

September 15, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tariffs

Someone in the paper is writing that Petraeus's folks are extracting customs tariffs from people coming in through Syria. If it is true, how does that connect to the Coalition Provisional Authority?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091503-12

.....
Please respond by 9/19/03

012

15SEP03

U15369 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16173

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (IMMEDIATE TX) (SEP. 15. 2003 6:29PM) * * *

FAX HEADER:

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERSONAL NAME	FILE
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RCPT BY

SGT

(b)(6)

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S : STANDARD
* : PC
2- : ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
+ : ROUTING
1- : MIL_STD MODE

S : TRANSFER
@ : FORWARDING
F : FINE
Q : RECEPT. NOTICE REQ.
3- : RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING
E : ECM
> : REDUCTION
A : RECEPT. NOTICE

11-L-0559/OSD/16174

September 16, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Bremer
Paul Wolfowitz
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq Personnel

I understand you believe there are two or three hundred State Department personnel awaiting some sort of clearance to get to Baghdad and help staff the CPA. Could you please send me the list, so I can help push that along?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091603-12

U15370 /03

16Sep03

11-L-0559/OSD/16175

September 15, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Business Council in Iraq

What do you think about fashioning a business council of expatriates and from neighboring countries to begin working with the Iraqi Governing Council and you to get investment going.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091503-73

.....
Please respond by 9/26/03

Iraq

15 Sep 03

U15392 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16176

September 15, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Service Secretaries
David Chu
Service Chiefs
Combatant Commanders
LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Announcements

320.2

Let's make sure that no Service, CINC, or others make announcements on troop rotations, stop loss or mobilizations, without the proposal having been worked through the Joint Staff, David Chu and me personally.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091503-23

.....
Please respond by _____


15 Sep 03

U15419 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Steve Cambone

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Counterterrorism and UK

UK

I talked to MoD Geoff Hoon today. He said if there is anything they can help with in respect to the counterterrorism issue and getting more assets on it, to let him know. We might want to figure out how we want to beef up our effort and see if they can help by beefing up some folks with us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091503-54


.....
Please respond by 9/26/03

15 Sep 03

September 15, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: UK Offer

OK

I talked to MoD Geoff Hoon today. He said they are interested in beefing up the training in the south. You might want to figure out a way to include the UK in training for these various types of Iraqi security forces if that has not already been done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091503-55

.....
Please respond by 9/26/03

15 Sep 03


11-L-0559/OSD/16179

U15421 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: UK Offer

I talked to MoD Geoff Hoon today. He said they are interested in beefing up the training in the south. You might want to figure out a way to include the UK in training for these various types of Iraqi security forces if that has not already been done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091503-55

.....
Please respond by 9/26/03

U15421-03

11-L-0559/OSD/16180



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

17 September 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake, CPA Communications, 10 September 2003

We valued Scott Sferza's visit and comment on his points below. In the past 2 weeks, our team has been greatly strengthened by the arrival of Gary Thatcher, Dorrance Smith and a number of additional press officers. Our Strategic Communications staff in Baghdad now numbers 69 and we are also flowing officers to our provincial CPA offices.

FILING CENTER: We had already planned to establish a credentialing system for the U.S. and Iraqi press; a filing center to complement it would be helpful too.

Building both will require the full attention of two communications staffers for approximately two weeks. Until State and DoD meet our personnel request list, our existing team is spread too thin to handle it. Many important day-to-day tasks would lay dormant if current personnel were assigned to work on the highly technical filing center effort. I request that the White House send an expert to work on this for as long as it takes. Jim Van Keuren, from White House Communications Agency, is already here and working on the Governing Council Press Center and he should stay as well.

RELOCATING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS STAFF TO CONVENTION CENTER: This will be difficult. The Palace is the nerve center for policy meetings, decision-making, and other CPA business. To move the Baghdad press staff out of headquarters will move them out of the information flow, into an environment in which telecommunications are unreliable. One solution is to have our spokespersons spend a designated few hours at the Convention Center each day, to be available to reporters working out of the filing center.

PSYOPS TRAVEL: The purpose of their trips is to execute information operations directed at the indigenous population; tactics that may not be appropriate to showcase to U.S. media. I recommend against inviting press to accompany these missions.

Today, however, we organized a separate trip (100 reporters) to tour the New Iraqi Army base in Kirkush. This could be the model – albeit for smaller groups of reporters –

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION					
SECDEF	DEPMIL	INFL ASST	SECSTATE	USDP	
USDP	CDR	DDO	CANFOR	PLS	

11-L-0559/OSD/16181

U15429 /03

whereby we would organize trips frequently and exclusively for the press, all dependent on the availability of military assets (helicopters, humvees, etc.) and staff.

HOUSING FOR KEY MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS: We have no spare hotel capacity within the Green Zone. We will see if there are any other options available to us. Perhaps it would be tied to long-term commitments of their correspondents/producers to their Iraq bureaus; a condition we believe directly affects the fairness of their coverage and one we also want to require in return for any credentials.

PRESS BRIEFS: The memo from Mr. Sforza indicates that the CJTF-7 and CPA hold joint press briefings weekly. That is incorrect. There is a daily briefing.

SECURITY: My final caveat with all these constructive suggestions is that force protection requirements in the Green Zone present obstacles that we will do our best to work around, but it may not always be possible.

September 16, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Powell Moore
Dov Zakheim
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Pending \$87 Billion Presidential Request

ITag

It looks as though the key witnesses on the \$87 billion Presidential request will be Ambassador Jerry Bremer and General John Abizaid. The thinking currently is that several committees in the House and Senate would be holding hearings on it, possibly September 24 and 25.

I wanted to mention this to you immediately, so you would have it in your thinking in terms of travel plans. While it is not set, there is at least a reasonable possibility that the folks are going to want you back here as the lead witnesses.

Regards,

DHR:dh
091603-16

.....
Please respond by _____

16 Sep 03

U15448 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16183

September 16, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Iraq

Attached are some notes I made after a meeting with some editorial boards in New York.

Attach.
9/15/03 MFR

DHR:dh
091503-71

.....
Please respond by _____

MAILED 16 SEP 03

16 SEP 03

U15450 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16184

September 16, 2003

SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Iraq—The message

In New York at two editorial board meetings, I received the following suggestions:

- Our message isn't getting through
- It will take video and pictures—not just print.
- We could use some polls to prove there is recognition of progress in Iraq.
- We have to control the spectrum.
- We have to do something about improving Al-Jazeera and Al Arabiyah.
- We may need some creative events.

DHR:dh
091503-64

11-L-0559/OSD/16185

September 17, 2003

TO: Gen. Jim Jones

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Balkans

It would be great if we could reduce the U.S. commitment in the Balkans to zero. I am aware of the "in together, out together" philosophy. Therefore, if not to zero, we could possibly reduce to 100 or so U.S., so we could continue to have a presence and cooperate from an intel standpoint, etc.

I have been impressed with the way your folks have been pulling down our forces there over recent years. Everyone has done a good job. Nonetheless, we have significant tasks in the world today, and it would be a big help if we could reduce the forces, not simply because of the forces that are there, but because of the rotation multiplier that pertains.

Please think it through, then get with Dick Myers and the Policy shop to come up with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091703-20

.....
Please respond by 10/10/03

U15465 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16186

092.

195403

September 17, 2003

TO: Gen. Jim Jones
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Balkans

It would be great if we could reduce the U.S. commitment in the Balkans to zero. I am aware of the "in together, out together" philosophy. Therefore, if not to zero, we could possibly reduce to 100 or so U.S., so we could continue to have a presence and cooperate from an intel standpoint, etc.

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Please think it through, then get with Dick Myers and the Policy shop to come up with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091703-20

.....
Please respond by 10/10/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16187

U 15465-03

September 17, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: MoD Conference

Please tickle this package for February 2004.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/5/03 ASD(SOLIC) memo to SecDef re: Minister of Defense Conference—Locations

DHR:dh
091703-8

.....
Please respond by 2/04

U15530 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16188

092.3

1752403

EF 6720

USD(P)_____

I-03/011914-SO
SEP 5 2003

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action_____

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict

SUBJECT: Minister of Defense Conference—Locations

- In the past, we have discussed hosting a Minister of Defense level conference in the spring of 2004. This conference will be a symbolic gathering of nations friendly to the United States.
- We need to choose a conference location and date as soon as possible in order to secure room reservations.
- Dick McGraw has agreed to lead a Task Force to handle arrangements and logistics for the Minister of Defense conference. He is currently the Task Force Director for the informal NATO Ministerial.
- At our request, he identified four potential conference locations (Tab A):
 - Broadmoor Hotel—Colorado Springs, CO
 - Hotel Del Coronado—San Diego, CA
 - Marriotts (2) on the River—San Antonio, TX
 - Renaissance OR Mayflower—Washington, DC
- All four locations have the necessary facilities and resources for a conference of this magnitude.
- We are hosting the informal NATO Ministerial at the Broadmoor Hotel this October. The Broadmoor is Mr. McGraw's preferred option.
- The room rates (per day) for the four hotels are as follows: Broadmoor (\$189 *pre-negotiated rate for the informal NATO Ministerial), Hotel Del Coronado (\$225-\$245), Marriotts (\$139), Renaissance (\$150), and Mayflower (\$150).
- The Marriotts are only available 24-30 April 2004.
- The Hotel Del Coronado has the lowest room rate the week of 12-15 April 2004.

11-L-0559/OSD/16189

- See calendar at Tab B for full range of dates and prices.

RECOMMENDATION: Hold the Minister of Defense Conference at the Broadmoor in Colorado Springs on the following dates:

5-8 April 2004

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ OTHER _____

12-15 April 2004

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ OTHER _____

RECOMMENDATION: Hold the Minister of Defense Conference at the Hotel Del Coronado in San Diego on 12-15 April 2004.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ OTHER _____

RECOMMENDATION: Hold the Minister of Defense Conference at the Marriotts on the River in San Antonio on 27-30 April 2004.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ OTHER _____

RECOMMENDATION: Hold the Minister of Defense Conference in Washington, DC at the following location and date:

Renaissance, 5-8 April 2003


APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ OTHER _____

Mayflower, 12-15 April 2003

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ OTHER _____

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As Stated

 Sep 4, 2003

DASD Stability Operations

Prepared by: Heather Panitz, SO/LIC Stability Operations,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/16190

Site evaluation for Spring Mod Conference

Requirements and Assumptions:

A. Must be near enough to military installation for that installation to be able to provide support for the conference.

B. Physical facilities for conference—Sleeping rooms, conference facilities and meeting rooms and catering facilities to accommodate approximately 400 delegates and staff. Each MOD will bring a spouse, if he/she has one, an interpreter if they don't speak English, a personal security person and at least one staff person. That's five already. I suspect you may have to increase your limit on the number of invitees. ((If you're inviting MODs, should you also invite CHODS? Any Combatant Command Commanders (PACOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, SOCOM, CENTCOM) ? Staff from any of those organizations? Any staff from SHAPE? Any staff from such organizations as the OAS, NATO (US Mission staff)? How many from the Pentagon?)) We also will need to provide liaison officers for each delegation and housing for them, two personal security officers and housing for them, drivers for each delegation and possibly housing for them.

C. Sufficient local parking to accommodate a motor pool of up to 200 vehicles, depending on movements necessary.

D. Sleeping rooms, conference and meeting rooms should ideally all be in the same facility to minimize logistical problems of moving among multiple locations.

E. Temperate climate to facilitate social activities and have the least risk of interrupting air ops.

F. Ease of providing personal security for the delegates.

G. A facility large enough to accommodate a media center and additional media briefing rooms.

G. Nearby sleeping accommodations for possibly 200 press and media.

H. Local interest facilities for spouses program.

I. Near enough to commercial air facility to accommodate those delegates who travel by commercial air.

J. Local hotel/resort staff are good representatives of the United States.

1. The Broadmoor in Colorado Springs

- Available dates--500 rooms are available **April 5-8** (arrive Monday and depart Thursday) and **Apr 12-15** (also arrive Monday, depart Thursday).
- Room rate for the Broadmoor would be the same we have negotiated for the NATO conference--\$189. Suites would be more expensive.

- Average temperatures for Colorado Springs in April are 61 for the mean daily high and 35 for the mean daily low.
- The Broadmoor would be easy to work with because of our experience with the NATO meeting
- Air Force would be the Executive Agent and I would be able to use most of my existing task force in Colorado Springs.
- Most of the attendees probably would not have seen the American West

2. The del Coronado in San Diego

- Available dates--**April 12-15** (arrive Monday, depart Thursday); **May 9-12** (Sunday-Wednesday); and **May 10-13** (Monday-Thursday).
- Room rate of \$225 for the April dates (that's before any negotiations). \$240 and \$245 respectively for the May dates.
- Weather is never a question in San Diego.
- Management from a task force perspective would be a little more difficult because of the distance from Washington.
- Navy would be the Executive Agent and I would have to recruit a new task force.
- Lovely beach location.

3. The Marriotts (2) on the River in San Antonio

- Available dates--Very limited mid-week dates are available. The only April dates available are **April 27-30**. Arrive on Tuesday 28th and depart on Friday 30th. In May only **Saturday 15 to Monday 17** is available.
- Unnegotiated room rate is \$139.
- Weather in San Antonio good in April and May
- Air Force or Army would be Executive Agent. New task force would be recruited.
- Lots to see and do in San Antonio. Lots of western history.

4. Washington, DC

- Available Dates--There are a limited number of hotels in DC that have enough rooms to house all the delegates in the same hotel. If they are in the same hotel security is easier, transportation is easier and management of the event is easier.
- The Renaissance has rooms available the week of **April 4** and the Mayflower has rooms available the week of **April 12**.
- Spring in Washington is gorgeous. Lots to see and do for delegates and spouses.

- Getting around in the city is a nightmare in the Spring with all the tourists.
- Any service could be the Executive Agent. New task force would be recruited.
- Easier to manage because the entire task force would be on site—not split as it would be with a remote location.
- I'm told by the Executive Secretariat that government sponsored meetings in the District of Columbia require the approval of Congress.

April 2004

April 2004							May 2004						
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Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Sat/Sun
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RENAISSANCE (\$150 room rate)

DEL CORONADO (\$225 room rate)
MAYFLOWER (\$150 room rate)

MARRIOTT(S) (\$139 room rate)

May 2004

May 2004						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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30	31					

June 2004						
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20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Sat/Sun
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					2
3	4	5	6	7	8
					9
					DEL CORONADO (\$240 room rate)
10	11	12	13	14	15
DEL CORONADO (\$240 room rate)					
DEL CORONADO (\$245 room rate)					
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17	18	19	20	21	22
					23
24	25	26	27	28	29
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31					

September 17, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. John Abizaid
Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Generators

I met with some people from the region the other day, and they said there are a number of five-megawatt generators that can light up a city in Bahrain, Kuwait and various Gulf locations. Why don't we borrow them and get them into Iraq? Can we be helpful?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091703-9

.....
Please respond by 9/26/03


U15531 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16196

463.2

17 Sep 03

September 17, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Steps to Sovereignty

Please give me the seven steps towards sovereignty on a single piece of paper, so we have everyone here focused on exactly what it is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091703-5

.....
Please respond by 9/22/03

U15532 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16197

IRAQ

17 Sep 03

September 17, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Business Development

What can we do to get more business people interested in Iraq? What can I do to help?

Thanks.

DIR:dh
091703-13

.....
Please respond by 10/3/03

U15533 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16198

I-03/012439-

EF-6762
September 9, 2003

TO: → Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Prep for Kuwait

ADVANCE
UNSUBSID

Kuwait

I need a report on the status of the Kuwaiti detainees before I meet with the Prime Minister of Kuwait. I would like to see what information the President has been given on this in anticipation of his meeting with him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090903-10

.....
Please respond by 9/10/03

9 Sep 03

U15549 / 03


11-L-0559/OSD/16199

September 22, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Service Secretaries
Service Chiefs
Geographic Combatant Commanders
ADM Ed Giambastiani
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Force Provider

I have said on several occasions that I would be more comfortable if force rotation and the deployment/mobilization process were handled by a single point of contact, and that that should be Joint Forces Command. However, I keep finding that the Services and the Joint Staff come to me individually on these subjects. I don't have the feeling that the issues they bring to me have been threaded through the Joint Forces Command needle.

If what I have proposed does not make sense, we need to talk it out and find out what does make sense. What I have suggested is that the Joint Forces commander be the single force provider and be involved in every decision with respect to mobilizations, demobilizations, force flows, deployments, rotations, stop-losses, selection of units to be mobilized or deployed, and be the regulator to try to see that we call up units that have not been called up recently, to see that we more effectively use volunteers, and to make sure that the Services are not doing what we did during the Iraq War—namely, not notifying people until four days before they are due—so we make sure that we show more respect for employers, families, and the like.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092003-19

.....
Please respond by 10/10/03

U15569 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16200

322

22 Sep 03

September ²² 20, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Electric Generators

As I think I mentioned to one or both of you, I was told that Kuwait, Bahrain and other countries in the Gulf have five-megawatt portable, movable electric generators that would light up a whole city. They are there in the region, they are not being used, and if we went to them and told them we needed them, they could be available. I was told this by a fellow from Kuwait in a meeting Brent Scowcroft had.

Please tell me what we can do to help you track that down and figure it out, if in fact it is something we ought to take advantage of.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092003-2

.....
Please respond by 10/3/03

U15572 /03


11-L-0559/OSD/16201

463.2

22 Sep 03

September ²²19, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith
Gen. John Abizaid
Marin Strmecki

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: More on Afghanistan

Attached is an interesting article on Afghanistan.

Thanks.

Attach.

Moore, Perry. "The Soviet Nadir: Cataclysm at Shawar, April 1986," *Against the Odds*,
December 2002

DHR:dh
091903-9

.....
Please respond by _____

Afghanistan

22 Sept 03

U15573 /03

THE SOVIET NADIR

CATAclysm AT ZHAWAR, APRIL 1986

BY PERRY MOORE

✓
9/19

Against the Odds
magazine
Dec 2002

THE ASSAULT

In February, 1986, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Ministry of Defense and their Soviet patrons decided to destroy Zhawar. Zhawar was a Mujahideen logistics transfer base in Paktia Province in the eastern part of Afghanistan. It was located four kilometers from the Pakistan border and 15 kilometers from the major Pakistani forward supply base at Miram Shah. Zhawar was a Mujahideen training center and a major combat base for supply, training and staging. The base was located inside a canyon surrounded by Sodyaki Ghar and Moghulgi Ghar mountains. The canyon opens to the southeast facing Pakistan.

The Mujahideen had built at least 11 major tunnels into the south-east facing ridge of Sodyaki Ghar Mountain. Some tunnels reached 500 meters and contained a hotel, a mosque, arms depots and repair shops, a garage, a medical point, a radio center and a kitchen. A gasoline generator provided power to the tunnels and the hotel's video player.

Defending this key logistical base was the "Zhawar Regiment", some 400 strong that were permanently based there. This regiment was primarily responsible for logistics and for supplying the Islamic Party (HIK) groups in other provinces of Afghanistan. The regiment was not fully equipped for combat, but was a credible combat force. The regiment had a Soviet D30 122mm howitzer, some six-barrel Chinese BM-12 multiple rocket launchers (MRL), three 30mm Oerlikon AA, numerous 12.7mm machine guns, SA-7 SAMs and 13 Blowpipe. Some indicate a Stinger SAM was present. An air defense company defended Zhawar with five ZPU-1 and four ZPU-2 14.5 mm antiaircraft heavy machine guns. These were positioned on high ground around the base. All ground approaches were protected by AT mines, mortars, anti-tank RCL weapons and the infamous RPG-7. Many positions had communications linked with telephone or walkie talkie radios.

The approaches to the base were the responsibility of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), the Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA), and two Islamic

Party factions (HIH and HIK). These amounted to another 400 or so men. Twenty percent of all the Mujahideen supplies came through the Zhawar. The overall Mujahideen commander of Paktia Province, including Zhawar base, was Jalaluddin Haqani, a tall, blackbearded, 50 years old.

THE PLAN

The Soviets felt that the DRA should now take the leading combat role against the Mujahideen and urged the DRA to again attack Zhawar. This urging was to show how a DRA/Soviet planned offensive could be a success after the dismal failure of an earlier DRA Zhawar attack in September 1985. The DRA plan was classic on paper: DRA ground troops would attack from Tani and Borkikehel, both south of Khost. Artillery units would be based near Lezhi. As this occurred, the 38th Commando Air Assault brigade (some 400-500 Soviet/DRAmen) would descend from their Mi-8s atop of the 2180 meter high Manay Kandow. The thought was to trap the Mujahideens blocking the ground forces, and open a corridor to Zhawar.

The general of the Soviet Army, Varrenikov, gave his blessing and the high command developed the plan for a combined operation. The plan would commit 54 under-strength DRA maneuver battalions (these battalions averaged 300-400 men) plus DRA artillery and 32 Mi-8s to the assault (plus Mi-24s and Su-25s). The 7th Infantry Division (2nd Army Corps) moved from Kandahar, the 8th Infantry Division (1st Army Corps) moved from Kabul, the 14th Infantry Division (3rd Army Corps) moved from Gazni, the 25th Infantry Division (3rd Army Corps) moved from Khost, the 38th Commando Brigade, and the 666th Air Assault Regiment "Commando" (3rd Army Corps) from Khost were committed.

These units came under the 3rd Afghan Army Corps, under General-Major Mohammad Asef Delavar. His Soviet adviser was Deputy to the Senior Military Adviser for Combat, General-Major V. G. Trofimenko.

The eastern combat group was comprised of the 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions and the 666th Air Assault Regiment. The

11-L-0559/OSD/16203

western combat group consisted of the 8th and 25th Infantry Divisions. The commando group had little, if any, experience in air assault missions, and the first lift was scheduled to go in before sunrise as the ground assault began.

THE CATAclysm AND NADIR

Sometime around midnight on 2nd of April, the DRA began a two-hour artillery and aviation preparation of the target area. Then six Mi-8 armed helicopter transport ships flew in to insert the initial assault group of the 38th Commando Brigade (60 men). The commandos landed without opposition, but the ground assault ran into heavy resistance from Mujahideen defending Dawri Gar mountain. Already, something had failed. The 7th and 14th Infantry divisions tried to link up. They could not break through the defenses. These divisions would try for three days, until their entire supply of ammunition was expended. By the 10th, these divisions pulled back to their start points. The 25th Infantry Division, located in the second echelon, covered the western flank, the artillery positions and the corps rear area. It did nothing the whole time (The DRA continued to fight for the possession of the Manay Kandow Pass for ten days following the air landing mess. The Mujahideen would attack the DRA LOCs and the airfield at Khost while the Mujahideen holding the Manay Kandow checked their advance).

The command post for the operation at Tani was in radio contact with the initial air assault group. The air assault group commander reported that the enemy firing was far away from his location. It was now 0300 hours in the early morning. The DRA artillery fired an illumination round on the northern slope of Dawri Gar mountain. The CP asked, "Do you see the round?" The Commandoes replied, "Yes, we see it. It's about 15 kilometers from us!" For some odd reason, the CP thought nothing odd about this! The DRA then fired another illumination round five kilometers further away on the southern side of Dawri Gar mountain. The CP asked, "Do you see this round". The commandos replied, "Yes, we see it. It's about ten kilometers from us". It was finally clear to the CP that the commandos had landed some five kilometers inside Pakistan - far beyond the base at Zhawar! The Commandoes tried to withdraw but after an hour were surrounded and locked in deadly combat.

Pakistan was clearly concerned with the major battle raging on her border. The Mujahideen lacked effective air defense

against helicopter gunships, and the strafing and bombing attacks of high-performance aircraft. The Mujahideen had some British Blowpipe shoulder-fired air defense missiles, but they were not effective. Pakistan sent some officers into Zhawar during the fighting to take out attacking aircraft with the Blowpipe missiles and show the Mujahideen how it was done. After climbing a mountain and firing thirteen Blowpipe missiles to no avail, a Pakistani captain and his NCO were severely wounded by the attacking aircraft.

Mawlawi Haqani was in the Zadran area when he saw approximately 20 Mi-8 helicopters flying over. He radioed the commanders at Zhawar to warn them. He thought they would land at Lezhi or Darakai. After his radio message, he saw another group of helicopters, including some Mi-24s gunships flying the same direction. These were escorted by SU-25 jet fighters. He again radioed this information to Zhawar. The hornet's nest was stirred.

The Mujahideen were caught by surprise. Their intelligence agents within the DRA failed to tip them off and the helicopters landed the rest of the 38th Commando Brigade on seven dispersed landing zones around Zhawar. The DRA/Soviets then committed the rest of the brigade to combat, not onto the Dawri Gar mountain landing zone, which was well-populated with Mujahideen, *but onto the open areas around Zhawar itself.* This was a very bad move.

INTO THE HORNET'S NEST

The first lift was comprised of 15 helicopters, which landed at 0700 hours on the Spin Khawara plain. More lifts followed in rapid succession. Mi-24s gunships protected the convoy on the way in. Some of the landing zones were within a kilometer of the Pakistani border. Most of the helicopters landed on the high ground to the west of Zhawar. Mujahideen gunners destroyed many helicopters while they were on the ground. RPGs, SA-7s and Blowpipes all took their toll. The Soviets had not expected this. Following the air assault, Soviet SU-25 jet aircraft bombed and strafed Mujahideen positions. Mujahideen air defenses had no effect against them, but did take a severe toll on the Mi-8s.

The Mujahideen, instead of defending in positions being pounded by fighter-bomber aircraft, began assaulting the landing zones. They quickly overran four landing zones and captured many of the DRA commandos. This was another totally unexpected event. Further, Mujahideen reinforcements moved from Miram Shah in Pakistan to

Zhawar and took the commandos from the rear. The commandos were trapped between two forces and were killed or captured. By the end of the day, the Mujahideen captured 530 commandos from the 38th Brigade (Soviet sources indicate 312 landed and only 25 survived).

Thus, the classic "A Bridge Too Far" scenario was repeated. This time, the DRA ground forces failed to reach the LZs and the commandoes became easy, stranded targets.

Meanwhile, Soviet aircraft with KAB 1500 precision guided missiles made runs on the caves. Soviet aircraft made numerous violations flying over Pakistani air space. The Zhawar caves faced southeast toward Pakistan, forcing the Soviet aircraft overfly Pakistan in order to turn and fly at the southern face with the smart weapons. Smart missiles were usually launched from 5-7,000 ft, up to 2 miles away. One cave was hit and the explosion killed 18 Mujahideen. Smart missiles hit another western cave, collapsing it and trapping some 150 Mujahideen inside. This second cave was 150-meters long and was used as the radio transmission bunker. The commander, Jalaluddin Haqani, who had just arrived from Miram Shah, was among those trapped in the second cave. The jets easily evaded the defensive SA-7s. The Pakistanis sent in a small team armed with 13 Blowpipe SAMs. These were wire-guided and required extensive training to be effective. The Pakistani team fired 13 missiles at the Soviet SU-25s. None hit their targets. Pakistani General Akhtar (who led the team) was now convinced the Blowpipe was too complicated of a weapon, and would soon replace it with the American Stinger.

Other SU-25s dropped tons of bombs, blasting away the rubble blocking the cave entrances. The trapped Mujahideen nonetheless managed to escape. The battle for the remaining landing zones continued. One group of commandos on high ground held out for three days before they were finally overrun. The chief of counter-reconnaissance in one of the commando battalions managed to lead 24 of the commandos to the safety. This took eight days. Of the 32 helicopters assigned to the mission, only eight survived!

CONSEQUENCES

General Varrenikov criticized the leadership of the 7th, 8th and 14th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Corps Commander. In his secret report to the Marshal of the USSR, General Sokolov, the following reasons were cited:

All the forces were poorly or untrained for the operation, poor and erroneous intel-

ligence of the area and enemy, unexpected events, leadership tolerated false situation reports and helicopter pilots were poorly oriented on the terrain of the landings. General Sokolov, the Minister of Defense, responded with a stern reply and gave Varrenikov twelve days to prepare for resumption of the operation.

The failed attack had ended in fiasco, and now the Soviets were in damage control mode. A reinforcing regiment each from the DRA 11th and 18th Infantry Divisions and the DRA 21st Mechanized Infantry Brigade arrived along with the DRA 203rd Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (special forces). The DRA 37th Commando Brigade arrived. Varrenikov authorized five Soviet battalions sent to Khost and Tani between 5 and 9 April. Soviet forward air controllers (in their Mi-4s) were assigned to work with Afghan Forward Air Controllers. Soviet unit commanders were assigned to work with the Afghan division commanders.

From Kabul, orders were issued to arrest the helicopter regiment commander, but the commander had vanished. The helicopter pilots who landed the commandos in Pakistan said that the commander had ordered them to land there. The Chief of Staff, 40th Soviet Army, General-Major Yu. P. Grekov, took command of the five Soviet battalions. General-Lieutenant V. P. Grishin (Operations Group of the Ministry of Defense, USSR in Afghanistan) assumed overall coordination of all the forces. The total DRA/Soviet force now exceeded 6,600 men. Varrenikov himself arrived at the battlefield to make sure no more fiascos occurred.

THE SECOND ATTEMPT

The renewed attack began on the morning of April 17. The DRA 25th Infantry division led the assault in the west and the DRA 14th Infantry Division led the assault in the east. In order to deceive the Mujahideen, a diversion was created. The eastern group began its attack at 0630 and the western group began at 1030. The DRA 25th Infantry Division was concentrated at Lezhi. Meanwhile, the Mujahideen had fortified the Dawri Gar mountain and could cover the majority of the slopes with accurate fire. Multiple prior Soviet/DRA attacks on the mountain had failed. When the artillery fire preparation began, the Mujahideen took shelter in caves and when the barrage ceased, they reoccupied their firing positions and repulsed the attack. To avoid a repeat, during the night of April 16th, troops silently positioned themselves near the summit and, at dawn, launched

an attack on the Mujahideen without artillery preparation. The regiment captured the summit in a matter of minutes. The surprised Mujahideen fell back in disorder from the Lezhi area and into higher mountains. The DRA/Soviet force moved through the Manay Kadow pass.

Simultaneously, the DRA/Soviet force launched a flanking attack from the Lezhi area that moved to the east. This column moved toward Moghulgai mountain on the east flank of Zhawar. As the DRA column neared, the Mujahideen HHH regiment withdrew without a fight! At the same time, leader Jalaluddin Haqani was wounded by attacking aircraft. Rumors spread among the Mujahideen that Haqani was dead. Panic took hold. The Mujahideen evacuated Zhawar, moving into surrounding mountains as the two ground columns closed onto Zhawar. These rumors were untrue; he had suffered only minor wounds.

Most of the stores in Zhawar were found in tact. The two T-55 tanks in the possession of the Mujahideen were moved out of their caves and fought the advancing column before being abandoned. LTC Kulenin, the adviser to the commander of the DRA 21st Mechanized Brigade and his political deputy were killed by a T-55 round. The Soviet and DRA forces would finally enter Zhawar on April 19, 1986.

One eyewitness account of the Soviet arrival follows from Colonel Kutsenko, Engineer Demolition:

After a narrow passage of mountain road, it opened up into a wide canyon of 150 meters, whose sides stretched upwards for two kilometers. Caves were carved into the rock face of the side facing Pakistan. The caves were up to 10 meters long, four meters wide and three meters tall. The walls were faced with brick. The cave entrances were covered with powerful iron doors, which were painted in bright colors. There were 41 caves in all. All had electricity.

More amazing material was to be found by Soviet troops:

A hospital with new modern medical equipment made in the USA, nickel plated furniture, a library with English and Farsi books, a bakery, shelves of ammo and small arms, mines of all sorts from Italy, France, Germany, an operational T-34 tank, and a hotel with many rooms untouched by the Soviet bombs.

The Afghan soldiers looted the base. The Soviet troops did not stop them. Even the six

foot high brick facing wall was pulled down and hauled back to the 25th Infantry Division at Khost! The DRA had no intention of staying in Zhawar. Their troops were quite nervous and leery of the Mujahideen. They knew the enemy would organize a counter-attack. The Mujahideen had already moved MRLs up to the Pakistan border to fire on the communist forces. Nobody, including the Soviets, wanted to be trapped! Soviet reluctance to hold Zhawar for any length of time curtailed a thorough job of destroying the base. It is a strong testament to the ability of the Mujahideen to threaten their enemies' lines of communication.

Colonel Kutsenko was in charge of destroying Zhawar. The Soviet high command had given him four hours to do so! The sappers of the 45th Engineer Regiment, 40th Army went to work. Privately, he knew that it was an impossible task in the available time. Above each cave was a 90 foot thick layer of rock. There was no time to drill a one to two meter shaft into the cave ceiling, then cram that full of explosives to cause a collapse. So the sappers stacked 200 anti-tank mines in the caves and rigged them for simultaneous electric detonation.

As the 45th attempted to do this, the combat soldiers were withdrawing! The sappers had to depart before nightfall. At 1700 hours, the command was given to the engineers to evacuate and head for Tani. The Mujahideen were hot on the Soviet heels. Anyone who fell behind would face a gruesome death. Kutsenko and his men hurriedly left as the Mujahideen MRLs fired with greater accuracy.

THE END AT ZHAWAR

After 19 days, the DRA/Soviet troops held Zhawar for five hours. In addition to the standard mines and booby traps, the Soviet forces planted seismic-detonated mines and sprinkled aerial-delivered butterfly bombs over the area. The Mujahideen returned to Zhawar on the 20th. The Mujahideen pushed forward from Zhawar to retake Lezhi and other areas. Only the cave entrances were destroyed. The weapons stored in some of the caves were still intact and useable.


Mujahideen casualties were 281 KIA and 363 WIA. DRA and Soviet losses are unknown, but the Mujahideen reportedly destroyed 24 helicopters, shot down two jets and captured 530 personnel of the 38th Commando Brigade. The Mujahideen executed Colonel Qalandar Shah, the commander of the 38th Commando Brigade and another colonel who landed with the brigade as artillery spotters. There were

78 other officers among the prisoners. They were given a chance to confess to their crimes from different battles. All 78 officers were executed. All soldiers were given amnesty. The amnestied soldiers were asked to perform two years of labor service in exchange for the amnesty. They did their service in logistics, were "reeducated" and released after two years.

The DRA/Soviets celebrated the fall of Zhawar with parades and medals as a major victory. The Kabul press indicated that the enemy had lost 2000 men and another 4000 wounded! Pure propaganda. Zhawar was in full operation within weeks of the attack! The Mujahideen had learned to make connecting tunnels between caves. The caves were improved and lengthened to 400-500 meters long.

The region later fell to the Taliban militia in the mid-1990s, and the area became a training center for various mujahideen groups affiliated with them. The site suffered some damage from American cruise missiles in 1998, but remained in use. The Zhawar complex saw action most recently beginning on January, 3, 2002, enduring a two-week American bombardment of remaining Taliban elements in the region, following the larger action at Tora Bora in December 2001. Four B-1B bombers, four F-A/18 Hornets and an A/C-130 gunship were involved in the air action at Zhawar. Afterwards, Navy SEAL teams detonated on-ground explosives to seal as many of the caves as possible, presumably far more thoroughly than the Soviet sappers did in 1986. They found that "the complex had proven to be more extensive than previously thought" according to the US DoD.

Because of its close proximity to the tribal areas of Pakistan's North West Province, the Zhawar region will likely continue to be a staging area for insurgency into Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.



Order of Battle for April 3-10th Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)

7th Infantry Division (1st echelon)
8th Infantry Division (reserve)
25th Infantry Division (rear area)
14th Infantry Division (1st echelon)
666th Air Assault Commando
3rd Corps attachments
= 54 infantry battalions (each bn = 300-400 men)
38th mixed DRA/Soviet Commando Brigade (530 men)

Soviet
32 Mi-8s
6+ Mi-24s
One SU-25 squadron

Additional forces For 11-19th offensive DRA

1 reg/11th Infantry Division
1 reg/18th Infantry Division
21st Mech Inf brigade
203rd Infantry Spemaz Bn
37th Commando Brigade

Soviet
1st and 3rd Bns/345th Ind. Parachute Reg
4th and 5th Bns/56th air assault Brig
2nd Bn/191st Ind Mot Reg
45th Engineer Sapper Reg ♦

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: September 8, 2003

Pass the attached email to Robert Kaplan.

Dear Bob:

You were so thoughtful to send your note on the Philippines.

We spent a lot of time on working those problems and I quite agree with you that much of what was done worked and was successful, and ought to be instructive for the future.

I am delighted you were there and that you plan to write on the subject. I think it would be a valuable contribution.

With my appreciation and best wishes.

Sincerely,

P.S. If you have other thoughts, do send them along. It is helpful. You can send them in care of (b)(6)

DIR:azm
090803 4b

U15585 /03

Sent
9/10

11-L-0559/OSD/16207

Philippines

85SEP03

Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2003 8:28 AM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: Robert D. Kaplan

Passed to you first.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Thomas, James P, SES, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2003 4:52 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: Robert D. Kaplan

Thanks!

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2003 4:30 PM
To: Thomas, James P, SES, OSD
Subject: RE: Robert D. Kaplan

Of course.

-----Original Message-----

From: Thomas, James P, SES, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2003 4:30 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: Robert D. Kaplan

(b)(6)

Below is memo from journalist Robert Kaplan for the Secretary. Can we pass this through you?
Thanks,

Jim

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Saturday, August 09, 2003 8:57 AM
To: james.p.thomas@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: Robert D. Kaplan

Dear Jim,

Here is the memo for Rumsfeld.

TO: Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld
FROM: Robert D. Kaplan

Dear Mr. Secretary,

9/8
Secret -
a thoughtful idea
from Robert
Kaplan
D.R.

9/2/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/16208

R+R

I just returned from over a month in the Philippines with some thoughts.

In 2002, the island of Basilan - the main island in the southern Sulu chain - was an Army Special Forces laboratory for using humanitarian relief to flush out international terrorists.

Basilan had been the lair of Abu Sayyaf guerrillas. It made sense. Basilan is a poor, largely-Moslem island that the Christian mestizo oligarchy in Manila ruled but made no effort to responsibly govern. Whether the dictator Marcos was in power or democrats like Corey Aquino, it has made no difference to these southern Moslems, who still lacked potable water and basic security from bandits and pirates. Their kids still died from meningitis, scabies, malaria, etc. Abu Sayyaf, through killings and kidnappings, drove out the doctors and teachers, closed the schools and hospitals.

PACOM, as you know, was limited by strict ROEs regarding its role in hunting down these terrorists. But the solution that it and Army SF came up with bears studying for future application:

International Islamic terrorism is, among many other things, a classic insurgency: something the U. S. military learned by trial and error how to deal with in the Philippines between 1898 and the end of the Islamic Moro rebellion in 1913, put down by Capt. John "Blackjack" Pershing. To my mind, the most important lesson of that episode in our nation's history was that in order to defeat terrorist insurgents, you must sever the link between them and the indigenous population. Only then can terrorists be isolated and destroyed.

That happened in 2002 in Basilan without firing a shot.

About a dozen SF "A" teams were deployed, with administrative "B" teams. American contractors came in. Roads were built, water wells dug. We bought locally and hired locally, right down to the aggregate for the roads. "A" teams encamped to train Filipino army units. SF team medics conducted MEDCAPS and DENTCAPS continually all over the island. Schools were built, and even a few neighborhood mosques with the help of SF teams. To call all this "soft" humanitarian relief is to see only one layer of reality.

The MEDCAPS, etc. spun the local Filipino media and intellectuals into writing nice things about the U. S. military for the first time since we lost Clark Field and the Subic Bay Naval Station. The MEDCAPS, etc. were useful venues for gathering native intelligence on local terrorists, which could then be passed on to the Filipino military. The very presence of U. S. forces, in small numbers, got Abu Sayyaf to flee the island, to more remote places. Furthermore, it accomplished something quite radical:

It shamed the corrupt Manila oligarchy into paying more attention to its own Moslem south. And it showed Filipino Moslems that everything that Abu Sayyaf said about Americans was not true. That, ultimately, is what severed the link between Abu Sayyaf and the island's inhabitants.

The Northwest Frontier of Pakistan, as I know from much personal experience, is another area long forsaken by its own government, democratic or dictatorial, it never made a difference. No insurgent can hide without some assistance from the indigenous inhabitants. I wonder what a Basilan-approach would do to improve native intelligence for us in that region, and others?

In a world where host countries regularly put restrictions on what we can and cannot do, we must more creatively use the leeway within the ROEs that we do have.

I will write all of this and much more in future books and articles, but felt that as a citizen these ideas should make it to your desk soonest.

Warmest regards,

Bob Kaplan

9/2/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/16209

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Warmest regards,

Bob Kaplan



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

INFO MEMO

2003 SEP 23 PM 5:25
September 22, 2003 6:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Snowflake on Pentagon Interns

- In the subject Snowflake, you asked why the Joint Staff was not represented in the intern numbers we provided to you in our initial Snowflake response of August 12th (attached). You also noted the difference in intern numbers among the components and asked if we should have a departmental policy regarding interns.
- The Joint Staff does not have any civilian interns at this time. However, OSD Presidential Management Interns (PMIs) occasionally rotate through the Joint Staff.
- The numbers provided on August 12th reflected only those Interns serving in the Pentagon at the time, which is a relatively small subset of the total Intern population in the Department. The number of Interns in the Department is as follows:

Component	Short-term Student Programs	Presidential Management Interns	Other Post Graduate Interns	Career Program Interns*	Total
Air Force	4,402	4	30	2,454	6,890
Army	3,646	11	8	10,459	14,124
Navy	3,521	35	3	940	4,499
OSD/JCS/ Defense Agencies	2,346	21	5	1,568	3,940
Total	13,915	71	46	15,421	29,453

* e.g. Financial Management, Audit and Human Resources Programs

- The Office of Personnel Management and the USD(P&R) provide guidance for the Department on intern and other student hiring programs. The Components believe that this guidance is adequate. The above numbers indicate that they are making robust use of the policies and authorities currently in place.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Laura Devlin, (b)(6)

U15712 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16211

230

22 Sep 03

August 18, 2003

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Interns

Please take a look at these interns from the various services and OSD. It doesn't say anything about the Joint Staff, which it probably should.

Look at how differently people are doing this—ought we to have a policy and encourage people to do certain things? It looks kind of strange to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/12/03 DuBois memo to SecDef re: Pentagon Interns

DHR:dh
081803-37

.....
Please respond by 9/12/03



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1850 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET
2003 AUG 13 AM 9:51

INFO MEMO

August 12, 2003, 3:45 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Raymond F. DuBois*, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Snowflake on Pentagon Interns

- In the snowflake, you had asked how many interns we have in the Pentagon and where they work.
- As of July 31, 2003, we had 353 civilian interns working in the Pentagon. Following is a breakout by Component and type of internship:

TYPES OF PENTAGON INTERNS AND WHERE THEY WORK

<u>Component</u>	<u>Presidential Management Interns (PMIs)</u>	<u>Student Summer Interns</u>	<u>Other Student Interns (Various Programs)*</u>	<u>Total</u>
OSD/WHIS	8	42	86	136
Army	19	31	4	50
Air Force	11	60	80	140
Navy	7	12	12	19
Marine Corps	7	0	0	7
DISA	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	41	133	179	353

* Includes unsalaried interns; student interns working part time during school year and full time during summers/breaks; and special intern programs for disabled, minority, and disadvantaged youth.

Attachment
As stated

Prepared by: Laura Devlin, WHS, (b)(6)

EPL ASSISTANT DI RTA	8/12
SR LIA CRADDOCK	8/14
MA DIAET	8/15
EXECSEC MARROTT	8/14

18
July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Interns

Larry Di Rita

8/14

I have been meeting interns all over the government. They come up and want their picture taken and all of that. How many interns do we have in the Pentagon. and who do they work for?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071403-67

Please respond by

7/18/03

~~WMD~~ Larry Di Rita
Please advise.

P. Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

7/18

230

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

9/25 - Larry Di Rita 9/25

Ray - This memo
implies there are
29,000 + interns
in DOD right now.
I think the two large
categories need a little
elaboration. D, RL

255sep03

U15712A/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16215



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

CT 15
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

203 SEP 23 11 5:25

September 22, 2003 6:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois
SUBJECT: Follow-up to Snowflake on Pentagon Interns

- In the subject Snowflake, you asked why the Joint Staff was not represented in the intern numbers we provided to you in our initial Snowflake response of August 12th (attached). You also noted the difference in intern numbers among the components and asked if we should have a departmental policy regarding interns.
- The Joint Staff does not have any civilian interns at this time. However, OSD Presidential Management Interns (PMIs) occasionally rotate through the Joint Staff.
- The numbers provided on August 12th reflected only those Interns serving in the Pentagon at the time, which is a relatively small subset of the total Intern population in the Department. The number of Interns in the Department is as follows:

Component	Short-term Student Programs	Presidential Management Interns	Other Post Graduate Interns	Career Program Interns*	Total
Air Force	4,402	4	30	2,454	6,890
Army	3,646	11	8	10,459	14,124
Navy	3,521	35	3	940	4,499
OSD/JCS/ Defense Agencies	2,346	21	5	1,568	3,940
Total	13,915	71	46	15,421	29,453

* e.g. Financial Management, Audit and Human Resources Programs

- The Office of Personnel Management and the USD(P&R) provide guidance for the Department on intern and other student hiring programs. The Components believe that this guidance is adequate. The above numbers indicate that they are making robust use of the policies and authorities currently in place.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Laura Devlin, (b)(6)

SPI ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	9/24

11-L-0559/OSD/16216

U15712 / 03

August 18, 2003

TO: Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Interns

Please take a look at these interns from the various services and OSD. It doesn't say anything about the Joint Staff, which it probably should.

Look at how differently people are doing this—ought we to have a policy and encourage people to do certain things? It looks kind of strange to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/12/03 DuBois memo to SecDef re: Pentagon Interns

DHR:dh
081803-37

.....
Please respond by 9/12/03



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

2003 AUG 13 11 3: 51

INFO MEMO

August 12, 2003, 3:45 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Raymond F. DuBois*, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Snowflake on Pentagon Interns

- In the snowflake, you had asked how many interns we have in the Pentagon and where they work.
- As of July 31, 2003, we had 353 civilian interns working in the Pentagon. Following is a breakout by Component and type of internship:

TYPES OF PENTAGON INTERNS AND WHERE THEY WORK

<u>Component</u>	<u>Presidential Management Interns (PMIs)</u>	<u>Student Summer Interns</u>	<u>Other Student Interns (Various Programs)*</u>	<u>Total</u>
OSD/WHIS	8	42	86	136
Army	19	31	0	50
Air Force	0	60	80	140
Navy	7	0	12	19
Marine Corps	7	0	0	7
DISA	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	41	133	179	353


* Includes unsalaried interns; student interns working part time during school year and full time during summers/breaks; and special intern programs for disabled, minority, and disadvantaged youth.

Attachment
As stated


Prepared by: Laura Devlin, WHS, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	8/15
SA LIA CRADDOCK	8/14
MA BAKER	8/15
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	8/14


September 23, 2003

TO: Colin Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Department of State Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 64 positions that could be staffed by State Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. We may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative  fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

*I know we've
been back & forth on this -
but here is the latest -*


Iraq

2350903

U15713 /03

CPA PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Total Personnel Requirements: 64
as of September 22, 2003**

Foreign Affairs (6)

FSO/Consular/Trade Expert
Budget Specialist
Recruitment Specialist
Overseas Allowance Specialist
Consular Advisor
Admin Assistant

Governance Teams (47)

Regional Administrator
Political Advisors (8)
Executive Assistants (3)
Civil Admin Coordinator
Operations Officers (9)
Directors of Governance (3)
Budget Analyst/Pay Agent (4)
Public Affairs (7)
Planning Economic Development (3)
Foreign Affairs Officers (3)
Plans (3)
Deputy Regional Advisor
Deputy Director, Reconstruction

Strategic Communications (11)

Arabic Readers (FBIS) (4)
Public Affairs Officers (7)

September 23, 2003

TO: Tom Ridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Department of Homeland Security Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 23 positions that could be staffed by Homeland Security personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. We may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6), fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

*Thank for
your help! -
Don*

Iraq

235003

U15714 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16221

CPA PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

**Total Personnel Requirements: 23
as of September 22, 2003**

Interior Ministry (20)

Border Enforcement
Immigration Specialists (2)
Advisor, Border/Customs
Customs/Airport Advisor
Immigrations Customs Agents (5)
Border Patrol Agents (10)

Transportation (3)

Head, Civil Aviation
TSA Security Advisors (2)

September 23, 2003

TO: John Snow

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Department of Treasury Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 18 positions that could be staffed by Treasury Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. We may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

I understand, John, that Treasury has a team of financial and banking experts identified to work in Iraq. I greatly appreciate your assistance.

Thanks to much -


U15715 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16223

Iraq

235403

CPA PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

**Total Personnel Requirements: 18
as of September 22, 2003**

Central Bank (8)

Guide Dev for Iraq Central Bank
Re-establish Iraq Commercial Banking (2)
Re-establish Bank Operations (2)
World Bank
Treasury Auditors (2)

Finance (5)

Coordinator of Commercial Banks
Re-establish Treasury Operations
Re-establish Insurance Operations (2)
Currency Exchange


General Counsel (1)

Treasury Lawyer (Economic Reform)


Governance Teams (4)

Central Bank/Finance (4)


September 23, 2003

TO: John Ashcroft
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Department of Justice Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 43 positions that could be staffed by Justice Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. We may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative  fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Thanks to me!


Iraq

23 Sep 03

U15716 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16225

CPA PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

**Total Personnel Requirements: 43
as of September 22, 2003**

General Counsel (4)

Foreign Litigation
Attorneys (3)

Governance Teams (6)

Legal/Claims Officer (2)
Justice Specialists (4)

Interior (25)

Senior Advisor
Police Advisor
Budget Analyst
Communications Technician
Accounting Specialist
ATF Agents (5)
DEA Agents (4)
FBI Agents (10)
EMS Executive

Justice and Prisons (7)

Prison Consultants (2)
Advisor, Chief Operations
Office of Pub Prosecutions
Judicial Training
Court Administrator
Judicial Monitor

Science and Technology (1)

Security/Force Protection Manager

September 23, 2003

TO: Norman Mineta


FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Department of Transportation Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 13 positions that could be staffed by Transportation Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. We may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) (fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Thank you much


Iraq

23 Sep 03

U15717 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16227

CPA PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

**Total Personnel Requirements: 13
as of September 22, 2003**

Governance Teams (3)

Transport/Communications (3)

Transportation (10)

Surface Transport. Reg. Reform

Public Liaison (2)

Surface Transportation Privatization

Meteorologist

Broadcast Regulator


Administrative Assistant

Senior Telecom Engineer


Senior IT Program Manager

Technical Project Manager


September 23, 2003

TO: Spencer Abraham
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Department of Energy Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 21 positions that could be staffed by Energy Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. We may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative  fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Thank to much -


U15718 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16229

Iraq

23 Sep 03

CPA PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

**Total Personnel Requirements: 21
as of September 22, 2003**

Electricity Commission (5)

Deputy Advisor
Electrical Fund Planner
General Coordinator
Oil Ministry Relations
Admin Assistant

Governance Teams (8)

Electric/Power (4)
Trade/Oil (4)

Oil (5)

Advisors (3)
Petroleum Engineers (2)

Science and Technology (3)

Quality Control Expert
Electrical Engineer
Radiation Safety Officer

TAB A

516

August 13, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Rotations

12A Q

What do you think we ought to do about fixing the rotations of people in key spots in Iraq, so we get better continuity?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081303-14

.....
Please respond by

27
8/27/03

1340603

11-L-0559/OSD/16231

03 AUG 22 AM 5:52

15720 / 03

Tab A

September 23, 2003

TO: VADM Jacoby
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: North Korean Military

I am told that the North Koreans had to lower the height of people going into the military. Could you please tell me how many inches they lowered it—from what to what?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092203-62

.....
Please respond by 10/10/03

U15739 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16232

Korea(North)

23Sep03



UNCLASSIFIED
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

INFO MEMO



U-2206/DR

26 September 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *L.E. Jacoby*, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Lowered North Korean Military Height Requirements - The Implications of Malnutrition

(U) DIA assesses that the Korean People's Army has changed the minimum height standard for male conscripts from 5' 2" to approximately 4' 10."

- (U) In physical stature, enlisted men—especially new recruits—are shorter in height and appear much younger and less physically mature than troops in the early 1990s.
- (U) Studies by nutritionists indicate that North Korean males are on average nearly 4" shorter than their South Korean counterparts. Additionally, North Korean males of conscription age, now 17 – 18 years, are on average 3/4" shorter than conscripts were five years ago.
- (U) The diminished physical stature of North Korean troops is attributable to several factors: chronic malnutrition that has plagued the country since the early 1990s leading to the severe famine that claimed as many as one million lives between 1996 and 1998; inadequate health care services; and shortages of appropriate pharmaceuticals.
- (U) Conscripts are still experiencing poor health maintenance and exposure to diseases exacerbated by malnutrition, weak immune systems, and shortages of most pharmaceuticals.

Implications:

- (U) Malnutrition (protein deficiency) and undernourishment (calorie deficiency) will continue to have an adverse effect on military readiness as the pool of healthy, mentally capable troops is considerably smaller than the manpower resources of the early 1990s.

Korea (North)

26 Sep 03

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/16233

U15976 / 03

UNCLASSIFIED

- (U) We assess chronic malnutrition and undernourishment, inadequacies in health care delivery, and limitations in production of pharmaceuticals will increasingly impact military readiness through the next decade. We expect future conscripts to have diminished stature and reduced motor skills and cognitive abilities.

Prepared by: CW2 Bob Sensenig, USA, DSN

(b)(6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

11-L-0559/OSD/16234

September 24, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Security in Iraq

Attached are some thoughts I received on the necessity to change to improve the military situation. Let's discuss them.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/15/03 Memo, "Iraq: Is it necessary to change to improve the military situation?"

DHR:dh
092403-4

.....
Please respond by 10/17/03

U15787 103

11-L-0559/OSD/16235

U15787-03

Iraq

2450003

✓
9/23

Sept 15, 2003

Iraq: Is it necessary to change to improve the military situation?

A. The Problem. The problem is not the enemy, who are weak and disorganized. Rather, the problem is our deployed force structure, which is mainly armored and mounted, and which is supplied by convoys comprised of non-riflemen. The current force structure has three disadvantages.

-Employing heavy firepower breeds revenge attacks. Tanks and Bradleys are not precision weapons.

-Dissociation from the Iraqis. Tanks and armor put a huge distance between the people and the US soldiers.

-Combat Support troops not trained to fight back. 85% of the casualties are US soldiers riding in vehicles, many in support convoys who do not expect to shoot their rifles.

B. Alternative: replace armor with infantry. Unfortunately, only the marines have the critical mass of infantry which would reduce US casualties and increase the pace of Iraqization and US withdrawal. There are four reasons for this stress upon infantry.

-No armor. When they began stability ops in the south last May, the marines sent home their armor. Though it was not known then how the population would react, the commander, MajGen Mattis, believed he could handle any situation – anywhere in Iraq - without the overwhelming firepower of armor. In his view, armor conveyed the wrong message both to the Iraqi people and to his own troops.

-Combat support drivers are riflemen. Every Marine is a first a rifleman. Marine convoys protect themselves. Indeed, they employed deceptions to lure the enemy into attacking so they could go after them.

-Aggressiveness reduced casualties. Ironically, the marine enthusiasm for close combat reduced casualties. In 200 incidents between May and August, no Marine was killed in action. This was partly due to luck, but also due to Mattis's standing rule: when a Marine was fired upon or an explosion went off, those marines being attacked had orders to stop whatever they were doing and to counterattack off the road immediately.

-Daily interaction with the Iraqis. Infantry, with no armored vehicles to guard or to shelter in, are accustomed to walking and to interacting with the people.

C. What Would Infantry Do? Train Iraqis OJT and Work Themselves out of a Job.

In addition to standard existing tactics, three additional procedures are suggested:

1 Bring back the Combined Action Platoon. Contracting out training to US firms is slow. The infantry can pitch in. In Vietnam, in the midst of a heavy shooting war, there were a hundred such Combined Action Platoons. If every deployed US company were to train and equip a like company of police or local guards, and patrol with them to instill techniques and confidence, the pace of Iraq-ization would leap forward and intelligence on the dead enders would increase.

2 Decentralize resource control. The civilian Coalition Provisional Authority is understaffed and swamped with challenges in Baghdad. It will be many months before the CPA is really functioning in the provinces. In the interim, the US units working daily with the Iraqis should be given budget authority to make immediate decisions, to include equipping the Iraqis.

3 Institute a simple Hamlet Evaluation System at the Tactical Level. Because security among the thousands of hamlets in Vietnam varied so dramatically, an evaluation system was developed. Until it was blown away by North Vietnamese tanks, the system was reliable for assessing trends in a district, province or countrywide. The data and subjective evaluations of each district were submitted by captains and majors, and not massaged.

D. What is the opportunity cost of sending in infantry now, not several months from now? First, the theater combatant commanders would object. To deploy marines means telling CinCs that some will have to do without their offshore MEU force-in-readiness. That would be a hard sell. But unfortunately the marines are the only ready source of enough infantry with the requisite skills.

Second, there aren't enough infantry available, with or without the marines, given the size of Iraq. While this is true, there are hard spots, like the town featured in the Washington Post on 14 September where the police are terrified on their own, which demand the Combined Action approach only confident US infantry can apply.

Summary. No one with experience in combat in stability ops would argue with the proposition that infantry are the force of choice. The issue is whether the situation on the ground merits a rapid change to the existing rotation plan. Without data to measure trend lines, it is difficult to know whether the Iraq-ization of security is proceeding well and when US units can leave.



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2003 SEP 23 11 25 51

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

September 24, 2003 - 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Marine Corps Stop Loss--Stopped - SNOWFLAKE

- Responding to your guidance (attached), the Marine Corps has withdrawn its proposal to extend stop loss for 695 Marines now deployed in Okinawa and off Liberia (26th MEU).
- Instead, the Marine Corps will invite those Marines who wish to stay with their units to extend their service for this purpose. (Those extending will be asked to sign a statement, confirming their desire to do so. Those who do not wish to extend will be brought home early and released from active duty.)
- This volunteer policy will be the approach the Marine Corps will use in similar future circumstances.
- I believe this is an excellent outcome.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

COORDINATION: Acting SECNAV *H 2 Johnson 9/24/03*

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/16238

U15805 / 03

9/12/03

September 12, 2003

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
H.T. Johnson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Extension of Marine Corps Stop Loss

Please do not extend the stop loss on the Marines until we have a chance to talk. I want to understand what the effects might be and what ways we might find to mitigate them. With respect to those near Liberia, the MEU will be moving out on October 1.

When you have a major regional conflict, we cannot expect to have "business as usual" for every other aspect of our activities. Things need to change.

I think if we do extend stop loss for some people, we ought to look at using financial incentives and use volunteers. My instinct is that this is not a good idea and that there may be better ways to do it.

Please think it through again and get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/11/03 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Extension of Marine Corps Stop Loss

DHR:dh
091203-6

.....
Please respond by 9/17/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16239



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

C 911
✓
911

INFO MEMO

September 11, 2003 - 2:30

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

SUBJECT: Extension of Marine Corps Stop Loss

- The Secretary of the Navy plans to extend stop loss for 695 Marines now serving with units on Okinawa (437) and near Liberia (258) through 28 February 2003 (Tab A).
- Most of the personnel affected are in their first term of service. The Marines sought the extension to maintain unit integrity. While all the units are planned to return to the United States by November, the Marines prefer an extension through February 2003 to facilitate out-processing and guard against unforeseen developments.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

cc: DEPSECDEF



11-L-0559/OSD/16240



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

29 August 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Extension of Suspension of Provisions of Law and
Marine Corps Policy Relating to Retirement or
Separation (Stop Loss) (Sixth Action) - ACTION
MEMORANDUM

In accordance with your memo of November 9, 2001, (Attachment 1), this is to coordinate prior to announcement of my exercise of stop-loss authority in response to a request from the Marine Corps for a limited extension of previously granted stop-loss authority.

On May 12, 2003, the Marine Corps cancelled stop-loss, as authorized by Secretary England's memo of January 7, 2003 (Attachment 2), for all CONUS and Non-Forward Deployed units. At that time, the Marine Corps projected all affected personnel other than forward-deployed units would be separated prior to September 15, 2003.

As a result of changing threat conditions, the Marine Corps has requested an extension of stop-loss authority to February 28, 2004, with respect to certain units currently deployed in Okinawa (UDP) and near Liberia (26th MEU).

- These units deployed after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom on a surge basis, without the full pre-deployment training cycle or manning stabilization that normally occurs prior to deployment. Marines in these units who would be subject to stop-loss are primarily first-term enlisted serving in squad leader and sergeant-level positions. Their presence in the units has provided continuity of small-group leadership, mitigating the risks of deployment without full training.
- The Marine Corps estimates approximately 695 Marines may be affected by the requested stop-loss authority. Experience shows that many Marines in essential positions subject to stop-loss in fact volunteer to reenlist or temporarily extend their terms.
- All affected units are currently scheduled to return to CONUS in November 2003.
- Based on deployment plans, all involuntarily retained Marines will be home for the holiday season.

11-L-0559/OSD/16241

September 12, 2003

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
H.T. Johnson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Extension of Marine Corps Stop Loss

Please do not extend the stop loss on the Marines until we have a chance to talk. I want to understand what the effects might be and what ways we might find to mitigate them. With respect to those near Liberia, the MEU will be moving out on October 1.

When you have a major regional conflict, we cannot expect to have "business as usual" for every other aspect of our activities. Things need to change.

I think if we do extend stop loss for some people, we ought to look at using financial incentives and use volunteers. My instinct is that this is not a good idea and that there may be better ways to do it.

Please think it through again and get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/11/03 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Extension of Marine Corps Stop Loss

DHR:dh
091203-6

.....
Please respond by 9/17/03

210 Marines

12 Sep 03



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

C 4114
✓ 9/11

INFO MEMO

September 11, 2003 - 2:30

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

SUBJECT: Extension of Marine Corps Stop Loss

- The Secretary of the Navy plans to extend stop loss for 695 Marines now serving with units on Okinawa (437) and near Liberia (258) through 28 February 2003 (Tab A).
- Most of the personnel affected are in their first term of service. The Marines sought the extension to maintain unit integrity. While all the units are planned to return to the United States by November, the Marines prefer an extension through February 2003 to facilitate out-processing and guard against unforeseen developments.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

cc: DEPSECDEF



11-L-0559/OSD/16243



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

29 August 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Extension of Suspension of Provisions of Law and
Marine Corps Policy Relating to Retirement or
Separation (Stop Loss) (Sixth Action) - ACTION
MEMORANDUM

In accordance with your memo of November 9, 2001, (Attachment 1), this is to coordinate prior to announcement of my exercise of stop-loss authority in response to a request from the Marine Corps for a limited extension of previously granted stop-loss authority.

On May 12, 2003, the Marine Corps cancelled stop-loss, as authorized by Secretary England's memo of January 7, 2003 (Attachment 2), for all CONUS and Non-Forward Deployed units. At that time, the Marine Corps projected all affected personnel other than forward-deployed units would be separated prior to September 15, 2003.

As a result of changing threat conditions, the Marine Corps has requested an extension of stop-loss authority to February 28, 2004, with respect to certain units currently deployed in Okinawa (UDP) and near Liberia (26th MEU).


- These units deployed after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom on a surge basis, without the full pre-deployment training cycle or manning stabilization that normally occurs prior to deployment. Marines in these units who would be subject to stop-loss are primarily first-term enlisted serving in squad leader and sergeant-level positions. Their presence in the units has provided continuity of small-group leadership, mitigating the risks of deployment without full training.
- The Marine Corps estimates approximately 695 Marines may be affected by the requested stop-loss authority. Experience shows that many Marines in essential positions subject to stop-loss in fact volunteer to reenlist or temporarily extend their terms.
- All affected units are currently scheduled to return to CONUS in November 2003.
- Based on deployment plans, all involuntarily retained Marines will be home for the holiday season.

11-L-0559/OSD/16244

August 18, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: David Chu
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Component Commands

I understand the organization arrangements CENTCOM had during major combat operations.

I wonder why the ground forces component command is still in Kuwait, rather than back in Georgia. I think I understand why the Navy component command is still out in Bahrain, because that is where it always was. I don't know about the air component command. I would appreciate some information on these questions.

It seems to me that if we want to reduce the number of deployed people, given the high multiples that result from having people deployed, one thing to do might be to transfer whatever Title 10 responsibilities the land component commander in Kuwait has to Sanchez and the Corps, and move the rest back to the U.S.

Please do some analysis on that, and let me know what you think.

Thanks very much.

DHR:dh
081403-21

.....

Please respond by ~~9/12/03~~

U15879 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16245

322

18 Aug 03

52:21:51 PM '03



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

SECRET
2003 SEP 23 11:23:27

SEP 23 2003

HEALTH AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Update - Malaria in Marines from Liberia as of 23 Sep 03

- This provides an update to the previous response to your snowflake dated September 10, 2003 (TAB A).
- There have been a total of 80 presumed cases of the severest type of malaria, *Plasmodium falciparum*, among the 225 US forces who were ashore in Liberia (from 12-28 August 2003). There have been no new cases detected in the last five days.
- Five were seriously ill but have recovered. There have been no deaths. Three patients remain hospitalized at National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda.
- There are several preventive (prophylactic) drugs for the prevention of malaria. Because of the likelihood that the *P. falciparum* in Liberia is resistant to the oldest such drug (chloroquine), the Marines ashore were prescribed mefloquine, a newer drug developed for such a situation.
- The occurrence of these cases prompted initial concerns that the mefloquine had failed to prevent the cases. As a result, those now ashore in Liberia are taking another drug, doxycycline, until test results return on the effectiveness of mefloquine and/or resistance of this malaria strain.
- Factors being investigated:
 - Is the parasite resistant to mefloquine?
 - Were the supplies of mefloquine fully potent?
 - Did the Marines fully adhere to the prescribed schedule of taking mefloquine?
 - Did the Marines fully comply with other protective measures designed to protect them from the mosquito vectors, i.e., use of bed nets; use of repellants on uniforms, bed nets, and skin?

U15909 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16246

- The investigation encompasses:
 - An anonymous survey of affected Marines.
 - Measuring mefloquine concentration in patients' blood to determine if it was adequate for prevention. This test is being conducted at the CDC.
 - Possibility of parasite resistance to mefloquine. Testing underway at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.
- I have been briefed twice by the investigative team, and I am pressing them for prompt, accurate answers. Early indications are that some amount of non-adherence to prescribed medication schedules is at least partly responsible, but all the possible explanations have not been fully explored.
- Subsequent to the completion of lab tests, I expect a near complete picture to emerge within 10 days, and I will provide further information to you at that time. Policy and procedure implications for line and medical leadership will be pursued, based upon final results of the investigation.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Francis L. O'Donnell, MD, MPH, DHSD, FHP&R
PCDOCS #55146

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/16247



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

SEP 10 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD. ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Update - Malaria in Marines from Liberia

- A total of 43 patients have been evacuated from Liberia with diagnosis of Malaria:
 - The 2 patients at Landstuhl are still in the ICU, but are improving.
 - 41 patients are at NNMC in Bethesda. 2 of these remain in the ICU on a ventilator. 14 have been discharged from the inpatient ward to the Medical Holding unit. Though a few are seriously ill, most are showing progress with treatment.
 - 18 have had the diagnosis *confirmed* by lab tests and the remainder are strongly suspected based on their symptoms. Most other severe illnesses have been ruled out by lab tests.
- Additionally, three marines with a diagnosis of Malaria are being treated on the Iwo Jima.
- EUCOM and the Navy are investigating as follows:
 - A Navy epidemiologist is in theater investigating the situation on the ships and at the Roberts International Airport where the marines were ashore.
 - Blood samples from both sick and symptom-free marines from this task force have been sent to the CDC to determine if the blood levels of the preventive drug Mefloquine were adequate. These test results should be available late next week.
 - Samples from sick marines have been cultured to determine if the malarial organism (*P. falciparum*) is resistant to Mefloquine. This process could take several weeks.
 - Samples of the Mefloquine used are being analyzed for potency.
 - While preliminary reports indicate personal protective measures (use of insecticide treated uniforms and insect repellent, proper taking of the medication) were done, the team forward is investigating to determine if the measures taken were adequate.
- Our office is getting daily updates from the Joint staff and the Navy and will continue to monitor the situation

COORDINATION: TAB A

Attachments: NONE

Prepared by: LTC Steve Phillips DO, MPH, FHP&R (b)(6) PCDOCS#54767

I am following this situation very closely, and I should have a more definitive report on what happened, and where, in a few days.

Bill

11-L-0559/OSD/16248

September 10, 2003

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

SUBJECT: Malaria

Please check in and find out why so many folks got malaria. Were proper precautions taken? Are there drugs to prevent malaria?

Thanks.

DHR:db
091003-1

.....
Please respond by _____


SUBJECT: Update - Malaria in Marines from Liberia as of 18 Sep 03

COORDINATIONS

DASD, FHP/R Ellen P. Embrey Concur 9/22/03

CoS, HA Diana Tabler _____

PDASD, HA Mr. Ed Wyatt _____

USD, PR David S.C. Chu 
25 Sep 03



~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

INFO MEMO



U-2206/DR

26 September 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *L.E. Jacoby* L.E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Lowered North Korean Military Height Requirements - The Implications of Malnutrition

(U) DIA assesses that the Korean People's Army has changed the minimum height standard for male conscripts from 5' 2" to approximately 4' 10."

- (U) In physical stature, enlisted men—especially new recruits—are shorter in height and appear much younger and less physically mature than troops in the early 1990s.
- (U) Studies by nutritionists indicate that North Korean males are on average nearly 4" shorter than their South Korean counterparts. Additionally, North Korean males of conscription age, now 17 – 18 years, are on average 3/4" shorter than conscripts were five years ago.
- (U) The diminished physical stature of North Korean troops is attributable to several factors: chronic malnutrition that has plagued the country since the early 1990s leading to the severe famine that claimed as many as one million lives between 1996 and 1998; inadequate health care services; and shortages of appropriate pharmaceuticals.
- (U) Conscripts are still experiencing poor health maintenance and exposure to diseases exacerbated by malnutrition, weak immune systems, and shortages of most pharmaceuticals.

Implications:

- (U) Malnutrition (protein deficiency) and undernourishment (calorie deficiency) will continue to have an adverse effect on military readiness as the pool of healthy, mentally capable troops is considerably smaller than the manpower resources of the early 1990s.

Korea (North)

26 Sep 03

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

11-L-0559/OSD/16251

U15976 /03

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

- ~~(S)~~ We assess chronic malnutrition and undernourishment, inadequacies in health care delivery, and limitations in production of pharmaceuticals will increasingly impact military readiness through the next decade. We expect future conscripts to have diminished stature and reduced motor skills and cognitive abilities.

Prepared by: CW2 (b)(6) USA, DSN (b)(6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

11-L-0559/OSD/16252

September 23, 2003

TO: VADM Jacoby
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: North Korean Military

I am told that the North Koreans had to lower the height of people going into the military. Could you please tell me how many inches they lowered it—from what to what?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092203-62

.....
Please respond by 10/10/03

Korea(North)

23Sep03

U15739 /03


11-L-0559/OSD/16253

September 29, 2003

Germany

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Assistance from Germany

Colin Powell told me this morning that the Germans have offered to help train police in Iraq. I mentioned that I thought they had done a pretty slow job in Afghanistan. Condi said she thought the reason was because they did the facilities first, and now they are ready to really get going in Afghanistan.

I don't know if that is going to happen or not, but we sure ought to check and see what they have done in Afghanistan. Then we ought to decide what we want them to do in Iraq. If they are stepping up and offering it, my instinct is to grab it and have them help us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092903-27


.....
Please respond by 10 / 11 / 03

U16081 /03

29 Sep 03

September 29, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Jerry Bremer
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Press in Iraq

I am told that the press people are frightened to leave Baghdad. I wonder if we ought to arrange for them to get out on a space available basis to go to places like Mosul, so they can see the rest of the country.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092903-35

.....
Please respond by 10/17/03

29 SEP 03

U16082 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16255

September 29, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

SUBJECT: Training Iraqi Police

I understand your interest in making sure the police are trained in a way that is appropriate for police. On the other hand, it is urgent that we get a rapid expansion of the police capability in Iraq.

The only capability we have to really get something done fast in that country is the U.S. military. We have plenty of people offering assistance, such as the Department of State, Germany, Jordan, UAE and others.

My suggestion is that I name CENTCOM the "executive agent" for police training, and that the Coalition Provisional Authority hold control over the curriculum, the type of training they receive and who does the actual training. Since Bernie Kerik left, I understand things have slowed down on police training. I think this would be a good way to get it going. CENTCOM can help with all the heavy lifting.

Please talk about this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092903-28

.....
Please respond by 10/17/03

U16083 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16256

IRAQ

29SEP03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 30 2003

Dr. Paul Teller

(b)(6)

Dear Dr. Teller,

I was very sorry to hear the news about your father's passing, and I want to offer my condolences.

He was a giant of our times and will be missed greatly. I feel fortunate to have worked with him.

With my deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

U16091 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16257

293

30 Sep 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 30 2003

Ms. Wendy Teller

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Teller,

I was so sorry to learn of the loss of your father.

He was one of the great ones, and he will be missed.

I extend my condolences to you and your family. You
are in our thoughts and prayers.

With my deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

U16091 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16258



THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

Sec Def

Letter File #
9/29

Dr. Paul Teller


(b)(6)

Dear Dr. Teller,

I was very sorry to hear the news about your father's passing, and I want to offer my condolences.

He was a giant of our times ^{and} He will be missed ^{greatly} - I
With ^{my} deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

 Leonid Brezhnev
to have worked
with him



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Ms. Wendy Teller

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Teller,

I was so sorry to learn of the loss of your father.

He was one of the great ones, and he will be missed.

~~I~~^{my} extend ~~our~~ condolences to you and your family. You are in our thoughts and prayers.

With my deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

Sec Def

9/29

Gamble, Zeno K, CIV, OSD

From: Carol Boyd (b)(6) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2003 2:47 PM
To: zeno@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: Addresses

Zeno,

Below are the addresses for Dr. Teller's son and daughter that you requested for Secretary Rumsfeld. I've also included a little more information regarding a website and donations in case anyone is interested. Please let me know if I may be of any further assistance.

Carol

SON:

Dr. Paul Teller

(b)(6)

DAUGHTER:

Wendy Teller

(b)(6)

A Web site (http://www.llnl.gov/llnl/06news/NewsMedia/teller_edward/teller_index.html) dedicated to the life of Dr. Edward Teller has been created. Funeral arrangements for Dr. Edward Teller are pending. Plans are also underway for a public memorial service. As the details of those arrangements become available, we will publish the information on this web site. Dr. Teller's family has asked that in lieu of flowers, tax-deductible donations can be made to the Fannie and John Hertz Foundation. Further information on the Hertz Foundation is available by contacting Mrs. Barbara Nichols, senior administrator at (925) 373-1642, or barb@hertzfoundation.org or Mr. John Holzrichter, President, at jfh@hertzfoundation.org. Dr. Teller died Tuesday afternoon at his home on the Stanford University campus. He was 95.

A. Carol Boyd

Executive Assistant to the Director
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

(b)(6)

HE ALSO HAS 4 GRANDCHILDREN AND 1 GREAT-GRANDCHILD.

7/6
V/r
- Zeno.

9/15
1730 Snowflake

September 15, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Edward Teller

Please have someone find out if Dr. Edward Teller had any survivors—wife, child or someone and let me know. I would like to write them a note.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091503-8

.....
Please respond by 9/19/03

Pls draft to son & daughter
any DI RM 9/22
9/15
Geno - Pls advise DLR

Larry Di Rita
9/15



Death of a Beautiful Mind

By Doug Patton

September 15, 2003

Six years ago, in the late summer of 1997, a selfless paragon of virtue, Mother Theresa, died as she had lived, serving others, in the squalor of Calcutta, India. But news of her death was almost totally eclipsed by the violent, late-night demise, in a mangled car in a Paris tunnel, of Britain's Princess Diana.

Last week, there was a similar eclipse, as the death of two entertainers almost completely overshadowed the passing of one of the towering intellects of the 20th Century. As the premature death of actor John Ritter and the long-expected death of country singer Johnny Cash captured the attention of the media, a 95-year-old giant quietly slipped away at the end of a truly remarkable life.

Dr. Edward Teller was a brilliant nuclear physicist whose contemporaries included J. Robert Oppenheimer and Albert Einstein. Though he was known as "the Father of the H-Bomb," Teller always said he would have preferred to be a concert pianist. If he was to be known as the "father" of anything, he once said, he really wanted to be known simply as the father of his children. As for his work, he wrote that he wanted to be remembered as "a founding member of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, which worked on the H-Bomb and contributed to our winning the Cold War."

Born in Budapest in 1908, Teller was educated in Germany. He came to the United States in 1935 during the rise of Nazi-sponsored anti-Semitism in Europe.

When he and Oppenheimer worked on the Manhattan Project, developing the first atomic bomb, Teller's mind was already formulating the theories for the next generation of nuclear technology, the hydrogen bomb.

In the 1950s, he co-founded the Livermore Laboratory and served as its director. He remained a director emeritus there until his death last week.

A life-long believer in peace through strength, Teller was in his seventies when he headed up President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the project

many believe broke the back of the Soviet Union and ended the Cold War.

Two years ago, at 93, Edward Teller was awarded the Corvin Medal, bestowed by the Hungarian government for exceptional achievement in the arts and sciences. At the ceremony, it was explained that the Hungarian Prime Minister had revived the Corvin Medal, which was last awarded in 1930, specifically to honor Dr. Teller.

"I am standing face to face with history," said one of the Hungarian delegates. "The name of Edward Teller is more than just a person, it is a symbol for Hungary. Edward Teller is the most distinguished Hungarian living in the world today."

Another delegate said that the prime minister considered Teller's contributions toward ending the Cold War to be "the primary force behind the fact that Hungary is again a free nation."

I had the honor of meeting Dr. Teller on two different occasions when he came to Omaha in 1994 to campaign for a young, conservative congressional candidate for whom I was working at the time. The first time Dr. Teller came to town, I remember putting him on a local radio talk show and listening to him explain for ten minutes the difference between fusion and fission technology. None of us understood any of it, but it was fascinating to listen to this man hold forth on the mysteries of atom.

During the second trip, I arranged a press conference for Dr. Teller and our congressional candidate at the SAC Museum, which at that time was still located at Offutt Air Force Base.

Afterward, we walked around the museum, looking at the displays. As we rounded a corner, I suddenly realized that we were looking at a display of the H-Bomb - the very weapon Dr. Teller had invented - and I understood the feeling described by that Hungarian delegate. I was standing next to a legend, a giant, a man who had developed the most terrible weapon ever devised by man, and who had spent the rest of his life making sure it never had to be used. I was in the presence of a truly beautiful mind.

Few men can ever say they saved the lives of millions. Dr. Edward Teller is gone now, but his legacy lives on through the generations whose security was assured by his work.

Doug Patton is a freelance columnist who has served as a political speechwriter and

public policy advisor at the federal, state and local levels. His weekly columns can be read in newspapers across the country, and on www.GOPUSA.com, where he serves as the Nebraska Editor. He also writes for Talon News Service (www.TalonNews.com). Readers can e-mail him at Doug.Patton@GOPUSA.com.



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

✓
9/30

ACTION MEMO

CM-1232-03
30 September 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 9/29*

SUBJECT: Service Deployment Force Ratios

- In response to your inquiry, the following information is provided.
- As you know, Services' Force Rotation Goals were discussed at length during ELABORATE CROSSBOW III, culminating in a brief to you on 15 September. As a result, a common method of force deployment ratio measurement has been agreed upon: number of months deployed versus number of months non-deployed.
- As we have discussed, force ratios will continue to differ by Services for a variety of reasons, and each Service builds its force deployment ratio goals based on the competing demands of long-standing global contingency commitments, sustaining readiness and managing force tempo.
- Current Service Ratio Goals (by Service) are:
 - Navy 1:3: 6 months deployed for every 18 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is each fleet unit.
 - Marines 1:3: 6 months deployed for every 18 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is a battalion.
 - Army 1:4: 6 months deployed for every 24 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is a brigade.
 - Air Force 1:4: 3 months deployed for every 12 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is the Air Expeditionary Force.
- Recommend an upcoming session be set aside to meet with Service Chiefs to further explore underlying force rotation goal rationales.

370

305903

RECOMMENDATION: OSD and CJCS staffs coordinate meeting with Service Chiefs regarding force rotation goal rationales.

Approve DA Disapprove _____ Other _____

SEP 30 2003

U16127 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16266

COORDINATION:

Attachments:

As stated


Prepared By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

COORDINATION PAGE

USA	LTC (P) Hooker	6 August 2003
USN	CAPT Thompson	6 August 2003
USAF	Col Ball	6 August 2003
USMC	Col Van Dyke	6 August 2003

498

July ²⁹24, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Multiple on Rotation Forces

What do you propose we do to analyze the issue of why we seem to need from three-to-one to five-to-one multiple based on rotation forces. I have trouble understanding why the differences between the Services and why the difference between three and five.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072403-21

.....
Please respond by 8/8/03

✓ 9/30
C 9/30

Sir,
Response attached.
Copy to DepSec.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
9.30

88 JUL 30 AM 7:59

11-L-0559/OSD/16269



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

773 OCT -1 11 7:30

September 30, 2003 – 4:30 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Pay for Troops in USCENTCOM AOR--SNOWFLAKE

- Responding to your note (attached.) Congress enacted temporary (FY 2003) incentives for those in Iraq and Afghanistan, but inadvertently targeted a substantial part of the funds to those outside the theater.
 - The FY 2003 Supplemental temporarily hiked the Family Separation Allowance (FSA) from \$100 to \$250, and boosted Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) from \$150 to \$225.
 - These are entitlements paid globally, with FSA going to all separated from families for more than 30 days, including those in training (e.g., from Fort Bragg to Orlando). IDP also is an automatic entitlement payable to 55 areas.
- This operates to the strong disadvantage of single warriors, who comprise the majority (55%) of those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their increase is just \$75 monthly, while married counterparts get \$225.
- A meeting of the Big 4 on September 12 forced OMB to reach a tentative decision. It adopted targeting OEF/OIF personnel through expanded use of Hardship Duty Pay (HDP)—a pay that can be controlled and rapidly adjusted. All serving in OEF/OIF would receive the same \$225 increase. Worldwide FSA/IDP hikes would remain in place until January 2004, to coincide with the next pay raise, cushioning completely their loss for most.
 - That is more generous than the approach adopted by the House in its action on the 2004 authorization. The House would have terminated FSA/IDP for those outside the USCENTCOM AOR in October 2003.
 - Throughout this process, we have worked to build an internal consensus, through the Service manpower officials. I raised the



11-L-0559/OSD/16270

U16143 / 03

240

305403

issue with the Director of the Joint Staff several weeks ago, and he facilitated a "tank" briefing to the Vice Chairman, the Chiefs and the Operations Deputies on 19 September. I met with the Chairman on 29 September. We have declined to comment on the issue publicly, outside of defending those provisions in the Supplemental necessary to protect continued payment of the allowances (which otherwise expire today), and to protect the funding necessary for any likely decisions by the Congress.

- The House reportedly has moved to the OMB position giving DoD full (policy) control over HDP pay levels up to a ceiling of \$600 monthly. Senate Democrats argue for (permanent) entitlements reflected in the Supplemental. Either approach costs slightly more than \$1B annually. But unlike the FSA/IDP option, costs under the OMB alternative would subside as the spike of current operations diminishes.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As Stated

cc: CJCS

Prepared by: Mr. William Carr, Acting DUSD/MPP – (b)(6)

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 25, 2003
SUBJECT:

I want to put a hold on any more discussion about this danger pay and separation pay. We've got to get our arms around this subject, decide what we believe it ought to be, make sure we get OMB and the White House to agree, and then communicate it once, correctly. We need to know the facts - the costs, the different proposals, who has done what.

Thusfar I am unhappy about how it is being handled. Please get back to me fast.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092503.04

Please respond by: _____

9/30

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 25, 2003
SUBJECT:

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Thanks.

DHR/azn
092503.04

Please respond by: _____ *9/30*

11-L-0559/OSD/16273

U16145 / 03

240

25 SEP 03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

500

INFO MEMO

2003 09 11 11 7:34

September 30, 2003 - 4:30 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Pay for Troops in USCENTCOM AOR--SNOWFLAKE

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- A meeting of the Big 4 on September 12 forced OMB to reach a tentative decision. It adopted targeting OEF/OIF personnel through expanded use of Hardship Duty Pay (HDP)—a pay that can be controlled and rapidly adjusted. All serving in OEF/OIF would receive the same \$225 increase. Worldwide FSA/IDP hikes would remain in place until January 2004, to coincide with the next pay raise, cushioning completely their loss for most.
 - That is more generous than the approach adopted by the House in its action on the 2004 authorization. The House would have terminated FSA/IDP for those outside the USCENTCOM AOR in October 2003.
 - Throughout this process, we have worked to build an internal consensus, through the Service manpower officials. I raised the

240

305ep03



11-L-0559/OSD/16274

U16143 / 03

issue with the Director of the Joint Staff several weeks ago, and he facilitated a "tank" briefing to the Vice Chairman, the Chiefs and the Operations Deputies on 19 September. I met with the Chairman on 29 September. We have declined to comment on the issue publicly, outside of defending those provisions in the Supplemental necessary to protect continued payment of the allowances (which otherwise expire today), and to protect the funding necessary for any likely decisions by the Congress.

• The House reportedly has moved to the OMB position giving DoD full (policy) control over HDP pay levels up to a ceiling of \$600 monthly. Senate Democrats argue for (permanent) entitlements reflected in the Supplemental. Either approach costs slightly more than \$1B annually. But unlike the FSA/IDP option, costs under the OMB alternative would subside as the spike of current operations diminishes.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As Stated

cc: CJCS

Prepared by: Mr. William Carr, Acting DUSD/MPP (b)(6)

498

July ²⁹ 24, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Multiple on Rotation Forces

What do you propose we do to analyze the issue of why we seem to need from three-to-one to five-to-one multiple based on rotation forces. I have trouble understanding why the differences between the Services and why the difference between three and five.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072403-21

.....
Please respond by 8/8/03

✓ 9/30
C 9/30

Sir,
Response attached.
Copy to DepSec.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
9.30

29 JUL 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16276

05 JUL 30 AM 7:59

U16161 /03

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1241-03

1 October 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 9/30

SUBJECT: Legislative Authorities

- In response to your inquiry (TAB A), provided is a summary (TAB B) of the DOD legislative authorities we have requested.
- There are additional authorities not in the supplemental (TAB C) that are still required. Of chief concern is the replenishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq and the creation of a similar program for use in Afghanistan.
- Two other concerns involve extending to Afghanistan the authority to transport and sustain coalition forces and seeking a full \$50M of authority for the CTNC Initiative Fund.
- I am also greatly interested in seamlessly blending title 10 and title 22 authorities so that problems such as those in Afghanistan are solved.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Copy to:

OUSDC(C)

OUSDP

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ without attachments

U16228 / 03


~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

TAB A

September 9, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. John Abizaid
Doug Feith
Dov Zakheim

CC: Jim Haynes
Powell Moore
Pete Geren
LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Legislative Authorities

When we pull the supplemental appropriations request together, we must include whatever legislative authorities we need. Several times during my recent trip I heard from both the civilian and the military leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq that there are impediments to how we spend money.

We simply must go after those restrictions. It will involve the State Department, so we should get the right people involved early.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090903-13

.....
Please respond by 9/24/03
24

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/16278

U/15019-03

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

TAB B

29 September 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: General Authorities Sought by Department of Defense in FY 04 Supplemental Appropriations Bill

1. Purpose. Provide information about general legislative authorities sought by the Department of Defense in the FY 2004 Supplemental Request for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM and NOBLE EAGLE (OIF, OEF and ONE).

