

STAFF DRAFT

was made to those bombings. The delay in responding to the embassy bombings in April, followed by the delay in response to the subsequent United States Marine *Corps* barracks bombings, and culminating in the ineffective response months later came to mind. The bottom line is that, in such instances of attack against American interests, I thought we needed to respond quickly and decisively, and aim at the true source of the problem, and in a way that is understood and supported by the American people, or else we would waste our effort at best and, more likely, simply encourage future, more daring, attacks against our people.

During the course of the day of 9/11, the President indicated to me that he expected options for military responses to be presented, and, in the intervening days, we began preparing those options for him in an effort that concluded with his direction to me to carry out the actions that ultimately became known as Operation Enduring Freedom, against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that harbored and supported al Qaeda.

Post-911

STAFF DRAFT

EF-8768

March 8, 2004

I-04/003195

Honduras

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Honduras

DR
3/24

Shouldn't we get the President to make a determination for Honduras, like he did on Colombia—that they could shoot down drug airplanes?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-7

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

✓
3/30

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nasuno
3/30

OSD 10903-04

09-03-04 11:59 15

11-L-0559/OSD/43256

MAR 11 2004
rec'd SOLIC 1030 hrs 19 Mar 04

8 Mar 04

EF- 8768

March 8, 2004

I-04/003195

Honduras

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Honduras

Shouldn't we get the President to ~~make~~ a & termination for Honduras, like he did on Colombia—that they could shoot down drug airplanes?

Thanks.

DHR:db
030804-7

✓ 3/30

3/19/04 19 Mar 04

TO: SECDEF Please respond by 3/19/04
FM: ASD/ SO- LIC. Tom O'Connell
Sir,

USD(P) 3/19/04
DSD _____

Under the current law (22 USC 2291-4), it would be hard to argue that narcotics air trafficking presents an extraordinary threat to Honduran national security.

We are working with the interagency to amend the law to allow the USG to address air bridge denial from a regional vice country by country basis. My staff met with ONDCP reps on 10 March. A PCC was held 12 March. We see positive movement.

As you may recall, Defense passed the lead for air bridge denial to State after the civilian shoot-down in Peru. 09-03-04 11:59 IN

We are trying to lead from the rear, not the front.

VK.
O'Connell10903-04
050601
8 Mar 04

720

cap XTRA

1200
7/15

Bcc DSD

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 14, 2004

383.6

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: MEK

Please see if we can get this MEK issue moved over to the State Department. It seems to me it is essentially in their court now, and we have only a custodial responsibility. Negroponte is the one who ought to be working the issue.

Thanks.

Attach.
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD Cable R 1410042JUL 04, "USEB 79: ICRC Raises New Roadblock to MEK Interviews"

DHR:dh
071404-11

.....
Please respond by 7/23/04

14 JUL 04

OSD 10904-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43258

28 7/14

RTTUZYUW RUEHGBA0113 1961004-UUUU--RUEKNMA.

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

R 141004Z JUL 04

FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 01/8

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC

INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

RUEHGV USMISSION GENEVA 0001

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714

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000128

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR NSA/I

TAGS: PREL, ICRC, PGOV, PTER, PREF, UNHCR, IZ

SUBJECT: USEB 79: ICRC RAISES NEW ROADBLOCK TO MEK
INTERVIEWS

1. (SBU) THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS AN ACTION REQUEST. WE ARE SEEKING WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE, WITH CHANGES AS NECESSARY, TO OUR PROPOSED REPLY TO THE ICRC. PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPH 7.

2. (SBU) SUMMARY. DURING AN INITIAL MEETING ON JULY 12, BETWEEN THE NEWLY ARRIVED ICRC BAGHDAD HEAD OF DELEGATION CHRISTOPHE BENEY AND U.S. OFFICIALS, BENEY STATED THAT THE ICRC COULD NOT BEGIN CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS OF MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (MEK) MEMBERS UNTIL IT RECEIVED ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON THEIR LEGAL STATUS. BENEY INDICATED THAT SECURITY CONCERNS COULD ONLY BE ADDRESSED AFTER THE ADDITIONAL LEGAL ISSUES WERE RESOLVED. THE U.S. TEAM PROMISED A SPEEDY, WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THE ICRC QUESTIONS WHILE NOTING THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE TEAM HAD HEARD OF THE ICRC REQUEST. END SUMMARY.

3. (SBU) EMBASSY POLITICAL-MILITARY COUNSELOR NEUMANN, MNF-I DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS MAJOR GENERAL MILLER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS MAJOR GENERAL SERGEANT, EMBASSY NOTE TAKER, AND SEVERAL LAWYERS FROM GENERAL MILLERS STAFF MET JULY 12, 2004 WITH NEWLY ARRIVED ICRC BAGHDAD HEAD OF DELEGATION CHRISTOPHE BENEY TO DISCUSS MEK ISSUES. AT THE START OF THE MEETING, BENEY STATED

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: <u>X</u>	DEPSEC: <u>/</u>	EXECSEC: <u>/</u>	FILE: _____
OSD: <u>/</u>	CCD: <u>/</u>	CABLE CII: _____	
USDP: <u>/</u>	DIA: _____	OTHER: <u>CPA</u> <u>/</u>	
USDI: <u>/</u>	PER SEC: _____	COMM: _____	

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

11-L-0559/OSD/43259

March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Goldwater-Nichols for the US Government

Attached is a memo I dictated on the idea of Goldwater-Nichols for the whole US government.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.

2/8/04 SecDef MFR re: Goldwater-Nichols for the USG (020804-64)

DHR:dh
030804-22

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 10906-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43260

February 8, 2004

SUBJECT: Goldwater-Nichols for the USG

The US Government as a whole is now really the way DoD was in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols days.

DoD in those days had the best Army in the world, the best Navy in the world, the best Air Force in the world, the best Marine Corps in the world.

But each one of them did what they did individually and separately.

To get where we are, each of those Services had to give up something—some authorities, some notoriety, some fame—to achieve a greater good.

The US Government is now where DoD was in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols days. The country teams are not really country teams—they are Department of State embassies. DoD is not a competent play in a country team, nor probably are other agencies and departments.

To achieve our goals, we need to have true country teams, and we need to have leadership in those teams—not Department of State career SFOs. We need to have competent people who are the equivalent of our combatant commanders—people like Howard Baker, Bob Strauss, Mike Mansfield, Tom Foley and the like.

DHR:dh
020804-64

11-L-0559/OSD/43261

3/11 1230
120
~~INFORMATION RETENTION~~

C3/15
March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

Larry Di Rita
3/15
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: India and Pakistan

Do you have any proposals on this Vern Clark memo? I think he has a good point.

Let's discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/24/03 CNO memo re: India/Pakistan Trip Thoughts
12/27/03 SecDef memo to CJCS (122703-29)

DHR:dh
030804-24

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

3/11/04

→ SD

Adm. Clark makes good points
I'll work with Pete Pace and
with LTG Tom Walters of DSCA
on the Pakistan "recovering from
sanctions" item. ~~am~~

I've begun to address the India-Centcom
relationship issues - e.g. ~~INFORMATION RETENTION~~
I invite both Paccom and
Centcom representatives to my meetings with the Indians.
I'll continue to press on this, together w/ Pete Pace.
Doug Feith

OSD 10907-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43262

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PACOM and CENTCOM

Here is a Vern Clark e-mail on the lines between PACOM and CENTCOM that we ought to think through. Please see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/24/03 CNO e-mail re: India/Pakistan Trip Thoughts

DHR:dh
122703-29 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/23/04

U22539 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/43263

No Classification in Message Body

Craddock, John J, LTG, OSD

From: Clark, Vern (N00) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 24, 2003 6:16 PM
To: 'john.craddock@ (b)(6)'; 'meyersrb@ (b)(6)
Cc: 'fargotb0@ (b)(6)'; 'abizaijp@ (b)(6)
Subject: India/Pakistan trip thoughts

Importance: High
Sensitivity: Personal

John,

-- Please pass to Secretary Rumsfeld --

Mr. Secretary and Chairman,

You may recall I recently visited India and Pakistan. It was a terrific trip and very fruitful.

Two major issues for me:

- * One: the disconnect in both countries with how the UCP divides sensible relations with these two nations.
- * Our dividing lines are impacting them.
- * India wants to be engaged to the west. They have real national interests in that direction.
- * We are protective to the west because, in CENTCOM, we protect the feelings of Pakistan. (I'm not casting blame; just addressing perceptions)
- * So...India is not as engaged in the Gulf as they would like to be and they told me they sense a lack of connection with CENTCOM. They feel they have no entrance to deal in that AOR, e.g. exercises, liaisons, etc.
- * They don't see themselves as "belonging" to PACOM only.
- * It is less true for Pakistan looking east. As you know, Pak is keeping score of every move we make with India, but in naval stuff, they played in PACOM's submarine rescue event and liked it.

* Recommendation: We need to figure out how to fuzz the lines between these kinds of boundaries.

- * Two: Recovering from sanctions.
- o Lots of frustration. This is familiar to you I know.
- o We need to figure out how to look proactive in a post sanctions window. We don't.
- o Example: Pak already has the HARPOON surface-to-surface missile. During the years of sanction their HARPOON missiles became inoperable ...lack of support, parts, test equipment, etc. They are unable to obtain much needed parts and support equipment for legacy systems like this without starting over through our formal, multiagency approval process.
- * Recommendation: When we lift sanctions, we should consider a fundamental change to our interagency approval process and issue, pre-emptively, a list of items already approved. We should not force the nation to go through the approval process again.

All in all a good trip. I told each of them you had given me, and each of the Chiefs, the direction to get engaged. That message was well received.

VR, Vern

No Classification in Message Body
11-L-0559/OSD/43264

March 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Meeting on Footprint

Let's make sure I have a meeting with John Warner and Pete Pace on this footprint issue on Monday or Tuesday next week.

Thanks

Attach.

Spiegel, Peter. "Senator Condemns Pentagon Move to Cut Number of US Troops Based in Europe," *London Financial Times*, March 5, 2004.

DHR:dh
030504-11

.....
Please respond by

3/10/04

File

London Financial Times
March 5, 2004
Pg. 10

Senator Condemns Pentagon Move To Cut Number Of US Troops Based In Europe

By Peter Spiegel

Senator John Warner, the powerful chairman of the armed services committee, yesterday voiced his opposition to any significant reductions in the number of US forces based in Europe, saying such downsizing was inappropriate during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although the Pentagon has yet to announce specific plans for troop levels in Europe, Nato diplomats have said they are expecting reductions of as much as a third, one of the biggest redeployments of American forces since the second world war.

Donald Rumsfeld, defence secretary, ordered a review of all overseas troop commitments shortly after taking office three years ago.

But speaking at a hearing on the Pentagon's budget, Mr Warner said he opposed even a study of a reduction, although he was more accepting of plans to move troops stationed in Germany into new bases in eastern Europe. There are 120,000 US troops in Europe, two-thirds of them based in Germany.

"Even the thought, at this particular point of time, with the war on terrorism, of making any significant reduction of forces concerns me greatly," Mr Warner told General Jim Jones, US commander in Europe and Nato's military chief. "This is certainly not the time for even any reassessment of that."

Gen Jones said he supported overseas troops in principle but did not address Mr Warner's concerns directly in his oral testimony. In a written statement provided to the committee, however, the general made clear his commitment to reducing troop levels in Europe and creating a series of smaller operating bases in the region.

"The United States' level of interest, commitment, and military capability resident in this theatre should no longer be measured exclusively by the number of troops permanently based in Europe," he said.

Although Mr Warner is one of the most powerful Republicans in Congress on military issues, he is unlikely to prevent the Pentagon from making the changes through legislative means.

His ability to affect defence department policymaking, however, is significant. If he decides to make the stationing of troops in Europe a personal cause, it could severely complicate Mr Rumsfeld's efforts to make US forces abroad smaller and more mobile.

At the same hearing, General John Abizaid, commander of US troops in the Gulf, rejected calls by Shia leaders in Iraq to allow them to set up local militias to protect themselves from terrorist attacks such as the bombings in Karbala and Baghdad this week.

Shia clergy have angrily criticised the US for not providing enough security. The Shias' leading political party, Sciri, has asked that its former armed movement, the Badr Corps, be allowed to operate as a

11-L-0559/OSD/43266

private militia.

March 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Intelligence

I think I need a better screen on the intelligence material I am getting. I get the feeling I get two or three copies of everything. It is wasting a lot of time for me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-33

.....
Please respond by —

*OB
3/8*

OSD 10909-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43268

March 8, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*
SUBJECT: Material for Speeches

Let's think about including in a speech the things that Harry Truman did after World War II—all of the accomplishments: NATO, the UN, the World Bank, the Marshall Plan and the like.

Then let's come up with a list of things that need to be done after the end of the Cold War.

Please see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-31

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 10910-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43269

351.00150

8 MAR 04

March 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tribune Foreign Correspondent

Please find out about Christine Spolar — who she is, where she works, what her beat is.

Thanks.

Attach.

Spolar, Christine. "U.S. Plans Al Qaeda Offensive," *Chicago Tribune* January 28, 2004.

DHR:dh
030504-33

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

OB
3/24

[Previous](#)[Next](#)[Index](#)

U.S. plans Al Qaeda offensive

Publication: Chicago Tribune

Author: ~~Chitra~~ Spolar

Tribune Foreign Correspondent

Published January 27, 2004, 10:00 Pm Cst

WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration, deeply concerned about recent assassination attempts against Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and a resurgence of Taliban forces in neighboring Afghanistan, is preparing a U.S. military offensive that would reach inside Pakistan with the goal of destroying Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network, military sources said.

U.S. Central Command is assembling a team of military intelligence officers that would be posted in Pakistan ahead of the operation, according to sources familiar with details of the plan and internal military communications. The sources spoke on the condition they not be identified.

As now envisioned, the offensive would involve Special Operations forces, Army Rangers and Army ground troops, sources said. A Navy aircraft carrier would be deployed in the Arabian Sea.

Referred to in internal Pentagon messages as the "spring offensive," the operation would be driven by certain undisclosed events in Pakistan and across the region, sources said. A source familiar with details of the plan said this is "not like a contingency plan for North Korea, something that sits on a shelf. This planning is like planning for Iraq. They want this plan to be executable, now."

The Defense Department declined to comment on the planned offensive or its details. Such an operation almost certainly would demand the cooperation of Musharraf, who previously has allowed only a small number of U.S. Special Operations forces to work alongside Pakistani troops in the semi-autonomous tribal areas. A military source in Washington said last week, "We are told we're going into Pakistan with Musharraf's help."

Yet a large-scale offensive by U.S. forces within the nuclear-armed Islamic republic could be political dynamite for Musharraf.

The army general, who took power in a bloodless coup in 1999, has come under growing political pressure from Islamic parties, and his cooperation with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts is widely unpopular among average Pakistanis. Nor can Musharraf count on the loyalty of all of Pakistan's armed forces or its intelligence agency, members of which helped set up and maintain the Taliban in Afghanistan and are still suspected of ties to militant Islamic groups.

Speaking on Friday at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Musharraf again rejected the need for U.S. forces to enter Pakistan to search for bin Laden.

"That is not a possibility at all," Musharraf said. "It's a very sensitive issue." The U.S. military is

11-L-0559/OSD/43271

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operating under the belief that, despite his recent statements, Musharraf's thinking has changed, sources said. Musharraf himself said last week that bin Laden and his followers likely were hiding in the mountains along the Afghan border. He also said "we are reasonably sure that it is Al Qaeda" who was behind the two attempts on his life.

An offensive into Pakistan to pursue Al Qaeda would be in keeping with President Bush's vow to strike wherever and whenever the United States feels threatened and to pursue terrorist elements to the end.

"The best way to defend America ... is to stay on the offensive and find these killers, one by one," Bush said last week. "We're going to stay on the hunt, which requires good intelligence, good cooperation, good participation with friends and allies around the world."

Musharraf's vulnerability is of deep concern to U.S. officials. Were he to be killed, Bush administration officials say, it is unlikely that any successor would be as willing to work toward U.S. goals to eliminate Islamic extremists.

The U.S. military plan is characterized within the Pentagon as "a big effort" in the next year. Military analysts had previously judged that a bold move against Islamic extremists and Osama bin Laden, in particular, was more likely to happen in spring 2005.

~~A series of planning orders-referred to in military jargon as warning orders-for the offensive were issued in recent weeks. The deadline for key planning factors to be detailed by the U.S. military was Jan. 21.~~

Sources said the plan against Al Qaeda would be driven by events in the region rather than set deadlines and that delays could occur. But military sources said the push for this spring appeared to be triggered by the assassination attempts on Musharraf, both of which came in December, and, to some extent, the capture of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

Hussein was captured after eight months of an intense military and intelligence effort on the ground in Iraq. Pentagon and administration officials, buoyed by that success, believe a similar determined effort could work in Pakistan and lead to the capture or killing of bin Laden, said sources familiar with the planning.

Thousands of U.S. forces would be involved, as well as Pakistani troops, planners said. Some of the 10,600 U.S. troops now in Afghanistan would be shifted to the border region as part of regular troop movements; some would be deployed within Pakistan.

"Before we were constrained by the border. Musharraf did not want that. Now we are told we're going into Pakistan with Musharraf's help," said a well-placed military source.

Internal Pentagon communications indicate that the U.S. offensive would rely on several areas of operation, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries in the region.

The U.S. also is weighing how and if Iran can be persuaded, through direct or indirect channels, to lend help, according to internal Pentagon communications. The U.S. is eager to avoid a repeat of the Afghan war in 2001, when some Al Qaeda fighters were believed to have escaped into Iran.

Military planners said the offensive would not require a significant increase in U.S. troops in South Asia. But Special Operations forces that had shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003 will return.

"We don't have enough forces but we can rely on proxy forces in that area," said a military source,

11-L-0559/OSD/43272

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referring to Pakistani troops. "This is designed to go after the Taliban and everybody connected with it."



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~~SECRET~~

March 5, 2004

TO: Mike Wynne
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Report on Stryker Tests

Here is a report on Stryker I have not read. The cover memo says Congress is waiting for this report.

Please tell me what I am supposed to do with this.

Thanks

Attach.

2/18/04 Dir, OT&E memo to SecDef w/ "Combined Operational Test & Evaluation and Live Fire Test & Evaluation Report on the Stryker Family of Vehicles" [OSD 75496-04]

DHR:dh
030504-3

.....
Please *respond* by _____

✓ 3/10
3/10

*Sir,
Response attached. ADM is
the acronym for Acquisition Decision
Memorandum.*

*rr / CDR Nosenzo
3/10*

~~SECRET~~

classified
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/43274 **OSD 10912-04**



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

March 9, 2004, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DSD _____

FROM: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

MAR 10 2004

SUBJECT: Report on Stryker Tests

- Your March 5, 2004, snowflake requested information on action required regarding the subject report. No action on your part is necessary.
- The report was provided to Congress on February 19, 2004, by Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. This report supported the Stryker Milestone III full rate production decision, as required in Title 10 United States Code Sections 2399 and 2366. (ADM attached)
- On March 4, 2004, I approved full-rate production for seven Stryker vehicle configurations. Six vehicles were assessed as operationally effective and suitable in the test report. The Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV) was assessed as not operationally effective or suitable. I requested advice from the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) on this finding. The JCB determined that continued production is supportable given demonstrated performance, programmed fixes, operational work-arounds, and planned follow-on testing. Based on this determination, I approved full-rate production for the Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV).

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

~~None~~ ADM

Prepared By: Anne Swanek, OUSD(AT&L)/DS/LW&M, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/43275

OSD 10912-04



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

04 MAR 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Stryker – Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)

On February 20, 2004, I conducted a review of the Stryker program. As a result of that review, I approve Milestone III for continued production of the following Stryker vehicle configurations: Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM), Commander's Vehicle (CV), Fire Support Vehicle (FSV), Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV), and Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV).

I referred the Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV) to the Force Application (FA) Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) to determine if operational capabilities provided by the ESV support its continued production. The FA FCB and the subsequent Joint Capabilities Board of February 25, 2004, determined that the operational capabilities provided by the ESV do indeed support its continued production in light of programmed fixes, operational work-arounds, and planned follow-on testing. Therefore, I also approve Milestone III of the ESV configuration.

I direct the Army to:

- consider the recommendations identified in the Beyond Low-Rate Initial Production (BLRIP) Report and identify a path forward for corrections, funding, and testing.
- fund the Stryker Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Production to the levels identified in the Army Cost Position; and Operations and Maintenance in accordance with approved Operating Tempo levels in the FY06 – FY11 POM.
- submit the Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Information Support Plan (C4ISP) by April 30, 2004 for approval.

I delegate to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) decisions on Add-on Armor and Mortar Carrier production upon successful assessment in the BLRIP and Live Fire report update. The AAE will notify me of the decisions before taking action to implement them. Regarding the Mobile Gun System (MGS) and the Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) development, within 90 days the Army shall provide proposed changes to the MGS exit criteria, with rationale, and an update to the Technology Readiness Assessment for the NBCRV.

I direct the Army to develop an implementation plan for brigade enhancements to include Secretary of Defense approved enhancements, migration to a net-ready capability, and early application of future force (e.g., Future Combat Systems)




capabilities. The plan shall detail the incremental upgrades of all Stryker brigades and the associated scheduling and funding actions.

I request that PDASD(C3, Space, and IT Programs) oversee, with the Director, Defense Systems and USD(I) **support**, an Army-led Stryker force integration study. The **study** should **address** force interoperability among Stryker-equipped brigades and Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C3ISR) systems at the Army, joint, and coalition levels.

The Stryker **OPT** shall meet in **August 2004** to advise me on the following:

- the **Army** plan for accommodating BLRIP report recommendations;
- the **progress on the development of the NDCRV and MGS configurations and** their readiness for production;
- the implementation **plan** for brigade enhancements;
- the results of the force integration study.

Point of contact is Dr. Robert Buhrkuhl, Acquisition Resources and Analysis (OUSD(AT&L)), (b)(6)


Michael W. Wynne
(Acting)

cc:

USD(I)
D,DS
PDASD(C3, Space, and IT Programs)

March 8, 2004

TO: Andy Marshall
Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PRC and Russia

It seems to me that we might want to do some sort of a net assessment on the PRC and on Russia, and some competitive analysis as to where we think they are going.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-12

.....
Please respond by

4/2/04


OSD 10913-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43278

China

8mar04

March 5, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Iraqi Police Training

Please have someone draft a letter from me to Colin Powell describing what the problem is here and asking if he could help speed it up.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/5/04 SMA note to SecDef re: Iraqi Police Training

DHR:dh
030504-27

OB
3/16

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 10914-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43279

Iraq

SMA 04

4:05 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 24, 2004

SUBJECT: Police

Do you remember who was going to do the mentoring of the police? They are now under the military but the military probably aren't the right people to do the mentoring, are they?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
0202404.05ts



Please respond by: _____

3/5

3/5

SECRET -

- Police are to be mentored by Civilian Police Advisors, who are to be recruited/provided by the State Dept.
- This program is woefully behind schedule. OSD 09521-04
- 1500 Advisors are required, 40 are on hand
- State is projecting 500 O/H by the end of March

11-L-0559/OSD/43280

March 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Afghan Prisons

Let's get a timeline where we can get Afghanistan to provide the prisons necessary to house the GTMO detainees who are Afghans. One would think we ought to be able to get the right kind of an arrangement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-17

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 10915-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43281

Afghanistan

8 March 04

March 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Magdalena Sub Base

OB/3/16

I have never seen the Magdalena sub base in Sardinia. We may want to stop there for refueling going to or from someplace this next trip, if there is an air base there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-34

.....
Please respond by *3/26/04*

333 SD

8 MAR 04

OSD 10916-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43282

March 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: North Korea

You ought to sit in when Volko briefs me on the North Korean nuclear situation.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030504-14

.....
Please respond by _____

file

OSD 10917-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43283

Korea(north)

8 March

SM 22 Jul 04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 7/21/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC
OSD CONTROL OSD 10917-04 DOC 3/8/2004 ATTACHMENT: DOR 7/21/2004 SIGNATURE CASE:
FROM SECDEF TO USI CAMBONE
SUBJECT NORTH KOREA
KEYWORDS SNOW FLAKE
COMMENTS CAF - NO DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.
FN Korea(north) SEC U OCN030504-14
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION
PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0
SUSPENSE STATUS PACKAGE VIEW:
FRONT OFFICE DOC

CREATED BY: reynolds

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES
ADC *R

11-L-0559/OSD/43284

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division (CCD), WHS Room 3A948. Suspense Desk: (b)(6) FAX Number: (b)(6) Email: (b)(6)

Action Agency

USP

Suspense Date

3/25/2004

1. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)

- ☐ a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- ☐ b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO (Justify below)
- ☐ c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO (Justify below)
- ☐ d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- ☐ e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO (Justify below /include POC Name & Phone Number)
- ☐ f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO (Justify below)

2. JUSTIFICATION

3. REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY

USP

e. APPROVING AUTHORITY

(Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level)

Signature

Date Signed

b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER

c. TELEPHONE NO.

5. ACTION TAKEN

(For EXSEC/ Correspondence Control Division Use Only)

d. DATE

a. EXT

☐ Approved

☐ Disapproved

b. CANX

☐ Approved

☐ Disapproved

c. DWNGRD

☐ Approved

☐ Disapproved

d. TRANSFER

☐ Approved

☐ Disapproved

e. OTHER (Specify)

4. CCD CONTROL #

OSD 03700-04

Signature

Date Signed

SD FORM 391, JAN 2000

11-L-0559/OSD/43285

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP

Action Agency: **UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY**

Action Required: **APPROPRIATE ACTION**

Coordinate With:

References:

Remarks:

Document Type: **INCOMING**

Special Instructions

Suspense Date: **March/25/2004**

Routing Date: **March/12/2004**

OSD CONTROL #: **OSD 03700-04**

INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION

OFFICE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REAR



SECRETARY GENERAL
LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

2004 FEB 12 11:13:50

SG(2004)0226

23 February 2004

Dear Secretary, dear Donald,

Looking ahead to the expanded ISAF mission beyond Kabul and Konduz, I am writing to alert you to the challenge and responsibility we share in providing the additional forces needed to support the new OPLAN currently being developed by SACEUR.

While some important progress on filling critical ISAF shortfalls was made at our recent informal meeting in Munich, particularly for Kabul airport, I must stress that those commitments relate to the current requirement only.


Over the coming weeks, SACEUR will be working closely with nations on sourcing the new ISAF combined joint statement of requirement (CJSOR). In this context I urge you to follow through the political commitment, jointly made by all Allies to enhance NATO's support for the Afghan Transitional Authority, by providing the necessary forces for ISAF's expanded mission. In the true spirit of shared responsibility and solidarity I believe that all nations can make worthwhile contributions, based upon their declared force commitments and capabilities.

As ISAF's expansion is based on the concept of additional ISAF PRTs I also take this opportunity to urge those of you who are considering the deployment of PRTs to accelerate that process. Istanbul is rapidly approaching and with each passing week it becomes increasingly difficult to meet our goal of 5 ISAF PRTs in the field by the end of June.

The Berlin Conference at the end of March and the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting immediately thereafter will be important stepping stones to mark the progress we have achieved in making good on our promises in Afghanistan. It is therefore essential that we have completed our work on the new ISAF OPLAN and the associated force generation process ahead of these meetings. I count on your support to turn political intent into concrete pledges during the next few critical weeks.

-1-

For your information, I have written to all your colleagues, including invitees, along the same lines.

Yours ever,

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense of the United States of America
Washington D.C.

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 3/12/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: **INCOMING**

OSD CONTROL **OSD 03700-04**

DOC **2/23/2004**

DOR **3/12/2004**

SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM **NATO SCHEFFER**

TO **SECDEF**

SUBJECT **LOOKING AHEAD TO THE EXPANDED ISAF MISSION BEYOND KABUL AND KONDUZ**

KEYWORDS **SCHEFFER, J**

COMMENTS

FN

SEC U

OCN

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE

DECISION

DECISION DATE

PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY **USP** ACTION ASSIGNED

FAA

SUSPENSE **3/25/2004**

DOC SUSPENSE: **3/25/2004**

SUSPENSE COMPLETE

ACD

COORDINATION

PAGES **1**

ENCLOSURES **0**

PACKAGE VIEW:

SUSPENSE STATUS

INCOMING

CREATED BY: **reynolds**

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES

ADC R

ES O

USP E

DSD R

ESR R

11-L-0559/OSD/43289

March 5, 2004

TO: Mike Wynne
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Adding Launchers and Interceptors

Here is an idea someone forwarded. Why not take a look at it and tell me what you think about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
MDA Forward Based Multi-mission Components

DHR:dh
030504-25

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

373.24

5 MAR 04


OSD 10910-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43290

Current Plan

- Components Configured For Unique Missions -

- Forward Based Sensors leverage the THAAD Radar Component and add unique HW/SW to execute the new sensor mission
- THAAD Fire Unit is designed specifically to engage ballistic missiles
- Current plan fields three Forward Based Sensors and one THAAD Fire Unit**
 - Forward Based Radar(s) deployed to increase sensor for U.S. defense against
 - THAAD Fire Unit capable of rapid, world-wide, deployments defeat ballistic missiles of all



Challenges

- Single mission THAAD Fire Unit can not be used for the Forward Based Sensor
- Single Mission Forward Based Radars are vulnerable (lack ability to defeat BMs)**
- Single Mission **Forward Based Radars provide no defense** to host nations or regional combatant
- Uniquely configured components require different CONOPS, maintenance, and


	Cost (\$M)					
	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10
Forward Radar #1	●	185	●			
Forward Radar #2		●	185	●		
Forward Radar #3			●	185	●	
THAAD Fire Unit			●	470	●	

\$1025M

Concept Under Evaluation

- Components Configured For Multi-Mission Capability -

- Evolve THAAD Radar and C2/BMC components to a multi-mission forward based configuration
- Exercise option to **field additional missiles and launchers** to complete 3 additional configured fire units
 - Provides **four multi-mission fire units versus one** mission THAAD Fire
 - Provides four multi-mission **forward radars with protection** from ballistic
 - **Provides host nation protection** for up to countries/regional combatant
 - Maximizes commonality and provides overall reduction life cycle



Challenges

- Multi-Mission configuration for Radar and C2/BMC requires MDA Sys Eng to define and direct requirements and interfaces to avoid stove-pipe design
- MDA Sys Eng must be given authority to disrupt elements current path

	Cost (\$M)					
	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10
Forward Radar #1		185				
Forward Radar #2			185			
Forward Radar #3				185		
Launchers and Missiles*					400	
THAAD Fire Unit			470			

* 9 Launchers and 72 Missiles for Forward Based Radars

\$1425M

Summary

MDA forward based multi-mission components:

- Maximizes BMDS flexibility and compliments BMDS with underlay capability for GMD
- Provides initial underpinning for **Global Missile Defense**
- Achieves ballistic missile protection to deployed forces, and friends
- **Offers “Regional missile defense”** for up to 4 host nations
- Maximizes BMDS support to the Combatant Command
- Allows backfilling of multi-mission Forward Based Sensor missiles and launchers to provide **three additional THA Units at less than the cost of one new fire unit**
- Maximizes commonalty and provides overall reduction in costs

720

CLOSE HOLD
(Hand deliver)

March 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker
Gen. Doug Brown

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Les Brownlee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs



322

My impression is that civil affairs was put in with Special Operations because it was different and Special Ops was different, which made sense. Probably also it was because the regular Army did not want it.

It continues to be different, but it is also different from Special **Ops**, as well as being different from the regular Army,

My impression is that we ought to give careful thought to moving it over to the regular Army, so that the regular Army interests itself in that subject and so the transitions from combat to post-combat stabilization can be relatively seamless. Furthermore, I don't think there is anything lost by moving it out of Special Ops, and possibly something gained.

Please think about it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-25

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

(Hand deliver)
CLOSE HOLD

11-L-0559/OSD/43294

OSD 10919-04

322

March 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting w/Warner

When I meet with Warner next week, I want to talk to him about:

1. His position on forces in Europe and their relationship to Afghanistan and Iraq. John Craddock, you ought to make sure I know what the relationship is precisely.
2. The McCain e-mail issue, because he had breakfast with me and told me flat out not to worry, that that was only a solo McCain effort.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030504-18

.....
Please respond by _____

file

OSD 10920-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43295

March 5, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Information Warfare Board

334

Did we ever develop an information warfare board, and if so, are any of these people who I have listed here on it?

Thanks.

Attach.
5/14/01 "Information ~~Warfare~~ Board"

DHR:dh
030504-31

.....
Please respond by _____

5 MAR 04

OSD 10920-04

March 5, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

TO: Honorable Henry Kissinger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*


Thanks for the call on the number-two man in the China Foreign Office. I am not going to be able to do it, but Paul Wolfowitz is going to try to do it.

Thanks for the heads up.

Regards,

DHR:dh
030504-13

File



OSD 10928-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43297


030504

5 MAR 04



March 4, 2004

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Number

Please get back to me with that number I asked you for, the percentage — the one I guessed was something like .012.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-30

.....

Please respond by _____

200

4 Mar 04

OSD 10924-04

3/12
1800



1

March 4, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Larry Di Rita
3/29

SUBJECT: Testimony before Budget Committee

110.01

Yesterday the Vice President told me that Nussle says he is unhappy because I have not testified before the Budget Committee.

What is the background of that? I guess Paul does it.

I wonder if I ought to have him down for breakfast or lunch someday and talk to him.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-27

.....

Please respond by _____ *3/28*

DR
4/12

C 3/30

See Dy
→

He might come for one-on-one. He has never come with 2 other Budget members when invited

4 Mar 04

Larry Di Rita
3/29

TEN
3/30

11-L-0559/OSD/43299

OSD 10927-04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

March 12, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake# 030404-27 regarding Testimony before
Budget Committee

- Your March 4th snowflake (Tab 1) noted that the Vice President commented that Congressman Nussle said he was "unhappy because I did not testify before the Budget Committee,"
- A call came to Legislative Affairs in late January requesting that you testify before the Committee sometime before the markup of the Budget Resolution. We directed the request in a Decision Memo to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz (Tab 2) because there is no precedent in this Administration for the Secretary of Defense to testify before the Budget Committee. The period between the State of the Union and the mark-up of budget resolutions is usually heavily occupied with your testimony before jurisdictional committees.
- The Deputy declined to testify and requested that Dr. Zakheim be offered to the Committee as the DoD witness. OSD(LA) complied and made the offer.
- Several weeks later, the Committee staff called back to say that the hearing was canceled. At no time did the staff indicate that the lack of testimony was a problem. Nor did I ever receive a phone call from the Chairman or Chief of Staff.
- Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has previously handled Budget Committee testimony. According to our research, the Secretary of Defense has testified before this committee infrequently. Former Secretaries Cohen, Cheney, and Perry testified once each during the entire length of their tenure.
- We have invited Chairman Nussle for breakfast in previous years along with his Budget Committee counterparts, Senator Domenici, Senator Conrad and Congressman Spratt. Each time he has declined. We have not invited this group this year. There has been time for only three breakfasts on your schedule and we have had higher priorities.
- We should consider inviting him to breakfast later in the year.

Attachments
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/43300

OSD 10975-04

DS
4/12

110.01

12 MAR 04

4 MAR 04



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100
ACTION MEMO




January 23, 2004 12:30 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: House and Senate Budget Committee Hearings on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget



- The House Budget Committee has invited Secretary Rumsfeld to testify at an upcoming hearing on the FY 2005 Department of Defense (DoD) Budget. It is likely that the Senate Budget Committee will also invite the Secretary. Specific hearing dates have not been set.
- While you have testified before the Budget Committees, most recently during the rollout of the FY 2004 DoD Budget, Secretary Rumsfeld has not. Given that there is no precedent for Secretary Rumsfeld testifying before these committees, I would not recommend setting one now. The Secretary will have a full schedule of hearings and meetings in February associated with the rollout of the FY 2005 DoD Budget.
- Do you have a desire to testify at these hearings? If not, I would be happy to fill in for you. After accompanying the Secretary to his round of posture hearings and conducting my own briefings for Congressional staff, I will be in a good position to address the concerns of the members of the Budget Committees.

RECOMMENDATION: Advise me of your desired course of action.

DepSec will testify _____ USD(C) will testify PN 1/28/04 Other _____

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments: None

11-L-0559/OSD/43301

Prepared By: Mark Hoffman, (b)(6)

TSA SD	1/28
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	1/23

OSD 01104-04



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100



(Program/Budget)

January 14, 2004

COVER BRIEF

TO: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

THRU: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ^R SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER) *JAN 20 2004*
DEPUTY COMPTROLLER (PROGRAM/BUDGET) *[Signature]*

FROM: DIRECTOR FOR PLANS AND SYSTEMS *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: House and Senate Budget Committee Hearings on the FY 2005 DoD Budget

PURPOSE: Determine the Deputy Secretary's preference regarding the DoD witness for these hearings.

DISCUSSION:

- The attached action memo informs the DepSec that the House and Senate Budget Committees have either invited or will soon invite Secretary Rumsfeld to testify at their upcoming hearings on the FY 2005 DoD Budget.
- The memo points out that there is not a precedent for Secretary Rumsfeld appearing before the Budget Committees, and you do not recommend setting one now. The Secretary will already have a full schedule of hearings and meetings in February associated with the rollout of the FY 2005 DoD Budget.
- You ask the DepSec if he would like to testify at these hearings. If not, you present him with the option of designating you as the lead DoD witness.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memo.

COORDINATION: None LA (attached)

Attachments: None

Prepared by: Mark Hoffman, (b)(6) OUSD(C)P/B, P&S, 3A862/04JAN14

11-L-0559/OSD/43302

JAN 16 2004



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100
ACTION MEMO



January 23, 2004, 12:30 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: House and Senate Budget Committee Hearings on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget

- The House Budget Committee has invited Secretary Rumsfeld to testify at an upcoming hearing on the FY 2005 Department of Defense (DoD) Budget. It is likely that the Senate Budget Committee will also invite the Secretary. Specific hearing dates have not been set.
- While you have testified before the Budget Committees, most recently during the rollout of the FY 2004 DoD Budget, Secretary Rumsfeld has not. Given that there is no precedent for Secretary Rumsfeld testifying before these committees, I would not recommend setting one now. The Secretary will have a full schedule of hearings and meetings in February associated with the rollout of the FY 2005 DoD Budget.
- Do you have a desire to testify at these hearings? If not, I would be happy to fill in for you. After accompanying the Secretary to his round of posture hearings and conducting my own briefings for Congressional staff, I will be in a good position to address the concerns of the members of the Budget Committees.

RECOMMENDATION: Advise me of your desired course of action.

DepSec will testify _____ USD(C) will testify _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments: None

11-L-0559/OSD/43303

Prepared By: Mark Hoffman, (b)(6)

Coordination Page

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (LA) Mr. Stanley January 13, 2004

March ³~~7~~, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

17

SUBJECT: Note from Henry Catto

For your information.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/9/04 Catto note to SecDef
SecDef reply

DHR:dh
030104-83

.....
Please respond by _____

OB

3/5

OSD 10926-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43305

381

381

February 7 2004
HENRY E CATTO

Dear Don,

I read the transcript of your remarks at the Wehrkunde meeting. As usual, you were absolutely first rate. One matter in particular caught my eye: your suggestion that think-tanks might explore certain facets of the Western relationship. I am Chairman of the Atlantic Council, which as you likely know is devoted to studying NATO and Atlantic unity. If it could be of any

use to the Pentagon in these matters, I hope you will let me know.

With admiration and appreciation,

Sincerely,

/s/



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Henry E. Catto
Atlantic Council of the United States
910 17th Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Henry,

Thanks so much for your note. It was good to hear from you.

I have passed your suggestion along to Doug Feith and Paul Wolfowitz, and they will give some thought as to how that might be helpful.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Secretary Rumsfeld Availability at the Munich Conference on Security Policy

Q [Professor Karl Kaiser, visiting professor at Harvard University]: **Mr. Secretary**, the doctrine of preemption has been greatly criticized all over the world, but you rightly point out that under conditions of weapons of mass destructions and terrorism, our old criteria of defining the legitimacy of defense, of course, is to be reviewed. And it is an absolutely central rule of international law, I'm referring to Article 51, which makes the use of force legitimate. My question to you now is: should we not leave the redefinition of the criteria just to the accidents of the moment? Shouldn't we all sit together and redefine the criteria of when defense is legitimate under these circumstances? And secondly, where should we do it, in your opinion?

Rumsfeld: I think it's a good idea. I'll leave it to experts and diplomats to figure out where it ought to be done. My guess is it needs to be done in multiple locations. It's such a central issue that needs to be addressed, and it should be done in academia, it should be done in the think tanks, it ought to be done inside governments and it ought to be done among and between governments. It is enormously important. We did an exercise, I didn't, but some people in the United States did, I think it was Johns Hopkins on, they called it "Dark Winter," and they looked at smallpox, I believe, and put it in two or three locations in the United States and watched what happened. And the numbers immediately, very rapidly, ran into the hundreds of thousands of dead. You think what we've done for decades, when I was a child, even then we preempted. If someone got smallpox they were quarantined; they had not given that to anybody else yet, but they were stopped and they were not allowed to give it to anybody else and -- why? Because so many people could be killed by smallpox was the reason. The state stepped in and said, we are going to preemptively stop you from hurting somebody else even though you don't want to, you have no intention to, and there is not any certainty you even would -- but we're going to stop you. I think you're right, I think it's something that merits our attention, and I suspect when with discussions and debates are completed we'll find that it fits something like I suggested: the more powerful, the greater the risk and the danger, the lower the threshold for action.

March 3, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: French Forces

I am told by Colin Powell that the French plan to have a total of 800 people into Haiti by Friday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030304-15

.....

Please respond by _____

OSD 10927-04

FRANCE

3/3/04

3
March 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: QDR Process

I am told that this QDR process is coming at us hard. We are going to need to get me some time to make sure we get it on the right track.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-81

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 10928-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43310

310.1

3 MAR 04

March 2, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: President's Management Agenda

Sometime in the next four to six weeks, I need a briefing on the President's Management Agenda. I would like to have someone from OMB there on the management side and people from DoD. We need someone to describe what the goals are, how they work and what our goals are for 2004.

Possibly we should have a SLRG on it.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/2/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: The President's Management Agenda Q1 FY04 (OSD #02575-04)

DHR:dh
030204-8

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

11-L-0559/OSD/43311

OSD 10929-04

310.1

270104



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

February 2, 2004, 4 PM

Burnham
2/24
Sec. Dir.
W/ OMB
of DoD
for info
for 2/24

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CC: DSD *Done 2/24*

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*
x P. 104

SUBJ: The President's Management Agenda Q1 FY04

- OMB has released the latest "scores" of progress toward accomplishing the President's Management Agenda. The overall Executive Branch Scorecard is at **TAB A**.
- OMB's assessment of our progress on the five crosscutting initiatives is at **TAB B**. We are "Green" in all Progress Areas. A summary of our Status follows:

Human Capital

Despite significant advances with the introduction of the National Security Personnel System, and our Workforce Restructuring Plan, Status remains "Yellow."

Competitive Sourcing

The Department exceeded OMB's goal of completing 15 percent of our agreed to 226,000 positions in FY 2003 by a factor of two. Status has advanced to "Yellow."

Financial Management

The Department-wide financial system enterprise architecture has been briefed to OMB. The score remains as rated last year: "Red" for Status.

E-Government

The Department has performed an impressive amount of work in this area. While we believe our efforts merit an elevation to "Yellow" in Status, our score remains "Red."

Budget and Performance Integration

DoD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System has served us for over 40 years. We believe it merits a "Green" in Status; the score remains "Yellow."

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by Mr. John G. Vonglis, Dir. Management Initiatives, P&R

Human

SEC. ASSISTANT TO THE	<i>HAZ</i>
DIR. MA. GRADUATE	<i>CLB</i>
MA. BUREAU	<i>2/25</i>
(b)(6)	<i>2/23</i>

OSD 02575-04



TAB A

Executive Branch Management Scorecard

	Current Status as of December 31, 2003					Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda				
	Human Capital	Competitive Sourcing	Financial Perf	E-Gov	Budget/Perf Integration	Human Capital	Competitive Sourcing	Financial Perf	E-Gov	Budget/Perf Integration
AGRICULTURE	●	○	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●
COMMERCE	○	○	●	○	○	●	○	●	●	●
DEFENSE	○	○	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●
EDUCATION	○	○	●↑	○	●	●	●	●	●	●
ENERGY	○	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●
EPA	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	●
HHS	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○
HOMELAND	●	○↑	●	●	●	○	●	●	○	●
HUD	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●
INTERIOR	●	○	●	●	●	○	●	○	○	○
JUSTICE	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●
LABOR	○	●	○	○	○	●	○	●	●	●
STATE	○	●	○	●	○	●	○	●	●	●
DOT	○	○	●	○↑	○	●	●	●	●	●
TREASURY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●
VA	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	●	●	●
AID	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	○
CORPS	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	○
GSA	○↑	○	●↓	●	○	●	●	●	○	●
NASA	●↑	○↑	●	○↑	●↑	●	●	○	●	●
NSF	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	○
OMB	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○
OPM	○	○	○	●↑	○↑	●	●	●	●	●
SBA	○	○↑	●	○	○	●	●	○	●	●
SMITHSONIAN	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○
SSA	○	●	●	○	○	●	●	●	●	●

↑↓ Arrows indicate change in status since evaluation on September 30, 2003

Executive Branch Management Scorecard



	Status as of September 30, 2001					Status as of December 31, 2002				
	Human Capital	Competitive Sourcing	Financial Perf	E-Gov	Budget/Perf Integration	Human Capital	Competitive Sourcing	Financial Perf	E-Gov	Budget/Perf Integration
AGRICULTURE	●	●	●	○	●	m	●	●	○	●
COMMERCE	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	○
DEFENSE	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	○
EDUCATION	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●
ENERGY	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	○	●
EPA	●	●	●	○	○	●	●	○	○	○
HHS	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●
HOMELAND						4)	●	●	●	●
HUD	D	m	m	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
INTERIOR	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
JUSTICE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
LABOR	○	m	●	○	●	○	●	○	○	○
STATE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
DOT	●	●	●	●	○	m	●	●	●	○
TREASURY	m	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
VA	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○
AID	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
CORPS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
GSA	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
NASA	●	●	○	●	●	○	●	●	●	○
NSF	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	●
OMB	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
OPM	○	●	●	○	●	○	●	○	○	●
SBA	●	●	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	○
SMITHSONIAN	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	●
SSA	○	●	○	○	●	○	●	○	○	○

Program Initiatives Scorecard



	Current Status	Progress in Implementation
Faith-Based and Community Initiative:		
• Agriculture	●	●
• Education	○	●
• HHS	○	●
• HUD	○	●
• Justice	○	●
• Labor	○	●
• AID	●	○
Privatization of Military Housing	○	●
Better R&D Investment Criteria	●	○
Elimination of Fraud and Error in Student Aid Programs and Deficiencies in Financial Management	○	●
Housing and Urban Development Management and Performance	●	●
Broadening Health Insurance Coverage Through State Initiatives	○	●
A "Right-Sized" Overseas Presence	●	●
Coordination of VA and DoD Programs and Systems	○	●

TAB B




**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

Initiative	Current Status (As of December 31, 2003)	Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda	Comments
Human Capital Agency Lead: Dr. David S.C. Chu Gail McGinn Ellen Tunstall Lead RMO Examiner: Janiie Price-O'Donnell OPM IIC Officer: Jennifer Hopkins	 Yellow Next ↑ est. by FY 2004, Q3	 Green	<p>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2003</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provided revised "Proud to Be" document with sufficient supporting data in the correct format • Developed Defense Business Fellowship Program • Completed development of funding strategy for marketing DoD as a "first choice" employer • Published program assistance package to promote a diverse and representative workforce • Promoted diversity in providing developmental opportunities to employees • Reported on FY 2003 diversity goals (hiring employees with disabilities) • Updated annual Workforce Planning Analysis Chart (due 12/03) • Updated Restructuring Plan (done every 6 months) <p>Planned Actions for 02 FY 2004</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide report on adequacy of resources to support FY 2006 budget (training and professional development) • Provide metric/calculation to use to develop civilian personnel compensation estimates under NSPS • Provide report on review of recruitment programs • Provide report on legislation and strategy for staffing mission-critical occupations • Provide analysis of data from Components on Time to Fill metric <p>In order to stay on track to meet Proud to Be Goals, DoD must demonstrate results with qualitative and quantitative evidence of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Demonstrate an implemented SES and performance management system for at least 60% of the workforce which links to the agencies strategic goals, differentiates between performance levels, and provides positive and negative consequences based on performance; 2. Demonstrate the use and success of succession strategies; 3. Demonstrate a diverse workforce and the use of diversity strategies that are successful in reducing under representation in mission critical occupations and its leadership ranks; 4. Identify its mission critical occupations and skill gaps and demonstrate how it has significantly reduced the gaps; and 5. Demonstrate how its accountability system is used to make decisions and drive results. <p>DoD remains GREEN in status because:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD implemented a Civilian FIR Strategic Plan for FY2002 to FY2008. • Each FY, Components meet to discuss the results of past objectives and determine future objectives/milestones to accomplish. • On Nov. 24, 2003, the President signed legislation to authorize a new HR system. OPM will work closely with DoD to implement new regulations. • DoD will meet with Components in January/February to determine objectives/milestones to accomplish.

**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

<p>Competitive Sourcing</p> <p>DoD Leads: Dov Kakheim Rag DuBois Mike Wynne</p> <p>Lead RMO Examiner: Bill McQuaid x53657</p> <p>Lead OFPP Analyst: Matt Blum</p>	<p align="center"></p> <p align="center">Yellow</p> <p align="center">Next ↑ est. by (12/04)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Approved competition plan ✓ "yellow" plan on (8/03) ✓ "green" plan will be submitted in FY 2005 Budget Standard competitions ✓ completed 16 standard cost comparisons during Q4 FY 2004 — announced in accordance with "green" plan schedule NA — in the past year completed ≥ 90% in 12 months or less NA Standard and streamlined competitions ✓ at least 10 completed since January 2001. DoD has completed 270 competitions since January 2001. None under the revised Circular. Streamlined competitions completed in 90 days or less ≥ 75% during the past 2 quarters (date) — ? 95% during the past year (date) ✓ 10% of announced standard and streamlined competitions cancelled <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 0 in past two quarters 4-9, 2003 1 in past year 2002 of 21 announced competitions — Commercial activities exempt from competition ✓ OMB approved all categories for justification on 12/29/2003. OMB's FAIR letter accepted DoD's inventory 	<p align="center"></p> <p align="center">Green</p> <p>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2003</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OMB's DoD Passback requested that the Business Improvement Council (BIC) 226,000 position goal be budgeted for in 05 Budgets and FYDP of the Military Services and Defense Agencies by 2009. Comptroller issued a data call to provide the data requested in the Passback. Only plans using (1) the revised A-76 Circular, (2) OMB-approved Pioneer Projects, and (3) military conversions will be accepted; Strategic Sourcing and other re-engineering projects will not be permitted in meeting the OMB/BIC goals. Comptroller has signed a Program Budget Decisions (PRD) to ensure that the Military Services and Defense Agencies do budget for the BIC position goal. The Comptroller will use this PRD process to correct any problems with the components' budgets by going to the Deputy Secretary. <p>Planned Actions for Q1 FY 2004</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track and review execution and savings for DoD's existing, ongoing competitive sourcing program. Continue to track the development of DoD guidance on revised A-76 circular. Continue to participate closely in the PRD-process for competing the BIC 226,000 position goal through the FY 2005/FYDP budget process. Audit component budgets for A-76 reviews. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Since DoD has completed competitions for 17% of the FAIR inventory, OMB maintains DoD's "Status" as Yellow. The decline in new announcements has raised questions about DoD attaining the DoD/BIC 226,000 position goal, but the PBD process is reversing that issue. The DoD Leads are ensuring that this decline in starts is replaced with significant increases in planned announcements across all components through the PBD process. OMB and DoD have agreed that the FY 2005 budget is detailing how the Military Services and Defense Agencies will meet the BIC 226,000 FTE goal in the new PBD. Now that the Military Services and Defense Agencies have aligned their plans and allocated budget and other resources necessary to implement FY 2005-9 targets to meet the BIC's 226,000 FTE goal in the PBD process, OMB has changed the rating to Green on Progress in the FY 2005 Budget. <p>To get to Green on Status, each Military Service and Defense Agency would need to have policy, infrastructure and other resources in place, and be actively announcing significant numbers of competitions under the revised A-76 circular to reach the BIC goals consistent with the approved PRD.</p>
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**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

Financial Performance		Department of Defense	
Agency Lead: Dr. Dov Zakheim	 Red	 Green	Actions Taken Since Sept 30, 2003 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Progressed toward "proud to be" goals (see right) Improved timeliness/ reliability of execution reporting for major on-going operations. The Secretary of Defense reporting that 2 of 13 material auditor-reported internal control weaknesses will be eliminated (problem disbursements, health care liability) Made good progress on Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) planning and implementation. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Began business process modeling efforts Developed high level milestones, schedules for BMMP Increment 1 Identified content for Incr. 2 & 3 Developing BMMP performance goals Started portfolio management reviews (Logistics domain)
Lead RMO Examiner: Shannon Stuart	Next  est. by 2007		Planned Actions for Q2 FY 2004 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Report reliable execution data for major on-going overseas operations within 45 days Assess Component plans and integrate into department-wide plan for getting a clean opinion Complete review and analysis of Anti Deficiency Act (ADA) reporting process Develop management guidance for environmental restoration liabilities Define process for selecting and controlling business system investments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Issue portfolio management instructions Conduct portfolio management reviews for remaining domains Continue BMMP implementation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop detailed schedule and milestones for the first phase of Increment 1. Establish performance targets and establish performance measurement capability Define accounting rules/ Incr. 1 requirements
Lead OFFM Analyst: Jean Holcombe			Proud to be <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meeting financial reporting deadlines Components submitted detailed plans for getting to a clean audit opinion DoD estimates that 25 FMFIA weaknesses will be resolved in FY2004. Good progress on financial operations intricacies Working with Components to reduce ADA violations and erroneous payments DoD and OMB management attention needed to assure continued progress BMMP financial systems improvement effort.
			RMMP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD will implement BMMP in Increments. Increment One (14 segments on critical path to clean opinion) will be complete in 2007 DoD is taking constructive steps to meet the challenge of architecture implementation, but significant work remains. DoD still needs to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop a strategy for transitioning the functions of the 2,274 legacy business systems Provide updated BMMP business case Articulate specific plans for each functional domain and show linkages to overall BMMP effort Fully implement new portfolio management processes to affect Component's FY2006 program/ budget build Critical RMMP milestones occur in Q3 FY04: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing "master plan" with more detailed schedules and milestones for Increment 1 Completing Increment One business process modeling April 04 Conducting Increment One Analysis of Alternatives
			Other critical future actions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pilot for reporting mid-year status of FMFIA corrective actions (Q3 FY04)

President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense

E-Government		Actions Taken Since Sept. 30, 2003	In general, DoD is meeting its Proud to He goals and milestones.
Agency Lead:		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Submitted 162 business cases for FY 2005, with all 162 rated as acceptable, although 107 remain on the management watchlist: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > 36 for low total scores (a 3 overall) > 27 for low security scores (1, 2 or 3 in security) > 44 for both low total scores and low security scores (3 overall and 1, 2, or 3 in security) Submitted additional information on low security scores and a plan of action for improving business cases with low security scores. Conducted logistics business domain portfolio review, a first step towards full implementation of the Business Systems Modernization domain portfolio review concept. Developed high-level milestones and schedules for the Business Management Modernization Program Increment (BMMP) One; identified content and schedules for remaining increments. Submitted FISMA report for 2003 	Specifically it submitted improved business cases, and it is moving forward with architecture efforts, and strengthening its IT security program.
John Stenbit DoD CIO	Red	Green	DoD will submit regular reports on the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS).
			The Department should demonstrate how the GIG architecture and the BMMP Architecture are integrated.
Lead HMO Examiner:			DoD is taking constructive steps to meet the challenge of architecture implementation, but significant work remains. DoD still needs to:
Andrew McIlroy			> Develop a strategy for transitioning the functions of the 2,274 legacy business systems
Lead IT/E-Gov Analyst:			> Provide updated BMMP business case
Dave Muzio			> Articulate specific plans for each functional domain and show linkages to overall BMMP effort
			> Fully implement new portfolio management processes to affect Component's FY2006 program/budget build
			DoD can improve its status to Yellow if 80% of IT systems are properly secured based on a full count of all systems or the IG verifies there is a plan of action and milestones.
			In addition, DoD should implement the requirement for an Earned Value Management System (BVMS) on the Development and Modernization portions of major investments.

