," Sept. 18) that Secretary Rumsfeld forbade war planners from developing a plan for securing Iraq and threatened to "fire" anyone who did are absurd. The general quoted, Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, publicly refuted the article cited, explaining it was a "manipulation of my words to stir controversy."

Contrary to the suggestion in the column, the U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam Iraq in 2002. This planning included input from and consultation with all parts of the U.S. Government -- the Secretary's own policy office, the State Department, and the National Security Council.

A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command was specifically assigned the task of preparing for "Phase IV" -- the transition from major combat to security and stability operations. And in January 2003, after these months of preparation, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was created to plan for and facilitate the administration of post-Saddam Iraq.

Furthermore, the article states that Secretary Rumsfeld "shunted aside" Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki after he supposedly disagreed with military leaders over troop levels in Iraq. In fact, General Shinseki completed his full four-year term as service chief and retired on schedule.

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington, D. C.**

National Post (Canada)  
September 22, 2006

## **Iraqi Troops Are Winning The War**

The recent article ("Why we're losing", 9/19/2006) contains the erroneous claim that in Iraq "150,000 U.S. troops have been trying to win a war that, from the very beginning, called for double or triple that number." This is doubly misleading.

First, it implies that Secretary Rumsfeld has opposed sending more troops to Iraq if that proves necessary. As General Tommy Franks told the Senate in July 2003, while still in command in Iraq: "There has been [the] suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And in fact, I can tell you ... that if more troops are necessary, this secretary's going to say yes." Since then, the Secretary has regularly asked General John Abizaid, the current commander of U.S. Central Command, and General George Casey, the commander of Multinational Force – Iraq, if they have all the necessary resources, and, if not, what more is required to carry out a successful campaign. Commanders in the field have consistently said that they need more capable Iraqi forces, not American troops. This is what has occurred over the past three years.

There are now, in fact, "double or triple that number" of troops in Iraq, as some 300,000 Iraqi Security Forces are now trained and equipped. 106 Iraqi Army battalions are currently taking part in combat operations. In fact, Iraqi forces now lead nearly 75 percent of combat operations in their respective areas. The capability of the Iraqi Security Forces continues to grow.

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs**

Albany Times-Union

September 22, 2006

## **Column Included Wrong Portrayal Of Rumsfeld**

Two assertions in Robert Seltzer's recent column ("Living in confusing times," **Sept. 19**) are inaccurate.

First, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld did not merely say "my goodness," responding to Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton during Senate hearings in August, nor did he treat her "as if the senator were some junior leaguer."

He offered a point-by-point response to Senator Clinton's concerns, reflecting on such issues as the level of violence in Iraq, U.S. troop levels in Iraq, how the Iraqi Army largely disbanded itself, and the steps taken by the government planning for post-war Iraq.

Second, the secretary did not liken critics of the Iraq war to "weak-kneed politicians who tried to appease the Nazis" in his remarks to the American Legion National Convention.

In fact, the secretary never mentioned any critics of the Iraq war in his remarks. This mistaken interpretation of the secretary's remarks was corrected by The New York Times and the AP.

Instead, the secretary's remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, so that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats while focusing nearly exclusively on American imperfections does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in what will be a long and difficult struggle against violent extremists.

We invite your readers to read the full text of the secretary's remarks at [www.defenselink.mil/speeches](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches).

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington, D.C.**

## A Truly Multinational Force Is Moving Afghanistan Forward

The assertions made in Carl Robichaud's Sept. 21 Opinion piece, "Failings of the Rumsfeld doctrine," that "America's efforts in Afghanistan... are unraveling" due in part to America's supposed failure to lead a "genuinely multinational force" are baseless.

Today, NATO holds operational responsibility for over three-quarters of Afghanistan. Some 20,000 troops from 37 NATO and non-NATO nations are committed to the effort. (This is in addition to the roughly 20,000 US forces in the country.) One wonders exactly how many countries need to be involved before a mission moves from being a "handful of Western countries" to "genuinely multinational" in Mr. Robichaud's book.

The only efforts that are "unraveling" are those of our enemies, as Qari Mohammed Yousaf Ahmadi, generally viewed as the Taliban's chief spokesman, stated on Sept. 15: "The Taliban forces have conducted a tactical retreat."

As Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, commanding general of Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan noted last month: "NATO and US-led coalition and Afghan national security forces are moving aggressively to deny the enemy safe havens, to interdict his movement roots, and most importantly to extend the authority of the central government....[T]he progress we're making in Afghanistan is significant."

Dorrance Smith, Washington, Assistant secretary of defense for public affairs

New York Times  
September 26, 2006

## **The Rumsfeld Way: Squash As Metaphor**

To the Editor:

“Rumsfeld Also Plays Hardball on Pentagon’s Squash Courts” (front page, **Sept. 24**):

Your front-page article includes a comment by someone who is acknowledged not to ever have played Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld at squash.

I have played **him**, probably hundreds of games. In addition to being a focused, aggressive player, Mr. Rumsfeld is fastidious about points and rules.

I have worked closely with Mr. Rumsfeld, in addition to being a frequent competitor in squash. I have learned this above all else about him:

In squash and in life, **Mr.** Rumsfeld succeeds precisely because he masters and adheres to **the** rules of whatever he is doing.

Not knowing this about him is to not know him, and clearly the individual quoted in your article does not.

**Larry DiRita, Potomac, Md., Sept. 24, 2006**

*The writer is a former Pentagon spokesman.*



El Diario/La Prensa (New York City)  
September 29, 2006

## From The Secretary Of Defense

The assertions in a recent editorial ("On Rumsfeld," 9/26/2006) that Secretary Rumsfeld "had forbidden military strategists to plan for securing postwar Iraq" and that he was either "willfully blind" or "acted to mislead" are absurd. The general quoted, Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, later refuted the original article cited in this column, explaining it was a "manipulation of my words to stir controversy."

The U.S. military began planning for post-Saddam Iraq in 2002. This planning included input from and consultation with all parts of the U.S. Government. A group of American and Allied officers at Central Command was specifically assigned the task of preparing for "Phase IV" – the transition from major combat to security and stability operations. And in January 2003, after these months of preparation, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was created to plan for and facilitate the administration of post-Saddam Iraq.

Furthermore, Secretary Rumsfeld has consistently been realistic about how difficult the War on Terror will be. For instance, in October, 2003 he noted: "It's a tough hard slog... There's no question but that what we're doing in Afghanistan and Iraq is difficult work, it's dangerous work. It is work that is important, it has to be done, and we're making progress." That observation remains true today.

Sincerely,

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs**

**Current News Editor's Note:** The editorial referred to originally appeared in the *Buffalo News* on Sept. 15, 2006. The following text is the above letter as it appeared in the Spanish-language El Diario/La Prensa.

### ***Desde la Secretaría de Defensa***

*Las afirmaciones en un reciente editorial ('Sobre Rumsfeld', 9/26/2006) de que el Secretario Rumsfeld "ha prohibido que estrategias militares planean sobre la seguridad de la Ira de postguerra" y que fue "voluntariamente ciego" o "actuó para engañar" son absurdas. El general citado, Brigadier General Mark Scheid, posteriormente refutó el artículo original citado en este editorial, explicando que se trató de una "manipulación de mis palabras para desatar controversia".*

*Las Fuerzas Armadas de EE.UU. comenzaron a planear para la Irak post-Saddam en el 2002. Este planeamiento incluyó asesoría y consulta con todas las partes del gobierno federal. A un grupo de americanos y oficiales aliados en el Comando Central le fue específicamente asignada la tarea de prepararse para la "Fase IV" — la transición de*

*combate mayor a operaciones de seguridad y estabilidad. Y en enero del 2003, tras estos meses de preparaci3n, la Oficina de Reconstrucci3n y Asistencia Humanitaria fue creada para planear y facilitar la administraci3n de un Irak post-Saddam.*

*M3s a3n, el Secretario Rumsfeld consistentemente ha sido realista sobre qu3 tan dif3cil ser3 la Guerra contra el Terrorismo. Por ejemplo, en octubre, 2003 3l declar3 "es un tronco duro y dif3cil ... no hay dudas de que lo que hacemos en Afganist3n e Irak es trabajo dif3cil, es trabajopeligroso. Es trabajo importante, que tiene que ser hecho, y estamos haciendo progreso". Esa observaci3n sigue siendo verdad hoy.*

*Bryan Whitman, Subsecretario de Defensa para Asuntos P3blicos*

## Additional 'Letters To The Editor'

*NOTE: The following letters are unedited and reflect only the views of the author.*

Warren P. Strobel's and William Douglas's recent article ("Pentagon study claims U.S. broadcasts to Iran aren't tough enough") is riddled with errors, starting with the first sentence. The reporters' claim that a "Pentagon Unit has drafted a report" on U.S. radio broadcasts into Iran is incorrect in every respect.

An individual DoD employee because of specific language skills was asked by an interagency committee on Iran policy to monitor and personally evaluate U.S. broadcasting into Iran. She did so. There was no "Pentagon report." The charge made that there is a "gambit" underway by the Pentagon to take control of Iranian broadcasts is simply wrong.

Unfortunately, the remainder of the article follows a similar course, insinuating repeatedly that the Pentagon is preparing for a confrontation with Iran. Again, the facts interfere with a good story. The President and Secretary of State are on a diplomatic track with Iran, and there is no daylight between their policy and the Department of Defense.

Strobel and Douglas even referenced the now-defunct Office of Special Plans, even though the myths surrounding that entity and repeated in this article were thoroughly discredited by the Robb-Silberman Commission and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Finally, contrary to the article's insinuations, having an Iran policy office at the Pentagon is not a mystery. In both State and Defense, the Near East bureaus have offices dealing with Iran, as well as offices dealing with policy toward every other country in the region. These Iran offices were established to support closer interagency work on Iran policy, not for imagined or nefarious purposes.

We ask that these errors be corrected.

Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

23 October 2006

Editor  
AFP  
1015 15<sup>th</sup> Street, NW, Suite 500  
Washington, D.C. 20005

To the Editor:

A recent article ("Rumsfeld admits progress...," Oct. 7, 2006) selectively quotes from Secretary Rumsfeld's recent column about Afghanistan in a way that created a misleading impression of the Secretary's views.

The Secretary did note that "not all the news about Afghanistan is encouraging," but went on to explain that "for all of the challenges the Afghan people face, there are many promising indicators." For example, he mentioned

- "Security: The Afghan National Army has grown to more than 30,000 ... The *Afghan* National Police now number more than 46,000";
- "Economy: The size of Afghanistan's economy has tripled in the past five years, and is projected to increase another 20 percent next year"; and
- "Health Care: In 2001 only 8 percent of Afghans had access to at least basic health care; at least 80 percent do today."

Secretary Rumsfeld concluded by noting that Afghanistan's overall trajectory is "a hopeful and promising one." This summation was also conspicuously not reflected in your article.

Sincerely,

Bryan G. Whitman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs



11-L-0559/OSD/60732

The Sunday Times (London)  
Oct. 15, 2006

## **Letter RE: "Time for a change in Iraq"**

A recent article ("Time for a change in **Iraq**," Oct. 8, 2006) contains a number of erroneous claims, two of which especially merit a response.

First, the claim that **Iraq** is in "chaos" due to "politicians making military decisions" is false. Commanders in the field have consistently determined troop levels and other military matters. Regarding troop levels, commanders have emphasized the need for more capable Iraqi forces, not additional American troops. As General Abizaid, Commander U.S. Central Command, explained

"I think those 'experts' want the U.S. troops to do all the work. And General Casey and I don't want U.S. troops to do all the work. It's very, very clear to both of us that, in order to win in **Iraq**, the Iraqis have to assume more and more responsibility. And they're doing that, and we intend to keep doing that."

Second, the claim that "Rumsfeld froze out others in the administration, refusing even to return their calls" is false. This myth is derived from a passage in Bob Woodward's recent book where Secretary Rumsfeld supposedly refuses to return then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice's phone calls. Secretary Rice has described **this** claim as "ridiculous," and stated "Secretary Rumsfeld has never refused to return my phone calls." Secretary Rumsfeld similarly described this as "nonsense."

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy assistant secretary of defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington**

## An Ongoing Question

Your editorial urging the administration to commit more troops to Iraq merits comment ("More Troops," Oct. 9). As Secretary Rumsfeld has explained, determining troop levels is more an ~~art~~ than a science. But it is an ~~art~~ that requires a ~~firm~~ understanding of the present conditions on the ground.

Those with the best vantage point, the commanders in Iraq, have consistently said that American troops are at the level they believe is required. They say that they need more capable Iraqi forces, not American troops. As General Abizaid explained recently, "This notion that troop levels are static is not true, never has been true, and it won't be true. We will ask for what we need when we need them. But it's key that the Iraqi military take on more and more responsibility."

U.S. troop levels have fluctuated ~~as~~ the conditions in Iraq have evolved. Recently, ~~as~~ your editorial noted, troop levels in Baghdad increased ~~to help~~ Iraqis quell sectarian violence. It is simply incorrect to suggest, ~~as NR~~ does, that the military and civilian leadership has been willing "to commit only enough forces not to lose." The Department of Defense is committed to victory, and will continue to rely heavily on the advice of military experts with firsthand knowledge of the battlefield.

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, The Pentagon**

New York Daily News  
October 30, 2006  
Pg. 14

## Defense For The Defense

Washington: Daily News columnist Michael Daly's characterization of the National Intelligence Estimate and claims about Defense Secretary Rumsfeld are misleading ("Forget Joe, fire Rummy," Oct. 10). Daly selectively quotes the NIE finding that Iraq has become "a cause celebre for jihadists" but leaves out another finding: "Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight." Of equal concern is Daly's claim that Rumsfeld "pushed" for an invasion of Iraq; that is simply not true. Finally, we strongly disagree that we entered Iraq "with considerably less troops than our best military minds considered necessary." The troop-level decision was based on recommendations by many decorated military leaders.

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense**

Christian Science Monitor  
October 16, 2006

## State Department Has Been Active In Iraq

John Hughes's Oct. 11 Opinion column, "Problems in Iraq should not deter US commitment to freedom," makes the false assertion that postwar problems in Iraq are due in part to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's "apparent decision to sideline the State Department."

The State Department was well represented on the ~~staff~~ of Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (US Army, ~~ret.~~) and in the Coalition Provisional Authority. Many ~~senior~~ staff members with Coalition Provisional Administrator Ambassador L. Paul Bremer were from the State Department.

And senior State Department officials served ~~as~~ advisers heading Iraqi ministries prior to the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. To claim that the State Department was "sidelined" is simply inaccurate.

**Bryan Whitman, Deputy assistant secretary of defense for Public Affairs,  
Washington**



U.S. News & World Report  
November 6, 2006

## A Challenge On Iraq

Mortimer B. Zuckerman's Recent column "A Sad Litany of Failures" [October 23] merits a response. Zuckerman claims violence in Iraq may have "cost more than 600,000 Iraqis their lives," yet fails to note this figure has been challenged. Michael E. O'Hanlon, an expert on Iraq policy at the Brookings Institution, noted: "I do not believe the new numbers. I think they're way ~~off~~." An Iraqi blogger wrote that the authors of this study "resorted to mathematics" when the statistics "did not satisfy their lust for more deaths." Zuckerman claims one of "the single most damaging move[s] in postwar Iraq ... [was] the swift dissolution of the Iraqi military." Yet, although officially disbanded by coalition officials, the Iraqi military largely disbanded itself. **As** the commander of the best-equipped division in the Iraqi military, the Republican Guard Al-Nida Division, explained "I started the war with 13,000 soldiers. By the time we had orders to pull back to Baghdad, I had less than 2,000; by the time we were in position in Baghdad, I had less than 1,000. Every day the desertions increased. We had no engagements with American forces." Finally, Zuckerman used Bob Woodward's latest book to attack Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. However, as other scenes concocted by Woodward have been variously described **as** "a lie" by President George H. W. Bush, "ridiculous" by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and "nonsense" by Secretary Rumsfeld, his assertions are hardly "devastating."

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs**

**Editor's Note:** The column referred to appeared in the *Current News Early Bird*, Oct. 15, 2006, from the *New York Daily News* ("A Mountain Of Mistakes.")

Washington Post  
October 28, 2006  
Pg. 13

## Rep. Murtha Draws Fire From Defense

In "Confessions of a 'Defeatocrat'" [Outlook, Oct. 15], Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) made a number of inaccurate claims about Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and the Defense Department.

By selectively quoting from the secretary's recent address to the American Legion, Murtha claimed that Rumsfeld has faulted Democrats "for believing that 'vicious extremists can be appeased.'" Yet Rumsfeld did not mention congressional Democrats in his remarks -- in fact he didn't mention any critics of the Iraq war. His remarks were an effort to remind people of the similarities between past and current periods in U.S. history, *so* that a mentality of dismissing real and gathering threats does not undermine our nation's ability to prevail in the war on terror.

Murtha's claim that the Defense Department has "a new military blueprint to keep 140,000 troops in Iraq through 2010" is a mischaracterization of comments made by Gen. Pete Schoomaker, Army chief of staff. The Army plans for a variety of contingencies. Schoomaker's comments on the Army planning for potential scenarios in Iraqis are one example of this. None of this should be understood as a forecast for the commitment of U.S. forces,

Murtha claimed that Gen. Eric Shinseki's recommendation for "several hundred thousand troops . . . was ignored." As Gen. Richard Myers, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, noted in congressional testimony in June 2004, Shinseki provided no recommendation on troop levels to the Joint Chiefs. Despite Shinseki's public comments, there was thus no recommendation to ignore.

Finally, Murtha claimed that the "Iraqi army was disbanded," a decision he blames for subsequent violence. Although officially disbanded by Coalition Provisional Authority officials, the Iraqi military largely disbanded itself. As the commander of the best-equipped division in the Iraqi military, the Republican Guard's armored al-Nida Division, explained:

"I started the war with 13,000 soldiers. By the time we had orders to pull back to Baghdad, I had less than 2,000; by the time we were in position in Baghdad, I had less than 1,000. Every day the desertions increased. We had no engagements with American forces."

**Dorrance Smith**, Washington

*The writer is assistant secretary for public affairs in the Defense Department.*

**Editor's Note:** The op-ed by Murtha appeared in the *Current News Early Bird*, October 15, 2006.



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 26, 2006

Editor

**Fort Worth Star-Telegram**

309 West 7th St., Suite 1414

Fort Worth, TX 76102

To the Editor:

Bob Cox's October 15th article on the Army and the budget ("Army leads way in battle for the budget") included a fairly egregious error – one that requires a correction.

Mr. Cox is incorrect when he writes, "Breaking with all precedent, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld gave Schoomaker permission to plead his case directly with the Office of Management and Budget. Schoomaker has said in recent days that the budget discussions are continuing." Though a number of news outlets have reported on the budget process using similar language, there is simply no truth in the assertion whatsoever. Secretary Rumsfeld did not grant any special permission "breaking with all precedent" to General Schoomaker. Any discussions the Army had with the Office of Management and Budget were part of the usual process by which the defense budget is constructed. There is nothing out of the ordinary about this.

Please correct this ~~error~~ for your readers.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dorrance Smith", is written over the word "Sincerely,".

Dorrance Smith

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public  
Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60739

Weekly Standard  
November 6, 2006  
Pg. 5

## Defending The DoD

William Kristol's "Huffing and Puffing" (Oct. 23) manipulates Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's comments at a recent press conference and misleads your readers. Kristol quotes at length from the October 11 press conference during which the secretary opened his remarks by noting the sixth anniversary of the terrorist attack on the **USS Cole**. The secretary then moved into a discussion of the threat posed by North Korea.

Kristol interrupts Secretary Rumsfeld's remarks by interjecting a question, asking, "But on the sixth anniversary of the attack on the *USS Cole*, what are we doing about these threats and trends?" He then proceeds to use the rest of the secretary's remarks--in which **Mr.** Rumsfeld discusses the need for the cooperation of the international community on stopping North Korea--to answer a question the secretary was never asked.

Kristol conducts this misleading parsing of Secretary Rumsfeld's statement so that he can make his point that, in his words, "the lesson Rumsfeld takes from the *USS Cole*, and *all that happened since*, is this: 'We're dependent on the 'international community' and we need to cooperate with others'" (emphasis added).

Though it may strike some **as** odd that Kristol takes issue with the notion of the "need to cooperate with others," Secretary Rumsfeld said nothing of the sort. His discussion of the international community pertained specifically to the president's policy on North Korea, not our reaction to the *Cole* bombing or other terrorist attacks. If anything, in fact, the secretary's comments on the international community could be read as exactly the opposite of what Kristol implies. Indeed, a few days earlier, the secretary noted at another press event that "the international community's going to have to do a lot better or else face a world that will be quite different, with multiple nuclear nations and . . . the added risk of these very lethal weapons falling into the hands of nonstate entities."

A full transcript of the secretary's comments in both press conferences--absent Kristol's commentary--is available at [www.defenselink.mil/transcripts](http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts).

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.**



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 24, 2006

Editor  
*The Baltimore Sun*  
501 North Calvert Street  
Baltimore, MD 21278

To The Editor:

We recently became aware of your October 1, 2006 article, "More Troops Not Solution To Iraq Crisis, Experts Say." The article, by reporter David Wood, states a number of opinions as if they are **facts**. Simply because these criticisms were printed in books does not mean they are true. Several assertions merit correction.

Mr. Wood, for example writes that "[b]y late last year, even the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. John Abizaid, was fed up." This apparently is based on a quote that General Abizaid supposedly made to an unnamed **friend**, according to an account by another reporter, Bob Woodward, who was not present at the original conversation. General Abizaid has disputed Mr Woodward's account. This was not mentioned in your article.

To cite a more egregious example, **Mr. Wood** writes the following: "The Army's first estimate, that 400,000 to 450,000 would be needed for the occupation, was extrapolated from its peacekeeping experience in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. But that plan was rejected by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, according to the memoirs of retired Gen. Tommy Franks, the top U.S. commander at the time."

General Franks's book in fact said that Secretary Rumsfeld asked General Franks **to** update the existing war plan for Iraq, but never suggested or rejected any size force that General Franks deemed necessary. According to the very source **Mr. Woodward** cites, it was in fact General Franks who recommended a smaller force. On page 333 of his memoirs, General Franks wrote: "As I concluded my summary of the existing 1003 plan, I noted that we'd trimmed planned force levels from 500,000 troops to around 400,000. But even that was still way too large, I told the Secretary." General Franks also notes on a number of occasions that rather than "rejecting.. military advice, Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly listened to commanders' advice in designing a plan for Iraq. On page 313, for example, General Franks wrote, "Don Rumsfeld was a hard taskmaster - but he never tried to control the tactics of our war-fight."

If you cannot provide us with the documentation used to make Mr. Wood's assertion about General Franks' memoirs, we **ask** that you correct this error for your readers.

11-L-0559/OSD/60741

Mr. Wood then noted the following: "Rumsfeld disputed an assertion in the memoirs of L. Paul Bremer, the former top U.S. civilian official in Iraq, that Bremer had asked for additional troops in the summer of 2003 and been ignored." Mr. Wood fails to mention that in a TV interview earlier this year, Mr. Bremer himself backed away from the claim made in his book. He stated that "[Rumsfeld] said he'd received it and would consider it and he ~~did~~ he consider it."

Mr. Wood also writes "a review of the record shows that the Bush administration made decisions to keep troop levels low in Iraq and that in the uncontrolled chaos that followed, the insurgency took hold." Who conducted this "review"? Was it Mr. Wood? Was it Bob Woodward? Was it based on an opinion by a retired general Mr. Wood cites? Was the Pentagon asked to comment on this "review"? Why not?

In addition to correcting errors of fact, we therefore also ask that a clarification be issued on the larger article itself – to make clear to your readers that many of the assertions made by Mr. Wood were opinions, not facts, and are disputed by the Department of Defense, which was not asked to comment for the article.

*Thank you for your prompt attention.*

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dorrance Smith", written over the typed name.

Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 26, 2006

Editor  
USA Today  
Gannett Co., Inc.  
7950 Jones Branch Drive  
McLean, VA 22107

To the Editor:

The Department of Defense and Secretary Rumsfeld shares Chairman Hyde's concern over the ties between extremists and drug trafficking. This is why Coalition forces have made numerous seizures of drug shipments and arrests of those who traffic them over the past five years. However, in focusing solely on DoD efforts, your article discussing Chairman Hyde's letter (Hyde Asks Rumsfeld To Bolster Fight Against Afghan Heroin, October 24, 2006) oversimplifies counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan.

There is a tendency, by some, to see the military as the means to accomplish every mission from the global war on terrorism to tsunami and earthquake relief efforts. However, the decades-old drug trade in Afghanistan is larger and more complex than any one Department should or does undertake. Your article overlooks the efforts of the State Department, who has the American lead on this issue and other U.S. Departments and agencies. In addition there is the role of allies and particularly the sovereign Afghan government who carries the ultimate responsibility for issues within their borders. Only through close cooperation between all entities will drug traffickers be defeated.

The Department of Defense has accomplished a great deal in Afghanistan. You can read about it in the Five-Year Afghanistan Report at <http://defenseLink.mil/home/docuupdate/documents/20062006b.html>.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dorrance Smith".

Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60743

Unpublished  
October 24, 2006

## Letter To The New York Times

To the Editor:

The New York Times has once again repeated a popular **myth** to mislead its readers about Secretary Rumsfeld. We ask for an immediate correction.

Today's editorial claims: "There have never been enough troops, the result of Mr. Rumsfeld's negligent decision to use Iraq as a proving ground for his pet military theories, rather than listen to his generals." Whether or not the Times believes there were enough troops in Iraq, the claim that any troop level in Iraq is the result of Secretary Rumsfeld "not listening to his generals" is demonstrably untrue.

Generals involved in troop level decisions have been abundantly clear on this matter:

\*General Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command during the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom: "Don Rumsfeld was a hard task master -- but he never tried to control the tactics of our war-fight [Franks, "American Soldier," pg 313]

Rather than advancing Secretary Rumsfeld's alleged "pet theories," General Franks wrote that he based his troop level recommendations on the following: "Building up a Desert Storm-size force in Kuwait would have taken months of effort - very visible effort - and would have sacrificed the crucial element of operational surprise we now enjoyed. . . . And if operational surprise had been sacrificed, I suspected that the Iraqis would have repositioned their Republican Guard and regular army units, making for an attrition slugfest that would cost thousands of lives."

On page 333 of his memoirs, General Franks added: "As I concluded my summary of the existing 1003 plan, I noted that we'd trimmed **planned** force levels from 500,000 troops to around 400,000. But even that **was** still way too large, I told the Secretary." General Franks also notes on a number of occasions that rather than "rejecting" military advice, Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly listened to commanders' advice in designing a plan for Iraq.

\*General George Casey, Commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq: "I just want to assure you and the American people that if we need more troops we'll ask for them. Right now, we don't." [CBS News, June 27, 2005]

\*General John Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command: "...this notion that troop levels are static is not true, never has been true, and it won't be true. We'll ask for what we need when we need them." [CNN, September 18, 2006]

\*Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of **Staff** General Pete Pace: "We have done more than honor the request of the commanders. . . . As Joint Chiefs, we have validated that; we have looked at that; we have analyzed it. We decided for ourselves, and I as an individual have agreed with the size force that's there. So we should take on the responsibility that we own." [Pace Confirmation Hearings, Transcript, July 10, 2005]

\*Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers: "But in the plan going in there,



the best military judgment, the judgment we got from academia, from anybody that wanted to make inputs to include the National ~~Security~~ Council was that we had the right number of troops. And so you can always look back and say, should we had something different? I personally don't believe - we didn't want to turn Iraq into a police state." [ABCNews, April 16, 2006]

These statements are not new, nor difficult to find in public sources. So the implication is that either the New York Times believes these generals are not being truthful, or that they are too intimidated to tell the truth. If the Times feels this way, way not say so? For our part, we vigorously dispute either assertion about these distinguished military leaders.

The Times claims to correct "all errors of fact." Please correct this at once or provide us with demonstrable facts that support your assertion.

Sincerely,

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs**

**Editor's Note:** *The New York Times* has refused a DoD request for a correction.

Washington Post  
November 1, 2006  
Pg. 20

## **Mr. Rumsfeld And Iraq**

The Oct. 27 article and the accompanying headline "Rumsfeld Tells Iraq Critics to 'Back Off,' " incorrectly said that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's comments in his Oct. 26 news conference were aimed at "detractors" and "critics." In fact, the secretary was referring specifically to journalists seeking to create a perception of major divisions between the positions of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.

Mr. Rumsfeld was not referring to critics of the administration's Iraq policy.