2. Key Points

- On 17 September, the Department of Defense sent to Congress, through the OMB, a request for \$65.6 billion in FY 04 to finance incremental costs of OIF, OEF and ONE. The request also proposed "general provisions." A general provision in an appropriations act applies to one or more appropriations and may provide special legislative authority in addition to funding.
- Key Requested General Provisions
 - Drawdown. Increase the amount of Presidential drawdown authority under the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 from \$300 million to \$600 million.
 - Contingency Construction. Authorize transfer of \$500 million appropriated to Department of Defense into the contingency construction account to carry out projects not otherwise authorized by law. Continues requirement that temporary requirements formerly completed with O&M be funded with these contingency construction funds.
 - Intelligence Activities. Deem that funds appropriated for intelligence activities are specifically authorized by Congress for purposes of Sec 504 of the National Security Act of 1947.
 - Defense Cooperation Account. Authorize the Secretary of Defense to transfer amounts credited to the Defense Cooperation Account to other accounts consistent with the purposes of contributions.
 - Ill or Injured Service Members--Family Member Expenses. Continue existing travel and transportation allowances for family members of

Tab B

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

11-L-0559/OSD/16279

ill or injured OIF, OEF and/or ONE Service members and augment with per diem to family members traveling to and from hospital and while at site during visits. Also authorize civilian attire suitable for wear by Service member during hospital stay and travel to home station (i.e., jogging outfits and sports shirts—not to exceed \$250).

- Imminent Danger Pay and Family Separation Allowance. Increase Imminent Danger Pay from \$150 to \$225 per month and increase Family Separation Allowance from \$100 to \$250.
- Hardship Duty Pay. Increase Hardship Duty Pay from \$300 to \$600 per month.
- Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF). Enable prudent management of the balance of the DERF, created by Congress in aftermath of the 11 Sept attacks and scheduled to expire 31 Oct 2003.
- Lift and Sustain Coalition Forces. Authorize use of O&M funds to provide supplies, services, transportation (including airlift and sealift) and other logistic support to coalition forces supporting military and stability operations in Iraq.
- Train, Equip and Assist Counter-Terrorist Forces. Authorize up to \$200 million of O&M to be used by the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence of SECSTATE, to provide assistance to military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and other friendly nearby regional nations to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and support US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- General Authorities Elsewhere in the Request. Though not styled as “general provisions,” the following authorities are sought in the DOD request under individual appropriation headings:
 - CINC Initiative Fund. Authorize an additional \$15 million of Defense-Wide O&M (augmenting \$35 million requested for FY04) to be used for Iraq and Afghanistan-related initiatives.
 - Coalition Support. Authorize \$1.4 billion of Defense-Wide O&M for reimbursements of key cooperating nations for logistic and military support to US military operations.
 - Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA). Fund USEUCOM and USCENTCOM projects for Iraq, Afghanistan and related areas.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

- Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF). Fund the IFF that was created in the April 03 supplemental with an additional \$1.99 billion. Authorized transfer from IFF into military personnel, OHDACA, procurement, MilCon, Defense Health Program and working capital funds.

Prepared by: Mark Martins, LTC, USA
LC, OCJCS, (b)(6)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

29 September 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Legislative Authorities Required

1. Purpose. To respond to SecDef direction that the Department of Defense pursue legislative authorities in the FY04 emergency supplemental budget request to remove impediments to how the Department spends money.

2. Key Points

- Joint Staff Action in Reference to Snowflake/534
 - DJ-8 initiated a legislative authorities call to the combatant commanders and the J-code directors.
 - All combatant commander and J-director submissions were addressed to OSD (Comptroller) and OSD Office of General Counsel (OGC).
- Background
 - The Secretary of Defense desires broad authorities in this supplemental. The package submitted by the President and OMB to Congress reflects an approach targeted to specific, demonstrated requirements.
 - SecDef desire is mirrored by the CDRUSCENTCOM request that the WOT be resourced from a "single, ready source of funding." USCENTCOM also urges the creation of a DOD-led interagency task force dedicated to resourcing the WOT.
 - Although new authorities will not be granted if they are never requested, much work already done to obtain progressively more authority from Congress could be jeopardized by an over-strident or arguably unjustified push for broad measures.
- Summary
 - FY2004 emergency supplemental budget requests legislative authorities to match the wartime requirements for the fight against global terrorism.
 - FY2004 supplemental authorities provide a means to satisfy most combatant command WOT requests.

- FY2004 supplemental authorities ride on and flow from prior DOD success in adapting peacetime authorities to the WOT.
- The progressive approach to authorities, from the first post-9/11 emergency supplemental through two President's budgets and two subsequent supplementals, has produced significant gains.
- PB05 is the next iteration. A call for legislative proposals for PB05 was made last week.
- Combatant command authorities requests not satisfied in this supplemental fall into three categories: better addressed in other ways (pending legislation, etc.); substantially met by existing legislation; or already being considered by Authorization Committees with jurisdiction and would jeopardize the supplemental.
- In summary, FY04 supplemental authorities provide the combatant commanders most of what they want without risking a fight having significant downsides, but much work remains in seeking additional authorities.
- Exceptions. Six authority issues remain to be worked now and in subsequent submissions of legislative proposals. The first five of these are significant.
 - Replenishing CERP Accounts With O&M. The Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), currently funded with seized assets of the former Iraqi regime, provides tactical commanders with a flexible means to complete small reconstruction projects. **Ensure CERP continuity through the use of appropriated funds** because Iraqi seized assets are nearly exhausted. A program like CERP would also be invaluable in Afghanistan.
 - Title 22 versus Title 10 in Afghanistan. US Army training teams today do not accompany their Afghan National Army charges on operations because reporting for these two sources of funds is encumbering to the point of being disabling. **Policy changes within the Department of Defense could perhaps cure this problem. However, rendering inoperative in Iraq and Afghanistan a title 22 prohibition on US trainers engaging in combat would ensure this prohibition no longer poses a risk to operations.**
 - Lift and Sustain. The FY 2004 proposal restricts this authority to Iraq. **It should also include Afghanistan.** The proposal would fund coalition transportation and sustainment from O&M without any specific monetary ceiling. It could cover both countries easily. Including Afghanistan will provide a more straightforward and timely means of addressing matters that have proved troublesome to

USCENTCOM. A DJS memo to the USD(C) requesting this change has resulted in a reply request for additional justification. We need this authority to encourage potential coalition partners such as Bulgaria and Romania to join the effort in Afghanistan.

- Contingency Construction. **Broader authority requested** by the Joint Staff and OSD addresses many combatant command complaints of unresponsive military construction funding. Congressional staff indicate willingness to relax restrictions of FY03 Supplemental.
- Train and Equip. Introduced in both the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Service Committee, then reintroduced at Conference on the Authorization Bill and now introduced in a less flexible form in the supplemental; this **issue continues to be a worthy effort**.
- CINC Initiative Fund (CIF) Authority. **The supplemental request should be boosted by \$5M**. The request incorrectly presumed that the outcome of appropriations conference action on the FY04 President's Budget would be \$35M for CIF. In fact the outcome is \$30M. \$50M is needed for FY04 combatant command support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. A DJS memo to the USD(C) requesting this change has resulted in a reply request for additional justification. In the course of a year \$50M is the right level to accommodate unforeseen, emergent joint warfighting opportunities.

3. Recommendations

- Pursue methodical increases in authority in this supplemental.
- Continue the methodical approach in PB05
- Argue for above CERP, title 22 and title 10 adjustments, lift and sustain, contingency construction and train-equip authorities.

Prepared by: Rich Snead, CAPT, USN
PBAD, J-8, (b)(6)

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

OUSDC	Copy provided	23 September 2003
OGC	Copy provided	23 September 2003
OUSDP	Copy provided	23 September 2003
USCENTCOM	Copy provided	23 September 2003



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

September 26, 2003, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Legislative Authorities

- You stated that you wanted to make sure that all required legislative authorities needed to accomplish our missions were included in the proposed supplemental (TAB A).
- My staff contacted United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and other organizations to double check and make sure all the needed authorities were included. The supplemental request does include the special authorities to meet the requirements identified including:
 - Train and Equip foreign military forces
 - Increased drawdown authority
 - Authority to lift and sustain foreign troops assisting our forces
 - Drug interdiction and counterdrug authority for Afghanistan
 - Authority to reimburse coalition partners
 - A new Iraqi Freedom Fund request
 - Special transfer authority and contingency military construction authority
 - Increasing hardship duty pay and other provisions
- USCENTCOM has also proposed a DoD-led, interagency task force to address several new proposals (TAB B). Their new proposals, if adopted, may require changes to the Services Procurement Act (Title 10), the Foreign Assistance Act (Title 22), and the Anti-Deficiency Act (Title 31). Several of these proposals are controversial or have been denied in the past.
- The new USCENTCOM proposals will require extensive coordination and a task force to develop them and to gain support from the Department of State and Office of Management and Budget.
- We did not receive any new proposed authorities that needed to be added to the supplemental request.

COORDINATION: none

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

110.01

(22Sep03)

R 115863-03

October 1, 2003

TO: ADM Giambastiani

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

D.R.

SUBJECT: Joint Operations in Phase IV

Attached is an interesting memo from Michael Bayer. Let's discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/8/03 Bayer memo to SecDef re: Effects-Based Concepts and Tools to Enhance Joint Operations in Phase IV

DHR:dh
100103-18

.....
Please respond by 10/31/03

381

1 OCT 03

U16240 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16287

9/11
9.8.03
9/11
SecDef -
This is a thoughtful analysis.
D. L. H.
army Di Pm
9/11

To: The Secretary of Defense
Fm: Michael J. Bayer
Re: Effects Based Concepts and Tools to Enhance
Joint Operations in Phase IV

Assumptions:

- Phase IV post-conflict operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq have presented significant challenges to US Forces
- In Phase IV in all three of those post conflict operations, some of the assumptions made during their Phase I planning about post-conflict conditions, proved incorrect
- Additionally, some of the challenges which emerged in Phase IV were not identified in Phase I
- In those operations, Phase II was more heavily focused towards the challenges and opportunities within Phase III, rather than those of Phase IV
- (X) Phase I planning ought to anticipate and shape, within Phase II, the conditions that might emerge in Phases III and IV
- This would enable tradeoffs between the isolated objectives of Phase III and similarly isolated objectives of Phase IV and a basis for operational allocation of time for the conduct of Phases II, III and IV
- This analysis would increase the certainty that the operation will more quickly and economically achieve the Nation's end state strategic goals
- While there are robust Phase I tools and skills to anticipate and shape Phase II for Phase III, , there are however, few available to the Combatant Commanders to anticipate and shape Phase IV, or enable the tradeoffs with operational alternatives

Actions:

- Viewing Phases I-IV as a continuum and not as independent entities:
- Assemble a small team, comprised of individuals with deep expertise in civil-military relations, governance, security, economic and socio-political-cultural systems, and large-scale ideological communications to develop an approach to the following questions:
 - What are the scenario, modeling and planning tools, and staff expertise needed to better support the Combatant Commanders for these Phase II, III and IV operations?
 - What is the range of in-country pre-conditioning and shaping operations and activities that ought to be available to the Combatant Commanders during this phase?
 - What are the value tradeoffs between resources (human and financial) and time spent on in-country shaping efforts during Phase II (pre-conflict) and delayed onset of Phase III to enable better Phase IV outcomes?

October 1, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Iraqi Munitions

Why don't we train an Iraqi demolition crew that can work for you and go out and gather up all these munitions. We can pay them to destroy them.

Thanks.

DHR:Jh
100103-0

.....
Please respond by 10/24/03

U16241 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16289

Iraq

1 OCT 03

October 1, 2003

TO: Mel Martinez

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Department of Housing and Urban Development Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 16 positions that could be staffed by HUD personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

U16263 103

11-L-0559/OSD/16290

IRAQ

10CT03

CPA PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

**Total Personnel Requirements: 16
as of September 29, 2003**

Governance Teams (3)

Regional Administrator of Housing and Construction

Regional Directors of Industry/Minerals/Housing and Construction (2)

Housing (13)

Advisor

Factory Management and Logistics

Government Owned Property Inventory Manager

Roads and Bridges

General Building Construction (6)

Architect, Construction Scheduling, Planning, and Requirements

Contracts/Acquisition

Administrative Specialist/Office Engineer

October 1, 2003

TO: Rod Paige

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Department of Education Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 9 positions that could be staffed by Education Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

U16263 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16292

CPA PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

**Total Personnel Requirements: 9
as of September 29, 2003**

Governance Teams (4)

Regional Education/Youth Specialists (4)

Education (3)

Senior Advisor
Curriculum and Testing Specialist
Content Specialist (reading instruction in Arabic)

Higher Education (2)

Director of Administration and Finance
Special Assistant

October 1, 2003

TO: Don Evans

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Department of Commerce Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 11 positions that could be staffed by Commerce Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

U16263 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16294

CPA PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

**Total Personnel Requirements: 11
as of September 29, 2003**

Governance Teams (4)

Regional Industry/Minerals Administrator
Trade and Industry/Minerals Specialist (3)

General Counsel (4)

Commercial Law Reform Specialists (4)


Trade (2)

Senior Advisor
Contractor to review Commercial Law


Scientific/Technical

Chief of Staff

October 1, 2003

TO: Ann M. Veneman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Department of Agriculture Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 7 positions that could be staffed by Agriculture Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to ~~contact~~ Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative  fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

U16263 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16296

CPA PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

**Total Personnel Requirements: 7
as of September 29, 2003**

Governance Teams (3)

Regional Agriculture/Irrigation Specialists (3)

Agriculture (2)

FAS/Agriculture Economist/Food Distribution Specialist
Agriculture Legal Officer


Trade (1)

FAS-Agriculture Economist/Food Safety Network


Science/Technology (1)

Food Processing Specialist

October 1, 2003

TO: Anthony Principi 
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Department of Veterans Affairs Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes a position for a Veterans Employment and Training Services Specialist that could be staffed by the Veterans Department. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative  (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

U16263 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16298

October 1, 2003

TO: Elaine Chao

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Department of Labor Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 4 Labor/Social Affairs Specialist positions, a Senior Advisor position and a position for a Chief Counsel that could be staffed by Labor Department personnel. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6)

Thank you very much for your assistance.

U16263 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16299

October 1, 2003

TO: Gale Norton
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Department of Interior Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 2 Regional Interior Specialist positions and a Pure Water Expert position that could be staffed by Interior Department personnel. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

U16263 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16300

October 1, 2003

TO: Tommy Thompson
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Department of Health and Human Services Personnel for Iraq

Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 4 Regional Health/Religious Affairs Specialist positions that could be staffed by HHS personnel. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6)

Thank you very much for your assistance.

U16263 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16301

October 1, 2003

TO: Andrew Natsios
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: USAID Personnel for Iraq



Jerry Bremer has asked for some additional civilian expertise to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 13 Program Manager positions, 2 Regional Deputy Directors for Reconstruction, and 3 Regional Contract Officer positions that could be staffed by USAID. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I ask for your assistance in this matter. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. We are standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

U16263 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16302

NOT ALL
LETTERS HAVE
AN ATTACHMENT

TO: Honorable Ann M. Veneman
Secretary of Agriculture

CC: Dr. Rice
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Department of Agriculture Personnel for Iraq

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has an urgent need for people to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 7 positions that could be staffed by Agriculture Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I am requesting your immediate attention and assistance on this critical matter. Please identify people within your department who can fulfill these responsibilities. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. My staff is standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

TO: Honorable Don Evans
Secretary of Commerce

CC: Dr. Rice
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Department of Commerce Personnel for Iraq

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has an urgent need for people to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 11 positions that could be staffed by Commerce Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I am requesting your immediate attention and assistance on this critical matter. Please identify people within your department who can fulfill these responsibilities. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. My staff is standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

TO: Honorable Rod Paige
Secretary of Education

CC: Dr. Rice
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Department of Education Personnel for Iraq

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has an urgent need for people to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 9 positions that could be staffed by Education Department personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I am requesting your immediate attention and assistance on this critical matter. Please identify people within your department who can fulfill these responsibilities. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. My staff is standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

TO: Honorable Tommy Thompson
Department of Health and Human Services

CC: Dr. Rice
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III

SUBJECT: Department of Health and Human Services Personnel for Iraq

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has an urgent need for people to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 4 Regional Health/Religious Affairs Specialist positions that could be staffed by HHS personnel. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I am requesting your immediate attention and assistance on this critical matter. Please identify people within your department who can fulfill these responsibilities. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. My staff is standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

TO: Honorable Mel Martinez
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development

CC: Dr. Rice
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Department of Housing and Urban Development Personnel for Iraq

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has an urgent need for people to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 16 positions that could be staffed by HUD personnel. The attached list identifies the positions that need to be filled. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I am requesting your immediate attention and assistance on this critical matter. Please identify people within your department who can fulfill these responsibilities. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. My staff is standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

TO: Honorable Gale Norton
Secretary of Interior

CC: Dr. Rice
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Department of Interior Personnel for Iraq

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has an urgent need for people to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 2 Regional Interior Specialist positions and a Pure Water Expert position that could be staffed by Interior Department personnel. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I am requesting your immediate attention and assistance on this critical matter. Please identify people within your department who can fulfill these responsibilities. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. My staff is standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

TO: Honorable Elaine Chao
Secretary of Labor

CC: Dr. Rice
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Department of Labor Personnel for Iraq

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has an urgent need for people to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 4 Labor/Social Affairs Specialist positions, a Senior Advisor position and a position for a Chief Counsel that could be staffed by Labor Department personnel. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I am requesting your immediate attention and assistance on this critical matter. Please identify people within your department who can fulfill these responsibilities. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. My staff is standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

TO: Honorable Anthony Principi
Secretary of Veterans Affairs

CC: Dr. Rice
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Department of Veterans Affairs Personnel for Iraq

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has an urgent need for people to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes a position for a Veterans Employment and Training Services Specialist that could be staffed by the Veterans Department. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I am requesting your immediate attention and assistance on this critical matter. Please identify people within your department who can fulfill these responsibilities. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. My staff is standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

TO: Administrator Andrew Natsios
Administrator of USAID

CC: Dr. Rice
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: USAID Personnel for Iraq

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has an urgent need for people to assist with our efforts in Iraq. The current Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requirement list includes 13 Program Manager positions, 2 Regional Deputy Directors for Reconstruction, and 3 Regional Contract Officer positions that could be staffed by USAID. As our effort in Iraq evolves, we may request additional personnel (positions will also be eliminated over time).

I am requesting your immediate attention and assistance on this critical matter. Please identify people within your department who can fulfill these responsibilities. In general, we would like people to serve a period of six months. My staff is standing by to meet with representatives of your department to assist in deployment of these people. Please ask your senior representative to contact Frederick C. Smith, Chief of Staff, Office of the CPA Representative (b)(6) (b)(6) fred.smith@osd.mil).

Thank you very much for your assistance.

8:53 AM

TO: J.D. Crouch

EF-6815

I-03/012746

DATE: September 10, 2003

SUBJECT: Missile Defense

The last time we talked and met with the missile defense folks, it seemed to me that the target dates that have been set are going to be difficult to achieve. It is a complicated business, the time lines are relatively short, and what is being done is breaking new ground.

I wonder if it might make sense to get some outsider like Larry Welch, but not Larry since he has done so many studies on this I think he's almost considered an insider, to take a look at the things that are ahead of us. As I recall, the target date is the end of September '04. For example, some of the things that person could look at would include how we ought to feel about the fact that there very likely would not be a system wide exercise plan prior to that date that included operators and all the equipment.

It may be that we could be facing a funding shortfall in '04 which could also jeopardize the date.

A thought might be to appoint a senior retired military officer to pull together a group to provide us with a quick analysis of the missile defense capabilities and shortfalls. I suppose it could be done as a project of the Defense Science Board.

Let me know what you think.

DHR/azn
09103.02

Please respond by: 9/20

1050803
9/29/03
Sir,
Response attached.
w/cde Nosenzo
7.29

11-L-0559/OSD/16312

U16276 /03



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

10-01-03 17

INFO MEMO

October 01, 2003 5:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois (10.1.03)

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Snowflake on Pentagon Interns

- In the subject Snowflake, you asked why the Joint Staff was not represented in the intern numbers we provided to you in our initial Snowflake response of August 12th (attached). You also noted the difference in intern numbers among the Components and asked if we should have a departmental policy regarding interns.
- The Joint Staff does not have any civilian interns at this time. However, OSD Presidential Management Interns occasionally rotate through the Joint Staff.
- The numbers provided on August 12th reflected only those interns serving in the Pentagon at the time, which is a relatively small subset of the total Intern population in the Department. The number of interns in the Department is as follows:

Component	Presidential Management Interns	Other Post Graduate Interns	Short-term ¹ Student Programs	Career ² Program Interns	Total
Air Force	4	30	4,402	2,454	6,890
Army	11	8	3,646	10,459	14,124
Navy	35	3	3,521	940	4,499
OSD/JCS/ Defense Agencies	21	5	2,346	1,568	3,940
Total	71	46	13,915	15,421	29,453

¹ Students working and attending school concurrently.

² Functional intern programs designed and operated by the Components to help recruit, train and develop future staff (e.g., the Naval Acquisition Intern Program and the DeCA Commissary Management Intern Program).

- The Office of Personnel Management and the USD(P&R) provide guidance for the Department on intern and other student hiring programs. The Components believe that this guidance is adequate. The above numbers indicate that they are making robust use of the policies and authorities currently in place.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Laura Devlin, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/16313

U162801/03

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

9/25 - Larry Di Rita

Rey - This memo
implies there are
29,000 + missions
in DoD right now.
I think the two large
categories need a little
elaboration. I think

The memo states that will not meet 1?

U15712A/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16314

9/24
1530

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 SEP 23 PM 5:25

September 22, 2003 6:00 p.m.



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois
SUBJECT: Follow-up to Snowflake on Pentagon Interns

- In the subject Snowflake, you asked why the Joint Staff was not represented in the intern numbers we provided to you in our initial Snowflake response of August 12th (attached). You also noted the difference in intern numbers among the components and asked if we should have a departmental policy regarding interns.
- The Joint Staff does not have any civilian interns at this time. However, OSD Presidential Management Interns (PMIs) occasionally rotate through the Joint Staff.
- The numbers provided on August 12th reflected only those Interns serving in the Pentagon at the time, which is a relatively small subset of the total Intern population in the Department. The number of Interns in the Department is as follows:

Component	Short-term Student Programs	Presidential Management Interns	Other Post Graduate Interns	Career Program Interns*	Total
Air Force	4,402	4	30	2,454	6,890
Army	3,646	11	8	10,459	14,124
Navy	3,521	35	3	940	4,499
OSD/JCS/ Defense Agencies	2,346	21	5	1,568	3,940
Total	13,915	71	46	15,421	29,453

* e.g. Financial Management, Audit and Human Resources Programs

- The Office of Personnel Management and the USD(P&R) provide guidance for the Department on intern and other student hiring programs. The Components believe that this guidance is adequate. The above numbers indicate that they are making robust use of the policies and authorities currently in place.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Laura Devlin, (b)(6)

SPI ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARIOTT	9/24

11-L-0559/OSD/16315

U15712 / 03

August 18, 2003

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Interns

Please take a look at these interns from the various services and OSD. It doesn't say anything about the Joint Staff, which it probably should.

Look at how differently people are doing this—ought we to have a policy and encourage people to do certain things? It looks kind of strange to me.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/12/03 DuBois memo to SecDef re: Pentagon Interns

DHR:dh
DR1803-37

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET
2003 AUG 13 11 3: 51

INFO MEMO

August 12, 2003, 3:45 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Raymond F. DuBois*, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Snowflake on Pentagon Interns

- In the snowflake, you had asked how many interns we have in the Pentagon and where they work.
- As of July 31, 2003, we had 353 civilian interns working in the Pentagon. Following is a breakout by Component and type of internship:

TYPES OF PENTAGON INTERNS AND WHERE THEY WORK

<u>Component</u>	<u>Presidential Management Interns (PMIs)</u>	<u>Student Summer Interns</u>	<u>Other Student Interns (Various Programs)*</u>	<u>Total</u>
OSD/WHs	8	42	86	136
Army	19	31	8	50
Air Force	0	60	80	140
Navy	7	10	12	19
Marine Corps	7	0	10	7
DISA	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	41	133	179	353

* Includes unsalaried interns; student interns working part time during school year and full time during summers/breaks; and special intern programs for disabled, minority, and disadvantaged youth.

Attachment
As stated

Prepared by: Laura Devlin, WHS, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	8/12
SA L'A CRADDOCK	8/19
MA BULLI	8/15
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	8/14

June 3, 2003

TO: Jaymie Duman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Academy Boards of Visitors

Please find out how the boards of visitors for the academies work—who nominates people, who selects them, and what say we have over it. If we don't have a say, we better get a say with the White House. Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060303-20

Please respond by

6/20/03

352 Academies

3 Jun 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

CH-1248-03 10 15

INFO MEMO

CH-1248-03
3 October 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 10/2*

SUBJECT: End Strength Memo

- In response to your question (TAB) concerning Mr. Barry Blechman's (CEO and President, DFI International) suggestion to offer an additional combat unit as an incentive to the Services for reductions in non-combat units, the following is provided.
- While the idea of using this incentive has merit, standing up an additional combat brigade can be very costly and requires time to recruit, train and/or retrain the combat specialties. An increase in the top line funding would also be required for the Services to replace military with DOD civilians and/or contractors.
- I recommend that work continue with OSD and the Services to explore other options to resolve military end strength challenges.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria I. Cribbs, USAF; Director, J-1, (b)(6)

*Mr. Secretary
I think allowing the Services
to keep military that are replaced
by contractors or DOD civilians as
incentive enough.*

*VR
DICK*

U16336 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16319

TAB

September 15, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: End Strength Memo

Attached is a letter from Barry Blechman with some good ideas on the end strength memo I sent him. Let's edit the memo to reflect these thoughts.

What do you think about his idea of giving some incentives to the Services and offer an additional combat unit if they are able to deliver the kinds of reductions we are talking about?

Tab



DEF INTERNATIONAL

Barry M. Blechman
CEO, DEF International

August 26, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Room 3E880
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Thanks very much for your letter of August 19th and the attached draft working paper on end-strength. I agree completely that given the endless costs of adding to uniformed strength, it is a step best avoided if at all possible. And I agree further that much could be done to utilize Defense manpower more efficiently, making possible additional strength in combat and combat support forces without adding to overall totals. The working paper of course has an extensive list of ways to improve manpower efficiency, covering most of those with which I am familiar. I'd stress restructuring the active/reserve mix and finding innovative ways to utilize reservists on a more selective and purposeful basis among the most important of these ideas, along with getting uniformed personnel out of jobs performed more efficiently by government civilians or contractors.

Among the ideas that I didn't see in the draft are: (i) reducing the amount of time military people spend in formal training and educational institutions by increasing on-the-job training, particularly with the help of computerized learning techniques; and (ii) lengthening typical tours of duty to reduce time lost in transitional billets.

The Sunday New York Times account of the paper and the process surrounding it suggested that you are going to direct the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to find greater efficiencies in manpower. It is the Services, of course, who know better than anyone where the inefficiencies can be found. Given the right incentives, they might be more cooperative than under other circumstances. One idea, perhaps apocryphal, has been attributed to Jim Schlesinger when he was Secretary. The idea is to offer additional combat units for the delivery of a multiple number of reductions in non-combat slots. For example, the Army could be offered an additional brigade (and the budget necessary to equip it), if it could reduce certain categories of manpower by a multiple of the number of people required to man an incremental brigade. It's tricky to execute such a strategy, but it at least gets everyone's interests aligned more closely.

I also notice in the paper a variety of policy-related changes that could reduce manpower requirements – e.g., more use of international police and peacekeeping forces, reductions in certain long-term commitments, etc. This is an area in which we've done a variety of studies and would be happy to provide some inputs if you could point me in the right direction.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/16321

TAB

September 15, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: End Strength Memo

Attached is a letter from Barry Blechman with some good ideas on the end strength memo I sent him. Let's edit the memo to reflect these thoughts.

What do you think about his idea of giving some incentives to the Services and offer an additional combat unit if they are able to deliver the kinds of reductions we are talking about?

320.2

15 Sep 03

Tab

U16339 / 03



DFI INTERNATIONAL

Barry M. Blechman
Chairman/President

August 26, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Room 3E880
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Thanks very much for your letter of August 19th and the attached draft working paper on end-strength. I agree completely that given the endless costs of adding to uniformed strength, it is a step best avoided if at all possible. And I agree further that much could be done to utilize Defense manpower more efficiently, making possible additional strength in combat and combat support forces without adding to overall totals. The working paper of course has an extensive list of ways to improve manpower efficiency, covering most of those with which I am familiar. I'd stress restructuring the active/reserve mix and finding innovative ways to utilize reservists on a more selective and purposeful basis among the most important of these ideas, along with getting uniformed personnel out of jobs performed more efficiently by government civilians or contractors.

Among the ideas that I didn't see in the draft are: (i) reducing the amount of time military people spend in formal training and educational institutions by increasing on-the-job training, particularly with the help of computerized learning techniques; and (ii) lengthening typical tours of duty to reduce time lost in transitional billets.

The Sunday New York Times account of the paper and the process surrounding it suggested that you are going to direct the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to find greater efficiencies in manpower. It is the Services, of course, who know better than anyone where the inefficiencies can be found. Given the right incentives, they might be more cooperative than under other circumstances. One idea, perhaps apocryphal, has been attributed to Jim Schlesinger when he was Secretary. The idea is to offer additional combat units for the delivery of a multiple number of reductions in non-combat slots. For example, the Army could be offered an additional brigade (and the budget necessary to equip it), if it could reduce certain categories of manpower by a multiple of the number of people required to man an incremental brigade. It's tricky to execute such a strategy, but it at least gets everyone's interests aligned more closely.

I also notice in the paper a variety of policy-related changes that could reduce manpower requirements – e.g., more use of international police and peacekeeping forces, reductions in certain long-term commitments, etc. This is an area in which we've done a variety of studies and would be happy to provide some inputs if you could point me in the right direction.


Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/16323

EF-6897 C 2/2
I-03/013086

September ²²~~19~~, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Taliban

We have to get a response to me on whether or not Karzai is softening up on the Taliban. I need to know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091903-16

AFGHANISTAN

✓
10/3
Sir,
Response attached.
vr/
CDR Nosenzo
102

22 Sep 03

U16375 /03



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET
2003 OCT -3 PM 5:25

INFO MEMO

October 3, 2003 – 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Template for Military Pay and Benefits—
SNOWFLAKE

- You asked if we could develop a “comprehensive template” for military pay and benefits against which proposals for change could be tested (attached). I think we can, but urge that we approach this as an iterative task, rather than hoping that our first draft will be either definitive or enduring.
- I will attempt to have that first draft in hand for you by early November. My plan is to organize it against outcomes we desire to achieve, rather than by categories of compensation. Our standard will be the one you have consistently reiterated: we must offer exactly what we need to attract, retain and motivate the talent the nation needs—no less, no more.
- As we develop this “template”, I believe that we should invite the Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation to help us assess present compensation against it, as well as proposals for change. (By law, we must start that review this year.)

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

U16378 /03



11-L-0559/OSD/16325

9/26/03
11/1/03
Snowflake

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D.
DATE: September 25, 2003
SUBJECT:

I do think you ought to get a comprehensive look at pay and benefits for active reserve, guard and retired so that we can force any proposals in these areas to be tested against the template as to where we have the need. Why don't you think that through and see if it is doable.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092503.35

Please respond by: 10/8

11-L-0559/OSD/16326



~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CN-1249-03

3 October 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff *10/3*

SUBJECT: Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) paper

- In response to your query (TAB A), I'm pleased to provide the attached Joint Operations Concepts paper (TAB B) for your approval.
- This is the culmination of a year's development and refinement in a collaborative process with the Services, Combatant Commands, Joint Staff, and Defense Agencies. My staff has provided draft copies of the paper to the Office of Force Transformation and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy / Plans and Programs throughout the writing process (TAB C).
- Development of the supporting concepts, Joint Operating Concepts and Functional Concepts, is on track for completion in February 2004.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve Joint Operations Concepts paper

COORDINATION: See Tab C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Col Lee DeRemer, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED: *[Signature]* NOV 5 2003

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: _____

*Mr Secretary,
The JCS, JFC and
many others have worked
the Op c hard. I think
it's a good start (80%
solution) and ready
for your approval.*

SPL ASSISTANT CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>[Signature]</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

11-L-0559/OSD/16327

U16395 /03

381

3 OCT 03

A

547

24
September 22, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Con Ops

My understanding of the joint con ops is not happening. Somehow or other, the resistance in the institutions of this Department seem to have stopped it dead in its tracks. I'm tempted to put together a group to write it myself.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092203-28

.....
Please respond by 10/1/03

03 SEP 25 AM 3:47

11-L-0559/OSD/16329

B

JOINT OPERATIONS CONCEPTS

JCS VERSION 1.0 for 2003



3 October 2003

Secretary's Foreword

The first few years of the 21st Century have taught us that the future is full of open and hidden dangers. The Department of Defense must prepare now to address those threats to our freedom or face a very uncertain destiny.

We do not know the true face of our next adversary or the exact method of engagement. The threat may come from terrorists, but it could come in the form of cyber-war, a traditional state-on state conflict, some entirely new form of attack, or it may take the form of a natural or man-made disaster. This uncertainty requires us to move away from our past threat-based view of the world and force development. We must change. We must envision and invest in the future today so we can defend our homeland and our freedoms tomorrow.

The future demands we move towards a capabilities-based approach as articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. This approach focuses more on how the United States can defeat a broad array of capabilities that any adversary may employ rather than who the adversaries are and where they may threaten joint forces or US interest. The joint force will have attributes to make it fully integrated expeditionary in nature, networked, decentralized, adaptable, able to achieve decision superiority, and lethal.

This document articulates the overarching concept that describes the conduct of future joint military operations. It defines the construct for the development of subordinate operating, functional and enabling concepts that will identify emerging capabilities across the domains of air, land, sea, space and information. It is transformational and will act as the genesis for new ideas and concepts hence the name "Joint Operations Concepts."

New ideas and concepts come from a culture of continual transformation. We are counting on the superb members of today's Joint Force to make transformation possible. These brave men and women remain the most critical asset to the Armed Forces. We must ensure they have the resources, capabilities and innovative culture they need to assure our allies, as well as dissuade, deter and, if necessary, defeat the aggressors we will face in the dangerous century ahead.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

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Preface

*"Our military culture must reward new thinking, innovation, and experimentation. Congress must give defense leaders the freedom to innovate, instead of micromanaging the Defense Department. And every service and every constituency of our military must be willing to sacrifice some of their own pet projects. Our war on terror cannot be used to justify obsolete bases, obsolete programs, or obsolete weapon systems. Every dollar of defense spending must meet a single test: **It must help us build the decisive power we will need to win the wars of the future.**"*

President George W. Bush, Citadel Speech, 11 December 2001

Purpose. The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) describes how the Joint Force¹ intends to operate within the next 15 to 20 years. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities. The JOpsC provides the conceptual framework to guide future joint operations and joint, Service, combatant command and combat support defense agency concept development and experimentation.² The JOpsC also provides the foundation for the development and acquisition of new capabilities through changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).³

Scope. The President directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to transform to meet an uncertain future and the unfolding challenges of the 21st Century. To mitigate the risk and uncertainty of the future, DOD will transition from a threat-based, requirements-driven, force development process to a capabilities-based, concepts-driven force planning process.⁴ JOpsC provides the operational context for military transformation in sufficient detail for the development of subordinate joint operating, functional and enabling concepts.

As an overarching concept, this document describes the conduct of joint military operations in the context of interagency⁵ and multinational⁶

¹ The term "joint force" in its broadest sense refers to the Armed Forces of the United States. While this document focuses primarily on the changes in the way that "operating elements" of the Armed Forces will organize, plan and prepare, and operate as an integrated joint force in the future, these changes will impact on every element of the Armed Forces. The term joint force (lower case) refers to an element of the Armed Forces that is organized for a particular mission or task. Since this could refer to a joint task force or a unified command, or some yet unnamed future joint organization, the more generic term "a joint force" will be used, similar in manner to the term "joint force commander" in reference to the commander of any joint force.

² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3010.02A; *Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan* (JIMP) (Washington, DC: 2001), Enclosure A describes the process for concept development and experimentation.

³ CJCSI 3010.02A; GL-2.

⁴ *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001*, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: 2001), III-13, describes a shift from force development to force planning.

⁵ CJCS Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* (Draft) (Washington, DC: October 2002); Approved for inclusion in CJCS JP 1-02; *Department of Defense Dictionary*

coordination across the full range of military operations (ROMO).⁷ The JOpsC focuses on joint military operations at the operational and strategic level of war and crises resolution. It describes the integration of emerging capabilities across the domains of air, land, sea, space and information and the development of supporting concepts to obtain these capabilities.

Application. The JOpsC is applicable to combatant commands, Services, combat support defense agencies and the Joint Staff for concept development and experimentation.

of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 2001): A broad generic term that describes the collective elements or activities of the Department of Defense and other US Government agencies, regional and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and commercial organizations engaged in a common effort.

⁶"The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions." *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS) (Washington, DC: 2002), President's Foreword, iii.

⁷ Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) MEMO 023-03, "Interim Range of Military Operations (ROMO)" (Washington, DC: 28 Jan 03).

Joint Operations Concepts

An overarching description of how the future Joint Force will operate across the entire range of military operations. It is the unifying framework for developing subordinate joint operating concepts, joint functional concepts, enabling concepts, and integrated capabilities. It assists in structuring joint experimentation and assessment activities to validate subordinate concepts and capabilities-based requirements.

Section 1. Introduction. The Armed Forces of the United States provide a critical and flexible instrument of national power, will be globally employed and will operate across the ROMO.

The JOpsC describes how the Joint Force will operate in a complex environment within the next 15 to 20 years and describes the coordinated development of Service, combatant command and combat support defense agency capabilities. The JOpsC is designed to guide and leverage the innovation, change and adaptation of the Armed Forces of the United States and is based on a clear understanding of the strategic setting, strategic guidance and a capabilities-based approach to joint warfare and crisis resolution.

1.A. Strategic Setting. The enduring nature of war, fundamental elements of crisis resolution, challenges of a new security environment and emerging threats, as well as an understanding of the American culture all profoundly affect how the Joint Force operates.

Nature of War and Crisis Resolution. War will continue to be characterized by a violent clash of wills between nations or armed groups in the pursuit of political or ideological ends. The fog and friction of war will randomly impact military operations and decision-making at all levels. Warfare will continue to include both violent and non-violent means.

Crises will still be distinguished by deteriorating situations resulting from natural or manmade catastrophes. These situations will continue to lead to potential humanitarian, societal or state instability, and the increased likelihood of conflict.⁸

While the nature of warfare and crisis resolution remains unchanged, changes in the security environment, technology and the threat will cause the conduct of military operations to change. Accordingly, the United States must change the way it conducts joint military operations – shift to a global perspective of the battlespace, a noncontiguous approach to operations and the employment of a fully integrated Joint Force.

⁸ Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) MEMO 022-03, "An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution In the 21st Century" White Paper (Washington, DC, Joint Staff, J7: 28 January 2003), 6.

1.B. American Culture and People. The Department will tap into the strength and innovation of the American culture and people to form the foundation for change.

The Armed Forces of the United States possess a unique philosophical and cultural approach to joint warfare and crisis resolution that reflects the cumulative historical experience, values, traditions and character of the American people, the individual Services and the unique institutions and governmental processes of the United States of America. This includes adherence to the rule of law, civilian control of the military, promotion of democracy and the preservation of life.

People remain the centerpiece of successful joint operations. Although the capabilities associated with the tools of warfare will change, the dynamics of human interactions and will, instilled through innovative leadership, will remain the driving force in all military operations. Fundamental to the successful utilization of improved capabilities will be the capacity of the individual Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen to learn and adapt to new mission demands, bear the hardships of combat and work diligently to synchronize Service efforts.

1.C. Strategic Guidance The President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense establish strategic guidance that provides goals and objectives for the Armed Forces of the United States.

1.C.1. The National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS reflects the nation's values and interests. The United States, in cooperation with other nations, will deny, contain and curtail adversaries' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. To ensure protection, the United States may be forced to act in self-defense against emerging threats before they can be applied against national vital interests. The aim of this strategy is not just to protect the United States, but also to help make the world better. To achieve the NSS goals, the United States will:⁹

⁹ NSS, President's forward, 1-2.

National Security Strategy

- Champion aspirations for human dignity;
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against allies, friends and the United States;
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- Prevent enemies from threatening allies, friends and the United States, with weapons of mass destruction;
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and trade;
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power;
- Transform America's national security institutions to meet the emerging challenges and opportunities.

1.C.2. The Defense Strategy. Four DOD policy goals and a set of strategic tenets guide the Defense Strategy, as described in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and FY 04-09 Defense Planning Guidance.

Defense Policy Goals

- Assuring allies and friends by demonstrating US steadiness of purpose, national resolve and military capability to defend and advance common interests, and by strengthening and expanding alliances and security relationships
- Dissuading adversaries from developing threatening forces or ambitions, shaping the future military competition in ways that are advantageous to the United States and complicating the planning and operations of adversaries
- Deterring aggression and countering coercion against the United States, its forces, allies and friends in critical areas of the world by developing and maintaining the capability to swiftly defeat attacks with only modest reinforcement
- At the direction of the President, decisively defeating an adversary at the time, place and in the manner of US choosing

Strategic Tenets

- Managing Risks
- A Capabilities-Based Approach
- Defending the United States and Projecting US Military Power
- Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships
- Maintaining Favorable Regional Balances
- Developing a Broad Portfolio of Military Capabilities

1.C.3. The Military Strategy of the Department of Defense.¹⁰ The military strategy is the Armed Forces' plan to carry-out missions assigned by the Defense Strategy. It defines defensive, offensive, and anticipatory actions that commanders take to achieve military objectives in support of the Defense Policy goals. The military strategy applies a set of overarching principles – agility, decisiveness, and integration – that guide how commanders achieve their supporting objectives. The military strategy provides the context to describe the desired attributes and capabilities of the Joint Force and lays the foundation for the common architecture for capabilities-based force planning described in this document. The military strategy, as the foundation for other strategic documents, supports near-term operational planning while providing a common joint vision of future operations that serves as an azimuth for joint force transformation.

1.D. Capabilities-Based Approach.¹¹ One key tenet of the QDR and NMS is the development of a capabilities-based approach. A capabilities-based approach focuses more on how the United States can defeat a broad array of capabilities that any adversary may employ rather than who the adversaries are and where they may engage joint forces or US interests.¹² Development of a capabilities-based Joint Force requires a broad and long-term strategic perspective, a greater appreciation of the operational and strategic environmental factors and a rigorous analysis of the capabilities needed to achieve defense policy goals.

In the past, the construct of force development was requirements-driven based upon specific threats. However, the United States cannot predict with confidence the nations, combinations of nations, or non-state actors that may pose threats to its interests, allies or friends. To mitigate the risk of this uncertainty, the United States must anticipate the range of broad capabilities that any adversary might employ and the necessary capabilities required to resolve any conflict or crisis. Thus, a capabilities-based approach shifts this construct from threat-based force development to force planning based on a set of desired capabilities for any given military operation. These desired capabilities are derived from a set of **joint operating concepts**, describing how the future force will operate within specified segments of the ROMO and a set of **joint functional concepts** that describe the desired capabilities within each functional area across the ROMO.

1.E. Meeting the Challenges. The strategic setting makes clear the requirement to transform the way the United States conducts joint military operations. Identifying the potential capabilities of adversaries and adapting forces to counter those capabilities will allow the Joint Force to meet the

¹⁰ Military Strategy of the Department of Defense (Draft), 11 Sep 03.

¹¹ QDR 2001, 13.

¹² NSS, 29.

challenges of the future. To prevail, the Joint Force will leverage such near-term objectives as the Service's significant changes to increase agility, reduce profiles and synchronize capabilities as well as the future goal of being full spectrum dominant.

Section 2. Full Spectrum Dominance (FSD).

Full spectrum dominance is the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations.

