



# Host Nation Popular Support

11-L-0559/OSD/60913

Polling	Indonesia	Bangladesh	Remarks
Aware of MERCY HA mission	16%	43%	Uneducated Indonesians surveyed tend to answer "don't know" (23%)
Favorable opinion of mission	85%	95%	Of those aware of mission
Aid to tsunami and earthquake victims is important in overall opinion of US	57%	NIA	
Fact that USNS MERCY was a USN ship favorably impacted opinion of the mission	48%	83%	



# Contributions



## Project HOPE:

- Donations : \$6.1 Million
  - Biaxin
  - Vaccines
  - Medical Consumables

## Project Handclasp:

- Donations : \$426k
  - 100 Wheel Chairs
  - 34 Pallets - Hygiene Products
  - 25 Pallets - Medical Products
  - 25 Pallets - Sports Equipment
  - 20 Sewing Machines
  - 14 Pallets - Books





# MERCY FUNDING (Operational)




**Original Budget Estimate = \$19.387M**

## Operational Funding

### Fund Summary (thousands)

Original Budget Estimate	\$	19,387
Obligations	\$	17,486
Remain to Fund	\$	-
<b>TOTAL Under Budget</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>1,901</b>




### Notes

- Return AMC flight from Darwin - \$920K
- Helo Det: \$800K added (funded by CNAP)
- Completed the deployment 9.8% under budget

**Deployment complete \$1.9M under budget**



# MERCY FUNDING (Title 10)




## Title 10 Funding

### Fund Summary (thousands)

Funds Available	\$ 1,625
Executed	\$ 1,323
Balance Remaining	\$ 302
Return to PACOM	\$ 276
Balance Remaining	\$ 26

### Notes

- \*Return of \$276K to PACOM in unexecuted funds in progress
- \*Remaining \$26K is leftover Seabee ENCAP funds being returned



*Adequate funds available after PACOM augment (\$500K)*



# MERCY FUNDING (other)

## EEE Mess Funding

<u>Func Sun</u>	<u>isands)</u>
Funds Available	\$ 91
Executed	\$ 71
Balance Remaining	\$ 20
NGO, EEE Requirements	\$ 20

### Notes

- NAVSUP 51 to fund overnight patient meals not previously budgeted (total \$18K)

***NAVSUP 51 to fund \$18K for Patient Feeding***

## MSC ORF Funding

<u>Fund Summary (thousands)</u>	
Funds Available	\$ 16.5
Executed	\$ 10.1
Balance Remaining	\$ 6.4
Remain to Fund	\$ -
Available Balance	6.4

### Notes

- Remaining funds returned to MSC

***Funding Exceeded Requirements***



# Take-Aways

- Theater Security Cooperation benefits
- NGO integration and trust
- Agreeable multilateral experience
- Material readiness of MERCY: Ship and MTF
- Exercised host nation HA processes and disaster relief preparedness
- Information exchange
  - Military, Medical, NGO exposure





# Take-Aways



- **Big value for relatively little cost**
  - Over 60,000 patients helped
  - **Over \$31,000,000 worth of health care delivered for \$19,000,000**
  - Over 600 patients received lifetime of benefit surgeries
  - Over 200 biomedical equipment repairs
  - Over 48 infrastructure engineering repair jobs
- **NGO/int'l military integration changes the mission appearance**
- **Planning effort is extensive and far reaching**
- **Polling and metrics are keys to assessment process**
- **HA missions beyond short MED/DEN/ENG CAPS should continue as TSCP events**
  - Expand beyond T-AH ships






# Prospective Amphib HA Deployment 2007

## • MED / DEN / ENG Deployment

- Approximately 120 day deployment
- Fewer stops of greater duration (~ 2 weeks)
- Public Health focused
- SEABEE detachment for  
ENG CAP focus
- NGO, Host Nations, Partner  
Nations and other USG Organizations to  
participate in MED / DEN CAP
- Focus on Indonesia, Philippines and  
Oceania nations



**xpand multi-lateral participation**

**xpand foreign military partners (Japan / ROK)**





11-L-0559/OSD/60921



# Value Average Data for Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Timor

- Pharmacy:

\$11,625,000.00

- Total prescriptions dispensed: 64,150

- Clinical:

\$2,350,800.00

- Total adults: 27,300
- Total pediatrics: 11,500
- Immunizations: 19,375

- Surgery and Anesthesia

0

- Includes screening, anesthesia, surgery, post-operative care, and supplies.

- Total screened: 5,911

- Total surgeries: 1,083

- Dental and Optometry:

\$3,725,000.00

- Total patients: 25,457

- Total extractions: 9,373

- Total eyeglasses: 16,141



# Value Average Data for Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Timor

- Laboratory and Radiology:  
\$3,650,000.00

- Total laboratory : 19,739
- Total radiology exams: 2,736

- Preventive Medicine and  
Veterinary Services:  
\$295,700.00

- Industrial hygiene, environmental health, vector control
- Veterinary services for bovine and caprine herds, avian flocks, felines, canines, equine.

- Training Division:  
\$286,050.00

- Multiple BLS, OB topics, and courses to meet local nursing and medical school needs.


- Construction and Biomedical  
Engineering projects:  
\$275,000.00

- Includes  
191 construction and  
571 biomedical repair projects

**ALL PHASE TOTAL VALUE:  
\$31,180,000.00**



# Personnel Manning



~~FOUO~~

October 23, 2006

0914

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Information on All Language Training

Your attached August 18 memo responded to my request for information specifically about Arabic language training in DoD. Please prepare for me a similar breakout of what has happened with language training in DoD since 2001 of all languages: French, Spanish, Chinese, etc. I would like a clear, simple summary that I can use.

Thanks.

Attach. 8/18/06 USD(P&R) memo to SD re: "Final Response on Arabic Language Enrollment" (OSD 13310-06)

DNR:G  
57102306-07

\*\*\*\*\*  
*Please Respond By 11/30/06*

230006

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60925



11/29/2006 12:04 59 PM



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 203014000

0914

INFO MEMO

November 28, 2006, 11:00 AM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Language Training 2006 vs. 2001 (Snowflake--Attached at Tab A)

- The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) is our principal provider of foreign language instruction.
- TAB B shows all 64 languages taught at DLIFLC 2001 vs. today.
- TAB C extracts the languages of greatest interest:
  - Arabic language enrollment was 570 in FY2001, as compared to 945 during FY2006 (66 percent increase).
  - Chinese language enrollment was 297 in FY2001, as compared to 483 during FY2006 (63 percent increase).
  - Pashto language enrollment was 2 in FY2001, as compared to 150 during FY2006 (7400 percent increase).
- Incontrast:
  - Russian language enrollment was 508 in FY2001, as compared to 174 during FY2006 (66 percent decrease).
  - French language enrollment was 112 in FY2001, as compared to 108 during FY2006 (4 percent decrease).
  - Spanish language enrollment was 390 in FY2001, as compared to 246 during FY2006 (37 percent decrease).
- Up to now foreign language training requirements have been based on Service specific statements of needs. We are now involving the combatant commanders by asking them to report quarterly foreign language and regional expertise capability required in support of ongoing crises, contingency and security cooperation plans. First quarterly report began April 2006.

28 Nov 06

Attachments:  
As stated

OSD 18441-06



11/29/2006 12:04:51 PM

Prepared by: Roberto "BJ" Sanchez, OUSD/P&R/Plans (b)(6) roberto.sanchez@osd.pentagon.mil

23 Oct 06

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

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DHR:db  
8F102306-07

.....

*Please Respond By 11/30/06*

~~FOUO~~



~~FOUO~~

August 07, 2006

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Number of Folks enrolled in Arabic Classes

Please tell me how many people *in* the Department were enrolled *in* Arabic classes on January 1, 2001, and how many are enrolled *in* Arabic classes *today*.

Thanks.

DHR,ss  
8F08706-02

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/15/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60929

Arabic Language Enrollment

**FY2001**

Resident Enrollment	
Basic Course	
Intermediate Course	
Advanced	
Refresher	
<b>Total All Resident Courses</b>	<b>531</b>

Fort Gordon	<b>30</b>
Goodfellow AFB	<b>9</b>
<b>Total All Resident Courses</b>	<b>39</b>

Resident	<b>531</b>
Non-Resident	<b>39</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>570</b>

**FY2006**

Resident Enrollment	
Basic Course	
Intermediate Course	
Advanced Course	
Refresher	
<b>Total All Resident Courses</b>	<b>727</b>

Fort Gordon	<b>39</b>
Fort Meade	<b>28</b>
Wiesbaden, <b>Germany</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Offutt AFB</b>	<b>5</b>
Camp Pendleton	<b>3</b>
Monterey	<b>3</b>
<b>Total All Resident Courses</b>	<b>85</b>

Resident	<b>721</b>
Non-Resident	<b>85</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>812</b>

Source: Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center

**TAB**

**B**

Language	FY01	FY06	% Change
Afrikaans	1	0	-100%
Albanian	3	1	-67%
Amharic	0	2	N/A
Arabic	570	945	66%
Armenian	0	2	N/A
Azerbaijani	0	4	N/A
Bengali	1	1	0%
Bulgarian	2	3	50%
Burmese	1	0	-100%
Cambodian	2	3	50%
Chechen	0	2	N/A
Chinese	297	483	63%
Czech	2	3	50%
Danish	3	2	-33%
Dutch	13	6	-54%
Estonian	1	2	100%
Finnish	2	1	-50%
French	112	108	-4%
Georgian	0	5	N/A
German	89	46	-48%
Greek	5	4	-20%
Haitian-Creole	3	2	-33%
Hausa	0	1	N/A
Hebrew	33	46	39%
Hindi	4	20	400%
Hungarian	5	1	-80%
Indonesian	7	16	129%
Italian	32	28	-13%
Japanese	19	26	37%
Korean	473	654	38%
Kurmanji/Behdini	0	14	N/A
Lao	3	1	-67%

Includes DLIFLC and DLI-W Figures

Language	FY01	FY06	% Change
Latvian	1	0	-100%
Lithuanian	1	0	-100%
Macedonian	0	1	N/A
Malay	2	0	-100%
Mongolian	0	1	N/A
Nepali	0	1	N/A
Norwegian	8	9	13%
Pashto	2	150	7400%
Persian-Afghan (Dari)	0	106	N/A
Persian-Farsi	143	295	106%
Polish	4	5	25%
Portuguese	25	18	-28%
Romanian	6	7	17%
Russian	508	174	-66%
Serbian/Croatian	88	26	-70%
Sinhala/Singhalese	1	0	-100%
Slovak	1	2	100%
Slovenian	1	0	-100%
Somali	0	3	N/A
Sorani/Kurdi	0	13	N/A
Spanish	390	246	-37%
Swahili	0	7	N/A
Swedish	1	3	200%
Tadjik	0	1	100%
Tagalog	5	51	920%
Thai	14	19	36%
Tigrinya	0	4	N/A
Turkish	14	15	7%
Ukrainian	2	3	50%
Urdu	1	13	1200%
Uzbek	1	0	-100%
Vietnamese	35	3	-91%

11-L-0559/OSD/60932

**TAB**

**C**

<b>Language</b>	<b>FY01</b>	<b>FY06</b>	<b>% Change</b>
Arabic	570	945	66%
Chinese	297	483	63%
French	112	108	-4%
German	89	46	-48%
Hindi	4	20	400%
Indonesian	7	16	129%
Italian	32	28	-13%
Japanese	19	26	37%
Korean	473	654	38%
Pashto	2	150	7400%
Persian-Afghan (Dari)	0	106	N/A
Persian-Farsi	143	295	106%
Russian	508	174	-66%
Spanish	390	246	-37%
Turkish	14	15	7%

~~FOUO~~

November 21, 2006

TO: **GEN** Pete Schoomaker  
CC Gen Pete Pace  
Dorrance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**  
SUBJECT Ricks Article on Embedded Trainers

Pete,

The article this morning in the Early Bird about ~~our~~ trainers in Iraq is concerning. I visited the 1ID "train the trainer" program a couple weeks ago at Ft. Riley and found a professional, motivated cadre and impressive curriculum.

It seems to me, Ricks has old data. What do you think? I was also led to believe that there is an active lessons learned program that feeds back into the training program. Is that true? We ought to get our own picture out there so people don't get the wrong impression.

Thanks.

Attach. Ricks article in the *Washington Post*

DHR:as  
SF112106-07

.....  
*Please Respond By December 05, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18510-06



11/30/2006 11:27:23 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60935

LETT

20061121

Washington Post  
November 21, 2006  
Pg. 1

## Flaws Cited In Effort To Train Iraqi Forces

### *U.S. Officers Roundly Criticize Program*

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. military's effort to train Iraqi forces has been rife with problems, from officers being sent in with poor preparation to a lack of basic necessities such as interpreters and office materials, according to internal Army documents.

The shortcomings have plagued a program that is central to the U.S. strategy in Iraq and is growing in importance. A Pentagon effort to rethink policies in Iraq is likely to suggest placing less emphasis on combat and more on training and advising, sources say.

In dozens of official interviews compiled by the Army for its oral history archives, officers who had been involved in training and advising Iraqis bluntly criticized almost every aspect of the effort. Some officers thought that team members were often selected poorly. Others fretted that the soldiers who prepared them had never served in Iraq and lacked understanding of the tasks of training and advising. Many said they felt insufficiently supported by the Army while in Iraq, with intermittent shipments of supplies and interpreters who often did not seem to understand English.

The Iraqi officers interviewed by an Army team also had complaints; the top one was that they were being advised by officers far junior to them who had never seen combat.

Some of the American officers even faulted their own lack of understanding of the task. "If I had to do it again, I know I'd do it completely different," reported Maj. Mike Sullivan, who advised an Iraqi army battalion in 2004. "I went there with the wrong attitude and I thought I understood Iraq and the history because I had seen PowerPoint slides, but I really didn't."

Gen. John P. Abizaid, the top U.S. military commander for the Middle East, told Congress last week that he plans to shift increasing numbers of troops from combat roles to training and advisory duties. Insiders familiar with the bipartisan Iraq Study Group say that next month the panel will probably recommend further boosts to the training effort. Pentagon officials are considering whether the number of Iraqi security forces needs to be far larger than the current target of about 325,000, which would require thousands more U.S. trainers.

Most recently, a closely guarded military review being done for the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid out three options for Iraq. It appears to be favoring a version of one option called "Go Long" that would temporarily boost the U.S. troop level -- currently about 140,000 -- but over time would cut combat presence in favor of training and advising. The training effort could take five to 10 years.

Despite its central role in Iraq, the training and advisory program is not well understood outside narrow military circles. Congress has hardly examined it, and training efforts lie outside the purview of the special inspector general on Iraq reconstruction. The Army has done some studies but has not released them. Even basic information, such as how many of the 5,000 U.S. military personnel involved are from the National Guard and Reserves, is unusually difficult to obtain.



But the previously unreported transcripts of interviews conducted by the Army's **Combat Studies** institute at **Fort Leavenworth, Kan.**, offer a view into the program, covering a time **from shortly after the 2003 invasion until earlier this year.**

One of the most common complaints of the Army officers interviewed was that the **military** did a poor job of **preparing** them. "You're supposed to be able to shoot, move and communicate," said Lt. Col. Paul Ciesinski, who was an adviser in northern Iraq last year and **this year.** "Well, when we got to Iraq we could hardly shoot, we could hardly move and we could hardly communicate, because we hadn't been trained on how to do these things." The training was outdated and lackadaisical, he said, **adding** sarcastically: "They packed 30 days' training **into 84 days.**"

Sullivan, who advised three infantry companies in the Iraqi army, called the **U.S. Army's instruction** for the mission "very disappointing."

Nor were the officers impressed by some of their peers. Maj. Jeffrey Allen, an active-duty soldier, noted that all other members of **his team** were **from** the National Guard, and that **his team** was **supposed to** have **10** members but was given only five. He described his team as "weak . . . in particular the brigade team chief."

A separate internal review **this year** by the **military's** Center for Army Lessons Learned, based on **152** interviews with soldiers involved in the training and advisory program, found that **there was "no standardized guideline"** for preparing advisers and **that** such instruction was needed **because** "a majority of advisers have little to no previous experience or training."

Lt. Col. Michael Negard, a spokesman for the Multi-National **Security** Transition Command-Iraq, the headquarters for training, said he has not seen the Lessons Learned report and so **does not know** whether the training has been improved or standardized since that report was issued.

After arriving in Iraq, advisers said, they **often** were shocked to find that the **interpreters** assigned to them were of little use. Ciesinski reported that at his base in western Nineveh province, "They couldn't speak English and we would have to fire them."

Nor were there enough interpreters to go around, said Sullivan. "It was a real juggling **act**" with interpreters, he said, noting that he would run **from** the headquarters to a company **to** borrow an interpreter, run him over to say something, and then send him back."

But he was better off than Maj. Robert Dixon, who reported that during his tour in **2004**, "We had no interpreters at the time."

The Center for Army Lessons Learned study, whose contents were first reported by the Wall Street Journal, found one unit that learned after 10 frustrating months that its interpreters were "substandard" and had been translating the advisers' instructions so poorly that their Iraqi pupils had difficulty understanding the concepts being taught.

Trainers and advisers also reported major problems with the Army supply chain. "As an adviser, I got the impression that there was an **'us'** and **'them'**" divide between the advisers and **regular** U.S. forces, said Maj. Pete Fedak, an adviser near Fallujah in **2004.** "In other words, there was an American **camp** and then, outside, there was a bermed area for the **Iraqis**, of which we were part."

Replacing basic office materials was one of the toughest problems advisers reported. "Guys would come

- under fire so they could get computer supplies, paper and things like that," Sullivan said. "It was a **surreal** experience."

Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, a staff officer with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 who worked with Iraqi units, came away thinking that the Army fundamentally is not geared to the task of helping the advisory effort.

"The thing the Army institutionally is still struggling to learn is that the most important thing we do in counterinsurgency is building host-nation institutions," he told the interviewers, "yet all our organizations **are** designed around the least important line of operations: combat operations."

Advisers found that the capabilities of Iraqi forces "ran the gamut from atrocious to excellent," as it was put by Lt. Col. Kevin Farrell, who commanded an armored unit in east Baghdad **last** year and **this** year.

Many worried that the Iraqi units being advised contained insurgents. An Iraqi National Guard battalion "was infiltrated by the enemy," said Maj. Michael Monti, a Marine who was an adviser in the **Upper** Euphrates Valley in **2004** and **2005**.

Some advisers reported being personally targeted by infiltrators. "We had insurgents that **we** detected and arrested in the battalion that were planning an operation against me and my team," Allen said.

But Iraqi officers may have had even more to fear, because their families were also vulnerable. "I went **through** seven battalion commanders in eight weeks," Allen noted. Dixon reported that in Samarra both **his** battalion commander and intelligence officer deserted just before a major operation.

Iraqis also had some complaints about their U.S. advisers, most notably that junior U.S. **officers** who had never seen combat were counseling senior Iraqi officers **who** had fought in several wars. "Numerous teams have lieutenants . . . to fill the role of advisor to an Iraqi colonel counterpart," the **Lessons Learned** report stated.

Farrell, the officer in east Baghdad, said some advisers were literally "phoning **in**" their work. Some would not leave the forward operating base "more than one or **two** days **out of** the week -- instead they would just call the Iraqis on cellphones," he said.

Dixon was grim about the experience. "Would I want to go back and do it again?" he asked. His unambiguous answer: "No."

Yingling came to a broader conclusion. He recommended an entirely different orientation in Iraq, both for trainers and for regular U.S. units. "Don't train on finding the enemy," he said. "**Train on finding** your friends, and they will help you find your enemy. . . . **Once** you find your friends, finding the enemy is easy."

*Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.*



UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

NOV 29 2006

INFO MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army *P. Schoomaker*

SUBJECT Ricks Article on Embedded Trainers

- This responds to the Secretary of Defense's Snowflake dated November 21, 2006, subject as above (Tab A).
- The Washington Post published on November 21 an article by Defense correspondent Mr. **Thomas Ricks**, entitled "Flaws Cited in Effort to Train Iraqi Forces," that mischaracterized current training for military advisors based on **Army** lessons learned reports, some dating back to **2003**.
- Major General Carter F. Ham, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division and **Fort Riley**, authored a letter to the editor that US Army Public Affairs sent to the Washington Post on November 22, 2006, to set the record straight (Tab B).

COORDINATION NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Paul Boyce, (b)(6)

ZKAC

27 NOV 06

21 NOV 06

OSD 18510-06



11/30/2006 11:37 14 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60939

~~FOUO~~

November 21, 2006

**TO:** GEN Pete Schoomaker  
**CC:** Gen Pete Pace  
Dorrance Smith  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Ricks Article on Embedded Trainers

**Pete,**

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Thanks.

Attach. Ricks article in the *Washington Post*

DHR<sub>ss</sub>  
SFI 12106-07

.....  
*Please Respond By December 05, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60940

Washington Post  
November 21, 2006  
Pg. 1

## Flaws Cited In Effort To Train Iraqi Forces

### *U.S. Officers Roundly Criticize Program*

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post ~~Staff~~ Writer

The **U.S.** military's effort to train Iraqi forces has been rife with problems, from **officers being sent in** with **poor preparation** to a **lack** of basic necessities such as interpreters and office materials, **according to** internal Army documents.

The shortcomings have plagued a program that is central to the U.S. strategy in Iraq and is **growing in importance**. A Pentagon effort to **rethink** policies in Iraq is likely to suggest **placing less emphasis** on combat and more on training and advising, **sources say**.

In dozens of official interviews compiled by the Army for its **oral history archives**, **officers who had** been involved in **training and advising Iraqis bluntly criticized almost every aspect of the effort**. Some officers thought that team members were often selected poorly. **Others fretted** that the soldiers **who prepared them** had never served in Iraq and lacked understanding of the **tasks of training and advising**. Many said they felt insufficiently supported by the **Army while in Iraq**, with intermittent **shipments of supplies and interpreters who often did not seem to understand English**.

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Some of the American officers even faulted their **own** lack of understanding of the **task**. "If I had to do it again, I know I'd do it completely different," reported Maj. Mike Sullivan, who **advised an Iraqi army battalion in 2004**. "I went **there** with the wrong attitude and I thought I understood **Iraq and the history** because I had seen PowerPoint slides, but I really didn't."

Gen. John P. Abizaid, the top U.S. military commander for the Middle East, told Congress **last week** that he plans to **shift** increasing numbers of troops **from** combat roles to training and advisory duties. Insiders familiar with the bipartisan Iraq Study Group say that next month the panel will **probably recommend** further boosts to the training effort. Pentagon officials **are** considering whether the number of **Iraqi security forces** needs to be far larger than the current target of about **325,000**, which would **require** thousands more **U.S.** trainers.

Most recently, a closely guarded military review being done for the Joint Chiefs of Staff **laid out** three options for Iraq. It appears to be favoring a version of one option called "Go Long" that would temporarily boost the U.S. troop level -- currently about **140,000** -- but over time would cut combat presence in favor of training and advising. The training effort could take five to 10 years.

Despite its central role in Iraq, the training and advisory program is not **well** understood **outside narrow** military circles. **Congress** has hardly examined it, and training efforts lie outside the **purview** of the special inspector general **on** Iraq reconstruction. The **Army** has done some studies but has not released **them**. Even basic information, such as how many of the 5,000 U.S. military personnel involved **are** from **the** National Guard and Reserves, is unusually difficult to obtain.

But the previously unreported transcripts of interviews conducted by the Army's Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., offer a view into the program, covering a ~~time from~~ **shortly** after the 2003 invasion until earlier **this** year.

One of the most common complaints of the Army officers interviewed was that the military did a poor job of preparing them. "You're supposed to be able to shoot, move and communicate," said Lt. Col. Paul Ciesinski, who was an adviser in northern Iraq last year and **this** year. "Well, when we got to Iraq we could hardly shoot, we could hardly move and we could hardly communicate, because we hadn't been trained on how to do these things." The training was outdated and lackadaisical, he **said, adding** sarcastically: "They packed 30 days' training into 84 days."

