



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Aug. 2, 2004 – SecDef Interviews on Iraq

Following are highlights of radio interviews of Secretary Rumsfeld on July 29, 2004. For full transcripts, go to the transcript page of www.defenselink.mil, the Defense Department's web page. For more information about the Global War on Terror, please visit www.defendamerica.mil.

Number of U.S. Troops in Iraq

- Secretary Rumsfeld relies on the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders whether there are enough troops on the ground in Iraq. All say there are about the right number.
 - Fewer troops could lead to a less secure situation.
 - Many more troops would have a heavier footprint - a greater occupation presence.
 - More troops would require more force protection, more logistic support of the force protectors and the additional troops, and would be more intrusive into the Iraqi people's lives.
- The real task is not putting in more Americans. The task is getting more Iraqis providing for their own security so we can begin bringing Americans out.

Intelligence in Iraq and Iraqi Troops

- Intelligence is improving every week in Iraq. It will improve geometrically as Iraqis take increasing responsibility for their country's security.
- Joint patrols with the Iraqis and Iraqis patrolling by themselves will result in better situational awareness than would U.S.- or Coalition-only patrols.
- More than 200,000 Iraqis are now part of their country's security forces.
 - Iraqis are lining up to volunteer to join the security forces and protect their country, even as some of those already in the force are being killed in the line of duty.

Prowess in the Global War on Terror

- The Coalition is making excellent progress in the Global War on Terror by:
 - Stopping financing
 - Arresting and capturing people and killing terrorists
 - Stopping terrorist activities
 - Making it more difficult to raise money and more difficult for the terrorists to communicate with each other.

Iraq Update

- Several shifts in authority over the weekend demonstrate Iraqis are assuming more control within their own country.
 - The Iraqi Army activated its seventh battalion with the graduation of 723 recruits during an Aug. 1 ceremony at Kirkush Military Training Base, east of Baghdad. ([link to CENTCOM release](#))
 - The battalion is the third Iraqi army battalion solely trained by Iraqis.
 - The Iraqi Army ultimately will consist of 27 battalions, nine brigades and three divisions.
 - The 22 remaining Iraqi Army battalions will begin and complete training in the coming months at various bases throughout Iraq. The final unit is slated to come on line in February 2005.
 - Multi-National Force-Iraq handed back control of the Baghdad International Airport's control tower on Aug. 1. ([link to CENTCOM release](#))
 - Royal Australian Air Force personnel spent the past six months training Iraqi civil air traffic personnel.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 27, 2004 - Army CoS Briefing

U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker addressed the Pentagon press corps on July 26 about the state of the Army – its composition and its ongoing efforts to both fight the Global War on Terror and continue transforming itself for the 21st century. Following are some of the highlights. For a full transcript, go to the [transcript](#) page of www.defenselink.mil, the Pentagon's web site.

The Numbers

- Currently there are more than one million soldiers in the Army.
 - More than 276,000 are deployed around the world in more than 120 countries.
- Despite the increases in deployments and missions, the Army is well on track to meet its recruiting and retention goals for fiscal year 2004.

The Challenge

- The Army is making some of its most significant changes since World War II.
 - Even while Army soldiers are fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and remain alert in other areas, the Army is still transforming.
 - Gen. Schoomaker has compared such a transformation to tuning a car engine while the engine is running.
- The Army is transforming along three primary avenues:
 - First – the Army is restructuring the force into modular formations.
 - Second – the Army is rebalancing the force between the Active component of the Army and the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
 - Part of rebalancing the force is looking at the skill sets the Army needs to fight in the 21st century instead of fighting the Cold War. Ensuring there are enough people in the Active Army with these skill sets will help reduce the number of Guard and Reserve who need to be activated.
 - Third – the Army is stabilizing the force.
- These three changes – restructuring, rebalancing and stabilizing the force – will result in:
 - More cohesive and combat-ready formations;
 - More stability;
 - More high-demand units and skills;
 - More commonality across the entire Army; and
 - A more predictable lifestyle for soldiers and their family.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 26, 2004 – SecDef Message to the Troops

Secretary of Defense Message to Troops on Why We Fight in Iraq

More than 15 months ago, a global coalition ended the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein and liberated the people of Iraq.

As in all conflicts, this has come at a cost in lives. Some of your comrades made the ultimate sacrifice. For your sacrifices, our country and the President are deeply grateful.

In a free, democratic country we have vigorous debates over important public policy issues – none more heated than a decision to go to war. But this should not distract us from the mission at hand or lessen the magnitude of your accomplishments.

The threat we face must be confronted. And you are doing so exceedingly well. Indeed it has been an historic demonstration of skill and military power.

On September 11, 3,000 citizens were killed by extremists determined to frighten and intimidate our people and civilized societies. The future danger is that, if the extremists gain the potential, the number of casualties would be far higher. Terrorists are continuing to plot attacks against the American people and against other civilized societies. This is a different kind of enemy and a different kind of world. And we must think and act differently in this new century.

These extremists think nothing of cutting off innocent people's heads to try to intimidate great nations. They have murdered citizens from many countries – South Korea, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and others – hoping to strike fear in the hearts of free people.

Theirs is an ideology of oppression and subjugation of women. They seek to create radical systems that impose their views on others. And they will accept no armistice with those who choose free systems.

They see the governments of the Middle East, the United States and our stalwart allies all as targets.

Consider the background. In the span of 20 years, Hussein's Iraq invaded two neighbors, Iran and Kuwait, and launched ballistic missiles at two more. He employed poison gas against soldiers in Iran and against Kurdish villagers in his own country.

The United Nations and the U.S. Congress shared the view that Saddam's regime was a threat to the region and the world. Indeed, in 1998, our Congress passed a resolution calling for the removal of the regime. And over the years the U.N. passed 17 resolutions condemning Saddam's regime and calling on him to tell the UN about his weapons programs. He ignored every one.

Information gathered since the defeat of Saddam's regime last year confirms that his last declaration to the United Nations about his weapons programs was falsified. The U.N. resolutions had called for "serious consequences" should Saddam not comply. He did not.

The President issued a final ultimatum to Saddam to relinquish power to avoid war. Saddam chose war instead.

By your skill and courage, you have put a brutal dictator in the dock to be tried by the Iraqi people and restored freedom to 25 million people. By helping to repair infrastructure, rebuild schools, encourage democratic institutions and delivering educational and medical supplies, you have shown America's true character and given Iraq a chance at a new start.

But most importantly, your fight – and ultimate victory – against the forces of terror and extremism in Iraq and the Middle East will have made America safer and more secure.

You are accomplishing something noble and historic – and future generations of Americans will remember and thank you for it.

Donald H. Rumsfeld



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 22, 2004 – 9-11 Report

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission) will issue its final report today. Since September 11th, the United States has better prepared itself for attacks and led a worldwide Coalition to defeat terrorism. The nation is safer and the terrorists are weaker because the United States and its allies acted. Following are talking points.

- **The United States is safer today than it was on Sept. 10,**
 - The nation is better protected and better prepared.
 - There is a higher level of vigilance among the American people.
 - Government agencies are better coordinated with forward-looking scenarios and action plans.
 - The United States is leading a worldwide Coalition to defeat terrorism.
 - More than 80 nations are cooperating to share intelligence, put pressure on the terrorists' bank accounts, and make it harder for terrorists to recruit and retain people, communicate with each other or move between countries.
 - We are improving every day, while our enemies are becoming more desperate and their efforts are being degraded.
- **Global terrorism has been dealt**
 - The Taliban has been removed from power in Afghanistan, a brutal dictator is gone from Iraq and the seeds of freedom and democracy have been planted in the Middle East.
 - Terror cells have been disrupted on most continents.
 - Forty-six of the 55 most wanted in Iraq have been captured or killed, including Saddam Hussein.
 - Two-thirds of the known al-Qaeda leaders have been captured or killed.
- **The Bush Administration and the Defense Department took the warfare seriously, before**
 - Early on, the Department recognized the danger posed by asymmetric and terrorist threats, and began preparing new strategies and the building blocks necessary to carry them out.
 - Preparations made throughout 2001 enabled the U.S. to build a Coalition to immediately launch the Global War on Terror.
 - Work done throughout 2001 formed the basis of Operation Enduring Freedom and allowed the United States to pursue the perpetrators of the 9-11 attacks in Afghanistan just 26 days after they occurred.
- **In responding to a terrorist attack, there are only two choices – take the enemy or wait until they hit you again. America**
- **Ultimately, the most important thing that can come out of reports are recommendations for how the United States can**



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 20, 2004 - SecDef Media Interviews GWOT, Iraq

Following are highlights from recent media interviews of Secretary Rumsfeld.

Measuring Progress in the Global War on Terror

- The Coalition is making progress in the Global
 - More than 80 nations have joined the Global War on Terror. These Coalition nations are putting pressure on the terrorists by:
 - Sharing intelligence.
 - Putting pressure on bank accounts and making it more difficult to move money.
 - Making it harder for terrorists to recruit people and retain them.
 - Complicating terrorists' ability to communicate with each other and move between countries.
 - The Coalition has brought down the Abdul Qadeer Khan network.
 - The network was trading in nuclear materials and technologies.
 - Khan was the father of Pakistan's gas centrifuge program. He was removed from his post as advisor to Pakistan's prime minister for providing nuclear technology, components and equipment to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
 - Libya has come forward and decided to forego weapons of mass destruction.

America Is Safer

- America is safer today than it was on 9/11.
 - Terrorists have been captured and killed and their cells have been disrupted.
 - Forty-six of the 55 most wanted in Iraq – including Saddam Hussein and his sons Uday and Qusay -- have been captured or killed.
 - Close to two-thirds of known senior al-Qaeda leaders have been captured or killed.
 - Thousands of terrorists and regime remnants in Iraq and Afghanistan have been hunted down, and terrorist cells on most continents have been disrupted.
 - Even before Sept. 11, plans were underway to transform the Department of Defense from a post-Cold War department to a 21st century department to better face new threats.
 - The Department has moved from a "threat-based" to a "capabilities-based" approach to defense planning. This means not just focusing on who might threaten the United States and where and when, but also how we might be threatened and what capabilities are needed to deter and defend against those threats.
 - The attacks on Sept. 11 prove the urgent need to transform the Department so it is better arranged for the threats and difficulties of the new century.

Troop Strength and Length of Stay in Iraq

- The date for bringing home U.S. forces is not calibrated to a calendar, it is circumstances on the ground and what the
 - If the situation in Iraq deteriorates because the Ba'athists and former Saddam elements become more desperate to stop representative government before the elections in Iraq, the Department will react appropriately.
 - If the situation in Iraq improves and the number of forces could be reduced, the Department will also consider that alternative.

To read transcripts of the Secretary's July 16 interviews, go to transcript section of [Defenselink.mil\(link\)](http://Defenselink.mil/link)

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New York Times
July 20, 2004
Pg. 1

Rebuilding Iraq, A Well At A Time

By James Glanz

MOSUL, Iraq, July 17 - Across the hardscrabble Iraqi countryside, dozens of modest construction initiatives, many so tiny and inexpensive that they could be called microprojects, are generating at least a taste of the good will that Congress envisioned when it approved billions of dollars for grandiose rebuilding plans that have mostly been delayed.

Typical of the little projects is a hole in the ground that was being dug last week by an ungainly contraption, chugging along with big, spinning wheels and an enormous weight that smacked the muddy earth again and again outside the isolated village of Khazna, south of Mosul.

The machine was gouging out a well as part of a civil reconstruction program led by American military forces stationed here in the north of Iraq, financed mostly by Iraqi oil revenues.

As a convoy of big armored vehicles picked their way, rut by rut, over the village's zigzagging lanes toward the well, the dubious scene easily evoked the skepticism that has dogged the rebuilding effort all over the country.

But then a villager named Rabaa Saleh, standing among the swarms of children who had run out to meet the vehicles, gave his view of the proceedings.

"It makes people think good things are on the way," Mr. Saleh said through a translator. "When this well is done, each time somebody takes a drink of water they will say the Americans did something good."

Still, while local citizens like Mr. Saleh say they appreciate the work and are willing to credit Americans for paying for it, they often do not want to see Western faces at the projects themselves, fearing terrorist attacks and general hostility from ordinary Iraqis. At a ribbon-cutting for a major school renovation in Mosul on that same morning, the city's education director refused to invite the American officers who had financed the project.

The man digging the well in Khazna was a Syrian Kurd subcontractor. That project will cost the United States Army just \$35,000 and affect no more than a couple of hundred lives in a dusty village that has never had its own well.

It is hardly a match for the ambitious program of \$18.4 billion approved by Congress last fall for rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure, money funneled largely through nonmilitary government agencies and major American contractors.

But for various reasons, ranging from the lack of security in Iraq to bureaucratic red tape, the projects in that huge pot of money have taken so much longer to begin than initially promised that Iraqis - those who have heard about the work at all - often have a hard time believing that they will ever really happen.

Around Mosul and elsewhere in Iraq, the American military, whether through wisdom or sheer luck, has hit upon an approach that seems able to overcome that skepticism, at least locally.

From building a new soil laboratory to making improvements at a famous archaeological site to repairing a single elevator in a hospital, the projects are all small, fast and undertaken in response to a highly specific need identified by local Iraqis.

The army here is working on dozens of projects, using about \$20 million in financing, although that number constantly shifts as new sources of money are identified. Until the new Iraqi government took over on June 28, for example, the projects were financed from Iraqi oil revenues, and some of that money is still being spent. A little over \$5 million, from the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid program, is being split among 113 projects involving water supplies, sewers, wells and clinics.

The approach may be generating some of the good will that has been so elusive for America and its allies in a nation based on identification with neighborhood and clan. The results also come with the uncomfortable suggestion that the expensive rebuilding plan approved by Congress may never have the impact that lawmakers envisioned when they appropriated so much money.

"At the end of the day, it is about the small things that touch people's lives," said Nesreen M. Siddeek Berwari, the minister of municipalities and public works in the new Iraqi government. "The big billions number that has been mentioned doesn't mean much."

That sentiment certainly seems to hold true at the Nimrud archaeological site, south of Mosul, where a \$28,000 grant to refurbish what remains of an ancient Assyrian capital has brought it several steps back from garbage-strewn chaos, said Muzamim Mahmoud, director of the Mosul museum and antiquities director for the province.

Walking proudly among the ancient chambers lined with huge bas-reliefs of kings and servants and bird-headed gods, Mr. Mahmoud said foreign tourists had visited Nimrud as recently as 2002. But looting after the American-led invasion last year left behind an abandoned place with little more than heavy carved stones to mark the glory that once inhabited this spot.

The money let Mr. Mahmoud rehabilitate the gate and guardhouse - now manned by Iraqi security officers - and clean up the entire site and make major repairs on a trailer used by archaeologists during their digs. Now there are even little pitched sheet-metal roofs over the carvings to protect them from erosion as Mr. Mahmoud seeks new international donors for permanent facilities.

"Step by step they need to repair the site for tourists," Mr. Mahmoud said, "and this amount of money comes just in time."

Projects in such isolated locations, across a dusty countryside that is still troubled by killings, bombings and mortar attacks, also illustrate the relative ease with which military forces can move about in the kind of territory that Western civilian contractors have often fled, leaving their work unfinished.

Approvals for the projects can take from a few days to a few weeks, said Maj. Wayne Bowen, a history professor at Ouachita Baptist University in Arkadelphia, Ark., and a reservist who is overseeing projects that touch on higher education.

But with that speed comes a great reliance on the judgment of the Iraqis. Most proposals have been well considered, Major Bowen said, but there have been a few clinkers, like the time a university professor requested money to buy a pistol.

The informality of the process was evident during a visit by Maj. Glenn Mundt to a project intended to erect 31 electrical transmission towers as part of a plan to bring power down from Turkey. Led by Khalaf Dahan Hamoud, chief engineer at the Rashidiya substation near Mosul, the project was ahead of schedule.

Standing next to a half-assembled tower on a remote hill, Mr. Hamoud casually mentioned a much larger project that would restore a huge electrical loop in the north that had been severed years ago.

"Can you give me that project by Tuesday?" Major Mundt said. "Approximately. Within a couple of million dollars."

Mr. Hamoud, looking surprised, pointed out again that it was a much larger project than the one he was about to complete.

"Just come up with a basic scope of work," Major Mundt said, "and I'll push it down to Baghdad."

It was an exchange that the officials in charge of the Congressionally earmarked \$18.4 billion could only dream about.

"We have to follow United States contracting laws and procedures," said John Procter, a spokesman for the Project and Contracting Office, which is affiliated with the Pentagon

and the State Department and is administering the Congressional money. "That's where I think some of the frustration is coming from."

Even so, some of the oil money was parceled out by the contracting office in a program called the accelerated Iraq reconstruction effort, and \$500,000 of that money worked its way through the northern military authorities and into a project to rehabilitate the main terminal at the Mosul airport.

Amid the pounding of hammers and the bustle of workers tearing down a stained old drop ceiling, the assistant manager of the airport, who asked to be identified only as General Muhammad, said there was a \$10 million to \$20 million project afoot to restore the entire airfield. But that money would come from Congress, and there had been no sign of it.

"There is no bureaucratic channel," General Muhammad said of the \$500,000 in accelerated money. "It will be quick."

General Muhammad, who asked that no pictures be taken of his face, referred to himself as "invisible," clearly another reference to the dangers of being identified as a recipient of American money.

But for all those concerns, the projects are rolling forward, even where the strange contrivance was pounding away at the ground next to the village of Khazna. The technician who was running the machine, a Syrian Kurd named Khalid Esa, said he was within 15 feet of water.

Miami Herald
July 20, 2004

Iraqi Police Show Resilience After Deadly Attack At Station

When insurgents attacked Baghdad's biggest police station, killing nine Iraqis, officers stood their ground instead of running, as they did after a bombing last fall.

By Ken Dilanian, Knight Ridder News Service

BAGHDAD - Just as nearly 300 police officers were gathering in their station's parking lot for a shift change Monday morning, a white tanker truck came barreling down a nearby street, crashed into a brick wall and exploded.

With timing that suggested inside knowledge of police routines, the blast killed nine Iraqis, including two police officers, and injured at least 62, the Health Ministry said. It was the fifth vehicle bombing in the past week, including one suicide attack that narrowly missed the justice minister -- but killed five bodyguards -- and another that killed 11 people outside the protected area that houses the interim Iraqi government.

After a relatively calm period following the June 28 transfer of sovereignty, the strikes underscored the insurgency's undiminished resolve to destabilize the country. In a separate act Monday, militants killed a top official in the Defense Ministry in a drive-by shooting as he walked to his Baghdad home.

"They don't want security to prevail. They want the chaos to continue," said Officer Hatham Fawzi, standing where dozens of his colleagues had been wounded.

While some young officers sat speechless, dazed or distraught after the attack, many expressed a grim determination to continue their jobs.

"Surely this won't shake us," said Sgt. Raad Saad, who left the hospital to return to the police station despite a bruised leg that he could barely walk on.

Their resilience contrasted with officers' behavior following an attack on the station in October 2003 -- after which police fled the scene -- suggesting the police force has matured considerably.

WIDESPREAD DAMAGE

Monday's bomb carved a giant crater at the impact site, and the blast waves devastated the interior of the al Bayaa police station, Baghdad's largest. Inside the two-story building, every door was blown off its moorings, every window shattered into bits and shards. Files lay strewn about and blood spattered the floor.

In the parking lot beside the crater, 80 police vehicles were damaged, some crushed beyond recognition. Charred flesh stained the ground.

Although some U.S. military police work in the station, none were there when the bomb exploded.

The bomber struck around 8:30 a.m., as night-shift officers were returning from patrol and day-shift officers were receiving their assignments -- all standing together in the parking lot. Asked about the possibility of an inside tip-off, Col. Khaldoun Abdullah, the station commander, said: "They had very accurate information, and I don't want to go further."

Iraqi police officers are a prime target for militants who consider them collaborators. Hundreds have been shot dead or blown up across the country in the past year.

At nearby Yarmuk Hospital, where most of the injured were taken, every emergency room bed was filled, and patients were being treated on the floor. Doctors ran short of sutures and chest tubes.

"I was standing with my colleagues waiting for the morning assignment, when suddenly a massive explosion happened," said Officer Ali Subal, 40, his head covered with a bandage. "I was thrown to the ground and hit my head on a rock.

"I saw huge smoke and dust in the area. Flames were coming from everywhere. I saw most of my friends lying on the ground bleeding. I tried to rescue one of them but he was dead -- something penetrated his chest."

Muthema Faiz, 23, a patrol officer whose arms had been cut by shrapnel and glass, said: "We had just arrived at the police station after finishing our patrol. I heard a loud explosion. I saw a lot of bodies and burned cars. I'm worried about my two friends. I couldn't find them."

OCTOBER BOMBING

Sixteen people, including six Iraqi police officers and one U.S. soldier, were killed when the building was hit by a suicide bomber Oct. 27.

Tall concrete blast shields had been placed at the front of the building, but none were in the rear, which abuts a street in a residential and business district.

That's where the truck exploded Monday. Although the bomb went off more than 400 feet from the police station, the explosion was large enough that its kill zone reached the gathering of officers. Police on the scene said 28 officers were wounded.

Also among the dead and injured were residents, shop owners and their patrons.

"I was preparing breakfast for my husband, when suddenly my ceiling collapsed on my head," said Hayat Abed Ali, 59, who was being treated for head injuries and a broken arm. Her house also was damaged in the October attack. "We can't withstand this situation anymore."



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Talking Points – July 19, 2004 - Troop Strength

Earlier this month, the Army began notifying approximately 5,600 soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of their pending mobilization to active duty.

IRR soldiers have completed an active-duty enlistment but they are still within eight years of when they entered the military. All enlistees agree to an eight-year commitment, usually served in a combination of active, reserve-component and IRR service.

Following are talking points on the IRR call up and Army end strength numbers.

- The activation of several thousand IRR soldiers will allow the Army to fill spaces in the units called up for Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 and Freedom 6.
 - Having access to IRR soldiers means less disruption across the force – it allows the Army to fill holes in units without having to call up other units simply to make up for shortfalls.
 - IRR is a manpower tool in the Ready Reserve. The IRR is designed to meet the Army's individual manpower requirements during times of national emergency.
 - There are approximately 111,000 IRR soldiers, both officers and enlisted personnel.
 - Letters were sent on July 6 to 5,674 IRR soldiers; approximately 4,000 will be brought to active duty.
- Before calling up IRR soldiers, the Army will look first for active Army soldiers who match the grade and skill requirements needed.
 - Most of the soldiers brought to active duty will be in the specialties of military intelligence, engineers, truck drivers and other combat-service support forces.
- The Army recognizes deploying IRR soldiers
 - Because generally these families have no access to support systems in place at military bases or through reserve-component family-readiness groups, the Army has a process in place to help the IRR families meet their special needs and challenges.
 - The soldiers will be given a minimum of 30 days advance notice to report.
 - IRR soldiers will not be involuntarily mobilized if they have returned from a combat zone or hardship tour within the past 12 months of the notification of possible mobilization.
- Since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, the operational tempo for **U.S.** has increased as troops have helped remove two terrorist regimes, Hussein and senior al-Qaeda operatives and break up terrorist cells. **DoD** has long-term initiatives underway to relieve stress on the force and
 - Investing in new information-age technologies, precision weapons, unmanned air and sea vehicles;
 - Increasing the jointness of U.S. forces;
 - Rebalancing the active force and the Guard and Reserves; and
 - Converting jobs being performed by military personnel to civilian jobs, thus freeing troops for military tasks.

- **Increasing “end strength” – or the total number of military personnel – is solution to reducing the stress on the force.**
 - The capability of the force is more critical than the number of troops.
 - For instance, Coalition forces in Iraq defeated a larger adversary with speed, power and agility, not mass.
 - A permanent end strength increase is very likely the slowest, least effective and most expensive option for increasing capability and reducing stress on the force.
 - Because of the time necessary to recruit, train and integrate new troops, the benefits of increasing end strength will not be felt for some time.
 - A permanent increase in end strength would require cuts in other areas, which would mean less funding for transformational capabilities that will allow DoD to do more with fewer forces than there are currently.
- **The United States can afford the military force necessary to ensure national security, but end strength is a last, not first, choice.**

For more information about the Individual Ready Reserve call up, please link to a July 16 story with highlights of an interview with Gen. Richard A. Cody, vice chief of staff of the Army, and a June 30 story. Both stories are posted on www.defenselink.mil, the Defense Department's web site. Gen. Cody's interview will appear soon on [the Pentagon Channel](#).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 14, 2004 - Women's Progress in Afghanistan

Women have made great progress in post-Taliban Afghanistan – their lives are better, they have more opportunities, and they are helping to shape their government. Following are highlights.

Afghan women are:

- **Receiving better health care.**
 - Afghanistan has the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world. It also has a significantly high child mortality rate (one in four children die before age five). Adult life expectancy is 46, lower for women.
 - In the short term, the U.S. is putting a priority on rebuilding health clinics and schools, training midwives and teachers and providing supplies such as medical equipment and textbooks.
 - The U.S. has rehabilitated or constructed 140 health clinics and expects to double the number in 2004.
 - More than \$10 million in grants is being used to deliver health services by women-focused non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and for vocational training for women as community health care workers and midwives.
 - In the long term, the goal is to build the capacity of Afghans to sustain the positive changes.
- **Getting educations.**
 - Afghan girls are attending school. According to the Afghan Ministry of Education, girls comprise 35 percent of the 5.8 million Afghan children attending schools. This is the highest number by far in Afghan history. Female illiteracy countrywide in Afghanistan is estimated to be 86 percent.
 - Approximately 80 percent of schools were damaged or destroyed in the decades of conflict in Afghanistan. More than 200 schools have been rebuilt, 7,000 teachers have been trained and 25 million textbooks have been provided.
 - Because Afghan women have identified jobs as one of their major concerns, U.S. programs stress education and skill training, plus financial help for women and assistance for widows. Included are programs to educate women on their property rights and legal processes.
- **Participating in government.**
 - Two Cabinet ministers are women.
 - A woman heads the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.
 - When the Loya Jirga met in January to create a new constitution, 102 of the 500 delegates were women.
 - The constitution gives the right to vote to all citizens, men and women, and guarantees freedom of expression, assembly and religion.
 - Women can now register to vote in the upcoming elections this fall.
 - Over one third of registered voters are women.
 - In cities where there are U.S.-funded women's radio stations (Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif) almost half of the women have registered.

For more information, link to a report for Congress prepared by the State Department ([report](#)). The Defense Department has an [Afghanistan Update](#) link on www.defendamerica.mil, its web page about the Global War on Terror.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 9, 2004 - Global War on Terror

Iraqis continue to rebuild their lives and their nation less than a month after the transfer of sovereignty. While Coalition troops remain in Iraq to help establish the stability and security that democracy requires, Iraqis are also stepping forward to protect their own country.

Forty Iraqi women soldiers will graduate today from a military training course in Jordan, the second of three classes of women soldiers planned to train at the base. Earlier this week, the Iraqi Army's 6th Battalion completed its basic training and activated at a graduation ceremony for more than 500 soldiers at the Kurkush military training base. This course marks the second Iraqi Army battalion solely trained by Iraqis.

More than 50 million people have been freed from brutal dictatorships in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are central fronts on the Global War on Terror. Following are talking points on the Coalition's efforts, successes and challenges in the two countries.

➤ Why is the Coalition in

- Iraq and Afghanistan were state sponsors of terrorism and harbored terrorists. In the case of Iraq, they also had the potential to give WMD to terrorists.
- In both cases, the Coalition went in after U.N. resolutions gave the Taliban and Saddam Hussein a last clear chance to comply with the international community. They failed that chance.
- Neither action was about stockpiles of weapons or imminent threats. It was about the clear lesson of September 11th: The United States cannot wait for a threat to become imminent; the dots must be connected early to defeat the threat before it is too late.

➤ Why is it important

- The Coalition cannot turn away and allow these two countries to slide back to the havens for terrorism they once were.
- Iraq and Afghanistan are in the early stages of building democracies. They will be more stable countries with representative governments, just as so many eastern European countries have become.
- Terrorists understand that winning in Iraq and Afghanistan is a major defeat for them.

➤ How is the Coalition is

- The key to victory is Iraqi and Afghan self-government and self-defense
- The most promising development in both countries is Iraqis and Afghans stepping forward to govern their own countries and to defend themselves. They are being led by brave Iraqi officials who know first-hand the personal risks they take by standing up to the enemy. The great majority of Iraqis want a free and democratic Iraq, at peace with itself and its neighbors. Iraqis know that they must not retreat in the face of evil.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 7, 2004 - National Security Personnel System

The Department of Defense is restructuring the way it hires, pays, promotes and disciplines its more than 650,000 civilian employees. Although the efforts to update the personnel system began before Sept. 11, 2001, the changes will allow the Department to better utilize the tremendous skill and talent of not only its civilian workforce, but also the men and women in uniform as the United States fights the Global War on Terror. Secretary of the Navy Gordon England was asked by Secretary Rumsfeld to help develop a new National Security Personnel System (NSPS). Following are talking points.

- The National Security Personnel System will allow DoD to transform the civilian personnel system to make it more agile and responsive.
 - The new system introduces changes in the way DoD hires, pays, promotes and disciplines its civilian employees.
 - Currently 19th century rules limit the Department's ability to use personnel to execute 21st century missions.
 - The system is still in the development stage. The process will be both careful and thoughtful. DoD employees and union representatives are being asked to provide input throughout the development. Secretary England has set a goal of having draft regulations published in the Federal Register by the end of this year, and pilot projects in place next summer.
 - The task is to design a system that:
 - Supports DoD's national security mission.
 - Treats workers fairly and protects their rights.
- The National Security Personnel System will develop personnel rules for the Department's 650,000 civilian employees so the right person can be placed in the right job. The NSPS will:
 - Speed up the hiring process.
 - Introduce pay-for-performance bonuses.
 - Streamline the promotion process.
 - Give DoD senior managers flexibility to place civilian workers where they are most needed, without delay.
 - Better utilize the active duty force by making it easier to employ civilian employees in jobs currently being filled by uniformed military personnel.
 - More than 300,000 military personnel are now doing jobs that could be carried out by civilians.
 - Moving some fraction of those people in uniform out of civilian jobs and back into military jobs will reduce the stress on the force, allowing them to focus on their military duties.
- 9 Congress authorized the NSPS as part of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act.
 - The new National Security Personnel System is the most significant improvement to the civilian personnel management since the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
 - The law passed by Congress covers the following areas: job classification, pay banding, staffing flexibilities and pay for performance.
 - The NSPS legislation passed by Congress ensures:
 - Veterans' preference is protected.
 - Merit systems principles govern changes in personnel management.
 - Whistleblowers are protected.
 - Discrimination remains illegal.
- 9 The new personnel system is a collaborative effort.
 - DoD is working with other government agencies as it develops the new system. DoD officials are consulting with the Office of Personnel Management, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government Accounting Office. Officials are also looking at the Department of Homeland Security, which built its own personnel system after it was formed last year.
 - DoD civilians and others interested in the system should check a special web site launched by the Department to give employees current information on the system's implementation. The NSPS web site is central source of information on NSPS. The address is: www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – July 2, 2004 - July 4th Messages

As America celebrates Independence Day this weekend, the Department of Defense would like to recognize the men and women who serve to protect our Nation, and the families, employers and communities that support them.

Following are highlights of Defense Department leaders' messages to the troops.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

From an interview yesterday with the American Forces Press Service and the Pentagon Channel.

"As we go into the July 4th weekend, it seems to me that people will be reminded of our independence and of the freedoms that we value and how important the people in uniform are to the protection of those freedoms and to the defense of freedom. We have to be grateful. We are grateful, And I know the American people are deeply grateful."

Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, C J Chiefs of Staff

Excerpt of the July Fourth message from Gen. Myers

"This Independence Day we celebrate our Nation's 228th birthday and honor the legacy of our founding fathers. Pioneers like Presidents Washington and Jefferson set a young nation on a course for democracy guided by the values of liberty and justice that have shaped our national character. As we pay tribute to the past, we must also look to the future and face the challenges of the 21st century.

"Today, as throughout our history, the proud members of our Armed Forces are meeting these challenges head on, engaged around the world keeping the peace and demonstrating our firm resolve. Through your unwavering service and commitment] you have secured America's shores and given hope to millions that liberty and justice can be theirs too."

Marine Gen. Peter Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

In an interview with the American Forces Press Service and the Pentagon Channel yesterday] Gen. Pace said that as July Fourth approaches, each service member should "Take a minute to really appreciate the fact that every single one of them is making a difference.

"There's no doubt in my mind that each of them would rather be home with family, friends, loved ones. But there is also no doubt in my mind that the vast majority of our troops overseas understand exactly what they are doing and why they are doing it. They are proud to be serving."

Links:

American Forces Press Service [story](#) AFPS/Pentagon Channel interview with Secretary Rumsfeld

Gen. Myers July Fourth [Message](#)

American Forces Press Service [story](#) - AFPS/Pentagon Channel interview with Gen. Pace

Watch excerpts from the interviews of Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace on www.pentagonchannel.mil.

Read Defense Department news at www.defenselink.mil and www.defendamerica.mil.

Learn how Americans are thanking the troops at the [Operation Tribute to Freedom](#) web site.

11-L-0559/OSD/46883



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – June 30, 2004 – Individual Ready Reserve Mobilization

Beginning July 6, the Army will begin notifying approximately 5,600 soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of their pending mobilization to active duty. Following are talking points on the announcement.

Messages

- The Army Reserve is an integral part of an Army that is serving the nation in the
- President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have pledged that if American commanders ask
- Secretary Rumsfeld has pointed out there are too few of some essential skills and capabilities in the Active and Reserve forces and too many in others.
 - The Army is restructuring its force during the next few years to create more units in stressed fields and reduce units that have not been needed in recent years.
 - DoD has dozens of long-term initiatives underway to relieve stress on the force, and increase its capability by:
 - Investing in new information age technologies, precision weapons, unmanned air and sea vehicles;
 - Increasing the jointness of U.S. forces;
 - Rebalancing the Active force and the Guard and Reserves; and
 - Converting jobs being performed by military personnel to civilian jobs, thus freeing troops for military tasks.
- America is grateful for the sacrifices that our troops, their families and their employers make

Background

Why are Individual Ready Reserve soldiers being called up?

- IRR soldiers are being mobilized to meet unique manpower and mission requirements in support of the Global War on Terror.
- Using the IRR allows the Army to build the future rotational force into a structure that has some predictability.
- The soldiers will fill vacancies in the National Guard and Army Reserve units scheduled to rotate into Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
- These are seasoned and experienced soldiers who can contribute significantly to Army readiness and operational capabilities.
- Before calling up IRR soldiers, the Army will look first for active Army soldiers who match the grade and skill requirements needed.

What is the Individual Ready Reserve? Who serves in it?

- The IRR does not include retirees. There are no retirees associated with this call-up.
- The IRR is a manpower pool in the Ready Reserve. The IRR is designed to meet the Army's individual manpower requirements during times of national emergency.
- IRR soldiers have had training, have served previously in the Active Army or the selected Reserve, and may have some period of military service obligation remaining.
- There are approximately 111,000 IRR soldiers.
- The IRR consists of both officer and enlisted personnel.

How much notice will the IRR soldiers be given? How long will they serve?

- Soldiers will be given a minimum of 30 days advance notice to report.
- The soldiers will be mobilized for approximately 18 months (including 12 months of "boots on the ground" in theater); their actual period of service may be adjusted on the needs of the Army for service of up to 24 cumulative months.
- The soldiers will be assigned to designated mobilizing Army National Guard and Reserve units based upon the needs of the Army.
- The soldiers will be brought on active duty over an extended period in several groups, from July through December 2004.
- IRR soldiers will not be involuntarily mobilized if they have returned from a combat zone or hardship tour within the past 12 months of their notification of possible mobilization.
- Soldiers who require more than 60 days of reclassification training will generally not be mobilized.

Have IRR soldiers been used before?

- Yes. During the Gulf War, more than 20,000 IRR soldiers were mobilized and deployed. Since then, there have been several other voluntary and involuntary soldier call-ups, including approximately 2,500 IRR soldiers mobilized since Sept. 11, 2001, in the Global War on Terror.

Under whose authority are the troops being mobilized?

- The Secretary of Defense approved the Army's request for further access to the IRR on Jan. 20, 2004. The approval authorizes the mobilization of up to 6,500 IRR soldiers involuntary.
- Every effort has been made to minimize the impact of the call up by first contacting individual IRR soldiers and soliciting volunteers prior to initiating mandatory call-ups.
- More than 1,000 IRR soldiers have volunteered to mobilize in support of the Global War on Terror.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – June 29, 2004 – Supreme Court Detainee Decision

The Supreme Court on June 28 ruled on three cases concerning enemy combatants being held in the Global War on Terror. Following are talking points on what the decisions mean and some short background on the cases and the Court's decisions.

What the Decisions Mean

- The ruling is important in that it affirms the President's authority to detain enemy combatants, including U.S. citizens, in the Global War on Terror.
- The Court recognizes that these essential authorities are necessary to defend America against its enemies.
- The Court also held that certain procedural rights must be afforded to enemy combatants to contest their detention.
- The Court's decision reaffirms the Administration's right to try enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo by military commissions.

The Review Process

- The Department of Defense has initiated a new review process to conduct an annual review of each enemy combatant held by the department in Guantanamo.
- These reviews are an opportunity for detainees at Guantanamo to challenge their detention and for the U.S. government to determine whether to release or continue to detain each combatant.
- The department will be reviewing the Court's ruling to see how to modify existing procedures to satisfy the court.

Yasser Hamdi

- Yasser Hamdi is an American who was raised in Saudi Arabia. He was captured in Afghanistan fighting with the Taliban against U.S. forces and is being held in the Charleston Consolidated Navy Brig since being moved there in the summer of 2003.
- The Court said Hamdi has the right to contest his detention.

Jose Padilla

- Jose Padilla is an American citizen. He was arrested in O'Hare airport. He is being detained in connection with a plot to detonate a "dirty bomb" and is alleged to be associated with al-Qaeda.
- The Court ruled the lawsuit filed on behalf of Padilla saying that since Padilla is now jailed in South Carolina, the New York court where his habeas petition was filed does not have jurisdiction. He must refile his petition in South Carolina.

Consolidated Cases of Rasul v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United States

- This case involved a group of 16 detainees who brought suit against the Department of Defense contesting that enemy combatants held at Guantanamo have the right to bring habeas corpus cases – in short, they have the right to contest their detention in federal courts.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – June 28, 2004 – Iraqi Sovereignty

The Coalition Keeps Its Word – Sovereignty Is Transferred to Iraq, Ahead of Schedule

- Legal documents were signed this morning in Baghdad transferring sovereignty of Iraq from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the Interim Iraqi Government on behalf of the Iraqi people.
- The Coalition has kept its word to:
 - End a dangerous regime.
 - Free the oppressed.
 - Restore sovereignty.
- U.S. Ambassador to Iraq John Negroponte has arrived in Iraq. He will lead the new U.S. embassy in Baghdad.

International Support For Iraq Is Growing

- The NATO Alliance has agreed to help train Iraqi security forces.
- Iraq's interim government has gained broad international support and has been endorsed by the U.N. Security Council.

U.S. Will Maintain Its Commitment to the Iraqi People

- The commitment of the U.S. military in Iraq has not changed. U.S. and Coalition forces will remain in Iraq and will operate under American command as part of a multinational force authorized by the U.N.
- As leaders of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF), provided for under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, the United States will continue as full partners in helping the new government bring democracy and security to Iraq. The aid will focus on:
 - Supporting Iraq's political transition.
 - Equipping and training Iraqi security forces.
 - Helping set the stage for national elections at the end of the year.
- U.S. and Coalition forces have served honorably in Iraq.
 - The dedication of the servicemen and women, and that of thousands of civilians, has helped to restore freedom to Iraq and rebuild the country.
 - The Department of Defense is grateful for the sacrifices they and their families have made.

Five Steps Toward a Free and Democratic Iraq

As outlined by President Bush before the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. ([May 24 transcript](#))

1. Hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government.
2. Help establish the stability and security in Iraq that democracy requires.
3. Continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure.
4. Encourage more international support.
5. Move toward free, national elections that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people.

Links: [Defenselink story](#) [Defenselink story](#) [photo essay of signing](#) [President Bush remarks](#)

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz answers questions about Iraq on ["Ask the White House."](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – June 25, 2004 – Public Opinion in Iraq

Despite attempts by terrorists and insurgents to sow instability in Iraq as the June 30 date for transition to sovereignty draws nearer, a recent poll of Iraqis shows many feel positive about their country and their future. Because of the sacrifice and determination of U.S. and Coalition soldiers and the Iraqi people, Iraq has made great progress toward the five steps toward a free and democratic Iraq outlined by President Bush ([transcript](#)). Following are talking points on Iraqi views and accomplishments.

Step One:

Hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government.

- On June 30, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will transfer full sovereignty to Iraq.
- The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) will become the ruling body in Iraq.
 - The Iraqi Interim Government will consist of a president, two deputy-presidents, a prime minister and 26 ministries.
 - Control of all 26 ministries has already been turned over to Iraqi ministers.
- The Iraqi Interim Government will operate under the rules defined in the Transitional Administrative Law, the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world.
- On June 8, the U.N. Security Council unanimously endorsed the Iraqi Interim Government and the holding of democratic elections no later than January 2005.

Iraqi snapshot:

- 80 percent of Iraqis approve of the interim government and 68 percent of Iraqis have confidence in it.
- 79 percent of Iraqis think the interim government will make things better for Iraq.
- 84 percent of Iraqis approve of President Al-Yawer; 73 percent approve of Prime Minister Allawi.

Step Two

Help establish the stability and security in Iraq that democracy requires.

- Iraqi Security Forces are growing. More than 200,000 Iraqis are on duty or in training to protect their country.
- Iraqi police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) have recently captured several terrorists, including a key al-Zarqawi lieutenant.
- The ICDC is conducting joint patrols throughout Iraq with other Coalition forces and Iraqi police forces.

Iraqi snapshot:

- 52 percent of Iraqis say that security is the most urgent issue facing Iraq. This is the lowest number ever for "security." Infrastructure placed second at 22 percent; the first time it has been deemed more urgent than "economy."
- 70 percent of Iraqis express confidence in the New Iraqi Army.
- 82 percent of Iraqis express confidence in the Iraqi Police Service.

Step Three

Continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure.

- Estimated crude oil export revenue is more than \$6.9 billion for 2004.
- All 22 universities and 43 technical institutes and colleges are open.
- Coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500 schools and an additional 1,200 are expected to be completed by the end of the year.

- All 240 hospitals and more than 1,200 health clinics are open. Health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times over pre-war levels.
- An estimated 85 percent of Iraqi children have been immunized.
- There are now 55,000 Internet subscribers in Baghdad; in 2002 there were 3,000.
- The number of telephone subscribers, including cell phones, is now more than 1.2 million – more than 45 percent above pre-war levels.

Iraqi snapshot:

- Infrastructure issues are rising in importance for Iraqis.
- Infrastructure needs are seen as the second most urgent issue in Iraq after security.

Step Four

Encourage more international support.

- Thirty-one countries have forces in Iraq.
- Prime Minister Allawi has written NATO ahead of the upcoming summit in Istanbul, requesting additional international forces in Iraq. After June 30, U.S. and Coalition forces will remain in Iraq and will operate under American command as part of a multinational force authorized by the U.N.
- Prime Minister Ayad Allawi announced a plan regarding the country's militias. Nearly 90 percent of the 100,000 militia members will transition into new occupations prior to the elections.

Step Five

Move toward a national election that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people.

- By the end of 2005, Iraqis are scheduled to vote on a new constitution that will protect the rights of all Iraqi citizens regardless of their religion or ethnicity. This is the historic point when Iraq will have the necessary legitimacy for durable self-rule. During this process Iraqis will decide for themselves the exact structure of their permanent government and the provisions of their Iraqi constitution.
- The U.N. Security Council on June 8 unanimously passed Resolution 1546, endorsing the transition timetable adopted by Iraqis and encouraging other U.N. members to add their support.
- The international community at large will continue to play a key role in helping Iraq stand on its own feet through actions such as economic assistance, debt relief and continued military support.

Iraqi Snapshot

- Over 50 percent of Iraqis believe that elections will be free and fair (36 percent believed that there will be minor problems).
- 75 percent of Iraqis believe that the best guarantee of free and fair elections is the careful watch by international election experts.
- 64 percent of Iraqis believe that all political parties, regardless of their policies, should be allowed to have access to TV in order to reach voters.
- Just 13 percent of Iraqis believe that the area where they live is controlled by parties or other organizations that would force their vote.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – GTMO Interrogation Documents - June 23, 2004

On June 22, the Department of Defense released documents relating to interrogation procedures for detainees at Guantanamo. Following are talking points on the issue.

- **Detainees at Guantanamo have been treated humanely.**
 - The documents released show that the President gave clear direction that all detainees were to be treated humanely.
 - The process was respectful of people. No procedures approved for use ordered, authorized, permitted or tolerated torture. Some of the approved techniques were never used.
 - Techniques approved included changing sleep patterns of the detainees, staring at the detainee to encourage discomfort, and the use of mild, noninjurious physical contact such as poking.
 - The guidelines issued for interrogations protected the detainees, our institutions and the troops responsible for carrying out these operations.
 - It has always been the policy and practice of the Defense Department and the U.S. government doctrine to treat detainees humanely, and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention.

- **The process to review detainee interrogation procedures**
 - It was clear from the moment the United States was attacked on September 11th that we were in a new kind of war, with a new kind of enemy, which required reviewing detainee interrogation procedures.
 - Opinions were sought and considered from many government and military officials.

- **The United States is at war with an enemy that will stop at nothing to kill innocent people.**
 - In the Global War on Terror, the United States faces a new kind of enemy, and consequently a new group of people from whom to gather intelligence.
 - There is no doubt that interrogating detainees saves lives. The detainees have information about our enemy: how he works, operates, and finances his activities. Getting this information has helped us prevent attacks.
 - Detainee interrogations are an invaluable tool in the Global War on Terror.
 - The same day the Department released documents to show American openness and reassure its commitment to humane treatment, our enemy cut off the head of a South Korean businessman.

Rumsfeld OK'd Harsh Treatment

Interrogation documents made public

By John Diamond, USA Today

WASHINGTON — In an extraordinary disclosure of classified material, the Bush administration released 258 pages of internal documents Tuesday that portray harsh interrogation techniques — including stripping terror suspects and threatening them with dogs — as a necessary response to threats from al-Qaeda terrorists.

The release of lists of interrogation techniques and other documents previously kept secret even from U.S. allies was a bid by the administration to quiet harsh criticism over its handling of prisoners in the war on terror and the conflict in Iraq.

Though some of the memos argued that Bush had the right to approve torture, the administration said it had never done so, and pointed to techniques it said fell far short of torture. In a separate press briefing Tuesday, the Justice Department backed away from a memo written in 2002 that appeared to justify the use of torture in the war on terror. That memo argued that the president's wartime powers superseded anti-torture laws and treaties.

Bush made his most explicit comments yet about the issue Tuesday: "We do not condone torture. I have never ordered torture. I will never order torture," Bush said.

The documents reveal Bush, senior administration officials and hard-pressed commanders in the field grappling with the need to extract information about future terror attacks from suspects skilled at defeating many interrogation techniques. In a Feb. 7, 2002, finding, Bush said the Sept. 11 terror attacks require "new thinking in the law of war."

Bush said al-Qaeda members and their Taliban allies in Afghanistan were not covered by the protections of the Geneva Conventions. But he ordered U.S. armed forces to treat them "humanely" anyway, and to observe Geneva Conventions standards "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity."

Just such a necessity arose months later when the first anniversary of Sept. 11 brought new fears of terror attack. Intelligence officers at the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, told their superiors that Mohamed al-Kahtani, believed to be the would-be 20th hijacker in the Sept. 11 plot, was withholding information about new attacks, Daniel Dell'Orto, the Pentagon's deputy general counsel told reporters at a White House briefing Tuesday.

The alert set in motion a review that culminated with a N o ~27,2002, "action memo" in which Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved interrogation techniques that included "removal of clothing" and "inducing stress by use of detainee's fears (e.g. dogs)."

Rumsfeld also approved placing detainees in "stress positions," such as standing for up to 4 hours, though he apparently found this approach unimpressive. Rumsfeld, who works at a stand-up desk, scrawled on the memo, "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to four hours? D.R."

Eventually, after military officers raised moral and legal concerns about the techniques and the Pentagon conducted an internal review, Rumsfeld issued revised rules for Guantanamo in April 2003 that omitted the stripping and use of dogs.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – GTMO Interrogation Process - June 23, 2004

The Department of Defense today released approximately a hundred pages of declassified documents related to how interrogation procedures for detainees at Guantanamo were developed. Following are talking points.

(The declassified documents will be available on www.defenselink.mil.)

Release of the Documents

Release of the documents demonstrates:

- The Department's concern to balance law with the need to obtain intelligence on the Global War on Terror.
- The actions of the Defense Department are bound by law and guided by American values.
- The transparency with which the Department is conducting inquiries into abuse allegations.

The Interrogation Procedures

The interrogation procedures:

- Are developed and reviewed with strict legal and policy reviews so that the detainees, our institutions and our troops who carry out the operations are all protected.
- Are reviewed and modified when deemed necessary and appropriate.

The February Decision

The February decision set the policy for the operations at Guantanamo.

- The processes and procedures that followed:
 - Reflect America's values.
 - Call for all detainees in U.S. custody to be treated humanely.
 - Call for all detainees in U.S. custody to be treated to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Convention.

Timeline

Following is a brief timeline that led to the development of the documents and the interrogation procedures in effect today at Guantanamo.

Jan. 11, 2002

- The first detainees arrive at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-Guantanamo).
- From January to December 2002 interrogations are guided by doctrine contained in Field Manual 34-52.
 - The manual sets forth basic interrogation principles for the U.S. Armed Forces in a conventional military conflict.
 - The interrogation procedures include 17 techniques such as direct questioning and providing incentives.

Summer 2002

- The U.S. is in a high-threat environment. Intelligence continues to indicate planning by al-Qaeda for attacks in the U.S. and elsewhere.
- Among the detainees at Guantanamo are individuals with close connections to al-Qaeda leadership and people who demonstrated they had been trained by al-Qaeda to resist interrogation methods set out in Field Manual 34-52.

Oct. 11, 2002

- The commander of JTF-Guantanamo requests the use of additional techniques for an individual who is believed to have close al-Qaeda connections.
- The commander requests approval for 20 other interrogation techniques.

Oct. 25, 2002

- The commander of U.S. Southern Command forwards the JTF-Guantanamo commander's request to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

Nov. 27, 2002

- The General Counsel, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommends the Secretary of Defense approve 17 of the 20 techniques requested by Southern Command.

Dec. 2, 2002

- The Secretary of Defense approves the 17 techniques recommended by the General Counsel.
- The techniques approved are arranged on a three-tiered system that require approval from different levels of the chain of command before they can be used. A number of the techniques approved are never used.
- The guidelines are in effect from Dec. 2, 2002, until Jan. 15, 2003.

Jan. 15, 2003

- The Secretary of Defense rescinds the Dec. 2, 2002, guidance when he learns some advisors outside the process are concerned about this decision.
- The Secretary directs the Defense Department's general counsel to establish a working group of representatives from offices in DoD to address the legal, policy and operational issues related to interrogating detainees held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the Global War on Terror.
- The Justice Department advises the working group in its deliberations.
- The working group reports 35 techniques as appropriate for consideration. It rejects several as inappropriate or lacking sufficient information to permit review.

(Note, for more information about the working group, read the transcript from a DoD background briefing on May 20, 2004, posted on DefenseLINK under the [transcripts](#) section.)

April 16, 2003

- After this deliberative and determinative legal and policy review from the working group, the Secretary of Defense approves the use of 24 techniques for use at Guantanamo.
- Seventeen of the techniques approved come from Field Manual 34-52.
- Four of the techniques require Secretary notification before use.

Detainee Treatment

- It has always been the policy and practice of the Defense Department and the U.S. government doctrine to treat detainees humanely, and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention.
- No procedures approved for use ordered, authorized, permitted or tolerated torture.
- Individuals who have abused the trust and confidence in them will be held accountable.
- There are a number of inquiries that are ongoing to look at specific allegations of abuse. Those investigations will run their course.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – June 16, 2004 – Prisoner Treatment

Following are talking points on the prison abuse scandal and the legal and military context of holding and interrogating prisoners.

INVESTIGATIONS

- The Administration is taking the
 - A series of investigations have been initiated to find those responsible for wrongdoing, bring them to justice, and ensure that such behavior does not happen again.
 - The ongoing investigations relate to both specific allegations of abuse and to address potential systemic problems.
 - While the abuses at Abu Ghraib are horrific, the Iraqi people, the American people and the world are seeing that the U.S. democratic system functions and operates transparently.
- The great majority of U.S. service members conduct themselves in strict accordance represent themselves, the United States
 - The military is a values-based organization committed to respecting the international laws of armed conflict.

LEGAL CONTEXT

- After 911, the United States faced a new kind of enemy. The United States had to review people who
 - The Administration's decision-making process on how to proceed with interrogations in the post-911 world was a careful legal analysis of complicated issues.
 - The process was deliberative, involving experts from several agencies. Many opinions were expressed.
 - After carefully reviewing the recommendations, the President issued very clear guidance and expressed his firm commitment against torture.
 - The decisions were made within the existing legal framework of the Geneva Conventions that would enable the United States to effectively defend itself against future attacks while respecting international standards.
- The Administration is firmly committed
 - The Administration has made clear that Geneva Conventions apply in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 - While the prisoners at Guantanamo are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions, they are treated in accordance with the provisions of the Conventions.

MILITARY CONTEXT

- The President has a responsibility to
 - After 911, the nation found itself at war with a new kind of enemy, and consequently, a new group of people from whom to gather intelligence.
 - Terrorists will stop at nothing to kill innocent people around the world -- in New York, in Riyadh, in Madrid and in Bali.
 - While the U.S. must be ever vigilant to protect against attacks, terrorists need only be lucky once.

FACTS V. MYTHS

- The photographs from Abu Ghraib are shocking. Such tactics were never
 - The facts bear repeating: Every standing policy and every order articulated by senior officers from the President on down stated clearly that humane treatment is to be afforded to prisoners.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Afghanistan Update - June 15, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld welcomed President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan to the Pentagon yesterday.

The secretary commended President Karzai's leadership and noted the movement to democracy is always difficult, especially in a country that endured 23 years of war, five years of Taliban repression, and seven years of drought.

Following are talking points about the progress in Afghanistan.

Accomplishments - ghts

- A transitional government was established in June 2002.
- A new constitution was ratified in January.
- Nearly 10,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers have been trained. They have participated in joint patrols and combat missions.
- The Kabul-to-Kandahar road was completed in December 2003, cutting the travel time between the two cities from 15 to five hours, and construction of the Kandahar-Herat portion of the "ring road" is underway. The ring road will link major Afghan cities and other areas to help facilitate commerce, security, attract foreign investment and better unify the country.

Coalition's Goals in Afghanistan

As outlined by Army Gen. John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, the Coalition's goals in Afghanistan are:

- To conduct "robust combat operations" around the country's border with Pakistan to defeat al Qaeda.
- To destroy Taliban remnants and increase the presence of the Afghan National Army throughout the country.
- To increase reconstruction efforts through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and further internationalize PRTs.
- To increase the capacity of the Afghan national government to control the country's security.

International Contributions

- Approximately 18,000 U.S. soldiers and 2,000 soldiers from Coalition countries are deployed in Afghanistan.
- Army Lt. Gen. David Barno is the Commanding General of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan.
- There are also 6,000 International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) under the control of NATO.
- In early 2002, during a G-8 meeting in Geneva, certain nations were designated as the "lead country" relative to Afghanistan reconstruction and security. For example, the United States is taking the lead on the Afghan National Army; Japan on disarming former militia; the United Kingdom on counter-narcotics, Italy on judicial reform and Germany on police training.

Security

- The Afghan government is taking an increasing role in providing for its own security.
- Currently, more than 9,700 soldiers have been trained for the new Afghan National Army and more than 12,500 Afghan National Police have been trained.
- More than 6,000 former combatants have been demobilized as part of a pilot program designed to eliminate private militias.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

PRTs are small groups of civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces. There are 15 PRTs now in Afghanistan, with another expected by the end of June.

- PRTs extend the reach of the Afghan national government.
- They enhance security in their respective areas.
- They facilitate reconstruction.
- PRTs are an example of the international community's coordination and willingness to join the Coalition in the Global War on Terror. Some of the leaders of the PRTs include New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Germany, under the auspices of NATO.

Governance and Elections

- A transitional government was established in June 2002.
- The Constitutional Loya Jirga approved the Afghan constitution on Jan. 4, 2004.
 - The adoption of the constitution is a significant milestone in Afghanistan's path toward a moderate, democratic society.
 - The Constitution is an effective system and balances power between a strong president, parliament and independent judiciary.
- Direct presidential elections will be held in the coming months.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – SecDef in Singapore - June 4, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld left Wednesday for a trip to Singapore and Bangladesh, where he will meet with Prime Minister Zia.

In Singapore the secretary is participating in the Institute of Scientific Studies Conference, otherwise known as the "Shangri-la Dialogue", a conference of Pacific nations. He will also meet with Singapore officials and with representatives of other U.S. Pacific-region allies.

This morning the secretary held a town hall meeting aboard the USS Essex, which was ported at Changi Naval Base in Singapore. He also administered the Oath of Enlistment to 30 sailors and two Marines aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Essex.

During the town hall meeting, the secretary made several points on the shape and progress of the Global War on Terror.

- Terrorists don't have armies, navies, air forces or even countries – they have little to defend. They must therefore be found through intelligence – such as how and where they move their money, move between countries, and communicate with each other.
- The hunt for Osama bin Laden continues, and the al Qaeda terrorist is under pressure. Saddam Hussein hid in his "spider hole" for months, with troops passing by every day. Eventually someone led soldiers to the right spot. Finding bin Laden will come by successful interrogations, and tracking people who have a connection with him.

The secretary also discussed the future of the Navy.

- The Navy is trying to invest in increasingly capable and lethal military equipment that is less manpower-intensive.
- Capabilities that make the Navy more agile and lethal mean new and better ships can operate with fewer people, so the Navy may see its personnel numbers remain level or drop modestly.
- The term "downsizing" leaves a misunderstanding in people's minds. The Navy of the future will be a more capable and more lethal force.

The secretary also acknowledged this weekend's ceremonies marking the 60th anniversary of the Allied forces invading Normandy and the mission of today's troops serving around the world.

- D-Day troops went overseas to defend American freedoms and "fight the designs of tyrants." The call to defend freedom is clear again today, and the duty falls to today's troops.
- The attacks of September 11th changed the world, which has struck back against terrorism.
 - A global Coalition has overthrown two vicious regimes, liberated 50 million people, disrupted terrorist cells and thwarted terrorist attacks.
 - To prevail against extremists and radicals, the Coalition must root out the terrorists before they develop more powerful means to inflict greater damage on innocent people.
- The country is grateful for the commitment, courage and resolve of the U.S. troops who volunteered for a cause larger than themselves.

Links: [USS Essex](#), [Shangri-la Dialogue link](#), [DoD DefenseLink articles](#)

Normandy Sacrifices Places Debt on All

Commentary by Jim Garamone

American Forces Press Service ([link to article on defenselink.mil](http://defenselink.mil))

WASHINGTON, June 4, 2004 – No matter how many military operations have been, or will be, launched: To Americans, D-Day will always be June 6, 1944.

D-Day was the "Greatest Generation's" ultimate operation and represents a lasting legacy.

The invasion at Normandy – code-named Operation Overlord – was the largest amphibious operation in history. Planning took years and required massive amounts of shipping, aircraft, equipment, supplies and, most of all, personnel.

As we look back on the invasion, it can seem that the invasion was pre-ordained for success. Nothing could be further from the truth. It was a daring operation into the teeth of a well-entrenched enemy.

Many "what-ifs" could have doomed the Allied invasion. What if Hitler had realized early that the landings in Normandy were the main Allied efforts? What if German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel had the time to perfect the defenses on the beaches? What if Panzer divisions had arrived at the beaches the day of the invasion? What if the men of the 1st and 29th Infantry divisions hadn't fought and clawed their way off "Bloody Omaha" Beach?

These what-ifs-turned-into-certainty could have changed the course of history. Even with these what-ifs not being factors, the invasion's success was still not a sure thing. At nightfall on June 6, Allied commander Army Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower could only say that his forces had established a beachhead. Holding it was another story.

But the men of the American, British, Canadian and French forces fought tenaciously. Other men landed more supplies, more tanks, more artillery pieces and more fighting men. Thousands of those fighting men paid the ultimate price.

It is now 60 years later, and those young men that defeated the Nazi menace are now old. This anniversary could be their last large-scale celebration and remembrance.

As we look to the years ahead, D-Day – June 6 – is a date that later generations need to remember. The cause our fathers and grandfathers fought for needs to live on. And we need to celebrate the world they made and left for us to maintain.

The American cemetery above Omaha Beach is freedom's sacred ground. More than 5,300 Americans lie in honored glory in that graveyard – and that's just a small portion of those killed in battle.

The row upon row of crosses and Stars of David should give every American an idea of the sacrifice that an earlier generation made on our behalf. They should also inspire this generation and all future ones to maintain the light of freedom handed to us.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Overseas Ballots - June 2, 2004

The Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States Postal Service (USPS) are committed to ensuring that U.S. military personnel serving abroad, their families, and civilians overseas have the opportunity to vote in the 2004 election and that their ballots are counted.

To ensure that these ballots are given the highest priority, DoD and USPS are working together on a series of initiatives. Following are highlights.

- The purpose is to ensure that the ballots sent to and from military personnel serving abroad are sent expeditiously.
- The first step will be postal employees at the local level contacting each of the approximately 3,000 county election offices throughout the country. Together they will coordinate the mailing of absentee ballots from the applications for absentee ballots they have received.
- Next, after the ballots are prepared for mailing, the local post offices will hold out the military ballots, sort them, and send them by Overnight Express Mail to three military "gateways," approximately 30 to 45 days prior to Election Day:
 - San Francisco for service members based around the Pacific Rim.
 - New York for service members in Europe and the Middle East.
 - Miami for service members in Central and South America.
- After the initial wave of ballots is mailed, remaining ballots that need to be sent will be expedited on a daily basis from local post offices to military gateways.
- At the gateways, USPS will sort the ballots by destination and place them in specially marked trays to ensure they receive first priority for transportation and processing.
- Then the Military Postal Service Agency will take over. (The MPSA is a division of DoD; it operates as an extension of the USPS). MPSA will work to ensure that ballots are given priority handling at overseas destinations, and will make every attempt to deliver them as expeditiously as possible.
- After service members vote and return their ballots to the APO (Air/Army Post Office) or FPO (Fleet Post Office), the MPSA will ensure that each ballot is given a proper, legible postmark when it is mailed. The ballots will be sorted into easily identifiable containers to ensure they are given priority back to the USPS gateways.
- Once the ballots arrive back at the gateways, they will then be given priority processing for delivery to county election officials.
- The Federal Voting Assistance Program has designated the week of Sept. 6 as Get Out the Vote Week.
- The week of Oct. 11 has been designated as Overseas Voting Week.

Related Sites:

Military Postal Service Agency (<http://hqdainet.army.mil/mpsa/>),

Federal Voting Assistance Program (<http://www.fvap.gov/>),

DoD release ([ballot initiative release](#)).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraqi Interim Government - June 2, 2004

Within the past few days, the prime minister, president, deputy presidents and cabinet ministers have been chosen for the new Iraqi Interim Government.

Following are highlights of the Iraqi Interim Government's structure and duties.

Q: When will the Iraqi Interim Government take power? Will they have full sovereignty?

A: On June 30, the Coalition will transfer power to the Iraqi Interim Government. The Iraqi Interim Government will have full sovereign powers for the State of Iraq.

Q: What are the primary responsibilities of the Iraqi Interim Government?

A: The primary responsibility of the Iraqi Interim Government will be to administer Iraq's affairs by providing for the well being and security of the Iraqi people, promoting economic development, and preparing Iraq for the national elections that will be held no later than Jan. 31, 2005.

Q: What offices comprise the new Iraqi Interim Government?

A: The Iraqi Interim Government includes a president who acts as head of state, two deputy presidents, and a prime minister who leads the Council of Ministers and oversees the administration of the government.

Q: How was the Iraqi Interim Government chosen? Is it really representative?

A: The Iraqi Interim Government was chosen by Iraqis through a consultation process led by the United Nations. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, who serves as the special advisor on Iraq to the Secretary General of the United Nations, facilitated the process. The process to form the interim government was wide ranging and a broad spectrum of Iraqis, including political, religious and tribal leaders and civic associations were consulted.

Q: How long will the interim government exist?

A: The interim government will serve for seven months, until Jan. 31, 2005, at the latest. Then a new Transitional Government, chosen through democratic elections, will take over.

Q: How is the Iraqi Interim Government preparing to take power on June 30?

A: This month they are busy engaging in outreach with Iraqis across the country, setting an agenda for when they take office and assume full responsibility for Iraq's affairs. Fourteen of Iraq's ministries have already transitioned to full Iraqi control.

Q: What is the legal framework for the Iraqi Interim Government?

A: The legal framework for the Iraqi Interim Government is the Transitional Administrative Law (the TAL), which will become the supreme law of the land on June 30. The TAL provides a bill of rights and a roadmap to a permanent constitution in 2005.

Q: What happens to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on June 30?

A: The CPA will dissolve on June 30 and the occupation will end. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the administrator of the CPA, will return to the United States.

(continued)

Q: What happens to the multi-national forces? What will the relationship of the Interim Iraqi Government be with nations contributing troops?

A: Multi-national forces will stay in Iraq to help maintain security. The relationship will be one of partnership; the detailed arrangements will be a matter of discussion between the Iraqi Interim Government and the nations contributing troops.

Q: Who will control the Iraqi Armed Forces, the police and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)? What about the oil revenues?

A: The Iraqi Interim Government will control the Iraqi Armed Forces, the police and the ICDC. They also will have full control over Iraq's oil revenues and natural resources.

Key Dates: Iraq's Path to Democracy

- | | |
|--|----------------|
| • Liberation | April 2003 |
| • Governing Council Established | July 2003 |
| • First Cabinet Formed | September 2003 |
| • Deadlines Announced for Sovereignty
And Transitional Administrative Law | November 2003 |
| • Transitional Administrative Law Signed | March 2004 |
| • Interim Government Announced | June 1, 2004 |
| • Sovereignty
(Interim Government Assumes Power) | June 30, 2004 |
| • National Conference Convened
National Council Established | July 2004 |
| • Democratic Elections
(Transitional Government Elected) | January 2005 |
| • Constitution Ratified | October 2005 |
| • Constitutionally-based Elections
(Constitutional Government Elected) | December 2005 |

11-L-0559/OSD/46902



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Halliburton Contract Facts - June 1, 2004

Media reports claim that a sole-source contract awarded to Halliburton to restore the Iraqi oil sector was “coordinated” through Vice President Cheney’s office. The Vice President was formerly chairman of Halliburton.

The reports are wrong. Here are the facts.

Background:

The reports quote an internal Pentagon email dated March 5, 2003, by an Army Corps of Engineer official who wrote:

“Accompanied OHRA leader to get release of declass[ification] and authority to execute RIO [Restore Iraqi Oil]. DepSecDef sent us to UnderSecPolicy Fieth [sic] and gave him authority to approve both.

“Declass – Fieth [sic] approved, contingent on informing the WH [White House] tomorrow. We anticipate no issues since action has been coordinated with VP’s office.”

Explanation of the email: This e-mail (written in 2003 before the war started) referred to the need to declassify a U.S. government project to be ready to restore the Iraqi oil infrastructure following potential hostilities in Iraq, and to approve the execution of plans that the U.S. government had developed for this purpose. The project came to be known as Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO).

It was decided in March 2003 to declassify the project. By declassifying the project, teams could be ready to begin the restoration work as soon as possible, thus minimizing damage from sabotage or combat operations.

Myth: The Vice President’s office “coordinated” the contract.

Facts: The Vice President exercised no role or influence whatsoever in the Department’s decision to select Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) for this work.

The only “coordination” with the Vice President’s office was that the office was informed the Defense Department was soon to make public the prior decision to award the contract to KBR. The Vice President was informed because of his former affiliation with the company.

Myth: The contract with Halliburton was approved by Douglas Feith, undersecretary of Defense for policy.

Facts: Mr. Feith was *not* the approval authority for awarding this contract. The approval authority was the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. He approved a temporary sole-source contract to Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), a Halliburton subsidiary.

The Office of Reconstruction (ORHA) was situated in the Department of Defense by Presidential Directive. That office was overseen for policy purposes by the Under Secretary for Policy. The Under Secretary had no contractual authority and took no contractual actions.

As the executive agent for the oil restoration work, the Army instructed KBH to be ready to start the work and continue until the U.S. government was able to hold an open competition (which it has since done).

Mr. Feith was the original classifying authority for the contingency plans the Department developed before the war for restoring Iraqi oil. That is why the Deputy Secretary referred the declassification action to Mr. Feith.

11-L-0559/OSD/46903



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Transition to Iraqi Self-Government - May 28, 2004

The Iraqi Governing Council today unanimously accepted the nomination of Iyad Allawi to be the new transitional prime minister of Iraq. A member of the Governing Council, he is a Shiite Muslim and a physician. Expected to be nominated soon are a president, two vice presidents and a 26-member cabinet.

Following are highlights of Iraq's transition to democracy, as outlined by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week ([link to prepared statement](#)).