**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

<p>Budget & Performance Integration</p> <p>DoD Leads: David Chu, Ken Krieg and Dov Zakheim</p> <p>Lead RMO Examiner: Bill McQuaid (b)(6)</p>	<p align="center">Yellow</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance info used to make decisions, at least quarterly <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ some major areas (12/02) — all major areas Q1 2006 Strategic and annual plans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ limited # of goals & use PART measures on FY 2005 Budget — AND focus on info used in senior mgmt. report 1012003 ADR Performance appraisal plans link, differentiate, provide consequences for SES & mgrs. (date) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ AND for ≥60% of agency FY 2005 Cost of achieving performance goals <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ full cost reported on Q1 FY 2004 — AND marginal cost reported on will strive to identify At least one efficiency measure per program <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ for >50% of PARTed programs on FY 2004 Budget — for all programs on Q1 2006 Use of PART ratings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ to justify requests, etc. and ≤ RND for more than 2 yrs. in row FY 2004 Budget — justify requests, etc., direct improvements, and < 10% RND for more than 2 yrs. in row Q1 2006 DoD's performance/budget metrics have been incorporated into the Balanced Risk Scorecards, Annual Defense Report (ADR), and to some degree, Congressional Justifications. RND for more than 2 yrs. in row Q1 2006 <p>DoD's performance/budget metrics have been incorporated into the Balanced Risk Scorecards, Annual Defense Report (ADR), and to some degree, Congressional Justifications.</p>	<p align="center">Green</p>	<p>Actions Taken Since September 30, 03</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD's Comptroller is implementing a Program, Planning, and Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system to replace the old PPBS program. PPBE formulates a two-year program and budget, and uses the off-year to focus on program performance and execution. The Annual Defense Report (ADR) was published which reflects the Secretary's Instrument Panel metrics and the Balanced Risk Scorecards that are being devolved to the Military Services and Defense Agencies. Comptroller proposed Operations for the next PART which will cover 30% of the budget for a total of 70% by next year. A Comptroller-directed inter-Service-Agency working group is developing and improving performance measures by budget activity. The program and budget reviews are being combined with more emphasis on performance. <p>Planned Actions for Q2 FY 2004</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The PARTS and other performance measures will be mapped in the justification material to highlight usage. the Operations PART will be cascaded to all DoD components early next year. DoD and OMB will jointly evaluate the Operations PART for an additional 30% of the budget, ensuring that at least 70% of its funding is linked to program performance metrics. <p>The next ADR will report on performance metrics by March 1, 2004.</p>	<p>DoD has incorporated performance information into a published Secretary's Annual Defense Report. This ADR balances risks among the defense goals competing for DoD's limited budget resources for the first time.</p> <p>DoD's effort to develop performance metrics for use in the FY 2005 budget is much more detailed in the financial management area than anywhere else. DoD is working with OMB to define measures in many other areas including acquisition.</p> <p>OMB is working with DoD's Comptroller to review its planning and resource allocation processes to link strategically military requirements and acquisition decisions to program, performance and budget development.</p> <p>DoD is making significant improvements in linking performance and budget information in the Budget and Congressional Justifications.</p> <p>OMB has continued the Green for Progress and Yellow for Status in this Scorecard. The DoD Leads need to continue to jointly work together to fully integrate performance and budget.</p> <p>To move to Green in the FY 2006 Budget process, DoD should meet the standards and fully integrate DoD's PARTs with the ADR and Congressional Justifications. To maintain the Green on Status after that, DoD should align budget information with missions, functional accounts and activities.</p>
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March 2, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Dov Zakheim
Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stress on Equipment

It seems to me that a Supplemental is to replace things that happen in a war. If there is additional stress on the equipment during a war, then that ought to be replaceable. If there is lost equipment, it ought to be replaceable. This memo from Dov Zakheim is worrisome to me.

Please come up with an appropriate approach, and then a draft memo from me to OMB to get this handled in the proper way.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/26/04 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Stress on Equipment (OSD #02925-04)

DHR:dh
030204-12

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

11-L-0559/OSD/43323

OSD 10930-04

IRAAQ

2 MAR 04



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

3/2

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 FEB 27 AM 9:38

February 26, 2004, 3:00 PM

3/1
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Stress on Equipment

- You asked how we plan to deal with stress on our equipment in Iraq in the context of past and future requests for Supplemental funding.
- It is certainly true that when we use equipment at a faster rate for a sustained time, we must budget to replace the equipment earlier than anticipated. It is sometimes difficult to get Supplemental funding for this effort. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) often considers Supplemental funding to be reserved for immediate operational needs. In OMB's view, replacement of equipment, because of its longer lead time, can be budgeted for in normal appropriations requests.
- Last summer, we examined what equipment was lost in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, and allocated funding in the Supplemental to facilitate "re-setting the force," to ensure that military forces would be ready for new combat situations. In the fiscal year (FY) 2003 and FY 2004 Supplementals, \$4.3 billion was provided for reconstitution of equipment, and another \$5.2 billion was allocated for depot maintenance.
- Ken Krieg plans to take the lead on the study you suggest on stress on equipment caused by high optempo over sustained time periods. His office is developing the guidelines for the study and plans to involve the Military Departments and the Joint Staff in this effort. I will also participate and provide analysts to assist. This study will prove invaluable in helping the Department make its case for Supplemental funding to support investment needs.

RECOMMENDATION: None

Prepared By: John Roth (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	2/29
SR MA CRAMPOCK	3/1
MA BATT POSEY	3/1
EXECUTIVE SECRET	2/27

OSD 02925-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43324

March 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Use of Reserve Components

Please take a look at the attached memo from David Chu on the use of reserve components, and let's talk about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/19/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef [OSD#02515-04]

2/8/04 SecDef memo to USD(P&R) [020804-55]

DHR:dh
030104-94

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

11-L-0559/OSD/43325

326

2 MAR 04



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

February 19, 2004, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chu - 19 Feb 04

SUBJECT: Frequency of Using Reserve Components - SNOWFLAKE

- In your July 9, 2003, memo you had indicated a planning factor of not involuntarily calling up Reserve members more than one year out of every six. Our recommendation to you reflected a judgment as to what might be sustainable. As is evident, it implies approximately three years active service in a 20-year service career.
- Though there has been some discussion regarding flexibility in implementing this guidance, it has been widely reported and is generally accepted as approximately right by the Military Departments and Reserve Components.
- What really counts is what Reservists think. Reserve member expectation management is critical.
- We are undertaking an evidentiary process using survey research, empirical data, and modeling to determine the effect of activation on recruiting and retention-- some results are expected this year. In our April status of forces surveys we will ask about the frequency of call up, which will give us a better basis for judging the appropriateness of one in six.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

ASSTANT DIR RITA	
DIR RITA	2/20
EXERCISE RESERVE	2/20




OSD 02515-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43326

February 8, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Frequency of Using Reserve Components

We need to think through and decide how often we want to use the Reserve components. Is it 1 in 50 years, as is the case with a great many of them, or is it 1 in 10 or 1 in 7?

We need to understand it and then recruit, attract and retain people based on whatever it is we think makes sense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-55

.....
Please respond by 2/18/04

✓
3/1

0 SD 02515-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43327

EF-8670

03/12

March 2, 2004

In reply refer to EF-8670 & 04/002892

TU: Ken Krieg
Andy Hoehn

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gordon England

SUBJECT: Long-Term Costs

Gordon England mentioned that DoD could end up like Bethlehem Steel because we have too many employees, too much healthcare and too much retirement, and that the weight of all of that over time will collapse us.

He also mentioned that David Chu is addressing the issue on the military side, but no one is addressing it on the civilian side.

Why don't we get Gordon England to put some structure into this problem and come up with a proposal as to how we could do the preparatory work, with an eye towards eventually ending up with a SLRG.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-96

✓ 3/12

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

SecDef:

I have discussed the idea with Ken Krieg. He and Gordon England will tackle the issue. I will provide support as they need it.

Andy H.
Andy Hoehn

2 MAR 04

OSD 10932-04

March 2, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Realignment of Troops

Please set up a meeting for me to discuss realigning troops, probably with Feith and Hoehn.

I want to talk about some downsizing in Europe and South Korea, possibly leaving some in CENTCOM. We ought to address the Air Force, as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-26

.....
Please respond by

3/19/04

✓ 3/4
SecDef -
Scheduled for Monday,
8 March, 10:45-11:30

C 3/4

320.2

2 MAR 04

March 1, 2004

711

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

SUBJECT: Relationship to Homeland Security Council

You mentioned to me you wanted to change your relationship to the Homeland Security Council.

Please describe for me what you think that relationship should be, and compare it to what it is now.

Also, how does what you think your Homeland Security Council role should be compare with your relationship to the National Security Council?

Shanks.

DHR:dh
030104-5

.....
Please respond by

3/19/04

That is
correct
closed
C 3/4

OSD 10934-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43330

334 HSC

March 04

Received 0955/ WR 21 2004

Deputy EA W EA JA

CJCS Decision:

Memo for my Signature

Will answer at Roundtable:

Give me verbal response

Give me e-mail response

Give me 5x8 / slides etc.

Send to Staff for Info

No Reply Required

Copy to: JS

OBE
Washed
Roundtable
3/2
JA

CJCS HAS SEEN

MAR 02 2004

March 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Funding Army's New Force Structure Plan

I find this memo from Dov Zakheim unclear, and I need a meeting on it.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/10/04 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Funding Status on the Army's New Force Structure Plan
(OSD #01977-04)

DHR:dh
030104-59

.....
Please respond by

3/12/04

W
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e
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1 Mar 04



✓ 3/11

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 100

INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

February 10, 2004, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Funding Status on the Army's New Force Structure Plan *MTA needed*

- You asked for the latest funding status on the Army's new force structure plan.
 - **FY 2004 Execution Plan:** As the 82ABN, 10th ID, and 3ID return from deployment next month and begin the reconstitution process, the over strength in these units (i.e., the personnel that exceed their authorized end strength) will be used to stand-up three new Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). The Army will complete one full brigade and begin to stand-up two more in FY 2004. The cost estimate is approximately \$600 million.
 - We currently have over \$300 million on withhold in the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation that is not currently needed for purposes requested in the supplemental. Our plan is to release these funds to help finance the Army's new force structure plan.
 - During the upcoming OUSD(Comptroller)'s Midyear Execution Review, we will address the remaining shortfall of \$300 million, which will compete with other funding needs identified to date (totaling over \$2.5 billion) related directly to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (e.g., higher than expected Operating Tempo, transportation, and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) costs).
 - **FY 2005 Funding Plan:** The cost estimate for the full stand-up of four (completing two from FY 2004 and two new BCTs in FY 2005) and partial stand-up of one BCT is approximately \$1.6 to \$2.2 billion. DoD supports including these costs in the FY 2005 supplemental request for OEF and OIF.
 - **FY 2006 Funding Plan:** The cost estimate for FY 2006 is nearly \$3 billion. The funding for FY 2006 and beyond will be addressed during the FY 2006 – 2011 Program and Budget Review.
- A talking point paper (TAB A) is also attached summarizing the funding status on the Army's new force structure plan.
- We will continue to work with the Army to address the funding issues during the upcoming FY 2004 Midyear Execution Review and the FY 2006 – 2011 Program and Budget Review.

COORDINATION: See attached. (TAB B)

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>[Signature]</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>[Signature]</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	2/11

11-L-0559/OSD/43333

OSD 01977-04

Funding Status on the Army's New Force Structure Plan

Overview:

- What follows is a coordinated strategy from USD(C), OMB, and the Department of the Army.
- As the Army returns divisions from Iraq, they will be reorganized to create new Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) within each division.
- The Army will staff these new brigades with additional personnel that exceed the current authorized level and transfers from other units.

FY 2004 Funding Plan

- The Army will complete one full BCT and begin standing up two more in FY 2004.
- The cost estimate is \$600 million.
 - The DoD has \$300 million, currently not needed for purposes requested in the supplemental, that could be used for this requirement.
 - USD(C) will address the remaining \$300 million at the midyear execution review. However, this will have to compete with other critical funding needs that have been identified (totaling over \$2.5 billion).

FY 2005 Funding Plan

- The Army will stand-up three more BCTs in FY 2005.
- The cost is approximately \$1.6 to \$2.2 billion.
- DoD supports including these costs in an FY 2005 supplemental request.

FY 2006 Funding Plan

- The cost for FY 2006 is nearly \$3 billion and will be addressed during the FY 2006 – FY 2011 Program and Budget Review.

Coordination: Army FM (MG Hartsell), OMB (Ms. Peroff)

Prepared by: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

COORDINATION PAGE

OMB	Ms. Peroff	Feb. 10, 2004
Army Budget	MG Hartsell	Feb. 9, 2004



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

7201
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

June 24, 2004, 9:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE **JUL 19 2004**
(PERSONNEL & READINESS) (signed by Dr. Chu, see attached)

SUBJECT: State Solutions for Educational Issues of Military Children - Snowflake

- I met with Senator Alexander, and we testified at his field hearing on this issue. The most common concern of military parents is the lack of a recognized state history course for graduation from the receiving school.
- The DoD has several programs in place to promote state reciprocity and legislation:
 1. DoD representatives are personally contacting each state department of education.
 2. **The DoD Promising Practices Program** identifies state & local outstanding programs that solve education issues for the military child.
 3. **The DoD Consortium of Highly-Impacted States** will meet Fall of 2004 to address educational issues of the military child in transition and deployment. Georgia House Bill 1190 Section 2 will be highlighted for replication: "The State Board of Education is authorized to provide for exemptions to the required course of study in the history of Georgia and the Georgia Constitution for transfer students, including students whose parents serve in the Armed Forces of the US."
 4. **Five DoD Regional Quality of Life Coordinators** are being sent to heavily-impacted states to work full-time with governors, legislators, State Departments of Education and school districts to address education concerns of military families.
 - Their mission is to facilitate legislation and reciprocity and improve educational opportunities and quality education for military children. They will also address other military quality of life issues.
 - Selectees are highly-skilled educational leaders familiar with the needs of the military child.

RECOMMENDATION: For information only.

Attachments: As stated

PREPARED BY: Dr. Jean Silvernail, ODUSD(MC&FP), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/43336

OSD 10936-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

June 24, 2004, 9:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(PERSONNEL & READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 19 Jun 04

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 - Selectees are highly-skilled educational leaders familiar with the needs of the military child.

RECOMMENDATION: For information only.

Attachments: As stated

PREPARED BY: Dr. Jean Silvernail, ODUSD(MC&FP), (b)(6)




11-L-0559/OSD/43337

5/12/04

May 12, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: State Reciprocity for Military

Senator Lamar Alexander and Saxby Chambliss are both eager to be helpful to try to tie military families into state reciprocity.

We should get a program going to do that, and I would like you to keep me posted on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051204-10

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

5/12/04

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David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

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DHR:dh
051204-10

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

350

12 M
04

March 1, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

CC: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Economic Issues in Iraq

Attached is a letter I received from Art Laffer with some suggestions on Iraq.

Let's set up a meeting and discuss them.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/18/04 Laffer e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
030104-62

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

OB
3/12

Iraq

1 March

✓
3/1

Original Message

From: Jax Schluederberg (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2004 1:35 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: Letter From Dr. Arthur Laffer

cc: L. D. Pita
LTG Graddock

6

February 18, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Last week I was invited by a group of your finest (Marine officers) to a seminar at Camp Pendleton, which is only a few miles north of where I live. These guys are great and have been assigned to a variety of tasks involved in the transition of Iraq from an occupied, economically dependent territory to a self-governing economically independent country. They have their work cut out for them under the best of circumstances. Why I'm writing to you, however, is because I was led to believe both from written material and during the course of our conversations that these tasks are facing additional potentially insurmountable obstacles placed in their way by the Coalition Provisional Authority and other directives coming from the U.S.

Because of my experience with the domestic economy of Vietnam in the 1970-1974 period under George Schultz and my work on a post-Castro transition plan for Cuba with the Cuban American National Foundation, when it was ably led by Jorge Mas Canosa (who passed away five years ago), I thought you might be interested in my two-cents worth (which has been discounted even below two cents). Rather than criticizing what I may not have fully understood of the Bremer and CPA plans, I've limited myself to what I consider essential do's and don'ts for creating an economically viable society out of a war-ravaged former totalitarian state.

- A. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to reestablishing markets is the absence of a viable stable-valued means of payment and store of value (currency). To foster economic interchange, merchants, workers, savers and investors need a currency they can count on both over time and across space. This currency has to be stable in value over time to satisfy the needs of small savers, and to provide a basis for contracts and it has to be readily acceptable everywhere both inside and outside the region to facilitate trade and investment flows.

I can't begin to tell you how depressing it was to the local economy of Mexico in 1976 when the peso started to collapse after having been stable for years and years. Likewise, Argentina's recent abandonment of the currency peg (under de la Rúa) and the subsequent financial collapse is a tragedy of immense proportions. Our own return to dollar credulity in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan was the *sine qua non* of America's renaissance. Time and again countries are forced to relearn the powerful dictum of a sound money.

Iraq does not have the ability nor does it have powerful enough political institutions to pursue, maintain and monitor its own currency *de novo*. Iraq, if it is to have its own currency at all, must have that currency immutably linked to the dollar or euro. My personal suggestion would be to use either euros or dollars as the domestic currency of

Iraq and don't even pretend to introduce a new Iraqi currency. Panama is dollarized literally, and lots of other countries are dollarized *de facto*, and the system works extremely well.

Attempting to set up a new currency puts at risk the entire Iraqi rehabilitation effort and could, if bad enough, force the lower echelons of the Iraqi economy into barter. Barter is inefficient, inconvenient and costly, and will materially impede the type of economic progress we all hope for. The upper levels will always be able to take advantage of foreign currencies.

- B. Also of exceptional importance for a new Iraqi government is the structure of fiscal policy (taxation, spending and the issuance of debt) at the national and provincial levels.

In countries like Iraq where financial markets are years and years away from sophistication, there is a virtual certainty that budget deficits will lead to overuse of the printing press and hyperinflation. Budget deficits also can lead to excessively high tax rates and widespread disregard and flouting of the laws. Therefore, clear and concise tax policy explicitly segregated between federal and provincial prerogatives is of the essence.

Iraq is extraordinarily fortunate to be blessed with oil. As such severance taxes on oil should be a mainstay for government revenues – severance taxes are about as efficient as taxes get. If set up correctly, a good system of oil severance taxes is effectively a tax on foreigners and should do the least damage to the domestic economy of any tax system I know. We have two states that use them extensively, Alaska and Wyoming. It also makes lots of sense to collect revenues on a comprehensive flat rate basis on imports. Any type of sin tax is also a good option because the economic damage the tax does is on the disfavored products. Also property taxes should be used at the provincial level – property and real estate are about the only items that can't escape local taxes by leaving. Any additional revenue supplements should be on a flat rate, broad-based, value added like tax.

Taxes that should be avoided are income taxes (especially progressive) and small taxes where the costs of collection approach or exceed the revenue actually collected. The keys to good tax policy are:

- i.) Tax those items most that can escape the least, and conversely tax those least that can easily escape. It makes no sense to tax something that then flees the jurisdiction, goes underground or stops working. You not only don't get the revenue, but you also lose the benefits of the productive services.
- ii.) Tax those things most that you least like (sin taxes). An additional benefit of sin taxes is that they do reduce the activity being taxed.
- iii.) Tax those things least where the collection costs are highest
- iv.) Broad based low rate taxes provide people with the least incentives to evade, avoid and otherwise not report taxable income and the least number of places where they can escape taxation.
- v.) Tax people fairly. People in like circumstances should have similar tax burdens. The perception of fairness is key to voluntary compliance.
- vi.) Make sure that taxation is not arbitrary or easily subject to discretionary changes. The power to tax in the wrong hands is an ugly weapon for exploitation.

- vii.) Lastly, collect only as much as you really need. Wasteful spending will always rise to the level of revenues.

These rules should help your efforts, if meticulously adhered to. Next to a bad money I know of nothing that will bring an economy to its knees faster than an unjust, inefficient, anti-growth, excessive system of taxation. This principal is universal.

On the spending side, priorities need to be set really quickly. In my view infrastructure is the first among equals such as: security (police), judiciary, water, electricity, telecommunications, roads, airports, hospitals and government itself. In the near term at least, school programs, women's issues, social redistribution and humanitarian projects are further down on the list. Once the economy is back on its feet there will be plenty of time to redress these wrongs. At the outset, government spending should be focused almost exclusively on getting the economy back on its feet as quickly as possible. Without production there's nothing to redistribute. Feigning a big heart is often the quickest path to disaster. Iraq needs endemic production and government can be instrumental in achieving its goal.

- C. Forgiveness of debt owed by Iraq to foreign creditors can be enormously beneficial to Iraq if and only if Iraq has the infrastructure to take advantage of the additional resources financed by additional debt. If Iraq's incentive structure and system of self governance isn't well ranged, new debt to replace old debt is money down a rat hole. You really don't want to replace old bad loans with new bad loans. No one wins. Allowing Iraq to incur additional foreign debt obligations should only occur after Iraq's economy and government have been established. You're going to make lots of mistakes and will learn a lot from those mistakes. The smaller the scale of the initial operations, the less Iraq will have to pay for lessons learned. The less costly the mistakes from which you learn, the better off Iraq will be.
- D. Regulatory policy should be simple, small and fair. Laws should be basic and enforceable with quick and decisive action for violation. Having laws on the books that are not observed or actively disobeyed undermines the moral authority of all government. Keep regulations to a minimum, keep them simple and enforce them.
- E. Trade policy should be as open and as free as possible, restricting only those products which really cause harm (drugs, weapons, etc.). For revenue purposes you may want a low rate, broad-based tax on imports. It's interesting to note that for most of our country's history, tariffs provided the lion's share of our tax revenues. Tariffs plus an oil severance tax could well be the lion's share of future Iraqi tax revenues.

Trade is often an area where privilege and corruption take root. Here more than anywhere is where Iraq needs transparency, simplicity and fairness.

- F. A lot of attention is being placed on the need to provide an adequate number of jobs for Iraq. And while jobs per se clearly are important, increasing employment and creating jobs is often a catch phrase standing in for increasing output. In truth Iraq needs additional output far more than it needs more jobs. Now in some cases these two phrases are synonymous, but they may not be interchangeable in Iraq. Make work projects and avoiding reform for fear of losing jobs are sure fire losers. At no time and nowhere is it more important to recognize the primacy of efficiency, output and productivity than it is now in Iraq.
- G. Special industries like banking, glass factories, construction companies, etc. should be left to the marketplace. I know they are important, but so does every business person in Iraq. Those businesses will grow on their own if they are profitable.

- H. Dismantling the former government and former military can be carried too far. Under Saddam Hussein there were no alternatives and therefore there are no substitutes waiting in the wings to take over the general functions of government and security. You do need an Iraqi presence to deal with, to support, and to nurture, in order for us to get out.
- I. Be very careful of U.S. quasi-governmental lobbying groups who see visions of sugarplums with each new contract with Iraq. These people rarely focus on what's good for the Iraqi people (or Americans for that matter) and yet they can wrap their desires in the full cloth of altruistic public interest.
- J. Don't expect Iraq or Iraqis to love us right away. Even though we have done an enormous amount for them, they still feel the intense pain of Saddam's vicious dictatorship and the ensuing war and will lash out at anyone near them. In due course, if we continue to behave honorably, they will come to appreciate all that we have done for them and they will respect us for all that we have sacrificed on their behalf.
- K. Our purpose for being in Iraq has absolutely nothing to do with our desire to develop a free-enterprise, pro-growth, democratic, capitalist nation. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a threat to our way of life and as such we terminated that threat. Anything additional we do for the Iraqi people is truly out of the goodness of our hearts, not out of guilt. No matter what anyone may say, you were 100% correct in the actions you took. You make me very proud to be an American.

Hope these points are of some value. You have done and are doing the best job ever. I dream and hope for your continued success.

Your Buddy,

Arthur B. Laffer

cc: Steven Bucci
Catherine Mainardi
Paul D. Wofowitz

Dr. Arthur B. Laffer
Laffer Associates
5405 Morehouse Drive, Suite 340
San Diego, California 92121
858-458-0811
Fax 858-458-9856

EF-8644

March 1, 2004

I-04/002773

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Peace Corps and Afghanistan

Please find out why the Peace Corps cannot go into Afghanistan. They say it is too dangerous. My goodness, it is no more dangerous than Washington, DC.

What do we have to do to get that changed?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-33

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

3/10

C3/12

Sec Def -

Attached is letter
from Feith to
Grossman/State.

J. L. L.

March

Larry Di Rita
3/11



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL
AFFAIRS (MARC GROSSMAN)

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]* 3/2/04

SUBJECT: Peace Corps in Afghanistan

The situation in Afghanistan has improved markedly over the last two years. Non-governmental organizations operate nationwide, and much of the country is secure.

One key program missing from Afghanistan is the Peace Corps. In the past, the Peace Corps played an important role in the development of Afghanistan. In addition, the Peace Corps is seen as a measure of stability by investors and many in the international community.

I think it would be a good idea to stand up a Peace Corps office in Afghanistan immediately. I would be interested in your thoughts.

Thanks.



11-L-0559/OSD/43346

March 1, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Statistics

I need a list of the number of people killed in action in World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, so far in Afghanistan and so far in Iraq.

I also want the number of people killed each year, by month, in the major cities of the world: Washington, Chicago, New York, Moscow, London, and Paris. I want their populations noted on that paper, please.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-16

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OB
3/5

11-L-0559/OSD/43347

OSD 10939-04

104

1 Jan 04



March 1, 2004

06050

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Video from Afghanistan

I need to get a copy of the videotape of my speech to the police academy in Iraq.
Melissa had a camera there the whole time. I would like to see the tape.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-21

.....
Please respond by 3/5/04

OB
3/16

1 MAR 04

March 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Article

Someone down there in your shop might find the attached article amusing. I was a midshipman on the USS Wisconsin when Admiral Zumwalt was a lieutenant commander and navigator when the ship pulled mooring and ran aground.

560.1

Thanks.

Attach.

Winkler, David F. "'Wisky' Aground," *Sea History* 92, Spring 2000, pp. 17-18.

DHR:dh
030104-29

.....
Please respond by _____

1 MAR 04

"Wisky" Aground: *Inter-Service Can-Do Saves the Day!*

by David F. Winkler, PhD

One of the US Navy's most embarrassing episodes, the grounding of USS *Missouri* (BB-63) at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on 17 January 1950, led to the relief of the commander. In the mud off the Army Officers Club at Fortress Monroe, efforts over two weeks to free the historic battlewagon drew national attention. Having to live down this incident, the Navy could have faced even greater ridicule with the grounding of *Missouri's* sister, USS *Wisconsin* (BB-64). This happened on the morning of 22 August 1951 in the Hudson River, overlooked by midtown New York—but actions taken by members of the Navy's sister sea services saved *Wisconsin* from infamy.

Wisconsin had been decommissioned and placed in mothballs on 1 July 1948, then recommissioned on 3 March 1951 in response to the Korean War. "Wisky," as she was affectionately known, had picked up 800 midshipmen at Norfolk, Virginia, for a trip to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Returning from Halifax on 21 August, *Wisconsin* passed through the Verrazano Narrows to moor in the Hudson River to give the crew some liberty before returning to Virginia.

The commanding officer was Captain Thomas Burrowes, USN. Joining Burrowes for the reactivation was Commander Charles H. Becker, who served as the executive officer. The navigator, Lieutenant Commander Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., was a more recent addition to the crew, having relieved the first navigator.

Burrowes, Becker and Zumwalt had hoped to have *Wisconsin* pier-side for the New York stay. However, the only space that could accommodate the 860-foot-long warship was occupied by the liner *Queen Mary*. The Port Authority did provide an option: a buoy moor in the Hudson River. This was acceptable to Burrowes's immediate superior, Rear Admiral Clarence E. Olsen, Commander Battleship Cruiser Division Two (ComBatCruDiv Two). RADM Olsen wanted the "middies" to have some good liberty and the proximity to Times Square and the attractions of mid-Manhattan assured increased time on the beach. He directed Burrowes to accept the Port Authority's proposal.

LCMs and tugs team up to keep the ship's stern from swinging into the New Jersey shore. (Photos courtesy Naval Historical Center)

Zumwalt and Burrowes, however, were not convinced that the buoys could hold the pull of the massive battleship. Zumwalt sent an advance party out, and they confirmed the buoys were properly anchored to the bottom. Still Zumwalt felt uncomfortable. Burrowes agreed, and again requested an anchorage assignment. ComBatCruDiv Two responded: "Suggest you carry out previously directed orders."


Accordingly, with the help of eight tugboats, *Wisconsin* latched herself to two buoys, one forward, one aft, headed downstream. At 1030, Captain Burrowes assumed duties as Senior Officer Present Afloat.

Captain Francis E. Blake, USMC, commander of the Marine Detachment, returning to the battleship from a stint at legal school, reported aboard at 1040. He spoke with several more experienced deck officers during the evening meal about the possible hazards of the current moor. In the meantime, Captain Burrowes departed to overnight ashore with friends and family.

After a hectic first day, all was quiet on the battleship on the evening of the 21st. When Capt. Blake assumed the watch as in-port Officer of the Deck on the aft quarterdeck, only boiler 6 remained on line to provide auxiliary steam. As dawn broke over Manhattan on the 22nd, the Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) told Blake that the anchor watch had reported the port chain securing the ship to Buoy A, the upstream buoy, to be under heavy strain. Blake directed the JOOD to have the duty boatswain inspect the forward, downstream moor, and within minutes,

received a report that the wires were taut. He sent his messenger to contact the duty commander and then called the XO's state-room to inform Becker. While talking to Becker, Blake received a report that the stern was swinging to starboard; a glance out the porthole confirmed the bad news. The upstream mooring was dragging!

Back on the aft quarterdeck, Blake ordered LCMs (landing craft) assigned to *Wisconsin* to take position on the starboard quarter and start pushing. Meanwhile, word spread through the messdecks that the ship was adrift. Many of the middies, bleary-eyed after liberty in the big city, treated the scuttlebutt with skepticism, until the squawk boxes announced "station the special sea detail" and called all hands topside to quarters. As the crew and middies streamed out to their mustering stations, the watch was shifted to the bridge. Blake remained on the aft quarterdeck while Zumwalt and Becker assessed the situation from above. At 0656, Zumwalt informed Becker that the stern was approaching shoal water. As the stern swung thirty degrees off center, the bridge team took every action they could conceive of. *Wisconsin's* remaining boats were called away. Passing tugs and additional LCMs from the landing ship dock Lindenwald responded to signals for assistance. Down below, the engineers lit off boilers 1, 2 and 5. At 0705, with the forward moor, downstream, beginning to drag, the signalman sent up the international distress signal. Becker ordered the starboard anchor dropped. That helped to hold the bow, but at 0710, Zumwalt received sounding reports indicating that the





Wisconsin's skipper, Captain Burrowes, delivers his accolade to Marine Corps Captain Blake—whose prompt action saved the ship from damage, and her officers from humiliation.

stern had come into contact with the Hudson's muddy bottom. On a positive note, the grounding eased pressure on the forward, downstream moor.

The tide was low, with high tide scheduled at 1349. These tidal conditions bode well for refloating. Unfortunately, the engineers reported a slow loss of vacuum on turbo generators 5 and 6. Lacking circulating water due to the intakes resting on the mudflats, the engineers shut down the power plants at 0715. Power was lost throughout the ship.

By this time six tugboats had joined the gaggle of LCMs on the starboard quarter in a seemingly futile attempt to move 45,000 tons of steel. But these efforts kept the battleship from moving farther toward the New Jersey shore. Over on the New York shore, *Wisconsin's* gig headed toward the 79th Street pier to pick up Captain Burrowes and the chief engineer, Lieutenant Commander G. Gardner.

At 0727 a message was dispatched to the commander of Naval Base New York to "expedite" sending additional tugs and a pilot. With the after emergency diesel generator coming to life, lights throughout the ship began to flicker. However, attempts to restart generators 5 and 6 using circulating water cut in from the firemain failed and the lights again went out at 0755 when the after emergency diesel had to be shut down due to overheating.

By this time both Burrowes and Gardner had returned. Heading down into the darkening engineering spaces, the Chief Engineer found out that the feed water supply in fireroom three was running critically low. He approved the transfer of reserve feedwater from fireroom four so that boiler 6 could continue steaming. With electrical ventilation systems shut down, the heat below became nearly unbearable as the boilermen rotated in on five-minute shifts. Four men suffered heat exhaustion.

Up above, more tugs responded to *Wisconsin's* pleas for aid. And at 0844, the Coast Guard icebreaker W-91 took position on the starboard quarter and began pushing. The icebreaker's powerful thrust proved decisive. At 0855 the sounding of the depth of water aft, which had been reading 23 feet four inches, deepened to

25 feet. *Wisconsin's* stern began to swing back into the main channel of the Hudson. A few minutes later, lights and ventilation came on as the forward emergency diesel generated power to the main switchboard. Along the New Jersey Palisades, thousands watched the drama unfold.

Still, "Wisky" faced the predicament of being latched to two buoys, and there were concerns of fouling one of the battleship's four screws in the wires. Burrowes cut loose the wires from Buoy B, aft, and the port anchor chain latched to Buoy A and raised the starboard anchor to get underway. With a pilot aboard and tugs alongside to guide the way, *Wisconsin* tested her engines. At 1057 she was under her own power, making her way down to an anchorage at Gravesend Bay near Coney Island.

Aware of the calamity of the *Missouri* grounding and the subsequent investigations and hearings, Zumwalt began drafting a chronology of events leading to the grounding. He never got to send it. As he readied the message for transmission, a message arrived from ComBatCruDivTwo. Zumwalt recalled that Olsen wrote: "Regret the report of your incident but I am delighted to note there was no command error involved."

After four days of liberty, the mighty *Wisconsin* once again raised her anchor and headed out to conduct gunnery practice and further training at Guantanamo, prior to her return to the Pacific for action off Korea. Eventually on 15 January 1952, while on the gun line off the Kosong area of Korea, Captain Burrowes recognized Marine Corps Captain Blake with a letter of commendation, crediting him with actions that were "measurably responsible for the prompt return of this vessel to safe waters."


Unlike the *Missouri* grounding, there were no courts-martial, boards, hearings—not even a standard JAGMAN investigation. RADM Olsen, by accepting immediate responsibility for his error, shielded the battleship from unnecessary scrutiny and protected the careers of her officers.

RADM Olsen was relieved as ComBatDivTwo shortly after the incident, but went on to serve the Navy for several more years with a final posting in Norway. Both Burrowes and Zumwalt attained Flag Rank. The recently deceased Zumwalt served as Chief of Naval Operations, 1970–74.

As for the cause of the grounding, the weather was blamed. Heavy summer downpours in upstate New York had flooded the Hudson's tributaries, leading to an unusually strong downstream current rushing up against *Wisconsin's* stern. The battleship's sailors clearly learned a lesson that remains valid today—that the true danger may arise from well beyond the horizon. †

Dr. Winkler is an historian with the Naval Historical Foundation and author of Cold War at Sea: High Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union due May 2000 from the Naval Institute Press

The lithe form and powerful armament of USS Wisconsin, here off Japan in 1953, were of little avail when failed moorings let her drift into danger.



March 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Quote

I think you ought to go in and tackle this Shinseki quote in this *New York Post* article by Ralph Peters. You should get a letter to the editor of the paper, plus write a letter to Peters and tell him he is flat wrong.

Thanks.

Attach.

Peters, Ralph. "Comanche: A Good Kill," *New York Post*, February 27, 2004

DHR:dh
030104-50

.....
Please respond by 3/5/04

the weapons-system area so it can continue to produce attractive weapons systems.

That said, the officials told the security cabinet that they have now revised this coming year's expected \$2.5b. in arms sales to \$4b., which would match the record for 2002, if not surpass it.

New York Post
February 27, 2004

38. Comanche: A Good Kill

By Ralph Peters

Earlier this week, the U.S. Army scored a victory for our national security and the American taxpayer: It killed the Comanche attack-helicopter program, a \$40 billion legacy of the Cold War.

It was a tough decision. Over two decades, billions have been spent developing the Comanche. Had it gone into production, it would have been the finest attack helicopter in the world. And the Army had a deep emotional investment in the system.

The Army's chief of staff did the right thing. The funding was already in the pipeline. The Army could have grabbed the Comanche, then gone back to the Hill to beg for more money to pay for the gear our soldiers really need. Instead, the Army faced up to its budgetary - and moral - responsibilities.

Sexy though it was, the Comanche didn't offer a decisive advantage over systems already fielded. And the battlefield equation is changing. Drones handle more missions at less expense, from reconnaissance to precision strikes. And the service couldn't afford the luxury of buying the Comanche: Our soldiers have practical needs, from more personnel to a new generation of combat vehicles to replace an aging fleet.

To the Army's credit, its leadership faced the facts - not a routine practice in the Pentagon. Revelations of

military waste - real or imagined - always make headlines. But you don't see much on 24/7 when the Army declares that a weapon costs too much.

That same Army has been criticized as hidebound by civilian theorists who never ate a field ration. But the Army's deliberate approach paid solid dividends. Instead of gutting its combat power to conform to abstract theories, the Army is undertaking its most ambitious reorganization in half a century based upon battlefield experience.

Breaking down its divisions into ready-to-go-anywhere brigades, the Army's using lessons learned in Iraq and elsewhere to increase effectiveness while seeking new efficiencies. (And the Army was pretty damned good the way it was. Just ask Saddam.)

Today's chief of staff, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, is building on the legacy of his predecessor, Gen. Eric Shinseki, who was mocked by defense "intellectuals" for predicting that the occupation of Iraq would require more than 100,000 troops.

Shinseki was also attacked for buying an innovative, cost-effective, wheeled combat vehicle, the Stryker. Disingenuously calling the Stryker a deathtrap, greedy contractors deployed their lawyers to force the Army to buy outdated junk. The Army beat them off. But self-interested critics continued to insist that the Stryker was bound to fail.

In Iraq, where it counts, the Stryker has been a noteworthy success. Even before planned upgrades, it's proven highly effective. The troops like it and trust it. And no matter what the armchair generals tell you, that's what matters.

TRADITIONALLY, only the Marine Corps and our chronically under-funded Coast Guard have been

responsible stewards of our tax dollars. Now the Army has turned a corner, demanding value and real utility, instead of gold-plating the McClellan saddle again.

The other services? A victim of its own success at dominating the seas, the Navy struggles forward in the absence of blue-water enemies. While shifting to deliver firepower deep inside enemy territory, the Navy remains a prisoner of traditions that undervalue cost-effective killing. We have the finest navy that ever sailed, but it doesn't deliver much bang for the buck.

The Navy's best friends are also its worst enemies - the senators from the shipbuilding states determined to see new hulls go down the slips, whether the Navy needs those hulls or not.

But the real problem is the Air Force. Despite endless hype about transformation, it refuses to cancel a single major program inherited from the Cold War.

The ultimate test of defense reform is the fate of the F-22 fighter. Conceived to dogfight Soviet planes that never got off the drawing board, it has no mission. No other air force is coming up to challenge us - and if they did, we already have the finest fighter aircraft in the world.

Factor in all the upstream and downstream costs, and F-22s will run at least \$180 million each. (Note to pilot: No parachute for you, pal - bring that baby home.)

The F-22 is wildly overpriced, conceptually outdated and nearly useless. And the contractors know it. As do Congress and the Air Force. So the aircraft's partisans cooked up a Rube-Goldberg redesign to give the world's most expensive air-to-air fighter a ground-attack role. No matter that carrying bombs degrades its stealth capabilities or that it can't haul much ordnance. Presto, it's the answer to all our

needs.

Using the F-22 for ground attack is like using a Maserati as a pick-up truck.

It's not a question of cutting the Air Force budget. The service needs every penny it can get - for new and affordable ground-attack aircraft, tankers, bombers and transports. But the generals in blue suits need to face reality. We can't afford the planes we need if we buy the F-22 - which is nothing more than welfare for Lockheed Martin.

Our troops must be supplied with all they need, no matter the cost. But our military leadership has a responsibility to separate needs from wishes. At a time of exploding deficits and global warfare, we can't afford extravagant buys that offer no utility.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld loves to preach "transformation." So far, that's meant starving our troops while shoveling money into contractors' pockets. The only weapons system Rumsfeld killed was the Army's Crusader howitzer - a program that deserved to die, but peanuts compared to the F-22's cost.

If Rumsfeld's serious about improving our national defense, he needs to kill the F-22 immediately.

Meanwhile, here's a well-deserved salute to the U.S. Army. It did its duty and shot the horse it loved.

Ralph Peters is the author of "Beyond Baghdad: Postmodern War and Peace."

International Herald Tribune
February 28-29, 2004

39. Europe's Debt To Rumsfeld

One year later

By Mark Leonard

LONDON--A year ago, Europe's major powers were experiencing their worst falling-out in living memory. Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair cold-shouldered each other at an emergency EU summit meeting, at the end of a week

8:30 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: DOUG FEITH
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 25, 2004

SUBJECT:

I think we've got to go to Congress and ask for changes in legislation on their decision to cancel IME^T and FM^{F?}. Seems to me the one thing they ought never to cancel except in the most egregious circumstances is the educational exchange programs.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022504.04

Please respond by: _____

3/8

*Sir,
Response attached.
vr/
CDR Nasenzo
7/6*

*7/6
7/8*

OSD 10943-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43354

021.3

021.3



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

June 28, 2004, 4:45 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign
Military Financing (FMF)

- You noted: "I think we've got to go to Congress and ask for changes in legislation on their decision to cancel IMET and FMF. Seems to me the one thing they ought never to cancel except in the most egregious circumstances is the educational exchange programs."
- For certain countries, the law provides that IMET and FMF funds are only available if the Secretary of State makes certain determinations related to protection of human rights. Some statutes provide for a waiver if determined and reported to Congress that waiver is in the U.S. national security interest.
- An example is the statute (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004) pertaining to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which includes "national security interest" waiver authority for Kazakhstan but not for Uzbekistan.
- Options for dealing with such provisions include (1) working with the State Department to find ways to provide assistance through certifications and/or waivers; and (2) legislative initiatives.
- DoD's work with the State Department resulted in the Secretary of State's recent certification of Kazakhstan. IMET money and FMF is now being allocated.
- DoD is continuing to work with State Department on certifying Uzbekistan, emphasizing that denying Uzbekistan IMET funds is counterproductive to fostering improvement in protection of human rights.
- DoD is exploring legislative relief options by (1) obtaining at least a waiver provision for Uzbekistan in the FY 2005 appropriations bill; and (2) making the case generally to Congress that IMET should be excluded from such provisions since IMET programs directly support the objectives that are at the root of the legislation.



11-L-0559/OSD/43355

OSD 10943-04

2/18

091.3

28 Jun 04

25 Feb 04

3/17/04

720
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EF-8800
04/003254ES

March 9, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

Larry Di Rita
3/25
7 Sec Del

SUBJECT: Karimov

I talked to Colin today and reminded him what Karimov had done in the right direction. His comment was that they still have not done enough.

I think we better marshal our arguments and weigh in at the right time.

What is the timetable on certification?

Thanks.

OHR:dh
030904-8

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

✓
3/24

C3/25
3/17/04

Sir,

Response attached.

v/r
(b)(6)

OSD/0945-04
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10-03-04 10:24 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/43356

Debbie Kisten

0 11-03-04

TAB

May 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information

What should we do about getting that person who said he knew information about the abuses? He is in Roscoe Bartlett's Congressional district and briefed Murtha and someone else.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-14

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

383.6

19 May 04

Tab

OSD 10977-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43357



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-1946-04
20 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard D. Myers, CJCS *RD/11/20*

SUBJECT: Information

- **Question.** "What should we do about getting that person who said he knew information about abuses? He is in Roscoe Barlett's Congressional district and briefed Murtha and someone else." (TAB)
 - **Answer.** The Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) interviewed SGT Davis and there is no action required.
 - **Analysis**
 - SGT Davis is currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Fort Lee, Virginia. While assigned in Iraq with 372nd MP Company, his duties included escorting detainees in and out of Abu Ghraib (Oct 2003-Nov 2003).
 - SGT Davis provided a statement to Army CID dated 27 May 04 in which he claims to have witnessed certain treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib to include: 1) Naked detainees handcuffed together and to the bars of the cell being yelled at by interrogators; 2) Naked detainees being ordered to low-crawl on the floor, and; 3) PFC England taking photos of detainees.
 - SGT Davis reported what he saw to his chain of command while in Iraq. His platoon commander gave a written reprimand to a CPL involved in the events witnessed by SGT Davis. In addition, when it was brought to the attention of the Commanding Officer of Fort Lee that SGT Davis had information about possible detainee abuse, the Commanding Officer reported this to CID, resulting in CID interviewing SGT Davis. The information provided by SGT Davis is still part of a current investigation. This information was provided by CID Agent Worth of the Detainee Task Force and the agent that interviewed SGT Davis.
- 386*
20 Jul 04

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated.

Prepared By: LtCol Richard E. Grant; USMC; OCJCS/LC; (b)(6)

17 Nov 04

OSD 10977-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43358

March 8, 2004

715

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Assessment Team on Iraqi Detainee Issue

It may be that we need to get an assessment team working on the detainee issue in Iraq. I am totally dissatisfied with the way it has been handled. I feel like I am just whistling into the wind.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how we might do it.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030504-9

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

*closed per Smt
3/26/04*

OSD 10980-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43359

March 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Feedback from Capstone

Did you get any feedback from that Capstone meeting I had?

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-10

Please respond by

3/12/04

✓
3/8

SecDef —

Yes — all very positive

- appreciated the time you invested*
- the Q & A was a big hit*
- your responses were considered focused and candid — no ~~backplate~~ backplate or trite phrases.*
- The fact you asked who all the non-uniformed folks in the room were then shared into with them — impressed all!!*

OSD 10981-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43360

March 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Brief on Iraqi Detainees

I want to get briefed on Iraqi detainees fast. I really am worried about it.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-17

Please respond by 3/10/04

*OB
3/9*

OSD 10982-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43361

720

March 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Priso

3836

Let's push ahead on the idea of takiug Afghan detainees to Afghanistan in one of the prisons. The fact that it is in a prison that used to be a bad prison doesn't bother me a bit. We are doing the same thing in Iraq.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-16

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

3 MAR 04

OSD 10983-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43362

March ,2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Larry King

I saw Larry King at the White House. He says he wants me to do some kind of a show on March 14 or 19.

I don't know what that is about, but he says he has a request in. I told him I would try to do something with him. It is the anniversary of the end of the Iraq war. I probably ought to do it.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-18

.....
Please respond by

3/10/04

OB
3/7

8.11.04

OSD 10984-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43363

March ⁸/₇, 2004

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper from Rice

Please tickle a note for seven days from now that I want *to* get a paper from Condi Rice on war powers, a summary she is preparing for the President. I want to see it. too,

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-23

.....
Please *respond* by 3/11/04

OSD 10985-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43364

031

8 M 12 C

8
March 4, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Set-Aside

Please get the information as to what Tom DeLay is talking about, a set-aside of DoD spending to make sure that there is no waste, fraud or abuse.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-26

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

OSD 10986-04

~~SECRET~~

EF-9005
I-04/004079
March 24, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

Larry Di Rita

SUBJECT: Troops in Iraq

Please give me a list of all the countries that have troops in Iraq, and if they have announced since the Spanish election whether or not they are going to stay in. I am told that both Romania and Ukraine have said they are going to stay in.

I would like to see a complete list. We ought to compliment the people who have stood up and not caved in to terrorism.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032404-21

Please respond by

4/2/04

Sir,
Response attached.
//r.
LTC Swager

4/8

23-03-04 12:03 PM

NSD 10998-04

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	CH/7
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	Cox 4/5

11-L-0559/OSD/43366

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DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

EF-8753

8
March 4, 2004

I-64/003131

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FILE

Latv DI RIR

3/29

SUBJECT: Commitment on Security in Afghanistan

I talked to Condi and Colin about the Afghan request for a commitment on security. We are going to be thinking about it.

I want you to start thinking through the Karzai request for a security commitment of some kind, and let's talk about that and Iraq.

This is a very important aspect of the footprint, and I want it at your level for the time being.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-13

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

UCB please control

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
3/30

Returned to Policy
(ca Benjamin)
3/30

Response is

OSD 77408-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43367

08-03-04 12:32 IN

OSD 11000-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EF-9060
04/004207

March 24²⁹, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*
SUBJECT: Colombia

I want to make sure we work hard to get the caps on the number of people in Colombia up. If that is not an agreed-upon position in the government, we should make it an agreed position; if it is, we should help push it across.

I also want to try to get the air bridge straightened out in Honduras and other countries like Honduras.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/19/04 Talking points for Uribe meeting

DHR:dh
032404-31

Please respond by 4/23/04

UCB-
FOR control-
MISSING Classified
attachment

→ SD
Attached is the
raise-the-cap letter
I sent to Congress
folks.

By separate memo, I'll
report to you about Honduras.

11-L-0559/OSD/43368

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
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OSD 11001-04



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4601

MAR 31 2004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.


Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,


Douglas J. Feith

cc: Senator Carl Levin



11-L-0559/OSD/43369



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

MAR 31 2004

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4002

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

cc: Representative Ike Skelton



11-L-0559/OSD/43370



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-6015

MAR 31 2004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

cc: Representative John P. Murtha



11-L-0559/OSD/43371



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6025

MAR 31 2004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

cc: Senator Daniel K. Inouye



11-L-0559/OSD/43372



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

MAR 31 2004

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the House
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

cc: Representative Nancy Pelosi



11-L-0559/OSD/43373



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

The Honorable Bill Frist
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

MAR 31 2004

Dear Senator Frist:

As you know, Section 3204 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-246) as amended restricts funding for U.S. personnel deployed in support of Plan Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors. Current SOUTHCOM requirements to support Colombia are pushing the limits of this cap. We seek relief from this restriction.