Full spectrum dominance is based on the ability to sense, understand, decide and act faster than any adversary in any situation. These actions are preceded by decisions that are led by better understanding of the battlespace. This allows commanders to act simultaneously or sequentially to achieve the desired end-state at the least cost in lives and national treasure.

In order to achieve FSD, the Joint Force will pursue a capabilities-based approach that focuses more on how the United States can defeat a broad array of capabilities that an adversary may employ rather than who the adversaries are and where they may engage US interests. FSD emphasizes **adaptability**, balances capabilities and manages risk within a global perspective¹³ to protect the United States, prevent conflict and surprise attack, and prevail against all adversaries.¹⁴

Framed within this approach and against the evolving security environment background, a new battlespace perspective emerges for future military operations. To accomplish assigned missions, an adaptive joint force will be capable of conducting rapidly executable,¹⁵ globally and operationally distributed,¹⁶ simultaneous and sequential operations. In so doing, the Joint Force will be able to apply continuous pressure¹⁷ on an adversary, control the tempo of the operation, and develop and exploit opportunities faster than an adversary can adapt. This continuum of action will require **decentralized**

¹³ "An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution In the 21st Century" White Paper (Washington, DC, Joint Staff, J7: 28 January 2003), 23.

¹⁴ Military Strategy of the Department of Defense (Draft), 11 Sep 03

¹⁵ "Rapidly executable" implies that as decisions are made, the joint force will have an increased capability to quickly execute, if desired, the task. This does not mean that every operation will be rapidly executed, but it does suggest that closing the gaps between decision, initial entry forces, and follow-on forces may facilitate achieving objectives faster. The joint force will still retain campaign qualities for those situations where speed is undesirable, unattainable or politically constrained. *Authors.*

¹⁶ Forces, potentially geographically separated, sharing a common operational picture through a global network to enable the operational control of tempo and momentum to achieve the effects desired. Derived from *JW&CR White Paper*, 21.

¹⁷ *JW&CR White Paper*, 34.

execution, where joint capabilities are organized and interdependently applied at increasingly lower echelons.

To meet these future operational aims, the Joint Force will leverage technology to provide actionable, precise, "fused" intelligence at all levels of war to facilitate **decision superiority**. This requires a singular battlespace,¹⁸ networked to enable continuous and collaborative campaign planning. The Joint Force also requires adaptive command and control (C2) organizations and will increasingly employ tailored, capabilities-based force packages¹⁹ that habitually plan and routinely train together in the live-virtual-constructive environment.

Fundamental to the success of FSD is the national priority for a secure homeland. Properly planned, supported and coordinated interagency actions ensure a secure homeland and also serve to protect and advance other US interests and the mutual interests of allies and friends. In addition, combatant commands will initiate activities to promote security throughout the globe. Leveraging these shaping activities, combatant commanders set the conditions that allow the Joint Force to seize and maintain the initiative when responding to a crisis or entering a conflict. This allows the Joint Force to retain friendly freedom of action including assured access and the quick defeat of enemy anti-access and/or area-denial strategies.

Additionally, the Joint Force will be able to rapidly build momentum and close the gaps between the decision to employ force and the deployment of initial entry and follow-on forces in order to rapidly achieve objectives. Thus, the Joint Force will deploy and employ from the United States, abroad, or forward-deployed locations directly throughout the depth of the battlespace. These forces will engage the adversary's critical nodes, linkages and vulnerabilities to reduce their centers of gravity.

Joint force personnel will require a joint and expeditionary "mindset," which reflects a greater level of deployability and versatility. Yet, the Joint Force must also ensure that capabilities not only swiftly defeat an adversary but are applicable to sustained combat, and the potential simultaneous conduct of operations to reestablish order, stability, and local governments.

The Joint Force must sustain itself in austere global regions by becoming less dependent on existing infrastructure and using globally integrated and

¹⁸ Singular battlespace is a new way of viewing the battlespace. It sees both the enemy and friendly forces as a complex, adaptive system, composed of many systems and subsystems. These battlespace systems, consist of nodes and connecting links that represent some kind of relationship. The systems and their nodes may be linked directly or indirectly and the links may be physical or non-physical links. *Joint Operational Warfighting* (Draft) (Suffolk, VA, USJFCOM, J9 Joint Futures Lab: 15 Aug 02), 20.

¹⁹ Capabilities-based force packages are joint forces built based on what they must do rather than the quantity of forces or platforms they possess.

synchronized end-to-end logistics and self-sustainment systems. This enables the conduct of operations for a specified time without requiring an operational pause. Finally, the Joint Force will remain committed to full coordination and interoperability of capabilities with interagency and multinational partners to ensure complementary effects.

Section 3. The Future Joint Force. The following describes attributes of the future Joint Force and broadly explains how this force will organize, plan, prepare and conduct operations.

3.A. How It Will Operate. Although specific operations along the ROMO may require other capabilities, the Joint Force will generally organize, plan, prepare, and operate using the following common core capabilities.

3.A.1. Achieve common understanding of all dimensions of the battlespace throughout the Joint Force.

Understanding the battlespace begins with planning against anticipated adversary capabilities or other likely contingencies. Such capabilities and contingencies will be identified through in-depth studies of the operational environment including operational net assessments developed from robust intelligence.

Secondly, security cooperation and robust intelligence provide the JFC with enhanced situational understanding, advanced indications and warning. Joint forces assist in establishing relationships and regional understanding by engaging in theater security cooperation activities with other nations.

Finally, the Joint Force uses an effects-based approach that includes "systems visualization." Systems visualization develops a shared understanding of causal relationships and provides critical tools that assist commanders and staffs to plan, execute, assess, and adapt. It also provides some insight into potential effects beyond those that are desired. This situational understanding of the essential political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information systems within an area of interest highlights how the system function and are interrelated.

3.A.2. Make joint decisions and take action throughout the Joint Force faster than the opponent.

Decision superiority and rapidly employable capabilities allow the Joint Force, in coordination with allies and partners, to seize and maintain initiative to ensure freedom of action. The United States takes control of the situation and operational tempo by forcing a change in the adversary's strategy, lines of operation or force employment.

Guided by the JFC's intent, joint planners design operational plans to achieve desired end-states. These plans describe how the Joint Force command intends to take joint action. Designated joint task forces will routinely evaluate plans via exercises in the live, virtual and constructive training environments.

An established network, allowing commanders at all levels to collaborate and thereby facilitate timely employment of appropriate joint capabilities, will support the planning and execution effort. Collaborative planning and execution will include considerations for personnel tempo and coordination with the other instruments of national power and multinational partners to help shape the overall security environment to meet global priorities. Plans and actions will take into account that the Joint Force may assume either a supporting or a supported role in its relationship with national and multinational agencies.

The Joint Force terminates a specific operation when the necessary military conditions have been met to accomplish strategic objectives. After achieving its military objectives, the force assumes a supporting role and transitions back to normal operations or another contingency.

3.A.3. Adapt in scope, scale, and method as the situation requires.

The Armed Forces of the United States secure the homeland, its territories and strategic bases for expeditionary joint forces. In certain operations, such as non-hostile domestic events and most foreign humanitarian assistance operations, the JFC may be in a support role to a civil authority. Joint forces are forward based, forward deployed, or available for employment from the United States in relation to global priorities.

The nature of potential adversaries requires an adaptive approach to ensure operations achieve the desired end-state. To maximize the speed and effectiveness of US actions to achieve the desired end-state, assessments of changes in the adversary's system must be continuous. These assessments will allow commanders to adapt and exploit or mitigate changes in the adversary's systems.

The Joint Force must remain adaptable with the capacity to commit to a specific operation while remaining ready to shift to another operation that may or may not be in the same operational area. Joint forces must be able to hand over one operation, reconstitute while remaining forward deployed for subsequent tasking, and undertake an entirely different military operation without extensive reliance on host-nation or overseas infrastructure.

Services and combatant commands will develop, organize and train their forces in order to provide desired joint capabilities. Capability-based force

packages combine and establish habitual relationships among elements of joint, multinational and interagency capabilities that are tailored for a flexible array of capabilities across the ROMO. The packages have the ability to be employed independently or interdependently, and rapidly transition between missions.

3.A.4. Rapidly deploy selected portions of the Joint Force that can immediately transition to execution, even in the absence of developed infrastructure.

Rapid employment of permanent or rotation-based forward joint forces and tailored expeditionary forces, along with space-based assets, provide the initial engagement capabilities and facilitate the introduction of follow-on forces. Expeditionary capabilities, coordinated with other instruments of national power, shape the battlespace, set initial conditions to achieve strategic objectives, provide assured access and the required infrastructure.

3.A.5. Create and sustain continuous pressure throughout the battlespace for as little or as long as it take to accomplish strategic or operational aims.

Commanders dynamically employ maneuver forces, precision engagement and information operations to apply immediate and continuous pressure on any adversary, foreclosing options and presenting difficult dilemmas. Commanders should expect an adversary to attempt a preemptive first move or other actions to resist joint force actions.

The Joint Force must also possess the capability to persistently engage in protracted operations when a crisis cannot be quickly resolved. Additionally, planners must consider the need to continue force flow or the rotation of forces to increase the available combat capabilities to either complete the initial force package or to preempt adaptations the adversary may attempt.

3.A.6. Disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy any opponent with a combination of lethal and non-lethal means.

An integral part of joint operational planning will involve identifying and exploiting the critical relationships, dependencies, vulnerabilities and strengths of adversary systems. An effects-based approach, which employs a systems methodology, is particularly applicable to an adversary system where identified links and nodes can be influenced by various instruments of national power. Such an approach may complement or supplant other approaches. The desired result for this approach is to produce specific effects that disrupt the adversary's decision making, alter intent, diminish capability and force the adversary to comply with US will.

3.A.7. Conduct deployment and sustainment activities in support of multiple simultaneous, distributed, decentralized battles and campaigns.

Achieving strategic objectives may not call for large-scale operations but rather many distributed operations unified by common purpose. The Joint Force conducts distributed operations to match its strengths against the adversary's critical vulnerabilities. The future Joint Force will be capable of conducting and supporting distributed non-linear operations in a singular battlespace. In addition, the Joint Force will be capable of reacting appropriately to the varying degrees of urgency established by the strategic campaign objectives. Such operations can be characterized as multi-directional and multi-dimensional from regionally or globally dispersed locations directed against an adversary's dispersed critical vulnerabilities.

The importance of distributed non-linear operations is an ability to create unpredictability in the application of combat power and to overwhelm an adversary. By integrating joint capabilities at increasingly lower echelons and enhancing connectivity among the elements, joint forces can better conduct distributed operations. These factors enable commanders to match capabilities more precisely to specific tasks and purpose within a singular battlespace.

Fundamentally, the sustainment mission is integral to deployment and employment of the Joint Force by getting the right support to the right place at the right time. This will not change. However, a distributed force, maneuvering at an increased tempo, requires fully integrated, globally synchronized, agile sustainment. This calls for a shift from supply-based logistics and regionally focused, service-centric planning to a sustainment system that is precise, flexible and responsive to sustaining tailored forces operating in a dynamic environment.

A fully integrated logistics system is networked, distribution-based and executes in a responsive mode to meet the real time demands of the operational users. Global synchronization of the entire logistics system is essential for managing sustainment. Sustainment operations begin on day one and must remain continuous from deployment, through employment and redeployment to mitigate the need for operational pauses. Within the initial phase of operations, expeditionary forces must possess a certain level of self-sustainment. Beyond this initial phase, an agile logistics sustainment and distribution system with unparalleled reach will provide the necessary support for continuous and distributed operations.

Regardless of the scale of the contingency, the Joint Force will be required to provide some level of support to US government agencies, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and host-nation agencies. While providing this support, the Joint Force prepares for future operations, or

resumes normal operations while maintaining the initiative and protecting against renewed adversary offensive actions.

3.A.8. Accomplish all of the above in an inter-agency and multi-national context.

Achieving full spectrum dominance requires full coordination with interagency and multinational partners. Achieving the desired end-state and strategic objectives necessitates an integrated, networked Joint Force, as well as interoperability with interagency and multinational partners.

3.B. Attributes. To realize the common core capabilities described above, the future Joint Force must possess the following attributes:

Fully Integrated. The Joint Force must move beyond deconfliction to fully integrated elements with all functions and capabilities focused toward a unified purpose. This means that the capabilities provided by the Services, combatant commands and combat support agencies are born joint and fully integrated.²⁰ Thus the Joint Force Commander (JFC) will have a set of inherently interoperable and synergistic joint capabilities to employ.

Legacy equipment and systems will be "made joint" to the extent possible until such time as replacement by "born joint" equipment and systems is feasible. Full integration will require further expansion of the "joint team mindset"²¹ from the combatant command level where it exists today down to the joint task force (JTF) and component headquarters (HQ).²² An increased degree of integration and synchronization will also be required among appropriate Service forces to conduct joint tactical actions at appropriate levels. Joint training, more interoperable systems and the elimination of seams between functional components will enhance this integration. For full integration in the strategic, operational and tactical domains greater coordination and collaboration must also extend to the interagency and to multinational partners.

Expeditionary²³ describes those elements of the Joint Force that are rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable throughout the global battlespace regardless of anti-access, or area-denial environments²⁴ and independent of existing infrastructure. Designated elements based in the United States, abroad or forward deployed must be configured for immediate employment and sustained operations in austere environments. These forces

²⁰ JW&CR White Paper, 22.

²¹ Ibid., 11

²² JTF headquarters may change significantly. This approach applies to whatever command and control element and/or structure may replace the current notion of a JTF. *Authors.*

²³ NSS, 30.

²⁴ QDR 2001, 30.

must be capable of seamlessly transitioning to sustained operations as a crisis or conflict develops. Expeditionary also describes the Joint Force mindset. That mindset takes advantage of areas such as knowledge and maneuver and applies the appropriate capabilities of a balanced Joint Force.

Networked²⁵ describes a Joint Force that is linked and synchronized in time and purpose. The Joint Force capitalizes on information and near simultaneous dissemination to turn information into actions. Networked joint forces will increase operational effectiveness by allowing dispersed forces to more efficiently communicate, maneuver, share a common operating picture and achieve the desired end-state.

A networked Joint Force expands its reach. Reachback is the ability of the Joint Force to extend beyond organic capabilities to include fire support, sustainment and information. This network includes interagency, designated multinational partners, academic and industrial sources, and includes both technical linkages and personal relationships developed through training and habitual association.

A networked Joint Force is able to maintain a more accurate presentation of the battlespace built on the ability to integrate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, information and total asset visibility. This integrated picture allows the JFC to better employ the right capabilities, at the right place and at the right time. Fully networked forces are better able to conduct distributed operations.

Decentralized describes a Joint Force that leverages the power of integrated joint capabilities while operating in a joint manner at lower echelons. These forces use collaborative planning and shared knowledge to empower subordinate commanders distributed across a noncontiguous battlespace to make decisions and take action. This requires shared knowledge of adversaries, friendly forces and the environment as well as a clear understanding of strategic objectives and commander's intent. Unique situational awareness, greater autonomy and increased freedom of action at lower levels enable subordinate commanders to compress decision cycles, seize the initiative and exploit fleeting opportunities.²⁶

Adaptable²⁷ describes a Joint Force prepared to quickly respond to any contingency with the appropriate capabilities mix. This requires versatile and agile forces that are tailorable and scalable for employment and able to adapt fundamental capabilities in a multi-use manner as mission requirements

²⁵ Ibid., 32.

²⁶ David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*, 2d ed. (DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, Washington, DC: August 1999), 121.

²⁷ Derived from *QDR 2001*, III and 17.

dictate without losing significant operational capability. Adaptability ensures that the Joint Force can rapidly shift from mission to mission.

Decision superiority is the state at which better-informed decisions are arrived at and implemented faster than an adversary can react, or in a non-combat situation, at a tempo that allows the force to shape the situation or react to changes and accomplish its mission. To facilitate decision superiority, the Joint Force must gain and maintain information superiority.

Decision Superiority: The objective of decision superiority is to turn an information advantage, i.e. information superiority, into a competitive advantage. Decision superiority uses a superior information position to create and enable highly effective actions, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) or relationships that would not otherwise be possible. To facilitate decision superiority, the Joint Force must gain and maintain information superiority by applying joint capabilities developed in information operations, in the collaborative information environment, through shared situational awareness, and through ISR.

Information Superiority is an imbalance in one's favor in the information domain with respect to an adversary. The power of superiority in the information domain mandates that the United States fight for it as a first priority even before hostilities begin. This requires that the Joint Force develop doctrine, TTPs, organizational relationships and technologies to win this two-sided fight. The quality of the information position depends upon the accuracy, timeliness and relevance of information from all sources. A priority responsibility of command is to ensure access to all relevant information sources within and among all DOD organizations, and in coalition operations with mission partners. The continuous sharing of information from a variety of sources enables the fully networked Joint Force to achieve the shared situational awareness necessary for decision superiority.

Lethality describes increased and refined joint force capabilities to destroy an adversary and or the systems in all conditions and environments. It includes the use of kinetic and/or non-kinetic²⁸ means, while leveraging technological advances in greater precision and more devastating target effects²⁹ at both longer-ranges and in close combat.

Section 4. Subordinate Concepts. The JOpsC, JOCs, Joint Functional Concepts and Enabling Concepts represent an interrelated construct of concepts. In this construct of concepts, joint operating concepts, joint functional concepts, and enabling concepts are subordinate to the JOpsC. There is no hierarchy to operating, functional or enabling concepts - they must all inform and interrelate with each other. These subordinate concepts and

²⁸ Non-kinetic includes use of actions such as network and electronic attack or non-physical or non-chemical employment of action. *Authors*

²⁹ Our object in applying firepower must be to exploit its substantial paralytic effects to gain advantage. *Future War Anthology*, 15.

future concepts will require JROC approval to proceed into assessment by joint experimentation.

"A concept is a notion or statement of an idea—an expression of how something might be done."³⁰ A military concept is the description of methods (ways) for employing specific military attributes and capabilities (means) in the achievement of stated objectives (ends). A concept may, after further development, experimentation, assessment and refinement, lead to an accepted way of doing something. It is only after an accepted concept has been validated and approved, with reasonable confidence, that it provides the basis for force planning.

JOCs, joint functional concepts and enabling concepts will be validated

Joint Operating Concept

A description of how a future Joint Force Commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain a joint force against potential adversaries' capabilities or crisis situations specified within the range of military operations. Joint Operating Concepts serve as "engines of transformation" to guide the development and integration of joint functional and Service concepts to describe joint capabilities. They describe the measurable detail needed to conduct experimentation, permit the development of measures of effectiveness, and allow decision makers to compare alternatives and make programmatic decisions.

through joint experimentation and other rigorous analysis leading to a refined concept for JROC approval. In order to implement a concept, DOTMLPF capability improvement recommendations will be developed and presented to the JROC for approval and tasking.

4.A. Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs). JOCs will further develop key areas of the JOpsC. Focusing at the operational-level, JOCs integrate functional and enabling concepts to describe how a JFC will plan, prepare, deploy, employ and sustain a joint force given a specific operation or combination of operations. The JOCs will also provide a detailed conceptual perspective for joint experimentation and assessment activities.

JOCs must be developed with a narrow scope to guide and describe the development of desired operational capabilities. These capabilities must be examined in terms of assumptions, attributes and metrics in order to identify tasks for the future Joint Force. JOCs must be written in measurable detail to allow for experimentation and let decision makers compare alternatives. JOCs must specifically address the potential means and ways they contribute to achieving the six 2001 QDR operational goals.

³⁰ CJCSI 3010.02A; A-4.

The Joint Chiefs and Transformation Planning Guidance have identified four broad initial joint operating concept categories, they are: major combat operations, stability operations, homeland security, and strategic deterrence. These and future JOCs will require JROC guidance for further development and validation.

Major Combat Operations (MCOs). MCOs achieve objectives by removing an adversary's ability to conduct military operations and creating acceptable political conditions for the cessation of hostilities and the imposition of US will. At the direction of the President, the Joint Force will simultaneously "swiftly defeat" two efforts, and, if necessary, win one of those efforts decisively. MCOs are conducted in a campaign consisting of sequential, parallel and simultaneous actions distributed throughout the physical, information and cognitive domains of the global battlespace. Operations will attempt to sustain an increased tempo, placing continuous pressure on the adversary, and will harmonize military action with the application of other instruments of national power. The campaign is designed to dismantle an adversary's system of offense and defense, preempt their freedom of action, destroy critical capabilities and as rapidly as possible isolate enemy forces. Thereby, the Joint Force will deny the adversary sanctuary, the ability to maneuver and reconstitute, and defeat or destroy them through the integrated application of air, ground, maritime, space and information capabilities.

Stability Operations. Stability operations are military operations in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners, to maintain or re-establish order and promote stability. These consist of global and regional military operations that establish, shape, maintain and refine relations with other nations. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving the US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. Stability operations help ensure unhindered access by the US and its allies to a global economy. These operations may include a wide array of tasks from combat operations - in order to remove isolated pockets of resistance, to peace enforcement, or security cooperation activities.³¹

Homeland Security (HLS). The highest priority of the United States is HLS. The military mission sets are homeland defense, civil support and emergency preparedness. Homeland defense will be the primary focus of the Homeland Security JOC. Military forces may execute assigned missions in circumstances of emergency, routine or extraordinary nature. The mission sets for homeland defense are aerospace, land and maritime defenses. These are operationalized through attack operations, active defense, passive defense and C4I. The mission sets for civil support are military assistance to civil

³¹ Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) MEMO 023-03, "Interim Range of Military Operations (ROMO)" (Washington, DC: 28 Jan 03).

authorities, military support to civilian law enforcement agencies and military assistance for civil disturbances.

Strategic Deterrence. Strategic deterrence encompasses the range of DOD efforts and capabilities to discourage aggression or coercion by potential adversaries. Strategic deterrence provides the President with a range of military options and capabilities intended to deter aggressors while requiring only modest reinforcement of forward-deployed and stationed forces from outside the theater. Strategic deterrence includes joint counterproliferation, defense against weapons of mass destruction, overseas presence, peacetime military engagement and nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities enhanced by global intelligence.

Joint Functional Concept

A description of how a future JFC will integrate a set of related military tasks to attain capabilities required across the range of military operations. Joint functional concepts derive specific context from the joint operating concepts and promote common attributes in sufficient detail to conduct experimentation and measure effectiveness.

4.B. Joint Functional Concepts. Using the Joint Operations Concepts and JOCs for their operational context, functional concepts amplify a particular military function and apply broadly across the ROMO. Individual functional concepts outline desired joint capabilities. The JROC will provide guidance for the joint functional concepts to ensure seamless development. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have identified five initial functional concept categories of Joint Command and Control (JC2), Battlespace Awareness, Force Application, Focused Logistics, and Protection. These and potential other functional concepts require JROC guidance for further development and validation through joint experimentation and assessment.

4.C. Enabling Concepts. While still expressed in conceptual terms, enabling concepts are the most specific of all military concepts. Enabling concepts are descriptions of how particular tasks or procedures are performed within the context of broader functional areas. Enabling concepts must be developed, experimented on and validated with sufficient specific detail to directly link capabilities to military tasks. Although not the only enabling concepts, information, interagency, and multinational operations are integral enabling

concepts that are intertwined throughout all operations. They crosscut functional and operating concepts.

4.C.1. Information Operations. In support of a joint campaign or national strategy, information operations are the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception and operation security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making, while protecting our own.³² Information operations are a critical enabler to the functions of engagement, protection and C2.

4.C.2. Interagency. Operations which will enhance joint interagency coordination in each combatant command will facilitate and enable greater application of all elements of national power. This capability is developed through early integration of agency representatives to create an effective conduit for shared understanding enabling integrated decision-making between the Joint Force HQ and agencies. This capability integrates an interagency perspective in collaborative planning and execution. JFCs are made aware of agency planning, cultural sensitivities, support requirements, capabilities and limitations while in turn civilian agencies are made aware of the Joint Force operational requirements, concerns, capabilities and limitations.

The Joint Force, in coordination with interagency partners, must therefore develop a common concept to train and operate together on a routine basis. Commonly understood concepts, capabilities and TTPs will enable the Joint Force to achieve FSD. To develop the necessary integrated capabilities, interagency capabilities must become a part of the force-planning construct.

Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at each combatant command HQ will significantly increase civilian and military coordination and enable a more complete understanding of policy decisions, missions and tasks and the strategic and operational assessment. They enable collaboration to integrate the capabilities from all instruments of national power to more effectively achieve the desired end-state. The tools and relationships necessary to enable such coordination must be established before a crisis unfolds.

4.C.3. Multinational Operations occur within the structure of an alliance or coalition and are a key aspect of future operations. Against the backdrop of an increasingly interdependent world, unilateral operations are becoming a thing of the past. Understanding this, the United States will continue to work with multinational partners. Security cooperation activities combined exercises and shared tools for planning reduces the past challenges of dissimilar training, equipment, technology, doctrine, culture and language associated with

³² *Information Operations Roadmap* (Washington, DC: Sep 03).

multinational operations.

Multinational partners provide unique capabilities that support military operations, enhance regional and cultural expertise and demonstrate international support for operations. Multinational involvement, with a unified purpose, enables the coordinated application of the instruments of international power to achieve the desired objectives. National liaison teams, equipped with tools to enable integration and collaboration, must form habitual training and operational relationships with the military forces of potential coalition partners. Seamless connectivity is enabled by established security cooperation relationships that are in place before a crisis occurs.

US security cooperation arrangements with other nations serve four major purposes. First, they reduce the potential for conflict by assuring allies of US resolve and communicating US intentions to dissuade potential adversaries. Second, they facilitate future US operations in regions that may otherwise be difficult to access enhancing readiness to counter coercive threats, deter aggression or defeat adversaries. Third, these arrangements support worldwide positioning of forces as a foundation for flexible and adaptive deployment, employment and sustainment. Fourth, they enable multinational operations that draw upon the adaptive capabilities of all friendly nations. To develop these integrated capabilities multinational operations must become a part of force-planning.

5. Addressing the Future (Near, Mid and Far-Term).

"We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the US armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight."

SecDef Rumsfeld's Remarks to National Defense University, 31 Jan 02

The procurement of future Joint Warfighting Capabilities requires the development of capability improvement recommendations. Such recommendations can be based on Combatant Commander and Service input, joint lessons learned, analytic agenda studies, experimentation on concepts, and other assessment insights.

Matériel capability improvements will be recommended in accordance with CJCSI 3170.01C, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*. Non-matériel capability improvements will be recommended in accordance with CJCSI 3180.01, *Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Programmatic Processes for Joint Experimentation and Joint Resource Change Recommendations*. The objective of these capability recommendations, whether near-term or far-term, should clearly support the attributes of the future Joint

Force as described in the JOpsC and the distilled capabilities as described in subordinate concepts.

5.A. Joint Tasks. To ascertain Joint Capabilities that can immediately direct the near and mid-term objectives of the Future Years Defense Plan, joint tasks must be determined on an annual basis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Services and Combatant Commands will prioritize a limited number of joint tasks, including capability prototypes, annually that are based on Combatant Commander input, experimentation and joint lessons learned. The joint tasks will be developed to meet the Joint Force objective of Full Spectrum Dominance as informed by the JOpsC. The joint tasks will primarily focus on joint military operations at the operational and strategic level of war and crisis resolution as informed by the JOCs. The development of these joint tasks will determine the division of Service responsibilities and permit the distillation of quick-win joint capabilities. The resulting Service responsibilities and capabilities from these joint tasks will serve to inform programming decisions and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).

5.B. Concept Development, Experimentation, and Assessment. The JOpsC and the various supporting concepts will be developed and refined through the joint concept development and experimentation (JCDE) process as described in CJCSI 3010.02A, *Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan* and the Transformation Planning Guidance. US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) will ensure overall integration of joint concepts.³³ The JROC approves proposed concepts, experiments and recommends approval of DOTMLPF changes.

Joint experimentation (JE) and assessment is designed to evaluate concepts, compare alternatives and provide observations, insights and actionable recommendations to senior decision-makers.

The Joint Staff and USJFCOM efforts will establish appropriate objectives, goals, scenarios, metrics and tasks to focus evaluation efforts.³⁴ The Chairman's JE Guidance provides a common pathway for JCDE to facilitate concept development and experimentation. The key goals of JE and assessment of joint concepts (JOpsC, JOCs, Joint functional and enabling concepts) include:

- Gain insights and understanding of what concepts and capabilities are feasible given the current state of technology, potential developments, and integrated effects with other technologies.

³³ CJCSI 3010.02A; A-7.

³⁴ The process is described in CJCSI 3010.02A, *Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan*.
Authors.

- Establish measures of effectiveness to achieving the desired capabilities outlined in FSD. Permit the exploration and co-evolution of new concepts, processes, capabilities, doctrine and technologies for the future joint environment.
- Provide a cohesive JCDE environment through the integration of Service, joint, multinational and interagency experiments.
- Leverage Defense Planning Scenarios (DPSs) in experimentation. DPS's will set the conditions and standards to enable experimentation to look at:
 - The global nature of warfare
 - The need for "campaign quality" concepts (pre-conflict through post-conflict)
 - The varying environmental conditions across the ROMO
 - Operations within a strategic context that includes other instruments of national power

The Joint Staff and USJFCOM will identify the critical measures of effectiveness and establish a model to demonstrate changes from current to future capabilities to validate emerging concepts.

5.C. Potential Capabilities-Based DOTMLPF Considerations.

Transformation is a continuous process. Therefore, DOD must develop methods that assess legacy and proposed systems and define required joint capabilities. The process must validate capabilities, considering the full range of DOTMLPF solutions to advance joint warfighting, and field the capabilities required to deter and defeat the adversaries. The following considerations should be examined during initial concept development and assessment: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities.

5.C.1. Doctrine. The joint doctrine process must evolve, become more efficient and streamlined, and be more directly linked to the concept development and experimentation process.³⁵ Once approved by the JROC, doctrine change recommendations, based on joint experimentations, must be incorporated into doctrine without delay. This process may develop joint and multinational doctrine during the JCDE cycle. Services, combatant commanders and combat support agencies should be fully involved in the doctrine process.

³⁵ QDR 2001, 37.

5.C.2. Organization. DOD has initiated Unified Command Plan (UCP) changes as part of its adaptation to the strategic environment. The Joint Staff and combatant commands must examine organizational and technological changes needed to fully integrate interagency and multinational partners. A more formalized and direct force-provider relationship among USJFCOM, US Special Operations Command and the Services must be examined to enable more flexible and responsive deployment and employment of joint capabilities.

Additional organizational changes will take place at the operational level. The Joint Force must be organized into tailorable capabilities-based force packages for employment designed to produce a set of synergistic joint capabilities not currently available to the JFC. These force packages will not necessarily be based on previous unit configurations. They must be capable of "plugging" into an adaptable standing joint C2 structure for immediate employment by the JFC.

5.C.3. Training.³⁶ Joint training and exercises are essential to building a joint team that includes interagency and multinational partners. Tough realistic training will be necessary to forge teams and foster a joint mindset within leaders and staffs. Capabilities-based force packages, designated as components and not permanently assigned, will conduct routine training exercises in the live, virtual and constructive training environments. Joint training scenarios should be built around an adaptive and complex opposing force or a dynamic crisis situation that may be conducted in a "free play" environment that stresses the JFCs, their staff and leaders to the point of failure. Training will be based on lessons learned and designed to improve adaptability to the challenges posed in dynamic and uncertain environments. Establishing a Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) will contribute to the training, observation and assessment programs.

5.C.4. Materiel. Technological advances will continue to affect the transformation of the Joint Force. They help bridge the gap between current and future joint capabilities. Concepts help identify new ways of exploiting technological advances. The Department of Defense needs an improved process of identifying critical materiel solutions based on joint criteria and approved measures of effectiveness. This process must be responsive and adaptive to support modernization needs and rapid technological breakthroughs.

5.C.5. Leadership and Education. Leadership development will remain the foundation of institutionalized transformation and innovation. Decentralized execution in an uncertain operating environment requires adaptive, innovative and decisive leaders. Leadership education and training will focus on

³⁶ QDR 2001, 46.

developing skilled and knowledgeable leaders capable of meeting the increasingly complex requirements of joint operations. Personnel must expand their understanding of individual, Service and joint core competencies. Joint professional military education provided throughout the careers of both officers and enlisted will broaden their understanding of the uncertain strategic and operational environments. Education and leadership development must prepare leaders to succeed in chaotic environments.

There must be a link between education and the "characteristics and conduct"³⁷ of the future Joint Force. The Joint Force must develop joint operational level leaders capable of synergistically combining the emerging capabilities in time, space and purpose to accomplish the operational or strategic objectives. Joint operational leaders must fully understand the operational strategy and be capable of designing an integrated approach in support of the other instruments of national power. The development of leaders grounded in both the art and science of joint operations must begin very early in the military education process.

Commander's Intent will have greater significance for the future Joint Force leadership. Senior leaders must ensure that command intent is better communicated to all relevant subordinate commands. Junior leaders will need to acquire a better understanding of the importance of that intent and operate within that intent to achieve overall strategic objectives.

5.C.6. Personnel. People are the cornerstone of the future Joint Force. The Armed Forces of the United States must continue to recruit men and women of character who embody the American culture and possess the drive and innovation needed to protect our freedom. The Joint Force will recruit and retain those who are willing to bear the hardships of combat and those who are willing to be integral parts of a joint team that adapts to the demands of any mission.

5.C.7. Facilities. The Department of Defense must optimize its infrastructure both at home and abroad. To conduct fully integrated operations, joint facilities must be developed that support and exercise the integration desired in the daily activities. Service facilities must be seamlessly connected to these joint facilities to foster a joint culture and collaboration on ideas, doctrine, plans and training. To plan and operate effectively in a global common operational network, training must start today by linking combatant commands, Services, and multinational, interagency and industrial partners.

³⁷ JW&CR White Paper, 5, 6, 17 – 43.

Section 6. Conclusion.

"And let there be no doubt, in the years ahead it is likely that we will be surprised again by new adversaries who may also strike in unexpected ways. And as they gain access to weapons of increasing power--and let there be no doubt but that they are--these attacks will grow vastly more deadly than those we suffered several months ago. Our challenge in this new century is a difficult one. It's really to prepare to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain and what we have to understand will be the unexpected. That may seem on the face of it an impossible task, but it is not."

SecDef Rumsfeld

The JOpsC guides future Joint Force planning and will help clarify the conduct of joint operations across the ROMO in a multinational and interagency context. It provides critical links to other strategic guidance, it provides the key attributes of the future Joint Force, and it provides the conceptual framework for developing joint operating, joint functional and enabling concepts. It focuses the Department of Defense in exploiting available and emerging ideas and technologies to change the organization, planning, preparation and conduct of operations. Implementation of the JOpsC will result in transformational changes to meet the President's challenge, "Every dollar of defense spending must meet a single test: It must help us build the decisive power we will need to win the wars of the future."³⁸

³⁸ Speech by President George W. Bush to the Citadel, 11 December 2001. *White House Website* [Cited September 2002]. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.

Glossary

C2	command and control
C4I	command, control, communication, computers and intelligence
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities
FSD	full spectrum dominance
HQ	headquarters
JCDE	joint concept development and experimentation
JE	joint experimentation
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JIACGS	joint interagency coordination groups
JIMP	Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan
JNTC	Joint National Training Capability
JOCs	Joint Operating Concepts
JOpsC	Joint Operations Concepts
JP	joint publication
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JTF	joint task force
MCO	major combat operation
MS	Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
ROMO	Range of Military Operations
TTPs	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command

C

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy)/Resources and Plans <i>USD(Polcy)</i>	Mr. Jason Dechant	Copy Provided, 17 Sep 03
Office of Force Transformation	COL Rich Marchant	Copy Provided, 19 Sep 03

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/16361





POLICY

OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

27 OCT 15 2003 10:50
8 October 2003

MEMO TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**FROM: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

R. S. K. K.
OCT 14 2003

SUBJECT: JOINT OPERATIONS CONCEPTS

1. Attached (Tab 1) is the Chariman's package requesting your approval of the initial overarching Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC).
2. The Director, Office of Force Transformation supports the effort and provided his comments on the JOpsC (Tab 2).
3. We agree with ADM Cebrowski that the concept represents a good effort and a step forward in transformation.

Prepared by: Jason Dechant, (b)(6)

Attachment: a/s

11-L-0559/OSD/16363

U16395 / 03



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



October 8, 2003, 13:30

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FORCE TRANSFORMATION

A. Chavak 1/8

SUBJECT: JOINT OPERATIONS CONCEPTS

- The Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) tasks me to provide you comments on the Joint Operations Concept Paper. I concur with the Chairman's appraisal of the document. It can serve as the capstone document for development of the supporting concepts.
 - The concept explicitly addresses the Joint Concept Guidance and principles contained in the TPG.
 - The tenets of Network Centric Warfare are specifically addressed.
 - A new model for logistics is described.
 - The concept is sufficiently forward looking to support further concept development and experimentation (CD&E) and incorporates the emerging new "American Way of War."
- The submitted concept is a result of a highly collaborative process in which a number of competitive alternatives were considered and subjected to a vigorous and substantive dialog. Therefore, it does not represent a lowest common denominator consensus product. This competitive process was an important byproduct of the concept development effort and represents a positive step in the Department's transformation efforts.
- In the dialog, laudable elements such as joint application of sea basing and the creation of a single, tiered joint sensor and weapons grid were omitted.
 - Other issues such as effects-based operational planning, linking fire and maneuver, integrating deployment, employment and sustainment, and information-age warfare were addressed, but could have received more attention.

- These issues form a stepping-off point for the next iteration of the concept due to begin in January.
- Your approval of this initial overarching concept will not foreclose continued intellectual dialog on the issue of how the future joint force will operate. To the contrary, the JOpsC will serve as an important guide for ongoing concept development and experimentation with alternatives.
- While the JOpsC in no way constrains Joint and Service transformation roadmaps, it will help guide their development and the more detailed operating concepts for mission areas such as major combat operations, stability operations, strategic deterrence and homeland security.

547

24
September 22, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Con Ops

My understanding of the joint con ops is not happening. Somehow or other, the resistance in the institutions of this Department seem to have stopped it dead in its tracks. I'm tempted to put together a group to write it myself.

381

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092203-28

.....
Please respond by 10/1/03

2452P03

SEP 25 2003

October 4, 2003

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Colombia and Helicopters

How do you propose we solve the helicopter problem for Colombia?

Should we both go up to Congress together and talk to some of the key people to see what we can do?

DHR:dh
100103-12

Colombia


U16401 /03

402012

11-L-0559/OSD/16367

October 4, 2003

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Colombia and Helicopters

How do you propose we solve the helicopter problem for Colombia?

Should we both go up to Congress together and talk to some of the key people to see what we can do?

DHR:dh
100103-12



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

September 29, 2003, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

03 OCT 2003

SUBJECT: Good News: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Defense Industrial Base Response

- Defense industry efforts to support OIF generally were successful. We base this assertion on field reports received from the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and our own experience securing preferential performance of critical defense contracts for OIF applications.
- For the period Mar 19 – Jun 26, DoD made over 9000 requests to contractors to expedite deliveries. Of 50 requests documented in DCMA weekly activity reports as indicative of the larger picture, 48 were shipped in accordance with accelerated schedules, among them C-17 aircraft, structural panels and tube assemblies for the E-3 Sentry AWACS, and thermal identification panels (prevents friendly fire).
- DLA reported no major industrial base surge failures; and customer satisfaction levels generally in line with peacetime. For example, prior to OIF, industry produced 70,000 JSLIST chemical protective suits per month. Vendors surged to over 128,000 per month, exceeding the contracted wartime surge requirement of 119,000 per month.
- We utilized our Priority Allocation of Industrial Resources Task Force on several occasions to deconflict orders competing for scarce production resources – 18 times for Operation Enduring Freedom, 5 times for OIF. The Task Force currently is working with suppliers to compress the planned 3-year fielding schedule for protective insert plates. Every U.S. soldier and contractor in Iraq will have effective body armor by December.
- When problems are identified to the production and logistics community, dedicated contractor and Department personnel strive to meet our troops' needs.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments: None.

Prepared by Gary Powell & Michael Caccuitto/ODUSD(IP) (b)(6)

11-L-0500SD/16369

U16408 / 03



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



ACTION MEMO

000000-7 01 14 03

October 6, 2003 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Washington Headquarters Services

SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fundraising

- In the attached snowflake you asked about the status of Pentagon Memorial fundraising and also inquired about informing the former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense of the opportunity to contribute.
- As of today, DoD has received a total of \$350,000 in gifts from all sources. In addition, the families of 9-11 victims have established the Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. (PMF) as a nonprofit organization, to actively raise funds on a broader basis. The PMF is listed as a participant in this year's Combined Federal Campaign.
- Should you wish to communicate with the former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, a draft letter is attached (Tab B) for your consideration. However, Jim Haynes has concerns about the appearance of you writing to solicit the former Secretaries and recommends against this. (Tab C)
- As an alternative, Jim suggests that you might consider approaching one or more of the former Secretaries, and ask that they write their fellow former Secretaries, as well as the former Deputies, and inform them about the opportunity to make contributions for the Pentagon Memorial. Former Secretaries Harold Brown and Melvin Laird both served on the design selection jury for the Memorial and might be willing to undertake such an effort.

RECOMMENDATION: That I contact Secretaries Brown and Laird to request their assistance on your behalf.

Approve Ray Disapprove _____ Other _____

OCT 16 2003

COORDINATION: DoD GC - See Tab C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Howard Becker, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	C 10/15
MA KRA	
EXCUSED HANNOY	10/8

11-L-05590SD/16370

U16543 / 03

0004

6 OCT 03

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
DATE: September 25, 2003
SUBJECT:

Please find out what the status of the Pentagon Memorial Fund Raising is.

One thought would be to make sure that the former Secretary's of Defense and Deputies have an opportunity to contribute. We might want to have someone draft a letter to them as appropriate.

I need a report on where we stand.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092503.21

Please respond by: _____

9/30

11-L-0559/OSD/16371

DRAFT

Draft Letter to Former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense:

This note is to bring you up-to-date on the establishment of the Pentagon Memorial. Congress authorized the establishment of a Pentagon Memorial to honor those who were lost at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and has also specifically authorized DoD to accept contributions for its costs. The Department has completed an extensive concept design competition and recently awarded a phased design-build contract for construction of a Memorial on the grounds near the south-western side of the Pentagon.

We hope to complete the Pentagon Memorial by the Fall of 2005. Construction will cost around \$12 million, and our expectation is that it will be built entirely with private contributions. To date, we have received just over \$350,000 in private gifts including contributions from DoD personnel. This is a good start, but the construction must wait until we receive significantly more funding. As a former Secretary [Deputy Secretary], should you desire to contribute to this effort, donations may be sent to the Director of Budget and Finance, Washington Headquarters Services at the Pentagon. Checks should be made payable to "U.S. Treasury – Pentagon Memorial".

There is a very informative web-site at <http://memorial.pentagon.mil>. If you wish to know more, please let me know and I will arrange a briefing.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/16372



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Washington Headquarters Services

SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fundraising

- In the attached snowflake (Tab A), you asked about the status of Pentagon Memorial fundraising and also inquired about informing the former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense of the opportunity to contribute.
- As of today, DoD has received a total of \$350,000 in gifts from all sources. In addition, the families of 9-11 victims have established the Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. (PMF) as a nonprofit organization, to actively raise funds on a broader basis. The PMF is listed as a participant in this year's CFC campaign.
- Should you wish to communicate with the former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, a draft letter is attached (Tab B) for your consideration.

COORDINATION: DoD GC

*I don't like the idea of secret sending
a letter asking for money. I recommend against it.
WHD/MS 10/2/03*

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Howard Becker, (b)(6)

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
DATE: September 25, 2003
SUBJECT:

000.4

Please find out what the status of the Pentagon Memorial Fund Raising is.

One thought would be to make sure that the former Secretary's of Defense and Deputies have an opportunity to contribute. We might want to have someone draft a letter to them as appropriate.

I need a report on where we stand.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
092503.21

Please respond by: _____

9/30

25 Sep 03

U16544 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16374

October 6, 2003

TO: Dr. David Kay

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



I am sorry we didn't connect when you were in town, but I watched your television appearances and thought they went well.