Sullivan, who advised **three** infantry companies in the Iraqi army, called the U.S. Army's instruction for the mission "very disappointing."

Nor were the officers impressed by some of their peers. Maj. Jeffrey Allen, an active-duty soldier, noted that all other members of his **team** were **from** the National Guard, and that his team was **supposed to** have 10 members but was given only five. He described his team as "weak . . . in particular the brigade team chief."

A separate internal review **this** year by the military's Center for Army Lessons Learned, based on 152 interviews with soldiers involved in the training and advisory program, found that there was **"no** standardized guideline" for preparing advisers and that such instruction was needed because "a majority of advisers have little to no previous experience or training."

Lt. Col. Michael Negard, a spokesman for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, the headquarters for training, said he has not seen the Lessons Learned report and **so** does not know **whether** the training has been improved or standardized since that report was issued.

After arriving in Iraq, advisers said, they often were shocked to find that the interpreters assigned to them were of little **use**. Ciesinski reported that at his base in western Nineveh province, "They couldn't speak English and we would have to fire them."

Nor were there **enough** interpreters to go around, said Sullivan. "It was a real juggling act" with interpreters, he said, noting that he would **run** from the headquarters to a company "to borrow an interpreter, run him over to say something, and then send him back."

But he was better off than Maj. Robert Dixon, who reported that during his tour in 2004, "We had no interpreters at the time."

The Center for Army Lessons Learned study, whose contents were first reported by the Wall Street Journal, found one unit that learned after 10 frustrating months that its interpreters were "substandard" and had been translating the advisers' instructions **so** poorly that their Iraqi pupils had difficulty understanding the concepts being taught.

Trainers and advisers also reported major problems with the Army supply chain. "As an adviser, I got the impression that there was an 'us' and 'them' " divide between the advisers and regular U.S. forces, said Maj. Pete Fedak, an adviser near Fallujah in 2004. "In other words, there was an American camp and then, outside, there was a bermed area for the Iraqis, of which we were part."

Replacing basic office materials was one of the toughest problems advisers **reported**. "Guys would come

- under fire so they could get computer supplies, paper and things like that," Sullivan said. "It was a surreal experience."

Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, a staff officer with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 who worked with Iraqi units, came away thinking that the Army fundamentally is not geared to the task of helping the advisory effort.

"The thing the Army institutionally is still struggling to learn is that the most important thing we do in counterinsurgency is building host-nation institutions," he told the interviewers, "yet all our organizations are designed around the least important line of operations: combat operations."

Advisers found that the capabilities of Iraqi forces "ran the gamut from atrocious to excellent," as it was put by Lt. Col. Kevin Farrell, who commanded an armored unit in east Baghdad last year and this year.

Many worried that the Iraqi units being advised contained insurgents. An Iraqi National Guard battalion "was infiltrated by the enemy," said Maj. Michael Monti, a Marine who was an adviser in the Upper Euphrates Valley in 2004 and 2005.

Some advisers reported being personally targeted by infiltrators. "We had insurgents that we detected and arrested in the battalion that were planning an operation against me and my team," Allen said.

But Iraqi officers may have had even more to fear, because their families were also vulnerable. "I went through seven battalion commanders in eight weeks," Allen noted. Dixon reported that in Samarra both his battalion commander and intelligence officer deserted just before a major operation.

Iraqis also had some complaints about their U.S. advisers, most notably that junior U.S. officers who had never seen combat were counseling senior Iraqi officers who had fought in several wars. "Numerous teams have lieutenants. . . to fill the role of advisor to an Iraqi colonel counterpart," the Lessons Learned report stated.

Farrell, the officer in east Baghdad, said some advisers were literally "phoning in" their work. Some would not leave the forward operating base "more than one or two days out of the week - instead they would just call the Iraqis on cellphones," he said.

Dixon was grim about the experience. "Would I want to go back and do it again?" he asked. His unambiguous answer: "No."

Yingling came to a broader conclusion. He recommended an entirely different orientation in Iraq, both for trainers and for regular U.S. units. "Don't train on finding the enemy," he said. "Train on finding your friends, and they will help you find your enemy. . . . Once you find your friends, finding the enemy is easy."

*Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.*

Mr. John White  
Letters to the Editor  
The Washington Post  
1150 15<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC. 20071

Dear Mr. White.

It is unfortunate Tom Ricks did not visit Fort Riley, Kan., prior to penning The Washington Post Nov. 21 cover article, "Flaws Cited In Effort To Train Iraqi Forces." The Washington Post story did not inform its readers of pertinent current facts.

The sources for his article are from military interviews gathered by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, whose charter is to gather data on what works and what doesn't work on today's battlefields - and help drive change in Army organizations, tactics, training and equipment: The data cited by Ricks was gathered by this organization starting in 2003, and has, in fact, informed the Army's course change to better train the teams who will in turn train and advise Iraqi forces.

The Army dedicated a front-line Division, the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division at Fort Riley, to training these teams in June 2006. Since establishing the training here, we trained 51 11-man teams for duty in theater and have another 53 currently training in the ever-changing and adaptive curriculum. In a 60-day period, teams get over 50 hours of language training, hours of focused cultural training, and over 70 hours of advisor training.

Much of what Mr. Ricks writes about is anecdotal old news and has been addressed. The Army invites Mr. Ricks to Fort Riley to more accurately report how we are handling this critical mission today.

Proudly serving.

Maj. Gen. Carter F. Ham  
Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley, Kan.



~~FOUO~~

November 21, 2006

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Bringing Back the Draft

This issue of bringing back the draft has come up again. One of the elements of it is the theory that the poor and the minorities are serving disproportionately. We ought to get the actual data on it, and in particular, the data on the number of minorities being killed or wounded.

Please pull that together fast and let me take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF112106-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/27/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60945



11130120066 20:27 PM



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C 20301-4000



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R) *David S. C. Chu 30 Nov 06*

SUBJECT: Bringing Back the Draft (Snowflake at TAB A)

- A recent Heritage Foundation report shows that more recruits come from middle income families, with far fewer drawn from poorer families. Tab B shows recruits come disproportionately from neighborhoods with **above-average incomes**. Over recent years, we have actually seen an **increase** in recruits from higher income families, with a corresponding decrease from **lower income families**.
- African Americans remain under-represented among deaths and casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The total force is about 67 percent white, 19 percent African Americans, and 10 percent Hispanics. (Data through November 4, 2006)

	Recruits	Percentage	Casualties	Percentage
American Indian or Alaska Native	30	1.10%	209	1.00%
Asian	51	1.80%	267	1.20%
Black or African American	276	9.80%	1,773	8.20%
Hispanic or Latino	316	11.20%	1,278	5.90%
Multiple races, pending, or unknown	34	1.20%	2,511	11.60%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	28	1.00%	117	0.50%
White	2,090	74.00%	15,417	71.50%
Total	2,825	100.00%	21,572	100.00%

- Mr. Rangel introduced "draft" legislation in 2003: 2005 and 2006. It was only voted on once on October 2004, when it was defeated 402 to 2 with **29** members not voting. Even Mr. Rangel voted "Nay".




11-L-0559/OSD/60946

OSD 18559-06



11/30/2006 6:20:18 PM

### Recruit Neighborhoods



~~FOUO~~

November 21, 2006

TO: DavidChu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Bringing Back the Draft

This issue of bringing back the draft has come up again. One of the elements of it is the theory that the poor and the minorities are serving disproportionately. We ought to get the actual data on it, and in particular, the data on the number of minorities being killed or wounded.

Please pull that together fast and let me take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:sj  
SF112106-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/27/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60948

OSD 18559-06



11/30/2006 6:20:27 PM

~~FOUO~~

October 27, 2006

TO: Lt Gen Gene Renuart

CC: ~~Mary~~ Claire Murphy

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*



SUBJECT Jim Steele

*2006.6*

Please think through whether or not we want to give an award to Jim Steele sometime, if he has not already received one.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
SF102706-08

*Please Respond By November 15, 2006*

OCT 31 2006

(b)(6)

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

*10/31*

*1971*

*SIR -*

*JIM STEELE HAS BEEN GIVEN TWO AWARDS. ONE WAS THE DISTINGUISHED PUBLIC SERVICE AWARD AND THE SECOND WAS THE DOD MEDAL OF VALOR. THINK WE ARE OKAY IN TERMS OF ACKNOWLEDGING HIS SERVICE.*

*OK DR*

*V/R -*

*Gene*

*27 OCT 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60949

OSD 18612-06



12/1/2006 11:36:20 AM

~~FOUO~~

November 03, 2006

*014.35*

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Military Voting

After the elections, please give me a summary as to how we did with military voting.

Thanks.

DHR  
SF110306-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/16/06*

*3 NOV 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60950



12/1/2006 1 08 07 PM



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

November 27, 2006 - 10:00 A.M.

017.05

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (P&R) *David S. C. Chu 30 Nov 06*

Subject: Military Voting (Snowflake attached)

- As you know, we put added effort into military voting for the 2006 cycle, as we did for the 2004 Presidential election:
  - Conducted 113 Voting Assistance Workshops to train our personnel (vs. 164 in 2004, 105 in 2002, 62 in 2000, and fewer than 60 in 1998).
  - Tasked the Services to contact individual members personally, and we directly e-mailed all personnel on active duty three times about voting opportunities and procedures. Direct e-mail contact was a new innovation for 2006.
- In addition, we continued practices followed in 2002:
  - Placed reminder messages on all Leave and Earning Statements (LES) from August through October.
  - Filmed 4 absentee voting spots for the Pentagon Channel which aired multiple times, and conducted 47 radio and print interviews to publicize registration and voting. American Forces Information Service produced and ran television and radio spots, and we launched new creative work as part of our continuing Get Out the Vote Campaign with the Ad Council (media kits to 14,500 media affiliates worldwide including military media). DoD leaders issued a series of memoranda Service leadership to encourage voting.
- Our periodic survey of military personnel (December) will reflect the rate of military voter participation in 2006 (vs. 2002 rate, 42%). We do know that:
  - Approximately 140,000 absentee ballots were mailed to overseas military addresses. This suggests a modest—but not a dramatic—improvement in voter participation. Media accounts indicate that Congressional elections

27 NOV 06

3 NOV 06



11-L-0559/OSD/60951

OSD 18618-06



12/1/2006 1 08 21 PM

did not excite the same level of interest as did the Presidential election among troops in the field.

- Several thousand voters used electronic means to request, secure or transmit voting materials.
- We will incorporate this cycle's lessons learned into the ongoing 2008 preparation.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)



---

**TAB**

**A**

~~FOUO~~

November 03, 2006

TO: David Chu

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

*DR.*

**SUBJECT** Military Voting

After the elections, please give me a *summary as to* how we did with military voting.

Thanks.

DHR.ss  
SF110306-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/16/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60954

~~FOUO~~

November 06, 2006

Sudan

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT "Lost Boys of Sudan"

Someone told me about a book by someone named Dave Eger about the "lost boys of Sudan." Apparently there are 2,000 of them, and they speak Arabic, and there are also a number of girls I guess.

Someone suggested they might be helpful to the U.S. Government because of their language capability. Do you know anything about this?

Thanks.

DHR,dh  
SF110606-04

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/07/06*

6/20/06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60955

OSD 18619-06



12/12/2006 1:11:01 PM



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
 INFO MEMO



*WON*

PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

November 30, 2006, 5:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R) *David S. C. Chu 30 Nov 06*

SUBJECT: "Lost Boys of Sudan" -- SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- The recent book written by Dave Eggers, **What is the What: the Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng**, is a fictional novel based on the life of V. A. Deng.
- It was a collaborative effort following their introduction through the **Lost Boys Foundation**, an organization developed to assist relocated victims of the civil war that tore through Sudan in the 1980s and '90s (Tab B).
- Our Defense Language Office is working with Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) and State to pursue options and explore whether any of these individuals might be engaged by the U S Government.
- The Army 09L program manager reports that several Sudanese have already completed the program and are now serving, but has not confirmed they were part of the "Lost Boys."

*WON*

Attachment:  
 As stated

Prepared By: Stephen Wellock OUSD(P&R) (b)(6) -- November 30, 2006



11-L-0559/OSD/60956



OSD 18619-08

12/1/2006 1:11:17 PM

*WON*

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

November 06,2006

TO: David Chu

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

SUBJECT "Lost Boys of Sudan"

Someone told me about a book by someone named Dave Eger about the "lost boys of Sudan." Apparently there are 2,000 of them, and they speak Arabic, and there are also a number of **girls** I guess.

Someone suggested they might be helpful to the U.S. Government because of their language capability. Do you know anything about this?

Thanks.

DIR dh  
SF110606-M

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/07/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60958

**TAB**

**B**

A novel by any other name The Globe and Mail (Canada) November 25, 2006

November 25, 2006 Saturday

**SECTION** BOOK REVIEW, FICTION; Pg. D26

**LENGTH** 1119 words

**HEADLINE** A novel by any other name

**BYLINE** KAREN SOLIE

**BODY:**

What is the What: The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng

By Dave Eggers

McSweeney's, 480 pages, \$32.50

While I wouldn't go so far as to say that Dave Eggers's work has divided his readers, fellow writers and critics, it has made for some animated conversations. His debut, *A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius*, was a Pulitzer Prize finalist in 2001. A novel, *You Shall Know Our Velocity*, appeared in 2002, was expanded, revised and published as *Sacramento* a year later, then reprinted as *You Shall Know Our Velocity!* (exclamation point noted). *How We Are Hungry*, a book of stories, was published in 2004.

While Eggers's writing has been praised as honest, original and stylistically innovative, it has also been criticized as faddish, undisciplined and tiresomely self-interested. The general consensus, though, is that he has talent. With his new book, *What is the What: The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng*, this talent has been mobilized in conjunction with his experience as an editor and journalist to produce a work of significant strengths.

*What is the What* is a collaborative project based on years of meetings and recorded interviews between Eggers and Deng following their introduction through the Lost Boys Foundation, an organization developed to assist relocated victims of the civil war that tore through Sudan in the 1980s and '90s. Its current strain is now raging in Darfur.

Deng initially wanted to write his own story, but, as he was still taking classes in basic writing, found himself unequipped to do so. He notes in his preface to the book that Eggers wrote it "approximating my own voice and using the basic events of my life as the foundation. Because many of the passages are fictional, the result is called a novel." In a dual on-line interview for McSweeney's, the publishing house and magazine Eggers founded and edits (and which also publishes *The Believer*), Deng says that while the book compresses time, combines personalities into single characters and reconstructs chronologies, he feels "it is important to say that the parts of the book that seem most incredible are those that are most true." Readers will find "incredible" an understatement.

The novel opens on Deng, in his Atlanta apartment, being robbed. Beaten, tied up, bizarrely guarded by his assailants' little boy, he begins to narrate the story of his own childhood, his escape into the ravaged countryside following the annihilation of his village and suspected murder of his family. He meets other small boys also stricken, their numbers in the dozens, then hundreds. Led by a former teacher, Deng's group walks toward the promise of a refugee camp in Ethiopia. They walk for months. Some of the boys are slaughtered by government forces, some are abducted and sold as slaves. Others sicken and die from lack of food and water, from disease, injury, madness. Lions, hyenas, crocodiles and mosquitoes prey on them. Some just give up. The scale of the misery and bloodshed is staggering. After being driven from Ethiopia back into Sudan, "Thirty thousand people searched for food in a field where a few dogs would struggle to eat."

Eventually, the boys make it to Kakuma, a camp in Kenya that gets so big it grows suburbs. Even under the constant fear of conscription by the rebel SPLA, Deng carves out a life. He lives in Kakuma 10 years before his relocation to Atlanta as part of an international resettlement initiative.

Structured episodically, the novel alternates scenes from Deng's history with the present tense of the robbery and its aftermath, and also with events of the middle distance: Deng's early years in the United States, his relationships with sponsors and with the network of resettled Lost Boys. When the narrative tension sags, it tends to be during these latter scenes. On a few occasions, the book feels like a documentary containing some asides and re-enactments that just need waiting out. At these times, the spell peculiar to novels is broken.



A novel by any other name The Globe and Mail (Canada) November 25, 2006

It's worth keeping in mind here, though, a passage in the **book** where **Deng** acknowledges the edits and embellishments made by Lost Boys to their stories, given that "sponsors **and** newspaper reporters **and** the like expect the stories to have certain elements." People tend to like the parts about the lions, hyenas and crocodiles the best, he says. **See** my synopsis above.

Identifying *The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng* as a novel by Dave Eggers involves some risks, given the expectation of fidelity to two genres and two visions. It's trickier than writing one's own autobiographical novel, or a biography. But it may also be interpreted as a hedging of bets, a way to head off charges of uneven **pacing** or factual **inaccuracy** by invoking each genre's demands. Essentially, however, all readers have is what's on the page and **the** question of whether it works. And **here**, particularly, whether it works **as** a novel.

Notwithstanding the above-noted criticisms, it largely does. *What is the What* is not only a valuable cultural document, **it's** also **an** engaging and often compelling read. In the McSweeney's interview, Eggers says that by writing in Deng's "very distinct" voice, he "could disappear completely." But in the wrong hands, even the most **important** of stories and articulate of resources **can** vanish into a sinkhole of bad writing. The Valentino **Achak** Deng who narrates the novel is a well-realized, not idealized, character - smart, passionate, honest and tough - and the voice is consistent and relatable, even **when** the horror and chaos of his **story** are nearly incomprehensible.

He's also funny. Eggers's demonstrated ear for the **humour** of the absurd, the understatement, the universally human, is allowed to shine **as** a **strength**. **As** is his ability to write beautiful lyric passages. And there **are** scenes in the novel of devastating simplicity. In one, the Lost Boys come upon a **ruined** village and one of them, **Monyhial**, simply stops waking.

"I'll see you some other time, he said.

"In **this** village, **Monyhial** found a deep hole, created by an Antonov's bomb, and he stepped down into it. **We** said goodbye to **him** because we were accustomed to boys dying and leaving the group in many ways. . . . On the **third** day he decided to die in the hole, because it was warm there **and** there were no sounds inside. And he did die that day **be-** cause he was ready."

From Valentino Achak Deng's amazing and important story, Eggers has **crafted** a novel notable for its **writing** as well as its historical relevance. I likely won't be the only one surprised by it.

Karen *Solie* is *writer-in-residence at the University of New Brunswick in Fredericton*. She is the author of two *collections of poems*, *Short Haul Engine* and *Modern and Normal*.

GRAPHIC Illustration

**LOAD-DATE** : November 25, 2006

~~FOUO~~

November 27, 2006

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Stop-Loss

How much "stop-loss" is the Army using?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF112706-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/07/06*

*320.2*

*27 Nov 06*

*4 Dec 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60962

OSD 18728-06



12/5/2006 9:34:38 AM



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

December 4, 2006 5:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

Signature & Date

3202

SUBJECT: Stop-Loss – Snowflake TAB A

- On October 31, 2006, the Army Stop-Loss Program affected a total of 12,673 personnel (8,742 Active; 1,645 Reserve; and 2,286 National Guard soldiers).
- The Army uses the Stop-Loss program to ensure cohesive, trained, and ready forces deploy to Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom.
- The triggering event for Stop-Loss is similar for each Army Component:
  - The Active Component trigger is issuance of JCS deployment / execution order, with Stop-Loss invoked 90 days prior to the earliest arrival date specified therein.
  - Reserve Component Stop-Loss is triggered on the date of the alert, and – if the unit is mobilized – remains in force through deployment and redeployment.
  - Stop-Loss in all cases is terminated upon the unit's redeployment to its permanent home station, plus a maximum of 90 days.
- Exemption from Stop Loss is available for compelling or compassionate reasons (e.g., Soldier already had shipped household goods in anticipation of separation).
- ~~Army~~ also allows exemptions for those retiring or separating (e.g., disability retirement, pregnancy, hardship, or alcohol / drug rehabilitation failure).
- Army intends to continue using Stop-Loss for the foreseeable future, under the general procedures outlined above. However, we are working with Army to identify Force Generation alternatives to determine whether we can set an end date.

COORDINATIONS: Tab B


Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Brad Loo (b)(6)

4 Dec 06



11-L-0559/OSD/60963



OSD 18728-06

12/5/2006 9:35:07 AM

~~FOUO~~

November 27, 2006

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Stop-Loss

How much "stop-loss" is the Army using?

Thanks

DHR,dh  
SF112706-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/07/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60964

~~FOUO~~

NOV 27 2006

0007

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article in LA Times

You might want to take a look at this article from the LA Times and see if you know anything about this fellow working in the Policy shop.

Thanks.

Attach. LA Times article by Greg Miller

~~DATE~~  
~~11/20/06 11:25:02 AM~~  
11/20/06 11:25:02 AM

Please respond by December 3, 2006

~~FOUO~~

OSD 18739-06  
  
12/5/2006 11:25:02 AM

27 NOV 06

director of government relations for the Military Officers Association of America.

"It's not that members who aren't veterans don't support us on military issues. Sometimes they bond over backwords because they didn't serve," Strohrijs said. "But we bond to work a little harder to establish the bond" to those who don't have firsthand knowledge.

"Once they understand, they can be at least as supportive as those who have served," he said.

The decision to military experience among members of Congress reflects the fading of the World War II generation - where most of the men served - and the decision that they passed since the end of the Vietnam War and the military has military land.

The number of veterans in the House peaked in 1971-74, when about 80 percent of the members had military experience, said Strohrijs. The peak in the Senate was in 1973-74, when 75 percent were veterans.

In a population of about 200 million people, there are only about 24 million veterans now, said the American Legion's Robinson. That's fewer than ever in 20 American.

Even personal experience to the service doesn't mean veterans see eye-to-eye on issues involving the military. U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.D.), a colonel in the Air Force Standby Reserve, said that while he supports the military is short of personnel, "I don't see you do this with an all-voluntary service, all-voluntary Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy. And if we can't, then we'll look for some other option."

Robinson also said being a veteran doesn't necessarily mean a political action agenda. "I'm a political action member," said Lindsey Graham (R-S.D.) was a prominent speaker at the meeting.

veterans, but their support is visible or less than that of other veterans. Robinson said, "I've seen that Edwards has been such a staunch supporter for veterans."

In their effort to attract nonveterans members, Strohrijs said 120 retired military officers will visit congressional offices in the new Congress space. One house is that "we don't have a big concept here," he said.

By the way, asking the same people to go again and again and again "is kind of an absurdity," he said. "Whether you like the current war or not, your priority was to be ready in the field for next war."

The Associated Press contributed to this article.

Los Angeles Times  
November 22, 2005

21. **Blocked As A War Preparer**  
**Carney** who worked at the Pentagon, still believes there was a relationship between *they and Al Qaeda* by Greg Miller, Times Staff Writer

**WASHINGTON** — **Of all** the Democrats who spoke in a wave of public anger over Iraq to speak veterans this month, **Carney** said the most notably overlooked as a war critic.

Before winning the seat the Pennsylvania 10th Congressional District, **Carney** was part of a congressional delegation with a the Pentagon that was responsible for some of the most alarming — and, it turned out, unheeded — power claims about Iraq.

Assigned to search for links between Iraq and Al Qaeda, he not tracked a series of connections, including that a Dept. 11 inspector had met with Rep. **Carney**, that have since been widely dismissed. The Pentagon staff was created and run by one of the Iraq war's principal architects.

two-**thousand** of **Defense** **Douglas J. Paul**

**Carney** took part in hearings at the White House and the Pentagon that depicted the CIA as underestimating the relationship between Baghdad and the former network. Vice President Dick **Carney** and other administration officials frequently turned the hearings to blame the war on the

**Douglas** his background, **Carney** complained as an author Democrat said he got a "very warm reception" when he arrived at Capitol Hill the week to take part in the **Carney** and his accompanying members, **Carney** is a rising Democrat, according to his press secretary.