**Dorrance Smith, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington**



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 31, 2006

Editor  
*USA Today*  
Gannett Co., Inc.  
7950 Jones Branch Drive  
McLean, VA 22107

To the Editor:

The assertion in a recent article ("Army to spread burden of combat" 10/27/2006) that "the Army announced this month that it plans to maintain its current force level in Iraq through 2010" mischaracterizes comments made by General Pete Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the Army.

The Army plans for a variety of contingences. General Schoomaker's comments on the Army planning for potential scenarios in Iraq is one example of this. Yet as General Schoomaker said, none of ~~this~~ should be understood as a forecast for the actual commitment of U.S. forces in the future.

Sincerely,

Bryan Whitman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs



11-L-0559/OSD/60747



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 25, 2006

Editor  
*U.S. News and World Report*  
1050 Thomas Jefferson Street NW  
Washington, DC 20007

To the Editor:

Anna Mulrine's October 30th article on the Army and ~~the~~ budget ("The Third Battlefront: Money") included a fairly egregious error – one that requires a correction.

Ms. Mulrine is incorrect when she attempts to convey the Army's contact with the Office of Management and Budget as unprecedented, or "a shocker." Though a number of news outlets have reported on the budget process using similar language, there is simply no truth in the assertion whatsoever. Secretary Rumsfeld did not grant any special permission breaking with any "precedent" to General Schoomaker; ~~any~~ discussions the Army had with the Office of Management and Budget were part of the usual process by which the defense budget is constructed. There is nothing out of the ordinary about this.

Please correct this error for **your** readers.

Sincerely,

Dorrance Smith  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public  
Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/60748

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**Defense fires back**

Thursday, November 02, 2006

I read your editorial concerning the Defense Department's ongoing efforts to modernize its public affairs operation ("Casualties, votes and the battle for hearts and minds," Oct. 31) with great interest.

We have always felt it is important to correct inaccuracies or misunderstandings about the department and what it does.

Your claims that these efforts may somehow be related to the upcoming election or are an attempt at "molding Americans' views of the Iraq war" are unfounded. The department's efforts have not focused solely on the Iraq war.

We have also dealt with such issues as NATO's growing role in Afghanistan, U.S. government broadcasts into Iran and the readiness of the U.S. military. Efforts to improve the department's public affairs operation have been going on for nearly a year, and are unrelated to the electoral calendar.

They are simply the outgrowth of our firm belief that it is the government's — and the media's — duty to convey the truth to the public.

BRYAN WHITMAN, Deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, Washington, D.C.

**Property taxes strain seniors**

At a time when a late Scott Lamm of The Oregonian for bringing up a price we lower-income elderly homeowners worry about ("Tax votes stick seniors with dollar dilemma," Oct. 29).

My husband and I live on Social Security. Every year, our property taxes come right out four and a half percent of our income. It's very hard to vote for any bond levy if it will increase this yearly drain on our safety net.

I strongly agree that Oregon either has to fund its bond levies some other way than by property tax, or provide us seniors and disabled with a reality-based discount. A tax break won't help, because we have too little income to pay any.

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## What Rumsfeld Said

Regarding the article "White House fires back at McCain's comment on Iraq," (Nation, Aug. 24), it is important to note that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has, from the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, attempted to strike a balance in his comments on the situation in that country.

The secretary has properly noted the accomplishments of the U.S. military and the progress made by the Iraqi people — accomplishments often overshadowed by the reports of violence that have come to dominate the 24-hour news cycle — while at the same time reminding the public and the press just how difficult and unprecedented the task is, and will be, for some time.

Regarding the term "dead enders," the secretary was specifically referring to remnants of the former regime who — harboring delusions of returning to power and privilege — were fighting the coalition and terrorizing other Iraqis along with foreign jihadists and thousands of criminals released from jail prior to the war.

On April 9, 2003, when the liberation of Baghdad by coalition forces was causing euphoria in many quarters, the secretary offered this assessment: "There is no question that there are difficult and very dangerous days ahead and that the fighting will continue for some period."

On the effort in Iraq, Mr. Rumsfeld has also said:

"This is a tough business, and wars are unpredictable and there [are] lots of difficulties." ? March 25, 2003;

"If some analysts want to say its going to be a cakewalk, and it turns out not to be a cakewalk, the fact of the matter is we have said repeatedly [that] we can't say how long it will last. We do not know. It is not knowable." ? March 25, 2003;

"I'm realistic. I'm not going to suggest it's easy. It's hard. It's very difficult. The biggest concern I have is that [the Iraqi] people are undoubtedly starved by 35 years of political repression and economic repression." ? October 10, 2003;

"It's a tough, hard slog...What we're doing in Afghanistan and Iraq is difficult work, it's dangerous work." ? October 27, 2003.

DORRANCE SMITH, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington

Washington Times  
September 19, 2006  
Pg. 18

## For The Record

Nat Hentoffs column "Seeking Justice," about the administration's relationship with military lawyers — members of the Judge Advocate General's *Corps* (JAGs) — is replete with inaccuracies (Op-Ed, September 11).

For example, in the development of interrogation policies in 2002 and 2003, civilian political decision-makers did not "ignore the Uniformed Code of Military Justice" (UCMJ).

Instead, JAGs led the analysis of the UCMJ part of that work because of their expertise with that body of law. Most important, far from being "kept out" of the work on interrogations, JAGs participated actively in the 2003 working group discussions on interrogation policy, and as Rear Adm. James McPherson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 2005, "we did have an impact."

More recently, concerning draft legislation for trials of captured terrorists, the top military lawyers for each service, their staffs, and civilian Department of Defense leadership worked together closely for many hours over several weeks developing and reviewing successive proposals leading to the one President Bush submitted to Congress last week.

It is therefore a misrepresentation to claim that the administration's consultation consisted of only one meeting between Department of Justice lawyers and a working group of military lawyers. To the extent that the administration's proposed legislation differs from the recommendations of individual JAGs, that difference is not occasioned by lack of JAG involvement — rather, it results from considered administration determinations, after careful attention to all points of view.

The truth is that the Department of Defense and the administration have relied extensively on the expertise of JAGs in the field and JAGs at the Pentagon in addressing the very difficult issues that have arisen in the ongoing war against global terrorism, and it is wrong to portray the military lawyers as a distinct group who all adhere to a single viewpoint, distinct and opposed to the civilian lawyers and the administration.

**Bryan G. Whitman, Deputy assistant secretary, Public affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Defense Department, Washington**

Washington Times  
September 28, 2006  
Pg. 18

## **In Defense Of JAG**

The **Sept. 15** item "JAG proliferation" (Inside the Ring) begins with an incorrect premise and then accuses Defense Department attorneys of putting self-interest above national security.

The judge advocates general of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the staff judge advocate to the commandant of the Marine Corps are honorable, professional, intelligent and patriotic men. They are the senior uniformed legal advisers for their respective services and together with their civilian colleagues **must** wrestle with some of the most profound and difficult issues in our history during a time of **war**. I **am** astonished that their integrity would be impugned in such a manner.

**BRYAN G. WHITMAN, Deputy assistant secretary, Public affairs, Office of the assistant secretary, Defense Department, Washington**



San Francisco Chronicle  
October 21, 2006  
Pg. B4

## Set Record Straight

Editor -- Sadly the Oct. 1 Insight piece, "U.S. is recruiting misfits for Army," by Nick Turse, blames America's armed services and ignores the facts. Americans can, and do, openly disagree over America's foreign policy, but shouldn't maliciously attack the very soldiers who volunteer to protect our freedom of speech. Turse's allegations aside, the soldiers who answer the call to duty and serve in your Army are smart, fit and morally sound. In fact, they **are** above average: today, less than one-third of American males between the ages of 17-24 qualify to join the Army.

**Every** enlistee **has** a high-school diploma or equivalent. More than 60 percent of those who enlist score in the top half of the nationally normed entrance exam. Recruits must pass stringent medical and physical fitness tests. Because we recognize some people can overcome mistakes made at a young age -- a belief we share with most Americans -- we do issue some carefully considered waivers for minor medical issues or minor brushes with the law.

A final thought for Turse: If I **am** willing to continue going to combat with these great Americans volunteering for military service and **am** confident in their quality, why should you -- someone who will never see combat -- have a problem with them?

Proudly serving you.

ANTHONY A. CUCOLO III, Brigadier General, U.S. Army, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Washington Times  
October 16, 2006  
**Pg. 20**

## **Mischaracterizing Gen. Schoomaker's Remarks**

The article "Bush hits Democrats on N. Korea talks," (Nation, Thursday) mischaracterizes remarks made by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Schoomaker.

The Army, charged with organizing, equipping, training and providing the majority of the ground forces for the joint fight, must constantly plan worst case (greatest possible need) for worldwide requirements for ground forces. I was present at this interview. The general said ~~future~~ troop levels in Iraq are for planning purposes only, not necessarily a forecast for the ~~actual~~ commitment of forces.

"It's better for me to do that and be able to pull things off the table or to reduce tour lengths than it is to 'under plan,'" he said. "What we want to do is ~~try~~ to put **as** much predictability into people's lives as we can, and to anticipate in a way that they're ready in time to go."

As always, it is the Defense Department and U.S. Central Command -- not the Army -- who determine what forces will be deployed. But the Army will always have **trained** and ready forces available for the call in these uncertain times.

**Brig. Gen. Anthony A. Cucolo III, Army, Washington**

Boston Globe  
October 29, 2006

## Older Soldiers Do Not Signify Lag In Troop Levels

I LOOK forward to serving with the future soldiers the Globe profiled in the article "Older recruits fill out military" (Page A1, Oct. 23). However, you repeat the conventional wisdom that the Army raised the maximum enlistment age because we were "pressured by declining enlistment and the need for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan."

Central Command, not the Army, determines deployed troop levels, and Army units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan go, and have been going, at 100 percent strength. In fact, almost half the active duty force has never deployed.

This age change primarily allows motivated, patriotic Americans, who previously were ineligible because of an arbitrary age limit, the opportunity to answer the call to duty. Only 56 Americans older than 39 have enlisted in the active Army, and the average recruit age remains 21.

BRYAN HILFERTY, The Pentagon, Washington

*The writer, a lieutenant colonel, is an Army spokesman.*

**Editor's Note:** The article by Brian MacQuarrie appeared in the *Current News Early Bird*, October 23, 2006.

Pacific Stars and Stripes  
November 2, 2006

## Same Coverage With MTV Armor

Your articles headlined “Marines downrange to get new body armor” (Okinawa and Japan editions; “Marines to get new body armor,” Korea edition) and “Marines in Iraq to get new armor by 2007” (Okinawa and Japan editions; “Marines in Iraq to get new armor by December 2007”) — which ran in the Pacific editions of your paper on Oct. 23 and 25, respectively (“Soldiers will wait years to get side body armor” and “Outfitting Marines in Iraq with better body armor should be complete by 2008” in the European edition) — implied the Marine Corps’ new Modular Tactical Vest is superior to the Army’s Outer Tactical Vest. This is a misleading message that does a disservice to soldiers wearing the OTV as part of their Interceptor Body Armor. Allow me to clarify this issue with the facts.

The Marine Corps’ MTV and Army’s OTV provide the same amount of coverage and level of ballistic and fragmentation protection to their wearers. In fact, the MTV reuses the same soft, Kevlar ballistic inserts and two Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts as the OTV. Both can also integrate two side carriers and plates.

The MTV, in size medium, weighs approximately a pound and a half more than a size medium OTV. The MTV has a nondetachable back protector that provides 50 square inches of ballistic protection, while the OTV has an optional, detachable back protector that provides 80 square inches of additional ballistic protection and adds one pound of weight.

The Army is exploring new ideas for the Army’s next generation of body armor to develop a capability that enhances force protection yet reduces the load soldiers must carry. Prototypes of this capability have been developed by the U.S. Army Soldier System Center (Natick Labs) with support from the U.S. Army Infantry Center and School.

**Maj. Gen. Jeffrey A. Sorenson, Deputy for acquisition and systems management, The Pentagon**

**Editor’s Note:** The article by Jeff Schogol appeared in the *Current News Early Bird*, Oct. 22, 2006.

## MYTHS V. FACTS

### DEBUNKING THE WASHINGTON POST'S EDITORIAL ON IRAQ:

"How To Lose A War" (Oct. 4, 2006)

In an Oct. 4, 2006 editorial, "How to Lose a War," the Washington Post makes a series of unfounded accusations, based largely on three books on Iraq written by its reporters. A few of the most egregious errors of fact are corrected below:

**INCORRECT WASHINGTON POST CLAIM:** *"President Bush and his most senior aides meanwhile stubbornly refused to listen to advisers who warned of the consequences of their policies."*

#### RESPONSE:

- The president listened to the advice and recommendations of a broad range of people with differing views on how to approach the situation in Iraq. The suggestion that he may have disagreed with some advisors does not mean he ignored them.
- Senior leaders thought carefully about the consequences of entering Iraq and what could go wrong. Bob Woodward himself makes this argument in his previous book, "Plan of Attack." He wrote:
  - "At an NSC meeting during this period, Rumsfeld was thinking about what could go wrong. He began doodling a list that grew to some 15 items. ... Among the items: Another state could try to take advantage of the U.S. involvement or preoccupation with Iraq. ... There could be higher than expected collateral damage. ... Iraq could experience ethnic strife among the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds as had happened before. ... The list had grown to 29 items."
- Further, the suggestion of a static and unyielding approach to Iraq also fails to take into account continuous adjustments in strategy on the battlefield:
  - The program for training and equipping the Iraqi army was revised substantially to stand up a force better suited to internal security and fighting terrorists.
  - The Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) initial plan to transfer sovereignty and hold elections was moved up to an earlier date, in response to the desire of the Iraqi people to take charge of their own country.
  - The reconstruction and aid program for Iraq was adjusted to focus less on large, long-term infrastructure to funding smaller projects that could be implemented quickly with immediate impact in the community, while also providing jobs for young men who might be tempted by the insurgents or militias.

**INCORRECT WASHINGTON POST CLAIM:** *"Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld monopolized administration planning for Iraq ... Mr. Rumsfeld's Pentagon excluded the State Department from reconstruction planning, then failed to produce any plan of its own."*

#### RESPONSE:

- Planning for the contingency of a postwar Iraq was an *interagency* process, in which officials from the State Department, USAID, Treasury Department, National Security Council staff, Office of Management and Budget, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Department (DoD), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and others met many times a week -- at senior levels and working levels -- beginning in the summer of 2002.
- An ad hoc group of the interagency Deputies Committee met regularly -- typically twice a week -- on Iraq-related issues, including post-war planning.
- In July 2002, an assortment of working groups began forming to conduct and coordinate post-war planning, including:
  - Interagency Iraq Political-Military Cell (NSC, State, DoD, CIA, OVP):
  - Interagency Executive Steering Group (NSC, State, DoD, CIA, OVP):
  - Interagency Humanitarian/Reconstruction Group (NSC, State, DoD, CIA, OVP, Treas, DOJ, USAID)
  - Interagency Energy Infrastructure Working Group (State, DoD, CIA, DOE)
  - Interagency Coalition Working Group (State, DoD)
- In January 2003, DoD created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA): an expeditionary interagency office with officials from all departments and agencies in charge of detailed planning and, if necessary, implementation.
- The State Department was well represented on the staff of Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (U.S. Army, Ret.) in ORHA and in the CPA. Senior State Department officials served as advisors heading Iraqi ministries prior to the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004. The vast majority of senior staff members with Coalitional Provisional Administrator Ambassador L. Paul Bremer were from the State Department, Coalition partners, other U.S. government agencies, or volunteers from the private sector, not DoD.
- Again, Mr. Woodward's previous book supports this. Rather than ignoring post-war Iraq, Mr. Woodward writes: "Rumsfeld had been pushing everyone to prepare estimates on the reconstruction needs and costs."

INCORRECT WASHINGTON POST CLAIM: *"Staff members for Mr. Bremer's authority too often were picked on the basis of Republican political affiliation, rather than experience or competence -- with the result that people in their twenties were handed control over matters such as the Iraqi government budget."*

#### RESPONSE:

- The role of the White House personnel office in the hiring process for Iraq was quite limited. It was but one of several sources of hiring for the Coalition Provisional Authority.
- Most of those hired were career employees of DoD, the State Department, other government agencies, and personnel from Coalition partners (such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Spain and Romania). The leadership team and senior staff of the CPA included several former U.S. ambassadors from the career foreign service.
- Additionally, those who staffed the CPA represented a broad mix of people with experience in government and the private sector. They included Democrats and

Republicans, and encompassed people who had worked in both the Bush and Clinton Administrations. Some examples:

- An undersecretary at DoD under President Clinton was a high-level aide to Paul Bremer and participated in the decisions regarding the Iraqi army.
- A former Clinton political appointee who had served as a deputy in the DoD Comptroller's office under Secretary Bill Cohen controlled CPA finances and Iraqi monies.
- The Post's one specific allegation -- that a person "in their twenties" was handed control over "the Iraqi government budget" -- is false. The individual in question did not manage the Iraqi budget, she executed it, and the earlier claim by a Post reporter that she "had no background in accounting" has since been corrected by the Post. In fact, this person had a substantial background in accounting and an M.B.A. from one of the best business schools in Europe.

INCORRECT WASHINGTON POST CLAIM: *"Having dispatched too few troops to Iraq at the beginning of the war, Mr. Rumsfeld has perpetuated this signal failing for 3 1/2 years."*

RESPONSE:

- Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the civilian leadership at DoD has relied heavily on the advice of commanders on the ground -- those who lead and see daily operations firsthand -- to determine troop levels.
- Secretary Rumsfeld supported troop levels as high as 400,000 if they were needed during the initial planning of the war.
- U.S. CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks decided to launch a campaign that emphasized speed rather than mass. This was designed to bring down the Hussein regime quickly, and thus prevent many of the possible negative consequences of invasion that were widely predicted at the time, such as:
  - Saddam Hussein's deliberate burning of oil fields.
  - Large-scale refugee flows.
  - Food or medical humanitarian crises.
  - Destabilization of neighboring countries because of a protracted war.

The civilian and military leadership have had to balance the tension between having enough troops to provide the security necessary for economic and political progress to go forward, while not having so many troops that it breeds Iraqi resentment and dependency. It is a difficult question in which fair minded people can disagree. But to point to "more troops" as a panacea for Iraq's difficulties is simplistic and does not take into account realities on the ground.

- On July 9, 2003, Gen. Franks said in Senate testimony:  
"We have about 145,000 troops in there right now ... There has been [the] suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops. And in fact, I can tell you, in the presence of [Secretary Rumsfeld], that if more troops are necessary, this secretary's going to say 'yes.' I mean, we have talked about this on a number of occasions."
- On June 27, 2005, Gen. George Casey, Commander of Multi-National Force -- Iraq, said the following:

“I just want to assure you and the American people that if we need more troops we’ll ask for them. Right now, we don’t.”

- On September 18, 2006, Gen. John Abizaid, CENTCOM Commander, said the following:

“... this notion that troop levels are static is not true, never has been true, and it won’t be true. We will ask for what we need when we need them.”

Tens of thousands more troops *have* been added to the force providing security in Iraq. They have been *Iraqi* troops -- more than 300,000 of which have been trained and equipped -- who our commanders agree are the key to success in *Iraq* over the long term.



## MYTHS V. FACTS

### DEBUNKING NEWSWEEK'S ARTICLE ON AFGHANISTAN: "The Rise of Jihadistan" (Oct. 2, 2006)

**INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:** *"The 2003 invasion of Iraq did more than divert essential resources from Afghanistan; it created a test lab for new insurgent weapons and tactics that have since been adopted by the Taliban."*

#### RESPONSE:

- The assertion that the Iraq invasion "diverted" resources from Afghanistan is a talking point of critics of the Bush administration. It is an opinion, not a fact.
- Resources to Afghanistan have **increased** since Operation Iraqi Freedom began. In March 2003, the United States had about 9,500 troops in Afghanistan. Today, there are more than 21,000 U.S. forces either under U.S. or NATO command in Afghanistan or directly supporting missions there.
- The insinuation that Iraq has created new tactics is, at best, exaggerated. Guerrilla warfare techniques and terror tactics such as suicide bombings were not invented in Iraq.
- Additionally, the logic of this claim seems to be that U.S. forces should never confront terrorists far from our shores because of the danger that the enemy might fight back -- and learn new tactics in the process. This is not a coherent policy.

**INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:** *"Five years after the Afghan invasion, the Taliban are fighting back hard, carving out a sanctuary where they -- and Al Qaeda's leaders -- can operate freely."*

#### RESPONSE:

- Afghanistan is undergoing a difficult transition from a state of anarchy in many areas to a country with a democratically elected central government that is reaching out to long ungoverned territories. The article frequently relies on myths, opinions, worst-case scenarios, and a disinclination to mention any positive developments.
- The strength and influence of the Taliban has grown in some areas, but the Coalition, NATO/ISAF and Afghan forces are on the offensive and will relentlessly pursue Taliban and al-Qaeda extremists, as well as any associated movements. The rise in violence is often directly attributable to OEF Coalition, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan National Army and Police offensive operations. These operations are designed to set the stage for the continued development and extension of the central government's reach **into** areas ~~that~~ have been lawless for decades. Not all the violence can be attributed to the Taliban and al-Qaeda: some arises from criminality, tribal strife, land disputes, or narco-trafficking.

INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM: *"To impose order following the 2001 invasion, the Pentagon relied heavily on the same corrupt mujahedin chiefs whose brutal misrule first spawned the Taliban in the mid-1990s."*

RESPONSE:

- This is an opinion stated as a fact.
- Instead of initiating a massive military occupation along the lines of the Soviets during the 1980s, the Coalition has worked with local leaders and institutions to move Afghanistan forward from its tragic past. National disenfranchisement often encourages Afghans to fight against the Coalition, so an Afghan solution -- not a U.S.-imposed solution -- was deemed best.
- The Coalition worked quickly to help emplace an interim government that would be acceptable to the Afghan people. Hamid Karzai was selected by the Loya Jirga -- a traditional assembly of Afghan tribal and community leaders. President Karzai was democratically elected by the Afghan people in their first such vote in the country's history.
- Many of these chiefs or "warlords" did initially have their own separate militias, but most were placed under the control of the Ministry of Defense -- then disarmed and demobilized. The Afghan National Army has since grown to more than 30,000 troops, with the possibility of increasing to 70,000. The government of Afghanistan continues to work to disarm illegal armed groups in the country.

INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM: *"After U.S. commanders failed to seal off the Pakistan border near the besieged caves of Tora Bora, letting bin Laden escape, the Qaeda leader helped rebuild Mullah Omar's decimated forces."*

RESPONSE:

- This claim is disputed and lacks context. In an Oct. 19, 2004, op-ed in *The New York Times*, Gen. Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander at the time, wrote: "We don't know to this day whether **Mr.** bin Laden **was** at Tora Bora in December 2001." Franks noted that some intelligence sources said bin Laden was present; other sources indicated he was in Pakistan; and still others suggested he was in Kashmir.
- Concerning the actual conduct of the battle, Tora Bora is a mountainous and difficult region of Afghanistan -- an area that was all but impossible to surround or seal off. Haphazardly sending a massive U.S. force into unfamiliar terrain would have invited intense resistance from local tribesmen, potentially bloody battles, and would have alerted al-Qaeda operatives to an impending attack, which might have given many of those we captured more time to flee.
- Gen. Franks has stated that the United States enlisted Afghan fighters to help lead the search for bin Laden and other al-Qaeda members because "[k]illing and capturing Taliban and Qaeda fighters was best done by the Afghan fighters who already knew the caves and tunnels."
- In addition, special operations forces from the United States and several other countries were also there, providing tactical leadership and calling in air strikes.
- Pakistani troops also provided significant help: As many as 100,000 took up positions along the border and rounded up hundreds of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters.

**INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:** *“Washington pushed Musharraf to crack down on the never-tamed Afghan borderlands, but fierce tribal resistance led to a formal deal letting the Taliban retain their bases there.”*

**RESPONSE:**

- This claim is disputed.
- According to Pakistan’s President Musharraf, the agreement with tribal leaders had “bottom lines” that were non-negotiable. In his words, the agreement requires: “No al-Qaeda activity,” and “no Taliban activity in our tribal agency or across [the border] in Afghanistan.”
- Gen. James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has said that “[i]f all the elements of the agreement are, in fact, lived up to by the signatories, then the situation on the border should improve.”

**INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:** *“As doubts rise over Bush’s global aims, NATO is hard put to find the troops it needs for the mission.”*

**RESPONSE:**

- Each of NATO’s 26 members is contributing to the Afghanistan mission -- an unprecedented commitment for the Alliance outside of its own borders.
- On Oct. 5, 2006, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force took over security operations in the eastern part of Afghanistan, bringing more than 12,000 U.S. troops under NATO command. At the recent NATO ministerial in Slovenia, Poland pledged 1,000 additional troops to support ISAF.
- With nearly 20,000 non-U.S. NATO troops, plus the more than 12,000 U.S. troops under NATO command, the NATO mission is the strongest it has ever been, and Alliance forces have been directly taking the fight to the enemy in southern Afghanistan.
- In testimony before Congress, Gen. Jones stated: “[T]he opposing militant forces have tried to test NATO to see if we have the will and the capability to stand and fight. And the evidence is in: The overwhelming answer is yes.”

**INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:**

*“In the countryside over the past year Taliban guerrillas have filled a power vacuum that had been created by the relatively light NATO and U.S. military footprint of some 40,000 soldiers, and by the weakness of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s administration.”*

**RESPONSE:**

- Qari Mohammed Yousaf Ahmadi, generally viewed as the Taliban’s current chief spokesman, stated publicly on Sept. 15, “The Taliban forces have conducted a tactical retreat.” It is difficult to fill a power vacuum if your forces are retreating.
- As Gen. Jones has recently stated, much of the recent increased fighting stems from the Afghan central government extending into areas in the south that have been lawless for

decades. Much of the fighting reflects a decision by the Taliban to challenge the NATO force in southern Afghanistan. The tactic hasn't worked.

- President Karzai himself has acknowledged the importance of strengthening and improving Afghanistan's governmental institutions. A representative government has never before existed in Afghanistan's long history, and strengthening that government will take time and patience.

#### INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:

*"Afghanistan is 'unfortunately well on its way' to becoming a 'narco-state,' NATO's supreme commander, Marine Gen. Jim Jones, said before Congress last week."*

#### RESPONSE:

- While Gen. Jones did in fact warn of such a possibility, that was not all he said in his testimony to Congress. Left out of the *Newsweek* article was his assessment that this situation can be reversed if the Afghan government, NATO, and the Coalition work aggressively to reduce the cultivation and flow of opium in Afghanistan and provide rural economic development to improve the economic prospects of Afghan farmers. This is precisely the approach being taken.
- The article also leaves out other parts of Gen. Jones' statement that give fuller context to his sentiments. He went on to say, "Afghanistan should no longer be considered a failed state, but rather a fragile state."

#### INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:

*"But the harsh truth is that five years after the U.S. invasion on Oct. 7, 2001, most of the good news is confined to Kabul, with its choking rush-hour traffic jams, a construction boom and a handful of air-conditioned shopping malls. Much of the rest of Afghanistan appears to be failing again."*

#### RESPONSE:

- Afghanistan was -- and is -- one of the poorest country's on the face of the earth. It will take years of hard work by the Afghan people and the international community to reverse the effects of decades of occupation and civil war.
- Improvements are not confined to Kabul, though it is true that much of the development and growth has been in larger cities, such as Kabul, Herat, and the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Nonetheless, there has been a significant economic growth and donor efforts to improve living conditions across the country. Some examples:
  - o Afghanistan's GDP was valued at \$2.4 billion in 2001. In 2006, it was valued at \$7.3 billion, and that number is projected to rise to \$8.8 billion next year.
  - o The government of Afghanistan collected more than \$177 million in revenue in 2002-2003, and \$300 million in 2004-2005, an increase of 70 percent.
  - o Eighty-five percent of all property deeds in Afghanistan have been restored or reorganized, decreasing land and ownership disputes.
  - o There is now a Central Bank with 32 computerized provincial branches.

- The completion of the Kabul-Kandahar highway improved transportation and commerce by dramatically reducing travel times between the two cities.
- Thousands of kilometers of roads have been built or improved since the Taliban fell. The U.S. portion of the Kandahar to Herat highway **has** reduced the travel time between those two major cities from 10 hours to **4.3** hours. The average speed on 70 percent of Afghanistan's roadways **has** increased three-fold, from 20 kilometers per hour to 60 kilometers per hour.
- There have been more than 28,000 micro-loans given out for agricultural activities.
- At least **2.5** million Afghans have benefited from irrigation and road projects linking farms to market. Other agricultural improvements include 210 irrigation structures and 300 kilometers of canals that have been rehabilitated to improve 300,000 hectares of cropland.
- At least 2.3 million animals have been vaccinated against disease.
- In 2001, only eight percent of Afghans had access to basic health care. Now, 80 percent do.
- There are currently more than 5 million students enrolled in schools -- **34** percent are girls.

