

Douglas Sears

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EMPLOYMENT

- Dean and Professor, Boston University School of Education.
January 2003-present.
- Dean, *ad interim* and Professor, Boston University School of Education.
September 2001-December 2002.
- Associate Dean and Professor, Boston University School of Education.
February 2000-August 2001.
- Superintendent, Chelsea, Massachusetts Public Schools.
July 1995-January 2000.

As Superintendent, responsible for day-to-day management of the schools under the Boston University/Chelsea Partnership agreement. The school system enrolled over 5,800 students and had an annual operating budget of over \$40 million.

- The combined average SAT score in Spring 1995, shortly before assumption of superintendency, was 727. In Spring 2000 combined average was 868, a gain of 149 points.
- Advanced Placement courses were introduced to Chelsea High School in 1996. The overall number of AP tests taken rose from 13 in 1996, when the average score was 1.62, to 115 in Spring of 2000, when the average score was 2.56.
- A \$115 million school construction project was completed on schedule and on budget. Seven new schools were built and an eighth, the nationally recognized Early Learning Center, was completely renovated.
- Average daily attendance, first tallied in a systematic and accurate way in the 1996-1997 school year, rose consistently from 88.6 percent to 93.3 percent in Spring 2000.
- Assistant to the President, Boston University. September 1988-July 1995.

Senior staff position with chief executive of research university enrolling 30,000 students. Principal responsibility was for troubleshooting in all areas of university life including admissions, financial aid, housing, discipline, and personnel.

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EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

- United States Foreign Service Officer. August 1984-August 1989 (includes leave of absence August 1988-August 1989).

Tenured, September 1988. Meritorious Honor Award, 1988. Second Secretary (Economic Section), American Embassy, Bern, Switzerland, December 1986-August 1988. Vice Consul and Third Secretary, American Embassy, Manila, The Philippines, January 1985-July 1986.

- American Embassy Bern

Represented United States government positions to government of Switzerland and prepared analytical reporting cables on economic and political issues including civil aviation, technology transfer, GATT, European integration, and agriculture. Screened and assigned priority to ambassador's cable traffic and prepared speeches and remarks for the ambassador's public appearances. Because of personnel shortages and reassignments served variously as acting chief of economic, political, and treasury sections of the embassy. Designated as embassy contact officer with Swiss Foreign Ministry during crisis following U.S. shootdown of Iranian civilian jetliner and as part of that responsibility relayed U.S.-Iranian communications via Swiss Foreign Ministry.

- American Embassy Manila

Assignment coincided with period of political upheaval that resulted in the collapse of the Marcos regime and establishment of the Aquino administration. As Vice Consul, conducted interviews to determine eligibility of applicants for immigrant and non-immigrant visas and issued and renewed American passports. As Third Secretary, traveled to northern Philippines to collect information and prepare reports in anticipation of a disputed election. Served as election observer in the province of Ilocos Norte. Contributed to reports that served as basis

for White House conclusion that election was corrupt. Served on joint U.S.-Philippine Fulbright scholarship selection panel.

EDUCATION

- Ph.D. in Political Science. May 1987, Pennsylvania State University.

Dissertation: "Strategic Ambivalence." Adviser: Dr. Robert Harkavy.
Comprehensive Examination Fields: International Relations,
Comparative Politics, American Politics. Geographic area
Concentration: Eastern Europe/Soviet Union.

- International Summer Course on National Security. Summer 1982, Christian Albrechts University, Kiel, Germany. Non-degree.

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EDUCATION (cont.)

- M.A. in Government. June 1977, Lehigh University.

Master's Thesis: "A Critique of Selected Radical Revisionist Historical Contentions Regarding the Origins of the Cold War." Adviser: Dr. Nils Wessell (currently Professor at the Coast Guard Academy.)

- B.A. in History. December 1974, Bates College.

LANGUAGES

- German, fluent. Last tested November 1986, Foreign Service Institute (FSI), score 3+/3+. Maintained through regular reading and practice.
- Russian, reading knowledge. Last tested 1984, FSI, score 1/2.

PUBLICATIONS

- "No Good Deed. . ." *Connection*, Volume XVI, Number 2, Fall 2001.
- "Das Chelsea Projekt: Eine Partnerschaft zwischen Universitaet und Schule," with Dr. Thomas Kingston. *Bildung und Erziehung*, 50. Jg. Heft 2/Juni 1997.
- "The Partnership: the Present." *Journal of Education*, Volume 176, Number 1, 1994.
- "Soviet Control Mechanisms and Enticements: Military Alliances and Arms Transfers." *Soviet Union*, Volume 13, Part I.

BOARD MEMBERSHIPS

- Chairman, Boston University Management Team for Chelsea.
February 2000-present.
- Treasurer, Board Member, American-Swiss Foundation. March 1998-present.

AVOCATIONS

Fitness (running, rope jumping), reading and language study, music and dancing.

PERSONAL

Married to (b)(6) Two children (b)(6) and
(b)(6)

SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jonathan Arnold

Here is a background sheet on Jonathan Arnold, who Margaret Robson knows. He is very eager to go to Iraq and help out. He is an economist in Chicago Partners. In any event, he is supposed to be very good. Why don't you have someone take a look at him and see what he might be able to do.

Thanks.

Attach.
Background sheet on Jonathan Arnold

DHR:dh
060903-2

.....
Please respond by 6/20/03

6/17

Jim J. Beirne

Larry Di Rita
6/18

U17363 /03

030.02

06/10/03

10-1a)

JONATHAN I. ARNOLD

December 2002

Chicago Partners, L.L.C.
140 South Dearborn Street, Suite 1500
Chicago, Illinois 60603

(b)(6)

EDUCATION

M.B.A. (Finance and Accounting), The University of Chicago.

B.A. (Economics), The University of Chicago.

CURRENT POSITION

CHICAGO PARTNERS, L.L.C.

Principal (1995 - present).

Economic consulting and expert economic testimony.

RECENT PREVIOUS PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS.

Lecturer (1998 - 1999).

Taught microeconomics (topics included price theory, industrial organization, capital theory, principles of labor economics, and durable goods economics).

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO SCHOOL OF LAW

Lecturer of Law (1997 - 1998).

Taught antitrust economics.

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Application of economics to legal and regulatory questions including antitrust, intellectual property, securities, contract damages and mass torts.

TESTIMONY (since 1998)

Expert report in Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift America v. Power Lift, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Civil Action No. SACV 01-1084 DOC (Anx). (November 2002.)

Expert report, revised expert report and supplemental expert report in re Dade Behring Holdings, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Illinois (Eastern Division), Ch. 11 Bankruptcy Case No. 02-29020. (September 2002.)

Deposition in eSpeed v. The Chicago Board of Trade, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas (Dallas Division), Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-1016-M. (August 2002.)

Supplemental expert report in eSpeed v. The Chicago Board of Trade, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas (Dallas Division), Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-1016-M. (August 2002.)

Court testimony in McNeill-PPC v. Bayer, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Civil Action No. 99-CV-4733. (July 2002.)

Expert report in eSpeed v. The Chicago Board of Trade, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas (Dallas Division), Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-1016-M. (June 2002.)

Supplemental expert report in McNeill-PPC v. Bayer, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Civil Action No. 99-CV-4733. (May 2002.)

Deposition in McNeill-PPC v. Bayer, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Civil Action No. 99-CV-4733. (May 2002.)

Deposition in Southern National Corp. v. United States, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Civil Action No. 95-526-C. (February and March 2002.)

Expert report in McNeill-PPC v. Bayer, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Civil Action No. 99-CV-4733. (February 2002.)

Deposition in SouthTrust of Georgia, Inc. v. United States, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Civil Action No. 95-773-C. (February 2002.)

Deposition in Cain et al. v. The United States of America, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Civil Action No. 95-499-C. (January 2002.)

TESTIMONY (continued)

Joint expert report (with Steve Davis) in Southern National Corp. v. United States, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Civil Action No. 95-526-C. (January 2002.)

Expert report in Southern National Corp. v. United States, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Civil Action No. 95-526-C. (January 2002.)

Expert report in SouthTrust of Georgia, Inc. v. United States, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Civil Action No. 95-773-C. (December 2001.)

Expert report of Jonathan I. Arnold in Cain et al. v. The United States of America, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Civil Action No. 95-499-C. (November 2001.)

Expert report in Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., Claimant, and CTL Inc., CTLPET Systems, Inc., Terry Douglass and Ronald Nutt, Respondents, Arbitration before the Honorable Sam C. Pointer, Jr. (August 2001.)

Deposition in Valeo Electrical Systems v. Siemens Automotive Corp., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, No. 99-CV-40430. (June 2001.)

Rebuttal expert report in Valeo Electrical Systems v. Siemens Automotive Corp., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, No. 99-CV-40430. (May 2001.)

Expert report in Valeo Electrical Systems v. Siemens Automotive Corp., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, No. 99-CV-40430. (May 2001.)

Rebuttal expert report in B.Braun Medical v. Johnson & Johnson et al., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, No. 00-CV-380. (April 2001.)

Expert report in B.Braun Medical v. Johnson & Johnson et al., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, No. 00-CV-380. (March 2001.)

Rebuttal expert report in Art Gaskill Motorcycles v. Polaris Industries, American Arbitration Association, Dallas, Texas, Proceeding Number 651810015199. (August 2000.)

Rebuttal expert report in Carol Kropinski et al. v. Johnson and Johnson, Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Civil Action No. 8886-96. (February 2000.)

Deposition in Re Gaylord Container Shareholders Litigation, Court of Chancery, State of Delaware (New Castle County, Consolidated Civil Action No. 14616. (September 1999.)

Expert report in Surgical Sales v. Heyer-Schulte Neurocare, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, No. 98-CV-5813. (July 1999.)

TESTIMONY (continued)

Expert report in Re Gaylord Container Shareholders Litigation, Court of Chancery, State of Delaware (New Castle County, Consolidated Civil Action No. 14616. (July 1999.)

Supplemental expert report in Screening Systems, Inc. v. QualMark Corporation, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Western Division), Case Number SACV 96-283 LHM (EE). (June 1999.)

Deposition in CCC Information Services v. American Salvage Pool Association, U. S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois (Eastern Division), Civil Action No. 97-C-8634. (June 1999.)

Expert report in CCC Information Services v. American Salvage Pool Association, U. S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois (Eastern Division), Civil Action No. 97-C-8634. (June 1999.)

Expert report in Skechers v. A.C.I. International, U. S. District Court, Central District of California. (May 1999.)

Deposition in Re: MobileMedia Communications, Debtors, MobileMedia Communications v. Fujitsu Business Communications (February 1999.)

Expert report in Re: MobileMedia Communications, Debtors, MobileMedia Communications v. Fujitsu Business Communications (January 1999.)

Declaration in Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. v. Pro-Tech Power Corp., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia (Alexandria Division), Civil Action Nos. 97-1123-A and 98-124-A. (December 1998.)

Preliminary rebuttal expert report in Maxicare Health Plans of the Midwest, Inc. v. The Foundation For Medical Care of Central Illinois, U.S. District Court, Central District of Illinois (Springfield Division), Civil Action No. 97-3091. (November 1998.)

Declaration in Maxicare Health Plans of the Midwest, Inc. v. The Foundation For Medical Care of Central Illinois, U.S. District Court, Central District of Illinois (Springfield Division), Civil Action No. 97-3091. (November 1998.)

Deposition in Maxicare Health Plans of the Midwest, Inc. v. The Foundation For Medical Care of Central Illinois, U.S. District Court, Central District of Illinois (Springfield Division), Civil Action No. 97-3091. (September 1998.)

Court testimony in Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. v. Pro-Tech Power Corp., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia (Alexandria Division), Civil Action Nos. 97-1123-A and 98-124-A. (August 1998.)

TESTIMONY (continued)

Court testimony in Gateway 2000, Inc. v. Jeffrey F. Livak, U.S. District Court, Eastern Division of Michigan (Southern Division), Civil Action No. 98-72034. (August 1998.)

Deposition in Maxicare Health Plans of the Midwest, Inc. v. The Foundation For Medical Care of Central Illinois, U.S. District Court, Central District of Illinois (Springfield Division), Civil Action No. 97-3091. (August 1998.)

ARTICLES

"The Law and Economics of Reasonable Royalty Damages After Black & Decker's 'SnakeLight' Flashlight Litigation" 7 Fed. Cir. Bar J. 373 (Winter 1997).

"The Costs and Benefits of Expanding Capacity at Airports," 1997, manuscript.

"A Positive Analysis of the Federal Seven-Day Waiting Regulation for Handgun Purchases," 1996, manuscript.

"Real Estate Investment Analysis Using Modern Finance Theory" in Supplement to Real Estate Transactions: Structure and Analysis (Warren, Gorham & Lamont: 1994).

"Intellectual Property Litigation in High Technology Cases" (Prentice Hall Law & Business: 1993). (On videotape.)

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS


American Economic Association.
American Law and Economics Association.

OTHER

Certified public accountant

SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Kevin Woelflein

Here is a background sheet on Kevin Woelflein. I am told he is very smart. He knows that part of the world, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region. His expertise is he has set up banks and done various things. He is eager to get out there and help. My recollection is that those folks are short on people in economics.

Why don't you take a look at this and see if there is something he could do, either there or here.

Thanks.

Attach.

Background sheet on Kevin Woelflein

DHR:dh
060903-3

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Please respond by 6/20/03

230,02

9 Jun 03

U17364 103

Kevin G. Woelflein

(b)(6)

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Unique experienced financial executive with more than twenty five years domestic and international banking responsibilities. Founded UBAF Arab American Bank, New York, an Arab consortium bank whose Chairman was Dr. Fawzi El Kaissi, Iraq Minister of Finance prior to and during the early years of Saddam Hussein's rise to power. Wharton MBA and MIT undergraduate degrees.

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS

Founding President, CEO of UBAF Arab American Bank, New York City, a consortium bank owned 80% by 16 Arab banks and 20% by four American banks – First National Bank of Chicago, Bankers Trust, Texas Commerce and Security Pacific. The bank was chartered in New York State and a member of the Federal Reserve.

Organization of UBAF Arab American Bank was approved , by the National Security Council, as complementary to U.S. foreign policy to recycle petrodollars.

Reported, for nearly seven years, directly to the Chairman of the Board, Dr. Fawzi El Kaissi, Minister of Finance of Iraq and previously Governor of the Iraq Central Bank. Vice Chairman was Yusef Nimattalah, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Oman. The Board of Directors included Abdul Majid Shoman, Chairman and owner of The Arab Bank, Jordan, Dr. Mohammed Abushadi, Chairman of UBAF (Paris), Vice Governors of the Central Bank of Egypt and Morocco, Chairman of the Alahli Bank of Kuwait, and shareholder Directors from Abu Dhabi, Saudia Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Libya. American Directors included Charles Scanlon former President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

Monthly Board meetings, required by New York law, often were conducted throughout the world. But in general, business travel was required throughout the Arab world. The bank's business focused on international loan syndications, trade finance, foreign exchange, investment trading, mismatched funding and client funds management.

Selected to be founding President of UBAF Arab American Bank because of education, experience and personal characteristics further developed as founding General Manager of The First National Bank of Chicago's Tokyo Branch, an assignment of three years prior to New York.

MIT Chemical Engineering education was preparation to deal with the unknown and unfamiliar; Wharton finance training focused banking interests. I was fortunate to have a series of career opportunities dealing with unstructured banking situations in Chicago, Tokyo, New York and Boston including the challenge of introducing Arab banking into New York. Privileged to work directly with Dr. El Kaissi, a respected international financier and PhD from the University of Southern California.

OTHER INFORMATION

As President of The Massachusetts Company in Boston, organized the shell charter, which originated in the early 1800s, as a non-bank bank with commercial lending orientation but no demand deposits. Reported to the President of the Keystone Mutual Funds, a wholly owned subsidiary of Travelers Corporation.

Have Series 7 license to sell securities and worked helping banks manage investment portfolios and analyzing ongoing results.

Earlier banking experience included commercial lending at First Chicago, specializing in chemical companies nationwide, which followed employment at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia as National Business Economist.

Experience in the oil and chemical industry included development, as a member of a three person team, of the first computer simulation of a complete refinery, including optimization of crude selection, refinery operations and products.

Education

MBA - Wharton Graduate School of Finance, University of Pennsylvania.

BS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chemical Engineering

ABD - All but dissertation - Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, for PhD in Business & Applied Economics.

Honor - MIT Corporate Leadership Award

Personal - Married, (b)(6) children

- Biography in Who's Who in America

SENT 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: WMD

Now that the Iraq war is pretty well over, shouldn't we be able to declassify a lot of that information on weapons of mass destruction that would help put in context all the complaints about not finding it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-9

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

Iraq

9 June 10 3

U17365 /03

EF-5660

SGT 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: WMD

Please have someone give me the preamble to the UN resolution, so we can see what they said about weapons of mass destruction.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-10

Please respond by

6/13/03

6/17

USDP -
Please include 1441, too
Di Rite
Larry Di Rite
6/18

06-11- 11:40 1K

11-L-0559/OSD/16989

U173667/03

9 June 03

2/11
1800

6/23
Larry Di Rite

52

**Security Council**

Provisional

19 May 2003

Original: English

UNSCR 1483

Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution*The Security Council,**Recalling* all its previous relevant resolutions,*Reaffirming* the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq,*Reaffirming also* the importance of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and of eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq,*Stressing* the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, *welcoming* the commitment of all parties concerned to support the creation of an environment in which they may do so as soon as possible, and *expressing* resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly,*Encouraging* efforts by the people of Iraq to form a representative government based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender, and, in this connection, *recalls* resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,*Welcoming* the first steps of the Iraqi people in this regard, and *noting* in this connection the 15 April 2003 Nasiriyah statement and the 28 April 2003 Baghdad statement,*Resolved* that the United Nations should play a vital role in humanitarian relief, the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative governance,*Noting* the statement of 12 April 2003 by the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations in which the members recognized the need for a multilateral effort to help rebuild and develop Iraq and for the need for assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in these efforts,*Welcoming also* the resumption of humanitarian assistance and the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to provide food and medicine to the people of Iraq,*Welcoming* the appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Adviser on Iraq,

Affirming the need for accountability for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime,

Stressing the need for respect for the archaeological, historical, cultural, and religious heritage of Iraq, and for the continued protection of archaeological, historical, cultural, and religious sites, museums, libraries, and monuments,

Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the "Authority"),

Noting further that other States that are not occupying powers are working now or in the future may work under the Authority,

Welcoming further the willingness of Member States to contribute to stability and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the Authority,

Concerned that many Kuwaitis and Third-State Nationals still are not accounted for since 2 August 1990,

Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Appeals* to Member States and concerned organizations to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country, and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with this resolution;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations for Iraq and to help meet the humanitarian and other needs of the Iraqi people by providing food, medical supplies, and resources necessary for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq's economic infrastructure;

3. *Appeals* to Member States to deny safe haven to those members of the previous Iraqi regime who are alleged to be responsible for crimes and atrocities and to support actions to bring them to justice;

4. *Calls upon* the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future;

5. *Calls upon* all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907;

6. *Calls upon* the Authority and relevant organizations and individuals to continue efforts to locate, identify, and repatriate all Kuwaiti and Third-State Nationals or the remains of those present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990, as well

letter
outlines
CPA WMD
disarmament
responsibilities

as the Kuwaiti archives, that the previous Iraqi regime failed to undertake, and, in this regard, *directs* the High-Level Coordinator, in consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Tripartite Commission and with the appropriate support of the people of Iraq and in coordination with the Authority, to take steps to fulfil his mandate with respect to the fate of Kuwaiti and Third-State National missing persons and property;

7. *Decides* that all Member States shall take appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return to Iraqi institutions, of Iraqi cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance illegally removed from the Iraq National Museum, the National Library, and other locations in Iraq since the adoption of resolution 661 (1990) of 2 August 1990, including by establishing a prohibition on trade in or transfer of such items and items with respect to which reasonable suspicion exists that they have been illegally removed, and calls upon the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Interpol, and other international organizations, as appropriate, to assist in the implementation of this paragraph;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq whose independent responsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the Council on his activities under this resolution, coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq, coordinating among United Nations and international agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and, in coordination with the Authority, assisting the people of Iraq through:

(a) coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by United Nations agencies and between United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations;

(b) promoting the safe, orderly, and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons;

(c) working intensively with the Authority, the people of Iraq, and others concerned to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a process leading to an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq;

(d) facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastructure, in cooperation with other international organizations;

(e) promoting economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development, including through coordination with national and regional organizations, as appropriate, civil society, donors and the international financial institutions;

(f) encouraging international efforts to contribute to basic civilian administration functions;

(g) promoting the protection of human rights;

(h) encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force; and

(i) encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform;

9. *Supports* the formation, by the people of Iraq with the help of the Authority and working with the Special Representative, of an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional administration run by Iraqis, until an internationally recognized, representative government is established by the people of Iraq and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority;

10. *Decides* that, with the exception of prohibitions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related materiel other than those arms and related materiel required by the Authority to serve the purposes of this and other related resolutions, all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq and the provision of financial or economic resources to Iraq established by resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, including resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992, shall no longer apply;

11. *Reaffirms* that Iraq must meet its disarmament obligations, *encourages* the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to keep the Council informed of their activities in this regard, and *underlines* the intention of the Council to revisit the mandates of the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and 1441 (2002) of 8 November 2002;

12. *Notes* the establishment of a Development Fund for Iraq to be held by the Central Bank of Iraq and to be audited by independent public accountants approved by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq and looks forward to the early meeting of that International Advisory and Monitoring Board, whose members shall include duly qualified representatives of the Secretary-General, of the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, of the Director-General of the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, and of the President of the World Bank;

13. *Notes further* that the funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed at the direction of the Authority, in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration, for the purposes set out in paragraph 14 below;

14. *Underlines* that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a transparent manner to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq;

15. *Calls upon* the international financial institutions to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction and development of their economy and to facilitate assistance by the broader donor community, and *welcomes* the readiness of creditors, including those of the Paris Club, to seek a solution to Iraq's sovereign debt problems;

16. *Requests* also that the Secretary-General, in coordination with the Authority, continue the exercise of his responsibilities under Security Council resolution 1472 (2003) of 28 March 2003 and 1476 (2003) of 24 April 2003, for a period of six months following the adoption of this resolution, and terminate within this time period, in the most cost effective manner, the ongoing operations of the "Oil-for-Food" Programme (the "Programme"), both at headquarters level and in the field, transferring responsibility for the administration of any remaining activity

under the Programme to the Authority, including by taking the following necessary measures:

(a) to facilitate as soon as possible the shipment and authenticated delivery of priority civilian goods as identified by the Secretary-General and representatives designated by him, in coordination with the Authority and the Iraqi interim administration, under approved and funded contracts previously concluded by the previous Government of Iraq, for the humanitarian relief of the people of Iraq, including, as necessary, negotiating adjustments in the terms or conditions of these contracts and respective letters of credit as set forth in paragraph 4 (d) of resolution 1472 (2003);

(b) to review, in light of changed circumstances, in coordination with the Authority and the Iraqi interim administration, the relative utility of each approved and funded contract with a view to determining whether such contracts contain items required to meet the needs of the people of Iraq both now and during reconstruction, and to postpone action on those contracts determined to be of questionable utility and the respective letters of credit until an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq is in a position to make its own determination as to whether such contracts shall be fulfilled;

(c) to provide the Security Council within 21 days following the adoption of this resolution, for the Security Council's review and consideration, an estimated operating budget based on funds already set aside in the account established pursuant to paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, identifying:

(i) all known and projected costs to the United Nations required to ensure the continued functioning of the activities associated with implementation of the present resolution, including operating and administrative expenses associated with the relevant United Nations agencies and programmes responsible for the implementation of the Programme both at Headquarters and in the field;

(ii) all known and projected costs associated with termination of the Programme;

(iii) all known and projected costs associated with restoring Government of Iraq funds that were provided by Member States to the Secretary-General as requested in paragraph 1 of resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992; and

(iv) all known and projected costs associated with the Special Representative and the qualified representative of the Secretary-General identified to serve on the International Advisory and Monitoring Board, for the six month time period defined above, following which these costs shall be borne by the United Nations;

(d) to consolidate into a single fund the accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995);

(e) to fulfil all remaining obligations related to the termination of the Programme, including negotiating, in the most cost effective manner, any necessary settlement payments, which shall be made from the escrow accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), with those parties that previously have entered into contractual obligations with the Secretary-General under the Programme, and to determine, in coordination with the Authority and the

Iraqi interim administration, the future status of contracts undertaken by the United Nations and related United Nations agencies under the accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (b) and 8 (d) of resolution 986 (1995);

(f) to provide the Security Council, 30 days prior to the termination of the Programme, with a comprehensive strategy developed in close coordination with the Authority and the Iraqi interim administration that would lead to the delivery of all relevant documentation and the transfer of all operational responsibility of the Programme to the Authority;

17. *Requests further* that the Secretary-General transfer as soon as possible to the Development Fund for Iraq 1 billion United States dollars from unencumbered funds in the accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), restore Government of Iraq funds that were provided by Member States to the Secretary-General as requested in paragraph 1 of resolution 778 (1992), and *decides* that, after deducting all relevant United Nations expenses associated with the shipment of authorized contracts and costs to the Programme outlined in paragraph 16 (c) above, including residual obligations, all surplus funds in the escrow accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b), 8 (d), and 8 (f) of resolution 986 (1995) shall be transferred at the earliest possible time to the Development Fund for Iraq;

18. *Decides* to terminate effective on the adoption of this resolution the functions related to the observation and monitoring activities undertaken by the Secretary-General under the Programme, including the monitoring of the export of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq;

19. *Decides* to terminate the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 661 (1990) at the conclusion of the six months period called for in paragraph 16 above and *further decides* that the Committee shall identify individuals and entities referred to in paragraph 23 below;

20. *Decides* that all export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas from Iraq following the date of the adoption of this resolution shall be made consistent with prevailing international market best practices, to be audited by independent public accountants reporting to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board referred to in paragraph 12 above in order to ensure transparency, and *decides further* that, except as provided in paragraph 21 below, all proceeds from such sales shall be deposited into the Development Fund for Iraq, until such time as an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq is properly constituted;

21. *Decides further* that 5 percent of the proceeds referred to in paragraph 20 above shall be deposited into the Compensation Fund established in accordance with resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and subsequent relevant resolutions and that, unless an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq and the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, in the exercise of its authority over methods of ensuring that payments are made into the Compensation Fund, decide otherwise, this requirement shall be binding on a properly constituted, internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq and any successor thereto;

22. *Noting* the relevance of the establishment of an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq and the desirability of prompt

completion of the restructuring of Iraq's debt as referred to in paragraph 15 above, further *decides* that, until December 31, 2007, unless the Council decides otherwise, petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas originating in Iraq shall be immune, until title passes to the initial purchaser, from legal proceedings against them and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment, or execution, and that all States shall take any steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal systems to assure this protection, and that proceeds and obligations arising from sales thereof, as well as the Development Fund for Iraq, shall enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those enjoyed by the United Nations except that the above-mentioned privileges and immunities will not apply with respect to any legal proceeding in which recourse to such proceeds or obligations is necessary to satisfy liability for damages assessed in connection with an ecological accident, including an oil spill, that occurs after the date of adoption of this resolution;

23. *Decides* that all Member States in which there are:

- (a) funds or other financial assets or economic resources of the previous Government of Iraq or its state bodies, corporations, or agencies, located outside Iraq as of the date of this resolution, or
- (b) funds or other financial assets or economic resources that have been removed from Iraq, or acquired, by Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the former Iraqi regime and their immediate family members, including entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction,

shall freeze without delay those funds or other financial assets or economic resources and, unless these funds or other financial assets or economic resources are themselves the subject of a prior judicial, administrative, or arbitral lien or judgement, immediately shall cause their transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq, it being understood that, unless otherwise addressed, claims made by private individuals or non-government entities on those transferred funds or other financial assets may be presented to the internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq; and *decides further* that all such funds or other financial assets or economic resources shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and protections as provided under paragraph 22;

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the work of the Special Representative with respect to the implementation of this resolution and on the work of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board and *encourages* the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to inform the Council at regular intervals of their efforts under this resolution;

25. *Decides* to review the implementation of this resolution within twelve months of adoption and to consider further steps that might be necessary;

26. *Calls upon* Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute to the implementation of this resolution;

27. *Decides* to remain seized of this matter.

*Trace
UN*

The President of the Security Council presents his compliments to the members of the Council and has the honour to transmit herewith, for their information, copies of a letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. This letter will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/2003/538.

8 May 2003

**UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017

**UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**
One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza
New York, New York 10017

May 8, 2003

Excellency:

The United States, United Kingdom, and Coalition Partners continue to act together to ensure the complete disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions. The States participating in the Coalition will strictly abide by their obligations under international law, including those relating to the essential humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq. We will act to ensure that Iraq's oil is protected and used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

In order to meet these objectives and obligations in the post-conflict period in Iraq, the United States, United Kingdom, and Coalition partners, acting under existing command and control arrangements through the Commander of Coalition Forces, have created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), to exercise powers of government temporarily, and as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.

The United States, United Kingdom, and Coalition partners, working through the Coalition Provisional Authority, shall, *inter alia*, provide for security in and for the provisional administration of Iraq, including by: deterring hostilities; maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and securing Iraq's borders; securing, and removing, disabling, rendering harmless, eliminating or destroying (i) all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and all other chemical, biological and nuclear delivery systems, and (ii) all elements of Iraq's programs to research, develop, design, manufacture, produce, support, assemble, and employ such weapons and delivery systems and subsystems and components thereof, including but not limited to

His Excellency
Mr. Mimir Akram,
President of the Security Council,
United Nations,
New York, New York.

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stocks of chemical and biological agents, nuclear-weapon-usable material, other related materials, technology, equipment, facilities, and intellectual property that have been used in or can materially contribute to these programs; in consultation with relevant international organizations, facilitating the orderly and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons; maintaining civil law and order, including through encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force; eliminating all terrorist infrastructure and resources within Iraq and working to ensure that terrorists and terrorist groups are denied safe haven; supporting and coordinating de-mining and related activities; promoting accountability for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime; and assuming immediate control of Iraqi institutions responsible for military and security matters and providing, as appropriate, for the demilitarization, demobilization, control, command, reformation, disestablishment, or reorganization of those institutions so that they no longer pose a threat to the Iraqi people or international peace and security but will be capable of defending Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The United States, United Kingdom, and Coalition partners recognize the urgent need to create an environment in which the Iraqi people may freely determine their own political future. To this end, the United States, United Kingdom, and Coalition Partners are facilitating the efforts of the Iraqi people to take the first steps towards forming a representative government, based on the rule of law, that affords fundamental freedoms and equal protection and justice under law to the people of Iraq without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender. The United States, United Kingdom, and Coalition partners are facilitating the establishment of representative institutions of government, and providing for the responsible administration of the Iraqi financial sector, for humanitarian relief, for economic reconstruction, for the transparent operation and repair of Iraq's infrastructure and natural resources, and for the progressive transfer of administrative responsibilities to such representative institutions of government, as appropriate. Our goal is to transfer responsibility for administration to representative Iraqi authorities as early as possible.


The United Nations has a vital role to play in providing humanitarian relief, in supporting the reconstruction of Iraq, and in helping in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority. The United States, United Kingdom, and Coalition partners are ready to work closely with representatives of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies and look forward to the appointment of a Special Coordinator by the Secretary-General. We also

-3-

welcome the support and contributions of Member States, international and regional organisations, and other entities, under appropriate coordination arrangements with the Coalition Provisional Authority.

We would be grateful if you could arrange for this letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.


John D. Negroponte


Jeremy Greenstock

TOTAL P.03

11-L-0559/OSD/17000

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
8 November 2002

Resolution 1441 (2002)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on
8 November 2002**

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,

Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully,

Recognizing the threat Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,

Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,

Deploing the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,

Deploing further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons

inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,

Deploing the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,

Deploing also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,

Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,

Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,

Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions,

Noting that the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq's continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions,

Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States,

Commending the Secretary-General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary-General for their efforts in this regard,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

2. *Decides*, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;

3. *Decides* that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material;

4. *Decides* that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;

5. *Decides* that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;

6. *Endorses* the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq;

7. *Decides* further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks

set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in Iraq:

- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available;
- All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA;
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998) of 2 March 1998;
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities;
- Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient United Nations security guards;
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected;
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles;
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage;

8. *Decides* further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands

further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

10. *Requests* all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

11. *Directs* the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;

12. *Decides* to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;

13. *Recalls*, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex

Text of Blix/El-Baradei letter

**United Nations Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission**

International Atomic Energy Agency

The Executive Chairman

The Director General

8 October 2002

Dear General Al-Saadi,

During our recent meeting in Vienna, we discussed practical arrangements that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. As you recall, at the end of our meeting in Vienna we agreed on a statement which listed some of the principal results achieved, particularly Iraq's acceptance of all the rights of inspection provided for in all of the relevant Security Council resolutions. This acceptance was stated to be without any conditions attached.

During our 3 October 2002 briefing to the Security Council, members of the Council suggested that we prepare a written document on all of the conclusions we reached in Vienna. This letter lists those conclusions and seeks your confirmation thereof. We shall report accordingly to the Security Council.

In the statement at the end of the meeting, it was clarified that UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be granted immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites, including what was termed "sensitive sites" in the past. As we noted, however, eight presidential sites have been the subject of special procedures under a Memorandum of Understanding of 1998. Should these sites be subject, as all other sites, to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, UNMOVIC and the IAEA would conduct inspections there with the same professionalism.

H.E. General Amir H. Al-Saadi
Advisor
Presidential Office
Baghdad
Iraq

We confirm our understanding that UNMOVIC and the IAEA have the right to determine the number of inspectors required for access to any particular site. This determination will be made on the basis of the size and complexity of the site being inspected. We also confirm that Iraq will be informed of the designation of additional sites, i.e. sites not declared by Iraq or previously inspected by either UNSCOM or the IAEA, through a Notification of Inspection (NIS) provided upon arrival of the inspectors at such sites.

Iraq will ensure that no proscribed material, equipment, records or other relevant items will be destroyed except in the presence of UNMOVIC and/or IAEA inspectors, as appropriate, and at their request.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA may conduct interviews with any person in Iraq whom they believe may have information relevant to their mandate. Iraq will facilitate such interviews. It is for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to choose the mode and location for interviews.

The National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) will, as in the past, serve as the Iraqi counterpart for the inspectors. The Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre (BOMVIC) will be maintained on the same premises and under the same conditions as was the former Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The NMD will make available services as before, cost free, for the refurbishment of the premises.

The NMD will provide free of cost: (a) escorts to facilitate access to sites to be inspected and communication with personnel to be interviewed; (b) a hotline for BOMVIC which will be staffed by an English speaking person on a 24 hour a day/seven days a week basis; (c) support in terms of personnel and ground transportation within the country, as requested; and (d) assistance in the movement of materials and equipment at inspectors' request (construction, excavation equipment, etc.). NMD will also ensure that escorts are available in the event of inspections outside normal working hours, including at night and on holidays.

Regional UNMOVIC/IAEA offices may be established, for example, in Basra and Mosul, for the use of their inspectors. For this purpose, Iraq will provide, without cost, adequate office buildings, staff accommodation, and appropriate escort personnel.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA may use any type of voice or data transmission, including satellite and/or inland networks, with or without encryption capability. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may also install equipment in the field with the capability for transmission of data directly to the BOMVIC, New York and Vienna (e.g. sensors, surveillance cameras). This will be facilitated by Iraq and there will be no interference by Iraq with UNMOVIC or IAEA communications.

Iraq will provide, without cost, physical protection of all surveillance equipment, and construct antennae for remote transmission of data, at the request of UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Upon request by UNMOVIC through the NMD, Iraq will allocate frequencies for communications equipment.

Iraq will provide security for all UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel. Secure and suitable accommodations will be designated at normal rates by Iraq for these personnel. For their part, UNMOVIC and the IAEA will require that their staff not stay at any accommodation other than those identified in consultation with Iraq.

On the use of fixed-wing aircraft for transport of personnel and equipment and for inspection purposes, it was clarified that aircraft used by UNMOVIC and IAEA staff arriving in Baghdad may land at Saddam International Airport. The points of departure of incoming aircraft will be decided by UNMOVIC. The Rasheed airbase will continue to be used for UNMOVIC and IAEA helicopter operations. UNMOVIC and Iraq will establish air liaison offices at the airbase. At both Saddam International Airport and Rasheed airbase, Iraq will provide the necessary support premises and facilities. Aircraft fuel will be provided by Iraq, as before, free of charge.

On the wider issue of air operations in Iraq, both fixed-wing and rotary, Iraq will guarantee the safety of air operations in its air space outside the no-fly zones. With regard to air operations in the no-fly zones, Iraq will take all steps within its control to ensure the safety of such operations.

Helicopter flights may be used, as needed, during inspections and for technical activities, such as gamma detection, without limitation in all parts of Iraq and without any area excluded. Helicopters may also be used for medical evacuation.

On the question of aerial imagery, UNMOVIC may wish to resume the use of U-2 or Mirage overflights. The relevant practical arrangements would be similar to those implemented in the past.

As before, visas for all arriving staff will be issued at the point of entry on the basis of the UN Laissez-Passer or UN Certificate; no other entry or exit formalities will be required. The aircraft passenger manifest will be provided one hour in advance of the arrival of the aircraft in Baghdad. There will be no searching of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or of official or personal baggage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA will ensure that their personnel respect the laws of Iraq restricting the export of certain items, for example, those related to Iraq's national cultural heritage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may bring into, and remove from, Iraq all of the items and materials they require, including satellite phones and other equipment. With respect to samples, UNMOVIC and IAEA will, where feasible, split samples so that Iraq may receive a portion while another portion is kept for reference purposes. Where appropriate, the organizations will send the samples to more than one laboratory for analysis.

We would appreciate your confirmation of the above as a correct reflection of our talks in Vienna.

Naturally, we may need other practical arrangements when proceeding with inspections. We would expect in such matters, as with the above, Iraq's co-operation in all respect.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed)
Hans Blix
Executive Chairman
United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission

(Signed)
Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency

505 6/11
June 9, 2003

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Lugar

I think we ought to do more with Dick Lugar. I think he wants to be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060903-11

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

032

SD outbox
8/6

U17367 /03

5/24/03

MEMORANDUM

June 12, 2003

I want to talk to Steve Cambone and Jim Jones about the treasure trove of spying that Jim Jones mentioned.

DHR/azn
061203 14

1 Zerhagen

DIA link

Will show Richardson
to get the intel to get to
PFWIC & not caught
Show for compliance w/serbi
for 1st year.

Should you increase how
they operate.

US Dem Intel &
Some oversight by CIA -
OK.

"Palla Casone"
J-2 Evon Brindel
S.C. on it - Ski back
Int. friend.

UK has it all -

Need to decipher.

Archives know op. not results

US-UK channels doing
Analysis - Handwritten

SG & Lord Arch will not -
others are not sure

6 m. to Analysis - 2-3 operations

mostly handwritten - delete
didn't track

000.71 SD

12 June 03

8:15 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 12, 2003

SUBJECT:

We should have known about the video of the Vice President and the other folks in Garmisch so we can de-conflict out comments. I was saying almost the same thing they were saying.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061203.15

Please respond by: _____

U17377 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17011

8:15 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: June 12, 2003

SUBJECT:

I understand there's an article on wrestling and me in *The New York Times*. Could you give it to me? I've never seen it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061203.07

Please respond by: _____

U17379 : /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17012

000.7 SD

12 June 03

Long Di File
6/23

6/19/03

Sir:
I haven't found anything in the NYT or New Yorker yet but we will look for it.
Or New Yorker

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Morning Call (Allentown, PA)

June 15, 2003 Sunday FIRST EDITION

SECTION: SPORTS, Pg. C2, SIELSKI

LENGTH: 995 words

HEADLINE: Before he grappled with world issues, he wrestled

BYLINE: By Mike Sielski Of The Morning Call

BODY:

From the moment the matchup was set, the confidence flowed through Ken Hunt like a drug, so certain was he that he wouldn't, couldn't lose now that he knew who his opponent was. He was a sophomore at Cornell University then, a 19-year-old kid on the cusp of the 1953 NCAA Eastern Intercollegiate wrestling championship in the 157-pound weight class, with only Donald Rumsfeld in his way.

"I just felt right from the beginning I was going to beat him," Hunt said over the telephone recently. "When the finals came around, I felt pretty confident."

Fifty years later, Hunt owns a software consulting company and lives in Greensboro, N.C., his victory over the man who now oversees the American war machine the capstone to his career as a competitive wrestler -- a career aided by tutelage from legendary Lehigh coach Billy Sheridan. He never wrestled again after defeating Rumsfeld, a Princeton University junior at the time, the U.S. Secretary of Defense now -- that final match lasting half a century as Hunt's most prestigious win, against his most prestigious foe.

While most of the nation sees Rumsfeld only through the prism of his Pentagon briefings, his often contentious press conferences televised live by CNN and C-SPAN, Hunt's view has an added dimension. He can close his eyes, and there's Rumsfeld: No glasses wrapped around the eyes. No slick, silver hair. No air of authority on the events in Iraq. Just a competitor in an orange-and-black singlet, standing between Hunt and a championship.

"I actually respect him," Hunt said. "My perception is, he's acting on his beliefs. I felt that, with the little bit that I knew him after that wrestling match, he was consistently the same person. The way he's operating now is consistent with that."

Hunt had the pedigree for the sort of performance he put on at the 1953 Easterns. He had wrestled at Mepham High School on Long Island, had been there during a stretch in which the program won 100 consecutive matches, lost one, then won another 156 in a row.

In a prelude to the 1953 Easterns, Hunt, while a junior at Mepham, had met Rumsfeld in 1950 for the 155-pound championship at an AAU tournament at the New York Athletic Club in Manhattan. Hunt won on a referee's decision.

Each summer during high school, he traveled southwest to Bethlehem to spend a week at Sheridan's summer camp, to learn under the coach who had guided Lehigh to eight NCAA Championship appearances from 1931 to 1940.

"Lehigh," Hunt said, "was the mecca in the east."

After straining cartilage in his knee during his freshman season at Cornell, Hunt emerged as one of the country's top middle-weight wrestlers as a sophomore.

"Kenny was one of the most naturally talented wrestlers I ever knew," said Don Dickason, a '53 Cornell grad and one of Hunt's former teammates. "I'm not saying he didn't work, but he came on the scene and was so talented. His countermoves were intuitive. Kenny just seemed to do it."

Rumsfeld, according to Dickason and an April article in The New Yorker, lacked Hunt's innate skill, but he could wear down opponents through sheer relentlessness. His trademark move was a "fireman's carry," in which he used a spinning motion to lift his opponent off the mat and dump him on his back.

"He was an excellent, sturdy workman," said Dickason, who lives in Princeton and served as Penn State University's dean of admissions from 1979-85. "Someone would get ahead, but then he'd come back. At the end of the match, you knew you were in a tough battle."

That Rumsfeld advanced to the '53 Eastern final -- held at Princeton -- was the greatest surprise of the tournament. It was assumed Hunt would meet Syracuse's Ed Rooney for the title, but Rumsfeld's 6-4 semifinal win over Rooney remains a match that aficionados of wrestling history hold up as a classic.

"That was a major upset," Phil Harvey, a teammate and classmate of Hunt at Cornell, said from his home in Chester County. "Rooney, the next year, would win the Eastern title and be named the outstanding wrestler in the east. Rumsfeld just never seemed to take a backwards step."

Unlike Hunt and Rumsfeld's earlier AAU bout, this match, from its beginning, promised not to be so close.

Once, twice, and then a third time, Hunt slipped around Rumsfeld, grabbed him by the ankle and dropped him to the mat, piling up points two by two. Three successive takedowns, a six-point lead in a championship match against a wrestler he had beaten once before, and still Hunt couldn't end the thing. Still, Rumsfeld kept coming after him.

"I think I was ahead 8-2 or 8-2," Hunt told The New Yorker. "And then I began to run out of gas. I had the feeling that he could taste blood, you know, if he could get me real tired -- and I was getting tired."

He held on, however. Though Rumsfeld reversed Hunt several times during the third period, he didn't have enough time to complete a comeback. Hunt won, 9-5.

"If it hadn't been that [Rumsfeld] was in such better condition than Ken," Harvey said, "it wouldn't have been a match."

Only one of the two finalists was **wrestling** the following year. **Rumsfeld**, a senior captain of Princeton's team, advanced to the 1954 Eastern semifinals. But Hunt reaggravated his freshman-year knee injury during Easterns in '53 and, after defeating Rumsfeld, skipped nationals that year. By his own admission, he didn't love wrestling enough to compete in his final two years at Cornell.

"It didn't seem so important," he said, laughing.

Hunt appreciates that time in his life, he said, but he seems not to cling to it too tightly. He graduated from Cornell in 1955, began his career in the software industry, and has allowed the memories from that final match -- his anticipation of victory, the irony of his opponent's identity, his last glimpse of athletic glory -- to warm him for 50 years.

"Everything I think about from those days," he said, "is wonderful."

michael.sielski@mcall.com

610-820-6628

GRAPHIC: Photo by Yves Logghe, Associated Press; U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD exhibited the same tenacious qualities he has today when he wrestled for Princeton.

LOAD-DATE: June 15, 2003

Document 1 of 5 [next](#) ►

11-L-0559/OSD/17014

8:15 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 12, 2003

SUBJECT:

I talked to the Spanish MoD and I agreed to help them with the Poles to see that it works out well for them. They did a terrific thing by agreeing to work with the Poles. We need to help them.

Thanks.

Spain
6/30
CJCS RESPONSE ATTACHED

v/r

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 1 2003

DHR:azn
061203 06

6/21/03

Please respond by: _____

03 JUN 20 AM 9:15

U17380 /03

D-18

11-L-0559/OSD/17015

13 June 03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1025-03
25 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Helping Spain with the Poles in Iraq

- In response to your inquiry we agree Spain has been generous in its offer to join us in Iraq with the Poles. General Franks and I have recently completed trips to Madrid and have clearly stated our appreciation for their efforts.
- General Franks has told the Spaniards to prepare a list of requirements that they believe need US support to ensure their success. I also made the same point to the Spanish CHOD during my visit this past week. US Central Command will work through this list to ensure the Spaniards achieve the necessary objectives.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/17016

8:15 PM

TO: J. D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 12, 2003

SUBJECT:

The MoD from Romania wants me to go to Transylvania. Do you know what he's talking about?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061203 05

Please respond by: _____

6/18/03

U17381 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17017

Romania

10 June 03

8:15 PM

TO: Secy. Jim Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 12, 2003

SUBJECT:

We must not cave in to Senator Craig. If we do, it will never end. Please see me.

Thanks.

DHR:azn
061203 03

Please respond by: _____

6/17/03

020AF

12 Jun 03

U17382 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17018

9:46 AM

TO: Gen. Craddock
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 14, 2003

SUBJECT: **Gen. Franks**

Tom Franks is going to be in Washington on July 8th and 9th after he is no longer Combatant Commander but before he is retired. I think we ought to have him brief on Afghanistan and Iraq, maybe on two separate days.

We ought to think about what we do with him while he is here. He certainly ought to meet with the President for a farewell.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061403.02

Please respond by: _____

U17385 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17019

*m
w
/*

14 Jun 03

4/19
Snowflake

10:19 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: June 14, 2003

SUBJECT: Attached Newspaper Clipping

This says that in January, Don Rumsfeld and Condi Rice mentioned Iraq's alleged attempts to buy uranium. I don't remember anything like that. Could you check and see if I said anything like that and let me know.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061403.06

Attach: Newspaper clipping; source unknown

Please respond by:

6/20/03

U17386 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17020

Sir:
Please
See attached
from 1/29/03
TC.

Lance D. Rice
6/20

600.75D

14 June 03

Search

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TODAY

QUESTIONS?

PUBLICATIONS

United States Department of Defense

News Transcript

On the web: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/t01292003_t0129sd.htmlMedia contact: media@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 697-5131Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html> or +1 (703) 428-0711

to 38,500,000
and these strike, then
Total Savings up to 80%

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tracts

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Updated: 29 Jan 2003

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Wednesday, January 29, 2003 - 2:18 p.m.
EST

DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers

(Also participating was Gen. Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In response to questions on Secretary Rumsfeld's meetings with the Congress and the Joint Chiefs a fact sheet is at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/d20030129consultations.pdf>.

Additionally, the fact sheet referred to by Gen. Myers on weapons caches is located at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/d20030129weapons.pdf>.)

Rumsfeld: Good afternoon. In the State of the Union remarks last evening, the President made clear that Saddam Hussein poses a "serious," to quote him, "and mounting threat to our country, [and] our friends and our allies" that cannot be ignored. As the President pointed out, the Iraqi regime has not accounted for some 38,000 liters of botulism toxin, 500 tons of Sarin, mustard gas, VX nerve agent, upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical weapons, and a number of mobile biological labs designed to produce biological weapons while evading detection. His regime has the design for a nuclear weapon; it was working on several different methods of enriching uranium, and recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa. The regime plays host to terrorists, including al Qaeda, as the President indicated. Saddam's regime hides military equipment in or near mosques, hospitals, civilian homes and has a history of using innocent civilians as human shields. That is why, as he said, our nation and the world must not allow a brutal dictator with a history of reckless aggression and ties to terrorism to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States.

For those who counsel more time for inspections, the President responded that we have given Saddam Hussein more than a decade to give up chemical, biological and his nuclear weapon program. Yet nothing to date has restrained him: Not economic sanctions, not diplomacy, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes on his military facilities. He's now refusing to cooperate with the 17th U.N. Security Council resolution. As Mr. Blix's report pointed out, at what point do reasonable people conclude that we know his answer as to whether or not he intends to cooperate and voluntarily disarm? As the President made clear, the dictator of Iraq is not disarming; to the contrary, he is deceiving. His time to do so is running out. It's up to Iraq to prevent the use of force. And let's hope that they do so.

General Myers?

10:04 AM

TO: Gen. Craddock
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 14, 2003

SUBJECT: **Phone Call**

I need a phone call with Gen. Jim Jones, SACUR. I want to talk to him about the classified project he briefed me on so it has to be Secure.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061403.04

Please respond by: _____

6/20/03

DB8

U17387 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17022

ENCOM

14 Jun 03

Snowflake

EF-5757

10:21 AM

TO: J. D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 14, 2003

SUBJECT:

See if you can get a copy of that cover of *The New Republic* so I can send it to Nick Burns like I promised. *National Review*

Thank you.

From De Crouch *7/9*

DHR/azn
061403.07

5/12

Please respond by: _____

6/20/03

U17388 /03

06-10-03 00:52 PM

11-L-0559/QSD/17023

061403.07

14 Jun 03

Byron York: Is Bush a Liar?

NATIONAL REVIEW

NEOCONSERVATIVES



Ramesh Ponnuru
ON BUSH'S
MISUNDERSTOOD
FOREIGN POLICY

SD/17024

www.nationalreview.com

~~SECRET~~EF-7003
I-03/013544

September 29, 2003

Honduras

TO: Peter Rodman

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Honduran Air Bridge Denial

Do we plan to get back to the President of Honduras on this air bridge issue?

Thanks.

Attach.

8/27/03 SecDef memo to CJCS re: Honduran Air Bridge Denial

DHR:dh
092903-23.....
Please respond by 10/17/03

✓ b/w
C 10/15

Sir,
Response to these
two snowflakes
attached.
vr
CDR Nosenza
10/15

295403

U17407 /03

~~SECRET~~
11/10/03/1025UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

August 20, 2003

EF-6502

03/01/77-ES

TO: Peter Rodman

SUBJECT: Drug Runners Flying Over Honduras

I would like to solve the issue of why we are prohibiting the Hondurans from shooting down aircraft that are running drugs. Knowing that they are not allowed to shoot them down is like an invitation to having drug runners fly over Honduras. It is crazy.