➤ **Iraqis continue to**

- The Transitional Administrative Law (the TAL) will govern Iraq's transition period beginning June 30.
- The TAL is the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world.
- Assurances in the TAL include:
 - Freedom of religion.
 - Freedom of expression.
 - Freedom of the press.
 - freedom of assembly.
 - Equal rights for all Iraqis regardless of ethnicity, denomination or sex.
- Iraqis are participating in their government and letting their voices be heard.
 - More than 90 percent of Iraqi towns and provinces have local councils.
 - More than half of Iraqis are active in community affairs, and one in five belong to a non-governmental organization.

➤ **The TAL establishes how the permanent constitution will be drafted and representatives will be elected.** Iraq's political transition is scheduled to

- Phase I (June 30, 2004)
 - The Interim Government will assume full sovereignty on June 30.
 - The Interim Government is being selected based on intensive consultations among Iraqis.
 - These consultations are being led by Ambassador Brahimi, the UN Secretary General's Special Advisor on Iraq.
 - Under the plan, there will be a president, two deputy presidents a prime minister and a ministerial cabinet.
 - In July a national conference will convene to choose a "consultative" council.
- Phase II (January 2005) – Iraqi Transitional Government
 - The Interim Government will serve until the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) is elected in either December 2004 or January 2005.
 - The TNA will then elect a three-person Presidency Council.
 - The Presidency Council will consist of a President and two Deputies.
 - The Presidency Council will appoint by unanimous vote the Prime Minister, and on the Prime Minister's recommendation, a Council of Ministers.
 - The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers must obtain a vote of confidence from the TNA before taking office.
 - The TNA, the Presidency Council (the president and two Deputies) and the Council of Ministers will comprise the Iraqi Transitional Government.
 - In addition to being the legislature, the TNA will draft a permanent constitution for Iraq, which will be submitted for popular ratification by Oct. 15, 2004.
 - Elections under the new constitution are to be held by Dec. 15, 2005.
 - The newly elected government, operating under the permanent constitution, will take office by Dec. 31, 2005.
- Phase III (January 2006) – Iraqi Government under a Permanent Constitution.

11-L-0559/OSD/46904



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraqi Visitors, Victim Justice - May 26, 2004

Iraqis to Lay Wreath at Tomb of Unknowns

- Tomorrow, May 27, a delegation of seven Iraqi men who were tortured by Americans who have died in Operation Iraqi Freedom by placing a wreath at the Tomb
 - Each man had his right hand cut off for trading U.S. currency. In addition, each had his forehead tattooed with a cross.
 - After learning of the torture from an American documentary filmmaker, a team of plastic surgeons in Houston volunteered to surgically attach donated prosthetic hands and remove the tattoos.
 - Yesterday the Iraqis and those who helped them met with President Bush at the White House. The president called their plight an example of Saddam's brutality. ([link to White House page on visit](#))
 - In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explained to the senators that Saddam ordered their hands amputated to make them scapegoats for Iraq's economic failure. The deputy relayed a statement by one of the men, 'The age of tyrants is over, the age of good remains. God willing. Good is coming in Iraq.' ([prepared remarks](#))

Special Task Force Created For Compensation For Victims of Former Regime

- Ambassador Bremer today announced the creation of a special task force on compensation
 - With the establishment of the task force, Iraqis will determine justice for these victims.
 - Ambassador Bremer emphasized that while no government or institution can erase the past abuses, compensation can provide an element of justice.
 - The head of the task force is Dr. Malek Dohan Al Hassan, the president of the Iraqi Bar Association.
 - Dr. Malek and his staff will work with victims and ministries to define what types of injustices should be compensated and how individuals can demonstrate they are eligible. His report is due by August 1. It will be given to the interim government as soon as possible after the transfer of sovereignty so Iraq's leaders, in the best interests of the people, can act on the recommendations.
 - The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is reserving \$25 million for initial compensation and to operate the task force. ([CPA release](#))

Fact Sheet: The Transition to Iraqi Self-Government

- President Bush announced a five-step plan to achieve freedom and democracy in
 - Hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government.
 - Help establish the stability and security in Iraq that democracy requires.
 - Continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure.
 - Encourage more international support.
 - Move toward free, national elections that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people.

Read more about the plan at the Coalition Provisional Authority's web site ([link here](#)).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Progress in Iraq - May 24, 2004

As Iraq transitions to sovereignty on June 30, the Coalition's goal remains a prosperous, unified Iraq on the path to a democratic government, at peace with itself and its neighbors.

Despite the recent violence aimed at creating chaos, Iraq has been transformed in the past year. Saddam Hussein has been captured, the country's economy is recovering, essential services are being restored and the political system is moving forward. Following are some of the highlights of this progress.

Economy: Iraq's economy is on the path to recovery and prosperity:

- Unemployment has fallen by nearly one-half over the past year.
- Inflation is a quarter of what it was before the war.
- For the first time in decades, Iraqi marketplaces are filled with consumer goods.
- The Coalition Provisional Authority has created more than 395,000 jobs for Iraqis.

Education

- All 22 universities and 43 technical institutes and colleges are open.
- Almost 2,500 schools have been rehabilitated
- 32,000 secondary school teachers and administrative staff have been trained;
- More than 8.7 million textbooks have been printed and distributed.

Health Care:

- Health care spending in Iraq is 30 times greater than its pre-war levels.
- All 240 hospitals and more than 1,200 health clinics are open.
- More than 5 million children have been immunized for measles, mumps and rubella.

Essential Services: Essential services are improving:

- Electricity generation has surpassed prewar levels and is more evenly distributed.
- The number of telephone subscribers, including cell phones, is nearly one-third above pre-war levels.
- As of May 4, estimated crude oil export revenue was more than \$5.6 billion for 2004.

Governance and Political Freedoms:

- The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which was signed by all members of the Iraqi Governing Council in March, will govern Iraq's transition period beginning June 30. Assurances include:
 - freedom of religion;
 - freedom of expression;
 - freedom of the press (170 newspapers are being published in Iraq); and
 - freedom of assembly.
- The TAL also calls for equal rights for all citizens regardless of ethnicity, denomination or sex.
- More than 90 percent of Iraqi towns and provinces have local councils.
- More than half of Iraqis are active in community *affairs*, and *one in five* belongs to a non-governmental organization.
- Twelve government ministries have transitioned to full Iraqi authority.
- Iraq has a functioning judiciary to provide equal justice for all.

Security

- Saddam Hussein is in prison. His sons are dead, Forty-six of the 55 "most-wanted" have been captured or killed.
- More than 200,000 Iraqis are serving in their country's security forces.
- More than 30 countries are contributing some 25,000 troops to help Iraq.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Abu Ghraib - May 20, 2004

- **The Defense Department has been actively investigating allegations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.**
 - On Jan. 13, a soldier brought his concerns to the attention of the chain of command.
 - A criminal investigation was initiated the next day.
 - A press release and background briefing followed within 72 hours.
 - Seven soldiers now face or may soon face criminal charges.
 - The charges include dereliction of duty, conspiracy to maltreat subordinates (detainees), maltreatment of subordinates, indecent acts and battery.
 - Additionally, two noncommissioned officers were charged with aggravated assault.
 - An additional six soldiers in the chain of command were given letters of reprimand; two of them were relieved of their duties.
 - A seventh soldier received a letter of admonition.
- **Those who engaged in the abuses at Abu Ghraib will be brought to justice.**
 - Today is the first of several trials expected in the Abu Ghraib abuse accusations.
- **While the abuses at Abu Ghraib are horrific, the Iraqi people, the American people see that the U.S. democratic system**
 - The world will see that Americans will not accept dishonorable behavior.
 - The courts-martial proceedings are open to the media. In addition to U.S. journalists, members of the Iraqi and international media also attended the proceedings today at the Baghdad Convention Center.
 - During a press conference May 18 in Baghdad, BG Mark Kimmitt emphasized that there is a commitment by the Coalition and its soldiers to increase the transparency at Abu Ghraib and other facilities.
 - For instance, media, Iraqi notables and families have visited the prison. These visits demonstrate that the abuses shown in the photographs were rare and isolated events, and on a day-to-day visit that is not how those prisons are run.
- **Americans were outraged at the photographs of the abuses at Abu Ghraib, but the actions of these few do not represent America or American values.**
 - The great majority of U.S. troops are serving honorably. They are helping to reconstruct Iraq, train its security forces, and transition the country after 35 years of brutal dictatorship to a nation at peace with itself and its neighbors.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – SecDef, Chairman Troop Visit - May 13, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, today made a surprise visit to Baghdad, where they spoke with U.S. troops serving there, met with military and Coalition Provisional Authority officials and toured Abu Ghraib prison. Following are highlights of their remarks at a town hall meeting with the troops at Camp Victory. (transcript)

- U.S. troops have helped to liberate 25 million people in Iraq. They have also performed numerous acts of kindness, generosity and compassion and showed the world the character of the United States and the character of its armed forces.
- The abuse alleged at Abu Ghraib is stunning. Investigations are underway and those involved will be brought to justice.
- It will not be an easy path to turn Iraq from a repressive dictatorship to a stable and prosperous country that respects all groups, understands human rights and is at peace with its neighbors. But when U.S. troops fighting in the Global War on Terror look back on their service, they will be proud of and say it was worth it.
- The goal is not to have U.S. troops in Iraq; rather, it is for Iraqis to take charge of their country and their security. U.S. troops are working hard to help recruit, train, equip, deploy and mentor the Iraqi security forces, so responsibility can be passed to them as soon as they are capable of taking it.

Prowess in Iraq

- Two ceremonies were held today in the northern Iraqi city of Qarrayah. Sixty Iraqi soldiers graduated from Iraqi Civil Defense Corps basic training, and 20 graduated from the primary leader development course. U.S. Army soldiers teach the basic six-week training program, which is designed to transform Iraqi civilians into soldiers. Instruction includes basic rifle marksmanship, the law of war, human rights, and security and communication skills. The leader development course is a two-week program that trains junior soldiers, teaching them the skills they need to become non-commissioned officers. (CENTCOM release)
- Iraq's soccer team earned a place at the Summer Olympics in Athens by defeating Saudi-Arabia 3-1 yesterday. The visit will be the first by the team to the Olympics. Player Hawar Mulla Mohammed, who scored the winning goal, said the entire country deserves the win. National Olympic Committee of Iraq President Ahmed Al-Samarrai called the victory the biggest moment in Iraqi Olympic history. (CPA release)
- Full authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was formally handed back to the Iraqi people during a ceremony yesterday in Baghdad at the ministry's headquarters. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer congratulated Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoshiyar Zebari and his staff for their accomplishments, including Iraq's reinstatement into the Arab League, the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. (CPA release)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – FY05 Budget - May 12, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified today before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense regarding the fiscal year 2005 budget request. Following are highlights from his prepared remarks.

- The Department of Defense must ensure U.S. forces, the finest in the world, will have defend the nation in the years ahead. The Department is doing so in
 - By giving troops the tools they need to win the Global War on Terror.
 - By transforming for the 21st century, so troops will have the training and tools they need to prevail in future wars, which could be notably different from today's challenges.
 - By ensuring the force is managed properly, so the best and brightest continue to be attracted to serving, and so the quality of the all-volunteer force is sustained.
- The United States must provide its warfighters all the resources they need to conduct their operations and complete their missions.
 - While the exact costs for operations in 2005 are not known, the Department needs to plan for contingencies so there is no disruption in resources for the troops.
- The President has asked Congress for a \$25 billion contingency reserve fund that operations in Afghanistan and Iraq until a clearer picture emerges of what will
 - This reserve fund would be used primarily for operation and maintenance requirements such as personnel support costs, combat operations, supplies, force protection and transportation.
 - The \$25 billion reserve fund will not be all that is needed for 2005. The Department anticipates submitting a full fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriation request early next year when costs can be better estimated.
- The President has asked Congress for \$401.7 billion for fiscal year 2005, and
 - The request is a large amount of the taxpayers' hard-earned money. Such investments will be likely be required for some years because the nation is engaged in a struggle that could well go on for a number of years.
 - The objective is to ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces remain the best trained, best equipped fighting force in the world and that the volunteers who make up the force are treated with respect equal to their sacrifices and dedication.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Overview - May 10, 2004

President Bush reaffirmed commitments in Iraq during remarks today at the Pentagon. To read the transcript, please link to the White House web page (www.whitehouse.gov).

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz spoke to the World Affairs Council of Greater Philadelphia on May 6 about the Global War on Terror. Following are some of the highlights of his remarks. (To read the entire transcript, link to the Defense Department's [transcript page](#).)

Coalition Successes In the Global War on Terror

- The Coalition has overthrown two terrorist regimes, rescued two nations and liberated 50 million people.
- The Coalition has captured or killed close to two-thirds of the known senior al Qaeda operatives; has captured or killed 46 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq, including Saddam Hussein; and disrupted terrorist cells on most continents.
- \$200 million in terrorist assets has been seized or frozen.
- The Coalition has dismantled a dangerous nuclear proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan, the former head Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The network had been providing nuclear technology to dangerous regimes around the world, including Iran and North Korea.
- The Coalition persuaded Libya to eliminate its chemical and nuclear-related programs and to accept international inspections.

The Adversaries

- The adversaries in the Global War on Terror are unlike any the United States has known.
 - They do not seek an armistice.
 - They have no territory to defend, and no populace to answer to.
 - They only need to be lucky once. As defenders, the Coalition must be lucky all the time.
- The only way to win the war is to root out terrorists at their source and to put pressure on them to change their way of life.
- The defeat of tyranny and violence in Iraq and the rise of democracy in the heart of the Middle East will be a crucial setback for international terror.

Progress in Iraq

- The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) approved by the Iraqi Governing Council is the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world.
 - The TAL assures freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly. The TAL also includes fundamental rights for women.
- Iraq's new currency is the most heavily traded currency in the Middle East.
- Oil production and power generation have surpassed pre-war levels.
- All 22 universities and 43 technical institutes and colleges are open.
- Coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,200 schools.
- All 240 hospitals and more than 1,200 health clinics are open. Health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times over pre-war levels.
- 170 newspapers are being published.

Abu Ghraib

- The actions of the soldiers in the photographs are totally unacceptable. They betrayed their comrades, who serve honorably every day, and they have damaged the cause for which brave men and women are fighting and dying.
- The offenders will be dealt with, and action will be taken to prevent such situations from happening again.

11-L-0559/OSD/46910

**TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
BEFORE THE SENATE AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES**

**As Prepared
MAY 7, 2004**

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee -- Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

In recent days, there has been a good deal of discussion about who bears responsibility for the terrible activities that took place at Abu Ghraib. These events occurred on my watch. As Secretary of Defense, I am accountable for them. I take full responsibility. It is my obligation to evaluate what happened, to make sure those who have committed wrongdoing are brought to justice, and to make changes as needed to see that it doesn't happen again.

I feel terrible about what happened to these Iraqi detainees. They are human beings. They were in U.S. custody. Our country had an obligation to treat them right. We didn't do that. That was wrong.

To those Iraqis who were mistreated by members of U.S. armed forces, I offer my deepest apology. It was un-American. And it was inconsistent with the values of our nation.

Further, I deeply regret the damage that has been done:

- First, to the reputation of the honorable men and women of our armed forces who are courageously, skillfully and responsibly defending our freedom across the globe. They are truly wonderful human beings, and their families and loved ones can be enormously proud of them.
- Second, to the President, the Congress and the American people. I wish we had been able to convey to them the gravity of this was before we saw it in the media;
- Third, to the Iraqi people, whose trust in our coalition has been shaken; and finally
- To the reputation of our country.

The photographic depictions of U.S. military personnel that the public has seen have unquestionably offended and outraged everyone in the Department of Defense.

If you could have seen the anguished expressions on the faces of those of us in the Department upon seeing the photos, you would know how we feel today.

We take this seriously. It should not have happened. Any wrongdoers need to be punished, procedures evaluated, and problems corrected.

It's important for the American people and the world to know that while these terrible acts were perpetrated by a small number of the U.S. military, they were also brought to light by the honorable and responsible actions of other military personnel. There are many who did their duty professionally and we should mention that as well:

- First the soldier, Specialist Joseph Darby, who alerted the appropriate authorities that abuses of detainees were occurring. My thanks and appreciation to him for his courage and his values.

- Second, those in the military chain of command who acted promptly upon learning of those activities by initiating a series of investigations -- criminal and administrative -- to ensure that the abuses were stopped, that the responsible chain of command was relieved and replaced, and that the Uniform Code of Military Justice was followed;
- Third, units singled out for praise in General Taguba's Report for the care they provided detainees in their custody and their intolerance of abuses by others.
- And finally, the CENTCOM chain of command for taking action and publicly announcing to the world that investigations of abuse were underway.

The American people and members of the committee deserve an accounting of what has happened and what's being done to fix it.

Gathered today are the senior military officials with responsibility in the care and treatment of detainees.

The responsibility for training falls to the U.S. Army. The responsibility for the actions and conduct of forces in Iraq falls to the combatant commander. And the ultimate responsibility for the department rests with me.

Each of us has had a strong interest in getting the facts out to the American people.

We want you to know the facts. I want you to have all the documentation and the data you require. If some material is classified, we will ensure members get an opportunity to see it privately.

Having said that, all the facts that may be of interest are not yet in hand. In addition to the Taguba Report, there are other investigations underway. We will make the results of these investigations available to you. But because all the facts are not in hand, there will be corrections and clarifications to the record as more information is learned. If we have something to add later, we'll do so. If we find something that we've said that needs to be corrected, we'll correct it.

From the other witnesses here, you will be told the sequence of events and investigations that have taken place since these activities first came to light.

What I want to do is to inform you of the measures underway to remedy some of the damage done and to improve our performance in the future.

Before I do that, let me make one further note: As members of this Committee are aware, each of us at this table is either in the chain of command or has senior responsibilities in the Department. This means that anything we say publicly could have an impact on legal proceedings against those accused of wrongdoing in this matter. Our responsibility at this hearing, and in our public comments, is to conduct ourselves consistent with that well known fact. So please understand that if some of our responses are measured, it is to ensure that pending cases are not jeopardized by seeming to exert "command influence" and that the rights of any accused are protected.

Now let me tell you the measures we are taking to deal with this issue.

When this incident came to light and was reported within the Chain of Command, we took several immediate actions. These will be discussed in detail by others here today, but let me highlight them.

- General Sanchez launched a criminal investigation immediately.
- He then asked for an administrative review of procedures at the Abu Ghraib facility. That is the so-called Taguba Report.

These two investigations have resulted thus far in criminal or administrative actions against at least 12 individuals, including the relief of the prison chain of command and criminal referrals of several soldiers directly involved in abuse.

- The Army also launched an Inspector General Review of detainee operations throughout Afghanistan and Iraq. That review continues.
- The Army has initiated an investigation of Reserve training with respect to military intelligence and police functions.
- General Sanchez also asked for an Army Intelligence review of the circumstances discussed in General Taguba's report and that is ongoing.
- And, I also asked the Navy Inspector General to review procedures at Guantanamo and the Charleston Naval Brig.

As these investigations mature, we will endeavor to keep you informed. But there is more to be done.

First, to ensure we have a handle on the scope of this catastrophe, I will be announcing today the appointment of several senior former officials who are being asked to examine the pace, breadth, and thoroughness of the existing investigations, and to determine whether additional investigations need to be initiated. They are being asked to report their findings within 45 days of taking up their duties. I am confident these distinguished individuals will provide a full and fair assessment of what has been done thus far – and recommend whether further steps may be necessary.

I will encourage them to meet with members of Congress to keep them apprised of their progress. I look forward to their suggestions and recommendations.

Second, we need to review our habits and procedures. One of the things we've tried to do since September 11th is to get the Department to adjust its habits and procedures at a time of war, and in the information age. For the past three years, we have looked for areas where adjustments were needed, and regrettably, we have now found another one.

Let me be clear. I failed to identify the catastrophic damage that the allegations of abuse could do to our operations in the theater, to the safety of our troops in the field, the cause to which we are committed. When these allegations first surfaced, I failed to recognize how important it was to elevate a matter of such gravity to the highest levels, including leaders in Congress. Nor did we anticipate that a classified investigation report that had not yet been delivered to the senior levels of the Department would be given to the media. That was my failing.

In the future, we will take whatever steps are necessary to elevate to the appropriate levels charges of this magnitude.

Third, I am seeking a way to provide appropriate compensation to those detainees who suffered grievous and brutal abuse and cruelty at the hands of a few members of the U.S. military. It is the right thing to do. I'm told we have the ability to do so. And so we will – one way or another.

One of the great strengths of our nation is its ability to recognize failures, deal with them, and to strive to make things better. Indeed, the openness with which these problems are being dealt is one of the strengths of our free society. Democracies are imperfect, because they are made up of human beings who are, by our nature, imperfect. Of course, we wish that every person in our government and our Armed Forces would conduct themselves in accordance with the highest standards of ethics. But the reality is some do not.

One mistake we have made during our initial investigation into these charges, for example, was failing to sufficiently call to your attention the information made public in the CENTCOM press release regarding the investigations they had initiated back in January. We also failed to sufficiently call your attention and brief you on the preliminary findings of the criminal investigation announced on March 20 by General Kimmitt. I am advised the Army has had periodic meetings to inform Congressional staffs.

There are indications that the information provided was penetrating at some level, however. On January 20th, for example, CNN reported that a CID investigation was being conducted into allegations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, and mentioned the possible existence of photographs taken of detainees.

Nonetheless, I know that we did not fully brief you on this subject along the way and we should have done so.

I wish we would have known more sooner and been able to tell you more sooner. But we didn't. For that, I apologize.

We need to discuss a better way to keep you informed about matters of such gravity in the future.

The fact that abuses take place – in the military, in law enforcement, and in our society – is not surprising. But the standard by which our country and our government should be judged is not by whether abuses take place, but rather how our nation deals with them. We are dealing with them forthrightly. These incidents are being investigated and any found to have committed crimes or misconduct will receive the appropriate justice. Most of the time, at least, the system works.

None of this is meant to diminish the gravity of the recent situation at Abu Ghraib. To the contrary, that is precisely why these abuses are so damaging -- because they can be used by the enemies of our country to undermine our mission and spread the false impression that such conduct is the rule and not the exception – when, in fact, the opposite is true.

Which is why it is so important that we investigate them publicly and openly, and hold people accountable in similar fashion. And that is exactly what we are doing.

QUESTIONS:

When we first were told about these activities and saw those photographs, I and everyone at this table was as shocked and stunned as you were.

In the period since, a number of questions have been raised -- here in the Congress, in the media, and by the public. Let me respond to some of them.

Some have asked: Why weren't those charged with guarding prisoners properly trained?

If one looks at the behavior depicted in those photos, it is fair to ask: what kind of training could one possibly provide that would stop people from doing that? Either you learn that in life, or you don't. And if someone doesn't know that doing what is shown in those photos is wrong, cruel, brutal, indecent, and against American values, I am at a loss as to what kind of training could be provided to teach them.

The fact is, the vast majority of the people in the United States Armed Forces are decent, honorable individuals who know right from wrong, and conduct themselves in a manner that is in keeping with the spirit and values of our country. And there is only a very small minority who do not.

Some have asked: Hasn't a climate allowing for abuses to occur been created because of a decision to "disregard" the Geneva Convention?

No. Indeed, the U.S. Government recognized that the Geneva Conventions apply in Iraq, and the armed forces are obliged to follow them. DoD personnel are trained in the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions. Doctrine requires that they follow those rules and report, investigate, and take corrective action to remedy violations.

We did conclude that our war against al-Qaeda is not governed precisely by the Conventions, but nevertheless announced that detained individuals would be treated consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions.

Some have asked: Can we repair the damage done to our credibility in the region?

I hope so and I believe so. We have to trust that in the course of events the truth will eventually come out. And the truth is that the United States is a liberator, not a conqueror. Our people are devoted to freedom and democracy, not enslavement or oppression.

Every day, these men and women risk their lives to protect the Iraqi people and help them build a more hopeful future. They have liberated 25 million people; dismantled two terrorist regimes; and battled an enemy that shows no compassion or respect for innocent human life.

These men and women, and the families who love and support them, deserve better than to have their sacrifices on behalf of our country sullied by the despicable actions of a few. To that vast majority of our soldiers abroad, I extend my support and my appreciation for their truly outstanding service.

One final thought:

Today we'll have a full discussion of this terrible incident and I welcome that. But first, let's take a step back for a moment.

Within the constraints imposed on those of us in the chain of command, I want to say a few additional words.

First, beyond abuse of prisoners, we have seen photos that depict incidents of physical violence towards prisoners – acts that may be described as blatantly sadistic, cruel, and inhuman.

Second, the individuals who took the photos took many more.

The ramifications of these two facts are far reaching.

Congress and the American people and the rest of the world need to know this.

In addition, the photos give these incidents a vividness – indeed a horror – in the eyes of the world.

Mr. Chairman, that is why this hearing today is important. And why the actions we take in the days and weeks ahead are so important.

Because however terrible the setback, this is also an occasion to demonstrate to the world the difference between those who believe in democracy and human rights and those who believe in rule by the terrorist code.

We value human life; we believe in their right to individual freedom and the rule of law.

For those beliefs we send the men and women in the armed forces abroad – to protect that right for our own people and to give millions of others who aren't Americans the hope of a future of freedom.

Part of that mission -- part of what we believe in -- is making sure that when wrongdoing or scandal occur that they are not covered up, but exposed, investigated, publicly disclosed -- and the guilty brought to justice.

Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the world: Judge us by our actions. Watch how Americans, watch how a democracy deals with wrongdoing and scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and weaknesses.

And then after they have seen America in action -- then ask those who preach resentment and hatred of America if our behavior doesn't give the lie to the falsehood and slander they speak about our people and way of life. Ask them if the resolve of Americans in crisis and difficulty -- and, yes, the heartache of acknowledging the evil in our midst -- doesn't have meaning far beyond their code of hatred.

Above all, ask them if the willingness of Americans to acknowledge their own failures before humanity doesn't light the world as surely as the great ideas and beliefs that first made this nation a beacon of hope and liberty to all who strive to be free.

We know what the terrorists will do. We know they will try to exploit all that is bad to obscure all that is good. That is the nature of evil. And that is the nature of those who think they can kill innocent men, women and children to gratify their own cruel will to power.

We say to the enemies of humanity and freedom:

Do your worst.

Because we will strive to do our best

I thank you Mr. Chairman. My colleagues each have a brief statement.

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US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Abu Ghraib, Troop Deployment - May 4, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the Pentagon press corps today on allegations of abuse by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib and troop deployment. Following the secretary and vice chairman's briefing, Gen. George Casey, vice chief of staff of the Army, spoke about the situation at Abu Ghraib. Highlights from his comments are also included.

Abu Ghraib

- **The images shown in the media of the U.S. soldiers and prisoners at the Baghdad Correctional Facility at Abu Ghraib are deeply disturbing.**
 - The photographs depict actions that are fundamentally unacceptable.
 - These actions do not in anyway represent the values of the United States or the Armed Forces, the vast majority of whom serve with honor.
- **The Secretary and the Department of Defense are taking the charges and allegations seriously.**
 - On Jan. 14, one day after allegations first came to light, a criminal investigation was initiated to examine the charges. On Jan. 16, CENTCOM issued a press release, and Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt briefed that an investigation had been initiated into reported incidents of detainee abuse.
 - On Jan. 31, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, at the request of Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, was appointed to conduct an administrative investigation of procedures at Abu Ghraib.
 - In February, the acting Secretary of the Army directed the Army Inspector General to conduct an assessment of doctrine and training associated with detention operations throughout the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
 - In March, the Chief, Army Reserve initiated an assessment of Army Reserve training with an emphasis on military police and military intelligence activities related to prisoners.
 - On April 23, at Gen. Sanchez's request, the head of Army intelligence provided an investigating officer to investigate military intelligence practices in Iraq.
 - Early this month, the U.S. Navy Inspector General was asked to assess the detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay and at Charleston Naval Station Brig.
- **The Department will continue to take whatever steps are necessary to hold accountable those who may have violated the code of military conduct.**
 - Such violations betray the trust of the American people and the men and women in uniform who serve honorably each day.
 - Thus far, from these investigations, six individuals have been identified for Article 32 criminal hearings. At least six other individuals have been given letters of reprimand, and two of these six were relieved of their responsibilities.
- **As Gen. Casey emphasized in his opening statement to the press, the Army is extremely disappointed that anyone would engage in the mistreatment and humiliation of detainees or take such pictures.**
 - The U.S. Army is a values-based organization that respects the International Law of Armed Conflict and human dignity. More than 300,000 Army soldiers are deployed around the world, defending the United States and its values.
 - The behavior that led to the images is clearly unacceptable. It does not reflect Army training or values, and is a complete breakdown in discipline.
 - The Army is committed to treating all persons with dignity, respect and humanity.
 - U.S. soldiers recognize they have a moral and legal obligation to provide humane treatment to the personnel in their custody.

- Commanders will continue to investigate all allegations of detainee mistreatment and take appropriate action. Commanders will continue to set appropriate climate and standards with regard to humane treatment of detainees.

➤ **The Army has taken action in Iraq to address the**

- There is new unit leadership at Abu Ghraib, and close coordination between the military intelligence brigade commander and the military police brigade commander.
- There is now one single person responsible for all the detainee activities. On April 15, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller took charge of all the detainee operations in Iraq.
- Additional training on the Geneva Convention and the rules of engagement has been given to all of the new units that have gone into these facilities.
- A mobile training team of corrections and legal experts is on the ground working at the detention facilities and helping train soldiers to improve operations at the facilities.
- A lessons-learned process is ongoing and recommended changes are being incorporated into the Army's schools, doctrine and combat training centers.

Secretary Rumsfeld also announced some additional troop deployments during the press briefing.

Troop Deployment

➤ **Gen. John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, has indicated a desire level of**

- Recently, 20,000 troops had their deployments extended by up to 90 days to keep force levels at 135,000.
- These troops will not have their deployments extended further. Instead, Secretary Rumsfeld has approved the deployment of approximately 10,000 replacement personnel.

For more information, please see the news release posted on www.defenselink.mil (link to [release](#)).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Abu Ghraib Prisoners - May 3, 2004

Following is information about the reported abuse at the Baghdad Correctional Facility at Abu Ghraib.

➤ **The Department of Defense is taking allegations of prisoner abuse**

- On Jan. 14, one day after allegations were first reported by a concerned soldier, a criminal investigation was initiated to examine the allegations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.
- On Jan. 31, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command began an administrative investigation into potential systemic problems relating to detention operations in Iraq, including training of units assigned to the detention facilities and command policies and procedures.
 - The investigation's findings were approved on April 6. They included actions against several commanders and military personnel operating detention and internment facilities in Iraq. Also included were administrative and training recommendations.
- In February, the Army Inspector General began an assessment of doctrine and training associated with detention operations.
- In March, the Chief, Army Reserve initiated an assessment of Army Reserve training with an emphasis on military police and military intelligence activities related to prisoners.
- On April 23, at Gen. Sanchez's request, the head of Army intelligence provided an investigating officer to investigate military intelligence practices in Iraq.

➤ **Individual**

- Six preliminary charges have been levied against soldiers allegedly involved in the incident. Separately, six other personnel have been issued Memorandums of Reprimand- two of them were relieved of their positions.
- Abuse of prisoners will not be tolerated by the Defense Department.
- The photographs of prisoners in Abu Ghraib shown by various media outlets in the United States and the Middle East are heinous.
- The great majority of U.S. service members conduct themselves in strict accordance with their training, and represent themselves, the United States and the Coalition honorably. The military is a values-based organization committed to the respect of the international laws of armed conflict.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Fallujah Operations – April 30, 2004

Below are highlights from a briefing today by Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Coalition Provisional Authority spokesman Gareth Bayley about operations in Fallujah.

➤ **The Coalition's objectives**

- Eliminate the armed groups in Fallujah.
- Collect the heavy weapons.
- Restore law and order.
- Rebuild the judicial system.
- Bring to justice those who have committed crimes.

➤ **A number of initiatives are underway to**

- The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force is overseeing the formation of the first battalion of the proposed Fallujah brigade.
- The battalion will include 600 to 1,100 soldiers.
- The mission of this interim organization is to work cooperatively with Coalition forces and eventually assume responsibility for security and stability throughout Iraq.
- The battalion will be recruited largely from former soldiers of the Iraqi army.
- The 1st MEF will have operational control of the battalion, and will provide them the resources and equipment they need to accomplish their mission.

➤ **Marines will continue to maintain a strong presence in and around Fallujah until all demonstrate they have the capacity to**

- Coalition forces will maintain the right of freedom of movement in all areas of responsibility.
- As calm is restored, families will be allowed to return to the city.
- Investigations will continue to find those responsible for the murder of the four American contractors and when they are captured, they will be tried in Iraq's judicial system.

➤ **Negotiations**

- The Marines are not withdrawing.
- As long as there is progress, the Coalition will continue to pursue the peaceful track.
- Iraqis are coming forward, asking to be part of the process. The Coalition welcomes their contributions, which will benefit Fallujah, al Anbar province and the country.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Missile Defense – April 28, 2004

The United States currently does not have the ability to defend itself from a limited long-range missile attack. In December 2002, President Bush announced plans to begin fielding a missile defense capability, with the goal of beginning initial defensive operations in 2004 and 2005. The United States is on track to meet that goal this year.

Following are highlights about missile defense: U.S. capabilities, adversaries' capabilities and an outlook for developing a U.S. system.

➤ **Several nations are developing or acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. They are sharing capabilities and technologies and acquiring it from others. For instance:**

- North Korea continues to move forward with the development of the long-range Taepo Dong 2 missile.
- Iran has successfully flight tested the 1,300 km Shahab 3 missile.

➤ **The United States must defend**

- New acquisition management processes like spiral development and capabilities-based acquisition allow a new technology like missile defense to engage in realistic, challenging development and testing, while at the same time making the technology available for limited defensive operations.
- This new acquisition system is important because the United States cannot wait until a future threat is fully developed before it deploys missile defenses.
- The Missile Defense Act of 1999 mandates that the Department of Defense take the necessary steps to deploy as soon as technologically possible effective missile defenses capable of defending all 50 states.

➤ **Since 2001, it has been the Administration's policy to develop and deploy missile**

- The capability to be fielded this year carries out the President's policy and the mandate of the 1999 law.
- The direction from the President states that ballistic missiles also endanger U.S. allies and friends around the world and affirms the need to work together to defend against these threats.
 - The United States has kept Russia well informed of U.S. missile defense policy and is engaging in discussions with Russia on future cooperative efforts on numerous missile defense technologies.
- The United States is spending billions of dollars to protect against terrorist threats to infrastructure, ports, aviation and agriculture. Missile defense will comprise less than three percent of the Defense Department's budget over the next several years.

➤ **The missile defense development program is set in two-year blocks that at the**

- The plan for the 2004 block that ends with calendar year 2005 is to deliver a system testbed in the Pacific Ocean for realistic testing, while also providing an operational capability against a limited threat.
 - The testbed will include a capability against long-range ballistic missiles with required radars and other sensors, a command and control network, and a limited number of interceptors based in Alaska (up to 16 by the end of 2005) and California (up to four in 2004-2005) utilizing the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

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Wall Street Journal
April 27, 2004
Pg. 18

Australia Won't Cut And Run

By Alexander Downer

CANBERRA -- As Australia's foreign minister, I respect the right of countries to take decisions they perceive to be in their national interest. But I do not always agree with the choices they make. The announcement by Spain, and subsequently, by Honduras, to withdraw troops from Iraq is a case in point.

It is perhaps understandable that Spain's new government would want to withdraw its troops from Iraq. After all, this had been Prime Minister Zapatero's position for some time. Spain's decision, however, is extremely disappointing. For there has never been a greater need for the international community to pull together to help Iraqis in their hour of need.

We are no longer debating the just cause of removing forcefully Saddam Hussein's vile regime. That debate is over. The fall of Saddam ended decades of brutal tyranny and removed the threat his regime posed to international peace and security by ensuring Iraq's compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. The issue now is how to ensure that Iraq succeeds in its transition from brutal dictatorship to a democratic state in which Iraqis can enjoy the rights and freedoms that we, in the West, often take for granted.

Transforming Iraq was never going to be easy. The legacy of Saddam and his henchmen runs deep. And terrorists have made Iraq the frontline in their unholy war. But to abandon the Iraqi people at this critical stage would be a slap in the face for them. Even worse, such "cut and run" defeatism would deliver an unprecedented victory to the terrorists.

Advocates of a "cut and run" strategy must consider the consequences of their proposed actions. If other governments were to follow the lead of Spain, Iraq would be left in a precarious state. At its worst, Iraq could become a failed state, embroiled in civil strife, a haven for terrorists and a source of instability in the region.

The Australian government and, I believe, most Australians understand the consequences of a premature and predetermined withdrawal of forces. And that's why Australian defense force personnel will remain in Iraq until their task is complete. Australians understand that we cannot sit back and expect others, principally the U.S., to bear the load of making the world a safer place. Such isolationist thinking is dangerous and ill-conceived.

While considerable progress has been made in building up the Iraqi police and security forces, an international military presence will be necessary for some time. This reality is

understood by most Iraqis, who according to a recent Oxford Research International poll, do not wish to see the immediate departure of international forces.

The international community needs to stand ~~firm~~ in the face of violent threats and actions. We need to encourage Iraq's various religious and ethnic groups to work together to prepare to assume full responsibility for their affairs, and to develop robust institutions that can deal with the myriad challenges facing the country.

We need to sustain the U.N.'s most welcome re-engagement in Iraq's political transition, including electoral preparations. International solidarity in support of Iraq will send a clear and strong message to those violently opposed to a peaceful transition, who feed on division and signs of weakness. International solidarity, in short, will create the best chance for peaceful progress toward a brighter future for Iraqis.

Mr. Downer is Australia's foreign minister.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update – April 26, 2004

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, senior spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority] briefed the media today in Baghdad about the situations in Fallujah and Najaf. Following are highlights.

- **While Iraqis understandably express opposition to the occupation, the silent grateful**
 - Iraqis also express concern that if the Coalition departs, the security situation will destabilize.
 - The majority of Iraqis and the Coalition have a common enemy, whether it is the small bands of former Fedayeen Saddam, the former Mukhabarats (Iraq's former intelligence service), international terrorists or Muqtada al-Sadr's militia.
- **The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force is following its orders to suspend offensive operations in Fallujah. The Coalition wants a peaceful resolution to the situation in Fallujah.**
 - The Marines maintain the inherent right of self-defense.
 - Soon joint patrols will begin in Fallujah with Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces becoming a visible presence in the city. The commanders on the ground will make the decisions about the exact timing of the patrols.
 - No weapons were turned in during the past 24 hours in Fallujah. The Coalition is hopeful that tomorrow there will be a large weapons turn-in, which would demonstrate a good-faith effort on the part of the insurgents to meet the Coalition halfway.
 - The end state in Fallujah remains restoring Iraqi control to the city, either through negotiations, a political track or through force of arms.
- **Regarding Najaf, the Coalition has made its position clear: It will not tolerate**
 - Places of worship are not protected under the Geneva Conventions in the event of military action if they are used as bases for operations and bases to store weapons and other tools of violence.
 - The process to restore the holy places must begin immediately; holy places must cease to be used as sites where violence is organized.
- **Ambassador Bremer issued the following**

"A dangerous situation is developing in Najaf, one that is putting all the law-abiding citizens of that holy city at even greater risk. Weapons are being stockpiled in schools, mosques and shrines. This explosive situation cannot be tolerated by those who seek a peaceful resolution to this crisis. The Coalition certainly will not tolerate this situation. The restoration of these holy places to calm places of worship must begin immediately."



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Remains Transfer Policy – April 23, 2004

Following are talking points on the Department of Defense's policy regarding media coverage of troops' remains being returned to Dover Air Force Base. For additional information, please refer to the transcript of a briefing given yesterday to the Pentagon press corps [\[transcript\]](#).

- The principle focus of the Department's policy is to protect the wishes and the privacy of the families of service members during their time of great loss and grief.
 - Military funeral honors are rendered only at graveside. The ceremony is a way to show the Nation's deep gratitude to those who, in times of war and peace, have faithfully defended their country.
- The Department's policy regarding no media coverage of remains transfer has been in effect since 1991.
 - Courts have repeatedly upheld the Department's policy, citing two key points:
 - To reduce the hardship on the families and friends of the war dead, who may feel obligated to travel great distances to attend arrival ceremonies at Dover AFB if such ceremonies were held.
 - To protect the privacy of the families and friends of the dead, who may not want media coverage of caskets being unloaded at Dover AFB. In this regard, the court noted that the bereaved might be upset at public display of the caskets of their loved ones.
- The policy balances the desires of the families to maintain their privacy against the media's First Amendment rights.
- The purpose of sending the remains to Dover AFB is to prepare them for return to their family and loved ones.
 - Honors are not rendered at Dover because their mission is to identify the remains, conduct necessary forensic examinations, and prepare the remains to be transported to the family so they can be properly and respectfully laid to rest in a place of the family's choosing.
 - The preparation is clinical in nature and does not lend itself to media coverage.
- The National Association of Military Families, an independent organization, has stated, "The current policy is sensitive to the needs of the families."



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Fallujah and former Ba'athists – April 22, 2004

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority, briefed the press today in Baghdad. Following are highlights on the situation in Fallujah, and the issue of former members of the Ba'ath party serving in the new Iraqi army.

Attached to this set of talking points is a news article about Fallujah's violent history. It was written by Jim Garamone of the American Forces Press Service, who traveled to Iraq and the Middle East region last week with Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The article is also posted to the Defense Link web site (www.defenselink.mil).

Fallujah

- **Discussions are continuing in Fallujah to resolve the situation peacefully.**
 - The Coalition's message to the people of Fallujah remains the same:
 - Heavy and illegal weapons must be turned in.
 - Of the weapons received thus far, few are in working order. The Coalition is seeking a serious show of commitment and wants the heavy weapons responsible for the recent engagements in Fallujah brought in.
 - Fallujans must work to remove foreign fighters, Special Republican guard, former Fedayeen Saddam, Mukhabarat (Iraqi intelligence service), drug users and other dangerous and violent criminals from using Fallujah as a base of operations to conduct the r operations of violence and terrorist acts.
- **While the Coalition remains willing to continue discussions in Fallujah, time is running out.**
 - The U.S. military stands poised and ready to act, ready to resume hostilities on short notice.
 - The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force continues aggressive patrols and offensive operations outside Fallujah, as well as providing humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Fallujah.

De-Ba'athification

- 9 **The de-Ba'athification of Iraq is both a difficult and necessary process that Iraqis must go through in order to come to terms with their past.**
 - There is no room in the new Iraq for the Ba'athist ideology and for the senior members of the former regime who played a role in the worst Ba'athist crimes and brutality.
- **While the policy on de-Ba'athification must remain as it is, its implementation should be reformed.**
 - Some Iraqis have complained the appeals process is slow, and excludes innocent and capable people who were Ba'athists in name only from playing a role in Iraq's reconstruction.
 - The exceptions and appeals process must be timely in order to be effective.
 - Ambassador Bremer will address these issues in an address he delivers to the Iraqi people Friday.
- **As the Iraqi army increases in size and responsibility, it will need senior commanding officers.**
 - It takes 10 to 15 years and more to train senior colonels and generals.
 - There are many senior officers remaining in Iraq who can meet the criteria established in the de-Ba'athification process and contribute to Iraq's future.
 - It has always been expected that senior-level military officers would play a role in the new Iraqi army. It has also always been part of the plan that these individuals would be fully vetted to ensure that had no hand in the Ba'athist horrors.
 - The policy on including senior level military in Iraq's new army has not changed. The Coalition is studying how to improve implementation of the de-Ba'athification process, so Iraq's army can benefit from the expertise of thoroughly vetted senior military officers.

- To take disparate memos, reports and legal memoranda, regardless of their context or purpose, and put them together to suggest the government told people to torture prisoners is distorting the facts.

INTERROGATION INTELLIGENCE – SAVING LIVES

- Detention and interrogation operations at Guantanamo and other locations support the and save lives by removing
 - The interrogations at Guantanamo are an example of how the United States has worked meticulously to collect life-saving intelligence, while consistently going above and beyond what is required by international law.
- Conditions at Guantanamo are stable, secure, safe and humane.
 - Such an environment sets the conditions for interrogators to work successfully and to gain valuable information from detainees because they have built a relationship of trust, not fear.
 - Those who have visited the prison – including many members of Congress -- agree that the conditions are clearly humane.
- The interrogations that have been conducted over the past two and a half years have saved the lives of U.S. and Coalition soldiers in the field.
 - The information also saves the lives of innocent civilians at home and abroad.
- - Led to the capture of Saddam Hussein, the deaths of his sons, the capture of his top lieutenants.
 - Has helped Coalition forces intercept weapons caches and communications, plus identify terrorist and insurgent groups and intercept their funds.
 - Has resulted in information Coalition forces can use to conduct raids to gather more intelligence and stop insurgents from more destruction.
 - Helped Coalition forces conduct successful raids against insurgents and other enemies of the Iraqi people.
- At **Guantanamo** the government is holding and interrogating people who are a clear threat to the United States and the Coalition. These detainees are providing valuable information in the intelligence information that has been
 - An individual who attempted to enter the United States who was later captured in Pakistan. The individual has links to a financier of the 9/11 plot.
 - An al Qaeda member who served as an explosives trainer for the terrorist group and designed a prototype shoe bomb for destroying airplanes and a magnetic mine for attacking ships.
 - Individual associated with senior al Qaeda members who were working on explosives to use against U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

11-L-0559/OSD/46928

By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, April 21, 2004 – A certain amount of lawlessness has always been a part of life in Fallujah, Defense Department officials said recently.

While U.S. Marines stand ready inside the city, anti-coalition forces continue to attack in defiance of a ceasefire agreement. The city is a hotbed of anti-coalition activity, and has been since the U.S. troops entered the area in April last year.

But Fallujah's reputation for violence didn't start when the coalition rolled into town. It has always had the taste of what Americans would call the Wild West.

While Iraq is laced with antiquities, Fallujah isn't one of them. Just after World War II, the population of the town was around 10,000. The city, about 40 miles west of Baghdad, is on the edge of the desert, and now has about 300,000 citizens. It is a dry and arid landscape, made productive only because of extensive irrigation from the nearby Euphrates River.

It was, however, located on the main routes into Jordan and Syria. And in crime, as in real estate, location is everything. The city was on the main route for smugglers, and sheltered a number of very successful crime lords. The area is poor, and the villages surrounding the city still shelter subsistence farmers and their families. The smugglers were a source of money – even wealth – for those in the region. Even government officials sheltered the smugglers, DoD officials said.

When Saddam Hussein took power in 1979, the city received a boost. Many of the people in Fallujah supported Saddam, and many of his closest advisors, highest-ranking military officers and high-ranking members of the Baath Party came from Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit and other areas in the center of the Sunni Triangle. Arab tribes in and around the city also owed fealty to Saddam and became bastions of the regime.

Hussein returned the favor by building factories in the city and providing jobs for his chosen people.

Fallujah took a number of hits in the first Gulf War. News reports indicate that in one instance, a U.S. bomber tried to take out Fallujah's bridge over the Euphrates. The bomb missed and allegedly killed 200 Iraqis in the city market. Following the Gulf War, the city became an even larger smuggling center, this time with government encouragement, officials said. Saddam encouraged the smugglers to skirt the U.N.-imposed sanctions on Iraq.

Since the U.S.-led liberation of Iraq, former regime supporters have allied themselves with foreign fighters who seem to be entering Iraq via Syria, officials said. U.S. officials suspect that members of al Qaeda affiliate Ansar al-Islam have cells in the city. Other terror groups have allied themselves with former regime elements and Sunni extremists, making for a very volatile mix.

Officials said these groups intimidate the larger population of Fallujah, and these citizens seem to be caught in the middle. If the people of Fallujah cooperate with the former regime members, then coalition forces will come after them. If they cooperate with the coalition, then they will be killed.

Terrorists have launched attacks against coalition forces, Iraqis supporting coalition efforts such as police and members of the Civil Defense Corps and against everyday civilians.

The Sunni Triangle became a haven for foreign fighters and anti-coalition elements. Attacks mounted against coalition and Iraqi targets. When coalition forces captured Saddam in December, the number of attacks dipped. But on Feb. 12, former regime elements launched an attack against U.S. Central Command chief Army Gen. John Abizaid, who was visiting the area.

On March 31, anti-coalition forces attacked an SUV with four American security specialists. The attackers killed the men, and then a crowd mutilated their bodies. The Marines of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force launched Operation Vigilant Resolve on April 4.

On April 10, the Marines announced a unilateral ceasefire that allows humanitarian relief to reach the residents of the city. The Marines have remained in this posture since then, replying only when fired upon by anti-coalition forces. (end)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update – April 20, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld, Gen. Pace Briefing

Secretary Rumsfeld and Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, today briefed the Pentagon press corps on progress in Iraq, including the situations in southern Iraq and Fallujah. Following are highlights.

- The Coalition is working with moderate Shi'a leadership in southern Iraq to resolve the stand-off with militia from radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
 - The moderate Shi'as, like the vast majority of Iraqis, want freedom and the rule of law take root in Iraq.
- Discussions in Fallujah continue, led by local and national Iraqi leaders.
 - The current state of affairs cannot continue indefinitely.
 - The Coalition will not allow the thugs and assassins in Fallujah who oppose peace and freedom to carve out portions of the city.
 - These dead-enders are trying to hold back progress through terror and intimidation. They aim to foment civil war among Sunnis and Shi'as, block the progress on the path to Iraqi self-rule and drive out the Coalition.
 - The dead-enders will fail in this test of wills. Saddam's remnants will not be allowed to determine the fate of 25 million Iraqis.
- U.S. forces are performing well, and the American people are grateful for their skill and courage. Their strength and sacrifices are a reflection of the strength of the American people. Americans remember those wounded or killed and their families.

BG Kimmitt, Dan Senor Briefing

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, senior spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority, today briefed press in Baghdad. Following are highlights.

- The Coalition has reemphasized to all parties involved in talks to end the stand-off in Fallujah that the Coalition remains very serious in its goal to peacefully resolve the situation.
 - If the peaceful track does not play itself out and there is not a serious effort by all parties, major hostilities will resume on short notice.
- The 36th Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Battalion's performance during recent combat operations in Fallujah is noteworthy. In the view of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, the battalion distinguished itself as a trustworthy and capable Iraqi security force. Their performance will serve as an ICDC benchmark for future operations.

Announcement on U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

President Bush yesterday announced his intention to nominate John Negroponte as U.S. ambassador to Iraq. Currently Mr. Negroponte serves as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, a post he has held since September 2001.

If the U.S. Senate confirms him, he would be the first ambassador at the new U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, which is slated to open following the June 30 transfer of sovereignty. At that time, the Coalition Provisional Authority will be dissolved.

([Link](#) to the ambassador's response to the president's announcement; [link](#) to the ambassador's biography.)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Detainee Policy – April 19, 2004

Tomorrow the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on three cases involving detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The court will decide a narrow aspect of detainee policy - whether or not federal district courts have the jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus cases for detainees at Guantanamo. The consolidated cases are *Al Oda v. United States*, *Rasul v. Bush* and *Ghrebi v. Bush* and *Rumsfeld*.

Below is background on the detainee situation and military commissions.

Guantanamo Detainee Status

- There are approximately 595 detainees at Guantanamo.
- The numbers of detainees in Guantanamo are a small percentage of those scooped up in the Global War on Terror. Of the roughly 10,000 people originally detained in Afghanistan, fewer than 10 percent were brought to Guantanamo.
- One hundred forty-six detainees have departed Guantanamo,
 - 134 were transferred for release.
 - 12 have been transferred for continued detention (seven to Russia, four to Saudi Arabia and one to Spain).
- Decisions to transfer or release detainees are based on many factors, including whether the detainee is believed to pose a threat to the United States and whether he has further intelligence value.
- The releases are not without risk. At least one released detainee has gone back to the fight. This is further evidence that these individuals are dedicated to their cause and have been trained to be deceptive.
- Detainees are treated humanely: They are given three culturally appropriate meals, have opportunity for prayer and receive exceptional medical attention.
- The United States does not permit, tolerate or condone torture by its employees under any circumstances; U.S. personnel are required to follow this policy when questioning the detainees.

Military Commissions

- The military commission process provides for a full and fair trial while protecting national security information.
- The commission includes fundamental principles of justice such as: the presumption of innocence, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, representation by defense counsel, and the ability to present evidence and call witnesses.
- The concept of detaining those captured during armed conflict is not new.
 - In every war the United States has fought, the U.S. has detained the enemy without lawyers, without charges, and released them at the end of the conflict when the threat had passed.
- Removing enemy combatants from the battlefield allows Coalition troops to move more freely. Detaining and interrogating them helps the Coalition gain valuable information about terrorist activities.
- The Department of Defense has no desire to hold detainees longer than necessary. The Department will work diligently to resolve all cases.
- Military commissions have historically been used to try violators of the law of war. The commissions take into account national security interests and the unique battlefield environment associated with the Global War on Terror.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Troop Extensions in Iraq – April 15, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld and Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced today that about 20,000 troops in Iraq will have their tours extended for 90 days in Iraq and up to 120 days deployed before returning home. Following is information on the announcement.

- The United States is committed to providing a secure environment in Iraq that will allow the country to become free, democratic and at peace with itself and its neighbors.
- As the June 30 date for transition to sovereignty draws nearer, forces in Iraq that oppose the country's progress are becoming more desperate.
- The commanders on the ground have requested additional combat capability for Iraq. Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have pledged that commanders will get the troops and equipment they need to accomplish their mission.
- The Secretary has approved the extension of about 20,000 forces currently in theater, of which about one-quarter are National Guard and Reserve personnel, for up to 90 additional days in Iraq and up to 120 days deployed.
- The 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment comprise the bulk of combat forces being extended in Iraq; they are being supported by Army National Guard and Reserve combat support and combat support personnel.
- Of the roughly 115,000 troops that have been scheduled to rotate out, some 36,000 are still in the theater. Of those 36,000, about 20,000 will be retained for a period while the remainder will continue their rotations home.
- The troop extensions will allow the United States and the Coalition to meet the short-term security challenges in Iraq. The plan minimizes the impact on current and future force rotations requirements, and on service members, their families and their employers.
- The troop extensions demonstrate both the ability of the United States to provide the force structure that the commanders need, and the commitment of the United States to providing a safe and secure environment for the Iraqi people as they transition to a new government and rebuild their country.
- The plan is capability based; when a unit's capabilities are no longer needed, the unit will be released.
- The Department of Defense remains committed to managing the force by making sure that the right people with the right skill sets are in the right jobs. The Department will continue to transform the force for the future.
- America is grateful for the sacrifices that our troops, their families and their employers make while our nation is at war.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – April 12, 2004

➤ **Areas in the south that have been under attack by Muqtada al-Sadr's**

- Al Kut, Nasariyah and the Hillah area are under control.
- The holy city of Najaf is still under the control of al-Sadr, and his forces have some presence in Karbala. Coalition forces are in the vicinity of Najaf, a holy city where religious celebrations were taking place, and are prepared to conduct offensive operations to eliminate the final elements of al-Sadr's influence.
- The Iraqi people have cooperated in stabilizing the area. The situation was not a Shi'a uprising.
- The mission of the Coalition forces is to kill or capture al-Sadr.
- The Iraqi Governing Council intends to bring al-Sadr to justice.

➤ **Coalition forces have continued to suspend offensive operations in Fallujah**

- Marines in Fallujah remain equipped and ready to continue operations if ordered. However, the Coalition at this point is working a political track to restore legitimate Iraqi control of the city.

➤ **Iraq's security problems must ultimately be solved by Iraqis,**

- It will take time to stand up credible and capable Iraqi security forces that will be able to assume the internal and external security missions in the country.
- There were a number of police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units in the south which did not stand up to the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr; however, there have been strong performances by units in other locations, such as Fallujah,
- Iraq's security forces will become the bulwark against terrorism and anti-democratic forces in the country, because the Iraqi people support them in their mission.
- Special operating forces will help train the Iraqi security forces.

➤ **The military operations in Iraq have been very precise.**

- U.S. troops have attempted to protect civilians to the best of their ability.
- Arab press, in particular Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, are falsely reporting that U.S. Marines are targeting civilians.

➤ **The Coalition will continue to confront the organizations and elements who want to intimidation to**

- **As** the June 30 transition to sovereignty date draws closer, those who oppose democracy in Iraq will become more desperate. They will use any means necessary – including combat, intimidation and terror – to try to derail the process.
- Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces remain resolved to attack, defeat and kill these elements in order to provide a security situation in Iraq that allows the democratic process to move forward.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – April 9, 2004

- The Coalition's offensive and civil military operations are continuing throughout Iraq in support of the Coalition's multiple objectives:
 - To restore order and eliminate anti-Coalition forces in Fallujah.
 - To destroy Muqtada al-Sadr's militia in the central and southern provinces.
 - To continue progress made in rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, its economy and its transition to sovereignty.
- Coalition forces unilaterally suspended offensive operations in Fallujah today in order to facilitate:
 - A meeting of Iraqi Governing Council representatives with leaders of the community and anti-Coalition forces.
 - The distribution of humanitarian relief supplies and tending to the wounded.
 - Coalition forces are retaining the inherent right of self-defense and will respond to continued attacks accordingly while offensive operations have been suspended.
 - The operations in Fallujah are not punitive. Those citizens who want democracy in Iraq have nothing to fear from the Coalition.
 - Approximately 25 to 30 percent of the operation conducted inside Fallujah is being conducted by an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps unit.
 - Coalition troops go to extraordinary lengths to minimize civilian casualties and minimize collateral structural damage.
- The United States and Coalition forces are conducting offensive operations against Muqtada al-
 - The Coalition intends to destroy the Sadr militia and all of its elements.
 - The vast majority of moderate Shi'a are denouncing al Sadr's activities.
- U.S. forces are restoring order and are
 - In the west in al Anbar province (which includes Ar Ramadi and Fallujah), Ramadi has been quiet today.
 - Coalition forces are firmly in control of Baghdad, including Sadr City.
 - In Karbala, the Coalition and Iraqi security continue their presence inside the city.
 - Sadr militia have been observed in some parts of the city.
 - To allow the observance of Arba'in, the Coalition will take a passive role to allow the estimated number of 1.2 million pilgrims to make their observances with Iraqi security forces and local authorities to take the lead.
 - In Najaf, Sadr militia are currently the predominant force inside the city.
 - The Coalition bases outside and ringing the city remain vigilant, maintaining force protection status, and carefully watching the Arba'in festivities.
 - In Kut, the Coalition expects to have firm control of all government facilities and Iraqi police stations on Saturday.
 - In Nasiriyah – the Italian brigade reports that resistance is minor and manageable.
- There is a small faction representing different elements which does not want
 - These elements are becoming more desperate as the June 30 sovereignty date approaches.
- Coalition military forces will conduct powerful, deliberate and very robust military operations until the job is done. The Coalition will continue the attacks until Sadr's influence is eliminated and his militia is no longer a threat to Iraq and its citizens.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – April 7, 2004

9 The U.S. will take military action against enemies of the Iraqi people.

- The U.S. will take robust military action as necessary to deal with challenges to Iraq's transition to sovereignty.
- U.S. forces are on the offense, The United States, its Coalition partners and Iraqi security forces are taking the battle to the terrorists,
- Military plans are being implemented that systematically address the situations currently faced by the U.S. in Iraq.
- Due to a major troop rotation, there is a planned increase in the number of U.S. troops in the CENTCOM area of responsibility and in Iraq. The military is taking advantage of that increase and will likely manage the pace of redeployments to allow seasoned troops with relationships with local populations to see the current situation through.

➤ The vast majority of Iraqis want freedom for their country.

- This is an important moment in Iraq's history -- the future of the Iraqi people is at stake. The stakes are high for Iraq, the region, and the world.
- Iraq is in a power play between those who favor terrorism and a return to oppression and those determined to have freedom and self-government.
- The U.S. has no intention of allowing Iraq's movement toward a better future to be undermined by former regime elements -- the enemies of a free Iraq, who include:
 - Ba'athists, Iraqi extremists and extremists from outside Iraq.
 - Members of the Zarqawi network.
 - The estimated few thousand lightly-armed members of the so-called Mahdi Army -- gangs associated with Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

➤ As the June 30 date for Iraq's transition to self-governance approaches, those opposed to a free Iraq will grow increasingly desperate.

- The terrorists are threatened by the Iraqi people's progress toward self-government, because they know that they will have no future in a free Iraq.
 - They know, as al Qaeda associate Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi wrote in a recently-intercepted letter: "Democracy is coming," and there will be no excuse thereafter for their attacks.
 - They know that the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people oppose them and that, given a free choice, the Iraqi people will choose the rule of law, not rule by murderers.

➤ The United States will stay until the job is done.

- As President Bush said, the United States did not charge hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq and pay a bitter cost of casualties to liberate 25 million people, only to retreat before a band of thugs and assassins.
- The U.S. is facing a test of will, and will meet that test.
- The will of the Iraqi people is also being tested. They will choose freedom and the chance to live a decent life over more tyranny and oppression.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – NATO and Iraq – April 6, 2004

NATO

Secretary Rumsfeld today is in Norfolk, Va., for a NATO meeting on transformation.

- Last week, NATO welcomed seven new countries to the Alliance -- Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. These countries understand the meaning of political freedom, and value it greatly.
- All 26 NATO allies have forces in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and 17 have forces in both.
- In the past year, NATO has made impressive accomplishments, including:
 - Standing up the Transformation Command in Norfolk;
 - Working to help Poland stand up the multinational division in south-central Iraq; and
 - Deploying NATO forces to lead the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan – NATO's first mission outside of Europe and North America.
- NATO countries must have militaries that are organized, trained, equipped, and deployable in a relatively short period of time so they can contribute to peace and stability in the world.

U.S. Troops in Force Levels in Iraq

- The United States is currently managing the largest troop rotation since World War II.
- The combatant commanders are in the best position to determine troop level needs. They review their needs continuously, and are given the resources they require to meet their mission. They have announced no change in their plans. The current plan is to have approximately 115,000 troops in Iraq after the rotation.
- The Department of Defense is taking action to relieve the temporary stress on the force by:
 - Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces, which now number more than 200,000.
 - Increasing international military participation.
- The June 30 deadline for the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq refers to the political governance of the country; it does not apply to security responsibility. U.S. and Coalition forces will stay in Iraq to help the Iraqi people secure and stabilize their country.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – Operation Vigilant Resolve – April 5, 2004

Following are highlights of Operation Vigilant Resolve and the arrest of Mustafa al-Yacoubi, who is accused of brutally murdering an ayatollah one year ago in front of a shrine.

- **Iraqi security forces, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and special Operation Vigilant Resolve in Al Anbar**
 - The operation's mission is to confront anti-Coalition and anti-Iraqi elements in Fallujah.
 - More than 1,300 personnel have established traffic control points around the city. A curfew from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. has also been imposed.
 - These actions are the first in a series to attack anti-Coalition and anti-Iraqi forces, reestablish security in the city and begin the process of civil military assistance projects.
- **The Coalition is working with community leaders and authorities in Fallujah who wish to move forward to establish an Iraq that is free, democratic and peaceful.**
 - The violence in Fallujah is in no way representative of the overall situation in Iraq.
 - Fallujah is a small part of the country and the people who murdered Americans last week are a small minority of the population there.
 - The vast majority of Iraqis have expressed their outrage and shame at the incident-- they say it is not representative of the people of Iraq.
 - The operation's tactics are appropriate. The operation is directed at a small number of individuals who are trying to thwart progress in Iraq.
- **Iraqi police today**
 - Al-Yacoubi was arrested in connection with the murder of Ayatollah Sayyed Abdul Majeed al-Khoi, a respected advocate for human rights who was shot and stabbed to death last April in front of one of the world's holiest shrines.
 - An Iraqi judge issued a warrant for al-Yacoubi's arrest as the result of an Iraqi criminal investigation and indictment.
 - Al-Yacoubi is in Iraqi police custody. He will be tried by Iraqi judges in Iraqi courts under Iraqi laws.
 - Coalition authorities on Monday announced that an Iraqi judge has issued an arrest warrant for Muqtada al Sadr, a Shi'ite cleric. The warrant is based on evidence that connects al Sadr to the murder of Ayatollah al-Khoi.

Coalition Forces Update

- **More than 3,700 South Korean soldiers will deploy to Iraq, Korean officials announced recently.**
 - The soldiers are expected to deploy mid-June to Irbil or As Sulimaniyah provinces in northeast Iraq. The unit will contain engineers, medics, truck drivers and security and civil affairs personnel.
 - Five hundred South Korean soldiers are based in Nasiriyah. They are mostly engineers and medical personnel.
 - The commitment will make the South Korean contingent the third largest foreign contribution in Iraq after the United States and the United Kingdom.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – Fallujah – April 2, 2004

"[The] events in Fallujah are a dramatic example of the ongoing struggle between human dignity and barbarism. ... The acts we have seen were despicable and inexcusable. They violate the tenets of all religions, including Islam, as well as the foundations of civilized society. Their deaths will not go unpunished. Our sympathy goes out to the families of all, civilian and military, Iraqi and Coalition, who have given their lives in the war to liberate Iraq and free it from terrorism. They have not died in vain.

"These acts are also a crime under law and a crime against the future of Iraq. The Coalition, Americans and others, came here to help the people of Iraq. They came to help Iraq recover from decades of dictatorship, to help the people of Iraq gain the elections, democracy and freedom desired by the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people. "

- L. Paul Bremer, Administrator] Coalition Provisional Authority] April 1, 2004.

- The murder and mutilation of four civilian contractors in Fallujah is an unspeakable depravity. Those responsible will be dealt with sternly.
- Coalition forces will respond in a manner that is deliberate, precise and overwhelming.
- U.S., Coalition and Iraqi security forces are resolute in their determination to hunt down and capture these criminals.
- Fallujah is in no way representative of the overall situation in Iraq. Fallujah is a small part of the country and the people who did this are a small minority of the population there.
- The vast majority of Iraqis have expressed their outrage and shame at the incident-- they say it is not representative of the people of Iraq.
- These murders are a painful outrage, but they will not derail the march to stability and democracy in Iraq.
- Iraq remains on track for its transition to sovereignty -- a real opportunity for the Iraqi people to build an Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors and the world; respectful of human rights and the rights of individuals; that sustains a viable economy; and utilizes its resources to benefit the Iraqi people instead of bankrolling weapons and palaces.
 - Over time, progress toward these goals will diminish the root causes of terrorism in the region.
- The U.S. and Coalition will not walk away from its shared commitment to the people of Iraq and to justice. For as long as it takes, the Coalition will continue to do what is necessary for Iraq to defend itself against murderers and terrorists.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Troop Rotation to Iraq – April 1, 2004

The largest U.S. troop rotation since World War II is continuing in Iraq. More than 250,000 U.S. service members are involved. Following are details.

➤ **Planning for the rotation has been underway for months.**

- The new units deploying worked with units in Iraq to plan movements and learn their missions.
- New units began flowing into the region in December.
The rotation is expected to continue through May, when 110,000 service members will be in place, replacing 130,000 troops who have been serving in the region.

➤ **Approximately 95 percent of the service members deploying to Iraq have arrived**

- More than 90 percent of the cargo has arrived.
- More than 60 percent of personnel due to return to their home stations have done so.

➤ **Units**

- The 101st Airborne Division (Fort Campbell, Ky). They have been replaced in Mosul by Task Force Olympia, which includes the Stryker Brigade from Fort Lewis, Wash.
- The 82nd Airborne Division (Fort Bragg, N.C.)
- The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Fort Carson, Colo.)
- The 1st Armored Division (Germany and Fort Riley, Kan.)
- The 173rd Airborne Brigade from Vicenza, Italy;
- The 4th Infantry Division (Fort Hood, Tex., and Fort Carson, Colo.).

➤ **Arriving Army**

- The 1st Cavalry Division (Fort Hood, Tex.), which will command the 39th Brigade Combat Team from the Arkansas National Guard. The Division will relieve the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad around April 15.
- 1st Infantry Division (Wurzburg, Germany, and Fort Riley, Kan.) has relieved the 4th ID and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The 30th Brigade Combat Team of the North Carolina National Guard is part of the 1st ID.

➤ **Arriving Marines**

- The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Camp Pendleton, Calif.) last week relieved the 82nd Airborne and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Fallujah, Ramadi and
- The 1st MEF will command the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley and the 81st Armored Washington State National Guard.

➤ **Iraqi security forces continue to grow.**

- More than 210,000 Iraqis are involved in security work in their country.
- A new Iraqi army brigade should be operational when Iraq assumes sovereignty on June 30.

Related Sites:

[3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division \(Stryker Brigade\)](#)

[101st Airborne Division](#)

[82nd Airborne Division](#)

[1st Armored Division](#)

[173rd Airborne Brigade](#)

[4th Infantry Division](#)

[1st Cavalry Division](#)

[39th Brigade Combat Team](#)

[1st Infantry Division](#)

[1st Marine Expeditionary Force](#)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Reconstruction – Partnership for Prosperity – March 30, 2004

Following are highlights from a briefing yesterday by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), retired Admiral David Nash, the director of CPA's Program Management Office, and members of the Iraqi Governing Council. Ambassador Bremer discussed reconstruction in Iraq and the new Partnership for Prosperity. The 2,300 construction projects planned for Iraq that will provide jobs and contribute to the country's economic growth. [\[transcript\]](#)

➤ **Iraq's reconstruction**

- The World Bank estimates that after decades of mismanagement by Saddam Hussein, Iraq needs between \$55 billion and \$60 billion to regain its economic balance.
- The United States has contributed more than \$18 billion for this effort. This commitment is the bedrock of the Partnership for Prosperity.

