

EF 5488

May 27, 2003 3:45 PM

TO: Doug Feith

Jaymie Dummer
6/2
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Administration Accomplishments

Here is a note on administration accomplishments in the War on Terrorism that required a response to the NSC by April 29. I would be curious to know what you submitted.

000.5

Thanks.

Attach.

4/25/03 NSC memo re: Administration Accomplishments in the War on Terrorism

DHR:dh
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Please respond by 6/6/03

5/30

POLICY INPUT AT 2ND RED TAB

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07/11/03

**ADMINISTRATION
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
IN
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM**

DRAFT #4

THE WHITE HOUSE

FEBRUARY 2003

"The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were acts of war against the United States of America, its allies, friends, and against the very idea of civilized society. No cause justifies terrorism. The world must respond and fight this evil that is intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedoms and our way of life. Freedom and fear are at war. The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism."

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003

This document highlights the efforts and accomplishments, to date, of the United States in the Global War on Terrorism.

AFGHANISTAN

Military operations

- U.S. and allied military forces deprived al-Qaida of Afghanistan as a safe haven and stronghold. More than 14,000 troops from 31 nations have deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

Insert #1

Humanitarian assistance and reconstruction

The United States has led the world in providing humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. More than 365,000 metric tons of food have been delivered since the war in Afghanistan started, and the United States has provided \$840 million in humanitarian and reconstruction aid to help the people of Afghanistan.

- U.S. is assisting the Afghan government in repairing and reconstructing 28 bridges and more than 4,000km of secondary and tertiary roads, and rehabilitating over 6,000 water wells, canals, dams and water systems.
- The U.S. Congress has passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, which authorizes \$1.45 billion for Afghanistan over the next four years.
- The Department of State is providing the United Nations and international NGOs with \$145.7 million in funds for repatriation assistance and the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons. \$6 million is being directed to indigenous NGOs, focusing on women's groups and community development projects.

America's Fund for Afghan children has raised \$11.5 million in funds for educational, medical and humanitarian supplies.

Insert #2 →

Counternarcotics

The U.S. counternarcotics police and justice sector reform program is funded at nearly \$75 million. It has created thousands of short-term jobs to provide alternative employment to poppy growers.

Communications

The U.S. Government is funding a communications network to link the Ministry of Interior in Kabul with chiefs of police in the 32 provinces.

Voice of America and the Afghan Information Ministry have been provided \$10 million to install radio transmitters to rebuild the national radio network.

Good Governance

- The United States is funding a facility to train police, judges and prosecutors, including women, in modern criminal justice principles and human rights.
- The U.S. Government has provided 1,000 copies of pre-Soviet, pre-Taliban Afghan legal codes to the Ministry of Justice in local languages for their use in re-establishing their justice system.

Security

- The United States and its allies are training the Afghan army so that it will have the capacity to provide security to the Afghan people.
- Together, Norwegian, British, Polish, Jordanian, and U.S. forces cleared landmines from over 2,000 square miles. The Department of State allocated over \$7 million towards this crucial effort.

HOMELAND SECURITY

New Department of Homeland Security

The President signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The Act established a single department whose primary mission is to protect the American people and their homeland, transferring 22 Federal entities to the new Department of Homeland Security. This is the most significant reorganization of Government in more than 50 years.

- The President announced a comprehensive National Strategy for Homeland Security to guide our interagency efforts for preventing terrorist attacks, reducing America's vulnerability, and minimizing damage and recovering from attacks that may occur.

Government-wide Homeland Security Funding

- The President's 2004 proposal for non-defense homeland security funding is double the 2002 level and nearly three-times the 2001 level.

Border and Port Security

- As a result of efforts by the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, the INS apprehended more than 1,000 immigrants for a variety of offenses and deported over 500 of them.

Since 9/11, the Coast Guard made the largest commitment to port security operations since World War II, including over 35,000 port security patrols and 3,500 air patrols. The Coast Guard boarded over 2,500 high interest vessels, interdicted over 6,200 illegal migrants, and created and maintained over 115 Maritime Security Zones.

- In December 2001, the United States and Canada signed the Smart Border Declaration, which included 30 action items for increasing security, enhancing joint law enforcement, improving physical and technological infrastructure, and facilitating trade between the two countries.
- The Customs Service launched the Container Security Initiative (CSI), establishing a tough new international security standard for high-risk cargo containers before they arrive at U.S. ports. As of December 2002, the Customs Service reached agreements with 9 of the top 20 ports to screen approximately 1.2 million sea containers destined for our shores.

In April 2002, the U.S. Customs Service formally launched the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a public-private partnership aimed at securing the global supply chain against terrorism, while also facilitating legitimate trade.

U.S. Customs created the National Targeting Center and enhanced its Automated Targeting System to identify those containers and travelers that pose a high risk of terrorism.

Since September 11, 2002, and including the President's budget request for FY 2004, \$62 million has been earmarked for CSI, \$16 million has been earmarked for C-TPAT, over \$250 million has been earmarked for additional inspection technology, and 2,000 positions have been added to the U.S. Customs Service to assist in the protection of our borders.

"Operation Shield America" has been implemented to prevent terrorist organizations from obtaining U.S. munitions that could have sensitive civil and military applications.

- The Coast Guard instituted Maritime Safety and Security Teams and Sea Marshals to respond to terrorist threats or incidents in domestic ports and waterways. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs have expanded Passenger Analysis Units at key airports and seaports around the country to target and identify high risk travelers and immediately react to threats.

The strong cooperation between the United States and Canada resulted in the Free and Secure Trade initiative (FAST). The FAST program enables U.S. Customs to focus its security efforts and inspections on high-risk commerce while making sure legitimate, low-risk commerce faces no unnecessary and costly delays.

In addition, the new U.S.-Mexican Border Partnership contains a 22-point action plan to increase law enforcement cooperation and information exchanges, share technology, enhance infrastructure and rail security, harmonize operations, improve community health and safety, and facilitate trade.

- The Department of State developed a new tamper-resistant visa, expanded the visa application review process, and now shares more information regarding travelers wishing to visit the U.S. with U.S. law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community.

Border agencies required all flagged vessels to provide 96-hour notification prior to arrival in a U.S. port than the previously required 24-hour notification, giving officials more time to check for potentially dangerous crew, passengers and cargo.

- The 2004 Budget includes \$480 million to continue building a comprehensive system to track both the entry and exit of all visitors to the United States. This represents a commitment of \$860 million since 2002.

Transportation Security

- On November 19, 2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created as a new Federal law enforcement agency tasked to increase transportation security throughout the country.
- More than 50,000 newly-trained Federal screeners are deployed to our nation's airports where new baggage inspection equipment is being installed to ensure passengers are not carrying unauthorized material (explosives, guns, chemicals) in their checked bags. In addition, all airport personnel must now undergo background checks.
- All major domestic carriers completed Phase I modifications of commercial aircraft in the reinforcement of cockpit doors to prevent unlawful entry.

TSA has instituted 100 percent checked baggage screening and modernized passenger screening at America's airports to protect against unknown passengers or luggage on-board at take-off.

TSA has expanded the Federal Air Marshal program so that thousands of protective air marshals are now flying on commercial aircraft and began installing hardened cockpit doors on all 6,000 large commercial aircraft, an effort that will be completed in 2003.

TSA has mandated international airlines to provide information on U.S.-bound passengers prior to their arrival, which is then checked against the FBI's and other relevant databases. The result is advanced screening and warning of potentially dangerous passengers.

- The United States is working with other countries to prevent the proliferation of shoulder launched missiles that can be used against commercial aircraft.
- The TSA has assessed the vulnerability of major airports to shoulder-launched missiles, and is planning protection with airport, local and Federal law enforcement agencies.
- The TSA and the FBI have provided shoulder launched missile awareness training to key personnel around the country.

Intelligence, Warning and Law Enforcement

- The Central Intelligence Agency has actively assisted in the arrest of terrorists around the world. The U.S. along with allies and friends have detained more than 3,000 terrorists in over 90 countries since 9/11.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has centralized responsibility for intelligence gathering and analysis and, for the first time, created a 24/7 Counterterrorism watch office to serve as the focal point for all incoming terrorist threat information. The watch office distributes this information to the appropriate elements in the law enforcement and Intelligence Community for action.

- The FBI received and assessed the credibility of approximately 3,000 threats to the United States and has taken comprehensive steps to investigate and resolve those threats.
- The FBI issued over 57 threat warnings via the newly-established National Threats Warning System. These warnings were disseminated to more than 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies in the United States, as well as 60 Federal government agencies and subcomponents.

The FBI established the National Joint Terrorism Task Force at FBI Headquarters and expanded to 66 Joint Terrorism Task Forces among the FBI offices throughout the country to investigate terrorist activities. These interagency organizations combine personnel from Federal and local law enforcement, the INS, Customs, Intelligence Community, and other Federal Agencies to focus entirely on terrorism.

The FBI established the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to identify and locate terrorists. Based on analyses of identity information for known or suspected terrorists, the FTTTF has referred more than 200 leads to FBI counterterrorism components for further investigation.

- The United States broke up suspected al-Qaida-associated cells in Buffalo, New York and Portland, Oregon and arrested individuals charged with supporting the Egyptian-based Al-Gama Al-Islamiyya terrorist group.
- The Department of Justice established 93 Anti-Terrorism Task Forces -- one in each U.S. Attorney's district -- to integrate the communications and planning efforts of local, state and Federal law enforcement incident managers and first responders to ensure a rapid, coordinated response to terrorist threats or attacks.

The INS began implementation of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) requiring individuals who satisfy certain risk factors to register, be fingerprinted and be photographed.

- The INS working closely with the Department of State initiated two nation-wide worksite enforcement operations. One program undertakes background security checks on those individuals who work at airports and have direct access to commercial aircraft and the secure areas of airports. The second program undertakes background security checks of the 65,000 workers at the nation's nuclear facilities. Both programs are designed to identify personnel who may pose an insider threat to domestic critical infrastructure.
- The INS initiated the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, a tracking system on foreign students that ensures those aliens who come to the United States to study are actually enrolled and attending classes. The system will become mandatory on February 15, 2003.
- The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) created a new position of Associate Director for Homeland Security, doubled the size of its Counterterrorist Center (CTC), quadrupled the number of counterterrorism analysts, significantly enhanced the number of those analysts dealing with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear issues, doubled the number of analytic reports to senior Administration officials, and increased cooperation with foreign intelligence services.
- The President has instructed the leaders of the FBI, Central Intelligence, Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location.

The Department of State deployed an improved, tamper-resistant non-immigrant visa worldwide.

Defending against Biological, Chemical terrorism and Agroterrorism

- The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created an Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Preparedness, established a new Command Center and implemented Emergency Response Teams to coordinate with states affected by public health emergencies. In addition, HHS established regional Centers for Public Health Preparedness and is developing a Medical Reserve Corps.

The United States joined with Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and the UK to form the Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG), a coalition designed to improve health security globally, enhance international coordination, and better prepare for and respond to acts of biological, chemical and radiological and nuclear terrorism.

- Increased the number of food safety inspectors by 700, doubling the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) capacity to conduct safety inspections of our food systems.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has provided nearly \$90 million in assistance to states and local water utilities to assess site security, develop appropriate emergency response plans, and coordinate water-related counter-terrorism efforts across all levels of government.

The Department of Agriculture created a web-based tracking system for disaster reporting and developed a system to rapidly test for agents that pose the most serious threat to our agriculture.

- HHS has distributed \$1.1 billion in assistance to state and local governments for improved planning, and increased preparedness, including rapid secure communications and laboratory capacity, as well as hospital preparedness and ~~infrastructure improvements. A total of \$3 billion is requested in the FY 2003 and FY 2004 Budgets for continued support of state and local efforts to augment preparedness for a bioterror incident.~~

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is placing a priority on research to develop next generation vaccines, diagnostics and medicines that will allow us to better prevent, identify, and treat the effects of a biological attack. Over \$3.3 billion is requested in the FY 2003 and FY 2004 Budget for these activities at NIH.

- In his State of the Union Address, and in a subsequent speech at the NIH campus on February 3, 2003, the President proposed Project BioShield. This effort is designed to accelerate the point by which the government can acquire next-generation vaccines and other products to counter bioterror threats. Project BioShield has three components: 1) Allow the government to purchase needed countermeasures as soon as they become available -- use of this authority is currently estimated to be \$890 million in FY 2004 and \$5.6 billion over ten years; 2) Accelerate NIH research and development on medical countermeasures by providing increased flexibility in areas such as hiring and procurement; and 3) Give the FDA the ability to make promising treatments quickly available in emergency situations.

- The U.S. business of chemistry has worked in partnership with the Department of Energy (DOE), EPA and others to evaluate vulnerabilities and put enhanced measures in place to ensure the safety of its facilities and communities. Companies representing more than 90 percent of chemical production have adopted a comprehensive and rigorous security code, including mandatory site security evaluations. Examples of security enhancements already implemented include additional security personnel, upgraded security procedures, enhanced emergency response programs, access control systems, perimeter barriers and intrusion alarms.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

The U.S. Government provided \$820 million in grants to help state and local responders and emergency managers prepare for terrorist attacks. Since September 11, 2001, the Office for Domestic Preparedness has supported training for over 108,000 first responders.

- The 2004 Budget proposes \$3.5 billion to ensure that first responders are properly trained and equipped. This includes funds to purchase protective gear for working in hazardous environments and devices for detecting and disarming explosives and other dangerous materials. Out of this amount, \$500 million will support assistance to firefighters, particularly for terrorism preparedness, and \$500 million will support state and local law enforcement's anti-terrorism efforts.

In 2002, EPA significantly expanded its ability to respond to a chemical or biological event. The agency created a second emergency response team and added additional on-scene coordinators, increasing its basic response capabilities.

The Strategic National Stockpile contains drugs, vaccines, other medical supplies and equipment that can be delivered to any place in the country within 12 hours of a request for assistance. In the last year, the stockpile has been augmented. It now holds enough smallpox vaccine for every American, sufficient treatments for 20 million persons exposed to anthrax, and treatments for injuries following a chemical attack or explosion. The federal government has worked with every state to ensure rapid distribution of the stockpile to their citizens if needed. The 2004 budget contains \$400 million to maintain the stockpile and to strengthen its future capacity.

- The U.S. government provided anthrax and smallpox vaccinations to all U.S. government staff overseas and their dependents.

- Local Citizen Corps Councils were formed in 43 states and territories in order to harness the power of every individual to make communities safer, stronger and better prepared to the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues and disasters of all kinds. State Citizen Corps Councils formed in 31 states and two territories, with all 56 states and territories expected to have State Councils by the end of February 2003.

Medical Reserve Corps demonstration grants were provided by the Department of Health and Human Services to 42 communities in November 2002. Medical Reserve Corps units are community-based and comprised of health care professionals who serve in their communities during emergencies, as well as with ongoing public health needs.

- Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) training occurred in 244 localities in 42 states.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets

- The Army Corps of Engineers evaluated its civil works facilities (such as locks and dams on the Inland Waterway System, multipurpose dams) and identified 306 facilities where terrorist action could result in loss of life downstream or significant economic losses. At the facilities exposed to the highest consequences, the Corps is implementing protective measures to improve surveillance and detection, control access, and interpose protective barriers.
- The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for identifying America's critical infrastructures and key assets. It will maintain up-to-date assessments of their vulnerability to terrorist attack. The 2004 Budget includes about \$500 million to identify key critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and take the necessary steps to ensure security is improved at these sites.
- The Department of the Interior established an intelligence section at its headquarters and stationed law enforcement officers around the clock at all National Critical Infrastructure dams, power plants and other facilities.
- The Department of Energy is working with U.S. companies to increase the ability of production, refining and distribution facilities to resist attacks. Under Presidential Directive 63, the petroleum industry has partnered with DOE to develop and implement security guidelines to protect every category of industry facility, vessel, and the chemicals they contain from terrorist attack. DOE worked with the energy industry to develop model security guidelines and establish information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) which funnel terrorist

threat alerts to energy facilities, develop security guidelines, and direct possible threat information to the government.

The security guidelines for the petroleum industry have been endorsed by an energy sector interagency task force, which included EPA and a number of states. DOE is currently conducting annual site visits to verify continued implementation of the security guidelines and to determine if enforcement measures are necessary.

- The Department of the Treasury established a new Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Compliance Policy. Through this Office, the Department of Treasury works closely with the financial services industry, trade associations, self-regulatory organizations, and other Federal agencies to improve the protection of the nation's critical financial infrastructure.
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has undertaken a top-to-bottom review of security programs, developed a new threat advisory system that is compatible with the homeland security advisory system, and instituted measures to increase security at nuclear reactors and other facilities that use and store nuclear materials.

Legislation Related to the 9/11 Attacks

- 9/11 has been designated Patriot Day. Since that time 19 bills and joint resolutions have been signed into law, most notably the USA Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act, with the express purpose of improving the U.S.'s ability to fight terrorism. Additionally, 20 other related anti-terrorism resolutions have been approved.

MILITARY

The United States and allied military forces have eliminated Afghanistan as a sanctuary and the Taliban as a support structure for terrorists.

- U.S. Civil Affairs personnel have completed over ³⁰⁰~~240~~ humanitarian aid projects in Afghanistan, including food assistance, schools, medical and veterinary facilities, and wells and irrigation projects valued at more than ~~\$11~~^{\$12.5} million.
- The United States has disrupted al-Qaida and Abu Sayyaf terrorist cells and detained over 675 enemy combatants.

Insert #3 →

Insert #4 →

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The United States has trained counterpart forces in the Philippines, Georgia, Afghanistan, and Yemen to fight terrorism.

A Horn of Africa Combined Joint Task was established, creating a force presence to deny terrorists sanctuary or infiltration.

Special Operations were transformed (20% budget increase, new concepts and operational methods) to wage the new kind of war against terrorism.

- The United States established two radio transmitters to broadcast in local languages, within Afghanistan, aimed at winning the war of ideas.

Insert #6 →

~~The Department of Defense established the United States Northern Command to consolidate military operations in homeland defense.~~

~~The Department of Defense reorganized itself to establish an Undersecretary for Intelligence to better coordinate intelligence actions. The Department also established an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, to better focus on terrorism and domestic security.~~

- The U.S. military flew over 20,000 sorties over America's cities and airports to protect against air hijackers.
- When called upon, tens of thousands of Reserve and National Guard members added security to America's critical military, infrastructure and public facilities.

DIPLOMACY

- There are over 160 nations participating in the war on terrorism by arresting terrorists, freezing terrorist assets, and providing military forces and other support.

President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell built a worldwide coalition for the war against terrorism. During the past year, President Bush met with leaders from more than 90 countries to build support for and coordinate the war on terrorism.

- Multilateral organizations from every region of the world have voiced support for the war on terrorism.
 - The Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the G-7/G-8, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ANZUS Treaty members, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and others took concrete steps to combat terrorism more effectively.

- Most notably, the ASEAN nations solidified their cooperation in fighting terrorism in their region.
- The Malaysians are establishing a Combating Terrorism Center in Kuala Lumpur.
- Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong and others in Southeast Asia arrested terrorist leaders from local al-Qaida-affiliated terrorist groups or al-Qaida members traveling through their countries.
- On October 17, 2001, African leaders pledged their cooperation against terrorism in the Dakar Declaration.
- The countries of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil have come together in a united approach to fighting the war on terrorism in the tri-border area.
- The OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) took key steps to improve counterterrorism cooperation in the hemisphere, especially by enhancing border and financial controls.

Canada and the United States signed the 30-point Smart Border Action Plan to improve security along the U.S.-Canadian border while facilitating the legitimate flow of goods and people.

- The Department of State developed border security, counterterrorism and training initiatives with the Caucasus, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and the Balkans nations.
- The Department of State developed new and effective nonproliferation partnerships with Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
- The Department of State initiated a Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Joint Working Group with Pakistan and greatly enhanced counterterrorism cooperation with India and China.
- Working closely with U.S. officials, Pakistani authorities have arrested 460 terrorist suspects.

U.S. officials helped facilitate Turkey's decision to take over command of Phase II of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

- The Greek Government arrested and is prosecuting vigorously numerous suspected members of the 17 November Terrorist Organization.
- The French, Germans, British, Italians, Spanish and other European nations wrapped up al-Qaida cells and are vigorously pursuing other terrorist leads.
- Many Middle Eastern and North African nations have sought and arrested al-Qaida members.

COMBATING TERRORIST FINANCING

- President Bush launched the first offensive in the war on terrorism on September 23, 2001, by signing an Executive Order freezing the U.S.-based assets of individuals and organizations involved with terrorism.
- All but a handful of the 212 countries and jurisdictions in the world have expressed their support for the financial war on terror. 169 countries have issued orders to freeze the assets of terrorists.

Since 9/11, the United States has frozen \$36.2 million in terrorist assets, while other countries have frozen an additional \$88 million, for a total of over \$124 million. Interagency task forces working to combat terrorist financing have seized over \$8.4 million during investigations and another \$21 million in bulk cash that was being smuggled.

U.S. authorities issued blocking orders on the assets of 251 terrorists, terrorist organizations, and terrorist supporters, effectively denying them access to the U.S. financial system. Federal law enforcement officials have arrested over 61 individuals, indicted 43, and convicted 12 in connection with terrorist financing investigations.

- The United States referred to the United Nations Sanction Committee the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Somalia-based al Barakaat network, which once funneled as much as \$15 million a year to al-Qaida; 14 al-Qaida-linked non-profit and charitable foundations, including two overseas branches of the large Saudi Arabia-based charity al Haramain; the extensive financial networks of Youssef Nada and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin; Saudi millionaires Yasin al-Qadi and Wa'el Hamza Julaidan; and the Southeast Asia-based organization Jemaa Islamiyah.

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- The United States has taken significant actions against non-al-Qaida linked terrorist organizations, such as HAMAS and the Basque terrorist group, ETA. On December 4, 2001, President Bush issued an order to freeze the assets of a U.S.-based foundation -- The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development -- along with two other HAMAS financiers, Beit al Mal and the Al Aqsa Islamic Bank. In partnership with our EU allies, the United States designated 31 ETA operatives and one organization that supports ETA.

Since September 28, 2001, over 175 nations submitted reports to the United Nations on the actions they have taken to block terrorist finances, as required under United Nations Security Council resolution 1373, which calls on all nations to keep their financial systems free of terrorist funds.

- The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) -- a 29-nation group promoting policies to combat money laundering -- adopted eight strict new standards to protect the world financial system from being abused by terrorists and is issuing specific interpretive guidance on how to implement those standards.

The G-7, G-20, EU, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), Western Hemisphere Finance Ministers (WHFM), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and OSCE have all issued action plans calling on their members to take a series of concrete measures to enhance the effectiveness of their counterterrorist financing regimes.

- During the last year, a number of Gulf countries have established Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) that receive reports of suspicious transactions, analyze them, and forward them to appropriate authorities for further investigation. In June 2002, with the U.S. as a sponsor, the UAE was the first Arab country to be admitted into the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. By the end of 2003, most Gulf countries anticipate having working FIUs.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are planning to conduct in-depth assessments of the laws and efforts of their member countries to combat terrorist financing and to identify the gaps that need to be addressed.

- The United States identified 19 countries as priorities for receiving technical assistance and training and is working with other bilateral donors, the United Nations, FATF, the IMF and the World Bank to deliver the assistance.
- United States government agencies deployed trainers and advisors on numerous missions to countries on all continents, with the exception of Antarctica, to assist in the drafting of implementing legislation to combat terrorist financing, to

strengthen bank supervision in identifying suspicious transactions, and to address other financial crimes and corruption.

- Over 80 countries introduced new terrorist-related legislation since 9/11 , and a similar number have now established Financial Intelligence Units.

**Department of Defense Comments on the Paper Entitled,
“Administration’s Accomplishments in the Global War on Terrorism”**

1. Page 2

Comment: Add a new section on “Iraq”, after the “Afghanistan” section and before the “Homeland Security” section. Points include:

- Through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the United States and its coalition partners defeated Saddam Hussein’s regime, effectively eliminating a state sponsor of terrorism and proliferator of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist organizations.
- The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is now in Baghdad assessing the conditions and needs of the Iraqi people.
- Working closely with Iraqi leaders, the United States is beginning the process of building an Iraqi Interim Authority.

2. Page 11, “Military” Section

Comment: Add the following point within the opening subsection on Afghanistan:

- For Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the United States built a worldwide coalition of 70 countries, which provide a variety of support, including troops, basing, overflight, etc. Sixty-two countries offered military forces/ capabilities, 37 countries performed missions, and three international organizations offered support.

3. Page 11, “Military” Section

Comment: Replace the statistics in the first bullet with 300 (for 240) and \$12.5 (for \$11) so that the updated text reads

- U.S. Civil Affairs personnel have tackled nearly 300 humanitarian aid projects in Afghanistan, including food assistance, building schools, medical and veterinary facilities, and wells and irrigation projects valued at more than \$12.5 million.

4. Page 12, “Military” Section

Comment: Add a new subsection that addresses Iraq to be inserted just after the Afghanistan subsection. The following points should be included:

The United States and coalition forces have eliminated Iraq as a sanctuary and the Saddam Regime as a support structure for terrorist groups.

- Stopped terrorist organization Ansar al-Islam from operating in northern Iraq.
- Eliminated the Saddam regime's funding to families of Palestinian homicide bombers in Israel, which have resulted in the killing of innocent civilians including Americans citizens.
- The capture and arrest in Baghdad of Abu Abbas, whom the Saddam regime had provided a safe haven since 1994. Abbas masterminded the 1985 hijacking of the Italian Cruise Liner Achille Lauro in which a disabled American tourist was executed and thrown overboard.
- Eliminated Iraq as a sanctuary for the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi network, which helped to establish a poison and explosive training center camp in northeastern Iraq. Al-Zarqawi is an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and one of his al-Qaida lieutenants. The Al-Zarqawi network used Baghdad as a base of operations to coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies.
- Eliminated Iraq as a training center for other terrorist groups.
- Shut down the Salman Pak training camp where members of many terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, were trained.
- Broke the nexus between Iraq and terrorist networks, which could have led to terrorist organizations armed with weapons of mass destruction.
- Eliminated Iraq as a base of support for many terrorist organizations including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Palestine Liberation Front, the Abu Nidal Organization, Hamas, Hizballah, and others.

5. Page 12, "Military" Section

Comment. Add the following points to the general list of (currently unbulletized) military items as found at the top of page 12:

- United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) provides forces to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to construct and maintain detainment facilities for over 500 unlawful combatant detainees. GITMO activities are focused on intelligence and law enforcement.
- Joint Special Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) operating in the southern Philippines provides critical humanitarian assistance, civil-military operations, follow-on security assistance and intelligence fusion activities critical to the war on terrorism.

The U.S. counter-terrorism enhancement program with Yemen began on 25 May 2002. Approximately 70 US Special Forces personnel trained an initial cadre of 40 Yemeni soldiers.

- In the Horn of Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa has secured basing and access to Camp Lemoine and live-fire ranges in Djibouti for US counter-terrorism forces. The CJTF-HA is also assisting Djibouti in numerous civil-military operations projects that deal with health, education and infrastructure needs as well as counter-terrorism oriented training of the Djiboutian National Army. The Task Force is also coordinating expanded Maritime Interception Operations in the region, increased military-to-military contact with Eritrea to execute counter-terrorism and humanitarian actions, and monitoring drought/ famine in the region.
- The United States and its allies conduct multi-national Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) in the Mediterranean, North Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and off the Horn of Africa to disrupt terrorist lines of communication (leadership, weapons, and intelligence). Italy relieved Spain as commander of the coalition task force on 1 Feb 2003.

6. Page 12, "Military" Section

Comment: Add the following to the subsection that addresses Department of Defense accomplishments.

- The Department of Defense established the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, funded at \$17.9M for FY02-03, to provide coalition counterparts with the skills and training necessary to establish and maintain effective counterterrorism programs in their home countries.

Under this program, by July 2003 over 160 students will be attending professional military education courses, technical courses, and combating terrorism programs in the United States. In addition, six mobile education teams will reach over 200 military professionals abroad in coming months.

- The Department of Defense continued to improve its anti-terrorism protective posture by implementing the recommendations from the USS COLE Commission Report and developing new physical protection measures, an improved threat methodology, standards, policy, and procedures.

These programs will bring new technology on-line to enhance our antiterrorism/force protection posture in order to improve perimeter and water/ship side security while reducing manpower.

- A Department of Defense pilot program is underway to enhance the preparedness of installations to detect and provide emergency response to a terrorist attack using CBRNE. This program will lay the groundwork for the Department's long-range goal to extend chemical and biological protection to 200 defense installations by 2010.
- The Department of Defense has also developed an Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, which

will better focus its efforts to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack by establishing a management framework and quantifiable long-range goals.

- The Department of Defense produced an information sharing system (Project Protect America) that establishes and implements Homeland Security (HLS) information sharing across defense-related agencies. The system is rapidly scalable to the entire HLS community and fills an acknowledged information-sharing void.

Comment: In the same "Military" section, delete the current bullets concerning U.S. Northern Command and the Undersecretary for Intelligence and replace them with the following three bulleted items that address both those subjects in greater detail and adds an important note on the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

- To ensure unity of command for U.S. military forces engaged in homeland defense missions, the President authorized the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which began operations on October 1, 2002. The establishment of NORTHCOM will eliminate gaps among the different military organizations that currently have homeland defense responsibilities and allow for better military support of civilian agencies. NORTHCOM is responsible for land and maritime defense of the territory and people of the continental United States and Alaska against external threats, and for certain military-related aspects of security cooperation and coordination with Canada and Mexico.
- The Department of Defense now has an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)) whose principal duty is the overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of the Defense Department. The ASD(HD) serves as the DoD Domestic Crisis Manager to focus the planning and execution of DoD activities and the use of resources in preventing and responding to crises, to include management and coordination of DoD support to international and national special events. The ASD(HD) also assists the Secretary in providing policy direction on homeland defense matters through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to U.S. Northern Command and other combatant commands, as applicable.
- In a major reorganization of the defense intelligence oversight apparatus, the Department of Defense established the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to assure that all elements of the Department receive the warning, intelligence, and counterintelligence support needed to pursue the objectives of the U.S. defense strategy. The USD(I) will provide a primary point of contact for coordination of national and military intelligence activities with the staff of the Director of Central Intelligence and will maintain a close relationship with the ASD(HD), providing an opportunity for feedback regarding intelligence tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination as it affects homeland defense users at various levels.

UNCLASSIFIED

Prepared by: Burgess Laird, OUSD(P)/Strategy, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/16596

Sec 11 5/31 0945

~~May 29, 2003 1:48 PM~~

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
Jerry Bremer
Sarah Nagelmann
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missing Persons

Attached is a copy of a letter I received. My understanding is that these folks have some very good technology and can be helpful.

You have the responsibility for this activity. Please consider taking advantage of this offer.

Regards.

Attach.

5/19/03 Kimsey ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
052903-21

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 9 2003

Response attached

C 6/7

11-L-0559/OSD/16597

-----Original Message-----

From: **Whitcomb, MG Steven R** [mailto:whitcosr@centcom.smil.mil]

Sent: **Saturday, June 07, 2003 2:50 AM**

To: John LTG Craddock (E-mail)

Cc: Steven COL OSD Bucci (E-mail)

SECDEF HAS 301-3

JUN 9 2003

General Craddock...Sir, GEN Franks received SECDEF note (0945 5/31) re: Letter received from Mr James Kimsey, Chairman, International Commission on Missing Persons, soliciting SECDEF's support for efforts in Iraq...SECDEF note to COMCENT said "You have the responsibility for this activity. Please consider taking advantage of this offer"... I have spoken with AMB Pat Kennedy, AMB Bremer's chief of staff, and they have this and in fact Mr. Kimsey's team is coming next week to discuss with CPA...CPA acknowledge mass grave exploitation is their responsibility with assistance from CJTF-7/CENTCOM for security... Just wanted to make sure you knew we connected with CPA on mass graves and exploitation.

Very Respectfully--Whitcomb

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 29 2003

JAMES V. KIMSEY
1700 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE NW
SUITE 900
WASHINGTON, DC 20006

May 19, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In light of recent events in Iraq, I would like to contribute the services & technology of the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) to support the Department of Defense in dealing with the mass graves found and the families of the victims of forced disappearance under the regime of Saddam Hussein.

I assumed Chairmanship of the ICMP at the request of Secretary of State Colin Powell more than two years ago. As you may know, the ICMP was established in 1996 to address the issue of the missing in the regions of the former Yugoslavia. The successes of our projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate the magnitude of the contribution we might make in Iraq.

I would like to take a team from the ICMP with our equipment to Iraq to search for and identify human remains. I am asking for your support in this endeavor. Your support would put the ICMP in a position to seek additional funds to complete its work in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the possible extension of its operations into Iraq.

In light of the criticism that has been leveled toward post-conflict activities in Iraq, it seems obvious that there could be some immediate benefit in taking advantage of the proven capacity of the ICMP.

I will be traveling to Bosnia-Herzegovina and then hopefully into Iraq in mid-June to further assess ICMP's potential involvement in the identification of the missing there. I need your assistance to make this happen.

Peter Kirsch, my Chief of Staff, will be in touch with your office immediately.

Sincerely,

James V. Kimsey
James V. Kimsey, Chairman
International Commission on Missing Persons

I need your help on this

Don, Jim has waited both you and me. The ICMP does great work. I think they can help with this problem.

29/5

May 27, 2003 8:04 AM

OB 5/29

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Statistics

Here is a rotten article from the *Baltimore Sun*. Why don't you take the statistics for Baltimore that the ExecSec is compiling and then write a letter to the editor there, showing him what Baltimore looks like from a crime standpoint.

ATTACHED

000.5

Thanks.

Attach.

"Rumsfeld's Legacy," *Baltimore Sun*, May 25, 2003.

DHR:dh
052703-6

.....
Please respond by 5/30/03

U16848 103

11-L-0559/OSD/16600

27 May 03

Baltimore Sun
May 25, 2003

Rumsfeld's Legacy

Donald H. Rumsfeld was responsible for planning the war in Iraq, he was responsible for overseeing the conduct of the war in Iraq, and today he is responsible for the wreck that is Iraq.

How misguided has American policy been? In just the three weeks after Baghdad fell, things got so bad so fast that the American in charge there, Jay Garner, had to be given the boot. The long-standing American promise that authority would be quickly turned over to an interim government has now been scrapped - which is a smart move, but a graphic confession that the original idea wasn't working out at all.

The Bush administration can truthfully point to a few emerging signs of progress. Schools have reopened, electricity is a little more reliable, an arms crackdown is under way, and the United Nations has given Washington authority over Iraq's fortunes.

But the signs of continued deterioration are considerably more troubling.

Rape, murder and looting - and what's left to loot by this point? - are still endemic. Archaeological sites are being thoroughly trashed. Militias of all sorts are said to be springing up, with weapons stolen from - or supplied by - the Iraqi army.

Most disturbing of all: An Iraqi nuclear research plant has been thoroughly ransacked. People living near the plant have been falling ill. No one knows how much of the 4,000 pounds of partially enriched uranium, how much cesium and how much cobalt that were there may have gone missing.

This war was justified by the fear that Saddam Hussein would use or sell his weapons of mass destruction; in overthrowing him, American forces neglected to prevent their dispersal. It may well be that there were no Iraqi biological or chemical weapons, but Iraq did possess radioactive materials - and they are unaccounted for. The danger here is not that terrorists might acquire and detonate an actual nuclear weapon, but that they could blow up a suitcase filled with, say, cesium - sufficient to contaminate the better part of a typical city.

If Iraqi gangs can get organized for the purpose of selling antiquities out from under the noses of American troops, they can surely do the same with weapons of mass destruction. And maybe there were biological and chemical weapons in Iraq. Where are they now?

It was Mr. Rumsfeld who insisted on limiting the number of troops who would go to Iraq, and who appears to have given almost no thought to the inevitable occupation. It was Mr. Rumsfeld who was - and is - in charge.

The secretary of defense oversaw a brilliant, technological campaign that smashed Iraqi authority to pieces, with a very small number of soldiers doing the smashing. The whole world has to live with the consequences, and so far the American effort to tie down the lethal loose ends has been

appallingly inadequate.

If Mr. Rumsfeld fails to understand that he must turn his considerable energy toward the task of securing a better future for Iraq, this will be his legacy: a broken, dangerous nation.

2002 CRIME STATISTICS

<u>CITY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>AVERAGE # OF MURDERS PER MONTH</u>	<u>AVERAGE # OF ROBBERY / LARCENY / THEFT PER MONTH</u>	<u># OF MURDERS PER MONTH (ADJUSTED TO POPULATION OF BAGHDAD)*</u>	<u># OF R/L/T PER MONTH (ADJUSTED TO POPULATION OF BAGHDAD)*</u>
Baghdad, Iraq	5,600,000				
Albuquerque, N.M	448,607	4	2,680	50	33,455
Baltimore, MD	651,154	5	3,895	42	33,501
Los Angeles, CA	3,694,820	54	12,995	82	19,696
New York, NY	8,008,278	49	10,863	34	7,596
Washington, DC	572,000	22	3,247	215	31,793
Paris, France	2,110,000	35	13,620	93	36,148
Moscow, Russia	9,000,000	106	5,027	66	3,128

***These numbers project a local crime rate to adjust for a population size to match Baghdad (5,600,000)**

<u>City</u>	<u>Crime Statistic Source</u>
Albuquerque, N.M.	Albuquerque Police Dept
Baltimore, MD	Baltimore Police Dept
Los Angeles, CA	Los Angeles Police Dept
New York, N.Y.	New York City Police Dept
Washington, D.C.	Washington D.C. Metro Police
Paris, France	Vocal, U.S. Embassy, Paris.
Moscow, Russia	U.S. Embassy Moscow, Russia

Prepared 5/27/2003 2:52 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/16603

SENT 5/27 0700
~~May 23, 2003~~ 3:03 PM
(MEM. DAY WICAR)

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Nebraska Avenue

Secretary Tom Ridge said that he wanted to come in and talk to me about the Nebraska Avenue expansion they want, and I said I didn't know anything about it and would have you look into it.

384

Please look into it, find out what they are looking for, and then come and see me. We'll see if we can handle it without my getting involved.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052303-8

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

U16849 /03

27 May 03

May 27, 2003 7:51 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letters to Congress

These two files of letters came too late, and I think they have been overtaken by events. Let's redo them, and then I will edit them again and decide what I want to send.

Thanks.

Attach.
Draft letters

DHR:dh
052703-2

.....
Please respond by 5/31/03

U16850 103

11-L-0559/OSD/16605

032

27 May 03

May 27, 2003 2:57 PM

*Done
6/4*

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Request for Recommendation

One of the families at the White House of the folks who were killed in Iraq handed me the attached letter, which is self-explanatory. It certainly looks meritorious to me.

Do you want to see if you can do something? I don't know how you handle these things without doing something that somebody won't like, but take a look at it and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach. (b)(6) ltr to SecDef
5/26/03

DHR:dh
052703-28

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

*Response 6/13/03
5/30/03*

U16851 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16606

3355D

27 May 03

4 June 2003

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Request for a Letter of Recommendation

Sir,

I called the West Point Admissions Office to gather some background on the status of (b)(6) file. As it turns out, he has never established a file or applied at all. (Establishing a file is done by merely writing to West Point and making an inquiry about admissions. I am quite an expert right now, not only due to my own experience, but because my son (b)(6) is attempting to gain admission with the class entering in July of 2004.)

Next I called (b)(6) who wrote the letter. It took several tries before he returned my calls, but when he did, he immediately told me that, in fact, they had never yet applied, and had just recently gotten some background material off the Academy website.

I explained the procedures to him regarding establishment of a file, seeking a nomination (Congressional, and other possibilities), and competing for an appointment. Since (b)(6) is graduating next week, he will likely attend another college this coming year. I explained that you could still compete even after beginning another school. Credits transfer like any other school, the difference is that everyone is a freshman and does four years. Those with previous college time just get more electives.

I also explained that at this time, a letter from you would not be appropriate. (b)(6) will work with his son to begin the process of application, and during that time, if a requirement arises for a letter, he will contact me (I told him I would be here for at least 13 more months.), and I will work the request with you.

He was very happy and appreciated the follow-up and information. At this time, no further action is required.

V/R, COL B

4/6

11-L-0559/OSD/16607

Kevin Trumnow

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 27 2003

May 26, 2003

**Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Washington, D.C.**

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I am writing this letter on behalf of my son, (b)(6) is the step-brother of (b)(6) who was killed in Afghanistan on January 30, 2003 while on a training mission with the 160th Special Operations Regiment while piloting a Blackhawk MH-60 helicopter.

(b)(6) has aspirations of attending West Point Military Academy. Since the untimely death of his stepbrother, his desire has heightened. However, due to miscommunication, he missed the application deadline in April.

(b)(6) is an excellent student and athlete. He has attended several workshops sponsored by the Defense Department where students are given roles (President, Secretary of State, etc.) and given a mock international crisis to solve. His group was given high marks in the most recent of these last fall.

Acceptance to West Point is very greatly affected by the recommendation letters presented by applicants. Such a letter from yourself would be the blessing (b)(6) needs to have the opportunity to follow in (b)(6) footsteps.

Last week at Fort Bragg, I had the pleasure to meet Lieutenant General Philip R. Kensinger, Jr., the Commanding General of the Army's Special Operations Forces. General Kensinger stated that he attended West Point, Class of 1971. He encouraged me to contact him for a similar letter of recommendation.

I would like to thank you in advance for your consideration of our request to assist us in this effort to help our son become a cadet at West Point. We are very proud of (b)(6) and would like to see (b)(6) carry on the tradition with a military career in service to the United States of America.

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/16608

May 27, 2003 3:45 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Monthly Meetings w/Chu

Cathy Schedule
Thanks,
[Signature]

11
11
11

I need to meet with David Chu at least once a month.

Please see the attached memo on that and schedule me for a meeting to talk about some of those things.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/6/03 SecDef memo

DHR:dh
052703-34

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

U16852 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16609

10 Page 10

January 6, 2003 1:12 PM

SUBJECT: Notes for Meeting w/David Chu

We need to decide how often I ought to meet with him—maybe every three weeks or every month at the minimum.

I ought to tell him what I want to do with the Reserves and the actives and maybe I ought to have Gen. Pace in that meeting. I need to tell him what I want his shop to do. I want to know why he doesn't contribute to the dep orders and help us. I want to better understand what his role with the SROC and the HDLCs are and how we operationalize it, how we get him in more meetings and why he doesn't participate more in force manning. I want to use Herbits' memo.

DHR:dh
010603-34

11-L-0559/OSD/16610

May 27, 2003 4:07 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: POM

When Gordon England left, he said we should stick with the no new POM, that we are going to get rolled if we aren't careful. We have to force it to make it happen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052703-35

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

U16853 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16611

100.54

500.000

May 27, 2003 4:15 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Great Job

Please pass it along—I thought the remarks for Memorial Day were excellent.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052703-37

.....

Please respond by _____

U16854 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16612

000

27 May 03

May 28, 2003 11:30 AM

OB
6/2

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Articles by Hormats

IRAG

Here are a couple of papers by Bob Hormats on Iraq that are worth reading.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hormats, Robert. "Post-War Germany's Lessons for Post-War Iraq," *CEO Confidential*, Issue 2003/06, April 2003, p. 1-2.

Hormats, Robert D. "Draw from Past in Postwar Iraq," *Baltimore Sun*, March 23, 2003.

DHR:dh
052803-7

.....
Please respond by _____

U16855 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16613

28 May 03

Inside:

Reaching Deeper Into the Monetary Policy Tool Kit	3
Better—But Not Bright— Prospects for Tech Spending	4
Market Snapshot	5
The World in a Nutshell	6
After the War: Parallels With September 11	8

Post-War Germany's Lessons for Post-War Iraq

The personal views of Robert Hormats, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs (International)

Presenting his vision of post-war Iraq, President Bush compared reconstruction in Iraq to that of Germany and Japan after World War II. The comparison is apt. In particular, the allies' experience in Germany offers valuable lessons for today's planners.

Then-Secretary of State James Byrnes described the allies' aims: 'to win the German people . . . it was a battle between us and the Russians over minds.' This time, the battle over minds will be with Islamic radicalism. The coalition's success or failure in Iraq will have a crucial impact on that battle throughout the Middle East and around the world.

The war has also forced the US and the UK to grapple with the right balance between 'winning the war' and 'winning friends.' US, British and Australian forces have fought the war with tactics designed to minimize civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure—while still destroying strategic targets and undermining the military structure of the Saddam regime. This is a difficult challenge; achieving the right balance will be critical to the future of Iraq and the region.

Differences between post-war Germany and post-war Iraq are as instructive as the similarities. Unlike Iraq, Germany had a modern economy and democratic institutions before the rise of the Nazis. Germany also was far more homogeneous ethnically and culturally than Iraq. The country already had close commercial and diplomatic links to many western nations and long-standing ties of immigration, culture and trade with the US. Not so Iraq, a culture and society that few westerners on either side of the Atlantic are very familiar with. This will make post-war reform cooperation between coalition countries and Iraqis a lot more difficult.

Allied forces entered Germany as occupiers. This time the coalition wants its forces to be received by Iraqis and seen by others as liberators. Therefore, US and coalition authorities may be less willing than 50 years ago to press for wholesale political and social reengineering. Enlisting UN and multilateral support could sustain the pressure for reform and increase the perception of legitimacy in

the eyes of the Iraqi people and others in the Islamic world. Also, US forces in the 1940s were largely draftees: many had expertise in civilian governance and economic management. In today's armed forces, such skills are largely among reserves, increasing the need for help from private and UN agencies.

Despite obvious differences, many of the post-war challenges are similar. In 1945, Germany suffered wretched hunger, sickness and poverty. Millions roamed in search of shelter, food and jobs. In Iraq, millions already face shortages of food and medicine. War could make these worse, especially by disrupting the oil-for-food distribution system on which 16 million Iraqis depend for subsistence. If Iraq's fragile electric power infrastructure is damaged, hospitals, sewage systems and water treatment plants will fail. Wars with Iran and Kuwait, and Saddam's own brutality, have created many displaced persons and refugees. This war, plus score settling and retribution, could add more.

Germany had to be de-Nazified, demilitarized and purged of war criminals. Iraq will have to be de-Baathified, its military thinned and war criminals punished. But disqualifying too many civilian officials could be counterproductive. Allied authorities needed skilled and experienced Germans to help run the country; one of the chief reasons for the German economic and political recovery was the abundance of skilful and experienced Germans to set the country on a new course. The current coalition must find and support a similar group of Iraqis.

The allies pressed the Germans to create a new government structure that would prevent authoritarian power from re-emerging, yet be strong enough to avoid disintegration. In Iraq, the coalition will want to see authority diffused, but not so much that Baghdad cannot maintain Iraq's territorial integrity. A security architecture was built to provide Germany a place in Europe that did not threaten its neighbors. The same will be needed in the Gulf region. Cooperation with other regional powers, especially Turkey, will be needed to ensure a stable post-war regional environment.

Continued on page 2

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London EC4A 2BB
England

Sandra Lawson
Senior Global Economist
Roopa Purushothaman
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Post-War Germany's Lessons for Post-War Iraq

Continued from page 1

What Can Be Learned From the Occupation of Germany That Will Help in Iraq?

The allies were unprepared for the widespread hunger, disease and malnutrition that staggered Germany after the war. Much of Europe and Asia experienced similar conditions, so Germans got little sympathy. Today, the coalition will be judged harshly if a comparable humanitarian disaster befalls Iraqis. Immediate and massive assistance for the malnourished, wounded and uprooted will be required.

Fortunately, a great deal of planning and propositioning of food and medicine has taken place, and supplies are already entering southern Iraq. Relief will likely be required for a long time. That will require cooperation among the coalition, the UN and private relief agencies. Non-coalition countries have an interest in joining this effort to build a prosperous and free Iraq. Indeed, cooperation in the rebuilding effort provides an opportunity to heal many of the deep rifts that developed in the pre-war period.

According to noted US diplomat and historian George F. Kennan, US forces embittered Germans by 'camping in luxury amid the ruins . . . inhabiting the same sequestered villas that the Gestapo and SS had just abandoned, and enjoying the same privileges.' As coalition forces establish a presence in Iraq, they must remember and not repeat that experience.

Important Nazi leaders escaped prosecution, while needed German teachers, doctors and health workers were dismissed. The perceived arbitrariness and

length (five years) of de-Nazification left some Germans asking whether allied justice shared some of the ousted government's characteristics. Swift, fair and transparent prosecution—with international legitimacy—can avoid that charge in Iraq.

Even with Germany's skilled and democratically experienced population, a new government structure had to be constructed from the bottom up. First, elections were held in the states (Länder). Then governors (minister presidents) in the western occupation zones met to fashion broader administrative institutions. A German Economic Council was elected to oversee reconstruction. Four years after the war, state delegations met to draft a West German constitution (Basic Law). Only then did parliamentary elections take place. The US, the UK and France worked closely together to support German reformers during this lengthy process.

A similar approach could lead to the creation of an Iraqi federal government representing geographic rather than ethnic or communal interests. In the absence of democratic experience, this should start with discussions about the responsibilities of voters and elected officials. Electing an Iraqi Economic Council representing the various regions of the country, to work with the coalition partners and international agencies on reconstruction and oil matters, would help dispel the idea that the war was fought to control oil.

Secretary Byrnes insisted that 'large armies of foreign soldiers or alien bureaucrats . . . are in the long run not the most reliable guardians of another country's democracy.' Even as they maintained responsibility for maintaining order and stability, allied authorities gave able and trusted Germans 'primary responsibility for running their own internal affairs.' The US commander, General Lucius Clay, supported the decision of Ludwig Erhard, top German economic official in the western zones, to eliminate price controls and introduce a stable currency. Hoarding stopped, and food appeared on shop shelves.