Let's sort through that and see what we can do about it. Please don't let it drop. It is ridiculous. They are allowed to shoot people if they are on the ground. They are allowed to shoot people if they are in the sea. But they are not allowed to shoot people if they are in the air. I don't get it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082003-7 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/19/03

U17408 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17026

Honduras

20 Aug 03



OCT. 20. 2003 11:35AM
OCT. 10. 2003 12:10PM

CCCC SECURE FAX

NO. 111 P. 1
NO. 037 P. 2

October 14, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION				
SECDEF	DDPSEC	ISPLASST	SECDEF	USDP
USDP	CD	CD X	CABLES	FILE

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sunni Triangle

Attached is an e-mail from a person on the ground in Iraq with some strong views.
It is worth reading and thinking about.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/29/03 Bing West e-mail to James Schlesinger re: Report from Sunni Triangle

DHR:dh
101403-17

.....
Please respond by 10/31/03

Mr. Secretary:

*I presume this constant delay of "send the
Marines in" has some purpose I do not
understand or appreciate. Please feel free
to send in the Marines. CENTCOM needs
capability not service squabbling. Otherwise
I agree with some key points.*

11-L-0569/OSD/17027

017410

103

CF

*WCS
10/15*

Transcription of Note from General Abizaid to Secretary Rumsfeld**Mr. Secretary,**

I presume this constant deluge of "send the Marines in" has some purpose I do not understand or appreciate. Please feel free to send in the Marines. CENTCOM needs this capability, not service squabbling. Otherwise, I agree with some key points noted.

V/R A**Copy For: CJCS**

OCT. 20. 2003 11:37AM
OCT. 16. 2003 12:20PM

CCCC SECURE FAX

NO. 777 P. 4
NO. 839 P. 1113

Snowflake

October 14, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION					
SECDEF	DEP SEC	SEC ASST	SEC SEC	SEC	FILE
USED	USED	USED	USED	USED	FILE

Eikenberry tells me he really has no visibility as to what the Agency is doing in Afghanistan. Will you please look into that and see if you can fix it.

Thanks.

DHR:dk
101403-12

.....
Please respond by 11/7/03

A Mr. Eikenberry:
Karl may not have had visibility.
Believe my recent trip there where
we brought *& Military Cdr*
together on both sides went a *long way*
to fix the problem. Also had

(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i), (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3507

(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i), (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3507

(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i), (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3507

with me. Think we moved a long way
towards better visibility. U17144 103
Will follow-up on my next trip. Will

(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i), (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3507

U17411

11-L-0559/OS 11/17/03

Meet before I reach back

Transcription of Note from General Abizaid to Secretary Rumsfeld

Mr. Secretary,

Karl may not have had visibility. Believe my recent trip there, where we brought (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i),(b)(3):50 U. and Military Commanders together on both sides, went a long way to fix the problem. Also had (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3507 with me. Think we moved a long way toward better visibility. Will follow-up on my next trip. Will also meet with (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024 (i),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 35 on Monday before I head back.

V/R A

11:19 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: October 18, 2003

SUBJECT: **Senior Military Briefer**

As you know, the President has been pushing for a senior military briefer on a regular basis in Baghdad.

I understand that BG Schloesser speaks Arabic. He also has the advantage of having worked on the Joint Staff and knows the folks here. Further, he's been with Petraeus for six months and has good situational awareness.

If you can find, through a normal nominating process, an Arabic speaker with those kinds of capabilities, I would be amazed.

The President raised this with Dick Myers and me two months ago. It seems to me it is time to move.

Hadley called again today about it. If you haven't got a better answer, why don't we go with Schloesser.

Thanks.

DHR/azm
101803.8

Please respond by: 10/27

U17442 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17031

ITR 9

18 OCT 03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

October 20, 2003 – 11:30 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: California Recall Vote--SNOWFLAKE

- Responding to your note (attached). Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) has been working with the CA Secretary of State's office since August to ensure military personnel could vote in the October 7 election. Overseas absentee voters were allowed to fax their voted ballots to county election officials.
- You asked about arrangements growing from the study Bill Cohen initiated. A series of initiatives — going well beyond the scope of that study — have been adopted:
 - In the past five years, DoD has been very successful in getting state legislation passed to allow “blank ballot” and “voted ballot” faxing.
 - In October 2002, we expanded our toll-free fax service to allow access from 49 countries.
 - In 1999, DoD designed an on-line Federal Post Card Application form. All but one state accept the on-line form.
 - Since 1998, FVAP has promoted other technology-based solutions as alternatives to the “by mail balloting” process (e.g., e-mailing blank ballots to the military).
 - FVAP has initiated the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE) project as a follow-on to our highly successful 2000 “Voting Over the Internet” project. DoD will carry out the demonstration in 2004 under cooperative agreements with the States that agreed to participate in the project.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As Stated

Prepared by: Ms. Polli Brunelli, Director, FVAP —

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/17032


U17459 03

014.35

20 OCT 03

September 16, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/17033

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: California Recall Vote

Are U.S. military forces going to be able to vote in the California recall? What arrangements do we have for absentee ballots as a result of the study Bill Cohen initiated before we got here?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091603-11

.....
Please respond by 10/1/03

October 20, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Media

I understand there will be requests in the next week or two to schedule some time for media opportunities around the country via satellite.

I intend to make time for it, and I hope you are able to, as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102003-1

.....
Please respond by _____

U17466 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17034

000.775D

20 OCT 03

October 20, 2003

TO: Les Brownlee
Gordon England
Jim Roche

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
ADM Ed Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

Here is an article that may or may not be accurate. It might be helpful if you have lessons learned studies going on in your department to feed those results into either the Joint Staff or JFCOM comprehensive reviews talking place.

Thanks.

Attach.

Jaffe, Greg. "U.S. Army Finds No signs Hussein Planned to Wreck Key Iraqi Infrastructures," *Wall Street Journal*, October 13, 2003.

DHR:dh
102003-34

.....
Please respond by 11/14/03

22 OCT 03
U17467 103

11-L-0559/OSD/17035

Wall Street Journal
October 13, 2003

U.S. Army Finds No Signs Hussein Planned To Wreck Key Iraqi Infrastructures

By Greg Jaffe, Staff Reporter Of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON -- An Army study found no signs that Saddam Hussein was planning a large-scale campaign to destroy Iraq's oil fields, bridges and dams, diminishing U.S. forces' much-heralded success at preventing mass sabotage during the invasion of Iraq.

Senior Bush administration officials have sought to deflect criticism they failed to plan for the looting, guerrilla attacks and electricity woes that have plagued U.S. forces since the invasion by insisting that their war plan was focused on averting other huge disasters, such as oilfield and infrastructure sabotage.

"The choice we made to go for speed rather than ponderously securing everything as we went along prevented damage to the environment and to the resources of the Iraqi people," Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said in a speech over the summer. His boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, was equally emphatic: "At least in part because of the speed and the skill in the execution of the war plan by Gen. [Tommy] Franks and his team, some bad things did not happen. The vast majority of those oil fields were not destroyed and the country's oil wealth is intact for the Iraqi people."

The Army study suggests, however, that there was never a real threat of oil fires, wrecked bridges and dams in Iraq, and as a result there is "little evidence that speed pre-empted an imminent scorched earth campaign."

The draft study notes that only 22 of the 250 oil wells in the Rumaila oil field were prepared for demolition and only nine were detonated, creating seven small fires. The Kirkuk oil field had never been prepared for demolition, it states. Since the war's end, however, the pipeline linking the Kirkuk oil fields to Turkey has twice been attacked -- the most recent act of sabotage taking place over the weekend when crude oil leaking from the pipeline was set on fire, a military spokeswoman in Iraq told Reuters. The closed pipeline, which has been open only three days in the last six months, is costing Iraq about \$7 million a day.

The study also concludes that the Iraqis didn't have a serious plan to wire bridges or dams for demolition, said one person familiar with the full study.

Rather, the Army report, prepared by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute in Carlisle, Pa., suggests Mr. Hussein may have wired a few of the wells in an effort to "bluff" the U.S. into thinking that he had plans to cause widespread damage in Iraq.

An Army spokeswoman cautioned that the study, which involved more than 176 interviews with officers from the U.S. and United Kingdom as well as Iraqi prisoners of war is likely to change because it is still in a draft stage and hasn't been subjected to a peer review. None of the authors would comment on its contents.

One senior defense official questioned the Army's conclusion that Mr. Hussein had no plans to destroy Iraqi infrastructure on a large scale. "Even today it is impossible for us to know what was going on in

Saddam Hussein's mind," this official said. The defense official suggested that U.S. troops may have been able to get to the wells, bridges and dams before Mr. Hussein and his troops could plant explosives in them.

Even before the war, it was plausible to believe that Mr. Hussein would have wanted to trigger a massive environmental disaster. In the first Gulf War, Mr. Hussein's troops did just that, torching the Kuwaiti oil fields.

And so, the U.S. war plan in Iraq relied heavily on speed to prevent damage to infrastructure. U.S. commanders also believed that a rapid advance would demoralize Iraqi defenders, leading them to surrender before U.S. troops became embroiled in a bloody fight in downtown Baghdad.

Based on interviews with Iraqi prisoners of war, the U.S. Army study concludes that the speed of the U.S. push didn't "appear central in the breakdown of Iraqi morale." The report suggests that the regular Iraqi army's morale was broken before the war even began, and that the morale of the Special Republican Guard and paramilitary fighters was broken in close skirmishes with U.S. troops.

The report attributes the quick collapse of the Iraqi forces to the U.S. military's ability to collect and distribute information about the enemies' positions through the battlefield and then target Iraqi forces with precision munitions.

It also cites superior U.S. training and severe "Iraqi ineptitude." In one fight, dug-in Iraqis engaged exposed U.S. forces at a range of 800 meters firing 16 125 mm rounds without causing any damage. "U.S. return fire annihilated the battalion," the study notes. Most Iraqi Army units had no live-fire training in the year leading up to the war, and the vast majority of Iraqi forces had no training in urban warfare, it says.

"I worry that Pentagon is drawing cosmic lessons from the defeat of a truly inept enemy. That is a big, big mistake," says Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the Lexington Institute, a Washington-based think tank.

October 20, 2003

TO: David Chu

CC: Les Brownlee
Gordon England
Jim Roche
Jim Haynes
Joe Schmitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Report on USAFA

This weekend I again reviewed the report of the Panel to Review Misconduct Allegations at the United States Air Force Academy. I consider it a good report.

I would like you to develop tasking for the Services and OSD to see that, where appropriate, any schools we have take into account the recommendations contained in this report and the problems it highlights for the Department.

Please report back to me in four months as to the steps that have been taken by each of the Services and any other schools in the Department where these recommendations might be appropriate and any recommendations they may have, so we can see that this problem is dealt with appropriately.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102003-30

.....
Please respond by 2/20/04

U17469 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17038

000.5

20 OCT 03



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



INFO MEMO

October 20, 2003, 10 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dan Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: SecDef Gifts

- This responds to your note to me of October 15, 2003, regarding whether gifts that you accept are published. (Tab A) You also asked to see what such publications look like.
- Gifts of more than minimal value that federal employees accept from foreign governments are itemized and published annually in the Federal Register through the Department of State in accordance with the Foreign Gifts Act. Other gifts are not published. Minimal value is currently set by regulation at \$285.00.
- At Tab B is the latest notice published in the Federal Register for applicable foreign gifts accepted in 2002. The section showing gifts that you and others in DoD accepted is flagged for you starting at page 37260.
- Gifts are reported to GSA and normally retained by DoD in a vault or on official display until the recipient prepares to depart his office. At that time, the recipient would decide which gifts he wishes to purchase, and the rest would be physically transferred to GSA. In the published report, "Reported to GSA for purchase" means that the recipient has expressed an interest in purchasing the gift.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Bill Brazis,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559 OSD/17039

U17491 703

6:30 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 15, 2003
SUBJECT: **SecDef Gifts**

Are my gifts that I accept published? I talked to David Addington and he said the Vice President's are published. If so, I would like to see what the publications look like.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
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**Monday,
June 23, 2003**

Part II

Department of State

**Office of Protocol; Gifts to Federal
Employees From Foreign Sources
Reported to Employing Agencies in
Calendar Year 2002; Notice**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of Protocol; Gifts to Federal Employees From Foreign Government Sources Reported to Employing Agencies in Calendar Year 2002

(Public Notice 4380)

The Department of State submits the following comprehensive listing of the statements which, as required by law,

Federal employees filed with their employing agencies during calendar year 2002 concerning gifts received from foreign government sources. The compilation includes reports of both tangible gifts and gifts of travel or travel expenses of more than minimal value, as defined by statute.

Publication of this listing in the Federal Register is required by Section

7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, as added by Section 515(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978 (Pub. L. 95-105, August 17, 1977, 91 stat. 865).

Dated: June 5, 2003.

Grant S. Green, Jr.,

Under Secretary for Management;
Department of State.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	Box: 7½" x 5" x 1½" silver box, engraved with Greek crest and "C. Simitis" on lid. Rec'd—January 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$400. Archives Foreign. Photo album: 12½" x 12" brown vinyl album with currency displayed (Euro dollars and Greek drachmas). Rec'd—January 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$854. Archives Foreign. Komboloi: string of amber beads with tassel and silver charm engraved "GWB" on one side and "No 43" on reverse. Paperback book: "The Komboloi and Its History (5th Edition)," by Aris Evangelinos. Rec'd—January 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$50. Archives Foreign. Greek Bible: sterling silver cover with gold overlay embossed with design of Jesus on the cross and eight small stones. Rec'd—January 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$400. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Constantine Simitis, Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Desk accessories: sterling silver and amber pen stand with silver border and outline of building; including a silver pen. Rec'd—January 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign. Leatherbound book: "New York," by Jerzy Habbas. Rec'd—January 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$40. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Leszek Miller, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Softcover books (16): multi-volume set of the works of Turkish poet Mevlana Celaleddin; translated by Nevit O. Ergin. Leatherbound reproduction of the "Holy Koran", hand-lettered by Ahmed Karahisari in the sixteenth century; held in a leather case. Rec'd—January 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$990. Archives Foreign. Vase: 11" stoneware vase with metal overlay and boat and cloud motif. Rec'd—January 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$120. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	Artwork: 11" x 11" "Over the Horizon," by Azuolas Vaitukaitis; gold-plated copper plaque etched with fields, with amber stone representing the sun; held in a black presentation case with plaque engraved to President George W. Bush. Rec'd—January 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$600. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Valdas Adamkus, President of the Republic of Lithuania.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Rug: 116" x 84" fringed wool and silk Afghan rug with multicolored pattern on gold background. Rec'd—January 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$4000. Archives Foreign. Plaque: 11" x 11" resin plaque with image of the damaged World Trade Center towers and Afghan Buddhist statues, engraved "World Terrorists Are Destroying Civilization" and "From the People of Afghanistan to the People of the United States Partners in a Common Struggle." Rec'd—January 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Hamid Karzai, Chairman of the Interim Authority of Afghanistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Artwork: 17" x 12" x 9" metal sculpture of four people in a troika. Rec'd—February 4, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Mikhail Kasyanov, Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Rug: 83" x 56" multi-colored Oriental rug, primarily in blue. Rec'd—February 13, 2002. Est. Value—\$2800. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Pervez Musharraf, President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Medallion: 2½" gold medallion engraved with cherry blossoms and the front facade of the Japanese Diet building on one side, and Mount Fuji on the reverse; held in a blue velvet case. Rec'd—February 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$50. Archives Foreign. Hardcover book. "The National Diet of Japan." Rec'd—February 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$90. Archives Foreign. Box: 12½" x 2" black lacquer box with tree branch painted on lid, and interior lined in blue velvet. Rec'd—February 18, 2002. Est. Value, \$275. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable Yutaka Inoue, President of the House of Councillors.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Chunma-ch'ong Gold Crown (replica): 5th–6th century Silla Dynasty, National Treasure #188. Rec'd—February 19, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Kim Dae-jung, President of the Republic of Korea.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	Hardcover book: "30 Years of Sino-US Relations," by Xiyuan Publishing House, China Intercontinental Press; inscribed by donor, and presented in gold-colored book box. Rec'd—February 21, 2002. Est. Value—\$550. Archives Foreign. Sculpture: 12" x 16" x 4" "Ma Ta Fei Yan (Horse Galloping on the Flying Swallow)", a 24K gold-plated horse with stand, presented in wooden box. Rec'd—February 21, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Artwork: 27" carving of numerous connected figures, made from a single piece of ebony. Rec'd—February 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$1200. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Artwork: 28" wooden carving of a male figure carrying a knife and balancing a vessel on his head; held in a red presentation case. Rec'd—February 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$1375. Archives Foreign. Consumables (42) 250g bags of Cafe Ginga coffee from Angola. Rec'd—February 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$336. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy. Hardcover book: "Angola: The Future Begins Now," published by the government of Angola. Rec'd—February 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$70. Archives Foreign. Artwork: two tribal paintings on canvas; one (41" x 33") depicts four dancing figures and one (34" x 27") depicts traditional tribal musical instruments. Rec'd—February 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$1350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of the Republic of Angola.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Box: 7" x 7" x 1 3/4" sterling silver box lined in blue velvet and engraved in Arabic on top; held in blue velvet presentation case. Rec'd—March 5, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Mohamed Hosny Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Clothing: traditional Uzbek attire consisting of a multi-colored silk scarf (49" x 49"), a collapsible 6" black leather hat with white design, and a navy blue velvet robe with elaborate gold embroidery. Rec'd—March 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$750. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
	Tea set: brass tea set with platter, tea pot, and 6 small cups, all elaborately engraved; held in a burl walnut case (17¼" x 13¾" x 7") with red velvet lining. Rec'd—March 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$200. Archives Foreign.		
President	Bowl: 12" Tipperary Crystal bowl, engraved with a St. Patrick's Day message from Prime Minister Ahern on behalf of the Irish people. Rec'd—March 13, 2002. Est. Value—\$321. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Bertie Ahern, Prime Minister of Ireland.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Consumables: six bottles of 1990 Chateau La Lagune Haut-Medoc wine. Rec'd—March 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$372. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy.	His Excellency Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Vase: Olmeca vase of sterling silver with geometric design. Rec'd—March 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Vicente Fox Quesada, President of the United Mexican States.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Stirrups: pair of wooden stirrups (9" x 9" x 7") with elaborate silver detail. Rec'd—March 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Alejandro Toledo Manrique, President of the Republic of Peru.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
	Eagle: elaborately wrought silver eagle (18" x 15") with wings spread; held in a blue velvet presentation case. Rec'd—March 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$2000. Archives Foreign.		
President	Stone: 11" x 13" x 2" green stone, resembling marble and smooth on two sides with a silver plate engraved "Walking Together Towards Peace Alejandro Toledo President of Peru, March 23, 2002. Rec'd—March 23, 2002." Est. Value—\$250. Archives Foreign.		
President	Statue: 18" white porcelain elephant. Rec'd—April 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$400. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable Dr. Edmund Stoiber, Minister-President of the Free State of Bavaria.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Glassware: four pieces of Iittala glass designed by Alvar Aalto, including 6" and 4¾" vases, a 3" bowl, and a 14" platter. Rec'd—April 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$690. Archives Foreign.	Her Excellency Tarja Halonen, President of Finland.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Humidor: 12½" x 5¼" x 9¼" polished wood humidor with street scene painted on lid. Rec'd—April 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Rafiq al-Hariri, Prime Minister of the Republic of Lebanon.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
	Consumables: assorted pieces of tropical and dried fruit. Rec'd—April 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$25. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy.		

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	Dagger: 17" knife made of 18K gold with diamonds and rubies on ivory hilt; gold scabbard is elaborately detailed with diamonds and rubies. Rec'd—April 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$20000. Transferred to the Department of the Interior. Artwork: 28½" x 41" painting of seven figures on horseback; matted and held in a 37" x 50" gilt frame. Rec'd—April 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$100. Archives Foreign.	His Majesty Mohammed VI, King of Morocco.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Icon: 5½" x 7½" painted wooden image of St. George slaying the dragon; held in a red velvet case. Rec'd—April 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Archives Foreign. Hardcover book: "Treasures of Christian Art in Bulgaria," edited by Valentino Pace. Rec'd—April 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$50. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Dagger: 10" knife, with finely detailed 18K gold hilt and scabbard decorated with small diamonds; held in a green leather case with the Saudi Arabian coat of arms on lid. Rec'd—April 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$3500. Archives Foreign.	His Royal Highness Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince, First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Vase: 11" onion-shaped vase with blue and purple glaze and wooden stand; held in a silk-covered presentation case. Rec'd—May 1, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Hu Jintao, Vice President of the People's Republic of China.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Saddle: leather saddle with sheepskin cover and accompanying bridle, harness and stirrups. Rec'd—May 2, 2002. Est. Value—\$1250. Archives Foreign. Hardcover book: "Caballos en Espana," by J.A. Gabriel, et al. Rec'd—May 2, 2002. Est. Value—\$50. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Jose Maria Aznar, President of the Government of Spain and Mrs. Aznar.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Vessel: 6" silver cup with elaborate detailing and four colored stones on stem. Rec'd—May 7, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Sher Bahadur Deuba, Prime Minister of Nepal.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Box: 11" x 6¼" x 2" silver box lined with burl wood, with Jordanian seal and signature etched on lid; held in a red leather case. Rec'd—May 8, 2002. Est. Value—\$1,000. Archives Foreign.	Their Majesties King Abdullah II, and Queen Rania al Abdullah.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	Rice bowl: 7½" traditional silver "Bekas Nasi" (rice container) with lid and elaborate gold detailing; held in a green leather presentation case. Rec'd—May 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$750. Archives Foreign. Large bouquet of Malaysian Orchids. Rec'd—May 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$600. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy.	His Excellency YAB Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Sword: "The Knight's Saber of Peace", a 34" stainless steel sword; held in a wooden presentation case. Rec'd—May 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Janez Drnovsek, Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Stone: 13" x 8" piece of the Berlin Wall with multi-colored graffiti on one side; mounted in a clear plexiglass case. Rec'd—May 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$400. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Mr. Johannes Rau, President of the Federal Republic of Germany.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Pen: green and black Pelikan fountain pen with gold tone trim. Rec'd—May 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$555. Archives Foreign. Consumable: 50ml bottle of royal blue Pelikan ink. Rec'd—May 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$4. Handled pursuant to Secret Service Policy.	His Excellency Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Artwork: 13½" x 19" engraving by LeMire of the Marquis de Lafayette at the end of the Virginia campaign of the American Revolution in 1781, dedicated to George Washington; matted and held in a 21½" x 28" silver tone frame. Rec'd—May 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Watch: stainless steel Cartier "Roadster", held in a red leather box. Rec'd—May 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$3950. Archives Foreign. Statue: 31½" alabaster sculpture of four figures, titled "Allegory of the Triumph". Rec'd—May 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$30000. Archives Foreign. Box: 5½" x 92¼" burl wood box with five time pieces set in lid, showing the time in Moscow, New York, London, Rome and Tokyo; interior is lined in brown velvet and embossed "Vertice NATO-RUSSIA ROMA 28-5-2002." Rec'd—May 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$200. Archives Foreign. Consumables: two tins containing 8.8 oz bags of "e Tricaffe" coffee. Rec'd—May 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$14. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy.	His Excellency Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	Box: 5½" x 3½" x 1¼" silver box with donor's signature engraved on lid; held in a green watered silk presentation case. Rec'd—May 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, President of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Painting: 25" x 21" watercolor of the bell tower of Sainte Mere Eglise in a blue and gold tone frame. Rec'd—May 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable Marc Lefevre, General Counsellor and Mayor of Sainte Mere Eglise.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Statue: 6½" coral sculpture of the Blessed Virgin and Child; mounted on a wooden base and held in a blue velvet presentation case. Rec'd—May 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$1500. Archives Foreign.	His Holiness, John Paul II	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Pen: limited edition (43/50) "Stars and Stripes" Mont blanc pen inset with rubies and diamonds in an American flag pattern. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$18000. Archives Foreign.	Lieutenant General Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid al-Nahayyan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Knife: replica Army Ranger knife forged from metal of a WWII-era U.S. Jeep, mounted in sheath wrapped in locally-recovered barbed wire and sand from D-Day beaches, engraved "In Memory of American's Soldiers offert a Monsieur George W. Bush President des Etats Unis d'Amerique. A Sainte Mere Eglise le 26 Mai 2002" on goldtone plaque. Rec'd—June 3, 2002. Est. Value—\$325. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable Max Avenel, Mayor of Agon-Coutainville.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Collectable: 32½" x 32½" red and blue silk scarf in military motif commemorating the 200th anniversary of L'Ecole Speciale Militaire, Saint Cyr, 1802-2002; displayed in 36" x 36" blue rubberized frame with small brass plate engraved "La Promotion 'du Bicentenaire de Saint-Cyr' au President des Etats-Unis d'Amerique" Rec'd—June 6, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	Student Delegation, L'Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Rugs (2): 56" x 83" Egyptian rugs designed as portraits of President George W. Bush, and 74" brass rods for hanging. Rec'd—June 7, 2002. Est. Value—\$1000. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Mohamed Hosny Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Ax: 37½" decorative wood and metal long-handled ax with rural Slovak scenes engraved in blade. Rec'd—June 7, 2002. Est. Value—\$125. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Rudolf Schuster, President of the Slovak Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	<p>Vase: 20" blue glass vase with 24K detailing and applied flowers; American and Slovak flags crossed above "Prezidentovi Spojenych Statov Americkych Georgovi W. Bushovi venuje Rudolf Schuster prezident Slovenskej republiky 7. juna 2002." Rec'd—June 7, 2002. Est. Value—\$200. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Accessories (2): 8½" black wool hat with silver 10-chain band around crown and elastic chin strap; 42" light brown belt (4½" wide) with geometric floral design and gold tone detailing, including engraved clasps. Rec'd—June 7, 2002. Est. Value—\$200. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Coin (.5 oz): 1" gold coin with image and signature of President Schuster on one side and building on the reverse; held in a red leather box. Rec'd—June 7, 2002. Est. Value—\$175. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Household accessory: 39" x 20" white linen table runner edged in lace. Rec'd—June 7, 2002. Est. Value—\$100. Archives Foreign.</p>	The Right Honorable Jean Chretien, P.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Canada.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	<p>Pen rest: 8" x 4" marble base with wooden pen rest. Rec'd—June 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$20. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Wine: three 375 ml. bottles of "Canadian Icewine, Summerhill (2002), Paradis Ranch (2002), and Trius (1997)" in wooden box. Rec'd—June 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$120. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy.</p> <p>Marble statue: 21" x 9" Serpentine stone carving of Narwhale handcarved by Takealook Temela, a Canadian Inuit artist.</p> <p>Ceramic Plate: 16" plate painted with mountain landscapes and floral images, by Don Wells. Rec'd—June 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$1850. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Framed document: Kananaskis Summit declaration signed by all leaders and framed in a 20" x 26½" silver tone frame. Rec'd—June 26, 2006. Est. Value—\$150. Archives Foreign.</p>	The Honorable Dave Bronconnier, Mayor of Calgary.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued
(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	Cowboy hat: white Stetson hat with small peacock feather and white tie in black carrying case with presentation plaque engraved "Presented to President George W. Bush by Mayor Dave Bronconnier on behalf of The City of Calgary, Alberta, Canada June 26-27, 2002". Rec'd—July 1, 2002. Est. Value—\$65. Archives Foreign.		
President	Chapan: 53" green- and yellow-striped Afghan robe, with red, white and black trim. Rec'd—July 1, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Hamid Karzai, Chairman of the Interim Authority of Afghanistan.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Men's watch: silver Hublot Automatic MDM Geneva watch, with black rubber band and black face. Rec'd—July 5, 2002. Est. Value—\$2200. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Consumables: assorted Godiva chocolates, Perugina chocolates, Perugina cookies, and nonpareils. Rec'd—July 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$1248. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy.	His Majesty Mohammed VI, King of Morocco.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
	Fishing equipment: 82 lures and hooks in a two-level 16" x 10½" plastic tackle box; Mepps "Basser Kit" of 6 lures; Mepps "Trophy Series" kit of 6 lures; 78 piece selection of sinkers; 5 Spro heavy swivels; Rapala ProGuide fishing clipper; Rapala ProGuide 15 lb. digital scale; and an orange Lindy fish handling glove. Rec'd—July 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$449. Archives Foreign.		
	Large arrangement of flowers. Rec'd—July 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy.		
	Fish bowl: 17" x 20" painted ceramic fish bowl. Rec'd—July 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$600. Archives Foreign.		
	Miscellaneous decorative boxes (7) and a 28" x 24" x 13" woven basket with handles. Rec'd—July 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$171. Archives Foreign.		
	Paperback book: "Baits, Rigs & Tackle," by Vic Dunaway. Hats (2, size S/M): one blue and one tan Speedo fishing hat. Rec'd—July 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$52. Archives Foreign.		
	Fishing bait: 2 oz. jar of Uncle Josh salmon eggs. Rec'd—July 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$3. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy.		

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	Tableware: 7" glass pitcher and 6" glasses (6) decorated with silver and 1½" amber stones; held in a blue presentation case. Rec'd—July 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$1150. Archives Foreign. CD: "Tribute to USA," by the Adam Mickiewicz University Academic Choir. Paperback book: "Stop Terrorism," by donor. Rec'd—July 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$30. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Aleksander Kwasniewski, The President of the Republic of Poland and Mrs. Kwasniewska.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Coins (3): Dominican Republic 1 peso, 100 peso, and 500 peso coins in a green velvet box with the country's shield embossed on lid. Rec'd—July 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$375. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Hipolito Mejia, President of the Dominican Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Belt: black Tumi leather belt with silver buckle painted with the American flag and an eagle; held in a leather box. Rec'd—August 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$295. Archives Foreign.	His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Bag: 10½" x 5½" black leather Tanner Krolle toiletries bag with "G.W.B." embossed in gold on the top. Rec'd—September 7, 2002. Est. Value—\$351. Archives Foreign.	The Right Honorable Tony Blair, M.P.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Pen: black Mont Blanc fountain pen with "H.E. G.W. Bush" engraved on cap; held in a black presentation box. Rec'd—September 9, 2002. Est. Value—\$375. Archives Foreign. Ink: Mont Blanc black ink refill (50 ml.). Rec'd—September 9, 2002. Est. Value—\$9. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy.	Mr. Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Rug: 59½" x 78" red Afghan rug with fringed ends. Rec'd—September 10, 2002. Est. Value—\$1400. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Ishaq Shahryar, Ambassador of Afghanistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Bowl: 6" sterling silver bowl with scalloped edges and blue beads inset around the rim; held in a green velvet presentation case. Rec'd—September 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Pervez Musharraf, President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Watch: Patek Philippe Calatrava Travel Time wristwatch with black leather band and gold face; held in a leather-lined polished wooden box. Rec'd—September 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$14500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	Photograph: 7¼" x 9¾" color photo of President George W. Bush, Prime Minister Berlusconi and President Putin at the NATO—Russia Council meeting in Rome in May 2002; held in a 11" x 13" silver frame. Rec'd—September 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign.		
President	Vase: 12¼" Moser crystal vase with short stem supporting flared twelve-sided urn with horse motif etched into the glass. Rec'd—September 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Cuff links: ½" gold cuff links with red stones. Rec'd—September 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$250. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Hugo Guiliani Cury, Ambassador of the Dominican Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Coffee service: elaborately detailed 10" silver coffee urn with six matching 3½" cups and an 11" platter; held in a presentation case. Rec'd—October 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency The President of the Russian Federation and Mrs. Putina.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Porcelain: "Good Fortune" pattern porcelain service (for 8) with 146 total pieces; held in three red and gold fabric-covered presentation cases. Rec'd—October 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$1800. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Artwork: 17" x 17¾" giclee print of a painting of the desert and ocean by Susana Diaz-Rivera; matted and held in a 24¾" x 25½" wooden frame. Rec'd—October 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable Leonel Cota Montano, Governor of Baja California Sur.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Artwork: "Nocturn Figure," a 6" x 7" limited edition (14/30) print by Jose Luis Cuevas. Rec'd—October 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$1500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Vicente Fox Quesada, President of the United Mexican States.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Leatherbound book: "Beirut the wars of destruction and the perspectives of reconstruction" with hologram on cover and inscribed by donor; held in a 18" x 14" navy leather presentation case. Rec'd—November 7, 2002. Est. Value—\$400. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Rafiq al-Hariri, Prime Minister of the Republic of Lebanon.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Leatherbound book: "Kossuth Lajos 1802–2002," by Gyorgy Szabad; held in a burgundy print presentation box. Rec'd—November 8, 2002. Est. Value—\$75. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency The Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary and Mrs. Medgyessy.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	<p>Coin: 4" silver coin engraved "Szt. Istvan 969-1038" on front and "Ezereves Magyarorszag" on reverse; held in a 6" x 6" wooden presentation box. Rec'd—November 8, 2002. Est. Value—\$200. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Decanter: 10" amber colored Bohemian crystal decanter and stopper with six matching shot glasses, all painted with rural scenes; held in a blue velvet presentation case. Rec'd—November 21, 2002. Est. Value—\$280. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Excellency The Prime Minister of the Czech Republic and Mrs. Spidlova.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	<p>Coin: 1 1/4" pure silver coin commemorating the NATO Summit in Prague, November 21-22, 2002. Rec'd—November 21, 2002. Est. Value—\$15. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Artwork: "Fair Wind Over the Baltics," an 8 1/4" amber statue, by Algirdas Mikutis, depicting a boat on a brass base; held in a green presentation case. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$325. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Award: The Order of Vytautas the Great medal and sash awarded to President George W. Bush, November 23, 2002, and proclamation bestowing award; both held in white leather cases. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$280. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Excellency Valdas Adamkus, President of the Republic of Lithuania.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	<p>Hardcover books (7): clothbound set of donor's writings (in Czech); held in a matching case inscribed to President George W. Bush on top. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Miscellaneous items from Prague Summit: blue canvas tote printed with NATO logo and "Sommet de Prague Summit 21-22 Nov. 2002" in white on front, and blue ballpoint pen with Summit logo in silver. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$25. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Excellency Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	<p>Paperback books (2): "NATO, Europe, and the Security of Democracy: Selected Speeches, Articles, and Interviews 1990–2002," by donor and signed, and "Prazsky Chodec," by Jiri Vsetecka. Hardcover books (2): "Catalogue of the Czech Defence Industry 2001–2002," produced by the Association of the Defence Industry of the Czech Republic, and "The Czech Contribution to Peace and War in Europe: From the Hussite Wars to NATO Membership," published by the Czech government and held in a blue fabric book sleeve. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$70. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Artwork: 15¼" x 19¾" painting on wood of St. George. Rec'd—November 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$250. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Artwork: 13" x 16¾" caricature rendered in pastels of President Bush with a hunting rifle, holding a rabbit with the face of Saddam Hussein; matted and held in a 18" x 20" gold tone frame and presented in a blue leather case. Rec'd—November 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Hardcover books (3): "Romania at the Moment of Truth," by donor and inscribed; "Brancusi," by Radu Vania; and "Romania," by Petre Baron and held in a velvet case with "Romania" embossed in gold. Rec'd—November 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$163. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Accessories (2): beaded shoulder bag and straw hat in the traditional style of the Maremures region of Romania; bag has black braiding around edges and hat has two large green stones in gold tone settings on front. Rec'd—November 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$60. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Award: 32" gold tone "Star of Romania" chain with 2¼" medalion awarded to President George W. Bush November 23, 2002, and proclamation (in Romanian) bestowing award; both held in burgundy leather cases. Rec'd—November 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Excellency Ion Iliescu, President of Romania.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
President	Artwork: 28" x 19¼" painting of three elephants; held in a 35" x 26" wooden frame. Rec'd—December 5, 2002. Est. Value—\$2000. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Daniel T. Arap Moi, President of the Republic of Kenya.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
President	Kettle: 11" silver "Kiri" with handle and intricate designs etched in the silver; held in a glass display case. Rec'd—December 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$3500. Archives Foreign.	His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanah Bolkiah Mu'izzaddin Waddaulah, Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei Darussalam.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Models: replicas of the ceremonial "Kasur Namat" (8½" x 8½" cushion and mat) and "Dian Empat" (four 5" silver candlesticks) used during coronation, wedding, and other royal ceremonies; held in a glass display case. Rec'd—December 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency The Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey and Mrs. Ecevit.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Hardcover books (3): "Imperial Taste: 700 Years of Culinary Culture," produced by the Ministry of Culture; "Civilizations Under the Clouds of Anatolia," by Gurol Sozen; and "Turkey: An Endless Poem," by Zeynel Yesilay. Rec'd—January 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$225. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Bowl: 12" glass bowl (254/2000) with metal overlay and painted boats and clouds. Rec'd—January 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$110. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Scarf: 13" x 32" silk scarf with design inspired by Roman mosaic from Antioch, Turkey. Silver pieces; hand mirror and trinket box with floral motif. Rec'd—January 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$188. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Jewelry: 18K gold earrings with five diamond-shaped clear stones. Rec'd—February 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$175. Archives Foreign.	Mrs. Sehba Musharraf, First Lady of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Fabric: 43" x 158" apricot-colored silk with seed pearls and floral pattern embroidered in green and pink. Rec'd—February 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$700. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Doil: 16" Kyugetsu doll in traditional Japanese dress on a black lacquer stand; with a glass display case. Rec'd—February 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$400. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable Yutaka Inoue, President of the House of Councillors.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
First Lady	Paperback books (7): "100 Chinese Gods," "100 Buddhas in Chinese Buddhism," "100 Celebrated Chinese Women," "Legend of the Moon Maiden," "Dragon Tales," "Chinese Astrology," and "Madam White Snake," all produced by AsiaPac Books and held in a fabric-covered box. Rec'd—February 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$95. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China and Madame Wang Yeping.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Household accessories: two Swedish glass goblets with brass accents, made by Orrefors. Rec'd—March 1, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	Her Majesty Queen Silvia	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Rug: 51½" x 70" fringed silk rug with a geometric pattern of flowers in green, red and blue. Rec'd—March 4, 2002. Est. Value—\$2400. Archives Foreign.	Mrs. Suzanne Mubarak	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Quilt: 70" x 88" handmade quilt embroidered "From Mrs. Jewel H. Taylor, First Lady Rep. of Liberia, To Mrs. Laura Bush, First Lady U.S.A., Our Children First" on white background with 8 doves on border and hands holding up a baby under rays of sunlight. Rec'd—March 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$1000. Archives Foreign.	Mrs. Jewel H. Howard-Taylor, The First Lady of the Republic of Liberia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Clothing: traditional Uzbek attire consisting of a gold hat with pink sequins and a gold tassel, black velvet slippers with gold embroidery, and a maroon velvet robe with gold and white embroidery in a floral pattern and matching pants. Rec'd—March 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Box: 8" x 7" silver box with woven fabric under glass on lid, and interior lined with cedar. Rec'd—March 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	Mrs. Eliane Karp, First Lady of the Republic of Peru.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Statue: 16½" carved ivory statue of a female figure carrying two children and a basket on her head; on a round wooden base. Rec'd—April 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$2500. Transferred to the Department of the Interior.	Mrs. Ana Paula dos Santos, Office of the President of the Republic of Angola.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Purse: 4¾" silver filigree clutch purse with cubic zirconias on clasp; held in a black leather case with royal seal on lid. Rec'd—April 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$250. Archives Foreign.	His Majesty Mohammed VI, King of Morocco.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
First Lady	<p>Consumables: five bottles of cologne "Santal Rare," "Ambre Special," "Jasmin," "Rose Maroc," and "Fraicheur de Fruits"; held in a green leather case with gold detail. Rec'd—April 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$475. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Jewelry: silver tone jewelry set consisting of a necklace, earrings, ring, bracelet, choker and belt. Rec'd—April 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Clothing: traditional Saudi attire of a black and burgundy robe with matching 70" shawl and a black caftan with elaborate gold embroidery and multi-colored sequins. Rec'd—April 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$250. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Royal Highness Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince, First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Fabric: 20" x 4" Chinese silk yardage, in black with red flowers. Rec'd—May 1, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	Madame Liu Yongqing, Office of the Vice President of the People's Republic of China.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Vessel: 4" silver cup with elaborately etched detailing. Rec'd—May 7, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	Dr. Arzu Deuba, Prime Minister's Residence.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	<p>Photograph: 19 1/2" x 16" print of a mountain gorilla; matted and held in a 28" x 24" green wooden frame. Rec'd—May 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$225. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Carvings (5): one pair of carved wooden elephant bookends (9 1/2"); one pair of carved wooden giraffe candle holders (19 1/2"); and one carved wooden bowl (12") with depictions of various wildlife on the inside. Rec'd—May 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$790. Archives Foreign.</p>	Mrs. Janet K. Museveni, Office of the President of the Republic of Uganda.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	<p>Dish: 9" Herend porcelain clam shell dish, painted with black and green floral design; held in a green velvet case. Rec'd—May 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$555. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Video: "George Bush." Rec'd—May 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$5. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Hardcover books (2): "The Parliament House of Hungary," by Jozsef Sisa and "Hungarian Helicon," by Watson Kirkconnell. Rec'd—May 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$45. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Excellency The President of the Republic of Hungary and Mrs. Madl.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
	Album: 10" x 14" navy blue leather photo album stamped with Hungarian crest on cover; photographs document visit by former President George H.W. Bush to Hungary in November 2001. Rec'd—May 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Archives Foreign.		
	Book: "Embers," by Sandor Marai. Rec'd—May 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$21. Archives Foreign.		
	Paperback book: "A Nemzet Konyvtarabol." Rec'd—May 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$20. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Bowl: 6" open-cut Herend porcelain lidded bowl, painted with flowers and fruit; held in a red velvet presentation case. Rec'd—May 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$670. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Vase: 25" glass vase of contemporary design with blue, yellow, and purple spheres around center. Rec'd—May 20, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
	Artwork: 23" x 27" portrait on canvas of Mrs. Bush by Zubov; held in a blue wooden frame. Rec'd—May 20, 2002. Est. Value—\$400. Archives Foreign.		
	Hardcover book: "Praga Caput Regni," by Jaroslav Guth and Jaroslav Seifert. Rec'd—May 20, 2002. Est. Value—\$26. Archives Foreign.		
	Handbag: black beaded evening bag in a blue presentation case. Rec'd—May 20, 2002. Est. Value—\$120. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Accessories: 54" x 54" black silk chiffon scarf with white trim and beaded seashell pattern in one corner; and 13" x 4" black leather "Gold Pfeil" handbag with silver tone trim. Rec'd—May 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$689. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Artwork: 3" oval painting of Jesus inside a gold tone Faberge-style egg with multi-colored enamel detailing; egg is suspended over a blue marble pedestal with inlaid cross on front. Rec'd—May 24, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	Mrs. Ludmila Aleksandrovna Putina.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
	Tea service: Tiffany & Co. silver tea set, including 14" platter, 5½" pot, 3" creamer, and 4½" sugar bowl decorated with blue and white enamel; Faberge-style egg with similar motif also included. Rec'd—May 24, 2002. Est. Value—\$6050. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Album: white vinyl photo album with gold embossing, chronicling Mrs. Bush's and Mrs. Putina's visit to a Russian museum and school. Rec'd—May 24, 2002. Est. Value—\$30. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Handbag: 12" navy blue Christian Dior "saddle bag" purse. Rec'd—May 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$590. Archives Foreign.	Mrs. Bernadette Chirac	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Tableware: wooden salad set, consisting of 5½" bowls (12), 16½" serving bowl and two serving utensils. Rec'd—June 13, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Abel Pacheco de la Espriella, President of the Republic of Costa Rica.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Brooch: 2½" stick pin brooch with diamond. Rec'd—June 26, 2002. Est. value—\$550. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable Dave Bronconnier, Mayor of Calgary.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Clothing: traditional Afghan attire of multi-colored and heavily embroidered pants, tunic and scarf. Rec'd—July 16, 2002. Est. value—\$800. Archives Foreign.	Dr. Zimat Karzai, Office of the President of the Afghan Transitional administration.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Hardcover books (2): "Bronze Sculpture," by Magdalena Abakanowicz, and "Magdalena Abakanowicz," by Barbara Rose. Rec'd—July 24, 2002. Est. value—\$100. Archives Foreign.	Mrs. Jolanta Kwasniewska	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
	Sugar bowl: 4" sterling silver sugar bowl with round green stone on top and six silver and green sugar spoons; held in a wooden and glass case. Rec'd—July 24, 2002. Est. value—\$450. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Shawl, 86" x43" beige wool shawl with multi-colored embroidered trim. Rec'd—September 12, 2002. Est. value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Pervez Musharraf, President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Jewelry: 14" white gold Damiani necklace with grey pearls and a cluster of diamonds. Rec'd—September 14, 2002. Est. value—\$2250. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Plate: 13½" Moser glass plate with filigreed gold edge. Rec'd—September 18, 2002. Est. value—\$800. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency The President of the Czech Republic and Mrs. Havlova.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

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First Lady	Jewelry: 18" gold tone necklace with three square cut amber stones in center and a pair of 1/2" matching earrings. Rec'd—September 25, 2002. Est. value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Hugo Guillani Cury, Ambassador of the Dominican Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Table linens: 8 white linen napkins (15" x 15") embroidered in one corner with a flower and birds, and a 58" x 92" matching tablecloth. Rec'd—September 25, 2002. Est. value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	Mrs. Lalao Ravalomanana, Office of the President of the Republic of Madagascar.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Hardcover books (2): "Concepts and Theories of His Majesty the King on Development" and "King Bhumibol: Strength of the Land," both published by the Thai government. Paperback book: "The Support Foundation and Handicrafts," published by donor's organization. Rec'd—October 9, 2002. Est. value—\$115. Archives Foreign.	Her Majesty Queen Sirikit of Thailand.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Purse: 6" handbag made of woven grasses with a gold handle and clasp studded with diamonds, held in a purple silk presentation case. Rec'd—October 9, 2002. Est. value—\$10,000. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Table linens: 6 white linen napkins (11" x 11") with lace edging shot through with bronze thread and a matching 93" x 56" tablecloth. Rec'd—October 12, 2002. Est. value—\$300. Archives Foreign.	Mrs. Ludmila Aleksandrovna Putina.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Shawl: 35" x 84" pink cashmere shawl with fringed ends. Rec'd—October 25, 2002. Est. value—\$239. Archives Foreign.	Madame Wang Yeping	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Lady	Hardcover books (12): "A Dream of Red Mansions (3 volumes)," by Tsao Hsueh-Chin and Kao Hgo; "Journey to the West (3 volumes)," by Wu Cheng'en; "Outlaws of the Marsh (3 volumes)," by Shi Nai'an and Luo Guanzhong; and "Three Kingdoms (3 volumes)," by Luo Guanzhong. Rec'd—October 25, 2002. Est. value—\$244. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Accessories: 52" x 11" natural silk scarf and matching 10 1/2" x 10 1/2" handkerchief, both with black and white handprinted designs of flowers and dots. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$110. Archives Foreign. Accessory: 8 1/2" black beaded clutch-style evening bag. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$120. Archives Foreign.	Mrs. Dagmar Havlova, First Lady of the Czech Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