INCORRECT NEWSWEEK CLAIM:

*"Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups now have a place from which to hatch the next 9/11."*

RESPONSE:

- This assertion is contradicted within the same article by Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, Commander, Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan. He points out that al-Qaeda or its successors have nothing like the liberty that allowed them to plot September 11 in the open. He states: "They have no safe haven inside Afghanistan that if we find it, we will not strike against them."
- It is one thing for al-Qaeda remnants to operate within Afghanistan's borders while being vigorously pursued and attacked by Afghan, NATO, and Coalition forces -- as is happening now. It is quite another thing for a terrorist organization to have an entire nation where they can plan, train, and launch attacks with impunity -- as Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda did in Afghanistan before September 11.
- There is simply no comparison between the situation in Afghanistan when 9-11 was "hatched" to the situation today.

2 of 2 DOCUMENTS

Los Angeles Times

September 1, 2006 Friday  
Home Edition

## You can't appease terrorists

**BYLINE:** Donald H. Rumsfeld, DONALD H. RUMSFELD is the U.S. secretary of Defense.

**SECTION:** CALIFORNIA; Metro; Editorial Pages Desk; Part B; Pg. 13

**LENGTH:** 652 words

IN THE LAST FEW DAYS I have had the opportunity to speak at the annual conventions of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion. It is always a humbling experience to be in the presence of those who have served and fought for our country during some of our darkest, most trying times -- when it was unclear whether our way of life would prevail.

We are again engaged in conflicts that are testing whether we believe that the defense of liberty is worth the cost. And again, there are those who disagree with the mission, who question whether it is worth the sacrifice. This is to be expected in a time of war.

Today, some think that World War II and the Cold War were black-and-white affairs: good versus evil. But there were always those who thought that we should retreat within our borders.

In an effort to avoid repeating the carnage of World War I, much of the Western world tried to appease the growing threats in Europe and Asia in the years before World War II. Those who warned against the rise of Nazism, fascism and communism were often ridiculed and ignored.

The enemy we face today is different from the enemies we have faced in the past, but its goal is similar: to impose its fanatical ideology of hatred on the rest of the world.

In speaking to our veterans, I suggested several questions to guide us during this struggle against violent extremists:

- \* With the growing lethality and availability of weapons, can we truly afford to believe that vicious extremists can somehow be appeased?
- \* Can we really continue to think that free countries can negotiate a separate peace with terrorists?
- \* Can we truly afford to pretend that the threats today are simply "law enforcement" problems rather than fundamentally different threats requiring fundamentally different approaches?
- \* Can we truly afford to return to the destructive view that America -- not the enemy -- is the real source of the world's troubles?

These are the central questions of our time, and, as in all periods of conflict, we have no choice but to face them honestly.

The last question is particularly important, because this is the first war of the 21st century -- a war that, to a great extent, will be fought in the media on a global stage. We cannot allow the terrorists' lies and myths to be repeated without question or

challenge.

We also should be aware that the struggle is too important -- the consequences too severe -- to allow a "blame America first" mentality to overwhelm the truth that our nation, though imperfect, is a force for good in the world.

Consider that a database search of the nation's leading newspapers turns up 10 times as many mentions of one of the soldiers punished for misconduct at Abu Ghraib than of **Sgt.** 1st Class Paul Ray Smith, the first recipient of the Medal of Honor in the global war on terror.

Then there is the case of Amnesty International, a long-respected human-rights organization, which called the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay the "gulag of our times" -- a reference to the vast system of Soviet prisons and labor camps where innocent citizens were starved tortured and murdered. The facility at Guantanamo Bay, by contrast, includes a volleyball court, basketball court, soccer field and library (the book most requested is "Harry Potter"). The food, served in accordance with Islamic diets, costs more per detainee than the average U.S. military ration.

With examples like these prevalent in the world media, I do worry about the lack of perspective in our national dialogue -- a perspective on history and the new challenges and threats that free people face today. Those who know the truth need to speak out against the myths and distortions being told about our troops and our country. My remarks at the Veterans of Foreign Wars and American Legion conventions have generated much discussion. I encourage everyone to read what I actually said at [defenseink.mil/speeches](mailto:defenseink.mil/speeches).

**LOAD-DATE:** September 1, 2006

**LANGUAGE:** ENGLISH

**DOCUMENT-TYPE:** Opinion piece

**PUBLICATION-TYPE:** Newspaper

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~~FOUO~~

NOV 1 E 2006

TO: Steve Bucci

CC: Cathy Mainardi  
(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Gerald Ford Dinner on June 11, 2007

I have been invited to be the honored guest at this Gerald Ford Dinner on June 11, 2007. Please put it on my calendar.

Thanks.

Attach 11/14/06 Invitation from Jack Ford

DHR:js  
SP111506-14

.....

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60768

OSD 17838-06



1/16/2007 5:49:06 PM

*OSD 4*

*16 Nov 06*

*14 Nov 06*



GERALD R. FORD



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November 14, 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Room 3E880  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

At the recent Gerald R. Ford Foundation Executive Committee meeting on November 8, 2006, a resolution was proposed and passed unanimously to invite you to be the honored guest at this year's annual dinner in Washington, DC on June 11, 2007. A copy of the resolution is enclosed.

Your fellow trustees and friends salute your long service to our country and treasure our friendships.

Let me add on a personal note that you and Joy, as longtime friends of Mother and Dad, are always in the Ford family's thoughts and prayers.

Again, thanks for all you have done.

Sincerely,

Jack Ford

Chairman

Gerald R. Ford Foundation

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
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11-L-0559/OSD/60769

**RESOLVED**, In tribute and with deepest gratitude for Donald Rumsfeld's decades of extraordinary service to our Nation, including as an officer in the U.S. Navy, member of Congress, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, White House Chief of Staff to President Gerald R. Ford, and Secretary of Defense for President Gerald R. Ford and President George W. Bush, and for his tireless efforts to ensure the security and freedom of the American people, Trustee Rumsfeld is chosen to be the Honored Guest for the Foundation's June 11, 2007 Annual Dinner in Washington, D.C. John G. Ford, Chairman of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, shall promptly notify Trustee Rumsfeld of this decision.

Signed:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John G. Ford", written over a horizontal line.

John G. Ford  
Chairman  
Gerald R Ford Foundation

GERALD R. FORD



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November 14, 2006

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Room 3E880  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

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Your fellow trustees and friends salute your long service to our country and treasure our friendships.

Let me add on a personal note that you and Joy, as longtime friends of Mother and Dad, are always in the Ford family's thoughts and prayers.

Again, thanks for all you have done.

Sincerely,

Jack Ford  
Chairman  
Gerald R. Ford Foundation

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
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www.geraldrfordfoundation.org  
11-L-0559/OSD/60771

**RESOLVED**, In tribute and **with** deepest gratitude for Donald Rumsfeld's decades **of extraordinary** service to our Nation, including **as an officer** in the **U.S.** Navy, member of Congress, **U.S.** Ambassador to **NATO**, White House Chief of **Staff** to **President Gerald R. Ford**, and Secretary of Defense for President Gerald R. Ford and President George W. **Bush**, and for his tireless efforts to ensure the security **and** freedom **of the American people**, Trustee Rumsfeld is chosen to be the Honored Guest for the Foundation's June 11, 2007 Annual Dinner in Washington, D.C. John G. Ford, Chairman of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, shall promptly notify Trustee Rumsfeld of this decision.

Signed:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John G. Ford", written over a horizontal line.

John G. Ford  
Chairman  
Gerald R Ford Foundation



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOV 16 2006

001.1 SD

Mr. John G. Ford  
Chairman  
Gerald R. Ford Foundation  
303 Pearl Street, NW  
Grand Rapids, MI 49504-5353

Dear Jack,

Thanks so much for your note and for the resolution that was passed on November 8. I appreciate it a great deal.

16 Nov 06

Joyce and I look forward to seeing you all at the June 11, 2007 dinner, if not before.

As you know, our folks here are working hard on the naming events for the Gerald R. Ford carrier. We will stay in touch with you.

Best regards,

14 Nov 06

11-L-0559/OSD/60773



OSD 17838-06

11/17/2006 8:18:18 AM

~~FOUO~~

SEP 12 2006

TO: Sieve Bucci  
CC: Mary Claire Murphy  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting on DACOWITS



334 DACOWITS

Please set a meeting for me with David Chu, Robert Rangel to talk about the DACOWITS membership. Set it for 20 minutes, but allow 30 minutes.

Thanks.

Attach. 5/12/06 and 6/28/06 Rangel memo to SD

DHR:dh  
SFD91106-18

.....  
*Please Respond By October 05, 2006*

NOV 15 2006

ESD

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~~FOUO~~

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11/16/2006 8 02 20 AM

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

6/28

Sec Def -

- Attached is memo on  
Dacowits membership  
discussed during today's  
civilian personnel meeting.
- Recommendation of  
Chu, O'Brien, Rangel  
& Di Rita is to approve  
proposed new members.

Robert

Robert Rangel  
6/28/06 4:25

May 12, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Rangel *RR*

SUBJECT: DACOWITS membership

- Attached package contains recommendation to fill remaining DACOWITS vacancies.
- Recommendations result from negotiations between White House Liaison (Jim O'Bierne) and David Chu and meet with the approval of both.
- Larry DiRita and I have also reviewed the recommendations and agree that they "meet the minimums."

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

See edits \_\_\_\_\_



23  
500



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

(b)(6)

SPECIAL ASSISTANT

ACTION MEMO

May 3, 2006, 3:30pm

Robert Rangel

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: JIM O'BEIRNE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR WHITE HOUSE LIAISON (WHLO)

JPB  
5/3/06

SUBJECT Completion of DACOWITS Membership Appointments

The attached list of DACOWITS recommendations is submitted for your review and decision. The list is composed of ~~two~~ parts:

- Part I: Members Previously Approved
- Part II: Candidates Pending Approval (Resumes are included)

Under Secretary David Chu concurs in the recommendation of all five pending candidates.

Recommend approval of candidates listed in Part II.

Attachment (1)

As stated

Declassified

Prepared by: Jim O'Beirne (b)(6)



5/2/2006

**DACOWITS 2006 Members**  
(Previously Approved & Pending Approval)

**I. Previously Approved by the Secretary**

1. Mary Nelson            New Chairman [Holdover]
2. Lynda Davis           Vice Chair [Holdover]
3. Margaret Hoffman    Member [Holdover]
4. Margaret Robson      Member [Holdover]
5. Denise Balzano        Member [new]
6. Margaret White        Member [New]
7. Diana Denman         Member [New]

**II. Candidates Pending Secretary's Approval [Resumes attached]**

8. Kerry Lassus           Military spouse (USA)/Independent business woman  
[TAB 1]
9. Judith O'Flaherty      Military experience (USNA)/teacher  
[TAB 2]
10. Roberta Santiago      Military experience (USMC)/community leader  
[TAB 3]
11. Vera Mikula            Military Spouse; former DOD board member  
[TAB 4]
12. Felipe Torres          Military experience (USMC)  
[TAB 5]

**Kerry Hogan Lassus**

(b)(6)

**Personal:** Wife of Colonel Kenneth J. Lassus, US Army JAG Corps, Staff Judge Advocate Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir VA; mother of ~~Bett~~ Lassus, senior at University of ~~Notre~~ Dame and of Lauren Lassus, freshman at St. Mary's College at Notre Dame IN.

As an **Army** wife for more **than 22 years** I have been extremely involved in volunteer service to **both** the civilian and military communities. **both** here and overseas. I have led family support groups at the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, ~~Fort Hood~~ TX and The Judge Advocate General's School (TJAGSA), Charlottesville, VA. I served as President of ~~the~~ TJAGSA Officers' Wives Club and as Membership chair of ~~the~~ JAG Women's and Spouses' Club for ~~the~~ D.C. area. I have also been employed twice by ~~the~~ U.S. military and the federal government. As **both** an employee and a military family member, I have **been** able to view the organizations from dual vantage points.

**Education:** Tulane University Law School, New Orleans, LA, Juris Doctorate, 1977  
University of New Orleans, Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, 1974  
Archbishop Chapelle High School, Metairie, LA. 1970

**Professional Experience:**

As an Attorney: in various positions from 1974 through 1998 including:

National Legal Research Group, Charlottesville, VA. Legal writer/editor. (1989-1998). Duties included original writing, editing of articles, chapters and volumes in more than 30 legal publications such as AmJur, TexasJur, MassJur, and other Lawyers' Coop and in-house publications.

Consumer Affairs Office, Army Community Service, Eighth U.S. Army, Seoul, Korea, Director (1988-1989). Duties included advising the command regarding consumer issues, mediating consumer complaints brought by members of the military community against Korean merchants, supervising the operation of the Army personal debt liquidation program, and teaching classes to military units regarding **personal** financial responsibility.

Eighth U.S. Army, Seoul, Korea, Retirement Services Officer (1988-1989). Duties included advising military retirees and active duty soldiers regarding retirement eligibility, benefits, and procedures.

**Office of General Counsel Panama Canal Commission, Balboa, Republic of Panama (1985-1987).** Duties included representing the Commission in labor arbitrations, EEOC hearings, tort litigation in U.S. District Court and in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals; lead attorney in FOIA/Privacy Act matters; and responding to legal questions regarding the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 and U.S. public sector law.

**Office of the District Attorney for the 24<sup>th</sup> Judicial District, Jefferson Parish, LA, Assistant District Attorney (1978-1982).** Duties included prosecution of felony and misdemeanor cases before juries and judges in district felony court, and parish juvenile court; also reviewing criminal charges for sufficiency and perfecting appeals in state appellate system.

**Hogan & Lassus, Attorneys at Law, Gretna LA, (1980-1982) Maintained** general civil law practice, representing clients in state, parish and federal courts in such matters as domestic relations, real estate, contracts, personal injury and wrongful death actions.

**In Business:** **Mary Kay Cosmetics, Independent Sales Director and Consultant,** (1998-present) Retail sales as well as mentoring women in their home-based businesses.

**Community Involvement:**

**Member of the Board of Directors of Holy Trinity Catholic High School, Temple TX, Director (1999-2005); Secretary of the Board, (2000-2004).**  
**Other leadership and volunteer positions, see Personal section above.**

**Awards and Recognitions:**

**2001** Recipient of "***The Yellow Rose of Texas Award***" from Texas Governor Rick Perry in recognition of outstanding voluntary service to the community.  
**2001 Volunteer of the Year, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, US. Army, Fort Hood TX**  
**2001** recipient of the ***Commander's Award for Outstanding Volunteer Service*** to the Fort Hood Community from General Benjamin Griffin

(b)(6)

**JUDITH PAGE O'FLAHERTY**

(b)(6)

**EDUCATION**

United States Naval Academy, **Annapolis, Maryland**  
**BS Political Science** 1992

Vice President, *Women's Professional Association*  
Skipper, *Offshore Sailing and Training*

**MILITARY EXPERIENCE: U.S. NAVY**

**June 95 – August 97** Strike Fighter Squadron **OneFour Six**, Lemoore, CA

Monitored production and maintenance requirements for **12 F/A-18 aircraft**. Responsible for training, proficiency, evaluation and well being of 45 personnel.

- \*Budget in excess of \$3,500,000.00 for fuel, maintenance and administrative requirements.

- \*Embarked on USS Nimitz for first female integrated crew deployment to the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf. As senior female officer, provided inputs for the Navy's "Women at Sea" program and the "Lessons Learned" for commands preparing for the integration of females. ~~Headed~~ **Sexual Harassment/Equal Opportunity** working groups to educate and monitor command integration of women.

- \*Completely revised all squadron maintenance and technical training.

- \*Directly responsible for \$7.8 million of aircraft maintenance support equipment.

- \*Received **Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (Third Award)** for technical and managerial skills essential in maintaining the highest levels of squadron combat readiness during an extremely successful deployment.

**November 93 – May 95** Strike Fighter Wing **Pacific**, Lemoore, CA

Maintenance training officer for all **West Coast F/A-18 aircraft**. Responsible for quality, effectiveness, evaluation, tracking and currency of training for aircraft technicians.

- \*~~Head~~ of maintenance inspection team for aircraft material condition, maintenance documentation and personnel program effectiveness.

**\*Member of high level training support advisory group to design and present future naval training requirements for F/A-18 technical training.**

**\*Received Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (Second Award) for professionalism and contributions to the field of F/A-18 technical training.**

**March 93 - October 93 Student, Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL**

**June 92- February 93 StrikeFighter Weapons School Pacific, Lemoore, CA**

**Training and technical assistant. Responsible for the development and procurement of training aids for U.S. Navy pilots and maintenance technicians.**

**\*Created and implemented graphic displays for dynamic aircraft tactical instruction.**

**\* ————— logistical support of major conferences for pilots and tactical experts for the development and procurement of training aids.**

**\*Received Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal for professional achievements in training, security management and contributions to F/A-18 maintenance.**

## **WORKFORCE EXPERIENCE**

**August 97 - May 98 Frito Lay/PepsiCo Operations Management**

**One of a team of eleven Start-Up managers who designed, built, and staffed a new multi-million dollar production facility in Visalia, CA.**

**\*Brought state-of-the-art facility "on-line" and managed packaging team for new Frito Lay project. Monitored quality of product, efficiency of operations, financial records and incorporation of new production lines.**

**\*Interfaced with technical and management representatives from corporate headquarters to ensure that Start-up knowledge was "captured" for other new facilities.**

**June 98 - May 99 Elementary School Educator, Lemoore, CA**

**Third Grade teacher for 32 students at P.W. Engvall Elementary School. Created an optimal learning environment so that students could experience academic success, aligned instruction to state and district grade level standards, and served on school district technology development committee.**

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## NCO MATTERS

ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

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10/01/2003

**Command Sergeant Major**

**Jimmie W. Spencer, USA, Ret.**  
**Director, Noncommissioned Officer**  
**and Soldier Programs**

Command Sgt. Maj. Roberta L. Santiago, U.S. Army Reserve, Ret., is the 2003 recipient of the Army William Bainbridge Noncommissioned Officer Medal.

The Bainbridge medal is awarded annually to a noncommissioned officer – active, retired – contributing most to the U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Corps.

Santiago will receive the award Oct. 6 at the Opening Ceremony of this year's Assoc. Annual Meeting at the New Washington Convention Center.

Santiago served the Army and this nation for more than 23 years.

She entered the U.S. Army Reserve under the Civilian Acquired Skills Program (CASI) during her Army career she held a variety of assignments of increasing responsibility.

Key assignments including senior legal specialist, personnel staff NCO, senior financial sergeant and command sergeant major of three U.S. Army Reserve hospitals.

Her last Army assignment was as the command sergeant major of the 362nd Combat Hospital, Oakland, Calif.

She retired from the Army Reserve on Jan. 12, 1999.

Santiago is the epitome of a noncommissioned officer.

She is a leader, teacher and role model for soldiers and noncommissioned officers.

AUSA is also recognizing this outstanding NCO for her extensive involvement with AUSA the civilian and military communities.

Santiago is a key AUSA leader at both the chapter and region levels.

She has served on the Maj. Gen. William F. Dean Chapter's executive board of directors years as the chapter treasurer and chairperson of the Women's Advisory Committee.

Additionally, Santiago is the Sixth Region vice president for NCO and soldier program.

At the national level, has she served six years on AUSA's Resolutions Committee where platform for the coming year is developed and presented to the chapter delegates for.

For the past two years, Santiago has chaired the policy subcommittee that deals with affect the men and women who serve in our Army.

Her many awards include the Legion of Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal and the / Medal.

In 1997, she was awarded the Navy Meritorious Service Award for her participation in Naval Supply Center in Oakland.

CSM Roberta L. Santiago is clearly deserving of the prestigious Bainbridge medal for out of uniform.

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She is a leader, a role model, a distinguished noncommissioned officer and an important community.

### Still Serving!


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**VERA MIKULA**  
**ST MARY'S PARISH HIGH SCHOOL • COUNSELOR**

Vera Mikula was born and raised in South Africa and became an American citizen in 1970. She holds a Master of Science Degree in Educational School Counseling from Long Island University, a Bachelor of Science Degree in Social Counseling from St. Thomas Aquinas College, and is a member of the Alpha Sigma Lambda Scholastic Honor Society. She also holds a diploma in computer programming.



Since 1989, Mrs. Mikula has worked as a guidance counselor at St. Mary's High School in Annapolis, Maryland. Her office is responsible for all activities pertaining to Admissions, Academic Counseling, Standardized Testing, Personal Counseling, Academic Placement, and College Application. There are presently, seventeen former St Mary's students enrolled at the United States Naval Academy, which is a typical number from the Parish. In recent years, the school has also sent graduates to both the US **Military** Academy and the US Air Force Academy. **Prior** to coming to St Mary's High School, Vera served as Assistant Director and Director for a Children's World Learning Center in Maryland and as a Counselor at James I. O'Neill High School in New York.

Mrs. Mikula's husband, John Mikula, is a West Point graduate **and** retired Army officer whose final tour of duty was on the academic faculty at West Point. During this assignment, she was actively involved with cadets as both a sponsor and through her husband's academic department. Following her husband's retirement after a 21-year **Army** career, the Mikulas relocated to Annapolis, Maryland and became actively involved with the US Naval Academy and its midshipmen. Mrs. Mikula's experiences at the US Military Academy and US Naval Academy have provided Vera a well rounded perspective on cadet and midshipmen life.

The Mikulas also have a daughter who graduated from John's Hopkins University and was commissioned through the Army ROTC program as a medical service corps officer in the **Army** Reserve. This provided Mrs. Mikula yet another perspective on the military training of female officers.

Mrs. Mikula has most recently served in 2004-2005 as a member of the Department of Defense (DOD) Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the **Military** Service Academies.

Felipe Torres  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

# Felipe Torres

---

**Objective** Seeking a challenging and responsible position in organizational development, human resources, or criminal justice.

**Experience** Most recently served as an executive in the juvenile services field after culminating a successful career as a Marine Corps officer with the rank of Colonel. Offering a balance of technical proficiency, extensive experience, senior leadership, mature judgement, initiative, and the ability to interface effectively with all levels of management, personnel, and clientele. The last 10 years of responsibilities are summarized below:

November 2000 – July 2001 Cornerstone Programs Corporation  
Englewood, Colorado

**Director, Staff Development and Training/Director, East Coast Region/Director, Camp Kenbridge, Virginia**

- Responsible for identifying, coordinating, and implementing required staff training and development within the company.
- Responsible for two east coast region programs.
- Director of Camp Kenbridge, a Direct Challenge Program and the most successful juvenile regimented treatment program for adjudicated juveniles in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

July 1999 – July 2000 U.S. Marine Corps  
Marine Corps Base, Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan

**Inspector (Inspector General), Marine Corps Bases Japan**

- Inspected or investigated all areas with emphasis on: government fraud, waste, and abuse; discrimination and sexual harassment; ethics/integrity; effectiveness/efficiency; environmental protection; safety; and quality of life.
- Performed as the Magistrate for the adjudication of misconduct cases and traffic violations involving U.S. civilians and military family members who violated U.S./Japan laws or regulations.
- Oversaw the complete rewrite of the Misconduct of U.S. Civilians and Military Family Members Directive which provides guidance and direction for adjudicating violations of laws and regulations while in Japan.
- Chaired the Teen Focus Group (providing guidance/solutions for students at risk).

July 1997 – June 1999 U.S. Marine Corps  
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington DC and Virginia

**Advisor (Consultant) to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on Equal Opportunity (EO) Matters and Head of the Manpower EO Branch**

- Oversaw the Equal Opportunity Program in the Marine Corps and monitored the impact and long-term effects of personnel policies and practices on the organizational climate and unit readiness in the Corps (over 210,000 personnel).
- Responsible for Marine Corps participation at diversity conferences and workshops involved in addressing organizational human climate issues.
- Oversaw the creation of the Campaign Plan to recruit the best officer corps from a diverse nation to lead the Marine Corps into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

- Totally revised the Marine Corps climate survey tools to better assess the organizational human climate as it affects readiness.

June 1995 – June 1997      U.S. Marine Corps  
Naval Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia

**Commanding Officer (CEO), Marine Corps Security Force**

- Responsible for the security of a significant portion of the strategic nuclear triad.
- Responsible for the welfare, training, equipping, and resourcing of almost 400 highly trained and equipped Marine Security Force personnel.
- Coordinated responses, training, and memorandums of understanding with federal, state, and local agencies concerning special security missions/situations.

July 1992 – May 1995      U.S. Marine Corps  
United States Strategic Command, Nebraska

**Chief (Director), Command Security**

- Responsible for the interpretation, implementation, and administration of nuclear security policy and involved in the budgeting and programming associated therewith.
- Conducted/participated in oversight inspections of the physical security of strategic assets throughout the U.S. (sensitive security clearance/access required).
- Key player involved in the rewrite of the Department of Defense Directive on Nuclear Security and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Instruction on safeguarding the national strategic plan.
- Conducted Total Quality Leadership workshops throughout the Command.

June 1990 – June 1992      U.S. Marine Corps  
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton California

**Commanding Officer (CEO), Corrections Battalion**

- Responsible for the effective and efficient operation of all aspects of the confinement facility to include the security, safety, welfare, and rehabilitative/educational programs involving hundreds of confined personnel.
- Responsible for the leading, training, and equipping of over 300 staff personnel.

**Education**

Webster University, San Diego, California campus  
 • M.A. Management, 1991.  
 Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas  
 • BAAS, Occupational Education, 1985 (Cum Laude graduate)

**Interests and Skills**

Extensive knowledge of total physical fitness; small arms and ballistics expertise and marksmanship; master instructor certification in Okinawan karate (7<sup>th</sup> Degree Black Belt); total quality leadership instructor; motivational speaker; challenge course facilitator.

**Projects**

Developed and directed the Marine Corps corrections School; chaired various boards and proceedings; participated in Marine Corps-wide promotion boards; hosted corrections (ACA) conference and held numerous corrections workshops; taught total quality leadership.

**Awards**

Military: Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and four Meritorious Service Medals. Civilian: National Image Meritorious Service Award, Hispanic Magazine Avanzando Award, and Clara Barton Red Cross Volunteer Leadership Award/Meritorious Community Service Award for lifelong service to community.

3/28  
1649



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2006 MAR 28 PM 4:29  
MAR 28 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RANGEL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT DACOWITS Nominations

*Robert* \_\_\_\_\_

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the DACOWITS nominations (TAB A) and please forgive my delay in doing so. We had not had the opportunity to review some of the nominations from the White House Liaison Office.

We agree with the nomination of Roberta Santiago. We had initially submitted her name. She is a retired Command Sergeant Major in the Army Reserve and will bring both an enlisted and Reserve perspective to the committee. We would also support the selection of Ms. Kerry Lassus, Ms. Judith O'Flaherty, and Ms. Vera Mikula. Ms. Mikula has experience in education and child care, and was a member of ~~our~~ Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies.

I believe it is problematic to appoint members who have a perspective on the matters that may come before the committee that could be perceived as "one-sided". Both Mr. Adam Mersereau and Dr. Charmaine Yoest have a record of publications that could be read as reflecting such a perspective. If one or both are to be considered, I believe we will need to add members with well-known "opposing" views-and this will tend to polarize the panel.

Additionally, I would urge consideration of a nominee previously submitted: Felipe Torres, who has Marine Corps experience as well as a background in Inspector General and Equal Opportunity issues. I will try to offer one or ~~two~~ more names later this week if it is the Secretary's desire to sustain the panel size at 12.

  
David S. C. Chu

MA SD		SMA DSD	
<u>TSA SD</u>		SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	6/3/28	4/4	
ESR MA	8/3/28	STF DIR	



11-L-0559/OSD/60788

OSD 05020-06



**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

James H. O'Beirne, Special Assistant to the  
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense  
**14-Mar46**

FROM **Jim O'Beirne** *JOB*  
TO: David Chu  
CC:  
RE: Completion of the DACOWITS appointments

---

David:

The personnel meeting with the Secretary was interrupted today by an unplanned visit to the Pentagon by Congressman Duncan Hunter. The meeting was, therefore, abbreviated in duration. The last item of discussion was the completion of the DACOWITS appointments.

The Secretary stated that DACOWITS probably didn't need 12 members and suggested reducing the size. I pointed out that you had already reduced it ~~from 35~~ to 15 to 12, and with those facts on the table, he dropped the idea.