I know the working conditions you are dealing with in Iraq are tough and want you to know that we appreciate what you are doing.

Best regards,

DHR:dh
100603-15

000.77

6 OCT 03

May 19, 2003 3:23 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
Jaymie Durnan
6/4

SUBJECT: Nuclear Issue in Iraq

We simply have to get Tom Franks' outfit dealing with this nuclear issue in Iraq.
Please give me a report as to what you have going on and what you expect to
initiate.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/19/03 Reuters wire story: "El Baradei Warns of Iraq Nuclear Emergency" and SecState note

DHR:dh
051903-49

SECDEF HOS

JUN - 5 2003

Please respond by 5/23/03

CJCS RESPONSE

ATTACHED

v12

6/4
*C**19 May 03*

May 20, 2003 12:00 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Patrols in Baghdad

Please find out how many military folks out of each unit in Baghdad are actually on foot. Tell me the number of people in each unit and the number of people who are actually out on foot doing patrols at any given time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003-11

CR/S 5/21

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

6/20
Response
Attached

11-L-0559/OSD/16377

U16616 /03

*Iraq**20 May 03*

May 27, 2003 11:56 AM

Done 6/16

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Combatant Commanders' Conference

Please give me the Combatant Commanders' Conference calendar for July 15. I want to get set, so we know how to handle that time they are in town.

I may want to have a dinner for them. Let's pick a night when we might have them at the house. It cannot be on July 16, but it could be on July 14, 15 or 17, if they are in town.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052703-19

.....
Please respond by

5/31/03

- Draft agenda for Combatant Commanders' Conference attached.
- With regard to dinner, either 14 or 15 July looks best. Conference closes on 16 July, therefore, 17 July not good.

11-L-0559/OSD 116625 103

C 5/29

337

May 1, 2003 5:13 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Nepal

Please take a look into the idea of having Nepal supply some Ghurkas for Iraq or Afghanistan. I believe one of the Saudis suggested it.

Thanks

DHR:dh
050103-34

.....
Please respond by _____

U16643 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16379

B 22

Nepal

1 MAY 03

5/22
1700

May 1, 2003 3:07 PM

IRAO

Jaymie Durnan

TO: ~~Steve Cambone~~ Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
CC: C. J. C.
SUBJECT: Logistics

Attached is a memo I dictated after meeting with a logistics man from the Iraqi war. Do we have anything going that will fix this?

Thanks

Attach.
5/1/03 SecDef memo re: Logistics [050103-19]

UHR:dh
050103-20

Please respond by _____

ALDRIDGE RESPONSE ^{5/22}

ATTACHED.

5/27

✓/R

SIR:

Gus Pagenis + General Handy will be coming in on 6/17 to brief you on their views.

✓/R
Jaymie

1 MAY 03

May 1, 2003 3:12 PM

SUBJECT: Logistics

I had a good visit with MG Claude Christensen, who was the logistics man for part of the Iraqi war.

He said a good deal of logistics is still Service-unique and could be fixed.

For example, he said when they put Army cargo on an Air Force transport, they have no more visibility into it. We need to get this fixed across the force. The separation of logistics under Title 10 is the root of the problem.

We either need a carrot or a stick.

One of the things that struck me was that these logistics people don't have a long enough time in their job. For the people in Wal-Mart to get good at it, they do it for 10 or 15 years.

DHR dh
050103-19



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

May 21, 2003 2:00pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action_____

FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr., Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics) *Pete 5/22/03*

SUBJECT: Logistics

- Your Question: "Attached is a memo I dictated after meeting with the logistics man from the Iraqi war. Do we have anything that will fix this? (more logistics jointness, we need a carrot or a stick)"
- Response: Yes, we have been pursuing several structural initiatives to achieve joint logistics:
 - For weapon systems, a single program manager is charged with the total life cycle, including sustainment of joint platforms which will dramatically reduce footprint.
 - For commercial items (food, fuel, etc.), DLA is charged with end-to-end support of the joint force, using best commercial practices. As an example, we dramatically decreased in-theater supply levels of food, through integrating supply chains.
 - For deployed combat support, I have directed our Logistics policy group to team with the Joint Staff and JFCOM to revise our sustainment planning and in-theater distribution practices.
- We achieved unprecedented levels of asset visibility during OIF to meet joint requirements.
- Other near-term (05) actions include: implementing the Defense Business Board recommendations on supply chain management, and institutionalizing a joint theater logistics center within each regional command to enforce jointness.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Mr. Lou Kratz, ADUSD(LP&P), (b)(6) 21 May 2003 *Heidi Dornier*

Subject: Logistics

- Visibility of forces and sustainment cargo moving to Iraq increased dramatically through a variety of tools that provided a joint view of cargo in movement.
 - Expanded use of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology enhanced visibility of unit equipment and supplies.
 - A new Joint computer system is supporting re-deployment of Army units from Iraq to create detailed lift requirement information for USTRANSCOM and Joint in-transit visibility data for all stakeholders. The same system will provide deployment information in future conflicts.
 - Examples of visibility transformation: In Operation Desert Storm, there were 60 days of materiel, including MREs, in the theater. During OIF, we had 8.1 days of MRE's on the ground. The Commander called for 15 days of MREs, but improved in-transit visibility (ITV) permitted a reduction.
 - See attached news article on OIF logistics successes.
- Deployment and sustainment issues:
 - Despite enhanced cargo visibility, there are still gaps, due to where we fight and the international partners we engage.
 - Unit deployments and combat-enabling supplies often compete for lift and supporting infrastructure.
 - Therefore, we are teamed with JFCOM, USTRANSCOM, and the Joint Staff (J-4) to re-engineer and synchronize deployment and sustainment processes to fill these gaps.
- The Future Logistics Enterprise (FLE), your Department-wide strategy to transform logistics, has defined a new CONUS and Theater Logistics Operations structure concept, CLOC and TLOC, respectively, to enhance end-to-end customer support. In fact, Gus Pagonis incorporated this concept within his recommendation to you for a Global Supply Chain Integrator, which he briefed to you on May 14.
- As for the question regarding job tenure, we have career civilian and military logisticians with decades of experience within all branches of the Department. Civilians tend to remain in specific jobs longer than military.
- I welcome an opportunity to tell you more about how we are transforming logistics. An update would include advances in operational planning, technology, and partnering with industry, all of which enabled our Combatant Commander and Service Components to have much improved situational awareness and our weapon systems operators to maintain high mission-capable rates during our recent conflicts.

Snowflake

May 1, 2003 5:23 PM

337

TO: LTG Craddock
CC: Jaymie Durnan
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meetings Monday

1. I need a meeting on Monday with Paul Wolfowitz and whoever else he wants to be there to talk about the Interim Iraqi Authority, and I need this memo for the meeting.
2. I also need a meeting on Monday with Pete Aldridge to talk about the tanker issue, and I would like Paul Wolfowitz to be there. See attached memo.

Thanks

Attach.

4/28/03 DepSecDef memo to SecDef re: "Forming an Iraqi Interim Authority"
4/30/03 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: "Tanker Lease Status"

DHR:dh
050103-38

.....
Please respond by _____

U16645 /03

1MAY03

11-L-0559/OSD/16384

NIB

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld**DATE: April 29, 2003****FROM: Paul Wolfowitz****SUBJECT: Forming an Iraqi Interim Authority**

The attached memo describes a pretty good sketch of how an interim authority might be structured and a roadmap for meetings that could take you to a final meeting in Baghdad at the end of May.

However, the real issue is who will pick the key figures in the leadership, including the chief executive, and by what process.

State and Zal Khalilzad seem to be in no hurry to have a leadership group emerge. They may take this position because they don't want the external opposition to dominate the process and believe that delay will allow other leadership to emerge. Whatever the reason, the current approach seems unlikely to define a leadership anytime soon.

A different way of proceeding might be the following:

The Leadership Committee of the Opposition – which formed after their meeting in Northern Iraq in early February and consists of Talabani, Barzani, Chalabi, Alawi, al-Hakim and Pachachi – is planning to convene a meeting this week in Baghdad. Reportedly, if this meeting takes place, they will also invite some additional number of "internals" to join them as a group.

If that happens, then you could initiate a process of close consultation with that group by someone who really speaks with your authority (Garner, Di Rita or someone else) to begin to negotiate the shape of the Interim Authority.

This would set up what might become a kind of audition process that would give us a much better feeling for the capacity of a handful of a dozen or so key people.

Absent something like that, I believe the current process is just going to wander around and end up with a pretty formless meeting at the end of May.

The above approach would represent a fairly significant departure from the prevailing interagency thinking to date, which has been that somehow the Iraqis

themselves would come to a consensus about who they want as their leaders. The overwhelming impression from the meeting in Baghdad is not only are the Iraqis not going to do so, but they're very impatient for us to step in and tell them what we want. The national and regional meetings described in the attached paper could proceed in parallel, but they are unlikely to produce a definitive outcome by themselves.

To be successful, this expanded Leadership Committee would definitely have to include representatives of some key Shia religious leaders, such as Sistani and Sadr. It should also include the 2 or 3 most promising new people that have emerged. Dealing directly with a smaller group would give us better information about who these people are, how they work with one another and how they work with us. Without that, it's hard to see how we can expect to make an informed decision by the end of May as to who we'd really like to see managing the process.

Paul W.

~~DRAFT/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD Policy
29 April 2003
8:00pm EST

**Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA)
Implementation Plan**

IIA Overview

- The Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) would serve as the instrument of Iraqi national leadership in the period before the ratification of a new Iraqi Constitution and the free election of a new Iraqi government.
- The IIA might have a number of major components:
 - Leadership Council (12-25 members): This might include an interim chief executive, who might be required to agree not to run for office for a period of years. The Council would take the lead in liaising with ORHA, foreign governments, and international institutions. It would assume responsibility for administering Iraqi government functions (including running ministries) as determined by ORHA. It could also set up subordinate commissions, perhaps including:
 - Economic Reform Commission: Responsible for advising on issues of trade, national finance, privatization, monetary/fiscal policy, and embracing free-market practices.
 - External Affairs Commission: Responsible for representing Iraqi views to the world, and advocating for the normalization of Iraq's status in the international system.
 - Constitutional Commission (150-225 members): Responsible for drafting new Iraqi Constitution and Bill of Rights, in addition to devising process for constitutional ratification. Independent of Leadership Council.
 - Legal Reform Commission (9-15 members): Responsible for advising the Coalition on eliminating Ba'athist elements were eliminated from the legal code. It might also consider issues of transitional justice. Independent of Leadership Council.
- All members of the IIA would be required to live in Iraq.
- The specific relationship between the IIA and the Coalition will be established in an agreement to be signed as soon as the IIA Leadership Council is selected.

~~DRAFT/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

1

~~DRAFT/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD Policy
29 April 2003
8:00pm EST

IIA Road Map

- Central Iraq meeting (April 28) agreed that a subsequent nationwide conference should be held within four weeks to select the IIA.
- IIA Conference could include total of 300-350 Iraqis.
 - 150-225 internal Iraqis, distributed proportionally by province. Selected by the Coalition or elected by local town hall meetings.
 - 65-person Iraqi Opposition Committee from London.
 - 50-100 additional Iraqis chosen by Coalition. Selected by the interagency, in conjunction with the British.
- IIA Conference, guided by Coalition consultation, could select an Organizing Committee (10-15 members), which would choose IIA Leadership Council.
- IIA Conference/Organizing Committee could either select members of Constitutional Commission and Legal Reform Commission, or agree upon a process for doing so.

Action Items

- Determine a mechanism by which each governorate would be represented at IIA Conference.
 - If they are to be chosen by local meetings, immediately establish talks with local Iraqis from Nasiriyah/Central Iraq meetings and the Opposition Leadership Committee to organize.
 - If they are to be selected by Coalition, prepare list of candidates and devise process by which list can gain popular legitimacy.
- Plan the IIA Conference.
- Draft an agreement to govern relations between the IIA and the Coalition. Informally discuss with prominent Iraqis likely to play leading roles in IIA.
- Determine whether Iraqi Interim "Authority" should be modified to be an Iraqi Interim "Government," as voted on in the April 28 Central Iraq meeting.

~~DRAFT/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

2

11 L 0559/OSD/16388

~~DRAFT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD Policy
29 April 2003
8:00pm EST

Key Outstanding Questions

- What decision-making powers should the IIA have?
 - What veto powers should the Coalition have?
- Should the IIA have a legislative assembly?
 - Should there be any legislative function at all in the IIA?
- What should be the relationship between the various components of the IIA?
 - Should there be independence for the Constitutional and Legal Reform Commissions?
 - Should Economic Reform and/or External Affairs Commissions be independent of Leadership Council, or subordinate to it?
- Who chooses the IIA Leadership Council?
- Who chooses the IIA Legislative Assembly, if there is one?
- Who chooses members of the additional IIA commissions?
- How, if at all, should existing Iraqi Opposition structures/organizations be utilized in selecting the IIA?
- How should the Coalition ensure that religious/ethnic minorities and women are represented in the IIA?
- Should the Coalition have veto power over individuals selected by Iraqis to join the IIA?
- What regional and/or national political meetings, organized by Iraqis and/or the Coalition, should take place before any final conference to choose the IIA?

~~DRAFT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

April 30, 2003

To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense

CC: Powell Moore

From: Pete Aldridge 

Subject: Tanker Lease Status

The resolution of the tanker lease arrangement is going painfully slow. The biggest hurdle is overcoming a tanker cost estimate difference between the Air Force and an independent estimate prepared by the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA). The Air Force average unit cost estimate is \$146 million and the IDA cost estimate is "no greater" than \$125 million. We are meeting today (April 30) to reconcile the differences. My personal view is that the Air Force estimate is closer to reality, but we should still be able to lower it to about \$140 million.

OMB is insisting that the lease cannot go forward unless we accept the \$125 million unit cost limit for a full-up tanker configuration. As an interesting side note, the Italians and Japanese are buying a less capable 767 tanker and they are paying about \$170 million each. I am objecting to the notion that OMB can dictate a cost and a configuration of the tanker for us to lease. That should be our decision.

We have had numerous contacts on the Hill to assess positions and to get feedback. So far we have found: 1) Those for the lease are Hastert, Hunter, Stevens, Dicks, Pomeroy, Skelton, Murtha, Dorgan, Conrad; 2) Warner is "generally supportive" but will hold a hearing; 3) Those who claim to be "neutral" are Levin, Sessions and Jerry Lewis; 4) Lieberman is leaning toward the lease, but has some questions; 5) Inhofe's interest is only in training of tanker crews (currently done at Altus AFB, OK); 6) The only one we have found to be against the lease is McCain. We will continue the Hill contacts through this week.

It is our intent to make a final decision to proceed on the lease plan or not by Friday, May 2, 2003. At that time we will know whether we can reach closure on the unit cost estimate and the desired configuration in order to have a basis for final negotiations with Boeing.

Action: None. Information only.

~~SENSITIVE~~

11-L-0559/OSD/16390

sl.

1/5

EF-5756

8 15 PM

TO: Mira Ricardel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 12, 2003
SUBJECT:

I do really want to get our experts over there and get back a report to me and see if we can help the MoD problem with his boss. He has to show that he has worked hard at it. We have to help him.

Thanks.

Ukraine

6/20
RESPONSE ATTACHED

DHR/azn
061203.02

Please respond by:

JUN 18 2003

1245 RECEIVED IN ISP

12 Jun 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16392

06-18-03 08:53:16
U16650 /03

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: September 23, 2003

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

**CC: Ambassador Bremer
General Myers
General Abizaid**

SUBJECT: Your Snowflake on Electrical Generators

Don,

We contacted Brent Scowcroft's office, who identified the Kuwaiti gentleman you spoke with as (b)(6). We got in touch with Mr. (b)(6) and he explained that there were several 3-5MW portable generators available in Kuwait and other nearby countries and they could be transported to Basra, if we needed them.

(b)(6) gave us the name of the Minister of Electricity in Kuwait who would be the point of contact - Mr. Homoud Anizi.

We will pass this information to the Army Corps of Engineers through CTJTF-7 to explore with the Kuwaiti's if we could, and how best we to use the generators.

11-L-0559/OSD/16393

U16651 /03

4630

23 Sep 03

22
September 28, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Electric Generators

As I think I mentioned to one or both of you, I was told that Kuwait, Bahrain and other countries in the Gulf have five-megawatt portable, movable electric generators that would light up a whole city. They are there in the region, they are not being used, and if we went to them and told them we needed them, they could be available. I was told this by a fellow from Kuwait in a meeting Brent Scowcroft had.

Please tell me what we can do to help you track that down and figure it out, if in fact it is something we ought to take advantage of.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092003-2

.....
Please respond by 10/3/03

May 1, 2003 3:33 PM

88

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stabilization Funds

IRAQ

When can we start using the dollars we have collected in Iraq for stabilization?

Thanks

DIIR dh
050103-25

.....

Please respond by _____

1 MAY 03

U16654 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16395

~~OB~~
6/17

May 2, 2003 12:08 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Marin Strmecki
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Provincial Reconstruction Teams

I want to put a full court press on getting more Provincial Reconstruction Teams in as many provinces in Afghanistan as we can.

If we make a major effort, push it forward, ask interested countries to step up and help, and really put force behind it, we could do it.

As we transition to Phase IV, we ought to be able to get more cooperation from others.

The only question I have is whether the time, money and effort should be put into the ANA instead. My hope is we can do both.

Thanks

DHR:dh
050103-5

.....
Please respond by _____

2 MAY 03

U16655 /03

May 2, 2003 6:57 AM

Saudi Arabia

TO: Larry Di Rita
Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Prince Saud's Suggestions

The Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, insisted on riding to the airport with me so we could talk. Rather than staying back for prayers, he drove with me and said the following:

1. He suggested we get the names of technocrats in the major Iraqi cities, invite them to a meeting, form city councils and then get them to begin to participate in an Interim Iraqi Authority. He said if they boycott, then they are out. They get invited one time—if they don't come, show that they made a mistake by not inviting them again and by letting it be known that their boycott excluded them.
2. The important thing is to get the cities working, so that the daily lives of people are improving. From that group we will see leadership generated.
3. The next step would be to hold a national assembly from those people. They are the kind of people who could help the country be more efficient.

DHR:dh
050103-24

2 May 03



U16656 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16397

25

May 3, 2003 12:44 PM

015

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Powell Moore
FROM:  Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Legislation on Legal Fees

Why don't we think about getting some legislation drafted that would assure that anyone accused under the International Criminal Court law who was on active duty and functioning in an official position will have legal fees and other expenses reimbursed.

Please see the attached article.

Thanks.


9/29 

Attach.

"Targeting Tommy Franks," *Washington Times*, May 2, 2003, p. 22.

DHR:dh
050303-18

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03



3 MAY 03

U16657 /03

Washington Times
May 2, 2003
Pg. 22

Targeting Tommy Franks

Gen. Tommy Franks, who valiantly led American troops to victory in Baghdad, is now the target of a lynching by a few Iraqis. Iraqi civilians are currently lodging a criminal complaint in a Belgian court against the general and other U.S. officials, accusing them of war crimes. The civilians claim that coalition forces are responsible for the indiscriminate killing of Iraqi civilians, the bombing of a marketplace in Baghdad, the shooting of an ambulance and the failure to prevent the mass looting of hospitals. Jan Fermon, the Brussels-based lawyer representing the 10 Iraqis who claim to be the victims or eye witnesses of atrocities committed during Operation Iraqi Freedom, is demanding that the court issue an indictment against Gen. Franks on charges of "command responsibility" for the purported crimes.

If Brussels is not embarrassed by this complaint, it should be. Its unique 1993 law of "universal jurisdiction" claims that non-citizens can be tried in a Belgian court for war crimes committed anywhere in the world.

The Bush administration has reacted angrily to the complaint. It has rightly argued that the absurd charges highlight the dangers that war crimes laws and institutions such as the International Criminal Court can be used to launch politically motivated prosecutions against American officials.

Despite recent amendments to Belgium's law, the universal jurisdiction statute needs to be altered even further to prevent frivolous prosecutions against U.S. officials. The administration should make it clear that if Belgium does not fundamentally revamp its law, then there will be a diplomatic price to pay.

The farcical legal filing shows that the administration was justified in having refused to join the ICC last year. The United States should continue to shield itself, and especially our troops, from bogus charges. The complaint is an example of how dangerous it is for the United States to be at the mercy of a foreign court.

The administration is also correct in denouncing the principle of "command responsibility," that is being used as the basis of the complaint against Gen. Franks. Under the logic of the theory of "command responsibility," any political or military leader can be tried for war crimes because of isolated acts committed by individual soldiers in battle. The Bush administration is justified in its outrage at the complaint against Gen. Franks. This is not a U.S. problem. It is a Belgian problem.



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

September 12, 2003, 12:20 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: Legislation on Legal Fees

- You asked on May 3, 2003, for me to think about drafting legislation that would ensure that certain individuals accused under the International Criminal Court would have legal fees and other expenses reimbursed.
- My office drafted legislation that would provide comprehensive legal support for all Federal officials—military and civilian—including representation and all related fees, costs, and expenses (TAB A). The legislation goes further than any existing protection because it covers former officials and extends to preliminary legal proceedings, including depositions and investigations.
- I sent the proposal to OMB for interagency coordination and received considerable support from CIA, DHS, and State. The Vice President's counsel, David Addington, revised my proposal, giving DoJ primary responsibility for administration and implementation. I support the revised proposal.
- My office recently circulated Mr. Addington's revised version throughout DoD for review and comment. Once DoD coordination is complete next week, I will forward the legislation to OMB and request that the Administration introduce it as a new bill in Congress immediately.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: LTC Michael Fucci, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/16400

**SEC. ____ . LEGAL SUPPORT FOR U.S. PERSONNEL SUBJECTED TO FOREIGN
JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.**

1 (a) IN GENERAL.—When a non-United States tribunal exercises or purports to exercise
2 jurisdiction with respect to a covered person or the official conduct of a covered person, the
3 Attorney General shall, unless and to the extent that the Attorney General determines it is clearly
4 contrary to the interests of the United States—

5 (1) provide legal representation to the covered person through attorneys and other
6 qualified individuals engaged by contract or otherwise;

7 (2) pay the fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with such
8 representation; and

9 (3) pay other expenses incurred by or in relation to the covered person with
10 respect to the activities of the non-United States tribunal, including, but not limited to,
11 lodging, subsistence, court costs, bail, and indemnification for monetary judgments, fines
12 or penalties.

13 (b) REIMBURSEMENT.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), no covered person shall be liable to
14 the United States for the amount of any payment made under subsection (a).

15 (2) The Attorney General may, when he determines it is in the interests of justice,
16 institute a civil action against a covered person in any district court of the United States to
17 recover for the United States the amount of a bail payment forfeited due to conduct of the
18 covered person.

19 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

20 (1) The term "covered person" means—

September 5, 2003 FY04-326_Sept5

1 (A) a member of the United States armed forces;

2 (B) a person accompanying the United States armed forces;

3 (C) an officer or employee of the United States other than a person
4 described in subparagraphs (A) or (B);

5 (D) a person acting under the authority of the United States on behalf of
6 the United States other than a person described in subparagraphs (A), (B) or (C);
7 and

8 (E) a person who, at the time of the events in relation to which the exercise
9 or purported exercise of jurisdiction arises, was a person described in
10 subparagraphs (A), (B), (C) or (D);

11 (2) The term "exercises or purports to exercise jurisdiction" includes, but is not
12 limited to, action to—

13 (A) seize, arrest, extradite, detain, investigate, prosecute, try, or punish for
14 an alleged crime;

15 (B) institute proceedings from which non-criminal liability, such as
16 monetary damages, may be imposed; or

17 (C) seek or obtain evidence or information in relation to matters described
18 in subparagraphs (A) or (B); and

19 (3) The term "non-United States tribunal" means—

20 (A) an administrative tribunal or administrative agency of a foreign
21 country or an international organization;

September 5, 2003 FY04-326_Sept5

11-L-0559/OSD/16402

1 (B) a court or other judicial tribunal of any foreign nation or international
2 organization; or

3 (C) an international tribunal.

4 (d) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to—

5 (A) authorize the exercise of jurisdiction by a non-United States tribunal with
6 respect to the United States, any department, agency, entity, officer, employee or agent
7 thereof, or any other organization or person, including any covered person;

8 (B) recognize, condone, or approve the exercise of jurisdiction by, or cooperation
9 with, a non-United States tribunal;

10 (C) waive or abridge any immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
11 Relations, the law of nations, or the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States;

12 (D) supersede or otherwise affect the American Servicemembers' Protection Act
13 of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.), sections 705 and 706 of the Consolidated
14 Appropriations Act, 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7401 and 7402), section 2001 of the Revised
15 Statutes (22 U.S.C. 1732), or section 1037 of title 10, United States Code;

16 (E) supersede the obligations of the United States under any treaty or international
17 agreement in force on the date of enactment of this section; or

18 (F) limit or otherwise affect the constitutional authority of the President to protect
19 Americans abroad.

20 (2) The authority granted to the Attorney General by this section is in addition to any
21 other authority available by law.

September 5, 2003 FY04-326_Sep15

11-L-0559/OSD/16403

1 (e) IMPLEMENTATION.—(1) The Attorney General shall issue such regulations as he
2 deems necessary in the implementation of this section.

3 (2) Functions vested in the Attorney General by this section—

4 (A) are vested in the Attorney General's discretion; and

5 (B) shall be deemed to be foreign affairs functions for purposes of section
6 553(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code.

Section-by-Section Analysis

This proposal would ensure that all present and former U.S. Government officials, regardless of agency or department of origin, receive legal support, including representation and payment of related expenses, in the event they become subject to foreign judicial tribunals and administrative agencies. This new authority would extend to existing cases pending in the court system of Belgium, the International Criminal Court, and any other foreign judicial tribunal and administrative agency.

Existing law consists of separate statutes that authorize legal support for all Department of Defense personnel (section 1037 of title 10, United States Code), as well as U.S. Government employees who become the subject of legal action before the International Criminal Court (section 7427 of title 22, United States Code). The shortcomings of existing law may include a lack of coverage in certain circumstances for some non-Department of Defense employees and some former U.S. Government employees. Further shortcomings also may involve a potential lack of coverage extending to legal support costs that may arise prior to the official filing of a case, such as legal representation and expenses relating to official interrogatories, as well as a lack of authority to ensure indemnification for post-judgment fines or other levies.

Rather than attempt to correct every existing shortcoming through a mangled patchwork of new, separate statutes, this proposal would provide a single, comprehensive remedy that would ensure all present and former U.S. Government officials receive equivalent, appropriate legal support should they become subject to foreign judicial tribunals and administrative agencies.

While this proposal would ensure appropriate legal support, it would not authorize across-the-board immunity for U.S. officials. The purpose of this proposal is to provide uniform, comprehensive legal support for both civil and criminal proceedings, including pretrial and post-judgment expenses.

September 5, 2003 FY04-326_Sept5

11-L-0559/OSD/16404

5/16
2. 1800

Snowflake



15/30
EF-517
Binder

ISA -

May 5, 2003 1:37 PM

Australia

Jaymie Durnan
5/29

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Thank the Aussies,

SECRET
MAY 24 2003

Your shop ought to draft a thank you note from me to the Aussies for their help in Iraq, since they are now taking their SOF out I believe.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-40

.....

Please respond by 5/9/03

5/30
FEITH RESPONSE ATTACHED

V/R

U16658 /03

SHAY03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 13 2003

The Honorable Robert Hill
Minister of Defense
Parliament House
Canberra, ACT 2600
Australia

Dear Senator Hill:

Thank you for arranging to meet with me in the Middle East. It was helpful to have the opportunity to discuss our efforts and those of the Coalition.

We have achieved a good deal in Iraq, and Australian forces were a critical element of that success. Australia has been a steadfast ally, and your offers of contributions to post-conflict efforts are greatly appreciated. We will continue to work closely with you to restore peace and stability in Iraq.

We will be working to sort out the question you raised in the period immediately ahead.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Rumsfeld", written over a horizontal line.

U07258-03

11-L-0559/OSD/16406



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 19 2003

Australia

The Honorable John Howard
Prime Minister
Australia

Dear Prime Minister Howard:

As Australian troops prepare to return home, I extend my thanks for their contributions toward the liberation of the Iraqi people.

Together we have achieved a great deal. I appreciate your commitment to helping restore security in postwar Iraq. Australian forces were an important element in removing Saddam from power. We look forward to continuing to work closely with you to restore peace and stability in the region.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



19 May 03

U07466 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16407

May 5, 2003 12:40 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
CC: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reuben Jeffrey

Reuben Jeffrey is my neighbor. He is going to Iraq sometime. Why don't I have him over to the office, visit with him and see what he is going to do.

You can reach him in the White House switchboard.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-29

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 6 2003

*He is
meeting with
Herbits 5/6
We are looking
@ bringing him into
DoD. He is interested.*

*1/2
Jaymie*

U16665 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16408

006.7105D

542103

May 5, 2003 4:57 PM

OB
5/20

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Intelligence Finds in Iraq

IRAQ

I just got a call from George Tenet. He said the White House keeps asking him about the mobile biological lab. He feels there is no real order, structure, or "belly button" out there.

We have so many people involved looking at so many sites, and they are basically teams of people who are not the top experts. With the dozens of people looking and military people finding things, I think we need a top-level cell, so that when someone finds something that might be important, like the mobile lab, the top-level cell takes it over.

I suppose it is a CENTCOM-J2 function, but DIA is involved. I told George that, since he is DCI and prepared the Powell UN presentation, he ultimately ought to be deeply involved in the good ones, the ones that might nail the case.

I said I would get with you, and you would get with Jacoby and CENTCOM and get an understanding of how it is now working and then develop procedures, so when something that might be big is found we can immediately put the top team in on top of it.

George said he didn't have a good fix on document exploitation, which may be under-resourced. DIA is in charge of that, as he understands it.

U16667 /03

SMAY03

He talked about high-value target interrogation, and he said he didn't quite know how that was going, what the priorities are, etc. He wonders if maybe we both ought to send some senior people out there and see that somebody is in charge of the entire process. I agree we ought to have a very senior person out there to grab a hold of this whole thing, put structure into it, and see that it goes the way we want. In addition, if that happens, I would think that as we find something that looks good, George ought to have his folks get deeply involved, because he is the one who has to answer the questions from the President and Condi, and make the case.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-2

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

May 7, 2003 4:21 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PC Tomorrow

Done

334 NSC

I am told there is a PC on Thursday, tomorrow, at 2:05 on the Iraqi Interim Authority. Who is going to be doing that?

Thanks.

→ The Deputy

DHR:dh
050703-4

.....

Please respond by _____

U16668 /03

7 MAY 03

sent 6/9
June 6, 2003

Powell Moore

Afghanistan

TO: Marin Strmecki
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Dana Rohrabacher

Larry Di Pina
7/8

You might want to meet with Congressman Dana Rohrabacher and walk him through what you are thinking and see his thoughts. He has a lot of knowledge about Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060603-26

Please respond by 6/20/03

RESPONSE ATTACHED

7/11

V/R

9 Jun 03

06-10-03 08:52 PM

I-008120 ISA/AP
 SET 6/11
 June 9, 2003 Action

TO: Doug Feith
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Australia Ministerial

Colin Powell said that the Aussies are unhappy with us because we have not set a date for the Aussie meeting. Is that true?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 060903-8

Please respond by 6/11/03

6/17

USDP/-
 There has been discussion
 subsequent to the note.
 I assume you are checking
 to see about another venue
 (Guam, Hawaii) in context of
 Sec Def's Asia trip, and
 whether that would work for Sec State
 Overall, only one Asia trip for Sec Def
 is the goal.

Larry Di Rita

13
800
P?

cc: Sarah N (done 5/14 SC)

May 12, 2003 2:36 PM

IRAP

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts

ADVANCE
COPY SENT

Here is this memo from Dov Zakheim. Would you please process it through Doug Feith, so he can make sure it makes sense to Bremer, then through the General Counsel and Paul Wolfowitz. Then please get it to me for signature.

See if you can pull that off in one week.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/2/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts [U06713/03]

DHR:dh
051203-12

.....
Please respond by 5/19/03

(done 5/14 SC)
TO: RYAN Henry
Please get
back to me
Thanks,
Jaymie

12MAY03

5/12/03

May 12, 2003 2:36 PM

ADVANCE
COPY SENT

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts

Here is this memo from Dov Zakheim. Would you please process it through Doug Feith, so he can make sure it makes sense to Bremer, then through the General Counsel and Paul Wolfowitz. Then please get it to me for signature.

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Thanks.

Attach.

5/2/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts [U06713/03]

DHR:dh
051203-12

.....
Please respond by 5/19/03

Dov/Larry Langlois
Have you cleared w/
Bremer. Larry has
the memo.
Thanks,

CC: Sarah Nagelmann
11-L-0559/OSD/16415
Jaymie Durnan
5/21

May 12, 2003 2:36 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT*

Here is this memo from Dov Zakheim. Would you please process it through Doug Feith, so he can make sure it makes sense to Bremer, then through the General Counsel and Paul Wolfowitz. Then please get it to me for signature.

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Thanks.

Attach.

5/2/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts [U06713/03]

DHR:dh
051203-12

.....

Please respond by 5/19/03



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



ACTION MEMO

May 2, 2003 4:00PM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 12 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts

- Background: There are two significant and parallel actions ongoing to ensure that Iraq Reconstruction and Humanitarian Relief contracts are reasonably priced. The first, Extension of the "Oil-for-Food" Program, is the primary focus of this memo. The second -- audit evaluation of U.S. contractor reconstruction support -- is being separately managed by the Director, DCAA, to include timely and complete support of the many ongoing contractual activities by U.S. Government organizations. This includes the U.S. Army, the Corps of Engineers, and the Agency for International Development. At my request, DCAA is presently developing an audit universe that will summarize workload for all of its customers. It will include a complete listing of all audit requests, planned audit requests, and a related audit plan. I have authorized the establishment of a formal DCAA audit office in Iraq, which is currently under consideration by DCAA.
- Extension of the Oil-for-Food Program: After consultation with OSD Policy and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), I recommend that the team of Defense and State Department auditors include DCAA and DCMA representatives, and that the team leader for the cost evaluation portion of this effort be a DCMA senior official. I have the full commitment and support of the Directors of DCAA and DCMA to staff this evaluation with exceptional DCAA auditors (CPAs) and DCMA contract administrators. DCMA and DCAA will perform financial cost analysis to the maximum extent possible, given the support that is provided by the project bidder and the United Nations representatives. Initial coordination by OSD Policy representatives indicates that the basis for these cost estimates may be limited, and in many cases inadequate.

DCAA auditors, in concert with DCMA contract administrators, will timely evaluate contracts previously awarded by the United Nations, and identify any potential issues related to contract overpricing and inadequate contract cost estimate support. Inadequate cost estimate support on potential projects and contracts is the single most significant cost risk for contract overpricing on this program. I recommend that assistance from the Secretary General and his designee be sought when high risk contracts are identified by the audit team, and



11-L-0559/OSD/16417

U06713 /03

that the United Nations designees and those organizations submitting the contract cost data be asked to provide a specific and supportable basis for their estimates. Failing that support, I do not believe that the U.S. Government will have a valid basis to state that contracts (already approved or potential contract awards) are reasonably priced or supported.

- Accordingly, I recommend that both Defense and State Department officials develop an advance understanding with the United Nations that sufficient cost support will be required, and failing that support, any future contract awards or outstanding contract requests will not be approved. In addition, I recommend that Defense and State Department officials, through assistance of the United Nations Secretary General, seek voluntary refunds for those cases where contracts have been awarded and payments made, and contract overpricing is apparent. This policy is essential to assure the Iraqi people and the world community that all reconstruction and humanitarian assistance projects are fairly priced, and that organizations and individuals do not receive inappropriate windfall profits.
- **RECOMMENDATION:** That you approve the DoD audit process outlined above with DCMA designated as team leader with full DCAA support. Also, that OSD Policy and State Department representatives establish a policy in their working agreements/arrangements with UN officials, that adequate audit support, where a need is documented and presented to the UN by the audit team, is required.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ OTHER _____

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Michael J. Thibault, DCAA, Deputy Director, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DIR/NAI	5/8
SR MA CRADDOCK	C.518
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC	Cox 5/8

11-L-0559/OSD/16418

Rush to
✓

12
May 8, 2003 8:00 AM

TO: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UK Envoy to Iraq

Geoff Hoon, the MoD of the UK, tells me that Prime Minister Blair has dispatched an envoy to Iraq named John Sawyers, who speaks fluent Arabic. It sounds to me like he could be a help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050903-9

.....

Please respond by _____

May 12, 2003 7:53 AM

DB
6/13

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Paper on Afghanistan

I think we need a paper on Afghanistan like the one we just did for Iraq as to what our policy is. It doesn't exist. Let's do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050903-7

— Send it to ABeS
+ let him take a
First cut.

Please respond by 5/23/03

U16672 /03

12 MAY 03

May ¹² 8, 2003 11:19 AM

IRAQ

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Saddam Dinar

We ought to think through how we get rid of the Saddam dinar.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050903-27

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

12MAY03

U16673 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16421

May 16, 2003 6:59 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Tapes

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT
VIA E-MAIL*

060

We are not going to be showing the New Trier High School group any tapes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051603-1

.....

Please respond by _____

U16674 103

11-L-0559/OSD/16422

16MAY03

11:51 AM

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 17, 2003
SUBJECT: **Policy Board**

What do you think about Larry Welch as Chairman of the Policy Board? He is very, very good, but maybe not on the policy side. He sure knows how to run a meeting and get work done fast.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051703.05

Please respond by: _____

5 | 30 | 03

U16676 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16423

334

17MAY03

11:44 AM

08
6/2

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 17, 2003

SUBJECT:

One of the things Bremer did say is he really feels a shortage of economic competence and doesn't feel that we have it in the Policy shop and I agreed. I said I think we've got to use Treasury people.

Put together an economic backup cell of Treasury and Policy people so that we make sure that Bremer's got economic support.

ITag

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051703.04

Please respond by: 5/30/03

17 May 03

U16677 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16424

1:19 PM

TO: Gen. Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 17, 2003
SUBJECT: **Calendar**

I need a 20-30 minute meeting with Dick Myers some times next week to talk to him about the OSD Joint Staff linkages.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051703.09

Please respond by: 5/23/03

U16678 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16425

000.715D

17MAY03

11:52 AM

TO: Les Brownlee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 17, 2003

SUBJECT:

I do want to see a proposal from you folks about how you are going to get continuity in the leadership for the future combat system; not 18 months or even three years, but longer.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051703.06

Please respond by: _____

5/30/03

3810

17 May 03

U16679 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16426

5/20
1330 Snowflake

ER-5353 05 6/2

May 19, 2003 10:02 AM

cc ISP

Lammie Duman

Doug Feith

5/23 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Article 98 Agreements

Don't you think we ought to think about publicizing the number of countries that have given us Article 98 agreements, so we can start letting other countries know they are not on the list?

015

Why don't you talk to Torie and figure out a political way to do this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-10

MAY 20 2003

Please respond by 5/30/03

Note typed 5/20
up see attached
Lumen

Send Def -

I am been working closely with Bolton. We want to hit 40 (we are at 36 now) and then go back to weak EU countries and show them the progress we are making. Our hope is to pick one off.

We need to publicize, but would like to wait until early summer when we think we will break 40. If we don't we will go public then anyway.

05-20-03 05:13 1P

11-L-0559/OSD/16427 U16680 103

J.D

5/20/2003

SecDef:

I have been working closely with Bolton. We want to hit 40 (we are at 36 now) and then go back to weak EU countries and show them the progress we are making. Our hope is to pick one off. We need to publicize, but would like to wait until early summer when we think we will break 40. If we don't, we will go public with them anyway.

JD

#18 Snowflake.

EF- 4793
CS/S

April 7, 2003 7:39 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ICC Countries

Jaymie Durnan
4/21

Please give me a list of countries that have signed the ICC Article 98.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040703-2

.....
Please respond by 4/11/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN
MAY 19 2003

4/B
RESPONSE ATTACHED
N/R

11-L-0559/OSD/16429

04-08-03 13:38 IN



Agreements Concluded To Date

28 Total Article 98 Agreements (as of 8 APR 03)

- Romania (8/1/02)
- Israel (8/2/02)
- East Timor (8/23/02)
- Tajikistan (8/27/02)
- Marshall Islands (9/10/02)
- Palau (9/13/02)
- Dominican Republic (9/16/02)
- Mauritania (9/17/02)
- Uzbekistan (9/18/02)*
- Honduras (9/19/02)
- Afghanistan (9/20/02)
- Micronesia (9/24/02)
- Gambia (10/5/02)
- El Salvador (10/25/02)
- Sri Lanka (11/22/02)
- India (12/26/02)
- Nepal (12/31/02)
- Tuvalu (1/9/03)*
- Djibouti (1/24/03)
- Bahrain (2/6/03)
- Georgia (2/10/03)
- Azerbaijan (2/26/03)
- Nauru (2/26/03)
- Rwanda (3/5/03)
- Egypt (3/5/03)*
- Dem. Rep. of Congo (3/19/03)
- Tonga (3/21/03)
- Sierra Leone (3/31/03)

* Agreement has entered into force

5/20 Snowflake
1330

May 19, 2003 2:22 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
Col. Bucci

CC: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Round Table Schedule

ADVANCE COPY SENT

I will need a 45-minute Round Table Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday until we get worked off through this stack.

Thanks.

Done
Jaymie Durnan
9/22

337

DHR:dh
051903-40

.....
Please respond by 5/20/03

U16681 /03

19 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16431

5/20
1130
Snowflake

C 5/23

May 19, 2003 2:07 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
Ray DuBois

Jaymie Durnan
5/22
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Award for Garner

Please make sure you get the highest civilian award, a distinguished service medal,
prepared for Jay Garner.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-37

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

RECEIVED HAS SENT
MAY 24 2003

SD:
will have the award
ready upon Jay's return
It is the Defense
Distinguished Public Service
Award

2003 6 SD 0834

19 May 03

U16682 103

11-L-0559/OSD/16432

Jaymie Durnan
5/22

5/28

May 19, 2003 2:10 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pre-brief for SLRG

In the future, I want a pre-brief before I have a SLRG, and I want time to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-38

.....
Please respond by _____

U16683 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16433

334

19 May 03

4/20
1330 Snowflake

May 19, 2003 2:12 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Call w/Margaret Tutwiler

ADVANCE COPY SENT

I would like a phone call with Margaret Tutwiler sometime today or tomorrow, probably on a secure line. She is back in Morocco.

Thanks.

Dane

Jaymie Durnan

9/22

DHR:dh
051903-39

311.3

.....

Please respond by _____

U16685 /03

19 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16434

5/20
1330 Snowflake

May 19, 2003 2:24 PM

Advance Copy Sent

TO: Jaymie Durnan
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Phone Calls

020 SD

Please put down on my calendar that I would like to call President Ford sometime this week—Tuesday or Wednesday preferably. Also block out some time so I can make these five Congressional calls.

Thanks.

Dune

Jaymie Durnan

5/22

DHR:dh
051903-41

.....
Please respond by 5/21/03

19 May 03

U16686 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16435

May 19, 2003 2:54 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Leaks

380.015

I want to do something on leaks. Here are the two papers. There is an awful lot in here that I agree with.

Please get Gen. Myers, Gen. Pace, Steve Cambone, Jim Haynes, Torie Clarke, and Doug Feith, and get a coordinated recommendation to me sometime in the next week and a half, so we can move ahead.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/9/02 Haynes response to SecDef memo or 7/4/02
4/29/02 Draft recommendations of task force

DHR:dh
051903-43

Please respond by

5/30/03
6/05/03

Jim Haynes
Please lead this

Jaymie
Jaymie Durnan

done 5/27
CC: VCJCS
Steve Cambone
Torie Clarke
Doug Feith

19 MAY 03

U16687 /03



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

October 9, 2002, 5:00 P.M.