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	Consumable: 10.5 oz bottle of Bulgari "cologne au the vert (green tea)." Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$225. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy. Silver and green Bulgari atomizer. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$70. Archives Foreign. Artwork: 4½ x 3¼ ceramic tile decorated with fruit design. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$10. Archives Foreign.		
First Lady	Leatherbound book: hand-written religious manuscript on parchment in Geez, a Semitic Ethiopian language; inscribed by donor and held in a silk presentation case. Rec'd—December 5, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Family	Home accessories: 11" x 4" glass candle plate; 4¼" x 4¼" wooden and stone coasters (6) with nautical theme; 6 navy blue and beige placemats with sea shell decorations; 6 navy blue cloth napkins with sea shell decorations; 6 blue and orange ceramic cups with nautical theme; and 4" x 6" stoneware picture frames (2) imprinted with outlines of sea life. Rec'd—January 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$671. Archives Foreign. Candles: three square, scented candles. Rec'd—January 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$30. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy. Chest: 22" x 15¼" x 10½" wooden chest with glass lid containing various nautical items including shells, star fish, and smooth pebbles. Rec'd—January 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$60. Archives Foreign. Hardcover book: "The Little Book of Aqaba" set on glass display with glass magnifying bar and painted ceramic tile. Rec'd—January 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$65. Archives Foreign.	Their Majesties King Abdullah II and Queen Rania al Abdullah.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Family	Artwork (2): stitched portraits of President Bush (18" x 22") and Mrs. Bush (18" x 21"); held in green velvet boxes. Rec'd—March 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$200. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Family	Sculptures (2): contemporary design in glass and metal. Rec'd—March 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$25. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Vicente Fox Quesada, President of the United Mexican States.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
First Family	Scarves (5): 54" x 12" scarves, two brown made from Vicuna wool, one grey made from baby llama wool, one ivory made from royal alpaca, and one taupe made from guanaco wool; held in two wooden cases. Rec'd—March 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Alejandro Toledo Manrique, President of the Republic of Peru.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Family	Artwork: 23" x 15" embroidered image of the First Family, double matted and held in a 34½" x 26" brown wooden frame. Rec'd—April 4, 2002. Est. Value—\$1500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Family	Tea service: six 3½" blue and gold painted teacups, six saucers, 8" pitcher, 5" covered sugar bowl, 4" cream pitcher, 6" pastry plates (6), and 8½" round serving plate. Rec'd—May 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$449. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable Vladimir Anatolyevich Yakovlev, Governor of St. Petersburg.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Family	Artwork: 41½" x 29½" oil on canvas painting (c. 1891–93) of a Native American buffalo hunt, by C.M. Russell; held in a 48" x 37" gilt frame with small plaque at bottom. Rec'd—August 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$1,000,000. Archives Foreign. Framed letter: March 4, 1942 letter from Helen Tredwell Harrison, whose father was original owner of "The Buffalo Hunt," by C.M. Russell, to a gallery in Dallas, TX, detailing the circumstances of her father's possession of the painting; matted and held in a 25" x 20¼" wooden frame. Rec'd—August 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Archives Foreign.	His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Family	Household accessory: 4½" Herend bowl handpainted with blue, orange, pink, yellow, purple and green flowers with gold trim; held in a 6½" x 5½" blue velvet presentation box. Rec'd—November 8, 2002. Est. Value—\$535. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency The Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary and Mrs. Medgyessy.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Family	Glassware: Moser glass decanter (11") with stopper and six matching glasses. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$1000. Archives Foreign. Consumable: 70cl bottle of Jan Becher Becherovka Carlsbad liqueur. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$54. Handled pursuant to Secret Service policy.	His Excellency Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
First Daughters—Jenna and Barbara.	Artwork: 14" x 18½" painting with a three dimensional abstract figurat of a bird in the center, by Romanian artist Luciana Tamas. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$1500. Archives Foreign. Accessories (2): 36½" and 40" black velvet belts with intricate beaded floral motifs. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$30. Archives Foreign. Artwork: 9½" colorful three dimensional sculpture resembling a teapot, by Romanian artist Luciana Tamas. Rec'd—November 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$1000. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Ion Ilescu, President of Romania.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Daughter Barbara Bush	Pitcher: 9½" Turkish glass pitcher with blue and white swirl design. Silver pieces: 6" hand mirror and 2" trinket box with floral motif. Handkerchief: hand-stitched white handkerchief with small yellow flowers around the edge. Rec'd—January 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$225. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency The Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey and Mrs. Ecevit.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Daughter Barbara Bush	Fabric: Five yards of silk with intricate red design on a black background. Rec'd—February 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China and Madame Wang Yeping.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Daughter Barbara Bush	Clothing: Traditional Uzbek attire consisting of a gold hat with colored sequins and a gold tassel, black velvet slippers with gold embroidery, royal blue velvet pants with gold trim, and a royal blue velvet robe with white and gold embroidery in a floral pattern. Rec'd—March 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Daughter Jenna Bush	Pitcher: 9½" Turkish glass pitcher with white swirl design and cork. Silver pieces: 6" hand mirror and 2" trinket box with floral motif. Handkerchief: hand-stitched white handkerchief with small pink flowers around the edge. Rec'd—January 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$237. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency The Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey and Mrs. Ecevit.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
First Daughter Jenna Bush	Fabric: Five yards of silk with intricate red design on a black background. Rec'd—February 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China and Madame Wang Yeping.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
First Daughter Jenna Bush	Clothing: Traditional Uzbek attire consisting of a gold hat with colored sequins and a gold tassel, black velvet slippers with gold embroidery, royal blue velvet pants with gold trim, and a royal blue velvet robe with white and gold embroidery in a floral pattern. Rec'd—March 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Brooks, Karen B., Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council.	Wall hanging: 23" x 23" traditional Zodiac design depicting the Year of the Horse in gold, brown, green and blue stitched cord and metallic sequins on black velvet. Rec'd—May 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Government Property.	Police Colonel Hkam Awng, Joint Secretary of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control, Ministry of Home Affairs of the Union of Burma.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Brooks, Karen B., Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council.	Clothing: 16½" x 68" orange silk scarf embroidered with traditional pattern in rust, celadon, black and pale yellow. Rec'd—December 20, 2002. Est. Value—\$600. Government Property.	His Excellency Phanthong Phommahaxay, Ambassador of the Lao People's Democratic Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Bryza, Matthew J., Director, European and Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council.	Flatware set: silver flatware service for six; presented in a 13½" x 13½" wooden case. Rec'd—July 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$650. Government Property.	His Excellency Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Card, Andrew H., Jr., Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff.	Watch: Cartier men's stainless steel "Tank Francaise Steel" watch with automatic date; held in a red leather presentation case. Rec'd—May 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$2900. Government Property.	His Excellency Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Elliott, Ruth E., Special Assistant for Scheduling and Advance, National Security Council.	Rug: 5' x 6.8' hand crafted rug from Morocco of the "Rabat" design with medallion open-field red, cream and multi-color border (red, yellow, blue, green, black, and terra cotta). Rec'd—April 24, 2002. Est. Value—\$600. Transferred to General Services Administration.	His Majesty Mohammed VI, King of Morocco.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Falkenrath, Richard A, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Policy and Plans, Office of Homeland Security.	Binoculars: black Swarovski Habicht 10 x 40 binoculars with wide angle. Rec'd—July 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$722. Government Property.	His Excellency Ernst Strasser, Federal Minister for the Interior of the Republic of Austria.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Fenton, Cathy, Special Assistant to the President and White House Social Secretary.	Rug: 10' x 6.8' hand crafted Oriental rug of the "Rabat" design. Rec'd—May 8, 2002. Est. Value—\$1200. Government Property.	His Majesty Mohammed VI, King of Morocco.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Frazer, Jendayi, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs, National Security Council.	Artwork: 18" x 24" oil painting on canvas board of African women seated against a wall, by Robe Kavanja; held in a 21¼" x 27¼" wooden frame. Rec'd—December 20, 2002. Est. Value—\$650. Government Property.	Ms. Rebecca Nabutola, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Fried, Dankel, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council.	Clothing: traditional Uzbek attire consisting of a multi-colored silk scarf (49" x 49"), a collapsible 6" black hat with white design, and a navy blue velvet robe with elaborate gold embroidery. Rec'd—March 13, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives, Staff Gift.	His Excellency Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Fried, Daniel, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council.	Watch: Bulgari stainless steel "Rettangolo" watch; held in a black leather presentation box. Rec'd—May 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$3000. Government Property.	His Excellency Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Hughes, Karen, Assistant to the President and Counselor to the President.	Bowl: 8½" x 10½" white porcelain Kongliche Porzellan-Manufaktur Berlin oval vegetable dish, with gold band trim and handpainted floral and butterfly design. Rec'd—May 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$315. Archives, Staff Gift.	His Excellency Mr. Johannes Rau, President of the Federal Republic of Germany.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Moriarty, James F., Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council.	Desk clock: 1½" square silver trim clock face set in blue lucite square (3½"), with four pearls in silver squares accenting the four corners of clock face, etched silver crest on top of lucite square; quartz movement; mounted on 1¼" x 3½" silver base; reverse of clock engraved "Office of the Prime Minister, Tokyo". Rec'd—October 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$555. Government Property.	His Excellency Yasuo Fukuda, Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Scarf 76" x 22½" olive green silk embroidered with gold thread and 2" fringe. Rec'd—January 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives, Staff Gift.	His Excellency Abdus Samad Azad, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Tea pot: 12" silver tea pot with engraved designs. Rec'd—January 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$1000. Archives, Staff Gift.	His Highness Sheikh Sulman bin Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, Crown Prince of the State of Bahrain and Head of the Bahrain Defense Force.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Plate: 9¼" silver plate engraved "Presented by Nguyen Tan Dung, Deputy Prime Minister Socialist Republic of Vietnam", with a black lacquer stand. Rec'd—January 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Archives, Staff Gift.	His Excellency, Nguyen Tan Dung, Deputy Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Crystal rock with light wood stand from Madagascar, presented in a hand woven basket with yellow embroidery. Rec'd—January 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$714. Archives, Staff Gift.	His Excellency, Didier Ratsiraka, President of the Republic of Madagascar.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Jewelry set (4 pieces); silver necklace, earrings, ring and bracelet with coral stones. Rec'd—January 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$750. Archives, Staff Gift.	His Excellency, Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of the Republic of Yemen.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Clothing: traditional Uzbek attire consisting of a gold hat with colored sequins and a gold tassel, and a blue velvet robe with gold and white embroidery in a floral pattern. Rec'd—March 13, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Archives, Staff Gift. Flatware set: 22K silver flatware service for six; presented in a 13½" x 13½" wooden case. Rec'd—March 13, 2002. Est. Value—\$650. Archives, Staff Gift.	His Excellency, Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Jewelry 1" 18K white gold American flag lapel pin, inset with sapphires, diamonds and rubies. Rec'd—May 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$1,000. Government Property.	His Excellency, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, President of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Hardback book: "The Russian Museum," a compilation of paintings found within the Russian Museum. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$28. Government Property. Hardback book: "The Tretyakov Gallery," a compilation of paintings found at the Tretyakov Gallery. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$28. Government Property. Hardback book: "Nizhny Novgorod Region," with a history of, and various scenes throughout the region. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$27. Government Property. Hardback book: "Folk Handicrafts of the Nizhny Novgorod Region," featuring crafts of local citizens. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$18. Government Property. Hardback book: "Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States," printed in Russian. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$20. Government Property. CDs (2): "The Best of Henry Mancini." Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$29. Government Property. CDs: "Romances," by Alexander Podbolotov. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$28. Government Property. CDs: "Nue," by Lara Fabian (in French). Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$26. Government Property.	Mr. Vladimir B. Rushaylo, Secretary of Russian Security Council.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
	<p>Hardcover coffee table book: "Treasures of the Kremlin" (approximate title, printed in Russian), held in red cloth sleeve. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$30. Government Property.</p> <p>Hardcover coffee table book: "Hermitage Paintings" (approximate title, printed in Russian), by Kolin Eysler. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$55. Government Property.</p> <p>Hardcover book: "Scientific Problem of National Security of the Russian Federation: Volume 3," (approximate title, printed in Russian), by the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$20. Government Property.</p> <p>Hardcover book: "The Special Services of the USA" (approximate title, printed in Russian). Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$20. Government Property.</p> <p>Hardcover book: "Contemporary International Relations," (approximate title, printed in Russian), by Mgimo. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$20. Government Property.</p> <p>Hardcover book: "The History of Russia's International Relations and Foreign Policy 1648–2000," (approximate title, printed in Russian), by A.S. Protopopov, V.M. Kuzmenko, and N.C. Yelmaniva. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$20. Government Property.</p> <p>CDs (5) "The Carnival of Love," "Besame Mucho," "Tango," "With Love to You," and "The Best of Rio-Rita" by V. Kovtun (approximate titles, printed in Russian). Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$40. Government Property.</p> <p>CD: "Promise of Love," (approximate title, printed in Russian), by Mikael Tariverdiyov. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$8. Government Property.</p> <p>CD: "Great Composers: Masterpiece of the Musical Art of Russia," (approximate title, printed in Russian). Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$8. Government Property.</p>		

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Textiles: 27" x 83" fringed traditional silk and wool cloth, handwoven in light blue, white, tan, peach and yellow threads. Rec'd—June 6, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Government Property.	His Excellency Ivica Racan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Clothing: traditional Saudi attire (abaya) of a black and burgundy robe with matching 70" shawl and a black caftan with elaborate gold embroidery and multi-colored sequins. Rec'd—June 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$250. Archives, Staff Gift. Jewelry: sterling silver jewelry set consisting of a necklace, earrings, ring with black stone, bracelet, choker and belt. Rec'd—June 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Archives, Staff Gift.	His Royal Highness Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince, First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Rug: 73" x 44" Turcoman hand knotted rug, made of wool on warp and silk on weft with 2 1/2" silk fringe. Rec'd—June 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$2200. Government Property.	His Excellency Mr. Yonus Qanooni, Minister of Interior of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Jewelry: 1" x 1 1/2" amber "Joyas Criollas" pin with 14K twisted gold setting. Rec'd—July 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Government Property.	His Excellency Hipolito Mejia, President of the Dominican Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Art: two contemporary brass sculptures (7 1/2") mounted on 4" circular wooden bases. Each sculpture has two stylized figures of a man and a woman linked arm in arm. Rec'd—August 5, 2002. Est. Value—\$190. Government Property. Art: 21 1/2" x 13" framed copper relief overpainted with an image of a woman stirring a mortar, signed "02 . . . Lotonga". Rec'd—August 5, 2002. Est. Value—\$210. Government Property.	His Excellency Augustin Katumba Mwanke, Minister of the Presidency of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Candelabrum: 14" x 13 1/4" three candle, sterling silver hallmarked candelabrum, convertible to single candlestick, with top nob, held in a blue velvet presentation box. Rec'd—September 30, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Government Property.	His Excellency Mohamed Hussein Tantawy, Minister of Defense and Military Production of the Arab Republic of Egypt.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	Accessories: 36" square, silk Hermes scarf with "Aloha" images of parrots, Hawaiian women, palm trees and ocean, in orange, yellow, blue and green tones with a terra cotta tone border. Rec'd—October 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$250. Government Property.	Her Excellency Michele Alliot-Marie, Minister of Defense and War Veterans of the French Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: WHITE HOUSE OFFICE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	<p>Desk accessory: Pichard-Balme paperweight of enameled French flag and standard; obverse has inset of Ministry of Defense gold tone insignia and four symbols in corners of flag; "Ministre de la Defense" and smaller insignias inset on reverse. Rec'd—October 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$45. Government Property.</p> <p>Hardcover books (2): "Brancusi," by Radu Varla, 2nd printing 2002, Rizzoli International; "Romania," by Petre Baron, presented in a red velvet box. Rec'd—November 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$135. Government Property.</p> <p>Artwork: 11" x 14" single matted oil pastel caricature of Dr. Rice by Stefan Popa titled "Condoleezza Rice (SUA) Praga 21–22 Noiembrie 20020", held in a 16" x 20" frame; presented in navy blue portfolio box. Rec'd—November 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Government Property.</p> <p>Desk accessory: 34" x 9" x 11" wooden model ship with banners "NATO builds Tomorrow's Security Ark". Rec'd—November 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$175. Government Property.</p>	His Excellency Ion Iliescu, President of Romania.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	<p>Household accessory: 8" x 3½" round sterling silver compote with silver handles, with raised diagonal design in four quadrants; from the Museum of Cycladic Art. Rec'd—November 26, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Government Property.</p>	His Excellency George Papandreou, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Rice, Condoleezza, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.	<p>Desk accessory: hinged 4½" x 1½" silver filigree box of intricate design studded with numerous small silver beads worked into design; 3" square raised on top. Rec'd—December 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Government Property.</p>	His Excellency Igor Ivanov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Ridge, Thomas J., Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.	<p>Paperback book: "Catalogo del Fondo Reservado de la Biblioteca." Rec'd—March 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$75. Government Property.</p> <p>Hardcover book: "Patrimonio Artistico de la Procuraduria General de la Republica." Rec'd—March 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$125. Government Property.</p> <p>Platter: 10" x 12" silver platter engraved "Procuraduria General De La Republica." Rec'd—March 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$100. Government Property.</p>	The Honorable David Rafael Mercado de la Concha, Attorney General of the United Mexican States.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
114168/BOYER_C, Vice President	Oil Painting on canvas of the Statue of Liberty, titled Liberty, in the Impressionist style by Georgian artist Tamaz Khutsishvili (2001), measures 30" by 36", with 3 inch gilt frame, Rec'd—October 1, 2001. Est. Value—\$1800. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
115304/MURRAY_M, Vice President.	Silver cigarette box, approximately 7 1/4" by 4 1/4", with scene engraved on lid of Palazzo Dell'Eccellence Principe Chigi in Piazza Colonna, Venice. Rec'd—October 22, 2001. Est. Value—\$550. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Gianfranco Fini, Deputy Prime Minister of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
114191/MURRAY_M, Vice President.	Leaded crystal liquor serving set consisting of a decanter with stopper, six serving glasses and six cloth napkins. Rec'd—January 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$550. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister The Republic of Turkey.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
115410/MURRAY_M, Vice President.	Afghani rug, navy background with rust colored designs. Silk and wool. Measures 118" by 84". Rec'd—January 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$4000. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
114992/BOYER_C, Vice President	Sculpture by Israeli artist, Miriam Hirszwicz, of a small silver dove sitting on a frosted glass stele, mounted on a piece of frosted glass. Measures 6" high by 5" wide. Rec'd—February 6, 2002. Est. Value—\$290. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, Minister of Defense for Israel.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
115138/MURRAY_M, Vice President.	Silver palm tree approximately 8" high and 5" in width on plastic base, inscription reads "Presented by H.H. Shaikh Salman Bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, Crown Prince & Commander-in-Chief Bahrain Defence Force." Rec'd—February 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign.	His Highness, Sheikh Salman Bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, Crown Prince and Commander in Chief of the Bahrain Defence Force.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
115145/MURRAY_M, Vice President.	Pakistani carpet, ca. 2000, in new condition, very good quality, elongated center Arabesque medallion, cotton warp and weft, all wool pile. Taupe medallion with navy blue field. Measures 48" by 76" Rec'd—February 13, 2002. Est. Value—\$1800. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Pervez Musharraf, President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
115445/MURRAY_M, Vice President.	Ebony sculpture of seated African man, measures 22" high. Rec'd—February 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$1375. Archives Foreign. Tapestry painting of African woman on mottled red and black velvet, signed Pululu 02. Rec'd—February 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of the Republic of Angola.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
	<p>Hard cover book—Angola O Futuro Comeca Agora, with two CDs in book pocket. Similar coffee table books on Barnes and Noble sell for \$50. Estimated value for two CDs is \$20. Rec'd—February 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$70. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Forty 250 gram packages (10 Kilos) of Cafe Ginga roasted coffee beans from Angola priced at \$8 per package. Rec'd—February 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$320. Handled pursuant to Secret Service Policy.</p>		
115528/BOYER_C Vice President	Sterling silver rectangular box lined in blue velvet, in blue velvet presentation case. Lid of box is inscribed in Arabic. Measures 8" by 4.5". Rec'd—March 4, 2002. Est. Value—\$550. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Mohamed Hosny Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
117574/BOYER_C, Vice President	Bronze resin bust of Winston Churchill. A Marcus Replica—exact reproduction of hand sculpted model. Made in England for the Cabinet War Rooms Museum. Museum is partially government funded. Rec'd—March 10, 2002. Est. Value—\$291. Transferred to the General Services Administration.	Mr. Philip Reed, Director, Cabinet War Rooms Museum, London.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116622/BOYER_C, Vice President	<p>Large ceremonial robe of navy blue velvet with gold and multi-colored embroidery, multi-colored silk scarf, and small black hand sewn hat. Rec'd—March 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Sterling silver flatware service for six in presentation case with Uzbekistan seal. Flatware is Continental style. Rec'd—March 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$850. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Excellency Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116466/BOYER_C, Vice President	Sterling silver notepad. Measures 4" by 6" with the Jordanian crest and a lithograph of the Monastery at Petra. Rec'd—March 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$225. Archives Foreign.	His Majesty, King Abdullah II bin al Hussein, of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116510/BOYER_C, Vice President	Gold vermeil sculpture of a palm tree with three antelopes grazing beneath it, on a wooden base covered with freshwater pearls. One of the antelopes was broken in shipping. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$1500. Archives Foreign.	His Majesty, Sheikh Hamad bin Essa Al Khalifa, King of the Kingdom of Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
119371/BOYER_C, Vice President	<p>Painted red Arabic chest, hinged lid with brass latch, 2 drawers, elaborate brass decoration on lid and sides. Measures 14" by 25" by 13", Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$400. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Four UAE gold coins in protective plastic cases (\$300 each) Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$1200. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Woven wool horse blanket, measures 30" by 104" (\$35) Two black, red and green woven horse leads with silver thread, measure 1" by 28", with matching small tasseled pieces, measuring 1" by 8", (\$200) Pink and purple yarn lead with tassel, 3" by 36", for decoration, no monetary value. Red and white woven lead with silver thread, 1" by 34", no monetary value, Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$235. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Framed 8" silver dagger with elaborate engraving; in a wood-framed double matted shadow box, measures 12" by 15". Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$125. Transferred to the General Services Administration.</p> <p>Wooden wall hanging with brass latch and other brass detailing, measures 10" by 20", Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$175. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Highness, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116474/BOYER_C, Vice President	<p>Traditional Saudi men's clothing in green leather box: two long white cotton shirts, complete headdress, leather sandals, prayer beads, and brown tunic with gold epaulets. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$250. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Clock topped with Sterling silver horse trimmed in gold vermeil, on a malachite base. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$7500. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Christian Dior Cosmetics for men—"Fahrenheit" fragrance; toilette water spray, after shave lotion, deodorant, soap, after shave splash. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$177. Handled pursuant to Secret Service Policy.</p>	His Majesty, Fahd Bin Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

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[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
116508/BOYER_C, Vice President	Large gold vermeil and Sterling silver sailboat on burl wood base. Given to the VP on his Middle East trip. Gift is a duplicate of a previous gift by same donor. Rec'd—March 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$2500. Archives Foreign.	His Highness, Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116511/BOYER_C, Vice President	Aynsley bone china urn, with handpainted scenes of the Gulf War, and the inscription "Liberation of Kuwait", Rec'd—March 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$350. Archives Foreign. Book: Kuwait Photographs & Memories by Mona Jabir Al-Abdullah Al-Jabir Al-Sabah, Rec'd—March 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$65. Archives Foreign.	His Highness Shaykh Saad al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al Sabah, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116242/BOYER_C, Vice President	Silver covered cup, 3 inches in diameter, .900 silver. Rec'd—March 19, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Transferred to the General Services Administration. Silver plate inscribed with the Prime Minister's name and a Turkish flag, wooden plate stand. .900 silver. Rec'd—March 19, 2002. Est. Value—\$200. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister, The Republic of Turkey.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116565/BOYER_C, Vice President	Handmade Khutaya porcelain decorative bowl with cover. White background with royal blue and gold trim and small colored flowers around the edge and bottom. 12" in diameter. Presented in a blue velvet box. Rec'd—March 19, 2002. Est. Value—\$700. Archives Foreign.	General Huseyin Kivrikoglu, Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116404/BOYER_C, Vice President	Small Sterling silver sculpture depicting the walled old city of Jerusalem. Measures 2.5 inches in diameter. In plexiglass case, lined in blue velvet, with inscription to the Vice President. Rec'd—March 19, 2002. Est. Value—\$500 Archives Foreign. Handpainted linen table runner with wheat design by Israeli artist, Anat Mayer. Measures 27" by 13", Rec'd—March 19, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable, Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of the State of Israel.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
117090/BOYER_C, Vice President and Mrs. Cheney.	Bouquet of roses in ceramic vase. Rec'd—March 30, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Handled pursuant to Secret Service Policy.	His Royal Highness, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan Bin Abdulaziz, and Her Royal Highness, Princess Haifa Al Faisal, Embassy of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

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[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
119207/BOYER_C, Vice President	Reproduction of a Faberge egg. Red enamel egg on an attached pedestal. Made of 18K gold, with a total of 10.5 carats of diamonds. The center of the egg is rimmed with a floral garland; at the center of each flower is a .5 carat diamond. The top of the egg twists off to reveal a gold basket with gold flowers and three small eggs made of jasper. A band of small diamonds rims the dome of the egg. Rec'd—May 1, 2002. Est. Value—\$17500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Igor Yusufov, Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
119822/BOYER_C, Vice President	Gold vermeil disk with a scene from Bahrain, on a metal stand with inscription to the VP. Measures 4" in diameter. Rec'd—May 8, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Shaykh Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
119455/MURRAY_M, Vice President	Ceramic, lidded vase in white, green, black and red, in a snake stitch design with gold overlay, 12" tall. Rec'd—May 24, 2002. Est. Value—\$2000. Archives Foreign.	His Majesty, Mohammad VI, King of Morocco.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
119917/BOYER_C, Vice President	Afghani carpet in colors of navy, salmon, green, cream, and maroon. Measures 72" x 44.5". Rec'd—May 30, 2002. Est. Value—\$660. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Yonus Qanooni, Minister of Interior, Interim Administration of Afghanistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
119824/BOYER_C, Vice President	Gold vermeil eagle sculpture on malachite base decorated with gold flowers with semi-precious stones at the center. Rec'd—June 3, 2002. Est. Value—\$3500. Archives Foreign.	His Royal Highness, Abdallah Bin Abd Al-Aziz, Al Saud, Crown Prince, First Deputy Prime Minister, and Commander of the National Guard of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
119461/MURRAY_M, Vice President	Sterling silver hexagonal jewelry box with hinged cover and blue velvet interior. Engraved design on exterior of the box. Rec'd—June 6, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Mohamed Hosny Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
120248/MURRAY_M, Vice President	Ceramic marriage dolls titled, "A Lasting Marriage," by Chen Hui-Yen Sculpture Studio, Taiwan. Measure 6.5" high. Male and Female porcelain dolls with miniature lamps, shoes and a gong. Rec'd—June 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable Fredrick Chien, President of Control Yuan of the Republic, Taiwan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
12037/BOYER_C, Vice President	18 K gold reproduction of a Roman coin, with copy of donor's acceptance speech and program dated 5/30/02. Inscription on back of coin reads, "Senato Della Repvbblca". Rec'd—June 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$400. Archives Foreign.	Senator Marcello Pera, President of the Italian Senate.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

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121673/BOYER_C, Vice President	Six Sterling silver shot glasses with buffalo motif, in wooden presentation box with Sterling silver ornamentation. Rec'd—July 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$850. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
124348/BOYER_C, Vice President	Handwoven silk rug from Uzbekistan in Turkmen style and design, but bright red and unusual. Highly collectible. Measures 47" X 63", Rec'd—September 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$900. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Abdulaziz Komilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
127931/BOYER_C, Vice President	Tooled leather chest board in Kyrgyz design, with a leather carrier. Wooden chess pieces depict the epic "Manas," with dark-stained hats on one side and clear varnish hats on the opposition. Measures 18" by 18". Rec'd—September 24, 2002. Est. Value—\$409. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Askar Akaev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
125948/BOYER_C, Vice President	Sterling silver plate engraved with a scene of King RamsesII riding his chariot. Measures 12" in diameter. Rec'd—September 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Archives Foreign. Hand knotted silk Egyptian rug. Silk foundation and fringe. The ground is set with four panels of individual foliate designs. Major border with red ground; outer plain blue border. In green velvet box. Measures 12" x 29". Rec'd—September 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$525. Archives Foreign.	Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
126198/BOYER_C, Vice President	Mosaic Russian Icon of unidentified saint, in 18K gold frame with sapphires and rubies from Thailand and Sri Lanka inset in the frame. Frame has a jasper backing. Measures 7" by 4 25" by 5". Rec'd—October 3, 2002. Est. Value—\$9500. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Igor Yushov, Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
127985/BOYER_C, Vice President	Wool and alpaca textile (axsu) woven on a pre-Columbian loom by Bolivian artisan, Leonarda Churqui. Measures 26" by 36"; mounted on black wool with wooden hanging rods. Features columns of red/black and pink/navy in native designs. Rec'd—November 14, 2002. Est. Value—\$1000. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Gonzalo Sanchez De Lozada, President of the Republic of Bolivia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
129322/BOYER_C, Vice President and Mrs. Cheney.	Tiffany "Brittania" crystal compote. Measures 5 75 inches high and 10 inches in diameter. Rec'd—December 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$195. Vice President retained.	His Excellency, Salem Abdullah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah and Mrs. Rima R. Al-Sabah, Embassy of Kuwait.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

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116764/BOYER_C, Vice President and Mrs. Cheney.	Inlaid mother-of-pearl background with nativity scene in bas relief and the word "Bethlehem 2000". Rec'd—March 19, 2003. Est. Value—\$2000. Archives Foreign.	Yasser Arafat, Chairman of Palestinian Authority, Palestine.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
128536/BOYER_C, Vice President	Red and white Hsiao Fang Pottery vase, 12" high, with dragon motif, on a rosewood base. In silk covered presentation box. Rec'd—09/17/02. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign.	The Honorable Lien Chan, Chairman, Kuomintang Party, Taiwan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
115528/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney	All silk Egyptian carpet, measures 40" x 58", having geometrical center medallion containing seven diamonds, new ca. 2000, very good quality and coloration. Rec'd—March 4, 2002. Est. Value—\$1800. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency, Mohamed Hosny Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116466/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney	Multi-color wool rug, handwoven by the Bedouin women of Jabal Bani Hamida for the Jordan River Foundation, a group dedicated to helping Jordanian women form microbusinesses making traditional crafts. Measures 80" by 60". Rec'd—March 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Archives Foreign.	His Majesty, King Abdullah II bin al Hussein, of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116338/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney	Necklace, bracelet, earrings, ring in swirled pattern. White gold with 46.99 carats of diamonds and 51.08 carats of rubies. Manufactured by Mouawad. Given to Mrs. Cheney on March 2002 Middle East trip by Her Highness Hussa Al Shalon, wife of the Crown Prince. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$40000. Archives Foreign.	His Royal Highness, Abdallah Bin Abd Al-Aziz, Al Saud, Crown Prince, First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116510/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney	Sterling silver commemorative coin set (8 coins), valued at \$125. One 22k gold commemorative coin, valued at \$315. Given to Mrs. Cheney by Sheikha Hala Bint Dalj Al-Khalifa on the Middle East trip. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$440. Archives Foreign.	His Majesty, Sheikh Hamad bin Essa Al Khalifa, King of the Kingdom of Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
134571/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney	Samsonite metal suitcase given to Mrs. Cheney by Sheika Fatima Bent Mubarak al Kethi, wife of the President. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$476. Archives Foreign. Royal blue silk long dress in a caftan style, embroidered with gold thread and beading. Given to Mrs. Cheney by Sheika Fatima Bent Mubarak al Kethi, wife of the President. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$200. Archives Foreign.	His Highness, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

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119371/BOYER_C Mrs. Cheney	<p>Three piece black dress ensemble of brocade and tulle. Given to Mrs. Cheney by Sheika Fatima Bent Mubarak al Kethi, wife of the President. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$200. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Green silk long dress in the caftan style decorated with scrolled and trailing flowers and leaves. Given to Mrs. Cheney by Sheika Fatima Bent Mubarak al Kethi, wife of the President. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Two piece dress in lightweight orange and white floral design silk-like fabric. Given to Mrs. Cheney by Sheika Fatima Bent Mubarak al Kethi, wife of the President. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$75. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Large Arabic stained wooden chest, hinged lid with brass latch, 5 drawers, elaborate brass decoration on lid and sides, measures 19" by 45" by 19". Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$900. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Hardcover books: Phoenix Rising: The United Arab Emirates, Past, Present & Future by Werner Forman (cover price \$95) and UAE in Focus: A Photographic History of the United Arab Emirates (\$51). Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$146. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>21 K gold jewelry, necklace and earrings with synthetic emeralds and rubies and pearls. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$4000. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Six inch silver engraved dagger in a wood-framed double matted shadow box, measures 12" by 14". Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$150. Archives Foreign. Transferred to the General Services Administration.</p> <p>Four yards cotton dress material with silver braid at the neckline (\$100), Black silk outer robe with jet beads, matching scarf (\$100) Yellow satin dress with mauve chiffon overlay, jeweled bodice (\$100). Girl's dress, purple with embroidered flowers, size 6–8, with silver braid at the neckline (\$75). Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$375. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Highness, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

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116474/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney	Gold plastic gahwa, 16" high (\$25) Woven wool horse blanket, measures 18" by 104" (\$35), Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$60 Archives Foreign. Photograph of the Royal Family in a Christofle silver frame. Frame was broken in transit from the Middle East. Given to Mrs. Cheney by Sheika Fatima Bent Mubarak al Kethi. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Archives Foreign.	His Majesty, Fahd Bin Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and King of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
118558/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney	Abaya and veils in black silk, with gold trim. Textiles valued at \$250. Ornate jewelry made of thinly fashioned silver: Large necklace, belt, bracelet, earrings with black stone, ring with black stone, small necklace. Jewelry valued at \$150. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$400 Archives Foreign. Christian Dior cosmetics for women—"J'Adore" fragrance; perfume, body lotion, soap, deodorant, bath gel. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$176. Handled pursuant to Secret Service Policy.	His Highness, Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
117577/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney	Necklace, bracelet, earrings, and ring in antelope motif, white gold with 22 heart-shaped garnet stones of a total weight of 24.08 carats. Designed by Issa Al-Ghanem exclusively for Al Wajba Palace. In a burgundy colored ostrich leather box. Given to Mrs. Cheney by Her Highness Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al-Missned, second wife of the Amir. Rec'd—March 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$3500 Archives Foreign.	High Highness, Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116511/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney	Limited edition, handcrafted and hand blown perfume bottle, made exclusively for Shiellah Center for Children with Special Needs. It has a Shiellah dower stopper, Sterling silver and gold plated. Made by Thomas Goode of London. Given to Mrs. Cheney by Her Highness Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al-Missned, second wife of the Amir. Rec'd—March 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$400. Archives Foreign.	High Highness, Shaykh Saad al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al Sabah, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

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116582/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney ..	<p>Miniature mbayyat three drawer box encrusted with 22K gold. Given to Mrs. Cheney by Her Highness Shaykha Latifeh Fahad Al Sabah. Measures 10" x 5" x 6". Rec'd—March 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$2500. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Woman's ring, in 24K gold, with polished turquoise stone, given to Mrs. Cheney by Her Highness Shaykha Latifeh Fahad Al Sabah. Rec'd—March 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Archives Foreign.</p>	Shaykh Saad al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al Sabah, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
121673/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney ..	Silver pendant necklace with large Baltic amber stone, in flowing Art Nouveau design, with hinged Sterling silver tulus attached. Given to Mrs. Cheney by Jolanta Kwasniewski, wife of the President. Rec'd—July 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$250. Archives Foreign.	His Excellency Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
125948/BOYER_C, Mrs. Cheney ..	Jewelry set: white gold and small diamond necklace, bracelet, ring and earrings. Rec'd—September 25, 2002. Est. Value—\$2500. Archives Foreign.	Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116338/BOYER_C, Vice President Staff	<p>Concord stainless steel women's Saratoga bracelet watch, with quartz movement, calendar, and water resistance. Given to Mary Matalin at the Crown Prince's dinner in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$1450. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Stainless steel Concord Sportivo men's bracelet watch with chronograph dial, quartz movement. Given to Lewis Libby at Crown Prince's dinner in Jeddah. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$1790. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Stainless steel Concord Sportivo men's bracelet watch with chronograph dial, quartz movement. Given to Enc Edelman at Crown Prince's dinner in Jeddah. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$1790. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Stainless steel Concord Sportivo men's bracelet watch with chronograph dial, quartz movement. Given to John Hannah at Crown Prince's dinner in Jeddah. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$1790. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Royal Highness, Abdallah Bin Abd Al-Aziz, Al Saud, Crown Prince, First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT--Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
119371/BOYER_C, Vice President Staff.	<p>Small Arabic stained wooden chest, hinged lid with brass latch, 3 drawers, elaborate brass decoration on lid and sides, measures 14" by 30" by 16" (\$150) Book: UAE Yearbook 2000-2001 (\$14) Brass gahwa, 15" high (\$25) Framed silver 6 inch engraved dagger, in wood-framed double-matted shadow box, 12" by 14" (\$150) Four yards cotton dress material with silver braid at neckline (\$100) Woven horse blanket, 30" by 70" (\$35) Given to Lea Berman. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$474. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Small Arabic stained wooden chest, hinged lid with brass latch, 3 drawers, elaborate brass decoration on lid and sides, measures 14" by 30" by 16" (\$150) Book: UAE Yearbook 2000-2001 (\$14) Brass gahwa, 15" high (\$25) Framed silver 6 inch engraved dagger, in wood-framed, double-matted shadow box, 12" by 14" (\$150) Four yards cotton dress material with silver braid at neckline (\$100) Woven horse blanket, 30" by 70" (\$35) given to Laura Chadwick. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$474. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Highness Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116474/BOYER_C, Vice President Staff.	<p>Black silk abaya, with rhinestones and gold lace Given to Mary Matalin. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$250. Personally retained by staff member.</p> <p>Seven boxes of Saudi traditional men's clothing were given to members of the VP's delegation to the Middle East. Two long white cotton shirts, complete headress, leather sandals, and prayer beads in green leather case. Each gift was valued at \$250 by James Keshsishian. One box was sent to State Department Office of Protocol for Ambassador Burns; another box was sent to the President's gift unit for General Wayne Downing. The remaining five boxes were intended for members of the Vice President's personal staff. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$1750 Archives Foreign.</p>	His Majesty, Fahd Bin Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and King of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting the gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
116511/BOYER_C, Vice President Staff.	<p>Women's 22k gold bracelet with two rows of small cultured egg-shaped freshwater pearls. For Lea Berman. Rec'd—March 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Transferred to the General Services Administration.</p> <p>Seven boxes of Saudi traditional men's clothing were given to members of the VP's delegation to the Middle East. Two long white cotton shirts, complete headress, leather sandals, and prayer beads in green leather case. Each gift was valued at \$250 by James Koshishian. One box was sent to State Department Office of Protocol for Ambassador Burns; another box was sent to the President's gift unit for General Wayne Downing. The remaining five boxes were intended for members of the Vice President's personal staff. Rec'd—March 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$1750. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Highness Shaykh Saad al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al Sabah, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
116511/BOYER_C, Vice President Staff.	<p>Women's 22k gold bracelet with two rows of small cultured egg-shaped freshwater pearls. For Lea Berman. Rec'd—March 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Transferred to the General Services Administration.</p> <p>Women's 22k gold bracelet with two rows of small cultured egg-shaped freshwater pearls. For Laura Chadwick. Rec'd—March 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$450. Transferred to the General Services Administration.</p>	His Highness Shaykh Saad al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al Sabah, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
129322/BOYER_C, Vice President Staff.	<p>Tiffany "Metropolis" crystal bud vase. Measures 10 inches high. Given to Lewis Libby. Rec'd—December 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$110. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Tiffany crystal bowl. Measures 4 inches high and 5 inches in diameter. Given to Eric Edelman. Rec'd—December 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$100. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Tiffany crystal bowl. Measures 4 inches high and 5 inches in diameter. Given to John Hannah. Rec'd—December 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$100. Archives Foreign.</p> <p>Tiffany crystal bowl. Measures 4 inches high and 5 inches in diameter. Given to Dr. Tom Parker. Rec'd—December 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$100. Archives Foreign.</p>	His Excellency Salem Abdullah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah & Mrs. Rima R. Al-Sabah, Embassy of Kuwait.	Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: UNITED STATES SENATE

(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Max Baucus, U.S. Senator	Ceramic Plate with 24 Karat gold trim. June 11, 2002—Est. Value—More than \$100. Deposited with Secretary of the Senate.	Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, Embassy of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Joseph Biden, U.S. Senator	Needlepoint picture of a bowl and flowers. April 23, 2002—Est. Value—Over \$100. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	Do Van Tai, Chairman of the Foreign Committee of the National Assembly of Vietnam.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Sam Brownback, U.S. Senator	Souvenir Set of Coins. March 15, 2002—Est. Value—Over \$100. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam A. Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Sam Brownback, U.S. Senator	Silver Flatware set for six. March 15, 2002—Est. Value—\$500-700. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam A. Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Senator.	Hermes Scarf. March 3, 2002—Est. Value—\$275. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	Jean Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Susan Collins, U.S. Senator	Set of 12 Commemorative Uzbekistan silver coins in wood presentation box. January 6, 2002. Est. Value—\$200. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator	Wooden Chalice with gold outlines. February 11, 2002—Est. Value—\$300. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	Amir of Qatar Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator	Sterling Silverware. January 19, 2002—Est. Value—\$500-700. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator	4'x6' Red Silk and Wool Rug. February 11, 2002—Est. Value—\$300. Displayed in SH-509.	Chairman Karzai of Afghanistan ...	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
John Edwards, U.S. Senator	Set of 12 Sterling Silver Coins. January 6, 2002—Est. Value—\$200. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Diane Feinstein, U.S. Senator	Wicker Basket containing cookies, nuts, candies, cheeses, crackers and other edibles. December 12, 2002—Est. Value—\$200. Donated to Charity, House of Ruth, Washington, DC.	Bader Omar Al-Dafa, Ambassador of Qatar.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator	Set of 12 Sterling Silver Souvenir Coins. January 6, 2002—Est. Value—\$200. Displayed in SR-246.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Edward Kennedy, U.S. Senator	Hanging tiled wall mosaic. August 1, 2001—Est. Value—\$1500. Displayed in SR-319.	President Bouteflika of Algeria	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Carl Levin, U.S. Senator	Six piece, 22 karat Place setting. July 22, 2003—Est. Value—Over \$100. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Joe Lieberman, U.S. Senator	Sterling Silver Decorative Jar. January 4, 2002—Est. Value—\$250. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	Prime Minister of Ecevet of Turkey.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.

AGENCY: UNITED STATES SENATE—Continued
(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Joe Lieberman, U.S. Senator	Sterling Silverware. January 6, 2002—Est. Value—\$500–700. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Joe Lieberman, U.S. Senator	Set of 12 Sterling Silver Coins. January 6, 2002—Est. Value—\$200. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
John McCain, U.S. Senator	Set of 12 Sterling Silver Coins. January 3, 2002—Est. Value—\$200. Displayed in SR–241.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator	Set of 12 Sterling Silver Coins. January 6, 2002—Est. Value—\$200. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator	Rug. April 14, 2001—Est. Value—Over \$100. Displayed in SH–716.	President of Algeria, H.E. Abdelaziz Bouteflika.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator	Rug. July 12, 2001—Est. Value—Over \$100. Displayed in SH–716.	President of Azerbaijan Heyder Aliyev.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Jack Reed, U.S. Senator	Set of 12 Sterling Silver coins. January 6, 2002—Est. Value—\$200. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Richard Shelby, U.S. Senator	Portrait of Ethiopian Monk. August 19, 2002—Est. Value—Over \$100. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator	Portrait of Ethiopian Monk. August 19, 2002—Est. Value—Over \$100. Deposited with Secretary of the Senate.	Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
Fred Thompson, U.S. Senator	Set of 12 Sterling Silver Coins. January 6, 2002—Est. Value—\$200. Deposited with Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.
John Warner, U.S. Senator	Sterling Silverware. Service for Six. July 22, 2002—Est. Value—\$400. Deposited with the Secretary of the Senate.	President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause donor embarrassment.

AGENCY: UNITED STATES SENATE
(Report of Travel or Expenses of Travel)

Name and title of person accepting travel expenses consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government	Brief description of travel or expenses accepted as consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government and occurring outside the United States	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Joe Biden, U.S. Senator	Transportation by air from Islamabad, Pakistan to Kabul Afghanistan, January 10, 2002.	World Food Program, A United Nations Agency.	Official travel to Afghanistan. No commercial air travel available; no U.S. military aircraft available.
Joe Biden, U.S. Senator	One night lodging and meals, December 6–7, 2002.	Kurdish Regional Government	Official travel to Northern Iraq. Security and diplomatic considerations required acceptance.
Joe Biden, U.S. Senator	One night lodging and meals, December 8, 2002.	Government of Saudi Arabia	Official travel to meet U.S. troops and Saudi officials. Refusal to accept would have caused diplomatic embarrassment to United States Government.
Jonah Blank, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	Transportation by air from Islamabad, Pakistan to Kabul Afghanistan, January 10, 2002.	World Food Program, A United Nations Agency.	Official travel to Afghanistan. No commercial air travel available; no U.S. military aircraft available.

11-L-0559/OSD/17083

AGENCY: UNITED STATES SENATE—Continued

[Report of Travel or Expenses of Travel]

Name and title of person accepting travel expenses consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government	Brief description of travel or expenses accepted as consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government and occurring outside the United States	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Jonah Blank, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	Transportation within Pakistan via Helicopter to military installations, including lodging and meals, August 29–30, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	Official visit to view posts on the line of Control. No commercial transportation was available to these sites.
Antony Blinken, Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	One night lodging and meals, December 6–7, 2002.	Kurdish Regional Government	Official travel to Northern Iraq. Security and diplomatic considerations required acceptance.
Antony Blinken, Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	One night lodging and meals, December 8, 2002.	Government of Saudi Arabia	Official travel to meet U.S. Troops and Saudi officials. Refusal to accept would have caused diplomatic embarrassment to the United States Government.
Jean Camahan, U.S. Senator	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Susan Collins, U.S. Senator	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Joni Crosley, Legislative Assistant to Senator George Voinovich.	Transportation within Brussels, Belgium via ground transportation, lodging and some meals, January 7–12, 2002.	The Atlantic Council	Travel to Meet with NATO and European Union Officials, as well as U.S. personnel overseas.
Joni Crosley, Legislative Assistant to Senator George Voinovich.	Transportation within the Republic of China, including lodging and meals, August 19–25, 2002.	Chinese Association of Industry and Commerce.	Travel to examine US–ROC foreign policy, trade, and security issues. As well as ROC–PRC and US–PRC relations.
Fred Downey, Office of Senator Joe Lieberman.	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Mark Esper, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator	One night lodging and meals, December 6–7, 2002.	Kurdish Regional Government	Official travel to Northern Iraq. Security and diplomatic considerations required acceptance.
Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator	One night lodging and meals, December 8, 2002.	Government of Saudi Arabia	Official travel to meet U.S. Troops and Saudi officials. Refusal to accept would have caused diplomatic embarrassment to the United States Government.
Julla Hart, Office of Inter-Parliamentary Services.	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Liz King, Office of Senator Jack Reed.	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Norm Kurz, Communications Director of Senator Joe Biden.	Transportation by air from Islamabad, Pakistan to Kabul Afghanistan, January 10, 2002.	World Food Program, United Nations Agency.	Official travel to Afghanistan. No commercial air travel available; no U.S. military aircraft available.
Miles Lackey, Office of Senator John Edwards.	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Carolyn Leddy, Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	Transportation to and from ArianeSpace launch facilities within French Guiana, August 26–29.	Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), Government of France.	Fact finding trip related to ArianeSpace commercial space launch facilities and CNES space activity in French Guiana.
Joe Lieberman, U.S. Senator	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
John McCain, U.S. Senator	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.

11-L-0559/OSD/17084

AGENCY: UNITED STATES SENATE—Continued

(Report of Travel or Expenses of Travel)

Name and title of person accepting travel expenses consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government	Brief description of travel or expenses accepted as consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government and occurring outside the United States	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Patricia McNeary, Republican Staff Director, Committee on Foreign Relations.	Transportation within Norway, August 11–17, 2002.	Government of Norway	Attend Arctic Parliamentary Conference, and to visit sites related to nuclear waste clean up.
Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Eric Newhouse, Legislative Director to Senator George Voinovich.	Transportation within Brussels, Belgium via ground transportation, lodging and some meals, January 7–12, 2002.	The Atlantic Council	Travel to Meet with NATO and European Union Officials, as well as U.S. personnel overseas.
Eric Newhouse, Legislative Director to Senator George Voinovich.	Transportation within the Republic of China, including lodging and meals, August 19–25, 2002.	Chinese Association of Industry and Commerce.	Travel to examine US–ROC foreign policy, trade, and security issues. As well as ROC–PRC and US–PRC relations.
Andrew Parasiliti, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of Senator Chuck Hagel.	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Andrew Parasiliti, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of Senator Chuck Hagel.	One night lodging and meals, December 6–7, 2002.	Kurdish Regional Government	Official travel to Northern Iraq. Security and diplomatic considerations required acceptance.
Andrew Parasiliti, Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of Senator Chuck Hagel.	One night lodging and meals, December 8, 2002.	Government of Saudi Arabia	Official travel to meet U.S. Troops and Saudi officials. Refusal to accept would have caused diplomatic embarrassment to the United States Government.
Jack Reed, U.S. Senator	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Puneet Talwar, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	Transportation by air from Islamabad, Pakistan to Kabul Afghanistan, January 10, 2002.	World Food Program, United Nations Agency.	Official travel to Afghanistan. No commercial air travel available; no U.S. military aircraft available.
Puneet Talwar, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	Government of Saudi Arabia provided lodging in guest quarters as well as two meals, August 10–11, 2002.	Government of Saudi Arabia	Non-acceptance would have caused diplomatic embarrassment to the United States government.
Puneet Talwar, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	Six nights lodging and meals, October 24–29, 2002.	Kurdish Regional Government	Official travel to Northern Iraq. Security and diplomatic considerations required acceptance.
Puneet Talwar, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	One night lodging and meals, December 6–7, 2002.	Kurdish Regional Government	Official travel to Northern Iraq. Security and diplomatic considerations required acceptance.
Puneet Talwar, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.	One night lodging and meals, December 8, 2002.	Government of Saudi Arabia	Official travel to meet U.S. Troops and Saudi officials. Refusal to accept would have caused diplomatic embarrassment to the United States Government.
Fred Thompson, U.S. Senator	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
Dan Twining, Office of Senator John McCain.	Transportation within Pakistan; Islamabad to Khyber Pass and return, January 8, 2002.	Government of Pakistan	No commercial flights available; non-acceptance would cause embarrassment.
George Voinovich, U.S. Senator	Transportation within the Republic of China, including lodging and meals, August 19–25, 2002.	Chinese Association of Industry and Commerce.	Travel to examine US–ROC foreign policy, trade, and security issues. As well as ROC–PRC and US–PRC relations.
George Voinovich, U.S. Senator	Transportation within Brussels, Belgium via ground transportation, lodging and some meals, January 7–12, 2002.	The Atlantic Council	Travel to meet with NATO and European Union Officials, as well as U.S. personnel overseas.
Peter Zimmerman, Chief Scientist, Committee on Foreign Relations.	Government helicopter from Longyearbyen to Ny Aalesund, Svalbard, Norway including lunch, August 13, 2002.	Government of Norway	Official travel to view arctic research station. No commercial transportation was available to sites.

11-L-0559/OSD/17085

AGENCY: UNITED STATES SENATE—Continued

[Report of Travel or Expenses of Travel]

Name and title of person accepting travel expenses consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government	Brief description of travel or expenses accepted as consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government and occurring outside the United States	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Peter Zimmerman, Chief Scientist, Committee on Foreign Relations.	Transportation by Zodiac boat to view solar powered remote lighthouse built by Norway as prototype for replacing radioactive isotope powered lighthouse in Russia, August 14, 2002.	Government of Norway	Official travel to view arctic environmental risk areas. No commercial transportation was available to these sites.

AGENCY: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Mike McIntyre, Member of Congress.	Bokhara rug. Received August 2002. Value—\$350.00. On display in Rep. McIntyre's district office in Wilmington, North Carolina.	Hamid Karzi, President, Government of Afghanistan.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor.
Bob Stump, Member of Congress	Silver plated coffee server, brass trim, long handle and spout, oriental design. Received March 12, 2002. Value—\$400.00. Displayed in Rep. Stump's office in 2002 and delivered to the Clerk's office prior to Rep. Stump's departure from office.	His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa A-Thani, The Emir of the State of Qatar.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor.

AGENCY: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

[Report of Travel or Expenses of Travel]

Name and title of person accepting travel or travel expenses consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government	Brief description and estimated value of travel or travel expenses accepted as consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government and occurring outside the United States	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Cass Ballenger, Member of Congress.	2 night stay aboard M/V Galapagos Explorer II and all meals aboard ship, January 16–18, 2002, for fisheries study and discussions with government officials.	Government of Ecuador	Authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Jessica H. Baumgarten, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.	2 night stay aboard M/V Galapagos Explorer II and all meals aboard ship, January 16–18, 2002, for fisheries study and discussions with government officials.	Government of Ecuador	Authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Patrick T. "Ted" Brennan, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.	2 night stay aboard M/V Galapagos Explorer II and all meals aboard ship, January 16–18, 2002, for fisheries study and discussions with government officials.	Government of Ecuador	Authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Linda Danforth, Rep. Adam Smith	Lodging and meals in Wuxi, meals in Shanghai, bus transportation, Sept. 4–Sept. 10, 2002.	Governments of Beijing, Wuxi, and Shanghai, Peoples' Republic of China.	Authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii)

AGENCY: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Continued
 [Report of Travel or Expenses of Travel]

Name and title of person accepting travel or travel expenses consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government	Brief description and estimated value of travel or travel expenses accepted as consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government and occurring outside the United States	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Elton Gallegly, Member of Congress.	Lodging, meals and land transportation in Ecuador for Member and spouse, January 17–20, 2002.	Government of Ecuador	Authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Kirsti T. Garlock, House International Relations Comm.	2 night stay aboard M/V Galapagos Explorer II and all meals aboard ship, January 16–18, 2002, for fisheries study and discussions with government officials.	Government of Ecuador	Authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Caleb McCarr, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.	2 night stay aboard M/V Galapagos Explorer II and all meals aboard ship, January 16–18, 2002, for fisheries study and discussions with government officials.	Government of Ecuador	Authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii).
John P. Mackey, International Relations Committee.	2 night stay aboard M/V Galapagos Explorer II and all meals aboard ship, January 16–18, 2002, for fisheries study and discussions with government officials.	Government of Ecuador	Authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Collin C. Peterson, Member of Congress.	2 night stay aboard M/V Galapagos Explorer II and all meals aboard ship, January 16–18, 2002, for fisheries study and discussions with government officials.	Government of Ecuador	Authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Paul L. Oostburg Sanz, International Relations Committee.	2 night stay aboard M/V Galapagos Explorer II and all meals aboard ship, January 16–18, 2002, for fisheries study and discussions with government officials.	Government of Ecuador	Authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7342(c)(1)(B)(ii).

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 [Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Bust 10" and plaque 13½ H (framed), polychromed carved stone, together with a videotape. Rec'd—9/5/02. Est. Value—\$400.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Jean Ping, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and Francophonie Affairs of the Gabonese Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Ice pail, 4½" H x 6" diameter across, two lug handles with pendant rings, 900 silver, by Romana, Colombia, 8 ozs T. Rec'd—12/4/02. Est. Value—\$425.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Carolina Barco, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Colombia.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Vase, 6" H, sterling silver, copy of an ancient Greek design, 6 ozs T. Rec'd—11/21/02. Est. Value—\$300.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. George Papandreou, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.