I submitted for his review the attached packet. He was about halfway through the package when he realized that his next appointment (with a foreign defense minister I believe) was upon him. He abruptly adjourned the personnel meeting saying he would review the remainder of the package and get back to us.

3/14/2006

**DACOWITS 2006 Members**  
(Previously Approved & Pending Approval)

**I. Previously Approved by the Secretary**

1. Mary Nelson New Chairman [Holdover]
- ✓ 2. Lynda Davis Vice Chair [Holdover]
3. Margaret Hoffman Member [Holdover]
4. Margaret Robson Member [Holdover]
- ✓ 5. Denise Balzano Member [New]
6. Margaret White Member [New]
- ✓ 7. Diana Denman Member [New]

**II. Candidates Pending Secretary's Approval [Resumes attached]**

8. Adam Mersereau Military experience (USMC)/author & attorney  
[TAB 1]
9. Kerry Lassus Military spouse (USA)/Independent business woman  
[TAB 2]
10. Charmaine Yoest Recognized expert in social and family issues  
[TAB 3]
11. Judith O'Flaherty Military experience (USNA)/teacher  
[TAB 4]
- ✓ 12. Roberta Santiago Military experience (USMC)/community leader  
[TAB 5]

3/14/2006

**DACOWITS 2006 Members**  
**(Previously Approved & Pending Approval)**

**III. Alternate Candidates [Resumes on file and available]**  
**[To be considered if the need arises as a result of unanticipated resignations.]**

- |                   |   |   |
|-------------------|---|---|
| 13. James Durso   | Military experience (USN)/executive         |   |
| 14. Amy McCarthy  | Military experience (USAFA)/military spouse | / |
| 15. Vera Mikula   | Military Spouse; former DOD board member    |   |
| 16. Martha Kleder | Military experience/Policy analyst          |   |

**ADAM G. MERSEREAU**

(b)(6)

**EMPLOYMENT****LONG ALDRIDGE & NORMAN LLP, Atlanta, Georgia****August 1998-Present****Associate Attorney****General Corporate and Business Law Practice.****Emphasis on Intellectual Property and Technology.**

Experience with drafting and negotiating contracts of all kinds, including complex service, manufacturing, and independent contractor agreements, confidentiality agreements, software, patent and other IP licensing agreements, Internet services agreements, domain name and IP transfer agreements, employment contracts and settlement agreements; experience with general corporate governance, handling IP in mergers and acquisitions, and representation of start-up companies; intimate knowledge of trademarks, copyrights, and working knowledge of patent law; some experience with litigation and drafting demand letters, complaints, discovery documents; experience with advising litigators in IP disputes; responsible for the day to day operation of the firm's domestic and foreign trademark practice, consisting of over 450 trademarks; some experience with TTAB litigation.

Member of the Georgia Bar Association (Computer Law Section), the Atlanta Bar Association, The Technology Alliance of Georgia, the International Trademark Association and the Federalist Society.

**OFFICER, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS****May 1991-April 1995****Summer Instructor to Naval Academy Midshipmen**

Assisted in designing and implementing a summer education and training program for sophomores at the U.S. Naval Academy.

Instructed over 1000 Midshipmen in professional military subjects.

**Communications Officer**

Appointed legal officer for unit of 250 Marines. Acted as commander's liaison on all Civilian and military legal matters.

Selected to conduct two Judge Advocate General's Investigations (criminal).

Special staff officer to the commander of 1000 Marines for all matters involving communications and computers.

Commanded 48 Marines. Responsible for the training, administration and evaluation of all personnel.

Responsible for the operation and maintenance of \$5 million in communications equipment.

**EDUCATION****JURIS DOCTOR, CUM LAUDE Georgia State University School of Law 1998**

CALI Awards for Excellence in Legal Writing, Selected Topics in Jurisprudence and National Security Law.

Selected to Editorial Board, ABA Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal (USC).

Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Risk Management and Insurance, GSU College of Business Administration.

**GRADUATE ECONOMICS STUDY, The University of Oklahoma GPA 4.0**

(7 credit hours, taken for personal improvement and enjoyment)

11-L-0559/OSD/60792



**B.S. BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, College of Charleston 1991**  
 Founder and President, Sigma Chi Fraternity (Iota Epsilon Chapter).  
 Omicron Delta Kappa National Leadership Society.

**PUBLICATIONS**

E. Gail Gunonells and Adam G. Mersereau, *Internet Jurisdiction* (Co-Author), **THE COMPUTER LAWYER**, vol. 16, no. 10, October 1999, p. 19.

Joan T. A. Gabel, *The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and Employer: An Opportunity for Restructuring the System* (Research Assistant), 35 **AM BUS. L.** 403 (1998).

Adam G. Mersereau, *The Military Should Fight Wars, Not Sexism*, **THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**, March 17, 1996. A20.

*A* Adam G. Mersereau, *Women in Combat: The Deadly Inefficiency of Current Law and Policy*, 3 **THE HOLY CROSS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUB. POL.** 39 (1998).

Joan T. A. Gabel, *The Emerging Bad Faith Cause of Action Taken on the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine* (Research Assistant), 48 **MERCER LAW REV.** 63 (1996).

*A.95* Adam G. Mersereau, *'Diversity' May Prove Deadly on the Battlefield*, **THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**, November 14, 1996, NO.

Adam G. Mersereau, *Republicans Should Overlook Dole's Superficial Shortcomings*, **THE STATE, COLUMBIA, S.C.** February 29, 1996. A9.

**TEACHING/PUBLIC SPEAKING**

J. Mack Robinson School of Business, Georgia State University, part time instructor for graduate course in "Law and Ethics in Business." Summer Session 2000.

Goizueta Business School of Emory University, guest lecturer on Corporations, Director and Officer Liability and Mergers and Acquisitions, June 22, 1999.

Center for Military Readiness 1998 Policy Conference on the Culture of the Military at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., guest speaker and panelist, October 21, 1998.

WCNN News Radio, Atlanta, guest on The Tom Hughes Morning Show, to discuss recent article in the Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1998.

FOX News Channel (Television), *The Crier Report*, interviewed by Ms. Crier with regard to military readiness issues, December 17, 1997.

CBS Radio, *The Gill Gross Show*, debated Brig. Gen. Wilma Vaught (USAF Ret.) on military readiness issues, November 18, 1996.



# BZOGRAPHY

*delectare et docere*

Channaine Yo

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## CHARMAINE CROUSE YOEST, Ph.D.

Dr. Charmaine Yoest is the Project Director of the Family, Gender and Tenure Project, at the University of Virginia, a nationwide study focused on parental leave policy funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Bankard Fund. Beginning her career in The White House during the Reagan Administration, Charmaine is now an author and political analyst conducting in-depth research into social and family policy issues.

As an expert on domestic social policy, Dr. Yoest has provided Congressional testimony before both the United States House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as testifying before the New Jersey State Senate, the L.A. County Board of Supervisors, and the Virginia State School Board She is the co-author of Mother in the Middle, an examination of work/family and childcare policy, and she is currently working on her next book, *Empowering Shakespeare's Sister: The Politics of Parental leave*.

Dr. Yoest has been an Instructor at the University of Virginia, teaching Politics and the Family. And, as a recipient of Mellon, Olin, Bradley and Kohler Fellowships, she has done work on tax policy, child care policy, welfare reform and gender and the welfare state.

As a political commentator, Dr. Yoest has appeared on all of the major networks and cable outlets, including NBC's *Today Show*; CBS *Evening News* and CBS *This*

11-L-0559/OSD/60794

*Morning*; *MSNBC*; *Hardball* with Chris Matthews. *The NewsHour* with Jim Lehrer; CNN's *Crossfire*, *Headline News*, *The Jesse Jackson Show*; *McLaughlin's One on One*; *Technopolitics* with Jim Glassman; C-SPAN's *Washington Journal* and was a regular guest on *Politically Incorrect*.

In print, Charmaine has been published in the *Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Times*, *The American Enterprise*, *The Women's Quarterly*, and has been a guest columnist several times for *USA Today*. She is frequently quoted in publications such as the *The Chronicle of Higher Education* and the *Congressional Quarterly Researcher*. She was also the editor and co-author of *Free to Be Family: Helping Mothers and Fathers Meet the Needs of the Next Generation of American Children*, a compendium of research on major policy issues affecting the family which received extensive media coverage in print and by news programs such as the *MacNeill/Lehrer News Hour*.

Previously, Charmaine served as a Contributing Editor at *Policy Review*. She also served as Deputy Director of Public Policy for the Family Research Council, where she was responsible for policy development on family formation and women's issues. This included work on welfare reform, education, child care, adoption and poverty issues.

Charmaine has a Ph.D. and an M.A. in Politics from the University of Virginia, and a B.A. from Wheaton College. She also did graduate work at Oxford University in Ethics and Philosophy. She and her husband, Jack, are marathon runners and live with their five children in the Washington, D.C. area.

###

telephone 202.215.243s • [yoest@virginia.edu](mailto:yoest@virginia.edu) • Knowl

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Last Update: 11/23/2005 133026

**DIANA DESTINE DENMAN  
(THE HONOWLE)****PERSONAL:****Date of Birth:**

(b)(6)

**Office:**

(b)(6)

**Social Security:  
Spouse:****Home:****EDUCATION:**

American University/Catholic University, Washington, DC  
Communications and Theater Arts (1955-1956)  
George Washington University, Washington, DC  
Bachelor of Arts in Journalism (1953-1955)  
1954 - Elected to Pi Beta Phi Sorority  
Mount Vernon Junior College, Washington, DC  
(1951-1953)  
Mount Vernon Seminary, Washington, DC  
(1948-1951)

**PROFESSIONAL:**

Investor/ Volunteer  
(1964 - present)  
Actress - Los Angeles, California  
(1956-1965)

**MEMBERSHIPS:**

The Hoover Institution - Former Member, Board of Overseers  
The Jamestown Foundation - Board of Directors  
Center for Security Policy - Board of Advisors  
The Philadelphia Society - Member  
Council on National Policy - Member  
Hillsdale College - Associate  
Landrum Society - Board of Directors  
Young Conservatives of Texas - Board of Advisors

**HONORS & AWARDS:**

Distinguished Alumna Award  
Mount Vernon College (1986)

Voted One of the Three Most Influential Couples in San Antonio  
ABC affiliate (KSAT-TV) (1986)

## **INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT:**

**Member, American Foreign Policy Council / Congressman Curt Weldon Delegation to Tbilisi, Georgia - Minsk, Belarus - Moscow, Russia (2002)**

**Observer, The Jamestown Foundation Delegation to the Russian Presidential Elections (2000)**

**Observer, International Republican Institution to Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada Elections (March 29, 1998)**

**Observer, The Jamestown Foundation Delegation to the Russian Presidential Elections (1996)**

**Official Guest, Inaugural of President Armando Calderón Sol, El Salvador (1994)**

**Observer, Alianza Republica Nacionalista (ARENA) Party Conference, El Salvador (1993)**

**Accuracy in Media Conference, El Salvador (1990)**

**11<sup>th</sup> World Media Conference, *Advancement of Global Communications and Cooperation*, Moscow, USSR (1990)**

**8<sup>th</sup> World Media Conference, *Leaders Delegation to Eastern Europe and the USSR* (1989)**

**Member, United States Presidential Delegation to Grenada, West Indies (1988)**

**Member, National Museum Services Board (1986-1991)**

**Observer, US Delegation to Presidential Elections in Honduras, Central America (1985)**

**Member, Women for Peace through Real Defense, Geneva Summit, Geneva, Switzerland (1985)**

**Guest, Conservative Party Conference, Brighton, England (1984)**

**Co-Chairman, US Peace Corps Advisory Council (1982-1983)**

# Presidential Scholars Foundation

## COMMISSION

### The Commission on Presidential Scholars

ABOUT US

HISTORY

COMMISSION

NEWSLETTER

SCHOLARS

SUPPORT

LEADERSHIP

NOTABLE  
ALUMNI

SHOP

HOME



#### Flo N. Traywick: Virginia

National Committeewoman, Republican Party of Virginia, elected in 1984. Chief Deputy Commissioner, Department of Aging. Member of the Executive Committees of both the Republican Party of Virginia and the Virginia Federation of Republican Women. Trustee of the Lynchburg Academy of Music. Member of the White House Commission on Presidential Scholars from 1991 to 1993. Worked extensively on the Republican National Convention from 1976 to the present. A member of President Reagan's Virginia Steering Committee and a Founding Board Member of the Virginia School of Arts. Candidate for Congress in 1986 and House of Delegates in 1977.



#### Mary K. Turner: Virginia

Mary Kay Turner teaches World Religion and Ethics at Bishop O'Connell High School in Arlington, Virginia. After teaching on an Indian Reservation in Montana, Mrs. Turner pursued her graduate studies in Humanities with a focus on Indian education and later researched alternative education programs, helping to found Western Wyoming Alternative High School and The Learning Center, a program for developmentally disabled young children in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. As Chairman of Western Wyoming Mental Association, Mrs. Turner worked to bring services to rural areas in the state. More recently she completed an appointment to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) and is presently on the board of the Alliance for National Defense.



#### Paul G. Vallas: Illinois

In 2002, Mr. Vallas was named the Chief Executive Officer of the School District of Philadelphia, charged with improving student achievement and leading the largest school reform effort in the history of public education. As CEO of Chicago Public Schools, a position he held from 1995 until his move to Philadelphia, he is credited with improving student test scores by virtually every academic indicator, eliminating waste, streamlining operations, implementing large-scale school construction and renovation, ending social promotion, partnering with national and civic groups and the private sector, and establishing the largest after-school and summer reading programs in the country. He previously served for six years as Chicago's Budget Director and Director of Revenue, and for five years as the Executive Director of the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission. Mr. Vallas began his career as a teacher in elementary school and higher education. He served in the Illinois Army National Guard for twelve years, earning the rank of Captain, and was a senior instructor at the Illinois Military Academy. He holds undergraduate and master's degrees from Western Illinois University. He and his wife Sharon have three sons.

#### Fidel Vargas: California

Fidel Vargas is currently Vice President of Reliant Equity Investments. Previously he served as Mayor of Baldwin Park, California, where his innovative approaches to city government-- resulting in balanced budgets, decreased crime, increased city services, public safety, community improvement and business recruitment-- earned praise as "best practices" by the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Mr. Vargas is a founding member of the Cesar Chavez Foundation, and has served on two Presidentially-appointed national Social Security commissions, including President George W. Bush's bi-partisan Social Security Study

**Denise W. Balzano**

(b)(6)

**PERSONAL PROFILE**

- Co-founder, grassroots consulting firm specializing in workforce communications
- Local community activist advocating for at-risk children and families
- Skilled fundraiser: more than 10 years fundraising and non-profit board experience

**EXPERIENCE**

**Co-Founder & Vice President, External Affairs, Balzano Associates  
Arlington, VA 1985-88; 1991-present**

- Co-founded consulting firm designed to create grass roots education and outreach programs for both industrial clients and elected officials.
- Public policy analysis, issues management, message selection, strategic planning.
- Grassroots mobilizations, event planning, and media management.

**Childhelp/Virginia Board of Trustees, Childhelp USA**

*Childhelp is one of the nation's leading organizations in the fight against child abuse. 1991-present*

- Chairman, Program Committee - Childhelp/VA Board of Trustees.
- As president of Washington Chapter, created annual gala fundraiser.
- Working with corporate committee, raised nearly \$2.5 million in eight years for construction of new facilities and for program expansion.
- Developed new chapters; expanded membership; created new volunteer opportunities.
- Created and directed National Day of Hope Congressional outreach.

**Editor, Media Directory of Women Experts, Independent Women's Forum  
Washington, D.C. 1993-95**

- Developed and organized a media directory of 300 women experts, listing areas of expertise and professions.
- Directory distributed to more than 2,500 media outlets throughout the country.

**Chief of Staff to Marilyn Tucker Quayle, The White House  
Washington, D.C. 1988-91**

- Established and managed Office of the Second Lady.
- Helped create the message and outreach for MTQ involvement in breast cancer treatment/prevention and in disaster preparedness issues.
- Responsible for all official, political and diplomatic programs, activities and events related to the Second Lady, Quayle's family and the Vice President's Residence. Managed renovation of Vice President's Residence.
- Served as press spokesman.

**Executive Director, Republican Women's Federal Forum**  
**Washington, D.C. 1981-86**

- Reorganized, revitalized and managed group's operations.
- Increased membership fourfold and net revenues tenfold.
- Organized forums hosting Cabinet & Congressional leadership to speak on current public policy issues.
- Directed work of Advisory Council, including Cabinet & congressional spouses.
- Since 1987 & currently, serve as Member of Advisory Council

**International Economist, U.S. Department of Commerce**  
**Washington, D.C. 1971-74**

- Legislative analysis in preparation of departmental position and congressional testimony.
- Liaison with industry & interagency working groups.

**Legislative Assistant, Office of Congressman Tim Lee Carter (Ky)**  
**Washington, D.C. 1970-71**

- Organized and managed legislative and press operations.
- Key issues: health care, trade, drug abuse, and environment.

**POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT**

- Official Proceedings - Republican National Conventions - 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000
- Delegate to Virginia State Republican Conventions - 1988, 1992
- Greater McLean Republican Women's Club - Assisted with get-out-the-vote efforts
- Republican Women's Federal Forum Advisory Council Member - 1979 to present.

**EDUCATION**

M.A. International Relations, Georgetown University, 1970 (Economics and Political Theory minor)  
A.B. Political Science, Hollins College (Economics & Political Science minor, Hollins College)





# Fact Sheet

**Defense Department Advisory Committee on  
Women in the Services  
(DACOWITS)**



## DR LYNDA DAVIS

**DACOWITS ASSIGNMENTS:** Appointed 2002- Completes Fall 2005.

**BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:** Dr. Davis received her Bachelor of Arts Degree in Developmental Psychology from the University of Santa Barbara, her Master of Arts in Community/Clinical Psychology from the California State University at Northridge, and her Master of Public Administration and Doctor of Philosophy in public Administration from the University of Southern California. She currently serves as both the President and CEO of Davis O'Connell, Inc. and the President of The Carlton Group. The former is a Washington-based government relations firm providing technical consulting services to educational institutions, school districts, municipalities, high technology firms and non-profit organizations in their work with the U.S. Congress; the latter is a communications firm providing advice to non-profit organizations and public relations firms on project and grassroots development. Her career also spanned numerous other positions, from Director of Clinical Services to Director, State of Florida, Washington Office. She was also a member of the Florida Army National Guard from 1987 to 1994 when she transferred to the United States Army Reserves until 1997, where she attained the rank of Captain.

**MEMBERSHIPS AND CIVIC ACTIVITIES:** Since 1998, Dr. Davis is a Founding Member and past Chair of the National Council for Adoption. She is also the founder of Linkages, an organization to assist orphanages in Bosnia.

**AWARDS AND HONORS:** Dr. Davis was a Presidential Management Intern with assignments at the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Management and Budget, and the U.S. Congress from 1980-1982. At the same time, she served as the Intergovernmental Human Services Coordinator, American Society for Public Administration. From 1975 to 1977, she was an appointee to the National Task Force on Education American Psychological Association.

**PERSONAL INFORMATION:** Dr. Davis lives in Great Falls, Virginia with her husband, Anthony D. Blankley, and three children, Spencer, Trevor and Anastasia.

4000 Defense Pentagon, Room 7C548A, Washington, DC 20301-4000  
For more information, call (b)(6)

3/14/2006

**DACOWITS 2006 Members**  
(Previously Approved & Pending Approval)

**I. Previously Approved by the Secretary**

1. Mary Nelson            New Chairman [Holdover]
2. Lynda Davis           Vice Chair [Holdover]
3. Margaret Hoffman    Member [Holdover]
4. Margaret Robson      Member [Holdover]
5. Denise Balzano        Member [New]
6. Margaret White        Member [New]
7. Diana Denman         Member [New]

**II. Candidates Pending Secretary's Approval [Resumes attached]**

8. Adam Mersereau      Military experience(USMC)/author & attorney  
[Previous **rec.** by Personnel & Readiness (P&R)]  
[TAB 1]
9. Kerry Lassus          Military spouse (USA)/Independent business woman  
[Rec. by outgoing board member]  
[TAB 2]
10. Charmaine Yoest      Recognized expert in **social** and family issues  
[**Rec.** by The Heritage Foundation & WHLO]  
[TAB 3]
11. Judith O'Flaherty    Military experience(USNA)/teacher  
[Previous rec. by P&R; also rec. by WHLO]  
[TAB 4]
12. Roberta Santiago     Military experience(USMC)/community leader  
[Rec. by Personnel & Readiness]  
[TAB 5]

**3/14/2006**

**DACOWITS 2006 Members**  
(Previously Approved & Pending Approval)

**III. Alternate Candidates** [Resumes on file and available]  
[~~To be~~ considered if the need arises as a result of unanticipated resignations.]

- |     |                    |   |
|-----|--------------------|---|
| 13. | <b>James Durso</b> | Military experience (USN)/executive<br>[Rec. by Bill Schneider]             |
| 14. | Amy McCarthy       | Military experience (USAFA)/military spouse<br>[Rec. by WHLO]               |
| 15. | Vera Mikula        | Military Spouse; former DOD board member<br>[Rec. by WHLO]                  |
| 16. | Martha Kleder      | Military experience/Policy analyst<br>[Rec. by Concerned Women for America] |



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301-4000



ACTION MEMO

September 28, 2005, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSECDEF \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 28 Sep 05*  
SUBJECT: 2005 Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services  
(DACOWITS) Member Selection

- You suggested that we assess the **size** of DACOWITS. You **also** asked **that** we discuss the extension of any members of DACOWITS with you and suggested individuals **for** the Committee (**SNOWFLAKE**, TAB A).
- In 2002, the membership of the DACOWITS **was** reduced from 35 to 13. Additionally, the **2002** DACOWITS Charter limited the Committee **to** not more **than** **15**.
- The membership of the DACOWITS can be reduced **from** 13 to 11 members **and** **still** meet the requisite expertise, requirements and mission set forth in the Charter (Tab **B**).
- Ten of 13 current members **of** DACOWITS, including the Chairperson, complete their **three-year terms** in December **2005**. Additionally, Mrs. Ellen Sauerbrey has been nominated for an **Assistant** Secretary of State position and will be **leaving** the **Committee**. The **terms of** the two remaining members expire in **2006** and **2007**.
- For the eight appointments TAB **C** **offers** eleven candidates, including the individuals you suggested.
  - o One is a current member whose term expires in December **2005**, but would like **to** serve a fourth year. Her expertise **is** extremely valuable.
- Candidates to fill the position of DACOWITS Chairperson **are** being submitted separately.



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**RECOMMENDATION** Approve the reduction in the sizes of the DACOWTTS to eleven members and select eight members.

*Committee of 11:* Approved \_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

*Selection of Members:* \_\_\_\_\_

**COORDINATION:** White House Liaison office and Services

**Attachments:**

**As stated**

**Prepared by:** Col Denise Dailey, USA, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

6/28/05

June 28, 2005

TO: David Chu  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DACOWITS

Please don't extend the DACOWITS people without talking to me.

Attached is a paper on Diane Denman. Let's take a look at her as a possibility, and also, let's take a look at Mary Kay Turner (John Turner's wife). She previously served on DACOWITS, and is a friend of the Vice President's.

Please see me about it, so you can get a little guidance and calibration.

Thanks.

Attach: Note from Diane Denman

DHR:js  
062705-40

.....  
*Please Respond By July 21, 2005*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60806

**Subj: No Subject**

**Date: Sunday, June 26, 2005 40805 PM**

**DACOWITS**

**Diana Denman**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Two husbands in the military and brother**

**Brother WW1**

**Father - couldn't stay in military - health issue so went to the Red Cross served in China, Burma and India**

**First husband Marine - served in two Gima**

**Second husband Leroy Army specialist - Adjunct General's office - Central & South America. He and she and he lived in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador**

**Is a candidate for Windsec Board - papers in process - only meet once or twice a year?**

**Was co-chairman Peace Corp Board and always interested in National Defense - see resume**

## APPENDIX A

### Charter

#### Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)

**A. Official Designation:** Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS).

**B. Objectives and Scope of Activities:** The Committee shall provide the Department of Defense, through the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (PDUSD (P&R)), with advice and recommendations on matters and policies relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women in the Armed Forces. In addition, the Committee shall provide advice and recommendations on family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. To accomplish this mission, the Committee shall be composed of not more than 15 civilian members, representing a distribution of demography, professional career fields, community service, and geography, and selected on the basis of their experience in the military, as a member of a military family, or with women's or family-related workforce issues. Members must be US citizens selected without regard to race, creed, gender, national origin, age, marital status or physically challenging conditions. Members are appointed by the Secretary of Defense, and shall serve as individuals and not as official representatives of any group or organization with which they may be affiliated. While the members serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense, normally the term of membership is three years, with approximately one-third of the membership rotating annually. The members of the Committee shall serve without compensation, but may be allowed transportation and per diem for Government-directed travel.

**C. Period of Time Necessary for the Committee to Carry Out Its Purpose:** Indefinite.

**D. Official to Whom the Committee Reports:** The Committee reports to the PDUSD (P&R), with functional responsibilities under the staff cognizance of the Director for DACOWITS and Woman's Military Matters. The PDUSD (P&R) shall appoint a Designated Federal Official (normally the Director) to approve or call each meeting, to approve the meeting agenda, to attend all meetings, and to chair meetings when so directed by the agency head. The Designated Federal Official shall have the authority to adjourn any meeting of the Committee which is not considered to be in the public interest.

**E. Agency Responsible for Providing Necessary Support:** The PDUSD (P&R) provides such personnel, facilities, and other administrative support necessary for the performance of the Committee's functions.

**F. Duties:** The duties of the Committee include assisting the Department of Defense by advising on specified matters relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women in the Services. In addition, the Committee will advise on family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. In carrying out its duties, the Committee serves as a conduit of information and advice to the Department of Defense on issues relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women and on family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. Through its work, the Committee encourages public acceptance of military service as a citizenship responsibility and as a career field for qualified women in the Services. In addition, the Committee will actively promote family-related issues that will assist the Department in recruiting and retaining a highly qualified professional military.

**G. Annual Operating Costs:** It is estimated that the annual operating costs to support the Committee will not exceed \$500,000, which includes staff support years, meetings, per diem and travel costs. The annual person-years of Federal staff support for the Committee will not exceed five.

**H. Number and Frequency of Committee Meetings:** A minimum of two meetings shall be held annually.

**I. Termination Date:** The Committee shall terminate upon the completion of its mission or two years from the date this Charter is filed with the US Congress.

**J. Filing Date:** April 17, 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/60808



**Recommended Criteria for Selection of New Members as outlined in the DACOWITS Charter**

**Military Experience:** Personal military experience will allow members to identify with the issues and concerns of today's Service members and their families. Military veterans of the Active and Guard Reserve components understand the unique experiences, concerns, issues and needs of Service members and how each affects readiness, recruitment and retention, and quality of life. The nomination of a retired military service member to DACOWITS is highly encouraged. To prevent a conflict of interest, currently servicing Department of Defense military and civilian personnel and drilling Guard/Reserve members will not be considered for membership.

**Military Family Member:** Military family members will bring a unique perspective to the Committee as it expands its focus to family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. Family members feel the direct impact of policy on quality of life issues.

**Women's or Family-Related Work Force Experience:** The Department of Defense is committed to recruiting and retaining the best people of both genders for military service, and will compete with the private sector to become an employer of choice. Experience in women's or family-related work force issues will provide critical background to reviewing these issues within the Department of Defense.

**Availability:** Members whose other obligations make it difficult or impossible to conduct installation visits or attend meetings ultimately do a disservice to the Committee, the Department of Defense, and our military women and families.

# NCO MATTERS

## Message from the Director

### Santiago Honored

October 1, 2003

**Command Sergeant Major  
Jimmie W. Spencer, USA, Ret.  
Director, Noncommissioned Officer  
and Soldier Programs**

Command Sgt. Maj. Roberts L. Santiago, U.S. Army Reserve, Ret., is the 2003 recipient of the Sergeant Major of the Army William Bainbridge Noncommissioned Officer Medal.

The Bainbridge medal is awarded annually to a noncommissioned officer – active, reserve component or retired – contributing most to the U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Corps.

Santiago will receive the award Oct. 6 at the Opening Ceremony of this year's Association of the U.S. Army's Annual Meeting at the New Washington Convention Center.



Santiago served the Army and this nation for more than 23 years.

She entered the U.S. Army Reserve under the Civilian Acquired Skills Program (CASP), Sept. 20, 1978, and during her Army career she held a variety of assignments of increasing responsibility.