Economic change in Iraq will require coalition support for similarly bold moves and ambitious reformers. Just as the success of the occupation of Germany depended on the will and capability of many highly skilled and dedicated Germans—so will the success of the rebuilding and reform of Iraq depend on a similar group of Iraqis. The potential for finding them is considerable; Iraq is one of the most secular countries in the region, with a strong tradition of education and a skilled middle class.

Exports of factories and equipment as reparations jeopardized German reconstruction, so General Clay ordered them to be cut back. Massive reparations and debt repayments could cripple recovery in Iraq. Large-scale rescheduling or forgiveness will be needed. The US, other coalition nations, the World Bank and the IMF should lay the groundwork now.

Oil revenues should be used for key priorities, such as humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. There is a tendency to overestimate the size of oil revenues (which have been about \$15 billion annually) and the ability to quickly increase oil exports. Using oil revenues to support coalition forces or pay war costs would undermine reconstruction and public good will—as did German reparations.

If the peacekeeping and reconstruction are done well, and a moderate, progressive government takes root, Iraq will be a far better place—as Germany is today. And a successful, prosperous and peaceful Iraq will be of considerable benefit to its neighbors, just as a successful, prosperous and peaceful Germany has been to Europe and the rest of the world. Failure, on the other hand, would undermine American and British credibility and influence in much of the world—as it would have in Germany 50 years ago. ■

Further information on the topics in this report is available on the GS Financial Workbench™. For access, please go to www.gs.com/ceoconfidential

Contributors: Ben Broadbent, Bill Dudley, Robert Hormats, Fiona Lake, Binit Patel, Dominic Wilson

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Draw from past in postwar Iraq

By Robert D. Hormats
Originally published March 23, 2003

PRESIDENT BUSH has compared postwar reconstruction in Iraq to that of Germany and Japan after World War II. The comparison is apt. In particular, America's experience in Germany offers valuable lessons for today's planners.

Then-Secretary of State James F. Byrnes described America's aims: "to win the German people ... it was a battle between us and the Russians over minds."

This time, the battle over minds will be with Islamic radicalism. America's success or failure in Iraq will have a crucial impact on that battle throughout the Middle East and worldwide.

Differences between postwar Germany and postwar Iraq are as instructive as the similarities.

Unlike Iraq, Germany had democratic institutions before the takeover of the Nazis, and a modern economy. Germany had longstanding ties of immigration, culture and trade with the United States. Many Americans spoke German; many had visited there.

U.S. forces entered Germany as an army of occupation. This time, the United States wants its forces to be received by Iraqis and seen by others as liberators. Therefore, U.S. authorities may be less willing than in Germany to demand wholesale political and social re-engineering. Enlisting U.N. and multilateral support for reform could reduce the need for unilateral pressure.

Despite obvious differences, many of the postwar challenges are similar.

In 1945, Germans suffered wretched hunger, sickness and poverty. Millions roamed in search of shelter, food and jobs. In Iraq, millions already face shortages of food and medicine. War could make these worse, especially by disrupting the oil-for-food distribution system on which 16 million Iraqis depend for subsistence.

If Iraq's fragile power infrastructure is damaged, hospitals, sewage

Also

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[Cutt](#)

systems and water treatment plants will fail. Wars with Iran and Kuwait and Saddam Hussein's brutality have created many refugees. A new war, plus score-settling and retribution, will add many more.

Germany had to be de-Nazified, demilitarized and purged of war criminals. Iraq will have to be de-Baathified, its military thinned and war criminals punished. But disqualifying too many civilian officials could be counterproductive. U.S. authorities needed skilled and untarnished Germans to help run the country. They must find a similar group of Iraqis. And they must support Iraqi reformers, just as they did German reformers such as Ludwig Erhard, who created the postwar German market economy.

The United States pressed Germany to create a new government structure that would prevent authoritarian power from re-emerging yet be strong enough to avoid disintegration. In Iraq, it will want to see authority diffused, but not so much that Baghdad loses the ability to maintain the country's territorial integrity. A security architecture was built to provide Germany a place in Europe that did not threaten its neighbors. The same will be needed in the Persian Gulf.

What can be learned from the occupation of Germany that will help in Iraq?

The United States and its allies were unprepared for the widespread hunger, disease and malnutrition that staggered Germany after the war. Much of Europe and Asia experienced similar conditions, so Germans got little sympathy.

Today, the United States will be judged harshly if a comparable humanitarian disaster befalls Iraqis. Immediate and massive assistance for the malnourished, wounded and uprooted will be required. U.S., U.N. and private relief agencies should be preparing a major effort.

Even with Germany's skilled and democratically experienced population, a new government structure had to be constructed from the bottom up.

First, elections were held in the states. Then governors in the western occupation zones met to fashion broader administrative institutions. Representatives to a German economic council were elected by the states to oversee reconstruction. Four years after the war, state delegations met to draft a West German constitution. Only then were parliamentary elections held.

A similar bottom-up approach could lead to the creation of an Iraqi federal government that represents geographic rather than ethnic or communal interests. In the absence of democratic experience, this should start with discussions about responsibilities of voters and

elected officials. Electing an economic council to oversee reconstruction and oil matters would help dispel the myth that the war was fought to control oil.

Reparations and debt repayments could cripple a recovery in Iraq. Rescheduling or forgiveness will be needed. The United States, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should lay the groundwork now. Oil revenues should be used for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes. Using them to support U.S. forces or pay war costs would undermine reconstruction, as did German reparations.

If American peacekeeping and reconstruction is conducted well, and a moderate, progressive government takes root, Iraq and the entire Middle East will be far better places - as Germany and Europe are today.

Failure would undermine U.S. credibility and influence in much of the world, as it would have in Germany more than 50 years ago.

Robert D. Hormats, a Baltimore native and vice chairman of Goldman Sachs (International), was a senior economic official in the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations.

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May 28, 2003 4:13 PM

OB
6/2

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *1/1*
SUBJECT: Zal Khalilzad and Afghanistan

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT*

Afghanistan

Zal Khalilzad has agreed to become ambassador to Afghanistan.

When he comes over on Monday at 4:45 p.m., we ought to give him a full brief on what we think ought to be done in Afghanistan. We ought to try to fashion a proposal for him that he can then use as a model.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052803-10

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

U16856 /03

28 May 03

May 28, 2003 3:14 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Nominations

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT**230,02*

I have talked to Brown, and he is delighted. I told him we would get the nominations up and sent in and we would get back to him with respect to a date.

I asked him about Olsen, and he said Olsen would be absolutely at the top of his list. He said Dell Dailey would be right there as well, but Army/Army is probably not as appealing as Army/Navy for the top two jobs.

Tell me what I ought to do with Olsen. Should I pick up the phone and call him as well, and tell him we are going to go with him for number two, under Brown?

So let's get those moving. You might want to talk to Staser and make sure you know what needs to be done.

Thanks.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 1 2003

DHR:dh
 052803-N

I am working w/ Staser on all these items.

Please respond by 5/30/03

SecDef -

- Brown's nomination is working. Will have to synchronize confirmation hearing timing with LA - in progress.
- Olsen's nomination package also working its way to us.
- Recommend you do not call Obenshine. You haven't done so for other Deputies. W
- and SOCOM informing him.

230,02

U16857 103
 11-L-0559/OSD/10020

5/30

May 29, 2003 11:21 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Confirmation Process

Is there someone who could figure out what percent of our Senate-confirmed posts, military and civilian, have been filled during the course of the first two and a half years of this Administration?

The process is so tedious that, after FBI and White House clearances and finally Senate confirmation, I am going to guess we end up with roughly a third of our people unconfirmed at any given time. That has to get fixed.

Please have Legislative Affairs produce a document that shows me from January 20, 2001 to date where we stand with respect to everybody who has been selected for a post, civilian or military, who has not yet been cleared by the White House, cleared by the FBI, or cleared by the Congress. Please show me the format before putting the dates in.

Thanks.

SECDEF HAS SEEN A RESPONSE

JUL - 8 2003

ATTACHED

DHR:dh
052903-6

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

U16858 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16621

Fawell Moore
Stanley
Please provide ASAP
2
620 DOD

7/1

1/2

69 M/03

11




THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED
INFO MEMO

June 27, 2003 5:45 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Legislative Affairs, 697-6210



SUBJECT: Status of Nominations – Response to Snowflake # 052903-6

- With the exception of ASD (SO/LIC), every civilian position requiring Senate confirmation over the past two and a half years has been filled at one time or another.
- The Department currently has 40 of 47 or 85 percent of the civilian posts requiring Senate confirmation filled. This is the lowest the percentage since November 8, 2001.
- There are currently six civilian vacancies:

<u>Position</u>	<u>Previous</u>	<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>Replacement</u>	<u>Status</u>
USD(AT&L)	Pete Aldridge	May 2001	May 2003	Mike Wynne	WH
ASD (PA)	Victoria Clarke	May 2001	Jun 2003	None Named	
ASD (SOLIC)	not filled		Jan 2001	Tom O'Connell	SASC
SECNAV	Gordon England	Jul 2001	Jan 2003	Colin McMillan	WH
USECNAV	Susan Livingstone	Jul 2001	Feb 2003	None Named	
SECARMY	Tom White	May 2001	May 2003	Jim Roche	WH
ASA(CW)	Mike Parker	Sep 2001	Mar 2002	JP Woodley	Senate

- Of the 168 three and four-star positions, 161 are filled. Several of the 161 positions are filled by officers scheduled for rotation or retirement.
- The seven gapped positions have been filled by extending the incumbents or having the office deputy serve in an "acting" capacity.

Army Gaps

- o The Army Chief of Staff. General Schoomaker's nomination was received in the Senate on 17 June 2003.

Prepared by CDR Taylor Skardon, Director, Senate Affairs, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/16622

- o Army Deputy COS G-2. Major General Alexander's nomination was confirmed 27 June.
- o Fifth Army Commanding General, Lieutenant General McFarren, has been extended for a year while Major General Clark's nomination is considered by the SASC.

Air Force Gaps

- o The relief for the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy was delayed due to the hold that had been placed on Lieutenant General Rosa's nomination by Senator Craig. Lieutenant General Rosa was confirmed on the 23rd of June and is in the process of moving to Colorado Springs.

Navy Gaps

- o The Superintendent of the Naval Academy is not filled. No nomination has been sent to the White House.

Joint Gaps

- o Major General Boykin (assumes a new position in USD (I)) was confirmed 27 June.
 - o Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-6). General Shea's nomination is at the White House.
- Attachment: civilian confirmation tracking sheet.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CIVILIAN POSTIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION**

	Position	Name	Nominated	Confirmed	Resigned
1	Secretary	Donald Rumsfeld	January 20, 2001	January 20, 2001	
2	Deputy Secretary	Paul Wolfowitz	February 15, 2001	February 28, 2001	
3	USD (AT&L)	Pete Aldridge	April 23, 2003	May 8, 2001	May 23, 2003
	Relief	Michael Wynne			
4	PDUSD (ATL)	Michael Wynne	June 12, 2001	July 12, 2001	
	Relief	Jaymie Duman			
5	DUSD (L)	Diane Morales	June 5, 2001	July 12, 2001	
6	DDR&E	Ron Sega	July 12, 2001	August 3, 2001	
7	ATSD (Nuclear, Chem, Bio)	Dale Klein	October 18, 2001	November 8, 2001	
8	USD (Policy)	Doug Felth	April 30, 2001	July 12, 2001	
9	DUSD (P)	Steve Cambone	June 12, 2001	July 19, 2001	June 30, 2002
	Relief	Ryan Henry	January 9, 2003	February 4, 2003	
10	ASD (ISP)	J.D. Crouch	May 7, 2001	August 1, 2001	
11	ASD (ISA)	Peter Rodman	May 14, 2001	July 12, 2001	
12	ASD (SOLIC)	Tom O'Connell	May 1, 2003		
13	ASD (Homeland Defense)	Paul McHale	January 9, 2003	February 4, 2003	
14	USD (Comptroller)	Dov Zakheim	March 13, 2001	May 1, 2001	
15	ASD (CSI)	John Stenbit	July 12, 2001	August 3, 2001	
16	USD (P&R)	David Chu	April 30, 2001	May 26, 2001	
17	DUSD (P&R)	Charlie Abell	March 20, 2002	November 12, 2002	
	ASD (Force Management)	Charlie Abell	March 29, 2001	May 3, 2001	Position Abolished
18	ASD (Health Affairs)	William Winkerwerder	September 21, 2001	October 16, 2001	
19	ASD (Reserve Affairs)	Tom Hall	April 22, 2002	October 2, 2002	
20	USD (Intelligence)	Steve Cambone	February 4, 2003	March 7, 2003	
21	ASD (Legislative Affairs)	Powell Moore	April 23, 2001	May 1, 2001	
	Relief	No Nomination			
23	General Counsel	Jim Haynes	April 23, 2001	May 17, 2001	
24	Dir. (OT&E)	Tom Christie	May 24, 2001	July 12, 2001	
25	Inspector General	Joe Schmitz	June 18, 2001	March 21, 2002	

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

CIVILIAN POSTIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION

[illegible]

May 29, 2003 8:42 AM

TO: Jaymie Duman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Letter for Garner

Please draft a letter from me to Jay Garner thanking him for his outstanding service.

Thanks.

I will do it.

DHR:dh
052903-14

.....
Please respond by 6/4/03

U16859 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16626

2355D

09 May 03

May 29, 2003 8:20 AM

TO: Jaymie Duman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Papers from Gen. Pace

Please talk to Pete Pace and tell him I really do mean it when I say I want him to send stuff to me and not the Deputy.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052903-7

.....

Please respond by 6/4/03

U16860 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16627

May 29, 2003 8:23 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Shinseki and Brownlee

Please see me about what I should do about Shinseki and Brownlee.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052903-8

.....

Please respond by 6/4/03

020 Army

29 May 03

U16861 /03

#443

May 29, 2003 8:31 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *y*

SUBJECT: POMCUS

We have to talk about POMCUS in Norway and around the world. Is it something we should be pulling back? Is it just a leftover?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052903-11

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

6/24
RESPONSE RECEIVED

V/R

U16862 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16629

Norway

29 May 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JUN 24 PM 1:26

INFO MEMO

CM-1014-03
24 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: POMCUS

- mem 6/23*
- to where*
- In response to your questions regarding POMCUS in Norway, the following comments are provided.
 - The Army and Marine Corps both maintain pre-positioned equipment in Norway. The Army is carefully assessing worldwide requirements and has decided to pull back Norway stocks. A formal notification is currently being staffed to the Norwegian Ministry of Defense (in accordance with treaty agreements) stating that the United States will remove all Army stored supplies and equipment no later than 30 December 2003.
 - The Marine Corps currently has an Expeditionary Brigade set in Norway and supports maintaining this for operational reasons. The flexibility provided by the Norwegian location, coupled with the high quality of maintenance of the pre-positioned equipment, make this set particularly valuable for rapid deployment in support of contingency operations. Elements of this equipment were used in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) with great success.
 - Pre-positioned stocks are not considered to be leftovers, as POMCUS has been built upon, relocated and reconfigured on an ongoing basis to meet the strategic threat. Determinations continue to be made on stocks to be pulled back from around the world. Each Service is developing detailed plans for the constitution of these assets post-OIF. The individual Service plans are in the initial stages of execution and will result in the pre-positioned force becoming lighter and more flexible while maintaining its lethality.

COORDINATION:

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM G. S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

Mr Secretary,
We will brief you
on these plans in
the next few weeks.

VR
Dock

11-L-0559/OSD/16630

U09772 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET
2003 JUN 24 11 1: 26

INFO MEMO

CM-1014-03
24 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: POMCUS

- In response to your questions regarding POMCUS in Norway (TAB A), the following comments are provided.
- The Army and Marine Corps both maintain pre-positioned equipment in Norway. The Army is carefully assessing worldwide requirements and has decided to pull back Norway stocks. A formal notification is currently being staffed to the Norwegian Ministry of Defense (in accordance with treaty agreements) stating that the United States will remove all Army stored supplies and equipment no later than 30 December 2003.
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- Pre-positioned stocks are not considered to be leftovers, as POMCUS has been built upon, relocated and reconfigured on an ongoing basis to meet the strategic threat. Determinations continue to be made on stocks to be pulled back from around the world. Each Service is developing detailed plans for the constitution of these assets post-OIF. The individual Service plans are in the initial stages of execution and will result in the pre-positioned force becoming lighter and more flexible while maintaining its lethality.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM G. S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	6/25

*Mr Secretary,
We will brief you
on these plans in
the next few weeks.*

*VR
Drctz*

11-L-0559/OSD/16631

U09772 /03

TAB B
COORDINATION

USA	COL Chappell	19 June 2003
USMC	Col Bultermeier	13 June 2003

08
6/2

May 29, 2003 11:24 AM

SUBJECT: Constitution

I want to talk to Jerry Bremer about Bob Goldwin and the constitution.

DHR:dh
052903-17

for

U16863 /03

6/2/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16633

May 29, 2003 11:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: VP in the Loop

Whenever we have an NSC or PC and the Vice President is not there, we should make sure he gets the papers. Did he have Bremer's papers today?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052903-20.....
Please respond by 5/30/03*Sec Def -*

The papers were sent to SIT Room this morning for them to forward to the VP. Prior to the SVTC, we received a confirmation back from them that they had transmitted the slides and the VP's office had them.

5/29


U16864 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16634

*3341 NSC**50 pages 60
May 03*

May 29, 2003 8:53 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Gen. Shinseki

I should probably give General Shinseki the Defense Department Distinguished Service Medal sometime and see him before he leaves in June. Let's talk about how to handle that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052903-16

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

300.6
DDSM

20 May 03

U16865 /03

5/29
1200 Snowflake

EF-4595

SENT 5/29 0700
May 27, 2003 2:29 PM

Jaymie Durnan
6/2
TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Canada and NORAD

Canada

If you are doing missile defense, would you please call Colin Powell and explain the NORAD-Northern Command relationship with respect to missile defense in Canada. Apparently, the Canadian foreign minister is asking Colin about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052703-23

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

5-29-03

Mr. Secretary-

I talked to Secretary Powell's Asst. Sec. and explained our position, and have passed a position paper to the State Dept.

J.D.

U16866 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16636

27 May 03
6/2

Sent 5/29 07:00

May 28, 2003 7:35 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Article on Franks

I have not read these two articles, #36 and #37 from today's *Early Bird*, but it looks like someone just fabricated things in the *Tampa Tribune*. Is that true? Please let me know. That is amazing.

Thanks.

Attach.

Early Bird table of contents

DHR:dh
052803-1

Please respond by 6/6/03

U16868 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16637

28 May 03

...The United States must abandon nuclear threats. It must also join with the four other nuclear states that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- Russia, Britain, France and China -- in renewed efforts "to pursue negotiations in good faith" on nuclear disarmament.

34. **The Commander**

(*Weekly Standard*)....Fred Barnes

...A myth surrounds the war plan. It is that Rumsfeld forced a new paradigm of warfare on an unimaginative and deeply conventional Franks. This isn't true. Rumsfeld was particularly insistent about deploying special operations forces--the Delta Force, Navy Seals, Army Rangers. And he has campaigned noisily for the transformation of the military into a smaller, more mobile, and less risk-averse force. But the plan belonged to Franks, who began thinking about Iraq while the war in Afghanistan was still being fought.

35. **A Sane Defense Budget -- (Letter)**

(*New York Times*)....Lawrence P. Farrell Jr.

Re "The Defense Budget Spills Forth" (editorial, May 20): Let's put the "voracious old ways of military budgeting" in perspective. The defense budget is now close to historic lows as a percentage of gross domestic product and will continue to shrink as a percentage of the overall federal budget, even with projected increases that will only partly compensate for past neglect.

36. **Regarding Gen. Franks -- (Letter)**

(*Tampa Tribune*)....Gen. John M. Keane, USA

In the May 23 edition of The Tampa Tribune, there is a news story titled "Gen. Franks Announces Retirement" by Keith Epstein. In that story is a quote attributed to me by your reporter. I never made that statement to your reporter, nor have I made that statement in any forum - private or public - to anyone.

37. **Correction**

(*Tampa Tribune*)....Unattributed

Gen. John Keane, Army vice chief of staff, was not interviewed by The Tampa Tribune for a story Friday about the retirement of Gen. Tommy Franks. In addition, Keane said he has never privately or publicly said the stress of working for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld caused Franks to smoke more. The Tribune quoted an unnamed source for that information.

EDITORIAL

38. **Relaunching The Rising Sun**

(*Washington Times*)....Editorial

...There is fear in Asia over the dangers of letting the Japanese military genie out of the bottle. Memories are long, and the lore of Imperial Japan's brutality is part of modern history in most places in the region. The fact, however, is that Japan is a changed country. Now a pro-American capitalist democracy, its foreign aid is the highest in the world. But its geopolitical usefulness should be more than doling out cash. Japan's natural role is to guarantee a balance of power in Asia. It can only do that if its neighbors fear offensive projection of military force. We think Tokyo should have that power.

39. **Dissect The Iraq Data**

(*Los Angeles Times*)....Editorial

...The accuracy of U.S. intelligence is one question. Another is the influence of the Pentagon's so-called Special Plans intelligence unit, dealing with estimates and led by neoconservative scholar Abram Shulsky. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, who was impatient with the CIA, championed the creation of the hawkish unit. Did the Pentagon unit, which fed information directly to President Bush, bulldoze more cautious CIA analyses?

Gen. Franks Announces Retirement
By KEITH EPSTEIN kepstein@tampatrib.com
[<mailto:kepstein@tampatrib.com>](mailto:kepstein@tampatrib.com)
Published: **May 23, 2003**

WASHINGTON - You're at the indisputable top of your game.

As commander of U.S. troops, you swept a superpower to swift victory over two distant nations.

You overthrew a reviled regime called the Taliban and toppled a dreaded dictator named Saddam.

You did better than oversee one of history's most dramatic transformations in how the United States fights wars. You proved it works, with impressive acts of military speed, agility and precision.

Your name is Tommy Franks. You are an American hero. And, now, it's time to retire, as Franks announced Thursday.

Long hours and extensive travel kept Franks from friends, family and his wife, Cathy. The general even noted how he forgot his wedding anniversary for the first time in years during Operation Enduring Freedom.

And the stress of managing tactics and troops while working for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld - a notorious and sometimes acerbic micromanager - fed Franks' cigarette habit, now up to two packs a day.

Rumsfeld wanted Franks to take a desk job, as Army chief of staff. It's a political post relished by few combat commanders because instead of picking targets, a Washington general easily becomes one.

Meanwhile, Franks' greatest triumph - which historians may someday regard as a huge turning point in military strategy, geopolitics and the struggle against terrorism - has given way to unrelenting chaos, theft, destruction and a new wave of suicide bombings in Iraq.

So what do you do?

If you're Tommy Franks, you retire, maybe to Tampa.

Franks, the 57-year-old U.S. Central Command combatant commander who ran wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, made it official. He and his wife were reportedly already scouting for a home on Davis Islands, but suddenly the whole world knows.

Why now?

"Tommy Franks recognizes that this is the high point in his Army career. If he doesn't leave now, he'll leave at some lower point," said Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with close ties to Pentagon brass.

"He knew it was time to go home."

After Franks turned down Rumsfeld for the job in Washington, the defense secretary pressed the Army vice chief of staff, Gen. John M. Keane. But Keane also chose to retire, for reasons of family illness.

Since then, Keane has been spreading around Washington Franks' explanation to him for rejecting Rumsfeld: "Franks is smoking two packs of cigarettes a day. Dealing with Rummy's not that easy."

The Question Of Successors

Franks may not formally step aside until late summer. Possible successors are Army Lt. Gen. John Abizaid, who was Franks' top deputy at Camp As Sayliyah during the war; Marine Lt. Gen. Michael P. DeLong, who is now at U.S. Central Command; and Army Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, commander of ground forces in Iraq.

Already, Franks' hop- scotching the globe between Central Command's forward headquarters in Qatar and the home office in Tampa - with frequent stops in places such as Bahrain and Washington for meetings with emirs and presidents - has given way to a different itinerary.

Last week, Franks, an insatiable fan of country and western music, was in a private box at the St. Pete Times Forum in Tampa for a concert of Don Henley and the Eagles, which, next to dropping megaton precision weapons, demonstrated a different kind of taking things to the limit.

"He's maintained a hectic pace, long nights, long days, a lot of travel and staff work. First thing he'll do is some serious family life again, and probably go to Texas to fish. He really needs to relax," said Gabriel Marcella, an Army War College professor who was among the first to teach Franks strategy.

That was more than 15 years ago, but the two stay in touch.

"It's a very different military from when he was here as a student - light, deployable, agile and more lethal," Marcella said. "He has presided over the remaking of the American military, and he'll be remembered as the implementer of these capabilities."

Military historians will undoubtedly take note of the confluence of military and world events that made Franks an unlikely hero.

A soft-spoken Texan who enlisted and worked his way up, he was uncomfortable in public and less charismatic than Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, who is also retired in Tampa.

Franks At War

But Franks showed remarkable flexibility. Generals are often accused of fighting the last war and failing to innovate. But when Rumsfeld sought changes in the battle plan, Franks adjusted. When, early on, tipsters identified a suspected hideout of Saddam Hussein, Franks ordered the strike.

Retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, who led U.S. Central Command for three years before Franks, said the Army general who took such a beating by pundits at the start of the Afghanistan war acquitted himself well.

"I think he did an outstanding job," Zinni said from his home in Virginia.

"In three years as the Army component commander with me and three years on his own, he has done much with Central Command."

Ultimately, Franks' fame may be greater than Schwarzkopf's.

"Anybody could have gone and kicked Iraq's butt with all the countries and people Schwarzkopf had on his side," said analyst Thompson, who runs the Lexington Institute think tank. "Tommy Franks managed both in Afghanistan and Iraq to use tactical innovation and high technology as a way of compensating for lack of numbers and a geographical disadvantage."

While Schwarzkopf merely repelled Saddam from Kuwait, Franks' operation - following the successful ousting of the terrorist-assisting Taliban from Afghanistan - removed Saddam's grip on power.

"Franks achieved greater victories than Desert Storm was, and they are likely to be regarded much more highly in military history," Thompson said.

"They show use of creativity and finesse as an alternative to massive firepower. Tommy Franks got extraordinary mileage out of a very light force."

Now, he is likely to command extraordinary profits on books and speeches. While publishing houses and literary agents are wont to discuss such things publicly, a book deal could be worth up to \$10 million.

Schwarzkopf signed a \$5 million book deal after his retirement in 1991, and can garner \$60,000 for making a single speech.

"He'll have a lot of companies asking him to sit on their board, too," said Brig. Gen. Jack Gary, a Marine who retired from Central Command in 1986 and has joined a large number of retired military leaders living in the Bay area.

Tampa Mayor Pam Iorio was pleased to hear Franks might settle here.

"That's wonderful. We'd love to have him as a Tampa resident on a permanent basis." Asked if she'd consider him for community leadership involvement, the mayor said: "I look forward to getting to know him."

Meanwhile, Franks will have more chances to attend games of his beloved Tampa Bay Buccaneers. During the Super Bowl in January, Franks made special arrangements so he could watch the game in his room in Pakistan, in the middle of the night. No average general, he's no average sports fan, either.

Now, though, Franks will be able to follow the game in person, with friends such as retired Bucs safety John Lynch or New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner. The baseball magnate and Tampa resident said

Thursday that "It means something great for our community that Gen. Franks and his wife are fans of Tampa Bay."

Added Steinbrenner: "I'd take him in my foxhole any day of the week."

It's more likely to be Steinbrenner's box, of course.

Gary said he could easily understand how Franks would prefer the appeal of Tampa Bay and the opportunities of military retirement to the Army chief of staff job.

"It would be a big step down for him. It's an administrative job. They don't give rudder orders, as they say in the Navy. They procure equipment. They prepare individuals for the services. But it's combatant commanders that fight the force. You're a warrior, you fight the force. Tommy Franks is a warrior."

Reporters Ira Kaufman and George Coryell contributed to this story. Reporter Keith Epstein can be reached at (202) 662-7673.

6:59 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Powell Moore
Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 30, 2003
SUBJECT: **Frank Wolf's Report of Iraq**

I sent you Frank Wolf's memo (copy attached). It is excellent, as I said. I promised him that some time in early July after we get back from the July 4th holiday we will bring him in and have a cup of coffee and brief him on what we've done off that memo, what we didn't do, and why, and what the progress is. Powell Moore will set it up.

Frank

You should get somebody in your office tracking it and we should press people to work off some of these things.

Thanks.

DIIR/azn
053003.02

Attach: Report from Rep. Frank R. Wolf 5/29/03 Re: Iraq

Please respond by: _____

6/06/03

T 7/1

U16869 /03

30 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16643

6:35 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Jerry Bremer
Gen. Franks
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 30, 2003
SUBJECT: **Iraq**

Attached is a very good memo from Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia. It is filled with things that are important for us to register and ideas that we should carefully consider doing.

I would like Doug to get Jerry's thoughts and, to the extent we can be helpful in implementing any of these, we should do so.

I am also by this copy sending a copy to Gen. Franks with the same request.

I am very much in agreement that a visit by some of the members of the Bipartisan Commission could be helpful. I also agree with his point that it is important to have members of Congress visit Iraq and see what is actually going on, which is why I have asked that the Congressional delegation restrictions be loosened, even if it takes additional resources for the Department.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
053003.01

Attach: Report from Rep. Frank R. Wolf 5/29/03 Re: Iraq

Please respond by: _____ *6/10/03*

11-L-0559/OSD/16644

I just returned from spending two days in southern Iraq. I was there Sunday, May 25, and Monday, May 26.

I crossed over the border from Kuwait. I visited the towns of Nasiriyah, where some of the heaviest fighting took place during the war, Al Kut and Al Amarah.

I spent the night in Nasiriyah then traveled northeast to Al Kut Monday morning. I then headed south to Al Amarah, driving through the outskirts of Basara on the way back to the Iraqi border.

I felt it was important to go Iraq to assess the humanitarian situation and to get a first hand look at the reconstruction efforts that are under way.

While there I talked with several Iraqi's, visited two hospitals, including the one from which Pvt. Jessica Lynch was rescued, met with military officials and representatives from several non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

I also saw one of Saddam Hussein's infamous torture chambers.

I also spent a day in Kuwait – Tuesday, May 27 – meeting Kuwaiti officials, military officials and State Department officials, including officials from USAID.

Life in southern Iraq is tough. Saddam Hussein did everything in his power over the last decade to make life in towns like Nasiriyah as miserable as possible because of the uprisings following the first Gulf war. Thousands of men literally disappeared following the uprisings and have never been heard from since; they are presumed dead.

Poverty is widespread in southern Iraq. Many of the trees have been cut down for firewood because propane was so scarce. The water is putrid. The conditions in the two hospitals I visited – while dramatically improved over the last month – are pitiful.

At what was once the Saddam Hussein General Hospital in Nasiriyah – it is now just called the General Hospital – there are no screens on the doors so anytime a door is opened bugs – particularly flies – come streaming in. Flies were swarming over two of the empty beds in the emergency room.

There is no monitoring equipment for the beds in the emergency room – in fact, I saw very little monitoring equipment anywhere in the hospital. Imagine walking into your local hospital and not seeing something to monitor your pulse or take your blood pressure. Medicine is in short supply.

It was depressing.

cc: Jaymie Durnan
5/29/03 4:05 pm

11-L-0559/OSD/16645

Before I go on, I want to praise the efforts of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and members of the Coast Guard who served or are continuing to serve in Operation Iraqi Freedom. They are the best of the best.

I cannot emphasize enough how good a job they have done and continue to do. They all have made tremendous sacrifices. Their families also have made tremendous sacrifices.

I was particularly impressed with the soldiers and Marines I talked with who were called to active duty from the reserves. Many left good jobs and/or school to serve. Their professionalism and attitude was exceptional.

I want to express my heartfelt sympathy to all the families who lost loved ones during the war. Those individuals made the ultimate sacrifice.

All the soldiers and Marines I met with in Iraq are doing an incredible job under some extremely difficult circumstances.

The heat in Iraq and Kuwait is oppressive and will only get worse as summer approaches. It was over 100 degrees both days I was in Iraq. I was told that the temperature can sometimes reach 140 degrees in July and August. Moreover, while the war may be over, Iraq is far from being safe. Lives are still being lost.

Security in Iraq remains a real concern, not only for coalition forces but for the general public. No matter whether you talked to military officials, NGOs or Iraqis, the issue of security was the topic of conversation.

Looting is still a problem in some parts of the country and I heard several stories about robberies and car jackings. I was told MPs in Nasiriyah successfully stopped a car jacking Sunday night.

Many Iraqis are afraid to go back to work for fear their home may be looted or they may be robbed. Several people told me that hearing random gun fire after sundown was commonplace.

NGOs that I talked with said that it was not unusual for their vehicles to be pelted with rocks in some parts of the country. No one travels after sunset.

In order for the United States to win the peace in Iraq it is imperative that we restore law and order. We need to redouble our efforts to ensure that Iraq is safe.

In "Play to Win," the final report of the bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, security is one of the four "pillars" of post-conflict reconstruction. The other

three are: justice and reconciliation; economic and social well being; and governance and participation.

This comprehensive report published in January by the Association of the United States Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies should serve as the blueprint for the reconstruction efforts in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

Members of the commission include retired general officers, representatives from the NGO community and international organizations, former high-ranking executive branch officials, and Members of Congress with expertise in foreign affairs.

Among those on the commission: Dr. John Hamre, former deputy secretary of defense; Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations; Gen. Gordon Sullivan, former chief of staff of the U.S. Army, Senator Pat Roberts and Rep. Doug Bereuter. (I, too, was a member of the commission, although did not have a leading role.)

The report makes 17 recommendations "on what the United States will have to do to enable itself to help countries successfully rebuild themselves following conflict."

I have asked the commission to provide me with 535 copies of the report so I can to share them my colleagues. It can be found online at <http://www.pcrproject.org>

Below is an excerpt from the report on the issue of security:

"Security is the *sine qua non* of post-conflict reconstruction. Though every case is different, there is one constant – if security needs are not met, both the peace in the given country and the intervention needed to promote it are doomed to fail. Unless comprehensive security needs are addressed upfront, spoilers will find the weak areas and retain leverage to affect the political outcomes, vitiating the peace. While peace is essential, it never will be one hundred percent guaranteed and the perfect must not become the enemy of the good. In order to achieve acceptable levels of security, "coalitions of the willing" and the UN peacekeeping operations need coherent military leadership and core troops from a lead nation that provide the backbone of the operation. The international community must also enhance its ability to deploy civilian police to address temporary needs. In addition, efforts to design and reconstruct local security institutions, including both military and police, must begin early in the process."

I believe the Administration would be well served to have five or six members of the commission visit Iraq to measure how the reconstruction efforts underway measure up to the recommendations in the report.

Dr. Hamre and Gen. Sullivan, who served as the co-chairman of the commission, could be charged with selecting which members are chosen to visit Iraq and Afghanistan. There should be no objection to this recommendation. Each of the commission members has a distinguished

and extensive background. Their insight and observations could prove to be invaluable.

In addition to members of the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction visiting Iraq, Members of Congress should visit. In my opinion, it would make sense for the chairman and ranking Democrat – or their designees – of the following committees to travel to Iraq:

House and Senate Armed Services committees
House International Affairs committee
Senate Foreign Relations committee
House and Senate Appropriations committees

In addition to meeting with military commanders, these members or their designees should meet with Paul Bremer and other officials from the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance – now called the Coalition Provisional Authority – US AID officials, and representatives from the NGO community and other international organizations.

Meetings with Iraqi citizens also should be set up.

Members should spend time in all parts of Iraq. Yes, safety and security are issues, but the trips could be made in small groups without publicity. The only way to get a feel for what is happening is to visit the towns and cities and talk to the people living there.

Congress needs to be involved in – and kept up-to-date on – the reconstruction of Iraq. Clearly, there is a great deal at stake for the United States in Iraq. Reconstruction in Iraq is going to be long and arduous. No one is naive enough to believe it has going to happen overnight. Nor is anyone naive enough to think that it is not going to come without problems and challenges.

Yet, if Congress is not involved, the Bush Administration is going to be left without a partner in rebuilding these two countries.

The Congress is the Bush Administration's greatest ally. There should be nothing to hide – and after my trip I believe there is much to tell, and much of it is positive.

I now want to take a few minutes to go over some recommendations I have since spending time in Iraq. Each of you should have a copy, plus a copy of "Play to Win."

RECOMMENDATIONS

* Security is priority one. While the forces have made great strides in trying to improve security in recent weeks, there is still a long way to go. Security is the linchpin to winning the peace in Iraq. That means security for coalition forces. Security for the NGOs. Security for the contractors. And security for the Iraqi people so they can go about their life. The gun turn-back program recently announced by Ambassador Bremer is a positive step but many are concerned that people may turn in only one gun and keep two. In addition to concerns about personal safety, looting remains a problem. I was told that looters continue to target electrical substations in southern Iraq, stealing the copper wire to sell on the black market. These substations provide much of the power for Baghdad. Coalition forces should provide security until it can be provided by the Iraqis.

* Justice is another major issue. Re-establishing a fair and just judicial system in a timely fashion is critical. Figuring out what to do with locals who break the law – such as looters – but are not a threat to U.S. security must be addressed as soon as possible. The laws need to be clear and must be enforced. Before the war started, Saddam Hussein opened the prisons, releasing both political prisoners and criminals. Getting these criminals back behind bars is imperative restoring order.

* “Play to Win,” the final report of the bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, should be used as the blueprint for rebuilding Iraq. The report, released in January, was produced jointly by the Association of the United States Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Its 17 recommendations provide an excellent model to follow. The commission is made up of 27 distinguished individuals with extensive experience in government, the military, non-governmental organizations and international aid groups. It met throughout 2002 to “consider recommendations that surfaced over two years of research, expert working groups, and vetting with current policy-makers and practitioners.” The report can be found online at <http://www.pcrproject.org>

* A select group of the commission – appointed by the panel’s co-chairmen, Dr. John Hamre, former deputy secretary of defense, and Gen. Gordon Sullivan, former chief of staff of the U.S. Army – should travel to Iraq to assess how the reconstruction efforts are going. Their assessment – a second opinion, if you will – would be impartial and could prove to be invaluable. They should travel in a small group with a military escort to ensure their safety.

* Members of Congress – in small groups without publicity to ensure their safety and the safety of those who would be providing protection – should visit Iraq to learn more about what is happening in the country and what it is going to take to rebuild the country. The chairmen and ranking members – or their designees – of the House and Senate Armed Services committees, Appropriations committees and International Relations/Foreign Affairs committees should consider going. In addition to meeting with military commanders, the members should meet with Ambassador Bremer and other officials in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), USAID officials, representatives from the NGO community and other international organizations, and Iraqi citizens.

* Every effort must be made to involve the Iraqi people in rebuilding their country, from governance to security to rebuilding the country's infrastructure. The Iraqi people must be an equal partner in the process.

From "Play to Win": "...every effort must be taken to build (or rebuild) indigenous capacity and governance structures as soon as possible. Leadership roles in the reconstruction effort must be given to host country nationals at the earliest possible stage of the process. Even if capacity is limited, host country representatives should chair or co-chair pledging conferences, priority-setting meetings, joint assessment of needs, and all other relevant processes."

* Along these lines, American companies awarded contracts to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure should hire locals whenever possible. There are many skilled and educated people in Iraq and they should be tapped to help rebuild their country.

* The sooner the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance – now the called Coalition Provisional Authority – is running at full speed the better. Every effort should be made to ensure that Ambassador Bremer and his staff have the necessary tools and resources to successfully complete the job.

* The military's Civil Affairs detachments in Iraq have worked diligently to help restore order and are making more and more progress every day. Consideration should be given to providing the officer in charge of each of the 18 provinces in Iraq with access to a ready cash account – perhaps up to \$500,000 – so they can more quickly hire translators, laborers and other locals to assist in their efforts in putting together a government without having to get every expenditures signed off by headquarters or Washington. The money also could be used to purchase goods and services in-country, such as generators, pumps or even a trash truck, on a more timely basis rather than waiting for it to be brought in by coalition forces. Government on any level needs money to operate. Clearly, this money must be accounted for, but it would greatly assist in the efforts to rebuild the country.

* Consideration also should be given to helping augment the work of the Civil Affairs detachments by bringing in civilians with expertise in local government, such as county administrators and city managers, as well as experts in agriculture and public works. In each of the 18 provinces, the head of each military Civil Affairs detachment acts like a governor. They need experts – much like a cabinet – at their disposal who can advise them on issues like banking, education, public works and health care. For example, the National Association of County Administrators could assist in rotating in civilian administrators to work with the military and local Iraqis in setting up local governments. There could be one for each of the 18 provinces. Some of the leading agriculture companies in the country could lend their expertise on irrigation and production. The head of the public works department in any large county or city in the country would bring an inordinate amount of experience to the table. There also is a great deal of expertise in federal government which can be tapped. Again, these individuals would work hand-in-hand with the military and the locals.

* The military has to begin thinking about training more of its soldiers for a post-combat environment to help fill any void until the necessary Civil Affairs and Military Police units can

be put in place. I realize this is asking our war fighters to take on a new mission, but in this new world environment, I believe this skill is necessary.

* Communications and communication systems remain a problem for both the military and the aid organizations working in Iraq. I was told that not all of the Civil Affairs detachments are readily able to communicate with each other or with the Humanitarian Assistance Center in Kuwait, which is coordinating all the civil affairs and humanitarian assistance in Iraq. I was told part of the problem is that most Civil Affairs detachments are made up of reserve units and do not have the same communications equipment. This needs to be addressed. It is imperative that all 18 provinces be linked with each other and headquarters. Congress should provide DOD with the necessary funding to ensure that these detachments have radios, computers and other communications equipment that can talk with each other. Aid organizations also are encountering problems communicating with their staff in southern Iraq because telephone and other data transmission lines have yet to be repaired. This presents a problem, especially for sharing data and supplying information.

* The issue of Iraqi currency must be dealt with immediately. Many people in Iraq will not accept payment with the old regime's currency. The World Bank should provide its expertise in helping get Iraq's banking system back up and running.

* The State Department working with the National Endowment for Democracy and other groups with similar expertise should develop a program on democracy and how a democratic government works. I was told that Iraqis watch a great deal of TV. Perhaps whatever program is developed should be put on videotapes and tailored to specific age groups so that all Iraqis can understand the process. This program must be made available to the Civil Affairs units in each of the 18 provinces. I understand money already has been appropriated and some contracts have been let. This program must be put into place as soon as possible.

* A pro-democracy newspaper also should begin to be published on a daily basis in Iraq.

* Finding and removing unexploded ordnance needs to be a priority. Sadly, many Iraqi children have been seriously hurt by exploding weapons while playing outdoors. When I visited the General Hospital in Nasiriyah, a young boy had just been brought into the emergency room after a mine or some sort of ordnance blew up near him. He was severely burned and there was a piece of shrapnel in his right eye. Clearing this ordnance will be a long and arduous process.

* While great progress has been made to improve health care in southern Iraq since the war ended, there is still a long way to go. While the major hospitals in southern Iraq used to bear Saddam Hussein's name – and are all identically constructed – there was little or no medicine and the conditions inside are deplorable. I was told that more than 2 tons of donated medicine has been distributed to hospitals and clinics in southern Iraq. There is concern, however, that diseases like malaria and visceral leishmaniasis – also called Dum Dum Fever or Black Fever – will ravage the region this summer because no spraying was done this spring to kill the mosquito larvae or sand flea larvae. Bites from sand fleas are the cause of visceral leishmaniasis, which is 80 percent fatal for young children unless treated with a 21-day shot routine. The disease attacks internal organs. Cholera is another concern. Area hospitals and American drug companies

12:43 PM

TO: Jerry Bremer
Cc: Bill Winkler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: May 30, 2003

SUBJECT:

Secretary Thompson, the Secretary of HHS called and said he wants to be helpful in Iraq on healthcare. He has heard about their problems. He is available to send a team in to assist you or do anything you want.

It is conceivable that they have some money and capabilities that could be useful. Just let us know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
053003.06

Please respond by:

6/10/03

See Note attached

ARM Di Ri

6/11

U16871 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16652

30 May 03

51081

for

ARM Di Ri
6/18



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 JUN 16 AM 8:23

INFO MEMO

JUN 12 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Department of Health and Human Services Offer of Assistance to Improve Health Care in Iraq

- On May 30, you informed Ambassador Bremer that Secretary Thompson, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, had contacted you with an offer of assistance to improve health care in Iraq. (TAB A)
- On June 6, Mr. James K. Haveman arrived in Baghdad as the Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Health. My office arranged contacts for Mr. Haveman with officials in the Department of Health and Human Services prior to his departure.
- Mr. Haveman is now preparing a health care service plan for Ambassador Bremer in conjunction with my office and the Iraqi Ministry of Health which will identify and prioritize health care system needs in Iraq. This plan will assist us in prioritizing the many offers of assistance that are coming forward from both governmental and non-governmental sources. I am also assembling an interagency senior health care steering committee to coordinate our support to Ambassador Bremer and his staff. I will ensure that the Department of Health and Human Services' proposals are included in this review and receive the highest attention.
- At this time, discussions are ongoing to identify Department of Health and Human Services personnel that can be added to the ministerial team, particularly in the critically needed area of support to medical laboratories and medical surveillance.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARIOTT	6/16

Prepared by: Diana Tabler, CoS, OASD (HA)

(b)(6)

PCDOCS 51081, 51083

U09246 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16653

Snowflake

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: May 30, 2003
SUBJECT: Air Force Nominations

I am told that Senator Craig is the one holding up air force nominations and it is because he wants C17s in Idaho.

Someone had better check into it and find out what is going on and let me know.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
053003 03

Please respond by: _____

6/02/03

6/10

Sec. Def -

My sense of
that Senator Craig
is getting squeezed
from a lot of
directions on this.
A New York Times piece
d

Larry Di Rita

4/11

30 May 03
C6/11/03

11-L-0559/OSD 16654 016672 103



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

DECISION MEMO

June 4, 2003 6:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake # 053003.03 regarding Air Force Nominations

- I have been talking to Senator Craig's Chief of Staff about Senator Craig's hold on Air Force nominations for three or four weeks and had high hopes that a meeting between Senator Craig and General Handy of TRANSCOM on the Friday before the beginning of the Memorial Day recess, May 23, would lead to a solution. After talking with Senator Craig today, it is clear to me that the problem persists.
- Senator Craig believes that the Air Force promised him a squadron for eight C-130s in 1996 but has only delivered four. He says that Gowen Field in Boise is the only C-130 base in the country without a full squadron of eight. He adds that the four C-130's they have had since 1996 are old and deteriorating. He also expressed resentment that C-17s are being stationed across the border in the state of Washington, which is represented by two liberal Democratic Senators. He said 50 C-17s are going to Washington, but in reality it is 35. He also mentioned Trent Lott in my conversation with him and I believe he may be driven by a Mississippi factor. The state of Mississippi is the only state that has a squadron of eight C-17s assigned to the state Air Guard and he undoubtedly believes that Lott landed them by playing hardball.
- He focused on Idaho's favorable environment for the Air Force with open airspace, no congestion and friendly, patriotic people.
- I made the point that we should work to resolve these issues without involving the careers and promotions of more than 850 Air Force officers. I cited the implications that his hold has for retention and maximizing the capability of the Air Force.
- The position of the Air Force is that no promise was ever made in 1996 that there would be eight C-130s at Gowen Field in Idaho. Moreover, they correctly state

11-L-0559/OSD/16655

that the precedent of letting a Senator add to his National Guard inventory of aircraft by holding up nominees would encourage other Senators to use this tactic and be a serious setback in the system. They do not intend to yield and I agree with them.

RECOMMENDATION: That you call Senator Warner and give him the responsibility of untying this Gordian knot.

SECDEF DECISION:

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Other _____

Attachment:

Snowflake # 053003.03

*I called
Frist*

7:13 AM

TO: Gen. Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: May 30, 2003
SUBJECT: Statistics

Advance

Please give me the total number of active duty, the total number of reserves, the total number of civilian employees in the Department of Defense, and the total number of retired.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
053003.04

020000

Please respond by: _____

5/30

RESPONSE ATTACHED,
COURTESY OF TSGT WESTBERG
& PETTY OFFICE APPLEWHITE.

v/r

30 May 03

U16873 /03

**TOTAL NUMBER OF DoD ACTIVE DUTY, RESERVE, RETIRED
AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL**

Active Duty Military	1,414,454
Reserve Military	727,297
National Guard	458,535
Retired Military	2,008,106
Civilian Personnel	<u>664,446</u>
	5,272,838

Note: This information was derived from the Personnel and Readiness office.

May 30, 2003 4:46 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Contingency Plans

Please set a meeting with a small group, maybe for Saturday, so we can do that list of contingency plans we want. Set it up either Saturday or Monday for 20 minutes, and we will just try to get the first rough and dirty.

Then we have to set up a larger meeting to have a discussion about the draft list we have come up with.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-11

.....
Please respond by _____

5/30
SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY
2 JUNE AT 2:30 PM

V/R
CDR SETTEL

U16874 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16659

36/

30 May 03

7/15

EF-5530

SENT 5/31 0945

~~May 30, 2003 10:10 AM~~

103/009109

TO: Doug Feith

Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 7/1

SUBJECT: Assessments in Iraq

10/1/03

I am told that no one from ORHA has visited a lot of the regions in Iraq. We ought to get a report as to how they are moving around and making their assessments, and get the same information about the military.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-3

..... SECDEF HAS SEEN

Please respond by 6/6/03

JUL - 8 2003

7/1
FEITH / CPA RESPONSE ATTACHED

U16876 /03

31 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16660

06-02-03 07:55 PM

7/7



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL - 8 2003

EF-5652

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM:

^{for} Douglas J. Feith *[Signature]* 3 Jun

SUBJECT: Places the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has visited

You asked for a report that shows data on which regions of Iraq CPA people have visited and how frequently.