11-L-0559/OSD/17087

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Vase, 6½" H, Moser faceted crystal of lapering form, Czech Republic, late 20th/early 21st century. Rec'd—11/21/02. Est. Value—\$400.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Cyril Svoboda, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Briefcase, black leather, Mexico, together with a Sheaffer ball-point pen. Rec'd—10/24/02. Est. Value—\$3,500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Jorge Castaneda, Secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Coin, 1½" diameter, gold proof, Bahamas commemorative 1973–1998, \$250 face value, 47.5g, limited edition #126/250. Rec'd—2/7/02. Est. Value—\$500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Hubert A. Ingraham, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Antique Glass Bowl. Rec'd—5/1/02. Est. Value—\$400.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Lt. General Shaul Mofaz, Chief of General Staff, Government of Israel.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Cigarette Box, 6" L, sterling silver inlaid with pieces of chilean lapis lazuli, engraved with dedication, 13 oz. Rec'd—1/28/02. Est. Value—\$300.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Maria Soledad Alvear Valenquela, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Chile.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Floor screen, 68½" x 17¼" each of four panels, carved and pierced teakwood. Rec'd—1/16/02. Est. Value—\$750.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Pervez Musharraf, President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Cigarette box, 7" L rectangular, silver, lid with repousse decoration, wood lined, Thailand, 14 ozs T. Rec'd—10/9/02. Est. Value—\$400.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Paperweight, 2½" diameter, sterling silver with parcel gilding, Jerusalem, by A. Klein. Rec'd—5/1/02. Est. Value—\$500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Coins, 100 So'm, silver proofs, 10 oz T each, Uzbekistan. Rec'd—11/23/02. Est. Value—\$300.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Islam A. Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Table decoration, 8½" H, gold palm tree with lapis lazuli, rock crystals ball mounted with a map of Saudi Arabia set with three tiny emeralds (Riyadh, Mecca and Medina (probably)), rock crystal stem, leather box. Rec'd—4/24/02. Est. Value—\$10,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.R.H. Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince, First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Bowl, pottery, 10½" diameter set with pierced yellow gold mounts, by Laghrissi Fafi, leather box. Rec'd—4/22/02. Est. Value—\$1,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.M. Mohammed VI, King of Morocco.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Vase 11½" H, silver, repousse floral decoration. 18ozsT. Rec'd—4/5/02. Est. Value—\$450.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Figure, 9" H, weighted silver decorated with polychrome enamels depicting an elephant with mahout. Rec'd—1/1/02. Est. Value—\$450.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Lal Krishna Advani, Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of India.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Coins, silver proof, 100 Som, wood Box and Flatware, sterling silver, 6 dinner knives, 6 demitasse spoons, 6 soup spoons, 6 dinner forks, fitted box. Rec'd—3/12/02. Est. Value—\$1,450.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Wristwatch, man's, stainless steel Breitling "Emergency" with transmitter tester and case. Rec'd—5/6/02. Est. Value—\$2,700.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Cigarette box, 8¾" L, handwrought sterling silver, engraved with dedication, 34ozsT. Rec'd—3/23/02. Est. Value—\$450.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Diego Garcia Sayan, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Peru.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Cufflinks, 18 karat white gold disks bearing crests, each set with 28 round diamonds TW 56 points both. Rec'd 4/29/02. Est. Value—\$1,500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Milo Djukanovic, President of the Republic of Montenegro.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Carpet, 7'10" x 6'4", wool on cotton, two tone green field with sculpted modern decoration. Rec'd—1/18/02. Est. Value—\$1,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Sher Bahadur Deuba, Prime Minister of Nepal.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Chess set, tooled leather case, camel bone chessmen, 20th/21st century. Rec'd—9/23/02. Est. Value—\$350.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Askar Akayev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Wristwatches, man's, 18 karat white gold case and bracelet, Piaget "Dancer", burlwood case. Rec'd—8/1/02. Est. Value—\$16,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.M. Sultan Haji Hassanah Bolkiah Mu'izzaddin Waddaulah, Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Medal, bronze, Bartholomew 1. Rec'd—3/5/02. Est. Value—\$500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	His All Holiness Bartholomew, Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Charger, 9 3/4" diameter, 900 silver, repousse decoration of Madonna and Child, Greece, 2002, 1400zsT. Date Rec'd—3/5/02. Est. Value—\$550. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	His All Holiness Bartholomew Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Bowl, 6" diameter, polished black stone bowl resting on a sterling silver star shape base, has a face at each point. Mexico, 7 ozsT. Rec'd—10/24/02. Est. Value—\$300.000. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H. E. Jorge Castaneda, Secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Bottle of vodka in the form of a Khatashnikov rifle, fitted green painted wood case, Russia, 20th/21st century Rec'd—4/10/02. Est. Value—\$450.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Pastel, 16" x 11 1/2", Caricature portrait of Colin Powell, by Stefan Papa, Romanian, late 20th century, metal frame, fitted leatherette case. Rec'd—11/23/02. Est. Value—\$300.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Ion Iliescu, President of Romania.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Dress sword, chromed metal, lion head pommel with two red garnet eyes, by Carl Eickhorn, Solingen, Germany. Rec'd—11/23/02. Est. Value. \$550.00. Pending transfer to the General services Administration.	H.E. Ion Iliescu, President of Romania.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Sculpture, 8 3/4" H, patinated and polished bronze, Madonna and Child, b Mpanda Vita, Angola, wood base. Rec'd—10/9/02. Est. Value—\$400.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of the Republic of Angola.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Sculpture, 7 3/8" L, white marble, polar bear by Wilbur Hobbs, Inuit.	T.H. William Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Tray, 11 3/4" diameter, silver plate, Christoffe, France. Rec'd—4/15/02. Est. Value—\$450.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Emile Lahoud, President of the Republic of Lebanon.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
T.H. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State.	Carpet, 6'5" x 8'10", wool on cotton, dark blue field with overall polychrome scrolling, multiple borders, Afghanistan. Rec'd—1/28/02. Est. Value—\$500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Hamid Karzai, Chairman of the Afghanistan Interim Authority.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Mrs. Alma Powell, Spouse of the Secretary of State.	Wristwatch, woman's stainless steel case with 120 tiny diamonds set to bezel and face TW 1.2 carat, blue straps, Techno Marine. Rec'd—8/1/02. Est. Value—\$1,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Her Majesty Raja Isteri Pengiran Anak Hajah Saleha, First Wife of the Sultan of Brunei.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Mrs. Alma Powell, Spouse of the Secretary of State.	Minaudiere, 7 1/4" L oval, woven "Yan Lipao" basketry having 18 karat yellow gold mounts and swing handle set with a total of 147 diamonds TW 2 carats. Rec'd—10/16/02. Est. Value—\$4,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.M. Queen Sirikit of Thailand	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Mrs. Alma Powell, Spouse of the Secretary of State.	Vase, 10 1/4" H, Britannia Heritage porcelain with polychrome floral encrustation, late 20th century, England. Rec'd—7/31/02. Est. Value—\$400.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.R.H. Penigiran Isteri Hajah Manam, Second Wife of the Sultan of Brunei.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Mrs. Alma Powell, Spouse of the Secretary of State.	Brooch, 18 karat yellow and white gold floral mounting set with 218 round diamonds TW 4.36 carats and 11 round diamonds TW 1.65, by deFred. Rec'd—08/01/02. Est. Value—\$3,850.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Her Majesty Raja Isteri Pengiran Anak Hajah Saleha, First Wife of the Sultan of Brunei.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Mrs. Alma Powell, Spouse of the Secretary of State.	Woven polychrome "yan lipao" straw envelope containing two pieces of handwoven fabric. Thai "Hill Tribe" work. Rec'd—10/16/02. Est. Value—\$250.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.M. Queen Sirikit of Thailand	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Albright, Madeleine K., former Secretary of State.	Carpet, 6'8" x 10'3", wool on cottonkilim, blue field with polychrome decoration, Bosnia. Rec'd—3/9/00. Est. Value—\$850.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Family in Bosnia	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Albright, Madeleine K., former Secretary of State.	Pastel, 23 1/4" x 17 1/4", Sloth, by Luisa Periaza, late 20th century, matted and framed, Costa Rica. Rec'd—5/7/97. Est. Value—\$400.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Ms. Luisa Periaza, Costa Rica	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Albright, Madeleine K., former Secretary of State.	Painting, oil on canvas, 8" x 9 3/4", bread and doughnuts, by Manita Lagunes, late 20th century, matted and framed, Mexico. Rec'd—5/1/97. Est. Value—\$300.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Ms. Maria Teresa Lagunes, Mexico.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Albright, Madeleine K., former Secretary of State.	Bows, lacquered wood, signed, together with four arrows having handwrought fints, black lacquered wood stand, late 20th century, Japan. Rec'd—7/12/00. Est. Value—\$1,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Governor of Miyazaki Suketaka Matsukata.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Albright, Madeleine K., former Secretary of State.	Scaff, Silk, Hermes, Paris. Rec'd—12/8/98. Est. Value—\$375.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	M. Badinter, France	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Albright, Madeleine K., former Secretary of State.	Miniature coach and horses, silver, wood base, glass case, Indonesia. Rec'd—1/4/00. Est. Value—\$300.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Mr. Tony Winata, Indonesia	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Ensenat, Donald B., Ambassador, Chief of Protocol of the United States	Wristwatch, man's, stainless steel case, Bulgari "Rettangolo" #RT45SJ19334, black leather strap. Rec'd—5/1/02. Est. Value—\$2,350.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.R.H. Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud Crown Prince, First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Kattauouf, Theodore H., U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.	Wristwatch, man's, gold filled and stainless steel case, by Paola del Lungo. Rec'd—6/1/02. Est. Value—\$500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Abdul Rahman Alokazay, Managing Director of Al-Wali Trading.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Kattauouf, Theodore H., U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.	Wristwatch, woman's, gold filled and stainless steel case, by Paola del Lungo. Rec'd—6/1/02. Est. Value—\$500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Abdul Rahman Alokazay, Managing Director of Al-Wali Trading.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Kattauouf, Theodore H., U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.	Wristwatches, stainless steel, man's plain, woman's set with 59 diamonds. Rec'd—6/1/02. Est. Value—\$3,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Abdul Rahman Alokazay, Managing Director of Al-Wali Trading.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Keshap, Atul, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.	Eterna Men's Watch. Rec'd—10/29/02. Est. Value—\$500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Kraus, Martin, Special Agent, Diplomatic Security.	Rolex Watch. Rec'd—1/30/02. Est. Value—\$4,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Major Mohammed Al-Junaibi, United Arab Emirates.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Mr. Randy Bumgardner, Assistant Chief of Protocol, General Manager of Blair House.	Wristwatch, man's, stainless steel, Rolex Oyster Perpetual "Datejust" Saudi Arabia Coat of Arms. Rec'd—9/25/02. Est. Value—\$3,250.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Ross, Dennis B., Special Middle East Coordinator (SMEC).	Engraved Picture Frame. Rec'd—10/28/97. Est. Value—\$270.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Woodrow Wilson House	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Sembler, Melvin, Ambassador to Italy.	Wristwatch, man's, 18 karat yellow gold case and bracelet, Eterna #5001.68. Rec'd—12/10/01. Est. Value—\$8,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Sembler, Melvin, Ambassador to Italy.	Wristwatch, man's, stainless steel and 18 karat yellow gold case and bracelet, "Scuba" model, #LCF35SCD10946, Italy (lacing arrantee, instruction booklets) Rec'd—12/10/01. Est. Value—\$8,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
Shear, David, Minister Counselor for Political Affairs, American Embassy, Tokyo.	Wristwatch. Rec'd—11/21/02. Est. Value—\$300.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, Diet Member, Tokyo, Japan.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs	Vase, "Liberty" reproduction from the Liberty Collection introduced by Ginori in 1905, numbered A187. Rec'd—5/28/02. Est. Value—\$500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Johnny Young, U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain.	Tray, 15 1/4" diameter, silver plate, Christofle, France. Rec'd—8/23/02. Est. Value—\$500.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Mohamed bin Khalifa Al-Khalifa, Minister of the Interior, Kingdom of Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Marcelle Wahba, U.S. Ambassador to United Arab Emirates.	21K Gold Necklace with Seed Pearls. Rec'd—11/25/02. Est. Value—\$3,676.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	Sheikha Fatimah, First Lady of the United Arab Emirates.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Marcelle Wahba, U.S. Ambassador to United Arab Emirates.	Dupont Platinum Lighter. Rec'd—12/25/02. Est. Value—\$1,906.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.E. Abdullah M. Al Uthman, Qatari Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.
T.H. Robert W. Jordan, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.	Wristwatches (2)—His and hers Bulgari wristwatches—gold circular face, croc strap. Rec'd—4/25/02. Est. Value—\$6,000.00. Pending transfer to the General Services Administration.	H.R.H. Abdulah bin Abdulaziz, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would cause the donor or the U.S. Government embarrassment.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
[Report of Tangible Gifts, Calendar Year 2002]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Michele Davis, Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs).	Gold commemorative coin. Rec'd—March 4, 2002. Est. Value—\$395. Treasury retained on August 23, 2002.	Abdulla Saif, Finance Minister, Government of Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

11-L-0559/OSD/17093

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY—Continued

(Report of Tangible Gifts, Calendar Year 2002)

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary	Gold commemorative coin. Rec'd—March 8, 2002. Est. Value—\$395. Treasury retained on August 23, 2002.	Abdulla Saif, Finance Minister, Government of Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary	Gold commemorative coin. Rec'd—March 5, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Treasury retained on August 27, 2002.	Salem Abdulaziz Al-Sabab, Governor, Central Bank of Kuwait, Government of Kuwait.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary	Sterling silver flatware (6 sets). Rec'd—March 5, 2002. Est. Value—\$779.70. Treasury retained on August 23, 2002.	Islam Karimov, President, Government of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary	Silver dagger. Rec'd—March 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$300. Treasury retained on August 23, 2002.	Abdulla Saif, Finance Minister, Government of Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Juan Zarate, DAS, Terrorism & Violent Crime.	Gold commemorative coin. Rec'd—March 4, 2002. Est. Value—\$395. Treasury retained on August 23, 2002.	Abdulla Saif, Finance Minister, Government of Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Nilmini Gunaratne, International Economist.	Gold commemorative coin. Rec'd—March 29, 2002. Est. Value—\$395. Treasury retained on August 23, 2002.	Abdulla Saif, Finance Minister, Government of Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary	Gold plated brass & silver tea set. Rec'd—March 5, 2002. Est. Value—\$500. Treasury retained on August 23, 2002.	Ibrahim Al-Assaf, Finance Minister, Government of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary	Gold khanjar (dagger). Rec'd—May 6, 2002. Est. Value—\$1,000. Treasury retained on August 23, 2002.	Ibrahim Al-Assaf, Finance Minister, Government of Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary	Two handmade cold cast bronze sculptures. Rec'd—June 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$760. Pending review in Treasury General Counsel.	John Kufuor, President, Government of Ghana.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary	Oil painting of a woman on a horse. Rec'd—July 29, 2002. Est. Value—\$325. Pending review in Treasury General Counsel.	Edward Shevardnadze, President, Government of Georgian Republic.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary	Sterling silver flatware (6 sets). Rec'd—August 8, 2002. Est. Value—\$779.70. Pending review in Treasury General Counsel.	Islam Karimov, President	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
John B. Taylor, Under Secretary (International Affairs).	Commemorative gold coin. Rec'd—March, 2002. Est. Value—\$395.00. Treasury retained on December 31, 2002.	Abdulla H. Saif, Finance Minister, Government of Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(Report of Tangible Gifts)

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	Gold Bracelet. Rec'd—Feb. 4, 2002. Est. Value—\$395.00. Reported to GSA.	Minister of Defense and Military Production, Field Marshal Tantawy, Egypt.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	Rug 9 x 12. Rec'd—Feb. 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$1,100.00. Reported to GSA.	Chairman H. Karzai, Afghanistan	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

11-L-0559/OSD/17094

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	Rug. Rec'd—Mar. 1, 2002. Est. Value—\$300.00. Reported to GSA.	Minister of Defense and Military Production, Field Marshal Tantawy, Egypt.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	Souvenir Set of Coins (\$220.00) and Silver Tray 11½" (\$115.00). Rec'd—Mar. 13, 2002. Est. Value—\$335.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	President Islam A. Karmiv, Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	Rug. Rec'd—Apr. 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$400.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	Chairman H. Karzai, Afghanistan	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	Silver ring w/emerald stone. Rec'd—Apr. 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$425.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	Defense Minister Fahim Khan, Afghanistan.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	Embroidered Velvet Robe w/hat (\$160.00). Reported to GSA. Framed Rug w/Stitched picture of SecDef (\$400.00). Reported to GSA for Purchase and Photo album of pictures of SecDef in Kazakhstan (N/V). Reported to GSA SecDef. Retained Apr. 27, 2002.	Minister of Defense, General-Colonel Mukhtar Altyntaev, Kazakhstan.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	Rug w/heart city theme. Rec'd—Apr. 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$980.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	President of Krygyzstan, Askar Akayev, Krygzstan.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	7" Silver dagger w/silver casing in leather case. Rec'd—Apr. 27, 2002. Est. Value—\$340.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	Governor of Herot, Ismail Khan, Kazakhstan.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	Silver Dish, 9 x 8 (\$265.00). Plaque (N/V). Double-barreled Shotgun w/Ammunition (\$280.00) and Gold Bracelet (\$1240.00). Rec'd—Sept. 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$1,785.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	Minister of Defense and Military Production, Field Marshal, Tantawy, Egypt.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.	Gold/Silver Stamps in wooden case, (\$170.00) Reported to GSA and Antique Pistol (\$2,200.00) Reported to GSA for Purchase. Rec'd—Nov. 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$2,370.00.	His Excellency Rudolf Schuster, President Slovak Republic.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense.	Rug. Rec'd—Jan. 2, 2002. Est. value—\$350.00. Approved for Official Display.	Field Marshall Hussein, Tantawy, MOD.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense.	Coin Set Rec'd—July 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$290.00. Approved for Official Display.	S. Sargsyan, Minister of Defense, Armenia.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense.	Khafan Robe (\$100.00), Afghan Shawl (\$20.00) and Afghan Handmade Rug (\$200.00). Rec'd—July 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$320.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	Chairman H. Karzai, Afghanistan	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense.	Diamond Crystal (\$65.00) and Gold Necklace with Bug Pendant (\$300.00). Rec'd—Sept. 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$365.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	Field Marshal Hussein Tantawy, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Minister of Defense and Military Production.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense.	2 Silver Vases 13" tall. Rec'd—Oct. 30, 2002. Est. Value—\$370.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	Lt. Gen. Hamdy Weheba, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense.	Hand-woven Rug. Rec'd—July 15, 2002. Est. Value—\$900.00. Reported for Purchase.	Deputy Minister of Defense, Special Rep to the North, Northern Province, Abdul Rashid Dostum.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Dov S. Zakheim, USD, Comptroller.	Large Rug. Rec'd—Nov. 01, 2002. Est. Value—\$1,200.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mazar-e-Sharif.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Peter Rodman, ASD, International Security Affairs.	Gold Bracelet. Rec'd—Oct. 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$495.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	Lt. Gen. Hamdy Weheba, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Peter Rodman, ASD, International Security Affairs.	Silver Candle-holder (\$100.00). Reported to GSA for Purchase and Gold Bracelet (\$320.00). Reported for Purchase. Rec'd—Sept. 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$420.00.	Field Marshal Hussein Tantawy, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Minister of Defense and Military Production.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Dr. William J. Luti, DASD, Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs.	Sportivo Wrist Watch w/Saudi Arabia Crest in Lower Left Corner. Rec'd—Mar. 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$780.00. Reported to GSA for Purchase.	Crown Prince Abdullah, Saudi Arabia.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.	Gold Necklace and Bracelet (\$1,840.00) and Rectangular Persian Rug (\$190.00). Rec'd—Jan. 19, 2002. Est. Value—\$1,930.00. Approved for Official Display.	Field Marshall Tantawy, Minister of Defense, Egypt.	Acceptance of the gift, in the judgment of the recipient, in that refusal of the gift may have offended or embarrassed the donor.
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.	Sword. Rec'd—Jan. 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$290.00. Approved for Official Display.	Mr. Malkawi, Minister of Defense, Jordan.	Acceptance of the gift, in the judgment of the recipient, in that refusal of the gift may have offended or embarrassed the donor.
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.	Gold Bracelet (\$1,840.00) and Rectangular Persian Rug (\$190.00). Rec'd—Jan. 22, 2002. Est. Value—\$1,930.00. Approved to Official Display.	Lt. Gen. Hamdy Weheba, COS, Egyptian Armed Forces.	Acceptance of the gift, in the judgment of the recipient, in that refusal of the gift may have offended or embarrassed the donor.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
RADM William M. Fogarty, COMJTF, Middle East.	Man's watch/gold bracelets/gold sword. Rec'd—Sept. 1991. Est. Value—\$6500.00. Transferred to GSA on June 6, 2002.	The Amir of Bahrain	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command.	Man's Omega watch w/cufflinks. Rec'd—Sept. 7, 1998. Est. Value—\$7567.70. Transferred to GSA on June 6, 2002.	The Amir of Bahrain	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Mrs. Charles W. Moore	Woman's Omega watch. Rec'd—Sept. 7, 1998. Est. Value—\$3000. Purchased by recipient on May 23, 2002.	The Amir of Bahrain	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore	Man's Piaget watch. Rec'd—Mar. 1, 1999. Est. Value—\$16,492.00. Transferred to GSA on June 6, 2002.	The Amir of Bahrain	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Mrs. Charles W. Moore	Woman's Piaget watch. Rec'd—Mar. 1, 1999. Est. Value—\$14,896.00. Transferred to GSA June 6, 2002.	The Amir of Bahrain	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Mrs Charles W. Moore	Coral & silver necklace/earrings. Rec'd Oct. 4, 1998. Est. Value—\$319.20. Transferred to GSA June 6, 2002.	The Gov't. of Yemen	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Mr Charles W. Moore	Set of 3 gold bracelets. Rec'd—Sept. 7, 1998. Est. Value—\$1400. Transferred to GSA Sept. 12, 2002.	The Amir of Bahrain	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Mrs Charles W. Moore	Double-strand pearl necklace. Rec'd—Oct. 15, 1998. Est. Value—\$10,000. Transferred to GSA June 6, 2002.	The Amir of Bahrain	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore	Man's Ebel sportswatch. Rec'd—May 13, 2001. Est. Value—\$1,489.60. Transferred to GSA June 6, 2002.	Chief of Staff, Kuwaiti Armed Forces.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore	Brass/goldplated dhow. Rec'd—Oct. 18, 1998. Est. Value—\$319.00. Approved for official use.	Dubai Ports Authority	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore	Omani Khanjar. Rec'd—May 23, 2000. Est. Value—\$370.00. Approved for official use.	Command and Staff College, Sultan Armed Forces.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore	Goldplated and crystal camel. Rec'd—Aug. 2, 2000. Est. Value—\$1995.00. Approved for official use.	Minister of Foreign Affairs, UAE ..	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore	Brass/goldplated dhow. Rec'd—May 17, 2001. Est. Value—\$532—\$665.00. Approved for official use.	Commander, UAE Navy	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore	Silver dagger. Rec'd—Feb. 1, 2002. Est. Value—\$1596.00. Approved for official use.	Prime Minister, State of Bahrain ..	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore	Brass/goldplated sword. Rec'd—Feb. 6, 2002. Est. Value—\$3192.00. Approved for official use.	Commander-in-Chief, Bahrain Defense Force.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore	Aluminum/copper dhow. Rec'd—Feb. 8, 2002. Est. Value—\$319.20. Approved for official use.	Coast Guard General Deputy, Ministry of Interior, Kuwait.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
VADM Charles W. Moore	Silver/goldplated khanjar w/belt clip and holder. Rec'd—June 29, 1999. Est. Value—\$480.00. Transferred to GSA June 6, 2002.	Commander, UAE Navy	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
CAPT Philipp Renaud, Commanding Officer, Naval Oceanography Command.	24K gold coin with a portrait of the Crown Prince of Bahrain. Rec'd May 9, 2002. Est. Value—\$350.00. Approved for official use at the Maurey Library at the Stennis Space Center, MS.	His Excellence Mohammed Al'Kalifa, Director of the Ministry of Housing and Environment, Bahrain.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
BGEN K. J. Stalder, Deputy Director, J-5, U.S. Central Command.	Concord Sportivo Chronograph Wristwatch. Rec'd—Mar. 17, 2002. Est. Value—\$1075.00. Transferred to GSA Oct. 17, 2002.	King Abdul Aziz, Saudi Arabia	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

[Report of Travel or Expenses of Travel]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Brief description and estimated value of travel or travel expenses accepted consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government and occurring outside the United States	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
ADM Vern E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations.	Rec'd Oct. 15-17, 2002. Est. Value—\$1439.34. Expended for hotel.	Chief of Staff, Italian Navy	Represented U.S. Navy and spoke at Fourth Regional Seapower Symposium.
CAPT D.W. Davenport, Executive Assistant to ADM Clark.	Rec'd Oct. 15-17, 2002. Est. Value—\$1439.34. Expended for hotel.	Chief of Staff, Italian Navy	Accompanied CNO at Fourth Regional Seapower Symposium.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Ann M. Veneman, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture.	A heavily decorated ceremonial robe made with blue velvet. The border and the front panels are decorated with gilt machine embroidered floral designs. The gold colored hat is designed with a multilayered mane style tassel. Received—February 10, 2002. Appraised Value—\$400.00 SF-120 prepared; pending transfer to GSA.	Islom Karimov, President of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Ann M. Veneman, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture.	A set of six cut crystal stemmed goblets. Origin: Czech Republic. Hexagonal bases with bowls having etched stars. Labels include "RUCKL Czech Republic," "A. Ruckle & Sons 1846," and "Lead crystal 24% Bohemia" Ht. 8" in presentation box. Received—November 27, 2001. Appraised value—\$60.00 per goblet; \$480.00 for the set. SF-120 prepared; pending transfer to GSA.	Jan Fenc, Minister of Agriculture, Czech Republic.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Ann M. Veneman, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture.	Flatware Set: A twenty-four piece set of sterling silver flatware made in Uzbekistan. Configured as a service for six, the service consists of six each dinner knives, dinner forks, oval soup spoons and small coffee spoons. Markings include "925," "OYK," and a pyramid of 12 stars with the letter "K." Total weight (to include the stainless steel blades on the knives) is 1,640 grams. An accompanying card describes the set having been produced in Uzbekistan. It is fitted in a mahogany case. Received—February 10, 2002. Appraised value: \$1,050.00. Approved for official use and is on display in the Office of the Secretary.	Islom Karimov, President of Uzbekistan.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government
Samuel W. Bodman, Deputy Secretary of Commerce.	Gold coin, 22 carats, weight 33.81 grams. Rec'd—03/02/02. Appraised Value—\$300. Location—Deputy Secretary's Office.	Sheik Ahmed bin Mohammed, Governor of The Bahrain Monetary Agency.
Samuel W. Bodman, Deputy Secretary of Commerce.	Ornate, blue-framed (painted lapis tile, six pieces signed.) Rec'd—09/24/02. Appraised Value—\$300. Location—Deputy Secretary's Office.	President Bouteflika of Algeria.
Samuel W. Bodman, Deputy Secretary of Commerce.	Ceremonial silver sword w/scabbard, very ornate containing piece of uncut coral. Rec'd—09/24/02. Appraised Value—\$350. Location—Deputy Secretary's Office.	President Bouteflika of Algeria.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Framed Oil Painting (Forest scene), Russia in winter. Signed. Rec'd—05/22/02. Appraised Value—\$350. Location—Secretary's Office.	Konstantin Alekseyevich Titov.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Balalaika (Russian musical instrument), black lacquer. Rec'd—05/23/02. Appraised Value—\$650. Location—Secretary's Office.	German Gref, Minister of Economic Development Trade of Russia.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Russian-made clock. Marble, key wind, silver trim w/gold hands. Rec'd—05/22/02. Appraised Value—\$3,000. Location—Secretary's Office.	Igor Yusufov, Russian Minister of Egypt.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Framed and matted artwork, depicting Shanghai City skyline scene is a piece of dogwood made of silver and jade. Rec'd—04/24/00. Appraised Value—\$1,000. Location—Secretary's Office.	Chen Liangyu, Mayor of Shanghai.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Two marble horses, one green and one white mounted on board background of Chinese characters. Rec'd—04/25/02. Appraised Value—\$300. Location—Secretary's Office.	Wang Zhan, WTO Affairs Consultation.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Chinese book, history of Chinese coinage. Rec'd—04/30/02. Appraised Value—\$500. Location—Secretary's Office.	Hu Jintao, Vice President of China.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Ceremonial dagger (Khanjar) wood handle, scabbard, trimmed in ornately silver. Rec'd—08/21/01. Appraised Value—\$500. Location—Secretary's Office.	Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdulla, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Sultanate of Oman.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Obsidian statue, bust of woman 6" high w/silver earrings and band ornate necklace. Rec'd—09/05/01. Appraised Value—\$600. Location—Secretary's Office.	Vincente Fox Quesada, President of Mexico.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Statue, bronze pedestal, situated on a square, green marble base, 12" tall. Rec'd—10/14/01. Appraised Value—\$800. Location—Secretary's Office.	German Gref Minister, Economic Development and Trade, Russia.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Two large amethyst crystals (geodes). Rec'd—02/15/02. Appraised Value—\$400. Location—Secretary's Office.	Jorge Batlle, President of Uruguay.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Framed & matted geode (petrified wood). Rec'd—04/23/02. Appraised Value—\$350. Location—Secretary's Office.	Jiang Zemin, President of Beijing, China.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Decorative crystal plate, engraved of President's residence in center. Rec'd—07/17/02. Appraised Value—\$400. Location—Secretary's Office.	Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of Poland.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Afghan carpet, handmade, 100% wool, 4' x 6' fancy guls (hatchli design, number □). Rec'd—07/25/02. Appraised Value—\$1,500. Location—Secretary's Office.	Sayed Mustafa Kazemi, Minister of Commerce.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Egyptian statue—ceramic (nefert), gilt with blue and red trim. Rec'd—10/04/02. Appraised Value—\$500. Location—Secretary's Office.	Youssef Boutros-Ghali, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Egypt.
Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce	Replica of a Dake tripod, made of bronze (cooking vessel). Rec'd—12/11/02. Appraised Value—\$350. Location—Secretary's Office.	Xu Guanhua, Chinese Minister of Science and Technology.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Report of Travel or Expenses of Travel]

Name and title of person accepting travel expenses consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government	Brief description and estimated value of travel or travel expenses accepted as consistent with the interests of the U.S. Government and occurring outside the United States	Identify of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
None			

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identify of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy.	"Russian Field" specially commissioned one-of-a-kind artwork by Sirin of Moscow tracking number 112, 175.42g of yellow gold, 366 diamonds totaling 6.48 karats, 3.2g of enameling. Received—May 2, 2002. Estimated Value—\$7,000.00. Reported to GSA October 30, 2002; pending transfer to GSA.	Igor Yusufov, Minister of Energy, Russia.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy.	Algerian rug with bands of geometric patterns, approx 97" x 140" Received—June 5, 2002. Estimated Value—\$540.00. Reported to GSA October 30, 2002; pending transfer to GSA.	Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy.	Silver plated falcon on glove. Received—June 19, 2002. Estimated Value—\$340.00. Reported to GSA October 30, 2002; pending transfer to GSA.	Abdullah Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, Minister of Energy, Qatar.	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[Report of Tangible Gifts—2002]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identify of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Silvered metal katar and scabbard, modern, on a silver embroidered black velvet belt with two boxes. L of belt: 43 inches. Rec'd—February 16, 2002. Est. Value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Filigree silver figure of a dove, modern, mounted on a black slate base. H: 7 inches. Rec'd—February 18, 2002. Est. Value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Middle Eastern or Indian embossed partial gilt silver short sword and scabbard, modern, with attached black silk cord. L overall: 27½ inches. Rec'd—February 20, 2002. Est. Value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts—2002]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Coral and jeweled filigree silver short sword and scabbard, modern, in a fitted carved wood case. L: 25½ inches. Rec'd—February 20, 2002. Est. Value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Embossed silver mounted ivory short sword and scabbard, modern, with attached silk cord. L: 26 inches. Rec'd—February 28, 2002. Est. Value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Pair of gold overlay rock crystal candlesticks, modern. H: 9 inches. Rec'd—April 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$600.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Coral six-strand necklace, with silver clasp mounted with a coral bead, in fitted blue silk case. L: 17 inches. Rec'd—May 31, 2002. Est. Value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Rug, 7 ft. 8 in. x 5 ft. 8 in., modern, windowpane field with multi-colored floral reserves, zigzag guard boarder on salmon ground. Rec'd—February 19, 2002. Est. Value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Rug, 116 x 82 inches, modern, beige ground with stepped prayer design field. Rec'd—February 19, 2002. Est. value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Silver double horse-drawn condiment cart with salt and pepper shaker, modern, fitted in a black velvet case, with stamped 13 standard mark. L: 12 inches. Rec'd—August 19, 2002. Est. value: \$600.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence.	Henry Jean Pontoy (French 1888–1968) Femme du Sud, signed lower right, also title on reverse and numbered 7, oil on canvas. 18 x 15 inches. Rec'd—December 11, 2002. Est. value—\$500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
John E. McLaughlin, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence.	Sterling "double tower" pen holder and letter opener Standish, on an oval mahogany base. L: 11 inches. Rec'd—April 6, 2002. Est. value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts—2002]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
An Agency Employee	Rug, 117 x 82 inches, modern, red ground with diagonal rows of octagon and floral medallions, multi-colored guard border. Rec'd—February 3, 2002. Est. value—\$600.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Diamond dinner ring, the contemporary 875 (18 karat) yellow gold crossed over mount set with two rows of round faceted brilliant cut diamonds, each weighing approximately .10 carats, total weight approximately 1 carat. Rec'd—June 1, 2002. Est. value—\$500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Contemporary hallmarked 18 karat yellow gold and diamond five-piece ensemble, the Florentine and polished gold setting set with round faceted brilliant cut diamonds, each weighing approximately .10 to .15 carats each, consisting of: a pendant necklace set with eleven diamonds, a bangle bracelet set with twelve diamonds, a ring set with two diamonds and a pair of pierced type earrings, each set with one diamond, fitted in a rose velvet case. Gross weight: 6 oz. Rec'd—June 2, 2002. Est. value—\$2,500.00.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Contemporary 18 karat white and yellow gold diamond four-piece ensemble, each in the Art Deco style, consisting of: a tassel pendant and chain set with a pavé of diamonds, a ring and a pair of pierced type tassel earrings, fitted in a green velvet case. Rec'd—June 2, 2002. Est. value—\$3,000.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Gentleman's Swiss stainless steel wristwatch, from the Yves St. Laurent Collection, together with a partial gold ballpoint pen, in a fitted gray leather and gray velvet lined interior locked case. Rec'd—June 2, 2002. Est. value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Pair of white gold, diamond and turquoise beaded pendant-type pierced earrings, modern, each set with a round cabochon turquoise, approximately 8½ mm, surrounded by a pavé of round faceted brilliant cut diamonds. Rec'd—June 2, 2002. Est. value—\$2,500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts—2002]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
An Agency Employee	Contemporary hallmarked white gold and diamond dinner ring, set with a pavé of melee diamonds. Rec'd—June 2, 2002. Est. value—\$750.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Daum amber Pate de Verre Figus (Fig) bowl, modern, the compressed body molded in high relief with berries and leaves and two crawling salamanders, signed on base, Daum/France. H: 7½ inches. Rec'd—June 2, 2002. Est. value—\$1,500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Ladies four diamond engagement ring, modern, the 18 karat yellow and white gold four prong Tiffany mount set with a single row of round faceted brilliant cut diamonds, each weighing approximately .20 carats, total weight approximately .80 carats. Rec'd—May 24, 2002. Est. value—\$650.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Unmarked yellow gold mounted ivory five-piece ensemble, modern, consisting of: a pendant necklace, a four-panel bracelet, a ring and a pair of leaf-shaped pendant pierced-type earrings, in a red velvet fitted case. Rec'd—September 25, 2002. Est. value—\$500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Unmounted emerald cut emerald weighing approximately 1.70 carats, good color with some inclusions. Rec'd—September 7, 2002. Est. value—\$600.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Filigree silver two-handle floriform vase, modern. H: 12½ inches; W: 44 oz. Rec'd—October 1, 2001. Est. value—\$500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Wood Group of Two Figures, modern. H: 39½ inches. Rec'd—June 20, 2001. Est. value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Unmounted emerald cut emerald, weighing approximately 2.50 carats, deeper green color with some inclusions; together with an uncut emerald nugget weighing approximately 2 carats. Rec'd—August 1, 2002. Est. value—\$1,000.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts—2002]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
An Agency Employee	Silver mounted ivory five-piece ensemble, modern, consisting of: a melon beaded necklace and bracelet, a pair of leaf-shaped pierced-type pendant earrings and a ring, in a fitted tan velvet case. Each stamped 925 standard. Rec'd—October 20, 2001. Est. value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Silver mounted ivory five-piece ensemble, modern, consisting of: a melon beaded necklace and bracelet, a pair of leaf-shaped pierced-type pendant earrings and a ring, in a fitted tan velvet case. Rec'd—October 20, 2001. Est. value—\$400.000. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Unmarked yellow gold mounted ivory five-piece ensemble, modern, consisting of: a heart pendant necklace, a four-panel bracelet, a pair of leaf-shaped earrings and a ring, in a fitted red velvet case. Note: necklace with one section unattached from the leaf-shaped pendant. Rec'd—October 20, 2001. Est. value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Unmarked yellow gold and gold-filled mounted ivory five-piece ensemble, modern, consisting of: A leaf pendant necklace, a four-panel bracelet, a pair of leaf-shaped pierced-type earrings and a ring, in a fitted red velvet case. Rec'd—October 20, 2001. Est. value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Unmarked silver mounted ivory five-piece ensemble, modern, consisting of: A leaf-shaped pendant necklace, a four-panel bracelet, a pair of leaf-shaped pendant pierced earrings and a ring, in a fitted green and tan velvet case. Note: necklace with some silver inlay unattached. Rec'd—October 20, 2001. Est. value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Silver mounted ivory seven-piece ensemble, modern, consisting of: a 925 marked melon ball necklace with matching bracelet, two pairs of pendant-type earrings and a ring, in a red velvet fitted case. Rec'd—October 20, 2001. Est. value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts—2002]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
An Agency Employee	Unmarked silver mounted ivory five-piece ensemble, modern, consisting of: a leaf-shaped pendant necklace, a four panel bracelet, a pair of leaf shaped pendant leaf earrings and a ring, fitted in a red velvet case. Rec'd—October 20, 2001. Est. Value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Unmarked silver mounted ivory five-piece ensemble, modern, consisting of: a leaf-shaped pendant necklace, a four panel bracelet, a pair of leaf shaped pendant leaf earrings and a ring, fitted in a red velvet case. Rec'd—October 20, 2001. Est. Value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Rug, 13 ft. 1 in. x 7 ft. 8 in., modern, windowpane field with alternating blue and rose ground enclosing floral medallions, lozenge and floral guard border on blue and ivory ground. Rec'd—December 11, 2002. Est. Value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Chased silver plated samovar, modern. H: 24 inches. Est. Value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Silver plated and partial gilt chess set and board, modern. D of board: 20 inches. H of chessmen: 3½ inches. Est. Value—\$500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Contemporary 750 (18 karat) yellow gold chain link gentleman's signate bracelet and inscribed "God Bless You" and contemporary ring, set with a round faceted brilliant cut diamond weighing approximately .10 carats. Rec'd—June 1998. Est. Value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Double strand graduated cultured pearl necklace and a pair of pendant earrings, modern, the necklaces measuring from 8 mm to 5½ mm (not individually knotted), with a silver plated clasp, the earrings set in gold-filled bowknot form tassel mounts set with a synthetic diamond, suspending a pendant pearl and a mabe pearl clasp. Rec'd—May 12, 2002. Est. Value—\$750.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—Continued

[Report of Tangible Gifts—2002]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
An Agency Employee	Contemporary diamond star-form pendant and 918 (21 karat) yellow and white gold round braided chain, the princess-type pendant set with a pavé of round faceted diamonds, total weight approximately 1 carat. Rec'd—December 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$800.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Contemporary diamond star-form pendant and 918 (21 karat) yellow and white gold round braided chain, the princess-type pendant set with a pavé of round faceted diamonds, total weight approximately 1 carat. Rec'd—December 23, 2002. Est. Value—\$800.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Contemporary diamond and emerald three-piece ensemble, the 14 karat yellow gold "V" pendant mount set with seven marquise faceted cut emeralds alternating with six twin round faceted melee diamonds, on a flat braided chain; together with a pair of complementary leaf-shaped pierced-type earrings, each set with three marquise faceted cut emeralds and a row of six round faceted melee diamonds. Rec'd—April 19, 1998. Est. value—\$650.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Group of nine unmounted precious and semi-precious stones, consisting of: two emerald cut emeralds, two oval faceted rubies and five round faceted white sapphires. Est. value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Pair of Contemporary hallmarked 21 karat partial silver and yellow gold bangle bracelets and a ring. Rec'd—June 30, 2002. Est. value—\$500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Pair of Contemporary hallmarked 21 karat partial silver and yellow gold bangle bracelets and a ring. Rec'd—June 30, 2002. Est. value—\$500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Contemporary 750 (18 karat) white gold, diamond and sapphire dinner ring, the interlocking mount set with a row of fifteen round faceted blue sapphires surrounded by a pavé of round faceted diamonds. Rec'd—June 30, 2002. Est. value—\$2,500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AGENCY: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—Continued
[Report of Tangible Gifts—2002]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
An Agency Employee	Pair of Contemporary hallmarked 21 karat yellow gold polished and textured herringbone bangle bracelets, total weight approximately 1 oz. Rec'd—June 30, 2002. Est. value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Gentleman's Swiss stainless steel and black reptile band water resistant wristwatch by Corum, in a fitted blue leather case. Rec'd—June 30, 2002. Est. value—\$300.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Yellow gold mounted ivory five-piece ensemble, modern, consisting of: a leaf pendant necklace, a four-panel bracelet, a pair of pendant leaf-type earrings and a ring, in a glazed top wood case. Rec'd—July 20, 2001. Est. value—\$400.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Wain partial silk and wool rug, 8 ft 10 x 8 ft 2 in, modern, green ground with palmate and trellising vine field centering a pull star medallion on ivory to blue ground, palmette and trellising vine guard boarder on ivory ground. Rec'd—April 28, 2001. Est. value—\$1,500.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.
An Agency Employee	Kerman rug, 12 ft 6 in x 8 ft 2 in, post 1950's ivory ground with a floral spray field centering an oval medallion with complementary field on green ground, palmette and trellising vine guard border on red ground. Rec'd—May 20, 2000. Est. value—\$1,000.00. To be retained for official display.	5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4)	Non-acceptance would have caused embarrassment to donor and U.S. Government.

AMENDED REPORT
AGENCY: UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
[Report of Tangible Gifts]

Name and title of person accepting gift on behalf of the U.S. Government	Gift, date of acceptance on behalf of the U.S. Government, estimated value, and current disposition or location	Identity of foreign donor and government	Circumstances justifying acceptance
Andrew Natsios, USAID Administrator.	Leather rug & three pillow cushions. Est. value—\$850.00. Rec'd—11/18/02. Location—Administrator's Suite.	Government of Nigeria	Refusal to accept would have caused embarrassment to the donor.
Andrew Natsios, USAID Administrator.	Afghanistan Rug. Est. value—\$300.00. Record—12/20/02. Location—Administrator's Suite.	Sayed Hussan Anwari, Min. of Agric.	Refusal to accept would have caused embarrassment to the donor.

[FR Doc. 03-15209 Filed 6-20-03; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710-29-M

6:30 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 15, 2003
SUBJECT: SecDef Gifts

Are my gifts that I accept published? I talked to David Addington and he said the Vice President's are published. If so, I would like to see what the publications look like.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
101503.14

Please respond by: _____ *10/30*

005

15 OCT 03

June 30, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Declassifying Documents

Please talk to the gentleman we met with on the record keeping—I think it was Larry Curry, Director of Communications and Directives—and see if he can get my classified files at the Library of Congress reviewed for declassification that have not already been reviewed for declassification.

I think he said he had already done that for my prior tour as SecDef. I am thinking that perhaps he could do it for the classified files from my NATO years, my time in the White House and my time as Middle East Envoy.

Please see if they have already been declassified. If they have, then get a set of the declassified papers ready at the Library of Congress.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-82

.....
Please respond by 7/25/03

U17568 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17110



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

October 16, 2003, 9:08 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action_____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

SUBJECT: DACOWITS Office Moving

- You asked for information on the "move" of the DACOWITS office (TAB A). There is a pending physical move of the DACOWITS office and also the earlier organizational realignment of the five military spaces from OSD to the Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA).
- In regards to the physical move, the DACOWITS support office will relocate on December 4, 2003 to room 2C548, as part of the Pentagon renovation. The new space is renovated and offers upgrades and a larger working area for the committee and support staff.
- Additionally, as a result of the OSD Headquarters Reduction effort in July 2002, the DACOWITS support staff was realigned under the Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA). DACOWITS along with other "operational / non-policymaking" entities in P&R were realigned to the DHRA, which is a Field Operating Agency of P&R. The movement of these spaces is transparent to the field and supervision of DACOWITS remains under the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Denise Dailey, DACOWITS,

(b)(6)

U17581 03



11-L-0559/OSD/17111

9/22/03
Mr. Abell

September ²²20, 2003

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Office Moving?

Is your office moving? Is DACOWITS being moved? Someone asked me about it. I am curious to know why. Is it because of the building renovation?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092003-13

.....
Please respond by 10/3/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17112

8:51 AM

TO: ADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: October 22, 2003

SUBJECT: **Krepinevich Paper**

IRAQ

I just read the Andy Krepinevich "Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment." It's interesting. Unfortunately, at the end he says that we haven't done a serious study of what took place. I think you ought to get a hold of him and straighten him out and tell him about your "lessons learned" activity.

Thanks.

D:IR/azn
102203.18

Please respond by: _____ *11 | 10*

U17654 /03

22oct03

11-L-0559/OSD/17113

June 30, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Article 98

EF-5957
*I # 03/009414**292*

The President made a decision on Article 98 waivers.

Would you please call Steve Hadley and find out what it was. Steve mentioned it to me on the phone, but what I wrote down is inaccurate. He may not have fully understood it, or I may have transcribed it incorrectly.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063003-25

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

RECEIVED IN ISP 7/8/03 1750

30 Jun 03

07-08-03 15:09

U17658 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17114

5/14/03

EF-5288
15P

May 14, 2003 2:59 PM

RUSSIA

Jaymie Dunn
5/23

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security for Ivanov

OBE
C 5/28

Please get back to me on security for Ivanov.
Thanks.

DHR:db
051403-19

.....
Please respond by 5/20/03

5-19-03

Mr. Secretary -

Please see the attached memos.
I believe these were separately forwarded
to you around the time you dictated this
memo to Doug Feith.

J.D. Crowe

14 MAY 03

U17659 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17115

5/28

79
1200
June 23, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: EPWs in Iraq

IRAQ

The numbers are growing. I want to see a plan as to how we plan to manage this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062303-36

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

7/9
POLICY RESPONSE ATTACHED
v/r

7/10
Colin M.
has indicated a brief is needed
7/11

2534003

11-L-0559/OSD/17116

U17660 /03

TAB A

SENT 6/30
June 27, 2003
ALREADY Caught
per SUT 8/21
R/T on 4/18
ORIGINAL
Sent -
anyway
this

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Police

I would like a little more visibility into the actual number of police we are trying to get from other countries, what we think we are going to get and how we might increase that.

I am inclined to believe we need more police. Have we thought about putting out a call in the U.S. for retired police?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062703-6

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

27 Jun 03

U17661 /03

Tab A

02 JUL 2 4:10:55

11-L-0559/OSD/17117

1/3
1030

EF-5744
June 16, 2003

TO: Doug Rumsfeld
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Finding Individuals

Please get someone to do a paper on the difficulty of finding individuals, such as the FBI most wanted, Eric Rudolph, Karadzic and these people we have been looking for over five, six or seven years.

Let's get a thoughtful, intelligent piece that shows it is just a very difficult thing to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-14

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

7/7
USD(P)

This does not answer the thought.

D. Rumsfeld
Larry Di Rita
7/7

06-17-03 15:13 IN

U17662-03

11-L-0559/OSD/17118

000.5

1630003

EF-5744
June 16, 2003
Pclose

TO:

Don

FROM:

Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Finding Individuals

Please get someone to do a paper on the difficulty of finding individuals, such as the FBI most wanted, Eric Rudolph, Karadzic and these people we have been looking for over five, six or seven years.

Let's get a thoughtful, intelligent piece that shows it is just a very difficult thing to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061603-14

Please respond by 7/11/03

06-17-03 16:18 IN

U17662 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17119

CLOSED 8/11

SECRET
10/20/03 11:03

October 20, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hospital Meals

*Admiral sent
10/20/03*

I would like to get an answer from you soon as to how we solve this problem of servicemen having to pay for their meals in the hospitals.

Please get back to me no later than Wednesday of this week.

Thanks.

[Handwritten signature lines]

DHR:dh
102003-11

.....
Please respond by 10/22/03

632

U17664 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17120

20 Oct 03



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

10 OCT 23 11 09 '03

INFO MEMO

October 23, 2003—12:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

SUBJECT: Hospital Meals (Snowflake)

- This responds to your question of October 20, 2003, on hospital meals (TAB A).
- Background: Previously, under 10 U.S.C. § 1075 (TAB B), hospitalized officers, former officers, and enlisted members entitled to basic allowance for subsistence had to pay a certain amount for hospital care that was attributable to subsistence (meals); since they were being paid for meals, we were required to collect for any meals we served them.
- On September 30, 2003, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, § 8146 (TAB C), exempted service members and former service members hospitalized during fiscal year 2004 from paying for their meals if they are hospitalized because of an injury incurred as a direct result of armed conflict; while engaged in hazardous service; in the performance of duty under conditions simulating war; or, through an instrumentality of war.
- We have already issued interim guidance to implement this law.
- Once released from the hospital, even if still recuperating, the service member is again governed by the underlying statute, which requires collecting for any meals the government serves if the member is being paid a subsistence allowance.

632

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Ed Wyatt, PD, Health Affairs, (b)(6)

U17665 /03

22 06/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17121

TAB

A

October 20, 2003

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

*Adm. Asst. sent
10/20/03*

SUBJECT: Hospital Meals

I would like to get an answer from you soon as to how we solve this problem of servicemen having to pay for their meals in the hospitals.

Please get back to me no later than Wednesday of this week.

Thanks.

[Handwritten signature lines]

DHR:dh
102003-11

.....
Please respond by 10/22/03

U17664 / 03

TAB

B

Public Law 108-87, Section 8146

SEC. 8146. FISCAL YEAR 2004 EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM REQUIREMENT TO PAY SUBSISTENCE CHARGES WHILE HOSPITALIZED. (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section

1075 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting “(a) **IN GENERAL.**—” before “When”; and

(2) by striking the second sentence and inserting the following:

“(b) **EXCEPTIONS.**—Subsection (a) shall not apply to any of the following:

“(1) An enlisted member, or former enlisted member, of a uniformed service who is entitled to retired or retainer pay or equivalent pay.

“(2) An officer or former officer of a uniformed service, or an enlisted member or former enlisted member of a uniformed service not described in paragraph (1), who is hospitalized under section 1074 because of an injury incurred (as determined under criteria prescribed by the Secretary of Defense)—

“(A) as a direct result of armed conflict;

“(B) while engaged in hazardous service;

“(C) in the performance of duty under conditions simulating war; or

“(D) through an instrumentality of war.

“(c) **APPLICABILITY.**—The exception provided in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) shall apply only during fiscal year 2004.”.

(b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—Subsections (b) and (c) of section 1075 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall take effect on October 1, 2003, and apply with respect to injuries incurred before, on, or after that date.

This Act may be cited as the “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004”.

TAB

C

10 U.S.C. 1075. Officers and certain enlisted members: subsistence charges

When an officer or former officer of a uniformed service, or an enlisted member of a uniformed service entitled to basic allowance for subsistence, is hospitalized under section 1074 of this title, he shall pay an amount equal to the part of the charge prescribed under section 1078 of this title that is attributable to subsistence. An enlisted member, or former enlisted member, of a uniformed service who is entitled to retired or retainer pay, or equivalent pay may not be so charged

October 23, 2003

Iraq

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ideas from Senator Alexander

Attached is a note I received from Senator Lamar Alexander with some interesting thoughts.

Regards,

Attach.
10/22/03 Sen. Alexander ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
102303-2

.....
Please respond by _____

23 Oct 03

U17672 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17128

✓
10/23

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

October 22, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
1300 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Don,


Thank you very much for your letter of the 16th and the copy of the one pager you are working on to explain the administration's plan to win the peace.

The one-pager is moving in the right direction. Fully developed, it should persuade Americans of our goal, our plans and our progress toward the goal.

Since you asked, here are my suggestions:

1. Set a clear overall goal: Operation Iraqi Democracy.
2. Set a timetable for accomplishing the goal and withdrawing most American forces: for example, January 1, 2005 or 2006.
3. Establish a set of measurable objectives which, taken together, add up to a plan to meet the goal. These should specify pre-war levels, post-war levels, today's levels, today's goal, and the goal for January 1, 2005 (or 2006). I've appended a list of suggested measurable objectives that are easy to understand.
4. Report publicly on the objectives once a week.
5. In every speech you, the President, Vice-President, Secretary Powell, Dr. Rice and other key officials make, refer briefly to that week's progress report: "As our weekly progress report on our plan to build democracy in Iraq showed, electricity before the war was at 3300 megawatts, our goal for January 1, 2005(or 2006) is 6000 megawatts, we are at 4217 megawatts today which is 1217 more than before the war, and right on schedule for our goal; on crude oil production, etc.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/17129

118
1200
E+ 5741

I-008619 ISA

June 19, 2003

Nato 092

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ISAF

Let's make a major push to expand ISAF.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-4

.....
Please respond by 6/27/03

POLICY RESPONSE ATTACHED ^{7/9}

^{7/10}

^{✓R}

USD(P) -

All this paper does is raise a lot of questions about expanding ISAF. Sec Def will assume you know all the obstacles, and would ~~prefer~~ probably prefer a paper describing how to approach the problem in spite of them. Give him something to ACT upon.