Key assignments including senior legal specialist, personnel staff NCO, senior financial NCO, and first sergeant and command sergeant major of three U.S. Army Reserve hospitals.

Her last Army assignment was as the command sergeant major of the 352nd Combat Support Hospital in Oakland, Calif.

She retired from the Army Reserve on Jan. 12, 1999.

Santiago is the epitome of a noncommissioned officer.

She is a leader, teacher and role model for soldiers and noncommissioned officers.

AUSA is also recognizing this outstanding NCO for her extensive involvement with Association activities in the civilian and military communities.

Santiago is a key AUSA leader at both the chapter and region levels.

She has served on the Maj. Gen. William F. Deen Chapter's executive board of directors for more than 10 years as the chapter treasurer and chairperson of the Women's Advisory Committee.

Additionally, Santiago is the Sixth Region vice president for NCO and soldier programs.

At the national level, has she served six years on AUSA's Resolutions Committee where the Association's platform for the coming year is developed and presented to the chapter delegates for adoption.

For the past two years, Santiago has chaired the policy subcommittee that deals with many issues that directly affect the men and women who serve in our Army.

11-L-0559/OSD/60810



# TAB C

## Recommend Members Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>AREA OF EXPERTISE</u>	<u>SOURCE OF NOMINATION</u>
1. Dr. Lynda Davis	Military Experience. Extend for a 4 <sup>th</sup> Year.	Sec Rumsfed
2. Mrs. Mary K. Turner	Women's or Family-Related Workplace Experience	Sec Rumsfed
3. Mrs. Diana D. Denman	Women's or Family-Related Workplace Experience	Sec Rumsfed
4. Mrs. Denise Balzano	Women's or Family-Related Workplace Experience; Public Policy Experience; Chief of Staff for Mrs. Quayle (1988-91)	White House Liaison Office
5. Roberta L. Santigao	Major Military Experience; Key troop Leading positions in USAR units; Recognized for leadership by AUSA	USD(P&R)
6. Mrs. Zandra M. Krulak	Military Family Member Experience; Spouse of former Commandant USMC	USD(P&R)
7. Felipe Torres	Military Experience; Garrison and Combat Marine leadership, EO and IG Experience	USMC
8. Allison L. Johnson	Military Experience; EO Advisor to Sec Army; Member of Sec Army Sexual Harassment Panel (1996-97)	Army
9. Michael J. Halpin	Military Experience; Marine Unit Command and leadership Positions	Rep Heather Wilson

10. Vincent W. Patton

**Military Experience;** Master  
Chief Petty Officer of the  
Coast Guard (Retired)

**Coast Guard**

11. Dr. Alan Gropman

**Military Experience; 27 Years** Air Force,  
Leadership and Staff Positions (Retired)  
NDU Academic Research Expertise

**USD (P&R)**

~~FOUO~~

October 25, 2006

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Assessments Paper on Indigenous Languages - Africa

With regards to *the* attached paper, I ~~want~~ to see the difference between 2000 and 2006 to determine if we are making progress. It could be worse today, but I can't tell by looking at ~~the~~ attached assessments paper.

Thanks.

Attach: Assessments Indigenous Languages - Africa paper

DHR:aa  
SF102506-05

.....  
*Please Respond By November 09, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17903-06



11/15/2006 6:23:20 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60814




10/25/06

For Official Use Only

# Assessments

## Indigenous Languages - Africa



Afrikaans	77	Kpelle	3
Akan(Twi)	123	Lingala	7
Amharic	106	Loma	2
Bakweri	3	Makua	2
Bassa	4	Malinke	6
Berber	3	Mende	6
Dinka	6	Mpongwe	1
Djerma	1	Sena	2
Efik	9	Somali	16
Ewe	29	Swahili	183
Fang	9	Swati	3
Fon	3	Tira	3
Ga	47	Tonga	24
Galla	16	Tsonga	3
Hausa	46	Tswana	8
Igbo	118	Wolof	6
Kabyle	1	Xhosa	3
Kituba	2	Yoruba	204
Kongo	4	Zulu	6

For Official Use Only



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

~~FOUO~~  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

November 15, 2006, 12:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R) *David S. C. Chu 15 Nov 06*

SUBJECT: Navy's Assessments Paper on Indigenous Languages – Africa  
(SNOWFLAKE – Tab A)

- Overall, the number of Navy personnel (active, reserve and civilian) identified as proficient in the languages listed has increased 152% since 2000, 281% in Swahili, 411% in Hausa, and 119% in Yoruba.
- Swahili and Hausa/Yoruba are currently on the Department's Strategic Language List (SLL). The SLL identifies those languages for which the Department **has** current or projected needs.
- TAB B contains similar information on all of the languages in the Navy assessments paper.
- The increases likely reflect better reporting, in response to the language incentives now being offered. Improved visibility, of course, allows the Department to meet its needs more quickly and probably at lower cost.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Peter L. Gillis, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/60816

OSD 17903-06



11/15/2006 6:23:12 PM



# TAB A

~~FOUO~~

October 25, 2006

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ~~Assessments~~ Paper on Indigenous Languages - Africa

~~With~~ regards to the attached paper, I want to see the difference between 2000 and 2006 to determine if we are making progress. It could be worse today, but I can't tell by looking at the attached ~~assessments~~ paper.

Thanks.

Attach: ~~Assessments~~ Indigenous Languages - Africa paper

DMR:sp  
SP102506-05

.....  
*Please Respond By November 09, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17903-06




11/15/2006 23:20 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60818

# Assessments

## Indigenous Languages - Africa



**For Official Use Only**

<b>Afrikaans</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>Kpelle</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Akan(Twi)</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>Lingala</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Amharic</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>Loma</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Bakweri</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Makua</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Bassa</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Malinké</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Berber</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Mende</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Dinka</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Mpongwe</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Djerma</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Sena</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Efik</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Somali</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Ewe</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>Swahili</b>	<b>183</b>
<b>Fang</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>Swati</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Fon</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Tigre</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Oa</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>Tonga</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Galla</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>Tsonga</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Hausa</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>Tswana</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Igbo</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>Wolof</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Kabyle</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Xhosa</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Kituba</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>Yoruba</b>	<b>204</b>
<b>Kongo</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Zulu</b>	<b>6</b>

# **TAB B**

**Navy Population Comparison  
Indigenous African Languages  
2000 and 2006**

<b>LANGUAGE</b>	<b>2000<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>2006<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>% Change</b>
AFRIKAANS	25	77	208%
AKAN	58	123	112%
AMHARIC	34	106	212%
BAKWERI	0	3	N/A
BASSA-KRU	2	4	100%
BERBER	3	3	0%
DINKA	1	5	400%
DJERMA	1	1	0%
EFIK	3	9	200%
EWE	6	29	383%
FANG	11	9	-18%
FON	0	3	N/A
GA	19	47	147%
GALLA	14	16	14%
HAUSA	9	46	411%
IBO	51	119	133%
KABYLE	1	1	0%
KIKONGO	1	4	300%
KITUBA	3	2	-33%
KPELLE	1	3	200%
LINGALA	1	7	600%
LOMA	5	2	-60%
MAKUA	2	2	0%
MANDINGO-MALINKE	0	5	N/A
MENDE	2	5	150%
MPONGWE	1	1	0%
SENA	0	2	N/A
SOMALI	7	16	129%
SWAHILI	48	183	281%
SWATI	3	3	0%
TIGRE	4	3	-25%
TONGA	12	24	100%
TSONGA	1	3	200%
TSWANA	10	8	-20%
WOLOF	1	6	500%
XHOSA	0	3	N/A
YORUBA	93	204	119%
ZULU	1	5	400%
<b>Total</b>	<b>434</b>	<b>1092</b>	<b>152%</b>

<sup>1</sup> Source: DMDC as of Sep 2006

<sup>2</sup> Source: U.S. Navy Execution of the Department of Defense-directed One-Time Self-Report of Foreign Language Skill Briefing of September 2006

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Training and Equipping Countries Who Help Us

Attached is a memo I sent to Policy and the response Peter Rodman sent back, which I find interesting and useful. I think we ought to do that.

Please put in place a project with Eric Edelman to do so, if you agree. If not, let's talk about it.

Thanks.

Attach. 9/28/06 ASD(ISA) memo to SD (OSD 15371-06), SF071706-16.

D:\R\dr  
100306-01 (travel computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by October 26, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17913-06



11/16/2006 10:46:08 AM

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~~FOR OFFICIAL  
USE ONLY (FOUO)~~

INFO MEMO

SEP 18 2006  
COA  
10/3  
SF071706-16  
USC

SEP 28 2006

12  
Robert Rangel  
7/29

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Helping Countries Who Help Us in Afghanistan and Iraq

- You asked us to think through how we can reward, repay and favor countries that have helped us in Afghanistan and Iraq.
- The best way we can help coalition partners who have helped us is to ensure they are well-equipped and trained, and interoperable with U.S. forces.
- We need to work with combatant commanders and the military departments to prioritize and rank order countries to ensure training and equipment flow to those countries that most merit assistance. Additionally, we would:
  - reprioritize the distribution of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) to support a wider universe of coalition partners. Roughly 90% of current CSF goes to Pakistan and Jordan, leaving very little for the rest of our coalition partners;
  - conduct pre-deployment training for coalition partners in critical areas such as counter-IED, interoperability, and measures to protect against fratricide—some of this can be done in partnership with NATO;
  - expand already proven security cooperation tools;
  - increase the combatant commanders' ability to train and equip coalition partners for multiple contingencies by seeking permanent Section 1206 authority for a \$500 M Global Train & Equip fund.
  - broaden coalition partner training and maximize their participation in the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program, War College, Service Schools, and Regional Center programs, to help our partners prepare for current and future conflicts.
- resource a Defense Coalition Support Account (DCSA) to stockpile equipment for our coalition partners;

Prepared by Jim Stahlman, ISA-Coalition Affairs 771-6717

MA ES	MA ES	MA ES
MA ES	MA ES	MA ES
MA ES	MA ES	MA ES
MA ES	MA ES	MA ES



~~FOR OFFICIAL  
USE ONLY (FOUO)~~



OSD 16371-08

9/29/2006 9:14:30 AM

Tab A

~~FOR OFFICIAL  
USE ONLY (FOUO)~~

- transform CENTCOM's Coalition Village into a Coalition Liaison Center (CLC) with a global focus. Baseline funding for the CLC is estimated at \$32.3M in the first year; and
- Integrate coalition-enabling technology solutions into existing and planned programs. We are requesting baseline funding of \$30M per year to execute this initiative.
- Additionally, we have identified an interoperable Counter Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare (CREW) system to help save the lives of our coalition partners by defeating Improvised Explosives Devices. We will purchase an initial inventory of systems this year, and will prioritize distribution to those coalition partners most willing to fight.

COORDINATION: Tab A

~~FOR OFFICIAL  
USE ONLY (FOUO)~~

A277

Tab A



SM17NOV06

## SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 11/16/2006

DOCUMENT TYPE FRONT OFFICE DOC ATTACHMENT:  
OSD CONTROL OSD 17913-06 DOC 10/4/2006 DOR 11/16/2006 SIGNATURE CASE:  
FROM SECDEF RUMSFLED TO JCS PACE  
SUBJECT TRAINING AND EQUIPPING COUNTRIES WHO HELP US  
KEYWORDS SNOW FLAKE  
COMMENTS CAF. NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL  
FN 092.3 SEC U OCN 100306-01  
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS OSD 15371-06  
STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:  
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:  
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION  
PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 1  
SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW  
OSD 17913-06  
FRONT OFFICE DOC  
INFO MEMO

CREATED BY: hawleye

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES  
ADC RWI

11-L-0559/OSD/60825

OSD 17913-06





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-0562-06

15 November 2006

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS

SUBJECT: Training and Equipping Countries Who Help Us (SF 100306-01)

In response to your issue (TAB A), I agree with ASD(ISA) that the best way we can assist coalition partners who have helped us in Iraq and Afghanistan is to ensure they are well-equipped, trained, and interoperable with US forces.

- Recommend expansion of the Coalition Support Funds to reimburse and ensure accountability of funds provided to our coalition partners; the reprioritization should not be at the expense of Jordan and Pakistan. I support all of the other ASD(ISA) suggestions, and we are working with his staff to bring these objectives to fruition.
- Recommend we also focus on helping partners who have helped us in the GWOT beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
- It is important that Congress pass the Building Global Partnerships Act (BGPA) next year (TAB B). This will require aggressive congressional engagement. The combatant commanders and I are ready to assist in explaining these requirements to Congress. The BGPA includes important new authorities to assist partners, such as:
  - Permanent, flexible authority to train, equip, and operate with partners to combat terrorism and enhance stability.
  - Authority to provide logistics support for coalition partners involved in the GWOT.
  - Authority to improve interoperability with partner nations.
  - Permanent and Global Commanders Emergency Response Program authority to meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs.
- Finally, we are working with your staff on a wide range of other efforts which are relevant to building partner nation capacity. These include:
  - Seeking your approval to delegate to USCENTCOM approval authority to loan significant military equipment to certain coalition forces within Iraq and Afghanistan when this does not detract from the readiness of US forces.

OSD 17913-06



11/16/2006 10:43:21 AM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60826

092.3

15 Nov 06

400706

- Implementing the Quadrennial Defense Review's Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap.
- Revising security cooperation priorities in the Security Cooperation Guidance.
- Working to enact security assistance reforms with the Department of State.

**COORDINATION: TAB C**

**Attachments:**

**As stated**

**copy to:**

USD(P)

USD(AI & L)

USD(C)

DOD(GC)

**Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. F. Sattler, USMC: Director, J-5**

(b)(6)

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Eric Edelmann  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Training and Equipping Countries Who Help Us

Attached is a memo I sent to Polby and the response Peter Rodman sent back, which I find interesting and useful. I think we ought to do that.

Please put in place a project with Eric Edelmann to do so, if you agree. If not, let's talk about it.

Thanks.

Attach. 9/28/06 ASD(ISA) memo to SD (OSD 15371-06), SF071706-16.

DISSEM:  
100306-01 (unclassified) doc

.....  
**Please respond by October 26, 2006**

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

9/24  
13/15

**FOR OFFICIAL  
USE ONLY (FOUO)**

INFO MEMO

SF071706-16  
USDP

SEP 28 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Robert Rangel  
9/29

SUBJECT: Helping Countries Who Help Us in Afghanistan and Iraq


- You asked us to think through how we can reward, repay and favor countries that have helped us in Afghanistan and Iraq.
- The best way we can help coalition partners who have helped us is to ensure they are well-equipped and trained, and interoperable with U.S. forces.
- We need to work with combatant commanders and the military departments to prioritize and rank order countries to ensure training and equipment flow to those countries that most merit assistance. Additionally, we would:
  - reprioritize the distribution of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) to support a wider universe of coalition partners. Roughly 90% of current CSF goes to Pakistan and Jordan, leaving very little for the rest of our coalition partners;
  - conduct pre-deployment training for coalition partners in critical areas such as counter-IED, interoperability, and measures to protect against fratricide—some of this can be done in partnership with NATO;
  - expand already proven security cooperation tools:
    - increase the combatant commanders' ability to train and equip coalition partners for multiple contingencies by seeking permanent Section 1206 authority for a \$500 M Global Train & Equip fund.
    - broaden coalition partner training and maximize their participation in the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program, War College, Service Schools, and Regional Center programs, to help our partners prepare for current and future conflicts.
  - resource a Defense Coalition Support Account (DCSA) to stockpile equipment for our coalition partners;

Prepared by Jim Stubbins, MA-Coalition Affairs (b)(6)

MA SO	SSA DSD
TRAIR	SA DSD
EXEC REC	1300 10/7/06
ERRMA	APR 10/7/06



**FOR OFFICIAL  
USE ONLY (FOUO)**



OSD 16371-06  
10/2/2006 9:14:30 AM

Tab A

~~FOR OFFICIAL  
USE ONLY (FOUO)~~

- transform CENTCOM's Coalition Village into a Coalition Liaison Center (CLC) with a global focus. Baseline funding for the CLC is estimated at \$32.3M in the first year; and
- ~~integrate coalition~~ integrate coalition-enabling technology solutions into existing and planned ~~programs~~ programs. We are requesting baseline funding of \$30M per year to execute this initiative.
- Additionally, we have identified an interoperable Counter Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare (CREW) system to help save the lives of our coalition partners by defeating Improvised Explosives Devices. We will purchase an initial inventory of systems this year, and will prioritize distribution to those coalition partners most willing to fight.

COORDINATION: Tab A

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# **TITLE XV—MATTERS RELATING TO BUILDING PARTNER CAPABILITIES TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND ENHANCE STABILITY**

Sec. 1501. Short title.

## **SUBTITLE A—TRAINING AND EQUIPPING PARTNER NATION FORCES TO BUILD CAPABILITIES**

Sec. 1511. Making permanent authority for support of military operations to combat terrorism by United States special operations forces.

Sec. 1512. Building the partnership capacity of foreign military and other security forces.

## **SUBTITLE B—ENHANCING PARTNERS' CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS**

Sec. 1521. Loans of significant military equipment.

Sec. 1522. Grants of non-lethal excess defense articles by geographic combatant commanders.

Sec. 1523. Provision of automatic identification system information on maritime shipping to foreign countries.

Sec. 1524. Establishment of a defense coalition support account to maintain inventory of critical items for coalition partners.

Sec. 1525. Reimbursement of salaries for reserve components in support of commercial sales overseas.

Sec. 1526. Sales of defense services to be performed overseas to support direct commercial sales by United States companies.

## **SUBTITLE C—DEVELOPING COMMONALITY BY EXPANDING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND SUPPORT FOR PARTNERS**

Sec. 1531. Authority for distribution to certain foreign personnel of education and training materials and information technology to enhance military interoperability.

Sec. 1532. Medical care and temporary duty expenses for coalition liaison officers.

Sec. 1533. Enhancing participation of the Department of Defense in multinational military centers of excellence.

Sec. 1534. Stability Operations Fellowship Program.

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## **SUBTITLE D—SETTING CONDITIONS THROUGH SUPPORT FOR LOCAL POPULATIONS**

Sec. 1541. Making permanent and global the commanders' emergency response program for urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs in the field.

Sec. 1542. Amendment of authority for humanitarian assistance to include stabilization activities.

Sec. 1543. Third party payments under the DoD rewards program in support of U.S. operations to combat terrorism.

## **SEC. 1501. SHORT TITLE.**

This title may be cited as the "Building Global Partnerships Act of 2007".

## **Subtitle A — Training and Equipping Partner Nation Forces to Build Capabilities**

### **SEC. 1511. MAKING PERMANENT AUTHORITY FOR SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS TO COMBAT TERRORISM**

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding ~~at~~ the end the following new section:

#### **"§ 408. Support of military operations to combat terrorism**

"(a) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of Defense may expend up to \$25,000,000 during any fiscal year to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces to combat terrorism.

"(b) NOTIFICATION.—Upon using the authority provided in subsection (a) to make funds available for support of an approved military operation, the Secretary of Defense shall notify the

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congressional defense committees expeditiously, and in any event in not more than **48** hours, of the use of such authority with respect to that operation. Such a notification need be provided only once with respect to any such operation. Any such notification shall be in Writing.

"(c) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—This section does not constitute authority to conduct a covert action, as such term is defined in section 503(e) of the National Security Act of **1947** (**50** U.S.C. 413(e)).

"(d) ANNUAL REPORT. —Not later than 90 days after the close of each fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on support provided under subsection (a) during that fiscal year. Each such report shall describe the support provided, including a statement of the recipient of the support and the amount obligated to provide the support."

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:  
"408. Support of ~~military operations to combat terrorism~~"

#### Section-by-Section Analysis

This section would permit the Secretary of Defense to continue the program developed under section 1208 ("Support of Military Operations to Combat Terrorism") of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year **(FY)2005** (Public Law 108-375), with modifications. The original authority allows the Department of Defense to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by U.S. special operations forces to combat terrorism, and is in effect through FY 2007. The Secretary of Defense exercises this authority and operations are funded through U.S. Special Operations Command in accordance with the procedures established by the Secretary of Defense on March **29**, 2005.

This section would delete the original subsections (b), **(g)**, and (h) of section 1208 as no longer applicable, and redesignate the remaining subsections accordingly. This section also would correct an error in the notification provision so that it reads "not more than **48** hours" instead of "not less than **48** hours." In addition, this section would change the **annual** report due date from 30 days after the close of the fiscal year to **90** days in order to ensure the provision of reliable financial data from the field. Finally, this section would make the authority permanent.

The activities authorized under section 1208 have already proven to be an invaluable tool for Special Operations Forces in the fight against international terrorism.

#### **SEC. 1512. BUILDING THE PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY OF FOREIGN MILITARY AND OTHER SECURITY FORCES.**

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

"§ 409. Authority to build the capacity of foreign military and security forces

"(a) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, may authorize programs—

"(1) to build the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces and other security forces, including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure

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protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces, in order for that country to—

"(A) conduct counterterrorist operations; or

"(B) participate in or support military and stability operations that are consistent with the security interests of the United States; or

"(2) when **U.S.** forces are deployed in a large-scale stability operation in a country, to build the capacity of security forces in that country.

"(b) **TYPES OF CAPACITY BUILDING.**—

"(1) **AUTHORIZED ELEMENTS.**—Programs authorized under subsection (a) may be carried out by grant or otherwise, and may include the provision of equipment, supplies, and training, and minimal construction incidental to the provision of equipment.

"(2) **REQUIRED ELEMENTS.**—Programs authorized under subsection (a) shall include elements that promote—

"(A) observance of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and

"(B) respect for legitimate civilian authority within that country.

"(3) **PREPARATION ELEMENTS.**—In preparation of execution of programs authorized under subsection (a), United States conventional military forces may participate in training activities authorized by section 2011 of title 10, United States Code, in nations where training pursuant to such section is on-going.

"(c) **LIMITATIONS.**—

"(1) **ANNUAL FUNDING LIMITATION.**—The Secretary of Defense may use, or transfer to the Department of State or any other federal agency, up to \$750,000,000 of funds in any fiscal year to conduct or support activities authorized under subsection (a).

"(2) **ASSISTANCE OTHERWISE PROHIBITED BY LAW.**—The authority in subsection (a) may not be used to provide any type of assistance described in subsection (b) that is otherwise prohibited under this title or the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2795 et seq.).

"(3) **WAIVER AUTHORITY.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may waive any restrictions that may apply to assistance for military or other security forces provided under this section and subject to paragraph (2), or provided under any other provision of law, upon determining that the applicable standard for any such waiver already available under existing law is met, or otherwise upon determining that it is in the national security interests of the United States to do so.

"(d) **FORMULATION AND EXECUTION OF PROGRAM.**—The Department of Defense and the Department of State shall jointly formulate any program authorized under subsection (a). The Secretary of Defense shall coordinate with the Secretary of State in the implementation of any program authorized under subsection (a).

"(e) **CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.**—

"(1) **ACTIVITIES IN A COUNTRY.**—Not less than 15 days before initiating activities authorized under subsection (a) in any country, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the congressional committees specified in paragraph (2) a notice of the following:

"(A) The country being assisted pursuant to subsection (a).

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"(B) The budget, implementation timeline with milestones, and completion date for completing the program authorized under subsection (a).

"(C) The source and planned expenditure of funds to complete the program authorized under subsection (a).

"(2) SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The congressional committees specified in this paragraph are the following:

"(A) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

"(B) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on International Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives."

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

'409 Authority to build the capacity of foreign military and security forces."

### Section-by-Section Analysis

This section would amend and make permanent the authority of the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to direct programs to build the capacity of foreign forces. This authority was first provided under section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 and extended in section 1206 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007.

This section would expand the type of forces that may be trained and equipped under this authority. Counterterrorism and stability operations are often conducted by security forces in addition to the military forces of partner nations. Provision of such assistance to military and security forces would still have to meet the criteria in subsection (a) of proposed section 409 of title 10, United States Code, and support human rights and legitimate civilian authority as prescribed under subsection (b)(2).

To meet the goal of reducing stress on U.S. forces, subsection (a)(1) would enable the Department of Defense to train or equip forces in countries where doing so advances U.S. security interests, as determined by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, but without a requirement for such forces to deploy with U.S. forces.

The operational tempo of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) constrains the ability of commanders to conduct critical training and exercises, and combatant commanders have identified the ability of conventional forces to participate in such training and exercises as mission critical. Increasingly, conventional forces need to both benefit from and provide critical training with partners. Subsection (b)(3) would enable this by allowing conventional forces to participate in training activities authorized by section 2011 of title 10 where such training is ongoing and when such participation will assist the forces carrying out missions under this section.

Based on proposals received from the Combatant Commands, more than \$200 million's worth of programs could be executed in FY 2006, more than \$500 million in FY 2007, and more than \$900 million in FY 2008. Given the tremendous need for capacity-building to implement

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the GWOT campaign plan and meet emerging threats and opportunities, this section would provide a permanent annual funding ceiling of \$750 million. To ensure that commanders have adequate flexibility to meet operational needs, this section also would eliminate Foreign Assistance Act restrictions while maintaining restrictions under Title 10 or the Arms Export Control Act. The joint approval process and advance congressional notification will ensure transparency and that respect for human rights and civilian authority remain a key component of programs under this section without sacrificing flexibility critical to United States national security.

Subsection (c)(3) of proposed section 409 would authorize the President to waive restrictions on such military or security force assistance, under this or any other Act, in accordance with applicable waiver standards, or otherwise when it is in the national security interest to do so. Such waivers could be exercised by the President *in extremis* should a critical need arise to train and equip a country under restrictions that would otherwise prevent such assistance

## **Subtitle B—Enhancing Partners' Capacity for Effective Operations**

### **SEC. 1521. LOAN OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EQUIPMENT.**

Section 2350(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: ", except that such items of significant military equipment may be provided for temporary use, not to exceed one year, to security forces of nations participating in combined operations with the United States armed forces for personnel protection or to aid in personnel survivability, if the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines in writing that it is in the national security interests of the United States to provide such support".

### **Section-by-Section Analysis**

This section would meet a critical need to provide interoperability and adequate personnel protection to coalition partners in combined operations with U.S. forces. Congress provided similar authority on a temporary basis for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan under section 1202 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal ~~Year~~ (FY) 2007. This proposed change would make permanent the authority of the Department of Defense to transfer under Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), on a lease or loan basis, items identified as SME for personnel protection or to aid in personnel survivability to nations participating with U.S. Armed Forces in military operations if the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines in writing that it is in the national security interests of the United States to provide such support.

U.S. Armed Forces depend on coalition partners to be able to patrol and engage opposition forces as needed. Due to improvised explosive devices and the weapons and/or weapon systems available to opposition forces, providing use of all reasonably available security measures not only for U.S. Armed Forces, but also for coalition forces of other countries is

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critical. While currently most important in Iraq and Afghanistan, similar challenges are expected in any other theater in which U.S. and partner forces conduct combined military operations.

Currently, critical assets for force protection and survivability(e.g., counter-improvised explosive device equipment, defusing equipment, and vehicles hardened or with turrets) are designated as SME on the U.S. Munitions List, section 12I.1, which prevents a ~~Combatant~~ Commander from providing them even temporarily to coalition partners except as provided for by section 1202 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007. Nations that provide forces in support of OIF, OEF, and the Global War on Terror often do not have the same capability that U.S. Armed Forces have to protect their personnel. Coalition members have often requested temporary U.S. logistical support in the form of items designated as SME to be able to accomplish OEF and OIF missions in concert with U.S. Armed Forces. Though the section allows only temporary use of the items for receipt of reciprocal value under existing ACAs with partner countries, it will significantly increase coalition partners' effectiveness.

## **SEC. 1522. GRANTS OF NON-LETHAL EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES BY GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 166b the following new section:

### **"§ 166c. Geographic combatant commander's authority to transfer excess defense articles**

"(a) **AUTHORIZATION.** —A geographic combatant commander is authorized to transfer, on a grant basis, a total of \$25,000 per year of non-lethal excess defense articles to each country within that commander's area of responsibility for the purpose of building the capacity of such countries to conduct counterterrorist operations, or to participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United States armed forces are a participant.

"(b) **LIMITATIONS ON TRANSFERS.**—A geographic combatant commander may transfer excess defense articles under this section only if—

"(1) such articles are drawn from existing stocks of the Department of Defense;

"(2) funds available to the Department of Defense for the procurement of defense equipment are not expended in connection with the transfer; and

"(3) the transfer of such articles will not have an adverse impact on the military readiness of the United States.

### **"(c) TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED COSTS.—**

"(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in paragraph (2), funds available to the Department of Defense may not be expended for crating, packing, handling, and transporting excess defense articles transferred under the authority of this section.