➤ **An immediate effect of the Partnership for Prosperity will be the rapid creation**

- More than 50,000 Iraqis will be working on jobs funded by the Partnership for Prosperity when Iraq assumes sovereignty on June 30.
- Tens of thousands more jobs will be created for Iraqis as the 2,300 projects of the Partnership get underway. These projects will help raise the standard of living in Iraq by improving principal services.

➤ **The Partnership for Prosperity will propel Iraq out of a decades-long economic slump**

- Managed properly, Iraq's economy can once again provide a decent life with good jobs for all Iraqis.
- Iraq's economic transformation is a twin complement to its political transformation. A free and prosperous Iraq is the best response to the continued threat of terrorism.

➤ **Of the \$18.4 billion grant from the United States, approximately \$12 billion is being spent on construction work, and \$6 billion is being spent on other efforts.**

- Construction work falls into six sectors: electricity; water resources and public works; security and justice; transportation and communications; buildings, health and education; and oil.
- Examples of non-construction work include projects such as civic education, and outright purchases for goods and services such as training, vehicles, weapons and uniforms.

Progress on Health Services

The Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraq's ministries are working to bring fundamental change to the way the Iraqi health system operates. In its new Ministry of Health, under the leadership of Dr. Khudair al-Khatib and Jim Havens, the coalition's advisor for Health, we laid the foundation for a stronger, more efficient health care system in Iraq. The Ministry has developed a new strategic plan, reorganized its administration, and instituted a new financial and balances system to deter and root out corruption.

Other achievements of Iraq's Ministry of Health include:

- Increasing Iraq's health budget: Iraq's health budget in 2002 under Saddam was \$16 million. This year, Iraq's health budget is \$948 million.
- Health care supplies: 30,000 tons of pharmaceuticals and health care supplies have been delivered to facilities across Iraq.
- Hospitals and health centers: 240 Iraqi hospitals and 1,200 primary health centers are operating.
- Vaccinations: More than 30 million doses of children's vaccinations have been distributed.

(For additional information, link to the [CPA web site](#) and the [CPA release](#).)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – 100 Days to Sovereignty – March 24, 2004

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer today marked 100 days until Iraqi sovereignty with a speech to the Iraqi people that notes both successes of the past year and challenges ahead. Following are highlights. The [full text](#) can be read on the Coalition Provisional Authority's web site (www.iraqcoalition.org).

The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)

- The TAL, Iraq's interim constitution, lays out the country's path democracy. It protects the vital
 - The TAL recognizes that Islam enjoys a special place as the religion of most Iraqis, but guarantees the religious beliefs and practices of all citizens.
 - The TAL protects the rights of every Iraqi. They have the right to speak their mind on any subject, to assemble peacefully, to travel freely and the right to privacy.
 - The TAL creates a nation of laws. Every citizen is entitled to the protection of the law. No citizen is above the law.

The Elections Calendar Under the TAL

- Under the TAL, there will be four national elections before
 - The first election, to elect a 275-member National Assembly, must take place no later than Jan. 31, 2005, and earlier if possible.
 - Iraqi voters will elect governate councils no later than Jan. 31, 2005.
 - A constitution written by the National Assembly must be presented to the people in a general referendum no later than Oct. 15, 2005.
 - The fourth election, for a government elected under the terms of the new constitution, must be held no later than Dec. 15, 2005. This fourth election will bring a directly elected government to power in Iraq.

New Institutions Created in the Next 100 Days

- To ensure that Iraq has the structures to protect its citizens from foreign aggression, an Iraqi Ministry of Defense and a cabinet-level National Security Committee will be created later this week.
 - These institutions will begin working immediately with the Coalition Provisional Authority on security matters.
- To protect Iraqis from the corruption that was rampant in Saddam but cooperating agencies will be created to
 - The Commission on Public Integrity will enforce anti-corruption laws.
 - The Commission will work with a revitalized Board of Supreme Audit and a newly established Inspectors General.
 - Inspectors have already been appointed to 19 ministries.
- To regulate publicly owned media, an Iraq Public Service Broadcaster
 - Under Saddam, the government owned and ran all media outlets.
 - In the new Iraq, government-owned media exist to inform the public, not to promote the political interests of the leaders.
 - This new Commission will be completely independent of the government.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – September 11th Commission - March 23, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld today testified before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Following are highlights from his prepared testimony, which was divided into seven sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Preparing for an Era of Surprise: January 20, 2001 – September 10, 2001; (3) The Day of September 11th; (4) What Steps Have Been Taken Since September 11th; (5) Some Questions That Have Been Posed; (6) Suggestions for the Future; and (7) Conclusion. ([link to full text](#))

Introduction

The world of September 10th is past. We have entered a new security environment, arguably the most dangerous the world has known. And if we are to continue to live as free people, we cannot go back to thinking as we did on September 10th. For if we do -- if we look at the problems of the 21st century through a 20th century prism -- we will come to wrong conclusions and fail the American people.

Preparing for an Era of Surprise: January 20, 2001 – September 10, 2001

It had become increasingly clear that we could no longer afford to treat terrorism as a manageable evil – that we needed an approach that treated terrorism more like fascism -- as an evil that needed to be not contained, but fought and eliminated.

When this Administration came into office, the President asked the NSC to begin preparing a new counter-terrorism strategy. His instructions were to develop a strategy not simply to contain terrorism, but to deal with it more aggressively – not to reduce the threat posed by al-Qaeda, but to eliminate the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

The Day of September 11th

A few days after 9/11, I wrote down some thoughts on terrorism, and the new kind of war that had been visited upon us. I noted:

- “It will take a sustained effort to root [the terrorists] out.... The world needs to have realistic expectations. This campaign is a marathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist network, such as al-Qaeda, is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers.
- “The Coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed; rather, they will change and evolve... [E]ach country has a somewhat different perspective and different relationships, views and concerns. It should not be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities in which the U.S. is engaged, while other countries will not.
- “Some will be reluctant to join an effort against terrorism or at least some aspects of our efforts. Terrorists terrorize people. We accept that fact.
- “This is not a war against the people of any country. The regimes that support terrorism terrorize their own people as well. We need to enlist all civilized people to oppose terrorism, and we need to [help] make it safe for them to do so.
- “This is not a war against Islam.... The al-Qaeda terrorists are extremists whose views are antithetical to those of most Muslims. Their actions... are aimed in part at preventing Muslim people from engaging the rest of the world. There are millions of Muslims around the world who we expect to become allies in this struggle.”

What Steps Have Been Taken Since September 11th

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of Defense has pursued two tracks simultaneously:

- We have prosecuted the Global War on Terror in concert with other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and
- We have continued and, where possible, accelerated, the effort to transform the Department to be able to meet and defeat the threats of the 21st century.

We are having success on both fronts.

What the courageous men and women in uniform have accomplished since our country was attacked 30 months ago is impressive. In the 2½ years since 9/11, with our Coalition partners, they have:

- Overthrown two terrorist regimes, and liberated some 50 million people;
- Hunted down thousands of terrorists and regime remnants in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries;
- Captured or killed 46 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq -- including Saddam Hussein;
- Disrupted terrorist financing;
- Interdicted shipments of chemical and nuclear weapons components bound for terrorist states;
- Disrupted terrorist cells on several continents; and
- Undoubtedly prevented a number of planned terrorist attacks.

Some Questions That Have Been Posed

Some have asked: Why wasn't bin Laden taken out, and if he had been hit, would it have prevented September 11th?

First, I know of no actionable intelligence since January 20, 2001 that would have allowed the U.S. to attack and capture or kill Usama bin Laden. In the 2½ years since September 11th, all the nations of the Coalition have focused a great deal of time, energy and resources on the task of finding him and capturing or killing him. Thus far none of us has succeeded. But we will. It took ten months to capture Saddam Hussein in Iraq -- and Coalition forces had passed by the hole he was hiding in many times during those ten months. They were able to find him only after someone with specific knowledge told us where he was. What that suggests is that it is exceedingly difficult to find a single individual who is determined to not be found.

Second, even if bin Laden had been captured or killed in the weeks before 9/11, no one I know believes it would have prevented 9/11. Killing bin Laden would not have removed the al-Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. Moreover, the sleeper cells that flew the aircraft into the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon were already in the U.S. some months before the attacks. Indeed, if the stars had aligned, actionable intelligence had appeared, which it did not, and if it had somehow been possible to successfully attack him, it would have been a good thing, to be sure, but, regrettably, 9/11 would likely *still* have happened. And, ironically, much of the world in all likelihood would have blamed September 11th on the U.S. as an al-Qaeda retaliation for the U.S. provocation of capturing or killing Usama bin Laden.

Conclusion

Think about what has been done since the September 11th attacks: two state sponsors of terrorism have been removed from power, a 90-nation Coalition has been formed which is cooperating on a number of levels – through diplomacy, law enforcement, military action, financial and economic measures, information and intelligence. Some of these actions are public and seen – still others are unseen, with operations that must remain secret, even in success.

All of these actions are putting pressure on terrorist networks. Taken together, they represent a collective effort that is unprecedented -- which has undoubtedly saved lives, and made us safer than before September 11th.

And yet, despite that pressure and that collective effort, terrorist attacks have continued: in Bali and Baghdad, Jakarta and Jerusalem, Casablanca and Riyadh, Mombasa and Istanbul, and most recently the bombings in Madrid. It is likely -- indeed almost certain -- that, in the period ahead, somewhere, somehow, more terrorist attacks will be attempted -- even here in the United States. Certainly intelligence powerfully points to terrorist efforts to do just that.

What can be done? We can remain vigilant. We can continue the efforts underway to transform the institutions of government – military, intelligence, law enforcement and homeland defense -- to better focus on the threats of the 21st century. We can continue working with allies and partners around the world. And we can continue rooting out terrorist networks, dealing with the proliferation of dangerous weapons of mass murder, and denying terrorists sanctuary.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – OIF Operation Iron Promise - March 22, 2004

Operation Iron Promise

The 1st Armored Division, under the command of MG Martin Dempsey, launched Operation Iron Promise in Iraq last week. Following are details about the operation.

- **Iron Promise targets former regime elements and other extremists in Baghdad who threaten the Iraqi people and stand in the way of a new Iraq.**
 - Iraqi security forces are contributing significantly to Operation Iron Promise. The operation is city-wide, and it involves members of the Iraqi Police Service, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the Iraqi Army and Coalition Forces.
 - The operation will counter the new threats emerging in Baghdad in the past few months, including the linkage between international terrorism and Iraqi extremism.
 - To date, 1st AD troops have conducted 76 battalion operations, captured 115 enemy personnel, 208 weapons, 107 artillery and rocket rounds, and significant quantities of improvised explosive device (IED) materials.
 - The operation's name was carefully chosen to convey to the Iraqi people that as the 1st AD transfers authority to the 1st Cavalry Division, the Coalition will remain committed to defeating Iraq's enemies.
 - Operation Iron Promise is just one of many military actions conducted by the U.S. military, Coalition partners, and Iraqi security forces to bring stabilization and security to Iraq.

Update on Iraqi Security Forces

Iraqis continue to volunteer to protect their country. Following is an update on Iraqi security forces as provided by MG Martin Dempsey during a press briefing in Baghdad on March 18.

Police:

- The goal for the city of Baghdad is to have 19,000 police (a ratio of one-to-300, generally the accepted standard for a modern city).
- There are currently 10,000 police in Baghdad.
- Approximately 2,000 officers will graduate in the next month.
- For every slot available, there are five or six candidates who apply.

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps:

- The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) is fully recruited. They are trained through the platoon level, and within a month they will be trained at the company level.

The New Iraqi Army:

- The 1st AD is mentoring an Iraqi army battalion in Taji.
- By July there will be two additional battalions in Taji, for a total of three battalions.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq – Wolfowitz Perspective – March 19, 2004

Following are highlights of a March 18 interview of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz with Jim Lehrer on The NewsHour.

On Avman al-Zawahiri (bin Laden's deputy) and Dismantling al Qaeda

"He's regarded as the number two, but, you know, sometimes Americans, I don't know what it is, but we get obsessed with the silver bullet solution. Obviously getting bin Laden would be a very big thing, but anyone who thinks that that's going to be the end of al Qaeda, the end of these terrorists networks, doesn't understand how they work. They are very decentralized operations, the kind of killing that we saw in Spain just a few days ago. It's not a large number of people. They don't need support from Afghanistan, so you've got to go after them one by one."

On Going to War

"The reason for going to war was because Iraq was in violation of the U.N. Security Council resolution. In fact, there were three major reasons, and if you go back and read Secretary Powell's speech to the U.N. in February of last year, he said specifically it is weapons of mass destruction, it is their support for terrorism, and it's the oppression of their people and we had agreed in fact with Resolution 1441 to limit it to weapons of mass destruction and give them one last and final chance to come clean and he did not come clean."

On Expectations and Challenges

"We expected a war. We expected a very difficult fight. Some things have gone better than we expected. Some things have been tougher. I think what is the heart of our challenge there is the fact that this regime that is defeated and the leader was captured hiding in a hole, nevertheless, has some significant numbers, in the thousands, not in the tens of thousands, but in the thousands of killers who still want to destabilize the society and believe that somehow they can bring back some version of the tyranny. That's the main problem we confront.... The other problem we confront is people like Zarqawi, who were basically, if they are not literal members of al Qaeda, they are from the same mind set and they're associated (with those) who believe that if they kill enough people, they can destabilize the country, they can defeat democracy. So that is a challenge."

On the Year Since the War

"I think 25 million of some of the most talented people in the Muslim and Arab world have been liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of the last 100 years. Iraq is no longer a government that supports terrorism. We don't have to worry about them restarting nuclear programs or restarting biological weapons programs, and if you have any doubt about it, I guess I'd encourage people to go read this letter that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, probably the most dangerous terrorist in Iraq today, sent to his colleagues in Afghanistan... They understand that this is a battle for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world, and I think they are afraid they are losing it. I think they are losing." ([link to text of al Zarqawi letter](#))

On the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces

"(The) Coalition is now 35 countries, plus the U.S. The 35th country is Iraq. (There are) some 200,000 Iraqis in the police force, in the civil defense corps and the army who are out there on the front lines fighting for their country, risking their lives, unfortunately sometimes losing their lives. That's where the future lies and that's what has Zarqawi so discouraged. That's why they are one of his big targets."

On Troop Numbers and Intelligence

"It's the combatant commanders who have made the recommendations about what troops are required, and they have gotten what they've asked for. They say that what they need is more intelligence and more Iraqis, not more American troops. Unless you have better intelligence, you are just going to have people there for people to take shots at them and that's not a good thing either. We have a very large force there. It's probably larger than we expected we'd have at this point, but General Abizaid (commander, U.S. Central Command) is asked regularly by the president and by the secretary of defense, do you have what you need and... he gets what he needs."

Links: ([DefendAmerica.mil - Iraq - A Year of Progress](#)); ([DefendAmerica.mil - Iraq Time Line](#))

Following is an op-ed by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld.

New York Times
March 19, 2004

The Price Of Freedom In Iraq

This week, as we mark the one-year anniversary of the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is useful to recount why we have fought. Not long ago I visited South Korea, just as the Korean government was debating whether to send troops to Iraq. In Seoul, I was interviewed by a Korean journalist who was almost certainly too young to have firsthand recollection of the Korean War. She asked me, "Why should Koreans send their young people halfway around the globe to be killed or wounded in Iraq?"

As it happened, I had that day visited a Korean War memorial, which bears the names of every American soldier killed in the war. On it was the name of a close friend of mine from high school, a wrestling teammate, who was killed on the last day of the war. I said to the reporter: "It's a fair question. And it would have been fair for an American to ask, 50 years ago, 'Why should young Americans go halfway around the world to be killed or wounded in Korea?'"

We were speaking on an upper floor of a large hotel in Seoul. I asked the woman to look out the window — at the lights, the cars, the energy of the vibrant economy of South Korea. I told her about a satellite photo of the Korean peninsula, taken at night, that I keep on a table in my Pentagon office. North of the demilitarized zone there is nothing but darkness — except a pinprick of light around Pyongyang — while the entire country of South Korea is ablaze in light, the light of freedom.

Korean freedom was won at a terrible cost — tens of thousands of lives, including more than 33,000 Americans killed in action. Was it worth it? You bet. Just as it was worth it in Germany and France and Italy and in the Pacific in World War II. And just as it is worth it in Afghanistan and Iraq today.

Today, in a world of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and states that sponsor the former and pursue the latter, defending freedom means we must confront dangers before it is too late. In Iraq, for 12 years, through 17 United Nations Security Council resolutions, the world gave Saddam Hussein every opportunity to avoid war. He was being held to a simple standard: live up to your agreement at the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf war; disarm and prove you have done so. Instead of disarming — as Kazakhstan, South Africa and Ukraine did, and as Libya is doing today — Saddam Hussein chose deception and defiance.

Repeatedly, he rejected those resolutions and he systematically deceived United Nations inspectors about his weapons and his intent. The world knew his record: he used chemical weapons against Iran and his own citizens; he invaded Iran and Kuwait; he launched ballistic missiles at Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain; and his troops repeatedly fired on American and British aircraft patrolling the no-flight zones.

Recognizing the threat, in September 2002 President Bush went to the United Nations, which gave Iraq still another "final opportunity" to disarm and to prove it had done so. The next month the president went to Congress, which voted to support the use of force if Iraq did not.

And, when Saddam Hussein passed up that final opportunity, he was given a last chance to avoid war: **48** hours to leave the country. Only then, after every peaceful option had been exhausted, did the president and our coalition partners order the liberation of Iraq.

Americans do not come easily to war, but neither do Americans take freedom lightly. But when freedom and self-government have taken root in Iraq, and that country becomes a force for good in the Middle East, the rightness of those efforts will be just as clear as it is today in Korea, Germany, Japan and Italy.

As the continuing terrorist violence in Iraq reminds us, the road to self-governance will be challenging. But the progress is impressive. Last week the Iraqi Governing Council unanimously signed an interim Constitution. It guarantees freedom of religion and expression; the right to assemble and to organize political parties; the right to vote; and the right to a fair, speedy and open trial. It prohibits discrimination based on gender, nationality and religion, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention. A year ago today, none of those protections could have been even imagined by the Iraqi people.

Today, as we think about the tens of thousands of United States soldiers in Iraq — and in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world fighting the global war on terrorism — we should say to all of them: "You join a long line of generations of Americans who have fought freedom's fight. Thank you."

(end)

Following is an op-ed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

March 19, 2004
The New York Post

Terror is Losing

After the horrific March 2 bombing that killed 170 at Shi'a shrines in Baghdad and Karbala, one Iraqi had an answer for those in the West who wonder if such tactics can work. His words speak to the horror of the events in Spain last week and in Baghdad on Wednesday.

His name is Ali and his Web log said this about the terrorists and their allies: "They are spitting in the face of the wind."

One of the interesting developments in post-Saddam Iraq is the appearance of amateur Web sites, where Iraqis are taking advantage of modern technology to give voice to their newfound freedom. One such site shows Iraqi women demonstrating against Resolution 137, passed by the Iraqi Governing Council, which threatened women's rights.

These women - who were exercising their right of free speech to demonstrate for women's rights - were dressed in very conservative Muslim fashion. Yet, as one of them put it: "We didn't wait all these years without the most basic rights to be denied them now."

An Arab reporter asked if she were Sunni or Shi'a. She snapped: "I'm an Iraqi citizen first and foremost, and I refuse to be asked such a question."

In increasing numbers, likeminded Iraqi women - and men - are making it clear they expect basic rights. People are listening. Not only did this pressure force the repeal of Resolution 137, but, when the new Iraqi interim constitution was signed March 8, it contained assurances of equal rights - and substantial representation - for women.

It also provides for other fundamental pillars of true democracy, including separation of powers and an independent judiciary, rule of law, fundamental civil rights and civilian control of the military. That's a significant step forward that came from heated and healthy political debate - debate that would have been impossible a year ago.

While such debates do show that Iraqis disagree among themselves, they demonstrate - more importantly - that Iraqis can debate those issues openly and democratically. Significantly, in a recent opinion poll of Iraqis, 56 percent said things were going better today than a year ago; 71 percent said they thought they would be better off a year from now.

Last March, Iraqis were suffering under the thumb of one of the most brutal dictatorships of the last hundred years - a regime that industrialized brutality, tortured children to coerce their parents and raped women to punish their relatives. A U.S. Army commander in Iraq told me last July about the excavation of one mass grave where they discovered remains of 80 women and children - with little dresses and toys.

Today, Iraq's era of systematic savagery is over. Thanks to the dedication and courage of American and Coalition military and civilians, the support of the U.S. Congress and the American people, life in Iraq is improving steadily:

* Electricity reached pre-war levels last October, and is on track to reach 150 percent of pre-war levels, despite an infrastructure devastated by Saddam.

* Oil production has reached 2.5 million barrels per day, well ahead of projections.

* Funding for public health care is up **26** times the level under Saddam.

* All 22 universities, **43** technical institutes and colleges opened on time last fall.

* Some 72 million new textbooks will go to primary and secondary schools by the end of this school year, so children will no longer learn arithmetic from books that say "2 Saddams plus 2 Saddams equals 4 Saddams."

One of the most important developments is the increasing role played by Iraqis in providing for the security of their country. Since Baghdad was liberated, Iraqi security forces went from almost none to the 200,000 who currently serve in various security roles.

Today, Iraqis who are fighting and dying for the "New Iraq" are numerically the largest member of the Coalition. While they are not as well-trained or equipped as American forces, they have many advantages because they know the country and the language. They're the "home team" and enjoy tremendous popular support - to the terrorists' frustration.

It is altogether appropriate that Iraqis should fight to defend their country, and it is heartening that they continue to volunteer in large numbers despite the enemy's attempts to frighten them.

A few weeks ago, after an attack on a police station in Fallujah, when the U.S. offered Iraqi Civil Defense Corpsmen help in subduing the attackers, they said, no thanks - we want to do this job ourselves so people will know we can.

Ali, the Iraqi blogger, put such attacks into a larger perspective: "Some people still wonder what would be the relation between the liberation of Iraq and [the] war on terrorism. I think that the fact that nearly all the terrorists are gathered on our land to fight so fiercely should be more than enough explanation." He added: "We are . . . showing [other Arabs] what they can achieve once they are free . . . I see these evil powers show their true and ugly face and play their last card - surer than ever that we are winning."

WHEN 9/11 changed everything, it was that same determination that led America to take up our own fight against terrorists. Perhaps no one understands better than New Yorkers just how much changed that day. What happened in lower Manhattan, at the Pentagon and in Shanksville meant we could no longer allow the world's most brutal tyrants to traffic with terrorists - or allow the Middle East to breed terrorists on a massive scale.

Today, nothing is more important to world security than fighting these terrorists where they live. Or sustaining progress in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Winning in both countries is imperative. But it is only part of the larger war on terrorism. It won't be over with one victory in Afghanistan or another in Iraq - important as they are. It won't be over when we capture or kill Bin Laden.

The recent homicide bombings in Spain - a country that has taken a courageous lead against global terrorism - warn us that every free and open society is vulnerable. Free nations must remain united in fighting for freedom against a threat that is as evil and as dangerous as the totalitarian threats of the last century.

It's an enormous job. In Iraq alone, as the president often reminds us, it won't be quick and it won't be easy. Saddamist killers and foreign terrorists are doing all they can to stop progress. However, a recently intercepted letter from Abu Masabal-Zarqawi - a major terrorist mastermind in Iraq - to his al Qaeda associates in Afghanistan suggests that he is getting discouraged: The geography is unfriendly and Iraqis are too, the writer laments. Every time they mount an attack to drive Iraqis apart, they come together instead.

"Democracy" in Iraq, he writes, "is coming," and that will mean "suffocation" for the terrorists. Zarqawi says his best hope is to start a Shi'a-Sunni civil war by killing Shi'a.

Democracy is coming to Iraq. And we'll be there to see it. When sovereignty is handed over to Iraqis on July 1, our engagement will change. But our commitment will not. We'll stay in Iraq until our job is done.

Last July, an American Army colonel in the 101st Air Assault Division told me that he explained that job to his soldiers like this: He told them that what they're doing in Iraq is every bit as important as what their grandfathers did in Germany or Japan in World War II or what their fathers did in Korea or in Europe during the Cold War.

Those soldiers are changing history in a way that will make America and the world safer. Our soldiers are making it possible for people to build free and stable governments that will join the fight against terrorism - and our children and grandchildren will be safer for it.

Someday, Iraq will be one of these free and prospering nations. As Ali put it so well: "It's just a matter of time."

(end)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq - International Support, Security- March 17, 2004

International Support

- A broad coalition of nations is providing support for efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq: 34 countries, including 11 of the 19 NATO countries, have provided more than 25,000 troops to secure in Iraq.
- There are two multinational divisions in Iraq: one led by the United Kingdom in central-south Iraq and one led by Poland with forces from 17 nations.
- In southern Iraq, the transition to Multinational Division Southeast and Multinational Division South is complete.
- Japanese troops are now part of Multinational Division South. In their first deployment into a combat environment since World War II, they are providing medical assistance, water supplies and helping to reconstruct public facilities.
- The international community has pledged at least \$32 billion to improve schools, health care, roads, water and electricity supplies, agriculture and other essential services.
- The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and 38 countries have pledged to extend loans and grants to Iraq. Other nations are contributing humanitarian assistance, extending export credits and reducing Iraqi debt.
- The UN Security Council on Oct. 16, 2003, unanimously approved Resolution 1511 that calls on member states to support the work of the multinational force in Iraq.

Security

- Forty-six of the 55 most wanted Hussein regime members have been captured or killed, including the brutal dictator himself, whose capture sent a powerful message to the Iraqi people that the tyranny is over.
- More than 200,000 Iraqis now provide security for their fellow citizens. Iraqi security forces now account for the majority of all forces in Iraq.
 - Nationwide, approximately 77,000 police officers have been hired.
 - The new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps has more than 30,000 personnel operating and another 3,800 in training.
 - Approximately 20,000 Iraqis serve in the Border Police Force.
 - 73,000 are in the Facility Protection Service Service, protecting vital infrastructure from sabotage and terrorist attacks.
 - More than 3,000 soldiers serve in the new Iraqi Army.
- Intelligence in Iraq has improved since the capture of Saddam Hussein: more Iraqis are telling Coalition soldiers about anti-Coalition forces, foreign fighters, and the locations of improvised explosive devices and weapons caches. Saddam's capture is also allowing the Coalition to apprehend more mid-level financiers and organizers.
- Success in training Iraqis as security forces is allowing U.S. troops to rotate back to their home stations. In May, the Coalition's forces will decrease from approximately 130,000 troops to approximately 110,000.

Washington Post
March 13, 2004
Pg. 11

Pentagon Shadow Loses Some Mystique

Feith's Shops Did Not Usurp Intelligence Agencies on Iraq, Hill Probers Find

By Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer

In February 2002, Christina Shelton, a career Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, was combing through old intelligence on Iraq when she stumbled upon a small paragraph in a CIA report from the mid-1990s that stopped her.

It recounted a contact between some Iraqis and al Qaeda that she had not seen mentioned in current CIA analysis, according to three defense officials who work with her. She spent the next couple of months digging through 12 years of intelligence reports on Iraq and produced a briefing on alleged contacts Shelton felt had been overlooked or underplayed by the CIA.

Her boss, Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy and the point man on Iraq, was so impressed that he set up a briefing for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who was so impressed he asked her to brief CIA Director George J. Tenet in August 2002. By summer's end, Shelton had also briefed deputy national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley and Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby.

Shelton's analysis, and the White House briefings that resulted, are new details about a small group of Pentagon analysts whose work has cast a large shadow of suspicion and controversy as Congress investigates how the administration used intelligence before the Iraq war.

Congressional Democrats contend that two Pentagon shops -- the Office of Special Plans and the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group -- were established by Rumsfeld, Feith and other defense hawks expressly to bypass the CIA and other intelligence agencies. They argue that the offices supplied the administration with information, most of it discredited by the regular intelligence community, that President Bush, Cheney and others used to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.

But interviews with senior defense officials, White House and CIA officials, congressional sources and others yield a different portrait of the work done by the two Pentagon offices.

Neither the House nor Senate intelligence committees, for example, which have been investigating prewar intelligence for eight months, have found support for allegations that Pentagon analysts went out and collected their own intelligence, congressional officials from both parties say. Nor have investigators found that the Pentagon analysis about Iraq significantly shaped the case the administration made for going to war.

At the same time, the Pentagon operation was created, at least in part, to provide a more hard-line alternative to the official intelligence, according to interviews with current and former defense and intelligence officials. The two offices, overseen by Feith, concluded that Saddam Hussein's Iraq and al Qaeda were much more closely and conclusively linked than the intelligence community believed.

In this sense, the offices functioned as a pale version of the secret "Team B" analysis done by administration conservatives in the mid-1970s, who concluded the intelligence community was underplaying the Soviet military threat. Rumsfeld, in particular, has a history of skepticism about the intelligence community's analysis, including assessments of the former Soviet Union's military ability and of threats posed by ballistic missiles from North Korea and other countries.

Rumsfeld's known views -- and his insistence before the war that overthrowing Hussein was part of the war on terrorism -- only enhanced suspicion about the aims and role played by Feith's offices.

Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), a member of the intelligence panel, charged that Feith's work "reportedly involved the review, analysis and promulgation of intelligence outside of the U.S. intelligence community."

Levin pressed Tenet on Tuesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee: "Is it standard operating procedure for an intelligence analysis such as that to be presented at the NSC [National Security Council] and the office of the vice president without you being part of the presentation? Is that typical?"

"My experience is that people come in and may present those kinds of briefings on their views of intelligence," responded Tenet, who said he had not known about the briefings at the time. "But I have to tell you, senator, I'm the president's chief intelligence officer; I have the definitive view about these subjects. From my perspective, it is my view that prevails."

Hussein's Role

Feith, who worked on the NSC staff in the Reagan administration, is a well-known conservative voice on Israel policy who once urged the Israeli prime minister to repudiate the Oslo peace accords. His views are a source of tension between him and foreign policy officials at the State Department and elsewhere who advocate concessions be made by Palestinians and Israel to achieve a peace settlement.

No sooner had Bush announced that the United States was at war on terrorism than it became Feith's job to come up with a strategy for executing such a war.

"We said to ourselves, 'We are at war with an international terrorist network that includes organizations, state supporters and nonstate supporters. What does that mean to be at war with a network?' " Feith said in an interview.

But Feith felt he needed to bring on help in the Pentagon for another reason, too, said four other senior current and former Pentagon civilians: the belief that the CIA and other intelligence agencies dangerously undervalued threats to U.S. interests.

"The strategic thinking was the Middle East is going down the tubes. It's getting worse, not better," said one former senior Pentagon official who worked closely with Feith's offices. "I don't think we thought there was objective evidence that could be got from CIA, DIA, INR," he added, referring to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's main intelligence office, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Feith's office worked not only on "how to fight Saddam Hussein but also how to fight the NSC, the State Department and the intelligence community," which were not convinced of Hussein's involvement in terrorism, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Feith set up the first of his two shops, the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, to "study al Qaeda worldwide suppliers, chokepoints, vulnerabilities and recommend strategies for rendering terrorist networks ineffective," according to a January 2002 document sent to DIA.

The group never grew larger than two people, said Feith and William J. Luti, who was director of the Office of Special Plans and deputy undersecretary of defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

The evaluation group's largest project was what one participant called a "sociometric diagram" of links between terrorist organizations and their supporters around the world, mostly focused on al Qaeda, the Islamic Resistance Movement (or Hamas), Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. It was meant to challenge the "conventional wisdom," said one senior defense official, that terrorist groups did not work together.

It looked "like a college term paper," said one senior Pentagon official who saw the analysis. It was hundreds of connecting lines and dots footnoted with binders filled with signals intelligence, human source reporting and even thirdhand intelligence accounts of personal meetings between terrorists.

One of its key and most controversial findings was that there was a connection between secular states and fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups such as al Qaeda.

If anything, the analysis reinforced the view of top Pentagon officials, including Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Paul N. Wolfowitz and Feith, that Hussein's Iraq had worrisome contacts with al Qaeda over the last decade that could only be expected to grow.

The evaluation group's other job was to read through the huge, daily stream of intelligence reporting on terrorism and "highlight things of interest to Feith," said one official involved in the process. "We were looking for connections" between terrorist groups.

From time to time, senior defense officials called bits of intelligence to the attention of the White House, they said.

Feith said the worldwide threat study itself never left the Pentagon. It helped inform the military strategy on the war on terrorism, but it was only one small input into that process, he said.

Mainly, the work of the evaluation group, Luti said, "went into the corporate memory."

'Very Helpful'

In the summer of 2002, Shelton, who had been working virtually on her own, was joined by Christopher Carney, a naval reservist and associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. Together they completed their study on the links between al Qaeda and Iraq.

"It was interesting enough that I brought it to Secretary Rumsfeld because Secretary Rumsfeld is well known for being a particularly intelligent reader of intelligence," Feith said.

Rumsfeld told Feith, " 'Call George and tell him we have something for him to see,' " Feith said. On Aug. 15, 2002, a delegation from Pentagon was buzzed through the guard station at CIA headquarters for the Tenet meeting. Shelton and Carney were the briefers; Feith and DIA Director Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby accompanied them.

"The feedback that I got from George right after the briefing was, 'That was very helpful, thank you,' " Feith said.

CIA officials who sat in the briefing were nonplussed. The briefing was all "inductive analysis," according to one participant's notes from the meeting. The data pointed to "complicity and support," nothing more. "Much of it, we had discounted already," said another participant.

Tenet, according to agency officials, never incorporated any of the particulars from the briefing into his subsequent briefings to Congress. He asked some CIA analysts to get together with Shelton for further discussions.

Feith also arranged for Shelton to brief deputy national security adviser Hadley and Libby, Cheney's chief of staff.

"Her work did not change [Hadley's] thinking because his source for intelligence information are the products produced by the CIA," White House spokesman Sean McCormack said.

Nor did the briefing's content reach national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Cheney or Bush, according to McCormack and Cheney spokesman Kevin Kellems. (In November 2003, a written version of her PowerPoint briefing, a version submitted to the intelligence committees investigating prewar intelligence, was published in the conservative Weekly Standard magazine.) The briefing openly challenged the prevailing CIA view that a religion-based terrorist, Osama bin Laden, would not seek to work with a secular state such as Iraq. "They were the ones who were intellectually unwilling to rethink this issue," one defense official said. "But they were not willing to shoot it down, either."

Whatever the agency really thought of Shelton's analysis, on Oct. 7, 2002, CIA Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin sent a letter to the Senate intelligence committee which, in a general sense, supported her conclusion: "We have solid evidence of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qa'ida going back a decade," it said. ". . . Growing indications of a relationship with al-Qa'ida, suggest that Baghdad's link to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action."

A Nondescript Name

In August 2002, as the possibility of war with Iraq grew more likely, Luti's Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NESA) was reorganized into the Office of Special Plans and NESA. Its job, according to Feith and Luti, was to propose strategies for the war on terrorism and Iraq.

It was given a nondescript name to purposefully hide the fact that, although the administration was publicly emphasizing diplomacy at the United Nations, the Pentagon was actively engaged in war planning and postwar planning.

The office staff never numbered more than 18, including reservists and people temporarily assigned. "There are stories that we had hundreds of people beaver away at this stuff," Feith said. ". . . They're just not true."

The office's job was to devise Pentagon policy recommendations for the larger interagency decision-making on every conceivable issue: troop deployment planning, coalition building, oil sector maintenance, war crimes prosecution, ministry organization, training an Iraqi police force, media strategy and "rewards, incentives and immunity" for former Baath Party supporters, according to a chart hanging in the special plans office, Room 1A939, several months ago.

The insular nature of Luti's office, and his outspoken personal conviction that the United States should remove Hussein, sparked rumors at the Pentagon that the office was collecting intelligence on its own, that it had hired its own intelligence agents. Even diehard Bush supporters, some of whom were critical of Feith's and Luti's management style, were repeating the rumors.

Yesterday, Rumsfeld addressed the controversy, saying critics of the Office of Special Plans had a "conspiratorial view of the world." Shelton's analysis, he emphasized, was shared with the CIA, and White House briefings were not unusual.

"We brief the president. We brief the vice president. We brief the [CIA director]. We brief the secretary of state. . . . That is not only not a bad thing, it's a good thing."



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Progress in Iraq - March 16, 2004

Freedom & Sovereignty in Iraq

- On March 8, the Iraqi Governing Council approved the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The TAL will serve as Iraq's interim constitution between June 30, 2004, and December 31, 2005. An interim government will assume sovereignty on June 30th. Elections for a national assembly will be held in December 2004, paving the way for a transitional government until a permanent constitution is written and ratified by referendum in the fall of 2005.
- The TAL includes a historic Bill of Rights that is unprecedented for Iraq and the region. It guarantees the basic rights of all Iraqis, including freedom of religion and worship, the right to free expression, to peacefully assemble, to organize political parties, and to form and join unions. It also guarantees the right to peacefully demonstrate and strike, to vote, to receive a fair trial and to be treated equally under the law. Discrimination based on gender, nationality, religion or origin is strictly prohibited
- In nearly all major cities and most towns and villages, Iraqi municipal councils have been formed.
- Approximately 24 Iraqi cabinet ministers also contribute leadership on a day-to-day basis to the business of the government.
- For the first time in more than a generation the Iraqi judiciary is fully independent. More than 600 Iraqi judges preside over more than 500 courts that operate independently from the Iraqi Governing Council and from the Coalition Provisional Authority.
- More than 170 independent newspapers are in print. "Al Iraqia" (formerly the Iraqi Media Network) is broadcasting 20 hours per day.

Iraqis Upbeat About Future in Public Opinion Poll

According to a new poll by U.S. and international media organizations, a majority of Iraqis believe life is better now than it was under Saddam Hussein's regime. Among the results:

- 57% said life was better now than under Saddam.
- 49% believe the liberation of their country by U.S. and British troops was right; 39% said it was wrong.
- 71% said they expected things to be better in a year's time.
- 68% voiced approval the new Iraqi police force.
- 56% voiced approval of the new Iraqi army.

For complete poll results, please see ABCNEWS.com.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Contractors in Iraq - March 11, 2004

Contractors are contributing to the success of the Coalition mission in Iraq.

- Contractors are supporting our troops, helping restore vital services and establishing stability in Iraq.
 - The support of contractors in Iraq has freed at least 24,000 soldiers for war fighting who would otherwise be required for logistical tasks.
 - Contractors are providing food, shelter and logistical support for U.S. troops, Coalition partners and staff working in Iraq.
 - Contractors in Iraq are repairing and rebuilding schools, banks, railway stations, clinics, mosques, and water treatment plants. Contracts have also been awarded to provide police and fire fighting equipment, hospital supplies, electrical power equipment and buses. In addition, contractors are building playgrounds, youth centers, housing, roads, sewers and irrigation systems.
 - More than 55,000 Iraqis are employed by contractors, at an average wage of \$4.00 - \$5.00 dollars per day -- far exceeding what most Iraqis earned under the regime of Saddam Hussein.
- For contractors, doing business in Iraq is not like doing business anywhere else: it is difficult and often dangerous.
 - It is estimated that several dozen civilian contractors from at least four different countries (South Korea, U.S., France, Columbia) have died in Iraq, and many more have been injured.
- With the help of contractors, significant progress has already been achieved:
 - The Coalition has successfully helped in reopening all 240 Iraqi hospitals and 95 percent of Iraq's 1,200 medical clinics.
 - Today Iraq is producing more than 2 million barrels of oil per day, of which more than 1.7 million barrels per day is exported to the world market-- resulting in \$7.4 billion in revenue to date to support the Iraqi economy and reconstruction efforts
 - Approximately 400 Iraqi courts are back in operation.
 - The new Iraqi dinar is in circulation.
 - Approximately 170 newspapers are being published.
 - 5.1 million Iraqi students are back in the classroom, and 51 million new textbooks have been issued; 97,000 Iraqis applied to attend college for the 2003 fall semester.

The Department of Defense's oversight system is efficient and effective in using American taxpayers dollars.

- Shortly after conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) was asked to audit major contracts.
 - A 20-member interagency team of auditors has been in Iraq since April 2003. This team consists of auditors from the DCAA, the Inspector General for the Department of Defense, and the Inspector General for the Department of the Army.
 - DCAA has issued more than 180 audit reports related to contractors in Iraq during fiscal year 2004. These reports address pricing proposals, costs incurred in existing contracts, contractor policies and internal controls.
- DoD's oversight system works: nearly every significant contracting problem to date has been discovered by DoD's own auditors. The Department is addressing problems identified by DCAA audits:
 - DoD believes that Kellogg Brown & Root did not have adequate subcontract pricing evaluation prior to the award of the Reconstruct Iraqi Oil (RIO) contract, resulting in overpricing as high as \$61 million through September 30th. DoD recently launched a criminal investigation in connection with a whistleblower complaint made regarding the contract.
 - DoD also believes that KBR failed to adjust a subcontract price submitted for dining halls and cafeteria service under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract. There was a \$42 million overcharge that was caught in the proposal process. DoD auditors rejected that proposal and returned it for re-pricing.
- Improperities uncovered are a small percentage of the \$4 billion awarded in 1,500 contracts thus far for rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure.
- The Department of Defense will continue vigorous oversight of contractors in Iraq to ensure that taxpayer dollars are used effectively.

Facts for Iraq's reconstruction are awarded through a process that is fair, inclusive and

- The Coalition is a responsible steward of Americans' tax dollars. Rigorous and effective oversight ensures proper contractor performance and redress in the event of any irregularity.
 - Multiple in-country contracting agencies-- State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-- are used in concert with the Coalition's Program Management Office (PMO), which makes financial, contractual and project progress information available in real time and files periodic progress reports.

(For more information, please see: DefenseLINK News: Iraqi Rebuilding Contracts Proceeding Well, Nash Reports)

Q&A: The "LOGCAP" Contract

What is the "LOGCAP" contract and why is it necessary?

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) allows the U.S. Army to have a company on standby that is capable of providing massive amounts of logistical support should the need arise. It allows the U.S. Army to be more lethal and agile -- in Iraq, it frees up to 24,000 war-fighters from many logistical tasks so they may concentrate on fulfilling the mission.

Is the LOGCAP just for Iraq?

Operation Iraqi Freedom is not the first operation supported by the LOGCAP contract. The LOGCAP was used during operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, and is estimated to have saved millions of dollars in logistical costs to the U.S. Army. The current contract supports U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Djibouti, the Republic of Georgia and Uzbekistan.

What types of services are provided by this contract?

The current LOGCAP contract makes vital services possible in Iraq, including food, shelter, electricity, communications, and transportation for U.S. troops and civilian authorities.

Was the LOGCAP awarded competitively?

The LOGCAP contract was competed under full and open competition, and was awarded based on technical and management capability, past performance and the cost value to the American taxpayer.

How long has DoD used the LOGCAP?

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded the first LOGCAP contract to Brown & Root Services, Inc. after a competitive solicitation in August 2002. Management of LOGCAP was transferred to Army Materiel Command (AMC) in October 1996, and AMC awarded its first LOGCAP contract to DynCorp in 1997. The current LOGCAP was awarded in December 2001 to the Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root, which competed against Raytheon Technical Services and DynCorp International for the contract award.

How does DoD address allegations of contractor impropriety?

The Department of Defense takes allegations of wrongdoing seriously. Anyone with information about potential contracting improprieties is urged to contact the Inspector General hotline at 1-800-424-9098, or by email at hotline@dodig.osd.mil.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – U.S. Global Defense Posture - March 10, 2004

The U.S. Defense Strategy, as outlined in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, identified the need to reorient U.S. global defense posture — where U.S. military personnel, equipment, and installations are located overseas — given the different security environment now faced by the United States.

- DoD's global posture study seeks to support the new Defense Strategy's four policy goals: Assure allies and friends; dissuade competition by influencing the strategic choices of key states; deter adversaries with forward forces; and defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.
- New strategic circumstances demand review of an overseas footprint that by-and-large still reflects the realities of the Cold War. Defining elements of these new circumstances:
 - Terrorist groups and outlaw states are seeking access to unprecedented destructive power, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons.
 - As we learned on September 11, 2001, the U.S. homeland is threatened in new ways by active and capable terrorist groups. Allied territory is vulnerable as well.
 - The U.S. and Allies face growing challenges from anti-access capabilities, including NBC weapons and missiles.
 - A number of failed or failing states have emerged that contain ungoverned areas that may serve as breeding grounds or sanctuary for terrorism.
 - Various regional powers are at strategic crossroads, leading to uncertainty about their intentions and future strategic direction.

The Department's approach to changing U.S. global posture seeks to strengthen U.S. defense relationships with key allies and partners; improve flexibility to contend with uncertainty; enable action both regionally and globally; exploit advantages in rapid power projection; and focus on overall capabilities instead of numbers.

- Develop flexibility to contend with uncertainty.
 - The U.S. changing strategic circumstances defy prediction. Therefore, DoD will develop new and expanded security relationships to emphasize flexibility in force posture and basing.
- Strengthen allied roles.
 - The U.S. will expand opportunities for combined training with allies, with the goal to bring relevant allied capabilities to the War on Terror.
 - The U.S. footprint will be tailored to match emerging relationships and local conditions, and also to reduce the impact of U.S. presence on host nations.

- Focus both within and across regions.
 - Although the U.S. must be prepared to act regionally and locally, it must also promote an understanding that forces should not be tied to any single area or region. The U.S. will work with key allies not simply on regional problems, but also on global issues such as terrorism and proliferation. Allies will help us to develop global reach-back capabilities.
- Exploit advantages in rapid power projection.
 - Since forces will not likely fight in place, U.S. regional presence requires realignment to improve rapid response capabilities for distant contingencies. This means an updated transport and support infrastructure to facilitate movement of forces and to operate in remote areas. It also means updated command structures for deployable operations.
- Focus on capabilities instead of numbers.
 - Overmatching power — leveraging U.S. advantages in knowledge, speed, precision, and lethality — supplanted overwhelming force as a defining concept for military action. The specific number of forward-based forces in a given area is no longer an accurate representation of the the U.S.

The Department of Defense has intensified public outreach to inform and consult with allies and Congress about these changes.

- On November 25th, the President announced the intent to accelerate discussions on the Global Posture Review. However, no decisions have been made yet on the shape of the U.S.' future global posture.
- The Departments of Defense and Department of State provide regular briefings to Congressional staff and Members on the progress of the review.
- Over the past year, the Secretaries of Defense and State, as well as other senior level officials, have had various consultations with Asian allies and partners about the global posture review.
- Senior-level State and DoD officials conducted intensive discussions in European capitals in December 2003 and in Asian capitals during January and February 2004.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Progress in Iraq - March 9, 2004

Following are highlights of remarks by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on Iraq's interim constitution given at a press briefing today by the secretary and Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- **The brief delay in the final signing of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) is a sign of the progress being made in Iraq.**
 - Iraqis from a range of ethnic, political and religious traditions settled their debate peacefully.
 - The debate, discussion and free exchange of views of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) members are hallmarks of a democratic society.
 - Americans are accustomed to delays while proposed legislation is debated. However, the process of political debate and discussion is new to Iraqis, who barely a year ago lived under one of the world's most brutal dictatorships.
- **Iraq now has an interim constitution, with a Bill of Rights that**
 - Iraqis are now guaranteed freedom of religion and worship, the right to free expression, to assemble and demonstrate, to organize political parties and to vote, and the right to equal treatment under the law and a fair trial.
 - Discrimination based on gender, nationality, religion and origin is prohibited.
- **The process by which the TAL was established is as important as the document itself.**
 - The process required both vigorous debate and peaceful compromise.
 - The leaders of the IGC have not only enacted a landmark law, but also shown the world Iraqis are ready for the difficult work of democracy.

Progress in Iraq

- Some Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers are spending the month training at Baghdad International Airport's Camp Slayer with soldiers from the 1st Armored Division's 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment. Their training includes both classroom and hands-on instruction, including performing route security and conducting raids and searches.
- Reconstruction on the Al Mat Bridge is complete. More than 3,000 trucks per day travel over the bridge on the main highway from Jordan to Baghdad, bringing reconstruction and humanitarian aid. A bypass was constructed around the damaged bridge in July 2003, allowing repairs to begin.
- Iraqi children will soon be able to participate in Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts. Scouting was first introduced in Iraq in 1921, but was terminated under Saddam Hussein's regime. The initiative to bring scouting back to Iraq was launched recently with the backing of the World Scouting Organization and the Arab Scout Organization.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Transitional Administrative Law Signing – March 5, 2004

The signing ceremony for the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), scheduled for today in Baghdad, has been postponed. Following are talking points on the situation from interviews given by Dan Senor, senior spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

- The TAL is an historic document for Iraq and the region. It will serve as the country's interim constitution between June 30, when the CPA returns sovereignty to the Iraqi people, and the completion of a permanent constitution by a parliament that is directly elected.
- Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the CPA administrator, recognizes that the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and the future Iraqi government will have to work through the democratic process. He has taken the position of observing the procedures instead of forcing a resolution.
- The IGC is making a lot of progress on resolving the issue and working through it themselves. The timetable for the conclusion of the discussions and signing of the document is up in the air at this point.
- The discussion on Iraq's interim constitution is the most interesting and important debate taking place in the Middle East now. Iraqis are able to relay their concerns without fear of winding up in a mass grave or a torture chamber, a real possibility under Saddam Hussein's regime.
- The TAL will govern affairs for the Iraqi people in the transition to Democracy.
- The TAL was to have been signed by the IGC earlier in the week, but was postponed out of respect for the mourning period for Iraqis lost in Tuesday's suicide bombings in Baghdad and Karbala.
- Within the last 24 hours, a few members of the IGC had technical concerns about one specific article in the document, which is now under discussion.
- It is important to keep in mind that the IGC had reached agreement on 98 percent of the document, including issues such as the definition of Islam in the state and the role of women, and there is still agreement on these important issues.
- The debate among the IGC members is an example of democracy in action in Iraq.

The following opinion piece appeared in yesterday's *Los Angeles Times*.

([Link to LA Times web site](#)).

Los Angeles Times
March 4, 2004

Democracy's Bus Is Rolling In Iraq

By Max Boot

Iraq is starting to resemble the 1994 movie "Speed." Like the bus on which Sandra Bullock and company were trapped, the country is in constant danger of blowing up. To avoid disaster, it has to keep moving, crashing through some obstacles and avoiding others. As long as it maintains momentum, its occupants will survive.

Too many real bombs have been blowing up in Iraq recently. But as horrifying as their consequences are, the political bombs that haven't blown up are even more significant.

There has been a danger of outright civil war erupting among Sunnis intent on regaining their old privileges, Shiites bent on holding early elections that would give them governmental control and Kurds determined to maintain their autonomy. L. Paul Bremer III has been playing the Keanu Reeves role, trying to keep the bus in one piece.

Bremer's efforts were rewarded this week when the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council agreed on an interim constitution that is a marvel of liberalism. It guarantees free speech, free religion, free assembly and numerous other rights that are taken for granted in the West but are conspicuously absent in the Arab world. Despite an attempt by some clerics to impose Islamic dictates, the constitution says only that Sharia will be one source among many for Iraqi law. Sure, the document leaves important issues unresolved, such as the future role of political militias, but it's pretty impressive that agreement was reached at all by a fractious group of Iraqis.

The biggest outstanding issue is how to select an interim government after the formal U.S. occupation ends June 30. Bremer pushed for caucuses; Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the leader of Iraq's Shiites, insisted on elections. In a development reminiscent of Winston Churchill's famous quip about battleship procurement ("The admiralty asked for six ships, the government offered four, so they compromised on eight"), they seem to be heading for neither elections nor caucuses. Though the exact mechanism remains undetermined, power is likely to pass on June 30 to an unelected provisional government, probably an expanded Governing Council, which will prepare for elections by Jan. 30.

Sistani deserves kudos for abandoning his earlier insistence on immediate nationwide balloting, which would have been unworkable. The ayatollah's willingness to compromise suggests a keen awareness of his adopted country's troubled history.

In 1920, Iraqi Shiites led a bloody rebellion against British rule. The British, eager to pull out, handed over authority to Sunnis led by a Hashemite royal family imported from Hijaz. The Shiites were frozen out of power for the next eight decades. Sistani doesn't want to repeat that mistake by forcing out coalition troops prematurely or making Iraq ungovernable. Thus he was willing to back down after U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi agreed that elections couldn't be held right away.

There is more good news coming from Iraq. Thanks in part to the much-maligned work of Halliburton, the country's oil production and electricity generation will soon surpass prewar levels. The number of coalition soldiers killed in January and February (75) was 52% lower than in November and December (158). The number of U.S. soldiers wounded fell even more during that period — to 260 from 638.

Of course, the glad tidings shouldn't be exaggerated. One reason why attacks on coalition soldiers are down is that, as Tuesday's atrocities in Baghdad and Karbala demonstrate, terrorists are finding Iraqis an easier target. But although the terrorists can kill and maim, they cannot win public support. In the Sunni Triangle, where most of the violence is occurring, 21 imams issued a *fatwa* condemning "any act of violence against Iraqi state government workers, police and soldiers."

As responsibility for fighting insurgents and criminals falls more squarely on Iraqi shoulders, the number of foreign casualties should decline still further. Coalition troops won't be able to leave Iraq for years, but they will be able to concentrate their efforts outside major cities, where they will be less vulnerable to attack. Having Iraqis, not Americans, patrol city streets should also remove some of the resentments fostered by foreign occupation.

More bombs, both real and metaphorical, are certain to go off in the days ahead, but Iraq already has confounded many Western "progressives" who doubted that the Arab world could ever make progress. The bus may be rickety and it may have lost some passengers, but—guess what? — it's on schedule toward its final destination: democracy.

Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes a weekly column for the Los Angeles Times.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Haiti Operational Update - March 4, 2004

Brig. Gen. David Rodriguez and Lawrence Di Rita, Pentagon spokesman, briefed the Pentagon press corps today. Following are highlights from the press conference about the situation in Haiti.

- **Approximately 1,000 U.S. Marines have arrived in Haiti. The forces are well-prepared to carry out their mission, which is to:**
 - Secure the capital city of Port-au-Prince;
 - Help promote the constitutional political process;
 - Create conditions for the arrival of the U.N. multinational force;
 - Secure key sites, including the U.S. embassy, the presidential palace and the international airport to support multinational force movements.

- **Gen. Hill, the head of U.S. Southern Command, continues to monitor the situation**
 - Approximately 600 troops from Canada, France and Chile have arrived.
 - The United States is working to secure commitments from other countries as well.

- **The security situation has improved.**
 - The majority of the looting tailed off significantly as the multinational force arrived.
 - The United States will continue to support the Haitian police in the security and stabilization process.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Detainee Review Process - March 3, 2004

The Department of Defense today outlined an annual review process to assess the detention of individual enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. The draft review process memorandum is available online at <http://www.dod.mil/news/mar2004/d20040303ar.pdf>.

Highlights below.

A review board will assess a detainee's threat to the United States and its allies.

- A review board comprised of three military officers will assess whether a detainee remains a threat to the United States and its allies in the Global War on Terror.
- The review board process will be overseen by a senior civilian Defense Department official.
- Based on its assessment, the board will recommend to that senior official whether a detainee should continue to be detained. That senior civilian will make the determination of whether the detainee should remain at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
- Where the constraints of national security permit, the detainee's country of origin will be notified of the review process and permitted to submit information regarding the detainee.
- Where the constraints of national security permit, the detainee's family may also be permitted to present information on behalf of the detainee.
- A designated military officer will be responsible for presenting all available information to the review board. This officer is not an advocate for or against detention.
- The review board will also assess information provided about the detainee from the Department of Justice, the CIA and the Department of Homeland Security.

Detainees will be allowed to present information to the review board.

- Detainees will be permitted to present information on their own behalf that explains why they no longer pose a threat to the United States and its allies.
- To the extent necessary and consistent with national security, detainees will also be granted access to information presented to the board. This information will be made available to the detainees in advance of their hearings and in a language they understand.
- A military officer will be assigned to help each detainee present his information to the review board. That military officer may act as a spokesman before the board for the detainee. Detainees will be permitted to meet with that officer in advance of the review, and will have access to an interpreter.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Interim Constitution - March 2, 2004

The 25-member Iraqi Governing Council on Feb. 29 passed an interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). Following are highlights.

➤ **The TAL is an historic document for**

- It will serve as the country's interim constitution between June 30, when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) returns sovereignty to the Iraqi people, and the completion of a permanent constitution by a parliament that is directly elected.
- The Iraqi Governing Council has met a significant milestone by passing the TAL by the end of February. The date was set in the November 15 agreement between the Iraqi Governing Council and the CPA, which sets forth the steps for Iraq's transition to sovereignty.

➤ **The TAL will govern affairs for the Iraqi people in**

- The passage of the TAL is a tremendous sign of progress in Iraq, and a signal to the terrorists of the will of the Iraqi people to move forward.

➤ **The TAL includes unprecedented individual**

- With the passage of the TAL, Iraq has moved from a country ruled by one brutal individual to a country where the rights of every individual are protected.
- Under the TAL, the Iraqi government answers to the people instead of oppressing them.

➤ **The TAL guarantees basic rights**

- The freedom of religion and worship;
- The right to free expression, to peacefully assemble and demonstrate, to organize political parties, and to form and join unions.
- The right to be treated equally under the law, The TAL prohibits discrimination based on gender, nationality, religion or origin.
- The guarantee of a fair, speedy and open trial. Iraqi authorities may not subject anyone to arbitrary arrest or detention.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Bremer Statement - March 2, 2004

The Coalition Provisional Authority released the following statement from Ambassador L. Paul Bremer about the bombings today in Baghdad and Karbala.

Statement by L. Paul Bremer **Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority**

Today terrorists have again struck the Iraqi people. We of the Coalition offer our deepest sympathy to the families of those who were murdered and to the wounded. We pray for your strength in this time of sorrow. Along with civilized people everywhere we share your horror at these evil acts and utterly condemn the acts and those who carried them out.

We of the Coalition will not abandon the people of Iraq. The Coalition is even now providing all possible medical care for the wounded. And I pledge the full capacity of the Coalition to bring these murderers to justice as Iraq continues its march to democracy and sovereignty.

Terrorists have murdered and maimed on one of the holiest days of the year, the day that commemorates the death of Imam Hussein. We know they did this as part of an effort to provoke sectarian violence among Muslims. We know they chose this day so that they could kill as many innocents **as** possible.

Why would anyone want sectarian violence? The terrorists want sectarian violence because they believe that is the only way they can stop Iraq's march toward the democracy that the terrorists fear. We know that the terrorists fear democracy because they said so. In a recent letter the terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi wrote that democracy was coming to Iraq and that once Iraq was democratic there would be no pretext for attacks. And so Zarqawi has admitted that the terrorists are in a race against time. It is a race they will lose.

They will lose because the Iraqi people want and will have democracy, freedom and a sovereign Iraqi government. An Iraqi government is coming. This week, after an appropriate period of mourning, the Iraqi Governing Council will sign the Transitional Administrative Law. That law brings with it all that the terrorists fear:

- They fear an Iraqi government controlled only by Iraqis.
- They fear equality before the law for all of Iraq's citizens.
- They fear Democracy.

After the law is signed, Iraq's journey to a future of hope will continue. On June 30, the Coalition will turn sovereignty over to the Iraqi people. Next year there will be three elections and Iraq will end 2005 with an elected government.

Iraq stands at the forefront of the war on terrorism. It is, at heart, a war between the forces of decency and the forces of evil. It is a war between those who value and defend the innocent and those who murder the innocent and hold them valueless. It is a war for Iraq's future, a war between a future of hope and a future of fear.

The Coalition stands firmly with the forces of decency, with those who protect the innocent, with those who will bring about Iraq's future of hope.

Aash al-Iraq! (Long live Iraq!)



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Haiti – March 1, 2004

Following are details of a press briefing today by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and U.S. Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

➤ **President Bush ordered the deployment of U.S. Marines to Haiti at the request of former Supreme Court Chief**

- An initial contingent of U.S. Marines arrived in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, last night.
- Additional forces will be deploying over the next several days.
- Former President Aristide and his wife have arrived in the Central African Republic.

➤ **The forces are securing key sites in Port-au-Prince. Their**

- Contribute to a more secure and stable environment in the capital city in order to help support the constitutional political process;
- Protect U.S. citizens;
- Facilitate in the repatriation of any Haitians who are interdicted at sea; and
- Help create the conditions for the anticipated arrival of a U.N. multinational force.

➤ **The United States will initially lead the**

- The final size of the United States contribution is still being determined.
- The secretary has ordered additional forces to deploy as necessary to fill the U.S. contribution to the multinational interim force.
- The United States is working with the new Haitian government, the United Nations and the Organization of American States to stand up the interim force.
- The leadership of the final multinational U.N. force will be determined in the days ahead.
- The United States is in contact with a number of countries that have expressed a willingness to contribute forces.
- The U.N. Security Council last night passed a resolution authorizing support for the transition in Haiti.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – New U.S. Landmine Policy - Feb. 27, 2004

The indiscriminate use of persistent landmines is a serious humanitarian problem around the world. (Persistent landmines are munitions that remain lethal indefinitely. They do not self-destruct or self-detonate.) At the same time, landmines provide the U.S. military with capabilities to protect the forces by enabling commanders to shape the battlefield and deny the enemy freedom to maneuver.

The Bush Administration today announced a new U.S. policy on landmines. The policy will help reduce humanitarian risk and save the lives of U.S. military personnel and civilians. The policy addresses both persistent anti-personnel and persistent anti-vehicle landmines. Following are highlights.

- 9 **The United States has committed to eliminate persistent landmines of all types from its arsenal.**
 - After 2010, the United States will not employ persistent anti-personnel landmines or persistent anti-vehicle landmines.
 - Today, persistent anti-personnel landmines are only stockpiled for use by the United States to fulfill treaty obligations with the Republic of Korea.
 - Between now and the end of 2010, persistent anti-vehicle mines will only be employed outside the Republic of Korea when specifically authorized by the President.
 - Within two years, the United States will begin destroying persistent landmines that are not needed for the protection of Korea.
- 9 **The United States will seek a worldwide ban on the sale or export of all persistent landmines.**
 - The ban will help prevent the spread of technology that kills and maims civilians.
- 9 **The United States will continue to develop non-persistent anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines.**
 - These mines self-destruct or self-deactivate. After they are no longer needed on the battlefield, non-persistent landmines detonate or turn themselves off, eliminating the threat to civilians.
 - Self-destructing/self-deactivating landmines have been rigorously tested and have never failed to destroy themselves or become inert within a set time.
- 9 **The United States is one of the world's strongest supporters of humanitarian action regarding mines.**
 - The United States was one of the first countries to support humanitarian demining efforts in 1988 when it funded the first such programs in Afghanistan.
 - The United States has provided nearly \$800 million to 46 countries since 1993 when the United States Humanitarian Mine Action program was formally established.
 - Funds for the State Department's portion of this program will be increased by an additional 50 percent over fiscal year 2003 baseline levels to \$70 million a year, significantly more than any other single country.
 - The Department of Defense trains countries on landmine clearance, mine awareness and victim assistance.
- **The U.S. will not join the Ottawa Convention because its terms would require giving capability. However, the new U.S. policy dramatically reduces the danger posed landmines left**
 - The Ottawa Convention does not restrict the entire class of more powerful anti-vehicle landmines. The new policy put forth by the United States addresses both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines.
 - The United States has already ratified the Amended Mines Protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and is also a party to the Geneva Conventions.

Notes: Anti-personnel landmines are primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person. Anti-vehicle or anti-tank landmines are designed to explode by the presence or proximity of, or contact with a vehicle; the presence of a person is not normally enough to trigger them. They are usually used on or along roadways to prevent movement of enemy vehicles.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points –Secretary Rumsfeld’s Trip, Feb. 26, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld’s Trip

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld returns Friday from a trip to Kuwait, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan.

- The Secretary praised those Iraqis stepping forward to defend their country, despite terrorist attacks on the forces. He said the story of Iraq will include Iraqis fighting for their own freedom and putting their own lives at risk. In remarks at the Baghdad Police Academy, the Secretary said the police recruits are helping to build an Iraq that is free and at peace with its neighbors.
- In Uzbekistan, the Secretary met with Uzbek leaders to discuss military, political
 - Uzbekistan has 25 million citizens
 - The United States has approximately 1,000 military people plus contractors in Uzbekistan working on support operations and humanitarian missions at Karshi-Khanabad.
 - Karshi-Khanabad has been pivotal to operations in Afghanistan. Support and humanitarian operations into Afghanistan are conducted from the base there.
- In Kazakhstan, Secretary Rumsfeld said that if Saddam Hussein had followed Kazakhstan's in Iraq never would have happened. The country renounced nuclear
 - Drug-running operations originating in Afghanistan are a concern to Kazakhstan.
 - Secretary Rumsfeld said the Coalition, led by the United Kingdom, is working with Afghanistan to solve the problem.
 - The focus on Afghanistan's drug problem will increase now that the country has a newly approved constitution and elections on the horizon.
 - Secretary Rumsfeld and Kazakhstan leaders discussed further strengthening of military relationships. The Secretary also met with Kazakhstani troops who have just returned from Iraq. The troops worked in the Polish-led division, where they helped dispose of unexploded ordnance.
 - About 15 million people live in Kazakhstan, which borders Russia, China and the Caspian Sea.

Allegations of Sexual Assault During Overseas Deployment

- Sexual assault will not be tolerated in the Department of Defense. The department is committed to preventing sexual assault in the military.
- On Feb. 5, Secretary Rumsfeld directed a special 13-member task force to investigate reports of alleged sexual assaults on service members serving overseas and to examine how the Department of Defense treats and cares for victims.
- The task force is to report its findings by April 30. Ellen P. Embrey, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for force health protection in readiness, is in the Central Command area of operations now to investigate the issue and begin fact-finding.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Army's Comanche Helicopter: Feb. 24, 2004

"As the people who were doing the study ... determined that what we needed to do was significant, and as we looked at our aviation budget over the years of the program, about 40 percent of that budget for aviation was devoted to Comanche. So when you looked at what we could do with those resources and the capabilities we could provide our troops within that timeframe, it just became apparent that [it] was the right decision."

Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee

"First of all, [it is] very important to emphasize this is an Army initiative as a result of our studies, and it is about fixing Army aviation for the future, for today and for tomorrow, not just about terminating Comanche. It's a big decision. We know it's a big decision. But it's the right decision."

Gen. Peter Schoomaker

As the result of a study initiated several months ago, the Army is restructuring and revitalizing its aviation programs. One result is the termination of the RAH-66 Comanche, an armed reconnaissance helicopter. Following are highlights of a briefing on this announcement yesterday by Les Brownlee, the acting Secretary of the Army, and Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff.

9 The Army's aviation study reflects the operational environment of the future and takes into account combat lessons learned in the Global War on Terror.

- When the Comanche was envisioned, starting in 1983, the program made sense in the context of the threat faced at the time. The program makes less sense in today's national security environment.
- It is not prudent for the Army or the taxpayers to spend \$39 billion on a program that is not a good idea for the 21st century battlefield. (Approximately \$6.9 billion has been spent thus far on Comanche.)
- The decision must be reviewed in the context of restructuring and other Army initiatives -- including modularity and balancing the Active and Reserve components.
- It is critical to the Army now for the ongoing War on Terror and for the future that funds that were identified for the Comanche program remain with Army aviation. An amendment to the fiscal year 2005 budget currently before the Congress will be submitted to reflect those changes.

9 Roughly \$14 billion allocated for the Comanche through fiscal year 2011 will be applied to other Army aviation programs.

- The revised plan includes procuring almost 800 new aircraft -- including Apache and Blackhawk helicopters -- for the Active and Reserve component; and
- The enhancement, upgrade, modernization and recapitalization of more than 1,400 aircraft.
- The relevant technologies developed in the Comanche program will be applied to future aviation initiatives. Such programs include the Joint Multirole Helicopter and the Joint Airlift Aircraft.

Links: [\(transcript\)](#), [\(American Forces Press Service story\)](#), [\(Army News Service story\)](#).



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Haiti - Feb. 23, 2004

Approximately 50 Marines will depart today for Haiti, where an estimated 42 people have been killed in an armed uprising that began Feb. 5 in the central coast city of Gonaïves.

➤ **The United States is committed to providing for the**

- In response to a request from the U.S. ambassador, U.S. Southern small military team to Haiti to provide the ambassador and the embassy capability to
 - A Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) leaves today from Norfolk, Va., for Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The team is based at Camp LeJeune, N.C.
- As a precautionary measure, U.S. Southern command has also directed deployment of a SOUTHCOM Situational Assessment Team (SSAT) to assist the ambassador and his staff in Haiti.
 - The SSAT is a small military team that will perform a technical assessment of the situation. They will review existing action plans and make recommendations should those plans be executed. The team arrived within a matter of days following the rebellion's outbreak and will remain for an indeterminate period of time.

➤ **The U.S. military is prepared to**

- Already on the ground are: An eight-person Mobile Security Detachment Department, a seven-Marine Security Detachment (standard for most embassies) and 10 security
- While there is currently no active consideration of a non-combatant the U.S. military is trained and prepared for such operations



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Transition to Sovereignty - Feb. 19, 2004

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer today reviewed overall goals of the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA) for the transfer of power to the Iraqi people. The Iraqi Governing Council is drafting the temporary law of administration that will guide the transitional period of Iraq into full sovereignty. By the summer of 2005, Iraqis will go through a constitutional convention, write a constitution and elect a democratic parliament.

Below are highlights of the Ambassador's press conference.