- Attached are a spreadsheet (provided by Jerry Bremer) and a map depicting CPA travel.

^{for}
DUSD (SP-NESA) Wb3 *[Signature]* 2 Jun 03




11-L-0559/OSD/16661

IRAQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY REGIONAL SITES VISITS

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

COINTEL IN NUMBER OF VISITS

0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers

0 50 100 150 200 250 Miles

Created 18 June 2003 by NMIA Joint Staff/
OSD Geospatial Analysts.
Data compiled from numerous sources.

11-L-0559/OSD/16662

Regions Visited as of 05 JUN 03

#	Regional Coordination Group	Site	Governorate	Date Visited	By Whom?
1	Central	approx. 12 per day	Baghdad	Daily	RCG Staff
2	Central	approx. 18 per day	Baghdad	Daily	Ministries Staff
3	North		Balizan Valley	30-May-03	OCPA North Staff
4	North		Bayari	2-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
5	North		Bayji	28-May-03	FEST OCPA Staff
6	North		Delala	25-26 May 03	FEST OCPA Staff
7	North		Dohuk	15-May-03	OCPA North Staff
8	North		Dokan	2-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
9	North		Duhan	25-26 May 03	FEST OCPA Staff
10	North		Duree	30-May-03	FEST OCPA Staff
11	North		Erbil	27-Apr-03	OCPA North Staff
12	North		Erbil	12-May-03	OCPA North Staff
13	North		Erbil	20-May-03	OCPA North Staff
14	North		Erbil	22-May-03	OCPA North Staff
15	North		Erbil	27-May-03	FEST OCPA Staff
16	North		Erbil	28-May-03	OCPA North Staff
17	North		Erbil	30-May-03	FEST OCPA Staff
18	North		Erbil	4-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
19	North		Erbil	Permanent since 7 APR 2003	OCPA North Staff
20	North		Gallep	2-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
21	North		Halabja	2-Jun-03	OCPA North Staff
22	North		Halapja	25-26 May 03	FEST OCPA Staff
23	North		Haman al alil	5-Jun-03	OCPA North Staff
24	North		Harir	30-May-03	FEST OCPA Staff
25	North		Kasje	25-26 May 03	FEST OCPA Staff
26	North		Kaye	2-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
27	North		Khurmali	2-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
28	North		Kirkuk	15-Apr-03	OCPA North Staff
29	North		Kirkuk	21-May-03	OCPA North Staff
30	North		Kirkuk	2-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
31	North		Kirkuk	Permanent since 25 APR 2003	FEST OCPA Staff
32	North		Kirkuk-Dibis-Bajji	22-25 Apr 03	FEST OCPA Staff
33	North		Kirkuk-Dibis-Hawija	3-8 May 03	FEST OCPA Staff
34	North		Meyasor	30-May-03	OCPA North Staff
35	North		Mosul	17-Apr-03	OCPA North Staff
36	North		Mosul	25-26 Apr 03	OCPA North Staff
37	North		Mosul	Permanent since 21 APR 2003	FEST OCPA Staff
38	North		Mosul-Dahuk	20-21 Apr 03	OCPA North Staff
39	North		Mukhmur	5-Jun-03	OCPA North Staff
40	North		Quyyarah	5-Jun-03	OCPA North Staff
41	North		Razone	30-May-03	FEST OCPA Staff
42	North		Said Sadiq	2-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
43	North		Said Sadiq	25-26 May 03	FEST OCPA Staff
44	North		Salah ad din	14-Apr-03	OCPA North Staff
45	North		Salah ad din	27-May-03	OCPA North Staff
46	North		Salah ad din	1-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
47	North		Sinjar	1-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
48	North		Sirgat	2-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
49	North		Suleymania	16-Apr-03	OCPA North Staff
50	North		Suleymaniyah	3-Jun-03	FEST OCPA Staff
51	North		Suleymaniyah	23-24 May 03	FEST OCPA Staff
52	North		Suleymaniyah	25-26 May 03	OCPA North Staff

11-L-0359/OSD/16663

#	Regional Coordination Group	Site	Governorate	Date Visited	By Whom?
53	North		Tikrit	28-May-03	FEST OCPA Staff
54	North		Zakho	29-May-03	OCPA North Staff
67	South-Central	Ar Ramadi	Al Anbar	2 June 03	ORHA South-Central
68	South-Central	Ar Ramadi	Al Anbar	5 June 03	Buck Walters
69	South-Central	Diwaniyah City Hall	Al Qadisiyah	19 May 03	Buck Walters
70	South-Central	Diwaniyah	Al Qadisiyah	20 May 03	ORHA South-Central
71	South-Central	Diwaniyah City Hall	Al Qadisiyah	21 May 03	LTC Wolff
72	South-Central	Diwaniyah	Al Qadisiyah	24 May 03	LTC Wolff
73	South-Central	Diwaniyah	Al Qadisiyah	31 May 03	ORHA South-Central
74	South-Central	Diwaniyah	Al Qadisiyah	3 June 03	ORHA South-Central
75	South-Central	Diwaniyah	Al Qadisiyah	4 June 03	ORHA South-Central
76	South-Central	An Najaf City Hall	An Najaf	22 May 03	Buck Walters
77	South-Central	An Najaf	An Najaf	24 May 03	ORHA South-Central
78	South-Central	An Najaf City Hall	An Najaf	24 May 03	Marc Powe
79	South-Central	An Najaf	An Najaf	25 May 03	ORHA South-Central
80	South-Central	An Najaf	An Najaf	28 May 03	Buck Walters
81	South-Central	An Najaf	An Najaf	30 May 03	ORHA South-Central
82	South-Central	An Najaf	An Najaf	1 June 03	ORHA South-Central
83	South-Central	An Najaf	An Najaf	3 June 03	ORHA South-Central
84	South-Central	Mahawil	Babil	5-May-03	Buck Walters
85	South-Central	Al Musayibbe	Babil	6 May 03	ORHA South-Central
86	South-Central	Al Musayibbe	Babil	7 May 03	ORHA South-Central
87	South-Central	Mahawil	Babil	8 May 03	ORHA South-Central
88	South-Central	AL Musayibbe	Babil	16 May 03	ORHA South-Central
89	South-Central	Al Musayibbe	Babil	26 May 03	ORHA South-Central
90	South-Central	Mahawil	Babil	31 May 03	ORHA South-Central
91	South-Central	Hillah	Babil	2 May - 5 June 03	ORHA South-Central
92	South-Central	Hillah	Babil	27-28 apr 03	Buck Walters
93	South-Central	Basrah	Basrah	14-18 apr 03	ORHA South-Central
94	South-Central	AZ Zubayr	Basrah	14-18 apr 03	ORHA South-Central
95	South-Central	UM Qasr	Basrah	7-25 apr 03	ORHA South-Central
96	South-Central	Nasinyah	Dhi Qar	14-18 apr 03	Buck Walters
97	South-Central	Karbala City Hall	Karbala	13 May 03	Buck Walters
98	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	14 May 03	ORHA South-Central
99	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	15 May 03	ORHA South-Central
100	South-Central	Karbala City Hall	Karbala	15 May 03	LTC Wolff
101	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	17 May 03	ORHA South-Central
102	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	23 May 03	ORHA South-Central
103	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	26 May 03	Ananta Hans
104	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	27 May 03	Tom Delaney
105	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	29 May 03	Buck Walters
106	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	29 May 03	ORHA South-Central
107	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	31 May 03	LTC Bruce
108	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	1 June 03	Tom Delaney
109	South-Central	Karbala	Karbala	4 June 03	ORHA South-Central
110	South-Central	Samawah	Muthanna	23-25 APR 03	ORHA South-Central
111	South-Central	Al Kut	Wasit	30-Apr-03	Buck Walters
112	South-Central	Al Kut	Wasit	6-May-03	ORHA South-Central
113	South-Central	Al Kut	Wasit	15 May 03	Buck Walters
114	South-Central	Al Kut	Wasit	18 May 03	LTC Wolff
115	South-Central	Al Kut City Hall	Wasit	19 May 03	ORHA South-Central
116	South-Central	Qifl	Wasit	30 May 03	Buck Walters

Regions Visited as of 05 JUN 03

#	Regional Coordination Group	Site	Governorate	Date Visited	By Whom?
117	South-Central	Al Kut	Wasit	3 June 03	LTC Bruce
55	Southeast		Al Basrah	5May-7June	OCPA South Staff
56	Southeast		Al Muthanna	5/31/2003	OCPA South Staff
57	Southeast		Al Muthanna	6/2/2003	DRC/party
58	Southeast		Al Muthanna	10/11May	AMB Olsen/party
59	Southeast		Dhi Qar	5/11/2003	AMB Olsen/party
60	Southeast		Dhi Qar	5/25/2003	DRC/party
61	Southeast	Al Nasariyya	Dhi Qar	6/2/2003	Thi Qar Team (fixed)
62	Southeast		Dhi Qar	6/7/2003	Food/AG Team
63	Southeast		Maysan	5/20/2003	DRC/party
64	Southeast		Maysan	5/23/2003	OCPA South Staff
65	Southeast		Maysan	18/19May	OCPA South Staff
66	Southeast		Maysan	7/8May	AMB Olsen/party

11-L-0559/OSD/16665

JUN - 4 2003

DU
MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *2/10 6/1/03*

Secretary Rumsfeld would like a report that shows data on which regions of Iraq the OCPA people have visited and how frequently. He wants to be able to gauge how solid are our assessments of circumstances in the various regions.

11-L-0559/OSD/16666

SENT 5/31 0945
May 30, 2003 1:50 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq's WMD Programs

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT*

Here are the proposed talking points from the NSC on WMD programs. You ought to get your folks working on them fast.

look

Thanks.

Attach.
Points on Iraq's WMD Programs

DHR:dh
053003-10

.....

Please respond by 6/3/03

U16877 /03

30 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16667

for Bob Joseph

Points on Iraq's WMD Programs

● We are continuing as a top priority the effort to unmask the full story of Iraq's WMD programs. We have already found a very revealing component of Iraq's biological weapons program – two mobile production facilities equipped to produce BW agents.

● The configuration of these mobile facilities is almost identical to that described by Secretary Powell in his presentation to the UN Security Council before the war. The Secretary's presentation was based on an account of an eyewitness who had first hand experience with these BW systems. The description of this witness, which had been corroborated by other informants, matched what we found.

● Before the conflict with Iraq, we said that Iraq had large-scale, sophisticated WMD programs. These mobile production facilities are strikingly similar to this description.

- Making them mobile made the facilities less susceptible to discovery by inspectors, and less vulnerable than a fixed site to discovery and attack.
- Making them mobile could also support a mobilization production concept to provide BW agents to operational units just before use. This concept -- "just in time WMD on demand"-- may also apply to Iraq's CW program.

● Before the war, we said that Iraq had not accounted for large quantities of chemical and biological agents and delivery means – hundreds of tons of CW, thousands of liters of BW agents such as anthrax, and thousands of specially designed shells and bombs. All of these estimates were taken from UN inspection reports – cited not just by the United States but also by UN inspectors prior to the conflict.

● We continue to look for stocks of chemical and biological weapons and agents, but are not surprised that we have not yet found them yet. This is a process that will take a major effort and a lot of time – similar in approach to an organized crime investigation rather than a response to a robbery.

● We are now beginning to deploy the Iraq Survey Group to take charge of the investigation of Iraqi WMD programs. This new group, about a thousand experts that will search sites, review documents and interview Iraqi officials, will replace through a planned rotation the smaller units that provided our initial capability. We have said from the beginning that the key to unraveling Iraq's programs is through the people involved.

If asked about alternative uses for the mobile BW production facilities: We stand behind the conclusions of the joint CIA-DIA white paper, including the finding that "BW agent production is the only consistent, logical purpose for these vehicles." As we have always said, we will continue our investigation into all aspects of Iraq's WMD programs.

SENT 5/31 0945
~~May 30, 2003 10:13 AM~~

TO: Powell Moore
Doug Feith

CC: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressman Wolfe

Frank

We need to bring Frank Wolfe in during the first two weeks of July and brief him on what we have done in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-6

.....

Please respond by 7/1/03

U16878 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16669

30 May 03

6/2
Jaymie Durnan
6/2

5/31/03

5/31 0945

May 30, 2003 1:48 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Circulation

Sir:
Please see attached
T.E.

Do we have a way to get ^{my} the Wall Street Journal piece or the statement of policy on Iraq widely circulated? It seems to me it is important that it get out in coalition countries as well.

hand

Thanks.


DHR:dh
053003-9

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

U16879 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16670

30 May 03
6/2

TO: SecDef
FROM:  Tony Clarke
DATE: June 2, 2003
SUBJECT: Distribution and Dissemination of Iraqi Guidelines

Done:

Wall Street Journal op-ed

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) remarks in New York

Remarks broadcast in Iraq on Commando Solo

Remarks and op-ed distributed among interagency

Remarks and op-ed sent to key Public Liaison lists: formers, military analysts, educators, good government

Week of June 1:

Remarks and op-ed to Coalition country Ambassadors, press counselors and economic officers

Remarks and op-ed to key foreign Public Liaison lists: Wehrkunde attendees, academic/business lists

If you would like, we could also send to the foreign VIP and friends list that Arlene maintains for you (e.g. Francois DeRose)

SENT 5/31 0945

May 30, 2003 10:09 AM

OB Done 6/3

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: North Korea

We have to have a paper on North Korea soon, and we have to get our heart into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-2

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

Korea (North)

U16880 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16672

30 May 03

SENT 5/31 0945
May 30, 2003 10:12 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Flexibility with Money

long

We need to find out how much money our local commanders can actually spend to make things better for people. We finally got that sorted out in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-4

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

*DUB agreed
to \$100,000 per
local commander
+ they can spend
up to \$10,000
per event.
Money comes out
of seized assets*

[Signature]
30 May 03

U16881 /03
11-L-0559/OSD/16673

May 31, 2003 1:26 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Flexibility with Money

If your note here is true on what the local commanders can spend, we ought to make sure that Bremer knows it.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/30/03 SecDef memo w/Durnan response

DHR:dh
053103-11

.....
Please respond by 6/3/03

Bremer knows.

V/R
Jaymie

U16882 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16674

Barb

31 May 03

SENT 5/31 0945
~~May 30, 2003 10:12 AM~~

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Flexibility with Money

We need to find out how much money our local commanders can actually spend to make things better for people. We finally got that sorted out in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-4

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

*DWB agreed
to \$100,000 per
local commander
+ they can spend
up to \$10,000
per event.
Money comes out
of seized assets*
[Signature]

May 31, 2003 1:53 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
cc: David Chaffin
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Pulling Together Elements

As I understand it, you are going to come back to me with some proposals as to how we pull together all the Guard, Reserve, military and civilian elements in DoD and some proposed guidance for General Blum.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
033103-18

Please respond by 6/16/03

7/9
Response
Attached

U16883 103

3
2
5

31 May 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-1057-03
3 July 2003

SECRET
2003 JUL -7 11 7:30

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM 7/3*

SUBJECT: Pulling Together Elements

- You requested proposed guidance for Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), to aid him in pulling together the Guard and Reserve and military and civilian elements in the Department of Defense as he transforms the NGB

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the letter to CNGB at TAB B.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Major General John A. Bradley, USAF; ACJCS-RM; 693-6166

*Mr. Secretary —
Chief, National Guard Bureau
agrees with his testimony. I
think this is a good letter and
that you should sign it. ASD
Hall concurs as well. VB
(OSD Reserve Affairs) Dick*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	7/9
SR MA CRADDOCK	7/10
MA BUCCI	7/10
EXECSEC MARIOTT	4 7/7

U10516 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16677



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Guard Bureau Initiatives

Your initial steps to instill a greater joint focus into the National Guard Bureau (NGB) staff are on the mark. The fact that we will be prosecuting a war against terrorism (WOT) requires us to examine how we currently do business and make adjustments so that our Armed Forces, Active and Reserve Components (AC/RC), remain relevant. As you continue your efforts, there are a few areas into which I would like you to look.

First, in light of the fact that Congress has chartered NGB as a joint Bureau under the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, develop proposals to forge a new relationship among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff and the NGB that are more relevant to the current environment. Improving the Department's access to National Guard (NG) capabilities should be your principal focus. Develop, for my review, recommendations on how the NGB should interact with OSD and the Joint Staff. Identify any regulatory or statutory changes that might be required to facilitate this new relationship.

Second, the NGB should be the focal point for Guard matters at the strategic level. Title 10 clearly outlines NGB's role as the channel of communications between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the several states and territories. As you reorganize the Bureau, strengthen that statutory link with the Army and Air Force, and intensify your efforts to ensure the NG remains an effective participant in our joint forces. All US forces and leaders must be trained and ready to operate in the joint environment to meet today's challenges.


Third, strive to adapt the NGB to better support the WOT, homeland defense and homeland security (HLS). Seek ways to strengthen NGB's relationship with the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and the OSD - Homeland Defense. My intent is to enhance our ability to employ forces to meet the Nation's HLS needs.

Fourth, I would like you to work with USJFCOM as it develops proposals to change and modernize the mobilization process. Make recommendations to enhance the availability and accessibility of our NG forces.

Finally, work with the Services as they develop proposals to adjust their AC/RC mix. You must be a full player in these efforts if we are to take full advantage of our NG forces.



11-L-0559/OSD/16678



Nothing the military has been asked to do since World War II is as important as the task we face today -- fighting and winning the war on terrorism. You and the Nation's citizen-soldiers are key to winning that war, at home and abroad.

Work with the Army and Air Force, and get back to me with your thoughts in the next 30 days.

Copy to:
SecArmy
SecAF
CJCS

TAB C

USMC	Colonel Bultemeier	June 27, 2003
USA	Colonel LaCrosse	June 27, 2003
USN	Commander Kreitz	June 25, 2003
USAF	Colonel Ball	June 27, 2003
USGC	Mr. Terriberry	June 27, 2003
NGB	Dr. Spencer	June 26, 2003

Tab C



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 OCT 14 AM 11:13

INFO MEMO

September 22, 2003, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef_____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Defense Business Fellows Program - Implementation

- This responds to your inquiry regarding timeliness for the Defense Business Program Fellows (DBF) (Tab A).
- The Defense Business Practice Implementation Board recommended the creating of the program using a DoD-specific Executive Order (EO), which would involve a lengthy process involving OMB, OPM and other agencies.
- We will begin immediately using existing authorities to appoint interns at the GS-9 level, and simultaneously request OPM concurrence for a plan to appoint at the GS-11 and GS-12 levels. (If NSPS passage includes waiver of the Title 50 hiring provisions, we would not need OPM approval).

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Jeanne N. Raymos, ODUSD(CPP)

(b)(6)


U16926 03'

11-L-0559/OSD/16681

Snowflake

Have you seen?
Gail

August 4, 2003

TO: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Defense Business Fellows

I would like to push ahead with this Defense Business Fellows Program, so we can do it in the earlier timeframe—'04 instead of '05.

Please tell someone what needs to be done to have that happen.

Thanks.

Attach.
Defense Business Fellows Program Timeline

DHR:dh
030103-21

.....
Please respond by 8/22/03

Groeber, Ginger, CIV, OSD - PR

From: Groeber, Ginger, CIV, OSD - P&R
Sent: Tuesday, August 26, 2003 11:18 AM
To: Raymos, Jeanne N., CIV, OSD - P&R; Chun, Sandra J., CIV, OSD-P&R
Cc: Tunstall, Ellen E, CIV, OSD-P&R
Subject: Secretary Snowflake

I would like to have something drafted for Dr. Chu to send to the Secretary on what we are doing regarding the Defense Business Fellows Program. I think we need to provide a timeline on what we are going to accomplish by what date. Obviously we need to look like we are doing this program in 04. Please run the timeline by me before you put the package together to go back to the Secretary. I have a copy of the snowflake in my outbox for you. This is already overdue, so we need to shoot for something up to Dr. Chu no later than Friday this week. Thanks.

**Report to the Senior Executive Council,
Department of Defense**

**MBA RECRUITMENT
TASK GROUP**

Report FY03-2

- **Recommendations on developing and implementing a program for recruiting top-tier Master of Business Administration (MBA) graduates for the Department of Defense.**

February 5, 2003



**DEFENSE BUSINESS PRACTICE
IMPLEMENTATION BOARD**

**William "Gus" Pagonis, Chairman
Michael J. Bayer, Vice Chairman**

**Nell F. Albert
Bradford J. Bends
Dennis A. Bovin
Frederic W. Cook
D. Travis Engen
Stephen Friedman
Robert F. Hale
W. N. "Norm" Johnson
James V. Kinsey
Dana G. Mead
Philip Merrill
Richard N. Perle
William R. Phillips
Arnold L. Punaro
William Schneider
Andrew R. Siegel
Frank J. Sullivan
Mortimer B. Zuckerman**

**Thomas Modly, Executive Director
Kelly Van Niman, Deputy Director
Alex Zemek, Defense Fellow**

MBA RECRUITMENT TASK GROUP REPORT

OBJECTIVE: This report should be viewed as part of the larger effort to transform human capital management in DoD's civilian workforce (see earlier DBB Human Resources Task 1 Report). As stated in the introduction to that report, the Department of Defense is striving to develop a high-performance, results-oriented and responsive civilian workforce. This workforce should complement the capabilities-based military force with a lean, flexible, agile and innovative support structure. It should be known and highly regarded throughout the public and private sectors for using world-class management, financial and HR practices to attract and retain outstanding men and women, who excel in service to their country.

The recruitment of top-tier MBA students through this proposed program will help accelerate this civilian transformation. It will infuse DoD's civilian management structure with highly talented, recent MBA graduates from top-tier U.S. business schools. These graduates bring new ideas, energy and private sector management techniques to the Department of Defense, thereby strengthening the Department's leadership resources, filling vacancies caused by early retirement eligibility, and reducing the risks of succession to the next generation of leadership.

TASK: This report represents the findings and advice of the Defense Business Practice Implementation Board (DBB) for developing and implementing a program for recruiting top-tier Master of Business Administration (MBA) graduates for the Department of Defense (DoD). The Board relied on private sector best practices in the development and implementation of a program, and designed it to attract and retain talented people with innovative ideas developed through diverse experiences.

The Task Group was asked to provide the following deliverables: ✓

- 1) Review current practices on professional recruitment
- 2) Identify best practices for top-tier MBA recruitment employed by private industry
- 3) Outline a best-in-class civilian recruitment process of top-tier MBAs for the Department of Defense specifically addressing:

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

- Entry level positions and career development path
- Funding source, expected costs and return on investment projections
- Sponsorship, authority and control over program
- Size and scope of the program
- Success management metrics
- Implementation plan

(Note: The original terms of reference for the Task Group requested the development of a pilot program for the Navy. After coordination with the Navy, it was determined that the timing of the Task Group's recommendations would not coincide with the Navy's desire to implement this pilot program for the Class of 2003. The Navy is utilizing an interim solution until the implementation of the Task Group's findings and advice.)

- DBB Task Group Chairman: Frederic W. Cook
- DBB Task Group Members: Denis Bovin, William Phillips, Andrew Siegel
- Task Group Co-sponsors: The Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)
- DoD Liaisons to the Task Group: Ms. Ginger Groeber (OUSD Personnel & Readiness), Ms. JoAnn Boutelle (OUSD Comptroller), and Lt. Peter Majeranowski (USN)
- DBB Task Group Executive Secretary: Kelly S. Van Niman

PROCESS: The Task Group was briefed on existing hiring practices for MBAs within the Department, and developed a summary of existing governmental hiring authorities (see Appendix A). The Task Group benchmarked MBA recruitment practices at leading companies (McKinsey & Co., General Electric Company, Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and the Boston Consulting Group). The benchmarked companies were selected on the basis of their long-standing and recognized success with MBA recruitment. The Task Group met twice via conference call to discuss findings and directions, and prepared this report for the review of its sponsors and the full DBB on January 29, 2003, before forwarding to the Senior Executive Council (SEC).


Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

RESULTS: After conducting its analysis on current hiring practices used by the Department of Defense, and through its benchmarking of private industry best practices in this regard, the Task Group concluded the best approach for attracting top-tier MBA talent to the Department would be to develop a dedicated, prestigious recruitment program similar to the White House Fellows Program. This recommended program is called the "Defense Business Fellows Program."

The report will present the Task Group's findings and advice as follows:

- I. Current Practices for Professional Recruitment in DoD
- II. Best Practices for Top-Tier MBA Recruitment in the Private Sector
- III. Recommended Defense Business Fellows Program

Respectfully Submitted,



Frederic W. Cook

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

I. CURRENT PRACTICES FOR PROFESSIONAL RECRUITMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Currently there is no dedicated effort to hire recent MBA graduates into the Department of Defense's civilian management ranks, including within the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. Federal hiring regulations do not permit hiring managers to require an MBA as the basis for selection of a candidate. Thus, the Department has focused its efforts on attracting the best individuals and once employed, offering them the opportunity to obtain their MBA.

Perhaps because of the aforementioned restriction, the Department's recruiting efforts are more general in nature. Currently, the Recruitment on Campus Initiative, sponsored by OUSD (Personnel & Readiness), is designed to market the Department as the employer of choice to college graduates -- but not specifically to MBA graduates. The Department could expand this marketing initiative to graduate business school campuses. However, the Department must still address the regulatory issue previously mentioned, and also be prepared to compete with other private corporations recruiting on campus, which are willing and able to offer highly competitive salaries. Like the previous criteria to possess an MBA, DoD would have to obtain statutory authority or an Executive Order to hire MBAs at a level higher than GS-9 (2003 range of \$39,597 to \$51,476), assuming the individual does not have either prior work or equivalent grade experience.

Existing hiring authorities for recruitment of those with college degrees into exempt or professional positions in government service are described in Appendix A and listed below:

- General Schedule (GS) and Senior Executive Service (SES)
- Presidential Management Intern (PMI) Program
- Defense Career Intern Program (DCIP)
- Limited-term and Emergency SES Appointment
- Consultants to the Department of Defense
- Schedule C and Non-career SES Appointments
- Contractors to the Department of Defense
- White House Fellows Program

The Board believes that the Defense Career Intern Program, if appropriately centralized and modified to suit top-tier MBA recruitment, and the White House Fellows Program, are excellent models for developing the program structure and

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

hiring authority to fit the Task Group's vision of the Defense Business Fellows Program. The necessary authority to require a recent MBA degree as a prerequisite for entry into the program should be obtainable by Executive Order, and would authorize DoD to recruit MBAs and pay them at an appropriate salary level to start, for example GS-12/13. ✓

II. BEST PRACTICES FOR TOP-TIER MBA RECRUITMENT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Based on the collective experience of the Task Group members and direct research at General Electric Company, Goldman Sachs, McKinsey & Co., the Boston Consulting Group and Bear Stearns, the Task Group believes the following would characterize a U.S. high-profile firm's "best practices" for top-tier MBA recruitment:

Uniform Image

- The company aims to present a single uniform image on each campus
- Separate departments or divisions do not recruit separately

Proactive Recruiting Schedule

- The recruiting effort covers both years of a two-year MBA degree program
 - You have to start with attracting first-year students because the best candidates are committed by the second year
- Campus presence is continuous and inclusive, starting with the students' arrival in September of their first academic year
- Each campus is different; each campus team needs to know the special recruiting rules applicable to that campus and follow them

Selective Recruiting Presence: Physical vs. Electronic

- Graduate business school campuses are specifically targeted and separated into two groups: *Physical Presence* (high-intensity on-campus presence); and *Electronic Presence* (low-intensity, low cost, no campus presence).

Physical Presence

- A special team is assigned to each high-intensity, physical-presence campus, comprised of:
 - A top executive who interfaces with the school President and/or business school Dean ("CEO/Ambassador" role)

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

- A senior executive who is the Team Leader and is active in representing the firm on campus
 - Other mid- and lower-level executives who do the interviewing
 - The HR coordinator
- (All team members are alumni if possible)

Electronic Presence

- Companies market their organizations in the career placement office, advertise vacancies in job books, and accept and screen applications

Formal Recruiting Program Structure: Centralized vs. Decentralized

Full-Time Support Positions

- The MBA recruitment program is managed and coordinated centrally, typically by the Human Resources department
- The role of HR, however, is behind the scenes providing program administration and support and coordination with each campus
- HR has no role in interviewing, selection or hiring

Part-Time Recruiting Positions

- Representations of the line organizations volunteer or are tasked to form the dedicated recruiting teams for each school selected for physical presence
 - Members of the recruiting teams are alumni if possible
- Allows you to determine mutual interest, cultural fit and hiring potential; low cost and low risk

Disciplined/Sequenced Recruiting Process

- The total recruitment effort consists of three phases: "*stimulate interest*", "*screen and assess*", and "*cultivate*"

Stimulate Interest

- Activities undertaken during the "*stimulate interest*" phase to create a strategic pipeline for identification of top-tier candidates include:
 - Review the resume book and identify students of interest
 - Partner with affinity clubs, e.g., armed forces club
 - Provide speakers to clubs and classes
 - Organize and host events (open to all or by special invitation)
 - Conduct on-campus workshops and networking sessions
 - Seek to educate students about your firm
 - Interface with professors

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

- Provide case studies and course materials

Screen and Assess

- Activities during the "*screen and assess*" phase include:
 - Invite those the firm is interested in to submit applications
 - Either screen applicants and invite those in whom you are interested to a first-round interview or interview all who apply
 - Check backgrounds but reference checks are optional
 - Conduct on-line testing for verbal skills, quantitative skills and leadership, but not for intelligence which is presumed
 - First round interviews conducted on campus by trained interviewers from the line organization (not HR) using a structured format
 - Screen for cultural fit, desired characteristics, talent, and motivation
 - Provide for mandatory summer internships for first-year students who pass the assessment screens and interviews
 - Internships are valuable "feeder" for new hires; creates valuable on-campus awareness
 - Allows you to determine mutual interest, cultural fit and hiring potential; low cost and low risk

Cultivate

- Activities during the "*cultivate*" phase include:
 - Make job offers at the end of the summer program based on performance evaluations and interest
 - Offers are for the same salary amount for all; do not negotiate or deviate
 - Once an offer has been made, designate a contact person to maintain contact, answer questions, address concerns, and encourage acceptance
 - Provide for further office visits and social events to meet other candidates and co-workers
 - Allow a reasonable time for offer acceptance

Post-Hiring Professional Development and Training

- Upon joining, provide a short indoctrination course, but no probationary period; work hard to make the hiring decision successful
- Assign each new hire a senior advisor to assist in development and social issues

Many of these "best practices" have been included in our recommendations for a Defense Business Fellows Program that follows in the next section.

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

III. DEFENSE BUSINESS FELLOWS PROGRAM

SUMMARY

This section outlines the Board's advice and recommendations for the structure and management of a Defense Business Fellows Program. The Program is designed to recruit 20 or more top-tier MBA recent graduates a year, to train and develop them (through rotational assignments and targeted training for a two-year Fellowship Program), and to non-competitively convert them to permanent positions in the DoD civilian management structure following graduation from the Program. Unlike the White House Fellows Program, the vision of this program is not to have the Fellows serve for only two years and return to the private sector. Likewise, the Program should not be considered a limited internship. Rather, the Program should be viewed as a permanent vehicle for adding top talent to the civilian management ranks in the Department of Defense over an extended period of time.

The recruiting and two-year development program for successful applicants should be centrally managed, coordinated and funded by the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness). However, a joint Selection Panel consisting of senior line military officers, Senior Executive Service (SES) executives and Political Appointees from the Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Defense Agencies participating in the Program, as well as, the senior OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) official overseeing the Program, should make selection and hiring decisions. All these Program characteristics will need to be spelled out in the Executive Order establishing the Program and understood by applicants (see draft Executive Order at Appendix B).

PROGRAM ELEMENTS

• Fellowship Program Structure and Accountability

The Board recommends that the two-year Defense Business Fellows Program consist of:

- (1) A short, centralized program of indoctrination and acculturation at the start (e.g., military/civilian rank structure, DoD organization, mission and values, DoD finance and accounting, government rules on conflicts of interest, Title 5 HR rules, standards of performance, and

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

acceptable/unacceptable behaviors) run by OUSD (Personnel & Readiness);

(2) Two rotational assignments of one year each to allow Fellows to undertake substantial job assignments. Job descriptions should emphasize the importance of spending time in the field to enhance the Fellows' understanding of DoD operations; ✓

- Hiring managers should review this report's summary of MBA skill sets (see Appendix C) when developing job assignments (e.g., finance, marketing, operations, consulting and strategy, HR, business-government relations, etc.),
- Participants should have their performance evaluated, and they should in turn evaluate their Program experience, at the beginning of the Program, after each rotation, and at the end of the Program,

(3) Advanced classroom training and testing, and special events such as briefings by Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs, visits to DARPA and DIA, briefings by the White House and the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, visits to carrier battle groups at sea, attendance at State of the Union addresses, visits to military reviews, concerts, and colors ceremonies, viewings of military training, weapons testing and combat exercises, and family picnics and social events. ✓

In addition to an immediate supervisor during rotational assignments, each Fellow should be assigned a Sponsor who is a member of the Selection Panel and who will act as a senior advisor to the Fellow during and after the Program. The Sponsor should monitor their progress and be available to deal with unforeseen problems or personnel issues throughout the two-year Program. ✓

At the end of each two-year Fellows Program, Fellows' performance should be evaluated and offers of conversion to permanent positions for those meeting high performance standards and expectations should be extended. A "rank and rate" process should determine permanent assignments at program completion. Each participant should rank his or her preferences for the positions, branch or Defense component available. Likewise, each branch or component should rank participants in terms of desirability. The Selection Panel, to be detailed later in this report, should perform a "marrying up" process based on the Fellows' and the departments' rankings, and should reserve the right to resolve any "conflicts" through ultimate determination in final offers. Those not offered a permanent

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

position, or who do not accept the position offered (assuming another accommodation cannot be made), would be dropped from the Program.

The Board recommends that a graduation ceremony be held, including an address by the Secretary of Defense or other member of the SEC.

The Board recommends that day-to-day management and coordination of the Defense Business Fellows Program be assigned to OUSD (Personnel & Readiness). A suggested name for such an office could be the Defense Business Fellows Program Office. A senior OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) official should be assigned to oversee the head of the Defense Business Fellows Program Office and represent OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) on the Selection Panel. An Implementation Team, to be detailed in a forthcoming section, should determine Defense Business Fellows Program Office staffing needs and a table of organization. ✓

The Defense Business Fellows Program Office should exercise continuous oversight of the career progress of program graduates, including assistance in obtaining SES rank and arranging for rotational assignments to avoid having one's career limited to a particular military branch or Defense component.

Program management and coordination includes overseeing the recruitment process, serving the needs of the Selection Panel, running the two-year Fellows Program, managing Program budgets, measuring program effectiveness, and following the later careers of Program graduates. A financial account should be established to record the costs of the recruitment Program, including direct costs, out-of-pocket travel costs, and the time for those involved in the recruitment process.

• Compensation and Promotions

The Board understands that salary packages for top-tier MBA graduates are approximately \$85,000 in salary, and often include signing bonuses and loan forgiveness for associates returning to their former employers and staying two years. The Board does not believe that DoD needs to be fully competitive with private industry in its starting salaries because of the high regard by the American public for those in military service and the draw of service to country in the current economic and geopolitical environment. The Defense Business Fellows Program may not be attractive to a large percentage of top-tier business school graduates for various reasons, for example, they are committed to return to their former employers, are motivated more by money than by service, or are oriented towards ✓

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

entrepreneurial small business. The Program is not designed to attract people based solely on its salary. However, the Program needs to be conservatively competitive in pay to attract those who are otherwise motivated to join and serve. As a result, the Board recommends a starting salary of \$70,820 (GS-12, step 8) for successful applicants to the Program, with promotion potential to GS-13 after one year and a satisfactory performance review. Upon successful completion of the Program, Fellows would convert to permanent status at either GS-13 or, if recommended by the hiring managers, at a higher level.

The Board recommends that the GS level and salary offer be the same for all successful applicants in the class of 2004, with no deviation or negotiation permitted. While backgrounds and experience, skill sets and school performance may be different, all Fellows are expected to be recent graduates of top-tier business schools who will be performing in positions of substantially equivalent responsibilities during the two-year Fellows Program. In the same vein, promotion to GS 13 after one year should be identical for all program participants meeting performance standards. However, conversion to permanent positions at the GS-14 level at the end of the two-year Program, and subsequent advancement, should be based on the specific position responsibility and individual performance. ✓

In addition to the starting salary, the Board recommends that as an added inducement, Fellows should be eligible for the same recruitment, retention and relocation bonuses, and student loan repayment as currently offered by the Defense Career Intern Program. Bonuses can be up to 25% of basic pay, and student loan repayment can be up to \$6,000 per year.

• Candidate Selection and Hiring Process

The Board recommends that the recruitment and selection process for applicants for the Defense Business Fellows Program be a competitive process through Program postings on DoD's web page and open application acceptance, in addition to more proactive recruiting at schools targeted for *physical presence* and *electronic presence*.

The Selection Panel should be comprised of senior line military officers, SES executives and Political Appointees from the Services, OSD and the Defense Agencies participating in the Program, as well as, the senior OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) official overseeing the Program. The Panel members should be assigned to a target school at which DoD will have a physical recruiting presence, and whenever possible, be an alumni from that school. The Selection Panel member for each recruiting team, in consultation with the Team Leader (full duties

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

to be detailed later), should have the authority to prescreen candidates for internships and Fellowships. A Selection Panel member also will have to be assigned to review the applications of those who apply electronically.

The Selection Panel should make offers of internships, Fellowships and permanent employment with full benefits to successful candidates, who meet the minimum criteria. Further, we recommend an outreach program to national organizations of Black, Hispanic, and Asian MBA students to help ensure a diverse applicant pool. The Selection Panel will have to act quickly on the recommendations and make the final selection of interns and Fellows. ✓

The intent of the screening and selection process is to assume that successful applicants will pass all job performance hurdles during the two-year Fellows period and qualify for permanent career employment following graduation, similar to procedures in private industry. Nonetheless, it is also intended that those not invited to convert at the end of the two-year Program period will not have appeal rights or rights to severance. Any decision to terminate a Fellow during the two-year Program, or not offer the opportunity to convert upon graduation from the Program, should be subject to Selection Panel review. ✓

As mentioned previously, each member of the Selection Panel should be designated as the "CEO/Ambassador" to one of the target business schools where DoD is establishing a physical recruiting presence. The person's role would be to initiate and maintain top-level contact with the school on a continuing basis. As in the case of best practices in the private sector, where companies do not maintain hiring quotas per school, each Selection Panel member and Team Leader should be authorized to recommend those candidates they feel qualified to serve.

• Recommended Selection Criteria

The Board recommends the following standards for candidate qualification:

Minimum Criteria

- U.S. citizen
- Recent MBA degree
- GPA of 3.2 or above (or its equivalent)
- Pass background checks
- Related work experience min. 2-3 years
- Ability to obtain necessary security clearance
- No conflicts of interest

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

Pass on-line skill, behavioral and leadership testing
Willingness to relocate upon graduation from the Fellows Program

Desirable Criteria

Related work experience in large organizations (4-5 years)
Prior military service

• First -Year Summer Internship

Best practices in the private sector indicate that successful recruitment should begin in September of the students' first year on campus, i.e., September 2003 for the class of 2005. Summer internships should be offered between the first and second year of the MBA program at the GS-7 level. At the end of the summer internship program, the Selection Panel should offer a position in the Fellows Program to those whose performance meets expectations and who express a willingness to be considered for the Fellows Program. The Fellows must be able to start the following summer. An additional benefit DoD may be able to offer is work during holidays or other time off following the summer internship and before the two-year Fellows Program begins.

• Targeted Top-Tier Business Schools

The DBB staff has researched the characteristics and the reputations of major Graduate Schools of Business in the U.S. The analysis covered not only the program of study for which each school is known, but also the potential target population of students per class and the potential interest in DoD by virtue of the presence of a military/veterans club. Contact information for each school also is included. This information is outlined in Appendix D.

The DBB Task Group recommends the following nine top-tier schools for focused recruiting with a physical DoD presence:

Columbia Business School
Harvard Business School
Kellogg School of Management (Northwestern University) •
MIT Sloan School of Management
Robert H. Smith School of Business (University of Maryland)
Stanford Graduate School of Business •
The University of Chicago Graduate Business School
University of Michigan Business School

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

The Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania)

The following 11 prominent business schools are recommended for electronic marketing of the Program on the schools' web pages and placement offices:

Darden Graduate School of Business Administration (University of Virginia)
The Fuqua School of Business (Duke University)
Haas School of Business (University of California - Berkeley)
Howard University School of Management
Kelley School of Business (Indiana University)
Kogod School of Business (American University)
McCombs School of Business - University of Texas at Austin
McDonough School of Business (Georgetown University)
School of Business Administration (The College of William and Mary)
School of Business and Public Management (George Washington University)
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth

IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS

- **Form Implementation Team**

Following conceptual approval of the proposed Defense Business Fellows Program by the SEC and the Secretary of Defense, the Board suggests that the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) appoint an Implementation Team led by a senior OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) official. The Implementation Team should be composed of this official, as well as an OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) representative who will actively manage the program, and human resources representatives from the Defense components participating in the Program, who could be military officers or civilians. It would be desirable if Implementation Team members had MBA degrees and experience in graduate-level recruiting and management development.

- **Confirm and Quantify the Need and Use for Program Participants**

The next step will be confirming and quantifying the need for top-tier MBA graduates in the Department of Defense, and confirming the willingness of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to support the Fellows Program and to provide meaningful work opportunities for the participants and graduates.

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

This process should proceed as follows:

- (1) Define the skill sets and experience likely possessed by recent MBA graduates (e.g., finance, marketing, information systems, human resources, operations and general management) (see Appendix C),
- (2) Ask each military service and Defense component to express their interest in particular MBA skill sets, to estimate their desired intake, and prepare job descriptions for how they would use Program participants for introductory summer internships, rotational assignments during the two-year Program and for permanent positions following Program graduation and conversion.

The Implementation Team under the direction of Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness), should do this confirming and quantifying work.

The Board recommends setting a goal of 20 Fellows to comprise the pilot for the Defense Business Fellows Program. Fellows would start working around July 1, 2004. This estimate is based on five graduates for each of the military branches and five for the Fourth Estate (OSD and the Defense Agencies). If possible, the Board strongly recommends that OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) organize and implement the Summer Intern Program for candidates from the Class of 2004, offering internships that would commence during the summer of 2003. The Board would like to see intake build to around 50 recent MBA graduates for subsequent Fellows classes.

If, however, the initial confirming and quantifying work reveals insufficient need and willingness, then the expense and effort involved in starting the recruitment and development work should not be undertaken.

The Implementation Team should develop estimates of program costs and a proposed table of organization for managing and overseeing the program.

The go-ahead for the Program should be based on the findings of the Implementation Team, and the views and recommendations of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness); authorization of an appropriate level of funding from the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and approval of the program by the SEC and the Secretary of Defense.

The remainder of this section assumes a positive go-ahead decision.

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

- **Commence the Recruitment Process**

The Board recommends the following steps to activate the recruitment process, following best practices in the private sector:

- (1) The SEC should appoint the Selection Panel consisting of senior line military officers, SES executives and Political Appointees from the Services, OSD and the Defense Agencies participating in the Program, as well as the senior OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) official overseeing the Program; and assign them a target school (alumni where possible) where DoD wishes to establish a physical recruiting presence.
- (2) Individual members of the SEC should be asked to initiate contact with either a target school's President or Dean to brief them on the Defense Business Fellows Program and to gain their support.
- (3) Selection Panel members assigned to a target school should visit with the Dean of the business school and the head of career placement to brief them on the Program, and to obtain advice as to how best to proceed at that particular school.
- (4) USD (Personnel & Readiness) or the senior OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) official selected to oversee the Program and sit on the Selection Panel should select an OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) official to head the Defense Business Fellows Program Office.
- (5) The Defense Business Fellows Program Office should develop the Program notice and application procedures to be used for each school.
- (6) The Defense Business Fellows Program Office should finalize the selection criteria and develop or outsource any on-line testing for behavioral or leadership skills to be used.
- (7) An interview team should be identified for each target physical presence school, composed of volunteers from the Services and the Fourth Estate,

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

hopefully MBA graduates from that school. OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) should arrange for interview training for the interview team.

(8) A Team Leader should be appointed for each interview team. This leader should accompany the Selection Panel member on the initial visit to the school.

(9) Responsibilities for the Team Leader should be to:

- Develop a specific recruiting strategy for the school for the approval of the Selection Panel member assigned that school
- Take the lead in executing the recruiting strategy, including maintaining the physical presence at the school
- Review the resume book to identify potential prospects
- Initiate contact with any armed forces club, hosting information meetings and encouraging applications
- Manage the interview process, preparing hiring recommendations in coordination with the Selection Panel member assigned to the school for review by the entire Selection Panel
- Maintain contact with those to whom offers are made to answer questions and to encourage acceptance

The Board or members of this Task Group would be pleased to review recruiting strategies developed for each school, questions to be used by the Selection Panel and/or other elements of the recruiting program.

The initial year's work on campus for the nine target schools with a physical recruiting presence should focus on:

- (1) stimulating interest in the class of '04 by selecting candidates for the pilot summer internship program (July 2003),
- (2) recruiting and recommending candidates for the pilot Fellows Program to commence in July 2004, and
- (3) stimulating interest in the class of 2005 starting in September 2003.

No applications should be sought or accepted from the class of '03 because the two-year Fellows Program will not be ready until July 2004. }

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

Extreme care should be taken in selecting applicants for summer interns this summer since many otherwise qualified and interested students already may be committed for other summer work. Summer interns who perform well will expect an offer to join the Fellows Class of 2004. Thus, room should be left in the desired intake from the class of '04 for those who cannot join the summer intern program. They should be actively recruited this fall. ✓

For the second and ensuing years, the recruiting focus should be on:

- (1) *first-year students* – stimulating interest, screening, soliciting and offering summer internships for the best qualified and motivated students, and
- (2) *second-year students* – maintaining contact and interest in those offered positions in the Fellows Program after their summer internships, and soliciting applications from targeted second year MBAs who did not participate in the summer Program.

The Board also recommends that attempts be made to quickly engage top schools previously recommended and offer DoD summer internships for the best candidates the summer of 2003. Recruiting teams should be deployed quickly. The Team Leaders, in coordination with the Selection Panel member assigned to their school, should be empowered to identify and recommend interns to the Selection Panel. The Selection Panel will have to be cognizant of each school's deadlines and select interns within the appropriate timeframes. The Board recommends that interns for the Defense Business Fellows Program be offered positions with pay at the GS-7 level.

• Plan to Immediately Measure Program Effectiveness

The Board recommends that early attention be paid to establishing success criteria for the Program so that it may be measured and altered based upon its actual effectiveness. One measure of Program effectiveness is recruiting costs per hire. Personnel & Readiness should assess intake from each school and compare the average cost per hire from each school with the overall Program average. ✓ Schools should be dropped where costs are out of line with other schools. Recruiting effectiveness also can be measured by the ratio of applicants per eligible applicant pool (generally a high % to demonstrate Program interest), offers per applications submitted (target 10%), and acceptances to offers (target 80%).

The Board has no specific measures to propose for the two-year Fellows Program itself. The design of metrics with respect to cost savings or revenues

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

generated per Fellow are not as realistic for DoD as in the private sector. Presumably, participants are doing meaningful work in comparison to their salaries. Surveying the views of the service secretaries and component heads, however, as well as the experiences of Fellows can assess overall Program effectiveness. Ultimately, however, the true contribution of the Fellows will be seen in the application of the top-tier business skills they bring to the Department.

**Report to the Senior Executive Council,
Department of Defense**

MBA RECRUITMENT TASK GROUP

Report FY03-2

- **Recommendations on developing and implementing a program for recruiting top-tier Master of Business Administration (MBA) graduates for the Department of Defense.**

APPENDICES

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

APPENDIX A

Current Practices for Professional Recruitment within the Department of Defense

Recruitment on Campus (ROC) Initiative

An initiative to market Defense as the employer of choice (military and civilians, GS-5 through SES level) to college graduates (undergraduate through PhD). OSD (Personnel & Readiness) will perform the following role: manage a central web to identify Defense agencies and military services websites; provide responses to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ's); staff an Applicant Assistant Center (AAC) to respond to inquiries from applicants; and coordinate campus visits by General/Flag Officers and SES members to recruit at their respective alma maters and/or targeted college recruitment. The AAC staff will not directly recruit for a specific vacancy.

Appointment Types Applicable to all Federal Positions

Permanent – appointment is not time limited

Term – appointment is for greater than one year, but not more than four years

Temporary – appointment is for up to one year

Competitive Service Appointments (External Hiring)

The competitive service includes a wide variety of hiring flexibilities including permanent, temporary, and term appointments. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulates and oversees all competitive service hiring it has delegated to federal agencies to use. Agencies use the OPM-delegated examining authority to hire new Federal employees. Agencies must advertise positions to the public and apply Merit Systems Principles, Federal qualification standards, and veterans' preference when hiring. Other preference programs may also preempt the external hiring effort. Professional positions are established by agencies at grades from GS-5 to 15. After the examining process, agencies refer a short list of eligible candidates to selecting officials. Selected candidates serve a one-year probationary or trial period upon appointment to permanent or term appointments, respectively. Standard government benefits are available to permanent and term employees, but not to temporary employees. Applicants must be US citizens

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

unless the hiring authority can show that no US citizen was available to fill the vacancy. Recruitment, retention, and relocation bonuses of up to 25 per cent of basic pay may be paid. Student loan repayment of up to \$6,000 per year not to exceed \$40,000 total may be paid.