D. Rumsfeld

19 Jun 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17130 ^{7/11} 17689 /03

7/1
1330

EF 5791

I-008619 ISA

June 19, 2003

JUN 21 2003

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ISAF

Let's make a major push to expand ISAF.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061903-4

Please respond by 6/27/03

30 JUN 2003

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL - 8 2003

✓
→ Sec Def :

A paper will come to you shortly on this issue, relating it to other issues, such as the handover of ISAF/Kabul to NATO command; the role of the PRTs; and the long-term relation between ISAF and the PRs.

Pete Rodman

061903

061903-4

11-L-0559/OSD/17131

7/2

arry Di Rita
7/7

CLOSE HOLD

June 23, 2003

381

TO: Andy Hoehn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Defense Strategy Paper

I read Andy Marshall's updated defense strategy paper. I think it is excellent.
What do you propose we do with it?

Thanks.

Attach.
6/12/03 "Defense Strategy Paper 2003"

DHR:dh
062303-24

.....
Please respond by 7/11/03

6/28
→ Sec Def -
In addition to
Andy Hoehn's comments, maybe
we could brief President at
Crawford. Bring Andy Marshall?

D.R. to
Larry D. Rumsfeld
6/30

23 Jun 03

CLOSE HOLD

11-L-0559/OSD/17132

U17690 / 03

Defense Strategy Paper 2003

~~SECRET HAS SEEN~~

JUN 23 2003

I. Overview

- A. The US starts from a strong position. We dominate high end conventional warfare, and the oceans provide large strategic buffers for us while allowing the projection of our forces to the Eurasian continent. This position is the result of geography, the absence of another major power in this hemisphere, the history of the past century, and past investment in military capabilities (including superior military training in the last 30 years). And we are currently ahead in exploiting what technology offers.
- B. We did not seek this dominant position, but we have it and should not give it up. We are not perfectly protected—September 11, 2001 is evidence of that—and the logic of the situation tends toward a search by potential opponents for other ways of dealing with us, either attacking/threatening the US homeland, or preventing US forces from entering areas near themselves. Those efforts encourage proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD.
- C. While some long term trends are visible—e.g., the rise of Asia, and the rapid pace of scientific and technological development—the level of uncertainty we face in planning for the future is higher than existed during the past.
- D. The strategy we propose includes:
- preferential investment in a selected portfolio of military capabilities in order to maintain a position of strong advantage in a particular area or to create a position of strong advantage in an important emerging area of future warfare that is central to the maintenance of our strong strategic position.
 - measures to cope with the responses of potential opponents, e.g., increased efforts for homeland defense, preparations for limiting proliferation of WMD, and preemption if that fails, etc.
 - long term repositioning and reshaping of our forces, officer corps, and alliances to focus more on Asia and to hedge against the possible rise of a hostile China.

II. The Future Situation

A. The Logic of the Situation

- The U.S. has a substantial geostrategic and military advantage over possible major competitors for the next decade. With the oceans as strategic buffers that limit threats to U.S. territory, we station and project forces forward to join with allies and friends to deter or defeat threats.
- Some nations dissatisfied with this situation will try to erode the U.S. position, and economic and technology trends may allow them to do so. They will search for ways to make it difficult for the U.S. to operate close to their borders; and will have strong incentives to obtain long-range systems and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that can threaten U.S. territory as a deterrent to U.S. intervention overseas.

B. Uneven economic growth will gradually reshape the balance of potential power.

- China, India, and South Korea are likely to grow faster than the US, Europe, Russia, and Japan, although long term economic forecasts cannot be taken literally and there is particular uncertainty about China.
- Post-Soviet Russia's geographic and economic contraction has reduced its economic size to something more like Italy, Brazil, or Canada.
- Illustrative numbers: Percent of total world GDP.
 - US 23% in 2000, 22% in 2025.
 - EU 21% in 2000, 16% in 2025.
 - China 8% in 2000, 13% in 2025.
 - Japan 8% in 2000, 5% in 2025.
 - India 5% in 2000, 8% in 2025.
 - Russia 2.5% in 2000, 2.1% in 2025.
- Implication: Asia gradually emerges as a potential source and potential prize of large-scale military power.

Tab A

~~DRAFT CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/17134

- Indicators of potential power do not decide where U.S. priorities lie or where conflict is most likely. But since the demise of the Soviet Union, no other country has commanded aggregate resources anywhere near those of the U.S. *If we are going to face a military competitor with a formidable resource base in the next several decades—or if military rivalry or conflict develops between other great powers—it is likely to be in Asia.*
 - The vast distances within the Asian theater and the lower density of U.S. basing options there place a premium on long-range systems. For example, a Taiwan-China theater is 650 miles from Okinawa, 1000 miles from other U.S. air bases in Japan and Korea, 2000 miles from Guam, and more than 4000 miles from Australia and Hawaii. The distance from Asia to the American continent, and the distances within the Asian theater, should inform our planning for logistics systems, and for the mix of platforms and capabilities we develop.
 - DoD and the U.S. in general will need to develop widespread regional expertise. This will entail developing a new generation of experts in the languages and strategic cultures of Asian countries, and increasing DoD's familiarity with the region by placing more headquarters in the region, sending officers to schools in the region, etc.
 - Demographic trends are one contributor to the economic forecast, and will amplify its effect, as services for aging populations will tend to divert resources away from the military in Europe, Japan, and (slightly later) the United States.
 - There is particular uncertainty about China. Measures of past performance and relative size are suspect and disputed. Insolvent banking system supports large and inefficient state owned enterprises, clouding future prospects. China's population will also age, though trailing Europe, Japan, and the US.
- C. Continuing growth of world trade, including China and India becoming significant importers of oil.

- Japan, South Korea, Germany, and France are already roughly 100% dependent on imported oil. By 2020 (according to very rough projections), China could go from importing a third of the oil it consumes to importing seven-tenths of it; India could go from 60% dependent to 85%.
- Notwithstanding the likely development of oil supplies in the Caspian Basin, and the large share of U.S. oil imports that will originate in our own hemisphere, the Persian Gulf will remain uniquely important as the major supplier to the global oil market that determines the price we and other importers pay for oil. The Persian Gulf will retain its special strategic significance as long as oil remains a key energy source, a situation of finite but uncertain duration.
- Import dependence is probably not a cause of conflict, but is a vulnerability in wartime, and may shape forces and policies. For example, reliance on oil imports may spur investment in naval forces; or efforts to influence oil exporting countries, e.g., by arms sales.

D. Emerging military challenges

1. Proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

- Iran, Libya, and North Korea are currently the most likely new additions to the nuclear club; actual (or effectively threatened) use of a nuclear weapon could provoke a considerably broader proliferation.
- WMD threats (against U.S. allies, hosts, forces, or U.S. territory) will likely, among other things, be attempts to deter U.S. power projection operations.
- Russia, China, and others could develop low yield tactical nuclear weapons and appropriate operational concepts to counter what they see as overwhelming U.S. conventional capabilities.

2. Increasing threats to U.S. territory.

- Terrorists may use more lethal means, including weapons of mass destruction.
- To deter or respond to U.S. military intervention against them, adversaries are likely to threaten or strike U.S. territory and interests, using covert operations

- or, as they obtain them, longer-range strike systems (cruise and ballistic missiles) and nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.
- Opponents may also target electronic networks on which U.S. infrastructure, banking, and communications increasingly depend, so as to threaten or demonstrate an ability to inflict severe economic disruption.
3. Proliferation of advanced conventional technologies may permit more sophisticated anti-access strategies against U.S. power projection.
- Ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced mines and submarines, and target recognition and guidance systems would be designed to prevent U.S. forces' timely arrival or deter their deployment. Forward bases and U.S. aircraft carriers would be targets—as would allied, coalition, or host country forces and facilities.
 - Information warfare could be waged against U.S. territory to disrupt U.S. force deployments, and against U.S. forces highly dependent upon shared information for self-defense and strike effectiveness. Measures would likely include computer network attacks, anti-satellite attacks, jamming of Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, and use of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and radio frequency (RF) weapons.
4. Opponents will look for other means of offsetting the advantages of US forces once in theater.
- Efforts to offset U.S. air attack will include concealment, decoys, dispersal, hardening, and infrared-guided surface to air missiles.
 - We can expect wider proliferation of older, simpler, but still effective weapons such as small arms, grenade launchers, and shoulder-fired missiles. Even the most recent versions of these weapons are available for sale internationally.
 - Opponents will try to use urban areas, restricted terrain, and guerrilla tactics to limit U.S. options.
5. The proliferation of accurate missiles may have other important effects.

- It could create options for coercive threats or attacks against economic assets.
 - The growing role of international commerce, the increasing wealth of countries, the difficulty of conquering and occupying territory, and the technical challenge of targeting mobile or hidden enemy military forces—all these considerations may encourage attempts to use military force coercively, against commerce or other economic assets.
 - U.S. allies and friends who face such threats may seek U.S. help against them.
 - Incentives to initiate war preemptively may increase, as owners of accurate missiles may think they can disarm the enemy decisively, and fear that a missile-armed enemy will act first.
- 6. U.S. efforts to deter aggression or the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons will confront different circumstances.
 - The larger number of actors and variety of actions we may wish to deter make us unlikely to have a reliable understanding of those actors' calculations and psyches.
 - Our Cold War focus on the Soviet Union and the peculiarly "rationalist" style of Communist doctrine facilitated our deterrence calculations; but our success may conceal the role of luck, and the risk of failure was probably higher than hindsight recalls.
 - In contrast to the Cold War focus on deterring the conquest of Western Europe and a massive nuclear attack on the United States, some of the actions we wish to deter in the future will threaten less dire and immediate consequences for us. The actors we wish to deter may have or think they have much higher stakes at risk than we do, which will reduce the deterrent effect of our advantage in military capability.
- E. Recent and likely technological advances appear to permit radical innovations in military methods over the next several decades. The full exploitation of new

technologies will probably require changes in how military forces are organized and in their concepts of operations. This is both an opportunity for the U.S. and a source of potential threat. The U.S. will face a wide ranging menu of options—as will potential enemies, aided by global commerce and the “dual use” character of many important technologies.

- Robotic systems could be developed for a variety of missions. Stealth, performance, cost, and casualty concerns may move the U.S. and competitors toward a greater reliance on unmanned combat systems.
- Much smaller, even microscopic, sensors and weapons could be linked by information networks.
- Space based systems could take on a wider range of military functions.
- In general, information processing technology, whose rapid recent development has been widely exploited by military forces, is a likely source of further change.
 - Communications networks permit vast improvements in the precision and coordination of military effort; but an opponent’s use of information technology to deny, disrupt, or corrupt communications and information may have offsetting—or even devastating—effects.
 - Information operations more broadly considered may also be a critical strategic tool, as military forces as well as entities outside of the military engage in public diplomacy, psychological warfare, and deception. These methods may be enhanced by advances in cognitive sciences.
- Biological technologies and diseases may be the basis of various new measures and countermeasures, with soldiers, populations, crops, and livestock as potential targets.
- In combination with, or as successors to, the proliferation and improvement of long range strike forces, these technologies could permit radical changes in warfare, devaluing capabilities today thought formidable, or the significance of geographic distance, oceans, and mountain ranges.

F. Uncertainties

1. The surprises and erroneous predictions that litter the historical record caution against confidence in forecasting. Since we face an irreducible uncertainty about crucial matters, our strategy must lead, hedge, and adapt—not simply anticipate.
2. Unpredictable discontinuities may affect the security environment more severely than predicted trends.
 - In most of the world's undemocratic countries, some kind of revolution or political instability is plausible but not predictable.
 - Technological breakthroughs can belie assumptions about existing sources of military advantage.
 - Use of nuclear weapons would promote a scramble for defenses, nuclear proliferation, and a search for (or, depending on what had just happened, loss of confidence in) "guarantees" extended by others, particularly the U.S.
 - Additional major terrorist attacks on the U.S. remain possible.
3. We cannot predict the timing, identity, and extent of future military challenges.
 - E.g., technology appears widely available to support "anti-access" capabilities, and we already see some evidence that several countries are developing them; but we do not know how rapidly this will proceed and how robust the capabilities built will be.
 - E.g., China's growing wherewithal makes it a central actor, but a wide range of policies and developments are conceivable.
 - Will the priority of trade and economic growth inhibit military ambitions? Would China try to absorb Taiwan by force, and if so when might they have the capability? Will China press for US withdrawal from Japan, Korea?
 - Will economic reversals or political change disrupt any such intentions?

Tab A

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11-L-0559/OSD/17140

- Large-scale conflict between major powers does not appear to be the most likely case for the next decade or so; but a prudent DOD strategy must remain fully prepared for that contingency.

III. Sustaining the Favorable US Position

A. Advantage-based strategy

- An advantage-based strategy focuses on identifying the most important sources of existing US military advantage; determining how to sustain advantages that might be challenged; deciding whether and how we can favorably influence the forces and behavior of potential opponents by enhancing certain advantages; and selecting emerging warfare areas in which it is most important to attain new advantages.
- There will certainly be some military requirements we will face that we must prepare to meet even if we are not in an advantageous position.
 - For example, even if missile defense is difficult and costly compared to the offensive missile threats that may proliferate in the future, we will probably need to pursue that mission.
 - Whether or not we are able to become especially proficient in post-war "constabulary" duties, we are likely to face that task.
 - Thus focusing on a "portfolio of advantages" is a way of exploiting our strengths, but it is not a comprehensive prescription for force planning.
- To be a useful management tool, the portfolio of key advantages must be a limited, selected set—not an exhaustive list of useful military capabilities. The intention is to identify areas for special attention where U.S. strength appears to have the highest payoff, where particular efforts of analysis and experimentation may be warranted. Depending on what judgments are reached about a particular area, it may or may not gain in budgetary priority.

- Given the great uncertainties involved, as well as the difficulty of combining the variety of considerations that deserve some weight, there is no straightforward recipe for the portfolio. This section outlines the main issues to be considered, in particular
 - identifying key advantages evident in our current capabilities
 - introspection about the sources of those military advantages
 - analysis of the dynamics of longer term competition, i.e., how our capabilities shape the investments, operations, and even goals of potential opponents
 - assessment of prospects for technological and operational innovation, and their impact
 - judgment of how to place bets and hedge against risks.

B. Key advantages in current capabilities

- Central to our favorable geostrategic situation is a strong US superiority in projecting forces for high intensity conventional warfare, and in preventing any such power projection against US territory.
 - Our power projection superiority did not prevent the attack of September 11, 2001, but has shown its value in the aftermath of that attack. This capability not only supports allies threatened by aggression, as has long been the case; it is essential to our ability to prevent or deter terrorist attacks on ourselves.
- The U.S.'s superior position in power projection and counter-power projection depends in part on access and cooperation provided by numerous overseas allies and friends. And it depends on a number of specific military competences in which we have superior (in some cases, overwhelmingly superior) capabilities.
 - For example, US superiority in aerial warfare means that U.S. leaders count on quickly gaining control of the air, limiting if not eliminating enemy ability to mount aircraft attacks against our deployed forces or against regional airbases, airheads, logistics facilities, and ports used by American forces and allies in the

region. Air superiority also enables us to deliver much more ordnance against targets than can an enemy whose only long range strike systems are missiles.

- The US also has a strong advantage in using space assets to enhance military operations, exploiting satellites for rapid communication with and among globally dispersed forces, and for precision navigation and targeting.
- The recent goal of regime change in Iraq made clear that a key element of US power projection dominance is embodied in ground forces capable of rapid movement and territorial control. One should add airlift and sealift assets to the list; indeed a comprehensive list of the military capabilities that enable our successful power projection operations would be a very long one.
- Criteria developed below offer a way of more sharply focusing managers' attention.

C. Sources of these elements

- The specific US military competences just mentioned are attributable to more general sources. Strategy should try to understand and where necessary cultivate those roots. For example, the complexity, scope, and realism of U.S. military training activities are well beyond the capabilities of most other nations, and have created force-wide levels of "first battle" competence without precedent in American history.
- The chain of causation can be traced back farther: While US training advantages are partly the result of past resource allocations and institutional learning, they may also reflect certain cultural or political characteristics of our country—such as a tolerance for very frank discussion between personnel of different ranks, including discussion of errors and failures.
- Whether specific US military advantages are traced to luck, or history, or culture, the key point for strategy is to comprehend our collection of inherited assets, and to consider which of their sources may need future nourishment, and which of those assets might be more fully exploited in the future.

- While we also look for promising new areas of military advantage, existing areas of advantage may have particular merit in making use of underlying national strengths. And we want to preserve and build on assets acquired with great cost and difficulty, rather than planning to rebuild them only when needed. Apart from the likely high cost of recreating discarded assets, institutional and personnel competences may be difficult to rebuild at all.
- Some existing US advantages may lie in methods of warfare that could be more fully exploited, that is, applied to a broader range of military functions.
 - For example, the US has a highly developed competence in undersea warfare, which may offer important operational options to cope with a more difficult anti-access environment.
 - Or the US advantage in naval platforms and operations could support missile defense systems in close enough proximity to launch sites to permit boost phase interception.
 - The US's highly developed space capabilities might reward efforts to bring down the high cost of launching to orbit (currently (\$5,000 to \$10,000 per pound) so as to permit innovations that could create new military advantages.

D. The dynamics of longer term competition

- The idea of a portfolio of advantages is meant to focus attention on the long term competitive effects of US military advantages, that is, their effects on the investments, operations, and even the goals of potential US military opponents (and, for that matter, on US allies as well). Some US advantages that do not appear conspicuous in a review of recent warfare may nevertheless play a crucial role as "entry barriers" to threatening capabilities. Such barriers are likely to be under appreciated if they are successful and no threat becomes manifest.

- For example, US sea denial capabilities and US counter-air capabilities make it extremely difficult for anyone to contemplate acquiring a capability for very large scale, inexpensive bombardment of our territory.
- Worldwide sea control requires a tremendous commitment in manpower and resources; modern ships have high acquisition costs and large supporting infrastructures that will likely dissuade all but the most economically successful countries from developing blue water navies. It may therefore be quite feasible for the US to retain a very large margin of advantage in sea control, preserving a formidable barrier against future enemy long distance power projection. This does not necessarily require more money or innovation; we may need only to recognize the strategic value of our advantage, keep an eye on developments, and maintain forces sufficient to keep up the entry barrier.
- US air superiority also serves as an entry barrier in theater war operations. If enemies realize they cannot hope to defeat that superiority, they may build hundreds or thousands of missiles to generate a strike capability, but they cannot marshal the tens of thousands of relatively cheap strike munitions that manned aircraft can deliver.
- One effect of an entry barrier is to divert opponents' efforts toward other, alternative activities.
- There is some benefit if we can reduce our uncertainty about what future opponents may do by making some options infeasible for them. We may in some cases want to pursue innovations that make our capabilities a more robust, moving target for asymmetric strategies that attempt to exploit an existing set of vulnerabilities or achieve a narrow area of advantage. And we should look for opportunities to divert opponent efforts into activities less dangerous to ourselves.

- Not to be underestimated is the possibility that opponents' goals may themselves be influenced by our evident determination to retain a superiority that would be very difficult to challenge.
- In any case, to manage of portfolio of advantages effectively we will need to monitor carefully what other countries are up to—in particular how they respond to our own choices—and adjust our plans accordingly.

E. Frontiers of technological and operational innovation

- A portfolio of advantages designed for the long term must take account of changes in technology that may make formidable new capabilities possible or undercut the effectiveness of existing capabilities.
- Technological change makes it likely that new and much more effective systems and methods of warfare will be invented. We want to develop superior competence in the methods of warfare that will be most decisive in the future, including most robust against successive rounds of countermeasures. This is not only a matter of anticipating and thwarting enemy innovations, but of pursuing advantageous opportunities.
- For example, unmanned systems are likely to become increasingly capable due to advances in information technology, microelectronics, power supplies, and artificial intelligence. They can overcome endurance and maneuver limits associated with human pilots, and reduce force protection concerns. Our technology base and experience make this a promising area, even if we cannot foresee how quickly various capabilities can be developed or precisely what military role they will play.
- In some cases, a key US military advantage may be at risk from emerging trends. In that case the question is how the advantage can be preserved—by force modernization or expansion, perhaps, or (more likely) by the development of new military methods, including new operational concepts or military organizations. For example:

- The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles threatens the forward bases and aircraft carriers on which much of our long range precision strike capability depends. To preserve our advantage in long range strike, we may need different sorts of forces, systems, and concepts—perhaps missile defense systems, perhaps a greater reliance on long range aircraft, aerial refueling, unmanned aerial combat vehicles, or cruise missiles or other precision ordnance fired from surface ships or submarines.
- As competitors buy or develop increasingly lethal anti-access capabilities, non-stealthy U.S. naval assets will operate at increased risk and may be denied access to key littoral areas. This may require a greater reliance on, for example, the stealth associated with undersea warfare.
- Emerging U.S. advantages in using space to enhance military operations within the atmosphere will likely provoke opponents to try to negate these capabilities—so that to retain our advantage we will need to find the means to survey foreign activities in space, identify hostile movements, and protect satellites.
- The selection of key areas of advantage would both guide, and be informed by the results of, a robust, sustained program of experimentation to develop and test new means of warfare. Programs of experimentation, and implementation of new methods in a limited part of our forces, will create options and allow learning.
- We will face considerable uncertainty about the rate of progress and technical effectiveness of a variety of measures and countermeasures, so we will need to develop multiple options and conduct experiments.
- On the basis of what we learn—about what weapons systems are feasible and effective, what organizational changes and operational concepts take best advantage of new systems, and how to execute those concepts—we will be in a position to make broader adjustments over a longer period of time.

- Innovations may be introduced initially to relatively small, selected elements of the force, as a foundation for further experimentation and experience, including experience gained from participation in any combat operations that occur in the future.

F. Placing bets and hedging against risks

- By selecting a number of promising areas of military competence we would build a portfolio of advantages the diversity of which would be a hedge against the uncertainty about the future value of each. We would try to place the most promising "bets," but not expect all to pay off.
- Defense managers will need to consider the possibility that a certain area of advantage is or could become unsustainable, and that the U.S. must look for substitutes elsewhere in its "portfolio."
- The real merit of preserving existing advantages (such as those we have in manned aircraft and large surface ships) runs the risk of cost-ineffective—or futile—efforts to preserve methods that new technologies (like supersonic, stealthy cruise missiles) may make obsolete.
- This will be a difficult analytical and political challenge.

G. Examples: Key areas of military advantage

What military competences would constitute a manageable "portfolio" to support sustained US superiority in power projection? This would require serious deliberation by the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD. But what has been said above suggests a notional first draft for such a portfolio:

1. **Aerial Warfare.** This is an area where we have a strong existing superiority in both our equipment and our training, which plays a central role both in power projection and in denying options for enemy power projection. US microelectronics and software skills facilitate sensor and communications improvements. Accurate enemy missiles targeted at US forward bases or carriers appear to be the chief means by which our advantage might be challenged. And,

absent innovations to extend our operating ranges, our effectiveness may also be undermined by the long distances characteristic of the Asian theater.

2. **Sea Control.** Both our ability to project and sustain power long distances, and our ability to deny enemies the ability to project power onto our soil depend in large measure on our success in controlling the seas. This is currently an area of strong US superiority, and the high cost of naval forces gives the wealthy US an advantage in preserving their entry barrier against large scale enemy power projection. Naval forces used for force projection are likely to face anti-access challenges including missiles, mines, and submarines, requiring innovations on our side (e.g., a greater reliance on the stealth of undersea systems) to retain our advantage.
3. **Space Operations.** The US is well ahead of other nations in making military use of space, and relies much more than others do on the contribution of space assets to military operations (e.g., communication, navigation, timing, sensors, and precision guidance using GPS). Space assets are well suited to a globally dispersed force such as ours. Opponents are unlikely to match these capabilities, but antisatellite threats will probably mandate innovations in our hardware or practices.
4. **Training.** This is a US superiority that we acquired at great cost after the Vietnam War. It manifests itself across many forms of warfighting, seems to draw to some extent on conducive US cultural traits, and is embodied in assets like the instrumented ranges at Nellis AFB and the Army's National Training Center. An important issue is the extent to which our practices could be effectively imitated by opponents who observe their effectiveness.
5. **Unmanned Systems.** For reasons mentioned earlier, this appears to be both a very promising area for military innovation in general, and one particularly suited to US concerns with protecting our own personnel, the benefits of enhanced ISR, and the need to operate in a wide range of environments. While it appears that unmanned systems will be important, it is difficult to foresee how exactly they will

be employed. Therefore a useful hedging strategy is to develop a broad-based competence in this area so that the nation can adapt quickly as new technologies and operational concepts emerge. Experimental units incorporating such systems could test and refine new concepts and capabilities in the field.

IV. Implementation

- A. Activities outside the portfolio.** The "portfolio" approach just described is not a comprehensive prescription for our forces and budgeting. We want to sustain and exploit our advantages, but we will need to perform some missions even where we face disadvantages.
- Indeed our dominance in conventional warfare and power projection will cause some of our most determined opponents to focus their efforts not on denying access to our projection forces or developing large scale projection forces of their own, but on short cuts that they think can circumvent our superiority: covert terrorist or missile attacks, perhaps using nuclear or biological weapons. While a continuing US superiority in power projection is a critical means by which these threats may be dissuaded, deterred, or preempted, there is no doubt that measures for the direct defense of US territory (including missile defense) will be a major claimant on resources.
 - Similarly, the example of Iraq reminds us that power projection for regime change creates a requirement for post-war "constabulary" forces. While such capabilities would probably not fit into the portfolio described here, DOD managers must certainly consider how the requirement can be met—whether by specialized forces, contributions of allies, or other approaches.
- B. Development of Analytic Concepts, Measures, and Expertise.** Implementing an advantage-based approach to strategic planning within DOD will require new analytic techniques and people trained to use them. This is likely to be a multi-year effort, perhaps on a scale similar to that associated with the rise of PPBS in the 1960s. Appropriate steps include a program of research at think tanks, war colleges, and

~~DRAFT CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/17150

T - L A


other institutions to develop a literature, set of practices, and trained practitioners; and changes to the curricula and faculty at the war colleges, Naval Postgraduate School, and elsewhere to emphasize this new approach to defense strategic planning. As new concepts develop and expertise grows, we will need to apply these to existing practices within DOD, that is, alter the planning guidance to reflect the emphasis on developing and maintaining areas of advantage rather than focusing on threats; focus the acquisition process on longer-term capabilities; and alter force sizing analysis and force selection processes to incorporate the new emphasis on developing strong positions in the areas identified in the portfolio. An advantage-based strategy should also inform changes in intelligence collection priorities, indicators and warnings, and other intelligence community products.

- C. Determining Areas to Include in the Portfolio.** Selecting areas of military competition to be included in the portfolio will not be easy. As a start, OSD might convene a study effort, together with senior officers from the military services, to identify those areas that seem to be most centrally related to our ability to retain the favorable position we have today. At the same time, top defense managers and senior officers ought to be considering new or emerging areas that will be important in future warfare. Here study will need to be complemented by a robust experimentation program, in which new technologies and concepts can be honestly explored and evaluated.
- D. Experimentation.** Innovative approaches to gaining or extending US advantages will need to be refined and tested before their role and merit will be clear. This requires field experimentation, including experimental military units that would adapt emerging technologies, field new systems, develop new operational concepts and methods of organizing, and engage in training exercises against existing forces and opposing forces that carefully study the culture and tactics of potential adversaries. Special efforts should be made to exploit the "natural experiments" that occur when US forces improvise and innovate in wartime, so that advantageous methods are incorporated into subsequent training and operational plans.

E. Focus more DoD attention on Asia. It would be useful to develop a broad base of military personnel well schooled in Asia, especially officers who understand the culture and history, speak the language, and have lived in and interacted with the people of Asian countries. In addition, curriculum changes in the war colleges and in training programs could improve understanding of Asia. The creation of additional military command infrastructure within Asia would allow more officers to serve there and experience the size and distances of the Asian region.

~~SECRET~~

June 23, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: CINCs

I wonder if I ought to try to have a separate meeting with the CINCs when they are in town. Not Giambastiani, Jones or Handy, because I have just seen them, but maybe PACOM, Abizaid, LaPorte and possibly Brown, and get their heads right.

Thanks.

DHR:db
062303-11

.....
Please respond by 6/25/03

U17691 /03

~~SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/17153

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

337

23 Jun 03

TAB A

10:21 AM

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: October 2, 2003

SUBJECT: *RC/AC**326*

We've got to make sure we manage the balancing between the RC and the AC very carefully and that we keep the right people posted on it. There could be some issues there.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
100203.26

Please respond by: _____

*10/14**2 Oct 03*

11-L-0559/OSD/17154

U17743 /03
Tab A

May 1, 2003 1:49 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
Jaymie Durnan

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Meeting re: DoD-State Relationship

I need to have a staff meeting and talk about the DoD-State Department relationship. Then I think I need to have a separate meeting with Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith and his top eight or ten people to talk about it.

Thanks

DHR:dh
050103-1

.....

Please respond by _____

U17749 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17155

093

1 May 03



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

October 10, 2003 1:06 p.m.

FOR: ~~SECRETARY OF DEFENSE~~

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Legislative Authorities (to overcome legal and fiscal impediments in Afghanistan/Iraq)

- You asked on September 9, 2003 to include legislative authorities we may need in order to overcome impediments to how we spend money when we pull the supplemental appropriations request together.
- Immediately upon receipt of your snowflake, the Joint Staff polled all of the Combatant Commands, including SOCOM and CENTCOM, and compiled a list of possible new legislative authorities. USD (Policy) also compiled a list.

10/24
GC - Yes. Thanks. D.H.
The USD (Comptroller), working closely with my office, reviewed the lists, determined that many of the items had already been included in the draft Supplemental that was then being finalized, and took action to add or amend language to address other requested authorities that were legally supportable and politically feasible at this time. (OMB was limiting the Supplemental to matters directly related to Iraq and Afghanistan.) TAB A contains a summary (and current legislative status) of authorities that were included in the President's Supplemental Request, and information on other authorities requested by CENTCOM and SOCOM.

Larry D. R. 10/24
• We ~~personally~~ advised both the Joint Staff and USD (Policy) to review the balance of the concepts on their lists, determine whether any of the new authorities might still be useful in the long-term, and submit new legislative proposals for inclusion in the FY 2005 DoD Legislation Program.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: LTC Michael Fucci (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/17156

U17757 / 03

C 10/15

110.01

10 Oct 03

Legislative Authorities for Supplemental

The formal supplemental request included the following, all of which address CENTCOM's and SOCOM's needs:

- \$1.4 billion of additional authority to reimburse countries providing support to U.S. military ops. (HAC mark includes \$1.3B; SAC mark includes \$1B)
- Increase Afghanistan Freedom Support Act drawdown authority by \$300 million. (HAC and SAC both increased by \$150M)
- Increased authority (\$500M) to carry out construction projects overseas to meet urgent military operational requirements of a temporary nature in connection with operations in Iraq or GWOT. (SAC included at \$150M level; HAC provided authority to use up to \$500M in O&M for this purpose – language that we have been negotiating with HAC staff)
- Lift and Sustain authority – authority to provide in kind support to coalition forces in Iraq (HAC and SAC both included)
- Train and Equip authority – authority to use up to \$200 million to train and equip foreign forces to for purpose of combating terrorism. (Both HAC and SAC included, although both limited to Iraq and Afghanistan, and HAC limited to \$100M)
- \$15 million increase in CIF (CINC Initiative Fund) authority. (Both HAC and SAC included.)

The following were also requested by CENTCOM and/or SOCOM in response to the Snowflake:

- Authorize replenishment of CERP program with DoD O&M funds. (Language passed informally to committees. We have discussed with committee staff and explained need for the provision)
- Authorize use of O&M for low level source operations, including cash payments and bartering. (SOCOM advised that we have an established practice in place, using EEE authority, that is recognized and supported by Congress, works well, and should not be tampered with)

- Airlift and Medivac of troops from Troop Contribution Nations (Covered by above authorities)
- Use of DoD O&M to support fielding of ANA (Covered by above authorities and Rice memo)
- Use of O&M to support PRTs in Afghanistan. (Funded in State portion of Supp.)
- Bailment of U.S. Military equipment to Coalition Forces (Covered by above authorities)
- Travel and Per Diem for Coalition Planning Groups. (Covered in FY04 Authorization Act)
- Greater simplification of Federal Acquisition Procedures. (To be worked as part of FY05 Legislative Program)
- Extend existing tax relief measures applicable to federal civilian employees to military and contractors (Currently covered in pending legislation)
- Reimburse humanitarian efforts from other countries (Covered by State Dept. authorities)
- Update rules on unit purchase thresholds. (Legislation not required)

10/14

CC-

(A)

Did we do any
of this?
D. R. R.

TAB A

534


C10/2

Cord rundown -
September 9, 2003
See tabs A150

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. John Abizaid
Doug Feith
Dov Zakheim

CC: Jim Haynes
Powell Moore
Pete Geren
LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Legislative Authorities

When we pull the supplemental appropriations request together, we must include whatever legislative authorities we need. Several times during my recent trip I heard from both the civilian and the military leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq that there are impediments to how we spend money.

We simply must go after those restrictions. It will involve the State Department, so we should get the right people involved early.

Thanks.

SIR,
CJCS response attached.
Dr Zakheim and Gen Abizaid
previously noted.
ur / COR Nozzeno
10.2

DHR:dh
090903-13

Please respond by 9/25/03
LY

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/17159

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TAB B

29 September 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: General Authorities Sought by Department of Defense in FY 04
Supplemental Appropriations Bill

1. Purpose. Provide information about general legislative authorities sought by the Department of Defense in the FY 2004 Supplemental Request for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM and NOBLE EAGLE (OIF, OEF and ONE).

2. Key Points

- On 17 September, the Department of Defense sent to Congress, through the OMB, a request for \$65.6 billion in FY 04 to finance incremental costs of OIF, OEF and ONE. The request also proposed "general provisions." A general provision in an appropriations act applies to one or more appropriations and may provide special legislative authority in addition to funding.
- Key Requested General Provisions
 - Drawdown. Increase the amount of Presidential drawdown authority under the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 from \$300 million to \$600 million.
 - Contingency Construction. Authorize transfer of \$500 million appropriated to Department of Defense into the contingency construction account to carry out projects not otherwise authorized by law. Continues requirement that temporary requirements formerly completed with O&M be funded with these contingency construction funds.
 - Intelligence Activities. Deem that funds appropriated for intelligence activities are specifically authorized by Congress for purposes of Sec 504 of the National Security Act of 1947.
 - Defense Cooperation Account. Authorize the Secretary of Defense to transfer amounts credited to the Defense Cooperation Account to other accounts consistent with the purposes of contributions.
 - Ill or Injured Service Members--Family Member Expenses. Continue existing travel and transportation allowances for family members of

Tab B

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

11-1L-0559/OSD/17160

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

ill or injured OIF, OEF and/or ONE Service members and augment with per diem to family members traveling to and from hospital and while at site during visits. Also authorize civilian attire suitable for wear by Service member during hospital stay and travel to home station (i.e., jogging outfits and sports shirts—not to exceed \$250).

- Imminent Danger Pay and Family Separation Allowance. Increase Imminent Danger Pay from \$150 to \$225 per month and increase Family Separation Allowance from \$100 to \$250.
- Hardship Duty Pay. Increase Hardship Duty Pay from \$300 to \$600 per month.
- Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF). Enable prudent management of the balance of the DERF, created by Congress in aftermath of the 11 Sept attacks and scheduled to expire 31 Oct 2003.
- Lift and Sustain Coalition Forces. Authorize use of O&M funds to provide supplies, services, transportation (including airlift and sealift) and other logistic support to coalition forces supporting military and stability operations in Iraq.
- Train, Equip and Assist Counter-Terrorist Forces. Authorize up to \$200 million of O&M to be used by the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence of SECSTATE, to provide assistance to military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and other friendly nearby regional nations to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and support US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- General Authorities Elsewhere in the Request. Though not styled as "general provisions," the following authorities are sought in the DOD request under individual appropriation headings:
 - CINC Initiative Fund. Authorize an additional \$15 million of Defense-Wide O&M (augmenting \$35 million requested for FY04) to be used for Iraq and Afghanistan-related initiatives.
 - Coalition Support. Authorize \$1.4 billion of Defense-Wide O&M for reimbursements of key cooperating nations for logistic and military support to US military operations.
 - Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA). Fund USEUCOM and USCENTCOM projects for Iraq, Afghanistan and related areas.

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- Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF). Fund the IFF that was created in the April 03 supplemental with an additional \$1.99 billion. Authorized transfer from IFF into military personnel, OHDACA, procurement, MilCon, Defense Health Program and working capital funds.

Prepared by: Mark Martins, LTC, USA
LC, OCJCS, (b)(6)

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

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TEL OCT -1 PM 5:27

✓
10/4

CM-1241-03
1 October 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

tab 119/30

2
Wm

SUBJECT: Legislative Authorities

- In response to your inquiry, provided is a summary (TAB B) of the DOD legislative authorities we have requested.
- There are additional authorities not in the supplemental (TAB C) that are still required. Of chief concern is the replenishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq and the creation of a similar program for use in Afghanistan.
- Two other concerns involve extending to Afghanistan the authority to transport and sustain coalition forces and seeking a full \$50M of authority for the CINC Initiative Fund.
- I am also greatly interested in seamlessly blending title 10 and title 22 authorities so that problems such as those in Afghanistan are solved.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Copy to:

OUSD(C)

OUSDP

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8:

(b)(6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ without attachments

U16228 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17163

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

29 September 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Legislative Authorities Required

1. Purpose. To respond to SecDef direction that the Department of Defense pursue legislative authorities in the FY04 emergency supplemental budget request to remove impediments to how the Department spends money.

2. Key Points

- Joint Staff Action in Reference to Snowflake/534
 - DJ-8 initiated a legislative authorities call to the combatant commanders and the J-code directors.
 - All combatant commander and J-director submissions were addressed to OSD (Comptroller) and OSD Office of General Counsel (OGC).
- Background
 - The Secretary of Defense desires broad authorities in this supplemental. The package submitted by the President and OMB to Congress reflects an approach targeted to specific, demonstrated requirements.
 - SecDef desire is mirrored by the CDRUSCENTCOM request that the WOT be resourced from a "single, ready source of funding." USCENTCOM also urges the creation of a DOD-led interagency task force dedicated to resourcing the WOT.
 - Although new authorities will not be granted if they are never requested, much work already done to obtain progressively more authority from Congress could be jeopardized by an over-strident or arguably unjustified push for broad measures.
- Summary
 - FY2004 emergency supplemental budget requests legislative authorities to match the wartime requirements for the fight against global terrorism.
 - FY2004 supplemental authorities provide a means to satisfy most combatant command WOT requests.

- FY2004 supplemental authorities ride on and flow from prior DOD success in adapting peacetime authorities to the WOT.
- The progressive approach to authorities, from the first post-9/11 emergency supplemental through two President's budgets and two subsequent supplementals, has produced significant gains.
- PB05 is the next iteration. A call for legislative proposals for PB05 was made last week.
- Combatant command authorities requests not satisfied in this supplemental fall into three categories: better addressed in other ways (pending legislation, etc.); substantially met by existing legislation; or already being considered by Authorization Committees with jurisdiction and would jeopardize the supplemental.
- In summary, FY04 supplemental authorities provide the combatant commanders most of what they want without risking a fight having significant downsides, but much work remains in seeking additional authorities.
- Exceptions. Six authority issues remain to be worked now and in subsequent submissions of legislative proposals. The first five of these are significant.
 - Replenishing CERP Accounts With O&M. The Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), currently funded with seized assets of the former Iraqi regime, provides tactical commanders with a flexible means to complete small reconstruction projects. **Ensure CERP continuity through the use of appropriated funds** because Iraqi seized assets are nearly exhausted. A program like CERP would also be invaluable in Afghanistan.
 - Title 22 versus Title 10 in Afghanistan. US Army training teams today do not accompany their Afghan National Army charges on operations because reporting for these two sources of funds is encumbering to the point of being disabling. **Policy changes within the Department of Defense could perhaps cure this problem.** However, rendering inoperative in Iraq and Afghanistan a title 22 prohibition on US trainers engaging in combat would ensure this prohibition no longer poses a risk to operations.
 - Lift and Sustain. The FY 2004 proposal restricts this authority to Iraq. **It should also include Afghanistan.** The proposal would fund coalition transportation and sustainment from O&M without any specific monetary ceiling. It could cover both countries easily. Including Afghanistan will provide a more straightforward and timely means of addressing matters that have proved troublesome to

USCENTCOM. A DJS memo to the USD(C) requesting this change has resulted in a reply request for additional justification. We need this authority to encourage potential coalition partners such as Bulgaria and Romania to join the effort in Afghanistan.

- Contingency Construction. **Broader authority requested** by the Joint Staff and OSD addresses many combatant command complaints of unresponsive military construction funding. Congressional staff indicate willingness to relax restrictions of FY03 Supplemental.
- Train and Equip. Introduced in both the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Service Committee, then reintroduced at Conference on the Authorization Bill and now introduced in a less flexible form in the supplemental; this **issue continues to be a worthy effort**.
- CINC Initiative Fund (CIF) Authority. **The supplemental request should be boosted by \$5M**. The request incorrectly presumed that the outcome of appropriations conference action on the FY04 President's Budget would be \$35M for CIF. In fact the outcome is \$30M. \$50M is needed for FY04 combatant command support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. A DJS memo to the USD(C) requesting this change has resulted in a reply request for additional justification. In the course of a year \$50M is the right level to accommodate unforeseen, emergent joint warfighting opportunities.

3. Recommendations

- Pursue methodical increases in authority in this supplemental.
- Continue the methodical approach in PB05
- Argue for above CERP, title 22 and title 10 adjustments, lift and sustain, contingency construction and train-equip authorities.

Prepared by: Rich Snead, CAPT, USN
PBAD, J-8, (b)(6)

TAB D


COORDINATION PAGE

OUSDC	Copy provided	23 September 2003
OGC	Copy provided	23 September 2003
OUSDP	Copy provided	23 September 2003
USCENTCOM	Copy provided	23 September 2003

October 27, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Ramadan

Attached is a paper of interest on Ramadan.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/10/03 E-mail on Ramadan in Iraq

DHR:dh
102703-2

.....
Please respond by _____

0003

27 Oct 03

U17895 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17168

Subject: for dr s: ramadan in iraq/public info campaign for iraq-my trip observations

Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2003 09:19:30 EDT

From: (b)(6)

To: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Ramadan in Iraq

Ramadan is one of the most holy of Muslim holidays, focusing on sacrifice and prayer. This sacrifice is manifested in almost daily visit to the Mosque and an increase in providing for their "poorer brethren." Ramadan this year begins on 26/27 October and ends o/a 24/26 November.

Ramadan is a period of increased religious observances, fasting and celebrations. The fasting for most citizens (above 5 years old, excluding the infirmed and very elderly) begin at daybreak and end at dark; not even water or tea are allowed. The fasting is followed by night-long dining celebrations with the last meal just before dawn. People will be out in the streets going to pray, to eat, to visit friends, to shop, etc. Therefore, curfews will be problematic.

In Iraq it will be the first time the various religious communities will be able to

observe this religious occasion openly without the constraints imposed by Saddam's regime.

RECOMMENDATION:

This also will be the first experience the majority of US/Coalition military on the ground in Iraq have with Ramadan, it is recommended that a booklet or factsheet on the history of Ramadan, its customs, expected changes in behavior of the citizens and instructions for the soldiers on how to react to (or participate in) various situations be prepared and distributed to all military personnel and contractor personnel in Iraq.

We would expect Ramadan to be celebrated somewhat differently this year in Iraq, especially in the South where in the past these celebrations were controlled by Saddam. This makes Coalition respect for and understanding of the importance and holiness of this first Ramadan for free Iraqis essential.

Because the fasting/celebrating cycle continues each day for 30 days, the population can become irritable during the day, and likely to be less disciplined at night. Thus, creating the potential for increased run-ins with coalition military. There will be less traffic and movement during the day and because celebrations are held with extended family and friends and run throughout the night, curfew violations will be more numerous. Military and contractors should expect increased tardiness or absences from their local employees.

It will be important for all coalition military to understand these customs and for the Command to determine new procedures/rules (or reinforce current procedures/regulations) for the military and the public. For example, it is considered extremely impolite and disrespectful to eat, drink or smoke in public during the day light hours of the fast.

CPA and the Command should know that the Government of Iraq under Saddam provided Ifar dinners/celebrations for the poor. It is important that food distribution take into account the traditions and timing of this holiday.

In addition to written materials for the military and contract employees, Public Service Announcements over available television and radio outlets, as well as printed media, outlining for the public "the regulations" for this time period will be important in preventing misunderstandings and possible tragedies. We recommend that these PSAs be done by members of the Governing Council or senior Iraqi law enforcement officials.

Where appropriate, it is recommended that coalition military work with local leadership officials so that coalition military can participate with the townspeople in these important holiday celebrations. The coalition military units may also wish to host some celebration dinners with the townspeople. However, the increased celebrations and gatherings will offer increased opportunities for terrorist activities.

PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN FOR IRAQ Observations from the Iraqi Public at Large

The following is a compilation of comments and insights shared by a cross section of Iraqi people-- men and women, professionals, academics, current and former officials, and ordinary citizens-- from various levels of Iraq's socio-economic sphere collected during my visit to Baghdad July 5-11.

This first section contains the strongest and most often repeated perspectives and ideas presented by my contacts. The Iraqi people are

11-L-0559/OSD/17169

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(b)(6)

MITRE/CASD-F10

OCT-20-2003 10:34

extremely confused and poorly informed about what is going on. They are not interested in listening to music, sports news or history. Our public relations campaign must be pro-active and truthful. It must target all segments of the Iraqi population, including Shia, Sunni, Kurd, victims, criminals, Ba'athist, normal people, and religious leaders. The battlefield has shifted to winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people and exposing the brainwashing and atrocities Saddam's regime inflicted during his years of rule.

Current sources of accurate information are limited and slow. Many rumors and much disinformation are floating around Baghdad and throughout Iraq. It is critical to provide accurate and up-to-date information about the situation in Iraq and plans for the future. This can easily be rectified by facilitating a public information campaign via radio, television, newspapers, and most importantly fliers, a common form of communications in country. Because of the electricity situation, all three forms of media are essential to spread this information.

The Iraqi people are extremely eager to hear official information instead of music or miscellaneous talk.

- 1) The people are eager to hear about the crimes of Saddam and his henchmen. Reading and showing official documents, including security documents, depicting these crimes would provide concrete evidence for the people of Iraq that crimes were committed and would go a long way to convince them of the criminal behavior of the past regime.
- 2) It is critical to provide the Iraqi people with information about the planning, operations, and updates on the progress of the OCPA, reconstruction, political process, and situation reports in the various sectors.
- 3) It is important to provide concrete information about the goals of the OCPA, not just to liberate the Iraqi people and develop a democracy.
- 4) Provide information about salary levels to reassure people of the future, to give people hope that they can one day live in a house that can be paid through a mortgage, will have an acceptable job with acceptable salaries and the ability to provide for their families.
- 5) Show the people what will be done in Iraq for the future. Using Eastern Europe as an example, explain how those people have advanced from almost nothing.
- 6) Give all Iraqi people hope. Tell Saddam's old colleagues they will live better and will be treated fairly if they stop fighting a losing battle.
- 7) Show the Iraqi people how northern Iraq has progressed in the recent past, the freedoms they enjoy, the higher standard of living, their sustainable political process, their level of organization and lack of chaos. The people in the rest of Iraq, unaware of the progress in the North, should be shown progress is possible, that their lives can and will get better.
- 8) It is extremely important to tell and show the Iraqi people what Saddam did to whole families, how he killed them, and why. Once again, the Iraqi people only hear rumors and know a few personal stories; thus it is important to show the full magnitude of Saddam's atrocities.
- 9) Explain Saddam's bad intentions, plots, and why and how he made the Iraqi people suffer in order to make them believe the UN embargo was the main cause for their suffering. Show that it was not the fault of the international community or the embargo, but Saddam who was to blame.
- 10) Weapons of mass destruction were owned and used by Saddam, a proven fact. So if you don't find them now, does that change anything or make Saddam a good man?

Indictment of Saddam as Criminal

It is critical for the United Nations to indict Saddam as a world criminal. This will provide the nail in the coffin and eliminate any notion in the minds of the Iraqi people that Saddam will regain power. If the Iraqi people see that the entire world now rejects Saddam, they will never allow him to come back to power. The Arab and Muslim states must declare publicly what they have said privately throughout all these years -- that Saddam is a criminal. He must be defamed publicly by the world community which should not be difficult to achieve once the evidence is prominently revealed. The UN should say he is a criminal, not the United States, and the OCPA must put all its effort to get such a resolution and it must be simple and clear.

The following are potential results of such an indictment:

1. Saddam will have no chance of thinking he might come back.
2. Saddam's men who are causing the current problems will realize Saddam is finished, give up and seek a new leader (the OCPA and new Iraqi government council) to follow.
3. The rest of the Iraqis will get over their fears that he might come back.

America's Intentions

Why did America come to Iraq? Most Iraqi people do not know for certain, but they do not believe that the U.S. came only to free Iraq from Saddam. They are told by all the Arab television channels and Saddam's men that the U.S. came to steal the oil and serve Israel.

The US must continue to tell them that Iraqi oil will be sold by Iraqis to any buyer who will pay the world price. All Saddam's oil clients were receiving oil for free or at severely reduced prices. Saddam was bribing them with oil to go against the U.S. The Iraqi people must be reassured and shown that the money gained from the sale of Iraqi oil will stay in Iraq and used for the betterment of Iraq.

Regarding Israel's safety, the U.S. wants to end the Middle East conflict with the help of the parties to the conflict and others in the region. The people of the Middle East should be pleased and hopeful in the future once the Iraq conflict is over. We should try, with the help of all Arabs and the Israelis, to make the Middle East an area where the people spend their wealth on the advancement of their countries instead of buying arms and building armies.

Saddam and men like him have spent trillions of dollars in the pretext of fighting Israel, but in fact it was only to keep themselves in power not to make their people happy and healthy. When this problem is over, the peoples of the Middle East will be much better off. The Palestinians are working to this end and the future will show that this is the only sound path.

We want to ensure that no young men of countries ruled by military and para-military governments will seek solutions by following terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden. We want the Middle East to be a part of the world, enjoying advances in agriculture, health, technology and learning in

11-L-0559/OSD/17170

cooperation.

Order and Safety in Iraq

The old police force consisted of corrupt and contented people who were serving their master because of the huge gains they realized from receiving bribes. Now this force will be more than willing to serve the new order provided they get the money they were making or more. We cannot have policemen taking bribes so they should be highly paid in order to stem this behavior and ensure they cooperate fully with the orders of the new government. They should do their job with the understanding that if they conduct themselves inappropriately or against the rules, they will lose their jobs. Former police chiefs should serve in the same areas where they live so they can better relate to the people. They know who the bad guys are and will keep their areas safe and orderly SO LONG AS they are paid ample salaries. During Saddam's time, policemen had a salary of \$3-4 per month, but they made more than \$100 per month from bribes. So unless the salaries are the equivalent of what the policemen previously made, including bribes, they will not be dedicated.

Members of the Iraqi police force will stand in line to serve and follow orders, allowing the OCPA to keep the soldiers in other more critical areas or out of harm's way. Saddam's men are looking for easy targets, don't give them a chance. Give the dirty job to the Iraqi police and support them with proper supervision, training, salaries, and helicopter surveillance in emergencies.

The Ba'athist Party

Party members are divided into multiple groups:

1. One percent (1%) are true believers;
2. Thirty (30%) became party men because they wanted to make a better life for themselves and were willing to do anything to advance themselves in the party. These were the bad guys who wrote reports on their friends and neighbors, who followed people, who enlisted in different militias, and were Saddam's eyes in every corner of the country. They were ready to do anything to please Saddam.
3. The rest of the Ba'athist are people who became members to be safe from the bad guys and live in peace. Teachers had to be Ba'athist, army officers had to become members, etc. What should be done with these people? There should be few problems with this third category. If they are paid well, respected and allowed to explain why they became Ba'athist, they will support the new Iraqi government. It is not hard to find this group of people as they will readily tell you they were Ba'athists, but no one will accuse them of doing bad things and they will be ready to sign such a statement.