➤ **On June 30, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) passes sovereignty back but the Coalition will continue to help Iraq rebuild itself after**

- The Iraqi Governing Council and the CPA promised the Iraqi people sovereignty on this date, and it will hold.
- There may be changes in the way an interim government is formed, but the date is certain.
- The occupation will end, and Coalition forces will no longer be occupying forces, they will be in partnership with the Iraqi people to protect Iraqi security.
- The United States at that time will not abandon Iraq – it will stay until its mission is complete.
- U.S. and Coalition troops will stay in Iraq to assist with security as Iraqi citizens continue to build their own forces.
- Thousands of American government officials will stay in Iraq to work with the Iraqi people on reconstruction and governance.

➤ **Iraq's new government will protect fundamental rights and provide**

- The transitional administrative law will give Iraqis freedoms they did not have under Saddam Hussein's brutal regime. Iraqis will now have:
 - Freedom of speech;
 - Freedom of assembly;
 - Freedom of religious beliefs and practice.
 - Iraqis will be equal in the law regardless of ethnicity, religion and gender.
- The new Iraq will be a single country with:
 - One foreign policy;
 - One army, one police force, one border patrol; and
 - One currency.

➤ **The transitional law will include the fundamental right to freedom of Islamic**

- In the November 15th agreement, the Iraqi Governing Council committed itself to a transitional law that respects this important fundamental right.

➤ **As the sovereign power now, the United States has an obligation to ensure democratic structure is put**

- The United States and its Coalition partners share the same vision with the Iraqi people: an Iraq that is unified, stable and at peace with itself and its neighbors.

L. Paul Bremer
Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority
Opening Remarks
Press Conference 19 February 2004

We are in the middle of the largest troop rotation since the Second World War. Over 100,000 American troops will depart Iraq and be replaced by their compatriots. Many Coalition partners have carried out or will be carrying out similar rotations.

Before those completing their service depart, I want to speak directly to the men and women from around the world who make up Coalition Forces.

After months of arduous, dangerous and uncomfortable duty, many of you are now being relieved by your compatriots. People everywhere know, understand and appreciate the sacrifice you have made.

You have made America, each of your countries and the world a safer place. You can rightly tell your children and their children:

"We liberated Iraq and put it on the road to democracy."

Thank you for your service to your country, your service to the world and your service to the people of Iraq.

* * *

There are 133 days left before sovereignty returns to an Iraqi government on June 30.

Changes in the mechanism for forming an interim government are possible, but the date holds.

And hold it should: In the November 15 agreement the Governing Council and the Coalition promised the Iraqi people sovereignty on date certain. And we will give it to them. The Coalition's

As delivered

11-L-0559/OSD/46977

goal has always been an Iraq that is free and democratic, peaceful and prosperous, sovereign and united.

The plan to achieve that goal is divided into three interdependent parts:

- security
- governance, and
- the economy.

We have made great progress in all three.

Turning first to security—

It has always been obvious that Iraqis are the ultimate guarantors of their own security. We always knew what would begin as a Coalition effort would have to become an Iraqi effort in partnership with the Coalition countries and, eventually, a wholly Iraqi effort. This transformation is underway and, in spite of painful losses, it is progressing:

- Iraqis continue to swell the ranks of their armed forces.
- Our Iraqi comrades in arms and Coalition Forces continue to capture or kill foreign terrorists, subversives and others who would derail Iraq's movement toward democracy,
- It is increasingly apparent that the terrorists and subversives cannot win—and it is apparent that they know it.

The letter drafted by al-Qaida associate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi lays out, in his own words, the facts as seen by the subversives and terrorists:

Zarqawi and his terrorists have failed to intimidate the Coalition:

“...Americadid not come to leave, and it will not leave no matter how numerous its wounds become and how much of its blood is spilled.”

Zarqawi knows that attacks on Iraqis provoke hatred of and resistance to the terrorists.

*“How can we fight their cousins and their sons and under what pretext after the Americans... pull **back**?”*

Zarqawi and all the others know they are falling behind in a race against time—a race against Iraqi self-government.

*When he says, “Democracy is coming, and there will be no excuse thereafter” for the **attacks**.*

In their desperation they are trying to provoke a chaotic blood bath. They see it as their only hope to retrieve an otherwise hopeless situation. They explicitly want to set Iraq on Iraq in a cynical effort to effort to kindle sectarian violence.

They will not succeed.

The growing strength and confidence of Iraq's security forces will eventually overwhelm the subversives and terrorists. Iraqis will, in time, secure their own country.

Make no mistake, the last terrorist in Iraq will be killed or captured by Iraqis.

On the subject of governance and political development, all of you have reported on the likely changes and adjustments on the road to sovereignty. And well you should. Iraqi sovereignty is important to people all around the world not just to Iraqis. But the changes should not distract us from reaching the goals we in the Coalition set out at liberation.

- We seek a representative and sovereign government.
- That government should be bound by a Transitional Administrative Law that protects fundamental rights and provides a stable political structure.
- Under that law Iraqis will enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the freedom of religious belief and practice.
- All Iraqis will stand equally before the law, regardless of ethnicity, regardless of religion, regardless of gender.
- Iraq will be a single country with one currency, one foreign policy, one army, one police force and one national border.

These are core values and precepts of the Coalition countries and they will be embodied in the Transitional Administrative Law.

The changes being worked out at the national level are of course important, but the seed beds of participatory democracy are thriving and this is crucial.

Democracy is much more than elections. Democracy rests on pluralism and the balance of power at multiple levels. That is why the United States is spending almost half a billion dollars to promote civil society.

These programs are working:

- Hundreds of local and provincial councils have been formed.
- Student councils, women's forums and Parent Teacher Associations have been created in thousands of schools.

- Professional organizations of women, of physicians and lawyers and engineers have come into being all over the country.

These are the essential elements of democracy.

And finally we turn to the Economy.

Neither security nor government can be sustained without money, without economic activity. A moribund economy sooner or later leads to a moribund and insecure society.

Iraq's once moribund economy is coming to life:

- As all of you know when you drive around, Consumer goods are widely available.
- The Iraqi Central bank, which was wholly subservient, is now fully independent.
- The currency exchange was one of the most successful in history, even under extremely daunting circumstances. We put 4.62 trillion New Iraqi Dinars in place and finished on-time and on-budget.
- Iraq now enjoys observer status at the World Trade Organization.
- The restoration and expansion of electrical services continues. Last week electrical production hit its highest point since the war on a seven-day average. Yesterday we generated 98,917 MW Hours of power—a record since liberation. We continue to project 6,000 megawatts of peak wattage capacity by July 1, 2004.
- Telephone service continues to expand with more than 95 percent of service restored outside Baghdad and substantial progress in Baghdad.
- Hospitals, schools, food supplies and water resources are all at or above pre-war levels. It is not yet good enough, but progress has been made.

And all this economic activity will be further boosted by the \$10.2 billion in reconstruction contracts funded by the supplemental budget we expect to let before July 1.

Progress in each of these areas-- economics, security and governance-- reinforces each of the others. Not every piece will move just when we thought; there will be bumps in the road, but we have made great progress.

Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Guantanamo Detainees - Feb. 18, 2004

The United States and its Coalition partners remain at war against al Qaeda and its affiliates, both in Afghanistan and in operations around the world. The law of armed conflict governs this war and establishes the rules for detention of enemy combatants.

- **Approximately 650 enemy combatants are being detained at the U.S. military**
 - The detainees include:
 - Rank-and-file soldiers who took up arms against the Coalition in Afghanistan; and
 - Senior al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, including some who have expressed a commitment to kill Americans if released.
- **Enemy combatants are being detained because**
 - Enemy combatants are not common criminals. They are being detained for acts of war against the United States, which is why different rules apply to them.
 - If they were not detained, they would return to the fight and kill innocent men, women and children.
- **Detaining the enemy provides the Coalition with intelligence that can help prevent future acts of terrorism.**
 - Detainees have revealed how al Qaeda structures its leadership, gets its funds, communicates and trains. They have also provided information on plans for attacking the United States and its allies.
 - Coalition leaders have used this intelligence to help forces on the battlefield, and to protect the homeland.
- **The United States does not want to hold enemy combatants any longer than necessary.**
 - The United States is working to release enemy combatants that are judged to no longer be a threat or no longer have information that could prevent future acts of terrorism. Eighty-seven detainees have been transferred for release.
 - The United States prefers to transfer detainees who continue to be a threat but are not guilty of war crimes to their native country for detention or prosecution. To date, four detainees have been transferred to Saudi Arabia for continued detention, and one to Spain.
 - The United States is instituting a process for annual review of detainees who continue to pose a threat.
- **A thorough process is in place for determining enemy combatant status.**
 - The United States follows an extensive, multi-step process for determining who is detained as an enemy combatant, and which enemy combatants should be transferred to Guantanamo.
 - Guantanamo detainees represent only a small fraction of those taken in to custody in the Global War on Terror.
 - Of the roughly 10,000 people originally detained in Afghanistan, fewer than 800 have been brought to Guantanamo.
 - The detainees are being treated humanely and in a manner that is consistent with the Geneva Convention.
- **Detainees prosecuted by the United States will likely be tried**
 - Under the law of war such tribunals are a recognized way to try enemy combatants. They are not new.

Links: ([DoD Briefing on Detainee Operations at Guantanamo Bay](#)); ([transcript of Secretary Rumsfeld's Remarks at the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce](#));([military commissions](#)).



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Progress in Afghanistan - Feb. 17, 2004

The Coalition continues to make progress in Afghanistan, a key front in the global war on terror. Through its 11 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) the Coalition is building relationships with local Afghans and bringing security and stability to the country. NATO is exploring the creation of five additional PRTs in the next several months, a positive development as the number of nations joining the Global War on Terror grows.

Building a Secure and Stable Afghanistan

PRTs are small groups of civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces to provide security for aid workers and help with reconstruction work.

- PRTs enable and integrate the reconstruction process in Afghanistan:
 - They help the Coalition build relationships with local Afghans.
 - They extend the reach of the Afghan national government.
 - They establish security in their respective areas.
 - They encourage nongovernmental and international assistance organizations to move in.
- PRTs are an example of the international community's coordination and willingness to join the Coalition in the Global War on Terror.
 - Eleven of the PRTs are fully operational; the 12th will open this week.
 - Eight of the PRTs are led by the United States.
 - New Zealand leads one PRT; the United Kingdom leads one PRT; and Germany, under the auspices of NATO, leads the third.
 - NATO has set a commitment internally to deliver approximately five more PRTs before the next NATO summit in Istanbul, Turkey, in June. The lead countries have not been officially determined, but several have expressed interest.

The Coalition's Mission in Afghanistan

- Afghanistan is a key front on the Global
 - The Coalition will continue its mission of helping Afghans build a country that is free of terror, oppression and intolerance.

The Global War on Terror – On the Offensive

- Ultimately it is the Iraqi people who must secure their own country. The Coalition is working with Iraqis to ensure they have the capabilities, training and support they need to do the job.
 - Iraqi police on Sunday arrested Muhammad Zimam abd al-Razzaq al-Sadun, No. 41 on the top 55 most wanted list. Al-Sadun is a former Central Ba'ath Party regional chairman for the Ninawah and Ta'mim governorates. His arrest follows the Feb. 7 capture last week of Muhsin Khadr al-Khafaji, No. 48.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq's WMD: Feb. 12, 2004

What Was Known About Iraq's WMD

- The world knew the following about Iraq and Saddam's WMD:
 - Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people and Iran at least 10 times.
 - Saddam launched missiles against Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
 - Iraq had a nuclear program discovered after the Persian Gulf War that was far more advanced than pre-Gulf War intelligence had indicated.

Discoveries Since the End of Major Combat Operations in Iraq

- Dr. David Kay served in Iraq for some six months directing the work of the Iraq Survey Group and reporting to CIA Director George Tenet. While the ISG's work is far from over, the following has been discovered (Source www.cia.gov):
 - Evidence of an aggressive missile program concealed from the U.N. and international community, including plans and advanced design work for liquid and solid propellant missile with ranges of up to 1,000 kilometers.
 - Confirmation of prewar intelligence that Iraq was in secret negotiations with North Korea to obtain some of its most dangerous missile technology.
 - Work underway on two unmanned aerial vehicles: one developed in the early '90s and another under development in late 2000 -- both intended for the delivery of biological weapons.
 - Evidence of research and development on a biological weapons program that included a network of laboratories and safe houses containing equipment for chemical and biological research] and a prison laboratory complex possibly used in human testing for biological weapons agents.

Widespread Consensus on Saddam's Threat

- From review of the same intelligence information there was consensus among:
 - The intelligence community.
 - Successive administrations of both political parties.
 - The U.S. Congress.
 - Much of the international community (the U.N. passed 17 resolutions regarding Saddam's WMD).

Saddam's Behavior Reinforced Conclusions About Iraq's WMD

- Saddam did not behave like someone who was disarming and wanted to prove he was doing so.
- He did not open up his country to the world, as did Kazakhstan] Ukraine, South Africa, and as Libya is doing today.
- Instead, he continued to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenues under U.N. sanctions when he could have had the sanctions lifted and received those billions of dollars simply by demonstrating that he'd disarmed, if in fact he had.
- His regime filed a fraudulent declaration with the United Nations and ignored the final opportunity to avoid war afforded him by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points – Choices and Consequences - Feb. 10, 2004

Choices and Consequences for Terrorist Regimes

- In the past year, two terrorist regimes – Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and Libya under Moammar Gadhafi – have chosen different paths.
 - Saddam Hussein chose going to war.
 - He ignored 17 U.N. resolutions.
 - He was given an opportunity to leave the country, but refused.
 - He passed up his final opportunity – UN Resolution 1441 – to show the world he had ended his programs and destroyed his weapons.
 - Libya chose to cooperate, and open itself to the world.
 - Libya has announced its decision to disclose and eliminate its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, as well as its ballistic missiles.
- The lessons are clear – choices carry costs.
 - If Saddam had chosen differently, there would have been no war with Iraq.
 - By choosing to disclose its weapons programs, Gadhafi has opened Libya's path to better relations with nations of the free world.
 - The advance of freedom and democracy will be a powerful long-term deterrent to terrorist activities.

Attacks Against Iraqis -- Failed Attempts at Intimidation

- An explosion today outside a police station south of Baghdad has killed up to 50 people. While the cause of the blast is being investigated, this much is clear: those who oppose Iraq's transition to freedom and democracy will continue their attacks as Iraq moves toward sovereignty.
 - These attacks are attacks against progress in Iraq.
 - Iraqis are not intimidated. They continue to volunteer to become part of Iraq's security forces. More than half the forces in Iraq are Iraqis.
 - The Coalition will continue to train Iraqis to protect their own country, because they know the language, customs and neighborhoods best.
 - Attacks on Iraqis and Coalition forces are an attempt to create instability. The Coalition will continue to follow through with its mission: To create a free, stable and prosperous Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbors.

Coalition Forces – On the Offensive

- The Coalition remains on offense – to attack, kill or capture enemies of the Iraqi people and anti-Coalition elements.
 - Combined Joint Task Force-7 today announced the capture of Muhsin Khadr al-Khafaji, No. 48 on the "Top 55" Iraqi most wanted list. Al Khafaji is a former Ba'ath Party Regional Commander and Chairman for the Qadisiyah District. He was captured in Baghdad on Feb. 7.



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points –Secretary Rumsfeld's Trip, Feb. 6, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld departed Thursday for a five-day, three nation European tour that will include stops in Germany, Croatia and the United Kingdom.

- **Today Secretary Rumsfeld attended an informal meeting of NATO**
- **On Saturday, the secretary will attend the Wehrkunde Conference, attended by defense ministers from countries**
 - The conference will lay the groundwork for an international summit in Istanbul, Turkey, in June.
 - This is the first conference the secretary will attend with new NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.
 - During the conference, he will have bilateral meetings with his counterparts from Spain, Canada, Germany, Georgia, Singapore and India. He will attend a working breakfast with representatives from countries recently invited to join NATO.
- **Topics at the Wehrkunde Conference are likely to include Afghanistan, Iraq and forces in Bosnia-**
 - During his comments to reporters on the flight to Germany, Secretary Rumsfeld praised NATO's efforts in Afghanistan as a first "major out-of-Europe activity for the international body.
 - There is a proposal that NATO troops take over the mission of the provincial reconstruction teams throughout Afghanistan.
 - The secretary raised the possibility that NATO's mission in Bosnia is coming to an end, and said it is possible NATO troops there could be replaced by a force from the European Union.
 - He noted that NATO probably needs a very small headquarters there to assist with indicted criminals.
 - Mr. Rumsfeld called NATO's eventual withdrawal from Bosnia a success story for NATO when it happens and also for the Bosnian people.
- **The secretary will visit**
 - Croatia has provided strong support to the US-led war on terrorism and is working toward NATO membership.
- **Mr. Rumsfeld will end his trip in London on Monday, where he will meet with**

Links:

NATO's web page on the informal ministerial [\[NATO\]](#).

NATO in Afghanistan ([NATO International Security Assistance Force](#)).

NATO information on provincial reconstruction teams ([PRTs](#)).

Biography of Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer ([Scheffer biography](#)).

Transcript of the secretary's remarks to reporters en route to Germany ([transcript](#)).



U.S. Department of Defense

Talking Points - Intelligence and Iraq's WMD, Feb. 5, 2004

"Intelligence will never be perfect. We do not, will not and cannot know everything that's going on in this world of ours. If at this important moment we mistake intelligence for irrefutable evidence, analysts might become hesitant to inform policymakers of what they think they know and what they...don't know, and even what they think. And policymakers bereft of intelligence will find themselves much less able to make prudential judgments -- the judgments necessary to protect our country."

- Secretary Rumsfeld
Senate Armed Services Committee
Feb. 4, 2004

What the Intelligence Community Knew About Iraq

- The intelligence community knew the history of the Iraq regime and its use of chemical weapons on its own people and its neighbors.
- They knew what had been discovered during the inspections after the Persian Gulf War, some of which was far more advanced, particularly the nuclear program, than the pre-Gulf War intelligence had indicated.
- They were keen observers of United Nations weapons inspection reports in the 1990s, and they did their best to penetrate the secrets of Saddam Hussein's regime after the inspectors left in 1998.
- They rightly determined that Iraq was exceeding the U.N.-imposed missile range limits. Documents found by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) show evidence of high-level negotiations between Iraq and North Korea for the transfer of long-range missile technology.
 - If Iraq had a surge capability for biological and chemical weapons, its missiles could have been armed with weapons of mass destruction and used to threaten neighboring countries.

pre r on am Threat

- From review of the same intelligence information there was consensus that Saddam was pursuing weapons of mass destruction among:
 - The intelligence community.
 - Successive administrations of both political parties.
 - The U.S. Congress.
 - Much of the international community (the U.N. passed 17 resolutions regarding Saddam's WMD).
- Congress and the national security teams of both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations looked at essentially the same intelligence and came to similar conclusions that the Iraqi regime posed a danger and should be changed.
 - Congress passed regime-change legislation in 1998.

Reinforced C n b t Ira WMD

- Saddam did not behave like someone who was disarming and wanted to prove he was doing so.
- He did not open up his country to the world, as did Kazakhstan, Ukraine, South Africa, and as Libya is doing today.

-
- Instead, he continued to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenues under U.N. sanctions when he could have had the sanctions lifted and received those billions of dollars simply by demonstrating that he'd disarmed, if in fact he had.
 - His regime filed with the United Nations what almost everyone agreed was a fraudulent declaration, and ignored the final opportunity afforded him by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441.

Ongoing Work on Iraq's WMD

- Dr. David Kay served in Iraq for some six months directing the work of the Iraq Survey Group, and reporting to CIA Director George Tenet. Dr. Kay and the ISG have worked hard under difficult and dangerous conditions. They have brought forward important information.
- Kay has outlined his hypothesis on the difference between prewar estimates of Iraq's WMD and what has been found thus far on the ground. While it is too early to come to final conclusions, there are several alternative views currently postulated:
 - WMD may not have existed at the start of the war -- possible, but not likely,
 - WMD did exist, but was transferred in whole or in part to one or more countries.
 - WMD existed, but was dispersed and hidden throughout Iraq.
 - WMD existed, but was destroyed at some moment prior to the beginning of the conflict.
 - Iraq had small quantities of biological or chemical agents and also a surge capability for a rapid buildup.
 - Iraq's WMD could have been a charade by the Iraqis -- that Saddam Hussein fooled his neighbors and the world, or members of his own regime.
 - Saddam Hussein himself might have been fooled by his own people, who may have tricked him into believing he had capabilities that Iraq really didn't have.
- It has not yet been proven that Saddam Hussein had what intelligence indicated regarding Iraq's WMD -- but the opposite has also not been proven.
- The Iraq Survey Group's work is some distance from completion. There are 1,300 people in the ISG in Iraq, working hard to find ground truth. When that work is complete, we will know more. It is the job of ISG to pursue these issues wherever the facts may take them.

The Decision to Take Military Action Against Saddam Hussein

- The President has sworn to preserve, protect and defend the nation. With respect to Iraq, the following issues were taken into account:
 - The available evidence.
 - The attacks of September 11th.
 - Saddam Hussein's behavior of deception.
 - Iraq's ongoing defiance of the U.N.
 - The fact that Saddam's forces were shooting at U.S. and United Kingdom aircraft in the northern and southern no-fly zones.

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- The fact that Saddam's was a vicious regime that had used weapons of mass destruction against its own people and its neighbors, and had murdered and tortured the Iraqi people for decades
 - The President went to the United Nations, and the Security Council passed a 17th resolution.
 - The President went to Congress, which voted to support military action if the Iraqi regime failed to take a final opportunity to cooperate with the United Nations.
 - When Saddam Hussein did pass up that final opportunity, the President gave him an ultimatum -- a final, final opportunity to leave the country.
 - Only then, when all alternatives had been fully exhausted, did the Coalition act to liberate Iraq.
 - The world is safer today and the Iraqi people far better off for that action.

Improving & Strengthening Intelligence

- U.S. intelligence capabilities must be strengthened to meet the threats and challenges of the 21st century.
- The President has announced that he will form a bipartisan commission on strengthening U.S. intelligence capabilities.
 - The commission will review past successes of the intelligence community, as well as cases that have not been successes, to examine whether the intelligence community has the right skills, proper resources and appropriate authorities to meet the challenges and the threats of the 21st century.

Wall Street Journal
January 28, 2004

So Where's The WMD?

Iraq weapons inspector David Kay speaks to the Senate today, and our (probably forlorn) hope is that his remarks will get wide and detailed coverage. What we've been hearing from him in snippets so far explains the mystery of whatever happened to Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.

His answers, we should make clear, are a long way from the "Bush and Blair lied" paradigm currently animating the Democratic primaries and newspapers. John Kerry of all people now claims that, because Mr. Kay's Iraq Study Group has not found stockpiles of WMD or a mature nuclear program, President Bush somehow "misled" the country. "I think there's been an enormous amount of exaggeration, stretching, deception," he said on "Fox News Sunday." This is the same Senator who voted for the war after having access to the intelligence and has himself said previously that he believed Saddam had such weapons.

The reason Mr. Kerry believed this is because everybody else did too. That Saddam had WMD was the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community for years, going back well into the Clinton Administration. The CIA's near east and counterterrorism bureaus disagreed on the links between al Qaeda and Saddam -- which is one reason the Bush Administration failed to push that theme. But the CIA and its intelligence brethren were united in their belief that Saddam had WMD, as the agency made clear in numerous briefings to Congress.

And not just the CIA. Believers included the U.N., whose inspectors were tossed out of Iraq after they had recorded huge stockpiles after the Gulf War. No less than French President Jacques Chirac warned as late as last February about "the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq" and declared that the "international community is right . . . in having decided Iraq should be disarmed."

All of this was enshrined in U.N. Resolution 1441, which ordered Saddam to come completely clean about his weapons. If he really had already destroyed all of his WMD, Saddam had every incentive to give U.N. inspectors free rein, put everything on the table and live to deceive another day. That he didn't may go down as Saddam's last and greatest miscalculation.

But Mr. Kay's Study Group has also discovered plenty to suggest that Saddam couldn't come clean because he knew he wasn't. In his interim report last year, Mr. Kay disclosed a previously unknown Iraq program for long-range missiles; this was a direct violation of U.N. resolutions.

Mr. Kay has also speculated that Saddam may have thought he had WMD because his own generals and scientists lied to him. "The scientists were able to fake programs," the

chief inspector says. This is entirely plausible, because aides who didn't tell Saddam what he wanted to hear were often tortured and killed. We know from post-invasion interrogations that Saddam's own generals believed that Iraq had WMD. If they thought so, it's hard to fault the CIA for believing it too.

Mr. Kay has also made clear that, stockpiles or no, Saddam's regime retained active programs that could have been reconstituted at any time. Saddam tried to restart his nuclear program as recently as 2001. There is also evidence, Mr. Kay has told the London Telegraph, that some components of Saddam's WMD program "went to Syria before the war." Precisely what and how much "is a major issue that needs to be resolved." The most logical conclusion is that Saddam hoped to do just enough to satisfy U.N. inspectors and then restart his WMD production once sanctions were lifted and the international heat was off.

By all means let Congress explore why the CIA overestimated Saddam's WMD stockpiles this time around. But let's do so while recalling that the CIA had *underestimated* the progress of his nuclear, chemical and biological programs before the first Gulf War. We are also now learning that the CIA has long underestimated the extent and progress of nuclear programs in both Libya and Iran. Why aren't Democrats and liberals just as alarmed about those intelligence failures?

Intelligence is as much art and judgment as it is science, and it is inherently uncertain. We elect Presidents and legislators to consider the evidence and then make difficult policy judgments that the voters can later hold them responsible for. Mr. Kay told National Public Radio that, based on the evidence he has seen from Iraq, "I think it was reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat." He added that "I must say I actually think what we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially, than in fact we thought it was even before the war."

As intelligence failures go, we'd prefer one that worried too much about a threat than one that worried too little. The latter got us September 11.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Wolfowitz Iraq Trip: Feb. 3, 2004

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has returned from Iraq, where he met with commanders, troops and Ambassador Paul Bremer.

The deputy also visited with families of soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division (the Big Red One), 14,000 of whom are deploying to Iraq to replace the 4th Infantry Division. Following are highlights of the deputy's comments.

- **The main role of the 1st ID, and all troops in Iraq, is to help the Iraqi people become independent and build a free and democratic nation.**
 - At the division level, the soldiers will work with Iraqis to build their confidence and defeat those terrorizing and intimidating them, and they will help Iraqis build their new government and security forces.
 - A primary mission of the 1st ID will be to train Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers in the triangle areas north and west of Baghdad.
 - More than 200,000 Iraqis are now serving in the new Iraqi army and the security forces.
 - 1st ID soldiers will face tactical challenges, and will have to build relationships with the Iraqis. Because the soldiers have been deployed to the Balkans, they have a sense of what kind of stabilization requirements this mission entails.
- **The family support effort is crucial to the mission of the soldiers in Iraq.**
 - The soldiers' family network helps the troops concentrate on their mission, knowing that their families are being taken care of.
 - Division officials will use the American Forces Network, the division newspaper and a special deployment paper to keep families informed.
- **The United States and its Coalition partners have made enormous progress on many fronts in the Global War on Terror.**
 - Both Afghanistan and Iraq have been liberated from an evil, bureaucratic regime.
 - Iraq's liberation demonstrates to Arabs there is a better path to follow than the one the terrorists are offering.
 - The Coalition is hunting and capturing a large number of terrorists.
 - While the Coalition is making progress, the problem of terrorism will not disappear overnight.

Links: [1st Infantry Division](#) [4th Infantry Division](#)

For stories on the deputy's trips, please visit [DefenseLink.mil](#). For a transcript of an interview with the Armed Forces Network, please visit [\(DoD transcripts\)](#).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Defense Budget: Feb. 2, 2004

Following are highlights of a briefing by Dov Zakheim, Under Secretary Comptroller for the Department of Defense, on President Bush's fiscal year 2005 budget request.

FY 2005 Defense Budget Priorities

- **Successfully pursue the**
 - The budget includes robust readiness and acquisition funding, important legislative authorities, and other essentials vital to winning the Global War on Terror.
- - The budget will support the high morale and quality of U.S. men and women in uniform by giving them good pay and good benefits.
 - The budget requests a 3.5 percent military pay raise.
 - The budget keeps DoD on track to eliminate nearly all inadequate military family housing units by fiscal year 2007, with complete elimination in fiscal year 2009.
- **Manage**
 - Recent operations have placed a heavy demand on America's military.
 - DoD leaders believe that a permanent increase to military personnel levels would be the most expensive option for managing demand on the force, and has other disadvantages as well.
 - Instead, DoD is developing initiatives to reduce demand on the force, including rebalancing the force, and converting positions currently filled by military personnel to positions that could be supported by DoD civilians or contractors.
- **Reshape global**
 - DoD will continue to scrutinize all aspects of America's global defense posture – including personnel, infrastructure, equipment, sourcing and surge capabilities,
- - Transforming America's military capabilities involves developing and fielding new military systems that can combat current and future security threats. Programs include missile defense, the Army's Future Combat Systems and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.
- **Improve**
 - The budget includes funding for technologies and initiatives that will strengthen intelligence activities and capabilities, including improving human intelligence.
- **Further streamline DoD**
 - Recent operations reinforce the importance of transforming DoD management processes so they work better and cost less. Initiatives include the National Security Personnel System (NSPS).
 - The new NSPS manages DoD civilian personnel in a way that provides needed flexibility and incentives, but keeps important safeguards. Initial implementation will cover 300,000 employees.

For additional information, please link to the press release posted on DoD's web site ([press release](#)).



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update: January 30, 2004

Following are highlights from a press briefing today in Baghdad by Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy director for operations for Coalition Joint Task Force 7, and Dan Senor, senior advisor for the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Improving Security

➤ **The Coalition continues to pursue former regime cells, criminals inside Iraq pose a threat not only to the Coalition but also**

- Each of these groups has different techniques and procedures. The Coalition uses any actionable intelligence about these elements to capture or kill them.
- The Coalition has suspected the presence of Al Qaeda in Iraq; the recent capture of Hassan Ghul, a senior member of Osama bin Laden's network, provided confirmation.
 - The Coalition also has suspected over the past few months that tactics were shifting. The use of suicide bombings, plus information gleaned from detainees, have indicated an Al Qaeda presence, but the Coalition still does not think it is a large number of cells.
 - The Coalition is thoroughly examining the evidence and using all intelligence to hunt down enemies of the Coalition and the Iraqi people.

➤ **Iraq's security**

- Yesterday 466 new Iraqi police officers graduated in Jordan, the first to graduate from the center there. A second class of 500 students has begun its training, and a third class of 1,000 will arrive for training early next month.
- Within three months, the training center in Jordan will have the space to train 3,000 students at any one time. Countries providing trainers in addition to Jordan include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, Finland and Austria.

The New Iraqi Dinar

➤ **The appreciation of the dinar against the dollar**

- When the new dinar was announced last year, some speculated that the dinar would fluctuate wildly. These predictions have not proven accurate.
- Iraq's currency has remained fairly steady, and even appreciated slightly and gradually. These are good indications Iraq's economy is stabilizing and its financial situation is improving.

Transfer of Sovereignty

➤ **A United Nations security team is in Iraq, assessing the situation before**

- The Coalition is cooperating closely with the security team, providing them with the resources and information they need to take the next step in assessing conducting direct elections.
- The Coalition has conducted a number of briefings with the U.N. security team, and expects that they will be traveling across the country to assess the situation.

Showcasing Iraq's Progress

➤ **Approximately 200 Members of Congress, several members of President Bush's cabinet, and from Coalition countries – including Spain, Poland and the United Kingdom-- have visited Iraq since**

- These visits reflect Iraq's progress and the willingness of leaders around the world to support the reconstruction of Iraq.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – End Strength: January 29, 2004

Following are highlights from testimony yesterday by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker before the House Armed Services Committee on why he opposes an end-strength increase to the size of the Army.

- **The current stress on the Army from worldwide operations is a temporary spike. Plus-ups can be carried out with current resources and without asking for a permanent increase in troops.**
 - Secretary Rumsfeld has agreed to allow the Army to temporarily increase by 30,000 soldiers above its congressionally approved limit of 482,000, giving it the personnel needed to handle the stress of ongoing operations.
 - It costs \$1.2 billion a year for every 10,000 people added to the Army. But Congress often gives the military an unfunded order – meaning the service must take the money from other areas to fund the requirement.
 - An unfunded end-strength increase puts readiness, training, modernization and transformation at risk.
- **The Army is not facing a recruiting and retention crisis.**
 - In 2003, the Army made all its retention goals except one – Army Reserve mid-careerist missed its goal by 6 percent.
 - Indications this year are that the Army is on track to make 100 percent of its goals across all components.
- **Allowing the Army to pursue the course now charted will mean a better Army, more capable of carrying out its mission with the current level of resourcing. These initiatives include:**
 - Stabilizing the force by giving soldiers longer tours, which will increase retention.
 - Reviewing positions that could be converted from military to civilian, thus freeing these troops for military duties.
 - Continuing to search for efficiencies as the Army examines its global footprint and restructures its overseas overhead and headquarters.
 - Expanding the 33 active brigades under the 10 active-duty division headquarters to 48 active brigades, allowing the Army to become more strategically agile. This includes:
 - Reassigning some units -- such as air defense, signal intelligence and other support groups-- to units with skills in greater demand, such as military police and civil affairs.
 - Going forward with five Stryker brigades in the active structure.
 - Retaining the eight division headquarters in the Reserve, but increasing from 15 to 22 the number of enhanced brigades, increasing the Reserve brigades' levels of readiness, and outfitting them with the best equipment available.
 - Such moves would increase the capability of the brigades to become part of a broader rotation base to meet the future strategy.

Additional Efforts

- 9 **The Army is continuing to rebalance its force, and plans to restructure more than 100,000 jobs in its active and Reserve components.**
 - This rebalancing and restructuring will provide ready and more capable forces to the regional combatant commanders, and relieve stress on forces in high demand.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Town Hall Meetings in Iraq: January 28, 2004

➤ **As Iraq transitions to a sovereign nation, town hall meetings are being held give citizens an opportunity**

- The town hall meeting tomorrow in Ba'quba will be the first of its kind in Diyala province, north of Baghdad.
- Citizens of Baghdad held their town hall meeting at the Palestine Hotel today.
 - The meeting followed a panel and roundtable discussion where citizens discussed topics in small groups, then reported their suggestions to an assigned panel member.
 - Panel members included Dr. Adnan Pachachi, current president of the Iraqi Governing Council.
- More than 220 people attended the Mosul town hall meeting on Dec. 12.
- At the Basra town hall meeting Dec. 29, topics included the role of Islam in the new government, timing of direct elections, the extent of United Nations involvement in the transition and women's participation in government.

➤ **The town hall meetings are a forum for Iraqis to candidly**

- Iraqis will determine their ultimate form of government.
- At this early stage in Iraq's new democracy, the success of the forums may not produce consensus, but the forums do give Iraqis an opportunity to become involved in the political process and feel as though they have a stake in their government.

➤ **Self-government continues to expand in Iraq: the majority of towns and cities local governments and citizens are learning about how to set up**

- Citizens in each of Baghdad's 88 neighborhoods have chosen representatives for local governing councils. These representatives, in turn, choose members of nine district councils and the 37 members of the Baghdad City Council – in all, more than 800 representatives serving their fellow citizens.
- A lecture at Al Hillah University tomorrow will feature participants who have just returned from a democracy training forum in Jordan.
- More than 1,500 people in south central Iraq attended a democracy discussion on Jan. 21 in Hillah. Topics included how to choose leaders, how citizens participate in a democracy, rights in a democracy and the rule of law.

Links: [\(Mosul town hall meeting\)](#), [\(map of Iraq\)](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Women in Democratic Iraq: January 26, 2004

Freed from Saddam Hussein's regime and the Ba'athist government, women in Iraq are participating in national, regional and local government, gaining a greater voice and helping to shape their country's political future.

Democracy Training for Women

- The Women's Rights Center in Diwaniyah in south-central Iraq held one of an ongoing series of democracy training seminars on Jan. 24. Topics included the basics of democracy and participation in a democratic government.
- The Center assists widowed, impoverished and otherwise vulnerable women as they work to improve their lives and those of their children.
- The Center also helps provide women the crucial opportunity to focus on leadership and participate in reconstructing their country.
- Dr. Maha Al-Sagban, a Women's Rights Center board member, explained:
"They want democracy now, but it takes a long process... They are now allowed to take part in life. Because of the previous regime, they didn't speak, but that is changing... First, we have to rebuild a woman's self-confidence and return (her) lost pride... I think democracy is progressing. It is going on nicely... already democracy is being implemented."
- Sessions on democracy, the qualities of a good candidate for public office, caucuses and organizing public advocacy groups are some of the topics at democracy training classes at the Women's Rights Center being held in Hillah tomorrow.

Women In Government

- Leaders at the national level include Minister of Public Works Sasreen Sideek Barwari; Rend Al-Rahim, the Principal Representative of Iraq to the United States; and three women serving on the Iraqi Governing Council.
- Six of the 37 members of the Baghdad City Council are women.
- More than 80 women serve on neighborhood and district councils in Baghdad, and many others have been elected to district, local and municipal councils in other regions.

Programs for Women

- The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is working with local women's groups to establish women's centers in Baghdad to provide education, job skills, rights awareness and mentoring programs.
- Women's centers are also being established in Hillah, Karbala, Najaf, Al Kut and Sulaimaniyah.
- At the Women's Forum in Baghdad, courses include health care, computer skills and dress making. Staff are also working to set up a library and start English classes.
- The United States has given more than \$6.5 million to local women's groups including non-governmental, community and professional organizations. One example is the New Horizons of Iraq, an organization of businesswomen, which meets weekly at the Baghdad Community Center.
- The United States sponsored a delegation of Iraqi women leaders to the Global Women's Summit in Marrakech, Morocco, in June 2003. Plans are underway for a Partnership for Learning conference in Istanbul, Turkey, this year.
- Links: [\(CPA fact sheet\)](#), [\(\(Women U.S. House members delegation trip to Iraq\)](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Defense Department FY '05 budget: January 23, 2004

The Department of Defense today announced that President Bush will request \$401.7 billion in discretionary defense funding authority for fiscal year 2005.

- - Is a seven percent increase over fiscal 2004 funding levels after taking into account congressionally-directed recissions.
 - The specific numbers making up the \$401.7 billion will be announced during a DoD press briefing scheduled for Feb. 2.

- **The budget request balances defense priorities and commitments abroad and**
 - Reflects the president's commitment to prosecute the global war on terrorism;
 - Balances the military's long-term needs to transform technology and defense capabilities with needs for current operations;
 - Invests in better-integrated intelligence capabilities;
 - Emphasizes readiness and training;
 - Supports continued transformation of the joint force;
 - Highlights the president's commitment to providing the pay, benefits and other quality-of-life measures to recruit and retain troops; and
 - Provides for homeland defense needs.

- **The budget request capitalizes on the new National Security Personnel and signed by the president in November 2003 as part of**
 - The NSPS system better utilizes the active duty force by making it easier to place civilian employees in jobs currently being filled by uniformed military personnel.
 - Under the NSPS system, DoD officials will be able to more effectively manage the department's 700,000-person civilian workforce by giving senior managers flexibility to place civilian workers where they are needed most, speeding up the hiring process and introducing pay-for-performance bonuses.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – 4th ID Update: January 22, 2004

Following are highlights from a press briefing today in Tikrit by Maj. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno.

- The former regime elements the Coalition has been combating have been
 - Capturing Saddam Hussein was a major operational and psychological defeat for the enemy.
 - Saddam's capture has resulted in an increase in accurate information from Iraqis. The information has allowed Coalition forces to conduct raids to capture or kill financiers, mid-level former regime leaders and those who make improvised explosive devices.
 - Iraqis clearly understand the Ba'ath party is gone. They are ready to move forward.
- The number of enemy attacks against Coalition forces has been declining
 - In their desperation, the enemy is targeting civilians and Iraqi security forces, and ambushing convoys.
 - These attacks demonstrate their disdain for peace and prosperity in Iraq and for Iraqis.
 - Attacks against Iraqi security forces have not deterred Iraqis from signing up to protect their country.
 - These forces are conducting joint patrols with Coalition troops, as well as independent operations.
- The Coalition continues to focus on extensive civil-
 - In the past 10 months, nearly 2,000 projects worth \$10 million have been completed in the 4th Infantry Division's area of operation.
 - More than 600 schools, 70 mosques and 75 medical facilities have been refurbished; 500 miles of roads have been improved, and hundreds of projects that benefit children – such as soccer fields and youth centers have been completed.
 - Another 700 projects are in progress.
- The 4th Infantry Division is readying a transition of the area's mission to
 - The division's area of operations includes the region west and north of Baghdad, which has seen the most attacks against the Coalition.
 - The two staffs are already are working together to ensure a seamless transition.

Progress in Iraq

- A third battalion of the new Iraqi Army will graduate
 - The ceremony for the 750 soldiers will be at the Kirkush military training base.
- A medical clinic in Hatra has been refurbished and
 - The clinic in northern Iraq has 13 medical staff and 11 technicians, plus an ultra-sound machine, a computer system and other equipment purchased with \$60,000 from the 101st Airborne and the Coalition Provisional Authority.
- Members of the 82nd Airborne in Ar Ramadi, west of Baghdad, have begun bags Sunday to the fire chief, Iraqi security forces and schools in the schools,
 - The aid bags are being distributed as an adjunct to the "first responder" training given to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the Force Protection Services and Iraqi Police. Schools will use the bags as first aid kits.
- Three million children under age
- Links: [\[Gen. Odierno biography\]](#); [\[4th ID web site link\]](#); [\[1st](#)



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – New Iraqi Army Training: January 21, 2004

Following are highlights from a press briefing today in Baghdad by Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, commander of the Coalition's military assistance and training team in Iraq.

➤ **The Coalition plans to train and equip nine infantry brigades (27 battalions) in**

- Three battalions have been trained thus far; a fourth is being trained now.
 - The first battalion graduated on Oct. 4. It is based at Kirkuk with the 4th Infantry Division.
 - The second battalion graduated on Jan. 6. It is based at Taji with the 1st Armored Division.
 - The third battalion will go to Mosul after its graduation Jan. 24.
- There are three recruiting hubs: in Basra, Baghdad and Mosul.
- A majority of new recruits have prior military service.
- Soldiers are given medical and physical tests and interviews, and are checked for any history of affiliations with the Special Republican Guard, intelligence services and the Ba'ath Party.
- Nearly 1,000 men are recruited in order to produce an active battalion of 757 soldiers.
 - Attrition is due to such reasons as voluntary withdrawal or failure to meet standards.
 - Soldiers were previously being paid \$60 to \$180 a month; salaries now are \$120 to \$240 a month.

➤ **The Coalition is also training a small coastal defense force and the beginning**

- The Coastal Defense Force will consist of a patrol boat squadron of five 30-meter boats and a naval infantry regiment, which is currently training with the army.
- The Coastal Defense Force will also train in the Umm Qasr and Basra for boat training, where they will learn interdiction and boarding operations in order to protect the 80 kilometers of Iraqi coastline.
- The Iraqi Army Air Corps will focus primarily on troops and logistic movements.
- Helicopter and transport pilots are currently being trained; the first operational squadron will be fielded this summer.

➤ **Creating an army in Iraq improves both the country's**

- In addition to the soldiers, hundreds of Iraqi civilians must be hired to build garrisons and provide security.

➤ **The new Iraqi Army will**

- The new Iraqi Army values compassion and respect for human rights.
- In addition to learning fundamental fighting skills, soldiers are taught how to function as a member of a multi-ethnic team.
- The new Iraqi army will defend the territorial sovereignty of Iraq.
- Soldiers in the new Iraqi Army are treated with respect.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Message to the Troops/Afghanistan: January 16, 2004

A Message to the Troops from Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff

"We are entering the most challenging period for our Army since World War II. As we deploy and redeploy nearly one quarter of a million soldiers over the next four months, we all will be required to make sacrifices to ensure that we safely and successfully accomplish the mission. Soldiers' contributions to Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and other expeditionary operations have been critical to our nation's successes and to keeping the American people safe.

"We are warriors, and that entails a special ethos: I will always place the mission first, I will never accept defeat, I will never quit, and I will never leave a fallen comrade. When our nation calls upon us we have to be motivated by things that come from deep in our souls. It is called service for a reason. It is about giving more than you get. It is about duty. It is about sacrificing for the good of the whole."

Afghanistan Update

- The U.S. and its Coalition partners are helping the Afghan people rebuild a country that has struggled through 23 years of war, five years of Taliban repression and four years of drought. The challenge is great: in 2001 Afghanistan was a failed state with a destroyed infrastructure-- it ranked 169 out of 174 states on the United Nations human development index (in 1996, the last year it was ranked).
- Afghanistan's political and economic reconstruction is underway.
 - Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are up and running in Gardez, Bamiyan, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, Parwan and Kandahar.
 - Afghanistan has a secular constitution, formulated through the democratic loya jirga process, that enshrines human rights and democratic principles. It provides for a president, bicameral legislature and independent judiciary.
 - The influence of the Afghan central government is spreading through the national development framework, effective engagement with local warlords and plans for national elections in the coming months.
- Security progress:
 - The U.S. has trained 13 battalions of the Afghan National Army.
 - Military operations are ongoing against remaining Taliban and al Qaeda elements.
 - Germany is helping train 24,000 new police officers.
 - Italy is working to establish an effective judicial system in Afghanistan.
 - Japan and the United Nations are aiding demobilization and integration efforts.
 - The United Kingdom is undertaking counter-narcotics operations and initiatives.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points: Progress in Iraq – Jan. 15, 2004

Saddam's Capture

- Since Saddam's capture on Dec. 13, more Iraqis, including former Ba'ath Party officials, are coming forward with actionable intelligence on weapons caches and wanted individuals.
- Those Iraqis who still have loyalties to Saddam can turn themselves in and become part of Iraq's future, instead of its past.

Iraqi Security Forces

- Iraqi forces now number more than 200,000, making them the largest security force in Iraq.
- The quality of intelligence the Coalition is receiving is improving in large measure because of the increasing engagement of Iraqis in security activities.

International Support

- There are more than 24,000 Coalition troops in Iraq from 34 countries.
- The world community is coming together to help build a free Iraq. There is a broad, international effort to reconstruct the country.
- More than 70 countries participated in the Madrid donors' conference in October, pledging more than \$13 billion in aid in addition to the United States contribution.
- The Coalition continues to solicit international participation for the reconstruction of Iraq.
- Former Secretary of State James Baker, serving as a personal envoy for President Bush, is meeting with world leaders to discuss restructuring and reducing the debt burden on the Iraqi people.

Education

- All 22 universities and 43 technical institutes and colleges are open.
- Teachers are earning from 12 to 25 times the salaries they earned under Saddam's regime.

Health Care

- Public health spending is 26 times higher than the amount spent during Saddam's reign, and doctors' salaries are eight times higher.
- All 240 hospitals and more than 1,200 clinics are open.

Governance

- On Nov. 15, the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council agreed to for framework for transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi people.
- The Nov. 15 agreement provides for:
 - An interim but fully sovereign government by next summer;
 - Direct elections for a constitutional convention; and
 - A date for the directly elected constitutional government.



US Department of Defense

Iraq Update: No. 54 Captured; Democracy Building Jan. 14, 2004

Following are highlights of a press conference today in Baghdad by Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority ([link to transcript](#)).

➤ **The Coalition remains on offense to attack, kill or capture enemies and anti-**

- **The Coalition today announced the capture of No. 54 on the Top 55 deck of cards ([link to deck of cards](#)), ([list of 55 most wanted](#)).**
 - Members of the 82nd Airborne and Special Operations Forces captured al-Muhammad near Ar Ramadi, west of Baghdad, on Jan. 11.
 - Al-Muhammad is a former Ba'ath Party regional chairman for the Karbala governate.
 - Al-Muhammad was an enabler for many of the attacks on the Iraqi people and Coalition forces. His capture is another significant step in reducing anti-Coalition resistance.
 - Forty-two of the 55 most wanted have been captured or killed.
- **An early morning raid in Samarra has netted four nephews of Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, No. 6 on the Top 55 most-wanted list.**
 - Soldiers from the 720th Military Police Battalion acted on a tip to find the men, who have been detained for questioning.
 - A \$10 million reward has been posted for Al-Duri, who is believed to be a key leader in coordinating attacks against Coalition forces and innocent Iraqi citizens.

➤ **Democracy continues to take root in Iraq as its citizens**

- A town hall meeting in Baghdad scheduled for Jan. 28 is expected to be the largest yet. More than 200 residents of Mosul turned out for a town hall meeting on Jan. 12.
- The meetings are part of the Coalition's overall democracy-building initiative.
- The Coalition will continue to work closely with the Governing Council, provincial and city councils, and the more than 200 local political parties now in Iraq.
- More than 600 meetings – some as small as 20 people and some with hundreds of participants – were held in December.

➤ **The Coalition has devoted a significant amount of funding for democracy-programs for Iraq –**

- This is the largest amount of funding dedicated to the early stages of a country's democratic development since the end of the Cold War.
- The training includes the basics of democracy, such as the accountability of government employees, the importance of transparent government action and processes, and how citizens can participate in their government.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Troop End Strength: January 13, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the Pentagon press corps today. Following are highlights.

- Since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, the operational tempo for U.S. has increased as troops have helped remove two Saddam Hussein and senior al-Qaeda operatives, and
 - The current stress on the force from these missions is a spike in activity that is expected to be temporary.
 - The Department of Defense (DoD), for instance, does not anticipate having 120,000 troops permanently deployed in a single campaign, such as they are now for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
- DoD is taking immediate action to relieve stress
 - Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces, which now number close to 200,000;
 - Increasing international military participation in Iraq; and
 - Dealing aggressively with those elements that threaten Iraq's transition to self-reliance.
- Increasing “end strength” – or the total number of military personnel best solution to reducing the
 - The capability of the force is more critical than the number of troops.
 - For instance, Coalition forces in Iraq defeated a larger adversary with speed, power and agility, not mass.
 - A permanent end strength increase is very likely the slowest, least effective, and most expensive option for increasing capability and reducing stress on the force.
 - Because of the time necessary to recruit, train and integrate new troops, the benefits of increasing end strength will not be felt for some time.
 - A permanent increase in end strength would require cuts in other areas, which would mean less funding for transformational capabilities that will allow the Department to do more with fewer forces than there are currently.
- DoD has dozens of long-term initiatives underway to relieve stress on the force, and increase its capability by:
 - Investing in new information age technologies, precision weapons, unmanned air and sea vehicles;
 - Increasing the jointness of U.S. forces;
 - Rebalancing the active force and the Guard and Reserves; and
 - Converting jobs being performed by military personnel to civilian jobs, thus freeing troops for military tasks.
- The United States can afford the military force necessary to ensure national security, but end strength is a last, not first, choice.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update: January 12, 2004

➤ **More than 220 people attended a town hall meeting in Mosul in Ninevah Province today regarding Iraq's transitional political process.**

- The cross section of political, social and civic leaders asked a range of questions of the four panelists during the two and one-half hour forum, in particular federalism and the power structure between Baghdad and the provinces.
- The panelists said federalism does not mean separation, and emphasized Iraq will remain a unified nation.
- The panelists said under federalism the rights of ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds, would be respected, but everyone would continue to think of themselves as Iraqis.
- The panelists and audience agreed that democracy was the only acceptable option for the future Iraqi government.
- The four panelists included a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, the governor and deputy governor of Ninewa, and a Ninewa Provincial Council member. A professor from Mosul University moderated the forum.

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senior, spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority, held a press conference today in Baghdad. Following are highlights.

➤ **The Iraq Governing Council's (IGC) announcement of the new de-Ba'athification policies and procedures marks the final step in transferring de-Ba'athification authority to the IGC and the Iraqi people.**

- The IGC now has full command of de-Ba'athification.
- The policy strikes a balance between being tough on senior-level Ba'athists while allowing for the reintegration of nominal Ba'athists into society.
- Ambassador Bremer has maintained that de-Ba'athification should be a policy that is implemented and managed by the Iraqi people.
- The announcement marks another step in the transition of authority to the Iraqi people, which will culminate with the June 30 transfer of sovereignty.
- Ambassador Bremer signed the first de-Ba'athification decree May 16 and delegated authority to the Governing Council Nov. 4.

➤ **A Nov. 15 agreement reached by Ambassador Bremer and the Governing Council is being implemented.**

- The agreement lays the foundation s for a free, democratic and sovereign Iraq.
- The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council are working closely on the next steps to move toward a basic law, an agreement on the status of forces, and toward establishing a transitional government.
- It is a healthy sign of a new Iraq that some political and religious leaders take issue with certain provisions in the agreement, and that they express these views openly.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update: January 9, 2004

Iraq Operations Update

- Over the past week there have been 18 daily engagements against Coalition military on average, slightly more than two attacks against Iraqi security forces, and slightly more than one attack against Iraqi civilians on a daily basis.
- In the past 24 hours, the Coalition conducted 1,601 patrols, 28 offensive operations, 19 raids, and captured 47 anti-coalition suspects.
- In the northern zone of operations, Coalition forces conducted a neighborhood engagement in west Mosul, where they searched 223 houses. They detained six individuals and seized weapons, ammunitions and extensive amounts of explosives.
- Ba'ath Party weapons turn-ins continue. A Shua'bah-level Ba'ath Party member from Tall Afar turned in a total of 76 AK-47s and 108 AK magazines. A Shua'bah-level Ba'ath party member from Zumar turned in 98, 82mm mortar rounds and one complete 82mm mortar system and a sandbag full of mortar fuses. The weapons turn-ins continue in the north, and is evidence of the former Ba'ath party members' willingness to support Coalition activities and assist in the reconstruction of a new Iraq.
- In the north-central zone of operations, Coalition and Iraqi security forces conducted 157 patrols, one raid, and captured 10 individuals. Coalition forces conducted a raid near Tikrit, capturing Sulwan Ibriham Omar al-Mussliit, a former regime-element leader. Coalition forces conducted another joint raid south of Dibs, detaining Salah Shahab. Salah is wanted for murdering eight Iraqi soldiers who attempted to desert during the ground-combat operations phase of the war and is now believed to be involved in terrorist acts. Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers yesterday conducted a raid near Ash Sinya. The intended target was a suspected weapons dealer. ICDC forces captured two individuals and confiscated extensive small arms and ammunition.
- In Baghdad, Coalition forces conducted six offensive operations; forces performed 569 patrols, of which 77 were joint patrols with Iraqi police service and ICDC soldiers. These operations resulted in the capture of 11 people including two suspected anti-coalition planners. Forces conducted a cordon and search for Abdal Razakh, suspected of the bomb attack on a local interpreter's house. The unit captured Razakh and confiscated weapons and ammunition.
- In the western zone of operations, Coalition forces conducted 187 patrols, including nine joint patrols and four offensive operations, capturing 20 individuals. Coalition forces conducted a cordon and search near Nasir wa-al-Salam to kill or capture members of a former regime element cell operating in that area. The operation was conducted without incident and resulted in the capture of six of the eight primary targets.
- Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in Ar Ramadi continue to conduct independent combat operations to disrupt enemy activity and prevent enemy forces from placing bombs and selling black-market fuel along Highway 10. This operation will continue for several more days, and those soldiers began to conduct limited visibility operations yesterday.

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11-L-0559/OSD/47007



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Detainee Release, Afghanistan PRTs: January 7, 2004

Iraq: Conditional Release Announcement of Detainees

Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator L. Paul Bremer announced today that the Coalition will release 506 low-level detainees in Iraq; the first 100 will be released tomorrow. Approximately 9,000 cases were reviewed. Adnan Pachachi, the current head of the Iraqi Governing Council, approved the releases. Following are highlights of the announcement ([link to transcript](#)).

- **The release of the nonviolent detainees is an opportunity**
 - The release of the detainees is a new chance for Iraqis to reconcile with their countrymen, and join in rebuilding their country.
- **The releases are**
 - Renounce violence; and
 - Have a guarantor, such as prominent person in his community or a religious tribal leader who will accept responsibility for the good conduct of the individual being set free.
- **This not a program for**
 - Anyone involved in the death or serious injury of another person will not be released.
 - Anyone accused of torture or crimes against humanity will not be released.
- **The Coalition remains committed to pursuing major criminals and those who**
 - The Coalition will continue to attack, capture or kill enemies of the Iraqi people and anti-Coalition elements.
 - The Coalition today announced rewards of up to \$200,000 for information leading to the capture of lesser criminals or information that such criminals are dead.
 - Earlier this week the Coalition announced rewards for members of the 13 remaining "Top 55" members of Saddam Hussein's regime still at large.
 - A \$1 million reward was posted for 12 of the men.
 - The reward for Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, No. 4 on the most-wanted list, is \$10 million.
 - Saddam's capture on Dec. 13 brings the total to 42 former Ba'athists on the Top 55 list that have been captured or killed.

for Provincial Reconstruction Teams

- **The Coalition-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in**
 - The team is led by Germany.
 - The PRT is the first in Afghanistan to operate under NATO control, marking another milestone in the planned expansion of the program.
 - The mission of the PRTs is to help the interim government establish effective control over the country by:
 - Restoring the rule of law in the region;
 - Getting weapons off the street; and
 - Helping the country recover after two decades of conflict.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update: January 6, 2004

National Army Day in Iraq

- Today is National Army Day in Iraq, a national holiday that pre-dates the former regime.
- This year, the holiday coincides with the graduation of 705 recruits of the second battalion of the New Iraqi Army.
- The first battalion has already graduated and is deployed, serving alongside Coalition troops.
- The Iraqi leadership and Coalition are building this all-volunteer Army for the purposes of defending Iraq, not to engage in reckless offensive operations or domestic repression and brutality.
- Today's graduates will assist the U.S. Army in and around Baghdad, and also help train new recruits of subsequent battalions whose mission -- unlike that of Saddam Hussein's army -- is to protect and defend the Iraqi people, not oppress them.

Iraq I U

Following are highlights of today's Baghdad press briefing by Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., 82nd Airborne Division commander:

- Attacks against Task Force All-American forces in the Anbar province in western Iraq have decreased almost 60 percent in the past month.
- The number of attacks in the region dropped from 15-19 a day in October to a current rate of 0-4 per day. The effectiveness of the attacks has also decreased -- improvised equipment and untrained forces cause attacks to misfire.
- Reasons for the decline in attacks:
 - ◉ The task force uses aggressive tactics to find, kill or capture anti-Coalition forces. U.S. forces have killed or captured a large number of the leaders, financiers and facilitators of the insurgency.
 - The capture of Saddam Hussein provided a boost to intelligence throughout western Iraq -- tips on the task force's command hotline have jumped 50 percent. Local Iraqis are telling Coalition soldiers about anti-Coalition forces, foreign fighters, and the locations of improvised explosive devices and weapons caches.
 - The task force has developed, trained and equipped Iraqi security forces. Division soldiers helped train 1,300 Iraqi Civil Defense Corps members. Of the 6,500 Iraqi police in the Anbar province, some 370 have been retrained and are working to teach the new tactics and policies to their fellow officers.
 - The task force has consolidated and destroyed vast amounts of military hardware left over from Saddam's regime. Soldiers and local Iraqis have destroyed 72 of 91 known weapons caches.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Afghanistan Constitution – Jan. 5, 2003

Delegates to Afghanistan's loya jirga (grand council) approved the country's new constitution January 4.

➤ **The adoption of the constitution is a significant milestone in Afghanistan's democratic**

- Balances power between a strong president, parliament and independent judiciary.
- Extends equal status to both men and women.
- Allows Afghans to exercise tolerance for all people.
- Refers to the country as an Islamic state, but Islamic Sharia law is not specifically mentioned in the document. The rights of minorities are respected.
- Names Dari and Pashtu as the national languages.

➤ **The new constitution was debated by the loya jirga, a body that reflects and respects Afghanistan's diversity.**

- The loya jirga comprises 502 Afghans, including:
 - 114 women;
 - Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks; and
 - Neglected minorities such as refugees, Hindus, Sikhs and nomads.

➤ **The draft process**

- A 35-member independent constitutional commission worked eight months before unveiling the proposed constitution on Nov. 3.
- The loya jirga began debating the draft Dec. 14.

➤ **The new constitution paves the way**

- Voters will elect a president and two vice presidents.
- The president must receive more than 50 percent of the votes cast through "free, general, secret and direct voting. The term is five years, and the president may serve a maximum of two terms.
- The president's duties include: commander-in-chief of the armed forces and appointing the cabinet and the nine members of a supreme court, subject to approval by the national assembly.
- The constitution proposes a bicameral parliament (national assembly): the lower house, called the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) and the upper house is the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders).

➤ **The United States will remain steadfast in**

- Approximately \$1.7 billion in assistance was included in the supplemental bill recently signed by President Bush.
- There are approximately 11,000 U.S. service members, 2,000 Coalition forces, and 5,000 International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) under the control of NATO deployed in Afghanistan. The troops will provide security and stability so the constitutional process can go forward.
- The United States and its Coalition partners will continue to hunt down remnants of the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.



US Department of Defense

Talking Points – Iraq Update – Jan. 2, 2003

Following are highlights of recent efforts in Iraq and the region to locate and capture enemy personnel and weapons, and key points from a briefing today in Baghdad by Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), on the growing number of Iraqi forces.

Valu Target Captured in Al Anbar Province

- Soldiers from the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment captured Abu Mohammed, a high-1.
 - Mohammed is believed to be responsible for moving foreign fighters and large sums of cash throughout western Iraq.
 - Mohammed was found in a cab 200 meters from the border. He and his driver were taken into custody.
 - A subsequent cordon and search operation in the area netted three additional suspects, small arms weapons and a large number of documents potentially linked to Mohammed's activities.

Reward Amounts Announced for Members of Former Regime

- The CPA and Coalition Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) have announced rewards "Top 55" members of Saddam Hussein's
 - A \$1 million reward was posted for 12 of the men [[link to release with CPA list](#)].
 - The reward for Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, No. 4 on the most-wanted list, stands at \$10 million.
 - Saddam's capture on Dec. 13 brings the total to 42 former Ba'athists on the Top 55 list that have been captured or killed.

Task Force "All American" and Iraqi Police Capture Enemy Personnel, Weapons

- Al Haswah police (Al Anbar Province) and 82nd Airborne Division (Task captured six enemy personnel and confiscated small arms during a joint cordon and search Jan. 2.
 - The purpose of the operation was to capture those responsible for the recent attack on Al Haswah's police station; the operation was based on information provided by the local police.
- Eighty-second Airborne soldiers also discovered a cache of weapons
 - The site contained a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, 24 RPG rounds, a box of explosives and thousands of rounds of ammunition.

U.S. and Australian Vessels Seize Drugs, Suspects in North Arabian Sea

- U.S. and Coalition maritime forces seized 15 individuals and \$11 million street (2,800 pounds) from an intercepted ship in the North Arabian Sea on Jan. 1.
 - An Australian P-3 located and tracked the ship after receiving information about possible smuggling activities. Units from the Expeditionary Strike Group 1 intercepted the vessel.
 - The interception is the third in two weeks by Coalition maritime forces.
 - On Dec. 15 forces from USS Decatur detained a ship and its 12 crewmembers, and seized approximately \$10 million in hashish.
 - On Dec. 20 forces from USS Philippine Sea detained two vessels, their 21 crewmembers, and seized 95 pounds of heroin and more than 50 pounds of methamphetamines.
 - Of the 33 crew detained in those interceptions, 10 have been transferred for further questioning after initial interrogations revealed possible Al Qaeda affiliations.

Updates on Iraqi Police and Protection Forces

➤ Iraqis continue to step forward to help protect their country as part of the

- One hundred members of the Iraqi Diplomatic Protection Service (IDPS) graduated Jan. 2.
 - The IDPS is a new division of the Iraqi Facilities Protection Service; its members will protect foreign embassies in Iraq.
- Sixty members of the new Iraqi Correctional Service will graduate this week; 200 are scheduled to graduate next week.
- On Jan. 6, the 2nd Battalion of the new Iraqi army will graduate.
- Six hundred army officer candidates departed this week for Jordan for 11 weeks of officer training.
- By the end of January, more than 450 Iraqis are scheduled to graduate from the International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan.

7209
~~FOUO~~

OCT 06 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Procurement Laws

DA

What should we do about getting our procurement laws changed so we can go to a single vendor, as the CIO Group suggested?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100504-12

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

400.13


6 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02076-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47013

OCT 06 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
cc: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: CIO in the QDR

I think the CIO and changes to get information superiority ought to be part of the QDR.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100504-17

.....
Please respond by _____

3101

6 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

January 31, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey
GEN Tom Metz

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

The 30th of January 2005 was an extraordinary day in Iraq. We are all proud of the superb efforts of your brave Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. Together, they have advanced the cause of liberty at a moment when the eyes of the world were quite literally upon your commands.

You stood and delivered, and history will record that the U.S. Military has been instrumental in achieving a free system democracy in Iraq. Well done!

DHR:ss
013105-25

.....
Please respond by

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02087-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47015



31 Jan 05

~~FOUO~~

January 31, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey
GEN Tom Metz

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

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DHR:ss
013105-25

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02087-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47016

FOUO

January 31, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey
GEN Tom Metz

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

The 30th of January 2005 was an extraordinary day in Iraq. We are all proud of the superb efforts of your brave Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. Together, they have advanced the cause of liberty at a moment when the eyes of the world were quite literally upon your commands.

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DHR:ss
013105-25

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Please respond by _____

OSD 02087-05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/47017

7201
FOUO

~~SECRET~~ / ~~GE~~ / ~~AS~~ / ~~TE~~
ATTACHMENT

OCT 21 2004
SECRET

2005 11 11 11:13:57

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paul McHale's Memo on DoD Support

Please review this memo from Paul McHale and chop it around to the Joint Staff and others and get back to me with your recommendation. And talk to Paul McHale about getting something like this staffed properly.

I notice he talks about "fixed wing," why does he care whether it is fixed or rotary wing?

Thanks.

Attach.
10/18/04 ASDHD Memo to SecDef re: DoD **Support** to Emergency Preparedness Planning

DHR:ss
101904-16

.....
Please respond by

~~SECRET~~ / ~~GE~~ / ~~AS~~ / ~~TE~~
ATTACHMENT

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/47018

OSD 02104-05

351

11-L-0559/OSD/47018

4/22
1800

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef

273 FEB 22 11 12: 21

USD(P) 2/20/05

I-05/001879-ES

ES-2243

300.8

Paul Butler

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: DoD Directives

FEB 10 2005

- In a February 5th Snowflake you requested Policy to pick up the pace in our review, revision or cancellation of our out-of-date DoD Directives (attached).
- If you recall you approved our review plan in an October 2004 decision memo to you (Tab A).
 - In that memo we committed to a work plan that accelerated our revision effort while sustaining policy-setting support to you, and to complete the work in June 2005.
- We remain on our time line to complete the task.
- Here is a snapshot of where Policy stands with regard to the directives review.
 - We started with 66 directives and now have 64 following transfer of a few directives to the appropriate reviewer.
 - Eleven are current and require no further revision.
 - Those requiring revision have declined from 53 to 44, with 27 left to send out for coordination.
 - After review, the quantity to cancel has risen from 2 to 9, with 2 more left to consider for cancellation.

10 FEB 05

Recommendation: That we continue with our work plan to complete effort in June 2005.

Approved: 

Other: _____

FEB 23 2005

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: William Mock, OPDUSDP/ES, (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD	2/24	
TSA SD	SA DSD	2/23	
EXEC SEC		2/24	
ESR MA	ESV	2-22-05	

31 JAN 05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

19948918 59FM

OSD 021 09 -05

11-L-0559/OSD/47019

TAB

A

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef _____
1-04/012468-ES

ES-0772
10/13/04

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Subject: DoD Directives

- You directed that Policy update 100% of its assigned DoD Directives by the end of this year and, if that is not possible, to respond to you.
- I met with Director Administration and Management's (DA&M) staff on 15 July to devise a work plan to manage Policy's directives workload that was compatible with ensuring policy-setting support to you.
 - o Of Policy's 66 assigned directives, 11 were current, 53 needed to be revised and 2 to cancel. Of the 53 directives to revise, 5 were in DoD coordination at the time.
 - o To accelerate our revision effort while sustaining policy-setting support to you, we committed with DA&M to produce one directive per month for each of my 5 components.
 - o The process began in August and we propose to complete it in June 2005.
- Status now is 7 revisions in DoD coordination and 1 signed into effect.

Recommendation: That we continue with our work plan to produce 5 revisions a month to complete effort in June 2005.

Approved:  Other: _____

OCT 15 2004

OSD 14072-04

~~FOUO~~

ES-2243
05/001879-ES
FEB 05 2005

TO: Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: DoD Directives

I've reviewed the latest update of progress in revising/canceling our out-of-date DoD Directives, and it seems that USD(P) and USD(I) are somewhat lagging – respectively, only 32% and 28% submitted for coordination, as opposed to a 65% average across the Department. Please pick up the pace.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/31/05 Dir, A&M memo to SD re: DoD Directives End of Year Update – 2004 [OSD 02109-05]

DHR:dh
020405-15

.....
Please respond by 3/3/05

~~FOUO~~

07-02-05 08:33 1P

11-L-0559/OSD/47022

OSD 02109-05



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET 2/4

INFO MEMO

2005 FEB -1 11:11:23
31 JAN 2005

Paul Butler
7

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Directives End of Year Update - 2004

- On September 16, 2004, you issued instructions to the OSD Components: "I would like to see everyone up to 100% by the end of the year. If someone thinks that is not possible, please let me know." USD(AT&L), USD(P) and USD(I) responded that they could not meet your deadline.
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- Analysis: Since our last update of November 5, 2004, total revisions have increased from 51% to 65%.** Excluding USD(AT&L), USD(P) and USD(I), revision rates increased to 76%, with 46 directives not yet in formal coordination. Twenty-two of these directives are charters under DA&M that require significant OSD Component input. **Since our last update, total cancellations improved from 77% to 87%.**
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 - Expand directives review to Services and Joint Staff issuances (separate staff action in route).
 - Revisit the 249 DoD directives certified as current in late 2003, prior to establishing the standard for a two-year review cycle.
 - Maintain regular contact with OSD Components granted extensions of time for directives revisions/cancellations; provide assistance when possible.
 - Continue to revise or cancel the remaining 126 directives to reach 100%.
- I will keep you advised of our progress. Next update due as of 14 March 05.