Career Senior Executive Service (SES)

A government-wide, or all-qualified candidates, competitive process for recruitment of career SES members, managed by OPM. Vacancies must be posted on OPM's website, USAJOBS, for a minimum of 14 days for government-wide competition; OSD policy requires a minimum 30-day announcement period if the area of consideration is all-qualified candidates. All applicants must address accomplishments towards the Executive Core Qualifications (ECQs): leading change, leading people, results driven, business acumen and building coalitions. Agencies have the option of additionally requiring applicants address technical qualifications. Applications are reviewed by an agency Executive Resources Board that develops a list of best qualified candidates, certifying the proposed appointee meets the qualifications requirements of the position. The ECQs of the hiring official's selection must be submitted to OPM's Qualifications Review Board for certification prior to appointment. The SES contains no citizenship requirement, however, citizenship is required to obtain a clearance, which is required for the majority of DoD SES positions.

Excepted Service Appointments

These are appointments to appropriated-fund positions that are excepted from competitive service requirements. These professional positions are established by agencies at grades from GS-5 to 15. Excepted appointments, which may be permanent, temporary, or term, fall into one of three categories:

- 1) **Schedule A** positions are positions for which it is not practical to apply competitive service qualifications and requirements, and which are not of a confidential or policy determining nature. This includes positions such as attorneys, intelligence corps, and faculty members.
- 2) **Schedule B** positions are those for which it is not practical to hold open competitive examinations, and which are not of a confidential or policy determining nature. Individuals appointed under Schedule B must meet

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

OPM qualification requirements. Students in cooperative education programs fall under Schedule B.

- 3) **Schedule C** positions are either key policy determining positions or positions involving a close personal relationship between the appointee and key officials. No examinations are required and the agency appoints persons whom they determine to be qualified.

Individuals appointed under Schedule C always remain in the excepted service since they serve at the pleasure of the President and their hiring manager. Individuals appointed under Schedules A and B may, depending upon the hiring provisions, remain permanently in the excepted service, or may be subsequently converted to the competitive service. Although appointments under Schedules A and B typically provide more flexibility than do those in the competitive service, certain basic principles continue to apply: veterans' preference, applicable qualification requirements, competitive processes, and merit principles. Excepted service appointments include benefits consistent with the type of appointment, e.g., appointments without time limit are eligible for full benefits packages.

Non-Career SES Appointments

A non-competitive recruitment process for a limited number of professional-level candidates who serve at the pleasure of the President. Individuals are selected by the Secretary's White House Liaison Office and approved by the White House Presidential Personnel Office and OPM. Appointees either fill sensitive positions making or approving substantive policy recommendations, or possess a thorough knowledge of and sympathy with the goals, priorities, and preferences of an official who has a confidential or policy determining relationship with President or agency head. Appointees are eligible for a standard Federal benefits package.

Limited-Term and Emergency Senior Executive Service (SES) Appointment

A non-competitive, or competitive, recruitment process for SES positions that are typically project in nature. Hiring managers may propose candidates whose final appointment must be approved by OPM. Limited-term appointments can be up to three years without renewal. An individual may hold more than one limited term appointment, in different SES limited term positions, for a period not

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

to exceed 36 months in any 48-month period. Limited emergency SES appointments may be made for up to 18 months to meet unanticipated urgent requirements, and must be approved by OPM. Appointees are not eligible for retirement or life insurance benefits. Appointees are only eligible for health benefits if his or her appointment as a federal employee results in a denial of health benefits from another source.

Experts and Consultants

Experts and consultants provide specialized opinions and advice, bringing an "outside" point of view to complex issues. Hiring managers directly recruit and select candidates. Appointments are of a temporary nature (not to exceed one year, but there is an option to renew) and consultants work on an intermittent basis (not to exceed 130 days during the year of the appointment). They are intended to be a supplement to the services of Federal employees, not a substitute. Pay is normally limited to that of GS-15, step 10, although higher rates may be authorized for those serving in scientific and other highly technical roles. Expert and consultant positions provide no benefits.

Contractors to the Department of Defense

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) offers a contract vehicle to Government agencies to hire outside individuals who possess a particular subject-area expertise. Commercial contract partners are selected based upon their particular expertise and in accordance with full and open competition requirements of the *Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)*. Hiring managers access contractors through a pre-qualified commercial partner, i.e., rates for service(s) are negotiated during the qualification/selection process. Hiring managers write a job description with sufficient detail to permit the commercial partner to identify and hire the specific individual(s) to meet the requirements of the position. The commercial partner is responsible for providing all benefits to the contractor.

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

Presidential Management Intern (PMI) Program

This is a highly selective government-wide recruitment program targeted at Master's Degree level graduates. The selection process, which includes merit principles and veterans' preference provisions, is run by OPM. Successful candidates receive an excepted service appointment with OPM, which then matches them with agencies who have been given a PMI authorization. PMIs are hired at the GS-9 level, and have promotion potential to GS-11 after the first year. PMIs who are U.S. citizens may be converted to permanent appointments at the completion of the program. PMIs are eligible for all standard government benefits; they may also be eligible for student loan repayment, and a retention bonus of up to \$25,000 upon completion of the program.

Defense Career Intern Program (DCIP)

A non-competitive recruitment program managed and implemented by Defense Components using a special hiring authority created by OPM through an Executive Order. Merit Systems Principles, Federal qualification standards, and veterans' preference apply to the program. Hiring managers directly recruit and select desired individual(s) for a two-year internship beginning at a pay level up to GS-9. DCIP employees may be promoted while serving the internship. OPM authority is required if the hiring component wishes to recruit above the GS-9 level, or to extend internships beyond two years. DCIP positions do not have to be publicly advertised. Each intern must complete a formal training and development program during the internship. DCIP interns are non-competitively converted to permanent appointments upon satisfactory completion of the internship. Interns who are U.S. citizens may be converted to permanent appointments at the completion of the program. DCIP employees are eligible for all standard government benefits during the two-year internship. Recruitment, retention, and relocation bonuses of up to 25 per cent of basic pay may be paid. Student loan repayment of up to \$6,000 per year not to exceed \$40,000 total may be paid.

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White House Fellows Program

This highly selective program created by Executive Order is designed to provide 11 to 19 competitively selected US citizens (non-government employees, except career military) with exposure to senior level government operations. Fellows serve as a Special Assistant to the agency head. The Cabinet Secretaries, through their respective White House Liaison Offices, submit job descriptions to the Presidential Commission on White House Fellows. Candidates apply to their regional White House Fellows Board for initial review, and if chosen, their names are forwarded to the Presidential Commission for final selection. Finalists are ultimately reviewed and approved by the President. Job assignments are made by the Director of the Commission in consultation with agency officials and based on the outcome of interviews between the Fellows and the agencies. The Fellows serve for one year with pay equivalent to the GS-14 step 3 level, and are eligible for a standard Federal benefits package. There is no provision for further service or conversion since the goal of the program is to equip Fellows to return to their former employment with a richer sense of public service and to foster public goals in their private pursuits.

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

APPENDIX B

The White House

(DRAFT) EXECUTIVE ORDER

Defense Business Fellows Program

WHEREAS it is in the national interest to continue to develop a high-performance, results-oriented, responsive civilian management structure at the Department of Defense; and

WHEREAS world-class management, financial, and business skills are essential to achieve this desired management structure; and

WHEREAS recent school graduates from top-tier U.S. business schools possess these skills as well as new ideas, energy, and private sector management techniques:

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including Sections 3301 and 3302 of Title 5 of the United States Code, Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and to provide for the recruitment, selection and employment of exceptional recent MBA graduates from top-tier U.S. graduate schools of business, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. There is hereby established the Defense Business Fellows Program, hereafter referred to as the Program, the purpose of which is to attract and retain a cadre of men and women of exceptional senior-level business administration potential who have received special training in business administration.

Section 2. The Program provides the nation's finest men and women the opportunity to improve Government business practices within the Department of Defense while gaining valuable insight into the most senior levels of government management.

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

Section 3. Outstanding US citizens who have pursued a course of study oriented toward business administration at an accredited graduate school of business, who have had at least two years of professional experience in a business-related field, who, at the time of application, have received within the last 2 years, or upon acceptance will receive, a Masters degree in Business Administration, and who have maintained at least a 3.2 grade point average, or its equivalent, during their studies and met other minimum criteria established by the Department of Defense, are eligible to apply for participation in the Program.

Section 4. The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), shall create a Defense Business Fellows Program Office, hereafter referred to as the Program Office, to develop appropriate procedures for the recruitment, screening, and selection of applicants possessing the qualifications described in Section 3 of this Executive Order. In developing these procedures, the Program Office shall be guided by the following principles and policies:

- (a) The Program Office shall manage and administer the Program in coordination with the participating Defense Components.
- (b) The number of Fellows participating in the Program shall not exceed fifty per class.
- (c) Fellows shall serve the Department of Defense for a period of 2 years, upon which they may convert their status to permanent federal employees. Fellows shall be hired at GS-12, step 8, with promotion potential to GS-13 after one year and satisfactory performance review. Upon successful completion of the Program, Fellows shall convert at the same level or may be promoted to a higher level if recommended by their hiring managers.
- (d) The Program shall also provide for internships for prospective Fellows as designed and implemented by the Program Office.
- (e) Final selection of Fellows, including those participating in the internships, shall be made by a

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Selection Panel comprised of senior line military officers, Senior Executive Service executives and Political Appointees from the Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Agencies participating in the Program, as well as the senior OUSD (Personnel & Readiness) official overseeing the Program.

- (f) The procedures so developed shall provide for such affirmative action as the Program Office deems appropriate to assure equal employment opportunity.

Section 5. Continuation in the Program shall be contingent upon satisfactory performance by the Fellows throughout the fellowship period. Each participating Department of Defense Component shall submit evaluations of the Fellows to the Program Office, which shall have the responsibility to measure the effectiveness of the Program.

Section 6. The Program Office, in coordination with the Office of Personnel Management, shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Executive Order.

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APPENDIX C

Summary of MBA Skill Sets

Top-tier MBA programs require at least two years of practical business experience, so that students can relate better to the issues being addressed in their classes. The goal of an MBA program is to graduate students who are prepared, experienced and capable of applying the following knowledge and skills:

Finance:

Defined as the supply of fund or capital; the management of money and other assets

- MBAs will understand the role of finance in supporting the functional areas of a firm and how financial decisions themselves can create value.
- MBAs will recognize that accounting is the primary channel for communicating information about the economics of a business, and thus comprehend a broad view of how accounting contributes to an organization.

Marketing:

Defined as the commercial functions involved in transferring goods from the producer to the consumer

- MBAs will comprehend the role of marketing in the company; and explore the relationship of marketing to other functions.
- MBAs will recognize how effective marketing builds on a thorough understanding of buyer behavior and demand to create value for customers.
- MBAs will have a good insight into the thoughts of the consumer. Skills could be applied to DoD for assisting in recruiting diverse, qualified enlistees.

Operations:

Defined as those issues surrounding the planning and operating functions

- MBAs will understand the skills required and concepts needed to ensure the ongoing continuation of the many processes required for the development and manufacture of products as well as the creation and delivery of services.

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Consulting/Strategy:

Defined as the business of providing advice and strategic planning

- MBAs will be able to formulate strategy, and possess an understanding of:
 - A firm's operative environment and how to sustain competitive advantage,
 - How to generate superior value for customers by designing the optimum configuration of the product mix and functional activities,
 - How to balance the opportunities and risks associated with dynamic and uncertain changes in industry attractiveness and competitive position.
- MBAs will understand competitive positioning; understanding comparative costs; and addressing issues such as cannibalization, network externalities, and globalization.

Organizational Behavior:

Defined as how a company is structured and how processes are disseminated throughout an organization

- MBAs will be effective leaders by addressing the human side of enterprise and will understand:
 - Customer Focus
 - Information and Technology Management
 - Driving Change in Operation and the Supply Chain

Business Government and the International Economy & Social Enterprise:

Defined as business interaction with the community and the world as a whole

- Graduates will understand varied economic environment of business to help managers understand the implications for their companies.
- MBAs will recognize the interactions between and interdependence of business with the civic and government sectors. Not only are the relationships increasing in importance, but they are also essential to business success.

Entrepreneurialism:

Defined as a willingness to take risks to gain rewards

- MBAs will have addressed the issues faced by managers who wish to turn opportunity into viable organizations that create value.

Negotiations:

Defined as discussions intended to produce business agreements

- Graduates will be able to develop negotiation skills and analyses.

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APPENDIX D

TOP SCHOOLS FOR RECRUITING VIA PHYSICAL DOD PRESENCE

Columbia Business School

Uris Hall
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027

Phone: 212-854-1961
<http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/mba/index.html>

Dean Meyer Feldberg

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 455 (470 Summer grads + 180 Winter grads = 650 students – 30% international)

Expertise/Recruitment Strength: Finance

Harvard Business School

MBA Career Services
Wilder House, Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163

Phone: 617-495-6232
Fax: 617-495-8947
Email: mbacs@hbs.edu

Dean Kim B. Clark

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 612 (900 students – 32% international)

Expertise/Recruitment Strength: General Management

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Rd
Evanston, IL 60208

General information: 847-491-3300
Recruiting cmc@kellogg.northwestern.edu

Dean Dipak C. Jain

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 434 (620 students – 30% international)

Expertise/Recruitment Strength: Marketing, Brand Management

MIT Sloan School of Management
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

Phone: 617-253-2659
URL: <http://mitsloan.mit.edu>

Dean Richard Schmalensee

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 210 (300 students – 30% international)

Expertise/Recruitment Strength: Engineering, Systems Management

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

Robert H. Smith School of Business
University of Maryland
Van Munching Hall
College Park, Maryland 20747

Phone: 301-405-2278
Info@rhsmith.umd.edu
<http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/>

Joanne Ferchland-Parella, Assistant Dean for External Relations
Phone: (301) 405-9454
E-mail: jferchla@rhsmith.umd.edu

Dean Howard Frank

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 150 (200 students – 25% international)

Expertise/Recruitment Strength: New Economy, MIS/Information Technology and
Public Administration (home of the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise)

Stanford Graduate School of Business
Admissions
518 Memorial Way
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-5015

Phone: 650-723-4046
Fax: 650-723-1332
email: alumni_inquiries@gsb.stanford.edu

Dean Robert Joss

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 281 (370 students – approximately 24-32% international)

Expertise/Recruitment Strength: General Management, Entrepreneurialism

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

The University of Chicago Graduate Business School
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637

University of Chicago switchboard: 773-702-1234/7743
email: ds hotline@gsblistmail.uchicago.edu

Dean Edward A. Snyder
tsnyder@gsb.uchicago.edu
Phone: 773-702-1680
Dean's Office: 773-702-7121

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 370 (530 students – approximately 28-31% international)

Expertise/Recruitment Strength: Quantitative, Finance

University of Michigan Business School
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI
48109-1234

Admissions
2260 William Davidson Hall
Fax: 734-763-7804
Phone: 734-763-5796

On-line Job Board: On [website](#). Contact is Katrina Vegter, Career Resources and Technology Coordinator at (734) 647-4917 or vegter@umich.edu. Postings remain active for 90 days; there is no fee for postings.

Dean Robert Dolan
1248 William Davidson Hall
Phone: 734-764-1363
Fax: 734-763-0671

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 305 (430 students – approximately 28-30% international)

Expertise/Recruitment Strength: Strategy

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
420 Jon M. Huntsman Hall
3730 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104.6340

Dean Patrick T. Harker
Phone: 215-898-6183/3430
Fax: 215-898-0120
email: mba.admissions@wharton.upenn.edu

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 480 (800 students – 40% international)

Expertise/Recruitment Strength: Finance

#

**TOP SCHOOLS FOR RECRUITING VIA ELECTRONIC MARKETING
ON SCHOOL WEB PAGE**

Darden Graduate School of Business Administration
University of Virginia
Mail Address: P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6500
Courier Address: 100 Darden Boulevard
Charlottesville, VA 22903

Phone 800-UVA-MBA1 (800-882-6221) or 434-924-7281, or 434-924-7739
email: Darden@Virginia.edu

Dean Robert S. Harris

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 226 (310 students - 27% international)

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

The Fuqua School of Business
Duke University
Box 90120
Durham, NC
27708-0120

Phone: 919-660-7700
Fax: 919-684-2818
email: <http://www.fuqua.duke.edu>

Dean Douglas T. Breedon

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 224 (340 students - 34% international)

Haas School of Business
University of California - Berkeley
545 Student Services #1900
Berkeley, CA 94720-1900

Phone: General Information 1-510-642-7989
Email: <http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/>

Dean Tom Campbell
Phone: Dean's Office 1-510-643-2027 campbell@haas.berkeley.edu

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 161 (240 students – approximately 28-35% international)

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

Howard University School of Business
2600 6th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20059

Recruiting Services, Mr. Harold Gray
Center for Professional Development
Phone: 202-806-1500/1518
Email: <http://www.bschool.howard.edu/>

Dean Dr. Barron Harvey

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 190 (200 students - 3% international)

Kelley School of Business
Indiana University
1309 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, Indiana 47405

Dean Dan Dalton
Phone: 812-855-8100
Phone: 812-856-5052

Email: mbaoffice@indiana.edu
Email: gcs@indiana.edu
<http://www.kelley.iu.edu>

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 180 (257 students - 30% international)

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

Kogod School of Business
American University
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016

Phone: 202-885-1000

Dean Myron Roomkin
bizdean@american.edu
Phone: 202-885-1985

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 105 (210 students - 45% international)

McCombs School of Business
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX 78712-1178

Phone: 512-471-5921
Fax: 512-471-7725
Email: <http://www.bus.utexas.edu/>

Katy Nelson, Matt Turner
Associate Director, Corporate Relations
Katy.nelson@bus.utexas.edu
Phone: 512-475-8176

Dean George W. Gau
Phone: 512-471-5921
Fax: 512-471-7725

Target Recruitment Population per Class: 296 (400 students - 26% international)

Defense Business Fellows

Cost Projections

Program Estimate (FY 2004-FY 2007)	1
Program Costing Assumptions	2
Notional Hiring Projection	3
Program Cost Details	4

Defense Business Fellowship (DBF) Program Estimate (FY 2004-FY 2007)

	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07
Program Development				
Marketing	394,000	400,500	413,500	416,500
Recruiting TDY	112,000	224,000	224,000	224,000
Candidate Interviews (TDY)	20,000	40,000	40,000	40,000
Orientation Prog	10,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Mentor/Supervisor Training	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
Recruiter Training	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
Total Program Development Cost	545,000	675,500	688,500	691,500
Program Participants				
Fellows				
Salary & Benefits	292,818	1,675,653	3,566,176	4,215,570
Recruitment Bonus	161,994	330,467	337,077	343,818
Retention Bonus	0	165,230	337,080	343,820
Training	0	120,000	300,000	300,000
TDY	0	168,000	336,000	336,000
Performance Awards	0	7,601	15,506	15,816
Security Clearances	24,000	48,000	48,000	48,000
Total Fellows Cost	478,812	2,514,951	4,939,839	5,603,024
Interns				
Salary & Benefits	50,190	119,119	138,566	141,337
Training	0	0	15,000	15,000
TDY	0	0	4,100	4,100
Total Interns Cost	50,190	119,119	157,666	160,437
Total Program Participant Cost	529,003	2,634,070	5,097,504	5,763,461
Program Management Office				
Personnel Costs	380,436	386,798	394,534	402,425
Support Costs	423,000	392,150	342,150	342,200
Total Program Management Office Cost	803,436	778,948	736,684	744,625
Total Costs	1,877,438	4,088,518	6,522,688	7,199,586

Defense Business Fellows Costing Assumptions:

- Costs are based on the number of Fellows and Interns depicted in the Notional Hiring Projection.
- Program Development Category (includes all activities required prior to hiring Fellows and Interns).
 - Recruiting trips assume 2 people per trip for 3 days with 20 trips in FY04 and 40 trips in FY05 and beyond. Each trip is costed at \$1400 per person.
 - TDY is costed at \$1400, which represents a typical expense considering authorized per diem and airfare to high, medium and low cost areas.
 - Candidate interview trips assume 1 person per trip for 2 days for 20 candidates in FY04 and 40 in FY05 and beyond. Each trip is costed at \$1000.
 - Orientation program cost assumes 5 days in Washington, D.C. Development and facilities costs would be incurred in FY 04; facilities costs and program revisions in FY05 and beyond.
 - Mentor/Supervisor training assumes 3 days in Washington, D.C. Cost factor is 3/5 of the orientation program cost.
 - Recruiter training assumes 1 day in Washington. Cost factor is 1/2 mentor training cost. Development and facilities costs would be incurred in FY04; facilities costs and program revisions in FY05 and beyond.
- Program Participant Category (includes all activities required to support employment of Fellows and Interns).
 - Fellow salaries are costed at GS-12/8 for entire program period (assumes no promotion for second year).
 - Recruitment and retention allowances are costed at 25 percent of base pay.
 - Fellows training costs based upon 6 (2 per quarter) training events per year per person at \$1500 per training event.
 - Intern salaries are costed at GS-07/1 for three months in the summer and the month of December. Interns are assumed to be in program for only one year.
 - Intern training costs based on \$1500 per event, plus 2 weeks TDY.
- Program Management Office Category (includes all activities to support office operations).
 - Assumes funds needed for research or support contracts (e.g., targeting universities, marketing, advertising, program assessment model development).
 - Assumes more funds required during start-up year than steady-state years.

Program Development Costs

	FY 04			FY 05			FY 06			FY 07		
	Unit	No. Units	Total	Unit	No. Units	Total	Unit	No. Units	Total	Unit	No. Units	Total
Marketing Costs												
Brand Development												
Contractor Support			75,000			50,000			50,000			50,000
TDY to Universities (2/trip) ¹	2,800	20	56,000	2,800	40	112,000	2,800	40	112,000	2,800	40	112,000
Program Materials												
Targeted to Universities												
Print Material			5,000			2,500			2,500			2,500
DVDs												
Development	15,000	1	15,000	7,500	1	7,500	7,500	1	7,500	7,500	1	7,500
Production	10	100	1,000	10	500	5,000	10	500	5,000	10	500	5,000
Targeted to Students												
DVDs/Videos												
Development	30,000	1	30,000	15,000	1	15,000	15,000	1	15,000	15,000	1	15,000
Production	10	2,500	25,000	10	2,500	25,000	10	2,500	25,000	10	2,500	25,000
Handouts			10,000			5,000			10,000			5,000
Web Site												
Development			25,000									
Annual Maintenance						12,500			12,500			12,500
Advertising												
Print Ads	15,000	8	120,000	16,000	8	128,000	17,000	8	136,000	18,000	8	144,000
Recruitment Fair Fees	300	20	6,000	300	40	12,000	300	40	12,000	300	40	12,000
Association Registration Fees			1,000			1,000			1,000			1,000
Conferences	25,000	1	25,000	25,000	1	25,000	25,000	1	25,000	25,000	1	25,000
Total Marketing Costs			394,000			400,500			413,500			416,500

Program Development Costs

	FY 04			FY 05			FY 06		
	Unit	No. Units	Total	Unit	No. Units	Total	Unit	No. Units	Total
Recruitment Costs									
Recruitment Visits (2/trip) ²		40			80			80	
High Cost Area	3,600		144,000	3,600		288,000	3,600		288,000
Mid Cost Area ³	2,800		112,000	2,800		224,000	2,800		224,000
Low Cost Area	100		4,000	100		8,000	100		8,000
TDY for Candidate Interviews	1,000	20	20,000	1,000	40	40,000	1,000	40	40,000
Training Program Development									
Orientation	10,000	1	10,000	5,000	1	5,000	5,000	1	5,000
Mentor/Supervisor	6,000	1	6,000	3,000	1	3,000	3,000	1	3,000
Recruiter	3,000	1	3,000	3,000	1	3,000	3,000	1	3,000
Total Program Development Costs			545,000			675,500			688,000

Notes

¹ TDY assumes 2 staff per trip, 10 trips in FY04, 20 trips in FY05 and beyond.

² TDY assumes 2 staff per trip, 20 trips in FY04, 40 trips in FY05 and beyond.

³ Mid cost area expenses are used in estimates.

Program Participant Costs

DBF Fellow Salary & Benefits (GS-12/08)	FY 04		FY 05		FY 06		FY 07	
Salary¹	Unit Cost	Total Cost	Unit Cost	Total Cost	Unit Cost	Total Cost	Unit Cost	Total Cost
10 Fellows for 1 QTR + 1 Mo.	24,351	243,508		1,393,475		2,965,635		3,505,671
10 Fellows for 12 Mo.			74,148	741,482				
5 Fellows for 3 QTRs			55,885	279,425				
15 Fellows for 1 QTR + 1 Mo.			24,838	372,567				
30 Fellows for 12 Mo.					75,631	2,268,934		
5 Fellows for 3 QTRs					57,003	570,028		
5 Fellows for 1 QTR + 1 Mo.					25,335	126,673		
40 Fellows for 12 Mo.							77,144	3,085,751
5 Fellows for 3 QTRs							58,143	290,714
5 Fellows for 1 QTR + 1 Mo.							25,841	129,206
Benefits²		49,310		282,179		600,541		709,898
Total Salary & Benefits		<u>292,818</u>		<u>1,675,653</u>		<u>3,566,176</u>		<u>4,215,570</u>
Recruitment Bonus³								
10 for FY 04	16,199	<u>161,994</u>						
20 for FY 05			16,523	<u>330,467</u>				
20 for FY 06					16,854	<u>337,077</u>		
20 for FY 07							17,191	<u>343,818</u>
Retention Bonus³								
None for FY 04	0							
10 for FY 05			16,523	<u>165,230</u>				
20 for FY 06					16,854	<u>337,080</u>		
20 For FY 07							17,191	<u>343,820</u>
Performance Awards								
1.15% Base Pay			760	<u>7,601</u>	775	<u>15,506</u>	791	<u>15,816</u>
Security Clearance								
\$2,400/Person	2,400	<u>24,000</u>	2,400	<u>48,000</u>	2,400	<u>48,000</u>	2,400	<u>48,000</u>

Program Participant Costs

DBF Intern Salary & Benefits (GS-07/01) ⁴	FY 04		FY 05		FY 06		FY 07	
	Unit Cost	Total Cost	Unit Cost	Total Cost	Unit Cost	Total Cost	Unit Cost	Total Cost
Salaries								
5 Interns for 1 QTR	8,348	41,738		99,059		115,231		117,536
10 Interns for 1 QTR			8,515	85,146				
5 Interns for 1 Mo.			2,783	13,913				
10 Interns for 1 QTR					8,685	86,849		
10 Interns for 1 Mo.					2,838	28,382		
10 Interns for 1 QTR							8,859	88,586
10 Interns for 1 Mo.							2,895	28,950
Benefits²		8,452		20,059		23,334		23,801
Total Salary & Benefits		<u>50,190</u>		<u>119,119</u>		<u>138,566</u>		<u>141,337</u>

Notes

¹ Salary for Fellows costed at GS-12/08 for entire program (2 years) with a 2% per year inflation factor. Salaries are slightly overstated in FY 06 and FY 07 due to Fellows completing program.

² Benefit factor is 20.25%

³ Recruitment and Retention Bonuses based upon 25% of base pay.

⁴ Salary for Interns is costed at GS-07/01 for entire program (1 year) with a 2% per year inflation factor.

Program Management Office Costs

	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07
<u>Personnel Costs</u>				
GS-14/08	132,776	135,432	138,140	140,903
GS-13/05	95,997	97,433	99,382	101,370
GS-13/05	95,997	97,433	99,382	101,370
GS-09/05	55,666	56,499	57,629	58,782
Total Personnel Costs	380,436	386,798	394,534	402,425
<u>Support Costs</u>				
<u>Staff Training</u>				
2/year/person @ 1500 Each	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000
<u>Staff Mission TDY</u>				
2/QTR/person @ 1000 Each	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000
Contract Support²	300,000	250,000	200,000	200,000
<u>Misc</u>				
Supplies	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500
Equipment ³	55,900	75,000	75,000	75,000
Phone ⁴	2,100	2,150	2,150	2,200
Rent ⁵	17,000	17,000	17,000	17,000
Associations	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Publications	500	500	500	500
Total Support Costs	423,000	392,150	342,150	342,200
Total PMO Costs	803,436	778,948	736,684	744,625

Notes

¹ Personnel costs include salary and benefits with a 2% per year salary inflation factor. Benefit factor is 20.25% of salary.

² Contract support includes funds required to develop ads, assessment program, and additional support requirements.

³ Equipment includes 4 desk top computers, one fax, one color and one black and white copier. Laptops for Fellows and Interns are also included.

⁴ Assumes 5 phone lines (one for each person and one for the fax) at \$450/year/line.

⁵ Rent based upon square footage estimates.

DBF Notional Hiring Projections

Fiscal Year	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
FY 04 Fellows Interns	PMO Operational	First Recruiting Trips							10 5	10 5	10 5	10
FY 05 Fellows Interns	10	10	10 5	15	15	15	15	15	30 10	30 10	30 10	30
FY 06 Fellows Interns	30	30	30 10	35	35	35	35	25	40 10	40 10	40 10	40
FY 07 Fellows Interns	40	40	40 10	45	45	45	45	25	40 10	40 10	40 10	40

Assumptions:

1. Annual requirement (steady state) is 20 Fellows and 10 Interns.
2. First year program participant recruitment is planned to meet half of annual requirements.
3. To coincide with MBA graduation dates, the hiring of participants is split between January and June. The majority will be hired in June as there are typically more graduations in May than December.
4. Interns will work only during school breaks, such as December and June through August.



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

29 SEP 14 AM 11:21
September 29, 2003 - 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: DACOWITS Visit to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Yuma, Arizona -
SNOWFLAKE

- This memorandum provides additional information requested in your July 23, 2003 memo (Tab A) regarding issues that arose during a recent visit to at Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma by members of the Defense Advisory Committee On Women In the Service (DACOWITS).
- Issue: Why is pay not related to hours of work? Given the nature of military service, a member on active duty military service may be expected to be available twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. Pay levels are set to attract and retain the quality people we need who will also accept this duty responsibility. Leaders may provide some relief by authorizing liberty, pass, or other time off in addition to the members' 30-day annual leave.
- Issue: Junior enlisted Marines getting married or separating to avoid living on-base in the barracks. Most of the Services are moving to allow more E-4s and above to live off base. We are working to accelerate this. The Department recognizes that young people coming into the military today desire and value privacy and the autonomy of living off the installation, but our policies and practices are rooted in a paternalistic mentality that was directed toward a conscripted force.
- Related issue: Turning over administration and maintenance of the barracks to a civilian contractor. There does appear to be a discipline and training problem at Yuma that will not be solved by privatizing barracks.
- Issue: Long waiting lists for child-care and lack of drop-in child-care service. Yuma has a waiting list of approximately 110 people (wait varies based on the age of the child). Services have a history of not committing sufficient funds for the construction of on-base child development centers. The Department is insisting more be built, but the biggest gain in the short run will be more in-home care, which we are emphasizing. Service members are routinely unaware of the expense of childcare (military and civilian) and are generally unappreciative of the



11-L-0559/OSD/16734

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significant subsidies provided by the Department. We are engaged in a process of increasing this awareness.

- Related issue: Drop-in child care. Drop-in child care is hard to expand until funding daily child care is properly funded and the number of members on the waiting list for daily child care are reduced.
- Issue: Process to reimburse Marines for commuted rations (missing messing meals) is complicated. A working group has recently been established to examine alternatives to current messing arrangements, including a "pay-as-you-go" messing arrangements. Under a pay-as-you-go plan, members would only pay for meals actually consumed in the dining facility. Recommendations due January 2004.
- Issue: Work absence related to pregnancy. Data on days of work missed by gender. (Tab B)

RECOMMENDATION: Information only.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: CDR Brad Roberson, OUSD(P&R)/MPP/OEPM, (b)(6)

7/23/03

23
July 21, 2003

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Personnel Issues

Here is some material on a friend of mine's DACOWITS visit to Yuma. It might be helpful to you.

Regards,

Attach.

Notes from Dacowits visit to Yuma, AZ July 11, 12

DHR:dh
072103-28

.....
Please respond by 8/15/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16736

Notes from Dacowits visit to Yuma, AZ July 11, 12

These are observations that I am sure that will show no new information.

Colonel James J. Cooney, CO was extraordinary in his treatment to us as was his second in command, Lt. Col William Turner.

In the tour of the flight line via car, I asked to see a harrier up close so Col. Cooney arranged a visit with a pilot to go over the plane carefully - in 120 degree heat!

Compared with the visit I made to Fort Sam, this CO, Col Cooney, was deeply to committed to the quality of life on and off base for his marines and interested in the issues we addressed in our focus groups - retention, deployment and women's health care.

We interviewed enlisted only : (except officer wives)

E-1-E-3 Female Pfc-LCpl

E-4-E-5 Male Cpl-Sgt

E 6-E-9 Female SSgt-GySgt-MSgt-SgtMaj

E-6-E-9 Male SSgt-Gyst-MGySgt- SgtMaj

Officer Family members - female

Issues

1. Want pay related to hours of work - with increased work because of numbers deployed
2. Equipment - trucks, helicopters - 30 years and older - I thought it was interesting to hear it from the marines working on the equipment rather than the CO. They are convinced it is cheaper to buy new and worried about repairs all the time.
(I know money is always the concern in every issue)
3. Barracks - a major problem and an old one (like living in a prison cell) yet barracks must be 90% full
Marines get married JUST to live off base and not in barracks and marriages do not last
Some marines leave the service just not to live in barracks

20319

CO said new barracks are a mess after a year in spite of Friday inspections. No one is responsible like the "old days" and these young men and women coming in don't care about property - costs \$60,000 to \$75,00 each year to repair broken furniture and equipment. CO thinks the barracks and their care should be contracted to private sector. "We're fighters not cleaners"

4. Deployment issues are always the same but at this base it was clear all services are available to families- financial (power of attorney - wills, etc.) and info. on all other issues. The problem is getting the marines and their families to USE what is available. It was suggested that when you arrive at a new base -deployment issues be part of the introduction training for families and marines - some even thought it could be mandatory that a marine bring his spouse in but that couldn't work because it would reflect on the marine's record if spouse didn't show.

Child Care - always a complaint - long lists to get into child care - off base is extra cost and must be licensed and varies by community. Would like drop-in child care where there are large deployments so remaining spouse can get errands, Dr. appointments done.

5. Marines have to pay for food by the month and miss many meals by work schedule and hard to get reimbursed by chits. Suggestion was made for a swap card like they use in colleges.

6. The male E-6 to E-9 were toughest on the female marines (discussion did not include deployment) but on base. Pregnancy (and female physical problems) in work situations - time off because "didn't feel good" or in warehouse couldn't do job later in pregnancy. They were very vocal and then the Sgt. major spoke at length about the progress that had been made over his time in the marines and tried to put on a positive spin.

7. Col Cooney considers Yuma a soft target - minutes from Mexico

and the huge fuel tank is on the Mexican side of the base. He thinks one person could destroy the tank and cause havoc - not on terms of lives but chaos at the most important Marine aircraft base.

MZR

HQMC
21 Feb 96

E R R A T U M
TO
MCO 5000.12D
MARINE CORPS POLICY ON PREGNANCY AND PARENTHOOD

1. This erratum is issued to include enclosure (1) with the basic order.

PCN 10207020880

11-L-0559/OSD/16740



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

MCO 5000.12D

MPP-55

4 Oct 95

MARINE CORPS ORDER 5000.12D W/CH 1, 2, AND ERRATUM

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps

To: Distribution List

Subj: MARINE CORPS POLICY ON PREGNANCY AND PARENTHOOD

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 1000.10

(b) MCO P1700.24A

(c) BUMEDINST 6320.1D

(d) MCO P1900.16D

(e) OPNAVINST 3710.7P

(f) MCO 1740.13A

(g) MCO P1080.40

(h) MCO P1300.8R

(i) MCO 1001.45F

(j) MCO P1040.31G

(k) MCO P1040R.35B

(l) MCO P1050.3G

(m) MCO p1020.34F

Encl: (1) Format for Notification of Commanding Officer

1. Purpose. To establish Marine Corps policy and procedures concerning the retention, assignment, and separation of pregnant Marines and the requirement to support all Marines making decisions which balance both their commitment to the Marine Corps and their parental responsibilities.

2. Cancellation. MCO 5000.12C.

3. Background

a. Reference (a) provides the first DON policy for all military personnel, both Active Component and Reserve, except midshipmen, on pregnancy and issues related to pregnant service-members. It builds positively on existing programs while maintaining operational readiness.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

4 Oct 95

b. DON policy is that pregnancy is a natural event that can occur in the lives of Marines and Sailors, and is not a presumption of medical incapacity. Pregnancy and parenthood are compatible with a naval service career. However, there are responsibilities that come with parenthood, and for those in uniform, these responsibilities require even more careful consideration and planning due to military commitments. Marines are expected to balance the demands of a service career with their family responsibilities.

c. Pregnancy could affect a command's operational readiness by temporarily limiting a Marine's ability and availability to perform all assigned tasks. Therefore, pregnancy requires the establishment of policy and procedures to ensure the health and welfare, appropriate counseling, and administrative support of pregnant Marines. All Marines will be educated on family responsibilities and afforded ample opportunity to explore the broad range of medical, legal, financial, and emotional obligations parenthood entails.

d. Reference (a) also establishes a requirement for the collection of objective data and analysis of information for use in guiding the evaluation of future pregnancy policy decisions.

4. Policy

a. The health care needs of pregnant Marines and Sailors serving with the Marine Corps will be met in a manner to accommodate their welfare and career needs to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the demands of service.

b. Per reference (b), appropriate family life education and counseling will be made available at Family Service Centers (FSC) throughout the Marine Corps to assist those who seek it in planning for and carrying out the responsibilities of parenthood.

c. A Marine who suspects she is pregnant is responsible for promptly confirming her pregnancy through testing by an appropriate medical provider and informing her commanding officer within 30 days of confirmation.

4 Oct 95

d. A Marine reassigned due to pregnancy will be returned to the same billet, whenever possible, in the same command, or to an equivalent billet in a command of the same type duty, following the pregnancy and any related convalescent leave and period of deferment. PCS or TAD orders for school or special duty (recruiting, DI, etc.) that were cancelled due to pregnancy will be reissued following the pregnancy and any related convalescent leave if the Marine otherwise remains qualified and assignment requirement still exists or school seat is available. Competitive selection boards will reconsider the Marine during the next scheduled session. Applications, as required, must be resubmitted by the Marine per applicable MCO's.

e. A pregnant active duty Marine with no dependents may reside in bachelor quarters for her full term. Upon her request and consistent with the needs of the Marine Corps, the host commander may authorize a pregnant Marine to occupy off-base housing and be paid BAQ and VHA (if applicable at the "without dependents" rate) prior to her 20th week of pregnancy. However, from the 20th week forward, the host commander will approve such a request without option. All approvals for allowances will be filed on the document side of the Marine's SRB/OQR.

f. Per reference (a), active duty Marines and Sailors assigned to imminently deploying units or positions (defined as scheduled to deploy within 3 months) will be given priority over other active duty personnel receiving routine OB/GYN care in all DON medical facilities.

g. Active duty Marines may obtain OB/GYN care at civilian hospitals in limited circumstances per reference (c). This is not a routine option, and Marines should be familiar with the specific procedures for seeking civilian care so as not to end up with significant financial liability for which there is no reimbursement. Reservists are not eligible for this care unless they are serving on active duty for 31 consecutive days or longer.

h. Medical limitations and/or assignment restrictions, or periods of absence because of pregnancy or associated medical care, will not be the basis for lower proficiency and conduct marks, lower marks or adverse fitness reports.

4 Oct 95

i. A pregnant Marine may request separation from active duty or the SMCR per reference (d). Requests will not normally be approved unless the Marine demonstrates extenuating circumstances, or it is otherwise considered to be in the best interests of the Marine Corps.

j. Marines may not be involuntarily separated on the basis of pregnancy or on prediction of future performance after the birth of a child. However, pregnancy does not bar processing for separation for other reasons under the appropriate paragraph of reference (d). For example, a pregnant Marine who is being processed for separation based on misconduct or commission of a serious offense may still be separated on the latter basis.

k. Marines will be afforded the opportunity to take advantage of available legal assistance for advice regarding their options in establishing paternity or seeking child support.

l. Pregnant Marines will not participate in contingency operations nor will they deploy for operations aboard naval vessels. Pregnant Marines may participate in local disaster relief operations if medically authorized.

m. Flight personnel are grounded during pregnancy per reference (e) unless a medical clearance to continue flight status is granted by the CMC (ASM). Per reference (e), waivers may be granted for aircraft other than single-piloted aircraft, ejection seat aircraft, high performance aircraft that will operate in excess of two G's, and aircraft involved in shipboard operations. Participation in aviation physiology, aviation water survival, or other survival training programs is not permitted.

5. Education of Marines

a. The decisions surrounding parenthood and family matters can best be made in an environment of concerned leadership. Military responsibilities require command attention to help Marines fulfill their sense of duty to their units and also meet family responsibilities.

b. The Marine Corps will provide education on the responsibilities of parenthood and the policies contained in this

4 Oct 95

Order to all Marines initially upon entry into the Marine Corps and then repeatedly throughout a Marine's service in the Corps.

c. Information concerning the many issues, demands, and responsibilities of pregnancy and parenthood will be made readily available and widely disseminated via FSC's, medical treatment facilities, chapel programs, legal assistance offices, and child development programs.

d. Staff at the FSC and chaplains are available to provide counseling in preparation for pregnancy and parenthood, as well as ongoing support and counseling for families to help them meet the requirements of the workplace and home. Services such as the New Parent Support Program, marriage preparation workshops, and personal financial management classes are available. Participation in these and similar programs should be highly encouraged for all Marines facing these challenges.

e. A Marine, Active Component or Reserve, who becomes a single parent or who is part of a dual military couple and becomes a parent, must complete a Family Care Plan per reference (f).

6. Reporting Requirements

a. A Marine whose pregnancy is confirmed will be reported into the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) per reference (g). Duty limitations for a pregnant Marine will be reported as DU LIMIT PREGNANCY (limitation code "N") for the period of pregnancy, and DU LIMIT MEDICALLY NONDEPLOYABLE (limitation code "D") for the convalescent period following pregnancy. Medical certification will be the source document for all diary entries related to pregnancy.

b. A Marine joined to a Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reporting unit and whose pregnancy is confirmed will be reported into SORTS as nondeployable per reference (h). She will remain in a full duty status until a medical officer certifies that full duty is medically inadvisable.

7. Notification Procedures. All pregnant Marines, regardless of component/grade (except IRR and Standby Reserve Marines), will

4 Oct 95

notify their commanding officers/Commanding General, Marine Corps Reserve Support Command (the latter by Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) personnel only) in writing within 30 days of medical certification of pregnancy. The notification will be formatted per the enclosure and include:

a. A medical certificate of pregnancy, to include the estimated date of delivery and a determination as to whether any medical reasons exist which make remaining in a full-duty status or in the Marine Corps Reserve inadvisable. For purposes of this Order, certification of pregnancy by a civilian physician is acceptable in the case of an SMCR Marine not on EAD.

b. A statement acknowledging the requirement to make arrangements for child care during regular working hours, duty, exercises, war or combat contingency deployment, etc., in the case of Marines on active duty, and child care arrangements during periods of active duty/inactive duty for training (ADT/IDT) and upon mobilization in the case of SMCR Marines. Single Marines and dual service couples who have dependents must develop a Family Care Plan per reference (f).

c. A statement by a Marine in the Active Component, Active Reserve (AR), or a Reserve Marine serving on EAD that she understands she remains otherwise eligible for reenlistment and will serve on active duty until the expiration of her active service obligation. An SMCR Marine will provide a statement that she will remain in the SMCR.

d. A statement that she understands she may request separation and remain eligible for maternity care until the birth of the child per reference (d). (Applicable to Active Component/AR Marines only.) If the Marine feels that extenuating circumstances exist which preclude further service, the notification should include a request for separation per paragraph 10 of this Order, but may be submitted after the initial notification. (Applicable to Active Component, AR, and Reserve Marines serving on EAD only.) In the case of the SMCR, when retention is deemed medically inadvisable, transfer to the IRR to satisfy the term of service for which the Marine is obligated is authorized.

4 Oct 95

e. A statement that she understands that she is available for worldwide assignment and that there is no guarantee of special consideration in duty assignments or duty stations based solely on her pregnancy or the fact that she will have a dependent, except as provided for in this Order. This statement is not applicable to a pregnant SMCR Marine.

f. A statement that she is aware of the limitations of eligibility for dependent housing and shipment of household goods (applies to Active Component, AR, and Reserve Marines serving on EAD as E-4's and below only).

g. A statement that the Marine will advise the command of any unexpected changes in her medical status and will return to full duty as soon as medically authorized.

h. A statement that the Marine understands that she must be prepared to pass the Marine Corps PFT and conform to acceptable weight standards no later than 6 months following return to full duty by a medical officer. Include a statement that the Marine will commence physical training as soon as medically authorized.

i. A copy of the notification letter will be retained in the Marine's SRB/OQR until after the birth of the child.

8. Extension of Active Duty/Reenlistment

a. Per reference (i), pregnant Reserve officers may apply for extensions of up to 1 year on their current period of obligated service.

b. Enlisted Marines, including AR Marines, who are pregnant may reenlist/extend provided they are otherwise qualified per references (j) or (k) and have complied with paragraph 7 of this Order.

9. Assignment/Deployability Limitations of Pregnant Marines

a. Pregnant Marines will not be ordered to a dependents-restricted tour. Reference (h) provides a 4 month deferment for female Marines, after the birth of a child, from deployment/assignment to a dependents-restricted tour and affords that same

4 Oct 95

opportunity for a single parent, or one parent of a dual service couple in the case of adoption. This deferment may be waived by the Marine.

b. Pregnant Marines stationed in CONUS and Hawaii will not be detached after their 6th month of pregnancy. Specific instructions relating to PCS orders modifications/cancellations will be obtained from the CMC (MMEA/MMOA/RA, as appropriate).

c. Pregnant Marines serving overseas may be detached at their normal rotation tour date (RTD), even when that date occurs after the 6th month of pregnancy, if medical certification authorizing travel is obtained. Where apparent that the overseas tour of a pregnant Marine will be involuntarily extended because of her condition (e.g., delivery date approximates RTD), the CMC (MMEA/MMOA as appropriate) may authorize early termination of her tour. The CMC (MMEA/MMOA) will normally not approve early termination of an overseas restricted tour because of pregnancy where the Marine has completed less than 9 months of her tour unless directed by competent medical authority.

d. A Marine on an unaccompanied tour overseas, at a location which does not have adequate medical facilities or dependent housing, whose pregnancy is discovered once overseas or becomes pregnant during her tour, will be reassigned per reference (h) as soon as possible to another location which can provide adequate medical facilities and dependent housing. The new location may be another overseas location in order to receive credit for an overseas tour. A Marine has no actual entitlement to dependent housing until she actually has a dependent and only then if the CMC (MM) converts it to an accompanied tour per reference (h).

e. A Marine or Sailor assigned to a deployed Marine unit who is confirmed as being pregnant during deployment aboard ship will, at first opportunity, be sent TAD to the closest U.S. military facility that can provide OB/GYN care and returned to her unit's home base at the earliest opportunity via a medically authorized mode of transportation.

f. Pregnant Marines may deploy, in conjunction with advice from their medical care provider, when the mode of transportation does not involve transport aboard naval vessels and the deploy-

4 Oct 95

ment is other than a contingency operation (i.e., training deployments to Twentynine Palms, Unit Deployment Program to Okinawa/Iwakuni, etc.).

g. Pregnant Marines may not board or embark upon naval vessels, even when the naval vessel is tied to a pier, after the Marine's 20th week of pregnancy. Prior to her 20th week of pregnancy, a Marine assigned to a naval vessel may remain aboard when underway in limited circumstances at the discretion of the commanding officer of the ship. This is not designed to permit pregnant Marines to routinely operate at sea, but rather to provide commanding officers flexibility during short underway periods such as changes in ship's berth, ammo/stores/training anchorages, transits to and from local shipyards, etc., without being forced to transfer pregnant Marines from the ship. Pregnant Marines may get underway within these established limitations only when actually assigned to a ship as part of ship's company.

h. Per reference (e) pregnant flight personnel shall consult with their flight surgeon when they first suspect they are pregnant. Flight personnel are grounded during pregnancy unless a medical clearance to continue flight status is granted by the CMC (ASM).

(1) Request for flight or training waivers shall be originated by the pregnant Marine and forwarded to the CMC (ASM) via the appropriate chain of command and NAVAEROSPMEDINST (Code 42). The request shall be accompanied by a report from a local board of flight surgeons per the Manual of the Medical Department (MANMED).

(2) A local board of flight surgeons is able to issue an Aeromedical Clearance Notice (BUMED 6410/2) following their recommendation for waiver. This clearance notice is valid during the waiver review process until the waiver request is granted or denied by the CMC (ASM). Waiver requests are considered inappropriate for single-piloted aircraft, ejection seat aircraft, high performance aircraft that will operate in excess of two G's, and aircraft involved in shipboard operations.

(3) Following pregnancy and recovery, an Aeromedical Clearance Notice shall be issued prior to resumption of flight duties.