The Administration proposes to increase the cap to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors. This would improve SOUTHCOM's capabilities to help President Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Although the Administration opposes the cap and would prefer to have the restrictions lifted altogether, amending Section 3204 to support up to 800 U.S. military personnel and 600 U.S. civilian contractors would help greatly.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that this proposal is in accordance with the President's program.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counter-narcoterrorism efforts.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

cc: Senator Tom Daschle



11-L-0559/OSD/43374

March 22, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Dollars for INC

*Advance
copy sent
3/22 1215*

Please get back to me on the question of the dollars for the INC. We have to sort that out fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032204-8

.....
Please respond by _____

MAR 29 2004 *response attached*

UCB-

Please control

Response is:

OSD 77397-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43375

OSD 11002-04

IT-9

2004/04/02

August 3, 2004

TO: Senior OSD Staff
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detailees

Please review the number of military detailees you have in your office. Determine if the number has crept up over the years, and if there might be some way you can reduce the number. Please report back.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/21/04 Dir, Admin & Mngmnt memo to SecDef're: OSD Military Detailees [OSD 11020-04]

DHR:dh
080304-4

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

OSD
3 Aug 04
2152104



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

JUL 21 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management
Ray DuBois 7/21/04

SUBJECT: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Military Detailees

- At a senior staff meeting, you raised a concern regarding the number of military detailees to the OSD staff. You asked all of your Principal Staff Assistants to review detailees working for them and revalidate their assignments or return them to their parent units. Currently, there are **55** military detailees assigned as outlined on the attached.
- The assigned detailees are concentrated primarily in OUSD(AT&L) (15), OUSD(P) (16), OUSD(P&R) (11) and OUSD(I) (4). The OUSD(C) currently does not have any military detailees assigned. Additionally, the OGC has 7 military detailees and both ASD(NII) and WHS have 1 assigned. The assigned numbers are in rough proportion to the size of the components' permanently assigned staff.
- Military detailees are typically detailed to the OSD staff for one year or less and remain permanently assigned to their parent organization's roles. Temporary details are authorized to support unforeseen temporary requirements, workload surges, or as a short term measure where the knowledge and skills are not otherwise available from within the organization. Many are detailed to provide temporary, but specific, military expertise required for the Global War on Terrorism and some are detailed for an educational/training experience. Additionally, roughly 10 percent of existing detailees are performing a liaison function between OSD and their parent unit.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Prepared By: Carol L. Walker, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/43377

OSD 11020-04

OSD / WHS MILITARY DETAILEES
(as of 12 July 2004)

<u>USD(POLIC)</u>		<u>USD(AT&L)</u>	
<u>ASD(SOL/IC)</u>		<u>DUSD(IE)</u>	
Army		Army	
0-5	1	0-6	1
0-4	3	TOTAL	1
TOTAL	4		
		Navy	
Navy		0-5	1
0-5	1	TOTAL	1
TOTAL	1	<u>TOTAL DUSD(IE)</u>	2
Air Force		<u>DUSD(A&T)</u>	
0-4	2	Army	
TOTAL	2	0-5	1
<u>TOTAL ASD(SOL/IC)</u>	7	TOTAL	1
<u>ASD(ISP)</u>		Navy	
Army		0-4	1
0-6	1	TOTAL	1
TOTAL	1		
		Air Force	
Air Force		0-5	2
0-5	1	TOTAL	2
TOTAL	1		
<u>TOTAL ASD(ISP)</u>	2	Marine Corps	
		0-6	1
<u>ASD(ISA)</u>		TOTAL	1
Army		<u>TOTAL DUSD(A&T)</u>	5
0-3	1		
<u>TOTAL ASD(ISA)</u>	1	<u>DDR&E</u>	
		Air Force	
<u>ASD(HD)</u>		0-5	1
Army		<u>TOTAL DDR&E</u>	1
0-6	2		
0-4	1	<u>ATSD(NCB)</u>	
TOTAL	3	Army	
		0-6	1
Navy		0-5	1
0-6	1	TOTAL	2
TOTAL	1		
		Navy	
Marine Corps		0-5	2
0-5	1	TOTAL	2
TOTAL	1		
		Air Force	
<u>USCG</u>		0-6	1
0-6	1	0-3	1
TOTAL	1	E-7	1
<u>TOTAL ASD(HD)</u>	6	TOTAL	3
		<u>TOTAL ATSD(NCB)</u>	7
GRAND TOTAL USD(P)	16		
		GRAND TOTAL USD(AT&L)	15

OSD / WHS MILITARY DETAILEES
(as of 12 July 2004)

USD(I)

Army	
O-4	1
E-7	1
TOTAL	2

Navy	
O-4	1
TOTAL	1

Air Force	
O-4	1
TOTAL	1
TOTAL USD(I)	4

USD(P&R)

Air Force	
O-6	1
TOTAL	1

PDUSD(P&R)

Army	
O-6	1
TOTAL	1

Marine Corps	
O-4	1
TOTAL	1

Coast Guard	
O-4	1
TOTAL	1
TOTAL PUSD(P&R)	3

ASD(RA)

Army	
O-6	2
O-5	2
O-3	1
TOTAL	5

Marine Corps	
E-7	1
TOTAL	1

Coast Guard	
O-6	1
TOTAL	1
TOTAL ASD(RA)	7

GRAND TOTAL USD(P&R) 11

ASD(NII)

Navy	
O-5	1
TOTAL ASD(NII)	1

GC

Army	
O-6	2
O-5	1
TOTAL	3

Navy	
O-6	1
TOTAL	1

Air Force	
O-5	1
O-4	1
O-3	1
TOTAL	3
TOTAL GC	7

WHS

Marine Corps	
O-5	1
TOTAL WHS	1

TOTAL OSD/WHS DETAILEES 55



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
704 SEP - 2 PM 5:24
SEP 02 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond E. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Military Detailees

- In the attached snowflake, you asked the senior OSD staff to review the number of military detailees in their offices, determine if the number has crept up over the years, and if they could reduce the number. My staff consolidated the senior staff responses for your information (Tab A).
- In total, there are 51 military detailees. This represents a reduction of 24% from 2003. The OUSD(Policy), OUSD(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), OUSD(Personnel and Readiness), and the DoD General Counsel account for the majority, with the remainder assigned to OUSD(Intelligence), OASD(Networks and Information Integration), Net Assessment, and Program Analysis and Evaluation.
- For the most part, they are being used in accordance with current guidance which authorizes their use to support unforeseen temporary requirements and workload surges, fill knowledge and skills gaps when not otherwise available from within the organization, and provide developmental training or act as a liaison between their parent unit and OSD. In a more limited number of instances, it appears that, based on some of the comments provided, a number do not conform to the definition of a detailee because they are supporting permanent workload requirements.
- While the reduction reflects progress in limiting military serving on the OSD staff, further scrutiny may present continuing opportunities to discipline our practices to refocus the OSD detail program to limited, temporary assignment of personnel as defined above. **An** important first step is the update of the applicable guidance to provide more clear-cut rules of engagement for application across the OSD staff. My staff is currently developing the updated guidance. In the interim, I will forward a memorandum to the senior staff outlining the salient program requirements.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments :

As stated

Prepared By: Carol L. Walker (b)(6)

OSD 21020-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43380

~~FOUO~~

NA

August 3, 2004

TO: Senior OSD Staff

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Detailees

Please review the number of military detailees you have in your office. Determine if the number has crept up over the years, and if there might be some way you can reduce the number. Please report back.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/21/04 Dir, Admin & Mngmnt memo to SecDef re: OSD Military Detailees [OSD 11020-04]

DHR:dh
080304-4

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

OSD 11020-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43381

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MILITARY DETAILEES

<u>Component</u>	<u>Military Detailees</u>	<u>Comments</u>
USD (AT&L)	13	Detailees to OUSD(AT&L) provide expertise in chemical and biological defense, chemical demilitarization and threat reduction, nuclear weapons, executive support, business transformation, treaty compliance oversight and other areas. Detailees provide field and headquarters level experience as well as unique sets of skills not readily available within existing staff.
USD (Policy)	16	OUSD(P) reduced military detailees from 24 in 2003 to 16 in 2004. Total in 2002 was 18, 2001 was 21 and 2000 was 17.
USD (C)	0	None assigned.
USD (I)	4	Two of the four expired 31 Aug 04; no plans to replace. One is a Navy intern on a rotation program, the other has key knowledge of operational CI and will be continued. USD(I) is composed of 117 permanent billets. The broad role of this organization requires occasional assignment of detailees who are experts in various fields to augment specific tasks.
USD(P&R)	9	OUSD(P&R) has 9 authorized detailees but found 2 additional military working on the staff and has expedited their return to their services. USD(P&R) believes the 9 are being used appropriately, but will continue to closely monitor this programs.
ASD(NII)	1	Navy detailee provides unique expertise required for oversight of space-based environmental monitoring programs such as National Polar-orbiting Operational Satellite System program. OASD(NII) does not have the expertise on staff otherwise to perform this oversight.
ASD(LA)	0	None assigned.
ASD(PA)	0	None assigned.
DoD GC	6	GC will continue to scrutinize on-going requirements and reduce the number as soon as possible.
Dir, PA&E	1	Current detailee is here on part of Navy Medical Corps educational program. PA&E has had three or fewer detailees serving simultaneously and PA&E does not solicit the services for military detailees.
Dir, OT&E	0	None assigned.
ATSD(IO)	0	None currently assigned and do not envision the requirement for any in the future.
ODA&M	0	None assigned to ODA&M within the last three years.
Dir Net Asmt	1	Per request of Commandant, US Coast Guard, one USCG officer is detailed to NA. Detail enhances USCG long-term planning process by participating in net assessment analyses.
Dir Force Trans	0	None assigned.

Total

72

3
March 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Adaptive Planning Process

381

We are going to need some time on the adaptive planning process, so we get that going properly.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030104-82

Please respond by 3/26/04

3 MAR 04

OSD 11023-04

3
March): 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Follow **Up** to Assessment Teams

I need a method of following up on the decisions with respect to each of the recommendations of each of the assessment teams.

I need a procedure to follow up on the implementation of each of the recommendations that I approve.

Please arrange that.

Thanks.

DHR:db
030104-85

.....
Please *respond* by 3/19/04

OSD 11025-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43384

381

34124 04

March 8, 2004

718

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Elections in Taiwan

Let's nail down the facts on Taiwan. What has happened after previous elections, what has the US military done in connection with those elections and the like.

Let's do it fast.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-22

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

China (NATS)

8 Mar 04

OSD 11028-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43385

March 2, 2004

TO: David Chu
Gen. Mike Hagee

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Security Guard Rotations

I notice that the rotations in Afghanistan are 60 days for the Marine guard at the embassy. It is hard for me to believe that people can serve in Iraq and Afghanistan for a year in a combat role, and that it makes sense to have 60 day rotations for the security guards.

Please explain.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-5

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

200.4

2 MAR 04

OSD 11029-04

March 2, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Review Law

I have to review the military section of the new basic law as soon as a copy of the English version comes in from Baghdad.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-15

.....
Please respond by _____

✓ 3/24

Tom / Mark —

*Policy or CPA should
have this — let's
get a copy today*

Thx

C 3/4

IRAQ

2 MAR 04

**LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ
FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (03/02/2004, 9:40pm)**

PREAMBLE

The people of Iraq, striving to reclaim their freedom, which was usurped by the previous tyrannical regime; rejecting violence and coercion in all their forms, and especially when used as instruments of governance; determined that they shall hereafter remain a free people governed under the rule of law; affirming today their respect for international law, especially having been amongst the founders of the United Nations; working to reclaim their legitimate place among nations; and endeavouring at the same time to preserve the unity of their homeland in a spirit of fraternity and solidarity; in order to draw the features of the future new Iraq, and to establish the mechanisms aiming, amongst other aims, to erase the effects of racist and sectarian policies and practices; do now establish this Law to govern themselves during the transitional period until a duly elected government operating under a permanent and legitimate constitution achieving full democracy shall come into being.

CHAPTER ONE – FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Article 1.

- (A) This Law shall be called the “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” and the phrase “this Law” wherever it appears in this legislation shall mean the “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period.”
- (B) Gender-specific language shall apply equally to male and female.
- (C) The Preamble to this Law is an integral part of this Law.

Article 2.

- (A) The term “transitional period” shall refer to the period beginning on 30 June 2004 and lasting until the formation of an elected Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution as set forth in this Law, which in any case shall be no later than 31 December 2005, unless the provisions of Article 61 are applied.
- (B) The transitional period shall consist of two phases.
 - (1) The first phase shall begin with the formation of a fully sovereign Iraqi

Interim Government that takes power on 30 June 2004. This government shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations. This government shall exercise authority in accordance with this Law, including the basic principles and rights specified herein, and with an annex that shall be agreed upon and issued before the beginning of the transitional period and that shall be an integral part of this Law.

- (2) The second phase shall begin after the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government, which will take place after elections for the National Assembly have been held as stipulated in this Law, provided that, if possible, these elections are not delayed beyond 31 December 2004, and, in any event, beyond 31 January 2005. This second phase shall end upon the formation of an Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution. The provisions of this Law shall apply to this second phase of the transitional period.

Article 3.

- (A) This Law is the supreme law of the land and shall be binding in all parts of Iraq without exception. No amendment to this Law may be made except by a three-fourths majority of the members of the National Assembly and the unanimous approval of the Presidency Council. Likewise, no amendment may be made that could abridge in any way the rights of the Iraqi people cited in Chapter Two, extend the transitional period beyond the timeframe cited in this Law, delay the holding of elections to a new assembly, reduce the powers of the regions or governorates, or affect Islam or any other religions or sects and their rites.
- (B) Any legal provision that conflicts with this Law is null and void.
- (C) This Law shall cease to have effect upon the formation of an elected government pursuant to a permanent constitution.

Article 4.

The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared between the federal government and the regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations. The federal system shall be based upon geographic and historical realities and the separation of powers, and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.

Article 5.

The Iraqi Armed Forces shall be subject to the civilian control of the Iraqi Transitional Government, in accordance with the contents of Chapters Three and Five of this Law.

Article 6.

The Iraqi Transitional Government shall take effective steps to end the vestiges of the oppressive acts of the previous regime arising from forced displacement, deprivation of citizenship, expropriation of financial assets and property, and dismissal from government employment for political, racial, or sectarian reasons.

Article 7.

- (A) Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the rights cited in Chapter Two of this Law may be enacted during the transitional period. This Law respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice
- (B) Iraq is a country of many nationalities, and the Arab people in Iraq are an inseparable part of the Arab nation.

Article 8.

The flag, anthem, and emblem of the State shall be fixed by law.

Article 9.

The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turcoman, Syriac, or Armenian, in government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions, shall be guaranteed. The scope of the term "official language" and the means of applying the provisions of this Article shall be defined by law and shall include:

- (1) Publication of the official gazette, in the two languages;
- (2) Speech and expression in official settings, such as the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official conferences, in either of the two languages;
- (3) Recognition and publication of official documents and correspondence in the

two languages;

- (4) Opening schools that teach in the two languages, in accordance with educational guidelines;
- (5) Use of both languages in any other settings enjoined by the principle of equality (such as bank notes, passports, and stamps);
- (6) Use of both languages in the federal institutions and agencies in the Kurdistan region.

CHAPTER TWO – FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Article 10.

As an expression of the free will and sovereignty of the Iraqi people, their representatives shall form the governmental structures of the State of Iraq. The Iraqi Transitional Government and the governments of the regions, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations shall respect the rights of the Iraqi people, including those rights cited in this Chapter.

Article 11.

- (A) Anyone who carries Iraqi nationality shall be deemed a citizen. His citizenship shall grant him all the rights and duties stipulated in this Law and shall be the basis of his relation to the homeland and the State.
- (B) No Iraqi may have his citizenship withdrawn or be exiled unless he is a naturalized citizen who, as established in a court of law, made material falsifications on the basis of which citizenship was granted in his application for citizenship.
- (C) Each Iraqi shall have the right to carry more than one citizenship. Any Iraqi whose citizenship was withdrawn because he acquired another citizenship shall be deemed an Iraqi.
- (D) Any Iraqi whose Iraqi citizenship was withdrawn for political, religious, racial, or sectarian reasons has the right to reclaim his Iraqi citizenship.
- (E) Decision Number 666 (1980) of the dissolved Revolutionary Command Council is annulled, and anyone whose citizenship was withdrawn on the basis of this decree shall be deemed an Iraqi.

- (F) The National Assembly must issue laws pertaining to citizenship and naturalization consistent with the provisions of this Law
- (G) The Courts shall examine all disputes arising from the application of the provisions relating to citizenship.

Article 12.

All Iraqis are equal in their rights without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion, or origin, and they are equal before the law. Discrimination against an Iraqi citizen on the basis of his gender, nationality, religion, or origin is prohibited. Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his life or liberty, except in accordance with legal procedures. All are equal before the courts.

Article 13.

- (A) Public and private freedoms shall be protected.
- (B) The right of free expression shall be protected.
- (C) The right of free peaceable assembly and the right to organize freely into associations and political parties, as well as the right to form and join unions freely, in accordance with the law, shall be guaranteed.
- (D) Each Iraqi has the right of free movement in all parts of Iraq and the right to travel abroad and return freely.
- (E) Each Iraqi has the right to demonstrate and strike peaceably in accordance with the law.
- (F) Each Iraqi has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice. Coercion in such matters shall be prohibited.
- (G) Slavery, the slave trade, forced labor, and involuntary servitude [CHECK TO ENSURE SAMIR SUMAIDY ADDITION IS IN] shall be forbidden.
- (H) Each Iraqi has the right to privacy.

Article 14.

The individual has the right to security, education, health care, and social security. The Iraqi State and its governmental units, including the regions, governorates, municipalities, and local

administrations, shall strive, within the limits of their resources and with due regard to other vital needs, to provide prosperity and employment opportunities to the people.

Article 15.

- (A) No civil law shall have retroactive effect unless the law so stipulates. There shall be neither a crime, nor punishment, except by law in effect at the time the crime is committed.
- (B) Police, investigators, or other governmental authorities may not violate the sanctity of private residences, whether these authorities belong to the federal or regional governments, governorates, municipalities, or local administrations, unless a judge or investigating magistrate has issued a search warrant in accordance with applicable law on the basis of information provided by a sworn individual who knew that bearing false witness would render him liable to punishment. Extreme exigent circumstances, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may justify a warrantless search, but such exigencies shall be narrowly construed. In the event that a warrantless search is carried out in the absence of an extreme exigent circumstance, the evidence so seized, and any other evidence found derivatively from such search, shall be inadmissible in connection with a criminal charge, unless the court determines that the person who carried out the warrantless search believed reasonably and in good faith that the search was in accordance with the law.
- (C) No one may be unlawfully arrested or detained, and no one may be detained by reason of political or religious beliefs.
- (D) All persons shall be guaranteed the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, regardless of whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. Notice of the proceeding and its legal basis must be provided to the accused without delay.
- (E) The accused is innocent until proven guilty pursuant to law, and he likewise has the right to engage independent and competent counsel, to remain silent in response to questions addressed to him with no compulsion to testify for any reason, to participate in preparing his defense, and to summon and examine witnesses or to ask the judge to do so. At the time a person is arrested, he must be notified of these rights.
- (F) The right to a fair, speedy, and open trial shall be guaranteed.
- (G) Every person deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall have the right of recourse to a court to determine the legality of his arrest or detention without delay and to order his release if this occurred in an illegal manner.

- (H) After being found innocent of a charge, an accused may not be tried once again on the same charge.
- (I) Civilians may not be tried before a military tribunal. Special or exceptional courts may not be established.
- (J) Torture in all its forms, physical or mental, shall be prohibited under all circumstances, as shall be cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. No confession made under compulsion, torture, or threat thereof shall be relied upon or admitted into evidence for any reason in any proceeding, whether criminal or otherwise.

Article 16.

- (A) Public property is sacrosanct, and its protection is the duty of every citizen.
- (B) The right to private property shall be protected, and no one may be prevented from disposing of his property except within the limits of law. No one shall be deprived of his property except by eminent domain, in circumstances and in the manner set forth in law, and on condition that he is paid just compensation.
- (C) Each Iraqi citizen shall have the full and unfettered right to own real property in all parts of Iraq without restriction.

Article 17.

It shall not be permitted to possess, bear, buy, or sell arms except on licensure issued in accordance with the law.

Article 18.

There shall be no taxation or fee except by law.

Article 19.

No political refugee who has been granted asylum pursuant to applicable law may be surrendered or returned to the country from which he fled.

Article 20.

- (A) Every Iraqi who fulfills the conditions stipulated in the electoral law has the right to stand for election and cast his ballot secretly in free, open, fair, competitive, and periodic elections.

- (B) No Iraqi may be discriminated against for purposes of voting in elections on the basis of gender, religion, race, belief, sect, ethnic origin, language, wealth, or literacy.

Article 21.

Neither the Iraqi Transitional Government nor the governments and administrations of the regions, governorates, and municipalities, nor local administrations may interfere with the right of the Iraqi people to develop the institutions of civil society, whether in cooperation with international civil society organizations or otherwise.

Article 22.

If, in the course of his work, an official of any government office, whether in the federal government, the regional governments, the governorate and municipal administrations, or the local administrations, deprives an individual or a group of the rights guaranteed by this Law or any other Iraqi laws in force, this individual or group shall have the right to maintain a cause of action against that employee to seek compensation for the damages caused by such deprivation, to vindicate his rights, and to seek any other legal measure. If the court decides that the official had acted with a sufficient degree of good faith and in the belief that his actions were consistent with the law, then he is not required to pay compensation.

Article 23.

The enumeration of the foregoing rights must not be interpreted to mean that they are the only rights enjoyed by the Iraqi people. They enjoy all the rights that befit a free people possessed of their human dignity, including the rights stipulated in international treaties and agreements, other instruments of international law that Iraq has signed and to which it has acceded, and others that are deemed binding upon it, and in the law of nations. Non-Iraqis within Iraq shall enjoy all human rights not inconsistent with their status as non-citizens.

CHAPTER THREE – THE IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

Article 24.

- (A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, which is also referred to in this Law as the federal government, shall consist of the National Assembly; the Presidency Council; the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister; and the judicial authority.
- (B) The three authorities, legislative, executive, and judicial, shall be separate and independent of one another.

- (C) No official or employee of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall enjoy immunity for criminal acts committed while in office.

Article 25.

The Iraqi Transitional Government shall have exclusive competence in the following matters:

- (A) Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; formulating foreign economic and trade policy and sovereign debt policies;
- (B) Formulating and executing national security policy, including creating and maintaining armed forces to secure, protect, and guarantee the security of the country's borders and to defend Iraq;
- (C) Formulating fiscal policy, issuing currency, regulating customs, regulating commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq, drawing up the national budget of the State, formulating monetary policy, and establishing and administering a central bank;
- (D) Regulating weights and measures and formulating a general policy on wages;
- (E) Managing, in consultation with the regions and governorates, the natural resources of Iraq, which belong to all the people of all the regions and governorates of Iraq; and distributing the revenues resulting from their sale through the national budgeting process in an equitable manner proportional to the distribution of population throughout the country, and with due regard for areas that were unjustly deprived of these revenues by the previous regime, for dealing with their situations in a positive way, for their needs, and for the degree of development of the different areas of the country;
- (F) Regulating Iraqi citizenship, immigration, and asylum;
- (G) Regulating telecommunications policy.

Article 26.

- (A) Except as otherwise provided in this Law, the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 shall remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transitional Government in accordance with this Law.

- (B) Legislation issued by the federal legislative authority shall supersede any other legislation issued by any other legislative authority in the event that they contradict each other, except as provided in Article 54(B).
- (C) The laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.

Article 27.

- (A) The Iraqi Armed Forces shall consist of the active and reserve units, and elements thereof. The purpose of these forces is the defense of Iraq.
- (B) Armed forces and militias not under the command structure of the Iraqi Transitional Government are prohibited, except as provided by federal law.
- (C) The Iraqi Armed Forces and its personnel, including military personnel working in the Ministry of Defense or any offices or organizations subordinate to it, may not stand for election to political office, campaign for candidates, or participate in other activities forbidden by Ministry of Defense regulations. This ban encompasses the activities of the personnel mentioned above acting in their personal or official capacities. Nothing in this Article shall infringe upon the right of these personnel to vote in elections.
- (D) The Iraqi Intelligence Service shall collect information, assess threats to national security, and advise the Iraqi government. This Service shall be under civilian control, shall be subject to legislative oversight, and shall operate pursuant to law and in accordance with recognized principles of human rights.
- (E) The Iraqi Transitional Government shall respect and implement Iraq's international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and associated equipment, materiel, technologies, and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production, and use of such weapons.

Article 28.

- (A) Members of the National Assembly; the Presidency Council; the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister; and judges and justices of the courts may not be appointed to any other position in or out of government. Any member of the National Assembly who becomes a member of the Presidency Council or Council of Ministers shall be deemed to have resigned his membership in the National Assembly.

- (B) In no event may a member of the armed forces be a member of the National Assembly, minister, Prime Minister, or member of the Presidency Council unless the individual has resigned his commission or rank, or retired from duty at least eighteen months prior to serving.

Article 29.

Upon the assumption of full authority by the Iraqi Interim Government in accordance with Article 2(B)(1), above, the Coalition Provisional Authority shall be dissolved and the work of the Governing Council shall come to an end.

CHAPTER FOUR – THE TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

Article 30.

- (A) During the transitional period, the State of Iraq shall have a legislative authority known as the National Assembly. Its principal mission shall be to legislate and exercise oversight over the work of the executive authority.
- (B) Laws shall be issued in the name of the people of Iraq. Laws, regulations, and directives related to them shall be published in the official gazette and shall take effect as of the date of their publication, unless they stipulate otherwise.
- (C) The National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with an electoral law and a political parties law. The electoral law shall be designed to achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the National Assembly and of having fair representation for all communities in Iraq, including the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and others.
- (D) Elections for the National Assembly shall take place by 31 December 2004 if possible, and in any case no later than by 31 January 2005.

Article 31.

- (A) The National Assembly shall consist of 275 members. It shall enact a law dealing with the replacement of its members in the event of resignation, removal, or death.
- (B) A nominee to the National Assembly must fulfill the following conditions:
 - (1) He shall be an Iraqi no less than 30 years of age.

- (2) He shall not have been a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party with the rank of Division Member or higher, unless exempted pursuant to the applicable legal rules.
- (3) If he was once a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party with the rank of Full Member, he shall be required to sign a document renouncing the Ba'ath Party and disavowing all of his past links with it before becoming eligible to be a candidate, as well as to swear that he no longer has any dealings or connection with Ba'ath Party organizations. If it is established in court that he lied or fabricated on this score, he shall lose his seat in the National Assembly.
- (4) He shall not have been a member of the former agencies of repression and shall not have contributed to or participated in the persecution of citizens.
- (5) He shall not have enriched himself in an illegitimate manner at the expense of the homeland and public finance.
- (6) He shall not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and shall have a good reputation.
- (7) He shall have at least a secondary school diploma, or equivalent
- (8) He shall not be a member of the armed forces at the time of his nomination.

Article 32.

- (A) The National Assembly shall draw up its own internal procedures, and it shall sit in public session unless circumstances require otherwise, consistent with its internal procedures. The first session of the Assembly shall be chaired by its oldest member.
- (B) The National Assembly shall elect, from its own members, a president and two deputy presidents of the National Assembly. The president of the National Assembly shall be the individual who receives the greatest number of votes for that office; the first deputy president the next highest; and the second deputy president the next. The president may vote on an issue, but may not participate in the debates, unless he temporarily steps out of the chair immediately prior to addressing the issue.
- (C) A bill shall not be voted upon by the National Assembly unless it has been read twice at a regular session of the Assembly, on condition that at least two days intervene between the two readings, and after the bill has been placed on the agenda of the session at least four days prior to the vote.

Article 33.

- (A) Meetings of the National Assembly shall be public, and transcripts of its meetings shall be recorded and published. The vote of every member of the National Assembly shall be recorded and made public. Decisions in the National Assembly shall be taken by simple majority unless this Law stipulates otherwise.
- (B) The National Assembly must examine bills proposed by the Council of Ministers, including budget bills.
- (C) Only the Council of Ministers shall have the right to present a proposed national budget. The National Assembly has the right to reallocate proposed spending and to reduce the total amounts in the general budget. It also has the right to propose an increase in the overall amount of expenditures to the Council of Ministers if necessary.
- (D) Members of the National Assembly shall have the right to propose bills, consistent with the internal procedures that drawn up by the Assembly.
- (E) The Iraqi Armed Forces may not be dispatched outside Iraq even for the purpose of defending against foreign aggression except with the approval of the National Assembly and upon the request of the Presidency Council.
- (F) Only the National Assembly shall have the power to ratify international treaties and agreements.
- (G) The oversight function performed by the National Assembly and its committees shall include the right of interpellation of executive officials, including members of the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, and any less senior official of the executive authority. This shall encompass the right to investigate, request information, and issue subpoenas for persons to appear before them.

Article 34.

Each member of the National Assembly shall enjoy immunity for statements made while the Assembly is in session, and the member may not be sued before the courts for such. A member may not be placed under arrest during a session of the National Assembly, unless the member is accused of a crime and the National Assembly agrees to lift his immunity or if he is caught *in flagrante delicto*.

CHAPTER FIVE – THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Article 35.

The executive authority during the transitional period shall consist of the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers, and its presiding Prime Minister.

Article 36.

- (A) The National Assembly shall elect a President of the State and two Deputies. They shall form the Presidency Council, the function of which will be to represent the sovereignty of Iraq and oversee the higher affairs of the country. The election of the Presidency Council shall take place on the basis of a single list and by a two-thirds majority of the members' votes. The National Assembly has the power to remove any member of the Presidency Council of the State for incompetence or lack of integrity by a three-fourths majority of its members' votes. In the event of a vacancy in the Presidency Council, the National Assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of its members, elect a replacement to fill the vacancy.
- (B) It is a prerequisite for a member of the Presidency Council to fulfill the same conditions as the members of the National Assembly, with the following observations:
 - (1) He must be at least forty years of age.
 - (2) He must possess a good reputation, integrity, and rectitude.
 - (3) If he was a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party, he must have left the dissolved Party at least ten years before its fall.
 - (4) He must not have participated in repressing the *intifada* of 1991 or the Anfal campaign and must not have committed a crime against the Iraqi people.
- (C) The Presidency Council shall take its decisions unanimously, and its members may not deputize others as proxies.

Article 37.

The Presidency Council may veto any legislation passed by the National Assembly, on condition that this be done within fifteen days after the Presidency Council is notified by the President of the National Assembly of the passage of such legislation. In the event of veto, the legislation shall be returned to the National Assembly, which has the right to pass the legislation again by a two-thirds majority not subject to veto within a period not to exceed thirty days.

Article 38.

1

- (A) The Presidency Council shall name a Prime Minister unanimously, as well as the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers shall then seek to obtain a vote of confidence by simple majority from the National Assembly prior to commencing their work as a government. The Presidency Council must agree on a candidate for the post of Prime Minister within two weeks. In the event that it fails to do so, the responsibility of naming the Prime Minister reverts to the National Assembly. In that event, the National Assembly must confirm the nomination by a two-thirds majority. If the Prime Minister is unable to nominate his Council of Ministers within one month, the Presidency Council shall name another Prime Minister.
- (B) The qualifications for Prime Minister must be the same as for the members of the Presidency Council except that his age must not be less than 35 years upon his taking office.

Article 39.

- (A) The Council of Ministers shall, with the approval of the Presidency Council, appoint representatives to negotiate the conclusion of international treaties and agreements. The Presidency Council shall recommend passage of a law by the National Assembly to ratify such treaties and agreements.
- (B) The Presidency Council shall carry out the function of commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces only for ceremonial and protocol purposes. It shall have no command authority. It shall have the right to be briefed, to inquire, and to advise. Operationally, national command authority on military matters shall flow from the Prime Minister to the Minister of Defense to the military chain of command of the Iraqi Armed Forces.
- (C) The Presidency Council shall, as more fully set forth in Chapter Six and Seven, below, appoint, upon recommendation of the Higher Juridical Council, the Presiding Judge and members of the Federal Supreme Court, as well as the members of the national commissions, in accordance with the conditions appearing in the relevant Articles below. [CHECK TO CONFIRM]
- (D) The Council of Ministers shall appoint the Director-General of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, as well as general officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Such appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the National Assembly by simple majority of those of its members present.

Article 40.

- (A) The Prime Minister and the ministers shall be responsible before the National Assembly, and this Assembly shall have the right to withdraw its confidence either in the Prime Minister or in the ministers collectively or individually. In the event that confidence in the Prime Minister is withdrawn, the entire Council of Ministers shall be dissolved, and Article 40(B), below, shall become operative.
- (B) In the event of a vote of no confidence with respect to the entire Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers shall remain in office to carry out their functions for a period not to exceed thirty days, until the Presidency Council appoints a new Prime Minister, consistent with Article 38, above.

Article 41.

The Prime Minister shall have day-to-day responsibility for the management of the government, and he may dismiss ministers with the approval of a simple majority of the National Assembly. The Presidency Council may, upon the recommendation of the Commission on Public Integrity after the exercise of due process, dismiss the Prime Minister or the ministers.

Article 42.

The Council of Ministers shall draw up rules of procedure for its work and issue the regulations and directives necessary to enforce the laws. It also has the right to propose bills to the National Assembly. Each ministry has the right, within its competence, to nominate the employees of special grades, deputy ministers, and ambassadors. After the Council of Ministers approves these nominations, they shall be submitted to the Presidency Council for ratification. All decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by simple majority of those of its members present.

CHAPTER SIX – THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Article 43.

- (A) The judiciary is independent, and it shall in no way be administered by the executive authority, including the Ministry of Justice. The judiciary shall enjoy exclusive competence to determine the innocence or guilt of an accused pursuant to law, without interference from the legislative or executive authorities.
- (B) All judges sitting in their respective courts as of 1 July 2004 will continue in office thereafter, unless removed from office pursuant to this Law.
- (C) The National Assembly shall establish an independent and adequate budget for the judiciary.

- (D) Federal courts shall adjudicate matters that arise from the application of federal laws. The establishment of these courts shall be within the exclusive competence of the federal government. The establishment of these courts in the regions shall be in consultation with the presidents of the judicial councils in the regions, and priority in appointing or transferring judges to these courts shall be given to judges resident in the region.

Article 44.

A Higher Juridical Council shall be established and assume the role of the Council of Judges. The Higher Juridical Council shall supervise the federal judiciary and shall administer its budget. This Council shall be composed of the Presiding Judge of the Federal Supreme Court, the presiding judge and deputy presiding judges of the federal Court of Cassation, the presiding judges of the federal Courts of Appeal, and the presiding judge and two deputy presiding judges of each regional court of cassation. The Presiding Judge of the Federal Supreme Court shall preside over the Higher Juridical Council. In his absence, the presiding judge of the federal Court of Cassation shall preside over the Council.

Article 45.

- (A) The federal judicial branch shall include existing courts outside the Kurdistan region, including courts of first instance; the Central Criminal Court of Iraq; Courts of Appeal; and the Court of Cassation, which shall be the court of last resort except as provided in Article 46 of this Law. Additional federal courts may be established by law. The appointment of judges for these courts shall be made by the Higher Juridical Council. This Law preserves the qualifications necessary for the appointment of judges, as defined by law.
- (B) The decisions of regional and local courts, including the courts of the Kurdistan region, shall be final, but shall be subject to review by the federal judiciary if they conflict with this Law or any federal law. Procedures for such review shall be defined by law.

Article 46.

- (A) A court called the Federal Supreme Court shall be constituted by law in Iraq.
- (B) The jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court shall be as follows:
 - (1) Original and exclusive jurisdiction in legal proceedings between the Iraqi Transitional Government and the regional governments, governorate and municipal administrations, and local administrations.

- (2) Original and exclusive jurisdiction, on the basis of a complaint from a claimant or a referral from another court, to review claims that a law, regulation, or directive issued by the federal or regional governments, the governorate or municipal administrations, or local administrations is inconsistent with this Law.
- (3) Ordinary appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court shall be defined by federal law.
- (C) Should the Federal Supreme Court rule that a challenged law, regulation, directive, or measure is inconsistent with this Law, it shall be deemed null and void.
- (D) The Federal Supreme Court shall create and publish regulations regarding the procedures required to bring claims and to permit attorneys to practice before it. It shall take its decisions by simple majority, except decisions with regard to the proceedings stipulated in Article 46(B)(1), which must be by a two-thirds majority. Decisions shall be binding. The Court shall have full powers to enforce its decisions, including the power to issue citations for contempt of court and the measures that flow from this.
- (E) The Federal Supreme Court shall consist of nine members. The Higher Juridical Council shall, in consultation with the regional judicial councils, initially nominate no less than eighteen and up to twenty-seven individuals to fill the initial vacancies in the aforementioned Court. It will follow the same procedure thereafter, nominating three members for each subsequent vacancy that occurs by reason of death, resignation, or removal. The Presidency Council shall appoint the members of this Court and name one of them as its Presiding Judge. In the event an appointment is rejected, the Higher Juridical Council shall nominate a new group of three candidates.

Article 47.

No judge or member of the Higher Juridical Council may be removed unless he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or corruption or suffers permanent incapacity. Removal shall be on the recommendation of the Higher Juridical Council, by a decision of the Council of Ministers, and with the approval of the Presidency Council. Removal shall be executed immediately after issuance of this approval. A judge who has been accused of such a crime as cited above shall be suspended from his work in the judiciary until such time as the case arising from what is cited in this Article is adjudicated. No judge may have his salary reduced or suspended for any reason during his period of service.

CHAPTER SEVEN – THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL AND NATIONAL COMMISSIONS

Article 48.

- (A) The statute establishing the Iraqi Special Tribunal issued on 10 December 2003 is confirmed. That statute exclusively defines its jurisdiction and procedures, notwithstanding the provisions of this Law.
- (B) No other court shall have jurisdiction to examine cases within the competence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, except to the extent provided by its statute.
- (C) The judges of the Iraqi Special Tribunal shall be appointed in accordance with the provisions of its founding Statute.

Article 49.

- (A) The establishment of national commissions such as the Commission on Public Integrity, the Iraqi Property Claims Commission, and the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission is confirmed, as is the establishment of commissions formed after this Law has gone into effect. The members of these national commissions shall continue to serve after this Law has gone into effect, taking into account the contents of Article 51, below.
- (B) The method of appointment to the aforementioned national commissions or any other commission that the National Assembly may create in the future shall be the same as that for the Presiding Judge and judges of the Federal Supreme Court, as contained in Article 46(E), above.

Article 50.

The Iraqi Transitional Government shall establish a National Commission for Human Rights for the purpose of executing the commitments relative to the rights set forth in this Law and to examine complaints pertaining to violations of human rights. The Commission shall be established in accordance with the Paris Principles issued by the United Nations on the responsibilities of national institutions. This Commission shall include an Office of the Ombudsman to inquire into complaints. This office shall have the power to investigate, on its own initiative or on the basis of a complaint submitted to it, any allegation that the conduct of the governmental authorities is arbitrary or contrary to law.

Article 51.

No member of the Iraqi Special Tribunal or of any commission established by the federal government may be employed in any other capacity in or out of government. This prohibition is

valid without limitation, whether it be within the executive, legislative, or judicial authority of the Iraqi Transitional Government. Members of the Special Tribunal may, however, suspend their employment in other agencies while they serve on the aforementioned Tribunal.

CHAPTER EIGHT – REGIONS, GOVERNORATES, AND MUNICIPALITIES

Article 52.

The design of the federal system in Iraq shall be established in such a way as to prevent the concentration of power in the federal government that allowed the continuation of decades of tyranny and oppression under the previous regime. This system shall encourage the exercise of local authority by local officials in every region and governorate, thereby creating a united Iraq in which every citizen actively participates in governmental affairs, secure in his rights and free of domination.

Article 53.

- (A) The Kurdistan Regional Government is recognized as the official government of the territories that were administered by the that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala and Neneveh. The term “Kurdistan Regional Government” shall refer to the Kurdistan National Assembly, the Kurdistan Council of Ministers, and the regional judicial authority in the Kurdistan region.
- (B) The boundaries of the eighteen governorates shall remain without change during the transitional period.
- (C) Governorates outside the Kurdistan region, with the exception of Baghdad and Kirkuk, shall have the right to form regions from amongst themselves. The mechanisms for forming such regions may be [EITHER “PROPOSED” OR “PREPARED”] by the Iraqi Interim Government, and shall be presented and considered by the elected National Assembly for enactment into law. In addition to being approved by the National Assembly, any legislation proposing the formation of a particular region must be approved in a referendum of the people of the relevant governorates. [THIS IS OUR BEST EFFORT TO CAPTURE THE ESSENCE OF THE AGREEMENT; PLEASE REVIEW.]
- (D) This Law shall guarantee the administrative, cultural, and political rights of the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and all other citizens.

Article 54.

- (A) The Kurdistan Regional Government shall continue to perform its current functions throughout the transitional period, except with regard to those issues which fall within the exclusive competence of the federal government as specified in this Law. Financing for these functions shall come from the federal government, consistent with current practice and in accordance with Article 25(E) of this Law. The Kurdistan Regional Government shall retain regional control over police forces and internal security, and it will have the right to impose taxes and fees within the Kurdistan region.
- (B) With regard to the application of federal laws in the Kurdistan region, the Kurdistan National Assembly shall be permitted to amend the application of any such law within the Kurdistan region, but only to the extent that this relates to matters that are not within the provisions of Articles 25 and 43(D) of this Law pertaining to the exclusive competence of the federal government.

Article 55.

- (A) Each governorate shall have the right to form a Governorate Council, name a Governor, and form municipal and local councils. No member of any regional government, governor, or member of any governorate, municipal, or local council may be dismissed by the federal government or any official thereof, except upon conviction of a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction as provided by law. No regional government may dismiss a Governor or member or members of any governorate, municipal, or local council. No Governor or member of any Governorate, municipal, or local council shall be subject to the control of the federal government except to the extent that the matter relates to the competences set forth in Article 25 and 43(D), above.
- (B) Each Governor and member of each Governorate Council who holds office as of 1 July 2004, taking into account the law on local government that shall be issued, shall remain in place until such time as free, direct, and full elections, conducted pursuant to law, are held, or, unless, prior to that time, he voluntarily gives up his position, is removed upon his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude or related to corruption, or upon being stricken with permanent incapacity, or is dismissed in accordance with the law cited above. When a governor, mayor, or member of a council is dismissed, the relevant council may receive applications from any eligible resident of the governorate to fill the position. Eligibility requirements shall be the same as those set forth in Article 31 for membership in the National Assembly. The new candidate must receive a majority vote of the council to assume the vacant seat.

Article 56.

- (A) The Governorate Councils shall assist the federal government in the coordination of federal ministry operations within the governorate, including the review of annual ministry plans and budgets with regard to activities in the governorate. Governorate Councils shall be funded from the general budget of the State, and these Councils shall also have the authority to increase their revenues independently by imposing taxes and fees; to organize the operations of the Governorate administration; to initiate and implement province-level projects alone or in partnership with international, and non-governmental organizations; and to conduct other activities insofar as is consistent with federal laws.
- (B) The *Qada'* and *Nahiya* councils and other relevant councils shall assist in the performance of federal responsibilities and the delivery of public services by reviewing local ministry plans in the afore-mentioned places; ensuring that they respond properly to local needs and interests; identifying local budgetary requirements through the national budgeting procedures; and collecting and retaining local revenues, taxes, and fees; organizing the operations of the local administration; initiating and implementing local projects alone or in conjunction with international, and non-governmental organizations; and conducting other activities consistent with applicable law.
- (C) Where practicable, the federal government shall take measures to devolve additional functions to local, governorate, and regional administrations, in a methodical way. Regional units and governorate administrations, including the Kurdistan Regional Government, shall be organized on the basis of the principle of de-centralization and the devolution of authorities to municipal and local governments.

Article 57.

- (A) All authorities not exclusively reserved to the Iraqi Transitional Government may be exercised by the regional governments and governorates as soon as possible following the establishment of appropriate governmental institutions.
- (B) Elections for governorate councils throughout Iraq and for the Kurdistan National Assembly shall be held at the same time as the elections for the National Assembly, no later than 31 January 2005.

Article 58.

- (A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime's practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of

the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall take the following steps:

- (1) With regard to deported and expelled residents, it shall, in accordance with the statute of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other measures within the law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the residents to their homes and property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall provide just compensation.
 - (2) With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories, it shall act in accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission statute to ensure that such individuals may be resettled, may receive compensation from the state, may receive new land from the state near their residence in the governorate from which they came, or may receive compensation for the cost of moving to such areas.
 - (3) With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of support in order to force migration out of their regions and territories, it shall promote new employment opportunities in the regions and territories.
 - (4) With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all relevant decrees and shall permit affected persons the right to determine their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free from coercion and duress.
- (B) The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent constitution. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a distinguished international person to be the arbitrator.
- (C) The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified. This resolution shall be consistent with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories.

CHAPTER NINE – THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

Article 59.

- (A) The permanent constitution shall contain guarantees to ensure that the Iraqi Armed Forces are never again used to terrorize or oppress the people of Iraq.
- (B) Consistent with Iraq's status as a sovereign state, and with its desire to join other nations in helping to maintain peace and security during the transitional period of ongoing terrorism, the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) and any subsequent relevant resolutions. This arrangement shall last until the ratification of a permanent constitution and the election of a new government pursuant to that new constitution.
- (C) Upon its assumption of authority, and consistent with Iraq's status as a sovereign state, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall have the authority to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the multi-national force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), and any subsequent relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. Nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations under these agreements, or under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), and any subsequent relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, which will govern the multi-national force's activities pending the entry into force of these agreements.

Article 60.

The National Assembly shall write a draft of the permanent constitution of Iraq. This Assembly shall carry out this responsibility in part by encouraging debate on the constitution through regular general public meetings in all parts of Iraq and through the media, and receiving proposals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes the constitution.

Article 61.

- (A) The National Assembly shall write the draft of the permanent constitution by no later than 15 August 2005.
- (B) The draft permanent constitution shall be presented to the Iraqi people for approval in a general referendum to be held no later than 15 October 2005. In the period leading up to the referendum, the draft constitution shall be published and widely distributed to encourage a public debate about it among the people.

- (C) The general referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if a majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates do not reject it.
- (D) If the permanent constitution is approved in the referendum, elections for a permanent government shall be held no later than 15 December 2005 and the new government shall assume office no later than 31 December 2005.
- (E) If the referendum rejects the draft permanent constitution, the National Assembly shall be dissolved. Elections for a new National Assembly shall be held no later than 15 December 2005. The new National Assembly and new Iraqi Transitional Government shall then assume office no later than 31 December 2005, and shall continue to operate under this Law, except that the final deadlines for preparing a new draft may be changed to make it possible to draft a permanent constitution within a period not to exceed one year. The new National Assembly shall be entrusted with writing another draft permanent constitution.
- (F) If necessary, the president of the National Assembly, with the agreement of a majority of the members' votes, may certify to the Presidency Council no later than 1 August 2005 that there is a need for additional time to complete the writing of the draft constitution. The Presidency Council shall then extend the deadline for writing the draft constitution for only six months. This deadline may not be extended again.
- (G) If the National Assembly does not complete writing the draft permanent constitution by 15 August 2005 and does not request extension of the deadline in Article 61(D) above, the provisions of Article 60(E), above, shall be applied.

Article 62.

This law shall remain in effect until the permanent constitution is issued and the new Iraqi government is formed in accordance with it.

EF-9191
04/004825

APR 07 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Afghan Security Responsibility

I think we ought to propose that CENTCOM take over all Afghan security and be responsible for seeing that the Germans get the police done and all of that other stuff. It just isn't happening fast enough there.

Any thoughts on this?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
033004-20

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

Policy ExecSec's Note

June 11, 2004

CAPT Marriott:

- Copy provided to SD office on 5/17/04.
- ISA is updating response based on a June 8, 2004 DSD snowflake. (See attached.)

C. L. O'Connor

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

07-04-04 18:44 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/43413

OSD 11042-04

I-04/007771
EF-9831

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Military Assistant

8 Jun 04 - 1600

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)

SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces

Sir,

The Deputy observed that progress toward expanding Afghan security forces has been slow. The Deputy asks:

- a. What are the causes for lagging progress?
- b. What actions should be taken now to accelerate our efforts?

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Mark R. Hagerott
Commander, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE: 14 Jun 04

cc: DJS
EA VCJCS

11-1-0559/OSD/43414

OSD 08573-04

July 23, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crawford Options

On the subject we talked about this morning, if people couldn't get down to Crawford on Monday or Tuesday, or the President didn't want to take that much time to host everybody, you could do it by SVTC. He could discuss his issues and give instructions to the group via SVTC.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072304-13

ObOWH

23501dy

OSD 11043-04

72
July 26, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Op-ed

Attached is an interesting op-ed by Stephen Sestanovich entitled, "How Saddam Failed the Yeltsin Test."

Respectfully,

Attach.

"How Saddam Failed the Yeltsin Test"

DHR:dh
072604-8

ITag
6249

2650104

11-L-0559/OSD/43416

OSD 11117-04

How Saddam Failed the Yeltsin Test

By Stephen Sestanovich

Most anyone who's worked in government has a story — probably re-told often these days, given the Iraq debate — about facing a big decision on the basis of information that then turned out to be wrong. My favorite is from August 1998 when, with Bill Clinton just three days away from a trip to Moscow, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that President Boris Yeltsin of Russia was dead.

In 1998 the news that Mr. Yeltsin had died was, of course, no more surprising than the news, in 2003, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. It matched what we knew of his health and habits, and the secretive handling of his earlier illnesses. Nor was anyone puzzled by the lack of an announcement. Russia's financial crash 10 days earlier had set off a political crisis, and we assumed a fierce Kremlin succession struggle was raging behind the scenes.

In the agonizing conference calls that ensued, all government agencies

Stephen Sestanovich is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor of international diplomacy at Columbia University. From 1997 to 2001 he was United States ambassador at large for the former Soviet Union.

played their usual parts. The C.I.A. stood by its sources but was uncomfortable making any recommendation. National Security Council officials, knowing Mr. Clinton wasn't eager for the trip, wanted to pull the plug immediately. The State Department (in this case, me) insisted we'd look pretty ridiculous canceling the meeting because Mr. Yeltsin was dead — only to discover that he wasn't.

Eventually we decided that the Russians had to let the deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, who was in Moscow for pre-summit meetings, see Mr. Yeltsin within 24 hours or the trip was off. Nothing else would convince us: no phone call, no television ap-

**Bush was right to
put the onus on Iraq
to avoid war.**

pearance, no doctor's testimony. The next day Mr. Yeltsin, hale and hearty, greeted Mr. Talbott in his office, and two days later Bill Clinton got on the plane to Moscow.

When the trip was over, I phoned the C.I.A. analyst who had relayed the false report. He was apologetic — sort of. "You have to understand," he said. "We missed the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests last spring. We're under

a lot of pressure not to miss anything else."

Some of the lessons of this episode are the same as those emerging from the Iraq debate: sensitive intelligence is often too weak to guide important decisions; if the information fits what we already believe, or what we want to do, it gets too little scrutiny.

Yet Mr. Yeltsin's "near-death experience" of 1998 carries another lesson that unfortunately hasn't been part of the current controversy. When policymakers have imperfect information about a serious problem (which is almost always), what should they do? The answer, then as now, is to shift the burden of proof to the other guy. If we had been denied that meeting with Mr. Yeltsin, it would hardly have proved that he was dead. But we would have canceled the trip all the same. Russian uncooperativeness — not our poor intelligence — would have left us no choice.

Going to war and canceling a trip are vastly different matters, but what the Bush administration did with Saddam Hussein in the run-up to war followed the same rule: it challenged him to prove that American intelligence was wrong, so that the responsibility for war was his, not ours.

Clearly, President Bush and his advisers did not expect Saddam Hussein to cooperate in this test, and might still have wanted war if he had. But even if the administration had handled other aspects of the issue differently, it would still have been neces-

sary to subject Iraq to a test. In our debate about the war, we need to acknowledge that the administration set the right test for Saddam Hussein — and that he did not pass it.

When America demanded that Iraq follow the example of countries like Ukraine and South Africa, which sought international help in dismantling their weapons of mass destruction, it set the bar extremely high, but not unreasonably so. The right test had to reflect Saddam Hussein's long record of acquiring, using and concealing such weapons. Just as important, it had to yield a clear enough result to satisfy doubters on both sides, either breaking the momentum for war or showing that it was justified.

Some may object that this approach treated Saddam Hussein as guilty until proved innocent. They're right. But the Bush administration did not invent this logic. When Saddam Hussein forced out United Nations inspectors in 1998, President Clinton responded with days of bombings — not because he knew what weapons Iraq had, but because Iraq's actions kept us from finding out.

A decision on war is almost never based simply on what we know, or think we know. Intelligence is always disputed. Instead, we respond to what the other guy does. This is how we went to war in Iraq. The next time we face such a choice, whether our intelligence has improved or not, we'll almost surely decide in the very same way. □

720
~~FOUO~~

TO: GEN DICK MYERS
PAUL WOLFOWITZ
DOUG FEITH
GEN. CASEY

JUL 26 2004

TO: Ambassador John Negroponte

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Property Disputes

One of the issues still pending is the problem of the properties that Saddam Hussein took from people in the north and gave to people from the south.

Since that happened, the properties have been sold, and the current occupants of those properties in many cases are legitimate owners, even though the people who originally owned the houses were dispossessed unfairly.

A process to solve that is critically important. It seems to me that that is a project that you might want to consider working on with the Iraqi Interim Government.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072204-6

cc:

Hon. Colin Powell

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43418

720
9

26 Jul 04

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 10:03 PM
To: 'RSS - SecDef CablesESO'
Subject: RE: 2 pg memo for Negroponte and Casey from Rumsfeld

acknowledged

-----Original Message-----

From: RSS - SecDef CablesESO (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 6:45 PM
To: 1LT Kathleen Bikus (E-mail); COL James Barclay (E-mail); LTG George Casey (E-mail); MAJ Anthony Hale (E-mail); John Espinoza (E-mail); Negroponte, John (New York), ,State; Negroponte, John D (NEA/I) (Main State), ,State
Subject: 2 pg memo for Negroponte and Casey from Rumsfeld


Classification: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Please email receipt confirmation of 2-pg doc for GEN Casey and **Amb** Negroponte from SecDef.

VR/ Capt Steinfadt

(b)(6)

August 4, 2004

TO: Joe Califano
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

Attached is a note I just received on the Family Day Proclamation.

Regards,

Attach.
8/4/04 WH memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
080404-11

OSD 11203-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43420


006

4 Aug 04

22 Jul 04

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 2004

TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: HARRIET MIERS 
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

This note responds to your memo of July 28th to Secretary Andrew Card. The White House will be proclaiming September 27th Family Day. The Family Day Proclamation has been issued annually for a day in September since 2001. Please let me know if *this is the* information you wished. If I may be of any further assistance to you please let me know.

Thank you-

11-L-0559/OSD/43421

July 28, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

Andy—

Joe Califano asked me to help again this year in encouraging the President to make a Presidential Proclamation in regards to Family Day. They would like to have an opportunity to publicize it in plenty of time.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/13/04 Califano letter to POTUS

DHR:dh
072804-15

OSD 11203-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43422

006

28 JUL 04

22 JUL 04



The National Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse
at Columbia University

May 13, 2004

653 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017-6708

phone 212 641 5200
fax 212 056 8020
www.casacolumbia.org

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George Rupp (1995-2002)
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Frank G. Wells (1992-1994)

The President
The White House
Office of Presidential Messages
and Proclamations
Washington, D.C. 20502

Faxed to (b)(6) 5/13/04

Dear Mr. President:


I am writing to request a presidential Proclamation for *Family Day: A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children*, an initiative of The National Center On Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) at Columbia University. Each year since its inception in 2001, you have issued a Presidential Proclamation proclaiming *Family Day*. A copy of each proclamation is attached.

Since 1996, CASA research has consistently shown that the more often children eat dinner with their families, the less likely they are to smoke, drink or use illegal drugs. *Family Day - A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children* is a national effort to promote parental engagement as a simple, effective way to reduce substance abuse by children and teens and raise healthier children. *Family Day* emphasizes the importance of regular family activities in parent-child communications and encourages Americans to make family dinners a regular feature of their lives. In addition to your proclamation, the governors of 35 states and more than 200 cities and counties have issued *Family Day* proclamations each year. Last year your mother, former first Lady Barbara Bush, appeared in television spots to publicize *Family Day* and Jamie Lee Curtis did the same on the radio.

Also attached are background information on *Family Day*, CASA, a copy of the letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr, President of CASA, to Mr. Andy Card, and the response from Melissa Bennett. We would like the proclamation by June 15, 2004 because of our request in The Office of Scheduling for a June presidential ceremony to publicize *Family Day*.

If you need further information, please Contact me at (b)(6) and (b)(6) Thank you.

Sincerely,


Kathleen Gerard
Director of Development

Enclosures

11-L-0559/OSD/43423



FAMILY DAY, 2003

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Children thrive in loving families where they are taught, nurtured, and comforted. By spending time with our children and stressing the importance of making the right choices, parents and other family members help them develop into confident, successful individuals.

Families can help secure a healthy tomorrow for their children by providing guidance, staying involved, and serving as role models. I am committed to supporting strong families and strong marriages to help ensure that every child grows up in a safe, loving family. Statistics show that children from two-parent families are less likely to end up in poverty, drop out of school, become addicted to drugs, have a child out of wedlock, suffer abuse, or become a violent criminal. Because stable families should be the central goal of American welfare policy, I have proposed spending up to \$300 million a year to find the most effective programs to strengthen marriage.

Parents play a critical role in discouraging harmful behavior such as experimenting with alcohol, drug, and tobacco. Research shows that teens often listen to their parents when it comes to decisions about harmful substances and risky behaviors. Regular family activities provide opportunities for parents to communicate important messages and enhance their relationships with their children. Recent studies from the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University found that teens from families who eat dinner together were less likely to use illegal drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes, while teenagers who rarely eat dinner with their parents were more likely to engage in these unhealthy activities.

Families and all Americans can act together to educate our youth about the dangers of drugs and alcohol and help them grow into healthy, responsible, compassionate citizens. In order to ensure a brighter future for our Nation, and safe, healthy, and happy lives for our children, our children must learn that avoiding harmful substances is an ongoing responsibility. As we work to educate our next generation about making healthy choices, we renew our commitment to the American family.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim September 22, 2003, as Family Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day by engaging in activities to strengthen the relationships between parents and children and help fight against substance abuse and risky behaviors.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-eighth day of August, in the year of our Lord two thousand three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-eighth.