COORDINATION: None

cc: All OSD Components Listed

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. John C. Krysa (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/47023

MA SD	SMA DSD	FEB 03 2005	
TSA SD	SA DSD	2/3	
EXEC SEC	M 2/3		
ESR MA	E 2/1	2/1	

OSD 02109-05 2/4

AD 02159

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
2004**

CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER</u>	<u>CERTIFIED CURRENT</u>	<u>REVISIONS REPORTED SUBMITTED</u>	<u>CANCELLATIONS REPORTED SUBMITTED</u>	<u>% of TOTAL SUBMITTED</u>	<u>SIGNED BY DSD</u>		
TOTAL:	653	246	325	210 / 65%	82	71 / 87%	69	130
TOTAL:(less USD(AT&L), USD(P), and USD(I))								
	422	194	188	142 / 76%	40	33 / 83%	77	85

REVISIONS

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>REPORTED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION</u>	<u>% SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION</u>	<u>SIGNED BY DSD</u>
USD (AT&L)	47	41	87	24
USD (P)	44	14	32	1
USD (P&R)	86	68	79	33
USD(C)	7	7	100	1
USD (I)	46	13	28	1
4SD (NII)	10	8	80	3
ASD (PA)	3	3	100	2
4SD (LA)	3	2	67	0
DPA&E	1	1	100	0
DOT&E	1	1	100	0
DNA	1	1	100	0
IG, DoD	7	7	100	4
GC, DoD	16	12	75	9
DA&M	46* (See Page 2)	25	54	5
WHS	7	7	100	7
TOTAL:	325	210	65%	90
TOTAL: (less (USD(AT&L), USD(P), and USD(I))	188	142	76%	64

REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
2004

CANCELLATIONS

<u>OSD</u>	<u>REPORTED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION</u>	<u>% SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION</u>	<u>SIGNED BY DSD</u>
USD (AT&L)	27	27	100	16
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USD (P&R)	14	12	86	8
USD(C)	1	1	100	1
USD (I)	6	4	67	3
ASD (NII)	14	12	86	10
ASD (PA)	0	0	NA	0
ASD (LA)	0	0	NA	0
DPA&E	0	0	NA	0
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IG, DoD	0	0	NA	0
GC, DoD	1	1	100	1
DA&M	10*	7	70	1
WHS	0	0	NA	0
TOTAL:	82	71	87%	40
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*Of the **56** DA&M directives identified for revision/cancellation, **49** are charter directives requiring significant input from OSD Components.

RECAP:

Total revisions/cancellations submitted: **69%**

Total revisions/cancellations submitted less (USD(AT&L), USD(P), and USD(I)): **77%**

FOUO

To: Howard Bremer
200 2/1/05
FEB 05 2005

TO: Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DoD Directives

I've reviewed the latest update of progress in revising/canceling our out-of-date DoD Directives, and it seems that USD(P) and USD(I) are somewhat lagging - respectively, only **32%** and **28%** submitted for coordination, as opposed to a 65% average across the Department. Please pick up the pace.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/31/05 Dir, A&M memo to SD re: DoD Directives End of Year Update - 2004 [OSD 02109-05]

DHR:dh
020405-15

.....
Please respond by 3/3/05

FOUO

OSD 02109-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47026

2/3
0800



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2/4

INFO MEMO

2005 FEB -1 AM 11:23
31 JAN 2005

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT
Paul Butler

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management
Ray DuBois 1/31/05

SUBJECT: DoD Directives End of Year Update - 2004

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COORDINATION: None

cc: All OSD Components Listed

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. John C. Krysa, (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD	FEB 03 2005	
TSA SD	SA DSD	2/3	
EXEC SEC	M 2/3		
ESR MA	E 2/1	2/1	

OSD 02109-05 2/4

AM 02959-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47027

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
2004**

CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>TOTAL. NUMBER</u>	<u>CERTIFIED CURRENT</u>	<u>REVISIONS REPORTED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED</u>	<u>CANCELLATIONS REPORTED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED</u>	<u>% of TOTAL SUBMITTED</u>	<u>SIGNED BY DSD</u>		
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REVISIONS

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**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
2004**

CANCELLATIONS

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RECAP:

Total revisions/cancellations submitted: 69%

Total revisions/cancellations submitted less (USD(AT&L), USD(P), and USD(I)): 77%



Executive Services and Communications
Directorate

1-26-05

Memorandum For: Mr DuBois

Subject: Directives Update *SECDEF*

Sir -

*Edits made per your
guidance.*



VR.

PETER O'CONNOR
Assistant Director for Programs



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
EXECUTIVE SERVICES &
COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE


25 Jan 05

MEMORANDUM THRU ACTING DIR, ESCD *e 25 Jan 05*

DIR. WHS

SUBJECT: Info Memo to SECDEF – Directives Update

Enclosed Info Memo forwarded for DA&M approval and signature.



Peter O'Connor
Assistant Director for Programs

Encl

11-L-0559/OSD/47031



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

31 JAN 2005

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management
Ray DuBois 1/31/05

SUBJECT: DoD Directives End of Year Update - 2004

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COORDINATION: None

cc: All OSD Components Listed

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. John C. Krysa, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/47032

OSD 02109-05

AM 02959-05

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
2004**

CONSOLIDATED OVERVIEW

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REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
2004

CANCELLATIONS

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RECAP:

Total revisions/cancellations submitted: **69%**

Total revisions/cancellations submitted less (USD(AT&L), USD(P), and USD(I)): **77%**

OCT 08 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned on Detainees

Someone ought to do a lessons learned on what mistakes we may be making in releasing GITMO detainees who then go back to the battlefield. There ought to be something we can learn about that.

Please prepare a proposal for me as to what you think we might do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100704-16


.....
Please *respond* by

10/22/04

383,6

8 Oct 04

OCT 06 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
David Chu
CC: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Adjusting of Guard and Reserve Units

Please be sure to talk to Ray DuBois about how you plan to adjust the Guard and Reserve Units to fit recruiting and how that might link to BRAC.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100504-19

.....
Please respond by _____

326

to Otag

OSD 02120-05

TAB
~~FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~
December 10, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Answers to Town Hall Questions

I want to personally get clear answers to the three questions that were asked at the town hall in Kuwait:

- 1) What happened to that unit's pay
- 2) The armor issue
- ③ The antiquated equipment for Guard and Reserve

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121004-2

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

*Sir,
Response attached.*

*DR
Lt Col Bengel*

DEC 16 2004

Tab

~~FOUO~~

OSD 021 68-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47037



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

OM-2309-05 0000
1 February 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 2/1*

SUBJECT: Answers to Town Hall Questions

- In response to your issue (TAB), the following information is provided.
- There are no material differences in the way that Army Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers or units are equipped when deploying from Kuwait into Iraq.
- Decades of tiered resourcing strategies and early shortages across all components created a perception that RC units may deploy into Iraq without adequate vehicle armor and body armor while deploying AC units are adequately equipped.
 - Unit readiness resourcing in all components was based upon how quickly units were expected to deploy. Earliest deploying units were equipped with the most up-to-date equipment first.
 - Army readiness strategy prior to 9/11 allowed for an average of 65 percent mission-essential equipment authorized for RC. The Army goal was to equip all units from 90 to 100 percent before entering the combat zone.
- Equipment shortfalls are largely corrected during predeployment preparations in CONUS and remaining shortfalls are corrected in Kuwait **before** units cross the line-of-departure into Iraq.
 - Unit personnel are trained and certified on the equipment they will use in combat.
 - Coalition Forces Land Component Command, in coordination with the Army Materiel Command, established a Theater Augmentation Set as a source from which to issue modernized mission-essential equipment to units prior to deployment to Iraq.
- Risk of mission, independent of component, determines the priority for equipping Army forces.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: MG C. Vaughn, USA; ACJCS/National Guard Matters; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/47038

OSD 021 68-05

~~FOUO~~

012405-24
JAN 25 2005
2005 JAN 25 11:41:00

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Insurance Issue

Here's a letter on the insurance issue. Please tell me what you think I should do.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/14/05 Letter from A. Kaiper Wilson

DHR:ss
012405-24

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02171-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47039



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

2005 JAN 31 12:16 PM

January 31, 2005 (12:16pm)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Insurance Issue

- MetLife has advised you that its surety policy covering your benefits from Tribune Company, Kellogg, and Sears has been extended until not later than April 20, 2005. MetLife very likely will not extend coverage beyond that time.
- We have been unable to identify a new insurer who will provide replacement policies at reasonable rates. I doubt if a commercial replacement exists.
- We have drafted legislation to authorize DoD to establish and operate a replacement surety program. Our draft is currently under review at OMB.
- The Office of Government Ethics has opined that Federal employees will not have a conflict of interest in matters affecting sponsors of their retirement benefits unless the employee participates in particular matters that will affect the sponsor's willingness or ability to pay that benefit.
- Consequently, it is not necessary for you to be recused from matters affecting Tribune Company, Kellogg, or Sears unless those particular matters may directly and predictably affect their willingness or ability to pay your benefits.
- Nevertheless, if you desire, I can prepare a recusal memorandum for these interests.
- We have consulted with the Senate Armed Services Committee staff, which agrees that you are not required to divest these interests.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by Steve Epstein

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/47040

OSD 02171-05

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef
 USD(P) *copy provided 2/16/05*
 I-05/001733-WH
 ES - 2220

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
 (Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) *07 FEB 2005*

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter of Condolence from Mexican Secretary of National Defense,
 General Gerardo Vega Garcia

- General Vega sent you a letter expressing his regret for the deaths of marines and sailors during the tragic CH-53E helicopter crash near ArRutbah, Iraq that same day (TAB B).
- Attached at Tab A is a proposed response thanking General Vega.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the response letter at Tab A.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As Stated

2/16
Sam
Paul Butler

Prepared by Juan P. Cardenas, ISA WHA, (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD		
TSA SD	SA DSD	2/16	
EXEC SEC	M 2/15		
ESR MA	2/14		

2/16
7 Feb 05
26 Jan 05

FOUO

SECRET

05/001733
ES-2220

2005 FEB 10 10:00 AM February 3, 2005

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Response to Mexican MOD

Let's get a letter **back to** the Mexican MOD (see the attached).

Thanks.

Attach.

1/26/05 Letter from Gen Vega Garcia to SecDef

DHR:ss
020305-4

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

FOUO

03-02-05 10:57 AM

OSD 021 83-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47042

Informal translation

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -2 AM 9: 02

Dear Secretary,

Today I learned about a tragic air accident in **Iraq** and I feel deeply sympathetic with you. I also learned that 31 Marines of the US Armed Forces were killed on the line of duty.

We, the soldiers of the Mexican Army and Air Force are terribly shocked, due to such a sad event. On their behalf and my own, I want to express our most sincere condolences for such obvious and inevitable pain you are going through, for the loss of human lives. On this difficult situation we wish to express sympathy to men and women of the Armed Forces under your distinguished command.

Likewise, our best wishes are that those memories of the 31 killed soldiers strengthen your spirit and allow you to overcome the terrible gain caused by such losses.

I take this opportunity to send warm greetings and my full respect, as well as to reiterate my most sincere and distinguished consideration.

Secretary of National Defense
of the United Mexican States
(Signature)
General GERARDO VEGA GARCIA

Mr.
DONALD H. RUMSFELD.
Secretary of Defense
of the United States of America
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Mexico, D.F., January 26, 2005.

OSD 02183-05



SRO. DEF. NAL.
MEXICO

Señor Secretario:

Con **profundo** pesar me enteré del trágico accidente aéreo ocurrido este día en Irak, en el que lamentablemente fallecieron 31 Infantes de Marina de las Fuerzas Armadas de ese país, en el cumplimiento de sus misiones.

Tan sensible y **penoso** suceso nos ha causado profunda consternación a los Soldados del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos, por lo que a nombre de ellos y del mío propio, le expreso nuestra mas sincera condolencia por el comprensible e inevitable dolor que están sufriendo ustedes, por esta conmovedora pérdida de vidas humanas. En este difícil momento, nos **unimos** con nuestro solidario afecto al pesar que viven los hombres y mujeres integrantes de las Fuerzas Armadas bajo su digno liderazgo.

Asimismo, hacemos patente nuestros **votos** porque el recuerdo de los 31 soldados **fallecidos**, los fortalezcan espiritualmente y les permitan **superar** el sentimiento de dolor que su aflictiva pérdida causa.

Aprovecho esta oportunidad para enviarle un abrazo y manifestarle mis **respetos**, así como para reiterarle la **seguridad** de mi más fina y distinguida consideración.

EL SECRETARIO DE LA DEFENSA NACIONAL
DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS.


Gral. GERARDO VEGA GARCIA.

Sr.
DONALD H. RUMSFELD,
Secretario de Defensa de los
Estados Unidos de América.
Washington, D. C., E. U. A.

México, D. F., a 26 de enero del 2005.

FOUO

SECRETARY

05/001733
ES-2220

2005 FEB 14 PM 3:27

February 3, 2005

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Response to Mexican MOD

Let's get a letter **back** to the Mexican MOD (see the attached).

Thanks.

Attach.

1/26/05 Letter from Gen Vega Garcia to SecDef

DHR:ss
020305-4

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

FOUO

03-02-05 P05:57 OUF

OSD 02183-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47045

293
3 FEB 05 265005

Informal translation

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -2 AM 9:02

Dear Secretary,

Today I learned about a tragic **air** accident in **Iraq** and I feel deeply sympathetic with you. I also learned that 31 Marines of **the** US Armed Forces were killed on the line of **duty**.

We, the soldiers of the Mexican **Army** and Air Force are terribly shocked, due to such a sad event. On their behalf and my own, I want to express our most sincere condolences for such obvious and inevitable pain you are going through, for the loss of human lives. On **this** difficult situation we wish to express sympathy to men and women of the Armed Forces under your distinguished command.

Likewise, our best Wishes are that those memories of the 31 killed soldiers strengthen your **spirit and** allow you to overcome the terrible **pain** caused by such losses.

I take this opportunity to send warm greetings **and** my full respect, **as well as** to reiterate my most sincere and distinguished consideration.

Secretary of National Defense
of the United Mexican States
(Signature)
General GERARDO VEGA GARCIA

Mr.
DONALD H. RUMSFELD.
Secretary of Defense
of the United States of America
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Mexico, D.F., January 26, 2005.

OSD 02183-05



SRIO. DEF. NAL.
MEXICO

Señor Secretario:

Con profundo pesar me enteré del trágico accidente aéreo **ocurrido** este día en Irak, en el que lamentablemente fallecieron 31 Xnfantes de Marina de las Fuerzas Armadas de ese país, en el cumplimiento de sus misiones.

Tan sensible y penoso **suceso** nos ha causado profunda consternación a los Soldados del Ejercito y Fuerza **Aérea** Mexicanos, por lo que a nombre de ellos y del mio propio, le expreso nuestra mas sincera condolencia por el comprensible e inevitable dolor que están sufriendo ustedes, por esta conmovedora **pérdida** de vidas humanas. **En** este difícil momento, nos unimos con nuestro solidario afecto al pesar que viven los hombres y mujeres integrantes de las Fuerzas Armadas bajo su digno liderazgo.

Asimismo, hacemos patente nuestros **votos** porque el recuerdo de los 31 soldados fallecidos, los fortalezcan **espiritualmente** y les permitan superar el sentimiento de dolor que su aflictiva pérdida causa.

Aproveeho esta oportunidad para enviarle un **abrazo** y manifestarle mis respetos, así como para reiterarle la seguridad de mi más fina y distinguida consideración.

EL SECRETARIO DE LA DEFENSA NACIONAL
DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS.


Coral GERARDO VEGA GARCIA.

Sr.
DONALD H. RUMSFELD.
Seeretario de Defensa de los
Estados Unidos de América.
Washington, D. C., E. U. A.

México, D. F., a 26 de enero del 2005.

Informal translation

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -2 AM 9: 02

Dear Secretary,

Today I learned about a tragic air accident in Iraq and I feel deeply sympathetic with you. I also learned that 31 Marines of the US Armed Forces were killed on the line of duty.

We, the soldiers of the Mexican Army and Air Force are terribly shocked, due to such a sad event. On their behalf and my own, I want to express our most sincere condolences for such obvious and inevitable pain you are going through, for the loss of human lives. On this difficult situation we wish to express sympathy to men and women of the Armed Forces under your distinguished command.

Likewise, our best wishes are that those memories of the 31 killed soldiers strengthen your spirit and allow you to overcome the terrible pain caused by such losses.

I take this opportunity to send warm greetings and my full respect, as well as to reiterate my most sincere and distinguished consideration.

Secretary of National Defense
of the United Mexican States

(Signature)

General GERARDO VEGA GARCIA

Mr.
DONALD H. RUMSFELD.
Secretary of Defense
of the United States of America
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Mexico, D.F., January 26, 2005.

OSD 02183-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47048



SRIO. DEF. NAL.
MEXICO

Señor Secretario:

Con profundo pesar me enteré del tragico accidente aéreo ocurrido este día en Irak, en el que lamentablemente fallecieron 31 Infantes de Marina de las Fuerzas Armadas de ese país, en el cumplimiento de sus misiones.

Tan sensible y penoso suceso nos ha causado profunda consternación a los Soldados del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos, por lo que a nombre de ellos y del mio propio, le expreso nuestra mas sincera condolencia por el comprensible e inevitable dolor que estan sufriendo ustedes, por esta conmovedora pérdida de vidas humanas. En este difícil momento, nos unimos con nuestro solidario afecto al pesar que viven los hombres y mujeres integrantes de las Fuerzas Armadas bajo su digno liderazgo.

Asimismo, hacemos patente nuestros votos porque el recuerdo de los 31 soldados fallecidos, los fortalezcan espiritualmente y les permitan superar el sentimiento de dolor que su aflictiva pérdida causa.

Aprovecho esta oportunidad para enviarle un abrazo y manifestarle mis respetos, así como para reiterarle la seguridad de mi mas fina y distinguida consideración.

**EL SECRETARIO DE LA DEFENSA NACIONAL
DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS.**

Genl. GERARDO VEGA GARCIA.

Sr.
DONALD H. RUMSFELD.
Secretario de Defensa de los
Estados Unidos de América.
Washington, D. C., E. U. A.

MCxico, D. F., a 26 de enero del 2005.

11-L-0559/OSD/47049



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 16 2005

His Excellency
Gerardo Vega Garcia
Secretary of National Defense of the Republic of Mexico
Mexico City, Mexico

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your kind words of sympathy on the deaths of the 31 U.S. service members who perished in the helicopter crash near ArRutbah, Iraq on January 26, 2005.

Your expressions of sadness are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/47050

OSD 02183-05

293

16 Feb 05

26 JAN 05

RAAUZYUW RUEWMFU4594 0480143-UUUJ--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEKJCS4594 0480143
R 170143Z FEB 05
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//WHA/PM//
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
RHHFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCCC/SCJ5//
BT
UNCLAS

SUBJ: SECDEF LETTER TO MOD GARCIA

REQUEST DATT DELIVER THE LETTER FROM SECRETARY RUMSFELD TO MOD
GARCIA. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

HIS EXCELLENCY

GERARDO VEGA GARCIA

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF MEXICO

MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND WORDS OF SYMPATHY ON THE DEATHS OF THE 31
U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS WHO PERISHED IN THE HELICOPTER CRASH NEAR
ARRUTBAH, IRAQ ON JANUARY 26, 2005.

YOUR EXPRESSIONS OF SADNESS ARE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

SINCERELY,

//DONALD RUMSFELD//

BT

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION

(U,8,F)

2

INFO SJS-C(*) SJS-C(1) NMCC:CWO(*) CMAS(*)
CMAS(1) J5(*) JSAMS(*) USDP:ESC(*) ESC-SMTP(*)
DACS-ZK:POLAD(*) SJS-C(*) CMAS(*) JCSCNNIPRDA(*)
JCSONSIPRDA(*)

CJCS V6

ACTION

(U,8)

0

INFO CHAIRMAN DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED(*) J3(*)
J4:LRC(*)

SECDEF V2

ACTION

(M)

1

INFO CHAIRS(*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(*) SECDEF-C(*)
TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED,

3

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: DEPSEC: EXECSEC:
C&D: CCD: CABLE CH: FILE:
USDP: DIA: OTHER:
USDI: PER SEC: COMM:

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

11-L-0559/OSD/47051

OSD 02183-05

ACTION PREC: ROUTINE
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
INFO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//WHA/PM//
AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//
CDR USSOUTHCOM COMMAND MIAMI FL//SCCC/SCJ5//

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER TO MOD GARCIA

REQUEST DATT DELIVER THE LETTER FROM SECRETARY RUMSFELD
TO MOD GARCIA. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

HIS EXCELLENCY
GERARDO VEGA GARCIA
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF MEXICO
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND WORDS OF SYMPATHY ON THE
DEATHS OF THE 31 US. SERVICE MEMBERS WHO PERISHED IN THE
HELICOPTER CRASH NEAR ARRUTBAH, IRAQ ON JANUARY **26,2005.**

(PARA) YOUR EXPRESSIONS OF SADNESS ARE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

SINCERELY,
//DONALD RUMSFELD//

(END TEXT)

~~FOUO~~

f.7e

20 October 29, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: HUMINT Question

Do we have a way of attracting and utilizing U.S. citizens who are Muslim -- people who are in business or retired military -- to help us with HUMINT?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-14

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

DR 12/10
Sir,
Response attached.
v/r,
Lt Col Langyel

DEC 03 2004

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47053

OSD 021 85-05

7201
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SECRETARY

2005 FEB -2 PM 9:36

ES-0032
04/008979
July 1, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Put Iceland on Hold

Please put Iceland on hold for three or four months, and then bring it back up with me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070104-33

.....
Please respond by

11/1/04

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

July 21, 2004

Captain Marriott,

Regarding the subject issue, USDP
will follow up with SecDef on September 1.

VR -


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

OSD 021 93-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47054

Iceland

2172004 150104

7201
~~FOUO~~

file

October 29, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iceland

What is the status on Iceland and the changes we want to make there?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-1

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

DR 12/14

12/12

*you have
latest
talking
points.*

V/R [signature]

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47055

OSD 02194-05

11/19/04

11/19/04

October 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Accomplishments

I think we've got to come up with a calculation of all the things that were done:

- the millions of people that move back and forth
- the millions of tons
- the millions of meals
- all of the weapons that were captured

The military is getting a bum rap and they've done a great job. Someone needs to go out there and explain what's been done and how magnificent it's been done. I need data for that, so let's get it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-4

.....
Please respond by 11/3/04

IT-9

29 OCT 04

October 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 Program

Here's a memo from Jim Haynes on the C-130 Program. You have been involved with this. Please grab a hold of it and figure out what we ought to be doing in this Department in connection with it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/8/04 SecDef Memo re: C-130 Issue
10/22/04 DoD OGC Memo to SecDef re: C-130 Program

DHR:ss
102904-29

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

452C

290CT04

10/21 1730
~~FOUO~~

October 8, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: C-130 issue

There are allegations in the press concerning a C-130 contract or situation. It came **up** recently in a Congressional hearing also.

I would like you to **look** into and tell me what you recommend the Department do about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100804-12

.....
Please respond by _____

→ *TO See Def*
Paul Butler
10/27

2004 OCT 22 PM 4:50
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47058

OSD 16863-04



GENERAL COUNSEL


GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

October 22, 2004, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: C-130 Program

- Recent reports in the press concerning the Air Force's C-130 program relate to two distinct issues: 1) the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG's) audit of the Air Force's commercial procurement of C-130J aircraft; and 2) recent protests by Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, challenging the Air Force's conduct of certain competitive procurements in which Darleen Druyun was involved as an employee of the Air Force.
- In its report of July 23, 2004, the OIG concluded that the acquisition of the C-130J aircraft as a commercial item was improper, and that the aircraft does not meet contractual requirements and cannot perform its mission.
- Senator McCain cited the OIG's report in a hearing before the SASC regarding the 9/11 Commission, and in a letter to you concerning the analysis of alternatives for the recapitalization of the tanker aircraft fleet.
- On August 18, 2004, you requested that the Deputy Secretary look into Senator McCain's concerns. In response to your request and the OIG's report, the Acting USD(AT&L) has undertaken a review of the C-130J program. That review is ongoing, and may result in a plan to address the concerns. The Acting USD(AT&L) informed Senator McCain of the review in a letter dated September 29, 2004.
- Following reports of Ms. Druyun's plea agreement, Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems addressed their protests to officials in the Air Force. The protests challenge the award of contracts to Boeing under the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, and in other competitive procurements in which Ms. Druyun participated. My staff is reviewing the protests in coordination with attorneys in the Air Force Office of General Counsel.

TSA SD	10/27
BRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	11/19/04

OSD 16063 0494



11-L-0559/OSD/47059

COORDINATION: TAB A

Prepared By: Charles Bidwell, (b)(6)

TAB A -- COORDINATION: INFO MEMO RE C-130 PROGRAM

Mr. Krieg, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, October 21, 2004

Mr. Patterson, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, October 21, 2004

October 29, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: SOF Paper

Here's a paper Tom O'Connell sent me. I started to make some edits, but it is really not what I'm looking for.

When I came in I decided Special Ops were enormously important to our country. We began expanding them. There were several specific things we did. For example:

- We decided they should be a supported, as well as a supporting, command with all the implications of that.
- I decided I wanted the Marines involved.
- I decided we ought to stop using the SOF people for the lower tier activities, such as training and equipping the Georgian forces, and stop using them for things other people could do just as well such as guarding Karzai, and the like.
- I wanted the regular Services to step up and do some of the lower-end of some of the current SOF responsibilities and move the SOF forces up to concentrate more on those activities in the higher tiers.

What I would like is a one or two page point paper without a lot of sentences, without using the word "enhanced" over and over, that shows precisely what we've done in a thoughtful, punchy way. See if you can get someone to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/18/04 ASD(SO/LIC) Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
102904-26

.....
Please **respond** by 11/19/04

OSD 02197-05

W
e
e

29 OCT 04

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

USD(P) _____

I-04/014071

ES-1118

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) *Clawall*

18 Oct 04

SUBJECT: SOF Enhancements

- You asked me to provide you with a summary of the Department's efforts to improve Special Operations Forces (SOF) since January 2001. A summary is attached.
- The Department's efforts have been considerable, with the SOF budget in FY 2005 nearly doubling since FY 2001.
- The SOF program will continue to add people and platforms for several years beyond FY 2005.
- You have assigned USSOCOM the lead for planning and synchronizing the Global War on Terrorism effort. USSOCOM has undergone a significant reorganization and refocus as a result.
- To aid in this effort, Congress recently gave you the authority you requested to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals **who** can support military operations by SOF to combat terrorism.
- With this and other granted authorities, expanded command and control, and improved intelligence capabilities, USSOCOM has greater flexibility to meet and respond to current and future challenges.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: LtCol Kevin Ross, (b)(6)

21-10-04 14:10:00

11-L-0559/OSD/47063

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Special Operations Forces ~~Enhancements~~

BACKGROUND

- o ~~The Department of Defense has~~ ^{DOD} recognized Special Operations Forces (SOF) as an essential capability needed to lead the global war on terrorism.
- e ~~SOF can not be mass produced.~~ ^{DOD} Since January 2001, ~~the Department has been embarked on a~~ ^{executed} program to expand SOF to meet current and future operational needs and to modernize and transform SOF capabilities. ^{However,}

DISCUSSION

- Budget
 - USSOCOM's budget increased 77.1%, to \$6.6B in FY2005 ^{from \$3.7B in FY2001.}
 - USSOCOM received \$4.4B in supplemental appropriations and Defense Emergency Response funds between FY2002 and FY2004 to provide immediate enhancements.
- Personnel
 - USSOCOM end strength increased 12.5%, to 51,411 (47,977 military/3,464 civilians) from 45,719 (42,866 military/2,853 civilians) between FY2001 and FY2005.
 - Personnel include Special Forces, SEALs, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, special mission and aviation units. Personnel were also added to enhance combat service support, Theater Special Operations Commands, communications and maintenance, institutional training, and headquarters operational support.
 - 1,118 more personnel are programmed through FY2009 to support additional ^{SOF} aircraft.
- o Planning for and synchronization of the war on terrorism
 - USSOCOM created the Center for Special Operations as the war-fighting hub within USSOCOM. This joint/interagency directorate is solely focused on and responsible for planning, supporting, and executing special operations in the war on terrorism.
 - ^{specific} USSOCOM requested specific authorities that provide increased capabilities and freedom of action against terrorists. Congress recently authorized SECDEF authority to expend up to \$25M/yr to "support foreign forces, irregular forces, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitation ongoing military operations by SOF to combat terrorism."

- Theater Special Operations Commands manning was increased and communications capabilities were enhanced to provide better command and control of theater special operations. USSOCOM is now capable of forming three deployable Joint Task Forces to support Combatant Commander's requirements or unilateral USSOCOM operations.
- Additional investment in threat and analysis systems has provided new capabilities such as the Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (SOJICC). Used extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq, the SOJICC provides USSOCOM the capability to integrate and analyze data from interagency intelligence sources to support SOF priorities.
- Mobility
 - Provided **24** additional **MH-47** Chinooks helicopters, **4** additional AC-130U gunships, and 10 additional MC-130H Combat Talons, providing an expanded rotational base to support additional US Central Command and worldwide war on terrorism demands.
 - Established service life extension-programs for Army special operations **MH-47s** and **MH-60s** that will extend their service lives for an additional 20 years while increasing performance, reliability, and mission capability.
 - Added an **MC-130H** aerial refueling capability, more than tripling the number of penetrating tanker aircraft to conduct and support deep SOF helicopter infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply missions.
 - Provided additional infrared and radio frequency countermeasure systems for SOF aircraft to counter the proliferating surface-to-air threats.
 - Added over **1,300** additional vehicles to meet increased ground mobility requirements, allowing unprecedented agility and flexibility.
- Other
 - Significant investment into soldier systems like body armor, protective clothing, night vision equipment, medical support equipment, and enhanced weapons and sensors
 - Enhanced command and control by funding additional tactical wireless networks, mobile and fixed command, control, and communication systems, high-capacity satellite communication systems, and coalition video conferencing systems.
 - Improved psychological operations capabilities through additional PSYOP radio and television broadcast systems, deployable print media systems, leaflet delivery systems, and upgrades to the EC-130 Commando Solo airborne broadcast platform.

Prepared by: Lt Col Kevin Ross, (b)(6)

7201
~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Herbits Memo Attachment

Please see if you can find the attachment Steve Herbits refers to in the attached memo. I cannot locate it.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/24/03 Herbits Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
102904-18

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

000.5

29 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47066

OSD 02198-05

November 24, 2003

TO: SecDef
FROM: Steve Herbits
SUBJECT: Larger War on Terrorism

Don,

If we are going to start to win that aspect of the war on terrorism we call the "war for minds," we should begin at home, with our own behavior, our own justice, our own Justice Department. I fear we are creating the motivation for terrorists; not educating the world of the incompatibility of terrorism and civilization.

The attached Miami *Herald* magazine insert from yesterday is eloquent testimony for broader thinking.

All the best,

SH 112403 0900

11-L-0559/OSD/47067

October 29, 2004

TO: Jim Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Druyun Paper

Please edit this paper on Darlene Druyun and add any embellishments you think would be helpful.

Thanks very much.

Attach.
Draft Druyun Memo

DHR:ss
102904-17

.....
Please respond by 11/1/04

000.5

29 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47068

OSD 02199-05

October 29, 2004

SUBJECT: Darlene Druyun and Corruption in the AF acquisition process –
“How could that corruption happen, over such a long period, without
the others above and around her seeing it?”

The Air Force says the following:

- Druyun was the “civilian” Deputy for Acquisition of the Air Force for 10 years.
- During that 10-year period, the post of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, to whom she reported, was vacant. She was the “Acting” Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition for four of those years. Over the remaining six years, there were **four** Air Force Assistant Secretaries for Acquisition moving in and out of the post as her superior.
- There is also a “military” Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisition in the Air Force. During Druyun’s 10 years, there were four military Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Acquisition.
- But, it is particularly notable that, under Goldwater-Nichols, only the “civilian” deputy Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition can make acquisition decisions.
- During the same 10-year period that Darlene Druyun served, there were five Secretaries of the Air Force or Acting Secretaries of the Air Force.

That high amount of turbulence in the civilian political appointees, plus the turbulence in the military acquisition officials, is a formula for disaster.

The combination of Congressional micro management, plus the extensive delays in getting political appointees through the FBI clearances, and through the ethics requirements and through the Senate confirmation process, coupled with the rigidities in the civil service system that protect a senior SES, all conspire to create an environment hospitable to corruption.

And that is exactly what happened.

DHR:ss
102804-9

~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004

TO: Brad Berkson
cc: Mike Wynne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Supply Chain Performance

I had lunch with Newt Gingrich yesterday and he was talking about logistics. He believes there is still opportunity for DoD supply chain improved performance, and I'm sure you agree. I suggested he get together with you. He's very bright and interested, and I'm confident, can be helpful.

Attached is a paper he left with me regarding this subject.

Thanks.

Attach.

Paper: Opportunity Remains in DoD's Supply Chain for Improved Performance

DHR:ss
102904-2

.....
Please *respond* by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47070

OSD 02200-05

Opportunity Remains in DoD's Supply Chain For Improved Performance

DoD's supply chain has successfully supported the War on Terrorism. DoD and WalMart are driving the implementation of passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies within consumable supply chains. Notwithstanding these and other successes, significant opportunity remains for DoD to reduce cost and cycle time within its extended and complex supply chains. During the past decade, America's private sector has demonstrated that a body of proven supply chain methods and technologies, not theories, has routinely produced large savings.

During this period of business change, industry leaders have built business-to-business exchanges, created collaborative value chains, and implemented the technology enablers to build more effective supply chains. These technology enablers are finally enabling commercial companies to integrate and fully leverage the changes that took place in the late 1990s. These changes include restructuring and business process standardization, the integration of global capital markets, a focus on core skills, and emphasis on value drivers. Those value drivers include: leverage, speed, flexibility, process transformation, change leadership, and the strategic options they create.

Many of these approaches are under investigation or deployment within DoD. Notwithstanding DoD performance improvements, when compared, on average, with commercial supply chain leaders, the world-class performers:

- Meet scheduled delivery dates 17% more often;
- Met requested dates over 95% of the time;
- Carry 60% less inventory; and
- Spend 45% less on supply chain costs.

World class leaders use an integrated supply chain as the key to achieve results.

Opportunity exists within the Defense supply chain to yield faster, more accurate, and transparent services to the warfighter. \$25-\$30 billion in cost savings over a 3 to 5 year period are achievable.

* * * * *

The Key First Step: A Single Supply Chain Leader To Drive Supply Chain Integration

Private sector experience clearly demonstrates that success requires a single leader for their integrated supply chain.

Many Defense supply chain activities are fragmented and not well integrated. Achieving end-to-end integration of supply chain activities is a key for success. Most large private sector companies have addressed similar problems by creating a single point of accountability for supply chain integration. In the private sector, the Integrated Supply Chain Leader is empowered to coordinate all the relevant activities/functions of the supply chain such as transportation, warehousing, procurement, distribution, etc.

The DoD supply chain has unique organizational restrictions under law, and complex operational requirements which are different than commercial supply chains, but a single unifying authority is required to lead the requisite changes. Thus, an empowered leader of an Integrated Supply Chain is a fundamental requirement.

The definition of supply chain within DoD must encompass more than just the supply functions within the Department. The supply chain (or another term that DoD can embrace) needs to include all aspects from manufacturing of raw materials to disposal of obsolete stuff. It needs to be inclusive of all the functions that deal with that time line (raw materials-->disposal) and the associated information and financials. Thus, truly integrated supply chain activities enables the reduction or removal of redundancies and duplications, shrinks complexity, allows systems to be consolidated, reduces the logistics footprint, and reduces warfighter total cycle time. With projected losses of skilled personnel due to retirement in the near future, it results in more capable supply chain which requires fewer personnel.

This first step is the key enabler to unlock the value within DoD's Supply Chain.

Much Has Been Done, But More Remains To Be Done

Much hard work and many initiatives have taken place, and improvements have been achieved in DoD's supply chain, e.g. DoD's order to receipt cycle times have been halved in the past decade, but defense still remains an order of magnitude less capable than America's private sector.

A number of compelling forces for change are in motion. These forces include the looming retirement of 50% of the Acquisition workforce; pressure on National

priorities by potential increase in interest rates and federal deficits; increasing effectiveness of Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) technologies.

Readiness Impacts are Substantial

The accelerated application of commercial practices to Defense should enable a much leaner and more efficient service for the transformed war fighter. This would be measured in increased readiness, lower response cycle time, reduced inventories, and less infrastructure required to support the operating units. Aggressive implementation focused on readiness would permit savings of \$9-10 billion or more to be achieved annually over the baseline condition within 3-5 years. Equivalent levels of savings should be targeted for achievement out of the support infrastructure transformation. Thus, by the year 2008 a substantial body of savings could be harvested to serve more urgent and vital requirements.

Private Sector Actions Require: Speed and Focus

The private sector demands more rapid Time to Results (TTR). For example, a recent review of Enterprise Resource Process (ERP) systems implementation demonstrates that commercial implementations are done on much shorter timelines. This willingness to accept longer implementation times delays benefit realization for DoD.

Focus is a second differentiator. An Integrated Supply Chain leader selects improvement initiatives which optimizes the "end-to-end" supply chain rather than only an element of the supply chain. Due to DoD's less integrated supply chain many current initiatives focus at optimization of a part of the process, and may sub-optimize the whole.

A Higher Velocity Supply Chain Requires Less Infrastructure

The fundamental shift in the US Defense strategy from a threat-based strategy to a capabilities based strategy already has significant ramifications for the operating forces. Based on financial analyses, it is reasonable to believe that more than 25% excess capacity exists in Defense infrastructure. Shrinking this footprint will permit savings in billions of dollars in facilities operating and maintenance expenses.

###



DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500

INFO MEMO

February 16, 2005, 9:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef _____

THROUGH: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

DefSec 2/24/05

FROM: Mr. Bradley Berkson, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Logistics & Materiel Readiness)

BB 2/17/05

SUBJECT: DoD Supply Chain Performance

- Pursuant to your memo of October 29, 2004 (Tab A), we have established an ongoing dialogue with Speaker Newt Gingrich regarding opportunities for improving DoD's Supply Chain performance. Using his white paper, and based on an initial meeting held in December, we developed two "breakthrough" transformational concepts for discussion, concepts which could leverage his stature and influence to positively affect their outcomes.
- On February 14, 2005, the Speaker participated in a three hour session here in the Pentagon. We reviewed our ongoing L&MR transformational initiatives including Lean, Industrial Prime Vendor (IPV), Performance Based Logistics (PBL), Commodity Councils, Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative, RFID, and Regional Inventory & Material Management. We also proposed the following two "breakthrough" transformational logistics concepts for his consideration:
 - Creating a process owner to manage all material readiness across the DoD.
 - Using commercial logistics vendors to provide global storage and distribution access similar to CRAF.
- The Speaker complimented us on the results of our Lean efforts at DoD maintenance activities, our DLA Prime Vendor program (especially in the area of pharmaceuticals), and Performance Based Logistics. He took copies of the brief to share with HHS Secretary Leavitt.



- We agreed to the following next steps:
 - Review DLA's Pharmaceutical Prime Vendor program with him for possible expansion across the USG,
 - Detail several DoD Lean best practices examples which we can use to generate positive Congressional interest and eventual Committee hearings in order to showcase DoD logistics transformation efforts. He believes this could provide a catalyst for spreading these approaches across the USG.
 - Develop a pilot program (perhaps diesel engine overhaul) which uses reverse auctions to award work among our organic depots. This would allow us to test the power of market forces to create competition, increase quality, and reduce prices.
- We plan to reconvene in two months to assess progress and discuss additional opportunities.

RECOMMENDATION: None. Information only.

Prepared By: CAPT Rob Bianchi, USN, Military Advisor to DUSD (Logistics & Materiel Readiness), (b)(6)

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004

TO: Brad Berkson
CC: Mike Wynne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Supply Chain Performance

I had lunch with Newt Gingrich yesterday and he was talking about logistics. He believes there is still opportunity for DoD supply chain improved performance, and I'm sure you agree. I suggested he get together with you. He's very bright and interested, and I'm confident, can be helpful.

Attached is a paper he left with me regarding this subject.

Thanks.

Attach.

Paper: Opportunity Remains in DoD's Supply Chain for Improved Performance

DHR:ss
102904-2

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47077

OSD 022 00-05

Opportunity Remains in DoD's Supply Chain For Improved Performance

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* * * * *

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###

October 29, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Regional Centers

I just looked at this page on the Regional Centers. I think over a **3-4** year period we ought to migrate:

- o The Marshall Center down from \$26.9M to \$11M.
- o The Asia Pacific from \$13.8M up to \$16M
- o The Center for Hemispheric Defense from \$5.5M up to \$8M
- o The Africa Center from \$10.3M up to \$11M
- o The Near East-South Asia Center from \$6.8M up to \$17M.

Why don't you consider that, see me about it, and let's think about refining it and then getting a program to move in that direction.

Thanks.

Attach.
DOD Regional Centers Background

DHR:ss
102904-7

.....
Please respond by 11/27/04



POLICY

DoD Regional Centers Background

*Person
part 2
4 yr.*


fix

Regional Center	Year	Service	Command	Budget	Participants	Participant Days	Dollars Spent per Participant Day (FY04)
Marshall Center	1993	Army	EUCOM	\$26.9M	2,304	64,566	\$416
Asia-Pacific Center	1995	Navy	PACOM	\$13.8M	1,012	27,732	\$498
Center for Hemispheric Defense	1997	NDU	SOUTHCOM	\$5.5M	862	5,953	\$924
Africa Center	1999	NDU	EUCOM	\$10.3M	905	2,913	\$3,530
Near East-South Asia Center	2000	NDU	CENTCOM	\$6.8M	1,458	5,543	\$1,227
Total				\$63.3M	5,940	106,000	

FY04 Budget

FY04 Participants

FY 04 Participant Days



(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only.
Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

11-L-0559/OSD/47082

205 MAR 12 21 21 19

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

MAR 09 2005


I-04/0014563/ES-1233

..

Reference: 102904-7, "Regional Centers"

Captain Marriott,

The October 29 "Regional Centers" snowflake is overtaken by SecDef's desire to have plan to reallocate Regional Centers funds over a **period** of time addressed in the **January** 31 "DoD Regional Centers" snowflake (012805-2). Policy is working to develop the plan.


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

Attachments:

1. 102904-7 "Regional Centers"
2. 012805-2 "DoD Regional Centers"

OSD 022 01 -05

11-L-0559/OSD/47083

~~FOUO~~

fite

OCT 29 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brownlee Memo on AMD

Please take a look at this memo from Les Brownlee and see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/09/04 Acting SecArmy Memo to SecDef re: AMD Transformation

DHR:ss
102804-21

.....
Please respond by 10/12/04

Ready at your convenience

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47084

OSD 02202-05

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUL 16 JUN 14 2004
10 22

TO: Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: History

I would like to visit with you about when the last time was that the US fired from the ground at aircraft attacking US forces. My guess is that it was probably Korea. I don't think it happened in Vietnam, and likely not since. All we have seen lately have been Scuds.

What personnel and investment do we have in the Army air defense forces? Do you have any proposals with respect to the future?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-22

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

#OW-035 14 Jun 04 SA 11-L-0559/OSD/47085

OSD 10554-04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

204 JUL 16 10 10 22

July 9, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army
~~Peter J. Schoomaker, General, Chief of Staff, United States Army~~

SUBJECT: Army Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Transformation

- Reference your memo dated 14 June 2004 at Tab A.
- The last time the Army fired at an attacking manned aircraft was in 1950 during the Korean War. Currently, our Air Forces have attained a level of deterrence that dissuades potential and current adversaries from pursuing large manned air forces. As a result, the Army began reorganization and modernization efforts within AMD. The Joint Force identified capability gaps that include the need for improved defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, rockets, artillery, mortars, combat identification, and a Single Integrated Air Picture. Of particular concern are cruise missiles and the proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles. *when what?*
- This concern resulted in the shift of personnel and investments as indicated in the attached chart at Tab B. Specifically, the Army terminated Stinger Based Systems, received transfer of Patriot and Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) programs from the Missile Defense Agency, and stood up a National Guard Brigade and Battalion for Ground Based Midcourse Defense. These efforts support National Security Presidential Directive - 23.
- The centerpiece of the Army's AMD transformation is the conversion to composite battalions. These battalions are capable of operating from tactical to strategic levels. interdependent with other services, as well as providing for Homeland Security. The Army has realigned 29 AMD battalions to other missions. The remaining organizations are transforming into a minimum of 14 Active Component AMD Task Forces and eight Homeland Defense battalions. *2?*
- A recent review of Army Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) capability resulted in increased funding for this mission by \$1.1 billion in President's Budget 05. The Army will deploy a CMD capability by fiscal year 2008. The Army will field an aerostat-based elevated sensor and an integrated fire control capability while executing an acquisition effort with the United States Marine Corps on a Surface Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM) System.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: COL Ralph M. McGee (b)(6)

TSA SD	7/18
SRMA SD	
MA SD	SPB 7/18
EXEC SEC	7-16-04 SL


11-L-0559/OSD/47086

OSD 10554-04




Army AMD Transformation Since 1999

PB99




PB05




Investment

?

1999



2005



?

?

Personnel

*Reflects Total Army Analysis-I 1 (TAA-11) Decisions, Modularity and AMD Task Forces



Legend:

ABT - Air Breathing Threat
BMC2 - Battle Management Command and Control
GMD - Ground Based Midcourse Defense
MAMD - Maneuver Air and Missile Defense

AMD TF - Air and Missile Defense Task Force
CMD - Cruise Missile Defense
HLS - Homeland Security
TBMD - Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense

OCT 29 2004

TO: Ken Krieg

c c : Doug Feith
David Chu
Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Longer Tours/Longer Tenure

Attached is some material from David Chu. I think we need to have a SLRG on this subject -- we can't just go forward. Are there other pieces of this that should be included?

What do you propose?

Attach.
9/20/04 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R) re: Two Major Initiatives
10/8/04 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef re: Longer Tours/Longer Tenure

DHR:ss
102804-18

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

210 (344)

2906704

4/2/04

~~FOUO~~

SEP 20 2004

2004 09 21 13 PM 10:05
OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Two Major Initiatives



I plan to put forth a major initiative with respect to longer tours for people and, for those that are successful, somewhat longer service.

I am also going to put forth a major initiative for Standing Joint Headquarters, so that when we have to fight a next war, we will have the headquarters set up, and won't end up with the headquarters half-filled when the war is over. I have been pushing this for three years, but the resistance is powerful.

We need to get both of them done. Please get back to me with proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.
CJTF-7 Joint Manning Timeline (2 pages)

DHR:ss
091304-25

Please *respond* by 10/29/04

*Sir,
Longer tour initiative
response attached.
v/R
LTCOL Lengyel
10/14*

~~FOUO~~



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



2004 OCT 13 AM 10:05

ACTION MEMO

October 8, 2004; 4:15 PM

Paul Pritler
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action

Pub
FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 8 Oct 04
(Signature and Date)

10/14
SUBJECT: Longer Tours—and Longer Tenure—SNOWFLAKE

- You asked for a proposal initiating action on your desire that senior officers serve longer tours
- I believe three steps will accomplish your objective:
 1. Announce that you expect most four-star officers to serve at least four years in their posts (Tab C lists four-star posts, and average tenure over the past decade).
 2. Confer with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs on the three-star posts that should likewise carry a tenure of three or four years, with the balance assumed to be two-year tours (Tab D lists three-star posts, nominating as four year candidates those that are normally "capstone" posts—i.e., last post of career).
 3. Invite the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to provide you with a similar list for one and two-star officers, for your review and approval.
- This is a simple approach, to begin changing our culture. Actual tours may vary somewhat from the new norms—and you may want some to be of intermediate length. As such a system is implemented, it will be critical to encourage prompt retirement of those not advancing, and to assure those staying longer will be properly compensated. (The latter requires statutory change and will require your personal backing. We have already failed twice to persuade Congress.)
- Memoranda to initiate this action are attached for your consideration.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum to the Service Secretaries and CJCS at Tab A.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Lernes Hebert, (b)(6)

TSA SD	10/14
SRMA SD	
MA SD	2 10/13
EXEC SEC	M 10/13



11-L-0559/OSD/47090

OSD 15889-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHIEFS OF SERVICES

SUBJECT: Expectations for the Tenure of Senior Officers

Senior officers must enjoy sufficient tenure in their posts to be effective. They must have sufficient time to size up what is to be accomplished, to develop the appropriate plans to put those plans into effect, and to see them through to success.

Regrettably, the data I've seen suggest that the average time in post for our flag officers is frequently less than two years. This is too short.

As we plan for the future, we should assume that those confirmed for a four-star post will typically serve at least four years in that position. This should likewise be the expectation for several of our three-star posts, and I will be meeting with you to discuss the posts where longer tenure could be meritorious. A list of three-star billets with recent tour averages is provided to aid in this review.

I invite you to provide me, in advance of our meeting, but no later than November 1, 2004, your recommendations on tenure length for the one and two-star posts in your domain. I will ask the Chairman and Combatant Commanders for their recommendations on joint positions.

cc: CJCS



11-L-0559/OSD/47091



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Tenure of Senior Officers in Joint Assignments

We must give senior officers assigned to joint posts sufficient tenure to be effective. Regrettably, the data I've seen suggest the average is often less than two years. For some operational posts this may be acceptable. But in other cases this will not be enough time to size up the situation, decide what must be accomplished, and see the plans through to success.

In consultation with the Combatant Commanders, I would like your recommendations on the tenure we should expect for those officers occupying joint assignments in the grades of O7 through O9. I look forward to discussing these recommendations with you at your earliest convenience.

cc: Combatant Commanders



11-L-0559/OSD/47092

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-10 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Commander, US Central Command	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	37	3.1	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Commander, US Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	29	2.4	4
Commander, US Northern Command	Joint/External			4
Commander, US Pacific Command	Joint/External	33	2.8	4
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US Southern Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	4
Commander, US Special Operations Command	Joint/External	34	2.8	4
Commander, US Strategic Command	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Commander, US Transportation Command	Joint/External	33	2.7	4
Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	48	4.0	2*
Vice Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	35	2.9	2*
Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	36	3.0	4*
Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	25	2.1	4
	Air Force	27	2.2	4
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	34	2.8	4
Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	26	2.2	4
Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	24	2.0	4
	Air Force	25	2.1	4
Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command	Army	30	2.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Forces Command	Army	18	1.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	36	3.0	4
Chief of Staff, USA	Army	49	4.1	4
Commanding General, USA Europe and Seventh Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Vice Chief of Staff, USA	Army	20	1.7	3
Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	48	4.0	4
Assistant, Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	25	2.0	3
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (SEA-08)	Navy	72	6.0	3*
Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	42	3.5	4*
Commander, US Atlantic Fleet	Navy	25	2.1	4
Commander, US Naval Forces, Europe	Navy	30	2.5	4
Commander, US Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	4
Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	22	1.8	3

*Statutory Tour Length

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Joint/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Joint/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Joint/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Joint/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Joint/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Joint/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Joint/External	29	2.4	3
Director of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
(President, National Defense University)	Joint/External	34	2.8	3
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency	Joint/External			3
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Joint/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Joint/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Joint/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Joint/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Joint/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Joint/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center [Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe [Dep Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Joint/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Joint/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	24	2.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	47	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force			3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force			2

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Arm/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.2	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Navy	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Naw	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Naw			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Naw	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Navy			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Naw	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Naw	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Naw			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Naw	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Naw	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Navy	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Navy	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH Fleet	Navy			2


Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Twelfth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command; Commander Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	28	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

OCT 29 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Army Retention Rate

I notice the Army active retention is down in the 89-95% range for initial mid-career and career. It's the only Service where that is the case.

I would be curious to know what you think about it and what you are doing about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102704-15

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

340

29 OCT 04

October 28, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Pete Pace
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Tour Lengths

Attached is a report on average tour lengths that is disturbing. The short tours are a problem I have brought up repeatedly. We need to **fix** this.

Attach.
GFO Tour Lengths

DHR:ss
102804-17

.....
Please respond by _____

2004

28 OCT 04

GFO Tour Lengths 10 Year Average

170

RT

Service	Position	Grade	Avg Mos	Avg Yrs
Joint	CJCS	O-10	48	4
Joint	VCJCS	O-10	35	2.9
Joint	CENTCOM	O-10	36	3
Joint	EUCOM	O-10	37	3.1
Joint	JFCOM	O-10	29	2.4
Joint	PACOM	O-10	33	2.8
Joint	SOUTHCOM	O-10	20	1.7
Joint	SPACECOM/NORAD	O-10	27	2.3
Joint	SOCOM	O-10	34	2.8
Joint	STRATCOM	O-10	28	2.4
Joint	TRANSCOM	O-10	33	2.7
Joint	DEUCOM	O-10	32	2.7
ARMY	CG, TRADOC	O-10	36	3
ARMY	CG, FORSCOM	O-10	18	1.5
ARMY	CG, AMC	O-10	30	2.5
ARMY	CG, USAEUR	O-10	31	2.6
ARMY	VCSA	O-10	20	1.7
NAVY	PACFLT	O-10	30	2.5
NAVY	LANTFLT	O-10	25	2.1
NAVY	NAVEUR	O-10	30	2.5
NAVY	VCNO	O-10	22	1.8
USMC	ACMC	O-10	25	2
AF	ACC	O-10	25	2.1
AF	AETC	O-10	27	2.2
AF	USAFE	O-10	24	2
AF	PACAF	O-10	24	2
AF	AFMC	O-10	34	2.8
AF	SPACECOM	O-10	26	2.2
AF	VCAF	O-10	25	2.1
O-10 Average:			29	2

Joint	DIA	O-9	32	2.7
Joint	DSPACECOM/NORAD	O-9	27	2.3
Joint	DTRANSCOM	O-9	27	2.2
Joint	DPACOM	O-9	26	2.2
Joint	J3	O-9	22	1.8
Joint	J8	O-9	21	1.8
Joint	J5	O-9	20	1.7
Joint	DJFCOM	O-9	20	1.7
Joint	DSTRATCOM	O-9	19	1.6
USMC	DCSPlansPrgmsOps	O-9	19	1.6
Joint	DCENTCOM	O-9	18	1.5
ARMY	DCSOPS (G3)	O-9	18	1.5
NAVY	DEPCHIEF OPS	O-9	17	1.4
AF	DCSAIRSPACEOPS	O-9	16	1.3
Joint	DJS	O-9	16	1.3
Joint	DSOCOM	O-9	14	1.2

O-9 Average: **21** **2**

Global Average: **26** **2**

October 27, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GEN Shinseki's Retirement

General Shinseki's retirement ceremony was held on June 11, 2003. I was in Europe during that time, including Brussels -- attending a NATO meeting that had been set the year before.

DHR:ss
102704-9

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/47100

27 Oct 04

October 27, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Washington Post Article of Oct. 26

Check with Jim Haynes, but I don't believe the Pentagon should be included in this list on item 40 in the *Early Bird*.

Attach.
10/26/04 Early Bird (pg. 33)

DHR:ss
102704-10

.....
Please respond by _____

year arrived at a strikingly different conclusion. After investigating whether pre-war intelligence had been "cooked" by "Mr. Feith's shop" when it raised questions with the intelligence community about evidence of ties between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and al Qaeda, the committee unanimously declared: "The committee found that none of the analysts or other people interviewed by the committee said that they were pressured to change their conclusions related to Iraq's links to terrorism."

Elsewhere, the SSCI went so far as to note, "In some cases, those [intelligence community] analysts interviewed stated that the questions had forced them to go back and review intelligence reporting, and that during this exercise they came across information they had overlooked in initial readings. The committee found that this process — the policy-makers probing questions — actually improve the Central Intelligence Agency's products."

Interestingly, Mr. Levin joined every other member of the intelligence committee in endorsing this report.

Equally peculiar is the Levin charge that "the intelligence community was consistently dubious" about a connection between Iraq under Saddam and al Qaeda. In a letter sent on Oct. 7, 2002, by the CIA's director to the then-chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Sen. Bob Graham, George Tenet wrote:

"We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda going back a decade. Credible information indicates that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression. We have credible reporting that al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The reporting also

stated that Iraq has provided training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs."

In short, Mr. Feith's staff did in the run-up to war precisely what one would expect a policy organization to do: Evaluate and, where appropriate, challenge available intelligence about the threat that might make military operations necessary. And, having done so — as the SSCI found, through established channels — the Feith organization contributed accordingly to the development of policy.

If anything, information that has emerged from liberated Iraq has made the Levin critique even more untenable. In the Oct. 19 edition of the New York Sun, Laurie Mylroie noted, for example, that "an 11-page document [found in Iraq and] dated Jan. 25, 1993, lists various organizations with which Iraqi intelligence maintained contacts. It recommends 'the use of Arab Islamic elements which were fighting in Afghanistan and now have no place to go and who are currently in Somalia, Sudan and Egypt.' Saddam approved the suggestion, with the order to 'concentrate on Somalia.'" At the time, the network that would become known as al Qaeda was among the "Arab Islamic elements" operating in these countries.

The danger associated with allowing Saddam's ties to such terrorist organizations to metastasize further is now clear as well. In the Wall Street Journal on Oct. 14, Richard Spertzel, a former U.N. weapons inspector and member of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), noted that the ISG uncovered a plan concocted by Iraqi intelligence's M16 directorate "to bottle sarin [a lethal nerve agent] and sulfur mustard in perfume sprayers and medicine bottles which they would ship to the United States and Europe."

The effort to smear conscientious public servants who, thankfully, did their jobs to protect this country may fit with Mr. Kerry's anything-goes campaign for the White House. It does not inspire confidence, however, about either his ability to prosecute the war on terror or to select competent people to help him do it.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is president of the Center for Security Policy and a columnist for The Washington Times.

Washington Post
October 26, 2004

Pg. 24

40. The CIA's Disappeared

THE BUSH administration pretends, and many Americans may believe, that the abuse of U.S.-held prisoners abroad ended after the release of sensational photographs from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Sadly, it did not. While blaming the crimes at Abu Ghraib on a small group of low-ranking soldiers, the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA have fought to preserve the exceptional and sometimes secret policies that allow U.S. personnel to violate the Geneva Conventions and other laws governing the handling and interrogation of foreign detainees. Under those policies, practices at odds with basic American values continue — even if there are no sensational photos to document them.

The latest example concerns "ghost prisoners," suspects captured in Iraq and Afghanistan who are interrogated by the CIA in secret locations, sometimes outside those countries, and whose identities and locations are withheld from relatives, the International Red Cross and even Congress. For all practical purposes, they have "disappeared," like the domestic detainees of some notorious dictatorships. The first official Army

investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib called this practice "deceptive, contrary to Army doctrine and in violation of international law." Yet, according to reporting by The Post's Dana Priest, the CIA subsequently transported as many as a dozen more "ghost detainees" out of Iraq to interrogate them in its secret prisons.

The Geneva Conventions, which the administration says it is following in Iraq, require the registration of all detainees with the Red Cross. They also prohibit "forcible transfers as well as deportations" of individuals, and ban all "physical or moral coercion ... in particular to obtain information." To get around these rather clear-cut standards, the CIA seems to be relying once again on secret legal opinions whose conclusions — once they leak out — are disputed by nearly every authority other than Mr. Bush's political appointees. One, submitted to White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales on March 18, is titled "Protected Persons in Occupied Iraq"; it argues that certain people captured there may be excluded from the conventions — an interpretation at odds with that of the Red Cross. Another draft memo, drawn up by the Justice Department around the same time but never formally issued, argues that even "protected persons" may be taken out of Iraq and interrogated "for a brief but not indefinite period."

It's not clear what legal standards the CIA is using for its ghost prisoners, because it refuses to explain the standards even to the congressional committees charged with oversight, much less to the public. What ought to be clear, however, is that the practice of holding detainees incommunicado in secret prisons without any outside oversight violates basic standards of human rights. A number of members of Congress, including several

Republican senators, have expressed outrage about the ghost detainees and have promised to investigate; to date they have not done so. Now would be a good time to start.

New York Times
October 26, 2004

41. Making Things Worse

President Bush's misbegotten invasion of Iraq appears to have achieved what Saddam Hussein did not: putting dangerous weapons in the hands of terrorists and creating an offshoot of Al Qaeda in Iraq.

The murder of dozens of Iraqi Army recruits over the weekend is being attributed to the forces of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who has been identified by the Bush administration as a leading terrorist and a supposed link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. That was not true before the war - as multiple investigations have shown. But the breakdown of order since the invasion has changed all that. This terrorist, who has claimed many attacks on occupation forces and the barbaric murder of hostages, recently swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and renamed his group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.

The hideous murder of the recruits was a reminder of the Bush administration's dangerously inflated claims about training an Iraqi security force. The officials responsible for these inexperienced young men sent them home for leave without weapons or guards, at a time when police and army recruits are constantly attacked. The men who killed them wore Iraqi National Guard uniforms.

A particularly horrific case of irony involves weapons of mass destruction. It's been obvious for months that American forces were not going to find the chemical or biological armaments that Mr. Bush said were stockpiled in Iraq. What we didn't know is that while they were looking

for weapons that did not exist, they lost weapons that did.

James Glanz, William J. Broad and David E. Sanger reported in The Times yesterday that some 380 tons of the kinds of powerful explosives used to destroy airplanes, demolish buildings, make missile warheads and trigger nuclear weapons have disappeared from one of the many places in Iraq that the United States failed to secure. The United Nations inspectors disdained by the Bush administration had managed to monitor the explosives for years. But they vanished soon after the United States took over the job. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was so bent on proving his theory of lightning warfare that he ignored the generals who said an understaffed and underarmed invasion force could rush to Baghdad, but couldn't hold the rest of the country, much less guard things like the ammunition dump.

Iraqi and American officials cannot explain how some 760,000 pounds of explosives were spirited away from a well-known site just 30 miles from Baghdad. But they were warned. Within weeks of the invasion, international weapons inspectors told Washington that the explosives depot was in danger and that terrorists could help themselves "to the greatest explosives bonanza in history."

The disastrous theft was revealed in a recent letter to an international agency in Vienna. It was signed by the general director of Iraq's Planning and Following Up Directorate. It's too bad the Bush administration doesn't have one of those.

Los Angeles Times
October 26, 2004

42. Worse Than The Usual Bad

The confirmation Monday that U.S. forces in Iraq failed to prevent the looting of 380 tons

of conventional explosives represents a new chapter for the "just when you thought things could not get much worse" file. Further, the execution-style murder Saturday of dozens of Iraqis being trained as soldiers, the very men to whom the United States planned to transfer the job of guarding the country, demonstrates an abject failure by Iraqis and occupation officials to learn from past mistakes.

The International Atomic Energy Agency announced Monday what it told the interim Iraqi government and the Bush administration earlier this month: High-powered explosives that could demolish buildings, bring down aircraft or detonate nuclear weapons have disappeared from a former Iraqi army site about 30 miles south of Baghdad. A Pentagon official said troops searched the site soon after the March 2003 invasion and found the explosives that had previously been counted by the United Nations. But U.S.-led coalition forces failed to guard the site, and the explosives later disappeared.

President Bush has repeatedly said his generals have not told him they need more than the 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. But it's now clear that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and his Pentagon colleagues should have listened to Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, then the Army chief of staff, when he warned that "several hundred thousand" troops would be required to win the peace as well as the war. Instead, Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, disparaged Shinseki and shoved him aside.

The ineptness of the Pentagon's civilian leadership surfaced as well in its confused attack-and-retreat from the Sunni stronghold of Fallouja. Times reporters Alissa J. Rubin and Doyle McManus reported Sunday that after the March 31 killing and mutilation of four American security guards, a

Marine general said that rather than besiege the city out of anger, his troops should first enlist moderates to provide intelligence. Rumsfeld did not tell Bush of the Marines' objections, and the president authorized the attack. Yet when the Marines reported that they were close to retaking the city, the White House, worried about backlash, ordered a cease-fire. Fallouja remains under insurgent control and is the base of one of Iraq's main terrorist leaders, Abu Musab Zarqawi.

Zarqawi's followers claimed responsibility for the Saturday attack on the unarmed army recruits. Rebels dressed as police or soldiers stopped three vehicles, ordered the passengers out and shot them. Iraqi police and military trainees have been targets for months. The recruits should have been protected by other soldiers or given weapons to defend themselves.

The U.S. military prides itself on the lessons it learns in combat. Yet the continued assaults on Iraqi police and military trainees, and the evidence that insurgents keep infiltrating those squads, indicate a failure to adapt tactics to an increasingly powerful and sophisticated enemy.

There have been better days in the Iraq war, but not many worse ones.

Wall Street Journal
October 26, 2004
Pg. 24

43. War And 'Competence'

A week before Election Day, John Kerry and his allies have once again changed their line of attack on Iraq. The issue isn't any longer whether we should have fought the war at all ("wrong war, wrong place, wrong time"), it is that the Senator would fight it with more "competence."


The peg for this line is yesterday's story that a stockpile of explosives was

~~FOUO~~

JAN 03 2006

TO GEN Montgomery Meigs (Ret)
Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force

CC: Gen Pete Pace
Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT Task Force Progress

Thanks for your memo of December 22. It looks to me like you're off to a good start.

I do hope you'll focus on tactics, techniques, and procedures. Keep me posted as to what you find.

Thanks so much for climbing back in the saddle. I appreciate it a great deal.

Happy New Year!

Attach.
12/22/05 Meigs memo to SD

DHR:dh
122905-16 (TS).doc

~~FOUO~~

02220-06

1/5/06

471.86

3 Jan 06

22 Dec 05

~~FOUO~~ CLOSE HOLD - DO NOT COPY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
 DEFEAT TASK FORCE
 1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

27 13 PM 1:48

December 22, 2005

Robert Rangel

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Mission and Implied Tasks for IED Task Force:

1. Mission: Focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices as weapons of strategic influence.

2. Essential Tasks:

a. Serve as the DoD's point of coordination and catalyst for initiatives across the full range of efforts necessary to defeat the IED threat.

b. To defeat current threats, stimulate and employ streamlined DoD change processes that...

- Assess and Adapt: Collect and analyze operational and forensic data and technical exploitation of IEDs and their initiation components to (1) derive and assess the effectiveness of new tactics and procedures and (2) initiate statements of requirements for new equipment.

- Equip: Rapidly acquire equipment to counter known and newly deployed IED threats; ensure that these systems incorporate embedded training and logistic support; that they are fielded with a system for feedback on effectiveness; and that they possess the flexibility for constant product improvement.

- Train: Assist Joint and Combined commanders with understanding the IED threat across their AORs and the effectiveness of current and potential counters to that threat. Provide advisory training support to enable comprehensive Service and joint pre-deployment and in-theater training for Joint forces.

- Improve Intelligence: Collect and analyze data from the field to 1) assess the effectiveness of current intelligence support for commanders and their staffs, 2) develop and track responses to priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and 3) in coordination with the operational chain of command, develop new intelligence

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A-41-3

OSD 02220-06

471.86

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support and intelligence requirements against IED threats to ensure Commanders' needs are met.

- **Transition:** Develop approaches for organizing, training, and equipping Host Nation forces to defeat IED threats to both combatants and civilians.
- **TF efforts will be responsive to:**
 - Field commanders' stated requirements
 - JFCOM's improvements in joint training
 - Existing and anticipated enemy capabilities for employing IEDs
 - Opportunities to improve capabilities by exploiting new technologies or operational concepts
- c. **To counter the enduring IED threat...**
 - **Understand the enemy:** Provide a better understanding of the enemy system that funds, invents, and distributes IED technology into and within local areas of interest in order to develop offensive strategies against these systems.
 - **Establish Center of Excellence:** Develop and manage within Service combat training centers a distributed Joint Center of Excellence for the development of new operational techniques and tactical procedures, and provide a venue for training, experimentation, and testing of new equipment and concepts. Maintain within the Center of Excellence a deployable capability to support commanders in the field.
- **Advise DoD Leadership:** Act as a so — of advice to the Secretary, the Deputy, the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the IED threat and operational concepts and techniques to counter it. Assist in inter-agency and multi-national coordination of their efforts to support DoD.

d. When a JTF or CJTF deploys to a threat area, on order, task organize from organic assets and contractor support and deploy with the US commander a capability to provide support for all tasks listed above.

3. To augment the Task Force's ability to accomplish these tasks, immediately: (1) review and reorganize as necessary the Task Force's establishment and move it to facilities that support maximum effectiveness and productivity; (2) improve the Task Force's communications with Congress and its participation in the Department's


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A-41-4

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resourcing process; (3) initiate action on the Center of Excellence; (4) reorganize downrange assets into JTFs (FWD) in Iraq and Afghanistan; (5) produce and disseminate appropriate PIR; and (6) create an operations analysis capability to support the above activities.

4. The Joint IED Defeat Task Force POC for this memorandum is BO Joseph Votel,
(b)(6)


Montgomery C. Neigs
Director

cc:
DepSecDef
CJCS
VCJCS

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A-41-5

2015 December 31, 2004.

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Protecting Officials

I just read the attached cable. We're simply going to have to find a way to get that responsibility moved to the Iraqis. There's no way DoD can keep using SOP for these personal security responsibilities.