(4) Pregnancy of an air traffic controller is not considered physically disqualifying in itself. Duty modifications during pregnancy are expected and should be managed locally to accommodate local circumstances and the individual Marine's medical requirements.

i. A pregnant Reserve Marine will not be allowed to perform any periods of IDT or active duty (with or without pay) within 30 days of her anticipated date of delivery. The unit commander will excuse the Marine from attending IDT periods or annual training within this 30 day time period. Commanders will ensure that a pregnant Reserve Marine previously assigned to active duty (other than EAD) will be released 30 days prior to her estimated date of delivery. Documentation verifying the

11-L-0559/OSD/16749

4 Oct 95

estimated date of delivery must be provided by competent medical authority prior to the issuance of orders and that no complications have arisen since the onset of the pregnancy.

j. A female reservist will not be required to perform active duty for 4 months (applies to those Marines not on EAD) or IDT for 6 weeks after giving birth. This policy is also applicable to single female parents and one parent of a dual service couple in the case of adoption. The 4 month/6 week period (as applicable) for adoptions starts after the actual effective date of the adoption of a child. The reservist may waive any part of the deferment period. If the deferment is not waived and the unit performs Annual Training (AT), the reservist will attend an alternate AT.

10. Separation of Pregnant Marines

a. Upon medical certification of pregnancy, a Marine may request separation by submitting an Administrative Action Form to the appropriate separation authority as defined by reference (d). A request for separation will normally be denied per reference (d) unless there are extenuating circumstances which the Marine can substantiate by demonstrating overriding or compelling factors of personal need or that extraordinary circumstances of a humanitarian nature exist. The following guidance applies:

(1) Marines may not be separated on the basis of pregnancy alone nor on predictions of future performance of the Marine after birth of the child. References (d) and (f) provide for separations for the Convenience of the Government by reason of Parenthood or by reason of Dependency or Hardship should a Marine become unable to fulfill military obligations or become nonavailable for worldwide assignment.

(2) A pregnant Marine may be separated on the basis of pregnancy if a medical officer certifies that continuation on active duty jeopardizes the mental/physical health of the Marine or the healthy development of the unborn child. In other words, conditions have arisen, or have been aggravated to an excessive degree since entry into the Marine Corps, and separation will eliminate or materially alleviate the threat to the health and welfare of the Marine or unborn child. A Marine may be separated if there are no other means of alleviation reasonably available.

(3) Separation will not be authorized solely for personal convenience.

b. Requests for separation by reason of pregnancy will include a medical officer's certification of pregnancy. An

4 Oct 95

Active Component, AR, or Reserve Marine on EAD will provide a statement of understanding that the Marine acknowledges that she remains eligible for maternity care following her release from active duty/discharge only per reference (d).

c. Any such separation for pregnancy must be effected no later than 4 weeks prior to the estimated date of delivery; however, an earlier separation date may be requested. All such requests must include specific justification for separation, per reference (d).

d. Commanding officers will forward the Marine's request for separation to the separating authority with a recommendation for separation or retention on active duty.

e. An officer's request for resignation/release from active duty will comply with references (d) and (i).

f. To prevent the loss of potential mobilization assets, the separation authority will screen Marines being separated for pregnancy for transfer to the IRR vice discharge per reference (d).

g. A pregnant Reserve Marine serving in the SMCR without a drilling obligation may transfer to the IRR at her own request. A pregnant Reserve Marine with a mandatory drilling obligation must submit a request to transfer to the IRR via the appropriate chain of command to the Commander, Marine Forces Reserve/Commanding General, Marine Corps Reserve Support Command (for IMA personnel), as applicable. An SMCR Marine (either obligor or nonobligor) and a member of the IRR who desires a discharge must submit a written request to the Commander, Marine Forces Reserve or Commanding General, Marine Corps Reserve Support Command (for IMA personnel), as appropriate.

11. Action

a. Commanding Officers

(1) Will provide appropriate training as part of their units' orientation and annual troop information programs to ensure that Marines are aware of the contents of this Order and the broad range of medical, legal, financial, chaplain, and other services available to assist and encourage all Marines in making family life decisions that are supportive of both service obligations and their parental responsibilities.

4 Oct 95

(2) Will thoroughly counsel each pregnant Marine on the contents of this Order. A Marine who will become a single parent and Marines who are members of a dual military couple residing in a joint household will also be counseled regarding the availability of government housing (especially in high cost areas).

(3) Will ensure that appropriate unit diary and SORTS entries are run per paragraph 6 of this Order.

(4) May deploy pregnant Marines, in conjunction with advice from the medical officer, per paragraph 9 of this Order. These determinations will be made on a case-by-case basis and will be dependent on the unit's mission, the Marine's billet, available medical support, and medical authorization.

(5) Will ensure that a pregnant Marine is not required to perform duties, including PT or standing in formations, that in the opinion of the medical officer are hazardous to her or her unborn child.

(6) Will ensure that a Marine returns to a normal duty assignment commensurate with her grade, MOS, and the unit's requirements as soon after delivery as the medical officer certifies the Marine to be medically qualified for full duty. This will normally occur directly after the 6 weeks medical convalescence leave following the birth. A Marine needing additional personal time after being medically certified fit for duty may be granted annual leave per reference (1).

(7) May authorize up to 10 days permissive TAD for a married male Marine when his spouse gives birth dependent on the unit's mission, specific operational circumstances, and the Marine's billet. This authorization may be excepted for unmarried male Marines in circumstances such as, but not necessarily limited to, when the unmarried male Marine has sole-custody of the baby. This authorization for up to 10 days of permissive TAD commences the day of the child's birth and ends 25 days after the child's birth. If appropriate medical facilities are not available for delivery, then permissive TAD up to 10 days may be authorized for the male Marine to accompany his spouse prior to and immediately following delivery.

(8) May authorize up to 10 days permissive TAD for any Marines(s) adopting a child, dependent on the unit's mission, specific operational circumstances, and the Marine's(s) billet(s). This authorization extends to both members in a dual military status. Permissive TAD period should commence when the child is ready for placement to assist the parent(s) in relocating the adoptive child, formalizing legal requirements, establishing a child care program, and other tasks as required.

(9) May authorize a Marine to wear the maternity uniform for up to 30 days following her return to duty. Reference (m) prescribes regulations regarding the procurement and wearing of the maternity uniform. May authorize a Marine

4 Oct 95

- to wear the utility uniform in lieu of the maternity uniform during early pregnancy and after return to duty when the uniform of the day is normally service "C," "B," or Blue Dress "D."

(10) Will require that a Marine take the PFT and conform to the acceptable weight standards no later than 6 months after being returned to full duty by the medical officer. Additional time may be granted if necessary and recommended by the medical officer due to unique medical circumstances. A Marine should be encouraged to commence PT as soon as medically authorized.

(11) Will ensure that a Marine whose pregnancy terminates prematurely or results in a stillbirth provides a medical officer's certification that she is fit for full duty. A command climate of concerned leadership will be essential in helping Marines impacted by these type of traumatic events. The unique circumstances of each pregnancy dictate that the decision on when a particular Marine is physically qualified to take the PFT and may be reasonably expected to conform to weight standards will be made on a case-by-case basis by a medical officer's determination.

(12) Will ensure that Marines are afforded the opportunity to take advantage of available legal assistance for advice regarding their options in establishing paternity or child support.

(13) Are encouraged to work closely with commanders of DON medical facilities to encourage priority treatment for pregnant dependent spouses of imminently deploying male Marines among other pregnant dependent spouses receiving routine OB/GYN care.

b. CMC (M&RA)

(1) DC/S M&RA (MM) will track and report information on the number and disposition of requests for separation for pregnancy by FY to assist M&RA (MA) in studying the issues surrounding pregnancy and M&RA (MP) in meeting the reporting requirements per reference (a).

(2) DC/S M&RA (MP) has staff cognizance on this policy and will coordinate the effort to meet the reporting requirements to Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA) per reference (a).

(3) DC/S M&RA (MA) will coordinate the study and analysis necessary to meet the reporting requirements in reference (a) concerning service analyses on the effects of pregnancy and other medical, administrative, and disciplinary factors on deployability of Marines.

4 Oct 95

(4) DC/S M&RA (MH) will assess existing training and take steps, in conjunction with the CG MCCDC and the CMC (REL), to ensure that all Marines are informed about the contents of this policy, are properly educated about the Marine Corps Core Values and expectations regarding responsible behaviors, and are made aware of the broad range of services available to assist and encourage our Marines in making decisions that are supportive of both service obligations and their parental responsibilities at the following times:

- (a) Entry level training;
- (b) Professional Military Education (PME) courses;
- (c) Annually in the Troop Information Program.

c. CMC (AVN) will ensure that procedures for managing requests for flight waivers are disseminated throughout the aviation community and remain in accordance with reference (e).

d. CMC (HS) will meet the reporting requirements of reference (a) by working with BUMED to:

(1) Assess the health care risks associated with pregnancy and other types of medical conditions that may exist for Marines and Sailors assigned to operational/deployable commands and support commands with significant occupational health considerations (e.g., ship and airplane construction/repair facilities, high frequency communication gear, etc.).

(2) Assess the impact of the policy and actions ensuring priority for routine OB/GYN care as set forth in paragraph 4f of this Order.

(3) Assess the worldwide availability of and access to appropriately staffed and equipped military OB/GYN medical support. This assessment should include the possible impact of mobilization and assignment of pregnant Reserve Marines to duty stations within CONUS.

e. CMC (REL) will ensure that Marines and commanding officers are supported by chaplains prepared to counsel Marines and to provide commanding officers with additional training support on the issues of faith, character, parental responsibilities, personal decisions, and core values per reference (a).

f. CMC (JA) will coordinate to help ensure that appropriate judge advocates provide legal assistance relating to Marines' options in establishing paternity and obtaining child support.

g. CG MCCDC


(1) Ensure the policy contained in this Order and classes on sexually responsible behavior are presented during entry level training to both officer and enlisted Marines.

(2) Ensure the policy contained in this Order is presented as part of the leadership training presented in all PME courses.

4 Oct 95

(3) Ensure the policy contained in this Order and classes on sexually responsible behavior are incorporated into the annual requirement in the Troop Information Program.

12. Reserve Applicability. This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.



G. R. CHRISTMAS
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs

DISTRIBUTION: PCN 10207020800

Copy to: 7000110 (55)
70000027 (25)
7000093/8145005 (2)
7000099, 144/8145001 (1)

4 Oct 95

UNCLASSIFIED

R 111600Z JUL 96 ZYB
FM CMC WASHINGTON DC//M-RA//
TO ALMAR
BT
UNCLAS //N05000//
ALMAR 249/96
MSGID/GENADMIN /CMC/MPP//
SUBJ/MCO 5000.12D CH 1 THE MARINE CORPS POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR
/PREGNANT MARINES//
AMPN/THE REF IS MCO 5000.12D, THE MARINE CORPS POLICY AND PROCEDURES
FOR PREGNANT MARINES.//
RMKS/1. PARAGRAPH 11A(7) OF THE REF IS MODIFIED TO READ: MAY
AUTHORIZE UP TO 10 DAYS PERMISSIVE TAD FOR A MARRIED MALE MARINE
WHEN HIS SPOUSE GIVES BIRTH DEPENDENT ON THE UNIT'S MISSION,
SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE MARINE'S BILLET.
THIS AUTHORIZATION FOR UP TO 10 DAYS OF PERMISSIVE TAD COMMENCES THE
DAY OF THE CHILD'S BIRTH AND ENDS 25 DAYS AFTER THE CHILD'S BIRTH.
IF APPROPRIATE MEDICAL FACILITIES ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR DELIVERY,
THEN PERMISSIVE TAD UP TO 10 DAYS MAY BE AUTHORIZED FOR THE MALE
MARINE TO ACCOMPANY HIS SPOUSE PRIOR TO AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
DELIVERY.
2. POC AT THIS HEADQUARTERS IS CAPT J. R. FLATTER, MPP-55, AT COML
(703) 614-3440 OR DSN 224-3440.//
BT

R 120800Z DEC 96 ZYB
FM CMC WASHINGTON DC//MP//
TO ALMAR
BT
UNCLAS //N05000//
ALMAR 436/96
MSGID/GENADMIN/MPP//
SUBJ/MCO 5000.12D CH 2, MARINE CORPS POLICY ON PREGNANCY AND
/PARENTHOOD//
REF/A/DOC/CMC951004//
AMPN/REF A IS MCO 5000.12D, MARINE CORPS POLICY ON PREGNANCY AND
PARENTHOOD//
RMKS/1. THIS CHANGE IS APPLICABLE TO MARINE CORPS ACTIVITIES ON PCN
102 07020800. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ALMAR IS TO DIRECT PEN CHANGES
TO MCO 5000.12D, MARINE CORPS POLICY ON PREGNANCY AND PRENTHOOD.
2. ACTION
A. ON PAGE 8, PARAGRAPH 9C, REPLACE THE LAST SENTENCE WITH THE
FOLLOWING: "THE CMC (MMEA/MMOA) WILL NORMALLY NOT APPROVE EARLY
TERMINATION OF AN OVERSEAS RESTRICTED TOUR BECAUSE OF PREGNANCY
WHERE THE MARINE HAS COMPLETED LESS THAN 9 MONTHS OF HER TOUR UNLESS
DIRECTED BY COMPETENT MEDICAL AUTHORITY."
B. ON PAGE 13, PARAGRAPH 11A(7), ADD THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FIRST SENTENCE: "THIS AUTHORIZATION MAY BE
EXCEPTED FOR UNMARRIED MALE MARINES IN CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AS, BUT NOT
NECESSARILY LIMITED TO, WHEN THE UNMARRIED MALE MARINE HAS
SOLE-CUSTODY OF THE BABY.
C. ON PAGE 13, PARAGRAPH 11A(8), REPLACE THE FIRST SENTENCE WITH
THE FOLLOWING: "MAY AUTHORIZE UP TO 10 DAYS PERMISSIVE TAD FOR ANY
MARINES(S) ADOPTING A CHILD, DEPENDENT ON THE UNIT'S MISSION,
SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE MARINE'S(S) BILLET(S).
THIS AUTHORIZATION EXTENDS TO BOTH MEMBERS IN A DUAL MILITARY
STATUS."
3. POC AT THIS HEADQUARTERS IS CAPT J. R. FLATTER, CMC, MPO-45, AT
COML (703) 614-3440 OR DSN 224-3440.

11-L-0559/OSD/16756

FORMAT FOR NOTIFICATION OF COMMANDING OFFICER

5000.12
Date

From: Marine's Grade, Full Name, SSN/PMOS, USMC(R)
To: Commanding Officer

Subj: NOTIFICATION OF CONFIRMATION OF PREGNANCY

Ref: (a) MCO 5000.12D
(b) MCO 1740.13A
(c) MCO P1900.16D

Encl: (1) Medical Certification of Pregnancy
(2) Separation Request (only if applicable)

1. I have been fully counseled and understand the contents of reference (a) and provide the following information:

a. This is to notify the command of my pregnancy. A medical certificate of pregnancy is provided as enclosure (1) and includes the estimated date of delivery and whether any medical reasons exist which make remaining in a full duty status inadvisable.

b. I understand that I am responsible for making arrangements for child care during regular working hours, duty, exercises, war or combat contingency deployment, etc., and will develop a Family Care Plan per reference (b). (Applies to Active Component, AR, and Reserve Marines serving EAD only.) I understand that I am responsible for making arrangements for child care during periods of active duty/inactive duty for training and upon mobilization and will develop a Family Care Plan per reference (b). (Applies to SMCR Marines only.)

c. I understand that I remain otherwise eligible for reenlistment and will serve on active duty until the expiration of my active service obligation. (Applies to Active Component, AR, and Reserve Marines serving EAD only.) An SMCR Marine will indicate that she will remain in the SMCR.

4 Oct 95

d. I understand that I may request separation and remain eligible for maternity care until the birth of my child per reference (c). (Select only one of the following two sentences.) If I feel that extenuating circumstances exist which preclude my further service, I understand that I must request for separation per paragraph 10 of reference (a). Since I feel that extenuating circumstances exist which preclude my further service, enclosure (2) is my request for separation per paragraph 10 of reference (a).

e. I understand that I remain available for worldwide assignment and that there is no guarantee of special consideration in duty assignments or duty stations based solely on my pregnancy or the fact that I will have a dependent, except as provided for in reference (a).

f. I am aware of the limitations of eligibility for dependent housing and shipment of household goods (applies to Active Component, AR, and Reserve Marines serving on EAD as E-4's and below).

2. I will advise the command of any unexpected changes in my medical status and will return to full duty as soon as medically authorized.

3. I understand that I must be prepared to pass the Marine Corps Physical Fitness Test and conform to the acceptable weight standards no later than 6 months following my return to full duty. I will commence physical training as soon as medically authorized.

(Signature)

ENCLOSURE (1)

OCT 14 2003

TO: Gen Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Defense Strategy and Military Strategy

Defense strategy and military strategy provide necessary context for the efforts of the Defense Department. Given that it has been two years since we did the Quadrennial Defense Review work on strategy, I direct the following:

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall prepare a defense strategy for my review, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare a military strategy for my review, in consultation with the Combatant Commanders, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Within the next ten days, I would like to review your plans for completing this assignment.

Thanks.

.....
Please respond by 10/24/03

U16942 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16759

381

14 OCT 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

✓ 10/14 ✓ 10/13
EF-7043
CM-1239-03
1 October 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM/9/30*
Douglas Feith, USD(P) *10/12/03*

SUBJECT: Defense Strategy and Military Strategy *Continue need DOD*

- At last Friday's tank session, which included Steve Cambone and Andy Hoehn, the Chiefs discussed the need for a separate defense strategy and military strategy to guide their efforts.
- The Joint Staff and Services have been drafting a military strategy based on lessons learned in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, there is pending legislation, which would require the Chairman to produce a military strategy every two years.
- The discussion also was prompted by your question regarding the number of planning documents needed to guide this department (e.g., Contingency Planning Guidance, Defense Planning Guidance, Unified Command Plan, Joint Operating Concepts, etc.).
- In the end, all the participants in the meeting recommended against new legislation, but they agreed the department would benefit from a defense strategy, approved by you but distinct from the QDR report, that would provide overall direction and orientation.
- The participants also recommend development of a military strategy that would provide specific operational content to your defense strategy.
- Given our experiences over the past several years, the participants thought this would be a propitious time to produce a defense strategy and military strategy.
 - It would allow us to reflect on the conclusions we drew in the 2001 QDR.
 - It would also provide a sound basis for the next QDR.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the attached snowflake directing preparation of a defense strategy and military strategy.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: General Richard B. Myers, USAF; CJCS; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/16760

02-10-03 11:09 IN

TAB A

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 8, 2003

When I was in Afghanistan we were told the people who train Afghan army people cannot then go out with them on operations because it falls under Title 22 to train, that when they deploy, it is some different law. They say that every time they propose it to CENTCOM and the Joint Staff, it gets stopped by the lawyers.

Would you please figure out what is going on and let me know what you think we ought to do about it?

DHR/asm
090803.32b

Please respond by: _____

9/18

Afghanistan

8 Sep 03

11-L-0059/OSD/16761

Tab A

U169571/03

SEP 12 4:44

June 2, 2003 11:17 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Salman Pak

A friend of mine who was with me Congress, Pete Biester, is now a judge.
Attached is a letter he sent me. If you have any desire to get additional
information, he is available.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/28/03 Biester letter to SecDef

DHR:dh
060203-32

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

U17087 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16762

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUN - 2 2003

THE BEASLEY FIRM
ATTORNEYS AT LAW



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MARSHA F. SANTANGELO, M.D.
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- * ALSO MEMBER NJ BAR
- * ALSO MEMBER NY BAR
- * ALSO MEMBER NJ, NY & DC BARS
- * ALSO MEMBER NJ, NY & CA BARS
- * ALSO MEMBER OH BAR
- * ALSO MEMBER NJ & DC BARS
- * RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NJ PRACTICE
CERTIFIED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW JERSEY AS A CIVIL TRIAL ATTORNEY
- * DIPLOMATE, AMERICAN BOARD OF
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ATTORNEYS
- * BOARD CERTIFIED AS A CIVIL TRIAL
ATTORNEY BY THE NATIONAL BOARD
OF TRIAL ADVOCACY

MY DIRECT DIAL: 215-931-2620
MY E MAIL: jkb@tortlaw.com

May 28, 2003

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Honorable Edward G. Biester
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, DELAWARE COUNTY
c/o Gerald C. Montella, Esquire - District Court Administrator
Courthouse
201 W. Front Street
Media, PA 19063

Re: **Salman Pak Facility**

Dear Judge Biester:

In response to your request for information regarding the Salman Pak facility in Iraq, I can provide to you the following, which was developed in connection with our recent trial on behalf of the families of several 9/11 victims. Salman Pak is a 20 square kilometer area which was developed, in the mid-1980s, into a secure biological warfare research facility. By the 1990s, the scope of the facility had been expanded to include highly secret terrorist training activities where both Iraqis and non-Iraqi Arabs received training on hijacking planes and trains, planting explosives, sabotage, and assassinations.

Salman Pak does not contain an airport, and runways are non-existent. The aircraft which was stationed there for hijack training would have to have been dismantled, shipped in, and then reassembled. This airliner was reportedly stolen from Kuwait by the Iraqis after the August, 1990 Iraqi invasion.

11-L-0559/OSD/16763

THE BEASLEY FIRM

Honorable Edward G. Biester

May 27, 2003

Page 2 of 2

Terrorists were trained at Salman Pak in the "art" of hijacking aircraft using unconventional weapons—such as utensils provided during a flight, or short knives such as those used by some of the hijackers on 9/11—in order to circumvent airport security measures, board the aircraft, overtake the crew, and use the plane itself as the ultimate weapon. This is precisely what occurred during the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Enclosed are some annotated images of the Salman Pak facility. Also enclosed is an Affidavit from Space Imaging which describes the time, date, and location of the images and how they were obtained.

If I can provide further information, please let me know.


Sincerely yours,



JAMES E. BEASLEY


JEB/cw
Enclosure

Salman Pak—further magnification of the Iraqi Terror train
April 25, 2000 Satellite image



**Jetliner used for terror training
by non-Iraqi Islamic fundamentalists**


11-L-0559/OSD/16765




Video and Space Technology Summary



Jun 02 03 10:39a



11-L-0559/OSD/16768



PAGE 04

69791/DSO/6590-7-11

SPACE IMAGING

3032542211

Jun 02 03 10:39a
07/27/2003 10:14

SENT 6/2 1530
May 31, 2003 1:46 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Plan

As I understand it, you are going to come back to me and tell me precisely what General Franks and CENTCOM's plan is to deal with the Badr Corps and the Iranian influence in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053103-17

.....
Please respond by 6/04/03

U17088 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16770

SENT 6/2 1530
May 31, 2003 1:19 PM

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bill in Conference

The BENS people want to help with the conferees.

To do it well, we need to know who the people are, and we will need to lay down who is going to be working whom. For example, what do we want the President, the Vice President, Andy Card, George Tenet, Paul Wolfowitz and me to do.

Let's get a lay down.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053103-1

.....
Please respond by 6/04/03

U17089 /03

June 2, 2003 7:19 AM

TO: Doug Feith
cc: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Info on Democracy for Schools

Frank Wolfe said that they need some material on democracy to put in the schools, that there is a vacuum. They need information. Let's get on that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-5

.....
Please respond by 6/25/03

cc: Terry Bremer

U17090 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16772

Sent 6/2 1530
~~May 31, 2003 1:32 PM~~

OB
6/4

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lynch Story

What are the facts on this Jessica Lynch piece?

Thanks.

Attach.

"A Very Rough Draft," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 30, 2003.

DHR:dh
053103-13

.....

Please respond by 6/4/03

U17092 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16773

fragile, as Russia's behavior in the weeks before the war in Iraq proved. The democratization of Russia is something the United States should care about, not merely because it is right but because it makes strategic sense.

Long Island Newsday

May 29, 2003

47. Lift Ban On Battlefield Nukes? Bad Idea In Costly Bill

It's an unfortunate sign of our troubled times that Congress authorized \$400.5 billion in defense spending last week and the most contentious issues had little to do with dollars.

Separate bills, passed overwhelmingly in the House and Senate, are skeletons to be fleshed out in coming months as Congress appropriates money. But it is questionable whether this precipitous 25-percent run-up in military spending under President George W. Bush is wise in the face of record budget deficits, debt and an ailing economy. Congress needs a real debate on how much is enough.

In the interim, a handful of bad policies should be stripped from the bills in conference, including one that would lift the ban on researching tactical nuclear weapons. Another would bar military women from obtaining abortions at U.S. medical facilities overseas, even with their own money. Others would exempt the military from some environmental laws, change civil service work rules for civilian defense employees and make it more difficult to close costly, unneeded military bases.

The case has not been made for any of these provisions. Most have more to do with political ideology and congressional pork than military readiness. And even where there is a legitimate question of military utility - as with the ban on bunker-buster

type nuclear weapons - changing the existing prohibition is a bad idea.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says battlefield nukes may be the best way to destroy any biological and chemical weapons stored by other nations in underground bunkers. But it is hypocritical for the United States to open this Pandora's box while insisting that other nations resist the lure of nuclear arms. Adding them to the U.S. arsenal would increase the likelihood that future wars would go nuclear.

The only appropriate role for nuclear weapons is as a deterrent, which decreases the likelihood that they will ever be used.

The budget bills would allow research on tactical nukes but require congressional approval to develop the weapons. That's a slippery slope that Washington should avoid altogether.

Philadelphia Inquirer

May 30, 2003

48. A Very Rough Draft

Hyped tale of soldier's rescue isn't only war story in need of more digging.

At a low point of the Iraq war, when unexpected Iraqi opposition seemed to threaten U.S. troops with a morass, America badly needed a hero.

And it found one.

This was the story, and a compelling one it was: Pfc. Jessica Lynch, a fresh-faced, 19-year-old Army supply clerk from West Virginia, was miraculously rescued from a hospital in Nasiriyah where, gravely injured, she was being held captive.

The Washington Post (whose report ran in The Inquirer April 3), quoted unnamed U.S. officials recounting that Lynch had engaged in a "fierce" firefight after her unit was ambushed following a wrong turn. She shot several enemy soldiers before her ammo ran out and she was captured.

"She was fighting to the death" and has multiple gunshot wounds, said an unnamed U.S. official in the story.

The most exciting part of the tale came next: Lynch's rescue. The defense sources described for the Post a classic Special Operations raid, with commandos in Black Hawk helicopters engaging Iraqi forces on their way into and out of Lynch's medical compound.

The commandos had been directed there by a heroic Iraqi lawyer who was appalled to see the bedridden Lynch slapped twice in the face by one of her captors. This account was trumpeted by U.S. print and broadcast outlets far and wide.

The story was a balm to American hearts.

Except that much of it now appears to be untrue. The British Broadcasting Corp. cast cold water on the tale two weeks ago: Lynch's injuries were probably caused by a road crash; she had received good treatment at the hospital; there wasn't a single armed opposition soldier in the hospital when the U.S. rescue troops burst in, John Wayne style.

Later - too much later - the American media have begun examining the story they had so swallowed in April.

Yesterday, this paper ran a lengthy Chicago Tribune story quoting Iraqis on the scene who said that much of the Lynch hero/rescue story was, basically, bunk. (Lynch herself has no memory of events.)

Now this glorious tale must be traded for some complicated questions about the sticky entanglements of a rah-rah Pentagon, a thirsty press, and a public desperate for good news.

Those questions don't just concern the story of Jessica Lynch.

Early reports of her rescue were, as the saying goes, the first, rough draft history. But, then, so too are all the accounts

so far of this fast-moving war. Stay tuned - perhaps decades from now - for the real story. What really did become of those WMD, if they existed at all? Where is Saddam Hussein? Exactly how many Iraqi civilians suffered and died?

It's too easy just to blame a sloppy press for overdramatizing the Lynch story initially. In the fog of war, most reporting is quick and dirty, with virtually no chance for outside corroboration. Clearly, in this case, at least some in the military were eager to peddle the more heroic narrative. And, to journalism's credit, the original, faulty stories usually get revised when facts finally become clear.

Is Pfc. Lynch indeed a hero?

For volunteering to serve the way she did, and enduring the way she did, she is. There are no doubt thousands more untold stories about the heroism of individual American and British soldiers in Iraq.

But a search for the perfect heroic story - and eager acceptance of any "facts" that enhance the tale - does a disservice to both heroes and the truth.

Sent 6/2 1530
~~May 31, 2003 1:23 PM~~

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Talking Points on WMD Programs in Iraq

Attached is a copy of Bob Joseph's recommended talking points on WMD programs in Iraq. I have glanced at them, but I am going to use something slightly different, which I will give to you.

Thanks.


Attach.
5/30/03 Joseph Talking Points: Iraq's WMD Programs

DHR:dh
053103-10

.....
Please respond by _____

U17094 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16775



Points on Iraq's WMD Programs

- We are continuing as a top priority the effort to unmask the full story of Iraq's WMD programs. We have already found a very revealing component of Iraq's biological weapons program – two mobile production facilities equipped to produce BW agents.

 - The configuration of these mobile facilities is almost identical to that described by Secretary Powell in his presentation to the UN Security Council before the war. The Secretary's presentation was based on an account of an eyewitness who had first hand experience with these BW systems. The description of this witness, which had been corroborated by other informants, matched what we found.

 - Before the conflict with Iraq, we said that Iraq had large-scale, sophisticated WMD programs. These mobile production facilities are strikingly similar to this description.
 - Making them mobile made the facilities less susceptible to discovery by inspectors, and less vulnerable than a fixed site to discovery and attack.
 - Making them mobile could also support a mobilization production concept to provide BW agents to operational units just before use. This concept -- "just in time WMD on demand" -- may also apply to Iraq's CW program.

 - Before the war, we said that Iraq had not accounted for large quantities of chemical and biological agents and delivery means – hundreds of tons of CW, thousands of liters of BW agents such as anthrax, and thousands of specially designed shells and bombs. All of these estimates were taken from UN inspection reports – cited not just by the United States but also by UN inspectors prior to the conflict.

 - We continue to look for stocks of chemical and biological weapons and agents, but are not surprised that we have not yet found them yet. This is a process that will take a major effort and a lot of time – similar in approach to an organized crime investigation rather than a response to a robbery.

 - We are now ^{beginning to} ~~beginning to~~ deploy the Iraq Survey Group to take charge of the investigation of Iraqi WMD programs. This new group, about a thousand experts that will search sites, review documents and interview Iraqi officials, will replace through a planned rotation the smaller units that provided our initial capability. We have said from the beginning that the key to unraveling Iraq's programs is through the people involved.
- If asked about alternative uses for the mobile BW production facilities: We stand behind the conclusions of the joint CIA-DIA white paper, including the finding that "BW agent production is the only consistent, logical purpose for these vehicles." As we have always said, we will continue our investigation into all aspects of Iraq's WMD programs.

SENT 6/2 1530
~~May 31, 2003 1:29 PM~~

OB
6/4

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Response

You have to jump on the *Daily Mirror*, *The Independent*, *The Guardian* and the BBC—all of these. That is just irresponsible.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/29/03 FBIS-FMN 03-210, "UK, France: Media Say Rumsfeld Statement Shows WMD Claims Were 'Lies'"

DHR:dh
053103-12

.....
Please respond by 6/4/03

U17095 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16777

29 May 2003
FBIS-FMN 03-210

FBIS

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 1 2003
*Foreign Media Note***UK, France: Media Say Rumsfeld Statement Shows WMD Claims Were 'Lies'**

In initial reaction to Secretary Rumsfeld's reported statement yesterday to a think tank that Iraq may have destroyed its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the war began, some major UK and French media said today the statement proved that the US and UK had knowingly made false claims to justify the war. The major dailies that carried such critical commentaries had strongly opposed the war; most other European media have carried only factual reports so far on the Secretary's remarks and on the vehement reaction of some anti-war opposition parties.

UK The most extensive commentary appeared in London media, which saw Secretary Rumsfeld's statement as a major blow to Prime Minister Blair.

- Under the headline "Outrage as Rumsfeld Admits WMD 'May Not Exist,'" *The Daily Mirror* highlighted anti-war politicians' charges that Blair led the UK into "a war based on lies." The tabloid's editorial said the "bizarre" statement increased doubts about the war's "legality."
- *The Independent* said that by virtually "admitting" that Iraq had no WMD, the Secretary indicated the US intelligence services had been "spectacularly wrong." Without WMD, the "legal argument" for the war "falls away," hurting Blair's "credibility," the editorial added.
- Center-left *The Guardian* said that Secretary Rumsfeld's "excuse" that Iraq had "sneakily destroyed" its WMD "would be hilarious if it were not so utterly outrageous." The war was "illegal" and has now been shown to be "plainly unwarranted," the paper declared.
- A commentator for the BBC, which had carried some negative coverage of the war, said that the Secretary "contradicted virtually every statement" Blair has made about WMD and that ministers who had resigned in protest against the war have reason to feel "vindicated."

Article follows

France The only reaction so far was from the influential center-left daily *Le Monde*, the harshest French critic of the war. Labeling the US's WMD claims "one of the biggest lies by a state in recent years," an editorial in the 30 May issue said Secretary Rumsfeld had moved toward admitting that the US started the war knowing with "quasi-certainty" that Iraq had no WMD. The paper accused the US of using "truncated" and "suspect" information as a "pretext" for the war, whose real purpose was changing the Iraqi regime and "remodeling the Middle East."

Other European Reaction Media reported that anti-war opposition parties in Ireland and Denmark said the Secretary's statement confirmed that the war in Iraq was unjustifiable. Decrying the destruction in Iraq, the parties demanded that their governments reassess the information that had led them to support the US-led war (Danmarks Radio, *The Irish Times*).

This FBIS foreign media note is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media. It is issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

11-L-0559/OSD/16778

June 2, 2003 8:07 AM

OB
6/4

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Op-ed

Here is an excellent article by Hoagland. You really ought to read it.

I am also curious to know about this business on Jessica Lynch. Do you know what actually happened?

Thanks.

Attach.

Hoagland, Jim. "Clarity: The Best Weapon," *Washington Post*, June 1, 2003, p. B7.

DHR:dh
060203-2

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

U17096 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16779

washingtonpost.com

Clarity: The Best Weapon

By Jim Hoagland

Sunday, June 1, 2003; Page B07

Did the Bush administration trick the public and America's allies about the intelligence it had gathered on Iraq to clear the way for war? And was the CIA a reluctant but complicit partner in that exercise?

That case is being made explicitly by those who accuse the White House and the Pentagon of mounting an "intelligence hoax" on unsuspecting citizens and foreign leaders. It is also framed implicitly by a growing number of media reconstructions that portray wartime stories of heroic rescue and intense diplomatic maneuvering for peace as so much Bushist propaganda.

Count me as an opponent of news management, spin and deception. But also count me as a skeptic on accusations that Bush strategists pulled off a great scam on Iraq. That underestimates the awareness and discernment of both the American public and U.S. allies. It is disingenuous to look back now and say that support for the war was built primarily on a belief that weapons of mass destruction would be found soon after battlefield victory.

Some critics now saying just that originally blasted Bush for offering too many reasons for going after Saddam Hussein instead of relying on one overriding cause. The very multiplicity proved -- or so it was asserted -- that regime change was the real motive for the war, not weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian intervention or terrorist links. Now the same people are shocked that they got it.

Three weeks before the war began, a representative Time/CNN poll reported that 83 percent of their sample said "the most compelling reason to disarm Hussein is that he has wantonly killed his own citizens." "Saddam's cruelty" was the top reason for action, followed by 72 percent who felt that a war "would help eliminate weapons of mass destruction."

There was a mosaic of valid reasons for removing Hussein, and most Americans understood and approved of that mosaic. Feigning shock on behalf of "duped" citizens who were fairly clear-eyed about what they were getting into takes some doing.

Nor did war opponents Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder base their decisions about whether Iraq possessed programs to produce biological, chemical or nuclear weapons on Secretary of State Colin Powell's powerful presentation at the United Nations. Nor was there ever any significant disagreement within the CIA over the intelligence on weapons programs. Controversy was over terrorist links.

The French president and German chancellor were briefed by their own intelligence chiefs and given assessments that closely matched the conclusions of Powell's presentation, reliable sources tell me. The argument with Washington, as French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin made clear at the time, was over the best way to find and get rid of the weapons -- not whether

11-L-0559/OSD/16780

they existed. If Bush was wrong, so were Chirac and Schroeder.

Or is it possible they were right and, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld now suggests, Hussein destroyed his stock of terror weapons before the war started? That seems a stretch.

But consider this: If the Iraqi dictator ditched his terror weapons, he was never able to admit it in a convincing manner. He originally manufactured them, at least in theory, to fight the Kurds, Iran and then the United States. He would have given up valuable ambiguity by making a transparent and truthful declaration, as the United Nations demanded right into last December. He was condemned to live -- and then be destroyed -- by his lies.

It is more probable that the extensive concealment mechanisms that Powell spotlighted in his U.N. remarks worked, and that weapons remain hidden in Iraq. It is both urgent and important for the Bush administration's credibility in any future international crisis that the search for these unconventional weapons be expanded, extended and professionalized.

Facts are stubborn things, as the spin masters who took liberties with the tale of Pfc. Jessica Lynch's capture and rescue are discovering. Detailed reconstructions by the BBC and the Associated Press make clear that the injured prisoner of war could have been removed from the Nasiriyah hospital without a shot being fired.

But that involves some retrospective clarity. At the time, the rescue team had to suspect that it was being led into a trap. So it came with full force for an operation that was captured on video. The dramatic precautions were necessary. The Pentagon failed seriously in the aftermath by not moving quickly and aggressively to correct a public record full of distortions and embellishments. Fairly or unfairly, that will help undermine the administration's credibility on larger questions.

The American public has shown a steady ability to sort through news, propaganda and self-serving embellishment, usually without mistaking any or all of them for unalloyed, revealed "truth." You won't find truth in that pure a form in a newspaper or an intelligence report.

You find truth only in common sense -- in the process of comparing and analyzing information yourself and then applying your life experiences to it to see where, how or even if it fits into the larger scheme of things. Americans by and large did and continue to do just that about Bush and Iraq. He should give them credit for that, and refrain from any embellishment.

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June 2, 2003 8:28 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meet w/Di Rita

Please schedule two 30-minute meetings for me with Larry Di Rita on:

1. Record keeping
2. OSD-Joint Staff consolidation

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-8

.....
Please respond by 6/04/03

U17097 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16782

337

2 Jun 03

June 2, 2003 8:52 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tillie Fowler and DPB

*Cathy = Give us
some dates in
mid July.*

*Thanks,
Dym*

334

I talked to Tillie Fowler over the past weekend. She was aware of becoming Chairman of the Policy Board. I told her we would announce it the coming week, so let's get that organized and announced.

I also told her I thought we ought to set a meeting, and she said terrific. Please find some dates I am in town and she is available, and then see what kind of attendance we can get. Please schedule a meeting for three or four weeks from now, sometime in late June.

Also, I told her Richard Perle would be calling her. So please call Richard and have him call Tillie and Chris Williams, and fashion a program for the coming meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-10

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

2 Jun 03

U17098 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16783

143

June 2, 2003 8:52 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Iran

Larry DLR
6/11

Please see me about a battle plan to deal with this misinformation on Iran that is constantly in the paper.

TORIE

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-11

.....
Please respond by 6/04/03

2 Jun 03

U17099 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16784

119

June 6, 2003

TO: SecDef
FROM: Torie Clarke
SUBJECT: Misinformation on Iran (and related)

Background

There are several reasons for recent negative and often inaccurate media coverage.

- We transitioned quickly from pumping huge volumes of information to large numbers of media during the war, to sporadic contact with fewer media.
- The quality and nature of media covering our issues changed also, from Pentagon veterans to rookies and intel/foreign correspondents.
- Some media feel obliged to be "tougher" on the military because of the primarily positive coverage during the war.

Strategy:

- Fill the information vacuum with more frequent regular and ad hoc briefings on Iraq and related issues.
- Aggressively refute and correct misinformation and widely disseminate corrections.

Following are actions underway and planned to deal with misinformation on Iran, Iraq and related topics:

Underway:

- More frequent briefings at Pentagon and in Iraq that give status reports and process information. CentCom and CPA in Iraq give daily briefings; key officials brief on select topics (e.g. Carroll on oil; McKiernan on security). Average of seven per week.

- Aggressive courting of Arab media; average of three senior DOD officials doing interviews with select Arab media per week; one senior official doing Arab media roundtable each week.
- Frequent letters to the editor and meetings with media regarding errors and misperceptions caused by irresponsible coverage. Examples: Vanity Fair and Wolfowitz; CNN and DIA report on Iraqi WMD. In most cases, we do get reasonable corrections.
- On the record refutations of gross inaccuracies (e.g. Feith briefing on DOD intel cell and plans for Iranian regime overthrow).

Planned:

- Reconstituted rapid response cell at CentCom (Iraq) and OSD Press Operations to improve prevention and speed of corrections.

Attachment: Examples of letters to the editors and results. All included in Early Bird.



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Financial Times (London)

June 5, 2003, Thursday London Edition 1

SECTION: LETTERS TO THE EDITOR; Pg. 20

LENGTH: 263 words

HEADLINE: Rumsfeld: hopeful that Iranians can persuade leadership it is going down the wrong road

BYLINE: By VICTORIA CLARKE

BODY:

From Ms Victoria Clarke.

Sir, Your article "Rumsfeld turns sights on Iran" (May 30) grossly misrepresents the views of Donald Rumsfeld, US secretary of defence, on US policy on Iran. He has never said or implied that Iran is a target of US military action, neither is he "spearheading efforts" to change US policy. He fully supports President George W. Bush's policy on Iran.

Secretary Rumsfeld and many other senior leaders throughout the government have made their views known about the challenges posed by Iran. Just one day before the Financial Times article was published, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations and said: "It's a country that has been unhelpful with respect to Iraq. It's being unhelpful today with respect to Iraq." However, he is not advocating what was suggested by the Financial Times.

He stated clearly that US policy on Iran was to recognise the "churning in that country" by the women and the young people and the pressure they are putting on a handful of clerics that control that regime. He stated further that US policy was not to engage with the top two layers of Iranian government. Doing so could legitimate those leaders and discourage the Iranian people. We are hopeful, the Secretary said, "that the Iranian people will have an opportunity to find ways to persuade the leadership in that country that they're going down the wrong road."

The headline, lead and intent of the article completely distorted the facts.

Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, DC, US

LOAD-DATE: June 4, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/16787

Corrections and clarifications

Thursday June 5, 2003

The Guardian

A report which was posted on our website on June 4 under the heading "Wolfowitz: Iraq war was about oil" misconstrued remarks made by the US deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, making it appear that he had said that oil was the main reason for going to war in Iraq. He did not say that. He said, according to the Department of Defence website, "The ... difference between North Korea and Iraq is that we had virtually no economic options with Iraq because the country floats on a sea of oil. In the case of North Korea, the country is teetering on the edge of economic collapse and that I believe is a major point of leverage whereas the military picture with North Korea is very different from that with Iraq." The sense was clearly that the US had no economic options by means of which to achieve its objectives, not that the economic value of the oil motivated the war. The report appeared only on the website and has now been removed.

The steam engine enthusiast referred to in Country Diary, page 20, G2, June 2, was the Rev Wilbert Awdry, (not Audry) the inventor of Thomas the Tank Engine.

Our Country Diary, page 16, G2, last Friday, May 30, was used ahead of its scheduled publication in place of a diary that had not turned up. Unfortunately a reference to its publication coinciding with the 50th anniversary of Coronation Day was left unchanged to the dismay and perplexity of the diary's author, A Harry Griffin, and his readers. Apologies to all.

It is the policy of the Guardian to correct significant errors as soon as possible. Please quote the date and page number. Readers may contact the office of the readers' editor by telephoning 0845 451 9589 between 11am and 5pm Monday to Friday (all calls are charged at local rate). Mail to Readers' editor, The Guardian, 119 Farringdon Road, London EC1R 3ER. Fax 020-7239 9997. Email: reader@guardian.co.uk

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Early Bird



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Mark Glaser currently writes technology features for TechWeb, occasional features for The New York Times' Circuits section, marketing material for Comcast Online, and a bi-weekly e-mail newsletter for the Online Publishers Association, whose

Mark Glaser scours the Web for tasty tidbits of online journalism news, and gives his spin in blog-style, twice a week.

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Feeling Misquoted? Weblogs, Transcripts Let the Reader Decide

Bush, Wolfowitz quotes get some context

Journalism is an imperfect art. Take away the reporter's personal bias, political ideology, geographical orientation, upbringing, mood, and hangover -- and you still have potential problems. Like the recording of an interview. Record it on tape? Take notes only? Get it via e-mail? Despite all these efforts, journalists still get quotes wrong, editors sometimes chop them up into mincemeat, and interviewees get angry.

Not to worry. We are now ushering in the era of the Internet in general -- and blogosphere in particular -- as quote checkers and quote debaters. A recent abridged quote of President Bush by Maureen Dowd of The New York Times got her into hot water, as Weblogs and conservative pundits piled on. Her Bush quote: "Al Qaeda is on the run. That group of terrorists who attacked our country is slowly but surely being decimated. . . . They're not a problem anymore." The full quote included these lines where the ellipsis was: "Right now, about half of all the top Al Qaeda operatives are either jailed or dead. In either case, they're not a problem anymore."

To Dowd, Bush was saying Al Qaeda was no longer a problem. To others, Bush was saying that the terrorists killed or in jail were not a problem anymore. Duh. Coming on the heels of the Jayson Blair scandal, this Dada-esque quote caused concern for Times reader Robert Cox, who e-mailed the paper and went through voicemail hell to get little help from the staff. "I couldn't believe the hypocrisy of people at the paper saying they were disappointed about readers not alerting The Times to errors [by Blair], and then they won't acknowledge this problem [with Dowd]," he told me. (The Times and Dowd did not return my queries.)

Cox found Bush's full quote on the White House Web site, and decided to go around The Times, sending his findings to Times Watch. The story ricocheted from there, prompting a

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membership includes most major media companies online. That won't stop him from taking cheap potshots at these outlets, when necessary. You can contact him with any juicy tidbits about online journalism at glaze@sprintmail.com.

*Glaser Online regularly combs the following sites for links to pertinent stories:
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News and AltaVista News.*

Texas paper to drop Dowd's May 14 column, and brought various corrections by newspapers and others who ran the syndicated column. The Times hasn't said much about the controversy, and Dowd herself simply gave the full quote in a later column.

Cox, an Internet entrepreneur in New Rochelle, NY, decided to start a Weblog himself on the subject, and is developing a site called The National Debate, giving background on TV personalities. He hopes to build a kind of Zagat's Guide to pundits, giving pertinent personal info on talking heads. "I realized in this case that I could get more action by going around these guys at The Times," Cox said. "This was an opportunity to test how much this works."

Quote fixing is not a sport confined to print media. The Volokh Conspiracy Weblog has been running the full context of Slate's Bushism of the Day, a quote that usually makes the president look silly. In this case, Slate has even made a book out of the quotes of our often tongue-tied president. But why would journalists abridge quotes? Is it bias? Space considerations?

"It's not a liberal or conservative bias -- the biggest media bias is in favor of conflict," says Weblogger Pejman Yousefzadeh, an attorney in Orange County, CA. "Journalists have to create a story with some drama. They have to sell papers."

Wolfing down Wolfy

Still, Yousefzadeh finds a liberal media bias in the case of Vanity Fair's Sam Tannenhaus slimming down quotes from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. The sensational quote was from Wolfowitz describing why the U.S. went to war in Iraq: "For bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on." Yousefzadeh and others pulled up the full transcript from the Department of Defense site, and saw that Wolfowitz actually listed a number of other reasons for entering the war.

In this case, you have spin coming from Wolfowitz, being spun by Tannenhaus, then spun back by conservatives and the Department of Defense online -- and then being spun one more time by liberal journo/blogger Josh Marshall at Talkingpointsmemo.com. Makes your head spin, no? After reading the whole Vanity Fair article and the Pentagon transcript, Marshall found quotes in the story that weren't anywhere in the transcript. The Pentagon told him that Tannenhaus must have gotten those quotes from another Wolfowitz interview. But Vanity Fair said it was indeed from their interview. "If that's true, why isn't it anywhere in the Pentagon's transcript?" Marshall asks.

Bryan Whitman, the deputy spokesman for the Department

of Defense, maintains that nothing is taken out of transcripts for political reasons. "It's truth in advertising," he told me. "There are rare occasions where something was off the record and is deleted, but we note that in the transcript. Part of my job is to correct the record if a journalist gets it wrong. With *Vanity Fair*, it was the marketing of the story more than the reporter. They ran a press release with a selective portion quoted to profit their thesis--then it was picked up by other news organizations."

Wolfowitz seems to be a particular target for quote manipulation, if you believe the bloggers. The *Guardian* recently ran a report under the headline: "Wolfowitz: Iraq war was about oil." But the *Belgravia Dispatch* blog quickly found that this was not what Wolfowitz was saying at all, with the full quote being: "The primary difference between North Korea and Iraq is that we had virtually no economic options in Iraq because the country floats on a sea of oil."

A Department of Defense transcript again came in handy, but not everyone believes that the government is releasing totally unedited transcripts. Brendan Nyhan, of the excellent *Spinsanity* site, helped attract attention to the Dowd misquote. He e-mailed me, saying "posting full transcripts of interviews and briefings online is a great way for the administration to give the press and public a fuller picture of what was said, and sometimes is effective at putting quotes in context ... [But] in several cases, White House transcripts have omitted or corrected various misstatements from the president and spokesman Ari Fleischer, so the transcripts that are released are not necessarily unimpeachable."

An imperfect system, for sure. But as for the growing number of misquotes and misinterpreted quotes, you have to wonder if the Blair scandal paired with the Internet is bringing out overzealousness among bloggers. Or are journalists just getting overly sloppy? Uber-blogger Glenn Reynolds sees the emergence of online group fact-checking in a parallel to Russia's post-Soviet *glasnost*. "People are appalled, saying it's the decline of journalism," he told me. "But it's the same as when Russia started reporting about plane crashes and everyone thought they were just suddenly happening. It was really just the first time people could read about them."