"They are judgment," **Carney** said of the fellow freshmen. "But I'm not sure if of them know about this."

**Rep. James G. Bohan** (D-Ill.) said the war was started by the war that caused the members would have first signed **Carney**.

"I think that to recognize that what happened there is deeply troubling and we're paying a price for it," **Bohan** said. "But I don't want to cast judgment on him."

**Carney**, 47, is not quite so apologetic about his work as the freshmen.

of multiple news of corporate," was possibly including the Dept. 11 article.

**Carney**, a former officer in the Army and political science professor of Penn State University, wasn't expected to visit the occurrence-hearing office in a common Pennsylvania, but his chance improved when the Republican incumbent, **Don Blumenthal**, withdrew but had a three-year contractual office and was forced to deny statements that he had elected his return.

**Carney** said he initially was a supporter of the invasion of Iraq but has been disappointed by the handling of the previous language. His stance hardened, he said, when one of his college students returned from Iraq and complained of how **Disruptive** **U.S. fighting** was seen.

"They had to recognize Iraq was going to be a much more difficult war," **Carney** said.

**Carney** ended up working the Bush after being asked up for duty as an analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency in the aftermath of Sept. 11. **Carney** was detailed to **Paul's** office in 2002 after the war had been declared and the DIA at provide two systems for a special project.

**Carney** and another DIA analyst, **Charles Shubin**, spent months poring over thousands of war intelligence reports. They quickly concluded that the CIA, which had been deprived of any earlier relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda, was getting it wrong.

"I found a kind of evidence the way they were so important in the analysis," **Carney** said of the CIA reports. "I was frustrated to see that others with all the evidence that was going on."

So the **Fitch** team unveiled a competing report called "Assessing the Relationship Between Iraq and Al Qaeda." The document cited "fundamental problems" with the CIA's analysis and offered

000.7

INFO MEMO

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

USD(P) WJ DEC 04 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) 12/6/06

SUBJECT: LA *Times* Article on Congressman-elect Chris Carney (D-PAIO)

- (FOUO) You asked if we knew anything about Congressman-elect Chris Carney, who was featured in an article in the LA *Times* (next under).
- (U) Mr. Chris Carney was mobilized as a Navy reservist (O-3, Lieutenant) in the wake of 9/11. He was a tenured professor of political science at Penn State University.
- (FOUO) In February 2002, LT Carney was detailed from DIA to work on the newly-established Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group under Douglas Feith.
- (FOUO) LT Carney and Ms. Christina Shelton briefed you in August 2002 on the relationship between Al Qaeda and Saddam's regime.
  - You instructed them to give this briefing to then-DCI George Tenet. The briefing was later given to Steve Hadley.
  - Senator Levin (D-MI) pointed to this briefing as an illegitimate intelligence activity in Doug Feith's office.
- (U) LT Carney demobilized in January 2003, and was then hired as a civilian by OSD Policy. He worked for Policy throughout 2003.
  - Mr. Carney returned to Penn State in January 2004.

6 Dec 06

COORDINATION Tab B.

Attachment:

Tab A: Photograph of Mr. Carney

Prepared by: Tim Kyger, ISA/ME (b)(6)

27 Nov 06



~~FOUO~~

NOV 27 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article in *LA Times*

You might want to take a look at this article from the *LA Times* and see if you know anything about this fellow working in the Policy shop.

Thanks.

Attach. LA Times article by Greg Miller


~~DR/ew~~  
~~11-0559-OSD-60968~~  
11-0559-OSD-60968

Please respond by December 3, 2006

~~FOUO~~











**Mr. Chris Carney**

11-L-0559/OSD/60970

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET


Subject: Article in the *LA Times* on Congressman Chris Carney (D-PA10)  
Snowflake Number: 1-06/015816-EXECSEC

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
PDASD/ISA	 Mary Beth Long	11/30/06
DASD/ME	 Mark T. Kimmitt	4/28/06
Director, Iraq	 John Trigilio	11/28/06
Special Advisor	 Abe Shulsky	11/28/06

~~FOUO~~

December 05, 2006

539 PFIAB

TO: The Honorable Joshua B. Bolten  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld.   
SUBJECT: Santorum on PFIAB

You folks might want to give some thought to Rick Santorum going on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In my view, he would be a terrific member.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SFI20506-06



5 Dec 06

OSD 18781-08



12/6/2006 10:14:30 AM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60972

~~FOUO~~

November 22, 2006

099

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Steve Cambone  
Eric Ruff

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Front Page Articles from October, 2003

Attached are two articles from the *NY Times* and the *Washington Post* on October 6 and 7, 2003. As I recall, they were page one, and they announced that National Security Advisor Condi Rice and the White House had taken over responsibility for Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thanks.

Attach. 10/6/03 *NY Times* article by Sanger, 10/7/03 *Washington Post* article by Slevin and Allen

DHR:js  
112106-06 (TS). Doc

.....

22 NOV 06

~~FOUO~~



12/6/2006 12:49:09PM

11-L-0559/OSD/60973

New York Times  
October 6, 2003  
Pg. 1

## White House To Overhaul Iraq And Afghan Missions

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Oct. 5 — The White House has ordered a major reorganization of American efforts to quell violence in Iraq and Afghanistan and to speed the reconstruction of both countries, according to senior administration officials.

The new effort includes the creation of an "Iraq Stabilization Group," which will be run by the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. The decision to create the new group, five months after Mr. Bush declared the end of active combat in Iraq, appears part of an effort to assert more direct White House control over how Washington coordinates its efforts to fight terrorism, develop political structures and encourage economic development in the two countries.

It comes at a time when surveys show Americans are less confident of Mr. Bush's foreign policy skills than at any time since the terrorist attacks two years ago. At the same time, Congress is using President Bush's request for \$87 billion to question the administration's failure to anticipate the violence in Iraq and the obstacles to reconstruction.

"This puts accountability right into the White House," a senior administration official said.

The reorganization was described in a confidential memorandum that Ms. Rice sent Thursday to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, and the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet.

Asked about the memorandum on Sunday, Ms. Rice called it "a recognition by everyone that we are in a different phase now" that Congress is considering Mr. Bush's request for \$20 billion for reconstruction and \$67 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. She said it was devised by herself, Vice President Dick Cheney, Mr. Powell and Mr. Rumsfeld in response to discussions she held with Mr. Bush at his ranch in late August.

The creation of the group, according to several administration officials, grew out of Mr. Bush's frustration at the setbacks in Iraq and the absence of more visible progress in Afghanistan, at a moment when remnants of the Taliban appear to be newly active. It is the closest the White House has come to an admission that its plans for reconstruction in those countries have proved insufficient, and that it was unprepared for the guerrilla-style attacks that have become more frequent in Iraq. There have been more American deaths in Iraq since the end of active combat than during the six weeks it took to take control of the country.

"The president knows his legacy, and maybe his re-election, depends on getting this right," another administration official said. "This is as close as anyone will come to acknowledging that it's not working."

Inside the State Department and in some offices in the White House, the decision to create the stabilization group has been interpreted as a direct effort to diminish the authority of the Pentagon and Mr. Rumsfeld in the next phase of the occupation. Senior White House officials denied that was the

Washington Post  
October 7, 2003  
Pg. 1

## New Group Intended To Speed Iraq Efforts

By Peter Slevin and Mike Allen, Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush announced yesterday that the White House will take a stronger role in overseeing the struggling effort to rebuild Iraq through a new group intended to speed the flow of money and staff to Baghdad and streamline decision-making in Washington.

The purpose of the new Iraq Stabilization Group is to "crack the whip, frankly," said a senior administration official, who described a sense of urgency amid persistent trouble in Iraq and polls showing declining confidence in Bush.

The announcement comes as some Democrats are intensifying their criticism of the administration for delays in restoring power, providing security and formulating a plan to cope with the complexities of rebuilding a country of 24 million people. As Congress debates the administration's request for \$20 billion for reconstruction, lawmakers are appealing to the White House for a more effective and transparent effort.

The new group, to be led by national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and drawn from more than a half-dozen Cabinet agencies, is intended to remove a bottleneck in decision-making by identifying and resolving problems faced by the U.S.-led occupation. Responsibility for running postwar Iraq will remain with the Defense Department, and civilian administrator L. Paul Bremer will retain considerable autonomy.

Reaction beyond the White House to the Bush announcement was muted. Skeptics said they welcome added attention to details by Rice, but they wonder how effective the new group will be and how it will change the situation on the ground.

"We're basically trying to figure out how it relates to the other 500 committees going on," a State Department official said. "It was not greeted as a major statement of interagency relations. We'll just see if it works."

This official said a stronger hand exerted by Rice could prove helpful in obtaining faster answers on such matters as spending, staffing and policy. But several officials and analysts noted that the groups are unlikely to solve the thorniest problems, which will continue to require decisions by Cabinet secretaries and their deputies. Consensus among them has often proved elusive, and Rice has often struggled to produce results.

"It still funnels decisions into the same deputies and principals meetings that we've been having all along," the official said.

The stabilization group will comprise committees concerned with economics, politics, counterterrorism and the media. In effect, it will split the work of a large NSC steering committee created more than a year ago as the White House prepared for war. That committee will continue to handle day-to-day affairs.

"It is to facilitate Bremer and to get him what he needs, whether it's policy guidance, whether it is to fix a problem in Washington between . . . two agencies that are not in sync and he can't fix it from the field," a senior administration official said. "It's an effort to make sure Washington is not part of the problem."

The official said the committees would not add a layer to the postwar problem-solving bureaucracy, but would "make the existing layer more efficient." He said it is not designed to limit Bremer, but to strengthen his hand as he wrestles with challenges in Iraq and Washington.

Administration officials had insisted last summer that the White House did not plan to play a larger role in the reconstruction effort. Bush's move is an acknowledgement of the vast political and diplomatic stakes in Iraq, where rebuilding has succeeded in some areas but in others has been afflicted by violence and other problems largely unanticipated by White House decision-makers.

Bush defended his administration's efforts in Iraq yesterday, saying that improvements there have been obscured by news coverage that his aides contend has emphasized American deaths and reconstruction setbacks at the expense of more upbeat developments.

"Listen, we're making good progress in Iraq. Sometimes it's hard to tell it when you listen to the filter," Bush said at a brief news conference. "The situation is improving on a daily basis inside Iraq. People are freer, the security situation is getting better."

The creation of the stabilization group and the recruitment of an ever-larger staff for Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority also serve as a reminder that the administration chose to keep control of Iraq's reconstruction rather than yield authority to other countries or the United Nations. With that decision came the understanding that the mission's fate is largely a U.S. responsibility.

The new NSC teams evolved from discussions Rice had with Bush in August during the president's vacation. Rice won support from Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney and Bush, an official said. The message, the official said, is, "This is a high priority. It's not business as usual."

Responding to Bremer's pleas, Rumsfeld appealed to his Cabinet colleagues last week for staff for the Coalition Provisional Authority. Rice followed up with telephone calls.

Powell is doubling the State Department contingent in Iraq in coming weeks. "This is our mission," he told his senior staff at a meeting last week, according to people present.

To emphasize that point, Powell told the staff members that they must provide officers for Iraq duty, no matter how important their current assignments. Officials will be granted hardship and danger pay for their tours in Iraq, and their work will be made part of their performance evaluation.

"Powell and [Deputy Secretary of State Richard L.] Armitage have made clear to all of us that if there are not enough volunteers, they will start identifying people to volunteer," a senior official said.

The number of State Department staff members working for Bremer will grow from about 55 to 110, making it the department's largest contingent in the Middle East, about 20 percent larger than in Egypt. At least a dozen foreign service officers are expected to be deployed outside Baghdad, where posts are now staffed by the Pentagon.



State Department leaders, who yielded responsibility for postwar Iraq to the Pentagon after Bush issued a presidential directive in January, have often been angered by their lack of influence over policies and staffing decisions in Iraq. One senior official said yesterday that the creation of the new NSC committees could increase State's role and make it harder for the Pentagon to decide matters on its own.

"It means that everybody gets to look at what everybody's doing and spending," another official said. "Basically, we see it as good."

Despite their frustration, several officials at State said they have given up fighting Rumsfeld's authority. They hope that the deployment of scores of staff members to Iraq will lead to a greater role than they could win in the administration's notoriously bitter inter-agency struggles.

"That's been the de facto plan since day one," said a State official involved in Iraq policy.

Several Clinton administration officials have called on Bush to take the civilian reconstruction job away from the Pentagon. Former deputy defense secretary John J. Hamre told the Defense Department is managing tasks "for which it has no background or competence."

James B. Steinberg, deputy national security adviser to President Bill Clinton, said the administration should have given substantial roles to more parts of the government from the beginning of the occupation. He said the new group looks like a step toward correcting that.

"One of the flaws has been that they basically turned the whole thing over to the Pentagon, when the expertise for political and civil reconstruction resides in the State Department," said Steinberg, the Brookings Institution's director of foreign policy studies. "It was a curious decision. The Pentagon has always resisted taking on stabilization work and has always seen that as not the military's job."



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON**  
**WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100**  
**INFO MEMO**

COMPTROLLER

December 7, 2006, 5:00 PM

110.01

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jones *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Information on Services Recapitalization (November 23 Snowflake)

- You asked for information on the Services Sustainment and Recapitalization rates by year from FY 2001 through FY 2007.
- Current projections for FY 2007:
  - Department-wide sustainment will reach 90 percent, up from 72 percent in FY 2006:
  - Department-widerecapitalization rate will reach 72 years, down from 89 years in FY 2006.
- Attached are charts that compare budgeted versus executed Sustainment and Recapitalization rates beginning in FY 2001.
- Should you wish to see it, Phil Grone in AT&L has developed a briefing that provides details on how the Department will achieve its Recapitalization and Sustainment goals.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
 As stated

7 Dec 06

Prepared By: Maria Probst, (b)(6)

OSD 18952-06




12/8/2006 9:03:34 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60978



# Department-Wide Sustainment




**Department –Wide Sustainment Rate to Reach 90% in FY07**

Note 1: 2007 execution data is projected

Note 2: Execution data not available prior to 2004



# Department-Wide Recapitalization



**Department-Wide Recapitalization Rate to Reach 72 Years in FY07**

Note 1: 2007 execution data is projected  
 Note 2: Execution data not available prior to 2004

~~FOUO~~

December 13, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Quality of Iraqi Police

IRAQ

Mr. President.

There is a lot of information flowing out there about the quality of the Iraqi police. I asked about it, and received the attached response from General Marty Dempsey. I found it to be interesting and helpful.

Respectfully,

Attach. 12/8/06 CJCS memo to SecDef (OSD19013-06)

DHR:ss  
SFI21306-03

13 Dec 06

8 Dec 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60981



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9000

CM-0619-06  
8 December 2006

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *VR-Peter Pace 8 Dec 06*

SUBJECT: Capability Assessment of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police

You asked' about recent contradictions between Civilian Police Assistance Training Team statements and public reporting concerning the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Iraqi Police Services (IPS).

- Attached (TAB A) is a memorandum from Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, explaining his assessment of the MOI and IPS.
  - Corruption exists at every level of the MOI, for political and personal gains.
  - Police forces include personnel who are passive, permissive, or complicit in militia activity.
  - Minister of Interior Boulani is taking action to combat corruption and militia infiltration.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Reference:  
1 Verbal tasking of 24 October 2006

Prepared By: Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, USMC; Director, J-5 (b)(6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

TT-L-0559/OSD/60982

OSD 19013-06



12/11/2006 1:10:17 PM



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ  
BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APOAE 09348

MNSTC-I-CG

29 October 2006

MEMORANDUM THRU

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq APO AE 09342  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 999 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-9999

FOR Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT: Response to Request for Information on the Extent of Corruption in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI)

**1. Disparity between open-source and MNSTC-I statements on Ministry of Interior progress.** Open-source reports almost exclusively highlight security force failures and are focused at the tactical level. The Ministry of Interior is a very complex organization with hundreds of thousands of employees working in four major aspects of civil security: Ministry Headquarters, Provincial Police Services, Border Forces, and National Police Forces. Imprecisely, misconduct and corruption are broadly described in open-source as “problems in the Mol.” There is progress at every level of the Ministry of Interior, and there are challenges at every level.

**2. The extent of corruption in the Ministry of Interior.** Corruption exists at every level of the Ministry of Interior and its forces. It is manifested in two ways:

- **Corruption for political gain.** The accommodation of political parties in the distribution of cabinet positions is reflected at sub-cabinet level as well. As a result, political party loyalties run deep into the Ministries in general and the Ministry of Interior in particular.

**ACTIONS ON-GOING TO COMBAT CORRUPTION FOR POLITICAL GAIN**

- ✓ Minister of Interior Boulani has embarked on a Ministry Reform Program that will reduce the number of Deputy Ministers from 6 to 4 and that will establish better balance among “groups” in order to reduce external political influence inside his ministry
- ✓ Minister Boulani has also initiated a National Police Transformation Program that has flattened the organization through the elimination of two headquarters, that is re-training National Police units to give them police skills they have been lacking, and that is vetting leaders at Battalion Commander and above for loyalty
- **Corruption for personal gain.** The long history in Iraq of corruption for personal gain is evident in most financial transactions and contracting actions.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60983

MNSTC-I-CG

SUBJECT Response to Request for Information on the Extent of Corruption in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI)

ACTIONS ON-GOING TO COMBAT CORRUPTION FOR PERSONAL GAIN

- ✓ Minister Boulani has approached us with a request to adopt US Foreign Military Sales as his ministry's acquisition strategy. He recognizes that this will eliminate corruption in his procurement actions. He is also keenly aware that he remains vulnerable to corruption in pay and life support activities.

3. **The extent of militia infiltration of the Ministry of Interior Forces.** There has been infiltration of militias into the Iraqi Security Forces. However, the larger problem is competing loyalties and militia influence. This manifest itself in several ways.

- **Police who are passive to the militia agenda.** In the most contested areas of Iraq, many local police and some National Police turn a blind eye to militia misconduct. This occurs for a variety of reasons including intimidation and, in some cases, sympathy for the militia's activities.
- **Police who are permissive to the militia agenda.** There are police in these same contested areas who do not engage in extra-judicial activity themselves but who assist the militia by providing safe passage, uniforms, equipment, and information.
- **Police who actively participate in a militia agenda.** Some police actively participate in extra-judicial, sectarian crime.

ACTIONS ON-GOING TO COMBAT MILITIA INFLUENCE IN THE POLICE FORCES


- ✓ It is important to note that there are at least as many positive reports of police conduct as reports of militia influence. Several recent examples include:
  - Police and Army working together in Mosul attacked an AIF ambush site killing and capturing over 40 enemy
  - Police in Amarah fought for more than 24 hours to defend their police station against Jaysh al-Mahdi attack
  - Police in Ramadi working with local tribal leaders have begun to regain control of Al Anbar Province and in the past month have captured over 70 tons of munitions
- ✓ Nevertheless, Minister Boulani is aware of the problems posed by militia influence, and he understands that he must address it through the careful selection of leaders at police station and above. He has begun this process in Baghdad with



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

local and National Police, and he is seeking additional authorities to influence the selection of leaders at Provincial level.

- ✓ Minister Boulani also understands that he must hold police and their leaders accountable for misconduct. Several recent examples of his willingness to tackle police misconduct include:
  - Using his Internal Affairs Directorate, he has directed investigations against more than 2,000 Ministry employees resulting in the conviction of **122**, the administrative punishment of **1,450** and the firing of **1,228**.

  
MARTIN E. DEMPSEY  
Lieutenant General, US Army  
Commanding

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/60985

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TAB B

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM

MG Ghormley

14 November 2006

11-L-0559/OSD/60986

Tab B

1217  
1630

~~FOUO~~

*W*

*Afghanistan*

### ACTION MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DEC 12 2006*

SUBJECT: UK Proposal for ISAF Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan

- You asked for:
  - A letter to MOD Browne addressing his proposal for a Ministerial level conference of ISAF Regional Command South participants on 19 December in London. (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the letter at Tab A.

*SDM  
Rough*

COORDINATION TAB B

*12 Dec 06*

Prepared by: CDR Mike Wettlaufer, ISA/EPN (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

*7 Dec 06*



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SD CA		DSD SA	
SD SMA		DSD SMA	
SD MA		DSD MA	
ISA	<i>12/12</i>	DSD CA	
STF DIR			
ES			
ESR MA	<i>12/12</i>	OSD/60987	



OSD 19092-06

12/12/2006 11:36:48 AM

12/12  
1630

~~FOUO~~

8

**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DEC 12 2006*

SUBJECT: UK Proposal for ISAF Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan

- You asked for:
  - A letter to MOD Browne addressing his proposal for a Ministerial level conference of ISAF Regional Command South participants on 19 December in London. (Tab A).


RECOMMENDATION: Sign the letter at Tab A.

COORDINATION: TAB B

*Edelman*

Prepared by: CDR Mike Wettlaufer, ISA/EPN, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~



SD CA		DSD SA	
SD SMA		DSD SMA	
SD MA	<i>ES 11</i>	DSD MA	
ISA	<i>12/12</i>	DSD CA	
STF DIR			
ES	<i>11</i>	<i>ES 0359/QSD/60988</i>	
ESR MA			





**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DEC 13 2006

The Right Honorable Desmond Browne MP  
Secretary of State for Defence  
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB  
United Kingdom

Dear Mr. Secretary:

**Thank** you for your letter of **5** December concerning the establishment of a Ministerial group to discuss the political framework for success in ISAF. **This** initiative is commendable.

I will pass your proposal to Dr. Gates and leave the decision on how we participate in the conference **to** him.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".



11-L-0559/OSD/60989



OSD 19082-06

12/13/2006 6:06:50 PM

UNCLAS  
ROUTINE

FROM: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
TO: USDAO LONDON  
ODC LONDON  
INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
USEUCOM STUTTGART GE//EJ5//  
USEUCOM STUTTGART GE//EJ4//  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS//  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//FILE/USDP ISA/USDP EUR POL//

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER TO UK SECRETARY DESMOND BROWNE

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING CORRESPONDENCE TO SECRETARY  
BROWNE. ORIGINAL LETTER MAILED AIR MAIL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

THE RIGHT HONORABLE DESMOND BROWNE *MP*  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE  
**UNITED** KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING  
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2HB  
UNITED KINGDOM

DEAR MR. SECRETARY

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR *YOUR* LETTER OF 5 DECEMBER CONCERNING THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF A MINISTERIAL GROUP TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL  
FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESS IN ISAF. THIS INITIATIVE IS COMMENDABLE.

(PARA) I WILL PASS YOUR PROPOSAL TO DR. GATES AND LEAVE THE  
DECISION ON HOW WE PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE TO HIM.

SINCERELY,  
//DONALD H. RUMSFELD//

(END TEXT)

11-L-0559/OSD/60990






OSD 19092-06

12/13/2006 6:06:51 PM

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

**Subject:** *UK Proposal for ISAF Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan*  
**Control Number:** SF-120606-11

<b>Title/Organization</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Date</b>
Coordination:		
ASD/ISA		<u>11 Dec 2006</u>
DASD Eur/NATO		<u>8 Dec 2006</u>
Director Europe North		<u>8 Dec 2006</u>

Attachments:

TAB A: Letter to Secretary Browne  
TAB B: Coordination



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
FLOOR 6, ZONE D, MAIN BUILDING  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 020 721 89000  
Fax 020 721 87140  
E-mail: defencesecretary@mod.uk

MSU 4/5/3K

5 December 2006

*Dear Don,*

I write to follow up the meeting about Afghanistan held in the margins of the NATO Summit in Riga on 29 November. Eric Edelman represented the US and will be able to report in more detail on the meeting itself. My proposition is that we should establish a pol-mil Ministerial group to generate a political framework for success. Our focus should be on the South of Afghanistan, in which our troops are engaged under RC(S) in ISAF. This grouping should not be confused with the much broader idea of an international Contact Group;

We need to give better political shape to the military mission. By this I mean that we should describe more fully the endstate we seek and the role security and other activities can play in achieving it. This should give us measures of success and provide us with a clearer understanding of the route we expect to travel to make progress incrementally. We need this, not just to establish firm political direction for our military endeavours, but also to enable us to communicate to our audiences at home and inside Afghanistan.