FACSIMILE

2004 JUL 27 11:53

THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE

At Columbia University
633 Third Avenue ~ 19th Floor
New York, NY 10017-6706
Main Phone (212) 841-5200
Main Fax: (212) 956-8020

Date: July 22, 2004

To: The Honorable *Donald H. Rumsfeld*, Secretary of Defense

Fax: (b)(6)

From: Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Direct Phone: (b)(6)

Direct Fax: (b)(6)

#of Pages (including this cover):

Dear Don,

Thanks so much for your help last year obtaining a Presidential Proclamation for *Family Day* in advance of the day. This **year** we **are** again having trouble getting a proclamation in a timely manner. May I ask you to please intervene again?

Family Day: A Day to Eat Dinner with Your Children will be held on September 27, 2004 and we would like to have the Proclamation **as soon as** possible in order to publicize it widely. The President will get much credit for this around the country and this year we have **many** more sponsors -- corporate, non-profit, community and government. We **plan** to have radio and TV spots featuring board member Jamie Lee **Curtis** and Barbara Bush as well as bus and subway posters, slides in movie theaters, and much local involvement.

I sent a letter to Andy **Card** in February asking for a Presidential Proclamation and *Family Day* ceremony. Scheduling did not permit the ceremony. Following are copies of a **staff** letter sent in May to the Office of Presidential Proclamations and the *Family Day 2003* Proclamation. We have been told by the office that the request is under consideration and we **will** not be apprised of their decision until closer to the event.

I'm sorry to bother you with this and thanks for any and all help you can give us.

Best regards.

Sincerely,


Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

11-L-0559/OSD/43425

OSD 11203-04

CASA Account code: 150

The information contained in this telecopy message is intended only for the use of the individual of entity named above and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under any applicable law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please immediately notify us by telephone and return the original message to us at the above address via the US Postal Service. Thank You.



FACSIMILE

201 JUL 22 11 00 AM

THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE

At Columbia University
633 Third Avenue - 19th Floor
New York, NY 10017-6706
Main Phone (212) 841-5200
Main Fax: (212) 956.8020

Date: July 22, 2004

To: The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

Fax: (b)(6)

From: Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Direct Phone: (b)(6)

Direct Fax: (b)(6)

#of Pages (including this cover).

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OSD 11203-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43427

CASA Account code: 150

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The National Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse
at Columbia University

May 13, 2004

The President
The White House
Office of Presidential Messages
and Proclamations
Washington, D.C. 20502

655 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017-6705

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fax 212 856 8020
www.casacolumbia.org

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Faxed to (b)(6) 5/13/04

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Sincerely,

Kathleen Gerard
Director of Development

Enclosures



FAMILY DAY, 2003

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

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Families can help secure a healthy tomorrow for their children by providing guidance, **staying** involved, and serving as role models. I am committed to supporting strong families and strong marriages to help **ensure** that every child **grows** up in a safe, loving family. Statistics show that children from two-parent families are less likely to end up in poverty, drop out of school, become addicted to **drugs**, have a child out of wedlock, suffer abuse, or become a violent criminal. Because stable families should be the central goal of American welfare policy, I have proposed spending up to \$300 million a year to find the most effective programs to strengthen marriage.

Parents play a critical role in discouraging harmful behavior such as experimenting with alcohol, drugs, and tobacco. Research shows that **teens** often listen to their parents when it comes to decisions about harmful substances and risky behaviors. Regular family activities provide opportunities for parents to communicate important messages and enhance their relationships with their children. Recent studies from the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University found that **teens** from families who eat dinner together were less likely to use illegal drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes, while teenagers who rarely eat dinner with their parents were more likely to engage in these unhealthy activities.

Families and all Americans can act together to educate our youth about the dangers of drugs and alcohol and help them grow into healthy, responsible, compassionate citizens. In order to ensure a brighter future for our Nation, and safe, healthy, and happy lives for our children, our children must learn that avoiding harmful substances is an ongoing responsibility. As we work to educate our next generation about making healthy choices, we renew our commitment to the American family.


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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-eighth day of August, in the year of our Lord two thousand three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-eighth.

July 27, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

c c : Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Document/Material Retention or Destruction

At the staff meeting this morning the subject came up about our policy on retention of documents and other old materials.

Please get with the General Counsel, and come in and tell me what the current rules are and what you think they ought to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072704-6

[illegible]

Please respond by 8/16/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11225-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43431



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 AUG 19 PM 2:21

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Policy on Document Retention

- In the attached July 27, 2004 snowflake you asked what our policy was on the retention of documents and other old materials, and that I brief you on the current rules and what I **think** they should be.
- The standards for records management are established by **statute**, and we implement these standards in coordination with the National Archives and Records Administration (**NARA**).
- In brief, official documents are used to conduct DoD business **while** personal documents may relate to political activities, personal or family matters, social or civic activities, or may be personal copies of official documents (not **original** copies).
- Official documents are organized into series based on **office** of **origin** and are categorized by NARA as either temporary (with destruction date) or permanent (retained forever for their historical or research value). Only **5%** of official documents are categorized as permanent.
- For instance, SecDef letters, memos, and other official documentary materials (official photographs, graphics, audio and video recordings, etc) are in Series 212 (Office of the SecDef), are considered permanent, and will be preserved in the National Archives.
- SecDef permanent records are maintained under our control for **30 years** and are stored at the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD, prior to their transfer to the National Archives.
- The current rules are in full compliance with Federal laws and regulations, and no changes are deemed **necessary** or **are recommended**.

COORDINATION: OGC

Attachment: As stated

Prepared By: Ms. Luz Ortiz, ESCD, (b)(6)

OSD 11225-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43432

313

16 AUG 04

27 JUL 04

~~FOUO~~

July 27, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Document/Material Retention or Destruction

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Please get with the General Counsel, and come in and tell me what the current rules are and what you think they ought to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072704-6

.....
Please respond by 8/16/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11225-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43433

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB A

July 1, 2004

819

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Personnel Out of UN Missions

How long before we are going to finish **up** on getting those **people** out of those UN missions'? I would like to be posted on where it stands and when it is finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070104-18

.....
Please respond by

7/9/04

Tab A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 11237-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43434

UN

1501

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USMOG-W

COL de la Pena

8 July 2004

DASD(NP)

Guy Roberts

8 July 2004

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/43435



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1954704
27 July 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 7/27*

SUBJECT: Personnel Out of UN Missions

- **Question.** "How long before we are going to finish up on getting those people out of those UN missions? I would like to be posted on where it stands and when it is finished,"
(TAB A)
- **Answer.** US personnel have been withdrawn from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The three officers and four military observers (MilObs) previously assigned to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) have returned to CONUS. After the 8 July signature of an Article 98 agreement by Eritrea, the United States has resumed its commitment to UNMEE and reassigned six officers to this mission. Five are currently in place.
- **Analysis**
 - UNMIK Personnel, Lieutenant Colonel Bilandzich, USAR, has returned to CONUS. Colonel Bagley was home on leave when the issue arose. He was reassigned temporarily to the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) and returned to Kosovo on 7 July to out-process from UNMIK and collect his personal effects. Colonel Bagley is now in CONUS awaiting reassignment.
 - UNMEE Personnel
 - MilObs Lieutenant Commander Stewart, Major Bascom, Captain Schell and Lieutenant Dyer have departed the mission entirely. Captains Knepper and Wilson returned to CONUS on 30 June and Lieutenant Colonel Parker followed on 5 July.
 - Eritrea has signed and entered into force an Article 98 agreement securing sufficient bilateral protection from the International Criminal Court for US personnel operating in Eritrea with the UNMEE mission. An administrative and technical status of forces agreement in Ethiopia provides sufficient protection in that country. Five officers are currently in place, with one more due to arrive in country by 4 August.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 11237-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43436

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB A

July 1, 2004

819

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Personnel ~~Out of~~ UN Missions

How long before we are going to finish **up** on getting those people out of those UN missions'? I would **like** to be posted on where it stands and when it is finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070104-18

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

Tab A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 11237-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43437

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USMOG-W

COL de la Pena

8 July 2004

DASD(NP)

Guy Roberts

8 July 2004

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/43438

720
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 23, 2004

811

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Follow Up w/Karzai

What is the process to follow up on the meetings we had with Karzai concerning the US security involvement in that country post the current global war on terrorism problems?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062304-9

.....
Please respond by

7/9/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 11294-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43439



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1959-04 28 JUL 28 PM 5:30
28 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 7/28*

SUBJECT: Follow Up w/Karzai

- **Question.** "What is the process to follow up on the meetings we had with Karzai concerning the US security involvement in that country post the current global war on terrorism problems?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** My staff is coordinating with OSD/NESA on a synopsis that outlines a way ahead for future US-Afghan bilateral military agreements. OSD/NESA will provide this brief to you when complete.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA, Director J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 11294-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43440

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 23, 2004

811

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Follow Up w/Karzai

What is the process to follow up on the meetings we had with Karzai concerning the US security involvement in that country post the current global war on terrorism problems?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062304-9

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

0 SD 11294-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43441

TAB B

OSD(NESA)

Mr. Kurt Amend

July 12, 2004

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/43442

7201
TAB A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

JUL 12 2004

813

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Pete Geren
MG Michael Maples

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Compensation Procedures

I testified in Congress that we would develop procedures to compensate those individuals who sustained abuse at Abu Ghraib. What is the status of that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070804-1

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

0 SD 11295-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/43443



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1960-04

28 July 2004 2004 JUL 28 PM 5:41

SECRET

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

FBM 7/28

SUBJECT: Compensation Procedures

- **Question.** "I testified in Congress that we would develop procedures to compensate those individuals who sustained abuse at Abu Ghraib. What is the status of that?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** On 1 June, DOD General Counsel, the lead office for this issue, sent a memorandum¹ to the Secretary of the Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy containing procedures for handling claims for compensation. The Joint Staff reviewed the proposal and replied on 10 June.²
- **Analysis.** It is my understanding that DOD General Counsel received final response to the 1 June memorandum on 12 July and the information will be presented for your review and approval in the near future.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

References:

- 1 DOD OGC memorandum, 1 June 2004, "Processing of Claims of Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment"
- 2 CJCS memorandum CM-1827-04, 10 June 2004, "Processing of Claims of Iraqi Detainees Based on Allegations of Personal Injury/Abuse and Mistreatment"

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

0 SD 11295-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43444

JUL 12 2004

813

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Pete Geren
MG Michael Maples

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Compensation Procedures

I testified in Congress that we would develop procedures to compensate those individuals who sustained abuse at Abu Ghraib. What is the status of that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070804-1

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

0 SD 11295-04

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

OGC

Ron Neubauer

13 July 2004

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/43446

Tab B


TAB A

May 25, 2004

785

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Foreign Troops in Iraq

We have to have a major push on to get troops to:

- Protect the UN.
- Help in the elections.
- Help train Iraqi forces.
- Help replace US troops.
- Help guard borders, ports, power stations and infrastructure.

There ought to be a lot of reasons we can talk countries into bringing in their troops.

Thanks.

12HR:dh
052504-7

.....
Please respond by 6/11/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/43447

OSD 11296-04

Iraq

25 May 04

JUL 28 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Pearl Harbor

I may have previously sent you Dr. Thomas Schelling's foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*.

But I just re-read it and, even though you may have read it at an earlier time, I think you will find it interesting to re-read it. I say this because of the intelligence we have been reading every day in recent months.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Thomas Schelling's foreword to *Pearl Harbor*, by Roberta Wohlstetter

DHR:dh
072704-10

cc: Vice President

OSD 11298-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43448

FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely *ordinary* blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not ~~our~~ warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were ~~so~~ busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it was an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called ~~off~~.) But it ~~was~~ not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a **long** shot for the Japanese, so ~~was~~ war with the United States; assuming the decision **on** war, the attack hardly appears reckless. There is a tendency in ~~our~~ planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not ~~con-~~sidered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what ~~is~~ improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible mistake—one we may have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that **a** fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to **a** government, is likely to be **a** complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off **so** often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it **is** the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to **a** government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's book is a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is at pains to show how easy it was to slip into the rut in which the Japanese found **us**, it can only remind **us** how likely it is that we are in the same kind of rut right now. The **danger** is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in **a** poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus **on** a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and **allow** for

a wider range of contingencies. But, as Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is **a** genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

*Center for International Affairs
Harvard University*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING



Pearl Harbor

Warning and Decision

Roberta Wohlstetter

"The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor." — Samuel Eliot Morison

Stanford University Press
Stanford, California

© 1962 by the Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University
Printed in the United States of America

Cloth ISBN 0-8047-0597-6

Paper ISBN 0-8047-0598-4

Original printing 1962

Last figure below indicates year of this printing:

98 97 96 95 94 93 92

Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/43451

TAB A

June 29.2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Preserving Antiquities in Babylon

You will recall ~~in the~~ Polish MoD meeting we agreed to put together an assessment team – US, Polish, and Iraqi – to take a look at Babylon and see what we can do to get that headquarters moved and to reduce the damage on the antiquities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062904-7(1s computer).doc

.....
Please respond by

7/19/04

OSD 11302-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/43452

*ii-
29*

29 Jun 04 28 Jul 04

TAB B

COORDINATION

OSD(P)	Mr. Shawn Steen	14 July 2004
USCENTCOM	CDR Lowman	15 July 2004

Tab B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1961-04
28 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 7/28*

SUBJECT: Preserving Antiquities in Babylon

- **Issue.** Following a recent meeting with the Polish Ministry of Defense, we agreed that an assessment team be assembled to review what could be done to relocate the Polish headquarters and preserve antiquities in Babylon (TAB A).
- **Conclusion.** Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) will lead the assessment team.
- **Discussion.** The team will focus primarily on where headquarters can be relocated in order to protect Babylonian antiquities while preserving the headquarters' effectiveness. The MNF-I-led assessment team will invite participation of the Polish headquarters and the Iraqi Ministry of Culture, attempt to incorporate expertise from Middle East antiquities authorities and coordinate its findings with USCENTCOM and US Mission, Baghdad.
- The assessment team will report its findings by 22 August 2004.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG W. L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 11302-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43454

TAB A

June 29, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Preserving Antiquities in Babylon

You will recall in the Polish MoD meeting we agreed to put together an assessment team – US, Polish, and Iraqi – to take a look at Babyion and *see* what we can do to get that headquarters moved and to reduce the damage on the antiquities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062904-7 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

7/19/04

OSD 11302-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/43455

TAB B

COORDINATION

OSD(P)	Mr. Shawn Steen	14 July 2004
USCENTCOM	CDR Lowman	15 July 2004

July 28, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Europe Over the Decades

Mr. President—

Attached is an illustrative list of issues that were major points of contention either between or among the United States and some countries in Europe. I send it because of the frequent references in the press that the differences between the U.S. and Europe are unusual or at an all-time high.

The fact of the matter is that what is occurring between the U.S. and Europe today is probably less contentious than has been the case in many periods over the past several decades. You may find it interesting to review this list.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Paper

DHR:dh
072804-7

OSD 11312-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43457

Europe

28 Jul 04

MAJOR STRAINS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

1950 – Truman - North Korea invades South Korea. Issue of allowing Germany to have troops for NATO use. France was alone in opposition.

1955-1956 – Eisenhower – Suez Crisis pits Britain and France against U.S. over strike on Egypt.

1957 -- Eisenhower – Soviets launch Sputnik, raising fears about the Soviet Union's growing ICBM capabilities. Europe questions U.S. ability to help protect it amid expanding Soviet capabilities.

1960-1962 – Eisenhower/Kennedy - European governments (led by the British) were unhappy with U.S. refusal to share nuclear information. U.S. offers to sell Britain Skybolt air-to-ground missile technology. When Skybolt technology failed, a large argument flared between NATO countries about Americans providing Britain with Polaris missiles. The British thought they were entitled to technology, but the U.S. did not agree. Eventually, they came to a compromise and Polaris was given to Brits.

1962 – Kennedy – Cuban Missile Crisis antagonized Europeans over America's lack of consultation with them.

1966 – Johnson - de Gaulle announces France's intention to withdraw from NATO's military command structure in protest of the dominance of U.S. commanders, and threw NATO Headquarters out of France.

1969 - Nixon - Many Western European countries questioned U.S. policies in Vietnam.

1971-1975 – Nixon/Ford - The Mansfield Amendment, proposing a 50 percent reduction in the U.S. combat troops in Europe (then numbering about 300,000) was defeated in the U.S. Senate by a vote of 61-36, and was the source of friction among NATO allies and the transatlantic relationship.

1973 – Nixon - Kissinger's "Year of Europe" effort to bolster the NATO alliance included a call for increases in military spending by European nations. The Europeans would not agree to more military spending while the alliance leader was still engaged in Vietnam. More broadly, they saw the move toward a more integrated Atlantic partnership as a challenge to their own integration and identity. Opposition to it was led by France.

1977-1978 – Carter - German-led opposition to U.S. development of a neutron bomb that could destroy troops, but not property. After Carter pushed allies to accept plans to develop the weapon, he dropped the project due to domestic political concerns, angering Germany.

1979 – Carter - The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. NATO views on the Soviet threat grew further apart, as the U.S. was ready for a more confrontational policy, while Europeans were anxious to save what was left of detente.

1981 – Reagan - Reagan Administration's decision to proceed with full production of the neutron bomb led to strong debate among NATO allies.

1981-1983 – Reagan - Europeans campaign against U.S. deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe.

1982 – Reagan - The Soviets tried to take advantage of tensions in the NATO alliance by offering large contracts to Western European nations for cooperating with the construction of a large natural gas pipeline. The Reagan Administration used import controls and economic sanctions to deter European countries that might wish to help build the pipeline.

1984 – Reagan - Americans become frustrated at the failure of NATO allies in Western Europe to provide more in military forces and economic support for their own defense.

1990 – George Herbert Walker Bush - Major post-Cold War debate between European countries about strengthening Western Europe's defenses and reducing its dependence on the U.S.

1992 – George Herbert Walker Bush - The argument of whether or not NATO should extend membership to newly freed countries of Eastern and Central Europe caused sharp divides. Some member countries saw the alliance as a passive hedge against the return of a Soviet threat, while others wanted the Alliance to play a more active role in reaching out to former adversaries.

1994 – Clinton - The wars of Yugoslav dissolution create strains in the alliance. As the wars dragged on, some members saw NATO's minimalist role as increasingly unsustainable. Frictions grew, particularly between the U.S. and other Allies, over what constituted a proper course of action.

1999 – Clinton - Criticism of how the Kosovo campaign was conducted - too great a U.S. and too small a European contribution - dominated debate.

2004 – George W. Bush - Disagreements over deployment of NATO forces to train Iraqi troops. France opposed.

2004 – George W. Bush - Disagreements over providing NATO troops to oversee Afghan elections. France opposed.

Current – George W. Bush - The NATO role in combating terrorism has caused frequent differences between France (with Luxembourg and Belgium) versus the rest of the Alliance.

SECRET:

BY HAND?

✓ BY FAX

08/29

OSD/ISA/NESA
I-04/009608-NES AR
ES-0196
JUL 26 2004

Afghanistan

ACTION MEMO

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

For Ryan Henry PDASD(P)

SUBJECT: Asia Foundation Survey on Afghanistan

- You asked about an Asia Foundation survey mentioned by President Karzai during his June 14 meeting with you.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign and send the attached note (Tab A), which commends the results of this survey to Secretary Powell and Dr. Rice.

Concur_____ Non-Concur_____ Other_____

Attachments: Letter

Prepared by: Dipali Mukhopadhyay, ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

DUSD/NESA _____

PDASD/ISA _____

OSD 11374-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43461

2674104

7/27
1430

June 14, 2004

EF-9871

I-04/008048

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita



7/29
Larry also
moving on
PA front J

SUBJECT: Asia Foundation Survey

We ought to move around that Asia Foundation survey and make sure the world knows it.

Thanks.

DHR dh
061404-31

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

NTB SecDef

Paul Butler

7/29 L 7/27

7/29

Sir,
Response Attached.

YR
Lt Col Greg Lengyel 7/27

14 Jun 04

26 Jul 04

OSD 11374-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43462

12-03-04 09:30 IN



The Asia Foundation

VOTER EDUCATION PLANNING SURVEY

Afghanistan 2004 National Elections

A REPORT BASED **ON** A PUBLIC OPINION POLL

Report Authors

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Radhika Nanda, Charney Research
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Project Direction and Editing

The Asia Foundation

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Project Management

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Research & Fieldwork

Afghan Media Resource Center (AMRC)



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Key Findings

- The mood is positive in most of the country, with almost two-thirds of respondents saying that the country is headed in the right direction.
- Afghans identified the major problems facing their country as its weak economy, the security situation, a poor educational system, and shattered infrastructure.
- Nonetheless, a large majority is pleased with the Transitional Government and President Hamid Karzai's job performance.
- Afghans feel somewhat more secure and much freer than they did under the Taliban. However, more say they have lost than gained economically since then.
- There are regional differences in mood, and region plays as great a role as ethnicity in shaping political outlooks. In particular, interviewees the South and Northwest were more negative than respondents in other regions about the direction of the country, job ratings for the government and president, and security and freedom of political expression.
- Most Afghans interviewed view the Taliban unfavorably, with majorities unfavorable to them in every region and even among those dissatisfied with the Transitional Government.
- The UN and foreign aid workers are generally popular with Afghans. The US and American troops are also regarded favorably by the majority, but the South and Northwest again remain exceptions.
- Most Afghan citizens surveyed know of the election and registration requirements and intend to vote as they are hopeful that the election will make a difference.
- However, there is substantial doubt as to whether the election will be free and fair, with potential vote buying and cheating in the count primary among the concerns. Doubts about the fairness of elections are closely related to a lack of knowledge of the process: most voters do not know that the ballot will be secret or that there will be election monitors.
- The problems facing Afghan women are widely recognized by both men and women, chief among them are lack of power and lack of education.

- Most Afghans believe that women will need the permission of husbands or fathers to vote in the coming elections. Between one in five and one in three women may not be allowed to vote.
- Two-thirds of Afghans interviewed can offer a meaning for democracy. The principal meanings they ascribe include freedom, rights and law, elections, and women's rights.
- Political tolerance, regarding parties or between persons, is low among the Afghans interviewed.
- Radio, especially foreign radio (Azadi/Radio Free Asia, VOA, BBC) reaches a majority of Afghans and is the preferred medium for voter education. Among those who do not listen to the radio, the preferred sources are village chiefs and religious leaders.
- Only one woman in five, at most, is completely housebound.² Visiting neighbors and doing household chores were the **two** most frequent answers from women about why they leave the house.

² A "housebound" woman does not leave the house at least once a month for any of the following activities: visiting neighbors, doing household chores, visiting family and friends, visiting a health clinic, shopping, taking children to school, or taking children to a health clinic.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUL 29 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Asia Foundation Survey

When I met with President Karzai on June 14, 2004, he mentioned the findings of an Asia Foundation survey on Afghanistan. The results are worth reviewing (see attached).

Highlights include:

- 62% of Afghans were pleased with Karzai's performance;
- 67% expressed a positive sentiment on the presence of US military forces;
- 64% responded unfavorably toward the Jihadi leaders;
- Only 9% considered democracy and Islam to be incompatible;
- 64% were able to identify at least one characteristic of a democratic country; and
- Only 24% of those who expressed dissatisfaction with the Transitional Government responded favorably towards the Taliban.

With the exception of responses in the Northwest and the South, the results suggest a sense of cautious optimism among the Afghans.

cc: White House Communication Director's Office

OSD 11374-04



11-L-0559/OSD/43466

Afghanistan

29Jul04

26Jul04

July 29, 2004

TO: Gen. George Casey

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Training for Protection

One of the other projects is to get people trained up to protect the Iraqi senior political leadership, so that we can take our military people off that assignment. Please include that in your periodic reporting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072904-8

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

IRAQ

2974104



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JUL 30 2004

Mrs. Bodman
c/o Walter Reed Army Medical Center
Office of Public Affairs
Building 1, Room C110
6900 Georgia Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20307-5001

Dear Mrs. Bodman:

Thank you for your contribution to the rehabilitation and convalescence of our wounded servicemembers at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. What you do is important.

Keep up the great work, and thanks again.

Sincerely,

OSD 11421-04



11-L-0559/OSD/43468

33559

30 July 04

July 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Mrs. Bodman

Larry Di Rita 7/20
Please find out what Mrs. Bodman does out at Walter Reed. Apparently she is helping out there. It might be something we would want to get some other folks helping on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070104-33

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

See, options below

33550

*- 30 -
- END -*

1 JUL 04

✓ Do a letter to her

— No Further action

*Sir,
Response attached*

*Y/R
Lt Col Lengyel
7/20
30 JUL 04*

720

REC'D 30 JUN

file

June 29, 2004

TO: Larry Lanzillotta

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DoD Airline Ticket Abuse

248.7

Please get back to me with a report on how you are going to fix this business on airline tickets reported in this article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Margasak, Larry. "Pentagon Wasted Millions on Airline Tickets, GAO Says," *Washington Post*, June 9, 2004, p. 8

DHR:dh
062904-11 (ls computer).doc

29 JUN 04

.....

Please respond by 7/26/04

Sr. *8/4*

Response attached.

v/r,

Lt Col Greg Lengyel *8/4*

29 JUN 04

OSD 11512-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

SECRET
201 1100 2 11:43

COMPTROLLER

July 29, 2004 5:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: DoD Airline Ticket Abuse

- You asked that I tell you how we are going to fix the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified deficiencies on airline tickets reported in a news article.
- What we have done to date.
 - Notified personnel, via remarks on their Leave and Earnings Statements, to return unused airline tickets to their travel offices.
 - Directed the Military Services to instruct military and civilian personnel to not claim as reimbursable expenses the tickets purchased through their organizations charge account and to return all unused tickets.
 - Approved a pilot program between the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Bank of America to compare electronic files of travel charge card transactions for potential fraud and misuse.
 - Requested assistance from the General Services Administration to address automatic cancellation and refund of tickets as part of the City-Pairs contract with the airlines.
 - Issued policy requiring all commercial travel offices contracts be reviewed and modified, as necessary, to ensure systematic identification of unused tickets and refund of tickets not used 30 days after the date of the last leg of scheduled travel.
 - Recovered overpayments on 99 of 123 cases the GAO identified.
- What we are currently doing: Military Services are researching 400 of the highest dollar value tickets to determine the status of the tickets, and determine possible resolution. Estimated completion date is first quarter FY 2005.
 - Researching additional 27,000 potential erroneous payments.

OSD 11512-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43471

- Fielding the Defense Travel System (DTS); full deployment scheduled by the end of FY 06. DTS will provide greater oversight and controls to prevent both unused tickets and improper reimbursements to travelers.
- The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) has agreed to accept responsibility for travel policy and to oversee the consolidation of travel management activities.

COORDINATION: TAB A.

Prepared by: Jacqueline Jenkins, (b)(6)

REC'D 30 JUN

June 29, 2004

TO: Larry Lanzillotta
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Airline Ticket Abuse

Please get back to me with a report on how you are going to **fix** this business on airline tickets reported in this article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Margasak, Larry. "Pentagon Wasted Millions on Airline Tickets, GAO **Says**," Washington Post, June 9, 2004, p. 8

DHR:dh
062904-11 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

7/26/04

11-L-0559/OSD/43473

Washington Post
June 9, 2004
Pg. 8

Pentagon Wasted Millions On Airline Tickets, GAO Says

By Larry Margasak, Associated Press

The Defense Department spent an estimated \$100 million for airline tickets that were not used over six years and failed to seek refunds even though the tickets were reimbursable, congressional investigators say.

The department compounded the problem by reimbursing employee claims for tickets the Pentagon bought, the investigators said.

To demonstrate how easy it was to have the Pentagon pay for airline travel, the investigators posed as defense employees, had the department generate a ticket and showed up at the ticket counter to pick up a boarding pass.

The General Accounting Office of Congress issued the findings in two reports on the Pentagon's lack of control over airline travel, copies of which the Associated Press obtained yesterday. A prior report, issued last November, found that the Pentagon bought 68,000 first-class or business-class airline seats for employees who should have flown coach.

"At a time when our soldiers are patrolling the streets of Iraq in unarmored Humvees, and when the Bush administration is asking for record defense spending, Secretary [Donald H.] Rumsfeld is letting hundreds of millions of dollars that could be used to protect our troops and our country go to waste," said Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky (D-Ill.), one of three lawmakers -- along with Republican Sens. Charles E. Grassley (Iowa) and Susan Collins (Maine) -- who ordered the studies.

The GAO estimated that between 1997 and 2003, the Defense Department bought at least \$100 million in tickets that were not used or used only partially by a passenger who did not complete all legs of a flight. The waste went undetected because the department relied on individuals to report the unused tickets. They did not.

The Pentagon said in a written statement that it is working to ensure it receives credit in the future for each unused ticket.

"We take this deficiency in our procedures very seriously and are moving swiftly to establish proper management controls. The long-term answer will be the automated Defense Travel System [DTS] that controls the travel order and payment process from beginning to end," the statement said. "DOD is researching the data presented in the GAO report and will continue to pursue the amounts we determine are recoupable."

The reimbursable tickets had no advanced purchase requirements, minimum or maximum stays or penalties for changes or cancellations under department agreements with the airlines.

While one GAO report focused on the unused tickets, the second investigation found potential fraud. It said the department paid travelers for tickets the department bought and reimbursed employees for tickets that had not been authorized.

A limited review of records for 2001 and 2002 identified 27,000 transactions totaling more than \$8 million in reimbursements to employees for tickets bought by the government. These figures represent only a small portion of the potential fraud, the GAO said.

It is a crime for a government employee knowingly to request reimbursement for goods and services he or she did not buy.

awick

TAB

A

Coordination:

Prin Dep Under Sec of Def (P&R)	Mr. Charles Abell	July 21, 2004
Ass Dep Under Sec of Def (AT&L)	Mr. Earl Boyanton	July 22, 2004
Director, DFAS	Mr. Zack Gaddy	July 20, 2004



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

AUG 2 2004

Mr. George Fernandes

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Fernandes:

It was a pleasure working with you during the past few years in your capacity as Minister of Defence. I appreciate your leadership and commitment to strengthen the bilateral defense relationship between our countries. As a result of your efforts, U.S.-India defense ties are stronger.

It was with dismay that I read press reports indicating that you had not received proper treatment at United States airports in 2002 and 2003. I regret that such incidents occurred.

Sincerely,

DA [Signature]

Warm regards -

India

2 Aug 04

16 Jul 04



OSD 11552-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43478

7/21
1030
7/21-1030

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

08/8/3

July 16, 2004

ES-0167

I-04/009596-ES

TO: Doug Feith

1

SUBJECT: Letter to Indian MoD

I think I probably ought to get a letter off to George Fernandes telling him how sorry I was that this incident occurred that is described here in the newspaper.

Thanks.

Attach.

"The Wand Beneath His Wings" *Washington Post*, In the Loop

DHR:dh
071604-9

.....
Please respond by _____

~~TO SecDef~~
TO SecDef

Fit
LARRY D. FEITH
7/27

Exec Sec
Send back
to policy to
make changes.
Thanks
Paul Butler
Filed 2/27 7/29

16 Jul 04

10-07-64 17:40 IN

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 11552-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43479

THE HINDU

Date:15/07/2004 URL:

<http://www.thehindu.com/2004/07/15/stories/2004071506220900.htm>

National

Not strip-searched: Fernandes

NEW DELHI, JULY 14 . As controversy raged over his "frisking" at a U.S. airport last year, the former Defence Minister, George Fernandes, today denied he underwent a "strip-search."

"Nothing like a strip-search happened there," he told reporters here referring to the book authored by a former United States Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, which says that the then Defence Minister, Mr. Fernandes, was "strip-searched" twice. Mr. Fernandes said he was asked to remove his coat, shoes and socks, which he did. "Then I was asked to spread my arms and raise them," he said, adding after that *khel khatam ho gaya* (the drama ended).

The former Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, today said he was not aware of the controversial searching of Mr. Fernandes by airport security in the United States. "I don't know about it," he told Zee News.

Asked whether he had not been informed about the incident, he said: "No." Appreciating the United States Embassy for expressing regret and apology over the "strip-searching" of Mr. Fernandes during his visit to the United States two years ago as Defence Minister, the Congress said the silence on the part of Mr. Vajpayee and his External Affairs Minister was "intriguing..."

"They (Vajpayee and his External Affairs Minister) should break their silence on the issue," the party's spokesman, Anand Sharma, told reporters here. — PTI

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Strip-search incident: Armitage apologises

July 14,200413:03 IST

Last Updated: July 14,200415:24 IST

US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage on Wednesday said he was "horrified" by the the incident of strip-searching involving former defence minister George Fernandes during an official visit to the US.

"On the way in the car here, I had the opportunity to telephone my old friend George Fernandes and told him I had heard about the problem he had. E was horrified about it and I personally apologised to him," Armitage told reporters after he met Leader of the Opposition Lal Kishenchand Advani.

Former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in his just published book has said Fernandes was strip-searched twice at Dulles airport when he was defence minister -- once on an official visit to Washington in early **2002** and another time while enroute to Brazil in mid 2003.

The US Embassy in Delhi said Fernandes was not strip-searched but a security wand was waved over him when a key in his pocket set off the metal detector.

"Fernandes played an important role in the burgeoning US-India relationship and we consider him the cherished friend of the US," an embassy spokesman said.

Fernandes, who confirmed reports that he was searched, has said he will never visit the US again.

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Never strip-searched in US airports, says Advani

Press Trust of India

Bangalore, July 11

Former Deputy Prime Minister LK Advani on Sunday said he had never been strip-searched in US airports and he would talk to NDA convenor George Fernandes, who as Defence Minister had reportedly undergone such an exercise twice.

"I did not face it during my visits," Advani replied to questions on reports from Washington quoting former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott that Fernandes was strip-searched twice in Dulles Airport when he was Defence Minister.

The BJP leader maintained that shedding of shoes and socks was a normal security check and officials who accompanied them had to undergo that but wondered whether that can be called strip-search.

If such incidents had implications, Advani said he believed Fernandes would have brought up the subject which was not the case.

Advani also expressed the view that it would not be correct for the Indian Government to protest this (shedding of shoes and socks for security check) as all passengers are subjected to such a procedure.

But he said he would certainly talk to Fernandes to find out the facts. Though he found it strange to liken shedding of shoes and socks to strip-check.

Printed From 

Fernandes confirms strip-search, says he won't visit US again

HT Correspondent
New Delhi, July 11

George Fernandes has confirmed he was strip-searched twice at Washington's Dulles airport when he visited the US as defence minister in 2002 and 2003. He has described the experience as an "ordeal", and said he will never visit the US again.

The story of Fernandes's humiliation has appeared in former US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott's book Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb.

"I cannot forget the ordeal which I underwent in the US and have decided not to go there in future," PTI quoted Fernandes as saying in Muzaffarpur on Sunday.

According to the report, the Americans went ahead with the search despite repeated pleas by the Indian ambassador to spare the minister the embarrassment. Fernandes said he had informed PM A.B. Vajpayee about the incidents.

Meanwhile, PTI Bangalore quoted former home minister L.K. Advani as saying he had never had such an experience in the US, and would "talk" to Fernandes about it.

Printed From **HindustanTimes.com**

Fernandes strip-searched twice during visit to US: Talbott

Press Trust of India

Washington, July 10

George Fernandes was strip-searched twice in Dulles Airport in the US capital area when he was Defence Minister, once while on an official visit to Washington and another time while en route to Brazil, according to former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.

In his new book *Engaging India - Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb*, Talbott says he was told this angrily by Fernandes himself when he had visited India in February this year as part of a delegation assembled by the Asoen Institute and the Confederation of Indian Industry.

"Our group held a series of meetings with senior officials--Brajesh Mishra, Yashwant Sinha and George Fernandes--who all voiced some unease that the American government was treating Musharraf with kid gloves. But they also expressed general satisfaction with the way things were going between the US and India," writes the former Deputy Secretary of State.

Talbott says, "Fernandes, as Defence Minister, made much of how American-Indian military cooperation was thriving. India, in short, had weathered the storm of American sanctions and was now well on its way to establishing itself as a military partner.

"Just as we were saying good-bye to Fernandes, a member of our delegation innocently asked him when he would next be coming to Washington. His demeanour abruptly changed. It was as though he was glad to have an excuse to tell us how he really felt about our country.

"Ignoring an Ethiopian delegation that was already filing into his office and taking its seats, Fernandes regaled us with the story of how he had been strip-searched by officers of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service at Dulles Airport when he arrived for an official visit in early 2002, and again, in mid-2003, when he was passing through the US on his way to Brazil.

"He seemed to enjoy our stupefaction at this tale. He and other Indians who later referred to the incident clearly regarded it as more than merely a lapse of protocol or just another example of the post-9/11 excesses and indignities that air travellers had to endure for the sake of security. The Indians saw it as a symptom of a deep-rooted widespread condescension--or worse--on the part of the West toward the East."

Printed From 



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

720
CM-1973-04
3 August 2004

INFO MEMO

CM-1973-04
3 August 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/2*

SUBJECT: Combatant Commanders'/Service Chiefs' Conference Agenda Item: Voting Issues


- **Issue.** In response to your statement; "The combatant commanders' conference is a good time to have them report back to us as to what they have done on this voting issue. Let's get that on the agenda." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** The briefing we received on 23 July, "DOD Absentee Voting Improvements Since 2000," has been added as **an** agenda item for the September 2004 Combatant Commanders'/Service Chiefs' Conference. Service Chiefs will provide status reports.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

TAB
~~FOUO~~

July 23, 2004

TO: Gen. **Dick** Myers
CC: RADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Agenda for CoCOM Conference

The combatant commanders' conference is a good time to **have** them **report back** to us as to what they have done on this voting issue. Let's **get** that on the **agenda**.

Thanks.

DHR:d/s
072304-11

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/43486



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET
2004-08-03 PM 3:19

INFO MEMO

CH-1973-04
3 August 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/2*

SUBJECT: Combatant Commanders'/Service Chiefs' Conference Agenda Item: Voting Issues


- **Issue.** In response to your statement; "The combatant commanders' conference is a good time to have them report back to us as to what they have done on this voting issue. Let's get that on the agenda." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** The briefing we received on 23 July, "DOD Absentee Voting Improvements Since 2000," has been added as an agenda item for the September 2004 Combatant Commanders'/Service Chiefs' Conference. Service Chiefs will provide status reports.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

TAB
~~FOUO~~

July 23, 2004

TO: Gen. **Dick** Myers
CC: RADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Agenda for CoCOM Conference

The combatant commanders' conference is a good time to have them report back to us as to what they have done on this voting issue. Let's **get** that on the agenda.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
(072304-1)

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/43488

720
TAB A

June 9, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Forces in Iraq and Kuwait

I would like to see a plan as to how we would begin to phase down forces from Kuwait and Iraq at the point when it is decided that it is appropriate to do so. It would be useful to begin thinking about that, so that we are ahead of the curve.

The same exercise should be undertaken with respect to Afghanistan.

I also noted that we have gone from 112,000 up to 143,000 troops in Iraq, and it seems to keep climbing. My recollection is that we were at 112,000 when General Abizaid said he wanted to go up by 19,000.

Also, I would be curious to know what skill sets are included in the increase of the 31,000 troops in Iraq.

Please get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060904-9

.....
Please respond by

6/18/04

04 JUN 10 09:22Z

Tab A

OSD 11592-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43489

72
TAB A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 24, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Police Training

I need you to follow up and provide details as to what the Department of State has done on police training in Afghanistan and Iraq – from the time they had responsibility until today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062404-9

.....
Please respond by 6/30/04

04 JUN 25 AM 10:22

OSD 11594-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/43490

~~FOUO~~

August 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on Corridors

2004 DEC -2 PM 14 02

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

000.715D

Please set a meeting for me with Paul Wolfowitz and Ray DuBois to discuss this paper on corridors. I will need it for the meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/2/04 Dir, A&M memo to SecDef re: Corridors [OSD11602-04] and SD memo #072204-14

DHR:dh
080904-19

.....
Please *respond* by 9/3/04

-UCB, From the OLD
SNOWFLAKE STACK.
P/S F16.

FB
12/2

~~FOUO~~

OSD 11602-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43491

9 AUG 04

~~FOUO~~

July 22, 2004

8/8/4

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Corridors

Please give me a list of all the corridors and what they are in honor of. Do we have one for World War I, WW II, Korea or Vietnam? Should we have one for the Global War on Terror? I know there are corridors for NATO, Eisenhower, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072204-14

.....
Please respond by _____

27h1

- ① Yes each dedn
- ② 5 How Admit
- ③ Why 2 Brille
- ④ 11 3 It Unit
- ⑤ Fix 4-500 Det Good
- ⑥ All A Pater Good
- ⑦ When 2 Know

Sir,
Response attached.
v/R
Lt Col Greg Lengyel
8/5

~~FOUO~~

⑥ H. 1000

AM 01634-09



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

201 112 - 1 11 6:15

INFO MEMO

AUG 02 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Corridors

- In the attached July 22 snowflake you asked for information about corridors here in the Pentagon and whether or not any were dedicated to WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam and the Global War on Terrorism.
- Also attached is an unofficial pamphlet that describes all the dedicated corridors as well as the major exhibits and displays here in the Pentagon.
- There are no corridors dedicated to a specific conflict; however, there are references, images, and memorabilia from/about them contained in various corridor displays and exhibits. **An** exhibit that featured artifacts and photographs from the Korean war was removed due to renovation and all items were returned to the Center of Military History.
- With the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) ongoing, it may be premature to dedicate one at the current time. As has been done for the other conflicts, a consideration may be to incorporate appropriate items and material related to the GWOT when our existing corridor displays and exhibits are refurbished and updated.
- As an aside, in the history of our military, there have been nine 5-star General/Flag officers – four Army (Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower and Bradley), four Navy (Leahy, King, Nimitz, and Halsey) and one Air Force (Arnold). There is a Pentagon corridor dedicated to each of the **Army** 5-stars and to the **Air** Force 5-star, but none to the Navy. However, in the Bradley Corridor, there is a panel that is dedicated to and lists all nine.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated





Prepared by: Brenda White, Graphics and Presentations Division, (b)(6)





TSA SD	8/5
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	M 8/4





OSD 11602-04


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**Corridors/Exhibits
in the Pentagon**



Corridors	Description	Location
<p>African Americans in Defense of Our Nation Corridor</p> 	<p>Dedicated to African Americans who contributed to the defense of our nation. Exhibit highlights 218 African Americans who have attained general and flag officer ranks.</p>	<p>3A2-3E2</p>
<p>Air Force Chiefs of Staff Corridor</p> 	<p>Contains paintings of past Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force.</p>	<p>4E9</p>
<p>ANZUS Corridor</p> 	<p>Commemorates the treaty enacted between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States in 1952.</p>	<p>2A2-3</p>
<p>Arnold Corridor</p> 	<p>Dedicated to General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold who was commander of the Army Air Forces in WWII and the only the air commander ever to attain the 5-star rank of general of the armies.</p>	<p>4E8</p>



<p>Bradley Corridor</p> 	<p>Dedicated June 1972 to General Omar N. Bradley who served as Army Chief of Staff from 1948–1949 and later as first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1949–1953.</p>	<p>2E8</p>
<p>Bradley Corridor - Officers of Five-Star Rank</p> 	<p>A list of all nine Officers of Five-Star Rank is located within Bradley Corridor.</p>	<p>2E8</p>
<p>Career Civil Servants Corridor</p> 	<p>Display recognizes historic and current achievements of DoD career civilians covering the period between 1789-2004.</p>	<p>2A3–2</p>
<p>Joint Chiefs of Staff Corridor</p> 	<p>Corridor highlights the past Joint Chiefs of Staff and Vice Chairman's military history and along with their medals.</p>	<p>2A8–2E8</p>




<p>Joint Chairman's Portrait Corridor</p> 	<p>Contains paintings of past Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.</p>	<p>2E9</p>
<p>50th Anniversary of DOD Corridor</p> 	<p>Display contains factual information and images covering the first fifty years of the Department of Defense.</p>	<p>2A2-2E2</p>
<p>50th Anniversary of the Pentagon Corridor</p> 	<p>Display contains factual information, images and memorabilia covering the first fifty years of The Pentagon.</p>	<p>Corridor 3 Ramp to Concourse</p>
<p>MacArthur Corridor</p> 	<p>Dedicated to General Douglas MacArthur who was named Army Chief of Staff from 1930-1935. Served as Commanding General of the Southwest Pacific area from 1942-1945. Served as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Japan after the Japanese surrender in September 1945.</p>	<p>3A4-5</p>


Marshall Corridor	Dedicated April 1976 to General George C. Marshall who served as Army Chief of Staff from September 1939 – November 1945. Marshall served as Secretary of Defense from September 1950 – September 1951.	3E4.5–5
 A photograph of a hallway with a white wall on the left. On the wall, there is a large portrait of General George C. Marshall and a smaller framed document. The floor is dark and polished, reflecting the light.		



Marine Corps Commandants Corridor	Contains portraits of former Marine Commandants.	4A–E5
 A photograph of a hallway with a white wall. Several framed portraits of Marine Commandants are displayed on the wall. The hallway is well-lit and appears to be part of a museum or historical site.		
Military Women's Corridor	Contains historical artifacts and information covering the history of the women in the military.	In storage due to renovation and will be returned to new location, once determined.
 A photograph of a display case filled with various historical artifacts, including photographs, documents, and small objects. The display is arranged in a way that tells a story about the history of women in the military.		
NATO Corridor	Contains a historical portrayal of the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which was established in 1949. All NATO member nations are represented in the corridor.	2A9–10
 A photograph of a display case featuring a large NATO logo on the left. To the right, there is a grid of small portraits representing the member nations of NATO. Below the grid, the text 'AN ALLIANCE FOR PEACE' is visible.		



Navy Executive Corridor	Contains paintings of past Chiefs of Naval Operations and Navy models.	4E4-6
		
9/11 Quilts Corridor	Will display a variety of quilts donated in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Pentagon.	1B4-E4
		



POW/MIA Corridor	Corridor is dedicated to all prisoners of war from the Vietnam Conflict.	4E7-8
		To be updated to reflect more recent conflicts – date TBD.
Secretaries of the Air Force Corridor	Contains paintings of past Secretaries of the Air Force.	4E8
		




<p>Secretaries of Defense Corridor</p> 	<p>Portraits and brief biographies of past Secretaries of Defense while in office.</p>	<p>2A8-9</p>
<p>Secretaries of the Army Corridor</p> 	<p>Contains Army flags and portraits of former Secretaries of the Army.</p>	<p>3A5-3E5</p>
<p>Secretaries of Navy Corridor</p> 	<p>Portraits of past Secretaries of Navy.</p>	<p>In storage due to renovation and are to be relocated – date TDB.</p>



<p>Secretaries of War Corridor</p> 	<p>Portraits of Secretaries of War.</p>	<p>2A4-5</p>
--	---	--------------

<p>soldiers and Signers of the Constitution Corridor</p> 	<p>Corridor honors 23 veterans of the Revolutionary War who were among the 40 original signers of the Constitution.</p>	<p>2A4-2E4</p>
<p>USO Corridor</p> 	<p>Covers the historical events of the United Service Organizations (USO) and their involvement in providing morale, welfare and recreation-type services to uniformed military personnel.</p>	<p>Corridor 2 Ramp to Concourse</p>

Exhibits	Description	Location
<p>Buffalo Soldier Exhibit</p> 	<p>Display is dedicated to the Buffalo Soldiers.</p>	<p>Display is undergoing repairs and will be returned to 2A5.</p>
<p>D-Day Ramp</p> 	<p>Contains 34 paintings depicting scenes from Operations Overlord during WWII. Painting were presented to Secretary of Defense William J. Perry on the 50th Anniversary of D-Day</p>	<p>Concourse ramp to 3rd floor</p>

<p>Hall of Heroes/Medal of Honor</p> 	<p>This hall is dedicated to the 3,440 recipients of the Medal of Honor for each of the services, our nations highest military decoration.</p>	<p>Pentagon Concourse</p>
<p>Joint Chiefs of Staff Legacy of Leadership Display</p> 	<p>Display of seven cases depicting the legacy of the leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1942 – 1993.</p>	<p>2E8</p>

<p>Korean War Exhibit</p> 	<p>Contained historical artifacts and information covering the history of the Korean War.</p>	<p>Removed due to renovation and items returned to Center of Military History</p>
<p>Kruzel Exhibit</p> 	<p>Dedicated to Joseph Kruzel in January 1996. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy who died in an accident while traveling outside Sarajevo in August 1995.</p>	<p>4D7-8</p>
<p>Native Americans in Defense of Our Nation</p> 	<p>Display honors the American Indians and Alaskan Natives who served our nation with dignity and valor.</p>	<p>2A</p>

Navy 9/11 Reflection Room	A prayer room honoring Navy personnel who were killed on 9/11.	1E4
		
9-11 Memorial	The memorial commemorates those killed in the terrorist attack on the morning of September 11, 2001.	1E4
		

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Law

JUL 12 2004
1-04/007308
ES-0107

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Relationships in Asia

In the meeting with Aussies, I asked them what should we be fashioning now by way of relationships in Asia that in five years we would not be able to fashion. It is a useful question. They couldn't answer it. What do you think?

Asia

Thanks.

DHR dh
070804-8

OSD 11610-04

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

August 2, 2004

Captain Marriott:

Richard Lawless provided the attached note to Mr. Feith describing his plan to address SecDef's question regarding relationships in Asia.

The attached is an interim response.

VR

June Bartlett

June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

12 Jul 04

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11-L-0559/OSD/43505

11610-04

12-07-04 14:25 IN



Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Asian and Pacific Affairs

MEMORANDUM FOR USDP

Info: ASD/ISA
PDASD/ISA


Subject: SD Snowflake: Relationships in Asia

Doug,

I've had the **AP** team consider the SD's question: "...what should we be fashioning by way of relationships in Asia that in five years we would not be able to fashion?" We are building the answer, but it is not a short one. We are at an historic moment in Asia regarding the GWOT, our global force posture movements, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in PRC/TW relations, the rise of China, dealing with Islam, etc. As we craft this response to SD, we will generally address those treaty, bi-lateral, and multilateral relationships which will preserve/create peace and stability in Asia in order to pursue US interests. Among other things this will include movement toward democratization and fostering economic development within the region. We have some ideas.

The other principal issue we will address in this response will be managing our relationship with China, both within the region and elsewhere. "China rising" is not necessarily bad for the US and our interests, but we should play an active, not reactive role in managing China's development. We have ideas here too.

The suspense date is 30 July. We're asking for a bit more time, 13 Aug."


Richard Lawless

OSD 11610-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43506

JUL 29 4:11PM

July 2004

ASI

2 Aug 04

125014

720
August 3, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Cable

I talked to Ann Veneman about the cable you sent, and I am pushing it. I hope it helps.

Regards,

DHR:dh
080304-16

OSD 11612-04


11-L-0559/OSD/43507

Afghanistan

3 Aug 04

August 3, 2004

TO: Honorable Tom Ridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

Attached is the foreword by Tom Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter's book on Pearl Harbor.

Given the discussions currently underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's **book**, *Pearl Harbor*]

DHR:dh
080304-5

OSD 11613-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43508

461

340304

FOREWORD

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Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/43511

August 3, 2004

TO: John McLaughlin
Lt. Gen. Mike Hayden
Lt. Gen. Jim Clapper
VADM "Jake" Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword



Attached is the foreword by Tom Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter's **book** on Pearl Harbor.

Given the discussions currently underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*]

DHR:dh
080304-7

OSD 11614-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43512

461

3 Aug 04

FOREWORD

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Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/43515

August 3, 2004

TO: Honorable Jim Schlesinger
Honorable Harold Brown
Honorable Frank Carlucci
Honorable William Webster
Honorable Bill Vroman
ADM Bill Studer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Meeting

Thanks so much for coming in to visit about the 9/11 Commission recommendations. I appreciated it a great deal and I know our team found it most helpful.

Attached is the foreword by Tom Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter's book on Pearl Harbor.

Given the discussions underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

DHR:dh
080304-8

OSD 11615-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43516

461

3 Aug 04

FOREWORD

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Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/43519

7209

August 3, 2004

TO: Ms. Fran Townsend

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

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Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

DHR:dh
080304-9

461

32

OSD 11617-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43520

FOREWORD

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Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/43523

August 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable John Ashcroft

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

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Given the discussions currently underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

DHR:dh
080304-10

OSD 11618-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43524

46

3 Aug 04

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Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/43527

August 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

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Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

DHR:dh
080304-12

OSD 11619-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43528

46

3 Aug 04

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Furthermore, **we** made the terrible mistake—one **we** may have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that a fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility *so* poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off *so* often it has been disconnected. It includes the *unalert* watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else *is* taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it *is* the occasion—which *is* usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip *us* off to the climax.) Finally, *as* at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in *an* alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's *book* is *a* unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. *If* she is at pains to *show how easy* it *was* to slip into the *rut* in which the Japanese found us, it can only remind *us* how likely it is that we are in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in *a* poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus on a *Few* vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and allow for

a wider range of contingencies. But, *as* Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is a genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

*Center for International Affairs
Harvard University*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING



Pearl Harbor

Warning and Decision

Roberta Wohlstetter

"The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor." — Samuel Eliot Morison

Stanford University Press
Stanford, California

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98 97 96 95 94 93 92

Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/43531

August 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Bob Gates
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

Attached is the foreword by Tom Schelling to Roberta Wohlstetter's book on Pearl Harbor.

Given the discussions currently underway, I think you will find it interesting.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, *Pearl Harbor*

DHR:dh
080304-13

OSD 11620-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43532

461

3 AUG 04

~~LOT~~

April 19, 2004

Syria

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Syrian Border

Colin Powell raised the issue on the 600-mile Syrian border, and whether we want to work with Syria on it. I told him I wanted to talk to Abizaid about it.

Please talk to John Abizaid and find out what he proposes, and let's do it fast, so I will know before tomorrow's 7:00 a.m. phone call.

Thanks.

DHR:db
041904-6

.....
Please respond by

4/19/04

19 APR 04

OSD 11633-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43533

APR 19 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Quotes in *Newsweek*

Newsweek says that I have said dismissively that what has been going on in Iraq was just a "flare-up."

Please see if I have ever said that publicly. I think the only place the word came up was in a classified briefing in the Senate Intel room, where I believe I said that that week we had seen some "flare-ups."

Newsweek is quoting me as being dismissive and quoting McCain. If it was only said in a classified briefing room, which I believe, I would like to know that. Also, please tell me the date of that intel meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041404-1

.....
Please respond by

4/23/04

OSD 11634-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43534

IRAQ

19 APR 04

- APR 20 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Leverage of Terrorists

Attached is an interesting paper on the leverage that terrorists have. It might be useful at some point.

Thanks.