So perhaps journalists, playing Wizard of Oz for so many years behind the veil of assorted editors, fact-checkers and media executives, are now feeling a bit naked out in the open. It doesn't help that media companies have cut fact-checking down to the bone (if it exists at all). With the Net and bloggers breathing down their necks, journalists will just have to try harder, especially when it comes to quotes.

[Note: All quotes in this story were run by the quoted parties before posting. Imagine that.]

Mark Glaser ☺
Posted: 2003-06-05

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Moving Swiftly To Make Iraq A Safer Place -- (Letter)

Page 1 of 1

Baltimore Sun
June 4, 2003

Moving Swiftly To Make Iraq A Safer Place

The Sun's editorial "Rumsfeld's legacy"(May 25) grossly distorts conditions in Iraq.

Just seven weeks after the end of major combat operations, considerable progress toward recovery and reconstruction has already been made. And while there remain many challenges ahead, we should keep the crime statistics in perspective.

Imagine if Baltimore were the size of Baghdad. According to Baltimore police statistics, the city has about 21 murders each month and another 3,895 incidents comparable to looting, such as robbery, larceny and theft. For a city the size of Baghdad, that would be approximately 190 murders per month and 33,500 other types of incidents.

Violent incidents can be expected to occur in Baghdad, as they do in Baltimore. To compound the problem in Iraq, one must also note, Saddam Hussein released some 100,000 criminals on the eve of war.

We have moved swiftly to deal with the situation in post-Hussein Iraq. Although many challenges lie ahead, Iraq is now free from the tyranny of Mr. Hussein, and conditions continue to improve with every passing day.

As we move forward to help the Iraqis build a free nation, the Coalition Provisional Authority will fill the vacuum of power in a country that has not known freedom for decades.

We will assert temporary authority over the country to provide security and essential services and restore law and order. We continue to hire and train Iraqi police, hundreds of whom are already conducting joint patrols with the thousands of military police in Iraq.

They augment the more than 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, along with nearly 15,000 other coalition personnel, with still more help from coalition partners in the offing.

As security continues to improve, a safer environment emerges with each passing day. And one should be careful when assessing the level of crime before making judgments about security.

Victoria Clarke, Washington

The writer is assistant secretary of defense for public affairs.

Editor's Note: The editorial referred to appeared in the *Current News Early Bird*, May 27, 2003.



4/28-1982
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

May 20, 2003

Mr. Hudson Morgan
The New Republic
1111 H Street, NW Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Mr. Morgan:

Lawrence Kaplan's commentary ("Early Exit," May 26, 2003) on the administration's exit strategy in Iraq is off the mark. Senior members of this administration have repeatedly affirmed our long-term commitment to Iraq. There is not now, nor has there ever been, a deadline or a timetable. Our military forces and our civilian leaders will remain in Iraq as long as necessary to enable the Iraqi people to govern themselves and provide for their own security - not one day longer nor one day sooner.

The number of U.S. and coalition military forces required to secure the peace and accomplish the mission will change over time. Gen. Tommy Franks and his commanders continually evaluate the situation on the ground to determine the proper level and mix of forces necessary for the mission at hand. Anyone who claims they can predict what those levels will be at any point in the future - next week, next month, or this fall - is certainly guessing. The administration has no "magic number" for the forces it will take nor is there an "end date" for mission accomplishment. That is a message on which Secretary Rumsfeld has been nothing if not straightforward.


Douglas M. Costle
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

June 4, 2003

Editor
Philadelphia Inquirer
400 North Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19130

To the Editor,

I take strong exception to your editorial of May 30th ("A Very Rough Draft") in which you repeat spurious charges by the BBC and others that the Defense Department somehow "managed" the news about the rescue of Pfc. Jessica Lynch.

The truth is, official spokespeople in Qatar and in Washington, as well as the footage released, reflected the events accurately and as fully as possible based on information from troops and commanders who were directly involved in the rescue. To suggest otherwise is an insult and does a grave disservice to the brave men and women involved. Within days of her rescue the physicians who cared for Pfc. Lynch held a press conference to fully explain the extent of her injuries and in doing so corrected the inaccuracies and speculations.

Military commanders always use a force robust enough to accomplish the mission and provide for the safety of the servicemembers involved. To do otherwise would be irresponsible. We should remember that the town in which the hospital was located, Nassiriyah, was an active scene of combat and remained under enemy control. A joint team of U.S. military forces put their lives on the line in a hostile area during combat operations to accomplish the mission.

Furthermore, the BBC's claims that Defense officials "managed," the news about Pfc. Lynch's rescue, which created the misperceptions echoed by your paper and others, are outrageous, patently false and unsupported by the facts. Inquirer readers should question why the BBC report, based on interviews with selected Iraqis, is treated as more credible than those from the American service members involved in the mission. That the Inquirer would simply repeat those claims without talking to the Defense Department or independently verifying them, does a disservice to your readers.


Victoria Clarke
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/16795



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

3 June 2003

Editor

London Daily Telegraph

One Canada Square, Canary Wharf

London E14 5DT

United Kingdom

Dear To the Editor:

The threat posed by Saddam's weapons of mass destruction is not an illusion, despite the rush to judgment by some ("Blair: I have Weapons Proof," June 2, 2003). Opponents of the war, having failed at preserving Saddam in power, now seek to make political hay of what we have always maintained will be a lengthy process. While no intelligence is perfect, the coalition is acting on the best information available to us. It is far too early to make any judgments, as the final chapter of Saddam's WMD ambitions has yet to be written.

U.N. inspectors documented the existence of large quantities of weapons of mass destruction before they were kicked out of Iraq in 1998. UNSCR 1481 required Saddam Hussein to account for it. He failed to do so. If Saddam Hussein could have accounted for these materials, it's reasonable to suppose that he would have done so, rather than risk his regime, his fortune, and possibly his life. All we had by way of assurance was the word of a ruthless dictator who was well known for both his brutality and deception.

Dozens of recently captured regime officials are now being interviewed in order to shed light on Iraq's denial and deception of its WMD programs. Now that major combat operations are over, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) is deploying to bring an even greater analytical aspect to the ongoing investigation. Hundreds of suspect sites are yet to be examined.

We have said from the beginning that information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program was going to come from the people involved. That's why, for instance, we pressed during the inspections process for UNMOVIC and IAEA to interview thousands of Iraqis. Now that Saddam's regime is gone, people in Iraq will be free to tell the truth.

The Iraq Survey Group will pursue this effort. In the months ahead, we expect the evidence of Saddam's WMD will be both compelling and definitive.

Victoria Clarke
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

May 20, 2003

Mr. Hudson Morgan
The New Republic
1331 H Street, NW Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005

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Victoria Clark
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

30 May 2003

Mr. Shiraz Lalani
Editor
The Mirror
One Canada Square
Canary Wharf
London E14 5 AP

Dear Mr. Lalani:

The allegations regarding Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in your editorial in the Voice of the Mirror column ("Rum Way to Defend War," May 30, 2003) are baseless and flat wrong. I'd like to correct the record for your readers.

At no time has Secretary Rumsfeld said or implied that Iraq "probably didn't have" weapons of mass destruction. Nor has he said or implied that Iran is a target of U.S. military action.

On Iraq, here is what Secretary Rumsfeld said earlier this week to the Council on Foreign Relations: "It's hard to find things in a country that's determined not to have you find them. And we'll just take our time and we'll go about that business. And my guess is that the kinds of things that the intelligence community provided Secretary Powell, and Secretary Powell provided the United Nations, will in fact be turned up, to the extent that they're still there."

On Iran, he said, "The policy of the United States has been in recent years to attempt to not engage the top two layers of that country to try to say things and do things that reflect an understanding of the circumstance of the people of that country, and hope that the people of that country will have an opportunity to find ways to persuade the leadership in that country that they're going down the wrong road."

A simple search of the record of Secretary Rumsfeld's many public appearances will show that www.defenselink.mil would contain the facts recorded by a large official staff.


Steven Clark
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-6000

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

June 4, 2003

Editor, New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036

To the Editor:

Paul Krugman, in his op-ed "Standard Operating Procedures" (June 1), has apparently concluded that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program - a threat documented by the UN - never existed. He then takes the next leap of logic, based on a false premise, that somehow the U.S. government was disingenuous about the intelligence available. Clearly he prefers placing his trust in Saddam Hussein, rather than those U.S. officials who in good faith acted on the best information available to them.

Prior to war, critics in the international community maintained that UN inspectors would need many months, even years to search for evidence of WMD programs in Iraq. Yet less than two months after the cessation of major combat operations, these same critics are changing their position, rushing to judgment, unwilling to give coalition forces the time required to solve the complex puzzle created by Saddam's denial and deception.

The threat posed by Saddam's weapons of mass destruction is not an illusion. Opponents of the war, having failed at preserving Saddam in power, now seek to make political hay of what we have always said will be a lengthy process. While no intelligence is perfect, the coalition is acting on the best information available. It is far too early to make any judgments, as the final chapter of Saddam's WMD ambitions has yet to be written.

Dozens of recently captured regime officials are being interviewed in order to shed light on Iraq's denial and deception of its WMD programs. Now that major combat operations are over, the Iraq Survey Group is deploying to bring an even greater analytical aspect to the ongoing investigation. Hundreds of suspect sites are yet to be examined.

We have said from the beginning that information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program would come from the people involved. Now that Saddam's regime is gone, people in Iraq will be free to talk. The Iraq Survey Group will pursue all other leads. Their task is a tough one, but in the end, we expect the revelation of Saddam's WMD will be a resounding and decisive one.


Patricia Charles
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs

11-10559/OSD/16799



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

June 2, 2003

Editor
Financial Times
1330 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

To the Editor:

Your article, "Rumsfeld pushes for Iran action," grossly misrepresents Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's views on U.S. policy on Iran. He has never said or implied that Iran is a target of U.S. military action, neither is he "spearheading efforts" to change U.S. policy. He fully supports the President's policy on Iran.

Secretary Rumsfeld and many other senior leaders throughout the government have made their views known about the challenges posed by Iran. Just one day before the *Financial Times* article was published, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations and said, "It's a country that has been unhelpful with respect to Iraq. It's being unhelpful today with respect to Iraq." However, he is not advocating what was suggested by the *Financial Times*.

He stated clearly that U.S. policy on Iran was to recognize the "churning in that country" by the women and the young people and the pressure they are putting on a handful of clerics that control that regime. He stated further that U.S. policy was not to engage with the top two layers of Iranian government. Doing so could legitimate those leaders and discourage the Iranian people. We are hopeful, the Secretary said, "That the Iranian people will have an opportunity to find ways to persuade the leadership in that country that they're going down the wrong road."

The headline, lead and intent of the article completely distorted the facts.

Donald Rumsfeld
Assistant Secretary of Defense



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

30 May 2003

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Mr. William K. Marimow
Editor and Senior Vice President
The Baltimore Sun
501 North Calvert Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21278

Dear Mr. Marimow:

Your editorial of May 25th ("Rumsfeld's Legacy") grossly distorts conditions in Iraq. Just seven weeks after the end of major combat operations, considerable progress toward recovery and reconstruction has already been made. While there remain many challenges ahead, we should keep the crime statistics in perspective. Consider if Baltimore were the size of Baghdad. According to Baltimore police statistics, there are five murders each month and another 3,895 incidents comparable to looting, such as robbery, larceny, and theft. If you correlate those statistics to a city the size of Baghdad, one would expect approximately 42 murders per month and 33,501 other types of incidents. That such incidents will occur in Baghdad, as they do in Baltimore, is to be expected. To compound the problem in Iraq one must add in the fact that Saddam Hussein released some 100,000 criminals on the eve of war.

We have moved swiftly to deal with the emerging situation in post-Saddam Iraq. Although many challenges lie ahead, Iraq is now free from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, and with every passing day, conditions continue to improve.

As we move forward to help Iraqis build a free nation, the Coalition Provisional Authority will fill the vacuum of power in a country that has not known freedom for decades. We will assert temporary authority over the country to provide security, essential services, and restore law and order. We continue to hire and train Iraqi police, hundreds of whom are already conducting joint patrols with the thousands of military police in Iraq. They augment the more than 140,000 troops in Iraq, along with nearly 15,000 coalition forces, with still more help from coalition partners in the offing.

As security continues to improve, a safer environment emerges with each day. One should be careful when assessing the level of crime before making judgments about security.

Sincerely,


Robert M. Canine
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000

May 21, 2003

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Editor
Los Angeles Times
202 West First Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012

To the Editor,

I take strong exception to the accusations in Robert Scheer's article on the Jessica Lynch rescue ("Saving Private Lynch: Part 2," May 21, 2003). Mr. Scheer's claims are outrageous, patently false and unsupported by the facts. Scheer cites an anonymous source in a *Washington Post* story and questions the credibility of the Iraqi lawyer who provided details about Lynch's whereabouts yet takes at face value the allegations made by other Iraqis to the BBC. That he relies on third party sources for the information upon which he draws his conclusions is no excuse.

The truth is, no one within the Department of Defense "manufactured" the news about Pfc. Lynch's rescue. A joint team of U.S. military forces put their lives on the line in a hostile area during combat operations to accomplish the mission. Official spokespeople in Qatar and in Washington, as well as the footage released, reflected the events accurately and as fully as possible based on information from troops and commanders who were directly involved in the rescue. To suggest otherwise is an insult and does a grave disservice to the brave men and women involved.

Times readers should question why the BBC report, based on interviews with alleged Iraqis, is treated as more credible than those from the American service members involved in the mission. That Mr. Scheer would simply repeat those claims without talking to the Defense Department or independently verifying them makes it clear he is more interested in spurious charges than in the facts.


Robert M. Clark
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs

June 2, 2003 9:03 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

Let's talk about how we can do a lessons learned and do some public roll out of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-12

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

*TC: Work w/
ADM G on
this.
Thanks
[Signature]*

2 Jun 03

2 Jun 03

U17100 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16803

June 2, 2003 9:06 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: *Daily Telegraph*

I am told The *Daily Telegraph* will do an interview with me with Charles Moore by phone if we want to get something out in England that straightens things out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-14

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

000.7 SD

2 Jun 03

U17101 /03

June 2, 2003 9:20 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Program Stability Statistics

Here is an interesting set of statistics.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/19/03 Aldridge Memo re: Program Stability

DHR:dh
060203-17

.....
Please respond by _____

100 59

2 Jun 03

U17102 /03

March 19, 2003

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 20 2003

INFO ONLY

Larry Di Rita
3/19

To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Myers

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: Program Stability

This is why we have a hard time maintaining program stability. In the life of a typical DoD program, lasting an average of 11 years, we have the following*:

- 4 Program Managers
- 5 Program Executive Officers
- 8 Service Acquisition Executives
- 8 Defense Acquisition Executives
- 5 Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 7 Secretaries of Defense, and
- 3 Presidents

The tenure of Program Managers is not the only problem.

* Source: Dave Walker, GAO

June 2, 2003 9:29 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
cc: Powell Moore / Exec Sec
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Managing Aircraft

Please get back to me with a proposed policy for how we manage aircraft in the United States so that commanders cannot just willy-nilly give them to Codels and the like or others.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-19

Please respond by

6/06/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 4 2003

Sir, we have a policy, albeit old (1964). Recommend two actions:

① Have OSD/LL (Powell Moore) redo the policy instructions.

② Have Powell Moore draft a msg for your signature restating the policy to the Service, Unified Commanders (including the Reserve and Guard).

U17103

103

11-L-055905

VR Dick

June 2, 2003 9:31 AM

Done #453
6/5
Per SMC/MS

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Logistics

Attached is a memo I dictated after meeting with a logistics man who was involved in the Franks operation.

200

Do we have activities going that will fix these problems?

Thanks.

Attach.
5/1/03 SecDef MFR re: Logistics [050103-19]

DIR:dh
060203-20

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

2 Jun 03

U17104 /03

May 1, 2003 3:12 PM

SUBJECT: Logistics

I had a good visit with MG Claude Christensen, who was the logistics man for part of the Iraqi war.

He said a good deal of logistics is still Service-unique and could be fixed.

For example, he said when they put Army cargo on an Air Force transport, they have no more visibility into it. We need to get this fixed across the force. The separation of logistics under Title 10 is the root of the problem.

We either need a carrot or a stick.

One of the things that struck me was that these logistics people don't have a long enough time in their job. For the people in Wal-Mart to get good at it, they do it for 10 or 15 years.

DHR:dh
050103-19

11-L-0559/OSD/16809

June 2, 2003 10:48 AM

TO: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DONE

SUBJECT: Forces

322

Gen. Myers said they had already given me the answer to this snowflake from May 1. See if you can find it or if not, get another copy from them.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/1/03 SecDef memo to CJCS re: Baseline Force Presence and Changes [050103-2]

DHR:dh
060203-27

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

25 Jun 03

U17105 /03

May 1, 2003 1:56 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Baseline Force Presence and Changes

Coer

I would like to see a paper showing what forces we had deployed around the world when the President arrived on January 20, 2001, and then what the pluses and minuses, the puts and takes, have been since then by country, by AOR and then the total.

Thanks

DHR dh
050103-2

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/16811

June 2, 2003 10:40 AM

49
08

TO: Jaymie Duman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld VN

SUBJECT: Jay Garner

Please find out when Jay Garner is going to be in Washington, and make sure he comes in to see me and we have lunch or arrange something. Don't tell him we are going to present him a medal and take him over to see the President.

11.7.03

Please find out when the President is going to be in town and available, and then try to get Jay in Washington during one of those periods.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-25

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

2 Jun 03

U17106 /03

June 2, 2003 9:38 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: "Intel Cell"

I have made some edits to these talking points on the so-called intel cell.

My instinct is to have the edits incorporated if they are accurate. If they are not, obviously tell me.

Second, have Bill Luti, Paul Wolfowitz, Torie Clarke and you all initial this, so you all agree that is what you know about it, and it is accurate and inclusive. Then give me and everyone else a clean copy.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/30/03 Policy Talking Points re: the Alleged DoD "Intel Cell"

DHR:dh
060203-21

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

358.09

7 Jun 03

U17107 /03

Re: the alleged DOD "Intell cell"

OSD Policy
30 May 03

Talking Points

- After 9/11, Under Secretary Feith identified a requirement to think through what it means to be at war with a terrorist network.
for DOD
 - This involved understanding how various terrorist organizations related to each other and to various sources of support, including state sponsors.
- To meet this requirement, he set up a team to help digest the mountains of relevant intelligence reports.
small
 - The team began work in October 2001 – it consisted of a naval reserve officer and a detailee from another office in the Defense Department.
- In early 2002, both members of the team left, and were replaced by two naval reservists, one of whom is now a civilian employee of the Department.
- This team was not involved in intelligence collection; *nor was it involved in board*
data
 - It relied on reporting from the CIA and other parts of the Intelligence Community.
Analyst work -
 - Its job was to advise policymakers on the import of the intelligence for the development of strategy.
the I.C.'s
- In 2002, together with ~~some~~ *DOD* other Defense Department staffers, it ~~analyzed~~ *examined* the interrelationships among terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism.
 - It concluded that groups and states were willing to cooperate across the ideological divides (secular vs. religious; Sunni vs. Shi'a) that, in the view of some intelligence analysts, precluded cooperation.
 - These conclusions were shared with the CIA.
 - In one case, a briefing was presented to DCI George Tenet. It dealt with links between Iraq and al Qaida.
- Several press articles have mistakenly identified this team with the Office of Special Plans.
 - The Special Plans office was carved out of the Near East and South Asia Bureau in October 2002 to concentrate on policy issues with respect to Iran, Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism.
 - It has nothing in particular to do with intelligence.

Misconceptions in the Press

- **Terrorist networks, not WMD.** The team looked at the interconnections among terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism. *Its purpose was to* ~~It did not deal with~~ WMD issues.
- **No intelligence collection.** The team was not involved in intelligence collection. It worked with the same intelligence reporting that analysts in the Intelligence Community used.
- **No connection with Iraqi defectors.** The team had nothing to do with the transfer of the "Intelligence Collection Program" (ICP) from the State Department to the Defense Humint Service. The ICP debriefed Iraqi defectors, many of whom escaped from Iraq with the help of the Iraqi National Congress.
- **Not focused on Iraq.** The team's responsibility was to analyze *all* interconnections among terrorist groups and their various sources of support, including state sponsors. *Its focus was not specifically Iraq*

Misconceptions -- continued

- **No relation to the works of Leo Strauss.** The team worked with intelligence reports – it did not analyze *Natural Right and History* or any other work of the late Leo Strauss.

June 2, 2003 11:01 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

IRAQ

I have some scraps of papers on lessons learned that include the following:

1. We have to move to standing joint task forces.
2. Marine air-to-ground cooperation is superb. Army air-to-ground is less so.
3. Battle damage assessments were not good. They were frequently two days behind.
4. We need a joint training center. We don't train the way we should.

Training has to include training with special operators if we are going to be able to connect the Army, Air Force and Special Ops.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 4 2003

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-28

Please respond by 6/27/03

*See, you will see
the lessons learned quick
look by Joint Forces
Command this Thursday.
They will cover those issues.
VR Dicks*

27 JUN 03

U17109 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16817

June 2, 2003 2:04 PM

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Ron Adams, Robin Raphael

Ron Adams worked at ORHA in Baghdad and is knowledgeable about C3I. He might be someone we want to take a look at.

Another person we might want to take a look at is Robin Raphael. She is also out in Baghdad.

Neither one of them will be there forever.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-39

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

U17110 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16818

230.02

2Jun03

6/15/03
June 2, 2003 12:05 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Mass Graves

6/18
Here is a note from Newt Gingrich, which is just an idea. Please come back to me with a proposal and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/2/03 Gingrich memo re: "A Website on Mass Cemeteries"

DHR:dh
060203-37

.....
Please respond by 6/03/03

U171111/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16819

687

274003

cc: Durnan
Craddock
D. Rite

2:30

Page 1 of 1

(b)(6)

~~SECRET HAS BEEN~~

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Monday, June 02, 2003 11:15 AM

JUN - 2 2003

To: llibby@ovp.eop.gov; cheneyel@state.gov; eedelman@ovp.eop.gov; jhannah@ovp.eop.gov;
Samantha_F._Ravich@ovp.eop.gov; Torie.Clarke@OSD.Mil; wilkinjr@centcom.mil;
DBartlet@who.eop.gov; tucker_a._eskew@who.eop.gov

Cc: jbolten@who.eop.gov; cdemuth@aei.org; Peter_H._Wehner@who.eop.gov; dpletka@aei.org

Subject: a website on mass cemeteries


as a step toward winning the argument about whether or not the Iraq war was the right thing to do, the government should create a website commemorating the number of cemeteries and mass executions, tortures etc which are now coming to light

there is one report that as many as 300,000 bodies may ultimately be discovered. this could have a devastating impact if it was organized and presented in the right way so the American left and Europeans could not hide from it
newt

6/2/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/16820

MEMORANDUM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Don Meyer 
CC: Chris Willcox, Bryan Whitman, Brent Krueger, Linda Kozaryn
RE: Documenting and Disseminating Information on Mass Graves
DATE: June 16, 2003

In response to the SecDef's June 2 snowflake, the following is recommended regarding public affairs efforts on mass grave discoveries in Iraq. The success of any sustained outreach & media effort on mass graves in Iraq will depend upon the following:

- A steady flow of information and demonstration of progress from the Iraqi Survey Group.
- Timely analysis and declassification of forensic findings in Iraq.
- A point of contact/spokesperson with the ISG for media in Iraq.
- A designated DoD official at the Pentagon available for public affairs activities.

Tactics

Public Liaison

- Permanent web page regularly updated on DefendAmerica.mil (mock-up from Linda's team attached).
- Regular Updates in Public Liaison Products.
- Outreach Briefings to human rights, religious and academic groups.

Media

- Messages on mass graves in SecDef opening statements from the podium.
- ISG team briefings from Iraq (via VTC to the Pentagon).
- Embedding media with field elements of the Iraqi Survey Group.
- Regular press briefings at Foreign Press Center.



"Nobody likes war. It's not a pretty thing. It's only compared to mass graves and the kind of terror that Saddam Hussein was putting forward that you can say it's the lesser of two evils." Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, CNN interview, May 31, 2003

Decades of Death

For more than 20 years, Saddam Hussein's regime killed, tortured, raped and terrorized the Iraqi people and his neighbors. Hundreds of thousands of people died as a result of his actions - the vast majority of them Muslims. U.S.-led coalition forces are now beginning to reveal evidence of the Iraqi dictator's crimes against humanity. Mass graves display the horror of his reign.

On May 29, Human Rights Watch reported that a survivor who escaped after he was left for dead in a mass grave in March 1991 linked the thousands of victims unearthed earlier in the month to systematic mass killings by Iraqi Special Republican Guards and Ba'ath Party officials. Farmers living near the sites also witnessed the killings and confirmed the survivor's account.

The group released a 14-page report, "The Mass Graves of al-Mahawil: The Truth Uncovered," providing the first independent documentation of how the Iraqi government suppressed the Shi'a uprising after the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

A History of Barbarism

According to an April 4 White House fact sheet, Saddam had approximately 40 of his own relatives murdered.

The regime used allegations of prostitution used to intimidate opponents of the regime, to justify the barbaric beheading of women.

Documented chemical attacks by the regime, from 1983 to 1988, resulted in some 30,000 Iraqi and Iranian deaths.

Human Rights Watch estimates that Saddam's 1987-1988 campaign of terror against the Kurds killed at least 50,000 and possibly as many as 100,000 Kurds.

The Iraqi regime used chemical agents to include mustard gas and nerve agents in attacks against at least 40 Kurdish villages

U.S. Marines Locate Grisly Reminder of Hussein's Regime

AL HILLAH, Iraq (May 5, 2003) — Decaying human bones and tattered clothes litter a dirt pit that was once used as a trash dump near the town of Al-Hillah.

Marines with 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, found the site but are quick to point out that its existence was no secret.

"It has been there since 1991," said an intelligence specialist staff sergeant with 1st Battalion. "This site was not a secret in this town, everybody knew where it was." *Story*



Refugees International reports that the "Oppressive government policies have led to the internal displacement of 900,000 Iraqis, primarily Kurds who have fled to the north to escape Saddam Hussein's Arabization campaigns (which involve forcing Kurds to renounce their Kurdish identity or lose their property) and Marsh Arabs, who fled the government's campaign to dry up the southern marshes for agricultural use. More than 200,000 Iraqis continue to live as refugees in Iran."

The U.S. Committee for Refugees, in 2002, estimated that nearly 100,000 Kurds, Assyrians and Turkomans had previously been expelled, by the regime, from the "central-government-controlled Kirkuk and surrounding districts in the oil-rich region bordering the Kurdish controlled north."

Malnutrition & Starvation

"Over the past five years, 400,000 Iraqi children under the age of five died of malnutrition and disease, preventively, but died because of the nature of the regime under which they are living." (Prime Minister Tony Blair, March 27, 2003)

Under the oil-for-food program, the international community sought to make available to the Iraqi people adequate supplies of food and medicine, but the regime blocked sufficient access for international workers to ensure proper distribution of these supplies.

Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces have discovered military warehouses filled with food supplies

11-L-0559/OSD/16822

<http://defendamerica.mil/cgi-bin/prfriendly.cgi?http://defendamerica.mil/specials/june2003...> 6/10/2003

between 1987-1988. The largest was the attack on Halabja which resulted in approximately 5,000 deaths. Two thousand Kurdish villages were destroyed during the campaign of terror.

"In the last few days, I've seen the shocking and haunting pictures of mass graves which contain some of the thousands and thousands of Iraqis he murdered. I have heard from dozens of Iraqi citizens about their gratitude that the coalition has freed them from this horror. Saddam Hussein was a truly evil man who repressed, tortured and murdered his people. He didn't go a day too soon."

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III
Baghdad, Iraq, May 15, 2003

Iraq's 13 million Shi'a Muslims, the majority of Iraq's population of approximately 22 million, face severe restrictions on their religious practice, including a ban on communal Friday prayer, and restriction on funeral processions.

According to Human Rights Watch, "senior Arab diplomats told the London-based Arabic daily newspaper al-Hayat in October [1991] that Iraqi leaders were privately acknowledging that 250,000 people were killed during the uprisings, with most of the casualties in the south."

Related Links

[Chemical Weapons Used in Halabja](#)

[Saddam's Brutality Against the Iraqi People](#)

[Repression of the Shi'a](#)

[Iraqi Crimes Against Humanity](#)

[The Plight of Iraqi Women](#)

[Just Who Is Saddam Hussein?](#)

[Iraq's Biological Warfare Agents](#)

[Iraq's Use of Chemical Weapons](#)

[U.S. State Dept. on Iraq](#)

meant for the Iraqi people that had been diverted by Iraqi military forces.

The Iraqi regime repeatedly refused visits by human rights monitors. From 1992 until 2002, Saddam prevented the UN Special Rapporteur from visiting Iraq. The U.N. Special Rapporteur's September 2001 report criticized the regime for "the sheer number of executions," the number of "extrajudicial executions on political grounds," and "the absence of a due process of the law."

Executions

Saddam Hussein's regime carried out frequent summary executions, including:

- 4,000 prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in 1984
- 3,000 prisoners at the Mahjar prison from 1993-1998
- 2,500 prisoners were executed between 1997-1999 in a "prison cleansing campaign"
- 122 political prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib prison in February/March 2000
- 23 political prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib prison in October 2001
- At least 130 Iraqi women were beheaded between June 2000 and April 2001

"In the Arab world it was actually not a surprise that thousands of mass graves turned up. I think the Arab people understand that this man was responsible for killing more Muslims than I think any other single individual and there is an opportunity now to build a much better Arab society and to demonstrate to the rest of the world that Arabs are capable of democracy."
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz
CNN Interview, May 31, 2003

<http://defendamerica.mil/specials/june2003/atrocities.html>

June 2, 2003 11:30 AM

08
6/23

IRAQ

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Iraqi Scientists

You will remember we gave the UN inspectors a list of people they ought to think about taking out of the country and interrogating.

What has the US done about trying to find those people? Do we have any of them in detention now? Do we know where others are? Are we trying to get them out of the country, if you will, to interrogate them?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-36

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

U17112 /03

25403

11-L-0559/OSD/16824

June 2, 2003 11:14 AM

OB
6/4

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Avail w/Garner and Di Rita

000.750

Let's think about taking both Jay Garner and Larry Di Rita down for a press briefing with me sometime when Jay Garner is in town this week or next.

Thanks.

DHR:db
060203-31


.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

U17114 /03

274n03

June 2, 2003 11:12 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Free Trade Agreements

It seems to me that we ought to have free trade agreements with the countries we want to get closer to. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-30

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

U17115 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16826

091.31

274103

June 2, 2003 11:10 AM

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D A
SUBJECT: Malik Hassan

Please give me a background sheet on Malik Hassan. Newt Gingrich sent the attached e-mail about him.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/2/03 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: "A Strong Potential Appointee"

DHR:dh
060203-29

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

230.02

25403

U17118 /03

cc Durnan
Craddock
Di Rita
Herbits

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 2 2003

(b)(6)

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Monday, June 02, 2003 7:59 AM

To: (b)(6)@pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: a strong appointee for foreign policy

for secdef.depsecdef

from newt 6/02/03

a strong potential appointee

the following is a sufficiently strong endorsement of Malik Hassan that I think it is worth sharing. I am not sure where he could be best used but he is a very successful entrepreneur and a remarkably effective advocate of the United States. He is worth considering for a wide range of posts and since he is independently wealthy (he owns the largest house in Beaver Creek Colorado) he can help with total focus on the President's assignments.

From: (b)(6)

To: (b)(6)

Dear Malik,

I want to say something about your diplomatic skills, which I believe are formidable although still emerging, and about securing an appropriate position where your services can be of maximum utility in serving the national interest.

I pride myself on being a good judge of diplomatic caliber for senior sensitive diplomatic missions. I spent nearly five years at the US Mission to the UN with Jeane Kirkpatrick as her personal counsel, and as chief counsel to the US delegation to the United Nations. As my book, *The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology--America at the United Nations 1981-1985*, makes clear, although it does not tell the whole story, she was much more than a UN ambassador: she was a trusted adviser to President Reagan. During that time, I also got to know General Vernon Walters when he was serving as the Ambassador at Large at the State Department. And when he replaced Jeane Kirkpatrick as the permanent US delegate he asked me to stay on as the sole Kirkpatrick era holdover, and I served in a similar capacity with him. His duties too included special assignments even while serving as the US rep to the UN.

My point is this: I know the limitations of working within an institutional bureaucracy

6/2/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/16828

which is the State Department. And I knew from having observed you at the Human Rights Commission that you can do great things for this country, being imaginative and forceful, determined when need be, and diplomatic as called for. You can help bridge the gap between different cultures.

You can be a voice for strength, and a voice for moderation. You have what it takes to serve our country at this critical juncture and I would hope you would consider something like an Ambassador at Large position akin to what General Vernon Walters occupied, or a similar appropriate position where you serve at the President's discretion.

All the best,

Allan

6/2/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/16829

June 2, 2003 2:53 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Personnel Meeting

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT*

000.715D

When Herbits and Holcomb come in, please make sure you have plenty of time—
leave an hour and 15 minutes or an hour and a half or something. I don't want to
run out of time. It is too important.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-44

.....
Please respond by 6/4/03

U17121 /03

2 JUN 03

SENT 6/3

May 31, 2003 11:44 AM

IRAQ

TO: Tom Christie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint BDA Joint Test and Evaluation Contribution to OPERATION
Iraqi Freedom

Thank you for your note on Joint Battle Damage Assessment. The information
has been passed on to JFCOM and CENTCOM for inclusion in OIF Lessons
Learned.

DHR:dh
053103-9

.....
Please respond by _____

3JUN03

U17123 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16831

SENT 6/3

~~May 31, 2003 8:37 AM~~

TO: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 7A

SUBJECT: Chairman Hyde

I would like to have Henry Hyde down for lunch someday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053103-3

.....
Please respond by 6/03/03

U17126 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16832

001150

374003

SENT 6/3
~~May 31, 2003 8:40 AM~~

032

TO: Powell Moore
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^{TR}

SUBJECT: Congressman Lantos

Lant. by email
6/20

Tom Lantos offered to give us a hand in the House of Representatives on projects we are working on. Let's make sure we use him. When someone offers, you have to give him something to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053103-4

.....
Please respond by

6/04/03

U17128 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16833

3JUN03

6/20



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

June 17, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Powell A. Moore", is written over a horizontal line.

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake # 053103-4 regarding Congressman Tom Lantos

I have talked to Congressman Lantos and asked for his assistance in obtaining the \$200 million in train and equip authority that we are seeking. In his position as the Ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, he is in a strong position to assist us and we are following up with detailed briefings.

Attachment: Snowflake

11-L-0559/OSD/16834

SENT 6/3

~~May 30, 2003~~ 5:21 PM

337

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CINC Conference

I do think it is a good idea to have Tom Franks talk to the CINC Conference about mass versus speed, and I would like to be there when he does it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053003-15

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

374103

U17129 /03

SENT 6/3
~~May 31, 2003 3:04 PM~~

IRAQ

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Franks
Jerry Bremer
Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Documents

I am told somebody found a cache of documents in the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Secret Police in Baghdad. The report indicates the documents are under water, and that some portion of them relate to the history of the Jewish community in Iraq.

I am told that Hebrew University has offered to take possession of them, restore them and make them available in some appropriate way.

Could you please have someone look into that and get back to me about what the situation is and what we are doing about it, if anything.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
053103-20

.....
Please respond by 6/08/03

3 Jun 03


U17152 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16836

October 15, 2003

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: Jim Schlesinger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

Jim—

Thanks for your note on Ramadan etc. I appreciate it. We are working the problem.

You said, "More if you want." I do want—give me all you have. I need it all!

Regards,

DHR:dh
101503-36

000.3

15 OCT 03


U17133 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16837

Start 6/3
~~June 2, 2003~~ 8:11 AM

OB
6/4

000.750

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Op-ed by Smith

Here is an article by Jeffrey Smith in Sunday's *Washington Post*. There was never any "analysis" done in the Policy shop. The Defense Intelligence Agency does analysis, which of course is its job.

The views that find their way into the Oval Office are via George Tenet and the daily briefing. We never brief the President on intelligence.

Thanks.

Attach.

Smith, Jeffrey H.. "Integrity, Intelligence and Iraq," *Washington Post*, June 1, 2003, p. B7.

DHR:dh
060203-3

.....

Please respond by 6/03/03

3 Jun 03

U17134 /03

Second, the most important aspect of intelligence analysis is integrity. Many factors contribute to that integrity, including the intellectual skills and character of the individuals preparing the reports, the support given to the analysts by CIA leadership and the independence of the agency. Tenet and his senior leadership have greatly emphasized the first two factors. Any recommendations emerging from these investigations must preserve or strengthen them. But attention should also be paid to the third: the independence of the CIA.

The CIA was established after World War II because President Truman and Congress recognized that it was imperative to have an agency to collect and analyze intelligence for the president that would be independent of the departments of State and Defense. This independence was and is essential to ensuring that analysis is not tailored to suit the views of any government policymaker.

The president's new policy of preemption places an even greater premium on the need for integrity in intelligence analysis. Iraq, the first real test of this policy, painfully proves the point. Serious questions are being asked about whether intelligence was misused, manipulated or ignored by the administration to argue in favor of an invasion. Foreign governments are questioning our word, making it much harder for the president to gather support for his policies in Korea, Iran and other hot spots. Members of Congress have said privately that when they hear reports of other threats facing the United States, they question whether they are accurate or have been influenced by senior administration officials who favor a particular policy.

Concern about the integrity of U.S. intelligence analysis cannot stand. The director of central intelligence must be able to speak truth to power. In many ways, Tenet's most important responsibility is to say, "Mr. President, your policy is failing." Those of us who know Tenet are convinced he has the steel to do precisely that.

The CIA has established the position of ombudsman for politicization of intelligence. If any intelligence analyst believes his or her analysis has been altered because of policy or political considerations, that analyst can report to the ombudsman, who would then take appropriate measures. The investigations currently underway should examine whether that system is adequate.

Congress can help. It has the obligation to conduct vigorous oversight of intelligence agencies. But it must make clear that what it values most is integrity in the collection and analysis of intelligence.

Organizational changes might also help. The 9/11 commission is considering changes in the organization of the intelligence community. The congressional oversight committees have been quietly considering some changes. Brent Scowcroft recently completed a study that remains classified but reportedly calls for the director of central intelligence to have greater authority over those agencies in the intelligence community that are part of the Defense Department. At the same time, the Defense Department has created an intelligence unit in the office of the secretary of defense that is said to be a rival to Tenet as a source for analysis that reflects the views of Rumsfeld and that often finds its way to the Oval Office. Congress should examine these organizational issues and be ready to act when the 9/11 commission makes its report.

Regardless of organizational or personnel changes, political leaders must recognize that however

badly they want intelligence that supports their policy prospective, they cannot "cook the books." Most important, the president must recognize that he needs someone who can speak the truth to him.

The writer is a former general counsel of the CIA.

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NEA-SP

EF-5524

June 3, 2003

Buck.

07/31
8/1
I RAO

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reconstruction Financing

9/31
Larry Di Pina

Here is some material on financing the reconstruction of Iraq that Phil Merrill sent along. You might want to get it to Bremer and his folks.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/28/03 Ex-Im Bank (Merrill) memo to SecDef re: Oil Trust Fund Securitization Mechanism

DHR:dh
060303-15

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Reconstruction Financing

Based on your recommendation, we forwarded Phil Merrill's paper on financing the reconstruction of Iraq to Bremer and his folks. We will keep you updated on our progress.

DTF:dy/kl
9/24/03

✓
8/1

Forwarded
4/1

CNR Nosenzo
7/31

06-04-03 18:11

37403

U17135 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16841

7/24



Jaymie Duman

6/2

PHILIP MERRILL
CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENTEXPORT-IMPORT BANK
OF THE UNITED STATES

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 3 2003

May 28, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1000 Defense, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I believe this Iraqi oil trust fund securitization mechanism can work. So do our people at Ex-Im Bank and many in the exporting community.

Warmly,

Phil

D: I hope this
will be helpful
to you. P.

PHONE (202) 565-3500 FAX (202) 565-3513 EMAIL: PHILIP.MERRILL@EXIM.GOV

811 VERMONT AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20571

11-L-0559/OSD/16842



EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
OF THE UNITED STATES

May 28, 2003

FINANCING THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ

SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper is to propose three initiatives that could substantially advance the Administration's efforts to rebuild the Iraqi economy and to outline ways that the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) can contribute to the implementation of these proposals. These initiatives are:

- **Securitize Future Oil Revenues** - utilize a securitization structure to maximize current funding of infrastructure reconstruction from future increased (i.e., incremental) oil production;
- **Establish a Trade Finance Facility** - establish a trade financing facility to facilitate and promote economic activity in the near term;
- **Restructure Iraq's Debt and Reparation Obligations** - determine the amount of and restructure the terms of Iraq's debt and reparation obligations.

Establishing effective financing mechanisms to facilitate trade with Iraq and maximizing the utilization of oil revenues for Iraqi reconstruction hold the key to the revitalization of the Iraqi economy. At the same time, the uncertainty associated with and the sheer magnitude of Iraq's foreign debt of approximately \$120-140 billion (not including reparation obligations and other compensation and contractual claims) present significant obstacles to private sector financing and economic growth in Iraq.

With a pre-war GDP of \$26 billion (as compared to a U.S. GDP of \$10 trillion), it would be impractical for a post-war Iraq to service its debt and other claims as currently structured. Moreover, without a financing mechanism to maximize the use of future Iraqi oil revenues for current reconstruction needs, it will be impossible to construct the stable and secure Iraq that both the Iraqi people and the world community seek.

Now that the U.N. sanctions have been lifted and the Development Fund for Iraq has been established, it is critically important that the Administration move forward with the next phase of measures to spur trade and finance the reconstruction of vital infrastructure needs in Iraq.

DISCUSSION

Initial funding for humanitarian relief and for reconstruction in Iraq is being provided under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations. Such funding, however, can provide only a small portion of the resources required to meet the needs of the Iraqi people. The establishment of the Development Fund for Iraq and passage of U.N. Resolution 1483 pave the way for economic revitalization and for repair of Iraq's infrastructure.

Open and vibrant international trade and strategic use of oil and gas revenues to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure will be the engines for economic growth in Iraq and will help to build the foundation for a new Iraq. Governmental, regulatory and legal uncertainty, absence of effective trade payment mechanisms, and massive debt, compensation and contractual claims are among the many impediments that must be overcome to jump-start Iraq's trade ties and foster private-sector economic growth. The initiatives discussed below can substantially contribute to overcoming those obstacles.

Securitizing Future Oil Revenues. Under U.N. Resolution 1483, 95% of Iraqi oil and gas export sales proceeds will be deposited into the Development Fund for Iraq. Given the vast needs in Iraq, there will be many competing demands for use of such revenues and actual receipts will be limited in the near term as production is restored and export sales gradually increase. This "pay-as-you-go" approach to Iraqi reconstruction will be inadequate to both meet current funding needs and make critical infrastructure investments.

Recent press reports indicate that the Iraqi oil ministry is targeting to reach 1.3 million barrels a day (bpd) by mid-July (allowing 750,000 bpd for export), which compares to 2.5 million bpd of production before the war. However, there is the clear expectation that oil revenues will increase significantly in the future as a result of investment in the sector and better overall management of the resources. Years of deferred maintenance, neglect and mismanagement mean that investments of several billions of dollars will be required to attain and exceed pre-war production levels. If such investments are made, estimated oil revenues are projected to be between \$10-15 billion a year (depending on the price of oil and assumptions of production levels).

Through securitization or collateral mechanisms, the anticipated future incremental production could be monetized thereby significantly increasing the financing that could be made available now for infrastructure projects (in both the petroleum and other critical sectors). Under this proposal, the Development Fund would segregate the future revenue stream from the "incremental" production that is over an established base level. Then, either the Development Fund itself could raise financing through securitization, or other financial institutions could provide financing for such projects based on the pledge of these future revenues. To the extent that commercial entities would be unwilling to

accept the risks inherent in such a structure, international and governmental financial institutions such as Ex-Im Bank could provide the financing.

Ex-Im Bank utilized a somewhat similar financing mechanism after the fall of the Soviet Union when it established the groundbreaking Russian Oil and Gas Framework Agreement. Ex-Im Bank would be prepared to assist the Development Fund in establishing such a financing structure and would be willing to consider how Ex-Im Bank could provide financing for U.S. goods and services for Iraqi infrastructure projects based on such a structure. World Bank and IMF restrictions on pledging public assets (i.e., "negative pledge" restrictions) would also need to be addressed.

Securitizing the future oil revenues would maximize the Development Fund's ability to finance infrastructure projects in Iraq today, while providing opportunities for U.S. exports. A similar proposal has been developed and is being strongly supported by the Coalition for Employment through Exports, an umbrella organization for many of our country's leading exporters.

Establishing a Trade Financing Facility. Free and open international trade is a key element to revitalizing the Iraqi economy and meeting the needs of the Iraqi people. An effective trade financing facility must be established to replace the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food program and jump-start Iraq's trade.

We understand that several major U.S. banks have made proposals for the establishment of trade financing facilities. We are strongly supportive of this private-sector approach. In the event that these are delayed or found not to be feasible at the moment, Ex-Im Bank could explore potential roles it could play to facilitate trade financing. These could include acting as administrative agent for the Development Fund for a trade facility it establishes or as the financial intermediary issuing letters of credit or short-term trade insurance for U.S. exports based on credit support provided by the Development Fund.

Ex-Im Bank's role as administrative agent could be modeled on the successful Ukraine Export Credit Insurance Facility created in 1995, where Ex-Im Bank utilized its expertise, based on its commercially accepted and successful export credit insurance program, to administer a trade finance facility for USAID.

Restructure Iraq's Debt and Reparation Obligations. The temporary immunization of oil proceeds from attachment by international creditors under U.N. Resolution 1483 was an important first step in addressing the massive obstacle that foreign debt, reparation, contractual and other compensation claims present to the economic and political development of Iraq. As noted above, payment of such claims and obligations on current terms and conditions is not sustainable.

The United States should continue to press for progress on this issue by establishing a "claims registry" with a limited period for claim filing and a process to examine and certify legitimate claims given the difficulty in obtaining information from Iraqi governmental records. At the same time, the U.S. should continue to press for rapid action on rescheduling of debt and reparation obligations.

CONCLUSION

There is much to be done to ensure that Iraq and its people benefit from the economic growth that is necessary for its stability and participation as a responsible member of the world community. Maximizing the ability to use future oil proceeds to finance infrastructure reconstruction, establishing trade financing facilities and restructuring debt and reparation obligations as outlined above are key steps to achieving these goals.

Whatever mechanisms are established should adhere to the Administration's clear principles that Iraq's oil resources belong to the Iraqi people and shall be used in a transparent manner for purposes benefitting the people of Iraq, including humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure. Ex-Im Bank can assist in these efforts while fulfilling its mission to support U.S. exports and the U.S. jobs they represent.

Prepared by: Peter Saba, General Counsel & Acting COO
David Chavern, Deputy General Counsel

October 15, 2003

TO: Jay Garner

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

Jay—

We are pushing the recruiting of the security forces in Iraq hard. The Army is the slowest piece. I like the ideas you mentioned.

I appreciate getting your memos a great deal. Keep your thinking machine going, my friend! We need all the help we can get.

DHR:dh
101403-72

Iraq

15 OCT 03

U17136 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16847

June 3, 2003 7:26 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senators' Stand on Personnel Issue

I want to make sure Powell Moore can tell me where every Senator on the committee I am testifying before tomorrow stands on the personnel issue. I would like to know later this afternoon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060303-2

Please respond by

6/3/03

U17137 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16848

6/3
Jaymie Durnan

0330

Jaymie Durnan
4/4
When we met with them who met with them.

374003

October 14, 2003

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: Jay Garner

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

Your September 29 memo was right on the mark. Thanks so much. I will keep pushing.

Regards,

DHR:dh
101403-7

Iraq

14 Oct 03

U17138 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16849

June 3, 2003 7:28 AM

TO: Ambassador Howard Baker (via e-mail)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

Thanks so much for your note on Paul's visit. I am delighted it went so well.

Hope to see you soon.

Regards,

DHR:dh
060303-3

333 D50

354103

U171414/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16850

No Classification Marking in Message Body

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

To: Baker, Howard H(Tokyo)
Subject: RE: MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD FROM AMBASSADOR HOWARD
BAKE R, JR. - PLEASE PASS

Sir,

Have received your email and will forward to the Secretary.

JUN - 3 2003

V/R,
Capt Jeff Spinnanger

-----Original Message-----

From: Baker, Howard H(Tokyo) [mailto:BakerHH@state.sgov.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, June 03, 2003 5:40 AM
To: 'cableseso@osd.smil.mil'
Subject: MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD FROM AMBASSADOR HOWARD
BAKE R, JR. - PLEASE PASS
Importance: High

Dear Don:

This is just a note to let you know that Paul Wolfowitz had a very useful stop here June 2-3. I think the Japanese were impressed by his continued strong interest in Japan and Paul went away with a heightened sense of the possibilities for progress on defense issues with Japan. Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda reiterated to Paul Prime Minister Koizumi's pledge to the President that Japan would do all it could to support Iraqi reconstruction, including introducing Diet legislation to put Self Defense Force "boots-on-the-ground." Paul also had good exchanges with the Japanese on Missile Defense, North Korea, and transformation. As always, he showed perfect pitch in his public remarks on alliance issues. Paul's visit strengthened an already strong Japanese belief in DoD's continued commitment to the alliance and I hope that he has prepared the way for your own visit here as soon as the opportunity presents itself.