If we have to, we should quickly put a team of people together to train Iraqis to train other Iraqis how to do this. The USG can't keep doing it all. In the meantime, they should use more contractors. *This is less than the*

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks

12/25/04 CMB: (RUSKOBAT346)

DOI: 10.1002/for
SYNOPSIS: This paper examines the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the performance of the Japanese stock market. The results show that the Japanese stock market experienced a significant decline in performance during the crisis, which was attributed to a combination of factors, including a sharp increase in the risk premium and a decrease in the market's liquidity. The paper also discusses the implications of these findings for the Japanese economy and the role of the government in stabilizing the market.

Please respond by 11/10/04

Tab A

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/47108

OSD 02227-05

7209

~~FOUO~~

1435
12/7

December 6, 2004

2005 12/14/04 11:10:23

TO: Paul Wolffowitz
FROM :
SUBJECT: Commando Solo

Please check to see how much longer we plan to go on with these Commando Solo flights relating to Cuba. Everything costs money.

Thanks.

OPR:ab
(20404-1)

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

I-04/016523

ES-1611

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

7 December 2004 - 1525 Hrs


MEMORANDUM FOR: USD(P)

SUBJECT: Commando Solo

Sir,

DSD requests that you prepare a response to the attached snowflake.

Very respectfully



Sean O'Connor

CAPT, USN

Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Cc: D S

Response: 14Dec04

~~FOUO~~

07-12-04 17:47 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/47110


OSD 02229-05

~~FOUO~~

FEB 02 2005

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Dick Myers
GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Allawi's Conversation with President Bush

Prime Minister Allawi spoke with the President today and thanked him for the work you and John Negroponte have done for the Iraqi people. The Prime Minister also mentioned how closely he works with you and thanked the President for sending such a good man to help the people of Iraq -- he was most complimentary of you and his relationship with you.

I thought you would want to be aware of that. I'm not surprised!

Regards,

DHR:ss
020105-15

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 02230-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47111

~~FOUO~~

FEB 02 2003

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Dick Myers
GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Allawi's Conversation with President Bush

Prime Minister Allawi spoke with the President today and thanked him for the work you and John Negroponte have done for the Iraqi people. The Prime Minister also mentioned how closely he works with you and thanked the President for sending such a good man to help the people of Iraq -- he was most complimentary of you and his relationship with you.

I thought you would want to be aware of that. I'm not surprised!

Regards,

DHR:ss
020105-15

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02230-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47112

8:10 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld Yh

DATE: ~~February 26~~^{March 1}, 2004

SUBJECT: **Suicide and Depression**

Please draft a letter from me to Senator Dominici responding to this question as you have indicated.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022604.05

Attach: Winkenwerder memo to SD 2/17/04 Re: Suicide

Please respond by: 3/17

OSD 02313-04

11-L-0559/OSD/47113

702

11-L-0559

1756004



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

February 17 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Suicide & Depression-- SNOWFLAKE: (Tab A)

- The Office of Legislative Affairs has made several attempts to schedule a presentation, and we are prepared to brief Senator Domenici at his convenience.
- The suicide rate in-theater is consistent with the annual suicide rates for the period 1990-2002 for all of the Services (TAB B). Suicide rates for the Services have remained in the range of 10-15 per 100,000 per year, while the civilian rate (matched by age and gender) is approximately 20 per 100,000 per year.
 - There have been 22 medical examiner confirmed suicides in the Iraqi theater (18 Army, 2 Navy and 2 Marine Corps). (Each service Criminal Investigation Division provides the final determination.)
 - The in-theater suicide rate for the Army is 13.5/100,000/year, compared against an overall Service rate of 11.6/100,000/year
 - The Marine Corps reports an in-theater rate of 5.3/100,000/year.
 - The Navy has experienced 2 confirmed suicides; with conservative estimates of the size of the naval force in theater, the rate would be less than the overall Service rate of 11.7/100,000/year.
 - The Air Force reports no suicides in theater.
- Each Service has a Suicide Prevention Program; I have reviewed them all. The Army, in particular, has developed a comprehensive program, consisting of
 - A formal training program, Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST), to educate leaders and service members.
 - Combat Stress Control units assigned throughout the theater
 - A Deployment Cycle Support Program which includes activities at each phase of deployment (pre-, during, and post-deployment).

COORDINATION: USD (P&R)

Attachments:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RTA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	12/26
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARIOTT	2/18

Prepared By: LTC Guy Strawder, OASD (Health Affairs), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/47114

OSD 02313-04

October 16, 2003

TO Bill Winkenwerder
CC Powell Moore
David Chu
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Depression

Senator Pete Domenici called me yesterday.

He noticed articles about suicides in the Army. He said something like the following. Suicide is frequently caused by depression, which can be a matter of the inability to sleep or indecisiveness. He wonders if the Army is doing a good job of looking into the possibility of depression in the military. He said a high percentage of certain age groups have some sort of depression, and that there is a relatively high teenage suicide rate now from depression.

His recommendation is that we get some psychiatrists or psychologists to take a look at the issue of depression. He is convinced a lot of it can be fixed with modern medicines.

Please tell me what you think. Also, please get with Powell Moore and go back to Senator Domenici to tell him what we know and are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101503-32

.....
Please respond by 11/21/03

U21311 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/47115



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

February 17 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Suicide & Depression -- SNOWFLAKE: (Tab A)

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 - Combat Stress Control units assigned throughout the theater
 - A Deployment Cycle Support Program which includes activities at each phase of deployment (pre-, during, and post-deployment).

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *David V. L. LHM 17 Feb 04*

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Guy Strawder, OASD (Health Affairs), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/47116

02313-04

TAB

A

October 16,2003

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Powell Moore
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Depression

Senator Pete Domenici called me yesterday.

He noticed articles about suicides in the Army. He said something like the following: Suicide is frequently caused by depression, which can be a matter of the inability to sleep or indecisiveness. He wonders if the Army is doing a good job of looking into the possibility of depression in the military. He said a high percentage of certain age groups have some sort of depression, and that there is a relatively high teenage suicide rate now from depression.

His recommendation is that we get some psychiatrists or psychologists to take a look at the issue of depression. He is convinced a lot of it can be fixed with modern medicines.

Please tell me what you think. Also, please get with Powell Moore and go back to Senator Domenici to tell him what we know and are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101503-32

.....
Please respond by 11/21/03

U21311^{*}/03

11-L-0559/OSD/47118

TAB

B

The
Washington
Times

The Washington Times

Front Page

Go

What's on the minds of the
leading conservatives?



LATEST NEWS

Top Stories

U.S.

World

Business

Personal Finance

Technology

sports

Entertainment

Health

Politics

Offbeat

Weather

NEWS SEARCH

Search

Go

Text Archive

SPECIAL SECTIONS

Hourly News Summary
(AUDIO)

Today in History

Washington in Depth

Video of the Day

The Day in Photos

PhotoWeek

SportsWeek

MULTIMEDIA

Portrait of War

Destination Mars

Homeland Security

Struggle for Peace

U.S. Oil Addiction

U.S. Crime Database

U.S. Census Database

Jan 14, 3:51 PM EST

U.S. Soldiers' Suicide Rate Is Up in Iraq

By MATT KELLEY
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- U.S. soldiers in Iraq are killing themselves at a high rate despite the work of special teams sent to help troops deal with combat stress, the Pentagon's top doctor said Wednesday.

Meanwhile, about 2,500 soldiers who have returned from the war on terrorism are having to wait for medical care at bases in the United States, said Dr. William Winkenwerder, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs. The problem of troops on "medical extension" is likely to get worse as the Pentagon rotates hundreds of thousands of troops into and out of Iraq this spring, he said.

Both situations illustrate the stresses placed on the troops and the military's health system by the war in Iraq.

Suicide has become such a pressing issue that the Army sent an assessment team to Iraq late last year to see if anything more could be done to prevent troops from killing themselves. The Army also began offering more counseling to returning troops after several soldiers at Fort Bragg, N.C., killed their wives and themselves after returning home from the war.

Winkenwerder said the military has documented 21 suicides during 2003 among troops involved in the Iraq war. Eighteen of those were Army soldiers, he said.

That's a suicide rate for soldiers in Iraq of about 13.5 per 100,000, Winkenwerder said. In 2002, the Army reported an overall suicide rate of 10.9 per 100,000.

The overall suicide rate nationwide during 2001 was 10.7 per 100,000, according to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

By contrast, two U.S. military personnel killed themselves during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, although that conflict only lasted about a month. The Army recorded 102 suicides during 1991 for a rate of 14.4 per 100,000. The Army's highest suicide rate in recent years came in 1993, when the rate was 15.7 per 100,000.

The Marine Corps has the military's highest suicide rate. Last year the Marines'



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Literacy Cambodia
Help Educate Children. Learn More &
Plan Your Trip of a Lifetime.

Top-Ranked in Efficiency
Since 1948, providing humanitarian aid
to people in need worldwide.

11-L-0559/OSD/47120

rate was 12.6 per 100,000. During 1993, the Marines' rate was 20.9 per 100,000.

The military investigates every death and some of those probes may be incomplete, meaning the actual suicide rate could be even higher, Winkenwerder said. He said health officials haven't identified any common threads among the confirmed suicides.

"We don't see any trend there that tells us that there's more we might be doing," Winkenwerder told a breakfast meeting of Pentagon reporters.

The military has nine combat stress teams in Iraq to help treat troops' mental health problems, and each division has a psychiatrist, psychologist and social worker, Winkenwerder said. Of more than 10,000 troops medically evacuated from Iraq, between 300 and 400 were sent outside the country for treatment of mental health problems, he said.

The military prefers to treat mental health problems such as depression by keeping troops in their regular duties while they get counseling and possibly medication, Winkenwerder said. Less than one percent of the troops in Iraq are treated for mental issues during an average week, he said.

Winkenwerder said he had no specifics on the number of soldiers being treated for battlefield stress, although the military is focused on treating that problem.

"We believe they are being identified, they are being supported," Winkenwerder said.

The military also is working to solve the issue of soldiers awaiting non-emergency medical care. Since November, about 1,900 of 4,400 waiting for medical care have been treated, Winkenwerder said.

But the military expects more problems when tens of thousands of troops are rotated in and out of Iraq this spring, Winkenwerder said. Many of those troops leaving Iraq may have to wait at various bases in the United States for medical treatment such as physical therapy for injuries, he said.

The Army is working to sign contracts with civilian medical providers and bringing in more staff from the Navy, Air Force and Department of Veterans Affairs to help, Winkenwerder said.

Another source of the problem has been a large number of National Guard and reserve troops activated for duty in Iraq who have to be treated for underlying health problems, Winkenwerder said. The Army is working to solve that problem by screening those reservists at their home bases, rather than later.

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Comments and questions

11-L-0559/OSD/47121

Washington Post
January 15, 2004
Pg. 14

Army's Suicide Rgte Tops Recent Average

No Trend Found, Health Officials Say

By Vernon Loeb, Washington Post Staff Writer

At least 22 U.S. service members committed suicide in Iraq last year, prompting concern among defense officials who describe the rate as elevated but not alarmingly high.

Soldiers accounted for 19 suicides, officials said yesterday. The tally included a spike in deaths in July that prompted the Army to dispatch a 12-member mental health assessment team to Iraq in September.

William Winkenwerder Jr., assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, said in an interview yesterday that military health officials have not discovered "any trend" or identified specific steps the Army could have taken that would have prevented the suicides. Nothing has been found, he said, "that tells us that there's more we might be doing."

Col. James K. Gilman, director of health policy and services for the Army surgeon general, said July's spike in suicides caused "great concern," but that no obvious common factor has emerged linking the individual cases. July's high rate, he said, did not reappear.

"You don't see worsening over time," Gilman said. The findings of the mental health team sent to Iraq in September have not been publicly released, he said.

The 19 Army deaths represented a suicide rate of more than 13.5 per 100,000 troops, officials said, which is higher than the Army's average of 10.5 to 11 per 100,000 troops in recent years. The overall suicide rate in the 1.2 million-member, active duty military is about one-third lower than that of the civilian population of about the same age range, defense officials said.

One official who spoke on the condition of anonymity called suicides in Iraq "an issue of concern, not an epidemic. It certainly is not at the oh-my-God stage or panic or anything. But when the Army saw the numbers start to go up, they took very swift action, and have been working very hard ever since."

The Army and the Marines have stressed suicide prevention since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, after suicides that officials say may be at least partly attributable to lengthy deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The numbers last year run counter to experience in past conflicts, when military suicides dropped during times of combat, officials said. During those conflicts, officials thought the reduction could be linked to troops' preoccupation with surviving combat, and with their removal from domestic problems and other personal pressures.

Whatever the cause of the elevated number of suicides in Iraq, Gilman said, "we want to get the rate lower. These are soldiers, and we care about every one of them. We want to get inside the problem even more and try to drive the rate down, in Iraq and in the Army as a whole."

To date, the 22 suicides represent about 14 percent of 153 nonhostile deaths in Iraq since the war began in March. An additional 343 service members have been killed in combat, bringing the total number of dead to 496, the Pentagon reported yesterday.

Winkenwerder said the military has committed considerable resources to treating soldiers' mental health problems, with the Army deploying nine combat stress company detachments to Iraq. Each Army division in Iraq, he said, has a

psychologist, a psychiatrist and a social worker, with an emphasis on trying to treat soldiers' stress problems as close to the front lines as possible.

"We believe they are being identified, they are being supported," Winkenwerder said. Of 10,128 service personnel transported out of Iraq for medical reasons since the war began, he noted, 300 to 400 have been for mental health problems.

As Winkenwerder expressed concern about suicides in Iraq during an interview with reporters, he said military doctors and medical personnel have proven more successful than ever in saving the lives of wounded service members.

Of 2,413 soldiers wounded in action as of Jan. 8, he said, about 37 were said officially to have "died of wounds" after arriving at a combat medical facility, a rate of about 1.5 percent. "That is stunning. It is remarkable. It has never been seen before," said Winkenwerder, a physician who became the Pentagon's top health official in late 2001 after serving as executive vice president of health care services for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts.

He attributed the low rate of soldiers who died of wounds to a combination of high-tech body armor worn by all soldiers in Iraq, surgical teams much closer to the front lines than in previous wars, new clotting agents that help stop bleeding on the battlefield, and new, portable ultrasound devices to determine whether soldiers are bleeding internally.

"All of our people have been working on these things for years, and I think it all came to fruition" in Iraq, Winkenwerder said. "We're saving people."

TAB

C

Depression and Suicide

William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD


Briefing for
Senator Domenici

11-L-0559/OSD/47125

Suicide in the Department of Defense

- Suicide rates for the Services have been stable in the range of 10-15 per 100,000 per year since 1990.
- The rate for a civilian population matched for age and gender is approximately 20 per 100,000 per year
- Despite the stable rates, the Services continue their efforts to bring the suicide rate down, because every life lost is a tragedy for families and a detriment to military readiness.

DoD Suicide Rates 1990-2003



Operation Iraqi Freedom - 2003

- **Army**
 - 18 confirmed suicides
 - Suicide rate 13.5 per 100,000 soldiers
- **Marine Corps**
 - 2 confirmed suicides
 - Suicide rate 5.3 per 100,000 Marines
- **Navy**
 - 2 confirmed suicides in forces supporting OIF
 - Rate not available because of small onshore presence
- **Air Force**
 - No suicides in forces supporting OIF

Risk Factors for Suicide

- Malegender
- Age 18-25
- Untreated depression
- Alcohol or drug abuse
- Relationship problems
- Financial problems
- Legal problems
- Easy access to firearms

Diagnostic Criteria for Depression

- Sleep disturbance
- Loss of interest or pleasure
- Feelings of guilt
- Lack of energy
- Difficulty with concentration or memory
- Loss of Appetite
- Slowed movements
- Suicidal ideation

Treatment of Depression

- Behavioral Health Care (psychiatry, psychology, social workers)
- Psychotherapy
- Medication

Suicide Prevention Programs

- Each Service has its own program tailored to its organizational structure
- Each provides education to leaders and service members on
 - Risk factors for suicide
 - Signs and symptoms of depression
 - Appropriate actions to take to intervene with a suicidal person

Army Suicide Prevention

- Combat Stress Control units
 - Dedicated units for support of forces in combat
 - Provide outreach and education on sources of stress, stress control, signs and symptoms of depression, risk factors for suicide
 - Provide far-forward treatment of combat stress casualties with rapid return to duty

Army Suicide Prevention

- Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST)
 - Formal training program to teach the skills for recognition and intervention with a suicidal person
 - 2 day workshop and interactive computer simulation

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Developed as a result of
 - The Army Well-being Initiative (2001)
 - Recommendations after the investigation of domestic violence deaths at Fort Bragg (2003)
 - Post Deployment Clinical Practice Guidelines from Deployment Health Clinical Center

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase I – Pre-deployment
 - Identify potential family issues
 - Suicide awareness and prevention training
 - Information briefing to spouses
 - Pre-deployment health evaluation

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase 2 – During deployment
 - Combat Stress Control units
 - Outreach facilitated by stationing CSC units with combat units
 - Suicide prevention and depression awareness education
 - Far-forward treatment of combat stress casualties
 - Military Healthcare System
 - Treatment for mental health casualties

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase 2 – During deployment
 - Pre-redeployment briefing
 - Manage expectations
 - Communication with family
 - Control alcohol use
 - Educate regarding Deployment Health Clinical Center and Army One Source
 - Provide information on transition benefits to reservists leaving active duty

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase 3 – Post-deployment
 - Post deployment health screening for
 - Exposure to combat, violence
 - Depression
 - Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
 - One week of half-days of work before block leave
 - Care managers embedded in primary care
 - trained in post-deployment health issues

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase 3 – Post-deployment
- Deployment Health Clinical Center
 - Located at Walter Reed Army Medical Center
 - Established to evaluate soldiers returning from first Gulf War with health problems
 - Mission is to improve military occupational health care by providing healthcare services, clinical consultation and practice improvement; develop health information and education programs; and conduct research to ensure evidence-based care.

Army Suicide Prevention

- Deployment Cycle Support Program
 - Phase 3 – Post-deployment
- Army One Source
 - Available to all active duty, mobilized reservists, and deployed civilians
 - 1-800 access – no preauthorization and no chain of command knowledge
 - Telephone advice and up to 6 face-to-face counseling visits for a problem

Navy Suicide Prevention

- Shipboard mental healthcare assets
- Increased emphasis on education, awareness, and prevention
- Training for leaders and sailors to make each person a “first responder” to a shipmate in crisis

Marine Corps Suicide Prevention

- Marine Corps adding division level mental health providers and Combat Stress Control units similar to the Army
- Return and reunion training through the “Warrior Transition” Program
- Chaplain Religious Enrichment Development Operation (CREDO) – Navy Chaplain outreach Program

Air Force Suicide Prevention

- Developed with a community philosophy
 - Healthcare system
 - Commanders
 - Chaplains
 - Families
- Medical records screen pre-deployment
- Mental Health Rapid Response Teams
 - Training
 - Command consultation
 - Individual and group therapy
- Reunion and reintegration briefings
- Post deployment surveillance and education


Summary

- Depression is a risk factor for suicide
- Depression is actively looked for and treated
- Each Service has a Suicide Prevention Program
- The Service-specific suicide rates for 2003 are similar to those for the past decade
- The Service-specific suicide rates for Operation Iraqi Freedom are within the range of overall suicide rates for the last decade

TAB

D

DOD Suicide Rates 1990-2000



11-L-0559/OSD/47147

Operation Iraqi Freedom -

- **Army**
 - 18 confirmed suicides
 - In-theater suicide rate 13.5 per 100,000 soldiers
 - Overall suicide rate 11.6 (difference not significant)
- **Marine Corps**
 - 2 confirmed suicides
 - In-theater suicide rate 5.3 per 100,000 Marines
 - Overall rate 12.6 (in-theater rate not significantly different)
- **Navy**
 - 2 confirmed suicides in forces supporting OIF
 - Rate not available because of small onshore presence
- **Air Force**
 - No suicides in forces supporting OIF

11-L-0559/OSD/47148

1-3
0600

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

call
2/4

2005 FEB -2 PM 3:23

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef _____

1-04/015884
ES-1495

Pal: Butler
2/3
1/4
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

FEB 2 2005
FE [Signature] [Signature]

SUBJECT: Meetings for Defense Ministers

- You asked whether there were groups of defense ministers, like the Defense Ministerial of the Americas, that we ought to pull together (attached).
 - o You suggested a triennial gathering of Central American MODs as an example.
 - o Regarding your specific suggestion, the DoD Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) is considering holding two-day seminars for MODs and defense chiefs by sub-region of the Western Hemisphere.
- You also might consider gathering defense ministers to address specific functional priorities for the Global War on Terrorism, particularly:
 - o Building partner nation security capacity
 - o The Proliferation Security Initiative.
- If you approve, we will come back to you shortly with proposed timing, agenda, and participants for each gathering.
- RECOMMENDATION: That you invite key defense ministers to summits on the topics listed above.

Approve DA Disapprove _____ Other _____

FEB 4 2005

Attachment: as stated

Cc: Dr. Downie, CHDS

Prepared by: John Kreul, Strategy (b)(6)

092.3

2 Feb 05

22 Nov 04

MA SD	SMA DSD	FEB 03 2005	
TSA SD	SA DSD		
EXEC SEC	142/3		
ESR MA	KSV	2-3-05	7:26

OSD 02316-05

02-02-05 10:23 IN

~~FOUO~~ OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -2 PM November 22, 2004

I-04/015884

ES-1495

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Meetings of Defense Ministers

Are there groups of ministers of defense, like the Defense Ministerial of Latin America, that we *ought* to pull together on our own? For example, should we have a defense ministers meeting of Central America once every third year? Are there other parts of the world where that would be smart?

Thanks.

DHR:es
112204-22

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

Sr, *DKH*
Response attached.
v/r
LTG/Lengyel
FEB 03 2005

23-11-04 12:33

~~FOUO~~

23-11-04 07:31 1X

11-L-0559/OSD/47150

08D 02316-05

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

November 22, 2004

I-04/015884

ES-1495

092.3

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Meetings of Defense Ministers

Are there groups of ministers of defense, like the Defense Ministerial of Latin America, that we *ought* to pull together on our own? For example, should we have a defense ministers meeting of Central America once every third year? Are there other parts of the world where that would be smart?

Thanks.

DHR ss
112204-22

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

23-11-04 12:33

~~SECRET~~

23-11-04 07:31 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/47151

OSD 02316-05

22 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

January 13, 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
CC: Gen Pete Schoomaker
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Modularity - Open Issues

We made some good progress in our discussion today - thanks.

You know the remaining open issues. I'd like you to come back and continue discussing them with me. Of particular note, I am interested in how we will end up balancing among the active, Reserve and Guard units.

Also, I really think we should have a better name than "modularity." Perhaps it would be helpful to call the overall concept the Army's "Brigade Combat Plan," or something that more clearly connotes the improvements we're making.

Finally, let's get a first-class paper explaining this for the press and the public - Pete Face has some good ideas.

Thanks..

DHR:dh
011305-5

.....
Please respond by 1/27/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47152

OSD 02348-05



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

2005 FEB -3 11 09 13

INFO MEMO

February 2, 2005, 8:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Army Modularity – Open Issues

- Reference your Snowflake dated 13 January 2005 attached at Tab A.
- The Army will make full use of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2005 process in order to address your concerns regarding how the Army will balance Active, Reserve and Guard units. It is the Army's intent during QDR 05, working closely with OSD and others, to carefully review our current and projected balance of capabilities and units across all components to provide the best portfolio of land force capabilities possible within projected resource levels. Additional information is provided at Tab B.
- Modularity is the Army's major force transformation initiative that involves the total redesign of the operational Army into a larger, more powerful, flexible and rapidly deployable force.
- The Army selected the term Modularity because it accurately describes the transformation process that restructures operational forces into more powerful, flexible and rapidly deployable combat formations. The dictionary defines "modular" as "designed with standardized units or dimensions, as for easy assembly and repair or flexible arrangement and use." The end result of the Army's modular transformation process is the Army Modular Force, based on common unit designs.
- The Army endorses the term "The Army Modular Force" since it correctly describes the ongoing transformational process, preserves the emphasis on the standardization of design, and enjoys broad recognition by OMB and Congress. Of note, Modularity is the transformation term of reference in the FY06 President's Budget.
- Our recommendation for a "first-class paper" explaining "The Army Modular Force" for the press and the public is at Tab C. This paper has been developed by the Army and reviewed by GEN Pace and Larry Di Rita. Their suggestions have been incorporated into the paper.

OSD 02348-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47153

COORDINATION:
VCJCS

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Edward Martin (b)(6)

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

January 13, 2005

TO: Fran Harvey

CC: Gen Pete Schoomaker
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Army Modularity - Open Issues

We made some good progress ~~&~~ our discussion today - thanks.

You know the remaining open issues. I'd like you to come back and continue **discussing** them with me. Of particular note, I **am interested in** how we will end up balancing **among** the active, Reserve and **Guard** units.

Also, I really think we should have a better **name than** "modularity." Perhaps it would be helpful to call the overall concept the **Army's** "Brigade Combat Plan," or something that more clearly connotes the improvements we're **making**.

Finally, let's get a first-class paper **explaining** this for the press and the public - Pete Face has **some** good ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011305-5

.....
Please respond by

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02348-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47156

TAB

B

Balancing Active, Guard and Reserve Units

Purpose:

- Optimal balance of capabilities, availability, usability and readiness across the force -- Active, Guard, and Reserve -- is a central objective of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 05). While much has already been accomplished in this regard, opportunities exist to further improve the Army's force posture to fulfill current and anticipated requirements across the range of military operations in support of the national defense strategy.
- It is the Army's intent during QDR 05, working closely with OSD and others, to carefully review our current and projected balance of capabilities and units across all components to provide the best portfolio of land force capabilities possible within projected resource levels.

Method:

- The requirement to provide land forces for prompt and sustained operations across the range of military operations is central to the Army's re-look of capability needs, mix, and balance.
- The QDR Terms of Reference provides sufficient focus and methodology to address this challenge. The output of the Capability Mix Issue Team will provide the necessary input to the Manning and Balancing the Force Issue Team to adequately develop options that optimize the balance between the Active, Guard, and Reserve units.
- A key aspect of our analysis will be creating an adequate rotation base of capabilities and forces, organized around Brigade Combat Teams (Units of Action), Army Expeditionary Force Packages, Units of Employment, and Support Brigades.
- Another key aspect is fully embracing joint interdependence. Joint interdependence of Army forces with those of other Services will address long-standing high-demand, low-density challenges, especially those exacerbated by the ongoing global war on terror and reduce redundant investment of like capability across the Services.

End State:

- The optimal mix of Active, Guard, and Reserve capabilities that minimizes operational risk across the full range of military operations and maximizes our return on investment.
- We anticipate that this optimal mix could result in a change in the number and types of units currently programmed.

TAB

C

The Army Modular Force

Modularity is the Army's major force transformation initiative, which involves the total redesign of the operational Army into a larger, more powerful, flexible and rapidly deployable force.

A Modular Army

- The Army will use its congressionally authorized increase in size to transition to the Army Modular Force design.
- The Army Modular Force contains three basic components:
 - ***Units of Employment*** above the brigade-level providing command and control;
 - ***Brigade Combat Teams (Units of Action)*** providing fighting forces. There are three types:
 - o Heavy Brigade organized around armored fighting vehicles
 - o Infantry Brigade organized around the infantry Soldier
 - o Stryker Brigade organized around Stryker fighting vehicles
 - ***Support Brigades*** providing enhanced capabilities.
- In keeping with the modularity concept, each organization will have a common design. For example, a Heavy Brigade Combat Team in the 3rd Infantry Division will be organized exactly the same as a Heavy Brigade Combat Team in the 4th Infantry Division.
- The Army will develop 77-82 Brigade Combat Teams using this modular concept:
 - 43-48 in the Active Component and 34 in the National Guard.
 - 13 Brigade Combat Teams have begun transforming into modular formations.
- Each Brigade Combat Team has about 3,300 to 3,900 Soldiers. Brigade Combat Teams:
 - Are a standardized tactical force;
 - Require less augmentation upon deployment;
 - Are organized the way they fight and contain embedded enablers such as communications, military police, chemical defense, artillery fires, intelligence, engineer and logistics.

Transition to The Army Modular Force Will:

- Result in at least a 30% increase in the combat power of the Active force;
- Reduce stress on the force by increasing the rotational pool of ready units by at least 50%;
- Make deployment cycles more predictable for Soldiers, their families and employers;
- Reduce the requirement for immediate mobilization of Reserve Component units;
- Enhance the Active Component's deployment capability and operational sustainability during first 30 days of a contingency;
- Provide lethal, agile and versatile forces capable of operating interchangeably within the Joint environment.

The Army Modular Force provides the Nation with a strategically responsive capability able to meet the challenges of the 21st Century security environment.

~~FOUO~~

FEB 03 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
c c : Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Transferring Responsibilities to Afghanistan and Iraq

I need you to develop an approach for the interagency whereby the Afghans and the Iraqis will build the prisons, train the guards, and establish the civil justice systems they need, so the U.S. can offload the Afghan and Iraqi prisoners and detainees we have.

DoD ought not to be the jailer for the GWOT. These countries ought to step up and develop the capacity to manage their own detainees and prisoners.

The only way this is going to be accomplished is if you push it hard and get the Departments of Justice, State and Defense, and the Embassies in those countries to establish very high priorities to see that this is accomplished.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
020205-9

Afghanistan

3 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02372-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47161

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2005 JAN 12 11:12 AM

January 4, 2005

I-05/000163
ES-1888

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Gingrich Thoughts on Disaster

Here are some thoughts from Newt on the disaster in South Asia. You ought to make sure that the people working this problem have these thoughts in mind.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/30/04 Gingrich e-mail: "Urgent—More on ~~Tsunami~~ Relief"

12/29/04 Gingrich e-mail: "Urgent – A Strategic Opportunity and a Moral Imperative"

DHR:dh
010305-51

.....
Please respond by

1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02373-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47162



Principal Director
Asian and Pacific Affairs

I-05/000163
ES-1888

SECURITY
2005 F-3-3 101 53

FEB 02 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Paul Butler

- The Alastair G. Bingham paper was distributed for consideration to the OSD Tsunami team and to PACOM.
- His thoughts helped shape our efforts early along. It was a valuable contribution.
- DoD operations conclude 12 FEB.

Very respectfully
John Ellis

OSD 02373-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47163

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

add
1/3/05

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Thursday, December 30, 2004 8:57 AM

To: (b)(6)@OSD.Mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)
jack.patterson@osd.mil; james.stavridis@osd.mil

Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil

Subject: urgent-more on tsunami relief-newt

for secdef

I sent the following to Rice et al this morning

she and I have since had a very productive conversation about it

from Newt

12-30-04

more on what an aggressive Tsunami Relief and Recovery program would look like

I watched Grossman, Natsios and Conway on C-Span last night. They are hard working decent serious people. They are also in Washington in front of a cynical hostile press that wants to keep them on defense. The scene is boring and normal.

The tsunami disaster is powerful theater. It requires powerful theater as a response.

Saying we are loading a ship in Diego Garcia sounds like Washington bureauacracy as usual.

Having an excited reporter live from Diego Garcia at three in the morning covering the 24 hour a day rapid relief effort loading a ship is the most powerful nation on earth rushing to help its friends and neighbors.

We have to take the offensive on the issue of help :

New York Times headline "Bush promises long range help as impatience grows in region" is probably much milder than what is being said in the non-American press.

we are trapped in our own success.

People believe we are the msot powerful country in the world and they believe that means we can do what we want. Therefore if something is not happening we do not want it to (we suffer from this on electricity and jobs in Iraq for example).

Let's react as the country we claim to be:

11-L-0559/OSD/47164

1. get live coverage from all military facilities where help is being organized and prepared.
2. create a Tsunami Relief and Recovery Center at the Pacific Command in Hawaii. This will allow the Hawaiian press to become a central provider of information about the recovery effort and it will be much more positive in tone than the Washington press corps (fox and cnn and the traditional networks can be live from hawaii immediately). send someone senior from state and aid to colocate at PACOM. Having the center at PACOM strengthens that command for the future and gives us increased acceptance throughout the region.
3. ask Jeb Bush to be special envoy for Tsunami recovery. His experience with four hurricanes makes him the preeminent American in thinking this through. His relationship to his brother **makes** him uniquely positioned to be important in the region as he visits. A five day swing through the region beginning New Year's day would be very powerful. Jeb Bush descending from an air force plane to meet with national leaders in each effected country would be a strong message of American seriousness.
4. pledge immediately \$350 million and challenge the European Union and Japan to match us to create a billion dollar plus relief and recovery fund. with Australian and other help this will rapidly become an illustration of American leadership.
5. make sure everything we are doing is explicitly American. We gain no advantage (and given their attitudes we actually buy ourselves a disadvantage) when we funnel our resources thorough international institutions dominated by people who gain prestige among their peers by attacking and criticizing the United States. It is to our advantage to let the world see Americans helping people with American aid delivered in American ships and planes.
6. Make clear that we have established an American **led** effort because the UN bureaucracy simply cannot cope with big important crises that threaten thousands of lives. This is **the** parallel to why we **do** not rely on the UN to stop bad guys from threatening civilization. When it matters the United States is a more reliable leader and implementer than the **UN**ited Nations. This is something we should be positive and explicit about rather than timid and defensive.
7. The President should make a ten minute prime time appeal to Americans this evening. The world will be watching and it will be picked up and shown all across the planet. Among other things he could say "while most of the world is preparing to celebrate the New Year some of our friends are neighbors are suffering from a terrible calamity" : "while your government is providing leadership and doing much to help, we in America have a deep tradition of reaching out to help our neighbors when they have a problem" "we know wfrom what we lived through with four

hurricanes that these storms can be dangerous, now we see people coping with a much bigger and more destructive disaster, we must help them" the President should announce a "tsunami relief and recovery fund" give the 800 number and the website for help, the Pioneers should be asked during the day to pitch in (I suspect Mehlman can send one email from the President and raise a surprising amount), extra help should be requested from some big corporations (including companies who manufacture or buy from the regio)

8. Americans with family in the region (Indian Americans for example are the wealthiest single subgroup in the United States) should be encouraged to pitch in and help **and** by this evening you could probably have wealthy Americans of South Asian background committed to helping lead the Tsunami Relief and Recovery fund-- in **two** weeks the leaders of the community ought to be at the White House reporting on how much they have raised and how many volunteers are going to help in the region with their own relatives (and they shold know this meeting will occur this evening so they have **two** weeks to raise the money and people needed to impress the President when they report)

9. the Peace Corps should announce a special effort to move doctors and nurses into the region immediately; the Peace Corps should also issue an appeal to former members and to retired doctors and nurses (this is totally different from the bureaurcatic cycle the Peace Corps has gotten into but is precisety in the spirirt of John F Kennedy trying to use American volunteerism to help people throughout the world).

10. FEMA should send a team to help the least developed areas with disaster recovery--volunteers should be requested publicly from FEMA teams throughout the country.

these are some examples of what an aggressive effort might look like

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

1/3/05

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Wednesday, December 29, 2004 11:45 PM

To: (b)(6)@OSD.Mil; Larry DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)
jack.patterson@osd.mil; james.stavridis@osd.mil

Subject: urgent a strategic opportunity and a moral imperative newt

for secdef
from newt 12-29-04

I have sent the following message to Cheney, Rice, Hadley, and Rove:

a strategic opportunity and moral imperative

the world is watching in horror a disaster of enormous proportions caused by the tsunami

probably 45 times as many people have died as died on 9/11

probably another 45 to 90 times as many people will die unless medical and other emergency services are extraordinary

this is both a moral moment and a strategic moment

the United States should visibly publicly lead with an all out effort embodied by our personnel in uniform.

a world which has seen Americans fighting in Fallujah should see Americans helping in southeast Asia.

Moslems who have seen us fight Moslems should see us rescuing Moslems.

rather than defending ourselves and complaining about the incompetence and dishonesty of United Nations officials we should be inviting embedded reporters to ride with our ships and our airplanes as we deliver rescue work across the region

the Combatant Commander for the Pacific should be empowered to organize an all out effort to coordinate with the local governments to rush aid to people in need

the President should explain the scale of the American effort and invite every American charitable and religious organization to pitch in and help

we should treat this as we would treat a hurricane in Florida

11-L-0559/OSD/47167

we will waste some money and we will once again overextend ourselves but the goodwill and the positive media we will gain by being aggressive and public will do more than the next twenty efforts at 'public diplomacy' or 'information campaigns.'

Disasters on this scale are blessedly rare.

They deserve a response equal to their scale of suffering.

The most powerful nation in the world has argued we can move decisively against terror.

this is a different but equally powerful form of terror.

we should prove we are as capable of moving peacefully with help as we are moving militarily with force.

this should be a very very public campaign and the media should be invited to cover every airplane and ship leaving on rescue missions and to accompany every mission.

with the goodwill of the American people who have been horrified by the images on television the President can probably help raise a lot of money as well as diverting federal dollars.

this event is as much a part of the war against terror as anything we are doing in Fallujah and it could be more positive for America than all our efforts to explain ourselves in other circumstances

we have to react immediately and within a strategic plan that is executed with great vigor.



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-2315-05
3 February 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBME/3*

SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief (SF 909)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue the attached implementing memorandum (TAB B) captures the initiatives CDRUSJFCOM briefed to you on 1 December 2004. The contribution that Reserve Component (RC) personnel may play in Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQs) requires further study.
- **Analysis.** On 1 December 2004, CDRUSJFCOM briefed you on a broad range of actions to accelerate DOD's ability to make JTF HQs immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of air, land, maritime and information capabilities. You questioned using RC personnel to supply JTF HQs. The memorandum proposes to study the role the RC should fill in both the rapid deployment and the longer-term sustainment of JTF HQs and recommends an RC mobilization process supporting this role. The memorandum also adds a second operational Standing Joint Force Headquarters within USJFCOM.
- During coordination, OSD(P&R) proposed a rewrite (TAB C) of the implementing memorandum with significant changes, to include: creation of permanent JTF HQs from Service Operational HQs through expansion of the Joint Manpower Exchange Program by 800 billets; CJCS validation of requirements for Joint RC augmentation units and eliminating the proposed study; USJFCOM publish Joint Training Guidance that would apply to the other combatant commands; and direct all policy changes be effective 31 March and personnel moves take place by 31 August.
- CDRUSJFCOM and I recommend not incorporating these additional items in this implementing document. To do so would negate some of the original intent of the memorandum and your discussion with CDRUSJFCOM.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the implementation memorandum (TAB B).

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:
As stated

MA SD	MA DSD	FEB 04 2005	
TSA SD	SA DSD		
EXEC SEC	<i>11 2/3</i>		
ESR MA	<i>FB 2/28/05</i>		

Prepared By: LtGen J.T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3 (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 02374-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47169

322

3 Feb 05 2 Dec 04

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
 UNDERSECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
 ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
 DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES
 CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Policy Implementation to Improve Formation and Sustainment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters.

On 1 December 2004, I approved a broad range of actions to accelerate the Department's ability to make Joint Task Force headquarters immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of our air, land, maritime and information capabilities. In order to meet that expectation, the following actions and responsibilities are directed.

Individual Augmentees

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, will assign a priority level to existing and planned Joint Task Force headquarters to guide manning and resourcing decisions. With support from the Combatant Commanders and the Services, the Chairman will establish an improved process for sourcing and training individual augmentation personnel assigned to JTF headquarters, using Execute Orders where appropriate.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense Agencies and the Services, will establish policy to ensure appropriate sources of active and reserve military personnel are available to fill individual augmentation requirements for JTF headquarters. As a part of this effort, the Chairman will establish standard tour length policy for military personnel who are individually assigned to serve on the staff of a JTF headquarters. Additionally, Service Secretaries will assess their ~~field grade end strength skill inventories~~ against individual augmentation requirements for JTF headquarters and resource these requirements in future personnel program objectives.

~~The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the Combatant Commanders, the Chief, National Guard Bureau and the Secretaries of the Military Departments will study the role that the Reserve Components should fill in both the rapid deployment and the longer term sustainment of JTF headquarters and recommend a Reserve Component mobilization process that fulfills this role. As a part of this study, the use of Joint Reserve Units to plug into JTF headquarters in key functional roles will be considered.~~

Service Operational Headquarters

Combatant Commanders will designate selected Service Operational Headquarters as enduring JTF headquarters. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the Combatant Commanders, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments will validate requirements for Joint Reserve component augmentation units to support expansion capability of

TAB C

these JTF headquarters. Combatant Commanders, in conjunction with the Services, will direct and oversee implementation of an expanded Joint Manpower Exchange Program to man these JTF headquarters totaling not less than 800 spaces.

——— Commander, USJFCOM will recommend sourcing solutions, supervise the implementation of sourcing decisions including the provision of individual augmentation to JTF headquarters designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will assist other Combatant Commanders in developing Joint Manning Documents for JTF headquarters. To improve the immediate operational performance of new JTF headquarters, Commander, USJFCOM will establish a second operationally-ready and immediately deployable Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element).

Personnel Policies

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and USD (P&R), in coordination with Commander, USJFCOM, will develop a common tracking mechanism to identify active and reserve personnel with JTF headquarters experience and to track the joint skill sets of individuals. Service Secretaries will use this information for career management, as appropriate, and make it available to USJFCOM for use in managing individual augmentation of JTF headquarters.

——— USD (P&R) will develop and submit proposed legislative changes and DoD policy to grant appropriate joint duty credit for serving 12 months on a JTF headquarters in a combat zone. ~~Combatant Commanders will direct and oversee implementation of an expanded Joint Manpower Exchange Program to encompass all Service operational headquarters that are designated by their Combatant Commander as potential JTF headquarters.~~

USD (Policy) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish a process and working relationships with appropriate offices of the U.S. Government to persuade coalition partner nations to assign highly skilled staff officers to man the suggested coalition positions in high priority, combined JTF headquarters.

Readiness Reporting

Combatant Commanders will certify and report the readiness of assigned headquarters staffs designated to perform as a JTF or functional component headquarters staff in the Defense Readiness Reporting System. Commander, USJFCOM, in collaboration with the other Combatant Commanders and the Service Chiefs will develop JTF headquarters training programs and readiness standards for approval by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commander, USJFCOM will publish Joint Training Guidance to guide development of joint training programs

All policy and process changes will be effective by 31 March. All actions requiring personnel moves will be in place by 31 August. These actions and responsibilities will be included in the next Strategic Planning Guidance and appropriate doctrine and policy documents. Because of the vital nature of these improvements to our ability to form and sustain JTF headquarters, I would like to be updated periodically on the progress of the initiatives directed herein.

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

Mr. Shepherd	USJFCOM	6 January 2005
Mr. Gardner	OSD(P&R)	4 January 2005
Mr. Gunziner	(OSD(Policy)	29 December 2004

TAB D

Tab D

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/47172

December 2, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

CC: **ADM** Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief

I was impressed with Ed Giambastiani's concept for the JTF HQ. Clearly a lot of good work by his ~~staff~~ and the Joint ~~Staff~~ as well went into it.

I do want to see **you** carefully think through whether it ought to be **an** active cadre of folks instead of reserves. I cannot see any reason whatsoever to use **reserves**. Once you think that through, I'd like to see an implementing document that I can **sign** in the next two weeks. We need to move out on **this**.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120204-10

.....
Please respond by 17 Dec 04

Thanks.

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47173

OSD 02374-05

322

2 Dec 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 4 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Policy Implementation to Improve Formation and Sustainment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters

On 1 December 2004, I approved a broad range of actions to accelerate DOD's ability to make Joint Task Force headquarters (JTF HQs) immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated operations of air, land, maritime and information capabilities. To meet that expectation, the following actions and responsibilities are directed.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commanders, will assign a priority level to existing and planned JTF HQs to guide staffing and resourcing decisions. With support from the combatant commanders and the Services, the Chairman will establish an improved process for sourcing and training individual augmentation personnel assigned to JTF HQs, using execute orders where appropriate.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense agencies and the Services, will establish policy to ensure appropriate sources of Active and Reserve military personnel are available to fill individual augmentation requirements for JTF HQs. As a part of this effort, the Chairman will establish standard tour length policy for military personnel who are assigned as individual augmentees to serve on the staff of a JTF HQs. Additionally, Service Secretaries will assess their skill inventory and field grade end strength against individual augmentation requirements for JTF HQs and accommodate these requirements in future personnel program submissions.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the combatant commanders, the Chief, National Guard Bureau and the Secretaries of the Military Departments will study the role that the Reserve Components (RCs) should fill in both the rapid deployment and the longer-term sustainment of JTF HQs and recommend an RC mobilization process that fulfills this role. As a part of this study, the use of Joint Reserve Units in key functional roles will be considered.



OSD 02374-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47174

322

4 Feb 05

2 Dec 04

Commander, USJFCOM, will recommend sourcing solutions, supervise the implementation of sourcing decisions including the provision of individual augmentation to JTF HQs and assist other combatant commanders in developing joint staffing documents for JTF HQs. To improve the immediate operational performance of new JTF HQs, Commander, USJFCOM, will establish a second operationally ready and immediately deployable Standing Joint Force Headquarters (core element).

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) (USD(P&R)), in coordination with Commander, USJFCOM, will develop a common tracking mechanism to identify Active and Reserve personnel with JTF HQs experience and to track the joint skill sets of individuals. Service Secretaries will use this information for career management, as appropriate, and make it available to USJFCOM for use in managing individual augmentation of JTF HQs.

USD(P&R) will develop and submit proposed legislative changes and DOD policy to grant appropriate joint duty credit for serving 12 months on a JTF HQs in a combat zone.

Combatant commanders will direct and oversee implementation of an expanded Joint Manpower Exchange Program to encompass all Service operational headquarters that are designated by their combatant commander as potential JTF HQs.

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish a process and working relationships with appropriate offices of the US government to persuade coalition partner nations to assign highly skilled staff officers to combined JTF HQs.

Combatant commanders will certify and report the readiness of assigned headquarters staffs designated to perform as a JTF or functional component headquarters staff. Commander, USJFCOM, in collaboration with the other combatant commanders and the Service Chiefs, will develop JTF HQs training programs and readiness standards for approval by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These actions and responsibilities will be included in the next Strategic Planning Guidance and appropriate doctrine and policy documents. Because of the vital nature of these improvements, I would like to be updated periodically on the progress of the initiatives directed herein.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Z. A. [unclear]', written in a cursive style.

~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Draft Register

I received the "draft register" for my personal papers that are already on deposit with the Library of Congress. I have several questions.

I'd like to see the following items before I include them in the gift:

- 1) White House personal file **#125**.
- 2) The memorabilia and photographs referred to on page 7.
- 3) The photographs in **615** referred to on page 7.
- 4) In container **546**, it mentions photographs. And also **547, 559**, and **615**.
- 5) CL **18** has a file that says "DR Personal Save" container **559**, CL **20**, there are two folders that say "DR Personal Save" in container **575**.
- 6) SCI-1 says "DR Personal Save" in container CL **20**.
- 7) And then there's something called oversized **1** and **2**.

I'd like to see all of the above, plus any photographs, memorabilia or oversized items before I include them in the deed of **gift**.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121304-22

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47176

OSD 02375-05

005

14 Dec 04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE



2005 FEB -3 PM 1:22

February 3, 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Donation of Papers to Library of Congress -- Update

- In December you asked to see certain items listed in the "draft register" for your personal papers already on deposit with the Library of Congress (Tab A).
 - A Library historian has located what he believes to be the material responsive to your request and has summarized the material (Tab B).
 - I have reviewed the summary of the items, but I have not examined them to confirm that they are the items you seek.
 - Based on the description in the historian's letter, it appears that the items you seek are contained in approximately 25 small and 2 large boxes that I estimate to total in excess of 10 linear feet of material.
 - Some of the items are classified and will require appropriate storage if removed from the Library.
 - You may view these materials either at the Library or request that they be delivered to you upon 48 hours' notice to the Library. I will arrange for their transportation from the Library if you would prefer to view them either in your office or at your home.
- In December you asked a number of questions about the draft instrument of gift (Tab C).
 - I am available to discuss these at your convenience.
 - I have scheduled a meeting with an attorney at the Library on Tuesday, February 8 to discuss the intellectual property question and to compare notes on some of the terminology in the draft instrument of gift.

314.7

3 Feb 05

14 Dec 04



OSD 02375-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47177

~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Draft Register

I received the "draft register" for my personal papers that are already on deposit with the Library of Congress. I have several questions.

I'd like to see the following items before I include them in the gift:

- 1) White House personal file #125.
- 2) The memorabilia and photographs referred to on page 7.
- 3) The photographs in 615 referred to on page 7.
- 4) In container 546, it mentions photographs. And also 547, 559, and 615.
- 5) CL 18 has a file that says "DR Personal Save" container 559, CL 20, there are two folders that say "DR Personal Save" in container 575.
- 6) SCI-1 says "DR Personal Save" in container CL 20.
- 7) And then there's something called oversized 1 and 2.

I'd like to see all of the above, plus any photographs, memorabilia or oversized items before I include them in the deed of gift.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121304-22

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47178

13 January 2005

To: Mr. Craig Glassner

Acting Director, ESCD

Fax: (b)(6)

From: John ~~Earl~~ Haynes 

20th Century Political Historian

Manuscript Division, Library of Congress

Phone: (b)(6)

e-mail: jhay@loc.gov

Subj: Secretary Rumsfeld's Personal Papers

Dear Mr. Glassner:

Attached is a description of what we believe to be the material designated in the fax you send on 12 January. The description is keyed to the eight items in your fax. In addition, the relevant pages of the register (finding aid) are also included.

The material outlined represents roughly twenty-five archival boxes and two oversize flat containers. Archival boxes are sized 12 1/4 x 10 1/4 x 5, much smaller than a record center carton which is roughly 12 x 12 x 12.

Secretary Rumsfeld can examine the material in two ways. He can come to the Manuscript Division and the material will be made available to him in the Manuscript Division Conference Room. Alternately, the material can be picked up and transported to Secretary Rumsfeld

If the latter is preferable, please note that the material in items #5 and #6 contain security classified documents (Secret and SCI and currently stored in our vault room for security classified material). Consequently whoever picks up the material should have appropriate authority to courier classified material. If Secretary Rumsfeld would prefer to have the material brought to him, we can have the boxes ready for pickup at the Library of Congress Madison Building loading dock within 48 hours.

Please let us know Secretary Rumsfeld's preference and we will do our part.

[7 pages follow]

11-L-0559/OSD/47179

JAN-13-2005 15:12

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97::

P.01

1. White House personal file #125:

This refers to the Personal File subseries (Containers 528-548) in the White House series. Its contents are listed starting on page 125 of the container list. Here is a general description of the subseries (see the container list for a more precise breakdown):

Personal File, 1962-1976, n.d.

Correspondence, casework files, memberships, photographs, congratulations, clippings, memorabilia, and invitations. Arranged alphabetically by type of material, name of person, organization, or topic and filed thereunder as received.

2. Memorabilia and photographs referred to on page 7:

This refers to a Scope and Content Note mention of memorabilia and photographs in the White House Personal File (See #1 above).

I took a look at the memorabilia. It consists of printed ephemera such as invitations, programs, tourist map and brochures, inaugural printed ephemera, name tags, dinner place cards, and stationery. **Quantity:** three large folders in boxes 545-546 and additional material in OV 1.

3. The photographs in 615 referred to on page 7:

Photographs of Rumsfeld as a Boy Scout (6 photographs) and naval officer (8 photographs) located in Box 615 and mentioned on page 7 of the Scope and Content Note.

4. Photographs in containers 546, 547, 559 and 615:

Containers 546-547: White House series photographs

Cost of Living Council, 1972

Miscellaneous, 1970-1976 (2 folders) *See also* Oversize

Office of Economic Opportunity, 1969-1970

Oval office meetings, 1974-1975 *See also* Oversize

Pay Board, 1972

Portraits *See also* Oversize

Others, 1975-1976

Rumsfeld, 1970-1975 (3 folders)

Rumsfeld with

Kissinger, Henry, 1975

Mayor of San Juan, P.R., 1969

Members of Congress, 1970, n.d.

Members of the press, 1971, n.d.

Moynihan, Daniel P., 1969

Staff party on *Sequoia* (yacht), 1975

State of the Union speech, 1976

Travel

11- L-0559/OSD/47180

Container 559: NATO series photographs

Award ceremonies, 1973

Ministerial meetings, 1973-1974 (3 folders)

Miscellaneous, 1973-1974, n.d.

Oval Office meetings, 1973-1974 See *Oversize*

Public relations, 1973

Reception at the residence, 1973

Summit meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 1974 See also *Oversize*

Container 615: Miscellany series (Boy Scout and navy photos)

5. "DR Personal Save" files in CL 18 container 559 and CL 20 container 574 (two folders of "DR Personal Save")

"DR Personal Save" was the original title of several folders in the NATO and DOD series. The folders contain copies of official memoranda, agenda, and reports which DR probably wanted segregated for easy reference. These folders do not contain personal information about him.

NATO series (Container CL18—classified items removed from Container 559)

Department of Defense (Containers 575/CL20/SCI)

6. SCI-1 "DR Personal Save" file in CL 20
See #5 above

7. *Oversize 1 and 2*
These boxes contain oversize photographs and memorabilia.

8. All of the above, plus any photographs, memorabilia or oversize items:
The only other photographs and memorabilia not listed above are in the Congressional File series and Department of Defense series.

Congressional File:

Memorabilia: Campaign buttons, earrings, matchbook, brochures, and bumper stickers.

1962	Box 58	1 folder
1964	Box 69	2 folders
1966	Box 73	1 folder
1968	Box 78	1 folder

Photographs

Campaign

1962	Box 58	(1 photograph)
	Box 67	(2 folders)
1964	Box 72	(2 folders)
1966	Box 76	(2 folders)
1968	Box 81	(2 folders)

Congressional File**Other Congressional photographs (see finding aid, pp. 85-86)****Box 317 (6 folders)****Box 318 (11 folders)****Defense Department (Containers 579-580)****Photographs***Greece, 1976**Miscellany, 1975-1976 See also Oversize**Swearing-in ceremony, 1975 See also Oversize**Veterans of Foreign Wars ceremony, n.d.***White House****Bill-signing ceremony, Fiscal Year 1978 defense appropriation,
1976****Dinner honoring Defense Department officials, 1976**

11-L-0559/OSD/47182

Papers of Donald Rumsfeld

Page 125

WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, n.d. (Continued)

<i>Container Nos.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
528 (cont.)	Personal File Acknowledgments, 1968-1975 (2 folders) Book proposal re House of Representatives, 1969
529	Business executives, lists, 1970-1972, n.d. (2 fold —) Casework 1969-1971 (6 folders)
530	1972-1975 (5 folders) Clippings Cabinet members, 1968-1969 Friends and associates, 1966-1970 People and projects, 1969 People in politics, 1969 Condolences and get-well wishes, 1969-1976
531	Congratulations Received Ford administration, 1974-1975 A-R (6 folders)
532	S-Z (2 folders) Nixon administration Counselor to the president, appointment, 1970-1971 (2 fold —) Office of Economic Opportunity, appointment as director, 1969 (2 folders)
533	(4 folders) Sent, 1969-1972 (2 folders)
534	(1 folda)

Papers of Donald Rumsfeld

Page 126

WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, n.d. (Continued)

<i>Container Nos.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
534 (cont.)	Personal File Correspondence American Political Science Association, fellowship program, 1967-1977 Brady, James S., 1977-1982 English, Robert E., 1969-1970 Robson, John E., 1962-1974 Searle, Daniel C., 1962-1967, 1975 Invitations regretted 1969, Apr.- June (3 folders)
535	1969, July-1970, June (9 folders)
536	1970, July-1971, June (8 folders)
537	1971, Aug.-1972, Feb. (8 folders)
538	1972, Mar.-Nov. (11 folders)
539	1972, Dec.-1974, June (16 folders)
540	1974, July-Dec. (7 folders) <i>See also Classified</i> 1975 Jan. (2 folders) <i>See also Classified</i>
541	(1 folder) Feb.-Mar. (5 folders)
542	Apr.-May (6 folders) June (1 folder)
543	(1 folder) July-Sept. (4 folders)

11-L-0559/OSD/47184

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P. 05

Papers of Donald Rumsfeld

Page 127

WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, a.d. (Continued)

<i>Container Nos.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
543 (cont.)	Personal File Invitations regretted 1975 Oct. (2 folders)
544	(1 folder) Nov.-Dec. (4 folders) See also <i>Classified</i> Memberships and sponsorships Regretted, 1963-1976 Terminated, 1963-1976 (1 folder)
545	(3 folders) Memorabilia, 1967-1977 See also <i>Oversize</i> (1 folder)
546	(2 folders) Photographs Cost of Living Council, 1972 Miscellaneous, 1970-1976 (2 folders) See also <i>Oversize</i> Office of Economic Opportunity, 1969-1970 Oval Office meetings, 1974-1975 See also <i>Oversize</i>
547	Pay Board, 1972 Portraits See also <i>Oversize</i> others, 1975-1976 Rumsfeld, 1970-1975 (3 folders) Rumsfeld with Kissinger, Henry, 1975 Mayor of San Juan, P.R., 1969 Members of Congress, 1970, n.d. Members of the press, 1971, n.d. Moynihan, Daniel P., 1969 Staff party on <i>Sequoia</i> (yacht), 1975 State of the Union speech, 1976

11-L-0559/OSD/47185

Papers of Donald Rumsfeld

Page 128

WHITE HOUSE, 1962-1984, n.d. (Continued)

<i>Container No.</i>	<i>Contents</i>
547 (cont.)	Personal File Photographs Travel Nigeria and Senegal, 1971 Vail, Colo., 1974 Thank-you letters Ford administration, 1974-1975 A-H (3 folders)
548	I-Z (5 fold —) Nixon administration, 1969-1973 (2 folders)

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 1966-1977, n.d.

548	Alphabetical file (correspondence received and copies of correspondence sent), 1973-1974 A-B (2 folders)
549	(1 folder) C-G (5 folders) <i>See also Classified</i>
550	H-L (5 folders) M-O (1 folder)
551	(3 folders) P-R (3 folders) <i>See also Classified</i> S-U (2 folders) <i>See also Classified</i>
552	(1 folder) V-Z (2 folders)

11-L-0559/OSD/47186

(b)(6)

D no

December 14, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Terry Robbins
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Instrument of Gift

Thanks for the draft Instrument of Gift.

I have the following questions and thoughts.

- 1) It says "residing in Washington, D.C." I think my legal residence is still in Illinois. I ought to talk to Terry to see if I want to use Illinois or Maryland, but I'm pretty sure I won't want to use Washington, D.C.
- 2) On line 5, it refers to the type of papers, but it does not mention "business," unless that's what professional means.
- 3) On the next to the last line, on page 1, it says that I may retain any of the originals of my personal papers and furnish a copy. Does that permit me to do it after digitization, when I have had a chance to look at everything and see what I might like the original of? Or do I need to decide before digitization?
- 4) Page 2, paragraph 1: I would like to discuss what "intellectual property" means, and how you solve that.
- 5) Page 3: I'd like to discuss the fact that it does not transfer title to classified information and how that gets handled.
- 6) Page 3, paragraph 2, line 5: I wonder if we ought to make it ten years.
- 7) Page 3, paragraph 2, Line 7 (under Access): I'd like to discuss those policies.
- 8) Page 3, next to last paragraph: When it mentions those that should be restricted from public access, for what length of time is that, and who makes the judgment?

- 9) Page 3, last line: I'd like to discuss that.
- 10) Page 4, item E: It talks about adversely affecting the security. I also think the reputation of the United States, or there may be something other than security. Let's discuss it.
- 11) Page 5, paragraph 1, line 2: Let's discuss this triple X series.
- 12) Page 5, paragraph 1: Let's discuss the five years.
- 13) Page 5: I wonder about case work and possible embarrassment for the constituents when I was a Member of Congress.
- 14) Page 5: I'd like to talk about press access.
- 15) Page 6, last three lines: Let's discuss.
- 16) Page 7, paragraph 5: I think that I should agree to pay for some or all of the digitization. Let's discuss that.
- 17) Page 7, paragraph 5: We may want to add "except as designated by the donor" and under the add, we may want to include "for all or most."
- 18) Page 8: We should include the George W. Bush Library, if/when it ever exists.
- 19) Page 8, Item 7: Let's discuss.
- 20) Page 9, middle of the first paragraph: Let's discuss a timeframe.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/30/04 Draft Instrument of Gift

DHR:ss
121304-25

.....
Please respond by _____

DRAFT
11/30/04

INSTRUMENT OF GIFT

Borell?
I, Donald H. Rumsfeld, residing in Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as Donor), hereby give, grant, and set over to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library of Congress (hereinafter Library) and for administration therein by the authorities thereof a collection of my personal and professional papers and associated material documenting my life and career in public service and government (hereinafter referred to as Collection), more particularly described by the attached schedule. Donor warrants that he **owns** the physical property in the Collection free and clear of any liens. Donor does not represent that the papers and materials donated constitute the entirety of the personal and professional papers and associated material in his possession.

This is a gift of only the physical property contained in the materials constituting the Collection, and Donor reserves to himself all rights, title, and interest he may have in and to all of the intellectual property associated with the Collection including, but not limited to copyright. Further, Donor, in his complete discretion, may retain the original of any of his personal papers and furnish a copy of that original to the Library.

*after
the gift?
& disposition?*

By accepting this gift, however, the Library does ~~so~~ to improve the national collections, and such acceptance of the physical property shall not be construed as a conclusive determination by the Library that the Donor does, in fact, have or possess with regard to these materials such intellectual property as above identified or described.

How Glue?

The Collection shall be subject to the following conditions:

1. Classified Materials. All materials in the Collection that are specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and are, in fact, properly classified pursuant to such statute or executive order, shall be safeguarded and administered by the Library in accordance with such statutes ~~or~~ executive orders. Access to these materials shall be allowed only in accordance with procedures established by the United States Government to govern the availability of such information. All classified materials shall be reviewed from time to time by the Library (and, at the Library's request, by appropriate security classification authorities), and materials which, because of the passage of time or other

17
2

DRAFT

circumstances, no longer require classification restrictions shall, upon declassification, be opened to public access, subject to the access requirements of provision #2 below. This gift does not transfer title to classified information, in whatever form in the collection; and, in accepting the ~~gift~~, the Library agrees to receive classified information only as a deposit for administration under the terms of this document. ?

2. Access. With the exception that the entire Collection shall at all times be available to the staff of the Library for administration purposes, access to the Collection is reserved to Donor and to others only with Donor's written permission, or, in the event of the death of Donor, with the permission of Donor's literary executor for a period of 5 years ¹⁰ from the later of the date of death of the Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld; thereafter the Collection shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature. ✓

Donor recognizes that the Collection may contain some or all of the following classes of material that should be restricted from public access: ✓ H. P. R.

(a) Papers and other historical materials the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a living ?

person or persons.

(b) Papers and other historical materials that are specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be restricted from public disclosure in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

(c) Materials relating to the personal, family, and confidential business affairs of Donor or other persons referenced in the Collection.

(d) Materials containing statements made by or to Donor in confidence.

(e) Materials containing statements or information the divulgence of which might prejudice the conduct of foreign relations of the United States or which could affect adversely the security of the United States.

(f) Materials relating to law enforcement investigations of individuals or organizations, to proposed appointments to office, or to other personnel matters directly affecting individual privacy.

[Add: Except for papers that contain national security information as described in (2)(b), all the papers in the Collection shall be made available to researchers after the restriction period described above.]

Those requesting access to the Collection shall provide Donor with their subject of interest and purpose of their research. Those granted access also must

DRAFT

agree in writing to obtain written permission of Donor or his designee prior to quoting for publication any unpublished material in the Collection.

Additionally, access to that section of the collection designated on the attached schedule as the xxx series will be reserved to the Donor and to others only with the Donor's written permission during the Donor's lifetime and the lifetime of President Gerald R. Ford, whichever comes later. In the event of the death of Donor, access to the xxx series will be restricted to those with the permission of the Donor's literary executor for a period of 5 years from the date thereof or during the life of President Gerald R. Ford, whichever is later. Thereafter, the xxx series shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature.

The Donor will appoint his literary executor. Upon Donor's death, Joyce P. Rumsfeld may appoint a new literary executor, including herself. Upon the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld, their surviving children may jointly appoint a new literary executor, who may not be any of the surviving children.

The Library will notify the Donor or, upon his death, his literary executor, promptly of any requests, claims, or legal actions relating to the papers or materials of the Collection.

Corr. 6.2

Pr 11 ?

3. Reproduction. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned reservation of rights and interest in and to the intellectual property as above identified, persons granted access to the Collection may obtain single-copy reproductions of the materials contained therein for research purposes, and, consistent with Library practices and procedures, such additional copies as may be allowed by copyright law (e.g., by the fair use doctrine or expiration of the copyright term). The Library **may** make preservation copies of the materials in the Collection in any format as determined by the Library.

4. Use. Use of the materials constituting the Collection shall be governed by the Library's policies for the administration and service of materials of this nature. The Library is also permitted to exhibit any or all of the material in the Collection on- and off-site and may display any or all of the materials in the Collection on its website or in any other electronic form or successor technology, provided, however, that the Library first obtains the permission of the Donor or the Donor's literary executor *{Delete: during the period of Donor's life and for 10 years thereafter}* ¹⁰ **[Add: for a period of 5 years from the later of the date of death of the Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld]** and subject to the other

EW Book

the Ronald Reagan Library, Gerald R. Ford Library, George H. W. Bush Library, Richard M. Nixon Library, Herbert Hoover Institute [?], and Princeton University, subject to the same conditions as provided for in **this** instrument.

6. Additions. Such other and related materials as the Donor may from time to time donate to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library shall be governed by the terms of this Instrument of Gift or such written amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon between the Donor and the Library. At the discretion of the Donor, future additions to the Collection **may** be transferred to the Library under a separately negotiated Instrument of Gift.

7. *{Delete: Removal. Donor or a representative acting on Donor's behalf pursuant to his written authorization may remove any or all of the Collection at Donor's complete discretion during Donor's lifetime.}* [Add: Original Items. The Donor may borrow original items from the Library for such periods of time as will be mutually agreed to by the Donor and the Library at the time of the loan of the original items.]

8. Disposal. Should any **part** of the Collection be found by the Library to

DRAFT

include materials which the Library deems inappropriate for retention with the Collection or for transfer to other collections in the Library, the Library shall offer to return the materials to the Donor and allow the Donor ninety (90) days from the date of such offer to reply. If the Donor does not wish to receive said materials or designate another repository to receive them, or has not responded to the Library's offer by the end of the aforesaid ninety (90) days, the Library **may** dispose of such materials in accordance with its procedures for disposition of materials not needed for the Library's collections. Should the Library determine, subsequent to acceptance and transfer of the Collection that any part of the Collection includes classified information which the Library deems inappropriate for permanent retention with the Collection, it shall notify the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense shall then notify the Library in writing of the appropriate disposition **of** these classified materials.

Tim
Hove

9. Communications. The Donor will provide the Library with a current address and other contact information in order that the Library can meet its responsibilities as herein described. The Library will send notices and requests to addresses of record as provided and updated by the Donor.

In witness whereof, I have set my hand and seal this _____ day of

_____, 2004 in the City of _____

Donald H. Rumsfeld


Accepted for the United States of America

The Librarian of Congress (seal)

Date

~~FOUO~~

January 31, 2005

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Gift Statement

Where do we stand on that gift statement for the Library of Congress?

Thanks.

DHR:sa
013105-7

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47199

OCT 06 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tracking PAS

We need to capture the Presidential appointees-Senate confirmed vacancies that have occurred over the entire time we have been here.

Specifically, I would like to know what percentage of the DoD PAS positions have been vacant over the first three years, through today. For example, of the 365 days in a year, what percentage of the days was each job vacant? Some would be vacant a year or a year and a half, and many would be vacant six or eight months.

My guess is if you add it all up, it will end up that we have been operating at about a 20 to 25 percent vacancy rate.

Please get back to me with that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100504-16

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

230.02

600764

October 4, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
CC: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Force Level Updates

Please arrange a briefing for me to get a report on everything that's happening on each of these items in my Force Level memo.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/07/04 Working Paper on Force Levels (v.6)
9/27/04 CJCS Info Memo to SecDef re: Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
100404-18

Please respond by 10/29/04

320.2

40404

~~FOUO~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Tina Jonas
David Chu
Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

Get mjb

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
090704-41

.....
Please respond by

9/14

OSD 14746-04

~~Open~~
Closed
9/14/04
~~Open~~

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47202

SUBJECT: “Force Levels,” “End Strength” and “Stress on the Force” — Are current U.S. military forces sufficient in size and properly organized and managed to meet the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

Summary: The U.S. can afford whatever military force level is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. It is our people who distinguish the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be a mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in force levels, we increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

Background: The operational tempo of U.S. forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the statutory “end strength” of the U.S. military, but have not explained how to pay for it. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is not cheap, easy or quick.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more forces, the more force protection that is required; the more forces, the more infrastructure that is required; the more forces, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is available.

- At present, the Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. The Department is taking immediate actions to relieve this stress on the force in Iraq. There is a three-pronged strategy underway that is working to:

- Develop Iraqi capacity to conduct police and other security tasks;
- Increase international military participation in Iraq; and
- Increase actionable intelligence to disrupt attacks on coalition forces and other threats to stability.

In any event, the current stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation in addition to those immediate actions listed above. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

1. Lessons Being Learned

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the

Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military — U.S. and international — elements.

- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of “forces for a specific combatant commander” with a “Global Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in support of their essential missions.
- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate mix for the 21st century. The task is to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.
- Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. DoD will review active and reserve components to determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill sets, within existing end strength limits, to best satisfy the demands of the 21st century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, DoD will seek ways to increase the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which it was called up. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- Precision Weapons. Our use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- Deployments. The old Industrial Age process is broken. An approach that permits only peace or war, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time and permit more nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.

- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. People

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end strength” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
- Core Competencies. OSD is aggressively working to move the military out of activities that are not core competencies or inherently governmental. For example, housing privatization has allowed DoD to get better value and speed modernization for the same expenditure of funds.
- Contract Employees. For shorter duration missions and missions that are not military core competencies, DoD will have to make more judicious use of contract employees. This will require that we organize so we have Congressional authority and the ability to properly engage contract assistance.
- Education. The Department is working to improve joint education to create a culture that empowers younger leaders to think beyond their parent Services for creative solutions to the challenges our nation faces.
- Coalition Forces. The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. This will—require a diplomatic effort—to substantially reduce the current restrictions

WORKING PAPER

and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations' ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.

- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. Additionally, the U.S. will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.
- Indigenous Forces. The U.S. must organize and fund to be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease the burden on coalition forces. This will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.
- Reserve Forces. DoD has established a policy whereby it will, to the extent possible, first use Reserve forces that have not recently been mobilized.
- Volunteers. DoD will continue to use volunteers from the Reserve force, to the extent available.
- Holidays. To the extent possible, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of major holidays.
- Call-ups. DoD is revising the process so as to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, and will consider a tiered arrangement whereby some reserve units might be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready for prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- Incentives. DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments.
- Peace Operations. The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.

- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

3. Technology

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate use of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.
- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and more interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD will invest in technology to substitute for human force protection — sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by as much as 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, in and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. Services are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency

- Organization of Forces. In the 21st century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.

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- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the U.S., thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. OSD and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired “effects” and “outcomes,” rather than simply responding to requests for numbers of things — troops or platforms.
- Procurement. DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure.
- Strategic Lift. DoD will continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint. Additionally, the Department must continue to support participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Act as a supplement to our national mobility capability.
- Rotation Ratio. The Services will work to find ways to reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to transport crews to their equipment.
- Headquarters Layering. DoD components’ reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. The flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- Best Practices. DoD will work to move best practices from inside and outside DoD throughout the Department.
- Planning Tools. DoD is developing tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- Operational Availability. DoD will implement the appropriate JROC “operational availability” studies’ recommendations.
- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.

- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.
- Safety. DoD will move aggressively to reduce the number of mishaps as a means to protect our most valuable resources, our people.

5. Policy

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.
- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to provide protection for deployed U.S. forces.

Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the

easy and more expensive course of increasing force levels. We owe the American people no less.

DHR:dh

Current MFRs/ End Strength

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 28 14 8:55

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Tina Jonas
David Chu
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
090704-41

.....
Please respond by 9/14

360.2

7 Sep 04

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Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47212

OSD 14746-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 28 AM 9:55

INFO MEMO

CW-2086-04
27 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBW 9/27*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

- **Question.** "Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Yes. OSD(P&R) has the Department of Defense lead using the process developed by OSD(Policy) last year. The Joint Staff uses the Joint Staff Action Processing system to manage actions for which it has the lead.
- **Analysis**
 - The Joint ~~Staff~~ will assist OSD(P&R) in developing its briefing and revising the action agenda. The current action agenda is attached (TAB B).
 - The OSD(PA&E) DOD Balanced Scorecard **risk** metrics and the Joint Staff/OSD(P&R) co-chaired Force Management Functional Capabilities Board also track force level initiatives.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

copy to:

DUSD(P&R)

Prepared By: VADM Robert F. Willard, USN; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

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WORKING PAPER

Version #6

September 7, 2004

SUBJECT: “Force Levels,” “End Strength” and “Stress on the Force”—Are current **U.S.** military forces sufficient in size and properly organized and managed to meet the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

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Background: The operational tempo of **U.S.** forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the statutory “end strength” of the **U.S.** military, but have not explained how to pay for it. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is not cheap, easy or quick.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for **retired**, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more forces, the more force protection that is required; the more forces, the more infrastructure that is required; the more forces, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is available.

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Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47214

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- At present, the Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. The Department is taking immediate actions to relieve this stress on the force in Iraq. There is a three-pronged strategy underway that is working to:

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Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation in addition to those immediate actions listed above. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

1. Lessons Being Learned (J7 lead with J1/J3/38/35)

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the

Tab A

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11-L-0559/OSD/47215

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Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military—U.S. and international—elements.

- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
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- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of "relief-in-place" and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. People (filled with JS/JS3/JA)

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable "end strength" by 50,000. We won't know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
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and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations' ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.

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- Peace Operations. The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.

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Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47218

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- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

3. Technology (J8 lead with J4/J5/J6)

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate use of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.
- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and more interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD will invest in technology to substitute for human force protection — sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by as much as 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, in and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. Services are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency (J8 lead with J1/J2/J3/J4)

- Organization of Forces. In the 21st century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation: force rotation, and employment flexibility.

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- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.

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- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.
- Safety. DoD will move aggressively to reduce the number of mishaps as a means to protect our most valuable resources, our people.

5. Policy (JS level with JS3)

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that 'deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.
- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to provide protection for deployed U.S. forces.

Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the

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easy and more expensive *course* of increasing force levels. We **owe** the American people no **less**.

DHR:db
Current MFRs/ End Strength

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Tab A ³

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TAB B
Final DRAFT Version 10 (as of 11 Oct)

ACTION AGENDA – REDUCING STRESS ON THE FORCE
(without increasing military end strength)

1. Lessons Being Learned

Action Item	Near-Term Action	Mid-term Action
a. Contingency plans	<p><u>USD(P)</u> - Update Contingency Planning Guidance to include action items from 18 Aug SECDEF “Operational Availability Action Items” memo (Sept 03).</p> <p><u>CJCS</u> - Within 6 months of Contingency Planning Guidance publication, update Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Direct Combatant CC’s to delineate forces required to seize the initiative, additional forces required to achieve SDTE objectives, and follow-on forces required to achieve objectives of win decisive.</p>	<p><u>USD(P)</u> – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process that encompasses the full spectrum of military operations. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p> <p><u>USD(P&R)</u> – Implement a new Defense Readiness Reporting System that uses adaptive planning constructs for force readiness assessment (IOC in FY04)</p>
b. Jointness	<p><u>CDRJFCOM</u> – Publish & oversee implementation of DoD’s Integrated Interoperability Plan as tasked in the Transformation Planning Guidance. (Nov 03)</p>	<p><u>CJCS</u> - Develop DPG language supporting initiatives that improve jointness and add synergy to joint force operations. (Dec 03)</p> <p><u>USD(P&R)</u> – Implement Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System to capture joint experience and training of military personnel. Ensure personnel systems uniformly define and track joint training qualifications and experiences for the selection of qualified personnel for joint assignments. (Oct 04).</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
c. Training and Exercises	<p>USD P&R – Update the Training Transformation [mplementationPlan as appropriate to include lessons from recent real world experience (Jan 04).</p> <p>CDR JFCOM – Implement an initial Joint National Training Capability training event in FY04.</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Evaluate progress on implementing the three enabling Training Transformation capabilities (Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, Joint National Training Capability, Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability), and recommend adjustments, if required, for POM 06. (Aug 04)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM - Create a Joint National Training Capability to routinely incorporate joint context into major Service training events (FY 04)</p>
d. Global Force Management	<p>CJCS – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p>	<p>USD(P) – Oversee implementation of the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Study. (ongoing)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p> <p>USD (P&R) – work with CJCS to implement capabilities-based force allocation into defense readiness assessment and planning (June 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
c. Reserve/Active Force Balance	<p><u>Service Secretaries</u> – Develop plans and propose program or budget changes (if appropriate) to implement the SECDEF “Rebalancing the Force” memo and the 18 Aug SECDEF Operational Availability memo (Oct 03).</p> <p><u>USD(P&R) and Secretary of Army</u> – work with PA&E to develop Army program changes that decrease reliance on the Reserve Component for “swiftly defeat” & high demand units. (Oct 03)</p>	<p><u>USD(P)</u> – Work with USD(P&R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation. (Dec 03)</p> <p><u>CDRJFCOM</u>: In conjunction with Service Component Commands (SCCs), identify and implement plans and procedures in support of JFCOM's roles as the single Force Provider for the supported Combatant Commanders.</p>
f. Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets	<p><u>Service Secretaries</u> – Brief SECDEF on actions taken to better align manpower skills with assigned missions and develop Budget Change Proposals, if appropriate, to initiate support of rebalancing the force efforts. (Oct 03)</p>	<p><u>USD(P)</u> – Work with USD(P&R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation (Dec 03)</p> <p><u>USD(P&R)</u>- with USD(I) and CJCS, conduct a study of DoD’s organic language, regional, and cultural expertise skill requirements. Recommend options to realign skill sets to meet foreign language requirements. (Aug 04)</p> <p><u>CJCS</u>: With Services, identify each Services need to provide support for other Service, allied, and coalition units in support of full spectrum operations. Determine if there is a need to realign manpower to support this mission area. (Jun 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
g. Time on Operational Duty	Service Secretaries – Assess options to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces are actually performing the mission. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	USD(P&R), CJCS, Service Secretaries – Develop action plan to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces are actually performing the mission (Aug 04). CDRJFCOM : Identify actions, plans, methods and capabilities to track rotations of forces within the overall mobilization process. (Aug 04)
h. Precision Weapons		USD(AT&L) – with D, PA&E, CJCS and USD(P), develop plan for long-lead analysis needed to inform QDR as to impact of current and projected precision weapons programs on logistics and manpower requirements. (Dec 03)
i. Deployments	CDRJFCOM - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	USD(P&R) – with CJCS and Service Secretaries define interactions between manpower, personnel management, and training systems to ensure these systems and supporting deployment processes are integrated. (Oct 06)
j. Relief in Place	CJCS – work with Services and USD (P&R) to develop a common definition of “relief-in-place.” (Nov 03)	Service Secretaries - Develop and implement procedures to better execute relief-in-place operations, to include conducting the operations in less time and doing so using best practices learned across all Services (Dec '03)
k. SJFHQ		USD(P) – Identify next steps for SJFHQ implementation in DPG for POM 06 action. (Dec 03)

2. People

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Military Out of Non-Military Jobs	USD(P&R) – Work through the Defense Human Resource Board to identify opportunities for civilian-military conversions. As appropriate, work with PA&E or Comptroller to develop a Program Review Issue or Budget Change Proposal on civilian-military conversions (Oct 03).	USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department's efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not "military essential." (Dec 03)
b. Core Competencies	Service Secretaries – Continue progress toward achieving the President's Management Agenda (PMA) competitive sourcing initiative via the A76 process or divestiture using a core competency approach (on going)	<p>USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department's efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not "military essential." (Dec 03)</p> <p>Service Secretaries – develop options for divesting non-core competency missions in POM 06-11, including plans for completing the required PMA review by FY09. (Aug 04)</p>
c. Contract Employees	USD(C) – Consider whether a legislative proposal is needed to allow DoD to more judiciously use contractors in an expeditionary role for short duration missions and for other missions that are not military core competencies. (Jan 04)	USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department's efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not "military essential." (Dec 03)
d. Education	CJCS – Complete/ implement Joint Professional Military Education initiatives	Dir, OFT – With USD P&R, develop options for a transformational education program for consideration in QDR. (Jan 05)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Coalition Forces	-	<p>USD(P) – Ensure increased availability and readiness of coalitions forces is a key issue for the next Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
f. Allies	USD(P) – Develop options for expanding the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)	<p>USD(P) – integrate appropriate direction in the Security Cooperation Guidance on sharing transformation with allies and accelerating their ability to assume greater responsibility for their own defense. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Develop a plan to implement common training and readiness assessment with Allies. (Oct 04)</p>
g. Backfill		<p>USD(P) – Develop appropriate direction to Regional Component Commanders in the Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
h. Indigenous Forces	USD(P) – Develop a plan to expand the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)	USD(P) - Update the Security Cooperation Guidance (Jan 04) to direct Regional Component Commanders to increase the availability and capability of host nation security personnel.

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
i. Reserve Forces	Service Secretaries – Review current policies and practices to ensure judicious and prudent use of reserve forces. Inform USD(P&R) of the results of this review. (Dec 03)	USD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04) CDRJFCOM: Develop plan for a consolidated Joint Mobilization Process focused on reengineering existing systems and plans for JFCOM's role as the single mobilization command.
j. Volunteers	Service Secretaries – Develop and implement initiatives that enhance unit and individual volunteerism per the 9 July SecDef “Rebalancing the Force” memo. Brief DepSecDef NLT Oct 03.	USD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04) CDRJFCOM: Develop plans, systems and procedures to standardize coordination and command and control for Service Component Commands in the management and tracking of volunteers. (Aug 04)
k. Holidays		USD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Component mobilization policy documents. (April 04)
l. Call Ups	CDRJFCOM – Identify changes in Joint doctrine, policy, and law required for new deployment and mobilization process reform and recommend to SECDEF improvements to RC mobilization considering NE/OEF/OIF lessons learned. (Jan 04) USD(P&R) - In coordination with CDRJFCOM develop “Quick Wins” initiatives from OIF lessons learned for SECDEF consideration. Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (Sep 03)	USD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04). Develop appropriate legislative proposals to implement deployment and mobilization process reforms. (Jan 04)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
m. Incentives	USD(C) and USD(P&R) - assess options to offer incentives for extended deployments and develop a Budget Change Proposal or Management Initiative Decision as appropriate for DepSecDef consideration (Oct 03).	
n. Peace Operations Initiative		USD(P) - Revise Security Cooperation Guidance as appropriate to better focus security cooperation efforts on increasing the ability of allies and partners to participate in peace operations. (Jan 04) USD(P) - Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).
o. Intelligence	USD(I) - Identify desired capabilities and shortfalls in our ability to generate actionable intelligence, including a concrete interagency plan for improving horizontal integration of intelligence. (Dec 03)	USD(I) - Develop action plan to strengthen actionable intelligence (Aug 04)

3. Technology

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Information Age	ASD(NII) – Develop options to accelerate the implementation of the GIG and use of new information technologies and concepts to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel. (Nov 04)	ASD(NII) – with CJCS , conduct long-lead analysis for QDR of potential effects of C4 systems on reducing U.S.-based and deployed personnel. (Jan 05). See associated action in section 4.b.
b. Logistics	USD(AT&L) - Review all Major Defense Acquisition Programs to ensure they emphasize smaller logistics requirements and footprints. (Nov 03)	USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to reduce logistics and support requirements. (Jan 04) CJCS – Consider the impact of improved systems on logistics, mobility and personnel requirements in Operational Availability '04 Study. (Mar 04)
c. New Technologies		USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries - Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to substitute for human force protection. (Jan 04)
d. Lethality	Secretary of the Army - Complete fielding of Stryker Brigade Combat teams IAW PDM I, FY04-09. (1 st Stryker deploying to OIF in Oct 03, 2 nd Stryker BCT ready in mid-FY04).	USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to lighten the deployed footprint while retaining lethality. (Jan 04)
e. U.S. and Coalition Transformation	CDR JFCOM – Develop a coalition experimentation plan to examine key interoperability needs of coalition partners. (Dec 03)	USD(P) - Update Security Cooperation Guidance to identify regional coalition transformation priorities. (Jan 04)

4. Efficiency

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Organization of Forces	<u>Service Secretaries</u> – Describe the capabilities required within each Service to drive modular design at appropriate levels and brief options for implementation by Dec 03.	<u>CDR,JFCOM</u> – with CJCS and P, OFT, conduct long-lead QDR analysis of options for modular force organizations. (Jan 05)
b. Global Reach Back	<u>Service Secretaries and Combatant Commanders</u> – Identify capabilities that lend themselves to reachback. Propose near-term joint options to increase reliance on reachback to help reduce the forward footprint. (Dec 03)	<u>USD(P)</u> – With ASD (NII) and CJCS, develop “Global Reach Back” DPG direction for POM 06 development and QDR preparation, with emphasis on organizing the Reserve Component to optimize reachback opportunities. (Dec 03). See associated action in section 3.b.
c. Force Allocation	<u>CJCS</u> – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).	<u>CDR,JFCOM</u> – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef “Operational Availability Action Items” Memo). <u>USD (P&R)</u> – work with CJCS to capture capabilities-based assessments in defense readiness assessment and adaptive planning tools. (July 04)
d. Procurement	<u>Services</u> – establish preferred munitions requirements prior to Service FY 06 POM development. (Jan 04)	<u>USD(AT&L)</u> - Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies that achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure. (Jan 04) <u>USD(P)</u> – Develop Defense Planning Guidance direction for munitions funding priorities. (Dec 03)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Strategic Lift	<u>CJCS</u> – Assess strategic lift requirements for warfighting scenarios specified in the Operational Availability '04 Study. (Mar '04).	<u>Service Secretaries</u> – Implement recommendations 2a and 2e from Secretary's 18 August "Operational Availability Action Items" memo in POM 06. (Aug 04) <u>Service Secretaries</u> . Initiate action on DepSecDef approved recommendations of the Advanced Mobility Concept Study (AMCS) for development of future strategic mobility capabilities (Aug 04).
f. Rotation Ratio	<u>CJCS</u> – develop an action agenda to implement SECDEF approved Elaborate Crossbow III initiatives. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving near-term stress on the force.(Oct 03) <u>USD(P&R)</u> – work with D,PJA&E and Services to develop options to reduce rotation ration by transporting crews to their platforms. (Nov 03)	<u>Service Secretaries</u> - assess options for reducing rotation ratios and make necessary programmatic adjustments by POM 06 (Aug 04)
g. Headquarters Layering	<u>CJCS, USD(P&R), USD(P)</u> – Leveraging previous work, assess near-term ways to further reduce the number of headquarters and combine headquarters activities. Brief SLRG in Oct 03. <u>USD(C), Service Secretaries, and CJCS</u> – Implement near-term budget and program changes as directed in 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Dec 03)	<u>USD(P)</u> –with USD(P&R) and CJCS, develop Defense Planning Guidance that examines ways to further reduce DoD's headquarters staff structure. (Dec 03). <u>CJCS</u> – Conduct study of Combatant Command manpower utilization as directed in the 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Oct 04)
h. Best Practices		<u>USD(P&R)</u> – Propose options to establish a process to identify and move best Human Resource Management practices among DoD Components. (Jan 04)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
i. Planning Tools	<p>USD(P&R) – Report to Deputy Secretary on progress in implementing new Defense Readiness Reporting System assessment tools (Nov 03).</p> <p>CDRJFCOM - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF and identify the capabilities need in planning tools to execute this new process. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03</p>	<p>USD(P) – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p>
j. Operational Availability	<p>CJCS - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving stress on the force. (Sept 03)</p>	
k. Strategic Warning	<p>USD(I) – Identify Intelligence shortfalls impacting the ability to generate increased strategic warning. (Jan 04)</p>	<p>USD(I) – In preparation for QDR 05, assess options to mitigate strategic warning shortfalls (Jan 05).</p>
l. The Right Skills	<p>CJCS - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. (Sept 03)</p>	<p>USD (P&R) – with the Services, extend provisional unit concepts to capitalize on the skills of the Individual Ready Reserve and recent retirees.</p>
m. Safety	<p>USD(P&R) – Form a Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC) to govern the Department's mishap reduction efforts (Sept 03)</p> <p>USD (P&R) – Develop an enterprise mishap reduction system to provide actionable data to DoD leadership (July 04)</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Work with USD(AT&L) to develop DPG language guidance to direct the Department's efforts to aggressively move on the 50% mishap reduction effort (Dec 03)</p>

5. Policy

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. US Foreign Commitments	<u>USD(P)</u> - Develop prioritized list of long-term foreign commitments where US could reduce or discontinue its presence. Brief SECDEF by Dec 03.	<u>USD(P)</u> - Develop plan to pare down long-term US commitments (Apr 04).
b. U.S. Non-Military Skills		<u>USD(P)</u> - Develop Defense Planning Guidance language on stability operations to guide POM 06 development. (Dec 03) <u>USD(P)</u> -- Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).
c. U.S. Worldwide Footprint		<u>USD(P)</u> - Oversee implementation of Global Posture (IGPBS) initiatives (ongoing)

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE


OSD(Policy)	Col Kelly	10 September 2004
OSD(Personnel & Readiness)	Mr. Gallant	16 September 2004

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~~FOUO~~

October 4, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Powell Moore
Mike Wynne

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Acquisition Regulations during 'Wartime

Here is an excellent cable from Ambassador Negroponte in Iraq concerning the difficulties he faces as a result of constrictive rules and regulations governing acquisition.

Let's get a team of people together and take this on, using concrete examples from the Ambassador's cable. We can do some real good here.

Thanks.

Attach.
UNCLASS AMEMBASSY Baghdad Cable (P 031705Z OCT 04 ZDK)

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Please respond by 10/29/04

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ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031705Z OCT 04 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1772
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 001220

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, PREL, PGOV, IZ

SUBJECT: PEACETIME RULES IN A WARTIME ENVIRONMENT

1. I HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE DIFFICULTIES WE
EFFORTS TO REBUILD IRAQ'S INFRASTRUCTURE,
ACQUISITION REGULATIONS ILL
EFFORTS IN THIS DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT. I
AND DEFENSE ESTABLISH A TEAM OF PROCUREMENT SPECIALISTS AND
LAWYERS TO REVIEW THE SUGGESTIONS BELOW AND MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROVIDE RELIEF
RULES. THIS CABLE OUTLINES
COLLECTIVE INTERESTS OF ALL AGENCIES
AS WELL AS MNF-I AND ITS MNSTC-

2. REQUEST SUPPORT FOR ONGOING
EFFORTS TO INCREASE SIMPLIFIED
PROCUREMENT IN IRAQ FROM USD 500,000 TO
(MODIFICATION TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
PROGRESS). STATUTORY CHANGE TO 41 U.S.C. - 403
REQUIRED, AFFECTING FEDERAL
AND PART 13 (MNSTC-I).

3. REFERENCE FAR 13.301 (G) (1) THE CURRENT MICRO-PURCHASE
THRESHOLD FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IS USD 15,000.
RECOMMEND MICRO-PURCHASE THRESHOLD BE INCREASED TO USD
25,000 FOR IRAQI FREEDOM REQUIREMENTS (PCO AND MNSTC-I).

4. REFERENCE FAR 5.203 (A) "PUBLICIZING AND RESPONSE TIME".
THE FAR CURRENTLY READS THAT THE SYNOPSIS MUST BE PUBLISHED
AT LEAST 15 DAYS PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF A SOLICITATION.
RECOMMEND THAT FOR IRAQI FREEDOM THE SYNOPSIS PUBLICATION
REQUIREMENT BE REDUCED TO SEVEN DAYS. (PCO)

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: DEPSEC: EXECSEC:
C&D: CCD: CABLE CH: FILE: X
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USDI: PER SEC: COMM:

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5. REFERENCE FAR 6.304(A)(1) (APPROVAL OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR USE OF OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION). RECOMMEND CONTRACTING OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION SERVE AS APPROVAL FOR UP TO USD 1 MILLION DOLLARS OR THE LIMIT OF HIS OR HER WARRANT, WHICHEVER IS LOWER (USACE).

6. REFERENCE FAR 28.102-1 (REQUIRING PERFORMANCE AND PAYMENT BONDS FOR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS EXCEEDING USD 100,000). THESE REQUIREMENTS SEVERELY RESTRICT ACCESS TO THE MARKET ON THE PART OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL FIRMS (AS THEY CAN NOT OBTAIN INSURANCE AND BONDS) AND SHOULD BE WAIVED. (USACE)

7. REQUEST SUPPORT FOR ONGOING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EFFORT TO MODIFY FAR 28.311-1 AND 52.249-14 AND ADD TERRORIST ACTS AS A REASON FOR EXCUSABLE DELAYS. (MNF-I)

8. REFERENCE FAR 46.805 (A)(4) AND 52.246-25 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. THE RECOMMENDATION IS THAT CONTRACTORS' LIABILITY BE LIMITED TO REPLACING COMPONENTS AND NOT THE VALUE OF THE SERVICES (E.G. ELECTRICITY OR WATER NOT PROVIDED BECAUSE THE WORK CAN NOT BE COMPLETED). (MNF-I)

9. REFERENCE FAR 28.309 (B) AND 52.228-4 WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION FOR EACH PROJECT SHALL BE LIMITED TO USD 10,000 DUE TO THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN IRAQ. (MNF-I)

10. REFERENCE FAR 28.311-1 AND 52.228-7 THIRD PERSON LIABILITY. THE CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY SHOULD BE LIMITED. (MNF-I)

11. REFERENCE FAR PART 12 AND 2.101 AND 15.4 COMMERCIAL ITEM/CERTIFIED COST DATA APPLY THE DEFINITION OF "COMMERCIAL ITEMS" TO CONSTRUCTION FOR THE REMAINDER OF IIRP. IF CONSTRUCTION CANNOT BE DEFINED AS A "COMMERCIAL ITEM," WAIVE THE REQUIREMENT FOR "CERTIFIED COST DATA" BASED ON PERFORMANCE OF DETAILED PRICE ANALYSIS ON ALL NON-COMPETED ACQUISITIONS AND CHANGES. (USAID)

12. REFERENCE FAR 52.245-2 ALT 1 (5) EQUIPMENT RISK OF LOSS ADDITIONAL WAR RISK INSURANCES DEEMED REIMBURSABLE IF SUCH INSURANCE IS AVAILABLE. IF INSURANCE IS NOT AVAILABLE (AND IT HAS NOT BEEN TO DATE), THEN U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACCEPT RISK OF LOSS ONCE EQUIPMENT CROSSES THE IRAQ BORDER. (USAID)

13. REFERENCE DEFENSE BASE ACT, 42 USC 1651-1654; FAR 52.228-3, "WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE (DEFENSE BASE ACT)"; FAR 28.309, "CONTRACT CLAUSE FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE"; AND FAR 52.228-4, "WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WAR HAZARD INSURANCE OVERSEAS". THESE PROVISIONS TOGETHER PROVIDE THAT (WHERE THE SECRETARY OF LABOR HAS WAIVED THE APPLICABILITY OF THE BASE DEFENSE ACT)

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WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE OR ITS EQUIVALENT SHALL BE SUCH AS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THE NATION OF WHICH THE EMPLOYEES ARE NATIONALS. IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT EACH NATION'S OWN SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY STANDARDS SHOULD BE APPLIED TO ITS CITIZENS. THE BASE DEFENSE ACT SHOULD BE AMENDED TO APPLY THIS STANDARD WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF A "WAIVER" BY THE SECRETARY OF LABOR. (USACE)

14. REFERENCE FAR 33.201 ET SEQ., "DISPUTES AND APPEALS." THE FAR CURRENTLY PROVIDES FOR THE CONTRACTING OFFICER TO PROVIDE A CONTRACTOR WITH A "FINAL DECISION" REGARDING ANY DISPUTES THE CONTRACTOR HAS WITH THE GOVERNMENT. THE CONTRACTOR MAY APPEAL A CONTRACTING OFFICER'S FINAL DECISION TO EITHER **THE** ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS OR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS. IRAQI CONTRACTORS **HAVE** LITTLE EXPERIENCE WITH OR ACCESS TO EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPELLATE BODIES. RECOMMEND THAT FOR IRAQI CONTRACTORS, THEIR APPEALS FROM CONTRACTING OFFICER FINAL DECISIONS BE DECIDED WITHIN THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND IN IRAQ. (USACE)

15. REFERENCE FAR 6.304, "APPROVAL OF THE JUSTIFICATION". THE FAR REQUIRES JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL (J&A) ACTIONS FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION TO BE APPROVED BY OFFICIALS AT HIGHER AND HIGHER LEVELS WITHIN THE PROCURING AGENCY AND ABOVE THE AGENCY, DEPENDING UPON THE ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF THE PROCUREMENT. RECOMMEND THAT, FOR J&A ACTIONS RELATED TO CONTRACTS **TO BE** PERFORMED IN IRAQ, THE APPROVAL OFFICIAL BE THE HEAD **OF THE** CONTRACTING ACTIVITY FOR THE IRAQ PCO. (USACE)

16. REFERENCE FAR 28.306, "INSURANCE UNDER FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS". THE FAR SHIFTS THE RISK OF LOSS TO CONTRACTORS UNDER FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS; THE FAR LEAVES IT TO THE CONTRACTOR TO BUY **AND** MAINTAIN INSURANCE COVERAGE AGAINST MOST RISKS. IN IRAQ, SUCH INSURANCE IS EITHER IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN OR VERY COSTLY. RECOMMEND THE FAR BE AMENDED TO **ADD A "WAR RISKS" PROVISION TO ALL CONTRACTS IN IRAQ THAT MAKES CONTRACTOR LOSSES DUE TO HOSTILE ACTIONS COMPENSABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CONTRACT.** (USACE)

17. REFERENCE FAR 15.404-3, "SUBCONTRACT PRICING CONSIDERATIONS." THE FAR IMPOSES COST AND PRICE REASONABLENESS STANDARDS AGAINST ALL CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS WHEN THE CONTRACT PRICE (OR ADJUSTMENT TO THE CONTRACT PRICE) REACHES A CERTAIN AGGREGATE THRESHOLD. **MANY** SUBCONTRACTORS **IN** IRAQ ARE LOCAL FIRMS OR INTERNATIONAL FIRMS, LACKING EXPERIENCE WITH U.S. COST STANDARDS AND HAVING COST ACCOUNTING **SYSTEMS THAT DON'T** MEET US STANDARDS. RECOMMEND THAT IRAQI OR INTERNATIONAL SUBCONTRACTORS TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN IRAQ MERELY HAVE TO MEET THE MORE RELAXED PRICE REASONABLENESS STANDARDS IMPOSED BY FAR 12.209, "DETERMINATION OF PRICE REASONABLENESS." (USACE)

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

11-L-0559/OSD/47240

18. REFERENCE FAR PART 12.404 WARRANTY. WHILE WE ARE ASKING FOR A RULING THAT ALLOWS CONSTRUCTION AS A COMMERCIAL ITEM, WE ARE ALSO SUGGESTING THAT COMMERCIAL STANDARDS BE APPLIED WHICH EXCLUDE WARRANTY FOR MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE. (USAID)

19. USG VS. MINISTRY/GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ PROPERTY- EITHER DECLARE MINISTRY PROPERTY USG PROPERTY OR AGREE THAT CONTRACTORS WHO INADVERTENTLY DAMAGE MINISTRY PROPERTY ARE ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT TO REPAIR/RESTORE IT. FAR PART 46 THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED THROUGHOUT RELATE TO U.S. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, WE ARE SEEKING A RULING THAT SUCH PROVISIONS THROUGHOUT THE FAR WILL TREAT IRAQI PROPERTY AS GOVERNMENT PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF INADVERTENT DAMAGE. (USAID)

20. ADDITIONAL DEATH AND DISMEMBERMENT INSURANCE- SUPPLEMENTAL WAR RISK INSURANCE OVER AND ABOVE WHICH DEFENSE BASE ACT (52.228-3) PROVIDES AND COVERS. DBA COVERAGE DOES NOT IN AND OF ITSELF COMPENSATE FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY AND UNPRECEDENTED PERSONAL RISKS OF SERVICE IN IRAQ. FURTHER, UNLIKE THE SITUATION IN OTHER USAID- ASSISTED COUNTRIES WHERE DBA IS DEEMED SUFFICIENT, EMPLOYEES IN IRAQ LOSE ALL THEIR EXISTING INSURANCE COVERAGE DUE TO STANDARD WAR RISK EXCEPTION IN THEIR INSURANCE COVERAGE. ALLOW PURSUANT TO COST PRINCIPLES FAR 31.205-19. (USAID)

21. FAR CITATION - LIMITATION OF LIABILITY EQUAL TO VALUE OF THE SUBCONTRACT, EXCLUSIVE OF LIABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY CLAIMS ARISING FROM INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS AND LOSSES ARISING FROM WILLFUL MISCONDUCT OF MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL. THIS IS NOT A FAR REQUIREMENT AS SUCH-WE ARE SEEKING A BLANKET AUTHORIZATION TO INCLUDE THIS LIMITATION AS IT IS A COMMERCIAL PRACTICE UTILIZED INDUSTRY WIDE IN SITUATIONS WITH EXCESSIVE RISK. (USAID)

JEFFREY

***** RETRANSMITTED MESSAGE *****

SECDEF V2

ACTION

INFO CHAIRS(*) CHAIRS TESTBED(*) CHAIRS2(*)
SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(*) C3I-DASD-DCIO(*)
USDAT:ENVS-ATLIE(*) USDAT:STS(*) ASD:PA-SMTP(*)
DIR:PAE-RAM(*) USDP:ESC(*) ESC-SMTP(*)
OSDONNIPRDA(*) OSDONSIPRDA(*)

(U,6)

1

#1220

NNNN

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

1

72
~~FOUO~~

October 15, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Brownlee and Schoomaker

Please arrange a meeting for me with Les Brownlee and GEN Schoomaker to discuss this memo on Defense Attaches.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/12/04 Acting SecArmy Memo to SecDef re: Selection of Officers to Serve as Defense Attaches

DHR:ss
101504-5

.....
Please respond by _____

h.1.0
h.4

15 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02408-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47242



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

October 12, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Selection of Officers to Serve as Defense Attachés

The following is provided reference your inquiry regarding the Army's processes for selecting officers to serve as the Defense Attachés (DATT) to Russia and China.

no
The DATT billets in China and Russia are currently the only validated, joint general/flag officer requirements for defense attachés. Although not mandated for fill by a general/flag officer in Title 10, these two billets have historically been held by general/flag officers due to the nature and scope of associated duties and the attendant political significance. Of note, before being repealed by the FY04 National Defense Authorization Act, § 714, Title 10 specifically required that the DATT - ~~France~~ billet be filled with a general/ flag officer. This legislation was enacted to overcome the Department of Defense's long-standing practice of filling the DATT - France with a colonel or Navy captain.

no
Each of the DATT billets are filled on a rotating basis by the Army, Navy and Air Force to ensure ability to train and select officers with the right skills and experience, while also precluding over-representation of officers with a potentially limited skill set among the Services' general/flag officer ranks. The Army is scheduled to fill the DATT - China billet in 2006 and the DATT - Russia in 2007. Accordingly, the Army Competitive Category Brigadier General Promotion Boards in FY05 (DATT - China) and FY06 (DATT - Russia) will need to select one officer (each) with the needed background to represent the Department and the Nation well in these critical positions.

no
Historically, Army colonels selected to serve as DATTs in China, Russia (and France) have possessed advanced degrees in area studies, regional experience and language skills that were consistent with the specific country for which a general officer DATT was required. This notwithstanding, and given precedents demonstrated by the other Services, I am confident that this year's Brigadier General, Army Competitive Category Promotion Board will select the best-qualified officer from among the 121 colonels eligible for consideration who possess the requisite background to serve as a DATT (Army officers holding this specialization are termed Foreign Area Officers). Accordingly, in the Memorandum of Instruction to the board members, I intend to provide generic guidance to select the best officer to serve as the DATT-China, vice specific guidance requiring that the selected officer be one whose foreign area of concentration is China. This is especially prudent given that the selected officer must possess the skills and attributes needed to continue serving the Army and Department of Defense in a variety of other billets upon completion of his duties as the DATT - China.

Brownlee
R. L. Brownlee

Acting Secretary of the Army

OSD 02408:05

11-L-0559/OSD/47243

091.4

12 OCT 04

15 OCT 04

720
~~FOUO~~

file

OCT. 27 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces Updates

In the future, on the Afghan Security Forces Update, they ought to put a mark for the April elections, so people will know where the forces will be for the April elections. We may also want to put a mark on the Iraqi Security Forces Update for the January 30 elections, and the other sequenced elections later next year, when the votes are going to occur.

On the Afghan Security Forces Update, page 5, it reads *MoD/GS*. I'd prefer not to use acronyms like that on the update, if you can avoid it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102604-9

.....
Please respond by _____

*Not Sent to
Chairman..
These changes already
accomplished.*

*v/r
H. Colby*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02412-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47244

AFGHANISTAN

270504

~~FOUO~~

October 4, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
CC: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Schoomaker and Brownlee

I would like a meeting with Gen Pete Schoomaker and Les Brownlee on the subject of the Location of Civil Affairs.

I'd like the attached memo given to me for the meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/27/04 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: Location of Civil Affairs

DHR:ss
100404-17

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

OSD 02415-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47245

322

400704

APR 27 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

When are we going to get closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-14

.....
Please respond by 5/9/04

Q
DR

closed
9/15/04 Memo
to SecDef promising
future brief.

OSD 13900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/47246

APR 27 2004

755

W
e
e

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

When are ~~we~~ going to get closure on where the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? What is the pacing item there? Is it ~~getting~~ on my schedule?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-14

.....
Please respond by

5/9/04

OSD 13900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/47247

11-L-0559

30 August 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: **Army** "Tiger Team" Briefing to Vice Chief of Staff

1. Purpose. To summarize latest Army briefing on Civil Affairs (CA) issues.
2. Key Points. On 26 August, the CA/PSYOP Tiger Team (CAPOTT) briefed the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) on options for the assignment of CA units.
 - The CAPOTT presented the following findings:
 - CA (and PSYOP) forces can best support operations by remaining under US **Army** Special Operations **Command** (USASOC). Reassigning CA to Army Forces Command would not increase **Army** interest in these activities, improve the transition to post-combat stabilization operations, nor support the **Army** Campaign Plan.
 - Addressing CA and PSYOP challenges requires partnership between US **Army** Forces Command and USASOC.
 - Operations **would** benefit from creation of a full-time strategic-level **Civil** Military Operations [**CMO**] planning/coordination capability.
 - The **Army** should consider elevating CMO to a doctrinal "battlefield operating system."
 - USASOC must redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structure for modularity **and use** Total Army Analysis to review AC/RC mix.
 - Extending the Reserve Component CA branch to the Active Component and creating a PSYOP branch would promote **the** management, professionalism and availability of those officers.
 - VCSA approved the **findings and** gave the following guidance:
 - Continue to **work** the force structure for CA and PSYOP.
 - Determine how to integrate CA, PSYOP and supported units per **the** Army Campaign Plan. This should include Combat **Training** Centers.
 - Return in 90 days to brief the implementation **plan**.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
201 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0201

26 AUG 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE), FORT BRAGG, NC 28310**

**SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations
Tiger Team (CAPOTT)**

1. As per our meeting and your request for assistance on 29 April 2004, I convened a Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT) to analyze your Civil Affairs and PSYOP "Way Ahead" concept. The Team **also analyzed two** additional concepts for points of comparison. The team consisted of members of the Army Staff, selected Army major commands, **and selected** outside agencies. it ensured all doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, **and** facilities issues were reviewed and considered.
2. The Tiger Team determined civil affairs and psychological operations forces **could** best **support** the Army **by** remaining under the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The Army's Force Generation Model's emphasis on modularity will assure that this capability is realized as CA and PSYOP staff planners will **be** assigned **down** to the BCT UA level. The Tiger Team recommends that USASOC should redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structures for modularity and **relook the AC/RC** mix.
3. During the conduct of the Tiger Team **review** and assessment **the following** three concepts were **developed**:
 - a. **Concept 1** - USACAPOC, with **all** currently assigned forces, remains assigned to USASOC and transforms to support **modularity**.
 - b. **Concept 2** - HQ USACAPOC **with** all CA and **PSYOP** Forces reassigned to JFCOM.
 - c. **Concept 3** - SOF supporting forces assigned to USASOC and conventional forces assigned to FORSCOM.
4. **Recommendation:** The CAPOTT endorses Concept 1 **by utilizing** the comparison criteria of **Training/Readiness**, Modularity, Flexibility, and Predictability. Recommend USASOC begin coordination with **FORSCOM** to support transformation and support modularity IAW Concept 1.


11-L-0559/OSD/47249



SUBJECT: Results of **G-3** Directed Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT)

5. Although this constitutes the closure of **this Tiger Team**, **the members are** available to assist in any capacity. We need to continue to **build on** the momentum **gained thus far**. Furthermore, **USASOC's** pursuit of **branches** for **CA** and PSYOP will help to increase professionalism, management, and **availability of the officers** in **those** branches.

6. The **POC** ~~for~~ this action is COL Jose Olivero, **HQDA, G-3, MOSO-SOD, DSN** (b)(6)
(b)(6)



RICHARD A. CODY
General, United States Army
Vice Chief of Staff

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

COL Milburn	USJFCOM	29 July 2004
COL Bennett	USSOCOM	28 July 2004
COL Wright	Army	5 August 2004
COL Van Dyke	USMC	10 <i>August</i> 2004

72
~~FOUO~~

OCT 15 2004

TO: Jim McDougal
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: October 6 Letter from Sergey

I assume this letter of Oct 6 from Sergey to me, which I just received, has been answered by our meeting and the things we hand-delivered to him.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/6/04 Letter from Ivanov to SecDef re: Tule Radar Station

DHR:ss
101404-44

.....
Please respond by _____

T 10/25

RUSSIA

15 Oct 04

OSD 02417-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47252

6 October 2004

Mr. D. Rumsfeld
U.S. Secretary of Defense
Washington D.C. United States of America

Dear Mr. Secretary

I would like to thank you for your letter of August 19, 2004 in which you responded to the Russian concerns in connection with the plan to modernize the missile strike early-warning radar station, located in Tule, Greenland.

At the same time, it would be appreciated if you could provide the Russian side with more complete information concerning the purpose, function, and capabilities of this station. Such information would help to bring the relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation to a new level.

I hope that the productive work on all issues connected with the cooperation between our countries in the military sphere will continue. The Russian side is prepared for such a dialog.

Respectfully,

<signature>

S. Ivanov
Minister of Defense
Russian Federation

OSD 15847-04

A118-4

October 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Accomplishments

020060

I think we've got to come up with a calculation of all the things that were done:

- the millions of people that move back and forth
- the millions of tons
- the millions of meals
- all of the weapons that were captured

The military is getting a bum rap and they've done a great job. Someone needs to go out there and explain what's been done and how magnificent it's been done. I need data for that, so let's get it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-4

.....
Please respond by 11/3/04

2900704

720
FOUO

file

October 19, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Druyun Statement

Please mark on this Darlene Druyun paper the things she admitted to, so I can just read it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Druyun plea

DHR:ss
101904-7

FAST

452T

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

Sir,

Oct 11/9

Response attached.

v/r

Lt Col Lengyel 10/19

19 OCT 04

FOUO

OSD 02419-06

11-L-0559/OSD/47255

10/19

To: SecDef

October 19, 2004

From: Paul Butler *PB*

Re: Druyn Plea

Druyn admitted to influencing 4 separate deals on behalf of Boeing (outlined in numbered paragraphs 1-4 on pages 2 and 3). *Marked and highlighted* She claims she did so in exchange for her job with Boeing and for Boeing's favorable treatment of her daughter and hiring of her son-in-law. The 4 deals are:

1. The KC 767A tanker lease deal. Druyn admits she agreed to a higher price and passed proprietary info to Boeing.
2. NATO AWACS program. Druyn admitted to influencing a decision to make an inflated \$100 million payment to Boeing in connection with a restructuring of this deal.
3. Upgrade of C 130 avionics. Druyn admitted that her selection of Boeing for this contract was influenced by Boeing having hired her son-in-law and that another contractor could have been selected absent this influence.
4. Settlement of C 17 H22 contract. Druyn admitted that her decision to pay \$412 million to Boeing to settle this dispute was also influenced by Boeing's decision to hire her daughter's ~~then~~ boyfriend.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

v.)

Criminal No. 04-150-A

DARLEEN A. DRUYUN,)

Defendant.)

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

It is agreed by and between the parties that the following facts are true and that they supplement the Statement of Facts filed in the above referenced case.

The Defendant's Post-Plea Admissions

On April 20, 2004 the defendant entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 208(a) in the Eastern District of Virginia. As a part of that plea, the defendant entered into a plea agreement with the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. That agreement required the defendant to provide full, complete and truthful cooperation to the government. Prior to entering the plea agreement with the United States, the defendant entered into a proffer agreement with the United States to formulate an appropriate resolution of this case. On December 2, 2003 the defendant was interviewed by agents of the government as part of the proffer agreement. On April 23, 2004 the defendant was again interviewed by government agents as part of the cooperation required by her plea agreement. The defendant now acknowledges that she provided false, misleading and untruthful information to government investigators at both of those sessions.

On July 28, 2004 the defendant was reinterviewed by government agents and acknowledged, as a result of the government's investigation, that she had not been truthful in her prior cooperation. The defendant had previously maintained that she had always acted in the best interest of the United States during her negotiations with the Boeing Company while she was employed by the Air Force. She acknowledged a conflict of interest in negotiating employment with Boeing while at the same time negotiating with Boeing on behalf of the Air Force. However, the defendant had maintained that her relationship with Boeing did not influence her official actions or harm the government.

The defendant, since July 28, 2004, now acknowledges that she did favor the Boeing Company in certain negotiations as a result of her employment negotiations and other favors provided by Boeing to the defendant. Defendant acknowledges that Boeing's employment of her future son-in-law and her daughter in 2000, at the defendant's request, along with the defendant's desire to be employed by Boeing, influenced her government decisions in matters affecting Boeing.¹ That as a result of the loss of her objectivity, she took actions which harmed the United States to include the following:

1. In negotiations with Boeing concerning the lease agreement for 100 Boeing KC 767A tanker aircraft, the defendant agreed to a higher price for the aircraft than she believed was

¹ The defendant also acknowledges contacting a senior official of Boeing in 2002 concerning the continued employment of her daughter by Boeing. The defendant had been told by her daughter that she feared termination by Boeing for employment performance issues. The defendant contacted a senior official of Boeing, with whom she was negotiating the KC 767A tanker lease, to prevent any adverse action by Boeing against her daughter. The daughter was not terminated and instead was transferred to a new position. This same senior Boeing official routinely updated the defendant concerning the daughter's employment with Boeing, for example advising the defendant of pay increases received by the daughter.

appropriate. The defendant did so, in her view, as a "parting gift to Boeing" and because of her desire to ingratiate herself with Boeing, her future employer. The defendant also now acknowledges providing to Boeing during the negotiations what at the time she considered to be proprietary pricing data supplied by another aircraft manufacturer.

2. During 2002 the defendant, as chairperson of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Program Management Board of Directors, was involved in negotiations with Boeing concerning a restructuring of the NATO AWACS program. The defendant negotiated a payment of 100 million dollars to Boeing as part of that restructuring. The defendant now acknowledges that at the time she believed a lower amount to be an appropriate settlement and she did not act in the best interest of the United States and NATO. Her agreement to the 100 million dollar settlement was influenced by her daughter's and son-in-law's relationship with Boeing and the employment negotiations.

3. The defendant was the selection authority in 2001 for the C-130 AMP which was an Air Force procurement of more than four billion dollars to upgrade the avionics of C-130 aircraft. The defendant selected Boeing from four competitors, and now acknowledges that she was influenced by her perceived indebtedness to Boeing for employing her future son-in-law and daughter. The defendant believes that an objective selection authority may not have selected Boeing.

4. During 2000 the defendant negotiated a settlement with Boeing concerning the C-17 H22 contract clause with a senior executive of Boeing. These negotiations occurred at the time the defendant was seeking employment at Boeing for her daughter's boyfriend. The defendant's decision to agree to a payment of approximately 412 million dollars to Boeing in connection with

the C-17 H22 clause was influenced by Boeing's assistance to the defendant.

The defendant has also acknowledged since July 28, 2004 that ~~her~~ earlier cooperation with the government was untruthful and misleading in other respects. For example, the defendant has revealed that a notebook she had provided to government investigators had been altered by her. This notebook contained what purported to be contemporaneous notes written by the defendant when she was employed by the Air Force. The defendant now acknowledges secretly adding notations to the notebook, before providing it to the government for the purpose of supporting her version of events.


Respectfully submitted,

Paul J. McNulty
United States Attorney


By:


Robert Wiechering
Assistant United States Attorney

After consulting with my attorneys and pursuant to the Supplemental Plea Agreement entered into this day between me and the United States, I hereby stipulate that the above Supplemental Statement of Facts is true and accurate, and that had the matter proceeded to trial, the United States could have proved the same beyond a reasonable doubt.


Darleen A. Druyun
Defendant

I am Darleen Druyun's attorney. I have carefully reviewed the above Supplemental Statement of Facts with her. To my knowledge, her decision to stipulate to these facts is an informed and voluntary one.


John M. Dowd
Counsel for the Defendant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)	
)	
v.)	CRIMINAL NO. 04-150-A
)	
DARLEEN A. DRUYUN,)	
Defendant.)	

SUPPLEMENTAL PLEA AGREEMENT

Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Robert W. Wiechering, Assistant United States Attorney, the defendant, Darleen A. Druyun, and the defendant's counsel have entered into a Supplemental Plea Agreement pursuant to paragraph 14 of the original plea agreement (hereinafter plea agreement) in criminal case 04-150-A. The terms of the Supplemental Agreement are as follows:

1. The defendant agrees and stipulates that she breached the plea agreement by not providing full, complete and truthful cooperation as required by paragraph 11 of the plea agreement. The Supplemental Statement of Facts filed with this Supplemental Plea Agreement outlines the nature of that breach and constitutes a stipulation of facts for purposes of Section 1B1.2(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.

2. The defendant agrees that the United States is entitled to exercise its remedies for the defendant's breach under the provisions of paragraph 13 of the plea agreement and as set forth in the Supplemental Plea Agreement.

3. Notwithstanding paragraph 10 of the plea agreement, the defendant agrees that the government may use information provided by her under the provisions of the plea agreement to enhance the defendant's guidelines range. Further, the defendant agrees to waive the provisions of the proffer agreement with the government dated November 25, 2003 and agrees to permit the government to use the information and statements provided by her to the government in this criminal case.

4. The parties agree to the preparation of a revised Presentence Report in this case and further agree to the following guideline calculation in this case:

- a. A base level of 6 under the provisions of § 2C1.3(a) and a 4-level increase for actual or planned harm to the government under the provisions of § 2C1.3(b).
- b. An increase of 2 levels in the offense level pursuant to the provisions of § 3C1.1 Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice.
- c. No reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the provisions of § 3E.1.
- d. This results in an offense level total of 12, Criminal History Category I, and a sentencing range of 10-16 months. The defendant agrees that there exists no mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from the range determined by the court. Accordingly the defendant agrees not to seek or support any downward departure from the applicable guideline range.


5. Waiver of Right to Jury Trial on Sentencing Factors.

The defendant also waives the right to have facts that determine the offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines (including facts that support any specific offense characteristic or other enhancement or adjustment) (1) charged in the indictment, (2) proven to a jury, or (3) proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant explicitly consents to be sentenced pursuant to the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, to have the sentence based on facts to be established by a preponderance of the evidence before the sentencing judge, and to allow the court to consider any reliable evidence without regard to its admissibility at trial. The defendant explicitly acknowledges that her plea to the charged offense authorizes the Court to impose any sentence that is authorized by the Sentencing Guidelines up to and including the maximum sentence set forth in the United States Code. The defendant also waives all challenges to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines.


6. In all other respects the plea agreement between the defendant and the United States remains in full force and effect.

Paul J. McNulty
United States Attorney

By:


Robert W. Wiechering
Assistant United States Attorney

APPROVED:


John Klein
Assistant United States Attorney
Supervisor Fraud Unit

Date of Approval:

9-28-2004

Defendant's Signature: I have read this Supplemental Plea Agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I understand this agreement and voluntarily agree to it.

Date: 8/27/04

Darleen A. Drury
Defendant

Defense Counsel Signature: I am counsel for the defendant in this case. I have carefully reviewed every part of this plea agreement with the defendant. To my knowledge, the defendant's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one.

Date: 8/29/04

John M. Dowd
Counsel for the Defendant

12/20 1730

720
~~FOUO~~

file

usap
Copy

October 15, 2004
ES-1065
04/013844

TO: Jim MacDougall
9 CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Letter from Ivanov

Here is the letter Ivanov gave me on Orlov. You will recall it came up in my meeting with him.

Please handle it from here.

Thanks.

Attach.
Ivanov Letter to SecDef re: Orlov

DHR:ss
10140443

R
U
S
S
E

Paul Butler

.....
Please respond by _____

OCT 18 2004

10/21
→ TB See def
Mr. Secretary:

In your meeting, Ivanov reported Orlov was in custody in Prague and that Ukraine asked the Czech Republic to extradite him. I have passed this on to CIA and State and will continue to follow up on this with them, the Russians and the Ukrainians.

15 OCT 04

OSD 02420-05

Respectfully,
15-10-04 18:55 IN

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47266 JIM MACDOUGALL

Moscow, October __, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Let me express my gratitude to you for the information released regarding the complicity of Oleg Orlov in an attempted smuggling operation involving an IGLA-type man-portable air defense system to be illicitly shipped into Iran.

We have undertaken a preliminary investigation in regard to the said person, which brought us to a conclusion that the person indicated has no affiliation with state-run, or any other, structures involved in military and technical cooperation with foreign states on behalf of the Russian Federation.

The information furnished by you in regard to the activities pursued by Oleg Orlov has been promptly forwarded to the relevant law enforcement agencies with an object of undertaking investigative work as appropriate. Any credible information worthy of interest will be forwarded to you through military diplomatic channels.

Respectfully yours,

Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

S.Ivanov

Attn. The Rt. Hon. D.Rumsfeld
US Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C., US

OSD 02420-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47267

Russia

15 OCT 04

15 OCT 04



Москва, 13 октября 2004 г.

Уважаемый господин Министр.


Позвольте выразить Вам мою признательность за предоставленную информацию о причастности гражданина Олега Орлова к попытке организовать по нелегальным каналам поставку ПЗРК типа «Игла» в Иран.

Мы провели предварительное расследование в отношении этого гражданина, в результате которого пришли к выводу о том, что указанный фигурант не имеет никакого отношения к государственным или другим структурам, осуществляющим военно-техническое сотрудничество с иностранными государствами от имени Российской Федерации.

Ваша информация о деятельности Олега Орлова была оперативно адресована соответствующим правоохранительным структурам с целью проведения необходимых следственных действий. При получении от этих структур какой-либо заслуживающей внимания информации, направим ее Вам по военно-дипломатическим каналам.

С уважением,

Министр обороны Российской Федерации

 С.Иванов

Господину Д.Рамсфельду
Министру обороны США
г.Вашингтон, США

11-L-0559/OSD/47268

~~FOUO~~

032

December 19, 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Gen Pete Pace
Michael Wynne
Gen Mike Moseley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Civilianizing Air Force GPS Activities

I like the idea of civilianizing the Air Force GPS activities where they train young military persons and rotate them in two years. We should look at using civilians to get greater stability.

Thanks.

DRR:ah
12/19/05-34

.....
Please Respond By 02/02/06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02452-06

11-L-0559/OSD/47269



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

32

FEB 13 2006

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT: Civilianizing Global Positioning System (GPS) Operations

- Defense Science Board recommended adding civilian positions to GPS operation activities in their October 2005 "Future of GPS" report.
- Civilians/contractors constitute nearly 50% of GPS operations today.
- Operations: 395 personnel total; 42% contractor, 34% active duty, 18% reserve, 6% government civilian.
- Air Force will continue to utilize a mix of military, civilian and contractor expertise to maintain stable and effective GPS operations to meet worldwide military and civilian needs.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

1. AFSPC "Civilianizing GPS Operations" Point Paper
2. AFSPC "Civilianizing GPS Operations" Brief

Prepared by: MAJOR BRAIN J. HAUG, AF/A3SSO, DSN (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/47270

OSD 02452-06

~~FOUO~~

12/22

December 19, 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Gen Pete Pace
Michael Wynn
Gen Mike Moseley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA.

SUBJECT: Civilianizing Air Force GPS Activities

I like the idea of civilianizing the Air Force GPS activities where they train young military persons and rotate them in two years. We should look at using civilians to get greater stability.

Thanks.

DDP:ah
02/0015-24

.....
Please Respond By 02/02/06

~~FOUO~~

08D 02452-06

11-L-0559/OSD/47271

POINT PAPER
ON
CIVILIANIZING GPS OPERATIONS

PURPOSE. To provide AFSPC position on SecDef 19 Dec 05 snowflake on civilianizing GPS operations

BACKGROUND:

- Oct 05 DSB Report addressing "The Future of the GPS"
 - AF personnel *"to provide guidance and direction to satellite operations"*
 - *"As a means of mitigating disruptions caused by personnel turnover and to provide an experienced cadre of GPS operators, selectively integrate contractor technical personnel into positions involving direct satellite system monitoring and execution of commands"*
- 19 Dec 05 SecDef Memo, "Civilianizing Air Force GPS Activities"
 - *"I like the idea of civilianizing the Air Force GPS activities where they train young military persons and rotate them in two years. We should look at using civilians to get greater stability."*

DISCUSSION:

- AF concurs—civilians/contractors constitute nearly 50% of GPS operations today -- and, the percentage will grow in the future
- Current GPS personnel picture - 20 years of highly integrated military-government-contractor operations
 - Operations: 395 personnel total
 - 42% contractor, 34% active duty, 18% reserve, 6% gov't civilian
 - Early orbit ops, day-to-day ops, anomaly resolution, sustainment, modernization, disposal
 - Acquisition: 527 personnel total
 - 61% contractor, 25% active duty, 14% gov't civilian, 0% reserve
 - Ground, space, user equipment, test & development, engineering, sustainment, contracting, modernization
 - As we evolve GPS (satellite and ground system upgrades), significant implications for manpower and personnel mix
 - Increased automation with machine-to-machine interfaces
 - Reduced sat C2 manpower requirements
 - Integrate enhanced NAVWAR capabilities (an inherently military function to protect navigation for our military use and deny adversaries the same)
- Guiding Principles

- Air Force has Title 10 responsibilities for providing means to control and exploit the medium of space
- GPS is a critical element of our national infrastructure—it is imperative that DoD & USAF continue to protect GPS systems and services
- Certain roles, functions, and skills within GPS are inherently military
 - Mission control, system protection, and anomaly resolution
 - Preparing and executing military plans, delivering effects to the warfighter, and denying them to adversaries
- Air Force must develop a cadre of space professionals who can plan and execute space power at the tactical and operational levels of war
- Conclusion
 - Air Force concurs with the value and contributions of civilians in operations and direct operations support
 - AFSPC heavily employs civil servants, contractors, reserve, and guard units to enhance stability, continuity, and technical expertise
 - There is room for growth, keeping in mind inherently military functions & the need for space professional development
 - Funding for civilians conducting operations must be treated as “flight hours” to successfully continue on this path
 - USAF and AFSPC are comprehensively improving GPS development, operations and sustainment

Unclassified -- ~~For Official Use~~



Civilianizing Global Operations:

A Response to CSAF'S

Lt Gen Frank G. K
Vice Commander,

11-L-0559/OSD/47274



DSB Report, Oct 05

- **DSB GPS** task force made 69 recommendations to comprehensively improve **GPS**
 - Improve availability and accuracy of satellite constellation
 - Improve functionality & accelerate **GPS** control segment upgrade
 - Accelerate anti-jam capability of **GPS** military user equipment
 - Improve anti-jam performance in applications
 - Improve organization and governance
- Air Force is already implementing 43 of the recommendations and is assessing

*Defense Science Board
Task Force*

on

The Future of the Global Positioning System



October 2005

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
For Acquisition Technology and Logistics
Washington D.C. 20301-3140



DSB Report, Oct 05 (continued)

- Additionally, report recommended
 - AF personnel “to provide guidance and direction to satellite operations”
 - “As a means of mitigating disruptions caused by personnel turnover and to provide an experienced cadre of GPS operators, selectively integrate contractor technical personnel into positions involving direct satellite system monitoring and execution of commands”

*Defense Science Board
Task Force*

on

The Future of the Global Positioning System



October 2005

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Washington, D.C. 20301-5140



SECDEF Memo, 19 Dec 05

- **"I like the idea of civilianizing the Air Force GPS activities where they train young military persons and rotate them in two years. We should look at using civilians to get greater stability."**

~~FOUO~~

December 19, 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Gen Pete Pace
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Gen Mike Moseley

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SUBJECT: Civilianizing Air Force GPS Activities

I like the idea of civilianizing the Air Force GPS activities where they train young military persons and rotate them in two years. We should look at using civilians to get greater stability.

Thanks.

DRR:da
121905-14

.....
Please Respond By 02/02/06



GPS Civil and Military Capabilities



11-L-0559/OSD/47278



GPS Constellation



11-L-0559/OSD/47279




Today's GPS Operations

Operations Functions

- Launch & Checkout
- Satellite C2
- PMT Mission Management
- User Interface
- Anomaly Resolution


Total: 395



Acquisition Functions

- Ground, Space, User
- Engineering
- Integration & Test
- Sustain
- Contracting

Total: 527





Current GPS Operations

8 x 5 Ops Support Network (touchable 24 x 7) (100+ civilians)

Deep Subsystem Analysts
(Payload, Bus, NDS)
Ground system analysts

Engineers
Computer operators/programmers
Communication Technicians

Mathematicians
Space Ops Trainers/Evaluators
System Administrators

24 x 7 Ops Support Network (20+ civilians)

IIA on-orbit support experts
IIR on-orbit support experts
System Administrators
Computer h/w, s/w experts
Communication Experts

Remote Site Technicians

Provide:

- On-orbit support
- Trending analysis
- Subsystem analysis
- Remote site maintenance
- Computer sys maintenance
- GPS user impact analysis
- Anomaly impact analysis
- Satellite eng expertise
- Advice to crew and senior decision makers

Provide:

- GPS user impact analysis
- Anomaly resolution
- Advice to crew and senior decision makers
- System administration
- Mission risk management
- Engineering/technical assistance
- Satellite performance trending
- HNV & S/W testing & integration
- Risk mitigation analysis
- Ground system modification/restoration
- Satellite system upgrade:
- Anomaly impact prediction and analysis
- Kalman filter maintenance
- Tactics development
- Constellation mgmt
- On-orbit maintenance planning/execution

7- person military ops crews

(3 officers, 4 enlisted)

Crew CC Crew Chief
GSO PSO
SVO SSO x 2


- Operational reporting
- Constellation health/sustainment/perf
- Ground equipment monitoring

Military on-call
3 Satellite Analysts

Military Management (4 Flt CCs)
Engineering, Maintenance, Tactics and Procedures



Integrated GPS Synchronized Schedule (7 Jan 06)





Future GPS Operations Transition from Satellite Ops to Mission/Service Focus

- **Space Segment**
 - Increased power / security / accuracy / availability, controlled integrity and system survivability for military and civil users
- **Ground Segment**
 - Increased automation, improved monitoring, and responsive PNT service tailoring
 - Reduce required Satellite C2 manpower
 - Focus military on mission control responsibilities—public safety/accountability, military operations and mission/system security
 - Increased PNT support to military and civil users



Guiding Principles

- Air Force has Title 10 responsibilities for providing means to control and exploit the medium of space
- GPS is a critical element of our national infrastructure—it is imperative that DoD & USAF continue to provide and protect GPS systems and services
- Certain roles, functions, and skills within GPS are core government responsibilities
 - Mission control and system protection
 - Preparing and executing military plans, delivering effects to the warfighter, and denying them to adversaries
- Air Force must develop a cadre of space professionals who can plan and execute space power at the tactical and operational levels of war
 - Use integrated team of military, civilian and contractors, employing unique skills and responsibilities



Conclusion

- Civilians/contractors have played a major role in GPS for over 20 years in operations and direct operations support
- AFSPC heavily employs civil servants, contractors, reserve, and guard units to enhance stability, continuity, and technical expertise
- Will pursue greater civilian/contractor role in AF space operations, but must fulfill inherently military roles/functions & the need for space professional development
- Funding for civilians and contractors conducting operations must be treated as “flight hours” to successfully continue on this path
- Air Force has been a good steward for development, operations and sustainment of GPS and is actively pursuing continuous and comprehensive improvement of the GPS system and services



Way

- Continue to implement the DSB recommen

11-L-0559/OSD/47286



Backups



11-L-0559/OSD/47287



Enablers

- **Special contract authority (e.g. NRO-like)**
- **Special manpower and personal authorities (short-term policy and procedure expectations)**
- **Treat space operations (O&M) hours like flying hours**
- **If required, relief from A-76 (in support of force mix changes)**




Questions from Gen Moseley

- How many AFSPACE people do we have involved in all GPS ops (launch, ops, tweaking, et al)?
- How many are mil and how many are civilian?
- **Is** there an advantage to move more civilians into the GPS world?
- If so, how would you structure it?
- **Is** there a benefit from completely handing this over to civilians?
- If so, is there a time that would be better



2 SOPS Manning History

2 SCS / 2 SOPS Manning History






Space Professional Development

- **Foundation: Three-level Certification program based on experience, education and training**
- **Space Professional Experience Codes track individual credentials and billet requirements—allows match of individual skills to job needs**
- **Career-long education realized via Space 100, 200, 300, continuing education and academic certificates**
- **Goal: Credentialed Space Professionals effectively delivering space capabilities for joint warfighting**




Provide Experience - Education and Training

*Space Professional,
Knowledgeable in the
Domain of Space*




Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20





GPS Constellation



7 Jan 06

~~FOUO~~

February 4, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

Donald Rumsfeld

FROM:

SUBJECT: Mike DeLong's Book

Mr. President,

Tommy Franks's Deputy, Lieutenant General Mike DeLong, USMC, now retired is shown on the front cover of his book talking to you during one of your visits to CENTCOM. He sent along the book with his warm inscription to you and asked me to see that it is put in your hands, which I am happy to do. He was a fine officer and did an excellent job for the country.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Inside CENTCOM by Lt. Gen Michael DeLong, **USMC, Ret.**

DHR:ss
020305-16

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02455-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47294

461

4Feb05

INTRODUCTION BY GENERAL TONY ZINNI, USMC, RET.

Former Commander of CentCom and Co-Author of Tom Clancy's *Battle Ready*

INSIDE CENTCOM

THE UNVARNISHED TRUTH ABOUT THE
WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ



LT. GENERAL MICHAEL DeLONG, USMC, RET.

FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

WITH NOAH LUKEMAN

11-L-0559/OSD/47295

30 Jan 2005

INSIDE CENTCOM

President Bush,

Thank you for

staying the course
and faith when you
were alone for our
great country —

I hope this week
helped inform the
electors!

With Deep Respect,

MP. D. G.

11-L-0559/OSD/47296

OSD 02455-05

7201
~~FOUO~~

December 8, 2004

I-04/016582

ES-1616

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM:
SUBJECT: Expressing Gratitude

We need to thank the people who were involved in helping us prevail in Afghanistan. Now that the President of Afghanistan has been inaugurated, it is the time, for example, to write Karimov and MoD Gulomov in Uzbekistan, and send them something or thank them. We couldn't have done it without Uzbekistan.

I need a list of the people like that -- Pakistan, the Brits, and others who were helpful. We need to get a full list, and then we need to develop a terrific letter. Also, let's think about sending them some memorabilia or something and marking the historic event that took place.


Thanks.

DHR:dh
120804-9

.....
Please respond by

12/16/04

An Afghan
Letter should
go to the
after the DGA
Preliminary
decisions -


~~FOUO~~

Sir,
Response Attached

V/A, COC B/S
2/8

OSD 02458-05

03-12-04 P12:00 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/47297

Afghanistan

8 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

ES-2167
05/001413

JAN 28 2005

205 FT -A 11 2

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: List of Items to Discuss with New Iraqi Government

We need to prepare a list of the things we will want to discuss with the new Iraqi government. For instance, when we do the SOFA and other types of things, what kind of briefings we want to set up for the people after they are elected, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:sa
012705-21

.....
Please respond by 2/3/05

~~FOUO~~

23-01-05 P04:03 IN

OSD 02494-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47298

~~FOUO~~

INFO MEMO

REF
OSDP-

2005 FEB -11 01 20 11

ES-1267,1509,1589

1-05/001413

DepSecDef _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Discussions with New Iraqi Government

3 FEB 3 2005

You asked for a list of things to discuss with the new Iraqi government and for a recommendation on briefings for incoming senior Iraqi officials (Tab A).

- Timing: although the Transitional Administrative Law provides up to six weeks for a cabinet to be selected and empowered, the process could move much faster.
 - We should be prepared for discussions with incoming officials by February 15th or as soon thereafter as they are identified or take office.

• **Key dates in 2005:**

Feb 15-Mar 15: Formation of Iraqi Transitional Government

June 8: Security Council review of multinational force (MNF) mandate under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546

October 15: Ratification of Permanent Constitution

December 15: Election of New Government

December 31: Installation of New Government.

December 31: Expiration of the MNF mandate under UNSCR 1546 (based on completion of the political process)

Topics we might brief:

- To all cabinet ministers and above:
 - MNF-I Iraq Campaign Plan and transition to Iraqi local and regional control
 - The status and roles of the military in a democratic society

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02494-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47299

~~FOUO~~

- To the Presidency Council, Prime Minister, National Security Advisor, Ministers of Defense and Security, and National Security Committee of the National Assembly:
 - Iraqi Security Forces (including military and police) train-and-equip program
 - Coordination with MNF-I, including planning and conducting combined operations
 - Developing the ministries and coordinating with them
 - Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (this would enable U.S. forces to provide direct logistics support to Iraqi military forces in the field)
 - Defense Attaché exchange
 - Common strategy for the required Security Council review of the MNF mandate under UNSCR 1546 (June 8, 2005). (Note: we and the Iraqis should be prepared to counter French or other demands for a Coalition withdrawal at the end of 2005.)