"(2) **EXCEPTION.**—A geographic combatant commander may provide for the transportation of excess defense articles without charge to a country for the costs of such transportation if—

"(A) it is determined that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so;

"(B) the recipient is a developing country;

"(C) the total weight of the transfer does not exceed 50,000 pounds; and

"(D) such transportation is accomplished on a space available basis.

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"(d) **PROHIBITED TRANSFERS.**—A geographic combatant commander may not transfer under the authority in section (a) excess defense articles that are significant military equipment as defined in section 47(9) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794(9)).

"(e) **EXCESS COAST GUARD PROPERTY.**—For purposes of this section, the term 'excess defense articles' shall be deemed to include excess property of the Coast Guard. The term 'Department of Defense' shall be deemed, with respect to such excess property, to include the Coast Guard.

"(f) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

"(1) The term 'geographic combatant commander' means the commander of a combatant command (as such term is defined in section 161(c) of this title) with a geographic area of responsibility.

"(2) The term 'excess defense articles' has the meaning set forth in section 644(g) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2403(g))."

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 166b the following new item:  
"166c. Geographic combatant commander's authority to transfer excess defense articles."

### Section-by-Section Analysis

This section would authorize each geographic combatant commander to transfer, on a grant basis, a total of \$25,000 per year of non-lethal excess defense articles to each country within the commander's area of operations for the purpose of building the capacity of such countries to conduct counterterrorist operations or to participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United States Armed Forces are a participant.

While the current Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, administered by the Department of State, is robust, there are a number of restrictions that inhibit the rapid transfer of limited-value articles. Under current law, excess defense articles can only be transferred by direction of the President, and then generally only with extensive prior notification of the Congress. No authority is currently available for combatant commanders to meet urgent needs through the quick provision of limited EDA.

The geographic combatant commanders are the nation's eyes and ears around the globe in the Global War on Terror. This section would give them a very limited authority to provide "on the spot" EDA grants when, in the commander's judgment, such a grant would build the capacity of such countries to conduct counterterrorist operations, or to participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United States Armed Forces are a participant. A typical scenario could involve providing a nation's military with computers which are obsolete for the American military, but which would provide important new capabilities for a developing country. By authorizing these small but direct grants by those commanders, this section would promote an efficient and effective way to respond to dynamic challenges.

The language of this section is based on the current authority for transferring EDA in section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j). The definition of "excess defense articles" is the same (by reference) and the equipment is limited to non-lethal items and subject to the same safeguards and restrictions as other EDA. Because the equipment subject to  
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grant under this section would -- by definition -- be subject to EDA grants under current law, there would be no budgetary effect.

**SEC. 1523. PROVISION OF AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM  
INFORMATION ON MARITIME SHIPPING TO FOREIGN  
COUNTRIES.**

(a) **AUTHORITY.**— The Secretary of Defense may authorize geographic Combatant commanders to exchange or furnish automatic identification system ~~data~~ broadcast by merchant or private ships and collected by the United States to a foreign country or international organization pursuant to an agreement for the production or exchange of such data. Such data may be transferred under this section without cost to the recipient country or international organization.

(b) **DEFINITIONS.**—As used in the section—

(1) the term "automatic identification system" refers to any system that ~~can~~ automatically identify and track maritime vessels; and

(2) the term "geographic combatant commander" means the commander of a combatant command (as such term is defined in section 161(c) of title 10, United States Code) with a geographic area of responsibility.

(c) **PROVISION OF DATA.**—**Notwithstanding** any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may authorize the provision of the data referred to in subsection (a) to any department or agency of the executive branch of the United States government.

**Section-by-Section Analysis**

This section would permit the Secretary of Defense to authorize geographic combatant commanders to provide foreign nations and international organizations with information on the location of merchant vessels. Generally, current international conventions require most seagoing vessels above specified tonnage to carry systems that automatically identify the vessel (including name, course, and speed) and exchange the data both with ships and with shore-based facilities. (*See generally* the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea, Ch. V.)

This section would enhance the ability of geographic combatant command in theater security cooperation endeavors, and assist foreign nations in fighting the Global War on Terror. Under current law, it is unclear whether the Secretary of Defense has the authority to provide this information directly to a foreign nation or international organization. This section also would clarify that the Secretary of Defense would have the authority to provide any of this data to any department or agency of the executive branch of the United States government.

The overall purpose of this authority would be to build comprehensive maritime domain awareness with our partners. This would help the United States and partner nations prevent the maritime domain from being used by terrorists, criminals and hostile states to commit acts of terrorism.

The information that is provided by maritime automatic identification systems is already being collected and processed by the Department of Defense and partner nations. This section

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would provide clear authority for the sharing of that information between the combatant commander and other nations and international organizations, many of which may not have the capability to collect such information.

**SEC. 1524. ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFENSE COALITION SUPPORT ACCOUNT TO MAINTAIN INVENTORY OF CRITICAL ITEMS FOR COALITION PARTNERS.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Arms Export Control Act is amended—

(1) by striking "Special Defense Acquisition Fund" each place it appears and inserting "Defense Coalition Support Fund";

(2) in section 51 (22 U.S.C. 2795)—

(A) in subsection (a)—

(i) in paragraph (1)—

(I) by striking "in consultation with" and inserting "with the concurrence of";

(II) by inserting "and management" after "control";

(III) by inserting "temporary use **or**" after "anticipation of their"; and

(IV) by inserting ", including to support coalition or international military stability or counter-terrorist operations" after "international organizations";

(ii) in paragraph (3), by inserting "(including temporary use)" after "transfer";

(iii) in paragraph (4)—

(I) by striking "narcotics control purposes" and inserting "building partner capacity"; and

(II) by striking "such as small boats, planes (including helicopters), and communication equipment";

(B) in subsection (b)—

(i) by striking "and" at the end of paragraph (2);

(ii) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraphs:

"(4) collections from leases made pursuant to section 61 of this Act; and

"(5) contributions of money or property from any United States or foreign person or entity, foreign government, **or** international organization for use for purposes of the Fund."; and

(iii) in the matter after paragraph (5), as added by clause (ii), by inserting "to the Department of State or the Department of Defense" after "authorized and appropriated;

(C) by amending subsection (c) to read **as** follows:

"(c) Except during a period of active hostilities, the value of property purchased and held in inventory under this section may not exceed \$200,000,000. Amounts credited to the **Fund** under subsection (b) shall remain available until expended."; and

(D) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(d) **TRANSFER OF FUNDS.**—In order to carry out the purposes of this Fund, amounts in the Fund may be transferred to any current appropriation, fund, or account of the Department of

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Defense or the Department of State, and shall be merged with the appropriation, fund, or account ~~to~~ which transferred."; and

(3) in section **52 (22 U.S.C. 2795a)**—

(A) in subsection (a), by inserting "(including temporary use)" after "transfer"; and

(B) in subsection (b), by striking "The President may" and inserting "The Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary ~~of~~ State may".

(b) **CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.**—Section 114 of title 10, **United States Code**, is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (c); and

(2) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and ~~(9)~~ as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively.

#### Section-by-Section Analysis

This section would authorize the President to establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to better support coalition partners in the Global War on Terror. ~~The~~ Department of Defense (DoD) needs to be able to have additional warfighter equipment (such as, night vision devices, communication equipment, and body armor) in its inventory, or to expedite the award of contracts to procure such equipment, ~~so~~ it will be readily available when it is required for transfer to coalition partners. Advance purchases will focus on high-demand warfighter support equipment that has long procurement lead times. Long procurement lead times ~~are often~~ the main limiting factor in our ability to provide coalition partners with critical equipment to make them operationally effective.

This section would create an improved mechanism that builds on aspects of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) (authorized by the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Public Law ~~97-1~~ 13, and decapitalized in 1993), and on some aspects of the newer Defense Cooperation Account (10 **U.S.C** 2608) that was created to be used to support the U.S. military in the Gulf War. This proposed revision to existing SDAF legislation would allow DoD ~~to~~ pre-purchase equipment for sale or temporary use to its partners, using funds that have been made available to DoD through appropriations by the Congress or by using donations from non-U.S. Government sources (e.g., foreign governments, international organizations, and private donors). Under ~~this~~ authority, DoD could accept orders from other federal agencies such as the Department of State to purchase or provide temporary use of equipment to coalition partners for Global War on Terror purposes like counter-terrorism, stability operations, border security and peacekeeping activities. No existing law provides the authorities that ~~are found in~~ this proposed revision to the **Arms** Export Control Act.

The proceeds from items sold ~~from~~ stock not to be replaced ~~are~~ normally deposited into Miscellaneous Receipts with other collections, such as nonrecurring cost ~~recoupments~~, and average \$22 million per year. Once the Defense Coalition Support Account is established, it could sustain itself (as a revolving account) without further regular appropriations through collections of sales or transfers made from this account, contributions accepted by the Secretary of Defense, and collections from transfers or sales of defense articles made pursuant to section

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21(a)(1)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, representing the actual value of defense articles not intended to be replaced in DoD stocks.

**SEC. 1526. REIMBURSEMENT OF SALARIES FOR RESERVE COMPONENTS IN SUPPORT OF COMMERCIAL SALES OVERSEAS.**

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, is further amended —

(1) in section 503(a) (22 U.S.C. 2311(a)), by inserting "members of the Reserve Components ordered to active duty for purposes of this section and" after "other than" in the matter after paragraph (3); and

(2) in section 632(d) (22 U.S.C. 2392(d))—

(A) by inserting ", except for members of the Reserve Components ordered to active duty for purposes of this section" after "United States" the first place it appears in the second sentence; and

(B) by inserting ", except for members of the Reserve Components ordered to active duty for purposes of this section," after "United States" the second place it appears in the second sentence.

**Section-by-Section Analysis**

The Global War on Terror has created more requirements than can be met with active duty military forces. Members of the Reserves, including the National Guard, provide a ready source of expertise for humanitarian assistance and demining, international military education and training (IMET), and such other security cooperation missions as counterterrorism. However, except in cases of national emergency, Reserve and Guard budgets normally support only two weeks of active duty per year for each Reserve member. As a result, to use Reserve members for security cooperation missions outside of the funded two weeks of active duty, Reserve members must be paid from other funds. Sources of funds from current appropriations, such as Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid, IMET and Foreign Military Financing, are available, along with such non-U.S. sources as foreign country national funds. This section would allow Department of Defense to use these other funds to pay Reserve members to perform missions that build global partnerships and help win the war on terror.

Section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as currently written, requires that salaries of members of the Armed Forces of the United States (other than the Coast Guard) be specifically excluded from the price of Foreign Military Sales paid with funds transferred pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection or from funds made available on a non-repayable basis under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act. Section 632(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as currently written, requires that reimbursement be made in an amount equal to the value (as defined in section 644(m)) of the defense articles and defense services provided. Salaries of members of the Armed Forces of the United States are specifically excluded from this requirement.

This proposed section would bring the reimbursement for military salaries in line with the definition of "value" set out in section 644(m) (22 U.S.C. 2403(m)). "Value" is defined as the

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cost to the United States Government and, with respect to Military Education and Training Services, includes "additional cost that are incurred by the United States Government in furnishing such assistance." This proposed section would increase flexibility by providing authority for the reimbursement of the salaries of Reserve, National Guard, or other members of the Armed Forces who may be ordered to active duty in situations where Department of Defense Appropriations do **not** fund their salaries.

**SEC. 1527. SALES OF DEFENSE SERVICES TO BE PERFORMED OVERSEAS TO SUPPORT DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES BY UNITED STATES COMPANIES.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 30(a) of the **Arms** Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2770) is amended by striking "**Provided, however,** That such services may be performed only in the United States".

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The heading of chapter 2B of the **Arms** Export Control Act (Public Law 97-392: 96 Stat. 1962) is amended to read as follows:

**"CHAPTER 2B—SALES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO UNITED STATES COMPANIES".**

**Section-by-Section Analysis**

This section would benefit **U.S.** industry and the U.S. Government by allowing the Department of Defense (DoD) to better provide needed support for direct commercial sales that are in the national interest of the United States. Current law allows the President to sell defense articles overseas, as well as government services to U.S. companies engaged in those sales, but limits the services sold to services provided in the continental United States. **This** hinders direct sales by U.S. companies to friendly foreign nations and international organizations to the detriment of U.S. national security interests. This section would allow the sale to U.S. companies of government services to be provided overseas. This change would assist in building partnership capacity by increasing the availability of services supporting U.S. defense articles, thereby facilitating the use of such articles, and increasing interoperability between partners and U.S. forces.

An increasing proportion of U. S. defense exports are made through direct commercial contracts between U.S. companies and friendly foreign countries or international organizations. These sales help promote foreign policy and national security interests; help to maintain the U.S. defense industrial base; keep open production lines; and boost economies of scale that can beneficially affect prices the U.S. military services pay to acquire and maintain equipment.

The Department of Commerce, under its Golden Key program, provides support directly to U.S. industry in support of sales of nondefense items. Often, U.S. industry requires specialized defense support that is only available from DoD military members and civilian employees. However, defense services needed to be performed overseas to support direct commercial sales of defense equipment to foreign countries currently can only be performed overseas through FMS to the countries. This section would allow the DoD to provide such services under contracts between the DoD (or other agencies) and **U.S.** companies.

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## **Subtitle C—Developing Commonality by Expanding Professional Military Education, Training, and Support for Partners**

### **SEC. 1531. AUTHORITY FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CERTAIN FOREIGN PERSONNEL OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING MATERIALS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE MILITARY INTEROPERABILITY.**

(a) **DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZED.**—To enhance interoperability between ~~the~~ Armed Forces and military forces of friendly foreign nations, the Secretary of Defense may—

(1) provide to personnel referred to in subsection (b) electronic distributed learning content for the education and training of such personnel for the development or enhancement of allied and friendly military capabilities for multinational operations, including joint exercises and coalition operations; and

(2) provide information technology, including computer software developed for such purpose, but only to the extent necessary to support the use of such learning content for the education and training of such personnel.

(b) **AUTHORIZED RECIPIENTS.**—The personnel to whom learning content and information technology may be provided under subsection (a) are military and civilian personnel of a friendly foreign government, with the permission of that government.

(c) **EDUCATION AND TRAINING.**—Any education and training provided under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Internet-based education and training.

(2) Advanced distributed learning and similar Internet learning tools, as well as distributed training and computer-assisted exercises.

(d) **SECRETARY OF STATE CONCURRENCE.**—In the case of any activity proposed to be undertaken under this section that is not authorized by another provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may undertake such activity only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

(e) **APPLICABILITY OF EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES.**—The provision of learning content and information technology under this section shall be subject to the provisions of the ~~Arms~~ Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and any other export control regime under law relating to the transfer of military technology to foreign nations.

(f) **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE.**—(1) **GUIDANCE REQUIRED.**—The Secretary of Defense shall develop and issue guidance on the procedures for the use of the authority provided in this section.

(2) **SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—Not later than 30 days after issuing the guidance required by paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report setting forth such guidance.

(3) **MODIFICATION.**—If the Secretary modifies the guidance issued under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the committees named in paragraph (2) a report setting forth the modified guidance not later than 30 days after the date of such modification.

(g) **ANNUAL REPORT.**—(1) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than October 31 following the close of the fiscal year in which the authority granted herein is used, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the committees named in subsection (f)(1) a report on the exercise of the authority provided in this section during the preceding fiscal year.

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(2) **ELEMENTS.**—Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, for the fiscal year covered by such report, the following:

(A) A statement of the recipients of learning content and information technology provided under this section.

(B) A description of the type, quantity, and value of the learning content and information technology provided under this section.

#### Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1207 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal ~~Year~~ 2007 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to expend operations and maintenance funds to provide electronically-distributed learning content and related information technology for the education and training of foreign military and civilian government personnel to enhance interoperability during multinational operations. Section 1207 enhances the ability of Combatant Commanders to develop the skills of allied and coalition partners to ensure interoperability for multinational operations. This provision would make this authority permanent.

The Defense Department has demonstrated the value of being able to provide the training described herein through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) ~~Program~~. The proposed legislative change would enable operations and maintenance funds to be applied for PfP-type initiatives to a broader coalition of multinational countries.

Increasingly, Combatant Commanders see the need for and receive requests ~~from~~ coalition and allied partners for training which helps partner forces understand the planning processes, organization, and command and control systems used by U.S. warfighters. Providing this type of training allows our foreign partners to develop capabilities in a manner that will improve interoperability with U.S. forces on the battlefield.

#### **SEC. 1532. MEDICAL CARE AND TEMPORARY DUTY EXPENSES FOR COALITION LIAISON OFFICERS.**

Section 1051a of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking "involved in a coalition" and inserting "involved in a military operation"; and

(B) by striking "coalition operation" and inserting "military operation";

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) in the heading, by inserting ", MEDICAL CARE" after "TRAVEL";

(B) by adding at the end of paragraph (2) the following new subparagraph:

"(C) **CIVILIAN OFF-BASE MEDICAL CARE.**—Expenses for civilian off-base medical care when adequate medical care is not available to the liaison officer at local military medical facilities and when the Secretary determines that payment of such medical expenses is necessary and in the best interests of the United States. This authority may not be used if medical care is otherwise available to the liaison officer pursuant to any international agreement or treaty."; and

(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

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"(3) **TEMPORARY DUTY TRAVEL EXPENSES.**—The Secretary may pay the mission-related travel expenses of any liaison officer as described in subsection (a) when such travel is in support of United States national interests and the commander of the headquarters to which the liaison officer is temporarily assigned directs round-trip travel from the assigned headquarters to one or more locations.";

(3) by amending subsection (d) to read as follows:

"(d) **DEFINITION.**—In this section, the term 'administrative services and support' includes base or installation support services, office space, utilities, copying services, fire and police protection, and computer support."; and

(4) by striking subsection (e).

### Section-by-Section Analysis

The members of the Coalition and similarly created organizations at subordinate commands **are** assigned by their nations to support the Global War on Terror (**GWOT**) mission. The assignment and function of these officers is unique, and they perform duties that might otherwise have to be provided by United States personnel. DoD needs to have the authority to pay costs associated with the performance of the DoD mission with and by these liaison officers. Without this authority, DoD's ability to maximize the benefit of coalition partners is severely degraded.

Specifically, this section would amend 10 U.S.C. 1051a(b)(2) to provide new authority for the Secretary of Defense to pay medical expenses incurred by a liaison officer from a developing country who is temporarily assigned to a headquarters of a combatant command, component command, or subordinate operational command in connection with the planning for, or conduct of, a coalition operation. This authority would only be available if the developing country has not entered into a Reciprocal Health Care Agreement with the Department of Defense (DoD).

This section **also** would add paragraph (3) to 10 U.S.C. 1051a(b) to authorize the Secretary to pay a liaison officer's temporary duty expenses when the liaison officer is temporarily assigned to the headquarters of a combatant command, component command, or subordinate operational command, and is requested by the commander to travel in support of the United States.

In addition, this section would amend 10 U.S.C. 1051a(a) to expand the category of liaison officers covered by the statute to include liaison officers from nations involved in military operations with the United States and assigned to combatant commands, component commands, or subordinate operational commands of the United States in connection with the planning for, or conduct of, such military operations. This would allow the Secretary to pay certain expenses of liaison officers from developing nations that are assisting us to conduct military operations, including coalition operations, prosecution of the GWOT, humanitarian operations, and military operations that further counternarcotics activities. This would greatly assist in improving the extent and quality of involvement of developing nations in supporting U.S. efforts in the GWOT. This change would also necessitate the deletion of 10 U.S.C. 1051a(d)(2) as no longer necessary.

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Finally, this proposed section would delete subsection (e) of section 1051a to make permanent the Secretary's authority to pay the expenses of the covered liaison officers supporting United States coalition operations. Otherwise, the Secretary's authority would expire on September 30, 2007.

**SEC. 1533. ENHANCING PARTICIPATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
IN MULTINATIONAL MILITARY CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—**Subchapter II** of chapter 138 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

**"§ 2350m. Participation in multinational military centers of excellence**

"(a) **PARTICIPATION AUTHORIZED.**—The Secretary of Defense may, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, authorize the participation of members of the armed forces and Department of Defense civilian personnel in any multinational military center of excellence hosted by any nation or combination of nations referred to in subsection (b) for purposes of—

"(1) enhancing the ability of military forces and civilian personnel of the nations participating in such center to engage in joint exercises or coalition or international military operations; or

"(2) improving interoperability between the Armed Forces of the United States and the military forces of friendly foreign nations.

"(b) **COVERED NATIONS.**—The nations referred to in this section are as follows:

"(1) The United States.

"(2) Any member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

"(3) Any major non-NATO ally.

"(4) Any other friendly foreign nation identified by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, for purposes of this section.

"(c) **MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.**—(1) **REQUIREMENT.**—The participation of members of the armed forces or Department of Defense civilian personnel in a multinational military center of excellence under subsection (a) shall be in accordance with the terms of one or more memoranda of understanding entered into by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, and the foreign nation or nations concerned.

"(2) **SCOPE.**—If Department of Defense facilities, equipment, or funds are used to support a multinational military center of excellence under subsection (a), the memorandum of understanding under paragraph (1) with respect to that center shall provide details of any cost-sharing arrangement or other funding arrangement.

"(d) **AVAILABILITY OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS.**—(1) **AVAILABILITY.**—Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for operation and maintenance are available as follows:

"(A) To pay the United States' share of the operating expenses of any multinational military center of excellence in which the United States participates under this section.

"(B) To pay the costs of the participation of members of the armed forces and Department of Defense civilian personnel in multinational military centers of excellence under this section, including the costs of expenses of such participants.

"(2) **LIMITATION ON AMOUNT.**—The amount available under paragraph (1)(A) for expenses referred to in that paragraph may not exceed \$5,000,000 in any fiscal year.

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"(3) **LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.**—No funds may be used under this section to fund the pay or salaries of members of the armed forces and Department of Defense civilian personnel who participate in multinational military centers of excellence under this section.

"(e) **USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT.**—Facilities and equipment of the Department of Defense may be used for purposes of the support of multinational military centers of excellence under this section that are hosted by the Department.

"(f) **REPORT ON USE OF AUTHORITY.**—

"(1) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than October 31 following the close of the fiscal year in which the authority granted herein is used, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the use of the authority in this section during that fiscal year.

"(2) **ELEMENTS.**—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

"(A) A detailed description of the participation of the Department of Defense, and of members of the armed forces and civilian personnel of the Department, in multinational military centers of excellence under the authority of this section during the fiscal year.

"(B) For each multinational military center of excellence in which the Department of Defense, or members of the armed forces or Department of Defense civilian personnel, so participated—

"(i) a description of such multinational military center of excellence;

"(ii) a description of the activities participated in by the Department, or by members of the armed forces or Department of Defense civilian personnel; and

"(iii) a statement of the costs of the Department for such participation, including —

"(I) a statement of the United States share of the expenses of such center, and a statement of the percentage of the United States share of the expenses of such center to the total expenses of such center; and

"(II) a statement of the amount of such costs (including a separate statement of the amount of costs paid for under the authority of this section by category of costs).

"(g) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

"(1) The term 'multinational military center of excellence' means an entity sponsored by one or more nations that is accredited and approved by the Department of Defense as offering recognized expertise and experience to personnel participating in the activities of such entity for the benefit of United States forces and the militaries of friendly foreign nations by providing such personnel opportunities to—

"(A) enhance education and training;

"(B) improve interoperability and capabilities;

"(C) assist in the development of doctrine; and

"(D) validate concepts through experimentation.

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"(2) The term 'major non-NATO ally' means a country (other than a member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) that is designated as a major non-NATO ally by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, under section 2350a of this title."

"(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of sections at the beginning of such subchapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:  
"2350m. **Participation in multinational military centers of excellence.**"

### Section-by-Section Analysis

This section would reauthorize and make permanent the authority granted by Congress in section 1205 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, which authorized the Secretary of Defense to enter into agreements with ~~North~~ Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance members, major non-NATO allies, and other ~~friendly~~ foreign countries to participate in organizations which are centers of excellence established to enhance interoperability, develop military doctrine, and develop and test new concepts. Section 1205 also authorized the expenditure of funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the support of international military organizations and to pay the salaries and expenses of personnel assigned to such organizations. In addition, section 1205 authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide facilities and equipment for the use of such organizations with or without reimbursement. This section also would clarify that Centers of Excellence (COE) do not have to be approved and accredited by NATO, and increase the authorization for expenditures for the U.S. share of operating expenses from \$3 million to \$5 million.

Examples of these organizations are the COE and training schools that have been independently formed by NATO alliance partners to support NATO. Following the lead of the United States in transforming training within its forces, during the 2002 Prague Summit NATO announced the creation of Allied Command Transformation whose mission is to lead NATO through transformation to face the operational challenges of coalition warfare against new and emerging threats. In support of this effort, Alliance partners, independent but in support of NATO, have created, through bilateral and multilateral agreements, COE and established schools the purposes of which are to support NATO transformation through doctrinal development, education, training and validation of new concepts through experimentation. This section would clarify the authority of the Secretary of Defense to support those organizations and others that may be established to support common security interests.

The United States benefits from this participation through its ability to influence the commonality of doctrine, education, training and development of new capabilities. The U.S. also gains the synergies associated with working cooperatively with allied/coalition partners in a synchronized effort across international programs and with multinational forces creating a transformed fighting team. This process improves interoperability between U.S. and foreign militaries and enhances security cooperation efforts to prosecute the Global War on Terror. This section would allow U.S. Forces to leverage the specific expertise or experience of some partners while simultaneously assisting all partners to reach shared understandings of doctrine. Building the capabilities of allied/coalition partners increases unity of effort and enhances the U.S. ability to execute multinational operations. Increased interoperability and enhanced capability of

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allied/coalition partners will result in a reduced strain on U.S. Forces as we operate in a coalition environment addressing common security interests. Strengthening our relationships through participation in organization supportive transformational concepts also strengthen the current transformational efforts of the Department of Defense.

These centers of excellence are multi-year commitments by the U.S. and require permanent funding authority to be successful. The NATO-related COEs have proven to be extremely useful vehicles to develop partnership capacity and the Department of Defense envisions that they will be useful vehicles in other parts of the world outside of the NATO context. The Department is requesting an increase in authorized funding in anticipation of increased COE activity with friendly foreign militaries outside of NATO.

#### **SEC. 1534. STABILITY OPERATIONS FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM .**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—subchapter 1 of chapter 134 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

##### **"§ 2249d. Authority to use appropriated funds for education and training of foreign visitors under the Stability Operations Fellowship Program**

"(a) **ACTHORITY TO USE FUNDS.**—Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be used to pay any costs associated with the education and training of foreign military officers and other foreign **officials** at military or civilian educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or other training programs conducted under the Stability Operations Fellowship Program, including costs of transportation and travel and subsistence costs.

"(b) **LIMITATION.**—The total amount of funds used under the authority in subsection (a) in any fiscal year may not exceed \$25,000,000.

"(c) **ANNUAL REPORT.**—Not later than January 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the administration of this section during the prior fiscal year. The report shall include the following matters:

"(1) A complete accounting of the expenditure of appropriated funds for purposes authorized under subsection (a), including—

"(A) the countries of the foreign officers and **officials** for whom costs were paid; and

"(B) for each such country, the total amount of the costs paid.

"(2) The training courses attended by the foreign **officers** and **officials**, including a specification of which, if any, courses were conducted in foreign countries.

"(3) An assessment of the effectiveness of the Stability Operations Fellowship Program in increasing the cooperation of the governments of foreign countries with the United States in stability operations and the global war on terror.

"(4) A discussion of any actions being taken to improve the program.

"(d) **OBLIGATION OF FUNDS.**—Funds made available to carry out the purposes of subsection (a) in any fiscal year may be obligated for the total cost of education and **training** programs that begin in such fiscal year and end in the next fiscal year."

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of sections at the beginning of such subchapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

"2249d. Authority to use appropriated funds for education and training of foreign visitors under the Stability Operations Fellowship Program."

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### Section-by-Section Analysis

This section would create a Stability Operations Fellowship Program modeled on the highly-successful Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program. This new program would **focus** on education and training for security, stabilization, transition, and **reconstruction** tasks and enhance the stability operations capacity of international partners through Stability Operations Fellowships.

This section would authorize \$25 million for Stability Operations Fellowships. **This** figure represents a growth plan of **\$5** million per year, beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 with a \$5 million program and culminating in FY 2112 with a \$25 million **program**. The **return** on investment would be a larger cadre of international partners ready to perform stability operations tasks around the world—either with American partners or in lieu of United States personnel.