Sincerely,

Howard

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	<input type="checkbox"/>
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FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>

October 15, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Jerry Bremer
Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ramadan

Attached is a note from Jim Schlesinger that raises some useful questions.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/10/03 Schlesinger memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
101503-37

.....
Please respond by _____

000.3

15 OCT 03

U17142 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16852

✓
10/15

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Donald Rumsfeld
FROM: James Schlesinger JS
DATE: 10 October 2003

Don:

Are you ready for Ramadan?

More importantly, are your troops, contractors, and CPA ready for Ramadan?

This is the first post-Saddam Ramadan and, thus, will be less controlled.

The faithful must fast all day and, thus, may be more irritable and difficult to control during the day. At night, they go out—they pray, shop, visit friends, etc. Thus, the public will be less disciplined at night. Curfews must be reexamined.

Finally, Saddam distributed food to the poor, also the troops might be distributing candy, crayons, etc. to the children.

More if you want.

cc: Di Rita
LTG Craddock

11-L-0559/OSD/16853



UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION

WASH FAX COVERSHEET
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES

N

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld OFFICE/DESK: Secretary of Defense PHONE NBR: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Ramadan FAX NBR: (b)(6)

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES: 3
(including cover)

☐ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE
☐ IMMEDIATE/URGENT

NOTE: Furnish after duty hour contact telephone number for each addressee requiring after duty hour delivery.

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
CENTCOM	General John P. Abizaid			

REMARKS:

U17142-03

For Cables: Return copy of transmission receipt to OSD/CCB

WASH FAX OPERATOR (b)(6)

SECDEF CABLES (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION

11-L-0559/OSD/16854

Jun 25 03 02:52p

USJFCOM

P. 2

P. 1

JUN. 18. 2003 6:39PM

NO. 304

P. 2

June 3, 2003 7:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: JROC

Please ask Ed Giambastiani what he thinks about this Newt Gingrich e-mail about JROC. I would think it would be a pain in the neck for him to be a member and have to come every time. The way it is now, he can come anytime he wants.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/26/03 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Making the JROC Truly Joint

DSR:m
060301-9

Please respond by

6/13/03

SECDEF—

I AGREE WITH YOUR
ASSESSMENT ABOVE. I'VE ALSO HAD
MY DEPUTY REPRESENT ME
AT JROC.

V/R

Ed 8/11

U17143 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16855

FORWARDED
V/R
COR NOSUMED
8/12

JUN 03

Larry Di Rita
6/8

6/17
Sharon - Please get this
to ADM G. Tort.

W
W
H

October 14, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Eikenberry tells me he really has no visibility as to what the Agency is doing in Afghanistan. Will you please look into that and see if you can fix it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101403-12

.....
Please respond by 11 / 17 / 03

Afghanistan

14 OCT 03

U17144 /03

cc: AUCENE

June 3, 2003 7:52 AM

Done
6/16

001.150

TO: Mary Claire Murphy
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Invitees for July 15

The people (with their spouses) to be invited for the function on July 15 at our house probably ought to be the following: Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, the Combatant Commanders, the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, and Gen. Craddock.

The ones I am considering are: the President, the Vice President, George Tenet, David Chu, Steve Cambone, Doug Feith and the four Chiefs of Staff of the Services, but not the Coast Guard person. I'll let you know on

Thanks.

The over I'm still
Goldberg

DHR:dh
060303-6

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

U17145 /03

374003

June 4, 2003

Done
6/16

217

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Gen. Myers
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Policy for Codels

Please redo the policy instructions for how Members of Congress can use aircraft, so that Reserve outfits don't do it.

Also please draft a message to the Services, Unified Commanders, Reserve and Guard for my signature restating the policy. If you need help, please talk to Jim Haynes and the Joint Staff.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/2/03 SecDef memo to CJCS re: Managing Aircraft [060203-19]

DHR:dh
060403-12

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

U17146 /03

4 Jun 03

June 2, 2003 9:29 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
cc: Powell Moore / Exec Sec
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Managing Aircraft

Please get back to me with a proposed policy for how we manage aircraft in the United States so that commanders cannot just willy-nilly give them to Codels and the like or others.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060203-19

.....
Please respond by

6/06/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 4 2003

Sir, we have a policy, albeit old (1964). Recommend two actions:

- ① Have OSD/LL (Powell Moore) redo the policy instruction.
 - ② Have Powell Moore draft a msg for your signature restating the policy to the Service, Unified Commanders (including the Reserve and Guard).
- VR Asch

11-L-0558

6/25/03
Snowflake

TO: IP
DPAP

June 4, 2003

635

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Michael Wynne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congresswoman Johnson

Larry Di Rite
6/24

I would like someone from the AT&L shop to get together with Powell Moore and talk to Nancy Johnson about the manufacturing base. She has some concerns about it that we ought to be aware of. Please let me know the result.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
(00403)-11

..... SECDEF HAS SEEN

Please respond by 6/13/03

JUN 27 2003

6/27
AT&L (WYNNE) RESPONSE
ATTACHED.
N/R

U17147 /03

474063

11-L-0559/OSD/16860



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 27 2003

INFO MEMO

June 23, 2003, 9:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (A&L)

SUBJECT: Snowflake: Congresswoman Nancy Johnson's Concerns about the
Manufacturing Base

- I am providing this memo to update you on Congresswoman Johnson's concerns about the manufacturing base.
- DUSD (Industrial Policy) Suzanne Patrick met with Congresswoman Johnson on June 19. The Congresswoman was concerned that subcontractors in her district were being harmed by prime contractors who: (1) inappropriately passed the burden of cancelled contracts to them by refusing to accept deliveries rather than canceling orders and paying termination charges, and (2) outsourced here-to-fore domestic work to foreign sources. Miss Patrick offered to meet with the contractors to better understand their concerns. Congresswoman Johnson expressed satisfaction with the meeting.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
None

Prepared By: LtCol Peter J. Streng, ODUSD(Industrial Policy)

(b)(6)



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

June 13, 2003, 12:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Snowflake: Congresswoman Nancy Johnson's Concerns about the
Manufacturing Base

- Per your June 4 request, Suzanne Patrick, DUSD (Industrial Policy), and Lt Col Esther Swartz of Legislative Affairs will meet with Congresswoman Johnson and her staff on June 19 to discuss her concerns.
- I will provide you an update following this meeting.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

None

Prepared By: LtCol Peter J. Streng, ODUSD(Industrial Policy),

(b)(6)

October 14, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Gen. John Abizaïd
Jerry Bremer
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sunni Triangle

Attached is an e-mail from a person on the ground in Iraq with some strong views.
It is worth reading and thinking about.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/29/03 Bing West e-mail to James Schlesinger re: Report from Sunni Triangle

DHR:dh
101403-17

.....
Please respond by 10/31/03

U17148 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16863

Iraq

14 OCT 03

✓
10/14

Subject: Fwd: Report from Sunni Triangle
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 13:58:42 -0400
From: Bing West <westf@gamacorp.com>
To: "Schlesinger James R." <jrs@mitrc.org>

The Marines should be sent into the toughest area ASAP.
Begin forwarded message:

-----Original Message-----

From: Bing West (mailto:westf@gamacorp.com)
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2003 10:34 AM
To: Schlesinger James R.; Marshall Andrew; Mami N
Subject: Report from Sunni Triangle

Below is a sobering report from a friend who is a Foreign Service officer and a major in the Army's Special Forces.

Dear Bing,

I spent a week in Baghdad and then a week in the Shia heartland in Hillah and finally landed six weeks ago as Ambassador Bremer's Governance Coordinator in Ramadi, southern piece of the Sunni Triangle. I worked with the 3d ACR for four weeks and am now with the 82d. Fascinating assignment, but the most consistent danger I have experienced. These IEDs and RPG attacks are psychologically worse than combat and are taking a toll on the troops. While it is statistically improbable that one will be hit, they remain unnerving, especially for those of us that have been through an attack.

Difficult to establish ground truth here, because of the diversity from North to Center to South. It certainly is a different world in Najaf and Karbala than what we experience here with the angry Sunnis. Marines in Karbala - LTC Lopez and his battalion - did really incredible work.

All depends on whether one is a winner or a loser in the new Iraq I suppose. The game is to expand the realm of winners so they squeeze out the operating space of the losers, but I have to say that in my neighborhood we are losing that fight, as the bad guys are playing a contrary game with some effectiveness. Fallujah has a level of rage that I haven't seen since Mogadishu and I would have to guess is right at the tipping point of a wholesale revolt. The problem is we lost so much time that we are now playing a desperate game of catch up, and it may be too late.

I think we have six months here, and whatever we accomplish in six months is what we will be able to do. We can stay around through pure force, but Iraq will be set in the next half year and if we are still in the muddle we are in now I think we will have completely lost the initiative.

It is all about power (electrical power), police, and political process, and if we can deliver on those three, we could still make this work. But we need a surge on all three, not the little of this little of that kind of approach we have had to date. I still find the police program maddening for its lack of focus and the inability five months into this to have something in place that would be producing a quality force.

During the Cold War America employed a "we pay, you fight" policy of national defense, using proxies to wear the Soviet Union down on its behalf. This evolved during Gulf I to a "you pay, we fight" policy, as wealthy Arab sheikhs and Asian oil consumers financed the U.S.-led expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. We have now adopted a "we pay, we fight" policy, as around the globe America is doing it all, and paying for it all. It is a policy that is wearing us down, made all the worse by the ready availability of allies that have not been fully empowered to enter the fight.

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0002-00-0000

A quality Iraqi police force, properly armed and equipped, could take over many of the risky jobs American soldiers are performing, such as keeping the roads cleared of improvised explosive devices and controlling the borders that are reportedly being infiltrated by terrorists. Police in Iraq could be employed for \$2 per day. But they are not being employed in anything close to the numbers that are needed, and those that are on the beat are shabbily armed and largely untrained.

Forming quality security forces in a hurry has been done before. In 1983 President Reagan made a determination to stop the advance of FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador. Over a period of four months the entire Salvadoran junior officer corps was brought to the United States for basic officer's training, while whole battalions were brought to bases in the U.S. and Honduras for unit training. A newly empowered Salvadoran Army took to the field and rapidly turned the tide, leading the country into peace talks in 1989 and to a full participatory democracy that included the country's former guerrilla foes thereafter.

Iraq needs a proficient and well-equipped police force in a hurry so that our soldiers can go home -- for our sake, and for Iraq's sake, since our welcome is quickly wearing out.

08
6/18

June 4, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: David Kay

37014

George Tenet called and said David Kay, who used to be a UN weapons inspector, still has clearances. He gave George some anecdotes as to how we need to restructure ourselves on WMD. He said:

- We don't have a good way of dealing with walk-ins;
- We don't have a good way of dealing with rewards to encourage folks to help; and
- ORHA had 300 nuclear scientists in a room, gave each of them \$20, and instead of interrogating them told them they wouldn't be having any more work.

George thinks we need a "strategist." I agree. He wants to hire David Kay. I told him to go ahead, and I would work with you to figure out how to connect him with your folks on the ground.

Please give me a proposal as to what you think, and we will connect with George or you can.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060403-9

.....
Please respond by


6/13/03

U17150 103

474403

June 4, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Paul Volcker

Should we try to get Paul Volcker up working on some of the senators to help us on the personnel thing? He is chairman of this national commission on public service, and he has endorsed our proposals.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060403-6

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

238.02

45m 03

U17151 /03

October 15, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. John Abizaid
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Iraqi Army

I am concerned about the pace of the recruiting and training of the Iraqi army. It feels slow. I wonder if we could consider requiring each U.S. division to recruit and train a brigade of former soldiers every quarter. This would be a strenuous requirement, but it would produce about 16 brigades annually. Even if we did half that, it would be a good thing.

As I recall, MPRI trained an army from recruits, not former soldiers, in Croatia and Bosnia. That is a thought as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101503-1

.....
Please respond by 11/17/03

U17152 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16868

Iraq

15 OCT 03

June 4, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: National Park Foundation and Free Parks Passes

080

1. 10/10/03 11/7

The Vice Chair and the President of the National Park Foundation, David Rockefeller and Jim Maddy, were in yesterday, and they said they thought it might be good for everybody if they figured out a way to provide free National Park passes for some category of military people—people who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, people on active duty, people in the Reserve or Guard who served on active duty, etc. They charge about \$50 per pass, but it costs the National Park Foundation only about \$1 to print one up. We would have to distribute them. They would get good publicity out of it.

Any thoughts? Attached is a memo from them on the subject. Please take a look at it, and then get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/3/03 NPF (Rockefeller and Maddy) ltr to SecDef re: National Parks Pass

DHR:dh
060403-3

.....

Please respond by

6/20/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL - 8 2003

6/17

7/7

See Chu memo, attached

D. Rita

7/7

[Signature]

[Signature]

Larry Di Rita

4/20

4 Jun 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16869

U17154 /03

7/7

SECRET

2003 JUL -2 PM 3:06



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECDEF HAS SEEN

June 26, 2003, 2:30 PM JUL 8 2003

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: National Park Foundation (NPF) and Free Parks Passes

- My staff is working closely with the President of the National Park Foundation (NPF), Mr. Jim Maddy, to facilitate this initiative.
- The proposal appears to be most easily implemented were the National Parks simply to admit for free individuals with military identification cards; however, NPF is considering printing special passes. We will assist in the control and distribution of these passes if that is the route the Foundation takes.
- There are no significant obstacles within the Department to bringing this to fruition. As of July 1, the Foundation has advised that their internal coordination process precludes a July 4 announcement. We will do all we can to facilitate its implementation when the Foundation is ready to proceed.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: Tab B

ATTACHMENTS: As stated.

PREPARED BY: William F. Gleason, Morale, Welfare and Recreation Policy,
ODUSD (MC&FP), (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	7/7
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	7/7
EXECSEC MARRIOTT 4	7/3



11-L-0559/OSD/16870

U10367 /03



11 Dupont Circle NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036-1224

202-238-4200 main
202-234-3103 fax

SECDEF HAS
JUN 4 2003

MEMORANDUM

DATE: JUNE 3, 2003
TO: SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: DAVID ROCKEFELLER, JR., VICE CHAIR, NPF
JIM MADDY, PRESIDENT, NPF
RE: NATIONAL PARKS PASS

At the most recent meeting of the Board of the National Park Foundation in San Antonio, Texas, Dayton Duncan proposed a concept to Secretary Norton and Director Mainella that was received with great enthusiasm. The proposal was to explore ways to give a National Parks Pass every American military family. While we recognize that many organizations are providing much-deserved support to the troops and their families, we strongly feel that access to National Parks, which capture the essence of the history and natural beauty of this country and honor the sacrifice of America's military in its history of world conflicts, is a special tribute to the men and women who serve, and their families who support them.

The National Park Foundation continues to manage the National Parks Pass program in partnership with the National Park Service. We would propose to structure this gift to America's troops as follows:

1. Building on its track record of corporate partnerships, the NPF would secure the commitment from a corporation to underwrite the costs to the NPS of providing a National Parks Pass to military families.
2. DOD would sponsor the distribution of the National Parks Pass and work with NPF on organizing a national press announcement.

We would propose announcing this campaign on July 4th 2003. Once again, the National Park Foundation, through a corporate partner, AT&T, will be underwriting the cost of the July 4 fireworks on the National Mall. NPF would organize a press event to include Secretary Norton, Director Mainella, yourself and members of the Board of the National Park Foundation to make the announcement to the American Public. We would seek your counsel, and that of Secretary Norton, as to whether this was an opportunity for participation by President and/or Mrs. Bush.

Please advise us about whether this concept is feasible and who to work with on your staff to implement. Thank you for your thoughts and consideration.

October 15, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Peshmerga

It strikes me that we ought to use the Peshmerga to guard static facilities, oil pipelines into Turkey and the high voltage lines into Baghdad in the northern provinces, and put them under the command of CENTCOM. They are mobile, trained, well-organized into units with a competent command and control system.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:jh
101503-2

.....
Please respond by 10/31/03

U17156 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16872

IR 9

15 OCT 03

SENT 6/5
June 3, 2003

381

TO: Doug Feith
cc: DSD
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D.A.

SUBJECT: Defense Strategy Review

Please take a look at my memo to Andy Marshall and his response, and tell me what you recommend.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/19/03 SecDef memo to Net Assessment [051903-28]
5/21/03 Net Assessment memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
060303-14

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

U171574/03

5 JUN 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16873

May 19, 2003 11:57 AM

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Defense Strategy Review

Do you think it would be worth you taking a crack at this Defense Strategy Review and getting an unclassified, shorter version that is up-to-date and post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan and post-9/11?

If so, please do so. If not, please let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/9/01 Draft Defense Strategy Review

DHR:dh
051903-28

.....~~SEGDEF HAS SEEN.~~

Please respond by 6/13/03

JUN - 3 2003

5/21

RESPONSE ATTACHED

v/r

11-L-0559/OSD/16874

5421
1400.



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

542
6/2
SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 3 2003

May 21, 2003

Jaymie Durnan

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6/2
M
FROM: Andrew W. Marshall *AWM*

SUBJECT: Updating Defense Strategy Review

Yes, I think that it would be worthwhile updating the version of the Defense Strategy Review that you sent me. What you sent me is an early version, the last draft that used the wording "advantage based strategy." Later versions eliminated that phrase, and added material on goals, allies, related non-DoD policies, etc., but were perhaps "detuned," as you commented to me later. Do you want this early version to be the basis of the updating?

Can you give me more guidance? What audience do you want to reach? Internal DoD? Congress? Public? The crafting of the text would depend on the audience.

Also an internal document should emphasize, I think, the importance of making the shift to capabilities based planning instead of threat based planning, an intellectual shift that many in DoD still have not really made.

I will put together a new draft for you to look at by mid June.

11-L-055  SD/16875

*Copy of the original
March 9 2001*

9 March 2001

DRAFT

(Provided to SecDef)

Defense Strategy Review

Andy Marshall

up close

1

I. Introduction

A. The US today enjoys a wide margin of military advantage over all other nations.

- This condition was not sought, but developed from the country's geographic setting and economic capacities, the outcome of World War II, the intense efforts generated by the Cold War, and the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union.
- Geographically, we are distant from potential threats and control the seas that buffer us from most of those threats. We cooperate with strong allies on or near the Eurasian landmass, and can operate from numerous bases there (where most of the rest of the world's potential power is located).
- Our military forces have developed superior competence in a variety of combat areas, including tactical aviation, undersea warfare, complex combined arms operations, and precision strike. And the scale of the US military program far exceeds that of any other nation.

B. Given this favorable condition, a reasonable goal for the US is to preserve that condition for as long as possible. Three main challenges confront the development of a strategy that pursues that goal:

- **The changing security environment.** Some evident trends, as well as some plausible but unpredictable discontinuities, could erode US military advantages, while uncertainty about the future environment diffuses US efforts.
 - E.g., likely development of "anti-access" capabilities—based on WMD or conventional missiles, mines, and submarines—to keep our forces out of forward bases and operating areas.
- **Changes in warfare.** The rapid advance of technology with military utility means that the most advantageous forms of warfare may change substantially in the years ahead; this means that preserving the world's leading force (or preparing to reconstitute or expand it when dangers arise) does not guarantee future superiority.
- **Threat-oriented policies.** US strategy has for some decades been understood as attempting to offset imminent enemy threats, and this has in recent years meant reducing

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(Provided to SecDef)

our forces in light of reduced threats. We have not fully confronted the fact of our current military superiority, articulated the advantage for our security and for world peace of sustaining a wide margin of superiority, or developed our forces with that aim clearly in view. A strategy to shape the environment to our continued advantage should aim not only to deter attack, it should aim to deter enemy force-building, making clear to possible contenders that the bar to military preeminence is very high.

C. Subsequent sections of this paper discuss the current US position; the future security environment; and the case for and characteristics of an "advantage-based" defense strategy.

II. The Current U.S. Position

A. Identifying current US military advantages and their genesis alerts us to possible trends or discontinuities that would undercut them, and should instruct deliberation about what advantages are sustainable or attainable for us in the future.

B. Sources of U.S. military advantage include

- Tranquil North American neighborhood. No nearby enemies, and oceanic distances impede most forms of military threat
 - (but ICBMs, ship-launched cruise missiles, and smuggled WMD are important exceptions, and may become more important).
- US political and economic institutions favorable to creation of wealth, technological innovation, free flow of information, and competent decentralized operations.
 - (But long-standing US advantage in aggregate resources—twice as big as any other nation for almost a century—will slowly diminish as populous poor countries get richer).
- A legacy of World War II: Strong allies and basing access on and near Eurasian landmass, supporting US power projection. Adversaries can be engaged far from American soil. Alliances with Europeans and Japan display a formidable combination of actual and potential power.

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(Provided to SecDef)

- (But alliances founded on common Soviet threat will tend to erode, and forward bases likely to become more vulnerable).
- A legacy of 1991: Cold War galvanized large resource commitments and development of specialized military competences.
 - (But threat-based strategy implies continuing glide path downward).

C. Specific areas of U.S. military advantage

- air operations
- sea control, including undersea warfare
- space operations, including reconnaissance
- complex combined arms operations
- long range precision strike
- offensive nuclear forces.
- training procedures and facilities that have created very high levels of first battle competence.
- long distance power projection

D. Logic of the situation will impel competitors to try to undercut or offset these advantages

- E.g., concealment, dispersal, hardening, IR-guided SAMs against air attack; ASAT and information warfare against our reconnaissance and communications.
- The overarching U.S. advantage in long distance power projection presents the clearest target for enemy strategies: deter, deny, or attrit arrival of US projection forces in their neighborhood.

III. The Future Security Environment

A. Uneven economic growth will gradually reshape the balance of potential power.

- China, India, and South Korea are likely to grow faster than the US, Europe, Russia, and Japan, although long term economic forecasts cannot be taken literally and there is particular uncertainty about China.

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(Provided to SecDef)

- Post-Soviet Russia's geographic and economic contraction has reduced its economic size to something more like the individual West European countries, but its economic prospects probably remain worse than theirs.
- Illustrative numbers: Percent of total world GDP.
 - China 8% in 2000, 13% in 2025.
 - India 5% in 2000, 8% in 2025.
 - EU 21% in 2000, 16% in 2025.
 - US 23% in 2000, 22% in 2025.
 - Japan 8% in 2000, 5% in 2025.
 - Russia 2.5% in 2000, 2.1% in 2025.
- Implication: Asia gradually emerges as a potential source and potential prize of large-scale military power.
 - But U.S. inherits Cold War forces and continues to design weapons optimized for a European theater characterized by large forward deployments, capable allies, and short distances.
- Demographic trends are one contributor to this economic forecast, and will amplify its effect, as services for aging populations will tend to divert resources away from the military in Europe, Japan, and (slightly later) the United States.
- There is particular uncertainty about China. Measures of past performance and relative size are suspect and disputed. Insolvent banking system supports large and inefficient state owned enterprises, clouding future prospects. China's population will also age, though trailing Europe, Japan, and the US.

B. Proliferation of important military capabilities will include nuclear and biological weapons, and advanced conventional weapons.

- Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea are the most plausible new additions to the nuclear "club"; actual use of a nuclear weapon could provoke a broader proliferation.
- WMD threats (against US allies, hosts, forces, or the US homeland) could, among other things, be attempted deterrent to US power projection operations.

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(Provided to SecDef)

- Russia, China and others could develop low yield tactical nuclear weapons and appropriate operational concepts to counter overwhelming U.S. conventional strike capabilities.
- Proliferation of advanced conventional technologies permits more sophisticated "anti-access" strategies against US power projection.
- Ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced mines and submarines, and target recognition and guidance systems (perhaps augmented by counter-space and information warfare) would be designed to prevent US forces' timely arrival or deter their deployment. Forward bases and US carriers would be lucrative targets.
- Information warfare against US homeland to disrupt US force deployments.
- Recent dominance of US precision strike systems likely to generate countermeasures: ASAT, jamming GPS, EMP, hiding and hardening. U.S. forces highly dependent upon shared information for their defense and for the effectiveness of strikes will likely face efforts to disrupt, corrupt or deny needed information. Adversaries are likely to engage in computer network attacks and also use electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons.

C. More generally, recent and likely technological advances appear to permit radical innovations in military methods. Global commerce and the "dual use" character of many emerging technologies will mean potential enemies, as well as the US, will face a wide ranging menu of options.

- Robotic systems could be developed for a wide range of missions. Stealth, performance, cost and casualty concerns may push the US and competitors toward a heavy reliance on unmanned combat systems.
- Much smaller, even microscopic, sensors and weapons could be linked by information networks.
- Space based systems could take on a wider range of military functions.
- Biological technologies may be the basis of various new measures and countermeasures, with soldiers, populations, and agricultural products as potential targets.

In combination with, or as successors to, the proliferation and improvement of long range strike forces, these technologies could bring radical changes in warfare, devaluing capabilities now thought formidable, or the significance of geographic distance, oceans, and mountain ranges.

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(Provided to SecDef)

D. Continuing growth of world trade, including China and India becoming significant importers of oil, and Chinese imports of grain.

- Japan, Korea, Germany, France already roughly 100% dependent on imported oil. By 2010, China goes from near zero to 45%, India goes from 54% to 77%. China's imports 2% of grain consumption today, probably near 10% of consumption by 2010.
- Import dependence probably not a cause of conflict, but is a vulnerability in wartime, may shape forces and policies.
- China's reliance on Persian Gulf may encourage its arms sales to Iran or Iraq.
- Commerce or other economic assets may become plausible targets of coercive threats made possible by accurate missile forces; US allies and friends may seek US response to such threats.

E. Unpredictable discontinuities may affect security environment more severely than predicted trends.

- E.g., vulnerability of regimes in China, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia.
- Technological breakthroughs can belie assumptions about existing sources of military advantage—e.g. some claim that Passive Coherent Location technologies permit tracking stealthy U.S. aircraft.
- Use of nuclear weapons would promote scramble for defenses, nuclear proliferation, and search for (or, depending on what had just happened, loss of confidence in) "guarantees" extended by others.

F. Likely continuing uncertainty regarding timing, identity, and extent of future military challenges.

- E.g., China's growing wherewithal makes it a central actor, but a wide range of policies and developments are plausible. Will priority of trade and economic growth inhibit military ambitions? Is China serious about absorbing Taiwan? Will China press for US withdrawal from Japan and Korea? Will economic reversals or political change disrupt any such intentions?

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11-L-0559/OSD/16881

(Provided to SecDef)

- Large-scale conflict does not appear to be the "most likely" case for the next several decades; but a DOD strategy of sustaining a wide margin of superiority assumes—and must argue—that this remains an important case in the longer term.

IV. Defense Strategy

A. Implication: The task of strategy

This account of our situation and of the prospective security environment implies that the task of strategy is to sustain US military advantage in the coming period of change.

- Our broad geostrategic advantage stems from the absence of nearby threats, an array of overseas allies and bases, and an unmatched capability to project enormous power across great distances.
- The changing security environment appears likely to challenge our power projection advantages by posing threats to the US homeland and our allies, and anti-access architectures against our deployments. And our planning is less well suited to contingencies of coercion rather than invasion, and in Asia rather than Europe.
- In the longer term, or in unpredictable ways even in the shorter term, broader changes are possible. We foresee no great power enemy who exploits radically new military methods or can project large scale power to our shores; and we expect no use of nuclear weapons. But these conditions are inherently uncertain and changeable.

Sustaining a position of military advantage serves overarching US goals:

- to maintain a century of peace
- to keep wars small and far from U.S. soil
- to discourage the emergence of a peer competitor.

B. Merits of an Advantage-Based Strategy

A strategy that seeks to sustain advantage differs from one that seeks to offset threats. There are several noteworthy merits to a strategy of sustaining advantage.

- It attempts to preserve and build on assets acquired with great cost difficulty, rather than planning to rebuild them only when needed. Apart from the likely high cost of recreating

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11-L-0559/OSD/16882

(Provided to SecDef)

discarded assets, institutional and personnel competences may be very difficult to rebuild at all.

- Given the great uncertainty about the future security environment and the possibility of shocks, as well as the deception, misestimates, and inertia that could obstruct a timely response to emerging dangers, sustaining advantage is a safer hedging strategy.
- Perhaps most important, a strategy of sustaining advantage gives us an opportunity to shape the policies of others, rather than waiting to see what they may turn out to be. Our margin of military advantage, both in the aggregate and in particular military competences, may in some cases discourage military ambitions before the fact, as a formidable barrier to entry. And it is likely to reassure allies and will tend to preserve alliances.
- By extending existing advantages and building new ones, we create a more robust and moving target for enemy asymmetric strategies that attempt to exploit an existing set of vulnerabilities or achieve a narrow area of advantage. We may reduce our uncertainty about the threats they will pose if capabilities we maintain or acquire foreclose some options for them.

As noted earlier, our current situation of military advantage was not sought. A deliberate attempt to create such an advantage might well have been rejected as impractical by the American people, or failed on account of intense countervailing efforts by other countries alarmed at what we might intend. But if we are today more secure than we could reasonably have expected, it is reasonable to try to remain so for as long as possible.

C. Difficulties of an Advantage-Based Strategy

- May lack the (perhaps spurious) precision of threat-based approach, both in bounding and allocating resources.
- Publicly stated, will be focal point for indignant criticism about US arrogance, hegemonic pretensions, etc..

D. General statement of the strategy

The strategy is designed to maintain the favorable geostrategic position of the U.S. by

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11-L-0559/OSD/16883

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- preserving military advantages that permit long distance power projection against future enemies who develop anti-access capabilities and threats to the US homeland;
- building advantages over any future competitors in the most decisive forms of military capability that emerging technologies permit; and
- shifting increased attention to Asia.

E. Criteria for prioritizing military advantages

- What kinds of military advantage should the US seek to preserve or develop? Shall we preserve what we are best at, try to remedy our deficiencies, or try something new? More precisely, the question is how to determine the relative priority and mix of various areas of actual or potential advantage.
- This question does not admit of a simple recipe. Deliberation must attempt to reconcile the implications of three principles:
 - Emphasize what we're good at, so as to exploit underlying national strengths or hard-won acquired military competences;
 - Emphasize what seems to be needed, in light of expected trends in the security environment;
 - Emphasize methods that will be most effective and robust as emerging technologies permit new kinds of systems and methods of warfare.
- At least the second and third of these standards urge the fundamental importance of experimentation. The strategy should hedge against profound technical and political uncertainty by placing "bets" on a variety of areas, putting DoD in position to adapt to developments and make choices when we know more. The recommended strategy does not deduce what the key areas advantage are and revise the existing force accordingly; it uses experimentation to learn and create options that can guide adjustments of our mix of capabilities over a long period of time.
- Prioritizing among competing potential areas of advantage will be extremely difficult, particularly as the future value of many areas cannot be forecast with any accuracy. As a result, this strategy should be pursued with the understanding that not all areas invested in will necessarily yield valuable advantage, and specific capabilities within these broad areas cannot be predicted; rather, these efforts are essentially bets to create options for the

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11-L-0559/OSD/16884

(Provided to SecDef)

future, so that the U.S. is in position to exploit those opportunities that do emerge. It is particularly important to place these bets early, as developing the associated technologies, operational concepts, and organizational concepts is likely to take a long time (possibly a decade or longer).

1. What we're good at

- The U.S. currently maintains advantage in some military areas that should not be relinquished, but should instead be expanded to deter competitors from challenging the U.S. in these areas, and to complicate even the prospect of such asymmetric responses. These areas will also require forces, systems, and programs different from today's and more appropriate to the long distances, new technologies, and new competitors the U.S. may face in the future.
- Real merit of exploiting and extending existing competences runs risk of cost-ineffective—or futile—efforts to preserve methods that new technologies make obsolete. This will be a very difficult analytical and political challenge.

2. What's needed

- Given the likely increasing importance of Asia, the U.S. will require different sorts of programs, systems, and personnel: for example, the vast physical distances associated with Asian operations will place a premium on long-range strike systems. Further, DoD and the U.S. in general will need to develop widespread regional expertise: this will entail developing a new generation of regional experts through language training and strategic culture analyses, as well as increasing DoD's familiarity with the region, through placing more headquarters in the region, sending officers to schools in the region, etc.
- The development of anti-access challenges to our power projection forces, and threats to the US homeland, mean that we should preserve capabilities that enable power projection and develop capabilities to defend against, deter, or mitigate the impact of threats to the US homeland.
 - As the U.S. continues to be globally engaged, competitors will have an increased incentive to develop capabilities to hold the U.S homeland at risk as one part of anti-access strategies they develop to keep the U.S. from becoming involved in

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/16885

(Provided to SecDef)

their regions. This will include pursuit of long-range strike systems (cruise and ballistic missiles) as well as efforts to develop or procure nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Further, opponents will likely target growing U.S. dependence on information networks by developing capabilities to attack electronic networks underlying U.S. infrastructure, banking, communications, etc., to make the prospect of U.S. involvement as painful as possible, hoping to deter U.S. action. While this issue includes DoD involvement, it goes beyond boundaries of DoD alone.

- Though most of the strategy is focused on guiding future investments, the US must preserve capabilities to meet current responsibilities, including alliance commitments, humanitarian or peacekeeping interventions, and preserving freedom of the seas.

3. What will be most effective under future conditions

- The U.S. should also develop new areas of advantage as rapid and potentially revolutionary technological change contributes to changes in the character of warfare and creates new areas of military competition, in order to shape future competitions and preclude competitors from entering into some areas.
- The U.S. may be able to motivate competitors to invest disproportionately in defensive systems or in systems that are otherwise less threatening to the U.S. interests.
- Given the changing nature of the future security environment, new military areas are likely to become critical to the U.S. ability to project power over long distances and meet the nation's other goals and responsibilities. Determining exactly which areas should be chosen, and what sorts of steps will be necessary to maintain or expand U.S. advantage in these areas will require substantial analysis.
- We will face great uncertainty about the relative effectiveness of alternative means of warfare in the future, not least because of uncertainty about what kinds of adversary methods will be developed and how effective they will be. This is an argument for broad experimentation.

F. Areas of military advantage: Some examples

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11-L-0559/OSD/16886

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1. Aerial Warfare as an Area of Advantage

- The U.S. has developed an overwhelming advantage in war in the air.
 - Recently, the U.S. has dominated adversaries across three critical elements of aerial warfare: fighter-vs-fighter combat, suppression of enemy air defenses, and precision attack.
 - The U.S. can also limit the effectiveness of enemy radar-guided surface-to-air missiles and, through the use of low-observable technologies, conduct precision-bombing attacks against targets throughout enemy territory.
 - Further, increasing use of precision weapons has given the U.S. the ability to hit what it wants and dramatically reduce risks of collateral damage and civilian casualties.
 - As a result of this dominance, U.S. leaders now count on quickly gaining control of the air, limiting if not eliminating enemy ability to mount aircraft attacks on regional airbases, airheads, logistics facilities, and ports used by American forces and allies in the region.
- Air superiority is certainly an area of advantage critical to maintain:
 - Reductions in overseas bases and forward-deployed forces mean that U.S. power projection capabilities rest heavily on the ability to project air power quickly, particularly in the first days or weeks of conflict, before heavy ground forces can arrive;
 - Precision air power will be particularly important for rapid response, which may be of growing importance as more nations have the ability to prepare for war rapidly, without traditional indicators such as industrial mobilization;
 - The long distances associated with operations in Asia indicate that long-range air power will be particularly important if the U.S. is to remain influential in this increasingly important region;
- Currently, the U.S. lead in this area is so overwhelming that competitors invest mostly in air defense, with only marginal investment in fighter forces (mostly for political purposes): the U.S. would like to maintain this situation by retaining a vast lead.
- Yet, the nature of aerial warfare is changing, and will continue to change over the decades ahead. For example, the U.S., as well as its competitors, will rely increasingly

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/16887

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on long-range missiles, forcing a re-evaluation of what is meant by "control" of the air: fighter-vs-fighter combat will no longer be the sole determinant of who gains control over the air. The potential for unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aerial combat vehicles may also transform the character of aerial combat.

- Maintaining an advantage in aerial warfare will thus require different sorts of forces, systems, and concepts than previously, and will also demand a reassessment of how overwhelming U.S. advantage can be.
- What might the U.S. do to maintain this advantage?
 - The F-22 as an example of strategic decision-making:
 - While the F-15 is greatly superior to competitor aircraft, the F-22 might convince potential competitors of the hopelessness of challenging the U.S. in this area, even though future utility of missiles and other systems may reduce the importance of fighter-vs-fighter combat;
 - The active-array, electronically scanned (ASEA) radar in the F-22 allows the possibility of electronic suppression of enemy fire-control radars, which may in turn allow enough suppression of enemy fighters and SAMs to allow day/night strike operations by B-2s based beyond the reach of enemy theater cruise and ballistic missiles. Such operations are likely to be of continued if not increasing importance to U.S. power projection capabilities.

2. Sea Control as an Area of Advantage

- The U.S. can control or deny others the use of the seas due to its dominant position in all aspects of naval warfare.
 - Several other countries have large navies and even sophisticated nuclear powered submarine and carrier aviation programs, however not even the former Soviet Union can maintain a worldwide naval presence.
 - While the U.S. Navy can defend America's shores, it has traditionally been and remains today, a power projection capability.
- Why continue to develop sea control as an area of advantage?
 - The overwhelming majority of commercial goods move via the sea.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/16888

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- Submarine cables now carry most of the worlds communications and information.
- The sea contains large amounts of untapped natural resources including oil.
- The U.S. needs to protect its access to energy and information flowing under the sea.
- Even traditional land powers like China will depend increasingly on sea based commerce including oil shipments. China and other nation's imported energy needs will become vulnerabilities and shape their security postures.
- The U.S. currently operates and sustains naval forces worldwide. Its surface ships and submarines collect intelligence and reassure allies as well as monitor and enforce economic sanctions. In times of crisis, they can react quickly to evacuate non-combatants or conduct strikes, providing national leaders with a variety of options.
- If the U.S. becomes more serious about missile defense, it may seek to interrupt launches in the boost phase. That requires systems to operate in close proximity to launchers, making survivable sea based platforms well suited to this task.
- Worldwide sea control requires a tremendous commitment in manpower and resources. Modern ships have high acquisition costs and large supporting infrastructures that will likely dissuade all but the most economically successful countries from developing blue water navies.
- As competitors buy or develop increasingly lethal anti-access capabilities, non-stealthy U.S. naval assets will operate at increased risk and may be denied access to key littoral areas. U.S. dominance in undersea warfare can continue to maintain a sea control advantage by virtue of their stealth, which makes them immune to most anti-access threats.
- How might the U.S. continue to develop this area of advantage?
 - Rebalance the fleet more in favor of stealthy, more numerous (expendable), and survivable assets. This could include combinations of smaller, stealthier surface ships, surface ships that operate very low in the water, or submarines.
 - The U.S. Navy should purchase and experiment with alternative surface ship types and determine possible replacements for current designs.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/16889

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- Extended range carrier capable aircraft, including unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) should be developed to allow aircraft carriers to stand-off, outside anti-access threat ranges. Experience gained from early UCAVs could be used to design follow-on launch platforms less vulnerable than existing aircraft carriers.
- While submarines have unmatched stealth, they currently lack payload capacity. The U.S. should convert TRIDENT submarines no longer required for strategic use to guided missile carrying submarines; SSGNs. Experience gained while operating these ships will help develop designs for follow-on submarines built specifically for strike operations.
- The U.S. should also experiment with more numerous, smaller and possibly non-nuclear powered submarines to improve affordability. Smaller, submarines with smaller crews could "call for fire" from towed, bottomed or moored unmanned strike modules. These modules could hold not only weapons, but also sensors, equipment for special operations units and even fuel for non-nuclear powered submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles.

3. Space Operations as an Area of Advantage

- Space is currently an area of significant U.S. advantage: the U.S. is well ahead of other nations in the process of making military use of space. The U.S. employs space for strategic intelligence purposes, but during the 1990s began, ahead of other nations, increasingly using space inputs to enhance as well military operations.
- Why Space Operations is a Critical Area of Advantage
 - This is a particularly critical area because of the emphasis the U.S. places on long range power projection: because the U.S. military is in this "business" to a unique degree, the nation will need to be particularly proficient in space operations.
 - U.S. military forces – air, land, and sea – rely on the ability to project power while operating from fewer, more widely-dispersed nodes with theater-wide responsibility.
 - Satellite Communications offer unique advantages for rapidly connecting mobile forces operating in this distributed mobile fashion. For example, satcom service

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11-L-0559/OSD/16890

(Provided to SecDef)

requires no theater footprint for maintenance and support aside from terminal equipment.

- The U.S. also depends upon space for navigation and timing:
 - GPS enables precision strike regardless of standoff range;
 - GPS timing signal is the only readily-available nano-second quality reference for synchronizing the electrical devices used in modern communications systems.
- The Character of Space Operations Will Continue to Evolve
 - Emerging U.S. advantages in using space to enhance military operations within the atmosphere will likely provoke opponents to try to negate these capabilities.
 - Consequently, the U.S. military must find the means to survey foreign activities in space, identify hostile movements, protect satellites from damage, prevent adversaries from successfully countering U.S. space capabilities, and if necessary negate hostile activity. Achieving space control will be a critical element of maintaining U.S. advantage in this area.
 - It is not clear how soon there will be true weaponization of space (i.e., orbital weapons), or if other nations will seek to, or succeed in, weaponizing space. This is, however, a major strategic issue and if the U.S. is to consider space weaponization, this should be done only after thorough analysis, consideration of possible consequences, etc.
- How the U.S. Might Preserve and Expand its Advantage in Space
 - Invest in jam-resistant, secure military satcom to meet U.S. expeditionary needs: the recent success of fiber optic cable and consequent sharp decline in commercial satellite communications makes it unlikely that the U.S. military can acquire adequate commercial bandwidth for sudden contingencies. Thus, the U.S. will need to develop its own satcom systems for use in those contingencies or situations in which fiber is not feasible.
 - Invest in GPS applications that emphasize long-range precision standoff attack
 - Employ greater orbital distances for a backup system. Positioning backup satellites at Earth-Moon Lagrange points would significantly reduce their

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11-L-0559/OSD/16891

(Provided to SecDef)

vulnerability while still, with the exception of SIGINT, providing a reasonable level of space capability.

4. Training as an Area of Advantage

- The U.S. currently enjoys an advantage in its ability to train combat ready units with force-wide levels of "first battle" competence without precedent in American history. This level of training is the product of conscious choices made over the last twenty-five years with attendant commitments in resources. The style, complexity, scope, and realism of U.S. training is well beyond the capabilities of most other nations, with only a few exceptions for small elements in allied countries.
- Factors which have contributed to this advantage include:
 - Commitment of extensive resources to institutional and unit training
 - The pursuit of realism and intellectual honesty in a training environment. For example our adherence to "performance-oriented" training measures, or the commitment to exceptionally competent opposing forces at the National Training Center to challenge the rotational training units
 - The incorporation of Modeling and Simulation for Training, War-Gaming
 - Establishment of the service training centers for large scale operations, such as the National Training Center
 - Commitment to establishing doctrine and references to promote standards and intellectual discussion
- There has been some erosion in this advantage. For example, the frequency of unit rotations through the service training centers has become protracted as less uniformly distributed across units as commitments to non-combat missions expanded.
- The advantage in superior training established by the services should be raised to the joint level. The nature of future conflict will require a joint "first-battle" competency. Achievement of this level of competency would further extend this advantage beyond that of any potential opponent. An element to support this might include the establishment of a Joint National Training Center (JNTC).

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11-L-0559/OSD/16892

(Provided to SecDef)

- The JNTC would be useful as an incentive for the services to transform. How well the participating service components were prepared upon arrival for a JNTC rotation would be a good indicator of the respective service transformation effort.
- The JNTC would be useful as a test-bed to evaluate interoperability and new doctrine, including methods of negating Anti-Access strategies
- Support the experimentation effort. Experimental type units could be included into rotations to evaluate their new capabilities.

5. Unmanned Systems: A New Area of U.S. Advantage

- Though the U.S. has only a comparative advantage in this area, it is clearly an area of growing importance and should be actively pursued. While it is difficult to forecast their precise role or the time required to develop such capabilities, unmanned systems will become a critical element in future conflicts. Advances in information technology, microelectronics, power supplies, artificial intelligence and related technologies will continue to improve endurance, payload and degrees of autonomy.
- Why is Unmanned Systems a Critical Area?
 - Early unmanned systems will lack the flexibility and adaptability human operators provide, however they are capable of greater performance in other areas. For instance, manned aircraft have endurance and maneuver limits based on the human occupant whereas Unmanned Aerial Vehicles do not. Unmanned systems lend themselves to long endurance missions necessitated by U.S. desires to project power as far as Asia, if no forward bases are available or secure. Moreover, unmanned systems can reduce force protection concerns, providing commanders with greater operational flexibility. The combination of these attributes dramatically increase the capabilities of U.S. forces.
 - Numerous potential adversaries have already entered the field of unmanned systems, possibly to enhance their ISR capabilities as part of their anti-access strategies or to threaten regional adversaries. While it cannot block entry, the U.S. should keep competitors from believing they can dominate this area.
 - It is an area of particular uncertainty: while it appears that unmanned systems will be important, it is difficult to foresee how exactly they will be employed.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/16893

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Therefore, it is important to develop a broad-based competency in this area so that the nation can adapt quickly as new technologies and operational concepts related to unmanned systems begin to emerge.

- How should the U.S. Develop a Comparative Advantage in Unmanned Systems?
 - There are several sorts of actions that might be taken to begin to lay the foundation for a competency. Some examples include:
 - Establish an enhanced program, through DARPA, for research and development of unmanned systems and related technologies, both to survey the possibilities and to begin to develop generation of technologists familiar with these systems.
 - Establish experimental units incorporating such systems, perhaps a UCAV unit or a unit oriented around unmanned underwater vehicles or ground robots. These units should eventually become operational, after perhaps a few years of experimentation, and test new concepts and capabilities in the field. It is particularly important to begin this soon, as developing operational and organizational concepts may take a decade or more of experimentation and practice.

G. Some Comments on Implementation

- The previous discussion of strategy should be seen only as a beginning sketch from which work can be accomplished to fully detail a complete strategy. Further, this additional development should include other important areas of military effort, such as logistics and intelligence support.
- This overall strategy suggests an implementation plan that focuses on a number of areas:
 - An overall "get-well" program to return most legacy forces to a healthy state. This will likely include the replacement of worn out platforms, the purchase of necessary spare parts, and the reduction of operational burden on service personnel
 - Establish a robust service and joint sustained experimentation program. Unlike current part-time efforts, such a program would dedicate personnel and resources to full time experimentation. Separate experimental units would adapt emerging

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11-L-0559/OSD/16894

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technologies and develop new operational concepts and methods of organizing. They would field new systems and use them in training exercises against existing forces and opposing forces that carefully study the culture and tactics of potential adversaries. Experimentation efforts could enumerate those merging areas where the U.S. could achieve an early advantage and help keep its comparative edge over competitors. Initially, experimentation programs would need to be somewhat bigger than the current set. And, as expertise and resources become available, expanded to more robust levels over time.

- Ultimately changes implemented must be supported within limited budget means. The identification of off-setting resources to get a significant program for developing new advantages and new ways of fighting in the future will be of immediate concern. Care must be taken in divestment and re-allocation of the resources for "getting-well" and experimentation. Areas of possible divestment might include rethinking the methods by which the U.S. meets humanitarian, peace-keeping, counter-drug and other non-combat obligations, particularly long-term commitments. This may require the establishment of new or differently organized forces and possibly even outsourcing some responsibilities to constabulary forces. Subsequent analysis of advantages may result in reductions or abandonment of resource commitment to support these initiatives.
- Refocus more DoD attention on Asia while continuing to remain active in our current relations. It would be useful to develop a broad base of military personnel well schooled in Asia. These individuals would be officers who understand the culture, history, speak the language, who would have lived in and interacted with the citizens of Asian nations. This level of expertise will be needed to develop both individual and institutional understanding of this area. Additionally, curriculum changes in the war colleges and military curriculum in the training base would improve the general sensitivity to Asia. The creation of additional military command infrastructure within Asia would allow more officers to serve in this region and experience the size and distances of the Asian region. That knowledge should then manifest itself in the developmental aspects of the force

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/16895

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- Shifting to an advantage-based strategy, rather than one framed by capabilities or threats, has substantial implications for our methods of analysis and the metrics used to measure the military. For example this shift may necessitate changes in the PPBS categories, or perhaps changes in the indicators and warnings or other aspects of intelligence sensitivity for understanding Asia.

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11-L-0559/OSD/16896

June 6, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on Sunday

Done
MTG

INDIA

I have agreed to have a meeting on Sunday with the deputy prime minister of India, Advani (*sp.?*), and Doug Feith's office is going to set it up. Probably at the Willard Hotel, probably around 1 p.m.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060603-36

.....

Please respond by 6/7/03

U17158 /03

6Jun03

11-L-0559/OSD/16897

June 6, 2003

Doc
6/5

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Spain's Candidate for NATO SG

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT*

Spain

I met with the Prime Minister of Spain yesterday. I agreed to see his candidate for NATO Secretary General, Mr. Vittorino, in Brussels. He is a member of the EU Commission. He said he is clever, a socialist, and was minister of defense for a year or so.

Let's arrange for me to spend 45 minutes with him—have a cup of coffee or a drink or something—when I am in Brussels.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060603-15

.....
Please respond by 6/7/03

U17159 /03

654403

11-L-0559/OSD/16898

June 6, 2003

TO: (b)(6)

CC: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: George Shultz

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT TO
MILGUE*

00115D

Please call George Shultz's office and tell him Joyce and I are already committed for the night of June 27, we will not be able to go to the Brady's for dinner with the former Secretaries of Treasury, and thank him very much.

Thanks.

DHR:db
060603-20

.....

Please respond by 6/9/03

U17161 /03

6 JUN 03

~~Done
6/9~~

June 6, 2003

COPY SENT
TO THESSER, CRMDXK

Portugal

TO: Travel Team
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Portugal

June 10 is Portugal's National Day. We should weave it into the remarks when I am there, and I should do something about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060603-11

.....