Attach.
"Wreaking Havoc" (anonymous, undated)

DHR:dh
041904-10

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Please respond by _____

OSD 11635-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43535

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20APR04

Wreaking Havoc

It takes extraordinarily few people to do the kind of damage that we're witnessing in Iraq today or that other countries, including the United States, have witnessed in the past:

- It took only Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols (some might say there was a third accomplice) to kill 168 people in Oklahoma City;
- It took, I believe, less than 10 people to put a bomb in the basement of the World Trade Center in 1993 that killed 6 people and injured more than 1000. It was the largest improvised explosive device in the history of forensic science and was intended to topple one tower on top of the other – in which case it would have been far worse than September 11;
- It just took two snipers, one a teenager, to terrorize the Washington metropolitan area for the better part of a month;
- There were probably fewer than 10 people involved in the Bali bombing that killed approximately 200 people;
- It probably didn't take more than 10 people to do the bombing in Najaf that killed 150 people, including one of the most important Shia leaders in the country and which led to several weeks of reporting on alleged instability in southern Iraq;
- Of course, it took only 19 hijackers on September 11, 2001 to kill more than 3,000 people in this country;
- Perhaps most illuminating for the Iraq situation, a couple of hundred Provisional IRA terrorized the UK for a period of many years, killing an average of 300 people per year and 700 people in the peak year;
- The Baader-Meinhof Gang, I believe, was only a few dozen people at its height, and it terrorized Germany for a considerable number of years; and
- The same is true of the Red Brigades in Italy, who have actually enjoyed a recent minor comeback.

What is the point of all this?

Two things:

1. The leverage that terrorists can enjoy is simply enormous. It takes a whole society to effectively eliminate a few dozen or a few score who can do enormous damage in the meantime;
2. Most important, with respect to Iraq, it does not take a popularly based resistance to do this kind of damage. We might at some point end up facing a popularly-based resistance in Iraq, but what we are facing today is predominantly a rear-guard action by the murderers and sadists who abused Iraq for 35 years.

The frequency of suicide bombings in Baghdad and around the country certainly is not evidence of popular opposition. In fact, on the hopeful side, this terrorism might inspire more popular hostility to the terrorists and their allies.

However, to convert popular hostility into effective action, Iraqis need to be convinced that we (and they) will win. This is a crucial moment when many Iraqis are sitting on the fence, weighing the risks involved in supporting us. We need to do everything we can to encourage the many brave ones who are ready to fight for their future. Capturing Saddam has given these people a big shot in the arm. Trying him would be even better.

6/21
0900

72

In reply refer to EF-9320 & 041005404-ES

APR 20 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

Paul Butler
6/23

Scud
SUBJECT: Advice

What do you think about this fourth recommendation of Cerhard **Caper**?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/19/04 Haynes memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
041904-9

.....
Please respond by

4/30/04

SOB 6/24
C 6/23

Sir,

Response attached.

vr
/CDR Nosenzo
6/23

OSD 11636-04


11-L-0559/OSD/43538

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20 APR 04


C4119

April 19, 2004

For: Secretary of Defense

From: W.J. Haynes, General Counsel 

Subject: Advice from Gerhard Casper

- I spoke with Gerhard earlier today about three topics:
 - He continues to urge that we release the detainees at Guantanamo (GTMO). (He also promised to provide me comments on your proposed long-term review procedures for those that we don't release.)
 - He observed that, if the Supreme Court rules that GTMO is not within the jurisdiction of U. S. courts, then "a technicality is being celebrated over substance."
 - He recommended that we preserve an exit strategy for Iraq by negotiating an open-ended Status of Forces Agreement (or its equivalent), in which the U.S. states that it will remove its armed forces if ever asked by the legitimate government of Iraq.
- 



DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
3030 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D C 20301-3030

UNCLASSIFIED

As of February 7, 2006 4:00 PM

**RESPONSE TO SNOWFLAKE FOR THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ON DESALINIZATION**

Robert Rangel

4/4 From: Mr. John J. Young, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering,

(b)(6)

- Desalination research is coordinated through the Expeditionary Unit Water Purification Program, executed by the Office of Naval Research.
- The White Paper provided by former Secretary Schultz is similar to past proposals Aqua Via has submitted to DoD, but contains less technical detail.
- The last water purification proposal Agua Via submitted was in response to a Broad Area Announcement (BAA) in January 2005. The Agua Via proposal was one of forty requested by the Office of Naval Research. 18 proposals were selected to be funded; the Agua Via proposal was not. (Tab C provides greater details)
- The Aqua Via proposal was focused largely on computer modeling. The proposal did not provide sufficient scientific and technical detail or an experimental proof-of-principle plan.
- A DDR&E technical staff expert examined the technical comments of that review and concluded that the proposal was fairly assessed. I can provide more details if you desire.
- More promising research based on artificial biological structures was recommended and is now underway.
- The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology (Dr. Slotter) has contacted Aqua Via (Ms. Pergamit) and will assist Agua Via in interfacing with DoD programs relevant to their technology interests.

Prepared by: Dr. André van Tilborg/DUSD(S&T) (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED



OSD 02314-06

11-L-0559/OSD/43540

~~FOUO~~

January 30, 2006

To: John Young
CC: Ron Sega
Robert Rangel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Desalinization Information from George Shultz

Whatever happened on that desalinization activity that I sent you from George Shultz?

Thanks.

DHR:as
013006-11

.....
Please Respond By 02/16/06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43541

OSD 02314-06

SEP. 28. 2003 12:11PM

GEORGE SHULTZ

NO: 040

P. 1



VIA FACSIMILE
(763) 693-0100

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

THOMAS W. AND JUDITH A. FORD

DEVELOPMENTAL FELLOWS

September 28, 2003

Dear Don,

Peter Rodman and his team were out here yesterday and we had what I think was a good discussion of the issues involved in communicating with the world of Islam. Peter has a copy for you of the written material we used.

I also gave him a copy of a book on demographics that I think is very informative. I challenge you to put it in your briefcase sometime when you're going on a trip and take a little time to leaf through it. You will find it genuinely enlightening about how the future may unfold.

I enclose a white paper on desalinization and purification that I mentioned to you on the telephone. The essence is the invention of a nano-nuclear membrane that can be configured in a variety of ways depending on the problem. I think this is pretty exciting stuff that could have broad military and, of course, civilian use. Apparently China's interior ministry is anxious to get its hands on this out of concern for water purification.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "George".

George P. Shultz

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
U.S. Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880
Washington, D.C. 20330

Enclosure

WHITE PAPER

Nano-Molecular Membranes For Water Desalination and Purification

September 2005

Use and Disclosure of Data

This proposal includes data that shall not be disclosed outside the Government and shall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed – in whole or in part – for any purpose other than to evaluate this proposal. However, if a contract is awarded to this offeror as a result of – or in connection with – the submission of these data, the Government shall have the right to duplicate, use, or disclose the data to the extent provided in the resulting contract. This restriction does not limit the Government's right to use information contained in these data if they are obtained from another source without restriction. The data subject to this restriction are contained in Sheets 1-15 inclusive.

Agua Via, LLC

agua: water
via: way, path

AQUA VIA, LLC
330 Beach Road
Burlingame, California 94010
Contact: Gayle Pergamit
Phone: 650/227-7777

(b)(6)

Agua Via, LLC 330 Beach Road, Burlingame, California 94010 650-227-7777

Use or disclosure of data contained on this sheet is subject to the restriction on the title page of this proposal.

1

11-L-0559/OSD/43543

AGUA: water

VIA: way, path

SUMMARY: Based on nanotechnology research work begun in 1997, a novel filtration technology has been developed which has the promise of broadly revolutionizing water purification, water remediation and desalination costs, purity and delivery systems. This technology was designed from its inception to deal with the challenging environmental, performance and financial considerations of this field.

Desalination and water purification based on this Smart Membrane™ technology is anticipated to:

- Deliver "full spectrum"™ filtration: filtering against the full spectrum of contaminants and delivering only pure water.
- Operate under a virtually complete range of environmental conditions and handle a virtually complete range of feedstock water
- Operate at the lowest energy thermodynamically possible for purification – 1 psi. Systems can be gravity-driven.
- Drop desalination costs by over 2/3rds by operating at the lowest energy thermodynamically possible for desalination of brackish or seawater – 1 psi plus 10 degrees of temperature change
- Present the smallest footprint theoretically possible. A Smart Membrane filtration cube measuring 165mm (6.5 inches) per side could produce 100,000 gallons of purified water per day at 1 psi
- Be completely scalable from municipal systems to individual use in the field. Individual use for full spectrum filtration could be as simple as a 27" long tube over a filter cartridge, allowing gravity to do the work.
- Drop maintenance costs and requirements by the simplest maintenance and operation modes of "filter and forget"™. No cleaning, recharging, backflushing, etc.
- Provide reliability and robustness: purification with no moving parts (except at atomic scale.)
- Introduce potential non-fouling and non-scaling ability by using biological techniques that provide non-fouling filtration in nature
- Deliver commercially-competitive performance lifetimes
- Reduce the cost of desalination to approximately that of water purification
- Replace partial water purification with complete purification at no increased cost.

"Water, like energy in the late 1970s, will probably become the most critical natural resource issue facing most parts of the world by the start of this century."

- The Financial Times of London

SMART MEMBRANE IMPACTS.

This technology is anticipated to make a significant impact on world water crisis, and issues facing the U.S. at home and abroad including hostile contamination of water supplies.

Calculations indicate that these membranes could produce 205 gallons per square foot per day (gfd) operating at <1 psi, and utilizing techniques other than high pressure to accommodate the osmotic gradient during desalination. At this filtration rate, high volume, high quality water purification and desalination could be provided within a small footprint: a Smart Membrane cube measuring 165mm (6.5 inches) per side could produce 100,000 gallons of purified water per day at 1 psi. For desalination, the cube would double in size and require 1 psi plus 10 degrees of temperature change.

The performance implications are:

- reduction in plant size and cost for both purification and desalination
- provide highest quality water purification at low cost
- eliminate the need for advance testing to identify contaminants.
- useful in a wide range of applications where size and energy are critical such as for peri-urban, rural or remote use off the power grid, emergency and military applications
- useful in a wide range of volume scales: from point of use solutions to small group or individual use in the field, mobile systems and municipal sizes systems in industrial, recreational, commercial, medical, agricultural, municipal, emergency and military settings
- can be packaged as low cost, reliable, low maintenance, easy to use systems which should even be applicable even in extreme rural environments.
- sufficiently low cost that it can be used for waste water remediation, elimination of endemic biologicals (e.g., Giardiasis), toxic solutes (e.g., arsenic) or other pollutants in rural communities worldwide.
- With the complexity built in at the atomic level, the user deals only with simple processes require minimal training and maintenance
- simple and safe technology appropriate for critical environments such as submarines, space applications

It is estimated that purification applications using membranes will be demonstrable in 18 months, and desalination applications ready in approximately three years.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Water quality and water quantity are a critical issue for the U.S., the rest of the G8 plus the developing world. In natural disasters and wars in extreme environments such as military, these dual problems are acute.

An abundant supply of high quality fresh water is essential as the basis for individual and community health, growth and industrial productivity and it is difficult to solve the problems of water quality and quantity were considered in the context of the world.

Agua Via, LLC 330 Beach Street, San Francisco, California 94010 650 227-7777

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Now, however, the definition of 'the world water crisis' encompasses 98 countries. The global-wide scientific understanding is that we have reached the end of the era of abundant, cheap, clean groundwater. According to the World Bank, the health and economies of more than 80 countries are threatened by current water shortages. Within the next 15-20 years, that problem will extend worldwide, including the U.S.

Except for a few locales which receive their water exclusively from annual snow pack runoff or from year-round rain, most of the world's fresh water supply is stored underground in aquifers - areas of porous rock which hold water like a sponge. These reservoirs may take on the order of 100,000 to 300,000 years to fill. Higher populations, the irrigated agriculture to feed those populations, and growth of industry during the 20th and 21st centuries have meant increasing water withdrawals from aquifers. These withdrawals exceed the natural recharge provided by rainfall. The wells and pumps used to tap aquifers are drilled ever deeper to chase the falling water levels. The ongoing water debt is independent of reduction in rainfall due to climate change, or cyclical fluctuations in rainfall patterns such as those that caused the Dust Bowl.



Some examples:

- The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation predicts the exhaustion of the aquifers underlying the western and mid-western United States by 2026. These aquifers required an estimated 100,000 years of rainfall to fill.
- In India, water tables are dropping by 30 inches per year.
- The aquifer which provides Australia's fresh water is predicted for exhaustion within 10 years. It is estimated that this aquifer had taken 300,000 years to fill with water. Throughout the continent, rivers are turning saline. The city of Perth (population 4M) is building a 45gigaliter desalination plant to come online in Aug 2006.
- China has officially recognized that approximately 400 out of 600 cities are short of water.
- More driven by water shortages are predicted to escalate over the next decades. More than a dozen nations receive >50% of their fresh water from rivers that cross borders of hostile neighbors. Currently, water stress contributes to areas of conflict in the Middle East. The wars of this century are predicted to be over water shortages.

Ogallala Aquifer

Ninety-five percent of the United States' fresh water is underground. As farmers in the Texas High Plains pump groundwater faster than rain replenishes it, the water tables are dropping. North America's largest aquifer, the Ogallala, is being depleted at a rate of 12 billion cubic meters (bom) a year. Total depletion to date amounts to some 325 bom, a volume equal to the annual flow of a Colorado River. The Ogallala stretches from Texas to South Dakota and waters one fifth of US irrigated land.

- The BBC



Fresh water could be acquired by "desalinating" high solute wastewater, or by desalinating seawater or the brackish water which underlies most continents. However, today this process is done using reverse osmosis technology whose high energy demands produce fresh water at a price which is 8 to 10 times that of purifying fresh water (not assuming any increase in energy prices from 2004). The impact of such cost increases on industry, which uses 20% of all water, and agriculture - which uses 70+% often at artificially low prices - would be significant.

In contrast, Smart Membrane technology is anticipated to provide desalination of waste water, brackish or seawater at a cost roughly equivalent to that of current fresh water purification.


WATER QUALITY ISSUES

Worldwide, 24% of all fresh water is now polluted and in countries such as China as much as 75% of all water is contaminated. New U.S. rules will require purification of these contaminants, at the cost of billions. Water quality issues derive in part from natural contamination from substances such as boron, bacterial and viral infestations, and from man-made contaminants. For example:

- man-made pollutants, such as chemicals from manufacturing operations, or product residue such as the MBTE which contaminates the Los Angeles water supply. Contamination may be accidental or deliberate, as in terrorist threat.
- bacteria and viruses. Bacteria or viral contamination is often discovered only after illness or fatalities are traced back to the water supply. To date, the largest U.S. problem resulting in disease and death involved 400,000 people in Michigan. Some bacteria and viruses have been further spread by human activity, such as the giardia and cryptosporidium contamination from livestock waste throughout rural US communities with farming operations. According to the EPA, approximately 95% of all U.S. municipalities are small systems serving populations of less than 5,000 and lacking resources to build improved their water purify. Terrorist scenarios envision deliberate contamination.

- ### Number of People at Risk From Arsenic Poisoning

US - unknown
Mexico - 400,000
Chile - 437,000
Bolivia - 8,000
Argentina - 2,000,000
Hungary - 20,000
Romania - 38,000
India - 1,000,000
Bangladesh - 80,000,000
Thailand - 1,000
Vietnam - millions
Taiwan - 200,000
China - 720,000
Nepal - unknown
Source - Jack Ng, University
of Queensland, Australia



example of this lack of precision is the presence of inflammation-causing endotoxins in "ultra pure" medical water for dialysis. Another example is the filtration technology used by DoD and emergency services for hydrating a sports drink or meal package; in order to let the water through, the filter also lets through a very small toxin, urea.

Although people will pay handsomely for bottled water, general water purification is an extremely price sensitive business. Traditionally, a disease outbreak signals that a

problem exists. Municipal water systems usually have tremendous difficulty providing any improvement which increases costs.

Smart Membrane purification, providing full spectrum filtration, does not require identification of a new threat or higher cost to provide superior protection. It does not require the traditional higher energy used for filtration at the smallest end of the pollutant range. Yet it will provide water purer than that found in medical treatment centers. The definition of the desired, potable water end product (water plus *anti-bio*) means that other chemical or biological species are not allowed to pass the membrane. No testing is required to determine what chemical, biological or other species of threat is present. In this way, the highest purity water could be consistently provided in the "filter and forget" mode, and at no additional cost for the increased purity.

Agua Via products are anticipated to provide such full spectrum filtration to create good, potable water, eliminating all bacteria, viruses, parasites, cysts, amoebae, chemical and biological warfare agents, poisons, toxins, arsenic, boron, spores of pathogens, nitrogenous wastes from constructed fertilizer or excrement, heavy metals, etc. This includes the common problems of dysentery, typhoid, cholera, polio virus, or minerals such as arsenic and fluoride. Good water becomes available at low cost for all needs: drinking, sanitation, hygiene and waste water reclamation. Adding Agua Via filtration to municipal systems would eliminate many contamination issues including the pervasive arsenic problem and the threat of contamination posed by herbicide.

OTHER TECHNOLOGIES PROVIDE INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS

Conventional technologies date from the 1800's (water purification) through the 1950's (reverse osmosis). Over the decades, conventional technologies have continued to make incremental gains as inventive engineers have found ways to extract bits of efficiency in creative ways. In some cases, such as multi-stage flush for treatment, take advantage of special circumstances, such as building a power plant and a water filtration plant together in order to use the abundant waste heat from the power plant. In general, however, these technologies have been out competed by membrane desalination technologies or conventional water purification techniques.

Water purification, and desalination are demanding applications in demanding environments. Experimental technologies which look good in limited performance environments in the lab commonly fail when tested in the field because of inability to deal with feedstock complexity, or other demands of the in-field environment. Adding the demanding financial requirements for water filtration or desalination can also eliminate a prospective technology or limit its use to a highly confined arena. Currently, carbon nanotubes are enjoying promotion as a water handling technology; they will have to face their limited adsorption capacity - after which small pollutants would just flow through, high manufacturing costs, lack of anti-fouling properties and attendant high maintenance costs to find any broad market acceptance.

In order to provide the necessary order of magnitude improvements to both costs and quality of filtration, truly new technology is needed that is capable of functioning in the

Membrane and Desalination

DEFINITION OF AN IDEAL PURIFICATION SOLUTION

- Able to clean up the full spectrum of possible contaminants with a single technology
- Lowest energy thermodynamically possible for water purification, waste water remediation and desalination. In the field, no external power source required.
- Technically simple and robust
- Greatest non-fouling and non-scaling capability ever applied to water purification or desalination.
- No ongoing maintenance requirements: eliminating chemicals, backflushing, plant downtime
- Low cost to manufacture
- Scalable from small point-of-use solutions (in the home or field) to handling large volume applications for urban water supplies.
- Long performance lifetime.
- Rapid purification of large volumes of water

SMART MEMBRANE TECHNOLOGY

The Smart Membrane core technology was designed from inception to provide ultra-specific filtration in rigorous real-world environments at the lowest energy and lowest total cost (infrastructure, maintenance, training, etc.) possible. Developing a technology capable of dealing with the highly complex set of issues involved in water purification and desalination was a key consideration in the basic design of Smart Membranes. The implication of working to the rigorous nanotechnology definition of "complete control at the atomic scale" provides unprecedented benefits in such areas as exfoliate filtration specificity, high filtration performance, low energy requirements, non-fouling in the face of multiple complex feedstocks and the other criteria need to be an ideal solution to water purification and desalination needs.

Although a Smart Membrane is only a few atomic layers thick (.05-.22 nm), it consists of three distinct parts:

1. A protective top layer is designed to amplify non-fouling characteristics, amplify water ordering to further reduce energy costs, and extend the working life of the Smart Membrane. This protective layer can be custom engineered on an atom-by-atom level of design to provide a specificity previously found only in living systems. As a result, many of nature's successful anti-fouling strategies can be applied for the first time.
2. A one-atomic layer thick nanomembrane is directly under the protective top coating. This is where the work of filtration and separation is carried out. The nanomembrane is designed and built to provide only the desired end product - usually either potable water (water plus earth salts), or water that is completely salt free. This membrane eliminates anything other than the specific class of water that the customer wants. At one atomic layer thick, this membrane offers no impedance to flow.

The one-atom-thick nanomembrane is the key to the benefits which a Smart Membrane can deliver. Unlike the way conventional membranes are constructed through bulk

processes, each nanomembrane self-assembles from a collection of custom designed, pharmacologically-built pores.

Smart Membranes result from the creation of a new class of extremely selective, biomimetic Smart Pores™ which assemble into thin (0.5nanometer-22nanometer) porous nanomembranes. These porous monolayer membranes have specific structures that provide a low energy barrier to the passage of water or specific solutes, while providing a high barrier to other solutes. This technology shows highly specific molecular filtration at the atomic scale and profound transport properties such as exquisite ion selectivity characteristics.

Each pore has been designed and built with complete atomic precision in exactly the same way that a pharmaceutical is designed and built. Often the design of the pore's interior may mimic the active filtration portion in cell membrane proteins, such as aquaporin, nature's water channel. By eliminating the voluminous support structures in the natural aquaporin and building only the "business part" of the molecule, a Smart Pore can move water even faster than its natural counterpart.

Because of this tight atomic design control, a pore need not be built to merely exclude contaminants based on their size, but can also be built to eliminate classes of contaminants based on their complete chemical identity including atomic shape, electrical charge, hydrophobicity, hydrophilicity, etc. This demonstrated ability means, for example, that a complex, mixed waste stream including a wide range of 400,000 different contaminants, earth salts, urea and water can deliver just potable water (water and earth salts). The major technical achievement demonstrated here is that even though the urea (a known toxin) is smaller than the earth salts, urea is rejected based on its electronic characteristics rather than size.

The exterior of each pore has a distinct top, bottom and sides. Think of a Leggo block with a hole in the center. The hole does the filtering work, but the top, bottom and side attachment sites on the Leggo let it snap together with other Leggo blocks. The sides of the pores attach to each other to form the nanomembrane the way the sides of Leggo blocks snap together to form a plane.

On the top surface, this snap-on ability allows the precision building of the protective top layer (discussed above) which can be specifically designed to prevent bacterial fouling, scaling and other forms of fouling while also enhancing water ordering to further reduce energy demands.

On the bottom surface, the snap-on ability allows the pores in the nano-membrane to attach to a thicker, porous substrate.

3. The porous substrate. The porous substrate answers the question of how to handle a nanomembrane that is only one atomic layer thick. The porous substrate is a thin film, much like a thinner version of Saran Wrap, with a regular array of holes in it. The porous substrate is a passive, structural component. Its purpose is strictly to support the nanomembrane, allow for handling during manufacturing and contribute to the working lifespan of the membrane. The nanomembrane does the actual work of filtration; the porous substrate lets the water flow on through.

TECHNOLOGY-DERIVED BENEFITS

This basic technology enables the delivery the application-critical benefits, as exemplified in the following four key areas:

1. Ultra specificity in filtration
2. Low maintenance through non-fouling, non-scaling characteristics
3. Ultra small device footprint coupled with ultra high performance
4. Ultra low Energy requirements

1. **Specificity.** Previously, the ability to create potable water by removing urea, even though the urea is smaller than the earth salts, was described. This is an unprecedented technical achievement, and a strong demonstration of exquisite control over specificity of filtration. Because pores can be built to absolute specification -- different sizes, shapes, charges, etc. -- this ability can be tuned to apply specific filtration to any class of problem required.

Agua Via products are anticipated to provide such full spectrum filtration to create good, potable water eliminating all bacteria, viruses, parasites, cysts, amoebas, chemical and biologic warfare agents, poisons, toxins, arsenic, boron, spores of pathogens, nitrogenous waste from commercial fertilizer or excrement, heavy metals, nanobacteria, etc. This includes the common problems of dysentery, typhoid, cholera, polio virus, or minerals such as arsenic and fluoride. Good water becomes available at low cost for all needs: drinking, sanitation, hygiene and waste water redemption. Adding Agua Via filtration to municipal systems would eliminate many contamination issues including the pervasive arsenic problem and the threat of contamination posed by terrorists.

2. **Low Maintenance.** A membrane, no matter, how perfect its ability to filter, is useless if it is clogged. Scale buildup in water with notable mineral content is one such problem. Bacteria are another prime problem; they attach to surfaces and form rock hard biofilm which impairs or ends filter performance. Conventional membranes are backflushed and bleached with harsh chemicals to kill bacteria or to descale; this requires plant downtime and creates maintenance expense.

The Smart Membrane's ability to address problem through specificity at the atomic level opens unprecedented opportunities to control these problems. For example, the technology of the Smart Membrane provides multiple strategies to defeat biofilm formation. Some strategies are at the level of the pores and nanomembrane, and others are employed by the protective top coating, creating a total anti-bacterial environment.

One major strategy of bacteria is to use the thread-like pill (seen here surrounding the main body of an E. coli bacterium) as grappling hooks to establish a foothold on a surface. But E. coli's pill, for example, measure 660 angstroms in diameter and are too big to snag onto any feature in a Smart Membrane. The pill are 100



Agua Via, LLC 330 Beach Road, Burlingame, California 94010 650-227-7777

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Use or disclosure of data contained on this sheet is subject to the restriction on the title page of this proposal.

times bigger than an individual pore's exterior of 85 angstroms, and 260 times bigger than a purification pore's interior dimensions of 25 angstroms.

Both the nanomembrane and the protective layer above it appear to these bacteria as absolutely smooth, featureless surfaces. The structures of both the protective layer and the nanomembrane are too small to be used by bacteria.

Laminar flow is also known to inhibit bacteria's ability to form biofilm. The environment bacteria encounter is optimized for laminar flow; they are swept along with no ability to attach to a surface.

Other bacteria do not use pili, but colonize by laying down a slime layer. But both classes of bacteria are known to have characteristics which can be used to inhibit biofilm formation. Both classes of bacteria prefer a hydrophobic surface on which to begin colonization. Bacteria are also known to be vulnerable to a range of anti-microbial chemical and pharmaceutical agents. Therefore, among the design requirements for the protective layer is to present a bacteria-hostile, hydrophilic surface studded with anti-microbial destruct points, and optimized for laminar flow.

This ability to design with atomic precision has never been available before. It means that many strategies for preventing fouling and scaling, or strategies for precision filtration are made available for the first time. In addition, this is setup up for continual filtration over a long life span. Unlike bulky tubes, activated charcoal or deionization media which ultimately saturate, a nanomembrane simply filters: undesirable classes of contaminants cannot pass through the membrane and are dumped to waste. Desirable pure filtrate water passes through the pore and is captured.

3. Small Footprint, High Performance. Attached to their Saran-Wrap-like porous substrate, the complete Smart Membranes are only 0.5 microns thick. In contrast with conventional membranes which are 35 times thicker. Therefore, a huge amount of filtration capability fits into a very small footprint. Calculations indicate that one square foot of membrane could produce 206 gallons of purified water per day operating at <1 psi. At this filtration rate, high volume water purification could be provided within a small footprint: a Smart Membrane cube measuring 165mm (6.5 inches) per side could produce 100,000 gallons per day at 1 psi. A city of 5 Million people with a 600 gigaliter annual water need could be met with 5,000 such cubes.

4. Low Energy Requirements. Because these membranes are so thin, very little energy is required for their operations. Because these membrane structures are so thin, it is useful to think about them in quantum mechanical terms rather than classical fluid mechanical terms. Dr. William Deen of MIT has described these pores as "orifices" offering no impedance to flow, rather than as conventional "pores."

With low pressure drops across a nanomembrane 0.5 nanometers thick, high flux is produced at very low pressure differential. In fact, the impedance to flow is created by the porous substrate - although its job is to provide support, the rate limit on how fast water can be processed is how long it takes to flow through the "thick" substrate.

In the most energy efficient mode, a filtration cartridge would sit at the bottom of a tube with a 27" head of water. At 1 psi, gravity does the work to purify the water.

SMART MEMBRANES AND DESALINATION

The most expensive form of creating potable water or water completely lacking salt is desalination. Excluding any recent rise in the cost of energy, today desalination of seawater can cost over \$1,000US per acre-foot. Water with less salt in it (brackish water) costs less to clean because the lower salt content drops the amount of pressure required. Although Tampa Bay, Florida had once hoped to desalinate a mix of brackish water and seawater at a cost of only \$650US per acre-foot, the potential cost reduction was due to favorable financing terms, not technical breakthroughs. Even at Tampa Bay's target cost, this still leaves desalination open only to energy and cash rich countries of the First World and the Middle East.

The claims of dramatically lower cost desalination which used to be made by the Tampa Bay, Florida project are now being made by the Ashkelon project in Israel. These numbers, which have even been quoted by the Congressional Budget Office as reflecting the current price of desalination, are again based strictly on financing deals which have been described in the industry experts as "brilliant." According to desalination experts within the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, these systems contain no technological contribution to increased efficiency. The true cost of desalination remains unchanged. In fact, Tampa Bay failed to meet its technical performance goals by 60% and is currently undergoing re-engineering.

Energy is the largest cost component of desalination; annually, energy costs generally match capital costs. A \$400M plant can expect to generate a \$400M annual energy bill, assuming no price increases for energy. A dominant percentage of the capital costs are also derived from the energy requirement, e.g., high pressure pumps, energy recovery systems.

The final stage of purification -- in which the water and salt are separated -- accounts for 89% of the energy cost. Of that energy cost, roughly 2/3rd is due to overcoming 1) the long and 2) tortuous path of the pores in conventional membranes. Only 1/3rd is due to overcoming the osmotic gradient of the salt.

The Smart Membrane's extreme thinness and lack of tortuous paths immediately eliminates the 2/3rd energy penalty experienced by conventional membranes. Significant as this cost reduction is, the impact of moving to a low-energy/low pressure mode ripples through the overall design of any water system, accounting for an additional reduction of both the capital cost and labor costs. Concomitantly, eliminating high pressure pumps, energy recovery systems (little wasted energy to recover), certain pretreatment systems, reducing system complexity and maintenance costs may provide overall cost reductions on the order of 60 or 70% for a Smart Membrane seawater desalination system.

SMART MEMBRANE TECHNOLOGY MODIFICATION AND DESALINATION

The differences between using a Smart Membrane for desalination, as opposed to water purification are:

1. For use in desalination, a smaller pore must be used than the basic water purification pore. A water purification pore can pass up to 4 water molecules at a time. For desalination, the pore must be capable of passing only 2 water molecules at a time.

2. Further "snap on" chemistry must be used to overcome the osmotic gradient.
3. In addition to the 1 psi energy requirement, 10 degrees of temperature change would be needed
4. The footprint would expand: the equivalent of two 6.5' cubes would now be needed to provide 100,000 gallons of desalinated water, instead of one cube.

OVERCOMING OSMOTIC GRADIENT WITH A SMART MEMBRANE SYSTEM

Conventional desalination today uses reverse osmosis with thick polymer membranes. To push the water through the membrane and leave the salt behind requires pressures ranging from 180 psi (for use with brackish water) up to 1400 psi (for use with seawater). In each case, 2/3rds of the pressure is used to overcome the tortuosity and the thickness of the membranes. The remaining 1/3rd is to overcome the osmotic gradient with salt water on one side of a membrane and fresh water on the other side, the more concentrated salt solution "wants" to pull more fresh water onto its side until the salt content is evenly balanced between both sides. In reverse osmosis, the additional pressure is placed on the salt side to push fresh water through the membrane and away from the salt.

Because of the Smart Membrane's extreme thinness, the penalty for overcoming the tortuosity and thickness of conventional membranes is eliminated. Therefore, 2/3rds of the pressure requirement and 2/3rds of the energy cost disappear.

This leaves the remaining issue of dealing with osmotic gradient and reducing its attendant costs. Recently, a different technique has been used to eliminate the need for high pressure in dealing with an osmotic gradient: forward osmosis. The most widely known example has been the DoD's use of the technique for rehydrating food packages or sports drinks using a warfighter's urine or waste water. In this technique, a contaminated solution (urine or unsafe water) is placed on one side of the membrane. Sugar is placed on the other side of the membrane. The sugar draws the liquid in the contaminated solution across the membrane until there is an osmotic balance between the two sides. The membrane, to the best of its ability, separates water from contaminants. The user now has a sports drink or a hydrated food package.

Note that this technique produces purified water, not desalinated water (water free from a high solute content).

The disadvantages of this technique which limit its usefulness are:

- unless the desired end product is a sports drink or a hydrated food package, the user now has water contaminated by sugar or some other substance which would require purification.
- once the sugar or food packet is used up, more sugar or another sorbent must be imported to process the next batch of water. This makes the technique expensive and impractical.
- As used today with conventional membranes, urea also passes along with the water and salts into the sports drink or hydrated food package. Urea is a known toxin, and too much exposure will cause kidney failure.

However, moved to a level of atomic precision, this forward osmosis technique can be modified to overcome its disadvantages and made useful for desalination. For desalination with a Smart Membrane, a reusable, high density ("thirsty") molecular sponge can be engineered and snapped onto the base of the Smart Membrane. The sponge would soak up water from the bottom of the pores until saturation is reached. A few degrees of temperature change would be required to "wring" the sponge out and release the water into the catch chamber. The sponge is now ready to soak up another batch of water. As abundantly demonstrated in nature, many other systems commonly load and release over prolonged lifetimes. By designing and building at the atomic scale, these systems can be borrowed and modified for use elsewhere.

SUMMARY

Smart Membranes represent a new technology based on building materials which mimic the way nature performs filtration, selection, and protection against biofilm and scale formation. This technology is anticipated to outperform any known or planned competitors. The benefits include operating in an ultra-low energy mode, and producing highly pure and highly specific filtration.

Smart Membrane technology is anticipated to be applicable and superior for applications in:

- Desalination applications, including both seawater and brackish water.
- Purification applications, ranging from high purity semiconductor, other industrial and medical uses through home drinking water.
- Remediation of both waste water and polluted ground water.

Their specific technical capabilities include:

- Unique "full-spectrum" filtration of any mix of contaminants in the water feedstock
- The highest purity possible
- The lowest cost possible
- The lowest energy requirements possible
- Extreme flexibility of capacity, from municipal scale to hand held units in the field, in an extremely small footprint. A 6.5" cube is anticipated to provide 100,000 gallons of purified water per day.
- "Filter and forget" robustness under tough conditions.

Applying Smart Membranes to the problems of water purification and desalination holds the potential to positively impact the world water crisis and the many dimension which water shortage or impure water represents: health, agricultural productivity, industrial

productivity, and conflict between nations. Because the technology combines high performance with low total costs (product costs, energy, infrastructure, maintenance, training, etc.), it is anticipated to have major impact at opposite ends of the spectrum.

1. High Performance Venues. In addition to water users with high purity demands, such as semiconductor manufacturers or medical applications, organizations such as the US DoD services, whose needs encompass and surpass those requirements are anticipated to derive value from Smart Membrane technology. The DoD operates in the most extreme environmental and logistical conditions, and is required to deal with the fullest array of water quality and water quantity problems. In addition, their operation is usually subject to the strictest footprint, weight, component resupply, volume issues, maintenance and safety requirements. The range is exemplified by the need for desalination and purification occurring everywhere from submarines at depth to individual warfighters on the ground facing CBW contaminated water, or no liquids at all except for their own sweat and urine.

2. Low Cost/High Volume. Municipal systems and point of use applications both in the U.S. and internationally are anticipated to be used by those seeking higher purity fresh water at low cost, or desalinated water at low cost to cope with water shortages. At a competitive price point, the Smart Membrane technology could provide cost-effective desalination to the American mid-west as well as cost-effective water purification against the problems such as arsenic, giardia, etc. Expressed interest in Smart Membranes has come from Australia, Singapore, China and India in addition to European partners. Introduction in some venues, such as the water-short Middle East, may assist in reducing tensions and increasing prosperity.

Various new paradigms of how water is delivered may well evolve, and with them new paradigms for living, conducting business or military operations. For example, municipal systems may become more widely distributed. Countries with substandard infrastructure may opt for home point of use systems to augment central municipal facilities. Military operations may be more flexible once the logistical burdens of water provision are lifted.

By combining high performance with low cost, Smart Membranes hold a potential solution to seemingly intractable problems involving water quality and water quantity.

Paul Armistead
Office of Naval Research, Code 331
875 N. Randolph Street
Arlington, VA 22203
(b)(6)
(b)(6)

Response to Aqua Via Desalination Paper

Gayle Pergamit submitted similar white papers and a proposal to ONR BAA 05-005 Science and Technology in Water Desalination and Purification, January 2005. The BAA was part of a congressional program sponsored from Senator Domenici's office: Expeditionary Unit Water Purification Program, EUWP. Through this congressional, ONR is interested in research towards lowering the costs associated with water purification and desalination.

Working with Martin Edelstein and the company Covalent Industrial Technologies, LLC Gayle Pergamit submitted two white papers. The proposed work was primarily computer modeling (by Edelstein) to determine which sort of cyclic molecules could desalinate water. At the time, the company claimed to have developed a successful kidney dialysis membrane based on molecular computations. Two white papers were submitted to get around the cap of \$250k per year. ONR received about 300 white papers and asked for about 40 full proposals (with intent to fund about 15-20). We requested that Pergamit and Edelstein: (1) combine their two white papers into one proposal; (2) show some of the 'successful chemistry' from their kidney dialysis product; (3) and come up with a proposal that resulted in proof of concept within two years. The proposal had significantly more detail than the white papers and significantly more detail than the current white paper from Aqua Via. The reviewer comments below show that at the time, it was still high risk/ high reward research and that none of the reviewers were comfortable even with the level of detail in the Covalent Industrial Technologies proposal. It was not recommended for funding.

Review comments from BAA 05-005, Covalent Industrial Technologies, Pergamit, Edelstein

Reviewer 1:

We got this proposal two years ago. They had already developed the kidney and were looking for new markets. Now the proposal says the kidney dialysis membrane is still in development. This proposal is more cryptic. What is a "smart pore?" It sounds like the same technology proposed in #849. At any rate, this proposal will only search their molecule database and model it for the first year and in the second year make one pore. #849 was a better deal.

Reviewer 2:

The PI proposes to develop a monolayer macrocycle membrane for RO just like the artificial kidney success that they claim. The problem is that specific chemical detail is not given. The concept is great but though I believe the membranes would be frail. They

propose to use molecular modeling to develop macrocycles with 2 angstrom pores that will let only water pass. The macrocycles will assemble side by side on a substrate and be reacted to the surface so that one has a 1 molecule thick separation layer on a substrate. They say that hurdles such as ordering of the macrocycles and bonding them to the substrate have been overcome, even patented, but give very little details and don't list the patent. Still, approach is tempting, but year 1 is only modeling to select which macrocycles to make and test in year 2.

Reviewer 3:

The offeror proposes to develop an aquaporin like macrocyclic molecule which will self-assemble into a monomolecular membrane. Biological membranes use aquaporin transmembrane protein channels to separate and transport water molecules with a high selectivity and low resistance resulting in a low consumption of energy. The offeror plans to conduct a structural evaluation of their existing macromolecular library, conduct structural evaluation for chemical modification, if in the likely event no existing molecules will form a water pore, conduct molecular pore modeling, conduct pore testing, and evaluation of membrane formation and testing. This pattern follows the successful pattern used for the development of an artificial kidney membrane. The use of molecular modeling will enable rapid evaluation of macromolecules. There appears to be a high risk with the offerors proposed approach of developing a nanomolecular membrane that is only one molecule thick. This means that they must be able to form a perfect layer only one molecule thick or will have defects in the membrane, reducing rejection efficiency. This one molecular thick membrane must also be able to cover the surface of a rough support layer that will have a roughness exceeding the thickness of the membrane or they will have to fabricate a new support membrane that is extremely smooth, which is an entire project in itself. In order to overcome osmotic pressure with a thin, delicate membrane the offeror proposes to use a novel forward osmosis based on a temperature sensitive reusable polymer. No details are given on the expected driving force generated by this process or energy requirements of the recovery of water from the polymer. Without this data it is impossible to evaluate the overall system energy requirements and potential for enhancement over current state of the art.

Current White Paper from Agua Via, LLC, Pergamit

The white paper from Agua Via has the following problems:

1. Absolutely no detail is given on the chemistry of the one atom thick membrane rejection layer. It is doubtful that such a thin membrane could exclude solutes by any mechanism other than sieving. Aquaporin water channels (the molecular proteins that transport water through cell walls) in the body have an hour glass shaped pore with 20 angstroms or so length and embedded charges using both sieving and columbic repulsion to purify water.
2. Absolutely no detail is given on the rest of the membrane structure, which must be rugged enough for handling and winding into a module, have fine enough pore structure to support the atomic layer, not foul, and have no pressure drop across it. If they had such a support they could already sell it to industry.

3. Absolutely **no** detail is given on how such an atomic layer membrane is assembled to be pinhole free and adequately supported.

4. There are membrane techniques such as "direct contact membrane filtration" that can desalt water without application of pressure, just taking advantage of vapor pressure differences between cold and hot water. At a 10C temperature difference across the membrane, there is a very low flux of water from the feed to the treated water stream.

Also, for such an approach to work, thicker membranes with larger hydrophobic pores are desired.

There is **no** reason to consider this white paper any further. Work **on** this began in 1997 yet the proposer does not give any indication as to the current **state** of progress in the development of these smart membranes. Thus there is no reason to believe any of the anticipated benefits of this nonexistent technology. The lack of details is consistent with a previous proposal received by the *Office* of Naval Research. Additionally, Martin Edelstein, the researcher **on** the previous proposal, is not mentioned in the white paper and the qualifications of Gayle Pergamit are not given.

Paul Annistead

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Agua Via LLC Nano-Molecular Membranes

1. Purpose. To respond to the Agua Via Nano-Molecular Membrane Unsolicited Proposal.

2. Facts.

a. All U.S. Army tactical water purification equipment is required to purify and/or desalinate any potential source water. In general, the Army is interested in research that could lead to the reduction in costs or increased availability of water purification equipment at the tactical and individual soldier level. Current purification systems are based on membrane technology using microfiltration or ultrafiltration followed by reverse osmosis.

b. In November of 2004, individuals from the Army Tank-Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) reviewed a white paper from Agua Via LLC on Nano-Molecular Membranes in support of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Expeditionary Unit Water Purification Program (EUWP). The ONR EUWP program is currently funding two projects investigating biomimetic membranes. The white paper purposed from Agua Via LLC was not selected by ONR for award.

c. The white paper from Agua Via LLC does not provide enough information **to assess the potential** of the proposed technology. Potential technical issues not fully addressed are the ability to create defect free membranes on a large scale and the elimination of fouling (choked with a foreign substance).

d. The proposed method of desalination, which requires heating water 10 degrees, will require approximately 11 watt-hours per liter. The Affordable Desalination Collaboration, a non-profit organization of commercial and government agencies, has recently demonstrated membrane based desalination with commercial technology at 2 watt-hours per liter. Therefore, from an energy efficiency standpoint, the proposed approach does not appear attractive.

Jeff Ernat / (b)(6)
Approved by Mary Miller
Office of ASA(ALT)

COORDINATION

DARPA	<i>TONY TETHER</i>	6 FEB 06
ASA(ALT)	MARY MILLER	6 FEB 06
ONR	PAUL ARMISTEAD	6 FEB 06

APR 20 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RA*
SUBJECT: Marines Performing Protocol-type Duties

Please have someone find out how many Marines, at any given time, are involved with Embassy guard duty and various other protocol-type things like that around the world.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041904-7

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

Del 4/21

SecDef —

*I sent a short note
into you correcting what
Gen Hagee told you —
he changed his number to
1200 Marines worldwide!*

C 4/21

020Marines

1200

APR 20 2004

TO: Mike Wynne

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
Doug Feith
Mira Ricardel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Program Director for Missile Defense Site

Someone tells me that the program director for the missile defense site has been reassigned back to Kadish's headquarters. Is that so?

If so, does it make sense with the deployment date so near?

It may be the exact right thing to be doing just now, but please get back to me with some thoughts on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041904-1

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

11-L-0559/OSD/43564

OSD 11638-04

02005MD

204PR04

APR 23 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Honor Cordons

I don't think we ought to be doing honor cordons for anyone but defense ministers, prime ministers or presidents. I don't think we ought to do them for finance ministers and foreign ministers.

It is embarrassing if Paul does them for some, and I don't do them for others.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042204-5

.....
Please respond by

4/20/04

11-L-0559/OSD/43565

OSD 11639-04

092

23 APR 04

APR 23 2004

TO: Gen. Mike Hagee

CC: Gordon England
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Marine Deployments

FILE
4/27

370

Mike, our meeting yesterday was helpful, but I still do not have conviction on the advantage of a 7-month deployment over a 12-month deployment.

As you recall, I asked you to come back to me soon and lay out how your Marines are arranged – how many where, doing what? Additionally, I would like for you to re-address the deployment length issue – show me how that plays out over time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042004-5

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

4/27


Sir,
Interim response, request
for additional time, attached.
vr/cdr Nosenko
4/27

03APR04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE
The Senior Military Assistant

DB 4/27
4/27

Sec Def -

- Gen Hagee wants to personally come back to you on the 7 vs 12 month deployment issue.
- He is on travel plus a Marine Corps study on this won't be ready until after 5 May
- I checked w/ LT GEN Schwartz, JS, to determine if he knew any reason in the deployment timeline why this should not be delayed. He did not.
- Recommend we schedule Gen Hagee to see you on or about 10 May 



2004/27

26 Apr 2004

MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Secretary of Defense

Sw

Subj: SECDEF MEMO TO CMC DTD 23 APR 04; RE: MARINE DEPLOYMENTS

1. Subject memorandum requests that Gen Hagee come back to SecDef with additional information on how Marines are arranged globally and to readdress the deployment length issue and show how it plays out over time. The response is due by 30 Apr 2004.
2. Gen Hagee is currently on travel to the Pacific region and returns on 8 April. His itinerary includes visits to Australia, Singapore, and visits with Marines and families at Camp Pendleton on the return flight.
3. Additionally, the Marine Corps convened a force structure review group on 7 April and their findings are due mid-May. These findings should add greater definition to our response on both issues.
4. Due to the complexity and importance of these issues, Gen Hagee desires to personally present the response to you, Sir. Therefore, request the response date of 30 April be extended to 14 May.

Very respectfully,

W. L. NYLAND

APR 23 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 7

SUBJECT: Format for Read-Aheads

The current format for read aheads for press events, speeches or Congressional events could be improved. I would like to have more of the kind of information I actually need to know, and less of what I have been receiving.

Please include the following information, when applicable, in all future read-heads:

- **Event format:** when and where the meeting is, how long it is supposed to last, whether or not there will be Q&As, whether or not there is a podium, whether I am standing or sitting, etc.
- **Audience:** background information about the organization/group, who the people are, why they are there, the total number, and whether or not spouses are included.
- **Context/Substance:** who else is speaking to them, what are the topics other people speaking to them might cover, and what topics do you think would be appropriate for me to cover.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042104-5

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/43569

OSD 11641-04

312

23 Apr 04

720

APR 23 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: William Levi

Attached is a background sheet on an interesting possible summer intern. He clearly doesn't have security clearances, so we would have to use him someplace where that is not required, but he looks interesting.

Please let me know if you have any interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
Background sheet on William Levi

DHR:dh
042204-1

.....
Please respond by

5/7/04

03 APR 04

OSD 11642-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43570

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

I am a sophomore at Stanford University with a strong interest in national security and foreign policy. My grandfathers were Edward H. Levi and George A. Ranney. This summer I would very much like to serve as an intern for you or for one of your assistants.

Much of my academic study has concentrated on national security and defense. I have taken courses in international conflict and peacekeeping, technology in national security, and the politics and history of national defense. I am also co-director of the public policy forum of Stanford In Government, a non-partisan student organization that promotes discussion of national political issues.

Last summer I interned for the House Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. This was a wonderful experience, and I learned a lot about the legislative branch while also making myself useful in anyway that I could.

It would be a great honor to serve you and to be of whatever help I am able.

I have attached a copy of my resume. I know that you are extraordinarily busy. Thank you so much for your consideration, I am most grateful.

Sincerely,

William R. Levi

William R. Levi

PO Box 16438

Phone: (b)(6)

Email: wlevi@stanford.edu

OSD 05776-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43571

WILLIAM R. LEVI

P.O. BOX 16438 - STANFORD, C.A. 94309
 PHONE (b)(6) • E-MAIL (b)(6)

EDUCATION

Stanford University, Class of 2006 Palo Alto, CA
 o GPA: 3.99, Major: History/Political Science

REFERENCES

Professor Stephen L. Stedman (b)(6)
 o Senior Fellow, Center of International Security and Cooperation,
 Stanford Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.

Howard E. Wolf (b)(6)
 o President, Stanford Alumni Association

Beth Sokol (b)(6)
 o Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
 Security

WORK EXPERIENCE

United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary,
 Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.
 o Congressional Intern, Majority Staff, June/July 2003, Washington,
 D.C. Prepared memos for Chair, members, and counsel of
 subcommittee

Office of Congressman Robert T. Matsui
 o Office Intern, August/September 2003, Washington, D.C. and
 Sacramento, CA. Performed constituent services, case work, data
 system management

Capital Nursery Company, Citrus Heights, CA 2000

VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE

Project Read, Redwood City, CA, literacy program 2002-2003
 St. HOPE Academy, Sacramento, CA, tutor/mentor 2002
 Putnep Student Travel, Costa Rica Summer, 2001
 Orphanage Building Project, Mexico Fall, 2000
 Seeds of Learning, Nicaragua, rural housing construction Summer, 1999

ACTIVITIES

Director of Public Policy Forum, Stanford In Government 2003-2004
 o Organized political panel discussions/speaking events
 o Created a public policy course entitled "Current Trends in Policy
 Making."

Stanford Peer Academic Advisor (PAA) 2003-2004
 o peer counselor and academic mentor to freshmen students

Stanford Polo Club Autumn, 2002-2003

APR 23 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Aerial Photographs

Please have someone get some overhead photographs of Iraq for me, if they are available, like the one I have of the Korean peninsula. I would like to see ones from before the war, during the war, and every couple of months since the end of the war, so we can see if there is any visible change.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042204-9

.....
Please respond by

5/7/04

11-L-0559/OSD/43573

OSD 11643-04

THQ

23 April 04

April 23, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Embedded Reporters

Do we have embedded reporters with folks in Fallujah today?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-2

.....
Please respond by

4/30/04

DA 4/26
4/23

Sec Def

*The I MEF in Fallujah
has embedded media with
them. I have asked
our PA folks to find out
who they work for.*

C

23 April 04

720
APR 27 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Op-ed on Stress on the Force

I think we need a good op-ed on relieving stress on the force and the things I mentioned today in the meeting that I think Paul Butler made notes of. We have five or six things going on that are helping and we have to get ahead of the curve.

Let's get the thing done soon. Let's just set a deadline. Today is April 23. Let's have it ready next Friday, April 30.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-19

.....
Please *respond* by 4/30/04

27 April
OSD 11645-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43575

EF-940Z
04/005796

APR 27 2004

5/5 1.00
Paul Butler

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Dinar

Please find out what the dinar is doing. I am told the dinar is strong. If that is true, then things may be better than we think in Iraq. Is that possible?

How could things seem to be so difficult and have the dinar going up?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042604-17

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

Distro To BL Fw BRKJ
Date 28 Apr 04
Time 1015

DA 5/12
C 5/11
Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
5/11

OSD 11647-04

27-04-04 13:38 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/43576

JEH

27 April 04

@5/12

INFORMATION MEMO

MAY 04 2004

EF-9402
I-04/005796

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) *for [signature] DUSD(P)*

SUBJECT: Dinar

- You asked us to find out what the dinar is doing.
- John Taylor (Treasury) told us:
 - "The dinar has been strong ever since the new currency was introduced. The new currency is popular. People want to hold it. Inflation has not been a problem. The economy has been expanding causing demand for the currency to be strong. The Central Bank is managing the currency well."

ITM

4 May 04

27 Apr 04

DUSD (NESA) *[signature]*

(B H Lof.)

OSD 11647-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43577

APR 27 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: David Merkel

There is a fellow named David Merkel referred to in this memo from Doug Feith.
I am told by Congressman Chris Cox that he is very good.

We ought to see if there is some other place in the Department for him, even if
Feith decides against him for the job discussed in the memo.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/2/04 Feith memo

DHR:dh
042604-15

.....
Please respond by

5/14/04

230.02

27 Apr 04

OSD 11648-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43578

C4/24
dt 4/26

② Am 10/1

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

DJF by LWS 4/2

SUBJECT: David Merkel

Chris Cox asked you to consider David Merkel as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasia. I interviewed Merkel today.

Key conclusion: In my view, he is not as strong a candidate as Jim MacDougall.

- Merkel has relevant experience and supports President.
- Merkel is currently Deputy Assistant Secretary International Affairs, Treasury Department working on congressional issues,
- He does not have much management experience (he supervises two people at Treasury).
- He does not have substantial foreign language skills.
- He, of course, is not as knowledgeable of current policy as MacDougall, who is acting DASD-Eurasia.

APR 27 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
CC: Bill Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stenbit on **DSB**

Paul Butler

5/24

Have we put John Stenbit on the Defense Science Board? If not, I think we ought to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042604-14

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

Response attached.

*vr/
CDR Nosenp
5/24*

05/24

27 Apr 04

334 DSB





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

INFO MEMO

April 28, 2003 0900

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. BILL SCHNEIDER, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

THRU: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Membership - Stenbit

- In response to your snowflake, we added John Stenbit to the membership of the Defense Science Board, effective 5 April 2004.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Cheryl Navarro/DSB (b)(6)

OSD 11649-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43581

334056
28 Apr 04
27 April

APR 27 2004

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ammunition Dumps

Apparently the Speaker is all concerned about the issue of unattended ammunition dumps in Iraq. We ought to figure out who should go see him and talk to him about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042604-12

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

OSD 11650-04

11-L-0550/OSD/43582

TRAP

27 April 04

720

6/5
OBE
Per LD

T 5/1

APR 27 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet w/Assessment Team

I have to have a meeting with the Assessment Team on their tracking on recommendations. I read the April 22 paper, and it is very worrisome. There is no green. It is all yellow and red.

THAT

Let's set up a meeting, so they can tell me what I need to do to get going.

One of the things I want to talk to them about and I should be reminded with this memo, is to begin reducing DoD and civilian people now rather than later.

Here is the paper to tickle for the meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/22/04 Assessment Team Recommendations

DHR:dh
042604-8

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

(4/1) for mtg Saturday

27 Apr 04



W. Green

Braden

Assessment Team Recommendation

DoD Transition Support Team - Iraq

Update to the
Secretary of Defense
22 April 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/43584



Progress Notes

- The Operations Plan, with accompanying Annexes, Appendices and Milestones, was circulated for comment on 6 Apr.
 - DoS, OSD, the Joint Staff, CENTCOM, CJTF-7 and all military departments returned very helpful comments. An updated Operations Plan will be published during the week of 26 Apr.
- The DoD Assessment Teams reviewed a consolidated list of 26 recommendations stemming from their reports.
 - 12 have been completed (see Back-up slide 10)
 - 7 have been resolved and actions are ongoing (see slides 3-8)
 - ▣ 6 are working toward resolution (see slides 3-8)
 - 1 has been forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for decision (see slide 7)

■ Complete

□ Missed, or potential to miss,
due date causes moderate
risk for transition

■ Missed, or potential to miss,
due date causes high risk
for transition



Iraqi Security Forces

POC: COL Frank Hull (b)(6)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Acquire urgently needed equipment for the Iraqi Security Forces.	1 Aug 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Army PMO reviewing and accelerating equipment procurement contracts in Baghdad. Iraqi Security Force equipment contracts will be awarded throughout April, with deliveries expected 30-90 days later.*
Strengthen Coalition efforts to stand up Iraqi Security Forces.	31 Jan 05	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Over 203,000 Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members in uniform. Current plan ensures that 68% will be fully trained by Jan 05, while 95% will have at least received training through the Transition Integration Program.**
Establish a process to certify that Iraqi units are credible and capable of performing their mission.	To be Determined	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iraqi Security Force training and certification is being re-assessed due to lessons learned from operations during the last two weeks. A new certification plan is pending new training concept approval.