#### **SEC. 1535. MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS AND COMPARABLE ACTIVITIES.**

Section 168(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(9) The exchange of personnel described in paragraph (3) or (4) on a non-reciprocal basis if the Secretary of Defense determines that such an exchange is in the interests of the Department of Defense."

### Section-by-Section Analysis

This section would allow the Secretary of Defense to waive the reciprocity requirements for personnel exchange programs with foreign governments when it is in the interests of the Department of Defense. **Many** developing countries could provide personnel with qualifications, training, and skills that are essentially equal to those that the United States provides, but are unable to because of funding constraints or other limitations. Waiving reciprocity agreements in these situations would directly support the theater security cooperation initiatives of all regional **combatant** commanders and support Phase Zero operations in the Global **War** on Terror.

The reciprocity requirements of section 168 of title 10, United States Code, preclude one-way exchanges with friendly foreign governments. Exchanges are **difficult** with partners from developing nations, although these **may** be the most important for **success** in a particular region. This section, for example, would allow the Commander, Naval Forces Europe to request the assignment of personnel to support Commander, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND theater security cooperation efforts in the Gulf of Guinea region of Africa. Personnel assigned to these developing nations would assist in ongoing efforts to build capacity to protect the maritime domain with countries that are willing to assist, but are unable to comply with the reciprocity requirements.

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**SEC. 1541. MAKING PERMANENT AND GLOBAL THE COMMANDERS  
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM FOR URGENT  
HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION NEEDS IN THE FIELD.**

**(a) IN GENERAL.**—Chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

**"§ 410. Commanders' emergency response program**

**"(a) AUTHORITY.**—Funds made available to the Department of Defense for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program for any fiscal year may be used by the Secretary of Defense in such fiscal year to provide funds—

**"(1)** for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program in Iraq and Afghanistan; and

**"(2)** for a similar program to assist the people of a developing country where United States forces are operating.

**"(b) QUARTERLY REPORT.**—Not later than 15 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter of fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report regarding the source of funds and the allocation and use of funds during that quarter that were made available pursuant to the authority provided in this section or under any other provision of law for the purposes of the programs under subsection (a).

**"(c) SUBMISSION OF GUIDANCE.**—

**"(1) INITIAL SUBMISSION.**—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a copy of the guidance issued by the Secretary to the Armed Forces concerning the allocation of funds through the Commanders' Emergency Response Program and any similar program to assist the people of a developing country.

**"(2) MODIFICATIONS.**—If the guidance in effect for the purpose stated in paragraph (1) is modified, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a copy of the modification not later than 15 days after the date on which the Secretary makes the modification.

**"(d) WAIVER AUTHORITY.**—For purposes of exercising the authority provided by this section or any other provision of law making funding available for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program referred to in subsection (a) (including a program referred to in paragraph (2) of that subsection), the Secretary of Defense may waive any provision of law not contained in this section that would (but for the waiver) prohibit, restrict, limit, or otherwise constrain the exercise of that authority.

**"(e) COMMANDERS' EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM DEFINED.**—In this section, the term 'Commanders' Emergency Response Program' means the program established by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority for the purpose of enabling United States military commanders in Iraq to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people."

**(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

"410. Commanders' emergency response program."

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This section would allow the Secretary of Defense to authorize **U.S.** military commanders to use Department of Defense funds appropriated to the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) or other operations and maintenance funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance to local populations where U.S. forces are operating. Resources under this section would be available for all military and security operations, including humanitarian, civic assistance, disaster relief, and peace operations.

The Secretary of Defense will refine CERP guidance to implement this authority and ensure flexibility and responsiveness and coordination with Department of State country teams. This section would capitalize on the success of the CERP, which has proven to be a high-impact, relatively low-cost program, indispensable to security and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Providing this capability to military commanders enables them to respond immediately to small-scale but urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements. The program has built trust and support at the grassroots level and provides results that people can see.

#### **SEC. 1542. AMENDMENT OF AUTHORITY FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO INCLUDE STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES.**

Section 2561(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting "and stabilization" after "other humanitarian".

#### **Section-by-Section Analysis**

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) provides the Department of Defense (DoD) with a unique capability, enabling DoD Commanders to access countries and regions that would otherwise be inaccessible to U.S. forces. Unlike the Commanders' Emergency Response Program, OHDACA can be used for planned, programmed activities, making it a key shaping tool. Using OHDACA, Commanders have a non-combat, results-oriented tool to interact with governments, indigenous organizations, and ordinary citizens to establish long-term, positive relationships, mitigating terrorist influence and preventing conflict.

From Afghanistan to Lebanon, we continue to witness the profound influence that humanitarian assistance provided by terrorist organizations has had on the local populace. Including stabilization activities within this authority would enable DoD to expand its interaction with local populations that are vulnerable to violence or other factors. With this proposed change, DoD personnel helping to build clinics or dig wells could also assist by supporting basic economic and infrastructure projects.

#### **SEC. 1543. THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS UNDER THE DOD REWARDS PROGRAM IN SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS TO COMBAT TERRORISM.**

Section 127b(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting "and government personnel of coalition nations and nations in which the **U.S.** armed forces are stationed or operating" after "personnel"; and

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(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting "or of coalition forces or forces of a country in which the U.S. armed forces are operating" after "forces".

### **Section-by-Section Analysis**

Under section 127b of title 10, the Secretary of Defense may pay ~~rewards~~ to persons for providing U.S. Government personnel with information or non-lethal assistance that is beneficial to armed forces operations or activities against international terrorism. This authority is useful to encourage the local citizens of foreign countries to provide information and other assistance, including the delivery of dangerous personnel and weapons to U.S. military authorities. This amendment would broaden the Department of Defense rewards program to make available incentives to partners and allies, as well as U.S. military forces, on the ground to use to encourage this cooperation.

The current statute authorizes only United States Government personnel to issue payments under the Department of Defense rewards program. This amendment would extend the authority to members of coalition forces or forces of a country in which the U.S. armed forces are operating. This change may likely diminish the frequency of punitive attacks on local citizens that overtly cooperate with the U.S. military. It also would improve the credibility of foreign forces by showcasing them as the primary provider for their citizens. These changes would incidentally enhance DoD force protection and facilitate operations against international terrorism, provided that U.S. objectives would be predominantly achieved by, with, and through our partners.

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### COORDINATION

OSD(Policy/Stability Ops)	Mr. McNerney	6 November 2006
OSD(Policy/Coalitions)	Mr. Stahlman	7 November 2006
OSD(Policy/NESA)	Mr. Kimmitt (DASD)	7 November 2006
USA	COL Malapit	2 November 2006
USN	<b>CAPT</b> Wode	31 October 2006
USAF	Col Hollerbach	1 November 2006
USMC	Col copp	2 November 2006
USCENTCOM	Ms. Grant (SES)	2 November 2006
USEUCOM	Col McGee	26 October 2006
USNORTHCOM	COL de la Pena	17 October 2006
USPACOM	Col Haskins	20 October 2006
USSOCOM	Col Otero	18 October 2006
USSOUTHCOM	BG Bivens	18 October 2006

Tab C

UNCLASSIFIED  
11 E 0559/OSD/60059

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2006

pg. 3

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Categories of Assistance

The Central American MoDs said the U.S. has so many different categories of assistance that, from their standpoint, if we give them some money for counter narcotics, and they buy a truck because and they want to use it for counterterrorism, hostage taking, gangs, or something else, they feel they ought to be able to.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100006-24 (travel computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by November 2, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18014-06



11/17/2006 1:37:48 PM

4 Oct 06

11-L-0559/OSD/60856



~~FOUO~~

INFO MEMO

DDUSDP NOV 16 2006  
DepSec Action

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: <sup>Fpt</sup> Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) <sup>15</sup>

SUBJECT: Central American MoDs Question on Categories of Assistance

- You relayed a question from the Central American MODs about using counternarcotics (CN) assistance (next under).
- Unlike State Department assistance, DoD CN assistance is flexible and not subject to American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) restrictions. However, we cannot merely transfer CN funds to foreign governments.
- Generally, DoD CN assistance trains and equips foreign military and law enforcement CN forces. In many instances, the training we provide may be applicable to missions other than CN.
  - o DoD-provided CN equipment also may be used for counterterrorism purposes. In addition, such equipment may incidentally benefit other anti-crime activities.
- The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007 provides additional CN train-and-equip authority, allowing such assistance for **Guatemala**, Belize and **Panama**.
- We will seek train-and-equip authority for the rest of Central America and Mexico.

COORDINATION: TAB A

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Mr. Mark Rondon, ODASD(CN) (b)(6)



\* S F - 1 0 0 3 0 6 - 2 4 \*



OSD 18014-06

11/17/2006 1:37:41 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60857


092.3

15 NOV 06

400406

~~FOUO~~

CCT 04 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Categories of Assistance

The Central American MoDs said the U.S. has so many different categories of assistance that, from their standpoint, if we give them some money for counter narcotics, and they buy a truck because and they want to use it for counterterrorism, hostage taking, gangs, or something else, they feel they ought be able to.

Any thoughts?

*Thanks.*

DHR:th  
100906-24 (unvet computer).doc

.....  
***Please respond by November 2, 2006***

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60858

~~FOUO~~

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

Subject: Snowflake (Central American Counternarcotics) Categories of Assistance

Control Number: SF-100306-24



<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
PDUSD (Policy)	Ryan Henry	<u>NOV 16 2006</u>
ASD Homeland Defense	Pete Verga	October 20, 2006
JS J-5 HD-CN	Col. Hackett	October 11, 2006
OGC	Dell'Orto	October 31, 2006



11-L-055940 OSD/60859

~~FOUO~~

November 09, 2006

032

TO: Robert Wilkie  
CC: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Reach Out After Losses in Election



Please give me a list of the people who lost in the House and the Senate. I want to select those I would like to call.

Start the list with Jim Talent of Missouri.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF110906-03

.....  
*Please Respond By November 13, 2006*

NOV 09 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

*Closed*

*R.*

*ESD* *UCB, ADL*  
*72*  
*17*

110906-03

9/20/06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60860

OSD 18156-06



11/21/2006 11:49:34 AM

**Election 2006 Analysis**  
**As of 3:00 PM, November 9, 2006**

**US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:**

***Pre-election 2006:***

**Republicans**

232 seats

**Democrats**

202 seats

**Independent**

1 seat

Four seats, three Republican and one Democrat, resigned prior to the election

Democrats needed to pick up 15 seats to take control of the House.

***Election 2006***

**Republicans**

196 seats (net loss -28)

**Democrats**

229 seats (net gain +29)

**Independent**

0 (net loss -1)

There **are** still **10** seats undecided (see last page)

***Overview analysis:***

Open seats: Of the 31 open seats 8 changed **hands** from the Republicans to the Democrats.

**109<sup>th</sup> Congress:**

**Kolbe (R-AZ)**  
**Beauprez (R-CO)**  
**Foley (R-FL)**  
**Nussle (R-IA)**  
**Boehlert (R-NY)**  
**Ney (R-OH)**  
**Delay (R-TX)**  
**Green (R-WI)**  
**Evans (D-IL)**  
**Hefley (R-CO)**  
**David (D-FL)**  
**Case @-HI)**  
**~~Costa~~ (R-ID)**  
**Cardin (D-MD)**  
**Schwarz (R-MI)**  
**Sabo (D-MN)**  
**Osborne (R-NE)**  
**Gibbons (R-NV)**  
**Harris (R-FL)**  
**Hyde (R-IL)**  
**Kennedy (R-MN)**

**110<sup>th</sup> Congress**

**Giffords (D-AZ)**  
**Perlmutter (D-CO)**  
**Mahoney (D-FL)**  
**Braley (D-IA)**  
**Arcuri (D-NY)**  
**Space (D-OH)**  
**Lampson (D-TX)**  
**Kagen (D-WI)**  
**Hare (D-IL)**  
**Lamborn (R-CO)**  
**Castor (D-FL)**  
**Hirono @-HI)**  
**Sali (R-ID)**  
**Sarbanes (D-MD)**  
**Walberg (R-MI)**  
**Ellison (D-MN)**  
**Smith (R-NE)**  
**Heller (R-NV)**  
**Buchanan (R-FL)**  
**Roskam (R-IL)**  
**Bachmann (R-MN)**

Strickland @-OH)  
Vacant (NJ)  
Owens (D-NY)  
Oxley (R-OH)  
Brown @-OH)  
Istook (R-OK)  
Jenkins (R-TN)  
Ford (D-TN)  
Sanders (I-VT)  
Bilirakis, M. (R-FL)

Wilson @-OH)  
Sires (D-NJ)  
Clarke (D-NY)  
Jordan (R-OH)  
Sutton (D-OH)  
Fallin @-OK)  
Davis (R-TN)  
Cohen (D-TN)  
Welch (D-VT)  
Bilirakis, G. (R-FL)

Turnovers: 21 Republican held seats were lost to Democrats:

**109<sup>th</sup> Congress**

Hayworth (R-AZ)  
Pombo (R-CA)  
*Simmons (R-CT)*  
Johnson (R-CT)  
Shaw (R-FL)  
Chocola (R-IN)  
Hostettler (R-IN)  
Sodrel (~~R-IN~~)  
Ryun (R-KA)  
Northrup (R-KY)  
Gutknecht (R-MN)  
Bass (R-NH)  
Sweeney (**R-NY**)  
Taylor (R-NC)  
Hart (R-PA)  
Weldon (R-PA)  
Gerlach (R-PA)  
Sherwood (R-PA)  
Bradley (R-NH)  
Kelly (R-NY)  
Fitzpatrick (R-PA)

**110<sup>th</sup> Congress**

Mitchell (D-AZ)  
McNerney (D-CA)  
*Courtney (D-CT) recount underway*  
Murphy (D-CT)  
Klein (D-FL)  
Donnelly (D-IN)  
Ellsworth (D-IN)  
Hill (D-IN)  
Boyda (D-KA)  
Yarmuth (D-KY)  
Walz (D-MN)  
Hodes (D-NH)  
Gillibrand (D-NY)  
Shuler (D-NC)  
Altmire (D-PA)  
Sestak @-PA)  
Murphy (D-PA)  
Carney (D-PA)  
Shea-Porter (D-NH)  
Hall (D-NY)  
Murphy (D-PA)

Turnovers: 2 Democrat seats were lost to Republicans:

**109<sup>th</sup> Congress**

Marshall (D-GA)  
Barrow (D-GA)

**110<sup>th</sup> Congress**

Collins (R-GA)  
Burns (R-GA)

**TOTAL NUMBER OF NEW CONGRESSMEN: 54**

**Republicans:**

13

**Democrats:**

41

Prepared by Lisa Marie Cheney, OSD-LA (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/60862

## US SENATE

### ***Pre-Election*** 2006:

<u>Republicans</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Independent</u>
55	<b>44</b>	1

There were 33 Senate seats in play for the **2006** elections 18 Democrat and 15 Republican.

Democrats need to pick up six seats to take control of the Senate.

### ***Election*** 2006

<u>Republicans</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Independent</u>
<b>49</b> (net loss -6)	49 (net gain +6)	2 (caucus with Dems)

### ***Overview*** Analysis.

Six seats held by Republicans have been lost to Democrats.

#### 109<sup>th</sup> Congress

Talent (R-MO)  
DeWine (R-OH)  
Santorum (R-PA)  
Chafee (R-RI)  
Bums (R-MT)  
Allen (R-VA)

#### 110<sup>th</sup> Congress

McCaskill (D-MO)  
**Brown** (D-OH)  
Casey @-PA)  
Whitehouse (D-RI)  
Tester (D-MT) (by less than 3000 votes)  
Webb (D-VA) (by less than 8,000 votes)

There were three open Senate seats, none changed parties in the **2006** election

#### 109<sup>th</sup> Congress

Sarbanes (D-MD)  
Dayton (D-MN)  
Frist (R-TN)

#### 110<sup>th</sup> Congress

Cardin (D-MD)  
Klobuchar (D-MN)  
Corker (R-TN)

There are now two Independent Senators, Liberman (I-CT) and Sanders (I-VT)

TOTAL, NUMBER OF NEW SENATORS: **10**

**TOTAL NUMBER OF NEW MEMBERS HOUSE AND SENATE: 64**

## GOVERNORS

### *Pre-election 2006:*

<u>Republicans</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Independent</u>
28	22	0

Democrats needed to pick up four Governorships to win a majority.

### *Election 2006*

<u>Republicans</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Independent</u>
22 (net loss -6)	28 (net gain +6)	0

There were 9 open Governorships, the Democrats picked up five of those seats:

#### Pre 2006 election

Murkowski (**R-AK**)  
Huckabee (**R-AR**)  
Owens (**R-CO**)  
Bush (R-FL)  
Vilsack (D-LA)  
Romney (R-MA)  
Guinn (R-NV)  
Pataki (R-NY)  
Taft (R-OH)

#### Post 2006 election

Palin (R-AK)  
Beebe (D-AR)  
Ritter (D-CO)  
Crist (R-FL)  
Culver (D-LA)  
Patrick @-MA)  
Gibbons (R-NV)  
Spltzer (D-NY)  
Strickland @-OH)

\* **Bold font indicates party change**

Republicans lost one Governorship that was not an open seat, Ehrlich (R-MD) lost to O'Malley (D-MD).



Ten House seats still remain undecided:

109<sup>th</sup> Congress

Simmons (R-CT)

110<sup>th</sup> Congress

Courtney (D-CT)/Simmons (R-CT)

Connecticut's 2nd District: At the latest count, Democratic challenger Joe Courtney led three-term Republican Rep. Roh Simmons by 170 votes out of 242,472 counted, a difference of .08 percent. Courtney is a former state representative who lost a 2002 challenge to Simmons.

Barrow (D-FL)

Barrow (D-FL)/Burns (R-FL)

Georgia's 12th District: Freshman Democratic Rep. John Barrow holds a narrow lead in the rematch of his close 2004 defeat of one-term Republican Rep. **Max Burns**. Running under a district map redrawn prior to this election by the Republican-controlled state legislature, Barrow led Burns by 51.2 percent to 48.8 percent — a margin of about 3,400 votes with 96 percent of precincts reporting. According to political reporter **Larry** Peterson of the Savannah Morning News, Barrow should win by about 800 votes after all are counted.

Haves (R-NC)

Haves (R-NC)/Kissell (D-NC)

North Carolina's 8th District: The final count of the extremely close race in the south-central part of the state will determine if Democrat Larry Kissell succeeded in his bid to defeat four-term Republican Rep. Robin Hayes — which would be one of the year's biggest upsets — or fell just short. With all precincts reporting in official returns, Hayes led Kissell by 456 votes out of more than 120,000 counted, a margin of two-tenths of 1 percent. A recount, if it is called for, would take place Nov. 20 or 21.

Wilson (R-NM)

Wilson (R-NM)/Madrid (D-NM)

New Mexico's 1st District: Rep. Heather A. Wilson, who is seeking a fifth full term in the House, may **earn** the prize for most resilient Republican incumbent of this tough election year if she hangs on to the narrow lead she holds in late returns. Facing Democratic state Attorney General Patricia Madrid — her toughest opponent since she first was elected in a June 1998 special election — Wilson led by about 1,150 votes out of more than 201,000 cast, a difference of half a percentage point, with 99 percent of precincts reporting.

Schmidt (R-OH)

Schmidt (R-OH)/Wulsin (D-OH)

Ohio's 2nd District: Republican Rep. Jean Schmidt's hard-edged conservatism remains problematic even though this southern Ohio district leans strongly Republican most of the time. After winning a much closer-than-expected special election contest in August 2005, Schmidt struggled this fall to fend off a determined underdog campaign by Democrat Victoria Wulsin. In the latest AP count, Schmidt led Wulsin by 50.5 percent to 49.5 percent, a margin of about 2,300 votes out of more than 225,000 cast.

Prvce (R-OH)

Prvce (R-OH)/Kilroy (D-OH)

Ohio's 15th District: Seven-term Republican Rep. Deborah Pryce's influential position as the House Republican Conference chairwoman, the party's fourth-ranking position, had been a big political strength in her easy past elections, but it made her a top target of

Pryce had to reach deep into the reservoir of affection held by voters in this Columbus-area district: She led Democratic challenger **Mary Jo Kilroy**, a Franklin County commissioner, by 52.5 percent to 47.5 percent, a sizable margin of more than 11,000 votes out of more than 227,000 cast. But a large number of absentee and provisional ballots has delayed a call on the race.

Reichert (R-WA)                      Reichert (R-WA)/Burner (D-WA)

Washington's 8th District: The hotly contested race in this suburban Seattle swing district — between freshman Republican Rep. Dave Reichert and Democratic political newcomer Darcy Burner, a former Microsoft manager — could turn out to be a cliffhanger. But for now, it's on the undecided list because so little of the vote has been counted, largely because of major flooding that hit the rain-soaked district on Tuesday. The latest AP report showed Reichert leading by 51 percent to 49 percent with fewer than a third of the precincts reporting.

Cubin (R-WY)                      Cubin (R-WY)/Trauner (D-WY)

Wyoming at-large: Differences between six-term Republican Rep. **Barbara Cubin** and many within the conservative state's usually overwhelming GOP base opened the door for an upset bid by Democratic **Gary Trauner**, an Internet service entrepreneur. Still, with all precincts reporting in unofficial returns, Cubin hung on to a lead of 970 votes out of nearly 193,000 cast, a difference of half a percentage point.

Jefferson (D-LA)                      Jefferson (D-LA)/Carter (D-LA)

Louisiana's 2nd District: Though eight-term Democratic Rep. William J. Jefferson is running under a heavy cloud of scandal — he is under investigation on allegations of accepting bribes — his long service and residual popularity drew him the backing of 30 percent of voters and a first-place finish in Tuesday's election, which under Louisiana's unique campaign law was a single-ballot, all-candidate **primary**. But it is far from clear whether Jefferson has enough remaining clout to survive the Dec. 9 runoff, required because no candidate received a majority. The seat will stay Democratic, in any case, as the runoff is between the top two vote-getters regardless of party, and the runner-up Tuesday was Democratic state Rep. Karen Carter. Running with the support of most of the state and national Democratic Party establishment, Carter is likely to emerge as the front-runner for the runoff.

Bonilla (R-TX)                      Rodriguez (D-TX)/Bonilla (R-TX)

Texas' 23rd District: Eight-term Republican Rep. Henry Bonilla was coasting earlier this year to what appeared an easy re-election when the Supreme Court, in June, ruled the lines of the 23rd District — **part** of a strongly partisan Republican redistricting plan implemented for the 2004 elections — limited Hispanics' voting rights.

An ensuing court-ordered remap added Democrats, mainly Hispanic, to the district, and forced a new, single-ballot primary election to coincide with the national Election Day. Had Bonilla won a majority in Tuesday's contest, he would have been deemed elected outright. But he fell just short with 48 percent, and now faces a December runoff with a familiar name: former Democratic Rep. **Ciro D. Rodriguez**, who held the neighboring 28th District seat for nearly eight years.



HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
109<sup>th</sup> Congress-2nd Session

REPUBLICANS



BARTLETT, MD




EVERETT, AL




McHUGH, NY




SAXTON, NJ



HEFLEY, CO




WELDON, PA



HUNTER, CA  
CHAIRMAN



HAYES, NC




GIBBONS, NV



RYUN, KS



JONES, NC



HOSTETTLER, IN



THORNBERRY, TX



McKEON, CA



WILSON, SC



MILLER, FL



FORBES, VA



AKIN, MO



DAVIS, VA



SIMMONS, CT



CALVERT, CA



FRANKS, AZ



ROGERS, AL



MILLER, MI



KLINE, NH



TURNER, OH



BRADLEY, NH



LOFGREN, NJ



DAVIS, NY



CONAWAY, TX



McMORRIS, WA



SCHWARZ, NH



DRAKE, VA



SHUSTER, PA

DEMOCRATS



SKELTON, YO  
RANKING



SPRATT, SC



ORTIZ, TX



EVANS, IL



TAYLOR, MS



BERGOM, HI



MEEHAN, MA



REYES, TX



SNYDER, AR



SMITH, WA



SANCHEZ, CA



McINTYRE, NC



TAUSCHER, CA



BRADY, PA



ANDREWS, NJ



DAVIS, CA



LANGEVIN, RI



ISRAEL, NY



LARSEN, WA



COOPER, TN



MARSHALL, GA



MEEK, FL



BORDALLO, GU




RYAN, OH




UDALL, M (CO)



BUTTERFIELD, NC



McKINNEY, GA



BOREN, OK

# HASC

<u>Republicans</u>	<u>Vote%</u>	<u>Vote %</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Vote%</u>	<u>Vote%</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
	<u>2004</u>	<u>2006</u>			<u>2004</u>	<u>2000</u>	
Akin, Todd (R-MO)	65	59		Abercrombie, Neil (D-HI)	61	69	
Bartlett, Roscoe (R-MD)	68	58		Andrews, Robert (D-NJ)	75	UNC	
Bilbray, Brian (R-CA)	NA	54		Bordallo, Madeleine (D-GU)	UNC		
<del>Bradley, Job (R-NH)</del>	63	49	Defeated	Boren, Dan (D-OK)	66	73	
Calvert, Ken (R-CA)	62	74		Brady, Robert (D-PA)	69	UNC	
Conaway, Mike (R-TX)	77	UNC		Butterfield, G.K. (D-NC)	64	UNC	
Davis, Geoff (R-KY)	55	52		Cooper, Jim (D-TN)	69	68	
Davis, Jo Ann (R-VA)	80	63		Davis, Susan (D-CA)	67	62	
Drake, Thelma (R-VA)	55	51		<del>Evans, Lane (D-IL)</del>	61	DNSR	Retired
Everett, Terry (R-AL)	71	69		Israel, Steve (D-NY)	67	70	
Forbes, Randy (R-VA)	65	76		Langevin, James (D-RI)	75	73	
Franks, Trent (R-AZ)	59	58		Larsen, Rick (D-WA)	64	66	
<del>Gibbons, James (R-NV)</del>	67	DNSR	Retired, Elected as Gov	Marshall, Jim (D-GA)	63	51	
Hayes, Robin (R-NC)	56	50	???	McIntyre, Mike (D-NC)	72	73	
<del>Hefley, Joel (R-CO)</del>	71	DNSR	Retired	<del>McKinney, Cynthia (D-GA)</del>	84	NA	Lost primary
<del>Heethtler, John (R-IN)</del>	53	38	Defeated	Meehan, Marty (D-MA)	67	UNC	
Hunter, Duncan (R-CA)	69	67		Meek, Kendrick (D-FL)	UNC	UNC	
Jones, Walter (R-NC)	71	69		Ortiz, Solomon (D-TX)	63	56	
Kline, John (R-MN)	56	57		Reyes, Silvestre (D-TX)	68	78	
LoBlondo, Frank (R-NJ)	85	62		Ryan, Tim (D-OH)	77	81	
McHugh, John (R-NY)	71	63		Sanchez, Loretta (D-CA)	60	57	
<del>McKeon, Howard "Buck" (R-CA)</del>	65	60	On leave from HASC	Skelton, Ike (D-MO)	66	68	
McMorris, Cathy (R-WA)	60	55		Smith, Adam (D-WA)	63	68	
Miller, Candice (R-MI)	69	67		Snyder, Vic (D-AR)	58	61	
Miller, Jeff (R-FL)	77	69		Spratt, John (D-SC)	63	57	
Rogers, Michael (R-AL)	61	58		Tauscher, Ellen (D-CA)	66	65	
<del>Ryun, Jim (R-KS)</del>	56	47	Defeated	Taylor, Gene (D-MS)	64	80	
Saxton, Jim (R-NJ)	63	59		Udall, Mark (D-CO)	67	71	
Schwarz, Joe (R-MI)	58	NA	Lost primary				
Shuster, Bill (R-PA)	70	60					
Simmons, Robert (R-CT)	54	50	???				
Thornberry, William "Mac" (R-TX)	UNC	74					
Turner, Michael (R-OH)	62	59					
<del>Weldon, Curt (R-PA)</del>	59	43	Defeated				
Wilson, Joe (R-SC)	65	63					

DNSR - Did not seek reelection

UNC - Unchallenged

NA - Not applicable

# 109<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session



**Chairman**  
C.W. Bill Young  
(R-FLA-10)

## House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense

**Ran  
Mer**  
John P.  
(D-

**Staff Director**

John Shank: (202) 225-2847  
H-149

**Minority Staff Director**

David Morrison: (202) 225-3481  
LHOB 1016

Ranking Order

Hobson, David  
(R-OH-7)



Bonilla, Henry  
(R-TX-23)

Cunningham, Randy  
(Duke)  
(R-CA-50)

Frelinghuysen,  
Rodney  
(R-NJ-11)



Tiahrt, Todd  
(R-KS-4)



Wicker, Roger  
(R-MS-1)



Kingston, Jack  
(R-GA-1)



Granger, Kay  
(R-TX-12)



Ranking Order

Dicks, Norman  
(D-WA-6)



Sabo, Martin  
(D-MN-5)

Visclos

Morar.  
(

Kaptu  
(

11-L-0559/OSD/60869

# HAC-D

<u>Republicans</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>Vote%</u>	<u>Vote%</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>Vote %</u>	<u>Vote %</u>
		<u>2004</u>	<u>2006</u>			<u>2004</u>	<u>2006</u>
Wicker, Roger (R-MS)		80	65	Dicks, Norman (D-WA)		69	71
<del>Benilla, Henry (R-TX)</del>		69	47	Kaptur, Marcy (D-OH)		68	73
Frelinghuysen, Rodney (R-NJ)		68	62	Moran, James (D-VA)		60	67
Granger, Kay (R-TX)		72	67	Murtha, John (D-PA)		<b>UNC</b>	61
Hobson, David (R-OH)		65	61	<del>Sabo, Martin (D-MN)</del>	Retired	70	DNSR
Kingston, Jack (R-GA)		UNC	68	Visclosky, Peter (D-IN)		68	68
Tlahrt, Todd (R-KS)		66	64				
Young, C.W. "Bill" (R-FL)		69	66				

DNSR - Did not seek reelection  
 UNC - Unchallenged  
 NA - Not applicable

# 110th Congress, 2nd Session

## House Appropriations Committee

### Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veteran's Affairs



**Chairman**  
**Walsh, James**  
(R-MY-25)



**Ranking Member**  
**Edwards, Chet**  
D-TX-17  
**Fort Hood**

#### Staff Director

Carol Murphy (202) 225-3047

#### Assistant

Walter Hearne: (202) 225-3047

Mary Arnold: (202) 225-3047

H-143 The Capitol

#### Minority Staff Director

Tom Forhan: (202) 225-3481

LHOB-1016



Aderholt, Robert  
(R-AL-4)  
BRAC  
Implementation  
at Red  
Stone/Rucker



Kirk, Mark  
(R-IL-10)



Rehberg, Denny  
(R-MT-At-Large)  
Recruiting



Crenshaw, Ander  
(R-FL-4)  
National Guard



Carter, John  
(R-TX-3)  
Fort Hood-Barracks



Young, Bill C.W.  
(R-FL-10)  
Wounded Soliders  
National Guard



Alexander, Rodney  
(R-TX-3)  
Newest Member  
National Guard  
Katrina Support

Sam Farr  
D-17-CA  
Fort Ord  
FUDS  
IEDs



Allen Boyd  
D-12-FL



Sanford Bishop Jr.  
D-2-GA  
Fort Benning  
BRAC Implementation



David Price  
D-4-NC  
IEDs



Robert Cramer  
D-5-AL  
Red Stone Implementation  
IEDs



4 March 05

11-L-0559/OSD/60871

# HAC-MilQual

<u>Republicans</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>Vote %</u>	<u>Vote %</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>Vote%</u>	<u>Vote%</u>
		<u>2004</u>	<u>2006</u>			<u>2004</u>	<u>2006</u>
Aderholt, Robert (R-AL)		75	69	Bishop, Sanford (D-GA)		67	67
Alexander, Rodney (R-LA)		59	68	Boyd, F. Allen (D-FL)		62	UNC
Carter, John (R-TX)		65	58	Cramer, Robert "Bud" (D-AL)		73	UNC
Crenshaw, Ander (R-FL)		UNC	70	Edwards, Chet (D-TX)		51	59
Kirk, Mark (R-IL)		64	53	Farr, Sam (D-GA)		67	71
<del>Northrup, Anne (R-KY)</del>	Defeated	60	48	Price, David (D-NC)		64	65
Rehberg, Dennis (R-MT)		64	53				
Walsh, James (R-NY)		91	51				
Young, C.W. "Bill" (R-FL)		69	66				

DNSR - Did not seek reelection  
 UNC - Unchallenged  
 NA - Not applicable



~~FOUO~~

November 21, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
CC: The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Steve Cambone

020451

Steve Cambone would very much appreciate having a chance to say goodbye to the President sometime between now and the **time** he leaves government service, which is the end of December. I would be happy to bring him over.