Please respond by 6/9/03

6 Jun 03

U17162 /03

June 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting at House

CATHY,
FOR YOUR INFO TO
SCHEDULE.
v/e L
000.0150

I want to have a meeting with you, Steve Cambone, Torie Clarke and John
Craddock at my house some Saturday in the next three or four weeks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-26

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

6/17

Sec Def -

Not Avail until
12 July

The first date that
works given schedules (basically,
Cambone's) is July 12. Torie will
be departed but we can ask her to
join anyway

Di Rita

U17164 /03

qjuncus

September 16, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ICRC and GTMO

What are the ICRC's views on the detainees at GTMO these days? Colin said there are problems. What is up?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091603-14

.....
Please respond by 9/26/03

*Please Pass to SecDef
Requires a short answer*

*COLB
10/8*

16 Sep 03

383.6



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

072 007 17 21 0 24

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R) *David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)*

SUBJECT: Short-Term Enlistments

- You asked for information on short-term enlistments. (Tab A)
- In March 2002, as a part of S. 2068, "Defend our Freedom Act of 2002," Senators Bayh, Carnahan, Cleland, Lieberman, and McCain proposed a short-term enlistment plan (\$18,000 bonus after completion of 18 months of active and 18 months of Selected Reserve service). We were concerned about the specifics of this proposal and we worked closely with Senate staff to develop an alternative program that could be used to integrate a short-term military option with the other forms of national service without negatively impacting the success of the all-volunteer force.
- The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 authorized the National Call to Service program to facilitate such enlistments.
- Participants will incur the traditional eight-year mandatory service obligation:
 - Initial entry training followed by fifteen months of active duty;
 - Then, either additional (24 months) active or Selected Reserve duty;
 - The remainder of the obligation shall be served in any combination of:
 - Active duty, Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, or other national service programs (i.e., AmeriCorps, Peace Corps).
- The incentives offered under this program should greatly assist in attracting "high-quality" youth. Participants may select one of the following:
 - \$5,000 bonus
 - Student loan repayment of up to \$18,000 for qualifying loans
 - 12 months of educational allowance (currently \$900 per month)
 - 36 months of educational allowance (currently \$366 per month)
- All Services intend to offer the program beginning in FY 2004. First year participation estimates are modest, about 2,500 across all Services.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Bob Clark, OUSD(P&R)/MPP/AP, (b)(6)
11-L-0559/OSD/16903

U17222 /03

TAB

A

→ mpp 081203
August 12, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Short-term Enlistments

Someone asked me about short-term enlistments. I am not familiar with it. Could you please explain it to me?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081203-12

.....
Please respond by 9/5/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16905

TAB

B

THIS SEARCH	THIS DOCUMENT	GO TO
Next Hit	Forward	New Bills Search
Prev Hit	Back	HomePage
Hit List	Best Sections	Help
	Contents Display	

H.R.4546

Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)

SEC. 531. ENLISTMENT INCENTIVES FOR PURSUIT OF SKILLS TO FACILITATE NATIONAL SERVICE.

(a) **AUTHORITY-** (1) Chapter 31 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 509 the following new section:

`Sec. 510. Enlistment incentives for pursuit of skills to facilitate national service

`(a) **ENLISTMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAM-** The Secretary of Defense shall carry out an enlistment incentive program in accordance with this section under which a person who is a National Call to Service participant shall be entitled to one of the incentives specified in subsection (e). The program shall be carried out during the period ending on December 31, 2007, and may be carried out after that date.

`(b) **NATIONAL CALL TO SERVICE PARTICIPANT-** In this section, the term `National Call to Service participant' means a person who has not previously served in the armed forces who enters into an original enlistment pursuant to a written agreement with the Secretary of a military department (in such form and manner as may be prescribed by that Secretary) under which the person agrees to perform a period of national service as specified in subsection (c).

`(c) **NATIONAL SERVICE-** The total period of national service to which a National Call to Service participant is obligated under the agreement under this section shall be specified in the agreement. Under the agreement, the participant shall--

`(1) upon completion of initial entry training (as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense), serve on active duty in a military occupational specialty designated by the Secretary of Defense under subsection (d) for a period of 15 months;

`(2) upon completion of the period of active duty specified in paragraph (1) and without a break in service, serve either (A) an additional period of active duty as determined by the Secretary of Defense, or (B) a period of 24 months in an active status in the Selected Reserve; and

`(3) upon completion of the period of service specified in paragraph (2), and without a break

in service, serve the remaining period of obligated service specified in the agreement--

`(A) on active duty in the armed forces;

`(B) in the Selected Reserve;

`(C) in the Individual Ready Reserve;

`(D) in the Peace Corps, Americorps, or another national service program jointly designated by the Secretary of Defense and the head of such program for purposes of this section; or

`(E) in any combination of service referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (D) that is approved by the Secretary of the military department concerned pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and specified in the agreement.

`(d) **DESIGNATED MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES-** The Secretary of Defense shall designate military occupational specialties for purposes of subsection (c)(1). Such military occupational specialties shall be military occupational specialties that, as determined by the Secretary, will facilitate pursuit of national service by National Call to Service participants.

`(e) **INCENTIVES-** The incentives specified in this subsection are as follows:

`(1) Payment of a bonus in the amount of \$5,000.

`(2) Payment in an amount not to exceed \$18,000 of outstanding principal and interest on qualifying student loans of the National Call to Service participant.

`(3) Entitlement to an allowance for educational assistance at the monthly rate equal to the monthly rate payable for basic educational assistance allowances under section 3015(a)(1) of title 38 for a total of 12 months.

`(4) Entitlement to an allowance for educational assistance at the monthly rate equal to 50 percent of the monthly rate payable for basic educational assistance allowances under section 3015(b)(1) of title 38 for a total of 36 months.

`(f) **ELECTION OF INCENTIVE-** A National Call to Service participant shall elect in the agreement under subsection (b) which incentive under subsection (e) to receive. An election under this subsection is irrevocable.

`(g) **PAYMENT OF BONUS AMOUNTS-** (1) Payment to a National Call to Service participant of the bonus elected by the National Call to Service participant under subsection (e)(1) shall be made in such time and manner as the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe.

`(2)(A) Payment of outstanding principal and interest on the qualifying student loans of a National Call to Service participant, as elected under subsection (e)(2), shall be made in such time and manner as the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe.

`(B) Payment under this paragraph of the outstanding principal and interest on the qualifying student loans of a National Call to Service participant shall be made to the holder of such student

loans, as identified by the National Call to Service participant to the Secretary of the military department concerned for purposes of such payment.

(3) Payment of a bonus or incentive in accordance with this subsection shall be made by the Secretary of the military department concerned.

(h) COORDINATION WITH MONTGOMERY GI BILL BENEFITS- (1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), a National Call to Service participant who elects an incentive under paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (e) is not entitled to additional educational assistance under chapter 1606 of this title or to basic educational assistance under subchapter II of chapter 30 of title 38.

(B) If a National Call to Service participant meets all eligibility requirements specified in chapter 1606 of this title or chapter 30 of title 38 for entitlement to allowances for educational assistance under either such chapter, the participant may become eligible for allowances for educational assistance benefits under either such chapter up to the maximum allowance provided less the total amount of allowance paid under paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (e).

(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense shall, to the maximum extent practicable, administer the receipt by National Call to Service participants of incentives under paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (e) as if such National Call to Service participants were, in receiving such incentives, receiving educational assistance for members of the Selected Reserve under chapter 1606 of this title.

(B) The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, prescribe regulations for purposes of subparagraph (A). Such regulations shall, to the maximum extent practicable, take into account the administrative provisions of chapters 30 and 36 of title 38 that are specified in section 16136 of this title.

(3)(A) Except as provided in paragraph (1), nothing in this section shall prohibit a National Call to Service participant who satisfies through service under subsection (c) the eligibility requirements for educational assistance under chapter 1606 of this title or basic educational assistance under chapter 30 of title 38 from an entitlement to such educational assistance under chapter 1606 of this title or basic educational assistance under chapter 30 of title 38, as the case may be.

(B)(i) A participant who made an election not to receive educational assistance under either such chapter at the applicable time specified under law or who was denied the opportunity to make an election may revoke that election or make an initial election, as the case may be, at such time and in such manner as the Secretary concerned may specify. A revocation or initial election under the preceding sentence is irrevocable.

(ii) The participant making a revocation or initial election under clause (i) shall be eligible for educational assistance under either such chapter at such time as the participant satisfies through service the applicable eligibility requirements under either such chapter.

(i) REPAYMENT- (1) If a National Call to Service participant who has entered into an agreement under subsection (b) and received or benefited from an incentive under subsection (e) (1) or (e)(2) fails to complete the total period of service specified in such agreement, the National Call to Service participant shall refund to the United States the amount that bears the same ratio to the amount of the incentive as the uncompleted part of such service bears to the total period of such service.

`(2) Subject to paragraph (3), an obligation to reimburse the United States imposed under paragraph (1) is for all purposes a debt owed to the United States.

`(3) The Secretary concerned may waive, in whole or in part, a reimbursement required under paragraph (1) if the Secretary concerned determines that recovery would be against equity and good conscience or would be contrary to the best interests of the United States.

`(4) A discharge in bankruptcy under title 11 that is entered into less than five years after the termination of an agreement entered into under subsection (b) does not discharge the person signing the agreement from a debt arising under the agreement or under paragraph (1).

`(j) **FUNDING-** Amounts for payment of incentives under subsection (e), including payment of allowances for educational assistance under that subsection, shall be derived from amounts available to the Secretary of the military department concerned for payment of pay, allowances, and other expenses of the members of the armed force concerned.

`(k) **REGULATIONS-** The Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments shall prescribe regulations for purposes of the program under this section.

`(l) **DEFINITIONS-** In this section:

`(1) The term 'Americorps' means the Americorps program carried out under subtitle C of title I of the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12571 et seq.).

`(2) The term 'qualifying student loan' means a loan, the proceeds of which were used to pay any part or all of the cost of attendance (as defined in section 472 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 108711) at an institution of higher education (as defined in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).

`(3) The term 'Secretary of a military department' includes, with respect to matters concerning the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating.'

(2) The table of sections at the beginning of that chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 509 the following new item:

`510. Enlistment incentives for pursuit of skills to facilitate national service.'

(b) **COMMENCEMENT OF PROGRAM-** The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the date on which the program provided for section 510 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall commence. Such date shall be not later than October 1, 2003.

(c) **CONFORMING REPEAL-** Section 3264 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed. The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 333 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 3264.

(d) **IMPLEMENTATION REPORT-** Not later than March 31, 2003, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the Secretary's plans for implementation of section 510 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).

(e) **EFFECTIVENESS REPORTS**- Not later than March 31, 2005, and March 31, 2007, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the committees specified in subsection (d) reports on the effectiveness of the program under section 510 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), in attracting new recruits to national service.

SEC. 532. AUTHORITY FOR PHASED INCREASE TO 4,400 IN AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS FOR THE SERVICE ACADEMIES.

(a) **MILITARY ACADEMY**- Section 4342 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting before the period at the end of the first sentence the following: `or such higher number as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army under subsection (j)'; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(j)(1) Beginning with the 2003-2004 academic year, the Secretary of the Army may prescribe annual increases in the cadet strength limit in effect under subsection (a). For any academic year, any such increase shall be by no more than 100 cadets or such lesser number as applies under paragraph (3) for that year. Such annual increases may be prescribed until the cadet strength limit is 4,400. However, no increase may be prescribed for any academic year after the 2007-2008 academic year.

`(2) Any increase in the cadet strength limit under paragraph (1) with respect to an academic year shall be prescribed not later than the date on which the budget of the President is submitted to Congress under section 1105 of title 31 for the fiscal year beginning in the same year as the year in which that academic year begins. Whenever the Secretary prescribes such an increase, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a notice in writing of the increase. The notice shall state the amount of the increase in the cadet strength limit and the new cadet strength limit, as so increased, and the amount of the increase in Senior Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps enrollment under each of sections 2104 and 2107 of this title.

`(3) The amount of an increase under paragraph (1) in the cadet strength limit for an academic year may not exceed the increase (if any) for the preceding academic year in the total number of cadets enrolled in the Army Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program under chapter 103 of this title who have entered into an agreement under section 2104 or 2107 of this title.

`(4) In this subsection, the term `cadet strength limit' means the authorized maximum strength of the Corps of Cadets of the Academy.'

(b) **NAVAL ACADEMY**- Section 6954 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting before the period at the end of the first sentence the following: `or such higher number as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy under subsection (h)'; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(h)(1) Beginning with the 2003-2004 academic year, the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe annual increases in the midshipmen strength limit in effect under subsection (a). For any academic

TAB

C

COORDINATIONS

PDUSD (P&R)

Acting DUSD (MPP)

CSA 10-15-03
8.29.03

Prepared by Mr. Bob Clark, OUSD (P&R)/MPP/AP, (b)(6)

→ mpp
August 12, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Short-term Enlistments

Someone asked me about short-term enlistments. I am not familiar with it. Could you please explain it to me?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081203-12

.....
Please respond by 9/5/03

340

12 Aug 03

17
October 15, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Abizaid
Jerry Bremer
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on Campaign Plan

ITag

I would like to schedule a meeting, where we have plenty of time for Abizaid and Bremer to jointly present their campaign plans. I would prefer it on Friday or Saturday of this week, or if needed, on Monday of next week.

We need to allow sufficient time for good discussion – at least 2 ½ hours.

Thanks.

DHR:db
101503-55

.....
Please respond by _____


17 Oct 03

U17224 /03

4:35 PM

TO: Jerry Bremer
GEN John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
GEN Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: October 15, 2003

SUBJECT:

I talked to Colin Powell today. He raised the subject of troops from Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Given the flap between the Governing Council and Turkey, the question is, will the Governing Council request troops from Bangladesh and Pakistan, or are they going to oppose having any Muslim troops in the country? We don't want to get too far out with those two countries and have them embarrassed. We need to think this through and manage it so it is not awkward, if possible.

Let's discuss this.

Thanks.

DHR/azm
101503.02

Please respond by: 10/30/03

U17226 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16916


ITag

15 OCT 03

4:35 PM

TO: Jerry Bremer
GEN John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
GEN Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: October 15, 2003

SUBJECT:

I talked to Colin Powell today. He raised the subject of troops from Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Given the flap between the Governing Council and Turkey, the question is, will the Governing Council request troops from Bangladesh and Pakistan, or are they going to oppose having any Muslim troops in the country? We don't want to get too far out with those two countries and have them embarrassed. We need to think this through and manage it so it is not awkward, if possible.

Let's discuss this.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
101503.02

Please respond by: 10/30/03

U17226 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16917

F u o

October 16, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Global War on Terrorism

The questions I posed to combatant commanders this week were: Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror? Is DoD changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security environment? Can a big institution change fast enough? Is the USG changing fast enough?

DoD has been organized, trained and equipped to fight big armies, navies and air forces. It is not possible to change DoD fast enough to successfully fight the global war on terror; an alternative might be to try to fashion a new institution, either within DoD or elsewhere—one that seamlessly focuses the capabilities of several departments and agencies on this key problem.

With respect to global terrorism, the record since September 11th seems to be:

- We are having mixed results with Al Qaida, although we have put considerable pressure on them—nonetheless, a great many remain at large.
- USG has made reasonable progress in capturing or killing the top 55 Iraqis.
- USG has made somewhat slower progress tracking down the Taliban—Omar, Hekmatyar, etc.
- With respect to the Ansar Al-Islam, we are just getting started.

Have we fashioned the right mix of rewards, amnesty, protection, and confidence in the US?

Does DoD need to think through new ways to organize, train, equip and focus to deal with the global war on terror?

000.5

16 OCT 03

Are the changes we have and are making too modest and incremental? My impression is that we have not yet made truly bold moves, although we have made many sensible, logical moves in the right direction, but are they enough?

Today we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?

Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions.

- Do we need a new organization?
- How do we stop those who are financing the radical madrassa schools?
- Is our current situation such that "the harder we work, the behinder we get" ?

It is pretty clear that the coalition can win in Afghanistan and Iraq in one way or another, but it will be a long, hard slog.

Does CIA need a new finding?

Should we create a private foundation to entice radical madradssas to a more moderate course?

What else should we be considering?

Please be prepared to discuss this at our meeting on Saturday or Monday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101503-58

.....
Please respond by 10/18/03

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (IMMEDIATE TX) (OCT. 16. 2003 1:29PM) * * *

FAX HEADER:

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERSONAL NAME	FILE
OCT. 16.	1:27PM	COMPATIBLE	3-S	1'59"	P.	3 OK		847

: BATCH
M : MEMORY TX
S : STANDARD
* : PC
2- : ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
+ : ROUTING
1- : MIL_STD MODE

S : TRANSFER
: FORWARDING
F : FINE
Q : RECEPT. NOTICE REQ.
3- : RICOH-MGS/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING
E : ECM
> : REDUCTION
A : RECEPT. NOTICE

In reply refer to EF and I #'s

EF-6999
03/013534-ES

September 29, 2003

C10/16

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Afghan Army Training

I saw Ivanov up at Camp David over the weekend. He said they would be willing to help with some equipment and spares for the Afghan Army training, but they would need some financial assistance, since his budget is only \$10 million for that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092903-8

.....
Please respond by 10/24/03

✓
10/16

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
10/16

Afghanistan

29 Sep 03

U17262 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16921

June 9, 2003

SUBJECT: Logistics

1. I would like to have Brad Berkston, who works for Mike Wynne, in when I have my logistics meeting.
2. I would also like to have Handy come in and think about spending time to create a truly joint logistics system, rather than Service logistics systems. Rather than giving logistics to TRANSCOM, I would like to give Handy to logistics and have him figure it out, maybe get him to leave his deputy in charge and spend three or four months figuring out a single data system. I don't think there is probably any other way to get it done. My guess is we could save billions and billions and billions of dollars.
3. Maybe the way to do it would be to ask Handy to draft a memo from me asking to have this done. I would like Larry Di Rita to give me a proposal.

DHR:dh
060903-18

U17326 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16922

CBSD
IBW 8/12

9 Jun 03

418

65
0800

Larry Di Rita

June 9, 2003

SUBJECT: Response Cell

I want to establish a response cell for the next 18 months and get Tony Dolan to head it up.

DHR:dh
060903-17

7/2 -

→ SecDef -

We're doing this.
Will report on its
development/progress.

D. Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

7/2

U17327-103

11-L-0559/OSD/16923

185

974003

7/2

SENT 6/9
June 7, 2003

323.3

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Help from Formers

I do think we want to get all former Secretaries of Defense to sign a letter to the conferees in the House and Senate to help us on the Senate version on BRAC and the House version on personnel and environment, and to keep out concurrent receipts and any other bad provisions in the legislation.

We need to think it through now and get it drafted, and then get some former Secretary of Defense to take the lead on it for us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060703-3

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

9 Jun 03

U17328-1/03

SENT 6/9
June 7, 2003

TO: VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret.)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ADM Clark

I think I would like to go ahead and think through how we could extend Vern Clark. I don't want to talk about it now, since it is not up until next year, but I think we ought to get the legal details clear and figure out if we have to get a statute and if we do, when we have to send it up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060703-2

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

210 Navy (344)

9 Jun 03

U17329 /03

SENT 6/9
June 6, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Interagency Informed on Iraq

*ADVANCE
COPY SENT*

We need to develop a plan for keeping the interagency informed on what is going on in Iraq. Please give me a proposal.

for

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060603-31

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

U17330 . /03

6 Jun-03

SENT 6/9
June 6, 2003
Dove
6/16

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Visit by Musharraf

I want to be involved in the various meetings when Musharraf visits the United States around June 24.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060603-27

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

Pakistan

U17331 /03

6 Aug 03

Sent 6/9
June 5, 2003

Done 6/16

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Brief for Tenet

I want to get George Tenet in to see "Lessons Learned." It is fascinating.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-11

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

ITAG

9 JUN 03

U17332 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16928

Sent 6/9
June 6, 2003

Done
6/16

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: George Shultz

George Shultz is available to come in on Friday, June 27, talk to some DoD people, have a lunch and just visit with them and make some remarks.

Please come up with a list of people we might want to pull together for lunch that day. Get a nice list of Policy type people. We could perhaps invite George Tenet also. Show me a draft list, and then we'll nail it down with George Shultz.

7/1/03
Also make a note he has invited Joyce and me to dinner at 7 p.m. on June 27. It is a dinner of former secretaries of treasury for the new secretary of treasury, and he is also inviting Cheney, Greenspan and me. I have to get back and acknowledge yes or no, and I will talk to Joyce.

SD IS
NOT
AVAILABLE

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-12

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

U17333 /03

6 June 03

SENT 6/9
June 6, 2003

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: WMD

I had a good visit with George Tenet.

His approach for WMD is: There will always be a lively discussion in the intel community. There has been this time. The only issue is did people cave in and politicize the intel? The answer is they did not.

If one looks at the intel from the beginning, back in the Clinton Administration, run a straight line through to today, and you will find the only thing that has happened is the intel has gotten richer, more information has been found. Where there are differences, like the aluminum tubes, the differences are in the NIE. It is all there. Some people thought one way; others thought another. The differences were not buried or hidden. They were right there, up front, in the intel assessments.

So, on the first issue, was there politicization—the answer is a flat no. Was there good discussion, debate, a lively analysis of what was going on—you bet. And that is healthy.

The second issue is was the Intel Community right or wrong? The answer is we believed we were right then, and we believed we were right now. We will know for sure later. Admittedly, it is an open question. What we do know is that everyone agreed on it, even the people who opposed the UN resolution. There was no debate about whether or not they had these programs. There was debate

ITag

95 Jun 03

U17334 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16930

over some minor issues, but there was near unanimity in the intelligence communities, ours and foreign countries', and indeed even in the Congress. The issue in the Congress and the UN was not whether or not Iraq had these programs. The issue was whether or not there should be more time for inspections.

It would be prudent to be careful about concluding prematurely that the near unanimous conclusions of the intel community with respect to WMD programs were wrong.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-13

.....
Please respond by _____

Sent 6/9
June 6, 2003

TO: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Red Cross

Joyce tells me the Red Cross has been terrific in helping the families of the people who were wounded and are staying at Walter Reed and Bethesda. As I recall, they have provided some money to pay the differential between what the hotels are charging and what Fisher House might have charged, or something like that.

They are doing a number of other things as well. In any event, it seems to me it would be appropriate for someone to draft a letter from me to the Red Cross thanking them for all they have done for the folks.

Thanks.


DHR:dh
060603-8

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

U17336 103

Sent 6/9
June 6, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen
ExecSec

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Ogilvie Letter

Attached is a statement by a friend of mine, Dr. Lloyd Ogilvie, who was the Chaplain to the Senate. We knew him for several decades. His wife passed away.

It struck me that you might want to read his statement about his wife's passing. It is beautifully done, and some of the language there is the kind of language that can be usefully repeated.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/5/03 Ogilvie note

DHR:dh
060603-9

.....
Please respond by _____

293

9 Jun 03

U17337 : /03

(b)(6)

Str - I was not
sure if you knew

From: Billingslea, Rachel, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2003 11:48 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: For (b)(6) Note from Dr. Ogilvie

Mrs. Ogilvie passed
away - See below -
JK has been
advised.

an

For (b)(6)

Hi there. Mr. and Mrs. Rumsfeld probably already know that Mrs. Ogilvie passed away a few weeks ago, but just in case they didn't, I thought I'd pass along a note Rev. Ogilvie sent around today (5 June 03) to his Senate friends.

Thank you Ms. (b)(6)
Rachel

-----Original Message-----

From: Dovilla, Mike (Govt Affairs)
[mailto:Mike_Dovilla@govt-aff.senate.gov]
Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2003 11:31 AM
To: Rachel E. Billingslea (E-mail)
Subject: FW: Personal note from Dr. Ogilvie

I thought you'd like to see this note from Dr. Ogilvie. As you know, he is Presbyterian and retired from the Senate Chaplaincy in March to be with his then-gravely ill wife in California.

I didn't know this until now, but she passed away not long after. Looks like he's doing well, given the circumstances; he's a very nice man and a great example of someone leading a Christian life.

Me

>
>
> Please distribute this to your entire staff. It is a personal note,
> handwritten by Dr. Ogilvie. Thank you! Meg)
>
> 5 June 2003
>
> My dear friend:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

>
> Gratefully, Aye,
>
> Lloyd Ogilvie
>
>
> _____
> Meg Saunders
> Director of Communications
> Office of the Senate Chaplain
> S-332, US Capitol
> Washington, DC 20510
> (d): (b)(6)
> main:
> fax:

→ Sharon / Di Rita

October 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bob Bell

Please draft a nice note to Bob Bell for me to see. He is leaving NATO.
Apparently he did a good job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100903-9 (is computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

10/10

*1 memo -
Please draft
Crouch shop can get
info. Tom
A. Miller*

*ATTY DI RITA
10/14*

335510

9 Oct 03



Updated: 28-Jan-2003

Who is who at NATO?

011-322-707-4964

[High
Resolution
Photo 888Kb]

**Assistant Secretary General
for Defence Support**



Robert Gregory Bell

1999 -

Current position Assistant Secretary General for Defence Support, NATO

Responsible for the promotion of NATO armaments cooperation policies and programmes. Chairs NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). Directs NATO International Staff activities in the areas of airspace management and air defense. Chairs the NATO C3 Board.

Experience

1993-1999

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC), The WHITE HOUSE. Special Assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs and NSC Senior Director for Defence Policy and Arms

Control.

- 1984-1993 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, U.S. SENATE. Principal staff assistant to Chairman Sam Nunn for arms control policy, strategic nuclear forces, and NATO weapons cooperation issues.
- 1981-1984 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE. Principal staff aide for defense policy and arms control to Chairman Charles H. Percy.
- 1975-1978, 1980 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS), Library of Congress. Defence Analyst and Assistant Division Chief for Research. Authored studies for Congress on strategic weapons and doctrine, NATO, arms control and arms sales policy.
- 1979 NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, Brussels. Staff Director, Military Committee.
- 1969-1975 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE . Squadron Commander, air traffic control and communications field

Education

- 1969-1970 TUFTS UNIVERSITY, FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW & DIPLOMACY, Medford, Mass. M.A. Degree. Major: International security studies, Minor fields : Soviet Foreign policy, international economics and Third World development.
- 1971-1972 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, Washington, D.C. - Graduate course work in defense policy and Soviet foreign policy.
- 1965-1969.1 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY, Colorado Springs, Colorado. B.S. Degree. Major: International Affairs. Honors: Distinguished Graduate.

Miscellaneous

Born in Birmingham, Alabama, August 26, 1947

Married to Mrs. Vibeke Roosen.

Two children: Nathan and Stefan

Associations:

Council on Foreign Relations, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Air Force
Association

Home



Index

sent 6/9
June 5, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

I want to see a list of each of the Services' proposals as to how they are going to rebalance their active duty forces versus Guard and Reserve.

The goal would be to make sure we have people who can do every needed skill on active duty, so that every time we want to do anything we don't have to activate Reserves.


We also need to look at the total number of people in each skill, so that we don't have to activate people so frequently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-10

.....
Please respond by

6/20/03



5 June 03
U173397/03

11-L-0559/OSD/16940

6/9/03 9:00
130.6

SENT 6/9
June 5, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

LEAD: DHS
4/20

I want to see a list of each of the Services' proposals as to how they are going to rebalance their active duty forces versus Guard and Reserve.

The goal would be to make sure we have people who can do every needed skill on active duty, so that every time we want to do anything we don't have to activate Reserves.

We also need to look at the total number of people in each skill, so that we don't have to activate people so frequently.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-10

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

U17339.103

11-L-0559/OSD/16941



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

270 JUN 17 AM 10:09

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

June 13, 2003, 11:00am

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces--SNOWFLAKE

- In your June 9, 2003, memorandum, you asked "to see a list of each of the Services' proposals as to how they are going to rebalance their active duty forces versus Guard and Reserve."
- As detailed in the "*Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*," there are multiple solutions to address your concerns about Active/Reserve force mix. These include:
 - Move AC/RC capabilities within/between war plans and theaters of operation.
 - Enhance volunteerism to provide trained, ready individual reservists, and units, who can be used without involuntary mobilizations.
 - Expand the use of reachback to reduce the need for deployed forces.
 - Streamline the mobilization process to improve responsiveness.
 - Rebalance capabilities between and within the AC and RC.
- The issue has been at the forefront of our ongoing discussions with the Services and is the topic of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) on June 19, 2003. Attached are the last two slides from that brief, constituting the proposed action items that will be the basis for discussion on the way ahead. The list you requested would be compiled from the Program Change Proposals due August 1st.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:

As stated

*Prepared by: Captain Alan LaBeouf,

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	6/17



11-L-0559/OSD/16942

U09352 /03

AC/RC Force Mix Considerations

OSD/RA Brief to SROC
25 June, 2003

THE WAY AHEAD

- Reduce dependence on involuntary mobilization of reservists needed early in an operation by replacing early deploying RC with later deploying AC where appropriate.
- Expand the use of volunteer RC units and individuals through application of concepts such as the Variable Pool of Reserves.
- Program for RC use in support of CONUS-based operations intended to provide reachback capabilities for forward forces, thereby reducing footprint in theater.
- Program RC capabilities to meet predictable, long lead-time missions such as rotational overseas presence and experimentation.

THE WAY AHEAD (Cont.)

- Implement innovative management techniques such as those described in the *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense* to include new management programs and auxiliaries for specialized skills difficult to access, train and retain, and designing and testing new RC affiliation programs.
- Determine the role and contribution of the RC to Homeland Defense and Assistance to Civil Authorities.
- Conduct a review of the most recent mobilization lessons learned and recommend an improved mobilization system. Identify legislation, policy, or procedural changes needed to enable the new system.
- Reprogram force imbalances that result in repeated, frequent mobilization of RC individuals and units by changing force structure and/or mix, using contractors, or mitigating shortfalls through technology.

REFER TO THE HANDOUT PROVIDED FOR ASSIGNMENTS AND DUE DATES

cc. SARAH NAEEMANN

7:12 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 10, 2003

SUBJECT: Iraq

On the June 9 Coalition Provisional Authority Highlights paper (copy attached), it says that they are trying to break a congressional hold on \$50 million needed to repair the telecommunications system. What's that about?

Thanks.

DHR/ezn
06100903.02

Attach: June 9, 2003 Coalition Provision Authority Highlights

Please respond by:

6/20/03

*Response attached**ARM J. R. 6/23*

06-11-03 18:04 IR

U17340 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16946

TO: L. N. Wells
Need by 6/20
Thanks,
J

*6/22**9/24/03**6/24*

6/20
1703



COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

INFO MEMO

June 20, 2003 3:50 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *for Cheryl Roby 6/20/03*
LINTON WELLS II, PDASD (NETWORKS AND INFORMATION
INTEGRATION

SUBJECT: Congressional hold on funds to repair Iraqi telecommunications

- Congress has released its hold on \$50M for a Bechtel contract to repair the telecommunications systems in Iraq, and Bechtel began work on June 20.
- The telecommunications infrastructure repairs are required in order for the interim government to operate. However, they are being addressed by USAID, not DoD, because telecommunications repairs are clearly an Iraqi infrastructure effort under USAID. USAID has an existing reconstruction contract vehicle with Bechtel. For DoD to address the reconstruction, a fully competitive contract would be required and would result in substantial delays.
- USAID had requested an additional \$50M for Bechtel to repair the fiber connectivity between cities and to replace three to five switches within Baghdad. The international gateway is also part of the Bechtel work.
- Congress put a hold on the funding because of concerns about the sole source nature of the contract, and because of intense pressure from the telecommunications industry. After further committee reviews, \$45M was approved unconditionally, and a \$5M assessment was approved on condition that the assessor would not perform the actual reconstruction work.

Prepared by: Dr. Ron Jost, Director, Wireless, OASD(NII)

(b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/16947

**Coalition Provisional Authority
Highlights for Secretary Rumsfeld
9 June 2003**

Baghdad Security:

- Payment of April salaries to Iraqi police for the month of April was completed on 7 June. Payments for May and June will be completed over the next 2 weeks.
- Facilities Protection Service recruitment is underway; training will begin this week.

Other Baghdad Government Services:

Service/Product	01-June	02-June	03-June	04-June	05-June	06-June	07-June	Pre-War
Power (MW)	1300	1300	1245	1300	1265	1250	1250	2500
Fuel (mil ltrs)	3.93	5.5	4.38	5.31	3.96	4.15	3.16	5.0
Water (mil ltrs)	1400	1400	1600	1750	1650	1600	1600	2000

Economy:

- Working to break congressional "hold" on \$50 million needed for repairs to telecommunications system.
- The headquarters of Rafidan Bank was reopened Saturday. Rafidan currently has 49 branches open throughout the country; Rashid Bank has 11 open. Money for salary payments is now fully positioned at banks throughout the country and is ready for disbursements.
- Five million dollars in new 250 dinar notes has been delivered to the Central Bank to exchange for 10,000 dinar notes. Indications are that the discount on the 10,000 note is declining.
- Continuing to work closely with Iraqi technical staff on review of Oil for Food contracts to evaluate which contracts are no longer needed and which should be prioritized.
- Forwarded note 9 June regarding intention to announce a \$100 million from vested assets for a construction fund, which will employ Iraqis in construction projects including the repair of government buildings.

Oil/Gasoline:

- During the month of May, over 134 million liters of gasoline – 80% of estimated daily consumption – were disbursed in and around Baghdad. The average of daily imports and domestic production of gasoline during this week was over 14.8 million liters. Significant improvement has been made in the gas lines at the

filling stations. A barge of over 6 million liters began unloading at Um Qasr on June 5 with 958,000 liters delivered to Diwaniyah.

- The tender for 10 million barrels of crude oil was released by SOMO on Thursday, June 5. Offers are due on June 10 with awards expected within 24 hours after receipt.

Civil Affairs:

- Following on the expanded consultative group meeting last Friday, invited same group to a meeting Monday to join discussion of economic issues with representatives of UNDP, IMF and World Bank.
- Traveled today to Hilla to address Irrigation Summit of national and provincial-level officials. Met with prominent Shia cleric, leaders of the large Bani Hassan tribal confederation, and the governor of Karbala.
- Planning trips in the coming days to Kirkuk, Basra, Ba'qubah, and Samarra.
- Continuing to meet with a wide range of Iraqis in Baghdad, including SCIRI's Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, to whom we delivered a clear message today about our concerns over Iranian interference in Iraq.

Public Affairs:

- Held a press conference exclusively with members of the Iraqi and Arabic press on Saturday.
- Visited boys and girls primary schools Saturday, followed by meetings at Baghdad University with University Presidents, all covered by a press pool that included Iraqi Media Network.
- Traveled South today to an Irrigation Summit accompanied by press pool that included Iraqi Media Network.

Other Comments:

- Located refrigeration trucks to store recovered Jewish texts. Working to identify appropriate experts who can travel to Iraq to examine the documents and advise on the procedures for restoration.
- Expecting arrival of 80 remaining IRDC members on Tuesday.

Snowflake

7:12 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 10, 2003

SUBJECT:

I want to see the thank you to Portas for the book before it goes out.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061003.10

Please respond by:

6/20/03

461

10 Jun 03

U17344 /03

U. 10655-03

11-L-0559/OSD/16950

Snowflake

7:12 AM

6/12
SL
6/12

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*

DATE: June 10, 2003

SUBJECT:

Don't forget you've got the responsibility of getting with Dov Zakheim and the congressional relations people and figuring out what we do about the Vice President's call to me about the possibility they are going to be looking to us for \$3.3 Billion out of our bill. It seems to me that you need to talk to him and you need to figure out what we could give him if he's trying to negotiate a deal. I can't believe it is \$3.3, but there may be some amount we could give him.

Thanks.

11D.D.1

DHR/azn
061003.09

*Don, This was already done before we
you got this note.
Dov and Langilotta believe that we*

6/20/03

Please respond by: _____

*can manage this number at a fairly early, on
the understanding that we will get a Supp.
early in '04.*

Paul W.

10 Jun 03

U17345..103

11-L-0559/OSD/16951

2

Snowflake

7:12 AM

TO: John Craddock
Larry Di Rita
Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 10, 2003

SUBJECT:

Andy Card mentioned in the Cabinet Meeting the risk of entourage creep. Let's review how many people we have with us when we go places and keep cutting it back.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061003.07

Please respond by:

6/20/03

U17347 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16952

333SD

10 Jun 03

7:12 AM

TO: *Larry Do RITA*
~~Doug Feith~~
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 10, 2003
SUBJECT:

The President mentioned that Ambassador Wolf is going to be his man on the ground for the Middle East. Please get his background sheet so I can find out who he is.

Also, get a background sheet on *Schoemaker* ~~Skinner~~ (?) over to the President FYI from me and to Condi.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061003.06

Please respond by: _____

6/23/03

U17348 : /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16953

ITag

1054203

Sec 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: AT&T

Vin Weber said that AT&T is not allowed to compete for telecom in Iraq. Why is that?

Drop

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-27

.....
Please respond by 6/12/03

6/12/03

Sec Def -

*Vin has partial
(and wrong) info. I
spoke with him and
offered additional briefing
on the contract if desired.
I think he's okay.*

I like to
9 June 03

U17350 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16954

sent 6/11
June 9, 2003

000.71 SD

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Henry Hyde

I want to have Henry Hyde down for lunch or go up and see him for a cup of coffee.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-29

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

Larry Di Rita

Larry Di Rita
6/20

9 Jun 03

U17351 /03

Sent 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invitation from Helms

What do you think of this invitation from Helms? I am kind of partial to it.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/28/03 Helms Invitation

DHR:dh
060903-31

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

U17352 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16956

00115D

4 June 03



Senator Jesse Helms

P.O. BOX 20699
RALEIGH, N.C. 27619

April 28, 2003

**The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301**

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Dot Helms and I have greatly admired your leadership during our country's dark days following September 11— especially your handling of Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. You have handled everything with expertise—your news conferences with a firm but friendly hand.

In honor of your remarkable career of service to our country, the Board of Directors of The Jesse Helms Center Foundation desires to present you with the *James W. Nance Medal of Freedom* on the occasion of the 15th Anniversary of the founding of The Helms Center on October 18, 2003.

We would very much like to do this at the Grandover Resort, a delightful resort near Greensboro, N.C. (The award was created in memory of our good friend, Admiral Bud Nance).

Bud was my best friend since his and my boyhood in our hometown of Monroe, N.C. We especially want to recognize you for your *many* contributions to the safety and security of our country. Bud Nance was remarkable in so many ways. (As you know, during his navy career, Bud served as captain of ships of all sizes—including a battleship).

The Jesse Helms Center Foundation at Wingate University is an educational not-for-profit organization dedicated to promoting principles for which you have fought and defended throughout your career--the importance of America's free enterprise system and the traditional values and

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

April 28, 2003

PAGE TWO

representative democracy so important to our survival as a strong and free nation.

The Foundation has extended a helping hand to young people of all ages and it has been enormously successful in making them a part of our advocacy of the free enterprise system--indeed the conservative cause in general.


Mr. Secretary, through those efforts, we have been so blessed. Thousands of young people in the United States and Mexico (and most recently, Uruguay) are already participating in the Center's programs. Our mutual friend, Lady Margaret Thatcher, bless her heart, came to dedicate our impressive 23,000 square foot headquarters building.

It will mean so much to Dot and me-- and indeed, countless of our home folks, if you can pay a brief visit to us in Greensboro, N.C. on October 18. We will have a meaningful celebration and a memorable tribute to our soldiers and sailors (and their families who have sacrificed so much for the cause of freedom).

This old retired war horse will be forever in your debt, Mr. Secretary, and I promise that we will consume no more of your time than you can spare. We will work with your folks about making certain that your visit will be entirely convenient to your busy schedule.

God bless you, my friend.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jesse Helms", with a horizontal line underneath.

JESSE HELMS:jre

June 2, 2003, 11:39 AM

41
1-320
Jaymie Duran

TO: The Secretary of Defense

44 FROM: Marc Thiessen

SUBJECT: Senator Helms

Senator Helms asked me to pass this invitation on to you, for your consideration.

SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Pete Teets

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

Iraq

Would you please take a look and see if there are any lessons learned about space from the Iraq war, and make sure they get incorporated.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-32

.....

Please respond by 6/27/03

9 Jun 03

U17354 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16960

TAB B

Sent 6/11
June 9, 2003

353

TO: ~~LTG Craddock~~ JOINT STAFF
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Training Schedule

I think the Service's training schedule should be submitted to us to take a look at to see how joint they are.

Please draft a memo for me to send to them to get that done. My guess is they are already projecting out five to seven years. They probably have the wrong countries participating. They probably are not joint. Let's take a look.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-33

.....
Please respond by _____

U17355 /03

9 Jun 03

03 JUL 21 08:45

11-L-0559/OSD/16961

8/8 TBN

TAB B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-1123-03
30 July 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{F&R} *VA/8/30/03*

SUBJECT: Training Schedules

- In response to your request, a memorandum has been drafted directing the Services to submit their exercise schedules from FY04 through FY08.
- The Services are instructed to include all the United States and foreign forces participating, dates for the exercise and a brief description of the exercise. This information will assist in assessing the quantity and quality of joint and combined training planned by the department.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the proposed memorandum

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: BG Mark Hertling, USA; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	6/6



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Service and Service Component Exercise Schedules

I wish to review your exercise program schedules to assess their degree of jointness and gain insight into the levels of multinational participation.

Please forward through the Joint Staff, your Service exercise schedule for the years FY04 through FY08, at battalion/squadron levels and above. Ensure the schedule contains all categories of exercises in which you and your combatant command components participate. Please ensure your schedules include all US and foreign force participation, dates for each exercise and a brief description of each exercise.

I want to ensure military exercises properly prepare US forces for future joint and multinational operations. Your attention in responding to this request by September 1, 2003, will assist me in this endeavor.



11-L-0559/OSD/16963

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

US Army	John Chappell, Colonel	22 July 2003
US Navy	Peter Leenhouts, Captain	22 July 2003
US Air Force	David Estep, Colonel	23 July 2003
US Marine Corps	A. E. Van Dyke, Colonel	23 July 2003

SGT 6/11
June 9, 2003

~~Done~~
6/16

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: George Shultz

Are you setting up a lunch or a meeting with George Shultz when he is in town, as I requested?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-21

137

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

U17356 /03

9 June 03

SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003

~~Done~~ 6/16

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tillie Fowler

Let's get the announcement on Tillie Fowler out and then go ahead and get a meeting set as I requested.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-23

11/11/03

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

U17357 /03

9 June 03

SEP 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tampa Trip

LTG C. 6/9
DATE FOR
CENTCOM COC
NOT YET SET
vick

I ought to go to Tom Franks' change of command ceremony, probably in Tampa
the first week of July.

Thanks.

DHR dh
060903-24

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03


*Try to
Set it
up I
can be there*

*I will do it
event + TACS*

*on
or if necessary
event have from*

*7/7/03
6/13/03*

SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Garner to POTUS

Please make sure that you, Jay Garner and I go over to see the President when Jay is in town.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-25

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03



Larry Di Rita

6/20

U17359 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/16968

337 WH
AM

9/20/03

6/13
1820
TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: "Plot"

SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003

Please
see attached
behind window

H-99

6/18
ATTN: DE RUM
Please take this Kagan article, and let's get some points of facts that we get around to all the people in the Department who talk to the press, so they have them clear in their minds.

Thanks.

Attach.

Kagan, Robert. "A Plot to Deceive?" *Washington Post*

DHR:dh
U60903-20

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

9 Jun 03

U17360 /03

washingtonpost.com

 **PRINT ARTICLE ONLY**

A Plot to Deceive?

By Robert Kagan

Sunday, June 8, 2003; Page B07

There is something surreal about the charges flying that President Bush lied when he claimed Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Yesterday The Post continued the barrage, reporting that Defense Intelligence Agency analysts claimed last September merely that Iraq "probably" possessed "chemical agent in chemical munitions" and "probably" possessed "bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard agent and VX," a deadly nerve agent.

This kind of "discrepancy" qualifies as front-page news these days. Why? Not because the Bush administration may have -- repeat, may have -- exaggerated the extent of knowledge about what Hussein had in his WMD arsenal. No, the critics' real aim is to prove that, as a New York Times reporter recently put it, "the failure so far to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq may mean that there never were any in the first place."

The absurdity of this charge is mind-boggling. Yes, neither the CIA nor the U.N. inspectors have ever known exactly how many weapons Hussein had or how many he was building. But that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and the ability to produce more? That has never been in doubt.

Start with this: The Iraqi government in the 1990s admitted to U.N. weapons inspectors that it had produced 8,500 liters of anthrax and a few tons of VX. Where are they? U.N. inspectors have been trying to answer that question for years. Because Hussein refused to come clean, the logical presumption was that he had hidden them. As my colleague, nonproliferation expert Joseph Cirincione, put it bluntly in a report last year: "Iraq has chemical and biological weapons." The only thing not known was where they were and how far the Iraqi weapons programs had advanced since the inspectors left in 1998.

Go back and take a look at the report Hans Blix delivered to the U.N. Security Council on Jan. 27. On the question of Iraq's stocks of anthrax, Blix reported "no convincing evidence" that they were ever destroyed. But there was "strong evidence" that Iraq produced more anthrax than it had admitted "and that at least some of this was retained." Blix also reported that Iraq possessed 650 kilograms of "bacterial growth media," enough "to produce . . . 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax." Cirincione concluded that "it is likely that Iraq retains stockpiles of anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin."

On the question of VX, Blix reported that his inspections team had information that conflicted with Iraqi accounts. The Iraqis claimed that they had produced VX only as part of a pilot program but that the quality was poor and the agent was never "weaponized." But according to Blix, the inspections team discovered Iraqi documents that showed the quality of the VX to be better than declared. The team also uncovered "indications that the agent" had been

"weaponized." According to Cirincione's August 2002 report, "it is widely believed that significant quantities of chemical agents and precursors remain stored in secret depots" and that there were also "thousands of possible chemical munitions still unaccounted for." Blix reported there were 6,500 "chemical bombs" that Iraq admitted producing but whose whereabouts were unknown. Blix's team calculated the amount of chemical agent in those bombs at 1,000 tons. As Blix reported to the Security Council, "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for."

Today, of course, they and many other known weapons are still unaccounted for. Does it follow, therefore, that they never existed? Or does it make more sense to conclude that the weapons were there and that either we'll find them or we'll find out what happened to them?

The answer depends on how broad and pervasive you like your conspiracies to be. Because if Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair are lying, they're not alone. They're part of a vast conspiratorial network of liars that includes U.N. weapons inspectors and reputable arms control experts both inside and outside government, both Republicans and Democrats.

Maybe former CIA director John Deutch was lying when he testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Sept. 19, 1996, that "we believe that [Hussein] retains an undetermined quantity of chemical and biological agents that he would certainly have the ability to deliver against adversaries by aircraft or artillery or by Scud missile systems."

Maybe former defense secretary William Cohen was lying in April when he said, "I am absolutely convinced that there are weapons. . . . I saw evidence back in 1998 when we would see the inspectors being barred from gaining entry into a warehouse for three hours with trucks rolling up and then moving those trucks out."

Maybe the German intelligence service was lying when it reported in 2001 that Hussein might be three years away from being able to build three nuclear weapons and that by 2005 Iraq would have a missile with sufficient range to reach Europe.

Maybe French President Jacques Chirac was lying when he declared in February that there were probably weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that "we have to find and destroy them."

Maybe Al Gore was lying when he declared last September, based on what he learned as vice president, that Hussein had "stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country."

Finally, there's former president Bill Clinton. In a February 1998 speech, Clinton described Iraq's "offensive biological warfare capability, notably 5,000 gallons of botulinum, which causes botulism; 2,000 gallons of anthrax; 25 biological-filled Scud warheads; and 157 aerial bombs." Clinton accurately reported the view of U.N. weapons inspectors "that Iraq still has stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions, a small force of Scud-type missiles, and the capacity to restart quickly its production program and build many, many more weapons." That was as unequivocal and unqualified a statement as any made by George W. Bush.

Clinton went on to insist, in words now poignant, that the world had to address the "kind of threat Iraq poses . . . a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or

provide them to terrorists . . . who travel the world among us unnoticed." I think Bush said that, too.

So if you like a good conspiracy, this one's a doozy. And the best thing about it is that if all these people are lying, there's only one person who ever told the truth: Saddam Hussein. And now we can't find him either.

The writer, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes a monthly column for The Post.

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SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reductions Over Three Months

I would like a projection on how you think you are going to be pulling down Kuwait and the remaining Gulf states over the next three months. We still have 80,600 in Kuwait and another 15,800 in the remaining Gulf states. I would think that at this point you might be able to give me a fix as to what your projection is between now and October 1.

Kuwait

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060703-7

.....
Please respond by 6/13/03

U17361 /03

9 June 03

11-L-0559/OSD/16973

SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003



TO: ~~Jaymie Durnan~~ Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Doug Sears

I have sent Doug Sears' name in before. An acquaintance of mine, Ed Delatra, recommended him. Apparently he is the dean of the School of Education at Boston University. It has to do with the education work going on in Iraq. Someone might want to take a look and see if you need somebody like him.

030.02

Thanks.

Attach.

Background sheet on Douglas Sears

DHR:dh
060903-1

Please respond by 6/20/03

6/17

June 18, 2003

White House Liaison Office

WHLO interviewed Doug Sears on June 12th and found him to be exceptionally well qualified and willing to participate in the reform of the Iraqi Ministry of Education. We have strongly recommended him to Williamson Evers, the presidentially-approved team leader for the ministerial advisory team. I consider him a "highly probable select" for the team, which is currently being built.

Jim O'Beirne, WHLO

Jim O'Beirne
Algeria

D. M.

Larry Di Rita
6/18

9 June 03