* CENTCOM is reporting requirements, equipment inventories and projected delivery dates. J8 has forwarded an inventory spreadsheet to CENTCOM to capture this critical information. CENTCOM and J8 are reviewing and reconciling a rough draft of the returned inventory spreadsheet. This information will be included as a back-up slide in next week's brief.

** During recent operations the Iraqi Police Service & Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in select locations failed to perform as expected. These forces are being reconstituted and new leadership training programs are being developed.



Iraqi Security Forces (cont.)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Embed advisors in the Iraqi Security Forces.	1 Jul 04	<input type="checkbox"/> The four (4) Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) battalions that have been trained and graduated are being mentored by Coalition forces.* (2 battalions are currently deployed) <input type="checkbox"/> All 40 Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) battalions are being mentored by Coalition forces.* (23 battalions are currently deployed) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 296 of 500 authorized Iraqi Police advisors are in theater. 50 are deployed in Kirkuk, however the remainder lack sufficient personal security and communications equipment to deploy with Iraqi Police units throughout Iraq.**

* CENTCOM currently developing a program to embed advisors down to the platoon level in both the IAF and ICDC.

** All police advisors and trainers are in lock down as Coalition forces have been tasked elsewhere to meet the recent security challenges.



Acquisition

POC: COL Nick Justice (b)(6)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Resolve post-transition Program Management Office (PMO) Alignment.	15 Apr 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Pending execution of a National Security Presidential Directive.* After the NSPD is signed, DoD and DoS will create a memorandum of agreement to address detailed operational and reporting requirements.
Develop a master plan for US Mission and other Green Zone facilities.	7 Jun 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Annex F of the Interagency Transition Operations Plan provides the overarching plan for facilities. DoS will complete a plan for US Mission facilities by 24 May. DoD will complete a detailed plan delineating the use of all other facilities in the Green Zone by 7 Jun. US Corps of Engineers has the lead.

*The National Security Presidential Directive will resolve the organizational placement of the PMO and Iraq Reconstruction Management Office after transition as well as the post-transition emergency hire authority. The National Security Council is coordinating DoD and DoS drafts and comments on the NSPD. The NSPD is expected to be approved during the week of 19 Apr 04.



Personnel

POC: Ellen Tunstall (b)(6)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Recruit to fill vacant CPA / post-CPA staff positions on or before 30 Jun 04.	30 Jun 04	<input type="checkbox"/> There are 398 personnel filling advisor positions. CPA recommends that this number be reduced to 199 after the transition. – 111 people have agreed to remain past the transition – 14 of which are from the Coalition. These volunteers are being vetted by DoS, and recruiting continues for the remaining 88 (26 Coalition) positions. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CPA has recommended 39 support staff for the Iraq Reconstruction Office Management Office (support and oversight entity for the advisors).
Create a CPA personnel redeployment plan.	16 Apr 04	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> The Interagency Transition Planning Team is working with CPA to develop the plan. CPA is expected to have a by name, time-phased redeployment plan by 25 Apr.
Establish mechanism for DoD and DoS to maintain 5 U.S.C. Section 3161 hiring authority.	15 Apr 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Will be authorized in a National Security Presidential Directive now being coordinated by the National Security Council (as noted on slide 5.)



Finance

POC: Mary Tompkey (b)(6)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Establish a cost-sharing plan between CPA and tenant organizations for administrative and life support costs.	1 May 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Decision memorandum setting forth the plan is in the Executive Secretary's office awaiting approval and signature.*
Balance the CPA budget.	30 May 04	<input type="checkbox"/> A series of actions, developed by the DoD Comptroller's office and Finance Assessment Team, from reviewing contract requirements to charging back logistics costs (see note above) are being planned and executed. As a result of these actions, the CPA predicts a balanced budget by the end of the fiscal year.

* In order to implement the cost-sharing plan by 1 May, the decision memorandum (OSD control number 75915) needs to be signed as soon as possible.

11-L-0559/OSD/43590



Information Technology

POC: Brian Fila (b)(6)

<u>Action</u>	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Status</u>
Establish a Senior Information Technology Steering Group in Iraq.	15 Apr 04	<input type="checkbox"/> A decision memorandum was circulated for comment within DoD on 1 Apr. CENTCOM / CJTF-7 registered initial non-concurrence. DoS, DoD and Joint Staff (J6) representatives met on 9 Apr to discuss how to resolve the issue.*
Stand-up an Iraq.gov internet domain to allow the Iraqi government to maintain internet services after 1 Jul.	1 Jul 04	<input type="checkbox"/> The Senior Advisor to the Science and Technology Ministry is leading the effort in coordination with the CPA Communications Support Office. A strategy document was forwarded to CPA on 7 Apr for acquisition of the domain name. Required equipment will be acquired and operated by the Ministry of Science and Technology.
Establish and fund a structure in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to promote information flow within the Iraqi Security Forces.	1 Jul 04	<input type="checkbox"/> Baghdad continues to work requirements with analysis and budget construction to follow; initial construction on a communications infrastructure may be linked to ongoing projects to speed delivery.

* During the 9 Apr meeting, DoS and the intelligence community agreed to provide representatives to the Iraq Senior Steering Group. CPA (Baghdad) is identifying an existing forum to meet the Steering Group requirement. If identified, there will be no need for the decision memorandum. The memorandum is on hold.



Back-Up

11-L-0559/OSD/43592



Tasks Completed Prior to This Week

Action

Identify and support key Iraqi ministries

Establish a panel in Washington to ensure interagency cooperation with respect to communications issues

Achieve unity of effort in the security sector.

Specify that the Multi-National Force – Iraq priority task is the creation of capable Iraqi Security Forces.

Establish a US Deputy for Admiral Nash to oversee Iraqi Army contracting requirements.

Reorganize the CPA Baghdad personnel office.

Start daily/weekly census of CPA personnel.

Improve the operation of the Baghdad strategic communications office.

Establish a working group to identify and overcome bottlenecks in the Iraqi Reconstruction and Relief Fund process.

Resolve pre-transition Program Management Office (PMO) Alignment

Assign a Green Zone Coordinator

Name a single Chief Financial Officer in Baghdad.

720
APR 27 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Multi-national Force Headquarters

I am concerned about the Chiefs raising questions about the number of people they are getting asked for the Iraq multi-national force headquarters. It sounds like that headquarters must be hundreds, maybe 500 to 1,000 people. Does that make sense?

I have no visibility on the size, what its functions will be, how the Petraeus activity fits in, or what its interaction with Metz will be.

I raise the question, because if you think about it, all we talk to is Abizaid and Sanchez. We don't ever hear about Metz. I have no idea what his role is. He is obviously somewhere between Sanchez and Conway, but the question has to be asked, is the Sanchez headquarters, the multi-national force headquarters, going to be so large that it is going to subsume Metz's function?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042604-31

.....
Please respond by

5/7/04

11-L-0559/OSD/43594

OSD 11652-04

IRHQ

876pm

APR 27 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Al-Jazirah

Here is some more on Al-Jazirah.

Thanks..

Attach.
FBIS-FMA-04-155

DHR:dh
042604-33

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/43595

OSD 11653-04

091.412

27 Apr 04



Foreign Media Analysis

Arab World: Al-Jazirah's Anti-US Tone on Iraq Overshadows Moderate Programming

The Qatari Government-financed Al-Jazirah TV in recent weeks has maintained a sharply critical tone toward the US in its reporting on Iraq. The channel portrayed US military actions in Al-Fallujah as unprovoked violations of the truce, highlighted the impact of US military operations on Iraqi civilians, implied Coalition forces used excessive force; and glorified the "resistance" against Coalition forces. The channel's reporting on Iraq is consistent with past coverage of US military operations resulting in civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Haiti. Despite the channel's consistently critical reporting on Iraq, it did provide time to the US viewpoint, covering US press conferences and speeches and inviting US officials to comment on events and participate in talk shows. The channel also offered entertainment programming that did not portray the US in an unfavorable light.

Al-Jazirah's reporting on the conflict in Al-Fallujah portrayed the situation as a popular Iraqi "resistance" against the "occupation force" without distinguishing between insurgents, foreign fighters, and unarmed civilians. The channel rarely reported insurgents as instigating attacks against Coalition forces, instead portraying US military actions as unprovoked violations of the truce.

- On 21 April, for example, Al-Jazirah's correspondent in Al-Fallujah, Abd-al-Azim Muhammad, reported renewed fighting between US forces and "resistance men, people of Al-Fallujah." Muhammad said: "As the residents of the neighborhood say, the firing began when the American force with armored personnel carriers and troop carriers penetrated into the center of the neighborhood. The force was met with heavy firing from the resistance men who were surprised at the American forces firing despite the truce agreed to by the occupation forces."
- On 20 April, Al-Jazirah reported "the American occupation forces announced that eight armed Iraqis were killed in Al-Fallujah this evening, while the soldiers of the Marines destroyed three cars in the area, despite the truce that the occupation forces agreed to with the people of the area."
- Al-Jazirah correspondent Hamid Hadid in Al-Fallujah on 14 April reported that the "sudden US storming of the Nazzal neighborhood constitutes a serious threat to the cease-fire, which witnessed many violations that were represented by taking the roofs and minarets of mosques as positions for the [US] snipers, who open fire on every target they see."

Al-Jazirah's reporting on Al-Fallujah also highlighted the impact of US military operations on local civilians, implied that Coalition forces exercised excessive use of force against Iraqi

civilians, and glorified the "resistance" by highlighting successes against Coalition forces and sometimes portraying the Iraqi dead as "martyrs."

- On 15 April, Hadid said that "an ambulance that had gone to evacuate some wounded from the Al-Shurtah [police] neighborhood was targeted by US planes which led to its destruction and the wounding of three of its members." Hadid said that US forces prevented a medical team from getting to the public hospital and preparing it for the patients: "under the pretext that it had not received orders to do so."
- Al-Jazirah on 14 April reported that overnight bombing resulted in nine killed and 11 injured in addition to damage to homes and cars. Hamid Hadid filed a video report in which he said: "Dead and injured, damage and destruction, is the result of the bombing of the citizens' homes by the American fighter planes and forces in response to the violation of the truce on the part of the people of Al-Fallujah, as they say." The report showed a resident saying the planes bombed a "residential area that didn't have any mujahidin or fighters."
- On 8 April, Al-Jazirah's Ahmad Mansur reported that the people of Al-Fallujah asked him to convey a "message" to the world that "we either live with dignity or die as martyrs and we will not surrender to the US forces, even if we remain under siege for more than a year." Mansur said: "So far, 60 martyrs have been buried in [the stadium]" and the "casualty toll of the past few days is 300 martyrs and more than 500 wounded."

Al-Fallujah Reporting Consistent With Reporting on Iraq, Other Conflicts

Al-Jazirah's reporting on events in Al-Fallujah was consistent with its reporting on events throughout Iraq, which during times of escalated violence consumed the majority of the channel's newscasts.

- On 25 April, Al-Jazirah reported: "Eyewitnesses have said that four school pupils were killed when US occupation troops opened fire indiscriminately in the vicinity of a road in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, after a roadside bomb exploded. The explosion damaged a US military vehicle." The video showed a dead child and injured children in a hospital.
- On 24 April, Al-Jazirah correspondent Yusuf al-Shuli reported that the "destruction and blood" in Al-Sadr City "were caused by US bombardment, as the citizens say, of several neighborhoods in the city." Al-Shuli added: "Some people say that this bombardment is nothing but a provocative attempt by the occupation forces against Al-Sadr City." He commented that the "bleeding is continuing in Iraq and the biggest losers are the civilians."
- On 25 April, Al-Shuli reported that the "scene in the village of Al-Nu'aymiyah, south of Al-Fallujah, was not much different from that in the city of Al-Sadr, for the destruction and blood swept the village, to which many Al-Fallujah citizens fled in quest for security. The US bombardment, however, forced them to flee the houses they sought refuge in to destinations they do not know."

1 Al-Jazirah's reporting on Iraq also mirrored the treatment the channel has given other recent conflicts involving US military actions resulting in civilian casualties or collateral damage.

- For example, a 10 December 2003 Al-Jazirah report on Afghanistan charged that "nine children paid with their lives last Saturday for an attempt by US planes to hunt a ranking Taliban minister" and the bodies of six more children who also "paid with their lives" were discovered on the same day. The video report noted similarities between US practices in Afghanistan and the Israeli practice of "targeted killings," showing Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld answering questions on the issue.
- During the channel's coverage of Haiti on 14 March, Al-Jazirah cited "eyewitnesses" in Haiti as saying that two more people have been killed "at the hands" of American soldiers, "one of them 18 years old," raising the number killed since the Marines arrived in the country to six. The report showed two bodies lying on a cement slab with people wailing and asserting that the two who were killed did nothing to provoke the attack.

Offering Modest Bright Spots

Despite Al-Jazirah's unfavorable news coverage and overwhelmingly critical commentary on the US in Iraq, the channel did consistently provide live coverage of US press conferences and speeches. Al-Jazirah also hosted Western personalities including current and former US Government officials on talk shows and, to a lesser extent, interviewed them during newscasts.

- On 25 April, Al-Jazirah aired repeatedly an "exclusive" two-minute recorded interview with US civil administrator Paul Bremer, in Iraq. He said the situation in Al-Fallujah is "difficult" and that "several hundred Saddam followers from the Republican Guard and the Intelligence joined some criminals and foreign terrorists and took the city hostage." Bremer added that the Coalition did not cause the problem in Al-Fallujah.
- Al-Jazirah's 23 April episode of "More Than One Opinion," moderated by Sami Haddad, discussed Bin Ladin's 16 April statement and included former British Ambassador to Iraq Sir Terrence Clark who argued against the message offered by Bin Ladin. On 26 March, the program included among its guests Stephen Cohen from the Brookings Institution.
- Al-Jazirah's live political discussion program "From Washington," which often hosts current and former US Government officials, featured former US Middle East Peace Process Coordinator Dennis Ross on its 15 April episode. On 25 March, former spokesman of the National Security Council, P. J. Crowley, and former adviser to President Carter in the National Security Council, William Quandt, appeared.

In addition, the channel sometimes presented reporting and commentary that, although not necessarily complementary of the US, did criticize terrorist activities.

- On 22 April, Al-Jazirah aired a live 12-minute report by its Baghdad correspondent Abd-al-Qadir Ayyad in which he reviewed the Iraqi press published on 22 April. During the report, Ayyad cited an article that said, "There were some 300 to 400 Arab terrorists in Al-Fallujah,

but most of them left the city after the Al-Fallujah residents insisted that they leave. Some of them refused and insisted on continuing to fight against the Americans.”

- Ayyad had with him the chief editor of Baghdad *Al-Watan* newspaper, Dr. ~~Tahar~~ Jaza, who commented on the Basra bombings, saying: “It is regrettable that we see such incidents taking place in Basra and other Iraqi cities because the result of these bombings negatively affects the civilians’ interests, security, stability, and life. Most of the Basra bombings’ victims were students.” Jaza said “there is confusion between the concept of terrorism and the concept of resistance. Nobody supports a resistance carrying out acts that harm Iraqi civilians.”
- On 15 April, Al-Jazirah aired a special talk show program discussing the Bin Ladin statement aired by the channel earlier that day. During the program, Al-Jazirah showed a three-minute video showing reactions by ordinary European citizens, including citizens of Arab origin or Muslims living in Europe. They all rejected any submission to Bin Ladin’s threats and affirmed that Muslims in European countries are being treated in a fair manner.

Al-Jazirah Offers Nonpolitical Programming

Not all of Al-Jazirah’s programming consisted of political discussion criticizing US foreign policy. The channel offered some programs that presented a mild tone toward the West, including a sports talk show, an automobile program, documentaries, a fashion program, and a cinema review program that reviewed Western movies. Al-Jazirah’s managing director also recently announced that the channel would be introducing a tourism program in an effort to “add a softer dimension” to the channel.

- Al-Jazirah’s program “Appointment in the Country of Emigration” [Maw’ad fi al-Mahjar] is a weekly program that presents the experiences of Arab personalities who emigrated to Western countries during their childhood and remained abroad to achieve prominence in the West. The channel’s 23 April episode featured a Lebanese-Arab living in Canada, Antwan Najim, who established the first “nuclear medicine laboratory” after obtaining his Doctorate in “nuclear pharmacology” in America.
- The Qatari English-language daily *The Peninsula* reported that Al-Jazirah “plans to add a softer dimension to its strident image with a slew of ‘lighter’ programs aimed at the family.” According to the article, managing director Waddah Khanfar announced the channel would soon air a travel and tourism program. The article quoted Khanfar as saying, “We don’t see our role as being restricted to bringing just the bad news and hard political developments to people. We also want to become a part of the every day lives of people. We want to create a friendly screen” (22 April).

April 27, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Let's do schedule something on missile defense so I get my head around it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042704-11

.....
Please respond by

5/14/04

11-L-0559/OSD/43600

OSD 11654-04

873.24

27 April

April 27, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PAS Vacancies

Please tell me the percentage of open positions in our top Presidential appointments has been throughout the Administration. In other words, if you looked at it by month, what is the average vacancy rate of our top people – I believe there are 48 Presidential appointments. We can calculate that. My guess is that it is close to 20 to 25 percent of the top 48 Presidential appointments that have not been in place at any given time during the past 3-plus years.

230

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042704-10

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

27 April

OSD 11655-04

7201
April 27, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Numbers in Headquarters

Please give me the numbers as to how many people are in Metz's headquarters,
Sanchez's headquarters and Abizaid's headquarters.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042704-12

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

322

OSD 11656-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43602

27 Apr 04

720
Incomplete

April 28, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Train and Equip Authorities

Put your head into this "Train and Equip" legislation memo and tell me what you think we ought to do. Please get back to me by the morning of **April 30**.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/12/04 ASD(LA) memo to SecDef re: Status of Train and Equip Legislation [OSD 05838-04]

DHR:dh
042804-4

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

Complete
4/30/04

091.3

28 April 04

OSD 11657-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43603



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600
INFO MEMO

2004 150 22 AM 11:10

April 12, 2004, 2:30 PM

C 4/21
all 4/28

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
& William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Status of Train & Equip Legislation

- This will provide an update regarding the Department's progress in achieving legislative authority to train and equip friendly foreign forces in furtherance of the global war on terrorism.
- Over the last two years, the Department has proposed and the Congress has enacted some new train and equip authority. A brief summary of existing, available train and equip authorities is provided at TAB A.
- In addition to the authorities noted in TAB A, the Department is seeking four new train and equip authorities – two included in the President's Budget Request for FY05 (appropriations provisions) and two in the Department's FY 05 legislative package (authorization provisions). (TAB B). The proposed authorization provisions have not yet been approved by the Office of Management and Budget, however. They both would give us new authority -- that is not encompassed by the appropriations provisions included in the Budget Request (assistance for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, and assistance for irregular forces, groups, or individuals assisting SOF forces to combat terrorism).
- Commanders in the field continue to express dissatisfaction concerning their ability to train & equip foreign forces. While in some cases the dissatisfaction is the result of a lack of authority, in other cases it stems from the cumbersome and relatively untimely nature of our authorities (e.g., drawdown), the result of lengthy, unanticipated delays in the procurement process (e.g., acquisition of battalion sets for the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps), or simply a lack of familiarity with authorities we do have (or the process for invoking them). As set forth in detail in TAB A, the Department already possesses some authority to address many train and equip requirements. However, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan DoD's authority is severely limited – the Department of State usually is the lead agency with the requisite authority.

TSA SD	4/21/04
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	4/21

11-L-0559/OSD/43604

OSD 05838-04

I-04/

TO: Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

MAY 2004
0752-112

SUBJECT: Train and Equip Authorities

- You requested me to put my head into the "Train and Equip" legislation memo and tell you what I think we ought to do.
- DoD requested four new "Train and Equip Authorities" in FY 2005 legislative proposals—all four have gone to Congress:
 - \$500 million "train and equip" authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and "other friendly nearby regional nations."
 - Additional \$200 million of drawdown authority under Afghanistan Freedom Support Act for the Afghan National Army.
 - \$100 million to fund President's Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative.
 - \$25 million to provide support to foreign forces and others facilitating military operations by US Special Operations Forces.
- What have we done:
 - In my hearings before the **SASC** on 20 April, HASC on 21 April, and the HAC-FO on 29 April, I urged Congress to support our train and equip legislative proposals fully.
 - At the **SASC** hearing, Sen. Lieberman responded positively: "we might ... take the lead in responding ... as rapidly as the urgent circumstances on the ground require."
 - SOCOM and SOLIC representatives have briefed the \$25 million SOF proposal to congressional staff.
 - OSD/LA is hosting briefings with HASC and **SASC** staffers on 30 April.
- Chairman Kolbe of **HAC-FO** indicated somewhat greater flexibility than in the past. I will follow up with him.
- I will also try to enlist support from Lewis-Murtha and Chairman Young (our problems in the past have mainly been with the HAC-FO).

COORDINATION: OSD (P), ISA, SOLIC, OGC, OSD/LA
Prepared by: William E. Hopewell, OSD (Policy), (b)(6)

691.3

3 May 04

28 Apr 04

April 28, 2004

EF-9426
I-04/005854

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Meeting w/Japanese

I need some sort of a prep for the meeting with the Japanese. I need a piece of paper as to what I should thank them for.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042804-9

.....
Please respond by 4/29/04

File
4/30

28-04-04 15:17 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/43606

OSD 11658-04

28 Apr 04

DepSecDef _____
USDP _____
ASD/ISA 4/28

What to Thank/Commend the Japanese for:

- Dispatch of Ground Self-Defense Forces (about 550) to Iraq for reconstruction and three Air Self Defense Force C-130s to Kuwait.
- Standing firm when hostage takers demanded that the Self-Defense Forces leave Iraq in return for the release of three Japanese citizens.
- Early commitment of \$5 billion for Iraqi reconstruction and close cooperation with the Coalition Provisional Authority on implementation.
- Diet approval of \$1 billion in first-year funding for fielding PAC-3 and AEGIS-based missile defense.
- Close consultations with the U.S. on how to transform each of our forces to deal with the future security environment.
- Close cooperation in handling North Korea.

Japan

28 Apr 04

28 Apr 04

April 28, 2004

TO: Jim Roche

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

Thanks for your note on updating systems and procedures. I am glad to see you're well on the road to getting this accomplished.

I have sent it along to Ken Krieg, who is going to coordinate this for the Department.

Thanks so much.

(Contact Sec. Roche if you need another copy. Copy has already been provided to P&E)

DHR:dh
042804-6

.....
Please respond by _____

cc: Krysty Kolesar

SECRETARY

cc: DEPUTY

- WE HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT A DOZEN INPUTS SO FAR
- WE ARE CATALOGUING THE IDEAS, GROUPING THEM IN LIKE CATEGORIES AND THEN EVALUATING BY A NUMBER OF ATTRIBUTES — RISK OF NOT DOING, COMPLEXITY, EFFECT ON WARFIGHTING/MISSION, ETC.
- ~~THE~~ WE ARE LOOKING AT WHAT IS BEING DONE IN THE AREA AT THE MOMENT
- WE SHOULD HAVE THAT BACK TO YOU IN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

OSD 11654-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43608

KEN KRIEG/30

April 28, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

Paul Butler
5/19

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Former Special Forces

On Wolf Blitzer on CNN at 5:40 p.m., he had on a Special Forces guy named Mancuso who has just retired. He was really impressive. I wonder if he is looking for a job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042804-3

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

TEN
5/19

2005/5/20
5/12 C 5/19

A.

We contacted him.
He is gainfully employed
and not looking for
additional or other
opportunities right now.

28 April 2004

April 28, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: E-mail

Let's get this e-mail in the press if there is a way to do it. It is amazing.

Thanks.

make sure this is authentic

Attach.
E-mail

DHR:dh
042804-2

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

OSD 11661-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43610

DR

28 April

(b)(6)

OSD

SECRET

~~FOR YOUR INFORMATION~~

Subject:

FW: Letter from a Medic serving in Iraq

CTG C-4427

GREAT STORY THAT
should be in the
papers.

(b)(6)

>
>
> This is a letter from Ray Reynolds, a medic in the Iowa Army National
> Guard, serving in Iraq:

>
> As I head off to Baghdad for the final weeks of my stay in
> Iraq, I wanted to say thanks to all of you who did not believe the
> media. They have done a very poor job of covering everything that has
> happened. I am sorry that I have not been able to visit all of you
> during my two week leave back home. And just so you can rest at night
> knowing something is happening in Iraq that is noteworthy, I thought I
> would pass this on to you. This is the list of things that has
> happened in Iraq recently: (Please share it with your friends and
> compare it to the version that your paper is producing.)

>
> * Over 400,000 kids have up-to-date immunizations.
> * School attendance is up 80% from levels before the war.
> * Over 1,500 schools have been renovated and rid of the weapons stored
> there so education can occur.
> * The port of Umm Qasar was renovated so grain can be off-loaded from
> ships faster.
> * The country had its first 2 billion barrel export of oil in August.
> * Over 4.5 million people have clean drinking water for the first time
> ever in Iraq.
> * The country now receives 2 times the electrical power it did before the
> war.
> * 100% of the hospitals are open and fully staffed, compared to 35% before
> the war.
> * Elections are taking place in every major city, and city councils are in
> place.
> * Sewer and water lines are installed in every major city.
> * Over 60,000 police are patrolling the streets.
> * Over 100,000 Iraqi civil defense police are securing the country.
> * Over 80,000 Iraqi soldiers are patrolling the streets side by side with
> US soldiers.
> * Over 400,000 people have telephones for the first time ever
> * Students are taught field sanitation and hand washing techniques to
> prevent the spread of germs.
> * An interim constitution has been signed.
> * Girls are allowed to attend school.
> * Textbooks that don't mention Saddam are in the schools for the first
> time in 30 years.

>
>
> Don't believe for one second that these people do not want us
> there. I have met many, many people from Iraq that want us there, and
> in a bad way. They say they will never see the freedoms we talk about
> but they hope their children will. We are doing a good job in Iraq
> and I challenge anyone, anywhere to dispute me on these facts. So If
> you happen to run into John Kerry, be sure to give him my email
> address and send him to Denison, Iowa. This soldier will set him
> straight. If you are like me and very disgusted with how this period
> of rebuilding has been portrayed, email this to a friend and let them
> know there are good things happening.

>
> Ray Reynolds, SFC
> Iowa Army National Guard
> 234th Signal Battalion
>

11-L-0559/OSD/43611

CB/11

TO See Def

April 29, 2004
EF-9456
I-04/006039

Paul Butler
5/10

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Larry Di Rita

SUBJECT: Vote on Solidarity

Please find out if Congress did, in fact, vote financial support for Solidarity.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-14

.....
Please respond by 5/5/04

Poland

DA 5/12

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosuneo

29 Apr

30-04-01 16:13

OSD 11662-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43612

04/5/12

INFO MEMO

MAY 04 2004 EF-9456

I-04/006039

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *EE [Signature] [Signature]*

SUBJECT: Vote on Solidarity

- You asked if Congress voted financial support to the independent Polish trade union Solidarity.
- Solidarity received funds through several laws from Fiscal Years (FY) 1987 - 1990.
 - FY 1987: Supplemental Appropriations Act provided \$1 million in economic funds.
 - FY 1988: State/Justice/Commerce appropriations provided \$1 million.
 - FY 1989: Foreign Operations appropriations provided \$2 million.
 - \$1 million directly to Solidarity; \$1 million through AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute to promote democratic activities in Poland.
 - FY 1990, Foreign Operations appropriations provided \$1.5 million. All funds distributed through AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute.
- June 1989: Tadeusz Mazowiecki became first non-communist prime minister.
- November 1989: Congress approved the Support East European Democracies (SEED) Act, provided \$1 million for government-direct economic stabilization programs.
- December 1990: Lech Walesa elected President of Poland.

COORDINATION: ISP

Prepared by: Jay Baumgartner, OSD (Policy), (b)(6)

Poland

4 May 04

29 Apr 04

OSD 11662-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43613

April 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Andy Hoehn

cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Ryan Henry

Ray DuBois
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Announcing Global Posture

We better think through how we are going to make this general announcement on the posture that Senators Warner and Levin were talking about. We certainly want to coordinate it with them from a timing standpoint.

I think it is very important that the announcement indicate how it fits with BRAC. I also think it is important that we list the principles and the criteria that I have been pushing and that Andy has been pushing.

I would like to clear the draft.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-12

Please respond by 5/7/04

320.2 STRATEGIC

29 Apr 04

OSD 11663-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43614

720
April 29, 2004

763

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Military Headquarters

We have to get very good visibility fast, like by Saturday, on what the military headquarters is going to look like, so we can figure out how it meshes with the US Mission that Negroponte is setting up.

I think we have had enough time to sort through it. Why don't your folks give me a briefing on Saturday to show me where you are.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-11

.....
Please respond by

5/1/04

*Closed.
Briefing given
on 1 May 04.*

OSD 11665-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43615

April 29, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*
SUBJECT: Cluster Bombs

Please let me know when you get the answer for that woman on cluster bombs. I need to know the answer.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-8

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosunzo
5/5



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

FEB 23 2006

Lord Paul Drayson
Minister for Defence Procurement
Ministry of Defence
Floor 5, Zone B, Main Building
Whitehall
London, England SW1A2HB

Paul
Dear Lord Drayson,

Thank you for the personal copy of the United Kingdom Government's Defence Industrial Strategy. It makes important statements on US policy towards technology transfer and on the UK defense acquisition process' openness to contracting with companies outside Great Britain.

As you gain insight and develop lessons learned from implementing your strategy, passing them on to Ken Krieg and his staff through the Bilateral Defense Acquisition Committee or other fora would be most appreciated.

The UK is our closest friend and ally. I share your view that we need to continue working together to meet our current and future defense requirements.

Best regards,
Andrew

cc:

Under Secretary of Defense (policy)

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)



OSD 00120-06

11-L-0559/OSD/43617

OK

23 Feb 06

15 Dec 05



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
EXECUTIVE SERVICES DIRECTORATE

February 24, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR CABLES DUTY OFFICER

SUBJECT: Release of Message – DepSecDef Message to Lord Drayson

The attached package contains a message/cable to be released via the Defense Messaging System (DMS) .

The text of the message and accompanying letter (as appropriate) has been reviewed and cleared for release.

Please return a copy of this memorandum along with a copy of the transmitted message to the Correspondence Control Division. If further information is required, please call (b)(6) Action officer information: Seth Wilson, OUSD(AT&L)/IC/ACA, (b)(6)

Thank you.

Michael Lowery
Executive Services Directorate
Correspondence Analyst

Attachments:
As stated

OSD 00120-06

11-L-0559/OSD/43618

UNCLAS
ROUTINE

FROM DEPSECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO: ODC LONDON UK
INFO: USDAO LONDON UK//OPNSNCO//
DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-1//

SUBJECT LETTER FROM HONORABLE GORDON ENGLAND TO LORD DRAYSON

ODC LONDON **IS** REQUESTED TO FORWARD THE FOLLOWING TEXT TO LORD DRAYSON AT **THE** EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

LORD PAUL DRAYSON
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
FLOOR **5**, ZONE B, MAIN BUILDING
WHITEHALL
LONDON, ENGLAND SW1A2HB

DEAR LORD DRAYSON:

(PARA) THANK YOU FOR THE PERSONAL COPY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT'S DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY. IT MAKES IMPORTANT STATEMENTS ON US POLICY TOWARDS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ON THE UK DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS' OPENNESS TO CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES OUTSIDE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

(PARA) **AS** YOU GAIN INSIGHT AND DEVELOP LESSONS LEARNED FROM IMPLEMENTING YOUR STRATEGY, PASSING THEM ON TO KEN KRIEG AND HIS STAFF THROUGH THE BILATERAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION COMMITTEE OR OTHER FOR A WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATED.

(PARA) THE UK **IS** OUR CLOSEST FRIEND AND ALLY. I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT WE NEED TO CONTINUE WORKING TOGETHER TO MEET OUR CURRENT AND FUTURE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

SINCERELY,
//GORDON ENGLAND//

CC:
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)
(END TEXT)

OSD 00120-06

11-L-0559/OSD/43619

April 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Quote

Some Congresswoman quoted me saying "untidy," and she said I said "a little untidy," implying that what is going on today is more than "a little untidy." I told her that I did not say "a little untidy." I thought I said "untidy," and I didn't say it in the last several weeks, I said it much earlier when things were, in fact, untidy. Please dig out that quote for me.

She also quoted the President improperly and said that he said that combat operations were over. I told her that it was "major" combat operations.

Let's get the two quotes, and we will send them to her.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-7

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04


OSD ~~11668~~ ¹¹⁶⁶⁷ -04

11-L-0559/OSD/43620

350.00150

29 Apr 04

720
April 29, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Congressman Kennedy

I want to get Congressman Pat Kennedy in sometime for a meeting with Paul Wolfowitz, Pete Pace and me to answer his questions. Please find out which Congressional resolution he voted for – whether it was the money or to go to war.

We'll just get him down maybe for lunch, so we can talk to him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-5

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

000.71.90
29 Apr 04
OSD 11669-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43621

April 29, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PAS Tracking

When you fashion the numbers on the Presidential Appointment-Senate Confirmed personnel, I do want to see the percentage we have had vacant throughout the entire term.

I also want to see who was responsible for the fact that we had that substantial percentage of vacancies.

Therefore, you need to break out the period as before the President sent the nominations to the Senate and after he sent them, before the individuals were sworn in. If I could see the percentage of the responsibility for those two categories throughout the year, it would be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-1

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

210

29 Apr 04

OSD 11670-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43622

C513

April 29, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Minow Report

What is the status on the Minow report? What is happening? Nothing seems to move forward.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-16

Please respond by

5/7/04

pt 5/4

Secret -

We will be back to you shortly on a way ahead (draft statement by you and letter to Minnow are out for comment). FYI, thought you should be aware of the highlighted language in the report. Not helpful as POTUS and AG stump for Patriot Act. This is why we are developing a strategy to distance you from the contents while properly thanking the Commission for their hard work.

Paul

Paul Butler

11-L-0559/OSD/43623

OSD 11671-04

319.1

29 APR 04

As a research agency charged with developing, but not implementing, technological tools, DARPA was unprepared to answer critics' questions about the privacy implications of how TIA might be used. Historically DARPA had engaged in high-risk, high-pay-off research for the DOD, conducted out of the limelight. Much of its research has resulted in spectacular advances, with benefits far beyond the defense establishment—for example, DARPA created ARPANet, the precursor to the Internet, as a technological tool for linking defense researchers—but never before had the agency been required to account for the potential impact on privacy of future uses of a tool it was in the process of developing.

This led to sustained miscommunication between DARPA and its critics. DARPA answered questions about privacy by repeatedly assuring the public that it was not aggregating personally identifiable information on U.S. persons or using TIA to access any such information, and that any such activities in the future would be by *other agencies* which would bear responsibility for complying with the laws and regulations applicable to *them*. Some observers found these responses evasive especially in the light of DARPA's public rhetoric promoting TIA. Although the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight found no evidence that TIA was at any time using personally identifiable information on U.S. persons, DARPA's assurances failed to resolve critics' concerns.

The timing of revelations about TIA also contributed to the controversy surrounding the program. Many Americans were growing increasingly uneasy about government actions, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, that appeared to threaten civil liberties: the detention of non-U.S. persons without charge or access to counsel, monitoring of inmate telephone calls with their attorneys, passage of the USA PATRIOT

Act with the new powers it conferred on the government to conduct—in some cases secret—s&~ and seizures, physical searches of airline passengers and their luggage, and the Attorney General's Operation TIPS program (later abandoned) under which delivery, repair, and other workers who entered people's homes would report to the government on what they saw there. Moreover, news of TIA was breaking during the fall of 2002, just as Congress was debating the Homeland Security Act, with the goal of centralizing many of the government's surveillance programs within a new Cabinet-level department. All of this coalesced to heighten concerns among legislators and members of the public to the potential threat of government use of personal data.

Another significant contributor to the controversy was DARPA's failure to build protections for privacy into TIA technologies as they were being developed. We recognize that DARPA had underway separate initiatives to develop privacy-protecting technologies, but these were not part of the TIA tools that DARPA was demonstrating in 2002 and 2003. As the Inspector General noted, these research projects "were not as comprehensive as a privacy impact assessment would have been in scrutinizing TIA technology."⁵⁵

Informational privacy is respected and meaningful policy oversight guaranteed only when they are made a central part of the technology development process and when the tools necessary to ensure them are developed as an integral **part** of writing software and building systems. DARPA failed, in the words of the Inspector General's report, "to ensure that privacy is built into the developmental process."⁵⁶ DARPA was by no means unique, but that failure ultimately contributed to the elimination of TIA. Ironically, it also contributed to Congress withdrawing funding for the privacy enhancing technologies that DARPA was developing.

72
April 29, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes LTG Sharp
Ryan Henry Lt Gen Schwartz
Peter Rodman MG Burgess
Reuben Jeffery VADM Jacoby
Bill Luti

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sistani

Please see the attached report about a meeting with a Sistani associate.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/22/04 Meeting report

DHR:dh
042804-10

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 11672-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43625

Iraq

29 Apr 04

22 April, 2004.

[REDACTED] is a close contact and personal friend of GA Ali Sistani. [REDACTED] has had access to GA Sistani for the past 15 years. [REDACTED] is a moderate and a respected notable in the city of Najaf/Kufa. He is not a cleric, and he is not employed by Sistani, but is an independently wealthy and a religiously inclined man who has had direct involvement in the Hawza.

The purpose of the meeting was to establish a direct relationship with CPA [REDACTED]. He claimed that many Baghdad visitors led them to believe that there was a solid conduit to CPA-Baghdad but that they were beginning to lose faith in this and wanted to build their own relationship at this point. He indicated grave dissatisfaction in dealing with multiple interlocutors who all claim they were sent by Amb Bremer to "solve the problem" and the episodic nature of their involvement. Some, he claimed, had even gone as far as asking for a photograph with GA Sistani [IGC member Muwaffaq Al Ruba'i] for what they interpreted as an attempt at proving they met with him and gaining increased credibility when they quoted him. He stated that Sistani understands many are speaking in his name and that he has to do something about that and is looking at making a direct office to office connection with a "real live American officer" in the CPA so there is no misunderstanding. He knows of [REDACTED], and sought us out.

Note: He did not indicate at any time that he had a message from Sistani. However, at the close of the meeting, [REDACTED] stated that he would report his meeting results directly to Sistani and requested that I meet with a closer contact of Sistani [NFI] this coming week. He stated that this person will come to CPA [REDACTED] to meet. He did not mention a name, nor did I ask, but he mentioned the person is a cleric and an associate of GA Sistani. I believe that final selection of this person will come out after [REDACTED] briefs GA Sistani.

Here is a report of the key points he made:

1. Coalition Forces were seen in some neighborhoods [Hayy Zahra] and were refreshingly received. He stated that the people that want peace welcome this action. Indicating that US Forces are welcome in their midst.
2. Any city where there is no Law and no Authority there is a problem, and thus is the case in Najaf and Kufa. The sovereign should never abandon his [people] during a crisis; neither should he yield his authority to any person that is not properly appointed. Here he is indicating the obvious, asking the US to regain control from the forces that now [occupy government offices] in Najaf. He mentioned US success in Kut, and wished for a similar outcome where the US was able to regain control and push back the militia.
3. He further commented that Najaf has fallen into the hands of the so called Jaysh Al Mahdi, a group of thieves, murderers, he goes on...that have armed themselves beyond any comprehension, taken police stations, released all the prisoners, and looted the government offices...all while the coalition forces watched. He went

on to say that anyone that worked with the CF has been targeted and many now are in jails and are being tried in so called Shari'a courts, some have been executed and still the Coalition stands by without interfering. He mentioned that [collaborators] are being systematically pursued, arrested, and detained daily and that the families have no where to go and complain—just like the old days under Saddam. Fear and Intimidation now rule the city again.

4. He stated that Sistani has done his duty [as a religious leader]; he sent a delegation asking MAS to leave the city if he intended to fight the coalition and spare the city and shrines from inherent destruction. He stated that the delegation warned MAS that the coalition will respond with might for every bullet Sadr Militia [SM] expended. He went on to explain that Sadr's inner circle was now in charge of key [military] decisions and that MAS remained removed from direct involvement, but that MAS was adamant about not backing down in the face of too much pressure—didn't look good—and that MAS was personally convinced that he could win and keep/control Najaf/Kufa.
5. He affirmed that most of the hardened MAS militants in the streets manning positions were strangers [from outside the city], and more likely from Thawra city [Sadr City] in Baghdad. He wondered how they could have traveled, unobstructed—to Najaf—and taken control so easily, and remain in control in the face of the mighty coalition that liberated Iraq. He said that people were beginning to draw dangerous conclusions from such a situation and that lest the coalition regain control that it would be hard to mobilize the citizens to help or cooperate later. They live in fear of retribution for any misconstruction made by the Sadr thugs...this is like living under Saddam only now it was 1991 all over again.
6. He stressed that Najaf is not Fallujah. He stated that Fallujah is full of former Baathists, foreign fighters from all over the Middle East to include Al Qaeda and Ansar Al Islam, former Iraqi military, former Iraqi Intelligence, and former Iraqi Special Services, many that benefited from the regime for years. Najaf is different. You do not have any military commanders, or any security apparatus, or any Sunni opposition. You have people that never benefited from the regime but were systematically oppressed and persecuted for the past 35 years. You don't have any former regime elements, or anyone fighting against an occupation—we are still thankful you liberated us, and Sistani has stated that since you announced you are leaving and given a date then you are not truly occupiers—so the dynamics are different and you can count on the people to support you to a limit if you were to go after him more aggressively. We hear the planes overhead daily and nightly, we know the troops are in the outskirts of the city, and we await a solution. It is my understanding here that he is indicating that they expect a US offensive to take back the town and remove MAS and his militia [using Kut as an example], but cautioning against prolonged fighting and collateral damage control [meaning the Shrines].
7. He described the Najaf Police as traitors that must be fired once the city is liberated. Stated that they were obedient dogs when Saddam was in power, and their paychecks were a fraction of what they are now. He displayed outright disdain for the great betrayal that they committed in giving over the city to Sadr's

criminals. He then said they would have never thought of doing that under Saddam, but it was easier now since there was no perceptible punishment by the local government/coalition, but that the outcome of not cooperating with MAS was taken more seriously.

8. Stated that Sadr was a cancer that needed to be removed or else it would get worse fast and that you would either have to amputate [give up Najaf] or be chasing the disease that was spreading ever so much faster. He urged some solution that would rid them of this future [Shi'a] Saddam. He went on to develop the Saddam analogy by showing that Sadr has surrounded himself with a circle much like Saddam's that would protect the leader as long as they were benefiting from him—currently that consisted of feeding of his spoils—like police cars and weapons, monies they plundered and influence they now enjoy along with its inherent respect. He stated that GA Sistani has declared that all government property had to be returned.

The meeting lasted two hours and was rather pleasant in tone. [REDACTED] is a friendly fellow that likes to make analogies and funny remarks. One joke he made about Sadr that is worth mentioning goes like this: A mother mosquito tells her child not to go near any people, she feared for his life, but the little mosquito didn't listen, he came home that evening and told his mother, mom, why did you ask me to stay away from the people, they really like me, when I went near them today they all started clapping for me...[he motioned with his hands how we try to kill a mosquito] he said this was Sadr, he was that naïve & stupid. We then had a catered lunch [actually cooked by the wife of one of our Iraqi staff—it was delicious] in our office followed by the usual barrage of tea and Pepsi.

Again, before we said our final good-bye's [which we did several times as usual] he mentioned that he would brief Sistani personally and re-contact our office for a future meeting with a closer associate. Direct contact with [REDACTED] is done through our [REDACTED] interlocutor [REDACTED], who has been faithfully with us for almost a year now. He has relocated his family [REDACTED] [REDACTED] after several death threats received in his home by phone and paper under the door.

April 30, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
Powell Moore

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Missile Defense FY 2005 Budget

Here is this letter from John Kyl that is time sensitive. What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/27/04 Kyl memo to SecDef

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

DHR:dh
043004-13

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

SecDef.

*I have scheduled
a meeting for Monday,
May 3 at 10am to
build a response.*

*We should have a
plan and assignments
complete by COB Monday,
to include your role
and that of Paul Wolfowitz*

*SK
5/1/04*



11-L-0559/OSD/43629

OSD 11673-04

*W
3
2
4*

30 April

APR 27 2004 6:27PM

SEN. JON KYL

NO. 471 - P. 2/4 -

04/28
04-7/20

JON KYL

ARIZONA

730 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING

(b)(6)

COMMITTEES:

FINANCE

JUDICIARY

ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES

CHAIRMAN

REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0304

STATE OFFICES:

2200 EAST CAMELBACK ROAD

SUITE 120

PHOENIX, AZ 85018

(b)(6)

7315 NORTH ORACLE ROAD

SUITE 220

TUCSON, AZ 85704

(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Secretary Rumsfeld

CC:

Under Secretary Douglas Feith

Acting Assistant Secretary Mira Ricardel

Assistant Secretary Powell Moore

Deputy Assistant Secretary Steve Moffitt

Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeanine Espeme

FROM:

Jon Kyl

DATE:

April 27, 2004

SUBJECT:

Missile Defense FY 2005 Budget

I believe the President's missile defense request for fiscal year 2005 is in serious danger of not being fully funded. According to today's CongressDailyAM (excerpt attached), Rep. Ellen Tauscher will likely offer an amendment to use missile defense as an offset for boosting the Army's end-strength in Iraq. I am most concerned about similar efforts in the Senate because they would be more difficult to defeat.

I understand that Senator Carl Levin will likely attempt to cut funding for interceptor deployment during the Armed Services Committee mark-up for the Defense Authorization bill. Furthermore, I am hearing that Sen. Levin may use a similar tactic to Rep. Tauscher - attempting to substitute missile defense funds for either the War on Terror or Iraq - which would, undoubtedly place Members in a politically difficult position by creating a false choice between two important priorities. I suspect some Republican Members might consider supporting such an amendment.

I alerted Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Powell Moore to my concerns in a phone call yesterday. It is absolutely critical that the Defense Department immediately begin an intense lobbying effort, focused first on Democrat and Republican Senate Armed Services Committee Members.

As I continue to gather information on efforts to cut missile defense funding, I will be sure to pass it along to you. In the meantime, if I can be of any assistance in this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact me at (b)(6)

<http://www.senate.gov/~kyl/>

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11-L-0559/OSD/43630

new entitlements pending.

That amendment passed on a 451-48 vote, with four Republicans voting with the Democrats to reinstate pay/go, while Democratic Sen. Zell Miller of Georgia voted 'no.' Sen. Tim Johnson, D-S.D., who was absent for that first vote, is expected to support it which means Republicans need to cajole two senators into switching their votes so Vice President Cheney can then cast a deciding vote in favor of the budget resolution.

With Commerce Chairman McCain and Sen. Lincoln Chafee, R-R.I., unwilling to negotiate, GOP leaders have turned to Governmental Affairs Chairwoman Collins and Sen. Olympia Snowe, R-Maine, as well as moderate Democrats.

Those discussions, including a one-on-one Monday evening meeting between Collins and Nickles to gauge her willingness to compromise, have not yet produced an agreement.

"We're rediscussing and working on it," Nickles said, walking with Collins from the meeting to the Senate floor. Collins made a similar comment.

Earlier, Snowe said she had had discussions with Nickles and GOP leaders but had made no commitments. "We've talked, that's about it," she said. *By Peter Cohn*

DEFENSE

Dems Target Missile Defense Funds To Boost Troop Strength

With pressure mounting on Capitol Hill to fund more troops and equipment in Iraq, some Democratic lawmakers are eyeing the president's \$10.2 billion missile defense request as a vehicle to offset such costs.

Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., said it would play into her plans to boost the Army's strength by 10,000 troops, a proposal that would cost an estimated \$1.6 billion in FY05.

"I will more likely than not offer an amendment to do that in the defense bill using national missile defense as the offset," she said. "I don't think the Pentagon should be without sacrifice for this while we're at war."

Although observers say Republican backing for such a proposal is unlikely, Tauscher's comments coincide with a report GAO issued last week criticizing the president's plan to field a missile defense capability this summer.

GAO found that the system has not been thoroughly tested and the program's prime contractors were over budget in FY03 by roughly \$380 million, according to a summary of the report.

GAO recommended that the Pentagon carry out more rigorous testing and set cost, schedule and performance baselines. Although the Defense Department agreed to establish baselines, it said formal operational testing is not required before entering production. The Bush administration has argued that growing concerns over the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, especially by a handful of potentially hostile states and terrorists, justifies the need for a missile defense capability.

The FY05 funding proposal would help field a national missile defense system with ground-based interceptors in Alaska starting sometime this summer. A total of 20 missile interceptors would be deployed in Alaska

APR 27, 2004 16:28 PM Congressional Daily

and California by the end of 2005.

Because the Bush administration has made missile defense a top priority, it is unlikely Republican lawmakers would support cuts proposed far it.

But bipartisan support to increase the number of troops and provide more equipment for troops in Iraq before the November election is growing.

House Armed Services member Jim Cooper, D-Tenn., last week introduced a bill that would provide \$50 billion in FY04 supplemental funding for troops deployed in Iraq. And Armed Services Chairman Hunter said he would support an FY05 wartime supplemental of at least \$20 billion to pay for more troops and equipment in Iraq.

Tauscher introduced a bill last year to temporarily increase military end-strength by 83,700 troops, raising the total strength of the Army, Marines and Air Force by 8 percent for five years. The bill had 25 Democratic co-sponsors, including Armed Services ranking member Ike Skelton, D-Mo. By Amy Klumper

HOUSE PACES

N.C. Dems Are Optimistic, But Need A Challenger To Hayes

Republican Rep. Robin Hayes -- whose tie-breaking 2001 trade vote and competitive district make him a perennial Democratic target -- likely will have to wait until next week to find out who Democrats will run against him.

North Carolina's candidate filing period opened Monday, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee is still working to recruit a credible challenger against the three-term incumbent before the May 7 filing deadline.

Concord businessman Wayne Troutman, one of two Democratic prospects, said in an interview Monday his chances of entering the race are "well more than 50-50." But he said he wants to gauge his political and financial backing. To run competitively, Troutman said he would need to nearly match the \$3 million he estimated Hayes would spend on re-election.

"This is going to be an expensive race if we do it," Troutman said. "There are a few things that have to fall into place."

Troutman said attorney Chris Kouri, the 2002 Democratic nominee who held Hayes to 54 percent, was unable to get much political traction out of Hayes' tie-breaking House vote in December 2001 to give the president trade promotion authority.

However, North Carolina Democrats said the bankruptcy and liquidation last year of the Pillowtex Corp., which cost North Carolina approximately 4,800 textile jobs, could make trade a much bigger issue this year.

"It's difficult to overstate the ramifications of that vote and its effect on the district," a state Democratic Party spokesman said.

The Democrats' other prospective candidate is 27-year-old Hunter Pruette. He served as the top field staffer, or "body man," to Sen. John Edwards, D-N.C., during Edwards' presidential campaign.

A Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee spokeswoman said

April 30, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

I need to have the views of the Chiefs, the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and Tom O'Connell on the subject of where the Civil Affairs people ought to be located.

I don't find this memo from the Army persuasive at all, nor do I think a study that is narrowly proposed is a good idea. I am not terribly interested in a study at all. I am interested in some argumentation, discussion, rationale, criteria, assumptions, and pros and cons.

Let's get the Chairman to get going on it, and eventually we will have a meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/6/04 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: Civil Affairs (CA) Recommendation

DHR:dh
043004-12

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

OSD 11674-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43633

322

11-L-0559/OSD/43633



UNITED STATES ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF

INFO MEMO

April 6, 2004, 2:50 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

FROM: GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs (CA) Recommendation

- In **1987**, CA was assigned to USSOCOM under U.S. Code Title **10** to designate a unified commander as the resource advocate and manager of shared characteristics of regional orientation and language skills. At the time, it seemed the best functional "fit."
- In **1993**, CA was formally designated as SOF. Prior to **1993**, CA was managed by both USSOCOM and Headquarters, Department of the **Army** (HQDA). The FY **2004-09** Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) SOF study found that, "While the focus of CA differs from that of SOF 'operators,' CA contributes best to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) by remaining within USSOCOM."
- There are proven advantages for maintaining CA within SOF. USSOCOM is uniquely suited to manage CA because of its unconventional nature and the unique skill sets CA soldiers must learn and sustain. USSOCOM is the doctrinal proponent for CA and provides the institutional training and education for all CA enlisted and officer personnel through the **JFK** Special Warfare Center and Schools at Ft. Bragg.
- CA units help commander's transition from combat to post-combat stabilization and ensure conventional commanders plan, resource, and conduct stability operations throughout the depth and width of the maneuver battlefield. Well-executed CA operations are not sequential to; they're simultaneous with combat operations.
- We have increased the role of CA in our new modularity construct. We are adding CA sections at the Unit of Action (UA) Level, and increasing CA staffing at the Unit of Employment (UE) Level. These CA forces will help **our** conventional commanders train, plan, and deploy with assigned CA experts.

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs (CA) Recommendation

- The Army is working with USSOCOM to grow the 96th CA battalion into a brigade. This will increase the number of active Army CA soldiers available on short notice. USSOCOM provides Army CA to all Combatant Commands and Services, not just Army formations.
- Recommend an independent study to conduct a thorough analysis of command relationships, organization, and staffing of CA assets to provide the requisite capability within Department of Defense before directing major changes.

COORDINATION: USASOC (LTG Philip R. Kensinger), SOCOM (LTC Kenneth Schladt), JCS J3 (LTC Stephen Dalzell), and MOSO SOD (LTC Dermis Cahill)

Prepared By: LTC Chris Hughes, (b)(6)

CLOSE HOLD
(Hand deliver)

C4/20

March 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker
Gen. Doug Brown

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Les Brownlee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs



My impression is that civil affairs was put in with Special Operations because it was different and Special Ops was different, which made sense. Probably also it was because the regular Army did not want it.

It continues to be different, but it is also different from Special Ops, as well as being different from the regular Army,

My impression is that we ought to give careful thought to moving it over to the regular Army, so that the regular Army interests itself in that subject and so the transitions from combat to post-combat stabilization can be relatively seamless. Furthermore, I don't think there is anything lost by moving it out of Special Ops, and possibly something gained.