What to do with the bad guys? It is unfortunate that many of these people are highly efficient and professional, and the country needs their services. They should be separated from the criminals who should have no part in public service and those who show promise in becoming part of the new Iraq and public service. Highly intelligent and well informed people should determine the separation between these types of Ba'athists. Those with promise should be given an opportunity.

Electricity and Water

This should be considered one of the highest priorities of the OCPA. Saddam is gaining sympathy because the people are suffering the most from the lack of water and electricity. His men are telling lies that the Americans are punishing the Iraqis because of a few resisters. The people should be informed of the truth via radio, television, newspaper, and airdropped leaflets, including blaming Saddam and his gang... Saddam blamed America for 35 years for every bad thing under the sun, so when his gang destroys a pipeline or electricity line, make it clear that Saddam and his followers are at fault. When a rumor spreads, tell the people it is a lie and let them know the truth, using airdropped leaflets to the utmost.

Pipeline Protection

The pipelines that carry Iraqi oil should be protected by dividing the pipe routes into zones. Each zone should be protected by the tribes who claim these zones as their land. Those who cooperate should be rewarded with respect and civil support for their areas rather than with direct cash assistance, and those who do not should be told in a direct manner that they will be held responsible and considered suspect if any damage occurs to the pipeline in their area.

The American Soldiers

They should not be asked to do too much. They are humans and standing in the sun day in and day out will adversely affect their morale and cause them to make poor decisions. Place 80% of them in air-conditioned safe places, give them good food and drink, and rotate them in and out to do the jobs they have to do. Enlist Iraqis, paid proper salaries, to stand in the sun and assist to the people. Iraqis should stand at the check points with proper supervision and patrol the streets. If the soldiers continue to try and do everything, they will get worn out and the Iraqis will feel less involved in the whole process. The Iraqis should do these jobs and take responsibility. They will be effective with the people because they can communicate better with them and would be afraid to lose jobs. US soldiers should be kept safe so Iraqis have a better chance of building a new Iraq. If Saddam and his followers want to harm the Americans, it must be made very difficult.

The River Boat Patrols

One source living on the Tigris river mentioned the American boat patrols passing by several times a day. Because the water level is low, the banks are higher, and the river passes in front of many un-populated and tree-lined areas unfriendly to coalition forces. He believes this is a dangerous mission, making US forces virtual sitting ducks. Given the revenge Saddam's backers are seeking having lost everything, they cannot be trusted. Until they are captured or converted, the boat patrols should be stopped or covered by helicopter surveillance to thwart the bad guys.

prepared: Sandra Charles
July 14, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/17171

October 27, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Visit to Iraq

333

Attached is a report by Congressman Amo Houghton on his visit to Iraq. Clearly, these visits are important.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/16/03 Houghton report on Iraq trip

DHR:dh
102703-6

.....
Please respond by _____

27 OCT 03

U17896 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17172

Friday 10/16/03

✓
10/27

I have just returned from Iraq as part of a Congressional delegation trying to assess Congress's part in its reconstruction. The bill is \$87 billion – a huge amount of money since I remember the total government expenses of one year in J.F. Kennedy's days in office were \$100 billion. The Army, the Iraqi Coalition government, the State Department, Paul Bremer – virtually everyone we met was solid, highly professional, focused people. Our problem, of course, is that Iraq now is a dysfunctional society, with every terrorist and his uncle out to undermine each and every effort to pull the country back into shape.

You would be so proud of our soldiers. Thanks to the Army (4th Infantry Division, 82nd and the 101st Airborne) we met many of the people from our district – privates, sergeants, 1st lieutenants, captains – they all are the best this country has to offer. You really “sweat your troops”, a British general told me, “and I hope you

appreciate them.” Well we do, yet it is a fierce burden they carry. The food is good, believe me; morale is high; but it is dangerous work and boiling hot. “The heat is not debilitating,” said Major General Petraeus (101st – 10th Mountain Divison), “it is crushing.”

We flew from Andrews Air Force Base in Washington to Kuwait City through Shannon, Ireland in a military plane. There were eight of us – 5 Republicans and 3 Democrats – a complementary, congenial, respecting bunch. Our base was Kuwait City. One night, because of plane difficulties, we slept in one of Uday Hussein’s palaces - huge place with not a stick of furniture. It had all been looted. So with Army chow, Army cots, and Army schedule, we went about our business of probing, listening, reacting, and probing again into the massive infrastructure that has evolved. Incidentally, while killing off two million of his own people, and reducing the National Health budget by 90%, Saddam

Hussein built over 140 palaces. I have traveled in Europe, and I've seen as a tourist, many palaces and castles. I've never seen the likes of these. No ordinary citizen was welcome. I'm told that in order to keep his whereabouts a secret, each night the chefs in all 140 palaces were ordered to prepare an evening meal in case he appeared. He was so conscious of security, that there were stories of eight large Mercedes limousines traveling along a road followed by a taxi – in which rode Mr. Hussein.

We flew into Baghdad in a large transport C-130. No windows, canvas belted seats, cavernous storage space, in which the first night out we rode literally, and at our feet, with three body bags draped with American flags. The flight pattern is so tight that these planes fly high into a "safe zone" and spiral down to land on the Army airfield.

We met British troops (mostly in the south). We saw Thai troops. There are 31 nations represented here. The most impressive were the Poles. "Why are you here?"

we asked one of the Polish officers at the briefing. He said "Look, we threw off a brutal dictatorship in 1989. We know what it's like to be under the heel of people who will do anything to stay in power. We wanted to help."

Blackhawk helicopters were our main source of transportation, although at times we drove through Baghdad proper with 20mm armed humvees stationed before and after our bus. We were safely home, luckily, when a car bomb exploded killing six and injuring forty people at the Baghdad Hotel.

The Baath party loyalists, the international soldiers of fortune will not accept the fact that most people, most Iraqis want a normal life. They are the carriers of chaos. These terrorists are now focusing on their own people, wantonly killing both ordinary citizens as well as those trying to piece together a government. If this whole thing works – meaning U.S. troops are out in 1½ to 2 years, with Iraqis taking over with their police, their

military, their elected government – it will be a first in the Middle East. All 22 Arab governments have never allowed their people to have elected representatives.

John Gardner, one of our country's greatest citizens, also a wise man, once said about this country (it could just as easily be applied to Iraq), "I see a society learning new ways as a baby learns to walk. He stands up, falls, stands again, falls and bangs his nose, cries, tries again and eventually walks."

We flew to Mosul on the northern edge of the country close to Syria. We traveled to Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's birthplace. It is part of what is referred to as the Sunni triangle. Ninety percent of the people there are Sunni Muslims. There are Kurds in the north; there is a smattering of other religions, but the major force is the Shiite Muslims. They are the main body of the population. The government will come primarily from them. Saddam Hussein, who is yet to be found, is a Sunni. In Kuwait

one of the ministers we met felt he was still in Iraq.

Rumors had it that he traveled to Russia, but they quietly asked him to leave - too hot a potato.

There are four issues Paul Bremer has in front of him every minute of the day. The first is "better security." The country is awash in Army, Iraqi police, other coalition forces - but the ability to murder, to blow up, to car bomb is still there. I am told that there is over one million tons of concealed ammunition in the country, as also are the parts, plans, and individual pieces of "weapons of mass destruction." Most of the country is at peace. Ninety percent of the attacks come in 5% of the country - which means around Baghdad.

The second is "essential services." All 22 universities are open, 95% of the schools - the Corps of Engineers and outside contractors have repaired or built 140 schools. We attended some of the classes. Children are children no matter when you meet them. These are

alert, decent kids who in the back of their minds, I'm sure, just want to get on with their lives.

The third issue is the "economic system." The Hussein years represented a tightly controlled "Stalin-like" economy. It is now the most open foreign investment climate in the area – with "0" tariffs, but as a spokesman said, the whole thing is like putting someone in a closet for twenty years – then suddenly opening the door and saying "you're free." What do you do when you are suddenly something you never were? And what foreign company wants to invest in such a dangerous area? The "economic issue," long-term, comes down to jobs. And the answer to jobs is the oil industry. If properly repaired and exploited, it could spit out enormous amounts of cash which then could create the jobs they need.

The fourth issue is "political reform." There are great programs in the making. General Petraeus of the 101st – 10th Mountain Division is as wiley and creative and

people sensitive a leader as you'll find. He is establishing election councils, area governments, the base for a constitution. No one asked him to do this. He's a General. He just did it. Eleven of the 25 top Iraqi coalition representatives remained in Iraq during the Hussein years; fourteen came back after the official war ended in May.

The bottom line is, like it or not, we have our reputation on the line. We cannot fail. We're in a race against time. We need patience; we need the international community. This whole business is a crap shoot, but from one who voted against the war, it is worth doing and is, over time, doable. Back to John Gardner – "What we have before us are some breathtaking opportunities disguised as insolvable problems."

Let's keep the faith.

May 1, 2003 3:48 PM

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Robin Raphel

When this Iraqi business is over, we might want to look at Robin Raphel. She is a career Foreign Service Officer who apparently doesn't have a slot in the Department of State. According to Jay Garner, she is doing a good job in Iraq.

Thanks

DHR:dh
050103-31

.....
Please respond by _____

U17943 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17181

B 21

08
5/20

May 1, 2003 3:34 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Oil Flow

Iraq

Please find out whether or not oil is currently flowing to Jordan or whether all oil out of Iraq is currently shut off. I need to know an answer, and I need to know it soon.

Thanks

DHR dh
050103-26

.....

Please respond by _____

U17944 /03

1 May 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17183

May 1, 2003 3:48 PM

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Gen. Jones

I have to figure out whether I think Jim Jones is being bold enough. I need to get a fix on it before he gets too far down the road. I need an in-depth briefing

Thanks

DHR:dh
050103-33

.....
Please respond by _____

U17949-1/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17184

ECOM

17/05/03

5/18 30

EF-5138 5/12

May 2, 2003 7:43 AM

TO: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Air Defense

Jaymie Dunn
5/4

log

Do you think Gen. Kadish and you ought to think about air defense for Iraq, possibly some version of Navy's air defense? Jay Garner suggested it.

Thanks

DHR:dh
050103-21

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Please respond by _____

MAY 13 2003

RESPONSE ATTACHED
5/12
VR

5 May 03

U17951 /03

05-06-03 07:31 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/17185

MAY 7 2003

DEFENSE

MAY 12 2003

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Received May 7, 2003

Mr. Secretary -

Ron Kadish and I
are looking now at
additional capabilities we
might want to field.
We will incorporate Iraq
into this, and brief
you in June, after the
NATO summit.

J. D. Cronch


May 2, 2003 4:00 PM

000.7

TO: Jay Garner

CC: Gen. Tom Franks
LTG John Abizaid
Larry Di Rita
Margaret Tutwiler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Press Articles

This is being dictated crossing the Atlantic. I have not had a chance to read them, but I am told there are a couple of miserable articles in the *New York Times* and *Financial Times*. I have issued a statement through Torie Clarke knocking them down, which is being put out at the Pentagon and the White House.

As you know from my personal visit with you, we all know you are doing a superb job, and we want you to continue doing a superb job.

I can well imagine that articles like that are notably unhelpful. I suppose that is the kind of mischief we have to live with.

In any event, know that you have the President's and my full confidence.

The following is the statement Torie put out:

Jay Garner is doing a truly outstanding job for the nation. Any suggestions to the contrary are flat untrue.

Donald Rumsfeld

DHR:dh
050203-8

2MAY03

U17952 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17187

May 2, 2003 1:01 PM

TO: ExecSec
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to former Senator Charles Percy

335 SD

ExecSec—please have the Writing Team type up the following letter to former Senator Chuck Percy, SOM it and send it out:

Dear Chuck,

Thanks so much for your thoughtful call. I received your message while crossing the Atlantic and do want you to know how much I appreciate it.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

DHR:dh
050203-1

.....
Please respond by _____

2 May 03

U17953 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17188

C5/2

May 2, 2003 1:38 PM

Australia

TO: Ryan Henry

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Australia's Role

What is happening with Australia's role with respect to the agricultural sector in Iraq? I would hope we give them an active role.

Thanks.

DFIR dh
050203-4

.....
Please respond by _____

Sec Def-

THE SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE AGRICULTURE MINISTRY IS AN AUSTRALIAN - TREVOR FLUGGE. MR. FLUGGE CURRENTLY IS A DIRECTOR OF A LARGE AGRICULTURAL COMPANY AND SITS ON SEVERAL ADVISORY BOARDS.

Ryan Henry

U17954 /03

2 MAY 03

May 2, 2003 4:34 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brits and U.S. National Disclosure Policy

I am going to assume you are going to pursue this issue of the U.S. national disclosure policy, which the Brits raised with you while I was gone. Prime Minister Blair raised it with me as well, so clearly they are interested.

UK

Thanks.

DHR:db
050203-12

.....
Please respond by _____

2 May 03

U17955 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17190

May 2, 2003 7:56 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Gen. CRaddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Police Work

Let's talk about the fact that Gen. McKiernan put all safety, de-mining, force protection and those types of activities under a single individual in the land forces command.

DHR:dh
050103-32

322

2 May 03

U17957 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17191

B41

May 2, 2003 7:56 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Engineering Competence

Please talk to Ray DuBois and find out how we can get the Corps of Engineers out of doing civil work and get them focused on military engineering.

In addition, should we consider merging the engineering competence in the Department—there are the SeaBees, folks in the Air Force, etc. Possibly they ought to be joint at this stage. If we are going to fight joint, there isn't any reason the engineering competence shouldn't be joint.

Any thoughts?

Thanks

DHR:dh
050103-30

.....

Please respond by _____

U17958 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17192

322

2 May 03

E 42

May 2, 2003 6:57 AM

OUTBOX
5/7

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Selecting Meetings on Foreign Visits

In the future when I travel, we ought to make sure we tell the ambassadors who I want to see and who I don't want to see.

Ambassadors tend to try to get me in to see everybody they want me to see, because it helps them. I don't mind helping them a little bit. But, when I am on a rushed trip, it is a waste of time to see people who are so far out of it that they no longer have influence in the government. When we see a cable from an ambassador saying he recommends we see A, B and C, we ought to use some judgment, rather than letting them just go do it.

33350

Thanks

DHR:dh
050103-17

.....
Please respond by _____

2 May 03

U17959 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17193

May 2, 2003 1:48 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Oral Histories

I have not read these oral histories. I did them back in 1994.

Please make a copy, give me back this original, and go through and edit it so that it is grammatically correct. Please put a check by things you think I may want to fix from a substantive standpoint.

Thanks.

Attach.
1994 SecDef oral histories

DHR:dh
050203-7

.....
Please respond by _____

314.7

2 May 03

U17960 /03

May 2, 2003 3:52 PM

TO: Rick Kisling
Syd Sullivan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

CC: *Jim Haynes*

SUBJECT: Private Use of Official Government Vehicle

I understand that you folks estimated the private use of the vehicle for the year.

Please make sure you include not just the door-to-door commute, but the non-business things, like going to church and functions that are not business-related, although there are not many of those.

Further, when you do it, make darn sure you do not underestimate. In the process of estimating, please round up, not down.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050203-9

.....
Please respond by _____

530

2 May 03

U17961 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17195

May 3, 2003 10:06 AM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Washington Times

7/12 MAY 2003
We have traveled - once, internationally, once domestically

Why doesn't the Washington Times ever travel on our trips?

Thanks.

Generally turn us down due to costs. T.C. 63350

DHR:dh
050303-1

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

TDR:
Answer @
Roundtable.
V/L

Jaymie Durnan
4/5

U17962 /03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY - 6 2003 May 3, 2003 10:09 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
 SUBJECT: Vernon Loeb Story

What did you think of the Vernon Loeb story in the Style section, with the photograph of the aircraft?

Thanks.

DHR JH
 050303-2

Please respond by 5/9/03

Sir:
 "Travel" stories
 are pretty standard
 fare for Cabinet
 officials. Could

have been much
 funnier and
 with more
 color. Many

people expressed
 amazement at
 the quieting
 schedule you
 keep T.C.

000750

3 May 03

U17963 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17197

May 3, 2003 10:21 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *LA Times* Op-ed

Please take a look at this op-ed from the *LA Times*. I think it merits a letter. Look at Bill Luti's information attached to the back.

Thanks.

Attach.

Turley, Jonathan. "Appetite for Authoritarianism Spawns an American Gulag," *Los Angeles Times*, May 2, 2003.

Note from Bill Luti

DHR:dh
050303-8

.....
Please respond by

~~5/4/03~~ 5/6/03

383.6

3 May 03

cc: DSD

U17964 /03

of U.N. headquarters in New York; it will come out of the ground in Iraq, as more and more factions join in the construction of a provisional government.

Tellingly, even the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq sent a delegation to the last meeting with Jay Garner, our proconsul in Baghdad. Even the Islamic radicals know the Pentagon is prepared to move with or without them. They know who's in charge. We need to keep it that way.

Los Angeles Times
May 2, 2003

47. Appetite For Authoritarianism Spawns An American Gulag

By Jonathan Turley

Last week, the United States confirmed it is holding children under the age of 16 at Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In keeping with the other shadowy facts about this camp, it is not clear how large the children's wing at Camp Delta has become. Before the Marine guards launch a Toys for Terrorist Tots campaign, it is time to get some answers about our government's plans for the growing number of detainees, including children, held in Cuba.

The camp's children are among 664 detainees from 42 countries. Some were captured in Afghanistan; others were rounded up elsewhere. Many have been held without trial for more than two years.

The Bush administration has argued that these detainees are not "people" under the Constitution but, rather, legal nonentities it may hold, release or even execute at its sole discretion. Recent reports indicate that the Justice Department has no intention of trying the vast majority of these prisoners. Rather, estimates on possible tribunal trials rarely exceed two dozen. The administration has simply

decided to hold hundreds of people without trial or judicial review at the president's whim. There is a term for that type of prison: gulag.

Although certainly tiny compared with Chinese or Soviet models, the facility operated by the U.S. can no longer be defined as a prison or even a military camp. It is an American gulag, holding hundreds of prisoners without trial or access to the courts. In fairness to the Soviets, it must be noted that at least their prisoners got sham trials. This makes Camp Delta an even more extreme variation on the gulag theme.

Camp Delta was originally justified as a holding area for alleged war criminals from the Afghanistan conflict. The administration now has broadened its use to include anyone whom it defines as a terrorist suspect or a person suspected of aiding or abetting terrorists. Of course, suspicion in the Bush administration is as good as a conviction because the vast majority will never be submitted to a tribunal, let alone a legitimate court of law.

Administration officials like Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft appear to covet the authority to hold individuals indefinitely. Ashcroft recently announced that legal immigrants would be held indefinitely based on a simple declaration that such confinement served national security. As for citizens, Ashcroft has previously claimed that he has the unilateral authority to declare U.S. citizens to be "enemy combatants" and to strip them of all constitutional rights — including access to the courts or counsel. Alternatively, Ashcroft is seeking new powers in Congress giving him the ability to strip people of citizenship, subjecting them to deportation or indefinite incarceration.

Camp Delta, the enemy combatant policy and the new alien policy are all examples of a certain appetite in the administration for the trappings

of authoritarian power. While the number of affected individuals remains relatively small, the taste for such unilateral power is clearly growing into a craving.

It is tempting to dismiss these measures as mere indulgences on the edges of society — akin to a frolic or fringe benefit for the autocratically inclined. Yet the construction of facilities like Camp Delta require the destruction of something irreplaceable in a nation of laws.

Ironically, Americans were appalled when Iraqi citizens looted their own national museum. Many asked how a people could destroy their own cultural treasures and history. Yet such looting is openly occurring in this country. As a relatively young nation, we have few gilded treasures like those from the Mesopotamian period. In fact, our greatest treasures tend to be documents, like the Bill of Rights, that define us as a nation. It is that legacy that is being looted and destroyed through the creation of places like Camp Delta.

Since his arrival, Ashcroft has rushed through the U.S. legal system with the same rampaging rage as a Baghdad looter, thoughtlessly shattering artifacts in looking for things of instant value. What remains are pieces of Americana, like the presumption of innocence and due process, that lay in shards after only a two-year period.

What is tragic is that, like the Iraq Museum looting, none of this was necessary or inevitable. If there was evidence that these detainees were terrorists or war criminals, they could have been handled in the very legal system that they sought to destroy. Instead, it is American hands that are pulling down that system and constructing a gulag in a new American image. Meanwhile, Congress remains silent.

Just as the military

watched as the Iraq Museum was plundered, Congress has adopted a pedestrian role concerning the this administration's excesses. The only preservation that appears to motivate our representatives is self-preservation.

Jonathan Turley is a law professor at George Washington Law School.

New York Times
May 2, 2003

48. A Long Way From Victory

As presidential spectacles go, it would be hard to surpass George Bush's triumphant "Top Gun" visit to the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln yesterday off the California coast. President Bush flew out to the giant aircraft carrier dressed in full fighter-pilot regalia as the "co-pilot" of a Navy warplane. After a dramatic landing on the compact deck — a new standard for high-risk presidential travel — Mr. Bush mingled with the ship's crew, then later welcomed home thousands of cheering sailors and aviators on the flight deck in a nationally televised address.

The scene will undoubtedly make for a potent campaign commercial next year. For now, though, the point was to declare an end to the combat phase of the war in Iraq and to commit the nation to the reconstruction of that shattered country. No fair-minded person would begrudge Mr. Bush and the crew members of the Abraham Lincoln this celebratory moment. America's armed forces performed courageously in Iraq, dislodging a brutal dictatorship in a swift, decisive campaign. They deserve the nation's thanks and a warm welcome home.

But as the president acknowledged, America's work in Iraq is far from done. If anything, securing a durable peace in Iraq will be harder than winning a military victory.

5/2

SECRET:

DOCTORS AT GITMO ESTIMATE THE AGES
OF THREE CHILDREN IN DETENTION AS:

1 UNDER 14 YRS OLD
2 UNDER 17 YRS OLD
3 TOTAL

- TREATED DIFFERENTLY THAN THE ADULTS:
 - LIVE IN A HOUSE
 - SLEEP IN REAL BEDS, REGULAR TOILET FACILITIES
 - UNDER CARE OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGISTS
 - SEPERATED FROM ADULT DETAINEES
- ALL THREE WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN
COMBAT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S.

Bill Lutz

May 3, 2003 11:24 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Video of *NewsHour*

Please get me a copy of the Thursday, May 1, *NewsHour* with Jim Lehrer television program.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050303-9

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

000,77

3 May 03

U17966 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17201

May 3, 2003 12:29 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Arafat

King Abdullah thinks that Mubarak is the person who keeps propping up Arafat.
We ought to develop a plan so we can go to work on Mubarak, so he doesn't do it again.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050303-10

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

EGJPT

May 03

CC: DSA

U17967 /03

~~SECRET~~

EF-7244
I-03/014581

October 20, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Saddam Hussein

The attached memo is addressed only to CPA; it is not also addressed to CENTCOM. If we capture Saddam Hussein, CENTCOM is just as important as Bremer.

Please have someone think through all the people who should receive it, correct the memo and send it back to me for signature.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/29/03 SecDef memo to USD(P) re: Saddam Hussein [092903-21]

10/15/03 Luti memo to SecDef re: Immediate Considerations

DHR:dh
102003-28

.....
Please respond by 10/24/03

Sir,

Revised memos
attached.

vr/CDR Noseny
10-22

10/22 2003

*Here
Phi-
Clear*

U17991 /03

~~SECRET~~

21-10-03 12:37 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/17203

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLAS

October 29, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tribes in Iraq

Attached is an interesting article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Baram, Anatzia. "Victory in Iraq, One Tribe at a Time," *New York Times*, October 28, 2003.

DHR:dh
102903-1

.....
Please respond by _____

U18015 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17204

Iraq

29 OCT 03

New York Times
October 28, 2003

Victory In Iraq, One Tribe At A Time

By Amatzia Baram

While we do not yet know who was responsible for the latest series of attacks across Iraq, there is no question that some of the bombings — including, American officials suspect, the missile attack on the hotel where Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was staying — were the work of forces loyal to Saddam Hussein. That these terrorists, mostly Sunni Muslims from the so-called Sunni Triangle northwest of Baghdad, retain a stubborn fealty to the former dictator seems to puzzle the coalition leadership. But it should not: their loyalty is rooted in part in centuries-old tribal kinship and religious identity. Only by understanding these ties and then using them to its advantage will the coalition authority reduce the resistance.

A letter earlier this month signed by Saddam Hussein and addressed to the sheiks of the Arab tribes in the Sunni Triangle insisted that Iraq "has been a poison" to the American soldiers and that "victory is near." It was one more sign that the former dictator understands that the tribal values of Iraq are ripe for exploitation.

But what works for Saddam Hussein can also be made to work against him. The coalition is eminently capable of winning over many tribes. An old saying in Iraq has it that you cannot buy a tribe, but you can certainly hire one.

And the nation's Sunni minority is open to offers. With Saddam Hussein's downfall, Sunnis, who make up only 15 percent of the population, were deprived of their long-standing political hegemony. The Sunnis from the triangle lost their prestigious and well-paying jobs in the armed forces and internal security apparatus. They were humiliated in the conflict and have had their homes and communities searched in its aftermath. Last but not least: they have been largely frozen out of the Governing Council and the senior bureaucracy.

The Sunni network was held together by a web of patronage, perks and favors that filtered down from the presidential palace to the tribal sheik to the "tribesman in the field." Of course, retribution played a role, too. Tribes were severely punished for transgressions (like refusing to abide by the whims of Baathist officials or allowing illicit traffic across borders without the dictator's permission), with the sheiks occasionally deposed and sometimes executed. In the south, whole villages were razed. But much more often the tribes were handsomely rewarded for cooperation — with money, weapons, state lands or even the property of rival clans.

While this network has been fractured, many of the older tenets of tribal life linger, and help to fuel the pattern of violence in the triangle today. Attacks on coalition troops should be viewed through the prism of tribal warfare. This is a world defined in large measure by avenging the blood of a relative (al-tha'r); demonstrating one's manly courage in battle (al-muruwwah); generally upholding one's manly honor (al-sharaf). For some of these young men, killing American soldiers is a political act, but it is also not unlike what hunting lions was to British colonial officers in 19th-century Africa: it involves a certain risk, but the reward is great.

Yes, religious fanaticism may also serve as a motivation, but in Iraq the rural tribes have generally been less inclined toward religious fanaticism than the city dwellers. The problem for the coalition is that religious fanaticism and tribal values are now working in the same direction. The coalition leaders must bear in mind that while the violence is endemic, it is not unstoppable — in large part, we are dealing with people who are open to persuasion.

Specifically, the Governing Council and its American supporters must come up with a coherent tribal policy. Certainly they can be excused for not having one — they've racked up many other achievements while focusing on more pressing problems. Moreover, the hesitation to give power to tribal leaders has been understandable: cultivating the tribes and the sheiks might be seen as a contradiction of the new leaders' stated goal of forming a democratic Iraqi civil society in a modern way. But to avoid increasing violence in the Sunni Triangle, there is a need to rethink that approach.

There are about 10 large tribal federations in central Iraq, but there are hundreds of subgroups, each with its own sheik. He is the leader of the people, and in return for his services — mediation, arbitration, attracting government services to the tribal area — he is respected and obeyed.

New efforts ought to be made to persuade the sheiks to assert their influence and help keep the peace. The easiest would simply be to hire the sheiks and their tribesmen — putting them on salaries and allowing them to spread the wealth among their people. In addition, sheiks in areas where coalition soldiers and oil pipelines are coming under frequent attacks should be told that the only way their tribes can receive luxuries — extra government services, construction aid, easy access to senior officials in Baghdad — is by making sure that there are no attacks against coalition soldiers in their domain.

If a sheik refused to cooperate, not only could his perks be withheld, they could be given to a neighboring sheik. This would eventually pit the uncooperative sheik against his own tribesmen, who would see that he was not serving their interests. If this weren't enough to get the sheik into line, it wouldn't be too difficult for the coalition to enact "regime change" on a small scale: almost every tribal leader has rivals within the group who covet his position.

For such a policy to be effective, however, it would require a deeper sense of local history. The coalition forces and the Governing Council (which is comprised largely of former exiles and urban Iraqis) must start sending civil officials to rural areas for extended periods so they can get a true picture of each region's tribal hierarchy and affairs. And while military units must be rotated, the civil officers should stay on, serving as social guides to the newly arrived units.

It is vital that the coalition officers develop close relationships with the sheiks and other influential figures in the tribes. These men will provide the coalition forces and the Iraqi government with the best information and advice. And the coalition authority should insist that the new Iraqi government set up a bureau for tribal affairs to serve as a repository for knowledge of the tribes and their traditions.

A policy giving special treatment to tribal leaders will have plenty of critics, in Iraq and in America. Yes, it would allow a degree of war-lordism. However, Iraq is not Afghanistan — these tribes are not miniature armies, and the Sunni Triangle is not surrounded by impassable mountains that make policing almost impossible. Most important, the central government in Iraq, with its foreign aid and eventual oil profits, will have far more to offer its tribespeople in terms of services and perks than does its Afghan counterpart.

- . In the Middle East, more often than not, tribes have been willing to give up a great degree of their autonomy in exchange for government services, and Iraq is no exception. The risk is worth taking.

Amatzia Baram is professor of Middle Eastern History at the University of Haifa in Israel and a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

Administration
& Management

INFO MEMO

OCT 29 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RAYMOND F. DUBOIS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT *Ray Dubois*

SUBJECT: Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

- Your October 27, 2003 snowflake at TAB A expresses your concern about and a call for action regarding the currency of DoD Directives.
- As program management responsibility for the publication of DoD issuances rests within my purview, Jim Haynes agrees that I would take the lead.
- In December 2002, I requested that the OSD Principal Staff Assistants conduct a review of those DoD issuances for which they were responsible and requested that they certify whether each issuance should be continued, revised or cancelled.
- Since that effort was limited to those issuances older than five years, and in view of your concerns about currency, I have gone back out to the PSAs asking them to review by November 21, 2003, all DoD Directives under their purview. This memo also notifies them that the mandatory review period for directives is being reduced from five years to two years in order to facilitate a systematic review process to maintain their currency. A copy of my memo is at TAB B.
- By the end of November, I intend to provide you an updated listing that reflects the PSA input. However, should you desire to have a list now of all 613 DoD Directives, I will certainly provide it to you.

COORDINATION: None

cc:

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
General Counsel
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. H.D. Neeley, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/17208

U18025 /03

A

11-L-0559/OSD/17209

✓
October 27, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Old Directives

I don't know if you were in the room when we found out that the SOLIC directive is dated 1995. It seems to me that you ought to set up a system where we review every directive that exists, listed by date and name, and let me look at it. I can select the ones I want to start having people review, so that we can get them up to date.

September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake. We owe it to ourselves. It may require getting some outside outfit like IDA to assist with a systematic review. I am sure there are a lot of directives.

Please let me know, and let's put some structure into this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102403-17

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/17210

B

11-L-0559/OSD/17211

B



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

OCT 29 2003

**Administration
& Management**

**MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION**

SUBJECT: Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

**Reference: DA&M Memorandum, "Mandatory Review of DoD Issuances for Currency,"
dated December 30, 2002.**

In the referenced memorandum, addressees were requested to certify the currency of all DoD issuances under their cognizance that were over five years old. Since that effort was initiated, the Secretary of Defense has noted out-of-date DoD Directives and has directed that they be reviewed and recertified for currency. He is concerned that the DoD Directives should reflect recent actions taken within the Department to respond to world events and the realignment of functions.

Because the Secretary has asked for a current listing of all directives, a timely review and certification of each directive (see attached list) is required by the responsible Principal Staff Assistant (PSA). Your response is requested by November 21, 2003, and shall indicate whether the listed directives are current, need revision or should be cancelled. Upon receipt and compilation of your input, this information will be provided to the Secretary.


For directives no longer current, proposed revisions should be processed through the DoD Directives System for signature by the Deputy Secretary of Defense within 90 days. Requests to cancel a directive should be processed within 45 days. The support and cooperation of coordinating officials are requested to ensure that these suspenses are met.

In order to facilitate implementation of a systematic review process for maintaining the currency of DoD Directives, the mandatory review period for directives in DoD Directive 5025.1, "DoD Directives System," will be reduced from five years to two years. This change is effective immediately and will be reflected in a forthcoming revision to that Directive.

11-L-0559/OSD/17213



Your certification of the listed directives should be provided to the Directives and Records Division, C&D, 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 501, Arlington, VA 22202. My action officer is Mr. H.D. Neeley, Chief, Directives and Records Division, who may be contacted at telephone (b)(6) or by e-mail at (b)(6)


Raymond F. DuBois
Director

Attachment:
As stated



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

OCT 29 2003

**Administration
& Management**

**MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION**

SUBJECT: Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

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
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11-L-0559/OSD/17215

Your certification of the listed directives should be provided to the Directives and Records Division, C&D, 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 501, Arlington, VA 22202. My action officer is Mr. H.D. Neeley, Chief, Directives and Records Division, who may be contacted at telephone (b)(6) or by e-mail at (b)(6)


Raymond F. DuBois
Director

Attachment:
As stated

October 27, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Old Directives

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September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake. We owe it to ourselves. It may require getting some outside outfit like IDA to assist with a systematic review. I am sure there are a lot of directives.

Please let me know, and let's put some structure into this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102403-17

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/17217

U18026 /03

300.8

2760703

October 29, 2003

OK

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: MoD Hoon

I talked to Geoff Hoon, the UK Defense Minister, today. He is going to try to see you when you are in London.

One thought he is going to mention, which I think is a good idea, is to possibly get together some of the commanders and share best techniques and practices around the country as to how to deal with the current problems there.

He also offered to assist with any kind of training or other things they might be able to help us with, so he is leaning forward and being cooperative.

Regards,

DHR:dh
102903-21

.....
Please respond by _____

29 Oct 03

U18098 . /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17218

October 29, 2003

Iraq

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Vaught Letter on Iraq

Attached is a letter from LTG James Vaught, retired.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/28/03 Vaught ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
102903-15

.....
Please respond by _____

29 Oct 03

U18099.1/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17219

Fax For LTG Craddock, Please Pass to Sec De-
Thank

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT

(U.S. ARMY RETIRED)

(b)(6)

BUSINESS PHONE/FAX (b)(6)

HOME PHONE (b)(6)

E-mail: (b)(6)

28 October 2003

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

The enemy foreign and domestic read your memo. They are turning up the heat to try to prove that the coalition, including friendly Iraqis, is losing the security and stability battle. I only know what the media and friends tell me. I have not been to Bagdad since the war. Establishing security and stability in Iraq and elsewhere may not be a "long hard Slog" if things are done right. Right now we must slog ahead. We have all the right tools. The challenge is to get our troops in the right places under determined qualified combat experienced leaders who have accumulated some wisdom. Not managers who are trying to be politically correct. Much of what we are trying to do in Iraq can be compared to a small boy standing in a bucket while trying to pick himself up with the handle.

Some thoughts from an old Soldier Veteran of three wars and other expeditions follows:

1. Recognize the fact that the terrorist have caused great losses other than 911- Add up the cost. Billions in the Airline Industry, billions to build security systems throughout the world. Diversion of large numbers of talented people into trying to decide where the enemy will strike next. Fact-no major damage since 911-Why? -very low organized terrorist capability and an alert public.
2. Ask President Bush to emphasize that the US must mobilize to win this war. We can't win a war while most of our citizens follow the good life. The DOD is carrying more than its share of the load. Why is Boing taking so long to build more CH-47? Why is Lockheed taking so long to build more AC-130 Gunships- Business as usual at home but not in Iraq.
3. Keep Rules of Engagement to none or absolute minimum. Just follow the Geneva Convention Rules. Commanders know how to fight and use common sense. They do not need a lot of rules their soldiers must recall and follow before they respond to a surprise attack.. Only those who have been in several fights should make the rules. Put the rule maker in the contest and they will understand or die.
4. National Intelligence:. Having been the beneficiary and the victim of our national system since 1945, it is clear that there have been and still are significant gaps in the system. Current law and traditions since the early sixties has enabled

Page 1

11-L-0559/OSD/17220

and sustained this structural problem which is that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA) is also the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Hence, we have the "Fox"-DCI guarding the hen house CIA. All national intel agencies are supposed to pass their products to the president thru the DCI. When there are multiple conflicting estimates about the same issue the DCI is supposed to resolve the contentions and pass one agreed report to the President and other authorized clients. Over time the CIA has been and still is the favored child. Accordingly, other members of the intel community believe their reports are wasted. hence leaks and wasted talent.

Recommendation: Select and appoint another person (former Cabinet Officer, Ambassador, Chairman of the JCS) As DCI, Give him tasking ability, over CIA, DIA and all others engaged in intelligence. This structure will help cure the problem and preclude another 911.

5. Stop worrying about political correctness. Do profiling. Why? It is much less expensive, takes fewer resources and will get the job done. It was Saudis, who attacked the US. Why did TSA agents make me take off my shoes when they knew I was a retired U.S. General officer? (Several TSA agents, former soldiers apologized and said we know this is stupid, but, these are the rules) Observation: Was this some more of Secretary Penata's politically correct stupidity?

6. Get all Clinton appointees, Senior civilians and reluctant General officers out of the policy and decision chain throughout the Government

7. Open Bagdad International Airport to commercial flights. Invite middle Eastern Countries to send their flights in first. Do some security escort planning (Have six or more armed Helicopters and an AC-130 gunship on patrol when commercial planes arrive and depart) Remember President Bush reopened, Reagan National when all the safe siders said don't do it.

8. Put more emphasis on capturing Bin Laden and Saddam. While their armies have been largely neutralized they are still a psychological threat symbol. Their capture by Muslims would be a big boost for all.

9. Stop playing two faced games with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Syria. All three are supporting both sides to some extent. Give them a choice, join and support the war against terrorism, no holding back, or we will neutralize them. Send a Special Presidential Envoy (High ranking military officer or Hard-Line ambassador to pass the message.)

10. Recognize and tell the world that Iraq is the worlds largest uninventoried ammo dump. Hence, it is easy for all enemies to obtain explosives to use in

making a variety of bombs, IED, demolitions and rockets. Tell the world where Saddam got them. (France, Germany, Russia and etc.) Ask the Iraqis to report and turn in all kinds of explosives. Pay rewards and get joint or only Iraqi officials to praise those who help. Set-up Boss-line-Hotline so Iraqi's can call in tips about security concerns and wrong doing.

11. Move the maximum number of Americans out of downtown Bagdad. Expand the Bagdad Airport base to a facility much like Long Binh was in Vietnam. Everything we did in Vietnam was not wrong. We just did not have a winning strategy.

12. Stop the "Fortress Mentality building walls, etc. Go on the offensive Terrorize the terrorist. Follow the principles of war with a new one, technology added. Please remember defense and bunker building are not principles of war or a part of a winning strategy. For 2000 years only those who followed the principals have won. We failed to follow them in Vietnam until Gen. Abrams got in charge. By then it was too late.

13. Establish random around the clock check points in highly contested area (This tactic was very effective in northern Ireland and Germany after WWII.)

14. Form a Counter-Terrorist cell in Washington. Bring in persons of all ages and backgrounds. Use the wisdom and the knowledge they bring. Remember, an old warrior coach just won the World Series.

15. Do a better job of training US Soldiers and Iraqis on how to cope with the current enemy. Bring in additional competent police officers from the US-Ireland and elsewhere to help. Hire more former Iraqi Soldiers and keep forming and using joint patrols.

16. Get 90% of all Strykers owned by the Army to Iraq and form joint constabulary patrols. Tanks and other tracked vehicles are not cost effective patrol vehicles.

17. Put a fixed wing STOL aircraft in the field to provide forward area logistic support for Army and Marine forces (A Modern Version of the Caribou used by the 1st Air Cav until they were transferred to the Air Force and left the forward area in the fall of 1967) We then had to use CH-47's, a more costly system, to do the job. If the Air Force doesn't want to fly Army logistic mission then provide planes to the Army and it will do the job (Fixed wing per-ton mile cost are much less than Helicopter cost.)

18. Get more snipers into the flight. Canvas the country. There are plenty of

retired and other profession snipers who can help. Snipers are very effective against terrorist. Remember Shugart in Mogadishu.

19. Follow the four "F's" in conducting counter terrorist operation.

- a. Find the enemy
- b. Fix them-surround isolate use intel, etc
- c. Fight them by developing a plan to neutralize them with a dynamic attack
- d. Finish them off, search the area, kill or capture all enemy element armed and others. Return area to local authority and depart. Optimally, use joint-combined arms team..

20. Creation of a Unified Command Center and Resources and Situation Awareness Center in the Pentagon is a great idea. Should have been done 20 years ago after I conducted the Iran Rescue Attempt. If the 911 damage to the Pentagon was corrected in one year why must the new Command Center take 2 years?

21. Get more return out of Army Helicopters. Most of the Army Aviation fleet flies less than 15 hours per month. Reduce the inventory and fly operations and training mission with Helicopters that fly up to 20 hours per day. Helicopters thrive and stay operational when flown daily. Left on the ramp and flown 15 hours per month is stupid. Could an equipment rental company survive with billions invested in equipment used less than 15 hours per month? Yes, we need contingency back-up but not the way we do it now. I am the "Godfather" of the 160th Avn. Regt the "Night Stalkers" where man "first in Army" Aviation feats have been achieved since the unit was activated in May 1980. The 160th knows how to get the most out of Helicopters. Our Army needs 5 pilots per seat for each Operational Aircraft (One in trained reserves, one in schools and three in the unit that flies the aircraft). Presently, the Army has less than two pilots per seat.

22. Get max # of Active Army Troops out of Korea soonest. Replace them with the National Guard and then withdraw the Guard after South Korea says it can conduct its own defense and win with precision weapons and other modern arms.


23. Enable selected Allies to learn how to use precision weapons. South Korea's Air Force can become proficient and with our intel and target planning system they can knock out North Korea's command and control and win.

24. Activate four Ranger Battalions, one for each Corps. This will create a Special Operations and Special Forces recruiting, support, and training base for future leaders. Get the spaces out of the Korean draw down.

Page 4

11-L-0559/OSD/17223

CC-CSA-USA
-G3 USA



11-L-0559/OSD/17223

October 31, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Krauthammer Article

Please fax the Krauthammer article in today's *Washington Post* to John Abizaid from me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103103-7

.....
Please respond by 10/31/03

U181047/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17224

IRAQ

31 OCT 03

Washington Post
October 31, 2003
Pg. 25

War By Car Bomb

By Charles Krauthammer

It is possible to win a counter guerrilla war. The British did so in Malaya in the 1950s. The United States may succeed in doing so in Iraq today. It is far more difficult, however, to defeat the car bomb. It is on the car bomb, therefore, that the Saddam Hussein loyalists' hope for victory rides.

The guerrilla war in Iraq is wearing and painful for Americans. The enemy plants the roadside bomb and succeeds with the occasional ambush. The losses are mounting. What makes success for the saboteurs still dubious, however, is that they do not represent a true guerrilla force. They are nothing like the successful Vietnamese, Chinese or Cuban guerrillas, who were, in Mao's famous phrase, "fish swimming in the sea of the people."

The Saddam loyalists swim in a small lake. They represent the deeply loathed Baathist regime, with just a small constituency at home -- bolstered by foreign terrorists who may speak for a general kind of Islamism but are no more loved by Iraqis than they were by the Afghans, who despised them.

There is no general uprising among the Iraqi people. On the contrary: 80 percent of the country is either Shiite or Kurd, for almost a century ruled and repressed by the Sunni Arab minority. Which is why most polls show a very substantial majority of Iraqis want the Americans and British to stay and are pleased with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

The resistance to the U.S. occupation is overwhelmingly Sunni Arab. But it represents only 15 percent to 20 percent of the Iraqi population. For 30 years, through their own Saddam Hussein, they used their power not just to rule but to rob. They gorged themselves on Iraq's oil wealth. Tikrit was a sleepy town before Saddam rose from it to Stalinist god-king and poured not only privilege, power and protection into Tikrit and onto Tikritis but vast amounts of money as well.

The Iraqi resistance, such as it is, is rooted in Sunni Baathists who have everything to lose if the Americans succeed. But it is precisely because they represent so small a minority that they are likely to fail, barring a collapse of American will at home.

Which is why the enemy has turned to the car bomb. The car bomb does not require a constituency. It does not require popular support. It requires only one person who knows explosives and another who is willing to drive and perhaps to die.

The car bomb is the nuclear weapon of guerrilla warfare. The 1983 car bomb attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Americans, drove the United States out of Lebanon. Commemorated here on its 20th anniversary just last week, it has long been celebrated by jihadists as proof of American weakness. But there was another car bomb in Beirut in the early 1980s that was just as significant. It is now largely forgotten in the West, but well-remembered by the Arabs.

It, too, had quasi-nuclear effect. In 1982 a car bomb blew up Phalange Party headquarters, killing Bashir Gemayel, the newly elected pro-Western, pro-American, pro-Israeli president.


Syria was deeply unhappy with him. The car bomb soon took care of business, wiping out an entire office building housing not just Gemayel but many top aides and government officials. It was the perfect political decapitation. With Gemayel gone, and a year later the Americans too, Lebanon inexorably fell into Syria's lap. It remains a Syrian colony.

Our enemies in Iraq have learned these lessons well. The car bomb of Oct. 12 was aimed at the Baghdad Hotel, housing not just large numbers of Americans but much of the provisional Iraqi government. It would have been the equivalent of the two Beirut bombings in one: a psychologically crushing massacre of Americans -- which would have sparked immediate debate at home about withdrawal -- and the instantaneous destruction of much of the pro-American government, a political decapitation that would have left very few Iraqis courageous enough to fill the vacuum.

The bomber failed. Most significantly, it was Iraqi police who assisted in shooting up the car at a relatively safe distance and thus preventing a catastrophe. The car bomb campaign has, however, continued with singular ferocity since. The war in Iraq now consists of a race: The United States is racing to build up Iraqi police and armed forces capable of taking over the country's security -- before the Saddam loyalists and their jihadist allies can produce that single, Beirut-like car bomb that so discourages Americans (and Iraqis) that we withdraw in disarray.

Who wins the race? If this president remains in power, the likelihood is that we do.

October 31, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Krauthammer Article

Please fax the Krauthammer article in today's *Washington Post* to John Abizaid from me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103103-7

.....
Please respond by 10/31/03

U181047/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17227

Washington Post
October 31, 2003
Pg. 25

War By Car Bomb

By Charles Krauthammer

It is possible to win a counter guerrilla war. The British did so in Malaya in the 1950s. The United States may succeed in doing so in Iraq today. It is far more difficult, however, to defeat the car bomb. It is on the car bomb, therefore, that the Saddam Hussein loyalists' hope for victory rides.

The guerrilla war in Iraq is wearing and painful for Americans. The enemy plants the roadside bomb and succeeds with the occasional ambush. The losses are mounting. What makes success for the saboteurs still dubious, however, is that they do not represent a true guerrilla force. They are nothing like the successful Vietnamese, Chinese or Cuban guerrillas, who were, in Mao's famous phrase, "fish swimming in the sea of the people."

The Saddam loyalists swim in a small lake. They represent the deeply loathed Baathist regime, with just a small constituency at home -- bolstered by foreign terrorists who may speak for a general kind of Islamism but are no more loved by Iraqis than they were by the Afghans, who despised them.

There is no general uprising among the Iraqi people. On the contrary: 80 percent of the country is either Shiite or Kurd, for almost a century ruled and repressed by the Sunni Arab minority. Which is why most polls show a very substantial majority of Iraqis want the Americans and British to stay and are pleased with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

The resistance to the U.S. occupation is overwhelmingly Sunni Arab. But it represents only 15 percent to 20 percent of the Iraqi population. For 30 years, through their own Saddam Hussein, they used their power not just to rule but to rob. They gorged themselves on Iraq's oil wealth. Tikrit was a sleepy town before Saddam rose from it to Stalinist god-king and poured not only privilege, power and protection into Tikrit and onto Tikritis but vast amounts of money as well.

The Iraqi resistance, such as it is, is rooted in Sunni Baathists who have everything to lose if the Americans succeed. But it is precisely because they represent so small a minority that they are likely to fail, barring a collapse of American will at home.

Which is why the enemy has turned to the car bomb. The car bomb does not require a constituency. It does not require popular support. It requires only one person who knows explosives and another who is willing to drive and perhaps to die.

The car bomb is the nuclear weapon of guerrilla warfare. The 1983 car bomb attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Americans, drove the United States out of Lebanon. Commemorated here on its 20th anniversary just last week, it has long been celebrated by jihadists as proof of American weakness. But there was another car bomb in Beirut in the early 1980s that was just as significant. It is now largely forgotten in the West, but well-remembered by the Arabs.

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Who wins the race? If this president remains in power, the likelihood is that we do.



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

0000

203 OCT 21 11 03 AM

INFO MEMO

October 20, 2003, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Food Stamp Usage in the 10th Mountain Division--SNOWFLAKE

- You asked (Tab A) how many people in the 10th Mountain division are on food stamps at any given time. Roughly 15.
- The Division, as with other installations, is unable to individually track this since requests are managed directly with county welfare offices. Those offices do not track by occupation of applicant. However, we can draw reasonable inferences:
 - First, we know from recent surveys that about 2.6 tenths of one percent of Army is eligible for food stamps. Applying that against the size of the Division generates a number of 30.
 - However, 17 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division presently receive the Family Subsistence Supplemental Allowance (FSSA) which we initiated in May 2001 to bring members above the "food stamp level."
- So we can *estimate* the number eligible for food stamps from past research, and we *know* the number who have accepted the FSSA to lift them above the food stamp level. What we do not know — but can estimate as above — is the number who do not request the FSSA (e.g., out of embarrassment) and would instead apply for food stamps directly.
- We will plan to undertake a matching of SSNs for those stationed at Fort Drum with automated "food stamp" files of the State of New York, although New York has chosen not to participate in past studies. But, we suspect the outcome would be consistent with past research (2.6 tenths of one percent of soldiers, as above).

Attachments:

As Stated

Prepared by: CDR Janet Florey, OSD(P&R)MPP/Comp (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/17230

U18109 03

SNOWFLAKE

DR. CHU FOR ACTION _____

ASSIGN ACTION TO REFP _____

SUSPENSE DATE BACK TO DR. CHU 10/18/03 _____

SUBJECT: FOOD STAMPS _____

Snowflake

September 23, 2003

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 9

SUBJECT: Food Stamps

I would like to know how many people in the 10th Mountain Division actually are on food stamps at any given time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092203-54

.....
Please respond by 10/16/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17232

2003 NOV 03 PM 1:15



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-1320-03

3 November 2003

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMy
10/31

*Mr Secretary,
The first time through
this we didn't spot any
redundant organizations.*

SUBJECT: Dual-, Triple- and Quadruple-Hatting of Military Officers

✓ R. Dick

- **Question.** You inquired (TAB A) about the practice of multi-hatting officers and if anyone had taken a good, hard look at this...if there are excessive, redundant organizations. Any thoughts?
- **Answer.** We multi-hat officers for a number of reasons, including economy of force, service or capability reachback, advocacy, task force assignments and treaty obligations. Will continue to work with the Chiefs and combatant commanders to ensure wise use of our people.
- **Analysis.** Multi-hatting is more often necessary, rather than desirable. I am continuously working with the Services and combatant commanders to streamline organizations and eliminate redundancies.
 - As an economy of force measure, we can multi-hat an officer in complementary billets. For example, Gen Eberhart is triple-hatted as Commander of USNORTHCOM, NORAD and USELEMNORAD. It makes sense that the commander who is responsible for defense of the homeland is also responsible for integrating the defense of North America through NORAD.
 - For capability reachback, the component commanders are dual hatted, functioning in operational roles and providing service functions. This design provides the command with capabilities inherent in the various Services.
 - For advocacy reasons, we sometimes recommend dual hatting. ADM Giambastiani has a new, additional hat as Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation. This dovetails into one of his established roles in USJFCOM as the joint force integrator and strengthens advocacy of transformational issues.
 - For missions of limited duration, we establish task forces. Lt Gen Sanchez is the V Corps Commander as well as CJTF-7 Commander in Iraq. Lt Gen Chandler is Commander, Alaskan Command, and would command JTF Alaska during a crisis. For example, JTF Alaska responded to the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill.
 - Treaty obligations often drive multi-hatting. Gen Jones serves as Commander of USEUCOM and Supreme Commander of NATO, allowing the flexibility to act unilaterally or multilaterally outside of the NATO structure while maintaining a key leadership role within the Alliance.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: MG Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/17233

U18215 /03

October 3, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu
Pete AldridgeFROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Dual-, Triple- and Quadruple-Hatting of Military Officials

Dick, I was asked to speak to John Handy's Air Mobility Command, and it reminded me that he is dual-hatted, as also Commander of TRANSCOM.