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information (Leaks)

- At your suggestion, I have sought the advice of the "Sages" on the persistent problem of leaks. While all appreciated the extent and seriousness of the problem, not surprisingly, none offered any magic solutions. Only a few had any suggestions. Four did.
 - Their proposals included: increased use of polygraphs, barring from the Pentagon any journalist who publishes classified information, requiring a certification from "top officials" that they did not leak and outreach by you to media editors, publishers and owners.
 - See attached matrix.
- The recent Department of Justice study and report on leaks did not plow any new ground, despite a lengthy and exhaustive effort.
- The problem is clearly one of longstanding and is likely intractable.
- Some measures could be pursued both for their deterrent effect and possible help in identifying the leakers.
 - Increased use of polygraphs predicated either upon consent as a condition of access to TOP SECRET, SCI, or SAR material or upon some level of suspicion.
 - Requirement that those with access to such information regularly execute a sworn attestation that they have not engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified information during the relevant period.

COORDINATION: None



11-L-0559/OSD/16437

Bill Coleman

- 7.
- Conduct a study of all possible issues.
 - Require polygraphs as a condition of employment. *ipoc*
 - Bar from the Pentagon any member of the press who has published classified information. *July. (✓)*
 - Require "top people" to certify periodically in writing that they have not leaked classified information. *(✓)*
 - Impose the same requirement on Congressional staff (and members) as are being imposed on DoD employees.
 - Consider temporary constitutional amendment to avoid 1st Amendment issues. *no*
 - Make people realize that leaking is a crime. *(✓) How*
 - Emphasize the seriousness of the media dimension of the problem by having SecDef deliver a speech to media leadership/owners.

*Silly
They'll
handle
it*

Marty Hoffman

- Live with leaks, recognizing that they are a symptom of poor morale, a culture that lacks accountability, and a reflection of the steady erosion of civilian control of the military.
- Set a trap by creating alternate versions of a single document. *(✓)*
- Be cautious about creating martyrs of, and a constituency supporting, people who oppose DoD because of aggressive rooting out of leakers.

Lloyd Cutler

- Disclaim any intention to prosecute journalists.
- Pick an egregious case and vigorously pursue criminally, after SecDef or POTUS fires individual.

Griffin Bell

- Leak only true information.
- Discipline those who leak deceptive information.

C 10/15

July 4, 2002 12:49 PM

TO: Jim Haynes

Larry Di Rita
10/15

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Leaks

Why don't we pull together some of those gurus we have and see if we can figure out a way to stop leaks in the Pentagon and elsewhere in the government that violate national security.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070402.8

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

10/15

HAYNES' RESPONSE
ATTACHED.

A 6 Sept

DRAFT--April 29, 2002 (9:49AM)

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the work of the task force, the following recommendations for protecting against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the media are offered:

- 1 ♦ Agencies that originate and handle classified information should undertake immediate and aggressive investigations of any and all leaks of classified information.
- 2 ♦ Agencies should, however, continue to report these crimes to the Department of Justice under established reporting requirements, but should not delay their investigations pending the Department's prosecutorial decision on the matter.
- 3 ♦ Agencies should use all available and appropriate investigative techniques and tools to determine who might have been responsible for the leak.
- 4 ♦ Agencies should consult with the FBI for investigatory guidance, but the FBI will not--at this stage of the investigation--be the lead investigative agency.
- 5 ♦ Upon identification of the person who leaked the classified information is made, the agency victimized by the leak should refer the matter to the Department for a prosecutive decision.
- 6 ♦ The Department of Justice should prosecute all cases where the evidence and circumstances warrant.
- 7 ♦ No new criminal provision should be proposed until administrative processes can establish the identify of the leaker.
- 8 ♦ The Department of Justice should vigorously pursue civil enforcement actions against identified leakers who have violated their contractual obligations with the government.
- 9 ♦ The non-disclosure agreements that all personnel who are granted access to classified information should be amended to include a provision that sets out liquidated damages for any breach of the agreement, and to require that the employee upon request during the course of a leak investigation execute a certification under oath or affirmation that he or she has not engaged in an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.


DRAFT--April 29, 2002 (9:49AM)

- 10 ♦ A comprehensive, coordinated, government-wide, well-resourced, and sustained program must be developed to reemphasize the need for government secrecy, the substantial harm caused as a result of media leaks, and the personal consequences for those leakers that are caught.
- A ♦ This program should emphasize one's personal accountability for the protection of classified information.
- B ♦ This program should reemphasize the principle of "need-to-know" with respect to the dissemination of classified information.
- C ♦ This program should use all available methodologies for increasing information security awareness, including through emails, regularized and non-adversarial defensive briefings of all levels of government service, Internet postings, and through more routine security awareness posters.
- 11 ♦ Agency and department heads should review their legal authorities and associated administrative processes to determine their adequacy to effectively and quickly determine the appropriate sanction to be imposed upon someone determined to have engaged in an unauthorized disclosure to the media.
- 12 ♦ Pursuant to the DCI's statutory obligation to protect sources and methods, and his responsibilities under the applicable executive orders to provide guidance on the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods, a well-resourced office should be established within the Community Management Staff that would:
- A ♦ develop a comprehensive Intelligence Community information security program;
- B ♦ provide analytical support to security investigators;
- C ♦ use cross-agency resources to develop a relational database on leaks;
- D ♦ coordinate leaks investigations across agencies;
- E ♦ ensure consistent application of security rules and procedures; and
- F ♦ recommend technological applications for information systems that handled classified intelligence information.

DRAFT--April 29, 2002 (9:49AM)

- 13 ♦ Agency and department heads whose organizations originate, disseminate, and handle classified information should clarify for their employees their organization's media contact policies and emphasize strict adherence thereto.
- 14 ♦ Technological enhancements to the protection of classified government information on Intelink must be implemented.
- A ♦ Dynamic Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology, and other like security software applications, should receive significant study to determine their particular efficacy in the cross-agency classified environment.
 - B ♦ Such enhancements should include a more agile and flexible auditing capability to provide leaks investigators with information about specific sites, the duration of visits, the documents viewed by particular users, and whether copies of documents were produced.
 - C ♦ Software applications must be developed and implemented that can limit access to defined areas of Intelink.

May 19, 2003 6:07 PM

TO: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Briefings for Codels

337

You might want to have Phil Carroll brief Congressmen or Senators when they are out there. He seems to do a pretty good job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-50

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

19 May 03

U16688 /03

5/24/03

File

May 19, 2003 2:02 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Terrorist Attacks

See
Please
attached.
been
and
You've
consistent
direct for some
time.
TC

000.5

The President asked me to make sure we caution on the potential for future terrorist attacks in the US. Some critics are suggesting that each time there is a terrorist attack, they get to say, "I told you so."

We need to demonstrate the truth, namely that all elements of national power are continuously being brought to bear on this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-34

05/23/03

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

GR
ask me about
a research project
on this front
TC

U16689 /03

19 MAY 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16444

May 23, 2003

**INFORMATION MEMORANDUM: Secretary Rumsfeld on the Public Record
Warning of Attacks Against the United States**

This memorandum provides a record of numerous times the Secretary has warned or implied that terrorists will try to attack our territory. As shown below, it is a theme he often mentions in public statements, as the topic arises.

May 21, 2003, Press Stakeout On Capitol Hill

(Response to a question about the heightened terrorism alert level) "And given the fact that there's a great advantage to a terrorist to attack, and it's very difficult to defend, there's a couple of truths that flow from that reality; that it's not possible to defend at every place, at every moment, against every conceivable type of technique. What's it mean? It means that we have to do exactly what President Bush has said. We have to go find the terrorists where they are, we have to deal with states that harbor terrorists, and we have to do our level best to stop the pervasive proliferation of these very, very lethal technologies. The second thing we have to do is we have to take reasonable precautions. And it is appropriate, when the intelligence information suggests that there is reason to believe that there might be some sort of an attack -- and **we have to accept the fact that there will be additional attacks**; there's a lot of al Qaeda and other terrorists that exist in the world, that are out there, including in this country -- we have to take reasonable precautions, and we do.

May 15, 2003, News Briefing with General Myers

Question: "Are you concerned, either of you, concerned that perhaps the U.S. forces that remain there (Note: in Saudi Arabia) might be in some danger because of this perception that perhaps the Saudis aren't doing enough to prevent this?"

Rumsfeld: "Look. Force protection levels change in country to country all over the world all the time. U.S. forces are in danger from terrorists just as people in the United States are in danger from terrorists from time to time. So, no. The answer is no."

May 4, 2003, Media Stakeout after Fox News Sunday Interview

(part of a response to a question about the questioning of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay) ... "What do these people know that we can get from them by way of or through interrogations **so that we can in fact stop future terrorist attacks?**"

May 2, 2003, Joint Media Availability with UK's Defense Minister Hoon

Question: ... "How do you move on from here? Is there anywhere else that is next on your list in the international war against terrorism? I'm thinking perhaps Syria or other places?"

Rumsfeld: "... the global war on terrorism is a serious battle that the free people of the world have to face. And there is no question but that there are terrorist networks. And I must say that I feel that the -- I've forgotten how many countries it is now that are participating in the global war on terrorism, but the sharing of intelligence and the pressure that has been put on terrorism networks has been increasingly successful. **That does not mean there won't be additional terrorist attacks. I'm afraid that the reality is there could very well be.** But the number of terrorist -- al Qaeda terrorist planners, for example, that have been scooped up in recent months is growing, and it's making it more difficult -- they're having more difficulty raising money. They're having more difficulty moving between countries. They're having more difficulty attracting and retaining terrorists. So I think that the task for free people is to keep working the problem, and that clearly is what's in front of us."

April 24, 2003, Interview with the Associated Press

Question: "On Afghanistan, what do you see as the, hurting the al Qaeda? It would appear that there's have been a major accomplishment in weakening the al Qaeda? What's your assessment?"

Rumsfeld: "Oh goodness. I don't know that I'm the best one to assess it, but there's no question but that the intelligence community broadly feels that al Qaeda has been significantly weakened, the absence of Afghanistan as a training area, the pressure that the Pakistan government is putting on the al Qaeda in Pakistan. ... **Now does that mean that the threat's gone away? No, does it mean that we've seen the end of terrorist attacks? No, we'll see more but a lot of good progress has been made.**"

March 4, 2003, U.S. Association of Former Members of Congress Statesmanship Dinner

"It should not come as a surprise to anybody that there is a debate and discussion here in the United States and around the world about this new security environment that we're in. No one -- no one rational person wants war, but that's not the choice before us today. **The choice before us is whether we can act now to stop another attack, or wait until attacked, and then have a war, but at a considerably higher price.**"

February 8, 2003, Address to the Munich Conference on European Security Policy

"It may be difficult for some to fully understand just how fundamentally September 11th transformed our country. **Americans saw the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Towers as a painful and vivid foreshadowing of far more deadly attacks to come.** We looked at the destruction caused by the terrorists, who took jetliners, turned them into missiles, and used them to kill 3,000 innocent men, women and children-and we considered the destruction that could be caused by an adversary armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Instead of 3,000 to be killed, it could be 30,000, 300,000."

January 20, 2003, Reserve Officers Association

Speech excerpt: "Yet, at this moment, terrorist networks and terrorist states are pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons - capabilities that will enable them to kill not simply thousands, but many tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of our people. **Our objective in the global war on terror is to stop them - to prevent additional attacks that would be far worse - before they happen.**"

Question: ... "What integration for medical support, both active and reserve, is going on between homeland security and military action, realizing the terrorists may choose to have their warfront in several different places?"

Rumsfeld: "There's no question but that at any time we have to be aware of the potential for terrorist attacks in this country. Some suggest that in the event force was used in Iraq that we'd have to be still more attentive to that possibility. There are all kinds of discussions that have been taking place between the military and first responders and thinking through ways that we can see that what we do is as efficient and supportive and constructive as is possible."

Nov. 11, 2002, FORTUNE Global Forum

"We have a lot of vulnerability. We have a terrific Army, a terrific Navy, a terrific Air Force, but if one thinks about it, the terrorist networks don't have armies, navies or air forces. What they do is they look for weaknesses. **Clearly a terrorist can attack at any time, any place, using any technique, and it's physically not possible to defend it every time in every place against every technique.**"

Oct. 2, 2002, USJFCOM Chg of Cmnd.

"We cannot, and will not, always know what will happen in the global war against terrorism. **The next attack could come at any time, from any location.** And our assignment is to be ready to deal with the unknown and the unexpected."

Sept. 27, 2002, Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce

"In the wake of September 11th we are all on notice and we ought to register the fact that we are on notice that another attack will be attempted. The only question is when and where and by what technique. It could be weeks or months, it could be a year or several, but they are determined."

Aug. 27, 2002, Town Hall, Pendleton, USMC

"We are tracking al Qaeda and other terrorists all across the globe today. It would make you feel good if you could retaliate against something, if you could find some target to vent against. But there aren't targets like that. They're in caves, they're in tunnels. They're blended in to the communities. **There are al Qaeda in the state of California, I don't doubt for a minute; they're in state after state across this country.** They're in country after country across the globe."

July 2, 2002, Press Briefing

"Ending the threat of terrorism will not be easy. The road ahead will be long and sometimes bumpy. **Deadly attacks may take place again at any time.** Like those Americans who gathered in Philadelphia in 1776 to sign the Declaration of Independence, Americans today are united and ready to make the sacrifice necessary to defend our liberties and the enemy -- from the enemies of freedom."

June 6, 2002, NATO, Belgium

"Today we discussed the way ahead in the War on Terrorism and how the Alliance must further transform to meet the threat facing all of our countries in the 21st century -- the spread of weapons of mass destruction into the hands terrorist states. **This threat is not theoretical; it is real. It is dangerous. If we do not prepare promptly to counter it, we could well experience attacks in our countries that could make the events of September 11 seem modest by comparison.**"

May 21, 2002, Senate Testimony

"As we painfully learned on September 11th, **our adversaries are transforming.** They're watching us. They're studying how we were successfully attacked, who we responded, and **they're looking for ways that we may be vulnerable in the future.** And we stand still at our peril."

Feb. 27, 2002, Interview WISN-ABC, Milwaukee

"**We do have to live with a sense of heightened awareness given the reality that there are some very, very well organized terrorists out there that are determined to kill thousands and thousands of innocent people.**"

Feb. 20, 2002, Address Nellis AFB

"And, interestingly, a year ago, when I was in my confirmation hearings before the United States Senate, not one senator mentioned the word Afghanistan. Not one senator, nor I, mentioned al Qaeda. And here we are.

"If it teaches us anything, it seems to me, it is that we need to recognize that we have to expect the unexpected. **We have to recognize that it is not possible to know every conceivable threat that can be posed against our country,** our friends, our allies and our deployed forces. And we have to recognize the kinds of capabilities that exist and be ready to deal with those capabilities wherever they happen to come from."

Jan. 31, 2002, Address NDU

"As we painfully learned on September 11th, the challenges of a new century are not nearly as predictable as they were during the Cold War. Who would have imagined only a few months ago that terrorists would take commercial airliners, turn them into missiles and use them to strike the Pentagon and the World Trade Towers, killing thousands? But it happened.

“And let there be no doubt, in the years ahead, it is likely that we will be surprised again by new adversaries who may also strike in unexpected ways.

“And as they gain access to weapons of increasing power -- and let there be no doubt but that they are -- these attacks will grow vastly more deadly than those we suffered several months ago.”

Jan. 30, 2002, Press Briefing

“The new budget is designed to strengthen the armed forces for today's global war on terror, and to better prepare the armed forces for the wars that we may have to face in the period ahead. The new budget is designed to help build an armed force that is prepared to contend with surprise -- and let there be no doubt, there will be surprises, undoubtedly somewhat different from September 11th, but surely there will be surprises again.”

Jan. 3, 2002, Press Briefing

“How disrupted are they? I think they're very disrupted. Does that mean that there aren't sleeper cells out there that could be doing something untoward at this very moment? Of course not. There are. We know there are. And we know they planned well ahead. But it has -- it takes them longer and it's harder and more dangerous for them to raise money today than it was three months ago. Their communications three months ago were relatively easy, and they're much more difficult today because there's an awful lot more people attentive to that. Their ability to move freely around the world was much easier three months ago than it is today. The training -- we've disrupted a number -- any number of training camps, and it does take training to become a polished, successful murderer, mass murderer.

“You don't walk out of grade school with that kind of knowledge. You need to practice and be taught by experts. So I don't know if that answers your question to your satisfaction, but that is the best I can do. This is a very serious organization, and it's only one of many.”

Dec. 18, 2001, North Atlantic Council

“In the wake of September 11th, we face two, equally important challenges: First, to prosecute the war on terrorism to its full and successful conclusion, pressing on until terrorists with global reach have been stopped. **And second, to prepare now for next war—a war which could be very different from the war on terrorism we fight today...** The threats to freedom did not disappear with the end of the Cold War—rather, they have merely taken new forms. And I suppose they will do so again the in the decades ahead.”

Nov. 21, 2001, Address Fort Bragg-Pope AFB

“This is a very serious problem that our country faces where 4,000 Americans were killed by terrorist attack, and there are threats of additional terrorist attacks coming in every day. And what we need to do is recognize that you cannot defend

against terrorists. You simply must go after them. You have to find them where they are and root them out and stop them. And given the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, we're talking not about 3,000, 4,000, 5,000 human beings; we're talking about tens of thousands or potentially hundreds of thousands of human beings at risk because of access to weapons of mass destruction. We have no choice, and we intend to find them. And by golly, the folks here deserve a lot of the credit for the success we've had so far."

Nov. 16, 2001, Address Naval Training Center, Great Lakes

"As each person here knows, a shadowy enemy attacked our country. Just last Wednesday, I visited the World Trade Center, where thousands of innocent people were killed, many still lost in the rubble, the smoke still smoldering as they move the debris. **And then we all know that new attacks could come at any time.**"

June 7, 2001, Address to North Atlantic Council

"[N]one of us here has a crystal ball through which we can clearly see the future. While it is difficult to know precisely who will threaten us or where or when in the coming decades, it is less difficult to anticipate how we will be threatened. Terrorism: We know, for example, that as an Alliance of democracies, our open borders and open societies make it easy and inviting for terrorists to strike at our people where they live, work and play.

"Cyber-attack: Our dependence on computer-based information networks make those networks attractive targets for new forms of cyber-attack.

"High-tech Weapons: The ease with which potential adversaries can acquire advanced conventional weapons (high-energy explosives, very fast torpedoes, surface-to-air missiles, sea mines, quiet diesel subs) will present us with new challenges in conventional war and force projection.

"Ballistic and Cruise Missiles and WMD: Our lack of defenses against ballistic missiles creates incentives for missile proliferation which, combined with the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, give future adversaries the ability to hold our populations hostage to terror and blackmail.

"Because of the speed of technological change, and with the increasing power and reach of weapons today, we must prepare to meet these threats before they fully emerge."

June 1, 2001, CNN Interview.

"... asymmetrical threats transcend geography; and the parallel revolutions of miniaturization, information, biotechnology, robotics, nano-technology and high-density energy sources are putting unprecedented power in the hands of small

countries and even terrorist groups and non-nation entities. And it foreshadows changes beyond any ability to forecast."

May 24, 2001, NY Times Interview

"You never know. That's a very tough call. We are doing a lot in the government of the United States with respect to terrorism, and with good reason. **We know of certain knowledge that there are any number of people who train people to engage in terrorist acts, who fund them to go out around and to attack various Western countries including the United States. We've experienced it here, in New York, and other places. So it merits attention.** So does ballistic missile defense, so does cruise missiles defense, information warfare. There are any number of things that we need to address.

May 18, 2001, Armed Forces Day

"[T]he threats of the Cold War are behind us, but the new threats of the 21st Century are there, but still not yet fully understood. **The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them pose new challenges: terrorism, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, cyber-attacks.** I suspect that future generations will look back at this time and judge that it was a time of transition--transition from the old, familiar, well-understood threats to new challenges from sources much less understood. "We may not know precisely who our adversaries may be or precisely what challenges they will pose, but we do know that challenges to freedom are unending. Your task is to defend your nation against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen and the unexpected. You're building the Armed Forces for the 21st Century that must deter and defend and prevail against the threats of this new era so that we, by our vigilance, can extend the peace well into this new century."

Feb. 11, 2001, Fox News Sunday

"It is a very serious problem. And if one thinks of all of the so-called asymmetrical threats -- the kinds of things people would do, or threaten doing, rather than to try to contest Western armies, navies and air forces, which doesn't work, obviously. The Gulf War proved that... Terrorism, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, cyberwarfare, information warfare. These are all things that are cheaper than land wars, and where the technologies are currently available. And **the United States has to recognize those emerging threats, and see that we're arranged so that we are not subject to nuclear or terrorist blackmail.**"

Feb. 2, 2001, En route Media Availability

"It is expensive and you would probably lose, which suggests that because of the proliferation that is taking place, and their interest in things other than armies, navies and air forces, and cheaper and easier ways to do things, that people look for so-called asymmetrical responses to dissuade people from attempting to have them not do what

they would like to do in their neighborhoods to their neighbors. Obviously, those things include all across the spectrum from terrorism through cyber attacks to information warfare to cruise missiles to short-range ballistic missiles to longer range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Now, those are the kinds of things that are increasingly attractive to various nations of the world. We know from watching them that they are taking steps to not just be interested in them, but to develop those capabilities.”

May 19, 2003 12:46 PM

OB
6/2

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TO: Doug Feith
CC: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Terrorism and the Nation State

Attached is a very good paper by George Shultz on "Terrorism and the Nation State." I would like you to take a look at it and see if we can get some of those thoughts cranked into our activities.

Marc, it is a very interesting paper. I think we ought to factor some of those thoughts into our remarks.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/13/01 Shultz paper, "Terrorism and the Nation State"

DHR:dh
051903-31

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

19MAY03

U16690 103

11-L-0559/OSD/16453

Terrorism and the Nation State**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

MAY 19 2003

We have declared war on terrorists AND the states that harbor them. No place to hide. This idea underlines the importance of the sovereign nation state, an entity with the capacity to govern and therefore to be responsible for what takes place within its borders. And this emphasis on the sovereign state dramatizes a shift of concept in international relations by my administration.

The war to hold terrorists accountable for their evil acts and to hold states accountable for acts of terror that originate within their borders, compels us to look closely at the foundation of order and progress in the world.

We live in an international system of states, a system that originated over three hundred years ago. The idea of the state won out over other ideas about how to organize political life because the state gave people a sense of identity, because it provided a framework for individual freedom and economic progress, and because states over time proved able to cooperate with each other for peace and mutual benefit.

The state has made its way in the world by beating back one challenge after another. In the nineteenth century, the idea of nationalism tried to take over the state and turn it into an instrument of aggressive power.

In the twentieth century, communism in Russia created a monstrous totalitarian tyranny.

The Nazis took power in a state, convinced they could transform it into a "Thousand-Year-Reich," an empire based on pre-state fantasies of racial purity.

In our time, the state has been challenged by global currents that have eroded its authority. Information, money and migrants moved across borders in ways far beyond the traditional means of state control. Non state entities encroach upon state responsibilities from below while international organizations draw sovereign state powers from above. Too often, nation states have themselves taken the easy way out of a problem: blame globalization, punt to the U.N. and blame the U.N. for any misfortune, blame "hot money" for problems originating in poor national governance.

All this amounts to defining multilateralism as participation in--sometimes virtual abdication to--international organizations and loose understandings. ✓

As states have appeared weaker, terrorists have moved in on them. Many states in response, and in the false hope of buying time or protection, have taken damaging actions that only further diminish their own authority and legitimacy. States in every part of the world have avoided accountability when it comes to terrorism and now we are paying a heavy price.

Some states have made tacit deals with foreign terrorists, allowing them offices in their cities in return for a pledge of immunity.

Some states have tolerated, subsidized and facilitated homegrown terrorist groups on the understanding that they will not attempt to overthrow national leaders, creating a kind of grotesque protection racket.

Some states pump out huge volumes of propaganda against other states, in order to direct terrorists within their borders toward external targets. ✓

Some states, in a desperate search for legitimacy, have invited religions that foster terrorists to take over substantial sectors of governmental activity on condition that some functions, like foreign affairs and defense policy will be left alone. ✓

And some states secretly, but undeniably, support terrorism directly as a matter of state policy. ✓

Every one of these deals between states and terrorists is an abdication of state accountability to its citizens. If these deals are not reversed, the states that make them and ultimately the international system of states will not survive. That is why the war on terrorism is of unsurpassed importance. ✓

For all the realities of globalization that have drained authority from the state, no other basic entity of international life can replace it. The state is all we have as a means of ordering our international existence. Other forms may challenge but none can replace it in its most important function: the state is the indispensable institution for achieving representative government and for protecting individual rights. ✓ ✓ ✓

So, if the pendulum has swung against the sovereign state in past decades, it is long past time to swing it back toward the sovereign state, to hold states responsible and to help strengthen states against our common enemy, terrorism. For make no mistake, terrorism is the enemy of the state, out to destroy the state or to commandeer it for their evil purposes. ✓

When we set out to revitalize the state, we are laying the groundwork for giving international cooperation and international organizations a new lease on life. To strengthen the state is to strengthen the ability for responsible multilateralism. Remember that international organizations – like the United Nations – are the organizations of their member states. International cooperation takes place through the interaction of states. International organizations do not work well when they are regarded as rivals of, or alternatives to the states; that's just not how they were designed to work. International organizations will flourish when healthy sovereign states use them as a vehicle for reaching their common goals. ✓

Today the war on terrorism is led by the United States and our friends among our fellow sovereign states. And our effort is backed by strong UN resolutions that were voted by states and which recognize the indispensability of the state in this vital cause. If we persevere in this approach we can revitalize the state and the international state system as expressed in our common international organizations. In doing so, we will lay a firm foundation for international relations not only to maintain peace and security but to move all peoples toward greater freedom and prosperity.


And, if we falter in the war on terrorism, more and more states will make accommodation with terrorism. Ultimately, the consequences for world peace, security, and progress will be catastrophic.

But if we are creative and resolute, more and more leaders and citizens will regard our determination as an opportunity to clean up and liberate their own societies and to reconstitute the principle of accountability in their states.

19
May 16, 2003 2:06 PM

IRAN

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iran

Let's get a list of the things we really do need to do with respect to Iran. I think if we can get it out fast, it would be a help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051603-15

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

U16691 /03

19May03

11-L-0559/OSD/16457

03 5/21

May 19, 2003 3:14 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Schedule and Metrics

337

Please take a look at this schedule and metrics paper and get back to me with your thoughts.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/14/03 SecDef memo to SMA re: Schedule and Metrics

DHR:dh
051903-46

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

19 May 03

U16692 103

May 14, 2003 8:54 AM

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Schedule/Metrics

As we discussed, we have to get organized for the period we are in. Specifically, rather than getting the usual SVTC briefings, we ought to have someone responsible for daily reports on where we are in at least each of the following categories:

1. **WMD**: site exploitation, organization, management and progress in seeing it is being led and executed in an orderly way, with sufficient resources. (Steve Cambone)
2. **Public Services for Iraqis**: We need better granularity. I am not sure I believe those red, green, amber, and blue charts. I would like to push a little underneath them to see how accurate they really are. (Bremer)
3. **Security**. We need some metrics on security. We have to be able to track it. The Joint Staff, working with the CFLCC commander, needs to be responsible for seeing that they are produced. (LTG Casey)
4. **Political Evolution**. We have to have some way of tracking the political progress—city councils, IIA, etc.—every day or two. (Jerry Bremer)

There may be other categories like the above that we owe it to ourselves and the President to put into a disciplined process. We need to keep pushing at it until we are satisfied we have the right leadership in each category, the right organization structure and the right metrics.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051403-1

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16459

May 19, 2003 10:03 AM

08/6/22
5/19
1555
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000.5

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Newt Minow

I am going to have dinner with Newt Minow on Friday night, May 23. Please give me a read by then on what he is doing on Terrorism Information Awareness, so I can thank him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-11

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

2/17/03

2/17/03

5/22
HAYNES RESPONSE
AT RED TAB
5/12

19 MAY 03

U16693 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16460



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

May 20, 2003, 9:30 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes II*

SUBJECT: Newt Minow

- Newt Minow is serving as the chair of the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, the federal advisory committee you established to advise the Department on the privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by DARPA's Total Information Awareness Program (TIA).
- The advisory committee is holding its first meeting on Friday, May 23, 2003. This meeting, which Mr. Minow will chair, is an organizational meeting. The first substantive meeting is scheduled for Thursday, June 19, 2003.
 - The other members of the advisory committee are Floyd Abrams, Zoe Baird, Griffin Bell, Gerhard Casper, Bill Coleman, Jr., Lloyd Cutler, and Jack Marsh.
- Since agreeing to serve as the chair of the advisory committee, Mr. Minow has become well-versed in the current debate surrounding the need to balance privacy interests with the government's need to collect terrorist-related information. He has been working closely with Lisa Davis, the official from AT&L who was selected to serve as the executive director of the advisory committee. Together, they have put together extensive background materials for the other members of the advisory committee to study prior to the first meeting.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Patricia Aronsson, Office of the General Counsel, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/16461



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

CS14
April 17, 2003 4:00 P.M.

Jaymie Durnan
4/21
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*
SUBJECT: Update on Total Information Awareness (TIA)

- There are three efforts underway involving TIA. A Federal Advisory Committee has been established. An internal oversight panel has been appointed. And, the response to the Wyden Amendment is being prepared.
 - The Federal Advisory Committee plans to hold its first meeting on May 23, 2003. The meeting will be an administrative/organizational meeting and will be held in the Pentagon. Newt Minow, the Chair, anticipates that the Committee will be able to complete its work before the end of the calendar year. The final product will be a report for the Secretary of Defense.
 - The internal oversight panel, chaired by Pete Aldrich, has met once. The group members have now been briefed on TIA. Mr. Aldrich expects the second meeting to be scheduled shortly.
 - DARPA has written a first draft of the report required by the Wyden Amendment, with Office of General Counsel input. Because Congress directed that the report be issued jointly by the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence, my office is working with counterparts at the Department of Justice and the CIA to prepare the legal and policy sections of the report. A draft of the report has been distributed and we expect to receive comments from the other agencies by Friday, April 25. The report is due to Congress on May 20, 2003.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: P. Aronsson, Office of the Deputy General Counsel (Intelligence), (b)(6)

CC: *DSD* *Done 4/24*

Jaymie Durnan

4/21 11-L-0559/OSD/16462

3/20
1336 Snowflake

5/28
BT-5354

May 19, 2003 10:13 AM

Afghanistan

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PRT Info

Jaymie Durnan
5/23


I hope you got the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team information to Strock, since he offered to look into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-14

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

TYPED NOTE
AT RED TAB



5-20-03

SecDef-

Yes. I passed a concept paper to the Germans. I have also passed to Spain and Portugal.

05-20-03 11:15 PM J.O

05-19-03 15:56 111

11-L-0559/OSD/16463 U16694 /03

19MAY03

5/28

5/20/2003


SecDef:

Yes. I passed a concept paper to the Germans. I have also passed to Spain and Portugal.

JD

May 19, 2003 10:11 AM

TO: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: ICC and Article 98

A question came up as to whether or not we need an ICC Article 98 signed by a country if the country has not signed the ICC at all. What is the answer?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-13

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

U16695 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16465

015

19 MAY 03

5/20
1330

EF-5349 05/28
OB
4/2

May 19, 2003 10:33 AM

Jaymie Durian

TO: Doug Feith

5/23

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DA

CC ISP

SUBJECT: Nick Burns and PRT

Should you get Nick Burns working on PRT's for the NATO nations and have him do it in NATO?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-16


NATO 092

Please respond by 5/30/03

SECRET HAS BEEN 20-03

5/20

NOTE TYPED
PROVIDED AT
RED TAB.



SECRET -

I spoke with
Nick about PRTs
when in Brussels
last week. He is
a/ready pushing them
with a))ies.

19MAY03

J-D

U16697 /03
11-L-0559/OSD/16466

05-19-03 10:26 16

5/20

SECRET HAS SEEN
5/20/2003
MAY 28 2003

SecDef:

I spoke with Nick about PRTs when in Brussels last week.
He is already pushing them with allies.

JD

May 19, 2003 11:01 AM

Transcom

TO: LTG Craddock
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gus Pagonis and Logistics

We should make sure we figure out a way to get closure on Gus Pagonis's proposal on logistics, and that Handy and Aldridge be involved.

Let's get the right meeting set up, have a presentation and then a discussion, and see if we can't move the ball on it.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/14/03 TRANSCOM memo to SecDef re: DoD Distribution/Logistics Transformation

DHR:dh
051903-20

.....

Please respond by 6/12/03

19 May 03

U16699 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16468

05/15



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

500 SCOTT DRIVE
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62226-6367

MAY 14 2003

14 May 2003

MTG

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: TCCC

SUBJ: DOD Distribution/Logistics Transformation

1. On 6-7 May 2003, I assembled a group of senior leaders (Atch 1), to develop visionary improvements to DOD logistics. Their significant logistics expertise and seasoned perspectives resulted in a dynamic, invigorating, and open exchange of transformational ideas throughout the 2-day conference.
2. We examined the full spectrum of logistics processes, from origin to the warfighter, focusing on business process improvements and operational effectiveness. We have reached consensus. There was conviction that our nation is best served by a single operational commander providing synchronized transportation, distribution, and sustainment to project and maintain national power where needed with the greatest speed and agility, the highest efficiency, and the most reliable level of trust and accuracy. Clearly, this "quick win" approach accelerates us down the path of improved warfighter support.
3. I am convinced now more than ever that transportation, distribution, and sustainment processes must be assigned to a combatant commander. This process realignment, combined with the collaborative relationship we have always enjoyed with the warfighters, will reap immediate and significant operational benefits, while providing the critical first step to fuel further logistics process transformation. The resultant successes will clearly signal the benefits of transformation within DOD. We have discussed this proposal previously, and I remain ready to meet with you to provide any additional information you may need. I look forward to your final decision on this matter.

VR-

JOHN W. HANDY
General, USAF
Commander

Attachment:
Attendee Listcc: CJCS
USD (AT&L)

Printed on

recycled paper



11-L-0559/OSD/16469

ER-5361
Done
5/22

May 19, 2003 11:51 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Brief

I want to have Marin Strmecki give the Afghanistan brief, separately, to Colin Powell, Tenet and Condi, and get their input. Then we will move it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-26

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

LTG C *05/4*
Per SecDef direction,
This brief will be given
at the PC tomorrow.
(1500-1600 by SVTC)

SD
5/21/03

Marin's briefing it
to Tom Franks and
Centcom people by
SVTC today.

We plan to brief it to
Tenet later this week
(or as soon as Tenet returns
to town) and then to
Colin, Condi, and the VP.

Doug Feith

U16700 /03

U16700 /03

19 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD 16470

FILED
MAY 20 7 51 PM
2003

May 19, 2003 11:57 AM

Done
6/3
181

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Defense Strategy Review

Do you think it would be worth you taking a crack at this Defense Strategy Review and getting an unclassified, shorter version that is up-to-date and post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan and post-9/11?

If so, please do so. If not, please let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/9/01 Draft Defense Strategy Review

DHR:dh
051903-28

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

19 MAY 03

U16701 /03

5/21
1400

513
6/2

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

May 21, 2003

Jaymie Durnan

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6/2
M FROM: Andrew W. Marshall *AWM*

SUBJECT: Updating Defense Strategy Review

Yes, I think that it would be worthwhile updating the version of the Defense Strategy Review that you sent me. What you sent me is an early version, the last draft that used the wording "advantage based strategy." Later versions eliminated that phrase, and added material on goals, allies, related non-DoD policies, etc., but were perhaps "detuned," as you commented to me later. Do you want this early version to be the basis of the updating?

Can you give me more guidance? What audience do you want to reach? Internal DoD? Congress? Public? The crafting of the text would depend on the audience.

Also an internal document should emphasize, I think, the importance of making the shift to capabilities based planning instead of threat based planning, an intellectual shift that many in DoD still have not really made.

I will put together a new draft for you to look at by mid June.

11-L-0559  SD/16472

if possible
March 9 2001

9 March 2001

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(Provided to SecDef)

Defense Strategy Review

Andy Marshall
by [signature] 1

I. Introduction

A. The US today enjoys a wide margin of military advantage over all other nations.

- This condition was not sought, but developed from the country's geographic setting and economic capacities, the outcome of World War II, the intense efforts generated by the Cold War, and the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union.
- Geographically, we are distant from potential threats and control the seas that buffer us from most of those threats. We cooperate with strong allies on or near the Eurasian landmass, and can operate from numerous bases there (where most of the rest of the world's potential power is located).
- Our military forces have developed superior competence in a variety of combat areas, including tactical aviation, undersea warfare, complex combined arms operations, and precision strike. And the scale of the US military program far exceeds that of any other nation.

B. Given this favorable condition, a reasonable goal for the US is to preserve that condition for as long as possible. Three main challenges confront the development of a strategy that pursues that goal:

- **The changing security environment.** Some evident trends, as well as some plausible but unpredictable discontinuities, could erode US military advantages, while uncertainty about the future environment diffuses US efforts.
 - E.g., likely development of "anti-access" capabilities—based on WMD or conventional missiles, mines, and submarines—to keep our forces out of forward bases and operating areas.
- **Changes in warfare.** The rapid advance of technology with military utility means that the most advantageous forms of warfare may change substantially in the years ahead; this means that preserving the world's leading force (or preparing to reconstitute or expand it when dangers arise) does not guarantee future superiority.
- **Threat-oriented policies.** US strategy has for some decades been understood as attempting to offset imminent enemy threats, and this has in recent years meant reducing

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our forces in light of reduced threats. We have not fully confronted the fact of our current military superiority, articulated the advantage for our security and for world peace of sustaining a wide margin of superiority, or developed our forces with that aim clearly in view. A strategy to shape the environment to our continued advantage should aim not only to deter attack, it should aim to deter enemy force-building, making clear to possible contenders that the bar to military preeminence is very high.

C. Subsequent sections of this paper discuss the current US position; the future security environment; and the case for and characteristics of an "advantage-based" defense strategy.

II. The Current U.S. Position

A. Identifying current US military advantages and their genesis alerts us to possible trends or discontinuities that would undercut them, and should instruct deliberation about what advantages are sustainable or attainable for us in the future.

B. Sources of U.S. military advantage include

- Tranquil North American neighborhood. No nearby enemies, and oceanic distances impede most forms of military threat
 - (but ICBMs, ship-launched cruise missiles, and smuggled WMD are important exceptions, and may become more important).
- US political and economic institutions favorable to creation of wealth, technological innovation, free flow of information, and competent decentralized operations.
 - (But long-standing US advantage in aggregate resources—twice as big as any other nation for almost a century—will slowly diminish as populous poor countries get richer).
- A legacy of World War II: Strong allies and basing access on and near Eurasian landmass, supporting US power projection. Adversaries can be engaged far from American soil. Alliances with Europeans and Japan display a formidable combination of actual and potential power.

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- (But alliances founded on common Soviet threat will tend to erode, and forward bases likely to become more vulnerable).
- A legacy of 1991: Cold War galvanized large resource commitments and development of specialized military competences.
 - (But threat-based strategy implies continuing glide path downward).

C. Specific areas of U.S. military advantage

- air operations
- sea control, including undersea warfare
- space operations, including reconnaissance
- complex combined arms operations
- long range precision strike
- offensive nuclear forces.
- training procedures and facilities that have created very high levels of first battle competence.
- long distance power projection

D. Logic of the situation will impel competitors to try to undercut or offset these advantages

- E.g., concealment, dispersal, hardening, IR-guided SAMs against air attack; ASAT and information warfare against our reconnaissance and communications.
- The overarching U.S. advantage in long distance power projection presents the clearest target for enemy strategies: deter, deny, or attrit arrival of US projection forces in their neighborhood.

III. The Future Security Environment

A. Uneven economic growth will gradually reshape the balance of potential power.

- China, India, and South Korea are likely to grow faster than the US, Europe, Russia, and Japan, although long term economic forecasts cannot be taken literally and there is particular uncertainty about China.

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- Post-Soviet Russia's geographic and economic contraction has reduced its economic size to something more like the individual West European countries, but its economic prospects probably remain worse than theirs.
- Illustrative numbers: Percent of total world GDP.
 - China 8% in 2000, 13% in 2025.
 - India 5% in 2000, 8% in 2025.
 - EU 21% in 2000, 16% in 2025.
 - US 23% in 2000, 22% in 2025.
 - Japan 8% in 2000, 5% in 2025.
 - Russia 2.5% in 2000, 2.1% in 2025.
- Implication: Asia gradually emerges as a potential source and potential prize of large-scale military power.
 - But U.S. inherits Cold War forces and continues to design weapons optimized for a European theater characterized by large forward deployments, capable allies, and short distances.
- Demographic trends are one contributor to this economic forecast, and will amplify its effect, as services for aging populations will tend to divert resources away from the military in Europe, Japan, and (slightly later) the United States.
- There is particular uncertainty about China. Measures of past performance and relative size are suspect and disputed. Insolvent banking system supports large and inefficient state owned enterprises, clouding future prospects. China's population will also age, though trailing Europe, Japan, and the US.

B. Proliferation of important military capabilities will include nuclear and biological weapons, and advanced conventional weapons.

- Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea are the most plausible new additions to the nuclear "club"; actual use of a nuclear weapon could provoke a broader proliferation.
- WMD threats (against US allies, hosts, forces, or the US homeland) could, among other things, be attempted deterrent to US power projection operations.

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- Russia, China and others could develop low yield tactical nuclear weapons and appropriate operational concepts to counter overwhelming U.S. conventional strike capabilities.
- Proliferation of advanced conventional technologies permits more sophisticated "anti-access" strategies against US power projection.
- Ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced mines and submarines, and target recognition and guidance systems (perhaps augmented by counter-space and information warfare) would be designed to prevent US forces' timely arrival or deter their deployment. Forward bases and US carriers would be lucrative targets.
- Information warfare against US homeland to disrupt US force deployments.
- Recent dominance of US precision strike systems likely to generate countermeasures: ASAT, jamming GPS, EMP, hiding and hardening. U.S. forces highly dependent upon shared information for their defense and for the effectiveness of strikes will likely face efforts to disrupt, corrupt or deny needed information. Adversaries are likely to engage in computer network attacks and also use electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons.

C. More generally, recent and likely technological advances appear to permit radical innovations in military methods. Global commerce and the "dual use" character of many emerging technologies will mean potential enemies, as well as the US, will face a wide ranging menu of options.

- Robotic systems could be developed for a wide range of missions. Stealth, performance, cost and casualty concerns may push the US and competitors toward a heavy reliance on unmanned combat systems.
- Much smaller, even microscopic, sensors and weapons could be linked by information networks.
- Space based systems could take on a wider range of military functions.
- Biological technologies may be the basis of various new measures and countermeasures, with soldiers, populations, and agricultural products as potential targets.

In combination with, or as successors to, the proliferation and improvement of long range strike forces, these technologies could bring radical changes in warfare, devaluing capabilities now thought formidable, or the significance of geographic distance, oceans, and mountain ranges.

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D. Continuing growth of world trade, including China and India becoming significant importers of oil, and Chinese imports of grain.

- Japan, Korea, Germany, France already roughly 100% dependent on imported oil. By 2010, China goes from near zero to 45%, India goes from 54% to 77%. China's imports 2% of grain consumption today, probably near 10% of consumption by 2010.
- Import dependence probably not a cause of conflict, but is a vulnerability in wartime, may shape forces and policies.
- China's reliance on Persian Gulf may encourage its arms sales to Iran or Iraq.
- Commerce or other economic assets may become plausible targets of coercive threats made possible by accurate missile forces; US allies and friends may seek US response to such threats.

E. Unpredictable discontinuities may affect security environment more severely than predicted trends.

- E.g., vulnerability of regimes in China, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia.
- Technological breakthroughs can belie assumptions about existing sources of military advantage—e.g. some claim that Passive Coherent Location technologies permit tracking stealthy U.S. aircraft.
- Use of nuclear weapons would promote scramble for defenses, nuclear proliferation, and search for (or, depending on what had just happened, loss of confidence in) "guarantees" extended by others.

F. Likely continuing uncertainty regarding timing, identity, and extent of future military challenges.

- E.g., China's growing wherewithal makes it a central actor, but a wide range of policies and developments are plausible. Will priority of trade and economic growth inhibit military ambitions? Is China serious about absorbing Taiwan? Will China press for US withdrawal from Japan and Korea? Will economic reversals or political change disrupt any such intentions?