Please think about it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-25

Sir,
Response attached. 4/30
v/r.
JTC Europe

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

(Hand deliver)
CLOSE HOLD

11-L-0559/OSD/43636

ASD 10919-04

7201
April 30, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Update for POTUS on Footprint

We are going to want to talk to the President about the footprint and give him an update every couple of weeks, including:

- Where the Congress stands on it.
- What its relationship is to BRAC.
- The announcement we are going to make, which should be coordinated with the White House as well as with the Congress.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-10

.....
Please *respond* by _____

DR
5/18

30 Apr 04

4/5/04
In reply refer to EF-9478 & 04/006073-ES

April 30, 2004

TO See Def

TO: Powell Moore
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Brief Committees on Posture

Do you think we ought to brief the Foreign Relations Committee and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on our posture statement?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-9

.....
Please respond by

5/7/04

5/11
Sir,
Response attached.
VR/CDR Nasenzo
5/11

put 5/12

03-05-04 10:21 IN

OSD 11676-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43638

320.2 Strategic

30 Apr 04

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef
USD(P) 5/5/04
I-04/006073

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy

May 3 2004

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Brief to Congress on Global Posture

- We have briefed all of the relevant congressional committee staffs on more than one occasion on our global posture work, and you have met with many of the key members.
- You have not yet met with Chairmen and the Ranking Members of the
 - o Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Sen. Lugar and Sen. Biden);
 - o House International Relations Committee (Rep. Hyde and Rep. Lantos).
- You also have not met with Sen. Inouye and Sen. Stevens, although Ryan Henry and Andy Hoehn briefed them recently.
- I will work with Powell Moore to schedule these remaining meetings. For the SFRC and HIRC meetings, which I recommend you cover in a single session, you might consider inviting Secretary Powell.

Cc: Powell Moore

Prepared by: Barry Pavel, Strategy, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/43639

03-05-04 18:46 1H

OSD 11676-04

3202 ST re ic

3 May 04 30 Apr 04

7209

April 30, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Wargame

353

As I mentioned, Condi and Colin both liked the idea of doing a wargame or some scenarios as to what is going to happen after July 1. Their question was at what level do we want to do this. They thought fairly high – Deputy or Deputy Under.

Let's press ahead with it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-8

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

30 Apr 04

OSD 11677-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43640

April 30, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Approach on Iraq

I would like to talk to you about a complete approach on Iraq, including borders, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-7

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

OSD 11678-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43641

720
April 30, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Detainees

Let's make sure we get the detainee updates for both Guantanamo and Iraq out at least a day before the next detainee meeting.

Also, please go back in and tell the NSC that the detainee meeting should be at the Deputy level, not at the Principal level.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-6

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

OB
5/4

11-L-0559/OSD/43642

OSD 11679-04

383.6

30

April 30, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq History Project

I just read this Collins memo on the Iraq History Project Update. The President's interest was not in museums and memorials. His interest was in what information about the atrocities and the things that went on in that country we can glean from interrogations, documentation or mass graves, so the world and the Iraqi people can have a good sense of it and put that on the scale as they are making their decisions. Three-quarters of what is on this memo seems to me to be not addressing those issues at all.

Please come back with another memo explaining if we are doing what we should be doing. If we are not, tell me and we will get someone to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/27/04 DASD (Stability Operations) memo to USD(P)

DHR:dh
043004-3

.....
Please respond by

5/14/04

OB
5/4

11-L-0559/OSD/43643

OSD 11681-04

INFO MEMO

ASD SO/LIC *MDJ*

EF-9421

I-04/05740-SO

FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations

SUBJECT: Iraq History Project Update

Joseph Collins
27 Apr 04

Museums and Memorials:

- State released a Request for Proposals for the first \$10.5 million of a \$15 million Iraq supplemental for human rights activities including museums, documentaries, and memorials on April 23, 2004.
- Ambassador Bremer announced the creation of an Iraq National Foundation of Remembrance for the purpose of commemorating and memorializing victims of the previous regime on April 25, 2004. It will be led by a seven-member Board of Directors appointed by the Administrator.

Documents:

- At a meeting on Baathist regime documents hosted by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), representatives from the Iraq Governing Council, Iraqi Ministries, non-governmental organizations, and political parties agreed to form an independent National Document Commission.
- The Document Warehouse is completed and the first 20 tons of documents have been delivered to the site.

Mass Graves

- The UK forensic team has pulled out due to security concerns. State is trying to hire the personnel as contractors in order to avoid restrictive UK security requirements.

Media:

- A film on mass graves in Iraq is about to start a tour of the US.
- Sam Chalabi, Administrator of the Iraq Special Tribunal (IST), is interviewing Sunni Arabs as potential spokesmen, and is going to begin publishing articles on the IST.
- CPA is developing a media outreach program. The first press release on judicial appointments to the IST was released the week of April 19th.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Heather Panitz, SO/LIC Stability Operations,

(b)(6)

Policy Info Memo Template

28-04-04 07:58 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/43644

7201
TAB

June 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Headquarters

We ought to have a session with General Casey to talk to him about that headquarters, the ways it could be organized, and its enormous size.

Before he goes, we are going to want to have him carefully think through how he can slim it down and use capabilities that already exist in the Corps headquarters.

Thanks.

DRL:cm
060804-22

.....
Please respond by 6/15/04

Tab

OSD 11682-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43645

322

8 Jun 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1976-04
4 August 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC

STAN 8/3

SUBJECT: MNF-I Headquarters

- **Issue.** Discussion with General Casey on size and organization of MNF-I Headquarters (TAB).
- **Conclusion.** General Casey will have had adequate time to assess MNF-I's organization and size with respect to requirements by late August, when he is tentatively scheduled to visit Washington.
- I will have my staff coordinate a session during George's next visit to Washington.

322

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J5; (b)(6)

4 Aug 04

8 Jan 04

OSD 11682-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43646

AR 080504

DOC 8/4/2004

DOR 8/4/2004

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APR 5 2004

Eritrea

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Eritrea

Please get somebody to draft a memo from me to the NSC people on Eritrea, saying that we have to balance these two State Department local nationals who are in jail against the fact that we are suddenly getting cut out.

Abizaid needs to get in. He needs to work with them. It is important. The question is what is the cost-benefit ratio here? It sounds to me like we are on the wrong side of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-19

.....
Please respond by

4/16/04

SAPPROY

OSD 11684-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43648

APR 5 2004

W40

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Douald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pay System

Please take a look at this article "Fight Now, Pay Later." It is one of the examples of how messed up our personnel system is in the Department of Defense.

Thanks.

Attach.

Carnahan, Ira. "Fight Now, Pay Later," *Forbes*, March 29, 2004, p. 50.

DHR:dh
040204-3

.....
Please **respond** by 4/23/04

5 APR 04

OSD 11685-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43649

H&R Blocked

The tax giant has a great brand name. Can it extend it to other financial services? BY EMILY LAMBERT

APRIL 15 LOOMS, but H&R Block Chief Executive Mark A. Ernst has more than taxes on his mind. He's eager to find out how many of this season's customers can gradually be convinced to buy H&R Block's newer offerings, including home mortgages, business consulting and brokerage services.

There's new urgency to this mission, although a strategy shift to build on the tax business has been in the works for several years. H&R Block offices lost 4% of their



Beyond 1040s: Chief Mark Ernst; new "relationship" ad.

taxpayer clients in 2003. Some filed taxes through H&R Block online—convenient for them but less lucrative for the tax preparer. Also, this season got off to a sluggish start, perhaps because of growing competition from rival Jackson Hewitt. Says Ernst: "This repositioning of the brand must happen." The effort is evident in increasingly pushy agents and TV spots that subtly pitch H&R Block advisers as experts in college planning, home buying—even, jokingly, nursery design. So far, results are encouraging: The average fee per office client as of Feb. 15 this year was \$135, up from \$131 last year and \$122 in 2002.

Last fiscal year the company's nontax businesses accounted for half of its \$3.8 billion in revenue, most of that from its mortgage lending, which it started offering in 1997. But other services are a tough sell. Its financial services business hemorrhaged \$128 million (pretax) last year, and the business services arm is also lagging. The unit, which operates as RSM McGladrey, lost \$14 million in 2003.

One problem has been turning number crunchers into smooth salesfolk. "Anything that's new is viewed suspiciously," sighs Ernst, 45. Now H&R Block gives its 80,000 tax advisers computer prompts with recommendations for clients, pointing them, for example, to IRAs (though it insists it wouldn't specifically push its own IRA product).

Some customers may be wary, too. The company is under fire for its "refund anticipation loans." The loans, which can carry interest rates of 129%, appeal to cash-strapped low-income customers. The fees accounted for \$109 million in revenue last year. H&R Block has settled a number of loan-related lawsuits, including one in Texas for \$50 million. The company defends the loans. But there could be more trouble: The Securities & Exchange Commission is investigating whether H&R Block properly disclosed the suits to shareholders. **F**

FIGHT NOW, PAY LATER

Members of the U.S. military earn an average salary and benefits of \$99,000 a year. So why is recruiting and retaining military personnel such a challenge?

With U.S. soldiers dying almost daily in Iraq, that might seem an absurd question. But it's not. The military's manpower problems precede Iraq. And while the war may scare off some potential recruits, it attracts others, who feel a patriotic call.

In fact, the Pentagon's personnel problems have a more mundane root: the way soldiers are paid. Only 43% of that \$99,000 package comes in their paychecks. The rest takes the form of benefits, with two-thirds of those benefits—mostly for pensions and health care—not received until years after soldiers leave the service, the Congressional Budget Office reports.

Not a good way to pay soldiers—or anyone else. It turns out that many prefer a bird in the hand to 200 in the bush. The evidence: In the 1990s, with the Cold War over, Congress and the Pentagon decided to encourage voluntary early departures by offering the choice of a lump-sum payment or a long-term annuity. The annuity had a present value about double that of the lump sum. Yet over half of the officers and 92% of the enlisted personnel who left took the lump sum.

Using those choices, economists John Warner of Clemson University and Saul Pleeter of the Defense Department calculate that officers discounted future benefits at an average rate of 10% to 19% a year, while enlistees discounted them at 85% to 94%, which is to say they valued such benefits hardly at all. The math is striking: A soldier with a 35% discount rate values a dollar to be received in

21 years at under a fifth of a cent. Yet to pay a soldier that \$1 in benefits in 21 years costs taxpayers 36 cents in today's dollars—200 times what the service member thinks it's worth.


So soldiers end up underpaid, and taxpayers overburdened: spending and accruals for military retirement now total \$52 billion a year, with an

additional unfunded liability of \$576 billion.

The military compensation scheme isn't just inefficient, it's also unfair. Soldiers must serve 20 years before they're eligible for retirement pay. That means the more than half of officers and 85% of enlistees who serve less than 20 years get zilch.

Fixing this screwed-up system won't be easy. The Pentagon says it's planning a review, but even a limited reform—which was passed by Congress in 1986 and wouldn't have lowered any soldier's retirement pay for another two decades—was repealed in 1999, before it ever had time to take effect.

—Ira Camahan



April 5, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
LTG John Craddock

*Advance sent
copy 4/5 0845*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Di*

SUBJECT: Homeland Security Council

I want to start going to Homeland Security Council meetings regularly. I want my calendar to reflect every time they are held, just like we do Cabinet meetings and NSC meetings.

Also, let's add McHale in for two Round Table meetings per week instead of one.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040504-8

.....
Please respond by _____

*OB
4/16*

334HSC

5 AUG 04

OSD 11686-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43651

APR 5 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Ryan Henry
LTG John Craddock



FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: POTUS Footprint Brief

When should we do the POTUS brief on footprint?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040204-11

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

OSD 11687-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43652

337 WH

SAPRO4

APR 5 2004

TO: *LARRY D. RITA*
LTG John Craddock
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: HSC Meetings

I am not receiving invitations to Homeland Security Council meetings. I need to start getting invitations, and I need to be the one to decide whether or not I go. I am not even being told about the meetings at the present time, and that is not good.

Let's fix it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040204-16

.....
Please respond by

4/9/04

*Answered 8 April
Snowflake - some question
C 4/4*

OSD 11689-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43653

334HSC

5 AUG 04

APR 5 2004

TO: Ryan Henry
Andy Hoehn

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Global Footprint

In this global footprint effort, the one thing we have not done is look at the places we are planning to stay and ask ourselves if we are comfortable with the usability of our forces in those locations and with the various other legal agreements we have. Because, if we are not comfortable and if we are not able to get them to a point that is acceptable, this is the time to find that out, and move those forces as well.

So, we need to get those issues surfaced up also.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040204-17

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

OSD 11690-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43654

W
D
D

545507

April 8, 2004

DONEAdvance
copy provided

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DN-
SUBJECT: Response to Novak Op-ed

I want to see a draft of a response to the Novak column, in detail, historically by noon today and I would like to get it out tonight.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
(41804-10)

.....
Please respond by

4/8/04

000750

8 Apr 04

4/15
am

APR 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
LTG John Craddock
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Testify

I am inclined not to testify again before the 9/11 Commission. Don't anyone agree to schedule me without my knowledge.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041204-3

.....
Please respond by _____

000.5

14 Apr 04

April 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DeFrank Article

You ought to go pound Tom DeFrank for the number 17 in today's *Early Bird*. It is just such nonsense. I have been pushing for them to let me know if they needed more troops, not resisting it. Anyone who knows anything about it knows that. If he paid attention, he would know it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041204-2

.....
Please respond by 4/14/04

Sec Def

4/15

*I sicced our pit
bull on him
(Eric Ruff).
He hit him hard.*

D. H. A.

APR 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Personnel Pay System

At the next Senior Staff Meeting, I want David Chu to brief on the personnel pay system and this business of getting everyone on the same system - Guard, reserve, active, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/6/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Personnel Systems for Guard and Reserve [OSD 04986-04]

DHR:dh
041204-4

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/43658

OSD 11696-04

3/16/04

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-24

Please respond by

~~4/2/04~~

31 MAR

4/12
DHR

Sir,

Response attached.

V/r.

LTC Swase

Chu response Attached

OSD 04986-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43659



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2004 APR 07 PM 1:50

April 6, 2004, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: Personnel Systems for Guard and Reserve -- SNOWFLAKE

- Pay for active, reserve, and Guard personnel is one of the many problems caused by our ineffective legacy military personnel systems.
- The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is developing an interim pay system (Forward Compatible Pay) that will address some of the pay problems. The Services are also putting in place manual workarounds. However, many of the pay problems are caused by the personnel systems and the lack of integration between personnel and pay.
- My office, working with the Services and other DoD offices, designed the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) that will address the problems with our current legacy military personnel and pay systems. It is a fully integrated, all-Service, all-Component personnel and pay system built on a commercial off-the-shelf base (PeopleSoft) and designed to streamline business processes and incorporate best practices. We recently developed an accelerated schedule for implementation that will bring the Army up beginning in September 2005 with full implementation in all Services by October of 2006.
- The accelerated program requires some additional near-term funding, which I will work with the Comptroller to secure.

RECOMMENDATION: INFORMATION ONLY

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: Norma St. Claire, Director, Joint Requirements and Integration Office,

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	4/9
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	4/7 Chu

OSD 04986-04



11-L-0559/OSD/43660

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-24

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

4/12 DR C411

*Sir,
Response attached.
v/v/CDR Nosenzo
4/1*

11-L-0559/OSD/43661



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

INFO MEMO

March 31, 2004, 8:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for the Guard and Reserve

- In response to your query of March 15, 2003, I fully agree that we need to ensure our Soldiers receive the best possible support, especially with respect to their pay. We have been working to resolve the systemic causes of the problems even before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. We have since intensified our efforts.
- In the near term, the Forward Compatible Pay System (FCPS) will provide a commercial, off the shelf, interim solution, beginning in March 2005. Current development cost estimates for FCPS total \$17.3 million. The ultimate solution is the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), which is being developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The deployment of the system will not begin until January 2006. The Army Budget Office is working with the Joint Requirements Integration Office to validate the full DIHMRS development costs.
- Until FCPS is fielded, the Army is providing training teams to finance battalions, mobilization/demobilization sites, and units in Kuwait, as well as establishing workarounds for current pay systems to correct specific, problematic input. Additionally, an information campaign to inform Soldiers and family members of the Guard and Reserve Pay Task Force (telephonic and e-mail hot line) is already proving beneficial in resolving pay issues.
- We continue to monitor progress in resolving this issue as outlined in the attached Pay Improvement Plan (Tab A).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Susan Beausoleil, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/43662



Summary Action/Task List for Improving Pay Support for Mobilized Soldiers

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Primary Organization</u>	<u>Suspense</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>GAO Response</u>	<u>Memoto Congress</u>
<u>Completed Actions</u>						
2	Training team to Kuwait	DFAS	Nov-03	completed	10	1a(2)
3	35 specific training events for finance battalions and mobilization demobilization site personnel	USARC		completed	10	1a(3)
7	US Army Reserve help lines for individuals and finance units	USARC		completed	N/A	1a(7)
8	Deploy integrated Active Component/Reserve Component input system (DMO) to all Army	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(1)
9	Retroactive entitlement input	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(2)
10	Leave Accrual	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(3)
11	Revise Defense Finance & Accounting Service (DFAS) Military pay message from 19Dec 02	DFAS	Nov-03	completed	1,3,18	1c(1)
12	Publish matrix of responsibilities by action	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	completed	1,3	1c(2)
13	Publish standardized entitlement explanation flyer for distribution at mobilization sites	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	completed	13	1c(3)
15	Add warning screens on input system (DMO and JUSTIS) for tour cancellations	DFAS, ARNG		completed	4, 21	1e
18	Published guidance on processing orders for medical extensions	Army G1		completed	4	1g
20	Review grades of US Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) military pay technicians	ARNG		completed	9	1i
25	Produce exportable DJMS-RC training package	Finance School	Mar-04	completed	10	2c
43	Joint Uniform Standard Terminal Input System (JUSTIS - ARNG input system)	ARNG	Apr-04	completed	20	N/A
	change to require remark on miscellaneous credit input					
44	DMO change to require remark on misc. credit input	DFAS	Apr-04	completed	20	N/A
50	Establish policy for supervisory control/review of tour cancellations	DFAS/ARNG	Apr-04	completed	N/A	N/A
<u>Ongoing Actions</u>						
1	Training at US Army Reserve Pay Operations Center	USARC		ongoing	10	1a(1)
4	National Guard mobilization finance classes	ARNG		ongoing	10	1a(4)
5	Notification to US Property & Fiscal Offices of pending mobilizations	ARNG		ongoing	N/A	1a(5)
6	Notification to US Property & Fiscal Offices of recent demobilizations	ARNG		ongoing	N/A	1a(6)
14	Initiate compliance reviews of mobilization/demobilization sites	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	ongoing	1	1d
16	Defense Joint Military Pay System - Reserve Component (DJMS-RC) automated reconciliation to in-theater database for monitoring stops/starts of theater entitlements	DFAS		ongoing	3	1f(1)
17	DJMS-RC automated reconciliation to demobilization site records for stopping all pay/curtailing tours	DFAS		ongoing	3	1f(2)
19	Publish memorandum to reserve commands on importance of using pay management report	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	ongoing	5	1h
21	Ensure pay issues for units identified by General Accounting Office are all resolved	ARNG	Oct-03	ongoing	15	1j
40	Continue to add functionality to myPay for discretionary actions	DFAS		ongoing	14	N/A
42	Add JUSTIS table of mobilized soldiers' accounts with recurring input required	ARNG	Apr-04	ongoing	19	N/A
45	Provide Defense Military Pay Offices (DMPO) and Finance Battalions (FB) with NG newsletter	DFAS		ongoing	20	N/A
51	Establish ombudsmen program for National Guard Soldiers	ARNG	Apr-04	ongoing	N/A	N/A

TAG A



Summary Action/Task List for Improving Pay Support for Mobilized Soldiers

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Primary Organization</u>	<u>Suspense</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>GAO Response</u>	<u>Memoto Congress</u>
<u>Near Term Actions (3 to 6 months)</u>						
22	Automate Hardship Duty Pay - Location (HDP-L)	DFAS	Apr-04	open	17	2a(1)
23	Develop/publish revised comprehensive procedures	USAFINCOM	Mar-04	open	1	2b(1)
24	Clarify who does what how & develop metrics/standards tailored to mobilization	USAFINCOM	Mar-04	open	2	2b(2)
38	Evaluate support for surge staffing of USPFOs	ARNG	Apr-04	open	7,8	N/A
41	Evaluate Standard Installation/Division Personnel System - National Guard (SIDPERS-NG) - JUSTIS interface for mobilization	ARNG	Mar-04	open	16	N/A
46	Evaluate potential DJMS-RC systems change for debt threshold	DFAS	Apr-04	open	21	N/A
<u>Mid-Term Actions (6 to 36 months)</u>						
26	Internet soldiers' pay account access (myPay) for dependents (view-only)	DFAS	Aug-04	open	14	3a
27	Forward Compatible Pay system (FCP) approval from DoD/ Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)	DFAS	Sep-04	open	17,18,20	3b(3)
28	Complete FCP Development-Dec 04	DFAS	Dec-04	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(a)
29	Start FCP deployment to the Army RC- Mar-05	DFAS	Mar-05	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(b)
30	Start FCP deployment to the Army AC-Jul 05	DFAS	Jul-05	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(c)
31	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes- DoDFMR	DFAS	Sep-04	open	6	3c
32	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes - AR 37-104-4	USAFINCOM	Sep-04	open	6	3c
33	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes - NGR 130-6	ARNG	Sep-04	open	6	3c
34	Evaluate placement and monitoring mechanisms for FCP/reserve pay training	Finance School	Sep-04	open	10,12	3d
39	Add pay support doc review & monthly reconciliations to precommand course	ARNG	Sep-04	open	11	N/A
49	Automate Continental US Cost of Living Allowance (CONUS COLA)	DFAS	Mar-05	open	N/A	N/A
52	Procedures for reviewing high dollar payments	DFAS	Sep-04	open	24	N/A
<u>Long Term Actions (36+ months)</u>						
35	Initial Army operational capability DIMHRS-Sep 05	OSD	Sep-05	open	22, 23	4a(4)(a)
36	Start deployment of DIMHRS to the Army-Jan 06	OSD	Jan-06	open	22, 23	4a(4)(b)
37	Complete DIMHRS implementation-Sep 07	OSD	Sep-07	open	22, 23	4a(4)(c)
47	Incorporate Army Guard pay problems in Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) development	OSD	Sep-05	open	22	N/A
48	Include full reengineering in DIMHRS	OSD	Sep-05	open	23	N/A

720
- APR 20 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bids Using US Equipment

Here is a note someone sent concerning the Iraqi Army. What do you folks think?

Thanks.

Attach.
3/25/04 Memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
041204-9

.....
Please respond by

4/30/04

11-29
20 APR 04

4/12
DA

March 25, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

I know you are incredibly busy and you haven't time to focus on the following, but I think it is important.

The Army's past request to industry to bid on equipping the Iraqi Army was cancelled. The Army through Army Material Command is re-initiating this proposal. In the initial proposal, bidders were allowed to bid foreign-made equipment. I recommend that DOD constrain industry to bidding only U.S. built equipment for the following reasons:

- It would logistically tie the Iraqi Army to the United States for the next several decades.
- It also means that we could logistically shut down the Iraqi Army at anytime of our choosing.
- We have excess equipment that can be used for equipping the new Iraqi Army.
- The upside to this is that we would need to refurbish new equipment through the Army Depot system (4-6 depots). This would be an economic advantage to the states concerned; which is a plus to the Administration in an election year.

Bottom line: I feel it is very important to have a logistical hold over the Iraqi Army.

thanx

6/14
1000

720

EF-9182
I-04/004798
APR 07 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invite Ukraine to Istanbul

Let's push for Ukraine to be invited to Istanbul.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040604-3

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

TN 6/15

To SecDef
Paul Butler
6/15

Policy ExecSec's Note

June 14, 2004

CAPT Marriott,

- SYG de Hoop Scheffer sent a letter inviting President Kuchma to attend the Istanbul Summit. Although the government of Ukraine is yet to provide a formal response, Ukraine MOD Marchuk made it clear to Ian Brzezinski on June 7 that Kuchma intended to go to Istanbul.

C. L. O'Connor

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

Det 6/16

NATO 337

7 Apr 04

OSD 11699-04
07-04-04 13:58 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/43667

April 5, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iranian Chargé

I was amazed to hear you say you were debating whether or not to move out the Iranian chargé. I thought we had decided to do that a month ago, when I raised that with you.

DHR:dh
040504-16

.....
Please respond by

4/9/04

Iran

5 Apr 04

APR 9 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Liability Language

Let's make sure we get this liability language surfaced that came up with Ivanov.

I want to see what the problem is.

Please get it teed up for me, and maybe I can help get it solved.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040604-14

.....
Please respond by

4/23/04

Russia

9 APR 04

720
APR 9 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Doug Feith
Dov Zakheim
Powell Moore
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Improving Security

The President raised the question of what we need to better develop the Iraqi security services.

We need to develop a list of things we would like to ask of Congress or OMB, which can enable us to do a better job. The Vice President raised it in the SVTC.

John Craddock, please assign someone the task of pulling that together.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040704-8

.....
Please respond by

4/23/04

SecDef -

- Ryan Henry, using Andy Hochen's shop, will pull this together
- This should get looked at by a high level group to ensure
 - focus is correct
 - list inclusive/comprehensive
- Might want to vet w/ the SLRG

11-L-0559/OSD/43670 OSD 11703-04 *C*

Iraq

4/10 9 Apr 04

April 5, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Iranian Chargé

I was amazed to hear you say you were debating whether or not to move out the Iranian chargé. I thought we had decided to do that a month ago, when I raised that with you.

DHR:dh
040504-16

.....
Please respond by

4/9/04

OB
4/14

Iran


5 Apr 04

APR 5 2004

W
D
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P

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Brief Senators Sessions and Bayh

If we haven't briefed Senator Sessions and Senator Bayh on force posture, footprint and Army end strength, we should certainly get them and do it. We could include some other folks at the same time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040204-19

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

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OSD 11706-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43672

March 30, 2004

SUBJECT: Security Transition

I have to talk to Colin Powell about security staying with CENTCOM and not going to the mission when sovereignty passes.

Our only way to make sure we get out of Iraq is if we see that CENTCOM – who has the security responsibility and is the outfit that has to organize, train, equip and undertake joint operations and work the command and control issues – has the baton.

DHR:dh
030004-18

OB
4/14


Iraq

30 Mar 04

April 8, 2004

TO: Steve Hadley

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Requests of Joint Staff

If you have requests of the Joint Staff or the Vice Chairman, you should run them through John Craddock's office. Then we will know what is going on and be able to make sure that appropriate information required by the National Security Council staff gets to you.

I have asked the folks in the Joint Staff to refer such requests to my office.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040804-4

0205CS

8 Apr 04

7201
April 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M.*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Special Tribunals

Here is a memo from Doug Feith about the Iraqi Special Tribunals. It obviously is important.

Please get into it, solve what you can solve **of** Doug's concerns and then come to me with a proposed way ahead.

It seems like you can probably resolve matters that are at the Feith-Hadley level.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/1/04 USD(P) info memo to SecDef re: Draft NSPD Concerning US Assistance to Iraqi Special Tribunal [OSD 04818-04]

DHR:dh
040804-5

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

8 Apr 04
OSD 11711-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43675

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

✓
4/8

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 APR -2 PM 4:18

EF-9006

04/004020

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef_____

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *4/1/04*

SUBJECT: Draft National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) Concerning
United States Assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST)

- The Department of Justice (DOJ) has the USG lead in providing support to the IST, which will try the top Iraqi regime officials. DOJ has drafted an NSPD to define the responsibilities of its Regime Crimes Advisor's Office (RCOA) and the supporting roles of the CPA, DoD, State, and the intelligence community.
- At the March 23, 2004, Deputies' Committee meeting, several of us questioned whether an NSPD is necessary for this purpose, but Hadley made clear that he intends to go forward with the NSPD. I said DoD has changes to propose and, in any event, we cannot approve the NSPD until the Secretary of Defense has reviewed it.
- The DoD Office of General Counsel, USD(I), and I have made edits to the latest DOJ draft (Tab B). However, the following items remain concerns that should be addressed before the NSPD is approved (relevant language is highlighted in the NSPD draft at Tab A):

We've already sent them to DOJ.

- The fourth full paragraph on page two delays releasing information to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights until "the conclusion" of the DOJ mission. This information is both critical to identifying missing Iraqis and to publicizing Saddam's atrocities. This should not be delayed but should be an ongoing effort.
- The last full paragraph on page three directs DoD to provide "secure access to and transportation of Iraqi prisoners for interviews." After June 30, DoD should not necessarily be required to provide access to and transport of prisoners in Iraqi custody. This would be an additional task for MG Miller's mission, which is still being defined (the Joint Staff has the pen).

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43676

SPL ASSISTANT TO STB	18704
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARIOTT	8: 962 4/5

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

- This same paragraph also requires DoD to provide “access” to Iraqi documents. The final paragraph (page 4) requires the ISG to “make available . . . appropriate documents.” This may require the ISG to shift its priorities in response to DOJ requests for documents. The issue of the ISG’s priorities is being reviewed now by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and should not get foreclosed by the NSPD.
- The NSPD also places four Judge Advocates assigned to the CPA’s Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice under RCAO “operational control.” While these Judge Advocates can and should participate in the RCAO effort, operational control must remain with DoD.
- The NSPD may also raise resource concerns. A copy has been provided to the Comptroller for comment.
- DoD General Counsel recommends non-concurrence until the document is acceptable.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachment(s):

As stated

Prepared by: MAJ Brad Clark, SO/LIC Special Operations Program Support, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43677

DRAFT

DoJ Draft
3/26/04

March __, 2004

NATIONAL SECURITY ~~PRESIDENTIAL~~ DIRECTIVE/NSPD-###

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE **SECRETARY** OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
 THE **SECRETARY** OF DEFENSE
 THE ATTORNEY **GENERAL**
 THE SECRETARY OF **COMMERCE**
 DIRECTOR, **OFFICE** OF MANAGEMENT AND **BUDGET**
 THE **SECRETARY** OF HOMELAND SECURITY
 CHIEF **OF** STAFF TO THE **PRESIDENT**
 ASSISTANT TO THE **PRESIDENT** FOR NATIONAL
 SECURITY AFFAIRS
 COUNSEL TO THE **PRESIDENT**
 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 DIRECTOR, **FEDERAL** BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 CHAIRMAN, **PRESIDENT'** SFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
 ADVISORY BOARD
 ADMINISTRATOR, **COALITION** PROVISIONAL
 AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: United States Assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal

The investigation and prosecution of **members** of the **former** Iraqi regime and the Iraqi Ba'ath **Party** for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of certain Iraqi laws represent key elements in the restoration of democratic self-government to the people of Iraq. The successful establishment and operation of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) is vital to the **success** of our national security, foreign policy, homeland security, law enforcement and defense **strategies**, and is critical to protecting and advancing **America's** interests. The **IST** statute mandates that international advisors assist the Tribunal Investigative Judges, Prosecutors, Trial Chamber Judges, and **Appeals** Chamber Judges in the performance of their duties. The United States must take **its** place in the provision of that international assistance.

Therefore, I direct the **following**:

- All relevant Departments and Agencies of the United States Government (USG), as set forth below, shall provide necessary assistance to the Iraqi people to establish a fully functioning, independent IST that reflects internationally accepted concepts of due process and the rule of law.
- The Attorney General shall appoint a Regime Crimes Advisor (RCA) to the **XST**. The Regime **Crimes** Advisor will lead and supervise American advisors and

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11-L-0559/OSD/43678

1 TAB 4

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certain international advisors, collectively known as the **Regime Crimes** Advisor's Office (**RCAO**), to continue the related work begun by the GPA Office of **Human Rights and Transitional Justice (OHRTJ)**. Specifically, the **RCAO** will assist **IST** investigators, prosecutors and investigative judges, direct American advisors to the IST, and serve as USG liaison regarding **IST** investigations and prosecutions to the Iraqi Governing Council (and the successor Iraqi Government after June 30, 2004). The RCA will assist the Governing Council in establishing, **staffing, and administering the IST**. The RCAO will serve as the lead Coalition office to assist the **IST** in coordinating all assistance to the IST by foreign governments, law enforcement agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, and other USG agencies in Iraq. The RCAO will also serve as the lead **Coalition** office supporting the **IST** measures to ensure the security and safety of witnesses and victims of **crimes** under investigation by the **IST**. hate

- The Department of Justice will assist the RCA to select a team of advisors that will deploy to Iraq. DOJ and RCA will assemble and deploy squads of investigators, under FBI leadership, drawn from federal, State or local law enforcement agencies. The RCA may deploy these teams or elements of them within Iraq in accordance with the investigative plan. RCAO may make use of any IST-related facilities and projects established or begun by OHRTJ, and coordinate this continued use after 30 June 2004 with the appropriate Iraqi authorities. DOJ will provide administrative support such as paralegals and secretaries to the RCAO.
- The RCA will supervise all USG advisors and mentors to the IST. RCAO personnel will work closely with the Iraqis supporting the IST, and ensure, where appropriate, that training and technical assistance is provided. ~~care~~
- The RCA will supervise and coordinate forensic and exhumation efforts by USG or third-nation elements in support of IST investigations. The RCA will also support Iraqi forensic efforts in support of IST investigations. The RCA may deploy personnel to locations outside Iraq.
- At the conclusion of the RCAO's mission to support the IST, the RCA will ensure that electronic or paper copies of all appropriate unclassified documents and information collected during its investigations are transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights to assist the Ministry's continuing efforts to identify missing persons and to preserve a historical record of the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein's regime.
- The CPA, in coordination with the Public Affairs Directorate of the National Security Council, will prepare a strategic communications plan directed at both Iraqi and international audiences concerning the activities of the IST and the role of the RCAO in support of the IST. Thereafter, all RCAO public affairs and public diplomacy activities will be closely coordinated with CPA's Strategic Communications Office before any public releases. In addition, all RCA public

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affairs activity **will** comply with any relevant rules **and** guidelines that the **IST** may enact governing pretrial **and** trial publicity.

- The **RCAO** shall function as a component within the CPA, and the RCA shall report to the CPA's Administrator.
 - The Attorney General may augment the **RCAO** with a **Budget Officer** to manage all **expenditures** in support of the **IST**, ~~from funds~~ appropriated for that purpose. **RCAO will have review and approval authority, within the expenditure process now employed by CPA, for all IST-related funds.**
 - The Attorney General, through the Deputy Attorney ~~General~~, may, in consultation with CPA, provide input to the RCA regarding **substantive legal and** investigative matters.
- Following the **transfer** of **full** governmental authority to the **transitional Iraqi** administration and the recognition of the sovereignty of that **administration**, all responsibilities of the **CPA** with respect to the **RCAO will devolve upon the** Secretary of State, acting through the Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
- The **heads** of all other United States law enforcement agencies **and organizations** will be **prepared to support** the RCA with personnel or resources **as** needed.
- **Using funds** appropriated to **support** the IST, the Department of Justice will support and sustain RCAO personnel in Iraq, to include: housing/billeting; transportation within Iraq; food/medical support; communications access and linkup; compound security and armed escort outside of Baghdad; security for investigative teams and forensic sites in the field; and weapons and related weapons training plus necessary personal protective gear. RCAO, in consultation with the CPA, will also coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior for personal and physical security of Iraqi IST installations and facilities, judges and personnel.
 - *under authority, direct - control of the CPA*
- The Secretary of Defense will assign to the RCAO from the military departments an agreed number of Judge Advocate General Corps (JAG) officers to serve as advisors to the IST, who will serve under RCAO operational control. The Department of Defense will also provide secure access to and transport of Iraqi prisoners for interviews; provide access to seized Iraqi documents and assistance with issues of classification and declassification; and provide departmental expertise in military history, law of war, and international law issues to include additional personnel, as appropriate.
 - *provide legal support as appropriate.*
 - *allow RCAO*
- The CPA and the Secretary of State will support the RCAO by assisting the Iraq Governing Council in establishing IST infrastructure and court facilities, and in

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the expedited identification and installation of Iraqi judges, tribunal investigators, and prosecutors to staff the IST.

- The Secretary of State will assist the RCA in recruiting and selecting, in consultation with CPA, international advisors and international investigative or forensic teams to assist the IST, and in advising the IST regarding its rules of evidence and procedure. The Secretary of State may also assist the RCAO by contacting other governments and requesting that they provide their full cooperation in collecting all evidence and contacting witnesses located within their territory that are relevant to IST investigations.
- The Director of Central Intelligence and the collected Intelligence Community: will provide historical and archival research support to the RCAO as appropriate; will serve as liaison between the RCAO and foreign government intelligence services to assist in investigations as needed; and will provide to RCAO support supplemental to the main efforts of DOD/CPA, for information security. Cleared RCAO personnel with a demonstrated need to know shall be given appropriate access to relevant captured documents and their analysis. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) within the Intelligence Community will make available to RCAO appropriate documents in ISG possession, custody or control that are relevant to RCAO and IST investigations, and ISG will coordinate with RCAO liaison to facilitate the declassification and handling of such materials.

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March __, 2004

USDP staff
O&C
USDP comments
3/31/04

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-###

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
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CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: United States Assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal

The investigation and prosecution of members of the former Iraqi regime and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of certain Iraqi laws represent key elements in the establishment ~~restoration of~~ democratic self-government ~~in to the people of Iraq~~. The successful establishment and operation of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) is vital to the success of our national security, foreign policy, homeland security, law enforcement and defense strategies, and is critical to protecting and advancing U.S. ~~America's~~ interests. The IST statute provides ~~mandates for the appointment of %international~~ advisors to assist the Tribunal Investigative Judges, Prosecutors, Trial Chamber Judges, and Appeals Chamber Judges in the performance of their duties. The United States must take its place in the provision of that international assistance.

Therefore, I direct the following:

- All relevant Departments and Agencies of the United States Government (USG), as set forth below, shall provide necessary assistance to the Iraqi people to establish a fully functioning, independent IST that reflects internationally accepted concepts of due process and the rule of law.

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11- L-0559/OSD/43682

TAB B
1

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- The Attorney General shall appoint a Regime Crimes Advisor (RCA) to the IST. The ~~RCA Regime Crimes Advisor~~ will lead and supervise ~~U.S. American~~ advisors and certain international advisors, collectively known as the Regime Crimes Advisor's Office (RCAO), to continue the related work begun by the CPA Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice (OHRTJ). Specifically, the RCAO will assist IST investigators, prosecutors and investigative judges, direct ~~U.S. American~~ advisors to the IST, and serve as USG liaison to the Iraqi Governing Council (and the successor Iraqi Government after June 30, 2004) regarding IST investigations and prosecutions ~~to the Iraqi Governing Council (and the successor Iraqi Government after June 30, 2004)~~. The RCA will assist the Governing Council in establishing, staffing, and administering the IST. The RCAO will serve as the lead Coalition office to assist the IST in coordinating all assistance to the IST by foreign governments, law enforcement agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, and other USG agencies in Iraq. The RCAO will also serve as the lead Coalition office supporting the IST measures to ensure the security and safety of witnesses and victims of crimes under investigation by the IST.
- The Department of Justice (DOJ) will assist the RCA to select a team of advisors that will deploy to Iraq. The DOJ and the RCA will assemble and deploy squads of investigators, under FBI leadership, drawn from ~~F~~federal, State or local law enforcement agencies. The RCA may deploy these teams or elements of them within Iraq in accordance with the investigative plan. The RCAO may make use of any IST-related facilities and projects established or begun by OHRTJ, and coordinate this continued use after ~~30~~ June 30, 2004 with the appropriate Iraqi authorities. The DOJ will provide administrative support such as paralegals and secretaries to the RCAO.
- The RCA will supervise all USG advisors and mentors to the ~~IQT~~. RCAO personnel will work closely with the Iraqis supporting the IST, and ensure, where appropriate, that training and technical assistance ~~are~~is provided.
- The RCA will supervise and coordinate forensic and exhumation efforts by USG or third-nation elements in support of IST investigations. The RCA will also support Iraqi forensic efforts in support of IST investigations. The RCA may deploy personnel to locations outside Iraq.
- Concurrent with its mission to ~~At the conclusion of the RCAO's mission to~~ support the IST, the RCAO will ensure that electronic or paper copies of all appropriate unclassified documents and information collected during its investigations are made available ~~transferred~~ to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights to assist the Ministry's continuing efforts to identify missing persons and to preserve a historical record of the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein's regime. In the event transfer of certain documents would interfere with investigative and prosecutorial efforts, transfer will be made at the conclusion of the RCAO mission.

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- The CPA, in coordination with the Public Affairs Directorate of the National Security Council staff, will prepare a strategic communications plan directed at both Iraqi and international audiences concerning the activities of the IST and the role of the RCAO in support of the IST. Thereafter, all RCAO public affairs and public diplomacy activities will be closely coordinated with CPA's Strategic Communications Office before any public releases. In addition, all RCA public affairs activity will comply with any relevant rules and guidelines that the IST may ~~adopt~~ ~~enact~~ governing pretrial and trial publicity.
- The RCAO shall function as a component within the CPA, and the RCA shall report to the Administrator of the CPA, ~~the Administrator~~.
 - The Attorney General may augment the RCAO with a Budget Officer to manage all expenditures in support of the IST, from funds appropriated for that purpose. The RCAO will have review and approval authority, within the expenditure process now employed by CPA, for all IST-related funds.
 - The Attorney General, through the Deputy Attorney General, may, in consultation with CPA, provide input to the RCA regarding substantive legal and investigative matters.
- Following the transfer of full governmental authority to the transitional Iraqi administration, ~~and the recognition of the sovereignty of that administration,~~ all responsibilities of the CPA with respect to the RCAO will devolve upon the Secretary of State, acting through the Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
- The heads of all other ~~U.S.-nited States~~ law enforcement agencies and organizations will be prepared to support the RCA with personnel or resources as needed.
- Using funds appropriated to support the IST, the Department of Justice will support and sustain RCAO personnel in Iraq, ~~to include~~ including: housing/billeting; transportation within Iraq; food/medical support; communications access and linkup; compound security and armed escort outside of Baghdad; security for investigative teams and forensic sites in the field; and weapons and related weapons training plus necessary personal protective gear. The RCAO, in consultation with the CPA, will also coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior for personal and physical security of Iraqi IST installations and facilities, judges and personnel.
- The Secretary of Defense will assign to the RCAO from the ~~M~~ilitary Departments an agreed number of Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAG) officers to serve as advisors to the IST, ~~who will serve under RCAO operational control~~. The Department of Defense will also provide secure access to and

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transport of Iraqi prisoners for interviews; provide access to seized Iraqi documents and assistance with issues of classification and declassification; and provide departmental expertise in military history, law of war, and international law issues, ~~to including e-assignment of~~ additional personnel, as appropriate.

- The Administrator of the CPA and the Secretary of State will support the RCAO by assisting the Iraq Governing Council in establishing IST infrastructure and court facilities, and in the expedited identification and installation of Iraqi judges, tribunal investigators, and prosecutors to staff the IST.
- The Secretary of State will assist the RCA in recruiting and selecting, in consultation with the Administrator of the CPA, international advisors and international investigative or forensic teams to assist the IST, and in advising the IST regarding its rules of evidence and procedure. The Secretary of State may also assist the RCAO by contacting other governments and requesting that they provide their full cooperation in collecting all evidence and contacting witnesses located within their territory that are relevant to IST investigations.
- ~~The Director of Central Intelligence and the collective elements of the~~ ed Intelligence Community, as appropriate, will; provide historical and archival research support to the RCAO as appropriate; ~~will serve~~ as liaison between the RCAO and foreign government intelligence services to assist in investigations as needed; and ~~will provide~~ to RCAO support supplemental to the main efforts of DOD/CPA, for information security. ~~Cleared~~ RCAO personnel with requisite security clearances and a demonstrated need to know shall be given appropriate access to relevant captured documents and their analysis. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) will provide access to appropriately cleared RCAO staff or cleared RCAO approved individuals to documents in the possession of the ISG. Materials will be declassified make documents available to RCAO and declassify appropriate material in accordance with the policy guidance that has been developed between the CPA and the TSG regarding Iraq document exploitation in support of the Iraq Special Tribunal. DoJ will provide all resources required for such support.
- ~~The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) within the Intelligence Community will make available to the RCAO appropriate documents in ISG possession, custody or control that are relevant to RCAO and IST investigations, and the ISG will coordinate with an RCAO liaison to facilitate the declassification and handling of such materials.~~

COORDINATION

Department of Defense
Office of General Counsel

Jim Haynes

March 26, 2004

Under Secretary of Defense
For Intelligence

Dr. Cambone

March 29, 2004

APR 07 2004

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Special Forces

We have a problem with CIA hiring away our Special Forces people and paying them more money. What do you propose we do about it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040504-11

.....
Please respond by

4/23/04

OSD 11712-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43687

April 5, 2004
EF-9144
I-04/004591

UZBEKISTAN

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: SecDef
SUBJECT: Certifying Uzbekistan

If we can possibly do it, I want to make sure that Uzbekistan gets certified. I have no idea where the State Department is on that at the present time.

Please check into it, and then let's do everything we can to get it right. In my view they have made darn good progress and responded to the things I raised with them. They are not perfect, but they are moving in the right direction. As I understand it, that is the test.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040504-1

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

Sir.
Response attached. C4/9
✓/r. Det 4/12
LTC Swape

SAUG04

OSD 11714-04

8:11 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 17, 2004
SUBJECT:

IRAQ

Please try to get back to me and tell me what the turkey farm or chicken farm had in Iraq and Libya so that I know what the real facts are. My mind is confused on it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041704.02

Please respond by: 4/30/04 *Closed by
desk note
4/21*

19 APR 04

OSD 11715-04

8:11 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 17, 2004

SUBJECT:

Please try to get back to me and tell me what the turkey farm or chicken farm had in Iraq and Libya so that I know what the real facts are. My mind is confused on it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041704.02

Please respond by: _____

4/19/04

*OB
5/18*

OSD 11715-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43690

~~SECRET~~

8:11 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 17, 2004

SUBJECT:

Please try to get back to me and tell me what the turkey farm or chicken farm had in Iraq and Libya so that I know what the real facts are. My mind is confused on it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
041704.02

Please respond by: _____

4/19/04

DR 4/21

Response attached

c 4/20

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/43691

APR 19 2004

749

580

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Gen. **Dick** Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Transport by Air

Why are we sending 90 percent of everything by air? I just got a stomach ache when I heard that. That would just be an enormous waste of money - like a billion and a half dollars.

Please check that and get back to me. People are convinced that **is** what is happening.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041304-10

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

PA 4/22

*Response attached
C 4/20*

19APR04

OSD 11728-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43692

7201
done

April 1, 2004

452T

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Meeting on Tanker E-mail

I simply have to solve this tanker issue. Let's get the e-mail meeting on fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-8

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

1 APR 04

OSD 11735-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43693

April 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Formers

Please have someone put together a list for me of all the living former Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security Advisers and CIA directors, and then give me back the attached list.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/12/04 List of former Secretaries of State and Defense and former **National** Security Advisers

DHR:dh
040104-2

.....
Please respond by

4/16/04

4/3 -
Attached. We have
done this before and the
list we are using for
invites reflects earlier
reviews.

D. Rita

4/2

Former Secretaries of State:

Madeleine Albright
Warren Christopher
James Baker III
Lawrence Eagleburger
George Shultz
Alexander Haig, Jr
Henry Kissinger

Former Secretaries of Defense:

William Cohen
William Perry
Richard Cheney
Frank Carlucci III
Caspar Weinberger
Harold Brown
James Schlesinger
Melvin Laird
Robert McNamara

Former National Security Advisors

Samuel Berger
Tony Lake
Brent Scowcroft
Colin Powell
John Poindexter
Robert McFarlane
William Clark
Richard Allen
Zbigniew Brzezinski

Former CIA Directors

John Deutsch
Jim Woolsey
Robert Gates
William Webster
Stansfield Turner
George H.W. Bush

APR 14 2004

EF-9261

Z-04/005098

Iceland

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iceland and the Sinai

How much longer are we going to be trying to get the proper arrangements in
Iceland and in the Sinai?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041304-2

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

4/16/04

C 4/16

→ SO

I am working to get Jan Brzezinski
to Iceland by the end of April
to inform the GOI that US assets
will come out this summer.
Hadley so far is cooperating.



Regarding Sinai, we may be able to
do a more ambitious move than
earlier envisioned. I am meeting
with my folks (Rodman et al.) today
to review in light of this week's
Sharon visit. We'll request a time to
brief you soon.

Doug Feith

11-L-0559/OSD/43696

OSD 11738-04

14APR04

APR 19 2004

TO: Tillie Fowler, Chairman, Defense Policy Board

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Bill Schneider, Chairman, Defense Science Board
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Information Warfare

Here is a memo from Andy Marshall about information warfare.

It would be helpful if the Policy Board got into it and proposed options for how we might go about creating such an entity as Andy suggests.

Please get back to me with some ideas.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/29/02 Net Assessment memo to SecDef re: Creation of an Organization to Explore the Information Aspects of Warfare [U07509/03]

DHR:dh
041404-5

Please respond by 5/14/04

OSD 11739-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43697

4/13/51

19 APR 04



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

MAY 3 9 2003

MAR 29 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ANDREW MARSHALL *Am*

SUBJECT: Creation of an Organization to Explore the Information Aspects of Warfare

BACKGROUND

Central to most of ideas about how warfare will change in the future is the notion that the information and communication technologies should lead to new operational methods and ultimately to major changes in warfare. We also already see that precision strike is now possible in ways that it was not in the more distant past, and that our ability to coordinate the actions of a wide variety of platforms or units, even if they are widely separated geographically, is now possible in a way that was never possible before. Information or superior information has always been important in warfare. Napoleon's success can be seen as due to his ability to use effectively available information and the staff that he created to support his operational command efforts. There is reason to think that information will be more central in the future than in the past. Therefore, a key competitive area in warfare is likely to be based on being better at getting and using information than one's opponent. One ought to start from a better position through superior investment, better organization for exploiting information, training, etc. As combat begins one would try to improve one's position by attacking and otherwise screwing up including deception the opponent's information acquisition and processing capabilities and defending against his efforts to similarly act upon our information gathering and processing systems. The problem is that we don't have an adequate basis for an analysis of the information aspect warfare, nor for measuring the level of superiority we have in any particular situation. We talk about information advantage, but there are few metrics. Also, our ability to model the information aspects of warfare is very poor, and hence difficult to include in any combat models that we have.

9/13.51

29mar02



U07509 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/43698

SUGGESTION

Create a RAND of the 1950's organization and provide it with a broad but clear mission statement. Such a statement might be something like the development of the science of the information aspects of warfare. The idea would be to bring together a very bright set of people and set them to work over an extended period thinking through the role of information in warfare and developing appropriate analytic tools, metrics and significantly improving our ability to model the contribution of information to the outcomes of combat. This is likely to be a decade long effort and not too expensive, although the bureaucratic obstacles to starting such a new Federal study organization would have to be negotiated with the Congress. I don't think this requires a lot of people; the numbers initially could be quite small, on the scale of 20-25 people in the organization. In any case, the key thing is picking the management and, as in the analogy with RAND, that means finding a Frank Colbohm and people like Charlie Hitch and John Williams to establish its character and provide initial intellectual leadership. Because there are no real experts in this area you would need to think about growing future Albert Wohlstetter and Herman Kahns. *So* young bright people with appropriate academic backgrounds that are willing to focus on concrete problems are what you need. Ideally, if I could, I would start two of these organizations and have them compete way to see which one could provide the best analytic framework for this area, the best case studies of the role of information in warfare, etc.

FOR ~~SMIA~~

10:11 AM

2/16

TO: Steve Cambone
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: April 16, 2004
SUBJECT: Attached

FILE
↑

384

Look at the attached. It shows that people have some security depending on threat level.

I would like to know what security they actually have had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was.

See the attached.

Thanks.

SIR,
LTG CRADDOCK INQUIRED ABOUT
THIS SNOWFLAKE SO I THOUGHT
YOU MAY NEED THE INFORMATION
AS WELL. ORIGINAL RESPONSE
ATTACHED. LISTED ATTACHMENT
INCLUDED BEHIND.

VR/CDR NOSENZO
6/14

DHR/azn
041604.01

Attach: Attachment B, Info Memo to Cambone from DUSD-CI&S Re: Protective Service Operations

Please respond by: 4/23

16 Apr 04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

MAY - 3 2004

384

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: Protective Service Operations

- This responds to your question (Tab B), *"I would like to know what security they actually had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was"* concerning protective service operations conducted by each Military Department (Service).
- Each Service reported data (Tab A), by month that reflects the total number of personnel used to provide personal protection to each protegee. Personal protection is provided by special agents (A) and when applicable are supported by drivers, administrative, and military police, which we call "support" (S).
- In the Services' report, each of the last 12 months is color-coded to show the threat level as determined by the responsible Services' field commanders.
 - Determining a threat to an individual while lacking a specific and credible threat information is subjective. The overall threat levels published by DIA, Department of Homeland Security, and COCOMs are taken into consideration, however the following are other factors field commanders consider when determining the overall threat:
 - Terrorism (kidnapping, assassination)
 - Criminal activities (kidnapping for ransom, assault or murder)
 - Civil disobedience (embarrassment of activities by demonstrators)
 - Wrong place, wrong time (natural disaster, victim of another's accident)
 - Association and/or proximity to another threatened person (collateral effects)

3 May 04

16 Apr 04

Prepared by: Col Kevin Jacobsen, ODU S&S (b)(6)

OSD 11740-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43701

- When the Services reported threat level for each month, they used the following general criteria:
 - LOW: No significant threat to protectee or the protectee is not exposed to the general population.
 - MEDIUM: General information, which shows the protectee may be targeted, based on his/her position or the protectee is exposed to the environment where the terrorist or criminal threat level is assessed as medium.
 - HIGH: Credible and specific information that shows the protectee is targeted and/or the protectee is exposed to **an** environment where the terrorist or criminal threat level is assessed at **high** or critical.
- TAB (C) was previously provided to you and is attached for background.