Topics the Iraqis may raise with us:

- Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). SOFA-like protections are currently afforded to the MNF pursuant to CPA Order No. 17 (revised), which like all CPA orders will remain in effect until "rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law." (TAL, Art. 27[C]). Therefore, the ITG could through legislation decide to rescind or amend CPA Order No. 17. Although it is too early to know whether the ITG would want to enact such legislation, should it do so we would need to engage in negotiations of a SOFA.
- Longer-term Basing Arrangements. (We may want to consider combining SOFA and facilities access provisions for the long term into a single text for negotiation.)
- Other specific issues, e.g., MNF-I's authority to detain persons, U.S. current use of property such as the International Zone and portions of BIAP.

Prepared by C. Straub ISA-NESA-NG, (b)(6)

DUSD (NESA) _____

~~FOUO~~

COORDINATION

OGC: Chuck Allen 3 Feb 05

Joint Staff: Col John Seifer USAF 3 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

February 1, 2005

I-05/001589

ES-2212

2005 FEB 1 11 3 17

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: --

SUBJECT: Inventory of Items to Accomplish

We've got to get an inventory of all the things we need to get done prior to the expiration of the UN Resolution in Iraq.

We also need to put together a team of people – probably with State – to get it done in an orderly way and in good time.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
020105-14

.....
Please respond by

2/24/05

~~FOUO~~

02-02-05 08:08 IN

OSD 02496-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47302

~~FOUO~~

ES-2196

05/001509

January 31, 2005

2005 FEB -01 11 31 17

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: List of Iraq Items

I need a list of the things we are going to have to be doing over the coming year with Iraq, such as the SOFA, and the like. Let's look ahead and plan it now.

Thanks.

DEAC:sc
013105-12

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

~~FOUO~~

11-01-05 08:04:05
OSD 02498-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47303

~~FOUO~~

3 FEB 07 2005

TO: GEN Doug Brown

c c : Gen Dick Myers
Gordon England
Gen Mike Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Marines Special Operations Command

Thank you for the briefing on the continuing efforts to involve the Marine Corps in Special Operations.

I think we need to push harder and faster in this area. I am interested in the question of whether the Marines should have a special operations command like the other Services. It seems to me that is an idea worth considering. It might create conditions to properly leverage the contributions the Marines could make in this vital warfighting area.

I would like you to come back within 30 days with an evaluation of such a command, what it might look like, how many Marines might be involved, where it might be located, and so forth.

The ideas you presented – such as using the Marines for training duties – are fine, but I think we could go further. Thinking through the idea of a MARCSOC may help us in that direction.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020405-19

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02555-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47304

SOCOM

7 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

105 511-7 PM 5:53

January 31, 2005

I-OS/001547

ES-2207

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Fran Harvey
Gordon England
Pete Teets
David Chu

FROM:

SUBJECT: Important Issues

It is clear to me that we have to move promptly to do the following:

- 1) Increase IMET
- 2) Solve the visa issue
- 3) Peel through all the FMS layers at the Department of State so that the right countries get the right amount of money in the right time and the right way.
- 4) Have the Services require language training for line officers, not just foreign area officers.

2/6/05

→SD

Thanks.

DHR:ss
013105-29

Our "Building Partner Capacity" initiative - part of the GWOT strategy briefing we gave to the President - would fix items 1 and 4.

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

The goal is to retire the current security assistance programs and create a new, flexible piece of legislation to give President more money and more authority.

I am working this with Hadley, Townsend, Robin Clark and others. Dave Feith

OSD 02616-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47305



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INFO MEMO



DepSecDef
DUSD(P) MAR 14 2005
1-05/001547
ES-2207

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PRM* 11 MAR 2005

SUBJECT: Important Issues Update – Interim Response

- In a recent note, you wrote that we have to move promptly on four issues: (1) increase IMET, (2) peel through all the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) layers at State so that the right countries get the right amount of money in the right time and the right way, (3) have the Services require language training for line officers, not just foreign area officers, and (4) solve the visa issue.
- IMET and FMF:
 - We will brief you this month on our FY07 IMET/FMF proposals and recommend a robust increase to both.
 - Our "Building Partnership Capacity" initiative – part of the GWOT strategy briefing we gave the President – is in work and will create a new, flexible process to give the President more options.
 - We are working this with the NSC, OMB, and others on two fronts: (1) what authorities does the President have now that he needs to redirect and (2) what legislative initiatives do we require to get the process in place?
- Language Training for Line Officers:
 - DepSecDef signed the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap on 14 February 2005. The Roadmap contains specific instructions for language training for junior officers that impact the entire officer corps.
 - Establishes the requirement that junior officers complete language training and makes available one-year assignments for junior officers to serve with a foreign military or national ~~constabulary~~ ~~para-military~~ force and reward such service via advancement.
 - Makes foreign language ability a criterion for general officer/flag officer advancement.
- Visa Issue: Information will be provided under a separate cover

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



OSD 02616-05

14-05-05 00:57 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/47306

COORDINATION

Mr. Barry Pavel, Principal Director for Strategy

Feb 16,2005

11-L-0559/OSD/47307

~~FOUO~~

January 31, 2005

I-OS/001547

ES-2207

To: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Fran Harvey
Gordon England
Pete Teets
David Chu

FROM:

SUBJECT: Important Issues

It is clear to me that we have to move promptly to do the following:

- 1) Increase IMET
- 2) Solve the visa issue
- 3) Peel through all the FMS layers at the Department of State so that the right countries get the right amount of money in the right time and the right way.

- 4) Have the Services require language training for line officers, not just foreign area officers.

Thanks.

DHR:m
013105-29

Please respond by

2/17/05

—>SD
Our "Building Partner Capacity"
initiative - part of the GWOT
strategy briefing we gave to the
President - would fix items 1 and 3.

.....The goal is to retire the
current security assistance
programs and create a new,
flexible piece of legislation to
give President more money and
more authority.

I am working this with
Hadley, Townsend, Robin Cleveland
and others.

Doug Feith

01-01-15 10:10

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47308

~~FOUO~~

105 FEB -7 PM 5:52

January 31, 2005

I-OS/001547

ES-2207

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Fran Harvey
Gordon England
Pete Teets
David Chu

FROM:

SUBJECT: Important Issues

It is clear to me that we have to move promptly to do the following:

- 1) Increase IMET
- 2) Solve the visa issue
- 3) Peel through all the FMS layers at the Department of State so that the right countries get the right amount of money in the right time and the right way.
- 4) Have the Services require language training for line officers, not just foreign area officers.

2/6/05

→SD

Our "Building Partner Capacity" initiative - part of the GWOT strategy briefing we gave to the President - would fix items 1 and 2.

Thanks.

DHR:sf
013105-29

.....
Please respond by

2/17/05

The goal is to retire the current security assistance programs and create a new, flexible piece of legislation to give President more money and more authority.

I am working this with Hadley, Townsend, Robin Clark and others. Dave Feith

OSD 02616-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47309

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef
 TOUSD(P) *QAFB*
 1-05/000165-ES -
 E-1890

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Gary Becker

- You stated **that** since **Gary Becker** is not **able** to come to the Defense Policy Board meetings that we **probably** ought to drop him **off** (Snowflake attached).
- Larry DiRita has spoken with **Dr. Becker** and he agrees to step down.
- Attached at Tab A is a **thank you note** to Dr. Becker for your signature.

Recommendation: Sign the **note** thanking Dr. Becker for **his** service.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Ann Hansen, Defense Policy Board, (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD		
TSA SD	SA DSD	2/4	
EXEC SEC	MLX		
ESR MA	RSV	2-8-05	

OSD 02617-05

Policy Info Memo Template

A-76-2

334

4 Feb 05

4 Jan 05

Paul
 2/4
 Pub

3/1

~~FOUO~~

January 4, 2005

I-05/000165
ES-1890

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM:
SUBJECT: Gary Becker

Since Gary Becker is not able to come to the Defense Policy Board meetings, we probably ought to drop him off.

Thanks.

W R dh
010305-38

.....
Please respond by

1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02617-05

04-01-05 16:49 IN

A7613

11-L-0559/OSD/47311

334

430065



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 17 2005

334

Dr. Gary S. Becker
University of Chicago Midway
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637

Dear Gary,

Thanks so much for your participation with the Defense Policy Board. I recognize the difficulty you have getting back and forth to Washington. I hope we can continue to tap into your expertise in the future.

With my very best wishes to you, my friend,

Sincerely,

P.S. Do let Joyce and me know when you and (b)(6) are going to be in Washington. We very much enjoy having a chance to catch up.

1m Feb 05

47 Jan 05

OSD 02617-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47312

~~FOUO~~

February 7, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Taiwan CHOD

Let's go ahead with the Taiwan CHOD. General Dick Myers agrees.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020705-25

OSD 02618-05

~~FOUO~~


11-L-0559/OSD/47313

~~FOUO~~

February 7, 2005

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Response to UK C-130K Crash

Attached is a nice letter from the British Minister of Defense, commending our response after their C-130 crashed. Please ensure the units he mentions are aware of his thanks on behalf of the British government.

This is yet another example of the fine work going on in Iraq – we're all proud of your team.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/4/05 Hoon ltr to SD

DHR:dh
020705-37

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02639-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47314

UK

7 Feb 05

4 Feb 05

Fax sent by : (b)(6)

MINISTERIAL SPT UNIT

07/02/05

11:44

Pg: 2/3



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
FLOOR 5 ZONE D MAIN BUILDING
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephones: 020 7216 9000 (Switchboard)

MST 4/5/2K

4 February 2005

Dear Donald,

I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to those members of the United States Armed Forces who provided unstinting support after a British C130-K aircraft crashed north-west of Baghdad on Sunday 30 January, especially on a day when coalition forces were heavily committed to assisting the Iraqi elections.

I am particularly mindful of the efforts of those units from 1 Marine Expeditionary Force, 332 Air Expeditionary Wing, Joint Task Force 6-26 and 1st Cavalry Division, all of whom contributed to the Quick Reaction Force which first located the crash site and to the subsequent cordon which allowed for the detailed search and investigation that followed. Reports I have received have contained nothing but the highest praise and gratitude for the assistance provided by your Armed Forces.

The Hon Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America



Recycled Paper

Fax sent by : (b)(6)

MINISTERIAL SPT UNIT

07/02/05 11:44 Pg: 3/3

Finally, I am grateful for the respects paid by 332 Air Expeditionary Wing in providing a full honour guard at Balad airbase. All of the efforts made by US personnel in this matter are very much appreciated.

I have conveyed my thanks separately to General Casey.

Yours sincerely

Geoff

GEOFFREY HOON

*They did a great job — we are all
extremely grateful, not least because
we all know the risks they were
running.*

M

BRITISH DEFENCE STAFF (WASHINGTON)

British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington DC 20008-3688
Tel: (202) 588 6701
Fax: (202) 588 7887
E-mail: pchampni@moduk.org

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

REF: DATE: 7 February 2005

TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
secretary of Defense

FAX: (b)(6)

FROM: Miss P E Champriss
Office of the Defense Attaché

**YOU SHOULD RECEIVE 3 PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET.
IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL THE PAGES, PLEASE CALL (202)588 6701**

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM UK SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENSE - THE HONORABLE MR GEOFFREY HOON

I would be grateful if the *attached* letter from UK Secretary of State for Defense could be passed to Mr Rumsfeld as soon as possible. The original will be forwarded when received by this office.

With many thanks,

Yours sincerely
Paul G. Chapman

SECRET CABLES	
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USD	N
C&D	N
CCD	N
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
11-L-0559/OSD/47317

~~FOUO~~

February 7, 2005

TO: GEN George Casey

c c : Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Response to UK C-130K Crash

Attached is a nice letter from the British Minister of Defense, commending our response after their C-130 crashed. Please ensure the units he mentions are aware of his thanks on behalf of the British government.

This is yet another example of the fine work going on in Iraq – we're all proud of your team.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/4/05 Hoon ~~to~~ to SD

DHR:dh
020705-37

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02639-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47318

Fax sent by : (b)(6)

MINISTERIAL SPT UNIT

07/02/05

11:44

Pg: 2/3



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
FLOOR 8 ZONE D MAIN BUILDING
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone: 020 721 8000 (switchboard)

dit
2/1

MST 4/5/2K

4 February 2005

Dear Donald,

I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to those members of the United States Armed Forces who provided unstinting support after a British C130-K aircraft crashed north-west of Baghdad on Sunday 30 January, especially on a day when coalition forces were heavily committed to assisting the Iraqi elections.

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The Hon Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America



Recycled Paper

11-L-0559/OSD/47319

Fax sent by : (b)(6)

MINISTERIAL SPT UNIT

07/02/05 11:44 Pgs: 3/3

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I have conveyed my thanks separately to General Casey.

Yours sincerely
Geoff

GEOFFREY HOON

*They did a great job — we are all
extremely grateful, and I am sure
we all know the risks they were
running.*

M

BRITISH DEFENCE STAFF (WASHINGTON)

British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20008-3688

Tel: (b)(6)

Fax:

E-mail: (b)(6)

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

REF:

DATE: 7 February 2005

TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

FAX: (b)(6)

FROM: Miss P E Champniss
Office of the Defense Attaché

**YOU SHOULD RECEIVE 3 PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET.
IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL THE PAGES, PLEASE CALL (b)(6)**

**SUBJECT: LETTER FROM UK SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENSE - THE
HONORABLE MR GEOFFREY HOON**

I would be grateful if the attached letter from UK Secretary of State for Defense could be passed to Mr Rumsfeld as soon as possible. The original will be forwarded when received by this office.

With many thanks,

Yours sincerely

Paula Chapman

SECDEF	N
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DEFSECDEF	
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11-L-0559/OSD/47321

Fax sent by : (b)(6)

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Pg: 2/3



SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRET

2005 FEB -5 AM 8:33

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
FLOOR 5 ZONE D MAIN BUILDING
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone: 020 7218 9000 (Switchboard)

MST 4/5/2K

4 February 2005

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The Hon Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

OSD 02639-05



Recycled Paper

Fax sent by :

(b)(6)

MINISTERIAL SPT UNIT

07/02/05 11:44

Pg: 3/3

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Yours sincerely

G-esth

GEOFFREY HOON

They did a great job — we are all
extremely grateful, not least because
we all know the risks they were
running.

11-L-0559/OSD/47323



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 8 2005

The Right Honourable Geoffrey Hoon
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Level 5, Zone D, Main Building
Whitehall London, SW1A 2HB

U/K

Dear Geoff,

Thank you for your thoughtful note concerning the quick response of various US units in the aftermath of the tragic crash of your C-130K aircraft.

We were proud to be able to render assistance to your brave soldiers and airmen. I will certainly ensure the US personnel involved are aware of your appreciation.

8 Feb 05

Such teamwork between our nations has been of enormous value in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and we are honored to serve alongside the United Kingdom in the cause of freedom.

Regards,

4 Feb 05

OSD 02639-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47324

Fax sent by : (b)(6)

MINISTERIAL SPT UNIT

07/02/05 11:44 Pg: 2/2



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
FLOOR 5 ZONE D MAIN BUILDING
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone: 020 7218 9000 (Switchboard)

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MST 4/5/2K

4 February 2005


Dear Donald,

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The Hon Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

11-L-0559/OSD/47325



02/07/2005 13:42

(b)(6)

PAULA&SUE

PAGE 03

Fax sent by :

(b)(6)

MINISTERIAL SPT UNIT

07/02/05 11:44

Pg: 3/

Finally, I am grateful for the respects paid by 332 Air Expeditionary Wing in providing a full honour guard at Salad airbase. All of the efforts made by US personnel in this matter are very much appreciated,

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Geoff

GEOFFREY HOON

*They did a great job — we are all
extremely grateful, not least because
we all know the risks they were
running -*

11-L-0559/OSD/47326



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

February 7, 2005, 1:15 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary Of Defense (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Updated Status on Boeing and Darleen Druyun

- This is an update to my January 14, 2005, Info Memo on actions taken due to the pleadings of Darleen Druyun. (TAB A)
- **Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force Review:** The DSB Task Force briefed you February 3, 2005, on the results of its review of the process by which we make acquisition decisions, and the checks and balances necessary to preserve the integrity of those decisions.
- **Review of Actions with Druyun Involvement:** The multi-service/agency team briefed me on the results of its review of Air Force acquisition actions involving Darleen Druyun on February 2, 2005. Eight new actions warranting further review (not part of any other investigation) were discovered. I am forwarding these to the DoD Inspector General for investigation. A summary of the review is at **TAB B**.
- **Government Accountability Office (GAO) Review:** GAO decisions on protests, filed by prospective contractors challenging Air Force contract awards to Boeing in light of Ms. Druyun's admissions, are due on February 18. I will provide an update to you when we learn the results.
- **Boeing Review of Internal Practices:** On January 17, 2005, Boeing responded to my request to examine its practices and Mr. Sears' role in Boeing business with the Department. Boeing did not discover any further improprieties. The company is, however, changing some of its hiring practices involving government employees.
- **Navy Review of F/A -18 Program:** ASN (RD&A) reviewed the F/A-18 program for improper involvement by Mr. Sears. He found no evidence of impropriety.
- Both the DSB and the multi-service/agency team principals are planning to brief *members of* congressional staffs **prior** to your budget hearings on February 16. Information on the reviews by the DSB, multi-service/agency team, and GAO is also part of your budget hearing briefing package (labeled "Ethics").

COORDINATION: and GC at **TAB C**.

ASD(LA), SAF/AQ, (b)(6)

Prepared By: Nancy Dowling/DPAP-PAIC



OSD 02664-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47327



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

JAN 14 2005

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

Reference the attached snowflake at (TAB A), here are the steps I have taken to address all of our concerns in this matter:

- On November 19, 2004, I tasked the Military Departments, Missile Defense Agency, and the Special Operations Command to perform self-assessments of their acquisition organization and process. The Defense Science Board Task Force I established is reviewing their assessments and their acquisition management structures. The Task Force will brief me on February 2, 2005.
- At my direction on December 13, 2004, a multi-service/agency team led by the Deputy Director, Defense Contract Management Agency began reviewing contract actions involving Darlene Druyun. Their findings will also be briefed to me on February 2nd.
- On December 16, 2004, I sent a letter to Harry Stonecipher, Boeing CEO, asking him to examine his own practices. I specifically asked him to examine Mr. Sears' role in Boeing's business with the Department. His December 21, 2004, reply states he is currently reviewing Mr. Sears' role and will share the results with us this month.
- Today, I sent a memorandum to the ASN (RD&A) asking him to conduct a review of the F/A-18 program, in which Mr. Sears was also involved. I also have asked the Inspector General (IG) to look *into* the dealings of Ms. Druyun's husband. I understand that the IG is also assisting the Justice Department on issues associated with the Druyun/Sears convictions.
- I will continue to coordinate with the General Counsel and the IG as these reviews proceed and report back to you on the findings.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Nancy Dowling/DPAP/PAIC/ (b)(6) IT 2005-0065

cc: DSD, GC, IG




033-01023-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47328

~~FOUO~~

November 30, 2004

TO: Joe Schmitz
Mike Wynne
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Boeing and Druyun

As I indicated at the staff meeting today, I believe that not only should we look at other activities that Darlene Druyun, who pled guilty, was involved in, but we should also look *at* other *activities that the* Boeing person who pled guilty *was* involved in.

We have a responsibility to look out for the taxpayers' money. Given the fact that each of them have confessed that they committed crimes, we have a responsibility to see if they committed other crimes. We know they are confessed criminals. Therefore, we ought to check and see if they committed some crimes relating to other activities of the Department of Defense for which they have not been charged.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
113004-23

.....
Please respond by

1/13/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47329

Point Paper
Multi-Service Agency Review of Contract Actions Involving Darleen Druyun

Purpose

Reviewed all Air Force acquisition actions executed or influenced by Ms. Druyun during her tenure (1993-2002) as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition and Management), to determine whether her decisions were consistent with DoD standards of integrity and sound business practices.

Background

Review Stats

- The Druyun Study Team reviewed 407 acquisition actions, and approximately 8,000 documents
- 15 contracts being referred for investigation
 - 8 contracts were referred to USD (AT&L)
 - 4 actions involved contracts with Boeing
 - 4 involved contracts with other contractors
 - 7 of the actions were forwarded previously to authorities conducting ongoing investigations.
- Good support from the Air Force, Navy, **Army**, and DCAA

Results

Contracts referred for investigation

- National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite system – Conical Microwave Imager Sensor (NPOESS-CMIS) - Boeing – 2001
- C-5 Avionics Modernization Program - Lockheed Martin – 1998-99
- Financial Information Resource System (FIRST) - Andersen Consulting – 2001
- C-22 Replacement Program (C-40) - Boeing – 1999-2000
- 60K Tunner Program Contractor Logistics - Systems & Electronics, Inc (SEI) - 2002
- KC-135 Programmed Depot Maintenance - Boeing/Pemco – 2000-2001
- F-16 Mission Training Center - Lockheed Martin-2001
- C-40 Lease & Purchase Program – Boeing – 2000-2002

Additions to ongoing investigations

- Wideband Gapfiller – Boeing – 2001
- NATO AWACS – Boeing – 2002
- NATO AWACS – Boeing – 2001
- JSTARS – Northrop-Grumman – 1999
- Peace Shield – Boeing – 1996
- C-130J Maintenance and Aircrew Trainers – Boeing – 2000
- F/A-22 – Lockheed Martin – 1997-2001

Conclusion

- Contracts referred for investigation being forwarded to the DoDIG
- Information related to ongoing investigations has been provided to the appropriate Government authorities.

Prepared by Nancy Dowling, DPAP/PAIC/ (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47331

COORDINATION SUMMARY

<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>COORDINATING OFFICIAL</u>	<u>DATE</u>
OGC	Mr. Daniel J. Dell'Orto (Principal Deputy)	February 4, 2005
OASD(LA)	Ms. Jeanine Esperne (DepAsstSec (House Affairs))	February 3, 2005
SAF/AQ	Lt Gen John Corley (Principal Deputy)	February 3, 2005

TAB A

~~FOUO~~



DEC 29 200

926

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: IIAV

I got the impression the Army needs more UAVs out in Iraq. Please see if that is true and, if it is, what do we do about it.

Thanks.

DRS:m
122904-33

Please respond by 1/21/05

Sir,

Response Attached

2/8

OSD 02709-05

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47333

A27-2

452 R

27 DEC 07

~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2005

4:15

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: RAND Study

Iraq

Here is a memo from RAND that is worth looking at.

Also attached is a copy of a memo I have sent to our team, asking them to consider it, and adding that you will be calling them together.

If you think some of these need to be put into the QDR, let's do so.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/7/05 Thomson ltr to SD w/attachment: "Iraq: Translating Lessons into Future DoD Policies"
3/1/05 SD memo to CJCS et al [Snowflake #022805-28]

1 Mar 05

DHR:dh
022805-30

.....
Please respond by

3/31/05

7 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47334

OSD 02710-05

~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers GEN Pete Schoomaker
Fran Harvey ADM Vern Clark
Gordon England Gen Mike Hagee
Pete Teets Gen John Jumper

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: RAND Study

Attached are some recommendations from RAND that are worth our careful consideration.

After you have had an appropriate amount of time to examine them, I have asked Paul Wolfowitz to gather you together and discuss what changes might be appropriate.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/7/05 Thomson ltr to SD w/attachment: "Iraq: Translating Lessons into Future DoD Policies"

DHR:dh
022805-28

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47335

OSD 02710-05



JAMES A. THOMSON
PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

1776 MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 2138
SANTA MONICA, CA
90407-2138

TEL 310.451.8034
FAX 310.451.8072
www.southcoast.org

2/2

(c)

February 7, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-2000

Dear Don:

I am writing to share with you lessons RAND researchers have drawn from U.S. military planning and operations in Iraq and their recommendations for future DoD policies. I would be surprised if the issues are all that new to you, and some of what we recommend may already be underway. What we do bring is a perspective based on extensive and in-depth RAND research involving over 20 studies that were undertaken across our three FFRDCs.

Let me highlight a few of our critical lessons and recommendations. A discussion of these as well as others can be found in the enclosed memorandum.

- Be cautious with respect to Army transformation plans that move to lightly armored vehicles and heavy reliance on networked information systems, given the difficulty in translating good sensor coverage of the battlefield into good situational awareness.
- Give serious attention to creating a dedicated cadre of counterinsurgency specialists.
- Assign responsibility to a single Army officer to redesign the Army's reserve mobilization systems.
- Be realistic with respect to expectations of what air attacks can achieve in bringing about the overthrow or collapse of an enemy regime.

You will see that we have tailored our recommendations to those issues directly within your responsibility as Secretary of Defense. We hope that these will be useful to you this spring in your strategic planning activities, including the QDR. I am ready to discuss these with you, and the researchers are ready to brief you or your staff on the details of our analyses.

Warm regards,

JAT:IF

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/47336

OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS. EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS.

050 02710 -05



IRAQ: TRANSLATING LESSONS INTO FUTURE DoD POLICIES

This memorandum presents lessons RAND researchers have learned from looking at U.S. military planning and operations in Iraq and our recommendations for future DoD policies. In each case, the first bullet describes the lessons learned and the second bullet briefly outlines our recommendations.

In many ways, Iraq was no match for coalition forces during major combat operations: the Iraqi leadership was strategically and operationally incompetent; Iraqi regular forces were weakened, poorly trained, and poorly equipped; and the paramilitary forces lacked training and popular support. Despite these conditions, we believe that the experience in Iraq holds very important lessons and should inform future DoD policies. There is a case for change, and even urgency, in those areas where problems arose even in such favorable circumstances.

The memorandum is divided into three parts: lessons and recommendations for conducting major combat operations, for responding to insurgencies, and for designing the NSC and DoD policymaking processes.

I. Lessons for conducting major combat operations

1. Air Operations and Regime Change

- As in previous conflicts, our ability to dominate operations in the air shaped the joint campaign fundamentally. It enabled a lean deployment to rear areas that were secure and it provided for unprecedented levels of situational awareness. Iraqi soldiers' appreciation that they had no defense against coalition air attacks caused units to disperse and hide, made soldiers afraid to fight, and ruled out large-scale maneuver operations by conventional Iraqi ground forces. Air attacks alone, however, did not achieve the broader strategic objective of regime collapse through attacks aimed at decapitating, isolating, or breaking the will of the enemy leadership—the concept of “shock and awe.” The attacks on “regime” targets (leadership, command and control, and infrastructure) were able to disrupt, but not eliminate, the ability of Iraqi leaders to communicate with the Iraqi people and military forces.
 - For the future, a caution is in order with respect to expectations of what air attacks on “regime” targets can achieve. Put simply, prompt regime collapse or decapitation is generally unlikely because of a host of limitations, some self-imposed, on the effectiveness of such attacks. Achieving operational surprise is unlikely. The kind of intelligence needed to pinpoint leaders is hard to acquire, given the opportunities leaders have to hide. Redundant communication networks are difficult to break. Political constraints on targeting will always be imposed so as to minimize civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. And, in my case, the psychological effects of air attacks against “regime” targets cannot be expected to emerge quickly.

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2. *Integration of Air-Land Operations*

- o The Iraq operation demonstrated the increasing interdependence of air and ground forces. Expeditionary operations are driving leaner deployments, and lighter and more mobile U.S. forces are more dependent on information and fires from sources "external" to the Army. Air forces took up the challenge, and, in fact, the primary contribution of fixed-wing aircraft in Iraq was in attacks on enemy forces and their support facilities. Air operations reduced substantially the costs and risks of ground operations. At the same time, air forces were dependent on land forces to generate ground targets in many situations, by their ability to flush enemy forces from hidden positions and to compel them to respond. Air forces were not responsive enough to take over the Army's mission of suppressing enemy mortars and artillery. Deep attack Apache helicopter missions in Iraq proved risky and not very productive, while opportunities were lost to employ them for close support or reconnaissance. Though planned, no air assault operations were undertaken, primarily because the risks outweighed the expected benefits.
- For the future, much can be done to enhance the effectiveness of air support to ground operations. Fixed wing aviation should be better integrated with ground forces by increasing the realism and frequency of joint training continuing to refine and field blue force tracker system, and investing in better equipment for forward air control teams. Attack helicopters should have close support as their primary mission. The experience in Iraq involving the employment of attack helicopters raises questions about some of the emerging concepts that place high reliance on so-called vertical envelopment operations deep into enemy territory.
- Changes need to be made in the traditional linear approach to the coordination of air and ground fire support. A nonlinear system of "kill boxes" should be adopted, as technology permits. This would involve designating areas of the battlefield as closed or open. Kill boxes around friendly forces would normally be closed, i.e., no air attacks without positive approval by terminal or forward air controllers. Kill boxes farther from friendly forces would normally be open, i.e., positive control would not be required. The attraction of such a system is that the kill boxes can be sized for open terrain or urban warfare, and opened or closed quickly in response to a dynamic military situation.

3. *Situational Awareness on the Battlefield*

- o The Iraq military campaign saw the operation of a variety of platforms and sensors that truly transformed the battlefield. But their utility depended on the level of command. Division commanders and above were well served, while tactical commanders often did not receive specific or actionable intelligence. Accessing the intelligence required an operational pause, which was not attractive because it slowed

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the advance and exposed the forces to attack. Tactical units were often moving too fast for the information to be useful, or the information was not detailed enough. Iraqi armored forces were able at times to exploit camouflage and concealment to avoid detection from the air. Most Army engagements were meeting engagements that occurred when Iraqi forces, typically *Fedayeen* and other irregular forces, opened fire and revealed their position. Additionally, the airborne sensor array deployed to Iraq was in many cases unable to locate and identify the type of threat that U.S. ground forces faced, namely relatively small groups of light infantry-type enemy forces deployed in built-up areas or moving along roads in civilian vehicles. The lesson from Iraq is that having good sensor coverage of the battlefield does not necessarily translate into good situational awareness.

- For the future, systems and procedures need to be designed from the bottom up to give the tactical commander the information he needs. This will require wideband satellite communication systems and UAVs (non-line-of-sight systems) for tactical units, as well as trained personnel who can quickly interpret the information. Developers of the Army's Future Combat Systems and the AN Force's Link-16 (and its successors) need to ensure that maneuver forces can directly access increasingly powerful air sensors operating above them. Procedures need to be designed not only for tailoring reports from the various sensors for tactical commanders but also for disseminating intelligence from individual sensors directly and quickly to these commanders. Until these steps are taken, the Army needs to be cautious in its transformation plans to shift to a family of more lightly armored fighting vehicles that will rely heavily on networked systems of information and situational awareness. This is reinforced by the experiences of Army forces in Iraq's cities in more recent counterinsurgency operations.

4. *Integration of Special Operations and Conventional Forces*

- Special operations forces played a critical part in all aspects of operations in Iraq, which was the largest and most complex mission for these forces in the nation's history. Nevertheless, fearing compromise of the operations, the decision to deploy special operations forces was delayed until just before the launch of major combat operations. There were also problems integrating operations involving conventional and special operations forces, arising from differences in perspectives, operating concepts, and command and control systems.
- In the future, steps need to be taken to exercise conventional and special operations forces together, as was the case in the past at the National Training Center. Especially important will be finding ways to build trust among the leadership of these two forces, through training at the various command and staff schools. Policymakers also need to understand the need to deploy these forces as early as possible, a step that could be made easier if this community found ways to communicate better to senior officials what their capabilities and needs are at the unclassified as well as the classified level.

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5. Security of Army Supplies

- The unanticipated need in Iraq to secure supply lines against *Fedayeen* attacks necessitated a short operational pause. It also reinforced the need for all units to be capable of combat, and highlighted the fact that many forces may be needed to secure the supply lines. Supply problems emerged in Iraq during major combat operations because of insufficient trucks. Problems for spares were exacerbated by a lack of mobile satellite communications systems. Although these problems increased the risk, they fell short of impeding the operation.
 - For the future, the Army needs to address the fundamental question of what limits will be imposed on its concepts for simultaneous and extended maneuver operations by the need to provide security for logistics operations as well as the constraints (both financial and those imposed by enemy attacks) that continue to limit the amount of intratheater airlift capacity that can be brought to bear.

6. Exploitation of Sensitive WMD Site?

- The exploitation of sensitive WMD sites in Iraq was unique for the breadth of the target set and the scope of the effort. Although no weapons or materials were found, the lesson from Iraq is that tensions will arise between operational military imperatives and the requirements of an exploitation mission. In allocating sensor coverage in Iraq, hunting for WMD was given priority over providing information to tactical commanders. But in the military operations themselves, a rapid drive to Baghdad was given priority, not securing the sensitive sites or protecting the exploitation team members. The resulting extensive looting at many sites made it difficult to ascertain whether weapons, materials, critical computer files, or documents had been removed or destroyed. When the exploitation task evolved from discovering caches of weapons to detective work in trying to find evidence of weapons, the teams lacked experts in conducting investigations as well as a mandate to collect human intelligence. The primary casualty of checking every site was the availability of time at any one site to search for evidence, making it even more difficult to answer the questions as to how the programs were set up, what had been accomplished since the UNSCOM inspectors left, and who were the key individuals in the programs.
 - In future military operations the need to exploit sensitive sites is likely to arise, whether it is in the form of hunting for terrorists (as in Afghanistan) or WMD (as in Iraq). Civilian and military staffs in the DoD need to introduce requirements for site exploitation missions early into the military campaign planning, so that the tensions can be understood in advance and the explicit tradeoffs made. Building on the experiences of the innovative Sensitive Site Exploitation headquarters in Iraq, it would make sense to create in the Army a permanent small cadre of specialists, technical experts, and MPs who plan and train for these missions, notwithstanding the additional costs.

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6. *Information Operations*

- An important tool of Sadaam Hussein in both controlling his own population and manipulating perceptions internationally was his broadcast capabilities, particularly through access to satellite television. Broadcast capabilities comprise a difficult target set because they are redundant, dispersed, mobile, easily repaired and replaced, and often located with the high potential for collateral damage. But the lesson from Iraq is that one aspect of information operations deserves greater attention and particular emphasis, and that is fighting the enemy's public information campaign.
 - For the future, new concepts need to be considered to take on this task, perhaps to include stand-in jammers, high-powered microwave weapons, and proliferated jamming transmitters to disrupt/defeat the regime's propaganda.

6. *Bomb Damage Assessment*

- The process for assessing the effects of air attacks in Iraq fell behind early, despite the best efforts of the analysts. Many factors contributed, including bad weather, inadequate reporting from operators, and a scarcity of sensor systems and analytical resources. Turnaround times were measured in days instead of hours. The uncertainties arising from these delays resulted in air forces restriking targets unnecessarily and ground forces having scant knowledge of the condition of enemy forces along the route of advance. Without such information, it was also not possible credibly to refute enemy claims about civilian damage caused by coalition bombing.
 - For the future, the military services jointly should take steps to improve the bomb damage assessment process through changes in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. A premium should be placed on quickly providing these assessments not only to military commanders but also to political leaders. More specifically, the Army should find ways to ensure that ground force assessment processes adequately address the concerns of ground force commanders and to integrate the products of damage assessment analysts with order-of-battle analysts, who have training in this task as well. Another step for improving bomb damage assessment would be to develop automated tools for generating and managing the flow of tactical reporting and to introduce joint training exercises. Finally, it should be possible to modify air-delivered missiles and bombs so that they report their location via a burst radio transmission just prior to detonation.

9. *Planning and Resourcing Post Conflict Activities*

- Planning for military combat and postwar operations in Iraq lacked the flexibility necessary to enable the U.S. military to respond to the situation that emerged after the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime. Post conflict stabilization and reconstruction were addressed only very generally; largely because of the prevailing view that the task would not be difficult. What emerged was a general set of tasks that were not prioritized or resourced. The possibility that these activities might require more resources, or a different mix of resources, than the earlier military operations was not contemplated.
 - For future intervention scenarios, the likelihood that the United States and its allies will quickly defeat outmatched opponents and then spend months or years winning the peace argues for an "inverted planning process," i.e., that the military and civilian resources required for securing the peace and reconstruction be given *primary* focus in the plan and priority in resources. Some process for exposing senior officials to possibilities other than those being assumed in their planning also needs to be introduced.

9. *Stability Operations and the Role of the Military*

- No planning was undertaken to provide for the security of the Iraqi people in the post conflict environment, given the expectations that the Iraqi government would remain largely intact; the Iraqi people would welcome the American presence; and local militia, police, and the regular army would be capable of providing law and order. By not including civil police in its nation-building operations, the burden for handling public security in Iraq fell upon coalition military forces, which were ill prepared. Iraq demonstrates that the military mission of providing security in the post conflict environment is just as important to achieving a strategic victory, if not more important, than the military mission of winning decisive combat operations.
 - For the future, the U.S. military cannot assume that some other organization, either within the U.S. government or in the host country, will take responsibility for providing law, order, and security through the transition period from the end of conventional military operations until a generally secure environment has been established. Until civilian agencies can operate in a secure environment, military personnel will need to be trained and prepared to assume responsibility for public security—including overseeing local police activities, providing short-term training, and directly suppressing criminal activity.

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II. Lessons for responding to insurgencies

1. Counterinsurgency Operations

- Iraq underscores first the overwhelming organizational tendency within the U.S. military not to absorb historical lessons when planning and conducting counterinsurgency operations. Missing in Iraq was the recognition of how critical political-military coordination is in waging an effective counterinsurgency as well as the essential element of actionable intelligence on the insurgents. But problems also arose because of a failure to understand how this Iraqi insurgency differs from past "wars of national liberation" and a "classical guerrilla-type campaign." Iraqi insurgents are groups of disparate opposition elements with no center of gravity, no clear leader, no aim to seize and hold territory, and no single, defined, or unifying ideology. The Iraq insurgency demonstrates the closest manifestation yet of "net war," which is characterized by flatter, more linear networks rather than the pyramidal hierarchies and command and control systems of traditional insurgent organizations.
 - In the future, U.S. military forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations must be composed of personnel with training and skills similar to special operations forces, i.e., the language and culture of the country, and in the critically important political, economic, intelligence, organizational, and psychological dimensions of counterinsurgency warfare. Serious attention should also be given to creating in the Army a dedicated cadre of counterinsurgency specialists and a program to produce such experts.
- 2. *Role of Special Operations Forces in Building Indigenous Security Forces*
 - Special operations forces in Iraq have been used predominantly in what is known as their direct action mission, that is, as a "high-value target" posse deployed on successive special mission task forces. They have been notably absent, for example, from the training and advising of indigenous Iraqi military and security forces, or accompanying them in counterinsurgency operations.
 - In the future, U.S. special operations forces need to be at the core of any successful counterterrorist and/or counterinsurgency strategy. In this respect, they can bring a distinct and advantageous "force-multiplying" capability to bear through their language proficiency and intercultural communications skills. They are also expert in training indigenous forces about how to win the trust of their fellow citizens and how to protect those citizens from insurgent attack and reprisals, as well as in organizing indigenous populations for their own self-defense, thereby giving them a stake in the outcome of their government's success. Because of their intimate understanding of unconventional environments, they can play a pivotal role in promoting sound civil-military relations.

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- In this context, special operations forces can also perform a critical "combat advisor" role, as they did in northern Iraq with the Kurds. Not only would they train Iraqi forces, but they would also have the flexibility to accompany these forces on counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency operations to follow through on the training received, and coach and mentor them on how such missions can be most effectively and successfully executed. Performing this advisory role would also place them in a position to synchronize U.S. intelligence, operations, and logistical support and in turn help ensure that U.S.-provided resources are being properly used and that rapport and trust is developed and maintained.

3. Air Force and Army Supply Operations

- As military operations in Iraq continued beyond major combat, the system for distributing spares and other on-demand items remained relatively slow for many months. Distribution problems resulted from a misalignment between the packaging and configuration of loads in the United States and the handling and distribution capabilities in the theater, and also from delays in increasing the capacity of U.S. distribution centers (i.e., warehouse and load consolidation centers). As very high demands continued, the system began to experience high backorders as national inventories, which had significant war reserve shortfalls, were drained. An industrial base surge was delayed by slow budget approval to place orders for quantities of spares above baseline demand levels. In supplying Air Force units, problems arose in coordinating the strategic and theater movements systems, in ensuring in-transit visibility, and in paying for the shipments. As a result, cargo built up at transshipment points for Air Force supplies. In contrast, distribution delays did not generally occur at transshipment points for Army supplies.
- A common commodity supply chain guiding vision or model setting out basic operating principles needs to be adopted by all supply chain organizations, including the Services, joint logistics commands, government agencies, and their commercial partners. The joint and service planning and assessment processes, doctrine, organization, training, and information systems then need to be modified for consistency with the model and to ensure that the assumptions of the organizations in the supply chains are consistent with the capabilities of their suppliers and customers. The goal is for the supply chains to be optimized as a whole rather than having each process optimized in and of itself. Ensuring that the system stays aligned with the model once a contingency begins then calls for the adoption of improved monitoring and control capabilities for logistics situational awareness so as to provide near-real-time feedback when problems begin to arise.
- The processes for planning and executing the airlift of supplies need to focus on outcomes, with a cadre of permanent staff in all operational theaters. The changes made during the course of operations in Iraq in how Army materiel is packaged for shipment should be embedded in joint policy and integrated into

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processes better designed to quickly make transitions to new locations as contingencies develop.

- Finally, there is the need throughout DoD to appreciate better the long lead times involved in providing parts for many critical weapon systems. These lead times call for an improved ability to quickly forecast contingency requirements; for a more rapid pre-contingency approval of contract authority for additional orders; for reducing the time needed to approve an increase in the Defense Logistics Agency workforce so as to expand the capacity of its distribution centers; for alerting senior policymakers to the risks when a given concept of operations must be adjusted for lack of logistics resources; and for changing the ways the Army computes and reserves war reserve inventory levels, given that some critical items with long lead times can only be supported in this way. The long-term effects of even small shortfalls in national supply and distribution capacity can be dramatic.

III. Lessons for designing the NSC and DoD policymaking processes

1. NSC Processes for Post-Conflict Planning and

- Historically, administrations have struggled to find ways to integrate military civilian planning and activities for the period when major combat operations come to an end. The Iraqi experience was no different, with frustrations recorded universally among both military and civilian organizations. The NSC coordinating effort for Iraq focused largely on military operations and plans for providing humanitarian assistance, not post-conflict activities. Responsibility for such planning and operations was given to DoD, but separate from the military command. This approach worked poorly, because DoD lacked the experience, authority, local knowledge, and established contacts with other potential civilian organizations needed to establish, staff, support, and oversee a large multi-
- Unity of command and broad participation are both important to the success of stabilization and reconstruction operations. There is a case to be made that such responsibility reside with a senior State Department official, who would be appointed as a special Presidential envoy with authority to convene an NSC interagency planning group. But who is given such responsibility is not as important as the requirement that the planning and operations be based on a full understanding of the operational military plan and that it involve both civilians and military officers with expertise in security and law enforcement, in various reconstruction operations, and critically in the culture of the region of the conflict. For this to happen, the Secretary of Defense will need personally to support a civilian-led planning effort and most importantly direct such sharing of operational military information. An active NSC interagency process will also be necessary to ensure that the State and Defense Departments are acting off the same sheet of paper and to bring forward

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debate of alternative views and subsequent decisionmaking on important issues. Policy differences need to be expressed and adjudicated, if necessary by the President, as the planning process goes forward.

2. *DoD Process for Force Deployments and Mobilization of Reserves*

- Within DoD, the principal organizational lessons from Iraq concern the militarily important and politically sensitive process of force deployments and mobilization of the reserves. In Iraq, the deployment of forces was accomplished through a procedure of separate requests from the commander for each force component. This had the advantage of tailoring the forces to the diplomatic and military situation, but it led to high-level micromanagement, delay, and disruptions. Because alert times were then compressed, most units received less than 30 days of mobilization notice. Extensive small, sequential requirements also led to readiness problems within units and administrative burdens. The Iraq experience also showed that the Army mobilization system is fragmented in terms of responsibilities, with no single organization responsible for monitoring performance or synchronizing the activities with others in DoD. This led to surprises, frictions, and false starts. The Army's outdated and inadequate information systems exacerbated these problems.
- For the future, the processes of deploying forces and mobilizing reserves within DoD need to be fundamentally redesigned to reflect the high political stakes as well as the critical military requirements in future military operations. A single Army officer needs to be accountable for redesigning the Army's reserve mobilization system and for how it performs. The system should involve the application of metrics for performance, such as meeting the commander's requirements, minimizing reserve soldier time on active duty, and providing predictability throughout the mobilization process. New information systems also need to be introduced to help integrate all these activities.

February 2005

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TAB A

2005 March 1, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers GEN Pete Schoomaker
Fran Harvey ADM Vern Clark
Gordon England Gen Mike Hagee
Pete Teets Gen John Jumper

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: RAND Study

Attached are some recommendations from RAND that are worth our careful consideration.

After you have had an appropriate amount of time to examine them, I have asked Paul Wolfowitz to gather you together and discuss what changes might be appropriate.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/7/05 Thomson ltr to SD w/attachment: "Iraq: Translating Lessons into Future DoD Policies"

DHR:dh
022805-28

Please respond by

3/31/05

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Tab A

OSD 02710-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47347



IRAQ: TRANSLATING LESSONS INTO FUTURE DoD POLICIES

This memorandum presents lessons RAND researchers have learned from looking at U.S. military planning and operations in Iraq and our recommendations for future DoD policies. In each case, the first bullet describes the lessons learned and the second bullet briefly outlines our recommendations.

In many ways, Iraq was no match for coalition forces during major combat operations: the Iraqi leadership was strategically and operationally incompetent; Iraqi regular forces were weakened, poorly trained, and poorly equipped; and the paramilitary forces lacked training and popular support. Despite these conditions, we believe that the experience in Iraq holds very important lessons and should inform future DoD policies. There is a case for change, and even urgency, in those areas where problems arose even in such favorable circumstances.

The memorandum is divided into three parts: lessons and recommendations for conducting major combat operations, for responding to insurgencies, and for designing the NSC and DoD policymaking processes.

I, Lessons for conducting major combat operations

1 Air Operations and Regime Change

- As in previous conflicts, our ability to dominate operations in the air shaped the joint campaign fundamentally. It enabled a lean deployment to rear areas that were secure and it provided for unprecedented levels of situational awareness. Iraqi soldiers' appreciation that they had no defense against coalition air attacks caused units to disperse and hide, made soldiers afraid to fight, and ruled out large-scale maneuver operations by conventional Iraqi ground forces. Air attacks alone, however, did not achieve the broader strategic objective of regime collapse through attacks aimed at decapitating, isolating, or breaking the will of the enemy leadership—the concept of “shock and awe.” The attacks on “regime” targets (leadership, command and control, and infrastructure) were able to disrupt, but not eliminate, the ability of Iraqi leaders to communicate with the Iraqi people and military forces.
 - For the future, a caution is in order with respect to expectations of what air attacks on “regime” targets can achieve. Put simply, prompt regime collapse or decapitation is generally unlikely because of a host of limitations, some self-imposed, on the effectiveness of such attacks. Achieving operational surprise is unlikely. The kind of intelligence needed to pinpoint leaders is hard to acquire, given the opportunities leaders have to hide. Redundant communication networks are difficult to break. Political constraints on targeting will always be imposed, so as to minimize civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. And, in any case, the psychological effects of air attacks against “regime” targets cannot be expected to emerge quickly.

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2. *Integration of Air-Land Operations*

- The Iraq operation demonstrated the increasing interdependence of air and ground forces. Expeditionary operations are driving leaner deployments, and lighter and more mobile U.S. forces are more dependent on information and fires from sources "external" to the Army. Air forces took up the challenge, and, in fact, the primary contribution of fixed-wing aircraft in Iraq was in attacks on enemy forces and their support facilities. Air operations reduced substantially the costs and risks of ground operations. At the same time, air forces were dependent on land forces to generate ground targets in many situations, by their ability to flush enemy forces from hidden positions and to compel them to respond. Air forces were not responsive enough to take over the Army's mission of suppressing enemy mortars and artillery. Deep attack Apache helicopter missions in Iraq proved risky and not very productive, while opportunities were lost to employ them for close support or reconnaissance. Though planned, no air assault operations were undertaken, primarily because the risks outweighed the expected benefits.
- For the future, much can be done to enhance the effectiveness of air support to ground operations. Fixed wing aviation should be better integrated with ground forces by increasing the realism and frequency of joint training, continuing to refine and field blue force tracker systems, and investing in better equipment for forward air control teams. Attack helicopters should have close support as their primary mission. The experience in Iraq involving the employment of attack helicopters raises questions about some of the emerging concepts that place high reliance on so-called vertical envelopment operations deep into enemy territory.
- Changes need to be made in the traditional linear approach to the coordination of air and ground fire support. A nonlinear system of "kill boxes" should be adopted, as technology permits. This would involve designating areas of the battlefield as closed or open. Kill boxes around friendly forces would normally be closed, i.e., no air attacks without positive approval by terminal or forward air controllers. Kill boxes farther from friendly forces would normally be open, i.e., positive control would not be required. The attraction of such a system is that the kill boxes can be sized for open terrain or urban warfare, and opened or closed quickly in response to a dynamic military situation.

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the advance and **exposed** the forces to attack. Tactical units were often moving too fast for the information to be useful, or the information was not detailed enough. Iraqi armored forces were able at times to exploit **camouflage** and concealment to avoid detection from the air. Most Army engagements were **meeting** engagements that occurred when Iraqi forces, typically *Fedayeen* and other irregular forces, **opened fire** and revealed their position. **Additionally**, the airborne sensor array deployed to Iraq was in many cases unable to locate and **identify** the type of threat that U.S. ground forces faced, **namely** relatively small groups of light infantry-type enemy forces deployed in built-up areas or moving along roads in civilian vehicles. The lesson from Iraq is that having good sensor coverage of the battlefield does not necessarily **translate into** good situational awareness.

- For the future, systems and procedures need to be designed from the **bottom up** to give the tactical commander the information he **needs**. This **will** require wideband satellite communication systems and UAVs (non-line-of-sight systems) for tactical units, as well as trained personnel **who** can quickly interpret the information. Developers of the **Army's** Future Combat Systems and the Air Force's Link-16 (and its successors) need to ensure that maneuver forces can directly access increasingly powerful air sensors operating above them. Procedures need to be designed not only for tailoring reports from the **various** sensors for tactical commanders but **also** for disseminating intelligence from individual sensors directly and quickly to these commanders. Until these steps are taken, the Army needs to be cautious in its transformation plans to shift to a family of more **lightly** armored fighting vehicles that will rely heavily on networked **systems** of information and situational awareness. This is reinforced by the **experiences** of Army forces in Iraq's cities in more recent counterinsurgency operations.

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9. *Planning and Resourcing Post Conflict Activities*

- Planning for military combat and postwar operations in Iraq lacked the flexibility necessary to enable the U.S. military to respond to the situation that emerged after the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime. Post conflict stabilization and reconstruction were addressed only very generally, largely because of the prevailing view that the task would not be difficult. What emerged was a general set of tasks that were not prioritized or resourced. The possibility that these activities might require more resources, or a different mix of resources, than the earlier military operations was not contemplated.
 - For future intervention scenarios, the likelihood that the United States and its allies will quickly defeat outmatched opponents and then spend months or years winning the peace argues for an "inverted planning process," i.e., that the military and civilian resources required for securing the peace and reconstruction be given primary focus in the plan and priority in resources. Some process for exposing senior officials to possibilities other than those being assumed in their planning also needs to be introduced.

9. *Stability Operations and the Role of the Military*

- No planning was undertaken to provide for the security of the Iraqi people in the post conflict environment, given the expectations that the Iraqi government would remain largely intact; the Iraqi people would welcome the American presence; and local militia, police, and the regular army would be capable of providing law and order. By not including civil police in its nation-building operations, the burden for handling public security in Iraq fell upon coalition military forces, which were ill prepared. Iraq demonstrates that the military mission of providing security in the post conflict environment is just as important to achieving a strategic victory, if not more important, than the military mission of winning decisive combat operations.
 - For the future, the U.S. military cannot assume that some other organization, either within the U.S. government or in the host country, will take responsibility for providing law, order, and security through the transition period from the end of conventional military operations until a generally secure environment has been established. Until civilian agencies can operate in a secure environment, military personnel will need to be trained and prepared to assume responsibility for public security—including overseeing local police activities, providing short-term training, and directly suppressing criminal activity.

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II. Lessons for responding to insurgencies

1. Counterinsurgency Operations

- Iraq underscores first the overwhelming organizational tendency within the U.S. military not to absorb historical lessons when planning and conducting counterinsurgency operations. Missing in Iraq was the recognition of how critical political-military coordination is in waging an effective counterinsurgency as well as the essential element of actionable intelligence on the insurgents. But problems also arose because of a failure to understand how this Iraqi insurgency differs from past "wars of national liberation" and a "classical guerrilla-type campaign." Iraqi insurgents are groups of disparate opposition elements with no center of gravity, no clear leader, no aim to seize and hold territory, and no single, defined, or unifying ideology. The Iraq insurgency demonstrates the closest manifestation yet of "net war," which is characterized by flatter, more linear networks rather than the pyramidal hierarchies and command and control systems of traditional insurgent organizations.
 - In the future, U.S. military forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations must be composed of personnel with training and skills similar to special operations forces, i.e., the language and culture of the country, and in the critically important political, economic, intelligence, organizational, and psychological dimensions of counterinsurgency warfare. Serious attention should also be given to creating in the Army a dedicated cadre of counterinsurgency specialists and a program to produce such experts.

2. Role of Special Operations Forces in Building Indigenous Security Forces

- Special operations forces in Iraq have been used predominantly in what is known as their direct action mission, that is, as a "high-value target" posse deployed on successive special mission task forces. They have been notably absent, for example, from the training and advising of indigenous Iraqi military and security forces, or accompanying them in counterinsurgency operations.
 - In the future, U.S. special operations forces need to be at the core of any successful counterterrorist and/or counterinsurgency strategy. In this respect, they can bring a distinct and advantageous "force-multiplying" capability to bear through their language proficiency and intercultural communications skills. They are also expert in training indigenous forces about how to win the trust of their fellow citizens and how to protect those citizens from insurgent attack and reprisals, as well as in organizing indigenous populations for their own self-defense, thereby giving them a stake in the outcome of their government's success. Because of their intimate understanding of unconventional environments, they can play a pivotal role in promoting sound civil-military relations.

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- In this context, special operations forces can also perform a critical "combat advisor" role, as they did in northern Iraq with the Kurds. Not only would they train Iraqi forces, but they would also have the flexibility to accompany these forces on counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency operations to follow through on the training received, and coach and mentor them on how such missions can be most effectively and successfully executed. Performing this advisory role would also place them in a position to synchronize U.S. intelligence, operations, and logistical support and in turn help ensure that U.S.-provided resources are being properly used and that rapport and trust is developed and maintained.

3. Air Force and Army Supply Operations

- As military operations in Iraq continued beyond major combat, the system for distributing spares and other on-demand items remained relatively slow for many months. Distribution problems resulted from a misalignment between the packaging and configuration of loads in the United States and the handling and distribution capabilities in the theater, and also from delays in increasing the capacity of U.S. distribution centers (i.e., warehouse and load consolidation centers). As very high demands continued, the system began to experience high backorders as national inventories, which had significant war reserve shortfalls, were drained. An industrial base surge was delayed by slow budget approval to place orders for quantities of spares above baseline demand levels. In supplying Air Force units, problems arose in coordinating the strategic and theater movements systems, in ensuring in-transit visibility, and in paying for the shipments. As a result, cargo built up at transshipment points for Air Force supplies. In contrast, distribution delays did not generally occur at transshipment points for Army supplies.
- A common commodity supply chain guiding vision or model setting out basic operating principles needs to be adopted by all supply chain organizations, including the Services, joint logistics commands, government agencies, and their commercial partners. The joint and service planning and assessment processes, doctrine, organization, training, and information systems then need to be modified for consistency with the model and to ensure that the assumptions of the organizations in the supply chains are consistent with the capabilities of their suppliers and customers. The goal is for the supply chains to be optimized as a whole rather than having each process optimized in and of itself. Ensuring that the system stays aligned with the model once a contingency begins then calls for the adoption of improved monitoring and control capabilities for logistics situational awareness so as to provide near-real-time feedback when problems begin to arise.
- The processes for planning and executing the airlift of supplies need to focus on outcomes, with a cadre of permanent staff in all operational theaters. The changes made during the course of operations in Iraq in how Army materiel is packaged for shipment should be embedded in joint policy and integrated into

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processes better designed to quickly make transitions to **new locations as contingencies develop.**

- **Finally, there is the need throughout DoD to appreciate better the long lead times involved in providing parts for many critical weapon systems. These lead times call for an improved ability to quickly forecast contingency requirements; for a more rapid pre-contingency approval of contract authority for additional orders; for reducing the time needed to approve an increase in the Defense Logistics Agency workforce so as to expand the capacity of its distribution centers; for alerting senior policymakers to the risks when a given concept of operations must be adjusted for lack of logistics resources; and for changing the ways the Army computes and resources war reserve inventory levels, given that some critical items with long lead times can only be supported in this way. The long-term effects of even small shortfalls in national supply and distribution capacity can be dramatic.**

III. Lessons for designing the NSC and DoD policymaking processes

I. NSC Processes for Post-Conflict Planning and Operations

- **Historically, administrations have struggled to find ways to integrate military and civilian planning and activities for the period when major combat operations come to an end. The Iraqi experience was no different, with frustrations recorded universally among both military and civilian organizations. The NSC coordinating effort for Iraq focused largely on military operations and plans for providing humanitarian assistance, not post-conflict activities. Responsibility for such planning and operations was given to DoD, but separate from the military command. Overall, this approach worked poorly, because DoD lacked the experience, expertise, funding authority, local knowledge, and established contacts with other potential civilian organizations needed to establish, staff, support, and oversee a large multi-agency civilian mission.**
- **Unity of command and broad participation are both important to the success of stabilization and reconstruction operations. There is a case to be made that such responsibility reside with a senior State Department official, who would be appointed as a special Presidential envoy with authority to convene an NSC interagency planning group. But who is given such responsibility is not as important as the requirement that the planning and operations be based on a full understanding of the operational military plan and that it involve both civilians and military officers with expertise in security and law enforcement, in various reconstruction operations, and critically in the culture of the region of the conflict. For this to happen, the Secretary of Defense will need personally to support a civilian-led planning effort and most importantly direct such sharing of operational military information. An active NSC interagency process will also be necessary to ensure that the State and Defense Departments are acting off the same sheet of paper and to bring forward**

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debate of alternative views and subsequent decisionmaking on important issues. Policy differences need to be expressed and adjudicated, if necessary by the President, as the planning process goes forward.

2. DoD Process for Force Deployments and Mobilization of Reserves

- Within **DoD**, the principal organizational lessons from **Iraq** concern the militarily important and politically sensitive process of force deployments and mobilization of the reserves. In **Iraq**, the deployment of forces was accomplished through a procedure of **separate** requests from the commander for each force component. This had the advantage of tailoring the forces to the diplomatic and military situation, but it led to high-level micromanagement, delay, and disruptions. Because alert times were then compressed, most units received less than 30 days of mobilization notice. Extensive small, sequential requirements also led to readiness problems within units and administrative burdens. The **Iraq** experience also showed that the Army mobilization system is **fragmented** in terms of responsibilities, with no single organization responsible for monitoring performance or synchronizing the activities with others in **DoD**. This led to surprises, frictions, and false starts. The Army's outdated and inadequate information systems exacerbated these problems.
- For the future, the processes of deploying forces and mobilizing reserves within **DoD** need to be fundamentally redesigned to reflect the high political stakes as well as the **critical** military requirements in future military operations. A single Army officer needs to be accountable for redesigning the Army's reserve mobilization system and for how it performs. The system should involve the application of metrics for performance, such as meeting the commander's requirements, minimizing reserve soldier time on active duty, and **providing** predictability throughout the mobilization process. New information systems also need to be introduced to help **integrate** all these activities.

February 2005



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 1 2005

1/24/05

Mr. James A. Thomson
President and Chief Executive Officer
RAND
1700 Main Street
PO Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

Dear Jim,

Thanks for your material on lessons learned. I'll see that it is made available to the appropriate folks here.

I would be curious to know who headed up the researchers.

Regards,

1/24/05

7 FEB 05

OSD 02710-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47359



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2420-05
4 April 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 4/2*

SUBJECT: RAND Study

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), several of the RAND Corporation's recommendations for future DOD policies are valid. I look forward to discussing the issues further with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and others as you suggest.
- **Analysis.** The Corporation's findings are generally consistent with DOD efforts, including the Joint Staff strategic lessons learned initiatives, USJFCOM/Service operational lessons learned efforts and products provided by the Defense Science Board. Many of the RAND findings can be mapped to these items, which are being included into the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities change processes.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

copy to:

DepSecDef
SECARMY
SECNAV
SECAF
CSA
CNO
CSAF
CMC

Prepared By: Major General Jack J. Catton, USAF; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/47360

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 02710-05

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

2005 March 1, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers GEN Pete Schoomaker
Fran Harvey ADM Vern Clark
Gordon England Gen Mike Hagee
Pete Teets Gen John Jumper

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: RAND Study

Attached are some recommendations from RAND that are worth our careful consideration.

After you have had an appropriate amount of time to examine them, I have asked Paul Wolfowitz to gather you together and discuss what changes might be appropriate.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/7/05 Thomson ltr to SD w/attachment: "Iraq: Translating Lessons into Future DoD Policies"

DHR:dh
022805-28

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 02710-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47361



JAMES A. THOMSON
PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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SANTA MONICA, CA
90407-2136

TEL 310.451.6936
FAX 310.451.6972
james.thomson@rand.org

out
2/8
(C)

February 7, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-2000

Dear Don:

I am writing to share with you lessons RAND researchers have drawn from US military planning and operations in Iraq and their recommendations for future DoD policies. I would be surprised if the issues are all that new to you, and some of what we recommend may already be under way. What we do bring is a perspective based on extensive and in-depth RAND research involving over 20 studies that were undertaken across our three FFRDCs.

Let me highlight a few of our critical lessons and recommendations. A discussion of these as well as others can be found in the enclosed memorandum.

- Be cautious with respect to Army transformation plans that move to lightly armored vehicles and heavy reliance on networked information systems, given the difficulty in translating good sensor coverage of the battlefield into good situational awareness.
- Give serious attention to creating a dedicated cadre of counterinsurgency specialists. ✓
- Assign responsibility to a single Army officer to redesign the Army's reserve mobilization systems. ✓
- Be realistic with respect to expectations of what air attacks can achieve in bringing about the overthrow or collapse of an enemy regime.

You will see that we have tailored our recommendations to those issues directly within your responsibility as Secretary of Defense. We hope that these will be useful to you this spring in your strategic planning activities, including the QDR. I am ready to discuss these with you, and the researchers are ready to brief you or your staff on the details of our analyses.

Warm regards,

JAT:r

Enclosure

Tab A

OSD 02710-05

OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS. EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS.

11-L-0559/OSD/47362

RAND RESEARCH AREAS
CIVIL POLICY
CIVIL JUSTICE
EDUCATION
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY
POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC SAFETY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TERRORISM AND
HOMELAND SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE

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IRAQ: TRANSLATING LESSONS INTO FUTURE DoD POLICIES

This memorandum presents lessons RAND researchers have learned from looking at U.S. military planning and operations in Iraq and our recommendations for future DoD policies. In each case, the first bullet describes the lessons learned and the second bullet briefly outlines our recommendations.

In many ways, Iraq was no match for coalition forces during major combat operations: the Iraqi leadership was strategically and operationally incompetent; Iraqi regular forces were weakened, poorly trained, and poorly equipped; and the paramilitary forces lacked training and popular support. Despite these conditions, we believe that the experience in Iraq holds very important lessons and should inform future DoD policies. There is a case for change, and even urgency, in those areas where problems arose even in such favorable circumstances.

The memorandum is divided into three parts: lessons and recommendations for conducting major combat operations, for responding to insurgencies, and for designing the NSC and DoD policymaking processes.

I. Lessons for conducting major combat operations

1. *Air Operations and Regime Change*

- As in previous conflicts, our ability to dominate operations in the air shaped the joint campaign fundamentally. It enabled a lean deployment to rear areas that were secure and it provided for unprecedented levels of situational awareness. 'Iraqi soldiers' appreciation that they had no defense against coalition air attacks caused units to disperse and hide, made soldiers afraid to fight, and ruled out large-scale maneuver operations by conventional Iraqi ground forces. Air attacks alone, however, did not achieve the broader strategic objective of *regime collapse* through attacks aimed at decapitating, isolating, or breaking the will of the enemy leadership—the concept of “shock and awe.” The attacks on “regime” targets (leadership, command and control, and infrastructure) were able to disrupt, but not eliminate, the ability of Iraqi leaders to communicate with the Iraqi people and military forces.
 - For the future, a caution is in order with respect to expectations of what air attacks on “regime” targets can achieve. Put simply, prompt regime collapse or decapitation is generally unlikely because of a host of limitations, some self-imposed, on the effectiveness of such attacks. Achieving operational surprise is unlikely. The kind of intelligence needed to pinpoint leaders is hard to acquire, given the opportunities leaders have to hide. Redundant communication networks are difficult to break. Political constraints on targeting will always be imposed so as to minimize civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. And, in any case, the psychological effects of air attacks against “regime” targets cannot be expected to emerge quickly.

Tab A

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2. Integration of Air-Land Operations

- The Iraq operation demonstrated the increasing interdependence of air and ground forces. Expeditionary operations are driving leaner deployments, and lighter and more mobile U.S. forces are more dependent on information and fires from sources "external" to the Army. Air forces took up the challenge, and, in fact, the primary contribution of fixed-wing aircraft in Iraq was in attacks on enemy forces and their support facilities. Air operations reduced substantially the costs and risks of ground operations. At the same time, air forces were dependent on land forces to generate ground targets in many situations, by their ability to flush enemy forces from hidden positions and to compel them to respond. Air forces were not responsive enough to take over the Army's mission of suppressing enemy mortars and artillery. Deep attack Apache helicopter missions in Iraq proved risky and not very productive, while opportunities were lost to employ them for close support or reconnaissance. Though planned, no air assault operations were undertaken, primarily because the risks outweighed the expected benefits.
 - For the future, much can be done to enhance the effectiveness of air support to ground operations. Fixed wing aviation should be better integrated with ground forces by increasing the realism and frequency of joint training, continuing to refine and field force tracker systems, and investing in better equipment for forward air control teams. Attack helicopters should have close support as their primary mission. The experience in Iraq involving the employment of attack helicopters raises questions about some of the emerging concepts that place high reliance on so-called vertical envelopment operations deep into enemy territory.
 - Changes need to be made in the traditional linear approach to the coordination of air and ground fire support. A nonlinear system of "kill boxes" should be adopted, as technology permits. This would involve designating areas of the battlefield as closed or open. Kill boxes around friendly forces would normally be closed, i.e., no air attacks without positive approval by terminal or forward air controllers. Kill boxes farther from friendly forces would normally be open, i.e., positive control would not be required. The attraction of such a system is that the kill boxes can be sized for open terrain or urban warfare, and opened or closed quickly in response to a dynamic military situation.

3. Situational Awareness on the Battlefield

- The Iraq military campaign saw the operation of a variety of platforms and sensors that truly transversed the battlefield. But their utility depended on the level of command. Division commanders and above were well served, while tactical commanders often did not receive specific or actionable intelligence. Accessing the intelligence required an operational pause, which was not attractive because it slowed

Tab A

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the advance and exposed the forces to attack. Tactical units were often moving too fast for the information to be useful, or the information was not detailed enough. Iraqi armored forces were able at times to exploit camouflage and concealment to avoid detection from the air. Most Army engagements were meeting engagements that occurred when Iraqi forces, typically *Fedayeen* and other irregular forces, opened fire and revealed their position. Additionally, the airborne sensor ~~any~~ deployed to Iraq was in many cases unable to locate and identify the type of threat that U.S. ground forces faced, namely relatively small groups of light infantry-type enemy forces deployed in built-up areas or moving along roads in civilian vehicles. The lesson from Iraq is that having good sensor coverage of the battlefield does not necessarily translate into good situational awareness.

- For the future, systems and procedures need to be designed from the bottom up to give the tactical commander the information he needs. This will require wideband satellite communication systems and UAVs (non-line-of-sight systems) for tactical units, as well as trained personnel who can quickly interpret the information. Developers of the Army's Future Combat Systems and the Air Force's Link-16 (and its successors) need to ensure that maneuver forces can directly access increasingly powerful air sensors operating above them. Procedures need to be designed not only for tailoring reports from the various sensors for tactical commanders but also for disseminating intelligence from individual sensors directly and quickly to these commanders. Until these steps are taken, the Army needs to be cautious in its transformation plans to shift to a family of more lightly armored fighting vehicles that will rely heavily on networked systems of information and situational awareness. This is reinforced by the experiences of Army forces in Iraq's cities in more recent counterinsurgency operations.

4. *Integration of Special Operations and Conventional Forces*

- Special operations forces played a critical part in all aspects of operations in Iraq, which was the largest and most complex mission for these forces in the nation's history. Nevertheless, fearing compromise of the operations, the decision to deploy special operations forces was delayed until just before the launch of major combat operations. These were also problems integrating operations involving conventional and special operations forces, ~~W i n g~~ from differences in perspectives, operating concepts, and command and control systems.
- In the future, steps need to be taken to exercise conventional and special operations forces together, as was the case in the past at the National Training Center. Especially important will be finding ways to build trust among the leadership of these two forces, through training at the various command and staff schools. Policymakers also need to understand the need to deploy these forces as early as possible, a step that could be made easier if this community found ways to communicate better to senior officials what their capabilities and needs are at the unclassified as well as the classified level.

Tab A