In all of this we must not divide ourselves from others contributing to the ISAF mission, nor undermine NATO itself. The purpose is to reinforce our support for NATO and help the NATO HQ to provide the clearest possible political leadership. The political cohesion we generate in our approach to the South should of course be exploited by those on the ground and throughout the chain

The Hon Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America




of command. A US d e in this group would be invaluable, both to offer coherence across the South and East, and as the largest contributor of resources to the NATO mission.

As to the frequency of these meetings at Ministerial level, we should aim to meet no less than once a quarter. We must avoid creating new bureaucratic structures and should use existing resources in a more focused way. I intend that we should harness the combined political will of our capitals, energising our representations both in NATO HQ and in Kabul.

I would like to propose a first meeting on 19 December in London to coincide with a visit here by the Australian Defence Minister, Dr Brendan Nelson. A VTC connection may suit some colleagues. It is, of course, up to you to involve State Department counterparts as you wish but I hope to keep these meetings small and focussed. A Minister plus no more than two officials would be ideal. A draft agenda is attached.

Subject to any quick views from you, I propose to finalise the agenda and meeting details by mid December. I am copying this to Eric Edelman and am writing in similar terms to colleagues of the other five nations represented in RC(S).

  
DES BROWNE

**FC(South) Ministerial Meeting: 18 December 2006****DRAFT AGENDA**

- Definition of what success in the South looks like, and the milestones to achieving it, including the key challenges for 2007
  
- Afghanistan/ISAF issues of importance to the South:
  - o Afghan security force deployments;
  - o Approach to training and mentoring Afghan forces;
  - o Place of eradication in the Counter Narcotics campaign;
  - o Local agreements and the Taliban dimension.

~~FOUO~~  
SENSITIVE Attachment

DEC 07 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: **MoD UK Letter**

Afghanistan

I received the attached letter **from** Des Browne. I believe there could be value in the group he describes, but **we** should defer action until **Dr. Gates** is on board.

Please draft a short note **from** me to **MoD Browne** outlining that position. Recommend **you** get with Dr. Gates early in his tenure to discuss it with **him**.

Thanks.

Attach.12/5/06 UK MoD Browne Ltr to SD

DHR:dh  
SF120606-11

.....  
*Please Respond By December 11, 2006*

12/06/06

~~FOUO~~  
SENSITIVE Attachment



12/12/2006 11:36:27 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/60995

<b>BRITISH DEFENCE STAFF (WASHINGTON)</b>	
British Embassy 3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington DC 20008-3688 (b)(6)	
E-mail: <a href="mailto:Jacqueline.Clarke@moduk.org">Jacqueline.Clarke@moduk.org</a>	
<b>REF:</b>	<b>DATE:</b> 6 December 2006
<b>TO:</b>	Def Sec
<b>FAX:</b>	(b)(6)
<b>FROM:</b>	Jacqueline Clarke PA/Defence Attaché
<b><u>YOU SHOULD RECEIVE 4 PAGES IN TOTAL</u></b>	

Please see attached letter from The Rt Hon Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence.

SECRET CABLE DISTRIBUTION				
SP/DEF	DEF SEC	IS/ASS	DEF SEC	USDP
001	100	100	100	100



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
FLOOR 6, ZONE D, MAIN BUILDING  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HBTelephone 020 721 6000  
Fax: 020 721 67140  
E-mail: defencesecretary@mod.uk

MSU 4/6/3K

5 December 2006

*Dear Don,*

I write to follow up the meeting about Afghanistan held in the margins of the NATO Summit in Riga on 29 November. Eric Edelman represented the US and will be able to report in more detail on the meeting itself. My proposition is that we should establish a pol-mil Ministerial group to generate a political framework for success. Our focus should be on the South of Afghanistan, in which our troops are engaged under RC(S) in ISAF. This grouping should not be confused with the much broader idea of an International Contact Group.

We need to give better political shape to the military mission. By this I mean that we should describe more fully the end state we seek and the role security and other activities can play in achieving it. This should give us measures of success and provide us with a clearer understanding of the route we expect to travel to make progress incrementally. We need this, not just to establish firm political direction for our military endeavours, but also to enable us to communicate to our audiences at home and inside Afghanistan.

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The Hon Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America

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\*\*\*  
A draft agenda is attached.

Subject to *any* quick views from you, I propose to finalise the agenda and meeting details by mid December. I am copying this to Eric Edelman and am writing in similar terms to colleagues of the other five nations represented in RC(S).

  
DES BROWNE

**RC(South) Ministerial Meeting: 19 December 2006****D.R. MAGENDA**

- **Definition of what success in the South looks like, and the milestones to achieving it, including *the key challenges for 2007***
  
- **Afghanistan/ISAF issues of importance to the South:**
  - **Afghan security force deployments;**
  - **Approach to training and mentoring Afghan forces;**
  - **Place of eradication in the Counter Narcotics *campaign*;**
  - **Local agreements and the Taliban dimension.**



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DEC 13 2006

Afghanistan

The Right Honorable Desmond Browne MP  
Secretary of State for Defence  
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB  
United Kingdom

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of 5 December concerning the establishment of a Ministerial group to discuss the political framework for success in ISAF. This initiative is commendable.

I will pass your proposal to Dr. Gates and leave the decision on how we participate in the conference to him.

13 Dec 06

Sincerely,

7 Dec 06



11-L-0559/OSD/61000



OSD 19092-06

12/13/2006 06:50 PM



UNCLAS  
ROUTINE

FROM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
TO: USDAO LONDON  
ODC LONDON  
INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
USEUCOM STUTTGARTGE//EJ5//  
USEUCOM STUTTGARTGE//EJ4//  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS//  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//FILE/USDP ISA/USDP EUR POL//

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER TO UK SECRETARY DESMOND BROWNE

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING CORRESPONDENCE TO SECRETARY  
BROWNE. ORIGINAL LETTER MAILED AIR MAIL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

THE RIGHT HONORABLE DESMOND BROWNE MP  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE  
UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING  
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2HB  
UNITED KINGDOM

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 5 DECEMBER CONCERNING THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF A MINISTERIAL GROUP TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL  
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(PARA) I WILL PASS YOUR PROPOSAL TO DR. GATES AND LEAVE THE  
DECISION ON HOW WE PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE TO HIM.

SINCERELY,  
//DONALD H. RUMSFELD//

(END TEXT)

11-L-0559/OSD/61001



12/13/2006 6:06:51 PM

**FOUO**

October 23, 2006

**TO:** Jim Haynes  
**cc:** Gordon England  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld

**SUBJECT:** DoD Involvement with Duke Cunningham

Please **take a look** at the attached report on the Duke Cunningham inquiry. In the Executive **Summary**, where I have checked, it suggests that some DoD employees may have been provided some benefits by these people who pled guilty.

Do you have **an** investigation underway **to** make sure we know if anyone has done anything wrong, who they are, and what is being done about it, **so they can be** properly dealt with?

**Thanks.**

Attach. "Report of the **Special** Counsel for the Cunningham Inquiry"

DHR:db  
SF102306-03

.....  
*Please Respond By November 16, 2006*

0005

230606

15-06-06

**FOUO**

OSD 19289-06



12/15/2006 9:16:44 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/61002

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Military Assistant

19 December 2006 - 1825 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HAYNES, GENERAL COUNSEL

**SUBJECT** DoD Involvement with Duke Cunningham

Sir:

The Deputy Secretary provides the following memo back to you with his note:

" Jim - Thanks! Gordon "

Very respectfully,



Russell L. Mack  
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:  
OSD 19289-06

SUSPENSE: No Resuonse Required

0005

19 Dec 06

15 Dec 06

UNCLASSIFIED  
11-L-0559/OSD/61003



OSD 19289-06

12/20/2006 4 49 20 PM

2/15  
1200



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SF ~~...~~

INFO MEMO

DEC 15 2006

SIRI  
FYI  
V/R  
RUSS

RR → FOR  
obert Rangel

FOR <sup>Security</sup> SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: DoD Involvement with Duke Cunningham

- This is in response to your question whether I have an investigation underway to determine if anyone has done anything wrong, who they are, and what **is being** done about it in relationship to the Duke Cunningham convictions for bribery.
- There is an on-going criminal investigation of incidents surrounding the activities of then Representative Duke Cunningham. The investigation is under the auspices of the Department of Justice and includes the US Attorneys for the District of Columbia, Eastern District of **Virginia**, and Southern District of California. The investigation is conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).
- The Department **has** fully cooperated with DoJ, FBI, and DCIS. It **has turned over** documents, including emails, and preserved potential evidence at the request of DoJ.
- I was recently briefed by the head of the Crimnal Division at the department of Justice, and have asked to be briefed by our Inspector General. While the Department must be careful not to disrupt the continuing investigation, we may be able to take interim steps to address systemic flaws.

*Jim  
Stankis*

SD CA		DSD SA	
SD SMA		DSD SMA	12/15/06
SD MA		DSD MA	
TSA	12/15	DSD CA	
STP DIR			
ES	Miz/AS, LHS		



OSD 19289-08

12/15/2006 9:14:50 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/61004

**FOUO**

October 23, 2006

TO Jim Haynes  
cc: Gordon Ewelund  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: DoD Involvement with Duke Cunningham

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Do you have an investigation underway to make sure we know if anyone has done anything wrong, who they are, and what is being done about it, so they can be properly dealt with?

Thanks.

Attach. "Report of the Special Counsel for the Cunningham Inquiry"

DHR:dh  
SF102306-03

.....  
*Please Respond By November 16, 2006*

**FOUO**



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

80  
if

INFO MEMO

DEC 15 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: DoD Involvement with Duke Cunningham

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15 Dec 06



11-L-0559/OSD/61006



OSD 19289-06

12/15/2006 9:14:58 AM

~~FOUO~~

October 23, 2006

TO: Jim Haynes  
cc: *Geason England*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: DoD Involvement with Duke Cunningham

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Thanks.

Attach. "Report of the Special Counsel for the Cunningham Inquiry"

DHR:dh  
SP102305-03

.....  
*Please Respond By November 16, 2006*

FOUO



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

DEC 15 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
 UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
 COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS  
 ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
 GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
 INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
 DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
 DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
 DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
 DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

33550

SUBJECT: Secretary of Defense Farewell Snowflake

The attached Secretary of Defense "Snowflake" is addressed to DoD personnel who work in the Pentagon or within your commands. Please distribute the Secretary's message of appreciation within your organization as you deem appropriate.

  
 William P. Marriott  
 Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
 As stated

15 Dec 06



11-L-0559/OSD/61008



OSD 19310-06


12/15/2006 1:12:40 PM



December 15, 2006

TO Pentagon Personnel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: "Snowflakes" - The Blizzard Is Over

**This** is my **final snowflake** - as Secretary of Defense.

Over the past six years, thousands of these memos have fallen -- sometimes in blizzards and flurries and sometimes in cold and lonely **isolation**.

Yet -- as **surprising** as **this** may seem to those who may have been buried in the deluge -- there are many people in the Department who have never received a snowflake. A few souls have even requested one.

**This** snowflake is especially for them.

Its message is, perhaps typically, to the point: **Thank** you!

The men and women of this Department have worked long hours to accomplish a multitude **of missions** and to keep the American people safe. **You** have played **important** roles during **times** of great consequence for our country. For that you have my respect and appreciation. **I** will treasure our time together.

**Oh**, and one **final note**. Somewhere there may be a few folks who hoped to **run out** the clock on their **outstanding** snowflakes. Well, I want you to know -- **You** have **not been** forgotten!

Nonetheless, in the spirit of the **season**, as my last official act as Secretary of Defense, I hereby **grant** a general amnesty for any **outstanding snowflakes**.


The blizzard is over! **Thank** you all for all you do for **our wonderful** country. Well done!

-----  
*Please respond by* not applicable



~~FOUO~~

December 15, 2006

TO: Pentagon Personnel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: "Snowflakes" - The Blizzard Is Over

33550

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15 Dec 06

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15 Dec 06

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*Please respond by not applicable*

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/61010



12/15/2006 1 12 45 PM

~~FOUO~~

NOV 22 2005

TO: Paul McHale  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
Gen Lance Smith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned on KATRINA

I've had a chance to go through the package you sent me on KATRINA Lessons Learned, which looks good. When will we see the final report?

Also, beginning in mid-December, I'd like to see a monthly update on our work to incorporate the lessons learned and be prepared for the next big natural disaster.

Please work with Joint Staff and JFCCOM to provide me a good sense of the progress.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
112105-01

.....  
*Please Respond By December 15, 2005*

*020.92*

*22 Nov 05*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61011

OSD 22855-05



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600  
MEMORANDUM

HOMDEFEND

11:18  
ADepSecDef/  
USD(P) *PK*  
JAN 03 2006  
1-051015443  
ES-4742  
*P.F. Verga*  
Peter F. Verga  
Principal Deputy

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: <sup>f</sup> Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned on KATRINA

- This is in response to your inquiry of November 21, 2005.
- General Lance Smith, Admiral Tim Keating, and I are scheduled to present you an update on January 5, 2006.

COORDINATION: Ms. Mainardi

Prepared by: Mr. Salesses, OASD(HD) (b)(6)

cc: Chairman, Joint Staffs of Staff

~~FOUO~~

November 21, 2005  
I-05/015443  
ES-4742

TO: Paul McHale  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
Gen Lance Smith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned on KATRINA

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Please work with Joint Staff and JFCOM to provide **me** a good sense of the progress.

Thanks,

DHR ss  
12105-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/15/05*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 22855-05

11-L-0559/OSD/61013

11-11-05 142 13

05/012827  
ES-4270

~~FOUO~~  
ZEL  
: 25

September 22, 2005

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: LT(jg) Jimmy Deane

Here is a letter from a good friend of mine, the widow of a friend of mine who was shot down by the Chinese in 1956.

Rich Haver is an expert on this subject. I don't know if you know him, but he is a good friend of ours and used to be here in the Pentagon until recently.

Since I am going to China, I think I would like to do something on this. Would you please get with Rich, and figure out what you think is the appropriate thing for me to do?

Thank you so much.

Attach.

9/20/05 Shaver ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
092205-2

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/06/05*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 23061-05

11-L-0559/OSD/61014

English Translation

China

**Air Force Headquarters,  
Chinese People's Liberation Army (Report)**

(56)GSH-O. 4/1115	Classification	Confidential	
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Cc: Operations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(Copies Printed: 5)

Comments:

**Report on the Air Battle and Shooting-Down of an American Aircraft  
At Night, August 23**

This is a report on the air engagement at night on August 23, when Zhang Wenyi, Navigation Director, 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Division, PLAAF, shot down a US Navy patrol aircraft.

**First, background:** At 23:17 on 22, one US Navy P4M-I patrol bomber was found at 32° 30' N and 121° 58' E (145 km northeast of Shanghai). Altitude: 1500-2000. Speed: 300-350. Course: 140" , north to south. At 23:54:10, it was at 31" 20' N and 122" 30' E (100 km east of Shanghai), intruding into the Chinese marginal sea. It then changed the course to 200" , and intruded straight into the Chinese airspace over Ding-hai and Zhou-shan Archipelago. By 00:13:30 on 23, it had been well into the Chinese airspace at 30" 37' N and 122" 15' E, or over Xia-chuan-shan Island. Afterwards, it changed its course to 145" and flew towards the Southeast.

19 Jul 06

20 Sep 05

23061-05  
|||

**Second, the course of the engagement:** At 23:59 on 22, a Mig-17 (the pilot being Zhang Wenyi, Navigation Director ~~of~~ the Regiment) of the 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> ~~Air~~ Division in Shanghai was directed to ~~take off~~ to intercept the enemy aircraft. Course: 120° . Altitude: 1500. Speed 750. At 00:17:02 on 23, guided by Radar II -20, the Mig-17 found the enemy aircraft in the airspace near Qu-shan. The Mig-17 launched its first attack 500-600m away from the enemy aircraft at 00:17:09. The second attack happened at 00:17:52, when the enemy aircraft began to ~~fire~~ back. A third attack was launched thereafter. It was ~~then~~ found the enemy aircraft was on ~~fire~~. The Mig-17 continued to watch the enemy aircraft till 00:20:22, when the later plunged into the sea 15 km southeast of Qu-shan. It ~~was~~ by then the Mig-17 returned to the base.

Third, the East China ~~Sea~~ Fleet sent patrol boats to search for ~~the~~ ~~airman~~ bailing out of the enemy aircraft after the battle, yet nothing is found so far.

The above is the primary information gathered. The reports on the details and the experience gained will be submitted separately.

Fourth, attached is a drafted news bulletin on this battle, for your examination and revision. As for whether it should be released, it ~~is~~ up to ~~the~~ decision of the General ~~Staff~~ Headquarters.

Air Force Headquarters  
(Official Seal)

14:00, Aug. 23, 1956

Print Number: 1034



保密室收字  
412059號  
1956.9.22

總參謀部  
1956.9.22

持急

# 中國人民解放軍空軍司令部 (報告)

月信

(56) 參作 字第 4/1115 號 秘密等級 秘密

主送: 總參謀部、電委

抄送: 作戰部、機要部

(打印5份)

批办:

## 八月廿三日夜击落美机战斗情况报告

茲將八月廿三日空軍第二師六團偵航主任張文遠夜間击落美海軍巡邏飞机的战斗情况报告如下:

一、情况: 22日23時17分在东經121度58分, 北緯32度30分(上海西北145公里)发现美海P4M-1海軍巡邏偵炸机一架, 高度1500-2000, 速度300-350, 航向140度, 由北向南飞行, 23時54分10秒在东經122度30分, 北緯1度20分(上海东100公里)进入我领海, 遂改航向300度直向我定海、舟山羣島上空入侵, 于23日零時13分30秒降至东經122度15分, 北緯30度37分我下川山島上空, 后改航向145度向东南飞行。

二、战斗经过: 22日23時50分我上海空二師六團奉命起飛

OSD 23061-05



7/19/2006 2:39:24 PM

格十七〇一架（飞行目的係攻击任南文通），航向120度，高度1500，速度750出航时间，23日零时17分02秒，在J-20雷达引导下于嵩山附近上空发现敌机，于零时17分00秒在距我500—600公尺时转入第一次攻击，零时17分52秒进行第二次攻击，并发现敌机游动，后又进行第三次攻击，见敌机起火并见敌机坠至零时20分22秒时落于嵩山东南15公里地面后才返航。

三、战斗后我海空队曾派出巡逻队搜索敌机残骸人员，迄今未得结果。以上系初步了解的情况，详情及主要动向待后上报。

四、另附此次战斗的公报初稿一份，请查核正，至于是否发表，请总参核示。

此 报 告



打印号：1034

(b)(6)

DATE  
PAGE  
7:25

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
U.S. Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
c/d (b)(6)

Dear Rummy:

It **has** been a year since I last wrote you about my search into what happened to **Jim** after his Navy plane was shot down off the coast of China on Aug. 22, 1956. I hope **you** know how very grateful I **am** for all of you've done over the years in helping me **try** to find the answers.

I **am** writing again because I understand you will be making your **first** official visit to China in October. I have been told by numerous China experts that the **only** people **who** would have access to, and control over, **this information** is the PLA. I **realize** the Pentagon's Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel **Office** and State Department have made inquiries about **Jim's case** in the past. However, I believe your **trip** provides a unique and crucial opportunity to get the **answers** once and for all from **China's top** military officials.

I **turned 73** this summer and want nothing **more** than to finally close **this painful** chapter in my life. I believe you are one of the few people who can help me do **that I am** hoping you personally will **inquire** about Jim as an **MLA** case during your discussions with the Chinese.

As you will recall, I have **obtained six** declassified U.S. intelligence reports from 1956 and 1957 reporting that Lt. j.g. James Brayton Deane Jr. and another crew **member** survived the shoot-down and **were taken** prisoner by the **Chinese**. I appreciate the fact that, so far, there **has been no** definitive proof whether these reports were true or fabricated. However, I have **been** told by numerous **U.S.** intelligence analysts that the reports appear to be credible. Moreover, the former head of Chinese **air** defense in 1956 confirmed there **were** two survivors of that plane taken prisoner.

I don't believe the **U.S.** has made a concerted effort at the highest **military** levels, such as yours, to find **out what** the PLA knows about the incident. I hope you **will** ask your Chinese military counterparts to release all reports on the incident and any survivors. I have **been assured** by numerous China experts in the **U.S.** that the PLA would still have these records in their **military** and party archives. Even if they will not release any records of **survivors**, the Chinese could, at the very least, provide whatever historical information they surely do have on **the** incident itself.

As you **might** know from your press office, my daughter, Katherine Shaver, **is a** Washington Post reporter and is writing a **story** for the Post's **magazine** about my

OSD 23061-05

11-L-0559/OSD/61019

research into Jim's disappearance. I believe she has requested an interview with you through Larry Di Rita via Col. Joseph Richard. However, please know that I am making this request only on my own behalf as an old friend seeking a personal favor. I fully appreciate the fact that you will have more pressing matters to discuss with the Chinese during your visit. However, I hope you will bring up Jim's case as a purely humanitarian issue — a 49-year-old case from a different era that the Chinese could use to demonstrate their openness and cooperation with the United States.

In the past you have cautioned me that I might never learn Jim's fate. I could come to peace with that if I knew that I had done everything possible to try. I have come to realize that obtaining information from the PLA via the U.S. Secretary of Defense may be the best resolution I might ever get. After years of painful uncertainty, I would have to live with that.

I am enclosing a synopsis of Jim's case, his Navy photo and copies of the declassified intelligence reports as background.

Thank you, Rummy, as always. I wish you a safe and productive trip to China and hope to hear from you soon about whether seeking answers in Jim's case will be part of it. I wish I were getting in touch with you all these years about a happier matter.

Please give my best to Joyce and your family.

Sincerely,



Beverly Deane Shaver, M.D.

(b)(6)

## SYNOPSIS

### P4M Shootdown Incident of August 22/23, 1956

Lt jg. James Brayton Deane, Jr., USN (#536882/1310) was the co-pilot of a P4M Martin Mercator electronic countermeasure plane shot down off the coast of Shanghai August 22 (23 Far East time), 1956. The plane was deployed from VQ-1 (ECMRON ONE) squadron based in Iwakuni, Japan, carried a crew of 16, and had a Navy bureau number of 124362.

While flying a course to the south, the plane reported at 00:19 August 23, 1956 local Far East time, an emergency message that it was "under attack by aircraft". Newspaper reports noted the shoot down involved one Mig 15 and two Mig 17s, and that "liferafts" were seen jettisoning from the tail of the plane as it flew off in a southeasterly direction.

On August 24, 1956 search and rescue by the US 7th fleet recovered debris from the plane and one body. A second body was found several days later. Subsequent investigation concluded that the plane had crashed into the sea in the vicinity of latitude 30-23 North, longitude 122-53 with great impact, but that the possibility could not be ruled out.

The People's Republic of China announced attacking over Huang tse Island a plane, presumed to be Chinese Nationalist, which had intruded over Ma-an Island. Both islands are part of the Choushan archipelago about 30 miles off the coast of Shanghai. The Chinese reported that the plane flew off in a southeasterly direction. A week or so later, the Chinese recovered two additional bodies, those of AT1 William F. Haskins and AT3 Jack A. Curtis, off the shore of Choushan Tao Island and returned them to the U.S. via the British Charge d'Affaires in Beijing. The remaining twelve crew members, including Lt. jg Deane, were held in a missing status for one year, and were presumed deceased August 31, 1957.