Would you find out when that might be appropriate?

DHR:ss  
SF112106-08

21 NOV 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60873

OSD 18239-06



11/22/2006 3:20:01 PM

~~FOUO~~

November 21, 2006

**TO:** Stephen J. Hadley  
**c c :** The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
**FROM** Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
**SUBJECT:** Steve Cambone

Steve Cambone would very much appreciate having a chance to say goodbye to the President sometime between now and the time he leaves government service, which is the end of December. I would be happy to bring him over.

Would you find out when that might be appropriate?

DHR:js  
SP112106-08

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60874

OSD 18239-06



11/22/2006 3:20:01 PM

~~FOUO~~

November 27, 2006

TO: The Honorable Dr. J.D. Crouch

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Excellent Material for the President

I know it is not over yet, but the material you and your team pulled together for the project for the President is excellent. Good for you. I know it had to be hard.

DHR:ks2  
SF112306-02

.....

335SD

27 NOV 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60875

OSD 18350-06



11/28/2006 10:23:58 AM

~~FOUO~~

OCT 11 2006

000.7

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Rumsfeld Finger Puppet Cartoon

Please have someone try to get the original of the attached cartoon "The Rumsfeld Finger Puppet." I would be happy to pay something for it, if they require it.

Attached: Cartoon from *Washington Post*

DHR:dh  
SF101006-29

\*\*\*\*\*

*Please Respond By 11/02/06*

11 Oct 06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18383-06




11-L-0559/OSD/60876

11/28/2006 11:43:53 AM

# THE RUMSPELD FINGER PUPPET

A RICHARD'S  
POOR ALMANAC  
EXCLUSIVE!  
by Richard  
Thompson

Cut out, glue to  
& wear it on the  
finger in the  
normal  
manner!



## The Taste of Revenge

Can we get a 17-0 double? Local and institutional for an issue at 1000 on Thu root (Joualy) for chef Robert Galileo restaurant took on Marianne Marzotto on the F "Iron Chef challenge" for the Donna had the best dressing. Marzotto the victory cook in 2005, which was the first to fail to complete the five req.

Cafe Saint-Julien owner Mike & members of his staff, Iceland's Siggi Hall and other food types the restaurant's plasma TVs. T the while cheering as if it were game. Donna's revenge victory Marzotto caused a near foodie people jumped up and down, & pumped and vodka shots (with grilled squid floating in them). you, this was a rerun (the orig aired on Oct. 1).

## A Pioneer's Place of Honor

From the attic to the archives Franklin E. Kameny, known as Washington's gay rights mover yesterday turned over more than personal letters, documents and to the Library of Congress and the Smithsonian Institution's Museum of American History — including a State Department sent to Kameny confirming that the department "hire homosexuals and does not p. employment," and black-and-white photographs of gays and lesbians in front of the White House in the 19 signs that read "First Class Citizen Homosexuals." In the past year, an group of gay-rights advocates, hea-

## DOONESBURY By G.



11/28/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Dorrance Smith *DS*  
SUBJECT Rumsfeld Finger Puppet Cartoon  
Ref: Snowflake 101006-29

7

Sir,

You sked me to get the original of this cartoon. The cartoonist has given the original cartoon away and is unwilling to ask the owner of the original if he could make a copy.

*DS NOV 06*

*11 Oct 06*

OSD 18383-06



11/28/2006 11:44:00 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60878

~~FOUO~~

OCT 11 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Rumsfeld Finger Puppet Cartoon

Please have someone try to get the original of the attached cartoon "The Rumsfeld Finger Puppet." I would be happy to pay something for it, if they require it.

Attached: Cartoon from *Washington Post*

DHR:ab  
SF101005-29

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/02/06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18383-06





11/28/2006 11:43:53 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60879

# THE RUNSEED FINGER PUPPET

A RICHARD'S  
POOR ALMAINE  
EXCLUSIVE!  
by Richard  
Thompson

Cut out, glue tabs  
to wear it on the  
finger in the  
normal  
manner!



## The Taste of Revenge

Can we get a 350-double? Local and sensational for as much as 200,000 to The root (Dorothy) the first Robert Gallo response, it took on Marianne the... the F "True Chief" for the... Donna had to be... Mortimer to get really cook in 2005, who... the to let to... the reg... Cut... the 8 members of his... local's... Stasi... the restaurant's... the while... if it were game. Donna's... victory... Mortimer... a... people... and down, in... and... (with... in them), you, this was a... (the... on Oct. 1).

## A Pioneer's Place of Honor

From the... to the... F... E... known as... yesterday... over more than... personal letters, documents and... to the Library of Congress and the Smithsonian Institution's... American History — including... State Department sent to... confirming that the... have... and does not... employment," and black-and-white photographs of... and... front of the White House in the 18... signs that read: "First Class... Honorable." In the past year, an... of... has...

## DOONESBURY by G.





**Walker, Jessica D Sgt OSD PA**

---

**Subject: FW: Cartoon of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld**

Dear Sgt. Walker,

My apologies for being slow in answering. Unfortunately, the person I gave it to has it framed and hanging (pretty tastefully for a cartoon), and I don't want to ask her to dismantle the thing for copying. I had a painting of him I did for USNews & World Report, and I'd send that in its stead, but I donated it to a charity auction last month. I don't hang on to drawings too long, as I have a small house.

So please give the Secretary my regrets. If I draw him again I'll let you know.

All best,

Richard Thompson

On Nov 6, 2006, at 7:46 AM, Walker, Jessica D Sgt OSD PA wrote:

> Mr. Thompson,  
> Is there still a possibility that we may have a copy of the "The  
> Rumsfeld Finger Puppet" cartoon?

>  
> V/r  
> SGT Jessica Walker

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Walker, Jessica D Sgt OSD PA  
> Sent: Monday, October 30, 2006 5:30 PM  
> To: (b)(6)  
> Subject: Re: Cartoon of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

> Mr. Thompson,  
> Thank you. I look forward to hearing from you.

>  
> V/r  
> SGT Jessica Walker

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Richard Thompson (b)(6)  
> To: Walker, Jessica D Sgt OSD PA  
> Sent: Mon Oct 30 17:21:37 2006  
> Subject: Re: Cartoon of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

> Dear Sgt. Walker,

> I'll see what I can do, and I'll get back to you in the next two days.

> Best regards,

> Richard Thompson

> On Oct 30, 2006, at 7:43 AM, Walker, Jessica D Sgt OSD PA wrote:

> Mr. Thompson,

> Good morning, 'Would it be possible to have a copy of drawing?

> V/r

11-L-0559/OSD/60881

SGT Jessica Walker  
Administrative Assistant  
Office of the Assistant Secretary  
of Defense for Public Affairs  
1400 Defense Pentagon (2E556)  
Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(6)

From: Richard Thompson

(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2006 4:30 PM  
To: Walker, Jessica D Sgt OSD PA  
Subject: Re: Cartoon of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

Dear Sgt Walker,

I'm sorry to say I've already given that drawing to a friend, who  
claimed it last week. Please give the Secretary my regrets.

Regards,

Richard Thompson

On Oct 23, 2006, at 11:22 AM, Walker, Jessica D Sgt OSD PA  
wrote:

Mr. Thompson,

Good morning, Secretary Rumsfeld would like to have the cartoon "The  
Rumsfeld Finger Puppet" that appeared in the Washington Post Style  
section. Could you please let me know if this is possible? Thank you

V/r


SGT Jessica Walker  
Administrative Assistant  
Office of the Assistant Secretary



~~FOUO~~

OCT 02 2006

000.1

TO: Dorrance Smith  
CC: SMSgt Calvin Shoulders  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get the original cartoon depicting Abraham Lincoln at  
Gettysburg shown on the attached magazine page. I would like to frame it.

attach. *National Review*, October 9, 2006, p. 56

DWR:ah  
10106-01 (travel companion).doc

.....  
*Please respond by October 26, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

000.1

OSD 18385-06



11/28/2006 11:48:49 AM

# HELA



## A PLAN? ANYONE?

*Russ Perigold doesn't have one.  
Nor does John Kerry. Hill.  
Wary as ducks in season.  
Flannery neither clax nor bill.  
Martha regroups in Kuwait.  
Dean hides behind a screen.  
Jay Rockefeller's clueless.  
Nancy adjusts a seam.*

—W. H. VON DIESEL



"Mr. Right moved over to be Mr. Neeson."



"AS AMERICAN BODIES PILE UP IN EUROPE, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TODAY ADMITTED THAT HITLER HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACKS. BACK TO YOU, KATIE..."

11/28/2006

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Dorrance Smith *DS*

SUBJECT: Cartoon

Ref: Snowflake 100106-03

Sir,

You asked me to get the original of this cartoon. The cartoonist has sold the original however, he is providing a signed copy.

000.7

28 NOV 06

2 Oct 06

OSD 18385-06




11/28/2006 11:46:55 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60886

~~FOUO~~

02 02 2006

TO: Dorrance Smith  
CC: SMSgt Calvin Shoulders  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get the original cartoon depicting Abraham Lincoln at  
Gettysburg shown on the attached magazine page. I would like to frame it.

Thanks.

Attach. *National Review*, October 9, 2006, p. 56

DN: bch  
100106-06 (vsnw) computer) doc

.....  
*Please respond by October 26, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18385-06



11/26/2006 11:45:49 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60887

# HELA


## A PLAN? ANYONE?

Russ Feingold doesn't have one.  
Nor does John Kerry. MR.  
Wary as ducks in season.  
Flannery neither clown nor hill.  
Narada regroups in Kuwait.  
Dean hides behind a screen.  
Joy Rockefeller's clueless.  
Nancy adjusts a seam.

—W. H. VON DRELE



"Mr. Right turned out to be Mr. Neeman."



"AS AMERICAN BOMBS FLY UP IN EUROPE, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TODAY ADMITTED THAT HITLER HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. BACK TO YOU, KATIE..."



**Walker, Jessica D Sgt OSD PA**

---

**Subject:** FW: Lincoln cartoon

-\_\_\_- Original Message -\_\_\_-

From: Walker, Jessica D Sgt OSD PA  
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 5:43 PM  
To: 'steve.breen@uniontrib.com'  
Subject: Re: Lincoln cartoon

Mr. Breen,  
Thank you for your response, a signed copy would be great, the mailing address is below.

Office of the Assistant Secretary  
Of Defense for Public Affairs  
Attn: SGT Jessica Walker  
1400 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1400

Thank you very much!  
v/r  
SGT Walker

-----Original Message-----

From: steve.breen@uniontrib.com <steve.breen@uniontrib.com>  
To: Walker, Jessica D Sgt OSD PA  
Sent: Mon Nov 06 15:25:57 2006  
Subject: Lincoln cartoon

Sgt. Walker,

Hi there! I tried calling last week but you had left for home. I am flattered that The Secretary of Defense liked one of my cartoons. I actually sold that one a few weeks ago to someone who saw it reprinted in a Colorado paper, unfortunately.

Can I sign a nice clean copy and mail that back to you? If so what's the address?

Best,

Steve Breen

~~FOUO~~

December 01, 2006

TO: Matt Latimer  
cc: Dorrance Smith  
Eric Ruff  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: USNS MERCY Deployment

The attached summary of the deployment of the USNS MERCY has some wonderful anecdotes. It might be good to pull a few of them for speeches you are working.

This kind of effort symbolizes the non-traditional means of combating extremism, and we ought to **talk** about it.

Thanks.

Attach. 11/28/06 CNO memo: "Recent Poll Reflects the Success of USNS MERCY (TAH 19) [OSD 18401-06]

DIIR,dh  
SF120106-01



~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60890

560

1 DEC 06

28 NOV 06

*CB*



**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**  
**CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS**  
**2000 NAVY PENTAGON**  
**WASHINGTON DC 20350-2000**

IN REPLY REFER TO  
**NOV 28 2006**

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**Subj: RECENT POLL REFLECTS THE SUCCESS OF USNS MERCY (TAH 19)**

1. In February 2005, less than two months after hospital ship USNS MERCY (TAH 19) joined in tsunami relief efforts in South and Southeast Asia, a poll conducted by an Indonesian polling company (Lembaga Survei Indonesia) showed a dramatic turnaround in public opinion there. The poll indicated that for the first time in a major Muslim nation, more people favored United States led efforts to fight terrorism than opposed them (40% to 36%), while support for Osama Bin Laden dropped significantly (58% favorable to just 23%). In June 2006, however, the Pew Global Attitudes Project indicated that relations between Muslims and Westerners in Indonesia were generally bad (53%).
2. In the summer of 2006, USNS MERCY conducted a five month humanitarian assistance deployment. During this 156 day mission, USNS MERCY embarked military medical personnel from Canada, Australia, Singapore, India, and Malaysia as well as representatives from 11 non-governmental organizations, including doctors and nurses from PROJECT HOPE. Military medical personnel from Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines also lent a hand ashore and in port. United States Navy medical crewmen were joined by service members from United States Army and United States Air Force as well as from the Public Health Service. During this deployment, USNS MERCY's accomplishments ashore and afloat included:
  - 60,081 patients seen, 131,511 total services provided
    - 1,083 surgeries
    - 19,375 Immunizations
    - 20,134 Optometry Evaluations, 16,141 glasses
    - 9,373 Dental Extractions
  - 236 biomedical equipment repairs, 254 people trained
    - 59 major and 177 minor systems restored to 100% operational capacity
  - 6,201 host nation students trained
3. Results of an August 2006 public opinion survey conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow in Indonesia and Bangladesh were remarkable. Indonesians and Bangladeshis overwhelmingly indicated their support of Navy's most recent humanitarian mission. In Indonesia, 85% of those aware of USNS MERCY's visit had a favorable opinion; in Bangladesh, this figure was 95%. In Bangladesh, 87% stated that USNS MERCY's

**OSD 18401-06**



**11-L-0559/OSD/60891**

11/28/2006 4:50:01 PM

Subj: RECENT POLL REFLECTS THE SUCCESS OF USNS MERCY (TAH 19)

activities made their overall view of the United States more positive. When asked to rank what future activities would further improve their opinion of the United States, the first choice of respondents in both countries was educational scholarships, but the second priority was additional and expanded visits of USNS MERCY to their countries.

4. Planning is currently underway for the deployment of the hospital ship USNS COMFORT (TAH 20) to either Africa or South America in 2007, and for another deployment of USNS MERCY in 2008.

VR



M. G. MULLEN  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Copy to:  
DEPSECDEF  
SECNAV  
USD(P)  
USD(P&R)

## Executive Summary:

In unprecedented public opinion surveys by Terror Free Tomorrow, Indonesians and Bangladeshis overwhelmingly welcome the U.S. Navy's recent humanitarian mission of the *USNS Mercy* to their shores.

*Mercy* is a fully equipped 1,000-bed floating hospital, staffed by Navy medical personnel and volunteer doctors and nurses from Project HOPE, which recently provided free medical services and training to the people of Indonesia and Bangladesh, among others. And by its mission, *Mercy* helped favorably change public opinion toward the United States in both Indonesia and Bangladesh—the world's first and third largest Muslim countries.

In a nationwide poll of Indonesians conducted after the mission, of those who had heard of the *Mercy's* visit, a remarkable **85** percent had a favorable opinion. In a similar survey throughout Bangladesh, 95 percent of the people of Bangladesh were favorable to the *Mercy's* mission.

The consensus approval of the *Mercy* mission cut across every demographic group and political view. Whether respondents were unfavorable toward the United States and opposed to the US war on terrorism, or even supporters of Bin Laden and approve suicide terrorist attacks—whatever their views or demographic category—every group had a favorable opinion of the *Mercy's* mission. Indeed, **87** percent of those surveyed in Bangladesh stated that the activities of *Mercy* made their overall view of the United States more positive.

In fact, having been questioned about views on terrorism, the United States, humanitarian relief, various types of foreign assistance and the *Mercy* mission, those surveyed were asked to rank what in the future would make their opinion of the United States more favorable. Respondents were given a choice of comparable and concrete activities the United States could undertake.

The first choice of respondents in Indonesia and Bangladesh was educational scholarships. But the number two priority was additional and expanded visits of the hospital ship *Mercy* to their countries. Next came concluding a free trade treaty with the United States and finally, stronger American support for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and for establishing a Palestinian state.

"The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism" by the Pentagon's Joint Chiefs of Staff concludes that American humanitarian assistance is "often key to demonstrating benevolence and goodwill abroad...countering ideological support for terrorism, [which is] the enemy's center of gravity."

The recent mission of the *Mercy* proves that ongoing humanitarian missions by the U.S. military will continue to reap demonstrable and measurable gains in popular esteem. Indeed, the near universal approval of the *Mercy* is a striking testament to the ability of

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UNTIL NOVEMBER 16,2006

11-L-0559/OSD/60893

tangible humanitarian aid to win favorable public opinion for the United States in the Muslim world.

The surveys also demonstrate that if the United States Navy itself delivers humanitarian assistance, as in the case of the *Mercy*, people overwhelmingly approve. The fact that the *Mercy* is a U.S. Navy ship makes Indonesians more positive by a striking six to one margin—no doubt a reflection of the continuing goodwill toward the U.S. Navy from tsunami relief.


American humanitarian assistance can make a significant and long-term difference in building goodwill toward the United States and eroding popular support for global terrorists. The mission of the *Mercy* by the United States Navy, in partnership with the volunteer assistance of Project HOPE doctors and medical personnel, sets a stellar example of the kind of actions the United States must take to win popular support, which is essential to winning the long-term struggle against extremism and terrorism.

Surveys on the *Mercy* mission were part of a broader inquiry on attitudes in the most populous Muslim countries. A complete analysis of those findings can be accessed at [www.terrorfreetomorrow.org](http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org).

The surveys in Indonesia and Bangladesh were conducted nationwide in local languages at the end of August 2006 among 1,209 respondents in Indonesia (2.9% margin of error) and 1,010 in Bangladesh (3.1% margin of error). Full survey results and methodology follow.



# Humanitarian Assistance Deployment 2006



11-L-0559/OSD/60895



# Mission Statement

- Provide medical and humanitarian assistance to populations in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions




- Cooperative mission with partner nations
- Compassion for local population
- Commitment of assistance and support





# Humanitarian Mission Evolution



- **Tsunami Relief 2004**

- Military response
- Governmental support
- C2 was not previously exercised

- **USNS MERCY**

- Deployment 2006**

- NGO provided skill-sets
- Host and non-host nation support
- C2 was exercised

- **Persistent Humanitarian Assistance**

- Sustained host nation support
- NGO provided skill-sets
- Military platform and capacity
- C2 preplanned
- Advance teams

**SERVE AND ASSIST  
WITH LASTING  
EFFECTS**



# Cooperation Opportunities

- **Benefits to Host Nation**

- Local care training and education
- Patient medical needs addressed
- Improved infrastructure
  - Facilities improvement
  - Equipment repair



- **Benefits for embarked Military and NGO personnel**


- Training and practice in skillset
- Exercising capabilities
  - Surgical / Medical / Labs
  - Equipment repair



**SERVE AND ASSIST WITH LASTING EFFECTS**



# USNS MERCY 5-Month Deplo



11-L-0559/OSD/60899



# Manning: A Team of Teams

## Humanitarian Assistance

\*Non-Governmental  
Organizations (embarked)

Host Nation  
Health Ministry  
and Military  
Personnel

•Non-Governmental  
Organizations  
(resident)

Uniformed Personnel:  
U.S. Navy, U.S. Army,  
U.S. Air Force,  
U.S. Public Health  
Service

•Partner Military  
Medical embarks  
(CA, AUS, SN, IN, MY)



# Medical Team Integration

- **Non-governmental Organizations:**

- Aloha Medical Mission
- CARE
- Chittagong Medical College
- International Organizations For Migration
- International Red Cross
- International Relief Team
- Operation Smile
- Project Hope
- Save The Children
- Tzu Chi
- UCSD Pre-dental Society

- **Partner Nations:**

- Australia
- Bangladesh
- Canada
- India
- Indonesia
- Malaysia
- Philippine
- Singapore





# Formula for Success



**Patients and population assisted**

**Host Nation Facility**

**Follow-on Care Capability**

**Advance party and local POC**

**Command and Control**

**Host Nation coordination of patients, media,  
embark- debark area and patient transportation**

**Military Platform and/or other  
cargo and pax transportation**

**Funding**

**Comms and Media**

**Skillsets:  
Medical (NGOs)  
Engineering (Military)  
Host Nation Participation**

**Building Block Approach**



# USNS MERCY (T-AH-19)

\*\*\*\*\*

- **Converted LNG tanker**
- **Vessel measurements:**
  - **Length overall: 894 ft**
  - **Beam: 106 ft**
  - **Draft, Design: 33 ft**
  - **Displacement: 69,360 tons**
- **4 Small Boats.**
- **Aircraft: 2 X MH-60s helicopters**
- **Robust Communications capability**
- **163 Inpatient Beds**
  - **Medical /Surgical**
  - **ICU/PACU and Iso**
- **4 Operating Rooms**
- **Laboratory**
- **Pharmacy**
- **Radiology / Imaging**
- **Blood Bank**
- **Dental lab**
- **Med Equipment Rep**
- **Medical Supply**
- **Optical Fabrication**
- **Physical Therapy**
- **Nutritional Care**

**SEABASING FOR C2 AND OPERATIONS**

11-L-0559/OSD/60903



# Top Clinical Services Afloat and Ashore

## Top Medical Services

- Primary Care
- Optometry
- Dental
- Psychology
- Pediatrics

60,081 Patients Seen



## Top Surgical Cases

- General Surgery
- Plastic Surgery
- Ophthalmologic Surgery
- OBGYN

1,083 Total Surgeries



## Ancillary Services

- Prescriptions Filled
- Lab Procedures
- Immunizations
- Eye Glasses Made

131,511 Total Services





# Surgical Impacts (1083 Surgeries)

- **118 Ophthalmology Operations**
  - Restoration of vision (cataracts);
  - Correction of visual problems
- **82 Pediatric Operations**
  - Increased survival
  - Lifetime of benefit
- **57 Major or Minor Orthopedic Cases**
  - Life saving, curative, and palliative
  - Limb saving or restorative
- **826 OB/GYN, General Surgery, Urology, ENT Operations**
  - Tumor removal and treatment
  - Increased life-expectancy,
  - Alleviation of pain and suffering





# Medical & Public Health Impacts

- 19,375 Immunizations
  - Disease is #1 cause of death
- 20,134 Optometry Evaluations and 16,141 Glasses
  - Improve reading and close hand-eye work
- 9,373 Dental Extractions:
  - Resolution of pain
  - Improved nutrition
  - Protection from serious infectious
- Treatment and Vitamins
  - Treatment of malnutrition
  - Restore normal growth in children
  - Improved performance in school
  - Treatment of anemia
  - Decreased infectious risks





# Biomedical Repair


- **Biomedical Repair**
  - 236 Equipment Repairs
  - 254 People Trained
  - 81 Projects
  
- **Biomedical Equipment**
  - 59 Major Systems brought to 100% operational capacity
    - 25 X-Ray Machines
    - 13 Ultrasound Machines
    - 12 EKG Machines
    - 9 Anesthesia Machines
  - 177 Minor systems brought to 100% operational capacity





# Engineering Services

- Direct impact on public health
  - Reworked hospital wiring Tawi Tawi
  - Installed two water pump houses Banda Aceh
  - Installed forty ceiling fans Chittagong Hospital
  - Installed air conditioners at TNI hospital in Tarakan
  - Assistance with PREVMED
- General improvement in host nation infrastructure
  - Pier refurbishment
  - Construction of
    - Hospital driveway
    - Gazebo at Jolo Hospital
    - Security fence at Bario Pita clinic, Dili





# Host Nation Training




**Total Number of students trained: 6201**



11-L-0559/OSD/60909



# Host Nation Training





# Partnership Observations

- Host Nation Governments - Very effective on-site interaction
  - Positive engagement with national & local government officials and organizations
  - Senior national leadership directly involved with mission support
  - Very satisfied with Force Protection
- Other Regional Governments
  - Interaction with allied militaries in providing care to regional partners was a key part of the mission
- Military-NGO interoperability
  - NGOs thoroughly integrated into all MERCY processes
  - Positive feedback from participating NGOs




**Successful NGO and partner military integration**




# Media sampling

## Virtual Information Center Reporting



■ Anti-Gov/Left Wing  
 ■ Regional/International  
 ■ Local/National

## Press summary by theme



■ Military pubs  
 ■ Press reporting  
 ■ NGO pubs/websites