That reminded me further that almost every military officer I talk to has two, three or four hats.

I wonder about this practice. It is not done in business. It strikes me that the reason we do multiple-hatting is because we have multiple organizations and redundant organizations. I wonder if anyone has ever taken a good, hard look at this. I have a feeling that if asked an outside organization to look at everywhere there is multiple-hatting going on, we might very quickly find where there are excessive, redundant organizations.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100303-11

.....
Please respond by 12/31/03

Tab A

114L-0559/OSD/17234

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USA	COL Chapell	14 Oct
USN	R.S. Erskine	14 Oct
USMC	COL Van Dyke	14 Oct
USFK	COL Mancini	14 Oct
USEUCOM	CDR Taubitz	14 Oct
USJFCOM	Col Harrison	14 Oct
NORAD	Col Byrd	14 Oct
USPACOM	BGen Utterback	14 Oct
USSOUTHCOM	Lt Col Lay	14 Oct
USSOCOM	COL Montgomery	14 Oct
USSTRATCOM	CAPT Patton	14 Oct
USTRANSCOM	Col Espinal	14 Oct
OSD	Col Mayo	14 Oct

TAB A

560

October 3, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu
Pete AldridgeFROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Dual-, Triple- and Quadruple-Hatting of Military Officials

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Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100303-11

.....
Please respond by 10/31/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17236

Tab A
U18216 /03

211


3 OCT 03

TAB A

October 1, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

CC: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Guantanamo

I would appreciate it if you two would coordinate a serious look into the problem in Guantanamo Bay concerning the interrogators and the chaplains. We need a complete review of how we are recruiting, hiring, contracting for, vetting and overseeing and monitoring those folks.

Obviously, interrogators and chaplains are a logical point of entry for terrorists to subvert what we are trying to do. I know we don't use polygraphs, but I am curious to know the extent to which we monitor these folks to see that the interpreters are in fact interpreting accurately, for example.

Please send me a plan as to how you intend to go about it, and get back to me with an interim report in two weeks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100103-14

.....
Please respond by 10/17/03

383.6

1 OCT 03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/17237

U18217 03



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

630103
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 NOV -3 PM 1:30

JOHN P. MURTHA

Sen Sec R -

you'd be happy to know
the father of a Reservist
from the 402 civil affairs
Bn - Thanks so because
there has been some progress.

Specifically they have
been issued body armor.

Joe

U18218 /03

C/S/28

May 3, 2003 12:27 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Army on Defense Policy Board

334

Is there a retired Army person on the Policy Board? If not, I may want to put Jay Garner on when he comes back.

Thanks.

DHR:Jh
 050303-17

.....
 Please respond by 5/23/03

SD:

1. Gen (ret) Cisneros (USA)
 is no longer on the board.
 he retired for health reasons.
 Garner would be ideal.

2. Should we consider appointing
 him for Afghanistan? If so, U18272 103
 recommend we not let a lot
 of water pass between the two SD's signature + stat. 5/23

Exec Sec:

Need a
 list of
 people on
 DSB +
 service
 served,
 if any.

3 May 03

Jaymie Durnan

5/23

5/28

**Defense Policy Board
(As of May 2003)**

Members:

Dr. Kenneth Adelman	Senior Counselor, Edelman Public Relations
Honorable Richard Allen	Senior Counselor, APCO Worldwide
Dr. Martin Anderson	Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
Dr. Gary Becker	Professor, University of Chicago
Dr. Barry Blechman	President & Chairman, DFI International
Dr. Harold Brown	Counselor, CSIS Partner, Warburg Pincus & Co
Dr. Eliot Cohen	Professor, Johns Hopkins University
Ms. Devon Cross	President, Donors' Forum on International Affairs
Gen(Ret) Ron Fogleman	Chairman and CEO, Durango Aerospace, Inc
Honorable Thomas S. Foley	Partner, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP
Honorable Tillie Fowler	Partner, Holland & Knight LLP
Hon Newt Gingrich	CEO, The Gingrich Group
Mr. Gerald Hillman	Managing Director, Hillman Capital Group <i>Retiree 6/11</i>
GEN (Ret) Chuck Horner	Consultant and Author
Dr. Fred Ikle	Chairman of the Board, Telos Corporation and CMC Energy Services
ADM (Ret) David Jeremiah	President Technology Strategies & Alliances
Dr. Henry Kissinger	Chairman, Kissinger Associates, Inc
ADM (Ret) Bill Owens	Co-CEO and Vice Chairman, Teledesic LLC
Mr. Richard Perle	American Enterprise Institute Fellow
VP Dan Quayle	Investment Banker, International Consultant
Dr. Henry Rowen	Professor, Stanford University

Dr. James Schlesinger
GEN (Ret) Jack Sheehan

Senior Advisor, Lehman Brothers
Senior Vice President & Partner, Bechtel
International

for info - 1/1

Dr. Kiron Skinner

Assistant Professor, Carnegie Mellon University
and Research Fellow, Hoover Institution

Honorable Walter Slocombe

Member, Caplin & Drysdale

Dr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Guest Scholar, Brookings Institution

for info - 1/1

Dr. Ruth Wedgwood

Professor of International Law and Diplomacy and
Director of International Law and Organization,
Johns Hopkins University

Mr. Chris Williams

Partner, Johnston and Associates

Honorable Pete Wilson

Former Governor, California

Mr. Jim Woolsey

Partner, Booz Allen Hamilton

All Cases

May 3, 2003 1:15 PM

TO: Doug Feith
cc ~~DSD~~
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

SUBJECT: Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan

Afghanistan

✓ I want to know precisely what we are doing to help set up the ministry of defense in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050303-21

.....
Please respond by

5/12/03

~~_____~~:

3 May 03

U18274 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17242

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

✓ Cathy:

PLEASE schedule

Policy to produce a
brief for SD on Afghanistan

Next Steps + Long term

~~and~~ Strategy


v/p

Jaymie

U18274™/03

cc: LTG CRADDOCK

May 3, 2003 2:14 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Defense Science Board

334

Here is a response from Bill Schneider about what the Defense Science Board is doing. I wonder if you ought to circulate that to people, so people in the building know it and can take advantage of the information there. They have done some good work.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/22/02 Chairman, DSB response to SecDef re: DSB Task Forces

DHR:dh
050303-23

.....
Please respond by 5/16/03

3 May 03

U18277 /03

Snowflake

October 1, 2002 2:53 PM

TO: William Schneider, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DSB Projects

Would you please give me a paper that shows the following:

- Every project the Defense Science Board has completed in the last 20 months—the date it started and the date it was finished.
- Every project currently underway, with the date it was started and the date it is scheduled to be completed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100102-54

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY - 3 2003

.....
Please respond by 10/25/02

10/22

*Response attached
DHR*

11-L-0559/OSD/17245



DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

SECDEF HAS SEEN
MAY - 3 2003

INFORMATION MEMO

October 22, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Completed, Ongoing and Planned Defense Science Board Task Forces

- A list of completed DSB task forces is attached at TAB A in response to your 1 Oct 2002 snowflake concerning Board projects.
- Ongoing task forces are attached in TAB B. Of special note are several ongoing efforts which are being conducted in phases. These include the ongoing task forces on OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM Lessons Learned, Missile Defense, and the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs. In addition, a new task force on Joint Experimentation is in the process of being started which will use a multi-phase approach. In some situations the multi-phase approach has demonstrated advantages over the normal task force process, especially in maintaining the knowledge base of the members.
- Three task forces were co-sponsored by the Director, Central Intelligence. These efforts (Intelligence Needs for Homeland Defense, Interference Capabilities, and Intelligence in Support of the War on Terrorism) are proving very beneficial, and additional cooperation between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Defense Science Board is planned.
- A list of proposed task force topics is attached in TAB C.

RECOMMENDATION: Information only.

Attachments:
As stated

cc:
Pete Aldridge
Gen Craddock

Prepared by: CDR Brian Hughes/DSB (b)(6) October 21, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/17246

As of October 21, 2002

**Completed DSB Projects
February 2001 – October 2002**

TASK FORCE TITLE	Start Date (TOR Date)	Completion Date (Report Date)
Options for Acquisition of the Advanced Targeting Pod and Advanced Targeting FLIR Pod (ATP/ATFLIR)	Feb 2001	Feb 2001
Sustaining US Military Dominance	Feb 2001	Feb 2001
Protecting the Homeland: Executive Summary, 2000 Summer Study, Vol. I	Jan 2000	Feb 2001
Protecting the Homeland: Defensive Information Operations, 2000 Summer Study, Vol II	4 Jan 2000	Mar 2001
Future DoD Airborne High Frequency Radar Needs/Resources	27 Jun 2000	Apr 2001
More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden	18 Jun 1999	May 2001
Protecting the Homeland: Defensive Information Operations, 2000 Summer Study, Vol. II, Part 2, Annexes	4 Jan 2000	Jun 2001
Biological Defense	6 Apr 1999	Jun 2001
High Energy Laser Weapon Systems Applications	11 Oct 2000	Jun 2001
Protecting the Homeland: Unconventional Nuclear Warfare, 2000 Summer Study, Vol. III	Jul 2001	Jul 2001
Logistics Transformation II	26 Sep 2000	Aug 2001

TAB A

Protecting the Homeland: Defense Against Biological Weapons, Leveraging Advances in Biotechnology and Medical Informatics to Improve Homeland Biodefense Capabilities, 2000 Summer Study, Vol. IV	12 Mar 2000	Oct 2001
Managed Information Dissemination	5 Jan 2001	Oct 2001
Precision Targeting, 2001 Summer Study	12 Dec 2000	Dec 2001
Intelligence Needs for Homeland Defense (co-sponsored by DCI)	6 Oct 2000	Jan 2002
Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned, Phase I	14 Dec 2001	Apr 2002
Defense Science & Technology, 2001 Summer Study	14 Dec 2000	May 2002
Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned, Phase II Rules of Engagement	14 Dec 2001	Jul 2002
The Impact of e-Business on DoD Acquisition Processes	19 Dec 2000	Jul 2002
Vulnerability Assessment	10 Nov 2001	Dec 2001
Aircraft Carriers of the Future	6 Sep 2001	Oct 2002

On-Going DSB Projects

TASK FORCE	Start Date (TOR Date)	Estimated Completion Date
Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned, Phase II, 8 Issue Teams looking at Rules of Engagement; Improved Air-to-Ground Fires; Common Ground Picture/Blue Force Tracking Concepts; No-plan Planning & Unit Deployment; Next-generation Night Vision; Tactical SIGINT; UHF SATCOM; ISR Integration; GPS Jamming	14 Dec 2001	Dec 2002
Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned, Phase III, Review of Lessons Learned by Others	14 Dec 2001	On-going
Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned, Phase IV, Application to Future Operations	14 Dec 2001	On-going
Chemical Warfare Defense	2 Jan 2001	Dec 2002
Training For Future Conflict	12 Dec 2000 revised scope 21 Sep 2001	Dec 2002
Discriminant Use of Force	19 Mar 2002	Feb 2003
Intelligence in Support of the War Against Terrorism (co-sponsored by DCI)	10 Jan 2002 revised scope 12 Jun 2002	Mar 2003
Defense Against Unconventional Use of Nuclear Weapons Against the U.S.	9 Apr 2002	Dec 2002
Homeland Defense Against Bio Terrorism (formerly, Defense Against Terrorists' Use of Biological Weapons)	6 Dec 01 revised scope 25 Mar 2002	Nov 2003

TAB B

TASK FORCE	Start Date (TOR Date)	Estimated Completion Date
Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities	14 Feb 2002	Mar 2003
Wideband RadioFrequency Systems	28 May 2002	Dec 2002
UXO	26 Sep 2002	Interim: Jan 2003 Final: Jul 2003
Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (multi-phases)	2 Aug 2002	Interim: Sep 2002 Final: Feb 2003 Follow-on: TBD
B-52 Re-engining	26 Jun 2002	Nov 2002
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs)	15 Jul 2002	Interim: Oct 2002 Final: Jan 2003
Seabasing	4 Sep 2002	Jun 2003
Smallpox Vaccine Down Select	2 Oct 2002	Mar 2003
Exploiting Technology to Transform Military Manpower	4 Oct 2002	Jul 2003
Missile Defense (multi-phases)	30 Nov 2001	On-going
Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism	2 Jan 2002	Nov 2003
Interference Capabilities (co-sponsored by DCI)	26 Jun 2002	Jan 2003

Planned DSB Projects (Task Forces)

PLANNED TASK FORCE	Projected Start Date	Projected Completion Date
Joint Experimentation – Phase I	Oct 2003	Jan 2003
Enabling Joint Force Capabilities	Nov 2002	Jun 2003
Identification Technologies	Nov 2002	July 2003
Alliance Issues	FY2003	TBD
Information Operations	FY2003	TBD
Stockpile Stewardship/Certification	FY2003	TBD
Urban Warfare	FY2003	TBD
Technologies for DoD Transformation	FY2003	TBD
Tactical Precision Targeting/Close Air Support (CAS) for Ground Forces	Jan 2003	Aug 2003
Knowledge Management	FY2003	TBD
Training for Joint Forces	FY2003	Oct 2003
Intelligence Ends vs. Means	FY2003	TBD
2003 SUMMER STUDY TOPICS		
Future Conventional and Nuclear Strategic Strike	Jan 2003	Aug 2003
DoD Role In Homeland Defense	Jan 2003	Aug 2003

TABC

May 3, 2003 3:22 PM

000.7

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get a copy of this cartoon.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/2/03 Baltimore Sun cartoon

DHR:dh
050303-26

.....

Please respond by 6/2/03

U18278 /03

3 MAY 03

OWEN V. FRISBY
PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSULTANT
FOUR OLD STAGE COURT
ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20852

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Page 14A : Friday, May 2, 2003 : The Sun

THE SUN

DENISE E. PALMER
Publisher and CEO

DIANNE DONOVAN
Editorial Page Editor

WILL ENGLEND
Associate Editor

JEAN E. THOMPSON
Associate Editor



DNE

May 3, 2003 10:11 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Transcript

- ATTACHED.
- DH

000.75D

Please see if we have a transcript of the press briefing Geoff Hoon and I did at the airport. I would like to re-read the question by John Snow and my answer.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050303-3

.....
Please respond by _____

3MAY03

U182795/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17254

Updated 02 May 2003



United States Department of Defense

News Transcript

On the web: <http://dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030502-secdef0145.html>

Media contact: media@dod.mil or +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact: public@dod.mil or +1 (703) 428-0711

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Friday, May 2, 2003 - 9:03 a.m. EDT

Secretary Rumsfeld Joint Media Availability with British Secretary of State for Defence

(Joint media availability with Geoffrey Hoon, secretary of state for defence, United Kingdom.)

Hoon: I apologize for keeping you waiting.

We had extremely good discussions earlier, with the prime minister, and again today covering, obviously, the situation in Iraq, particularly the need for reconstruction and rebuilding there and the close cooperation that exists between our armed forces. We've also touched upon Afghanistan and the need for a continuing effort there, as well as, obviously, the wider political situation in the region. Obviously, Donald has recently returned; I was there the week before.

Rumsfeld: I have nothing to add, except that -- to say that two days ago I had the privilege of visiting the U.K. forces that are in the Basra area and had a chance to thank them personally for the superb job they've done in helping to liberate the Iraqi people.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us the role now that you expect Paul Bremer to fill in the reconstruction program for Iraq? And does this reflect some unhappiness on the part of the administration with General Garner's efforts?

Rumsfeld: There are two things I'd say. One is, there is not only no unhappiness with respect to General Jay Garner, there is a great deal of pleasure in the fact that this man has undertaken and performed superbly for our country and for the coalition.

And with respect to Mr. Bremer, there have been no announcements made by the White House on that subject, to my knowledge.

Q: Do you -- (Off mike.)

Rumsfeld: I could, but I won't.

Hoon: John?

Q: Mr. Secretary, given the intimacy of your own involvement in the planning of this war,

what role did you have in the decision to protect the Oil Ministry but not the hospitals and not the national museum of Baghdad? And could I also ask you, given that the --

Rumsfeld: Let's do them one at a time.

Q: Yeah.

Rumsfeld: With respect to the question, the question assumes that such a decision was made. And I think that premise is very likely inaccurate.

The reality is that the commanders on the ground -- in this case, the land component commander -- has the responsibility for making those kinds of judgments. The air component commanders took great care to protect important sites, including museums and various other areas, hospitals, and innocent civilians. And I suspect there has never been a more precise campaign than the one that was just executed in Iraq.

The people on the ground have the responsibility for making judgments about force protection. Their first responsibility is to win in the conflict. And they went about their business, in my view, in an excellent manner.

Q: But Mr. Secretary, it really does seem curious, then, that the oil ministry was so successfully protected and the hospitals so unsuccessfully.

But the main -- other question I wanted to ask you was about the president's declaration that combat is over. Given that, would it not be now the right time to go for some semblance of legality and involve the United Nations in the very necessary nation-building that now has to take place?

Rumsfeld: Your questions have about eight or 10 opinions wrapped in them. I notice. The president did not say what you said he said. The president said that we have moved from a period of major military conflict to a period of stabilization. It is never this way or that way completely. There will continue to be pockets of resistance, there will continue to be people killed, as there have been killed and wounded in recent days, unfortunately. The activities of the coalition forces, despite your question, were, in fact, legal. And your contention that it requires something else to have some semblance of legality is incorrect. The coalition forces have been in contact through the foreign ministries with the United Nations and the secretary-general. And I suspect that there will be, over the coming period, intensive discussions as to what role the United Nations may or may not wish to play. Personally, I'm hopeful that they do play a role.

Hoon: Can I just answer that, John? What we're doing in Iraq is entirely lawful. It's covered by The Hague and Geneva Conventions, and it's perfectly proper and perfectly lawful.

Charlie?

Q: Mr. Secretary, Mr. Minister, Charlie Aldinger with Reuters. Saddam is gone, the war has gone on for eight weeks now. You've found no chemical or biological weapons. You both said

that this could be a long task to do so. Having said that, is it essential that you find such weapons and prove that he, in fact, had them when the war started, as you charged?

Hoon: Well, we've always made clear that the effort to locate and precisely identify weapons of mass destruction would take some time. We were well aware in the course of the U.N. inspections of the determined efforts by the regime to dismantle a weapon, to scatter them around Iraq, to hide them. And obviously, it will take time, not least now that we have the cooperation of certain individuals involved in those programs, that we can anticipate that success. But it's an effort that is continuing as we speak.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is it essential that you find such weapons and prove that he had them, as you charge, when the war started?

Rumsfeld: I think the minister responded correctly.

Q: Mr. Secretary, and Prime Minister, may I ask a general question of what's next now --

Rumsfeld: Why don't we do them to one or the other, rather than multiple questions to each? And then we can adjourn and let everyone go back.

Hoon: Richard?

Q: Can I ask both Defense secretaries about a stabilization --

Rumsfeld: Both, you said?

Q: Both.

Rumsfeld: Why don't we try one or the other and do one question, and then we can let a few other people answer questions.

Q: (Inaudible.) -- about a stabilization force in Iraq and how many forces, U.S. and/or British, will be in Iraq and for how long?

Rumsfeld: Oh, I can respond for the United States portion. We don't know. Indeed, it's not knowable. What we do know is we'll have as many forces in the country as is necessary to see that it is a sufficiently secure and permissive environment so that the humanitarian and reconstruction work can go forward, and so that the Iraqi people can fashion some sort of an interim governmental authority and then, ultimately, a final authority.

The numbers that it will require would depend on so many variables that have yet to be determined. In terms of the number of U.S. forces, that one other variable is how many other countries will be coming in to participate. And certainly we hope that it's a very broad coalition. There were some 65 nations involved in the Operation Iraqi Freedom. Minister Hoon had a meeting this week where -- I don't know, how many came?

Hoon: Sixteen.

Rumsfeld: Sixteen countries came and discussed what role they might play. Other meetings of that type are going to be held. And, of course, the larger number of countries that participate, the fewer number of forces from the United States will be necessary.

Q: Mr. Minister, what are your thoughts on the fate of Saddam Hussein?

Hoon: We are continuing to look for all of those who were engaged in what we judged to be criminal activities on behalf of the regime. Determined efforts are being made right across Iraq to bring them to account, and those efforts will go on until we locate each and every one of them.

Q: Do you believe Saddam Hussein is alive?

Hoon: I do not know. But certainly we will continue our investigations to either prove that he is dead or that he can be brought to account.

Q: Mr. Rumsfeld, if --

Rumsfeld: I'll tell you what I'm going to do, folks. I'll take one more question, and then I'm going to pack up this group and head back to the United States after being gone for a week.

Q: (Off mike.) --

Rumsfeld: -- after being gone for a week. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Let me get two more questions. You, and the lady in front of you.

Q: If, as you have declared, the war-fighting is over in Iraq --

Rumsfeld: Major military combat activity is over.

Q: However you want to phrase it.

Rumsfeld: Well, that's how we did phrase it. And that's how the president phrased it, also.

Q: Absolutely. How do you move on from here? Is there anywhere else that is next on your list in the international war against terrorism? I'm thinking perhaps Syria or other places?

Rumsfeld: You say "however you want to phrase it." I think it's important how it is phrased. And the reason I say that is because it would be a terrible mistake to think that Iraq is a fully secure, fully pacified environment. It is not. It is dangerous. There are people who are rolling hand grenades into compounds. There are people that are shooting people. And it's not finished. So we ought not to leave the world with the impression that it is.

With respect to your other question, the global war on terrorism is a serious battle that the free people of the world have to face. And there is no question but that there are terrorist networks. And I must say that I feel that the -- I've forgotten how many countries it is now that are participating in the global war on terrorism, but the sharing of intelligence and the pressure that

has been put on terrorism networks has been increasingly successful. That does not mean there won't be additional terrorist attacks. I'm afraid that the reality is there could very well be. But the number of terrorist -- al Qaeda terrorist planners, for example, that have been scooped up in recent months is growing, and it's making it more difficult -- they're having more difficulty raising money. They're having more difficulty moving between countries. They're having more difficulty attracting and retaining terrorists. So I think that the task for free people is to keep working the problem, and that clearly is what's in front of us.

Thank you very much.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Rumsfeld: Last question.

Q: I wanted to ask a general question also to you and both the prime minister. Now that --

Rumsfeld: I'll let you (have it?).

Q: I wanted to get a sense of what is next. What do you see ahead now, both in Iraq and Afghanistan? A general just setting the stage for the what's next.

Hoon: Well, we have to continue our efforts to rebuild both countries. They both have to be restored as cooperative members of the international community. The effort has to be continued in Afghanistan, where it's more advanced. But obviously, we are optimistic, as well, with our efforts, speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom, in the south of Iraq; that we can see a way forward. We've got a significant presence on the ground, British troops working closely with local members of each of the communities that we are responsible for. We have joint meetings between the military and local leaders. They are saying what kind of changes, what kind of improvements in their physical infrastructure they want to see. We're engaged in delivering that. There's great progress there, and from what I saw when I was in Umm Qasr and Basra, we are right to be optimistic about the way forward.

Q: Mr. Secretary, also --

Rumsfeld: (Wait, wait?). We had two final questions. We really do have to --

Hoon: Thank you all very much, indeed.

Rumsfeld: Thank you very much.

Hoon: Thank you.

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<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030502-secdef0145.html>

May 3, 2003 10:14 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get this cartoon by Catalino.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/17/03 *Washington Times*, p. A19

DHR:dh
050303-4

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

U18280 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17261

000.7

3 MAY 03

gering angst . . . new appreciation



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st on everyone. Ali
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AP that, "We discov-
it the Iraqi informa-
was saying was all
he added, "Now no
-Jazeera anymore."
of Al-Jazeera, one of
Dima Khatib, was
King if the joyful
o American soldiers
er. Her answer: "Yes,
ery surprised. . . . A
gues also were sur-
rprised all over
Everyone thought
not receiving the
British with smiles
Actually, I think the

people who were the most surprised
are those mothers and wives of men
who lost their lives who are from
Syria or Lebanon or Egypt or Tunisia
or other Arab countries who actually
went to Iraq and volunteered to de-
fend the Iraqi people and then, when
they saw the reaction of the Iraqi
people, they were disappointed in a
way because they, well, we thought
we sent our men to defend the Iraqi
people and look at them — they are
actually very welcoming to the
Americans and the Brits."

Those pictures of Iraqis throwing
flowers at American and British sol-
diers will not remake the region
overnight. But a giant step has been
taken toward peace and freedom.

*Mona Charen is a nationally syndi-
cated columnist and the author of
the best-selling book "Useful Idiots,"
released by Regnery Publishing.*

"History will record a
great American president who finally up-
held what America
stands for: liberty for all . . ."

Gracious sakes, who would write
in that vein to the New York Times?
Some doddering Republican
precinct chairman in Petal, Miss.?

The Dick Cheney family's assis-
tant chauffeur? Not — surely not —
an Arab? But, yes, Sami Assadi, a
self-identified member of the Arab
diaspora, felt led to express his de-
light at the president's leadership,
given "what is evolving in front of
our eyes." He wanted likewise to
register his weariness at being "pa-
tronized by Western leaders who
have supported brutal regimes in
the Middle East that keep the
Arabs down . . ."

Those would be leaders of a dif-
ferent stripe than the U.S. presi-
dent who initiated, and is methodi-

cally pressing, the campaign for
Iraq's liberation.

Sami Assadi has paid his own trib-
ute. It is time many more of us
chimed in. Hooray for George W.
Bush, a president who did what he
had to do and did it right.

The armed forces did the fighting.
The Pentagon laid the plans. Coun-
selors of all sorts put in all sorts of
oars. Nonetheless, the thing could
not have worked absent the stead-
iness and resolve of the commander
in chief himself — this so-called
Yale frat boy, hungering, suppos-
edly, to be as big a man as Daddy. If
Yale frat boys, collectively, perform
with the signal decisiveness of
Brother George, the U.S. govern-
ment should scoop them up the in-
stant they graduate.

As war leader, George W. Bush
has performed — is performing —
magnificently. It puts one in mind of
many things, such as the capacity of

May 3, 2003 10:17 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cartoon

000.7

If I have not already asked, please see if you can get these two cartoons for me.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cartoons

DHR:dh
050303-6

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

U18281 /03


3MAY03



Chicago Tribune

WEDNESDAY APRIL 16, 2003

MARLETTE © 2003
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT
daily.marlette.com



"THE WAR IS WINDING DOWN TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION WITH A FEW
SCATTERED POCKETS OF RESISTANCE..."



Daily Herald 4-16-03

www.caglecartoons.com Mike Keefe THE DENVER POST 2003

May 3, 2003 10:16 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get this cartoon by Gamer.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/1603 *Washington Times*, p. A18

DHR:dh
050303-5

.....
Please respond by 6/6/03

U18283 /03


11-L-0559/OSD/17265

000.7

3 MAY 03

IRG JR., VP, General Manager
EDWARDS, Vice President
AHR, Advertising Director
BER, Circulation Director
EVITT, Marketing Director
MAN, Production Director
ER, Computer Services Director
EET, Internet Director
Human Resources Director
3EN, Facilities Director

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© JARPER 03
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Letters

Curbing teen-age pregnancy

The article "America, expecting" (Culture, Friday) depicts California and Texas, two states with especially high Hispanic populations, as competitors. The challenge: Which state's gross education philosophy will produce fewer births among its teen population. In other words, which state has adopted the "common sense" idea?

before they hit their twentieth birthdays. Forty-five years later, they're probably the happiest couple I know. And all five of their children are happily married, too.

Abstinence educators are more likely to see teen births as just one symptom of the problem of unmarried teens engaging in casual sex. Focusing on reducing teen births through contraceptive methods, as the California approach does, still leaves youths vulnerable to sexually transmitted diseases and emotionally damaging marital sex.

Now, the pundits throw statistics at us, claiming that "comprehensive" sex education is the answer. But, if we look at the statistics, we see that the birth rate for teens is still high. It is my belief that the only way to reduce teen births is to teach young people the value of abstinence.

San Antonio. Indeed, San Antonio is on many top-10 lists. National surveys have shown that we perspire more, are more overweight and have the biggest cockroaches. One area in which we lead the country is teen pregnancies. In 2001, Bexar County's birth rate to females ages 15 to 17 was 44.5 per 1,000 births, 80 percent higher than the national rate of 24.7 per 1,000.

I used to think that for every teen mother there was a teen father. Facts seem to suggest otherwise. Some fathers of babies born to school-age mothers are adults. And the younger the teen mother, the less likely that the age of the father of the baby is provided on the birth certificate.

It is my belief that the only way to reduce teen births is to teach young people the value of abstinence.

May 3, 2003 10:18 AM

000.7

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D

SUBJECT: Cartoon

If I have not already asked, please see if you can get this Doonesbury comic strip.

Thanks.

Attach.
Doonesbury Cartoon

DHR:dh
050303-7

Please respond by 6/4/03

how one person can effect change.

DOONESBURY By GARRY TRUDEAU



3MAY03

U18284 /03

May 3, 2003 1:10 PM

005

TO: LTG Craddock
Jaymie Durnan
Mary Claire Murphy

CC: Larry Di Rita (after his return)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Gifts for Foreign Visits

I am so glad we got ahead of the curve on these gifts. They were nice gifts, they were inscribed, and they were appreciated. We have to make sure when I am going to travel that I do things like that in advance and think about it. We cannot wait until the last minute.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/25/03 Gift List

DHR:dh
050303-20

.....
Please respond by _____

3 MAY 03

U18285 /03

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq & United Kingdom)
(26 April - 2 May 03)

	Meeting With	Title	Proposed Gift	Gift we gave on this trip	Gift given to us on trip	Remarks	DATE OF NTG
United Arab Emirates	MUHAMMAD bin Rashid al-Maktum	Minister of Defense	Buffalo Statue ✓	BUFFALO STATUE	N/A	Protocol to Protocol	4/27/03
	KHALIFA bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan	Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi	Sterling Silver Knife	STERLING SILVER KNIFE	N/A	" "	4/27/03
	MUHAMMAD bin Zayid Sultan al-Nuhayyan	Lieutenant General Chief of Staff	Buffalo Box	BUFFALO BOX	3 PACKAGES OF LOWAN CANDY	" "	4/27/03
Afghanistan	Hamid Karzai	President	Buffalo Box				
Qatar	HAMAD bin Khalifa Al Thani	Amir, MoD, Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces	Colt Pistol	COLT PISTOL	N/A	Protocol to Protocol	4/28/03
	HAMAD bin Jasim	Foreign Minister	Buffalo Box	BUFFALO BOX	N/A	" "	4/28/03
Saudi Arabia	FAHD bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud	King, Prime Minister	Sterling Silver Knife "BACKUP ONLY"	STERLING SILVER KNIFE	N/A	Protocol to Protocol	4/29/03
	SULTAN bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud	Minister of Defense and Aviation	Buffalo Statue ✓	BUFFALO STATUE	GREEN BOX w/ SILVER ORAIS	SECEDEF TO PRINCE EXCHANGE	4/29/03
	ABDALLAH bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud	Crown Prince, First Deputy Prime Minister	Buffalo Box "BACKUP ONLY"	BUFFALO BOX	LARGE GREEN BOX w/ ORAIS TUNG	Protocol to Protocol	4/29/03
Kuwait	JABIR al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah	Amir	Sterling Silver Knife	STERLING SILVER KNIFE	N/A	Protocol to Protocol	5/1/03
United Kingdom	Geoffrey Hoon	Secretary of State for Defense	Buffalo Box ✓	Buffalo Box	N/A	In-person to Hoon	5/2/03
Jordan	Abdullah Abdullah	King	Sterling Silver Knife	STERLING SILVER KNIFE	N/A	Protocol to Protocol	5/2/03
United States	Tommy Franks	General USCENTCOM	Sterling Silver Knife ✓	STERLING SILVER KNIFE	N/A	SECEDEF TO FRANKS w/ DDSM.	4/28/03

4:00 PM


2 4/25/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/17269

May 5, 2003 11:13 AM

000077

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: CNN Video Clip

I would like to know the name of the colonel who was in Najaf. CNN reported on how he dealt with people near the sacred mosque. He handled it so well.

I would like to know who he is, and I would like to get a clip of the CNN program that played on Sunday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-14

.....
Please respond by 5/16/03

SMAY03

U18287 /03

May 5, 2003 11:19 AM

014.35

TO: Jaymie Duman
CC: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Absentee Ballots

I want to talk to you about whether or not the Department of Defense is fully set up to deal with absentee ballots this time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-17

.....
Please respond by 5/12/03

TO: David Chu: Please have someone
brief me on this.

v/r
Jaymie

SMAY03

U18288 /03

May 5, 2003 11:21 AM

0914

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Arabic Speakers

Were there 22 or 28 Arabic-speaking gay service members who were discharged from the military, just when we need Arabic speakers?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-18

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

U18291 /03

SMAY03

11-L-0559/OSD/17272

France

SUBJECT: Statistics on France

- Population.
- GDP.
- GDP per capita.
- Some of the key demographic trends:
 - How many people are currently working to support how many people who are not working.
 - What their annual growth in GDP has been in the last ten years.
 - What direction they are trending.
 - Where they are likely to be in five or ten years from an economic standpoint.
 - Where their military ranks.

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MAY 24 1961

May 05

Response in
folder

U18292 /03 C 5/27

11-L-0559/OSD/17273

SUBJECT: Statistics on France

MAY 28 2003

Population: Ranks 21st in the world; 59.3 millionGDP: Ranks 4th in the world; \$1.3 trillionGDP per capita: Ranks 11th in the world; \$23,955.00

Labor Force: 25 million; 22,750,000 working.

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
GDP (in millions)	\$1,297	\$1,338	\$1,394	\$1,420	\$1,434
Real GDP Growth	3.5%	3.2%	4.2%	1.8%	1.0%
Inflation	.6%	.5%	1.7%	1.6%	1.8%
Unemployment	11.3%	10.2%	8.8%	8.8%	9.0%

Economic Trends:

- French GDP increased by 1% in 2002, the lowest growth rate in 10 years
- French GDP growth was higher than the European Union as a whole (.8 for the EU).
- Economic activity is forecast to rebound this year and next. A projected 2-2.5% growth per year for the next 5 years.
- Unemployment is expected to increase over the next 2 years.

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Defense Spending (in millions)	\$36,088	\$36,704	\$36,408	\$36,167	\$35,685
Real Growth	-2.9%	1.7%	-0.8	-0.7	-1.3%
Number on Active Duty	286,000	242,000	218,000	197,000	197,000
Arms Exports (excl U.S. in millions)	\$6,957	\$3,559	\$2,048	\$1,119	\$753

Defense Trends

- Defense spending as a percentage of GDP ranks 53d in the world; 2003 spending is 2.5% of projected GDP.
- 2003 defense expenditures represent a 4% increase over 2002.
- 4th largest military budget in the world.
- Total forces, including the reserves and gendarmerie total 365,000.
- France has the ability to dramatically increase arms sale to assist the economy.

5/27/2003 7:33 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/17274

May 5, 2003 12:37 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Korean Peninsula Photo

Korea

Please find me a copy of that unclassified photograph taken at night of the Korean peninsula, showing the lights in the south and the blackness in the north.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-28

.....

Please respond by 5/16/03

U18293 /03

5MAY03



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000
INFO MEMO

October 30, 2003, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond H. DuBois, DUSD (Installations and Environment)

SUBJECT: California Wildfires - Installation Infrastructure Impact

- Physical damage/impact to DOD facilities resulting from the fire has been minimal.
- The Army and Air Force report no impact to their bases.
- Marine Corps Air Station Miramar: The fire burned 16,000 acres and two buildings out-leased to the US Forest Service, used for vehicle maintenance, were destroyed. The Community of Scripps Ranch, on Miramar's northern border, lost over 300 community homes.
- Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton: The fire burned over 8,500 acres and is considered to be out. No housing either on or off-base has been affected.
- Naval Air Facility El Centro: Phone and data systems are impacted by fire damage to transmission lines causing sporadic outages. Naval Regional Medical Center, San Diego, is sending medical personnel to treat potential respiratory problems resulting from heavy smoke.
- Naval Base Ventura County (North of Los Angeles): Heavy smoke and some falling ash on base, but no damage reported.
- Navy Housing in San Diego area: No housing was damaged and no housing areas are currently threatened. Seven military and nine civilian families, living on the economy, lost their homes to the wildfire.
- Approximately \$700K in support costs have been incurred to date: overtime for security and firefighting personnel, emergency consumables, housekeeping services and support, family emergency assistance and HVAC repairs.
- COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Steve Kleiman, ODUSD/IR&M, (b)(6)

Cc: ASD/HD



11-L-0559/OSD/17276

U18295 /03

C 10/31
11/3

000,92

300923

May 5, 2003 1:27 PM

~~outbox~~

383.6

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Enemy Prisoners of War

We have really pulled down the enemy prisoners of war. I think it is something that ought to be in the next press briefing statement. It is important, and we are making good progress.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-36

.....

Please respond by 5/9/03

500003

U18296 /03

10/24
1700



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

INFO MEMO

10/30
✓
11/3

October 24, 2003, 1:00 p.m.

Latvian
10/30

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs)

SUBJECT: Congressional Contacts for 2003

032

- Attached is a current summary of your congressional contacts during calendar year 2003.

Attachments:
As stated

24 OCT 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17278

U18297 / 03

SECDEF Contacts with Members of Congress (for CY 2003)

Date	Event	Location	Members Attending	Other DOD attendees	Duration
Jan 8	Ops/Intel Briefing	RHOB-2118	HASC – 40 Members (Invitations extended – 50)	CJCS, Moore, Geren, Craddock,	1 ½ hrs
Jan 9	Breakfast	Pentagon	Warner, Levin, Hunter (Invitations extended – 4)	DepSec, CJCS, Aldridge, Zakheim, Chu, Feith, Moore, Geren, Cambone, Krieg	1 hr
Jan 9	Meeting	H-140 Capitol	Lewis, Murtha	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	1 hr
Jan 15	Hearing	S-407, Capitol	SASC – Warner, Levin, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Carmy, Kennedy, Reed, Akaka, Nelson, Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor, Landrieu, Bingaman (Invitations extended – 25)	Moore, Clark, Luti	2 hrs
Jan 16	Breakfast	Pentagon	Chambliss, Dole, Ensign, Graham (Invitations extended – 9/4)	SecArmy, SecAF, VCJCS, Chu, Moore, Geren, Cambone, Lanzillota, DiRita	1 hr
Jan 23	Breakfast – Congressional contacts, legislative package, nominations	S-230, Capitol	Frist	Moore, Steve Biegun – Frist	1 hr
Jan 23	Briefing – Update on GWOT	S-407, Capitol	72 Senators (Invitations extended to full Senate)	SecState, DepDCI McLaughlin, Moore, Clarke, Craddock, Luti	1 ½ hr
Jan 27	Briefing	Pentagon	43 House Freshmen (Invitations extended – 55)	DepSec, SecArmy, SecAF VCJCS, Aldridge, Feith, Chu, Moore, Geren, Zakheim, Livingstone, DiRita	1 hr

Jan 29	Briefing – Update on GWOT	House Floor	Approximately 360 Members	SecState, DepDCI, Moore	1 hr
Jan 30	Breakfast – CentCom AOR	Pentagon	Warner, Levin, Stevens, Inouye, Hunter, Skelton, Murtha (Invitations extended – 8)	DepSec, CJCS, VCJCS, Franks, Feith, Craddock, DiRita, Moore	1 hr
Feb 3	Briefing - Budget Roll Out	Pentagon	Warner, Hunter, Young, Lewis (Invitations extended – 11)	Chu, Zakheim, VCJCS, Moore, Geren, Stanley	2 hrs
Feb 5	Hearing - Budget	RHOB-2118	Full HASC - 52 Members (Invitations extended – 61)	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	2 ½ hrs
Feb 8	Codel - Wehrkunde	Germany	McCain, Lieberman, Reed, Graham, Dicks, Larson, Dooley, Tauscher, Hannan, Moran, Abercrombie, Udall	Moore	1 ½ hr
Feb 11	Gaming Exercise	NDU	Akin, Andrews, Barrett, Forbes, Frelinghuysen, Frost, Meek, Nethercutt, Nuncs, Platts, Tanner, G. Taylor, Turner, Myrick, S. Davis (Invitations extended – 18)	DepSec, Geren, Moore	45 min
Feb 12	Briefing – Update on GWOT	RHOB-2212	HAC- D -- J Lewis, Murtha, Young, Hobson, Bonilla, Nethercutt, Cunningham, Frelinghuysen, Tiahrt, Wicker, Obey, Dicks, Sabo, Moran Invitations extended – 15)	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	3 hrs
Feb 13	Hearing – Budget	SH-216	SASC -- Warner, Levin, Inhofe, Allard, Sessions, Ensign, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Nelson (FL), Nelson (NE), Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor (Invitations extended – 25)	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	3 hrs

Mar 27	Hearing – Supplemental	RHOB-2359	HAC-D- Lewis, Young, Hobson, Bonilla, Nethercott, Cunningham, Frelinghuysen, Tiahrt, Wicker, Murtha, Dicks, Visclosky, Moran	DepSec, CJCS, Zakheim, Cartwright, Moore, Clarke	1 hr
April 1	Meeting - Operation Iraqi Freedom, Supplemental	H-C-6	Warner, Levin, Stevens, Inouye, Hunter, Skelton, Lewis (Murtha-Pennsylvania)	CJCS, Feith, Zakheim, Moore	1 ½ hr
April 2	Briefing War in Iraq	S-407	65 Senators	CJCS, Moore, Clarke, Craddock Luti	1 hr 15 min
April 2	Briefing War in Iraq	House Floor	More than 125 members	CJCS, Moore, Clarke, Craddock	1 hr
April 9	Briefing War in Iraq	S-407	53 Senators	CJCS, Moore, Clark, Mofitt	1 hr
April 9	Briefing War in Iraq	House Floor	More than 200 members	CJCS, Moore, Clark, Espern	1 hr
April 10	Meeting – War in Iraq, Supplemental, Transformation package	H-230, Capitol	House Leadership Hastert, DeLay, Blunt, Pryce, Cantor, Pelosi, Hoyer	CJCS, Moore	1 hr
April 24	Meeting – Transformation Package	Pentagon	Warner	DepSec, CJCS, Moore, Wynne, Abell, Lanzillotta	45 min
April 25	Lunch	Pentagon	Kirk	Duman	25 min
May 7	Breakfast – Mark-up Issues	RHOB-2212	Hunter, Weldon, Hefley, Saxton, McHugh, Everett, McKeon, Skelton, Ortiz, Taylor, Meehan, Reyes, Snyder	Moore, Clarke	45 min
May 8	Meeting – Iraq	S-230	Frist, Daschle, Warner, Levin, Stevens, Inouye	Franks, Moore,	20 min
May 8	Briefing – Iraq	S-407	48 Senators	Franks, Moore	45 min
May 8	Meeting Iraq	H-323	DeLay, Pelosi, Blunt, Hoyer, Pryce, Menendez, Hunter, Skelton, Lewis, Murtha	Franks, Moore	20 min
May 8	Briefing – Iraq	House Floor	More than 150 Members	Franks, Moore	45min
May 15	Meeting	Pentagon	Davis, Tom	DepSec, Chu, Geren, Moore	½ hr

May 20	Briefing - Transformation Package	HC-7	Tuesday Group - Bass, Bradley, T. Davis, Dunn, Ehlers, English, Frelinghuysen, Gilchrest, Gillmor, Hobson, Houghton, Kirk, Kolbe, Nethercutt, Quinn, Saxton, Shays, Simmons, Visclosky	Dubois, Chu, Moore, Clarke Geren, Esperne	1/3 hr
May 20	Briefing - Transformation Package		Senate Policy - Alexander, Allard, Allen, Bennett, Bond, Brownback, Bunning, Burns, Campbell, Chafee, Chambliss, Cochran, Coleman, Collins, Cornyn, Craig, Crapo, DeWine, Dole, Domenici, Enzi, Frist, Graham, Grassley, Gregg, Hatch, Hutchison, Inhofe, Kyl, Lott, Lugar, McCain, McConnell, Murkowski, Nickles, Roberts, Santorum, Sessions, Shelby, G Smith, Specter, Stevens, Sununu, Talent, Thomas, Warner	Moore, Moffitt	1/2 hr
May 20	Constituents fly in	LJ162	LaHood	Moore	1/2 hr
May 21	Briefing - Transformation Package	H-230	House Rep. Leadership - Hastert, DeLay, Blunt, Pryce, Cantor, Cox, Tauzin, Ney, Nussle, Young, Feeney, Ose, Doolittle, Kingston, Myrick, Reynolds, Portman, Drier, Hoyer	CJCS, CNO, Chu, Moore, Dubois, Geren, Esperne	1/2 hr
May 21	Meeting - Transformation Package	H-122	House Rep. Policy - Beauprez, Blackburn, Burgess, Camp, Cole, Collins, Cox, Cunningham, Davis, Ehlers, Flake, Graves, Harris, Hayes, Hunter, Kennedy, King, Rohrabacher, Royce, Schrock, Shadegg, Shuster, Tiberi, Vitter, Walden, Weldon, Wicker, Roger	Moore	40 min

May 30	Meeting – Syria	Pentagon	Lantos	Moore	½ hr
June 3	Meeting – BRAC, Conference Issues	Pentagon	Hunter	CJCS, Chu, DuBois, Moore, Geren	45 min
June 4	Meeting – Update on Iraq	H-118	SOS/Chowder & Marching Group – Bass, Ehlers, Frelinghuysen, Goss, Lewis (CA), Johnson, Regula, Shays, Shimkus (17 former members)	Geren	1 hr
June 4	Hearing – NSPS	SD-342	Senate Gov't Affairs – Collins, Voinovich, Specter, Coleman, Fitzgerald, Sununu, Stevens, Levin, Akaka, Durbin, Carper, Lautenberg, Pryor	CJCS, CNO, Chu, Clarke	½ hr
June 5	Meeting – Defense Bill	Pentagon	Blunt	Moore, Geren	½ hr
June 5	Meeting – Defense Bill	Pentagon	Delay	Moore, Geren	½ hr
June 5	Briefing – Ops/Intel	RHOB-2118	60 Members	CJCS, Moore, Cartwright	1 hr 45 min
June 19	Breakfast – Conference Issues & Confirmations	Pentagon	Warner	VCJCS, Chu, Moore	45 min
June 24	Breakfast – Conference Issues	Pentagon	Warner, Levin, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Nelson (FL), Dayton, Nelson (NE), Graham (SC), Talent	DepSec, Chu, Moore, CJCS, Gen. Keane, CNO, General Myers, General Keane, Admiral Clark, Gen. Foglesong, DuBois, Lanzilotta, Geren, Moffitt	1 ½ hr
June 24	Meeting – DoD Issues	S-128	Stevens	One on one	45 min
June 24	Meeting – DoD Issues	S-239	Inouye	One on one	45 min
June 26	Breakfast – Conference Issues	Pentagon	Hunter	DepSec, CJCS, Chu, Cambone, Wynne, Moore, Geren	30 min
June 26	Meeting – Conference Issues	Capitol – STM-2	Warner, Levin, Hunter, Skelton	CJCS, Chu, Zakheim, Wynne, Moore, Geren	45 min

June 27	Briefing – Ops/Intel	S-407	Frist, Stevens, Allard, Burns, Hutchinson, Sessions, Craig, Warner, Bennett, Voinovich, Bond, Levin, Bingaman, Reed, Akaka, Kennedy, Dayton, Corzine	CJCS, Dep DCI, Moore	1 ½ hr
Jul 9	Hearing – Operation Iraqi Freedom	SH-216	Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambiss, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Nelson (FL), Nelson (NE), Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor	Franks, Moore	4 hrs
Jul 10	Breakfast – ITAR Exemption for UK, Train and Equip	Pentagon	Hyde	DepSec, VCJCS, Zakheim, Crouch, Moore	45 min
Jul 11	Signing Ceremony	Pentagon	Brown (SC), Michaud, Reyes	SecLabor, VCJCS, Chu, Abell, Moore	15 min
Jul 23	Briefing – Ops/Intel	House Floor	More than 65 Members	CJCS, Keane, Moore	1 ½ hr
Jul 24	Breakfast – Iraq, Appropriations	Pentagon	Lewis, Murtha	DepSec, Lanzillotta, Cartwright, Moore	45 min
Jul 30	Briefing – Ops/Intel	S-407	36 Senators	VCJCS, Gen. Keane, Moore, Moffitt	1 ½ hr
Jul 30	Meeting – NSPS	S-128	Stevens	VCJCS, Chu, Moore	40 min
Jul 30	Meeting – NSPS	S-239	Inouye	VCJCS, Chu, Moore	30 min
Jul 31	Breakfast – SecAF nomination	Pentagon	McCain	DepSec, VCJCS, Wynne, Moore	40 min
Aug 4	Breakfast – Iraq	Pentagon	Lugar	CJCS, Feith, Zakheim, Moore	40 min
Sept 10	Briefing – Ops/Intel	S-407	63 Senators	SecState, OMB Director, CJCS, Zakheim, Jeffery Moore	1 hr

Sept 10	Briefing – Ops/Intel	RHOB-2118	More than 90 Members	DepSec, DepSecState, CJCS, OMB Director, Zakheim,, Moore	1 hr
Sept 11	9/11 Commemoration	Pentagon Chapel	Frist, Hastert, Daschle, Pelosi, Hoyer	CJCS, Service Secretaries, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Moore and others.	1 hr
Sept 15	Lunch – nominations	Pentagon	Warner	DepSec, VCJCS, Cambone, Moore	45 min
Sept 16	Breakfast – Defense Authorization Bill	Pentagon	Ben Nelson	VCJCS, Chu, Moore	45 min
Sept 21	Meeting w/Leadership on FY04 Supplemental	Pentagon	Frist, Warner, Stevens, Murtha	Bremer, Moore, Lanzillota, Korologos, Jeffrey	1 hr
Sept 24	Hearing – Supplemental	SD-106	SAC-Stevens, Cochran, Specter, Domenici, Bond, Burns, Shelby, Bennett, Campbell, Craig, Hutchison, Brownback, Byrd, Inouye, Hollings, Leahy, Harkin, Mikulski, Reid, Kohl, Murray, Dorgan, Feinstein, Durbin, Johnson	CJCS, Gen Abizaid, Zakheim, Moore	6 hrs
Sept 25	Meeting – Supplemental	RHOB-2168	Defense Study Group - Thornberry, Snyder, Bartlett, Cooper, Gerlach, Hart, Israel, Kennedy, Langevin, Meehan, Myrick, Pearce, Cunningham, Burgess	Zakheim, Moore	45 min
Sept 29	Meeting – Iraq	Pentagon	Wolf	One - on - One	30 min
Sept 30	Breakfast – Supplemental	Pentagon	Bond, Bennett, Alexander	DepSec, CJCS, Zakheim, Moore	1 hr

Sept 30	Hearing – Supplemental	RHOB-2359	HAC/D – Lewis, Young, Hobson, Bonilla, Nethercutt, Cunningham, Frelinghuysen, Tiahrt, Wicker, Obey, Murtha, Dicks, Sabo, Visclosky, Moran	CJCS, Zakheim, Moore, Stanley	2 hrs
Oct 2	Breakfast- Supplemental	Pentagon	Lewis, Murtha	DepSec, CJCS, Moore, Lanzillotta, Oliver	45 min
Oct 16	Breakfast – Iraq Codel	Pentagon	McConnell, Thomas, Craig, Chafee,	DepSec, CJCS, Zakheim, Feith, Moore, Korologos	45 min
Oct 21	Briefing – Ops/Intel	RHOB-2128	45 Members	VCJCS, Luti, Craddock, Moore, Esperme	2 hr
Oct 22	Breakfast – Iraq Codel	Pentagon	Upton, Saxton, Houghton, Kline, Turner-TX	CJCS, Feith, Lanzillotta, Moore, DiRita	45 min
Oct 22	Briefing – Ops/Intel	S-407	39 Senators	CJCS, Moore	1 hr

Total - 88

Briefings – 30

Breakfasts – 20

Meetings – 22

Hearings – 9

Lunch – 2

Other - 5

May 5, 2003 1:28 PM

000.750

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Briefing May 15

I think I would like to do a press briefing on May 15.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-38

.....