A Naval Court of Inquiry concluded that the plane was probably off course to the west due to a navigational error unavoidable because of weather conditions, topography of the local coast, and limitations on the plane's navigational capabilities imposed by the nature of the mission.

In 1992, the newly discovered and declassified files of Samuel Klaus, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, brought to light many documents concerning similar incidents during the Korean and Cold Wars. Among these documents were a series of intelligence reports indicating that

1. Three survivors of the P4M were picked up in the water by a Chinese patrol boat Number 4 of the Chang-tu Island detachment of the Choushan Islands garrison, and were taken to a local hospital at Cheng-hai. One died, one was severely injured, and the other slightly injured. The rescue occurred approximately 35 minutes after the shoot down. The remains of three other bodies recovered were cremated on Chang-tu Shan Island, and believed sent to Chen-hai.

2. Subsequently on September 15 (or 1<sup>st</sup>?), 1956 the two remaining survivors were admitted to Paoing (Baoding) Army Hospital's third ward (NR). Both were recovering. The one most severely injured was the taller of the two. Both had been questioned to a limited extent. Their presence at the hospital was a closely guarded secret, and the identities were not known. They were discharged November 26<sup>th</sup>, 1956 and transferred to Wen Ping, a small secret military prison in the Beijing area, where they were under surveillance of the Inspector General (Toku Satsucho).

3. The two prisoners were housed in the quarters of Tsai Mao, Chief of Public Information, Ministry of Social Welfare at WanPing prison, 40 kilometers south of Beijing. The taller one, described as the "crew leader" was identified by U.S. intelligence from the physical description (tall, not hairy, raised cheekbones, letter "J" on notebook, doesn't speak much, well-built, brown hair), as Lt jg Deane. The shorter one was identified as either A02 Warren Edgar Caron or AT2 Leonard Strykowski.

4. On April 10, 1957 Lt.jg Deane was moved to the quarters of Ch'eng Lung, Assistant Chief of the Public Security Department in Peking (Beijing). A military hearing was held in mid-April. Lt. jg Deane was reported in this last location as late as December 1957. The other prisoner remained at the quarters of Tsai Mao, and later was "employed" at the Sheng-Lung Corporation in Shanghai.

5. Although Klaus' file contain no later reports, his conversation memos as late as April 1958 indicate that he was still receiving reports of survivors of the P4M but had poor cooperation from the CIA and Office of Naval Intelligence.

.....

Lt. jg Deane's remarried widow, Dr. Beverly Deane Shaver, became aware of the P4M survivors in 1993, upon declassification of parts of the files of Samuel Klaus cited above. Numerous Freedom of Information Act requests were filed at many USG agencies seeking further information on the fate of Lt. jg Deane. One of the few documents released was a copy of the entire report of the Board of Inquiry conducted by the Navy in September, 1956. Despite the report including the early intelligence reports of survivors, the Board determined that all 16 members of the plane had died in the crash. Information was also sought at several times and routes from the People's Republic of China directly. The answer was always that they know nothing of survivors and that the crew must have all died in the crash.

Dissatisfied with the efforts of the USG to provide any significant information, Dr. Shaver in April 1999 made a visit to the People's Republic of China. During an interview with the 1956 head of Chinese Air Defense through intermediaries, Dr. Shaver learned that

- a) the name of the PRC pilot who shot down the P4M was Zhang Wen-yi. He was highly decorated for the shoot down and later became Chief of Staff of the PRC Air Force., and is now retired in Guangzhou (telephone numbers available).
- h) The head of Chinese Air Defense during 1956 recalled with much detail the great celebration among the senior military because of the arrest of two of the plane's "pilots" or crewmen after the incident.. He does not, however, know the disposition of the two prisoners. The existence of the two survivors was highly classified, and known only to the top military echelon..

In April 2000, on a second visit to the PRC, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries informed Dr. Shaver that, according to the Foreign Ministry and the People's Liberation Army, all information on Lt. jg Deane was still "highly classified", "top secret", and involved the "national security of China". She was strongly advised her to give up her search. In addition, upon being reinterviewed, the 1956 head of Chinese Air Defense, after speaking with another military colleague by phone, decided that now he was "not sure about survivors".

INFORMATION MEMO

2005 NOV 25

DSD  
USD (P) *[Signature]* NOV 23 2005  
PDUSD *[Signature]* NOV 22 2005  
I-05/012827-ES  
ES-4278

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *[Signature]* NOV 27 2005

SUBJECT: LTJG Jimmy Deane

- You asked about the appropriate way to handle assisting the widow of LTJG Jimmy Deane (next under).
- On the margin of your China trip, DUSD Lawless and I met with the Director of the Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office, MG Zhang Bangdong, to discuss the POW-MIA archival research proposal and the Deane case.
- At that time, Zhang responded to your October 18 request to Dai Bingguo for more information on the Deane case. He said the Chinese had reviewed their records but had no new information.
  - We requested that the Chinese thoroughly research the issue and report any findings during the December policy dialogue (scheduled for Dec 8-9 in Beijing). Zhang agreed.
  - We have prepared a non-paper on the Deane case (total of 12 Americans) to give to the Chinese. The document does not provide any new information, maintains our assumption that the Chinese have not told us everything, and requests further information.
- DUSD Lawless recently spoke with Rich Haver who is in touch with Dr. Shaver (who is currently vacationing in India). Haver will recontact Dr. Shaver after we have passed him any Deane-related information we obtain during the December dialogue.

COORDINATION:

PDUSD(P):  
PDASD/ISA: *[Signature]* 11/15/05  
DASD/DPMO: A. Cronauer, 9 Nov 05  
DUSDIAP: *[Signature]*  
PD/AP: 4 Nov 05

Prepared by: LTC Brian Davis, OSD/ISA/AP (b)(6)

OSD 23061-05



WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF  
**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

China

20 Jul 06

20 Sep 05

11-L-0559/OSD/61024

23061-05  
==  
x



London Daily Telegraph  
July 20, 2006

## China Gives Rumsfeld Secret Papers On Friend's Mystery Death

By Francis Harris

When communist Chinese jets shot down an American surveillance aircraft 50 years ago, the Beijing government did not care that the co-pilot was a close friend of a young US naval officer called Donald Rumsfeld.

But now China cares so much that when it sent its most senior military officer to the United States for a visit this week, Gen Guo Boxiong handed over previously classified papers on the incident to Defence Secretary Rumsfeld.

An American official said the documents had yet to be translated, but appeared to contain the Chinese air force account of the shooting down of an American Mercator electronic surveillance aircraft in international airspace off Taiwan in August 1956.

The pilot, 24-year-old Lt James Deane, had trained with Mr Rumsfeld in Florida.

China has acknowledged that its MiGs shot down the plane, but has denied claims that it saved and then secretly held some survivors. The papers are thought to confirm the official Chinese account.

Only four bodies were ever found from the 16-man crew. Lt Deane's was not among them and there have been questions about what really happened that night.

Suspicious deepened in 1992 when a previously classified US intelligence report was discovered saying that two Americans, one of them matching the lieutenant's description, had been moved from a hospital to the house of a Chinese government official. The document's discovery fuelled a private campaign by Lt Deane's widow, Dr Beverly Deane Shaver, to discover what had happened to her husband of three months.

She travelled to China and was told that details of her husband's shooting down were considered "highly classified".

Mr Rumsfeld first raised the issue with China when he was chief of staff to President Gerald Ford, 32 years ago.

In response, Deng Xiaoping told Mr Ford that there was "no information" on what had happened to Lt Deane. Over the years, China repeatedly denied that the men had been taken alive.

Eventually, Mrs Shaver and Mr Rumsfeld went public. "I remember the sorrow of losing him," Mr Rumsfeld said at the time.

It is uncertain what effect Lt Deane's death had on Mr Rumsfeld's strategic thinking. The US has been extremely suspicious about China during Mr Rumsfeld's tenure.

He has questioned China's huge arms build-up and has initiated a substantial reinforcement of US forces

in the Pacific.

pls MAIL TO:

Dr. Beverly Deane Shaver, M.D.

(b)(6)



ESD → UCB. mail  
pls mail  
Thank you  
9/6  
7/20  
FROM SD  
OFFICIAL ~~CORRESPONDENCE~~  
7

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JUL 19 2006

China

Dr. Beverly Deane Shaver, M.D.

(b)(6)

Dear Beverly,

Yesterday I met with General GUO Boxiong, the senior military official from the People's Republic of China. He was my host when I visited China last October. At that time, I asked for any additional information they could find on Jim Deane, and he agreed to look into it.


In our meetings yesterday, he said he opened a new investigation after my visit, but he regrets they found no new clues. He personally checked the records and contacted Air Force headquarters. He was provided the enclosed material, which I understand is a replica of the original report and includes an English translation. You may have seen it before

He went on to say that if at any time members of Jim's family would like to visit China to pay their respects to him at some appropriate location, I could contact him and he would see that proper arrangements were made.

I hope things **are** going well for you. Seeing that photograph of the **two** of us waterskiing in Pensacola so many decades ago brought back good memories!

Joyce and I send our best wishes,

Sincerely,



Enclosure

OSD 23061-05



7/19/2006 2:29:11 PM

19 Jul 06

20 Sep 05

11-L-0559/OSD/61028



English Translation

China

**Air Force Headquarters,  
Chinese People's Liberation Army (Report)**

(56) GSH-O. 4/1115	Classification	Confidential	
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Cc: Operations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(Copies Printed: 5)

Comments:

**Report on the Air Battle and Shooting-Down of an American Aircraft  
At Night, August 23**

This is a report on the air engagement at night on August 23, when Zhang Wenyi, Navigation Director, 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> **Air** Division, PLAAF, shot down a US Navy patrol aircraft.

**First, background** At 23:17 on 22, one US Navy P4M-1 patrol bomber was found at 32° 30' N and 121° 58' E (145 km northeast of Shanghai). Altitude: 1500-2000. Speed: 300-350. Course: 140° , north to south. At 23:54:10, it was at 31° 20' N and 122° 30' E (100 km east of Shanghai), intruding into the Chinese marginal sea. It then changed the course to 200° , and intruded straight into the Chinese airspace over Ding-hai and Zhou-shan Archipelago. By 00:13:30 on 23, it had been well into the Chinese airspace at 30° 37' N and 122° 15' E, or over Xia-chuan-shan Island. Afterwards, it changed its course to 145° and flew towards the Southeast.

19 Jul 06

20 Sep 05

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11-L-0559/OSD/61029

2

Second, the course of the engagement: At 23:59 on 22, a Mig-17 (the pilot being Zhang Wenyi, Navigation Director of the Regiment) of the 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Division in Shanghai was directed to take off to intercept the enemy aircraft. Course: 120° . Altitude: 1500. Speed: 750. At 00:17:02 on 23, guided by Radar II -20, the Mig-17 found the enemy aircraft in the airspace near **Qu-shan**. The Mig-17 launched its first attack 500-600m away from the enemy aircraft at 00:17:09. The second attack happened at 00:17:52, when the enemy aircraft began to fire back. A third attack was launched thereafter. It was then found the enemy aircraft was on **fire**. The Mig-17 continued to watch the enemy aircraft till 00:20:22, when the later plunged into the sea 15km southeast of **Qu-shan**. It was by then the Mig-17 returned to the base.

**Third**, the East China Sea Fleet sent patrol boats to search for the airman bailing out of the enemy aircraft after the battle, yet nothing is found **so far**.

The above is the primary information gathered. *The* reports on the details and the experience gained will be submitted separately.

Fourth, attached is a drafted news bulletin on this battle, for your examination **and** revision. **As** for whether it should be released, it is up to the decision of the General **Staff** Headquarters.

Air Force Headquarters  
(Official Seal)

14:00, Aug. 23, 1956

Print Number: 1034

保密室收学  
1958.9.27

总参作战部  
1958.9.27

持家

# 中国人民解放军空军司令部 (报告)

后特

(56) 参作 字第 4/1115 号 机密等级 秘密

主送: 总参联部、空军

抄送: 作战部、外交部

(打印5份)

批办:

## 八月廿三日夜击落飞机战斗情况报告

兹将八月廿三日空军第二师六团副团长任文选夜间击落美海空巡逻飞机的战斗情况报告如下:

一、情况: 22日23时17分在东海121度58分, 北纬32度30分(上海东北145公里)发现美海空P4B-1型巡逻机一架, 高度1500-2000, 速度300-350, 航向140度。由北向南飞行, 23时54分10秒在东海122度30分, 北纬1度20分(上海东100公里)进入我领海, 速度航向200度南向我定海、舟山群岛上空入侵, 于23日零时13分30秒降至东海122度15分, 北纬30度37分我下川山岛上空, 后改航向145度向南飞行。

二、战斗经过: 22日23时59分我上海空二师六团副团长任文选

OSD 23061-05



7/19/2006 2:39:24 PM


第十七中一架(飞行员即领航主任李文德)、航向120度,高度1500,速度750出航约23日零时17分02秒,在H-20雷达引导下于西山附近上空发现敌机,于零时17分09秒在距我500—600公尺时进入第一次攻击,零时17分52秒进行第二次攻击,并发现敌机被击,后又进行第三次攻击,见敌机向大海方向逃窜于零时20分22秒结束于西山东南15公里处后才返航。

三、战斗后我海空部队曾派出巡逻队搜索敌机残骸人员,迄今未得结果。

以上是初步了解的情况,详情及主要经验待后上报。

四、另对本次战斗的公报初稿一并呈报请示,至于是否发表,请总参决定。

此 报 告



打印号: 1034





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 2 2005

Dr. Beverly Deane Shaver, M.D.

(b)(6)

Dear Beverly,

As you know, I am back from China. While there, I raised the issue of Jim's status with various Chinese officials. As in the past, they have offered no new information as yet.

In early December, we have a policy dialogue scheduled in Beijing, and I will have our people raise the issue again with the appropriate authorities. Rich Haver, with whom I know you've been in contact, will be in touch with you about any additional information after that session.

We wish you the best of the Holiday Season,

Sincerely,

CHINA

RD

20 Sep 05

OSD 23061-05

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1128  
1500

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NOV 21 2005  
(b)(6)  
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DEFENSE

INFORMATION MEMO

2005 NOV 21 10:24

DSD  
USD(P) *gpc* NOV 23 2005  
PDUSD NOV 22 2005  
I-057012827-ES  
ES-4278

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *WR* NOV 21 2005

SUBJECT: LTJG Jiminy Deane

- You asked about the appropriate way to handle assisting the widow of LTJG Jimmy Deane (next under).
- On the margin of your China trip, DUSD Lawless and I met with the Director of the Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office, MG Zhang Bangdong, to discuss the POW-MIA archival research proposal and the Deane case.
- At that time, Zhang responded to your October 18 request to Dai Bingguo for more information on the Deane case. He said the Chinese had reviewed their records but had no new information.
  - We requested that the Chinese thoroughly research the issue and report any findings during the December policy dialogue (scheduled for Dec 8-9 in Beijing). Zhang agreed.
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- DUSD Lawless recently spoke with Rich Haver who is in touch with Dr. Shaver (who is currently vacationing in India). Haver will recontact Dr. Shaver after we have passed him any Deane-related information we obtain during the December dialogue.

COORDINATION:

PDUSD(P):  
PDASD/ISA: *MD* 11/15/05  
DASD/DPMO: A. Cronauer, 9 Nov 05  
DUSD/AP:  
PD/AP: 4 Nov 05 *seen*

*SPB 11/24*

MA SD	11/7	SMA DSD	
ISA SD	11/29	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	11/28	1250	4/30
ESR MA	11/28	1147	

Prepared by: LTC Brian Davis, OSD/ISA/AP (b)(6)

OSD 23061-05

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11-L-0559/OSD/61034

05/012827  
ES-4278

~~FOUO~~

2005 NOV 06 AM 10: 24

September 22, 2005

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: LT(jg) Jimmy Deane

Here is a letter from a good friend of mine, the widow of a friend of mine who was shot down by the Chinese in 1956.

Rich Haver is an expert on this subject. I don't know if you know him, but he is a good friend of ours and used to be here in the Pentagon until recently.

Since I am going to China, I think I would like to do something on this. Would you please get with Rich, and figure out what you think is the appropriate thing for me to do?

Thank you so much.

Attach.

9/20/05 Shaver ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
092205-21

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/06/05*

(b)(6)

*Sin,  
Response attached.*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61035

OSD 23061-05

(b)(6)

2005 SEP 20 AM 10:25

September 20, 2005

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
U.S. Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
c/o Ms. Nancy Pardo

Dear Rummy:

It has been a year since I last wrote you about my search into what happened to Jim after his Navy plane was shot down off the coast of China on Aug. 22, 1956. I hope you know how very grateful I am for all of you've done over the years in helping me try to find the answers.

I am writing again because I understand you will be making your first official visit to China in October. I have been told by numerous China experts that the only people who would have access to, and control over, this information is the PLA. I realize the Pentagon's Defense prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office and State Department have made inquiries about Jim's case in the past. However, I believe your trip provides a unique and crucial opportunity to get the answers once and for all from China's top military officials.

I turned 73 this summer and want nothing more than to finally close this painful chapter in my life. I believe you are one of the few people who can help me do that. I am hoping you personally will inquire about Jim as an MIA case during your discussions with the Chinese.

As you will recall, I have obtained six declassified U.S. intelligence reports from 1956 and 1957 reporting that Lt. j.g. James Brayton Deane Jr. and another crew member survived the shoot-down and were taken prisoner by the Chinese. I appreciate the fact that, so far, there has been no definitive proof whether these reports were true or fabricated. However, I have been told by numerous U.S. intelligence analysts that the reports appear to be credible. Moreover, the former head of Chinese air defense in 1956 confirmed there were two survivors of that plane taken prisoner.

I don't believe the U.S. has made a concerted effort at the highest military levels, such as yours, to find out what the PLA knows about the incident. I hope you will ask your Chinese military counterparts to release all reports on the incident and any survivors. I have been assured by numerous China experts in the U.S. that the PLA would still have these records in their military and party archives. Even if they will not release any records of survivors, the Chinese could, at the very least, provide whatever historical information they surely do have on the incident itself.

As you might know from your press office, my daughter, Katherine Shaver, is a Washington Post reporter and is writing a story for the Post's magazine about my

OSD 23061-05

11-L-0559/OSD/61036

research into Jim's disappearance. I believe she has requested an interview with you through Larry Di Rita via Col. Joseph Richard. However, please know that I am making this request only on my own behalf as an old friend seeking a personal favor. I fully appreciate the fact that you will have more pressing matters to discuss with the Chinese during your Visit. However, I hope you will bring up Jim's case as a purely humanitarian issue — a 49-year-old case from a different era that the Chinese could use to demonstrate their openness and cooperation with the United States.

In the past you have cautioned me that I might never learn Jim's fate. I could come to peace with that if I knew that I had done everything possible to try. I have come to realize that obtaining information from the PLA via the U.S. secretary of Defense may be the best resolution I might ever get. After years of painful uncertainty, I would have to live with that.

I am enclosing a synopsis of Jim's case, his Navy photo and copies of the declassified intelligence reports as background.

Thank you, Rummy, as always. I wish you a safe and productive trip to China and hope to hear from you soon about whether seeking answers in Jim's case will be part of it. I wish I were getting in touch with you all these years about a happier matter.

Please give my best to Joyce and your family.

Sincerely,



Beverly Deane Shaver, M.D.

(b)(6)

## SYNOPSIS

### P4M Shootdown Incident of August 22/23, 1956

Lt jg. James Brayton Deane, Jr., USN (#536882/13 10) was the co-pilot of a P4M Martin Mercator electronic countermeasure plane shot down off the coast of Shanghai August 22 (23 Far East time), 1956. The plane was deployed from VQ-1 (ECMRON ONE) squadron based in Iwakuni, Japan, carried a crew of 16, and had a Navy ~~bureau~~ number of 124362.

While flying a course to the south, the plane reported at 0019 August 23, 1956 local Far East time, an emergency message that it was "under attack by aircraft". Newspaper reports noted the shoot down involved one Mig 15 and two Mig 17s, and that "life rafts" were seen jettisoning from the tail of the plane as it flew off in a southeasterly direction.

On August 24, 1956 search and rescue by the US 7th fleet recovered debris from the plane and one body. A second body was found several days later. Subsequent investigation concluded that the plane had crashed into the sea in the vicinity of latitude 30-23 North, longitude 122-53 with great impact, but that the possibility could not be ruled out.

The People's Republic of China announced attacking over Huang (se) Island a plane, presumed to be Chinese Nationalist, which had intruded over Ma-an Island. Both islands are part of the Choushan archipelago about 30 miles off the coast of Shanghai. The Chinese reported that the plane flew off in a southeasterly direction. A week or so later, the Chinese recovered two additional bodies, those of AT1 William F. Haskins and AT3 Jack A. Curtis, off the shore of Choushan Tao Island and returned them to the U.S. via the British Charge d'Affaires in Beijing. The remaining twelve crew members, including Lt. jg Deane, were held in a missing status for one year, and were presumed deceased August 31, 1957.

A Naval Court of Inquiry concluded that the plane was probably off course to the west due to a navigational error unavoidable because of weather conditions, topography of the local coast, and limitations on the plane's navigational capabilities imposed by the nature of the mission.

In 1992, the newly discovered and declassified files of Samuel Klaus, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, brought to light many documents concerning similar incidents during the Korean and Cold Wars. Among these documents were a series of intelligence reports indicating that

1. Three survivors of the P4M were picked up in the water by a Chinese patrol boat Number 4 of the Chang-tu Island detachment of the Choushan Islands garrison, and were taken to a local hospital at Cheng-hai. One died, one was severely injured, and the other slightly injured. The rescue occurred approximately 35 minutes after the shoot down. The remains of three other bodies recovered were cremated on Chang-tu Shan Island, and believed sent to Chen-hai.

2. Subsequently on September 15 (or 1<sup>st</sup>), 1956 the two remaining survivors were admitted to Paoting (Baoding) Army Hospital's third ward (NR). Both were recovering. The one most severely injured was the taller of the two. Both had been questioned to a limited extent. Their presence at the hospital was a closely guarded secret, and the identities were not known. They were discharged November 26<sup>th</sup>, 1956 and transferred to Wan Ping, a small secret military prison in the Beijing area, where they were under surveillance of the Inspector General (Toku Satsucho).

3. The two prisoners were housed in the quarters of Tsai Mao, Chief of Public Information, Ministry of Social Welfare at WanPing prison, 40 kilometers south of Beijing. The taller one, described as the "crew leader" was identified by U.S. intelligence from the physical description (tall, not hairy, raised cheekbones, letter "J" on notebook, doesn't speak much, well-built, brown hair), as Lt. jg Deane. The shorter one was identified as either A02 Warren Edgar Caron or AT2 Leonard Strykowski.

4. On April 10, 1957 Lt.jg Deane was moved to the quarters of Ch'eng Lung, Assistant Chief of the Public Security Department in Peking (Beijing). A military hearing was held in April. Lt. jg Deane was reported in this last location as late as December 1957. The other prisoner remained at the quarters of Tsai Mao, and later was "employed" at the Sheng-Lung Corporation in Shanghai.

5. Although Klaus' file contain no later reports his conversation memos as late as April 1958 indicate that he was still receiving reports of survivors of the P4M but had poor cooperation from the CIA and Office of Naval Intelligence.

.....  
Lt. jg Deane's remarried Widow, Dr. Beverly Deane Shaver, became aware of the P4M survivors in 1993, upon declassification of parts of the files of Samuel Klaus cited above. Numerous Freedom of Information Act requests were filed at many USG agencies seeking further information on the fate of Lt. jg Deane. One of the few documents released was a copy of the entire report of the Board of Inquiry conducted by the Navy in September, 1956. Despite the report including the early intelligence reports of survivors, the Board determined that all 16 members of the plane had died in the crash. Information was also sought at several times and routes from the People's Republic of China directly. The answer was always that they knew nothing of survivors and that the crew must have all died in the crash.