COORDINATION: DUSD (CI&S); Army CID; Air Force OSI; Navy NCIS

Threat Levels:

Low - Green

Medium - Yellow

High - Red

ARMY LED PROTECTION

OSD/JCS Principals have Agent Only Details

A = Agent

S = support

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Juni-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
Sec of Defense													
* Metro	35	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	32	30	31	31	31
Travel													
Total	75	97	102	105	81	104	109	119	70	97	59	126	63
Spt to SecDef's Fam													
Dep Sec of Def													
* Metro	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	20	19	18	17	18	19
Travel													
Total	58	60	121	81	73	59	68	63	42	49	84	60	51
CJCS													
* Metro	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Travel													
Total	28	29	74	69	62	93	48	58	47	51	60	36	66
VCJCS													
* Metro	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7
Travel													
Total	22	28	38	51	32	37	17	30	32	34	37	33	42
SEC ARMY **				0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	
CSA													
Metro	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Travel													
Total	36	108	79	8	3	93	64	50	45	43	20	55	57
VCSA**								0					
Gen Franks (RET)													
Metro					3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Travel					9	4	13	38	23	37	33		34
Total					12	7	14	39	24	38	34	30	35
AMB Bremer**								9	0	7	5	0	0
SHAPE		A-9/S-3	A-9/S-3	A-9/S-3						A-9/S-3	A-9/S-3		A-9/S-3
USAREUR ***													
DEP EUCOM CDR **	A-1/S-35	A-1/S-36	A-1/S-36	A-1/S-36	A-1/S-40	A-1/S-39	A-1/S-37	A-1/S-35	A-1/S-36	A-1/S-36	A-1/S-37	A-1/S-41	A-1/S-41
NATO U.S. Rep ***							A-1/S-13						A-1/S-13
KFOR	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11	A-1/S-11
SFOR	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13	A-1/S-13
CG CFLCC													
DCG CFLCC													
V Corp													

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
III CORPS CDR													
CG, CFC-A													
CG, CJTF-180													
C, OMC-A													
CPA Augment ****													
JFCOM		A-0 / S-1	A-0 / S-1			A-0 / S-1							A-0 / S-2
SOUTHCOM***	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18	A-1/S-18
USARSO	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8	A-0/S-8
Total:	A-471s-322	A-471s-322	A-471s-323	A-471s-322	A-471s-326	A-471s-325	A-471s-322	A-471s-320	A-471s-321	A-471s-322	A-471s-325	A-471s-325	A-471s-326
* Total agent count includes all required agents ISO OSD/JCS Metro Mission on a daily basis													
** Travel Only													
*** Numbers Includes Residence Security and Travel Team													
**** Agents provide support in ITO only													

Threat Levels:

Low - Green

Medium - Yellow

High - Red

NAVY LED PROTECTION

A = Agent

S = support

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
Washington, DC													
CNO			A-3/S-2		A-3/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2		A-41s-2	A-41s-2
Travel Support			A-6		A-13	A-4	A-31		A-10	A-11		A-4	A-4
Total	A-21s-2	A-91s-2	A-91s-2	A-61s-2	A-16/S-2	A-61s-2	A-331s-2	A-251s-2	A-13/S-2	A-14/S-2	A-71s-2	A-81s-2	A-81s-2
SECNAV			A-3		A-3	A-3	A-3	A-3	A-4	A-4		A-4	A-4
Travel Support					A-4	A-13	A-4	A-5		A-25			A-14
Total	A-2	A-7	A-3	A-3	A-7	A-16	A-7	A-8	A-42	A-29	A-14	A-44	A-18
COMNAVNUKPROP			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support									A-1	A-1			A-3
Total	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-1	A-4
CMC			A-2/S-2		A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2		A-3/S-2	A-3/S-2
Travel Support			A-5			A-1	A-2	A-4	A-4				A-4
Total	A-8/S-2	A-2/S-2	A-7/S-2	A-5/S-2	A-4/S-2	A-3/S-2	A-4/S-2	A-6/S-2	A-7/S-2	A-19/S-2	A-7/S-2	A-6/S-2	A-7/S-2
Asst CMC			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support						A-3		A-2	A-1				
Total	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-4	A-1	A-3	A-2	A-1	A-3	A-1	A-1
Eurone													
COMNAVEUR	A-12	A-12	A-12	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-10	A-9	A-8	A-8	A-8
Travel Support			A-10	A-6	A-2					A-6		A-9	
Total	A-22	A-31	A-22	A-17	A-13	A-11	A-11	A-11	A-10	A-15	A-8	A-17	A-8
COMSIXTHFLT	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5
Travel Support	A-3	A-10	A-3	A-1	A-5						A-6	A-4	
Total	A-8	A-15	A-8	A-6	A-10	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-5	A-11	A-9	A-5
CAOC 7													
Travel Support													
Total	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-3	A-5	A-4	A-5
Bahrain													
COMUSNAVCENT													
Travel Support													
Total	A-6	A-7	A-6	A-5	A-5	A-6	A-10	A-8	A-6	A-6	A-8	A-8	A-9

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
Hawaii													
COMPAC			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support			A-2						A-7			A-5	A-2
Total	A-1	A-9	A-3	A-16	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-8	A-1	A-1	A-6	A-3
COMPACFLT			A-1		A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1		A-1	A-1
Travel Support					A-2							A-7	A-2
Total	A-1	A-1	A-20	A-1	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-3	A-8	A-3
Japan													
COMSEVENTHFLT													
Travel Support													
Total	A-1	A-3	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-3	A-5	A-3	A-1	A-3	A-2
Iraq													
CPA BASRAH													
CPA HILLAH													
Total				A-4	A-12	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-16	A-18	A-18

Threat Levels:

Low - Green

Medium - Yellow

High - Red

AIR FORCE LED PROTECTION

A = Agent

AF Principals have Agent Only Details

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
SECAF	A-14	A-10	A-6	A-4	A-9	A-10	A-1	A-11	A-3	A-9	A-6	A-4	A-14
USECAF	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-7	A-3	A-3
CSAF	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-2	A-4	A-6	A-6	A-2	A-9	A-2	A-2
VCSAF	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-3	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1
USAFE	A-9	A-9	A-14	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-9	A-11	A-9	A-9	A-9
NORTHCOM	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-8	A-6	A-12
SOCOM										A-1			
AFMC/CC													
ACC/CC													
AMC/CC													
AFSOC/CC													
AFSPC/CC													
PACAF/CC													
AETC/CC													
TRANSCOM/CC													
USCENTAF/CC													
SOUTH AF/CC													
CFACC/CC								A-3		A-4	A-12	A-5	A-7
Deputy CFACC/CC													
3rd AF/CC													
12th AF/CC													
13th AF/CC													
CPA Principals													
Chief of Defense (ChoD) Philippines													
ChoD Uzbekistan													
ChoD Colombia													
ChoD Jordan													
ChoD Japan													
ChoD Hungary													
ChoD Bulgaria													
Military of Defense (MoD) Vietnam													
NATO Ministerial								A-70					
Global Air Commander Conference							A-35						
Middle Eastern Air Symposium									A-20	A-20			
Total	A-43	A-49	A-52	A-45	A-48	A-50	A-86	A-138	A-95	A-78	A-80	A-54	A-88

Threat Levels:
No color code
annotated: Threat
level is assessed by
lead PSO agency

AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCY LED PROTECTION

A = Agent

Position	Mar-03	Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
President of the U.S	A-3	A-1		A-2				A-4	A-2			A-4	
Vice President of the U.S											A-6		A-5
Sec Def		A-1							A-7			A-2	
Deputy Sec Def				A-4					A-4	A-4	A-5	A-6	A-4
CJCS			A-2		A-3			A-3	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4
VCJCS					A-5				A-4	A-4	A-4		
CENTCOM	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1	A-1
Deputy CENTCOM						A-2							
SOUTHCOM										A-2			
J5 SOUTHCOM							A-1						
U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador						A-1			A-1				
US Naval Forces SOUTHCOM								A-1					
US Naval Forces Europe/CC						A-2							
Secretary of Energy											A-3		
Chief, US Military Training, CENTCOM											A-2		A-1
President of Latvia													A-1
US SECDEF for Policy												A-1	
USSS					A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-4	A-8	A-3	A-4
Total	A-4	A-3	A-3	A-7	A-13	A-10	A-6	A-13	A-27	A-19	A-33	A-21	A-20

US Army Criminal Investigation Command

<u>Position</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u># of SA</u>	<u>Military Police SPT</u>
Sec of Defense	World Wide	Sec Rumsfeld	22	0
Dep Sec of Def	World Wide	Sec Wolfowitz	14	0
CJCS	World Wide	Gen Meyers	7	0
VCJCS	World Wide	Gen Pace	8	0
Sec Army	World Wide	Act Sec Brownlee*	0 fulltime	0
CSA	World Wide	Gen Schoomaker	2	0
VCSA	World Wide	Gen Casey	0 fulltime	0
CENTCOM (RET)	World Wide	Gen Franks (Ret)	1	0
SHAPE	World Wide	Gen Jones	10	0
USAREUR	World Wide	Gen Bel	1	8
DEP EUCOM CDR	Europe	Gen Wald	1	43***
NATO U.S.Rep	NATO	LTG Kinnan	1	15
KFOR	KFOR	TF FALCON	1**	11**
SFOR	SFOR	COMSFOR	1**	13**
CG CFLCC	CENTCOM	LTG McKiernan	1**	12**
DCG CFLCC	CENTCOM	MG Speaks	1**	10**
V Corps CDR	CENTCOM	LTG Sanchez	1**	15**
III Corps CDR	CENTCOM	LTG Metz	1**	10**
CG, CFC-A	AFGAHNISTAN	LTG Barno	1**	12**
CG, CJTF-180	AFGAHNISTAN	BG(P) Austin	1**	15**
C, OMC-A	AFGAHNISTAN	MG Wastin	1**	10**
CPA Augmentation	ITO	CPA	27	120**
Metro Team/Residence	CONUS	Principals 1-4	49	0
Travel Team	World Wide	Principals 1-7	19	0
ATOIC	Pentagon		3	0
* Will change with new SEC Army		Total PSU SA-	174	Total MP SPT- 286

** BMM and only while deployed

*** Also performs residence and installation security and travel team

Air Force Office of Special Investigations

<u>Position</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u># of SA</u>	<u>Military Police SPT</u>
USAFE	Ramstein AFB	Gen Fogelsong	9	By Threat Level
NORTHCOM	Peterson AFB	Gen Eberheart	4	2 Auth/1 Assigned
SECAF	Andrews AFB	Hon Sec Roche	2	By Threat Level
Dep SECAF	Andrews AFB	Hon Sec Teets	1	By Threat Level
CSAF	Andrews AFB	Gen Jumper	2	By Threat Level
VSAF	Andrews AFB	Gen Moseley	1	By Threat Level
CENTCOM	Mac Dill AFB	Gen Abizaid	1	By Threat Level
AFMC/CC	Wright-Patterson	Gen Martin	1	By Threat Level
ACC/CC	Langley AFB	Gen Hornburg	1	By Threat Level
AMC/CC	Scott AFB	Gen Handy	1	By Threat Level
AFSOC/CC	Mac Dill AFB	Gen Hester	1	By Threat Level
AFSPC/CC	Peterson AFB	Gen Lord	1	By Threat Level
PACAF/CC	Hickham AFB	Gen Begert	1	By Threat Level
AETC/CC	Randolph AFB	Gen Cook	1	By Threat Level
CPA	Baghdad, Iraq		14	By Threat Level
		TOTAL SA	41	

Naval Criminal Investigative Service

<u>Position</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u># of SA</u>	<u>Additional SPT</u>
SECNAV	Washington D.C.	Hon England	5	By Threat Level
CNO	Washington D.C.	ADM Clark	3	By Threat Level
Cmdt Marine Corps	Washington D.C.	GEN Hagee	3	By Threat Level
NCISHQ	Washington D.C.		6	
COMUSNAVEUR	Naples, Italy	ADM Johnson	10	By Threat Level
COMSIXTHFLT	Gaeta, Italy	VADM Ulrich	3	By Threat Level
DEPCON CAOC	Larissa, Greece		3	By Threat Level
COMPAC	Hawaii	ADM Fargo	1	By Threat Level
COMPACFLT	Hawaii	ADM Doran	1	By Threat Level
COMSEVENTHFLT	Yokosuka, Japan	VADM Willard	1	By Threat Level
COMFIFTHFLT	Bahrain	VADM Nichols	1	By Threat Level
Counter Intel	CENTCOM AOR		20	USMC
Travel/CPA Support	World Wide/Iraq		44	

TOTAL SA 101**TOTAL DOD SA 315 TOTAL SPT- 286 (+)**

MAJ Oliver Rose/CIOP-OP/(b)(6)

APPROVED BY: COL Palgutt/(b)(6)



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

MAY - 3 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: Protective Service Operations

- This responds to your question (Tab B), *"I would like to know what security they actually had during the last 12 months, by month, and what they thought the threat level was"* concerning protective service operations conducted by each Military Department (Service).

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

John Craddock -

*This is
standable with a
little bit of interpretation.*

*Bottom line: if
these individuals are to
have protective details,
the #s seem right.*

*SC
5/3/04*

with that reflects the total number of
in to each protectee. Personal
and when applicable are supported by
which we call "support" (S).

months is color-coded to show the
Services' field commanders.

while lacking a specific and credible
overall threat levels published by DIA.
id COCOMs are taken into
are other factors field commanders
ll threat:

nation)
; for ransom, assault or murder)
nent of activities by demonstrators)
ral disaster, victim of another's

o another threatened person (collateral



11-L-0559/OSD/43711

Prepared by: Col Kevin Jacobsen, ODUS (CI&S), (b)(6)

OSD 11740-04



April 12, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*
SUBJECT: CPA Comments

Please edit this, and make it absolutely bullet-proof. Tell Carpenter we are going to move it around, so he is aware of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/6/04 Comments of Scott Carpenter

DHR:dh
041204-13

.....
Please respond by 4/15/04

OSD 11741-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43712

0200CPA

12 APR 04

Comments of Scott Carpenter, Director, Governance Team, Coalition
Provisional Authority: April 6, 2004

- Carpenter said that without the efforts of Ahmed Chalabi, CPA would not have achieved:
 - The law on direct foreign investment.
 - The flat individual and corporate income tax.
 - The November 15 agreement.
 - The Transitional Administrative Law.
- Carpenter also said, “we go to Chalabi on a day-to-day basis to solve problems.”

April 12, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable George Tenet
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: CPA Comments

Attached are some comments by the Coalition Provisional Authority's Director of the Governance Team, which are worth considering as we prepare for the meeting ahead.

Attach.

4/6/04 Comments of Scott Carpenter

DHR:db
041204-12

*Hold
for
Futh
to edit
attachment*

11-L-0559/OSD/43714

APR 14 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Steele Update on Iraq

I think you may want to get this memo from Jim Steele over to Petraeus, so he is aware of it.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/19/04 Steele e-mail to DepSecDef re: Update

DHR:dh
041204-10

.....
Please respond by 4/19/04

*Sent by
LTC Cavoli
for the Chairman*

OSD 11742-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43715

IRAO

14 APR 04

4/12/04

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

SECDEF —

From: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD
Sent: Friday, March 19, 2004 9:33 PM
To: Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD
Subject: FW: Update

FROM JIM STEELE TO
DEPUTY~~FYI~~

Sir -- thought you might want to see this email from Jim Steele to my boss.

V/r-- Bill

To: Ken?

C 3/20

-----Original Message-----

From: Steele, James (SES-5) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 19, 2004 11:39 AM
To: Wolfowitz, Paul, Dr, OSD
Cc: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD
Subject: Update

Bill, please be sure that Paul gets this.

Paul,

Here's an update on how I see the security situation and our response to the threat. I'd like to follow it up with a meeting with you either here or in DC.

- The security situation is not improving as it relates to the terrorist threat. There is improvement in law enforcement, but it remains spotty. These are my subjective assessments and may to some degree appear at odds with some of the metrics (i.e. number of Iraqi security forces, recruit and TIP graduates, equipment fill, etc.) that are being used to gauge our success. Effective Iraqi security forces, particularly the police, are the essential component in achieving our strategic objectives here. Demonstrated performance is the real measure of effectiveness.
- I consider the lack of effective leadership within the Ministry of Interior as the most significant impediment to improving the security situation. The problem begins at the top. The Interior Minister, Nouri Betran, is incompetent and dishonest. He consistently blames the US for the lack of security in that we have not provided assistance in the form of requested equipment. He and his INA party members (including Alawi) are soft on the Ba'athists and are making a concerted effort to reincorporate them into the government (including the police). I have addressed this repeatedly with Bremer, who by and large concurs with my assessment of the problem, but is unwilling to challenge the IGC by sacking one of its appointed ministers. This problem is further aggravated by the lack of an effective Senior Advisor to the MOI. The net result is the MOI, which is the key to our security objectives and withdrawal plans is marginal at best.
- General Ahmed K. Ibrahim is the latest victim of Betran's incompetence and our unwillingness to challenge him. In my opinion, Ahmed is the most competent and courageous Iraqi leader in MOI. He has been and continues to be our most loyal ally. Betran has orchestrated his removal from his post as Deputy Minister and assignment to the Foreign Ministry for subsequent transfer out of Iraq, perhaps to New York. Despite describing Ahmed in glowing terms and tell him that we need 10 more like him, Bremer has acquiesced to the reassignment as an accommodation to the IGC and Interior Minister as well as concern for Ahmed's safety. As you might expect, the enemy consider him the number one Iraqi target for assassination.


3/20/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/43716

- The enhanced role of CENTCOM in training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, especially the police, is a needed change. This is not only true for the reasons listed above, but because the police have suffered from a lack of support across the board, including from both the JTF and CPA. The MSCs have been reluctant to expend their resources on the police because CPA-MOI supposedly has that responsibility. Furthermore the MSCs would much prefer to field and support ICDC for which they are responsible and have complete control. In fairness, the support from the MSCs has ranged from excellent to poor. The quality of the police in Mosul is quite good as a direct result of the efforts of the 101st Commander. The results in Baghdad are at the opposite end of the scale. I am hopeful that the change to military control will cause the MSCs to assume greater ownership of the police across the board, especially as it relates to advising and mentoring the police leadership.
- The training program for the police is largely ineffective. We transplanted the ICITAP effort in Kosovo and with little change have attempted to implement it here. The security situation alone makes it nearly unworkable, but the constraints of time and the prior conditions within the police make the plan totally inappropriate. ICITAP has had problems everywhere, including Panama where I observed them firsthand. They simply cannot deal with a program of this size. That is why they create "model precincts" that are impressive to visitors, but fail to address the need in a comprehensive way. At my insistence and Bremer's direction, the training program has been modified to address the leadership problem. Unfortunately, it remains an afterthought effort and will probably be of marginal value unless CENTCOM focuses on it. Using effective military leaders, preferably those with law enforcement experience, to act as mentors to Iraqi police leaders is probably the only way to make real improvement in the near future.
- The 8-week recruit training course is a good starting effort, but requires a 24-week follow on mentorship program to produce a qualified basic policeman. Therein lies the problem. INL is not fielding the civilian police mentors in required numbers for a host of reasons, mostly security and equipment related. Those that are fielded are likely to go to the model precincts. Given the limited number of civilian police mentors, I believe they should be linked up with police chiefs and precinct and station commanders – not as recruit mentors. The other problem with the 8-week program is that it is alien to the existing police system. The Iraqi police, like all of their neighboring police, are organized along military lines. I predict that our efforts to unwind that system will not survive beyond July. I suspect the graduates of the 8-week program will not qualify for leadership positions in the police without going back to some extended academy education program like existed prior to the war.
- The 3-week TIP program is useful, but at present does not address the key issue – leadership. I proposed that the TIP be changed to a TIP II leadership course focused on mid-level officers. Those officers are attending the current TIP and are intermixed with policemen of all ranks. Why not frontload the officers and focus on making them more effective leaders? While Bremer agreed with the concept, nothing has changed on the ground.
- The fact that we are still unable to access the supplemental funds is impossible to explain.
- On a brighter note, our efforts to create an inter-ministerial working group to address counter-terrorism looks promising. It will have the benefit of some experts like Brian Jenkins and Bruce Hoffman from Rand. The first challenge will be the Shiite religious period of Arb'een in early April.

Paul, as you may gather from this litany, I am a very concerned about what is and is not happening in the security area here. While I have high respect for Bremer, he is consumed by governance issues and relying on others to address the security problem. Please don't consider my comments as denigrating the dedicated efforts of many both in and out of uniform. I need your advice and counsel regarding my continued role here. I'm not accustomed to failure and see this mission as too important to the Nation to let it falter. I look forward to hearing from you.

APR 5 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: LTG John Craddock 
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Threat Assessment for Service Chiefs

I would like to know what the threat assessment is that causes the four Service Chiefs to have personal security. We need to review that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-14

.....
Please respond by 4/9/04

OSD 11743-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43718

320.01

5 APR 04

APR 5 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Personal Security Forces for Services

I would like to know what the personal security forces are in each of the Services, what they were last year, and what they are planned to be for next year.

It seems to me we are living in a world where that needs to be addressed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-15

.....
Please respond by

4/16/04

OSD 11744-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43719

380.01

SAPRO4

~~SENSITIVE~~

APR 27 2004

IRAQ

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper on Sistani, A

Please clean up this piece on Sistani that you gave me and then send it to anyone who you think ought to have it from me.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/22/04 Sistani Rep Mtg

DHR:dh
042604-9

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

OB
4/28

OSD 11745-04

27 APR 04

11-L-0559/OSD/43720

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~SENSITIVE~~

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

Subject: FW: Sistani rep meeting at CPA-SC ~~SENSITIVE REPORT~~

(CPA South Central (Mike Gathers office))

CPA-SC Senior PolAd [Fadi Petro] receives Sistani Office representative at CPA-SC HQ.

22 April, 2004.

Sayyed Maytham Faisal Mazthboub (protect) is a close contact and personal friend of GA Ali Sistani. Maytham has had access to GA Sistani for the past 15 years. Maytham is a moderate and a respected notable in the city of Najaf/Kufa. He is not a cleric, and he is not employed by Sistani, but is an independently wealthy and a religiously inclined man who has had direct involvement in the Hawza.

The purpose of the meeting was to establish a direct relationship with CPA [regional]. He claimed that many Baghdad visitors led them to believe that there was a solid conduit to CPA-Baghdad but that they were beginning to lose faith in this and wanted to build their own relationship at this point. He indicated grave dissatisfaction in dealing with multiple interlocutors who all claim they were sent by Amb Bremer to "solve the problem" and the episodic nature of their involvement. Some, he claimed, had even gone as far as asking for a photograph with GA Sistani [IGC member Muwaffaq Al Ruba'i] for what they interpreted as an attempt at proving they met with him and gaining increased credibility when they quoted him. He stated that Sistani understands many are speaking in his name and that he has to do something about that and is looking at making a direct office to office connection with a "real live American officer" in the CPA so there is no misunderstanding. He knows of Mike, Hume and I [from back when we first made our rounds with the Ayatollahs], and sought us out.

Note: He did not indicate at any time that he had a message from Sistani. However, at the close of the meeting, Maytham stated that he would report his meeting results directly to Sistani and requested that I meet with a closer contact of Sistani [NFI] this coming week. He stated that this person will come to CPA-SC to meet. He did not mention a name, nor did I ask, but he mentioned the person is a cleric and an associate of GA Sistani. I believe that final selection of this person will come out after Maytham briefs GA Sistani.

Here is a report of the key points he made:

1. Coalition Forces were seen in some neighborhoods [Hayy Zahra] and were refreshingly received. He stated that the people that want peace welcome this action. Indicating that US Forces are welcome in their midst.
2. Any city where there is no Law and no Authority there is a problem, and thus is the case in Najaf and Kufa. The sovereign should never abandon his [people] during a crisis; neither should he yield his authority to any person that is not properly appointed. Here he is indicating the obvious, asking the US to regain control from the forces that now [occupy government offices] in Najaf. He mentioned US success in Kut, and wished for a similar outcome where the US was able to regain control and push back the militia.
3. He further commented that Najaf has fallen into the hands of the so called Jaysh Al Mahdi, a group of thieves, murderers, he goes on...that have armed themselves beyond any comprehension, taken police stations, released all the prisoners, and looted the government offices...all while the

4/23/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/43721

coalition forces watched. He went on to say that anyone that worked with the CF has been targeted and many now are in jails and are being tried in so called Shari'a courts, some have been executed and still the Coalition stands by without interfering. He mentioned that [collaborators] are being systematically pursued, arrested, and detained daily and that the families have no where to go and complain—just like the old days under Saddam. Fear and Intimidation now rule the city again.

4. He stated that Sistani has done his duty [as a religious leader]; he sent a delegation asking MAS to leave the city if he intended to fight the coalition and spare the city and shrines from inherent destruction. He stated that the delegation warned MAS that the coalition will respond with might for every bullet Sadr Militia [SM] expended. He went on to explain that Sadr's inner circle was now in charge of key [military] decisions and that MAS remained removed from direct involvement, but that MAS was adamant about not backing down in the face of too much pressure—didn't look good—and that MAS was personally convinced that he could win and keep/control Najaf/Kufa.
5. He affirmed that most of the hardened MAS militants in the streets manning positions were strangers [from outside the city], and more likely from Thawra city [Sadr City] in Baghdad. He wondered how they could have traveled, unobstructed—to Najaf—and taken control so easily, and remain in control in the face of the mighty coalition that liberated Iraq. He said that people were beginning to draw dangerous conclusions from such a situation and that lest the coalition regain control that it would be hard to mobilize the citizens to help or cooperate later. They live in fear of retribution for any misconstruction made by the Sadr thugs...this is like living under Saddam only now it was 1991 all over again.
6. He stressed that Najaf is not Fallujah. He stated that Fallujah is full of former Baathists, foreign fighters from all over the Middle East to include Al Qaeda and Ansar Al Islam, former Iraqi military, former Iraqi Intelligence, and former Iraqi Special Services, many that benefited from the regime for years. Najaf is different. You do not have any military commanders, or any security apparatus, or any Sunni opposition. You have people that never benefited from the regime but were systematically oppressed and persecuted for the past 35 years. You don't have any former regime elements, or anyone fighting against an occupation—we are still thankful you liberated us, and Sistani has stated that since you announced you are leaving and given a date then you are not truly occupiers—so the dynamics are different and you can count on the people to support you to a limit if you were to go after him more aggressively. We hear the planes overhead daily and nightly, we know the troops are in the outskirts of the city, and we await a solution. It is my understanding here that he is indicating that they expect a US offensive to take back the town and remove MAS and his militia [using Kut as an example], but cautioning against prolonged fighting and collateral damage control [meaning the Shrines].
7. He described the Najaf Police as traitors that must be fired once the city is liberated. Stated that they were obedient dogs when Saddam was in power, and their paychecks were a fraction of what they are now. He displayed outright disdain for the great betrayal that they committed in giving over the city to Sadr's criminals. He then said they would have never thought of doing that under Saddam, but it was easier now since there was no perceptible punishment by the local government/coalition, but that the outcome of not cooperating with MAS was taken more seriously.
8. Stated that Sadr was a cancer that needed to be removed or else it would get worse fast and that you would either have to amputate [give up Najaf] or be chasing the disease that was spreading ever so much faster. He urged some solution that would rid them of this future [Shi'a] Saddam. He went on to develop the Saddam analogy by showing that Sadr has surrounded himself with a circle much like Saddam's that would protect the leader as long as they were benefiting from him—currently that consisted of feeding of his spoils—like police cars and weapons, monies they plundered and influence they now enjoy along with its inherent respect. He stated that GA Sistani has declared that all government property had to be returned.

The meeting lasted two hours and was rather pleasant in tone. Maytham is a friendly fellow that likes to make analogies and funny remarks. One joke he made about Sadr that is worth mentioning goes like this: A mother mosquito tells her child not to go near any people, she feared for his life, but the little mosquito didn't listen, he came home that evening and told his mother, mom, why did you ask me to stay away from the people, they really like me, when I went near them today they all started clapping for me...[he motioned with his hands how we try to kill a mosquito] he said this was Sadr, he was that naïve & stupid. We then had a catered lunch [actually cooked by the wife of one of our Iraqi staff—it was delicious] in our office followed by the usual barrage of tea and Pepsi.

Again, before we said our final good-bye's [which we did several times as usual] he mentioned that he would brief Sistani personally and re-contact our office for a future meeting with a closer associate. Direct contact with Maytham is done through our Hawza interlocutor Ala', who has been faithfully with us for almost a year now. He has relocated his family to Hilla [with relatives] after several death threats received in his home by phone and paper under the door.

Very Respectfully,

Fadi Petro

Fadi Petro

Senior Political Advisor to the Regional Director

CPA-South Central, Hilla, Iraq

Mobile: (b)(6) Hilla

Pager: <http://messaging.iridium.com/> enter (b)(6)

Local: (b)(6)

Thuraya: (b)(6)

Iridium:

Mobile:

APR 5 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Homeland Defense Domestic Intelligence Highlights

I keep getting these things, and there is no report. Why should you waste time sending them in to me if there is nothing on them? It is kind of silly and a waste of everyone's time.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/1/04 Homeland Defense Domestic Intelligence Highlights

DHR:dh
040104-17

.....
Please respond by

4/9/04

DRH 4/19

4/5

Sec Def

- You are right — makes no sense.*
- We have told DIA to stop putting this in*
- We will do a better job of screening the folder for "blank" reports before sending to you.*

CHROBY

OSD 11746-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43724

C

APR 5 2004

337

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock
PAUL BURGER
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Schedule Meetings on Minow Report and E-mails

I really do have to solve the Minow report, and I have to solve the e-mails on McCain. This calendar has to reflect that.

This has to be done. We have to stop it. Please give me my calendar for Friday and let me see it, and for all of next week. Set time aside today for me to go over my calendars for Friday, Saturday, Sunday and all through next Friday. I want to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-16

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

Done
4/2/

OSD 11747-04

SAPPROY

11-L-0559/OSD/43725

914
1000

720

EF-9192
04/004826

APR 07 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: MOU for PRTs in Afghanistan

We need to talk about what the status is of an MOU for the PRTs in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040604-4

.....
Please respond by

4/23/04

To: Sec Def

Paul Butler

6/18

DA 6/19

Sir,
Response attached
vr/CDR Noswz
6/18

OSD 11766-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43726

01-04-06 15:15:10

file

June 15, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Paul Butler
Jim Haynes
Larry Lanzillotta

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Liability Insurance

b19

Please look into this subject of liability insurance for selected senior Defense Department officials, and then explain to me how we could implement it here in the Department.

As you will note, the Department of State already has such a program. It strikes me it would be a useful thing for us to do here, but we would have to figure out whether or not the Government would pay any portion, as it does at State, if it is legal, if we have authority, who we would include, and who we wouldn't include and why.

15
b3
04

Please come up with a simple proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/14/04 SecState fax re: Professional Liability Insurance

DHR:dh
061504-4

.....
Please respond by

7/16/04

DR 7/2
Sir,
Response attached.

4/2
LtCol Greg Leary
7/30


11-L-0559/OSD/43727

OSD 11777-04

2004104

~~FOUO~~

August 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Liability Insurance

I want to sign **up** for that liability insurance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080904-15

.....
Please *respond* by 8/27/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43728

ASD 11777-0f

019

9 Aug 04

26 Jul 04

To: SecDef

From: Paul Butler

Re: Liability Insurance

August 3, 2004

2004-08-03 12:56

I wish 8/4
performed
senior mil
could get
this! 8

8/4

- Attached is a copy of Ray Dubois snowflake response outlining the terms of the liability insurance available to DoD employees. Bottom line, most employees at the GS-15 level and above are eligible and can be reimbursed up to \$150 of the yearly premium. (The premium, however, is not expensive and is in the \$290 range).
- The coverage is available for either \$500k or \$1 million and covers liability and up to \$100k in attorneys' fees. (One caveat is coverage for "pre-existing conditions." I have looked at the application form and it asks whether the applicant is aware of any pending "claims or allegations" which presumably would not be covered by a policy obtained now).
- You asked whether coverage extends beyond separation from the government. General Counsel's office has informed me that if the employee resigned or retired (as opposed to being fired), they would be covered.
- As the last paragraph of Ray's memo states, the current plan is to publicize the availability of the insurance in the next quarterly edition of Personnel HiLites, published by WHS Human Resources Directorate.

TSA SD	8/5
SRMA SD	8/5
MA SD	8/5
EXEC SEC	8/8

OSD 11777-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43729



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO



08/19

July 20, 2004, 10:30 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: Professional Liability Insurance Reimbursement Program

- The attached snowflake requests information regarding a program for professional liability insurance reimbursement within DoD.
- DoD implemented this program beginning in FY 2000. Pursuant to the DoD program, qualified employees may be reimbursed up to one-half the cost incurred for professional liability insurance, not to exceed \$150.00 per year.
- The Treasury, Postal Service, and General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires agencies to reimburse qualified employees for up to one-half the cost incurred for professional liability insurance. The Act permits agencies some discretion on the specific amount to be reimbursed, provided the total yearly payment does not exceed one-half the cost of the premium. WHS operates this program for employees assigned to OSD as well as the JCS and activities receiving operational support from WHS.
- Qualified employees under the statute include law enforcement officers, supervisors, and management officials covered under the general schedule (GS) and those above the GS-15. Military personnel and non-appropriated fund supervisors and managers are not covered. Since the Program was implemented, WHS Human Resources Directorate has processed 15 claims for reimbursement. It does not have a record of claims for reimbursement sent directly to DFAS by administrative officers of other DoD organizations.
- Liability insurance obtained by employees covers legal expenses and damages awarded in the event that employees are sued for actions taken in the course of their duties.
- The Professional Liability Insurance Reimbursement Program will be publicized in the next quarterly issue of the WHS Human Resources Directorate's Personnel Highlights, a widely distributed on-line publication disseminated throughout OSD and other WHS-supported organizations.

Prepared by: David Bauer,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/43730

OSD 11777-04

~~FOUO~~

August 6, 2004

TO: Gen. George Casey

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: 30-day Assessment

Your overall 30-day assessment is excellent.

Thank you so much.

DHR:dh
080604-1

.....
Please *respond by* _____

OSD 11819-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/43731

020 A

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6 Aug 04

1561-1630
Scanned

June 17, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

Taylor
(D)

210 new (314)

What do you recommend on this eight-year four-star for the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program?

Thanks.

Attach.
6/14/04 GC memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
061704-3

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

7/1
8/9
1750004

DW
What do you
opine?
D.R.

1450004

SIR,
Response attached.

VR

LT Col Greg Lengyel
8/4

OSD 11872-04

11-L-0559/OSD/43732

PA 8/9

MEMO TO: Secretary ~~Rumsfeld~~

DATE: August 3, 2004

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz 

SUBJECT: Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

Don,

You asked me what I would propose concerning the personnel and assignment policies in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. In the short term, specifically the next four years, I endorse the CJCS recommended course of action, a course of action with which the SECNAV and CNO are in agreement: maintain the four star stature of the Naval Reactors Director, but reduce the tour length to four years, renewable to eight. I've attached the CJCS's original memo at Tab A.

I believe, however, that the question you raise, as well as several associated personnel and assignment issues, should be studied. E.g.:

- Despite rising nuclear carrier numbers and declining submarine numbers, the Naval Reactors directorship continues to reside with the submarine officers. Should this change?
- Another issue is the command of nuclear aircraft carriers. By law, dating from the 1920's, an aviator qualified officer must command a carrier. Given the sensitivity of nuclear safety issues and the complexity of these ships during the series of refueling overhauls now confronting the Navy, should consideration be given to sharing command of these capital ships with nuclear trained surface or submarine officers during these overhaul periods?
- The Naval Nuclear Propulsion program tends to get first call on that segment of the Naval officer corps with engineering and scientific aptitude. Is the platform-centric organizing principal of

210 Navy (384)


3 Aug 04

14 Jun 04

Naval Reactors appropriate for such a large percentage of these key members of 21st century officer corps? Is there another pool of manpower with which to operate the older technology represented by nuclear reactors (perhaps raising the retirement age of existing nuclear officers) thereby freeing up a larger percentage of the younger, technically capable officers to other needs of our nation's defense?

Reducing the term of the Naval Reactors Director to four years will require a legislative change, presumably as part of the FY'06 Authorization. With your approval, I would ask the Navy to come back with recommendations on the three questions above, as well as on the question of reducing the Director's term to four years in time to have a total package ready for the FY'06 submission.

Go ahead and task the Navy



AUG 9 2004

Prepare a tasker for SecDef signature _____

Other _____



UNCLASSIFIED

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1892-04

1 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *PHM 6/25*

SUBJECT: Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

- **Question.** What do you recommend on this eight-year four-star for the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program? (TAB A)
- **Answer.** I recommend the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program remain a four-star position, however, the Department should propose to revise the tour length in FY06 NDAA. An eight-year appointment is too long. The director should be appointed to serve an initial term of four-years with the option to serve additional one- or two-year terms not to exceed a total of eight years.
- **Analysis.**
 - Retaining the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program as a four-star position is commensurate with the level of responsibility for the safe operation of over 100 nuclear reactors.
 - Reducing the initial term from eight to four-years while retaining the option for additional one- or two-year terms will provide greater flexibility to manage the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
 - Revising the term of the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program requires the concurrence of the Secretary of Energy as well as a change to the current law.
 - The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations concur with this proposal.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM T. J. Keating, USN; Director, Joint Staff;

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/43735

OSD 11872-04

210 Navy (384)

1501 04

14500 04



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

June 14, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPSEC _____
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, (b)(6) *WJ Haynes*
SUBJECT: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

- At your earlier direction, Dan Dell'Orto met with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to obtain their views about the grade (O-10) and term of appointment (8 years) of this position.
- The Secretary of the Navy believes that any proposed change in either the grade level or term of appointment is sensitive.
- The grade level is significant because of the Navy's outstanding nuclear safety record.
- Were the grade level reduced, any subsequent safety problems likely would be attributed to that reduction.
- An 8-year term is unduly long and permits the incumbent to outlast at least one Administration, and possibly two.
- The Chief of Naval Operations agreed that any proposed change in either grade level or term of appointment would be controversial and possibly particularly difficult in an election year because the submarine community would mobilize to oppose any change.
- Having a 4-star officer (although it does not have to be a submariner, it historically has been) in this position provides the submarine community with an edge over both the surface and aviation community neither of which has a Navy uniformed advocate above the two-star level.
- Interestingly, ADM Clark does not believe that either the Department of Energy or the Senate would oppose a change in this position unless the submarine community sways them.

210 Navy (384)

14 Jun 04

OSD 11872-04



11-L-0559/OSD/43736



- The position as currently structured is an anachronism during a period of transition from a threat- to a capabilities-based defense and a platform centric system to an information centric system.
- Consideration should be given to a Senior Executive Service person for this position, as the Executive Order contemplates, as this would remove the position from the operations role and the submarine advocacy role.
- ADM Clark was very complimentary toward ADM Skip Bowman, the incumbent, who has handled himself as well as anyone could in this position.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, (b)(6)

November 7¹⁰, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  

SUBJECT: Navy Nuclear 4-Star


I think it is time to end the 8-year assignment for the Navy nuclear 4-star and possibly move it to a 3-star.

Please talk to Vern Clark and Gordon England, and see what we might want to propose next year by way of legislative change.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110703-8

.....
Please respond by 12/12/03

 6/17

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
6/16

U22310 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/43738

September 27, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Levin Request

1RAA

Carl Levin gave me the attached material last Thursday when I was testifying on the Hill.

Please get back to me by Wednesday with a proposed draft response to him.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/23/04 Levin List of Documents Not Yet Received from SecDef & USDP
8/05/04 Levin Letter to SecDef re: Pre-war Intel docs
6/30/04 Levin Letter to USDP re: Iraq docs
9/22/04 Levin Document Requests Update

DHR:ss
092704-17

27 SEP 04

.....
Please respond by 9/29/04

5 AUG 0

From Carl Stein
to Sec. Rumsfeld

September 23, 2004

List of documents not yet received from Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary Feith in response to Senator Levin's requests

- 1) Six items requested of Secretary Rumsfeld on August 5, 2004, to which there has been no response.
- 2) "Reviews of or contributions to" documents produced by other agencies (promised on Feb. 26, then he said on June 14 that he had not agreed to do so, and would have required permission of other agencies).*
- 3) Two binders of documents being reviewed for executive privilege (promised on May 12). ✓
- 4) ORCON documents (unspecified number) being reviewed by the CIA for release approval (promised on May 12).
- 5) Communications from Secretary Feith's Policy office (OUSDP) personnel to other agencies and offices related to the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda from September 2001 through April 2003*
- 6) Documents related to information from detainees, or from defectors provided by or assisted by the Iraqi National Congress (the latter promised on Feb. 26, then he said there were none on June 14).
- 7) SASC received documents contained in a Feith June 29 response to SSCI, which were responsive to a previous Levin request but which Feith said on June 14 could not be found. Therefore, it appears there are likely to be similar documents and communications from other staff that should be provided.

* Items 2-7 relate to requests to USD Feith, and are summarized in Senator Levin's June 30, 2004 letter to USD Feith. That letter clarified his request to include documents from other personnel and organizations within the OUSDP, in addition to the documents from the Office of Special Plans (OSP) and the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG). On August 16, DOD provided to SASC the October 27 answers to the SSCI's QFRs from July 10 hearing, without any reference to the June 30 letter.

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

August 5, 2004

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 1000 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to request additional documents related to my inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. Four of the documents I am requesting apparently have already been provided to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). Where relevant, I am including the page number from the 9/11 Commission report, with the reference in brackets.

- 1) September 14, 2001, Memo from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept." [p.559]
- 2) September 17, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Preventing More Events." [p.559]
- 3) September 18, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Were We Asleep?" [p.559]
- 4) September 20, 2001, Memo from Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith to Secretary of Defense, "Briefing Draft." [p.560]
- 5) All documents related to the DOD document identified as "Suggested Additions for CIA's 20 August Draft on Iraqi Support for Terrorism," which was provided to the Committee on January 15, 2004. This includes, but is not limited to, any cover memo; e-mails and other written communications regarding the document or the draft CIA paper; the draft CIA paper; and CIA's response to the DOD document.
- 6) All documents and communications, including e-mails, related to your request to the Intelligence Community to declassify statements about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, which you referred to in your press conference of September 26, 2002, and in your comments to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce on September 27, 2002, including, but not limited to, the statements themselves.

I would ask that you provide the documents in response to this request by August 20, 2004. *Thank* you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Carl Levin".

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: Senator John Warner

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

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JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

June 30, 2004

The Honorable Douglas J. Feith
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
2000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-2000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing in further pursuit of my request of November 25, 2003 for documents from your office related to Iraq. With your most recent letter of June 14, it appears you believe you have provided all the documents that are relevant to my request, other than documents being reviewed to determine if they are protected by executive privilege, or awaiting CIA release approval. I am concerned that you may be defining my request in a manner that limits both its scope and your response. There are some documents that you should have provided long ago, and I request that you provide them without delay, as described below.

Based on the information we already have received, it seems unlikely that there are no documents related to the subject of my inquiry. For example, you have stated on a number of occasions that new information from detainees was important in helping your office to develop its perspective on the links between Iraq and al Qaeda. Given the importance you have attached to this new information, it seems unlikely that not even one single document or record was created related to the debriefings of such detainees, whether by personnel in the Office of Special Plans (OSP) or the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) or by anyone else in the Policy office. If, upon further review, there are any such documents, please provide them.

Your letter of June 14 states that you "did not undertake" to provide "reviews of or contributions to" documents produced by other agencies. You had never previously denied your intent to provide the requested documents, and your explanation of the necessity to obtain release permission from other agencies is neither necessarily true, nor sufficient reason to withhold such documents. Clearly, you can provide your office's reviews of other agencies' documents, as you have already done in part with the briefings on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship. You should also be able to provide any contributions or suggestions given by your office to other agencies, whether or not they contributed to subsequent documents of those agencies.

11-L-0559/OSD/43743

You have already provided one document that your office initiated to provide such input to the Intelligence Community relative to a draft CIA report concerning Iraq's support for terrorism, an example in which it appears you did not need, seek, or obtain any release permission. Please provide all such contribution documents, records and communications.

Furthermore, I would point out that the three different versions of the briefings produced by your office and provided to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the staffs of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of the Vice President (OVP), respectively, on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship were, in essence, reviews of intelligence documents. As you have acknowledged, your staff met with Intelligence Community analysts after you briefed the DCI in August, 2002 in order to present your views on the intelligence. It should be a straightforward matter to provide all additional documents and records, as well as communications, related to this meeting and these briefings, including information related to why and on what basis the changes were made to the three different versions of the briefing.

Your unilateral withholding of your complete October 27, 2003 responses to the SSCI's Questions for the Record is unacceptable. Your previous actions have demonstrated that there is no reason to withhold the information. For instance, you have already provided to SASC a portion of your October 27 responses, as well as your complete responses to Senator Rockefeller's Questions for the Record from the same hearing. Also, you have provided to the SSCI all the documents provided to SASC in response to my request, and did not deny them such material as being proprietary to SASC. Why the double standard? I would also note that the Intelligence Community is providing to SASC all the documents it is providing to SSCI in response to its inquiry. The fact that I am on the SSCI is not relevant. By withholding the information from SASC, it prevents the SASC staff from reviewing the material. Please provide all the remaining material from your October 27 responses.

As to the issue of the two binders of documents being reviewed for executive privilege, your letter of June 14 states that "I did not say in my May 12 letter that the President has claimed executive privilege with respect to any of the documents you have requested." I remind you that unless the President has claimed executive privilege, documents are not protected by such privilege. Please provide the status of this review (which appears to have been under way for two months), including how many documents are being reviewed, a brief description of each document being withheld for review, and when we can expect documents to be provided or privilege asserted.

With respect to the ORCON documents mentioned in your May 12 letter that are being reviewed by the CIA, how many documents have you sent for review, and will you provide them on a rolling basis if they are approved for release on a rolling basis, rather than waiting for all of them to be reviewed?

Finally, based on the documents you have provided, it is clear that there are relevant documents that were prepared by, and communications from, individuals within your Policy office but outside of the Office of Special Plans (OSP) and Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG), including the Policy Support office. I am concerned that by asking for documents, records, and communications from the OSP and PCTEG groups, SASC would be missing a substantial amount of important and relevant information that has a bearing on our inquiry. Accordingly, I would ask that you provide all documents and communications from all persons within your Policy organization from September 2001 through April 2003, related to the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda

Please provide the requested documents no later than July 15, 2004.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Carl Levin". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "C" and a long, horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: Senator John Warner

September 22, 2004

^{Cu}
SEN. LEVIN DOCUMENT REQUESTS ON INTEL INVESTIGATION

- There are **2 outstanding requests from Sen. Levin** seeking documents relating to pre-war intelligence on Iraq and Policy's Office of Special Plans:
 1. **An August 5 letter to you** with 6 separate requests for documents. We expect to answer this one shortly and to provide most of the documents requested, although there are probably fewer than Levin expects.
 - a. The first 4 requests seek memos from the Deputy and Doug Feith written to you in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Although there are deliberative process privilege claims that could be made, these documents were given to the 9/11 Commission and the plan is to produce them.
 - b. The remaining 2 requests are looking for documents relating to the project on Iraq-al Qaida links and any requests you sent to CIA to declassify documents. We have some responsive documents but are still searching for others.
 2. **A June 30 letter to Doug Feith** seeking very broad categories of documents from the entire Policy organization on pre-war Iraq policy and intel. The request is still under Policy and General Counsel review. Policy has already responded to Levin as follows:
 - Policy staff has spent over 1800 person-hours searching files, reviewing documents and answering Levin's questions and document demands.
 - A team of three career DoD officials reviewed thousands of pages for any documents related to his inquiry
 - Feith's office sent five binders full of documents, plus several hundred more pages of documents at various times, showing what Special Plans and Policy Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Group did – all of it proper. (PCTEG)
- Levin's minority inquiry duplicates the SSCI's investigation of Special Plans and PCTEG.
 - Mr. Feith testified before the full SSCI (of which Levin is a member) and answered 51 written questions for the record – nearly all on the same subjects as Levin's minority inquiry. SSCI staff also interviewed 14 Policy staff members for more than 30 hours.

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United States Senate OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050
 2004 AUG -9 PM 1:43

August 5, 2004

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 1000 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to request additional documents related to my inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. Four of the documents I am requesting apparently have already been provided to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). Where relevant, I am including the page number from the 9/11 Commission report, with the reference in brackets.

- 1) September 14, 2001, Memo from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept." [p.559]
- 2) September 17, 2001, Memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense, "Preventing More Events." [p.559]
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- 6) All documents and communications, including e-mails, related to your request to the Intelligence Community to declassify statements about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, which you referred to in your press conference of September 26, 2002, and in your comments to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce on September 27, 2002, including, but not limited to, the statements themselves.

I would ask that you provide the documents in response to this request by August 20, 2004. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: Senator John Warner



POLICY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ~~TOP SECRET~~ DOCUMENT AT TAB E
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

OCT 20 2004

The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-8050

Dear Senator Levin:

I have reviewed your two October 6, 2004 letters to the Secretary of Defense. *The* shorter one, dealing with document requests, does not acknowledge the substantial efforts my office and I have made in response to your minority inquiry and the voluminous documents we have provided, as summarized in an attachment to Secretary Rumsfeld's October 1, 2004 letter to you and re-attached here (Tab A).

You included in your shorter October 6 letter a list entitled "Outstanding Information Requested from DoD." The list contains some errors. It refers to "outstanding" requests for documents that, as explained in my June 14, 2004 letter to you and Tab E of Secretary Rumsfeld's October 1, 2004 letter to you, we have not found, despite diligent efforts. Tab E of the Secretary's October 1 letter is re-attached here (at Tab B). Your list refers also to documentation that you say we did not provide about an interview with an Iraqi defector. That interview was not classified and not an intelligence de-briefing; it was a meeting between an Iraq exile and a Policy staff member doing unclassified research. I explained that interview in my June 29, 2004 letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts, a copy of which I sent to the SASC together with the relevant documents. In other words, these requests are not "outstanding."

I have **also** reviewed your longer October 6, 2004 letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, which dealt with CIA comments on our "Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al-Qaida Contacts (1990-2003)." We prepared the Summary in response to a request from the SSCI for intelligence community documents to which I had alluded in testimony before the SSCI. We did not write it as a paper for use within the Administration. Nor did we write it as a comprehensive analysis of the subject of Iraq-al-Qaida connections.

In July 2003, I had briefed the SSCI that in 2002 some Policy staff members believed that certain intelligence reports were not reflected adequately or at all in finished intelligence analyses on the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship. The SSCI asked me, among other

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11-L-0559/OSD/43749

questions for the record, to provide those reports. As I explained in my answer to the SSCI, I attached to my answer a list of the requested documents along with the Summary, which highlighted the main points in those documents on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida. To reiterate: The Summary responded to the SSCI's request for the reports.

The Summary was not intended to press a particular conclusion on the SSCI, which in any case had access to all the views of the intelligence community and to underlying documents. By the time the Summary was created, the matter of the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was an historical rather than a policy issue, given that the Saddam regime had fallen months earlier.

Your letter says that (1) I did not request CIA clearance on the Summary until after you asked that a copy of it be sent to the SASC, and (2) I did not reflect CIA's modifications in our January 2004 Addendum to the Summary. Neither of those points is correct, however.

I did request CIA approval in October 2003, before submitting the Summary to the SSCI. My staff provided the Summary to the CIA on October 24, 2003 and highlighted the urgency of a response. The CIA said that it would try to provide clearance by October 27, 2003. The Summary was part of the classified annex to our answers to questions for the record that the SSCI had issued on September 26 with a due date of October 3. We wished to be responsive and were already overdue. *So*, though I had not yet received formal word back from the CIA, I released the answers, with the Summary, to the SSCI on October 27. From that date until receiving the CIA's December 10, 2003 letter that you mentioned, my office received no CIA comments on the Summary.

The *Weekly Standard* published an article in November 2003 that purported to quote from the Summary. DoD issued the attached November 15, 2003 press statement (Tab C) that was coordinated with other agencies. I personally discussed the initial draft press statement with Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin, and after further discussion with others, the CIA cleared the press statement, which said that "the provision of the classified annex to the Intelligence Committee was cleared by other agencies and done with the permission of the Intelligence Community."

After the *Weekly Standard* article was published, the SASC, HASC and HPSCI all requested copies of what I had sent in October 2003 to the SSCI. Before honoring those requests, my office, for the second time, requested CIA permission because the initial permission related to providing the Summary to the SSCI only, rather than to the other committees. The CIA's December 10, 2003 letter responded to this second request and

referred to some required "additions, deletions and/or source document clarifications" that were detailed in the comments attached to the letter.

You say that DoD's January 15, 2004 transmittal letter, sending the Summary and Addendum to the SASC, was wrong in stating that the Addendum contained the CIA's proposed modifications to the Summary. You mention, as examples, items #8, #9, #10 and #33, but you do not explain what you mean.

I have reviewed these and the other items in the Addendum, and the CIA's December 10, 2003 comments. I do not see any misstatement in DoD's January 15, 2004 transmittal letter (attached at Tab D without attachments), which says that the Addendum "contain[s] the substance of the CIA's proposed changes." The Addendum refers to every change the CIA requested. The CIA did not ask us to include its commentary about the requested changes; rather, it asked us to make specific modifications, and we made them. None of the CIA's requested changes altered the substance of the Summary.

For example, in item #8 the CIA asked us to delete the phrase "from a well placed source;" the Addendum does so, and replaces the deleted phrase with "from the source described in the italicized paragraph above." The CIA made no comment on this italicized paragraph, except to ask that we not refer to Senior Executive Memoranda. In item #9 the CIA asked us to replace "from the same source" with "from the same foreign government service as #8" and to replace "field comment" with "foreign government service comment;" the Addendum does that. In item #10 we replaced "according to sensitive CIA HUMINT reporting (same source as #8)" with "according to the same foreign government service report as item #8," just as the CIA asked, and we included a reference to an additional source document that the CIA asked us to add.

With respect to item #33, we cited three sources, i.e., one raw intelligence report and two products produced after that raw report. The CIA did not ask us to make any specific changes to our text, but pointed out that the earlier raw report contradicted one of our comments, which was, however, supported by the later products that we cited. As the raw report had been cited to support the main proposition of item #33 and not to support the comment in question, we replaced the reference to the raw report with a reference to a later finished product supporting the main proposition, while retaining the references to the other two sources. It bears repeating: Those other two sources, which post-dated the raw report at issue, supported the challenged comment in our Summary. So it was reasonable to conclude that the raw report was ultimately judged by the Intelligence Community to be either untrue or no longer true regarding that comment. The CIA did not express any objection to the way in which we responded regarding item #33 (nor to our responses regarding any of the other items). If the CIA's judgments on

these matters have changed since we prepared our Addendum, that would have no bearing on the adequacy of our response to its December 10, 2003 comments.

By letter of January 15, 2004, we sent the CIA the Summary¹ and a memo entitled "Response to CIA Requested Modifications to 'Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al-Qaida contacts (1990-2003).'" That letter and memo (both attached at Tab E, without ORCON attachments) explained how we dealt with the CIA's requests and responded to questions the CIA had raised in its December 10, 2003 letter about source documents and citations. After sending that letter and memo we received from the CIA no further comments, questions, or requested changes. Had the CIA raised any further concerns, we would have worked with it to resolve them.

Your allegations have an accusatory tone. If you had called me or asked to meet and discuss these matters, we could have cleared up the misunderstandings that underlie your allegations. The matters at issue hinge on complex textual and historical analysis. A stream of confrontational correspondence is less productive than a civil dialogue would have been.

With best wishes, I remain

Yours truly,



Douglas J. Feith

Attachments: as stated

cc (with attachments): Senator John Warner
 Senator Pat Roberts
 Senator John D. Rockefeller IV
 Representative Peter Hoekstra
 Honorable Porter Goss

August 9, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meetings on Intel Legislation

In addition to Steve Cambone, we will want to have someone in the group who is a DoD military representative from either General Myers or General Pace.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
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9 AUG 04

July 26, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Costs for Iceland

I would appreciate getting hard facts on what it costs us to stay in Iceland. Please break it down for each category of activity we are doing there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072604-14

.....
Please respond by 8/13/04

Iceland

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