Please respond by 5/9/03

U18298 /03

SMAY03

May 5, 2003 1:46 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PA for Bremer and CENTCOM

Please see me about who should do public affairs for Bremer and CENTCOM if
Wilkinson comes back.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-43

.....
Please respond by 5/9/03

0200CPA

SMAY03

U18299 /03

May 5, 2003 2:25 PM

350.0015D

TO: Jaymie Duman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Testimony and Remarks

I will need to see my testimony for next Wednesday very soon, certainly by 5 p.m.
on May ~~09~~

I would like to see my Armed Forces Day remarks by Wednesday, May 14, at 4 p.m.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-46

.....
Please respond by 5/8/03

*TO Powell Moore + Marc Thiesen.
Can we push this?*

*V/R
Jaymie*

5 MAY 03

U18301 /03

ADVANCE
UNSIGNED

May 5, 2003 2:27 PM

006

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Armed Forces Day

DONE

Please tell me today whether or not I am speaking for Armed Forces Day on May 16 or May 17. Joyce said the office indicated it was Saturday, May 17, and my calendar says Friday, May 16.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050503-47

Please respond by 5/5/03

What time?

SEE

ATTACHED

5 MAY 03

U18303 /03

Friday 16 May 2003

6:30am	Depart Residence	(NSC Meeting – Canceled)
7:15am-7:30	C/C Call	
7:45am-8:10	Secure Call	
8:30am-9:00	Round Table	
9:10am	Duman	
9:30am	Depart River Entrance	
10:00am-11:00	Remarks – Armed Forces Day, Andrews AFB	
11:00am	Depart Andrews AFB	
11:20am	Arrive River Entrance	
11:30am-11:45	PDB	
12:00pm-1:00	DCI Lunch	
1:15pm-2:00	Dep Orders w/VCJCS, DJS, J3, Chu, Henry	
2:30pm-2:50	Prep for Philippine Visit w/	
3:15pm-4:00	(T) Naval Academy Speech Prep w/Clarke, Thiessen	
5:30pm	Depart Pentagon	

(Out of town reunion guests arrive)

TAB A

549

September 24, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Overseas Troops Locations

I would like to have a list of where all U.S. forces were overseas on January 20, 2001 and then where our troops are overseas now (on the date you do the study). I would like to see where they were then and where they are now—that is to say, what has been reduced, what has been increased, and what has been changed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092403-3

.....
Please respond by 10/17/03


320.2

245403

U18309 /03
Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/17292

November 5, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Bonuses

Here's a suggestion that we offer bonuses to Iraqi police to capture terrorists and other wanted individuals. You may want to wash around the idea.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/8/03 Maguire ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
110503-16

.....
Please respond by _____

Iraq

5 Nov 03

U184 36-03

11-L-0559/OSD/17293

TELEPHONE

(b)(6)

MAGUIRE OIL COMPANY

RENAISSANCE TOWER
1201 ELM STREET, SUITE 4000
DALLAS, TEXAS 75270-2103

FAX

(b)(6)

CARY M. MAGUIRE, PRESIDENT
BLAINEY MAGUIRE HESS, VICE PRESIDENT

RODNEY E. COX, VICE PRESIDENT
V. D. FLOURNOY, ASST. VICE PRESIDENT

October 8, 2003

Via FedEx

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don:


I enjoyed meeting with you just before you sat down for dinner at the book festival gala in Washington last week. The President, his father, and Jeb Bush have all been to our home in Dallas. Since under the leadership of President Bush and you, the United States was able to win quickly the substantive part of the war, it is important that the peace does not slip into a slow Vietnam. With the huge number of terrorists and criminals trying to stir up unrest in Iraq in order to undermine the U.S. efforts, I made the following suggestion to President Bush at the dinner, which I hope you will also consider:

A generous cash award program for the various Chiefs of Police and perhaps another program for the police under the Chiefs that will reward capturing the terrorists and criminals. The Iraqi police apparently have a low standard of living to start with so a generous supplemental cash award program, in addition to some type of honor program, could be quite effective and would probably save a number of American lives.

I mentioned this idea to Kay Bailey Hutchinson and she thought it should be pursued.

Keep up the good work!

Yours very truly,



Cary M. Maguire

CMM:jsg

U16733TM/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17294

8:17 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: October 22, 2003

SUBJECT: **Iraq Reports**

Let's get a letter off to cabinet members who go to Iraq and ask them for some sort of report back in writing. I would like to see what they have to say and I think it would be helpful also if they sent a report to the President. Or I could send him the one they send me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
102203.15

10/24
7 → *Have PS draft.*
Larry Di Rita
10/27

Iraq

Please respond by: 11/5

22 OCT 03

1118469 / 03

18046
17759
11-L-0559/OSD/17295

NESA/MORGAN

²⁹
July 24, 2003

EF-6318
I-03/010569

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Iran

Let's get a plan on how we deal with Iran. Jerry Bremer is interested as well. One of the things we should take into account is their interference with our communications.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072403-43

.....
Please respond by 8/8/03

Sent to Mr Feith via Jethro
confirmed by LCDR McDermie

29-07-03


3 N

11-L-0559/OSD/17296

U184841/03

November ⁶~~5~~, 2003

TO: Walter Slocombe

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Op-ed

The article in today's *Washington Post* was first-rate. Good for you!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110503-7

.....
Please respond by _____

000.7

6 Nov 03


U18497 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17297

6
November 8, 2003

TO: LTG Steven Blum

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Guard Bureau Initiatives

Thank you for your memo outlining the initiatives you are planning for the National Guard Bureau.

The issues we are wrestling with concerning the Reserve components are critical to shaping and arranging our force for the future. We must get to the 80% solution quickly, and then refine and improve over time.

It seems to me the transformation of the National Guard will have to be planned and conducted from two perspectives: first, internal transformation to move the Army and Air Force guard organizations into today's warfighting environment, and, second, external transformation to ensure adequate linkages to the joint and component forces they will operate with.

I look forward to receiving your briefing. The sooner the better.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110503-1

.....
Please respond by 12/12/03

U18498 : /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17298

325

6 Nov 03



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
1411 JEFFERSON DAVIS HIGHWAY
ARLINGTON, VA 22202-3231
September 30, 2003

✓
11/3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Guard Bureau Initiatives

In accordance with your 30 July 2003 memorandum, I have taken steps to transform the National Guard (NG). Below is a synopsis of the transformation that has taken place thus far, and our proposed way ahead.

On 1 July 2003, I completed the provisional reorganization of the National Guard Bureau (NGB). I merged three separate organizations into a joint bureau. On 1 October 2003, the state Adjutants General will consolidate 162 state headquarters organizations into 54 joint force state headquarters. The personnel and cost savings realized from this will be reinvested in unit readiness.

Under this plan, the Chief of the NGB would forge a new relationship in order to provide a more effective channel of communication among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff (JS), the Departments of the Army and the Air Force, and the States, on matters relating to the NG. My staff is working with the Departments of the Army and the Air Force to strengthen the existing statutory links and to improve the Services' access to NG capabilities.

NGB is working closely with Joint Forces Command and the Services to accelerate the mobilization/demobilization processes, as well as to use individual NG volunteers more effectively. The 54 joint force state headquarters will play a significant role in these efforts.

In response to your 9 July 2003 Rebalancing the Forces Memorandum, my staff is actively working with OSD, NORTHCOM, PACOM and the Services to determine how NG capabilities can be best leveraged in support of the Global War on Terrorism. I have provided to the Army and Air Force Secretaries recommendations designed to relieve the stresses on high demand/low density career fields and to mitigate capability shortfalls.

I will present the National Guard Transformation Concept Plan to OSD, JS and the Departments of the Army and the Air Force for their inputs. In addition, I will submit to OSD for formal vetting within the FY2005 Unified Legislative Budget process the statutory changes that will be required as part of this transformation. I will plan to provide an update to you and the Chairman by the end of the year.

I am committed to taking whatever steps are necessary to enhance the readiness, relevance, and accessibility of the National Guard to the Department of Defense and our nation.

H STEVEN BLUM
Lieutenant General, US Army
Chief, National Guard Bureau

CF:
SecArmy
SecAF
CJCS

11-L-0559/OSD/17299



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

July 30, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Guard Bureau Initiatives

Your initial steps to instill a greater joint focus into the National Guard Bureau (NGB) staff are on the mark. The fact that we will be prosecuting a war against terrorism (WOT) requires us to examine how we currently do business and make adjustments so that our Armed Forces, Active and Reserve Components (AC/RC), remain relevant. As you continue your efforts, there are a few areas into which I would like you to look.

First, in light of the fact that Congress has chartered NGB as a Bureau jointly administered under the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, I want you to develop proposals to forge a new relationship among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff and the NGB that are more relevant to the current environment. Improving the Department's access to National Guard (NG) capabilities should be your principal focus. Develop, for my review, recommendations on how the NGB should interact with OSD and the Joint Staff. Identify any regulatory or statutory changes that might be required to facilitate this new relationship.

Second, the NGB should be the focal point for Guard matters at the strategic level. Title 10 clearly outlines NGB's role as the channel of communications between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the states and territories. As you reorganize the Bureau, strengthen that statutory link with the Army and Air Force and intensify your efforts to ensure the NG remains an effective participant in our joint forces. All US forces and leaders must be trained and ready to operate in the joint environment to meet today's challenges.

Third, strive to adapt the NGB to better support the WOT, homeland defense and homeland security (HLS). Seek ways to strengthen NGB's relationship with the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and the OSD - Homeland Defense. My intent is to enhance our ability to employ forces to meet the Nation's homeland defense needs.

Fourth, I would like you to work with USJFCOM as it develops proposals to change and modernize the mobilization and demobilization process. Make recommendations to enhance the availability and accessibility of our NG forces.




U10516-03

11-L-0559/OSD/17300

Finally, work with the Services as they develop proposals to adjust their AC/RC mix. You must be a full player in these efforts if we are to take full advantage of our NG forces.

Nothing the military has been asked to do since World War II is as important as the task we face today -- fighting and winning the war on terrorism. You and the Nation's citizen-soldiers are key to winning that war, at home and abroad.

Work with the Army and Air Force, and get back to me in the next 30 days with a proposal on how to proceed.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Rumsfeld", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Copy to:
SecArmy
SecAF
CJCS



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JUL 9 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

The balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve components today is not the best for the future. We need to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions based on a disciplined force requirements process.

To that end there are three principal objectives that I want to achieve. They are:

- Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. Eliminate the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to the operation). Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year every 6 years.
- Establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and which validates requests for forces in time to provide timely notice of mobilization.
- Make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient. When Reservists are used, ensure that they are given meaningful work and work for which alternative manpower is not readily available. Retain on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.

I consider this a matter of the utmost urgency. I expect each of you to tailor the actions in the attachment to your specific organization and report back to USD (P&R) by memo on your assessment and plan for implementation NLT July 31, 2003. Follow up actions may be reviewed at a future SROC as necessary.

Attachment:
As stated

cc: Combatant Commanders

U10510-03

11-L-0559/OSD/17302

Attachment

Actions for Force Rebalancing

Rebalance Forces:

- **Rebalance AC/RC Forces.** Services submit Program Change Proposals to correct imbalances that result in lengthy, repeated, or frequent mobilization of RC individuals and units by changing force structure and/or mix, using contractors or civilians, or mitigating shortfalls through technology. Specifically address capabilities that reside exclusively or predominantly in the RC and are in high demand because of on-going operations and the Global War on Terror, capabilities that are required for homeland defense missions, and capabilities critical to post hostilities operations. (August 03)
- **Reduce Early Dependence on Involuntarily Mobilized RC.** Services submit Program Change Proposals or undertake policy changes in order to reduce dependence on involuntary mobilization of reservists needed early in an operation. (August 03)
- **Revise Requirements Review Process.** CJCS, in coordination with USD (P), USD (P&R), USD (C) and the Services will revise the requirements review procedure to ensure appropriate force structure is available and validate Combatant Commanders' request for forces. (August 03)
- **Determine RC Role in Homeland Defense.** ASD (HD), in coordination with NORTHCOM, PACOM, USD (P&R), the Services and Joint Staff, determine Total Force requirements for Homeland Defense and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (September 03). Based upon the established DoD requirements, ASD (RA) prepare a report on Reserve Component Contributions to Homeland Defense and Civil Support that will recommend the appropriate roles, force mix, priorities, command relationships, and resources required for conducting these missions. (December 03)

Encourage Increased Volunteerism

- **Establish Prototype Programs.** Services submit Program Change Proposals or undertake policy changes to establish prototype programs that expand the use of RC volunteerism at both the individual and unit levels, through techniques that allow for varying amounts of Reserve participation. (August 03)
- **Resources.** Services ensure that sufficient military pay is programmed to support the utilization of volunteer RC units and individuals.

Attachment

Actions for Force Rebalancing (continued)

Innovative Management

- **Establish Prototype Programs.** Services submit Program Change Proposals (August 03) to implement innovative management techniques such as those described in the *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense* to include the design and test of innovative RC affiliation programs for individuals with specialized skills, for military retirees, and for civilian volunteers. (December 03)
- **Use RC for Rotational Overseas Presence.** Services submit Program Change Proposals to allow RC capabilities to meet predictable, long lead-time missions such as rotational overseas presence and experimentation. (August 03)
- **Increase the Use of Reachback.** USD (P&R), in conjunction with USD (I) and ASD (NII) develop CPG language regarding the importance of Combatant Commanders' utilization of reachback and chair a reachback GOSC to determine the road ahead (July 03). Services submit Program Change Proposals to enhance RC use in support of CONUS-based operations intended to provide reachback capabilities for forward forces, thereby reducing footprint in theater. (August 03)
- **Improve the Mobilization Process.** Working within the JFCOM effort on mobilization process improvements, the USD (P&R), in coordination with JFCOM, the Joint Staff, the Services and other OSD offices as appropriate, undertake "Quick Win" opportunities to improve policy or process changes that can be implemented within the next three months, to improve the mobilization process. Issue guidance as appropriate. (September 03).

May 14, 2003 4:19 PM

Received 5/28
9:30 am.

310.1

TO: Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Metrics

I don't know what metrics Gus Pagonis is talking about. I would like to see the metrics he referred to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051403-25

.....
Please respond by 5/23/03

5/30
CONTROLLER RESPONSE
ATTACHED
v/e

①
How-
week reg?
reg?

14 May 03

U18500 /03

5130
1300



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

503
6/2

INFO MEMO

May 30, 2003 8:09 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Question about metrics from Gus Pagonis visit on May 14th

- During your meeting with Gus Pagonis, Chairman of the Defense Business Practice Implementation Board (DBB), Mr. Pagonis mentioned the Board's work on balanced scorecard metrics. The metrics to which Mr. Pagonis referred were developed in coordination with Ken Krieg, and are described in DBB Report FY02-2 (attached). The balanced scorecard metrics recommended by the Board in this report were formalized by Management Initiative Decision (MID) 901.
- The Board also recommended a set of discrete financial indicators. It is described in DBB Report FY03-1 (attached). These recommended indicators currently are being integrated into a comprehensive set of financial management metrics for the Department.
- I attach a summary page depicting both sets of DBB recommended metrics (balanced scorecard and financial indicators).

Attachments:

As stated.

Prepared by: T.Modly/Executive Director, DBB/2E314 (b)(6) May 30, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/17306

**Report to the Senior Executive Council,
Department of Defense**

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION TASK GROUP

Report FY02-2

- **Recommendations on the implementation of
balanced scorecard metrics for the
Department of Defense**

December 18, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/17307

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION TASK GROUP REPORT

BALANCED SCORECARD METRICS

TASK: To provide an initial set of management metrics that can be used by the Secretary of Defense to drive the performance of the Department of Defense. Rely on private sector best practices in the development and implementation of the metrics. Additionally, focus on force management and infrastructure (financial) measures and linkages to individual performance.

- DBB Task Leader: Neil Albert
- DoD Liaison: Ken Krieg, Executive Secretary, Senior Executive Council

PROCESS: The task team worked with Mr. Ken Krieg over the course of several months providing guidance and feedback on the development of scorecard metrics built around the 4 major risk areas for the Department:

- Force Management Risk
- Operational Risk
- Institutional Risk
- Future Challenges Risk

The team provided input into the development of an initial set of metrics and also developed a broad set of recommendations for the implementation of the scorecard. The team relied on its private sector expertise and referenced best practices related to balanced scorecard systems.

RESULTS: The substantive findings and advice of the task group were developed as a presentation for the Senior Executive Council (SEC). This presentation was delivered as an executive brief to the SEC on November 21, 2002. An updated version of the presentation, which is attached, submits recommendations around three primary areas:

1. Getting the process started
2. Cascading the metrics downward
3. Building an institutional approach

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

The recommendations also include 5-6 specific suggested metrics for each of the four risk areas plus an additional category of metrics to discretely measure financial management. The financial management metrics were developed in detail by the DBB Financial Indicators Task Group lead by Bill Phillips. The financial metrics presented on November 21st to the SEC were a “first-cut” at a representative set of metrics in this area. The attached report includes the updated financial metrics as recommended by Financial Indicators Task Group.

It is the intention of the DBB, through the Management Information Task Group, to continue to provide advice to Mr. Krieg and the SEC as the scorecard is refined.

Respectfully submitted,

Neil Albert

Chart A **Balanced Scorecard Metrics for DoD**

<u>Force Management Risk</u>		<u>Operational Risk</u>	
• Quality Index	• Civilian Workforce Progress	• Joint Con Ops Progress	• Specific Issues List
• Force Tempo Trend	• PMA Human Capital	• Operational Availability	•
• Quality of Life Index	•	• Joint Monthly Readiness	•
• Total Force Cost Trend	•	• C-Sorts	•
<u>Future Challenges Risk</u>		<u>Institutional Risk</u>	
• Experiments Progress	• Transformation Budget	• BRAC Progress	• Acquisition Cycle Time
• Joint Training Progress	•	• Life-Cycle Cost Trends	• Other PMA
• New Organization Standup	•	• FMMP Progress v. Plan	•
• National Capabilities Definition	•	• Competitive Sourcing Progress	•

Balanced Scorecard Metrics

**Final Report
December 2002**


11-L-0559/OSD/17310

Presentation Overview



- Introduction
 - Task Group Members
 - Objectives and Scope
- Recommendations
- Next Steps

Presentation Overview



- Introduction
 - Task Group Members
 - Objectives and Scope
- Recommendations
- Next Steps

December 2002

DBB Balanced Scorecard Metrics--
Final Report

11-L-0559/OSD/17312



Management Information Task Group



- **Neil Albert (Chairman)**
- **Bob Hale**
- **Bill Phillips**
- **Other DBB members in group sessions**

December 2002

DBB Balanced Scorecard Metrics--
Final Report

11-L-0559/OSD/17313

Objectives, Scope and Process



- **Provide an initial set of management metrics that can be used by the Secretary of Defense to drive the performance of the Department of Defense**
- **Rely on private sector best practices in the development and implementation of the metrics**
- **Focus on:**
 - **Balanced scorecard development/implementation**
 - **Force Management and Infrastructure (Financial) Measures**
 - **Looking toward individual performance**

Balanced Scorecard Approach



The Balanced Scorecard is based on the premise that corporate improvement can be managed by measuring and evaluating all the aspects of the business rather than a singular focus on the bottom line.

- **Traditionally, 4 basics areas of evaluation:**
 - Customer
 - Internal
 - Learning and Growth
 - Financial
- **The top three areas of evaluation should directly influence the fourth**

Balanced Scorecard Approach



DoD use of balanced scorecard approach could be challenging if not implemented carefully.

- **4 issues of concern:**
 - **1. Operations:** DoD does not operate as a commercial company – no profit and loss basis
 - **2. Organization:** Diverse requirements (Services, Agencies, etc.) internal to the DoD reduce ability to integrate strategies efficiently
 - **3. Culture:** Change within the Government is difficult due to multiplicity of goals and bosses (Congress, etc)
 - **4. Systems:** Lack of a consolidation of systems makes collecting and measuring data difficult

Balanced Scorecard Approach

Given the structure of DoD and the mission for which it operates, the proposed balanced scorecard, with the 4 risk areas, is a realistic approach for managing performance.

- **Meaningful metrics can be developed to overcome issues cited previously:**
 - **Align with the overall strategy of DoD**
 - **Measurable (Quantifiable)**
 - **Defined for everyone's (Services, Agencies, etc.) use**
 - **Data easily available and accessible**

Balanced Scorecard Approach



(Proposed DoD Scorecard Areas)

Force Management Risk

- **Definition:** Challenge of sustaining personnel, infrastructure and equipment
- **Risk Mitigation Examples**
 - Manage careers and rotations
 - Modernize infrastructure and facilities
 - Training, spares and overall readiness

Operational Risk

Definition: Challenge of deterring or defeating near-term threats

Risk Mitigation Examples

Plan and prosecute war on terror
Elevate role of homeland defense
Develop forward deterrence posture
Enhance operational capabilities with allies

Future Challenges Risk

Definition: Challenge of dissuading, deterring, defeating longer-term threats

Risk Mitigation Examples

Experiment with new concepts, capabilities and organizational designs
Investing in transformational capabilities for portions of the force
Foster a spirit of innovation and risk taking

Institutional Risk


Definition: Challenge of improving efficiency represented by unresponsive processes, long decision cycles, segmented information, etc.

Risk Mitigation Examples

Modernize financial management systems and approaches
Acquisition excellence initiatives
Improve planning and resource allocation

Presentation Overview

- Introduction
 - Task Group Members
 - Objectives and Scope



- Recommendations
- Next Steps

December 2002

DBB Balanced Scorecard Metrics--
Final Report

11-L-0559/OSD/17319

Recommendations



- **Get process started**
 - Just do it!
 - Suggested metrics for the four risk areas
 - Fifth area to consider: financial management
- **Cascade metrics downward**
- **Build an institutional approach**

Just Do It!



Best to get started immediately, but understand that development of scorecard is not a one-time event

- **Evolution is the best approach – no one gets it right the first time**
- **Keep it simple – Measurement viability will be realized as data becomes available and needs are formalized**
- **Initial cut to SecDef by Dec 02**
- **Review them regularly – at least quarterly**

Suggested Metrics



- **5-6 Metrics/Measures for each balanced scorecard risk area**
 - Minimize number of metrics; do not over measure
 - Ensure a clear strategy
 - Have strong management support
 - Include targets and “stretch” goals
 - Ultimately provide incentives to reward success
 - Try to build Department-wide buy-in, but understand that SecDef is ultimate customer
- **Establish “stoplight” summary based on targets and stretch goals**

DoD Quarterly Performance Scorecard



<u>Force Management Risk</u>		<u>Operational Risk</u>	
• Quality Index	• Civilian Workforce Progress	• Joint Con Ops Progress	• Specific Issues List
• Force Tempo Trend	• PMA Human Capital	• Operational Availability	•
• Quality of Life Index	•	• Joint Monthly Readiness	•
• Total Force Cost Trend	•	• C-Sorts	•
<u>Future Challenges Risk</u>		<u>Institutional Risk</u>	
• Experiments Progress	• Transformation Budget	• BRAC Progress	• Acquisition Cycle Time
• Joint Training Progress	•	• Life-Cycle Cost Trends	• Other PMA
• New Organization Standup	•	• FMMP Progress v. Plan	•
• National Capabilities Definition	•	• Competitive Sourcing Progress	•


December 2002

DBB Balanced Scorecard Metrics--
Final Report


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11-L-0559/OSD/17323


Force Management Risk Measures




Operational Risk Measures



Future Challenges Risk Measures



Institutional Risk Measures



December 2002

DBB Balanced Scorecard Metrics--
Final Report


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
Fifth Area: Financial Management



Effective financial management impacts all four risk areas and should be measured and represented on the scorecard accordingly.



Financial Management Measures



Cascade Metrics Downward



The Secretary's focus on the metrics will help drive the organization, but one level of management cannot develop this alone

- **Communication at all levels (Services, Agencies, Under Secretaries) will ensure full compliance--vertical and horizontal**
- **Link strategies; avoid conflicting priorities**
- **Leadership commitment**
- **Regular reviews by the Secretary will reinforce credibility of the measures**

Cascade Metrics Downward



Operational considerations--metrics should serve as a means to meet operational objectives at all levels

- **Establish targets and goals**
 - **Targets are expected results for period reviewed**
 - **Goals are over and above expectations for the period reviewed – “Stretch”**
- **Ultimately, the most junior level in the DoD structure should have individual performance criteria to ensure accomplishment of targets and goals (starting 2004)**


Build An Institutional Approach

Focused effort should be employed to ensure scorecard metrics become an integral part of Department of Defense's processes and practices

- **Use as part of 2003 Annual Report (GPRA report)**
- **Services include in 2003 CFO reports**
- **Use key metrics in 2003 SecDef Congressional testimony (same for direct reports)**
- **Put appropriate metrics at beginning of budget justifications (in 2004)**
 - **Personnel in Milpers, Acquisition in procurement, etc.**
 - **Seek Member(s) of Congress with interest in metrics and brief them (starting 2003)**

Presentation Overview

- Introduction
 - Task Group Members
 - Objectives and Scope
- Recommendations
- Next Steps



December 2002

DBB Balanced Scorecard Metrics--
Final Report

11-L-0559/OSD/17333

Next Steps



- **Coordinate with Services who are developing balanced scorecard metrics – look for overlaps**
 - Evaluate organizational strategies
 - Develop integrated themes
 - Determine barriers
- **Perform organizational reviews to determine level of data accessibility and availability**
- **Train top leadership on consistent approach to applying balanced scorecard**
- **Evaluate incentive process as discussed by Human Resources Task Group**

Get Started Now!

Balanced Scorecard Metrics

Executive Briefing
November 21, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/17335

**Report to the Senior Executive Council,
Department of Defense**

FINANCIAL INDICATORS TASK GROUP

Report FY03-1

- **Recommendations on the identification, development and use of meaningful financial indicators, ratios, and analyses for the Department of Defense.**

December 18, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/17336

FINANCIAL INDICATORS TASK GROUP REPORT

TASK: The Defense Business Practice Implementation Board (DBB) was tasked with providing recommendations on the identification, development and use of meaningful financial indicators, ratios, and analyses for the Department of Defense. The Board relied on private sector best practices in the development and implementation of the metrics. The use of these tools will be critical to the Secretary of Defense's efforts at Department-wide transformation, particularly as they relate to financial management.

The Task Group was asked to provide the following deliverables:

- 1) Identify 10-12 high-level financial management indicators that are meaningful and relevant to the senior decisionmaking process within the Department of Defense.
 - 2) Describe the value of the indicators to senior managers.
 - 3) Define a simple, repeatable methodology for gathering the information and construction of the indicators on a regular basis.
- DBB Task Group Chairman: William Phillips
 - Task Group Vice Chairman: Mike Powers, Accounting & Finance Policy and Analysis Directorate
 - DoD Task Group Sponsor: JoAnn Boutelle, Deputy Chief Financial Officer
 - DBB Task Group Special Consultant: Tom Cocozza
 - DBB Task Group Executive Secretary: Kelly Van Niman

PROCESS: Working with the Accounting & Finance Policy and Analysis Directorate and the Program and Budget Directorate, the Task Group reviewed the current presentation of DoD financial information in the Department's financial statements, and provided recommended metrics for immediate, senior level use and future best practices analysis and performance assessment. The metrics are built around four distinct financial performance areas:

- Operating Results
- Asset Management
- Liability Management
- Cash Management

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

The Board followed two key assumptions when developing their recommendations. First, that financial performance indicators are generally most valuable when they are analyzed in the context of two to three years of "Actual" results and three to five years of "Planned" forecasts. Analyzing indicators in this context adds historical and future perspective that provides additional meaning to a current year's results.

Second, many performance indicators will be more meaningful at the component reporting entity level than the Department of Defense (DoD) Agency-wide level. Most DoD operations occur at the component level rather than the DoD Agency-wide level, and therefore analysis should generally include both Agency-wide and component level perspectives. This is similar to a private sector organization that focuses on operating results for a specific division in addition to consolidated results.

RESULTS: On November 21, 2002, the DBB agreed to highlight a subset of 5 metrics that would be most immediately relevant to senior-level management of the Department. The remaining 8 metrics address other basic business practices of the Department. They will become increasingly important as initiatives such as the Financial Management Modernization Program (FMMP) result in robust business systems that fully comply with the CFO Act and the Government Results and Performance Act, as well as, the OMB Form and Content requirements.

The Task Group concluded that the Department's goal should be a set of readily measurable, accurate, and timely metrics that, at the highest levels in the Department, provide a picture of financial health. They should provide the basis for comparative analysis between and within the Services and Defense Agencies. The metrics also should be readily comparable across the Federal Government to facilitate best practices analysis and performance assessment against other Federal entities, as well as, the basis of a report card to citizen stakeholders.

As depicted in Chart A, the Task Group identified 13 individual metrics, each of which falls into one of the four financial performance areas cited earlier. The first 5 of the 13 metrics were identified as priority measures to be used


Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

immediately by senior management. The other 8 metrics remain important, but it is recommended that attention to them may be more appropriate at a level below the most senior managers in the Department.

Respectfully submitted,

William R. Phillips

Chart A
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE METRICS
DoD Agency-wide Indicators



Detailed descriptions of the metrics follow.

FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE METRICS

DoD Agency-wide Indicators

1. Relationship of Total Budgetary Resources to Apportionments to Allotments

(Highlights Management's Reserve)

Information Value: Total Budgetary Resource by Year represents the total amount of funding authorized by Congress. It is similar to an operating budget in the private sector. Apportionments represent the amount apportioned by OMB that is available for distribution by OUSD Comptroller. Allotments represent the amount allotted/distributed by OUSD Comptroller to the various component organizations. Showing the relationship of Total Budgetary Resources to Apportionments to Allotments over time highlights trends in the management of total resources, apportionments and allotments.

Calculation:



Source: Statement of Budgetary Resources. Total Budgetary Resources, Current and Prior Year (Line 1.F). For Apportionments, the balance of SGL account 4510, Apportionments should be extracted from DDRS. Account 4510 is displayed in Line 9, Apportioned, of the Statement of Budgetary Resources. Program Budget can provide Total Allotments to date.

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

2. Obligations to Total Budgetary Resources Ratio

(Highlights DoD's progress in executing programs)

Information Value: The Obligations to Total Budgetary Resources Ratio presents the percentage of budget authority that has been obligated. It measures the ability of the organization to manage to the original budget. A ratio significantly under 100% indicates the organization's budget may not be aligned properly to its operations. One reason total budgetary resources would not be obligated fully includes use of multi-year appropriations that are obligated over several years.

Calculation:

$$\frac{\text{Obligations Incurred}}{\text{Total Budgetary Resources}}$$

Source: Statement of Budgetary Resources. Obligations Incurred (Line 2A). Total Budgetary Resources (Line 1.F).

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

3. Potential Canceled Budget Authority

(Trend highlights DoD's record to successfully execute programs)

Information Value: Canceled Budget Authority is the amount of appropriation authority that is canceled five years after the expiration of an annual or a multi-year appropriation; or the amount of annual, multi-year or no-year appropriation authority that is canceled early by administrative action. Canceled Authority is lost to the organization, and should typically be managed close to a \$0 balance.

When calculated against the Department's Obligation Plan, this metric will highlight not only potential canceled budget authority, but also this indicator could be expanded to highlight expired authority that is below an established threshold, e.g., \$10 M. This will highlight potential solvency problems with expired authority.

Calculation:

Potential Canceled Budget Authority

Source: Program Budget.

Note: For actual Canceled Budget Authority at the end of the year, see the Standard General Ledger (SGL) balance from the Defense Departmental Reporting System (DDRS). DDRS is the compilation source system for the Statement of Budgetary Resources. The specific SGL account is 4350, Canceled Authority. Account 4350 is not a standalone number on the Statement.

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

4. Percentage of Uncovered Liabilities

(Trend analysis highlights budget resource exposure)

Information Value: The Percentage of Uncovered Liabilities describes the relationship between Total Liabilities Not Covered by Budgetary Resources and Total Liabilities. These are DoD liabilities for which budgetary authority is not currently available. There is no ideal value as many long-term liabilities are funded year to year. This indicator is best analyzed as a trend over time. Analysis of this indicator will help budget analysts in aligning budget decisions to long-term liabilities.

Calculation:

$$\frac{\text{Total Liabilities Not Covered by Budgetary Resources}}{\text{Total Liabilities}}$$


Source: Note 11, Liabilities. Total Liabilities Not Covered by Budgetary Resources (Column 2, Line 3). Total Liabilities (Column 3, Line 3).

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

5. Solvency Ratio --Working Capital Fund (Highlights shortfall, if any, of required cash balances)

Information Value: The Solvency Ratio describes the expected cash balance on hand for WCF activities using data from the reporting entity level. Forecasting the difference between ideal cash balances required and actual cash balances, allows management to realign expenses and/or cash reserves to address cash shortfalls.

Calculation:



Ideal Cash Balance is compared throughout the year to Actual Cash.

Source: Program Budget.

** Program Budget performs this calculation for both 7 and 10-day scenarios to calculate a range of results.

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

6. Unobligated Balances to Total Budgetary Resources Ratio

(Highlights resources in jeopardy of expiration)

Information Value: The Unobligated Balances to Total Budgetary Resources ratio presents the percentage of budget authority that has NOT been used. This indicator presents the opposite perspective from the Obligations to Total Budgetary Resources ratio. A high percentage, or upward trend, may suggest further analysis is needed on the alignment of the budget to operational requirements.

Calculation:

$$\frac{\text{Unobligated Balances Available} + \text{Unobligated Balances Not Available}}{\text{Total Budgetary Resources}}$$

Source: Statement of Budgetary Resources. Unobligated Balances – Available (Line 2.B) + Unobligated Balances – Not Available (Line 2.C). Total Budgetary Resources (Line 1.F).

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

7. Net Cost of Operations Growth Rate

(Trend analysis highlights spikes, if any, in operational costs)

Information Value: Net Cost of Operations is the gross cost incurred by the organization less any exchange revenue earned from its activities. This is the equivalent of an Income Statement in the private sector, however, the “bottom line” is cost, not profit. This indicator highlights the percentage growth rate of Net Cost of Operations over the current year, starting from the prior year balance. There is no right or wrong percentage, rather the indicator should support funding plans for each organization. This indicator will be most useful in comparing organization-to-organization, and program-to-program on a trend basis, much like private sector managers would track product-by-product performance over time. Management also may wish to see a trend analysis comparing the Net Cost of Operations Growth Rate to Total Obligation Authority Growth Rate to highlight any imbalances between the two growth rates.

Calculation:

$$\frac{\text{Net Cost of Operations (current year)} - \text{Net Cost of Operations (prior year)}}{\text{Net Cost of Operations (prior year)}}$$

Source: Statement of Net Costs. Net Cost of Operations (Line 4, Current and Prior Years).

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

8. Overhead to Total Cost Ratio

(Future indicator to trend overhead growth rate)

Information Value: The Overhead to Total Cost Ratio describes the percentage relationship of Costs Not Assigned to Programs to Total Costs. This is similar to overhead or non-product/service costs in the private sector. Most costs should support DoD programs. However, generally there will be some overhead costs not appropriately allocated to one or more programs. While the ideal percentage will vary organization-to-organization, an upward trend indicates that true overhead is increasing as a percentage of total cost. This ratio is recommended to be a future indicator once the Department implements systems that capture and assign costs to programs and overhead.

Calculation:

$$\frac{\text{Costs Not Assigned to Programs} - \text{Earned Revenue Not Attributable to Programs}}{\text{Net Cost of Operations}}$$

Source: Statement of Net Costs. Current Year Cost Not Assigned to Programs (Line 2) – Earned Revenues Not Attributable to Programs (Line 3). Net Cost of Operations (Line 4).

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

9. Over 180 Days Accounts Payable Percentage

(Highlights DoD's ability to manage cash flow)

Information Value: The Over 180 days Accounts Payable Percentage highlights the amounts of Intra-governmental and Non-federal Payables over 180 days old. Ideally, the percentage rate should be very low. Most payables should be disbursed within a 6-month period.

Calculation:

$$\frac{\text{Intra-governmental Payables over 180 Days}}{\text{Intra-governmental Payables}}$$

AND

$$\frac{\text{Non-federal Payables over 180 Days}}{\text{Non-federal Payables}}$$

Source: Note 12, Accounts Payable. Column 3 and supporting disclosures. Note: disclosure of payables over 180 days is not currently required in the instructions to Footnote 12. Recommend this disclosure requirement be added.

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

10. Quick Ratio

(Measures short-term solvency and need for additional budget resources)

Information Value: The Quick Ratio describes the percentage of liquid assets available to pay current liabilities. It is commonly used in the private sector as an indicator of short-term solvency. The percentage generally should be 100% or higher. A percentage under 100% indicates a potential immediate requirement for additional budget resources.

Calculation:

$$\frac{\text{Fund Balance} + \text{Current Accounts Receivable} + \text{Cash and Other Monetary Assets}}{\text{Total Liabilities Covered by Budgetary Resources}}$$

Source: Balance Sheet. Current Year Fund Balance with Treasury (Line 1.A.1) + Accounts Receivable (Line 1.A.3 + Line 1.C) + Cash and Other Monetary Assets (Line 1.B). Note 11, Liabilities Covered and Not Covered by Budgetary Resources. Total Liabilities Covered by Budgetary Resources (Column 1, Line 3).

** The Accounts Receivable balance must be analyzed for receivables that are long-term and not available for current operations. These long-term receivables should be excluded from the calculation. By definition, these receivables should be rare. An example of a long-term receivable is a receivable that is in litigation.*

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

12. Capital Asset Growth Rate

(Future trend to assist management in identifying their position in the capital asset life cycle)

Information Value: The Capital Asset Growth Rate describes the percentage growth rate of capital assets. There is no ideal percentage for this indicator; rather, the trend should demonstrate the organization's effectiveness in implementing capital planning requirements.

The components of this indicator will change significantly over the next several years as military equipment is valued and recorded on the Balance Sheet (classified as General Property, Plant and Equipment).

Calculation:

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \text{Inventory and Related Property} \\ \text{(current year)} \\ + \\ \text{General Property, Plant and} \\ \text{Equipment} \\ \text{(current year)} \end{array} - \begin{array}{c} \text{Inventory and Related Property} \\ \text{(prior year)} \\ + \\ \text{General Property, Plant and} \\ \text{Equipment} \\ \text{(prior year)} \end{array}}{\begin{array}{c} \text{Inventory and Related Property} \\ \text{(prior year)} \\ + \\ \text{General Property, Plant and} \\ \text{Equipment} \\ \text{(prior year)} \end{array}}$$

Source: Balance Sheet. Inventory and Related Property, Current Year and Prior Year (Line 1.E). General Property, Plant and Equipment, Current Year and Prior Year (Line 1.F).

Defense Business Practice Implementation Board

13. Over 180 Days Accounts Receivable Percentage

(Highlights DoD's ability to manage cash flow)

Information Value: The Over 180 days Accounts Receivable Percentage highlights the amounts of Intra-governmental and Non-federal Receivables over 180 days old. This "aging" of accounts receivable is performed commonly in the private sector. Ideally, the percentage rate should be very low. Most receivables should be collected within a 6-month period.

Calculation:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{Intra-governmental} & \div & \text{Intra-governmental} \\ \text{Receivables over} & & \text{Receivables} \\ \text{180 Days} & & \end{array}$$

AND

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{Non-federal} & \div & \text{Non-federal} \\ \text{Receivables over} & & \text{Receivables} \\ \text{180 Days} & & \end{array}$$

Source: Note 5, Accounts Receivable. Column 1 and supporting disclosures.



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100
INFO MEMO

SEC 1100
203 NOV -7 PM 5:03

COMPTROLLER

November 7, 2003, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Executing the Supplemental

DISCUSSION:

- By law (31USC 1513), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) must apportion all direct appropriated funding within 30 days after the date of the enactment of the law.
- For the Supplemental, this means that OMB must apportion all funds by December 6, 2003. The 30-day rule does not apply to transfer accounts such as the Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF) for the Department of Defense (DoD) since these funds are not apportioned.
- For the \$65.2 million appropriated to DoD, the Components are preparing the necessary apportionment documents, and we expect to submit them to the OMB staff for their approval next week.
 - There really is no urgency in getting the operating (i.e., Operation and Maintenance and Military Personnel) resources (\$56.8 billion) apportioned sooner than the 30 days. For the FY 2004 baseline appropriations, we worked with the OMB staff to ensure that each Service had sufficient cash allocated to them to finance its first quarter normal operating expenses plus those associated with the global war on terrorism.
 - We will push OMB to apportion the procurement (\$5.5 billion) and the research and development (\$0.3 billion) funds sooner than the 30 days.
 - The funding for the IFF (\$2.0 billion) is a transfer account, and funds will be apportioned based on the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and OMB conducting a review of the funding requirements.
- We are working with OMB to establish the new funding line and complete the required funding documents for the \$983 million for Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)'s operating expenses.
 - We anticipate having the account set up and funds apportioned by the end of next week.
 - We are waiting on the CPA to provide us with a quarterly apportionment for these funds.

11-L-0559/OSD/17352

U18570 03

- With respect to the \$18.4 billion for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (IRRF), OMB is still working out the details as to how it intends to allocate resources to the applicable executing agency for the CPA.
- All allocations from the IRRF require a 5-day congressional notification before the funds can be obligated.
- Initial indications from OMB is that CPA is restricted to using \$3.68 billion of its funds (20 percent of the total) until the CPA submits the congressionally required report that is due by January 5, 2004. *This report must be on a project-by-project basis to include the cost for the 3-month period and total cost of the project. The report must also specify any revenue provided by other countries/international organizations. The report must be updated every 3 months until October 1, 2007.*
- Until CPA submits an execution plan, we expect that OMB will approve the projects on a case-by-case basis as they did in the past.
- Ambassador Bremer will be meeting to discuss priorities for IRRF resources next week.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Mary E. Tompkey,

(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

6 November 2003 - 2030 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. DOV ZAKHEIM, USD / C

SUBJECT: Supplemental


Sir:

Please respond to the Deputy's questions to you on SecDef snowflake,
subject as above:

"Dov Zakheim -
What would be the normal process
for disbursing Supplemental Funds?
How can we speed it up? PW"

Thank you,

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:

SD 4Nov03 Snowflake #110403-4

Suspense: 1600, 7 November 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/17354



6 NOV 2008

From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

Dor Zakheim -
What would be the
normal process for
disbursing Supp. Funds?
How can we speed it
up?
PW

November 4, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Supplemental

How can we accelerate the money coming from the Supplemental?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110403-4

.....
Please respond by 11/7/03

10
July 8, 2003

7/31

340

TO: David Chu
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Retention

Army Di Rita

7/31

Is there any truth to this "Breaking the Army" article?

Thanks.

Attach.

O'Hanlon, Michael. "Breaking the Army," *Washington Post*, July 3, 2003, p. 23.

DHR:dh
070803-17

Please respond by

7/18/03

7/11 8/4

Chu Response
attached

Forwarded
v/r
CDR Nosenzo
7/31

10 JUL 03

November 11, 2003

TO:

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Photograph

Please give me a photograph with this piece of paper on Bucky Higgs tacked to it,
so I can send him an autograph.

Thanks.

Attach.
Note

DHR:dh
111103-8

.....
Please respond by _____

U18678 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17358

060 50

11 Nov 03



To: President Bush
Please see letter attached.
R. H. [Signature]

120°

11/3
~~October 30~~, 2003

TO: ~~Lucy Di Rita~~ *Do my faith*
CC: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Documenting Regime

Ken Adelman was in and we saw this tape on Fox. He said, "What about all the bad things the Iraqis were doing overseas."

It has been six months. We have been in their embassies, and we ought to have been able to find a lot files, papers and so forth. If we could start getting that information and letting the world know about it on a systematic basis, it would be an enormous benefit.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103003-19

.....
Please respond by 11/14/03

Iraq

3 Nov 03

602
November 5, 2003

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CENTCOM Campaign Plan

Prior to and during the Iraq War, we had a rhythm with Tom Franks. He prepared a war plan and briefings. We briefed the President.

We are now in a low-intensity war. Gen. Abizaid has not presented us with such a plan or briefings that we have gone back and forth on with him, or run through the tank and then presented to the President. Since we are in a low-intensity conflict that is going to last a period, it seems to me we ought to have something of that kind.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110503-11

.....
Please respond by 11/14/03

CENTCOM

SNW 03

U18702 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17361

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (IMMEDIATE TX) (NOV. 12. 2003 10:16AM) * * *

FAX HEADER: SECDEF CABLES

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERSONAL NAME	FILE
NOV. 12.	10:15AM	COMPATIBLE	3-S	1'10"	P. 1	OK		619

: BATCH
M : MEMORY TX
S : STANDARD
* : PC
2- : ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
+ : ROUTING
1- : MIL_STD MODE

S : TRANSFER
@ : FORWARDING
F : FINE
Q : RECEPT. NOTICE REQ.
3- : RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING
E : ECM
) : REDUCTION
A : RECEPT. NOTICE

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (IMMEDIATE TX) (NOV. 12. 2003 10:14AM) * * *

FAX HEADER: SECDEF CABLES

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERSONAL NAME	FILE
NOV. 12.	10:12AM		1-S	1:53"	P.	2 OK		618

: BATCH
M : MEMORY TX
S : STANDARD
* : PC
2- : ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
+ : ROUTING
1- : MIL_STD MODE

\$: TRANSFER
● : FORWARDING
F : FINE
Q : RECEPT. NOTICE REQ.
3- : RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING
E : ECM
) : REDUCTION
A : RECEPT. NOTICE

✓
481

July 9, 2003

TO: General Myers
CC: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Poland

I am told the Polish are a little concerned that they don't have air or artillery where they are going to be in Iraq.

We want to make sure they are not left with the impression that they are forbidden from having those capabilities, and we ought to try to find a cooperative solution to work with them.

Please tell me what you propose.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070803-43

.....
Please respond by 7/16/03

7/23
CJCS RESPONSE ATTACHED

VLR-9
JUL 10 3

50 JUL 11 14:10:09

118703/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17364

10
July 8, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Intel in Iraq

Jerry Bremer is recommending we improve intelligence on former regime members in Iraq, so that we can stop them. What do you suggest?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070803-21

.....
Please respond by 7/18/03

RESPONSE ATTACHED 7/14

U18704 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17365

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

July 8, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Port Visits

Regarding the attack in Vladivostok, why don't we stop port visits to Russia. We should only be places where people want us.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.

7/7/03 CJCS 5X8 re: US Sailors and Marines Attacked in Vladivostok, Russia

DHR:dh
070803-13

.....
Please respond by 7/16/03

✓ 7/24
7/23
CJCS RESPONSE ATTACHED

✓/K

650103

03 JUL 11 AM 7:43

U18705 /03

11-L-0550065617366
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

EF-5982

11:03 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 1, 2003

SUBJECT: Attached

Will you both please take a look at this note from Jerry Bremer about the MEK. I think we've got to figure out what we do about it. We can't keep tying up all our forces on that.

Let's get it sorted out.

Thanks.

7/14
FEITH RESPONSE ATTACHED *IR-89*

VIR

DHR/azn
070103.13

Attach: Bremer email of 6/27/03 to SecDef

Please respond by: _____

U18706 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17367

ATTY DI FILE
7/18

156103

11:03 AM

EX-1062.3

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 1, 2003

SUBJECT: **Attached**

Not
2.4 or 3.4 testing on the
11/1/03

Will you both please take a look at this note from Jerry Bremer about the MEK. I think we've got to figure out what we do about it. We can't keep tying up all our forces on that.

JS *FOR ACTION*
MONDAY.

Let's get it sorted out.

Thanks.

DIR:azn
(76103.13)

Attach: Bremer email of 6/27/03 to SecDef

closed
Response attached
v/r
CDR Nosenzo
7/31
per

Please respond by: _____

11-L-0559/OSD/17368

11-L-0559/OSD/17368

Durnan, Jaymie, CIV, OSD

From: Bremer, Paul (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, June 27, 2003 11:41 PM
To: Durnan, Jaymie, CIV, OSD
Subject: Message for SecDef

Jaymie

Please pass following to Secretary:

Mr. Secretary
27 2003

June

Yesterday I visited the Headquarters of the 4th ID. Commanding General Odierno noted that he has most of a brigade tied up in surrounding the now-disarmed MEK units. I believe we could make much better use of his soldiers patrolling the nearby Iranian border.

Shouldn't we be thinking about trying to find a third country, or countries, willing to take the MEK? We could do this through the UN High Commission for Refugees. It will no doubt be difficult and take time. But letting the UN do it buffers the US from the problem and at least provides some hope that we can redeploy our forces against armed bad guys.

If you agree that this is a good idea, I suggest that Washington take the lead in approaching the UNHCR, keeping us informed.

Jerry

SD/ASB:

*Thank you for your
thoughts / guidance.*

6/28/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/17369

✓/k

14
July 11, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Governing Council

I would be interested in knowing the names and situations of each of the people you think you are going to be putting on the Governing Council.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071103-3

.....
Please respond by

7/18/03



control

Iraq

14 Jul 03

EF-612L ✓

14
July 18, 2003

I-03/009737

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UK and Article 98

*Answered
on
7-16-03*

Today when we met with Henry Hyde we were told that the UK won't sign an Article 98 with us, but they have that kind of arrangement with Afghanistan. Let's find out what kind of arrangement the UK does have with Afghanistan that relates to Article 98.

UK

attached

Second, it is also my understanding on the issue of the transfer of information and technologies, the UK gave the EU a veto, but they seem not to be willing to give us a veto. We ought to be prepared to talk to those folks about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071003-38

.....
Please respond by 7/20/03

JUL 15 2003

1045 PM EDT 14 15P

*USDP-
ISP has lead.
Suspense 7/20/03*

Y/R ✓

7/15
Sir, I have nothing on file to indicate the 7/16/03 document was previously routed. The answers to both parts are included

Y/R
4/8
CDR Nosenzo
7/28
*17
4
1
03*

U18723 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17371

In reply refer to:
EF-6384 & I-03/010795

EF-6384 ✓
I-03/010795
Aug 1
July 30, 2003

TO: Dong Feith

SUBJECT: Commando Solo

What are we doing with Commando Solo in Iraq at the current time?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073003-7

.....

Please respond by 8/15/03

Iraq

Sir,
Response attached
v/r
CDR Nosenzo
8/18
C 8/18
1 Aug 03

01-08-03 2:32

U18724 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17372

7:23 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

DATE: July 25, 2003

SUBJECT: NATO

EF-6314

I-03/010515

You should figure out how NATO could conceivably be involved in helping the Turks and give them some political cover.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072503.06

Please respond by: _____

JUL 28 2003
RECEIVED IN ISP

Sir,
Forwarded, response
attached.

v/r
CDR Nosenzo
B/A

U187251/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17373

NATO 072

✓ 8/5
08/4

25
17
11
03

29
July 24, 2003

EF-6319

I-03/010570

NESA

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Stipulations

I think we ought to put some stipulations on Syria and/or Lebanon before we allow U.S. taxpayers' dollars to keep going to Lebanon.

Thanks.

DHR:db
(72403-4)

.....
Please respond by 8/8/03

Lebanon

Also closed SF070803-11

[Signature]

29 Jul 03

Distro To JA, DS, Hartley, files
Date 7/31/03
Time 11:40

U18726 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17374

TAB A

October 23, 2003

588

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Rotation

I don't understand why we think it is wise to rotate everybody in and everybody out of Iraq at the same time. It seems to me it might make sense to stagger the changeover.

The advantages of staggering it would seem to be:

- Better continuity, not everyone new at the same time.
- An easing on the transportation burden—air and sea.
- An easing on the medical facilities for those returning home—witness the backlog at Fort Stewart and elsewhere when large numbers come back at once.

We might want to see if it makes sense to bring some folks out at 10 months, some at 11 months, and some at 12 months. We would have to live with the argument that there were inequities because some people are staying longer than others. We would have to simply say, "Yes, that is right, but we cannot do everything at once." It is like the draft in the old days—somebody got called, somebody didn't. Someone got called first, someone got called second.

Any thoughts?

DHR:dh
102203-10

.....
Please respond by 11/1/03

11 18729 03

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/17375

Iraq

23 OCT 03