Dissatisfied with the efforts of the USG to provide any significant information, Dr. Shaver in April 1999 made a visit to the People's Republic of China. During an interview with the 1956 head of Chinese Air Defense through intermediaries, Dr. Shaver learned that:

- a) the name of the PRC pilot who shot down the P4M was Zhang Wen-yi. He was highly decorated for the shoot down and later became Chief of Staff of the PRC Air Force.. and is now retired in Guangzhou (telephone numbers available).
- b) The head of Chinese Air Defense during 1956 recalled with much detail the great celebration among the senior military because of the arrest of two of the plane's "pilots" or crewmen after the incident.. He does not, however, know the disposition of the two prisoners. The existence of the two survivors was highly classified, and known only to the top military echelon..

In April 2000, on a second visit to the PRC, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries informed Dr. Shaver that, according to the Foreign Ministry and the People's Liberation Army, all information on Lt. jg Deane was still "highly classified", "top secret", and involved the "national security of China". She was strongly advised her to give up her search. In addition, upon being reinterviewed, the 1956 head of Chinese Air Defense, after speaking with another military colleague by phone, decided that now he was "not sure about survivors".

29  
1930

~~FOUO~~

~~DEC 09 2005~~

TO: David Chu  
CC: Robert Rangel  
Larry DiRita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Margaret Robson and DACOWITS

Margaret Robson might agree to serve one more year, but not a full three year term. I think we ought to reappoint her, so add her to the list. Also, everyone I talk to thinks that Mutter has done a very good job, I wonder if we want to think about reappointing her for another period.

Do we have a deadline on finishing this?

Thanks .

DHR:ss  
120805M

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/19/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61040

*OSD 23915-05*



29  
1930

~~FOUO~~

~~DEC 09 2005~~

TO: David Chu  
CC: Robert Rangel  
Larry DiRita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Margaret Robson and DACOWITS

Margaret Robson might agree to serve one more year, but not a full three year term. I think we ought to reappoint her, so add her to the list. Also, everyone I talk to thinks that Mutter has done a very good job, I wonder if we want to think about reappointing her for another period.

Do we have a deadline on fishing this?

Thanks.

DHR:es  
120805-04

.....  
Please Respond By 12/19/06

334 DACOWITS

9 Dec 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61041

OSD 23915-05



UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. S. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE – Margaret Robson and DACOWITS

- You asked for information on completing the DACOWITS membership. (TAB A).
- You appointed seven members to the DACOWITS including Dr. Mary Nelson as Chairperson and reappointed Margaret Robson for an additional year. (TAB B).
- I met with Jim O'Beirne and agreed on a package of five nominees that if approved, would complete the Committee at twelve members. The nominees being vetted for your consideration are:
  - Kerry Lassus, Military Spouse and independent business women.
  - Roberta Santiago, Retired Army Reserve Command Sergeant Major.
  - Judith O'Flaherty, Former Naval officer with deployment experience.
  - Vera Mikula, Military Spouse and former member of the DoD Sexual Assault and Prevention Task Force.
  - Felipe Torres, Retired active duty Marine with combat, Inspector General, and Equal Opportunity experience.
- I agree that LtGen (Ret) Mutter did a good job as the DACOWITS Chairperson. Since Dr Nelson has been appointed as the current Chairperson, LtGen (Ret) Mutter is available for your consideration for another assignment.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: COL Rick Mustion, OUSD(P&R) (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/61042



OSD 23915-05

5/3/2006 7:02:59 AM

# TAB

# A

**FOUO**

December 08, 2005

TO: David Chu  
CC: Robert Rangel  
Larry DiRita  
Jim O'Beirne  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*  
SUBJECT: Margaret Robson and DACOWITS

Margaret Robson might agree to serve one more year, but not a full three year term. I think we ought to reappoint her, so add her to the list. **Also**, everyone I talk to thinks that Mutter has done a very good job, I wonder **if** we want to think about reappointing her for another period.

Do we have a deadline on finishing this?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
120805-04

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/19/06*

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/61044

*OSD 23915-05*

**TAB**

**B**



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

PERSONNEL SENSITIVE - RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

SPECIAL ASSISTANT

INFO MEMO

March 2, 2006; 1:00PM

FOR UNDER SECRETARY FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

FROM: Jim O'Beirne, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for White  
House Liaison (WHL) *902  
12/21/06*

SUBJECT: DACOWITS Membership

The following seven individuals, all previously approved by the Secretary, are cleared for immediate appointment to the DACOWITS:

1. Mary Nelson New Chairman [Holdover]
2. Lynda Davis Vice Chair [Holdover]
3. Margaret Hoffman Member [Holdover]
4. Margaret Robson Member [Holdover]
5. Denise Balzano Member [New member/resume attached]
6. Margaret White Member [New member/resume attached]
7. Diana Denman Member [New member/resume attached]

Appointees for the remaining vacant positions on the panel will be approved by the Secretary at the next scheduled civilian non-career personnel meeting.

PERSONNEL SENSITIVE - RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

1/20  
1/21  
1/20  
1315



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

(b)(6)

ACTION MEMO

7:16

January 18, 2006, 5:00 PM

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

COMPTROLLER  
**Robert Rangel**  
01/23

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Support for Regime Crimes Liaison Office - Request from the Attorney General

- You asked me to provide you a status of the funding request from Attorney General Gonzales for continued DoD financial support for the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), and what if anything DoD should be doing about it (Tab A).
- To date, DoD has provided financial support to the RCLO using resources (\$82 million) from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), which is managed by the Department of State.
- I have discussed this issue with Joe Bowab, my counterpart at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
  - He agreed that RCLO support is not a DoD funding responsibility.
  - He intends to work with the Department of State concerning the additional funding being sought by the Department of Justice for RCLO support.
- I have attached a proposed response to the Attorney General that advises him that OMB intends to address the RCLO funding issue with the appropriate parties to achieve a successful outcome (Tab B).

*TWJ*  
*18 Jan 6*

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary of Defense sign letter at Tab B.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Mary E. Tompkey (b)(6)

*SP3 1/20*

MA SD	<i>1/23</i>	SMA DSD	
<del>SA SD</del>	<i>1/20</i>	SA DSD	
EXFC SEC	<i>1/20</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>1/23 135</i>
ESR MA	<i>1/16</i>		

*16 Dec 05*

OSD 24195-05

11-L-0559/OSD/61047

~~FOUO~~

JAN 03 7:16

JAN 03 2006

TO: Tina Jones  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Funding for Regime Crimes Liaison Office

Please take a look at this letter from the Attorney General of the United States and tell me what the status is and what we ought to be doing, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/16/05 AG ltr to SD re: Iraq Special Tribunal

DHR-24  
122908-24 (TS).doc

.....  
*Please respond by January 26, 2006*

(b)(6)

*Sir,  
Response attached.*

*v/m,  
Lt Col Lenzel*

JAN 23 2006

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24195-05

11-L-0559/OSD/61048





Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

December 16, 2004

(b)(6)

12/16

The Honorable Donald R. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States Department of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

On May 13, 2004, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 37, which called for the United States to provide the necessary assistance to the Iraqi people to establish a fully functioning, independent Iraqi Special Tribunal, consistent with applicable law.

In accordance with NSPD 37, I appointed a Regional Crisis Liaison (RCL) to the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Through our operations of the Regional Crisis Liaison Office (RCL/O), the Department of Justice assists the Iraqi Government in its commitment to try Saddam Hussein and others accused of crimes against humanity. Our efforts range from evidence gathering to critical prosecutorial support. Also, as part of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the United States Marshals Service has assigned the Iraqi Judiciary with witness and courthouse security, which is necessary for bringing members of the former regime to trial.

I would like to thank you for your support the RCL/O and to outline your continued support. Over the past two years, the Department of State has provided \$24.4 million to the RCL/O and \$13.8 million to the Interim Justice Service, and the Department of Defense has provided \$61.5 million to the RCL/O. These funds, provided by Congress in the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund, have greatly contributed to our support of the Iraqi Special Tribunal and its efforts in creating the the members of the former Iraqi regime are tried for their crimes against the Iraqi people.

Unfortunately, I understand that current funding for the RCL/O will expire between June and September 2004, and I am unaware of plans for continued funding. As the vital of Saddam Hussein program, critical RCL/O and other Department of Justice support must not be disrupted. The Department urgently needs your continued financial support. I have made OASD Director Joshua Bohan aware of the funding situation, and given the importance of the issue and our support to the



A-11-2

OSD 24/195-05

12/16/2006 10:41 FAX

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Page 2

Iraq justice system, I wanted to be sure I have your support as your financial staff requests additional Iraq reconstruction funding.

Thank you for your help with this very important mission.

Sincerely,



Alberto R. Gonzales

cc: Joshua Bolton  
Director  
Office of Management and Budget

Condoleezza Rice  
Secretary of State  
United States Department of State

A-#3

**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)**

**COORDINATION SHEET**

SUBJECT: Support for Regime Crimes Liaison Office – Response to the Attorney General

USD(Policy)	Eric Edelman	January 9, 2006
General Counsel <b>GC Comment:</b>	W. J. Haynes No legal objection to proposed response, but I believe <del>that</del> DoD <u>could</u> justify such support also.	January 16, 2006
Office of Management and Budget	Joe Bowab Associate Director National Security and International Affairs Division	January 9, 2006

~~FOUO~~

JAN 03 2006 7:16

JAN 03 2006

*Iraq*

TO: Tina Jonas  
 CC: Eric Edelman  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Funding for Regime Crimes Liaison Office

Please take a look at this letter from the Attorney General of the United States and tell me what the status is and what we ought to be doing, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 12/16/05 AG ltr to SD re: Iraqi Special Tribunal

DRE:dh  
 122905-24 (TS).doc

.....  
 Please respond by January 26, 2006

*3 Jan 06*

~~FOUO~~

*16 Dec 05*

OSD 24195-05



Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D. C. 20530  
December 16, 2005

2005 DEC 16 11 03 AM '05

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States Department of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld

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In accordance with NSPD 37, I appointed a Regime Crimes Liaison (RCL) to the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Through our operation of the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), the Department of Justice assists the Iraqi Government in its commitment to try Saddam Hussein and others accused of crimes against humanity. Our efforts range from evidence gathering to critical prosecutorial support. Also, as part of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the United States Marshals Service has assisted the Iraqi judiciary with witness and courthouse security, which is necessary for bringing members of the former regime to trial.

I would like to thank you for your support the RCLO and to enlist your continued support. Over the past two years, the Department of State has provided \$24.4 million to the RCLO and \$35.0 million to the Marshals Service, and the Department of Defense has provided \$81.6 million to the RCLO. These funds, provided by Congress in the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund, have greatly contributed to our support of the Iraqi Special Tribunal and its efforts in ensuring that the members of the former Iraqi regime are tried for their crimes against the Iraqi people.

Unfortunately, I understand that current funding for the RCLO will expire between June and September 2006, and I am unaware of plans for continued funding. As the trial of Saddam Hussein progresses, critical RCLO and other Department of Justice support must not be disrupted. The Department urgently needs your continued financial support. I have made OMB Director Joshua Bolten aware of the funding situation, and given the seriousness of the issue and our support to the

OSD 24195-05

SECRET				
DISSEC	ISPLASRT	EXECSPEC	USDP	
USDI	ISD	CCD	CABLE CM	FILE

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Page 2

Iraqi justice system, I wanted to be sure I have your support as your financial staff requests additional Iraq reconstruction funding.

Thank you for your help with this very important mission.

Sincerely,

  
Alberto R. Gonzales  
Alberto R. Gonzales

cc: Joshua Bolten  
Director  
Office of Management and Budget

Condoleezza Rice  
Secretary of State  
United States Department of State



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JAN 24 2006

The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales  
Attorney General  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I am responding to your request for continued DoD financial support to the Regime Crimes Liaison Office.

We have discussed the issue of providing continued support for the Regime Crimes Liaison Office with the Office of Management and Budget. They do not believe that this is a Department of Defense funding issue. We understand that they intend to address the funding shortfall with the appropriate parties to achieve a successful outcome.

Sincerely,

*TRP*

*24 Jan 06*

*16 Dec 05*



OSD 24195-05



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300  
UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

December 20, 2005, 5:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response -- Inspector General Reports on "Ghost Detainees,"  
#093005-11 and # 100305-24 (Tabs A and B)

- Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) inquired about the status of reported CIA and DoD Inspector General investigations of "ghost detainee policy."
- Senator Reed's inquiry stems from the attached testimony of General Paul Kern, *et. al.*, on September 9, 2004 to the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on investigation into abuses at the Abu Ghraib theater internment facility. He states, "the Department of Defense Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General... have agreed that they will take on that task of investigating this *ghost detainee policy*." (Tab C)
- To date, the DoD Inspector General has not undertaken an investigation on this matter, and none is planned. DoD IG is conducting a review of the major detainee investigations, and the "ghostdetainee" issue is part of that review.
  - Regarding any CIA OIG investigations, the DoD OIG cannot attest to the work being done by the CIA OIG. Therefore, the Senator or his staff would need to pose any questions concerning CIA OIG completed, ongoing, and planned work to CIA.
- As stated in your memorandum of September 20, 2005, it is the policy of the Department of Defense to assign all detainees in its control an internment serial number as soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture. The Department maintains full accountability for all DoD detainees.
- My staff contacted Senator Reed's office on November 9, 2005 and provided this information to the Senator's Military Legislative Assistant.

COORDINATION: OGC, Detainee Affairs, DoD IG

Attachments:

Snowflake #093005-11 (TAB A)

Snowflake #100305-24 (TAB B)

SASC September 9, 2004, Question from Senator Reed (TAB C)

Prepared by: Christian P. Marrone, Special Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

OSD 24301-05


11-L-0559/OSD/61056



~~FOUO~~

A

2:05 PM '05  
OCT 04 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Answer to Senator Reed

I need to get an answer back to Senator Reed on the IG report that he asked about, which I don't remember.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100305-24

\*\*\*\*\*

*Please Respond By October 13, 2005*

~~FOUO~~


OSD 22270-05

11-L-0559/OSD/61057

~~FOUO~~

B

OCT 03 2005 11:05

TO: Dan Stanley  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Question from Senator Reed

Senator Reed asked about the CIA IG and the DoD IG with respect to ghost detainees. We need to get back to him (and me) as to when the inspection will be done.

Thanks

DHR:js  
0911105-11

.....

*Please Respond By 10/18/05*

**OSD 22269-05**

11-L-0559/OSD/61058

CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS  
Congressional Hearings  
Sept 29, 2005

C

## Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq

REED:

Well, first, General Myers, let me, too, compliment you on 40 years of honorable service to the nation in the uniform of our country. That's something we all can agree upon and something to be very proud of. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, last September General Curran (ph) came before the committee and a response to a question from Chairman Warner indicated that the inspector general of the Department of Defense and the inspector general of the CIA had taken upon the task, in his words, of investigating the ghost detainee policy.

Can you give us an update on those investigations, when they are to conclude and when we might get results?

RUMSFELD:

I have no information about the CIA investigation. I certainly can get you an answer as to when the I.G. and the department estimates that they'll complete it.

Federal News Service September 9, 2004 Thursday

you do not have to register them immediately. That is part of the Geneva Convention, is allowed. We also found many reports for which we cannot document for you because the documentation does not exist for people who were brought into the facilities and who were moved so that they could not be identified by the International Red Cross. This is in violation of our policy which requires us to register people so that it can be reported that they are being held in detention.

we have taken those actions and, as required by the instructions that we have given, and asked two organizations to do further investigations, the Department of Defense Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General, and both have agreed that they will take on that task of investigating this ghost detainee policy. The CIA has provided us a document that says their current policy is to abide by our regulations and policies if they bring a detainee to our facilities, but that policy was apparently, from what we can find, either not in effect or not known at the time that the violations that we believe happened are being reported, and that's what we're asking for further investigation to go into.

SEN. WARNER: What's the volume of cases?

GEN. KERN: I can't give you a precise volume, Chairman, because there is no documentation of the numbers. We believe, and I would ask General Fay to perhaps add to this, that the number is in the dozens to perhaps up to 100. I cannot give you a precise number.

GEN. FAY: This is accurate, sir. We were not able to get documentation from the Central Intelligence Agency to answer those types of questions, so we really don't know the volume, but I believe it's probably in the dozens.

SEN. WARNER: up to 100?

GEN. FAY: I doubt that it's that high, sir, but I think it's somewhere in the area of maybe two dozen or so, maybe more.

GEN. KERN: It's a very difficult question for us to answer, Mr. Chairman, because we don't have the documentation. What you see in our report is during the interviews of people reporting to us what happened without documentation.

That is a summary of what we found, and the causes of it, failures of leadership, failures of our own discipline when we expect people without leadership to do the right thing, failures to follow our own policy, doctrine and regulations which allowed these to take place, confusion because other policies which were designed for other theaters, Guantanamo, Afghanistan, found their way into documentation that we found in Abu Ghraib, which led to numerous iterations of how interrogations and the limits of authority were to be conducted. Those interrogations -- those policies were being debated while we were asking soldiers to conduct interrogations, and so they were seeking to find their limits of their authority at the same time, as reported, they were receiving pressure to produce intelligence. The purpose of interrogations clearly is to produce intelligence, and so that is a natural state of affairs. What was not occurring, though, was the leadership to stand in-between the interrogators and the sources of those who were trying to determine the intelligence to relieve the pressure on the interrogators. Again, a failure in the leadership and the chain of command to do the right thing.

We have found, and is reported in here, that it is not just enlisted soldiers, there are commissioned officers through the grade of colonel whom we believe are culpable, and through the grade of general officer whom we believe are responsible for these allegations, and for the actions that took place.

1 of 1 DOCUMENT

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Federal News Service

September 9, 2004 Thursday

SECTION: PRESS CONFERENCE OR SPEECH

LENGTH: 32797 words

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION OF THE 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON, IRAQ

CHAIRMAN: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIAL COMMAND; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTHONY R. JONES, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL R. STEVEN WHITCOMB, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY, DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO W. TAGUBA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, READINESS, TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION

LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

## BODY:

SEN. WARNER: (Sounds gavel.) Good morning, everyone. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the investigation of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, commonly referred to as the Fay-Jones Report. We welcome our witnesses, General Paul Kern, United States Army, appointing officer for the investigation; Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones, investigating officer; Major General George Fay, investigating officer; and Major General Anthony Taguba, investigating officer concerning the detainee abuse by members of the 800th Military Police Brigade at the prison; and Major General R. Steven Whitcomb, United States Army, special assistant to the commander of Central Command, representing the command responsible for acting on the majority of the recommendations that are flowing from their investigation and how they are being implemented.

General Fay was originally appointed as the investigating officer by General Sanchez, and was tasked with investigating allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib detention facility, and were the MI personnel, that's military intelligence personnel, comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable law and regulations. General Fay's investigation was subsequently augmented by the addition of Lieutenant General Jones as an investigating officer. General Jones was charged with focusing on whether organization or personnel higher than the 205th brigade chain of command or events and circumstances outside of

11-L-0559/OSD/61061

Federal News Service September 9, 2004 Thursday

GEN. KERN: We have that in our report, Senator. I don't have it at the tip of my fingers. We can provide that for the record.

SEN. WARNER: It's a mix?

GEN. KERN: It's a mix.

In addition, for non-military intelligence personnel, military police, an reported previously by Major General Taguba, there are seven who are previously charged. Those are the court cases which we see that are being followed today. In addition, we found three more. And we also found one more military police failure to report. We also found that there were medical personnel who failed to report abuses even though they clearly see what had happened. Next.

I'd like to summarize our findings in these points. First, there is no single cause. There are multiple causes of the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib. Second, as you pointed out, Senator, the primary cause of detainee abuse was individual misconduct. But also very disappointing to us is there was a failure of leadership, and a failure of discipline -- both hallmarks of our soldiers that we expect to be followed. In these cases, we found that there were failures in the entire chain-of-command, and in many cases a lack of a chain-of-command to oversee the operations that took place. What should have been reported by non-commissioned officers and officers was not,

Finally, and I really would like to emphasize this point, the vast majority of our soldiers are doing the right thing and are following the right standards. We're reporting to you on those that did not. We are taking action to ensure that those corrections are in place, and I will tell today that if you visited Abu Ghraib, if you visited with our soldiers, you would see a very, very different picture.

The 7,000 is now fewer than 2,400. The number of boards takes place on a regular basis to review the detainees and to ensure their release is appropriate. IA and IB now belong entirely to the Iraqi government. And so when a determination is made that a detainee is no longer to be held in U.S. custody, if they violated an Iraqi law, they are turned over to the Iraqi government for detention and further disposition in their court system.

And others are returned to their hometowns, but not just let out the front gate and said, "Go home." They make a strong effort today to go to the town, bring in the community, to talk to the religious leaders, the imams, to talk to the community leaders to ensure that they welcome these people back and know that they have been cleared, even if they had been brought into a U.S. detention facility. And so we are working both the quality of life for these people and the cultural issues as they are returned to their towns from which they were originally captured.

Finally, the soldiers there are being screened through a certification process to know that they clearly understand the rules of interrogation and detention. The medical personnel are providing medical care today in those facilities far better than most of those people have seen in their entire lives. So all of those previous problems, which were reported are greatly improved today. And I would report that it is also underway that we will close out this facility for U.S. operations in the future.

Finally, ghost detainees. This is perhaps one of the more troubling pieces of our investigation. We did find, in fact, that there were detainees brought into Abu Ghraib who were not registered in accordance with our regulations and policy. These personnel in some cases of eight that we could identify were done under an Article 143 exception, which says that for military security purposes



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

January 3, 2006, 3:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, 697- 6210

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response -- Inspector General Reports on "Ghost Detainees."  
#093005-11 and # 100305-24 (Tabs A and B)

- Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) inquired about the status of reported CIA and DoD Inspector General investigations of "ghost detainee policy."
- Senator Reed's inquiry stems from the attached testimony of General Paul Kern, *et. al.*, on September 9, 2004 to the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on investigation into abuses at the Abu Ghraib theater internment facility. He states, "the Department of Defense Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General...have agreed that they will take on that task of investigating this *ghost detainee policy*." (Tab C)
- To date, the DoD Inspector General has not undertaken an investigation on this matter, and none is planned. DoD IG is conducting a review of military department investigations of detainee abuse.
- Regarding any CIA OIG investigations," the DoD OIG cannot attest to the work being done by the CIA OIG. Therefore, the Senator or his staff would need to pose any questions concerning CIA OIG completed, ongoing, and planned work to CIA.
- As stated in your memorandum of September 20, 2005, it is the policy of the Department of Defense to assign all detainees in its control an internment serial number as soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture. The Department maintains full accountability for all DoD detainees.
- My staff contacted Senator Reed's office on November 9, 2005 and provided this information to the Senator's Military Legislative Assistant.

COORDINATION: OGC, Detainee Affairs, DoD IG (TAB D)

Attachments:

Snowflake #093005-11 (TAB A)

Snowflake #100305-24 (TAB B)

SASC September 9, 2004, Question from Senator Reed (TAB C)

Prepared by: Christian P. Marrone, Special Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

OSD 24301-05

11-L-0559/OSD/61063

A

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2005

TO: Dan Stanley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Answer to Senator Reed

I need to get an answer back to Senator Reed on the IG report that he asked about, which I don't remember.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100305-24

.....  
*Please Respond By October 13, 2005*

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/61064


OSD 22270-05



B

~~FOUO~~

OCT 03 2005 11:05

TO: Dan Stanley  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Question from Senator Reed

Senator Reed asked about the CIA IG and the DoD IG with respect to ghost detainees. We need to get back to him (and me) as to when the inspection will be done.

Thanks.