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- Large-scale conflict does not appear to be the "most likely" case for the next several decades; but a DOD strategy of sustaining a wide margin of superiority assumes—and must argue—that this remains an important case in the longer term.

IV. Defense Strategy

A. Implication: The task of strategy

This account of our situation and of the prospective security environment implies that the task of strategy is to sustain US military advantage in the coming period of change.

- Our broad geostrategic advantage stems from the absence of nearby threats, an array of overseas allies and bases, and an unmatched capability to project enormous power across great distances.
- The changing security environment appears likely to challenge our power projection advantages by posing threats to the US homeland and our allies, and anti-access architectures against our deployments. And our planning is less well suited to contingencies of coercion rather than invasion, and in Asia rather than Europe.
- In the longer term, or in unpredictable ways even in the shorter term, broader changes are possible. We foresee no great power enemy who exploits radically new military methods or can project large scale power to our shores; and we expect no use of nuclear weapons. But these conditions are inherently uncertain and changeable.

Sustaining a position of military advantage serves overarching US goals:

- to maintain a century of peace
- to keep wars small and far from U.S. soil
- to discourage the emergence of a peer competitor.

B. Merits of an Advantage-Based Strategy

A strategy that seeks to sustain advantage differs from one that seeks to offset threats. There are several noteworthy merits to a strategy of sustaining advantage.

- It attempts to preserve and build on assets acquired with great cost difficulty, rather than planning to rebuild them only when needed. Apart from the likely high cost of recreating

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discarded assets, institutional and personnel competences may be very difficult to rebuild at all.

- Given the great uncertainty about the future security environment and the possibility of shocks, as well as the deception, misestimates, and inertia that could obstruct a timely response to emerging dangers, sustaining advantage is a safer hedging strategy.
- Perhaps most important, a strategy of sustaining advantage gives us an opportunity to shape the policies of others, rather than waiting to see what they may turn out to be. Our margin of military advantage, both in the aggregate and in particular military competences, may in some cases discourage military ambitions before the fact, as a formidable barrier to entry. And it is likely to reassure allies and will tend to preserve alliances.
- By extending existing advantages and building new ones, we create a more robust and moving target for enemy asymmetric strategies that attempt to exploit an existing set of vulnerabilities or achieve a narrow area of advantage. We may reduce our uncertainty about the threats they will pose if capabilities we maintain or acquire foreclose some options for them.

As noted earlier, our current situation of military advantage was not sought. A deliberate attempt to create such an advantage might well have been rejected as impractical by the American people, or failed on account of intense countervailing efforts by other countries alarmed at what we might intend. But if we are today more secure than we could reasonably have expected, it is reasonable to try to remain so for as long as possible.

C. Difficulties of an Advantage-Based Strategy

- May lack the (perhaps spurious) precision of threat-based approach, both in bounding and allocating resources.
- Publicly stated, will be focal point for indignant criticism about US arrogance, hegemonic pretensions, etc..

D. General statement of the strategy

The strategy is designed to maintain the favorable geostrategic position of the U.S. by

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- preserving military advantages that permit long distance power projection against future enemies who develop anti-access capabilities and threats to the US homeland;
- building advantages over any future competitors in the most decisive forms of military capability that emerging technologies permit; and
- shifting increased attention to Asia.

E. Criteria for prioritizing military advantages

- What kinds of military advantage should the US seek to preserve or develop? Shall we preserve what we are best at, try to remedy our deficiencies, or try something new? More precisely, the question is how to determine the relative priority and mix of various areas of actual or potential advantage.
- This question does not admit of a simple recipe. Deliberation must attempt to reconcile the implications of three principles:
 - Emphasize what we're good at, so as to exploit underlying national strengths or hard-won acquired military competences;
 - Emphasize what seems to be needed, in light of expected trends in the security environment;
 - Emphasize methods that will be most effective and robust as emerging technologies permit new kinds of systems and methods of warfare.
- At least the second and third of these standards urge the fundamental importance of experimentation. The strategy should hedge against profound technical and political uncertainty by placing "bets" on a variety of areas, putting DoD in position to adapt to developments and make choices when we know more. The recommended strategy does not deduce what the key areas of advantage are and revise the existing force accordingly; it uses experimentation to learn and create options that can guide adjustments of our mix of capabilities over a long period of time.
- Prioritizing among competing potential areas of advantage will be extremely difficult, particularly as the future value of many areas cannot be forecast with any accuracy. As a result, this strategy should be pursued with the understanding that not all areas invested in will necessarily yield valuable advantage, and specific capabilities within these broad areas cannot be predicted: rather, these efforts are essentially bets to create options for the

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future, so that the U.S. is in position to exploit those opportunities that do emerge. It is particularly important to place these bets early, as developing the associated technologies, operational concepts, and organizational concepts is likely to take a long time (possibly a decade or longer).

1. What we're good at

- The U.S. currently maintains advantage in some military areas that should not be relinquished, but should instead be expanded to deter competitors from challenging the U.S. in these areas, and to complicate even the prospect of such asymmetric responses. These areas will also require forces, systems, and programs different from today's and more appropriate to the long distances, new technologies, and new competitors the U.S. may face in the future.
- Real merit of exploiting and extending existing competences runs risk of cost-ineffective—or futile—efforts to preserve methods that new technologies make obsolete. This will be a very difficult analytical and political challenge.

2. What's needed

- Given the likely increasing importance of Asia, the U.S. will require different sorts of programs, systems, and personnel: for example, the vast physical distances associated with Asian operations will place a premium on long-range strike systems. Further, DoD and the U.S. in general will need to develop widespread regional expertise: this will entail developing a new generation of regional experts through language training and strategic culture analyses, as well as increasing DoD's familiarity with the region, through placing more headquarters in the region, sending officers to schools in the region, etc.
- The development of anti-access challenges to our power projection forces, and threats to the US homeland, mean that we should preserve capabilities that enable power projection and develop capabilities to defend against, deter, or mitigate the impact of threats to the US homeland.
 - As the U.S. continues to be globally engaged, competitors will have an increased incentive to develop capabilities to hold the U.S homeland at risk as one part of anti-access strategies they develop to keep the U.S. from becoming involved in

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their regions. This will include pursuit of long-range strike systems (cruise and ballistic missiles) as well as efforts to develop or procure nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Further, opponents will likely target growing U.S. dependence on information networks by developing capabilities to attack electronic networks underlying U.S. infrastructure, banking, communications, etc., to make the prospect of U.S. involvement as painful as possible, hoping to deter U.S. action. While this issue includes DoD involvement, it goes beyond boundaries of DoD alone.

- Though most of the strategy is focused on guiding future investments, the US must preserve capabilities to meet current responsibilities, including alliance commitments, humanitarian or peacekeeping interventions, and preserving freedom of the seas.

3. What will be most effective under future conditions

- The U.S. should also develop new areas of advantage as rapid and potentially revolutionary technological change contributes to changes in the character of warfare and creates new areas of military competition, in order to shape future competitions and preclude competitors from entering into some areas.
- The U.S. may be able to motivate competitors to invest disproportionately in defensive systems or in systems that are otherwise less threatening to the U.S. interests.
- Given the changing nature of the future security environment, new military areas are likely to become critical to the U.S. ability to project power over long distances and meet the nation's other goals and responsibilities. Determining exactly which areas should be chosen, and what sorts of steps will be necessary to maintain or expand U.S. advantage in these areas will require substantial analysis.
- We will face great uncertainty about the relative effectiveness of alternative means of warfare in the future, not least because of uncertainty about what kinds of adversary methods will be developed and how effective they will be. This is an argument for broad experimentation.

F. Areas of military advantage: Some examples

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(Provided to SecDef)

1. Aerial Warfare as an Area of Advantage

- The U.S. has developed an overwhelming advantage in war in the air.
 - Recently, the U.S. has dominated adversaries across three critical elements of aerial warfare: fighter-vs-fighter combat, suppression of enemy air defenses, and precision attack.
 - The U.S. can also limit the effectiveness of enemy radar-guided surface-to-air missiles and, through the use of low-observable technologies, conduct precision-bombing attacks against targets throughout enemy territory.
 - Further, increasing use of precision weapons has given the U.S. the ability to hit what it wants and dramatically reduce risks of collateral damage and civilian casualties.
 - As a result of this dominance, U.S. leaders now count on quickly gaining control of the air, limiting if not eliminating enemy ability to mount aircraft attacks on regional airbases, airheads, logistics facilities, and ports used by American forces and allies in the region.
- Air superiority is certainly an area of advantage critical to maintain:
 - Reductions in overseas bases and forward-deployed forces mean that U.S. power projection capabilities rest heavily on the ability to project air power quickly, particularly in the first days or weeks of conflict, before heavy ground forces can arrive;
 - Precision air power will be particularly important for rapid response, which may be of growing importance as more nations have the ability to prepare for war rapidly, without traditional indicators such as industrial mobilization;
 - The long distances associated with operations in Asia indicate that long-range air power will be particularly important if the U.S. is to remain influential in this increasingly important region;
- Currently, the U.S. lead in this area is so overwhelming that competitors invest mostly in air defense, with only marginal investment in fighter forces (mostly for political purposes): the U.S. would like to maintain this situation by retaining a vast lead.
- Yet, the nature of aerial warfare is changing, and will continue to change over the decades ahead. For example, the U.S., as well as its competitors, will rely increasingly

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(Provided to SecDef)

on long-range missiles, forcing a re-evaluation of what is meant by "control" of the air: fighter-vs-fighter combat will no longer be the sole determinant of who gains control over the air. The potential for unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aerial combat vehicles may also transform the character of aerial combat.

- Maintaining an advantage in aerial warfare will thus require different sorts of forces, systems, and concepts than previously, and will also demand a reassessment of how overwhelming U.S. advantage can be.
- What might the U.S. do to maintain this advantage?
 - The F-22 as an example of strategic decision-making:
 - While the F-15 is greatly superior to competitor aircraft, the F-22 might convince potential competitors of the hopelessness of challenging the U.S. in this area, even though future utility of missiles and other systems may reduce the importance of fighter-vs-fighter combat;
 - The active-array, electronically scanned (ASEA) radar in the F-22 allows the possibility of electronic suppression of enemy fire-control radars, which may in turn allow enough suppression of enemy fighters and SAMs to allow day/night strike operations by B-2s based beyond the reach of enemy theater cruise and ballistic missiles. Such operations are likely to be of continued if not increasing importance to U.S. power projection capabilities.

2. Sea Control as an Area of Advantage

- The U.S. can control or deny others the use of the seas due to its dominant position in all aspects of naval warfare.
 - Several other countries have large navies and even sophisticated nuclear powered submarine and carrier aviation programs, however not even the former Soviet Union can maintain a worldwide naval presence.
 - While the U.S. Navy can defend America's shores, it has traditionally been and remains today, a power projection capability.
- Why continue to develop sea control as an area of advantage?
 - The overwhelming majority of commercial goods move via the sea.

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11-L-0559/OSD/16485

(Provided to SecDef)

- Submarine cables now carry most of the worlds communications and information.
- The sea contains large amounts of untapped natural resources including oil.
- The U.S. needs to protect its access to energy and information flowing under the sea.
- Even traditional land powers like China will depend increasingly on sea based commerce including oil shipments. China and other nation's imported energy needs will become vulnerabilities and shape their security postures.
- The U.S. currently operates and sustains naval forces worldwide. Its surface ships and submarines collect intelligence and reassure allies as well as monitor and enforce economic sanctions. In times of crisis, they can react quickly to evacuate non-combatants or conduct strikes, providing national leaders with a variety of options.
- If the U.S. becomes more serious about missile defense, it may seek to interrupt launches in the boost phase. That requires systems to operate in close proximity to launchers, making survivable sea based platforms well suited to this task.
- Worldwide sea control requires a tremendous commitment in manpower and resources. Modern ships have high acquisition costs and large supporting infrastructures that will likely dissuade all but the most economically successful countries from developing blue water navies.
- As competitors buy or develop increasingly lethal anti-access capabilities, non-stealthy U.S. naval assets will operate at increased risk and may be denied access to key littoral areas. U.S. dominance in undersea warfare can continue to maintain a sea control advantage by virtue of their stealth, which makes them immune to most anti-access threats.
- How might the U.S. continue to develop this area of advantage?
 - Rebalance the fleet more in favor of stealthy, more numerous (expendable), and survivable assets. This could include combinations of smaller, stealthier surface ships, surface ships that operate very low in the water, or submarines.
 - The U.S. Navy should purchase and experiment with alternative surface ship types and determine possible replacements for current designs.

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11-L-0559/OSD/16486

(Provided to SecDef)

- Extended range carrier capable aircraft, including unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) should be developed to allow aircraft carriers to stand-off, outside anti-access threat ranges. Experience gained from early UCAVs could be used to design follow-on launch platforms less vulnerable than existing aircraft carriers.
- While submarines have unmatched stealth, they currently lack payload capacity. The U.S. should convert TRIDENT submarines no longer required for strategic use to guided missile carrying submarines; SSGNs. Experience gained while operating these ships will help develop designs for follow-on submarines built specifically for strike operations.
- The U.S. should also experiment with more numerous, smaller and possibly non-nuclear powered submarines to improve affordability. Smaller, submarines with smaller crews could “call for fire” from towed, bottomed or moored unmanned strike modules. These modules could hold not only weapons, but also sensors, equipment for special operations units and even fuel for non-nuclear powered submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles.

3. Space Operations as an Area of Advantage

- Space is currently an area of significant U.S. advantage: the U.S. is well ahead of other nations in the process of making military use of space. The U.S. employs space for strategic intelligence purposes, but during the 1990s began, ahead of other nations, increasingly using space inputs to enhance as well military operations.
- Why Space Operations is a Critical Area of Advantage
 - This is a particularly critical area because of the emphasis the U.S. places on long range power projection: because the U.S. military is in this “business” to a unique degree, the nation will need to be particularly proficient in space operations.
 - U.S. military forces – air, land, and sea – rely on the ability to project power while operating from fewer, more widely-dispersed nodes with theater-wide responsibility.
 - Satellite Communications offer unique advantages for rapidly connecting mobile forces operating in this distributed mobile fashion. For example, satcom service

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11-L-0559/OSD/16487

(Provided to SecDef)

requires no theater footprint for maintenance and support aside from terminal equipment.

- The U.S. also depends upon space for navigation and timing:
 - GPS enables precision strike regardless of standoff range;
 - GPS timing signal is the only readily-available nano-second quality reference for synchronizing the electrical devices used in modern communications systems.
- The Character of Space Operations Will Continue to Evolve
 - Emerging U.S. advantages in using space to enhance military operations within the atmosphere will likely provoke opponents to try to negate these capabilities.
 - Consequently, the U.S. military must find the means to survey foreign activities in space, identify hostile movements, protect satellites from damage, prevent adversaries from successfully countering U.S. space capabilities, and if necessary negate hostile activity. Achieving space control will be a critical element of maintaining U.S. advantage in this area.
 - It is not clear how soon there will be true weaponization of space (i.e., orbital weapons), or if other nations will seek to, or succeed in, weaponizing space. This is, however, a major strategic issue and if the U.S. is to consider space weaponization, this should be done only after thorough analysis, consideration of possible consequences, etc.
- How the U.S. Might Preserve and Expand its Advantage in Space
 - Invest in jam-resistant, secure military satcom to meet U.S. expeditionary needs: the recent success of fiber optic cable and consequent sharp decline in commercial satellite communications makes it unlikely that the U.S. military can acquire adequate commercial bandwidth for sudden contingencies. Thus, the U.S. will need to develop its own satcom systems for use in those contingencies or situations in which fiber is not feasible.
 - Invest in GPS applications that emphasize long-range precision standoff attack
 - Employ greater orbital distances for a backup system. Positioning backup satellites at Earth-Moon Lagrange points would significantly reduce their

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11-L-0559/OSD/16488

(Provided to SecDef)

vulnerability while still, with the exception of SIGINT, providing a reasonable level of space capability.

4. Training as an Area of Advantage

- The U.S. currently enjoys an advantage in its ability to train combat ready units with force-wide levels of "first battle" competence without precedent in American history. This level of training is the product of conscious choices made over the last twenty-five years with attendant commitments in resources. The style, complexity, scope, and realism of U.S. training is well beyond the capabilities of most other nations, with only a few exceptions for small elements in allied countries.
- Factors which have contributed to this advantage include:
 - Commitment of extensive resources to institutional and unit training
 - The pursuit of realism and intellectual honesty in a training environment. For example our adherence to "performance-oriented" training measures, or the commitment to exceptionally competent opposing forces at the National Training Center to challenge the rotational training units
 - The incorporation of Modeling and Simulation for Training, War-Gaming
 - Establishment of the service training centers for large scale operations, such as the National Training Center
 - Commitment to establishing doctrine and references to promote standards and intellectual discussion
- There has been some erosion in this advantage. For example, the frequency of unit rotations through the service training centers has become protracted as less uniformly distributed across units as commitments to non-combat missions expanded.
- The advantage in superior training established by the services should be raised to the joint level. The nature of future conflict will require a joint "first-battle" competency. Achievement of this level of competency would further extend this advantage beyond that of any potential opponent. An element to support this might include the establishment of a Joint National Training Center (JNTC).

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11-L-0559/OSD/16489

(Provided to SecDef)

- The JNTC would be useful as an incentive for the services to transform. How well the participating service components were prepared upon arrival for a JNTC rotation would be a good indicator of the respective service transformation effort.
- The JNTC would be useful as a test-bed to evaluate interoperability and new doctrine, including methods of negating Anti-Access strategies
- Support the experimentation effort. Experimental type units could be included into rotations to evaluate their new capabilities.

5. Unmanned Systems: A New Area of U.S. Advantage

- Though the U.S. has only a comparative advantage in this area, it is clearly an area of growing importance and should be actively pursued. While it is difficult to forecast their precise role or the time required to develop such capabilities, unmanned systems will become a critical element in future conflicts. Advances in information technology, microelectronics, power supplies, artificial intelligence and related technologies will continue to improve endurance, payload and degrees of autonomy.
- Why is Unmanned Systems a Critical Area?
 - Early unmanned systems will lack the flexibility and adaptability human operators provide, however they are capable of greater performance in other areas. For instance, manned aircraft have endurance and maneuver limits based on the human occupant whereas Unmanned Aerial Vehicles do not. Unmanned systems lend themselves to long endurance missions necessitated by U.S. desires to project power as far as Asia, if no forward bases are available or secure. Moreover, unmanned systems can reduce force protection concerns, providing commanders with greater operational flexibility. The combination of these attributes dramatically increase the capabilities of U.S. forces.
 - Numerous potential adversaries have already entered the field of unmanned systems, possibly to enhance their ISR capabilities as part of their anti-access strategies or to threaten regional adversaries. While it cannot block entry, the U.S. should keep competitors from believing they can dominate this area.
 - It is an area of particular uncertainty: while it appears that unmanned systems will be important, it is difficult to foresee how exactly they will be employed.

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11-L-0559/OSD/16490

(Provided to SecDef)

Therefore, it is important to develop a broad-based competency in this area so that the nation can adapt quickly as new technologies and operational concepts related to unmanned systems begin to emerge.

- How should the U.S. Develop a Comparative Advantage in Unmanned Systems?
 - There are several sorts of actions that might be taken to begin to lay the foundation for a competency. Some examples include:
 - Establish an enhanced program, through DARPA, for research and development of unmanned systems and related technologies, both to survey the possibilities and to begin to develop generation of technologists familiar with these systems.
 - Establish experimental units incorporating such systems, perhaps a UCAV unit or a unit oriented around unmanned underwater vehicles or ground robots. These units should eventually become operational, after perhaps a few years of experimentation, and test new concepts and capabilities in the field. It is particularly important to begin this soon, as developing operational and organizational concepts may take a decade or more of experimentation and practice.

G. Some Comments on Implementation

- The previous discussion of strategy should be seen only as a beginning sketch from which work can be accomplished to fully detail a complete strategy. Further, this additional development should include other important areas of military effort, such as logistics and intelligence support.
- This overall strategy suggests an implementation plan that focuses on a number of areas:
 - An overall "get-well" program to return most legacy forces to a healthy state. This will likely include the replacement of worn out platforms, the purchase of necessary spare parts, and the reduction of operational burden on service personnel
 - Establish a robust service and joint sustained experimentation program. Unlike current part-time efforts, such a program would dedicate personnel and resources to full time experimentation. Separate experimental units would adapt emerging

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11-L-0559/OSD/16491

(Provided to SecDef)

technologies and develop new operational concepts and methods of organizing. They would field new systems and use them in training exercises against existing forces and opposing forces that carefully study the culture and tactics of potential adversaries. Experimentation efforts could enumerate those merging areas where the U.S. could achieve an early advantage and help keep its comparative edge over competitors. Initially, experimentation programs would need to be somewhat bigger than the current set. And, as expertise and resources become available, expanded to more robust levels over time.

- Ultimately changes implemented must be supported within limited budget means. The identification of off-setting resources to get a significant program for developing new advantages and new ways of fighting in the future will be of immediate concern. Care must be taken in divestment and re-allocation of the resources for "getting-well" and experimentation. Areas of possible divestment might include rethinking the methods by which the U.S. meets humanitarian, peace-keeping, counter-drug and other non-combat obligations, particularly long-term commitments. This may require the establishment of new or differently organized forces and possibly even outsourcing some responsibilities to constabulary forces. Subsequent analysis of advantages may result in reductions or abandonment of resource commitment to support these initiatives.
- Refocus more DoD attention on Asia while continuing to remain active in our current relations. It would be useful to develop a broad base of military personnel well schooled in Asia. These individuals would be officers who understand the culture, history, speak the language, who would have lived in and interacted with the citizens of Asian nations. This level of expertise will be needed to develop both individual and institutional understanding of this area. Additionally, curriculum changes in the war colleges and military curriculum in the training base would improve the general sensitivity to Asia. The creation of additional military command infrastructure within Asia would allow more officers to serve in this region and experience the size and distances of the Asian region. That knowledge should then manifest itself in the developmental aspects of the force

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11-L-0559/OSD/16492

(Provided to SecDef)

- Shifting to an advantage-based strategy, rather than one framed by capabilities or threats, has substantial implications for our methods of analysis and the metrics used to measure the military. For example this shift may necessitate changes in the PPBS categories, or perhaps changes in the indicators and warnings or other aspects of intelligence sensitivity for understanding Asia.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/16493

May 19, 2003 12:03 PM

381

TO: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Transformation

I received this book, "Transformation Under Fire," by Macgregor. Would you look it over and see if there are things we ought to take into account. I have not had a chance to read it, unfortunately.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated galley by Douglas A. Macgregor, "Transformation Under Fire"

DHR:dh
051903-29

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

19MAY03

U16702 /03

Sent 5/19

May 16, 2003 5:03 PM

TO: Doug Feith
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Legal Fees

I think we simply have to get a piece of legislation proposed so that any person like Tom Franks who is sued on frivolous war crimes charges is guaranteed full legal support. I have found that the US government, depending on who is in office, is ambivalent about the extent to which they do or do not want to support people like that.

I know Henry Kissinger has had to pay a pile of legal fees. It is unfair, and it is something that ought to be stopped.

Please get me a proposal we can start circulating interagency, so we can recommend some legislation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051603-18

.....
Please respond by

6/27/03

U16703 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16495

015

19MAY03

Sent 5/19

May 16, 2003 4:57 PM

08
6/2

Belgium

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO Construction in Brussels

Please get a memo to Nick Burns, with copies to the State Department, recommending that he put a full stop to the construction of the new NATO headquarters. I think it is a serious question as to whether NATO ought to be in Belgium, and until we get this stuff straightened out, we ought not to allow that to go forward.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051603-17

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

19 MAY 03

U16704 /03

714
1300 Snowflake

19
May 16, 2003 9:31 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
Jaymie Durnan
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Call w/Bremer

I simply have to have secure phone calls with Bremer alone. I have to get it done.
It has to happen. I want it today if possible. Then I want it at least twice a week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051603-7

.....
Please respond by _____

Col Bucci
for calls.
J

Jaymie Durnan

5/20

U16705 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16497

600,715B

17 May 03

5/19
1300
Snowflake

19
May 16, 2003 2:09 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Call w/Bremer

I need to talk with Bremer for about 10 or 15 minutes every day.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051603-16

.....
Please respond by _____

SD:
per our discussion
will schedule
M-W-F @ 0745
in lieu of the
Centcom call.
Centcom call
will be Tue/Thurs
1/2
J

Jaymie Durnan

5/20

U16706 /03

17 May 03
50 Pro 16 11

May 19, 2003 7:13 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Memorable Point

Let's have a project where every time I give a talk, speech or press briefing, there ought to be one single thing they would go away with and remember.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-1

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

350.001 SD

19 May 03

U16708 /03

19
May 16, 2003 12:11 PM

TO: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Ensign

I want to get Senator Ensign down sometime for breakfast or lunch.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051603-11

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

U16709 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16500

000.715D

19 May 03

May 19, 2003 9:59 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve

Please take a look at this memo of December 21 and January 28, and tell me what you think I ought to do with that. Is it OBE, or should I get IDA to do a study on it, as you suggested in January.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/28/03 CJCS response to 12/21/02 SecDef memo

DHR:dh
051903-9

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

U16710 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16501

926

19 May 03

9:06 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Admiral Giambastiani *AG*
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 21, 2002

SUBJECT:

I think we are going to have to find a way to take all of the responsibility for activating the guard and the reserve from the services, the joint forces command and the combatant commanders and put them in one place so that the flow of forces, whether it is active duty or reserves, is all in one location. We can't do anything skillfully the way it is currently disbursed.

disbursed *Amoyed*
GENERAL

Please come back to me with a recommendation.

11/19/02

1120

Thanks.

CJCS RESPONSE
ATTACHED

DHR/azn
122102.05

Please respond by: _____

1/8/03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-736-03

28 January 2003

#354

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

JCSM 1/28

SUBJECT: Activating the Guard and Reserve

- In response to your request (TAB A) the following information is provided.
- The Joint Staff will form a General and Flag Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) representing the combatant commands and Services, with a mandate to offer specific recommendations and provide a framework for operation by 28 February 2003.
- GOSC will evaluate three alternatives to consolidate responsibility for activating Reserve Components (RCs) into one location:
 - Establish a manpower allocation task force similar in doctrine and procedures to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Priority Allocation of Industrial Resources Task Force whenever the activation of RC personnel is contemplated.
 - Create a Joint Manpower Priorities and Allocation Board analogous to the Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board to administer the activation program.
 - Charge US Joint Forces Command, in its force provider role, to make force allocation decisions for both Active and Reserve Components.
- Each of these alternatives offers considerable change to organization, doctrine and business processes for the Services, combatant commanders and Joint Staff. GOSC will complete its report by the above stated due date.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM G.S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/16503

May 19, 2003 9:17 AM

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: FCS

Pate Aldridge
cc: Ken Knier

I want to make sure we implement all of Larry Welch's recommendations on the Future Combat System.

Thanks.

Attach.

Summary of Report of the FCS Independent Assessment Panel

DHR:dh
051903-8

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

470

U16711 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16504

19 May 03

**Future Combat Systems (FCS) Independent Assessment Panel (IAP)
Summary of Findings****SECRET HAS SEEN****MAY 19 2003**

The comments below summarize the Report of the FCS Independent Assessment Panel, forwarded by the panel's chair, General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret).

Transformation – FCS and the Objective Force

- The Army's Objective Force will be a mix of current, interim (Stryker), special operations, and FCS units at any point in the foreseeable future.
- Expanding transformation to the Objective Force with the FCS component requires the Department to provide an integrated "born joint" set of capabilities.
- Producing the FCS family of systems is a complex undertaking because several critical technologies are not yet mature; however, mitigation plans are in place.
- Given the attention to concerns by the Army, they are on the proper track to transform to contribute to joint operations.

Interdependencies and Connectivity

- Achieving FCS capabilities will require that the Services and joint forces place higher value on joint interdependencies.
- An FCS unit's survivability and effectiveness are critically dependent on battle space awareness; key C4ISR issues require further definition and resolution to provide that environment.
- Providing the integrated C2 ISR connectivity stands out as the most critical challenge to the viability of the FCS concept.
- Dependency on, and contributions of, FCS units to Joint Force ISR should drive joint standards.

Architecture and Program Structure

- The 19 major systems of FCS Increment 1 will not come on line simultaneously, requiring multiple configurations within the 15 brigades, FCS Unit of Action (UA), that constitute Increment 1.
- The program's spiral approach is, and needs to be, field the first UA by the end of the decade and evolve capabilities through block changes.
- The magnitude of FCS transcends any previous efforts and will require the attention of the top leadership.

Critical Technologies

- A number of critical technologies have not yet been "demonstrated in a relevant manner," but risk mitigation plans exist. Mitigation plans need to include lower-risk alternatives.
- Software development is judged to be the greatest risk.
- DARPA should continue its partnership with the Army to stretch land warfare transformation.

May 19, 2003 9:09 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

SUBJECT: Response to Red Cross

Please have someone prepare appropriate responses to this letter from Debbie Hasty and see that the letters in here are delivered to the people they should be delivered to. These were brought to me by one of my high school classmates who were in this past weekend.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/16/03 Hasty ltr to SecDef w/attachments

DHR:dh
051903-6

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

*TO DAVID
Chu*

Thanks,

Jaymie Durnan

5/22

U16712 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16506

60115D

19 May 03



American Red Cross
Greater Miami & The Keys

May 16, 2003

SECDEF HAS SEEN
MAY 19 2003

(b)(6)

www.miamiredcross.org

Dear Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Mrs. Rumsfeld,

We are planning a very special evening to honor our brave and courageous soldiers of Operation Iraqi Freedom who fought, and the 171 who have died, to free a people they don't even know. One year after our troops entered Iraq-March 20, 2004 we would like to honor you and our awesome United States Armed Forces and celebrate with joy the new and freed Iraqi people at the 21st American Red Cross Ball here in Miami.

We would like you both there as our very Honored Guests. We would like the President there along with Secretary Colin Powell, General Franks, General Brooks, General McChrystal. We watched you every day during Operation Iraqi Freedom, prayed for you and we would like to thank you for all the wonderful wisdom and leadership you have shown this country, and the world.

The Red Cross Ball is the social event in Miami and we will have 500 or so many more if you agree to be our Guest of Honor.

Please read the following letter I wrote you, the President and Secretary Powell last month. I don't know if you, or they, ever had a chance to read it. But I ask you if you would take a few moments, please to consider our request. Please ask the President about it. I haven't had a response from anyone. I promise it will be a very special evening for the Dream Team.

Have a great time with the Wheelers- they are really special people and friends. You still remain in our nightly prayers, by name, along with our President and our Soldiers.

God bless you both.


Sincerely,

Debbie Hasty 
(b)(6)

Chairman, 2004 American Red Cross Freedom Ball

May 19, 2003 8:07 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Threats

The threat from land attack cruise missiles and lethal unmanned aerial vehicles is obviously going to grow and have serious implications over the coming five or ten years. What would you suggest I should do to make sure this Department is focusing on that, making the right investments, and developing the right doctrine, training and exercises to be prepared for it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903.4

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

U16713 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16508

381

19 May 03

SENT 6/3
May 31, 2003 8:45 AM
E6-5563

TO: Steve Cambone
Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Priority List

I must have the priority paper back, coordinated and with your recommendations.
These delays have to end.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053103-5

.....
Please respond by

6/8/03

06-03-03 11:15 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/16509

U16728 /03

DRH

3 June 03

May 19, 2003 10:48 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
cc: **DSD**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: History Channel Programs on Saddam Hussein

Is there any way to get more of this material about Saddam Hussein's "Butcher of Baghdad" and "Reign of Terror" from the History Channel out to the public? It is just amazing stuff, and people don't know it. If you have not seen it, make sure you do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-18

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

U16755 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16510

000.77

19 May 03
To: Clark

May 19, 2003 10:45 AM

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: IIA Briefing

Please tell Bremer that sometime this week I would like a briefing on the progress toward an Iraqi Interim Authority.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051903-17

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

U16761 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16511

bag

19 May 03

May 20, 2003 7:17 AM

OB
5/29

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Rebuttal

Article #42 in the *Early Bird* is just outrageous. I don't know who Lawrence Kaplan is, but we are doing just the opposite of what he is saying. I cannot imagine where he got this nonsense.

bof

You might want to do something about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Kaplan, Lawrence F. "Early Exit," *New Republic*, May 26, 2003, p. 18.

DHR:dh
052003-9

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

U16762 /03

10 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16512

to join them. At the same time, the Bush administration must persuade the Sharon government to accept the road map as the best route to Israeli security.

America, Israel and the Palestinians know where they must go in stopping terrorism, and they have a detailed map how to get there. There's no excuse for not seizing this opportunity to create a structure that can save lives.

New Republic

May 26, 2003

Pg. 18

42. Early Exit

Why the Bushies want out of Iraq.

By Lawrence F. Kaplan

At long last, the military brass, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his civilian advisers at the Pentagon, and even the State Department agree about U.S. policy toward Iraq. They all support an administration plan that calls for a fairly rapid drawdown of American forces there: Whereas the United States currently has 130,000 troops in Iraq, by the fall it intends to have just 30,000.

Unfortunately, the plan is an enormous mistake. As America's soon-to-be former proconsul in Iraq, retired General Jay Garner, explained two weeks ago, "Before we begin the reconstruction successfully, we have to have security." And, as the experience of the last month has amply demonstrated, even 130,000 troops are barely enough to provide security in Iraq. A simple point, one might think. But not when one passes through the looking glass that is the U.S. occupation of Iraq--an occupation that, for reasons that have as much to do with political theology as with the particulars of Iraq, administration officials insist isn't really an occupation at all.

On the ground, American military commanders have shown little interest in employing their troops as a

constabulary force. Operating under strict rules of engagement and orders that, according to Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt of *The New York Times*, risk "leaving some areas of Iraq uncovered or with a minimal troop presence," the U.S. Army has hunkered down even as Iraq appears at times to be coming apart around it. And the military, in the person of Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the land component commander in Iraq, continues to have the most important say on security matters inside the country. McKiernan fully shares the reluctance to act like an occupying power of the civilians above him. "Ask yourself if you could secure all of California with 150,000 troops," McKiernan said last week. "The answer is no. The ultimate answer rests with Iraqis being in control of their country."

Fair enough. But the question isn't merely how many troops you have on the ground; it's what you do with them. "The real issue is the need for active security operations," says Michael Vickers, an ex-Special Forces officer and military analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, "and that's already clashing with the Army's culture of force protection." Indeed, some of the fateful decisions of recent weeks, among them the failure to prevent the looting of Baghdad's National Museum, were actually made by military commanders on the ground (and duly seconded by their civilian superiors).

The military, of course, takes its cues from the secretary of defense. And Donald Rumsfeld's message has been straightforward: Pack lightly--you won't be staying long. "The coalition has no intention of owning or running Iraq," Rumsfeld said two weeks ago, repeating exactly the phrase he had applied earlier to Afghanistan.

Rumsfeld, needless to say, is no advocate of nation-building. As he explained in a February speech titled, appropriately enough, "Beyond Nation Building," "In some nation-building exercises, well-intentioned foreigners arrive on the scene, look at the problems, and say, 'Let's fix it.' ... When foreigners come in with international solutions to local problems, if (they are) not very careful, they can create a dependency." Rumsfeld's "aversion to nation-building is instinctual, and Iraq is no exception," says one Bush adviser. "The view is, U.S. forces should be preparing for the next conflict, not cleaning up after the last."

Hence, the secretary of defense, who advised scaling back America's participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and the Sinai and plans to shutter the Army's Peacekeeping Institute, now makes the remarkable case that the United States should scale back its participation in an American peacekeeping operation. Accordingly, he has recommended that American forces be pared down from five to one or two divisions within months, advised that foreign troops take their places in northern and southern Iraq, and proposed moving a sizable bulk of the U.S. contingent to remote Iraqi bases even sooner.

While it's hardly surprising that the military brass and Rumsfeld would support a rapid troop withdrawal from Iraq, the idea is also strangely popular with the Pentagon's neoconservatives--who went into Iraq with the high-minded aim of building a democracy there. But assurances from Iraqi exiles, such as Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi, that Iraq would reconstitute itself quickly and in a manner congenial to the United States led Pentagon planners to underestimate the enormity of the task ahead of them. In fact, the Defense Department did

not even begin postwar planning until late January. When, for example, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told a Senate hearing in February that occupying Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of American troops, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz replied that the figure was "wildly off the mark." Postwar France, not Haiti, was the model.

Nor have the experiences of the last four weeks budged many Pentagon officials from this belief. Echoing Chalabi's contention that a lengthy occupation "is predicated on keeping Saddam's existing structures of government, administration, and security in place," they wish to diminish America's "footprint"--and cede power to Iraqi exiles--as soon as possible. A prolonged U.S. occupation, they maintain, runs counter to the aim of Iraqi democracy and will surely turn Iraqis against their occupiers. "If there's still a sizable U.S. presence a year from now," one official said last month, "we will have failed." Moreover, the speedy resolution of the war, after a first week of doom-and-gloom predictions from the media, has only bolstered their certainty that press reports of a security vacuum are overblown.

At the State Department, the situation is almost exactly the reverse. Before the war, State Department officials were outspoken in their belief that the United States would need to maintain a sizable troop presence in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. At a February Senate hearing, Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman predicted American forces might have to stay in Iraq for up to two years, and Colin Powell's former Middle East point man, Anthony Zinni, said at the same hearing, "The idea that there's an exit strategy or (that) we leave is naive." But State Department officials now claim these predictions mostly reflected reservations about the war itself.

May 20, 2003 6:57 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Certificate for Bremer

I promised Jerry Bremer we would get him one of those certificates like my Secretary of Defense certificate. Would you please have the White House do it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003-3

Please respond by

5/27/03

Jim O'Brien:
Please get
a certificate.
Let me know if
I need to help
push. Thanks
J

9006

50 May 03

U16763 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16514

May 20, 2003 6:55 AM

ADVANCE COPY SENT

TO: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Thank You Letters

Duncan Hunter said he would have Rangel talk to you about the people we should send thank you notes. We should be getting those kinds of things done quickly, but I still have not seen the letters.

Please explain.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003-2

.....

Please respond by 5/21/03

335SD

U16768 /03

20 May 03

May 20, 2003 2:15 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
Jaymie Durnan

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: SOS/Chowder & Marching Breakfast

Here is an invitation for me to speak to the SOS/Chowder & Marching breakfast.

I would like to accept it. I think it is on a Wednesday morning.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/20/03 Cong. Bass ltr to SecDef (delivered by hand)

DHR:dh
052003-14

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16516

U16769 /03

0011SD

cc: - Powell Moore
- Pete Geren

50 May 03

CHARLES F. BASS

2D DISTRICT, NEW HAMPSHIRE

2421 RAYBURN BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2902

(202) 225-5206

e-mail: cbass@mail.house.gov

web page: www.house.gov/bass

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 20 2003

May 20, 2003

Secretary Donald Henry Rumsfeld
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20230

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I am writing to extend an invitation to you to be a guest speaker at a regular breakfast meeting of the House Wednesday SOS/Chowder & Marching groups. The group is made up of Members of Congress and former Members. Generally, attendance ranges between 20-30 Republican members representing diverse interests and wide spread geography.

SOS and C&M were founded as individual Republican clubs over 40 years ago and have included such distinguished members as Gerald Ford, John Rhodes, Dick Cheney and Jack Kemp. These two clubs along with the Wednesday Group meet together every Wednesday morning at 8:00 a.m. in the Members' Dining Room of the Capitol building when Congress is in session. The breakfast meeting is always a Members-only, off-the-record session.

During the 107th Congress, we discussed a wide array of issues with members of the President's cabinet, the print and broadcast media, economists, authors and business leaders. The group would be delighted to hear from you. Traditionally, most speakers present about twenty minutes of remarks followed by Q&A. Lindsey Lorinovich, of my staff, will follow up by telephone.

Again, this breakfast is held every Wednesday. I realize you have many demands on your time; however, any consideration you are able to give to this invitation would be appreciated!

Sincerely,



Charles F. Bass
Member of Congress

CFB:ll

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AND INVESTIGATIONS

• SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND THE INTERNET

*Dear Mr Secretary - this is
SOS - we surely would
appreciate your doing this
for us*

REPLY TO

□ 142 NORTH MAIN STREET
CONCORD, NH 03301
(603) 226-0249

□ 170 MAIN STREET
NASHUA, NH 03060
(603) 889-8772

□ 76 MAIN STREET
SUITE 2C
LITTLETON, NH 03561
(603) 444-1271

□ ONE WEST STREET
SUITE 208
KEENE, NH 03431
(603) 356-4094

11-L-0559/OSD/16517

May 20, 2003 12:01 PM

Done 5/27

ADVANCE GPM SENT

TO: LTG Craddock
Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Crime Numbers

Please validate the crime numbers. I am afraid to use them unless I am absolutely certain they are correct.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003-12

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

0005

U16771 /03

50604408

11-L-0559/OSD/16518

2002 Crime Statistics Sources

City

Albuquerque, N.M.
Los Angeles, CA
New York, N.Y.
Washington, D.C.
Paris, France
Moscow, Russia

Crime Statistic Source

Albuquerque Police Dept
Los Angeles Police Dept
New York City Police Dept
Washington D.C. Metro Police
Vocal, U.S. Embassy, Paris
U.S. Embassy Moscow, Russia

2002 CRIME STATISTICS

<u>CITY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>AVERAGE # OF MURDERS PER MONTH</u>	<u>AVERAGE # OF ROBBERY / LARCENY / THEFT PER MONTH</u>	<u># OF MURDERS PER MONTH (ADJUSTED TO POPULATION OF BAHGDAD)*</u>	<u># OF R/L/T PER MONTH (ADJUSTED TO POPULATION OF BAHGDAD)*</u>
Baghdad	5,600,000				
Albuquerque, N.M	448,607	4	2,680	50	33,455
Los Angeles, CA	3,694,820	54	12,995	82	19,696
New York, NY	8,008,278	49	10,863	34	7,596
Washington, DC	572,000	22	3,247	215	31,793
Paris, France	2,110,000	35	13,620	93	36,148
Moscow, Russia	9,000,000	106	5,027	66	3,128

*These numbers project a local crime rate to adjust for a population size to match Baghdad (5,600,000)

Prepared 5/21/2003 2:05 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/16520

May 20, 2003 6:48 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
Col. Bucci

(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Vin Weber

I would like to have Vin Weber come in and have a cup of coffee with me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003-22

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

*2 June 1030
Margaret Gann*

U16772 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16521

000.715D

20 May 03

CLARK & WEINSTOCK601 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005

Phone: (b)(6)

**The Honorable Vin Weber****U.S. Congressman 1981-1993**

Vin Weber is managing partner of Clark & Weinstock's Washington office. Mr. Weber provides strategic advice to institutions interested in issues before the legislative and executive branches of the federal government.

Prior to opening Clark & Weinstock's Washington office in 1994, Mr. Weber was president – and remains co-director with Jack Kemp, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Bill Bennett – of *Empower America*, an organization advocating policies that emphasize individual responsibility and accountability in approaching economic, social welfare and educational problems.

Mr. Weber is co-director of the Domestic Policy Project of the Aspen Institute. He also is a fellow at the Humphrey Institute at the University of Minnesota, where he is a co-director with former Congressman Tim Penny of the Policy Forum

(formerly the Mondale Forum). Mr. Weber is a board member of several private sector and non-profit organizations, including ITT Educational Services, Department 56, the German Marshall Fund, National Public Radio, Council on Foreign Relations and Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy.

Mr. Weber has been featured in numerous national publications, including the *National Journal*, the *New Republic*, the *Wall Street Journal* and the *American Spectator*, as both subject and author. He is a sought-after political and policy analyst, appearing frequently on the major television networks on Sunday political talk shows and on CNN's *Crossfire* program.

Mr. Weber served in the United States House of Representatives from 1981 to 1993, representing Minnesota's 2nd Congressional District. He was a member of the Appropriations Committee and an elected member of the House Republican Leadership. Prior to his congressional service, he served as campaign manager and chief Minnesota aide to Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (1978-1980), as the co-publisher of *The Murray County Herald* (1976-1978) and as press secretary to Rep. Tom Hagedorn (1974-1976).