DHR:js  
093105-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 10/13/05*

C

CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS  
Congressional Hearings  
Sept 29, 2005

## Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Military Strategy and Operations in Iraq

REED:

Well, first, General Myers, let me, too, compliment you on 40 years of honorable service to the nation in the uniform of our country. That's something we all can agree upon and something to be very proud of. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, last September General Curran (ph) came before the committee and a response to a question from Chairman Warner indicated that the inspector general of the Department of Defense and the inspector general of the CIA had taken upon the task, in his words, of investigating the ghost detainee policy.

Can you give us an update on those investigations, when they are to conclude and when we might get results?

RUMSFELD:

I have no information about the CIA investigation. I certainly can get you an answer as to when the I.G. and the department estimates that they'll complete it.

Federal News Service September 9, 2004 Thursday

you do not have to register them immediately. That is part of the Geneva Convention, is allowed. We also found many reports for which we cannot document for you because the documentation does not exist for people who were brought into the facilities and who were moved so that they could not be identified by the International Red Cross. This is in violation of our policy which requires us to register people so that it can be reported that they are being held in detention.

we have taken those actions and, as required by the instructions that we have given, and asked two organizations to do further investigations, the Department of Defense Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General, and both have agreed that they will take on that task of investigating this ghost detainee policy. The CIA has provided us a document that says their current policy is to abide by our regulations and policies if they bring a detainee to our facilities, but that policy was apparently, from what we can find, either not in effect or not known at the time that the violations that we believe happened are being reported, and that's what we're asking for further investigation to go into.

SEN. WARNER: What's the volume of cases?

GEN. KERN: I can't give you a precise volume, Chairman, because there is no documentation of the numbers. We believe, and I would ask General Fay to perhaps add to this, that the number is in the dozens to perhaps up to 100. I cannot give you a precise number.

GEN. PAY: This is accurate, sir. We were not able to get documentation from the Central Intelligence Agency to answer those types of questions, so we really don't know the volume, but I believe it's probably in the dozens.

SEN. WARNER: Up to 100?

GEN. PAY: I doubt that it's that high, sir, but I think it's somewhere in the area of maybe two dozen or so, maybe more.

GEN. KERN: It's a very difficult question for us to answer, Mr. Chairman, because we don't have the documentation. What you see in our report is during the interviews of people reporting to us what happened without documentation.

That is a summary of what we found, and the causes of it, failures of leadership, failures of our own discipline when we expect people without leadership to do the right thing, failures to follow our own policy, doctrine and regulations which allowed these to take place, confusion because other policies which were designed for other theaters, Guantanamo, Afghanistan, found their way into documentation that we found in Abu Ghraib, which led to numerous iterations of how interrogations and the limits of authority were to be conducted. Those interrogations -- those policies were being debated while we were asking soldiers to conduct interrogations, and so they were seeking to find their limits of their authority at the same time, as reported, they were receiving pressure to produce intelligence. The purpose of interrogations clearly is to produce intelligence, and so that is a natural state of affairs. What was not occurring, though, was the leadership to stand in-between the interrogators and the sources of those who were trying to determine the intelligence to relieve the pressure on the interrogators. Again, a failure in the leadership and the chain of command to do the right thing.

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11-L-0559/OSD/61067

1 of 1 DOCUMENT

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Federal News Service

September 9, 2004 Thursday

SECTION: PRESS CONFERENCE OR SPEECH

LENGTH: 32191 words

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION OF THE 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE AT ABU GERAIB PRISON, IRAQ

CHAIRMAN: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTHONY R. JONES, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL R. STEVEN WHITCOMB, SPEC W ASSISTANT TO THE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY, DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND; MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, READINESS, TRAINING AND MOBILIZATION

LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:

SEN. WARNER: (Sounds gavel.) Good morning, everyone. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the investigation of the 209th Military Intelligence Brigade at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, commonly referred to as the Fay-Jones Report. We welcome our witnesses, General Paul Kern, United States Army, appointing officer for the investigation; Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones, investigating officer; Major General George Fay, investigating officer; and Major General Anthony Taguba, investigating officer concerning the detainee abuse by members of the 800th Military Police Brigade at the prison; and Major General R. Steven Whitcomb, United States Army, special assistant to the commander of Central Command, representing the command responsible for acting on the majority of the recommendations that are flowing from this investigation and how they are being implemented.

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11-L-0559/OSD/61068

Federal News Service September 9, 2004 Thursday

GEN. KERN: We have that in our report, Senator. I don't have it at the tip of my fingers. We can provide that for the record.

SEN. WARNER: It's a mix?

GEN. KERN: It's a mix.

In addition, for non-military intelligence personnel, military police, as reported previously by Major General Taguba, there are seven who are previously charged. Those are the court cases which we see that are being followed today. In addition, we found three more. And we also found one more military police failure to report. We also found that there were medical personnel who failed to report abuses even though they clearly see what had happened. Next.

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D

COORDINATION:

OGC: Dan Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy  
Detainee Affairs: Alan Liotta, Principal Deputy  
DoD IG: John Crane, Assistant IG

DATE

December 30, 2005  
January 3, 2006  
December 22, 2005

~~FOUO~~

December 15, 2005

TO: Mike Donley

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT Instructions for Submitting Papers to me

We need a directive **to go out** instructing ~~that~~, in the future, the coordination page **indicating** the people who have chopped on a package **contains**:

- a typed name
- a typed title
- the date that they've chopped **off**, and
- printed, legible notes (if any), **so I can** read them.

I have no idea **who** has coordinated on these papers that they are recommending I **act** on.

Please get something out -- FAST.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
121505-05

.....  
**Please Respond By 12/22/05**

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24444-05



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

13 JAN 2006 11:44

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD**

JAN 13 2006

SUBJECT: Correspondence Coordination

- o In your December 15, 2005 snowflake (TAB A), you directed that instructions be sent to the staff outlining correspondence coordination requirements for papers coming to you. You specifically cited the requirement for:
  - o atypedname
  - o a typed title
  - o the date that they've chopped off and
  - o printed, legible notes (if any), so you can read them
- On December 21, 2005, the Executive Secretary signed out a coordinated memo outlining the requirements detailed in the snowflake to the staff (TAB B).
- On January 11, 2006, I signed out a memorandum to the staff reinforcing your concerns and stressing the timeliness, accuracy and proper coordination of executive correspondence (TAB C).
- The Executive Services Directorate has suggested a number of initiatives to improve the correspondence coordination and control process that we intend to implement in the near future. We will continue to closely monitor the situation and work in concert with the Executive Secretary to improve the timeliness, accuracy and coordination issues expressed.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: James F. Deming, (b)(6)



**FOUO**

December 15, 2005

TO: Mike Donley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Instructions for Submitting Papers to me

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*Thanks.*

DHR.es  
121505-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/22/05*

**FOUO**

*OSD 24444-05*

11-L-0559/OSD/61073



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEC 21 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Coordinating Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and Deputy Secretary of  
Defense (DepSec) Action and Information Memoranda

Reference: DoD 5110.4-M, Manual for Written Material, March 2, 2004

There has been an inordinate number of Action and Information Memoranda forwarded for SecDef and DepSec decision or review that lack the appropriate level of coordination, fail to document coordination or to identify the coordinating official in accordance with current DoD policy (DoD 5110.4-M). In the future, please ensure your written products comply with the following key provisions for SecDef and DepSec packages:

- Concurrence or comments are required from the Heads of DoD Components or, in their absence, Principal Deputies.
- Coordination sheets must be typed, and include the name and position of each coordinating official, organization name and coordination date – “copy provided” is not considered a valid coordination.

Staff actions that do not comply with this guidance will be returned to the originating agency for compliance. Handwritten notes must be kept to a minimum per SecDef guidance. If required they should be printed and legible.

OSD 24397-05

11-L-0559/OSD/61074

You may direct any questions to the Washington Headquarters Services,  
Executive Services Directorate at (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'W. P. Marriott', with a stylized flourish at the end.

William P. Marriott  
Executive Secretary



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

JAN 11 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Action and Information Memoranda for the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and  
Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF)

Reference: Executive Secretary memo on Coordinating SECDEF and DEPSECDEF  
Memoranda, December 21, 2005

The SECDEF and DEPSECDEF rely upon each of us to provide them with documents for their decision or information that are timely **as well as** properly prepared and coordinated. Recently, per the reference, the Executive Secretary reiterated the format and proper coordination level for documents addressed to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF.

Delays in timely processing and delivery to these senior officials are caused whenever substantive deficiencies are detected and they must be returned to the submitting organization for correction.


The primary responsibility for ensuring that documents are prepared in compliance with SECDEF prescribed requirements of course is at the originating organization. The next and first level of external screening and quality control is at the Executive Services Directorate (ESD), which is the organization responsible for receiving, controlling and processing all documents addressed to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF before they are forwarded **through** the Executive Secretary.

The Director ESD currently is working a number of initiatives, both short and long term, that are designed to enhance and improve the processes and procedures for the improvement of quality control in SECDEF/DEPSECDEF correspondence. Information on these initiatives is forthcoming and will be provided to key members on your staff who are responsible for administrative matters.

OSD 00487-06

11-L-0059/OSD/61076

I appreciate your continued cooperation and support in this effort to provide the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF timely, accurate and properly coordinated staff products to improve the decision making process within the Department.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michael B. Donley". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping tail on the letter "y".

Michael B. Donley  
Director



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

775 7 201 11 05 11

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael B. Donley, Director, Administration and Management **MD** DEC 22

SUBJECT: Correspondence Coordination

- In your December 15, 2005 snowflake (TAB A), you directed that instructions be sent to the staff outlining correspondence coordination requirements for papers coming to you. You specifically cited the requirement for:
  - atypedname
  - atypedtitle
  - the date that they've chopped off and
  - printed, legible notes (if any), so you can read them
- These instructions/requirements are already prescribed in DoD Manual for Written Material (extracts at TAB B).
- In the attached memo, the Executive Secretary reiterated the standards already established (TAB C).
- We will more closely monitor the situation and work in concert with the Executive Secretary to enforce the standards outlined in the DoD Manual.

COORDINATION Note

Prepared By: James F. Deming, (b)(6)

OSD 24444-05

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
11-L-0359/OSD/81078

~~FOUO~~

December 15, 2005

TO: Mike Donley

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT Instructions for Submitting Papers to me

We need a directive to go out instructing ~~that~~, in the future, the coordination page indicating the people who have chopped on a package ~~contains~~:

- a typed name
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I have **no** idea who **has** coordinated on these papers that they **are** recommending I **act on**.

Please get something out -- **FAST**.

Thanks.

DHR:js  
121305-05

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/22/05*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 24444-05

11 L 0559/OSD/61070

C2.5.3.2. The responsible office shall furnish the ASD(PA) with information on which to base replies and updated information if circumstances change. When initiating a transfer, return original correspondence (if original was received) and proposed reply to the CCD along with SD Form 391 annotated with the name and telephone number of the ASD(PA) accepting official.

C2.5.4. **On** occasion, the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, their Military or Special Assistants, or the Executive Secretary may change an action assignment. In those instances, CCD shall forward a revised SD Correspondence Routing Slip formally notifying the responsible office that its requirement has changed.

## C2.6. COORDINATING ASSIGNED ACTIONS

C2.6.1. Coordinate with offices designated on the Secretary of Defense Correspondence Routing Slip and **any** office that **may** have an interest in or be affected by the outcome of the action.

C2.6.2. Obtain concurrence or comments from the Heads of the DoD Components or, in their absence, principal deputies.

C2.6.3. Coordinate with the DoD Components simultaneously to ensure responses are received **as quickly as possible**.

C2.6.4. Never allow disagreements about **your** recommendations or lack of response from a coordinating office to hold up a document. List "nonconcur" and place their comments at the coordination tab. Be sure to address their issues in a memorandum or attached supplement. Note on the coordination sheet when coordination was attempted, but not accomplished; include the amount of time allotted.

C2.6.5. If no coordination is required on **an** Action or Info Memo, state "none" on the coordination line. See Chapter 5 for details.

C2.6.6. Coordinate with the ASD(PA) on all correspondence:

C2.6.6.1. Containing information with public affairs implications.



C2.6.6.2. Involving requests for the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense to participate in public forums, such as speaking and media events, or events in DoD or military settings that may draw media coverage.

C2.6.7. Coordinate with the General Counsel, Department of Defense, on all correspondence having any legal implications or possible adverse reflection on the Department and all correspondence based on law.

C2.6.8. Coordinate with the ASD(LA) on all correspondence to Members of Congress.

C2.6.9. Coordinate with the Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for Protocol on all schedule proposals.

## C2.7. SUBMITTING MATERIALS TO THE SECRETARY OR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

C2.7.1. Use either an Action or Info Memo to forward materials to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. See Chapter 5 for details.

C2.7.2. Submit packages to CCD, Room 3A948, for control and forwarding through the Executive Secretary to either the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

C2.7.3. Correspondence requiring expeditious processing should be flagged with a red tag. ESCD staff shall ensure these materials receive priority processing and prompt delivery to the Executive Secretary.

C2.7.4. Extremely urgent communications requiring the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense attention within 2 hours should be flagged with a green tag and hand-carried to the Executive Secretary. See Table C2.T1., "Materials ESCD Does Not Process."

## C2.8. SUSPENSE REPORTING

ESCD publishes the "Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense Correspondence Report." This weekly report, distributed by e-mail on Fridays, consists of four sections. The first section provides a summary of overdue PRS/PRD and RDC/RD takings. Two additional sections provide detailed information about the PRS/PRD and RDC/RD overdue taskings. The final section provides a listing of all taskings that are

C5.4.1.2.6. Body. Adouble space belowthe subject line, type succinct bullet statements that tell the recipient what he or she needs to know about the subject and why it is okay to do what you are recommending. Double-space between bullets. Do not use the paragraph format for the standard memo. (See paragraph C4.1.5. for guidance on structuring bullet statements.)

C5.4.1.2.7. Recommendation. Adouble space below the bullet statements, type "RECOMMENDATION:" followed by a statement describing what you intend the recipient to do.

C5.4.1.2.7.1. If you are providing a letter for signature, the statement may read: "That Secretary of Defense sign letter at TAB A."

C5.4.1.2.7.2. If you do not provide adocument for signature, indicate what action the recipient should take, e.g., "RECOMMENDATION: That Secretary of Defense approve release of funds by initialing: Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_."

C5.4.1.2.8. Coordination. Adouble space below the recommendation, type "COORDINATION:" and specify the tab with the list of coordinating officials (always placed at the last tab in the package), or if appropriate, type "**NONE**."

C5.4.1.2.9. Signature Block. Do not include asignature block in an Action Memo.

C5.4.1.2.10. Attachments. List as in a standard memo.

C5.4.1.2.11. Classification Markings. Mark as in a standard memo.

C5.4.1.2.12. Prepared By Line. One inch from the bottom of the page and aligned with the left margin, type "Prepared by:" followed by the name and telephone number of the action officer who prepared the memo.

#### C5.4.2. Assembling an Action Memo Package

C5.4.2.1. Assemble packages with the Action Memo as the cover and/or forwarding document as follows:

C5.4.2.1.1. **TAB A** for the action item (e.g., for signature or approval).

C5.4.2.1.1.1. If sending a similar letter or memo to multiple addressees, place all at TAB A

C5.4.2.1.1.2. If including different items for the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense to sign or approve, separate them at TAB A-1, A-2, etc.

C5.4.2.1.1.3. For Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense communications with foreign government officials that require both a letter and a Defense Messaging System (DMS) message for electronic transmission, include both at TAB A

C5.4.2.1.2. TAB B for incoming correspondence, if applicable.

C5.4.2.1.3. TAB C for background material. If you need to use more than one tab, tab sequentially. If forwarding substantive or lengthy background information, provide a one-page executive *summary* of the information.

C5.4.2.1.4. TAB D (or last tab in package) to list the coordinating offices and/or activities on one page. See Figure C5.F15. for an example. Make sure you:

C5.4.2.1.4.1. Include the name and position of each coordinating official, as well as his or her organization and coordination date.

C5.4.2.1.4.2. Include concurrences from the Heads of the DoD Components, or, in their absence, the principal deputies.

C5.4.2.1.4.3. List "nonconcurs" and place their comments at the coordination tab. Be sure to address their issues in a memorandum or an attached supplement. Be sure to include:

C5.4.2.1.4.3.1. All interested parties' views and reasonable options.

C5.4.2.1.4.3.2. The coordinators' comments, modifications, or rewrites.

C5.4.2.1.4.4. State coordinations you attempted to obtain, but did not receive, **as well as** the time you allotted that coordinating office.

C5.4.2.2. Attach package elements with two-inch paper clips; do not staple or use clam clips.

C5.4.3. Submitting an Action Memo. Submit Action Memos to the Correspondence Control Division, Room 3A948. Provide the following:

C5.4.3.1. The original plus one complete copy of the memo with tabs and attachments. The copy should be of the same quality **as** the original, e.g., if attachments are printed in color for the original, the copy should have color attachments as well.”

C5.4.3.2. Mailing envelopes if unclassified, or two address labels per signature item if classified, when the correspondence shall be mailed after the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense approves it. You may use a rubber stamp for the return address, but do not use a rubber stamp or hand print the to address on envelopes for outgoing official mail.

C5.4.3.3. An electronic message version of any letter the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense shall sign to a foreign dignitary.

---

<sup>10</sup> For multiple addressee letters or those with cc listings, enclosures consisting of published reports in excess of 25 pages ~~must~~ be provided to CCB when the signature package is submitted.

Figure C5.F15. Sample Coordination Page

<b>Coordination:</b>		
<b>Under Secretary of Defense (AT&amp;L)</b>	<b>Mr. Johnson</b>	<b>March 20, 2002</b>
<b>Assistant Secretary of Defense (LA)</b>	<b>Mr. Smith</b>	<b>March 18, 2002</b>
<b>General Counsel</b>	<b>Mr. Jones</b>	<b>March 15, 2002</b>
<b>Director for Strategic Review</b>	<b>None obtained</b>	<b>Delivered March 10 - No response as of March 20</b>

## C5.5. INFO MEMO

### C5.5.1. Preparing an Info Memo

C5.5.1.1. See Figure C5.F16. for an example.

C5.5.1.2. Organize and format an Info Memo as follows:

C5.5.1.2.1. Header. A double space below the last line of the letterhead or organizational seal, type "**INFOMEMO**" all caps, centered, in boldface type.

C5.5.1.2.2. Date. A double space below the header, type the date, using month, day, year format with day and year in numerals and ending at the right margin. At the end of the date line, include the time the memo was prepared.

C5.5.1.2.3. Address Line. A double space below the date line, type "FOR:" followed by the title of the addressee.

C5.5.1.2.4. From Line. A double space below the address line, type "FROM:" followed by the name and title of the sender. Note that the sending official signs and dates on the "FROM" line; there is no signature block on an Info Memo.<sup>11</sup> If someone signs "for" the originating official, print the signer's name and title below the signature.

<sup>11</sup> If someone other than a Component Head or Principal Deputy signs an Info Memo, at least one of them shall be listed on the coordination page.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEC 21 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Coordinating Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and Deputy Secretary of  
Defense (DepSec) Action and Information Memoranda

Reference: DoD 5110.4-M, Manual for Written Material, March 2, 2004

There has been an inordinate number of Action and Information Memoranda forwarded for SecDef and DepSec decision or review that lack the appropriate level of coordination, fail to document coordination or to identify the coordinating official in accordance with current DoD policy (DoD 5110.4-M). In the future, please ensure your written products comply with the following key provisions for SecDef and DepSec packages:

- Concurrence or comments are required from the Heads of DoD Components or, in their absence, Principal Deputies.
- Coordination sheets must be typed, and include the name and position of each coordinating official, organization name and coordination date – “copy provided” is not considered a valid coordination.

**Staff** actions that do not comply with this guidance will be returned to the originating agency for compliance. Handwritten notes must be kept to a minimum per SecDef guidance. If required they should be printed and legible.

OSD 24397-05

11-L-0559/OSD/61086

You may direct any questions to the Washington Headquarters Services,  
Executive Services Directorate at (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'W.P. Maniott', with a stylized flourish at the end.

**William P. Maniott**  
**Executive Secretary**

# SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division (CCD), WHS Room 3A948, Suspense Desk: (b)(6) FAX Number: (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) Email: suspense-desk@osd.pentagon.mil

Action Agency **USP**  
 Suspense Date **22 May 2006**

**ACTION TAKEN (Check One)**


- a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO  (Justify Below)  (Justify Below)
- c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) Extend suspense to  (Justify Below)
- d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO  (Justify below / include POC Name & Phone Number)
- f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO  (Justify Below)

**JUSTIFICATION**

*Per ESR/Melmer (see attached e-mail) send  
 sent WH/Hadley a snowflake using  
 text. Cancel tasking.*

**REPORTING AGENCY**

ACTION AGENCY **USP**      c. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level)  
 NAME OF ACTION OFFICER       Signature       Date Signed

TELEPHONE NO. <input type="text"/>	<b>5. ACTION TAKEN</b> (For EXSEC/ Correspondence Control Division Use Only)		
. DATE <input type="text"/>	a. EXT	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	b. CANX	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
. CCD CONTROL # <b>OSD 76130-06</b>	c. DWNGRD	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	d. TRANSFER	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved
	e. OTHER (Specify) <input type="text"/>		
	signature <i>[Signature]</i>		Date Signed <b>5/16/06</b>

000.5

(12 May 06)

R 76130-06 JF1



**Larson, John CIV WHS/ESD**

---

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESD  
Sent: Tuesday, May 16, 2006 6:45 PM  
To: Helmer, Brian, CAPT, OSD  
Cc: Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD  
Subject: RE: OSD 76130-06

Will do.

Vr.

JL

---

**From:** Helmer, Brian, CAPT, OSD [mailto:Brian.Helmer@osd.mil]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 16, 2006 6:12 PM  
**To:** Larson, John CIV WHS/ESD  
**Cc:** Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD  
**Subject:** RE: OSD 76130-06

John,

SecDef sent a snowflake to Hadley using much of the proposed text. Recommend kill act 3n for Policy and USDI.

V/r  
Brian

---

**From:** Larson, John CIV WHS/ESD  
**Sent:** Monday, May 15, 2006 5:13 PM  
**To:** Helmer, Brian, CAPT, OSD; Lengyel, Greg, Col, OSD  
**Cc:** Vest, Kevin, COL, OSD  
**Subject:** OSD 76130-06  
**Importance:** High

Col Lengyel,

ESR routed original to JCS earlier today.

CAPT Helmer.

Database indicates you gave the original of Subject case to JCS earlier today; if you would, please retrieve and return to Col Lengyel.

Thank you,

Vr.

JL

*John Larson*  
*Executive Support Office*

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

June 13, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Steve Bucci  
Cathy Mainardi

*Spai*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Spanish MOD Visit Request

The Spanish MOD asked if he could visit the U.S. in October-November. I told him that's fine.

DHR:es  
SP061306-06



*13 JUN 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61090



8/2/2006 11:31:37 AM

*30 JUN 06*

~~FOUO~~

July 13, 2006

071206-09

Afghanistan

TO Abe Shulsky  
CC Dr Bill Luti  
Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT Cost to Finish the Ring Road

Please work with Bill Luti and figure out how much it is going to cost to finish the Ring Road in Afghanistan, and how we can accelerate it. It would make an enormous difference.

Thanks.

DHL:ksj  
SF071206-09

.....  
**Please Respond By August 01, 2006**

~~FOUO~~

OSD 76894-06



8/1/2006 12:52:44 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/61091

13 JUL 06

~~FOUO~~

July 07, 2006

TO Eric Edelman  
CC Gen Pete Pace  
FROM 'DonaldRumsfeld' *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Military Equipment for Afghanistan

*Afghanistan*

How much effort are we putting into getting military equipment from NATO countries for Afghanistan? Do we have a major effort going?

Thanks.

DIR #  
SF070706-14

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/18/06*

*7 Jul 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61092



OSD 77019-06

8/14/2006 9:45:38 AM

FOUO

Romania

July 28, 2006

TO. Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT Follow Up to Meeting with President Basescu

With respect to the meeting with President Basescu, I have the following thoughts:

1. **Get back to me on the logistic issue with the U.K. the Romanians need help with.**
2. **Get back to me with respect to the issue on NATO funding for some of the base efforts that is related to Afghanistan and Iraq.**
3. **I can't think of any reason we should not support Romania for the '08 summit. We may want to check with State and see where they are on it.**

Thanks.

DEIR as  
SF072806-04

.....  
**Please Respond By 08/09/06**

2872/06

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/61093



8/14/2006 10:03:19 AM

~~FOUO~~

August 17, 2006

TO: Peter Rodman

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Follow-Up to Peres Dinner

What should we do as follow-up in connection with the dinner with Shimon Peres?

Thanks.

DHR:es  
SFO81706-08



*Please Respond By 08/29/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61094

OSD 77146-06



8/31/2006 8:27.03 AM

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

June 21, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace

CC: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Casey's Briefing

Someone has to take the benchmark chart and the star chart out of Casey's briefing, and add the extra things like Baghdad and turning over division command, and make a good list of benchmarks.

Please do so, and let me take a look at it. We'll play with it and we will have to have that available for the rest of the government.

Thanks.

DHR:es  
SFOC2106-15

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/11/06*

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 77153-06



8/31/2006 11:50:37 AM


*Flag*

*0100010*

~~FOUO~~

June 22, 2006

TO Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Tracking Progress



*base*

Please work with Eric Edelman to fashion a set of benchmarks or metrics that we can track to show progress. Attached are the notes I made on my meeting with George Casey.

Thanks.

Attach 6/21/06 "Set of Metrics" SF 062106-20

DHR:dh  
SF062206-03

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/13/06*

*base*

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 77163-06



8/31/2006 11:50:37 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/61096

*base*



~~FOUO~~

~~TOP SECRET//SI//COMINT//NOFORN//NF~~

July 31, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Dorrance Smith  
Jim MacDougall  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper on Russia

R U S S I A

Attached is a very interesting paper. I call your particular attention to page 3 and the section I have marked.

Eric, you should work with the addressees to come up with a plan as to how we can do a better job on this. I consider it a high priority.

Thanks,

Attach 7/26/06Inel piece

DHR:m  
SP073106-11

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/29/06*

3154106

OSD 77167-08



9/1/2006 2:10:50 PM

~~FOUO~~

~~TOP SECRET//SI//COMINT//NOFORN//NF~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61097

~~FOUO~~  
UNCLASSIFIED Attachment

AUG 28 2006

082506-03

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Material for Ralston

Someone ought to find a way to make sure Joe Ralston is given the proper intelligence on the PKK situation as he works this problem. Here is an example of a recent piece.

Thanks.

Attach. 8/23/06 Agence France Presse piece: "PKK Kurdish Rebels Offer Ceasefire to Ankara"

DIR:R  
EPC2506-03

.....

*ISP*  
*cc: ISA*

~~FOUO~~  
UNCLASSIFIED Attachment

OSD 77169-06



9/1/2006 2:32:45 PM

Turkey

28AUG06

28AUG06

~~FOUO~~

July 13, 2006

TO Gen Pete Pace

CC: Eric Edelman  
Cathy Mainardi  
Steve Bucci

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Briefing by the Joint Staff re: Bagram

I need a brief ~~from~~ the Joint Staff of TRANSCOM as to precisely when Bagram will be ready to do the heavy lifting and we will not need Manas.

Thanks.

DHR:ks2  
SF071206-01A

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/19/06*

1504109

1504109

~~FOUO~~

OSD 77195-06



9/6/2006 9:13:56 AM

~~FOUO~~

06/011542-65

September 01, 2006

383.6

TO Eric Fdelman  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Guantanamo Bay Facts

You ought to get these Guantanamo Bay facts out widely -- in the interagency and elsewhere.

Thanks.

Attach: Paper "Guantanamo Bay: The Facts"

DHR:sn  
SP090106-11

.....  
*Please Respond By September 14, 2006*

15p 06

~~FOUO~~

A-32-2

OSD 77321-08



9/22/2006 3:08:13 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/61100

f c

## Guantanamo Bay: The Facts

*"Arguably, no detention facility in the history of warfare has been more transparent or received more scrutiny than Guantanamo. ... The United States government, let alone the U.S. military, does not want to be in the position of holding suspected terrorists any longer than is absolutely necessary. ... But as long as there remains a need to keep terrorists from striking again, a facility will be necessary."*

*Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, June 14, 2005*

**1. The Guantanamo Bay detention facility is a secure and safe location to detain and interrogate enemy combatants.** Since the attacks of September 11th, the U.S. military has apprehended thousands of enemy combatants in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Global War on Terror. Several hundred were deemed particularly dangerous and valuable from an intelligence perspective. There was no existing set of procedures or facilities to detain these enemies in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Guantanamo was the best option available at the time.

**2. Guantanamo Bay holds dangerous men.** Detainees are sent to Guantanamo only after a proper screening process that identifies prisoners who pose a threat to the United States or who have intelligence value.

The kind of people held at Guantanamo include:

- Al-Qaeda Recruiters and Facilitators
- Bodyguards of Osama bin Laden
- Bomb Makers
- Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Weapons Experts
- Potential Suicide Bombers
- 3 Terrorist Trainers
- Terrorist Financiers

Statements provided by some detainees give an insight into their mindset and intentions:

- "I will arrange for the kidnapping and execution of U.S. citizens living in Saudi Arabia. Small groups of four or five U.S. citizens will be kidnapped, held, and executed. They will have their heads cut off."
- "Their day is coming. One day I will enjoy sucking their blood..."
- "I pray everyday against the United States... The United States government is criminals."
- "It would be okay for [Usama bin Laden] to kill Jewish persons. There is no need to ask for forgiveness for killing a Jew."
- "[We] will shake up the US and countries who follow the U.S."
- "Not only am I thinking about threatening the American public, but the whole world."

**3. Information gleaned from detainees has proven vital in the Global War on Terror.** Only trained interrogators are allowed to question detainees — military guards and personnel are not allowed to query the prisoners. Interrogation techniques are consistent with American values and existing laws and treaty obligations.

1  
A-32-3

By using methods widely available for public scrutiny, interrogators have learned very useful information from detainees, including:

- **Communication and financing efforts of international terrorist networks;**
- **Established that 20 detainees were known Osama bin Laden bodyguards;**
- **Information that led to an extensive counterterrorism operation in 2005 in Europe, in which more than 700 police were involved in six cities and 22 suspected militant extremists were arrested;**
- **Locations of terrorist training compounds, safehouses, and terrain features;**
- **Trawl routes used for smuggling people and equipment.**

4. Guantanamo detainees receive better treatment than prisoners in other facilities around the world. Allegations of abuse at Guantanamo, as at any other U.S. military facility, have been thoroughly investigated. Any wrongdoing is held accountable through the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. The U.S. military has instituted numerous reforms of the conduct of detainee operations, with a renewed emphasis on standards and training.

As a detainee at Guantanamo Bay detention facility, a suspected terrorist can look forward to the following:

- Five daily calls to prayer
- A personal copy of the Koran
- Prisoners are supplied with prayer caps, beads, and oil. Detainees that behave well are rewarded by receiving a traditional Islam prayer rug and having access to special prayer rooms.
- Islamic Holy Periods Recognized.
- Muslim Dietary Practices Respected. Guantanamo takes special care to provide the suspected terrorists with the proper diet in accordance to the Muslim faith. Halal (meat from animals killed in the ritual way in accordance to Islamic law) and other food is flown in by a contractor and kept separate from food provided for U.S. military personnel.
  - Detainees can intake up to 4,200 calories daily and the annual "average weight gain for the detainees is six pounds."
- Detainees receive superb dental and medical care. Rules set forth by DOD guarantee medical-record confidentiality — much like doctor-patient privileges in the U.S. — so that interrogators, guards, and others cannot use any medical condition against the detainee. Some of the health care amenities include:
  - Access to the island's naval hospital specialists and professionals;
  - An operating room for general surgery;
  - 20 to 30 beds for in-patient care;
  - CT scan equipment and resources;
  - A dental clinic;
  - Immunization programs, including monitoring, regular check-ups and treatment (if needed) for hepatitis, tetanus, measles, mumps, rubella, tuberculosis, among others;
  - Nutrition consultation;

- **Optometry care;**
- **Orthopedic equipment and professionals;**
- **A pharmacy that supplies drugs available in the U.S.;**
- **A physical therapy department complete with therapy specialists;**
- **Prosthetics services;**
- **A radiology department;**
- **A separate health unit that treats mental health conditions;**
- **X-ray and digital x-ray capabilities.**
- **Some of the detainees have chronic medical conditions such as diabetes, high blood pressure or high cholesterol – all taken care of by medical staff. Detainees receive first-rate dental work and their overall health is exceptional. For many of them, it is the first time they have ever had dental work of any kind.**
- **Besides flying in U.S. consultants for special medical cases, the Guantanamo hospital collaborates with worldwide medical experts on many of their programs. For instance, the CDC frequently visits the facility to monitor Guantanamo's medical surveillance and in-processing programs.**
- **Recreational Amenities, such as volleyball and basketball courts, board games, TV privileges, workout equipment, among other things. Detainees enjoy a minimum of two hours and a maximum of twelve hours of recreation per day.**
- **Guantanamo Library. The suspected terrorists have access to the library, which holds 3,500 volumes in 13 different languages. Many of these selections are Islamic books. Ironically, the most popular are the Harry Potter series, which is offered in eight different languages.**

5. **No detention facility in the history of warfare has been more transparent or received more scrutiny than Guantanamo.**

- **Since its inception, there have been approximately 500 separate media visits to Guantanamo Bay by more than 1,000 national and international journalists.**
- **27 Senators and 120 Representatives, along with an estimated 100 congressional staffers, have visited Guantanamo. A number of Members have visited more than once.**
- **Congress has provided detailed and thorough oversight to detention facilities by holding more than 140 congressional briefings.**
- **The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), whose representatives meet privately with the detainees, is the only group that is permitted to conduct private interviews with the detainees. The ICRC visits Guantanamo every few months, and acts as go-between for detainees and their families.**

## Supportive Quotes

"Be assured the worst of the worst detainees are the ones at Gitmo. It took a lot of effort to get a detainee shipped over.... They are no victims.... People have already lost lives because we've released Gitmo detainees.... Gitmo didn't make [the released prisoners] want to kill again. Their release allowed them to kill again."

Major John Krenson, Tennessee Army National Guard, June 19, 2005

"I am lucky I went there, and now I miss it. Cuba was great. ... Americans are good people, they were friendly. I don't have anything against them. If my father didn't need me, I would want to live in America. ... Americans are great people, better than anyone else. Americans are polite and friendly... If I could be anywhere, I would be in America. I would like to be a doctor, an engineer — or an American soldier."

Asadullah Rahman, former Guantanamo detainee, returned to Afghanistan, March 6, 2004

"I am in Cuba in a special room, but it is not like a jail. Don't worry about me. I am learning English, Pashto and Arabic."

Naqibullah, former Guantanamo detainee, returned to his home in Afghanistan, March 6, 2004

"Of course they wanted to stay there. ... They had human rights and good living standards there. They had dentists and good meals — everything they wanted. And here, in Russian prisons, there are very bad conditions and very bad punishments."

Fatima Tekayeva, mother of former Guantanamo detainee Rusul Kudayev upon her son's transfer back to Russia for prosecution, March 3, 2004

"We have nothing against the Americans, they looked after the boy. They taught him English and other things."

Haji Mohammad Tabir, elder in the home village of Asadullah Rahman, March 6, 2004

"At the level of the detention facilities, [Guantanamo] is a model prison, where people are better treated than in Belgian prisons."

Abin Grignard, deputy head of Brussels' federal police anti-terrorism unit, March 8, 2006

"The facilities at Guantanamo are modeled after state-of-the-art prisons in the United States and some are fully air conditioned. The terrorists have full access to medical staff, which many of them have never had access to in their lives. Their hygiene is attended to and they get three balanced and healthy meals per day. We are treating the terrorists humanely and with dignity, respecting their religion."

Senator Jim Bunning, July 1, 2005

"I have personally visited our detention center at Guantanamo and found the facilities more than adequate for the housing of terrorist suspects."

House Armed Service Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter, June 20, 2005

"Nobody wants to be in prison, but if you're going to be in prison, [Guantanamo] is the one to be in."

Congressman Joel Hefley, June 29, 2005

"The Guantanamo we saw today is not the Guantanamo we heard about a few years ago."

Congresswoman Eden Tauscher, June 26, 2005

"We have been granted broad access to the camp. ... We are confident we have visited all of the people detained at Guantanamo, in all of the places they are being detained."

International Committee of the Red Cross, prepared statement, December 17, 2004



### Top 10 Things You Don't Know About Guantanamo

1. The facility at Guantanamo Bay holds about 450 detainees — including Bin Laden's bodyguards, bomb makers, and other suspected terrorists. Amnesty International has equated the facility with a Soviet-style 'gulag.'
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross visits detainees at the facility every few months and has exchanged more than 20,000 messages between detainees and their families.
3. More is spent on meals for detainees than on U.S. troops stationed there. Detainees are offered up to 4,200 calories a day. The average weight gain is six pounds per year.
4. Detainees receive free medical, dental, psychiatric, and optometric care — in 2005, there were 35 teeth cleanings, 91 cavities filled, and 174 pairs of glasses issued.
5. The Muslim call to prayer sounds five times a day. Arrows point detainees toward the holy city of Mecca.
6. Facilities include a basketball court, a volleyball court, a soccer field, ping-pong tables, checkers, and chess. High-top sneakers, Gatorade, and granola bars are provided for recreational activities. Arabic language TV shows, including World Cup soccer games, are shown.
7. The library has 3,500 volumes available in 13 languages — the most requested book is "Harry Potter."
8. Departing detainees receive a Koran, a jean jacket, a white t-shirt, a pair of blue jeans, high top tennis shoes, a gym bag of toiletries, and a pillow and blanket for the flight home.
9. One soldier recalled that some detainees didn't want to leave Guantanamo: "My men and I once spent nine hours on a runway trying to get a detainee on a plane to take him home." (*Minneapolis Star-Tribune*, June 27, 2005)
10. The mother of a returned detainee stated: "Of course they wanted to stay there... They had human rights and good living standards there. They had dentists and good meals — everything they wanted." (*The London Times*, March 3, 2004)

OSD Writers Group, Office of Public Affairs, The Pentagon

A-32-7

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

August 14, 2006

TO Gen Pete Pace  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Timeline on Police Situations

Please get me the timeline on the police situations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

If you have any questions, please see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
SF081406-20



*Please Respond By 08/21/06*

042

14 AUG 06

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 77352-06



TT-L-0559/OSD/61106

312712006 4 11 23 PM

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

AUG 28 2006

KOREA (North)

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

I have never seen a "lessons learned" from the July 4 Taepo-Dong missile firing. I talked to General Obering, and he said there was a good deal of misinformation being communicated by people who really didn't have the technical facts.

I do want to see the lessons learned. We do want to clean up the process, improve the communications, and put better discipline into this process.

Please let me know when you are going to get back to me with some solutions to this.

Thanks.

DATE: 10/5/2006  
TIME: 12:10:28 PM

(SF 082606-03)

.....  
Please respond by September 14, 2006

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 77436-06



10/5/2006 12:10:28 PM

B62

28 AUG 06

~~FOUO~~

LEAD

October 23, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT New Construct

I hope you folks are working hard in the interagency on the new construct I proposed.

*New Construct For Iraq*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
SF102306-31

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/02/06*

*030406*

*10 Oct 06*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 77490-06



11-L-0559/OSD/61108

11/2/2006 12:52:16 PM

~~FOUO~~

OCT 04 2006

Ukraine

TO Eric Edelman

FROM Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: PM of Ukraine

The MoD of Ukraine urged that we work with the Prime Minister of Ukraine. He said the PM is a smart man. Needless to say, the MoD wasn't lined up with him.

I ought to think about paying some attention to him and seeing him sometime when he is visiting the US or I am in Ukraine.

Thanks.

DHR:ah  
100306-30 (travel computer).doc

.....  
***Please respond by October 26, 2006***

~~FOUO~~

4 Oct 06

OSD 77497-06



10111/2006 5:19:13 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/61109

~~FOUO~~

October 06, 2006

*Korea*

**TO:** Richard Lawless

**CC:** Eric Edelman

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

**SUBJECT:** Memo on call with Korea's MOD Yoon

**Was there a note taker on my call with MOD Yoon of Korea last evening? Is there a memo forthcoming from the call?**

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF100606-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 10109106*

*6 OCT 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61110



OSD 77498-06

10/11/2006 5:25:50 PM

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2006

33350

TO: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Possible Visit to Serbia

I do think I ought to go to Serbia soon and encourage the reformers.

What do you think?

Thank you.

DFRC:ca  
092706-03 (75)

.....  
*Please respond by October 16, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

27 Sept 06

OSD 77514-06



10/12/2006 3:53:25 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/61111

~~FOUO~~

October 24, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Robert Wilkie

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Response to Hyde

Afghanistan

You are preparing a response to the letter from Henry Hyde and Mark Kirk on heroin production in Afghanistan -- a letter that was featured in a front-page article in today's edition of *USA Today* (see attached).

We ought to send them a thoughtful letter explaining that the British have been in charge of that issue since the Bonn Process in **2002**. The Afghan government has taken responsibility for the drug problem since the country became sovereign. For the United States, the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul have the lead in support of the Afghan government and the UK. DoD helps in support of the Department of State and the Afghan government.

We need to put it in proper perspective, but reflect our concern and interest. Possibly you could refer the letter to the Department of State to respond.

Thanks.

Attach. Leinwand, Donna. "Hyde Asks Rumsfeld to Bolster Fight Against Afghan Heroin," *USA Today*, October 24, 2006, p. 1

240606

DHR,dh  
SF102406-10

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/02/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61112



OSD 77646-06

10/30/2006 8:55:28 AM



USA Today  
October 24, 2006  
Pg. 1

## Hyde Asks Rumsfeld To Bolster Fight Against Afghan Heroin

### *Seeks air support for DEA missions*

By Donna Leinwand, USA Today

WASHINGTON — A leading House Republican is urging Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to revamp the U.S. strategy against heroin production in Afghanistan, saying record opium poppy harvests show efforts to target farmers are not working.

Rep. Henry Hyde, R-Ill., chairman of the House International Relations Committee, said in an Oct. 12 letter to Rumsfeld that the U.S.-supported poppy eradication program in Afghanistan is a failure.

In the previously unreported letter, provided by Hyde's committee office, Hyde urges the military to help agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) take out drug kingpins and heroin processing centers. The current program, backed by the State Department and international agencies, focuses on low-level poppy farmers.

The "opium crisis" has "increased violence and terrorism against coalition forces there, and is now threatening to totally corrupt all of the new Afghan democratic institutions we support," Hyde's letter said, echoing concerns voiced by many U.S. officials — including Rumsfeld — that drug money is aiding a resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Rumsfeld has not answered Hyde, but Air Force Lt. Col. Karen Finn, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said Monday, "We take this matter very seriously, and we will be responding."

Hyde's letter followed a report by the United Nations last month that said an estimated 407,724 acres of opium poppy were grown in Afghanistan this year. That's up 59% from 2005 and more than double the acreage farmed in 2000, before the U.S.-led assault on the former Taliban government.

Afghanistan is the world's top supplier of heroin, and narcotics make up more than one-third of its economy, the State Department has reported.

The Pentagon's mission in Afghanistan has focused on fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It has viewed drug trafficking as a law enforcement issue. However, Rumsfeld has authorized U.S. military units operating in areas with drug activity to take along DEA agents.

Military support has helped DEA operations, the agency's Mary Irene Cooper said. The poppy eradication effort, however, has had little impact. The U.N. said 37,807 acres were eliminated this year, about 7% of the acreage cultivated.

Hyde wants military air support for DEA missions. He said it is too dangerous for civilian authorities to work alone. "We can't lose the country to narcotics," he said in an interview.

~~FOUO~~

October 04, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: Unequal Assistance

The Central American MoDs said Taiwan gives more assistance to the Nicaraguan army than the United States does. They give the presidential palace, soccer stadiums and the like.

*Nicaragua*

We need to think this through.

Thanks.

DTR.ks2  
SF100306-23

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/02/06*

*402106*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61114

OSD 77682-06



10/30/2006 11:29:56 AM

~~FOUO~~

November 01, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.A.*

SUBJECT: Report on Phone Call ~~with~~ Des Browne

Please give me the ~~report~~ of my phone call ~~with~~ Des Browne.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF110106-08

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/03/06*

*UK*

*11/01/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61115



11/3/2006 4:00:01 PM

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

August 08, 2006

TO Gen Pete Pace

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Managing Equipment in CENTCOM AOR

*CENTCOM*

I would like a briefing on how we are managing equipment in the CENTCOM AOR

Do we have a first-rate system that is getting everything back that we want back -- and as soon as it is no longer needed over there -- so it can get into the reconstitution process?

Thanks.

DHR:es  
SF080806-12

.....  
*Please Respond By 08/29/06*

*2006-08-08 10:00 AM  
AOR  
2006-08-08 10:00 AM  
2006-08-08 10:00 AM  
2006-08-08 10:00 AM*

~~FOUO~~

*804906*

Tab A

OSD 77726-06





ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010


NOV 13 2006

*Centcom*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT TO  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Managing Equipment in USCENTCOM AOR

Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject brief. We concur. Still, it is important to note that our success in the area is dependant on the civilian and contractor workforce. They have done an excellent job in supporting the warfighter.

  
Kenneth J. Krieg

*13 Nov 06*

*8 Aug 06*



11-L-0559/OSD/61117

77726-06

~~FOUO~~

August 31, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
GEN John Abizaid  
GEN George Casey



FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT Iraq SOFA

I am worried about not having a SOFA in Iraq, and I am not persuaded by what I have heard. We better think this through rigorously.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF083106-31

*IRAQ*

*31 Aug 06*

*9 Nov 06*

NOV 15 2006

SNOWFLAKE RESPONSE ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61118

OSD 77791-08



11/15/2006 4:47:41 PM

~~FOUO~~

November 01, 2006

TO: Robert Rangel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Committee at the White House

*KOREA (North)*

Please find out who **runs** the Committee at the White House that **acts** on a **ship** that needs to be boarded.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF110106-16

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/07/06*

*1 NOV 06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61119



11/13/2006 3:23:57 PM

~~FOUO~~

October 23, 2006

AFGHANISTAN

TO Eric Edelman  
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Follow-up to Strmecki Brief

What should we be doing to follow up on the Strmecki brief?

Thanks.

DHR dh  
SF102306-23

-----  
*Please Respond By 11/09/06*

23 OCT 06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/61120



OSD 77809-06

11/14/2006 12:59:04 PM



~~FOUO~~

NOV 27 2006 -

11-L-0559

TO: Eric Fdelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter on Kosovo

Have we sent a letter on Kosovo to the interagency yet?

Thanks.

DR:em  
11/27/06-29 (TS) Dec

.....  
*Please respond by December 1, 2006*

~~FOUO~~

27110606



11/28/2006 8:29:26 AM

~~FOUO~~

November 28, 2006

IRAO

TO Eric Edelman  
 CC: Gen Pete Pace  
 FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
 SUBJECT: Decision to Not Go After **Sadr**

Dan Senor was on Fox yesterday saying that the decision to not go after Sadr was made in Washington. My recollection is that the decision was made in Baghdad, the Iraqi Governing Council was against it, and Bremer made the decision.

On the other hand, it is entirely possible Condi made the decision, and I just was not aware of it.

Please check with Doug Feith and find out what the facts are.

Thanks.

DHR:cb  
 SF112806-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/07/06*

28 NOV 06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 77955-06

11-L-0559/OSD/61122