Mr. Weber continues to enjoy strong bipartisan relationships across the legislative and executive branches of government. He and his wife Cheryl have homes in Alexandria, Virginia and Walker, Minnesota.

ACADEMIC AND PUBLIC POLICY LEADERSHIP

- Co-Founder and Co-Director of Empower America
- Co-Chair of the Aspen Institute's Domestic Strategy Group
- Senior Fellow at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and Co-Director of the Policy Forum; University of Minnesota
- Visiting Committee of the John F. Kennedy School of Government; Harvard University
- Senior Fellow at the Center of the American Experiment; Minneapolis, Minnesota
- Council Member, National Council for Political Management; George Washington University
- Advisory Committee Co-Chair of the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology

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SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 10/9/2003

ap
10/24

OSD CONTROL U16772-03
FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD
SUBJECT VIN WEBER
KEYWORDS

DOC 5/20/2003

DOR 10/9/2003

SIGNATURE CASE:

TO JAYMIE DURNAN, COL BUCCI

COMMENTS NO DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.

FN 000,7150

SEC U

OCN052003-22

RDD

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION

DECISION DATE

PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED

SUSPENSE

SUSPENSE COMPLETE

ACD

COORDINATION

SUSPENSE STATUS

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ADC RWI

11-L-0559/OSD/16523

May 20, 2003 6:50 PM

TO: Powell Moore

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Stevens

Please make sure that you get Congressman Davis and David Chu to talk to Senator Stevens about the personnel issue, and let's see where he really is on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003-23

*Green & Chu working
it*

Please respond by 5/30/03

U16773 /03

3202

20 May 03

May 20, 2003 2:43 PM

OB
6/2

TO: Gen. Franks

cc: D & D

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Codel Restrictions

The more I think about it, the more I want to loosen up the restrictions on Codel visits in Iraq. It would be a good thing for them and the world to see the mass graves and some of the prisons and torture chambers, and for them to develop conviction. It also would help for them to see the positive things that are happening, like what Petraeus is doing up north.

333

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003-16


.....
Please respond by 5/27/03

U16776 /03

307/03

May 21, 2003 10:55 AM

OB
5/29/03

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Quotes on DefenseLink

Every time I look at DefenseLink, I notice that the quotes they have are anywhere from a week to two weeks old. Why don't we refresh this thing more often?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052103-17

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

413.77

U16777 /03

31 May 03

May 21, 2003 7:37 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Elections

long

Here is a letter I want to send to Jerry Bremer. Why don't you think through what the answer ought to be and then handle it for Jerry with him.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/19/03 Hutar ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
052103-7

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

U16778 /03

31 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16527

INTERNATIONAL
FOUNDATION FOR
ELECTION SYSTEMS
1301 19th Street, N.W.
Third Floor
Washington, D.C. 20009

To: (b)(6)
From:
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April 24, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon, Room 3E880
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Don:

Congratulations for your superb work in the war against terrorism and enabling the people of Iraq to have the opportunity to live in a democracy.

I write to you as immediate past-president of the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and also on behalf of Professor Allen Weinstein, President and CEO of The Center for Democracy. Together, IFES and the Center have a total of 35 years of global experience in aiding countries' transition toward democracy and in helping them consolidate democratic institutions.

Earlier this month, our two organizations entered into a unique partnership, confirmed by our Directors, which has already resulted in a broad range of programmatic cooperation worldwide. For example, from May 21-23, IFES will co-sponsor the Center's annual International Judicial Conference held this year in Washington, D.C. More than 140 justices of highest courts from over 80 countries will discuss such topics as judicial response to terrorism and confronting judicial corruption.

Both IFES and the Center are deeply committed to assisting post-war democratic development once underway in Iraq, as we have done in the past as 'first responders' in such countries as the Philippines, the former Soviet Union, Nicaragua, Haiti, and elsewhere. Other areas include Bosnia and Kosovo.

Most recently, IFES in January 2002 helped organize one of the very first teams into Afghanistan, which produced a report that was widely used by USAID and the State Department. Priority areas of work center around Elections, Rules of Law, Civil Society, and Governance.

U06494 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16528

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
April 24, 2003
Page Two

We are extremely anxious to share our experiences as part of any democratic assessment team sent to Iraq at the successful conclusion of the current hostilities.

Allen and I would be grateful if you would share this letter with those responsible for organizing that process. We would be happy to meet with you and/or others involved in the democratic planning for post-war Iraq and appreciate your help in forwarding this letter along appropriately.

Sincerely,

Patricia Hutar, Chair
Board of Directors IFES Limited
International Foundation for Election Systems
1101 - 15th Street, N.W., Third Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005

I can be reached at (b)(6)
(b)(6)

May 21, 2003 7:05 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
LTG Craddock

Already Sent

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Personnel

I need an hour and a half twice a week on personnel until we get this business solved.

Thanks.

[Handwritten squiggle]

Working

3202

DHR:dh
052103-2

.....

Please respond by 5/21/03

31 May 03

U16779 /03

May 21, 2003 11:54 AM

TO: ADM Clark
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dominican Republic

Do our ships ever make port visits to the Dominican Republic?

There is a country that is very friendly, very helpful and very cooperative, unlike Puerto Rico, which has been uncooperative.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052103-18

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

6/5
CNO RESPONSE ATTACHED

1/2

C 6/5

U16801 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16531

Dominican Republic

21 May 03



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

INFO MEMO

IN REPLY REFER TO

June 2, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ADM V. E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: U.S. Ship Visits to the Dominican Republic

V. E. Clark
6/7/03

In your memorandum of May 21, 2003, you asked if our ships ever make port visits to the Dominican Republic.

- In the year prior to September 11, 2001, U.S. Navy Patrol Combatants made approximately five port visits to the Dominican Republic.
- In August 2002, USS PORTLAND made a port visit to Santo Domingo. Based on PORTLAND's after action report (which noted limitations in husbanding, water depth, and berthing facilities) we sent a survey team to assess suitability for future port visits.
- The survey determined that dredging is required for cruiser, destroyer and frigate visits. The Dominicans agreed to dredge the harbor in anticipation of UNITAS 2003, but were unable to do so.
- Until the port is dredged, port visits will be limited to shallow draft vessels such as amphibious ships and mine warfare vessels.
- With cessation of fleet operations at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, U.S. Navy ship operations in the Eastern Caribbean are infrequent. COMUSNAVSO will continue making port visits to the Dominican Republic as schedules allow.
- While not a port visit, a detachment from Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 133 completed a 3-month deployment to the Dominican Republic in May 2003 under SOUTHCOM's NEW HORIZONS Exercise program.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: CDR A.C. Jacobs, N523B, (b)(6)

REC: 6/5/03 @ 0830

11-L-0559/OSD/16532

5/22/03
Snowflake

EF-5408
C5/24

May 21, 2003 7:11 AM

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Nuclear Questions

Jaymie Durnan
5/22/03

Please look at the transcript from the May 20 press avail and the questions from Squitieri of *USA Today*. He claims there is a difference between a deep-penetrator and a battlefield weapon less than five kilotons. I don't know what he is talking about. Is he right?

A-471.61

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052103-5

.....
Please respond by 5/28/03

5-21-03

Mr. Secretary-

There is a difference between these two issues. The penetrator is a study we are seeking to fund; the five kiloton issue is a congressional restriction we are seeking to repeal. The one-pager attached provides an explanation.

01 May 03

J.D. U16803 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/46533

5/28

EF-5408



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

INFO MEMO

DATE: 1-03/007038

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J.D. O'Leary, II MAY 21 2003

DepSecDef

USDP

SUBJECT: Nuclear Issues in the FY04 Defense Authorization Bills

- The House and Senate are voting this week on competing versions of the FY04 DOD Authorization bills. There are two separate provisions on nuclear weapons matters we are tracking.

Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) Study

- Both bills would fund a feasibility study that would help to determine if an existing nuclear weapon could be repackaged to improve our ability to defeat hardened underground targets.
- We support this study. It is a study. It is not, as some critics have charged, a decision to develop, produce, or deploy new nuclear weapons.

Precision Low-Yield Weapon Development (PLYWD)

- A separate provision in the SASC bill would repeal the existing ban on research and development that could lead to production of new low-yield nuclear weapons.
- We support the repeal. The current ban restricts our ability to understand nuclear weapons capabilities that potential adversaries may seek.
- The HASC bill contains a provision that would repeal the ban on research, but maintain the prohibition on development and production.
- We oppose this language, as decision-makers may be reluctant to allocate funds for efforts that cannot move beyond the research stage.
- We will keep you apprised of developments.

Prepared by: David J. Trachtenberg, PDASD/ISP, (b)(6)

11-L-05504 SD/16534

May 21, 2003 9:53 AM

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Papers

ADVANCE COPY SENT

Please try to make sure that I get the papers from Feith and Haynes on the disarmament of weapons in Iraq and disestablishing the ministries of defense. I need them today.

Thanks.

[Signature]

DHR:dh
052103-15

.....
Please respond by 5/21/03

SecDef —

- Doug Feith & Bill Luti walked both in to you today around 3:00 pm
- You said you would read the proposed policy on ministry of defense
- Doug said he was not comfortable with the weapons policy — he has not studied it — you told him to work on it quickly or provide an interim option to LTG *etc. via man thru you.*
- *T have both papers available.*

U16804 103

11-L-05591 OSD/16535


6/10/03

6/10/03

May 22, 2003 8:44 AM

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Jaymie Durnan
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Congressman Rogers

Congressman Mike Rogers told me he was involved in trying to get some burn victims out of Baghdad into Kuwait, so they could be flown to Germany for assistance. He said he had arranged all the payments for everything, except the flight from Baghdad to Kuwait. All he had to do was get them to a commercial airline. The commercial airlines would fly them free, and the hospitals would take care of them free. The good will would be enormous. He had enormous bureaucratic problems with this.

Could you please have someone get the facts on that for me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-16

.....

Please respond by ~~6/6/03~~ 5/27/03

U16805 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16536

IRAQ

52 May 03

MIKE ROGERS
8TH DISTRICT, MICHIGAN

133 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-6972
(202) 225-6820 FAX

1327 EAST MICHIGAN AVENUE
LANSING, MI 48213
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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2206

May 22, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

As we discussed at the Capitol on Wednesday evening, I would appreciate your assistance in facilitating the effort to move to the University of Michigan Trauma Burn Center several Iraqi children who were burned due to coalition bombing during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In April, a constituent asked me to help bring to the U-M burn center a 16-year-old girl, Hannan Shahib, who was terribly burned during a coalition bombing. The burn center, Northwest Airlines and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services all cooperated to make it possible to get this young girl to the specialized treatment available here. That preparation took about three days. At the same time, we sought assistance from Central Command and Department of Defense to fly the girl out of Baghdad, but it was three agonizing weeks before that could happen. I am sure you appreciate that due to the nature of the injuries from burns, this is a time sensitive effort.

A U.S. military doctor in Baghdad met other children who needed burn treatment as well, all from coalition bombings. Immediately we began working to bring those children to the U-M facility for treatment. One of the children was so bad, that we had an urgent request last week to get her to treatment immediately. Everything except DoD approval was in place in less than 24 hours, but, unfortunately, the 7-year-old died before we could get her transport.


Mr. Secretary, I cannot stress enough how much the movement of Hannan to treatment gave the military men and women on the ground in Baghdad a sense of making a positive impact. While they are very proud of all they accomplished militarily in ousting Saddam Hussein, this act of compassion toward Hannan became for them a symbol of our humanitarian intent in Iraq. I hope that we all share that sense of compassion for these youngsters who are our hope for a new Iraq.

Thank you for speaking with me last evening, and thank you for your leadership at a critical and historical time in our nation. I look forward to hearing from you.

*Thank you
for your help on
this issue*

MR/sw

Sincerely,



Mike Rogers
Member of Congress

May 22, 2003 8:05 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Ben Cohen

Is Ben Cohen working in the Pentagon now? If so, please tell me what he is doing. He used to be the staff director for the House Republican Policy Committee.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052303-15

Please respond by 5/30/03

in helping coordinate
the ENVIRO package.

A good guy!

J/R

J

U16806 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16538

May 22, 2003 8:05 AM

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Powell Moore
ADM Clark
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hydrogen

Congressman Dana Rohrabacher mentioned something about hydrogen for the Navy. He said he had passed you the information.

Would you please see that Vern Clark gets it, and then have Vern let me know what he thinks of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-13

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

U16807 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16539

463

fuel

5060422C

May 22, 2003 8:05 AM

TO: Powell Moore / Pete Geren
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR-
SUBJECT: Congressman Mike Turner

Someone said that Mike Turner of Ohio did a good job in turning back amendments on the floor. Could you please find out what he did, see if I should write him a note and then draft it for me?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-14

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

U16808 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16540

032

50 pages

May 22, 2003 8:01 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Torie Clarke
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Getting the Story Out

Larry D. R. 6/8
Congressman Nussle of the Budget Committee said yesterday that he thought we were being attentive to taxpayers' money, but he really thought there ought to be a way we could show the taxpayers that we were being attentive.

Should we begin to think of how we can say we have saved money on different things and what we are trying to do? I think that is a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR:db
052203-11

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

6/17

See Zakheim note, attached

Larry D. R. 6/8

U16809 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16541

110.01

22 May 03

SENT 5/31 0945

May 30, 2003 11:54 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Savings

Where are the lists that show we are saving money in different things around here and that we are respectful of the taxpayers' dollars?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-7

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16542

2/12
1920



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

2003 JUN 12 AM 10:01

COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

June 11, 2003, 8:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Telling our Story on Stewardship of Taxpayer Money

- This is in reply to your recent memoranda (Tab A) on saving money and getting our story out about being good stewards of taxpayer money. Attached are examples of DoD actions supporting good stewardship. I will continue to develop these and related materials to help us get this story out.
- Telling our story on stewardship of taxpayer money is not only money savings initiatives, but also our management initiatives.
- We have had some success on specific issues with both the Hill and the press, e.g., transformation legislation, 2-year budgeting, management initiatives, and Personnel Security Investigations transferred to OPM.
- The appropriations bills are currently going through mark-up, and the authorization bills through conference. It is important that we continue to demonstrate our commitment to management improvements.
- I have already been working the Hill on our business architecture by using briefings and lunches to keep key staffers informed.
- I will work with Powell, Ken, and Torie to develop a more detailed plan of action.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Robert Shue,

(b)(6)

BPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	6/12

DoD Stewardship of Taxpayer Money

1. Adopt and support the right strategy

- 2001 QDR blueprint to transform U.S. defense to reflect 21st century realities.
- NPR recommended New Triad geared to realities of post-Cold War.
- Missile defense: new direction and way of budgeting (consolidate various \$ pots)
- Near-term requirements balanced with long-term transformation.

2. Acquire the right military capabilities

- Over \$80 billion shifted from old to new plans for FY 2004-09 – for early termination of acquisition programs and other efficiencies.
- Increased investments in transformation goals, Science & Technology.
- New ways to fulfill military missions, e.g. unmanned vehicles.
- Better focus on new threats: SSGN conversion, increased SOF.
- Skip ahead to better technologies/systems: CVN-21, DD-21 to DDX.

3. Change how U.S. military fights

- Joint operational concepts: interoperability, info superiority, intelligence, precision, speed, range, mobility, survivability, lighter logistics burden.
- New Unified Command Plan, greater roles for SOCOM and JFCOM.

4. Put people first

- Military compensation: Both added dollars and better distribution of funds through targeted pay raises for people who are hardest to retain.
- Privatization leverages budgets to yield quality housing faster: over 92,000 units.

5. Achieve passage of Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act

- National Security Personnel System; better military personnel management.
- Transformed acquisition process, range preservation initiative.
- DoD reorganization, greater flexibility for appropriated funding, fewer reports.

6. Improve defense acquisition

- Spiral development and other initiatives speed fielding of new systems.
- Realistic funding: FY 2002-03 requests added \$8 billion to key programs.
- Rationalizing long-term program, most notably tactical aircraft.

7. Streamline and upgrade DoD facilities

- President's and Congress's support for new 2005 BRAC round remains critical to achieve more streamlined, cost-effective facilities infrastructure.
- Once fully implemented. BRAC 2005 will save about \$8 billion per year.
- Facilities recapitalization: FY 2002-03 PB added about \$2 billion per year.

8. Overhaul internal DoD programming/budgeting

- Balanced scorecard and performance metrics to guide budget decisions and improve programs.
- New process: combined program/budget review, 2-year cycle, execution review.

9. Modernize business management systems

- The Department's 2,000 business systems are being transformed by eliminating some of them and overhauling the rest. The Business Enterprise Architecture is guiding the transformation. It will standardize and integrate systems, enabling them to generate timely and accurate business information for DoD leaders.

10. Advance other management improvements

- Senior leadership is in charge through Senior Executive Council, Business Initiative Council (BIC), and Defense Business Board, and use of the Management Initiative Decision (MID) process. Below are highlights of MIDs.
- Competitive Sourcing (MID 907): Directs studies of 226,000 DoD positions to determine which public or private organization can best provide the functions of those positions. Once the results of the studies are implemented, savings for FY 2006-2009 would likely exceed \$300 million.
- Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) (MID 908): DoD is seeking statutory authority to transfer the PSI function to the Office of Personnel Management, which would make it the central provider of these services for the federal government. This would eliminate redundancy and other inefficiencies, and is projected to save \$160 million.
- Defense Agencies (MID 909): Examples of proposals include:
 - For the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA): Divest its Document Automation and Production Service, finance various logistics studies from within available resources, and demolish obsolete fuel facilities.
 - For Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA): Conduct pilot test for outsourcing its audit workload.
- BIC Initiatives (MID 902): Examples include:
 - Cell phone economies: Achieve savings by pooling and bundling unused cell phone minutes by organization, installation, or regional level. This initiative now has been broadened to encourage users to obtain flexible cell phone plans that are tailored to their needs and most cost effective.
 - Alternatives for outsourcing. This advances the use of several efficient means for outsourcing non-core DoD functions to the private sector. Such means include direct service contracts and the commercial cost comparison option permitted by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. One example: One DoD organization outsourced its desktop computer services by defining them as a new requirement, then negotiating with the private sector for the efficient providing of those services.
 - Web-based processing. For DoD contracts, convert from paper-based to web-enabled process. This would speed up processing, make payments more timely and thus reduce penalties against DoD, and save operating costs.

May 22, 2003 7:42 AM

TO: Marshall Billingslea
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SOCOM Event

Thanks so much for the feedback on the SOCOM event. I am delighted it worked out so well.

Regards.

DHR:dh
052203-6

.....

Please respond by _____

335SD

U16810 /03

22 May 03

May 22, 2003 7:28 AM

TO: Jerry Bremer

CC: Jay Garner
Larry Di Rita
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Oil and Democracy

Attached is a memo I dictated after a visit with Alan Greenspan. I think you will find it interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/21/03 SecDef memo to USD(P) re: Oil and Democracy [052003-19]

DHR:dh
052203-2

.....
Please respond by _____

U16811 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16547

DR

22 May 03

May 21, 2003 9:45 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Oil and Democracy

Alan Greenspan came by to see me. The subject was oil and democracy.

Our discussion was along these lines:

We must keep the revenues from oil away from government. Throughout the world, underdeveloped countries with oil have wasted the revenues. They have been stolen, misused and used to suppress the population.

In the old days, the people of a country could swarm over a small minority that was robbing them or repressing them. Not so today. Small minorities—bullies—can use technology to successfully repress majorities. Repression works because of modern technologies.

The goal in Iraq from the outset should be to get the oil revenues into the hands of the Iraqi people. One approach might be to establish four or five mutual funds and put the revenues from oil and gas into them. They would be owned by the Iraqi people. The plan would be to take a small portion of the revenues of the funds, and pay them to the owners of the funds, all adult Iraqi citizens. There are issues as the definition of an Iraqi citizen (for example, are the people who just returned Iraqi citizens) but those issues could be dealt with.

Fortunately, the average income in the country is so low that it could make a significant difference and substantially affect the annual income of the Iraqi people by giving them a relatively small amount of money. Each of the funds would pay exactly the same monthly dividends, regardless of their varying successes.

The rest of the funds' income could be for:

1. Strengthening the oil infrastructure, improving liftings, building pipelines, and finding more efficient ways to do things.

11-L-0559/OSD/16548

2. Other infrastructure in the country that will benefit the Iraqi people and contribute towards increasing private sector economic activity and the economic well-being of the country.
3. Loans for small businesses. If the fund made loans for small businesses, it could help to develop a middle class, an entrepreneurial class, people who would develop material values, which could then begin to create in the Iraqi people a sense of progress. This could weaken the pull of Islamic fundamentalism.

Democracy

Democracy is linked to this idea. Democracy can be dangerous in the sense that if you have a group of people who have spiritual values but not material values and have not practiced the art of compromise, if they go too fast to an election by majority rule, it could end up with a permanent mistake—one vote, one time—and another Iran-like theocracy.

In short, we need to lay a foundation for self-government. The way to get a non-theocratic system is to go slowly. People have to begin to see what is in it for them.

That suggests we should not rush to have elections. We can have votes on things like city councils with a limited mandate—to help get sewers fixed, help get the garbage picked up, help get policemen out. Otherwise, the fundamentalists will very likely sweep, in a way that is disadvantageous to the people in terms of their long-term future and benefit.

Democracy involves choosing between things. If the people don't have things to choose between and there are strong, dominant theocratic forces, the outcome may be an unhappy one.

In short, the management of the oil revenues could conceivably help to begin to lay the foundation for movement towards democracy.

Thanks.

DHR:db
052003-19

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Please respond by _____

May 22, 2003 10:26 AM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Meet w/Cong. Hunter

We have to arrange for me sit down with Duncan Hunter before the conference to go over the things on BRAC and some other things in the bill that we want taken out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-24

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Please respond by 6/6/03

U16812 103

11-L-0559/OSD/16550

322.3

22 May 03

May 22, 2003 10:14 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
CC: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Richard Perle

Why don't you get Jim Haynes to draft a letter about Perle serving on the Defense Policy Board—what the ethics policies for the Board members are and that he has obeyed them.

We also ought to possibly have Jim talk to somebody at the Center for Public Integrity and make sure they understand what the facts are.

Thanks.

Attach.

Kass, John. "Perle's Actions Indefensible in Light of Bush Vow," *Chicago Tribune*, May 21, 2003.

DHR:dh
052203-23

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Please respond by 6/6/03

*Believe this
was closed
verbally @ round
table per Mij McInish
M 7/24*

U16813 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16551

334

02771653

"Perle is in conflict," said Charles Lewis, director of the Center for Public Integrity, a Washington-based ethics watchdog group.

"Over the past several months there have been two or three incidents reported where it seems that he's made or tried to make a buck from his Defense Policy Board access," Lewis told me in a telephone interview Tuesday. "Except for news reports, I don't hear any great outcry, and that's unfortunate. You know how Washington scandals go. There's a story or two, and then if it dies, it dies."

Well, I don't think this one should die.

According to a May 7 story in the Los Angeles Times, Perle and other members of the Defense Policy Board received a classified briefing in February from the "super-secret Defense Intelligence Agency on crises in North Korea and Iraq."

"Three weeks later," the paper reported, "the then-chairman of the board, Richard N. Perle, offered a briefing of his own at an investment seminar, on ways to profit from possible conflicts with both countries.

"Perle and his fellow advisers also heard a classified address about high-tech military communications systems at the same closed-door session," the Times reported. "He runs a venture capital firm that has been exploring investments in that very area."

I wrote about Perle in March after he resigned the chairmanship of the Defense Policy Board over other news reports that he sought defense-related business for a private company, Global Crossing, while running the board. Perle said the criticism was "monstrous."

After Perle resigned, I left it, figuring that the resignation was necessary and reasonable. What I didn't figure was that he would resign the chairmanship but remain on the board. And I didn't figure that Bush and Rumsfeld would keep him there.

You wouldn't accept that shell game from your local PTA, so why should we accept it from our White House?

"He never really resigned," Lewis said. "He's still on the board. Republicans won't embarrass the president with congressional hearings, and the Democrats won't pursue it either, perhaps because they've made political calculations and there are prominent Democrats on the board too."

If the Clintons had played it this way, Republicans would shriek their outrage. Now, though, the Republicans are silent.

I saw Bush speak in Philadelphia three years ago. It looked as if he actually believed the words coming out of his mouth. And I could hear him plainly.

I didn't even have to read his lips.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

April 25, 2003, 2:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Inquiry into Allegations Involving Mr. Richard N. Perle

- This updates my info memo of April 2, 2003 (Tab A), that reported our initiation of a preliminary inquiry into an alleged conflict of interest and related misconduct on the part of Mr. Richard Perle, a member of the Defense Policy Board.
- We have since obtained: (1) information concerning the nature of Mr. Perle's employment arrangement with DoD; (2) his financial disclosure statements and related ethics advisements; and (3) records of Defense Policy Board deliberations during the time that Mr. Perle served as Chairman.
- That information is not sufficient to resolve issues that were raised by Congressman John Conyers, Jr., in his letter to us of March 24, 2003. In accordance with our standard procedures, we will conduct additional investigative work that will involve interviews with knowledgeable witnesses, including Mr. Perle.
- Pursuant to our standard procedures we advised Mr. Perle (by telephone) and the complainant, Congressman Conyers (by mail; see letters at Tab B), that we will proceed with an inquiry. Because the congressional complaint was on Committee letterhead, we also advised Congressman James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee.
- I reiterate that we have not substantiated any allegation against Mr. Perle at this point. The results of our inquiry will be provided to you.

COORDINATION: None

cc: General Counsel of the Department of Defense

Prepared By: Joseph E. Schmitz (b)(6)



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

April 2, 2003, 4:50 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Inquiry into Allegations Involving Mr. Richard N. Perle

- In response to a letter dated March 24, 2003, on House Judiciary Committee letterhead from Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member, we initiated a preliminary inquiry into an alleged conflict of interest and related misconduct on the part of Mr. Richard Perle, a member of the Defense Policy Board.
- On April 1, 2003, I discussed this matter with the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee who informed me that he was unaware the letter had been sent.
- Congressman Conyers and other individuals who have since contacted this office regarding Mr. Perle alleged that:

Mr. Perle is representing another party in a matter in which the United States has an interest. Depending on the facts of Mr. Perle's activities, such conduct could violate 18 USC 203 (compensation in matters affecting the Government) or 18 USC 205 (activities of officers in matters affecting the Government);

- Mr. Perle participated as a Government official in particular matters which could have affected his private financial interests in violation of 18 USC 208 (acts affecting a personal financial interest); and
 - Mr. Perle's activities with outside entities may have violated prohibitions in the Joint Ethics Regulation that a Government employee shall not "use his public office for his own private gain," "give preferential treatment to any private organization," lose "impartiality in the performance of his official duties," or engage in "actions creating the appearance" of impropriety.
- As in any senior official matter at this stage, it is important to note that we have not substantiated any allegation against Mr. Perle. The results of our preliminary inquiry, and any resulting investigation, will be provided to you.

COORDINATION: None

cc: General Counsel of the Department of Defense

Prepared By: Joseph E. Schmitz (b)(6)



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

APR 11 2003

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-6216

Dear Congressman Conyers:


This is an initial response to your letter of March 24, 2003, requesting that the Inspector General "immediately open an investigation into allegations of conflict of interest and other misconduct involving Richard N. Perle, Chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board."

We have initiated an inquiry regarding the conduct of Mr. Perle and will provide you with our findings as soon as possible.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at

(b)(6)

Sincerely,


John R. Crane
Director
Office of Communications
and Congressional Liaison

cc: The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Chairman

11-L-0559/OSD/16555

OB
5/29

May 22, 2003 9:04 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Points to Make

Here are some remarks Doug Feith made. If you will see the section marked at the bottom of page 3, there are some things we ought to get out in the public if we haven't already.

for I

Thanks.

Attach.

Testimony on Post-War Iraq by Douglas J. Feith, May 15, 2003.

DHR:dh
052203-21


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Please respond by 5/27/03

U16814 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16556

20 May 03



Testimony on Post-War Iraq by Douglas J. Feith

Under Secretary of Defense For Policy Before the Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives 15 May 2003

Post-War Reconstruction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you about the work of the Defense Department and the U.S. Government to a free Iraq on its feet and headed toward stable, democratic government.

Combat operations to liberate Iraq moved speedily. From their start to the fall of Baghdad was a period of three weeks. Less five weeks have elapsed since Baghdad fell. Stability operations are underway throughout Iraq. Much work remains to be done before the coalition's military victory can be confirmed as a strategic victory.

As President Bush has announced, major combat operations in Iraq have ended. The Coalition continues to encounter attacks from scattered, small elements that remain loyal to the former regime. Coalition forces are proceeding with so-called Sensitive Site Exploitation, working their way down a list of hundreds of locations that may contain materiel or information relating to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Our forces are rounding up, more or less daily, regime leadership figures on our most wanted list and are collecting information on the Saddam Hussein regime's ties to terrorist activity.

Meanwhile, the Coalition has the responsibility for the time being to administer Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people. The Coalition is providing humanitarian relief, organizing basic services, working to establish security and creating the conditions for the liberated Iraqis to organize a new government for themselves.

Some Reflections on the War

Before entering more deeply into the post-war issues, I'd like to spend a moment on the war itself. As Secretary Rumsfeld has said, military commanders and historians will study this war with care for many years. I think they will find much in the plan and execution that was innovative, courageous and successful.

Some noteworthy points:

- Coalition forces began the ground war before the major air campaign. This gave us a degree of tactical surprise under circumstances in which strategic surprise was clearly impossible.
- Our forces demonstrated flexibility. They were able to adjust to bad news – for example, General Franks re-routed the Fourth Infantry Division after the Turkish Parliament refused to allow it to stage from Turkey.
- We used special operations forces to forestall particularly worrisome Iraqi options, such as missile attacks on Israel and sabotage of the southern oil fields and oil terminals.

- Our forces advanced rapidly into Baghdad to take advantage of – indeed to accelerate – the quick-paced collapse of Saddam's regime.
- And we used time-sensitive intelligence to attack high-value targets virtually instantly.

All in all, General Franks and his team developed a plan that was careful and detailed with scope for daring, adjustment and improvisation. It was a plan that reflected the essence of our new defense strategy, the acknowledgement that our intelligence always and inevitably imperfect, that the future is uncertain and that we must plan to be surprised. General Franks' plan allow coalition forces to exploit opportunities rapidly, as they presented themselves.

I expect that historians will long debate the extent to which the plan helped us avoid many of the "horribles" that we foresaw with concern (for example, large-scale refugee flows across Iraq's borders and Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons). Whatever the historians' conclusions on these difficult questions of cause and effect, however, we can be confident that they judge the thought and action of General Franks and of the Central Command as a favorable reflection on the brains, skill and character of the U.S. armed forces.

Post-war Objectives in Iraq

Now that major combat operations in Iraq are over, our policy goals remain:

- First, continue to demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that the United States and its coalition partners aspire liberate the Iraqis and not to occupy or control them or their economic resources.
- Second, eliminate Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, its nuclear program, the related delivery systems, and the related research and production facilities.
- Third, eliminate Iraq's terrorist infrastructure. A key element of U.S. strategy in the global war on terrorism is exploit the information about terrorist networks that the coalition acquires through our military and law enforcement actions.
- Fourth, safeguard Iraq's territorial unity.
- Fifth, reconstruct the economic and political systems, putting Iraq on a path to become a prosperous and free country. U.S. and its coalition partners share with many Iraqis the hope that their country will enjoy the rule of law and other institutions of democracy under a broad-based government that represents the various parts of Iraqi society.

We are pursuing these goals with a two-part determination: a commitment to stay and a commitment to leave.

- That is, a *commitment to stay* as long as required to achieve these objectives. We did not take military action in Iraq just to leave a mess behind for the Iraqi people to clean up without our lending a helping hand. That would ill serve the Iraqi people and the world and ourselves.
- But the United States and our coalition partners have a *commitment to leave* as soon as possible, for Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people.

When Iraqi officials are in a position to shoulder their country's responsibilities, when they have in place the necessary political and other structures to provide food, security and the other necessities, the coalition will have a strong interest in seeing them manage their own affairs. It is our interest to hasten the day when Iraq can become a proud, independent and respected member of the community of the world's free countries.

We are encouraging contributions and participation from around the world – from coalition partners, non-governmental organizations, the UN and other international organizations and others. We aim to transfer as much authority as possible, as soon as possible, to the Iraqis themselves. But the United States will not try to foist burdens onto those who are not in a position to carry them.

The Coalition Provisional Authority

When he declared Iraq's liberation, General Franks, as Commander of the Coalition Forces, announced the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA serves, in effect, as a government pending the Iraqi people's creation of a permanent government.

government. General Franks was initially the head of the CPA.

Last week, the President named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to be his Envoy to Iraq and put him in charge of all civilian U.S. personnel in Iraq, including the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA). On Tuesday, May 13th, Secretary Rumsfeld appointed Mr. Bremer as the head of the CPA, with the title of Administrator.

It is distressing to see news reports to the effect that Mr. Bremer's appointment reflects dissatisfaction with the work of Jay Garner, the director of ORHA. These reports are false. Starting in late January, Jay Garner created ORHA from scratch, staffed from a dozen or so offices of the US Government, from our coalition partners and from the private sector and got it deployed first to Kuwait and then, within weeks, to Baghdad, had ORHA manage the distribution of humanitarian assistance and began the process of building the new Iraq both physically and politically. The job was immense, the conditions difficult in the extreme, the time short and the achievements, as I shall discuss in some detail, have been substantial. Jay Garner has done superb work and deserves admiration and gratitude.

I would like to help set the record straight here: Secretary Rumsfeld decided in January to ask Jay Garner to organize the post-war planning office in the Pentagon. I made the first call to Jay to ask if he would undertake the assignment. In that call, I explained that the director of that office would build on the various post-war planning efforts that had been underway for months throughout the U.S. government. We conceived of the office as "expeditionary" in nature – the idea was that it would comprise the people who would, in the event of war, deploy to Iraq as soon as possible to form the nucleus of the staff of the coalition's post-conflict administration.

In that first call, I explained to Jay Garner that the director of the post-war planning office might or might not deploy to Iraq; in any case, the intention was that a senior civilian administrator would be appointed in Iraq after the major combat phase and that the post-war planning office (which became known as ORHA) would report to that administrator. Mr. Bremer's appointment fulfilled that original intention. People unfamiliar with this background have unfortunately misinterpreted events in a way that is unjust to a fine man.

The Challenges Facing the Coalition Provisional Authority: Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction

Now I would like to turn to the work the Coalition Provisional Authority has just begun, as Iraq emerges from its long period of tyranny.

Humanitarian problems exist, primarily in the areas of electricity and water supply, but the overall situation is not desperate. War caused much less damage than many expected – the major problems derive from the sad state of the pre-war infrastructure and from post-war violence by Baathists and ordinary criminals. The Coalition has managed to avert the humanitarian crisis through a combination of unprecedented interagency planning and preparation and the skill of our combat forces. In recent remarks, ICRC President Kellenberger, just back from Iraq, confirmed that there is not now a humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

It is useful to put our recovery efforts in Iraq in perspective. Iraq is a country that had been run into the ground by decades of systematic oppression and misrule. Even before the war:

- Only 60% of Iraqis had reliable access to safe drinking water
- 10 of Al Basrah's 21 potable water treatment facilities were not functional.
- 70% of sewage treatment plants were in urgent need of repair and 500,000 metric tons of raw or partially treated sewage was discharged into the Tigris and Euphrates rivers – Iraq's water supply.
- 23% of children under 5 suffered from malnutrition.
- Iraq's electrical power system (critical to its water system) was operating at half of its capacity.
- 80% of 25,000 schools were in poor condition – with an average of one book per six students.
- 60% of the population is wholly dependent on the UN oil-for-food program for subsistence.

The Coalition and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance are working to return all sectors of Iraqi life to pre-war baseline, and then to put Iraq on a trajectory toward sustained improvement.

Security is the *sine qua non* for relief and recovery efforts. It is the Coalition's highest priority. There has already been progress. Over half of Iraq's provinces, including Baghdad, have been declared "permissive." Throughout Iraq, the Coalition is screening and paying local police officers and often participating in joint patrols to address security concerns. We are bringing in international police advisors to do retraining and are reopening courts. We are also working with the Iraqi governmental


The Coalition to Win the Peace

We have won the war in Iraq. We are committed to winning the peace.

The United States is not acting alone. We have worked with a coalition in prosecuting the war and we have a broad coalition is contributing to stability operations and reconstruction. We are working also with the United Nations and various non-governmental organizations. And, of paramount importance, we are working with Iraqis who are eager to create for themselves government that will secure their freedom, build democratic institutions and threaten neither the Iraqi people, their neighbors others with tyranny, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction or aggression.

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May 22, 2003 7:52 AM

TO: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hospital

ADVANCE COPY SENT

Are there any wounded folks from Iraq or Afghanistan in Walter Reed or Bethesda who will be there this coming Sunday, May 25?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-10

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

U16815 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16561

789

53 May 03

May 22, 2003 3:25 PM

TO: J.D. Crouch
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: St. Petersburg

Russien

Sergei Ivanov said he wants me to visit St. Petersburg in September. I should let him know soon, so he can make arrangements for that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-31

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

U16816 /03

22 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16562

May 22, 2003 3:24 PM

TO: J.D. Crouch

CC: LTG Craddock T

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Ivanov

Sergei Ivanov said he wants to try to see me when I am at the Brussels meeting. He could come in the night of 12 June or see me on June 13, the day of the NATO-Russia meeting, or stay the night of June 13. He would like me to get back to him and let him know, so he can plan his schedule.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-30

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

U16817 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16563

Russia

22 May 03

May 22, 2003 2:11 PM

TO: Steve Herbits

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tillie Fowler

Please make sure if you talk to Tillie that she understands it is for one year, and that we are going to review all of these things every year.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-29

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

U16818 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16564

534

529/16/03

May 22, 2003 10:34 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crime Statistics

Please fax these crime statistics over to George Will for me.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/22/03 "2002 Crime Statistics"

DHR:dh
052203-27

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

U16838 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16565

2002 CRIME STATISTICS

<u>CITY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>AVERAGE # OF MURDERS PER MONTH</u>	<u>AVERAGE # OF ROBBERY / LARCENY / THEFT PER MONTH</u>	<u># OF MURDERS PER MONTH (ADJUSTED TO POPULATION OF BAGHDAD)*</u>	<u># OF R/L/T PER MONTH (ADJUSTED TO POPULATION OF BAGHDAD)*</u>
Baghdad, Iraq	5,600,000				
Albuquerque, N.M	448,607	4	2,680	50	33,455
Los Angeles, CA	3,694,820	54	12,995	82	19,696
New York, NY	8,008,278	49	10,863	34	7,596
Washington, DC	572,000	22	3,247	215	31,793
Paris, France	2,110,000	35	13,620	93	36,148
Moscow, Russia	9,000,000	106	5,027	66	3,128


***These numbers project a local crime rate to adjust for a population size to match Baghdad (5,600,000)**

<u>City</u>	<u>Crime Statistic Source</u>
Albuquerque, N.M.	Albuquerque Police Dept
Los Angeles, CA	Los Angeles Police Dept
New York, N.Y.	New York City Police Dept
Washington, D.C.	Washington D.C. Metro Police
Paris, France	Vocal, U.S. Embassy, Paris.
Moscow, Russia	U.S. Embassy Moscow, Russia

Prepared 5/22/2003 8:49 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/16566

May 22, 2003 10:29 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Soup Campbell

Please take a look at this job description for Soup Campbell over at CIA and tell me what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Brochure: "Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support"

DHR:dh
052203-25

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

U16839 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16567

SUPPORT

In support of the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), the ADCI/MS shall:

- Assist in the development of mutually supporting and integrated clandestine operations between the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) and CIA.
- Assist in the development of joint deployment and training opportunities between DHS and CIA.
- Participate in the integration and deconfliction of CIA covert action with DoD conventional and Special Operations plans and operations.

In overseeing the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), the ADCI/MS will ensure that the following tasks are performed:

Via the DCI representatives to the Unified Commands, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the ADCI/MS will ensure:

- CIA participation in the JCS and Unified Commands deliberate planning process.

- Liaison with the Joint Staff regarding CIA support to military plans, exercises, and operations.
- CIA support to JCS and Unified Command exercises and participation in DoD's Joint Lessons Learned process.

Enhance and maintain education and outreach programs from CIA to the military to inform them of CIA roles, missions, and capabilities to support the warfighter.

Participate in the organization, administration and deployment of CIA components of National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST).

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR MILITARY SUPPORT



VISION

Establish the Office of the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support as the preeminent authority for support to the military throughout the Intelligence Community (IC). Improve and enhance intelligence support provided to the military by the IC at large and the CIA in particular, with the strategic direction of enabling the successful accomplishment of the goals set forth in Joint Vision 2010.

MISSION

The Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support (ADCI/MS) serves as the principal adviser to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on military issues. Subject to the guidance and direction of the DCI, the ADCI/MS formulates, recommends, coordinates, and when necessary, directs the implementation of IC policies on support for military forces plans, exercises, and operations. The ADCI/MS reviews the allocation of IC resources to ensure adequate support to the military across the spectrum of R&D, acquisition, plans, training, and operations. The ADCI/MS coordinates, integrates, and deconflicts CIA activities in support of military plans, exercises, and operations, and performs other duties as assigned by the DCI.

SPECIFIED TASKS

The ADCI/MS shall carry out the following specified tasks:

- Assist in representing the DCI and DDCI, as requested, at NSC Principals and Deputies Committee meetings.
- Coordinate CIA support to deployed military forces across the spectrum of engagement.
- Conduct liaison with US Military Service Intelligence Chiefs and their staffs on IC policies.
- Facilitate IC support for military information superiority programs and information operations.
- Evaluate the adequacy of intelligence support for military purposes including operations, weapons acquisition, and training.
- Monitor the process of disseminating sensitive intelligence to Joint Force Commanders and, where appropriate, propose changes in the process necessary to ensure the dissemination of essential intelligence products.
- Represent the DCI on the Military Intelligence Board and other interagency groups established for discussion/resolution of military support issues.

SUPPORT

In support of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM), the ADCI/MS shall:

- Coordinate IC policy on support to the military.
- Formulate, recommend, coordinate, and when necessary, direct the implementation of Intelligence policies on support to military force plans, exercises, and operations.
- Participate in the requirements process to ensure adequate consideration of military requirements by the IC for deliberate and crisis planning.
- Review the allocation of IC resources and make recommendations for the allocation of IC resources to provide adequate consideration of military requirements and priorities in the budget process.
- Ensure adequate consideration of military requirements and priorities in the planning and acquisition of intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination systems.

May 22, 2003 8:48 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressman Wolf

Please let me know what is going on with Frank Wolf. He apparently sent me a three-page letter in here that I haven't seen. Apparently, we didn't let him get into Iraq.

If I could give him a call and talk to him, it would be a help. Let me know what to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-17

Please respond by 5/23/03

*Powell
I think SD should
call.*

J/R

Jaymie

U16841 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16570

333

20 May 03

May 22, 2003 10:04 AM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Death Benefits

Please let me know what happens by way of a death benefit when one of our folks is killed. We ought to consider possibly some sort of a minimum for families of service members killed in action, regardless of years of service or rank.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052203-22

.....
Please respond by

5/27/03

U16842 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16571

292

32 May 03

May 23, 2003 7:12 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Jay Garner

cc: Cathy

(b)(6)

When Jay Garner comes back, I would like to take him over to see the President and have the President thank him personally, and I want to present him the highest civilian award.

100.6

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052303-1

OFF

MAY 23 2003

WLCO

Please respond by 5/30/03

[Signature]

U16844 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16572

53 May 03

9:58 AM

TO: John Craddock
Col. Bucci
Jaymie Duman

CC: Cathy (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 24, 2003

SUBJECT:

Cathy: let's sched.

I would like to have Charlie Minter, a retired four-star admiral in for lunch someday. He was at NATO with me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052403.02

Please respond by: 6/3/03

COO.71 SD

U16845 /03

24 May 03